United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

CLEAN WATER 

Better Information 

and Targeted 

Prevention Efforts 

Could Enhance Spill 

Management in the 

St. Clair–Detroit River 

Corridor 

June 2006 

 

GAO-06-639 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 2006

CLEAN WATER

Better Information and Targeted 

Prevention Efforts Could Enhance Spill 

Management in the St. Clair–Detroit River 

Corridor 

Highlights of GAO-06-639, a report to 

congressional requesters 

Spills of oil and hazardous 

substances in the St. Clair–Detroit 

River corridor have degraded this

border area between the United

States and Canada and are a 

potential threat to local drinking 

water supplies. Within the United

States such spills are reported to 

the National Response Center 

(NRC), and in Canada to the

Ontario Spills Action Centre. This 

report discusses (1) how many oil 

and hazardous substance spills 

greater than 50 gallons (or of an

unknown volume) were reported in 

the corridor from 1994 to 2004, and 

how accurately reported spills 

reflect the extent of actual spills; 

(2) what processes are used to 

notify parties of spills, and if they

contain explicit requirements for

reporting times and spill 

magnitude; and (3) the extent of

Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) and the Coast Guard’s spill 

prevention efforts and enforcement 

activities in the corridor from 1994

to 2004. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that EPA Region

5 and the Coast Guard’s District 9 

update spill information and 

determine whether existing spill 

notification processes can be 

improved. GAO also recommends 

that EPA consider gathering 

information on which facilities are

regulated under its spill prevention 

program and develop goals for its 

spill prevention inspections. The 

Department of Homeland Security

agreed with our findings and 

conclusions overall and EPA 

provided technical comments only. 

The NRC received 991 spill reports and the Ontario Spills Action Centre 

received 157 reports of spills in the corridor from 1994 through 2004, but 

these reports do not accurately portray the actual number or volume of 

spills. Many spills go unreported by responsible parties because they do not 

understand or fail to comply with reporting requirements. Further, multiple 

reports for the same spill are often recorded by NRC and provided to EPA 

and the Coast Guard for investigation. EPA does not remove all duplicate 

spill reports or update its data after investigating spills. Coast Guard 

officials update their spill data after investigations but they are unable to 

update spill volume estimates due to automated system limitations. GAO 

also found that, according to agency data sets, other events—combined 

sewer overflows (CSOs) and industrial permit violations—occurred more 

frequently than spills in the corridor. While data on industrial permit 

violations and CSOs might be subject to the same limitations as the spill data

because the data are self reported and facilities may not report all of these 

events, spills may be particularly subject to underreporting because they are 

not part of a structured program as CSOs and industrial permit violations 

are. 

There are multiple parties involved in spill notification in the corridor and 

agreements outlining U.S.–Canadian notification processes are not explicit 

about reporting times or the magnitude of spills that warrant notification. 

The coast guards of each country have agreed to notify one another of spills 

primarily when a joint response may be needed. Another agreement 

between Michigan and Ontario officials calls for notifying each other of spills

that may have a joint impact. We reviewed six selected spill incidents that 

illustrate the various ways that notification can occur. The drinking water 

facility operators we contacted on the U.S. side of the corridor had differing 

perspectives on current notification processes, and the majority expressed 

concern that their facilities could be contaminated by spills if they are not 

notified in a timely manner. Finally, efforts have been made to develop 

informal notification processes between individual industries or trade 

associations and drinking water facilities. 

EPA’s spill prevention program is limited and the Coast Guard addresses

spill prevention as part of other compliance efforts. EPA’s prevention 

program addresses only oil spills. Further, EPA is uncertain of which 

specific facilities are subject to regulation under its spill prevention program, 

and conducts varying numbers of inspections per year. EPA inspections 

uncovered significant spill prevention deficiencies, whereas the Coast 

Guard’s inspections revealed minor issues. The agencies issued a total of 16

penalties for spills and program noncompliance during the period we 

reviewed. www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-639.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact John B. 

Stephenson at (202) 512-3841 or

stephensonj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 7

Agency Spill Data Are Not Sufficient to Accurately Determine the 

Actual Number or Volume of Spills 11

Spill Notification Occurs between and among Many Different 

Parties and Agreements Outlining U.S.–Canadian Notification

Processes Are Not Explicit about Time and Magnitude 17

EPA’s Spill Prevention and Enforcement Efforts Are Limited and 

the Coast Guard Addresses Spill Prevention as Part of Other 

Compliance Efforts 29

Conclusions 41

Recommendations for Executive Action 42

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 42

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 47 

Appendix II: Spill Data for the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor, 

1994–2004 49

EPA Spill Data 49

Coast Guard Spill Data 50

Michigan DEQ Spill Data 52

Ontario SAC Spill Data 53

Appendix III: CSO Data for the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor, 

1999–2004 55 

Appendix IV: NPDES Industrial Effluent Violation Data for the 

St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor, 1994–2004 56 

Appendix V: Spill Profiles for Six Selected Incidents 60

U.S. Spill: 2001 Hazardous Substance Spill 60

U.S. Spill: 2002 Oil Spill 61

U.S. Spill: 2004 Oil Spill 63

Canadian Spill: 2003 Hazardous Substance Spill 65

Page i GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Canadian Spill: 2004 Hazardous Substance Spill 66

Canadian Spill: 2004 Oil Spill 66

Appendix VI: ORSANCO Spill Detection and Notification 

System 67 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 70 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 74

Tables 

Table 1: Characteristics of Six Selected Spill Incidents in the 

Corridor from 2001–2004 23

Table 2: Number of Coast Guard’s Facility, Vessel, and Transfer 

Inspections Conducted in the St. Clair–Detroit River 

Corridor from 1994–2004 35

Table 3: EPA Spill Data by Year and Material 50

Table 4: Coast Guard Spill Data by Year and Material 51

Table 5: Coast Guard Spill Data by Water Body and Material 51

Table 6: Michigan DEQ Spill Data by Year and Material 52

Table 7: Michigan DEQ Spill Data by Water Body 53

Table 8: Ontario SAC Spill Data by Year and Material 53

Table 9: Ontario SAC Spill Data by Water Body 54

Table 10: CSOs in the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor from 1999–

2004 by Water Body 55

Table 11: Volume of CSOs in the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor 

from 1999–2004 (in Millions of Gallons) 55

Table 12: Number of NPDES Industrial Effluent Violations by 

Volume per Year 56

Table 13: Number of NPDES Industrial Effluent Violations by 

Discharged Material and Year 57

Table 14: Number of NPDES Industrial Effluent Violations by 

Water Body and Material for the 12 Most Frequently 

Violated Permits 58

Page ii GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Figures 

Figure 1: Spill Materials in the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor 2

Figure 2: Pollution Entering the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor 

from Sources Such as Spills, Industrial Permit Violations, 

and CSOs 9

Figure 3: Ontario SAC With Display Screens Showing Spill Incident 

Summaries 13

Figure 4: Relative Percentages of Reported Spills, Industrial Permit 

Violations, and CSOs from 1999-2004 in the St. Clair–

Detroit River Corridor That Were Greater Than 50 Gallons 

(or of an Unknown Volume) 15

Figure 5: Spill Notification Processes in the St. Clair–Detroit River 

Corridor 18

Figure 6: Notification Processes for Six Selected Spills in the St. 

Clair–Detroit River Corridor 25

Figure 7: U.S. Drinking Water Facilities on the St. Clair–Detroit 

River Corridor 26

Figure 8: Existing and Proposed Water Quality Monitoring Stations 

in the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor 29

Figure 9: Number of SPCC Inspections Conducted in the St. Clair–

Detroit River Corridor from 1994–2004 33

Figure 10: EPA and Coast Guard Spill-Related Penalties Assessed 

from 1994 to 2004 in the St. Clair–-Detroit River Corridor 38

Figure 11: 2002 Rouge River Oil Spill 61

Figure 12: 2004 Rouge River Oil Spill 63

Figure 13: ORSANCO Organics Detection System Monitoring Sites 68

Figure 14: Water Quality Monitoring Equipment Used at ORSANCO 

Sites 69

Page iii GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Abbreviations 

BMP best management practices 

CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 

 and Liability Act 

CSO combined sewer overflows 

DEQ Department of Environmental Quality 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 

NPDES National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 

NRC National Response Center 

Oil Fund Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund 

OSC on-scene coordinators 

PEAS Pollution Emergency Alerting System

PECC Pollution Emergency Communications Coordinator 

RP responsible party 

SAC Ontario Ministry of Environment’s Spills Action Centre 

SLEA Sarnia-Lambton Environmental Association 

SPCC Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page iv GAO-06-639 Clean Water
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

June 7, 2006

Congressional Requesters

Recent spills of large quantities of oil and hazardous substances like vinyl 

chloride have raised public concerns about the safety of drinking water for 

the more than 5 million people living within the St. Clair–Detroit River 

corridor, which borders the United States and Canada. The 98-mile 

corridor formed by the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair, and the Detroit River 

serves as a major shipping channel between the upper and lower Great 

Lakes. Approximately 500 industrial facilities, including chemical 

companies, oil refineries, power plants, and steel mills, are located within 

the corridor. The heaviest concentration of industry on the U.S. side is in 

the southern part of the corridor, around Detroit; Canadian industry is 

concentrated on the northern part of the St. Clair River, around Sarnia, 

Ontario. Seventeen drinking water facilities on the U.S. side have intakes 

in the corridor close to these industrial centers. The corridor is part of the 

Great Lakes Basin, whose waters, under the Great Lakes Water Quality 

Agreement, the two countries recognized could not be restored and 

enhanced without cooperation between the two countries. Yet because of 

contamination from spills and other pollutant discharges, the St. Clair and

Detroit Rivers have fish consumption restrictions, and oil sheens and other 

debris are commonly found on the waters’ surface or along shorelines. 

Recent spills of large quantities of oil and hazardous substances like vinyl 

chloride have raised public concerns about the safety of drinking water for 

the more than 5 million people living within the St. Clair–Detroit River 

corridor, which borders the United States and Canada. The 98-mile 

corridor formed by the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair, and the Detroit River 

serves as a major shipping channel between the upper and lower Great 

Lakes. Approximately 500 industrial facilities, including chemical 

companies, oil refineries, power plants, and steel mills, are located within 

the corridor. The heaviest concentration of industry on the U.S. side is in 

the southern part of the corridor, around Detroit; Canadian industry is 

concentrated on the northern part of the St. Clair River, around Sarnia, 

Ontario. Seventeen drinking water facilities on the U.S. side have intakes 

in the corridor close to these industrial centers. The corridor is part of the 

Great Lakes Basin, whose waters, under the Great Lakes Water Quality 

Agreement, the two countries recognized could not be restored and 

enhanced without cooperation between the two countries. Yet because of 

contamination from spills and other pollutant discharges, the St. Clair and

Detroit Rivers have fish consumption restrictions, and oil sheens and other 

debris are commonly found on the waters’ surface or along shorelines. 

Page 1 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Figure 1: Spill Materials in the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

To ensure that spills1

 are promptly reported, several statutes—including 

the Clean Water Act2

 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 

Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund)3

—require that the party 

responsible for a discharge of oil or hazardous substance notify the 

National Response Center (NRC) immediately. For oil spills, any amount 

that would create a sheen on the water is a reportable quantity whereas, 

for hazardous substances, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 

regulations (prescribed under Superfund and the Clean Water Act) specify 

what amounts the substances must exceed to be reportable. The NRC is 

the national point of contact for spill reporting, and it distributes reported 

spill information to agencies, including EPA and the Coast Guard, which 

are tasked with spill response for inland and coastal spills, respectively. In 

the corridor, EPA’s Region 5 and the Coast Guard’s District 9 are 

 1

For purposes of this report, “spill” refers to an unanticipated or accidental discharge of 

pollutants into the waters of the corridor, but excludes National Pollutant Discharge 

Elimination System (NPDES) permit violations and combined sewer overflows. However,

we treat permit violations and combined sewer overflows reported to the NRC as spills 

within this report. 

2

Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“Clean Water Act”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387. 

3

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“Superfund”), 

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. 

Page 2 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
responsible for responding to reported spills. While the NRC is a major 

source of spill information for the agencies, EPA and the Coast Guard may 

be contacted directly about a spill or learn of it while conducting their 

regular duties. EPA and the Coast Guard’s spill-related responsibilities are 

outlined in the National Contingency Plan, the federal government’s guide

to oil and hazardous substance spill response. It describes how the 

agencies are to assess a spill, and initiate response action if necessary. In

addition to federal agencies, the Michigan Department of Environmental 

Quality (Michigan DEQ) and Michigan State Police have a role in spillrelated response and notification. In Canada, the Ontario Ministry of 

Environment has a prominent role in spill-related activities in the St. Clair–

Detroit River corridor, including notification and enforcement. The 

Ontario Ministry of Environment’s Spills Action Centre (Ontario SAC) 

obtains and reports spill information to responders and other 

stakeholders. Environment Canada, the federal-level regulatory agency, 

has a lesser role in spill-related activities in the corridor. 

To decrease the likelihood of spills, both EPA and the Coast Guard 

administer spill prevention programs. EPA’s program requires that nontransportation related facilities (e.g., power plants) with a specified 

storage capacity prepare spill prevention plans and meet certain 

operational standards. These facilities must also provide containment 

structures or explain in their plans why the structures are not feasible. The

Coast Guard’s prevention program requires vessels with the capacity to 

carry certain amounts of oil and hazardous substances—and certain 

facilities that transfer oil and hazardous substances—to have written 

transfer procedures or operations manuals, meet minimum equipment 

requirements, and follow prescribed procedures when transferring oil on

navigable waterways. EPA and the Coast Guard have the authority to fine

parties that are responsible for spills, or that do not comply with spill 

prevention program requirements. 

In this context, you asked us to examine (1) how many oil and hazardous 

substance spills of more than 50 gallons (or of an unknown volume) were 

reported in the St. Clair–Detroit River corridor from 1994 to 2004, and how 

accurately reported spills reflect the extent of actual spills; (2) what 

processes are used to notify parties of spills, and whether they contain 

explicit requirements for reporting times and spill magnitude; and (3) the 

extent of EPA and the Coast Guard’s spill prevention efforts and 

enforcement activities in the St. Clair–Detroit River corridor from 1994 to 

2004. 

Page 3 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
To obtain overall information relating to spills, we gathered information 

from officials within various offices in EPA; the Coast Guard; the state of 

Michigan; and Ontario, Canada. To determine the number of spills over 50 

gallons (or of an unknown volume) reported in the St. Clair River, Lake St.

Clair, and the Detroit River and its tributary, the Rouge River, between 

1994 and 2004 we obtained spill data maintained by NRC, EPA, the Coast 

Guard, Michigan DEQ, and the Ontario SAC. We also obtained EPA and 

Michigan DEQ data sets related to other pollutant discharges, such as 

combined sewer overflows (CSO) and National Pollution Discharge 

Elimination System (NPDES) industrial permit violations to obtain more 

complete information on pollutants discharged into the water bodies of 

the St. Clair–Detroit River corridor. To assess what processes are used to

notify parties of spills and whether they contain explicit requirements for 

reporting times and spill magnitudes, we reviewed applicable laws and 

spill notification agreements and obtained information on implementation 

of these agreements. We obtained and analyzed documentation on six 

spills to better understand how the notification process was conducted 

under varying circumstances, and to show a range of spill materials and 

source locations. We also obtained information from all 17 of the drinking 

water facility operators on the U.S. side of the corridor to obtain their 

perspectives on the timeliness of spill notification. To identify spill 

prevention efforts and enforcement activities, we obtained and analyzed

the relevant legislation, agency spill prevention and enforcement policies, 

as well as agency data on spill-related inspections and enforcement 

actions in the corridor since 1994. We performed our work between 

September 2005 and June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. A more detailed description of our 

methodology is provided in appendix I. 

The NRC received 991 spill reports from the U.S. side of the corridor and 

the Ontario SAC received an additional 157 spill reports from the Canadian 

side of the corridor from 1994 to 2004, but these reports do not accurately

capture the actual number or volume of spills. U.S. and Canadian officials 

believe that many spills go unreported because, among other reasons, 

responsible parties may not understand or comply with the reporting 

requirements. In addition, the NRC database often includes multiple 

reports for the same spill. The response agencies—EPA and the Coast 

Guard—are required to assess each reported spill and therefore should 

have reliable spill information based on their investigations, but this is not 

the case. EPA Region 5 does not remove all duplicate spill reports, or 

update its data after investigating spills. Furthermore, investigators do not 

consistently document their activities, so it is unclear which spills have or 

Results in Brief 

Page 4 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
have not been investigated. In contrast, Coast Guard officials in District 9 

document their investigations and use the information to update their spill 

data, but they do not update spill volume estimates after investigations 

because of automated system limitations that do not allow them to input 

revised estimates. As a result, complete information on the extent of spills 

is not available to determine if additional management or oversight is 

needed to address the problem. Finally, we also found that, according to 

agency data sets, other events—CSOs and industrial permit violations—

occurred more frequently than spills in the corridor. 

There are multiple parties involved in spill notification in the corridor and 

agreements outlining U.S.–Canadian notification processes are not explicit

about reporting times or the magnitude of spills that warrant notification. 

Generally, spill notification involves the following: (1) spill occurrence and 

reporting by a responsible party or observer to a designated reporting 

center or a response agency; (2) spill notification from response agencies 

to one another if determined to be necessary; and (3) spill notification by 

response agencies to drinking water facilities and other stakeholders. All 

spill notification is dependent upon reporting by parties responsible for 

the spill or others who provide initial notification of the spill. Spill 

notification processes between the United States and Canada are outlined 

in two agreements between the countries. One process is used by the 

coast guards of each country, who have agreed to notify one another of 

spills primarily when a joint response may be needed. Another process is 

used at the state and provincial level, where officials from the Michigan 

State Police and Ontario Ministry of Environment have an agreement to 

notify one another of spills. However, these two agreements are not 

explicit about what constitutes timely reporting or what magnitude of spill 

triggers notification. According to Michigan State Police officials, the 

Michigan–Ontario notification agreement was meant to, among other 

things, expedite the dissemination of information to the public, because 

responsibility for notifying the public—including drinking water 

facilities—generally resides with state and local authorities. We reviewed 

six selected spill incidents to gain insight into the dynamics of spill 

notification processes from initial reporting to drinking water facility 

notification. The drinking water facility operators we contacted on the 

U.S. side of the corridor had differing perspectives on current notification 

processes, and the majority expressed concern that their facilities could 

be contaminated by spills if notification was not timely. Finally, efforts 

have been made to develop informal notification processes between 

individual industries or trade associations and drinking water facilities. 

Page 5 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
EPA’s spill prevention efforts are limited to potential oil spills, whereas the 

scope of the Coast Guard’s efforts are broader and included as part of 

other compliance activities. EPA’s Spill Prevention, Control, and 

Countermeasure (SPCC) program addresses only oil spills, not spills of 

other hazardous substances. Agency officials told us that their spill 

prevention regulations were written when oil spills were a bigger problem, 

and they believed that the NPDES program already addressed chronic 

pollution discharges in waterways. Unlike EPA’s NPDES program, which 

requires facilities to obtain a permit to discharge pollutants, the SPCC 

program has no mechanism to identify the facilities that it regulates. This 

creates a challenge in determining which facilities are required to create 

spill prevention plans. To date, EPA has not identified the universe of 

facilities to be inspected under its SPCC program. EPA Region 5 officials 

have identified 59 facilities in the corridor that are regulated under the 

SPCC program as a result of referrals from Michigan DEQ or through 

special inspection initiatives. Inspections for SPCC program compliance 

vary in number per year and are largely contingent upon other inspection 

initiatives because of limited numbers of inspection staff, according to 

agency officials. The inspections that were conducted disclosed significant 

and numerous spill prevention deficiencies, such as failure to prepare 

prevention plans. On the other hand, the Coast Guard inspected a greater 

number of the facilities and vessels under their jurisdiction than EPA—

mainly because the inspections were not only focused on spill prevention, 

but included other areas related to safety and security. Officials from the 

Coast Guard reported that in nearly all cases, their inspectors found that 

facilities and vessels were in compliance; those that were not in 

compliance had only minor issues, such as incidental omissions in 

operations manuals. In response to violations for spills or program 

noncompliance, EPA and the Coast Guard issued a total of 16 penalties. 

From 1994 through 2004, EPA Region 5 fined four parties an average of 

$39,000 each; three were for violations of the spill prevention program and 

one was for a spill. In assessing reported spills, EPA relies on Michigan 

DEQ to respond locally and does not respond on-site to the majority of 

spills reported to them. Therefore, it does not collect evidence from many 

reported spills that could be used to take enforcement actions against 

responsible parties. In contrast, officials from the Coast Guard told us they 

investigate all spills reported to them, both on-site and indirectly (e.g., 

through inquiries). Based on these spill investigations, the Coast Guard’s 

District 9 fined 12 parties an average of about $2,100 each in the time 

frame we reviewed. Neither agency fined parties for failure to report spills. 

To improve spill management, we are making recommendations to EPA 

and the Coast Guard aimed at providing better documentation of spill 

Page 6 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
investigation results, and identification of possible enhancements to the 

notification process. We are also recommending that EPA develop an

inventory of facilities that are subject to its spill prevention program and 

develop goals for the frequency and extent of its inspections for such 

facilities. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) agreed overall with our findings and conclusions, and EPA 

provided technical comments only. DHS did not address our 

recommendations. In commenting on our recommendation that it gather 

information on SPCC-regulated facilities, EPA stated that there is no 

authority in the Clean Water Act or the prevention regulations for facilities 

to provide this information to EPA. Furthermore, it stated that under the 

Paperwork Reduction Act the agency would need to seek approval from 

the Office of Management and Budget to collect such information. In this 

regard, we note that EPA has previously identified SPCC-regulated 

facilities in the corridor. However, if EPA determines that formal 

rulemaking is necessary for it to gather information on which facilities are 

covered under its spill prevention program, then we believe it should 

consider undertaking such a rulemaking. EPA also commented on the 

feasibility of updating spill information maintained by the NRC. While we 

acknowledge that EPA does not modify spill data maintained by the NRC, 

our recommendation was that EPA update its own spill data and explore 

the feasibility of updating spill information maintained by NRC by 

informing the NRC of duplicate spill reports. 

The St. Clair and Detroit Rivers, and Lake St. Clair, provide multiple 

benefits to residents of Michigan and Ontario, Canada, who use the water 

bodies as their primary source of drinking water as well as for recreation 

such as boating and fishing. Sensitive ecological areas located along the

corridor include Humbug Marsh, the last Great Lakes coastal marsh on the 

Michigan mainland of the Detroit River. It contains the greatest diversity of 

fish species found in the Detroit River and it is part of the migration route 

for 117 fish and 92 bird species. The Detroit River itself was designated an

American Heritage River in 1998 for these ecological resources. Despite 

these and other benefits, the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers are considered 

“Areas of Concern” by the U.S. and Canadian governments under the Great 

Lakes Water Quality Agreement as a result of beneficial-use impairments, 

such as restrictions on fish consumption. 

Background 

Pollutant discharges to the waters of the corridor include CSOs—caused 

by heavy rains that force wastewater treatment plants to bypass their 

Page 7 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
overburdened systems and discharge raw or partially treated waste 

directly into the water bodies. Michigan law requires that wastewater 

treatment facilities report their combined and sanitary sewer overflows to 

the Michigan DEQ within 24 hours. Discharges from industrial facilities 

with NPDES permits account for additional pollutants that enter the 

waters of the corridor. Industries with NPDES permits are required to 

report on the quality of all discharges and to detail any pollutants 

discharged that exceed their permit limits to EPA in monitoring reports at 

intervals specified in their permits, commonly monthly. As a result, 

NPDES-permitted industries regularly monitor their discharges. In 

addition to these requirements, federal law requires that parties that 

discharge oil or a hazardous substance beyond specified quantities into 

waters of the corridor report these incidents to the NRC. Spills and other 

pollutant discharges might also be reported to the NRC by members of the 

public that observe pollutant materials in waterways. When spills, 

industrial permit violations, and sewer overflows contain oil, they are 

visible—and more likely to be reported by observers. In contrast, releases 

of chemicals into the water are oftentimes not visible, unless they can be 

detected by their effects, such as fish kills. Figure 2 illustrates these 

sources of pollution. 

Page 8 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Figure 2: Pollution Entering the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor from Sources Such as Spills, Industrial Permit Violations, and 

CSOs 

Clinton

River

Lake Erie

Lake St. Clair

Lake Huron

Ontario, Canada

Michigan, U.S.

St. Clair

Marine City

Port Huron

Detroit

Detroit

Water and Sewerage Dept.

Wyandotte

River Rouge

Detroit River

St. Clair River

Sources: GAO, top and right photos; bottom photo U.S. Coast Guard; map, MapArt.

Wastewater treatment facilities

near Detroit with CSO events; 

CSO outfalls shown with arrows.

Industrial pollutant releases

around Sarnia; when on the U.S. 

side, includes NPDES permit 

violations.

Oil and chemical spills on the 

Rouge River and along the

St. Clair–Detroit River corridor.

Sarnia

Page 9 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
While EPA has federal regulatory responsibility for NPDES-related 

discharges and CSOs, EPA and the Coast Guard share responsibility for 

spill prevention and response on the U.S. side of the corridor. The National 

Contingency Plan and the Southeast Michigan Area Contingency Plan

describe a geographic division of responsibility between these agencies, 

but due to EPA’s expertise, the Coast Guard may refer chemical spills to 

EPA even if the spills are in locations otherwise assigned to the Coast 

Guard.4

 When spills originate on land but impact the navigable waters, 

both agencies might be involved in response. Within EPA, Chemical 

Preparedness officials enforce regulations that address chemical release 

reporting requirements while Oil Program officials coordinate spill 

response and oil spill prevention inspections. When spills involve 

industrial permit violations or sewage releases, EPA’s NPDES program 

officials are also involved—but because EPA approved Michigan’s NPDES 

program, Michigan officials are more directly involved in these cases. As 

agencies respond to spills, they work with responsible parties to ensure 

that they fund the cost of cleanup activities. If EPA and the Coast Guard’s 

spill responders do not identify the responsible party, however, they may 

obtain funds from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Oil Fund) or 

Superfund to finance their response efforts, including the cleanup. 

According to officials from the Coast Guard, notification of potentially 

affected parties is oftentimes a component of the agencies’ spill response 

efforts. In addition to federal agencies, the Michigan DEQ and State Police 

also provide spill notification. On the Canadian side of the corridor, the 

Ontario SAC consolidates spill reports routed to their center, as well as to 

other agencies. For example, the Ontario Ministry of the Environment has 

an agreement with Environment Canada under which they receive all spill 

reports for the federal agency. There are many potential pathways for spill 

notification in the corridor. The overall process can be divided into spill 

occurrence and reporting by a responsible party or observer to a 

designated reporting center; spill reporting from designated spill reporting 

centers to response agencies; and spill notification from response agencies 

to stakeholders, including drinking water facilities. Sometimes parts of the 

process are collapsed; for example, spill reporting centers may notify 

other stakeholders as well as response agencies. Alternatively, the process 

 4

In accordance with Section 10(g) of Executive Order 12580 of January 23, 1987, Coast 

Guard officials may use an instrument of re-delegation to shift leadership of response 

efforts to EPA. 

Page 10 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
can be lengthened if multiple agencies are responsible for notifying other 

stakeholders in sequence. 

Agency spill data are not sufficient, for multiple reasons, to accurately 

determine the actual number or volume of spills in the St. Clair–Detroit 

River corridor. Many spills go unreported because responsible parties may 

not understand or comply with reporting requirements. On the other hand, 

there are oftentimes multiple NRC reports for the same spill, since several 

observers may report them. EPA Region 5 does not remove all duplicate

spill reports from their database, or update its data after investigating 

spills. In contrast, Coast Guard officials in District 9 document their 

investigations and use the information to update their spill data, but they 

do not update spill volume estimates because of automated system 

limitations. Other events, including CSOs and industrial permit violations,

are reported more frequently in the corridor. 

NRC, EPA, Coast Guard, and Canadian officials believe that many spills 

are never reported, and therefore that spill data do not represent the true 

number of spills. Though responsible parties are required by law to 

immediately report spills in amounts beyond certain minimum quantities, 

agency officials believe they may not do so for a variety of reasons.5

 U.S. 

and Canadian officials suggested that responsible parties may not be 

aware of spills, may not understand the reporting requirements, or that 

they may not want to receive “bad press” or be forced to pay the costs of 

the cleanup. Reporting by responsible parties and others is critical 

because only one water quality monitoring station capable of detecting 

spills exists in the corridor. The Sarnia-Lambton Environmental 

Association (SLEA), a Canadian industry consortium, maintains a 

monitoring station south of the highly industrialized Sarnia area. Though 

SLEA monitors for a suite of chemicals, it does not detect all types of 

discharges—and while it shares spill data with the Ontario Ministry of 

Environment, its purpose is not to collect spill-related information for 

regulatory agencies; rather, it collects the information as a service to SLEA 

members, as well as agencies and communities. 

Agency Spill Data Are 

Not Sufficient to 

Accurately Determine 

the Actual Number or 

Volume of Spills 

Agency Officials Believe 

Responsible Parties May 

Not Report All Spills 

 5

Responsible parties are required to report spills by the Clean Water Act and 

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA); 

Ontario’s Environmental Protection Act also requires that parties report spills. 

Page 11 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
When spills are reported, in many cases the responsible party is unknown. 

In many of these instances, a member of the public or party other than the 

responsible party provides information to the NRC. EPA and the Coast 

Guard’s spill data indicate that 67 percent and 29 percent, respectively, of

reported spills in the corridor were released from an unknown source in 

the time period we reviewed. Ontario SAC data indicate that 10 percent of

Canadian spills were from an unknown source. 

NRC Data Contains 

Multiple Reports of the 

Same Spills 

Another reason spill data do not accurately represent the number of actual 

spills is that NRC spill data record some spill events multiple times. The 

NRC received 991 reports of spills in the corridor from 1994 to 2004, but 

these may include multiple reports of the same spills.6

 NRC officials are 

responsible for maintaining a call center for obtaining spill information, 

and relaying the information to the appropriate agencies that are tasked 

with response. They are not required to assess whether multiple reports 

pertain to the same spill, as this would require investigation. NRC officials 

told us that, as a result, many duplicate spill reports exist. Coast Guard 

officials from District 9 told us that they could, after investigating spill 

incidents, identify duplicate spill reports provided by NRC, link these 

duplicate reports to single spill incidents, and provide that information to 

the NRC so that they can update their records. 

Duplicate reporting has been addressed by Ontario’s SAC, which obtained

157 reports of spills on the Canadian side of the corridor during the same 

time period. Unlike the NRC, the Ontario SAC determines whether each 

spill report is unique when it records its information. The Ontario SAC is 

staffed by Ontario Ministry of Environment officials who are responsible 

both for obtaining preliminary spill information for the province, as well as 

for determining which spill reports relate to the same incident. The 

Ontario SAC has a rolling summary of spill incidents on a display screen 

and on staff computers, which allows them to identify multiple reports 

that relate to a common incident. (See fig. 3.) The Ontario SAC’s 

Emergency Management Coordinator told us that when these safeguards 

fail to eliminate a duplicative spill report, subsequent corrections are 

made. 

 6

The NRC spill data include spills greater than 50 gallons (or of an unknown volume). 

Page 12 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Figure 3: Ontario SAC With Display Screens Showing Spill Incident Summaries 

Source: Spills Action Centre.

To develop a process similar to Ontario’s for the U.S. side of the corridor, 

Michigan State Police officials told us that between 1986 and 1988 state 

officials explored the option of creating a spills center. At the time, they 

estimated that it would have cost $2 million to operate and it would have 

required 10 staff, including a chemical specialist and three shifts of phone 

operators. This was viewed as prohibitively expensive by Michigan 

officials, and as an alternative, the State Police and the Michigan DEQ’s 

Pollution Emergency Alerting System (PEAS) began operating as a spill 

notification system. The PEAS system is used for reporting spills to the 

Michigan DEQ during non-business hours, including holidays, weekends, 

and evenings. Spill data from PEAS, however, are similar to NRC data in 

that they include multiple entries for single spills because each call is 

logged, rather than each unique spill event recorded. 

EPA Does Not Eliminate 

All Duplicate Spill Reports 

or Update Spill 

Information after 

Investigations 

Unlike the NRC, response agencies such as EPA are required to assess 

each reported spill and therefore should have reliable spill information, 

but this is not the case. EPA Region 5 does not eliminate all duplicate spill 

reports because they do not respond on-site to the majority of spills for 

which they receive reports. EPA Region 5 officials told us that they rely on

Michigan DEQ to respond to the majority of spills since they are in closer

Page 13 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
proximity. Region 5 officials respond to spills upon receiving a request for 

assistance from Michigan DEQ officials, and when spills are over 1,000 

gallons, EPA officials respond to provide assistance even if they are not 

requested to do so. They told us that they investigate very few spills onsite—perhaps roughly one percent of spills—due to limited staff 

resources. Instead, EPA Region 5 officials follow up with state spill 

responders by phone to obtain more detail on spills. Though their 

operating protocols state that responders are to complete pollution 

reports and update spill data after investigation, EPA Region 5 officials 

told us that responders have not done so typically because they fail to

make it a priority. For this reason, EPA officials were unable to tell us 

which spills in the corridor in our time frame were investigated by their 

agency. They told us that EPA imports spill data from the NRC and does 

not make modifications to the data; therefore, EPA’s spill data set is of 

limited use. EPA Region 5 officials providing spill response in the corridor 

began using a new Web-based spill data system, Web Emergency 

Operations Center (Web EOC), in the fall of 2004. EPA officials are 

hopeful that spill responders will update spill information in the system 

following their investigations; however, they said that it is too soon to tell.

The Coast Guard Updates 

Most Spill Data but Does 

Not Update Spill Volumes 

Like EPA, Coast Guard officials from District 9 told us that they assess and 

investigate each spill, whether they go on-site or use phone calls and other 

means to obtain information; however, Coast Guard officials update spill 

information following these investigations. While the Coast Guard’s spill 

data sets included information on spill materials, the cause of spills, and 

how each spill was resolved, the formatting of the data sets makes it 

difficult to access accurate information on spill volumes. For example, a 

spill listed in the Coast Guard’s data set as being a 2,000-gallon spill is also 

reported in the Coast Guard’s annual report as being over 8 million 

gallons. Similarly, the Coast Guard’s spill data set contains a reference to a 

75-gallon oil spill, but summaries written by the Coast Guard’s District 9 

responders to the spill state that over 66,000 gallons of oil were recovered.

When asked about the discrepancies in these cases and others, Coast 

Guard officials from District 9 told us that they are unable to update the 

field in their database that contains preliminary volume estimates. Instead, 

they update volume information in narrative fields. As a result, it is 

difficult to assess the severity of any given spill in the Coast Guard’s data 

sets. 

Page 14 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
The number of reported spills is exceeded by other types of events, such 

as CSOs and industrial permit violations that are reported more frequently 

in the corridor. EPA’s data on U.S. industrial permit violations indicate 

that approximately 2,200 were reported in the corridor during the 11-year 

time period we reviewed; over 1,800 were greater than 50 gallons (or of an 

unknown volume). Michigan DEQ has tracked CSOs on the U.S. side of the 

corridor since 1999. Their data indicate that roughly 1,400 CSOs were 

reported in the corridor from 1999 to 2004. These data might be subject to 

the same limitations as the spill data because industrial permit violations 

and CSOs are self-reported and facilities may not report all of these events. 

However, spills may be particularly subject to underreporting because 

they are not part of a structured program—as CSOs and industrial permit 

violations are. Figure 4 illustrates the relative percentages of spills, 

industrial permit violations, and CSOs of greater than 50 gallons (or of an 

unknown volume) that were reported in the corridor in the 6-year period 

between 1999 and 2004, the time period for which CSO data were 

available. 

Number of Reported CSOs 

and Industrial Permit 

Violations Exceed the 

Number of Reported Spills 

in the Corridor 

Figure 4: Relative Percentages of Reported Spills, Industrial Permit Violations, and 

CSOs from 1999-2004 in the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor That Were Greater Than

50 Gallons (or of an Unknown Volume) 

56%

25%

18%

Industrial permit violations

Spills

CSOs

Source: GAO analysis of EPA, Coast Guard, Michigan DEQ, and Ontario Spills Action Centre spill data; Michigan DEQ combined

sewer overflow data, and EPA industrial permit violation data.

Notes: 

(1) Percentages do not total 100 due to rounding.

(2) This chart depicts the frequency, rather than the toxicity, of pollutant events. The data used to 

determine relative frequencies are limited by their reliance upon self-reporting by facilities.

Page 15 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Typically, CSOs in the corridor contain biological waste, commercial and 

industrial waste, and storm water runoff from streets and other surfaces. 

In the Detroit area, however, CSOs are more likely to contain industrial 

waste in concentrations that have the potential to negatively impact water 

quality to a greater extent. In addition to sewage from 3 million area 

customers and 78 municipalities that send their waste to the Detroit plant, 

the wastewater treatment facility treats industrial waste from over 250 

major industries. The facility has approximately 80 outfalls and is one of 

the largest wastewater treatment plants in the world.7

 While the facility 

has an industrial pretreatment program that requires that industries’ waste

meets certain limits before treatment, these limits may be relatively 

lenient, according to EPA officials, resulting in high volumes of waste 

flowing into the facility. For example, EPA officials told us that the facility 

has lenient oil and grease pretreatment limits. In the event of a CSO, the 

pretreated material that bypasses the Detroit wastewater treatment facility 

and is discharged into the Detroit and Rouge Rivers may contain industrial 

waste, including oil, grease, and other materials. The Detroit facility has 

historically had difficulties complying with permit requirements. To 

address these deficiencies, EPA filed suit against the Detroit facility in the 

1970s and the resulting consent decree has, according to EPA officials, 

provided a basis for many required changes to improve their facility.8

However, a lawsuit filed by EPA in the 1980s which related primarily to 

the facility’s industrial pretreatment program was dismissed in federal 

court.9

 7

An outfall is any pipe or conduit used to carry either raw sewage or treated effluent to a 

final point of discharge into a body of water.

8

United States v. City of Detroit, 476 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Mich. 1979). 

9

United States v. City of Detroit, 940 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (granting Detroit’s 

motion for summary judgment). 

Page 16 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Spill notification may involve the following: (1) spill occurrence and 

reporting by a responsible party or observer to a designated reporting 

center or a response agency; (2) spill notification from response agencies 

to one another; and (3) spill notification by response agencies to drinking 

water facilities and other stakeholders. Spill notification between the 

United States and Canada is outlined in two agreements.10 The coast 

guards of each country and officials from the Michigan State Police and

Ontario SAC have agreed to notify one another of spills; however, these 

two agreements are not explicit about which spills warrant notification or 

how quickly notification should occur. We reviewed six selected spill 

incidents to gain insight into the spill notification process from initial 

reporting to drinking water facility notification. Drinking water facility 

operators on the U.S. side of the corridor had differing perspectives on 

current notification processes, but the majority expressed concern that 

their facilities could be contaminated by spills due to untimely 

notification. Finally, efforts have been made to develop informal 

notification processes between individual industries or trade associations 

and drinking water facilities. 

There are several potential pathways through which spill notification may 

occur in the corridor. The overall process can be divided into spill 

occurrence and reporting by a responsible party or observer to a 

designated reporting center or response agency; spill reporting from 

designated spill reporting centers to response agencies; spill notification 

from response agencies to other response agencies; and notification to 

stakeholders, including drinking water facilities. Sometimes parts of the 

process are collapsed; for example, spill reporting centers may notify 

other stakeholders as well as response agencies. Alternatively, the process 

may be lengthened if multiple agencies are responsible for notifying other 

stakeholders in sequence (see fig. 5).

Spill Notification 

Occurs between and 

among Many Different 

Parties and 

Agreements Outlining 

U.S.–Canadian 

Notification 

Processes Are Not 

Explicit about Time 

and Magnitude 

Spill Notification Is MultiFaceted and May Follow 

Many Different Pathways 

 10In addition to these spill notification agreements related to marine spills, the Canada–U.S.

Joint Inland Pollution Contingency Plan provides for notification for inland spills. 

Environment Canada’s National Environmental Emergencies Centre notifies the NRC and

vice versa. Canadian officials told us the plan, as implemented, addresses mainly air 

releases. 

Page 17 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Figure 5: Spill Notification Processes in the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor

Spill discovery

A spill occurs in Michigan:

A responsible party or spill 

observer makes a call

A spill occurs in Ontario:

A responsible party or spill 

observer makes a call

Agencies receiving spill reports

Environmental Protection

Agency Reg. 5 Hotline

National Response Center

Michigan PEAS

MDEQ Districts

Ontario local responders:

Fire departments

Police

Michigan State Police

Ontario SAC

Environment Canada

Michigan local emergency

management coordinator

Michigan local responders:

Fire departments

Police

A

B

E2

C

D

F

H

G

Page 18 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Response/Notification Secondary notification

U.S. Coast Guard

Environmental Protection

Agency

Michigan DEQ

Michigan DEQ PECC

Canadian drinking

water facilities

Environment Canada

Canadian Coast Guard U.S. Coast Guard

Michigan DEQ

Canadian Coast Guard

Ontario SAC

Michigan State Police

Michigan drinking

water facilities

Ontario drinking

water facilities

Michigan drinking

water facilities

Michigan drinking

water facilities

E1

F

H

D

C

B

A

E3

G

Sources: EPA, U.S. Coast Guard, Michigan DEQ, Michigan State Police, Michigan drinking water facilities, NRC,

Environment Canada, and the Ontario SAC.

E1 E2 E3

Legend:

U.S./Canadian notification Domestic notification Notification sequence

Page 19 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
The Canada–United States Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan states

that on-scene coordinators (OSC) from the U.S. and Canadian Coast 

Guards may notify each other of spills when there is a substantial threat of 

the spreading of pollutants across shared boundaries, including the St. 

Clair–Detroit River corridor and other waters of the Great Lakes. The plan 

arises from the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement between Canada and 

the United States that calls for development of a joint contingency plan for 

use in the event or threat of a spill involving oil or a hazardous substance. 

The notification called for in the plan is conducted by phone between the 

two coast guards. They also provide warning messages to each other when 

they are uncertain as to whether a spill will impact the other’s waters; 

when a joint response is needed to address a spill, they call or 

communicate via fax. Officials from the Coast Guard told us the plan has 

only been utilized for joint response twice since 1994. While spill-related 

warnings have not been systematically tracked between the U.S. and 

Canadian Coast Guards, officials from the U.S. Coast Guard told us they 

are starting to track the warning messages to and from Canada. Though

U.S. Coast Guard officials may notify Canadian Coast Guard officials of 

spills, there is no guidance or directive for either party to notify local 

stakeholders, such as drinking water facilities; however, they told us that 

they sometimes do so as a courtesy.

Two Agreements Outline 

Notification between the 

United States and Canada 

Though the U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards have had a spill notification 

process in place since 1978, Michigan and Ontario officials believed that 

another notification process was necessary at the state and provincial 

level to expedite notification of stakeholders such as drinking water 

facilities. To address this need, the State of Michigan and Province of 

Ontario agreed in 1988 to contact one another by phone if an

unanticipated or accidental discharge of pollutants occurred and the 

discharge was likely to adversely affect the adjoining jurisdiction or 

drinking water supply. Michigan State Police were designated as the 

authority responsible for this task by the state governor because they have 

the capability to receive information on a 24-hour basis, 7 days a week. 

According to Michigan State Police officials, this notification process was 

intended to provide immediate spill-related information to state 

authorities, who in turn could provide that information to stakeholders 

such as drinking water facilities. These officials told us that they believe 

that duplication in notification efforts at the federal and state levels is 

beneficial, because stakeholders at all levels are more likely to obtain 

information if multiple processes are involved, since any one system might 

fail. 

Page 20 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
The responsibility for communicating spill information to the public 

generally resides with state and local authorities, who are presumed to be 

the first agencies on the scene. This responsibility was established in the 

Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) of 

1986,

11 which requires states to establish an emergency planning and 

notification system. This system includes local emergency planning 

commissions, which are charged with creating procedures for receiving

and responding to public requests for information. However, there is no 

proactive notification requirement in the act for the local planning 

commissions. 

Neither Agreement is 

Explicit about When or 

How Quickly Notification 

Should Occur 

Neither the Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan nor the Ontario–

Michigan Joint Notification Plan contains explicit requirements for what 

types of spills warrant notification or how quickly notification must be 

given. For example, Ontario Ministry of Environment officials told us that 

they classify some sewer overflows as spills. These include sewage 

bypasses caused by equipment failure, power outages, and maintenance 

shutdowns. Michigan officials, on the other hand, do not consider these 

events to be spills because they are regulated separately. U.S. Coast Guard 

officials said they do not regularly provide information about sewer 

overflows to Canadian officials, since they are not required to do so, these 

events occur too frequently, and it would not be feasible to relay 

information on each occurrence in the corridor. Even when Ontario and 

Michigan officials agree on what type of event is considered a spill, they 

told us that they do not have a common understanding of what magnitude 

of spill requires notification. According to Michigan officials, the 

agreement does not specify spill volumes that trigger notification, because 

the agreement’s authors were more concerned with spill-material toxicity. 

Michigan and Ontario officials told us that they have tried to better define

when notification is required, but they are frustrated because they have 

not yet reached consensus on the issue. For example, Michigan officials 

independently explored the idea of notifying Ontario officials of spills only 

when spills exceeded 1,000 gallons. Ontario officials, upon learning of this 

limit, did not agree. They thought this figure was too high and also 

indicated that volume alone is not an adequate measure of potential 

impact. In their opinion, other factors such as toxicity and concentration 

also need to be considered. Since two large chemical spills occurred at 

Sarnia industrial facilities in 2003 and 2004, Ontario officials told us they 

 11Pub. L. No. 99-499, tit. III, 100 Stat. 1728 (1986). 

Page 21 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
have notified Michigan officials of spills of various sizes but have not

always been informed of large U.S. spills by Michigan authorities. Ontario 

officials provided some examples of when the Province learned of spills 

originating in Michigan and impacting Ontario through calls to the SAC 

from fisherman and other local stakeholders. Michigan State Police 

officials told us they are uncertain as to whether they are notified of all 

Canadian spills. These officials have not tracked spill notification to and 

from Ontario; however, they told us they intend to start doing so. 

Though the Ontario–Michigan spill notification agreement specifies that 

notification is to be immediate for those spills likely to adversely affect the 

adjoining jurisdiction, officials on both sides told us that they are not 

always notified in a timely manner. Michigan DEQ officials told us that the 

greatest lag in the notification process is the time between when a spill 

occurs and when it is reported by a responsible party to agency officials. 

Ontario officials told us that they are not always able to notify immediately 

because some assessment is often required to determine if there is any 

likelihood of an impact on the U.S. side. Ontario officials also told us that 

the number of parties or steps involved in the Michigan notification 

process is greater than those involved in their process, and this could 

contribute to delays in Michigan’s spill notification. A local official from a 

county bordering Lake St. Clair also told us that the process employed by 

Michigan State Police and Michigan DEQ officials to notify stakeholders 

has too many steps, and drinking water facilities are too far down on their 

list for timely notification. Two local officials told us that Michigan’s spill 

notification process should include electronic communication, rather than 

relying exclusively on a phone tree, since this provides too many 

opportunities for communication to be disrupted.

Six Selected Spill Incidents 

Illustrate the Various Ways 

Spill Notification Can 

Occur 

Spill notification varies from spill to spill, depending on the unique 

circumstances of the incident. We selected six spill cases to illustrate the 

various ways that spill notification can occur. These six cases were chosen 

to maximize variability among several factors including country of origin, 

spill material, and whether the responsible party was known. (See table 1.) 

Page 22 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Table 1: Characteristics of Six Selected Spill Incidents in the Corridor from 2001–2004 

Month/ 

year 

Country

of origin Location Material Volume estimate

Responsible

party Cause Impacts 

May 

2001 

United 

States 

Detroit 

River 

Ethylene 

Glycol and 

Propylene 

Glycol 

8.4 million gallons (CGa) 

25 million gallons storm 

water/ethylene glycol 

mixture (RPb

) 

Known Pipe from containment 

pond to sewer system 

became blocked 

Wildlife injury and 

death 

April 

2002 

United 

States 

Rouge 

and 

Detroit 

Rivers 

Oil/sewage

mixture 

321,000 gallons of oil 

(EPA) 

> 66,000 gallons of oil 

recovered (CG) 

Unknown CSO-related Wildlife injury and 

death 

Vessel transits 

delayed, cancelled, 

and diverted 

U.S. and Canadian 

shorelines oiled

August 

2004 

United 

States 

Rouge 

and 

Detroit 

Rivers 

Oil/sewage

mixture 

5,000 gallons (CG) UnknowncCSO-related None documented

August 

2003 

Canada St. Clair

River 

Vinyl 

chloride 

monomer 

34 and 5 gallon spills 

(RP) 

Known Cracked tube in heat 

exchanger 

None documented 

February 

2004 

Canada St. Clair

River 

Methyl ethyl 

ketone and 

methyl 

isobutyl 

ketone 

> 39,000 gallons (RP) Known Leaking heat 

exchanger 

Drinking water facility 

intake closures

May 

2004 

Canada St. Clair

River 

Oily water Unknown Known Rain caused oil 

separator overflows 

None documented 

Source: EPA, U.S. Coast Guard, Ontario SAC, and Michigan DEQ.

a

CG is an abbreviation for the Coast Guard. 

b

RP is an abbreviation for Responsible party. 

C

In this case, the City of Detroit was held accountable for the spill and another that occurred later that 

month, because both originated in their sewer system. 

In three of the six cases we reviewed, the public, rather than the 

responsible party, was the first source of spill information to response 

agencies. In one of these cases, the responsible party later provided the 

approximate time that the incident occurred and therefore we could 

calculate the time between spill occurrence and reporting, which was 

about 24 hours. Notification of agency officials and then drinking water 

facilities occurred most quickly when the responsible party reported the 

spill within 2.5 hours of its occurrence. In February and May of 2004, a 

spill of methyl ethyl ketone and then an oily water spill occurred in 

Ontario; these entered the St. Clair River. For these spills, Ontario officials 

Page 23 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
notified Michigan officials within 1 to 2 hours of the spill being reported.

Michigan drinking water facilities were then informed of the spill by 

Michigan officials within the next 1 to 2.5 hours. For these incidents, 

notification took less than 5 hours, from spill occurrence to notification of 

drinking water facilities. When responsible parties did not promptly report 

the spill, the notification process took 2 days or more. For two chemical 

spills that we reviewed, including an ethylene and propylene glycol spill in

Michigan and a vinyl chloride monomer spill in Ontario, the responsible 

party failed to notify regulatory officials until several days after the spill 

occurred. The Canadian spill was not detected by the responsible party, 

because their monitoring equipment was not running as a result of a 

power outage. The U.S. spill was not detected until a member of the public 

observed fish dying and reported it to Michigan DEQ officials; the 

responsible party failed to notify state officials of the spill. In addition, our 

review of six selected cases illustrated that in five cases, agencies notified 

one another per the notification agreements. In the case in which they did 

not, Michigan officials determined that there was no potential impact to 

Canadian waters. Finally, for the six spills we reviewed, drinking water 

facilities were not notified in three instances. In these cases, agency 

officials determined that it was unnecessary to notify the facilities 

because, in their view, the facilities would not be affected or the 

information was deemed too late to be useful. Figure 6 shows the 

notification milestones for the six spills we profiled. 

Page 24 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Figure 6: Notification Processes for Six Selected Spills in the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor 

012 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

1 2 3 456

United States

Canada

Day(s)

Type of spill

Hazardous

substance

Hazardous

substance

Hazardous

substance

Oil

Oil

Oil

5 28

May 2001

April 2002

August 2004

August 2003

February 2004

May 2004

Legend:

Spill occurred

Spill reported by a responsible party

Spill reported by the publicb

Inter-agency notification

Drinking water facilities notified

Hour(s)

Michigan water

facilities notified

First reported by

a responsible party

Yes No Yes No

Country of

 origin

and year

Sources: EPA, Coast Guard, Michigan DEQ, and Ontario SAC.

a

a

In these cases, the responsible party provided the approximate time the spill occurred. 

b

For the April 2002 and August 2004 spills, the responsible party was not identified and the time the 

spills occurred is unknown. 

Page 25 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Drinking water facility opinions varied—by location along the corridor—

about the timeliness of spill notification. While nearly all drinking water 

facility operators with facilities along the St. Clair River and northern half 

of Lake St. Clair told us that spill notification was not timely, almost all 

facility operators with facilities along the lower half of Lake St. Clair and 

the Detroit River told us that notification was timely. These facility 

operators indicated that proximity to spill locations makes a difference in 

their definition of notification timeliness because they might have more or 

less time to prepare for spill material to pass their intakes. Figure 7 

illustrates the location of U.S. drinking water facilities in the corridor. 

Despite the difference of opinion on notification timeliness, the majority of 

the 17 drinking water facility operators all along the corridor told us they 

would like to be notified of a spill immediately, or within 1 hour or less of 

its occurrence. In the six spills we profiled, notification never occurred in 

this time frame. 

Drinking Water Facility 

Operators’ Opinions on 

Current Notification 

Processes Varied but Many 

Expressed Concern That 

Potential for Plant 

Contamination Exists 

Figure 7: U.S. Drinking Water Facilities on the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor 

Lake Erie

Lake St. Clair

Lake Huron

Ontario, Canada

Michigan, U.S.

Sarnia

Grosse Pointe Farms

Highland Park

Mount

Clemens

Marysville

St. Clair

East China

Marine City

Algonac

Old Club

Port Huron

Ira

Township New

Baltimore

Detroit

Detroit

Water and Sewerage Dept.

Wyandotte

River Rouge

Sources: GAO; map, MapArt.

Detroit River

St. Clair River

Page 26 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Furthermore, many Michigan drinking water facility operators along the 

corridor expressed concern that their facilities could be contaminated by 

spills. Some cited factors that could increase the likelihood of facility 

contamination, such as vessel traffic along the corridor or the number of 

industries located along the corridor. They told us that spill notification 

plays a key role in whether their facilities might be contaminated. Some 

told us that spill notification is the most important factor in their ability to

protect the drinking water. Two facility operators also indicated that their 

customers have expressed concerns about the safety of their drinking 

water. Generally, facility operators located along the St. Clair River and 

the top of Lake St. Clair seemed to express greater concern than facility 

operators located along the southern part of Lake St. Clair and the Detroit 

River. For example, a facility operator in the northern part of the corridor 

told us that he believes drinking water facility contamination due to spills 

is “a matter of when, not if.” However, Michigan DEQ officials told us that 

several factors make it unlikely that spills in the St. Clair River will 

contaminate drinking water: 

• Drinking water intakes are 20–30 feet below the water’s surface. 

• The river has distinct channels, and it is difficult for a pollutant originating 

on one side of the river to cross these channels. 

• At 180,000 to 200,000 cubic feet per second, the river flows so quickly that 

pollutants are flushed downstream before they affect drinking water. 

In contrast, Michigan DEQ officials told us that Canadian drinking water 

facilities are more vulnerable to contamination from spills in the St. Clair 

River. These officials noted that Canadian drinking water facilities have 

shut down more often than Michigan facilities as a result of spills in the 

corridor. They noted that the most vulnerable Canadian drinking water 

facility is located on Walpole Island, directly downstream of Sarnia, and it

provides drinking water to members of a First Nation community.12

Currently there are, or will soon be, efforts under way to supplement the 

existing spill notification processes employed by the U.S. and Canadian 

Coast Guards, and Michigan and Ontario officials. Informal notification 

Efforts Have Been Made to 

Supplement Existing 

Notification Processes 

 12First Nation tribes are composed of indigenous people of North America located in what 

is now Canada. 

Page 27 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
processes are already being employed along the corridor. For example, a

local emergency management coordinator in the St. Clair River area of the 

corridor has developed an informal agreement with Canadian industry 

representatives to call and notify him directly of any spills into the St. Clair 

River. Upon receiving spill information, he provides the information 

directly to drinking water facility operators along the portion of the 

corridor that borders the St. Clair River. Three drinking water facility 

operators listed him as their first source of spill information. In addition, 

Sarnia-Lambton Environmental Association (SLEA) officials told us that 

their member facilities contact Michigan drinking water facilities directly 

in the event of a spill. Several drinking water facility operators confirmed 

that they have received notification from members of this consortium of 

Canadian industries. 

In addition, two monitoring systems are being developed by officials from 

counties bordering the corridor and Michigan DEQ officials, who have 

obtained federal grants to install spill detection equipment in the St. Clair 

and Detroit Rivers. These systems are designed to provide spill 

information directly to drinking water facility operators with water 

monitoring equipment located near their intakes. One monitoring system, 

for the St. Clair River and Lake St. Clair, is funded by an EPA grant of 

$962,200 to Macomb and St. Clair Counties. The other monitoring system, 

for the Detroit River, is funded by a DHS grant of $760,000 to Michigan 

DEQ. The officials involved in obtaining both grants told us they are 

coordinating their efforts so that an overall network of water quality 

monitors will be more seamless along the corridor. For example, they plan 

to purchase the same monitoring equipment so that maintenance can be 

shared. EPA and Michigan DEQ officials estimate that the monitoring 

systems will be in place in the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers no later than 

2007 (see fig. 8). These systems are based on the Ohio River Valley 

Sanitation Commission’s (ORSANCO) spill detection and notification 

system, established in 1978 to protect drinking water intakes from 

chemical contamination. For additional information on this system, see 

appendix VI.

Page 28 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Figure 8: Existing and Proposed Water Quality Monitoring Stations in the St. Clair–

Detroit River Corridor

EPA’s spill prevention program addresses only oil spills, and EPA is 

uncertain as to which facilities are governed by its spill prevention 

requirements. EPA Region 5 conducted varying numbers of spill 

prevention-related inspections per year in the corridor for the time frame 

we reviewed, and their inspections uncovered significant spill prevention 

deficiencies. In contrast, the Coast Guard’s spill prevention efforts include 

oil and hazardous substances. The Coast Guard’s District 9 inspections 

targeted a greater number of the facilities and vessels they regulate; 

however, the Coast Guard’s inspections were multi-mission rather than 

focused on spill prevention exclusively. Their inspections revealed minor 

spill prevention-related issues. In response to spills and noncompliance 

issues, EPA and the Coast Guard issued a total of 16 penalties in the time 

period we reviewed. 

Courtright

Detroit

River Rouge

Detroit River

SLEA water quality 

monitoring station

Proposed water 

quality monitoring 

equipment

Sources: GAO; map, MapArt.

Lake Erie

Ontario, Canada

Lake St. Clair

Michig Sarnia an, U.S.

Lake Huron

St. Clair

Algonac

Proposed water 

quality monitoring 

equipment

St. Clair River

EPA’s Spill Prevention 

and Enforcement 

Efforts Are Limited 

and the Coast Guard 

Addresses Spill 

Prevention as Part of 

Other Compliance 

Efforts

Page 29 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
EPA’s Prevention Program 

Addresses Only Oil Spills 

While EPA has the authority to address spill prevention for both oil and 

hazardous substances, its program only addresses oil. In 1972, in 

amendments to the Clean Water Act, Congress called for regulations to 

prevent discharges of oil and hazardous substances; in 1974, EPA’s SPCC 

program became effective. EPA’s regulations require non-transportation 

related facilities with specified oil storage capacities13 which, because of 

their location, could reasonably be expected to discharge oil into the 

navigable waters, to implement a SPCC plan that has been certified by a 

licensed engineer. These plans should identify the location and types of 

stored oil, discharge prevention measures, drainage controls, and methods 

of disposal. Facilities must also meet certain operational standards that 

include having 

• necessary containment structures or equipment;14

• periodic integrity tests of containers and leak tests of valves and piping; 

and 

• training for oil-handling personnel on equipment operation and 

maintenance, discharge procedure protocols, pollution control laws and 

rules, facility operations, and the contents of their facility’s SPCC plan. 

In the late 1970s, EPA proposed hazardous substance spill prevention 

regulations, but they were never finalized. EPA officials speculated that,

possibly, these regulations were not finalized because oil spills were more

prevalent, hazardous substance spills have shorter-term effects than oil 

spills, and because EPA focused on the NPDES program to control 

chronic pollutant discharges. 

While EPA’s spill prevention program targets oil spills, the Coast Guard’s 

program addresses spill prevention for both oil and hazardous substances. 

The program applies to facilities or vessels that are capable of transferring 

oil or hazardous materials, in bulk, to or from vessels of certain minimum 

capacity. Facilities are required to develop an operations manual, employ

 13The regulation applies to non-transportation-related facilities with a total above ground 

(i.e., not completely buried) oil storage capacity of greater than 1,320 gallons, or total 

completely buried oil storage capacity greater than 42,000 gallons. In addition to the

storage capacity criteria, to be regulated, a facility, due to its location, must reasonably be 

expected to discharge oil into navigable waters of the United States or adjoining shorelines, 

into the waters of the contiguous zone, or that may affect federal natural resources. 

14Alternatively, they may explain in the SPCC plan why such measures are not practicable. 

Page 30 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
qualified personnel, and meet equipment standards. The operations 

manual must contain a description of the facility layout, the location of 

important equipment and personnel, and a discussion of procedures for 

transfer operations and emergencies. The manual must also include a

summary of applicable laws and information concerning personnel 

training and qualifications. Also, each facility must have emergency 

shutdown capacity and specified discharge containment features. Vessels 

are required to have written transfer procedures for oil and hazardous 

substances, meet maintenance and equipment standards, and employ 

qualified personnel. 

In addition to the Coast Guard and EPA’s prevention programs, the 

Michigan DEQ has a spill prevention program that is administered in 

conjunction with their NPDES program. This program requires that 

facilities that store or use oil or polluting substances, or those that may be 

deemed a hazard to waters of the state, create and implement spill 

prevention plans and inform Michigan DEQ of the plan’s completion and 

availability upon request.15 Michigan DEQ’s pollution prevention plans are 

to include a 

• polluting material inventory; 

• detailed facility plan, including floor drains and loading areas; 

• secondary storage container description; and 

• discussion of precipitation management. 

The plans are also to include spill control and cleanup procedures and are 

required to be reevaluated every 3 years (or whenever a material release 

occurs). If a facility is also subject to EPA’s SPCC program, it may submit 

a combination spill prevention plan that meets both state and federal 

requirements. If the facility is only subject to the Michigan DEQ’s spill 

prevention planning requirements, it is not required to have its plans 

certified by an engineer.

 15Facilities subject to Michigan DEQ’s Part 5 Rules are those that meet the definition of oil 

storage or on-land facility and receive, process, manufacture, use, store, or ship oil, salt, or 

polluting materials above the specified threshold management quantities (TMQs). The

TMQs are: total above ground capacity of 1,320 gallons or one tank larger than 660 gallons 

of oil; five solid tons or 1,000 gallons of salt; and outdoor use or storage of 440 pounds (or 

indoor use or storage of 2,200 pounds) of polluting materials.

Page 31 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
On the Canadian side of the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor, the Ontario 

Ministry of Environment did not have spill prevention regulations in place 

in the time frame we reviewed. Instead, the Ministry issued orders which 

required individual companies to conduct spill prevention planning, or it 

required spill prevention planning as a requirement for companies seeking 

a Certificate of Approval, which is required before operating. Due in part 

to the large chemical spills in 2003 and 2004 originating from facilities in 

Sarnia, the Ontario Ministry of Environment introduced new legislation 

under its Environmental Protection Act which addresses the requirement 

for spill prevention planning.16

EPA Region 5 does not know the universe of facilities that are subject to 

its spill prevention program requirements and it conducts varying numbers 

of inspections of known facilities under its jurisdiction in the corridor. 

Facilities that must comply with SPCC regulations are not required to 

report to the agency, so EPA does not have an inventory of facilities it 

regulates. The challenge this presents is not limited to the corridor, as EPA 

officials are uncertain as to how many facilities should comply with SPCC 

program requirements nationwide. In the corridor, EPA Region 5 has 

identified 59 facilities (of a greater number) that are required to meet 

SPCC requirements, either through special multi-media inspection 

initiatives or by referrals from Michigan DEQ. 

While SPCC plans must be reevaluated and reviewed every 5 years, a 

specified inspection frequency is not contained in EPA’s regulations. EPA 

officials in Region 5, which encompasses the corridor, rely on roughly 

three SPCC inspectors to conduct all plan reviews and provide all 

compliance assistance for facilities in the six-state region. According to 

these officials, with current SPCC resource constraints, they could only 

inspect facilities once every 500 years or more. From 1994 to 2004, EPA 

Region 5 inspected an average of 10 percent of the 59 known SPCCregulated facilities in the corridor per year. (See fig. 9.) 

EPA Is Uncertain As to 

Which Facilities Are 

Regulated by Its Spill 

Prevention Program, and 

Conducts Varying 

Numbers of Inspections 

Per Year 

 16Section 91.1 of the act requires implementing regulations that were not finalized as of the

issuance of this report. 

Page 32 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Figure 9: Number of SPCC Inspections Conducted in the St. Clair–Detroit River 

Corridor from 1994–2004 

Note: In 2001, EPA Region 5 did not conduct any SPCC inspections in the corridor.

EPA Region 5 inspected a number of these SPCC-regulated facilities as 

part of several multi-media inspection efforts conducted by their 

Enforcement and Compliance Assistance Team, including the Detroit 

River and Flyway Enforcement and Compliance Assistance Initiative. This 

effort identified and inspected 28 facilities in the Detroit area for 

compliance with multiple EPA programs, including the SPCC program; 

some of the inspected facilities overlap with a portion of the facilities 

along the corridor. When SPCC program officials inspect a facility they use 

a standardized approach, which includes the following: 

Year 

Source: GAO analysis of EPA data. 

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Number of SPCC inspections

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

• an in-depth review of the facility’s SPCC plan; 

• an interview with the facility owner or operator; 

• a physical inspection of the facility; 

• a verification of equipment, containment structures, and buildings; 

Page 33 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
• a review of facility inspections and training records; security and integrity 

testing; and

• verification that the facility’s SPCC plan has been certified by a licensed

engineer. 

While EPA has a separate program for spill prevention, the Coast Guard 

addresses spill prevention during its routine safety and security 

inspections of facilities and vessels. The Coast Guard’s District 9 regulates 

over 100 facilities and 23 vessels stationed in the corridor, as well as 

vessels that travel through the corridor. It also regulates the transfer of oil 

and hazardous substances. The Coast Guard inspects facilities and vessels

to a much greater extent per year than EPA; however, its inspections are 

multi-purpose rather than focused exclusively on spill prevention. The 

Coast Guard’s annual facility inspections incorporate spill prevention 

components that are similar to EPA’s SPCC inspection components, but 

their material transfer inspections and spot checks are not comparable to 

EPA’s focused spill prevention inspections. From 1994 to 2004, the Coast 

Guard’s District 9 inspected an average of 44 facilities, 135 vessels, and 30 

material transfer events per year, for safety, security, and pollution 

prevention requirements. When material transfer events are excluded, the

Coast Guard inspected, on average, about 44 percent of the facilities in 

their jurisdiction per year—compared to EPA’s inspections of roughly 10 

percent of the known SPCC-regulated facilities. However, we are 

uncertain as to how many of the Coast Guard’s yearly inspections were onsite inspections that are comparable to EPA’s SPCC inspections as 

opposed to spot checks or other multi-purpose inspections that the Coast 

Guard conducts. The Coast Guard conducts regular on-site inspections 

that consist of a check of maintenance and operation procedures, as well 

as a facility or vessel’s spill prevention planning. For their annual facility 

inspections, Coast Guard officials review, among other items: 

• contents of operations manuals, including specifications for containment

equipment; 

• transfer equipment requirements, including an examination of transfer 

pipes for defects; and 

• facility operations, including whether the designated person in charge has 

certification of completion of required training. 

Page 34 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
While some inspections are conducted on-site, the Coast Guard also 

conducts remote examinations, such as viewing a transfer of materials 

from a distance using binoculars. The specific type and number of 

inspections conducted by the Coast Guard from 1994 through 2004 is 

shown in table 2. 

Table 2: Number of Coast Guard Facility, Vessel, and Transfer Inspections 

Conducted in the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor from 1994–2004 

Year 

Facility 

inspections

Vessel 

inspections

Material transfer 

inspections

Total

inspections

1994 92 157 37 286

1995 63 172 36 271

1996 42 181 33 256

1997 22 166 44 232

1998 17 151 19 187

1999 16 89 40 145

2000 14 94 62 170

2001 29 122 33 184

2002 31 152 14 197

2003 31 99 10 140

2004 131 100 —a231

Total 488 1,483 328 2,299

Source: GAO analysis of the Coast Guard’s data. 

a

Data were not provided for 2004.

In addition to EPA and the Coast Guard, the Michigan DEQ inspects 

facilities for compliance with its spill prevention program during its 

regular NPDES program inspections. According to Michigan DEQ officials, 

their inspectors do not keep track of the number of spill prevention 

inspections conducted or deficiencies found due to a lack of funding for 

its spill prevention program. Further, the universe of facilities regulated by 

its spill prevention program is unknown—but approximately 400 facilities

that are in Michigan DEQ’s Southeast District, which is a larger area that 

includes the U.S. side of the corridor—have submitted certified spill 

prevention plans. On the Canadian side of the corridor, Ontario’s Ministry 

of Environment conducts inspections that include a spill prevention 

component. Ministry of Environment officials were able to provide 

inspection data from 2003 to 2005, which indicated that they inspected 

roughly 35 petrochemical and related facilities per year. The inspections 

conducted in 2004 and 2005 reflect the work that an “Environmental SWAT 

Page 35 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Team” conducted.17 The focus of this special initiative was on facilities 

with the potential for future spills that could pose risks to human health 

and the environment. The inspections included a comprehensive review of 

the facilities’ air emissions, water discharges, and spill prevention and 

contingency plans. 

EPA Region 5 officials told us that the spill prevention inspections they 

conducted from 1994 through 2004 disclosed significant and numerous 

deficiencies, such as failure to provide for secondary containment or 

failure to prepare spill prevention plans. For example, an SPCC inspector 

found that one company failed to prepare its SPCC plan within 6 months 

of beginning operations, and failed to implement its plan within 1 year. In 

addition, the facility never had its SPCC plan certified by a professional 

engineer. The SPCC inspector found that another facility had no additional 

containment around some bulk storage tanks, and it failed to amend its 

SPCC plan as required. In contrast, Coast Guard officials from District 9 

told us that their inspections revealed that nearly all facilities and vessels 

were in compliance, and those that were not had only minor 

noncompliance issues related to spill prevention, such as incidental 

omissions in operations manuals. For example, Coast Guard officials 

found instances in which a facility operator initialed only one section of a 

required form, rather than at multiple sections. The Coast Guard officials 

also found other minor violations that related to aged hoses outside their 

service life and inadequate lighting. 

Michigan DEQ officials told us that their inspections revealed that some 

facilities do not have spill prevention plans, or did not certify compliance 

with them. In some cases, facilities that already had some secondary 

containment or protection in place needed further upgrades in order to 

come into compliance with the state’s spill prevention requirements. For 

example, during one inspection, Michigan DEQ found that a facility had 

developed a spill prevention plan, but it was not adequately managing its 

materials in order to prevent storm water from contacting the materials 

and discharging them into the waterways. On the Canadian side, Ontario’s 

Environmental SWAT Team found that 34 of the 35 facilities inspected in 

EPA Inspections 

Uncovered Significant Spill

Prevention Deficiencies, 

Whereas the Coast Guard’s 

Inspections Revealed 

Minor Issues 

 17The Environmental SWAT Team is a specialized group that can be rapidly deployed to

address critical environmental issues. It complements ongoing work that the Ministry of 

Environment, including its district offices, pursues, including inspection and enforcement

activities. The 2004 inspections in the Sarnia area were the result of concerns raised by

chemical spills that occurred in 2003. 

Page 36 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
2004 and 2005 were not in compliance with one or more legislative and 

regulatory requirements. Eight facilities did not have spill prevention and 

contingency plans. Other deficiencies found during inspections included:

• a Certificate of Approval was not obtained for operations; 

• equipment, systems, processes, or structures were altered contrary to the

existing Certificate of Approval; and

• chemicals were improperly handled, stored, and identified. 

EPA and the Coast Guard issued 16 penalties in response to spills, 

noncompliance with spill prevention programs, or for failure to report 

spills during the period we reviewed. EPA Region 5 issued four penalties, 

primarily for SPCC violations, that were assessed at an average of $39,000 

each during the 11-year period. During the same time period, the Coast 

Guard’s District 9 issued 12 penalties for spills that were assessed at an 

average of $2,100 each. See figure 10 for total amounts of penalties 

assessed by EPA and the Coast Guard per year from 1994 through 2004. 

EPA and the Coast Guard 

Issued a Total of 16 

Penalties during the Period 

Reviewed 

Page 37 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Figure 10: EPA and Coast Guard Spill-Related Penalties Assessed from 1994 to

2004 in the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor

Note: In 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 no financial penalties were issued by EPA or the Coast Guard. 

EPA Region 5 officials told us they rely primarily on assisting companies 

in coming into compliance with spill prevention program regulations, and 

they pursue enforcement actions and issue financial penalties when 

companies fail to respond to their assistance. They also explained that

limited staff resources are available to pursue enforcement actions. EPA 

Region 5 has the equivalent of roughly one and a half full time staff 

persons devoted to spill-related enforcement duties conducted by the 

Office of Regional Counsel and the Oil Program. The Oil Program is 

responsible for determining noncompliance with the SPCC program, 

which entails establishing a history of spills or noncompliance; it is then 

responsible for determining penalty amounts. 

Determining noncompliance and identifying responsible parties for spills, 

however, can be problematic for EPA. While EPA Region 5 officials told us 

they use their spill data when pursuing an enforcement case, the agency, 

Year

Source: GAO analysis of EPA and Coast Guard data.

Amount collected (dollars in thousands)

45

65

85

105

125

0

4

8

12

16

20

Coast Guard

EPA

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Page 38 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
for most spills, does not confirm the validity of the spill data or gather 

additional information. Michigan DEQ responds to most reported spills in 

the corridor, but EPA Region 5 does not coordinate with Michigan DEQ to 

collect information for enforcement purposes. It is EPA’s policy to collect

spill information directly because, according to EPA officials, it is 

preferable to have first-hand knowledge in the event that staff have to

testify or provide a deposition for an enforcement case, among other 

reasons. To gather additional information, Oil Program officials stated that 

they send requests to facilities for spill-related information that they can 

then use in enforcement cases. If spill information is obtained, EPA Region 

5 officials told us that their informal policy is not to pursue an

enforcement case when the proposed penalty is less than $11,000 or the 

spill involves less than 100 gallons or two barrels of oil. They also stated 

that in most cases for which they issued a penalty, the amounts were 

ultimately reduced substantially through negotiations with the responsible 

party. For example, one facility was issued a financial penalty of 

approximately $320,000 for a spill prevention violation and the negotiated

final payment was $25,000. 

Like EPA, the Coast Guard relies primarily on assisting companies in 

coming into compliance with spill prevention program regulations. The 

average financial penalties that were assessed by the Coast Guard’s 

District 9 were relatively low compared to the maximum financial penalty 

of $32,500 that it has the authority to issue for a spill violation. Coast 

Guard officials from District 9 told us that, in determining penalties, they

take into account how much a facility or vessel owner has already paid for 

the cost of cleaning up a spill.18 In regard to why no penalties were 

assessed for spill prevention program violations, officials from the Coast 

Guard stated that they have the authority to order a facility or vessel to 

cease operations if it does not comply with their spill prevention program, 

and this serves as a strong deterrent to noncompliance. They added that 

large financial penalties have not been needed due to the cooperation of 

companies coming into compliance with their prevention regulations. 

 18Coast Guard officials stated that penalties are determined by hearing officers based upon 

multiple factors, including the size of the spill, the product discharged, the environmental 

or economic sensitivity of the impacted area, the measures in place by the responsible 

party to prevent discharges, the steps taken by the responsible party as a result of the

discharge toward preventing further discharges, as well as the financial impact of the 

cleanup operations. 

Page 39 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Similar to the Coast Guard, Michigan DEQ did not issue penalties for 

noncompliance with their spill prevention program in the time frame we 

reviewed. Michigan DEQ did, however, issue four penalties averaging 

$35,000 to responsible parties for spills in the corridor. Michigan DEQ also 

issued three penalties for multiple violations including spills and industrial 

permit violations; the penalties totaled approximately $300,000. Lastly, in

Ontario, the Ministry of Environment did not have the authority to issue 

administrative penalties for spills until 2005.19 Prior to that time, the 

Ministry of Environment pursued spill-related penalties through the 

provincial court system and from 2002 to 2004, four facilities were 

assessed penalties averaging approximately $171,000 in U.S. dollars after 

successful prosecutions. 

In addition, though EPA and Coast Guard officials acknowledge that spill 

reporting is not always occurring, the agencies did not penalize 

responsible parties for failure to report chemical releases in the time 

period we reviewed. We are, however, uncertain as to how many chemical

releases occurred in the corridor due to data limitations. The authority 

provided under the EPCRA allows EPA officials to penalize regulated 

industries for failure to report, in a timely fashion, spills of reportable 

quantities of hazardous or extremely hazardous substances. However, EPA 

Region 5’s Chemical Preparedness officials who administer EPCRA told us 

that they rely on 30 to 40 information requests sent to companies per year 

for the entire six-state region to gather the necessary information on 

reporting in order to pursue enforcement. They stated that, with three staff 

for the region to enforce the EPCRA and other regulations related to 

chemical releases, they lack the resources to inspect more than roughly 15

facilities per year to determine compliance with timely notification and 

other reporting requirements. They did not issue any penalties for failure 

to report chemical releases in the corridor in the time frame we reviewed. 

Superfund authorizes EPA and the Coast Guard to issue penalties for 

failure to report hazardous substance spills, but neither agency did so in 

the time frame we reviewed. The Clean Water Act, on the other hand, does 

not authorize civil penalties for a responsible party’s failure to notify NRC 

of an oil spill; only criminal sanctions are available. Michigan DEQ officials 

may make a criminal complaint or request that the state’s Attorney 

General pursue civil action for failure to report spills; however, they did

 19Bill 133, also known as the Environmental Enforcement Statute Law Amendment Act, was 

passed by the Ontario Legislature on June 9, 2005; this legislation provides the Ministry of

Environment with the authority to issue penalties for spills. 

Page 40 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
not in the period we reviewed. On the Canadian side of the corridor, 

Ontario’s Environmental Protection Act provides Ministry of Environment 

officials with the authority to penalize responsible parties for failure to 

report spills, as this is a violation of the act. The Ministry did so recently, 

and the company responsible for a large chemical spill into the St. Clair 

River in 2003 was charged and convicted of failing to report the spill 

immediately. 

Spill-related penalties that are collected by EPA and the Coast Guard help 

supplement the funds that provide for response efforts when a responsible 

party is not identified to pay costs. In these cases, EPA and the Coast 

Guard may obtain financing from the Oil Fund or Superfund to pay for 

their response efforts, including the cleanup.20 But these funds are being 

depleted by cleanup efforts in the corridor and are not being replenished 

through the cost recovery process because, in many cases, the responsible 

parties have not been identified. Fund data maintained by the National 

Pollution Funds Center show that, from 1994 to 2004, 

• approximately $8.4 million21 from the Oil Fund financed oil spill cleanups 

in the corridor, for which $80,067 was recovered to offset those 

expenditures, and 

• approximately $17,000 from Superfund financed hazardous material spill 

cleanups, with no additional funds recovered to offset those expenditures. 

Spills of oil and hazardous substances into waters of the corridor continue 

to be a concern, and agencies responsible for addressing this problem face 

challenges on several fronts including obtaining accurate spill information, 

and conducting spill notification and comprehensive prevention efforts. 

Officials from EPA Region 5 and Coast Guard’s District 9 concur that 

accurate spill information is not available and acknowledge that such 

information could be improved by better incorporating data, including 

final spill volume estimates, obtained through their spill response efforts. 

Coast Guard officials from District 9 also acknowledge that they could

help update the NRC’s spill information by documenting which duplicative 

Conclusions 

 20These funds may also be utilized when the responsible party is known, but unable to pay 

for spill response. 

21The 2002 Rouge River spill accounts for approximately $7 million of the total spent in the 

11-year time frame. 

Page 41 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
NRC spill reports are linked to common incidents. Better documentation 

of response efforts and the results of spill investigations could assist EPA 

and the Coast Guard in targeting inspection and enforcement efforts to the 

highest-priority need. Spill notification under the agreement between the 

United States and Canada, and Michigan and Ontario, while limited, 

appears to be meeting its intended purpose. Effective spill prevention 

helps reduce contaminants flowing into waters of the corridor. EPA’s spill 

prevention efforts are hampered by the fact that it does not know the 

universe of facilities regulated by its program, the scope of its program is 

focused only on oil, and limited resources are available for implementing 

the program—particularly for inspections. Given the focus and resource 

limitations which impact EPA’s ability to pursue spill prevention and 

enforcement activities, EPA could collect information about the facilities 

that are regulated in order to better define goals for the frequency and 

extensiveness of their inspections. 

To better ensure that spill data are available to target their inspection and 

enforcement efforts, and to improve the overall effectiveness of spill 

notification, we are recommending that the EPA Administrator direct EPA 

Region 5; and that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the 

Commandant of the Coast Guard and the Commander of District 9 to take 

the following two actions: 

• maintain and update spill information to include the results of 

investigations and explore the feasibility of updating spill information 

maintained by the NRC, and 

• determine whether existing spill notification processes can be improved or 

modified to provide reduced and consistent notification time frames. 

In addition, to better utilize spill prevention resources, we recommend 

that the EPA Administrator consider gathering information on which 

facilities are regulated under its spill prevention program. We also 

recommend that the EPA Administrator direct Region 5 to develop goals 

for the frequency and extensiveness of its inspections. 

GAO provided a draft of this report to EPA and DHS for review and 

comment. DHS provided comments on the draft report and generally 

agreed with our findings and conclusions. EPA provided only technical 

comments regarding the report. DHS did not address our 

recommendations. EPA commented on the feasibility of our 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 42 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
recommendations regarding gathering information on SPCC regulated 

facilities and updating spill information maintained by the NRC. 

While DHS generally agreed with our findings and conclusions, the agency 

commented on our observation that the Coast Guard does not update spill

volume estimates in its automated spill data system. Specifically, the 

agency cited an example used in our report and noted that it was the result 

of unusual circumstances that arose during the transition from one data 

system to another. In addition, DHS noted that Coast Guard investigators 

do have the ability to update spill volume estimates in investigative report 

narratives. We acknowledge that the Coast Guard transitioned from one 

data system to another in the time frame we reviewed. However, Coast 

Guard officials told us that with the current data system, initial spill 

volume estimates cannot be readily updated, except in the narrative of the 

investigation reports. We acknowledge that investigators do have the 

ability to update volumes in the report narratives but initial volume 

estimates cannot be changed in the volume data field of the current 

system. It is difficult to readily assess the magnitude of spills based on the 

initial volume estimates contained in the automated spill data. 

Furthermore, Coast Guard officials told us that they would benefit from an 

additional field in their spill data system which incorporated final spill 

volume estimates. In addition, DHS commented that additional factors 

should be considered in our report regarding agency efforts to penalize 

responsible parties for failure to report spills. DHS acknowledged that the 

responsible parties for many spills are not identified and, while penalties 

were not assessed for failure to report spills in the corridor in the time 

frame we reviewed, DHS stated that the Coast Guard, with the Department 

of Justice, has successfully prosecuted responsible parties for spills 

outside the corridor. The full text of DHS’s comments is included in 

appendix VII. 

EPA provided the following three comments on our report. First, EPA 

stated that it does respond to every spill, whether directly or indirectly, in 

the same way that the Coast Guard responds. However, EPA could not 

provide documentation of its response efforts whereas the Coast Guard 

provided documentation that indicated what actions were taken in 

response to each spill. In addition, EPA stated that its spill responders rely 

heavily on Michigan DEQ to respond to spills and coordinate response 

actions with the Coast Guard. EPA also said that it responded directly to 

greater than one percent of spills—as opposed to less than one percent, as

previously stated by EPA officials. Nevertheless, the level of EPA’s 

response is unclear due to lack of documentation. Second, EPA 

commented on our recommendation that it update spill information 

Page 43 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
maintained by the NRC. We acknowledge that EPA does not modify spill 

data maintained by the NRC; however, our recommendation was that it 

explore the feasibility of updating spill information maintained by the NRC 

by informing NRC of duplicate spill reports. While EPA maintains that 

information on spills can now be updated using a new system called Web 

EOC, and our report acknowledges that Web EOC is a method to update 

spill data electronically, the extent of its use is uncertain according to EPA 

officials. Finally, EPA commented on the feasibility of our 

recommendation that it gather information on facilities that are covered 

under its spill prevention program. EPA stated that there is no authority in

the Clean Water Act or the prevention regulations for facilities to provide 

this information to EPA. It further stated that under the Paperwork 

Reduction Act the agency would need to seek approval from the Office of

Management and Budget. However, EPA has previously identified SPCC 

facilities in the corridor. If the agency determines that formal rulemaking 

is necessary for it to gather information on which facilities are covered 

under its spill prevention program, then we believe it should consider 

undertaking such a rulemaking. EPA officials also provided specific 

technical comments and clarifications on the draft report that we have 

incorporated in the report as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to appropriate 

Congressional Committees, the EPA Administrator, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, and various other federal and state agencies. We also 

will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report 

will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 44 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-3841 or

stephensonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in 

appendix VIII. 

John B. Stephenson 

Director, Natural Resources 

 and Environment 

Page 45 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
List of Congressional Requesters 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Debbie Stabenow 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Sander M. Levin 

House of Representatives 

Page 46 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

We were asked to examine (1) how many oil and hazardous substance 

spills of more than 50 gallons (or of an unknown volume) were reported in

the St. Clair–Detroit River corridor from 1994 to 2004, and how accurately

reported spills reflect the extent of actual spills; (2) what processes are 

used to notify parties of spills, and whether they contain explicit 

requirements for reporting times and spill magnitude; and (3) the extent of

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Coast Guard’s spill 

prevention efforts and enforcement activities in the St. Clair–Detroit River 

corridor from 1994 through 2004. 

To determine the number of oil and hazardous substance spills of more 

than 50 gallons (or of an unknown volume) reported in the St. Clair–

Detroit River corridor from 1994 to 2004, and to what extent they 

represent actual spills, we obtained information on spills with those 

characteristics reported in the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair, the Detroit 

River, and a highly industrialized tributary, the Rouge River. We obtained

data sets with these attributes from the National Response Center (NRC), 

EPA Region 5, the Coast Guard’s Headquarters, Michigan’s Department of 

Environmental Quality (Michigan DEQ), and the Spills Action Centre 

(SAC) operated by the Ontario Ministry of Environment. To assess the 

reliability of each data set we questioned and interviewed knowledgeable 

officials about the data and the systems that produced them, and manually 

reviewed the data. Limitations to the data are discussed in the report and

in appendix II. When appropriate, we analyzed the data sets individually to

determine spill frequency over time and spill characteristics, such as 

volume and the type of material spilled. We were not able to combine the 

spill data sets for analysis because each entity tracks spills differently, and

we were limited in what we could conclude from the individual data sets 

because the degree to which they are updated varies widely. We also 

obtained EPA and Michigan DEQ data sets related to other pollutant 

discharges, such as combined sewer overflows (CSO) and industrial 

discharge permit violations, to provide context for the spill data and 

obtain more complete information on pollutants discharged into the water 

bodies of the St. Clair–Detroit River corridor. These data are likely subject 

to the same limitations as the spill data, in that industrial permit violations 

and CSOs are self-reported and facilities may be reluctant to report these 

events; however, spills may be particularly subject to underreporting 

because they are not part of a structured program as are CSOs and 

industrial permit violations. 

To assess what processes are used to notify parties of spills and whether 

they contain explicit requirements for reporting times and spill magnitude, 

we reviewed applicable laws and spill notification agreements and 

Page 47 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

obtained information on implementation of these agreements from EPA, 

the Coast Guard, Michigan DEQ, the Michigan State Police, and Canadian

officials. In addition, we obtained and analyzed documentation on six 

spills to better understand how the notification process was conducted in 

specific incidents. We selectively sampled the spill data sets for spills to 

illustrate the implementation of notification practices under various 

scenarios, including spills with source locations in both the United States 

and Canada and spills of differing materials and volumes. We questioned 

the 17 drinking water facility operators on the U.S. side of the corridor to 

obtain their perspectives on the timeliness of spill notification. We further 

obtained information on the automated monitoring system maintained by

Sarnia-Lambton Environmental Association, planned automated 

monitoring on the U.S. side of the corridor, and the monitoring conducted 

by the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission. 

To determine the extent of EPA and the Coast Guard’s spill prevention 

efforts and enforcement activities in the St. Clair–Detroit River corridor 

from 1994–2004, we first obtained and analyzed laws, regulations, and 

agency policies regarding spill prevention and enforcement. This included 

obtaining information on the potential enforcement penalty dollar 

amounts. We also obtained data from EPA, the Coast Guard, Michigan 

DEQ, and the Ontario Ministry of Environment on spill-related 

enforcement actions taken in the corridor since 1994. We analyzed the 

information to determine the number of inspections conducted, the types

of violations found, and the penalties assessed for each documented 

violation. Finally, we obtained information from the various agencies on 

the resources devoted to inspections and enforcement; the use of those 

resources; and priorities in using the resources. 

We performed our work from September 2005 to June 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 48 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
A

Detr

ppendix II: Spill Data for the St. Clair–

oit River Corridor, 1994–2004 

Page 49 GAO-06-639

Appendix II: Spill Data for the St. Clair–

Detroit River Corridor, 1994–2004 

Spill data sets were available from four sources: EPA, the Coast Guard, 

Michigan DEQ, and the Ontario SAC. Each data set is unique; however, 

some spill incidents are found in multiple data sets and therefore they 

cannot be combined or consolidated. The relative quality of each data set 

depends in part on whether it is updated after additional information is 

obtained from spill investigations or whether minimal updates are made, 

as with the EPA spill data set. Generally, all of the spill data sets have a 

common data reliability limitation which stems from uncertainty regarding

whether all incidents are reported. Of note, the data sets for EPA and the 

Ontario SAC contained a large number of incidents with unknown 

volumes. 

EPA’s spill data set is not routinely updated after EPA responders conduct 

investigations. Therefore, the data reflect preliminary information about 

spills received from the NRC, and the data likely do not represent the 

actual number and nature of spills. We are presenting this data for 

informational purposes only. The data set contained a total of 916 spill 

incidents that occurred in the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair, Detroit River, 

and Rouge River from 1994 through 2004 and that had volumes of greater 

than 50 gallons (or of an unknown volume). About 45 percent of the spills 

were oil-related. The number of spills has varied over time, not showing 

either an increasing or decreasing trend. The EPA data showed that the

greatest number of spills occurred in 1994. 

EPA Spill Data 

Clean Water
Appendix II: Spill Data for the St. Clair–

Detroit River Corridor, 1994–2004 

Table 3: EPA Spill Data by Year and Material 

Year Oilsa

Unknown 

material

Gasoline 

and 

fuelsb

ChemicalscTarsd

Wastewater

e

Other

f

Total

1994 71 56 20 2 0 0 0 149

1995 59 22 11 1 2 0 1 96

1996 51 39 8 2 1 0 0 101

1997 52 23 14 0 0 0 0 89

1998 49 49 5 2 1 1 1 108

1999 41 27 16 1 1 0 1 87

2000 15 24 5 1 0 0 0 45

2001 22 17 5 0 0 0 2 46

2002 19 23 8 0 0 0 0 50

2003 18 43 12 0 0 0 1 74

2004 17 43 7 2 0 0 2 71

Total 414 366 111 11 5 1 8 916

Source: GAO analysis of EPA data. 

a

Spills in the oils category consist of water with oil (2), miscellaneous waste oil (1), hydraulic oil (39), 

fuel oil (68), miscellaneous oil (152), diesel oil (74), other oil (34), transmission oil (3), waste oil (23), 

turbine oil (2), edible oils (4), epoxidized vegetable oils (2), capacitor oil (1), petroleum products (1),

crude oil (3), compressor oil (1), engine oil (1), sludge oil (1), carbon oil (1), and crank oil (1). 

b

Spills in the gasoline and fuels category consist of automobile gasoline (81), jet fuel (20), kerosene

(3), unleaded gasoline (3), gasoline or diesel (1), bunker c fuel oil (2), and fuel and lubricant (1). 

c

Spills in the chemicals category consist of mineral spirits (4), other chemicals (1), solvents (2), paints 

(2), Anton battery release (1), and hydrocarbon toluene (1). 

d

Spills in the tars category consist of coal tar pitch (3), crude coke oven tar (1), and anthracene oil (1). 

e

Spills in the wastewater category consist of wastewater with vegetable oil (1). 

f

Spills in the other category consist of brake fluid (1), asphalt (3), parking lot runoff (1), industrial 

waste (1), white foam material (1), and bilge slops (1). 

Coast Guard officials update spill data after investigations are conducted, 

thereby strengthening the reliability of their spill data. However, they are 

unable to update preliminary volume estimates and therefore these data

are likely unreliable. There are 51 spill incidents in the Coast Guard data 

set and the majority of spills—roughly 70 percent—were oil-related. The 

Coast Guard’s spill data set indicates that 11 spills were traced back to 

storm or sanitary sewer outfalls. In four of these instances, narratives 

completed by spill responders indicate that sewage was mixed with other 

spill materials. 

Coast Guard Spill 

Data 

Page 50 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix II: Spill Data for the St. Clair–

Detroit River Corridor, 1994–2004 

Table 4: Coast Guard Spill Data by Year and Material 

Year Oils Gasoline and fuels Coal tar Chemical Other Total

1994 7 1 0 0 0 8

1995 2 0 1 1 1a5

1996 2 0 1 0 0 3

1997 6 1 0 1 0 8

1998 4 0 0 1 0 5

1999 4 2 0 1 0 7

2000 1 1 0 0 0 2

2001 0 1b0 1 0 2

2002 3 0 0 0 0 3

2003 2 0 0 0 0 2

2004 5 0 1 0 0 6

Total 36 6 3 5 1 51

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data. 

a

Asphalt. 

b

Jet fuel. 

The Coast Guard’s data shows that the greatest number (26 of the 51) 

spills occurred in the Detroit River. Most of the oil spills investigated by 

the Coast Guard were in the Detroit and Rouge Rivers. Similarly, most of 

the chemical spills that the Coast Guard investigated were in the Detroit 

River, while most of the gasoline spills were in Lake St. Clair. 

Table 5: Coast Guard Spill Data by Water Body and Material 

Water body Oils

Gasoline and

fuels Coal tar Chemicals Other Total 

St. Clair River 3 0 0 0 0 3

Lake St. Clair 4 5a0 1 0 10

Rouge River 10 0 0 0 1b11

Detroit River 18 1 3 4 26

Not identified in

data set 

1 0 0 0 0 1

Total

c 36 6 3 5 1 51

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data. 

a

One of which was jet fuel. 

b

Asphalt. 

c

One spill incident did not have a water body listed.

Page 51 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix II: Spill Data for the St. Clair–

Detroit River Corridor, 1994–2004 

Michigan DEQ officials update their spill data after investigations are 

conducted, but some data fields (e.g., quantity of material released) are 

not completed because the information is unknown. There are 21 spill 

incidents in the Michigan DEQ spill data set that occurred in the St. Clair 

River, Lake St. Clair, Detroit River, and Rouge River from 1996 through 

2004 that have volumes of greater than 50 gallons (or of an unknown 

volume). Michigan DEQ did not provide spills prior to 1996 because that is

when they began collecting spill data electronically. 

Table 6: Michigan DEQ Spill Data by Year and Material 

Michigan DEQ Spill 

Data 

Year Chemicals Oils Wastewater

Gasoline 

and fuels Tars Other Total

1996 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1998 0 0 1 0 0 1 2

1999 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

2000 1 0 0 0 0 1 2

2001 1 1 1 1 0 0 4

2002 1 4 0 0 0 1 6

2003 0 0 1 0 0 1 2

2004 1 0 1 1 1 0 4

Total 4 5 4 2 2 4 21

Source: GAO analysis of Michigan DEQ data.

a

Spills in the chemicals category consist of sodium bisulfate (1), bromine (1), hydro fluranosilic acid 

(1), and sodium hydroxide (1). 

b

Spills in the oils category consist of non-PCB oil (1) and oils (4). 

c

Spills in the wastewater category consist of untreated wastewater (1), phosphorus wastewater (1), 

contact wastewater (1), and untreated process wastewater (1). 

d

Spills in the gasoline and fuels category consist of diesel (2). 

e

Spills in the tars category consist of coal tars (2).

f

Spills in the other category consist of brine (2), paper coatings (1), and clay coatings (1). 

Page 52 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix II: Spill Data for the St. Clair–

Detroit River Corridor, 1994–2004 

Table 7: Michigan DEQ Spill Data by Water Body

 Year Detroit River Rouge River St. Clair River Total

1996 1 0 0 1

1997 0 0 0 0

1998 0 0 2 2

1999 0 0 1 1

2000 1 0 1 2

2001 2 0 2 4

2002 2 2 1 5

2003 1 0 1 2

2004 3 0 1 4

Total 10 2 9 21

Source: GAO analysis of Michigan DEQ data.

Ontario Ministry of Environment officials update spill data to reflect 

additional information obtained. However, not all data fields are 

completed because information such as spill quantities and materials are 

not always known. There are a total of 157 spill incidents in the SAC data 

that occurred in the St. Clair River (105), Lake St. Clair (5), and the Detroit 

River (47) between 1994 and 2004 that have volumes greater than 50 

gallons (or of an unknown volume). About 9 percent of the 157 have 

unknown responsible parties, and 127 of the 157 have unknown volumes 

or masses. 

Table 8: Ontario SAC Spill Data by Year and Material 

Ontario SAC Spill 

Data 

 Year ChemicalsaOilsbWastewater

c

Gasoline 

and fuelsd

UnknowneOther

f

Total

1994 8 1 11 0 3 3 26

1995 6 3 2 0 1 2 14

1996 5 1 8 2 0 2 18

1997 10 2 2 1 0 2 17

1998 3 1 5 1 1 0 11

1999 4 1 0 3 2 2 12

2000 4 4 2 0 2 0 12

2001 0 0 1 0 1 1 3

2002 0 0 4 1 0 1 6

2003 0 2 1 0 10 2 15

Page 53 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix II: Spill Data for the St. Clair–

Detroit River Corridor, 1994–2004 

 Year ChemicalsaOilsbWastewater

c

Gasoline 

and fuelsd

Unknowne

Other

f

Total

2004 10 0 3 1 7 2 23

Total 50 15 39 9 27 17 157

Source: GAO analysis of Ontario SAC data. 

a

Spills in the chemicals category consist of acetonitrile, ammonia, benzene, butylene, cyclohexane, 

divinylbenzene, epoxy, ethylene, ethyl hexyl nitrate, ethyl benzene, ferric chloride, iron, 

metabisulphate, methylene chloride, methyl ethyl ketone, n-hexane, propylene dichloride, rust 

inhibitor, sodium chloride, styrene monomer, toluene, vcm, and xylene. 

b

Spills in the oils category consist of heating oil, oily material, transformer oil, petroleum oil, vegetable

oil, and waste oil.

c

Spills in the wastewater category consist of ash and water, chlorinated water, contaminated water, 

wastewater, wastewater with aromatics, wastewater with chlorides, wastewater with hydrocarbons, 

process water, effluent water, and water. 

d

Spills in the gasoline and fuels category consist of diesel fuel, fuel, and gasoline. 

e

Spills in the unknown category consist of unknown, not applicable, and blank fields.

f

Spills in the other category consist of asphalt, brine, cement, concrete, cooling water, foam, plastic 

material, sand and gravel, sediment, silt, and suspended solids. 

Table 9: Ontario SAC Spill Data by Water Body

 Year Detroit River Lake St. Clair St. Clair River Total

1994 5 0 21 26

1995 4 0 10 14

1996 3 1 14 18

1997 6 0 11 17

1998 2 0 9 11

1999 6 0 6 12

2000 6 0 6 12

2001 1 0 2 3

2002 3 1 2 6

2003 7 1 7 15

2004 4 2 17 23

Total 47 5 105 157

Source: GAO analysis of Ontario SAC data. 

Page 54 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix III: CSO Data for the St. Clair–

Appendix III: CSO Data for the St. Clair– Detroit River Corridor, 1999–2004 

Detroit River Corridor, 1999–2004 

Michigan DEQ’s CSO data were available as of 1999, when Michigan DEQ 

began tracking sewer overflows. The CSO data, like spill data, have a datareliability limitation relating to uncertainty as to whether all CSO events 

are reported; however, spills may be particularly subject to underreporting 

because they are not part of a structured program as CSOs and industrial 

permit violations are. CSO data provide additional information in terms of 

the amount and location of pollutant discharges into the waters of the 

corridor. According to EPA, CSOs contain storm water, untreated human 

and industrial waste, toxic materials, and debris. The roughly 1,400 CSOs 

that were greater than 50 gallons (or of an unknown volume) greatly 

exceeded the number of spills that met these criteria during the 6-year 

period. The largest category of CSOs was of diluted raw sewage. The

Rouge and Detroit Rivers received most of the CSOs, with 1,296 incidents. 

Table 10: CSOs in the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor from 1999–2004 by Water Body 

Water 

body

Fully 

treated

Treated to

NPDES limit 

Diluted raw 

sewage

Partially treated

sewage

Raw 

sewage

Not 

specified

No

 information Total

Detroit 

River 

0 

39 316 154 1 84 0 594

Rouge 

River 

0 

0 508 98 17 78 1 702

St. Clair 

River 

0 

0 91 0 0 38 0 129

Lake St. 

Clair 

0 

0 6 16 9 22 0 53

Total 0 39 921 268 27 222 1 1,478

Source: GAO analysis of Michigan DEQ data.

CSOs accounted for over 900,000 million gallons of partially treated 

sewage discharged into waters of the corridor. 

Table 11: Volume of CSOs in the St. Clair–Detroit River Corridor from 1999–2004 (in

Millions of Gallons) 

Water body

Volume of 

diluted raw 

sewage 

Volume of raw 

sewage 

Volume of 

partially treated

sewage Total

Detroit River 4,741 1,718 26,588 33,047

Rouge River 3,254 50 885,846 889,149

St. Clair River 233 0 0 233

Lake St. Clair 526 437 525 1,488

Total 8,753 2,205 912,959 923,917

Source: GAO analysis of Michigan DEQ data. 

Page 55 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix IV: NPDES Industrial Effluent 

Violation Data for the St. Clair–Detroit River 

Corridor, 1994–2004 

The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) requires 

industrial and municipal facilities to obtain permits to discharge pollutants 

into U.S. waters. Such permits establish required effluent limitations or 

best management practices. The industrial effluent violation data we 

obtained from EPA rely upon self-reporting by industries, and therefore 

the data have the same data reliability limitation as spills and CSO data in 

terms of uncertainty about whether all events are reported. In addition, 

volumes are not commonly reported with effluent discharge violations as 

toxicity is a greater concern—and therefore volume data are limited. 

However, the data provide additional information on pollutant discharges

in the corridor. From 1994 through 2004, there were a total of 2,257 

NPDES industrial effluent violations in the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair, 

Detroit River, and Rouge River. Of these violations, 1,871 (or about 83 

percent) of the total had volumes of greater than 50 gallons (or of an 

unknown volume). The two largest NPDES discharge violations, in terms 

of volume, related to oil and grease—and these were discharged by the 

same facility in 1994 only a few months apart. The most frequently 

discharged materials were solid pollutants, pH-altering materials, oil and 

grease, and materials that had the potential to alter oxygen availability in

the receiving waters. Solid pollutants include pollutants found in 

wastewater that were not removed during the treatment process and can 

cause toxic conditions or contaminate sediment. 

From 1994 through 2004 the volume of discharged materials was available 

for 204 of the 1,871 permit violations. For the remaining 1,667 (or 89 

percent) of the violations, the volume was not available. 

Table 12: Number of NPDES Industrial Effluent Violations by Volume per Year 

Year 

Number of NPDES

 violations

Volume per year if known 

(in gallons)

1994 271 23,073,813

1995 252 18,157

1996 279 23,707

1997 232 26,911

1998 179 7,492

1999 169 9,376

2000 102 7,934

2001 130 17,769

2002 121 13,133

2003 79 5,647

Appendix IV: NPDES Industrial Effluent 

Violation Data for the St. Clair–Detroit River 

Corridor, 1994–2004 

Page 56 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix IV: NPDES Industrial Effluent 

Violation Data for the St. Clair–Detroit River 

Corridor, 1994–2004 

Year 

Number of NPDES

 violations

Volume per year if known 

(in gallons)

2004 57 42,085

Total 1,871 23,246,024 

Source: GAO analysis of EPA data. 

Over 50 percent of the materials discharged by industries in violation of 

their permits were solid pollutants, oil and grease, zinc, or materials that 

alter the pH or oxygen available in the receiving waters into which they 

were discharged. 

Table 13: Number of NPDES Industrial Effluent Violations by Discharged Material

and Year 

 Year 

Solid

pollutants pH

Oil and 

grease 

Carbonaceous 05 

day, 20c BOD 

Zinc, 

total 

(as ZN) 

Other

materials Total

1994 37 44 37 21 30 102 271

1995 54 39 11 23 12 113 252

1996 48 34 23 18 15 141 279

1997 46 29 9 10 19 119 232

1998 47 31 4 13 5 79 179

1999 30 33 16 9 7 74 169

2000 30 12 4 2 0 54 102

2001 30 25 15 3 2 55 130

2002 34 8 15 3 5 56 121

2003 11 11 7 10 7 33 79

2004 12 9 6 7 1 22 57

Total 379 275 147 119 103 848 1,871

Source: GAO analysis of EPA data. 

Over 52 percent of the NPDES violations occurred at 12 facilities, and 1 

facility had 176 violations during the 11-year time frame. 

Page 57 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix IV: NPDES Industrial Effluent 

Violation Data for the St. Clair–Detroit River 

Corridor, 1994–2004 

Table 14: Number of NPDES Industrial Effluent Violations by Water Body and Material for the 12 Most Frequently Violated

Permits 

Facility name Facility types Materials discharged 

Receiving

water 

location Years 

Number of 

violations

Detroit Metro Wayne 

County Airport 

Airports, flying fields, 

and service 

Phosphorus, pH, oxygen 

dissolved, oil and grease, 

nitrogen ammonia, lagoon 

freeboard, carbonaceous 

biological oxygen demand 

Frank & Poet 

Drain/Sexton 

Kilter- 

(Detroit 

River) 

1994, 1995, 1996, 

1997, 1998, 1999, 

2000, 2001, 2002, 

2003, 2004 

176

DSC– Trenton plant Blast furnace and 

steel works 

Zinc, total suspended solids, 

total recoverable phenolics, 

pH, oil and grease, lead, 

free cyanide, cyanide total 

Trenton 

Channel–

Detroit River 

1994, 1995, 1996, 

1997, 1998 

131

Chrysler-Chelsea 

proving grounds 

Commercial testing 

laboratory 

Total suspended, solids, 

phosphorus total removal, 

dissolved oxygen, pH, oil 

and grease, nitrogen 

ammonia, carbonaceous 

biological oxygen demand, 

coliform fecal material 

Mill Creek 

(Detroit 

River) 

1994, 1995, 1996, 

1997, 1998, 1999, 

2000, 2001, 2002, 

2003, 2004 

129

United States Steel– 

Ecorse 

Blast furnace and 

steel works 

Zinc, final toxicity, total 

suspended solids, pH, oil 

and grease, copper 

Detroit River 1994, 1995, 

1996,1997, 1998, 

1999, 2000, 2001, 

2002, 2003, 2004 

113

Mobile Home Park & 

Marina 

Operation of mobile 

home sites 

Total suspended solids, 

phosphorus total percent, 

coliform fecal material, 

chlorine total residual, 5 day 

biological oxygen demand 

Huron River 

(Detroit 

River) 

1995, 1996, 1997, 

1998, 1999, 2000, 

2001, 2002, 2003, 

2004 

75

Cargill salt division– St. 

Clair 

Chemical and 

chemical preparation 

Total suspended solids, pH, 

conductivity, chloride 

St. Clair 

River 

1994, 1995, 1996, 

1997, 1998, 1999, 

2000, 2001, 2002, 

2003, 2004 

63

Selfridge Air National 

Guard Base 

Airport, flying fields, 

and service 

Oil and grease, pH, 

dissolved oxygen, 

carbonaceous biological 

oxygen demand 

Clinton River 

and Lake St. 

Clair 

1994, 1995, 1997, 

1999, 2001, 2002, 

2003, 2004 

57

Arkema Inc. Industrial inorganic 

chemicals 

Triethylamine, zinc, total 

suspended solids, pH, 

diethylamine, carbonaceous 

biological oxygen demand 

Trenton 

Channel of 

the Detroit 

River 

1994, 1995, 1996, 

1997, 1998, 1999, 

2001, 2002, 2003, 

2004 

56

DSC Ltd.–Gibraltar Nonclassifiable

establishments 

Zinc, total suspended solids, 

oxygen demand sum 

product, dissolved oxygen, 

oil and grease, nitrogen 

ammonia, carbonaceous 5-

day biological oxygen

demand, lead, pH 

Frank & Poet 

Drain (Detroit 

River) 

1994, 1995, 1996, 

1997, 1998, 1999, 

2000, 2001, 2002, 

2003 

54

Page 58 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix IV: NPDES Industrial Effluent 

Violation Data for the St. Clair–Detroit River 

Corridor, 1994–2004 

Facility name Facility types Materials discharged 

Receiving

water 

location Years 

Number of 

violations

Michigan Seamless 

Tube LLC 

Steel pipe and tubes Vanadium, zinc, final 

toxicity, total suspended 

solids, total phosphorus, pH, 

oil and grease, total cadium 

Yerkes Drain 

(Detroit 

River) 

1994, 1995, 1996, 

1997, 1998, 1999, 

2000, 2001, 2002, 

2003, 2004 

52

E.B. Eddy Paper Inc. Paper mills Total suspended solids, pH, 

copper, total residual 

chlorine, 5 day biological 

oxygen demand 

St. Clair & 

Black Rivers 

1994, 1995, 1996, 

1997, 1998, 1999, 

2000, 2001, 2002, 

2003, 2004 

43

Trelleborgysh Inc.–

Sandusky 

Rubber and plastic 

hoses and belts 

Oil and grease, total 

residual chlorine, toulene, 

dichloroethylene, 

trichloroethylene, pH, 

toxicity, dissolved oxygen, 

phosphorus total 

Black River 

via Stone 

Drain (St. 

Clair River) 

1994, 1995, 1996, 

1997, 1999, 2000, 

2001, 2002, 2003, 

2004 

46

Other permit violations 876

Total violations 1,871

Source: GAO analysis of EPA data. 

Page 59 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix V: Spill Profiles for Six Selected Appendix V Incidents : Spill Profiles for Six Selected 

Incidents 

• From May 16 at 1:00 p.m. to May 17 at 1:00 p.m., two spills of 

approximately 14–15 million gallons of storm water mixed with ethylene

glycol and propylene glycol (deicing agents) were discharged into a storm 

sewer leading to the Detroit River.1 The responsible party claimed that the 

release was due to blockage in a 10-inch pipe from a holding pond 

containing the material to the sanitary sewer system. 

U.S. Spill: 2001 

Hazardous Substance 

Spill 

• Initially, EPA estimated that 10,000 fish were killed due to depletion of 

dissolved oxygen in the waterway. 

• On May 18, the NRC received a spill report from an observer who saw fish 

dying. NRC reported the spill to EPA, the Coast Guard, and Michigan DEQ 

shortly after 6:00 p.m. At 6:53 p.m., EPA contacted the Michigan Pollution 

Emergency Alerting System (PEAS) hotline. At 8:00 p.m., the PEAS 

operator contacted Michigan DEQ Water Bureau staff. At 9:00 p.m., the 

EPA on-scene coordinator notified the Michigan DEQ and the Coast 

Guard. When the Michigan DEQ spill responder did not arrive on-scene, 

the PEAS operator called the Michigan DEQ District Supervisor at 11:30 

p.m. On May 19 at 12:15 a.m., the Michigan DEQ District Supervisor 

contacted a spill responder, saying that EPA had been on the scene and 

was requesting Michigan DEQ representation. At 8:00 a.m. on May 19, DEQ 

staff arrived at the scene. At 10:30 a.m., two Coast Guard responders 

arrived at the scene. 

• At 5:00 p.m. on May 20, tanker trucks flushed out an isolated section of the 

affected sewer drain with clean water. A pump was installed to pump 

water to the nearby wastewater treatment facility. This lasted until 10:00 

a.m. on May 21. 

• The responsible party notified Michigan DEQ of the May 16 and 17 

discharges on May 22. 

• The facility that is responsible for these discharges has an industrial 

NPDES permit. Michigan DEQ agreed to accept best management 

practices instead of numeric pollutant limits for the summer discharges 

from this facility. So from May through September, the facility’s permit 

had no limitations on oxygen-depleting materials. Michigan DEQ’s 

understanding was that all discharges containing high amounts of oxygendepleting materials would be directed to the sanitary sewer, for further 

treatment at the wastewater treatment facility. 

 1

Volume estimate provided by the responsible party. 

Page 60 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix V: Spill Profiles for Six Selected

Incidents 

Figure 11: 2002 Rouge River Oil Spill 

U.S. Spill: 2002 Oil 

Spill 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard. 

• On April 9, at 9:50 a.m., an observer notified the Coast Guard’s Detroit 

Marine Safety Office of an oil spill near their property. At 10:00 a.m., the 

Coast Guard received a spill report from a nearby bridge operator. At 10:01 

a.m., the Coast Guard notified the NRC. At approximately 11:00 a.m., the 

Page 61 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix V: Spill Profiles for Six Selected

Incidents 

Coast Guard arrived on the scene. At 1:00 p.m., the Coast Guard briefed 

Michigan DEQ. At 2:05 p.m., the Coast Guard notified EPA. 

• On April 10, at 9:20 a.m., the Coast Guard and EPA discussed the spill via 

phone. At 11:00 a.m., EPA and a contractor arrived at Dearborn, MI, to 

begin emergency assessment activities. Also at 11:00 a.m., the Coast Guard 

issued a warning message to Canadian officials. At 1:44 p.m., the Coast 

Guard began contacting Michigan drinking water facilities. At 7:55 p.m., 

the U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards agreed to invoke the Joint Marine 

Pollution Contingency Plan. 

• On April 12, another spill occurred in the Rouge River. 

• According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s 

Scientific Support Coordinator’s report, the spill material was weathered 

diesel mixed with used synthetic lube oil (such as “3 in 1 oil”), mixed with 

sewage. 

• A Coast Guard summary from April 26 indicates 66,359 gallons of oil were 

recovered. An EPA spill summary indicates that multiple agencies 

recovered 63,000 gallons of oily water from open water and shorelines and 

more than 771,564 gallons of oil, oily water, and oily sludge from the 

municipal sewers of Dearborn and Detroit. EPA’s final estimate for total 

spill volume was 321,000 gallons of oil. 

• The responsible party did not report the spills nor could officials identify 

the party. 

• A Coast Guard report from July 1 says that $3,989,905 was expended for 

response. Coast Guard officials from the Detroit marine safety office noted 

that there is not a funding mechanism for response when the spill 

originates on one side of the international boundary and damage occurs on

the other. A Canadian report notes that $1,131,550 in Canadian dollars was 

spent on spill response. 

• EPA’s cost of cleanup and response was about $2.5 million. An EPA report 

says that the Coast Guard, EPA, and responding city governments spent 

approximately $10 million on spill response and investigation. 

• According to the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), 17 miles of U.S. 

shoreline were affected and 16 kilometers (10 miles) of Canadian 

shoreline were impacted. Two of the islands with shorelines that were 

oiled were part of the newly created Detroit River International Wildlife 

Refuge. 

Page 62 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix V: Spill Profiles for Six Selected

Incidents 

• Over 100 birds and reptiles were reported as dead, rehabilitated, or 

observed oiled or otherwise impacted. A FWS representative believes this 

number significantly underestimates the numbers impacted. She believes a 

multiplier should be used, and estimated the actual number of birds and 

reptiles impacted at approximately 720 to 900. 

• Per the Coast Guard documents, the Captain of the Port closed the Rouge 

River temporarily. Six vessel transits were delayed, one cancelled, and two 

diverted to other ports as a result of the incident. Two companies 

expressed concerns about staying open if Rouge River closure extended 

past April 18. Some recreational boats and marinas were oiled. 

• On the Canadian side of the corridor, a drinking water intake advisory was 

in effect on April 11. 

Figure 12: 2004 Rouge River Oil Spill 

U.S. Spill: 2004 Oil 

Spill 

Source: U.S.Coast Guard.

Page 63 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix V: Spill Profiles for Six Selected

Incidents 

• On August 3, at 7:00 a.m., a bridge operator notified the Coast Guard’s 

Detroit marine safety office of an oil sheen in the Rouge River. At 8:00

a.m., the Coast Guard dispatched pollution investigators to the scene. At 

9:07 a.m., the Coast Guard notified Michigan DEQ. At 9:20 a.m., the Coast 

Guard notified the Ontario SAC. At 9:27 a.m., the Coast Guard notified 

EPA. At 9:30 a.m., the Coast Guard notified the NRC. 

• At 10:05 a.m., a Coast Guard contractor started containment efforts. The 

contractor diverted oil to a collection point and boomed the north side of 

the Rouge River. Vacuum trucks and skimmers recovered oil on the 

southern side of the Rouge River. At 11:30 a.m., the contractor deployed an

additional boom at the mouth of the Rouge River to collect any oil that 

escaped. 

• At 11:40 a.m., the Detroit Water and Sewage Department confirmed 

multiple CSO discharges into the Rouge River, the last of which ended at 

9:55 a.m. At 2:10 p.m., the Coast Guard’s District 9 reported that Canadian

authorities reported oil and debris on their side of the Detroit River in the 

vicinity of Fighting Island, and it was consistent with a CSO release. At 

3:24 p.m., the NRC notified the Coast Guard and Michigan DEQ of spill 

details provided by the Canadian Coast Guard. The Canadian Coast Guard 

indicated that the Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan was invoked. 

At 5:56 p.m., the NRC notified the Coast Guard and Michigan DEQ of spill 

details provided by an observer who stated that a black slick was seen 

coming from a freighter which recently took on a load of salt. At 6:03 p.m., 

the NRC notified the Coast Guard and Michigan DEQ of spill details 

provided by a power plant regarding a sheen coming into the plant’s inlet 

canal. On August 4, the NRC notified the Coast Guard and Michigan DEQ 

of an oil sheen reported again by the power plant. 

• The spill material was an oil and sewage mixture. The Coast Guard 

originally estimated that the spill was 100 gallons, however in their 

database it is listed as a 2,000-gallon spill. The Coast Guard’s final estimate 

was 5,000 gallons. 

• The responsible party did not report the spills, nor could officials identify 

the party. 

• EPA officials stated that officials from the City of Dearborn, the City of 

Detroit, Michigan DEQ, EPA, and the Coast Guard inspected CSO 

structures to the Rouge River in the area of concern, and no evidence of 

oil accumulation was found in any of the sewers. 

Page 64 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix V: Spill Profiles for Six Selected

Incidents 

• On August 3, a project cost ceiling was set at $25,000. This was raised on 

August 4 to $75,000. On August 6, the ceiling was raised from $110,000 to

$195,000. 

• On August 28, another oil spill occurred in the Rouge River. An EPA report 

indicates that the individual identifying the spill stated that CSOs 

containing oil had been occurring for 15 months intermittently. 

• The City of Detroit was held responsible for the August 3 and August 28 

spills, and ultimately paid approximately $249,000 for response efforts. 

• On August 14, at approximately 4:45 p.m., 34 gallons of vinyl chloride 

monomer were discharged into the St. Clair River.2

 The spill lasted for 

almost 12 hours. On the following day, another spill of 5 gallons of this 

substance was discharged into the river. The cause of the spill was a 

cracked tube in a cooling water system heat exchanger. The responsible 

party did not report the spill to the Ontario SAC until August 19, because 

an electrical blackout caused monitoring equipment to be inoperable. 

Canadian Spill: 2003 

Hazardous Substance 

Spill 

• Ontario Ministry of Environment staff implemented procedures to warn 

downstream intakes and take samples. All samples at Canadian reservoirs 

came back negative. In addition, the Ministry of Environment ran models 

to determine potential impacts. Ministry of Environment officials did not

issue an advisory, but Chatham Health Unit did issue a bottled-water 

advisory for Wallaceburg municipal supply consumers. 

• Models run by the Ministry of Environment showed that vinyl chloride 

levels would be below the drinking water standards (2 parts per billion). 

• There are 12 intakes serving Michigan public water systems in the St. Clair 

watershed between Port Huron and Detroit. Michigan DEQ scientists 

reviewed the incident and determined that the amount of vinyl chloride 

lost, based on a spill of 650 lbs., would not have resulted in concentrations

at Michigan drinking water plant intakes exceeding the maximum 

contaminant level and that no human health risks resulted from the event.

No sampling of Michigan drinking water plant intakes was conducted 

upon notification of the incident because data collected would not have 

been useful due to the rapid flow rate of the river at the time of the event. 

 2

Volume estimate was provided by the responsible party. Vinyl chloride is a potential 

human carcinogen when inhaled, and it has been shown to cause liver cancer in laboratory

animals exposed orally or by inhalation. 

Page 65 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix V: Spill Profiles for Six Selected

Incidents 

• On February 1, from 3:00 to 4:20 a.m., an estimated 39,626 gallons of 

methyl ethyl ketone and methyl isobutyl ketone were discharged into the 

St. Clair River. 

• At 5:31 a.m., the responsible party reported to the Ontario SAC that they 

had identified a leaking heat exchanger at the lube plant, which resulted in

contamination of their cooling water. At 6:40 a.m., SAC staff briefed the 

Michigan State Police on the incident. At 7:22 a.m., the Michigan DEQ’s 

Pollution Emergency Communications Coordinator contacted the relevant 

Michigan DEQ staff. Michigan DEQ staff contacted the SAC for more 

information at 7:45 a.m. Michigan DEQ then notified Michigan drinking 

water facilities between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. After 11:00 a.m., the Michigan 

DEQ made a decision to recommend that drinking water facilities shut 

their intakes. Drinking water facilities in Port Huron, Marysville, St. Clair, 

East China Township, Marine City, Algonac, Ira Township, New Baltimore, 

Mt. Clemens, Grosse Pointe Farms, Highland Park, and Wyandotte were 

advised of the situation and all plants except Port Huron, the Detroit 

plants, and Wyandotte were asked to shut down by Michigan DEQ. 

• The spill caused more than a dozen water plants on either side of the river 

to close their intakes. About 36,000 customers in the St. Clair and Macomb 

County communities of Marysville, St. Clair, East China Township, Marine 

City, Algonac, and Ira Township were adversely impacted by the intake

closures. 

• On May 23, at 4:10 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., an unknown number of gallons of

oily water were discharged into the St. Clair River. Heavy rains caused 

three oil separators to overflow. 

Canadian Spill: 2004 

Hazardous Substance 

Spill 

Canadian Spill: 2004 

Oil Spill 

• At 6:05 a.m., the responsible party reported the spills to the Ontario SAC. 

The responsible party began sampling and told Ontario officials that there 

were no visible signs of oil or contaminants. At 7:40 a.m., the Ontario SAC 

notified Michigan officials through the PEAS hotline. From 8:30 to 9:30 

a.m., a Michigan DEQ official notified Michigan drinking water facilities. 

Page 66 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix VI: ORSANCO Spill Detection and Appendix VI: ORSANCO Spill Detection and Notification System 

Notification System 

The Ohio River Valley Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO) was 

established in 1948 in order to control and abate pollution in the Ohio 

River Basin. ORSANCO is an interstate commission representing eight

states and the federal government. Member states include Illinois, Indiana, 

Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. 

ORSANCO has programs to improve water quality in the Ohio River and its 

tributaries. Their tasks include setting wastewater discharge standards, 

performing biological assessments, monitoring the chemical and physical

properties of the waterways, and conducting special surveys and studies. 

In addition, ORSANCO coordinates emergency response activities for 

spills or accidental discharges to the river and coordinates public 

participation in programs. 

In 1977, an unreported discharge of hazardous chemicals contaminated 

drinking water facilities in the corridor. Due to the lack of a coordinated 

monitoring system, misinformation was distributed to the public, causing

concern for the safety of the drinking water. This incident demonstrated 

the vulnerability of the Ohio River water intakes to spills and led to the 

development of the Organics Detection System. ORSANCO, in conjunction

with drinking water utilities, identified strategic locations along the river 

where monitoring for chemicals would be most beneficial and protective 

of drinking water intakes. ORSANCO suggested that water facilities 

located at strategic points along the river could perform routine 

monitoring for oil and hazardous chemical discharges. ORSANCO 

proposed that they serve as technical coordinator and information 

clearinghouse, providing statewide communications in the event of a spill. 

Currently, ORSANCO maintains an inventory of water intakes, wastewater 

discharges, and material transfers on the Ohio River. Also, a time-of-travel 

model is used to estimate the arrival time of contaminant discharges 

during spill events. The results of the model have been used to identify the 

locations of the Organics Detection System. The Organics Detection 

System was established in 1978 and participants include 11 water utilities, 

one chemical manufacturer, and one power generating facility. Data from 

each facility is to be downloaded for review and evaluation on a weekly 

basis. Each instrument can detect and quantify twenty-two organic 

compounds. The list of compounds represents the organic chemicals of 

greatest concern to water utilities and most likely to be detected based on 

an inventory of chemicals stored, transported, and manufactured along the 

Ohio River. 

Page 67 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix VI: ORSANCO Spill Detection and 

Notification System 

Figure 13: ORSANCO Organics Detection System Monitoring Sites 

Active ODS sites

Municipal and industrial drinking water intakes

Paducah

Ky. Va.

W.Va.

Ohio

Ind.

Pa.

Ill.

Tenn.

Evansville

Portsmouth

Huntington

St. Albans

Parkersburg

Wheeling

Weirton

West View

Hays Mine

Pittsburgh

Louisville 2

Cincinnati

Ohio River

Ohio River

Source: ORSANCO.

Facility operators are required to notify ORSANCO when detection of a 

compound over a specified threshold is observed or when an unidentified 

compound is detected. When this occurs, plant operating personnel are 

notified of the contaminant so treatment techniques to remove the 

compound can be implemented. ORSANCO notifies downstream water 

utilities and state and federal water quality and emergency response 

agencies, including the NRC. 

Page 68 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix VI: ORSANCO Spill Detection and 

Notification System 

Figure 14: Water Quality Monitoring Equipment Used at ORSANCO Sites 

Source: ORSANCO.

Page 69 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix VII: Comments from the Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 70 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 71 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 72 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 73 GAO-06-639 Clean Water
Appendix VIII: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 74 GAO-06-639

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

John B. Stephenson (202) 512-3841 

In addition to the individual named above, Kevin Bray, John Delicath, 

Michele Fejfar, Jill Roth Edelson, Katheryn Summers Hubbell, Jamie 

Meuwissen, and John Wanska made key contributions to this report. 

Clean Water

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(360600) 
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