J-S44042-23 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

MAURQUIS JAVON THOMPSON 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1781 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 20, 2022 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0002230-2012 

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED JUNE 26, 2024

Appellant, Maurquis Javon Thompson, appeals from the order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County that denied his timely first petition 

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 For the reasons set forth 

below, we affirm. 

 On April 12, 2013, Appellant was convicted by a jury of two counts each 

of third-degree murder, homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence 

(DUI), homicide by vehicle, leaving the scene of an accident involving death, 

and causing an accident involving death while not properly licensed, and one 

count each of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, DUI (marijuana), 

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*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546. 
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DUI (metabolite of marijuana), and possession of marijuana. These 

convictions arose out of events that occurred on December 9, 2011, when 

Appellant drove his car through a red light at a high rate of speed while under 

the influence of marijuana, struck and killed two young boys who were 

crossing the street, and fled the scene. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 106 

A.3d 742, 748, 757 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

On July 21, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to concurrent 

terms of 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment for one of the third-degree murder 

convictions and life imprisonment without parole for the other third-degree 

murder conviction pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715(a) (providing mandatory life 

sentence for the third-degree murder where defendant has a previous 

conviction for murder or voluntary manslaughter), and to various terms of 

imprisonment for the other convictions to run concurrent with the life 

sentence. Thompson, 106 A.3d at 749, 765-66. 

 Appellant filed a timely direct appeal challenging, inter alia, the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support his third-degree murder convictions and 

the legality of the life imprisonment sentence. Thompson, 106 A.3d at 749-

50. On December 10, 2014, this Court rejected those challenges and affirmed 

Appellant’s convictions and life sentence. Id. at 755-66.2 Appellant filed a 

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2

 The Court vacated Appellant’s judgment of sentence, but only to permit the 

trial court to correct clerical errors with respect to some of the sentences for 

offenses other than third-degree murder to make clear that the sentences 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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petition for allowance of appeal, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

denied on March 8, 2016. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 134 A.3d 56 (Pa. 

2016). Appellant then filed a petition for certiorari, which the United States 

Supreme Court denied on October 3, 2016. Thompson v. Pennsylvania, 

580 U.S. 848 (2016). 

 Following the denial of his petition for certiorari, Appellant filed the 

instant first PCRA petition in which he asserted claims of ineffectiveness of 

counsel. Pro Se PCRA Petition at 4-8.3 Appellant had been represented by 

three different lawyers in this case. Through his preliminary hearing, 

Appellant was represented by Michael Malloy, Esquire. PCRA Court Opinion at 

3; N.T. PCRA, 11/18/21, at 3-5. Following the preliminary hearing, Appellant 

was represented first by an attorney from the public defender’s office, and 

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were concurrent and not consecutive, and the Court affirmed the judgment of 

sentence in all other respects. Thompson, 106 A.3d at 766. 

3

 Appellant filed his PCRA petition on April 18, 2018, more than one year after 

his judgment of sentence became final. The PCRA court, however, found after 

a hearing on the timeliness issue that the PCRA petition was timely because 

the PCRA counsel that had been hired to represent Appellant had advised 

Appellant on May 19, 2017, less than one year after Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence became final, that he had filed a PCRA petition for Appellant, that 

this PCRA counsel had failed to file the PCRA petition, and that Appellant did 

not learn until he received the docket in his case, after March 26, 2018, that 

the PCRA counsel had failed to file the PCRA petition. PCRA Court Order, 

8/6/21; PCRA Court Opinion at 11. The Commonwealth does not challenge the 

PCRA court’s ruling that Appellant’s PCRA petition was timely filed, and the 

PCRA court’s findings satisfy an exception to the PCRA’s time bar. See

Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123, 1129-32 (Pa. 2018); 

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1272-75 (Pa. 2007). 
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then, from September 21, 2012 on, by Earl Raynor, Esquire, who represented 

Appellant on pre-trial motions, at trial, and on direct appeal. N.T. PCRA, 

11/18/21, at 8, 17-19, 34, 36, 45-47. In July 2019, Attorney Malloy entered 

his appearance as PCRA counsel for Appellant and thereafter filed amended 

PCRA petitions alleging that Attorney Raynor was ineffective in advising 

Appellant that he could not be convicted of third-degree murder and in failing 

to advise Appellant that he could be sentenced to life imprisonment and 

alleging that Appellant proceeded to trial, rather than pleading guilty, as a 

result of that advice. Amended PCRA Petition ¶¶10-16; Second Amended 

PCRA Petition ¶¶30-33. 

 On November 18, 2021, the PCRA court held a hearing on this claim for 

PCRA relief. Five witnesses testified at this hearing, Appellant, Attorney 

Raynor, and three attorneys who had worked on the case in the Delaware 

County District Attorney’s office, Daniel J. McDevitt, Elise Bradley, and 

Geoffrey Payne. 

Appellant and Attorney Raynor both testified that Attorney Raynor sent 

Appellant a letter on January 14, 2013, slightly less than three months before 

Appellant’s trial, stating the following: 

I would like to update you on where we are with your case. I have 

reveiwed [sic] all of the evidence in your ease including the 

Medical Examiner’s reports, statement from Officer Michael 

Fiocca, eyewitness statements, and the transcripts from the 

preliminary hearing. After reviewing the evidence, I believe the 

trial will turn out in your favor. 
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The evidence in your case does not sustain the charge of Third 

Degree Murder. After we present our case, the jury will see that 

the charge is bogus and meritless. If for any reason the jury 

decides to return a verdict of guilty on the murder charge, I will 

make an oral motion to the Judge at the sentencing hearing. The 

Judge will then be compelled to uphold the Constitution and 

dismiss the murder charge due to lack of evidence. 

I assure you that you will not have any penalty imposed upon you 

for the charge of Third Degree Murder. There is no legal basis for 

this charge in your case. This is a case of Homicide by Vehicle, at 

the most. 

Appellant’s PCRA Ex. 1; N.T. PCRA, 11/18/21, at 9-12, 28-31. Appellant and 

Attorney Raynor both testified that this was the advice that Attorney Raynor 

gave him concerning what could happen at trial, although Attorney Raynor 

testified that he advised Appellant that he could be convicted of homicide by 

vehicle while DUI, not merely homicide by vehicle. N.T. PCRA, 11/18/21, at 

10-12, 29-31. 

Appellant testified that he believed based on Attorney Raynor’s advice 

that he was not at risk of being convicted of and sentenced for third-degree 

murder and proceeded to trial based on that belief. N.T. PCRA, 11/18/21, at 

13-14. Appellant also testified that Attorney Raynor never advised him that 

he could be sentenced to life in prison if he was convicted of the third-degree 

murder charges, and Attorney Raynor testified that he did not believe that life 

imprisonment was a possible penalty if Appellant was convicted of thirddegree murder and never advised Appellant of the possibility of a life sentence. 

Id. at 13, 31-34, 44-45. Appellant, however, admitted that before trial, he 
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knew from another source that he was subject to a life sentence if he was 

convicted of the third-degree murder charges. Id. at 23-25. 

Appellant admitted that the Commonwealth had offered him a plea deal 

of 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment prior to the preliminary hearing, before he 

was represented by Attorney Raynor, and that he rejected that plea offer. 

N.T. PCRA, 11/18/21, at 15-16. Attorney Raynor testified that during trial, he 

discussed with the prosecutor, assistant district attorney (ADA) Payne, 

whether a 20-to 40-year plea offer was possible and that ADA Payne told him 

that it was too late and that ADA Payne and ADA Bradley both told him that 

there would be no plea deal because Appellant had rejected the plea offer 

before the preliminary hearing. Id. at 40-42. 

McDevitt, Delaware County’s deputy district attorney for the trial 

division at the time of Appellant’s prosecution, testified that he assigned ADA 

Bradley to Appellant’s case and directed her to make a plea offer of 15 to 30 

years if Appellant waived the preliminary hearing and to advise Appellant’s 

counsel that if this was not accepted, the Commonwealth would add third 

degree murder and other charges. N.T. PCRA, 11/18/21, at 51, 55-58. 

McDevitt testified that Appellant rejected this plea offer. Id. at 59. McDevitt 

testified that no further plea offers were made by the Commonwealth after 

that offer was rejected, that any plea offer from Appellant would have to be 

approved by him and the district attorney, that no plea offers from counsel for 

Appellant ever came to him, and that he would not have accepted a plea offer 
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for less than a life sentence after the preliminary hearing. Id. at 59-62. 

McDevitt testified that ADA Bradley left the district attorney’s office before 

Appellant’s trial and that he assigned ADA Payne to the case and told ADA 

Payne that no plea offers were to be made or accepted. Id. at 62-63. 

McDevitt admitted, however, that a plea offer of 20 to 40 years before 

Appellant’s trial would have been considered and discussed with the district 

attorney. Id. at 64. 

Bradley testified that she was the prosecutor assigned to Appellant’s 

case from December 2011 until she left the district attorney’s office at the end 

of 2012, that she conveyed the plea offer of 15 to 30 years if Appellant waived 

the preliminary hearing to Appellant’s counsel at the time, Attorney Malloy, 

and that Appellant rejected this plea offer. N.T. PCRA, 11/18/21, at 67-74. 

Bradley testified that she told Appellant’s public defender and Attorney Raynor 

that no further Commonwealth plea offers would be made and that neither 

Appellant’s public defender nor Attorney Raynor contacted her to pursue any 

plea negotiations. Id. at 78-79. 

Payne testified that he was assigned to Appellant’s case when ADA 

Bradley left and was the prosecutor at Appellant’s trial. N.T. PCRA, 11/18/21, 

at 81-82. Payne testified that he was instructed that no plea offers were to 

be made because of the rejection of the earlier plea offer and that he told 

Attorney Raynor that no plea offers or deals would be made. Id. at 82-83. 

Payne admitted, however, that at the start of trial, the trial court raised the 
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issue of whether a plea deal was possible and he told Attorney Raynor that 

although the Commonwealth would not make any plea offer, if Appellant made 

a plea offer with a sentence of 15 to 30 years or more, he would take it to the 

victims’ families and the district attorney to consider. Id. at 86, 88-95. Payne 

testified that Attorney Raynor, after speaking with Appellant, made no plea 

offer. Id. at 94-95. 

On June 20, 2022, the PCRA court entered an order denying Appellant’s 

PCRA petition. The PCRA court found that Attorney Raynor advised Appellant 

that he could not be convicted of third-degree murder and was not at risk of 

receiving a life sentence, but that Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel failed because, inter alia, Appellant did not show that he was 

prejudiced by Attorney Raynor’s advice. PCRA Court Opinion at 3-4, 8, 10-

11. Appellant timely appealed and new counsel was appointed to represent 

Appellant in this appeal. Following his appointment, Appellant’s PCRA 

appellate counsel filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) in which he asserted both claims that the PCRA court 

erred in failing to find ineffective assistance of counsel by Attorney Raynor and 

a claim that Attorney Malloy was ineffective in his representation of Appellant 

in the PCRA proceedings. Rule 1925(b) Statement. 

In this appeal, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in rejecting 

his claim that Attorney Raynor was ineffective in his advice to Appellant and 

that Attorney Malloy was ineffective in his representation of Appellant on the 
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PCRA petition because he failed to assert and prove claims of ineffectiveness 

with respect to the plea offer that the Commonwealth made when he was 

Appellant’s counsel. Our review of an order denying a PCRA petition is limited 

to determining whether the record supports the PCRA court’s findings and 

whether its decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 

A.3d 601, 617 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Steckley, 128 A.3d 826, 831 

(Pa. Super. 2015); Commonwealth v. Allen, 833 A.2d 800, 802 (Pa. Super. 

2003). 

To be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

the defendant must prove: (1) that the underlying legal claim is of arguable 

merit; (2) that counsel’s action or inaction had no reasonable basis; and (3) 

that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s action or inaction. Mason, 

130 A.3d at 618; Commonwealth v. Grayson, 212 A.3d 1047, 1054 (Pa. 

Super. 2019); Steckley, 128 A.3d at 831. The defendant must satisfy all three 

prongs of this test to obtain relief under the PCRA. Mason, 130 A.3d at 618; 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1153, 1158 (Pa. Super. 2018); 

Steckley, 128 A.3d at 831. 

A defendant is entitled to competent advice of counsel with respect to 

the plea bargaining process. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012); 

Grayson, 212 A.3d at 1054. The requirements of an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim in this situation are satisfied where the defendant shows both 

that his counsel failed to provide competent advice concerning his sentence 
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exposure or the crimes of which he could be convicted at trial and that there 

is a reasonable probability that he would been able to enter and would have 

entered a negotiated plea with a lesser sentence if he had been competently 

advised. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 161-70, 174 (ineffective assistance of counsel in 

rejection of plea offer shown where counsel erroneously advised defendant 

that he could not be convicted of the most serious offense with which he was 

charged); Steckley, 128 A.3d at 830, 832-36 (ineffective assistance of 

counsel shown where defendant who rejected plea offer was incorrectly 

advised concerning his sentence that he could receive if convicted). 

Here, the evidence at the PCRA hearing that the PCRA court found 

credible shows that Appellant did not receive competent advice from Attorney 

Raynor concerning the offenses of which he could be convicted or the sentence 

that he could receive if he went to trial rather than entering a negotiated guilty 

plea. Attorney Raynor testified that he advised Appellant that he could not be 

convicted of third-degree murder because the deaths were the result of a DUI 

accident and Appellant was intoxicated. N.T. PCRA, 11/18/21, at 28-31. 

Attorney Raynor testified that he did not advise Appellant that he would be 

subject to a life sentence if convicted of both third-degree murder counts 

because he believed that the life sentence for third-degree murder applied 

only where the defendant had previously been convicted of third-degree 

murder before committing a second third-degree murder. Id. at 31-33, 44. 
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The PCRA court found Attorney Raynor’s testimony credible. PCRA Court 

Opinion at 8. 

Attorney Raynor’s legal conclusions on which he based his advice and 

actions were contrary to established precedent. Precedential decisions of this 

Court pre-dating Attorney Raynor’s representation of Appellant had held that 

a death caused by a DUI motor vehicle accident can constitute third-degree 

murder. Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1219-20 (Pa. Super. 

2011); Allen, 833 A.2d at 801, 804. This Court had also held in a binding, 

precedential decision before Attorney Raynor’s representation of Appellant 

that the mandatory life sentence for “any person convicted of murder of the 

third degree in this Commonwealth who has previously been convicted at any 

time of murder or voluntary manslaughter” under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715(a) 

applied where the first third-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter 

conviction occurred at the same trial as the conviction for which life 

imprisonment was imposed. Commonwealth v. Morris, 958 A.2d 569, 578-

82 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). 

Although there was no plea offer from the Commonwealth when 

Attorney Raynor erroneously advised Appellant, both the testimony at the 

PCRA hearing and the trial record showed that Appellant had the opportunity 

to seek a plea deal at the start of trial, after Attorney Raynor’s advice, if 

Appellant was willing to agree to a sentence of at least 15 to 30 years’ 

imprisonment. N.T. PCRA, 11/18/21, at 88-95; N.T. Trial, 4/8/13, at 6-12. 
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Contrary to the PCRA Court’s conclusion, PCRA Court Opinion at 8-9, the fact 

that Appellant maintained that he was not the driver of the car until after trial 

had begun did not excuse counsel from providing competent advice 

concerning the consequences if his claim that he did not commit the crime 

was rejected by the jury. Steckley, 128 A.3d at 834 (counsel’s failure to 

advise defendant of mandatory minimum sentence found ineffective even 

though defendant maintained his innocence at trial). 

The PCRA court, however, did not err in finding that Appellant failed to 

show that he was prejudiced by Attorney Raynor’s faulty advice. The PCRA 

court found that Appellant was not prejudiced by Attorney Raynor’s failure to 

advise him concerning the life sentence for third-degree murder because 

Appellant already knew that third-degree murder convictions would result in 

a life sentence. PCRA Court Opinion at 10. That finding is supported by the 

record, as Appellant admitted at the PCRA hearing that he had been told 

before trial that he could spend “the rest of my life in prison” if he was 

convicted of third-degree murder. N.T. PCRA, 11/18/21, at 23-25. 

Appellant also failed to prove that he suffered prejudice from Attorney 

Raynor’s erroneous advice that he could not be convicted of third-degree 

murder. To prove prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel in this 

situation, the defendant must show that but for counsel’s deficient advice 

there is a reasonable probability that he would have succeeded in entering a 

negotiated plea with a lower sentence. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 163-64; 
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Commonwealth v. Rizor, 304 A.3d 1034, 1054-60 (Pa. 2023); Steckley, 

128 A.3d at 832. This requires proof not only that there was a plea with a 

lower sentence that the Commonwealth and the trial court would accept, but 

that there was a reasonable probability that the defendant would have agreed 

to that plea bargain. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 163-64, 174; Rizor, 304 A.3d at 

1057-60; Steckley, 128 A.3d at 832-34. The mere fact that the plea was 

objectively obviously beneficial to the defendant is not sufficient to prove this 

element of prejudice; rather, the defendant must show that there was a 

reasonable probability that he would actually have agreed to the plea bargain. 

Rizor, 304 A.3d at 1057-60. 

Here, there was no evidence that Appellant was willing to agree to any 

plea deal that the Commonwealth would accept. The record was undisputed 

that the Commonwealth would not agree to any plea bargain with a sentence 

of less than 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment and that Appellant had rejected a 

plea deal with a 15-to-30-year sentence before he was represented by 

Attorney Raynor and received the deficient advice. N.T. PCRA, 11/18/21, at 

15-16, 91-95; N.T. Trial, 4/8/13, at 7-8. Although he testified that he 

“proceeded to trial based on” Attorney Raynor’s advice, N.T. PCRA, 11/18/21, 

at 14, Appellant did not testify that he would have agreed to a plea with a 15-

to-30-year or greater non-life sentence at any time if Attorney Raynor had 

advised him that there was some risk that he would be convicted of thirddegree murder or testify that anything had occurred prior to the start of trial 
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that would have made him willing to accept the plea that he had previously 

rejected. Indeed, neither Appellant nor Attorney Raynor testified at all 

concerning their discussions of whether to offer a plea deal at the start of trial 

after the Commonwealth indicated a willingness to consider a plea with a 15-

to-30-year or greater sentence or testified concerning any discussions of any 

possible plea at any time. 

Because there was no evidence at all that Appellant would have agreed 

to a 15-to-30-year or greater sentence if he had been advised that there was 

a possibility that he could be convicted of the third-degree murder charges, 

Appellant failed to show that there was a reasonable probability that he would 

have entered into a negotiated plea but for Attorney Raynor’s advice. 

Compare Rizor, 304 A.3d at 1038-39, 1057-60 (prejudice not shown where 

there was no credible testimony from defendant that she would have accepted 

the Commonwealth’s plea offer, even though she would have received a 

sentence of only 51/2 to 30 years rather than life imprisonment); with Lafler, 

566 U.S. at 161, 174 (prejudice shown where record demonstrated that 

defendant had expressed willingness to accept a favorable plea bargain before 

counsel convinced him that he could not be convicted of the most serious 

charge); Steckley, 128 A.3d at 830, 832-34 (prejudice shown where 

defendant testified that he would have accepted plea offer of 2 to 6 years if 

attorney had advised him that he was subject to mandatory minimum 25-year 

sentence and PCRA court found that testimony credible). The PCRA court 
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therefore properly denied Appellant’s claim that Attorney Raynor was 

ineffective on the ground that Appellant failed to show that he suffered 

prejudice. 

Appellant did not raise his remaining issue, his claim that Attorney 

Malloy was ineffective, in the PCRA court. That does not bar Appellant from 

asserting a claim of ineffectiveness of Attorney Malloy as PCRA counsel in this 

appeal. Under Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), a 

defendant may raise claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel for the 

first time on appeal from the denial of a timely filed first PCRA petition where 

the PCRA counsel in question represented the defendant throughout the 

proceedings in the PCRA court. Id. at 401-05. Here, Attorney Malloy 

represented Appellant from the filing of the amended PCRA petitions until July 

21, 2022, after the appeal from the denial of Appellant’s PCRA petition was 

filed, and new PCRA appellate counsel raised the issue of Attorney Malloy’s 

ineffectiveness at the first opportunity, in his 1925(b) statement. 

Appellant’s claim that Attorney Malloy was ineffective, however, is 

barred because Appellant expressly waived the claim that he contends that 

Attorney Malloy was ineffective for failing to assert. Relief can be granted 

under the PCRA only where “the allegation of error has not been previously 

litigated or waived.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). This is not a case where PCRA 

counsel’s conduct of failing to raise a claim caused a waiver and the defendant 

therefore could claim ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel in waiving the claim. 
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Rather, Appellant, with knowledge that Attorney Malloy had represented him 

at the time of his rejection of the Commonwealth’s plea offer, expressly 

waived any claim that Attorney Malloy was ineffective with respect to the plea 

offer that the Commonwealth made when he was Appellant’s counsel. 

At the beginning of the November 18, 2021 PCRA hearing, the PCRA 

court noted that Appellant’s PCRA counsel, Attorney Malloy, had previously 

represented Appellant in this case and raised the issue of Attorney Malloy’s 

inability to assert claims of his own ineffectiveness. N.T. PCRA, 11/18/21, at 

3-4. Appellant acknowledged on the record that Attorney Malloy had 

represented him at his preliminary hearing and could not represent him on 

claims of ineffectiveness in that representation and stated as follows: 

MR. MALLOY: And what the judge is saying that if you’re going to 

raise any issues of ineffective counsel at the preliminary hearing, 

I certainly could not represent you at that hearing nor should I go 

forward in this particular hearing. Do you understand that? 

[APPELLANT]: I understand. 

MR. MALLOY: So in essence, you would – you’re either waiving or 

acknowledging that there was no ineffective counsel at the 

preliminary hearing. Is that correct? 

[APPELLANT]: That’s correct. 

MR. MALLOY: That you’re only proceeding on the ineffective 

assistance of counsel at the trial level. Correct? 

[APPELLANT]: Correct. 

 * * * 

THE COURT: ... And the reason that I wanted to bring it up and 

not that I thought that that was a claim, but I just want you to 
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understand, you would – you might be precluded both by time and 

waiver if you tried to raise it later. So it’s either now or never is 

essentially what we’re telling you. So you are satisfied that there 

was no ineffectiveness in Mr. Malloy’s representation at the 

preliminary hearing. Is that correct? 

[APPELLANT]: That’s correct. 

Id. at 4-6. Having expressly represented that he did not wish to assert any 

claim that Attorney Malloy was ineffective as his pretrial counsel, he cannot 

now contend that Attorney Malloy was ineffective for failing to assert such a 

claim. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that neither of Appellant’s issues 

merits relief. We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s decision denying 

Appellant’s PCRA petition. 

 Order affirmed. 

 Judge Nichols joins the memorandum. 

 Judge Olson concurs in the result. 

 

Date: 6/26/2024