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[House Report 109-590]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

109th Congress                                            Rept. 109-590
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                      Part 1

======================================================================

 
   UNITED STATES AND INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROMOTION ACT OF 2006

                                _______
                                

                 July 21, 2006.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

Mr. Hyde, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 5682]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on International Relations, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 5682) to exempt from certain 
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed 
nuclear agreement for cooperation with India, having considered 
the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and 
recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

                           TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
The Amendment....................................................     2
Purpose and Summary..............................................     8
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     9
Hearings.........................................................    10
Committee Consideration..........................................    11
Votes of the Committee...........................................    11
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................    12
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................    12
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................    12
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................    14
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................    14
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion.......................    14
Agency Views.....................................................    28
New Advisory Committees..........................................    29
Congressional Accountability Act.................................    29
Federal Mandates.................................................    29
Additional Views.................................................    31

                             The Amendment

    The amendment is as follows:
    Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``United States and India Nuclear 
Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006''.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other 
        weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and the 
        means to deliver them are critical objectives for United States 
        foreign policy;
            (2) sustaining the NPT and strengthening its 
        implementation, particularly its verification and compliance, 
        is the keystone of United States nonproliferation policy;
            (3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing 
        the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and maintaining 
        a stable international security situation;
            (4) countries that have never become a party to the NPT and 
        remain outside that treaty's legal regime pose a potential 
        challenge to the achievement of the overall goals of global 
        nonproliferation, because those countries have not undertaken 
        the NPT's international obligation to prohibit the spread of 
        dangerous nuclear technologies;
            (5) it is in the interest of the United States to the 
        fullest extent possible to ensure that those countries that are 
        not NPT members are responsible with any nuclear technology 
        they develop;
            (6) it may be in the interest of the United States to enter 
        into an agreement for nuclear cooperation as set forth in 
        section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) 
        with a country that has never been an NPT member with respect 
        to civilian nuclear technology if--
                    (A) the country has demonstrated responsible 
                behavior with respect to the nonproliferation of 
                technology related to weapons of mass destruction 
                programs and the means to deliver them;
                    (B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted 
                democratic system of government, has a foreign policy 
                that is congruent to that of the United States, and is 
                working with the United States in key foreign policy 
                initiatives related to non-proliferation;
                    (C) such cooperation induces the country to 
                implement the highest possible protections against the 
                proliferation of technology related to weapons of mass 
                destruction programs and the means to deliver them, and 
                to refrain from actions that would further the 
                development of its nuclear weapons program; and
                    (D) such cooperation will induce the country to 
                give greater political and material support to the 
                achievement of United States global and regional 
                nonproliferation objectives, especially with respect to 
                dissuading, isolating, and, if necessary, sanctioning 
                and containing states that sponsor terrorism and 
                terrorist groups, that are seeking to acquire a nuclear 
                weapons capability or other weapons of mass destruction 
                capability and the means to deliver such weapons; and
            (7)(A) India meets the criteria described in this 
        subsection; and
            (B) it is in the national security interest of the United 
        States to deepen its relationship with India across a full 
        range of issues, including peaceful nuclear cooperation.

SEC. 3. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

    (a) In General.--The following shall be the policies of the United 
States:
            (1) Oppose the development of a capability to produce 
        nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or 
        outside of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
        Weapons (21 UST 483; commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Treaty'' or the ``NPT'').
            (2) Encourage states party to the NPT to interpret the 
        right to ``develop research, production and use of nuclear 
        energy for peaceful purposes'', as described in Article IV of 
        the NPT, as being a qualified right that is conditioned by the 
        overall purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear 
        weapons and nuclear weapons capability, including by refraining 
        from all nuclear cooperation with any state party that has not 
        demonstrated that it is in full compliance with its NPT 
        obligations, as determined by the IAEA.
            (3) Strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines 
        concerning consultation by members regarding violations of 
        supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the 
        practice of a timely and coordinated response by NSG members to 
        all such violations, including termination of nuclear transfers 
        to an involved recipient, that discourages individual NSG 
        members from continuing cooperation with such recipient until 
        such time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response has 
        been achieved.
    (b) With Respect to South Asia.--The following shall be the 
policies of the United States with respect to South Asia:
            (1) Achieve a moratorium on the production of fissile 
        material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and 
        the People's Republic of China at the earliest possible date.
            (2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion 
        and implementation of a treaty banning the production of 
        fissile material for nuclear weapons to which both the United 
        States and India become parties.
            (3) Secure India's--
                    (A) full participation in the Proliferation 
                Security Initiative;
                    (B) formal commitment to the Statement of 
                Interdiction Principles;
                    (C) public announcement of its decision to conform 
                its export control laws, regulations, and policies with 
                the Australia Group and with the Guidelines, 
                Procedures, Criteria, and Control Lists of the 
                Wassennaar Arrangement;
                    (D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward 
                implementing the decision described in subparagraph 
                (C); and
                    (E) ratification of or accession to the Convention 
                on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done 
                at Vienna on September 12, 1997.
            (4) Secure India's full and active participation in United 
        States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, 
        sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of 
        mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability 
        (including the capability to enrich or process nuclear 
        materials), and the means to deliver weapons of mass 
        destruction.
            (5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in 
        South Asia, and to promote their reduction and eventual 
        elimination.
            (6) To ensure that spent fuel generated in India's civilian 
        nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United States 
        except pursuant to the Congressional review procedures required 
        under section 131 f. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
        U.S.C. 2160 f.).
            (7) Pending implementation of a multilateral moratorium, 
        encourage India not to increase its production of fissile 
        material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

SEC. 4. WAIVER AUTHORITY AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the 
President makes the determination described in subsection (b), the 
President may--
            (1) exempt a proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation 
        with India (arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic 
        Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)) from the requirement in 
        section 123 a.(2) of such Act, and such agreement for 
        cooperation may only enter into force in accordance with 
        subsections (f) and (g);
            (2) waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic 
        Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect to India, 
        provided that such waiver shall cease to be effective if the 
        President determines that India has engaged in any activity 
        described section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158), other than 
        section 129 a.(1)(D) or section 129 a.(2)(C) of such Act, at 
        any time after the date of the enactment of this Act; and
            (3) with respect to India--
                    (A) waive the restrictions of section 129 a.(1)(A) 
                of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158 
                a.(1)(A)) for any activity that occurred on or before 
                July 18, 2005; and
                    (B) section 129 a.(1)(D) of such Act.
    (b) Determination by the President.--The determination referred to 
in subsection (a) is a determination by the President that the 
following actions have occurred:
            (1) India has provided the United States and the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency with a credible plan to 
        separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and 
        programs, and has filed a declaration regarding its civil 
        facilities with the IAEA.
            (2) India and the IAEA have concluded an agreement 
        requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in 
        accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices 
        (including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) to 
        India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs as 
        declared in the plan described in paragraph (1), including 
        materials used in or produced through the use of India's civil 
        nuclear facilities.
            (3) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress 
        toward concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA 
        principles, practices, and policies that would apply to India's 
        civil nuclear program.
            (4) India is working actively with the United States for 
        the early conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff 
        Treaty.
            (5) India is working with and supporting United States and 
        international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and 
        reprocessing technology.
            (6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear 
        and other sensitive materials and technology, including 
        through--
                    (A) the enactment and enforcement of comprehensive 
                export control legislation and regulations;
                    (B) harmonization of its export control laws, 
                regulations, policies, and practices with the policies 
                and practices of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
                and the Nuclear Suppliers Group; and
                    (C) adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in accordance 
                with the procedures of those regimes for unilateral 
                adherence.
            (7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to 
        India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG and 
        such decision does not permit civil nuclear commerce with any 
        other non-nuclear weapon state that does not have IAEA 
        safeguards on all nuclear materials within its territory, under 
        its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
    (c) Submission to Congress.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall submit to the 
        Committee on International Relations of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate information concerning any determination made pursuant 
        to subsection (b), together with a report detailing the basis 
        for the determination.
            (2) Information to be included.--To the fullest extent 
        available to the United States, the information referred to in 
        paragraph (1) shall include the following:
                    (A) A summary of the plan provided by India to the 
                United States and the IAEA to separate India's civil 
                and military nuclear facilities, materials, and 
                programs, and the declaration made by India to the IAEA 
                identifying India's civil facilities to be placed under 
                IAEA safeguards, including an analysis of the 
                credibility of such plan and declaration, together with 
                copies of the plan and declaration.
                    (B) A summary of the agreement that has been 
                entered into between India and the IAEA requiring the 
                application of safeguards in accordance with IAEA 
                practices to India's civil nuclear facilities as 
                declared in the plan described in subparagraph (A), 
                together with a copy of the agreement, and a 
                description of the progress toward its full 
                implementation.
                    (C) A summary of the progress made toward 
                conclusion and implementation of an Additional Protocol 
                between India and the IAEA, including a description of 
                the scope of such Additional Protocol.
                    (D) A description of the steps that India is taking 
                to work with the United States for the conclusion of a 
                multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile 
                material for nuclear weapons, including a description 
                of the steps that the United States has taken and will 
                take to encourage India to identify and declare a date 
                by which India would be willing to stop production of 
                fissile material for nuclear weapons unilaterally or 
                pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or treaty.
                    (E) A description of the steps India is taking to 
                prevent the spread of nuclear-related technology, 
                including enrichment and reprocessing technology or 
                materials that can be used to acquire a nuclear weapons 
                technology, as well as the support that India is 
                providing to the United States to further United States 
                objectives to restrict the spread of such technology.
                    (F) A description of the steps that India is taking 
                to secure materials and technology applicable for the 
                development, acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of 
                mass destruction and the means to deliver such weapons 
                through the application of comprehensive export control 
                legislation and regulations, and through harmonization 
                and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime, the 
                Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, 
                Wassennaar guidelines, and United Nations Security 
                Council Resolution 1540, and participation in the 
                Proliferation Security Initiative.
                    (G) A description of the decision taken within the 
                Nuclear Suppliers Group relating to nuclear cooperation 
                with India, including whether nuclear cooperation by 
                the United States under an agreement for cooperation 
                arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy 
                Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) is consistent with the 
                decision, practices, and policies of the NSG.
                    (H) A description of the scope of peaceful 
                cooperation envisioned by the United States and India 
                that will be implemented under the Agreement for 
                Nuclear Cooperation, including whether such cooperation 
                will include the provision of enrichment and 
                reprocessing technology.
                    (I) A description of the steps taken to ensure that 
                proposed United States civil nuclear assistance to 
                India will not directly, or in any other way, assist 
                India's nuclear weapons program, including--
                            (i) the use of any United States equipment, 
                        technology, or nuclear material by India in an 
                        unsafeguarded nuclear facility or nuclear-
                        weapons related complex;
                            (ii) the replication and subsequent use of 
                        any United States technology in an 
                        unsafeguarded nuclear facility or unsafeguarded 
                        nuclear weapons-related complex, or for any 
                        activity related to the research, development, 
                        testing, or manufacture of nuclear explosive 
                        devices; and
                            (iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in such 
                        a manner as to facilitate the increased 
                        production of highly-enriched uranium or 
                        plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
    (d) Restrictions on Nuclear Transfers to India.--
            (1) In general.--Pursuant to the obligations of the United 
        States under Article I of the NPT, nothing in this Act, or any 
        agreement pursuant to this Act, shall be interpreted as 
        permitting any civil nuclear cooperation between the United 
        States and India that would in any way assist, encourage, or 
        induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
        weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
            (2) NSG transfer guidelines.--Notwithstanding the entry 
        into force of an agreement for cooperation with India pursuant 
        to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
        2153) and approved pursuant to this Act, no item subject to 
        such agreement or subject to the transfer guidelines of the NSG 
        may be transferred to India if such transfer would violate the 
        transfer guidelines of the NSG as in effect on the date of the 
        transfer.
            (3) Termination of nuclear transfers to india.--
        Notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement for 
        nuclear cooperation with India (arranged pursuant to section 
        123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)), exports 
        of nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, or 
        technology to India shall be terminated if India makes any 
        materially significant transfer of--
                    (A) nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, 
                or technology that does not conform to NSG guidelines, 
                or
                    (B) ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment 
                or technology that does not conform to MTCR guidelines,
        unless the President determines that cessation of such exports 
        would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United 
        States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the 
        common defense and security.
            (4) Prohibition on nuclear transfers to india.--If nuclear 
        transfers to India are restricted pursuant to this Act, the 
        Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or the Arms Export Control Act, the 
        President should seek to prevent the transfer to India of 
        nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other 
        participating governments in the NSG or from any other source.
    (e) Approval of Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Required.--
            (1) In general.--Subject to subsection (m), an agreement 
        for nuclear cooperation between the United States and India 
        submitted pursuant to this section may become effective only 
        if--
                    (A) the President submits to Congress the agreement 
                concluded between the United States and India, 
                including a copy of the safeguards agreement entered 
                into between the IAEA and India relating to India's 
                declared civilian nuclear facilities, in accordance 
                with the requirements and procedures of section 123 of 
                the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (other than section 123 
                a.(2) of such Act) that are otherwise not inconsistent 
                with the provisions of this Act; and
                    (B) after the submission under subparagraph (A), 
                the agreement is approved by a joint resolution that is 
                enacted into law.
            (2) Consultation.--Beginning one month after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act and every month thereafter until the 
        President submits to Congress the agreement referred to in 
        paragraph (1), the President should consult with the Committee 
        on International Relations of the House of Representatives and 
        the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate regarding the 
        status of the negotiations between the United States and India 
        with respect to civilian nuclear cooperation and between the 
        IAEA and India with respect to the safeguards agreement 
        described in subsection (b)(2).
    (f) Joint Resolution.--For purposes of this section, a joint 
resolution referred to in subsection (e)(1)(B) is a joint resolution of 
the two Houses of Congress--
            (1) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as 
        follows: ``That the Congress hereby approves the Agreement for 
        Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States of America and 
        the Republic of India submitted by the President on 
        ___________.'', with the blank space being filled with the 
        appropriate date;
            (2) which does not have a preamble; and
            (3) the title of which is as follows: ``Joint Resolution 
        Approving an Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between the 
        United States and India''.
    (g) Introduction and Referral.--
            (1) Introduction.--A joint resolution shall, on the day on 
        which the submissions under subsection (e)(1)(A) are made (or, 
        if either House of Congress is not in session on that day, the 
        first day thereafter when that House is in session)--
                    (A) be introduced in the House of Representatives 
                by the majority leader, for himself and the minority 
                leader of the House, or by Members of the House 
                designated by the majority leader and minority leader 
                of the House; and
                    (B) be introduced in the Senate by the majority 
                leader, for himself and the minority leader of the 
                Senate, or by Members of the Senate designated by the 
                majority leader and minority leader of the Senate.
        If either House of Congress is not in session on that day, the 
        joint resolution shall be introduced on the first day 
        thereafter when both Houses are in session.
            (2) Referral.--The joint resolution shall be referred to 
        the Committee on International Relations of the House of 
        Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
        the Senate.
    (h) Discharge of Committees.--If a committee to which a joint 
resolution is referred has not reported such joint resolution by the 
end of 60 days beginning on the date of its introduction, or the date 
of the submission of the nonproliferation assessment statement 
described in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
2153), whichever is later, such committee shall be discharged from 
further consideration of such joint resolution, and such joint 
resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House 
involved.
    (i) Floor Consideration in the House of Representatives.--
            (1) In general.--On or after the third calendar day 
        (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays, except when 
        the House of Representatives is in session on such a day) after 
        the date on which the committee to which a joint resolution is 
        referred has reported, or has been discharged from further 
        consideration of, such a joint resolution, it shall be in order 
        for any Member of the House to move to proceed to the 
        consideration of the joint resolution. A Member of the House 
        may make the motion only on the day after the calendar day on 
        which the Member announces to the House the Member's intention 
        to do so. Such motion shall be privileged and shall not be 
        debatable. The motion shall not be subject to amendment or to a 
        motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote by which 
        the motion is agreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to 
        proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution is agreed 
        to, the House shall immediately proceed to consideration of the 
        joint resolution which shall remain the unfinished business 
        until disposed of.
            (2) Debate.--Debate on a joint resolution, and on all 
        debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be 
        limited to not more than six hours, which shall be divided 
        equally between those favoring and those opposing the joint 
        resolution. An amendment to the joint resolution shall not be 
        in order. A motion to further limit debate shall be in order 
        and shall not be debatable. A motion to table, a motion to 
        postpone, or a motion to recommit the joint resolution shall 
        not be in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the 
        joint resolution is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in 
        order.
            (3) Appeals.--Appeals from the decisions of the Chair to 
        the procedure relating to a joint resolution shall be decided 
        without debate.
    (j) Floor Consideration in the Senate.--Any joint resolution shall 
be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of 
section 601(b)(4) of the International Security Assistance and Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976.
    (k) Consideration by the Other House.--If, before the passage by 
one House of a joint resolution of that House, that House receives a 
joint resolution from the other House, then the following procedures 
shall apply:
            (1) The joint resolution of the other House shall not be 
        referred to a committee and may not be considered in the House 
        receiving it except in the case of final passage as provided in 
        paragraph (2)(B).
            (2) With respect to a joint resolution of the House 
        receiving the joint resolution--
                    (A) the procedure in that House shall be the same 
                as if no joint resolution had been received from the 
                other House; but
                    (B) the vote on final passage shall be on the joint 
                resolution of the other House.
            (3) Upon disposition of the joint resolution received from 
        the other House, it shall no longer be in order to consider the 
        joint resolution that originated in the receiving House.
    (l) Computation of Days.--In the computation of the period of 60 
days referred to in subsection (h), there shall be excluded the days on 
which either House of Congress is not in session because of an 
adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain or because of an 
adjournment of the Congress sine die.
    (m) Section 123 of Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Not Affected.--
Notwithstanding subsection (e)(1), this section does not preclude the 
approval, under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
2153), of an agreement for cooperation in which India is the 
cooperating party.
    (n) Sunset.--The procedures under this section shall cease to be 
effective upon the enactment of a joint resolution under this section.
    (o) Reports.--
            (1) Policy objectives.--The President shall, not later than 
        January 31, 2007, and not later than January 31 of each year 
        thereafter, submit to the Committee on International Relations 
        of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations of the Senate a report on--
                    (A) the extent to which each policy objective in 
                section 3(b) has been achieved;
                    (B) the steps taken by the United States and India 
                in the preceding calendar year to accomplish those 
                objectives;
                    (C) the extent of cooperation by other countries in 
                achieving those objectives; and
                    (D) the steps the United States will take in the 
                current calendar year to accomplish those objectives.
            (2) Nuclear exports to india.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than one year after the 
                date on which an agreement for nuclear cooperation 
                between the United States and India is approved by 
                Congress under section 4(f) and every year thereafter, 
                the President shall submit to the Committee on 
                International Relations of the House of Representatives 
                and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a 
                report describing United States exports to India for 
                the preceding year pursuant to such agreement and the 
                anticipated exports to India for the next year pursuant 
                to such agreement.
                    (B) Nuclear fuel.--The report described in 
                subparagraph (A) shall also include (in a classified 
                form if necessary)--
                            (i) an estimate for the previous year of 
                        the amount of uranium mined in India;
                            (ii) the amount of such uranium that has 
                        likely been used or allocated for the 
                        production of nuclear explosive devices;
                            (iii) the rate of production of--
                                    (I) fissile material for nuclear 
                                explosive devices; and
                                    (II) nuclear explosive devices; and
                            (iv) an analysis as to whether imported 
                        uranium has affected such rate of production of 
                        nuclear explosive devices.
                    (C) Unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.--The report 
                described in subparagraph (A) shall also include (in a 
                classified form if necessary) a description of whether 
                United States civil nuclear assistance to India is 
                directly, or in any other way, assisting India's 
                nuclear weapons program, including--
                            (i) the use of any United States equipment, 
                        technology, or nuclear material by India in an 
                        unsafeguarded nuclear facility or nuclear-
                        weapons related complex;
                            (ii) the replication and subsequent use of 
                        any United States technology in an 
                        unsafeguarded nuclear facility or unsafeguarded 
                        nuclear weapons-related complex, or for any 
                        activity related to the research, development, 
                        testing, or manufacture of nuclear explosive 
                        devices; and
                            (iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in such 
                        a manner as to facilitate the increased 
                        production of highly-enriched uranium or 
                        plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
            (3) New nuclear reactors or facilities.--Not later than one 
        year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually 
        thereafter, the President shall submit to the Committee on 
        International Relations of the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report 
        describing any new nuclear reactors or nuclear facilities that 
        the Government of India has designated as civilian and placed 
        under inspections or has designated as military.
            (4) Disposal of spent nuclear fuel.--Not later than one 
        year after the date on which an agreement for nuclear 
        cooperation between the United States and India is approved by 
        Congress under section 4(f) and every year thereafter, the 
        President shall submit to the Committee on International 
        Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate a report describing the 
        disposal of spent nuclear fuel from India's civilian nuclear 
        program.
    (p) Definitions.--In this Act:
            (1) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic 
        Energy Agency.
            (2) MTCR.--The term ``MTCR'' means the Missile Technology 
        Control Regime.
            (3) NPT.--The term ``NPT'' means the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
            (4) NPT member.--The term ``NPT member'' means a country 
        that is a party to the NPT.
            (5) NSG.--The term ``NSG'' means the Nuclear Suppliers 
        Group.

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 5682, the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation 
Promotion Act of 2006, would exempt a future peaceful nuclear 
cooperation agreement with India from current statutory 
restrictions in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as 
amended, that would otherwise not permit the export of nuclear 
items and materials to India. Such restrictions normally apply 
on such agreements with states (other than ``Nuclear Weapon 
States'' such as the United Kingdom, France, China and Russia 
as recognized by the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, or NPT) that do not have comprehensive international 
nuclear safeguards, that have ongoing nuclear weapons programs, 
or that have tested nuclear weapons since 1978. A peaceful 
nuclear cooperation agreement with India would be inconsistent 
with these restrictions.
    H.R. 5682 requires that, in order to waive the requirements 
in the AEA, the President must certify that India has fulfilled 
the commitments it undertook on July 18, 2005 in the U.S.-India 
Joint Statement to (among other activities) expand peaceful 
nuclear trade. These commitments included providing a credible 
plan to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities, 
concluding a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), continuing its moratorium on nuclear 
tests, and working actively with the United States to prevent 
the spread of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technology to 
other countries, among other measures. In addition, the 
President must certify that the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 
has agreed by consensus to modify its guidelines to permit 
civil nuclear trade with India, which would otherwise be 
precluded for its 45 member-states.
    Once the President certifies that these conditions have 
been met, he may exercise the waiver authorities provided in 
the bill and present the negotiated agreement to Congress for 
approval. In order for U.S.-India nuclear cooperation to begin, 
however, the negotiated agreement must be approved by a 
subsequent joint resolution adopted by both the House and 
Senate. The text of the safeguards agreement between India and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency must also be submitted 
to inform Congressional review of the U.S.-India agreement, 
which will rely upon the IAEA safeguards to alert the U.S. to 
any diversion of U.S.-provided nuclear material from peaceful 
to military purposes. Finally, H.R. 5682 provides for enhanced 
Congressional oversight of nuclear cooperation with India by 
requiring annual reports on U.S. non-proliferation policy in 
South Asia and the implementation of the U.S.-India Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

    Relations between India and the United States have been 
marred for decades by coolness and distrust, punctuated by 
occasional hostility. With the receding of the Cold War's 
global divisions and the new realities of globalization and 
trans-national terrorism, for more than a decade there has been 
increasing recognition in both countries of the significant 
benefits to be obtained from closer cooperation across a broad 
spectrum. These range from shared strategic interests, such as 
enhanced stability and security in South Asia and the 
international system as a whole, to more specific priorities, 
including greater effectiveness in combating the AIDS epidemic, 
combating terrorism around the world, and preventing the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among others.
    To that end, on July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a joint statement 
announcing a ``global partnership'' between the two countries 
that embraces cooperation across a wide range of subjects. As 
part of that announcement, President Bush stated that he would 
``work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with 
India'' and would ``also seek agreement from Congress to adjust 
U.S. laws and policies.''
    The Administration's proposed legislation, H.R. 4974, 
subsequently reintroduced with modifications as H.R. 5682, 
would provide the Administration with authority to waive the 
relevant provisions of the AEA. Three provisions of the Atomic 
Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2153 et seq) contain restrictions on 
cooperation that the Administration deemed to be insurmountable 
hurdles in conducting civil nuclear cooperation with India: 
Section 123 a.(2), which requires that a non-nuclear weapon 
state have IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material in all 
peaceful nuclear activities in that state (commonly referred to 
as ``full-scope safeguards'') as a condition of approval for 
new cooperation agreements; Section 128, which requires a non-
nuclear weapon state recipient of U.S. nuclear exports to have 
full-scope safeguards as a prerequisite for licensing U.S. 
exports; and Section 129, which requires ending exports if a 
non-nuclear weapon state has tested nuclear weapons after 1978.
    The Atomic Energy Act contains provisions for the President 
to waive the full-scope safeguards requirement for a new 
cooperation agreement, but would require submitting the 
agreement to the Congress as ``exempt,'' with a determination 
that including the requirements would be ``seriously 
prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. nonproliferation 
objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and 
security.'' Such an exempted agreement could only enter into 
force with the enactment of a joint resolution of approval of 
the House and the Senate.
    The Atomic Energy Act also contains a provision for the 
President to override a decision by the Congress to halt 
exports under the export review provision in Section 128, 
requiring the President to determine that foreign policy 
interests dictate reconsideration. In addition, the Atomic 
Energy Act would allow the President to waive termination of 
exports under Section 129, pending a determination that 
cessation would be ``seriously prejudicial to the achievement 
of U.S. nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the 
common defense and security.'' Rather than use the waivers 
existing already under the Atomic Energy Act, the 
Administration requested separate waiver authority in H.R. 
4974.
    The Administration's proposal in H.R. 4974 sought to 
replace the procedure in existing statute for approving 
agreements that did not meet all the statutory requirements--a 
joint resolution of approval--with routine consideration for 
agreements that do meet the requirements. The Committee 
rejected this approach in favor of retaining existing 
Congressional prerogatives in the Atomic Energy Act.
    H.R. 5682 reflects broad agreement among Committee members 
that peaceful nuclear cooperation with India can serve multiple 
U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives, but must 
be approached in a manner that minimizes potential risks to the 
nonproliferation regime. Among the most important 
considerations are ensuring that NSG guidelines and consensus 
decision-making are upheld, and that a U.S. nuclear cooperation 
agreement and subsequent U.S. nuclear exports are consistent 
with the decisions, policies, and guidelines of the NSG.
    The bill requires, as a condition for the President to 
exercise his waiver authority, that the NSG agree by consensus 
to an exception specifically for India to its guidelines and 
that no U.S. exports may be transferred to India that do not 
comport with NSG guidelines and decisions. Equally important is 
the need to ensure that U.S. cooperation does not assist the 
Indian nuclear weapons program, directly or indirectly, in 
order to avoid contributing to a nuclear arms race in South 
Asia and because of U.S. obligations under the NPT.
    As in the Administration's proposed legislation, H.R. 5682 
requires the President to determine that India is upholding its 
July 18, 2005 commitments as a prerequisite for using his 
waiver authority. But the Committee also believes that India's 
continued implementation of those commitments is vital to the 
health of our bilateral relationship. Therefore, the bill 
contains reporting requirements and a provision that calls for 
termination of exports in the event of violations of certain 
commitments. Lastly, the bill seeks to uphold existing 
statutory Congressional oversight of U.S. nuclear cooperation 
and exports. At a time when the world appears to be considering 
nuclear energy as a viable and desirable alternative to carbon-
based energy sources, oversight of its expansion is crucial.

                                Hearings

    The Full Committee held 5 days of hearings related to this 
legislation: September 8, 2005; October 26, 2005; November 16, 
2005; April 5, 2006; and May 11, 2006. Testimony was received 
from 18 witnesses, including two Members of Congress, and 
representatives from 14 organizations.

                        Committee Consideration

    On June 28, 2006, the Committee met in open session and 
ordered favorably reported the bill, H.R. 5682, as amended, by 
a vote of 37 to 5, a quorum being present.

                         Votes of the Committee

    Clause (3)(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires that the results of each record vote 
on an amendment or motion to report, together with the names of 
those voting for or against, be printed in the Committee 
Report.
1) To report favorably, as amended--agreed to by a vote of 37-5
          Voting yes: Hyde, Gallegly, Ros-Lehtinen, 
        Rohrabacher, Royce, Chabot, Tancredo, Flake, Green, 
        Weller, Pence, McCotter, Harris, Wilson, Boozman, 
        Barrett, Mack, Fortenberry, McCaul, Lantos, Berman, 
        Ackerman, Faleomavaega, Brown, Sherman, Wexler, 
        Delahunt, Meeks, Crowley, Berkley, Napolitano, Schiff, 
        Smith (WA), McCollum, Chandler, Cardoza, and Carnahan.
          Voting no: Leach, Smith (NJ), Poe, Lee, and Watson.
2) Berman amendment--to add new subsection 4(b)(8)--India (regarding 
        fissile material)--defeated by a vote of 13-32
          Voting yes: Leach, Smith (NJ), Berman, Brown, 
        Sherman, Delahunt, Lee, Blumenauer, Napolitano, Schiff, 
        Watson, McCollum, and Chandler.
          Voting no: Hyde, Burton, Gallegly, Ros-Lehtinen, 
        Rohrabacher, Royce, King, Chabot, Tancredo, Issa, 
        Flake, Green, Weller, Pence, McCotter, Harris, Wilson, 
        Barrett, Fortenberry, McCaul, Poe, Lantos, Ackerman, 
        Faleomavaega, Wexler, Engel, Meeks, Crowley, Berkley, 
        Smith (WA), Cardoza and Carnahan.
3) Berman amendment--to add new subsection 4(f)--Limitation on Nuclear 
        Transfers to India--defeated by a vote of 12-31
          Voting yes: Leach, Smith (NJ), Fortenberry, Berman, 
        Brown, Sherman, Lee, Napolitano, Schiff, Watson, 
        McCollum, and Chandler.
          Voting no: Hyde, Burton, Gallegly, Ros-Lehtinen, 
        Rohrabacher, Royce, King, Chabot, Tancredo, Issa, 
        Flake, Green, Weller, Pence, McCotter, Harris, Wilson, 
        Barrett, Mack, McCaul, Poe, Lantos, Ackerman, 
        Faleomavaega, Engel, Meeks, Crowley, Berkley, Smith 
        (WA), Cardoza and Carnahan.
4) Sherman amendment--to add new subsection 4(b)(8) and subsection 
        4(p)--Annual Certification; Termination of Cooperation--
        defeated by a vote of 10-32
          Voting yes: Leach, Smith (NJ), Fortenberry, Berman, 
        Sherman, Lee, Napolitano, Schiff, Watson, and McCollum.
          Voting no: Hyde, Burton, Gallegly, Ros-Lehtinen, 
        Rohrabacher, Royce, King, Chabot, Tancredo, Paul, Issa, 
        Flake, Green, Weller, Pence, McCotter, Harris, Wilson, 
        Barrett, McCaul, Poe, Lantos, Ackerman, Faleomavaega, 
        Engel, Meeks, Crowley, Berkley, Smith (WA), Chandler, 
        Cardoza and Carnahan.
5) Lee amendment--to add new subsection 4(b)(8)--Requiring India to 
        sign the NPT--defeated by a vote of 4-36
          Voting yes: Leach, Smith (NJ), Lee, and Watson.
          Voting no: Hyde, Burton, Gallegly, Ros-Lehtinen, 
        Rohrabacher, Royce, King, Chabot, Tancredo, Paul, 
        Flake, Green, Weller, Pence, McCotter, Harris, Wilson, 
        Barrett, Fortenberry, McCaul, Lantos, Berman, Ackerman, 
        Faleomavaega, Sherman, Engel, Meeks, Crowley, Berkley, 
        Napolitano, Schiff, Smith (WA), McCollum, Chandler, 
        Cardoza and Carnahan.
6) Berkley amendment--to add new subsection 4(d)(4)--Prohibition on 
        U.S. Importation of Indian Spent Nuclear Fuel--defeated by a 
        vote of 15-19
          Voting yes: Leach, McCotter, Ackerman, Sherman, 
        Wexler, Delahunt, Meeks, Lee, Crowley, Berkley, Schiff, 
        Watson, McCollum, Chandler and Carnahan.
          Voting no: Hyde, Gallegly, Ros-Lehtinen, Rohrabacher, 
        Royce, Tancredo, Flake, Green, Weller, Pence, Harris, 
        Wilson, Boozman, Barrett, Fortenberry, McCaul, Poe, 
        Lantos, and Faleomavaega.
7) Berkley amendment--to add new subsection 3(b)(6)--Regarding spent 
        nuclear fuel transfers to the U.S.)--agreed to by a vote of 39-
        0
          Voting yes: Hyde, Leach, Smith (NJ), Gallegly, Ros-
        Lehtinen, Rohrabacher, Royce, Chabot, Tancredo, Flake, 
        Green, Weller, Pence, McCotter, Harris, Wilson, 
        Boozman, Barrett, Fortenberry, McCaul, Poe, Lantos, 
        Berman, Ackerman, Faleomavaega, Sherman, Wexler, Meeks, 
        Lee, Crowley, Berkley, Napolitano, Schiff, Watson, 
        Smith (WA), McCollum, Chandler, Cardoza and Carnahan.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII is inapplicable because 
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or 
increased tax expenditures.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with 
respect to the bill, H.R. 5682, the following estimate and 
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, July 13, 2006.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman,
Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5682, the United 
States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Sam 
Papenfuss, who can be reached at 226-2840.
            Sincerely,
                         Donald B. Marron, Acting Director.
Enclosure

cc:
        Honorable Tom Lantos
        Ranking Member
H.R. 5682--United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 
        2006
    H.R. 5682 would exempt India from the current-law 
prohibition on the transfer of nuclear materials and technology 
to countries that are not signatories to the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Under this bill, the United 
States could transfer nuclear material and technology to India, 
subject to an agreement between the two countries, if the 
President certifies that India meets certain conditions. Those 
conditions would require India to:

         LProvide a credible plan to separate civilian 
        and military nuclear facilities,

         LConclude an agreement with the International 
        Atomic Energy Agency,

         LWork actively with the United States to 
        prevent proliferation of nuclear enrichment and 
        reprocessing technology, and

         LGain the consensus support of the Nuclear 
        Suppliers Group, an organization of countries with 
        nuclear capabilities, for trade in items covered by its 
        guidelines.

    Additionally, in the event an agreement is reached for 
nuclear cooperation between India and the United States, the 
bill would require the President to submit a report detailing 
the basis for determining that India meets all the necessary 
requirements. Finally, the bill also would require that the 
agreement be approved by a joint resolution of the two Houses 
of Congress that has been enacted into law.
    CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 5682 would not have a 
significant impact on the federal budget. H.R. 5682 contains no 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would not affect the budgets 
of state, local, or tribal governments.
    The CBO staff contact is Sam Papenfuss, who can be reached 
at 226-2840. This estimate was approved by Peter H. Fontaine, 
Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The performance goals and objectives are to provide the 
President with authority to negotiate a civil nuclear 
cooperation agreement, to set conditions that that agreement 
must meet to enter into force, and to provide for an expedited 
approval process by Congress.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this legislation in Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the 
Constitution.

               Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

Section 1. Short Title.
    Section 1 states that this Act may be cited as the ``United 
States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006''.
Section 2. Sense of Congress.
    Section 2 expresses the Sense of Congress regarding the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime and the principles that should 
guide the United States in entering into arrangements with a 
country that has never been a signatory to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Paragraph (1) states that 
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD), and the means to deliver these are 
critical objectives for United States foreign policy. Paragraph 
(2) states that sustaining the NPT and strengthening its 
implementation is the keystone of United States non-
proliferation policy. Paragraph (3) states that the NPT has 
been a significant success in preventing the spread of nuclear 
weapons capabilities to other countries and in maintaining a 
stable international security situation. Paragraph (4) states 
that countries that have never become a party to the NPT and 
remain outside that treaty's legal regime pose a potential 
challenge to the achievement of the overall goals of global 
nonproliferation because those countries have not undertaken 
the NPT's international obligation to prohibit the spread of 
dangerous nuclear technologies. Paragraph (5) states that it is 
in the interest of the United States to ensure to the fullest 
extent possible that those countries that are not signatories 
to the NPT act responsibly regarding any nuclear technology 
they develop. Paragraph (6) states that it may be in the 
interest of the United States to cooperate with a country that 
has never signed the NPT with respect to civilian nuclear 
technology if that country meets certain criteria.
    These criteria include demonstrating responsible behavior 
with respect to the nonproliferation of WMD technology and the 
means to deliver these weapons; the country has a functioning 
and uninterrupted democratic system of government, has a 
foreign policy that is congruent with that of the United 
States, and is working with the United States in key foreign 
policy initiatives related to non-proliferation; such 
cooperation induces the country to implement the highest 
possible protections against the proliferation of technology 
related to weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver 
them and also to refrain from actions that would further the 
development of its nuclear weapons program; and that such 
cooperation will induce the country to give greater political 
and material support to the achievement of U.S. global and 
regional nonproliferation objectives, especially with respect 
to dissuading, isolating, and, if necessary, sanctioning and 
containing states that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups 
and that are seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability or 
other WMD capability and the means to deliver such weapons.
    The Committee intends that the set of principles presented 
in this section serve as a guide for possible future civil 
nuclear cooperation with any country that has never been a 
signatory to the NPT. This section draws upon statements made 
by Members of the Committee during hearings on this subject 
that any change in our approach to these countries should be 
based on such principles and not merely on strategic concerns. 
Cooperating with non-NPT countries that meet these criteria and 
that have developed a nuclear capacity could serve a number of 
non-proliferation goals.
    For example, information acquired from these countries' 
nuclear policies and programs might be useful in terms of 
developing new avenues of research. Cooperation in this area 
could include, among other activities, exchanges of data 
concerning proliferation-resistant technologies and the safety 
of civilian nuclear power generation, including the handling of 
spent fuel. This cooperation could serve U.S. national security 
interests, even if it did not include restricted data or 
sensitive nuclear technology as defined under the Atomic Energy 
Act. The Committee understands that the research component of 
the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement is currently under 
discussion and looks forward to close and timely consultation 
on this matter.
Section 3. Statements of Policy.
    Section 3 sets forth two sets of policies of the United 
States: those general in nature and those specific to South 
Asia.
    Subsection (a) states that it shall be the policy of the 
United States to:

        1. LOppose the development of a capability to produce 
        nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapons state, 
        within or outside of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
        Treaty (NPT).
        2. LEncourage states party to the NPT to interpret the 
        right to ``develop research, production and use of 
        nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,'' as described in 
        Article IV of the NPT, as being a qualified right that 
        is conditioned by the overall purpose of the NPT to 
        prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
        weapons capability. Among other methods, this should 
        include encouraging NPT states to refrain from all 
        nuclear cooperation with any state party that has not 
        demonstrated that it is in full compliance with its NPT 
        obligations, as determined by the IAEA.
        3. LStrengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines 
        concerning consultation by members regarding violations 
        of supplier and recipient understandings by instituting 
        the practice of a timely and coordinated response by 
        NSG members to all such violations, including 
        termination of all nuclear transfers to an involved 
        recipient, that discourages individual NSG members from 
        continuing cooperation with such recipient until such 
        time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response 
        has been achieved.

    Regarding the second statement relating to the NPT, the 
Committee believes that:

         LThe NPT was conceived, written, and ratified 
        by its member countries for the specific and overriding 
        purpose of preventing the proliferation of nuclear 
        weapons and nuclear explosive devices, as stated in the 
        Preamble and its first three Articles;
         Lall provisions of the NPT must be interpreted 
        within the context of preventing the proliferation of 
        nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices; and
         LArticle IV conditions a country's 
        ``inalienable right to develop research, production and 
        use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without 
        discrimination'' on that country's conformity with 
        Articles I, II, and III which obligate each signatory 
        ``not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
        weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to 
        seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of 
        nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.''

    The Committee further believes that, because the processes 
of enriching uranium or separating plutonium for peaceful or 
military purposes are essentially identical, they inherently 
pose an enhanced risk of proliferation, even under strict 
international inspections. Rights under Article IV of the NPT 
must be properly understood and exercised only insofar as they 
are consistent with preventing the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Therefore, the U.S. cannot recognize a claim by any 
non-nuclear country of a right to develop or possess a complete 
nuclear fuel cycle if that country has not provided convincing 
evidence that its nuclear activities are fully safeguarded from 
contributing to a nuclear weapons capability.
    This interpretation of Article IV of the NPT is directly 
relevant to current efforts by the U.S. and members of the 
international community to persuade Iran to end its programs to 
develop or acquire an autonomous capacity to enrich uranium or 
separate plutonium. This effort has been hindered by the 
logical inconsistency that they are attempting to prevent Iran 
from exercising an absolute right that they themselves agree 
Iran possesses. To eliminate this logical inconsistency and to 
prevent other non-nuclear signatories of the NPT from employing 
a similar argument to provide a cover for a covert nuclear 
weapons program, the U.S. should persuade all countries to 
interpret Article IV in the manner outlined above in order to 
ensure that the overriding purpose of the NPT of preventing the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons is not undermined by illogical 
interpretations of its provisions.
    Regarding the third statement relating to the NSG, the 
Committee holds that the effectiveness of the NSG rests upon 
its consensus decision-making, resulting in unified policies of 
its members. Consensus decision-making ensures that all states 
abide by rules prohibiting exports to restricted states (such 
as non-nuclear weapon states outside the NPT) and by rules 
restricting certain kinds of exports (such as enrichment and 
reprocessing, which the NSG restricts according to policy, not 
guidelines). The Committee is mindful that a country outside 
the regime that seeks an exception from NSG guidelines could 
follow a strategy of concluding agreements with key NSG members 
purely to persuade them to support changing the guidelines and 
then later discard those agreements while continuing to import 
from other NSG members. A single NSG member could prevent any 
effort to reimpose the previous restrictions, a position that 
expectations of commercial reward, among others, might 
encourage. In this scenario, the U.S. could negotiate a deal 
with a country that included elaborate restrictions, only to 
find that those restrictions were rendered null and void once 
the NSG guidelines had been changed and the intended partner 
cast the agreement aside, turning to less demanding countries 
to provide it with the desired exports and to prevent the NSG 
from amending its guidelines. To preclude such a scenario, the 
Committee urges the Administration to persuade other NSG 
members to act in concert, both in terms of timing, scope, and 
content of nuclear supply to all countries, including India. In 
particular, the Committee intends that the U.S. act to secure 
agreement among NSG members that violations by one country of 
an agreement with any NSG member result in joint action by all, 
including the termination of all nuclear exports.
    Subsection (b) states that, with respect to South Asia, it 
shall be U.S. policy to:

        1. LAchieve a moratorium on the production of fissile 
        material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, 
        Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China at the 
        earliest possible date;
        2. LAchieve the conclusion and implementation of a 
        treaty banning the production of fissile material for 
        nuclear weapons to which both the U.S. and India become 
        parties;
        3. LSecure India's full participation in the 
        Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), formal 
        commitment to the PSI's Statement of Interdiction 
        Principles, public announcement of its decision to 
        conform its export control laws, regulations, and 
        policies with the Australia Group and with the 
        Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Control Lists of 
        the Wassennaar Arrangement, and demonstration of 
        satisfactory progress regarding this decision; and 
        ratification of or accession to the Convention on 
        Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage;
        4. LSecure India's full participation in U.S. efforts 
        to dissuade, isolate, sanction, and contain Iran for 
        its efforts to acquire WMDs, including a nuclear 
        weapons capability and the means to deliver these;
        5. LSeek to halt the increase of nuclear weapons 
        arsenals in South Asia and to promote their reduction 
        and eventual elimination;
        6. LEnsure that spent fuel generated in India's 
        civilian nuclear power reactors is not transferred to 
        the U.S. except under procedures in the Atomic Energy 
        Act; and
        7. LEncourage India not to increase its production of 
        fissile material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

    The Committee believes that a U.S.-India nuclear 
cooperation agreement marks a turning point in the U.S.-India 
relationship, but this does not mean that the United States 
should sacrifice its long-standing objectives for non-
proliferation in South Asia. This subsection clearly states 
that U.S. policy must be continue to support a fissile material 
moratorium in South Asia and a halt to the increase in nuclear 
arsenals in the region, among others. In particular, the 
Committee believes that India has a significant role to play in 
preventing the proliferation of dangerous nuclear technologies 
to other countries and believes that India must be a part of 
the international effort to prevent Iran from acquiring weapons 
of mass destruction in general and nuclear weapons in 
particular. The Committee will continue to review India's 
behavior in this regard, as well the international community's 
demand that Iran suspend uranium-enrichment activities and that 
it adhere to the international community's requirements 
regarding the terms of any Iranian peaceful use of nuclear 
energy.
    An annual report by the President on the extent to which 
these policy objectives are being achieved is required in 
subsection (o).
    The Committee notes that in the July 18, 2005, Joint 
Statement, India committed to taking on the ``same 
responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits 
and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear 
technology, such as the United States.'' It is therefore 
imperative that India take steps soon to halt the production of 
fissile material for weapons, as four of the five nuclear 
weapon states have declared to have done. The Committee 
understands that India cannot do this alone, and therefore 
urges the U.S. Government to pursue a moratorium by Pakistan 
and China as well, as well as a multilateral treaty banning the 
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
    With respect to a treaty banning the production of fissile 
material for nuclear weapons, the Committee notes the 
longstanding delay of the start of negotiations on such a 
treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The 
Committee also notes that the Administration's draft treaty 
tabled in Geneva in May 2006 does not contain verification 
measures, while Indian officials have supported an effectively 
verifiable treaty
    The Committee believes India's participation in the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, the Australia Group and the 
Wassennaar Arrangement will be important steps in bringing 
India closer to the mainstream of the nonproliferation regime. 
In particular, it is critical to secure India's full 
participation in U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring 
nuclear weapons, a position held by many members of the 
Committee that resonated in several of the hearings held in 
relation to this bill. Finally, the Committee heard testimony 
from nonproliferation experts who overwhelmingly supported the 
need to avoid a nuclear arms race in South Asia as well as the 
need to ensure that U.S. assistance does not encourage India to 
increase its production of fissile material at unsafeguarded 
nuclear facilities. As noted below, the United States has an 
obligation under Article I of the NPT not to ``in any way 
assist, encourage, or induce a non-nuclear weapon state to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.'' As 
described later in this report, H.R. 5682 contains provisions 
that require reports related to that obligation.
Section 4. Waiver Authority and Congressional Approval.
    Subsection (a) provides the President with authority to 
exempt a civil nuclear agreement with India and nuclear exports 
to India from certain sections of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) 
that would otherwise present obstacles to approving and 
implementing such an agreement. Specifically, the waiver 
authority applies to sections 123 a.(2), 128, and 129. The 
authority to waive Section 128, which requires an annual review 
by Congress of one export license, shall cease to be effective 
if the President determines that India has engaged in any 
activity described in section 129 of that Act, other than 
section 129 a.(1)(D) or section 129 a.(2)(C) at any time after 
the date of the enactment of this Act. This means that 
Congressional review of exports would be reinstated in the 
event that the President made a finding that India had tested a 
nuclear device, terminated or abrogated IAEA safeguards, 
materially violated IAEA safeguards, materially violated an 
agreement of cooperation with the United States, or assisted, 
encouraged or induced a non-nuclear weapon state to engage in 
activities involving source or special nuclear material and 
having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition 
of nuclear explosive devices. In those cases, per Section 129, 
exports to India would likely cease anyway, but this provision 
would extend review to the circumstance in which the President 
decided to continue exports because he determined that 
cessation of exports would be seriously prejudicial to the 
achievement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives. The Committee 
notes that this authority does not provide in any way for the 
President to waive any other requirement of section 123 a. of 
the AEA.
    In addition, this Act would allow the President to waive 
the restrictions of section 129 a.(1)(A) of the AEA for any 
activity that occurred on or before July 18, 2005, as well as 
section 129 a.(1)(D). This would provide authority to waive a 
cutoff in nuclear exports required because of President 
Clinton's determination that India had tested a nuclear 
explosive device in 1998, while keeping in place the 
requirement to cut off exports should India test in the future. 
It would also provide waiver authority for cessation of U.S. 
nuclear exports to India in the event that the President 
determines that India has ``engaged in activities involving 
source or special nuclear material and having direct 
significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear 
explosive devices, and has failed to take steps which, in the 
President's judgment, represent sufficient progress toward 
terminating such activities.'' India will presumably continue 
to produce material for its military nuclear program, 
consistent with its separation plan.
    Subsection (b) requires the President to make the following 
determinations:

        1) LIndia has provided the United States and the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency with a credible plan 
        to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, 
        materials, and programs, and has filed a declaration 
        regarding its civil facilities with the IAEA;
        2) LIndia and the IAEA have concluded an agreement 
        requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in 
        perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, 
        principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of 
        Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) to India's civil 
        nuclear facilities, materials, and programs as declared 
        in its separation plan;
        3) LIndia and the IAEA are making substantial progress 
        toward concluding an Additional Protocol consistent 
        with IAEA principles, practices, and policies that 
        would apply to India's civil nuclear program;
        4) LIndia is working actively with the U.S. for the 
        early conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material 
        Cutoff Treaty;
        5) LIndia is working with and supporting U.S. and 
        international efforts to prevent the spread of 
        enrichment and reprocessing technology;
        6) LIndia is taking the necessary steps to secure 
        nuclear and other sensitive materials and technology, 
        including through the enactment and enforcement of 
        comprehensive export control legislation and 
        regulations, harmonization of its export control laws, 
        regulations, policies, and practices with the policies 
        of the Missile Technology Control Regime and the 
        Nuclear Suppliers Group, and adherence to the MTCR and 
        NSG in accordance with the procedures of those regimes 
        for unilateral adherence; and
        7) LThe NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply 
        to India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of 
        the NSG, and such decision does not permit civil 
        nuclear commerce with any other non-nuclear weapon 
        state that does not have IAEA safeguards on all nuclear 
        materials within its territory, under its jurisdiction, 
        or carried out under its control anywhere.

    The Committee has strengthened and enhanced the conditions 
included in the Administration's original proposal, H.R. 4974, 
in order to make certain that measures needed to ensure that 
the agreement can safely come into force are in place; e.g., a 
safeguards agreement negotiated with the IAEA, and that India 
has fulfilled key obligations it has freely undertaken in its 
July 18, 2005 statement and in subsequent statements. The 
Committee recognizes that a number of these conditions will 
require a considerable expenditure of effort and resources to 
satisfy, such as the negotiation of an Additional Protocol that 
must be tailored to India's unique needs, and for that reason 
has allowed for significant latitude regarding their 
completion. But the Committee believes that none of these 
conditions, either singly or in combination with others, is 
onerous. In addition, although it did not impose rigorous 
measurements or deadlines, the Committee intends that 
considerable substantive progress on the forgoing measures can 
be easily demonstrated, including India's cooperation with the 
U.S. to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing 
technology and its taking steps to strengthen its export laws 
and regulations. Regarding the NSG, the Committee intends that 
nothing be done in connection with this legislation or any 
subsequent act or policy to weaken the NSG's irreplaceable role 
in the global nonproliferation regime. To that end, the 
Committee has specified that the U.S. must continue to support 
the traditional practice by NSG members of taking decisions on 
the basis of consensus, defined as unanimous consent. This is 
consistent with statements by senior Administration officials.
    With respect to the requirement that India provide a 
credible separation plan for its civilian and military nuclear 
facilities, the Committee strongly urges the Administration to 
develop a clear definition of the term ``credible'' and to 
encourage India to interpret this to mean, among other aspects, 
that personnel, equipment, and nuclear weapons-relevant 
information is not transferred between the safeguarded civilian 
and unsafeguarded military sectors.
    Given that IAEA safeguards cannot prevent the diversion of 
information and technical knowledge, and that a significant 
portion of India's nuclear fuel cycle will remain outside of 
those safeguards, it is essential to ensuring that the United 
States meets its Article I obligation under the NPT that 
effective barriers are put in place to prevent the transfer of 
potentially useful information and personnel from the 
safeguarded to the unsafeguarded sector.
    Subsection (c) requires the President to submit to the 
House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee a report regarding this determination that 
includes:

        1) Lsummaries and copies of India's separation plan and 
        of its declaration of which of its civil nuclear 
        facilities will be placed under IAEA safeguards, 
        including an analysis of the credibility of the plan 
        and declaration;
        2) La summary of the safeguards agreement between India 
        and the IAEA, including a copy of the agreement and a 
        description of progress toward its full implementation;
        3) La summary and description of the progress made 
        toward concluding and implementing an Additional 
        Protocol between India and the IAEA;
        4) La description of the steps India is taking to work 
        with the U.S. for the conclusion of a multilateral 
        treaty banning the production of fissile material for 
        nuclear weapons, including a description of the steps 
        the U.S. has taken and will take to encourage India to 
        identify, and declare a date by which India would be 
        willing to stop production of fissile material for 
        nuclear weapons unilaterally or pursuant to a 
        multilateral moratorium or treaty;
        5) La description of the steps India is taking to 
        prevent the spread of nuclear-related technology, 
        including enrichment and reprocessing technology or 
        materials that can be used to acquire nuclear weapons 
        technology, as well as the support that India is 
        providing to the U.S. to restrict the spread of such 
        technology;
        6) La description of the steps that India is taking to 
        secure materials and technology applicable for the 
        development, acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of 
        mass destruction and the means to deliver such weapons 
        through the application of comprehensive export control 
        legislation and regulations, and through harmonization 
        and adherence to MTCR, NSG, Australia Group, and 
        Wassennaar guidelines, as well as United Nations 
        Security Council Resolution 1540, and participation in 
        the Proliferation Security Initiative;
        7) La description of the NSG decision regarding India, 
        including whether the U.S.-India civil nuclear 
        cooperation agreement is consistent with the decision, 
        practices, and policies of the NSG;
        8) La description of the scope of peaceful cooperation 
        envisioned by the U.S. and India that will be 
        implemented under the Agreement for Nuclear 
        Cooperation, including whether such cooperation will 
        include the provision of enrichment and reprocessing 
        technology; and
        9) La description of the steps taken to ensure that 
        U.S. nuclear assistance will not directly or indirectly 
        assist India's nuclear weapons program, including the 
        use of any U.S. equipment, technology, or nuclear 
        material by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility 
        or nuclear-weapons related complex; the replication and 
        subsequent use of any U.S. technology in an 
        unsafeguarded nuclear facility or unsafeguarded nuclear 
        weapons-related complex, or for any activity related to 
        the research, development, testing, or manufacture of 
        nuclear explosive devices; and the provision of nuclear 
        fuel in such a manner as to facilitate the increased 
        production of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium in 
        unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

    The Committee notes that several members expressed concern 
about the possibility that the provision of nuclear technology 
and nuclear fuel supplies to India could indirectly assist or 
encourage India's nuclear weapons program. To foreclose this 
possibility and to increase confidence that no such 
developments will take place, the bill includes the reporting 
requirement in subsection (c) (9). The report should address 
the potential replication of U.S.-origin nuclear technology in 
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in India, as well as address 
the possible utilization of foreign nuclear fuel supplies in 
such a manner that leads to the increased production of fissile 
material in India's unsafeguarded nuclear facilities using 
domestic uranium reserves. Further, the Committee notes with 
concern India's reported plans for building a third dedicated 
military production reactor in the near future to replace the 
CIRUS reactor scheduled for shutdown in 2010 and urges the 
Administration to encourage India to exercise the utmost 
restraint with respect to its nuclear weapons program.
    Subsection (d) provides that:

        1) Lnothing in this Act shall be interpreted as 
        permitting any civil nuclear cooperation between the 
        U.S. and India that would in any way assist, encourage, 
        or induce India to manufacture of otherwise acquire 
        nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;
        2) Lno item subject to the transfer guidelines of the 
        NSG may be transferred to India if such transfer would 
        violate the guidelines in effect on the date of the 
        transfer;
        3) Lexports of nuclear and nuclear-related material, 
        equipment, or technology to India shall be terminated 
        if India makes any materially significant transfer of 
        nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or 
        technology that does not conform to NSG guidelines or 
        ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment or 
        technology that does not conform to MTCR guidelines, 
        unless the President determines that cessation of such 
        exports would be seriously prejudicial to the 
        achievement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives or 
        otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security; 
        and
        4) Lthe President should seek to prevent the transfer 
        to India of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology 
        from other participating governments in the NSG or from 
        any other source, if nuclear transfers to India are 
        restricted pursuant to this Act.

    The Committee notes that the legislation includes an 
important requirement that a U.S.-Indian agreement for nuclear 
cooperation shall be terminated if India makes any transfer 
that does not conform with the guidelines of the NSG or MTCR. 
This is necessary to provide confidence that India is meeting 
other key obligations outlined in the July 18, 2005, Joint 
Statement. Failure to conform to these nuclear and missile 
export control guidelines would represent a failure by India to 
meet the nonproliferation standards expected of other 
responsible states. However, waiver authority of this sanction 
is granted to the President.
    The Committee notes that the legislation allows for certain 
narrow exemptions for India from certain requirements of the 
Atomic Energy Act, but expects that the Section 123 Agreement 
for Nuclear Cooperation now being negotiated with the 
Government of India is otherwise consistent with other Atomic 
Energy Act requirements. In addition, the Committee notes that 
it is the well-established policy of the United States not to 
transfer sensitive nuclear technology, including reprocessing 
or enrichment technology, to any state. As President Bush said 
in February 2004, ``enrichment and reprocessing are not 
necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes.'' Moreover, in answers to questions for the 
record posed by Senator Lugar on April 5, 2006, the 
Administration responded that ``Transfers to India would still 
have to meet all the other requirements of NSG Guidelines, 
including . . . Restraint in transferring to India sensitive 
facilities, technology and material usable for nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices (including enrichment or 
reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology.'' The 
Administration also responded in another question for the 
record posed by Senator Lugar that:

        ``We have also indicated to our NSG partners that we do 
        not intend to transfer enrichment or reprocessing 
        technologies. Our bilateral agreement will not permit 
        such transfers to be made under it.''

    The Committee finds that no part of this legislation should 
be interpreted to allow for any exception to this policy.
    As stated above, the Committee believes the NPT is the 
keystone of U.S. nonproliferation policy and must be sustained 
and strengthened. The United States has always abided by its 
obligation under Article I of the NPT to not in any way assist, 
encourage, or induce non-nuclear weapon states to manufacture 
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive 
devices. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 set a 
standard almost thirty years ago for the United States in its 
civil nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear weapon states by 
requiring those states to have full-scope safeguards. In making 
an exception for a future nuclear cooperation agreement with 
India in this bill, it is paramount to ensure that nothing in 
our cooperation would undermine our commitment to abide by 
Article I of the NPT. Subsection 4 (d)(1) underscores this view 
held by the Committee.
    Subsection 4(d)(2) is one of several provisions in the bill 
intended to ensure that any civil nuclear cooperation between 
the United States and India strengthens rather than weakens the 
global nuclear nonproliferation regime. This provision 
contributes to the achievement of this objective by prohibiting 
the transfer to India of any item the transfer of which is 
subject to (1) the U.S.-India Agreement for Cooperation, (2) 
the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254, Part 1) of 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), or (3) the Guidelines for 
Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, 
Software and Related Technology (INFCIRC/254, Part 2) of the 
NSG, if such transfer would violate, or otherwise be 
inconsistent with, either of the aforementioned transfer 
guidelines of the NSG as in effect on the date of the transfer. 
No waiver authority is provided to permit transfers to be made 
notwithstanding this restriction.
    This restriction will ensure that U.S.-India nuclear 
cooperation continues to be carried out in a manner consistent 
with the transfer guidelines and policies of the NSG. The 
Administration has expressed confidence that the NSG will 
adjust its guidelines in order to permit civil nuclear 
cooperation along the lines contemplated by the July 18, 2005, 
Joint Statement of President Bush and Prime Minister Singh. 
Further, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has publicly 
assured Congress, by means of a letter dated June 28, 2006, to 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, 
that:

        . . . in carrying out the laws and regulations of the 
        United States governing the export of nuclear-related 
        items, the United States Government will continue to 
        act in accordance with IAEA INFCIRC/254, as amended, 
        the Guidelines and Annexes of the Nuclear Suppliers 
        Group. The U.S. will also continue to act within the 
        policies and practices of the decisions taken by the 
        Nuclear Suppliers Group with respect to India. We 
        intend to do so notwithstanding any contrary actions by 
        any other participating countries in the Nuclear 
        Suppliers Group.

    Implicit in both the policy assurances provided to Congress 
by Secretary Rice and the restrictions of section 4(d)(2) is 
the risk that the United States will be unable to fully 
implement the vision of U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation 
set forth in the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement of President 
Bush and Prime Minister Singh to the degree that the NSG fails 
to adjust its guidelines to permit implementation of that 
vision. This would be a most regrettable outcome, but 
preferable to one in which NSG transfer guidelines were ignored 
or violated and fell into disuse. Both the Administration and 
the Congress recognize that the NSG transfer guidelines are a 
critically important element of the global nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, and as such, the United States has an 
overriding national interest in ensuring the preservation and 
continued vitality of those guidelines. The object of section 
4(d)(2) is to embed this principle into U.S. law.
    Subsection 4(d)(3) reflects the importance the Committee 
attaches to the commitments India has undertaken in the July 
18, 2005 Joint Statement wherein India agreed to secure its 
nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export 
control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to 
MTCR and NSG guidelines. These two steps are critical to 
bringing India closer to the nonproliferation mainstream, one 
of the benefits attributed to U.S. nuclear cooperation with 
India by the Administration. Moreover, failure to conform with 
these nuclear and missile export control guidelines would 
represent a failure by India to meet the nonproliferation 
standards expected of other responsible states.
    Acknowledging that no export control system is perfect, the 
Committee has made the threshold of violation one of material 
significance, and provided the President with the authority to 
waive termination of exports if he finds that such a 
termination would be seriously prejudicial to achieving U.S. 
nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common 
defense and security. The Committee believes that the threshold 
for the waiver, given its expectation that India will prove to 
be a valuable partner in the nonproliferation regime, is a 
reasonable standard to meet.
    Section 4(d)(4) provides that, in the event that U.S. 
exports must be terminated to India, the President should seek 
to prevent the transfer to India of nuclear equipment, material 
or technology from other sources. This bill makes clear that if 
the President finds that India engaged in activities that would 
result in termination of nuclear exports under Section 129 
(e.g., a nuclear test explosion, termination or abrogation of 
IAEA safeguards, material violation of IAEA safeguards or an 
agreement of cooperation with the United States, assistance or 
encouragement of a non-nuclear weapon state in nuclear-weapons 
related activities, or reprocessing-related activities) or if 
India does not uphold its July 18, 2005 Joint Statement 
commitments, U.S. nuclear assistance could be jeopardized.
    The Committee notes with concern the statements made by the 
Indian Prime Minister to the Indian Parliament on March 6, 
2006, that the U.S. Government has said it will take steps that 
include:

        1) Lincorporating assurances regarding fuel supply in a 
        bilateral Indo-U.S. agreement on peaceful uses of 
        nuclear energy which would be negotiated;
        2) Ljoining India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA 
        an India-specific fuel supply agreement; and
        3) Lsupporting an Indian effort to develop a strategic 
        reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption 
        of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors.

    In addition, if, despite these arrangements, a disruption 
of fuel supplies to India occurs, the U.S. will, with India, 
jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries, such as 
Russia, France and the United Kingdom, to pursue such measures 
as would restore fuel supply to India. The Committee has been 
assured that such assurance of supply arrangements that the 
U.S. is party to will only be concerned with disruption of 
supply of fuel due to market failures or other reasons, and not 
due to Indian actions that are inconsistent with the July 18, 
2005 commitments, such as a nuclear explosive test.
    Subsection (e) provides that a U.S.-India civil nuclear 
cooperation agreement may only become effective if: 1) the 
President submits to Congress the agreement reached between the 
United States and India, including a copy of the safeguards 
agreement entered into between the IAEA and India relating to 
India's civil nuclear facilities, in accordance with the 
requirements and procedures of section 123 of the AEA that are 
otherwise not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and 
2) the agreement is approved by a joint resolution that is 
enacted into law. In addition, the President is urged to 
consult with the House International Relations Committee and 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee each month after the 
enactment of this Act on the status of the negotiations 
regarding the civil nuclear cooperation agreement and the 
negotiations between the IAEA and India regarding the 
safeguards agreement.
    The Committee believes that the existing statutory 
congressional oversight provided in Section 123 of the Atomic 
Energy Act is necessary to achieve balance between the 
executive and legislative branches in undertaking significant 
nuclear cooperation and therefore retains the approval 
procedures in those sections of law, in contrast to the 
Administration's proposed legislation (H.R. 4974). This 
subsection makes clear that the special procedures in this Act 
only apply to a U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement under 
section 123 of the AEA that meets all the requirement of that 
section other than 123 a. (2). If the final agreement does not 
fulfill other requirements in that section, then subsection (e) 
has not been complied with and the expedited procedures 
provided for in this section shall not apply to such an 
agreement. However, in that case, the President may follow the 
path in existing law and submit the agreement under the 
procedures of Atomic Energy Act for agreements that do not meet 
such requirements, as provided in subsection (m). It is the 
Committee's understanding and its intent that the procedures 
under this Act that are used to approve a U.S.-India nuclear 
cooperation agreement will not be available for use for any 
future amendment of such an agreement.
    Subsection (f) prescribes the form of the joint resolution 
to approve the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as a 
simple resolution without a preamble.
    Subsection (g) provides that the resolution will be 
introduced by the House and Senate majority and minority 
leaders or their designees and will be referred to this 
Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
    Subsection (h) provides that if the joint resolution 
described in subsection (g) has not been reported by the 
relevant committee at the end of 60 legislative days beginning 
on the date of its introduction or the date of the submission 
of the nonproliferation statement required by section 123 of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, whichever is later, such 
committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the 
joint resolution.
    Subsection (i) provides for expedited consideration of any 
such legislation by the House. Paragraph (1) provides that on 
the third calendar day after the relevant Committee has 
reported out the joint resolution or after 60 legislative days 
has passed since the introduction and referral of the joint 
resolution described in subsection (g), any member of the House 
may make a privileged motion to proceed to the joint 
resolution.
    Paragraph (2) of subsection (i) provides that debate on the 
resolution shall be limited to six hours equally divided 
between proponents and opponents, and during debate the joint 
resolution shall not be amendable.
    Paragraph (3) of subsection (i) provides that appeals from 
the decisions of the Chair shall be decided without debate.
    Subsection (j) provides that floor consideration of the 
joint resolution by the Senate shall be in accordance with 
section 601(b)(4) of the International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
    Subsection (k) provides the procedure in the event that one 
House acts prior to the other. In both cases, the final vote of 
the House in prior receipt of the joint resolution from the 
other House shall be considered to be a vote on joint 
resolution of the other House. This subsection ensures that 
once voted on by one House, the vote in the second House will 
immediately send the resolution to the President.
    Subsection (l) provides that the 60 legislative days 
referred to in subsection (h) shall exclude days on which 
either House is not in session because of an adjournment of 
more than three days.
    Subsection (m) provides that the procedures described in 
this Act do not preclude approval of an India agreement on the 
unmodified provisions of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. 
This provision is intended to ensure that notwithstanding the 
conditionality described in subsection (e)(1), the President 
may determine that he cannot meet the procedures of this 
section (because, for example, he cannot meet a number of 
requirements of section 123 a. of such Act) and will use 
instead the procedures prescribed in the existing Atomic Energy 
Act.
    Subsection (n) provides that the procedures of this section 
shall cease to be effective upon the enactment of a joint 
resolution under this section. No other agreement or amendment 
of an agreement shall be subject to the waiver and the 
expedited procedures described in this joint resolution. Such 
agreements or amendments will have to follow the requirements 
of the existing Atomic Energy Act.
    The Committee decided to reject the Administration's 
proposed method of Congressional consideration of a negotiated 
agreement as intending to effectively remove Congress from any 
substantive role. Given the unique and controversial nature of 
the proposed civil nuclear cooperation agreement and the fact 
that Congress was not consulted regarding the negotiations 
between the Administration and the Indian government relating 
to the original announcement of their intention to negotiate 
such an agreement, Congressional scrutiny and approval was 
deemed essential to protect U.S. interests. Careful and 
extensive consideration was accorded by Committee members and 
staff to various methods by which that process could best 
occur, with a consensus agreeing to require passage of a joint 
resolution of approval by both the House and Senate to permit 
the agreement to take effect. Although there was considerable 
support for allowing amendments to the resolution, it was 
decided that this possibility would render the negotiation of 
an agreement of such complexity effectively impossible.
    Direct Congressional involvement, especially the 
requirement for its approval, is also necessary to ensure that 
the pledges and assurances made by the Administration and the 
Indian government are actually met and not rendered irrelevant 
through lack of action or discontinuation of interest. Without 
enforcement provisions, such statements are obviously little 
more than promises that may be modified at will, or even 
abandoned altogether, should circumstances change.
    Although the President plays a key role in the formulation 
and implementation of foreign policy, the Constitution 
nevertheless vests Congress with considerable powers and 
responsibilities in the areas of foreign policy and national 
security, which its Members are obligated to carry out. 
Fidelity to that trust means that Congress cannot delegate 
those responsibilities to the executive branch or allow itself 
to be made irrelevant to government policy in any area. The 
Committee believes this legislation reestablishes the proper 
balance between the two branches regarding the U.S. entering 
into substantive agreements with other countries and also 
reinforces the shared authority and mutual respect necessary to 
advance the security and interests of the American people.
    Subsection (o), Paragraph (1), provides that the President 
submit a report no later than January 31, 2007, and every year 
thereafter on the extent to which the policy objectives in 
section 3(b) have been achieved, the steps taken by the U.S. 
and India in the preceding calendar year to accomplish those 
objectives, the extent of cooperation by other countries in 
achieving those objectives, and the steps the U.S. will take in 
the current calendar year to accomplish those objectives.
    Paragraph (2) provides that no later than one year after 
the agreement for nuclear cooperation takes effect, and every 
year thereafter, the President submit a report describing U.S. 
nuclear exports to India in the preceding year and the 
anticipated exports in the next year. This report shall 
include, (in a classified form if necessary), an estimate for 
the previous year of the amount of uranium mined in India, the 
amount that has likely been used of allocated for the 
production of nuclear explosive devices, the rate of production 
of nuclear explosive devices and of fissile material for those 
devices, and an analysis as to whether imported uranium has 
affected such rate of production of these devices. In addition, 
the report shall include: a description of whether U.S. civil 
nuclear assistance to India is in any way assisting India's 
nuclear weapons program, including the use of equipment, 
technology, or nuclear material in an unsafeguarded nuclear 
facility; the replication and use of U.S. technology in an 
unsafeguarded nuclear facility or for any activity related to 
the research, development, testing, or manufacture of nuclear 
explosive devices; and the provision of nuclear fuel in such a 
manner as to facilitate the production of highly-enriched 
uranium or plutonium in unsafeguarded facilities. This 
reporting requirement is designed to determine whether any 
natural uranium, nuclear fuel or nuclear technology provided by 
the United States or other countries has led to the ability of 
India to increase its ability to produce fissile material for 
its nuclear weapons program. While India undoubtedly will make 
its own judgments regarding its national security interests, 
the international community should try to ensure that peaceful 
civil cooperation with India does not result in an increase in 
its nuclear arsenal.
    Paragraph (3) provides that one year after this agreement 
has been enacted and every year thereafter the President shall 
submit a report describing any new nuclear reactors of nuclear 
facilities that the Government of India has designated as 
civilian and placed under inspections or has designated as 
military.
    Paragraph (4) provides that one year after this agreement 
has been enacted and every year thereafter the President shall 
submit a report describing the disposal of spent nuclear fuel 
from India's civilian nuclear program.
    Subsection (p) provides definitions used in this Act.

                              Agency Views

    At the time the report was filed, no formal views were 
available.

                        New Advisory Committees

    H.R. 5682 does not establish or authorize any new advisory 
committees.

                    Congressional Accountability Act

    H.R. 5682 does not apply to the legislative branch

                            Federal Mandates

    H.R. 5682 provides no Federal mandates.
                            Additional Views

    H.R. 5682 is far from perfect, but it is a substantial 
improvement over the Administration's legislative proposal.
    Most importantly, this legislation ensures that Congress 
must approve a nuclear cooperation agreement with India by an 
affirmative majority vote and requires that the Administration 
provide copies of the cooperation agreement and the safeguards 
agreement negotiated between India and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) before we take that vote.
    My strong preference was to give Congress the ability to 
amend the cooperation agreement, but that proved to be 
incompatible with the expedited procedures this bill 
establishes for Congressional consideration of the agreement.
    Also on the positive side, this bill precludes the 
President from waiving some very important provisions in the 
Atomic Energy Act that place conditions on India's handling of 
nuclear materials received from the United States and provides 
for the termination of nuclear cooperation in the event that 
India resumes nuclear testing, violates its IAEA safeguards 
agreement, or violates the terms of our bilateral nuclear 
cooperation agreement.
    It requires the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to approve an 
exemption for India before Congress votes on the cooperation 
agreement. The NSG decision must be made by consensus, the 
standard practice for that organization.
    It directs the President to take steps to prevent other 
countries from making nuclear transfers to India if India takes 
certain actions, such as testing a nuclear weapon or violating 
IAEA safeguards, that lead to a termination of U.S. nuclear 
exports.
    And finally, the bill includes language I proposed 
prohibiting nuclear transfers to India if, after having agreed 
to adhere to NSG and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
guidelines, India exports items to other countries that violate 
those guidelines.
    Nevertheless, despite the inclusion of the aforementioned 
provisions, H.R. 5682 has some serious deficiencies. Most 
importantly, it does nothing to limit India's production of 
fissile material for nuclear weapons.
    I accept the fact that India has nuclear weapons and will 
not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
Nevertheless, I believe there is great value in restraining 
India's ability to produce additional plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium. Let me cite three reasons.
    First, if we are going to change the internationally 
accepted rules on nuclear trade for one country--rules that the 
United States, more than any other nation, is responsible for 
putting in place--then I believe we need a compelling 
nonproliferation ``gain'' to justify those changes.
    India's other nonproliferation commitments in the context 
of this nuclear deal--applying stringent export controls, 
adhering to NSG and MTCR guidelines, accepting IAEA safeguards 
on civilian facilities, among others--are positive steps in the 
right direction. But they are, for the most part, either a 
reflection of India's existing policies or largely symbolic. In 
my view, only a halt on fissile material production would make 
this deal ``a net plus for nonproliferation.''
    The second argument for requiring India to stop producing 
fissile material is the impact this agreement could have on 
India's neighbors.
    The vast majority of nonproliferation experts--both 
Republicans and Democrats--believe this agreement will enable 
India to increase its production of fissile material. Why? 
Because India now faces a shortage of domestic uranium and is 
forced to make a choice between generating electricity and 
making bombs.
    If and when the NSG decides to make an exemption for India 
and Congress approves the nuclear cooperation agreement, then 
India will be able to purchase uranium and other types of 
reactor fuel on the international market and will no longer 
face this dilemma. From that point on, India will be free to 
devote all of its domestic uranium supply to its weapons 
programs, if it so chooses.
    American nonproliferation experts are not the only ones 
making this argument. Some of their Indian counterparts are 
saying exactly the same thing. For example, in an article 
recently published in the New Delhi Indian Defense Review, a 
former high-level official in India's intelligence service 
argues that this deal will allow India to produce about 50 
bombs a year--a significant increase over current estimates.
    This is not to say that India will immediately begin a 
massive buildup of nuclear arms. But it will have the 
capability to do so. And that is a critical point for China and 
Pakistan, which will inevitably make their own strategic 
decisions based on worst-case assessments of India's arsenal.
    In other words, many experts believe this deal will likely 
lead Pakistan--and possibly China--to build more of their own 
nuclear weapons.
    With all due respect to President Musharraf, the last thing 
any of us should want is a Pakistan with even more fissile 
material and nuclear weapons than it already has. Nowhere else 
in the world is there a greater risk of radical Islamist 
terrorists getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction.
    A third argument for limiting the production of fissile 
material is India's commitment in the July 18, 2005 Bush-Singh 
joint statement to ``assume the practices and 
responsibilities'' of other advanced nuclear powers.
    Four of the five recognized nuclear weapons states--the 
United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia--have stopped 
producing fissile material for nuclear weapons as a matter of 
policy. The fifth, China, is also believed to have halted 
production. It is hard to think of a more important 
``practice'' for India to assume.
    The underlying bill includes language expressing the 
importance of achieving a moratorium on fissile material 
production in South Asia. Unfortunately, this is contained in 
the ``Statements of Policy'' section, which is essentially 
meaningless from a legal standpoint.
    Another provision in the bill requires the President to 
determine that ``India is working actively with the United 
States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty'' (FMCT). This sounds good on the surface, but in 
many ways this too is largely devoid of meaning.
    The U.S. recently introduced a draft FMCT at the Conference 
on Disarmament in Geneva. This draft did not include a 
verification mechanism because the Administration's view is 
that such a treaty is inherently unverifiable. The Indian 
position, on the other hand, is that an FMCT must include a 
verification mechanism.
    Given that our two governments have diametrically opposed 
views regarding verification issues, it isn't clear to me that 
the Indian commitment to work with us for the conclusion of 
such a treaty has much practical value.
    At the Committee markup of H.R. 5682, I offered two 
amendments designed to limit India's production of fissile 
material for nuclear weapons. Regrettably, both of them were 
voted down.
    The first amendment would have required the President to 
determine that India had halted the production of fissile 
material before he would be permitted to waive key provisions 
in the Atomic Energy Act and submit a nuclear cooperation 
agreement to Congress.
    India could meet this requirement in three different ways. 
First, it could declare a unilateral moratorium on the 
production of fissile material. Second, it could adhere to a 
multilateral moratorium, together with China and Pakistan (and 
possibly other countries). Or third, it could sign and adhere 
to a multilateral FMCT, if and when such a treaty is concluded.
    The second amendment was based on a proposal made by former 
Senator Sam Nunn, one of our nation's most respected voices on 
nonproliferation issues. It would have allowed exports of 
nuclear reactors, components, and other technology to India as 
soon as the conditions in H.R. 5682 were met. But it also would 
have restricted transfers of uranium and other types of nuclear 
reactor fuel until the President determined that India had 
stopped the production of fissile material.
    In considering these amendments and other critical issues 
related to the nuclear deal which have been negotiated with 
little or no input from, or consultation with, Congress, I 
would suggest that the most important question one should ask 
is not whether these are perceived as ``deal killers'' or will 
be acceptable to the Indian side. Instead, the real test should 
be whether they are good policy and serve American national 
security interests. And on both counts, I would argue that they 
do.
    I strongly support efforts to deepen the U.S.-India 
strategic partnership, and in that context, I welcome civilian 
nuclear cooperation. But such cooperation must strike the 
appropriate balance between two compelling U.S. national 
interests: strengthening our relationship with this growing 
power and preserving meaningful, internationally-accepted rules 
on nuclear nonproliferation.
    As H.R. 5682 moves through the legislative process, I will 
continue my efforts to achieve that balance.

                                   Howard L. Berman.

                                  
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