United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats and International Relations, 

Committee on Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

DOD EXCESS PROPERTY

Control Breakdowns 

Present Significant Security 

Risk and Continuing Waste 

and Inefficiency 

Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director 

Forensic Audits and Special Investigations 

John P. Ryan, Assistant Director 

Forensic Audits and Special Investigations 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Tuesday, July 25, 2006

 

GAO-06-981T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 25, 2006

DOD EXCESS PROPERTY 

Control Breakdowns Present Significant 

Security Risk and Continuing Waste and 

Inefficiency 

Highlights of GAO-06-981T, testimony 

before the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

In light of GAO’s past three 

testimonies and two reports on 

problems with controls over excess 

DOD property, GAO was asked to

perform follow-up investigations to 

determine if (1) unauthorized 

parties could obtain sensitive 

excess military equipment that 

requires demilitarization 

(destruction) when no longer

needed by DOD and (2) system and 

process improvements are

adequate to prevent sales of new,

unused excess items that DOD 

continues to buy or that are in

demand by the military services. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO briefed DOD management on

the results of its follow-up 

investigation and provided

additional perspectives on ways to 

resolve the control breakdowns 

that resulted in public sales of 

sensitive excess military equipment 

and new, unused excess items that

the military services continue to 

use. In its comments on GAO’s 

draft report, DOD stated that given 

the time allotted to comment, the 

department was not able to do a 

detailed review and has no

comments at this time. DOD also 

commented that it continues to 

implement changes to procedures

based on GAO’s May 2005 report 

(GAO-05-277). 

GAO investigators posing as private citizens purchased several sensitive 

military equipment items from DOD’s liquidation sales contractor, indicating 

that DOD has not enforced security controls for preventing sensitive excess 

military equipment from release to the public. GAO investigators at 

liquidation sales purchased ceramic body armor inserts currently used by 

deployed troops, a cesium technology timing unit with global positioning 

capabilities, a universal frequency counter, two guided missile radar test 

sets, 12 digital microcircuits used in F-14 fighter aircraft, and numerous 

other items. GAO was able to purchase these items because controls broke 

down at virtually every step in the excess property turn-in and disposal 

process. GAO determined that thousands of military items that should have 

been demilitarized (destroyed) were sold to the public. Further, in June 

2006, GAO undercover investigators posing as DOD contractor employees 

entered two excess property warehouses and obtained about $1.1 million in 

sensitive military equipment items, including two launcher mounts for 

shoulder-fired guided missiles, several types of body armor, a digital signal 

converter used in naval surveillance, an all-band antenna used to track 

aircraft, and six circuit cards used in computerized Navy systems. At no 

point during GAO’s warehouse security penetration were its investigators 

challenged on their identity and authority to obtain DOD military property. 

The table below shows examples of sensitive military equipment obtained 

during GAO’s undercover operations. 

Sensitive Military Equipment Obtained during GAO’s Undercover Tests 

GAO investigators posing as private citizens also bought several new, unused 

items currently being purchased or in demand by the military services from 

DOD’s excess property liquidation sales contractor. Although military units 

paid full price for these items when they ordered them from supply 

inventory, GAO paid a fraction of this cost to purchase the same items,

demonstrating continuing waste and inefficiency. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-981T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gregory D. 

Kutz at (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our recent investigation of 

Department of Defense (DOD) excess property controls. This testimony is 

the fourth in a series of testimonies and reports to this Subcommittee,1

detailing serious breakdowns in management processes, systems, and 

controls that have resulted in lost and missing property and substantial 

waste and inefficiency in DOD’s excess property reutilization program. 

Our June 2002 testimony and our November 2003 report documented 

instances where DOD sold to the public items such as Joint Service 

Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST)2

 and other chemical and 

biological protective suits and related gear that should have been 

restricted to DOD-use only. Our November 2003 report also identified 

several examples to show that at the same time DOD excessed biological 

equipment items in good or excellent condition and sold many of them to 

the public for pennies on the dollar, it was purchasing the same or similar 

items. Our May 2005 report stated that DOD reported $466 million in lost, 

damaged, and missing excess property from fiscal years 2002 through 

2004, including property with demilitarization restrictions,3

 such as 

chemical and biological protective suits, body armor, and guided missile 

warheads. Some of the missing restricted items had been improperly sold 

to the public. Further, our May 2005 report noted that during fiscal years 

2002 and 2003, the military services needlessly spent at least $400 million 

to purchase new items instead of reusing identical excess items in new 

and unused condition (A-condition). As a result, the new, unused excess 

items were sold for pennies on the dollar while the military services paid 

 1

 GAO, DOD Excess Property: Management Control Breakdowns Result in Substantial

Waste and Inefficiency, GAO-05-277 (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2005) and GAO-05-723T 

(Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2005); DOD Excess Property: Risk Assessment Needed on 

Public Sales of Equipment That Could Be Used to Make Biological Agents, GAO-04-81TNI 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2003) and GAO-04-15NI (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003); and 

DOD Management: Examples of Inefficient and Ineffective Business Processes, 

GAO-02-873T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002). 

2

 JSLIST is a universal, lightweight, two-piece garment (coat and trousers) that when

combined with footwear, gloves, and a protective mask and breathing device, forms the

warfighter’s protective ensemble. The ensemble is to provide maximum protection to the

warfighter against chemical and biological contaminants without negatively affecting the

ability to perform mission tasks. JSLIST is the current model protective suit used by the 

military services. 

3

 DOD-4160.21-M-1, Defense Demilitarization Manual (1995), contains DOD policy related 

to controls over items with significant military technology application. 

Page 1 GAO-06-981T 
the full acquisition price to order these items from Defense Logistics 

Agency (DLA) supply depots. 

Our recent investigative tests of controls over sensitive excess military 

equipment and technology items that require demilitarization focused on 

determining whether (1) DOD was improperly selling these items to the 

public4

 and (2) excess property warehouse facilities had adequate security

to prevent unauthorized parties from obtaining excess military items with 

demilitarization restrictions. Our investigative tests of controls for 

preventing liquidation sales of new, unused excess items that DOD is 

continuing to buy or that are in demand by the military services focused 

on whether these items were continuing to be sold to the public. We used 

publicly available information to develop undercover identities and 

techniques used in our investigations. We conducted our investigations 

from November 2005 through June 2006 in accordance with quality 

standards for investigators as set forth by the President’s Council on 

Integrity and Efficiency.

Today, we will summarize the results of our recent work with respect to 

whether (1) unauthorized parties could obtain sensitive excess military 

equipment that requires demilitarization when no longer needed by DOD 

and (2) systems and process improvements are adequate to prevent 

liquidation sales of A-condition items that DOD is continuing to buy or that 

are in demand by the military services. In addition, we will highlight the 

status of DOD corrective actions on the recommendations in our May 2005 

report. The details of our work are included in our investigative report, 

which the Subcommittee is releasing today.5

Posing as private citizens to disguise our identity, our investigators 

identified and purchased numerous sensitive excess DOD military 

technology items that should have been demilitarized instead of being sold

to the public. Sensitive excess military equipment we purchased at DOD 

excess property liquidation sales auctions included ceramic body armor 

Summary 

 4

 In concert with the federal government’s E-government policy to use information 

technology (IT) investments to deliver services and information to citizens electronically, 

DOD’s excess property liquidation sales are conducted over the Internet. OMB, 

Implementation Guidance for the E-Government Act of 2002, M-03-18, at att. A, ¶ B, 1

(Aug. 1, 2003). 

5

 GAO, DOD Excess Property: Control Breakdowns Present Significant Security Risk and

Continuing Waste and Inefficiency, GAO-06-943 (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2006). 

Page 2 GAO-06-981T 
inserts currently used by deployed troops, a time selector unit used to 

ensure the accuracy of computer-based equipment, such as global 

positioning systems and system-level clocks, a universal frequency counter 

used to ensure that the frequency of communication gear is running at the 

expected rate, two guided missile radar test sets, at least 12 digital 

microcircuits used in F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft, and numerous other 

sensitive electronic parts. We were able to purchase these items because 

controls broke down at virtually every step in the excess property turn-in 

and disposal process. Also, in instances where DOD required an End-Use 

Certificate (EUC)6

 as a condition of sale, our undercover investigator was 

able to successfully defeat the screening process by submitting bogus 

documentation and providing plausible explanations for discrepancies in 

his documentation. 

In addition, posing as DOD contractor employees7

 our undercover 

investigators were able to easily penetrate security at two separate 

locations in June 2006 and obtain at no cost directly from excess inventory 

warehouses, numerous sensitive military equipment items valued at about

$1.1 million that should not have been released outside of DOD. The items 

we obtained included two launcher mounts for shoulder-fired guided 

missiles, several types of body armor, a digital signal converter used in 

naval electronic surveillance, an all-band antenna used to track aircraft, 

six circuit cards used in computerized Navy systems, and several other 

items in use by the military services. The body armor could be used in 

terrorist or other criminal activity. Many of the other military items have 

weapons applications that also would be useful to terrorists. Our 

undercover investigators were able to obtain these items because Defense 

Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO)8

 personnel did not confirm 

their identity and authorization to requisition excess DOD property items. 

The DRMO personnel even helped our undercover investigators load the 

items into our van. 

 6

 An EUC is a form used by DOD to document the intended destination and disposition of 

sensitive, controlled items released from the department. 

7

 Under DOD’s excess property reutilization program, DOD contractors are treated the

same as DOD units and are not charged for excess property items they requisition for 

reuse. 

8

 DRMOs are excess property warehouses operated by the Defense Reutilization and 

Marketing Service (DRMS), which is the agency within DLA charged with managing DOD’s 

excess property disposal system. 

Page 3 GAO-06-981T 
We also made several undercover purchases of new, unused A-condition 

excess DOD items, including wet-weather parkas, cold-weather desert 

camouflage parkas, a portable field x-ray processing enclosure, highsecurity locks used to secure the back bay of logistics trucks, a gasoline 

engine, and a refrigerant recovery system used for servicing automotive 

vehicles. The items we purchased at DOD liquidation sales were being 

ordered from supply inventory by military units at or near the time of our 

purchases and for one supply depot stocked item—the portable x-ray 

enclosure—no items were in stock when we made our purchase. At the 

time of our purchase, DOD’s liquidation contractor sold 40 of these x-ray 

enclosures with a total reported acquisition cost of $289,400 for a 

liquidation sales price of $2,914—about a penny on the dollar. In another 

example, we purchased a gasoline engine in March 2006 for $355. The 

Marine Corps ordered 4 of these gas engines from DLA supply inventory in 

June 2006 and paid $3,119 each for them. At the time of our undercover 

purchase, 20 identical gasoline engines with a reported acquisition cost of 

$62,380 were sold to the public for a total liquidation sales price of $6,221.

Our investigation demonstrated that the problems we reported on in May 

2005 have not been fully resolved and there is continuing waste and 

inefficiency in DOD’s excess property reutilization program. 

We provided a detailed corrective action briefing to DOD on June 28, 2006. 

DOD managers told us they shared our concern about the breakdowns in 

security controls that allowed sensitive military items requiring 

demilitarization to be sold to the public. They asked us for pertinent 

documentation obtained during our investigations to support their followup inquiries and corrective action plans. We provided this information on 

June 30, 2006, along with documentation to show that the military services 

were still ordering and using the excess A-condition items that we 

purchased. In addition, we provided a draft of our investigative report to

DOD for comment on July 10, 2006. In commenting on our draft report, 

DOD stated that given the time allotted to comment,the department was 

not able to perform a detailed review and has no comments at this time. 

DOD also stated that it continues to implement changes to procedures 

based on our May 2005 report.9

 9 GAO-05-277. 

Page 4 GAO-06-981T 
Undercover 

Acquisitions of 

Sensitive Excess 

Military Items 

Identifies National 

Security Risk 

Posing as private citizens, our undercover investigators purchased several 

sensitive excess military equipment items that were improperly sold to the 

public at DOD liquidation sales. These items included three ceramic body 

armor inserts identified as small arms protective inserts (SAPI), which are 

the ceramic inserts currently in demand by soldiers in Iraq and 

Afghanistan; a time selector unit used to ensure the accuracy of computerbased equipment, such as global positioning systems and system-level 

clocks; 12 digital microcircuits used in F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft; guided 

missile radar test sets used to check the operation of the data link antenna 

on the Navy’s Walleye (AGM-62) air-to-ground guided missile; and 

numerous other electronic items. In instances where DOD required an 

EUC as a condition of sale, our undercover investigator was able to 

successfully defeat the screening process by submitting bogus 

documentation and providing plausible explanations for discrepancies in 

his documentation. In addition, we identified at least 79 buyers for 216 

sales transactions involving 2,669 sensitive military items that DOD’s 

liquidation contractor sold to the public between November 2005 and June

2006. We are referring information on these sales to the appropriate 

federal law enforcement agencies for further investigation. 

Our investigators also posed as DOD contractor employees, entered 

DRMOs in two east coast states, and obtained several other items that are 

currently in use by the military services. DRMO personnel even helped us 

load the items into our van. These items included two launcher mounts for 

shoulder-fired guided missiles, an all-band antenna used to track aircraft,

16 body armor vests, body armor throat and groin protectors, six circuit 

card assemblies used in computerized Navy systems, and two Palm V 

personal data assistant (PDA) organizers. 

Sensitive Excess Military 

Items Purchased at DOD 

Excess Property 

Liquidation Sales 

Using a fictitious identity as a private citizen, our undercover investigator 

applied for and received an account with DOD’s liquidation sales 

contractor. Our investigator was then able to purchase several sensitive 

excess military items noted above that were being improperly sold to the 

public. During our undercover purchases, our investigator engaged in 

numerous conversations with liquidation sales contractor staff during 

warehouse inspections of items advertised for sale and with DRMS and 

DLA’s Criminal Investigative Activity (DCIA) staff during the processing of 

our EUCs. On one occasion our undercover investigator was told by a 

DCIA official that information provided on his EUC application had no 

match to official data and that he had no credit history. Our investigator 

responded with a plausible story and submitted a bogus utility bill to 

confirm his mailing address. Following these screening procedures, the 

Page 5 GAO-06-981T 
EUC was approved by DCIA and our undercover investigator was able to 

purchase our targeted excess military items. Once our initial EUC was 

approved, our subsequent EUC applications were approved based on the 

information on file. Although the sensitive military items that we 

purchased had a reported acquisition cost of $461,427, we paid a 

liquidation sales price of $914 for them—less than a penny on the dollar.

We observed numerous sales of additional excess sensitive military items 

that were improperly advertised for sale or sold to the public, including 

fire control components for weapon systems, body armor, and weapon 

system components. The demilitarization codes for these items required 

either key point or total destruction rather than disposal through public 

sale. Although we placed bids to purchase some of these items, we lost to 

higher bidders. We identified at least 79 buyers for 216 public liquidation 

sales transactions involving 2,669 sensitive military items. On July 13, 2006, 

we briefed federal law enforcement and intelligence officials on the details 

of our investigation. We are referring public sales of sensitive military 

equipment items to the federal law enforcement agencies for further 

investigation and recovery of the sensitive military equipment. 

During our undercover operations, we also noted 13 advertised sales 

events, including 179 items that were subject to demilitarization controls, 

where the items were not sold. In 5 of these sales involving 113 sensitive 

military parts, it appears that DOD or its liquidation sales contractor 

caught the error in demilitarization codes and pulled the items from sale. 

One of these instances involved an F-14 fin panel assembly that we had 

targeted for an undercover purchase. During our undercover inspection of

this item prior to sale, a contractor official told our investigator that the 

government was in the process of changing demilitarization codes on all 

F-14 parts and it was likely that the fin panel assembly would be removed 

from sale. Of the remaining 8 sales lots containing 66 sensitive military 

parts, we could not determine whether the items were not sold because

DOD or its contractor caught the demilitarization coding errors or because 

minimum bids were not received during the respective sales events. 

Sensitive Military Items 

Obtained through Inside 

Penetrations of DRMO 

Security 

Our investigators used publicly available information to develop fictitious 

identities as DOD contractor personnel and enter DRMO warehouses 

(referred to as DRMO A and DRMO B) in two east coast states on separate 

occasions in June 2006, to requisition excess sensitive military parts and 

equipment valued at about $1.1 million. Our investigators were able to 

search for and identify excess items without supervision. In addition, 

DRMO personnel assisted our investigators in locating other targeted 

items in the warehouse and loading these items into our van. At no point 

Page 6 GAO-06-981T 
during either visit, did DRMO personnel attempt to verify with the actual 

contractor that our investigators were, in fact, contractor employees. 

During the undercover penetration at DRMO A, our investigators obtained 

numerous sensitive military items that were required to be destroyed when 

no longer needed by DOD to prevent them from falling into the wrong 

hands. These items included two guided missile launcher mounts for 

shoulder-fired missiles, six Kevlar body armor fragmentation vests, a 

digital signal converter used in naval electronic surveillance, and an allband antenna used to track aircraft. 

Posing as employees for the same DOD contractor identity used during 

our June 2006 penetration at DRMO A, our investigators entered DRMO B 

a day later for the purpose of testing security controls at that location. 

DRMO officials appeared to be unaware of our security penetration at 

DRMO A the previous day. During the DRMO B undercover penetration, 

our investigators obtained 10 older technology body armor fragmentation

vests, throat and groin protection armor, six circuit card assemblies used 

in Navy computerized systems, and two Palm V personal digital assistants 

(PDA) that were certified as having their hard drives removed. Because 

PDAs do not have hard drives, after successfully requisitioning them, we 

asked our Information Technology (IT) security expert to test them and 

our expert confirmed that all sensitive information had been properly 

removed.10

Shortly after leaving the second DRMO, our investigators received a call

from a contractor official whose employees they had impersonated. The 

official had been monitoring his company’s requisitions of excess DOD 

property and noticed transactions that did not appear to represent activity 

by his company. He contacted personnel at DRMO A, obtained the phone 

number on our bogus excess property screening letter, and called us. 

Upon receiving the call from the contractor official, our lead investigative 

agent explained that he was with GAO, and we had performed a 

government test. 

 10 Our IT expert used National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) utilities 

recommended for forensic analysis to run the tests. See NIST Pub. 800-72, Guidelines on

PDA Forensics (November 2004). 

Page 7 GAO-06-981T 
Waste Associated 

with Sales of ACondition Excess 

Items that Military 

Services Are 

Continuing to Use in 

Operations 

Because significant numbers of new, unused A-condition excess items still 

being purchased or in use by the military services are being disposed of 

through liquidation sales, it was easy for our undercover investigator to 

pose as a liquidation sales customer and purchase several of these items 

for a fraction of what the military services are paying to obtain these same 

items from DLA supply depots. For example, we paid $1,146 for several 

wet-weather and cold-weather parkas, a portable field x-ray enclosure, 

high-security locks, a gasoline engine that can be used as part of a 

generator system or as a compressor, and a refrigerant recovery system 

used to service air conditioning systems on automobiles. The military 

services would have paid a total acquisition cost of $16,300 for these items 

if ordered from supply inventory, plus a charge for processing their order.

11

Several of the items we purchased at liquidation sales events were being 

ordered from supply inventory by military units at or near the time of our 

purchase, and for one supply depot stocked item—the portable field x-ray 

enclosure—no items were in stock at the time we made our undercover 

purchase. At the time of our purchase, DOD’s liquidation contractor sold 

40 of these x-ray enclosures with a total reported acquisition cost of 

$289,400 for a liquidation sales price of $2,914—about a penny on the 

dollar. We paid a liquidation sales price of $87 for the x-ray enclosure 

which had a reported acquisition cost of $7,235. In another example, we 

purchased a gasoline engine in March 2006 for $355. The Marine Corps 

ordered 4 of these gas engines from DLA supply inventory in June 2006 

and paid $3,119 each for them. At the time of our undercover purchase, 20 

identical gasoline engines with a reported acquisition cost of $62,380 were

sold to the public for a total liquidation sales price of $6,221, also about a 

penny on the dollar. 

In response to recommendations in our May 2005 report,12 DOD has taken 

a number of actions to improve systems, processes, and controls over 

excess property. Most of these efforts have focused on improving the 

economy and efficiency of DOD’s excess property reutilization program. 

However, as demonstrated by our tests of security controls over sensitive

excess military equipment, DOD does not yet have effective controls in 

place to prevent unauthorized parties from obtaining these items. For 

Status of DOD 

Corrective Actions 

 11 As noted in our May 2005 report, the weighted average cost for warehousing and shipping

all supply items was 20.7 percent in fiscal year 2003. 

12 GAO-05-277. 

Page 8 GAO-06-981T 
example, although DLA and DRMS have emphasized policies that prohibit 

batch lotting13 of sensitive military equipment items, we observed many of 

these items being sold in batch lots during our investigation and we were 

able to purchase several of them. In addition, DLA and DRMS have not 

ensured that DRMO personnel and DOD’s liquidation sales contractor are 

verifying demilitarization codes on excess property turn-in documentation 

to assure appropriate disposal actions for items requiring demilitarization. 

Further, although DLA and DRMS implemented several initiatives to 

improve the overall reutilization rate for excess A-condition items, our 

analysis of DRMS data found that the reported reutilization rate as of June 

30, 2006, remained the same as we had previously reported—about 12 

percent.14 This is primarily because DLA reutilization initiatives are limited 

to using available excess A-condition items to fill customer orders and to 

maintain established supply inventory retention levels. As a result, excess

A-condition items that are not needed to fill existing orders or replenish 

supply inventory are disposed of outside of DOD through transfers, 

donations, and public sales, which made it easy for us to purchase excess 

new, unused DOD items. 

Despite the limited reutilization supply systems approach for reutilization 

of A-condition excess items, DLA and DRMS data show that overall system 

and process improvements since the Subcommittee’s June 2005 hearing 

have saved $38.1 million through June 2006. According to DLA data, 

interim supply system initiatives using the Automated Asset Recoupment 

Program, which is part of an old DOD legacy system, achieved reutilization 

savings of nearly $2.3 million since July 2005 and Business System 

Modernization supply system initiatives implemented in January 2006 as 

promised at the Subcommittee’s June 2005 hearing, have resulted in 

reutilization savings of nearly $1.1 million. In addition, DRMS reported that 

excess property marketing initiatives implemented in late March 2006 have 

resulted in reutilization savings of a little over $34.8 million through June 

2006. These initiatives include marketing techniques using Web 

photographs of high-dollar items and e-mail notices to repeat customers 

about the availability of A-condition items that they had previously 

selected for reutilization. 

 13 Batch lotting refers to combining one or more items, or a mixed group of items, on the

same turn-in document or sales lot. 

14 GAO-05-277 and GAO-05-729T. 

Page 9 GAO-06-981T 
Concluding Remarks Our most recent work shows that sensitive military equipment items are 

still being improperly released by DOD and sold to the public, posing a 

significant national security risk. The sensitive nature of these items 

requires particularly stringent internal security controls. Our tests, which 

were performed over a short duration, were limited to our observations, 

meaning that the problem may likely be more significant than what we 

identified. Although we have referred the sales of items identified during 

our investigation to federal law enforcement agencies for follow-up, the 

solution to this problem is to enforce controls for preventing improper 

release of these items outside DOD. Further, liquidation sales of items that 

military units are continuing to purchase at full cost from supply inventory

demonstrates continuing waste to the taxpayer and inefficiency in DOD’s 

excess property reutilization program. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my 

statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other 

members of the committee may have at this time. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D. 

Kutz at (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. Major contributors to this 

testimony include Mario L. Artesiano, Donald L. Bumgardner, Matthew S. 

Brown, Paul R. Desaulniers, Stephen P. Donahue, Lauren S. Fassler, Gayle 

L. Fischer, Cinnimon Glozer, Jason Kelly, John Ledford, Barbara C. Lewis, 

Richard C. Newbold, John P. Ryan, Lori B. Ryza, Lisa M. Warde, and Emily 

C. Wold. 

Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Technical expertise was provided by Keith A. Rhodes, Chief Technologist, 

and Harold Lewis, Assistant Director, Information Technology Security, 

Applied Research and Methods. 

Page 10 GAO-06-981T (192221) 
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