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from the desk of Jonathan Starr

Commissioner, The Hawaii State Commission on Water Resource 

Management, Department of Land and Natural Resources, Hawaii

Re: Red Hill Navy Deteriorating Fuel Storage, Draft AOC & SOW

July 20, 2015

Hawaii Department of Health, Solid and Hazardous Waste Branch;

United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region 9;

United States Department of the Navy, Commander Navy Region Hawaii; 

United States Defense Logistics Agency;

The Honorable President Barack Obama, Office of the President;

US Senator Brian Schatz;

US Senator Mazie Hirono;

US Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard;

US Congressman Mark Takai;

Hawaii Governor David Ige;

Hawaii Lieutenant Governor Shan Tsutsui;

Hawaii State Legislators.

Dear & respected members of the HDOH Solid and Hazardous Waste Branch, 

EPA, US Navy, USDLA, our Honorable President and Hawaii’s fine Elected 

Officials:

On June 1, 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 

Hawaii State Department of Health (DOH) released for public review and 

comment a proposed Administrative Order on Consent (AOC) and Statement of 

Work (SOW) that require the U.S. Navy and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 

to take measures to minimize the threat of future leaks at the Navy’s Red Hill 

Bulk Fuel Storage Facility. I am pleased to offer the following comments to these 

documents:
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General Comments

As Commissioner on the Hawaii State Commission on Water Resource 

Management (CWRM), I strongly disagree with the proposed Red Hill AOC and 

SOW as written. The documents lack public transparency, corrective action 

specificity, and the immediate implementation of improvements that will protect 

our groundwater and environment. At what point do the studies, required under 

the AOC and SOW to determine the best practicable available technology, 

become actions for implementation? Studies could potentially continue for years 

in the name of practicality, while the existing situation remains unchanged. The 

most recent recorded leak of 27,000 gallons of fuel from Tank 5, which occurred

shortly after completing a multi-year clean-inspect-repair and modernization 

process, does not demonstrate that the status quo approach is protective of the 

environment and drinking water.

Hawaii CWRM members appreciate the long and hard work of the EPA, DOH, 

Navy and DLA to develop the proposed AOC and SOW. Unfortunately, the 

contents do not adequately address our concerns about the facility storing 250 

million gallons of fuel located 100 feet above a State designated drinking water 

aquifer; mitigate fuel contaminants already in the groundwater underneath that 

facility; arrest the corroding condition of the tanks’ thin 1/4 inch steel wall and 

their fortification to minimize the risks fuel releases contaminating the aquifer.

This aquifer is the only one of its kind; is essential for the well being of Honolulu 

as one of the world’s great cities; and there are no cost-effective alternatives that 

can replace it. The State of Hawaii cannot countenance a long-term continuation 

of the significant, avoidable threat that the deteriorating Red Hill Tanks pose to 

the primary potable source wells for the Honolulu BWS. These wells presently 

show no contamination. The specter that they may become contaminated in the 

future by a serious breach of even one tank is existential, and must be avoided at 

any cost. It is unfortunate and irresponsible that the situation has continued to 

deteriorate for over 70 years without an adequate maintenance and replacement 

program. The US Navy must acknowledge that the life and welfare of a huge 

community, including many DOD personnel and facilities, is at stake here. The 

degree of unquestionable professionalism with which the US Navy treats hull 

integrity issues for major fleet units, should be employed with this facility. There 

are no Navy ships currently in service that regularly and repeatedly leak tens of 

thousands of gallons through their hull containment.

The Red Hill Tanks were constructed in two years of brilliant, intensive activity 

during WWII, and have subsequently existed for over 70 years without adequate 

maintenance. During that period, very large quantities of petrochemicals 

(estimates say 2 million gallons or so) have leaked or been disposed of in open 

waste pits, with little regard to the effect on irreplaceable ground water resources. 

It is time to end this irresponsible trend, and seriously to monitor, track and deal 

with the effects of plumes of fuel already in the ground.
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I am in agreement with the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, the Honolulu City 

Council, and the Senate of the State of Hawaii, in calling for fast action and the 

double-lining of the tanks with monitoring facilities between the inner and outer 

walls, as would comply with EPA UST requirements.

Recognition of the Groundwater Aquifer

The AOC and SOW do not recognize the location of the Red Hill facility to be 

within the boundaries of the Southern Oahu Basal Aquifer designated by EPA in 

1987 under the sole source protection authority in Section 1424 (e) of the Safe 

Drinking Water Act (SDWA). 

This aquifer, one of 77 sole source designations nationwide, includes the 

Waimalu and Moanalua aquifer sector areas, and its designation requires studies 

to assess the impacts on aquifer water quality by all federally funded projects 

within its boundaries.

According to the sole source aquifer protection authorized under the SDWA,

[Public Law 93-523, 42 U.S.C. 300 et. seq., Section 1424(e)] "If the Administrator 

determines, on his own initiative or upon petition, that an area has an aquifer 

which is the sole or principal drinking water source for the area and which, if 

contaminated, would create a significant hazard to public health, he shall publish 

notice of that determination in the Federal Register. After the publication of any 

such notice, no commitment for federal financial assistance (through a grant, 

contract, loan guarantee, or otherwise) may be entered into for any project which 

the Administrator determines may contaminate such aquifer through a recharge 

zone so as to create a significant hazard to public health, but a commitment for 

federal assistance may, if authorized under another provision of law, be entered 

into to plan or design the project to assure that it will not so contaminate the 

aquifer."

By this letter, EPA is requested to determine whether the existing Red Hill 

contamination has created a hazard to public health and if so, to publish its 

findings and ensure that federally funded projects for this facility do not further 

contaminate and create further hazards to public health. Furthermore, if there is 

a hazard to public health, cleanup of the site should be required to remove the 

hazard.

Public Transparency

According to Section 7003 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 

(RCRA), the public should be involved to the maximum extent possible based on 

the needs and concerns intrinsic to the situation, which in this case are the Red 

Hill tanks located 100 feet above the groundwater table and the contamination 

underneath the facility detected to date. Specifically, RCRA Section 7003 states 
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that Regions should ensure that public notice and an opportunity to comment are 

provided during the remedy selection process, which in this case is the SOW.

Given the intrinsic concerns of the facility on the Southern Oahu Basal aquifer, 

and the absence of cost effective alternatives to take its place, we strongly urge 

EPA revise the AOC and SOW processes to increase the amount of stakeholder 

and public participation in the identification and implementation of remedies to 

address the situation at Red Hill.

Corrective Action Identification and Due Dates

The processes outlined in the SOW are extremely protracted and lack specific 

due dates for completing each process. The SOW also requires evaluating the 

feasibility of improvements that have already been identified. For example, the 

2008 Red Hill Repair Tank Options Study identified the following two alternatives 

for upgrading the tanks.

1 Alternative 1 – Composite Tank: The Composite Tank consists of inspecting 

and repairing the existing steel liner in each tank, which would become the

secondary containment system, and then constructing a new liner with a 3 

inch wide interstitial space between the new liner and the existing liner. 

The interstitial space would be filled with grout and have a leak detection 

system.

2 Alternative 2 – Tank Within A Tank: The Tank Within A Tank concept consists 

of inspecting and repairing the existing steel liner in each tank which 

would become the secondary containment system, and constructing a 

new tank inside the existing tanks, with a 5 feet wide annular space 

between the new tank and existing tank shell that is accessible for 

inspection and visual leak detection.

The study consultant recommended to the Navy to authorize a single tank repair 

project to start the program as a means of proving up the concepts and 

confirming overall cost validity. According to the study report, the same 

consultant also performed a similar study in 1998 to develop possible repair 

options for Tank 19. According to the report, the 1998 study was performed due 

to tank integrity issues, environmental concerns, lack of leak detection capability, 

and lack of secondary containment at Red Hill. There should be no need to do a 

new two-year study to examine tank improvements when the assessment has 

already been done repeatedly.

As written, the processes in the SOW appear to enable the Navy to continue the 

operations of Red Hill as done in the past. While there are timeframes for 

executing the work elements, the language lacks compliance with specific due 

dates to ensure steady progress. Protractive repeating of studies is not 

protective of the groundwater and environment.
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Actions that should be implemented include:

1. Double-line all 20 tanks.

2. Install advanced leak detection and tank corrosion protection.

3. Add sufficient in-ground monitoring facilities.

4.Clean up the fuel that is already underneath the tanks.

5. Recognize the location of the Red Hill facility to be within the boundaries of the 

Southern Oahu Basal Aquifer designated by EPA in 1987 under the sole source 

protection authority in Section 1424 (e) of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).

6. Keep the BWS, CWRM, DOH and the public informed of its actions.

I hereby request that our Honorable US President Barack Obama and Federal 

Administration, Hawaii’s Senatorial and Congressional Delegations, the US 

Navy, the EPA, USDLA, HDOH, and other relevant Federal or State Agencies

perform whatever is needed to expeditiously cure the threat posed to Oahu’s 

water resources by the deteriorating Red Hill Tanks.

Our entire State Commission on Water Resource Management was scheduled to 

meet on July 15th, to discuss this matter and approve these remarks for formal 

submittal by CWRM/DLNR before the July 20th cutoff for testimony. 

Unfortunately, the meeting was cancelled beyond our control due to a perceived 

technical noticing issue, so as senior member I am submitting these remarks 

under my own signature at this time, since members cannot meet, discuss or 

approve any items outside of Hawaii sunshine-law noticed meetings. It is likely 

that remarks will be forthcoming from the Commission after our next meeting.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide these comments.

With Warmest Aloha,

Jonathan Starr

Commissioner,

Hawaii State Commission on Water Resource Management (CWRM)

Department of Land and Natural Resources, State of Hawaii

kalepa@maui.net (808) 283-1183

1942 Main Street, Suite 104, Wailuku, Maui, Hawaii, 96793