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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMlSSlUN 

WASIiINCTON, D.C. 20463 

D 

In the matters of 1 

1 

Congress of Industrial Organizations, et rrl. 1 

American Federation of Labor and 1 MU& 4291, et al’ .\ 

STATEMENT FOR THE RECOKD 

COMMlISSIONER SCOTT E. THOMAS 

On July 11,2000, the Commission approved the General Counsel’s 

recommendation to take no Mer action and close the files with respect to all 

respondents in the above-captioned matters. At issue was whether the American 

Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrid Organizations (“AFL-CIC)”) or its 

afEiliates had “coordinated” certain election-related public communications during the 

1996 election cycle with federal candidate or political party committees and thus had 

made %-kind” contributions to those committees. Under the Federal Election Campaign 

Act (“the Act”), corporations and labor organizations may not make contributions 

(including coordinated in-kind contributions) in connection with faded election 

campaigns. 2 U.S.C. 5 44lb. Based upon the standard for cootdination created by the 

district court in Federal Ekctiors Commission v. Christian CoaIitfon, 52 F.Supp.2d 45 

(D.D.C. 1999), the Office of General Counsel found irsufficient evidence that 

respondents improperly cooidinated its activities with a federal candidate or party 

. 

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committee. .i 

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In my view, the Commission should not have applied a 1999 district court ruling 

in deciding whethm 199511 996 activity constituted impermissibly coordinated activity. 

]Rather, the Commission should have looked to the regulations currently on the books 

which dehc “lcoordinalioa.” hideed, as a matter of &ninistrative law, the Commission 

has an obligation to apply those regulations. This is particularly true where, as here, those 

regulations address Supreme Coiirt and congressional concern. By Contrast, the Christian 

Ccmfition ruling is nowhere reflected in the Commission’s current regulations and so 

nmwly defines coordination that it threatens to undermine the Act’s limitations and 

prohibitions. 

’ 

--.-e ’ These MUR& includcd hWHS 4291,4307,4328,4338,4463,4500.4501,4513,4555,4573, and 4578. 
With two Cornmissioners recused and at least two other Commissioners 

supportive of the Christian Coalition approach, however, I could imagine no 

circumstances under which these matters could proceed by applying the Commission’s 

current regulations. With only four Coinmissioners participating, my vote to oppose 

closing these matters would have only kept these matters permanently unresolved. 

Accordingly, I voted to support the General Counsel’s recommendations to take no 

further action regarding’these matters and to close the file. I wouId have preferred that 

this matter be considered under the Conmission’s current regulations after probable 

cause briefing. Even if violations were found in these matters (and there is no way to 

predict, absent probable cause briefing, what result might obtain) and a minimal civil 

penalty agreed to, ‘an outcome reached by applying the Commission’s current 

coordination regulations is far more preferable than embracing the Chrisfiuri Coalition 

definition of coordination. 

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I. 

The definition of “coordination” found in Christian Coalition directly undercuts 

the effectiveness of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“the Act”). In Buckley v. Valeo, 

324 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld limits on contributions to federal 

candidates but ruled that a similar limitation on independent expenditures was 

unconstitutional. The Court recognized, however, that its ruling created many 

opportunities for evasion of the contribution limitations. If a would-be spender was able 

to pay for CL tclcvision advertiscmcnt providcd by a candidate, for example, this 

“coordination” would convert what is supposed to be an “independent” expenditure into 

nothing more tl;m a disguised contribution. Indeed, the Buckley Court warned that the 

contribution limitations would become meaningless if they could be evaded “by the 

simple expedient of paying directly for media advertisements or for other portions of the 

candidate’s canipaign activities.” id. at 46. 

In order to “prevent attempts to circrtrnverit the Act through prearranged or 

coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised contributions,’”id. at 47 (emphasis 

added) the Buckley Cout treated ‘koordinated expenditures. . . as contributions rather 

than expenditures.” Id. at, 46-47 (emphasis added). Thus, the Buckley Court drew a 

specific distinction between expenditures made b‘tofdy irrdependent& of the candidate 

and his campaign” and “coordinated expenditures” which could be constitutionally 

regulated. The Court defined “contribution” to “include not only contributions made 

directly or iridirectly to a candidate, political party, or campaign committee . . . but also 

all expenditures placed in cooperation with or with the consent of a candidate, his agents, 

or an authorized committee of the candidate.” Id. at 78 (emphasis added). Reacting to 

these judicial concerns, Congress enacted as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act 

Amendments of 1976 a definition of “independcnt expenditure” now codified at 2 U.S.C. 

943 1 (1 7). Concerned that independent expenditures could be used to circumvent the 

contribution limitations,’ Congress prescivcd thc distinction drawn by the Supreme Court 

’See, e.g., Fcdcral Elcction Campaign Act Amcndiiients, 197G: Hcarings on S.2911, et al., Subconuuttcc 

on Privilcgcs and Elections of thc Scnatt Coriuiuftee on Rulcs an3 Administration, 94& Cony., 2d Scss. 74 

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between those expenditures which were “totally independent” of the candidate’s 

campaign and those which were not? 

The current language of the Act reflects the judicial and Iegistative concern that 

independent expenditures are not turned into disguised contributions through 

coordination with the Candidate or his campaign. The Act squarely states that an 

expenditure made “in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or 

suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be 

considered to be a contribution to such candidate” and subject to the contribution 

limitations. 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(7)(€3)(i). Moreover, section 43 1( 17) of the statute defines, 

“independent expenditure” as: 

.\ 

[A]n expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or 

defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is made without 

cooperation or consultatiori with any candidate, or any authorized 

committee or agent of such candidate, and which is nat made in 

concert with,‘or at the request or suggestion o/; any candidate, or any 

authorized committee or agent of such candidate. 

2 U.S.C. 543 1 (1 7)(emphasis added). 

Section 109.1 (b)(4)(i) of the Commission’s regulations “clarif[ies] this language’’ 

and explains that an expenditure will not be considered’independent if there is “[alny 

arrangement, coordination, or direction by the candidate or his. . . agent prior to the 

publication, distribution, display or broadcast of the communication.” 1 1 C.F.R. 

5 109.1 (b)(4)(i). The regulations fiuther state that an expenditure is presumed not to be 

independent if: 

(A)Based on information about the candidate’s plans, projects, or needs 

provided to the expending person by the candidate, or. by the candidate’s 

agents, with a view toward having an expenditure made; or 

or expend finds, who is, or has been, m ofIicer of an authorized committee, 

or who is, or has been, receiving any form of compensation or reimbursement 

from the candidate, the candidate’s committee or agent.’ 

(B) Made by or through any person who is, or has been, authorized to raise 

: 

’ 

I .i I. Id. ; 

(remarks of Sen. Kennedy); 77 (remarks of Sen. Cannon); 77 (rernarks of Sen. Scott); 85 (statement of Sen. 

Mondalc); 89 (renurks of Sen. Griffin); 98 (remarks of Scn. Blickley); 107-08, 130 (remarks of then 

Assistant Attorney General Scnlia). ’ 1i.R. Conf. Rep. 94-1057 at 38 (1976). Spccifically, the Confcrcncc Kcport states: “Thc dcfinition of the 

!em ‘independent cxptnditure’ in the conference substitute is intended to be consistent with the discussion 

of independent political cxpenditures which was included in Buckley v. Valeo.” Id. ‘ FEC v. National Consorvatiw Political Action Committee, 647 F.Supp. 987,990 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). ’ Id. 

. ’ ‘. . ,. . I. . 

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The statute and the Commission’s regulations recognize that a narrow view of 

coordination would open a large loophole in the law. If, for example, a finding of 

coordination required some sort of “agreement” between a candidate and a spender, a 

candidate could set up a meeting with an organization known to be planning campaign 

ads, and could discuss campaign strategy arid the development of issues crucial to the 

campaign. The organizption could then niake “independent” expenditures based on this 

detailed knowledge and information. The only apparent restriction would be that a 

campaign could not “agree on” the final finished ad or actually authorize a buy for the 

timing and placement of the ad. Obviously, such a limited approach would render the 

coordination standard meaningless. 

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I . The district court opinion in Christian Coalition, however, effectively ignored the 

I Commission regulations on what constitutes “coordination.” Instead, the district court 

created its own definition of coordination. This judicially created definition of 

coordination bears little semblance to either the “totally independent” approach of 

Buckley, the language of the statute or the Commission’s regulations. 

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In its lawsuit, the Commission charged the Christian Coalition repeatedly spent its 

corporate treasury funds to influence federal elections in violation of the FECA. Based 

its staff repeatedly cooperated and consulted about campaign strategy and activities with 

several different Republican candidates, their campaigns, and the National Republican 

Senatorial Committee. The Commission alleged these coordinated expenditures 

constituted in-kind corporate campaign contributions made in violation of 2 U.S.C. 

5441b. The Commission also detailed, based on the record, numerous instances where it 

believed the Christian Coalition unambiguously advocated the election or defeat of 

specific clearly identified candidates in violation of the Act’s prohibition on independent 

corporate campaign expenditures. 

I on the record evidence, the Commission alleged the Christian Coalition’s leadership and 

With respect to coordination, the district court ruled against the Coinmission on 

five of the six coordinated expenditure allegations and found that there was a contested 

issue of fiict on the sixth. In the opinion of the district court, the Supreme Court in 

Buckley did not address “the First Amendment concerns that arise with respect ‘to 

expressive coordinated expenditures.” 52 F.Supp.2d at 85. The district court speculated: 

“It can only be smnised that the Buckley majority purposely left this issue for another 

case. In many respects this is that case.” Id. As a result the district court felt fiee to 

ignore the §44 la(a)(7)(B)(i) standard of coordination as well as the Commission’s 

regulations. I 

Instead, the district court created its own standard of coordination and applied it to 

a new concept, which it also developed, known as “expressive coordinated expenditures.” 

The district court concluded that “the First Amendment requires different treatment for 

‘expressive,’ ‘communicative’ or ‘speech-laden’ coordinated expenditures, which feature 

the speech of the spender, from coordinated expenditiires on non-communicative 

_- materials, such as hamburgers or travel expenses for campaign staff.’’ Id. at 85 11.45. Thc 

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district court then defined an “expressive coordinated expenditure” as an expenditure “for 

a communication made for the purpose of influencing a federal election in which the 

spender is responsible for a substantial portion of the speech and for which the spender’s 

choice of speech has been arrived at after coordination with the campaign.” Id. The court 

then developed its own test for coordination: 

In the absenm of a request or suggestion fiom the campaign, an 

expressive expenditure becomes “coordinated[]” where the candidate 

or her agents can exercise control over, or where there has been 

substantial discussion or negotiation between the campaign and the 

spender over, a communication’s: (1) contents; (2) timing; 

(3) location, mode, or intended audience (eg, choice between 

newspaper or radio advertisement); or (4)’volume’ (e.g., number of 

copies of printed materials or fiequency of media spots), Substantial 

discussion or negotiation is such that the candidate and spender emerge 

as partners or joint venturers in the expressive expenditure, but the 

candidate and the spender need not be equal partners. This standard 

limits 544 1 b’s contribution prohibition on expressive coordinated 

expenditures to those in which the candidate has taken a sunicient 

interest to demonstrate that the expenditure is perceived as valuable for 

meeting the campaign’s needs or wants. 

,. 

Id. at 92. 

Based upon this ahysis, and not the statute or the Commission’s regulations, the district 

court found that there was no improper coordination between the Christian Coalition and 

Bush-Quayle ‘92, Helms for Senate, Inglis for Congress, Hayworth for Congress, or the 

National Republican Senatorial Committee. 

The district court’s test for coordination weakens important provisions of the Act. 

Let us suppose that Candidate Smith is slightly behind in the polIs, low on money, and 

needs help. It is the week before the election and he knows that a corporation is planning 

to run an “issue” advertisement to assist the Smith campaign. Smith contacts the 

president of the corporation’and complains that nobody has focused on an important 

matter in the campaign: various problems in the personal life of his opponent, 

Congressman Jones. Because of this oversight, candidate Smith believes that 

Congressman Jones is viewed in a better light by the electorate. Candidate Smith, 

however, does not want to run such an advertisement himself for fear of being accused of 

negative advertising. 

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During his meeting with candidate Smith, the wealthy supporter says, “That’s a 

great idea! Thanks for the information.” Aiter the meeting, the wealthy supporter 

ch,vlges the advertisement to say: “Congressman Jones is a liar, tax cheat and a wifebeater-keep that in mind on Tuesday.” The advertisement runs on the weekend before 

the election. Is this a coordinated expenditure? Would it make a difference if the wealthy 

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contributor said nothing during his meeting with the candidate? As we understand the 

district court’s opinion, there would no coordination between the candidate and the 

spender since there was no “substantial discussion or negotiation” such that they appeared 

to be “partners or joint venturers.” 52 F.Supp.2d at 92. This is particularly true if the 

spender said nothing in response to the candidate’s entreaty. Under the Commission’s 

regulations, however, it ,would appear that this expenditure was a disguised contribution 

and coordinated because it was “based on infonnation about the candidate’s plans, 

projects, or needs provided to the expending person by the candidate’s agents, with a 

view toward having an expenditure made.” 1 1 C.F.R. 109.1&)(4)(i). This would appear 

to be the more appropriate result given the ease with which “coordination,” and thus, the - 

contribution limits can be so easily evaded under the di,strict court’s test. 

To its credit, the district court recognized the difficulty of its task and virtually 

invited the Commission to file an interlocutory appeal on the matter to the United States 

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: “This Court is of the opinion that 

’ this Order in relation to Counts I, II, and IIl involves controlling questions of law as to 

which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an intermediate 

appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the 

litigation .”52 F.Supp.2d at 98 (emphasis added). Commissioners Sandstrom, Elliott, 

Mason and Wold, however, voted to end the Commission’s enforcement litigation against 

the Christian Coalition and not appeal the matter6 

In my view, the Commission should not adopt the Christian Coalition definition 

of “coordination:”:. It is an approach which threatens the restrictions and requirements of 

the statute. Moreover, this judicially created definition completely ignores the definition 

of “coordination” properly promulgated in the Commission’s regulations. The 

Commission devoted considerable resources to investigating this matter under the 

regulations currently on the.books only to now. find that at least three Commissioners 

favor an interpretation posited by a single district court judge. See, e.g., FEC v. Christian 

Coalitiori (Commissioners Elliott, Mason, Sandstrom and Wold voted not to appeal 

district court decision); see also MUR 4378 Statement of Reasons of Commissioners 

Wold, Elliott and Mason at 9. In my view, the Commission should have continued to 

apply its current regulations and not the Christian Coalition approach. By its failure to 

do so, the Commission has created considerable uncertainty as to which standard of 

coordination should be applied in the fbture. As the instant matters demonstrate, this 

uncertainty will come at great expense in time, effort and energy to the Commission and 

the regulated community. 

Clearly, the Commission should not have dropped a significant enforcement action such as the Christian 

Coalifion case and wrested resolution .of these important issues away from the Article III courts. The 

decision of o single district court certainly cannot resolve these important issues. Indeed, the decision of 

the district court in Christiun Coulition is not binding precedent on any odier federal court, even in the same 

district. See, cg., In re Korean Air Line Disaster, 829 F.2d 1171, I 176 (D.C.Cir. 1987)(“Binding 

precedent for all [circuits) is.set only by the Suprenit Court, and for the district courts within B circuit, only 

by the court of appeals for that circuit”), urd, 490 U.S. 122 (1989). 

‘ 

6 
Rather than follow the definition of coordiiiation created out of whole cloth by the 

district court in Christian Coalition, the Commission in these matters should have 

followed the definition for coordination found in the Commission's regulations. Indecd, 

an administrative agency's obligation to follow its own rules and regulations is one of the 

most basic tenets of adniinistrative law: 

It is elementary that at1 agerrcy niust adhere to its own rules and 

regulations. Ad hoc departures from those rules, even to achieve 

laudable aims, cannot be sanctioned, Teleprompter Cable System v. 

FCC, 543 F.2d 1379, 1387 (D.C.Cir. 1976), for therein lies the seeds 

of destruction of the orderliness and predictability which are the 

hallmarks of lawful administrative action. SintpIy stated, rules are 

rrr~e.9, andjidelity to the rules which have been proper& pronudgated, 

consistent with applicable statutory requirements, is required of those 

to whom Congress has entrusted the regulatory missions of moderri 

1iJe. 

Reicters LTD. v. F.C.C., 781 F.2d 946,950 (D.C.Cir. 1986)(opinion of J. Starr)(emphasis 

added). Indeed, the courts sternly have lectured that: 

We do not believe [ai agency] should have the authority to play fast 

and loose with its own regulations. It has become axiomatic that an 

agency is bound by its own regulations. TIe fact that a regulation as 

wt-itte~t' does nol provide [art agency] a quick way to reach a desired 

,result does not authorize it to ignore the regulation or label it 

'itiappropriute. 

Pudmdle Ecutt'rrr fVpe the CO., v. P.h'.R.C., 613 rl.26 1120, 1135 (I.).C.Cir. 

1979)(emphasis added). See US. L~IJ~S v. Federal Marititne Commission, 584 F.2d 5 19, 

526 n.20 (D.C. Cir, 1978)(it is well-settled that "an agency is not fkee to ignore or violate 

its regulatidns while they remain in effect")(emphasis added), citing United States-v. 

Nixort, 4 18 'V.S. 683,693-696 (19741, Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (19571, and 

Accardi v. Sirarrghnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); see also Memorial, Inc. v. Harris, 655 

F.2d 905 (8th Cir. 1980)("[I]t is by now axiomatic that agencies must comply with their 

own regulations while they remain in effect."). 

i. 

Pursuant to its statutory authority, see 2 U.S.C. 0 437d(a)(8), the Commission put 

into place regulations defining what is coordination. These regulations did not steal upon 

an unsuspecting Commission. The Commission approved these carehlly crafted 

regulations after considering all the comments an.d testimony submitted in the 

rulemaking process as well as the pertinent case law, including Buckfey v. Vuleo, siipra. 

These validly adopted regulations have the "force and effect of law." 

7 
Accardi v. Shaiighrressy, supra; see also United States v. Nixon, supra. 41 8 US. at 695 

(“So long as this regulation is extant it has the force o’f law.”). 

Ohviously, it is possible for the Commission to amend or revoke the regulations 

defining what is coordination. But it has not done so. Indeed, last year the Cornmissioii 

published a suppIementa1 notice of proposed rdetnaking defining the term “coordinated 

general public political comniunication.” 64 Fed. Reg. 6895 1 (Dec. 9, 1999). These 

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proposed rules “are intended to incorporate into the Commission’s rules the standard 

articulated by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in the 

Christian Coalition decision.” Id. The Commission, however, still has not adopted these 

regulations and it is possible that any .final regulation will significantly differ in some 

respects fioni the Christian Coalitiorr opinion.’ 

. So long as the Commission’s current regulations remain in effect and have the 

force of law, the six members of the Commission are bound to respect and enforce them. 

This approach is far preferable to a decision which ignores regulations on the books and, 

instead, seeks to apply standards which have not been promulgated and are only at the 

proposed rulemaking stage. Xn my view, failure to apply the current regulations may we11 

expose the Commission to a §437g(a)(8) action alleging that the Commission’s dismissal 

of this.matter was contrary to law. 

It is uncikar whether the Commission would have ultimately proceeded against 

respondents under the definition of coordination currently found in the Commission’s 

regulations. On the one hand, the Office of General Counsel asserts in its close-out 

General Counsel’s Report: 

The investigation has produced enough evidence femiing to 

demonstrate that through the AFLCIO’s status as a “notional partner” 

of the Coordinated Campaign, both the individual state AFL-CIO 

federations and AFLCIO headquarters itself had access to volumes of 

of the DNC, the DCCC, the state Democratic parties, and in some . 

instcmces individual candidates for Federa1 office. Moreover, the 

evidence shows that the AFL-CIO had not merely access to, but 

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, non-public information about the plans, projects, activities, and needs 

- ’ Moreover, tlrerc is litilc doubt that whatever regulatory standard the Conmission develops, it will be 

subject to some future challenge and litigation. Indeed, one member of the regulated community reviewed 

the supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking creating a regulatory definition of coordination based on 

Christiun Coalition and “predicted. . .hat there would be negative comments on the new Commission 

proposal fiom business, labor and other groups.” BNA, Money & Politics at 2 (December 3, 1999). This 

prediction has provcn to be accurate. Negative comments have been made regarding the supplemental 

notice of proposed mlcmking, and the Commission is cunently struggling to address them 

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Democratic committees’ plans for “Coordinated Campaign” activity. 

MURs 4291 , et of. General Counsel’s Report at 18 (June 9,2000)(“June 9,2000 General 

Counsel’s Rrcport”)(emphasis added). Thc Gcneral Counsel’s Report further stated: 

- . .. authority to approve or disapprove, the DNC’s and the state 

_.. . 

Under the inferpretation of the law put forward by the Coniniission in 

the Chrisfiari Coalifiuri case and cases prior to it, the sharing of this 

much information about the potential recipient committees’ plans, 

projects, activities and needs would have been more than sufficient to 

taint the independence of any subsequent election-related 

communications to the general public by the AFL-CIO. 

Id. 

: On the other hand, it is procedurally premature to suggest.that the Commission, or 

even the General Counsel, would have settled on and eventually approved this. analysis. 

For example, the General Counsel had not yet prepared or sent his General Counsel’s 

Brief setting forth his ‘‘position on the factual and legal issues of the case and containing 

a recommendation on whether or not the Commission should find probable cause to 

believe that a violation has occurred.” 11 C.F.R. 51 11.16(a). Nor had the respond.ents 

filed a brief “setting forth respondent[s’] position on the factual and legal issues of the 

case.” 1 1 C.F.R. 5 1 1 1.16(c). Nor had the General Counsel, after reviewing the 

respondents’ brief, advised the Cornmission on whether he “intended to proceed with the 

recommendation, or to withdraw the recommendation from Commission consideration.” 

11 C.F.R. $1 1 l.lG(d). 

Adding to the uncertainty is the fact that the June 9,2000 General Counsel’s 

Report quoted above contains virtually no discussion of the current regulatory definition 

of “coordination” and its application to the particular facts of the instant matter; instead, 

the Report focuses almost. entirely on its coriclusion that “if the Christian Coalition 

standard governs these matters, further investigation of any strand of the investigation is 

unlikely to produce evidence of significant violations bythe AFL-CIO or the committees 

with which it was in contact. June 9 General Counsel Report at 49.* 

Even if violations were found in these matters, it is unclear what remedies would 

have been applied. .‘ I, for ohe, would have been happy to settle the case with a minimal 

There is a legitinlate question regarding application of the coordination standards in the statute and 

regulations to support of a party, versus support of a particular carrrlidute. The coordination rules deal with, 

e.g., requests or suggestions from “a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents.” 

2 U.S.C. 5441a(a)(7)(B)(i); see also 1 1 C.F.R. 0 109.l(b)(4). Thus, before I could be persuaded to find 

probable cause to believe a violation occurred regarding in-kind support of the DNC or some state 

Dernocrh psrtics, I would r1cc.d sonic analysis showing how tl~c candidate-oriented *:oordination nilcs 

could be applied to such party-oriented activity. 

9 
civil penalty in order to establish that the Conimission’s current regulations and not the 

Christiarz Cunli/iorr case define the term “coordination.” 

While the substantive resolution of these matters under the Commission’s current 

regulations is uncertain, it is clear to me that those regulations should have been applied. 

The Cjrrisfiari Coaiiiiurr definition of “coordination” is so narrow and limited that it 

threatens any effort to enforce the requirements of the Act in a serious manner. 

Moreover, as a matter of administrative law, I fail to see how the Commission can simply 

turn its back on its current regulations and instead apply a standard which is still the 

subject of debate in a notice of proposed rulemaking. For these reasons, I believe the . 

Commission should have resolved these matters under its current regulations. 

As a practical matter, however, I can no longer see four votes on the Commission 

for enforcing those regulations. As such, it obviously would be unfair to apply the 

broader definition of coordination found in the current regulations against the respondents 

in the instant matters, but later apply the narrower and more lenient Christiurz Coalitiori 

standard to others. Moreover, a vote against the General Counsel’s recommendation to 

close these matters would needlessly have kept these matters open where only four 

Commissioners were participating. As a result, I voted to adopt the General Counsel’s 

recommendation to take no further action and to close the file in these matters. 

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Scott E. Thomas 

Commissioner