In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-3881

Village of San Jose, a Municipal

Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Daniel L. McWilliams and Ida M. McWilliams,

Debtors-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 01 C 3116--Richard Mills, Judge.

Argued March 1, 2002--Decided March 27, 2002

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Bauer and

Harlington Wood, Jr., Circuit Judges.

 Bauer, Circuit Judge. The debtors filed

for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 7

of the Bankruptcy Code. The Village of

San Jose, a lien creditor, opposed the

discharge on the ground that within one

year of filing the petition the debtors

hindered, delayed, or defrauded the

Village by transferring or concealing

property. 11 U.S.C. sec. 727(a)(2). The

bankruptcy judge granted the discharge,

finding the debtors’ subsequent remedial

conduct of disclosing and recovering the

properties negated the pre-petition

conduct. The Village then appealed to the

district court, which affirmed the

bankruptcy judge’s ruling. Though the

Village stated that the debtors have no

discernable method to pay the amount

owed, bankruptcy or not, the Village

nevertheless seeks its "pound of

flesh"/1 in this court. After a

thorough review, we find that the

bankruptcy court erred, and reverse and

remand for further proceedings not

inconsistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

 The Village of San Jose, Mason County,

Illinois, is a small enclave of some 696

people, located approximately twenty

miles south of Pekin, Illinois./2
Daniel and Ida McWilliams owned a number

of properties and buildings in the

Village of San Jose. The main property at

issue was a two-story brick building

built in the late 1800s, which housed a

restaurant at one time. The building,

located at 120 West Vine, was fairly

large, approximately 70 x 100 feet,

occupying 10,000 square feet.

 In a letter dated January 4, 1999,

Daniel McWilliams was notified that the

building was condemned after inspection

by a Village health officer. According to

the health officer, the roof was sagging,

there was a hole in it, and contents were

falling into the structure. In a March 4,

1999 letter, the Village notified the

McWilliamses that they must either repair

or demolish the building, and if they

failed to act, the Village would demolish

it and charge the costs to them. The

McWilliamses obtained an estimate that it

would cost approximately $48,000 to

repair the building. The McWilliamses

neither repaired nor demolished the

building, stating they were unable to pay

for either action. On March 26, 1999, the

Village moved to demolish the building

and recover the costs of the demolition

and attorney’s fees incurred pursuant to

65 ILCS 5/11-31-1 (West 2001). An order

was entered in state court on July 2,

1999, permitting the Village to demolish

the building, effective July 22,

1999./3 The court also granted the

Village a lien on the property to satisfy

the costs of demolition.

 On September 3, 1999, Daniel and Ida

McWilliams conveyed several lots, by

quitclaim deed, to their four

grandchildren for "One ($1.00) Dollar and

Love." Prior to transferring the

properties, the McWilliamses satisfied

the outstanding mortgages with the San

Jose Tri-County Bank. The deeds were

recorded as transferred to the grandchil

dren with the proper government

officials, but the deeds were not

physically delivered to the

grandchildren.

 In February 2000, the Village filed a

supplemental motion in state court to set

aside the transfers under the Uniform

Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), 740 ILCS

160/5 (West 2001). The McWilliamses

voluntarily filed for bankruptcy

protection on March 15, 2000. The
Bankruptcy Trustee held the first meeting

of the creditors on April 10, 2000. The

McWilliamses have some 28 creditors and

the Village is the largest.

 The following assets were disclosed in

the creditors’ meeting: Ida McWilliams

was employed making roughly $600 per

month at one job, and $500 per week at a

second job. Daniel McWilliams is disabled

and receives only $937 a month in Social

Security Disability benefits, but he did

receive a $40,000 worker’s compensation

settlement at the time of injury. He has

been disabled since a 1984 accident at

work. The McWilliamses own a home at 400

W. Vine, and two adjoining lots at 402

and 404 W. Vine. There is a house on 402

W. Vine, which the McWilliamses rent out

for $300 per month. The properties at

400, 402, and 404 W. Vine have a combined

value of approximately $51,000. All three

properties have mortgages on them. The

McWilliamses also own a commercial

building on 320 S. Second, and are two

years into a four year installment sales

contract for $200 per month for the

property. The 320 S. Second property is

unencumbered. They also own a 1998 Ford

Taurus and a 1988 Ford Ranger, both of

which have liens on them.

 During the creditors’ meeting, the

Trustee inquired if the McWilliamses had

sold, exchanged, or given away anything

of value recently. Ida McWilliams

responded "no." The Trustee then

specifically asked about the lots

conveyed to the grandchildren. Daniel

McWilliams stated that they did convey

the lots in September 1999, and that

their value was $2,000 each. Daniel

McWilliams added that they conveyed the

lots "six months before we got a bill

from San Jose lawyer on what we owed them

that was the reason we had to file

bankruptcy."

 The Village filed an objection to the

McWilliamses bankruptcy petition and

discharge on April 10, 2000. On May 10,

2000, the grandchildren reconveyed the

lots at issue back to Daniel and Ida

McWilliams. A hearing was held on

February 6, 2001, before the bankruptcy

judge. The McWilliamses appeared pro se

at the hearing, stating they could no

longer afford an attorney./4 During the

first few minutes of the hearing, the

bankruptcy judge made his opinion of the
case known to the Village’s attorney.

 I think on this, and I know that I have

talked to you about this in the pretrial,

talked to you about it on other

occasions, I am not going to deny their

discharge under 727(a)(2). It’s been my

policy, and I think it’s good law, that

if I file a petition that says I made

these transfers and the Trustee said

those are invalid, correct that, I am not

going to deny a discharge. They have made

no attempt to conceal anything to this

Court or to the Bankruptcy Trustee.

That’s the purpose of the 727(a)(2) in my

opinion. And you can pull out a number of

cases . . . and I don’t care what those

say.

 . . . [L]et’s move on, okay. You are not

going to convince me to change my mind on

this. I have told you that from the day

you filed it.

 After the hearing, consistent with his

prior comments, the judge issued a ruling

granting the McWilliams’ petition. The

Village appealed to the district court,

which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s

ruling.

ANALYSIS

 The bankruptcy court’s factual

determinations are reviewed for clear

error and legal conclusions de novo. See,

e.g., Cult Awareness Network, Inc. v.

Martino (In re Cult Awareness Network),

151 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting

that in bankruptcy cases on appeal from

the district court, we use the same

standard of review as the district

court). The bankruptcy court interpreted

11 U.S.C. sec. 727(a)(2) as allowing a

discharge even if the debtor violated the

section, as long as the infraction was

rectified and none of the creditors were

harmed. The construction of the

Bankruptcy Code is question of law we

review de novo. See, e.g., In re Cult

Awareness Network, 151 F.3d at 607.

 The Village makes numerous arguments

urging reversal, not the least of which

is a constitutional due process argument.

The Village argues that the bankruptcy

judge decided the case before hearing its

arguments. The district court found that

the bankruptcy judge made his decision

based on the pleadings and Trustee’s
report; however, the bankruptcy court’s

order stated the determination the

McWilliamses lacked the intent to defraud

was based, in part, on testimony from the

hearing. The district court noted that if

the judge "was obligated to recuse

himself from this case simply because he

had read the pleadings before the

hearing, no judge could ever come to

court prepared." The district judge’s

comment was right on the mark, and we

need not elevate this disagreement to a

constitutional level when it is more

appropriately framed as a ordinary review

for error.

A. Discharge in Bankruptcy

 The purpose of the Code is to provide

equitable distribution of the debtor’s

assets to the creditors and "to relieve

the honest debtor from the weight of

oppressive indebtedness and permit him to

start afresh free from the obligations

and responsibilities consequent upon

business misfortunes." Williams v. United

States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549,

554-55 (1915). We construe the Bankruptcy

Code "liberally in favor of the debtor

and strictly against the creditor."

Gullickson v. Brown (In re Brown), 108

F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 1997); In re

Reines, 142 F.3d 970, 973 (7th Cir.

1998); In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999, 1003

(2d Cir. 1976); 11 U.S.C. sec. 727(a)

(providing that, "[t]he court shall grant

the debtor a discharge, unless . . .").

Thus, consistent with the Code,

bankruptcy protection and discharge may

be denied to a debtor who was less than

honest. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279,

286-87 (1991) ("But in the same breath

that we have invoked this ’fresh start’

policy, we have been careful to explain

that the Act limits the opportunity for a

completely unencumbered new beginning to

the ’honest but unfortunate debtor.’")

(quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.

234, 244 (1934)); Mayer v. Spanel Int’l

Ltd., 51 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 1995)

("Congress concluded that preventing

fraud is more important than letting

defrauders start over with a clean slate,

and we must respect that judgment."). If

a creditor demonstrates by a

preponderance of the evidence that the

debtor actually intended to hinder,

delay, or defraud a creditor, the court

can deny the discharge. See In re Keeney,

227 F.3d 679, 683 (6th Cir. 2000); In re
Scott, 172 F.3d 959, 966-67 (7th Cir.

1999); cf. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286-87.

The intent to defraud must be actual and

cannot be constructive; however, because

it is unlikely that the debtor will admit

fraud, intent may be established by

circumstantial evidence. See In the

Matter of Krehl, 86 F.3d 737, 743-44 (7th

Cir. 1996); Smiley v. First Nat’l Bank of

Belleville (In the Matter of Smiley), 864

F.2d 562, 566 (7th Cir. 1989).

B. Objections to Discharge Based on

Section 727(a)(2)

 In order to succeed with an objection to

discharge based on section 727(a)(2), the

creditor must prove:

(1) that the act complained of was done

at a time subsequent to one year before

the date of the filing of the petition;

(2) with actual intent to hinder, delay,

or defraud a creditor or an officer of

the estate charged with custody of

property under the Bankruptcy Code; (3)

that the act was that of the debtor or

his duly authorized agent; (4) that the

act consisted of transferring, removing,

destroying or concealing any of the

debtor’s property, or permitting any of

these acts to be done.

Lee Supply Corp. v. Agnew (In the Matter

of Agnew), 818 F.2d 1284, 1287 (7th Cir.

1987) (citation omitted). The facts show

that three of the four elements were met.

The issue was whether the second element,

actual intent, had been met. Though

actual intent is difficult to prove, it

may be shown through circumstantial

evidence, and the Fifth Circuit adopted a

series of factors which, if proven,

indicate actual fraud:

(1) the lack or inadequacy of

consideration; (2) the family, friendship

or close associate relationship between

the parties; (3) the retention of

possession, benefit or use of the

property in question; (4) the financial

condition of the party sought to be

charged both before and after the

transaction in question; (5) the

existence or cumulative effect of the

pattern or series of transactions or

course of conduct after the incurring of

debt, onset of financial difficulties, or

pendency or threat of suits by creditors;

and (6) the general chronology of the
events and transactions under inquiry.

Pavy v. Chastant (In the Matter of

Chastant), 873 F.2d 89, 91 (5th Cir.

1989) (citation omitted). If the creditor

can show that one or some of these

factors are met, "[t]his creates a

presumption of an intent to defraud

establishing plaintiff’s prima facie case

and shifting . . . the burden [to the

debtor-defendant] of demonstrating that

he lacked fraudulent intent." Id.

 The McWilliamses did transfer the

properties for $1.00 and love to their

grandchildren, retained possession of the

deeds, and transferred the properties

after they had been notified that the

Village demolished the building and would

seek to recoup the costs from them. This

circumstantial evidence demonstrates the

McWilliamses transferred the properties

to either conceal or prevent the Village

from obtaining them to satisfy their

debts. The bankruptcy court similarly

found that several of these factors were

met, yet concluded that the McWilliamses

did not make the transfers "with the

intent to hinder, delay, or defraud

creditors." The bankruptcy court

concluded that the McWilliamses cured the

fraud and redeemed themselves by

disclosing of the transfers and

subsequently recovering the properties.

 1. Redemption for a Less Than Honest

Debtor

 Though it does not cite a specific case

in support, the bankruptcy court’s

reasoning is in line with a doctrine

announced in First Beverly Bank v. Adeeb

(In re Adeeb), 787 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir.

1986). In Adeeb, the Ninth Circuit

allowed the granting of a discharge

petition over a creditor’s objections

because the debtor disclosed the previous

transfers to the creditors and was making

a good-faith effort to recover the

property at the time an involuntary bank

ruptcy petition was filed. Id. at 1346.

Adeeb, after being threatened by this

creditors, consulted with an attorney who

advised him to transfer title to several

parcels of property to third parties for

no consideration. Id. at 1341. After

consulting with a second attorney, Adeeb

told his creditors about the transfers,

and the creditors filed for an
involuntary bankruptcy. Id. Adeeb

attempted to recover the properties, and

the creditors objected to the discharge

based on section 727(a)(2). Id. The Ninth

Circuit interpreted the term "transfer"

in section 727(a)(2) "to mean

’transferred and remained transferred’"

because, they concluded, Congress

intended to deny discharge only to

debtors who try to keep assets hidden

"until after they obtain their discharge

in bankruptcy." Id. at 1344-45.

 Adeeb, as other courts have concluded,

appears to contravene the plain language

of the Code. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis

(In re Davis), 911 F.2d 560, 562 (11th

Cir. 1990) (per curiam) ("Congress

certainly was capable of drafting a

statute which would deny a discharge only

when assets were fraudulently transferred

and remained transferred at the time of

filing of bankruptcy proceedings, but it

did not."). However, the Ninth Circuit

felt that this exception would

"encourages honest debtors to recover

property they have transferred" and

permit an "honest debtor to undo his

mistakes and receive his discharge." In

re Adeeb, 787 F.2d at 1345. This

reasoning is not persuasive because the

debtor was in fact dishonest, he tried to

hide assets from creditors, and only

after the debtor discovered he would

likely be caught and pay a penalty did he

reverse the transfers. Furthermore,

section 727(a) already encourages debtors

to be honest, or they will not be able to

obtain a discharge; additional incentives

need not be judicially created. See

Martin v. Bajgar (In re Bajgar), 104 F.3d

495, 501 n.3 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[I]t is

likely that our decision, by denying

discharge, will facilitate this outcome

by deterring petitioners from

fraudulently transferring property within

one year of filing a voluntary bankruptcy

petition in the first place.") (emphasis

added).

 Even though Adeeb purports to interpret

the term "transfer" in section 727(a)(2),

the facts surrounding the case and

analysis reveal the court focused on the

equities. "We are also persuaded by

practical considerations that a discharge

should not be denied in the present

situation." In re Adeeb, 787 F.2d at

1345. Rather than finding Adeeb lacked

the intent to defraud, the court was

forced to go another route because it was
clear that Adeeb transferred the

properties with full knowledge and actual

intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his

creditors. Id. at 1341-43. In considering

the same issue, the First Circuit

concluded that expanding the definition

of "transfer" based on equitable

considerations "’has no place under the

Code to the extent the statute addresses

the question.’" In re Bajgar, 104 F.3d at

498 (quoting Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin.

Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1189 (7th Cir.

1989)).

 Further, Adeeb is not on all fours with

this case. Adeeb’s holding was limited to

involuntary petitions, and any commentary

on voluntary petitions was dicta. In re

Adeeb, 787 F.2d at 1346. Unlike Adeeb,

the McWilliamses recovered the property

on May 10, 2000, only after they filed a

voluntary petition for bankruptcy on

March 15, 2000. See In re Bajgar, 104

F.3d at 499-500 (distinguishing In re

Adeeb because in voluntary bankruptcies

"’[t]he Ninth Circuit requires actual

reconveyance of the fraudulently

transferred property before the

bankruptcy filing.’") (citation and

emphasis omitted). Moreover, the

McWilliamses disclosed the transfers and

recovered the properties in March 2000,

well after the Village discovered the

transfers and filed a motion to set them

aside under the UFTA in February 2000.

Cf. In the Matter of Smiley, 864 F.2d at

566 ("The policy behind the Adeeb

decision . . . is not applicable here

where property was recovered only as a

result of the action of the bankruptcy

trustee and court."). Though they had

disclosed the transfer in their petition,

when asked by the Trustee if they had

transferred anything in the past year,

Ida McWilliams responded "no." It was not

until the Trustee asked a second specific

question about the properties did Daniel

McWilliams acknowledge the transfers. By

the time the McWilliamses rectified the

fraud, the Village had already expended

considerable efforts to recover the

properties and prevent the discharge in

bankruptcy. Cf. In re Davis, 911 F.2d at

561 n.2 ("The creditor presumably

incurred legal fees and expenses when he

brought an action challenging the

fraudulent transfer."). Even if the

Village did not suffer any harm, the

McWilliams’ intent to defraud is all that

is needed for a petition to be denied
under section 727(a)(2). See, e.g., In

the Matter of Krehl, 86 F.3d at 744 n.4

("Yet so long as the debtor acted with

the requisite intent under Section

727(a)(2), his discharge may be denied

even if creditors did not suffer any

harm."); In the Matter of Smiley, 864

F.2d at 569.

 2. Property Transfer

 In the final paragraph of its ruling,

the bankruptcy court noted that it did

not believe the conveyance of the deeds

was valid under Illinois law because the

McWilliamses did not physically deliver

the deeds to their grandchildren. Under

Illinois law, "delivery of a deed is

essential to the operation and validity

of a conveyance," but physical delivery

is only one means of completing the

transfer. See, e.g., Calcutt v. Gaylord,

114 N.E.2d 340, 343 (Ill. 1953).

"Delivery is determined by the intention

of the grantor manifested by words and

acts or the circumstances surrounding the

transaction," and "[t]he intent to

deliver may be shown by direct evidence

or presumed from acts and declarations of

the parties . . . ." Id.; Herron v.

Underwood, 503 N.E.2d 1111, 1118 (Ill.

App. 5th Dist. 1987). The McWilliamses

have consistently maintained that they

intended to make an innocent gift of the

properties to their grandchildren. If we

accept the bankruptcy court’s

interpretation, it would have been

unnecessary for the McWilliamses to have

their grandchildren properly execute and

file deeds reconveying the properties

back to the McWilliamses.

 Moreover, we believe that the term

"transfer" in the Code is defined broadly

enough to encompass the transfer in this

case. Cf. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 284, 289

("Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act in

1970 to make nondischargeability a

question of federal law independent of

the issue of the validity of the

underlying claim."). "Transfer" is

defined as: "every mode, direct or

indirect, absolute or conditional,

voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of

or parting with property or with an

interest in property, including retention

of title as a security interest and

foreclosure of the debtor’s equity of

redemption." 11 U.S.C. sec. 101(54).
"’Under this definition, any transfer of

an interest in property is a transfer,

including a transfer of possession,

custody, or control even if there is not

transfer of title . . . .’" In the Matter

of Smiley, 864 F.2d at 565 (quoting S.

Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-

27 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.

5787, 5813, on the Bankruptcy Reform

Act); see also In re Bajgar, 104 F.3d at

498-99 ("[T]he legislative history of

Section 101(54), which defines

’transfer,’ explains that ’[t]he

definition of transfer is as broad as

possible.’ Limiting the definition of

’transferred’ to ’transferred and

remained transferred,’ in fact, would

contradict the drafters’ intent.")

(quoting S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong.)

(citations omitted); In re Davis, 911

F.2d at 562. The recording of the deeds

and acceptance of consideration

demonstrates that the conveyance in this

case was a "transfer" under the

definition in 11 U.S.C. sec. 101(54).

 Whether the McWilliams’ actions are

defined as a "transfer" or "concealment,"

it is clear that they attempted to hide

the property from their creditors. The

recording, but failure to deliver the

deeds, demonstrates the McWilliamses

attempted to create the appearance that

they no longer owned the property. Thus,

even if the property was not found to

have been "transferred," it could be

found to have been "concealed." See In re

Keeney, 227 F.3d 679, 682-83 (6th Cir.

2000) (quoting the bankruptcy court’s

finding that the debtor concealed

property by having it titled "’in his

parents’ names’" while retaining a

beneficial interest in it); Friedell v.

Kauffman (In re Kauffman), 675 F.2d 127,

128 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ("The

transfer of title with attendant

circumstances indicating that the

bankrupt continues to use the property as

his own is sufficient to constitute a

concealment."). However, the fact that

the McWilliamses did later disclose the

transfer when they filed their petition

might, in other circumstances, mitigate

the concealment. See Gullickson v. Brown

(In re Brown), 108 F.3d 1290, 1293 (10th

Cir. 1997) (distinguishing between

"concealment" and "transfer" in section

727(a)(2), and finding that the debtor

transferred but did not conceal the

transaction because he placed it on his
bankruptcy schedules). In this case, it

is more likely that the disclosure was

prompted by the fact that the Village had

discovered the transfer and moved to have

it set aside under the UFTA.

 The McWilliamses are certainly

unfortunate debtors, yet they are not

exactly honest debtors either. From the

transcript of the hearing and the

bankruptcy court’s ruling, there is

little doubt that the judge empathized

with the McWilliamses, and because they

disclosed the conduct and reconveyed the

properties the judge felt there was no

harm done. The counsel for the Village

was also quite displeased with this

outcome, and despite the judge’s

admonishment that an appeal would be a

waste of money, pursued the action with

two appeals. As the bankruptcy judge, we

are confounded as to the Village’s

vigorous pursuit of this case because it

is unlikely that the Village will see any

financial gain, and any benefits will

likely be offset by attorney’s fees. The

McWilliamses appeared pro se at oral

arguments before this court and we too

were not unmoved by their plight, but the

Village’s objections are clearly valid

under the law./5

CONCLUSION

 In enacting the Bankruptcy Code,

Congress has determined that attempts,

successful or not, to conceal, transfer,

remove or destroy property cannot be

later cured by remedial conduct,

including undoing any transfers, if the

transfer occurred within one year of

filing the bankruptcy petition. The

debtors in this case cannot shield

themselves from a creditor’s objections,

based on section 727(a), through attempts

to remedy the fraud by disclosing the

transfers and reconveying the property

after they filed for bankruptcy. The

judgment of the bankruptcy court granting

the debtors’ discharge petition is

therefore, Reversed and Remanded for further

proceedings not inconsistent with this

opinion. Circuit Rule 36 to apply to both

the district and bankruptcy courts on

remand.

FOOTNOTES

/1 William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice 1.3

& 4.1 (1596). According to the Village’s attorney
this appeal is not about the debt (bond); it is

a "matter of principle." Similarly, in The Merchant of Venice, Shylock, the money lender, when

offered several times the debt (bond) refused

stating the bond was forfeit and he wanted his

"pound of flesh." Id. It was only through the

rather creative reading of the law by Balthasar

(a doctor of laws, who was in fact Portia in

disguise) that the result was avoided. Id. Portia

read the contract as allowing the taking of the

pound of flesh, but not the drawing of any blood

(because it was not mentioned). Id. As we shall

see, no such creative reading of the law was

available here to save the debtors’ petition.

/2 See Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Profiles of General Demographic Characteristics

2000, 2594 (Issued May 2001). For those not

familiar with Pekin, Illinois (population of

33,857), it is about 170 miles southwest of

Chicago. Id. at 1759 & 2466. Also, San Jose

actually straddles the border of Mason and Logan

Counties, and the Census Bureau counted a little

less than half of the population as residing in

Logan County and a little over half as residing

in Mason County. See id. at 848-865 & 1037-1050.

/3 The McWilliamses contend that the building was

actually two buildings, and that the later amendment to the court demolition order permitting the

demolition of the second building after the fact

acknowledges this. The Village states that there

was a single building with a lean-to attached,

which shared a common wall, and that the amended

court order simply recognized that there was a

single building. A "lean-to" is defined as: "a

wing or extension of a building having a lean-to

roof" or "a rough shed or shelter with a lean-to

roof." Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary

662 (10th ed. 1996). We need not resolve this

point of contention as it does not alter our

analysis.

/4 The McWilliamses had previously been represented

by two different attorneys, one in the state

proceedings and another initially in the bankruptcy proceedings. They told the bankruptcy

judge that the attorneys with whom they spoke

said it would cost them more than $3,000 "up

front," and that the result would be the same

with or without an attorney.

/5 In The Merchant of Venice, the Duke of Venice

sought to find a way to deny Shylock his "pound

of flesh," but admitted he must grant it under

the law. Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice at

3.3, 4.1.