NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

LALI V., 

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.C., 

Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD 28327

The Honorable Bruce R. Cohen, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa

By Suzanne W. Sanchez

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Amber E. Pershon

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety
LALI V. v. DCS, A.C.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

O R O Z C O, Judge:

¶1 Lali V. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to A.C. (Child).1 For the following reasons, 

we affirm. 

FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother has an eight-year history of using heroin and 

methamphetamine, but has had periods of sobriety. Mother learned that 

she was pregnant in January 2014 and tested positive for heroin and 

methamphetamine in February 2014. When Child was born in April 2014 

she tested positive for opiates and methadone and suffered from 

“significant withdrawals at the time of her birth.” As a result of Mother’s 

drug abuse, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) filed a dependency 

petition in May 2014. The juvenile court found Child dependent as to 

Mother. 

¶3 DCS provided Mother reunification services including 

referrals to Terros and TASC, parent aides and individual counseling. 

Mother initially participated in services beginning in May 2014, but her 

participation declined after Father was incarcerated in October 2014. 

Mother relapsed and resumed using drugs from October 2014 to November 

2015. The case manager provided her over ten referrals to TASC and gave 

Mother money to obtain a photo identification to facilitate drug testing, but 

Mother did not follow through. Sometimes, Mother showed up intoxicated 

for visits with Child and her visits with Child were ultimately terminated

 

1 Father’s rights were also terminated, but he is not a party to this 

appeal. 

2 “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

[juvenile] court’s ruling.” Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 296, ¶ 17 

(App. 2013). 
LALI V. v. DCS, A.C.

Decision of the Court

3

because Mother did not call to confirm the visits. Also, Mother had not 

taken a drug test since October 2014. 

¶4 In March 2015, the State petitioned to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights to Child. A contested severance hearing was held in 

December 2015. Mother’s case manager testified about her concern that 

Mother would relapse. The case manager further testified that Mother had 

not completed most of the services offered by DCS and Mother’s inability 

to remain sober posed a safety risk for Child. Furthermore, Mother had not 

seen Child since January 2015. 

¶5 DCS presented testimony that Child is thriving in a licensed 

foster home and bonding with the placement. According to the evidence, 

Child is adoptable, the foster home is an adoptive placement, and even if 

this placement were unable to adopt, another placement could be located. 

¶6 The juvenile court granted severance, finding termination 

proper under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 8-533.B.3, 

prolonged drug abuse and B.8(a) and (c), length of time in care. The 

juvenile court also found that severance was in Child’s best interests 

because: 

[C]hild is thriving in her foster care placement. That family is 

prepared to proceed with adoption. This would afford 

[Child] permanency and continued stability. Even if that 

family cannot proceed with the adoption, [Child] is 

adoptable. 

¶7 Mother timely appealed and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 8-235.A, 

12-120.21.A.1, and -2101.A (West 2016).3

DISCUSSION

¶8 We review the termination of parental rights for an abuse of 

discretion and will affirm if the termination is supported by sufficient 

evidence. Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. at 296, ¶ 17. To justify 

termination of the parent-child relationship, the juvenile court must find at 

least one of the statutory grounds set out in A.R.S. § 8-533.B, and also that 

termination is in the child’s best interests. Linda V. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 211 Ariz. 76, 78, ¶ 6 (App. 2005). Mother does not challenge the 

 

3 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
LALI V. v. DCS, A.C.

Decision of the Court

4

grounds for termination; therefore, we only consider whether severance 

was in Child’s best interests. 

¶9 To establish a child’s best interests, the juvenile court must 

find “either that the child will benefit from termination of the relationship 

or that the child would be harmed by continuation of the parental 

relationship.” James S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 351, 356, ¶ 18 

(App. 1998). “[A] preponderance of the evidence must demonstrate that 

termination is in the best interests of the child.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. 

Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 7 (App. 2010).

¶10 Mother argues that the order terminating the parent-child 

relationship did not make the required findings of fact and conclusions of 

law. Specifically, Mother contends that the juvenile court failed to “(1) 

conclude that termination would result in a benefit for [Child], or (2) 

conclude that to not terminate would result in a detriment to [Child].” 

Additionally, Mother argues that the court did not make findings of fact 

“with respect to how [Child] would benefit from a severance or be harmed 

by continuation of the relationship.” 

¶11 When evaluating a child’s best interests, the juvenile court 

may consider whether an adoptive placement is immediately available, 

whether the existing placement is meeting the child’s needs, and whether 

the child is adoptable. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 

379, ¶ 30 (App. 2010). Here, DCS presented evidence that Child is thriving 

in a licensed foster home, Child is adoptable and the foster family is 

prepared to proceed with adoption. In its order, the juvenile court cited the 

appropriate legal authorities in noting that a best interest finding must be 

based on evidence “that the child will benefit from termination of the 

relationship or that the child would be harmed by continuation of the 

parental relationship.” The juvenile court then found that Child is thriving 

in her placement and that adoption “would afford [Child] permanency and 

continued stability.” See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 

174, 179-80, ¶ 21 (App. 2014) (finding that stability and permanency support 

a best interests finding). We therefore find that the juvenile court made 

sufficient findings.
LALI V. v. DCS, A.C.

Decision of the Court

5

CONCLUSION

¶12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

terminating Mother’s parental rights.