[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-10759

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-24338-UU

WALTER LEE WRIGHT, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

MELBA V. PEARSON, 

 Defendant - Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(September 25, 2018)

Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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William Lee Wright, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district

court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Assistant State 

Attorney Melba Pearson. After careful review, we conclude that the district court 

correctly determined that Pearson enjoyed official immunity and affirm the district 

court’s judgment.

I.

Wright, a Florida state prisoner, filed a complaint alleging that Pearson 

violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights when in his state 

post-conviction proceedings Pearson failed to turn over that evidence that Wright 

sought to have DNA tested. After Wright filed his complaint, the magistrate judge 

sua sponte screened the complaint to determine whether it “fail[ed] to state a claim 

on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The magistrate 

judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed because, among other 

reasons, Pearson, as an assistant state attorney, is entitled to absolute immunity 

from Wright’s claim.

Wright filed a timely objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. 

After considering Wright’s objections and performing a de novo review, the 

district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the 

complaint without prejudice, and closed the case. Wright then filed a timely notice 

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of appeal indicating that he was appealing the district court’s order adopting the 

magistrate judge’s recommendation.

On the same day, Wright filed a motion for reconsideration in the district 

court. The district court subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration. 

Wright did not file a notice of appeal from the denial of his motion for 

reconsideration. 

II.

On appeal, Wright contends that the district court erred in dismissing his 

complaint, arguing that it failed to adequately consider the objections he raised to 

the magistrate judge’s recommendation. He also contends that the district court 

erred in denying his motion for reconsideration. We address these arguments in 

turn.

Wright first argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his 

complaint for failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted. We review 

de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

for failure to state a claim. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1489-90 (11th Cir.

1997). Dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) are governed by the same standards as 

dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. We have 

recognized that a case is due to be dismissed for failure to state a claim when 

immunity “is an obvious bar given the allegations” in the complaint. Sibley v. 

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Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005). And we have explained that “a 

prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from allegations stemming from the 

prosecutor’s function as advocate.” Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1295-96 (11th 

Cir. 2009) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This absolute 

immunity extends to a prosecutor’s conduct during post-conviction proceedings

that is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id.

at 1296 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the district court properly concluded that Pearson enjoys absolutely 

immunity from Wright’s claim and dismissed Wright’s complaint. Wright’s claim 

arises out of action Pearson took as an assistant state attorney when she opposed 

his request in post-conviction proceedings to perform DNA testing on certain 

evidence. Because Wright’s allegations stem from actions that Pearson took while

acting as an advocate, Pearson enjoys immunity from suit. We acknowledge that 

Wright raises other arguments about why the district court erred in dismissing his 

complaint. But we need not address those issues because immunity provides a 

wholly independent ground that supports the dismissal of his complaint. See 

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). 

Wright also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for 

reconsideration. When an appellant’s notice of appeal specifies a judgment, we 

have “no jurisdiction to review other judgments or issues which are not expressly 

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referred to and which are not impliedly intended for appeal.” Whetstone Candy 

Co. v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 351 F.3d 1067, 1079-80 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). But we may allow an appeal from an order not 

expressly designated in the notice of appeal when “the order that was not 

designated was entered prior to or contemporaneously with the order(s) properly 

designated in the notice of appeal.” KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 

465 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Even construing Wright’s notice of appeal liberally, we conclude that 

Wright filed only one notice of appeal that identified only the district court’s order 

dismissing his complaint. When the district court subsequently denied his motion 

for reconsideration, Wright did not file a new notice of appeal. We thus lack 

jurisdiction to review Wright’s appeal of the district court order denying his 

motion for reconsideration.1

 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

AFFIRMED.

 1 Even if Wright had filed a notice of appeal from the order denying the motion for 

reconsideration, we could not say that the district court abused its discretion in denying his 

motion for reconsideration because, as we explained above, the allegations in his complaint 

readily establish that Pearson enjoyed absolute immunity from his claim. See Wilchombe v. 

TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009).

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