[Cite as Fraternal Order of Police v. Columbus, 2022-Ohio-4102.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Fraternal Order of Police, :

Capital City Lodge #9,

:

Petitioner-Appellee, No. 22AP-130

: (C.P.C. No. 21CV-7069)

v.

: (REGULAR CALENDAR)

City of Columbus,

:

Respondent-Appellant.

:

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on November 17, 2022

On brief: Harshman & Wannemacher, Nicole Rager 

Wannemacher and Lathan J. Lipperman, for appellee.

Argued: Lathan J. Lipperman.

On brief: Zach Klein, City Attorney, Paul M. Berhnart and 

Susan E. Williams, for appellant. Argued: Paul M. Bernhart.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

BEATTY BLUNT, J.

{¶ 1} Respondent-appellant, City of Columbus ("City"), appeals the January 25, 

2022 decision of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion filed by 

Petitioner-appellee, Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge #9 ("FOP"), to confirm 

an arbitration award and denying respondent's motion to vacate that same arbitration 

award.

{¶ 2} This case concerns the decision by the City's Department of Public Safety to 

contract with the law firm of BakerHostetler and authorize the firm to conduct 

administrative investigations into over one thousand citizen complaints filed against the 

Columbus Division of Police for excessive force during the protests that occurred in 
No. 22AP-130 2

Columbus between May 28 and June 3, 2020. The FOP filed labor contract grievances on 

June 7, 2020 and July 23, 2020 regarding the City's decision to employ BakerHostetler for 

this purpose, arguing that it violated Article 2.7, 8, 9, and 19.4 of the FOP's Collective 

Bargaining Agreement ("the CBA") with the City.

{¶ 3} The case proceeded through arbitration, and on November 3, 2021, the 

arbitrator issued an award ruling that the CBA "specifies the entities that may investigate 

'allegations that could result in disciplinary action against a member,' " and that the use of 

"an Independent Contractor to perform investigative duties assigned to the Internal Affairs 

Bureau violates Article 8" of the CBA, and that further "Article 19 [of the CBA] precludes 

the subcontracting of law enforcement duties," including internal investigations. The 

arbitrator sustained the grievances and directed the City to "cease and desist from using an 

Independent Contractor to perform internal investigations." (Opinion & Award, Grievance 

Nos. 23-2020 & 26-2020, filed as Ex. C to Petitioner's Mot. to Confirm Arbitration Award.) 

On November 8, 2021, the FOP filed its motion to confirm the arbitration award, and 

November 22, 2021, the City filed a memo responding and a motion to vacate the 

arbitration award. On January 25, 2022, the Common Pleas Court overruled the motion to 

vacate and granted the motion to confirm, concluding that it "does not find that the 

Arbitrator exceeded her authority nor that the Award violates public policy," that there was 

nothing in the record "demonstrating the Arbitrator exceeded her powers or so imperfectly 

executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted 

was not made," and that the City "does not point to any specific instances of public policy 

violations or specific public policies at issue." (Jan 25, 2022 Decision & Entry at 4.) This 

appeal followed, and the City asserts two assignments of error with the trial court's 

judgment: 

[I.] The Trial Court Erred by Granting Appellee's Motion to 

Confirm Arbitration Award. 

[II.] The Trial Court Erred by Denying Appellant's Motion to 

Vacate Arbitration Award.

These two assignments of error present two sides of the same question, and we will address 

them together.

{¶ 4} Ohio law favors arbitration and reviewing courts only have limited authority 

to vacate an arbitrator's award. Under R.C. 2711.10, a court may vacate an arbitration 
No. 22AP-130 3

award only on the grounds of fraud, corruption, misconduct, an imperfect award, or that 

the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority. The language of the parties' contract 

determines the parameters of an arbitrator's authority, and an arbitrator exceeds his or her 

authority in rendering an award if the award does not draw its essence from the collective 

bargaining agreement. Such an award departs from the essence of the collective bargaining 

agreement when it conflicts with the express terms of the agreement or is without rational 

support or cannot be rationally derived from the terms of the agreement. See State v. FOP 

of Ohio, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-457, 2017-Ohio-1382, ¶ 17-19; Franklin Cty. Sheriff v. 

Teamsters Local No. 413, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-717, 2018-Ohio-3684, ¶ 17-19. See generally 

Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. v. Findlay, 149 Ohio St.3d 718, 2017-Ohio-2804, ¶ 16, 

quoting Cedar Fair, L.P. v. Falfas, 140 Ohio St.3d 447, 2014-Ohio-3943, ¶ 7 ("Arbitrators 

act within their authority to craft an award so long as the award 'draws its essence' from the 

contract—that is, 'when there is a rational nexus between the agreement and the award, and 

where the award is not arbitrary, capricious or unlawful.' "). 

{¶ 5} But despite this limit on the parameters of the court's review, we apply mixed 

standards when analyzing an arbitration. "When reviewing a trial court's decision to 

confirm, modify, vacate, or correct an arbitration award, an appellate court should accept 

findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous but should review questions of law de novo."

(Emphasis added.) Portage Cty. Bd. of Dev. Disabilities v. Portage Cty. Educators' Assn.

for Dev. Disabilities, 153 Ohio St.3d 219, 220, 2018-Ohio-1590. And "[t]he question 

whether an arbitrator has exceeded his authority is a question of law." Id. at ¶ 25, quoting 

Green v. Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d 967, 974 (6th Cir.2000). The Portage standards of 

review apply to law enforcement labor disputes. See Brook Park v. FOP, 8th Dist. No. 

108879, 2020-Ohio-3035, ¶ 13. Accordingly, the limited question that can be reviewed in 

this appeal is whether the arbitrator's decision draws its essence from the contract—but 

that limited question is reviewed de novo.

{¶ 6} To analyze this question, we have thoroughly reviewed the arbitrator's 

decision and the record, and have identified two provisions of the collective bargaining 

agreement between the parties that are particularly relevant:
No. 22AP-130 4

ARTICLE 8 – INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS PROCEDURES

8.1 Scope

This Article is designed to address the procedures used for 

internal investigations of members. This Article shall applyto 

the investigation of allegations that could result in disciplinary 

action against a member. Internal investigations shall be 

conducted by the chain of command, by the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Office (EEO), and/or by personnel assigned to the 

Internal Affairs Bureau. Should the Office of the Public Safety 

Director conduct an investigation, members shall be afforded 

the rights applicable in an Internal Affairs Bureau 

investigation. The term investigator refers to the individual(s) 

conducting the investigation. The term "Lodge Representative"

refers to a Lodge officer, Lodge Grievance Chairperson or 

Lodge Representative, or Lodge-designated attorney.

* * *

ARTICLE 19 – MISCELLANEOUS

19.4 Contracting Out/Civilia[n]ization

The City agrees not to hire any additional Public Safety Officers 

and further agrees not to contract out or civilianize any law 

enforcement duties performed by members of the bargaining 

unit(s) unless such matters are first discussed in good faith 

with the Lodge at a Labor Relations Committee meeting; If, 

after the Labor Relations Meeting, the City decides to proceed 

with the contracting out or civilianization of any law 

enforcement duties, the Lodge may utilize the arbitration 

procedure and any other relevant provisions of this Contract to 

contest the propriety of the decision to contract out.

{¶ 7} We express no opinion as to the policy merits of the arbitrator's decision, but 

reading Article 8.1 and 19.4 together, we hold that the arbitrator could rationally conclude 

that under those provisions, the Department of Public Safety is authorized to conduct 

investigations but that the Department of Public Safety must obtain the prior agreement of 

the FOP before using outside contractors for law-enforcement purposes. In response, the 

City argues that it is at best unlikely that internal affairs officers could have completed any 

serious investigations of the one thousand misconduct complaints within the required time 

frames, even if there were no conflicts of interest or other issues that would delay those 

investigations. But the record demonstrates that BakerHostetler itself only used two 
No. 22AP-130 5

attorneys in evaluating and investigating the complaints, seriously undermining the City's 

contention. Without specifically arguing such, the City seems to be asserting an 

impossibility of performance defense to the contract's terms; but of course, the limited 

resources allocated to the project by BakerHostetler demonstrate the weakness of that 

argument.

{¶ 8} The City next contends that "administrative investigations" of the complaints 

do not constitute "law enforcement duties" under Article 19.4 of the collective bargaining 

agreement, and therefore that the Department of Public Safety was not precluded from 

hiring an outside contractor to conduct these investigations. The City asserts that the 

arbitrator "failed to distinguish between criminal investigations and administrative 

investigations when she determined that the investigations of citizen complaints were law 

enforcement duties." (Reply Brief of Appellant at 9.) But of course, since that distinction 

is not present in the contract and was established by the course of dealing between the 

parties, it was not incumbent on the arbitrator to create it.

{¶ 9} In sum, our review of the record—specifically including the trial court's 

decision to confirm the arbitrator's award, the award itself, the CBA, and the supporting 

materials and arguments submitted by the parties—we cannot say that the arbitrator 

exceeded her authority by concluding that the agreement precluded the City from using an 

outside contractor to conduct investigations into the complaints, as her decision is rooted 

squarely in the language of the CBA. For that reason, the trial court's decisions to grant the 

FOP's motion to confirm the arbitration award and deny the City's motion to vacate the 

award were not erroneous. 

{¶ 10} Accordingly, we overrule the City's two assignments of error and affirm the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed.

MENTEL and MCGRATH, JJ., concur.