### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE M a y 13, 2008 S e s s i on

C H A D A LA N PA R K ER v . STA TE O F TEN N ESSEE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Rutherford Coun ty

No. F -59907 Don R. Ash, Judge

No

. M2 0 0 7 -0 2 7 9 9 -C CA -R 3 -PC 

### - F il e d Jul y 31 , 200 8

The Petitioner, Chad Ala n Parker , pled nolo contendr e to one c ount of ag g ravated sexual battery and one c ount of burg lary of an a utomobile. Th e t ri al co u rt sentenc ed him to ten y ear s of incar cer ati o n and community supervision for life for the a g g ravated sexual battery conviction, and to two y ear s for the bur g lary conviction. The tria l court orde red that the sentenc es run concur rently . The Petitioner filed a pro se pe tition for post-conviction relief , wh i ch was amende d by appointed counsel, alleg ing he rec eived the ineffe ctive assistance of counsel

. Af t er revie wing t h e i s s u es and a pplicable a

uthorities, we re verse the post-conviction cour t’s judgme nt and re mand the ca se for

the Petitioner to withdraw his best intere st plea.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e ntof t he Ci r c uitCo ur t R e ve r se d

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J., d e liv e re d th e op ini on of the c ourt , in whic h J.C. M C L IN , J ., joined. D. KEL L Y T HOMAS , J R ., J ., filed a dissentingopinion. W.H. (Steve) Stephenson, I I , Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llant, Chad Alan Parke r.
Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l E

. Mo or e , So lic ito r G e ne ra l; Be nja mi nA

. B a ll , A s s is ta n t A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l; Wi ll ia

m C

. Wh it e s e ll , Jr

. , D is tr ic t A tt o rney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION I. F acts

A Rutherfor d County

Gra nd J ury indicted the Petitioner for o n e co u n t o f attempted ag g ravated ra

pe, one c ount of ag g ravated s ex u al b at tery , and one c ount of burg lary of an automobile. At the hea

ring on the Petitioner’s plea t o one count of ag g rava ted sexual battery

and one count of

burg lary of an a utomobile, the State informed the tria l co u rt t h at, had the c ase g one to trial, the evidenc e would have shown:-2-

Detec ti v e Cr a igSny d e r

o f th e M ur f r e e s b o r o Po li c e D e p artm e n t .

. . w o u ld testify as follows. That on or about the 28th day of De cembe r, 2005, he r esponded to the Targ et par

king lot in re fer ence to sex ual battery of a f emale vic tim. The investigation re v ea l ed that the female vic tim was enteringher ve hicle at the T arge t parkinglot when a male subject, later identified as Chad Par

ker, pushe d her f rom behind into her ve hicle, beg an pulling up he r skirt, attempted to re move he r u n d e r w e ar

. T h e v i c t i m b e g an s o un d i n g h e r h o r n o n th e v e h i c l e a t w h ic h ti me sever al witn es ses appr oache d the vehicle , tried to assist her, did follow Mr. Park e r, did

c a ll 9 -1 -1 and

g ive the po lic e dir e c tio ns on ho w t o g e t th e re and

did ke e p h im i n v ie w unti l th e po lic e did c ome . T he po li ce the n a pp re he nd e d h im
near the L owe’ s. . . .
The trial c ourt questioned the Petitioner a nd th en acc epted his guilty plea. The trial court e ntere d the sentenc e agree d to by the par ties, that being ten y ear s of incar cer ation, to be serve d at 100%, and co mm

u n it y s u p e r v is io nf o r li f e f o r th e a g g r av a te d

s e xu a l b a tt e r

y c o n v ic ti o n

. I t a ls o enter ed the ag ree d sentenc e for

the burg lary

conviction, two y ear s, and orde red the s en tence s to run
concur rently

. Although the Petitioner did not file an appea l, he subsequently filed a le tter with the trial court, which t h e t ri al court treated a s a pro se petition for post-conviction re lief. The tr ial court appointed him counsel, a nd counsel amended the p et i t i o n . At a hea ring on the petition, the following occur

red: The Petitioner’s trial c o u n s el (“Counsel” ) testified a bout the char g es the Pe titioner fac ed as pa

rt of this indictment and about those he a lso face d for se ven pending vio latio ns of

the se xua l of

fe nd e r r e g ist

ry . Co un se l sa id t

hat he re c e ive d d isco very fr om t he State
ear ly in the case , and he ha d acc ess to the State’s complete file.

Co u n s e l te s ti f

ie d th a t h e inv e s ti g a te d th is c a s e b y tr yin g to inte r

v ie w w it n e s ses and revie wing the discover

y , incl uding the 9-1-1 c alls. Ba sed upon his investigation, he discussed the pre p ar at i on and trial strateg y with the Petitioner. Counsel testified that the State made the Petitioner an off

er, wh i ch the Petitioner re jected. Counsel ne g otiated a de al with the State, and the State ac cepte d one of Counsel’s “ coun t er o ffe rs” on June 26, 2006, the day of the guilty

plea hear in g

. Co u n s e l d is c u s s e d th e a g r e e me n t w it

hth e Pe ti ti o n e r

b e f o r e th e h e ar in g

. Co u n s el ag ree d that the petition t o en t er the g uilty plea a g ree ment listed that the Petiti oner w as plea ding g uilty as a Rang e I

offe nder, which was inc orre ct.

Couns e l te sti fi e d th a t th e plea a g re e me nt r e qu ir e d th at th e Pe tit ion e r b e on c omm un ity supervision for life , in acc ordanc e with T en n es see Code Annotated sec tion 39-13-524. Counsel said that, from his per spective o n t he 26th, this posed no additional conseque nces to the Petitioner beca

use th e P et i t i oner w as, as a result of a

previous convic tion, alrea dy require d to be on community

supervision for life and on the se x ual offe nder r eg istry . Cou n s el explained as much t o t h e P et itioner, telling the Petitioner that there w ould be re strictions on where the Pe ti ti o n e r li v e d an d w o r

k e d a f te r h e w a s r e le a s e d f

r o m p r is o n

. Co un s e l c o n c e d e d th a t he later lear ned that ther e wa s more to the statute than he repr esente d to the Petitioner. Counsel said that he did not discuss with the S t at e’s attorney what community

supervision for life entailed. Counsel ag ree d that on the day of the he aringthe Peti tioner aske d him questions about the-3-

community

supervision. Counsel told him that he did not hav e h i s s t at u t e book with hi m, but he would look up the statute later a nd “g et bac k” to the Petitioner.

Counsel testified that he re prese nted another defe ndant in a post-conviction case a nd raised the same issue that the Petitioner in this case ra i s ed

. He s aid that he r eviewe d statute 39- 13-524 and r ealized the “a ctua l d ep t h s ” of the statute and the r equire ments, which we re more than he r epre sented to the Petitioner. Af ter re adingthe statut e, C o u nsel broug ht a copy of the statute to the Petitioner in jail. He s ai d that the ac tual status of the law a nd the re quirements that it impos ed upon the Petitioner we re greater than he had re prese nted to the Petitioner. For instance, the l aw re q uires that one on c ommunity supervision be unde r the super vision and control of the B oard of

Probation and Parole similar to a pe rson under parole supervision. The bo ard is a uth or ize d to e sta

bli shc on ditio ns of c omm un ity su pe rv isi on that are ne c e ssa

ry to protec t the public from a de fenda nt committi ng a new

sexual offense, as well as promoting the reha bilitation of the person. F urther, the law states that the boa rd is au t h o rized to impose and enfor ce a supervision and re h ab i l i tation fee upon a per son on community supervision similar to a fe e imp os e d b y

the oth e r p aro le st atu te . Co un se l te sti fi e d th a t th e statut e a lso state s th a t th e fi rs t violati on of c omm un ity su pe rv isi on is a Cla ss Amis de me ano r a nd the se c on d is a

Cla ss E felony , even thoug h the supervise e is not technica lly on probation or pa

role.

When Counsel ex plained the law to the Petitioner, the Petitioner told him t hat if he kne w that the supervision wa s go i n g t o be as the statute proscr ibed it, then he would not have pled g uilty . Counsel said that he believe d that th ere was a “sig nificant diff

ere nce” betwee n the law a s he desc ribed it to the Petitioner and the a ctual law. Counsel stated he believe d that it was err or for him not to expl ain all the provisions of this statute to th e P et i t i o n er befor e the Petitioner pled g u i l t y.
On

c ro ss- e xami natio n, Couns e l te sti fi e d th a t he c ou ld n ot b e sure of the c on dit ion s w ith which the Petitioner would have to comply upon the Petitioner’s re lease , in p art because the Pe t i t i o n er ’s probation off icer could impose any

conditions within hi s or her authority . Counsel
a g re e d th a t he c ann ot e xpla in t o a ny c lie nt t he e xac t te rm s o f t

he ir paro le be c a

us e tho se de ta ils
ar e n o t av a il a

b le to h im

. F u rth e r , h e s a id th a t h e a ls o c an n o t te ll h is c li e n ts w h a t th e ir e xa c t f ee fo r p aro le wi ll b e . Co un se l a g re e d th a t th e Pe tit ion e r h a d s e rv e d p ri so n ti me fo r a se x cr ime in t h e p a s t , m ak i n g t h e P e t i t i o n e r f a m i l i ar w i thth e r e qu i r e m e n t s o f th e s e x u a l o f

f e n d e r r e g i s tr y. Counsel also conce ded that, had the Petitioner g one to t ri al an d b een c onvicted, the Petitioner
wo uld be re le a se d s ub

je c t to the same re str ic tio ns a s h e wa s subj ect to as a re su lt o f h is guil ty plea.

Counsel testified that he fe lt he had a c ommand of the fa cts of this ca se and that he discussed the c ase w ith the Petiti oner o n n u m er ous occa sions. Further , Counsel testified that he discussed the post-c onviction case with the Petitioner, and the Petitioner unde rstood that if the petition is gra

nted the Petitioner will g o to trial. C ounsel testified that the video sur veillance tape from the Ta

rg et and L owe’ s involved in this case showed that the Petitioner was at the
scene of this attack.-4-

Counsel ag ree d that the trial judge ex p l ai n ed to the Petitioner at the guilty plea he aring that th e Pe tit ion e r w ou ld b e su bje c t to c omm

un ity supe rv isi on . T he c ourt

a sk e d th e Pe tit ion e r i f he had a ny questions, and the Petitioner re sponded that he did not.

The Petitioner testified t h at h e re called the plea ne g otiations went “bac k and for th” prior t o t h e gu i l t y

p l eah ea ri n g , a n d

t h ey fi n al l y re ac h edan agr ee m en to nJ un e 2 6 , b ef o re th e h ea ri n g. The Petitioner said that Counsel t old him that the St ate wa s making their final of fer , and he could take the offe r or they wer e g oing to t ry t h e ca s e that day . The Petitioner said that it had been his plan t o g o to trial. Counsel informed the Petitioner that the of fer was ten year s at 100%, which the Petitioner did not like. Counsel also i n fo rmed the Petitioner that he would be under community

supervisi o n fo r l i fe, and this was the first time duringall the plea ne g otiations that the Petitioner had he ard this term. T h e P et i t ioner a sked Counsel what that e ntailed, and Counsel informed him t h at , t o the best of his knowledg e, it meant that the Petitioner c ould not live or work a ro u n d a d aycar e. Counsel told the Petitioner it was the same a s his sex offe nder r eg istry require ments, which he ha d to comply with any way . C o u nsel told him t hat he would not have a parole office r but that he would be subject to the sexual offende r re g istr y re q u i re m en ts, which was unsuper

v is e d

. T h e Pe ti ti o n e r

s a id th a t t h e r e w e r e n o f

e e s inv o lv e d

f o r th e s e xu a l o f

f e n d er reg istry , and he a ssumed this was the same f or community

supervision for life

. Th e Pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t, l a te r, he le arn e d th a t he wo uld a c tua lly have to be on

pa ro le the re st of his life and that he w ould have to pay a $45 fe e eve ry

month for the re st of his life. Th e Pe tit ion e r s a id t

hat, h a d he kno wn

of the se c on se qu e nc e s, he wo uld have a sk e d Co un se l to g et another

plea a g ree ment or to take the case to trial.

On cr o s s -e x am ination, the Petitioner ag ree d that the statute may not expl icitly

state that he must pa

y $45 per month but that Counsel e x plained this to him a fter he had pled gu i l t y

. T he Pe tit ion e r s a id t

hat he did no t f ile a mot ion to w ith dr aw h is guil ty

pl ea beca

us e Couns e l to ld h im to file a post-c onviction petition.

Ba sed upon t h i s evidenc e and the filings of the par ties, the post-conviction cour t denied the Petitioner’ s petition for post-conviction re lief.

II. Ana lys is

On a pp e a l, t he Pe tit ion e r c on te nd s th a t th e po st- c on vic tio n c ourt e rr e d w hen it de nie d h is pe tit ion be c a us e he re c e ive d th e ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of counse l. H e a lso a sse rt s h is “ be st interest” ple a wa s not knowingly and voluntarily

enter ed bec ause it wa s enter ed as a result of materia lly

incorre ct and/or de ficient infor mation provided to h i m b y t ri al counsel. This is based upon the fa ct that he wa s not informed of the c onsequ en ce s o f the “ community supervision for life” pr ovision of his sentence.

I n order to obtain post-conviction relief , a petitioner must show that his or her conviction or sentenc e is void or voidable be cause of the ab ri d gm en t of a c onstitut ional rig ht. T.C.A. § 40- 30-103 (2006) . The pe titioner bear s the burden of provingfac tual al l ega t i ons in the petition for post-conviction re lief by

clear and convincing e vidence . T.C.A. § 40-30-110( f) ( 2006). Upon-5-

revie w, this Court will not re-w eig h or re -eval u at e t h e evidenc e below; a ll questions concer ning the cr e d ib il it

y o f w it n e s s e s , th e w e igh t a

n d v a lu e to b e g iv e nth e ir

te s ti mo n y

an d th e f a c tu al iss ue s r a ise d b y

the ev id ence ar e to b e re so lve d b y the tr ia l ju dg e , n ot t

he a pp e llate c ourt s. Mo mo n v . S

tate , 1 8 S. W.3 d 1 52 , 1 56 (T e nn . 1 99 9) ; H e n l e y v . Stat e , 960 S.W .2d 572, 578-79 (T e nn . 199 7). A po st-c on vic tio n c ourt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s are su

bje c t to a de no vo re vie w b y

thi s Court; ho we v er , we m ust acc ord these f actua l findings a

presumption of cor

rec tness, which ca

n be over come only

when a preponde ranc e of the evid en ce is c ontrary to the post-conviction court’s f actua l findings. Fi e lds v . S tate , 40 S.W. 3d 45 0, 45 6- 57 (T e nn

. 2001 ). A po stc on victio n c ourt ’s c on c lus ion s o f l aw a re su bje c t to a pure ly de no vo re vie w b y

thi s Co ur

t, w ith no presumption of cor

rec tness. Id. at 457. We will discuss each issue in turn.

A. Ineff ect ive Assistance of Counsel

Th e ri g ht o f a

c rimin a lly

a c c us e d to re pr e se ntatio n is g ua ra nte e d b y bo th t he Sixth Amendment to the United States Constituti on and ar ticle I , section 9 , of the Te nnessee Co n s ti tuti on. St at e v. W hite , 1 14 S.W. 3d

46 9, 47 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; State v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d 453, 4 6 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ; Ba

x te r v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) . The followingtwo-prong te st d ir e c ts a

c ourt ’s e va luatio n o f a

c la im f or ine ff e c tiv e ne ss:

F ir st, the [pe tit ion e r] mus t sh owthat c ouns e l’ s p e rfor manc e wa s d e fi c ie nt. Th is require s showing that couns el made e rror s so serious that counsel wa s not fu nc tio ning a s th e “ c ouns e l” g ua ra nte e d th e [pe tit ion e r] b y

the Sixth A me ndme nt. Second, the [petitioner] must show that the d ef i cient per formanc e pre

judiced the defe ns e. T h i s re quires showingthat counsel’s e rror s were so serious as to depr ive the [petiti oner] of a f

air trial, a trial whose r esult is reliable. Unle ss a [petiti oner] makes both showing s, it cannot be said that the c onviction or death sentence
re s u l t e d f r o ma b r e ak d o w ni nt h e a dv e r s ar y p r o c e s s t h a tr e n d e r s t h e r e su lt unreliable

. Strickland v. W

ashington , 4 66 U. S. 6 68 , 6 87 (1 98 4) ; S t a t e v. Me lson , 772 S.W .2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 1989)

.
I n revie wing a cla im of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, this Co u rt must determine wh et h er t h e advice g iven or ser vices re ndere d by

the attorne y

are within the rang e of c ompetence d e ma n d e d o f a tt o r

n e y s in c r im in a l c ases. Baxter , 523 S.W .2d at 936. To pre vail on a cla im of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, a pe titioner must show that “counsel’s representation fell below an objec tive standard of rea sonabl en es s

. ” Ho us e v . S tate , 44 S.W .3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (c i t i n g Strickland , 466 U.S. at 688 (1984))

. Whe n e va luatin g an in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l c la im, th e re vie wi ngc ourt sh ou ld judge the attorne y ’s per formanc e within the context of the ca se as a whole, takinginto account all rele vant circ umstances. Strickland, 4 6 6 U

. S

. a t6 9 0 ; St at e v. Mi tc he ll , 753 S.W .2d 148, 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) . The re viewingcourt must evaluate the questionable conduct from the att o rn ey ’s p er s p ective at the time. Strickland, 46 6 U .S. a t 69 0; He lla rd v . S tate , 629 S.W .2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) . I n d o ing so, the revie wing court must be hig hly defe rential a

nd “should indulge a-6-

strong presumption that counsel’s c onduct fa ll s wi t h i n t he wide r ang e of r easona ble profe ssional assistance .” Burns , 6 S.W .3d at 462. Fi n al l y , we n o t e that a de fenda nt in a criminal ca se is not entitled to perfe ct re pre s en t at i o n, only constitutionally

adequate re prese ntation. De nto n v . S tate , 9 4 5 S. W. 2 d 7 9 3 , 7 9 6 ( T e n n

. Cr im

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 6 )

. In o th e r w o r d s , “ in c o n s id ering claims of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, ‘ we a dd

re ss n ot what is pr

ud e nt o r appropr iate , b ut o nly wh a t is constitutionally

compelled.’ ” Burger v. Kem p , 4 8 3 U. S

. 7 7 6 , 7 9 4 (1 9 8 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Uni t ed S tates
v . Cr on ic , 466 U.S. 648, 665 n

. 3 8 (1 9 8 4 )). Counsel should not be dee med to have be en ineffe ctive mere ly beca

use a differ ent proce dure or strateg y might have prod u ce da d iffer ent
r e s u lt. W

ill iam s v . S

tate , 5 99 S.W. 2d

27 6, 27 9- 80 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 80 ). Th e fa c t th a t a pa rt ic ula r s tr a te g y

or ta c tic failed

or hurt the de fe ns e do e s n ot, sta nd inga lon e , e sta

bli sh
unrea sonable re prese ntation. Ho us e , 4 4 S

. W

. 3 d at 5 1 5 (c i t i n g Go ad v . S tate , 938 S.W .2d 363, 36 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 6))

. How e ve r, de fe re nc e to m a tte rs of str a te g y and ta c tic a l c ho ic e s a

pp lie s o nly

if the choice s are informed one s based upon a dequate prepa ration. Ho us e , 44 S.W .3d at 515.

I f the pe titioner shows that counsel’s r epre sentation fell below a rea so n ab l e st andar d, then the petitioner must satisfy the pre judice prong of

the Strickland

test by demonstrating“ther e is a re as o n ab l e proba

bility that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the result of the proce edingwould have be en diffe rent.” Strickland, 46 6 U .S. a t 69 4; Nic ho ls v . S tate , 90 S.W .3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 2002) . This rea sonable p ro b ab i l i ty must be “suffic ient to undermine c onfidenc e in the outcome.” Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 69 4; Ha rri s v . S tate , 875 S.W .2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1994). In the context of a guilty plea, to satisfy

the prejudice prongof Strickland , the petitioner must show that “there is a rea sonable probabi lity that, but for counse l’s err ors, he would not have ple aded guilty

and would have insisted on goingto trial.” Hi ll , 474 U.S. at 59.

I n the case under submissi on, the post-conviction court found Counsel’ s p er fo rmanc e wa s d ef i ci en tb u tt h at t h e P et i t i o n er d i d n o tp ro v e p re

j u d i ce , s t at i n g: This Court is of the opinion that P etitioner has not satisfied h i s burden of proof r equire d to establis h an o rd er for post-convic tion relief. The court c oncede s th a t th e Pe ti ti o n e r ’ s c o u n s e l’ s p e r f o r ma n c e w a s d e f

ic ie n t in s o me w ay

. S

ee B urns 6 S.[ W] .2d at 461. How ev er , t he Petitioner must satisfy both prong s of the Burns test to prove inef

fec tive assistance of counse l. The Court is of the opini o n that the Pe tit ion e r h a s f

a iled to p ro ve that “ the de fi c ie nt p e rf or manc e a c tua lly prejudic ed t h e defense.” Id. In order to show such pre

judice, the Petitioner would have ha d to offer

pro o f t h at “t here is a rea sonable proba bility that, but for counsel’ s d e f

ic ie n t p e r f

o r ma n c e , th e r e s u lt

o f th e p r o c e e d in g w o u ld

h av e b een differ ent.” The Court is of the belief P et i t i o n er has fa iled his burden of pr oof for this po int. I nf

a c t, th e T e n n e s s e e Co urt o f Cr im in a l A

p p e a ls h a s h e ld

th at
c o u n s e l ’ s f

a i l u r e t o a dv i s e h i s c l i e n t a b o u t th e d e t a i l s o f h i s p ar o l e e l i g i b i l i ty, in c lu d in g s e x o f

f e n d e r p r o g r ams , d o e s n o t amo un t to in e f f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n ce of counsel. Stu dd

ard v . S tate , No. W2004-00500-CCA-R3-PC, L EXI S 752 at 15 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006) (some citations omitted).-7-

I n ord e r f o r th e Pe ti ti o n e r

to p r e v a il h e r e in , h e mu s t s h o w , b y c le ar an d c o n v in c ing evidenc e, that his attorney failed to p ro p er l y advis e him of the possible conse quence s of his plea and that trial c ounsel’s fa ilure to d o s o re s u l t ed in prejudice . Once a guilty plea ha s been enter ed, ef

fec tiveness o f co u nsel is releva nt only to the extent that it aff

ects the voluntar iness of the ple a . In th is r e sp e c t, s uc h c la im s of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e ne c e ssa

ri ly imp lic a te the pr inc ipl e that g uilty

pleas be voluntarily

and intellige ntly

made. Se e Hi ll , 47 4 U. S. a t 56 . T he post

convi ct i o n co u rt conc luded that Counsel was inef fec tive in informing the Petitioner of the conseque nces of

his guilty plea, a nd the evidenc e supports that conc lusion.
We, however , conclud e that the e vidence preponde rate s ag ainst the post-conviction cour t finding that the Pet i t i o n er h as not proven pr ejudice. Counsel r eadily admits that the Petiti oner wanted to g o to trial but participated in leng thy plea ne g otiations, after which he a gree d to enter
a “ be st i nte re st” ple a . H e ma int a ine d at th e he ari ngth at he w ou ld h ave ins ist e d u po n ta kin g his
case to trial had he be en prop er l y i n fo rm ed of the c onsequenc es of his guilty plea. F or the
rea sons set forth in t he followingsection conc erningthe knowingand voluntary nature of the Pe ti ti o n e r ’ s g u il ty

p le a , w e c o n c lu d e th a t t h e Pe ti ti o n e r

is e n ti tl e d

to p o s t- c o n v ic ti o nrelief

. See Hi ll , 474 U.S. at 59.

B. Knowi ng and Voluntary P lea When evaluatingthe knowingand volunt ary nature of a guilty

plea, the United States Sup re me Court

ha s h e ld t

hat “ [t]he sta

nd ard wa s a nd re ma ins whe the r t

he ple a re pr e se nts a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative course s of action open to t h e d ef en d ant.” Nor th Car oli na v . A lfo rd , 400 U.S

. 2 5 , 3 1 (1970). The court re viewingthe voluntariness of a g uilty plea must look to the totality of the c ircumstance s. S

e e S ta tev

. Tu rner , 9 1 9 S.W .2d 346, 35 3 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); see al so Cha mb e rla in v . S

tate , 8 15 S.W. 2d

53 4, 54 2 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 1990). The circ umstances include :
the re lativ e int e lli g e nc e of the de fe nd ant; the de g re e of his fa mil iari ty wi th
cr i minal proce eding s; whether he was re prese nted by competent c ounsel and ha d the opportunity

to confe r with counsel a bout the options available to him; the
e xtent of a dv ic e fr om c ouns e l and the c ourt c on c e rn ingthe c ha

rg e s a g a ins t hi m; and the r easons f

or his decision to plead guilty , including a desire to avoid a g re a te r p e na lty

that mi g ht r e su lt f

ro m a jur y tr ia l.

Blan k e ns hip v . S

tate , 8 5 8 S

. W

. 2 d 8 9 7 , 9 0 4 (T en n

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Caudill v. Jago , 747 F.2d 1046, 10 52 (6 th C ir .1 98 4)). A ple a re su lti ngfr om i g no ra

nc e , mi sund e rs tand ing , c oe rc ion , in du c e me nt, or threa ts is not “voluntary .” Id.

I n the ca se under

submissi on, the post-conviction cour t found:
Reg ardingthe cha lleng e to the k n owing and voluntarine ss of his plea, the Court is also of the opi n i o n t h at t h e Petitioner has not satisfied his burde n of proof. L ooking to the totality of the circ umstances, the Court f inds th e P et i t ioner enter ed a vol u n tary

plea be cause he is very

familiar with cr iminal procee dings, he-8-

is familiar with sex offender law as he was pre viously convict ed as a sex offe nder, he is relatively

intelligent, he was repr es en t ed by competent c ounsel, he ha d o pp or

tun ity to c on fe r w ith his c ouns e l, a nd he ple d n o c on te st i n o rd e r t o re c e ive s e nte nc e le ss t

ha n a tr ia l po ssi bil ity

wo uld have re su lte d in . T he Court is also of the opinion that the P et i t i o n er enter ed a know ing ple a bec ause, a ccor ding to t he ple a tr ans c ri pt, the Court

re ve a le d th a t he fu lly

un de rs too d the pl ea and its
c on se qu e nc e s.
Th e re is n o c a se dir e c tly on po int , d isc us sin g wh e the r a pe tit ion e r who is misinformed ab o u t t h e requirements of c ommunity supervision for life is entitled to post-conviction relief on the g rounds that his g uilty plea wa s not knowingly and voluntarily

enter ed. We, howeve r, find instructive t h e ca s es discussing whether a petitioner is entitled to post-conviction re lief in the
c on te xt of

the pa ro le e lig ibi lity

re qu ir e me nts of

the se x off

e nd e r s tatut e. Th e se c a se s d ist inguis h be tw e e n c ir c ums tanc e s in wh ic h th e pe tit ion e r’ s c ouns e l fai ls to i nf or m th e pet it ion e r o f r e le a se re qu ir e me nts of

the se x off

e nd e r s tatut e and

wh e n th e peti ti on er’s c ouns e l mi sin for ms the petitioner of suc h require ments.

I n J ac o v . S tate , 1 20 S.W. 3d

82 8, 83 0 ( Te nn . 2 003) , th e pe tit ion e r a rgue d th a t hi s guil ty pleas to two counts of attempted rape wer e re ndere d u n k n o wi n g and involuntary beca use he w as not advised of the me ntal health re quirements he w ould be re quired to mee t as a sex offende r, pursuant to Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 40-35-503(c ) (20 0 3 ), b ef ore he could be r elea sed
on pa ro le . In r e

je c ting t he pe tit ion e r’ s c la im, our S up re me Court dis tin g uis he d th e fa c ts o f h is
case , in wh i ch h e was a dvised of the a ccur ate pa role e ligibility

date but not informed of the spec i fi c co n d i tions he would be re quired to mee t to achieve rele ase, f rom the fa cts in Howell v. Sta te , 569 S.W .2d 428, 435 (Tenn. 1975), in which the Court g rante d a petitioner post-c onviction
re lie f o n th e ba sis that he ente re d h is guil ty ple a wh ile un de r a

mis un de rs tand inga

bo ut h is rele ase e ligibility

date:

Unlike the def

endant in Ho we ll , M r. Jac o w a s n ot mi si nf or me d a bo ut h is p aro le elig ibilit y date. He will i n fa ct become par ole elig ible afte r ser ving thirty

perc ent of his se nte nc e a lth ou g h h e may no t a c t u a lly be re le a se d. Hi s r e le a se e lig ibi lity date is simply

the point at which he w ill be considere d for pa role u n d er the applicable standards . . . .

I n this case, the post c onviction tr i al co u rt found that no sex offende r has been r elea sed af

ter ser ving onl y t h i rt y

perc ent of his sentenc e unless the menta l health prof

essional conc luded that a f uture sex offense was phy sically impossibl e. Nonetheles s , a R ang e I standard of

fende r convic ted of a

sex crime become s parole elig ible afte r ser

ving thirty

perc ent of the a ctual sente nce impo s ed

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 5 0 1 ( c ) ( 2 0 0 3 )

. T h e r e qu ir e d e v a lu a ti o na f

f e c ts th e li k e li h o od of ac tual rele ase, but it does not af fec t the rele ase e ligibility date. Th u s, unlike the def endant in Ho we ll , M r. Jac o r e c e ive d a c c ur a te inf or matio n r e g ard ing his rele ase e ligibility

date pr ior to enteringhis plea.

Jaco , 120 S.W .3d at 832.-9-

This Court simil arly conclude d that err oneous information g iven to a petiti o n er –t h at
cer tain of his sentenc es would run c oncurr ently – entitled him to the appointment of co u nsel and
ane v i d e n t i ar

y h e ar i n g o n t h e i s s u e o f w h e th e r h i s g u i l ty p l e a s w e r e u n kn o w i n g an d i n v o l u n t ar

y. Cha rlton v . S

tate , 9 87 S.W. 2d

86 2, 86 7 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ). We h e ld t hat a petitio ne r i s entitled to “re ly

upon the ad v i ce of his attorney , espec ially when c onfirmed by

the trial judg e.” Id. F ur the r, we c on c lud e d th a t, “ I f, ba se d u po n the pa rt ic ula r c ir c ums tanc e s o f t

his c a se , it

is establish ed t h at t he plea

ag ree ment was e ntere d into under the c ollective misunderstanding that [t he sente nces] would be concur re n t l y s erve d, the plea a g ree ment should be set aside a s neither knowing nor voluntarily

made . . . .” Id

. We h ave , in

oth e r i ns tanc e s, g ra

nte d a pe tit io ner po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f whe n h is guil ty plea is ente red a fter ha

ving be en sig nifica n t ly

misinformed. Se e J

os e ph A. Ma inev . S

tate , No E2004 -00143-CC A-R3-PC, 2005 WL 1996631, at *7 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, Aug . 19, 2005) (g rantingpost-conviction re lief whe n a petition er wa s misinformed about the sente nces he would be re quired to ser ve), no Tenn. R. App

. P

. 11 application fil ed ; c f. Thomas Studdard v. State , No. W2004-00500-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 W L2771033, at *7 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Sept. 27, 2006) (deny

ing post-c onviction relief w h en counsel c orre ctly informed the pe titioner of his pa ro le e lig ibi lity

date but f

a ile d to inf

or m th e pe tit ion e r a

bo ut t he req uir e me nts he mus t complete pr ior to being parole d), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed

.
I n th e c a se un de r s ub mis sio n, the tot a lity of the c ircum st ances of

the c a se le a d u s to conclude that the Petitioner’s guilty plea wa s not knowingly and v o l u n t ar ily

enter ed. Counsel
rea dily admits that the Petitioner wanted to g o to trial but participated in leng thy plea neg o t i ati ons, after

which he a g ree d to enter a “best intere st” plea. Counsel infor med the Petitioner that community supervision for life would require nothing more of the Petitioner than he wa s alrea dy

require d to do as part of his participation in the sex o ff en d ers r eg istry . The sex of fe nd e rs re g istry

pr og ra m is un su

pe rv ise d, fr e e , a

nd re qu ir e s th a t an o ff

end e r r e g ist e r h is addre ss. The c o m m u n i ty supervision for life prog ram is much more intensive, requir ing the of fe nd e r t o r e po rt

to a pa ro le of fi c e r, wh o h a s w ide dis c re tio n in the imp os iti on

of re qu ir e me nts , and to p ay a mo n th ly f

e e

. U n d e r th e s e c ir c u ms ta n c e s , w e c o n c lu d e th a t th e Pe ti ti o n e r , rely ing on Counsel’s advise that the two pr og rams we re the same, wa s signific antly misinformed. There fore , under suc h circ umstances, his plea cannot be found to have bee n k n o wi n g and voluntary . Acc ording ly , we r ever se the post-c onvictio n court’s dismissal of the pe titioner and
re m an d fo r t h e P et i t i o n er

t o wi t h dra w h i s b e s t i n t e r e s tp l eaan d fo r f urt h er p ro ce ed i n gs consistent with this opi nion.

III. Conclusi on

B a se d o n th e fo re g oin g re a so nin g and a uth or iti e s, we re ve rse th e ju dg me nt o f t he po stconviction cour

t and re mand the matter fo r t h e P etitioner to withdraw his be st interest plea a nd for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion.

______________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE-10-