ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

In re Latoya C., 2013 IL App (1st) 121477

Appellate Court

Caption

In re LATOYA C., Alleged to be a Person Subject to Involuntary

Treatment (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v.

Latoya C., Respondent-Appellant).

 District & No. First District, Fifth Division

Docket No. 1-12-1477

Filed July 26, 2013

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

An order authorizing the involuntary administration of psychotropic

medication to respondent was reversed on appeal due to the trial court’s

failure to comply with section 3-816(a) of the Mental Health Code by

making a written statement in the record of its findings of fact and

conclusions of law.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12-COMH-1064; the

Hon. Paul A. Karkula, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed.
Counsel on

Appeal

Veronique Baker, of Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, of

Chicago, and Andreas Liewald and Laurel Spahn, both of Guardianship

and Advocacy Commission, of Hines, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and

Peter Maltese, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE TAYLOR delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice McBride and Justice Palmer concurred in the judgment

and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Following a hearing on April 17, 2012, the circuit court entered an order authorizing the

administration of involuntary psychotropic medication to respondent, Latoya C., for 90 days.

On appeal, respondent contends that the order should be reversed because the trial court

failed to make either oral or written findings of fact, as required by section 3-816(a) of the

Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/3-816(a) (West

2012)); the State failed to prove that she was provided information about alternative

treatment options, as required by section 2-102(a-5) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5)

(West 2012)); and the State failed to establish each element of the involuntary medication

statute (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5) (West 2012)). Respondent also contends that this appeal

falls within three recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine. We reverse.

¶ 2 On March 30, 2012, 24-year-old respondent was admitted to a mental health facility after

an apparent dispute with her cousin over money. On April 12, 2012, one of her treating

physicians, Dr. Vesna Pirec, filed a petition requesting a court order authorizing the

administration of involuntary treatment, specifically, the administration of an antipsychotic

medication known as haloperidol (Haldol) for up to 90 days.

¶ 3 At the hearing on the petition, three witnesses testified. Latasha C., respondent’s sister,

testified that respondent was diagnosed as schizophrenic and bipolar in 2005. They lived

together for a time prior to respondent’s admission to the hospital in March 2012. During the

time they lived together, respondent told her that the television and radio were talking to her.

When respondent started taking medication, i.e., Zyprexa, she was no longer delusional.

However, she discontinued taking the medication, and, in October 2011,respondent and their

mother got into an argument, which resulted in respondent being admitted to the hospital.

She was released the following night and went to a shelter. On February 9, 2012, respondent

had a baby and subsequently moved in with her cousin. When respondent was in the final

stages of her pregnancy, she became increasingly irritable and would yell at her family. She

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was not taking her medication at that time.

¶ 4 Dr. Vesna Pirec, a psychiatrist, testified that she treated respondent in October 2011 for

five days, but did not prescribe psychotropic medication for her at that time. On April 2,

2012, she began treating respondent during her most recent hospitalization on March 30,

2012. Pirec diagnosed respondent with schizoaffective disorder, and testified that she was

symptomatic at the time of the hearing. Respondent told Pirec that she was a celebrity,

Obama came to the hospital, and she had an aura around her. Respondent also acted

provocatively in the hospital and was paranoid. Pirec was concerned that respondent’s

symptoms would affect her ability to care for her child. Pirec administered two doses of

Haldol to respondent on or about April 4, 2012. However, after taking the two doses,

respondent refused to take more medication. Pirec then sought authority to involuntarily

medicate respondent, primarily with Haldol, for 90 days. Pirec wanted to use Haldol to treat

respondent’s psychosis, and she believed the benefits of the drug would outweigh the risk

of harm for respondent. Alternatively, Pirec testified that she would seek to treat respondent

with other medications. Although respondent told Pirec that she did not want anymedication,

Pirec believed that respondent lacked an understanding of her symptoms.

¶ 5 Respondent testified that immediately before she was admitted to the hospital she was

living with her cousin and supporting herself with social security. She did not make any

physical threats to harm herself or anyone else, and her most recent admission to the hospital

in March occurred because she had a dispute with her cousin over money. During her time

in the hospital, she took four doses of Haldol, but was unsure if she received any benefits

from the medication. The side effects from the medication included dizziness, drowsiness,

an increase in appetite, and blurred vision. Although respondent did not have a problem with

blurred vision prior to taking Haldol, the problem persisted after she stopped taking the

medication. Respondent started seeing Dr. Pirec after she refused to take Haldol. She did not

feel that Pirec knew her well because Pirec only saw her for about five minutes per day. At

the time of trial, respondent indicated that she would not consent to taking medication from

Pirec because taking Haldol was the hospital’s choice, and Pirec never offered her any other

types of medication. She noted that hospital personnel kept telling her that the drug worked,

but it did not.

¶ 6 Following closing arguments, the trial court announced its decision granting the petition.

In doing so, the court stated, “[t]he doctor’s testimony as an expert witness was extremely

credible; therefore, causing me to certainly see that the State has met their burden by clear

and convincing evidence.” The court also entered a written order stating, in part, that “[t]he

recipient has a serious mental illness/developmental disability” and “[t]he recipient exhibits

deterioration of his/her ability to function, suffering or threatening or disruptive behavior.”

This appeal followed.

¶ 7 There is no dispute that the case underlying the instant appeal is moot, as the circuit

court’s 90-day involuntarymedication order expired on July 16, 2012. However, respondent

contends that her appeal falls within several recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine.

In particular, respondent argues that three exceptions apply: the collateral consequences

exception, the public interest exception, and the exception for issues capable of repetition yet

avoiding review.

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¶ 8 The collateral consequences exception allows a reviewing court to consider an otherwise

moot case where an order for involuntary treatment “ ‘could return to plague the respondent

in some future proceedings or could affect other aspects of the respondent’s life.’ ” In re Rita

P., 2013 IL App (1st) 112837, ¶ 10 (quoting In re Val Q., 396 Ill. App. 3d 155, 159 (2009)),

appeal allowed, No. 115798 (May 29, 2013); see also In re Dawn H., 2012 IL App (2d)

111013, ¶ 13. For instance, reversal of an involuntary treatment order could provide a basis

for a motion in limine in a future proceeding that would prohibit any mention of the prior

treatment. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 362 (2009). The exception applies to a first

involuntary treatment order. In re Linda K., 407 Ill. App. 3d 1146, 1150 (2011). However,

it does not apply where the respondent has previously been subject to involuntary treatment

because any collateral consequences would have already attached. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d

at 362-63.

¶ 9 Here, the parties correctly agree that respondent has not been previously subject to an

involuntary administration of medication or other involuntary treatment. In addition, given

her diagnosis, it is likely respondent may be subject to future proceedings that would be

adversely impacted by past involuntary treatment. We thus conclude that the collateral

consequences exception to the mootness doctrine applies.

¶ 10 The State’s argument that collateral consequences have already attached due to her

mental illness and hospitalization has been rejected by this court. In Rita P., 2013 IL App

(1st) 112837, ¶ 12, this court distinguished In re James H., 405 Ill. App. 3d 897 (2010),

which the State relies on here, noting that the court in that case primarily relied on the fact

that the respondent had a record with the Secret Service in finding that collateral

consequences had already attached. Similarly to the respondent in Rita P., respondent in this

case had no such background. In light of our determination, we need not address the public

interest exception to the mootness doctrine or the exception for issues capable of repetition

yet avoiding review. See In re Vanessa K., 2011 IL App (3d) 100545, ¶ 16.

¶ 11 Turning to the underlying merits of the instant appeal, respondent contends that by failing

to make oral or written findings of fact on the record, the trial court failed to comply with

section 3-816(a) of the Code, which provides that courts ordering involuntarytreatment shall

state on the record their findings of fact and conclusions of law. 405 ILCS 5/3-816(a) (West

2012). Relying on Rita P., 2013 IL App (1st) 112837, ¶ 17, and In re James S., 388 Ill. App.

3d 1102, 1105 (2009), respondent asserts that absent written or oral findings of fact, the trial

court’s order must be reversed for statutory noncompliance.

¶ 12 In Rita P. and James S., the circuit court entered orders for involuntary administration

of psychotropic medication. Rita P., 2013 IL App (1st) 112837, ¶ 1; James S., 388 Ill. App.

3d at 1103. In both instances, this court reversed, finding that the circuit courts’ statements

were insufficient to satisfy section 3-816(a) of the Code because they essentially contained

no factual findings. In James S., 388 Ill. App. 3d at 1105, the trial court only stated that after

hearing the testimony and observing the witnesses, it found byclear and convincing evidence

that the respondent was subject to involuntary medication. In Rita P., 2013 IL App (1st)

112837, ¶ 17, the court only stated “ ‘[t]he testimony here is overwhelming in support of the

State’s petition. All three witnesses and all the observations of the Court made in open court

today so I am going to grant the petition.’ ” Moreover, the court’s written findings in Rita P.

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were conclusory, not tailored to the specific facts of the respondent, and tracked the language

of section 2-107.1 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1 (West 2010)), nearly verbatim. Rita P.,

2013 IL App (1st) 112837, ¶ 17; see also In re Aaron L., 2013 IL App (1st) 122808, ¶ 26

(holding that the order terminating wardship and guardianship and discharging the case was

ineffective under section 2-31(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-31(2)

(West 2010)), where the circuit court entered a written form order and made no specific

findings of fact).

¶ 13 Here, in delivering its ruling, the trial court’s sole statement was, “[t]he doctor’s

testimony as an expert witness was extremely credible; therefore, causingme to certainly see

the State has met their burden by clear and convincing evidence.” This statement is as

lacking in factual detail as the statements at issue in Rita P. and James S. In our view, it does

not meet the requirement of section 3-816(a) of the Code that an order for involuntary

treatment shall be accompanied by a statement on the record of the court’s findings of fact

and conclusions of law. Furthermore, the written order memorializing the trial court’s oral

decision is a form order that contains no specific findings of fact. Accordingly, we reverse

the order authorizing the administration of involuntary medication. Rita P., 2013 IL App

(1st) 112837, ¶ 22; see also In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364, 378 (2005) (affirming the

appellate court’s remand to the trial court for the limited purpose of allowing it to enter more

specific findings because the trial court’s preprinted dispositional order, as well as its oral

statements, lacked a factual basis for the court’s decision); In re Joseph M., 405 Ill. App. 3d

1167, 1183 (2010) (reversingwhere the circuit court made no express factual findings related

to whether the respondent met the statutory criteria for involuntary admission).

¶ 14 In reaching this conclusion, we find unpersuasive the State’s argument that the trial

court’s failure to comply with section 3-816(a) does not require reversal because although

that section states a trial court’s ordershall be in writing and accompanied by a statement on

the record of the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, Illinois law is well

established that such statutory language is merely directory rather than mandatory. See

People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 82-83 (1988); People v. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d 155, 162 (1982)

(construing sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 and the Unified Code of

Corrections as discretionary rather than mandatory).

¶ 15 The State acknowledges this court recently rejected the argument that Porter and Davis

support the conclusion that the statutory language of section 3-816(a) is merely directory

rather than mandatory. See Rita P., 2013 IL App (1st) 112837, ¶¶ 20-22. Nevertheless, the

State maintains that Rita P. failed to explain why the directory nature of the provisions at

issue in Porter and Davis did not violate a criminal defendant’s liberty interest, while a

ruling that section 3-816 of the Code was directory instead of mandatory would violate a

respondent’s liberty interest. Furthermore, the State maintains that Rita P. failed to explain

how a respondent’s liberty interest is afforded less protection by a circuit court’s harmless

failure to express its factual findings. Despite the State’s contentions to the contrary, Rita P.

addressed the State’s concerns by stating that the respondent had a “significant liberty

interest in remaining free from unwanted treatment,” and “strict compliance with the Code’s

procedural safeguards is required to insure that the mental health system does not become

a tool to oppress rather than serve society. [Citation.]” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

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Rita P., 2013 IL App (1st) 112837, ¶ 21 (relying on In re Alaka W., 379 Ill. App. 3d 251,

274-75 (2008), and James S., 388 Ill. App. 3d at 1107.). We thus find no reason to depart

from the well-reasoned holding in Rita P.

¶ 16 In light of our disposition, we need not address respondent’s remaining contentions

regarding whether the State failed to prove that respondent was provided information about

alternative treatment options, or failed to establish each element of the involuntary

medication statute.

¶ 17 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 18 Reversed.

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