a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, House 

of Representatives

July 2006 RAIL TRANSIT

Additional Federal 

Leadership Would 

Enhance FTA’s State 

Safety Oversight 

Program

GAO-06-821
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 2006

RAIL TRANSIT

Additional Federal Leadership Would 

Enhance FTA’s State Safety Oversight 

Program 

Highlights of GAO-06-821, a report to 

Committee on Transportation and

Infrastructure, House of Representatives 

The U.S. rail transit system is a

vital component of the nation’s 

transportation infrastructure.

Safety and security oversight of rail 

transit is the responsibility of statedesignated oversight agencies

following Federal Transit

Administration (FTA)

requirements. In this report, GAO 

addressed: (1) how the State Safety

Oversight program is designed; (2) 

what is known about the program’s 

impact; and (3) challenges facing

the program. We also provide 

information about oversight of

transit systems that cross state 

boundaries. To do our work we

surveyed state oversight agencies 

and transit agencies covered by

FTA’s program. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the 

Secretary of Transportation direct

FTA to (1) set performance goals 

for the program and develop a plan 

for maintaining the stated schedule 

of auditing oversight agencies and

(2) develop and encourage 

completion of a recommended 

training curriculum for oversight

agency staff. Also, we recommend 

that the Secretary of the 

Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) direct the Assistant 

Secretary of the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) to 

coordinate their security oversight

activities and audits with FTA and 

transit and oversight agencies. FTA 

and TSA generally concurred with 

the report and are considering how

to implement the 

recommendations. 

FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other 

federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the 

safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires states to designate 

an agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit agencies that 

receive federal funding. Oversight agencies are responsible for developing a 

program standard that transit agencies must meet and reviewing the 

performance of the transit agencies against that standard. While oversight 

agencies are to include security reviews as part of their responsibilities, TSA 

also has security oversight authority over transit agencies. 

Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit 

agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several 

transit agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such as 

reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is ample 

anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA has not 

definitively shown the program’s benefits and has not developed

performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as 

required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program 

after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to its stated 

3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies, resulting in a lack of 

information to track the program’s trends. FTA officials recognize it will be 

difficult to develop performance measures and goals to help determine the 

program’s impact, especially since fatalities and incidents involving rail 

transit are already low. However, FTA has assigned this task to a contractor 

and has stated that the program’s new leadership will make auditing 

oversight agencies a top priority. 

FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. 

First, expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically, officials from 

16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not having enough 

qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we 

spoke stated that oversight and technical training would help address this 

variation. Second, transit and oversight agencies are confused about what 

role oversight agencies are to play in overseeing rail security, since TSA has 

hired rail inspectors to perform a potentially similar function, which could 

result in duplication of effort. 

Examples of Rail Transit Systems Subject to FTA State Safety Oversight Program 

Sources: PennDOT; Seattle Center Monorail; San Francisco Municipal Railway; GAO.

Inclined Plane Inclined Plane

Heavy Rail Heavy Rail eavy Rail

Chicago Transit Authority “L”

Light Rail ht Rail ht Rail

Port Authority of Allegheny County “T”

Automated Guideway Automated Guideway utomated Guideway

Seattle Center Monorail

Trolley Trolley

Kenosha Transit Trolley

Cable Car Cable Car able Car

San Francisco Municipal Railway Cable Car

Inclined Plane

Port Authority of Allegheny County Duquesne Incline

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-821.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Katherine 

Siggerud on (202) 512-2834 or 

siggerudk@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 7

Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight 

Program 13

Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as 

Worthwhile; However, FTA Does Not Have Goals or Performance 

Measures to Document the Impact of the State Safety Oversight 

Program on Safety and Security 23

FTA Faces Challenges in Managing and Implementing the State 

Safety Oversight Program 28

Conclusions 34

Recommendations 35

Agency Comments 36

Appendixes

Appendix I: Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems 38

Appendix II: List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit Agencies They 

Oversee 43

Appendix III: Scope and Methodology 47

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 51

Tables Table 1: Estimated FTEs Employees Used by Oversight Agencies to 

Oversee Transit Agency Safety and Security 32

Table 2: Rail Transit and State Oversight Agencies 43

Table 3: Rail Transit Agencies We Visited for the Purposes of This 

Review 49

Table 4: State Oversight Agencies We Visited for the Purposes of 

This Review 50

Figures Figure 1: Examples of Rail Systems Included in the State Safety 

Oversight Program 10

Figure 2: Roles and Responsibilities of Participants in the State 

Safety Oversight Program 14

Figure 3: Locations and Types of Rail Transit Agencies 

Participating in State Safety Oversight Program 20
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

Abbreviations

APTA American Public Transportation Association

ATSA The Aviation and Transportation Security Act

CPUC California Public Utilities Commission

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOT Department of Transportation

DRPA Delaware River Port Authority 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

FRA Federal Railroad Administration

FTA Federal Transit Administration

FTE full-time equivalent

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act

NJDOT New Jersey Department of Transportation

MUNI San Francisco Municipal Railway

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

PATCO Port Authority Transit Corporation

PennDOT Pennsylvania Department of Transportation

PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

PTSB Public Transportation Safety Board

TOC Tri-State Oversight Committee 

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TSI Transportation Safety Institute

WMATA Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

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Page 1 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

July 26, 2006 Letr

The Honorable Don Young

Chairman

The Honorable James L. Oberstar

Ranking Democratic Member

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives

Rail transit moves over 7 million daily passengers. According to Federal 

Transit Administration (FTA) statistics, rail transit accounts for less than 6 

percent of all public transportation’s accidents while providing almost 32 

percent of all public transportation’s passenger trips, making it one of the 

safest modes of public transportation. However, safety and security are still 

concerns, especially as the number of rail transit systems—and therefore 

the number of passengers riding rail transit—increases. For example, the 

number of rail transit systems in FTA’s State Safety Oversight program 

increased from 32 in 1997 to 42 in 2006, and as many as 7 new systems are 

expected to open in the next 3 years. Furthermore, the number of fatalities 

and accidents has varied over the past few years. For example, while 

fatalities ranged from 26 to 57 per year (with an approximate average of 40 

per year) between 1999 and 2005, total reported accidents decreased 3 

percent. Finally, recent acts of terrorism on European and Indian transit 

systems illustrate the need to maintain high levels of safety and security for 

transit.

The federal government is involved, in varying degrees, with the safety and 

security of the nation’s transportation system. For example, the 

Department of Transportation (DOT) provides oversight of several 

transportation modes. Within DOT, the Federal Railroad Administration 

(FRA), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration (PHMSA) promulgate regulations and technical 

standards that govern how vehicles or facilities in their respective modes 

must be operated or constructed. In addition, each of these agencies use 

federal or state inspectors, or a combination of both, to determine 

compliance with the safety regulations and guidance they issue. Finally, 

these agencies can mandate corrective actions and levy fines to 

transportation operators who do not comply with regulations. 

FTA’s oversight of safety and security differs from the other DOT agencies. 

In 1982, FTA’s role in transit safety evolved when Congress gave it the 
Page 2 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

discretion to investigate unsafe conditions in any operation financed by the 

agency. Congress also gave FTA the power to withhold funds until a plan 

for correcting the conditions had been approved, but did not give it power 

to levy fines or take legal actions against transit agencies.1

 However, the 

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) suggested that states and 

localities take a more proactive role in overseeing transit safety, and that 

FTA closely monitor this state and local oversight.2

 Subsequently, in 1991, 

Congress required FTA to (1) issue regulations requiring states to designate 

an oversight agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit 

agencies and (2) withhold federal funds if a state did not comply with the 

regulations. Through the resulting State Safety Oversight program, which 

became effective in 1997, FTA requires states to designate an oversight 

agency to implement FTA safety and security oversight over rail transit 

agencies. In addition, in 2001, Congress passed legislation creating the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and defined its primary 

responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of transportation. While 

TSA’s most public role to date has been its airport screening duties, the 

agency is taking several steps to secure the U.S. rail transit system, 

including developing a rail inspector force.

To assist with Congress’ oversight activities, we (1) describe how the State 

Safety Oversight program is designed, (2) identify what is known about the 

impact of the program on rail transit safety and security, and (3) identify 

any challenges to the State Safety Oversight program. In addition, you 

asked us to provide information on how the State Safety Oversight program 

functions in areas where transit systems cross state lines. See appendix I 

for a description of program implementation where transit systems cross 

state lines. 

To determine how the program is designed, we interviewed a wide range of 

stakeholders including FTA, NTSB, TSA, and the American Public 

Transportation Association (APTA), an industry group. We also reviewed 

program documentation and guidance. To identify what is known about the 

impact of the program on rail transit safety and security, we reviewed FTA 

1

Prior to 1991, FTA was known as the Urban Mass Transportation Administration. For 

simplicity, we will refer to the agency as FTA throughout this report.

2

NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating every civil aviation 

accident in the United States and significant accidents in the other modes of 

transportation—railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline—and issuing safety 

recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents.
Page 3 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

documents and interviewed officials with FTA, NTSB, APTA, transit 

agencies, and state safety oversight agencies. To identify challenges facing 

the program, we conducted interviews with 24 of the 25 state safety 

oversight agencies across the country and 37 of the 42 operating rail transit 

agencies.3

 We visited 8 oversight agencies and 17 transit agencies. We 

selected these agencies to present a cross-section of transit and oversight 

agencies in major cities, smaller cities, states with several rail transit 

agencies, and states with only one rail system. In addition, 2 of the 17 

transit agencies that we selected will soon begin operations to see how the 

program may be incorporated into new transit systems. Also, we selected 3 

of the 17 because they cross state boundaries, so that we could determine 

how the program functions in these regions. We interviewed staff of the 

transit and oversight agencies we visited and reviewed relevant program 

documentation such as interagency agreements and program standards. 

We conducted our work from August 2005 through June 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. (See app. III for 

more detailed information on our methodology.)

Results in Brief FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, 

other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to 

ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. 

• FTA requires states to designate a state safety oversight agency and 

develops rules and guidance that those designated agencies are to use to 

perform their oversight. FTA’s rules and guidance are generally based on 

a system safety approach to provide a comprehensive and organized 

approach to safety and security. In addition, FTA officials require that 

oversight agencies include risk management components in what they 

require of the transit agencies they oversee. FTA officials stated that 

these risk management components, such as hazard analysis and risk 

mitigation procedures, are applicable to transit and are similar to those 

used in other transportation mode safety approaches. Although FTA 

develops and enforces regulations, it neither directly oversees transit 

operations, nor provides funding for the program after state oversight 

agencies are designated. 

3

One oversight agency and five transit agencies declined to participate in our review. 
Page 4 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

• The designated state oversight agencies directly oversee transit 

agencies’ activities. Among other things, they review transit agencies’ 

safety and security system plans, audit the transit agencies at least every 

3 years, and conduct periodic reviews of safety and security trends. 

States have designated several different types of agencies to serve as 

state oversight agencies. Most commonly, states have designated their 

transportation departments to fulfill this function, but public utility 

commissions, public safety agencies, and regional transportation 

authorities also serve in this role. In terms of funding, although states 

can use federal New Starts4

 funding to set up a new oversight agency, 

states must support the continuing operation of the oversight agency 

with other, generally non-federal, sources of funding. Officials in 17 of 

the 24 state oversight agencies with whom we spoke reported that they 

use state funds for the program, while 10 of the 24 reported they charge 

the transit agency for oversight. 

• Transit agencies develop and implement safety and security plans, 

assess hazardous conditions, report certain incidents to the oversight 

agency, conduct self audits, and keep the state oversight agency 

apprised of corrective actions. 

• Federal agencies other than FTA have oversight responsibility for part of 

the safety and security of rail transit operations. Since 2003, the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has had a role in transit 

security. DHS’s Office of Grants and Training provides grants to transit 

and other local agencies to enhance security while TSA has security 

regulatory authority over rail transit agencies. TSA recently hired and is 

deploying a rail security inspector force to oversee compliance with 

existing security directives and any future regulations. In addition, FRA 

has jurisdiction to regulate the safety of portions of rail transit systems 

that share track or rights-of-way with the general railroad system. 

Almost all oversight and transit agencies report that the State Safety 

Oversight program is worthwhile in terms of promoting and improving the 

safety and security of rail transit systems; however, there is limited 

information showing its impact on safety and security. Officials at 23 of the 

4

The New Starts program awards full-funding grant agreements for capital expenses for 

fixed guideway rail projects, and certain bus, trolley, and ferry projects. A full-funding grant 

agreement establishes the terms and conditions for federal participation in a project, 

including the maximum amount of federal funds available, which, by statute, cannot exceed 

80 percent of the project’s net cost. 
Page 5 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit agency officials with whom 

we spoke believe the program is worthwhile. The transit agency officials 

primarily cite the importance of having state oversight agency staff “look 

over their shoulder,” review safety and security trends, and require audits 

and corrective actions. Although many officials support the program, FTA’s 

methods for obtaining information on transit safety and security (i.e., 

transit and oversight agency data and FTA audits of the oversight agencies) 

do not include performance measures and related program goals. FTA has 

not conducted audits every 3 years, as envisioned when the program began. 

According to FTA officials, they did not keep to their stated audit schedule 

because they were reassessing the priorities for the program after the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. FTA issued annual reports from 1999 

through 2003 that track transit accident, crash, fatality, and other safety 

data; however, FTA officials have had difficulty identifying performance 

measures for the program and setting performance goals, because of the 

relatively low number of fatalities and incidents, and the varying design of 

rail transit systems, such as street trolleys and heavy rail. Furthermore, 

FTA audited all oversight agencies at least once in the past 8 years (except 

those that began operations in 2004 or later). They noted that while they 

conducted only four audits of oversight agencies from 2001 to 2004, they 

also conducted nine “safety and security readiness reviews” to ensure 

transit systems about to begin operations would be able to safely and 

securely begin passenger operations. Although the agency was focused on 

security after September 11, 2001, this infrequent schedule limits FTA’s 

ability to conduct oversight, including collecting information on the safety 

oversight agencies and making informed and timely revisions to the 

program. Recent changes in FTA’s program regulations and leadership 

provide an opportunity to address this lack of information, performance 

measures, and program goals, and to resume its stated audit schedule. For 

example, FTA has issued a revision to the regulations governing the State 

Safety Oversight program, recommitted to the audit process, and signed a 

contract that includes developing performance measures by the end of 

fiscal year 2006 and evaluating how new rail systems are implementing the 

program.5

5

Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), Pub. L. No. 103-62, 

in 1993. Under the act, federal agencies are to develop multiyear strategic plans, annual 

performance plans, and annual performance reports. According to GPRA, federal agencies 

are to include performance goals for agency activities in their strategic plans.
Page 6 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. 

First, the amount of staff and the level of state oversight-staff expertise 

(and thus their potential ability to oversee transit agencies) varies widely 

across the country. For example, one oversight agency requires its staff to 

have at least 5 years of rail transit experience. In contrast, another 

oversight agency assigned a state DOT transportation planner to work on 

safety and security oversight as a collateral duty. Although no officials 

identified a safety or security problem resulting from a lack of staff or 

expertise, officials from 16 of 24 state safety oversight agencies raised 

concerns about possibly not having enough qualified staff to carry out their 

oversight. Officials from three state oversight agencies stated that 

additional funding to hire more staff for this program would be helpful. 

Most transit and oversight agency officials with whom we spoke believe 

that federal funding for training and an FTA-developed curriculum would 

improve the qualifications and effectiveness of state oversight agency 

personnel. While FTA provides technical support on and supports the 

exchange of best practices for meeting its regulations, these activities do 

not include training on oversight approaches or providing funding to attend 

training classes. This contrasts with the approach taken by other DOT 

agencies, such as FRA and PHMSA, which provide free training or use 

agency funds to pay for state agency personnel to attend training sessions, 

in at least some instances. Although FTA considered addressing the lack of 

consistency in qualifications among state agencies in its recent regulations, 

FTA officials determined the agency lacks the legal authority to direct 

states to hire state safety oversight personnel with specific experience, 

training, or certification. A second challenge to implementing the program, 

according to officials from 20 of 24 state oversight agencies and 14 of 37 

transit agencies, is the uncertainty about the federal role in transit security 

given that TSA has no formally defined role in FTA’s program—even though 

it is the lead agency on security matters and has regulatory authority over 

security activities in transportation including rail. Although TSA’s program 

is still developing, several oversight and transit agency officials with whom 

we spoke were concerned about the potential for duplication of effort 

given that state safety oversight agencies and TSA both review and 

comment on transit systems’ security plans. Several transit agency officials 

described this as a particular concern due to the already limited resources 

they had available for responding to oversight activities. TSA and FTA 

recognize this concern and have begun discussions on how to coordinate 

their oversight efforts.

To help ensure that FTA has sufficient information to evaluate the 

program’s performance, we are recommending that FTA’s new program 
Page 7 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

leadership set performance goals for the program and develop a plan for 

maintaining FTA’s stated schedule of auditing oversight agencies’ 

performance at least once every 3 years. Also, to help oversight agency 

staff obtain adequate training to perform their duties, we are 

recommending that FTA develop a recommended training curriculum for 

oversight agency staff and work with oversight agencies to identify ways to 

address training deficiencies that exist among oversight agency staff. 

Finally, to reduce the potential for duplication of effort and confusion on 

the part of oversight and transit agencies regarding the security portion of 

the program, we are recommending that FTA and TSA coordinate their 

security oversight activities, including performing security audits in a 

coordinated fashion. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, officials from FTA, TSA, and NTSB 

provided comments generally concurring with the report. Furthermore, 

FTA and TSA officials stated that they are working to determine how to 

implement the recommendations. Finally, TSA provided a technical 

comment, which we included in the report.

Background In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency 

Act of 1991 (ISTEA),6

 which added Section 28 to the Federal Transit Act.7

ISTEA required FTA to establish a state-managed safety and security 

oversight program for rail transit agencies. As a result, on December 27, 

1995,8

 FTA published a set of regulations, called Rail Fixed Guideway 

Systems; State Safety Oversight (subsequently referred to as FTA’s rule in 

this report), for improving the safety and security of rail transit agencies. 

State oversight agencies were required by the rule to approve transit 

agencies’ safety plans by January 1, 1997, and security plans by January 1, 

1998. As part of the FTA rule, FTA officials stated they incorporated APTA’s 

1991 Manual for the Development of Rail Transit System Safety Program 

Plans to describe steps the state oversight agencies should take in 

developing the program standards that transit agencies would have to 

meet.

6

Pub. L. No. 102-240.

7

Codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 5330.

8

Codified at 49 CFR Part 659.
Page 8 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

In 1995, at the time of the FTA rule’s publication, 5 of 19 states affected by 

the FTA rule had oversight programs in place for rail transit safety and 

security, and no oversight agency met all the requirements in the FTA rule. 

During the first few years of implementation, FTA worked with states to 

develop compliant programs that addressed FTA’s requirements. Ten years 

after FTA promulgated the initial rule, FTA published a revision to it in the 

Federal Register on April 29, 2005. The FTA rule stated that oversight 

agencies had to comply with the revised rule by May 1, 2006. The revisions 

address, in part, the needs of a growing oversight community9

 and NTSB’s 

recommendations arising from transit accident investigations. For 

example, according to FTA and NTSB, NTSB found that the initial rule did 

not include the requirement that oversight agencies verify transit agencies 

are following safe and secure operating procedures by formally 

documenting how transit agency employees were performing specific work 

functions in compliance with the transit agency’s rules and procedures—a 

process known as “proficiency and efficiency testing.” Thus, the revised 

rule specifies what the state oversight agency must require of rail transit 

systems regarding such verification, and incorporates into the regulation 

material previously incorporated by reference to the APTA manual. Finally, 

the revised rule included additional information on ensuring rail transit 

security and emergency preparedness. 

FTA relies on staff in its Office of Safety and Security to lead the State 

Safety Oversight program—and hired the current Program Manager in 

March 2006. This manager is also responsible for other safety duties in 

addition to the State Safety Oversight program. Additional FTA staff within 

the Office of Safety and Security assist with outreach to transit and 

oversight agencies and additional tasks. For example, FTA has devoted a 

Transit Safety Specialist to the program full time; a Training Manager, Data 

Analyst, and Safety Analyst are also available to assist on an as-needed 

basis. FTA regional personnel are not formally involved with the program’s 

day-to-day activities, though officials from several FTA Regional Offices 

help address specific compliance issues that occasionally arise at transit 

agencies. Also, staff in at least one FTA Regional Office have taken it upon 

themselves to take an active role supporting transit agencies and oversight 

agencies in meeting the program’s requirements. In addition, regional staff 

9

Since the beginning of the State Safety Oversight program, the transit community affected 

by this oversight program grew from 19 states and 32 rail transit agencies to 26 states and 42 

rail transit agencies as of July 2006. FTA anticipates that two new states and as many as 

seven new rail transit agencies will enter the State Safety Oversight program by 2009. 
Page 9 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

help states with new transit agencies establish new oversight agencies, 

help new transit agencies create safety and security plans, and have helped 

facilitate disputes between oversight and transit agencies as needed. 

However, after a transit system begins operations, the program is primarily 

managed from FTA’s headquarters office. FTA also relies on contractors to 

do many of the day-to-day activities ranging from developing and 

implementing FTA’s audit program of state oversight agencies to developing 

and providing training classes on system safety.

FTA’s rule applies to all states with rail fixed guideway systems operating in 

their jurisdictions. The FTA rule defines a rail fixed guideway system as any 

light, heavy, or rapid rail system; monorail, inclined plane, funicular, trolley, 

or automated guideway that is not regulated by FRA and

• is included in FTA’s calculation of fixed guideway route miles or receives 

funding under FTA’s formula program for urbanized areas (49 U.S.C. 

5336); or 

• has submitted documentation to FTA indicating its intent to be included 

in FTA’s calculation of fixed guideway route miles to receive funding 

under FTA’s formula program for urbanized areas (49 U.S.C. 5336). 

Figure 1 shows examples of the types of rail systems that are included in 

the State Safety Oversight program.
Page 10 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

Figure 1: Examples of Rail Systems Included in the State Safety Oversight Program

FTA’s rule states that rail systems that are regulated by FRA, such as 

commuter railroads, are not considered rail transit agencies and are 

therefore not subject to its rule. In addition, FRA has oversight authority 

over the safety of portions of rail transit systems that share track or rightsof-way with the general railroad system.10 Furthermore, the revised rule’s 

definition of “rail fixed guideway system” includes systems built entirely 

without FTA capital funds, but that intend to receive FTA formula funding. 

Examples of these systems include Houston’s METRORail system and the 

Automated Guideway

Seattle Center Monorail

Inclined Plane

Port Authority of Allegheny County Duquesne Incline

Heavy Rail

Chicago Transit Authority “L”

Light Rail

Port Authority of Allegheny County “T”

Cable Car

San Francisco Municipal Railway Cable Car

Trolley

Kenosha Transit Trolley

Sources: PennDOT; Seattle Center Monorail; San Francisco Municipal Railway; GAO.

10Information on FRA’s jurisdiction over rail transit agencies with shared-use track can be 

found in FTA and FRA policy statements published in the Federal Register in July 2000. FRA 

clarified its position on safety jurisdiction over shared track situations. See 65 Fed. Reg. 

42529 (July 10, 2000). 
Page 11 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

New Jersey Transit RiverLINE system. Rail transit operations that do not 

receive FTA formula funds are not subject to oversight through FTA’s 

program. Las Vegas’ monorail line does not receive FTA formula funds and 

therefore does not fall within the FTA program. However, some of the rail 

transit systems—including automated airport people-movers and 

sightseeing tramways—that are not subject to the FTA program may be 

subject to state-mandated oversight in certain states. 

FTA and FRA have different regulatory authority and this has implications 

for their ability to provide oversight.11 According to statute, FTA cannot 

regulate safety and security operations at transit agencies except for 

purposes of national defense or in cases of regional or national 

emergency.12 In addition, FTA does not have safety inspectors. FTA may, 

however, institute nonregulatory safety and security activities, including 

safety- and security-related training, research, and demonstration projects. 

In addition, FTA may promote safety and security through grant-making 

authority. Specifically, FTA may stipulate conditions of grants, such as 

certain safety and security statutory and regulatory requirements, and FTA 

may withhold funds for noncompliance with the conditions of a grant.13 In 

relation to the State Safety Oversight program, both the authorizing statute 

and the FTA rule state FTA may withhold urbanized area program funds 

from states that do not meet the requirements of the program.14 For 

example, FTA invoked this authority and withheld federal funding from two 

states that failed to meet initial deadlines specified in the FTA rule. FTA 

withheld approximately $95 million in federal funding from one state for its 

failure to designate a state safety oversight agency and approximately $2.3 

11We also contacted Canadian transit officials in Toronto and Montreal to discuss their 

safety and security oversight system. However, we found that there is no standard national 

system of rail safety and security oversight in Canada, except in cases where a transit 

system is classified as a regular railroad. According to officials, rail transit systems are 

usually self-regulated in Canada, though some submit to external safety audits conducted by 

APTA.

1249 U.S.C. sec. 5334 (b).

13See 49 U.S.C. sec. 5334 (b) and 49 U.S.C. sec. 5330.

14The Urbanized Area Formula Program makes federal resources available to urbanized 

areas and to state governors for transit capital assistance in urbanized areas. An urbanized 

area is an incorporated area with a population of 50,000 or more. Urbanized areas with 

populations of fewer than 200,000 people may also use FTA’s formula funds for operating 

assistance.
Page 12 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

million from another state for failure to meet the FTA rule’s implementation 

deadlines.

FRA has broader jurisdiction over safety regulation than FTA. FRA 

oversees over 500 freight railroads and over 20 commuter railroads, in 

addition to Amtrak. According to agency officials, FRA can directly enforce 

safety statutes or regulations against railroads using a “toolkit” of 

consequences, which vary in severity and are used to compel rail carriers 

to comply with safety regulations. Most commonly, FRA will issue a civil 

penalty, or fine, against a railroad not in compliance with a particular 

regulation. Depending on the infraction, however, FRA can also issue an 

emergency order (the strongest response to noncompliance) or it can cite a 

defect (a minor deficiency that needs to be addressed but is not egregious 

enough to warrant a fine). FRA officials stated that the agency trains and 

maintains its own cadre of safety inspectors that are authorized to conduct 

safety inspections at any time, 24 hours per day and 7 days per week. In 

addition to these inspectors, FRA manages a program called the State Rail 

Safety Participation Program which allows states to employ their own FRAcertified inspectors who can enforce FRA regulations. 

Under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), 

federal agencies should design programs with measurable goals that 

support the agency’s strategic goals. Congress enacted GPRA to shift 

agencies’ focus from simply monitoring activities undertaken to measuring 

the results of these activities. Each agency’s strategic plan is to include a 

mission statement, a set of outcome-related strategic goals, and a 

description of how the agency intends to achieve these goals. To measure 

progress toward the strategic goals, we have previously reported that the 

agency should also have a plan for collecting data to measure and evaluate 

program performance.15 Without measurable goals and evaluation, it is 

difficult to determine whether the program is accomplishing its intended 

purpose and whether the resources dedicated to the program efforts 

should be increased, used in other ways, or applied elsewhere. 

15GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and 

Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996). 
Page 13 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

Many Agencies Are 

Involved in the State 

Safety Oversight 

Program

FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, 

other federal agencies such as DHS, states, and rail transit agencies 

collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. Under 

the program, FTA is responsible for developing the regulations and 

guidance governing the program, auditing state safety oversight agencies to 

ensure the regulations are enforced, and providing technical assistance and 

other information; FTA provides funding to oversight agencies in only 

limited instances under the program. State oversight agencies directly 

oversee the safety and security of rail transit systems by reviewing safety 

and security plans, performing audits, and investigating accidents. Rail 

transit agencies are responsible for developing safety and security plans, 

reporting incidents to the oversight agencies, and following all other 

regulations state oversight agencies set for them. In addition to FTA, 

federal agencies such as FRA, DHS’s Office of Grants and Training, and TSA 

also have regulatory or funding roles related to rail transit safety and 

security.

FTA Oversees and 

Administers the State Safety 

Oversight Program

FTA officials stated that they used a multi-agency system-safety approach 

in developing the State Safety Oversight program.16 Federal, state, and rail 

transit agencies collaborate to ensure the rail transit system is operated 

safely; each of these agencies has some monitoring responsibility, either of 

themselves or another entity. FTA oversees and administers the program. 

As the program administrator, FTA is responsible for developing the rules 

and guidance that state oversight agencies are to use to perform their 

oversight of rail transit agencies. FTA also is responsible for informing 

oversight and transit agencies of new program developments, facilitating 

and informing the transit and oversight agencies of available training 

through FTA or other organizations, facilitating information sharing among 

program participants, and providing technical assistance. One avenue FTA 

uses to provide these services is the annual meeting to which all program 

participants are invited. FTA also calls special meetings and communicates 

information to program participants via e-mail when applicable. (See fig. 2 

showing roles and responsibilities of participants in the State Safety 

Oversight program.) 

16A system-safety approach involves the application of technical and managerial skills, to 

identify, analyze, assess, and control hazards and risks. 
Page 14 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

Figure 2: Roles and Responsibilities of Participants in the State Safety Oversight Program

FTA officials stated they emphasize that components of a risk-management 

approach to safety and security, such as hazard analysis and risk-mitigation 

procedures, are included in the program standard that each state oversight 

agency issues to the transit agencies they oversee. This is consistent with 

our position that agencies make risk-based decisions on where their assets 

can best be used, both in transportation security and safety. However, FTA 

recognizes that only parts of the State Safety Oversight program are riskState Safety 

Oversight 49 

CFR

Part 659

Oversight 

agency 

designated 

by state

Develop and 

implement a

system 

safety plan 

that complies

with the SOA 

Standard 

and develop 

a system 

security plan

Classify 

hazardous

conditions

Conduct 

internal 

safety and 

security 

reviews

Obtain the 

SOA’s

approval of 

corrective 

action and 

implement 

plans

Report any 

accidents and 

unacceptable 

hazardous

conditions within 

the time frame 

specified by the 

SOA and 

investigate if 

necessary

Develop a

System 

Safety 

Program 

Standard 

(defines the 

relationship 

between the 

SOA and the 

transit 

agency)

Review, 

approve, and 

monitor the 

implementation of the 

transit

agency’s

plans

Require the transit 

agency to report the 

occurrence of 

accidents and 

unacceptable 

hazardous

conditions within a

period of time 

specified by

the Standard

Require the 

transit 

agency to 

implement a

Corrective 

Action Plan

Conduct an 

on-site 

formal 

Triennial 

Safety 

Review of 

the transit 

agency

Submit initial, 

annual and 

periodic 

reports to 

the FTA as

required by 

Part 659

Require the 

transit 

agency to 

conduct 

internal 

safety audits

Conduct 

audit of state 

oversight 

agency and 

review 

annual, 

incident, and 

3-year 

reviews. 

FTA 

STATE 

OVERSIGHT 

AGENCY 

(SOA) 

TRANSIT 

AGENCY 

Source: GAO adaptation of State Safety Oversight Program Annual Report 2003, FTA Office of Safety and Security.

DHS and FRA provide related 

oversight functions

Annually submit 

report on internal 

safety and security 

review, certification 

of compliance, 

hazard 

management 

program, and 

3-year reviews

Develop 

annual 

report and 

certification 

of 

compliance 
Page 15 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

based. The parts of the program that are risk-based are the areas where it 

believes risk management is most applicable to safety and security. These 

areas are similar to those in which other transportation modes, such as 

aviation and pipelines, also use risk-based approaches. Areas that are not 

risk-based would include such things as requiring minimum standards for 

all transit agencies in the program, no matter their size or ridership.17

While FTA officials stated that FTA does not inspect transit agencies with 

regard to safety, it is responsible for ensuring that, through audits and 

reviews of oversight agency reports, state oversight agencies comply with 

the program requirements. For example, according to the FTA rule, when a 

state proposes to designate an oversight agency, FTA may review the 

proposal to ensure the designated agency has the authority to perform the 

required duties without any apparent conflicts. FTA has recommended in 

two instances that a state choose a different agency because the oversight 

agency that the state proposed appeared to be too closely affiliated with 

the transit agency and did not appear to be independent. In addition, FTA is 

responsible for reviewing the annual reports oversight agencies submit to 

(1) ensure they include all the required information (e.g., descriptions of 

program resources, and causes of accidents and collisions), and (2) look 

for industry-wide safety and security trends or problems. FTA also has 

authority, under the FTA rule, to request additional information from 

oversight agencies at any time. Furthermore, FTA is responsible for 

performing audits of oversight agencies to ensure they are complying with 

program requirements and guidance. FTA audits evaluate how well an 

oversight agency is meeting the requirements of the FTA rule, including 

whether or not the oversight agency is investigating accidents properly, if it 

is conducting its safety and security reviews properly, and if it is reporting 

to FTA all the information that is required. Finally, FTA does not provide 

funding to states for the operation of their oversight programs. However, 

states may use FTA Section 5309 (New Starts program) funds—normally 

used to pay for transit-related capital expenses—to defray the cost of 

setting up their oversight agency before a transit agency begins operations. 

Also, FTA officials stated this year that FTA used a portion of the funding 

originally designated for FTA audits to pay for one person from each 

oversight agency to attend training on the revisions to the FTA rule, which 

oversight agencies had to comply with by May 1, 2006.

17FTA states that, to ensure a minimum standard is met, a focus on universally applied rules 

is necessary. Therefore, FTA officials stated that they felt it was inappropriate to use a riskbased approach in this area of the program. 
Page 16 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

State Oversight Agencies 

Conduct Direct Oversight of 

Rail Transit Agencies

In the State Safety Oversight program, state oversight agencies are directly 

responsible for overseeing rail transit agencies. According to the FTA rule, 

states must designate an agency to perform this oversight function at the 

time FTA enters into a grant agreement for any New Starts project involving 

a new rail transit system, or before the transit agency applies for funding 

under FTA’s formula program for urbanized areas. States have designated 

several different types of agencies to serve as oversight agencies. Most 

frequently—in 17 cases—states have designated their departments of 

transportation to serve in this role, either due to their expertise on rail 

transportation, or because state officials believed they had no other 

agencies with transportation expertise. In three instances—California, 

Colorado, and Massachusetts—states have designated utilities 

commissions or regulators to oversee rail transit safety and security. 

Officials from these states stated that since these bodies already had 

regulatory and oversight authority over utilities in these states, it was a 

natural extension of their powers to add rail transit to the list of industries 

they oversee. In fact, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) 

has been overseeing railroads and rail transit in that state since 1911. The 

commission has issued and enforces several “general orders” that rail 

transit agencies in California must follow or face fines and suspended 

service. Two states have designated emergency management or public 

safety departments to oversee their rail transit agencies. Officials in one 

state, Illinois, have designated two separate oversight agencies—both local 

transportation funding authorities—to oversee the two rail transit agencies 

operating in the state. In the Washington, D.C. (District of Columbia), 

region, the rail transit system runs between two states and the District of 

Columbia. These states and the District of Columbia established the TriState Oversight Committee as the designated oversight agency.18 Finally, 

one state, New York, has given its oversight authority to its Public 

Transportation Safety Board (PTSB). PTSB officials said they have 

authority similar to the public utilities commissions discussed above, but 

have no other mission than ensuring and overseeing transit safety in New 

York. See appendix I for further discussion of multi-state operations. Also, 

see appendix II for a table showing each oversight agency and the rail 

transit agencies they oversee.

18The Tri-State Oversight Committee has six representatives, two each from Maryland, 

Virginia, and the District of Columbia. 
Page 17 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

The individual authority each state oversight agency has over transit 

agencies varies widely. While FTA’s rule gives state oversight agencies 

authority to mandate certain rail safety and security practices as the 

oversight agencies see fit, it does not give the oversight agencies authority 

to take enforcement actions, such as fining rail transit agencies or shutting 

down their operations. However, we found five states where the oversight 

agencies have some enforcement authority over the rail transit agencies 

they oversee. In all cases, this was due to the regulatory authority states 

have granted their oversight agencies. For instance, state utilities 

commissions may have this authority written into their authorizing 

legislation. In other instances, states had given this authority to the 

oversight agency in state legislation. Officials from oversight agencies that 

have the authority to fine or otherwise punish rail transit agencies all stated 

that they rarely, if ever, use that authority, but each stated that they 

believed it gives their actions extra weight and forced transit agencies to 

acquiesce to the oversight agency more readily than they otherwise might. 

A majority of oversight agencies, 19 of the 24 with which we spoke, have no 

such punitive authority, though officials from some oversight agencies 

stated they may be able to withhold grants their oversight agencies provide 

to the transit agencies they oversee.19 Although officials from several of 

these agencies stated that they believe they would be more effective if they 

did have enforcement authority, under the current program this authority 

would be granted by individual states.

While the states have designated a number of different types of agencies 

with varying authority to oversee transit agencies, FTA has a basic set of 

rules it requires each oversight agency to follow. In the program, oversight 

agencies are responsible for the following: 

• Developing a program standard that outlines oversight and rail 

transit agency responsibilities. According to the FTA rule, the program 

standard “provides guidance to the regulated rail transit properties 

concerning processes and procedures they must have in place to be in 

compliance with the State Safety Oversight program.” FTA requirements 

for the program standard are procedural rather than technical. For 

example, the program standard must include, at a minimum, areas 

19Officials from 16 oversight agencies stated that they provide some form of grant funding to 

transit agencies they oversee and that they could, potentially, withhold those grants to force 

a transit agency to take a particular safety action. However, no oversight agency officials 

stated that they had taken this step.
Page 18 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

dealing with the oversight agency’s responsibilities, how the program 

standard will be modified, how the oversight agency will oversee the 

transit agency’s internal safety and security reviews, how the oversight 

agency will conduct the triennial audits, and requirements for the rail 

transit agency to report accidents. According to FTA, oversight agencies 

may choose to develop technical standards, such as requirements for 

the strength of track, crashworthiness of rail vehicles, or brightness of 

signals. In addition, the standard must contain sections describing how 

the oversight agency will investigate accidents, how the rail transit 

agency will develop a corrective action plan to address investigation and 

audit findings, and the minimum requirements in the agency’s separate 

safety and security plans. FTA mandates that the transit agency’s safety 

plan must include, among other requirements, a process for identifying, 

managing, and eliminating hazards. Similarly, FTA mandates that the 

transit agency’s security plan must include, among other requirements, a 

process for managing threats and vulnerabilities, and a method for 

conducting internal security reviews. 

• Reviewing transit agencies’ safety and security plans and annual 

reports. FTA requires oversight agencies to review and approve these 

plans and reports of their safety and security activities to ensure they 

meet the program requirements. 

• Conducting safety and security audits of rail transit agencies on at 

least a triennial basis. FTA requires oversight agency officials to audit 

the rail transit agencies’ implementation of their safety and security 

plans at least once every 3 years. We found one oversight agency that 

performed this audit on an annual basis. In addition, we found five 

others that perform the audit on a continuous basis, auditing the rail 

transit agency on a portion of their safety and security plans each year. 

FTA has approved both these alternative auditing schedules. 

• Tracking findings from these audits to ensure they are addressed. FTA 

requires oversight agencies to establish a process for tracking and 

approving the disposition of recommendations from the triennial audits. 

Oversight agencies must also have a process for tracking and 

eliminating hazardous conditions that the transit agency reports to the 

oversight agency outside the audit process.

• Investigating accidents. FTA requires oversight agencies to investigate 

accidents on the rail system that meet a certain damage or severity 

threshold and develop a corrective action plan for the causes leading to 
Page 19 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

the accident. Oversight agencies may hire a contractor or allow the 

transit agency to conduct the investigation on its behalf. 

• Submitting an annual report to FTA. According to the FTA rule, 

oversight agencies must submit an annual report to FTA detailing their 

oversight activities, including results of accident investigations and the 

status of ongoing corrective actions. 

Under the FTA rule, rail transit agencies are mainly responsible for meeting 

the program standards that oversight agencies set out for them. However, 

the FTA rule also lays out several specific requirements that oversight 

agencies must require transit agencies to follow, such as developing 

separate system safety and security plans, performing internal safety and 

security audits over a 3-year cycle, developing a hazard-management 

process, and reporting certain accidents to oversight agencies within 2 

hours. FTA also requires that these requirements are included in each 

oversight agency’s program standard. The locations and types of transit 

agencies participating in the program are shown in figure 3.
Page 20 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

Figure 3: Locations and Types of Rail Transit Agencies Participating in State Safety Oversight Program

Heavy Rail 

Light Rail 

Automated Guideway 

Trolley 

Cable Car 

Inclined Plane 

Sources: FTA’s National Transit Database; MapArt.

San Diego, CA Little Rock, AR 

Miami, FL 

San Jose, CA Denver, CO 

Sacramento, CA 

H

Chicago, IL 

Atlanta, GA 

San Juan, Puerto Rico 

Memphi Chattanooga, TN s, TN 

Kenosha, WI 

Tampa, FL 

A

Seattle, WA 

Jacksonville, FL 

C

L

Houston, TX 

Baltimore, MD 

Galveston, TX 

St. Louis, MO 

Tacoma, WA 

Salt Lake City, UT 

Dallas, TX 

T

New Orleans, LA 

Los Angeles, CA 

San Francisco, CA 

Washington, DC 

Cleveland, OH 

Portland, OR 

Philadelphia, PA 

Pittsburgh, PA 

Johnstown, PA 

Boston, MA 

Detroit, MI 

Trenton, NJ 

Jersey City, NJ 

Newark, NJ 

Minneapolis, MN 

Buffalo, NY 

New York City, NY 
Page 21 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

Other Federal Agencies Play 

a Role in Ensuring Rail 

Transit Safety and Security, 

but Often Their Roles Are 

Outside the State Safety 

Oversight Program

In addition to FTA, the state oversight agencies, and the rail transit 

agencies, other governmental agencies have some role in ensuring the 

safety and security of rail transit systems. One of these agencies is DHS’ 

TSA. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),20 passed by 

Congress in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, gave TSA 

authority for security over all transportation modes, including authority to 

issue security regulations.21 While TSA’s most public transportation security 

duties are its airport screening and aviation related activities, TSA has 

taken steps to enhance rail transit security. For example, in May 2004, TSA 

issued security directives to rail transit agencies to ensure all agencies 

were implementing a consistent baseline of security. Also, TSA has hired 

100 rail security inspectors, as authorized by Congress.22 While the exact 

responsibilities of the inspectors are still being determined, a TSA official 

stated that they will monitor and enforce compliance with the security 

directives by passenger rail agencies, as well as increase security 

awareness among rail transit agencies, riders, and others. The inspectors 

have begun outreach activities with rail transit systems aimed at enhancing 

security in rail and mass transit systems. TSA officials stated their 

responsibilities encompass the security of other rail systems, including 

freight rail, which is consistent with ATSA. 

In contrast to the enforcement role of TSA, the Office of Grants and 

Training within DHS’ Preparedness Directorate, plays a role in ensuring rail 

transit security through supporting security initiatives. The Office of Grants 

and Training (formerly known as the Office of Domestic Preparedness) is 

the primary federal source of security funding for passenger rail systems, 

and is the principal component of DHS responsible for preparing the 

United States for acts of terrorism. In carrying out its mission to prevent, 

prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism, the Office of Grants and 

Training provides training, funds for the purchase of equipment, support 

for the planning and execution of exercises, technical assistance, and other 

support to assist states, local jurisdictions (such as municipalities and 

transit agencies), and the private sector. The Office of Grants and Training 

20Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).

21ATSA initially created TSA within DOT. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 

107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), transferred TSA to DHS.

22These positions were funded through the DHS Appropriations Act of 2005 and its 

accompanying conference report, which provided TSA with $12 million in funding for rail 

security activities.
Page 22 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

has provided over $320 million to rail transit providers through the Urban 

Area Security Initiative and Transit Security Grant Program. 

In addition to FTA, another DOT agency, FRA, plays a role in ensuring 

transit agencies operate safely. In general, FRA exercises its jurisdiction 

over parts of a rail transit system that share track with the general railroad 

system, or places where a rail transit system and the general railroad 

system share a connection (e.g., a grade crossing).23 Rail transit systems 

that share track or grade crossings—or are subject to FRA regulations for 

other reasons—may apply to FRA for a waiver from these rules. According 

to FRA, if a rail transit vehicle were to operate on the same tracks and at 

the same time as general railroads, FRA would make the rail transit agency 

operating the vehicle meet the safety standards of the general railroads. 

This would likely require rail transit agencies to use much sturdier (and 

more expensive) vehicles, and could be cost-prohibitive for the rail transit 

agencies. Therefore, 11 rail transit agencies have requested waivers from 

FRA based on the fact that their trains operate at different times than heavy 

freight trains, and will not be on the track at the same time, meaning the 

risk of collision is low or non-existent. According to an FRA official, as of 

June 2006, FRA granted waivers to 10 of the 11 rail transit agencies that 

applied for them.24 After granting a waiver, FRA stays in contact with FTA 

and the relevant transit and oversight agencies to address any safety 

questions or problems that arise. 

NTSB also plays a role in enhancing and ensuring rail transit safety, though 

it has no formal role in FTA’s oversight program. NTSB has authority to 

investigate accidents involving passenger railroads, including rail transit 

agencies. Rail transit agencies must report to NTSB, within 2 hours, all 

accidents involving fatalities, multiple injuries, evacuations, or damage 

over certain monetary thresholds. NTSB officials stated they generally will 

investigate only the more serious accidents, such as those involving 

fatalities or injuries, or those involving recurring safety issues. Often, NTSB 

accident investigations of rail transit accidents will result in 

recommendations to federal agencies or rail transit agencies to eliminate 

the condition that led to the accident. NTSB has no power to enforce its 

23FRA clarified its position on safety jurisdiction over shared track situations in a Federal 

Register posting in 2000. See 65 Fed. Reg. 42529.

24FTA provided documentation showing that FRA told the one rail transit agency that did not 

receive its waiver that its application was unnecessary—what the agency proposed was 

already allowed under FRA regulations.
Page 23 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

recommendations, but NTSB states that, historically, agencies have 

implemented over 80 percent of its recommendations. NTSB also maintains 

expertise on transportation safety across all modes of transport and 

conducts studies on pressing issues. Rail transit agencies and FTA both 

stated that they consult NTSB periodically when they have safety 

questions, in addition to reporting accidents to it. 

Transit and Oversight 

Agencies Perceive the 

Program as 

Worthwhile; However, 

FTA Does Not Have 

Goals or Performance 

Measures to Document 

the Impact of the State 

Safety Oversight 

Program on Safety and 

Security

The majority of officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we 

spoke agreed that the State Safety Oversight program improves safety and 

security in their organizations. These officials provided illustrations about 

how the program enhanced safety or security; however, they have limited 

statistical evidence that the oversight program improved safety or security. 

FTA has obtained a variety of information on the program from sources 

such as national transit data, annual reports from oversight agencies, and 

its own audits of the oversight agencies. FTA has used national transit data 

and oversight agencies’ annual reports to collate information on safety, 

including information about fatalities and the causes of incidents; FTA last 

issued a report summarizing this information in 2003. However, this data is 

not linked to any program goals or performance measures. FTA officials 

recognize the need for performance measures for its safety and security 

programs and are taking steps in 2006 to begin to address this need. Finally, 

although FTA expected to audit the oversight agencies every 3 years, it has 

not conducted these audits as frequently as it had planned (it has 

conducted eight since September 2001). However, program officials stated 

they are committed to getting “back on track” to meet the planned 

schedule. Ensuring that FTA devotes enough resources to conduct the 

planned audits, and develops and uses planned performance goals and 

measures to improve the program, will be important for future assessments 

of the program.

Transit and Oversight 

Agencies Describe the 

Oversight Program as 

Worthwhile and Valuable

Both transit agency and oversight agency officials state that FTA’s State 

Safety Oversight program is worthwhile and valuable because it helps them 

maintain and improve safety and security. Of the 37 transit agency officials 

with whom we spoke, 35 believe the program that oversees their safety and 

security is worthwhile. Several officials stated that it is important and 

beneficial to have an independent agency verify their safety and security 

progress. One transit agency official explained that the oversight agency 

helps transit officials to identify larger, or systemic, issues. In addition, the 

program provides support to exert extra influence on a transit agency’s 
Page 24 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

board of directors or senior management to get safety or security 

improvements implemented faster. Furthermore, officials identified 

specific examples illustrating how oversight agencies helped improve 

safety or security. Officials from 15 transit agencies explained that the 

program helped modify equipment to improve safety and security. For 

example, one transit agency had problems with train operators failing to 

stop at red light signals. The oversight agency helped the safety department 

exert enough influence with the transit agency’s senior management to 

replace all signals with light-emitting diode (LED) signals that were 

brighter and more visible. Finally, transit agency officials believe that FTA’s 

program is an effective method for overseeing safety and security. Several 

officials said that having a state or local (rather than national) oversight 

agency facilitated ongoing safety and security improvements and 

consistent working relationships with the oversight staff.

In addition to transit agency officials, officials from 23 of the 24 state safety 

oversight agencies with whom we spoke believed that the State Safety 

Oversight program is valuable or very valuable for improving transit 

systems’ safety and security. Several officials commented that the program 

provides an incentive to examine safety and security issues and avoid 

complacency. It also helps the transit agencies by providing an independent 

third party, since self oversight is not, in the officials’ view, the best way to 

have an agency identify and resolve its safety and security issues. 

Furthermore, several officials commented that they believed the current 

system worked well, and that the program provides consistency and 

endows the state safety oversight agencies with enough authority to 

accomplish their tasks. Also, officials said that having the states carry out 

the program provides ongoing oversight in addition to formal audits, which 

helps maintain a constant oversight of safety and security issues. 

Furthermore, some transit and oversight agency officials stated that, 

because they were subject to oversight, they believed they saw improved 

safety statistics for their rail system. For example, CPUC provided safety 

statistics showing an 87 percent drop in rail transit collisions at the San 

Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI) from 1997, when the CPUC became
Page 25 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

its oversight agency, to 2005.25 Although FTA changed its definition of a 

reportable accident during this time period—making it impossible to 

determine exactly what impact external oversight had on MUNI safety—

both MUNI and CPUC staff stated they were confident CPUC’s efforts had 

been a major factor in the reduction in accidents. A MUNI representative 

estimated that the reduction in accidents was more likely about 15 percent, 

but stated that CPUC oversight led MUNI to develop a comprehensive 

safety program, which helped reduce accidents and increase the agency’s 

focus on meeting safety goals. In another example, New York oversight 

officials stated that, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, fires were prevalent 

in New York City’s transit system. After the New York State Legislature 

created the PTSB in 1984 to oversee public transportation safety in New 

York, the PTSB tracked incident numbers, approached the transit agency 

and, according to oversight and transit agency officials, was able to develop 

and implement an action plan which heightened the awareness of (and 

ultimately improved) the situation. Since these efforts occurred several 

decades ago, the data that might support the officials’ statements were not 

easily accessible today; however, FTA, PTSB, and New York City transit 

officials all cited this as an early success of state oversight of rail transit. 

APTA officials with whom we spoke stated that, although the State Safety 

Oversight program contains minimum requirements for safety and security, 

the previous industry-regulated approach encouraged industry officials to 

surpass minimum standards and continue striving for improved safety and 

security.26 However, transit officials with whom we spoke often discussed 

the benefits of a federal program. For example, a transit agency official 

explained that a benefit of FTA’s rule is that it standardized rail transit 

safety and security across the country. In addition, officials from 17 transit 

agencies reported that respective state safety oversight agencies imposed 

requirements above those required in FTA’s requirement. For example, 

25Prior to the existence of the FTA State Safety Oversight program, California law dictated 

that CPUC had oversight authority over rail transit agencies, but exempted municipally 

operated systems. Because the City of San Francisco operates MUNI, it was not subject to 

CPUC oversight. However, since 49 CFR 659 required that California designate an agency to 

oversee all rail transit systems receiving federal funds, the governor of California designated 

CPUC to oversee MUNI in 1997.

26Prior to the implementation of the State Safety Oversight program, according to APTA, 

most transit agencies were self-regulated and submitted to occasional APTA-sponsored 

safety audits as a way of obtaining outside feedback about their safety practices and areas 

for potential improvement. APTA charged transit agencies for their participation in these 

audits. 
Page 26 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

three state safety oversight agencies reported that they require transit 

agencies under their purview to have an “hours of service” type policy 

which requires minimum time off duty for train operators to rest. In 

addition, several oversight agencies have established more stringent 

reporting and notification requirements than required by FTA. For example, 

officials from two transit agencies reported that their oversight agencies 

require them to report accidents occurring in a rail yard, while two others 

stated that their oversight agencies require notification of any accident 

involving contact between vehicles, no matter how minor. 

FTA Gathers Various Types 

of Safety Information but 

Does Not Have the Data to 

Document the Impact of the 

Oversight Program on 

Safety and Security

One potential source of information about the State Safety Oversight 

program’s impact on safety and security are data that FTA collects through 

the annual reports it requires state oversight agencies to submit. The 

reports include information on many different issues, including program 

resources, accidents, fatalities, injuries, hazardous conditions, and any 

corrective actions taken resulting from audits or accident investigations. 

FTA officials stated they have used the oversight agency information, as 

well as national transit data, to publish its own annual reports from 1999 to 

2003. FTA’s reports included ridership data, fatality and injury data, and the 

results of accident investigations to identify common incident causes. 

Although these reports may have informed oversight agencies about what 

safety or security problems existed, the information was not tied to any 

program goals or performance measures. In addition, it has not issued a 

report since 2003. Although the reports provide data on transit safety, it is 

unclear how oversight agency officials use this data. For example, one state 

safety oversight official with whom we spoke recommended that FTA 

provide more extensive analysis of the accident data it receives from 

oversight agencies. He stated that analyses of such data could identify 

trends and help oversight agencies develop a more cooperative and 

collegial relationship with each other. 

According to program officials, FTA has recognized the need for better 

information and performance measures for its safety and security 

programs; also, it has not published a report since 2003 because it has been 

looking for ways to improve the type of safety and security data it can 

collect, and how it can use the information to track program performance 

and progress toward as-yet-undefined goals. FTA’s 2006 business plan for 

its Safety and Security Division includes a goal to continue developing and 

implementing a data-driven performance analysis and tracking system to 

help ensure management decisions are informed by data and focused on 

performance and accountability. As part of these efforts, FTA is working 
Page 27 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

with a contractor to develop performance measures for the State Safety 

Oversight program. FTA officials stated that their contractor is working 

with oversight and transit agencies to identify measures that they use and 

find useful in tracking the safety and security of their systems. Although it 

may be difficult to identify such measures—many of the oversight agencies 

with whom we spoke do not have performance measures, either—this 

effort could allow FTA to more readily determine areas where the program 

is having a positive impact on transit safety and security, and areas where 

more focus is needed. 

Another source of information is the audits of the oversight agencies that 

FTA attempts to conduct every 3 years. Although the audits provide 

detailed information on specific oversight agencies, FTA has not brought 

together information from these audits to provide information on the safety 

and security of transit systems across the country. FTA tracks the 

deficiencies and areas of concern, and follows up with oversight agency 

staff to assure that each state safety oversight agency resolves the 

suggested corrective actions. Furthermore, FTA has not conducted the 

audits frequently enough to provide a current picture of transit system 

safety and security, or to identify some challenges that oversight and transit 

agency officials raised during our interviews with them. FTA has audited 

each state safety oversight agency that existed prior to 2004 at least once 

since the program began; two agencies were audited twice. According to 

the FTA contractor, they piloted the audit program in late 1998 by 

conducting audits in three states with different legal authorities and a range 

of differently sized rail transit agencies. Regularly scheduled audits began 

in 1999. However, FTA largely discontinued the audit program after the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and acknowledged that the agency’s 

priorities shifted in the wake of the attacks. FTA has audited 8 of 24 

existing oversight agencies since September 2001. However, during that 

time period, FTA also conducted nine security and safety reviews to 

evaluate whether new rail transit projects could enter operations safely and 

securely. In addition, the program had several staffing changes after 2001, 

causing some oversight and transit officials to state that the program did 

not seem to be a priority for FTA.27 According to FTA officials, including the 

Program Manager, who started in February of 2006, FTA is not conducting 

audits in fiscal year 2006 so it can use the money and time to help states 

27FTA’s contractor stated that FTA conducted one audit of an oversight agency, at that 

agency’s request, in 2002, and performed several audits of oversight agencies that FTA had 

not previously audited.
Page 28 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

comply with the revised rule; FTA has planned a detailed outreach effort to 

this end, including a workshop for oversight agency officials to help ensure 

compliance. FTA plans to return to its triennial audit schedule in fiscal year 

2007, with 10 audits scheduled. FTA plans to begin with the states that it 

has judged to have had the weakest program standards and procedures, 

based on their initial submission under the new rule.

FTA Faces Challenges 

in Managing and 

Implementing the State 

Safety Oversight 

Program

Despite the program’s popularity with participants, FTA faces challenges in 

implementing the program’s revised rule and continuing to manage the 

program. First, several oversight agency officials stated they are not 

confident they have adequate numbers of staff to effectively oversee rail 

transit system safety and security and they are unsure the current training 

available to them is sufficient. Also, we found the level of staffing and 

expertise of oversight agency staff varies widely across the country. A 

second challenge FTA faces in implementing the program is that many 

transit and oversight agency personnel are confused about how security 

issues in the program will be handled, and what agencies will be 

responsible for what actions, as TSA takes on a greater role in rail transit 

security. 

Many Oversight Agency 

Officials Are Unsure That 

Their Staff Are Adequately 

Trained and That They Have 

Adequate Numbers of Staff 

While a clear majority of both oversight and transit agency officials with 

whom we spoke endorsed the usefulness of the State Safety Oversight 

program, many of these same officials stated that they were unsure that 

they were adequately trained for their duties. Specifically, 18 of 24 

oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated they believed additional 

training would help them provide more efficient and effective safety and 

security oversight. We found that the level of expertise of oversight agency 

staff varied widely across the country. For example, we found that 11 of the 

24 oversight agencies we examined had oversight staff that had no career 

or educational background in transit safety or security. Conversely, another 

11 oversight agencies required their staff to have certain levels of 

experience or education. For example, while New York’s PTSB requires its 

staff to have 5 years of experience in transit safety, the Massachusetts 

Department of Telecommunications and Energy requires its lead oversight 

staff person to have an engineering degree. According to some oversight 

agency officials who had no previous transit safety or security background, 

they had to rely on the transit agency staff they were overseeing to teach 

them about transit operations, safety, and security. Therefore, it took them 

several years before they were confident that they knew enough about rail 
Page 29 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

transit operations to provide effective oversight. These officials stated that 

if they left their positions, any new staff taking over for them would face a 

similar challenge. 

Most oversight agency staff believe they are doing a good job and are 

helping transit agencies operate more safely and securely through 

overseeing their operations, but several cite the lack of a training 

curriculum for oversight staff as a challenge to their effectiveness. Officials 

from some of the 18 agencies who stated additional training would be 

useful cited several examples of how additional training could benefit 

them. For example, officials from eight oversight agencies stated that the 

training they had received in transit operations, accident investigations, 

and other areas was beneficial, but they had not received any training on 

how to perform specific oversight functions. Thus, they were unsure how 

to carry out their agencies’ primary oversight role. Officials at a majority of 

oversight agencies (15 of 24) stated that they felt the training that had been 

made available to them either by FTA, the Transportation Safety Institute 

(TSI), or the National Transit Institute had been adequate.28 However, 

officials from 17 of 24 oversight agencies also stated that they were 

somewhat unsure of which courses they should take to be effective in their 

oversight role. For example, several oversight agency personnel stated 

that, while FTA officials have encouraged oversight agencies’ staff to obtain 

certifications from TSI in transit safety and security and have encouraged 

oversight agency staff to take selected TSI courses, FTA officials have not 

developed or recommended a course specifically related to oversight. 

Furthermore, although FTA provides training to state oversight agency staff 

(either on their own or through TSI), and encourages state oversight 

agencies to seek training opportunities, FTA does not pay staff to travel to 

these courses. Also, oversight agencies must pay their own tuition and 

travel expenses for courses not provided by FTA or TSI.29 Officials from 10 

of the 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke cited a lack of funds as 

one reason why they could not attend training they had hoped to attend.

28TSI is a part of DOT’s Research and Innovative Technology Administration. The National 

Transit Institute, which FTA funds, is affiliated with Rutgers University and dedicated to 

training employees of the public transportation industry.

29FTA and TSI provide their courses free of charge to transit and oversight agencies but do 

charge a nominal fee for course books and materials. FTA and TSI also respond to requests 

to teach courses in field locations, potentially reducing travel costs for participants.
Page 30 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

Also, officials from all 24 oversight agencies stated that, if FTA provided 

some funding for them to travel to training or paid tuition for training they 

wanted to attend, it would allow the oversight agencies to spend their 

limited resources on direct oversight activities, such as staff overtime, 

travel expenses to visit transit agencies, or hiring contractors. Several 

oversight agency officials also cited the example of other DOT agencies 

that provide free training or pay for state staff to travel to attend training. 

For example, 30 states participate in FRA’s State Safety Participation 

Program. These states have inspectors who FRA has certified to enforce 

FRA safety regulations. FRA pays for their initial and ongoing classroom 

training and state staff’s travel to this training. In addition, the federal 

agency regulating pipelines, PHMSA, authorizes state-employed inspectors 

to inspect pipelines in many states. To help defray their costs, PHMSA 

provides up to 50 percent of a state’s expenses in carrying out their pipeline 

safety program. PHMSA also recently paid for two inspectors from each 

state to attend training when it instituted a new inspection approach. 

Officials from both FRA and PHMSA stated that providing funding to states 

to train their employees helps federal agencies more effectively carry out 

their enforcement activities, easing the states’ burden of paying to enforce 

federal regulations. For the first time, FTA paid for oversight agencies’ 

personnel to travel to attend a special meeting in June 2006 in St. Louis, 

where FTA provided technical assistance and shared best practices in 

meeting the requirements of the revised rule. This instance could provide a 

model for future funding of training or training-related travel for oversight 

agency personnel.

FTA officials noted that the agency has provided considerable training in 

transit safety and security through TSI and through the State Safety 

Oversight program annual meeting, which includes a discussion of best 

practices and exchanges of information between oversight agencies. 

However, FTA officials agree that they have not provided training 

specifically pertaining to oversight activities, or provided a recommended 

training curriculum to oversight agencies; officials stated that it would not 

be difficult to take these steps in the future. Also, FTA officials told us that 

they considered addressing the lack of consistency in oversight agency 

staff qualifications when they were revising the FTA rule in 2005. However, 

they stated they did not have the legal authority to direct states to require 

certain education, experience, or certifications for oversight agency staff. 

Also, these officials stated that FTA has not issued any guidance to states 

about what level of training is appropriate for oversight staff or what level 

of staffing is appropriate for an oversight agency. However, these officials 

noted that, despite the lack of formal guidance, FTA checks to ensure 
Page 31 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

oversight agency personnel are adequately trained during its audits; in five 

instances, FTA has recommended that oversight agency staff take 

additional training. FTA officials also stated that FTA could issue informal 

guidance or recommendations to oversight agencies about the level of 

training their oversight staff should have.

In addition to concerns about training, oversight agencies were unsure 

about whether they had sufficient numbers of staff to adequately oversee a 

transit agency’s operations. Specifically, officials at 14 of 24 oversight 

agencies with whom we spoke stated that more staff would help them do 

their job more effectively. We spoke with some oversight agency personnel 

who were highly dedicated to performing oversight, even though they said 

they had no assistance and their states had limited resources to allocate to 

the task. Some staff took it upon themselves to stay informed about a 

transit agency’s operations by staying in regular contact with transit agency 

personnel, attending transit agency safety meetings, and making regular 

inspections of the system—even though these tasks were not required by 

their oversight agencies. However, officials from 11 oversight agencies told 

us they had devoted the equivalent of less than one person working halftime to oversight duties, and, in some cases, described the oversight part of 

their job as a “collateral duty.” Personnel from some of these oversight 

agencies told us they simply did not have time to perform the kind of active 

oversight that involved attending transit agency meetings, making spot 

inspections, and staying in regular contact with transit agency personnel. 

While in some of these instances, the transit agencies overseen are small, 

such as small streetcar lines, some of the transit agencies with the highest 

ridership levels have similar levels of oversight. For example, one state that 

estimated it devotes 0.1 full-time equivalent (FTE) to oversight program 

functions is responsible for overseeing a major transit agency that averages 

nearly 200,000 daily passenger trips. This state supplements its staff time 

with the services of a contractor, mainly to perform the triennial audits of 

the transit agency. Also, one state that estimated devoting 0.5 FTE to 

oversight functions is responsible for overseeing five transit agencies 

(including two systems not yet in operation) in different cities. The 

oversight staff in this state reported that it was difficult to maintain active 

oversight when their responsibilities were so spread out. Furthermore, we 

found 13 oversight agencies that estimated dedicating less than one fulltime equivalent staff member to the oversight task. This meant that the 

person (or persons) assigned to the oversight tasks had other duties, in 

addition to oversight of a transit agency. Table 1 shows the amount of 

personnel oversight agency representatives estimated their agencies 

dedicate to oversight responsibilities. (See app. II for information on 
Page 32 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

estimated FTE and transit system information for each state safety 

oversight agency and related transit agency).

Table 1: Estimated FTEs Employees Used by Oversight Agencies to Oversee Transit 

Agency Safety and Security

Source: GAO analysis of oversight agency interview responses.

Although it is up to states to determine the resources allocated to this 

program, providing appropriate and continuing training and experience 

may increase the effectiveness of the limited staff states have to dedicate to 

this program.

Transit and Oversight 

Agency Staff Are Uncertain 

How TSA’s Emerging Role in 

Transit Security Will Affect 

the Program

Another challenge facing the program is how the emergence of TSA and its 

rail inspectors might affect oversight of transit security. As discussed 

above, TSA now has full regulatory authority over transportation security 

across all modes, and TSA officials stated the agency has hired 100 rail 

inspectors, whose stated mission is to, among other duties, monitor and 

enforce compliance with rail security directives TSA issued in May 2004. 

However, of the officials at 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke, 20 

stated they did not have a clear picture of who was responsible for 

overseeing transit security issues. Similarly, officials at 14 of 37 transit 

agencies were also unsure of lines of responsibility regarding transit 

security oversight. Several state oversight agencies were particularly 

concerned that TSA’s rail inspectors would be duplicating their role in 

overseeing transit security. One oversight agency official stated that he felt 

transit agencies could begin to experience “audit fatigue” if both TSA and 

oversight agencies audited transit agencies’ security practices. This official 

stated it would be more efficient if TSA and oversight agency staff audited 

transit agencies’ security practices at the same time. Officials at several 

transit agencies were also confused about what standards they would be 

required to meet. For example, while oversight agencies are free to create 

their own standards, TSA issued rail security directives in May 2004—and 

could issue future directives or requirements that transit agencies must 

meet. Security officials at one transit agency specifically voiced concern 

Estimated FTEs 0.5 or less 0.6–1 1.1–3 3.1–5 Over 5 Total

Number of oversight 

agencies 11 5 6 1 1 24
Page 33 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

that there could be conflicting security requirements and hoped that TSA 

would coordinate with oversight agencies’ requirements and vice versa. 

TSA staff reported hearing similar comments from oversight agencies at a 

meeting they jointly hosted with FTA for oversight agencies in May 2006. 

FTA program staff and TSA rail inspector staff both stated that they were 

committed to avoiding duplication in the program and communicating their 

respective roles to transit and oversight agency officials as soon as 

possible. However, as TSA is still developing their program, currently there 

is no formally defined role for TSA in the State Safety Oversight program, 

and TSA has not determined the roles and responsibilities for their rail 

inspectors. While the FTA rule discusses requirements for a transit agency’s 

security plan (e.g., a method for conducting internal security reviews and a 

process for determining security threats and vulnerabilities to a transit 

agency), and requires oversight agencies to include security performance 

in their audits of transit agencies, the FTA rule does not discuss TSA’s 

specific role in the program; both TSA and FTA officials stated that exactly 

how TSA would participate in the program was still to be determined. 

However, TSA and FTA officials both stated they are committed to working 

together to ensure inspection activities are coordinated to foster 

consistency and minimize disruption to rail transit agency operations. Also, 

a TSA regional manager of rail inspectors with whom we spoke was unsure 

what the rail inspectors’ role would be in relation to the program; in 

addition, the manager was unsure what the details of the program were, 

including the identity of the relevant oversight agencies for the region. 

However, he stated that he was working to learn these details, and that he 

and his staff had been in touch with transit agency security officials to 

introduce themselves and gather information. 

Furthermore, in May 2006, after we had finished our interviews with transit 

and oversight agency staff, TSA staff stated that they were engaged in an 

ongoing dialog with FTA and oversight agencies, to determine how the rail 

inspectors could best assist oversight agencies in reviewing transit agency 

security. TSA gave several examples of activities resulting from this 

coordination. For example, TSA reported that they had designated 26 rail 

inspectors as liaisons to state oversight agencies. Also, TSA officials stated 

that they are working with FTA and the oversight agency from California to 

pilot a coordination approach they could use with oversight agencies 

across the country. Additionally, the director of the rail inspector program 

attended a meeting with representatives from almost all oversight agencies 

to discuss the concept of rail inspectors participating in oversight-agency 

audits of transit agencies. Finally, TSA is working to bring the 26 TSA rail 
Page 34 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

inspectors involved in the State Safety Oversight program to the next 

annual meeting for the program’s participants, so that the rail inspectors 

can learn more about the program and develop a “game plan” for how the 

inspectors will participate in the program.

Conclusions While FTA faces several challenges with the State Safety Oversight 

program, most participants in the program consider it a success at 

improving rail transit safety and security; nearly all participants can cite 

anecdotal evidence suggesting the program has had a positive impact. 

Although FTA collects data on safety and security from transit and 

oversight agencies, FTA has not developed a framework for demonstrating 

the impact the program has had on rail transit safety and security. As new 

leadership takes over administration of the program, this is an opportune 

time for FTA to determine how to assess the impact of the program, 

including determining a way to measure the impact of the program, setting 

performance goals, and developing and providing the means to meet a 

consistent schedule of auditing oversight agencies. 

Second, state oversight agencies have inconsistent training and 

qualifications for oversight staff across the United States, although it is 

unclear what impact, if any, this has had on rail transit safety and security. 

In other federally mandated transportation safety programs where states 

partner with the federal government to perform oversight duties, the 

federal government pays for a portion of the training expenses of oversight 

staff, (or for oversight staff to travel to attend training) because having 

well-trained state officials makes the federally mandated oversight more 

efficient and effective. Yet, in this program, FTA relies entirely on the states 

to determine how to fund their direct oversight of rail transit agencies and 

does not help defray their training or travel costs. While the program is 

generally thought of as bringing about positive change, these differing 

levels of training and qualifications are a cause for concern; it is 

conceivable that inadequately trained staff, especially staff that have no 

experience overseeing transit agency safety, might miss safety problems 

they otherwise would notice, or may be unable to effectively evaluate a 

transit agency’s proposals for resolving existing safety problems (though it 

is not clear whether either of these have occurred). One way to help ensure 

that oversight agency staff have at least a basic understanding of how to 

oversee rail transit operations would be to evaluate the amount of training 

oversight agency staff have obtained and, subsequently, develop a training 

curriculum that FTA could recommend to oversight agency personnel. 

Also, since many oversight agency personnel have little experience 
Page 35 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

conducting rail transit safety oversight, including the basic tenets of 

conducting oversight in the training curriculum would help ensure that 

oversight agency staff did not have to rely on transit agency personnel for 

advice on conducting oversight. In addition, FTA could review oversight 

staff qualifications in more detail during its audits of oversight agencies to 

help ensure oversight staff are adequately trained to perform their duties.

Lastly, many transit and oversight agency staff are concerned that the 

existence and deployment of TSA’s rail inspectors will complicate security 

oversight. While TSA and FTA are undertaking several efforts to coordinate 

their activities and determine the roles and responsibilities of the rail 

inspectors, the official role of the rail inspectors in the State Safety 

Oversight program remains unclear. Therefore, it is understandable why 

transit and oversight agency officials fear possible duplication of effort, 

especially for activities such as reviewing security plans and auditing 

transit security practices. Also, since TSA and DOT agencies have had 

some difficulties coordinating their actions in the past,30 such concern is 

warranted, though FTA and TSA statements promising to address this 

issue, and their recent activities in this direction, are a positive step.

Recommendations In order to assure that FTA devotes an appropriate level of staff resources 

to the State Safety Oversight program, obtains sufficient information to 

evaluate the performance of the program, and supports state oversight 

agencies in adequately training their staff to perform their oversight duties, 

we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation take the following two 

actions:

• Direct the Administrator of FTA to take advantage of the opportunity 

presented by having new program leadership to set short- and long-term 

goals for the program, along with measures to ensure that the program 

is making progress toward meeting those goals; develop performance 

goals for the agency’s other approaches for evaluating the impact of this 

program on safety and security; and develop a plan for maintaining FTA’s 

stated schedule of auditing oversight agencies at least once every 3 

years. 

30GAO-05-851, GAO-03-263, and GAO-03-843.
Page 36 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

• Direct the Administrator of FTA to assess whether oversight agency 

personnel are receiving adequate amounts of training to perform their 

activities effectively and, based on the results of this assessment, work 

with oversight agencies to develop a strategy to address any deficiencies 

they identify. This strategy should include developing an appropriate 

training curriculum, including training on conducting oversight for 

oversight agency staff and guidance to oversight agencies encouraging 

them to have their staff complete the training curriculum. If FTA 

determines that it does not have the authority to issue such guidance, it 

should seek such statutory authority from Congress. 

Furthermore, to reduce confusion among transit and oversight agencies 

about the role of TSA in transit security oversight and reduce the potential 

duplication of effort that would inconvenience transit agencies, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant 

Secretary of TSA to: 

• coordinate with the Administrator of FTA to clearly articulate to state 

oversight agencies and transit agencies the roles and responsibilities 

TSA develops for its rail inspectors; and

• work with state oversight agencies to coordinate their security audits 

whenever possible and include FTA in this communication to help 

ensure effective coordination with these agencies.

Agency Comments Officials from FTA, TSA, and NTSB provided oral comments on a draft of 

this report through their respective liaisons. The agencies concurred with 

the report. Furthermore, FTA and TSA officials stated that they are working 

to determine how to implement the recommendations. Finally, TSA 

provided a technical comment which we included in the report.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees, the Acting Secretary of Transportation, and the Secretary of 

Homeland Security. We will also make copies available to others upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 37 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix IV.

Katherine A. Siggerud

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
Page 38 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

Appendix I

Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems AAppenednxidexiIs

Three rail fixed guideway transit systems in the United States—the Port 

Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) in Philadelphia, MetroLink in St. 

Louis, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) 

in Washington, D.C.—cross state lines. Therefore, these systems require 

the collaboration of multiple oversight agencies to run the State Safety 

Oversight program or states can agree that one state will be responsible for 

oversight of the transit system. Each of these multi-state transit systems 

has a different structure to handle oversight responsibilities. The oversight 

programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed strategies to 

centralize decision making, streamline collaboration, and respond 

promptly to safety and security audit findings. In contrast, the Tri-State 

Oversight Committee (TOC), which serves as the oversight agency in the 

D.C. area, requires majority decision making by the six committee 

members of the agency, including at least one member from each 

jurisdiction, and has experienced difficulty obtaining funding, responding 

to Federal Transit Administration (FTA) information requests, and ensuring 

audit findings are addressed.

Multi-State State Safety 

Oversight Agencies Have 

Varied Structures and 

Handle Oversight 

Responsibilities Differently

Each multi-state oversight program varies in structure, and each performs 

oversight responsibilities differently. In Philadelphia, authority to serve as 

the oversight agency was delegated to one of the two state agencies—

namely, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) agreed 

to allow the New Jersey Department of Transportation to serve as the sole 

oversight agency for the PATCO heavy rail transit line. MetroLink in St. 

Louis is subject to oversight from both Illinois (through the St. Clair County 

Transit District) and Missouri (through the Missouri Department of 

Transportation); the two organizations share oversight duties. Finally, TOC, 

which is composed of multiple representatives from each jurisdiction 

(including Virginia, Maryland, and Washington, D.C.) provides oversight for 

WMATA.

The PATCO Speedline is a heavy rail line serving about 38,000 riders daily 

and links Philadelphia to Lindenwold, New Jersey. Most of PATCO’s track is 

in New Jersey, and 9 of the 13 stations are in New Jersey. Until early 2001, 

safety and security oversight functions were shared by Pennsylvania and 

New Jersey through the Delaware River Port Authority (DRPA), a regional 

transportation and economic development agency serving both 

southeastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey. When DRPA 

implemented organizational and functional changes, DRPA and PATCO 

leadership no longer believed that DRPA could perform its role as the 

designated oversight agency without facing conflicting interests. As a 
Appendix I

Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems

Page 39 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

result, Pennsylvania and New Jersey agreed to have the New Jersey 

Department of Transportation (NJDOT) replace DRPA as the oversight 

agency. This arrangement allows the oversight agency to take corrective 

action without seeking additional levels of approval from Pennsylvania, 

although the oversight agency does keep Pennsylvania informed of its 

activities. Also, Pennsylvania provides some support to the NJDOT by 

having PennDOT perform oversight functions for the stations, 

passageways, and concourses located in Pennsylvania. PennDOT reports 

any deficiencies or hazardous conditions that may be noted during the 

performance of oversight directly to New Jersey. Through meetings or 

other means of communication, the follow-up actions may be performed by 

the Pennsylvania oversight agency in a supporting role or directly by New 

Jersey. New Jersey currently devotes two full-time and one part-time staff 

members to its oversight program, and while these staff members must 

oversee several transit systems, including PATCO, their sole 

responsibilities for safety and oversight functions. 

The St. Louis MetroLink is a light rail line between Lambert-St. Louis 

International Airport, in St. Louis, and Scott Air Force Base outside Shiloh, 

Illinois. Service was initiated in 1993, at which time the system included 

about 16 miles of track in Missouri and about 1.5 miles of track in Illinois. 

Because so little track was in Illinois, Illinois officials agreed to allow the 

Missouri Department of Transportation to provide safety and security 

oversight for the entire system. However, in 2001, MetroLink opened a 17.4-

mile extension in Illinois, which roughly equalized the amount of track in 

both states. Because of this, the states agreed that it was appropriate for 

Illinois to play a greater role in safety and security oversight, and Illinois 

designated the St. Clair County Transit District as its oversight agency. St. 

Clair is one of the few non-state-level agencies to be an oversight agency. 

The involvement of two separate oversight agencies could create 

challenges to effective implementation, but the agencies have taken steps 

to ensure close coordination. First, the Illinois and Missouri oversight 

agencies have agreed to use only one uniform safety and security standard 

across the entire MetroLink system.1

 According to area officials, this 

arrangement creates consistency throughout the system and allows both 

agencies to perform their oversight functions in a consistent manner. In 

1

In the most recent revision to 49 CFR 659, the Rail Fixed Guideway Systems; State Safety 

Oversight rule governing the State Safety Oversight program, FTA mandated that in areas 

where transit agencies ran through multiple states, the states coordinate to ensure they use 

the same program standard for the transit agency to meet. This way one transit agency does 

not have to meet two separate standards in different parts of the system.
Appendix I

Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems

Page 40 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

addition, the agencies use a single contractor who is responsible for the 

triennial audit. All other work is performed by the Illinois and Missouri 

oversight agencies. Finally, staff from the two oversight agencies 

coordinate very closely and each have centralized leadership. Specifically, 

there is one employee in Missouri who devotes 90 percent of his time to 

safety and security oversight activities. Illinois has several employees who 

devote smaller percentages of their individual time to the program, but the 

Managing Director is primarily responsible for coordinating with Missouri. 

MetroLink, in turn, indicated that responding to state safety oversight 

directives is a priority, and the agency works quickly to implement changes.

WMATA operates a heavy rail system within Washington, D.C. (the District 

of Columbia), Maryland, and Virginia. The states and the District of 

Columbia decided to carry out oversight responsibilities through a 

collaborative organization through the TOC. TOC is composed of six 

representatives—two each from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of 

Columbia. All of the representatives have other primary duties, and their 

activities on TOC are collateral to these other daily duties, as is the case 

with staff at several other oversight agencies. TOC does not have any 

dedicated staff, and TOC members have limited rail operational 

experience. To gain access to additional experience and expertise in rail 

oversight, TOC contracts with a consultant to provide technical knowledge, 

perform required audits of WMATA, and ensure that audit 

recommendations are completed. In addition, TOC funding comes from, 

and must be approved by, each of the jurisdictions every year. The 

Washington Council of Governments processes TOC funds and handles its 

contracting procedures. These issues result in a lengthy process for TOC to 

receive its yearly funding and process its expenses. 

Multi-State Oversight 

Programs Have Addressed 

Administrative Challenges 

in Different Ways

The State Safety Oversight programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have 

attempted to streamline decision making, while TOC has a more 

collaborative process. Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed 

strategies to centralize decision making and streamline collaboration, 

albeit through different structures. Because Pennsylvania granted New 

Jersey the authority to act as the oversight agency for all of PATCO’s 

territory, PATCO only has to interact with one oversight agency’s staff. New 

Jersey also has in-house staff dedicated to the State Safety Oversight 

program, which helps to ensure continuity, facilitates communication, and 

provides PATCO with one set of contacts to work with on the 

implementation of any new safety or security processes. Although St. Louis 

has two agencies providing safety oversight, both oversight agencies have 
Appendix I

Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems

Page 41 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

made it a priority to ensure that they are providing consistent information 

to the transit agency, and they are coordinating activities so MetroLink is 

not burdened by multiple contacts about the same issue. To do this, the 

Missouri and Illinois representatives stay in close contact with each other. 

Both oversight agencies stated they have in-house staff dedicated to safety 

and security oversight, and the agencies have very good working 

relationships. Oversight agency staff admitted that St. Louis could face 

challenges in the future if staff turned over in either agency and new 

employees did not establish a similar working relationship. In addition, 

officials indicated that, if oversight agency staff had disagreements over 

safety or security standards, or how to enforce the existing standards, it 

would be highly problematic. However, officials in the Illinois and Missouri 

oversight agencies, as well as at MetroLink, thought that the current 

arrangements have produced one set of standards, good communication, 

and effective coordination. Both MetroLink and oversight agency staff in 

St. Louis credited each other with creating an environment where this 

system of having multiple oversight agencies could work well. 

In contrast, TOC has implemented a less streamlined process for making 

decisions, which, according to FTA and TOC officials, may have 

contributed to the difficulties it has had in responding to FTA information 

requests. On June 15, 2005, FTA notified TOC that it would perform TOC’s 

audit in late July 2005. FTA requested information prior to the audit to 

facilitate the time it spent on-site. TOC did not submit the requested State 

Safety Oversight program materials despite several FTA requests and an 

extension by FTA to move the audit to a later date. At the end of August, 

FTA initiated its audit even though it had not received requested 

information, but was not able to complete the audit until the end of 

September, when it received all requested materials. FTA’s Final Audit 

Report to TOC cited 10 areas for improvement and provided TOC 60 days 

to resolve these issues. According to FTA, TOC resolved one issue within 

the time period. FTA held a follow-up review with TOC in mid-March to 

check on the status of the remaining areas for improvement. As of June 

2006, FTA was evaluating how many of the remaining audit findings 

remained open, although FTA stated that TOC had created a detailed set of 

internal operating procedures to address many of FTA’s findings and 

concerns. In addition, TOC representatives stated that some of the areas 

for improvement FTA found were complicated issues, such as reviewing 

WMATA’s accident investigation procedures and approving modifications, 

and could not be addressed within the 60 days FTA initially allowed. TOC 

staff emphasized that, although WMATA was sometimes slow to respond to 

TOC audit recommendations or information requests, they were pleased 
Appendix I

Case Studies of Multi-State Transit Systems

Page 42 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

with their relationship with WMATA and that WMATA was responsive to 

TOC. Similarly, FTA officials stressed that they recognized and appreciated 

the effort TOC had undertaken in addressing FTA’s findings. 

TOC staff credited WMATA with helping TOC develop a matrix to track 

outstanding recommendations and agreeing to meet via conference call on 

at least a bi-weekly basis to ensure the issues are addressed. Also, TOC 

members stated that part of the reason they were slow to respond to FTA’s 

initial requests was that TOC had spent all its allocated funds for the year 

and, consequently, they had to temporarily stop working with the 

consultant who had conducted its audits of WMATA and maintained their 

files. According to TOC officials, since the process for acquiring additional 

funding would require approval from all three jurisdictions represented on 

TOC, it was not feasible to obtain additional funding quickly. In addition, 

TOC cannot take any action without a majority of its members, and at least 

one member from each jurisdiction, approving the action. Reaching such 

majority agreements can be time consuming since all members of TOC 

have other primary responsibilities. This is especially a concern when 

quick decisions are necessary, such as responding to FTA’s audit 

recommendations. 

TOC officials cited several challenges in accomplishing their mission, 

including lack of a dedicated and permanent funding source, the lengthy 

process required to obtain approval on planning and implementation of 

corrective actions, and limited staff time. They also stated that they 

believed TOC and WMATA receive more scrutiny than other transit and 

oversight agencies, due to their location in Washington, D.C., and proximity 

to FTA’s headquarters staff. To address these challenges, the chair of TOC 

stated that she planned to spend additional time on overseeing WMATA and 

was hoping to work to find ways to streamline the administrative and 

funding processes that TOC must navigate. Hiring a full-time administrator, 

or designating a TOC member to serve in a full-time capacity, could help 

solve some of these issues. However, funding this position could be a 

challenge and the administrator would need to have decision-making 

authority to be effective and act quickly.
Page 43 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

Appendix II

List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit 

Agencies They Oversee ApendxiI

Table 2: Rail Transit and State Oversight Agencies

State

State safety oversight 

agency (estimated 

FTE)

Rail transit agency 

(estimated FTE)

City center 

served Type of system

Annual ridership 

and directional 

route miles

Single state systems

Arkansas Arkansas State 

Highway and 

Transportation 

Department (0.5)

Central Arkansas 

Transit Authority (0.08)

Little Rock, AR Trolley 159,458

2.8

California California Public Utilities 

Commission (9.6)

Bay Area Rapid 

Transit (7)

San Francisco, 

CA

Heavy rail 99,296,028

209

Los Angeles County 

Metropolitan 

Transportation 

Authority (1.5)

Los Angeles, CA Heavy rail and light 

rail

74,242,912

141.6

San Francisco 

Municipal Railway 

(Muni) (7)

San Francisco, 

CA

Light rail, trolley, 

and cable car 

53,768,895

81.7

San Diego Trolley, Inc. 

(0.9)

San Diego, CA Light rail 29,334,362

96.6

Sacramento Regional 

Transit District (N/A)

Sacramento, CA Light rail 12,008,620

58.4

Santa Clara Valley 

Transit Authority (N/A)

San Jose, CA Light rail 6,780,431

58.4

Colorado Colorado Public Utilities 

Commission (1.2)

Denver Regional 

Transit District (1.25)

Denver, CO Light rail 11,142,220

31.6

Florida Florida Department of 

Transportation (1)

Metro-Dade Transit 

Authority (N/A)

Miami, FL Heavy rail and 

automated 

guideway

26,479,423

53.5

Jacksonville 

Transportation 

Authority (N/A)

Jacksonville, FL Automated 

guideway

736,510

5.4

Hillsborough Area 

Regional Transit (0.85)

Tampa, FL Trolley 565,002

4.8

Georgia Georgia Department of 

Transportation (0.1)

Metropolitan Atlanta 

Rapid Transit Authority 

(6)

Atlanta, GA Heavy rail 70,984,053

96.1

Illinois Regional Transportation 

Authority (1)

Chicago Transit 

Authority (11)

Chicago, IL Heavy rail 186,759,524

206.3

Louisiana Louisiana Department 

of Transportation (0.1)a

New Orleans Regional 

Transit Authority (N/A)

New Orleans, LA Trolley 5,667,952

25.3

Maryland Maryland Department of 

Transportation (1.3)

Maryland Transit 

Administration (5)

Baltimore, MD Heavy rail and light 

rail

18,059,117

87
Appendix II

List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit 

Agencies They Oversee

Page 44 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

Massachusetts Massachusetts 

Department of 

Telecommunication and 

Energy (2.67)

Massachusetts Bay 

Transportation 

Authority (5.1)

Boston, MA Heavy rail, light 

rail, and trolley

215,787,440

127.3

Michigan Michigan Department of 

Transportation (0.5)

Detroit Transit 

Corporation (Detroit 

People Mover) (1.1)

Detroit, MI Automated 

guideway

1,340,646

2.9

Minnesota Minnesota Department 

of Public Safety (0.1) 

Hiawatha Metro 

Transit (1-1.5)

Minneapolis, MN Light rail 7,901,668

24.4

New Jersey NJDOT (2-3) New Jersey Transit 

Newark City Subway 

(0.5)

Newark, NJ Light rail 14,312,676

99.9b

New Jersey Transit 

Hudson-Bergen Light 

Rail (N/A)

Jersey City, NJ Light rail

New Jersey Transit 

River Line (2)

Trenton, NJ Light rail

New York New York Public 

Transportation Safety 

Board (3.5)

New York City Transit 

(15)

New York City, 

NY

Heavy rail 1,803,536,486

493.8

Niagara Frontier 

Transit Authority (0.5)

Buffalo, NY Light rail 5,373,321

12.4

Ohio Ohio Department of 

Transportation (1)

Greater Cleveland 

Regional Transit 

Authority (1.2)

Cleveland, OH Heavy rail and light 

rail

8,236,840

68.5

Oregon Oregon Department of 

Transportation (1.2)

Portland Tri-Met (10) Portland, OR Light rail 34,755,147

92.9b

Portland Streetcar 

(0.5)

Portland, OR Light rail

Pennsylvania PennDOT (0.5) Southeastern 

Pennsylvania Transit 

Authority (2)

Philadelphia, PA Heavy rail, light 

rail, and trolley

113,252,100

141.1

Port Authority of 

Allegheny County 

(0.3)

Pittsburgh, PA Light rail and 

inclined plane

8,072,099

45.8

Cambria County 

Transit Authority (1)

Johnstown, PA Inclined plane 86,031

0.3

Puerto Rico Puerto Rico State 

Emergency and 

Disaster Management 

Agency (3) 

Puerto Rico Highway 

& Transportation 

Authority Tren Urbano 

(1.6)

San Juan, Puerto 

Rico

Heavy rail 2,182,668

(Continued From Previous Page)

State

State safety oversight 

agency (estimated 

FTE)

Rail transit agency 

(estimated FTE)

City center 

served Type of system

Annual ridership 

and directional 

route miles
Appendix II

List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit 

Agencies They Oversee

Page 45 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

Source: GAO interviews and National Transit Database.

Notes: FTE data comes from our interviews with oversight agencies and transit agencies. The data 

do not include contractor staff that assist transit or oversight agencies, though several agencies 

reported using contractors. Data on ridership is current as of 2005, and includes the total number of 

passengers boarding the rail system annually (also known as “unlinked passenger trips”) as provided 

by FTA. Directional route miles—the miles of track in each direction over which transportation vehicles 

travel while carrying passengers—are current as of 2004, and were obtained from data published by 

FTA in the National Transit Database. The data in this table are presented for background purposes 

and were not verified. FTA defines trolley operations as “light rail” for statistical purposes. However, to 

differentiate between vintage trolley operations and modern light rail operations, we have created 

separate categories for them in this chart. N/A = Not available

a

Because we were not able to speak with the oversight agency, FTE data was provided by FTA.

b Annual unlinked passenger trips and directional route miles represent the total for all systems within a 

transit agency.

Tennessee Tennessee Department 

of Transportation (0.25)

Chattanooga Area 

Rapid Transit Authority 

(N/A)

Chattanooga, TN Inclined plane 435,780

2

Memphis Area Transit 

Authority (0.3)

Memphis, TN Trolley 1,015,448

10

Texas Texas Department of 

Transportation (0.4)

Galveston Island 

Transit (0.25)

Galveston, TX Light rail 47,706

4

Dallas Area Rapid 

Transit (0.75)

Dallas, TX Light rail and 

trolley

17,487,057

87.7

Metropolitan Transit 

Authority of Harris 

County (2)

Houston, TX Light rail 10,233,638

14.8

Utah Utah Department of 

Transportation (0.8)

Utah Transit Authority 

(1.5)

Salt Lake City, UT Light rail 13,101,791

37.3

Washington Washington State 

Department of 

Transportation (0.35)

Sound Transit Tacoma 

Link (N/A)

Tacoma, WA Light rail 884,895

3.6

Seattle Center 

Monorail (0.02)

Seattle, WA Automated 

guideway

1,506,240c

1.8

Wisconsin Wisconsin Department 

of Transportation (0.3)

Kenosha Transit (0.85) Kenosha, WI Trolley 68,209

1.9

Multi-state systems

Illinois and Missouri St. Clair County Transit 

District (0.25-0.5) and 

Missouri Department of 

Transportation (0.9)

Bi-State Development 

Agency (St. Louis 

Metro) (2)

St. Louis, MO Light rail 15,648,233

75.8

New Jersey and 

Pennsylvania

NJDOT (2-3) PATCO (1) Philadelphia, PA Heavy rail 9,362,839

31.5

Maryland, Virginia, 

and Washington, D.C.

TOC (0.2) WMATA (1) Washington, D.C. Heavy rail 259,430,055

206.6

(Continued From Previous Page)

State

State safety oversight 

agency (estimated 

FTE)

Rail transit agency 

(estimated FTE)

City center 

served Type of system

Annual ridership 

and directional 

route miles
Appendix II

List of State Oversight Agencies and Transit 

Agencies They Oversee

Page 46 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

c

According to agency officials, the ridership data presented in this table represents a year when the 

monorail was out of service for an extended period and does not reflect the normal use of the system. 

In prior years the number of annual unlinked passenger trips exceeded 2 million.
Page 47 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

Appendix III

Scope and Methodology ApendxiI

To provide Congress with a better understanding of how the Federal 

Transit Administration (FTA) oversees safety and security in rail transit 

systems and what is known about the impact of the State Safety Oversight 

program on rail safety and security, we met with FTA management and 

consultants to discuss the history, mission, and design of the oversight 

program. In addition, we discussed system safety and risk management 

approaches used by FTA, but we did not independently verify that oversight 

agencies use these approaches. We met with officials from other federal 

agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); we also met with the American 

Public Transportation Association (APTA), a transit industry association. 

We met with these organizations to determine how oversight 

responsibilities are shared and coordinated, and the extent to which 

duplication of safety and security guidance existed among these agencies. 

We also spoke with a TSA Local Area Supervisor. To compare other 

transportation safety and security approaches to the oversight program, we 

interviewed FRA, APTA, and safety officials from Canadian transit 

agencies. 

In addition to these interviews, we also reviewed key documents, including 

rules, regulations, procedures, and guidance of the State Safety Oversight 

program; the triennial audits FTA performs on oversight agencies; 

documents tracking the performance of corrective action items; and 

memorandums of agreement between federal agencies to facilitate safety 

oversight coordination. At the state level, we reviewed annual reports that 

the oversight agencies provide to FTA. When states were willing to share 

these documents, we reviewed audits performed by the oversight agencies 

on transit agencies (40 percent of the states provided these documents) 

and authorizing legislation, or executive action, creating the state safety 

oversight agency (more than 80 percent provided the legislation or 

executive action). To compare the State Safety Oversight program with 

other transportation safety approaches, we reviewed our past work on 

pipeline, aviation, motor carriers, and highway safety.

To further our understanding of the design and impact of the program and 

also to identify challenges facing the program, we conducted semistructured interviews with oversight and transit agencies. To determine the 

universe of oversight agencies and rail transit agencies under the State 

Safety Oversight program, we requested a list from FTA. We compared 

FTA’s list of transit systems to information published by APTA regarding 

rail systems currently in operation, as well as those that were under 
Appendix III

Scope and Methodology

Page 48 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

development. In two cases, APTA listed a transit agency that had initiated 

service as “proposed,” and we were able to resolve this discrepancy by 

comparing it to the FTA list and checking the agency’s website, which 

showed that service had been initiated. We contacted all transit and 

oversight agencies participating in the program that were in operation as of 

October 2005. This included a total of 25 oversight agencies and 42 rail 

transit systems. Twenty-four of the twenty-five oversight agencies, and 37 

of the 42 rail transit systems, agreed to participate in these interviews. The 

New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (a transit agency) and Louisiana 

Department of Transportation (an oversight agency) requested that we 

exclude them from our review due to the difficulties posed by recovering 

from Hurricane Katrina, and we agreed to the request. Four additional 

transit agencies—the Jacksonville Transportation Authority, Chattanooga 

Area Regional Transportation Authority, Metro-Dade Transit Agency, and 

Hudson-Bergen Light Rail line—did not participate in our interviews. The 

semi-structured interview guide included questions concerning issues that 

could create challenges for the program such as an estimate of the number 

of FTE employees dedicated to the program, availability of FTA or other 

federally sponsored safety training to oversight agency employees, state 

funding schemes to support the program, the workload associated with 

audit responsibilities, the role of outside contractors to conduct the 

triennial reviews, employee turnover, and frequency of communication 

between the transit agencies and federal security agencies. 

The information collected from our semi-structured interviews with the 

oversight and transit agencies may be subject to errors, commonly referred 

to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in how a particular 

question is interpreted, the sources of information that are available to 

interviewees, or how the data are entered into a database or were analyzed, 

can introduce unwanted variability in the results obtained in these 

interviews. However, we took steps in the development of the interview 

questions, the data collection, and the data analysis to minimize these types 

of errors. For example, social science survey specialists developed the 

questions used in the interviews in collaboration with our own subject 

matter experts. Then, the questions were pretested to ensure that they 

were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to comprehend. When the data were 

analyzed, a second independent analyst checked all computer programs. 

Since the interviews were conducted using an electronic interviewing 

system, our interviewers entered answers obtained from officials directly 

into the electronic interview instrument. This eliminated the need to have 

the data keyed into a database by a third party, thus removing an additional 

source of error. 
Appendix III

Scope and Methodology

Page 49 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

We also conducted several site visits to further our understanding of the 

challenges facing the program. We visited 17 transit and 8 oversight 

agencies in both large and small cities, as well as in states with several rail 

transit agencies and only one agency; we chose this variety to witness a 

cross-section of transit agencies and observe the interactions the transit 

agencies had with their oversight agencies. Complete lists of the transit 

and oversight agencies we visited are in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. 

To determine how the program functions in regions where transit systems 

cross state boundaries, we visited three systems that crossed state 

boundaries. To identify how the program may be incorporated into new 

transit systems, we visited two systems that are in the design or 

construction phase, and one oversight agency that will eventually oversee 

a transit agency yet to begin service. We confirmed the accuracy of 

information presented in the report about state oversight and transit 

agencies by asking for the agencies to confirm text we sent to them prior to 

the publication of the report. We conducted our work from August 2005 

through June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards.

Table 3: Rail Transit Agencies We Visited for the Purposes of This Review

Rail transit agency Urban area served Multi-State region Not yet operating

Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) San Francisco/Oakland, California

Bi-State Development Agency (MetroLink) St. Louis, Missouri X

Chicago Transit Authority Chicago, Illinois

Kenosha Transit Kenosha, Wisconsin

Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation 

Authority (LACMTA)

Los Angeles, California

Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) Greater Washington, DC, and Maryland

New Jersey Transit River Line Camden, New Jersey

New York City Transit (NYCT) New York, New York

North County Transit District San Diego/Oceanside, CA X

Port Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) Lindenwold, New Jersey and 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania X

Regional Public Transportation Authority (Valley 

Metro) 

Phoenix, AZ

X

Sacramento Regional Transit District (SRTD) Sacramento, California

San Diego Trolley San Diego, California

San Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI) San Francisco, California
Appendix III

Scope and Methodology

Page 50 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

Source: National Transit Database.

Table 4: State Oversight Agencies We Visited for the Purposes of This Review

Source: GAO.

Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority 

(SCVTA)

San Jose, California

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 

Authority (SEPTA)

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 

(WMATA)

Washington, D.C. X

(Continued From Previous Page)

Rail transit agency Urban area served Multi-State region Not yet operating

State oversight agency State(s) served Multi-State region Not yet operating

Arizona Department of Transportation Arizona X

California Public Utilities Commission California

Missouri Department of Transportation Missouri X

New Jersey Department of Transportation New Jersey X

Oregon Department of Transportation Oregon

Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) Illinois

St. Clair County Transit District (SCCTD) Illinois X

Tri-State Oversight Committee (TOC) District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia X
Page 51 GAO-06-821 Rail Transit

Appendix IV

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiIV

GAO Contact Katherine A. Siggerud, (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Catherine Colwell, Assistant 

Director; Ashley Alley; Colin Fallon; Michele Fejfar; Joah Ianotta; Stuart 

Kaufman; Joshua Ormond; Tina Paek; Stephanie Purcell; and Raymond 

Sendejas made key contributions to this report.

(542068)
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