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THE U.S.–INDIA ‘‘GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP’’: HOW

SIGNIFICANT FOR AMERICAN INTERESTS?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 16, 2005

Serial No. 109–130

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

DOUG SEAY, Professional Staff Member 

JEAN CARROLL, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator 

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C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ashley J. Tellis, Ph.D., Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ...................................................................................................... 8

Stephen Philip Cohen, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The 

Brookings Institution ........................................................................................... 23

Francine R. Frankel, Ph.D., Director, Center for the Advanced Study of India, 

University of Pennsylvania ................................................................................. 26

Satu P. Limaye, Ph.D., Research Staff Member, Strategy, Forces & Resources 

Division, Institute for Defense Analyses ............................................................ 34

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ashley J. Tellis, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 10

Stephen Philip Cohen, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................... 25

Francine R. Frankel, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................. 27

Satu P. Limaye, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 36

APPENDIX 

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 57

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THE U.S.–INDIA ‘‘GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP’’: 

HOW SIGNIFICANT FOR AMERICAN 

INTERESTS? 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) Presiding. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. 

The establishment by the United States of a global partnership 

with the enormity known as India would appear to be a monstrous 

event—a momentous event. Monstrously momentous, how is that? 

But it is of a sufficiently general nature that any prediction of its 

long-term and real-world impact cannot be cast with any confidence. It may yet prove to be a profound initiative, but it may be 

destined to take its place as one more of the many routine agreements between the world’s countries. 

Although the agreement announced on July 18 was the result of 

a decade-long effort, it has been acknowledged by the Administration as having been hurriedly negotiated, so hurried that those involved in the negotiations have stated there was no time to consult 

with Congress beforehand. Given that its implementation requires 

congressional action, the purpose of today’s hearing is to assist us 

in examining, in greater detail, the agreement’s most likely impact 

on American interests. 

As part of that effort, this Committee has already held two hearings regarding the controversial provisions on nuclear cooperation, 

and will continue to devote attention to this and other consequences which this agreement may have for our security and 

that of the globe. Although the term ‘‘global partnership’’ lends 

itself to grand statements and sweeping pronouncements, my belief 

is that this agreement is likely to prove a more modest consequence 

and that it is best understood as a useful and long overdue clarification of relations, including clearing away the thicket of unnecessary encumbrances that have grown up over the years and confined 

us to narrow paths lined with thorns. 

Although it is somewhat of a novelty to regard the two countries 

as partners, even extended reflection on our strained relations fails 

to unearth any compelling clash of interests. Perhaps it is simply 

that we are both growing up. 

2

In terms of what the agreement will actually do, of what will be 

created or destroyed, conclusive evidence is difficult to come by. 

From the standpoint of the United States, I will defer to the Administration and the distinguished experts before us today to enlighten us. For myself, I find it encouraging that by this agreement 

the U.S. is, in effect, freely acknowledging India’s growing role in 

the world and, more importantly, welcoming it, regarding it not as 

the fulfillment of a threatening prophecy but as an awakening to 

be nurtured. 

But it must be noted that for all the talk in this city of a new 

alliance which, among other things, is said to be aimed at offsetting 

the rise of China, India’s leaders have proclaimed no such goal. In 

fact, they have repeatedly stated that they foresee no change in 

their decision-making or in their policies, which will remain as they 

have always been, namely to advance India’s interests. 

If we are seeking to use them for our purposes, most assuredly 

they will be seeking to use ours for theirs. 

What I hope this agreement most signifies is a change in how India’s leaders conceive their country’s role in the world. Since its 

independence in 1949, India’s role in the world has been but a fraction of what it otherwise might have been, and here I fault India’s 

leaders. Much of the problem can be traced to the legacy of the colonial past, specifically a mind-set manifested in a defensive attitude toward an imagined hostile world and a self-imposed alien nation from the West that impoverished its opportunities and produced anomalies remarkable for a democracy such as its close and 

warm relationship with the Soviet Union. 

Thus, among the most hopeful signs of this agreement is that 

these cramped dogmas of the past and the distorted view of India’s 

interest that accompanied them are now fading away and are increasingly being replaced by a more confident vision of India as a 

major actor in the world, for to maintain a position of defiance is 

to refuse to accept any burden for upholding the world in which 

one lives and, worse, to gleefully add to the problems facing those 

who do. Thus, the assumption by India of a more active role is to 

be very much welcomed if it is accompanied by commensurate expansion of responsibility for reinforcing security and stability in the 

Middle East, the Indian Ocean region, and Central Asia, and even 

for the international system as a whole. 

But complacency would be a mistake; we would be foolhardy, indeed, to believe that willful power dutifully acknowledges wisdom 

as its master. Giant India’s emergence summons comparably giant 

possibilities. 

History is pockmarked with rising powers aggressively seeking 

their place in the sun, their singular purpose resulting in a challenge to and not an enhancement of the international order. At 

best, this has proved a needless drain on resources for others without any real advantage accruing to the guilty country. At worst, 

mindless disaster has resulted. 

There is no evidence that this is even a remote possibility, but 

the permanent anarchy of the world allows for many things once 

believed to be unimaginable. We have no other course but to consider such things and thereby inoculate ourselves against them. 

3

But I would not want my remarks to be viewed through a distorting prism for my forecast is a sunny one. India is at a formative 

moment and facing profound decisions for her billion people, all of 

this occurring in a world which is quickly evolving into unfamiliar 

patterns, the old and familiar giving way to the unformed and new. 

My hope is she will join us in shaping this era and take possession 

of the limitless possibilities that are hers to possess. 

Now I would like to turn to my friend and distinguished colleague, Mr. Lantos, the Ranking Democratic Member, for any remarks he might wish to make. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am confronted amongst a time conflict. In a few minutes, I have to meet 

with the Dalai Lama. 

I want to apologize to our witnesses. I read your testimony with 

great care; I want to commend you on your testimony, and I look 

forward to being briefed on questions. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for convening today’s hearing, the third in a series on the agreement announced last July between the United States and India to bring forth a new strategic 

relationship between the two largest democracies on this planet. 

As I have said before, I believe that the July 18th joint statement 

is a historic breakthrough in U.S.-India relations, and I was among 

the first in Congress to support it. A closer global partnership with 

India to promote stability, democracy, prosperity and peace 

throughout the world is an outcome that I think every Member of 

Congress would warmly welcome. A truly reciprocal political and 

security partnership with the world’s largest democracy and the 

traditional leader of the so-called nonaligned movement could be 

revolutionary in its significance, especially the spread of democracy 

around the world and our joint commitment to fight against international terrorism. 

Both our countries are targeted by terrorists hell-bent on destroying the innocent and frightening our governments into submission and appeasement. New Delhi has itself been the site of 

deadly terrorist bombings as recently as 2 weeks ago. In perhaps 

the most apt demonstration of the perversity and moral degradation of the extremists responsible for this attack, 63 people were 

killed and over 200 wounded in advance of the Festival of Lights 

that marks the victory of good over evil, of light over darkness, and 

the celebration of the joy of life itself. 

Mr. Chairman, the terrorists will not succeed. The civilized and 

peace-loving nations of the world are joining forces to combat their 

evil ideology and hatred. Together, India and the United States can 

hold aloft a bright beacon of democracy and freedom to lead the 

way to a more peaceful and a more tolerant world. 

Indeed, Mr. Chairman, in this regard, we can have no better 

partner than India, a country of a billion people consisting of numerous ethnic minorities that nonetheless have found a way to create a pluralistic political society. 

Mr. Chairman, our last hearing focused exclusively on the possible implications, both positive and negative, of a portion of the 

July 18th agreement between our two countries, the proposal to expand nuclear cooperation. That hearing was remarkable in its examination of the details of the proposal and the expertise of our 

4

witnesses, and they gave the Members of this Committee much to 

think about as we consider implementing arrangements for this 

agreement. However, as I said at our last hearing, this deal will 

ultimately be approved on its merits as a whole. 

What we are to consider today are those merits of the agreement 

beyond the nuclear component. For example, the July 18th statement includes joint initiatives and increasing trade and economic 

development, promotion of bilateral cooperation and high technology and space research, and partnership in combating 

HIV/AIDS globally and a closer security relationship. 

The new agreement is already bearing fruit. Just 1 month ago 

the United States and India signed a new science and technology 

cooperation agreement. This agreement will expand the scientific 

and technological interrelationship and promote collaborative research between our private and public scientific, technological and 

engineering communities to the benefit of both of our nations. This 

same agreement includes protocols to improve intellectual property 

rights and the fruits of this expanded research. 

The United States and India are also in the midst of conducting 

the largest air force exercise to date, building on the defense framework agreement from last June, and fully in line with the July 

18th declaration of a new strategic partnership. 

Beyond these important concrete steps, Mr. Chairman, I think 

we should also recognize that the July 18th statement has the potential to greatly influence India’s perception of its role in the 

world. There are encouraging signs that the new agreement to 

begin a strategic partnership with the United States has stimulated the long overdue discussion within India over its self-defined 

independent foreign policy, the basis of its former nonaligned status. This is especially true with respect to the growing nuclear 

threat from Iran. 

New Delhi took the politically risky, but responsible decision in 

late September to vote in the International Atomic Energy Agency 

to formally judge Iran to be in noncompliance with its obligations 

under the NPT not to develop nuclear weapons. This vote has been 

controversial domestically, but also illustrates that New Delhi can 

make the tough decisions necessary to become the valued strategic 

partner of the United States that the July 18th statement envisions. 

We believe in this continued support, if we are to keep Iran from 

developing the means to implement the Iranian terrorist-in-chief’s 

desire to wipe Israel off the map. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. 

The Chair will entertain opening statements from those who 

have a burning desire to deliver them. We would like to get to the 

witnesses, but I think it is important the Members have 2 minutes 

to make an opening statement, should they desire. 

Mr. Leach of Iowa. 

Mr. LEACH. I would just ask to put one in the record, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Mr. Berman of California. 

Mr. BERMAN. No burning desire, Mr. Chairman. 

5

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman of New York. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I know that today’s hearing is focused on the strategic value to 

the United States of the proposed U.S.-India nuclear agreement, 

and I have to confess I haven’t heard anyone claim that this is not 

good for U.S.-India relations, but I do want to take up a point that 

was made by some of our witnesses at the last hearing. 

A number of witnesses and some other outside commentators 

have been suggesting in the course of our deliberations that Congress should add additional conditions to the agreement that the 

Government of India would have to meet before Congress would 

approve a formal nuclear cooperation agreement. I would point out 

to those critics of the agreement that there are already many serious and difficult conditions contained in the July 18th joint statement that India will have to meet. Indeed, there are some difficult 

conditions that the United States will have to meet. 

I also think that since this is likely to be a phased process and 

that as long as the Administration is forthcoming with information 

on Indian progress, Members of Congress will be able to decide for 

themselves that India is working to keep its commitments even as 

we are working to keep ours. 

It is perfectly appropriate for the Congress to include the conditions in the joint statement as part of the legislation we consider, 

but I have yet to be persuaded that the benefit of adding additional 

conditions would outweigh their cost. Indeed, I think, if we add additional conditions that the Government of India had previously rejected during the negotiations, the result will be not only scuttling 

the agreement itself, but significant and, I think, lasting damage 

to the U.S.-India relationship. 

I thank the Chair and look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Royce of California. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Just 1 minute here. 

Let me just say, without question, the U.S.-India relationship 

has reached new heights. Our two countries have established an 

ever-growing relationship that has, I think, benefitted both sides. 

Of note is the bipartisan nature of the progression. President Bush 

picked up where President Clinton left off. Members of this Committee and this Congress have worked together to achieve that relationship. 

The July 18th joint statement covers the gambit: Trade, environment, disaster relief, technology, among others. This week the first 

meeting of the India-U.S. Trade Policy Forum, established during 

the prime minister’s visit took place with U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman and India’s Commerce and Industry Minister discussing how to grow trade between the two countries, including 

better market access for U.S. companies into India. 

Of consequence is the agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation. 

Implementation of this agreement would require action by the Congress and have consequences beyond the U.S.-India relationship. 

Therefore, this Committee continues its close scrutiny of it. 

I look forward to the testimony and I thank you again Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing today. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, sir. 

6

Mr. Faleomavaega of American Samoa. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a little 

burning desire to issue a very brief statement. 

Mr. Chairman, in July of this year, President Bush and Prime 

Minister Singh of India announced a new strategic and nuclear 

partnership, and President Bush said he would, and I quote, ‘‘work 

to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with, . . . also seek 

agreement from Congress to address U.S. laws and policies.’’

While I agree we must proceed with caution, I support the President’s initiative and I applaud the efforts of the Government of 

India, especially the members of our Indian American community 

for actively engaging to advance this cause. 

India is the world’s most populous democracy, a U.S. ally and, 

potentially, a major export market. On purchasing power parity 

alone, their GDP is estimated well over $3 trillion. By this measurement, India is the world’s fourth largest economy and a global 

partner that we must not overlook. 

Mr. Chairman, I welcome our witnesses, and I thank you for supporting my request to include Dr. Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

Thank you. I yield back my time. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Weller of Illinois. 

Mr. WELLER. No, thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Blumenauer of Oregon. 

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is with trepidation that I take your offer in terms of a burning desire to make 

a comment. 

I appreciate what you and the Committee are doing in focusing 

on this. I mean, India, as is referenced, is the world’s largest democracy. In a few short years it will be the world’s most populated 

country. 

I have been intrigued with what has been advanced here in recent weeks. My hope is that we don’t back into the new era, and 

hence the hearings that you have had, I think, help us sharpen our 

focus both on India’s role in threading the needle extremely carefully dealing with issues of nuclear proliferation. Ultimately, India 

is going to play a critical role as a permanent member of the 

United Nation’s Security Council and as a force, in its own right, 

even greater than it is today in Asia and around the world. 

I will be quiet, move forward, but the point I want to make about 

not backing into something, I fear we haven’t spent enough time 

on the front end of some of these issues that are of great moment, 

and that is why your panel is so important today, and I appreciate 

it. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Mr. Boozman of Arkansas. 

Mr. Schiff of California. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. 

In looking at our panel of doctors before us, if I didn’t know better, I would say we were in Judiciary and the subject was tort reform or med-mal reform. 

But I am very grateful the Chairman has called this hearing. 

This is now, I think, the third we have had on the India proposed 

agreement. I don’t think there is a more important issue this ComVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:25 May 16, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\111605\24598.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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mittee will face than the one before us, and I share with my colleagues great optimism about the U.S.-India relationship, and am 

very pleased it has grown and prospered as it has over the last several years. I think it is enormously important, as we have so much 

in common with India in our shared democratic values. 

I am concerned about the nuclear aspect of this proposed cooperation agreement. The opportunities to strengthen ties with 

India are many and they could have been confined to other nonnuclear areas. The unspoken elephant in the room seems to be 

China, and I will be very interested to know what our panelists 

think in terms of what role China—or more specifically, providing 

a counterweight to China, what role this is playing in the proposal 

itself. Is this one of the driving forces behind this proposal, and 

given the relations between China and India, does this make 

sense? 

So I very much look forward to the panel and am grateful the 

Chairman has convened this as often on this important subject. 

I yield back. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Mr. Poe of Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

India certainly is a valuable partner in southern Asia, and I hope 

that the U.S. and India can build a strong relationship. But I think 

it is important that we be concerned about certain areas. 

The reports suggest that India is one of the main allies to the 

brutal regime in Burma that props up that evil empire with economic and military development. We hear about religious discrimination throughout India’s institutions. 

Religious minorities are not allowed to adopt children. Recently, 

it has been reported they were put in prison for trying to practice 

some form of religious freedom, the reports of Hindu extremists assaulting people of other religions, and justice seems to be rarely administered to those individuals. 

So I look forward to hearing the testimony on how the United 

States will address these issues while attempting to forge a better 

and stronger relationship with India. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. McCotter of Michigan. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing. I will be very brief. 

It has long been my grave concern that the crisis of the 21st century for the great democracies will be competing with the rise of 

the corporatist totalitarian state. It is my view that every democracy is indispensable. A partnership between the United States and 

India, the world’s largest democracy, is critical to the survival of 

democratic capitalism in the 21st century. 

Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee welcomes our first witness, Dr. 

Ashley Tellis. Dr. Tellis has served as Senior Advisor to the American Ambassador in India and was also on the staff of the National 

Security Council. 

Prior to his government service, Dr. Tellis was a Senior Policy 

Analyst at the RAND Corporation and professor of policy analysis 

8

at the RAND Graduate School. Currently, he is a Senior Associate 

at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

We are also fortunate to have Dr. Stephen Cohen with us today. 

Dr. Cohen is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and has 

taught international studies at several institutions in the U.S. and 

overseas. He currently teaches at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. 

Dr. Francine Frankel has an extensive background in South Asia 

studies and currently is professor for the Study of Contemporary 

India at the University of Pennsylvania. She is the Founding Director of the Center for the Advanced Study of India and also established the Governing Council of the Center’s counterpart institution in New Delhi. 

Dr. Satu Limaye recently joined the Institute for Defense Analyses after several years of directing the Research Publications and 

Regional Collaborative Programs of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. 

We are pleased to have you with us today. 

Dr. Tellis, would you proceed with a 5-minute summary of your 

prepared testimony? Your full statement will be made a part of the 

record. Dr. Tellis. 

STATEMENT OF ASHLEY J. TELLIS, PH.D., SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Mr. TELLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. And Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today 

on the transforming U.S.-Indian relationship and the significance 

for the United States. 

As requested by you, Mr. Chairman, in your letter, I will focus 

my oral remarks this morning mainly on my judgments about the 

importance of India to the United States and the context of the 

geopolitical challenges that will face us in the future. 

Although India and the United States have been united by common values for a long time and, increasingly, by the presence of Indian Americans in our national life, what I think is truly important 

is that in the 21st century we are likely to see a new convergence 

in our geopolitical interests. These geopolitical interests include advancing peace and stability in Asia, defeating international terrorism, arresting the spread of weapons of mass destruction, promoting democracy worldwide, diffusing economic development to an 

open trading system, preserving energy security, protecting the 

global commons, especially sea lanes of communication, and safeguarding the global environment. 

It would not be an exaggeration to say that for the first time 

American and Indian interests in each of these eight issue areas 

are strongly convergent. It is equally true to assert that India’s 

contribution ranges from important to indispensable as far as 

achieving U.S. objectives in each and every one of these reasons is 

concerned. This does not mean, however, that the United States 

and India will automatically collaborate on every problem that 

comes before our two countries. 

The differentials in raw power between the two sides could 

produce differences in operational objectives even when overarching interests are preeminently compatible. Bilateral collaboraVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:25 May 16, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\111605\24598.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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tion could also be stymied by differences over strategies, negotiating styles, and tactics. If all this is true, what does it mean then 

to say that U.S.-India relations are strongly convergent? 

I believe it means three things: First, that the United States and 

India share a common vision of which outcomes are desirable and 

ought to be pursued by the two sides; second, that there are no differences in vital interests that could cause either country to levy 

mortal threats against the other; and third, that Washington and 

New Delhi can and will collaborate despite the absence of any priority guarantees that assure such collaboration. 

The record of the past 5 years, in fact, strongly corroborates the 

view that India is evolving toward a strategic partnership with the 

United States. It demonstrates that India has supported the 

United States on many crucial global issues, often in the face of 

strong domestic and international opposition. In my written testimony, I have provided a list of initiatives on which the United 

States and India have actually come together in the last 5 years, 

and this morning I just want to highlight four of them to make my 

point: The only Indian endorsement of the President’s new strategic framework; the Indian support for the U.S. initiative to remove the Director General of the OPCW; the Indian refusal to join 

the international chorus of opposition to the U.S.-led coalition operation in Iraq; and finally, the decision to support the United States 

in declaring Iran in noncompliance with the MPT. But four examples culled from the experience of the last 5 years. 

Given these facts, it seems to me that the proposition that a 

strong democratic, even if perpetually independent India, is in 

America’s national interest is in the category of self-evident truths. 

Let me end my oral remarks this morning by noting that in 

every instance where the United States and India have been able 

to collaborate in the recent past, the most important ingredients 

were boldness of leadership, astuteness of policy and quality of diplomacy, both American and Indian. 

Congress now has an important opportunity to transform the nature of U.S.-Indian collaboration permanently, by changing the status from that of a target under U.S. nonproliferation laws to that 

of a full partner. 

The Administration’s civil nuclear agreement with India is directed fundamentally toward this objective. To be sure, it will 

produce important and tangible nonproliferation gains for the 

United States, an argument I have elaborated on in my written 

testimony, just as it will bestow important energy and environmental benefits for India. 

But at a grand, strategic level it is designed to do much more. 

It is designed to convey in one fell swoop the abiding American interest in crafting a new and productive partnership with India to 

advance our common goals in this new century. I sincerely hope 

Congress will agree with that assessment. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee for 

your consideration. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tellis follows:]

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Chairman HYDE. Dr. Cohen. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN PHILIP COHEN, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Mr. COHEN. Congressman Hyde, Members of the Committee. As 

you may remember, I grew up in Illinois and at one time lived in 

your district and taught at the University of Illinois for many 

years. So we have met in past. 

I am honored to appear before the Committee and share my understanding of India’s relations with the major states of the Middle 

East, especially in light of the newly announced American policy of 

helping India to become a major power and of recasting our nuclear 

relationship. I certainly agree with the latter and have argued for 

something like the Administration’s proposal for many years, as far 

as I can tell, as early as 1990. 

As for India’s emergence as a major power, this is not something 

that is in American’s hands to offer or deny. As I wrote in my book, 

India: Emerging Power, India has its own special qualities and advantages as well as liabilities, and many Indians remain leery of 

close cooperation with the United States and none would subordinate vital Indian interests to American ones. 

India will not become a independent state nor a close ally like 

Britain. It is more likely to emerge as an Asian France, a state 

with which we have many shared interests, even an alliance relationship, but one that sees the world through its own prism, not 

ours. 

These qualifications are particularly important in the case of the 

Middle East. Five factors seem to steer Indian policy. First, India 

is very reliant on Middle Eastern oil and gas and must maintain 

cordial relations with most of the major suppliers, including Iran, 

United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, as well as Iraq. 

While these states must sell their oil and gas somewhere, and 

India is a good customer, Delhi does not want to be vulnerable to 

temporary cutoff or increase in prices nor does India want to become dependent on Pakistan and the pipeline from Central Asia or 

Iran to India via Afghanistan. This pipeline is not likely to materialize soon. 

Second, while it is a secular democracy, India is also a major 

Muslim state, the second largest Muslim population after Indonesia, which could be true although the census data of all these 

countries is unreliable. Relations with Iran, in particular, resonate 

in the north Indian heartland, notably Uttar Pradesh. The other 

day there was a major rally in Lucknow, a city know for its Shi’a 

culture and links to Iran. Speakers at this rally condemned India’s 

votes in the IAEA and threatened to bring down the Congress-led 

coalition should India vote the wrong way as they saw it in the 

next round at the IAEA. 

This is only another example of the close linkage between foreign 

and economic policy on the one hand and domestic Indian politics 

on the other. India’s preferred strategy has been to avoid at all 

costs any stark choice between the loss of domestic political support 

and achieving some foreign policy goal. 

24

Thirdly, India is hypersensitive to criticism of its policies in 

Kashmir and wants to keep the major Muslim states of the Middle 

East from intervening in Kashmir or supporting Pakistan. It thus 

conducts a sophisticated balance of power diplomacy, hoping to 

counter Pakistani influence in the gulf and to keep Kashmir out of 

all discussions. 

The fourth factor shaping India’s Middle East policy is the new 

opening to Israel. This has brought important technological, intelligence and military benefits and more influence in Washington, 

but some in India are still uneasy with it. I would imagine that 

New Delhi must continuously calculate the balance between its relationships between Tel Aviv and Tehran. 

Finally, India does not want to run afoul of America’s nonproliferation policies in the Middle East, but its strategists have 

strong reservations about American goals and tactics. This should 

not be surprising since Indians were the leaders in building a theoretical case against the nonproliferation treaty and the global nonproliferation regime and much of its argument have been taken up 

by Iran and North Korea. It would have preferred to abstain or 

simply not appear when the Iran vote took place, and will look for 

a way out in the future. 

India’s record of horizontal proliferation, sharing nuclear technology with other states, is very good; and I think we hear this, I 

think the Indian statements on this counter are quite accurate, but 

it showed other states how to proliferate vertically, that is, upward 

in the face of international sanctions and expert control regimes. 

And, of course, the language that India developed such as ‘‘nuclear apartheid,’’ ‘‘nuclear segregation,’’ has been used by both 

North Korean and Iranian leaders in justifying their violation of 

their international—their NPT obligations. 

To conclude on a personal note, I was just as surprised as you 

were when I heard the news about the nuclear deal. Although I am 

sure some kind of arrangement will be worked out, I think both 

sides miscalculated the complexity of this deal and the likely opposition. We in the United States say the devil is in the details, and 

God is in the details also; and I am enthusiastic about the Administration’s proposal, but I would like to see the legislation. I would 

hope that it will conform to American interests and that it will be 

acceptable to India. 

I would not like to see changes in the legislation sink this agreement, but clearly I can’t comment on the actual deal until I see the 

Administration proposal. I would add, the Administration has not 

consulted very widely on this issue either, obviously with Congress 

or outside of Congress. 

I, as a scholar, am tempted to add that our own abysmal knowledge of India and its politics contributed to this situation. As far 

as I can tell, there is not a single senior American foreign policymaker in this Administration with firsthand expertise on Asia, let 

alone on south Asia. I think this lack of knowledge about south 

Asia, India in particular, contributed to this situation and, as a 

proponent of better U.S.-Indian relations, point out it is important 

that other dimensions of the expanding U.S.-India relationship be 

protected, including economic and military ties and closer cooperation in science and technology. 

25

Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Dr. Cohen. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN PHILIP COHEN, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, FOREIGN

POLICY STUDIES, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Congressman Hyde, and Members of the Committee: 

I am honored to appear again before the Committee and share my understanding 

of India’s relations with the major states of the Middle East, especially in light of 

the newly announced American policy of helping India to become a major power, 

and of recasting our nuclear relationship. 

I certainly agree with the latter, and have argued for something like the administration’s proposal for many years. 

As for India’s emergence as a major power, this is not something that is in American hands to offer or deny; as I wrote in my book, India: Emerging Power, India 

has its own special qualities and advantages, as well as many liabilities, and while 

its power is balanced, many Indians remain leery of close cooperation with the 

United States, and none would subordinate Indian interests to American ones. India 

will not be a dependant state, nor will it become a close ally like Britain; it is morel 

likely to emerge as an Asian France, a state with which we have many shared interests, and even an alliance relationship, but one that sees the world through its own 

prism, not ours. 

These qualifications are particularly important in the case of the Middle East. 

Five factors steer Indian policy: 

1) India is very reliant upon Middle East oil and gas, and must maintain cordial 

relations with most of the major suppliers, including Iran, UAE, Qatar, and Saudi 

Arabia, as well as Iraq. While these states must sell their oil and gas somewhere, 

and India is a good customer, Delhi does not want to be vulnerable to a temporary 

cut-off or an increase in prices. Nor does India want to become dependant upon 

Pakistan, and the pipeline from Central Asia or Iran to India via Afghanistan and 

Pakistan is not likely to materialize soon. 

2). While a secular democracy, India is also a major Muslim state, and relations 

with Iran, in particular, resonate in the north Indian heartland, notably Uttar 

Pradesh. The other day there was a major rally in Lucknow, a city renowned for 

its Shi’a culture and links to Iran. Speakers at this rally condemned India’s vote 

in the IAEA, and threatened to bring down the Congress-led coalition should India 

vote the ‘‘wrong’’ way. This is only another example of the close linkage between 

foreign and economic policy on the one hand, and domestic India politics on the 

other. India’s preferred strategy is to avoid, at all costs, any stark choice between 

the loss of domestic political support and achieving some foreign policy goal. 

3).. India is hyper-sensitive to criticism of its policies in Kashmir, and wants to 

keep the major Muslim states from either intervening in Kashmir or supporting 

Pakistan. It thus conducts a sophisticated balance-of-power diplomacy, hoping to 

counter Pakistani influence in the Gulf and to keep Kashmir out of all discussions. 

4) India’s new opening to Israel has brought important technical, intelligence, and 

military benefits, and more influence in Washington, but some in India are still uneasy with it. I would imagine that New Delhi must continuously calculate the balance between its relations with Tel Aviv and Tehran. 

5) Finally, India does not want to run afoul of America’s non-proliferation policies 

in the Middle East, but its strategists have strong reservations about American nonproliferation goals and tactics. This should not be surprising, since Indians were the 

leaders in building a theoretical case against the NPT and the global non-proliferation regime, and many of its arguments have been taken up by Iran and North 

Korea. It would have preferred to abstain or simply not appear when the Iran vote 

took place, and it will look for a way out in the future. India’s record of horizontal 

proliferation—sharing nuclear technology with other states—is very good, but it 

showed other states how to proliferate vertically—upward—in the face of international sanctions and export control regimes. 

To conclude on a personal note, I was just as surprised as you were when I heard 

the news about the nuclear ‘‘deal.’’ Although I am sure that some kind of arrangement can be worked out, I think that both sides miscalculated the complexity of this 

deal and the likely opposition. As a scholar, I am tempted to add that our own abysmal knowledge of India and its politics contributed to this situation, as a proponent 

of better US-Indian relations I would point out that it is important that other dimensions of the expanding India-US relationship be protected, including economic 

and military ties, and closer cooperation in science and technology.

26

Chairman HYDE. Dr. Frankel. 

STATEMENT OF FRANCINE R. FRANKEL, PH.D., DIRECTOR, 

CENTER FOR THE ADVANCED STUDY OF INDIA, UNIVERSITY 

OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Hyde and Members of the Committee, for giving me this honor of testifying this morning. 

Proponents of the joint statement, like my fellow panelist Ashley 

Tellis, argue that a partnership between India and the United 

States is vital for the success of U.S. geostrategic objectives. The 

Bush Administration’s decision to accommodate India on the issue 

of nuclear cooperation that accesses space-related and dual-use 

high technology is said to be desirable because it would speed up 

India’s pace for economic transformation and growth and strengthen its geopolitical importance, buttress its potential as a hedge 

against a rising China and encourage it to pursue economic and 

strategic policies aligned with U.S. interests. I think Ashley would 

recognize that language. 

I have been asked to discuss what has been referred to as the 

elephant in the room—although usually that phrase is reserved for 

India—and that is China; what is India’s ability to hedge against 

the rise of China? 

Let me make some points in a very short time, starting out by 

saying quickly, India is in a much weaker position than China, 

with an economy roughly 40 percent the size of that of China. 

There are more details about that in my testimony. As an illustration, out of a total of 13 countries around India, China has the 

highest share of the total external trade with 10 of those countries. 

India’s security concerns are compounded by competition with 

China in a common geopolitical space. China’s strategic partnership with Pakistan has been strengthened by its investment of up 

to 1 billion for construction of the deepwater port at Gwadar, along 

with feeder roads and possibly other nuclear facilities. 

At the same time, the Chinese military has made deep inroads 

into Myanmar on its eastern border. It has constructed a signal intelligence facility in the Great Coco Islands. It is contributing to a 

sense in India that China is pursuing a strategy of encirclement. 

And I can also refer you to the asymmetrical nuclear capabilities 

of both countries. China can reach India’s major cities, India has 

no equivalent capability. Yet, India’s leaders do not believe that 

there is a chance India and China will go to war. Their strategy 

is to leverage an improving relationship with the dominant superpower to accelerate its own global rise during a period when power 

projection is based on economic and not muscular competition. 

A close partnership with the United States based on technological cooperation and civil nuclear energy, space and dual-use 

high technology would allow India to stop closing the economic gap 

with China and also convince China to take India seriously. New 

Delhi has too much at stake in improving its relationship with Beijing to be drawn into what have been called robust demonstrations 

of support for U.S. interests. On the contrary, the mind-set of Indian advocates for a national partnership between the two countries are better described by the determination not to, quote—this 

27

1Frankel R. Frankel, India’s Political Economy 1947–2004, second edition, New Delhi: Oxford 

University Press, 2005, chapter Fourteen 

is from a policymaker—‘‘walk into a U.S. trap by becoming overtly 

anti-Chinese.’’

While the Bush Administration hopes that they will seek ways 

to harmonize their political strategies with those of the United 

States to achieve common goals with a preference for strategic coordination, the Manmohan Singh government is intent on remaining flexible, not necessarily equidistant. As policymakers might put 

it, in India we would like to see multiple poles of Japan, China, Europe, the U.S. and India, but the closest distance will be between 

the U.S. and India. 

The Indian prime minister has been forthright in dismissing the 

idea that India could ever be used as a bulwark against China. 

Symbolic of New Delhi’s determination to safeguard its strategic 

autonomy, during Wen Jiabao’s state visit to India in April, 2005, 

the two leaders signed formal statements heralding a strategic and 

cooperative relationship. 

The basic premise of India’s foreign policy and of the prospect 

that India can become a balancer in Asia is that India’s economy 

will grow over the next decade and beyond at 8 percent and start 

closing the gap with China. From India’s perspective, the impact of 

the proposed cooperation, civil nuclear understanding, space and 

advanced industrial and agriculture technologies will assure rapid 

growth and secure India’s future as a major global power. 

The goal for India is not an alliance against China, but an opportunity to solve its poverty and unemployment problems, with 

American help, and be truly independent. Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Dr. Frankel. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Frankel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANCINE R. FRANKEL, PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR THE

ADVANCED STUDY OF INDIA, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

INDIA’S POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE FOR VITAL U.S GEOPOLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN ASIA: A

HEDGE AGAINST A RISING CHINA?

India is so large, has such dramatically pronounced topographical features and diverse socio-cultural divisions among languages, castes, religions, and tribes, that it 

is difficult to comprehend holistically. To all of this has been added 1 the emergence 

of two economies created by economic liberalization and globalization. There is both 

a growing urban-rural divide of 2:1 in per capita income and a regional divide in 

distribution of households by income. The most populous states in the (East and 

North) have the greatest proportion of low income households, and are mainly excluded from the new boom economies in the larger cities and towns of the richer 

states of the West and South having the greatest share of upper middle and high 

income households. 

Understandably, policymakers have long settled for generalities in talking about 

India as ‘‘the world’s largest democracy.’’ There are few qualifications that unequal 

regional growth is a major threat to long term political stability as well as the viability of economic reforms because of the large states and politicized populations left 

behind. Future prospects are further clouded by the decline of national parties, fragmentation of state-based parties, polarization between coalitions based on secular 

groups and those led by Hindu nationalists, and ideological divisions within the ruling coalition. The Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) which came to 

power in 2004 under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is a minority government: 

the vote share of the Congress was less than 27 per cent; together with its pre-election allies, the Congress-led coalition reached 35 percent of the vote and 216 of 543 

seats. The Left parties, reaching a new high of 60 seats, assured the Congress the 

majority needed to form the government by offering support from outside. 

28

2 ‘‘Mapping the Global Future’’, Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, December 2004 3The India-China Relationship: What the United States Need to Know. co-editor with Harry 

Harding. New York: Columbia University Press and Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center 

Press, 2004. Introduction. 

Similarly, critical differences between India and China tend to be minimized in 

long-range projections about two rising powers in Asia that will transform the geopolitical landscape in the 21st century. The reality at present is that power equations between the two are extremely lopsided in favor of China. China’s GDP growth 

rate in the last 20 years averaged 9.4 percent. Its economy is the fastest growing 

in the world, and the seventh largest (2003). Barring unforeseen crises, it is likely 

to reach its goal of quadrupling GDP by 2020, pushing up GDP per capita income 

to over US $3000. Moreover, this scorching pace incorporates the predominant position of industry—automobiles, real estate, steel, cement and petrochemical products—rising growth in the services sector (33.5 percent of GDP); and an increasing 

share in global merchandise trade to 5.6 percent. China is the leading force behind 

regional economic integration having spearheaded ASEAN plus three, China, Japan 

and South Korea; and has proposed the establishment of an Asian Economic Community at a summit scheduled in the near future. 

India’s record of about 6 percent growth over the past two decades also makes 

it one of the top growing economies in the world. But it relies disproportionately 

on IT based services. The services sector accounts for nearly 50 percent of GDP and 

the economy as a whole generates less than one percent of world trade (0.8 percent). 

The rapid annual growth in bilateral India-China trade increased over seven times 

from 1998, and reached $13.6 billion in 2004, but India’s share in China’s imports 

is one percent and of China in India’s imports under 5 percent. Not unexpectedly, 

India’s exports to China are dominated by minerals and raw materials and semifinished products while India’s imports from China are mainly diversified manufactured goods-electronics and medicinal and pharmaceutical products. Even more telling, India’s national income per head in 2003 was less than half that of China 

($1100 compared with $530). While China has set its sights on becoming the equivalent of a ‘‘middle income’’ country in about ten years, India is expected to overtake 

Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and France in the size of its economy during 

the next 25 to 50 years. 

Those who support an Indo-US partnership are most influenced by the looming 

reality that US dominance in Asia is almost certainly going to be eroded by the economic, military and political rise of China by about 2020. They tend to argue that 

efforts to increase India’s pace of growth are beneficial to US global interests in a 

balance of power in Asia, and as a hedge against China. One projection by the CIA’s 

National Intelligence Council has captured the attention of key members of the 

Bush Administration. India, when ranked by composite measures of national power, 

including weighted combinations of GDP, defense spending, population and technology growth, will possess ‘‘the fourth most capable concentration of power after 

2015’’, following the US, European Union and China.2

India’s claim to destiny as a great power, despite never being unified as a single 

state even during periods of great empires, rests on beliefs of its unbroken 

civilizational unity as the carrier of a superior ancient culture which emphasized the 

importance of moral leadership over territorial control. In practice, Hindu kings pursued sacral ritual incorporation of conquered local rulers and territories rather than 

annexation of their kingdoms to establish a centralized state. One result was that 

India’s influence beyond the subcontinent was exercised not by war but by exerting 

influence through a mix of Buddhist and Hindu religious ideas, cultural forms and 

knowledge on China and Southeast Asia. This has been called the ‘‘Indianization’’ 

of these societies, with ‘‘Extreme Indianists’’ (including Jawaharlal Nehru for example), referring to the states of Southeast Asia as Indian ‘‘cultural colonies.’’ Related 

to these beliefs, after India won independence from the British, was the conviction 

that the country’s geostrategic position and size would make it an important actor 

in Asia and that India would exert major influence in world affairs. ‘‘India can no 

longer take up an attitude other than that demanded by her geographical position, 

by her great potential and by the fact that she is the pivot round which the defense 

problems of the Middle East, the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia revolve.’’ 3

Certain factors are critical for understanding the many reasons why this idea of 

India’s global role and its claim to great power destiny was disappointed in the intervening fifty years:

(1) Partition and the creation of Pakistan robbed India of its own geostrategic 

position. Overnight, India lost to Pakistan its location on the southern border of Afghanistan, its western flanks adjacent to the Persian Gulf and the 

29

4 ‘Looking East: Manmohan Singh at 3rd India-ASEAN Summit, India Review, January 1, 

2005, p. 7

Middle East, and its eastern boundaries abutting Southeast Asia, becoming 

immediately involved in the draining and still unresolved conflict over 

Kashmir;

(2) During the Cold War, the United States, suspicious of India’s non-aligned 

policy, found in Pakistan’s offer of a military alliance the prospect of a foothold in the strategic area adjacent to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and 

Southeast Asia. The 1954 military assistance agreement between the United 

States and Pakistan was perceived by India’s leaders as the beginning of 

‘‘building up’’ allied Pakistan and ‘‘building down’’ India;

(3) The challenge by China to Nehru’s ideas of cultural influence and potential 

dominance of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region with historical 

claims of its own, which drew from the widest extent of its traditional tributary system as well as recently conquered territories. Historically, the Chinese sphere overlapped with India’s perceived areas of cultural influence in 

southeast Asia (northern Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand), 

Myanmar, Bhutan, Nepal, Tibet and the whole of Kashmir. From China’s 

point of view, India possessed the British imperialist mentality and ambition to establish a greater Indian empire by dominating neighboring states 

through policies of ‘‘hegemonism.’’ The 1962 Sino-India border war which established Chinese control over the disputed area of Aksai Chin and humiliated India by routing its outnumbered and unprepared troops in the Northeast Frontier Area marked the beginning of an Indian military buildup 

aimed at confronting China on its own terms.

(4) When both the US and China felt most vulnerable to the Soviet Union, and 

the Nixon-Kissinger ‘opening to China’ changed the strategic equation, India’s 1971 success in dismantling Pakistan, creating Bangladesh and aligning with the Soviet Union was interpreted in Beijing as a strategy to encircle China and by the Nixon Administration as a policy to also attack in the 

West and cripple Pakistan. China responded with assistance to Pakistan, including transfer of designs for a tested nuclear device that was critical in 

Islamabad’s clandestine development of nuclear weapons by 1989, and with 

shipments of missile delivery systems or their components. The ‘‘all-weather 

friendship’’ between China and Pakistan, maintained until the present, is 

a major factor in the persisting lack of trust characterizing India’s attitude 

toward China, even though other aspects of the relationship have significantly improved.

Since the 1990’s, India’s governments have grappled with what role in world affairs the country could play after the Cold War. Attempts accelerated to end the hyphenated ‘regional’ category of India-Pakistan, break out of the ‘‘South Asia box’’ 

and improve relations with its neighbors. In the mid-1990s, India adopted a ‘‘look 

East policy’’ that attempted to restore its influence in Southeast Asia. The 10 

ASEAN states + India agreed to hold annual summit meetings in 2002 and in 2003 

signed an Indian-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement that India hopes will establish an 

‘‘arc of stability and prosperity through an Asian Economic Community as a counterpoise to the arc of instability to our west.’’ Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in 

November 2004, proposed to hold a workshop to evolve a concept paper on an Asian 

Economic Community including India, ASEAN, Japan, China and Korea.4 The 

South Asian Free Trade Area Accord (SAFTA) has been less successful because of 

the continuing hostility between India and Pakistan, although India has free trade 

agreements with Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan. 

From the late 1990’s, the ‘‘mood’’ in India grew to improve relations with the 

United States as the dominant world power, interrupted by India’s May 1998 nuclear tests, sanctions imposed by the US, and then lifted in November 2001. 

The emergence of India as a de facto nuclear weapons state greatly enhanced the 

confidence of policy-makers who desired India to play a bigger role in world affairs. 

This confidence was buttressed by rising annual growth rates of six percent annually from the mid-1980’s, sustained after the 1991 economic reforms. Even more decisive, over the past 5 to 6 years, the dramatic performance of India’s services sectors, IT/ITES/BPO, and more recently, plans to develop pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, as well as the global competitiveness of some of India’s restructured, 

and also new manufacturing companies (in auto components, specialist chemicals 

and potentially in textiles and electronics), have provided a critical psychological 

boost. It would be difficult to overestimate the psychological liberation that has 

30

5 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘‘South Asian Seesaw: A New U.S. Policy on the Subcontinent,’’ Washington 

D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Policy Brief, May 2005, http://

carnegieendowment.org/files/PB38.pdf) 6 ‘‘New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship, http://new delhi. Gov/

wwwhipr062905.html 7 Comprehensive bilateral ties are envisaged in combating international terrorism, developing 

a new U.S.-India Global Democracy Initiative, boosting trade, investment and technology, 

strengthening energy security, establishing cooperation in commercial space and satellite exploration and launch, and entering into full civil nuclear energy cooperation. 8 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘‘India as a New Global Power’’, An Action Agenda for the United States. 

Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p.27 9Fareed Zakaria, ‘‘Does the Future Belong to China?, Newsweek, May 9,2005

flowed from international recognition of India’s technological prowess, and the globally competitive industries of ‘‘India, Inc.’’ As the chief financial officer of a major 

Indian IT multi-national put it, Success in the global marketplace has more than 

economic significance. It asserts India’s position as an equal, not only the equality 

of India with the west, but the equality of the ‘brown’ person with the ‘white’. 

‘‘When I represent I.T. as an Indian, I am an equal: color doesn’t matter’’. 

A more confident India has been willing to engage the United States on equal 

terms, and to insist on this equality in bilateral relations. When during this same 

period, the US and India perceived a convergence of security interests, communications became much more direct and productive, especially in finding common ground 

on major issues concerning the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, non-proliferation 

(India is a status quo power, wanting to limit the number of nuclear weapons states 

to the five ‘‘recognized’’ under the NPT, and India, Pakistan and Israel), and the 

rapid rise of China. The decision to delink U.S. policy toward Pakistan and India 

first taken during President Clinton’s visit to India at the end of his second term, 

was finally implemented in March 2005, when Secretary of State Rice offered New 

Delhi a package of policies that deserves the often misused term of strategic partnership to ‘‘help India become a major world power in the twenty first century.’’ 5

‘‘The Defense Framework’’ signed by India’s Minister of Defense and the US Secretary of Defense on June 28, 2005 charted a ten year course that put new mechanisms in place to oversee defense sales and prospects for co-production and technology cooperation.6 How intertwined key policies of the two countries could become 

emerges from the Indo-U.S. Joint Statement at the end of Prime Minister 

Manmohan Singh’s visit to Washington on July 18, 2005.7 The headline making 

news in both capitals was that the US would work with Congress to adjust the 1978 

law restricting trade and commercial transactions in civil nuclear energy, space and 

dual use technology with non-signatory states of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to ‘‘enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.’’ Major proponents of the Joint Statement, like Ashley Tellis argue that a partnership between 

India and the US is vital for the success of US geopolitical objectives, and that the 

Bush Administration’s decision to accommodate India on the issue of nuclear cooperation, provide access to space-related and dual use high technology is desirable 

because it would speed up India’s pace of economic transformation and growth, 

strengthen India’s geopolitical importance, enlist its enthusiasm for counter-proliferation efforts in the Indian Ocean, and ‘‘ buttress its potential utility as a hedge 

against a rising China (and) encourage it to pursue economic and strategic policies 

aligned with U.S. interests.’’ 8

Hedging Against the Rise of China 

Despite the desire on both sides to avoid the perception of closer bilateral relations as anti-China, both the U.S. and India share concerns fostered by uncertainty 

about whether China should be viewed as a potentially cooperative partner or a 

power making a bid for dominance in Asia. US formulations about the potential for 

U.S.-China relations have swung sharply between the Clinton Administration’s goal 

of a ‘strategic partnership;’ the characterization by candidate George Bush in 2000 

of China as a ‘‘strategic competitor’’ and the cautiously positive formula adopted by 

President Bush and President Jiang Zemin in October 2001 of a ‘‘cooperative’’ and 

‘‘constructive’’ relationship. The US is China’s biggest export market but the leverage this affords against China is limited by the massive trade deficit. As Fareed 

Zakaria points out9 over the past fifteen years China’s exports to the US have 

grown by 1,600 percent and those of the U.S. to China, 415 percent; China supports 

the declining dollar as the second largest holder of foreign exchange reserves. Washington would be hard pressed to come to Taiwan’s assistance in the event of a Chinese invasion, and it relies on China to help defuse the crisis with North Korea over 

nuclear weapons. 

31

10Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, China and India, Cooperation or Conflict?

London: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2003, p.47 11 ‘‘Financial Times, May 10, 2005 12 Ashley J. Tellis, India as a New Global Power, op.cit., 51

India is in a much weaker position, with an economy roughly forty percent the 

size of that of China. Out of a total of thirteen countries around India, China has 

a higher share of the total external trade with ten.10 The Indian market has also 

been flooded with consumer goods and chemicals made in China, and India has 

brought some 70 anti-dumping cases against China in the WTO. India’s security 

concerns are compounded by competition with China in a common geopolitical space. 

China’s strategic partnership with Pakistan has been strengthened by its investment of up to $1 billion for construction of the deep water port at Gwadar, along 

with feeder roads and other facilities. At the same time, the Chinese military has 

made deep inroads into Myanmar on its eastern border, while providing assistance 

for construction of a signal intelligence facility in the Great Coco Islands, contributing to a sense that China is pursuing a strategy to encircle India. China has also 

established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, including Russia and the states 

of Central Asia, which India joined as an observer state in July 2005—along with 

Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia. 

Yet, India’s leaders believe there is no chance of India and China going to war. 

Their strategy is to leverage an improving relationship with the dominant superpower to accelerate its own global rise during a period when power projection is 

based on economic and not muscular competition. A close partnership with the 

United States based on technological cooperation in civilian nuclear energy, space 

and dual-use high technology would allow India to start closing the economic gap 

with China and also convince China to take India seriously. China’s perception of 

a closer U.S.-India relationship is likely to strengthen its incentives to offer a final 

border settlement. Should China prove intent on establishing a dominant role, a 

stronger US-India relationship, the argument goes, will make China more cautious 

in undermining India’s interests at a time when it is not ready to confront China 

on its own. This may be too optimistic, as both India and the U.S. assess the latest 

agreement between China and Pakistan11 to start joint production of a new fighter 

aircraft for Pakistan’s air force, (JF–17 ‘‘Thunder’’ aircraft) with supply of 150 aircraft to begin in 2007, (and 250 on order for China) which could change the strategic 

balance between India and Pakistan. From the U.S. perspective, already worried 

about China’s strategy to intimidate Taiwan, in the aftermath of the anti-succession 

law passed in March 2005, the new fighter aircraft along with increased missile capabilities would complicate US response to an attack. Over the long term, it makes 

sense to argue that a close US partnership with a more powerful India can help 

balance China’s position. Even so, an equally important assumption is that of an 

enduring US-Japan alliance, with a militarized Japan playing a key role. The tsunami naval quartet, US-India-Japan-Australia, is a possible alignment for the future, but still very far away. 

New Delhi has too much at stake in improving its relationship with Beijing to be 

drawn into ‘‘robust demonstrations of support for U.S. interests.’’ On the contrary, 

the mindset of Indian advocates for a natural partnership between the two countries 

are better described by the determination not to ‘‘walk into a US trap’’ by becoming 

overtly anti-Chinese. While the Bush Administration hopes that India will seek 

ways to harmonize its political strategies with those of the United States to achieve 

common goals in a preference for ‘‘strategic coordination’’,12 the Manmohan Singh 

government is intent on retaining flexibility, but not equidistance. As one senior policy maker put it, we would like to see multiple poles of Japan, China, Europe, the 

US and India, but the ‘‘closest distance’’ will be between the US and India. The Indian Prime Minister has been forthright in dismissing the idea that India could ever 

be used as a bulwark against China. Symbolic of New Delhi’s determination to safeguard its strategic autonomy, during Wen Jiabao’s state visit to India in April 2005, 

the two leaders signed formal statements heralding a ‘‘strategic and cooperative relationship.’’

Sino-Indian normalization of relations has proceeded by fits and starts but this 

process has been characterized by many of the trappings that have signaled improved relations between India and the United States; for example, summit meetings between heads of state and government, regular exchange of visits between 

high-ranking military and civilian officials, agreements to establish direct links for 

commercial airlines and telecommunications, cooperation in science, technology and 

space, and bilateral cultural exchanges. The 1993 ‘‘Agreement on the Maintenance 

of Peace and Tranquility’’ to resolve the border dispute by negotiations followed by 

the 1996 ‘‘Agreement on Confidence Building Measures’’ for significant troop withVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:25 May 16, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\111605\24598.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
32

13K. Subrahmanyam, ‘‘Hidden Strings and Free Lunches’’, The Indian Express, May 18, 2005

drawals along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was followed, finally, in 2001, at 

the thirteenth meeting of the China-India Joint Working Group (JWG) by an exchange of maps of the middle sector of the LAC; and in June 2002 by an exchange 

of maps of the western sector. 

Despite a spate of Articles following Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India 

hyping closer economic ties between China and India as the world’s ‘‘office’’ and 

China as the world’s ‘‘factory, there is virtually no chance that the two countries 

will agree to create a free trade area. Nevertheless, some projections that IndiaChina trade could overtake U.S.-India trade by 2008, rests on the growth of 

complementarities between the two economies. Indian IT companies have started to 

invest in China and to access Chinese engineering graduates to expand the talent 

pool from which to build computer services and outsourcing processes, while using 

China as a gateway to Japan, the second largest IT market after the United States. 

Chinese corporate leaders are also entering the Indian market to hire software specialists and learn how to improve their own technology industry. 

The rise of China is a general framing architecture in the discussion of security 

related issues, but the US and India have converging interests across a broad spectrum. 

Leading members of India’s strategic community are less suspicious than ever before of US motives behind its policies in the region, recognizing that India is needed 

as a ‘‘stabilizer in this region’’ as the world’s largest democracy ‘‘situated next to 

China, next to Pakistan-Afghanistan, West Asia and Central Asia.’’ 13 In practice, 

Washington and New Delhi coordinate policy toward India’s neighbors, Nepal and 

Sri Lanka in ways that shore up India’s position in the region, preventing a power 

vacuum from developing which can be filled by China or internal forces unfavorable 

to India. The cooperation with respect to Nepal in order to stem the Marxist tide 

and move toward constitutional government has been particularly close. India has 

also accommodated the U.S. For example, when the US response to the tsunami disaster was too slow, New Delhi helped Washington create an image of involvement 

in relief efforts by the military-political decision to work with the US in a ‘‘core 

naval group’’—US-India-Japan-Australia. 

Convergence of interests extends in differing degree to various other areas: 

Interests also overlap in Afghanistan. The U.S. fight against the Taliban set back 

Islamic fundamentalism and contributed to India’s strategic objective of a nationally 

consolidated Afghanistan. India is engaged in training skilled workers and by the 

end of 2005 will have given $500,000,000 in aid. The role of the U.S. is considered 

crucial: it has 70,000–80,000 troops in Afghanistan and is contributing $2 billion in 

aid annually. Pakistan is trying to regain its influence in Afghanistan where there 

is a lack of skilled Afghans in almost all walks of life and most workers are Pakistanis. The question therefore is whether the U.S. will extend its rationale for support of Pakistan in routing out terrorists to side with Pakistani demands and pressure India to hold back from projecting its influence into Afghanistan. The worst 

case for India is that the U.S. will withdraw its troops and make a clean exit after 

elections. 

There is no contradiction between the interests of the U.S. and India in Southeast 

Asia; or with the unstated notion that India should be a balancer in the region 

against China. Indian policy makers believe that ASEAN welcomes closer relations 

with India for this purpose and that they want more than one country to have influence. The U.S. and India have had differences on the Iraq war, but now that events 

cannot be undone, Indian policymakers believe the costs of U.S. failure in Iraq 

would outweigh India’s interest in US success. India approved of the Iraqi elections, 

however imperfect, as better than no elections. Moreover, India looks forward to a 

Shi’a dominated regime in Iraq. India has the second largest population of Shi’a in 

any country with a major Muslim community and India does not want to see 

Sunnis, dominant in Pakistan, capture power. In the event the US fails in Iraq, the 

general sentiment in the Gulf is liable to become very fundamentalist, which is not 

in India’s interest. India is dependent on imports for 70 percent of its oil supplies, 

mainly from the Gulf. 

The biggest issue of divergence has been Iran. India’s negotiations with Pakistan 

and with Iran for a pipeline to deliver national gas from Iran to India are reasonably well advanced, and opposition from the United States is considered to be interference with India’s autonomy in foreign relations, as well as disregard for its security and energy needs. The U.S., convinced Iran is developing nuclear weapons, supports an alternative more problematic pipeline route avoiding Iran, from 

Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, to India. 

33

14 ‘‘Musharraf in India’’, India Today International, May 2, 2005, p. 17

At the most general level, India accepts that the U.S. is an Asian power and will 

continue to play the most important role in the foreseeable future in Northeast Asia 

and Southeast Asia, and that this presence is to India’s advantage for a number of 

reasons, those already mentioned and others. Sea control is a very important economic and strategic issue. Both India and China have ambitious plans to build up 

naval power in this and coming decades and India believes projection of military 

power will be the same as projection of naval power. As in other areas, China is 

surging ahead. India believes it demonstrated to the US during the coordination of 

the tsunami relief effort that it is the most effective naval partner in the Indian 

Ocean and the Gulf. Trade and investment flows are also crucial. The US remains 

India’s single largest trading partner (although it is likely China will overtake the 

US in the next year or two); and the US is the most likely source of FII and FDI 

for India’s advanced technology sectors. 

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to underestimate the resentment that remains of US policies toward Pakistan, especially Washington’s lavish patronage of 

President Musharraf and his military government in the name of fighting the war 

on terror when Pakistan has been the home base of Al Quada and the patron of 

cross-border terrorism against Kashmir, as well as the source of clandestine sales 

and diffusion of nuclear technology and fissile materials. So far, Pakistan has received a three billion dollar economic and military assistance package, designation 

of Pakistan as a non-NATO military ally, and in March 2005, approval of the sale 

of F’16’s, put on hold for fifteen years, which can be upgraded and used to deliver 

nuclear weapons. US sensitivities toward Pakistan are also considered excessive in 

Afghanistan and potentially harmful to India’s security interests. For the time 

being, this resentment has been pushed just below the surface of Indian public policy in the aftermath of the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement. But even before this 

package offer, India recognized that the US war on terror served its own vital interests by pressuring Pakistan to cut back on support for jihadist groups, including 

cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. More recently, there has been apparent progress 

on the India-Pakistan composite dialogue started in January 2004, and especially 

the meeting in New Delhi (April 18, 2005). This ended with a joint statement by 

Musharraf and Manmohan Singh asserting that the peace process is now ‘‘irreversible.’’ For the first time, the two governments endorsed the idea that India and 

Pakistan will move toward a soft border in Kashmir through CBM’s that will increase travel (bus service), trade (by trucks), and pilgrimages across the Line of 

Control. Musharraf outlined options for a ‘‘final settlement’’ of the Kashmir issue, 

a term used by New Delhi for the first time since 1971, significant because it recognizes there is an ‘‘issue’’ which should be settled by both countries.14 Sensitivities 

about the magnitude of US support for Pakistan should lessen if CBM’s actually are 

implemented on the ground and a negotiated solution on Jammu and Kashmir eventually appears within reach. 

Impact of Proposed Civil Nuclear Agreement 

Cooperation in civilian nuclear energy and space between the United States and 

India has been interpreted as defacto recognition of India as a nuclear power. This 

is the interpretation placed on it by Indian policy makers who seek to harness the 

Bush Administration’s unorthodoxies or unilateralism, to advance India’s longstanding interests in transfer of dual-use technologies, and its current urgent needs 

for imported nuclear fuel and reactors to generate power as a prerequisite for pushing up and sustaining high growth levels. Many believe the Bush Administration 

does not care about the NPT and consider it a ‘‘silly little treaty’’, and this is not 

only the Indian government’s conclusion. Some senior U.S. officials clearly believe 

that the NPT and its five NWS’s cannot be resurrected, and the US needs to face 

reality. Pakistan, India, Israel are NWS’s, others may become nuclear weapons 

state, and therefore it is necessary to search for a new framework; one which does 

not sacrifice US economic interests—namely the opportunity offered by the Indian 

market for sales of defense equipment and advanced technology , which will only 

grow in the future. 

In India, despite dissenting voices, the most dramatic change from the past is the 

wide spectrum of support. Currently, the ballast is provided by those who believe 

that what the US has put on offer needs to be explored in India’s own interest. The 

most enthusiastic liken the package of policies approved in the Joint Statement as 

analogous to the US opening to China, perceived as the first step toward China’s 

rise as a global power. 

The basic premise of India’s foreign policy, and of the prospect that India can become a balancer in Asia is that India’s economy will grow over the next decade and 

34

beyond at 8 percent per annum and start closing the gap with China. From India’s 

perspective, the impact of the proposed cooperation in civil nuclear energy, space 

and advanced industrial and agricultural technologies will assure rapid growth and 

secure India’s future as a major global power. The goal for India is not an alliance 

against China, but an opportunity, with U.S. assistance, to sustain 8 percent economic growth over one or two decades so that India can solve its poverty and unemployment problems and be truly independent. Meanwhile, India will have to take 

into account U.S. interests in its foreign policy decisions, but it would probably be 

unrealistic to expect a ‘‘willingness to ally itself with American purposes.’’ More likely, is a partnership that will naturally grow out of high levels of trust and close cooperation.

Chairman HYDE. Dr. Limaye. 

STATEMENT OF SATU P. LIMAYE, PH.D., RESEARCH STAFF 

MEMBER, STRATEGY, FORCES & RESOURCES DIVISION, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES 

Mr. LIMAYE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Committee, for this opportunity to testify this morning. As requested by the Chairman in its invitation letter, I will briefly review India’s foreign policy interests and activities in East Asia, 

leaving out China, which Dr. Frankel considered; assess the extent, 

if any, to which Delhi is likely to ally itself with U.S. strategic purposes in this region; and assess the impact of improved U.S.-India 

relations, including the proposed nuclear agreement and our other 

relationships in the region. 

India’s interests in expanded engagement with East Asia are numerous. First, India seeks to maintain its strategic autonomy by 

avoiding overdependence upon the United States or being overshadowed by China. Second, India seeks to avoid diplomatic isolation by being included in regional organizations such as ARF, the 

ASEAN Plus India Dialogue, and the East Asian Summit. 

Third, India’s increased engagement with East Asia is intended 

to facilitate achievement of its great power ambitions, including a 

permanent seat on the UN Security Council and recognition as a 

nuclear weapons state. 

Finally, they seek trade, investment, energy, diplomatic and security gains from ties to countries in East Asia. 

What is our assessment, an assessment of India’s activities in 

this region? First, India is making active strides in becoming a 

more accepted regional player. Second, India is shedding its past 

image in the region of being economically irrelevant, politically 

uninfluential, anti-American, pro-Soviet and even potentially 

threatening. 

India’s diplomatic gains include new or renewed high-level political exchanges. India has gained membership in major regional 

multilateral organizations, acceded to the ASEAN Treaty and 

membership in multilateral organizations. 

India has growing trade and investment ties and has signed or 

is in the process of negotiating several bilateral trading agreements 

in the region. 

On the basis—finally, on military, India is cooperating with regional militaries through exercises, facility visits and training. It 

has also established high-level defense and security dialogues, including on counterterrorism. 

Based on these assessments, we can expect that India will likely 

achieve an incremental, steady growth in its East Asian profile. 

35

Do Indian’s expanded relations with East Asia serve America’s 

strategic interests? Several aspects of the East Asia relations are 

potentially problematic to the United States. 

First, India’s East Asia activities are designed, first and foremost, to achieve its strategic autonomy, prevent its marginalization 

and increase its power capabilities. India’s support for U.S. regional objectives will be measured against these primary goals. 

Second, India cannot be counted on to support the United States 

in a possible containment of China. India’s ties with the PRC are 

not good enough to create a Sino-Indian access against the United 

States, but nor are they bad enough to want to form an alliance 

with the U.S. India will continue to hedge, seeking benefits from 

both the U.S. and China. 

Third, in a conflict in either of Asia’s two potential flashpoints, 

the Cross-Straits and Korean Peninsula, India’s supporting role to 

the U.S. is difficult to envision. 

Fourth, India’s cooperation with the military regime in Burma is 

inconsistent with U.S. policy. Its engagement there is driven by 

largely internal security considerations as well as access to energy. 

Like the U.S., India supports an expanded role for Japan in Asia; 

however, unlike the United States, India supports such a role because it believes it will contribute to the emergence of a multipolar 

international system and ultimately a Japan less reliant on the 

U.S. and more receptive to partners such as India. 

There are some advantages to the United States of India’s growing East Asia roles. In the future, if India improves its relations 

with close allies such as Japan, Australia and Singapore, there 

could be a basis for multilateral security cooperation. Also, India’s 

improving relations with East Asia helps countries avoid overdependence on China, which is in U.S. interests. And, finally, India’s goals of better ties with East Asia demand that it continue 

improved relations with the United States. 

Finally, India’s growing economic ties, particularly with East 

Asia, could spur further liberalization, increasing U.S. commercial 

opportunities. 

What are the implications for the United States in its relations 

with our allies, partners and other partners in the region of the nuclear accord and of U.S.-India relations? I would conclude by simply 

saying that, on the whole, much of East Asia welcomes an improved U.S.-India relationship as they seek to improve relations 

with India themselves. However, on the nuclear issue, some countries, particularly our allies Japan and Australia, will be wary unless they see the implementation of adequate nonproliferation commitments by India. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Dr. Limaye. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Limaye follows:]

36

1Dr. Satu Limaye joined the IDA staff on November 14, 2005. These views are personal, and 

are derived on previoUS research and publications. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SATU P. LIMAYE,1 PH.D., RESEARCH STAFF MEMBER, 

STRATEGY, FORCES & RESOURCES DIVISION, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

Introduction 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee for this 

opportunity to testify on the subject The U.S.-India ‘Global Partnership’: How Significant for American Interests? 

A key element of the Bush Administration’s stated policy of transforming U.S.-

India relations globally is cooperation with India in the wider Asia-Pacific region. 

As Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns told the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee earlier this month: ‘‘We anticipate that India will play 

an increasingly important leadership role in 21st Century Asia, working with U.S. 

to promote democracy, respect for human rights, economic growth, stability and 

peace in that vital region. By cooperating with India now, we accelerate the arrival 

of the benefits that India’s rise brings to the region and the world.’’

As requested by the Committee, I will:

• Review briefly India’s foreign policy interests and activities in East Asia (except vis-a-vis China which have been/will be addressed by another panelist);

• Assess the extent to which, if any, Delhi is likely to ally itself to American 

strategic purposes in this region.

• Assess the impact of improved U.S.-India relations, including the proposed civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement, on our other relationships in the 

region. 

India’s Foreign Policy Interests in East Asia 

India’s interests in expanded engagement with East Asia are numerous. 

First, India seeks to maintain its strategic autonomy by avoiding over-dependence 

upon the United States, or being over-shadowed by China. 

Second, India seeks to avoid diplomatic isolation by being included in regional organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus India Dialogue, and the East Asian Summit. 

Third, India’s increased engagement with East Asia is intended to facilitate 

achievement of its great power ambitions, including gaining support for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and recognition as a nuclear 

weapons state. 

Finally, India seeks trade, investment, energy, diplomatic and security gains from 

relations with individual East Asian countries. 

An Assessment of India’s Activities in East Asia 

India is making steady strides in becoming a more accepted, active regional player. 

India is shedding its past image in the region of being economically irrelevant, 

politically un-influential, anti-American, pro-Soviet and potentially threatening. 

India’s diplomatic gains include new or renewed high-level political exchanges. 

Regular institutionalized bilateral dialogues are replacing ad hoc interactions. India 

has gained membership in major regional multilateral organizations, acceded to the 

ASEAN Treaty of Amity & Cooperation (TAC), and received support for a permanent United Nations Security Council seat. 

India has growing trade and investment ties and has signed or is negotiating several bilateral trading arrangements. 

India is cooperating with regional militaries through exercises, facility visits and 

training. It has established high-level defense and security dialogues including on 

counter-terrorism. 

Importantly, periods of intense India-Pakistan tensions, India’s self-declaration as 

a nuclear weapons state and government changes in New Delhi have interrupted 

but not derailed the India-East Asia rapprochement. 

India will likely achieve an incremental growth of its East Asia profile. 

Will India Support American Strategic Purposes in the Region? 

Do India’s expanded relations with East Asia serve American strategic interests? 

What are other potential benefits and drawbacks of India’s East Asian relations for 

the United States? 

Several aspects of India’s East Asia relations are potentially problematic to U.S. 

interests.

37

• India’s East Asia activities are designed to achieve its strategic autonomy, 

prevent its marginalization, and increase its power capabilities. India’s support for U.S. regional objectives will be measured against these primary goals.

• India cannot be counted on to support the U.S. in a possible containment of 

China. India’s ties with the PRC are not good enough to create a Sino-Indian 

axis against the U.S., but not bad enough for it to want a formal alliance with 

the U.S. India will continue to hedge, seeking benefits from both the U.S. and 

China.

• In a conflict in either of Asia’s two key potential flashpoints (i.e., the CrossStraits and Korean Peninsula) an Indian role supporting the U.S. is difficult 

to envision.

• India remains wary of initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative 

(PSI).

• India’s cooperation with the military regime in Burma is inconsistent with 

U.S. policy. India’s engagement with Burma is driven by internal security, energy and strategic considerations which are unlikely to change.

• India may ultimately support the development of regional multilateral organizations and identity unfavorable to the U.S.

• Like the U.S., India supports an expanded role for Japan in Asia. However, 

unlike the U.S., India supports such a role because it believes it will contribute to the emergence of a multi-polar international system and ultimately 

a Japan less reliant on the U.S. and more receptive to partners such as India.

• Fundamentally, India’s current role in East Asia, both in motive and capability, is insufficient to form the basis for transforming U.S.-India relations.

There are, however, also some potential benefits to the U.S. of India’s East Asia 

ties.

• India’s improving relations with close U.S. allies and partners such as Japan, 

Australia and Singapore could nurture multilateral security cooperation and 

burden-sharing. India already has contributed to niche cooperation such as 

escorting high-value shipping and post-tsunami humanitarian and disaster 

relief efforts.

• India’s improving relations with East Asia helps regional countries avoid 

over-dependence on China, which is in U.S. interests.

• India’s goal of better ties with East Asia demand maintaining improved ties 

with the U.S.-providing further motivation for India to cooperate with the 

U.S.

• Expanded India-East Asia economic ties could spur India’s economic growth 

and compel further liberalization, thereby increasing U.S. commercial opportunities in India. 

Implications for U.S.-East Asia Relations 

As the U.S. improves relations with India, including possible civilian nuclear cooperation, what responses may be expected from America’s allies, partners, and 

other countries in the region?

• On balance, much of East Asia welcomes an improved U.S.-India relationship. 

Most East Asian countries have strong ties to Washington and want to build 

productive ties to India. Solid U.S.-India relations make it easier to achieve 

this goal.

However, East Asian reactions to the proposed U.S.-India agreement for civilian 

nuclear cooperation appear more mixed and as yet uncertain.

• In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 2, 

Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security discussed some of the international reactions to the proposed initiative. 

He noted that countries such as the United Kingdom and France have reacted 

favorably whereas Sweden has not, and many others have adopted a ‘‘wait 

and see’’ attitude.

• There have been no official, public statements from East Asian governments 

specifically about their views of the proposed U.S.-India nuclear agreement.

• There are indications, however, based on press reports, past responses to India’s nuclear tests and other sources that suggest East Asia is likely to be 

wary. For example, a Japan Kyodo News article reports that during recent 

bilateral U.S.-Japan talks on disarmament and nonproliferation, U.S. officials 

were told that civilian nuclear cooperation with India could ‘‘send the wrong 

38

message to North Korea and Iran.’’ A recent Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) document mentions the proposed U.S.-India 

nuclear agreement but is silent on Australia’s views of it. In addition, India’s 

past attempts to seek recognition for its nuclear weapons status by stating 

its willingness to sign the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone 

(SEANWFZ) Protocol was rejected by ASEAN. It should also be noted that 

key U.S. allies such as Australia and Japan reacted strongly to India’s 1998 

nuclear tests.

• East Asian countries are at a minimum taking a ‘‘wait and see’’ approach to 

the proposed agreement. Their positions in the future are likely to be shaped 

by several factors including the extent and credibility of Indian nonproliferation commitments; impacts on their other foreign policy interests; and the importance they place on global nonproliferation in their foreign and security 

policies.

• It seems highly unlikely that any East Asian country (5 of the 44 members 

of the Nuclear Suppliers Group are from East Asia-Australia, China, Japan, 

New Zealand, and ROK) will pursue civilian nuclear cooperation with India 

in the form of supplying technology or material.

• Finally, no East Asian country is likely to advocate de jure recognition to India’s nuclear weapons capability, though several regional states have given it 

a de facto recognition.

Despite some uncertainty as to whether East Asia will support the initiative to 

pursue civilian nuclear cooperation with India, some points are clear:

• U.S. relations with East Asia are unlikely to be seriously harmed by the pursuit of the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement. However, potential frictions can be minimized, particularly with allies such as Japan and Australia, 

if India implements strong nonproliferation commitments.

• U.S. efforts to improve relations with India in other areas such as trade, investment, global issues, counter-terrorism, maritime security and defense will 

continue to be welcomed by America’s East Asian partners.

Chairman HYDE. The panel is to be congratulated for keeping 

within the time constraints. That is remarkable. 

Mr. Berman? 

He is not here. Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At our last hearing, 

most of the nuclear nonproliferation experts argued that India be 

required to adopt a moratorium on production of additional highly 

enriched uranium and plutonium weapons. This addition to the 

agreement could be a deal-breaker, as the Indians have continuously and strongly opposed this. 

However, the question is: Is there an additional benefit from the 

U.S. that the Indians might want that could persuade them to 

adopt a moratorium, such as U.S. support for permanent seat on 

the UN Security Council. 

Dr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes. You are getting into horse trading here, but I 

think that——

Mr. ACKERMAN. That is what we do around here. 

Mr. COHEN. I think the issue itself is critically important, and 

this is where India is in the early stages of learning how to be a 

nuclear weapons state. Nuclear weapons states come to realize that 

as they define their own security—how much is enough, how many 

nuclear weapons they need to be secure—that this may impinge on 

the security of other states, including states around the world. 

So an Indian nuclear program which satisfied Indian desires, 

that was 10,000 weapons or 1,000 weapons, which was seaborne, 

traveling all around the world, that would raise concern among 

many countries around the world. A program that was confined to 

39

South Asia with a side deterrent against China would not raise 

those kinds of alarms. 

So the big question that the Indians have to answer, that we 

can’t answer for them, but we can certainly ask the question, is 

how much is enough, how many weapons do they need? And if a 

fissile material cutoff at this point would limit the Indian programs, but no fissile material cutoff in Indian fissile nuclear material production of a substantial rate, it would certainly eventually 

threaten many other states and would not go through the nuclear 

supplier groups. Those countries, in particular, are concerned. So 

that is why I think this whole debate about the nuclear—dividing 

civil and nuclear facilities really is important. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Are you saying that rather than be looking for 

some kind of additional give-back from the United States, that the 

Indians would be willing to accept a cap? Is that what you are saying? 

Mr. COHEN. I think we need to know from them what their limits 

are going to be, what cap they will produce—what cap they will accept themselves. To be honest, I don’t know. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Dr. Tellis. 

Mr. COHEN. In the deal, it says they will separate civil and military facilities. How many of the reactors will wind up on the military side? How many on the civilian side? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. That is not my question. 

Dr. Tellis. 

Mr. TELLIS. I think this is an issue in which we can give nothing 

to get a cap, and the reason we cannot get a cap from India is very 

simple: As long as there is uncertainty about the future size and 

character of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, the Indians will not give 

up their option to produce fissile materials. 

The facts of the matter here are what determines India’s choices. 

India has a very small fissile material stockpile relative to what 

the Chinese have. The Chinese have the lead because they got into 

the fissile material production business about 30 years before the 

Indians did, and so at this point it is a national security interest 

for India. 

The constraint that is implicit in the July 18th agreement is that 

India puts its civilian reactors under safeguards, in effect implying 

that it gives up the option of building the largest possible arsenal 

that it could because it is essentially saying, I will give you X number of reactors under international safeguards, which will not be 

available for the production of fissile materials for the weapons 

programs. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. That is a pretty fungible kind of process. Your 

conclusion though, nonetheless, is that there is nothing India 

would trade. 

Dr. Frankel. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Yes, I just want to underline that. 

I think it is a very dangerous road to go down if we do want an 

agreement with India. There is a big debate raging in India right 

now about whether or not the agreement to separate military and 

nuclear facilities is, in fact, a cap of their ability to produce any 

fissile material. 

40

They have—scientists, politicians are arguing that it will slow 

down their attempt to build fast breeder reactors and use thorium, 

which would give them energy independence; so they are very 

wary, in fact, that the United States, introducing this kind of arrangement, is seeking already to cap their nuclear capability. And 

I think if that becomes a matter of debate within India, those who 

oppose any kind of concession, as they see it, to the United States, 

matters of national security, will accuse the Singh government of 

betraying India’s independent foreign policy. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Without such a cap, do you think that this proposal, as is, should be approved? 

Ms. FRANKEL. I think if you are going to go down this road, this 

is the only way that you will get an agreement with India. I think 

the prime minister has gone out on such a limb for this agreement, 

to say it is complete in itself as was negotiated, that he cannot now 

introduce other qualifications. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The question is, if we do not impose a cap—and 

the Indians, I should say, cannot accept a cap—do we go ahead 

with this because of the overall value of the agreement? 

Ms. FRANKEL. That then becomes a context of whether or not we 

think India can contribute to our strategic interests in Asia, we 

want to pay this particular price. I think that is a matter for the 

Congress. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I know the clock has run out, but 

if we can get a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ possibly from each of the other panelists on this, it is a very important question. 

Mr. TELLIS. The answer is ‘‘yes,’’ and I will say one other thing. 

If you want to get a cap, the best thing we can do is work for a 

global cutoff treaty. 

Chairman HYDE. Dr. Cohen? 

Mr. COHEN. I would say ‘‘yes’’ if, as Dr. Tellis says, the implicit 

understanding of the agreement is that there will be no master 

shift of civilian reactors to the military side, which is, in effect, a 

cap. 

Offering a UN seat is not in our power; we may support India 

for the UN. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. We can offer support for it publicly. 

Mr. LIMAYE. No, unless we can negotiate further nonproliferation 

commitments, such as a fissile material cutoff along Ashley’s lines. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Four qualified yeses. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Burton of Indiana. 

Mr. BURTON. I came down here trying to get some kind of definitive answer on this issue since we are going to be visiting India 

quickly. I feel a little confused. 

You say trust is a big part of all this. Any of you? You think that 

the members of the Indian government still have a lot of distrust 

about whether or not we will live up to our commitments, is that 

it? 

Mr. TELLIS. I think on this issue in particular it is less a matter 

of trust as it is a response to uncertainty. The Indians are uncertain about what their future nuclear environment will look like. 

They are uncertain about the eventual size of the Chinese arsenal. 

They are uncertain about what the Pakistan nuclear arsenal will 

look like. 

41

Given these two fundamental uncertainties, they are reluctant to 

accept a cap on their ability to produce fissile materials at this 

point. Therefore, the solution they have recommended and we have 

accepted in principle is that both sides will work toward a universal cutoff, which not only controls the Indian production, but the 

Pakistani production as well. 

Mr. BURTON. We have been very encouraged by Prime Minister 

Singh and President Musharraf’s discussions about working together to solve some of the very difficult problems that have led to 

conflicts in the past, and in particular we have been very happy 

that they have actually been willing to sit down and talk. 

Can you give us your assessment of the long-term arrangement 

or understanding between the two countries, or do you think this 

is just temporary? Number two, I would like to have somebody 

mention a little bit about the Kashmir issue. 

I talked to the former Foreign Minister of India, and he said the 

issue of Kashmir was nonnegotiable, and that has been a sticking 

point in the relationship between India and Pakistan for some 

time. I would like to get your assessment of that as well, any of 

you. 

Mr. COHEN. I will speak to both those questions. I don’t think 

that trust is an issue. I think it is a question of verification and 

views toward the United States. 

In a paper I submitted along with my testimony I go through 

four major schools of Indian thought toward the United States. 

[The information referred to follows:]

INDIA: AMERICA’S NEW ALLY? 

The Brookings Institution, July 18, 2005

Stephen P. Cohen, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies 

Stephen Cohen is the author of India: Emerging Power (2001).

This week Washington hosts Dr. Manmohan Singh, India’s Prime Minister, and 

one of the most thoughtful economist-politicians of this or any other era. The visit 

will be heralded as the further flowering of a ‘‘natural alliance’’ between the world’s 

oldest and largest democracies. The relationship has received bipartisan praise, notably by several former American ambassadors to Delhi, and in think-tank reports 

and Congressional testimony. 

All of this attention is deserved yet Washington still does not seem to have 

grasped the complexities and ambiguities present on the Indian side of this putative 

alliance. India is a democracy; while there was continuity between the conservative 

nationalist BJP-led coalition and the current left-liberal Congress-led coalition, the 

fact is that India is likely to remain governed for many years by ideologically diverse coalitions of uncertain durability. This means that US-Indian relations will remain hostage to Indian domestic politics. Further, there are important differences 

within the Indian strategic elite as to the wisdom of the growing American tie. 

There are four schools of thought in India regarding relations with America. 

These derive from differing readings of the past and differing visions of the future. 

The Enthusiasts tend to look upon past strains in the U.S.-Indian relationship as 

stemming from the Cold War or America’s ignorance of India’s importance. They believe that times have changed, and emphasize the many benefits that will accrue 

to India if it were to join with the United States in a quasi-alliance relationship. 

The Vajpayee government invented the term ‘‘natural alliance’’ which has been 

adopted by Prime Minister Singh’s government ,and American officials. The Enthusiasts, found in the Indian business community, in a few corners of the foreign ministry, and among some politicians, are confident that they can manage the Americans via the growing India lobby, by more gracious diplomacy, and by holding out 

the prospect of collaboration on a number of issues of mutual importance, notably 

terrorism, containing China, and coping with Islamic radicalism. They see the USIsrael relationship as a model, and for that reason have strongly cultivated IndianVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:25 May 16, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\111605\24598.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
42

Israeli ties. In the distant future, they see this new alliance as ensuring that American support for Pakistan will wither away. 

The Free Riders resemble the Enthusiasts in much of their analysis of the past, 

and acknowledge the major changes in the international order and in American perceptions of India, but they do not envision a long-lasting, open ended or durable alliance relationship with Washington. They might ride the American bus for a few 

stops, but not to the end of the line. Widely distributed in the Indian strategic community, the Free Riders believe that sooner or later as India gains strength from 

the American connection, strains will appear. In their view Indian national interests 

require a close connection to Washington but that in the long run America is too 

fickle and too powerful to be trusted. The US can be used, however, to establish 

India at the global level as a major power (symbolized by admission to the nuclear 

club, and a Security Council Seat), and to make India the dominant power in South 

Asia. For some Free Riders, Washington’s acquisition of bases in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan are warning signs that Washington might still be interested in challenging 

Indian dominance. 

The Doubters not only have a different reading of history than the first two 

groups, they see the future as far more troubling. From their perspective, Washington remains a potential threat to Indian interests, just as it was during much 

of the Cold War, when it armed and supported Pakistan. While the Enthusiasts and 

Free Riders might point to the threat to India from a ‘‘rising’’ China, and conclude 

that Washington sees India as a potential balancer, the Doubters, found among 

many diplomats and soldiers who came to political maturity during the worst period 

of US-Indian relations (the 1970s), do not believe that the Americans will consistently hold this view. In any case, they believe that India can cope with China’s rise, 

and that a too close entanglement with America might make India the target of Chinese hostility. In other words, they do not want a situation where the United States 

will fight China to the last Indian. The doubters favor continued restrictions on 

American scholars in India, are wary of American attempts to broker an agreement 

on Kashmir, and are alarmed by the rising ‘‘American lobby’’ in New Delhi and 

Mumbai, as distorting an independent analysis of Indian-American relations. 

Finally, the Hostiles see America as not only a dominant superpower, but as intrinsically opposed to India. From the left we hear that America seeks to dominate 

Indian markets, exploit Indian labor and manpower, and pollute the Indian landscape, to its own benefit and India’s detriment. On the right the arguments include 

a fear of cultural pollution from Hollywood and materialistic America, a concern 

that American technology will wipe out indigenous skills and entrepreneurs, and finally that Washington will never really abandon Pakistan because it needs to appease Muslim opinion, and because it fears a rising Hindu India. 

These four opinion clusters overlap, and a major Indian debate on relations with 

America is now underway. Washington must understand this debate, for it will influence future Indian policy decisions. For example, New Delhi led Washington to 

believe that it would send troops to Iraq, but after a loud cry was heard from the 

Doubters and the Hostiles, the Vajpayee government backed off. Conversely, there 

are Indian expectations regarding American policy (notably, support for a UN seat 

and membership in the nuclear club). How America responds to these Indian demands will shape the balance of influence among these four schools. Burying USIndian differences under labels (‘‘natural allies’’ being one of them), does injustice 

to the prospect of two democratic states discussing their real differences and their 

real shared interests, and forging a relationship that is both durable and mutually 

beneficial.

Mr. COHEN. Two of them are hostile, or verge on hostile, and I 

think the Indian government that negotiated this agreement with 

Washington really has to face a considerable amount of domestic 

criticism, and I think we should be supportive and helpful. 

I do think it is a good agreement, but they do face as much opposition there as it faces here, although of a different nature. 

As for Kashmir, from an Indian perspective, Kashmir is negotiable, but a negotiation between New Delhi and Srinagar, that is 

between India and the Kashmiri people, not with Pakistan, and 

least of all with the United States. 

Incredibly, you know, the one country that has an interest in the 

resolution of Kashmir and that has leverage in both India and 

Pakistan is China. I could foresee 5, 6 years from now a more maVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:25 May 16, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\111605\24598.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
43

ture China looking to the south and trying to broker a deal on 

Kashmir using its own border dispute with India as a leverage for 

the Indians. It may not happen, but if we are not going to do it, 

and I don’t think we are willing to do it, and no other country is 

going to do it, you may well see the Chinese step in and try to play 

the role of regional broker. Now this seems improbable, but 5 or 

6 years a more mature China, one that has demonstrated its bona 

fides in North Korea and elsewhere, might seek to play that role. 

But I do think the Indian government, for them, Kashmir is not 

negotiable in terms of making major concessions to Pakistan. 

Mr. BURTON. Okay. Let me follow up on that and then we will 

go to Dr. Frankel. You do believe that they are willing to work with 

and negotiate with the people of Srinagar, Kashmir rather, to work 

out some kind of a semi-autonomous governmental structure where 

they can govern themselves? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes. Kashmir has been badly governed from New 

Delhi for many decades, and the Indians are aware of this. There 

is no question they understand they have sort of mismanaged their 

part of Kashmir. And I think recent developments, a new Chief 

Minister in Kashmir, seems to indicate that there is more realism 

and more willingness to negotiate with Kashmiris in achieving 

some kind of autonomy, which lessens Kashmiri anger and irritation at India. 

Mr. BURTON. Prime Minister Singh you think, and his administration, will go along with that? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, it is both a Congress Party issue, but it is a 

government issue, and I think they have made some important 

steps. 

Mr. BURTON. I am sorry, if I could get a response from Dr. 

Frankel, I will let that be the end, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you. First of all, I think it is a mistake to 

underestimate the resentment that remains at U.S. policies toward 

Pakistan and especially Washington’s patronage of President 

Musharraf and his military government. I was in India just before 

Secretary Rice made her offer to India and the issue that dominated debate at that time was the decision by the United States 

to supply the F–16s to Pakistan. 

There was no doubt in the mind of senior policy leaders in Delhi 

that they would reconsider the entire relationship between the 

United States and India if we went ahead and supplied those 

planes to Pakistan. It was a matter of trust. 

What turned that around, of course, was this package that was 

offered to India a few days before we formally announced this 

transfer. So I think that the trust issue is very much still on the 

table. 

As far as—and I will back up by saying if we now try to change 

the terms of this July 18th accord, it will be seen as the resurgence 

of this old issue, how can you trust the United States. 

The second thing about Kashmir, there have been some positive 

signs. The composite dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad 

is proceeding, and I want to flag one particular meeting in New 

Delhi, April 18, 2005. That ended with a joint statement by 

Musharraf and Manmohan Singh asserting the peace process is 

now irreversible. What is interesting about that is the two governVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:25 May 16, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\111605\24598.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
44

ments endorsed the idea that India and Pakistan will move toward 

a soft border, and we have seen they are trying to increase trade 

by trucks, pilgrimages and so on. And Musharraf outlined options 

for ‘‘final settlement’’ of the Kashmir issue. This is a term also used 

by New Delhi for the first time since 1971. It is very significant because it recognizes there is an issue which should be settled by 

both countries. So I think it is a matter of CBMs that need to be 

worked out. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, may I have one more question real 

quick? 

How can the Congress of the United States, I know the Administration and Condoleezza Rice, our Secretary of State, have been 

working to work out an agreement and have better relations. How 

can the Congress of the United States create a better environment 

or better working relationship with India? You don’t need to go into 

great detail, but if you have some real quick vignettes, we would 

really appreciate it. 

Ms. FRANKEL. I think that the Congress demonstrating its support for this agreement, the debate is going to be watched very 

closely, is going to offer the evidence that India is looking for. I 

don’t think that beyond that individual Congressmen or groups of 

Congressmen can do much more than express their goodwill and 

support for a closer relationship between the two countries. 

Mr. COHEN. I would just add there are many other aspects of the 

U.S.-India relationship which have languished in the past and 

which should be supported and the Congress can play an active 

role in. I am particularly seeing a lot of academic exchanges. There 

are tens of thousands of Indian students here, and there is only 

like 450 American students in India. And clearly our countries and 

cultures need to know each other better. 

There is a large American Indian community which is useful, but 

this doesn’t make up for I think 30 years of neglect of a serious 

study of India in the United States. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to compliment my good friend and colleague from Indiana. 

It so happens that I have written the word ‘‘trust’’ in this note 

here. It seems to be the essence of the entire dialogue and the relationship currently existing between our country and India. 

In all the years that I have served as a Member of this Committee, I cannot think of a country that has had a more profound 

concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons than India, and 

I want to preface my remarks by saying in 1974 India exploded its 

first nuclear device. It shocked the world. Members of the nuclear 

club were saying, what in the world is this country doing? 

The first thing that India did, as I recall, is Prime Minister Gandhi then made a speech before the United Nations General Assembly and appealed to the world body, specifically to the members of 

the nuclear club, hey, we can do it too. But if we are ever going 

to be serious about nonproliferation, there has got to be effective 

measures taken, especially by the nuclear have’s, to make sure that 

nuclear weapons will be dismantled and gotten rid of, this madness 

from the world. 

45

And guess what? Total silence. Total silence, not only by the 

world community but by the nuclear have’s. I don’t think you have 

to be a nuclear scientist to suggest that India’s national strategic 

interest was at stake. If I was an Indian, I would be sleeping very 

lightly knowing that China has a nuclear weapon and I don’t. 

So we are back again here about some of the questions raised 

about nuclear India’s nuclear program. Now we are making this as 

Professor Cohen eloquently stated, negligence, or even just absolute 

indifference we have had as our policy toward India for the past 

30 or 40 years. 

Is it any wonder why Indian leaders have a little sense of perhaps mistrust toward us because we have not been fair with them, 

in my humble opinion. 

So my question to the members of the panel, and serious implications with Pakistan’s nuclear program, because the chain reaction 

is very much of that proliferation that we are very fearful of. But 

I ask the panel, what right is it for the nuclear have’s to tell the 

rest of the world you should not have in your possession nuclear 

devices, but it is okay for us to have it? I wanted to ask the members of the panel, am I making any sense here about proliferation 

and why India—this has not happened yesterday. India has been 

one of the strongest proponents of nonproliferation in the most serious way. Nobody would even give India attention to this whole 

thing. 

I notice that Professor Cohen shook his head at my comment 

there. But the fact that the Indians exploded this nuclear device in 

1974, since 1974 they have had to take their own interests at stake 

with their own national security, if you will, because why not? 

So I want to ask the panel if we don’t have a civil nuclear agreement with India, let’s say that the conservative element of the Congress, of the Administration, wins out this idea, no, let’s not have 

it, do you think this is going to prevent other countries from filling 

the gap, perhaps France, perhaps other countries that do have, and 

you can correct me. I am told that a vast majority of France’s nuclear, electricity, is dependent on nuclear energy. So what is to prevent a country like France or others to say hey, if the U.S. doesn’t 

want a civil agreement with you, we will do it for you, to provide 

for the needs of 1 billion people on this planet. I would like to ask 

Professor Cohen, because he shook his head when I said that India 

has done, in my humble opinion, has been one of the strongest proponents of nonproliferation, in all seriousness, but the world never 

seemed to pay any attention to this. 

Please. 

Mr. COHEN. Two points. I support this agreement, although I 

don’t know what the details, but generally I certainly support the 

Administration’s statement. A few years ago I organized a conference in New Delhi and an American said that the nuclear issue 

was a chasm that separated our two countries. And it is true, it 

is a symbolic, emotional policy chasm. He said we can’t jump the 

chasm in one step. An Indian said there is a chasm and we should 

work on it, but there are other areas where we are not that far 

apart and where you can hop over the gap between the two countries. 

46

I am concerned that the nuclear deal, while I support it, may get 

stalled or stagnated or blocked, either here or there, and that the 

other aspects of the relationship will suffer for it. 

But in the case of India’s nonproliferation policy, it is good in 

terms of vertical proliferation, although the Indian program triggered the Pakistani program, and the Pakistanis, of course, have 

gone on to bigger and better things in terms of leakage. 

But the Indians also showed the way, and the North Koreans 

and the Iranians quote India’s strategists about how to do vertical 

proliferation and by pointing out nuclear apartheid. 

I think the Clinton Administration pushed India into its nuclear 

test. I think they made a serious miscalculation of leveraging India, 

and I think the Bush Administration is seeing this more realistically and more sensibly, so I support this policy. 

But the Indians are not entirely without responsibility for what 

has happened. Their own nuclear program was covert, secret, they 

denied they had one for many decades. In fact we knew they did 

have one, eventually it became public. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Is it any different from the fact that Israel 

also denies it has in its possession nuclear weapons? 

Mr. COHEN. I agree. In terms of blame and support, I think they 

are perfectly comparable, yes. 

Mr. TELLIS. Congressman, I think that the international nuclear 

order is an inequitable order, there is no question about it, and if 

we pretend otherwise, it is just the will of the wisp. The question 

that we have to ask is, however regrettable the inequality is, does 

it serve our interests? And to that I would say in a qualified way 

that it does. 

So what we have done as a country, and particularly what the 

Administration has done since 2001, is actually to take your advice 

and not browbeat the Indians about the fact that they have a nuclear weapons program. 

The Clinton Administration actually tried to do this, especially 

toward the tail-end of the Administration. But as a full blown policy, it required the new Administration to in a sense say we have 

to face reality. 

The Indians live in a bad neighborhood, as Henry Kissinger put 

it. They are not going to give up their nuclear weapons no matter 

what we think about them. So the best way to dealt with India and 

engage India is to simply accept the fact that these weapons are 

going to be there and they are not going to go away. So I think the 

big policy change that has occurred since 2001 is we don’t get on 

India’s case. 

The second thing that I want to say, which goes to the earlier 

point that you have made about trust, is that we have tried to talk 

to India about every issue in the bilateral relationship, both issues 

on which we agree and on issues on which we have very serious 

disagreements about. And part of the reason why the Indians reacted with the equanimity they did about the U.S. decision to sell 

F–16s to Pakistan was because of us following the no surprises 

route. 

Secretary Rice went to Delhi and had a private conversation with 

the Prime Minister and conveyed to him U.S. intent. Of course, it 

was difficult for India to accept, but given our interests in PakiVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:25 May 16, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\111605\24598.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
47

stan, it is something that they understood. And even if they had 

reservations about U.S. plans, the important thing was that this 

took place in the context of a conversation between the leaders of 

the two sides and something you can read about in the newspapers. 

Let me also address the point you made about what prevents the 

French from going ahead and making their own agreement if we 

fail to do so. I would hope very much that the French don’t do that. 

In fact, at this stage in the game it is in our combined interests 

that this initiative not fail, because what are we trying to do here? 

What we are trying to do is create a carve-out in what is admittedly an inequitable order. This carve-out is going to pose tensions 

not only to existing U.S. policies but to a range of U.S. national security goals. We recognize this. 

Therefore, what we want to do is to institute this carve-out in 

the most orderly possible way, and we want to do this in consultation I hope between the Congress and the Executive Branch, but 

also in consultation between the United States and the international community. 

We do not want the U.S. agreement with India to become the excuse for every potential nuclear supplier on the planet to go out 

and make their own deals with people of their choosing. 

So the need for us to be successful and to be successful in an orderly fashion I think is extremely important. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has run. I 

would like to hear some comments from Dr. Frankel and Dr. 

Limaye for 1 minute, if it is all right with you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Yes, indeed. 

Ms. FRANKEL. It is going to be a challenge to do what Ashley has 

suggested, although I think that is a desirable thing to do. China 

in recent days, as you know, has come out very strongly to criticize 

the agreement between the United States and India, and it has already taken a strong stand against India’s position as a member 

of the UN Security Council. So I think it is unlikely that we can 

walk in lockstep with other members who are recognized nuclear 

weapons states on this issue. In fact, the worry is that China, and 

China has openly threatened this, will now take preferential policies forward that benefit its own favored countries and that, of 

course, suggests Pakistan. 

I should say in ending up that in any case, China has done this 

for a long time and we don’t know if they continue to do it. So there 

may be no solution to this kind of problem. 

Mr. LIMAYE. On the East Asian front, I would say, sir, that there 

are only five members in East Asia of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 

Japan, China, Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand. I 

wouldn’t anticipate any of those countries separately from us would 

go forward with nuclear cooperation with India. In Australia and 

Japan’s case, particularly because of their strong nonproliferation 

emphasis, they will not get ahead of the United States. 

But the real concerns I think, particularly on Japan’s part, as I 

understand their concerns, are the implications for a negotiation 

with North Korean and also for our negotiations with Iran. 

If this carve-out proceeds, what kind of spillovers might there be, 

what kind of amendments might they have to fend off demands 

from Tehran or Pyongyang. These are the kind of considerations 

48

they would face, but I wouldn’t anticipate any of the five NSG 

members from East Asia from moving forward with a separate nuclear supply arrangement with India for either material or technology. 

I would note just parenthetically that Australia is in the throes 

of negotiating a uranium supply agreement with China. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And please don’t mention New Zealand in 

this whole scenario, Dr. Limaye. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Royce of California. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Tellis, you recently wrote:

‘‘If the United States is serious about advancing its geopolitical 

objectives in Asia, it would almost by definition help New 

Delhi develop its strategic capabilities such that India’s nuclear weaponry and associated delivery systems could deter 

against a growing and utterly more capable nuclear force Beijing is likely to possess by 2025.’’

Please walk us through your logic. Is this the motivation behind 

this agreement? 

Mr. TELLIS. It is dangerous to have a paper trail. It is even more 

dangerous when people read what you write. But thank you for 

bringing this to my attention. 

Let me say two things. When I made that argument, I made that 

argument in the abstract on the assumption that only the balance 

of power mattered. If only the balance of power in Asia mattered, 

I would stand by everything that you just read out. However, there 

are other values that we have to pursue simultaneously in addition 

to maintaining a balance of power, part of which involves a stable 

nonproliferation order where we live up to our obligations of not assisting other countries develop nuclear capabilities. 

When you take the totality of the obligations that confront us, 

both with respect to power politics and nonproliferation, there are 

many things that I may prefer we do that we simply cannot do. 

And I think that is really the bottom line with respect to that specific argument. 

On the general argument, people have often asked whether it is 

a desire to balance or contain China that has driven this initiative. 

I think that is a very narrow way of looking at the problem. 

What has driven this initiative I think are two elements: One, 

the recognition that India is a rising power, is a democratic state 

with which we share common values, and which actually shares interests in common with the United States. That is one bookend. 

The second bookend is that India is located in a continent, Asia, 

which is going to grow more and more important for American interests over time, and part of our objectives must be to shape the 

Asian environment in a way that suits our interests. 

So what the Administration has tried to do is follow a three-track 

strategy: One, to improve U.S. relations with all the major Asian 

States; second, to improve U.S. relations particularly with the 

democratic states in Asia, because that provides us a certain degree 

of political and psychological insurance; and, three, to encourage 

the states in Asia to improve relations among themselves. 

49

Our agreement with India must be seen in the context of this 

shaping strategy. And, yes, while it will have the effect of creating 

an environment that provides disincentives for China to rise in any 

way other than peacefully, our objectives in reaching this agreement with India are much bigger than just China itself. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask Dr. Limaye for his observations as well. 

Mr. LIMAYE. Well, I share Ashley’s premise indeed that our improvement in relations with India must be seen in a broader context than just the China issue. 

Having said that, what I tried to convey in my opening remarks 

is that there are constraints, yet there may not be in a decade or 

two decades, but as of yet it is difficult to see that India shares exactly the same strategic interests with us in the broader Asian-Pacific region, or that their weight and depth of their interactions 

with Asia, East Asia in particular, are sufficient enough that they 

will become partners. 

Now, let me suggest two or three examples where they have become very helpful. Niche security cooperation, like escorting highvalue shipping through the Straits of Malacca. They were very 

helpful during OEF. They have been helpful in the post-tsunami 

disaster relief efforts, extraordinarily helpful on that front. And 

there are many ways in which we can cooperate with India, counterterrorism, piracy, sea lanes, et cetera. 

But I think that if we have very high expectations that we will 

jump from where we are now to a strategic alliance on major AsiaPacific issues, there will be a large gap there that won’t be met in 

reality. That is my only caution. 

Mr. ROYCE. Dr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, I don’t think we know yet whether China will 

be a threat to India of a magnitude that India has to have a massive nuclear capability, but I do know that the Indian, at least the 

preferred outcome of most Indian strategists is, as I think Dr. 

Limaye argued, a world of five or six major power centers, and 

India would be one of those. 

I think that in the medium term, India sees a relationship with 

the U.S. as leverage in Asia and the world to become one of those 

power centers. In the long term, we don’t know whether the U.S.-

India relationship will endure in India after India arrives as a 

major power center in Asia. So, to me, the future is unknowable. 

The nuclear deal is good, I think we should pursue it, but I don’t 

think it implies that we should build India to be a major military 

counter to China. That I think is premature. I think we should try 

to look at issues like arms control, negotiated agreement on levels 

and deployment between India and Pakistan and China, and if we 

can play a role in this ourselves in terms of our own willingness 

to again pick up the logic of arms control on these issues. 

I do think in this case the three countries do not need to be on 

an inevitable arms race with each other. There will be an arms 

crawl. They will improve their weapons, they will improve the 

range. But to have massive nuclear weapons deployed by all three 

countries I think is not in their interests and certainly not in our 

interests. 

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Watson of California. 

50

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for bringing 

this to our attention, our U.S. and India global partnership. I 

would like to address this question to Dr. Limaye. 

Just last week, our Trade Representative, Rob Portman, was in 

India working on particularly the issue of WTO negotiations. Last 

week also we participated with the Bollywood film industry. I represent Hollywood in my district in California, and we had the representatives from Bollywood with us. We talked about how we 

could better enforce the laws on intellectual property. We are quite 

concerned about the piracy that is taking place around the world 

and we wanted to really get into a discussion. I could not spend 

a whole lot of time with them. 

Anyway, we want to know how we can benefit from both our 

countries and what we can do to enforce the laws. 

I just want to know, do you see further evidence of an emerging 

convergence of U.S. and India interests on the trade and legal 

issues, and particularly those that confront Bollywood, Hollywood 

and the rest of our creative property interests? 

Mr. LIMAYE. Thank you for your question. I am afraid I am not 

sufficiently knowledgeable on the intellectual property rights. If I 

am not mistaken, one of my colleagues on the panel can correct me, 

that India has signed up to the intellectual property protection. 

That is the latest I know. As to how that applies, ma’am, specifically to intellectual property on the creative side, I am sorry, I simply don’t know. 

Ms. WATSON. Maybe somebody else on the panel would like to 

join in this discussion. 

Mr. TELLIS. I think today India’s interests, especially on questions of national property rights, are much closer to that of the 

U.S. than even as recently as 5 years ago, and there is a very simple reason why that is so. Because in the last 5 years, the Indians 

have become more confident, one, of their ability to stand up to 

international competition and in a sense play the same game and, 

two, they have become more and more important exporters of both 

goods and intangibles that require protection in third countries. So 

as long as India was purely a consumer for what the rest of the 

world produced, its interests in national property protection was 

close to zero. But when Indian goods in a sense start getting pirated, when India starts losing revenues because other trading states 

don’t have the same levels of protections that we do, then the Indians begin to immediately see the value of having a robust international intellectual protection regime that comes very close to 

ours. 

My own sense is that as India’s export performance begins to increase, especially in high value added industries, and Bollywood is 

a good example, because creative is a high value industry, pharmaceuticals, science and technology exports, India’s interest having a 

robust IPR will increase. 

Ms. WATSON. I would hope that we would continue, Mr. Chairman, to look at this issue, not only on the weapons, nuclear weapons level, but also on other levels too. I am glad that this is the 

beginning of that dialogue, and I hope we can continue it. 

51

We did work briefly together last week with their industry, their 

Bollywood industry, and we would like to continue that. So we 

might want to revisit some other trade issues at another time. 

Thank you for the time. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Mr. Pence of Indiana. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this 

hearing and my gratitude to the distinguished panel. It strikes me 

that there is perhaps other than the war on terror itself, there is 

no more important foreign policy opportunity for the people of the 

United States of America than our relationship with the largest 

English speaking democracy in the world. I appreciate the extraordinary experience that is represented on this panel, and it comes 

at a very meaningful time in the runup to congressional consideration of the changes that the Administration has called for in this 

relationship. 

I think I would like to direct my questions to Dr. Tellis and Dr. 

Limaye, if I might. Many you of us were thrilled when the Prime 

Minister came to Washington in July. I believe that history will 

record that as a milestone in a relationship between two great peoples. I believe that it is already on the path to becoming a part of 

the legacy of this Administration and will be spoken of decades 

from now if we proceed and if history unfolds in the terms that we 

hope. 

We understand that while the Administration has contemplated 

this Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, that comes in the wake 

of 30 years of disagreement. It is a disagreement over India’s decision not to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. That set the 

table for the United States not ever being willing to cooperate on 

the issue of civilian nuclear power. 

We have essentially been at loggerheads as two great peoples, 

and it strikes me that what the President apprehended on September 11 is that the only thing September 11 changed was everything, and that we had to look at relationships that had reached 

an historic stalemate and we had to reconsider. 

But I don’t think, at least my impression is, that it is not the intention of the Administration and would certainly not be the intention of Congress to reconsider the goals of the United States with 

regard to nonproliferation. India obviously is in an historic confrontation. It is happily a Cold War at this time, but it is at least 

that. So one can understand the reasons why India is not prepared 

to enter into a traditional nonproliferation posture. But it would 

still be our objective to get there. 

My question is, and I do have a question, is is it the judgment 

of you, Dr. Tellis, or you, Dr. Limaye, that a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement could actually promote nonproliferation efforts 

with India and bring them ultimately within the international nonproliferation regime? 

Mr. TELLIS. Congressman, I think you have asked a question 

that is at the heart of the agreement, because the way I envisage 

the benefits of this agreement, these are threefold. Clearly there 

are benefits with respect to overall U.S.-India engagement itself, 

what you pointed out in you initial remarks. There are questions 

with respect to assisting the growth of India power, providing it 

52

with energy, providing it with the capacity to grow at the 8 percent 

that it requires. And there is a third area that hasn’t received 

much attention today, and that is the nonproliferation benefits of 

bringing it into the fold. 

What are the facts here? The facts are that today India has mastery over three separate and distinct nuclear fuel cycles, that it is 

not constrained by any international regime or any international 

agreement from exporting. The only way we can expect India to accept the obligations that the rest of the members of the regime accept is if at some level we are willing to extend it some of the benefits, because it is just unreasonable to expect that they will maintain their good proliferation record in perpetuity if they continue 

to be the target of the regime at the same time. 

So what is at the heart of this bargain is really an effort to bring 

India into the fold, bring its entire apparatus other than the small 

portion that it will maintain for nuclear needs under an international system of safeguards. This to me is a profound nonproliferation benefit. 

Mr. PENCE. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is expired. If Dr. 

Limaye could respond briefly to my question, I will be grateful. 

Mr. LIMAYE. Very briefly, let me put it this way: Without a U.S.-

Indian civil nuclear agreement and the associated nonproliferation 

commitments that India must implement in exchange for that 

agreement, there is no chance of getting India on board to the nonproliferation goals we have. 

The essential question, and naturally Ashley and I would agree 

on this, is how do we move from the civil nuclear agreement carrot 

to the commitments on the nonproliferation front. How are those 

operationalized, implemented, transparent and reliable? That is the 

issue. But we must in the absence of this initiative, this very bold 

initiative, there is virtually no chance of moving forward, and I 

think it will also have all of the counter-implications that Ashley 

mentioned, which is it will set back U.S.-India relations if this now 

falls apart. The question is getting the commitments squared with 

the carrot of the cooperation. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Chandler of Kentucky. 

Mr. CHANDLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been a wonderful presentation, and obviously a very important issue that we 

are dealing with. It means an enormous amount to global peace. 

It seems to me after listening to the questions and to the testimony that there are a number of truths that come forward, one of 

which is that India will make their decisions based on what is in 

India’s national interests. So anything to the contrary, any thought 

to the contrary on our part would be mislaid. 

That should not surprise anybody. 

Given that, it would be of great interest to us to fully understand 

what India’s true interests are. With that in mind, it also seems 

to me that India’s relationship with China is particularly critical to 

understanding what India’s interests are. 

I think several years ago at the height of the Cold War our country made a great misapprehension as it related to China’s national 

interests. We took the position that they were better Communists 

maybe than they were better Chinese and thought that they had 

53

the possibility in the future of having a long-term alliance with the 

Russians, and I think it colored our international policy. 

What is the nature of India’s ancient relationship with China, 

with the Chinese? What can we expect in the future from that relationship based on what we know of the past and how will that help 

guide us in some of our efforts to forge a sensible policy toward 

India? 

Ms. FRANKEL. I can try and start the discussion on that. First 

of all, in the past India considered itself to be I suppose the cultural civilization that was superior to that of China. But as we 

know, their claims to influence within the larger area of the 

Himalayas through Southeast Asia are overlapping. So they are 

natural rivals within that region for influence. 

Since the disparity in power right now between India and China 

favors China so heavily, and I think I made that point in my remarks, India’s immediate interest is not to become a junior partner 

of China in Asia, because that is one possible future for India, and 

it is very important from India’s point of view to develop the relationship with the United States as the sole superpower for the time 

being. 

I think one can say they believe this is a moment in history, the 

United States is going to remain the dominant power for another 

30, 40, maybe even 50 years, that this is their opportunity to develop a relationship with the sole superpower to leverage their own 

development as a major global power, and that in the interim they 

will need to be very sensitive to America’s interests on the ground 

in Asia, except, as we keep saying, on issues that directly contradict their own national interests. 

I think if we implement this agreement with India and we develop close cooperation in key areas of their potential growth, we 

are talking about space, we are talking about civil energy, we are 

talking about high technology, these are going to make all the differences to India’s development. We will in the meantime have developed very strong networks of cooperation with them in each of 

these areas. Our activities and programs will become intertwined 

with theirs, our personnel will build personal connections with 

them. 

I think over this period, we will develop that relationship of trust 

that can lead to a true strategic partnership. I think this is really 

what India is interested in right now. 

India puts it this way: They recognize the United States as a 

major Asian power and they support the United States as a major 

power in Asia, and they want to see an Asia in which the United 

States remains predominant rather than one which is transformed 

by the rise of China’s dominance. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Schiff of California. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What I wanted to really 

focus on for a moment is how much significance the nuclear piece 

has or rather I guess how much significance the rest of the agreement has, excising the nuclear piece. I would like to ask the question in two ways: One, the President could have proposed a cooperation agreement with India that covered everything except the 

nuclear issue, that would have furthered the U.S.-India relationVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:25 May 16, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\111605\24598.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
54

ship, been far less controversial in many senses, perhaps not offered the same deepening and military respect with India, but offered a lot of other opportunities for increased work with India. 

My question is, do you believe that the nuclear piece alone, the 

nuclear piece alone either advances the nonproliferation interests 

of the United States or poses proliferation risks outweighed by the 

benefits that apart from the broader strategic question of China are 

not warranted? So if you just look at the proliferation piece, is it 

justified from a proliferation point of view only? 

Second, should the nuclear piece fall out of this agreement, is 

there nonetheless in the rest of the agreement enough worthwhile 

to go forward with? 

Mr. TELLIS. Let me take a crack at that, if I may. I believe that 

there is enough in the nuclear agreement on balance to advance 

global nonproliferation interests, and in fact, in my testimony there 

is an appendix that lays that argument out in some detail. 

On the second issue of could we have crafted an agreement with 

India minus the nuclear cooperation element and still have the relationship deepen, we tried doing this for 10 years in the early 

nineties and we failed. We failed because we reached a point in the 

relationship where we have done pretty much everything that is 

easy to do, and the one outstanding issue that was left there was 

whether we treat India as a partner or as a target under the nonproliferation regimes, and by 2001 we had reached the point in the 

relationship where we could not navigate around this problem. 

Mr. SCHIFF. That is suggesting that the rest of the agreement is 

really only window dressing. If we have done all we can do apart 

from the nuclear agreement, then all of the rest of the cooperation 

agreement doesn’t amount to very much. Is that your statement? 

Mr. TELLIS. No, I don’t want to convey that impression. The 

other elements of the agreement are extremely important, but they 

don’t test U.S. policy and don’t impose any burdens on the United 

States, because those are agreements that can be done without any 

modification of U.S. law or our regime obligations. 

The reason why the nuclear agreement was so important was because our nuclear policy and the international nonproliferation regime has defined a whole set of technologies which are dual use in 

many cases that are essentially unavailable to India, and the Indians have now reached a point where they say our relationship has 

improved. Why can’t we have access to those technologies which 

are still being denied to us? 

So this was the obstruction that in some sense the Administration had to confront sooner rather than later. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Can I get the rest of your thoughts on whether the 

nuclear piece alone, separate and apart from any thought of China 

or any other strategic interest, advances or retreats from our proliferation goals? 

Mr. COHEN. I would say that the text of the joint communique 

as I read it does advance our overall nonproliferation goals and is 

a net gain for nonproliferation, but I have not seen the legislation 

that they have proposed to submit to you, so I would want to read 

that first before coming to a conclusion. 

And I don’t think the rest of the agreement should be held hostage to this. In fact, we are moving along very quickly on a whole 

55

range of other issues that have been sort of backed up. So I hope 

that the nuclear agreement does go through, but if it should be 

stalled or delayed or deferred, I would very much be astonished 

and very disappointed should either side hold the rest of the agreement hostage because of that. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Dr. Frankel, do you have a different view on that? 

Ms. FRANKEL. I think if we want to be honest about this agreement that it cannot go through at least on the Indian side absent 

the nuclear piece. This is because I think of what Ashley just said 

and also because it is our own legislation, it is the legislation of the 

U.S. Congress, that has denied any dual use technologies to India, 

whether it is in civil energy or space, and this is not part of the 

NPT. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Is that though because you can’t unring the bell? 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. I hate to 

press the matter, but we have to leave very shortly. They are fixing 

the room up for another hearing. So could the gentleman conclude? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Yes. Perhaps we could let the final gentleman comment, and then I will yield back. 

Mr. LIMAYE. As I said earlier, sir, I think in the absence of the 

agreement we cannot have any nonproliferation agreements from 

India, and we are at the stage now where we have to look toward 

how to implement those commitments in return for the cooperation. 

Having said that, let us imagine that this nuclear agreement was 

not on the table, it did not exist. I do not see how India’s ambitions 

for itself, its national interests, can be met without cooperation 

with the United States on a number of fronts, economic, diplomatic, 

political, military and otherwise. But it is hard now that we are 

here to wish we were somewhere else. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Wexler of Florida. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing. 

The witnesses from my perspective have been extremely compelling 

and informative to listen and learn from you. 

I was wondering if I could ask I hope quickly, Dr. Tellis, if I understood some comments that you made earlier correctly, the way 

you frame it in its most simplistic sense is that the compelling reason to support a carve-out, if one does support one, is to, I think 

your words were, to bring India into the fold. I agree entirely. From 

an American analysis of what is the value or the most compelling 

reason to justify bringing India into the fold, it is in essence the 

fact of the battle against extreme Islamic terrorists. And in that 

context, how do we view India’s relationship with Iran, and I think 

it is important and I wouldn’t want to go beyond this discussion, 

and I know it has been said by Mr. Ackerman and others that 

India deserves great applause for the position it took at the previous IAEA meeting and we hope that cooperation will continue. 

Is it fair, do you believe, in our analysis to determine whether 

or not India is in fact in the fold to use the upcoming weeks and 

the decisions that will be made with respect to Iran as in essence 

a litmus test? I guess to use your exact words, India in the fold 

with us on Iran to me is worth every risk in the world. India not 

with us on Iran tells me they are not in the fold, at least from my 

definition of what ‘‘in the fold’’ means. 

Is that a fair analysis? 

56

Mr. TELLIS. I think we have every right to use the developments 

of the forthcoming weeks as a litmus test, because it goes to the 

fundamental principle that both we and India seek to uphold, 

which is states that have signed the Nonproliferation Treaty have 

to meet their Nonproliferation Treaty obligations. No if’s, no but’s. 

When Iran made a decision to sign this treaty, it had a choice 

of signing or not signing. Once it decided to sign, it has to meet 

its obligations. And this is an opportunity not only for the United 

States, but for India, to stand up for the principle that we all ought 

to make good on the commitments that we have freely undertaken. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. I want to thank this panel of witnesses. I have 

never heard a more knowledgeable and brilliantly presented discussion of complex subjects than I did today, and I think all of you 

are to be complemented on your knowledge and your ability to convey it. It was very instructive, and I thank you all. 

The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(57)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

MR. CHAIRMAN, THANK YOU FOR CONVENING THIS TIMELY AND IMPORTANT HEARING. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM OUR WITNESSES 

ON THE VAST RANGE OF ISSUES AFFECTING THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA. 

AS YOU KNOW, MR. CHAIRMAN, I WILL BE TRAVELING TO INDIA AND 

PAKISTAN WITH CLOSE TO A DOZEN OF OUR FELLOW COLLEAGUES 

LATER THIS MONTH, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETINGS WE HAVE 

SCHEDULED DURING OUR TRIP. 

I AM POSITIVE THAT THOSE MEETINGS WILL BRING ABOUT FRUITFUL 

DISCUSSIONS ON NOT ONLY THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED 

STATES AND OUR PARTNERS WITHIN THE REGION, SPECIFICALLY INDIA 

AND PAKISTAN, BUT ALSO ABOUT THE EMERGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN THEMSELVES. 

ONE THING IS FOR CERTAIN: WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARDS 

GREATER STABILITY THROUGHOUT SOUTH ASIA. AS WE KNOW, IN AUGUST OF 2005, INDIA AND PAKISTAN TOOK ANOTHER STEP CLOSER TOWARDS PEACE AS THE TWO NATIONS FORMALIZED AN AGREEMENT TO 

WARD OFF THE RISK OF ACCIDENTALLY STARTING A NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL EXCHANGE. I APPLAUD THE EFFORTS BY THE TWO PARTIES 

TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE AND FORGE NEW STEPS IN THIS PROCESS OF 

CREATING STABILITY WITHIN THE REGION. 

WE NEED TO SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE THESE KINDS OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN SO THAT 

LARGELY SYMBOLIC FIRST STEPS CAN EVOLVE INTO GREATER COOPERATION ON SECURITY, ECONOMIC AND OTHER GOALS OF MUTUAL INTEREST THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE PURSUING. 

I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT RESOLVING THE INDIA-PAKISTAN RIVALRY IS 

CRITICAL TO ACHIEVING LASTING PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA, 

AND IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE UNLESS THE UNITED STATES IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED WITH BOTH NATIONS. 

FURTHERMORE, WE WITNESSED EFFORTS EARLIER THIS SUMMER TO 

FORGE CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA 

IN A NUMBER OF AREAS, INCLUDING DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, AND REGIONAL SECURITY 

ARE STEPS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. 

IN FACT, JUST THIS WEEK, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE ROB PORTMAN 

DURING THE DOHA ROUND OF WTO NEGOTIATIONS NOTED THAT THE USINDIA TOTAL TRADE WAS AROUND $30 BILLION, BUT ‘‘IT SHOULD BE FAR 

IN EXCESS OF THAT,’’ HINTING THAT WE COULD SEE A DOUBLING OF BILATERAL TRADE BY 2008. 

IN ADDITION, AN ISSUE THAT AFFECTS SECURITY WITHIN THE REGION 

MUST ALSO BE ADDRESSED BY CONGRESS. WHILE INDIA’S HISTORY OF 

SUPPORT AND BUSINESS DEALINGS WITH IRAN HAVE BEEN DETRIMENTAL TO REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY BY ENABLING IRAN’S DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION CAPABILITY, INDIA 

DEMONSTRATED—IN LATE SEPTEMBER—THEIR COMMITMENT TOWARDS 

REGIONAL STABILITY WITH THE VOTE AT THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS 

MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), 

WHICH CONDEMNED IRAN’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACTIVITIES. 

58

MOREOVER, INDIA’S SUPPORT WILL BE NEEDED NEXT NOVEMBER, 

WHEN IRAN SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL FOR 

ACTION. THERE IS A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE FOR INDIA TO PLAY VIS-A-VIS 

IRAN AND THIS IS AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP. 

HOWEVER, AS A NUCLEAR POWER INDIA IS NOT A SIGNATORY TO THE 

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. NEW LATITUDE FOR INDIA’S ACCESS TO NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY REQUIRES CAUTION, OVERSIGHT, AND 

REGULATORY CHANGES. 

WHILE I UNDERSTAND PRESIDENT BUSH’S DESIRE TO BRING INDIA ON 

BOARD BROAD EFFORTS TO PROMOTE PEACE, STABILITY AND PROSPERITY, WE NEED ASSURANCES THAT INDIA WILL BE COMMITTED TO 

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AIMED AT STOPPING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. 

REGARDLESS, IT IS UPSETTING THAT THE U.S. CONGRESS HAS BEEN—

UP UNTIL JUST RECENTLY—KEPT IN THE DARK REGARDING THIS NEW 

AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT WOULD REVERSE NEARLY THREE 

DECADES OF U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY TOWARDS INDIA. AND I 

WOULD LIKE TO ONCE AGAIN EXPRESS MY EXTREME CONCERN OVER 

THE LACK OF CONSULTATION WITH THIS BODY. 

WHILE INDIA HAS PLEDGED ITS COMMITMENT TO SEPARATE ITS MILITARY AND CIVILIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES, THEY ARE SEEKING US SUPPORT FOR A CIVILIAN NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM AND WE NEED TO 

WATCH THIS PROCESS CLOSELY IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT IT IS DONE 

TRANSPARENTLY. ALL TOO OFTEN WE HAVE SEEN THE DIFFICULTIES 

THAT COME WITH KEEPING PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAMS PEACEFUL. 

MR. CHAIRMAN, I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR WITNESS TESTIMONY TODAY 

AND I ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO FUTURE HEARINGS ON THE IMPORTANT 

TOPIC OF A U.S.-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP. FURTHERMORE, I LOOK 

FORWARD TO SHARING WITH YOU AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE THE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS’ FINDINGS ONCE WE RETURN FROM INDIA AND PAKISTAN ON DECEMBER 4TH. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH CROWLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for bringing my resolution H. Res, 456 before 

the committee today for markup. At this time I would also like to thank my colleagues who have joined me on sponsoring this resolution, Congressman McDermott, 

Burton and Wexler. 

Aceh was first brought to my attention in 2000 by one of my constituents, Jafar 

Siddiq Hamzah, a human rights lawyer. 

Mr. Jafar told me about the abysmal human rights record of the Indonesian military and others in the province of Aceh. 

Upon returning to Aceh in August 2000, not long after we met, Jafar was abducted in Medan, tortured for several weeks, and found mutilated in a mass grave 

in the fall 2000. 

Cases like Mr. Jafar’s happened to often and motivated me to push for an end 

to his three decade long conflict that took over 15 000 lives. 

This resolution expresses support for the peace agreement signed on August 15th 

of this year by the Free Aceh Movement and the Government of Indonesia. 

This agreement saw both sides make considerable concessions in order to broker 

the peace. 

The Free Aceh Movement has abandoned its demands for independence and has 

agreed to disarm. 

On the other side, the government of Indonesia has granted amnesty for the Free 

Aceh prisoners and has agreed to a timeline of troop withdrawal. 

The memorandum has also given the people of Aceh new political powers that will 

allow them to retain 70% of the revenue from the natural resources of the land. a 

Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Human Rights Court will also be established giving the people the machinery for justice as well as peace. 

The considerable compromises that both sides made in this memorandum of understanding, shows their willingness to secure peace for the citizens of Indonesia 

and Aceh. 

This resolution acknowledges and expresses support for the memorandum signed 

by the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement. 

The resolution further expresses hope that both partiers will fulfill their commitments so that peace will be instilled in the region 

59

Lastly and perhaps most significantly this resolution encourages the Secretary of 

State and the Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development to commit resources so that the peace can be supported ensured. 

I support this resolution to show the people of Aceh and the government of Indonesia that the US Congress supports the progress they are making. 

Thank you. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GARY L. ACKERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

I want to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member Lantos for scheduling today’s 

hearing on the non-proliferation impact of the U.S-India nuclear cooperation agreement. 

Without question the July 18 joint statement is a dramatic change in U.S. nonproliferation policy but the fact of the matter is that it makes sense for the United 

States to welcome India as one of the leading states with advanced nuclear technology. Over the last 30 years, India has demonstrated not only a successful mastery of a complicated technology, but the ability to ensure that such technology does 

not get transferred into the wrong hands. It is here, Mr. Chairman, where I think 

opponents of the announced agreement get it wrong. 

India is not a proliferation risk, in the sense that it would share its own or our 

technology, with rogue states or with terrorists. Simply because India made the sovereign decision not to sign the NPT does not make it a proliferation risk. 

In fact, the Administration has won many concessions from India regarding separating its civil and military programs, declaring its civilian programs to the IAEA, 

signing an additional protocol, and continuing its moratorium on nuclear testing to 

name only a few. These concessions have produced an uproar of opposition in New 

Delhi, yet the point is that the Indian’s have voluntarily undertaken them. Opponents of the agreement suggest that the entire fabric of the global non-proliferation 

regime is been rendered with this single decision, buts let’s examine that argument. 

Clearly, before this agreement, India was outside the mainstream of non-proliferation norms. 

It has now committed to uphold or adhere to those norms. How can this be identified as anything but progress? Isn’t the explicit commitment to adhere to the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines and the Missile Technology Control Regime exactly 

what we’ve been trying to get India to do for decades? 

There is clearly a great deal of work to do, Mr. Chairman both internationally and 

domestically. There are significant questions regarding timing and implementation 

which need to be addressed but I think this agreement makes sense on a bilateral 

level and can in fact strengthen our multilateral non-proliferation efforts. 

Thank you and I look forward to hearing today’s witnesses.

Æ