SIDE

NTAIN:

the Soviet-Afghan War

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THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN:

Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

by

Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau

Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Introduction by

Lieutenant General John E. Rhodes

Commanding General

U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Courtesy of

The United States Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division

Quantico, Virginia

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 8

CONTENTS

Introduction vii

Foreword ix

Acknowledgements xi

Preface xiii

Chapter 1: Ambushes 3

Vignette 1 - Ambushes at the Mamur Hotel 5

Vignette 2 - Yet Another Ambush at the Mamur Hotel 9

Vignette 3 - Ambush South of the Tangi Waghjan Gorge 13

Vignette 4 - Ambush at Kanday 17

Vignette 5 - Ambush on the Jalalabad-Asadabad Road 21

Vignette 6 - No-Pula Ambush 23

Vignette 7 - Two Convoys in the Kill Zone 27

Vignette 8 - Ambush Near Abdullah-e Burj 31

Vignette 9 - Deh-Khwaja Ambush 35

Vignette 10 - Duranay Ambush 39

Vignette 11 - Kandahar Ambushes .43

Vignette 12 - Ambush at Qala-e Haidar 49

Vignette 13 - Ambush at the Sadre Azam Hill 53

Vignette 14 - Ambush at Mazar Creek 55

Vignette 15 - Ambush at Qafus Tangay 59

Vignette 16 - Sisay Ambush 63

Chapter 2: Raids 69

Vignette 1 - Raid on the Totumdara Security Post 71

Vignette 2 - Chamtala Raid 73

Vignette 3 - Raid on Bagram! District Headquarters 76

Vignette 4 - Attack on the Tsawkey Security Outposts 77

Vignette 5 - Raid on Pul-e Charkhi Radio Transmitter

Station

81

Vignette 6 - Raid from Cheltan on Outposts in the

Kabul Suburbs

. 87

Vignette 7 - Raid on Mahipar Outposts 89

Vignette 8 - Raid on Lataband Security Outposts 93

Vignette 9 - Raid on Outposts at Wreshmin Gorge 97

Vignette 10 - Raid on the Bridge Post in Alingar 101

Hi
Chapter 3:

Vignette

Vignette

Chapter 4:

Vignette

Vignette

Vignette

Vignette

Vignette

Vignette

Chapter 5:

Vignette

Vignette

Chapter 6:

Vignette

Vignette

Vignette

Vignette

Vignette 5

Vignette 6

Vignette 6a

Vignette 6b

Shelling Attacks

1 - A Shelling Attack Turns Bad

2 - A New Years Present for the Soviets

Attacking a Strong Point

1 - Taking Alingar District Capital

2 - The Battle for Panjwayee

3 - Attack on the Bodyalay Garrison

4 - Attack on Sorubay

5 - Storming Gula'i

6 - Destruction of the Bagh-e Mumtaz Brigade

Mine Warfare

1 - Mujahideen Demolition Methods

2 - Mining attacks near Mehtar Lam

Blocking Enemy Lines of

Communication

1 - Carving up Regiments on the Approach

to Wazi

2 - Blocking the Paghman Highway

3 - Road Block at Estalef

4 - Defense of a River Line and Road Block

at Sayad

- The Defense Against the Soviet

OPERATION "MAGISTRAL"

- OPERATION GASHEY (Arrow in Pushto)

- The Battle for the Khairokhel Post

- The Battle for Spina Thana Base

Chapter 7:

Vignette

Vignette

Chapter 8:

Vignette

Vignette

Vignette

Vignette

Siege Warfare

1 - Failed Siege at Urgun

2 - Dehrawud Offensive

105

107

113

117

119

123

127

129

132

135

139

141

143

147

149

153

157

161

165

175

189

193

197

199

205

Defending Against Raids 211

- Soviet Raid on Mujahideen Hideout 213

at Sayghani

- Battle for Alishang District Center 217

- Vision in the Bar Kot Valley 219

- Surprised by the Soviets in the Dara-e Nur 223

IV
Chapter 9: Fighting Heliborne Insertions 227

Vignette 1 - Soviet Heliborne Raid Achieves Surprise 229

Vignette 2 - Soviet raid on Kanda 233

Vignette 3 - Air Assault on Maro Stronghold 237

Chapter 10: Defending Against a Cordon and Search 241

Vignette 1 - Battle of Baraki Barak 243

Vignette 2 - Defending Against An Offensive in Paghman 247

Vignette 3 - Battle for Kama 251

Vignette 4 - Defending against a Cordon and Search 257

Operation in Parwan

Vignette 5 - Last Stand on the Islands Opposite 263

Gerdi Kats

Chapter 11:

Vignette 1

Vignette 2

Vignette 3

Vignette 4

Vignette 5

Vignette 6

Vignette 7

Vignette 8

Vignette 9

Vignette 10

Vignette 11

Vignette 12

Vignette 13

Vignette 14

Chapter 12:

Vignette 1

Vignette 2

Vignette 3

Vignette 4

Vignette 5

Defending Base Camps

- Soviet Offensive through Surkh Rud

- Defending Surkhab Base Camp

- Fall of Surkhab Base Camp

- Loss of the Tor Ghar Base Camp

- Battles for Sharafat Koh Mountain Fortress

- Qala-e Naw Base Camp Defense

- Defending the Suburbs of Kandahar

- Defending the Malajat

- Battle for Chaharqulba Village

- Zhawar One

- Zhawar Two

- Krer One

- Krer Two

- The Fall of Chaghni Base Camp

Counterambushes

- Caught in a Soviet Ambush

- Ambushed at Farza

- Blasting out of an Ambush

- Caught in a DRA Ambush

- Ambushed on the High Plain

Chapter 13: Fighting in an Encirclement

Vignette 1 - A trip to the "Governor's House" goes bad

Vignette 2 - The Battle for Musa Qaleh

Vignette 3 - Escape from the Arghanday Encirclement

267

269

273

277

281

285

297

301

305

311

317

323

327

331

335

341

343

347

349

350

351

355

356

359

363
Chapter 14:

Vignette

Vignette

Vignette

Vignette

Vignette

Urban Combat 365

1 - Kidnaping a Soviet Adviser 366

2 - Four Urban Bomb Attacks 368

3 - Incident at Qala-e Jabar 371

4 - Afshar Ambush 373

5 - Remote-control Attack on a Convoy in 377

the Suburbs

Vignette 6 - Attack on the Ministry of Defense 379

Vignette 7 - Alcohol Can Be Deadly 382

Vignette 8 - Raid on Balahessar Fortress 383

Vignette 9 - Raid on the Kabul Metropolitan Bus 385

Transportation Authority

Vignette 10 - Weapons raid in Charikar 387

Vignette 11 - Night raid on a city outpost 389

Vignette 12 - Raid on Kandahar Communications Center 391

Vignette 13 - Attack on KHAD Headquarters 393

Vignette 14 - Raid on the 15th Division Garrison 396

Chapter 15: Conclusion 399

Glossary

Symbols library

Index

About the authors

407

415

417

421

VI
INTRODUCTION

As we have throughout our history—the Philippines, Haiti,

Nicaragua, Lebanon, Vietnam and Somalia—Marines will encounter

guerrilla forces in the 21st century. Marines must understand potential

adversaries, and learn as much as possible about them. The

mujahideen of the Soviet-Afghan War prevailed against a larger and

decisively better equipped foe, the Soviet Army. The Other Side of the

Mountain presents the story ofthe mujahideen's fight against that foe.

On 27 December 1979, Moscow ordered the Soviet Army into

Afghanistan. Organized, equipped, and trained for the execution of

combined arms operations, that force embodied the concept of

blitzkrieg. Nine years later, it withdrew in defeat. The Other Side of

the Mountain was written from the reports of mujahideen combat veterans and provides a tactical look at a decentralized army of footmobile guerrillas waging war against a technologically superior foe.

Absolute supremacy of firepower did not guarantee victory. Native

knowledge of terrain and detailed study of a known adversary offset

that advantage. In particular, the chapter on urban combat will be of

great interest to commanders concerned with force protection. This

book and its companion volume, The Bear Went Over the Mountain:

Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, published for the United States

Marine Corps in 1996, offers a chronicle of the Afghan War by the

warfighters.

The Marine Corps of the 21st century will have tremendous advantages over guerrilla forces. Our equipment, technology, training, and

support are the best in the world. Yet, technological superiority is not

in and of itself a guarantee of success. Insight into our adversary's

capabilities, tactics and motivation will provide the decisive edge. The

Other Side of the Mountain will help us gain this insight. I heartily

recommend this book to all Marines.

J. E. RHODES

Commanding General

Marine Corps Combat

Development Command

vii
FOREWORD

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, few experts

believed that the fledgling Mujahideen resistance movement had a

chance of withstanding the modern, mechanized, technologicallyadvanced Soviet Army. Most stated that resistance was futile and that

the Soviet Union had deliberately expanded their empire to the south.

The Soviet Union had come to stay. Although some historians looked

at the British experience fighting the Afghan mountain tribesmen,

most experts discounted any parallels since the Soviet Union possessed an unprecedented advantage in fire power, technology and

military might. Although Arab leaders and the West supplied arms

and material to the Mujahideen, they did so with the hope of creating a permanent, bleeding ulcer on the Soviet flank, not defeating

the Soviet Union. They did not predict that the Soviet Union would

voluntarily withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989.

What caused the Soviet withdrawal? The Soviets realized that

they were trapped in an unwinnable war where they were suffering

"death from a thousand cuts" by an intractable enemy who had no hope

of winning, but fought on because it was the right thing to do. After

failing to achieve military victory, the Soviet Union cut its losses and

withdrew. The Soviet Union lost 13,833 killed. Over 1.3 million

Afghans died and over a third ofthe population became refugees. Most

have not yet returned to war-torn Afghanistan.

There have been few studies of guerrilla warfare from the guerrilla's perspective. To capture this perspective and the tactical experience ofthe Mujahideen, the United States Marine Corps commissioned

this study and sent two retired combat veterans to interview

Mujahideen. The authors were well received and generously assisted

by various Mujahideen who willingly talked about their long, bitter

war. The authors have produced a unique book which tells the guerrillas' story as interpreted by military professionals. This is a book

about small-unit guerrilla combat. This is a book about death and

survival, adaptation and perseverance.

This is a book for the combat-arms company and field grade officer

and NCO. It provides an understanding of guerrilla field craft, tactics,

IX
techniques and procedures. It has application in Basic and Advanced

Officer and NCO courses as well as special warfare courses. Senior

leaders will also find valuable insights for training and supporting

guerrilla forces as well as defending against guerrilla forces. This book

is a companion piece to The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet

Combat Tactics in Afghanistan which National Defense University

press published in 1996.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book would not be possible without the open, friendly and willing support of the many Mujahideen we interviewed. We thank

Mawlawi Abdul-Rahman, Haidar Ahmadi, Mohammad Akbar,

Akhtarjhan, Doctor Abdul Qudus Alkozai, Assadullah Mohammad

Asef, Assadullah, Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch, Abdul Baqi Balots,

Abdul Nasrin Baz, Commander Didar, Daoud, Gulaga Farid, Ghulam

Farouq, Pir Syed Ahmad Gailani, Haji Zaman Ghamsharik, Abdul

Ghani, Sofi Lai Gul, Wazir Gul, Tsaranwal Sher Habib, Haji

Habibulah, Ghulam Haidar, Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif, Mawlali

Nezamuddin Haqani, Hedayatullah, Toryalai Hemat, Engineer

Mohammad Ibrahim, Mohammad Shah Kako, Asef Khan, Asil Khan,

Haji Badshah Khan, Nawaz Khan, Counsel General Haji Abdul

Khaleq, Haji Badshah Khan, Major Sher Aqa Kochay, Lalai, Mulla

Malang, Haji Malangyar, Akhtar Mohammad, Amir Mohammad, Haji

Lai Mohammad, Haji Pir Mohammad, Engineer Sayed Mohammad,

Qari Feda Mohammad, Sultan Mohammad, Mohammad Amin

Mudaqeq, Haji Nematullah, Lieutenant Zabet Omar, Sher Padshah,

Haji Abdul Qader, Akhund Zada Qasem, Mawlawi Qasem, LTC Haji

Mohammad Rahim, Abdul Razek, Mohammad Saber, Abdul Sabur,

Doctor Mohammad Sadeq, Amin Safi, Haji Aaquelshah Sahak, Abdul

Sadiq Sahebzada, Sarshar, Haji Mohammad Seddiq, Shahabuddin,

Haji Mohammad Shah, Mohammad Humayun Shahin, Mawlawi

Abdul Shukur Yasini, Haji Sidiqullah, Qazi Guljan Tayeb, General

Abdul Rahim Wardak, Doctor Mohammad Wakil, Doctor Mohammad

Wali, Haji Mohammad Yakub, General Gulzarak Zadran and Zakari

for generously sharing their time and experience. We can only hope

that peace will finally come to Afghanistan so that they can start the

long, difficult job of rebuilding their shattered country.

Our special thanks for the generous hospitality and support

extended to us by Nancy Dupree of the Agency Coordinating Body for

Afghan Relief, Pir Gailani, Mr. Kamaluddin of the Afghan Media

Resource Center, Abdul Ahad Karzai, Ahmed Wali Karzai, General

Counsel Haji Abdul Khaleq, Vice Counsel Muhammad Wali Naeemi

and Abdul Ghani Wardak.

A special thanks to our colleague, Major Nasrullah Safi, who went

into areas ofAfghanistan to conduct interviews where we could not go.

We contacted several major Mujahideen commanders such as Ismail

xi
Khan, Masood, Abdul Haq, and Jaialuddin Haqani for interviews and

material, but we were unable to meet with them before the book deadline. Our thanks in advance for the privilege of returning at a future

time to conduct those interviews and to include them in a follow-on book.

Our special thanks to Colonel David O. Smith, Lieutenant Colonel

Terry Cook, Captain Bob Hehl and TSGT Barry Cuthbertson of the

United States Defense Attache Office in Islamabad and Principal

Officer of the United States Consulate in Peshawar, Brad Hanson.

The United States Marine Corps funded the research, writing and

publication ofthis book. Charlie Cutshaw, Karen Dolan and Dick Voltz

of the USMC Studies and Analysis Division at Quantico, Virginia

provided funding for printing The Bear Went Over The Mountain:

Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan and agreed to underwrite the

production of this counterpart volume on Mujahideen tactics. Colonel

Charles Johnston, the former Director of the U.S. Army Foreign

Military Studies Office (FMSO) enthusiastically supported the

research and production as did FMSO Director Dr. Graham Turbiville,

and FMSO analysts Dr. Jacob Kipp, Tim Thomas and Major Ray

Finch. Robert Love helped with translation support and Linda Pride

and Al Lindman provided computer assistance. The Combined Arms

Research Library and Command and General Staff College Map

Library at Fort Leavenworth provided invaluable assistance. Alice

Mink of FMSO kept the whole production on time and under budget.

A "band of brothers," skilled in tactics, read and provided commentary on the manuscript. Our special thanks to Colonel (Ret) David M.

Glantz of Carlisle, Pennsylvania; Colonel (Ret.) Charles E. Johnston,

former Director of FMSO; Colonel (Ret) William M. Mendel of FMSO;

Allen E. Curtis, Director of Intelligence and Security at the National

Training Center; former Marine Captain (Ret) Tim Leaf of Quantico,

Virginia; Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sray of CENTCOM; Lieutenant

Colonel Karl Prinslow of FMSO; and Major Darr Reimers of the 1st

Cavalry Division.

Mary Ann Glantz graciously edited the manuscript. Jonathan

Pierce was the book editor/designer, Rhonda Gross created the initial

map graphics, and Emily Pierce did a superb job of finishing the maps

and designing the cover.

Homaira Jalali and Gina Grau showed remarkably good humor

and supported the efforts oftheir husbands as they gathered the material and worked on the book. We thank all of you for your help. Any

mistakes are the authors.

XII
PREFACE

Afghanistan, a multi-ethnic state in southwest Asia, is home to

diverse social communities that share common experience through

interaction with dominant states, empires, invading armies, trade

and cultural movements that traversed the land during their thousands of years of history. The different ethnic groups in modern

Afghanistan (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmans, Persian-speaking

Hazaras, Balochis, etc.) straddle the boundries ofthe state. However,

their national identity is mostly defined by their differences with

their ethnic kinsmen across the borders rather than their national

commonalities. About 99% of Afghanistan's over 17 million population are Muslim, of which 85% are followers of the Sunni sect while

the rest are Shia. About 85% ofAfghans live in rural communities in

a land dominated by mountains and deserts. Modern travel is

primarily restricted to a highway ring connecting the various cities.

There is no railroad network.

Afghanistan has mostly been a loose collection oftribes and nationalities over which central governments had varying degrees of influence and control at different times. The country has been historically

known for its remarkable Islamic and ethnic tolerence. However tribal rivalries and blood feuds, ambitions of local chieftains, and tribal

defiance of pervasive interference by the central government have kept

the different parts of the land at war at different times. In such cases

the kinship-based identity has been the major means of the community's political and military mobilization. Such identity places far

greater importance on kinship and extended family than ideology.

Afghanistan stands at a geographic crossroads that has seen the

passage of many warring peoples. Each of these has left their imprint

on the ancient land and involved the people ofAfghanistan in conflict.

Often this conflict got in the way of economic development. What has

developed is a country composed of somewhat autonomous "village

states" spread across the entire country.1 Afghans identify themselves

by Qawm—the basic subnational identity based on kinship, residence

and sometimes occupation. Western people may refer to this as "tribe",

but this instinctive social cohesiveness includes tribal clans, ethnic

1 Ali A. Jalali, "Clashes of Ideas and Interests in Afghanistan", paper given at the Institute

of World Politics, Washington, D.C., July 1995, page 4.

xiii
subgroups, religious sects, locality-based groups and groups united by

interests.2The Qawm, not Afghanistan, is the basic unit of social

community and, outside the family, the most important focus on individual loyalty. Afghanistan has, at times, been characterized as a

disunited land riven by blood feuds. The feuds center on family and

Qawm. Yet, the leaders of the various Qawm have resolved feuds and

held the land together. Village elders can put feuds on hold for a

decade or longer and then let them resume once the agreed-on time has

expired and the matter is still unresolved. Afghanistan's ancient roots

and strong ties of kinship provide an anchor against progress, but also

the means to cope when central authority has collapsed. Historically,

the collapse of the central government of Afghanistan or the destruction of its standing armies has never resulted in the defeat of the

nation by an invader. The people, relying on their decentralized political, economic and military potential, have always taken over the

resistance against the invaders.3This was the case during two wars

with Great Britain in the 19th Century (1839-1842, 1878-1880). This

happened again in the Soviet-Afghan War.

The tactics of the Mujahideen reflected this lack of central cohesion. Their tactics were not standard, but differed from valley to

valley and tribe to tribe. No more than 15 percent of the guerrilla

commanders were military professionals. However, Afghanistan had

a conscript army and virtually every 22-year-old male served his two

year obligation. This provided a basic military education which eased

cooperation between the various Mujahideen groups. The Mujahideen were true volunteers—unpaid warriors who fought to protect

their faith and community first and their nation next. As true volunteers, fighting for their Qawm and religion, the Mujahideen looked

down on the professional soldier (asker) as a simple mercenary who

was either the victim of a press gang or too stupid to ply any other

trade.4This disdain did not attach to the professional officer, who

enjoyed a great deal of prestige.

Afghanistan was.not a guerrilla war ala Mao Tse Tung or Vo

Nguyen Giap. The Mujahideen were not trying to force ä new ideology and government on a land. Rather, they fought to defend their

Qawm and their religion against a hostile ideology, an atheistic value

2

ibid,3.

3

ibid,4.

4 Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994,

page 158-159.

xiv
system, an oppressive central government and a foreign invader. It

was a spontaneous defense of community values and a traditional way

of life by individual groups initially unconnected to national or international political organizations.5

The Great Game 6

Russian expansionism and empire building in Central Asia began

in 1734 and Moscow's interest in Afghanistan was apparent by the late

1830s. The Great Game described the British and Russian struggle for

influence along the unsettled northern frontier of British India and in

the entire region between Russia and India. Afghanistan lay directly

in this contested area between two empires. Russia described her

motives in the Great Game as simply to abolish the slave trade and to

establish order and control along her southern border. The British,

however, viewing Russian absorption of the lands of the Caucasus,

Georgia, Khirgiz, Turkmens, Khiva and Bukhara, claimed to feel

threatened by the presence of a large, expanding empire near India

and ascribed different Russian motives. The British stated that

Russian motives were to weaken British power and to gain access to a

warm-water port. Britain claimed that her own actions were to protect

the frontiers of British India.

The Great Game spilled into Afghanistan when British forces

invaded during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842). Britain

claimed that the invasion was supposed to counter Russian influence.

After hard fighting, the British withdrew. By 1869, the Russian

empire reached the banks of the Amu Darya (Oxus) river—the northern border ofAfghanistan. This caused additional British concern. In

1878, the arrival of a special Russian diplomatic mission to Kabul led

to another British invasion and the Second Anglo-Afghan War. The

British Army again withdrew. In the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907,

the Russians agreed that Afghanistan lay outside its sphere of interest and agreed to confer with Britain on all matters relating to

Russian-Afghan relations. In return, Britain agreed not to occupy or

annex any part ofAfghanistan nor interfere in the internal affairs of

that country. Although the Amir of Afghanistan refused to recognize

the treaty, Russia and Britain agreed to its terms and honored them

s Jalali,1

6 Section derived from Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins (editors), Afghanistan: A

Country Study, Fifth edition, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1986, 22-73 and

Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game, New York: Kodansha International, 1994.

XV
until 1919 when Afghan troops crossed into British India, seized a

village and attempted to raise a popular revolt in the area. The

British responded with yet another invasion and the Third AngloAfghan War. The political settlement resulted in Afghanistan's full

independence from Great Britain.

Afghanistan's foreign policy from 1919 until 1978 balanced the

demands of her immediate neighbors, and external powers such as the

United States, Germany and Great Britain. Normal relations with her

northern neighbor, the Soviet Union, led to increased Soviet investment and presence in Afghanistan.

In April 1978, a small leftist group of Soviet-trained Afghan officers

seized control ofthe government and founded the Democratic Republic

ofAfghanistan, a client state of the Soviet Union. Civil war broke out

in Afghanistan. The putsch installed President Nur M. Taraki, a

Marxist who announced sweeping programs of land distribution,

changed status for women and the destruction of the old Afghanistan

social structure. Disregarding the national social structure and mores,

the new government enjoyed little popular support. The wobbly Taraki

government was almost immediately met by increased armed resistance as the Mujahideen ranks grew. In 1978, religious leaders, in

response to popular uprisings across Afghanistan, issued statements of

jihad (holy war) against the communist regime. This was an appeal to

the supranational identity of all Afghans~a fight to defend the faith of

Islam. The combat readiness of the Army of the Democratic Republic

ofAfghanistan plunged as government purges swept the officer corps.

Soldiers, units and entire regiments deserted to the resistance and by

the end of 1979, the actual strength ofthe Afghan Army was less than

half of its authorized 90,000. In March 1979, the city of Herat revolted and most of the Afghan 17th Infantry Division mutinied and joined

the rebellion. Forces loyal to Taraki reoccupied the city after the

Afghan Air Force bombed the city and the 17th Division. Thousands of

people reportedly died in the fighting, including some Soviet citizens.

Soviet Intervention

The Soviet-Afghan War began over the issue of control. The

Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was nominally a socialist state

governed by a communist party. However, the state only controlled

some of the cities, while tribal elders and clan chiefs controlled the

countryside. Furthermore, the communist party of Afghanistan was

split into two hostile factions. The factions spent more time fighting

xvi'
each other than trying to establish socialism in Afghanistan. In

September 1979, Taraki's Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin, seized

power and murdered Taraki. Amin's rule proved no better and the

Soviet Union watched this new communist state spin out of control.

Meanwhile, units of the army mutinied, civil war broke out, cities and

villages rose in revolt and Afghanistan began to slip away from

Moscow's control and influence. Leonid Brezhnev, the aged Soviet

General Secretary, saw that direct military intervention was the only

way to prevent his client state from disintegrating into complete chaos.

He decided to intervene.

The obvious models for intervention were Hungary in 1956 and

Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Soviet General Staff planned the

Afghanistan invasion based on these models. However, there was a

significant difference that the Soviet planners missed. Afghanistan

was embroiled in a civil war and a coup de main would only gain

control of the central government, not the countryside. Although

participating military units were briefed at the last minute, the Soviet

Christmas Eve invasion of 1979 was masterfully planned and wellexecuted. The Soviets seized the government, killed the president and

put their own man in his place. According to some Russian sources,

they planned to stabilize the situation, strengthen the army and then

withdraw the majority of Soviet forces within three years. The Soviet

General Staff planned to leave all fighting in the hands ofthe army of

the Democratic Republic. But Afghanistan was in full revolt, the

dispirited Afghan army was unable to cope, and the specter of defeat

following a Soviet withdrawal haunted the Politburo. Invasion and

overthrow of the government proved much easier than fighting the

hundreds of ubiquitous guerrilla groups. The Soviet Army was

trained for large-scale, rapid-tempo operations. They were not

trained for the platoon leaders' war of finding and closing with small,

indigenous forces which would only stand and fight when the terrain

and circumstances were to their advantage.

Back in the Soviet Union, there was no one in charge and all decisions were committee decisions made by the collective leadership.

General Secretary Brezhnev became incapacitated in 1980 but did not

•die until November 1982. He was succeeded by the ailing Yuri

Andropov. General Secretary Andropov lasted less than two years and

was succeeded by the faltering Konstantin Chernenko in February

1984. General Secretary Chernenko died in March 1985. Although

the military leadership kept recommending withdrawal, during this

xvii
"twilight ofthe general secretaries" no one was making any major decisions as to the conduct and outcome of the war in Afghanistan. The

war bumped on at its own pace. Finally, Mikhail Gorbachev came to

power. His first instinct was to order military victory in Afghanistan

within a year. Following this bloodiest year ofthe war, Gorbachev realized that the Soviets could not win in Afghanistan without unacceptable international and internal repercussions and began to cast

about for a way to withdraw with dignity. United Nations negotiators

provided that avenue and by 15 October 1988, the first half of the

Soviet withdrawal was complete. On 15 February 1989, the last Soviet

forces withdrew from Afghanistan. Soviet force commitment, initially

assessed as requiring several months, lasted over nine years and

required increasing numbers of forces. The Soviet Union reportedly

killed 1.3 million people and forced 5.5 million Afghans (a third of the

prewar population) to leave the country as refugees. Another 2 million

Afghans were forced to migrate within the country. The country has

yet to recover.

Initially the Mujahideen were all local residents who took arms and

banded together into large, rather unwieldy, forces to seize the local

district capitols and loot their arms rooms. The DRA countered these

efforts where it could and Mujahideen began to coalesce into much

smaller groups centered around the rural village. These small groups

were armed with a variety of weapons from swords and flintlock muskets to British bolt-action rifles and older Soviet and Soviet-bloc

weapons provided to Afghanistan over the years. The guerrilla

commanders were usually influential villagers who already had a

leadership role in the local area. Few had any professional military

experience. Rebellion was wide-spread, but uncoordinated since the

resistance was formed along tribal and ethnic lines.

The Soviet invasion changed the nature of the Mujahideen resistance. Afghanistan's neighbors, Pakistan and Iran, nervously regarded the advance to the Soviet Army to their borders and began providing training and material support to the Mujahideen. The United

States, Peoples Republic of China, Britain, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia,

Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates began funneling military,

humanitarian and financial aid to the Mujahideen through Pakistan.

Pakistan's assessment was that the Soviet Union had come to

Afghanistan to stay and it was in Pakistan's best interests to support

those Mujahideen who would never accept the Soviet presence. The

Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) began to funnel aid

XVIII
through various Afghan political factions headquartered in Pakistan.

Eventually there were seven major Afghan factions receiving aid. The

politics of these factions were determined by their leaders' religious

convictions—three of which were Islamic moderates and four of which

were Islamic fundamentalists. Pakistan required that the various

ethnic and tribal Mujahideen groupsjoin one ofthe factions in order to

receive aid. Over time, this provided the leaders of these factions with

political power which they used to dominate the politics of postcommunist Afghanistan. The Pakistani authorities favored the mostfundamentalist groups and rewarded them accordingly. This aid

distribution gave the Afghan religious leaders unprecedented power in

the conduct ofthe war. It also undermined the traditional authority of

the tribal and village leaders.

The Mujahideen were unpaid volunteers with family responsibilities. This meant that they were part-time warriors and that spoils of

war played a major role in military actions. Mujahideen sold mostly

captured weapons and equipment in the bazaars to support their

families. As the war progressed, mobile Mujahideen groups emerged.

The mobile Mujahideen groups were larger and consisted of young

(under 25), unmarried, better-trained warriors. Sometimes the mobile

Mujahideen were paid. The mobile Mujahideen ranged over a much

larger area of operations than the local Mujahideen and were more

responsive to the plans and desires of the factions.

The strategic struggle for Afghanistan was a fight to strangle the

other's logistics. The Mujahideen targeted the Soviet lines of communication—the crucial road net work over which the Soviet supplies

had to travel. The Soviet attack on the Mujahideen logistics was two

phased. From 1980 until 1985, the Soviets sought to eliminate

Mujahideen support in the rural countryside. They bombed granaries

and rural villages, destroyed crops and irrigation systems, mined

pastures and fields, destroyed herds and launched sweeps through

rural areas—conscripting young men and destroying the infrastructure. The Soviet leadership, believing Mao Tse Tung's dictum that the

guerrilla lives in the population like a fish in water, decided to kill the

fish by draining off the water.7 As a result, Afghanistan became a

nation of refugees as more than seven million rural residents fled to

the relative safety of neighboring Pakistan and Iran or to the cities of

Afghanistan. This Soviet effort denied rural support to the

Mujahideen, since the villagers had left and most ofthe food now had

7 Claude Malhauret, Afghan Alternative Seminar, Monterey, California, November 1993.

xix
to be carried along with weapons and ammunition and materials of

war. The Mujahideen responded by establishing logistics bases inside

Afghanistan. The Soviet fight from 1985 to withdrawal was to find

and destroy these bases.

Terrain, as any infantryman knows, is the ultimate shaper of the

battlefield. Afghanistan's terrain is varied and challenging. It is

dominated by towering mountains and forbidding desert. Yet it also

has lush forests of larch, aspen and juniper. It has tangled "green

zones"-—irrigated areas thick with trees, vines, crops, irrigation ditches and tangled vegetation. It has flat plains full of wheat and swampy

terraces which grow delicious long-grained rice. It is not ideal terrain

for a mechanized force dependent on fire power, secure lines of communication and high-technology. It is terrain where the mountain

warrior, using ambush sites inherited from his ancestors, can inflict

"death from a thousand cuts". The terrain dictates different tactics,

force structure and equipment from those of conventional war.

This book is not a complete history of the Soviet-Afghan War.

Rather, it is a series of combat vignettes as recalled by the Mujahideen

participants. It is not a book about right or wrong. Rather, it is a book

about survival against the overwhelming firepower and technological

might of a superpower. This is the story of combat from the guerrilla's

perspective. It is the story of brave people who fought without hope of

winning because it was the right thing to do.

About the Book

Author Les Grau, regularly travels back and forth to Russia. He

received a book from the History of Military Art department at the

Frunze Combined Arms Academy in Moscow. The book was intended

for students' classroom use only and, as such, shows both the good

and the bad. With Frunze Academy permission, Les translated this

book and added commentary before it was published by NDU Press

as The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in

Afghanistan. Author Ali Jalali, helped in the editing process. "The

Bear" showed the tactics of the Soviets, but the Mujahideen tactics

were absent. Charlie Cuthbertson and Dick Voltz of the USMC in

Quantico agreed that both sides needed to be presented and sent Ali

and Les to Pakistan and Afghanistan to interview Mujahideen commanders for a companion volume.

Author Ali Jalali has the perfect credentials to do this book. Ali

was a Colonel in the Afghan Army and taught at the Afghan Military

xx
Academy and Army Staff College. His foreign education included the

Infantry Officer's Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Georgia; the

British Army Staff College at Camberley; and the Soviet Frunze

Academy. Many of Ali's officer students were key resistance figures.

Ali was also a member of the resistance and an accredited journalist

during the conflict. Now Ali works as a journalist and has covered

Afghanistan and Central Asia over the last 15 years. Ali is respected

by all the factions and has exceptional entre to the Mujahideen.

Ali and Les arrived in Pakistan in September 1996 and were

preparing to go into Afghanistan when the Taliban advance on Kabul

closed the borders to American citizens. Ali interviewed some 40

Mujahideen during a month in Peshawar, Quetta, and Islamabad,

Pakistan. Our colleague, Major Nasrullah Safi, conducted interviews

for another two months inside Afghanistan for this book. The interviews are the basis of this book. In those interviews where we have

several sources for the same vignette or where we have lots of

supporting written reports and material, we have written the vignette

in the third person. In those cases where the person interviewed is the

primary source, we have written the vignette in the first person. The

vignettes are arranged chronologically by type of action. Occasionally,

when the actions occur at the same place over time, we lump those

actions together instead of chronologically. We have tried to make the

book as accurate as possible, but realize that time and retelling may

have altered some of the facts. We have limited the span of the book

from the Soviet invasion until their withdrawal. The war started

before the Soviet invasion and continued long after their departure.

We plan to write about these battles in a future book.

We used edition 2-DMA series U611 1:100,000 maps from the U.S.

Defense Mapping Agency for the final preparation of the material.

For those who wish to consult the map sheets, map sheet numbers

are given with each vignette. We have numbered each vignette within the chapter and started each chapter with a country map showing

the rough location of each vignette. The interviews were long and

exhaustive, so many details are available. Many of the interviews

were conducted at different times and places, with different people

who had been part of the same battle or operation. This allowed us

to check and compare details and sequences of events. Map elevations are given in meters. Contour intervals are not consistent and

merely show elevation. Place and name spelling is based on Ali

Jalali's best transliteration efforts. Consistency in spelling is diffixxi
cult when two alphabets are involved—some spellings are different

than in other books on Afghanistan. Although the Mujahideen

always say 'Russian' instead of 'Soviet', we have used 'Soviet'

throughout unless it is a direct quote.

We use Russian map graphics on the maps. The Afghan Army

used the Soviet graphics system and most Mujahideen were familiar

with them. Russian graphics are more "user friendly" ( flexible and

illustrative) than Western graphics. The Russians can show the

sequential development of an action by adding times or identifying

lines to their graphics. These lines are explained in the legend. A

table of Russian map graphics is located in the back of the book.

Mujahideen forces are shown in blue and Soviet/DRA forces are

shown in red.

XXII
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN:

Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
CHAPTER 1

AMBUSHES

The ambush is a favorite tactic of the guerrilla since it allows him

to mass forces covertly, attack the enemy, seize needed supplies and

retreat before the enemy can effectively react. The ambush has long

been part of the Afghan warrior tradition and has been a key feature

of historic Afghan warfare—whether fighting other tribes, the British

or the government. The Mujahideen ambush served to attack the

Soviet/DRA lines of communication, provided needed supplies, and

forced the bulk of Soviet/DRAmaneuver forces to perform security missions. Logistics were key to the conduct of the Soviet/Afghan War and

Mujahideen ambushes threatened the resupply of Soviet and DRA

forces and limited the number of Soviet troops that could be deployed

into the country. The Mujahideen ambush was their most effective

counter to Soviet/DRA military activity and threatened the ability of

the Soviets and DRA to prosecute the war.

Gardez ^

Kandahar / ( Afghanistan

Chapter 1

ir-3\ ^y incidents
Page 4 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

^fflAMUR ,"

> HOTEL_" KOTUBKHEL

/ PUL-E QANDAHARI

.;■■

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VIGNETTE 1

AMBUSHES AT THE MAMUR HOTEL

by Commander Mohammad Akbar

A day seldom passed without a clash between the Mujahideen and

the Soviets or DRA in Logar Province. In the summer of 1980, my

group set an ambush to attack a supply column of Soviet and DRA

forces moving from Kabul to Gardez on highway 157. At that time, the

populace had not migrated from the area and it was full of people. The

Mujahideen had contacts in the government who reported on the movement of columns along the main highway. This was to be our first

attack on a major column on this highway following the Soviet invasion. The ambush site was located around the Pul-e Qandahari junction with the main highway. At this point, the Logar River comes within 200 meters of the highway to the east, and the Kuh-e Mohammad

Agha hills rise some 700 meters over the highway to the west. Ten

kilometers to the south, the road runs through a steep gorge where

vehicles cannot easily turn back (Map 1 - Mamur 1). We had 50

Mujahideen armed with Mosin-Nagant carbines, Enfield rifles and two

RPG-7s. Our leader, Commander Hayat, divided our men into three

groups and put one group in the Bini Sherafghan ruins some 70 meters

west of the road. He put the.second group to the east of the road

around the Mamur Hotel and put the third group to the east in Pul-e

Qandahari facing the Mohammad Agha High School. Our ambush

occupied a two-kilometer stretch. At this time, I was the late

Commander Hayat's deputy commander, commanding the Pul-e

Qandahari positions.

Commander Hayat ordered that the attack would start when

the end of the column reached the Bini Shirafghan ruins. The DRA

column came. It had about 100 vehicles carrying food, ammunition

and fuel. There were quite a few POL tankers in the column. We let

it pass and, as the end of the column reached the ruins, we started

to attack at the end of the column. In those days, convoy escort was

very weak and air support was insufficient. There was practically no

resistance or reaction to our attack from the column. Even the APCs

which were escorting the column were passive. We left our positions

Mohammad Akbar is'from the village of Shahi Kala in Mohammad Agha District of Logar

Province. He graduated from high school in the region and joined the resistance in 1979

and fought in Logar Province until the collapse of the DRA. He was a member of the

Islamic Party (HIH - Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin). [Map sheet 2885, vie grid 1086].
Page 6 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

and started moving up the column, firing as we went, and damaged

or destroyed almost all the vehicles. We had no casualties. I don't

know how many DRA casualties there were, but we wounded many

drivers who the government evacuated later. We left the area

promptly after the ambush.

The area around the Mamur Hotel was ideal for an ambush and

we, and other Mujahideen groups, used it often. In September 1981,

we set an ambush at the Mamur Hotel and in Pule-e Qandahari facing

the high school. The Mamur Hotel group was commanded by the noted

HIH commander Doctor Abdul Wali Khayat and the Pule-Qandahari

position was commanded by my commander, the late Commander

Hayat. There were some 35 Mujahideen armed with AK-47 rifles and

three RPG-7s. The ambush site occupied about one kilometer of roadway. When the column arrived, we destroyed twelve trucks and captured three intact. The three trucks were large, heavy-duty, eightcylinder trucks and they were loaded with beans, rice and military

boots. We needed all this gear. We also captured two 76mm field guns

and a heavier gun that I don't know the type or caliber. We did not

have any Mujahideen casualties.

In July 1982, the late Doctor Wali Khayat set an ambush near the

Mamur Hotel. A Soviet column, moving supplies from Kabul to Gardez,

entered the ambush kill zone. During the attack, one Mujahideen fired

an RPG-7 at an escorting APC. It hit the APC and a Soviet officer

jumped out of the damaged APC and took cover. The officer was

wounded. While the fighting was going on, the column sped up and left

the ambush area—and left the officer behind. Doctor Abdul Wali

Khayat fired at the position where the Soviet officer was. The Soviet

officer returned fire with his AK-74. Doctor Khayat fired again and

wounded the Soviet officer a second time—this time in the hand. The

Soviet officer dropped his AK-74 and took out his pistol. Doctor Khayat

threw a hand grenade at the officer and killed him. Then he crossed

the road and took his AK-74 and his Makarov pistol. He left the body

where it lay and the Mujahideen left the ambush site.

The next day the Soviets returned in a column from Kabul. They

cordoned off the area and searched the houses around Mohammad

Agha District headquarters and the town of Kotubkhel. They went

house to house looking for their missing officer. HIH commander

Sameh Jan was in Kotubkhel at that time. He coordinated and organized the actions of all the Mujahideen factions which were caught in

the cordon. There were about 150 Mujahideen caught in the cordon.

The Mujahideen began attacking the searching Soviets. They
Chapterl, Vignette 1 Page 7

-." ".^MOHAMMAD MAMUR2

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PUL-E QANDAHARI

3 KM

1 QALA-E

.■■" AHMADZIKALA

LEGEND

A Mamur Ambush

Cordon Operations O^ A
Page 8 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

launched sudden, surprise attacks in the close streets and alleys ofthe

villages and in the spaces between the villages. The fighting was

often at point-blank range. The fighting began in the morning and

continued until the late afternoon (Map 2 - Mamur 2). Soviet casualties are unknown but we think that they were heavy. The Mujahideen

captured four AK-74s. Mujahideen casualties were seven KIA including Sameh Jan. Most of the dead Mujahideen had run out of ammunition. The Soviets captured the weapons of the dead Mujahideen

including some AK-47s, a Goryunov machine gun, an RPG-7 and a few

AK-74s captured from the Soviets in the past. As the Soviets got

involved in fighting, they stopped searching. As daylight waned, the

Soviets disengaged, took their dead and withdrew back to Kabul.

They did find and evacuate the body of their officer who Doctor

Khayat killed the day before. It was still lying where he was killed.
VIGNETTE 2

YET ANOTHER AMBUSH AT THE MAMUR HOTEL

by Toryalai Hemat

My mobile regiment fought in many provinces in Afghanistan

during the war. One of our battles was in Mohammad Agha District

of Logar Province. The Jihad began here attacking columns between

Gardez and Kabul. This action occured on 8 July 1986. It was a

joint action with the HIH Mujahideen commanded by Doctor Wali

Khayat and was reported in the media. It was a small ambush

involving 13 Mujahideen armed with two RPG-7s, one PK machine

gun and 10 AK-47s. Seven of the Mujahideen were my men and six

were HIH. We set the ambush in Kotubkhel near the Mamur Hotel

which sits beside the main highway. I split the force into two groups.

I put a six-man group on the east side of the road along the Logar

River bank. At this point the river is some 40 meters from the road

and some two meters lower than the surrounding ground. This site

is by the hotel. I put my seven-man group on the west side of the

road on high ground. This site is a little further to the south, about

150 meters from the hotel. The high ground is known as Gumbazo

Mazogani by the locals. There was an RPG-7 at both sites. We had

instructed the group that if the column came from Kabul the furthest group (the western group on the high ground) would fire first

to get the column into the kill zone. That would be the river site's

signal to fire. We prepared our high ground positions in a ditch

which was not visible from the road. It is some 200 meters from the

road. We camouflaged our positions well (Map 3 - Mamur 3).

Our base was three kilometers southeast of Mohamad Agha south

of the village of Qala-e Shahi near Ahmadzi Kala. We moved from

Ahmadzi Kala at midnight. It took us one hour to reach the ambush

site. I was with the western group. We took our positions in the ditch.

At that time, there was fighting in Paktia Province, Jajai District and

the enemy was moving reinforcements to the area. In the morning, a

reinforcing column came. We opened fire when it reached us and the

eastern ambush site opened up as well. Wedestroyed or damaged two

armored vehicles, three jeeps and eight trucks. Some trucks turned

Toryalai Hemat was a regimental commander of a Mujahideen Mobile Regiment belonging

to the Etehad-e Islami (IUA) faction of Sayyaf. He fought in many provinces in Afghanistan

during the war. [Map sheet 2885, vie grid 1086].
Page 10 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

KOTUBKHEL

MOHAMMAD

I

QANDAHARI

MAMUR 3

JKM

/AHMADZIKALA
Chapter 1, Vignette 2 Page 11

back to Kabul and others were abandoned. There were some intact

abandoned trucks outside the kill zone. Dead and wounded lay on the

ground. Only damaged vehicles were left in the kill zone. We had no

casualties. In one of the jeeps we found some movie projectors. We

also captured 11 AKs, two pistols and one heavy machine gun (which

was mounted on an armored vehicle). We took what we could and split

the spoils. HIH got all the projectors. We left and went to Wazir Kala

some four kilometers away. Helicopter gunships came and fired at our

old positions. Four Soviet helicopters came and took away their dead

and wounded. We stayed in Wazir Kala for two or three hours. The

helicopters were bombing and strafing the positions all ofthis time. In

the late afternoon, when everything settled down, we returned to the

area to search and see what was left. We removed the heavy machine

gun and projectors at this time. We stopped a passing bus and asked

the passengers for matches. At first they refused, not wanting to be

accomplices, so we searched their pockets and got some matches and

set fire to the damaged vehicles. Two days later, the Soviets sent a

force to search our old positions. Of the 13 men in the ambush, only

Baryali, Asef of HIH and I survived the war.

COMMENTARY: Both the Soviets and Mujahideen set patterns. The

Mujahideen use the Mamur Hotel ambush site over and over again,

yet apparently the Soviets or DRA seldom dismounted troops to

search the area to spoil the ambush or to try to set a counterambush.

This last example is from 1986, yet there seems to be no learning

curve on the part of the Soviets. Air support is tardy, artillery fire is

unavailable and there is no reserve to move against the ambush.

Aggressive patrolling, specially-trained counter-ambush forces and

priority counter-ambush intelligence are lacking. The standard

Soviet/DRA counter-ambush techniques include an aerial patrol in

front of the column, an engineer sweep in front of the column looking for mines, armored vehicles in the front of the column, occasional armored vehicles throughout the column and a robust rear guard.

Once hit, the armored vehicles in the column would return fire while

the soft-skin vehicles tried to drive out of the kill zone. Seldom

would the ambushed force dismount forces to clear the ambush site

and pursue the ambush party.

The Mujahideen did vary ambush positions in the same ambush

site. Their primary concern was to hit the column where it was weakest—usually in the middle or rear—unless the purpose was to bottle up

the column. In most ambushes, a small number of highly-mobile
Page 12 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Mujahideen were able to move and attack with little logistic support,

but were unable to conduct a sustained fight. The RPG-7 was probably the most effective weapon of the Mujahideen. When used at close

quarters with the element of surprise, it was devastating.

In this region, Mujahideen ambushes occupied a very wide front.

This was a function of the open terrain and the spacing between convoy vehicles. Convoy SOP was to maintain 100 meters or more

between vehicles. In order to have enough vehicles in the kill zone to

make the ambush worthwhile, the Mujahideen had to constitute a kill

zone much bigger than that employed by most Western armies.
VIGNETTE 3

AMBUSH SOUTH OF THE TANGI WAGHJAN GORGE

by Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif

In May 1981, we joined other Mujahideen for an ambush in

Kolangar District, Logar Province (Map 4 - Kolangar). We were 11

Mujahideen with an RPG-7, seven Kalashnikovs and two Enfields. We

moved into the area the night before, spent the night in a village and

set up our ambush site the next morning north of Kolangar District

Headquarters. We were told that a column was coming from Kabul to

Gardez, and so we had time to set up during the daylight before the

column arrived, since the convoys always left Kabul in the morning

well after dawn. Kabul is about 50 kilometers north of the ambush

site. We set our ambush just south of the Tangi Waghjan Gorge.

There, the fiver continues to run parallel to the road and restricts

maneuver while providing better firing positions for the ambush force.

We had a collapsed electric pylon that we stretched across the road as

a road block. We put in an RPG firing position for Mulla Latif,1our

RPG gunner, and put two other Mujahideen on the edge ofthe river in

positions. Then we set up the rest of our positions and went to some

nearby houses for breakfast. At that time we were so popular with the

population that we didn't have to worry about supplies and the people

were always feeding us in their homes or sending us prepared food.

Mulla Latif left his RPG at the ambush position since the people were

moving about freely and would keep an eye on things.

As we were leisurely enjoying our breakfast, some people came into

the house and said that the convoy was coming from the north. This

was at about 1000 hours. While we were running to our positions, the

lead tank in the column came to our road block. The tank driver

stopped his tank, got out of the tank and moved the barrier. He had

gotten back into his tank and driven past as we reached our positions.

Mulla Latif was breathing heavily as he picked up his RPG-7 and fired

at the next tank. His first shot missed. He reloaded, fired again and

missed again. He was still breathing too heavily to aim accurately. He

then reloaded, jumped out of position, and ran down to the road. He

then sat down in the middle of road and fired at the tank from close

range. He hit the tank this time and it burst into flames. The column

Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif is from Logar Province. [Map sheet 2885, vie grid 0674].

1 Mulla Latif was killed in fighting later in the war.
Page 14 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

KOLANGAR
Chapter 1, Vignette 3 Page 15

was just coming out of the narrow Tangi Waghjan Gorge. This burning tank stopped the convoy since there was no room to maneuver or

pass. Other Mujahideen from other areas and groups ran to the area

and moved up the gorge by the trapped column and started firing at

the vehicles. There was not much resistance from this supply convoy.

The column consisted of 150 to 200 trucks full of many things such as

food and furniture. Whatever we could take away, we did. Hundreds

of Mujahideen came and looted the column. We captured 15 trucks for

my group which we eventually moved to our base in Durow canyon.

We torched the vehicles we could not take and left the area around

1300 hours. After we had finished, helicopters and aircraft came and

bombed some areas around the ambush site. Despite our lack of warning when the lead vehicle came toward our ambush site, the ambush

turned out well.

There is a reason why we were not in our positions when the column came. Prior to any ambush, we would select and prepare our

ambush positions, but we would not occupy them since helicopters

would always overfly the route ahead of the convoy looking for

ambushes and roadblocks. Normally, we would not put out the road

block until after the flyover, but for some reason this time we did. The

helicopter flyover was our usual tipoffthat the convoy was coming, and

our signal to put out the roadblock and occupy our positions. The helicopters did not do their road sweep in front ofthis particular convoy. I

later learned why the helicopters were absent. DRA President Barbak

Karmal was flying to Moscow that day and so the DRA had imposed a

"no fly zone" over Kabul. This meant that helicopters were either

grounded or had to refuel at Ghazni. The helicopters were not available to do the sweep.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen were quick to key on Soviet and DRA

tactical patterns and procedures and came to rely on them. As a result,

Mujahideen reactions to these patterns were often stereotyped, but the

Soviets and DRA evidently did not always pick up on Mujahideen patterns or insure that the relevant tactical commanders got the word. In

this case, the Tangi Waghjan Gorge is an obvious choke point and

ambush area. The convoy commander needed to send reconnaissance/security elements ahead ofthe convoy to secure the gorge's entry,

high ground and exit prior to moving the convoy into the gorge, but did

not. His lead armored vehicle spotted the road block and removed it.

This should have served as a warning, but the convoy commander

already had the leading part of the convoy driving through the gorge.
Page 16 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Depending on initial vehicle interval and the commander's ability to

stop the convoy from bunching up, some 70 to 150 vehicles may have

been caught in the three-kilometer gorge. The drivers were dependent

on firepower to rescue them, but the convoy was unable to bring firepower to bear to save their column.

Helicopters have an important role in convoy security, not only as

scouts, but as a rapid reaction force and as a lift force to move security elements from one piece of dominant high ground to the next. The

lack of helicopters deprived the convoy of needed warning and firepower.

The Mujahideen needed radios and early warning pickets to alert

ambush forces about the approach of convoys and aircraft. At this

point of the war, few Mujahideen had tactical radio communications
VIGNETTE 4

AMBUSH AT KANDAY

by Doctor Mohammad Sadeq

We fought the DRA and Soviets for control ofthe Kunar Valley. The

area borders Pakistan and is very mountainous and forested. Many of

the mountains are over 5,000 meters high and are permanently snowcapped. We operated in Shewa District along the Kunar River. There,

the mountains are not as high and the key terrain feature is the Kunar

River and the highway which parallels it. In September 1982, we

ambushed a supply column which was traveling from Jalalabad to

Kunar (Map 5 - Kanday). The column was about eight kilometers in

length. I had 22 Mujahideen armed with two RPG-7s, four AK-47

Kalashnikovs and 16 bolt-action Enfield rifles.

I set up the ambush on the high ground north of the Kunar River

at Kanday. I divided my force into a support group and an ambush and

attack group. The support group was on the high ground, while the

ambush and attack group was below them next to the road. When the

column came, we let it pass. I wanted to attack near the end of the

column. As the head of the column reached Ziraybaba, which is six

kilometers northeast of Kanday, a contact signaled us. We then opened

fire on the column with our RPGs. An armored vehicle turned off and

left the road to fire at us. It hit an antitank mine that we had planted

there. We also hit it with RPG-7 fire. We also hit a ZIL truck. Our

action split the convoy. Half of the convoy went on to Kunar and the

rest returned to Jalalabad. We didn't have enough fire power to continue the fight, so we withdrew. Besides taking out the armored vehicle and truck, we killed six enemy. I had one Mujahideen wounded.

COMMENTARY: Deciding where to ambush a long convoy is usually driven by geography, intent and escape routes. The Soviet/DRA convoy

commander was primarily concerned with not being on the road at

night and delivering the bulk of his cargo on time. He did not want to

fight a long, involved battle with guerrillas. If the terrain at the

ambush site is very constricted, the guerrilla may want to attack the

head of the convoy and block the route with a combination of a road

block and burning vehicles. If the convoy has armored vehicles and

engineer vehicles concentrated to the front of the convoy, the guerrilla

Doctor Mohammad Sadeq was a commander with the HIH in Kunar Province. [Map sheet

3186, vie grid 5328].
Page 18 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 1, Vignette 4 Page 19

may want to attack the middle or tail of the convoy with the hope that

the convoy commander will not divert a great deal of combat power

back to deal with his attack. If the guerrilla is after supplies, the

middle ofthe convoy is best if he can isolate a piece ofthe middle, since

most convoys have a rear guard. In this case, the purpose of the

ambush was to harass, not to capture supplies. The ambush site was

fairly constricted due to the proximity ofthe river and road to the high

ground, but it still allowed armored vehicles to turn around in the

area. The ambush commander decided to attack toward the rear ofthe

convoy, but far enough forward to avoid the rear guard.
Page 20 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

BABUR

Map 6
VIGNETTE 5

AMBUSH ON THE JALALABAD-ASADABAD ROAD

by LTG Haji Mohammad Rahim

The Jalalabad-Asadabad road runs right by the mouth of the

Babur Valley (which we nicknamed Islamdara—the Valley of Islam).

I had my base in the valley with 150 Mujahideen, one 82mm recoilless rifle, three DShK heavy machine guns, a Goryunov medium

machine gun, five RPG-7s, some Kalashnikovs and some Enfields. I

decided to set the ambush at the mouth of the valley. It was

December 1984. The area is perfect for an ambush (Map 6 - Babur).

The mouth of the valley allows a U-shaped ambush with a 1000-

meter kill zone. The forested valley allows a quick escape into the

forested mountains. I positioned the DShK machine guns on the high

ground and put the five RPGs and the recoilless rifle close to the

road. I had three positions for my force—the bottom of Spereh Ghar

facing southwest, the valley floor and the ridge of Shunkolay Ghar

facing south and southeast. I put myself in the center in the valley

floor position where I could best control the ambush. I had good

fields of fire to both sides of the ambush site. The terrain is close and

prevented the enemy from massing fires against the ambush. The

river prevented the enemy from maneuvering effectively against the

site. The withdrawal routes are covered.

A supply convoy came from Jalalabad. We let part of it pass to

attack the middle of the convoy. When we opened fire, the enemy

was hit from three directions. We destroyed three armored vehicles

and one truck fully loaded with melons and other fruit and one truck

full of boxes of cash. Some enemy tried to flee, but were trapped by

the river which has many channels in this area. The money truck

caught on fire and some of the money was burned, but we took what

we could and later I made it a payday for everyone. I still have some

of those burnt notes and someday I will cash them in for some good

ones. The enemy tried to fight back and maneuver against us, but

he could not find any favorable positions. Eventually, enemy helicopter gunships came and forced us out of position. Our concealed

withdrawal routes through the trees protected us from the gunships.

Sameh Jan Hejran from Chakdara was killed. He was a teacher. I

also had one WIA. The enemy losses are unknown since they evacLXC Haji Mohammad Rahim was an officer in the Afghan Army who became a Mujahideen

and led a group in Kunar Province. [Map sheet 3186, vie grid 7842].
Page 22 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

uated their dead. The following day, the DRA came and towed the

damaged armored vehicles away.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen were unpaid volunteers, so the money

truck was a real boon. Mujahideen still had to support their families,

so normally all heavy weapons and l/5th ofthe loot from an ambush or

raid went to the commander. The other 4/5ths was divided among the

Mujahideen combatants. Some Mujahideen would take their captured

Kalashnikovs to Pakistan where they would sell them and give the

money to their families to live on. Governments supporting the

Mujahideen would buy the weapons in Pakistan's bazaars and give

them to Mujahideen faction leaders for distribution.

LTC Rahim's military professionalism shows throughout this

vignette. His ambush lay down is by the book and very effective. He

might have blown the bridge in the middle of the kill zone, but that

would have meant that a guarded bridge repair crew would be

near his base camp for an indefinite period oftime impeding his freedom of movement.
VIGNETTE 6

No-PuLA AMBUSH

by Commander Sofi Lal Gul

In December 1980,1 led a group of 12 Mujahideen in an ambush on

the Kabul-Charikar highway at No-Pula, near Qara Bagh. We were

armed with Kalashnikov rifles and two RPG-7s. I selected the ambush

site at a point where orchards and other vegetation provide covered

approaches to the road and offered concealed positions for the ambush

team.2 We left our base at Farza, some ten kilometers to the west, long

before daybreak to arrive at the ambush site before sunrise. I deployed

my force into two ambush positions near the road and placed a threeman flank security team on the road which intersected with the main

highway (Map 7 - No-Pula).

About 0900 hours, an enemy column of trucks, jeeps and armored

vehicles arrived. As the head of the column passed our ambush position kill zone, we opened fire on the convoy and destroyed one of the

leading tanks with a direct hit by RPG-7. As the convoy unsuccessfully scurried to take cover, our fire destroyed a jeep and an APC.

• Explosions in the disabled vehicles set some trucks on fire. The enemy

returned fire but failed to use its infantry to attack us directly. The

action continued for less than an hour. When enemy aircraft arrived

over the ambush site, we broke contact and pulled out through the

green zone. We had no casualties, while we destroyed or damaged one

tank, one APC, one jeep and eight trucks.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen group achieved surprise by deploying

in the dark and using the covered area close to the road for the

ambush. The small number ofthe Mujahideen limited its action to one

strike, after which they had to pull out. Failure to act decisively cost

the convoy several vehicles and allowed the Mujahideen to slip away

unscathed. The passive response of the Soviets caught in ambush

often was due to the fact that they were carrying very few infantry in

Commander Sofi Lal Gul is from Farza village of Mir Bacha Kot District, about 25 kilometers north of Kabul. He was affiliated with Mojadeddi's Afghanistan National Liberation

Front of Afghanistan (ANLF) during the war with the Soviet forces. Commander Sofi Lal

Gul concentrated his efforts on the Kabul-Charikar highway. [Map sheet 2886, vie grid

1356].

2

The green zone is an irrigated area thick with trees, crops, irrigation ditches and tangled

vegetation. Green zones usually run parallel to rivers and are usually practically impassable for vehicles.
Page 24 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

N

NO-PULA

Map 7

BAGHAREGE

ULYA

0 100 200 300 400 500 METERS

" 1 1 1 1 __i
Chapter 1, Vignette 6 Page 25

their escorting personnel carriers.

The cover provided by the orchards and vegetation that flanked

both sides of the Kabul-Charikar highway helped the Mujahideen lay

successful ambushes. Later in the war, the Soviets ' destroyed the

roadside orchards and villages to prevent the Mujahideen from using

them in their ambushes.
Page 26 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

2 CONVOYS
VIGNETTE 7

Two CONVOYS IN THE KILL ZONE

by Toryalai Hemat

In the summer of 1986, the Soviets and DRA were moving lots of

reinforcements and supplies to Paktia Province. We set an ambush

on Highway 157 south of Mohammad Agha District headquarters on

the 12th ofJuly. This was four days after an ambush at the Mamur

Hotel. I sited the ambush along a two-kilometer stretch between

Qala-e Shekhak and Dehe Naw. Qala-e Shekhak is six kilometers

south of Mohammad Agha and Dehe Naw is three kilometers further

south from Qala-e Shekhak. There was a DRA outpost at Qala-e

Shekhak, so we started our ambush a kilometer south of the outpost.

The outpost was surrounded by mines and the DRA seldom left the

outpost. I felt that the DRA might shoot at us, but would not attack

from the outpost (Map 8 - Two Convoys).

I had 35 Mujahideen in my group. I divided them into four

groups—a northern containment group, an ambush group, a southern

security group and a support group. The northern containment group

was to fire on the DRA outpost to prevent them from interfering with

our ambush. The ambush group would attack the convoy from close

up. The southern security group would occupy a position at Dehe Naw

to protect our southern flank and prevent the arrival ofreinforcements

from the south. These three groups were armed with AK-47s, PK

machine guns and RPGs. The support group had one 82mm mortar

and a Goryunov machine gun.3I positioned the support group on the

east bank ofthe Logar River behind the ambush group. All the groups

were on the east side ofthe road. We moved from Ahmadzi Qala before

dawn and occupied our ambush positions.

We did not have any advance information on the movement of

columns, but there were enough columns moving to Paktia. At this

time, there was usually a daily column, so it was a free hunt. There

were many petrol tankers in these convoys. They were easy to set on

fire, and just firing at them would do the job. Once you set them on

fire, it would demoralize the entire column as everyone could see the

smoke. We always wanted to hit DRA columns since they wouldn't

Toryalai Hemat was a regiment commander of a mobile force allied with the IUA—Islamic

Union of Afghanistan of Sayyaf. He fought in many provinces in Afghanistan. [Map sheet

3185, vie grid 0680].

3

The Mujahideen acquired a lot of Afghan Army and DRA material. The Afghan infantry

battalion had nine Goryunov 7.62mm machine guns and nine 82mm mortars by TO&E.
Page 28 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

fight, whereas Soviet columns would. Usually when a column would

come, the enemy would establish security forces at suspected

ambush sites and occupy them until the column passed or until they

were certain that nothing was going to happen. Many times we

wouldn't risk taking on the entire column. We would attack the tail

since the enemy would not turn back to help the petroleum tankers

at the rear. The column would often reach Gardez, but they would

have lost a piece of it along the way. Attacking the column from the

rear was less risk to us, although sometimes there would be some

APCs at the rear of the column.

The enemy reaction when caught in the kill zone was usually

ineffective. They normally stopped, dismounted and took cover. They

fought back only when assistance arrived. We learned to hit the

column and leave. We did not want to fight reinforcements or helicopters because we did not have enough combat power and it was very

hard to move our wounded from the area under fire.

Later in the morning, a Soviet security force of armored vehicles

moved close to us and occupied a position. Then the column came from

the north. The security force rejoined the column before the entire column passed. This left the fuel tankers in the rear ofthe column for us!

We hit them by surprise, and it was effective. We damaged or

destroyed one jeep and nine tankers. Mohammad Hashem took out an

armored security vehicle with his RPG. We later learned that two

Russians fled from the south-bound column when we ambushed it.

They were captured by Mujahideen from HIH.

As we were getting ready to leave the ambush site, a Soviet

armored column came from the south. My southern security group had

already pulled back, so we were caught totally by surprise. They began

pouring fire into our ranks. Four helicopters also flew over firing at us.

Mohammad Hashem hit one helicopter with his RPG, but the fight was

unequal. All of my group, except for Ehsan and myself were wounded—most of them were wounded while we were withdrawing. Most

were lightly wounded, but two of them are still paralyzed.

What happened is that as we ambushed the tail of the southbound column, a north-bound column was traveling on the same

section ofroad. The heavily-armored head ofthe north-bound column

arrived at the kill zone as we were withdrawing. Helicopters were

flying air cover for the arriving column as well. Since my southern

security group had withdrawn, we did not know of their arrival until

they were firing at us.

COMMENTARY: The road runs through a deep gorge three kilometers
Chapter 1, Vignette 7 Page 29

south of Dehe Naw. The Soviets probably had anticipated problems at

this area and leapfrogged the security force there and put the helicopters overhead to deal with this probable ambush site. Security

elements should be the last elements to pull out of an ambush—not the

first. The southern security element should have been south on the

high ground where it could see. Simple hand-held walkie-talkie radios

and a security element that performs its mission would have averted

disaster for this Mujahideen commander.

The RPG-7 could be an effective anti-helicopter weapon— particularly when several RPGs were fired simultaneously at a hovering helicopter or at a helicopter on the ground.
Page 30 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
VIGNETTE 8

AMBUSH NEAR ABDULLAH-E BURJ

by Haji Abdul Qader and Haji Qasab

In October 1980, a Soviet column left its base in Bagram to conduct

a four-day operation against the Mujahideen in the Nejraw District of

Kapisa Province. To get there, they crossed the Abdullah-e Burj bridge

over the Panjshir River. The bridge is on the main highway connecting Bagram with the provincial capitals of Mahmoud-e Raqi and Deh

Baba'Ali and other major towns including Gulbahar in the north and

Sarobi in the south. Since this is the only bridge over the Panjshir

River in this region, Mujahideen felt that the Soviet force would return

to their base by the same route.

The Mujahideen based around the Abdullah-e Burj decided to

ambush the column on its return trip when the troops were tired and

more vulnerable. They decided to hit the column while it was crossing

over the bridge from Kapisa to Parwan Province. The Soviets would be

most vulnerable when half their column had crossed the river and

their force was divided by the river (Map 9 - Burj).

Haji Abdul Qader and Haji Qasab jointly planned and executed the

ambush. They decided to let the Soviet force move unopposed until the

head of the column reached Qala-e Naw, about 3.5 kilometers southwest of the bridge. The Mujahideen had watched the column depart

and knew how long the column was. They calculated that when the

column reached Qala-e Naw, half of the column would still be on the

north of the river with the tail of the column just south of Deh

Bäba'Ali. Haji Abdul Qader's group (about 150 men) would set up their

ambush south ofthe river along the Bagram-Kapisa road. They would

set up in the orchards and hills between Qala-e Naw and Abdullah-e

Burj. Haji Qasab, reinforced with local Mujahideen from Commander

Shahin's group (about 200 altogether) would ambush north ofthe river

between Abdullah-e Burj and Deh Baba'Ali. The two areas were part

of the normal AOs of the two commanders. In both areas, the

Mujahideen positioned their RPG-7s close to the road and their heavy

machine guns further back on dominant terrain. The Mujahideen also

supported the ambushes with a few recoilless rifles and 82mm mortars.

On 5 October, the Mujahideen secretly deployed into their designated positions and prepared. covered positions for their anti-tank

Haji Abdul Qader vyas a HIK commander in the Bagram area. Haji Qasab was a JIA commander in the Deh Baba'Ali area. [Map sheets 2886 and 2887].
Page 32 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

weapons. The Soviet column returned that afternoon. It moved unopposed across the bridge at Abdullah-e Burj, and the head ofthe column

reached Qala-e Naw around 1600 hours. Then, at Haji Abdul Qader's

signal, the ambushes opened fire on the tanks, APCs, and trucks along

the entire length of the column. The Soviets were caught by surprise.

South of the river, the Soviet forces drove off the road to try to escape

to the open plain. However, many vehicles were hit and destroyed by

RPG-7 fire. Vehicles were burning and the Soviet infantry which dismounted from the APCs came under heavy machine gun fire.

On the north side of the river, there is little room for vehicles to

maneuver in the surrounding green zone of orchards and vineyards.

Many soldiers abandoned their vehicles and rushed to try and ford the

river.4Some soldiers were washed away, while others made it to the

other side and headed for Bagram across the open plain. Many Soviet

soldiers were in a state of panic, and overall command and control had

broken down. Some troops established perimeter defenses around

their vehicles to hold on until help came. Others abandoned their vehicles and escaped toward Bagram. Some 20 or 30 vehicles were burning.

Night fell. Soviet artillery pounded Mujahideen positions around

Qala-e Naw, but it was not very effective. The Mujahideen moved

through the burning and abandoned vehicles removing supplies and

scores of weapons. In the morning, the Soviets sent a relief column

from Bagram to relieve the trapped column. The Mujahideen withdrew from the battlefield. At 0800 hours, the remnants of the Soviet

column moved on to their Bagram base. Mujahideen losses were light.

Haji Abdul Qader's group had two KIA and seven WIA. Total enemy

casualties are unknown.

COMMENTARY: There were several factors contributing to the

Mujahideen success. First, proper selection of the ambush site was

key. The Mujahideen caught the Soviet column straddling the river

and forced it to fight two separate, unsupported battles. There was little room to maneuver except over the sourthern escape route. Second,

the time ofthe ambush was optimum. The late afternoon arrival gave

Mujahideen gunnersjust enough time to inflict maximum damage, but

not enough time for Soviet air power to react. Soviet artillery could

cover only a portion of the battlefield and apparently no forward

4

Crossing the Panjshir River, or any of Afghanistan's major rivers, is always very risky.

The rivers often appear calm and shallow, but they are treacherous. The Soviet soldiers,

who expected to cross the river on a vehicle over the bridge, were probably not briefed as

to the danger.
Chapter 1, Vignette 8 Page 33

observers were forward to adjust artillery fire during the night. Third,

the Mujahideen had surprise. The column had driven out on this road

unmolested and expected to return unopposed. The soldiers were cold

and tired, and their guard was down. The head ofthe column could see

Bagram airbase when they were hit. Fourth, the simultaneous attack

along the entire length of the column stripped the convoy commander

of any uncommmited force which he could use as an emergency

reserve. The Mujahideen occupied very wide ambush frontages relative to their manpower and this allowed them to attack the entire convoy simultaneously. In retrospect there is little more that the

Mujahideen could have done except employ mines and mortar fire on

the southern escape route.

The Soviet commander contributed to his own defeat. He had poor

intelligence on the area that he was travelling through and did not use

reconnaissance forces effectively. He did not use forward detachments

to seize dominant terrain and obvious chokepoints, such as the

Abdullah-e Burj bridge, in advance of the column. He was highly predictable and used the same route to return that he had left on, yet

failed to post security along that route to support his movement. He

failed to leap-frog artillery groups along the column so that artillery

fire support was immediately available. He apparently did not have

helicopter gunships on stand-by to respond to ambush. He appears to

have not trained his force in standard counter-ambush drills and procedures. He apparently lost control of the column within the first

minute of the ambush.

The Soviet force in Bagram was reluctant to go to the aid of the

beleagured column at night. Apparently they were afraid of also being

ambushed. This reluctance to leave the relative safety of their base

camp at night was to the Mujahideen advantage.
Page 34 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

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VIGNETTE 9

DEH-KHWAJA AMBUSH

by Commander Mulla Malang

In 1982, the Soviet 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade,5

supported by DRA forces, launched a block and sweep operation

against the Mujahideen forces in the center of Panjwayee District.

Panjwayee District is located some 25 kilometers southwest of

Kandahar city. Mujahideen sources estimate that hundreds of enemy

tanks, APCs, BMPs and other vehicles were involved in the 25-day

operation. The Soviet purpose was to punish the Mujahideen .groups

who constantly harassed Soviet and DRA troop columns and supply

convoys on the main Kandahar-Herat highway. The operation was

also designed to destroy the resistance bases in the area and widen the

security zone around the government-controlled district center.

The Soviet operation in Panjwayee required constant resupply

from the main Soviet base located in the Kandahar air base. The supply columns had to travel along the main Chaman-Kandahar road to

its junction with the Kabul-Herat highway and then proceed through

Deh-Khwaja and Kandahar city to Sarpuza where the Panjwayee

access road joins the main highway. (Map 10a - Deh-Khwaja 1)

The Mujahideen groups around Kandahar decided to launch a

diversionary action against the enemy in order to relieve the pressure

on the resistance in Panjwayee. The Mujahideen realized that the

Soviets were weakest and most vulnerable along their supply route

and, therefore, decided to strike them there. Although the Mujahideen

could conduct small-scale ambushes along the entire stretch of the

road, there were only two places suitable for large-scale ambushes.

One is. a two-kilometer length of road between Manzel Bagh Chawk

and Deh-Khwaja. The other is a one-and-a-half kilometer stretch

between Shahr-e Naw and Sarpuza.

Mulla Malang was one of the most famous commanders of the Kandahar area. He was an

adherent of Mawlawi Mohammed Yunis Khalis-lslamic Party (Hezb-e-lslami-Khalis-HIK).

[Map sheet 2180].

5

The 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade was created using a regiment of the 5th

Motorized Rifle Division shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The 70th was

designed especially for counterinsurgency and had three motorized rifle battalions, an air

assault battalion, an artillery howitzer battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, a tank battalion and support troops. There are also some indications that a MRL battalion might have

belonged to this organization.
Page 36 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 1, Vignette 9 Page 37

The local Mujahideen groups in the Malajat6held a council of war

and decided to block the road and conduct a large-scale ambüsh at each

site. In addition to the ambush forces, the Mujahideen also designated support groups for both ambushes to protect the flanks and rear of

the blocking/ambush detachments. About 150 Mujahideen, split up

into small groups, moved from the Malajat area during the night and

took up positions in the orchards, buildings and ditches along the main

road between the Manzel Bagh Chawk and Deh-Khwaja gas station.

The back-up group for the detachment deployed south ofthe city. (Map

10b - Deh-Khwaja 2) A similar detachment blocked the road between

Shahr-e Naw and Sarpuza.

Early in the morning, a convoy of trucks carrying ammunition,

rockets and gasoline moved from the Kandahar air base toward

Panjwayee. As the column reached the first roadblock, the Mujahideen

opened fire simultaneously with RPG-7s, machine guns, rifles and a

recoilless rifle. Taken by surprise, the column stopped while the Soviet

security vehicles returned fire. Their fire hit the Deh-Khwaja residential areas and caused much destruction. However, Mujahideen fire

finally struck the ammunition trucks. They caught fire and hundreds

ofrockets and boxes of other ammunition began to explode. The explosions were so powerful that burning tires from APCS were thrown as

far away as Bala Karz, some two kilometers from the ambush site. The

ambush destroyed about 30 enemy supply trucks and damaged many

others. The rest of the Soviet convoy turned back. The Mujahideen

roadblock at Shahr-e Naw and Sarpuza had no enemy to attack.

This Mujahideen ambush had a decisive impact on the enemy

operation in that it forced the Soviet forces to end their siege of

Mujahideen forces in Panjwayee and return to Kandahar. However,

in order to prevent future ambushes in the area, the Soviet forces

bulldozed Deh-Khwaja homes along the main road out to a distance

of 300 meters from the highway.

COMMENTARY: Security of the lines of communication was a constant

challenge facing the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Security of the lines

of communication determined the amount of forces which the Soviet

could deploy in Afghanistan and also determined the scale and frequency of offensive combat directed against the Afghan resistance forces.

In this example the Soviets had to move supplies to a large group

of forces about 50 kilometers away. The road, although an all-season

major highway, was vulnerable to Mujahideen ambushes at almost

6 The large green zone to the south of Kandahar.
Page 38 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

every point. Further, the Soviets and Mujahideen fought for control of

Kandahar for the entire war. The Soviets knew that the road was not

secure. And yet, the convoy commander did little to ensure the security of the movement along the supply route. A preliminary road-clearing patrol could have preempted the Mujahideen's successful ambush.

Instead, their entire operation was disrupted due to their failure to

move the supplies to Panjwayee.

Normally, the Soviets spaced APCs throughout the convoy as security vehicles. In case of ambush, the APCs would stop in the kill zone

and return fire while the rest of the convoy caught in the kill zone

would drive out ofit. The portion ofthe convoy not under attack would

stop and wait for the APCs to drive offthe ambushers. Then, when the

ambushers had been driven off, the convoy would reform and continue.

This is why the Mujahideen established two ambush zones. They did

not think that they would stop the convoy at the first ambush and so

the second ambush was ready to hit the Soviet convoy again.

On the other hand, it took the Mujahideen about three weeks to

decide to help the resistance forces in Panjwayee by hitting the Soviets

elsewhere. Had they launched their attack earlier, it could have forced

their enemy to terminate his operation against Mujahideen groups in

Panjwayee earlier.
VIGNETTE 10

DURANAY AMBUSH

by Commander Haji Mohammad Seddiq

In September 1983, my group and I were visiting the area of

Maidan. The Maidan Mujahideen had heard about a future convoy

going from Kabul to Ghazni and were planning to ambush it. I joined

HIH commanders Ghulam Sakhi, Captain Amanullah, Mawlawi

Halim and Zabet Wali in setting up an ambush some 30 kilometers

southwest ofKabul. Together, we had some 60 Mujahideen armed with

AK-47s, 60mm mortars, RPG-7s and an 82mm recoilless rifle. We

planned two ambush sites. One group would deploy east of the road

between Duranay Bazar and Sur Pul. The other group would deploy

west ofthe road on the forward slope of Duranay mountain close to the

road (Map 11 - Duranay). The Mujahideen already had well-prepared

positions at both these sites.

We occupied our positions at dawn and waited for the column. At

about 0900 hours, the convoy came from Kabul. It was a column of

trucks and armored vehicles. A forward security element preceded the

convoy. It drove through the ambush area, but failed to detect our

forces. Then the convoy entered the ambush area. We let it pass

through until the head of the column reached the second ambush site

at Duranay mountain. Now, the column was in about a five-kilometer

stretch of kill zone. We opened up from all positions along the entire

length of the exposed column.

A heavy battle ensued as we fired at all the vehicles in the open.

The enemy had a security outpost at Sur Pul which joined in the battle and fired on our positions. Despite this security post fire, and the

fire from the armored vehicles, the Soviet response was fairly passive. Our prepared positions protected us, and the Soviets apparently did not have any infantry accompanying the convoy, so they could

not dismount and maneuver against us. Our positions were vulnerable to a flank attack through Kashmirian or Ghlo Ghar, but the

apparent lack of Soviet infantry support kept their vehicles pinned

Haji Mohammad Seddiq is from No-Burja village in Logar Province. The village is in the

Tangi-Wardak area which connects the Saydabad District of Wardak Province to the Baraki

Barak District in the Logar Province. Commander Seddiq's village is located on the border

between the two provinces. Therefore, his command fought in both provinces in coordination with other Mujahideen. Commander Haji Mohammad Seddiq was affiliated with

Hekmatyar's HIH. [Map sheet 2785, vie grid 8494].
Page 40 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

1 2 KM
Chapter 1, Vignette 10 Page 41

down on the lower ground where we continued to shoot them with

our anti-tank weapons.

Later in the day, the enemy brought reinforcements to the battlefield and began to pound Mujahideen positions with artillery and air

strikes. We began to gradually withdraw our ambush force and by

1500, there were no Mujahideen left in the area. A major Mujahideen

commander, Ghulam Sakhi, and several other Mujahideen were killed

and many were wounded. We damaged or destroyed 33 armored vehicles and 27 trucks. We captured some 40 weapons of different types.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen showed good planning and discipline

in this ambush, but used prepared positions that they had used before.

They also knew that these positions had exposed flanks, but took no

precautions. They felt that the Soviets would not dismount to check

the known ambush sites and did not expect immediate Soviet counteractions to turn their flanks. They were right. The Mujahideen were

setting a pattern, but the Soviets failed to react to it. The Mujahideen

stocked their positions with sufficient ammunition for a fight of several hours duration. They apparently took many oftheir casualties from

artillery and air strikes while moving to the burning vehicles to loot or

when pulling back.

The Soviet convoy movement was no secret. The Mujahideen had

contacts within the DRA and agents near the assembly areas. The

Soviets usually left after first light and therefore arrived in the area

between 0830 and 0930. This made it convenient for the Mujahideen

who did not have to stay in position all day. The Soviets knew that this

was an ambush site, but did not destroy the ambush positions, put

security elements on the high ground with helicopters or put a dismounted force through the area to check for ambushes. Further, they

did not have helicopter gunships flying overhead or on strip alert.

They did not carry an immediate reaction force which could get up into

the mountains and turn the flanks of the ambush sites. Instead, they

relied on the combat power oftheir armored vehicles and slow-reacting

artillery and air support.

The Mujahideen commander had 60 combatants spread over a five

kilometers stretch of ambush on both sides of the road. He did not

have radio communications with all his people. Instead, the signal to

initiate fire was the commander firing the first shot. Other commands

were given by messenger or visual signals—mirrors, flares, smoke

grenades and waving. Command and control depended greatly on the

commander's pre-ambush briefing and SOP actions.
Page 42 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
VIGNETTE 11

KANDAHAR AMBUSHES

by Commander Mulla Malang

Despite their best efforts, the Soviets were never able to gain full

control of the major Pashtun city of Kandahar. The battle for

Kandahar was unusual in that all guerrilla factions cooperated and

regularly rotated forces in and out of the battle to maintain pressure

on the Soviet and DRA garrisons. The suburbs of Kandahar were one

of the major scenes of Mujahideen road blocks and ambushes during

the war. Hardly a day would pass without a Mujahideen attack on

enemy columns along the main highway connecting the city with

Ghazni in the northeast and Girishk in the west.

The enemy columns were most vulnerable on a stretch of the road

between the western suburbs of the city and Hauz-e Madad, located

about 40 kilometers west of Kandahar. In this area, the Mujahideen

were able to hide in the orchards and villages to ambush enemy

columns. As the road leaves Sanjari on the Arghandab River, the green

zone runs parallel to the highway in the south and an arid plain, that

gradually rises toward the mountains, flanks the road to the north.

(See Map 10a - Deh-Khwaja 1 in Vignette 9.)

The Herat Column

In one oftheir early large-scale ambushes, the Mujahideen groups

affiliated with different parties planned a series of ambushes along

the main highway from Girishk to Kandahar (Map 12 - Kandahar).

In September 1984, a Soviet/DRA supply column moved from

Torghundi on the Soviet Turkmenistan border through the Shindand

air base in western Afghanistan to the Soviet garrison in Kandahar.

The column consisted of several hundred trucks escorted by tanks

and APCs. Most of the trucks were loaded with gasoline which they

Mulla Malang, now 38, is a Pashtun from the northwestern province of Badghisat. He was

a student (taleb) at a religious school (madrassa) in Kandahar when the communists came

to power in a bloody coup in Kabul in 1978. Mulla Malang joined a resistance cell in the

southern suburbs of Kandahar (Malajat) and started fighting the communist regime. He

was arrested in the fall of 1979 for spreading anti-government leaflets and later released

in general amnesty after the Soviet invasion in January 1980. Mulla Malang immediately

fled to Pakistan and joined Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Muhammadi's Harakat faction. He

returned to Kandahar for combat. Mulla Malang later joined HIK and became a major commander of the faction in the province with bases in Arghestan, Malajat, Pashmol and

Khakrez. [Map sheet 2180].
Page 44 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

brought from Shindand. Shindand was supplied with gasoline from

a Soviet-built field pipeline.

Saranwal Abdul Wali of NIFA and I coordinated the Mujahideen

plan. We planned to position several interconnected ambushes,

manned by small groups of Mujahideen, to surprise and take the

entire length of the column under simultaneous fire. This required

selection of a favorable stretch of the road that could accommodate

all the ambushes required to attack the entire column. We selected a

stretch of nearly seven kilometers between a point at the end of

Sanjari (the beginning ofAshoqa villages) and a point immediately to

the east ofPashmol as the killing zone for the enemy column. We estimated that this stretch of the highway corresponded to the length of

the enemy column.

We decided to divide the 250 available Mujahideen into several

groups. The groups were armed with RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers and four-to-five 82mm recoilless rifles. All ambushes were sited in

the green zone to the south of the road. Each ambush group had an

assigned sector ofthe kill zone. All groups were instructed to open fire

simultaneously as the head of the column reaches the Ashoqa villages.

It was expected that at that time the tail ofthe column would have just

cleared the Pashmol villages.

At that time, most of the local population still lived in their homes

along the road. Few had migrated to Pakistan since no major Soviet

military actions had taken place there. The Mujahideen groups coming

from Malajat (the southern and southwestern suburbs of Kandahar)

and other neighboring bases moved during the night to their designated ambush sites. The ambush plan was kept secret from the local

population and local Mujahideen units since resistance groups based

in the ambush area were reluctant to participate, fearing retaliation

directed at their homes and families still living there.

The ambush groups moved into position during the night and

deployed patrols to secure the area. As the day began and locals

started moving around, Mujahideen patrols temporarily detained

the villagers to ensure secrecy. The Soviet convoy reached the kill

zone at 0900 hours. As instructed, the Mujahideen groups opened

fire simultaneously, surprising the enemy. The column stopped and

many vehicles began moving north onto the open plain. The escorting tanks and APCs fired randomly in panic from on the road

without trying to maneuver or close with the ambush sites. Enemy

vehicles moving north off the highway soon were out of range of

many of the Mujahideen weapons.
Chapter 1, Vignette 11 Page 45

In the meantime, several gasoline trucks caught fire and the fire

quickly spread to other vehicles. The chain reaction set off several

explosions which threw burning debris on both sides of the road. We

scored direct hits on about 50 vehicles while many others were damaged in explosions caused by the blown up trucks and gas tankers. The

action lasted 30 minutes. We withdrew before enemy aircraft could be

scrambled. The enemy did not pursue us.

This ambush marked the beginning of a continuous battle for

control of the western road to Kandahar. Until the Soviet withdrawal

in 1989, this road was under constant threat by the Mujahideen who

would set up road blocks, conduct ambushes, mine long stretches of

the road and demolish bridges, underpasses and viaducts using unexploded aerial bombs. Faced with continuous Mujahideen ambushes

and attacks on convoys along the highway, the Soviet forces established several security posts and fire bases in the area. They built a

major fire base at Kandahar Silo and another at Karez Slim in the

northern plain overlooking the Kandahar western highway.

The Soviets set three security outposts at the points where

orchards and the green zone stretched to the road providing concealment for Mujahideen in ambush. They were established on both

sides of Pasab and at Hauz-e Madad (Map 10a Deh-Khawaja 1 in

Vignette 9). The posts were protected by earth berms. The road-side

security posts were connected to the main fire base at Karez Slim by

communications trenches which allowed safe, rapid reinforcement.

The twin Pasab posts were each manned by 10-15 men and each had

a tank, a howitzer and a mortar. The security post at Hauz-e Madad

was two times as large as the two Pasab posts combined.

The new security arrangement impeded Mujahideen movement in

the area. Repeated attempts by the Mujahideen failed to knock out the

Soviet outposts. Lala Malang7sent for me and asked me to join in a

coordinated attack on the Soviet security posts in November 1985.

Mujahideen forces lacked the ability to knock out security posts since

they had to fight from exposed positions with little cover and they

lacked engineering equipment to neutralize mine fields around the

enemy positions. Therefore, the Mujahideen could not sustain pressure on the outpost garrison.

We Kandahar Mujahideen decided to first enhance our tactical survivability and then renew attempts to destroy the enemy security

7 Lala Malang was a well-known Mujahideen commander who was based in Pashmol (he

was killed during a major Soviet sweep of the Arghandab Valley in 1987).
Page 46 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

posts. We began to steadily improve field fortifications areas around

Kandahar. We dug trenches with overhead cover overlooking the

enemy security posts. We constructed bunkers, underground night

shelters and covered access trenches, and stocked ammunition and

supplies in these prepared positions. Wherever possible, we built overhead cover using timbers covered with a thick layer of dirt as protection against artillery and aviation. We prepared firing positions for

our multi-barrelled rocket launchers. Each of these positions had a

pool of water so that the firing crew could splash water on the site

before firing to absorb the flames and fumes from the rocket launch.

These positions significantly enhanced Mujahideen field sustainability and enabled them to fire on the enemy outposts around

the clock. Enemy attempts to dislodge the Mujahideen with air

strikes and artillery fire repeatedly failed. Enemy tanks and motorized rifle forces were also unable to penetrate the green zones to

eliminate the positions.

Finally the enemy was forced to abandon his posts at Pasab and

Hauz-e Madad and shift his forces to Karez Slim. A local Mujahideen commander, Mulla Nek Mohammad, and some others intensified their daily harassment of enemy movements in the area close to

the green zone. Every morning, the Soviets would deploy security

patrols from their base at Kandahar Silo to secure the highway

from the city to Sanjari area. The Karez Slim fire base covered the

area west of Sanjari.

As Mujahideen attacks further threatened the security of the

enemy convoys on the highway, the Soviets decided to avoid the stretch

of road they could not control. They constructed a detour road to the

north of the highway. The bypass road was built in 1985 and connected Sanjari and Karez Slim (See MaplOa - Deh-Khwaja 1 in Vignette 9).

COMMENTARY: Soviet lack of adequate reconnaissance cost them

dearly. Moving a convoy of supply vehicles in close terrain, without

effective security arrangements, often resulted in major tactical

setbacks. They further failed to cover the convoy movement with

helicopter reconnaissance and helicopter gunships. The Mujahideen

had calculated the reaction time for helicopter gunships from

Kandahar air base. Timely action by helicopter gunships could have

saved the day for the Soviet convoy, but they were apparently not

planned for and not on call.

Normally, the Soviets spaced APCs throughout the convoy as security vehicles. In case of ambush, the APCs would stop in the kill zone
Chapter 1, Vignette 11 Page 47

and return fire while the rest of the convoy caught in the kill zone

would drive out ofit. The security detail followed this SOP. Instead of

aggressive efforts to use their armored strength and fire power to

outflank the ambush groups and cut off their withdrawal, the Soviet

security vehicles passively remained with the embattled column and

fired on suspected Mujahideen positions. They had little effect.

Later on, as the Soviet forces established stationary security posts

in the key areas along the highway, they failed to support and sustain

them in the face of constant Mujahideen attacks. This later led them

to construct a bypass road further to the north away from the dangerous green zone. The Soviet surrendered the initiative in movement

control to the Mujahideen and never regained it. Consequently most

of the Soviet actions in the area were reactive. In a guerilla war, the

loss of initiative becomes decisive in the outcome of tactical combat.

What mostly contributed to Mujahideen success in inflicting heavy

losses on the enemy was their elaborate planning, secrecy in movement and coordinated action. This became possible through detailed

information about the enemy including the size, direction of movement

and estimated time of arrival of the enemy convoy to the ambush site.

Simultaneous attack on the enemy column along its entire depth was

perhaps the most decisive element in this ambush. In this case, the

Mujahideen had approximately 40 combatants to a kilometer of

ambush. This was much denser than usual Mujahideen ambushes and

reflected that they were fighting from a green zone which could accomodate more combatants.

However, the Mujahideen failed to exploit the initiative they

achieved through surprise by moving to the road to complete the

destruction of a demoralized and panicked enemy. Instead, they

pulled out immediately after their success. This failure to fully exploit

an ambush became a hallmark of Mujahideen hit and run tactics

throughout the war.

Later fighting confirms the importance of field fortifications and

terrain to increase battlefield survivability and sustain combat despite

enemy air and artillery superiority. This was a lesson once learned by

the Mujahideen that was effectively implemented throughout the war.

The Soviets and DRA, on the other hand, did not make a concerted

effort to find and destroy these positions.

The parochial nature of the resistance always affected selection of

the place and time of tactical actions against the enemy. In areas

where the local population remained in their homes and had not emigrated, local resistance units preferred to reserve for themselves the
Page 48 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

choice of time, place and method of action against the enemy and not

let outside Mujahideen groups risk their security and plans by conducting combat in their area without their consent. The decentralized

nature of the resistance, factionalism and lack of unified command

were both a Mujahideen strength and weakness.
VIGNETTE 12

AMBUSH AT QALA-E HAIDAR

by Asil Khan

As early as 1980, Mujahideen began attacking Soviet columns

along the major southwest highway connecting the Afghan capital of

Kabul to Ghazni and Kandahar. This 480-kilometer stretch was vulnerable in many areas. The road between Cheltan and Maidan, just

outside of Kabul, was continuously attacked by Mujahideen operating

out of bases in the suburbs of Kabul, Paghman, Kurugh, Arghandeh

and Maidan. Initially, Soviet/ DRA forces would establish security outposts at key points along the road every time they moved a column on

the highway. According to the DRA security plan, different military

units were responsible for sections of road and for manning the security outposts while Soviet or DRA convoys were moving through their

area. Later on, as military traffic along the highway increased, units

would routinely post security details at the outposts in the morning

and pull them out at dusk. One of the outposts was located at the old

fort of Qala-e Haidar, some 15 kilometers west of Kabul. This outpost

was vulnerable to attacks by Mujahideen who would sneak up on the

outpost from neighboring villages which were not under government

control (Map 13 - Haidar).

In the beginning of October 1984, the DRA tired of the repeated

Mujahideen attacks and did not man the outpost for many days. Asil

Khan decided to conduct an ambush at Qala-e Haidar, although he

knew that he could not hold the site for more than a few minutes after

the ambush, since the DRA could quickly reach the outpost from adjacent outposts. On the night of 18 October 1984, Asil Khan led a Ionian team to Qala-e Haidar. There had been some road repair by the

outpost and the road had been scraped down and graded. Asil Khan

had his men bury three powerful remote-controlled mines in the road

immediately in front of the outpost. They also buried or disguised the

wires leading away from the mines to the ambush site. They spent two

nights mining the highway and preparing fighting positions in the

orchards and in a ditch in front of Qala-e Haider. Lookouts watched

the road for approaching columns.

Asil Khan is a famous urban guerrilla who operated in and around Kabul. He belonged to

the NIFA faction. Other notes and the DRA security plan consulted for this vignette. [Map

sheets 2785, 2786, 2885 and 2886].
Page 50 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

!

CHELTAN

jKM

HAIDAR

Map 13
Chapter 1, Vignette 12 Page 51

On the morning of 20 October, there were an unusual number of

helicopters flying in the area. Asil Khan felt that this indicated that a

convoy was leaving Kabul and so he moved his men into the ambush

site and waited for the column to arrive. Around 1000 hours, a large

supply column, escorted by tanks and APCs, approached the

Mujahideen position. Helicopters were flying overhead. As the leading tanks and APCs reached the kill zone, the Mujahideen detonated

the mines. One tank blew up and the column came to a sudden halt.

The Mujahideen opened fire on the column. But the Mujahideen were

so concerned about making a fast getaway, that their fire was not too

effective against the vulnerable column. They destroyed just one truck

with their RPGs before they broke contact and fled unscathed to

friendly territory in the west.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen achieved surprise but failed to exploit

it fully once the column stopped. The commander's desire to safeguard

his force prevented their further damaging the column. Still, a tank

and a truck is a good days work for a 15-man ambush. Proper selection of the ambush site is key and this area was very open and offered

little protection to the force. Some 12 kilometers further south is the

Kotal-e Takht (the Takht pass) which is far more suitable for an

ambush. The terrain there also allows surprise and provides better

protection and concealed exit routes for the ambushing force. An

ambushing force could fight much longer in this area and inflict more

damage on a column. However, there are certain limitations in selecting an ambush site in the area. First of all, Mujahideen groups generally operated on their home turf. Acting outside their home turf could

have unfavorable political, and support ramifications. Secondly, the

Mujahideen wanted to harass their enemy as close to the capital as

possible for political and propaganda reasons. Attacks at the gates of

Kabul were more significant than attacks further out. Finally, since

the area is very open, an ambush here had a good chance at surprise

since it is not an obvious ambush site.
Page 52 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

t

MORAD

Map 14

0 1 2
VIGNETTE 13

AMBUSH AT THE SADRE AZAM HILL

by Doctor Mohammad Wakil

It was August 1984. We had information that a Soviet supply

column would come to Kabul from the north. There is a small hill

on the highway south of Qala-e Morad Beg. (Map 14 - Morad) It is

the Sadre Azam hill. It is an excellent site for an ambush and

we set up our ambush on the hill to the east of the highway.8I

had 30 Mujahideen and four RPG-7s. This area was closely

watched by the enemy and so we could not spread our force out.

Therefore, I concentrated the force on the hill with the rifles

forward and the RPGs higher up on the hill. We thought that the

convoy would arrive at 1600 hours and were in place before that

time. At 1600 hours, the convoy came. It was led by a BMP. Soviet

soldiers were sitting on top of the BMP. Usually we would not

attack the head of the column, but since the lead vehicle was such

a good target, we opened fire on it and destroyed it. We took the

column by surprise. The column stopped and the enemy dismounted some soldiers who took up positions and fired back at us. We

fired at each other for about an hour until a relief column arrived

from nearby Kabul to help the ambushed column. We pulled out.

The enemy lost one BMP, four gasoline tankers and probably about

ten killed and wounded. We lost Malek Mohammad from Karez-e

Mir who was killed.

COMMENTARY: This is typical of the small-scale ambushes that the

Mujahideen regularly conducted. The losses on both sides were minor,

yet over time they added up. The Soviet soldiers customarily rode on

top of their APCs since it is safer if the APC hit a mine. A powerful

antitank mine blast might merely hurl the the soldiers off the APC

whereas it would almost certainly kill everyone inside. Furthermore,

the inside of an APC is crowded, is hard to see out of and, in August, is

unbearably warm.

Doctor Mohammad Wakil is from Shakardara District north of Kabul. He graduated from

high school before the war. He joined the resistance and received medical training in

Pakistan. [Map sheet 2886, vie grid 0734].

8 Author Ali Jalali has conducted tactical classes on this very terrain while teaching Afghan

Army officers at the Higher Education School. It truly is an excellent ambush site.
Page 54 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

The convoy was hemmed in by the village of Morad Beg, so the

Soviets had difficulty maneuvering armored vehicles forward to

fire into the ambush site. Since the object of the ambush was to

destroy vehicles, it made sense to hit the head of the convoy. If the

object had been to capture weapons, then an attack on the middle

or end of the convoy would have been better. Available terrain kept

the Mujahideen ambush compact—which is not what they prefer.

This is closer to a Western-style ambush. After the initial firing,

the ambush turned into a desultory, protracted sniping exercise

which was more like an afternoon's recreation for the ambushers

than decisive combat.
VIGNETTE 14

AMBUSH AT MAZAR CREEK

by Commander Qazi Guljan Tayeb

East of my base in Baraki Barak is the town of Padkhab-e

Shana. It is located one and a half kilometers from the KabulGardez highway. The Soviets had put security posts on the high

ground around this town to protect the highway from Mujahideen

attacks coming out of Baraki Barak District. I decided to attack

these posts in July 1985. By that time I had switched from the

Hikmatyar faction to the Sayaf faction.

We moved out from Baraki Barak at dusk. I had some 100

Mujahideen with me. We crossed the highway and entered Padkhab-e

Shana town. It is a large town occupying a square kilometer and

containing some 1,000 houses. My Mujahideen moved into houses and

stayed with the people throughout the next day. That night, using

local guides, we set up ambushes on the roads leading into the village.

The area around the town is also a green zone with orchards and woods

(Map 15 - Mazar). Mazar Creek passes through the town near the

bazaar. Mazar Creek begins at a spring and has good water. Soviet

soldiers would go to the creek to get water, wash, fish and take a dip.

We put an ambush at the creek near the spring. We put another

ambush along their supply route which ran to the Soviet security posts

from the main road. There was a path that ran from the security posts

to the town dwellings. Soviets would often come down this path to the

town to steal or extort things. We set our third ambush along this path

in an area covered by buildings and orchards where the enemy maneuver would be restricted and constrained. We set our fourth ambush

along the path from the creek to Mir Ghyas hill.

In the morning, a few Soviets came to the creek. The Mujahideen

at this ambush site opened fire and then left quickly after they saw

that they had killed some Soviets. About the same time, a Soviet jeep

drove along the supply route. That ambush opened fire and hit the

jeep. Soviet tanks came from Pule-e Alam and surrounded the town.

We hid our weapons and mixed with populace. Gradually we left the

Commander Qazi Guljan Tayeb was a third year student in Kabul Theological College during the communist takeover in 1978. He joined Hikmatyar and later switched to the Sayef

faction in the mid-1980s. He was the Commander of Baraki Barak District of Logar

Province. [Map sheet 2884, vie 0657].
Page 56 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 1, Vignette 14 Page 57

area disguised as civilians and went to the north and west. We had two

wounded Mujahideen. We killed 12 Soviets, destroyed one jeep and

captured four weapons.

COMMENTARY: The Soviets had set a pattern of behavior which

enabled the Mujahideen ambushes. They used the same roads and

paths regularly. Their behavior toward the villagers made the

villagers willing accomplices in setting the ambushes and hiding the

Mujahideen and their weapons. The DRA had traveling propaganda/civil affairs teams which provided entertainment, medical

treatment and pro-regime propaganda throughout Afghanistan.9

Their actions, however, did not offset the effects of poor behaviour by

Soviet combat forces.

9 N. I. Pikov,' "Vidy spetspropagandistskoy deyatel'nosti Armii Respubliki Afganistan"

[Methods of Special Propaganda Activity of the Army of the Republic of Afghanistan], Opyt

primeneniya Sovetskikh voysk v Respublike Afganistan [Experience applied by Soviet

Forces in the Republic of Afghanistan], Moscow: Institute of Military History, 1990,151-184

provides a good view of the composition and employment of these teams.
Page 58 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

-Z-Mr
VIGNETTE 15

AMBUSH AT QAFUS TANGAY

by Major Sher Aqa Kochay

On August 13, 1985, my 40-man Mujahideen force moved from its

base at Sewak (20 kilometers southeast of Kabul) to establish an

ambush at the Qafus Tangay (some 25 kilometers east of Kabul). The

area was protected by a Sarandoy (Internal Ministry Forces) regiment.

This area was previously protected by tribal militia, but exactly one

year prior, the local tribal militia of Hasan Khan Karokhel defected to

the Mujahideen. Hence, the regiment deployed east of Kabul between

Gazak and Sarobi to protect the power lines supplying electricity from

Naghlu and Sarobi hydroelectric dams to Kabul. The regiment's headquarters was at Sur Kandow and its forces were deployed along the

Butkhak-Sarobi road10 in security posts. (Map 16a - Qafus 1).

Each day, the regiment sent truck convoys with supplies from headquarters to the battalions. In turn, battalions sent trucks to make

deliveries to all their highway outposts. About two kilometers from the

DRA Mulla Omar base, the road cuts across the mouth of a narrow valley called Qafus Tangay. Qafus Tangay begins at the Khak-e Jabar pass

in the south and stretches north to the Gazak-Sarobi road. The valley

offered a concealed approach from the Mujahideen bases in Khord

Kabul in the south. The road at the mouth ofthe valley passes through

difficult terrain forcing the traffic to move very slowly. This was a

favorable point for an ambush.

I moved my detachment at night reaching the ambush site early in

the morning ofAugust 13. My group was armed with four RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers, several light machine guns and Kalashnikov

automatic rifles. I grouped my men into three teams. I positioned a

10-man party with the four RPG-7s at the bottom ofthe valley near the

road. I positioned two 15-man teams on each of the ridges on the two

sides of the valley that dominated the road to the north. Both of the

flank groups had PK machine guns. (Map 16b - Qafus 2)

Major Sher Aqa Kochay is a graduate of Afghan Military Academy, Kabul, and received

training in commando tactics in the Soviet Union. He served in the 37th Commando

Brigade and participated in DRA actions against the Mujahideen in Panjsher Valley. He

defected, with a large amount of weapons, to the Mujahideen in 1982 and became a NIFA

commander in Kabul. He organized a new Mujahideen base in the Khord Kabul area some

20 kilometers south of the Afghan capital. [Map sheet 2986, vie grid 4919].

10 The southern east-west road on the map.
Page 60 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 1, Vignette 1 Page 61

The plan was to wait until the enemy's supply vehicles arrived at

the difficult stretch of road directly facing the Qafus Tangay Valley. I

planned to assign targets to the RPGs as the trucks moved into the kill

zone (for example number one, fire at the lead truck). I hoped to engage

four trucks simultaneously, maximizing surprise and fire power. The

teams on the ridges were to cover the valley with interlocking fields of

fire and to support the withdrawal of the RPG teams while repelling

any enemy infantry. They would also seize prisoners and carry off captured weapons and supplies once they had destroyed the enemy convoy.

Finally, the group heard a vehicle approaching from the east. Soon

an enemy jeep appeared around a bend in the road. As the jeep slowly moved over the rocky road to the ambush site, a machine gunner on

the ridge suddenly opened fire at the vehicle.

I was extremely upset because the ambush had been compromised

and ordered one RPG-7 gunner to kill the jeep before it escaped. A few

seconds later, the vehicle was in flames and the wounded driver was out

of the jeep. He was the sole occupant of the vehicle. He was returning

from the battalion headquarters at Lataband where he had driven the

regimental political officer. We gave him first aid and released him.

He was a conscript soldier from the Panjsher Valley who had recently

been press-ganged into the military.

The Sarandoy sent out patrols from the nearby Spina Tana and

Nu'manak outposts. Because it was too risky to remain at the ambush

site we withdrew through the Qafus Tangay Valley to our base.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen ambush failed for lack of fire discipline. The unauthorized initiation of fire compromised a carefully

planned and deftly prepared ambush. It was always a challenge for

Mujahideen commanders to train and control a volunteer force fighting an organized military power. Further, some Mujahideen commanders ignored certain basic control measures. It is not clear what

arrangements Major Aqa made to control the fire of the Mujahideen

deployed on the ridges. Had the commander assigned sub-group leaders on each ridge with clear instructions to control the fire ofthe teams

the outcome of the ambush could have been different.

The ambush also lacked sufficient early warning which could

communicate the size, composition and activity of approaching convoys. Ifthe commander had early warning and a chain of command,

he could have anticipated the arrival of vehicles using something

other than sound, determined whether or not to attack the vehicles

and gotten his new orders to his men in a timely manner.
Page 62 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
VIGNETTE 16

SiSAY AMBUSH

by Commander Haji Mohammad Seddiq

In October 1985, several Mujahideen groups cooperated to establish an ambush at Sisay, some five kilometers north of the Saydabad

District Headquarters in Wardak Province. The ambush site is located along the main highway between Kabul and Ghazni. It is located at

the mouth of the valley which extends to Logar and offers concealed

approach and withdrawal routes for an ambush force. The terrain

facilitates the use of all types of weapons by an ambushing force, while

restricting maneuver to a force caught in the kill zone.

Mawlawi Faizan, the Wardak provincial leader of HIH, was overall commander of the Sisay combined ambush. He had information

from his sources that a large Soviet/DRA column would move from

Kabul to Ghazni. Mawlawi Faizan planned the ambush at Sisay and

called on several local Mujahideen groups to participate (Mapl7 -

Sisay). He assembled a combined force of 80 Mujahideen armed with

four 82mm mortars, six 82mm recoilless rifles, four 60mm mortars,11

ten RPG-7s and an assortment of Goryunov machine-guns, AK-47

assault rifles and bolt-action Enfield rifles.

I brought my group from Logar Province. It took us three hours to

reach the ambush site. Normally, we organized our force into six-man

teams, but due to the expected strength ofthe enemy column, we organized our force into 10-man teams. The ambush had three groups—an

assault group, a support group and a heavy weapons group. The

assault group had four teams (40 men) armed with the anti-tank

weapons. It deployed on Guley hill close to the road. The support

group was located behind the assault group. It had three teams (30

men) armed with the machine-guns. It's mission was to support the

assault group with machine gun fire, evacuate the wounded and resupply ammunition. The heavy weapons group had one 10-man team

Haji Mohammad Seddiq is from No-Burja village in Logar Province. The village is in the

Tangi-Wardak area which connects the Saydabad District of Wardak Province to the Baraki

Barak District in the Logar Province. Commander Seddiq's village is located on the border

between the two provinces. Therefore, his command fought in both provinces in coordination with other Mujahideen. Commander Haji Mohammad Seddiq was affiliated with

Hekmatyar's HIH. [Map sheet 2785, vie grid 7666].

11 The Mujahideen called the 60mm mortar the "guerrilla mortar" (cheriki hawan) due to

its light weight and transportability.
Page 64 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

armed with the mortars. It established firing positions across the

Wardak River. The firing sites were screened from observation by

Khadibooch hill.

We occupied our prepared positions in the dark. At about 0900

hours, the forward security element ofthe Soviet convoy drove into the

kill zone from the north. There were two BMPs and another APC in

the forward security element. We let them pass. The forward security elementjust cleared the kill zone and then stopped. They must have

assumed that the way was safe, since they then signaled the main body

of the convoy to proceed. The forward security element waited while

the main body, consisting of GAZ-66 trucks and armored vehicles,

moved out of the green zone south of Shekhabad village and into the

kill zone. As the column moved into the kill zone, we opened up on the

forward security element with our anti-tank weapons. We destroyed

both BMPs and the other APC. Then we shifted our fire to the main

convoy. The fighting lasted for two hours. The enemy returned fire

from his APCs and other armored vehicles, but their fire had limited

effect against our well-prepared positions. We punished the enemy

severely with our anti-tank fire and mortar fire. The enemy did little

to change the situation or to try to gain the initiative. They merely

returned fire and those caught in the kill zone died there. I commanded the first team of the assault group. By 1100 hours, we had

destroyed all the vehicles in the kill zone and we swarmed into the

area to capture whatever weapons and equipment we could carry.

Then we withdrew. We left 17 armored vehicles and 45 GAZ-66 trucks

and gas tankers burning in the kill zone. We captured four AK-74

assault rifles—the exclusive weapon of the Soviet forces. Mujahideen

casualties were 10 KIA and two WIA.

COMMENTARY: Thorough planning, good intelligence, detailed instructions to the combat elements and a simple task organization all contributed to the success ofthe ambush. The heavily-armed Mujahideen

were well-disciplined and controlled. They inflicted maximum losses

on the Soviet column before moving forward to loot. This was very

effective since it maximized their advantage of fighting from well-protected positions against an enemy caught by surprise and trapped in

the open. Perhaps the ambush should have had four elements. The

support group had a combat mission (machine gun support to the

assault group and a logistics mission of ammunition resupply and medical evacuation). Perhaps these missions should have assigned to different groups. Further, the heavy weapons group needed more men.
Chapter 1, Vignette 16 Page 65

Ten men cannot adequately handle four mortars, let alone eight.

The Soviets contributed to their own disaster. The forward security element "cleared" the area by simply driving through it and since

they were not fired on, they assumed that it was safe. This was a

favorite Mujahideen ambush site complete with well-prepared positions. The Mujahideen had conducted several ambushes from this very

site in the past. As a minimum, the Soviets should have sent a force to

destroy the positions prior to the convoy departure. Then, the forward

security element should have dismounted some troops to search the

area for possible ambush and held it until the convoy passed. The forward security element further contributed to the disaster by stopping

within anti-tank weapons range (300-800 meters) in an area where the

terrain restricted vehicular movement and waiting for the convoy to

catch up to it. When the Mujahideen fired on these stationary targets,

the forward security element became a burning blockade which

trapped the convoy. Had the forward security element moved well

ahead ofthe convoy, it would have allowed part ofthe convoy to escape

south and enabled the forward security element to return to provide

fire power to help extricate the trapped vehicles. Had the forward

security element moved off the road to the west and taken up covered

positions out of anti-tank weapons range, it could have provided considerable immediate firepower to the convoy.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY

The Mujahideen conducted ambushes for harassment or for spoils.

Often, harassing ambushes were small-scale ambushes which would

only fire a few rounds into the convoy to destroy or damage some vehicles. Then the ambushers would withdraw without attempting to loot

the column before the convoy commander could react. Ambushes conducted for spoils (weapons, ammunition, food, clothing and other military supplies) were normally conducted by larger forces who could

maintain their positions for up to an hour. Still, the ambush was a

short-term action designed to capitalize on surprise and terrain. Road

blocks, discussed in a later chapter, were designed to fight the enemy

to a standstill and prevent his passage for an extended period of time.

Ambushes for spoils were essential to maintaining the Mujahideen

in the field. Mujahideen were unpaid volunteers. Most of them had

family responsibilities. Normally all captured heavy weapons and

l/5th ofthe spoils went to the commander. The other 4/5ths was divided among the Mujahideen combatants. Many Mujahideen would take
Chapter 1, Vignette 16 Page 66

their captured Kalashnikovs and other trophies to Pakistan where they

would sell them and then give the money to their families to live on.

Although the popular concept of the Mujahideen combatant is a

hardened warrior clutching a Kalashnikov assault rifle, the most

important Mujahideen weapon in the conflict was the RPG-7 anti-tank

grenade launcher. This Soviet-manufactured, short-range weapon

allowed the Mujahideen to knock out tanks, trucks and, occasionally,

helicopters. The RPG was a great equalizer and a great weapon in an

ambush. Although the Mujahideen were light infantry, heavier crewserved weapons gave them more range and staying power in a fight.

Mortars, rockets, recoilless rifles and heavy machine guns were essential to the force that intended to hold its ground for a time against

mechanized Soviet and DRA forces.

The standard Soviet/DRA convoy had a group of armored vehicles at

the front of the convoy, more armored vehicles spaced evenly throughout the convoy and another group of armored vehicles constituting a

rear guard. The convoy might have a helicopter or ground advance

guard or patrol sweep the route prior to movement. Sometimes a minedetection/clearing force would precede the convoy, although mine-clearing was usually the responsibility ofthe unit guarding the road and the

convoy would not start until the unit had given the "all clear."

Sometimes a convoy would have artillery groups move within the

column and "leap-frog" to provide rapid, on-call fire support.

When hit, the convoy's standard reaction was to leave armored

vehicles inside the kill zone to return fire while the trucks drove out of

the kill zone. Ifthe armored vehicles chased the ambushers away, the

convoy would continue. Ifthe armored vehicles could not deal with the

ambush, helicopter gunships could usually drive the ambushers from

their positions. The convoy commander tried to maintain the movement of his convoy and would not usually turn forces around to deal

with ambushes. Sometimes this meant that an ambush would split a

convoy. The Soviets and DRA seldom dismounted infantry to pursue

their ambushers since convoy movement had priority, and they seldom

had enough infantry accompanying the convoy to pursue the

Mujahideen into their neighborhood and overpower them.

The Mujahideen seldom hit the head of a column unless terrain

allowed them to bottle-up the column by doing so. The Mujahideen

preferred to hit the middle of the convoy where there were fewer

armored vehicles. If possible, they tried to seal off the section of convoy they were attacking if they meant to loot it. Mujahideen usually

prepared fighting positions at the ambush site which enabled them to
Chapter 1, Vignette 16 Page 67

withstand fire from enemy armored vehicles and, sometimes, helicopter gunships.

The most successful Mujahideen ambushes organized the ambush

into a heavy weapons support group, flank security groups, an assault

group, and a logistics support/spoils removal group. The best ambushes had a well-understood chain of command and radio communications

between the groups. Following the ambush, the flank security groups

(with an air defense element), covered the withdrawal of the other

groups over a secured withdrawal route.
CHAPTER 2

RAIDS

The raid is a surprise attack designed to seize a point, exploit success and then withdraw. It is a temporary measure to capture equipment, destroy installations, bait traps to draw enemy reactions and

attack morale. The Mujahideen conducted raids as a primary way to

obtain weapons and ammunition—preferably from DRA security posts.

They also conducted raids to demonstrate their ability to attack DRA

and Soviet installations with relative impunity. Raids generally

require fewer supplies than an attack on a strong point since there is

no intention of holding the objective for any length of time following a

raid.

'[ Mazer-e

Sharif

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KABUL V/Asadabad

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Afghanistan

Chapter 2

) Kandahar \S*^ Incidents
Page 70 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

0 1 2 KM

i 1 i

TOTUMDARA

Map 2-1
VIGNETTE 1

RAID ON THE TOTUMDARA SECURITY POST

by Commander Sarshar

The Soviets had a series of security posts protecting the SalangKabul highway. They had one at Totumdara which is eight kilometers

north of Charikar1(Map 2-1 - Totumdara). This post had five armored

vehicles. We mounted a raid on the security post in September 1981.

My base was in Ghorband Canyon. I had 60 Mujahideen armed with

four Goryunov heavy machine guns, two PK medium machine guns,

four RPG-7s, and Kalashnikov rifles. The area around my base is very

mountainous, but also heavily patrolled, so we had to move at night.

We moved from our base over the mountain pass to our staging area at

Ofian-e Sharif. Ofian-e Sharif is about three kilometers south of our

target and it took us six hours to reach it from Ghorband. We had to

carry all our equipment on our backs.

We stayed in Ofian-e Sharif during the day and rested and made

our plan. That night we crossed over to the east into the green zone

and moved into the villages near the target. I positioned 40 of my

Mujahideen to secure our route back into the mountains and to help

carry the gear. The other 20 were my raiding party. I divided these

20 men into a 10-man group for immediate security and a 10-man

assault group. The assault group had two Goryunov heavy machine

guns, two PK medium machine guns, two RPG-7s and some

Kalashnikovs. We attacked the post that same night. We destroyed

two tanks with our RPGs and terrified their infantry with our

Goryunovs. However, the security post was heavily protected by

mines so we could not cross the mine fields to get into the post. The

Soviet security post at Pul-e Matak and the Project security post

(named after the Chinese irrigation project) were on the Totumdara

security post flanks. Both of these posts opened fire on us and we

Commander Sarshar was a police officer in Parwan who worked clandestinely with the

Mujahideen. When his cover was about to be blown, he became a Mujahideen commander in Ghorband. He commanded a mobile group in the Ghorband front near Charikar.

[Map sheet 2887, vie grid 1680].

1 This was part of the Soviet 108th Motorized Rifle Division area of responsibility. At this

time, the division's 285th Tank Regiment was stationed in Charikar while the 177th

Motorized Rifle Regiment was stationed 13 kilometers north at Jabulassarai. The outpost

belonged to one of these two regiments.
Page 72 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

were forced to withdraw. We withdrew to our base in Ghorband by

the same route we came. We had no casualties.

COMMENTARY: The Soviets employed millions of mines in Afghanistan

for installation security, LOC security and area denial. Mine clearing

was a major problem for any Mujahideen attack on a prepared site and

often prevented Mujahideen success. The Mujahideen needed rugged,

light-weight mine detection and clearing gear which would allow them

to clear mines quickly under fire. Often the Mujahideen had to resort

to heaving large rocks to create a path through a minefield.

Attacking parked vehicles is certainly easier than attacking vehicles which are crewed and moving. Apparently the Soviets had not

bothered to create a sandbag wall around their tanks, although an

RPG can penetrate the turret armor of older tanks.

The Mujahideen chose a target flanked by two other outposts that

could bring fire onto their attacking flanks. The flank security elements were close-in elements that merely guarded the flanks and did

nothing to pin the outposts in position. The bridge outpost should have

been an easier target with a better chance of success. This attack also

could have employed a larger force in two phases. The first phase

would be an attack to the flanks to neutralize the flanking fire. The

second phase would then be an attack on the Totumdara post. Such an

attack would require better coordination and discipline than demonstrated.
VIGNETTE 2

CHAMTALA RAID

by Tsaranwal (Attorney) Sher Habib

In June 1982, Commander Sheragai led a group of ten of my

Mujahideen on a successful raid on a DRA outpost on the Chamtala

plain near Highway 2, just north of Kabul. Commander Sheragai

was a Kochi2and a kinsman of a Kochi clan which had its summer

quarters in Paghman and in the areas around Kabul. Some of the

families of the clan pitched their tents in Chamtala plain. There

they tended their flocks of sheep and goats in the grazing lands just

north of Kabul. Their grazing lands were close to a DRA security

outpost. The DRA outpost hindered Mujahideen movement through

the area (Map 2-2 - Chamtala). ^

We decided to raid the DRA outpost. I selected Commander

Sheragai to lead the raid since he could easily gain the full cooperation

of his Kochi clansmen in the area. His group was armed with small

arms. They left our base at Qala-e Hakim in Paghman and walked to

the Chamtala plain. There, Kochi families took the raiding party into

their tents and cared for them. The raiding party stayed with the

nomads for several days while they studied and evaluated the outpost

and prepared for the raid. Commander Sheragai wanted to find an

unmined approach to the outpost, so he asked his kinsmen to move

their flocks to various spots around the outpost so he could probe the

approaches. This went on for three days while Commander Sheragai

picked the most secure approach to the outpost where the terrain

allowed to Mujahideen to sneak up on the outpost unobserved. They

cleared this approach of mines.

On the morning of the raid, the Mujahideen raiders moved to the

target within a herd of sheep. Some Mujahideen posed as shepherds,

while others crawled along in the middle of the grazing sheep. The

herd moved right up to the DRA outpost, but the Mujahideen presence

was never detected or suspected by the DRA guards. The raiding

group spent the whole day in the middle of the sheep herd and found

hiding places. At sunset, the shepherds drove the flock back toward

Tsaranwal (Attorney) Sher Habib commanded the Ibrahimkhel Front north of the city of

Paghman. His primary AOR extended from Paghman east and northeast to Kabul (some

20 kilometers). [Map sheet 2886, vie grid 2369].

2 Kochi are nomadic peoples.
Page 74 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

CHAMTALA

Map 2-2
Chapter 2, Vignette 2 Page 75

the encampment, while the Mujahideen remained behind in hiding

places. One of the things that the Mujahideen had discovered was

when the seven-man security outpost had dinner. One guard was left

on duty while the rest ate their dinner. As dinner was being served,

three Mujahideen crept to the outpost, jumped the guard and disarmed

him. One Mujahideen kept his hand on the mouth of the guard to

prevent him from screaming. Then the rest of the raiding party

swarmed into the outpost. They surprised the rest ofthe DRA soldiers

and captured them all without firing a shot. A DRA lieutenant was

among the prisoners. The Mujahideen took whatever they could carry

and then left for their base with all their prisoners.

COMMENTARY: Kabul and the surrounding area were heavily guarded.

The Soviet 103rd Airborne Division, the 180th and 181st Motorized

Rifle Regiments of the Soviet 108th Motorized Rifle Division, the DRA

8th Infantry Division, the DRA 37th Commando Brigade and the DRA

15th Tank Brigade were all garrisoned in Kabul. Careful reconnaissance, strict camouflage discipline and a clever deception plan enabled

the Mujahideen to carry off this raid. Local assistance from the Kochi

was essential to the plan. The selection of a Kochi commander and his

efforts to gain the cooperation of his kinsmen paid off. The Mujahideen

relied on the local populace for cover, food and water, intelligence, shelter and early warning. The time and effort spent were essential to the

Mujahideen success.

On the other hand, the DRA commander allowed his outpost activities to become routine. The Mujahideen planned the attack when

security was relaxed and captured the outpost without firing a shot or

alerting neighboring garrisons.
VIGNETTE 3

RAID ON BAGRAMI DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS

by Commander Shahabuddin

In July 1983, local units of all seven major factions united to raid

the Bagrami District Headquarters to the southeast of Kabul. (No

Map) We assembled about 250 Mujahideen armed with six 82mm mortars, nine recoilless rifles, and eight RPG-7s. We assembled at my base

at Yakhdara, made our plans and then spread our forces out in the villages. We assigned 100 Mujahideen to route security and posted them

prior to moving our main raiding forces to Bagrami and Qal-e

Ahmadkhan. These towns are in the suburbs just outside of Kabul

and are part of the inner security belt of Kabul. The Bagrami 40-man

assault group had eight RPG-7s, three recoilless rifles and two mortars. They were to attack the district headquarters from three directions. I led the assault group at Qal-e Ahmadkhan. I had 50 men—10

of which I used for flank protection and 40 for the raid. I also attacked

from three directions. As we approach Qal-e Ahmadkhan, we were

stopped by a small outpost. We overran it. Then we attacked one of

the many security outposts in the village. We overran this outpost

killing 25 and capturing eight DRA soldiers. We also captured 14

Kalashnikovs and a telephone set. The Bagrami assault group could

not get close enough to their target to attack it directly, so they shelled

it instead.

COMMENTARY: The DRA. and Soviets surrounded Kabul with a series

of three security belts composed of outposts, minefields and obstacles.

Their purpose was to deny Mujahideen entry into the city and prevent

Mujahideen shelling attacks. The Mujahideen often attacked these

outposts, but could not hold them. The main benefits of the security

belt system to the Mujahideen were these attacks kept a large numbers oftroops tied up in passive security roles, the outposts provided a

source of weapons and ammunition and these attacks affected the

morale of their opponents.

Commander Shahabuddin is from Shewaki Village south of Kabul. There is no map with

this vignette. [Map sheets 2885 and 2886].
VIGNETTE 4

ATTACK ON THE TSAWKEY SECURITY POSTS

by LTC Haji Mohammad Rahim

Tsawkey is a district of Kunar Province. The DBA established a

security post in the Tsawkey High School. This high school security

post provided protection for a section of the Jalalabad to Asadabad

highway. (Map 2-3 - Tsawkey) It was a usual practice of the DRA to

convert public buildings to such uses. I decided to capture this post in

October 1983. I had approximately 70 Mujahideen armed with two

82mm mortars, one DShK and some Enfield rifles. We planned our

battle in our base in the nearby Babur Gorge. Other Mujahideen

joined us from Dawagal. We would attack from three directions—from

the north (high ground), along the road from the northeast and from

the west. We moved from our base at night, deployed and attacked the

target. Our attack lasted 30 minutes. We overran the post but could

not hold it. We killed 11 DRA and captured one. We also captured a

ZGU-1, a DShK and some Kalashnikovs. We had three Mujahideen

KIA and one WIA. We could not hold the security post, so we left it.

There were two DRA security outposts near the Tsawkey District

headquarters. One was in the high school and the other was near the

bridge. We had a contact inside the second post who was a DRA officer—Musa Khan. In June 1985, he helped us capture his security post.

I assembled 50 Mujahideen armed with an RPG-7, Kalashnikovs and

Enfields. We came during the night from our base in Babur Valley and

followed the road bank to the southwest. We approached the post at

dawn from the high ground to the north. Our contact led us inside.

Most of the soldiers were asleep and we wanted to capture them.

However, some of our Mujahideen were not very quiet and the detail

woke up and started fighting us. We killed seven of the security detail

and captured one. We also captured one PK medium machine gun, 12

Kalashnikovs and ammunition. The firing alerted the other enemy

unit in the Tsawkey high school. They sent a detachment to the outpost, but I had posted a security element on the road. This security element blocked the movement of the detachment and covered our withdrawal. We all withdrew up to our base in the mountains. I had one

Mujahideen wounded.

LTC Haji Mohammad Rahim was an officer in the Afghan Army who became a Mujahideen

and led a group in Kunar Province. [Map sheet 3186, vie grid 7640].
Page 78 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 2, Vignette 4 Page 79

COMMENTARY: Less than 15% ofthe Mujahideen commanders had previous military experience, yet the impact ofthe military who joined the

Mujahideen was significant. They provided a continuity, an understanding of military planning and issues, a modicum of uniform training and an ability to deal with outside agencies providing aid to the

Mujahideen. On the other hand, these were fairly soft targets. The

security outposts were situated in existing buildings backed by wooded high ground. The Mujahideen had concealed approaches and exits

as well as inside help.
Page 80 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

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VIGNETTE 5

RAID ON PUL-E CHARKHI RADIO TRANSMITTER STATION

by Major Sher Aqa Kochay and others

In June 1984, Provincial NIFA leader Wali Khan issued orders to

Major Sher Aqa Kochay, the commander of a NIFA base in Sewak

(about 20 kilometers southeast of Kabul). Major Aqa would join two

other regional commanders—Haji Hussein Jan of Narey Oba and

Sayed Hasan Khan of Khak-e Jabar—in a raid on a radio transmitter

station. The transmitter was located near Pul-e Charkhi (20 kilometers east of Kabul city) and the raid would take place on the night of

26 June. The Soviet-backed Afghan government was expanding the

transmitter facility which would reach wider audiences inside and outside the country. The station used local broadcasts as well as programs

produced in the Soviet Union.3

The transmitter station was located in Pul-e Charkhi near a military complex which included the DRA 15th Tank Brigade, DRA 10th

field Engineer Regiment and some other units, (see Map 16a - Qafus 1,

Chapter 1 and Map 2-4 - Pul-e Charkhi.) Further to the east, between

Butkhak and Sarobi, a government-paid militia force patrolled the

area and protected the power lines and pylons that supplied electricity from Naghlo Dam through Sarobi to Kabul. The militia was recruited from the local tribe of the Karokhel clan of Ahmadzai Pushtuns.

Their chief was Hasan Khan Karokhel. On the surface, Hasan Khan

was a government supporter. But he was actually a major Mujahideen

collaborator. He provided the Mujahideen with logistic support, sheltered their resistance fighters and even provided medical care to

Mujahideen wounded at regime medical institutions.4

Principally based on an interview with Major Sher Aqa Kochay in Peshawar on September

14, 1996. Other sources include NIFA documents about the battle, Ali Jalali's discussions

with Hasan Khan Karokhel in 1986 in Peshawar, his interviews with the late Wali Khan

Karokhel (NIFA's provincial military commander of Kabul) in Peshawar and Islamabad in

1984 and 1986 and interviews with General Abdul Rahim Wardak. [Map sheet 2886, vie

grid 3221].

3

The Soviet Union and their clients in Kabul were also engaged in jamming international

broadcasts beamed to Afghanistan. Afghans considered such broadcasts the only source

of objective and uncensored news to the country. The jamming was done at other sites.

4

In fact NIFA's provincial commander, Wali Khan Karokhel, was the brother of Hasan

Khan Karokhel. Hasan Khan Karokhel had his headquarters in Mulla Omar, the ancestral

home of the Karokhel chiefs.
Page 82 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

According to the plan, Mujahideen from the three bases would

assemble at Mulla Omar for final instructions prior to the raid. By the

afternoon of 26 June, all three groups were in Mulla Omar. Major Sher

Aqa and Haji Hussein Jan had each brought 30 men from their bases

in Sewak and Narey Oba. Sayed Hasan Khan came with a 50-man

unit from Khak-e Jabar.

Wali Khan Karokhel issued the final instructions. Major Sher Aqa

was appointed the overall commander ofthe raiding group. He divided

his force into four teams. A 20-man assault team, commanded by Haji

Hussein Jan, carried automatic rifles, light machine guns and RPG-7

antitank grenade launchers. Their mission was to attack the transmitter from the southwest, destroy the facility and then withdraw

under the cover of the support group.

Major Sher Aqa's 20-man support team would cover the assault

team from positions in a ditch immediately to the east of the target.

The group had one 82mm mortar, a single barrel 107mm rocket

launcher (BM-1), a PK medium machine gun, a few RPG-7s and AK-47

assault rifles. Major Sher Aqa decided to stay with this team since it

would be the last to pull-out.

Sayed Hasan Khan commanded a 25 to 30-man containment team.

They were armed with small arms and RPG-7s. They would block the

Pul-e Charkhi-Butkhak road on the east bank of Kabul River and prevent the enemy forces from reaching the target. The rest of the

Mujahideen were assigned as supply and evacuation elements to help

the other groups.

Major Aqa decided to launch the assault at midnight. Since it is

Hasan Khan later cooperated with the Mujahideen in a major action in 1984 He sheltered, guided and supported a NIFA force which blew up all the electric pylons between

Butkhak and Sarobi. This cut off electrical power to Kabul for a long time. "Operation

Black-out" marked the end of Hasan Khan's service as the head of the government militia

and he, along with his family and 400 followers, migrated to Pakistan and continued his

struggle against the Soviet-backed regime from there. Hazhir Teimourian reported on this

in The Times of London on 31 August 1984.

Wali Khan, Hasan Khan's brother, remained NIFA's provincial leader in Kabul until

1986. Afterwards, he acted independently mostly in the anti Communist political movement outside the country. After the Soviet withdrawal, he joined the Council of Solidarity

and Understanding-^ movement of Afghan intellectuals campaigning for creation of a

moderate government in Afghanistan. The movement, and particularly Wali Khan Karokhel

supported the restoration of the former King of Afghanistan as a person who would serve

as a symbol of unity among the fractionalized Afghan Resistance. Wali Khan was assassinated in 1994 on the road between Peshawar and Islamabad by yet unidentified gunmen

Some speculation points to his political enemies among the extremist Islamic groups as the

perpetrators of the murder.
Chapter 2, Vignette 5 Page 83

about 15 kilometers from Mulla Omar to the site and since the raiding

party had to bypass a Soviet unit deployed in Gazak, the departure

time was set at dusk (about 2000 hours). The party would move from

Mulla Omar through Gazak to reassemble briefly at Lewano Randow.

The Mujahideen force moved out in small groups following each other

on the same route all the way to Lewano Kandow. A pair of reconnaissance patrols moved on the flanks and one moved to the front of

the column—keeping within voice contact distance.

When the force reached a water spring at the Lewano Kandow, Major

Sher Aqa issued the last coordinating instructions and ordered the

groups to open fire when he did. This would signal the start of the raid.

From their Lewano Kandow assembly area, the different elements of the

raiding party moved separately toward their designated areas.

Just before midnight, all groups were in place. Everything was

quiet around the transmitter site. At Major Sher Aqa's signal, the

assault team opened fire on the site and began the attack. The support

team covered their advance. RPG rounds set the wooden buildings on

fire and soon fire swept the site. The defenders at the site panicked

and failed to put up an organized resistance. The assault team overran the site, killed several soldiers, captured five Kalashnikov assault

rifles and demolished the transmitter station.

The DRA quickly responded by moving a tank column from the Pule Charkhi garrison to the site. The column crossed the bridge over the

Kabul River but then left the main road and bypassed the Mujahideen

blocking positions established by the containment (holding) team of

Sayed Hasan Khan. The tanks, driving with their headlights off, cut

across the plain to the east of the Mujahideen, cutting off their escape

route. A young Mujahideen named Babrak hit one tank with an RPG7 rocket and set it on fire. But the rest of the column moved swiftly to

the south-west.

Fearing encirclement, the containment (holding) team and the

assault team immediately broke contact and, without notifying Major

Sher Aqa, pulled out toward the Lewano Kandow, leaving the support

team behind. As Commander Sher Aqa was desperately trying to establish contact with the other teams, he heard tanks moving to the rear of

his position. By this time, all electric lights in the area were extinguished, but the transmitter station continued to burn brightly. The

Mujahideen and the DRA tank column both used the fire for orientation.

Facing a threatening situation, Major Sher Aqa instructed his men

not to panic but to exfiltrate individually through the intervals

between the tanks. Using masking terrain, his Mujahideen managed
Page 84 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

to exfiltrate and move to the designated assembly area at Lewano

Randow. As they straggled in, they found that the assault and containment teams along with supply and evacuation personnel were

already waiting there. Major Sher Aqa discovered that all the groups,

except his support group, had withdrawn when the enemy tank column

arrived. All Mujahideen reached Lewano Randow by 0200.

Mujahideen casualties were six wounded—one from the supporting

team who died on the way back, two from the assault team and three

from the containment team. It was not safe for the Mujahideen to

move further, since daybreak would be in two hours and the Mujaideen

would once again have to bypass the Soviet force at Grazak. The raid

on Pul-e Charkhi would clearly have alerted the Soviets to the presence of a Mujahideen force in their area.

Two groups, Haji Hussein Jan's detachment and Sayed Hasan

Rhan's party, decided to stay during the day in the Lewano Randow

mountain since they could not reach their bases during the remaining hours of the night. Major Sher Aqa's group, along with the

wounded, moved forward to Mulla Omar. This was only possible

since Hasan Rhan Rarokhel had sent trucks to Lewano Randow to

carry the wounded and other Mujahideen to safety before daybreak.

The trucks, posing as militia patrols trying to hunt down the raiding force, took these Mujahideen to Mulla Omar where they were

taken care of and medical personnel were summoned from Rabul

who tended to the wounded. The next night, the Mujahideen groups

returned to their bases and sent the body of the one dead warrior to

his family for burial.

COMMENTARY: The assistance extended by the Rarokhel militia contributed markedly to the Mujahideen success. Such assistance was

essential for actions conducted around a strongly defended city like

Rabul. From 1980 to 1984, the militia helped many Mujahideen infiltrate into Rabul before defecting en masse to the resistance. Their

assistance was particularly important in suporting the withdrawal of

Mujahideen strike groups at the end of an action. Such inside help

made it possible for a force of more than 100 to launch a raid right in

the heart ofthe enemy stronghold. Ideally, a much smaller group, like

a 15-man team, would have been more appropriate to the task. But the

Mujahideen preferred to move in large groups. Large groups could

carry heavy loads, provide needed labor in the field and carry and

escort the wounded and dead. Many Mujahideen felt more comfortable

having their relatives or close friends with them.
Chapter 2, Vignette 5 Page 85

Lack of reliable internal communications among the Mujahideen

combat teams led to a situation that could have turned disastrous. The

containment team did not contain the DRA tanks and pulled out immediately after it saw the tanks bypass its position. The group helped the

assault team during the assault, but this was not their assigned mission. Had the group laid anti-tank mines in areas that the enemy

tanks had to pass over— particularly in the vicinity of the bridge over

the Kabul River and the river fords—it could have delayed the tank

column and allowed them to engage it more effectively. This would

have prevented the enveloping movement that almost encircled the

whole Mujahideen contingent.

Apparently, the DRA had not developed and rehearsed contingency

plans to deal with such a raid. This, and luck, helped the Mujahideen

escape heavy casualties. A more active reaction by the DRA could easily

have jeopardized the concentration of a sizeable Mujahideen force in an

area totally controlled by Soviet/DRA forces. Relying on tanks, the

enemy failed to deploy infantry with the tanks. Infantry are more effective in the dark against guerrillas and provide protection to the tanks

against anti-tank gunners. At the same time, the Mujahideen failed to

take advantage of the tank column's vulnerability and use their RPG-7s

at close distance against the unprotected tanks. The Mujahideen had the

opportunity to kill more than the one tank they actually destroyed.

Fear of being cut off inhibited much ofthe Mujahideen action after

they successfully destroyed the transmitter. However, through good

leadership, Major Sher Aqa turned a threatening tactical situation into

a more manageable one and succeeded in pulling his men out through

the tank cordon.
Page 86 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

"t $ -

PUL

-

1E

KHUSHK

CHELTAN

Map 2-5
VIGNETTE 6

RAID FROM CHELTAN ON OUTPOSTS IN THE KABUL SUBURBS

by Commander Asil Khan

Kabul was surrounded by three security belts made up of security outposts manned by Soviet and DRA forces. A battalion from the

DRA 8th Infantry Division garrisoned the old highway construction

headquarters, commonly known as "the company," in the western

suburbs of Kabul. The battalion also guarded a number of government supply depots located across the highway to the west. The

battalion built security outposts on the Khwaja Pushta hills in the

south. The battalion protected all its installations with mine fields

except for the outposts on the hills. This made all the other installations too difficult to attack in the dark.

I commanded a joint 200 Mujahideen detachment made up from

local resistance units affiliated with NIFA, HIK and Etehad-e Islami

(IUA). According to our agreed plan, we were to move from our bases

around Cheltan and converge on the target area in the dark. We

would continually shell the main battalion camp and the depots,

while the assault groups would attack the Khwaja Pushta hill

outposts (Map 2-5 - Cheltan).

In the late afternoon of 1 June 1985, I led my NIFA Mujahideen

from our base at Morghgiran. We arrived near the target after 2000

hours. We deployed for battle according to plan. I established blocking positions at Asia-e Beni and Pul-e Khushk and deployed about 20

Mujahideen at each position. I positioned one 82mm mortar with its

five-man crew and two 82mm recoilless rifles (each with a five-man

crew) at Asia-e Beni to shell the enemy battalion.

The raid began around 2100 hours and lasted until 2300 hours.

Our heavy weapons kept the enemy battalion and the depot forces

pinned in place. The enemy responded with artillery fire but made no

attempt to counter with infantry or tanks. No enemy helicopters

responded throughout the raid. This lack of response left the tactical

initiative in my hands. We easily overran the enemy outposts on the

Khwaja Pushta hills and captured weapons and a radio set. Most of

the DRA soldiers ran away. At one outpost, we killed two enemy soldiers and wounded another. We had no casualties. We pulled out

before midnight and the force split up and returned to their bases.

Asil Khan was a NIFA commander and a famed guerrilla commander in the Kabul area.

[Map sheets 2885 and 2886].
Page 88 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

COMMENTARY: Throughout the war, Soviet and DRA forces were reluctant to respond aggressively to Mujahideen night attacks. Unless the

Soviet and DRA forces had planned and rehearsed a counter-attack

drill, they rarely left the relative safety of their prepared positions to

deal with Mujahideen night attacks. This encouraged the Mujahideen

to harass the enemy continuously at night and to attack the weakest

points of their defenses. Often, the Mujahideen boldly attacked areas

adjacent to large forces. These security posts were out of supporting

range of other posts, so the DRA refusal to react to the attack practically handed the outpost to the Mujahideen.

However, the Mujahideen could not fully exploit their enemy's

reluctance to fight at night to achieve decisive tactical results. The

Mujahideen could not readily penetrate the heavily-mined zones

surrounding Soviet and DRA positions. As long as the Soviet/DRA

forces felt no serious threat from isolated Mujahideen night attacks,

they preferred to respond by artillery fire instead of risking stumbling

into an ambush. The Soviet and DRA response came in the form of

well-planned major cordon and search operations in those areas where

the Mujahideen had gained an upper hand.
VIGNETTE 7

RAID ON MAHIPAR OUTPOSTS

by Commander Wazir Gul

In July 1984 three groups of Mujahideen combined to raid

Soviet/DRA security outposts on the main Kabul-Jalalabad highway.

(Map 2-6 - Mahipar) Highway 1 at Mahipar passes through a deep

gorge, with the river flowing immediately to the north of the road

and with a steep ridge rising on the south. Other than the highway,

the main access to Mahipar is through Mulla Omar Dara, a mountain valley connecting Mulla Omar Village with Highway 1. At that

time, the DRA had a militia unit headquartered at Mulla Omar. The

DRA militia commander was Hasan Khan Karokhel, the local

Ghilzai Pashtun chieftain. Hasan Khan was also a secret collaborator with the Mujahideen. He helped facilitate our movements and

combat against Soviet/DRA forces in the area.

My group reached Mulla Omar in the evening after a day march

from our base at Tangi Tezin. There, we were joined by two NIFA

commanders, Captain Afghan of Deh Sabz, and Sayed Hasan Khan of

Khak-e Jabar. All together, we had 80 Mujahideen armed with AK-47s

and .303 Enfield rifles, five BM-ls, four 82mm recoilless rifles, four

82mm mortars, two DShKs and 13 RPG-7s. We planned our combined

action at Mulla Omar and moved out the next morning toward

Mahipar over Lataband mountain. We had packed our heavy weapons

on mules. There were three chief components in our combined force—

two fire support groups and an assault group. Each fire support group

had BM-ls and 82mm mortars. Their mission was to attack and pin

down the DRA base on the left flank and the Soviet base on the right

flank. The assault group consisted ofthree teams. Each assault team

had a designated outpost to attack. Each assault team had RPGs and

recoilless rifles to support their attack.

In order to minimize the daylight available to the enemy's aircraft,

we began our attack at 1600. We knew it would take several hours for

them to respond. Our heavy weapons pounded the flanking bases to

isolate the attack area. The assault teams began to fire on the security posts and slowly move forward. The attack on the security posts

was hindered by enemy mines and it took several hours for the

Commander Wazir Gul was affiliated with Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan (JIA) of Burhanuddin

Rabbani. His base was in Tezin southwest of Sarobi. He fought in the Sarobi, Lataband

and Mahipar areas. [Map sheet 2986, vie grid 4723].
Page 90 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 2, Vignette 7 Page 91

Mujahideen to overrun the outposts after heavy clashes. By 2100, the

DRA soldiers manning the outposts were either killed or had escaped.

We took one tank crew prisoner.

The Soviet base and outposts further down the road could not

support the embattled DRA outposts. But as we pulled out, the

Soviet base began heavy fire on the withdrawing Mujahideen

groups. Their fire had little effect in the dark. We destroyed two

tanks, killed nine enemy soldiers and captured three DShKs, six AK47 rifles and a large amount of ammunition. Two Mujahideen were

wounded in the battle. We spent the night at Mulla Omar and

returned to our bases the next day.

COMMENTARY: The terrain here is very restrictive and rugged. The

Soviet/DRA bases and outposts were all in the canyon. The

Soviets/DRA surrendered the initiative in this area and trusted that

the difficulty in crossing the rugged terrain, coupled with their

bunkers and field fortifications, would protect these sites from the

Mujahideen. There were a series of three security outposts along the

road: two on the high ground on both sides of the gorge and the other

on the road. The purpose of security outposts was to protect bridges,

hydroelectric installations, dams and block the side valleys. The outposts on the high ground were not high enough to interfere with

Mujahideen freedom of action. There were a few observation posts on

the high peaks but they were not effective, particularly at night. The

security outposts on the high ground were mostly manned by DRA or

militia which lacked training and were in fact prisoners in their mineprotected enclaves. The Mujahideen could easily bypass them—particularly at night. The Soviets/DRA had mined the main approaches to

the gorge, but given the steep nature ofthe approaches, the mines usually washed away when it rained. The Mujahideen often used such

steep areas to descend to the highway.

The Mujahideen, on the other hand, saw this set up as an excellent

opportunity to punish their opponent, pick up some weapons and

resupply ammunition. The Mujahideen developed a standard pattern

for attacking outposts along this road. They would attack late in the

afternoon to minimize the effectiveness of air strikes and artillery.

They would fire rockets and mortars at the main base camps on both

flanks of the target area to seal the area and hold the attention of the

base camps so that they would not interfere with the main attack.

Then they would launch the attack against the outposts which were

mostly manned by ill-trained, poorly-motivated conscript DRA. The
Page 92 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

DRA had little stomach for the fight and, once the Mujahideen got

through the minefields surrounding the outposts, the Mujahideen

would strip the outposts of everything they could carry and disappear

into the night. The Mujahideen would usually offer DRA prisoners the

opportunity to serve as labor service with the Mujahideen or simply

turn them loose. The Mujahideen felt that the conscript DRA soldier

had little choice in the fight. DRA officers were kept prisoner until

they could be tried by field tribunal. The Mujahideen felt fairly secure

from sallies from the base camps at night. Soviet and DRA reaction

was mainly limited to area shelling and bombing.
VIGNETTE 8

RAID ON LATABAND SECURITY OUTPOSTS

by Commander Wazir Gul

There are two highways between Kabul and Sarobi. The northern

highway is the newer one and is part of Highway 1—the main highway

ofAfghanistan. The older Kabul-Sarobi highway runs roughly parallel to Highway 1, some four-ten kilometers to the south. A series of

Soviet and DRA security bases and outposts protected both highways.

In September 1985, several Mujahideen groups combined to conduct a

raid on the Soviet/DRA security outposts in the Lataband pass east of

Kabul (Map 2-7 - Lataband). Lataband is located on the old KabulSarobi highway. The Lataband pass was protected by a Soviet base at

Mulla Omar in the west, and a DRA Sarandoy base at Lataband in the

east. The area between the two bases was protected by several security outposts manned by DRA military detachments.

My group's base was in Zandeh Kalay which is some 25 kilometers

south of the pass. I planned the attack at the base. We left the base at

1500 and moved to the Tezin Valley where we spent the night. We carried our supplies and ammunition on mules. Once we got to the Tezin

Valley, I met with the commanders of other groups and we coordinated

our attack. The total strength of the combined Mujahideen force was

about 150 fighters. We left what we did not need for immediate combat at Tezin and moved out toward our targets. We brought the mules

with us. There were three chief components in our combined force—

two fire support groups and an assault group. Each fire support group

had heavy weapons (three BM-1, four DShK, three 82mm mortars).

Their mission was to attack and pin down the Soviet base at Mulla

Omar and the Sarandoy base at Lataband. The assault group had

twelve RPG-7s and four 82mm recoilless rifles. The assault group was

composed of three 20-man teams. Each 20-man team had a designated enemy outpost to attack.

We moved into position. In order to minimize the daylight available to the enemy's aircraft, we decided to start our attack in the late

afternoon. We began the attack at 1600 with heavy fire on the bases

at Mulla Omar and Lataband. Meanwhile, the assault teams occupyCommander Wazir Gul was affiliated with Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan (JIA) of Burhanuddin

Rabbani. His base was in Tezin southwest of Sarobi. He fought in the Sarobi, Lataband

and Mahipar areas. [Map sheets 2985 and 2986vic grid 5618].
Page 94 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 2, Vignette 8 Page 95

ing the high ground south of the Lataband pass began to fire on the

enemy outposts below. The shelling confused the enemy as the three

teams ofthe assault group approached their outposts and launched the

attack. The battle continued into the evening and the assault teams

overran the enemy outposts. As the Mujahideen approached the outposts, most of the DRA soldiers ran away and left behind an enormous

amount of ammunition and other equipment. We loaded what we

could on our mules and hauled it away. The enemy responded by saturating the area in and around the outposts with artillery fire and air

attacks. We lost two mules to artillery fire and so withdrew at 2100.

We suffered personnel losses. The losses in my own group were one

KIA and six WIA. We captured two DRA soldiers and lots of ammunition and supplies.

COMMENTARY: The isolated highway security posts were extremely

vulnerable to attacks by Mujahideen who controlled the surrounding

high ground. The Soviets/DRA had insufficient intelligence or surveillance in the immediate region. Furthermore, their contingency plans

to reinforce outposts or to react swiftly against Mujahideen attacks

were lacking or poorly executed. The forces in the bases seemed to

have a severe case of "bunker mentality" and passively sat out the

Mujahideen shelling and attack on the outposts. The Soviets and DRA

seemed particularly reluctant to move and fight at night. The

Mujahideen exploited this reluctance. Air support apparently was

slow in coming and was not very accurate at night.

In this example, the Soviet/DRA base forces waited until the outposts were overrun and the Mujahideen were withdrawing before they

reacted. They reacted with artillery and air strikes—not maneuver

forces. The DRA in the outposts were left to their own devices. The

DRA forces were generally ill-trained and had poor morale. Most ofthe

DRA soldiers had been press-ganged into the army and had no desire

to fight their countrymen. Therefore, the DRA soldiers were more

interested in escaping than in stubborn defense and were quite willing

to abandon the ammunition and supplies of the outpost to the attacking Mujahideen. The Mujahideen preferred to attack DRA outposts for

this reason.

Mujahideen dependence on these types of raids for weapons and

ammunition cost them casualties. The Soviets and DRA reacted with

artillery and air strikes when they could, but they did not continue

them all night long. This gave the Mujahideen the option of immediately entering the camp to seize what material they could and then
Page 96 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

leaving to get far away before dawn or waiting for the artillery to subside and then leaving with less time until daylight. Both courses

entailed risk.
VIGNETTE 9

RAID ON OUTPOSTS AT WRESHMIN GORGE

by Commander Wazir Gul

During October 1985, Mujahideen factions took turns blocking

the Kabul-Jalalabad highway at Wreshmin Tangay (gorge) between

Dabili and Dargo bridges (Map 2-8 - Wreshmin). My mission was to

block the highway for eight days. At that time, I commanded 70

Mujahideen. We were armed with five BM-ls, two BM-12s, four

82mm recoilless rifles, two ZGU-ls, three 82mm mortars and many

RPG-7s. In order to block the highway, I had to remove enemy security posts along that stretch of road. I moved my force from Manay

in Hisarak to the Tsapar (Capar) mountain where I refined my

battle plan. Since there are limited access routes into the area and

since the area near the highway was heavily mined, I decided to

launch the initial attack against the flanks ofthe area we were going

to block, i.e. against the Dabili bridge in the west and the Dargo

bridge in the east. These two places are relatively accessible from

the mountains in the south. After destroying the road bridges at

these two points, I planned to isolate the area and continue the

attack down the highway against the security outposts. The highway approach was best since the highway itself was not mined.

I divided my detachment into two groups and moved them to Dabili

and Dargo. I kept a reserve centrally located to the rear between the

two attacking groups. The two groups approached the target at night.

The next day, they captured the Dabili and Dargo bridges by swift

attacks. They immediately destroyed the bridges with explosives.

This isolated the area. Then, the two groups attacked down the road

(to avoid the DRA minefields) from the opposite directions. They eventually overran 16-17 small Soviet/DRA security outposts located on the

road. Then they turned around to consolidate their success and reinforced the defenses at the east and west flanks of the blockade.

During the next eight days, the Soviets and DRA tried to reopen the

highway, but failed. Their air strikes and artillery were generally ineffective due to the narrowness ofthe canyon. The enemy sent a column

from Jalalabad to force the road, but we stopped them in the narrow

confines around Dargo bridge and they had to withdraw. We spent the

Commander Wazir Gul was affiliated with Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan (JIA) of Burhanuddin

Rabbani. His base was in Tezin southwest of Sarobi. He fought in the Sarobi, Lataband

and Mahipar areas. [Map sheets 2985, 2986, vie grid 7617 to 8317].
Page 98 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

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Chapter 2, Vignette 9 Page 99

eight days stripping all the ammunition, weapons and supplies out of

the bases and outposts. We hauled the spoils of war into the mountains. We captured about 100 weapons and an enormous amount of

ammunition. At the end of our eight days, I withdrew my detachment

and we returned to our base. I lost six KIA and 18 WIA or about 30%

of my force. Enemy losses were heavier and included some 50 killed or

wounded and 24 soldiers captured.

COMMENTARY: The terrain played a major role in shaping the battle.

The Soviets/DRA controlled the ribbon of highway running through a

narrow gorge, while the Mujahideen controlled the surrounding mountains whenever they wanted to. The Mujahideen had the freedom to

choose the time and place to raid dozens of security outposts sprinkled

along the treacherous highway snaking through the very narrow

canyon in Mahipar and the Wreshmin Tangay. In the Wreshmin

Tangay, virtually all Mujahideen groups habitually first attacked the

two main bridges i.e. Dabili and Dargo. Then, after destroying the

bridges, they would attack the rest of the security posts from both

ends. This method proved to be the most effective one given the terrain, minefields, enemy dispositions and Mujahideen capabilities.
Page 100 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

ALINGAR

Map 2-9

GHULAMALI QALA

| rr^ / BRIDGE POST

I

I

TO ALINGAR TOWN

0.5 KM
VIGNETTE 10

RAID ON THE BRIDGE POST IN ALINGAR

by Doctor Abdul Qudus Alkozai and Commander Haji Sidiqullah

In February 1986, Commander Abdul Qudus Alkozai led a group of

15 Mujahideen on a raid of a government post near the center of the

Alingar District in Laghman Province. The post overlooked a bridge

on the Alingar River near Barwai Village, some four kilometers north

of Alingar. The bridge outpost was located within a walled enclosure

and included covered firing positions and parapets. The post included

a one-room guard house for the six soldiers who manned the post. The

outpost was part of a security belt protecting the district center against

Mujahideen attacks. There were several other outposts in the area

established in individual houses and fort-like structures. Among them

were Ghulamali Qala to the north and Yawar Qala and Sahebgul Qala

to the south of the bridge post. They were about 150-200 meters apart

(Map 2-9 Alingar).

My guerrilla raiding party left its base in a nearby village at 2200

hours on a dark, cold, rainy winter night. Moving north to the objective, I dropped a two-man observation/security party opposite the

Sahebgul Qala outpost. I posted another two-man observation/ security party outside the Yawar Qala outpost and a final two-man observation/security party alongside the road to the bridge. They were to pin

down any forces which attempted to come to the aid of the bridge outpost. My eight remaining Mujahideen and I were armed with eight

automatic rifles and one RPG-7. We moved to the bridge and deployed

in the cover of a roadside ditch. We completely blocked the western

approach to the bridge.

My plan was to remain in the ditch until the soldiers at the outpost opened the door of the guard house to relieve the sentry. Then,

using the light coming from the opened door to guide on, We would

jump over the low (one-meter) outpost enclosure wall, storm the post

and kill the occupants.

We waited for two miserable hours in the cold rain, but nothing

happened inside the outpost. Finally, I decided to take the initiative.

Haji Sidiqullah was the Provincial Military Commander of the HIH party in Laghman. He

joined Hekmatyar in the fight against Daoud-before the communist revolution. He had no

formal military education. Dr. Abdul Qudus was a guerrilla commander under Sidiqullah.

He doubled as the force medic, since he received medic's training in Pakistan. [Map sheet

3086, vie grid 2455].
Page 102 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

I directed three men to. move quietly to the post, jump over the wall

and attack the sentry. Then, as soon as the other soldiers started to

come out of the guard house, we would rush the guard house and

demand their surrender.

I positioned the RPG-7 where it could hit the guard house and told

the gunner not to fire if he heard his comrades telling the soldiers to

surrender (surrender was the code word). I instructed him to open fire

if the enemy initiated contact and opened fire on us.

At about 0100, my three-men party approached the outpost. One

man covered the team while the other two jumped over the wall. One

ofthese Mujahideen landed squarely on the back ofthe sleeping enemy

sentry. The sentry was wrapped in a blanket and sound asleep, but

when my Mujahideen landed on him, he woke up and began to shout.

My panicked Mujahideen opened fire and killed the sentry.

Anticipating the reaction of the guards, one Mujahideen tossed a hand

grenade into the door of the guard room. As it exploded, they rushed

into the structure. My RPG gunner heard the commotion, but did not

hear his comrades demanding the enemy surrender. Since the code

word was not used, my RPG gunner assumed that the enemy had overwhelmed his comrades and therefore opened fire on the guard house.

The RPG-7 rocket ripped through the wall of the guard house,

killing two soldiers and seriously injuring one ofmy Mujahideen standing nearby. This changed the situation drastically. My wounded

Mujahideen was calling for help and his comrades stopped to evacuate

him. As soon as my other Mujahideen saw their comrades stop to

attend to their fallen comrade, they also stopped their attack. I called

off the raid and ordered a withdrawal. As we withdrew, my security

teams rejoined us and we returned to our base.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen timing for the raid was ideal.

Inclement weather and night movement covered their approach. The

enemy guard was even asleep. This lack of enemy alertness was not

unusual. The DRA and Soviets usually failed to deploy foot patrols at

night between their outposts. There was also little tactical and fire

coordination between outposts. This passivity at night resulted in a

bunker mentality among the Soviet/DRA soldiers manning isolated

security outposts and allowed the Mujahideen freedom of movement

and the chance to own the night and conduct their hit and run raids.

Lack of control ofthe raiding party at the objective foiled an otherwise skillfully-planned action. What went wrong was a combination of

Murphy's law, a lack of precombat rehearsals and a lack of a regular
Chapter 2, Vignette 10 Page 103

chain of command. Landing on a sleeping soldier was bad luck, but dry

rehearsals would have exercised the option of an approach being discovered and provided for the continuation of the attack while wounded

are being evacuated. Since the force commander did not have communication with his RPG gunner, he needed the firm, positive control that

a subordinate leader, located with the RPG gunner, could have provided. Lack of communication, subordinate leadership and fire coordination at the objective cost the Mujahideen a tactical victory.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY

The Mujahideen raid depended on surprise and quick execution.

Raids produced needed weapons, ammunition and equipment. They

also proved a good way to destroy DRA or Soviet security posts and

sites. A well-organized raid had an assault force, a fire support group

and a security element. Portable radios were needed to coordinate the

raiding elements, but all too often the Mujahideen lacked these radios.

The Mujahideen primary obstacle in a raid was to get past the mine

fields which the Soviets and DRA emplaced around their security posts

and sites. The Mujahideen launched most oftheir raids at night. They

did so to prevent being hit by effective air or artillery strikes and to

avoid further contact with DRA or Soviet forces which were reluctant

to leave their garrisons at night.
CHAPTER 3

SHELLING ATTACKS

Mujahideen shelling attacks on garrisons, outposts, airfields and

cities were a daily event. The Mujahideen usually used mortars, rockets and recoilless rifles in these attacks. Sometimes they used mountain guns and howitzers. The objective was to harrass their foes and

destroy war material. Mujahideen gunners learned to construct multiple firing sites and to fire and then quickly displace before DRA or

Soviet artillery or aviation could respond effectively. When possible,

Mujahideen would keep water near their firing sites to dampen the

ground behind the rocket or recoilless rifle. This would help curb the

amount of tell tale dust raised by the backblast of the ordnance. The

Soviets and DRA tried to curb these attacks with counterbattery fires,

rapid reaction forces and ambushes. Due to their routine nature, the

Mujahideen did not usually discuss these unless the interviewer

probed. The Mujahideen considered these as usually rather dull

events that did not bear retelling. The following attacks, however,

were hardly dull events.

1 /[ Mazer-e\/

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Afghanistan

Chapter 3

Incidents
Page 106 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
VIGNETTE 1

A SHELLING ATTACK TURNS BAD

by Mawlawi Shukur Yasini

In the spring of 1981, the Soviets and DRA were very active in

our area. As a result, we dismantled our permanent bases and

changed them to mobile bases scattered throughout the area. I

intended to launch a major show of force against the Soviets using

my mobile bases. I had two mortars—a 60mm and an 82mm. The

problem with the 60mm mortar is that it only has a range of 1,400

meters, so the gunner has to get close to the target to use it. I also

had two DShK machine guns, and five RPG-7s. I kept these heavy

weapons at my base at Gerdab. My men had small arms which they

kept with them.

On 17 April 1981,1 launched a shelling attack against the Soviet

66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade in Samarkhel. I only took 42

men with me since we were not very well equipped and we were not

ready for a major encounter with superior forces. Further, Kama

District is right across the river from the 66th Brigade garrison and

they kept the area under constant surveillance. I did not want to

move a large group of men through the area and alert them. To

avoid observation, we went north from Gerdab into the mountains

and then west across the mountains and into Mamakhel Village in

the Kama area (Map 3-1 - Dargo). We stayed for three nights in

Mamakhel and spent the days in the mountains at Dargo China

spring—some three kilometers away. From Mamakhel, we went to

Mawlawi Shukur Yasini is a prominent religious leader in Nangrahar Province. He is from

the village of Gerdab in Kama District northeast of Jalalabad. During the war, he was a

major commander of the Khalis group (HIK). Later, he joined NIFA. During the war, he

took television journalist Dan Rather to his base in Afghanistan. He also accompanied

Congressman Charles Wilson of Texas into Afghanistan several times. During most of the

war he was active in his own area, fighting the DRA in Jalalabad and the Soviet 66th

• Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade at Samarkhel. He became a member of the Nangrahar

governing council after collapse of the communist regime—a position he held until the

Taliban advance in September 1996. [Map sheet 3185].

One day, three Soviet soldiers from the 66th Brigade crossed the Kabul River for a

picnic. They were drinking vodka and cooking shashlik around a campfire when Mawlawi

Shukur captured them. One of the Soviets, named Naomov, converted to Islam and fought

with the Mujahideen for three years. Author Ali Jalali interviewed Naomov during his visit

to Washington.D.C. sponsored by the Freedom House. Naomov spoke Pushtu well by that

time. Naomov recommended that "the Mujahideen quit fighting one another and unite

against the enemy." Naomov settled in Canada.
Page 108 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Kama Village where some people were still living—although many

people had already emigrated to Pakistan.

At Kama, I put my nephew Shahpur in charge and told him to

take my two mortars and 38 men and to go shell the 66th's camp.1I

kept four men with me. The shelling group left Kama at dusk. They

positioned the 82mm mortar on the north side of the river at the

house of Khan-e Mulla at Jamali Village—since it had the range.

Then they crossed the river at Bela and approached the camp

through the village of Samarkhel. They occupied positions close to

the entrance of the enemy camp. They had the guerrilla mortar

(60mm) and the RPGs with them. They opened fire with the RPGs

and the 60mm mortar from close range at 2200 hours. The 82mm

mortar joined in long-range fires onto the sleeping camp. The

shelling attack created chaos. The shelling group fired at intervals

over a two-hour period and then broke contact and withdrew. I was

in Kama throughout the attack. My men had orders to join me in the

mountains at the Dargo China spring the next day. I went to the

rendezvous point. I arrived at dawn and they were already there.

Two of my men were missing, since they had forgotten the 60mm

mortar and a video camera and had gone back to retrieve them.2

While I was in Kama, informers told me that the enemy would

launch a search and destroy mission in Kama District in five days. I

decided that they would now come sooner since we had shelled them.

I decided that we had to leave the area. At sunrise, I instructed my

men to go deeper into the mountains. I was tired and had a cold, so

I decided to go back home to Gerdab. However, as I set out, I saw two

helicopters lifting off from the airport and flying low over Kama

District. I hit the ground and hid. I was alone except for Haji

Shahbaz. Other helicopters followed the first two. At first I thought

that the helicopters were enroute to Kunar Province, but then they

started landing troops from two helicopters at Mirji Gholi point on

Derghi Ghar mountain—about a kilometer away. They also landed

The 66th and 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades were forces created for counterinsurgency. They had three motorized rifle battalions, an air assault battalion, an artillery

howitzer battalion, a MRL battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, a tank battalion and

support troops. The 70th was located in Kandahar. The 2nd battalion of the 66th was

located in Asadabad. ' Each of its motorized rifle companies had four motorized rifle

platoons instead of the usual three.

The video camera was an important accessory of this war. Mujahideen used video

cameras to record their actions so that they could prove that they expended weapons,

ammunition and supplies and achieved results. The video tapes justified the issue of more

supplies to the faction.
Chapter 3, Vignette 1 Page 109

troops north of Mamakhel on the plain and on Gedaro Ghunday hill.

My men saw the helicopters landing and realized that they would be

seen if they continued to climb into the mountains. So they turned

around in the wide canyon and started back toward me. I was in a

ditch between Mirji Gholi and Dargo China and was hidden by the

early morning shadow from the mountain. As I raised my head, I

could make out some 25 Soviet soldiers along with several people

wearing tsadar moving to the southeast from the high ground of Mirji

Gholi toward Gedaro Ghunday. I could also see Soviets setting up

mortars on top of Gedaro Ghunday. I crawled about 50 meters in the

ditch. The Soviets were facing the sun and I was in the shadow, so

they couldn't see me. As I crawled, I got rid of heavy things that I had

in my pockets—such as pliers and wads of money. I headed north

toward the mountain ridge. At that point, Zafar and Noor, carrying

the missing 60mm mortar and video camera, walked into the Soviet

group setting up at Gedaro Ghunday. They were immediately captured. Noor was my cousin.

I climbed Derghi Ghar Mountain to try and see what was happening. I saw that my men had split. Thirteen were now back in

Dargo China. These 13 men were commanded by Tajahul and the

rest, commanded by Shahpur, were going back into the mountains. I

saw that part of the Soviets were heading toward my 13 men. The

Soviets began firing flares at the group of 13 to mark their position.

Helicopter gunships then attacked my men with machine gun fire.

Other Soviets headed down from Derghi Ghar toward them. After

the air attack, the Soviets began attacking my 13-man group. I was

midway between the attacking Soviets and my men—about 500

meters away. I looked in my binoculars and saw that another group

of Soviets were down in the valley picking up the pliers, first aid

packets and money I had discarded. The group examining my things

looked different than the others and I thought that they were officers.

I decided that when the helicopters made their next strafing run, I

would use the noise of their gunfire to hide my fire. When the helicopters made their next gun run, I fired on the group in the valley

and hit one. I then took cover, raised my head, fired and got another

one. This drew the Soviets attention and they opened up on me.

Artillery started to fall all around. I ran from this position to another position about 100 meters away. I had a "20-shooter" [Czechoslovak M26 light machine gun] and some of my men had "20-shooters."

As I ran to change positions, I heard firing from "20-shooters" in my

group. They were involved in a heavy fire fight.
Page 110 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

I then heard noise from the north and I thought that the Soviets

were coming from that direction as well. But then I saw Shapur and

one of my other men. They were coming for me. Shapur reported that

tanks were moving through Kama and had sealed the exits. The

enemy were arresting people throughout Kama. We decided to leave

to the north. Earlier, Shapur had sent a messenger to my group of 13

telling them to move north. However, they were pinned down by heavy

artillery fire and direct fire. They could not break contact and fought

to the last man. As we left the area, one of my Mujahideen fired an

RPG at a helicopter. The helicopter caught fire and flew off and fell to

the ground near Kama—where it exploded. I don't know whether the

RPG hit the helicopter or whether other ground fire got it.

We moved to the village of Ghara Mamakhel, some four hours into

the mountains, where I met two more of my men. By morning, 12 of

my people arrived there. I learned the fate of my group of 13. The

Soviets remained in Kama for two days. Then we returned to retrieve

the bodies ofmy men. I found the bodies ofmy 13 men in a group, plus

those of Zafar and Noor and five more of my men. The Soviets had

booby-trapped some ofthe bodies and had sprinkled chemicals on other

bodies which caused them to disintegrate. We couldn't evacuate these

bodies. So we built graves over them. Their bodies are still there

under stones. I do not know what the Soviet casualties were, but I do

know that I shot two, we downed a helicopter and the Soviets lost three

armored vehicles to our mines during this action.

Throughout the war, I faced the Soviets like this during seven

sweeps. I moved the families of the martyrs to refugee camps in

Peshawar, Pakistan, since we couldn't support them in the Kama area.

I later learned that the Soviets were looking for me personally. They

arrested someone who looked like me (the narrator has a prominent

nose) while he was harvesting clover. At that time, my beard was

shorter. They took him to Jalalabad and paraded him around—"We've

caught the son of a b—" they said. Someone finally recognized him,

and said that he wasn't me and so he was released. Around that same

time, the DRA governor ofKama District was in the Merzakhel Village!

The Soviets arrested him and put him into forced labor since they didn't recognize him. They had him carrying water to their soldiers on the

high ground. The Soviets were very careless of Afghan lives. They

killed several villagers indiscriminately. They also killed one of my

men who was unarmed. I am glad we drove the Soviets out, but the

subsequent actions ofthe Mujahideen tarnish their record of victory. I

have written many poems of protest against their current activities.
Chapter 3, Vignette 1 Page 111

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen were able to fire on the garrison

over a two-hour period since they periodically shifted firing positions

to avoid return fire. The Soviets did not push out any night patrols

to find the firing positions but only replied with artillery fire. The

artillery fire did no good. Apparently, the garrison commander had

not surveyed potential and actual Mujahideen firing positions to

counter them.

The Mujahideen rendezvous point was located in one of three

escape routes into the mountains from Kama District. Further, it is

adjacent to a likely blocking position which the Soviets used during

their periodic block and sweep operations. The Mujahideen were

caught downhill from the Soviet blocking force and could not escape.

As usual, the Mujahideen were severely hampered by the lack of

portable, short-range radios which would have allowed them to

coordinate their actions.
Page 112 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
VIGNETTE 2

A NEW YEARS PRESENT FOR THE SOVIETS

by Mawlawi Shukur Yasini

The Soviets invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. I decided

that we should give them a combination anniversary and New Years

present on 29 December 1983. The present would be a shelling attack

on the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade at Samarkhel. I assembled 150 Mujahideen with two 82mm mortars, two RPG-7s, one recoilless rifle, and five or six antitank mines. We had 250 mortar rounds

for the attack. I placed my nephew Shapur in command. He formed

four groups: a mortar group commanded by Awozubellah; a mortar

group commanded by my son Abdul Basir; an observation post/fire

adjustment group commanded by Shapur; and a light group. We started moving the ammunition and supplies on donkeys and mules two

days before the attack. We had to move all ofit across the Kabul River

and stockpile it in the village of Gerdi Kats. From there we had to

move it to Khwaja Hanafi Baba Ghar Mountain overlooking

Samarkhel (Map 3-2 - New Year).

We moved all the ammunition and supplies to the mountain area

undetected during the two days. We set up the mortars behind the

mountain and set up the observation post on top. The light group had

the recoilless rifle, RPGs and antitank mines. They crossed the river

at Bela at night and went through Samarkhel to the west. Local

Mujahideen met them, guided them to the objective and helped them

plant the mines. They planted the mines in the road near the main

gate of the compound near a mosque. Our plan was to start with a

quick strike by the light group and then follow on with the mortar

attack. The 66th Brigade was garrisoned in barracks and tents, so we

hoped that our mortar fire would be effective against them. It was a

rainy night with lots oflightning. The light group launched the attack

at 2200 by firing the recoilless rifle and RPGs at the main gate of the

enemy compound. The enemy reacted with tanks and APCs which

came roaring out of the gate. Two of them were destroyed or damaged

by the antitank mines. The light group withdrew. At the same time,

the mortars went into action. They sent all 250 rounds of hot steel into

the enemy compound as our New Year's present to the 66th Brigade.

The 66th Brigade responded with BM-21s, artillery and mortars.

Mawlawi Shukur Yasini is the narrator of the previous vignette. [Map sheet 3185].
Page 114 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Round after round of enemy fire slammed into the mountains, while

the Mujahideen mortars continued to fire from the valley between the

mountains. With the Soviet fire, the Mujahideen mortars and the

lightning, the night was practically turned into day. It was a spectacular fireworks display.

I had stayed at Gerdab and had a cow killed and cooked. I

planned to welcome my returning heroes with a feast. They were

supposed to return at dawn and so all the arrangements for the feast

were ready as the eastern sky lightened. But, my men did not return

at dawn. They were pinned down by the heavy Soviet return fire. At

daybreak, Soviet helicopters and aircraft began flying over the area

and firing everywhere. I despaired that anyone would survive. I

promised Allah that I would donate a large sum of money to charity

if even half of my men would return. At 0800, my body guard, Juma

Khan, and I left Gerdab and climbed the mountain overlooking

Gerdab. I was using my binoculars, I saw a shepherd running toward

me. Everything was now calm. The aircraft had returned to the

airfield and the artillery had quit firing. I climbed down to meet the

shepherd. He brought me the good news that my Mujahideen had

survived and had returned to Gerdab. None of my Mujahideen were

even hurt! We had a very good feast!

Due to the heavy Soviet shelling, many other Mujahideen left

their areas. Our contacts in the Soviet camp later reported that helicopters evacuated wounded and dead from Samarkhel to Jalalabad

airport. The helicopters made 12 trips. Our contacts told me that

there were at least 200 killed and wounded. This attack increased

Soviet activity and Soviet helicopters were out flying every day looking for Mujahideen.

COMMENTARY: A lot of Mujahideen mortar firing was observed fire

from the forward slopes of a mountain with the gunner making firing

adjustments. The mortar crews in this attack would not have survived

the Soviet return fire if they had tried firing from the forward slopes.

Their reverse slope firing positions in the valley made it difficult for

Soviet artillery to reach the firing positions. The use of forward

observers to adjust fire is a mark ofsophistication among Mujahideen

forces. However, the Soviet mortar battery commanders should have

surveyed these likely firing sites and had them plotted long before the

Mujahideen attack. Apparently, they did not. This is a step that fire

support commanders should take whenever their forces stop. This was

a permanent garrison, so such planning should have been done years
Chapter 3, Vignette 2 Page 115

before. The figure of 200 dead and wounded seems high, but it was a

well-planned and executed attack.

DRA and Soviet intelligence efforts in the Kama area seem inadequate. Commanders, like the narrator, operated from the same area

throughout the war and moved freely through populated areas, yet the

DRA seemed unable to react in time. The Soviets and DRA knew who

the narrator was, what he looked like and where he was from, but they

were never able to kill or capture him.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY

The Mujahideen fired from fixed, surveyed sites and from mobile

firing bases. The mobile fire base deployed in two phases. During the

day, the firing survey party would move into the area, determine

weapons positions, map locations, headings, intended positions for the

aiming stakes and firing data. At night, the firing party would arrive

in a jeep, meet with the survey party, set up their weapons, conduct a

quick firing raid and depart.

The Mujahideen also employed unmanned firing bases. Unmanned

firing bases were used against targets which were devoid of cover and

concealment. The Mujahideen would survey these points in daylight

and set up rockets on makeshift or disposable launchers. They would

connect these rockets to time-delay firing devices. The Mujahideen

would be well away from the area when the Soviet or DRA forces would

launch a search for them.

Shelling attacks had mixed results. When launched against military airfields and garrisons, they occasionally destroyed military

targets of value. Further, they prevented the DRA or Soviet forces

from sleeping and depressed morale. When launched against cities,

they frequently killed innocent civilians. This cost the Mujahideen

potential supporters. As some civilians expressed it, "the government

oppress us during the day and the Mujahideen oppress us at night."
CHAPTER 4

ATTACKING A STRONG POINT

Attacking a strong point is often similar to conducting a raid and

many of the same tactical considerations and techniques apply.

Attackers quickly abandon their objective after a successful raid,

while there is usually an intent to hold a captured strong point

for some period of time. Therefore, an attack on a strong point

generally involves more supplies and heavier armaments. Most

often, the strong points were political centers which the Mujahideen

wanted to hold for propaganda value.

3yyAsadabad

Jalalabad

/ ( Afghanistan

Chapter 4

Incidents
Page 118 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Map 4-1
VIGNETTE 1

TAKING ALINGAR DISTRICT CAPITAL

by Nawaz Khan, Doctor Abdul Qudus Alkozai and Haji M. Siddiqullah

In July of 1980, the subdistrict capital of Nengrach was collocated

with the Alingar District Capital in the town of Alingar. This is

because the Mujahideen had driven the government out of the mountain redoubt of Nengrach. The district government of Nuristan was

also there. This was a common practice. The DBA maintained many

"governments in exile" for areas they did not control and held "nationwide" congresses using emigrants to represent those uncontrolled

areas. The DRA never controlled more than 15% of the countryside.

We decided to eliminate all these governments by seizing Alingar town.

It proved to be a major victory.

The DRA 81st Regiment had a battalion in Alingar and there were

some DRA militia forces as well.1(Map 4-1 - Alingar 2) We had two

contacts in the DRA garrison. One was Captain Yar Mohammad who

had a brother in our Mujahideen group. Captain Mohammad was from

nearby Koh-e Safi and routinely provided us information about government plans. We talked to the Captain about capturing Alingar and

he agreed to help us. We introduced the Captain to our other contact,

Piroz. Piroz was a cook in the DRA garrison. We gave drugs to Piroz.

The Captain and Piroz agreed that Piroz would drug the food before

our attack and that the captain would signal us when that was done

and we could launch our attack. We asked the cook how many

Mujahideen we should bring. "Not too many to cause trouble, but not

too few to fail" he replied. "Okay, about 70,000" we joked. "No, only

about 10,000" he joked back. In any case, the Mujahideen sympathizers in the DRA camp would kill the communist officers. The signal to

attack was the firing of a magazine full of tracer ammunition.

Nawaz Khan was a cadet in the Afghanistan Military Academy when he joined the resistance. He was a Mujahideen commander in Mehtar Lam, the Provincial Capital of

Laghman Province. Haji Sidiqullah was the Provincial Military Commander of the HIH faction in Laghman. He joined HIH in the fight against Dauod before the communist revolution. Dr. Qudus was a commander under Sidiqullah who doubled as the force medic. [Map

sheet 3086, vie grid 2455].

1 According to Soviet sources, the DRA 71st Infantry Regiment was garrisoned in Mehtar

Lam with some forces in the Alingar area. The 81st Mechanized Infantry Regiment was

stationed further to the south in Nangrahar Province. General Alexandr Mayorov, Pravda

ob Afganskoy voyne [Truth about the war in Afghanistan], Moscow: Prava Chiloveka, 1996,

Map set.
Page 120 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

There were about 300 total Mujahideen formed in four groups and

about 30 subgroups. We called the group commanders together and

told them to concentrate their men at night in Tokhi Khwar about one

kilometer from the district headquarters. We told them that we had

inside contacts but provided no details. We also assigned a group of

Mullas with megaphones to begin broadcasting after the attack. They

were to persuade the beseiged DRAto surrender. H-hour was midnight.

There were 150 Mujahideen in Nawaz Khan's group. They were

armed with three DShK heavy machine guns, two 82mm recoilless

rifles, some mortars and Kalashnikov rifles. Dr. Qudus group had

one Soviet PPSH submachine gun, some bolt-action rifles and some

other weapons. Several Mujahideen were unarmed. The other Mujahideen groups were similarly equipped. The signal to attack was

given 10 minutes early. The tracers ripped into the air. Although the

drugged food did not have its desired effect, Piroz and 10 other

Mujahideen sympathizers had killed their communist officers. The

DRA battalion surrendered to us as we stormed inside the battalion

compound. The first one in was Doctor Nasar who just this year finished his education in Egypt.

It was the 1st ofJuly 1980. The Mujahideen had deployed forces to

the north, south and west of the district center. One group attacked

the DRA security posts on Baghal mountain to the northwest. One

group attacked along the main road which ran east of the river. One

group attacked to seize and cross the bridge. One group attacked the

DRA posts on the Amir Shahid hill to the southeast. The DRA military

did not want to fight us, however, the local militia units were reluctant

to surrender and fought on. The militia were still protecting the government enclaves of Alingar, Nuristan and Nengrach. The military

then cooperated with us and turned their guns on the militia. A fierce

battle ensued with the Mujahideen and military fighting the militia.

During the fighting, the district governor ofAlingar and eight or nine

aides managed to escape to Mehtar Lam. Still, we captured Alingar

and eliminated the DRA governments of Nengrach and Alingar.

Thirteen officials from Nuristan made a break, but were cut down in

our cross fire. The governor of Nuristan was killed by a Mujahideen

whose brother had been killed by this same governor. At one point,

Sidiqullah saw Saidagui; the Alingar Communist Party Secretary,

being dragged off by a group he did not recognize. Since he had lent

his rifle to a friend, Sidiqullah was unarmed and so he struck two

stones together to imitate a bolt action rifle action and challenged

them. Mawlawi Rahim identified himself and stated that they had
Chapter 4, Vignette 1 Page 121

captured a DRA soldier. Sidiqullah identified Saidagul and told them

that they had a much more important catch. The fighting continued

through the night, the Mujahideen moving to cut off the fleeing DRA

officials and pursuing them in the dark. The fighting ended in time for

morning prayers.

One of the groups involved in the fighting was a group ofteenagers

from 13 to 18 years old who we called the Khandakiano (bull terriers)

group. During the fighting, one 14-year-old was fighting a desperate

hand-to-hand combat with a DRA sports captain named Sharif.

Fortunately, another Mujahideen killed Sharif during the fight.

We killed 285 DRA officials, police, soldiers, militia and civilians.2

We captured 80 heavy weapons, two armored vehicles and 1,200 small

arms. The heavy weapons included one 76mm mountain gun, one

76mm field gun, some ZGU-1 heavy machine guns, a 107mm mortar,

several DShK heavy machine guns, and some 82mm mortars. Many

government people also surrendered to us. It was a bonanza. In

Nawaz Khan's group, they lost three KIA and seven WIA. In

Sidiqullah's group they lost two KIA. We kept the district capital for

some time until a joint Soviet/DRA force pushed us out and reestablished DRA government in Alingar.

COMMENTARY: Alingar is about 30 kilometers from the province capital

of Mehtar Lam. At this point of the war, the Mujahideen were determined to control political centers so that they could claim to be a legitimate government in Afghanistan. The DRA was equally determined

to prevent this.

2

Sidiqullah states 120 DRA casualties.
Page 122 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
VIGNETTE 2

THE BATTLE FOR PANJWAYEE

based on an interview with Mulla Malang

In September 1982, the DRA, backed by Soviet forces, had firm

control of Panjwayee, the district capital of Panjwayee District (Map

4-2 - Panjwayee). Panjwayee is located some 25 kilometers southwest

of Kandahar. The district was militarily significant to both sides since

the town and its surrounding hills provided a favorable base for military action in the green zones which stretch all the way to the city of

Kandahar. This area was also the hot bed of resistance in the region.

Seizing control of Panjwayee was in the interest of all the local

Mujahideen groups based in the area. Therefore, about 1,000 Mujahideen assembled near Panjwayee to take the town. The operation was

directed by HIK commander Mulla Malang and others.

The town was defended by up to 300 militia who lived there with

their families. The militiamen had turned their houses and all other

buildings into fortified positions. They placed bunkers on the rooftops

and occupied and fortified the high ground overlooking the town and

the approaches to it. The Mujahideen began by surrounding the town

and shelling it for two days. The shelling had little effect on the

defenders, but the Mujahideen soon found themselves the object of

enemy artillery fire and aerial bombardment. Most ofthe Mujahideen

withdrew into the neighboring villages of Sperwan and Zangabad.

On the third day, Commander Mulla Malang decided to penetrate

the town with a small group and to seize control of a number of the

dominant positions that covered the approaches to the town. At noon,

Mulla Malang led a group of 25 Mujahideen to the southern edge ofthe

town. They carried picks and shovels. They quietly dug a hole through

the adobe wall and broke into a house. Once inside, they began to

advance from house to house by knocking holes into the walls. Their

advance was totally unobserved by the militia who were occupying the

rooftop positions overlooking the streets ofthe town. The Mujahideen

finally knocked a hole through a wall that opened onto a courtyard.

They burst into the courtyard with weapons at the ready. The

militiamen were caught by surprise. They assumed that the town

Mulla Malang was one of the most famous commanders of the Kandahar area. He was an

adherent of Mawlawi Mohammed Yunis Khalis-lslamic Party (Hezb-e-lslami Khalis). [Map

sheet 2180, vie grid 4794].
Page 124 The Other Side of the Mountain; Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

was already captured by the Mujahideen, and fled from the town.

Mulla Malang's group established a secure area and signaled the

Mujahideen outside the town. Soon, hundreds of other Mujahideen

poured into the town and cleared it from the southeast to the northwest, ending on the bank of the Arghandab River. They cleared the

town building by building, again avoiding the streets by advancing by

knocking holes in the walls. Other Mujahideen immediately climbed

to the rooftops and manned the abandoned positions. Only the district

headquarters remained under militia control. That night, the

Mujahideen consolidated their gains and captured the district headquarters the next day.

The militia had suffered heavy casualties and retreated to the overwatching high ground of a neighboring hill. The Mujahideen surrounded the militia positions. The government forces then opened

negotiations with the Mujahideen—apparently to gain time. As they

were talking, an armored Soviet/DRA column arrived from Kandahar.

The Mujahideen withdrew inside Panjwayee.

The following night, the Soviet and DRA forces attacked

Panjwayee and a heavy house-to-house battle ensued. The Mujahideen fired from the roof tops at the government forces advancing

along the streets. Eventually, the Soviet/DRA combat power made the

Mujahideen position untenable. The Mujahideen withdrew in small

groups under the cover of darkness. The regime restored the district

government in Panjwayee.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen gradually learned that overrunning

and seizing control of government administrative centers is easy, but

retaining them usually resulted in rapid Soviet or DRA retaliation.

The Soviets/DRA felt that they had to retain control of local government agencies and would go to great lengths and take high risks to

defend local administrative centers, even when they were tightly

besieged by the resistance. Control of a district center symbolized

control of the district, though this was seldom the case. In some

remote districts, government control was restricted to a few buildings

in the center of the district town. The government spared no effort to

maintain their presence in these remote district centers despite their

insignificant military usefulness and the high costs,in men and material, of holding them. This policy was promoted by the political importance of maintaining control, albeit nominal, over all provinces,

districts and subdistricts in a country which was in revolt against the

foreign-installed government.
Chapter 4, Vignette 2 Page 125

The battle of Panjwayee is an example of how easily the resistance

could seize control of an isolated district center and how vulnerable the

resistance became once it was forced to defend the town in the face of

overwhelming Soviet/DRA forces. For this reason, it was only toward

the end of the Soviet occupation that the Mujahideen again moved to

seize control of major district and provincial centers. The source of the

resistance power was not the cities and towns but the rural areas and

the hundreds of the cross-border supply and infiltration routes which

they controlled throughout the war.

Tactically, a 25-man detachment accomplished what a 1,000 man

force could not. They did this through surprise and the indirect

approach. However, the lack of an overall operational command left

the Mujahideen vulnerable. After seizing Panjwayee, the Mujahideen became overconfident and failed to prepare for the enemy

counter attack. They confidently parleyed with the militia while the

Soviet/DRA force formed and moved. The Mujahideen failed to

consolidate their victory and to establish defensive positions on the

hills to the east and west of Panjwayee and on the Arghandab River

to the north. They failed to post reconnaissance and ambush forces

on the likely enemy avenues of approach. Instead of having to fight

their way through a series of ambushes and then bumping into

outlying Mujahideen fortified positions, the Soviet/DRA relief force

moved unopposed to the battlefield and surprised the victorious

Mujahideen at Panjwayee.

Tactically, the Mujahideen realized that movement along streets is

suicidal in urban combat. However, the spontaneous nature of the

unpaid, volunteer Mujahideen made control very difficult. Mujahideen

forces joined the battle and left as they wished. Often, they did not

bother to let the coordinating commander know.
Page 126 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

BODYALAY

Map 4-3
VIGNETTE 3

ATTACK ON THE BODYALAY GARRISON

by Doctor Mohammad Sadeq

A DRA border guard battalion3at Bodyalay near Shewa District

had security posts on the high ground commanding the Dara-i-Nur

Valley which stretches northward from Bodyalay. We decided to attack

the security posts in March 1983 (Map 4-3 Bodyalay). We had 65

Mujahideen armed with one DShK heavy machine gun, one 82mm

mortar, four RPG-7s, 22 Kalashnikovs and other small arms. At that

time, we did not have a permanent base but moved from village to village in the Dara-i Nur Valley. We came down from the mountains in

the north through the side valley that opens onto Ziraybaba about

eight kilometers to the east. From that valley, we moved on mountain

paths to reach the eastern flank of the main valley at Bodyalay

Mountain We positioned the DShK and mortar near the peak of

Bodyalay Mountain. I divided our force into four groups. One group

deployed against the south side ofthe battalion garrison to pin them in

position and cut off any aid from the south. The second group deployed

against the government base at the village of Darah-e Nur to pin them

down. The third group deployed against the two battalion outposts on

Bodyalay Mountain. The fourth group was the support group which

manned the DShK and mortar on the top of Bodyalay Mountain.

We started our attack after midnight. One mortar shell scored a

direct hit on a government OP and killed one and wounded five of the

enemy defenders. We were fighting for 2 hours and 30 minutes but

were unable to overrun either of the outposts. As the day dawned, we

had to withdraw since we were surrounded by enemy forces and were

about to lose the advantage of night. We withdrew over the same

mountain paths. I had two wounded Mujahideen from the attack.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen force harassed the DRA battalion, but

lacked sufficient combat power to overrun any of its outposts since

much of its force was deployed to prevent the DRA forces from moving

to reinforce the besieged outposts. Even if the attack succeeded, the

attackers would have only had time to grab weapons and other spoils

and leave. The Mujahideen force escaped over the same route that

Doctor Mohammad Sadeq was a commander with the HIH in Kunar Province. [Map sheet

3186, vie grid 4830].

3

Probably the 902nd Border Guards Battalion.
Page 128 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

they arrived on. Ifthe DRA informer net was effective, the Mujahideen

were risking ambush on their return. The Mujahideen had no radios

or other rapid communications and so control of the battle was problematic at best.
VIGNETTE 4

ATTACK ON SORUBAY

by Toryalai Hemat

There were a lot of DRA sympathizers in the Nazian Valley. We

called this area "Little Moscow", as did the many Arabs in the area

who had joined us injihad.4The district headquarters of the Nazian

Valley is Sorubay. All the residents of Sorubay were communist

sympathizers. We decided to seize the district center in July 1985

(Map 4-4 - Sorubay). It was a combined action by the forces of

Hikmatyar, Sayyaf, Mohammadi and Khalis (HIH, IUA, IRMA and

HIK). There were about 1,000 Mujahideen in various bases in the

Maro Mountain stronghold area.

Sorubay District center is 12 kilometers north of the Melava base

and Maro Mountains—about a six-hour hike through the mountains.

I had 80 men in my command and we were well armed. I had three

BM12s, some medium mortars and many heavy machine guns in my

group. This was a major attempt by us to seize the Nazian District

government and in many respects was closer to conventional war

than guerrilla war. For two weeks, Mujahideen supply trains resupplied Melava base, replenished our ammunition and our MRL rockets. We prepared for the attack for an additional week and then

moved from Maro Mountain down into the Nazian Valley. Early in

the morning, we deployed our first groups against the DRA OPs

which sat on the small mountains overlooking Sorubay. There were

about 12 security OPs on the mountains surrounding Sorubay, so the

attack on the center started with the attack on the security posts.

After conducting heavy fire on these posts, we attacked and seized

them. We captured Sar Ghar and Tor Ghar security posts by 1000

hours. Then we started shelling the district center and descended on

Sorubay. Government officials, DRA soldiers and their families started fleeing. They left in such a hurry that when we entered Sorubay,

we discovered that the occupants had left their dinners still cooking

and bread dough was waiting to be baked. We captured many imporToryalai Hemat was a regiment commander of a mobile force allied with the IUA—Islamic

Unity of Afghanistan of Sayyaf. He fought in many provinces in Afghanistan. [Map sheet

3185, vie grid 8299].

4 Moscow soghra is the Arabic. Many Arabs came to Afghanistan for the jihad. The overall Afghan impression of the Arab Mujahideen, gathered from our interviews, is that they

were prima donnas who were more interested in taking videos than fighting.
Page 130 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

JALALABAD

7

HIGHWAY 1

SORUBAY

Map 4-4
Chapter 4, Vignette 4 Page 131

tant government documents which we sent to Peshawar. We sent our

DRA captives to Landay. I lost seven KIA during the attack. We

stayed in Sorubay overnight.

The enemy responded by sending forces from Jalalabad. Heavy

enemy artillery fire began to fall on the OPs located on the high

ground. Aircraft hit us as enemy armored vehicles neared the district

center. We could not hold the district center against the air and

artillery and so we vacated the place. During this fighting, we lost

many people. I lost another seven KIA in my group. We left one of

our dead, Ahmad Said, behind. He used to wear camouflage fatigues.

The next day the DRA radio stated that they had identified Chinese

mercenaries among our dead. Perhaps this was Ahmad. Two days

later, we attacked Sorubay again and I lost yet another seven KIA. I

had lost 21 of 80 men in this action. I don't know what the enemy

casualties were, but I personally saw 15 bodies when we captured

Sorubay. We returned to our bases.

COMMENTARY: There was a political advantage to holding district

capitals, as it conferred a degree of legitimacy on the Mujahideen.

However, these capitals were usually located on accessible ground

and were not sited for defense against modern artillery and air

power. In this instance, the Mujahideen moved from guerrilla warfare to a set-piece battle to capture Sorubay and were victorious.

However, their attempt to hold the prize resulted in heavy losses and

no political advantage.

The outposts overlooking Sorubay appear to have been sited

rather haphazardly with little planning for mutual support. The DRA

evidently fragmented their force to little advantage.
VIGNETTE 5

STORMING GULA'I

by Haji Malangyar

The Nangrahar agricultural/irrigation project was located in

Shinwar District, Nangrahar Province southeast of Jalalabad. The

massive irrigation project was built with Soviet help and guarded

by several DRA military garrisons. (No Map) A battalion and some

militia units protected the irrigation system. The battalion was garrisoned at the main water pump some 1.5 kilometers north of Gula'i.

Gula'i is three kilometers northwest of Ghanikhel. A canal runs parallel to the main road north of Ghanikhel and a militia unit guarded a bridge on this road. Another battalion protected a bridge further

to the northwest.

Our base at Marochina, was seven kilometers west of Gula'i.

There were no people left in Gula'i since everyone had migrated. I

had 59 Mujahideen armed with an 82mm mortar and 12 RPG-7s.

The 8th of July 1985 was the last day of fasting in Ramadan. The

next day would be the Feast of Ramadan (Eid-al-Fitr). We felt that

many DRA soldiers would celebrate the festival at home making

this a good time to attack. As was our custom, we prayed to God

and put the Koran inside the cloth tsadar. We held the tsadar high

and had every Mujahideen pass under it to ask God's blessing on

us. We walked to Gula'i and spent the night ofJuly 8th in an abandoned house. I selected four groups of eight-to-ten men each to

divert and contain the outposts at the Narai Pul bridge, the Aozhda

Ghundai hill, Smats hill, and the Spin Khwar syphon. I had radio

communication with all groups. I commanded the 19 men in the

main attack. Each containment group had two RPGs and the main

attack group had four RPGs. I positioned our mortar near the

Congregation Mosque (Eidgah). I started the attack at 1600 hours

and three hours later we overran the government post in Gula'i. The

containment groups prevented any assistance to the post. After

dark, we all gathered at the designated assembly area. We had two

WIA. The enemy lost three KIA and two POWs. We also captured

11 Kalashnikovs, 100 boxes of badly needed ammunition and some

hand grenades.

Haji Malangyar fought in the heavily contested Shinwar District. There is no map with this

vignette. [Map sheet 3185, vie grid 7910].
Chapter 4, Vignette 4 Page 133

COMMENTARY: Radios greatly helped coordinate Mujahideen actions.

Evidently, attacking during the Feast of Ramadan also helped.

Because the DRAhad to protect military, political and economic installations this spread the DRA force thin and inhibited offensive actions.

The agricultural project was vital to the economic well-being of the

area and, although the Mujahideen attacked the military posts, they

did not attack the canals.
Page 134 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

SHAKARDARA

Map 4-5
VIGNETTE 6

DESTRUCTION OF THE BAGH-E MUMTAZ BRIGADE

by Doctor Mohammad Wakil

In 1988, the DRA deployed a security brigade north of Kabul to

secure the route for the withdrawal of the Soviet 40th Army. It was

stationed on the Kabul-Charikar highway near the road junction with

the road leading to Shakardara—the district headquarters of

Shakardara District. The brigade was stationed in the Mumtaz

orchard, so it was called the Bagh-e Mumtaz Brigade5(Map 4-5 -

Shakardara). My brother, the late Commander Wasil, was the overall

commander of the many factions involved in this battle. He worked

out the plan during several commanders councils at thevarious faction

bases. At 0800 hours on 21 June 1988, we would begin our attack on

the brigade. The first phase would be the isolation and artillery preparation phase. Mujahideen would block the road from the north and

south to isolate the garrison and begin a seven-day artillery preparation with a BM-12, Saqar MRL, 122mm howitzer, 82mm mortars and

82mm recoilless rifles. The artillery preparation would be fired from

four directions. The second phase would be the ground offensive. One

hundred Mujahideen would attack on each of four axes. The attack

from the south would be led by my.brother, Commander Wasil, on the

southern axis Sehab-e Quli Village—Morad Beg town. Commander Taj

Mohammad would lead the attack on the southwest axis from Karez-e

Mir Village. Commander Naser would lead the attack on the western

axis while Commander Anwar would lead the attack on the eastern

axis. Mujahideen armaments included one Saqar, one BM12, one

122mm howitzer, six 82mm mortars, eight 82mm recoilless rifles and

approximately 40 RPG-7s. We also had some ZSU-23-2 antiaircraft

guns and some Stinger antiaircraft missiles.

The attack started on time, but the garrison did not last for the seven

days. The brigade's morale broke and we overran it by 1400 hours on the

first day. The brigade's tanks broke out. The brigade commander and

some ofhis deputies were on board the tanks. We tried to stop them with

RPG fire, but they escaped to Kabul. I do not know the total Mujahideen

casualties, but I do know of four KIA, including my brother. I also know

Doctor Mohammad Wakil is from Shakardara District north of Kabul. He graduated from

high school before the war. He joined the resistance and received medical training in

Pakistan. [Map sheet 2886., vie grid 0737].

5

Bagh-e means orchard. This was probably the 520th Brigade.
Page 136 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

10 ofthe Mujahideen WIA. We killed around 100 in the brigade and captured some 400-450 DRA soldiers. We also captured some 40 armored

vehicles, although not all of them were functioning. We captured 10

trucks and some 600 small arms. The Kabul government was slow in

reacting to our attack, since they did not expect that the brigade's resistance would collapse so quickly. After 1400 hours, the artillery of the

DRA 8th Infantry Division" began firing on the captured garrison from

positions in Qargha and the Kabul airport. However, they did not

employ any aircraft against us due to the presence ofthe ZSU-23-2s and

Stingers. We did not intend to hold the garrison area and had no desire

to remain under artillery fire, so we grabbed what we could and left. The

government never reestablished a unit at that garrison site.

COMMENTARY: Planning a seven-day siege within 15 kilometers of the

heavily garrisoned capital of Kabul is a high-risk option, but the garrison evidently capitulated as soon as its commander abandoned it and

fled in a tank. The Mujahideen southern roadblock was evidently not

too effective since the brigade's tanks managed to blast right through

it. At this point in the war, the DRA's morale (which was never high)

was at a record low. The Soviets had begun their withdrawal on May

15th over this same road and were conducting few offensive actions.

The DRA felt like the hapless brigade watching their commander flee.

The Soviets were clearly preparing to abandon the DRA.

The Mujahideen, on the other hand, were practically giddy with

anticipation of the complete Soviet withdrawal. The Mujahideen had

not expected to win the war and now could sense victory. Their actions

became more daring. However, after the Soviet withdrawal, the

Mujahideen began quarreling among themselves even more than usual

and the DRA resolve strengthened. The war went on.

Coordinating an attack by different factions with uncertain

communications from four directions is also a high-risk option which

chances fratricide. However, audacity prevailed and the Mujahideen

quickly destroyed a larger force.

The introduction of the U.S.-manufactured, shoulder-fired Stinger

air defense missile caused a change in Soviet aerial tactics. The

Soviets would not employ close air support forward of their own forces

if Stingers were present. Further, a Mujahideen rocket attack on the

Kabul airfield about this same time reportedly destroyed five SU-25

close air support aircraft and damaged three others. Mujahideen air

defenses and aircraft availability probably limited the Soviet/DRA

response to artillery fire.
Chapter 4, Vignette 5 Page 137

CHAPTER COMMENTARY

When the guerrilla force decides to seize and hold a strong point,

implied missions are the conduct of regular logistic resupply, the

continual manning of the strong point and the ability to withstand

artillery and air strikes. None of these are easy for a guerrilla force

dependent on part-time guerrillas. Further, it requires the commitment of crew-served weapons and sufficient ammunition—commodities that are hard to remove during a forced withdrawal. The

guerrilla is trading his mobility and anonymity for a fixed-piece

conventional battle. Quite frequently, the guerrilla is unable to

make the transition.
CHAPTER 5

MINE WARFARE

Mine warfare is a favorite technique with the guerrilla. It is a relatively inexpensive way to attack personnel and vehicles. Most

Mujahideen mines were anti-tank and anti-vehicular. When the

Mujahideen employed anti-personnel mines, they prefered the directional mine (similar to the U.S. claymore mine). Soviet mines were

mostly anti-personnel. During the war, the Mujahideen were supplied

with many types of foreign anti-tank mines. Often, the Mujahideen

would stack three anti-tank mines on top of each other to guarantee a

catastrophic kill. Many Afghans are inveterate tinkerers and they

preferred to make their own antitank mines from unexploded ordnance

and other antitank mines.

Mazer-e >

Sharif

KABULlardez.

^A'Asadabad

r^jalalabad

1 ^S *

Afghanistan

Chapter 5

Incidents
Page 140 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

DIAGRAM 1 MINE AND BATTERY

^.,..,.., J. Road Surfaces

Mine

_^|%|/M< Roadbed «Ml,....-.„,., ..,..,

DIAGRAM .2 WATER DETONATOR
VIGNETTE 1

MUJAHIDEEN DEMOLITION METHODS

by Commander Mulla Malang

The Mujahideen would move heavy unexploded bombs (250-500 kilograms) at night by tractors to the road and bury them under bridges,

underpasses and viaducts. The bombs were remotely controlled, usually by home-made detonators, fired some 500 meters from the road.

Several such bombs would be detonated under a passing enemy convoy

to heavily damage the vehicles. Tanks and other armored escort

vehicles were the primary target for remote-controlled bombs.

If remote-control detonation was unfeasible, the Mujahideen used

another method to selectively attack the tracked armored vehicles.

The Mujahideen would stretch two metal wires across the paved road.

The wires were spaced close together and hooked to an electric battery.

The rubber tires of civilian and military vehicles would pass over the

wires, but the metal tracks of tanks and BMPs would close the electrical circuit and set off the explosion. (See diagram)

Abdul Wali, a Mujahideen from Kandahar, was known for his

creative bomb-making. Once in 1986, he sent a floating bomb down

the Nosh-e Jan creek (which runs in the western suburbs of Kandahar

city from northeast to southwest) to destroy a government outpost at a

hotel1. Abdul Wali strapped a 250 kilogram bomb onto some truck tire

inner tubes. He measured the distance from the outpost to his release

point upstream where he would launch his floating bomb. The bomb

was hooked to a wire whose length was the length from launch point

to outpost. Once the floating bomb stretched out the full length of the

wire, it was exactly under the outpost. Abdul Wali remotely-detonated

the bomb and destroyed the outpost.

In well-defended enemy areas, the presence of minefields and other

obstacles did not allow Mujahideen to raid enemy bases. In this case,

delay-fired rockets hit the enemy positions. Kandahar air base, which

became a major Soviet military base, was one ofthese difficult targets.

The Mujahideen used delay-firing mechanisms so that they could leave

the area before the rocket fired and the Soviet counter-fires began.

Initially, only field-expedient delay-firing mechanisms were available.

Mulla Malang was one of the most famous commanders of the Kandahar area. He was an

adherent of Maulavi Mohammed Yunis Khalis-lslamic Party (Hezb-e-lslami Khalis).

1 Gul Sardar Hotel near Sarpuza.
Page 142 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Later in the war, the Mujahideen acquired factory-produced remote

control devices to fire their rockets, but they still continued to use field

expedient methods to do the job.

One local method was to use a leaking water container. The

Mujahidden would punch a hole in the bottom of an empty threegallon tin can and fill it with water. The trigger wire would be

attached to a wooden float. The trigger wire would be inserted into the

can. The other end of the wire would be connected to a battery. The

battery would not be strong enough to complete the circuit through the

water. The tin can would be attached by wire to the rocket. As the

water leaked from the can, the floating wire would move lower until it

reached the bottom ofthe can. The contact would complete the electric

circuit and set the rocket off (see diagram).
VIGNETTE 2

MINING ATTACKS NEAR MEHTAR LAM

by Commander Sher Padshah and Sheragha

After the battle for Alishang District Center, Commander Padshah

gathered 30 Mujahideen and moved further south to the village of

Mendrawur. Mendrawur is about 11 kilometers south ofthe provincial

capital of Mehtar Lam and about five kilometers north of the KabulJalalabad highway. We received information that an armored column

would be moving from Jalalabad to Mehtar Lam toward the end of

August 1981 (Map 5-1 - Mehtar). We decided to attack the column

with bombs and an ambush. We liked powerful mines, so we usually

took the explosives from two Egyptian plastic mines and put these into

a single large cooking oil tin container. We also used the explosives

from unexploded Soviet ordnance to make our own bombs. We put one

bomb under a small bridge and hooked a remote-control device onto it.

We strung the detonating wire about 100 meters further south where

we established our ambush in an orchard on the east side of the highway. We had two RPG-7s, one PK machine gun and one Bernau light

machine gun. There were three Mujahideen in the bomb-firing party.

We saw the Soviet column approach slowly. Dismounted Soviet

engineers were walking in front of the column with their mine detectors. They were carefully checking the route. When they came to the

small bridge, they discovered the bomb. Several Soviets gathered

around the bomb, but instead of disconnecting the wires, they stood

around talking about the bomb. The three-man firing party, Sheragha,

Matin and another Sheragha, were watching them through binoculars.

We saw several Soviets checking the bomb and knew that the ambush

was spoiled, so we detonated the bomb killing several Soviets. The

Soviet column began firing in every direction. We left the orchard and

withdrew through the Bazaar of Mendrawur going north. Some of the

villagers were wounded by the Soviet fire.

Three or four days later, we had 40 Mujahideen in our group and

were ready to try another ambush. We went to the village of

Mashakhel. We buried two of our bombs in the road. We did not have

any more remote-control firing devices, so we rigged these bombs with

pressure fuses. We put cow manure on the mines to hide them. God

bless Matin's soul, he used to always put the manure on the mines. We

Commander Sher Padshah and Sheragha are from Laghman Province. [Map sheet 3086].
Page 144 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

MASHAKEi:

KABUL

JALALABAD

MEHTAR

Map 5-1
Chapter 5, Vignette 2 Page 145

set up our ambush covering the mines.

We saw the column approach slowly. Soldiers with mine detecting

dogs were walking in front ofthe column. The dogs were running loose

and they promptly found and pointed out our bombs. Sheragha and

Shawali moved forward when they saw the dogs. They watched as the

dogs stood by the mine. Two soldiers got out of an APC with a long

probe. The soldiers started probing the manure piles and they found

the mine in the third pile. Four Soviets, including an officer, crowded

together looking at the mine. So, Sheragha and Shawali opened fire

killing the four Soviets. The remaining Soviets pulled back out of the

ambush kill zone.

The Soviets began to return fire. Commander Padshah ordered

four Mujahideen to move north onto Tarakhel hill to provide covering

fire for the group's withdrawal. To confuse the enemy, he grabbed his

megaphone and yelled "Keep yoUr positions. The reinforcements just

arrived." A DRA column came from Mehtar Lam and took up defensive

positions and started firing at us. Tanks also maneuvered against us

on the Mehtar Lam plain west of the road. We withdrew under the

cover of night. We know we killed four Soviets and may have killed or

wounded up to 18 DRA and Soviets. We destroyed one of their tanks

and two trucks.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY

The Mujahideen preference for home-made mines in metal cans

made it easier for Soviet mine detectors to find them. The tendency for

curious troops to cluster around a newly-discovered mine is not

uniquely Soviet, and the Soviets eventually trained their engineers to

quit clustering around mines.

The Mujahideen usually combined demolitions and mining with

other forms of offensive and defensive action. They usually covered

their mines with direct fire weapons. The Mujahideen seldom left

their mines unattended ifthey were located a distance from the border

and a ready supply of mines. After an ambush or fight, they would

often dig up their unexpended mines and take them with them to the

next mission.
CHAPTER 6

BLOCKING ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS

The war was a contest by both sides to control the other's logistics.

The Soviets used aerial bombing, scatterable mines, crop burnings and

assaults on rural villages to drive the rural population into exile or into

the cities. Their objective was to deprive the guerrilla of his source of

food, shelter and rest.

The Soviet lines of communication (LOC) was a double-lane highway

network which wound through the Hindu Kush Mountains—some ofthe

most inhospitable terrain on earth. Mujahideen constantly cut the road

and ambushed convoys carrying material from the Soviet Union. The

Soviet presence depended on its ability to keep the roads open. Much of

the Soviet combat in Afghanistan was a fight for control of the road network. Soviet security of the Eastern LOC required 26 battalions manning 199 outposts, patrolling the LOCs or escorting convoys. The moreopen Western LOC required three battalions. More than three-fourths of

'Asadabad

/\ ^•'Jalalabad

Gardez 1j5 ä

Afghanistan

Chapter 6

Incidents
Page 148 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Soviet combat forces were routinely involved in security missions. DRA

forces were also tied down in LOC and area security.

The resistance destroyed over 11,000 Soviet trucks. DRA truck

losses were reportedly higher. The Mujahideen ability to interdict the

LOC was a constant concern to the Soviets and prevented them from

maintaining a larger occupation force in Afghanistan.
VIGNETTE 1

CARVING UP REGIMENTS ON THE APPROACH TO WAZI

by Haji Badshah Khan

In April 1980,1 set out to capture the Wazi District Headquarters

which sits astride the main road between Gardez and Khowst. I had

some 400 Mujahideen who came from the Dari Khel Valley. The

Saroti pass is at the northern end of the Dari Khel Valley and offers

access from Gardez to Khowst. The Satakandow pass on the main

Gardez-Khowst highway was already controlled by the Mujahideen,

so the Dari Khel approach was the only possible route for the DRA.

In those days, we did not have base camps, but lived in our villages

and used whatever weapons were at hand. We had rifles plus some

locally manufactured machine guns from Pakistan. I made my plan

of attack. During the night, we moved to Wazi which is close to the

Dari Khel Valley (Map 6-1 - Wazi). I divided my men in groups and

we surrounded the district headquarters on all four sides. I ordered

my subordinate group commanders to wait for my signal to attack. In

the morning, I intercepted radio communications between the Wazi

garrison and their headquarters. The commander was asking for

help and stated that he was surrounded by Mujahideen. Shortly

after that, two helicopters came, circled the area and returned. The

commander of the garrison was Mohammad Hashem. He was from

the Jaji tribe and we knew each other. He sent a mediator to me who

announced that the garrison was ready to surrender. I told him to

disarm his men first and then we would negotiate. He did and then

he surrendered the garrison. We captured a lot of weapons. The

spoils of this action encouraged other Mujahideen to besiege other

posts for their weapons.

The DRA reacted to the fall of Wazi by sending two columns to

reestablish government control. The government forces moved on

two axes, one from Khowst and the other from Gardez. The column

from Khowst reached Said Khel and formed an assembly area

there. The column from Gardez approached the Saroti pass. I began

to mobilize people against the government forces. I sent harbakai

(tribal police or regulators who kept law and order in their areas)

Haji Badshah Khan is from the warrior subtribe of Dari Khel of the Zadran tribe. He lives

on the Saroti pass approach to Khost. When the communist coup occurred, he took his

family to Pakistan and then returned to build resistance forces in the area. [Map sheets

2883 and 2983].
Page 150 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

WAZI

Map 6-1
Chapter 6, Vignette 1 Page 151

to rally the tribes and the tribes responded since they knew that the

DRA would loot the villages ifthey let them into the area. I assigned

two harbakai groups to reinforce the Mujahideen blocking DRA forces

at Said Khel. I took the rest of the Mujahideen to the Saroti pass. I

arrived at Saroti in the late afternoon and surveyed the area. I determined how many Mujahideen I would need and where I would position the forces. I did not have enough Mujahideen, so I assembled

some of the local barbers (Pushtun barbers usually also play drums)

to play their drums to gather a lashkar.^ I did this to raise the whole

area and to demoralize the enemy. The drummers did a great job.

Warriors came from many tribes to Saroti and soon I had a large

army. Originally, I had planned to defend the pass, but when I

viewed the size of my army, I decided to attack. I promised them the

weapons we captured and we attacked the column and captured

weapons, trucks and tanks. When we had dealt with the Saroti force,

I left a blocking force to deal with any further columns and then took

the lashkar to Said Khel.

We cut the road to Khowst behind the DRA regiment which was

still assembled at Said Khel. Then we surrounded the regiment. It

remained trapped for 20 days. The DRA sent another column out of

Khowst to relieve this force, but they could not break through the

Mujahideen blockade. After some fighting, the entire force at Said

Khel surrendered. There were 1,300 personnel in the column and we

captured 1,200. The enemy lost another 100 either KIA or WIA. We

captured all the weapons of this regiment including 50-60 trucks and

armored vehicles. After the surrender, the DRA air force bombed

their own column and destroyed the rest of the vehicles in it, or we

would have had even more booty. A few vehicles managed to escape

from us. The father of DRA Minister of the Interior Gulabzoi was

wounded in the fighting and managed to escape in one of the APCs.

His name was Gulab Shah and he was a member of the Zadran tribe,

so perhaps some tribesmen helped his escape.

COMMENTARY: Early in the war, the Mujahideen resistance was mostly centered on the tribes. Only later, when the United States, Egypt,

Saudi Arabia and other countries began supplying the Mujahideen

through the various religious-based factions, did the Mujahideen's primary focus and loyalty shift to the factions. The method of

1 Lashkar in Pushto usage means a tribal army or armed force. A lashkar is usually gathered for a short time.
Page 152 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

raising the force and fighting the DRA columns described here is

little different from what the British forces experienced fighting

these same tribes on the northwest frontier. Once the lashkar assembled, the warriors would chant and sing along with the drums. This

occurred here as well.
VIGNETTE 2

BLOCKING THE PAGHMAN HIGHWAY

by Commander Haji Aaquelshah Sahak

I have been in many actions, but one stands out that I won't ever

forget, because it was a very trying situation. On 4 or 5 June 1983 we

were in Paghman, a district capital (garrisoned by DRA forces),2 which

is some 25 kilometers west of Kabul. We received information one

evening that a major Soviet/DRA column would attempt to resupply

and reinforce Paghman's garrison and government enclave. There are

two parallel highways from Kabul to Paghman. (Map 6-2 - Paghman)

The late Commander Habibullah, the late Commander Wahed and others planned to block the convoy. They had some 250 to 300 Mujahideen

armed with two mortars, one recoilless rifle, 12 RPG-7s, and some

Kalashnikov and Enfield rifles. They assigned sectors of responsibility to different groups. Each group would block the highway with

ambushes in its sector. Habibullah (HIK), Commander Aman (IUA)

and I (NIFA) were given the sector from Khwajajam to Khwaja

Musafer. Khwaja-jam is about a kilometer from the Cheltan road fork.

We occupied positions primarily on the south side of the road.

Commanders Ajabgul, Wahed, Abduljan and Kochi had the sector from

Khwaja Musafer to Pajak. They occupied ambush positions mostly on

the southern side of the road. From Pajak to Paghman, Mujahideen

occupied ambush positions on both sides of the road.

We occupied our ambush positions at night. The next morning, the

column left Kabul. As the leading armored vehicle reached Kwaja

Musafer, we opened fire. The ambush turned into a battle as we

destroyed 11 armored vehicles and two helicopters. Enemy aircraft

and helicopters continually tried to drive us from our positions, but we

held and the fighting continued for three days.3Even during the fightCommander Haji Aaquelshah Sahak is from the Chardehi District of Kabul (which is a

southern suburb). He was affiliated with NIFA. [Map sheets 2786 and 2886].

2 Reportedly two companies from the 200th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion.

3

Zakari, a Mujahideen in Commander Sahak's group, gave the following account of a portion of the battle. "I had an 11-shooter [bolt-action Enfield rifle]. It held 10 rounds in the

magazine and one in the chamber. The Russians knew the sound of the 11 shooter and

would count off the 11 shots and then charge after the 11th shot while you were trying to

reload. I was shooting at this Russian and had fired all 11 shots. He had counted my shots

off and charged me. I yelled for help to my friend who had an RPG-7 antitank grenade

launcher. 'What, shoot him with this thing?' my friend replied. 'Yes, he'll kill me' I

answered. 'Okay" he yelled and fired his RPG-7. It completely disintegrated the Russian."
Page 154 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

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ing, the women from the villages would bring bread and milk forward

to our positions. The whole area was actively supporting us. The

inhabitants of Paghman, Oryakhel and Khaldari were feeding us.

Mujahideen came from outside the area to reinforce us. Modir Zaher

of Khaldari took nine wounded Mujahideen into his home. His wife

cared for them, nursed them and applied dressings on them. The

Soviets tried to bypass our ambush by moving on the northern route to

Paghman through Qaragha. Mujahideen stopped this column at

Dodamast northwest of Qaragha. The enemy then tried to bypass the

Kwaja Musafer ambush by skirting around it, but the bypassing force

soon fell into further Mujahideen ambushes. The center of fighting

was Kwaja Musafer and we stopped and held the enemy there. After

three days offighting, the enemy broke contact and withdrew to Kabul.

In my sector, we lost 13 KIA and many wounded. I personally know of

20 wounded, but there were many more. The enemy lost 14 armored

vehicles and trucks in my sector. I know that over 40 DRA soldiers

were captured or defected. We captured hundreds of small arms

during this battle.

COMMENTARY: This is an example of good Mujahideen field cooperation—not always a feature ofthe war. The Mujahideen cooperated and

their overall formation strengthened as the battle continued since

Mujahideen came from all around the area to join in the fight. The

British noted that a good fight had almost a magnetic effect on the

warrior-tribesmen of Afghanistan and the Soviets learned that this

trait had not disappeared over time. The Soviets and DRA broke contact after three days although their lines of communication were intact

and the enemy was fixed in known positions. Firepower could not

break the Mujahideen and the Soviets and DRA would not commit the

necessary infantry to close with the Mujahideen.

The road to Paghman runs through a heavily-populated green zone

and the Mujahideen were able to select and fortify good ambush positions along the route. In this summer fighting, the trees and crops provided good concealment for the Mujahideen.
Page 156 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
VIGNETTE 3

ROAD BLOCK AT ESTALEF

by Commander Sofi Lal Gul

In October 1983, one of my men was injured during a fight with

other Mujahideen from the local area. I took a group of 20 of my

Mujahideen from my base in Farza and went five kilometers north

to Estalef. We were going to meet with local elders in Estalef to settle the dispute with other local commanders. Estalef is a popular

summer resort some 40 kilometers north of Kabul.

Informers told the DRA and Soviets about our gathering and the

enemy decided to attack us. The Soviet forces came from nearby

Bagram and the DRA forces came from Kabul. At night, Mujahideen

patrols at the Estalefjunction ofthe Kabul-Charikar highway reported that Soviet and DRA columns have moved from Kabul and Bagram

and were heading toward Estalef. The Mujahideen alerted their men

at dawn. My 20 men joined a force of nearly 100 commanded by a

local commander who was the son of a leading Estalefi chieftain

(Wakil Mohammad Amin Khan). We took up positions in the

orchards at Deh-e Khwajahasan and Qabr-e Malik (Map 6-3 -

Estalef). We planned to block the Estalef road and deny the enemy

access to the town which dominated the fertile valley.

The Mujahideen commanders divided their men into small teams

of four-five men and deployed them in the orchards along the road in

order to ambush the enemy column over a wide stretch. We instructed our men to let the head of the enemy column reach Qabr-e Malik

and then everyone should open fire. As the leading vehicles reached

Qabr-e Malik, the attack signal was given and relayed through

portable megaphones. We hit the lead armored vehicle and a jeep.

The battle raged along the length ofthe column from Qabr-e Malik to

Deh-e Khwajahasan. The Soviet infantry dismounted and attacked

the Mujahideen positions and heavy fighting ensued. We were scattered throughout the orchards and had plenty of room to maneuver,

so it was hard for the Soviet infantry to pin us down. However, we

were short of supplies, particularly ammunition. Further, the

Soviets/DRA had much more combat power than we did and they

Commander Sofi Lal Gul is from Farza village of Mir Bacha Kot District about 25 kilometers north of Kabul.'-He was affiliated with Mojaddedi's Afghanistan National Liberation

Front of Afghanistan (ANLF) during the war with the Soviets. Commander Sofi Lal Gul concentrated his efforts on the Kabul-Charikar highway. [Map sheet 2886, vie grid 0754].
Page 158 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

were using helicopter gunships and other aircraft against us. Since

we were scattered over a wide area in small groups, Mujahideen

command and control over the battle was difficult and sporadic.

Coordination of the actions of the many resistance groups became

very difficult.

The battle in the orchards continued until 1400 hours. As they

ran out of ammunition, the various Mujahideen groups withdrew in

different directions and moved their wounded to safe areas. The

Soviets consolidated their advance through the green zone, securing

the high ground commanding the approaches to Estalef. I pulled my

men out to Shoraw, about three kilometers northeast of Estalef. The

Soviet/DRA column moved to Estalef and launched an intensive search

of homes. The soldiers looted homes, destroyed property and set fire to

the houses of suspected Mujahideen. Many people lost their livelihoods due to their actions. The Soviets stayed three days in Estalef

and then returned to their bases. Mujahideen casualties in my group

were two KIA and 18 WIA. Most ofthe casualties were from Soviet air

strikes.

COMMENTARY: The large Mujahideen concentration in Estalef, close

to Soviet/DRA forces, was an extremely imprudent move/ If the

Mujahideen patrol had not provided early warning, the Mujahideen

losses at Estalef might have been much higher. The Mujahideen

deserve high marks for their quick reaction and rapid deployment

along the road to Estalef. They utilized their familiarity with their

home area to quickly select effective fighting positions and they used

local terrain and vegetation to conceal themselves from Soviet ground

and air power. However, the Mujahideen suffered from lack of effective command and control which prevented the timely coordination of

counterattacks and countermeasures. Better command and control

might have enabled the Mujahideen to hold the high ground dominating the Estalef approach and to prevent the Soviet entry. But the

well-armed and supported Soviet force was able to push its way

through. The Mujahideen were reluctant to become decisively

engaged in a protracted battle with a much-stronger, better-supplied

opponent. They felt that they had to survive to face this opponent

over and over again. The Mujahideen lack of a structured, viable

supply system hampered their tactical capabilities significantly.

The Soviets and DRA deserve high marks for carrying enough

forces for dismounted combat and for using them aggressively. The

combination of overwhelming firepower and ground maneuver
Chapter 6, Vignette 3 Page 159

unhinged the Mujahideen defense and the decisive action taken by

the Soviet infantry forced the poorly-supplied Mujahideen to break

contact—leaving the dominant terrain and subsequent access to

Estalef open. However, the Soviet/DRA forces merely pushed at a

more-nimble foe and failed to try to outflank or encircle the

Mujahideen force. This kept them from bringing the Mujahideen to

decisive combat and allowed the Mujahideen to withdraw without

heavy losses.
Page 160 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
VIGNETTE 4

DEFENSE OF A RIVER LINE AND ROAD BLOCK AT SAYAD

by Commander Haji Abdul Qader

In late summer and early fall of 1983, the Mujahideen in Nejrao

and Tagao Districts of Kapisa Province increased their attacks on

government facilities. These districts are located on the east side of

the Panjshir River and link Sarobi on the Kabul-Jalalabad highway

with key locations in the provinces of Parwan, Kapisa and Laghman.

These districts also provided access to several Mujahideen mountain

base camps. The only permanent bridge across the Panjshir River (at

Abdullah-e Burj) is located in this area and provides direct access to

Bagram. We expected Soviet/DRA forces at Bagram to launch a

strike through the area. Their purpose would be to protect Sarobi

and the main road connecting Sarobi with the Kapisa Province

Capital of Mahmoud-e Raqi and Gulbahar located further north at

the mouth of the Panjsher Valley.

We decided to block this expected advance with my forces and the

forces of Commander Shahin (based around Mahmoud-e Raqi). We

prepared defensive positions on the north bank of the Panjshir River

around the bridge at Abdullah-e Burj (Map 6-4 - Sayad) We built

blocking positions in a deep ditch which passes through upper Sayad

village and covers the road as it approaches the bridge. We prepared

positions on the high ground south of the river which dominates the

approach and both banks ofthe river. We put in land mines and built

shelters with overhead cover to protect our Mujahideen from air and

artillery fire. We moved supplies forward to a forward supply base in

Deh Babi village immediately northwest of Sayad village. We built

covered trenches from the base to the forward positions. The trenches were big enough to allow us to resupply by pack horses, mules and

foot porters.

Commander Shahin had approximately 600 men and I had

approximately 250. There was not enough space to deploy them all,

so one-third of the force occupied fighting positions while the rest

were in reserve or given support tasks. Some Mujahideen held flank

positions to contain the enemy. Since all of the Mujahideen were

locally based, we were able to deploy the blocking force in total

Haji Abdul Qader was a Commander for the HIK faction. His forces were based around

the vital Bagram area. [Map sheet 2886, 2887, vie grid 2872]
Page 162 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

secrecy. This helped surprise the enemy and hit him at a time and

place where he was not fully ready to react effectively.

Early on the morning of 31 October 1983, Soviet and DRA forces

moved out of their Bagram base along two parallel routes and

approached the Abdullah-e Burj bridge. I estimate the strength at

several regiments backed by strong artillery support and ample logistics. Tanks and APCs led the column. As the head of the column

reached the lower Sayad village on the southern bank, the tail of the

column had not cleared their Bagram base some ten kilometers to the

southwest. As the enemy tanks and APCs passed through lower

Sayad village toward the river, we opened fire and took the enemy by

surprise. It took the enemy some time to react and find our positions.

We intensified our fire as more vehicles of the enemy column came

into anti-tank weapons range. We hit several of their vehicles and

they started to burn. Instead of trying to secure the bridge by

infantry, the enemy continued to push his tanks and APCs toward

the bridge. One tank and two APCs made it to the bridge, but we

knocked them out at the bridge site.

The enemy stopped and began pounding suspected Mujahideen

positions with artillery fire and air attacks. He also began indiscriminately bombing the area, including the surrounding villages.

However, our blocking force was well entrenched and protected

against the enemy fire. Most of our Mujahideen moved into the

covered shelters for the duration of the enemy fire preparation. As

soon as the enemy began to shift his fire so that he could launch an

attack, our Mujahideen would reoccupy their fighting positions and

engage enemy infantry and tanks with mortars, machine guns,

82mm recoilless rifles and RPG-7s. The news of our defense against

the Soviet/DRA forces soon spread throughout the area and reached

as far as Kabul, Charikar and Panjsher. Mujahideen from these

areas began to move to the fight. This had a demoralizing impact on

the enemy as these Mujahideen began probing attacks against his

flanks and rear.

In early afternoon, the enemy reinforced his efforts with some

DRA troops and launched another attack to clear the roadblock. We

drove back the attack and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. In

the late afternoon, the enemy again conducted heavy artillery and air

strikes on our positions. Artillery, jets and helicopter gunships took

their turns against us and then a Soviet unit attacked us. We defeated this attack as well. During the night, the enemy tried to attack

across the bridge three times. Each time he was unsuccessful. The
Chapter 6, Vignette 4 Page 163

river could not be forded by vehicles and he did not try using infantry

in assault boats to cross at another point to outflank us. Probably the

number of Mujahideen who had come to the fight on both sides of

the river discouraged the enemy from risking an infantry assault

crossing at night.

On the morning of 1 November, the enemy resumed heavy

artillery fire and air attacks. At the same time, we detected enemy

activity toward the south. Around 1000 hours, the enemy facing the

bridge began to break contact. Most of their troops headed south

across the plain on the southern bank of the Panjsher river. We later

found out that the enemy built an engineer bridge across the river

near Shokhi, some 20 kilometers down stream and crossed there to

move against Nejrao and Tagao Districts. Seeing the enemy withdraw, we left our positions and collected what the enemy had left

behind. The next day, we pushed their disabled tanks and APCs off

the bridge into the river.

COMMENTARY: The Soviet/DRA force did not lead with reconnaissance,

nor did it use forward detachments to seize potential chokepoints

before it moved. The Soviet/DRA force was evidently surprised by the

strong resistance they met. Had they detected the Mujahideen road

block in advance, they could have dealt with it more effectively than

trying to force a crossing through repeated frontal attacks.

The Soviet/DRA force had several options besides frontal attacks.

First, they could have moved DRA forces from Jabul-e Seraj and

Gulbahar in the north to attack the Mujahideen positions from the

flank and rear since these forces were already garrisoned across the

river. Second, they could have conducted an infantry assault crossing

at an unopposed site and then attacked the Mujahideen position from

the flank. Third, ifspeed was essential, the planners could have selected the option it was later forced to choose after sustaining losses and

losing much time at the Abdullah-e Burj bridge.

Once delayed by a strong Mujahideen resistance, the Soviet/DRA

columns acted very slowly to try to seize the initiative. Tanks were

ineffective in forcing the bridge. The Soviet/DRA force needed to use

well-trained infantry to seize the dominant Kuh-e Top Mountain quickly. This mountain was on their side of the river and would facilitate

forcing the bridge. By allowing the column to stall in a Mujahideen

area, the Soviet/DRA force became vulnerable to flank and rear attacks

by local Mujahideen. Quick, decisive action is key to the survival of a

stalled, surrounded force.
Page 164 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Mujahideen secrecy while planning and implementing the road

block was commendable. The local commanders coordinated their

actions and the force fought staunchly. Their well-prepared defensive

positions allowed them to survive artillery fire and air bombardment.

The Mujahideen had the advantage offighting on home turfwith local

support.

Had the Mujahideen developed a more effective system of operational cooperation and coordination, the enemy column might not have

succeeded in reaching Nejrao and Tagao. Lack of a viable operational

command and control system prevented the Mujahideen at Abdullah-e

Burj, Shokhi, Nejrao and Tagao from acting together. A more elaborate

operational coordination could have mobilized the Mujahideen forces

at Shokhi to prevent the Soviet/DRA troops from crossing the river to

Kapisa Province.
VIGNETTE 5

THE DEFENSE AGAINST THE SOVIET OPERATION "MAGISTRAL"

by General Gulzarak Zadran, Lieutenant Omar,

Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani, and Mawlawi Abdul-Rahman

"We were a very desperate people without much equipment or armaments, but we had the power ofourfaith,

love for our homeland, love offreedom and reliance on

the Almighty. We were fighting against very heavy

odds."

General Gulzarak Zadran

Sources in the DRA warned us that a combined Soviet/DRA

force would launch an offensive to open the road between Gardez

and Khowst. We Mujahideen closed the road in March 1979 and

the government had supplied their garrison at Khowst by air ever

since. The DRA had tried to open the road on many occasions and

had two entire regiments annihilated in the process. The road had

become a thing of myth—the Mujahideen-held road that no power

could open. We watched the enemy mass his forces and supplies in

Gardez in November 1987. This was clearly going to be a major 40th

Army operation involving forces from several Soviet motorized rifle

divisions, the Soviet airborne division, DRA units, Spetsnaz, massed

artillery, surface-to-surface missiles, and Soviet air power. At the

time, General Zadran analyzed the impending operation to determine its operational significance. He determined two possible goals

for the operation: this unprecedented massing of such a major force

either meant that the Soviets wanted to escalate the war by threatening Pakistan directly from Paktia; or the Soviets wanted to shatter

General Guzarak Zadran was an officer in the Afghan Army and attended the Afghan Army

Higher OfficersTraining Institute where the author, Ali Jalali, was his instructor. He joined

the resistance and fought in Paktia Province. He fought in Zhawar 1 and 2 and at the

Satakandow pass. He belonged to IUA. After the fall of the DRA, he became the Deputy

Minister of Defense in the interim government. Currently he lives near Peshawar. [Map

sheets 2883, 2884, 2983].

Lieutenant Omar (Zabit Omar) graduated from the Kabul Military Academy in the 1970s.

After the communist coup and the Soviet invasion, Lieutenant Omar joined the Mujahideen

of the fundamentalist Islamic Party (HIK) founded by Mawlawi Mohammed Yunis Khalis.

He was a close aide to Jalaluddin Haqani and fought with him throughout the war. Haqani

ran the Mujahideen effort in the crucial Paktia Province. Lieutenant Omar also served as
Page 166 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 6, Vignette 5 Page 167

the myth that the Mujahideen along the Gardez-Khowst highway are

invincible by opening the unopenable road. If the Soviet goal was to

escalate and to threaten Pakistan, then the Soviets needed to bring

more forces to Paktia Province after they opened the road to Khowst.

General Zadran thought that this was too dangerous a gamble for

the Soviets to take, considering the probable international and

regional implications. Instead, General Zadran concluded that the

Soviets meant to show their military might to the world by doing

the impossible, so that they could then end the Soviet occupation

of Afghanistan and withdraw with a solid victory to their credit. In

order to accomplish the impossible, the Soviets needed to force

the main road from Gardez with at least a division and, having

achieved the breakthrough, move toward Khowst to link-up with

the DRA 25th Infantry Division which would try to open a corridor

to the west. General Zadran's final analysis was that the Soviets

needed to flex their muscles by opening the road that had been closed

for all those years.

We started to prepare for the Soviet offensive against the

Satakandow pass. The shoulders of the pass loom some 400 meters

over the road and, once in the pass, the road follows a slow, twisted

route packed with hairpin curves. It is an excellent place to defend.

We reinforced the minefields along the road. • We laid three mine

belts on a three kilometer front at the opening of the pass with 300-

400 meters between mine belts. We reinforced our positions on the

high ground overlooking the road and pass. We had a total of ten

BM-12s in the area. We crowned the pass with ZGU-1 air defense

machine guns. These are both good positional weapons but are

very difficult to displace rapidly when the situation requires. We

also had DShK machine guns, 75mm and 82mm recoilless rifles

and plenty of RPG-7s. Haji Nawab Khan commanded the

Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani was a group commander and a deputy to Jalaluddin Haqani.

He was a member of the fundamentalist Islamic Party (HIK) led by Mawlawi Mohammed

Yunus Khalis. He joined the Mujahideen following the communist coup in 1978 and fought

in the Paktia area. Prior to the Soviet invasion, his group had liberated the area surrounding Khowst and only the city of Khowst remained under government control.

Mawlawi Abdul-Rahman of Zadran is the son of Noor Mahmuod from Kandow village.

When Soviet forces attacked Satakandow pass, his group of 100-120 local Mujahideen

occupied positions at Ghelgoy. They were armed with 82mm recoilless rifles, ZGU-1

machine guns, DShK machine guns, 82mm mortars, MBRL and one Stinger. His group

fought a rearguard action through the pass to Sewak before they went into the mountains.

He lost ten KIA in the fighting.
Page 168 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Satakandow pass approach. Two kilometers to the west of the

Satakandow pass is the Khadai pass—a secondary pass with a dirt

trail going through it. We reinforced the defenses here as well.

Ismail commanded the Khadai pass approach (Map 6-5 - Magistral).

Most of the Mujahideen in this area were local men who were

defending their own villages. Unlike other parts ofAfghanistan, the

people still lived here and had not been driven out to the refugee

camps in Pakistan. The majority of the people in the area belonged

to the Zadran tribe, but other tribes and different factions were also

involved. The decision to prepare and the decision to fight was not

made by the factions, but by the tribal council. This was to be fight

for homes and neighborhoods. Our local major commanders were

Mawlawi Neza-muddin Haqani, Mula Ibrahim, Mula Abdurrahman,

Captain Khan' Zamak, Izat Khan, Ghaday, Dool Khan, Ghanamkay,

Sadat, Hakem, Jung, Dr. Khiali, Badshah and Alef.

We focused our efforts on the main road where it runs through

the Satakandow pass. There is another road some seven kilometers

to the east which goes through the Saroti pass and joins the main

highway at Lakatega4—some 25 kilometers to the south of the

Satakandow pass. This is a poor road which passes through the Dari

Khel tribe.5 We did not expect that the Soviets would want to move

vehicles along this road, so we did not mine it. However, we did reinforce the local Mujahideen in this area. Each tribe sent harbakai to

help and we sent about 300 harbakai as reinforcements to the Saroti

pass in the Dari Khel area. Commander Badshah commanded the

Saroti approach.

The Soviets established forward bases at Dara and Zawa. They

deployed their artillery in Division Artillery Groups (DAGs) near

Dara and deployed their Army Artillery Group further back south of

Gardez. They moved a maneuver force to Zawa. Suddenly, they

launched an attack from Zawa toward Saroti. We were completely

taken by surprise. In four to five days offighting, the Soviets pushed

us back on the Saroti approach. Commander Badshah was killed in

this fighting. Qader Shah took over command and fought a stubborn

withdrawal back through the Saroti pass (Map 6-6 - Phase 1).

Once the Soviets captured the Saroti pass, they launched air

assault landings on the high ground located between the main road

and the road through the Saroti pass. They now held key terrain

4

Lakatega means erected stone.

5

The Dari Khel tribe is a subdivision of the Zadran tribe. The Dari Khel have a well

deserved reputation as a very military and warlike people.
Chapter 6, Vignette 5 Page 169
Page 170 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

controlling both axes with air assault troops and small caliber

artillery.6Prom these peaks, they could hit our positions and

support their advance through the Satakandow pass on the main

road. At the same time, they could support their continued advance

along the Saroti approach. Their sudden seizure of the high ground

between their two axes gave them a tremendous advantage. The

Soviets began bombing the Mujahideen headquarters at Sarani.

Command and control suffered greatly from the shelling.

The Soviets on the high ground began directing artillery and rocket fire on the villages in both valleys leading from Satakandow and

Saroti. The Zadrans in the villages had not emigrated and the

Soviets wanted to displace them. They were successful. Many

Mujahideen, concerned about the danger to their families, left the

fighting to evacuate their families to Pakistan. This exodus opened

the way for the further advance of the Soviet troops. They were now

ready for the main attack on the Satakandow axis.

The Soviets opened their operation against the Satakandow pass7

with heavy air strikes and artillery fire while they moved their

maneuver forces to Dara. Then, once their positions were set, they

flew an airplane over the pass at high altitude, dropping paratroopers. Reconnaissance aircraft, flying at much higher altitudes, trailed

the aircraft that was dropping the paratroopers. We engaged the

paratroopers with all our air defense machine guns and whatever

other air defense weapons we had. As the paratroopers drifted closer, we realized that we had been duped. The "paratroopers" were

dummies and the reconnaissance aircraft had photographed our

response and pinpointed our positions.

The Soviets now began firing on our positions in earnest. Heavy

artillery strikes followed air strikes, which were followed by more

artillery strikes. We were pinned down in our positions by the strikes

which continued for hours. Our positions were generally artilleryproof but not bomb-proof and, thanks to their reconnaissance, they

were hitting our positions exactly. They then launched their ground

attack, but we readily defeated it. The next day, 1 December 1987,

they resumed their heavy shelling and bombing.

The overwhelming force of their artillery and airpower took the

6

Possibly the AM 2B9 Vasilyek (Cornflower) 82mm automatic mortar. This weapon can

fire direct and indirect fire. Other candidates are the older D-44 85mm gun (which was

found in airborne units) or the M-69 76mm mountain gun.

7

Vignette 17\nThe Bear Went Over the Mountain describes the battle for the Satakandow

pass from a Soviet perspective.
Chapter 6, Vignette 5 Page 171

initiative from us. There were no Soviet forces garrisoned in Paktia

and we were used to fighting the DRA. The DRA had no artillery

larger than 130mm. Now we were getting pounded by heavy artillery

including BM21 and BM-27 MRL. In Dara, the Soviets had three,

powerful, long-range heavy artillery pieces with four tires each. We

saw one of these firing. The firing recoil gases alone flipped a jeep

over.8 Aircraft were dropping cluster bombs on us. We could not

survive in these positions, so we left our positions and moved to

higher mountains in the west called Ghumbor Khwaley and Fakhry.

The Soviets advanced on our positions behind us and, after five days,

they seized the Satakandow pass.

We had cut and destroyed sections of the road in the Satakandow

pass. As the Soviets tried to repair the road, we started firing on

them with our heavy weapons from the high ground. But the Soviet

firepower was strong and the Soviets pushed us higher into the

mountains. As their converging forces cut our rear, we fell back. They

captured Gulzarak Zadran's base at Shwak. The Mujahideen took

what equipment they could, but some had to be abandoned to the

enemy. The Mujahideen withdrew to the southwest mountains and

the Soviets/DRA advanced and established a base camp where they

stayed for two days. Then they resumed their advance to Sarani.

They destroyed the Mujahideen base camp at Sarani—our first indication that the Soviets/DRA planned to abandon the route instead of

trying to maintain a long-term presence there.

The Mujahideen plight was serious and we were suddenly faced

with a new problem—the absence of drinking water. The intensity

of Soviet shelling was so great, that the chemical residue from

the explosions had contaminated the streams. Some of us thought

that the Soviets had poisoned the water since one glass of water

would choke you up and make you very ill. We had to use snow for

drinking water, but the snow was also affected by the chemicals. Our

supplies were cut off and food was scarce, but our major problem

was thirst. People were suffering from dehydration, but they could

not use the local water. We had not made arrangements to haul

water into the area since local water had always been adequate

for our needs. The roads were blocked so trucks could not enter the

area. We had some mules that we could use in some of the area, but

8

This was probably the 2A36 152mm gun, the "Hyacinth". It has a maximum range of

28.5 kilometers and fires 5-6 rounds per minute. The round weighs 46 kilograms and has

a muzzle velocity of 942 meters/sec. The piece weighs 9,800 kg and has a 8.197 meter

long barrel. Krasnaya zvezda [Red star], 16 July 1993, page 2.
Page 172 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

we carried in most of our supplies by Mujahideen porters.

The Soviets continued their move south. They preceded their

movement by air assault landings to seize high ground on both

sides of the road. Their columns would then advance under the

protection of these picketing forces. As the Soviets moved forward,

they left security OPs behind to secure their lines of communication.

The Soviets reached Lakatega and the columns from Satakandow

and Saroti linked up. After that, it was smoother for them. The

Soviets/DRA left a security detachment at Lakatega and advanced

on Khowst. At the same time, a DRA detachment from the 25th

Infantry division moved west out of Khowst to link up with the

approaching column. After the force secured the road to Khowst, they

began moving supply columns along the road to resupply the

beleaguered city.

The tide was beginning to turn. The local Mujahideen, who had

taken their families to Pakistan, returned. Mawlawi Jalaluddin

Haqani and other commanders (Matiullah, Mula Abdul Ghafur,

Gulzarak Zadran, Amanullah, Mula Seddiq, Tawakal, Abdur-rahman, Wakil Wazir Mohammad, Pari, Padshah Khan and Sadat)

arrived and moved into the mountains west of the highway. Colonel

Imam of the Pakistani ISI arrived and tried to coordinate, the

Mujahideen action. Haji Amanullah Khan and other commanders

arrived. Mujahideen from other areas in Afghanistan arrived.

Mujahideen and Taliban arrived from Pakistan. They were all eager

for a fight. The Mujahi-deen selected 12 commanders and assigned

enemy outposts between Wazi and Satakandow for them to attack.

The Soviets had moved into the side valleys, but the 12 commanders

forced the Soviets out of the side valleys and confined them to the

vicinity of the road. Then they began attacking the road. Jalaluddin

Haqani, was at Fakhry. Once again, Jalaluddin Haqani was wounded during battle—this time with shrapnel in his thigh. Although

Haqani was wounded, he stayed on for a week. Then he was evacuated on mule back over mountain paths to Miram Shah.

The Soviets/DRA could only keep the road open for 12 days. Then

they withdrew. When the Soviet air assault abandoned the heights,

they took their weapons, but left all the ammunition behind. The

Mujahideen recaptured the road and neither the DRA nor the Soviets

could reopen it.

Despite the intensity of battle, Mujahideen casualties were light.

There were perhaps some 100 Mujahideen KIA. The villagers

suffered greatly and the villages were heavily damaged or destroyed.
Chapter 6, Vignette 5 Page 173

Some 80% of the villages in the area were damaged. Soviet/DRA

losses are unknown. The Mujahideen shot down one helicopter and

three jets. As the Soviets withdrew, we captured two intact Soviet

tanks and four trucks. Some 600 DRA soldiers defected or were

captured. Most of them defected with their weapons.

COMMENTARY: Gulzarak Zadran's evaluation of the Soviets is not

flattering. "I should mention here that the Russian Army is a worthless military institution and that no professional soldier will

give them a high mark in discipline or the will to fight. They are

useless. I should also note that the Russians relied throughout the

action on maximum use of artillery and one Mujahideen would draw

the fire of a battery or more for several minutes. The high peaks

which they occupied by heliborne troops helped them a lot. Even

there, they surrounded themselves with all sorts of mines. And these

'bears' would be sitting around lighted campfires to keep themselves

warm in the winter, so the peaks were on fire all night. The Soviet

Air Force was not very effective because they flew very high, probably out of fear of our Stingers."

Despite General Zadran's comments, the Soviet planning and

execution of this operation was well done. It matches the initial

Soviet invasion in tactical surprise, the use of multiple axis, operational tempo and innovation. The fire support and logistics portion of

the plan were first rate and the use of dummy paratroopers was a

masterstroke. The use of air-assault forces was well-planned and

executed. The Soviets needed a "save-face" operation before withdrawal and Magistral was that.
Page 174 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
VIGNETTE 6

OPERATION GHASHEY (ARROW IN PUSHTO)

by General Abdul Rahim Wardak

From 23 October to 7 November 1988, a force of some 2,000

Mujahideen from the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA)

shut down the Kabul-Jalalabad highway along a 70-kilometer stretch

between Sarobi and Laghman. I commanded them.

This action was part of a four-party (NIFA, HIK, HIH and JIA)

combined operation aimed at closing the eastern supply route to

the Afghan capital for a period of two months (October-November).

Each party was responsible for deploying its units to keep the highway blocked for 15 days. The operation was planned in the wake of

Soviet forces withdrawal from the Nangrahar Province. The

Mujahideen intent was to prevent the government from reinforcing

the Jalalabad garrison while the Mujahideen prepared to advance on

Jalalabad from Torkham.

Elements ofthe DRA 8th and 18th border guard brigades, the DRA

60th Infantry Division, tank subunits from the 15th Tank Brigade, a

Sarandoy battalion and local militia manned the enemy's six bases and

nearly 20 outposts along this stretch of road. The DRA hoped to protect the highway against Mujahideen attacks and keep the supply

route to Jalalabad open (Map 6-7a - Arrow 1). Each base was manned

by at least a platoon reinforced by one or two tanks or APCs, 122mm

D30 howitzers plus heavy machine guns and 82mm mortars. The

outposts consisted of five to ten men reinforced with machine guns,

AGS-17 and mortars.9

I assembled my force from Mujahideen groups based across

General Wardak was an officer in the Afghan Army. He trained at US military schools

before the war and testified before the United States Congress on several occasions during the war. He was one of the most noted Mujahideen commanders. At the close of the

war, he was seriously wounded by a SCUD missile and was treated in the United States

for his wounds. He became the first Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the

Islamic Government of Afghanistan in 1992 following the Mujahideen victory and the downfall of the communist regime in Kabul. NIFA records and other interviews conducted by Ali

Jalali are used in this vignette. Correspondent Askold Krushelnycky accompanied NIFA

forces and filed a report on Operation Gashay in The Sunday times of 6 November 1988.

[Map sheets 2985, 2986,3085 and 3086].

9

A layout and discussion of the security outposts along this stretch of highway are found

in LTC Tubeev's article on pages 129-133 of The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet

Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, edited by Lester W. Grau, Washington: NDU Press, 1996.
Page 176 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

several districts in Nangrahar and Kabul Provinces. Some of these

groups were based more than 200 kilometers apart. Other groups

and a contingent of 70 former Afghan Army officers, who were used

to work with combat task forces, came from the NIFA central reserve

based in Pakistan.

I organized my force into five strike groups (task forces Bravo,

Charlie, Falcon, Gulf and Hurricane), two containment (holding)

groups (task forces Alpha and Delta), one reserve (task force Echo) and

one rocket launcher group (Saqar Rocket launcher). The force composition follows:

A. NIFA's Kabul Province Eastern Sector Forces under the overall command

of Dr. Shahrukh Gran

1. Task Force Alpha

AO: Marora and Salamkhel Tangay

Number of Mujahideen: 350"

Unit commanders: Sadiq Patang, Haji Sangeen, Mir Wali, Khawani,

Mirajan, Wrekhmin, Haji Habib, and Mo'alem Karim.

2. Task Force Bravo

AO: Debili

Number of Mujahideen: 393

Unit commanders: Janat Gul, Haji Mir, Gulbat, Sakhi Usmankhel, Ghulam

Easoul

3. Task Force Charlie

AO: Kamkay Dargo

Number of Mujahideen: 276

Unit commanders: Mohammad Alam, Zaher Khan, Sahak, Sakhi Janikhel,

Majnoon

4. Task Force Delta

AO: Ghata Dargo

Number of Mujahideen: 411

Unit commanders: Noor Hasan, Sayed Rahman, Captain Zalmay, Afridi,

Gulab, Noor Rahman, Ruhullah.

5. Task Force Echo

AO: Dargo

Number of Mujahideen: 343

Unit commanders: Hasan Khan Kairokhel, Sartor, Asel Khan, Captain

Hashmat, Khalil, Ehsan

6. Task Force SSM (Saqar)

AO: Chakari targeting Kabul Airport

Number of Mujahideen: 100

Unit commanders: Captain Sediqullah, Zaher Kahn, Shinwari, Hanari,

Ghulam Haider, Umar, Hasan Khan, Momin Khan
Chapter 6, Vignette 6 Page 177

B. NIFÄ Forces From Nangrahar Province, Southwestern Sector:

1. Task Force Falcon

AO: Tor Ghar opposite the Kaftarkhana base

Number of Mujahideen: 250

Unit commanders: Lt. Wali, Shari'ati, Mohammad Anwar

2. Task Force Gulf

AO: Tor Ghar opposite the Spina Thana base

Number of Mujahideen: 350

Unit commanders: Haji Zaman Ghamsharik, Zabit Zaher

3. Task Force Hurricane

AO: Tor Ghar opposite Khairokhel base

Number of Mujahideen: 130

Unit commahders: Asef Khan, Qazi Samiullah

While all these groups were assembling to the south of the Kabul

River, I ordered a group of about 50 Mujahideen under command of

Lieutenant Ali Ahmad and Ghuncha Gul to move from their bases in

the north (Ozbin area) and take positions at the northern ridge along

the Kabul-Jalalabad highway overlooking the Debili bridge. They

were to observe enemy activity and support the operation by fire. This

group occupied the designated position but was unable to participate

effectively and withdrew after a few days.

While the number of Mujahideen in each group ranged between

100 and 350, I could use only one third of them for combat since the

rest were required for logistics and security tasks and occasionally

relieving combatants at the front lines.

My force was armed with individual automatic rifles (AK-47), light

machine guns (RPK), heavy machine guns (PK), light anti-tank

grenade launchers (RPG-7), Milan anti-tank missile launchers, 82mm

recoilless rifles, 75mm recoilless rifles, 82mm mortars, 107mm

Multiple Barrel (twelve barrel) rocket launchers (BM12), Saqar Rocket

Launchers, and Stinger shoulder-fired air defense missiles.

I instructed my five strike groups to attack and seize enemy

bases/outposts, establish road blocks and lay ambushes against the

enemy columns.

The western containment (holding) group—Task Force Alphawas positioned in Marora and Salamkhel Tangay area. I ordered them

to block enemy columns attempting to enter its AO or attempting to

outflank my forces along the old Sarobi-Jalalabad road. This road

passes through Jegdalay, one of my main Mujahideen supply bases. I

gave Task Force Alpha an "on order" mission to disrupt any enemy concentration in Sarobi by fire. I gave the eastern containment (holding)
Page 178 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

group—Task Force Delta—a similar mission on the eastern flank of

the operation area, i.e. eastern mouth of the Abreshmin Gorge. I gave

Task Force Delta an "on order" mission to be prepared to serve as a

strike group. I had the Reserve group (Task Force Echo) concentrate

in the Dargo area. They were prepared to act against enemy heliborne

insertions; to relieve task forces Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta; and to

launch a counter-attack if needed.

I had the rocket launcher detachment operate independently.

Their mission was to occupy firing positions in the Chakari area (about

80 kilometers away)and hit the Kabul airport to divert attention from

the rest of the operation.

Conduct of the Operation

During the late part of September and first three weeks of October

1988, I directed the preparation, resupply and movement of participating Mujahideen forces as they moved to the area of operation and

deployed for action. I moved a total of 400 tons of various supplies

from Pakistan to the area of operation by mules and other pack animals. Supplies included mines, small arms ammunition, rockets, mortar rounds and anti-tank ammunition.

One major challenge facing me was to covertly move the various

Mujahideen groups from widely dispersed locations to the deployment

area, avoiding enemy observation and air attack. Further, moving

ammunition, supplies and men from Pakistan through the three

provinces of Paktia, Logar and Kabul required detailed planning and

careful execution.

Mujahideen were all unpaid volunteers who joined the jihad to

fight. One leadership challenge was to convince guerrillas to perform

the vital, if unglamourous, missions of rear area security and LOC

security instead of participating in actual combat. This was always

hard since these volunteers wanted to fight.

Another leadership challenge was commanding and controlling

a volunteer multi-regional force and integrating them into a single

command. In fact, as later transpired, the right flank strike groups

(task forces Falcon and Hurricane) left their positions and withdrew

unannounced to their permanent bases when their permanent bases

came under enemy threat. Further, as our operation continued over a

week many Mujahideen became restless and gradually left the battle

area unannounced. Mujahideen had developed the habit of what Ali

Jalali terms "short hit and long run tactics."
Chapter 6, Vignette 6 Page 179

There were several reasons for this. First, the Mujahideen felt that

they were fighting a war of "a thousand battles" and no single battle

was a decisive one. Therefore, the Mujahideen felt that combat should

be limited in terms of time and space in order to increase the

Mujahideen's survivability.

Another reason was the absence of an efficient logistic system to

provide meals, medical support and other required services. The fighters were issued all available supplies prior to the battle. There was

seldom resupply available afterwards. This forced the Mujahideen to

carry heavy loads and forage for food. Local food resources were scarce

since the Soviets had destroyed the local economy and driven out the

population in the rural areas. Consequently, Mujahideen field rations

had to be carried from Pakistan and were poor and monotonous (usually bread with tea or boiled rice and dhal (a split chick pea dish).

Mujahideen fought best on their home territory. This area of operation was not the "home turf for most of my forces. They were not

fighting on their home territory but away from their villages where

they were better provided for and had a better chance for rest. Given

the traditional attachment of the Afghan resistance to its home territory, many Mujahideen did not feel the same enthusiasm they showed

in fighting their own villages.

Finally, the long treks in the mountains sometimes lasted for

weeks and contributed to fatigue before the battle began.

Mujahideen commanders were hard pressed to keep their extremely

hungry and tired fighters together for an extended period of time.

Although my operations plan encompassed a wide front from

Sarobi to Surkhakan Bridge (70 kilometers), the main action took

place on a four-kilometer stretch between Debili and Dargo bases

(Map 6-7b - Arrow 2). Combat at other points was either in support

of this action (task forces Alpha, Delta and Echo), or were separate

actions (such as attacks on Khairokhel Post, Spina Thana Base and

Kaftarkhana Base).

The operation began with rocket attacks on the Kabul military

airport on October 19. The rocket launcher detachment targeted the

airfield and kept it under intermittent fire until a few days after

the beginning of the road block when the rocket detachment

moved to Jagdalay to fire on an enemy concentration in the NghluSarobi area.

My operations plan had four phases:

1. Attack to destroy and seize enemy bases and outposts.
Page 180 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 6, Vignette 6 Page 181

2. Block the road by destroying bridges, laying mines and shelling

enemy columns attempting to reopen the highway.

3. When the enemy manages to reopen the highway, conduct a largescale ambush to inflict heavy losses.

4. Break contact and withdraw.

PHASE ONE

The strike groups initiated their attack along the extended

front at 1000 hours, October 23. Rocket launchers, mortars, recoilless rifles and heavy machine guns provided supporting fire from the

southern high ground overlooking the highway. Since the area was

heavily mined by the enemy, my Mujahideen could not descend on

the road from all points. Instead, they moved down a limited number

of mountain arroyos. These arroyos were safe since minefields could

not be maintained in them due to the periodic flash floods which

swept through them. These arroyos were mostly in the Debili and

Dargo area.

Once my Mujahideen passed through the mined area, they fanned

out and attacked the enemy using the paved road as the main

approach. Their movement was covered by fire from the high ground

dominating the gorge. The assault groups stormed the targeted

enemy outposts and bases. After fierce fighting, several posts were

overrun and others isolated from their bases and neighboring posts

by 1600 hours.

During subsequent attacks through October 25, my force seized

14 outposts and four bases. The occupants were killed, fled or

captured. We seized about 100 prisoners, 11 tanks or APCs and 21

other vehicles. We damaged the hydroelectric installations at Sarobi

and Nghlu which supply electricity to Kabul and Jalalabad. Our losses were 10 killed and 21 wounded.

Phase Two

As my strike groups secured the highway, they destroyed

three highway bridges—Khairokhel bridge, Istehkam (Dargo) bridge

and Debili bridge; mined the road; set up road blocks and established firing positions on the southern high ground overlooking

the highway, the roadblocks and the destroyed bridges. Four other

outposts and the remaining bases, except the Mash äla base, fell to

us by October 31.

The DRAs reaction was slow and incremental. The DRA now

lacked sufficient observation and security posts on the high ground
Page 182 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

flanking the highway. The DRA failed to recapture any of his outposts except the Owa-Tsalay post. The Owa-Tsalay post was located

on the highest peak overlooking Sarobi and provided observation of

Mujahideen groupings and artillery positions. The Owa-Tsalay outpost changed hands several times, but we finally held it. The DRA

held the Mash'ala Base throughout the operation.

Our attack gained control of this stretch of the highway. DRA

reaction was very slow and ineffective. DRA forces in Sarobi fired

lots of artillery against my attacking force while their aircraft

bombed suspected Mujahideen positions on the rocky ridges south

and southwest of the gorge. DRA and Soviet helicopter gunships

were not very effective since they did not dare fly low through the

gorge or fly close to our positions. The DRA made no attempt to

outflank NIFA positions from Sarobi or from the eastern mouth ofthe

gorge at Mash'ala base. They also made no attempt to use heliborne

troops to cut our supply and withdrawal routes.

From October 25 through the end of the operation, the enemy

concentrated its efforts on building up forces at the two entrances

of the gorge and continuously tried to demolish our roadblocks

and regain control of the gorge section of highway. The DRA

launched frontal attacks using infantry supported by tanks moving

from the Mash'ala base in the east and from Sarobi in the west.

The DRA reinforced the beleaguered Mash'ala base with elements of

the 11th DRA Division which had been operating in Alingar District

of Laghman Province.

The DRA build-up from Laghman and Jalalabad was possible

because Mujahideen groups from Nangrahar Province (task forces

Hurricane, Gulf and Falcon) withdrew a week after overrunning their

assigned objectives. The DRA had moved reinforcements and

launched attacks in Nanagahar Province and the Mujahideen from

that area left to defend their homes. Consequently the DRA was

able to push more troops into the gorge from the east in an

attempt to break through the main obstacles (between Dargo and

Debili). From 25 through 31 October, the DRA launched several

unsuccessful attempts to open the road and suffered losses in men

and vehicles.

As the task forces Falcon, Gulf and Hurricane withdrew from

their sectors, two mechanized columns of DRA moved into the area

from two directions. Elements of 8th DRA Division, reinforced with

Soviet elements, moved east from Kabul to Sarobi and tried to open

the highway. Another column moved west from Jalalabad trying to
Chapter 6, Vignette 6 Page 183

overrun Mujahideen blocking positions between Dargo and Debili.

The pressure of the two-pronged attack on the widely scattered

Mujahideen groups and the lack of supplies forced me to narrow my

front and concentrate in the four-kilometer stretch between Dargo

and Debili between the two highway bridges which his Mujahideen

had destroyed earlier.

From 1 to 6 November, the enemy moved bridge-building vehicles

supported by tanks and motorized infantry to lay bridges across

the Kabul river at Debili and Dargo. We Mujahideen repeatedly

disrupted and defeated these attempts by firing from the high ground

south of the narrow gorge. We also took DRA columns under crossfire from well-prepared positions. During these attempts, the DRA

lost several tanks, APCs and bridging equipment sets.

PHASE THREE

The third phase of the operation was the conduct a large-scale

ambush before withdrawal. I ordered all Mujahideen task forces to

observe complete radio silence and cease firing effective 2000 hours

on 6 November. I further directed some Mujahideen to physically

withdraw as part ofthe deception. The next morning, the entire front

was quiet. The DRA moved freely along the highway and replaced

the necessary bridges. At 1530 hours, the DRA started moving large

mechanized columns across the Debili bridge toward Dargo, entering

our "kill zone." A large number of vehicles entered the kill zone as

traffic surged into the gorge from both directions. The two-way lanes

were full of vehicles and a traffic bottleneck ensued. The head of the

column coming from the east reached the repaired bridge at Debili

and the head of the column coming from the west reached the newlyEnemy Outposts Overrun:

1. Owa-Tselay Post 7. Dargo post

2. Sherkhan Upper Post 8. Kalima Post

3. Gharray Post 9. GirdabiPost

4. Two outposts set between the 10. Toot Post

Pul-e Estehkam bridge and 11. Soorey Tiga Post

Debili bases. 12. Lakai Post

5. Two outposts around the Pul-e 13.TekasPost

Estehkam Base 14. Surkhakan Bridge Post

6. One outpost set between the 15. Khairokhel Post

Dargo and Pul-e Estehkam 16. Lower Khairokhel Post

Bridge
Page 184 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Enemy Bases Overrun during the Operation

1. DebiliBase 4. Tori Zhawari Base

2. DargoBase 5. Kaftarkhana Base

3. Pul-e Estehkam Base 6. Spina Thana Base

(Engineer Bridge Base)

restored bridge at Dargo. The four-kilometer stretch between the two

restored bridges was jammed with traffic when I gave the signal to

open fire. My Mujahideen opened fire along the entire front, taking

the DRA by surprise. Mujahideen firing began at 1600 hours and

continued until 1900 hours in the evening. We inflicted heavy losses

on the trapped columns. The DRA columns retreated into Sarobi.

PHASE FOUR

My Mujahideen withdrew without DRA interference. They broke

contact during the night following the ambush and returned to their

bases.

DBA/Soviet Losses

Total losses during the entire operation include:

• Forty-two tanks and APCs, six BMPs, nine artillery pieces, one

BM-13 MRL, one bulldozer, two cranes, 65 soft-skin vehicles, two

jet aircraft and one helicopter gunship destroyed or damaged. Most

vehicle losses were inflicted during the Phase 3 ambush.

• Over 500 soldiers killed or wounded and 212 soldiers and 11 officers captured.

• Four pistols, 261 assault rifles, two flare guns, three light machine

guns, four medium (PK) machine guns, three heavy 7.62 machine

guns, three 12.7 DShK machine guns, seven ZGU-1 14.5mm heavy

machine guns, two AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers, thirteen

RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers, seven medium 82mm mortara,

and nineteen tactical radio sets captured.

Mujahideen Losses

18 killed and 53 wounded.
Chapter 6, Vignette 6 Page 185

COMMENTARY: OPERATION ARROW was one of the few thoroughlyplanned and fairly well-coordinated large-scale operations conducted

by the Mujahideen. The command and staff and the Mujahideen

combatants showed a high level of combat capability and resoluteness during the action. It was a complex, daring undertaking which

achieved an ambitious goal. Considering the number of combatants,

the time spent for preparation (two-three months according to

General Wardak), the complexity of the planning, the amount of

supplies needed to be moved to the battle area—mostly all the way

from Pakistan across three provinces (Paktia, Logar, Nangrahar)—

and the results achieved, it appears that OPERATION ARROW was an

expensive and not very cost-effective venture.

OPERATION ARROW was driven more by political than military considerations. The Soviet Union was withdrawing from Afghanistan

and, by this time, over half of the Soviet forces had already left.

People expected the DRA to rapidly crumble once the Soviets were

gone. The various political factions ofthe Mujahideen were jockeying

for position in the post-communist government of Afghanistan. In

order to maintain the interest and financial support oftheir Arab and

Western backers, the Mujahideen had to demonstrate their ability to

work together militarily—a cooperation that had been lacking

(except, to some extent, in the fighting around Kandahar) throughout

the war. This need for a show of military/political cooperation was

one of the key factors in planning and conducting such a large-scale

operation in this guerrilla war. OPERATION ARROW was a success and

boosted Mujahideen prestige and particularly promoted the lagging

image of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), which

enjoyed the greatest military success during the operation.

Militarily, the resources could have been better used by substituting a series of smaller actions (conducted successively by groups of

about 50-70 Mujahideen at a time) at different points along the

highway. These actions would each last for a few days over an

extended period of time. Such an option, although not very spectacular, would effectively block the highway for a longer period of time

than during OPERATION ARROW. The DRA losses would not have been

spectacular each time but should have ended with higher over-all

losses. While NIFA could afford to launch an "Arrow"-sized operation

once a year, it could conduct several similar actions of smaller size

with the same or less cost in men, material, time and other resources.

The political requirement to employ the forces of four Mujahideen

factions to close the Kabul-Jalalabad highway for two weeks each
Page 186 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

was an expensive option. It required four separate deployments of

forces, four separate plans of operation, three relief operations as

one faction took over the task from another and four withdrawals.

This inevitably entailed tactical and logistic duplications, unnecessary transportation costs, and the tactical complications involved

with relieving one group by another over a wide front. Dividing the

area into four sectors, each the responsibility of one faction for a

period of eight weeks, would have achieved the same goal with

fewer complications, lower costs, better logistic support, and more

focused action. However, the lack of a unified political and military leadership and factional differences among the Mujahideen

prevented this option.

The combined command and staff of the Mujahideen force showed

a high level of professionalism and operational vision in both planning and execution. The movement of a large force from widely

dispersed bases to the area of operation and providing for its logistic

support using very limited local resources is an extremely challenging task. The leadership of the force accomplished this with

admirable effectiveness. The impact ofthe operation went far beyond

the tactical and operational level, contributing to strategic and political destabilization of the Soviet-backed government in Kabul. The

operation panicked the DRA government which committed unnecessarily-large forces into the area and accepted heavy casualties.

But the Mujahideen also paid a political price for the operation.

The highway closure caused losses to civilian merchants who, at

this time of the year, export pomegranates from Tagao and grapes

from Kabul to Pakistan. The fresh fruit and vegetable trade is one

of the major sources of income in Afghanistan. During the first week

of November, representatives offruit dealers appealed to the Mujahideen to open the highway, but to no avail. In a guerrilla war, support

ofthe local population is too valuable to be risked by actions that hurt

local economy.

Tactically, the DRA committed several errors. Inadequate DRA

reconnaissance allowed the Mujahideen to deploy a several-thousand

man force within a short distance of DRA positions without detection

or interruption. Most of the Mujahideen movement took place at

night and employed natural cover and concealment in the mountainous terrain. However, a more active DRA reconnaissance would have

disclose the Mujahideen secret deployment and allowed countermeasures to interrupt the Mujahideen preparations for the operation.

DRA failure to establish and man observation posts on the higher
Chapter 6, Vignette 6 Page 187

mountains also let the Mujahideen move" into the area and prepare

attack positions undetected.

The enemy forces in Sarobi were in a favorable tactical position to

launch a flanking attack against the main base of the Mujahideen

toward Hisarak. Such a move, supported by air and artillery support,

should have foiled the Mujahideen operation and cut off their

withdrawal. Such a move, supplemented by heliborne landings

behind the Mujahideen lines, could have created chaos and forced

the Mujahideen to abort the operation. The DRA reaction, however

was reactive and unimaginative. The road-bound DRA forces paid

heavily for this leadership failure.

Falling into the final Mujahideen ambush was the worst and

the most costly DRA mistake. After the Mujahideen guns fell silent,

the DRA did not bother to ensure that the silence really meant that

the Mujahideen had withdrawn and was not a "calm before the

storm." The DRA then allowed too much traffic to move down the

unsecured highway. The DRA traffic jam occurred right in the

Mujahideen kill zone.

The two following vignettes describe battles within OPERATION

ARROW on the eastern approaches to the gorge.
Page 188 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
VIGNETTE 6A

THE BATTLE FOR THE KHAIROKHEL POST

by Asef Khan

I brought my 130 Mujahideen from our permanent base in

Surkhrud District, southwest of Jalalabad to join OPERATION ARROW.

My group was designated Task Force Hurricane. My group deployed

at night into its attack position located in the folds of the Tor Ghar

Mountain. My attack position was about 3 kilometers directly south of

my objective—the Khairokhel post (Map 6-8 - Arrow 3).

Khairokhel post was located immediately west of the Khairokhel

village. It was manned by a platoon-sized unit supported by two tanks

and one APC. They also had mortars and machine guns including

DShKs. There was another post connected with the Khairokhel defenses between the village and the Surkhakan Bridge Post to the east. The

enemy would detach small teams during the day to patrol the main

highway between Khairokhel and the Surkhakan bridge. The patrols

would return to their base at night.

Task Force Gulf, commanded by Haji Zaman Ghamsharik, was

deployed on the left flank of my group. Its mission was to attack the

adjacent enemy base at Spina Thana. Further to the west, Task Force

Falcon, commanded by Shari'ati and Lt. Wali, was to attack the

Kaftarkhana Base. The right flank of my task force Hurricane was

exposed and covered only by mountainous terrain.

I formed my task force into three groups: an assault group, a support group and a service detachment. There were 50 Mujahideen

armed with assault rifles and 15 RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launchers

in the assault group. The support group manned the heavy weapons

including one BM-1, one 75mm gun, and three 82mm recoilless rifles.

At 2200 hours on the night of 22 October 1988, I took a few men

down to the Khairokhel village on reconnaissance. I had dinner with

the local elders and asked them to talk to the government post

commander and convince him to abandon his positions rather than

face attack. Following the meal, I completed my reconnaissance and

returned to the attack position in the hills overlooking the village. It

was so close to the enemy that an American female journalist who

was accompanying my group said "If I were the government militia,

you would not be able to survive a single night sitting so close to the

Asef Khan was the commander of Task Force Hurricane.
Page 190 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

government post within range of heavy weapons."

The operational commander, General Rahim Wardak, radioed my

adjacent commander, Haji Zaman, and told him that the attack time

on the posts would be at 0800 hours, 23 October. When I returned from

my reconnaissance, Haji Zaman relayed this information to me. I

moved my raiding party into some ruins located one kilometer south of

the Kabul-Jalalabad highway in preparation for the next mornings

attack. I also set up an ambush near the highway to kill the patrol

that left the Khairokhel post and moved toward the Surkhakan bridge

every morning. My aim was to keep the area clear for my raid on the

Khairokhel Post.

At 0700, a group of about 15 soldiers left the government post and

started moving in the direction of Surkhakan bridge to set up security checkpoints. My Mujahideen let them clear the village and, as

soon as they reached an open stretch of the road, opened fire from

well-concealed positions near the road. My ambush killed six enemy

soldiers and wounded a few others.

This action drew a heavy barrage from the enemy bases on either

side of Khairokhel. Artillery and tanks were firing from the Spina

Thana in the west and from Surkhakan Bridge Post on the east. At

this point I radioed a coded message to Haji Zaman saying "get the

dogs off my back." He immediately responded with heavy fire against

the enemy base at Spina Thana. Haji Zaman's group was ready since

it was 0800 hours, the time to start the attack.

Mujahideen fire on Spina Thana took the pressure off my

Khairokhel sector. For several hours, Task Force Gulf exchanged fire

with the Spina Thana base. Then, some direct hits on fuel drums set

the fort ablaze. Task Force Gulf then attacked the enemy base.

As Task Force Gulf launched its attack against Spina Thana, I

launched the main part of Task Force Hurricane against the enemy

positions around the Khairokhel Post. I kept a security detachment

east ofthe village to block enemy forces trying to enter the engagement

area. The coordinated attacks of Task Forces Gulf and Hurricane overran the adjacent Spina Thana base and Khairokhel Post at about 1430

hours. My Mujahideen destroyed the tanks and APCs at the Khairokhel

Post and, while part of my group established a perimeter defense

around the captured post, the other part moved captured weapons and

equipment to my mountain hideout. This continued all day.

During the attack, the enemy was moving communist officials of

the Alingar District government to Jalalabad in a military convoy (at

this time, due to the ongoing Soviet withdrawal, the communist
Chapter 6, Vignette 6a Page 191

regime was withdrawing its military and administrative units from

those remote areas which could not be easily maintained or defended). This convoy deployed in the Mehtar-e Lam Baba hills north of

the Kabul river and began to employ long-range artillery and rocket

fire across a wide front stretching from Khairokhel to Kaftarkhana.

Their artillery and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers were firing at a

range of over 10 kilometers, so their fire was not very accurate or

effective. However, later in the day, part of the column moved along

the main road toward the battle area and tried to cross the

Surkhakan bridge. The enemy base at Kaftarkhana was still alive.

However it was under attack by Shari'ati's group and could not spare

its fire against the Mujahideen in adjacent areas.

In order to contain the movement of the enemy column, I moved

my assault group with all available RPG-7s to positions facing the

Surkhakan bridge. I also destroyed the highway bridge at Khairokhel village with demolition charges that we had brought for this

purpose all the way from our home base. The enemy tanks and APCs

in his column came under flanking fire from my RPGs. The enemy

could not hit my RPG gunners since they were protected by a steep

turn in the road. The enemy could not flank my position since the

off-road areas were heavily mined and the blown bridge prevented a

frontal assault. This significantly boosted my Mujahideen's morale

and gave them a sense of improved security. For some reason, enemy

air activity was weak despite the fact that the area was open and the

fight was going on in broad daylight.

At dusk the enemy column pushed its infantry out front to clear

the way for the vehicles, but it did not make any headway. Later, as

we moved our spoils and POWs to their mountain positions in the

south, I withdrew my security elements from the highway since the

enemy was moving yet another motorized column into the area from

Jalalabad. By the next day, Task Forces Falcon, Gulf and Hurricane

had withdrawn their forces from along the highway. The enemy

columns coming from Jalalabad and Laghman moved slowly down

the road all the way to Mash'ala Base and reinforced it. The

Mujahideen never overran this base and it played a pivotal role in

maintaining enemy's presence.

Following this, I limited our action to firing our heavy weapons at

enemy targets on the highway. Shortly thereafter, I withdrew my

Mujahideen from the operation since DRA forces had moved into my

district and were threatening our homes.
COMMENTARY: The confident commander's meal with the village elders

certainly helped his reconnaissance, but clearly tipped off the defending DRA commander that the Mujahideen attack might come soon. On

the other hand, the Mujahideen had been in the area for some time.

Further, the guerrilla commander apparently assumed that all the

local inhabitants were favorably disposed to the Mujahideen. His

brash behavior succeeded this time, but could have compromised operational security. Apparently, the DRA commander took no action to

increase his defenses and may not have even informed his superior.

Apparently, the Mujahideen lacked enough working radios so that

each Task Force Commander could have one. General Wardak could

not rapidly influence the course of the battle since communications

were scarce. Further, General Wardak lacked radio communications

with his eastern flank. This seems a serious problem in case the DRA

decided to roll up his operation from that flank.

Once the Mujahideen withdrew to the hills, their long-range fires

had little apparent effect. Their early departure, however, did create

additional problems for General Wardak.
VIGNETTE 6B

THE BATTLE FOR SPINA THANA BASE

based on interviews with Haji Zaman Ghamsharik

I commanded the 200-man Task Force Gulf (See Map 6-8 - Arrow

3). As part of OPERATION ARROW, I launched my attack on the government base at Spina Thana in coordination with attacks on the

Khairokhel Post to the east and Kaftarkhana Base to the west. Spina

Thana was one of the main military bases providing security for

columns moving along the Kabul-Jalalabad highway. It also

patrolled against guerrilla incursions across the Kabul River into

Laghman Province. A reinforced company supported by tanks,

BMPs, APCs, heavy machine gun and guns garrisoned the base.

They protected the base with mines and other obstacles. The entire

area surrounding the base, except the paved highway running

through the base was heavily mined.

Spina Thana would-be a tough nut to crack. I could assign up to

150 Mujahideen to the assault group, but using such a large force for

the attack carried some risks. I could incur heavy casualties since the

group could not effectively deploy due to the mines. I considered a

night attack, but this was equally difficult because of the mines, particularly since the enemy habitually mined the exits and entrances to

the base at night. I decided on a day-light attack. I intended to move

part of my force as close to the base as possible under heavy covering

fire. I decided to put my attacking force on the highway outside the

mined area and move on the highway in the attack. This was the only

route guaranteed free of mines.

I constituted a Task Force support group which manned our BM-12

and BM-1 MRL, 82mm recoilless rifles, ZGU-1 and DShK heavy

machine guns and mortars. I positioned it in the terrain folds of Tor

Ghar dominating the enemy base on the low ground between the main

highway and Kabul river.

I had to begin my planned fires earlier than intended when Task

Force Hurricane came under heavy fire from the Spina Thana Base.

The enemy responded resolutely to my fires. The fire exchange went

Haji Zaman Ghamsharik was the commander of Task Force Gulf. At the start of the war,

Ghamsharik controlled Khogiani District. He faked a defection to the DRA and requested

that the DRA provide him trained personnel to run the district. The DRA responded by

sending him 71 communists—who were promptly executed.
Page 194 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

on unabated until my Mujahideen gunners set part ofthe base on fire

with some direct hits. This was the turning point in the battle. As

panic spread throughout the defenders, I led a 60-man assault group

through a ravine to the west of the base. We got on the highway

and attacked east. I instructed my men to stay on the pavement.

Two of my Mujahideen who strayed had their legs blown off by

mines. We moved quickly to the base entrance. The defenders had

little time to mount an organized defense, particularly since some of

the defenders had fled from their positions in panic and were rushing

to the river to escape the fire. We met little resistance in storming

the base. We captured scores of defenders including the base

commander, Rahmatullah Spelanay. We destroyed the tanks and

APCs and whatever else could not be moved. We continued the

attack to the east to help Task Force Hurricane which was locked in

battle with the defenders of the Khairokhel Post. As we Mujahideen

advanced from two directions, most of the Khairokhel defenders

fled toward the river. We captured the rest. The actions for the rest

of the day unfolded as detailed in the preceding vignette.

COMMENTARY: One estimate claims that the Soviets left over 13

million landmines behind in Afghanistan. The Soviets and DRA

surrounded their outposts and bases with minefields. A major

Mujahideen problem in capturing a position was getting through the

minefield. Mujahideen minefield clearing methods included:

• probing the ground cautiously in a slow advance;

• driving a flock of sheep through the minefield;

• heaving boulders ahead of an advance to provide stepping

stones for the advance;

• firing recoiless rifles into the minefield and creating a path via

the recoiless rifle craters;

• limited use of some mineclearing systems provided by western

and Arab backers.
Chapter 1, Vignette 1 Page 195

CHAPTER COMMENTARY

Control of the highway net was essential to the Soviet/DRA effort,

but in some regions, the Mujahideen were able to block the highway for

weeks, months and even years. The best blocks were maintained by

local Mujahideen who were able to look after their personal interests

and yet maintain an effective blockade. The least effective road blocks

were those done by mobile guerrillas who lacked the supplies and

commitment required to keep the road closed.
CHAPTER 7

SIEGE WARFARE

The Mujahideen besieged several isolated DRA garrisons. If the

besieging Mujahideen were local, then the siege went on indefinitely.

If outside Mujahideen were involved, the siege usually failed since

the Mujahideen could not maintain the supplies necessary for

the siege or keep enough of the Mujahideen in place. Since the

Mujahideen were unpaid volunteers who also had family responsibilities, they were seldom interested in staying around for uninteresting, lengthy sieges.

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Page 198 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

LEGEND

A "\ INITIAL SITUATION

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PHASE 2

URGUN

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VIGNETTE 1

FAILED SIEGE AT URGUN

by General Gulzarak Zadran

Urgun was the home of the DRA's 21st Mountain Regiment. It is

located near the Pakistan border and is close to the strategic positions of Khost, Gardez, and Ghazni, as well as Waziristan, Pakistan.

Once, after the Mujahideen formed their government in exile, they

wanted to make Urgun the symbolic seat of their government.

Despite the fact that Urgun is located in an isolated area, its political significance prompted the DRA and Soviet forces to keep it under

control at all costs. One of the major Mujahideen actions at Urgun

took place in 1983. About 800 Mujahideen from the Wazir, Zadran,

and Kharoti tribes took part. Major commanders at the seige included Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqani, Mawlawi Arsalah, Matiullah,

Mawlawi Ahmad Gul and Qauzi Kharoti. The military council for the

seige included Captain Abdul Majid, Major Arsala Wazir, Captain

Qayum, Captain Sardar, Amanullah, Mawlawi Abdul Ghafur and me.

The regiment's main force was located in the old fortress at Urgun

which is commonly called the Octagonal Fort (Hashtrakha Kalo). It

had one battalion based in another fort four kilometers south of the

regiment at Nek Mohammad Kala. A reinforced company held the

airfield to the west of the regimental headquarters. Another company protected the main road to Urgun at a post some 1.5 kilometers to

the north. (Map 7-1 - Urgun)

We planned to destroy the regiment in two phases. The first phase

would destroy the security around the main headquarters (the southern battalion plus the two outlying companies). The second phase

would destroy the regimental headquarters. The first phase began in

August 1983. The Mujahideen based in the mountains east of Urgun

Valley encircled and besieged the battalion at Nek Mohammad Kala.

This enemy battalion was deployed in a fort which had several towers.

The fort was surrounded by minefields and heavy ZGU-1 machine

General Gulzarak Zadran was an officer in the Royal Afghan Army. He trained in the

United States and attended the Afghan Army Higher Officers Training Institute, where the

author, Ali Jalali, was his instructor. He joined the resistance and fought in Paktia Province.

He fought in Zhawar one and two and at the Satakandow pass. He belonged to Abdul-Rab

Russul Sayyaf's Islamic Union of Afghanistan (IUA). After the fall of the DRA, he became

the Deputy Minister of Defense in the interim government. Currently he lives near

Peshawar. [Map sheet 2882].
Page 200 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

guns were positioned in the towers which made it impossible for the

Mujahideen to approach close to the fort. This prevented the

Mujahideen from tightening their seige on the fort.

A few days after the seige began, the religious Festival of Sacrifice

(Eid-al-Adha) occured. It was customary for Mujahideen to go home

during the festival and the enemy felt that few Mujahideen would still

be around. This time, however, we did not let our people go home but

kept them at their bases. Thinking that the Mujahideen were not a

threat, the DRA took advantage of the holiday and sent three tanks

and a few trucks from the main regimental base to resupply the

battalion. We put an ambush force of approximately 70 Mujahideen,

commanded by Mawlawi Hasan, in a dry stream bed about halfway

between the two forts. Among their weapons were some RPG-7s.

When the DRA column entered the kill zone, he sprang the ambush.

The ambush destroyed one tank and damaged another. The ambushers killed some DRA soldiers and captured 25. Some others escaped.

The DRA abandoned one intact tank, but the Mujahideen could not

retrieve it due to heavy machine gun fire from the battalion's fort.

The fire forced the Mujahideen force back into a side canyon. When

night fell, Mawlawi Hasan and Khan Zamak led a group of

Mujahideen back to the intact tank. The Mujahideen group included

some former DRA tank crewmen. They drove the tank away to their

position.

We planned to attack the battalion fort three days later, using

the tank as the main weapon. We formed an 11-man tank protection

group and mounted them on the tank. They were armed with some

RPGs and small arms. They would ride the tank during a night

advance through the antipersonnel minefield that surrounded the

fort. In case the tank got stuck, the tank protection group would

protect the tank and free it. A 65-man assault force would follow in

the tracks of the tank as it passed throught the minefield. The tank

crew would blow a hole in the wall of the fort using the main gun

of the tank. The 11-man tank protection crew would then dismount

and secure the hole opening and the 65-man assault team would

enter the fort. Mujahideen communications personnel would also

help in the assault by interrupting the communications between

the battalion and regiment. When possible, the radio operators

would misdirect the artillery.1

1

It was common practice for Mujahideen and DRA to enter each others radio nets for

deception, harassment or to pass messages. General Gulzarak would often talk to the

other side and curse and insult them.
Chapter 7, Vignette 1 Page 201

At 2100 hours, the attack started. The Mujahideen tank moved

on its designated route with the tank protection crew mounted on

top. As it approached the fort and crossed the antipersonnel minefield, a few antipersonnel mines exploded, but the tank protection

crew was unscathed. The tank crew opened fire on the fort's towers

with their main gun. The main gun rounds knocked out the heavy

machine guns. However, the artillery located with the regimental

headquarters began firing into the area. Our Mujahideen communications personnel began screaming into the radio their fire was

short and was falling on the battalion. The artillery command post

became confused with their demands that the fire be shifted further

away. The artillery stopped firing. The Mujahideen tank crew then

fired at the wall of the fort. After several rounds, they knocked a hole

in the wall. The tank drove to within ten meters of the wall and

the tank protection crew signaled the assault group with a flashlight.

The tank protection crew immediately dismounted and secured the

breach. The assault group followed in the tank's tracks and entered

the fort. The enemy was surprised by the sudden breach and offered

no resistance. The Mujahideen captured 243 men plus all the

weapons and ammunition in the fort. We let those DRA prisoners

who wanted to join us. We released the others. We were now four

kilometers closer to the main fort.

Pishiano Ghar (the mountain of the cats) overlooks the octagonal

fortress. The regiment had a security post with mortars located on

the mountain. Our next move was to seize the security post so that

the seige would become more effective. A few days later, 70 Mujahideen attacked the security post from the north and south in a night

attack. The Mujahideen attack was successful. Once we controlled

Pishiano Ghar, the regiment pulled back the company that protected

highway 141 to the regimental base. We prepared for phase two. The

enemy was now completely beseiged and could not receive supplies by

road and had to get supplies by air. The beseiged DRA could only get

to the airfield, located some 1.5 kilometers to the west of the fortress,

by armored vehicles, since we could take out trucks and jeeps. Our

machine guns on Pishiano Ghar prevented DRA resupply by day. We

continued to tighten the seige. Mujahideen from Zadran brought

their tank to help out.

The DRA brought in an operations group from Kabul. Their job

was to help the regiment plan its defense and a linkup with a Soviet

unit which was coming from Ghazni to break the seige. DRA General

Jamaluddin Omar was in charge of the group. He was my old tactics
Page 202 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

instructor at the Royal Afghan Military Academy. The DRA spread

their 3rd battalion in the south of the city instead of in the fort. They

had two companies in the forward defensive line. To the southeast,

natural ditches and ravines created barriers to our advance. The

airfield lay to the west. One approach to west ofthe airfield was inadequately mined, so the DRA covered the gap with guards and patrols.

Besides our two tanks, we had two 76mm mountain guns, one

122mm D30 howitzer, one 107mm mountain mortar, other lighter

mortars, many RPGs, many DShK and ZGU heavy machine guns and

other lighter machine guns. It was January and snow was on the

ground. We covered part of our tanks with white cloth to hide them.

We recorded the sound of a moving tank. We received some loudspeakers from Peshawar and assigned people to use them on the eastern flank to depict tanks coming from the east. We structured our

forces for the assault by creating several groups:

• A tank and tank protection group commanded by Mawlawi

Shadam *

• Two assault groups—Northern and Southern

• An evacuation group to carry away the spoils.

• A family and dependents protection group to protect the families of DRA officers who were in the garrison

• A truck transport group

• A command and control group

We planned the attack. Following an artillery preparation, a tank would

spearhead the assault from the north and the south to clear a path

through the antipersonnel minefields. An assault group would follow in

the tank's tracks to hit the enemy from two sides simultaneously.

I was with the southern forces. At 2000 hours on a cold January

night, our Mujahideen were all in position. We started artillery

preparatory fire on the DRA positions. Ten minutes later, our tank

moved north toward the city. The tank fired on two city towers and

knocked out the machine guns in them. Then we turned on the loudspeakers in the southeast to create tank noises there. The enemy

fired at the noises as our tank changed direction and headed west

where it could reach the unmined area. Fifteen Mujahideen, including Mawlawi Shadam, Ismail Turkistani and me were on the tank as

it entered the city. As we passed through the mined area, we dismounted and moved to the rear of the 3d battalion. Assault group

south followed the tank's tracks into the city. They stormed through
Chapter 7, Vignette 1 Page 203

the city and the 3d battalion resistance collapsed. Battalion personnnel either surrendered. or retreated north. As the Mujahideen

continued to advance, we were stopped by the fire of a DShK machine

gun some 50 meters to our north. It was now 0300 in morning. We

attacked the position and killed the gunner—a Soviet adviser. The

rest of the DRA regiment had retreated into the fortress with General

Jamaluddin Omar.

At this point, Mawlawi Shadam reported that his tank was out of

ammunition. The tank driver, Lt Mohammad Gul Logari, was wounded in the arm and the gunner was killed. The enemy resolve was

strengthening and showing renewed resistance. Other Mujahideen in

the assault group were running low on ammunition. We had failed to

plan for ammunition resupply. We instructed Mawlawi Shadam to

take the tank and go back to get all types of ammunition and then

return to resupply and support our combatants. As the tank moved

back, the Mujahideen and the DRA heard it and thought that we were

withdrawing. It was cold, early in the morning and our command and

control was collapsing. Mujahideen began to fall back. The enemy

counterattacked and pushed us out of the city. Daybreak came with

the disorganized Mujahideen milling around outside the city. Wave

after wave of enemy aircraft appeared and began bombing and straffing the Mujahideen caught in the open. They destroyed our tank. We

retreated into the mountains.

I later learned that the northern assault group had not moved that

night since their tank was stuck in the sand and they could not free it.

The entire assault was from the south. This cost us an almost certain

victory. We had no other choice but to withdraw into our mountain

hideouts in the east. In the following days, as we were preparing to

resume the seige, a Soviet regiment arrived in Urgun from Ghazni to

resupply and reinforce the Urgun garrison.

COMMENTARY: Ammunition resupply was clearly a problem and the

withdrawal of the tank at a critical juncture turned the tide of battle.

Communications was as big a problem. The Mujahideen had radios,

but they were not able to accompany the assault forces. The northern

and southern assault groups were unable to communicate with each

other and, presumably, with the command and control group. If both

attacks had occured, prevention of fratricide would have been a difficult problem without radio communications. Further, members of the

military council were forward with the assault forces rather than

directing the battle.
Page 204 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Mujahideen air defense planning was also limited. The natural air

approach into Urgun follows highway 141 in a north-south direction.

The Mujahideen had heavy machine guns and control of the high

ground flanking the approach. Evidently, most of the machine guns

were used to fire on DRA ground forces and the air defense posture was

degraded at the time of the Soviet air response.

Mine clearance was a continual problem for Mujahideen forces and

the use oftanks to clear lanes through antipersonnel minefields and to

breach a hole in the fortress walls deserves high marks. The use of a

tank protection group, mounted on the tank, was a tactical innovation

that worked well. This may not seem a tactical innovation to professional officers who always keep infantry up with their tanks, but it was

not a common practice when Mujahideen acquired armor. The presence of professional officers, like General Zadran, was responsible for

the formation of the tank protection group.
VIGNETTE 2

DEHRAWUD OFFENSIVE

In the spring and summer of 1984, the Soviet forces stepped up

their attacks on Mujahideen hideouts and mobile bases in the three

adjoining provinces of Kandahar, Helmand and Uruzgan. The Soviets

also intensified their efforts to intercept Mujahideen supply convoys

coming through the mountains from Pakistan. In the fall, a number of

major Mujahideen commanders in these provinces decided to set up a

regional supply base in the Uruzgan Mountains that could support

Mujahideen units deployed in the area. Dehrawud District, located in

Uruzgan Province, seemed to be a suitable place for the supply base.

It is an oasis in the mountains in the upper Helmand Valley. It is easy

to defend and it is conveniently located between the three provinces

(Map 7-2 - Dehrawud).

The Dehrawud District capital of Dehrawud was garrisoned by

some 500 government militia who manned security outposts around

the town. They were supplied by air since the town was blockaded by

the local Mujahideen who controlled all the roads leading into the

town. The Mujahideen council decided to attack the government

enclave, dislodge the militia and consolidate control over the entire

valley. To do this, however, they first had to negotiate a truce between

rival groups in the region to ensure their full cooperation during the

upcoming operation. Two months before the action, Mujahideen delegations from Kandahar and Helmand mediated such a truce.

In October, Mujahideen forces from Kandahar under Mulla

Malang, Faizullah and other leaders joined a contingent of Helmand

Mujahideen commanded by the late Nasim Akhund Zada, the leading

resistance figure in Helmand Province. Haji Assadullah and some

Mujahideen fighters from Uruzgan and Baghran areas joined the

attacking force. This force eventually numbered over 1,000 men. The

Mujahideen force moved along different approaches to Dehrawud and

surrounded the government positions in the area. A 300-man detachment sealed off the main approach to Dehrawud from the south along

the Helmand River. Another 100-man detachment deployed to the

southeast to cover the Kotal-e Murcha (the Murcha pass) and mine its

Sources for this vignette include Commander Mulla Malang, Akhund Zada Qasem, several Mujahideen from Uruzgan, Kandahar and Helmand Provinces and Mr. Jalali's personal

notes and papers.
Page 206 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

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road. About 500 fighters deployed around the district center, while the

rest were engaged in fulltime logistic support.

The siege lasted 45 days while the Mujahideen gradually tightened

the noose around the militia positions. The Mujahideen kept only one

third of the fighters on the front line at any one time. The rest were

either in reserve or involved in logistic service. The front line fighters

were relieved every 24 hours.

The Soviets and DRA supported the Dehrawud garrison with daily

air strikes on Mujahideen positions to check their advance. They

would run two or three attack missions daily using fighter bombers

and helicopter gunships. In the meantime, the Soviet/DRA command

assembled ground forces from Kandahar and Shindand to relieve the

embattled militia at Dehrawud. However, it took the enemy weeks

before he was ready to move large columns ofinfantry and tanks to the

mountainous battlefield.

One day, a Mujahideen gun crew on a ZGU-1 anti-aircraft heavy

machine gun shot down one of a pair of Soviet fighter-bombers flying

over Dehrawud. The plane burst into flames and fell in the Helmand

River. The pilot, said to be a high ranking officer,? bailed out and landed five to six kilometers from the nearest Mujahideen position. The

other fighter circled the area and flew away apparently after pinpointing the crash site of the fallen plane. A seven-man Mujahideen team

under Mulla Juma Khan went to capture the pilot. By the time the

Mujahideen reached the pilot, he had moved to a position from which

he could fire his AK-74 at the advancing resistance fighters. The

Mujahideen tried to capture the pilot alive. While they were preparing to try and capture him, a swarm of transport helicopters and helicopter gunships flew over the Kotal-e Murcha pass from Kandahar and

began gun runs against the Mujahideen positions. Two helicopters

hovered over the crash site. One hovered about 50 meters from the

ground and lowered a ladder. The Soviet pilot jumped up from his

hideout and started climbing up the ladder. Seeing that the Soviet

pilot was escaping, the Mujahideen opened fire and killed the pilot and

damaged the helicopter. The helicopter tried to escape but crashed

about three kilometers away.

This incident triggered increased Soviet air activity as they tried to

soften up the area for the upcoming attack by ground forces moving on

two axes to Dehrawud. One column was approaching along the

Helmand River from Kajaki dam and the other from Khakrez across

the Kotal-e Murcha pass. For three days, Soviet air strikes continued

Mulla Malang states that he was a general officer.
Page 208 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

uninterrupted from dawn to dusk. However, the Mujahideen suffered

fewer casualties than the militiamen, who sustained losses from both

collateral damage and "friendly fire."

Following three days of heavy bombardment, a column of enemy

infantry and tanks arrived from the Kajaki side. Although the

Mujahideen groups assigned to cover this approach had left earlier, the

terrain did not support tank movement. A Soviet Movement Support

Detachment (MSD) used road construction machines and demolitions

to open a way through the rocky approaches to Dehrawud for the tanks

and APCs. The Soviets conducted airmobile insertions of soldiers on

the heights overlooking the movement route to provide flank security.

By this time, the Mujahideen were too widely dispersed for effective control. The contingents from Kandahar and Helmand were on

opposite sides of the Helmand River and could not cross it. Their

heavy weapons, such as the ZGU-1, DShK and surface-to-surface rockets were also positioned on both sides ofthe river. Their fires could not

be coordinated. Five days after they killed the Soviet pilot on the

Helmand River, the Mujahideen realized that they had lost command

and control over the scattered detachments and could not deal with the

two-pronged enemy advance. Therefore, the Mujahideen groups withdrew to their separate provincial bases by mountain paths.

The Soviet column from Kajaki reached Dehrawud and recovered the body of the dead pilot. The Mujahideen had removed

his documents earlier. As the Mujahideen pulled out, the column

from Kandahar stopped at Khakrez and did not proceed to

Dehrawud. It conducted a number of search and destroy actions

in the area and returned. During the entire 45-day battle, the

DRA militia incurred the heaviest losses. Mujahideen casualties

were negligible. Mulah Malang states that the Mujahideen shot

down a jet fighter and 10 helicopters.

COMMENTARY: This Mujahideen seige was a conventional battle by a

guerrilla force. It ended in a tactical setback. Had the Mujahideen

established an operational command system in the region, it would

have been easier for them to coordinate their action in terms of time

and space. Lack of such an arrangement left a sizeable Mujahideen

force without operational support by other local groups, especially in

blocking the movement of Soviet/DRA reinforcements.

Guerrilla forces are best employed for actions of short duration.

Long, extended operations, such as this seige, asks a lot of unpaid

volunteers. The Mujahideen did assign detachments to cover the
Chapter 7, Vignette 2 Page 209

approaches to Dehrawud from the south, but, as the seige continued,

many of the fighters found more pressing business to attend to

then sitting idly on a mountain. They departed one after another and

left the approaches open. Both the Kajaki axis and the Kotal-e

Murcha axis were very easy to block with a small detachment of

determined fighters. If the Mujahideen had held their positions,

they could have stopped the large columns of their enemy and celebrated a Mujahideen victory in Dehrawud. But, once again, the

Mujahideen experience demonstrated their tactical and logistical

limitations in maintaining control over large forces for an extended

period of time. Most of the Mujahideen were not fighting on their

home territory and, therefore, were less enthusiastic about remaining in stationary positions for an extended period of time while the

Soviet Air Force attacked them.

Air power, while seldom decisive in guerrilla war, played a major

role in breaking this seige. Once the Mujahideen assumed static positions, the Soviet Air Force was able to delay the Mujahideen assault

and gain the time needed for the ground forces to reach the battlefield.
CHAPTER 8

DEFENDING AGAINST RAIDS

Effective defense against ground raids requires timely intelligence,

plans and battle drills, prepared fighting and sheltered positions, a

ready reaction force, accessible weapons and ammunition, escape

routes, security patrols and sentries and early warning elements posted far enough away to provide adequate early warning. Rehearsal of

plans, battle drills, the ready reaction force and escape and withdrawal are essential to effective defense against raids.

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Page 212 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

QADER'S HOUSE

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1KM

SAYGHANI VILLAGE

Map 8-1
VIGNETTE 1

SOVIET RAID ON MUJAHIDEEN HIDEOUT AT SAYGHANI

by Haji Abdul Qader

On 9 January 1981, a Soviet detachment mounted a raid on

my home in Sayghani Village, about six kilometers northeast of

Bagram air base. At that time, I commanded a group of some 200

local Mujahideen who were spread among several mobile bases in

the area. We would conduct specific missions in Bagram and neighboring districts in Parwan and Kapisa Provinces. I rarely spent the

night in my village since it is very close to the Soviet garrison at

Bagram1and difficult to defend. I would alternate among my mobile

bases and would stay at a different location every night. I was

usually accompanied by no more than 20 of my men who were

disguised as peaceful civilians.

A week before, JIA Commander Mawlawi Zaher of Gujarkhel and I

combined forces to ambush a Soviet/DRA column at Sofi Baba along

the road from Koh-e Top to Sayad. The column had seven or eight

trucks and six APCs. The column was returning from Khanaqa and

Niazi in the south where the DRA had conducted a press gang to draft

recruits into the DRA army. We ambushed their column at dusk and

destroyed two APCs and four trucks with short-range RPG-7 fire. We

captured some 70 Kalashnikovs, which we desperately needed. We

divided the weapons between our two groups. I believe that the raid

on my home was in retaliation for this ambush.

That night I had some guests from Laghman and entertained them

until late in the evening in my house in the village. In the late

evening, I sent most of my men to other villages and kept about 40 at

Sayghani (22 of them were residents of the village).

Sayghani is a village of about 100 homes located off the main road.

My home is near the village mosque, protected by several fort-like

structures ringing the village (Map 8-1 - Sayghani). I posted two guard

details—one at my house and the other at the mosque. The night was

very quiet and at midnight the snow began to fall. Early in the morning, I woke up for morning prayer. The guards on my roof reported

Haji Abdul Qader was a school teacher who became a Mujahideen commander. He was

initially with the HIK faction and later with the IUA faction. [Map sheet 2886, vie grid 2970].

Mr. Anthon Jalali's notes also used in this vignette.

1 The Soviet 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 354th Separate Airborne Regiment

were garrisoned in Bagram.
Page 214 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

that everything was all right. However, when I was half way through

ablutions,2I noticed signal flares streaking across the cloudy sky.

They were coming from the northeast and southeast.

The night may have seemed'quiet to my guards, but it was busy for

the Soviet raiding detachment. Led by local guides and informants,

the raiders had stealthily walked from Bagram to the village during

the snowfall and quietly occupied several buildings around the village.

By dawn, the enemy had taken up positions at Haji Satar, Rahim, Haji

Taleb, Raza Khan, Haji Rahmat Sayed and Amanullah forts.3

As soon as I saw the flares, I asked the guards about it. They said

that they thought that the enemy was on the road to the village some

two kilometers away. I thought that the flares were much closer. I had

no time to gather all my men, so I took the 15 men who were staying

in my house and we tried to exfiltrate from the village. Shortly after

we left my house, I realized that I had forgotten my briefcase full of

data about my group. I sent my younger brother to fetch the briefcase

and ordered my men to move down the road to the mosque and then on

the Rahmat Said fort at the edge of the village. From there, we would

take the path to Mujahideen-held areas. I waited for my brother. A

few minutes later he joined me and we hurried after the group. We

caught up with the group as they approached the stream beyond the

mosque. The stream bed was full of Soviet soldiers in ambush. They

opened up on my group with AK-74s and killed three of my men on the

spot. The rest of my group disappeared in the dark and moved to the

southwest, where they were soon trapped in another ambush and

killed to the last man. An enemy tracer bullet had set my tsadar on

fire. My brother warned me that I was on fire. I pulled off my burning tsadar and threw it away, but that attracted the attention of the

first ambush group who again opened up on us and killed my brother.

1 had lost contact with my group and so I moved in the opposite direction and slipped out through ä house at the edge of the village. The

enemy had blocked all streets and escape routes and none of my

Mujahideen survived the raid. The enemy killed all 40 Mujahideen

and 15 civilians at different locations in the village.

COMMENTARY: Lack of effective security contributed decisively to the

Soviet success and led to the destruction of the resistance force.

Combat security should protect a unit from surprise attack and

2 Muslims pray five times a day and wash before prayers.

3 Many of the home in Afghanistan are surrounded by high, thick adobe walls and are actually small

forts.
Chapter 8, Vignette 1 Page 215

provide sufficient time and space for the main body to prepare and

deploy for combat in the most favorable conditions possible. Had the

Mujahideen posted security patrols on the approaches to the village,

the Soviets probably would have been unable to approach undetected

and to surprise the unprepared resistance fighters. The two guard

details that Commander Qader deployed inside the village could

provide only close-in protection but could not provide early warning

or tactical security for the unit.

The secrecy of the Soviet movement to the village and their

stealthy deployment at the village played a decisive role in the outcome

of the raid. Taken by surprise, the Mujahideen lost control of the situation and were forced to act under conditions dictated by the Soviets.

The Mujahideen could have avoided the disaster by preparing

contingency plans with clear-cut instructions to the combatants and

group leaders in the event of surprise attack. The plan would determine the location of each combatant and sub-group leader during their

overnight stay in the village. Bagram was a major Soviet installation

and the overconfidence and bravado of the Mujahideen contributed to

their defeat.

Once he discovered the Soviet presence, the Mujahideen commander did little to establish effective command and control over the

situation. He said that he did not have time to reach every combatant

and sub-group leader. But the commander failed to lead even the small

15-man group that was with him. He waited for his briefcase and told

his men to proceed without assigning a group leader in his absence.

This group was leaderless as it blundered into the two ambushes.

Local informers and collaborators were also vital to the Soviet

success. The Soviet detachment could not have achieved its goal without help from the inside. Such cases of collaboration created a lot of

suspicion among the Mujahideen and sometimes resulted in very tragic consequences to innocent people.

Haji Abdul Qader learned a very important lesson at a very high

price. As he says, his group never again stayed overnight in Sayghani

without posting a strong security detail on approaches to the village at

points not less than two kilometers from the place.
Page 216 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

ALISHANG

Map 8-2

4 KM
VIGNETTE 2

BATTLE FOR ALISHANG DISTRICT CENTER

by Commander Sher Padshah

In August 1981, the Mujahideen controlled the district center of

Alishang in Laghman Province. My base was in a remote upper valley

near Daulatshah. I brought 29 of my Mujahideen south through the

fertile Alishang Valley to Alishang Village. (Map 8-2 - Alishang) This

is a trip of over 45 kilometers. When we arrived, we were very tired

and the local Mujahideen, who numbered 50, told us to sleep and that

they would provide security. In the morning, as we were rising for

morning prayers, we heard shots. The guards then realized that we

were surrounded. We decided to escape into the mountains. The

Badrow hills are about three kilometers northeast of the village and

lead to the mountains. As we tried to get out of the village, we came

under fire from all directions. Within five minutes, we lost 14

Mujahideen KIA and 50 WIA. Mawlawi Niaz Mohammed, the local

Mujahideen commander, was among the dead. Faced with withering

fire and heavy losses, we retreated back into the village to conduct a

desperate defense.

Our force was down, to 15 Mujahideen but our mortars were still in

position from where we had set them up the night before. Besides the

mortars, we had RPG-7s, PK machine guns, Kalashnikov rifles, and

Bernau "20-shooters."4 We mounted a stubborn defense. We discovered that Soviet forces had surrounded the village. At 0800 hours, a

DRA reinforcing column with tanks and infantry came from the

provincial capitol of Mehtar Lam. We started firing the mortars at the

column. The DRA kept trying to get into the village, but we drove them

back. Sometimes the fight degenerated to hand-to-hand combat. We

hit one tank with a RPG-7. Around noon, a jeep full of Soviet advisers

drove into range. One of my RPG-7 gunners destroyed the jeep. We

also captured some ofthe DRA soldiers who were close to the jeep. We

demanded that they surrender and they did. The fighting continued

until 1600 hours. Then, as sunset neared, the DRA and Soviets withdrew, leaving the village in our hands. Besides our 14 Mujahideen KIA

and 50 WIA, there were many dead and wounded Afghan civilians

Commander Sher Padshah is from Laghman Province. [Map sheet 3086, vie grid 0149].

4

The Bernau is the Czechoslovak M26 light machine gun. The Mujahideen called them

"20-shooters."
Page 218 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

including women and children. I do not know what the total enemy

casualties were.

I am sure that someone from the village had told the government

that we were there. Some of the villagers had left the village before

the Soviets surrounded it. The villagers that were left actively helped

the Mujahideen in the defense. The women provided us with food and

showed us where to take cover. They led us from house-to-house as the

enemy tightened his noose around us. That evening, after the fighting,

we asked the locals for donkeys and mules to haul away our dead. We

put our dead on their animals and took the bodies to their villages for

burial. We took our wounded to local doctors for treatment. They

helped as best they could, including some of the doctors from the

government hospital.

The Soviets left some oftheir dead in the village ofAlishang. They

moved south to the village of Qawalkhel. They surrounded the village

and told the villagers to go to Alishang and recover their dead or

they would destroy their village. The Qawalkhel elders came to us and

asked for the Soviet dead. We told them that they could recover the

Soviet dead after we left.

COMMENTARY: Mujahideen night time security, when sleeping in a

village, was usually only a guard or two posted inside the village.

The Mujahideen needed to get security Out to the key terrain dominating the village to provide timely warning. When the Soviets

and DRA had timely intelligence, they were often able to surround

sleeping Mujahideen whose guards were within yards ofthe sleepers.

The Soviet forces were probably from the 66th Separate Motorized

Rifle Brigade in Jalalabad—some 40 kilometers away. The DRA

force was probably from the 71st Infantry Regiment—garrisoned only

seven kilometers away in Mehtar Lam. The area is open and easily

accessible by road. The local Mujahideen's overconfidence hurt the

resistance badly.
VIGNETTE 3

VISION IN THE BAR KOT VALLEY

by Doctor Mohammad Sadeq

It was December 1983. I left my village of Sotan in Dara-i Nur

Valley for the nearby valley of Bar Kot. I had five of my Mujahideen with me. In Bar Kot Valley, we stopped at the village of

Dud-Reg where we spent the night in a Mujahideen guest house

(Map 8-3 - Vision). Dud-Reg is the last village in the valley before

the forest begins. In this area, the mountains are all heavily wooded

with pine, juniper and sycamore. It was foggy, rainy and very cold.

There were other Mujahideen from IRMA staying in the house next

door to ours. After supper, everyone but my sentry went to bed. I was

asleep and dreaming. In my dream, I saw a man in a white robe who

laid his hand on my shoulder and said "You will prevail." Then the

man dropped ammunition in my lap and gave' me an Enfield rifle.

"This is the time to go forward" the man said. I woke up and looked

around. I could not find any ammunition or Enfield rifle, but I

checked to make sure that my Kalashnikov and pistol were still

under my pillow as I was thinking about the dream.

At 0030 hours, I again awoke as I heard a shot fired. I scrambled

to my feet and asked the sentry what was going on. "Nothing, everything is all right" Agha Gul replied. I lay back down. Shortly afterward, I heard another shot. I jumped up, pulled on my shoes and

grabbed my weapons. The other Mujahideen were also up. I looked

outside. The sentry said "The Soviets are here. We are surrounded. I

see their signal rockets all around us." The other group of IRMA

Mujahideen rushed out into the night and up into the mountains. My

five Mujahideen asked me "What should we do?" I replied, "Well,

they've come for us, so let's give them a fight." The enemy had us

surrounded and had blocked all the exits by this time.

The house that we were in had a large, enclosed courtyard (60

meters x 60 meters). The enemy were firing at us and they knew

exactly where we were. I went to the back of the enclosure and

crawled over the wall into a narrow meter-wide alley. I asked my

Mujahideen to follow me. We moved down the alley and into the open

fields. I could see Soviets in the open field. I told my Mujahideen

Doctor Mohammad Sadeq was a commander with the HIH in Kunar Province. [Map sheet

3186, vie grid 4341].
Page 220 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 8, Vignette 3 Page 221

that I would lay down a base of fire so that they could cross the field.

Once they crossed the field, they were to go to the flank of the field

and hold it. Just behind us was the house where the IRMA

Mujahideen had stayed. I did not know that they had gone and were

worried that they would unintentionally fire into our backs. I fired

as my Mujahideen crossed the field, but they came under fire. We all

fired back and retreated into the mountains. As we started up the

mountains, we bumped into still more Soviets who were positioned in

the mountains. As we were taking shelter behind a wall, one of my

Mujahideen was hit and killed. We did not know this area very well,

so we did not know how to get out. It took us about three hours to

find our way safely up into the mountain. As we reached the mountain, we met the IRMA Mujahideen who had escaped earlier. They

asked us to use tracer rounds to mark targets for their mortars. I

fired at the enclosure that_„we had started out from with tracer

bullets. The IRMA Mujahideen then fired their mortar at the enclosure. As daylight broke the IRMA Mujahideen mortar fire became

more effective. In all, they fired 42 mortar rounds. The Soviets did

not want to stay around and get mortared, so they withdrew. As I

watched the Soviets pull back, I realized that we had prevailed and

that my dream had come true. It was now time to go forward.

After the battle, I learned that the IRMA Mujahideen also had one

of their group killed by the Soviets. Two Afghan women were also

killed near the enclosure. The Soviet force had come from Jalalabad

(about 20 kilometers away).5They had come at night on their APCs.

They were guided by an Afghan named Nader. He was from Shewa.

Since the DRA was established in this area, the people were divided in

their loyalties and people like Nader worked against us.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen were lax about security in this area,

despite the known divided loyalties within the populace. The guesthouse that the Mujahideen were staying in was not a private home, but

a Mujahideen guesthouse regularly used by Mujahideen' passing

through the area. All the local villagers knew about its presence and

function. The Soviet's guide came from Shewa, which is 15 kilometers

away and yet he had no trouble pinpointing its location at night. The

Soviets drove through a well-populated area on APCs to conduct their

raid, yet the Mujahideen got no advance warning and their sentry was

5

The Soviet force was either from the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade or the

Spetsnaz battalion based in Jalalabad.
Page 222 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

surprised. The Mujahideen were complacent about security and set

patterns that the Soviets reacted to. Only the presence of the

Mujahideen mortar and a large stock of mortar ammunition saved

them.
VIGNETTE 4

SURPRISED BY THE SOVIETS IN THE DARA-E NUR

by Doctor Mohammad Sadeq

In March 1984, the DRA and Soviet forces again tried to destroy

the Mujahideen forces in the Dara-e Nur Valley. A total of 120

Mujahideen armed with seven RPG-7s, one 82mm mortar, one DShK

and many Kalashnikovs blocked their advance at Shokyali Village

which is located at the junction of Dara-e Nur and Bar Kot Valleys.

(Map 8-4 - Bar Kot) We positioned our forces to block both valleys

and the high ground between them. The enemy came and tried to

overcome our defenses but failed. Then the government sent a group

of the area's elders to talk to us. The elders tried to persuade us not

to fight in the area and to leave, but we refused. We held the area for

another year before the enemy brought another column against us.

Nader, the DRA police chief for the area, sent us a message also

trying to persuade us not to continue to fight in this area. He warned

us that, if we did not leave, the Soviets would destroy all the villages

in the area. It was now April 1985. At 2030 hours one evening, my

group left the village of Sotan. We were armed with an RPG-7 and

Kalashnikovs. We were moving to the junction ofthe two valleys along

the foot of the mountains. One of my men stated "I will fire a shot to

show our presence and let the people know that we are not cowards. It

will show them that we are not intimidated and that we are still here."

I tried to talk him out of it, but he finally fired the shot. As soon as

he fired, the night lit up with return fire from all the Soviets who

we discovered were in the area in force. The Soviets had arrived the

previous night and had waited all day for us. We had not reached the

junction yet, but were at a place called Kar. The Soviets were firing at

us from positions on the mountain to the west and to the east is a steep

canyon with a sheer 150 meter wall. We were trapped and surrounded, so we went to ground and fought back through the night and next

day. With the day, helicopters came and fired at us. We grimly held

our position and waited for the next night when we would try a breakout. But the Soviets had also had enough fighting, and they pulled out

at the end of the day. I lost one KIA and one WIA. I do not know if

there were any Soviet casualties.

Doctor Mohammed Sadeq was a commander with the HIH in Kunar Province and was also

the narrator of the previous vignette. [Map sheet 3186, vie grid 4742.]
Page 224 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

\ !^.\,5Si*&!7iKFOi:..''v - *.'-V*'lAV i. A {•',:
. Chapter 8, Vignette 4 Page 225

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen believed in the invulnerability of

their defenses and let the routines of positional defense dull their

alertness. The Soviets again were able to infiltrate a force deep

into the Mujahideen territory and take them by surprise. The lack

of Mujahideen discipline triggered the ambush, but apparently

triggered the ambush prematurely before the entire force was in the

kill zone. Mujahideen leaders led by consensus, force of personality

and moral persuasion.

The Mujahideen failed to man their defenses around the clock and

the Soviets were able to move through their unmanned positions and

surprise the Mujahideen. It is unclear whether the Soviets were in a

deliberate ambush or were waiting for night fall to move on Sotan to

attack the Mujahideen.

One ofthe problems that a guerrilla movement has is that the people who suffer the retaliations for guerrilla actions are usually the

civilian populace. What starts as a popular cause, supported enthusiastically by the populace, can sour when the local populace has to bear

the reprisals with no apparent end in sight. The local populace that

remains often just wants to be left alone by all sides. The Mujahideen

in this area lost a great deal of local support and, consequently, intelligence information and early warning.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY

Mujahideen local security was often lax in those areas which they

controlled or which Soviet/DRA forces had not visited in awhile. Often,

Mujahideen local security was even lax in areas adjacent to major

Soviet and .DBA garrisons. KHAD infiltrators and informers often

managed to provide timely information that resulted in successful

raids. The Mujahideen often failed to post security at a sufficient distance from their force to provide adequate warning. Instead, they

relied on local inhabitants to provide that warning. In areas where the

local populace had fled or Were tired of the war, the Mujahideen were

blind. The factional nature ofthe Mujahideen also discouraged the distribution of timely intelligence to all Mujahideen forces in an area.

The Mujahideen often failed to plan against raids, constitute a

ready reaction force, designate escape routes and assembly areas and

rehearse their defense. Aggressive Soviet or DRA raids had a good

chance of success against unprepared Mujahideen. The trick was to

withdraw before the Mujahideen had a chance to recover and pursue.
CHAPTER 9

FIGHTING HELIBORNE INSERTIONS

Soviet technology often had minimal impact on the Mujahideen

guerrilla. Many Mujahideen tactics were virtually unchanged and

still effective from their combat with Great Britain in the nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries. Soviet high-performance aviation

posed a direct threat to the civilian populace of Afghanistan, but the

Mujahideen learned how to avoid or misdirect high-performance

aircraft. However, the Soviet transport helicopter and helicopter

gunship proved to be major concerns to the Mujahideen. Helicopters,

and later the SU-25 close air support aircraft, were potent systems in

the Soviet arsenal that the Mujahideen respected and feared. Soviet

transports could land raiding parties deep in Mujahideen areas while

gunships and close support aircraft could attack any opposition.

Throughout the war, the Mujahideen had difficulty countering heliborne insertions, but they did learn that planning, drills and air

defense ambushes could help alleviate the heliborne threat.

j ^/\ Mazer-e N^/

r^JJs^ Sharif \

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1,2 JfAsadabad

* Jalalabad

/ \ Gardez

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Afghanistan

Chapter 9

Incidents
Page 228 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

QALATAK

LQASABA

3 KM
VIGNETTE 1

SOVIET HELIBORNE RAID ACHIEVES SURPRISE

by Doctor Abdul Qudus Alkozai and Commander Haji Sidiqullah

In the mid 1980s, Mujahideen forces based in Alingar District of

the Laghman Province intensified their attacks on Soviet/DRA

columns moving between Alingar and the provincial capital of Mehtar

Lam. Mujahideen action included harassing supply columns, blocking

traffic and launching raids on security outposts protecting government

establishments. These actions were usually conducted by local resistance groups of 30 to 70 men. Most were affiliated with the Hezb-e

Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIH).

Mujahideen commanders dispersed their men, weapons and equipment in the villages and hideouts and sometimes even buried their

weapons between actions. However, rarely a day would pass in the

region without some combat initiated by the Mujahideen or the DRA

forces. In response, the Soviet/DRA forces targeted suspected bases or

houses (permanent residences or headquarters) of major Mujahideen

commanders in the area. Most of the raids were conducted by ground

troops. However, after 1984, Soviet special forces launched several

heli-borne raids on Mujahideen targets in the region. Their action at

Badiabad Village was one of these.

In the summer of 1985, a Soviet heli-borne detachment raided the

house of a local Mujahideen commander, Mamur Ghulam Jailani, in

the village of Badiabad. The village is located about 15 kilometers

northeast of Mehtar Lam on the main road connecting the provincial

capital with the Alingar District (Map 9-1 - Badiabad). Commander

Jailani commanded 150 Mujahideen located in and around Badiabad.

His group was armed with automatic rifles, RPG-7 grenade launchers

and a few heavy and light machine guns.

The Soviet raid began around 0900 hours with successive gun runs

by pairs of helicopter gunships. Continual heavy helicopter rocket and

machine gun raked the village and gave the villagers little opportunity to move into the surrounding hills—a standard practice by women

and children to escape the ground force attacks that usually followed

Haji Sidiqullah was the Provincial Military Commander of the HIH party in Laghman. He

joined Hekmatyar in the fight against Daoud-before the communist revolution. He had no

formal military education. Dr. Abdul Qudus was a guerrilla commander under Sidiqullah.

He doubled as the force medic, since he received medic's training in Pakistan. [Map sheet

3086, vie grid 1745].
Page 230 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

air strikes. That day Commander Jailani was staying two villages

away at Mirza Qala, less than one kilometer to the east. His 14-yearold son was alone in the house during the raid. The youngster was

wounded, but managed to escape.

The aerial preparation continued about 30 minutes without any

Mujahideen reaction or return fire. Four lift helicopters then set down

in some corn fields 200-300 meters west of the commander's house.

The corn stalks were about 20-30 centimeters high at the time. About

40 commandoes disembarked and immediately split into three groups.

Two 10-man groups secured the northern and southern flanks of the

village and a 20-man group stormed through the village to the house

only to find that it was empty. The commandoes seized (stole) cash

and other valuables in the house and destroyed what they could not

take away. They searched several neighboring houses and found only

women and children. They detained two unarmed Mujahideen who

had buried their weapons. They were later released.

Several Mujahideen groups from the surrounding villages moved to

Badiabad to fight the Soviets, but none arrived on time. The Soviet

detachment withdrew unopposed and flew away in the helicopters that

brought it in. The entire action lasted about an hour.

COMMENTARY: Soviet intelligence as to the location ofthe commander's

house was good, probably reflecting the presence of an informer in the

area. However, the Soviets did not have current intelligence to pinpoint when the commander would be in his house. This indicates that

they were relying on only one intelligence asset and should have directed other assets to supplement their agent's reports. The resulting lack

of accurate, current intelligence resulted in a failed mission. On the

other hand, the guerrillas did not have an early warning system and

had not developed and rehearsed a plan or drills to counter a Soviethelicopter raid. This lack may have saved the Soviet force.

The guerrillas' lack of an overall village security plan and slow

reaction time cost the resistance a good opportunity for inflicting heavy

losses on the raiding detachment. A good security plan would concentrate on destroying the lift ships first and then fragmenting and

destroying the raiding detachment piecemeal.

Eyewitnesses say that Jailani had left an RPG-7 in his house. As

the Soviet gunships started strafing the village, he asked for a volunteer to go to the village and retrieve the valuable weapon. He offered

40,000 Afghanis (about 100 dollars) as a reward. His 17-year-old

nephew, Ismail, volunteered, reached the embattled house and
Chapter 9, Vignette 1 Page 231

retrieved the weapon minutes before the Soviets stormed the place.

Instead of retiring with the RPG-7, the Mujahideen commander

could have it used against the raiding force—perhaps to knock out

enemy helicopters. There was no lack of brave men among the

Mujahideen, like Ismail, who rushed to the village for combat. The

Mujahideen, in this case, demonstrated a lot of individual courage but

little tactical teamwork, initiative or cohesiveness.

About one month later, the Mujahideen had another chance and

reversed the outcome of a similar raid just four kilometers north of

Badiabad. This is the subject of the next vignette.
Page 232 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

PASHAKHEL

NIMNANAY

D RUINS

.ALUKHEL

KANDA

Map 9-2

1KM

I

1KM

_l
VIGNETTE 2

SOVIET RAID ON KANDA

by Doctor Abdul Qudus Alkozai and Commander Haji Sidiqullah

In July 1985, about one month after the Soviet raid on the

Mujahideen base in the village of Badiabad, the Soviets made a

similar attack against the resistance base of Doctor Alkozai at Kanda

Warajayee. Kanda Warajayee, commonly called Kanda, is located on

the main road between the provincial capital of Mehtar Lam and

the Alingar District in the Laghman Province. The village is nearly

eight kilometers south of the Alingar District center.

I located my base just outside the village to the west of the

main road. I moved all the crew-served weapons from my house in

the village to the base since the Soviets had conducted a series of

raids on the homes of known Mujahideen commanders. I located my

base in a ruin near an intermittent drainage ditch and protected it

with security posts and crew-served weapons firing positions.

One day in July 1985, a group of six Soviet helicopters flew into

my area. The helicopter group included four gunships which started

firing at positions around my house. It seemed to me that the enemy

intended to land troops and mount a raid on my house. The

Mujahideen in my base opened up with machine gun fire on the

enemy helicopters. This forced the Soviets to land at a distance from

the village. As the helicopters landed about three kilometers away

from Kanda on Shakhatara Dashta {plain), six of my Mujahideen

carried an 82mm Chinese-manufactured recoilless rifle to a natural

drainage ditch which extended from the village to the Prang Ghar

Mountain to the west (Map 9-2 - Kanda).

The Soviet soldiers jumped from their helicopters onto the open

terrain near a flock ofsheep. The Soviets promptly gunned down the

unarmed teenage shepherd. The enemy then tried to advance on

Kanda under the air cover provided by their gunships. But the intensity of fire from my Mujahideen pinned them down in the open. As

the fire fight continued, more of my Mujahideen rushed into the fray.

This forced the Soviet troops to withdraw, quickly board their helicopters and fly away. The Soviet raid was a complete failure.

Haji Sidiqullah and Dr. Abdul Qudus are the narrators of the previous vignette. [Map sheet

3086, vie grid 1948].
Page 234 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen's prompt reaction to the enemy attack

saved the day. The Mujahideen had learned that enemy airmobile

assaults in a guerrilla-controlled area have little chance of success

when met with coordinated fire from multiple directions. Dr. Alkozai

had planned for enemy air assault and positioned weapons to deal with

that possibility.

On the other hand, the Soviet forces paid heavily for their

attempt to land small units in an area totally dominated by the resistance. Aheliborne attack may succeed when it is launched against an

enemy caught by surprise and unable to respond swiftly. However,

heavy Mujahideen ground fire should have convinced the Soviet commander to abort his mission. Instead, he relied on gunship fire to

carry the day and was forced to withdraw from a hot LZ. He was

lucky not to lose some lift ships, particularly since his landing zone

was so close to the objective.

Soviet intelligence about their target appears to have been

good, but the Soviet commander lacked the complete intelligence

picture about the strength and location of guerrilla forces. Ifthe Soviet

commander had inserted some forces to secure the high ground

overlooking Kanda before landing the bulk of his force, he might

have been able to suppress guerrilla crew-served weapons and accomplish his raid.
Page 236 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

MARO

Map 9-3

0 1 2 3 4 5 KM I 1 1 1 1 1
Chapter 9, Vignette 3 Page 237

VIGNETTE 3

AIR ASSAULT ON MARO STRONGHOLD

by Toryalai Hemat

In April 1987, the Soviets and DRA launched a combined strike on

the Mujahideen stronghold in Nangrahar Province, Shinwar District

near the Nazian Valley. The Nazian Valley was heavily populated,

although many of the inhabitants had emigrated to Pakistan to avoid

the Soviet bombing attacks. The Mujahideen stronghold that the

enemy wanted was at Maro, some 70 kilometers southeast of

Jalalabad near the Pakistan border. Several Mujahideen groups

from different factions were located around Maro and there were

probably some 500 well-armed Mujahideen in the stronghold area.

The Soviets called this stronghold the Melava fortified region.1

For 18 days prior to the attack, the Soviets hit the area with

airstrikes. Then, a mechanized Soviet/DRA column moved east

from Jalalabad and, when it reached Shinwar Town, it split in two

(Map 9-3 - Maro). One column moved through Shinwar and up the

Nazian Valley, while the other column moved further to the east to

the subdistrict of Dur Baba and then attacked to the southwest.

Commander Saznur and his men defended on the Dur Baba

approach. Commander Khaled and I, along with our 10 other

Mujahideen, defended Ghazgisar—the highest ground in the area

overlooking Maro. The enemy launched heavy air strikes against us.

Following the airstrikes, Soviet helicopters landed air assault forces

on the high ground between the two axes.2Some 40 or 50 helicopter sorties were involved. One of the landing zones was right in

front of us. The fighting was fierce. Nine of my group were killed by

the bombing or while fighting the air assault force. Only Khaled,

Toryalai Hemat was a regiment commander of a mobile force allied with the IUA~lslamic

Union of Afghanistan of Sayyaf. He fought in many provinces in Afghanistan. [Map sheet

3185, vie grid 8892].

1 A Soviet account of this action is contained in vignette 26 of The Bear Went Over the

Mountain. The Soviet account mistakenly has the action to the northeast of Jalalabad, a

mistake that Les Grau made based on a similar name and some vague text.

2

These were two battalions from the 56th Air Assault Brigade in Gardez. The battalions

drove to Jalalabad and then to Shinwar. They staged the air assault from a field site in

Shinwar. Why they did not fly to Jalalabad airfield and then stage the air assault from the

airfield is a mystery. The ground force was most likely from the Soviet 66th Separate

Motorized Rifle Brigade and the DRA 11th Infantry Division.
Page 238 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Abdul Wakil and I survived. The Mujahideen [under Commander

Saznur] initially stopped the column from Dur Baba, but the column

coming from the Nazian Valley advanced quickly and captured Maro.

In my group, we three survivors were caught between two LZs. We

snuck out of the area and crossed the border into Pakistan and hiked

to the nearby village of Bazar. '

When the enemy took Maro, many Mujahideen fled across the

border and assembled at Bazar (Tirah Agency in Pakistan).

Reinforcements from the HIH and IUA factions poured into the

area. Arab volunteers along with Talibs from religious schools also

came for the fighting. We launched a counterattack. The fighting for

the bases was so fierce that at times it was hand-to-hand combat. I

personally was so close to some Russians during the fighting that I

would recognize them today. The enemy left many vehicles behind

and many dead on the ground. The Soviets did not usually leave

their dead, but we counted 75 Soviet KIA. I do not know the total

number of Mujahideen casualties, but I do know of 72 Mujahideen

killed and wounded. The Soviets only held Maro for three days. They

burned and destroyed what they could and mined the area before

they withdrew.

COMMENTARY: The Soviet air assault raids on mountain base camps

usually lasted for one to three days. As in this instance, the Soviets

preferred to have ground forces involved to link up with the air

assault forces. They tried to seize the area, destroy as much of

the base as possible, lay down mines and depart. And, they tried to

avoid getting trapped in the mountains fighting the Mujahideen on

their turf. As in Zhawar and Magistral, the Mujahideen initially

retreated, regrouped and reinforced and then launched a punishing

attack. The close proximity of this base to Pakistan allowed the

Mujahideen to do this. The Soviet planning and execution of this

action was well done, but they apparently were late in withdrawing

and had to fight a running withdrawal.

The Mujahideen distribution offorces on the two axes was uneven

and the air assault prevented the Mujahideen from employing a

reserve against the threatened axis. Part of the maldistribution is

due to the fact that various factions of various strengths were in the

area and missions were assigned by faction, not by strength.
CHAPTER COMMENTARY

In the early days ofthe war, Soviet air assault missions were rather

timid and unimaginative. Later, the Soviets became more confident

with the air assault concept and struck deeper and more aggressively.

Ambush forces were delivered by helicopter, and raiding forces

struck deep at Mujahideen supply bases and staging areas and even

conducted raids against Mujahideen redoubts such as the one at Maro.

The Soviets usually sent a ground element to link up with the air

assault element ifthe air assault element had to remain in the area for

any length of time. Soviet air assaults relied on helicopter gunships

and SU-25 close air support aircraft for fire support, but frequently

brought their artillery with them by helicopter.

The Mujahideen learned to counter air assaults with thorough

planning, immediate action drills, an early warning system and air

defense ambushes. They learned to mine likely LZs, employ massed

RPG fire against hovering or landing helicopters, and to try and

overrun a LZ before the air assault forces had an opportunity to get

organized and oriented. They also learned to "hug" Soviet forces so

that helicopter gunships could not fire at them.
CHAPTER 10

DEFENDING AGAINST A CORDON AND SEARCH

The Soviets preferred large cordon and search operations to deal

with large zones of Mujahideen-dominated territory. They would

cordon off the area using dominant terrain, roads and rivers as

boundaries. Then they would push forces through the area looking

for weapons, stores and Mujahideen. The Soviets: often used DRA

forces to do the actual searching. The DRA usually combined taxation and press-gang conscription with the search. At first, the

Mujahideen were vulnerable to these large-scale operations but then

they learned to build fortifications throughout the zones, coordinate

their defense, constitute a reserve and exact a toll'on the searchers.

Asadabad

Jalalabad

Afghanistan

Chapter 10

Incidents
Page 242 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
t

VIGNETTE 1

BATTLE OF BARAKI BARAK

by Commander Qazi Guljan Tayeb

Baraki Barak District is a very fertile oasis and a major green

zone located between the two main highways running south and

southwest from Kabul. One highway runs from Kabul to Gardez in

Paktia Province and the other runs from Kabul to Gazhni and on to

Kandahar. The waters of the Wardak River and Wardak Gorge irrigate this fertile area and wheat, corn, and rice fields intersperse with

vineyards and orchards. This fertile, well-populated valley provided

a natural base from which the Mujahideen could attack both of these

main LOCS as well at Muhammad Agha District to the north and

Gardez in the south.

In June 1982 there were several Mujahideen bases located in the

Baraki Barak District. We had brought a number of heavy antiaircraft machine guns into the area, particularly the ZGU-1 14.5mm

single-barreled machine gun. The enemy was concerned about the

presence of these air defense weapons. We received information that

the enemy was preparing an offensive into our area with three major

objectives: first, to seize our air defense weapons that were becoming

a hindrance to their air raids in our AO; second, to capture some of

the leading Mujahideen commanders who continuously harassed and

attacked Soviet and DRA columns traveling on the two highways

which bordered our area; and, third, to seize control of the area and

restore the district government to the DRA. We had overthrown the

DRA district government in 1979.

The Soviets and DRA launched their offensive with more than

20,000 troops involved directly and in support (Map 10-1 - Barak).

They sent out three columns, one each from Gardez, Kabul and

Wardak.1 These forces moved to our area, established a cordon

Commander Qazi Guljan Tayeb was a third year student in Kabul Theological College during the communist takeover in 1978. He joined Hikmatyar and later switched to the Sayef

faction in the mid-1980s. He was the Commander of Baraki Barak District of Logar

Province. [Map sheets 2784, 2785, 2884, 2885].

1 Forces on the Gardez axis were from the Soviet 56th Air Assault Brigade and the DRA

12th Infantry Division. Forces on the Kabul and Wardak axes were probably from the

Soviet 103rd Airborne Division and 108th Motorized Rifle Division, while DRA forces

were probably from the 8th Infantry Division, 37th Commando Brigade and 15th Tank

Brigade.
Page 244 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

around it, occupied the high ground and began attacking some of the

Mujahideen positions. The column from Kabul occupied Pul-e Alam

and from there sent one detachment to the west around Mir Abdal

mountain to flank the district from the northwest. The column from

Gardez moved west of the road to the Altamur plain and covered the

southeastern axis to the district. The column from Wardak occupied

positions on the district's western flank. The enemy blocked practically all major axes out of the area. Since we Mujahideen commanders knew ofthe upcoming offensive, we had gathered earlier to draw

up a joint defensive plan. All faction commanders participated and

we constituted the southeastern and northwestern defensive sectors

and assigned defensive areas within these sectors to different factions and units. We organized our forces into small groups to insure

our ability to maneuver and then occupied positions in the perimeter

villages of our district. We constituted mobile interior reserves and

kept them available to react to enemy actions.

I commanded the southeastern sector. I had approximately 800

Mujahideen, armed and unarmed, under my command. Our weapons

included ZGU-ls, DShKs, many RPG-7s, PK machine guns, 82mm

mortars, 82mm and 75mm recoilless rifles, machine guns, and a

number of .303 bolt-action Enfield rifles. These Enfields were quite

effective against dismounted Soviets. They had a maximum effective

range of 800 meters compared to 400 meters for the AK assault rifle.

Further, the more-powerful .303 round would penetrate Soviet flak

jackets while the AK round would not.

The enemy deployed his artillery on the Altamur plain and at

Pul-e Alam. His column from Wardak occupied the line Dashte

Delawar—Cheltan hill—and the northern villages to the high

ground. The enemy initiated their attack with heavy artillery fire

and air strikes on the villages and suspected Mujahideen positions.

The artillery fire continued for several hours. They hit the positions

of the ZGU-ls and set the entire area on fire. The enemy advanced

from the southwest between Cheltan and the road and entered our

villages and searched them. They also attacked from the other directions against the perimeter villages that they were facing. Our

Mujahideen fought them from their forward positions and fell back to

back-up positions as the enemy entered the villages. The villages and

orchard provided good cover and concealment and, although the

enemy had the area surrounded, we were able to move freely within

the 10-kilometer-wide area. We began to launch small-group counterattacks with our scattered groups of Mujahideen. We hit the
Chapter 10, Vignette 1 Page 245

enemy from many directions.

We suffered casualties, but the enemy also got a bloody nose. It

was an infantry fight at close quarters. Three Mujahideen in my

immediate group were killed during our local counterattack. Soviet

forces were encircled and the Soviets launched counter-counterattacks to aid their encircled forces. We also reinforced our forces. Our

forces were intermingled and the Soviet artillery was unable to fire

into the area of contact for fear of hitting their own troops. Fighting

continued until dusk. As night fell, fighting slackened and stopped.

The next morning, the enemy resumed the attack, but this time

from the east using tanks and infantry. We Mujahideen had mined

the Khalifa Saheb Ziarat2approach. The Soviets brought dogs to

detect the mines. My group in this area were in well-covered positions with three RPGs. As the enemy cleared the minefield and

moved forward, we opened fire with our RPGs on their tanks standing in the open cultivated areas. The enemy responded by moving

overwhelming force into the area. The Mujahideen responded by

moving out of their positions to move through gaps to attack the

enemy on the flanks. Small groups of Mujahideen with RPGs also

maneuvered through the concealing terrain folds to engage the

enemy. This totally changed the situation, with the enemy stopping

and going to ground in defensive pockets. The enemy's momentum

was lost as his attack bogged down. The Soviets occupied villages,

farm buildings and orchards and turned them into defensive positions as the second night fell. The Soviets were scattered in five or

six pockets and the Mujahideen kept them from linking up. We

Mujahideen knew the terrain and the local civilians helped us move

from position to position. We attacked the Soviets from all sides, but

suffered casualties as well. For the next day and night, the situation

continued. Both sides were intermingled and the whole area was on

fire. We saw guns capable of firing in every direction (D30) and saw

a single-barreled grenade launcher (RPG-18). This was the first time

we captured AK-74 assault rifles.3Flak jackets protected the Soviets

from AK fire, but our old .303s penetrated them. After three days and

nights, the enemy began to withdraw. Every column returned by the

direction it had come.

2

Ziarat means shrine.

3

The AK-74 Kalashnikov 5.56mm assault rifle was issued only to Soviet troops. DRA

troops had the older AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifle. The Mujahideen called the AK-74 the

"Kalakov". One of the Pashtun songs of the time had a line "A mother should not mourn a

son killed by a Kalakov" This meant that her son died fighting Soviets.
Page 246 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

None of the enemy's three objectives were achieved, but our losses

were very heavy with about 250 KIA. The enemy spread rumors that

they killed more than 2,000 of us. I don't know what the enemy

losses were, but we saw blood trails and blood pools all over the

former enemy positions. The enemy had done very hateful things in

the villages they occupied. They defecated in the crockery, smashed

pots and furniture, and destroyed villagers' food by cutting open sacks

of wheat, flour, salt and sugar and pouring it out on the ground. They

also pulled down walls, broke doors and ruined houses.

COMMENTARY: The Soviets and DRA throughly planned this operation. The converging movement of three columns from three directions was a desirable operational maneuver since it left the initiative

in the Soviets' hands and kept the Mujahideen off balance. However,

once the Soviet/DRA force entered the green zone, the terrain and

Mujahideen active defense split the communist force into a series of

isolated pockets which the Mujahideen were able to contain. The

Soviet/DRA force lost the momentum of the attack and were unable

to regain it. The initiative passed to the Mujahideen.

The Mujahideen planned their defense throughly. They conducted an active defense which incorporated tactical maneuver. They

maintained a central reserve and had the advantage of interior lines.

Terrain, well-constructed field fortifications and an aggressive

defense enabled the Mujahideen to split the Soviet/DRA forces into

isolated groups and stop their advance.

The Soviets and DRA did little to win the hearts and minds of the

populace outside of the areas they controlled. On the other hand,

Mujahideen activity often endangered the lives and property of the

populace. During the course of the war, the Soviets never controlled

Baraki Barak, but they bombed and shelled it continually. Farming was

disrupted and most ofthe population migrated to Pakistan or the cities.
VIGNETTE 2

DEFENDING AGAINST AN OFFENSIVE IN PAGHMAN

by Tsaranwal Sher Habib

In August 1982, the Soviet/DRA forces launched a search and

destroy operation against Mujahideen bases in Paghman. There were

two enemy columns. The main column moved southwest from Kabul

and then turned northwest onto the main highway to Paghman. Its

mission was to destroy resistance bases in the center, south and southwest of the Paghman area. The other, smaller column moved north

from Kabul and then turned northwest. Its mission was to block

Mujahideen escape routes along the northeastern edge of Paghman

through Ghaza and Zarshakh villages (Map 10-2 - Ghaza).4

Initially, the movement of the two columns in opposite directions

deceived the Mujahideen as to their enemy's real intention.

Nevertheless, when the Mujahideen saw the main column heading

toward the city of Paghman and its western and southern suburbs,

they quickly occupied prepared defensive positions and readied themselves for battle. However, the Mujahideen lost track of the northernmost column. It came through the town of Karez-e Mir and moved

undetected to take up positions on the hills between Somochak and

Ghaza. From the hill positions, the enemy column commanded the

main road from Paghman to the Shamali plain north of Kabul.

The next morning I dispatched two escorts to take one of my

wounded Mujahideen to Shamali for treatment. As they moved

through the Somochak Valley, they were ambushed and the escorts

were killed. The local Mujahideen from Somochak village went to

investigate and discovered that Soviet troops had occupied the ridge

overlooking the village. The Somochak Mujahideen attacked the ridge,

but the Soviets were too strong to be overrun. Other Mujahideen in

the area began to discover the enemy presence. Mujahideen in the

village bases of Qala-e Hakim and Isakhel and in the valley base of

Dara-e Zargar joined together. I took some 30 or 40 Mujahideen onto

Tsaranwal (Attorney) Sher Habib commanded the Ibrahimkhel Front north of the city of

Paghman. His primary AO extended from Paghman east and northeast to Kabul (some 20

kilometers). [Map sheet 2786, 2886].

4

The forces on the main axis were probably from the Soviet 108th Motorized Rifle

Division, while DRA forces were probably from the 8th Infantry Division, 37th Commando

Brigade and 15th Tank Brigade. The forces on the northern axis were probably from the

Soviet 103rd Airborne Division.
Page 248 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

l^--

Map 10-2
Chapter 10, Vignette 2 Page 249

the high ground at Loy Baghal Ghar. The Somochak Mujahideen reinforced their positions near the village. The Zarshakh and Ghaza

Mujahideen moved to cut the LOC of the Soviet force east of the

Torghonday hills. We had encircled the Soviet force in the northeast

sector with about 100 Mujahideen.

The fighting went on against the DRA/Soviet forces throughout

Paghman. We kept the northern Soviet blocking force pinned down,

exchanging fire with the Soviet troops for two nights and three days.

We commanders met and decided to attack and eliminate the Soviet

force on the afternoon of the third day. We launched the attack from

the west while the eastern Mujahideen contained the enemy. Our

progress was slow, however, since we did not have enough support

weapons. We had Kalashnikovs, .303 Enfields* a few RPG-7s and some

60mm mortars with a small stock of ammunition. We needed heavy

machine guns, 82mm mortars and rockets. As we Mujahideen were

closing to the Soviet positions, some 14 Soviet helicopters, including

gunships, arrived over the battlefield and began gun runs against us.

We sustained heavy casualties and broke offthe attack. The transport

helicopters landed and began lifting off the Soviet troops and flew

them away to Kabul. We had won the fight, but we suffered 23 KIA

and many others WIA in the three-day battle.

COMMENTARY: The Soviet/DRA force did an effective job initially

in disguising their objective and managing to move their northern

column while eluding Mujahideen surveillance. The northern column

effectively performed a surprise approach march and quietly occupied

necessary terrain. The northern column was organized to block

Mujahideen escape routes and so was lightly equipped. It was

battalion-sized or smaller. It seized and occupied its initial position,

but made no effort to expand that position so that it could achieve

its objective of completely blocking Mujahideen escape routes.

Further, once it disclosed its presence by firing on the litter party, it

made no attempt to seize the initiative, but remained passively in the

defense. Coordination between the northern column and the main

column was lacking since the main column seemed unable or uninterested in aiding the northern column despite their close proximity.

The Mujahideen reaction was excellent. They quickly took up positions on commanding high ground overlooking the Soviet positions and

sealed the area, trapping the Soviet force. However, the Mujahideen

lacked long-range heavy weapons, so they could not exploit the advantage that their dominant terrain gave them. The Soviets were in range
Page 250 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

of the bulk of Mujahideen weapons only during the Mujahideen

assault. The Soviet helicopter strike effectively countered this assault.

Soviet helicopter gunships were not as effective at night. Perhaps the

Mujahideen assault would have had a better chance ifthe attack were

launched at dusk or before dawn.

Mujahideen use of battlefield maneuver was commendable. They

offset much of their disadvantage in fire power, took dominant terrain

and attack positions, seized the initiative from the Soviets by trapping

them and forced the Soviets to stage a rescue by hazarding helicopters.

All of this was due to effective Mujahideen maneuver. If the

Mujahideen had some anti-aircraft weapons, they could have bloodied

the Soviet force badly. As it was, Mujahideen maneuver prevented the

success of the Soviet/DRA offensive and decided the outcome of the

battle in the Mujahideen's favor.
VIGNETTE 3

BATTLE FOR KAMA

by Abdul Baqi Balots

The Kama area, located northeast of Jalalabad, is approximately

87 square kilometers in area. It is bordered in the west by the Kunar

River, in the south by the Kabul River and in the north and east by

mountains. It is a large, well-irrigated green zone which was densely

populated before the war. The Mujahideen in the area were all locals

defending their home turf. In February 1983,1 commanded a group of

35 men in my village of Sama Garay (one kilometer east ofthe town of

Kama). We had Enfield and G35bolt-action rifles and a few

Kalashnikovs. We lacked the capability to launch major attacks, but

conducted hit and run actions. We did not have a base in the mountains, but lived in the village. There were similar units in the other

villages in the area. The Kama District Mujahideen were very fragmented and we had no contact with many groups in the area and so

we couldn't help each other. The Soviets could deal with us piecemeal.

We Mujahideen did not have a common contingency plan to deal with

the Soviets when they came in force to kill us all. And even if we had

such a plan, at that time our communications were primitive and most

communications were done with messengers.

The Soviets were close at hand. The Soviet "Thunder" unit6 was

stationed in Samarkhel to the east of Jalalabad. They crossed the

Kunar River and established a base south of the Tirana Ghashe on

the plain (Map 10-3 - Kama). Then at dawn on 15 February 1983, 20

to 25 of their helicopters landed troops in the mountains north and

northeast ofKama. The helicopters landed at Mashingan Ghar, Spinki

Abdul Baqi Balots was a Hezb-e Islami (HIH) commander in the Kama area east of

Jalalabad. Before the communist takeover, he was a student in the tenth grade of high

school. School authorities were forcing him to join the Communist Youth Organization. His

father advised him not to join but to fight. He left school and joined the Mujahideen and

fought through to the end. [Map sheets 3085 and 3185].

5

The US M1917 Springfield Rifle which Springfield Armory produced for the British Army

in World War I. The Mujahideen called them the G3 rifle.

6

The 'Thunder" unit was the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade. The Mujahideen

called it the Thunder unit because it was a reinforced unit designed for counterinsurgency.

It had three motorized rifle battalions, an air assault battalion, a tank battalion, an artillery

howitzer battalion, a MRL battalion, a material support battalion, a reconnaissance company and support troops.
Page 252 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 10, Vignette 3 Page 253

Ghar, Dergi Ghar, Wut Ghar, Cokay Baba Ghar, Kacay Ghar, and

Tirana Ghashe. The troops on the high ground sealed off our escape

into the mountains. At the same time, a detachment from the Soviet

base at Samarkhel crossed the Kabul River to establish the southern

part ofthe cordon. The main Soviet ground sweep started from Tirana

Ghar moving to the east.

We woke up to the sounds of helicopters and the lights offlares. We

were facing a large force—possibly bigger than a regiment. I was

saying my morning prayers when my guard approached and said

"Commander, things look different this morning." I told him, "Don't

worry, our lives are in the hand of God, not the Russians. We are

destined to die on the day that is destined for us. It will not be pushed

backward or forward." The helicopters continued to fly over, wave

after wave. %

I saw a group of Mujahideen from the village of Mastali running

away between Wut Ghar and Dergi Ghar. As they moved along the

road, the Soviets on the high ground began shooting at them. I saw

two of them go down. Gulrahg was one and the son of Ghulam

Sarwar the driver, was the other. Both were killed. The rest escaped

into the mountains.

We were close to the river, so we moved to the south of Kama

where there is a bushy area and a mosque. We took refuge and hid

ourselves there. Everything was quiet in our area for hours. My

Mujahideen came to me and asked what was happening. It was now

1100 hours. I said that the Russians would come when they would

come, but we were hungry now. I approached a village for food.

Someone came out and told me not leave the hideout since enemy

tanks were five minutes from the village. I returned to the hideout.

Around 1400 hours, another villager came and told me to leave

the bushy area since the Russians were going to set it on fire to

flush us out. He said eight tanks and APCs were approaching the

area. We moved to the edge of the wooded area where there is a

natural berm and took up positions there. We had one RPG-7 with

three rounds, two Kalashnikovs, and some Marko Chinese bolt-action

rifles.7The wooded area was also full of civilians who were hiding

from the Soviets, so we felt an obligation to defend them and the

wooded area and prevent the Soviets from setting it on fire. I saw

BMPs moving toward us. They stopped short of and bypassed the

wooded area and turned toward Kama. It was now 1500 hours.

Marko is the Chinese copy of the German M-88 Mauser.
Page 254 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

When we were scattered throughout the wooded area, I received a

message from the rest of my men who described their location and

asked me to join them since the air assault troops were moving to

Mashingan village. I took my 12 men with me and we moved to join

the rest of my men. The Tawdo Obo highway bridge was close to our

village. I joined the rest of my men at that bridge which was near the

village. We decided that the Soviets coming from the high ground

would cross over this bridge, so we took positions on both sides of the

road leading to this bridge. As we were taking our positions, a group

of Soviets moving toward us opened fire on us.

A bullet hit the butt ofthe rifle of my cousin, the son of my maternal uncle, and smashed it. "What will I do now?" he asked. "I will

find you another," I stated. As I approached the road, I saw my friend

Habib Noor some 30 meters to my right shooting at something. I hit

the ground and saw that he was shooting at two Soviets. He killed

them both. "Get their Kalashnikovs, Commander" he yelled at me. I

sprinted across the road and grabbed a Kalashnikov, but the rifle's

carrying strap was around the corpse's body and I couldn't get it

loose. I saw a lot of Soviets coming at me and they were all firing

(they put ten bullet holes through my baggy trousers). Bullets were

flying all around me. I kept tugging, but the rifles wouldn't budge, so

I abandoned trying to get the Kalashnikovs. I had an RPK-3 antitank hand grenade. I wanted to use it, even though there was no

tank, to make some noise to distract their attention so I could get

away. I threw the grenade. After four seconds, it exploded and made

a big noise and I got away to where my friend Habib Noor was. Habib

Noor told me that, unless we crossed the stream to the north, we

would not be able to engage the Soviets. He told me that since I am

short and he is tall, I had a better chance of making it across unobserved and I should cross. I told him " I am your commander, but I

am under your command now." I ran across and jumped but landed

directly into the stream. "Oh Allah," I cried "you have killed me without dignity." Then I made a big jump, I don't know how since even a

tank can't clear it, but I did and got out of the stream. Even today,

when I pass that spot, I measure it. I took up a position and fired my

Kalashnikov. I killed the Soviet facing Habib Noor. Habib shouted

that Soviets were still in the nearby houses of Shna Kala village. I

moved down the path from the bridge to get at the Soviets. I

approached that position, threw hand grenades at it and fired my

Kalashnikov. Everything was quiet after that. I looked back across

the road. Habib Noor was standing. I told him to get down. He
Chapter 10, Vignette 3 Page 255

remained standing, cursing the Soviets and demanding their surrender in Pashtu. At that moment, I saw a light in his stomach. He was

hit and fell down. I recrossed the road to get his body. I could see the

bodies of Soviets in the stream. When I reached Habib, he died. He

had only five rounds left. He was my good friend and was not even

from our village. He was from the Ahmadzai tribe, which live away

from this area.

Fighting went on all around us. I heard shooting from everywhere, but I only knew what was going on around me. Shaykh

Bombar from my unit came up to help. He had the only other

Kalashnikov in my group. He had given his Kalashnikov to another

guy and taken the RPG and one rocket and moved to my position.

As he came, I saw tanks moving toward us through the fields

from the Shna Kala village. The sun was setting. The air assault

troops had come down from the mountains and were advancing.

Tanks were coming from the west. We wanted to carry Habib Noor's

body to Rangin Kala village and from there it would be easier to

take his body out of the area. I took the RPG and rocket from Shaykh

Bombar. We wrapped Habib Noor's body in my tsadar—the allpurpose cloth that we all carry and wear. Then I shot the RPG at a

tank. The tanks were out of range and so the rocket landed among

the infantry. The tanks and infantry promptly stopped, realizing that

we had antitank weapons. Their halt enabled us to break contact and

take Habib Noor's body out of the area to Gerdab village—about six

kilometers further to the east. There, I rented a camel and we took

Habib's body to his family at a refugee camp in Pakistan. We buried

him in the refugee cemetery in Peshawar, even though his home was

in Paktia Province. His family is doing okay now since one of his sons

has a job in Saudi Arabia.

COMMENTARY: At this point, the Mujahideen effort was uncoordinated

and put the villagers at direct risk. The Mujahideen were poorly

trained and their lack of cooperation put the area at risk. Their

personal bravery and motivation, however, turned the entire area into

a defensive zone that slowed the Soviet effort. Later, as the

Mujahideen were better armed, had better communications and began

to coordinate their actions, they were more effective against the Soviet

and DRA forces. However, by that time most of the civilians were

killed or had left the area for refugee camps in Pakistan.

The Soviet effort was well planned and used air assault forces effectively to seal the area. However, their cordon enclosed a large area
Page 256 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

which they were unable to effectively sweep. They needed to break the

cordoned area into manageable segments and sweep those in turn.

Instead, their sweep was uncoordinated and large sectors of the green

zone were never checked. This green zone is full of villages and fields

and requires several days to clear. The Soviets were reluctant to maintain a cordon at night, so they hurried through the sweep and missed

the bulk of the disorganized Mujahideen.
VIGNETTE 4

DEFENDING AGAINST A CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATION IN

PARWAN

by Commander Haji Abdul Qader

In late January 1984, Soviet forces launched a multi-divisional8

cordon and search operation in Parwan and Kapisa Provinces. The

aim of the operation was to destroy the Mujahideen forces across

a wide area stretching from the Charikar-Salang highway in the

west, to Mahmoud-e Raqi in the east and Bagram in the south

(Map 10-4 - Parwan). This area is covered with villages and cut by

irrigation canals to the orchards, vineyards and farms of this fertile

area. There were dozens of Mujahideen bases in this area that were

affiliated with major resistance factions. Most of the Mujahideen

were not in their bases but split up into hundreds of small units

living in the villages during the winter.

On 24 January columns of Soviet and DRA tank and motorized

rifle forces moved from Kabul, Bagram, Jabal-e Seraj and

Gulbahar (at the mouth of the Punjsher Valley) to establish a wide

cordon around the green zone on both sides of the Panjsher River.

The cordon and sweep operation was backed with extensive air

support. The Soviets and DRA hoped to trap the thousands of

Mujahideen in this area and to destroy their base camps. The

Mujahideen reinforced their defenses along the major roads in

the area. The Mujahideen expected enemy advances along these

axes of advance and decided to block them to gain time to break

out from encirclement.

During the first day, the Soviet/DRA forces deployed and established blocking positions reinforced by tanks, APCs and artillery. At

dawn on 25 January, they mounted attacks from several points,

including Charikar, Jabal-e Seraj, Gulbahar, Mahmoud-e Raqi, Qalae Naw and Bagram.

Haji Abdul Qader was a commander in the Bagram area. The authors have consulted

other documents to add detail to his account. A former teacher, Abdul Qader hails from the

Sayghani village just six kilometers northeast of the Bagram air base. His group was initially affiliated with the HIK faction. He later joined Sayyaf's IUA faction. [Map sheets 2886

and 2887].

8 Most probably the Soviet 103rd Airborne Division and the 108th Motorized Rifle Division

and the DRA 8th Infanfantry Division and 37th Commando Brigade.
Page 258 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

CHARIIKAR

Map 10-4

0

l_

1

I

2

I

3

I

4

I

5 6 KM

_L I
Chapter 10, Vignette 4 Page 259

The Action Near Bagram

At that time, Haji Abdul Qader commanded some 200 Mujahideen

in the Bagram District. His permanent base was co-located with a JIA

base under Commander Shahin at Deh Babi near Abdullah-e Burj. His

other base was at Ashrafi near Charikar. His group was a mobile

group and spent most of its time fighting around Bagram or combined

With other Mujahideen units in Parwan and Kapisa Provinces.

During the Soviet cordon and search operation in Parwan and

Kapisa Provinces, Haji Abdul Qader's unit, along with a 150 strong

unit under Commander Sher Mohammad, was to defend a line

north of the main Bagram-Mahmoud-e Raqi road between Abdullahe Burj and Qala-e Beland. To the west, HIH faction Mujahideen were

blocking the Bagram-Charikar axis, and on the east flank, JIA

units were covering the area on the left bank of Panjsher River

(Map 10-4 - Parwan).

The night before the attack, Soviet and DRA artillery pounded

Mujahideen positions from fire bases that they established around the

area. They attacked swiftly and engaged the Mujahideen on all axes

with infantry and armor or pinned them down with heavy artillery and

air strikes. Their air force intensified the pressure on the second day

as ground attack aircraft and helicopter gunships supported the attacking columns. Mujahideen communications were seriously disrupted

and their tactical coordination dropped off dramatically.

Haji Qader ordered his men to occupy prepared blocking positions.

They were armed with Kalashnikovs, some 15 RPG-7 anti-tank

grenade launchers, three 82mm and one 75mm recoilless rifles, three

82mm mortars, two DShK machine guns and one ZGU-1 heavy

machine gun. They also had a few 107mm surface-to-surface rockets.

Haji Qader deployed all his anti-tank weapons forward and emplaced

his heavy machine guns on the high ground behind the front line. Haji

Qader split his force and rotated them in the defensive positions. The

Mujahideen who were not manning the positions constituted the

reserve and concentrated in Baltukhel and Sayadan, some two to three

kilometers to the northwest. Qäder's supplies and aid station were

also located in this area.

At dawn on January 25, opposing artillery pounded Mujahideen

positions for about two hours. The intensity of fire kept the resistance

fighters down inside their bunkers. Some Mujahideen took cover in

the ruins and terrain folds and ditches. The artillery fire was accompanied by air strikes and gun runs by helicopter gunships. The

Mujahideen did not expose themselves during the fire strikes. A little
Page 260 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

after sunrise, opposing infantry, backed by tanks and BMPs, launched

the attack. The attacking columns moved confidently, assuming that

the artillery fire and air strikes had destroyed the Mujahideen resistance. However, as they came within range, Mujahideen anti-tank

weapons and machine guns opened up. They caught the attackers by

surprise and forced the infantry and tanks to fall back. The attackers

were not very aggressive, probably as a result of their fear of mines

and anti-tank weapons.

During the first two days, the Soviets repeated their attack several times following the same scenario: artillery fire and air strikes

would hammer Mujahideen positions. Then the infantry and tanks

would advance until they were stopped with withering fire at close

quarter. They would then fall back. The tanks that were following the

infantry were very slow to advance, particularly when some tanks

were hit and the infantry suffered casualties. At the same time, the

infantry would lose heart after being hit by withering defensive fire

and would fall back to take cover behind the tanks.

As the operation continued, two factors worked against the

Mujahideen. First, the enemy penetrated Mujahideen positions to considerable depth on some axes. This raised the fear of being encircled

by flanking units. Second, as the Mujahideen began to understand the

scope and intent of the enemy operation, they began to escape out of

the enemy cordon. This weakened the Mujahideen positions and aided

the attacker. Some adjacent units left their forward positions at the

Qala-e Belend sector and fell back. This forced Haji Abdul Qader to

withdraw his force on the third day to his planned second line of

defense on high ground about one kilometer north of the forward

defensive positions. For the next three days, the Soviets tried to break

through Qader's positions on the high ground. It was even tougher

going for them. They used the same method of assault with the

infantry leading and the tanks following—and with the same results.

Toward the end of the week, hundreds of Mujahideen used the

Qala-e Beland sector as an escape route to their mountain bases in

Koh-e Safi in the south. The Mujahideen used a covered irrigation

canal to sneak out of the area. Just north of the road near the Qala-e

Naw bazaar, there is an east-west irrigation canal. Several northsouth feeder canals intersect this main canal. At several points, the

canal is bridged and covered to allow vehicles to cross. At these points,

the main and feeder canals are covered. In winter, the irrigation system is dry and provided suitable escape passages. During the last

nights of the operation, hundreds of Mujahideen escaped through the
Chapter 10, Vignette 4 Page 261

canals to Koh-e Safi. The attackers detected this exodus only toward

the end ofthe operation and opened fire on some escapees. Haji Abdul

Qader's men provided the rear guard and were the last to move out of

the area after blocking the Qala-e Beland sector for one week.

When the Soviets and DRA finally entered the area, thousands of

Mujahideen had escaped. Haji Qader claims that the Soviets only captured about 20 armed Mujahideen and that the Soviet commander in

charge ofthe operation was reprimanded for his failure. He states that

the Soviets used several divisions, made elaborate plans and fired

thousands of artillery shells and flew hundreds of combat missions

without achieving much. Haji Abdul Qader's group destroyed 11 tanks

and APCs and inflicted dozens of casualties on the enemy. His losses

included seven KIA and 18 WIA. Most ofhis casualties came from helicopter gunships.

COMMENTARY: Although the Soviet/DRA forces overran many

Mujahideen bases in Parwan and Kapisa Provinces, they failed to

destroy the Mujahideen forces which slipped out of the cordon or went

underground. The Mujahideen enjoyed freedom of movement and

maneuver in a large area until the Soviets and DRA finally penetrated. The Soviet/DRA encirclement was very porous—as was the case

with so many large-scale cordon and search operations of the war—

making it impossible to trap Mujahideen forces. The poor performance

by the Soviet infantry and tanks against a determined enemy cost

them dearly. Instead of mounting coordinated infantry-tank assaults,

the Soviet forces seemed to use each element separately. While a combined action could minimize the vulnerabilities of each element, a disjointed action maximized the vulnerability of both elements in the face

of a resolute defense.

The Mujahideen built a series of covered bunkers near their prepared fighting positions and these bunkers enabled them to survive air

strikes and intense artillery barrages. Most ofthis massive Soviet fire

destroyed civilians, houses and the agricultural system.

Lack of operational coordination among the Mujahideen groups

cost the resistance some major operational achievements. While the

Soviets failed to capture large numbers of Mujahideen or to destroy a

major Mujahideen grouping, the resistance missed a major opportunity to inflict heavy losses on the Soviets. The Mujahideen focused on

escape, when they had many chances to bloody their enemy by resisting on consecutive defensive positions in the area and by cutting the

Soviet withdrawal routes once they were inside Mujahideen territory.
Page 262 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

However, this was not the first nor the last battle for the resistance.

They were fighting a war of attrition and refused to become decisively

engaged in their home area where the civilians and villages would bear

the brunt ofthe damage. In this area, the civilian population remained

in their homes throughout thewar.

Tactically, the Mujahideen massed the fires of their light anti-tank

weapons at close range. Several anti-tank gunners would fire at the

same target simultaneously. This greatly increased their probability of

hit, prevented effective counter fires, demoralized vehicle crews, created confusion among their enemy's tank and motorized columns and

prevented the employment of accurate, Soviet indirect artillery fire

into the area. Heavy machine guns usually backed up the anti-tank

gunners to separate the dismounted infantry from the armored vehicles, keep the vehicle crews buttoned up so that their vision was

obscured, and provided covering fire should the anti-tank gunners

need to leave their positions.
VIGNETTE 5

LAST STAND ON THE ISLANDS OPPOSITE GERDI KATS

by Mawlawi Shukur Yasini

On 24 March 1984, the Soviets sent a large force into Kama

District. I was in Peshawar, Pakistan at that time. The Soviet force

was not just the 66th Brigade, but also included a force which came

from fighting in Laghman Province. The entire force had some 200-

300 tanks and APCs in it. I had two groups of Mujahideen in the

village of Merzakhel. One group was commanded by Baz Mohammad

and the other by my nephew Shapur. Baz Mohammad's group

managed to get out of Merzakhel before the Soviets arrived but

Shapur's group of 25 was trapped. The Soviets landed troops on the

high ground overlooking Merzakhel and their tanks were moving in

from the west (MaplO-5 - Gerdi). Across the river, Soviet tanks were

moving through Gerdi Kats. The Mujahideen moved south from

Merzakhel to the low, flat islands of the Kabul River between Gerdi

Kats and Merzakhel. These islands are covered with a low-scrub

which offers some concealment but not cover. As they reached the

islands, the Soviet infantry in Gerdi Kats began to cross the river

with inflatable rubber rafts. The Soviets also moved a tank into the

river to cross over, but it quickly became stuck. Fairoz, a Mujahideen

machine gunner, sunk the rafts with PK machine gun fire. The

Soviet infantry sunk into the river and several drowned. The Soviets

also had two dogs on the rafts. The dogs swam back to Gerdi Kats.

Mujahideen fire from the islands pinned down the Soviets and defeated their crossing attempt.

However, at the same time, the enemy brought pressure on my

group from both sides and only a few of my men managed to slip

away. They were exposed on the low-scrub islands and I lost 11 KIA,

two WIA and two captured. The two captured were Awozubellah and

Mawlawi Shukur Yasini is a prominent religious leader in Nangrahar Province. He is from

the village of Gerdab in Kama District northeast of Jalalabad. During the war, he was a

major commander of the Khalis group (HIK). Later, he joined NIFA. During the war, he

took television journalist Dan Rather to his base in Afghanistan. He also accompanied

Congressman Charles Wilson of Texas into Afghanistan several times. During most of the

war he was active in his own area fighting the DRA in Jalalabad and the Soviet 66th

Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade at Samarkhel. He became a member of the Nangrahar

governing council after collapse of the communist regime--a position he held until the

Taliban advance in September 1996. [Map sheet 3185].
Page 264 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 10, Vignette 5 Page 265

Nazar Mohammad. The Soviets tortured them, but they did not

break. They continually claimed that crazy Mawlawi Shukur forced

them to fight. Eventually, they were released. Shapur and Fairoz

were wounded. Villagers took them to safe houses and kept moving

them to hide them from the Soviets, who searched the area for

six days. We could not retrieve our Mujahideen dead due to enemy

pressure. Many of their remains were torn apart by foxes and jackals. After a week or so, we buried what remains we could find. The

Soviets paid a 20,000 Afghanis reward for recovering their dead from

the river. When I saw the condition of my dead, I banned Afghans

from helping the Soviets recover their dead. "Let the crows of this

country have their fair share."

COMMENTARY: The Kama Mujahideen usually tried to avoid the

Soviet cordon and search of their district by fleeing into the mountains, but the Soviets habitually used heliborne forces to block their

escape routes. This meant that the Kama Mujahideen fought the

Soviets within the green zone. However, the Kama green zone had a

road network within it and the Soviets could bring their combat vehicles into the green zone where their firepower gave the Soviets a

tremendous advantage. The Soviets used the same mountain LZs

over and over again, but the Mujahideen made no attempt to mine

the LZs or post antiaircraft weapons overlooking these sites on a

permanent basis. In this action, the Mujahideen were surprised and

unable to escape into the mountains and forced to fight an uneven

battle. If they had contested the known LZs, the outcome should

have been less costly for the Mujahideen.

Crossing shallow desert rivers looks fairly safe, but can be treacherous. On the 31st of March 1879, the British Army lost 47 men,

effectively a squadron of the 10th Hussars, crossing the Kabul River

some 35 kilometers to the west of this Soviet crossing attempt. The

Kabul River looks shallow and slow-moving, but it has fast, strong

undercurrents that can quickly overpower the unwary soldier.

9 Colonel H. B. Hanna, The Second Afghan War, 1878-79-80, Its Causes, Its Conduct,

and Its Consequences, Volume II, Westminister: Archibald Constable and Co., Ltd., 1904,

282-287.
Page 266 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

CHAPTER COMMENTARY

The Soviet/DRA cordon and search usually involved a number of

forces in a combined arms battle or operation. The Mujahideen who

had the best success surviving these did so because their actions

were centrally coordinated, they had developed contingency plans to

deal with them and they had built redundant field fortifications to

slow the Soviet/DRA advance and fragment their efforts. The betterprepared Mujahideen always retained a central reserve and were

adept at counterattacking the flanks of the attacker. The Mujahideen who had the most difficulty with cordon and search operations

were usually separate groups who had little or no ties to a central

Mujahideen planning authority, had worked out no contingency

plans and had taken no steps to fortify the area.
CHAPTER 11

DEFENDING BASE CAMPS

Although guerrilla forces would like to retain the initiative and

never have to defend, there are times when the guerrilla force must

defend. The guerrilla can conduct a mobile defense or a positional

defense. Guerrilla mobile defenses are usually rear-guard actions

designed to preserve the main force or draw the attacker into a

prepared ambush. Guerrilla positional defenses are normally associated with the defense of a pass, bridge, populated area, base camp or

supply depot. The odds are stacked against the defending guerrilla.

The attacker has the initiative, armored vehicles, air power, the

preponderance of artillery and overwhelming firepower. The guerrilla

tries to match this through use of terrain and prepared defenses.

In the Soviet-Afghan war, the Mujahideen spent a great deal of

time and energy in the defense. Mujahideen defense was associated

with Mujahideen logistics. Early in the war, Mujahideen logistics

requirements were primarily concerned with ammunition resupply

and medical evacuation of the wounded. The rural population willingly provided food and shelter to the Mujahideen, since the

Mujahideen were mostly local residents. The Soviets decided to attack

Mujahideen logistics by forcing the rural population off of their farms

into refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran or into the cities of

Afghanistan. They did this by bombing and attacking villages, scattering mines across the countryside, destroying crops, killing livestock, poisoning wells and destroying irrigation systems. The

Mujahideen, accustomed to living off the good will of the rural population, were now forced to transport rations as well as ammunition

from Pakistan and Iran into Afghanistan. The Mujahideen created a

series of supply depots and forward supply points to provision their

forces. These depots and supply points had to be defended. The

Mujahideen also controlled key passes, which forced the Soviets and

DRA to either withdraw cut-off forces or resupply them by air. The

Mujahideen defended these key passes zealously.
Page 268 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

The rugged terrain of Afghanistan aided Mujahideen defenses.

Defensive positions were another key component of the Mujahideen

defens. Mujahideen built rugged, roofed bunkers which could withstand artillery and airstrikes. The Mujahideen built elaborate

camouflaged defensive shelters and fighting positions connected

with interlocking fields of fire, communications trenches, and redundant firing positions. The Mujahideen learned to rotate defensive

forces through a position to lessen the effects of combat fatigue and

psychological stress.

What follows are examples of successful and unsuccessful

Mujahideen base camp defenses against ground attack or a combination of ground and air assault.

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VIGNETTE 1

SOVIET OFFENSIVE THROUGH SURKH RUD

by Commander Mohammad Asef

During 1978-1979, the heavily-populated Surkh Rud District

was a hotbed of resistance against the communist regime and a

base for Mujahideen actions in Nangrahar Province. Following the

Soviet invasion, one of the early major Soviet operations was

conducted against Mujahideen bases in Surkh Rud. There are two

main roads running northeast to southwest in Surkh Rud Valley

(Map 11-1 - Chaharbagh). Highway 134 runs through Chaharbagh,

Watapur, Surkh Rud (the district headquarters), Khayrabad, and

Fatehabad. The other road runs along the bottom of Tor Ghar

mountain. It passes through Darunta, Katapur, Balabagh, and then

follows the Surkh Rud River to the west. Most of the Mujahideen

bases were located along these two roads and most Mujahideen bases

also maintained hideouts in the canyons of the Tor Ghar mountain.

My home town of Bazetkhel was located between the two roads, but

my base was just to the east of Highway 134.

The Soviet forces concentrated in Jalalabad in May 1980. We were

tipped off that the Soviets planned to advance along the two roads,

destroying Mujahideen bases as they went. Their southern column

would swing north at Fatehabad to seal the pocket. I left my base at

Chaharbagh and went to my village at Bazetkhel, where I had 80 men.

I took 50 of these men north into a Tor Ghar mountain canyon. We

intended to stop the Soviet column on the northern route before they

reached the main Mujahideen base at Katapur. We also hoped to buy

enough time to allow the civilians to escape into the mountains. When

the column approached, my force engaged them and we stopped the

column. The Soviets dismounted and began moving aggressively into

the mountains. They were a bit too aggressive and our fire cut them

down. The Soviets were badly bloodied. The Soviets responded by calling in massive artillery fire on my positions. When night fell, I pulled

my force further up the canyon to the mountain ridge and then crossed

over into the next canyon to the west. We moved down the canyon and

into the town of Katapur.

Mohammad Asef was initially a Hezbi-lslami (HIH) commander until 1984 when he joined

NIFA. He was in high school when the communists came to power. He graduated from

school and then joined the resistance. He is from Bazetkhel in Surkh Rud District southwest of Jalalabad in Nangrahar Province. [Map sheet 3085].
Page 270 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 11, Vignette 1 Page 271

At Katapur, the local Mujahideen told us that Soviet troops

had chased the civilians into the mountains just north of Katapur

and killed many of them. During the fighting near Katapur, the

Soviets had left two of their dead behind. The Mujahideen expected

that the Soviets would return for their dead. My Mujahideen joined

other Mujahideen and we went to defend a canyon to the north of

Katapur. We laid an ambush on the high ground. Soon, a Soviet

detachment appeared looking for their dead. We opened up on the

Soviets and they left seven more dead behind. However, they retaliated on the villagers and massacred civilians and even animals in

Balabagh and Katapur arid then moved on to Fatehabad. The Soviets

could not dislodge the Mujahideen from the mountains and could not

find us in the valley, so they killed everything in sight. They established three bases—at Balabagh, Fatehabad and Sultan Pur. The

Soviets launched search-and-destroy missions from these bases

against the adjacent villages. Many civilians had to flee west while

Mujahideen detachments went to their hideouts in the Tor Ghar

mountain. Mujahideen commanders calculate that the Soviets

massacred some 1,800 people during 12 days in the Surkh Rud. Most

ofthese were innocent civilians. The Soviets expected that they could

readily flush out the Mujahideen. Their lack of success led to frustration and the Soviet soldiers ran amok—killing and looting. It was

the first Soviet operation in the area. They came looking for U.S. and

Chinese mercenaries and instead found frustration and an opportunity to murder and loot.

COMMENTARY: During this stage of the war, the Mujahideen lived in

their own houses in the midst ofthe population. Their food, water and

shelter was willingly supplied by the populace. As a result, many civilians died when the Soviets launched their operation. The large

number of reported civilian deaths could be a result of lack of officers'

control and unit discipline or deliberate policy. The apparent Soviet

plan was to separate the guerrilla from the populace by forcing the

populace out of the countryside. Later, most of the populace deserted

their homes in this area and fled to refugee camps in Pakistan.

This is too large an area to block and sweep as a single action and

the Soviets failed to segment the area and clear it a piece at a time.

This allowed many of the Mujahideen and civilians to escape the

cordon. The Soviet emphasis on the primacy of the large operation

instead of the well-executed tactical action worked to the Mujahideen

advantage. Mujahideen command and control was fragmented and
Page 272 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

worked through happenstance and chance encounters. Without

advanced warning, the Mujahideen would probably have suffered

much more in this sweep.
VIGNETTE 2

DEFENDING SURKHAB BASE CAMP

by Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif

In 1980, the Mujahideen began establishing bases in the mountains near the village of Surkhab in Lowgar Province. There were

perhaps 150 Mujahideen in the area belonging to several factions.

Mawlawi Mohammad Yusuf of the ANLF, Mawlawi Mohammadin of

the IRMA and small groups from JIA and IUA established bases

there. My base was in the mountains east of Surkhab in a canyon

called Durow. We had 82mm mortars, DShKs and RPG-7s. Early in

the morning of the 5th of June 1980, a mixed DRA/Soviet column

came from Kabul and exited highway 157 at Pule-e Kandahari

heading east. They were coming for us. They deployed their artillery

and began shelling our bases. Most of the Mujahideen were in

their villages at that time. They came out of their villages and occupied defensive positions while other Mujahideen joined them from

their mountain bases.

In order to block the advance of the enemy into our mountain

bases, we occupied blocking positions on Spin Ghar mountain overlooking Dara village (Map 11-2 - Surkhab). Other Mujahideen occupied positions south of Durow Canyon on Lakay Ghar mountain. Our

original plan was to defend the forward slopes of Spin Ghar and

Lakay Ghar. We set an ambush forward of our main defenses. It

inflicted casualties but was eventually overwhelmed. After their

artillery preparation, enemy tanks and infantry moved along the

valley road from Korek and attacked Mujahideen positions at the

canyon's western mouth. Fighting was heavy. This was our first

experience fighting the Soviets. Their helicopters came in to evacuate their dead and wounded. Our civilians suffered horribly. The

people began leaving their homes and fleeing to the mountains.

Fighting continued all day long, but the enemy was unable to break

through the Mujahideen positions.

On the second day, there were fewer Mujahideen fighting, as

some had left the area overnight. The enemy firing kept tremendous

pressure on the remaining Mujahideen and many had to withdraw

from their fighting positions. There is a covered approach to Spin

Ghar mountain from the north using the Tobagi plain. This plain is

Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif is from Logar Province. [Map sheet 2885, vie grid 2577].
Page 274 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

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higher than Surkhab village and it is easier to climb Spin Ghar

mountain from the Tobagi plain than from the Surkhab Valley. I

was climbing the mountain with two others carrying ammunition. I

intended to climb over the mountain to the north face. As we

reached halfway up the ridge, enemy aircraft flew over the area. The

enemy usually marked their infantry positions for the aircraft by

firing smoke or signal rockets. We saw rockets being fired on the

other side ofthe mountain. This meant that enemy infantry were on

the other side of the mountain and were trying to encircle the

Mujahideen bases by a flanking movement from the Tobagi plain. I

had all our spare ammunition with me and at that time ammunition

was as precious to me as my faith. We climbed back down the mountain and saw that the other Mujahideen were retreating into their

bases. The people of Surkhab came to the Mujahideen and demanded that we move our bases lest Surkhab be invaded everyday. The

Mullas had refused to move the bases earlier, but now they were

panicked and hiding in caves. The people taunted them with "You

told us this was Jihad, but now you are trying to flee." Some of the

Mullas came out, but everyone was still panicked. I had all of this

ammunition and no one to help me move it. I thought of abandoning

the ammunition and saving my skin, but then I thought how vital

the ammunition was and what would happen if I was later called to

account for my actions.

Finally, a group of us decided to make a suicidal last stand and

called for volunteers. Lieutenant Sharab, a DRA deserter, volunteered. We had suspected him earlier, but he proved himself now.

Lieutenant Sharab said, "They are not used to mountains. It will take

them a long time to climb them and they are afraid ofthese mountains.

If you fire at them from one position, they will stop and return fire for

a long time at that position." We fired mortars at the north slope and

positioned some Mujahideen on the top of Spin Ghar mountain to draw

fire. This was the turning point. All of a sudden, helicopter activity

fell off and firing tapered off in the valley. We thought that it was a

trick to make us believe that the fighting was over so the Mujahideen

would come out of their hideouts and then they would take us from

behind. We did not expect that such a powerful enemy would abandon

an almost certain victory and retire empty-handed. It was late afternoon when I saw civilians coming from Surkhab. They told us that the

enemy had withdrawn. The enemy evidently did not want to have to

fight to take the mountain. This was not our doing, but the hand of

God. We lost 10 KIA and six WIAin my group. I do not know the casu-
Page 276 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

alties in other groups. All the wounded who could walk, walked to

Pakistan for treatment. The other wounded were treated by local

doctors. Doctors from Kabul hospitals would come to help us also. Dr.

Abdur Rahman from a hospital in Kabul would often treat our wounded. I do not know what the enemy losses were, but they must have

suffered a lot to quit on the brink of victory.

COMMENTARY: The DRA/Soviets had the opportunity to attack the

eastern and western canyon mouths simultaneously. The Mujahideen

defenses were oriented to the west. Even on the' second day, when the

DRA/Soviets tried to envelop the Mujahideen position from the Tobagi

plain, they did not hook around the mountain, but tried to go over the

mountain. The Mujahideen were used to the mountains, whereas the

Soviets were not and their equipment was not designed for climbing in

mountains. Later in the war, the Soviets issued better equipment for

fighting in the mountains and began training their soldiers at mountain warfare sites. At this point, the non-nimble Soviets and the reluctant DRA were no match for the Mujahideen in mountain maneuver.

They should have taken the canyon from both ends. Further, if the

DRA or Soviets had covertly moved some artillery spotters onto high

ground before the offensive, they could have unhinged the Mujahideen

defenses before they were established.

The Soviets had not yet developed their air assault tactics for counterinsurgency. The mountain tops of Spin Ghar and Lakay Ghar can

handle heliborne landings and the Mujahideen air defense posture was

negligible at this point. A small Soviet force, reinforced with mortars,

artillery spotters and forward air controllers and machine guns could

have created havoc from the mountain tops.
VIGNETTE 3

FALL OF SURKHAB BASE CAMP

by Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif

In early September 1983, we laid an ambush at Pul-e Khandari on

Highway 157, the major road between Kabul and Gärdez. At that

time, Mujahideen ambushes were hurting the DRA/Soviet efforts to

keep Gardez supplied. The enemy convoys always left Kabul in the

morning. We would get into position in the morning and wait until

afternoon. If no convoys had shown by afternoon, we would quit and

go back to base or go take a nap in the villages. The enemy finally

figured out that we were reacting to their pattern and changed their

pattern. They started moving their convoys in the afternoon on the

assumption that we Mujahideen would have abandoned the ambush

sites, since it was long past time for the convoy to arrive. As usual,

we set up our ambush in the morning and waited. No convoy came.

We left the ambush site and, by, late afternoon, most of the

Mujahideen had left the area. Then the column of some 180 trucks

arrived. What Mujahideen were left in the village ran to the road and

engaged the supply convoy which was hauling ammunition, fuel and

food. We got part of the convoy and divided the booty among the

Mujahideen groups that had representatives at the ambush. My

group managed to capture some ammunition trucks, which we drove

to our base near Surkhab in Durow Canyon.

A few days later, a major enemy force moved against our base

camps to retaliate for this attack. They kept the area under seige

for eight days. We had a total of about 300 Mujahideen from various

groups in the area at this time. Our heavy weapons were DShK

machine guns and mortars. We had expected some retaliation, so

we had prepared defensive positions on the ridges on both sides

of the canyon mouth and laid some antitank mines in the area. We

also laid an antitank minefield on the trail to the Tobagi plain

(Map 11-3 - Surkhab2). The enemy column came through Pule-e

Kandahari. They attacked and lost some Soviet armored vehicles to

mines on the northern and southern approaches to the canyon.

Mujahideen fighting positions on the high ground overlooked these

minefields, so we could fire on the advancing enemy as they tried to

Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif provided the previous vignette, [Mapsheet 2885, vie grid

2577].
Page 278 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

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get through the mines. This slowed the enemy, but we also took

losses from their aerial bombardment. We held on and managed to

stop the enemy advance. The enemy evacuated their damaged tanks

and armored vehicles.

After one week of fighting, the enemy reinforced his effort. Some

of the Mujahideen had left since the enemy was stopped and

they had to take care of their families. The enemy employed air

assault forces, which they landed on the Tobagi plain and at

Chinosar at the eastern mouth to our canyon. They had outflanked

us. Now the enemy renewed his offensive with an attack against

the western and eastern mouths of the canyon and over the Spin

Ghar mountain. We could not hold and withdrew from our western

positions on Spin Ghar and Lakay Ghar mountains. We torched the

trucks that we had captured to prevent their recapture. The enemy

reached our canyon village of Durow and found the burnt-out hulks.

We moved east into the mountains and harrassed the enemy with

mortar fire, but they now controlled our base camps. They destroyed

what they could and left. As they left, they scattered mines in

some areas.

COMMENTARY: By 1983, the Soviets were using their air assault

forces more aggressively, but still not landing them directly on the

objective. In this case, Soviet air assault forces landed on Tobagi

plain and then climbed to the top of Spin Ghar mountain. By 1986,

Soviet air assault forces would be landing directly on the objectives.

The Mujahideen were tied to their bases and had to defend them.

This logistic imperative provided some advantages to the DRA and

Soviets, who knew that the one way to get the Mujahideen to stay in

an area where they could concentrate air power and artillery against

them was to locate the Mujahideen logistics base and attack it. Still,

the Soviets and DRA seldom did anything to "close the back door" to

the base while they attacked it. Consequently, many Mujahideen

lived to fight another day. Long range reconnaissance patrols,

scatterable mines, helicopter-landed ambush forces and conventional

forces in backstop positions are ways to prevent the escape of

. guerrilla forces.

The Mujahideen appear to have done little to improve their

defenses since this same base camp was almost overrun in June of

1980. The DRA and Soviets knew where this base camp was and how

it was defended, yet the Mujahideen established no eastern defenses.

The Mujahideen's one improvement appears to be mining the
Page 280 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

approach to the Tobagi plain, but they had no force guarding that

minefield. The Soviets flew over that minefield anyway.
VIGNETTE 4

Loss OF THE TOR GHAR BASE CAMP

by Commander Sher Padshah

Tor Ghar mountain lies eight kilometers northwest of Jalalabad.

Adam Khan and Rasul Khan established the Tor Ghar Mujahideen

base but were killed in early fighting. In 1980, the overall commander of the base was Qari Alagul. The base held some 200 Mujahideen

from four or five factions. I was a subgroup commander under

Commander Abdullah at the time. We had bases at both Chaharbagh

and Tor Ghar and regularly launched attacks against the Soviets from

Tor Ghar. Our contacts in the DRA had told us that the Soviets would

soon attack Tor Ghar in retaliation. Late one afternoon in July 1980,

our DRA contacts told us that the Soviets were coming that night. I

was with my group in Chaharbagh on the southeast side of the mountain. Commander Abdullah was at the Tor Ghar base. We immediately sent him a note to warn him and asked him to bury the ammunition and everything else since the Soviets would come in strength

and Abdullah's force could not expect to hold them. Abdullah sent a

note back to us. "As long as you hear my 20-shooters,1you know that

we are holding. We will swear on the Koran not to leave our position."

Abdullah had 25 men armed with RPGs, Kalashnikovs, Bernaus and

bolt-action rifles.

The Soviets attacked from several directions (Map 11-4 - Tor Ghar)

launching advances from Sorkh Rud, Jalalabad and Darunta. I withdrew my group from Chaharbagh. Soviet tanks deployed along the

road on the north-west side of the mountain and fired on the base.

BM-21s fired from Jalalabad. Artillery and BM-21s fired from multiple artillery sites. Helicopters strafed the area. They set the mountain

on fire. Then the Soviets climbed the mountain, reached the base and

fought for three days. In places, it was hand-to-hand combat. We

could not break into the area to help, since the Soviets had sealed the

area. Our Mujahideen fought until their ammunition was gone and

died to the last man. The Soviets destroyed the bases and infested that

mountain with mines.

COMMENTARY: Mujahideen insistence on holding base camps cost them

Commander Sher Padshah is from Laghman Province. Map sheet 3085.

1 Bernau M26 Czechoslovak light machine'guns.
Page 282 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 11, Vignette 4 Page 283

dearly. At this point in the war, base camps were not essential to

Mujahideen logistics and Abdullah's base camp was not the only one

which the Soviets overran. It was a pointless battle which could have

been avoided by the Mujahideen. When the Mujahideen held real

estate, it allowed the Soviets to concentrate their superior firepower on

the Mujahideen.
Page 284 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

SHAYKH BABA

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VIGNETTE 5

BATTLES FOR SHARAFAT KOH MOUNTAIN FORTRESS

. by Engineer Mohammad Ibrahim

Sharafat Koh is a large mountain southeast of the city of Farah.

It is located between the paved road running between Kandahar

and Herat (Highway 1) and the Daulatabad-Farah road (Highway

517). The real name of the mountain is Lor Koh, but we Mujahideen

renamed it Sharafat Koh (Honor Mountain).2The mountain is a

roughly rectangular-shaped massif with a plateau on top. It rises

some 1,500 meters above the surrounding desert and its sides are

steep. It covers over 256 square kilometers and is often snow capped.

Many large and small canyons (kals) cut into the mountain. On the

north side is the Shaykh Razi Baba Canyon (Map 11-5 - Sharafat—

red and blue graphics apply to last battle). To the northwest is the

Kale-e Amani Canyon. This canyon was populated by ancient peoples

and you can see their drawings of hunters with bows and arrows

on the rocks. To the west is the Kale-e Kaneske Canyon. The Jare-e

Ab Canyon faces southwest and links with the Kal-e Kaneske

Canyon at the top. To the south is the Tangira Canyon which had the

most water, but which the Mujahideen usually avoided since it was

the only canyon wide enough for armored vehicles to enter. Facing

south, and further to the east is the Khwaja Morad Canyon near the

Khwaja Morad shrine. There is access to all the canyons from the

mountain plateau.

The Kal-e Kaneske Canyon was the strongest base at Sharafat

Koh. It takes 35-40 minutes to walk from its entrance to the end.

The canyon mouth is an opening in solid rock and is only two or

three meters wide. When you walk into the canyon, you cannot see

the sky above you, but later it widens into a three or four hectare

area at the end of the canyon where there are trees. A stream runs

intermittently through the canyon. There is even a water fall with

Engineer Mohammad Ibrahim is a graduate of Kabul University in the College of

Agriculture. He was a group commander in Farah Province and doubled as medical officer and facilitator. Initially he was with Mawlawi Mohammad Shah but left in 1985 when

his Barakzai tribe had a falling out with the Achakzai tribe of Mawlawi Mohammad Shah.

He then fought for Haji Ghulam Rasul Shiwani. He now works with the UNHCR. [Map

sheets 1581 and 1582].

^ The communists called it Mordar Koh (Filthy Mountain) after the Mujahideen moved their

bases there in 1979.
Page 286 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

a 40 meter drop. The canyon had a water reservoir, a supply dump

and 16 caves holding 60 people. We defended the canyon with DShK

machine guns on the high ground on both sides of the canyon.

In the early days of the war, the Mujahideen had very strong

bases around the province centers of Farah and Nimruz, but later

on Soviet/DRA pressure forced them outward from Farah to Sharafat Koh. The Mujahideen had their first base at Sharafat Koh in the

Tangira Canyon in 1979. The Mujahideen were organized into tribal

groups and initially the Achakzai, Norzai, Barakzai and Alizai all

joined together and moved to a new base in Jare-e Ab Canyon. The

Soviets attacked this base in 1980 and the Mujahideen then moved

to Kahe Kaneske Canyon. The Mujahideen had bases within the

city of Farah until 1982. As the DRA and Soviets tightened their

security around Farah, these Mujahideen moved out and some fell

back on Sharafat Koh. After the Mujahideen left Farah, they lost

their contact with the city population. The city population was not

tribal and looked down on the Mujahideen as rustics. In turn, the

Mujahideen looked down on the city dwellers for their easy life.

Sharafat Koh lies about 12 kilometers from Highway 1 and 20 kilometers from Highway 517. We attacked convoys near Karvangah,

Charah and Shivan and the Soviets manned posts at Karvangah,

Charah and Velamekh to protect the convoys.

SKY WARRIORS STRIKE THE CANYON

In 1982, the Kal-e Kaneske Canyon was our primary base. Our

leader was Mawlawi Mohammad Shah from the Achakzai tribe.3

Mohammad Shah liked to brag about his base and would often escort

visitors through the canyon. Once he brought a DRA officer into the

canyon and gave him a tour. The DRA officer was also an Achakzai

and he told Mohammad Shah that he was stationed in Shindand and

wanted to establish secret contact with Mohammad Shah and work

with him. Evidently, while the DRA officer was in our canyon, he

managed to steal a map showing our base defenses.

At noon in July, about a month after the DRA officer's visit, three

Soviet helicopter gunships suddenly flew down the canyon and fired

at the caves and structures of our base. Our DShK machine guns

were all positioned on the high ground and could not engage aircraft

flying below them in the canyon. The gunships were severely damag3 Mawlawi Mohammad Shah was one of the famous commanders of the war. He was a

member of the Islamic Revolutionary Movement (IRMA) of Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi.
Chapter 11, Vignette 5 Page 287

ing our base. Khodai-Rahm was one ofthe DShK gunners. Physically,

he was a weak person, but he took the 34 kilogram (75 pound) weapon

off the mount, hoisted it on his shoulder and fired down into the

canyon. He hit two of the helicopters, one ofthem in the rotors. That

helicopter gunship climbed to the top of the mountain and then the

rotors quit turning. The pilot bailed out, but he was only 50 meters

above the mountain and he and the helicopter crashed onto the mountain southern wall near the interior mouth of the canyon. The second

damaged helicopter managed to escape, while the third helicopter

attacked the Mujahideen DShK gunners. Khodai-Rahm was killed

by the third helicopter.

The cheering Mujahideen rushed to the helicopter. There were

five dead Soviets—the pilot, two crew members and two passengers.

One of the passengers was a woman. One of the Mujahideen cut off

the pilot's head and brought it to Mohammad Shah. Suddenly Soviet

fighter-bombers flew over our base and began bombing us. Toward

late afternoon, Soviet transport helicopters flew in and landed

some three kilometers from the canyon mouth. Soviet troops dismounted and took up blocking positions—presumably to prevent us

from taking the downed crew out. Early the next morning, Soviet

armored vehicles arrived and surrounded the area. (Map 11-6 -.

Kaneske 1) Soviet infantry pushed forward, supported by armor.

The Soviet infantry moved on the high ground along the Tora Para4

toward the crash site. Some Soviets moved along the canyon floor

and the opposite canyon wall, supported by troops on the high ground

of Tora Para. As the Soviets advanced, they marked boulders and

rocks with numbers for orientation. After seven days offighting, they

reached the helicopter crash site. We retreated to higher ground by

the waterfall. On the eighth day, the Soviets left, taking their dead,

including the headless torso, with them. They left the hulk of the

helicopter behind.

COMMENTARY: One of the more successful Mujahideen air defense

ambushes involved digging in heavy machine guns into caves in

canyon walls. When the Soviet/DRA helicopters flew down the

canyon, the machine guns would fire across the canyon filling the air

with bullets. The helicopters could not attack the machine guns and

were hard pressed to avoid the bullets. This ambush would have

worked well in Kaneske Canyon.

4

Para means ridge.
Page 288 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

ABPARAN (WATERFALL)

KANESK11

MAP 11-6

NOT TO SCALE
Chapter 11, Vignette 5 Page 289

The Soviets painted numbers on boulders and rocks to provide

reference points during their attack. This is a good technique as it aids

adjusting air and artillery fire and keeping track of the progress of

units äs they advance. Still, the Soviet attack was a frontal attack

which allowed the Mujahideen to concentrate their fires against the

Soviet advance.

A SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE

In March 1983, our group leader, Mawlawi Mohammad Shah,

took the bulk of our Mujahideen to Nimruz Province. Iran had

supplied him with weapons and encouraged him to join the

Mujahideen in Nimruz Province in attacking the DRA 4th Border

Guards Brigade at Kang Wolowali (District) near the Iranian border.

Along with the Iranian weapons, Mohammad Shah took most of our

DShK machine guns. The attack on the border post failed and

Mohammad Shah lost 35 men. His own son lost a leg in the fighting.

It was a heavy blow to our group and we felt that Iran had conspired

in our defeat. At the time, Mohammad Shah was about to form an

alliance with the Maoist Gul Mohammad and Parviz Shahriyari.

Both were from Harakat (IRMA) and receiving arms from Iran.

Under the alliance, we would leave Sharafat Koh and move to

Chahar Burjak. This would have strengthened the Mujahideen and

Iran wanted to weaken us and make us dependent on Iran. As a

result of the disastrous attack, the Sharafat Koh Front was now

weakened and we only had 25 men in our base. After the disaster, I

was preparing to leave the base and visit my home, but as I moved

out I saw that the Soviets were fighting in Shiwan, so I returned to

the base where I made radio transmissions supposedly sending 50

men to this ridge and 40 men to that ridge. This radio deception was

supposed to keep the Soviets at bay.

I was sleeping at Nizam Qarawol, the gate security post at the

mouth of the canyon, when, early in the morning, we heard a helicopter flying over. (Map 11-7 - Kaneske 2) We put our ears to the

ground and heard the noise of tanks approaching. We quickly moved

through the darkness to our base, pausing only to lay some antitank

mines. Mohammad Shah's deputy, Haji Nur Ahmad Khairkhaw, was

in charge. We had gathered in the darkness discussing what to do

when Malek Ghulam Haidar and his Mujahideen from Shiwan

joined us. They had noted the Soviet preparations and guessed that

we were the target, so they came across the desert to join us. They
Page 290 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

f

A *>\ ^

(WATERFALL)

KANESKI2

Map 11-7 NOT TO SCALE
Chapter 11, Vignette 5 Page 291

arrived hours before the Soviets. We vowed to resist and to kill anyone who tried to flee. We took up positions on the high ground on

both sides of the canyon on the ridges of Tora Para, Shna Para and

Spina Para. We also put five men on the rear approach to the canyon

and put some men on Tor Tsalay to watch the approach from Jar-e Ab

Canyon. It was raining, but not enough to stop the Soviet aircraft.

Observation aircraft flew over and then fighter-bombers flew over in

groups of three. They made bombing runs on us. We only had two

DShK machine guns left and they were not enough to keep the aircraft away. The enemy intensified his bombing. They also began firing artillery at us and kept it up all night, depriving us of sleep.

Before sunrise on the second day, the enemy ground attack

began. There were probably two battalions in the attack. One battalion attacked Tora Para and the other attacked Spina Para. Tanks

supported the dismounted infantry, who tried to approach the canyon

but failed. During the afternoon of the second day, Malek Ghulam

Haidar was killed deep inside the base area. We had several Afghan

prisoners in our base, who we detained for disputes and crimes

committed in the area controlled by the Mujahideen. A Haji from Zir

Koh was one of our prisoners. He described how a lone Soviet came

into the camp and pointed his rifle at the prisoners. Through sign

language, they indicated that they were prisoners, so the Soviet

herded them into the prison cave and stood outside for awhile. Then

he disappeared. Nabi, who was carrying food to our front lines

returned to the camp and saw the Soviet. Since he was unarmed, he

ran and the Soviet followed him. Nabi ran to the arms depot where

Malek Haidar was. Nabi told him that Soviets had penetrated the

base from the mountain top. Malek took his American G3 rifle and

his Soviet TT pistol and walked out ofthe depot cave. The Soviet was

waiting behind a rock. He fired two shots and killed Haidar. Then

he took Haidar's G3 and pistol and left. I was sitting at the first aid

station near the front lines when I heard Abdul Hai yell "Who are

you? Who are you? Stop!" at the Soviet. Another Mujahideen was

going to shoot him, but didn't since the Soviet was far away and they

thought that he might be a prisoner carrying supplies to the forward

positions. The Soviet was in uniform, but he was down in the canyon

and we were high above him on the canyon walls and couldn't really

tell. Since the Soviet aircraft were still bombing us, we did not

believe that a single Soviet had snuck into our base and was now

leaving. Timurshah Khan Mu'alim, who was at Shna Para, also

aimed at the Soviet, but Bashar, Mohammad Shah's nephew, talked
Page 292 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

him out of it, convinced that the stranger was one of our own. Later,

we learned that the Soviets had invited some local elders to the

attack site to impress them with their strength. The elders later

described how the Soviet soldier came running into the site proudly

holding his trophy weapons over his head. The Soviets again fired

artillery at us all night.

Early on the morning of the third day, the Soviets again attacked.

They figured that we had no forces on the canyon floor, so they fired

smoke rounds into the canyon. We thought they were using poison

gas and tied handkerchiefs over our faces. The Soviets moved into

the canyon under the cover of the smoke. At first, we fired blindly

into the smoke from t'he high ground until we saw them signaling

each other with flares. We fired at the flares and then realized, from

the flares' positions, that they had penetrated far into the base. The

Mujahideen in the base were shouting "The Russians are here!" and

firing at close range. We abandoned our positions in the heights and

charged down the canyon walls. The fighting was heavy. The Soviets

withdrew in the late afternoon, taking their dead and wounded

with them. They left blood trails, bloody bandages and many RPG18s behind. Again, Soviet artillery fired at us all night.

On the fourth day, the Soviets advanced with tanks leading and

the infantry sheltering behind the tanks. The infantry was reluctant

to leave the shelter of the tanks, but they finally moved into some

folds on the canyon wall and sheltered there while the tanks withdrew. The infantry would not move out from the protection of the

folds and finally the tanks came forward again and the infantry

retreated behind the tanks. At noon, they quit firing and the Soviets

broke camp and moved out in the afternoon. We lit bonfires and

cheered from the heights. The bonfires were welcome since it had

rained throughout the battle and we couldn't light fires earlier as

that would have disclosed our positions.

COMMENTARY: Again the Soviets conducted a frontal attack, but this

time relied on a smoke screen to aid their advance. The advance was

initially successful, but the Soviets failed to clear their flanks äs they

advanced. Once the Soviets began to take casualties, they withdrew,

abandoning ground they would unsuccessfully try to retake the following day. The Mujahideen, who lacked communications, were hard

pressed to control the battle.
Chapter 11, Vignette 5 Page 293

AN UNSUCCESSFUL DEFENSE

In 1985 we had disputes over leadership and distribution of spoils

and the Mujahideen split into tribal units and moved into the various

canyons. Haji Abdul Kheleq and his Mujahideen from the Noorzai

tribe moved to the Shaykh Razi Baba Canyon. Haji Ghulan Rasul

Shiwani Rasul Akhundzada and the Mujahideen from the Alizai and

Barakzai tribes moved to the Kale-e Amani Canyon. I went with this

group. Mawlawi Mohammad Shah and his Mujahideen from the

Achakzai tribe stayed in the Kale-e Kaneske Canyon.

After the groups had moved to the different canyons, the Soviets

returned. The Soviets concentrated on Mohammad Shah and his

Mujahideen in the Kal-e Kaneske Canyon. He had six DShK

machine guns, one ZGU-1 machine gun, three 82mm recoilless

rifles, 25 RPG-7s and some medium machine guns. Soviet troop

columns with up to 200 tanks and APCs moved from Shindand to

Farah and surrounded the area.5Soviet aircraft flew from Shindand

airbase and bombed the base from high and low altitudes. Soviet

artillery moved into position and hammered his positions for several

hours with heavy fire (Map 11-8 - Kaneske 3). The Soviets spent the

first day with artillery and air preparations. On the second day, they

launched an attack against the canyon with infantry supported by

tanks. Mohammad Shah's force repulsed the attack. On the third

day, the Soviets attacked the canyon mouth again, but they also

snuck a force up the Jar-e Ab Canyon and then landed air assault

forces on the mountain top. These forces crossed over into the Kal-e

Kaneske Canyon and took Mohammad Shah's force from the rear.

Mohammad Shah's son was killed while firing his ZGU-1.

Mohammad Shah's force was pinned between the two Soviet forces as

night fell. Mohammad Shah gathered his force and said "Either we

stand and die here to the last man or we take a risk and charge the

attackers and try to break out. We should break out as a group. If

they see us, we will have enough firepower to fight them. If they

don't see us, we will all leave together." All his Mujahideen agreed.

Some 70 Mujahideen slipped out between the Soviet forces, up the

canyon and into the mountain. Only a few old men remained. The

next day, the Soviets continued to pound the canyon with air and

5

Troops were from the Soviet 5th Motorized Rifle Division. If the number of tanks and

APCs is correct, this was a regiment (probably the 371st Motorized Rifle Regiment) reinforced with air assault forces.
Page 294 the Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

<-$-*e-l

ATERFALL)

KANESKI3

Map 11-8 NOT TO SCALE
Chapter 11, Vignette 5 Page 295

artillery, not knowing that the Mujahideen had escaped. On the fifth

day, they entered the base, mined the caves, looted what they could

and left.

The Soviets then turned their attention to Kal-e Amani Canyon.

They came across the high ground from Kal-e Kaneske and air

assault troops attacked down into the canyon from the high ground.

Most of us were unable to escape and we lost some 50 Mujahideen

there. The Soviets then turned their attention to Shaykh Razi Baba

Canyon, but these Mujahideen had already left. This was the end of

the Mujahideen stronghold of Sharafat Koh. We now knew that we

could not hold these large bases in Afghanistan indefinitely against

the Soviets, so we moved our bases, staging areas and rest areas

across the border into Iran.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen maintained bases at Sharafat Koh

from 1979-1985. It was no secret that they were there and the

Soviets and DRA had ample opportunity to work against the base.

The Mujahideen were tied to these bases and had to maintain

sufficient defenders at Sharafat Koh at all times. This limited the

number of Mujahideen who could strike at the Soviets and DRA.

Once the Mujahideen split up into several canyons, they lacked

communications between the canyons and were unable to provide

warning or coordinate actions against the Soviets. The Soviets were

able to defeat each group piecemeal.

However, the Soviets were not successful in attacking Sharafat Koh

from the desert floor up. It took the Soviets a good deal of time before

they would land air assault forces on mountain tops far from link-up

forces. Once they started doing so, they were often successful.

However, some heliborne forces were isolated and destroyed in the

mountains by the Mujahideen. In this case, the Soviets were successful when they used helicopters to land troops on the heights and attack

down to link up with ascending forces.
Page 296 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
VIGNETTE 6

QALA-E NAW BASE CAMP DEFENSE

by Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch

Nimroz Province lies in the southwest corner ofAfghanistan. It is

fairly flat, lightly populated and mostly desert. The population lives

in the green zones along the river banks. The Khash Rud is one of

three rivers which run through the province. It runs northeast to

southwest. My base was 10 kilometers southwest of the Lowkhai

District capital in Khash Rud District. (Map 11-9 - Khash) It is a

wooded area at the village of Qala-e Naw near the banks ofthe Khash

Rud River. Highway 606 runs from Delaram and Zaranj—the provincial capital. It parallels the river and used to run through the

green zone. We would often block the highway and intercept convoys

traveling on it. Sometimes we would attack the provincial capital. I

had about 200 men in my main base at Qala-e Naw and had a forward base at the Pul-e Ghurghori bridge, where the highway crossed

over the Khash Rud. I often mined and destroyed that bridge to deny

passage to columns going to Zaranj. My main base on the river was

split between the southeastern and northwestern banks. During

flood stage, it was impossible to cross the river and the Mujahideen

on each bank fought in different regions throughout the year. Later

in the mid-1980s, when our resistance became very costly to the

enemy, they built a detour route on the plain between Zaranj and

Delaram. This detour arched about nine kilometers away from my

base. When the detour route was built, I could only field reduced

groups of 15-20 men against small enemy columns since the area is

very arid, very open and water supply is a major problem. We had to

let the big convoys pass unmolested. The new road rejoins the old at

the village of Radzay. This is about 17 kilometers to the southwest.

I started moving our ambushes to the Radzay area. There is a mountain to the east of Radzay with the same name. The road crosses

behind the mountain on the southeast side. This is an excellent

ambush site since there are also hills which restrict movement to the

road as it goes between the hills and the mountain.

Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch is from Nimroz Province. His base was at Lowkhai, the district capital of Khash Rud District on the Khash Rud River. He was initially with Mawlawi

Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi of the Harakat-e lnqelab-e Islami (HAR). Later on he

switched to HIK (Khalis). [Map sheet 1579 and 1580].
Page 298 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

In the fall of 1984, Khan Mohammad (my deputy) and I were both

away from our base at the same time. I was in Iran. Informants told

the government that we were both away and so the government

attacked our base in our absence. However, the day that the enemy

forces attacked our base, Khan Mohammad returned to our base. It

was five days before the feast of sacrifice (Eid-al-Adha). The enemy

moved from Delaram to the plain some 15 kilometers north of us—

just north of the main road. They established a base there. Since it

is desert, they could move in any direction. They attacked our base

the next day. There were only 70 or 80 Mujahideen in base at the

time. Our SOP for defense against an attack was to spread the forces

over a large area at strong points in some 20 villages. The enemy

would usually attack from the northeast to the southwest through

the green zone to the base area. He would also send a flanking

detachment to the Pul-e Ghurghori bridge and lodge in the Radzay

Mountain to encircle my force and pin us in the green zone. My

force had to fight in the green zone because the surrounding desert

was too flat and exposed for combat. We fought the enemy in the

green zone by confronting him with multiple pockets of resistance

anchored in fortified fighting positions. When the enemy tried to

concentrate against one pocket, Mujahideen from the other pockets

would take him in the flanks and rear. The enemy could not fragment his force to deal with all the pockets, but had to stay together

for security. We would let the enemy chase us from strongpoint to

strongpoint and attack him whenever we could. Eventually, the

enemy force would become exhausted. When their water and supplies ran out, they would break contact and go home.

The enemy attack developed as usual and, by the end of the day,

the enemy force retired. Unfortunately, my deputy was killed during

the fighting. In Iran, I heard about the enemy attack, gathered what

Mujahideen were available and started back to our base. The

Mujahideen at the base evacuated their casualties to Qala-e Naw,

Sheshaveh and Radzay. Informants told the enemy that the base

commander was killed. They thought that I was dead and decided

that it was the time to destroy all the Mujahideen in the green

zone. I arrived on the third day after the opening battle. That night,

another enemy column arrived and deployed in the desert north of

us. I realized that they were going to attack us. We had one BM-12,

one single-barreled 107mm rocket launcher, six 82mm recoilless

rifles, five DShKs, three ZGU-ls, and 15 RPG-7s. I now had 120

men. In addition to my Mujahideen, there were HIH Mujahideen in
Chapter 11, Vignette 6 Page 299

the area and they helped defend the base camp area. I sent 20 of

my men to the Ghurghori bridge with four RPG-7s and Kalashnikovs.

I told their commander to put 10 men on each bank to block the

enemy tanks which would make the encircling sweep. However, that

group didn't reach the bridge on time. They stopped short of the

bridge to avoid falling into an ambush. The enemy seized control of

the bridge at dawn. His other groups deployed at Qala-e Naw,

Radzay, Sheshaveh and other points in the area.

The enemy attacked, as usual, from the northeast and southwest.

The main attack was from the northeast and involved some 150-200

vehicles. My bridge group attacked the enemy group at the bridge,

but the enemy pushed them back and began advancing toward the

northeast from Radzay. Six enemy jet aircraft were attacking our

positions, while four helicopters adjusted their strikes for them. The

helicopters fired smoke rockets to mark the strikes. The fighting

continued for two days. Then they broke contact and withdrew.

During the fighting, 16 DRA soldiers defected to us. They were

soldiers drafted from Farah and Nimroz Provinces. They were from

the 21st Mechanized Brigade in Farah and the Sarandoy regiment in

Nimroz. There were also DRA deserters from the 4th Border Guards

Brigade. Mujahideen casualties were three KIA and several wounded. Enemy losses are unknown except for the 16 deserters.

COMMENTARY: When asked what made him successful Commander

Baloch said, "We intended to fight to the last man and they didn't.

This is a wide area and we were widely dispersed, which reduced

the impact of the enemy air force. Air power was fairly ineffective in

this desert. Many of their bombs failed to explode, but buried themselves in the sand. We had covered shelters and covered fighting

positions in each village. The enemy was very stylized and never

did anything different. We knew from where they would come, how

they would act and how long they could stay. Our defensive positions

were connected with communications trenches while the enemy

was always in the open. We had two kinds ofmaneuver. One was the

dispersal maneuver forcing the enemy to chase all over to find us.

The second was internal maneuver within a strong point where we

could shift between positions without being observed. We had these

positions in all the villages and throughout the area. There are also

many canals and ditches in the area, which we improved into

fighting positions."

"Once the enemy offered me a deal. 'Don't attack us and we will
Page 300 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

pay you a toll of 50,000 Afghanis ($250) per vehicle passing through

the area.' I turned the deal down with the words 'As long as Soviets

are here, we make no deals.' The enemy infantry was the weakest

part of their armies—DRA and Soviet. Their sequence of attack was

very predictable. They would start with an artillery and air preparation, then they would lay a smoke screen and then their infantry

would attack. Their tanks would support the infantry, but as soon as

they sustained casualties, they would stop. Their tanks were very

wary of antitank weapons. The mere presence of RPGs and recoilless

rifles in an area would keep the tanks at bay. We would wait until

tanks came within 20 or 30 meters of our antitank weapons before

opening fire. I would not allow my people to try long-range shots.

They would hold steady in their positions with patience and courage.

The tanks could not see us at long range so they couldn't hit us. We

could see them and hit them at close range. Most ofthe time we were

fighting an enemy strong in fire power and very weak in the assault.

During the two days of fighting, the enemy seldom came within

Kalashnikov range. The only innovation that the enemy showed

during this attack was that they launched it during the Festival of

Sacrifice, when they expected that the Mujahideen would be at home

instead of the base. Second, they returned sooner to the area than

usual. This broke their pattern. I did not really fight a guerrilla

war—I knew the enemy's position and he knew mine. A guerrilla is

evasive and attacks from an unexpected direction and time. Here,

the enemy kept attacking me at the same place and in the same fashion. Is this guerrilla war?"

"Our ambulance was two sticks and a piece of cloth. Theirs was a

helicopter. The secret of our success was that it was a popular cause.

Everybody knew that we were hurting the occupiers. This was not a

war but an uprising. Therefore, it was not a guerrilla war. We never

bothered about the food supply. The locals supplied us with whatever

they had. I had two pickup trucks—the enemy had two hundred vehicles. I used the pickups for ammunition and food resupply. We moved

them secretly along the river in the wooded area to supply the fighting

positions in the evening. Their rations would sustain them until the

next night. We basically had a mutton and nan6diet that the local

populace furnished us free. A normal full day's ration was a portion of

cooked mutton wrapped in nan. Water supply was simple since our

fighting positions were near the river and my men all had canteens."

6 Nan is flat Afghan unleavened bread. It is oval-shaped and about the thickness and size

of a small or medium pizza.
VIGNETTE 7

DEFENDING THE SUBURBS OF KANDAHAR

by Sultan Mohammad of Topkhana

The supporters of the HI faction, mostly Shia, were located

primarily in the southwest ofAfghanistan. The Hi's main base was in

the Khakrez southern mountains. This base was near the HIK base of

Islam Dara.7This was about seven hours on foot from Khakrez, which

is some 60 kilometers north of Kandahar. The HI fought in Khakrez,

Girishk, Uruzgan and Kandahar. The HI faction had four units in the

Kandahar area. We had about 300 Mujahideen. Our overall commander was Ali Yawar who was killed by a mine later in the war. We had

two bases in the Kandahar area—Char Dewal in the Malajat suburbs

south of Kandahar and Char Bagh in the Arghandab River Valley

northwest of Kandahar. I commanded a group at Char Dewal as did

Ghulam Shah and Shah Mohammad. Gul Mohammad commanded at

Char Bagh. We used to harass convoys and block Highway 1 near the

Kandahar prison at Pashtoon Bagh—about a half kilometer from the

Sarpooza ridge. Unlike some other areas in Afghanistan, all the

Mujahideen factions cooperated with each other in the Kandahar

area. Whenever there was any fighting, all the Mujahideen would

move to the area to help out. All large Mujahideen operations were

combined and were coordinated by the Mujahideen Council.

The Malajat area lies to the south of Kandahar. It is a wellirrigated suburb of the city full of villages, irrigation canals,

orchards, farms and vineyards. The Mujahideen moved freely

throughout this area despite the best efforts of the DRA and the

Soviet forces in the area.8Frequently, the DRA and Soviets would

throw a cordon around the Malajat area and try to enter it to destroy

Sultan Mohammad of Topkhana is a member of the minority Shia religious community in

Afghanistan. He belonged to the moderate Harakat-I Islami (HI) faction founded by

Ayatollah Asef Muhsini in neighboring Iran. He fought from the communist overthrow of the

government until the withdrawal of Soviet forces. [Map sheet 2180].

7

Islam Dara was the Mujahideen name for their base behind Shawadan mountain. The

Soviet 103rd Airborne Division launched an attack on this base in 1985 and this is

described in Vignette 25 of The Bear Went Over the Mountain. The site location in The

Bear Went Over the Mountain is wrong.

8

The Kandahar area was heavily garrisoned by the DRA 2nd Corps Headquarters, the

15th Infantry Division, the 7th Tank Brigade, the 3rd Border Guards Brigade, the 366th

Fighter-Bomber Regiment and the 379th Separate Bomber Squadron. Soviet forces

included the 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade and a Spetsnatz battalion.
Page 302 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

xz2^KANDAHAR

,/T-CHARDEWAL

MALAJAT

MAP 11-10

0 1 2 3 4 5 KM i 1 1 1 1 i
Chapter 11, Vignette 7 Page 303

the Mujahideen and their bases. Throughout the war, these efforts

never succeeded. There were always at least 1,000-1,500 Mujahideen

in Malajat from the various factions. These Mujahideen were all

from mobile groups and none were stationed permanently in Malajat.

Mujahideen forces would rotate in and out of the Malajat area and

thus maintained a high state of readiness. The Malajat mujahideen

were well prepared with supply bases and well-fortified bunkers and

fighting positions (Map 11-10 - Malajat).

In the fall of 1984, the enemy threw a wide cordon around the

Malajat occupying their normal southern positions from Zaker Ghar

in the east to Qaitul in the west. Thus they surrounded the Malajat

with Kandahar to the north and Highway 4 to the east and a ridge of

hills to the west. This encompasses a lot ofspace and the Mujahideen

were still able to maneuver freely within the Malajat area. At 0700

hours, an enemy mechanized column of 30-35 tanks and APCs moved

from Sarpooza while another column of 15-16 tanks and APCs moved

from the 15th Division headquarters past the Governor's house along

the Mahkama road near Poolan toward our defensive position. Our

defensive position stretched some three kilometers from Char Dewal

to Spin Ziarat and we could always see the enemy defenses from here.

We held this position with some 450 Mujahideen from various factions. There were HIK units from Sarkateb, the Gulagha Son of Haji

Latif's unit and two of our HI groups. The enemy columns were

covered by helicopter gunships who fired at our positions. However,

the enemy was unable to advance because we were well-protected by

our defensive positions. The enemy would not dismount from his

armored vehicles, but deployed his vehicles in a firing line and fired

at us for two or three hours. Even the green trees caught on fire. Our

defensive positions were three meter by two meter pits which held

two-to-three men. They were roofed with heavy wooden beams which

had 1.5 meters of dirt and rock tamped down on top ofit. During lulls

in the enemy firing, our men would pop out of the shelters and fire

RPG-7s and recoilless rifles at them. The enemy would promptly

start shooting again.

I said that the Soviets surrounded us, but that isn't completely

true. Throughout the war, the Soviets always left one side unguarded.

At around noon, 100 to 120 Mujahideen reinforcements arrived from

Zalakhan and Walakan, which are south and southeast of Spin Zirät.

These villages were in the sector that the Soviets left unguarded. The

arrival of the reinforcements turned the tide and eventually prompted

the Soviets to withdraw about 1800 hours. We destroyed three armored
Page 304 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

vehicles on the Sarpooza front and two on the Mahkama front.

Sometimes the bombs and artillery fire would block the exits to

our bunkers. We would have to go out at night to dig them out. This

happened often to our positions near the Panjao Pul bridge. Three

times I had to go out at midnight to locate the bunkers and unearth

our men. Sometimes they would be trapped in these bunkers from

0500 hours until past midnight, but these bunkers were essential to

stopping the enemy in the Malajat.

COMMENTARY: Soviet cordon and search operations usually involved

a large force surrounding a large area. The area contained within

the cordon was usually large enough to allow the surrounded

Mujahideen freedom of maneuver. Once the cordon was established,

the Soviets seldom split it up into manageable areas, but pushed

through the entire cordoned area if possible. This failure to fragment

the area allowed the Mujahideen to move and maneuver against the

Soviets. In this case, the Mujahideen were able to reinforce during a

hotly contested fight.

Many Soviet combat examples show an unguarded flank in a

cordon and search.9This might work if an ambush were set along the

escape route, but this did not seem to be the case. This might also be

a time-honored act to allow their enemy to escape and minimize the

casualties on both sides.

Finally, there was an apparent reluctance by the Soviets and DRA

to stay in the Malajat area at night. If they would not dismount from

their armored vehicles during the day, they would have to dismount at

night to secure the vehicles. The arrival of the Mujahideen reinforcements may have kept the Mujahideen in the fight, but may not have

been the prime reason that the Soviets withdrew at 1800 hours

9

As an example, see vignette 5 in The Bear Went Over the Mountain.
VIGNETTE 8

DEFENDING THE MALAJAT

by Mohammad Shah Kako and Abdul Ghani

The Malajat, the southern suburb of Kandahar, was a continuous

battlefield. The Malajat is a large green zone full of orchards,

villages, irrigation canals, and vineyards. The Mujahideen deployed

mobile bases throughout it. Many Mujahideen commanders with

bases elsewhere would maintain mobile bases in the Malajat as their

forward elements in the Kandahar area. Despite belonging to different factions, there was an exemplary cooperation among these mobile

groups. The DRA/Soviets tried to force the Mujahideen out by cordon

and search operations of the Malajat area. They would occupy the

high ground and villages north of the Tarnak River—Shorandam,

Zaker-e Sharif, Loy Karazak, Anguryan, and Bala Deh which are

north and west of the airfield. Then they would establish the western blocking positions on the Girowal Ghar, Suf Ghar, Zarah Ghar

and Chehelzena Ghar mountains (Map 11-11 - Mala). They used the

city of Kandahar as the northern blocking position. Kandahar was

occupied by DRA forces. Then the Soviets and DRA would push

inward into the Malajat area from these blocking positions search for

the Mujahideen. They were usually unsuccessful, but they continued

to do it over and over again. The blocking positions were also part of

the Kandahar security belt, but it was well-penetrated by the

Mujahideen. We would fight them initially in the Malajat area and

then exit to the south in the Loy Karazak area and Anguryan and in

the southwest in the Hendu Kalacha area. The Soviets had trouble

controlling these areas.

The Mujahideen prepared blocking positions along major axes and

turned this area into an impregnable stronghold. A typical blocking

position would be built near a mobile base and include several buildings in a village or orchard, where the mobile group would live. The

personnel in the mobile group would be relieved and replaced from

time to time from their main bases. Some Mujahideen would stay

permanently in the Malajat area. Mobile bases and blocking positions

were connected by communications trenches. The blocking positions

were dug into the ground and had firing positions for machine guns,

Mohammad Shah Kako initially fought with HIK and then switched to IUA. Abdul Ghani

fought with the ANLF. [Map sheet 2180].
Page 306 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 11, Vignette 8 Page 307

recoilless rifles, and RPGs. We covered the fighting positions with

berry-tree branches which we then covered with earth and packed it

down hard. The bases had covered bunkers to protect our Mujahideen

from artillery fire and air strikes. These bunkers were two-three

meters in width and six to eight meters long and were covered with

timber and a meter-thick layer of well-packed earth which resisted

artillery fire and most air strikes. Whenever the enemy would cordon

off the Malajat area and launch infantry attacks into the green zone,

the Mujahideen would occupy their blocking positions. Most fighting

positions were redundant so that the loss of a fighting position would

not adversely affect the defense.

In the beginning, the Mujahideen were unprepared and unable to

resist beyond two or three days but, after they developed their fortifications, they could withstand and push back the Soviets and DRA.

Once the area was cordoned, the Soviets usually launched their attack

along the main road from Zaker-e Sharif and further south from Loy

Karazak. In the north, the usual line of contact was Hokomati Dand,

Pakha Polan, Yakh Karez and Deh Khwaja. This wasjust outside the

built-up area. Later on, the Soviet and DRA forces established permanent, well-fortified and well-protected security outposts. The Soviets

had Shorandam hill, Zaker-e Sharif hill and Mala Kala hill. The DRA

had Suf Ghar, Zarah Shar Ghar and Chehelzena Ghar mountain sites.

Once every two months, the Soviets would launch a major cordon and

search against the Malajat area in order to keep it contained.

In November 1987, the Soviets launched an 18-day cordon and

search operation. In the cold dawn, the Soviet and DRA troops moved

from their garrisons and, by 0800 hours, had occupied their normal

blocking positions. Mohammad Shah Kako's base was at Sher-e Surkh

where he commanded some 30 men. There were some 350 Mujahideen

in the Malajat area from his party. The Mujahideen divided the front

line facing western Kandahar into four sectors. Each sector had about

50 men. The northwest sector was a Hizbe-Islami sector. The Pakha

Polan area was held by Mujahideen from Sher-e Surkh, Zaker-e Sharif

and Kukhabad. This meant that Mohammad Shah Kako's sector had

three commanders since there were three factions involved, but cooperation among the commanders was easy since they were all local and

knew each other. Regi was the third sector and Abdul Razak commanded this sector. Yakh Karez was the fourth sector and Saranwal

commanded it. Ghafur Jan coordinated the four sectors. The DRA

attacked from the city, but this time the Soviets did not move from

their blocking positions. The DRA infantry were accompanied by
Page 308 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

troops carrying chain saws. They planned to cut their way through the

orchards, destroy them and deny this refuge to the Mujahideen. We

had planted mines in front of our positions which deterred the poorlytrained DRA soldiers. We maintained a steady fire from well-situated

positions. We kept a reserve of 160-200 men in reserve resting. Every

evening, the relief group would move forward, carrying rations and

relieve the force who would go back and rest for two days. Then they

would rotate forward again. It was usually calm at night when we carried out the relief. In this manner, we kept up the defense for 18 days.

We did not resupply during the day, but brought food, water and

ammunition forward only at night. The DRA could not break through,

but they did cut some trees before we shot them down. It was winter

and it was cold. Our positions were good, although resupply was

tough. Throughout the fighting, the enemy bombed and shelled all

suspected bases in the area. One bomb, intended for our position in

Pakha Polan, missed the target and hit the western city gate, killing

many civilians. They could not hit us at the front line positions

because we were so close to their line and so our front line was safe

from air and artillery attack.

COMMENTARY: Throughout the war, the Soviets and DRA were never

able to bring Kandahar under complete control. Mujahideen urban

groups fought sporadic battles within the city walls and Mujahideen

mobile groups maintained control over the suburbs. Unlike other

areas of Afghanistan, there was little in-fighting among the factions

involved in the fighting around Kandahar and the Mujahideen ran the

fight cooperatively through regular meetings of a coordination council.

This cooperation provided tactical flexibility to the Mujahideen and

their redundant fortifications ensured that Soviet/DRA offensives

would never progress far. Most notable is the regular rotation of

Mujahideen from the forward positions. A relief in place is a difficult

procedure for the best-trained troops. The Mujahideen routinely

relieved front-line forces without a loss in combat effectiveness. This

is very impressive for any force, and even more so for a force that is in

direct contact and is heavily outgunned and poorly supplied.

There was a significant DRA/Söviet force garrisoned in the area.

The DRA 2nd Corps, 15th Infantry Division, 7th Tank Brigade, 3rd

Border Guard Brigade garrisoned Kandahar city. The Soviet 70th

Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, the DRA 366th Fighter Regiment,

the DRA 379th Separate Bombing Squadron and a Soviet Spetsnaz

battalion garrisoned the Kandahar international airport. The
Chapter 11, Vignette 8 Page 309

DRA/Soviet operations in the Malajat area were very predictable by

time and location. They continually tried to penetrate and sweep the

entire area instead of cordoning off and sweeping a smaller section

thoroughly. Although the combat in the Malajat area was a fight

through a fortified area, the DRA/Soviets continued to treat it as a

penetration and exploitation rather than a systematic reduction.

DRA/Soviet tactical intelligence apparently did not pick up the pattern

in Mujahideen resupply and relief activities to exploit it.
Page 310 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
VIGNETTE 9

BATTLE FOR CHAHARQULBA VILLAGE

by Commander Akhtarjhan

During the Soviet occupation, the eastern bank of the Arghandab

River near Kandahar city was a safe haven and the Mujahideen would

not fight in this area. The west bank was Mujahideen territory. I had

my base in Babur village in the orchards of the west bank (later, after

the Soviets withdrew, I established east bank bases in Baba Valisaheb

village, Pir-e Paymal and in the western suburbs of Kandahar). My

senior commander was Mulla Naqib. During the Soviet occupation, he

had a remote base in Khakrez mountain, but his main base was in

Chaharqulba village. My eldest brother was killed in fighting at this

village base. My next oldest brother fought out of the Babur base

and became a commander when my oldest brother was killed.

Commanders were selected based on the social position of the family,

education, and personal leadership talents. Family ties were important. A commander brought his relatives into the group and a prestigious family could raise a large group. Since my brother established

the group, it was natural that my brother, and, subsequently, I should

succeed to the command. In fundamentalist Mujahideen groups,

commanders were picked for ideological commitment and not for

family ties. Many teenagers joined the Mujahideen because the DRA

would press-gang youth into the army and Mujahideen bases were a

good place to avoid the draft.

In June 1987, during the month of Ramadan, the DRA/Soviets

launched a major operation in the Arghandab (Map 11-12 - Chahar).

During the operation, the enemy concentrated in Nagahan and then

moved northeast along the western bank of the Arghandab River.

Another column crossed the Arghandab River from Baba Valisaheb.

They began with a heavy air attack against suspected Mujahideen

bases. We moved to our bunkers. The west bank was actually a

Mujahideen fortified zone, which we laced with bunkers, fighting positions and trenches. Further, since the green zone was full of orchards,

Commander Akhtarjhan was a Jamiat-l-lslami (JIA) commander in Arghandab District

northwest of Kandahar. He was an elementary school student when he joined the Jihad

at the age of 12. At the end of the war he was 25 years old and a commander. He joined

the Jihad because he had had two brothers in the Jihad and they were both killed. He took

their place as family tradition dictated. He served under Mulla Naqib, the most powerful

Jamiat commander in the area. [Map sheet 2180].
Page 312 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

it was already cut up by irrigation ditches, so there was always a

place to fight from. We did not leave the bunkers since we were pinned

by all the aviation ordnance. Usually, the Soviets would deploy tanks

along the edge of the green zone and, after the heavy artillery

bombardment and tank fires, they would send infantry (usually

DRA) into the green zone with instructions to collect our weapons

since everyone in the impact area would be dead. The infantry would

move out confidently and the Mujahideen would come out of their

bunkers. The Mujahideen would inflict heavy losses on the infantry

and capture many of these ill-trained DRA recruits. We sent the prisoners north through the mountains and then, by circuitous routes,

south into Pakistan. We had built a veritable fortress around the base

at Chaharqulba. Some Mujahideen would defend the bases, while

others would range further afield to provide maneuver and depth to

the battlefield. It was very hard to move tanks into the green zone.

The Soviets would try to push tanks into the area to get close to the

Mujahideen, but the terrain channelized their movement and made

them vulnerable.

The Soviets and DRA moved from two directions against the

Mujahideen but were met with constant resistance from Mujahideen

fighting positions. Soviet tanks came from the Zhare Dashta and

stayed on the plain west of the green zone as they crept toward our

base at Chaharqulba. It took them a week of fighting to cover the six

kilometers to our base. All of their tanks were sandbagged against

our RPGs, so we were having difficulty stopping them. Finally, we

Mujahideen commanders went to Naqib and said that we are outnumbered and should leave the base. Naqib said that this is their

last battle and will decide the contest between them and us. They've

tried to conquer the base for years and this is their last throw. If we

leave, we will never get in again. If we stop them, then they will not

return. We replied that the RPGs were not working against sandbagged tanks. Naqib took an RPG and strode out to the forward

positions to kill a tank. We commanders stopped him and promised

to fight to the end.

Heavy fighting continued throughout that day, but we stopped the

enemy and they withdrew to Ta'bils—some kilometers to the south.

We pursued them to Ta'bils, engaging the enemy in the streets,

killing many of them. The Mujahideen then withdrew to

Chaharqulba before dawn. The following days, the enemy mounted a

three-pronged attack from Ta'bils in southwest, from Baba Valisaheb

in the southeast and from Jelawor in the northwest. They employed
Chapter 11, Vignette 9 Page 313

tanks and artillery on the plain of Zhare Dashta in support. Since

the orchards were impenetrable to their tanks, their tanks supported

their infantry like naval gunfire from ships. Their tanks would wait

until their infantry closed with our base and then would edge into the

channelized approaches. As soon as their infantry fell back, the

tanks would fall back. Tanks are of little value in the green zone and

would seldom advance there. APCs, however, would advance in

infantry support. However, their movement was also very channelized and they were easy to attack on the flank.

The enemy would precede his attack with heavy air and artillery

bombardment. The Mujahideen would stay in their bunkers to survive

and only leave a few observers in the fighting positions. As soon as the

observers saw the enemy approach, the Mujahideen would come out of

their bunkers and man the fighting positions. The enemy infantry

would suffer casualties and then fall back. Many of the DRA soldiers

defected. We would broadcast over megaphones "We are not your

enemy. We are your brothers. Join us." Still, the enemy infantry eventually gathered strength and returned to attack our base from the

south and southeast and then closed from Jelawor.

Our defenses were vulnerable in the northwest. After continuous

fighting, our Mujahideen were having trouble staying awake. At one

fighting position, a DRA patrol penetrated the position and stole a

recoilless rifle. The gunner was asleep. Commander Ahmadullah

Jan saw them taking the recoilless rifle and followed them. Some 25-

30 meters away, two APCs were waiting for the DRA patrol. Before

they reached their APCs, Ahmadullah Jan and his men, plus another

Mujahideen group, intercepted them and fought a fire fight. They

destroyed one APC, recovered the recoilless rifle, captured the patrol

and captured the remaining APC. They brought the patrol leader, a

DRA lieutenant, to Mulla Naqib. Naqib told him "We don't want to

kill you, but tell your fellows that we will not leave and this will

mean death for more of you. Stop your attacks and return to your

barracks." The lieutenant replied, "I can't do this because my

family is in Kabul." We let him go anyway that evening.

The fighting continued for 34 days. During the 34 days, a routine

emerged. The enemy would begin the morning with an aircraft and

artillery bombardment from the south and southeast. Usually, they

would then send eight helicopter gunships to work over the area.

Then, they would launch infantry attacks. The Mujahideen would

emerge from their bunkers, occupy fighting positions and wait for the

approaching infantry. We were hard to see since we had excellent
Page 314 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

fighting positions and wore garlands of grapevines as camouflage. We

let the enemy get closer than ten meters to us before opening fire. We

let them get this close for two reasons. First, we wanted to be sure to

get them with the first shot. Second, we wanted to prevent their

escape. We laid thousands of PMN mines10 in the area—particularly

on the infantry approaches from Jelawor. After DRA attacks failed,

they would often run into the mines as they tried to escape. The enemy

would retreat and we would go out and collect their weapons, rations

and ammunition. If the enemy was not attacking us, we would

send out ambush parties to hit his columns on the main road. It was

usually quiet at night. Sometimes the enemy would fire artillery and

bomb us at night but would never attack at night. They did not know

their way around the area in the dark, so they did not attempt any

night combat.

The DRA had a district government post and local militia on the

east bank. We Mujahideen had our families and R&R11 facilities on

the east bank since the government would not bomb that area.

Supplies came from our homes on the other side of the river, but

during heavy fighting, they could not supply us and we were on our

own. We could not cook since the enemy would shell any smoke they

saw. We had plenty of ammunition since the base was well-supplied

and we could resupply ammunition to our positions readily. Food,

however, was a serious problem although the number of combatants

at the Chaharqulba base did not exceed 500 Mujahideen at any time.

The intensity of fire sometimes prevented us from eating during the

day—and sometimes even during the night. Sometimes we would

salvage rations left behind by the Soviets and DRA. The Soviets

would leave lots of food behind, particularly bread. Often our sole

rations would be Soviet bread soaked in water.

We also had a problem with treating the wounded. We had medics

who had graduated from a short course in Pakistan and were qualified

to perform basic first aid. We normally evacuated our wounded to

Pakistan for treatment and recovery. During the siege, however, we

could not send our wounded to Pakistan. We could not remove the

shrapnel and so many of our seriously wounded died of their wounds.

We had a few Arabs in our base at this time. They were there for Jihad

credit and to see the fighting. "If you are Muslims, help us collect the

10 The PMN mine is a small, plastic antipersonnel mine manufactured by the Soviet

Union. It is pressure activated. The Mujahideen called them Kandani (sugar pots) due to

their similarity in size and shape.

11 Rest and relaxation.
Chapter 11, Vignette 9 Page 315

wounded," we would tell them. They would refuse.

Except for the Ta'bils offensive and ambushes, we were defending.

The Soviets were there in strength, but they stayed on the plain with

their tanks and artillery and seldom committed their own infantry.

Their tanks and artillery blackened the plain. It seemed that they

must have had a thousand of them, but they just stayed there. The

DRA infantry was doing most of the attacking and dying. The fight

bled the DRA to the point where they could not take any more casualties. Finally, after 34 days of fighting, the enemy forces broke contact

at 1100 hours and withdrew. In the past, the enemy had tried to take

us, but never had he come in such force or stayed for so long.

We lost up to 60 Mujahideen and commanders KIAin the base and

many others in areas around the base. DRA and Soviet casualties are

unknown, but we were always catching the enemy in surprise attacks,

so his casualties must have been much higher than ours. DRA casualties were definitely higher than Soviet casualties. I feel that the

enemy finally quit due to his casualties.12

COMMENTARY: The Soviets used the conscript DRA infantry extensively and supported them with artillery and air power. The DRA infantry

was poorly trained and equipped and had serious morale problems.

The use ofDRA forces as "throw-away" infantry did nothing to increase

morale. DRA forces had a reputation for passivity on the battlefield

and deserting at the first opportunity.

The Mujahideen defenses were relatively weak from the Jelawor

direction, but the Soviets apparently did not push hard enough on this

axis to discover this. Soviet and DRA tactical intelligence efforts

appear inadequate.

The Soviet/DRA willingness to drag combat out for 34 days and

then break contact and withdraw is remarkable. Their refusal to

push for quicker resolution strengthened the Mujahideen hand and

gradually created a qualitative change in the situation to the

Mujahideen advantage. On the other hand, the fragmented nature of

the Mujahideen resistance meant that the Mujahideen in

12 Page 6, Afghanistan Report #40, July 1987, published by the Crisis & Conflict Analysis

Team of the institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad, Pakistan: "It was reported that over

a period of one and a half month (sic) ending June, 1987, the Soviet-Kabul troops had suffered about 250 soldiers killed and 800 injured in Qandahar city and its suburbs. They lost

more than 100 vehicles, tanks, and jeeps, besides 13 aircraft/helicopters. About 2,500

Afghan government soldiers joined the Mujahideen during this what seemed to be the

longest Soviet-Kabul operation against the Mujahideen for several years. The offensive

apparently spilled over into July 1987."
Page 316 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Chaharqulba fought in isolation, bearing the full force of whatever

the Soviets and DRA could muster. Outside Mujahideen assistance

in the form of ambushes against supply convoys and raids on the

forces in Nagahan and on the Zhare Dashte plain would have clearly

eased the pressure on the Chaharqulba Mujahideen, but there was

little operational and strategic cooperation and coordination among

the various Mujahideen factions. The Mujahideen factions in

Kandahar cooperated better than elsewhere, but as this vignette

shows, this cooperation was still limited.

The Mujahideen were quick to pursue a retreating enemy and their

offensive into Ta'bils is a good example. Unless a force has established

a strong, cohesive rear guard, it is disorganized during withdrawal and

unable to concentrate combat power. This instant transition to pursuit

was characteristic ofthe Afghans when fighting the British earlier this

century and last.
VIGNETTE 10

ZHAWAR ONE

by Lieutenant Omar and Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani

Zhawar was a Mujahideen base in Paktia Province located some

four kilometers from the Pakistan border. A 15-kilometer road goes

from Zhawar to the major Pakistani forward supply base at Miram

Shah. Zhawar began as a Mujahideen training center and expanded

into a major Mujahideen combat base for supply, training and staging. As the base expanded, Mujahideen used bulldozers and explosives to dig at least 11 tunnels into the south-east facing ridge of

Sodyaki Ghar Mountain. These huge tunnels stretched to 500 meters

and contained a hotel, a mosque, arms depots and repair shops, a

garage, a medical point, a radio center and a kitchen. A gasoline

generator even provided power to the tunnels and the hotel's video

player! This impressive base became a mandatory stop for visiting

journalists, congressmen and other "war tourists." Apparently, this

construction effort also often interfered with basic construction of

fighting positions and field fortifications. The Mujahideen "Zhawar

Regiment," some 500 strong, was permanently based there. This

regiment was primarily responsible for logistics support ofthe mobile

groups fighting in the area and for supplying the Islamic Party (HIK)

groups in other provinces of Afghanistan. Due to the primary logistics function, the regiment was not fully equipped for combat, but was

a credible combat force. The regiment was responsible for local

defense and for blocking infiltration of Khad and KGB agents

between Afghanistan and Pakistan. They manned checkpoints along

the road to screen identification papers. The regiment had a Soviet

Lieutenant Omar (Zabit Omar) graduated from the Kabul Military Academy in the 1970s.

After the communist coup and the Soviet invasion, Lieutenant Omar joined the Mujahideen

of the fundamentalist Islamic Party (HIK) founded by Mawlawi Mohammed Yunis Khalis.

He was a close aide to Jalaluddin Haqani and fought with him throughout the war. Haqani

ran the Mujahideen effort in the crucial Paktia Province. Lieutenant Omar also served as

a group commander in Paktia Province throughout the war. [Map sheet 2983, vie grid

8267].

Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani was a group commander and a deputy to Jalaluddin Haqani.

He was a member of the fundamentalist Islamic Party (HIK) founded by Mawlawi

Mohammed Yunis Khalis. He joined the Mujahideen following the communist coup in 1978

and fought in the Paktia area. Prior to the Soviet invasion, his group had liberated the area

surrounding Khost and only the city of Khost remained under government control.
Page 318 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

\ MOGHULGI >

ZHAWARV . "

X^V \ 0 1 2, 3 4KNI

SPINKHWAR ^"*

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PAKISTAN MIRAMSHAH

ZHAWAR1

Map 11-13
Chapter 11, Vignette 10 Page 319

D30 122mm howitzer, two tanks (captured from the DRA post at Bari

in 1983), some six-barrel Chinese-manufactured BM-12 MRL and

some machine guns and small arms. A Mujahideen air defense

company also defended Zhawar with five ZPU-1 and four ZPU-2 antiaircraft heavy machine guns. The air defense machine guns were

positioned on high ground around the base. Defense ofthe approaches to the base was the responsibility of other Mujahideen groups.

In September 1985, the DRA moved elements of the DRA 12th

Infantry Division from Gardez, with elements of the 37th and 38th

Commando Brigades. They moved from Gardez circuitously through

Jaji Maidan to Khost since the direct route through the Satakadow

pass had been under Mujahideen control since 1981. This force

joined elements of the 25th Infantry Division which was garrisoned

in Khost. Shahnawaz Tani13 commanded this mixed force. The DRA

military units had their full complement of weapons and equipment,

but desertion, security details and other duties kept their units

chronically understrength. Since the DRA could not mobilize sufficient force from one regiment or division, they practiced "tactical

cannibalism" and formed composite forces for these missions.

Late one September afternoon, the DRA force began an infantry

attack supported by heavy artillery fire and air strikes on Bari,

which is northeast of Zhawar (Map 11-13 - Zhawar 1). Zhawar was

not prepared for this attack since most of its major commanders,

including Haqani, were on the pilgrimage to Mecca (the Haj). The

DRA recaptured Bari and drove on to Zhawar. The Mujahideen reacted by positioning an 80-man group to block the ridge on the eastern

slope of the Moghulgai mountains which form the eastern wall of the

Zhawar base. The DRA force arrived at night and during the night

fighting lost two APCs and four trucks. Eventually, the DRA became

discouraged, withdrew and returned to Khost.14 Mujahideen from

the nomad Kochi tribe, led by Malang Kochi, Dadmir Kochi and

Gorbez Mujahideen, recaptured Bari.

The DRA then launched its next attempt from the town of

Tani. They recaptured the town of Lezhi from the Mujahideen

and killed Commander Mawlawi Ahmad Gul. The major commanders returned to Pakistan from the Haj on that day (4 September)

13 General Shahnawaz Tani was from the neighboring town of Tani and enjoyed some

popular support in the area. He later became DRA Defense Minister. On 6 March 1990,

he joined forces with Mujahideen faction leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar in an attempted coup

against communist President Najibullah. When the coup failed, he fled to Pakistan.

14 Perhaps this was a reconnaissance in force.
Page 320 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

and hurried north to Zhawar to take command. The Mujahideen

from Lezhi retreated south while a 20-man Mujahideen force blocked

the Manay Randow pass.

The pass is dominated by a high peak which is capped with a

thick rock slab. Under the slab was a natural cave which the

Mujahideen improved. The cave could accommodate the 20 Mujahideen during artillery and air strikes. The Mujahideen also dug

communications trenches so that they could quickly reoccupy their

fighting positions once the firing stopped. The firing positions dominated the Tani plain and were well positioned to stop any infantry

attack. The DRA repeatedly attacked the pass but could make no

headway. The infantry would attack, meet withering Mujahideen fire

and stop. Then massed air and artillery would pound the area. The

infantry would again try to attack, but would again be stopped immediately. The procedure would then repeat itself, but the DRA made

no headway during its 10-day attack. After 10 days, the DRA called

in heavy Soviet airstrikes which continuously hit the mountain top.

The thick rock slab began to sway and rock. The Mujahideen were

afraid that the rock slab might shift and crush their cave, so they

finally withdrew. It was 14 September 1985.

As the Mujahideen fell back, the DRA established OPs on high

ground and started adjusting air and artillery strikes. This gave

the tactical advantage to the DRA and their infantry moved through

the pass. The Mujahideen rear guard desperately engaged the DRA

infantry with machine gun fire, and aircraft with ZGU machine

guns. The DRA continued to advance and seized the high ground of

Tor Kamar.

Tor Kamar is within a kilometer of Zhawar base and well within the range of machine gun fire. The DRA thought that the

Mujahideen did not have any heavy weapons and became careless

and bunched their forces on the high ground. Two Mujahideen, Alam

Jam and Muhammad Salim, were former tank commanders in the

DRA. In the late afternoon, they moved their tanks out of the caves

and swung north into firing positions. They opened fire and their

first rounds destroyed a DRA OP sending an artillery OP scope and

soldiers flying. The Mujahideen tankers then traversed to the second

OP and destroyed it with their next rounds. Then they opened up on

the other DRA soldiers.

The mauled DRA force fell back and maneuvered through the

15 Local name for the chalk layers in the rock which mark this saddle.
Chapter 11, Vignette 10 Page 321

"bird droppings" saddle15 to the east side of Tamberi Ghar. The

Mujahideen countered with blocking positions which they held for

five days. Haji Amanullah Khan and Ismail Khan played major roles

in the fighting at this stage.

The DRA Commander, General Tani moved his CP into the Manay

Kandow pass and tried to reinvigorate the DRA assault, but the

Mujahideen held. During the fighting, the Mujahideen shot down a

helicopter, but lost a major commander—Mawlawi Fathullah.

Mujahideen reinforcements arrived from Pakistan and as far away

as Jalalabad and Urgun. Commander Mawlawi Arsalah arrived.

The DRA were getting chronically low on men and supplies and, after

42 days of fighting, General Tani broke contact and conducted a

night withdrawal.

Mujahideen casualties were 106 KIA and 321 WIA. DRA and

Soviet losses were heavy, but their numbers are unknown because they

evacuated their dead and wounded.

COMMENTARY: Zhawar was a symbol of Mujahideen invincibility

in the border area and the Soviets and DRA felt that they had to

destroy this myth. The Mujahideen were convinced that Zhawar was

impregnable and failed to take some basic security precautions.

September-October and March-April are historically the best months

in Afghanistan for campaigning, since the weather is reasonable

and the roads are dry. August-September that year was also the time

of the Haj and the senior leadership of the area all made this

religious pilgrimage together. Consequently, the senior leadership

was absent when the battle started and other Mujahideen commanders had to take command of the battle. Field fortifications around

Zhawar were neglected and incomplete. The excellent field fortifications at the mouth of the Manay Kandow pass bought time to

improve the other fortifications The complacent attitude almost cost

the Mujahideen their base. Only the unexpected appearance of

Mujahideen armor at a crucial minute prevented a DRA victory.

The Mujahideen were able to move men and supplies from

Miram Shah in Pakistan throughout the battle. The DRA apparently made no attempt to impede access by deploying scatterable

mines against the route.
Page 322 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

PAKISTAN

ZHAWAR 2

Map 11-14
VIGNETTE 11

ZHAWAR TWO

by Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani and Mawlawi AbdulRahman

On 2 April 1986, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani was in the Zadran

area when he saw approximately 20 transport helicopters flying over.

He radioed the commanders at Zhawar and warned them. He expected that the helicopters would land at Lezhi or Darakai. After his radio

message, he saw another group of helicopters, including some heavy

transport helicopters, flying the same direction. These were escorted

by jet fighters. He again radioed this information to Zhawar. Zhawar

had 700-800 Mujahideen combatants, plus air defense forces, at the

time. However Jalaluddin Haqani, the Zhawar Commander, was at

Miram Shah. Mawlawi Haqani also radioed this information separately to Jalaluddin Haqani, who set out immediately for Zhawar.

The usual Soviet/DRA pattern for an attack on a Mujahideen base

was to pound the area heavily with air strikes and then follow the air

strikes with air assault landings, artillery fire and a ground advance

to link up with the air assault forces. The air strike gave the

Mujahideen commanders warning, reaction time and a solid indicator where the attack would go. In this case, the Mujahideen were

caught by surprise. Their intelligence agents within the DRA failed

to tip them off and the helicopters landed the DRA 38th Commando

Brigade on seven dispersed landing zones around Zhawar. There

were 15 helicopters in the first lift which landed at 0700 hours.

More lifts followed to get the entire brigade on the ground. The first

two helicopters landed on Spin Khwara plain. Some of the landing

zones were within a kilometer of the Pakistani border (Map 11-14 -

Zhawar 2). Most of the helicopters landed on the high ground to the

west of Zhawar. Mujahideen gunners destroyed two helicopters while

they were on the ground. Following the air assault, Soviet jet aircraft

Lieutenant Omar contributed to the previous vignette.

Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani contributed to the previous vignette.

Mawlawi Abdul-Rahman was a group commander from the Zadran tribe in Paktia Province.

His brother was killed in this action. Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap,

London: Leo Cooper, 1992,166-173 and Ijaz S. Gilani and Fazal-Ru-Rahman, Afghanistan

Report, Islamabad: The Institute of Strategic Studies, Number 25, April 1986, 2-5 also

consulted for this vignette.
Page 324 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

bombed and strafed Mujahideen positions. Mujahideen air defense

was not very effective against these aircraft.

Instead of defending in positions being pounded by fighter-bombers

and close-air support aircraft, the Mujahideen went on the offensive

and attacked the landing zones. They quickly overran four landing

zones and captured many of the DRA commandos. Mujahideen reinforcements moved from Miram Shah in Pakistan to Zhawar and took

the commandos from the rear. The commandos were trapped between

two forces and were killed or captured. By the end of the day, the

Mujahideen captured 530 commandos from the 38th Brigade.16

Meanwhile, Soviet aircraft with smart munitions made ordnance

runs on the caves. Since the caves faced southeast toward Pakistan,

the Soviet aircraft overflew Pakistan in order to turn and fly at the

southern face with the smart weapons. Smart missiles hit the first

western cave and killed 18 Mujahideen outright. Smart missiles hit

the second western cave and collapsed the cave opening trapping some

150 Mujahideen inside. This second cave was 150-meters long and

used as the radio transmission bunker. The commander, Jalaluddin

Haqani, who had just arrived from Miram Shah, was among those

trapped the second cave.

Soviet bombers followed the attack of the aircraft with the smart

ordnance. They dropped tons of bombs and, in so doing, blasted away

the rubble blocking the cave entrances. The trapped Mujahideen

escaped. The battle for the remaining landing zones continued. There

was one group of commandos on high ground who held out for three

days before they were finally overrun.

The DRA had regarrisoned Lezhi since Zhawar One and had

fought for the possession of the Manay Kandow Pass to Zhawar for

some 10 days following the air landing. Mujahideen attacked their

LOCs and the airfield at Khost while the Mujahideen holding the

Manay Kandow checked their advance. In first battle for Zhawar,

DRA/Soviet artillery and air strikes stopped at night, but this time

they were conducted around the clock. At night, they dropped aerial

flares for illumination. This heavy fire support continued for 12 days.

Finally, more DRA and Soviet forces came from Khost, through Tani,

to reinforce the effort at Lezhi. The Mujahideen fell back from the

Lezhi area into the higher mountains and slowly the DRA/Soviet

force moved through the Manay Kandow. At the same time, the

16 Following Zhawar Two, the remnants of the 38th Commando Brigade became the base

of the newly-formed 2nd Division.
Chapter 11, Vignette 11 Page 325

DRA/Soviet force launched a flanking column from the Lezhi area

that moved to the east. This column moved toward Moghulgai mountain on the east flank of Zhawar. There, a regiment of HIH

Mujahideen waited in defense. However, as the DRA column neared,

the HIH regiment withdrew without a fight. At the same time,

Jalaluddin Haqani was wounded by attacking aircraft. He had head

and facial wounds, but rumors spread among the Mujahideen that

Haqani was dead. The Mujahideen evacuated Zhawar and moved

high into the surrounding mountains as the two ground columns

closed into Zhawar after 12 days of combat.

The DRA held Zhawar for only five hours. Mujahideen had moved

MRL up on the Pakistan border and fired on the communists. The

DRA hurriedly tried to destroy the caves with explosives and boobytrapped the area. They also planted seismic-detonated mines in the

area and sprinkled aerial-delivered butterfly bombs over the area.

The DRA took pictures for their propaganda victory and withdrew

to their base camps. The Mujahideen returned to Zhawar on the

following day. The first Mujahideen to enter the area were killed by

seismic mines. The Mujahideen withdrew and fired mortars, BM12

and machine guns into the area to set off the seismic mines. Then

they began the slow process of finding the rest of the mines manually. The Mujahideen pushed forward from Zhawar to retake Lezhi and

other areas. Since the DRA was only in Zhawar for five hours, the

DRA did not manage to destroy the caves, but just collapsed some

entrances. Weapons that were stored in the caves were still intact

and useable inside. From this experience, the Mujahideen learned to

make connecting tunnels between caves. They reopened the caves

and built connecting tunnels. The caves were improved and lengthened to 400-500 meters long.17

Mujahideen casualties were 281 KIA and 363 WIA. DRA and

Soviet losses were unknown, but the Mujahideen destroyed two

helicopters on the ground, shot down two jets and captured 530

personnel of the 38th Commando Brigade. The Mujahideen held a

field tribunal. Yunis Khalis and others were the judges. They tried

and executed Colonel Qalandar Shah, the commander of the Brigade

and another colonel who landed with the brigade to adjust artillery

fire. There were 78 other officers among the prisoners. They were

given a chance to confess to their crimes from different battles and

17 Veterans of Zhawar have proposed to Haqani that the caves be restored and kept as

a museum so that 200 years from now, people can visit them and reflect on their heritage.
Page 326 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

then all the officers were executed. All the soldiers were given

amnesty since they were conscripts who were forced to fight. -The

amnestied soldiers were asked to perform two years of labor service

in exchange for the amnesty. They did their service in logistics, were

reeducated and released after two years.

COMMENTARY: The withdrawal of the HIH regiment, coupled with the

rumors of Haqani's death, greatly aided the DRA victory. Haqani's

loss, besides affecting Mujahideen morale, cost the Mujahideen what

little command and control they had left at this juncture of the battle.

The DRA failed to throw a blocking force on the Miram Shah road,

although they knew that Mujahideen reinforcements were moving

along this route. As a minimum, they could have employed scatterable

mines on the road, but they left the route open.

Pakistan was clearly concerned with the major battle raging on

her border and reportedly transported Mujahideen to the border and

supplied MRL to the Mujahideen who fired them across the border

into Zhawar. The Mujahideen lacked effective air defense against

helicopter gunships, and the strafing and bombing attacks of highperformance aircraft. The Mujahideen had some British Blowpipe

shoulder-fired air defense missiles, but they were not effective.

Pakistan sent some officers into Zhawar during the fighting to take out

attacking aircraft with the British Blowpipe shoulder-fired missiles

and show the Mujahideen how it was done. After climbing a mountain

and firing 13 Blowpipe missiles to no avail, a Pakistani captain and his

NCO were severely wounded by the attacking aircraft.18

The DRA celebrated the fall of Zhawar as a major victory, but

Zhawar was back in full operation within weeks of the attack.

18 Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap, London: Leo Cooper, 1992, 171.
VIGNETTE 12

KRER ONE

by Commander Assadullah

In late March 1986, the Soviet and DRA forces launched a major

offensive against Mujahideen bases at Krer on the Pakistani border

(Map 11-15 - Krer 1). Krer is located east of the Sarkani District

center in Kunar Province. The Mujahideen maintained two bases in

the mountain valley named "Shahid Abdul Latif and "Fatha." The

Mujahideen could reach the Bajuar area in Pakistan from the two

bases. The bases served as border supply depots and staging areas

for Mujahideen attacks against the Soviet/DRA forces in Kunar

Province. My Asama Ben Zaid Regiment manned both of the Krer

bases. The regiment's manpower fluctuated depending on the

requirements and situation. The proximity of the bases to Mujahideen camps across the border in Pakistan made it easier to reinforce

the Krer regiment at short notice. In March 1986, prior to the enemy

offensive, my regiment was under-strength. Later in the battle,

when reinforcements arrived from Bajuar in Pakistan, the number of

Mujahideen reached nearly 400.

We had many indications that the Soviets and DRA were planning

an attack, but we did not know when it would be launched. During

the last week of March, when the weather was still cold and the

mountain tops were still covered with snow, we detected enemy movement from the Sarkani direction across the Nawabad bridge. The

enemy made no attempt to conceal or camouflage his action and

apparently wanted to draw our attention to his movement. We later

found out that the enemy's show of force was part of a deception plan

to cover another attack that the enemy launched from Pashad—about

20 kilometers southwest of Sarkani. We did not expect an attack on

Krer from Pashad. We prepared for an enemy attacking from

Commander Assadullah is from Charquala village in Narang Subdistrict of Kunar Province.

He is the son of Mawlawi Mohammad Amin. He graduated from high school and emigrated to Pakistan in 1978 and later entered the Jamiat Islami faction's (JIA) military academy

and completed the year-long course. He became a Mujahideen regimental commander of

the Krer-based regiment. This was the Asama Ben Zaid Regiment of Sarkani District

(Asama Ben Zaid was a close companion of the Prophet Mohammad and one of the

Prophet's military leaders. At one point, Asama ben Zaid fought the Byzantines). The

Regiment belonged to the Sayyaf faction (IUA) and so Commander Assadullah switched

factions. [Map sheets 3287 and 3387].
Page 328 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 11, Vignette 12 Page 329

Sarkani and deployed the bulk of the force to the valley entrance

facing the Sarkani District center. This was the main avenue of

approach to Krer and I expected the enemy to use it.

A mixed Soviet/DRA column, led by local guides, crossed the

Kunar River at Nawabad bridge, northeast of Sarkani, and attacked

my forward positions in the late afternoon (Map 11-14 - Krerl). This

was where I expected them and heavy fighting ensued as enemy

infantry and armored vehicles fought with my resistance fighters

at the valley entrance. Both sides had heavy losses. While the

enemy tied my forces down, he launched another attack from Pashad

along the mountain paths to outflank my force. This attacking

column consisted of Soviet infantry (possibly a Spetsnaz detachment)

and it moved undetected to the rear of my force and seized the

undefended high ground on the Spina Tsoka mountains. From there,

the Soviet detachment attacked us from the rear and overran both

Mujahideen valley bases, including our main supply depot. By next

morning, we had lost all our installations and were surrounded by

the enemy forces. The enemy was pounding our positions from the

high ground to our rear.

I had crossed the border and mobilized a Mujahideen force in the

Bajuar camps and, as the enemy fought for Krer, the reinforcing

Mujahideen force moved toward Krer to help the embattled defenders. My reinforcements moved early in the morning to the border and

infiltrated through concealed approaches to Krer since the enemy

dominated the main road from the high ground. Around noon, I was

moving with a six-man group when we stumbled on a group of

Soviets. Apparently, they were a command group. We attacked the

group and after a brief but fierce clash, in which both sides threw

hand grenades at each other, we killed a senior Soviet officer. This

apparently lead to the withdrawal of the Soviets. With the arrival of

the Mujahideen reinforcements, the Soviet position was threatened

from the rear. Fragmented fighting broke out in separate areas

throughout the valley. The enemy began to pull out in the afternoon

and by the evening we Mujahideen recaptured the valley and our

bases. The bases were mostly destroyed by the enemy.

We caught a group of Soviet soldiers in one of our supply caves at

the depot. We attempted to flush them out and lost several

Mujahideen killed and wounded to AK-74 fire. Finally, we fired an

RPG into the cave and then threw hand grenades into it silencing the

enemy. The next morning we found several dead Soviets in the cave.

We buried our dead and evacuated our wounded. I had roughly 25%
Page 330 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

casualties (33 KIA and 40 WIA). I think that enemy losses were

higher because we captured some 60 enemy small arms.19

COMMENTARY: By drawing the bulk of the Mujahideen forces away

from their base and attacking the base from the rear, the Soviets

achieved a major surprise through deception and good planning. This

enabled them to overrun and destroy the Mujahideen bases without

facing any resistance. But Soviet failure to block the Mujahideen reinforcement routes resulted in apparent heavy Soviet losses and forced

them to withdraw from the areas they had so easily captured.

Mujahideen rapid reinforcement changed the course of the battle.

Seizing and retaining the initiative is crucial to any tactical scheme.

The Mujahideen lost the initiative to the enemy at the beginning ofthe

battle. But, the Soviets failed to retain the initiative and lost it to the

Mujahideen maneuver ofreserves from the rear. This decided the final

outcome of the battle. Guerrilla warfare is no different from conventional warfare in that a reserve can drastically change the situation

through quick and effective commitment before the opponent consolidates his tactical success.

19 Pakistani Strategic Studies Review, April 1986 notes: "Soviet forces launched air-cumground attack on Mujahideen base in Krer area killed 26 Mujahideen destroyed their entire

armament and lost 42 men after 15 hours fighting March 26. Mujahideen killed 70 Kabul

and 50 Soviet troops and lost 42 men in their bid to break Soviet-Kabul encirclement of

Soran base in Krer area of Sarkani District March 28-31. Mujahideen repulsed Soviet

attack after hours of occupation of their base in Krer after inflicting heavy losses and

capturing three Soviet troops during 48 hours fighting March 30-31."
VIGNETTE 13

KRER TWO

by Commander Assadullah

At the end of 1987, when the Soviet forces were preparing to begin

their negotiated withdrawal from Afghanistan, they launched a

number of high-visibility offensives, which served their propaganda

campaign which claimed that the Soviet Army was able to defeat any

Mujahideen force anywhere. To this end, the Soviets conducted operation Magistral in Paktia Province to open the "unopenable" GardezKhowst highway. At the same time, the Soviets attacked major

Mujahideen border bases. In Kunar Province, the Soviet/DRA forces

targeted the Mujahideen bases at Krer for destruction. Apparently,

they intended to establish a border security outpost at the Spina

Tsoka Mountain on the border with Pakistan to control several infiltration routes connecting the Nawa Pass, Gonjgal and other valleys

in Pakistan with the road to Sarkani and the valleys of Shonkray,

Shalay, and Olay in Afghanistan.

In late December 1987, I received intelligence reports that a

Soviet-led DRA column would attack the Krer bases. The intelligence

agents did not know when the attack would come. There were only

170 men in my regiment at that time. I established security posts

and conducted reconnaissance along the routes over which I expected

the attack. Based on past enemy behavior, I expected him to avoid

night combat and night maneuver. I expected him to attack at dawn

or later and to use the valley approach. The enemy surprised me. He

chose to move and fight at night and, instead of using the valley

approach, he moved to the north flank of the mountain and attacked

over it. He did this to get behind my forward defenses and unhinge

my defense (Map 11-16 - Krer 2).

The enemy moved from Sarkani at night in two columns. One

column moved against the Mujahideen "Fatha" base and the other

moved deeper in a flanking maneuver to the rear of my defenses and

tried to climb the heights of Spina Tsoka mountain. The column heading toward the "Fatha" base climbed the ridge from the east. There

was a security outpost there consisting of 10-12 men sleeping in a tent

and a small hut. The enemy soldiers silently approached the guard

and killed him without making any noise. The other Mujahideen at the

Commander Assadullah is the source of the previous vignette.
Page 332 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 11, Vignette 13 Page 333

outpost were fast asleep and were caught by surprise. The enemy was

killing them when some of them woke up and a shoot-out ensued. The

Mujahideen at "Fatha" died to the last man.

The noise from the gunfire alerted the rest of my Mujahideen. The

second enemy column had not yet reached the crest of Spina Tsoka

mountain. My Mujahideen occupied fighting positions and met the

approaching enemy with heavy fire. A fierce battle continued throughout the night. The enemy column was deep in our positions, but we

had cut off his withdrawal routes. We expected to bloody the enemy as

he fought to reopen his withdrawal routes. Instead, the enemy column

continued over the mountain path all the way to Pashad, some 20 kilometers southwest of Sarkani. We did not expect the enemy to withdraw in that direction.

Meanwhile, my Mujahideen directed heavy fire on the enemy at the

"Fatha" base and it began a fighting retreat back to Sarkani. By dawn,

the enemy had withdrawn from the Krer base and taken his dead and

wounded with him. Mujahideen losses included 18 killed and 20

wounded (again about 25% casualties).

COMMENTARY: The Soviet/DRA commander did a good job on analyzing the pattern set by his forces in the area. Using this stereotype, the

DRA commander caught the Mujahideen commander by surprise, even

though he had been warned. The Soviet/DRA commander knew that

the Mujahideen considered the Soviets and DRA reluctant to move and

fight at night and reliant on readily identifiable terrain for night movement. Therefore, he advanced stealthily at night over unexpected

approaches. This gave him tactical surprise and allowed him to wipe

out a critical Mujahideen outpost virtually without resistance.

However, his apparent lack of coordination between the two columns

disclosed his attack prematurely and denied victory the second

column. Had both columns been in position and launched their attacks

simultaneously, they might have achieved better results.

The Mujahideen were asleep despite sufficient warnings because

they reacted to a stereotype and pattern. Mujahideen actions, once

alerted, were commendable, particularly in cutting off the obvious

Soviet/DRA route of withdrawal. Whether the Soviet/DRA commander's original plan included withdrawal over the Pashad mountain

route or whether it was a decision that he made on the spot, it clearly

saved the force from some heavy casualties. Had the Mujahideen also

blocked the Pashad route, the Soviet/DRA force might have been in

very serious trouble and faced possible annihilation.
Page 334 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
VIGNETTE 14

THE FALL OF CHAGHNI BASE CAMP

by Commander Abdul Razek,

Haji Pir Mohammad, and Amir Mohammad

Chaghni base camp is in Shahr-e Safa District about 10 kilometers from Highway 1—the main highway from Kabul to Kandahar.

We normally set ambushes on the south side of the road, since the

north side is open between Shahr-e Safa and Kalat. There was only

one place optimum for ambush—a six-kilometer stretch where a

dry river bed parallels the road way. We could hide many Mujahideen in the high ground overlooking the road and escort vehicles

could not cross the river bed to get up into our ambush positions,

since the dry river banks were like sheer walls. Although no APC or

tank could get across, we mined the area between the road and

the river bed anyway. The high ground of Sher Alikhan Mountain

protected our withdrawal. Further, there were no villages or villagers nearby to provide warning to the enemy. We built permanent

fighting positions at this site and we ambushed the enemy at this

site continually, but they always seemed surprised. The enemy

convoy would usually reach our ambush site in the late afternoon

since they left Kabul about 0800. The enemy usually sent tanks,

BMPs and APCs to escort their convoys. We normally positioned our

heavy weapons on favorable ground higher up and positioned our

small arms forward.

At the point that we usually laid our ambushes, there was one

road that intersected our area. It had to cross the river bed, but we

usually mined that road as well for good measure. The normal reaction of the enemy convoy, when ambushed, was to drive off the road

to the north to get out of range of our weapons. They never tried to

attack us. Their trucks would be burning and destroyed, everything

would be in chaos and everyone was looking to his own survival.

There was no coordinated response. Escort tanks and APCs would

Abdul Razek was a major commander in the Kandahar area. Several of the current Taliban

leaders once worked for him. His command included Shahr-e Safa District northeast of

Kandahar. [Map sheet 2280, vie grid 6016].

Haji Pir Mohammad was a subgroup commander for Abdul Razek in the Kandahar area.

Amir Mohammad was a combatant in Abdul Razek's group.
Page 336 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

fire at random, but they would never dismount troops and push them

forward. Then enemy aircraft would' arrive and make strafing runs,

but it would be too late because darkness would be falling. Our

group and Chaghni base camp was a real thorn in the side of the

enemy.

It was in the year of Islam Dara (October 1986) that the Soviets

captured our base at Chaghni. Our commander, Abdul Razek, was

not at the base but was visiting other Mujahideen in Kandahar and

Helmand with a representative of our faction headquartered in

Peshawar. At 0400 hours, the enemy dropped illumination flares

that lit up the area like it was day. Everybody was sleeping at

Chaghni except for the sentries. The enemy followed this with an air

and MRL bombardment. Early in the morning, helicopters came and

landed troops at four LZs (Map 11-17 - Chaghni). Some 45 helicopters were involved. These four LZs were located on the high

ground to secure the flanks for their advancing tanks and infantry.

When the air assault forces reported that the way was clear, the

tanks and mechanized infantry moved from Shahr-e Safa. The

artillery fire and airstrikes were so heavy that they probably

assumed that no one was left alive.

The Soviets had moved earlier from Kandahar to Shahr-e Safa.

Now, the enemy ground column came from Shahr-e Safa south to

Kadu, where they turned east in the canyon between Mayantak

Ghar and Kharwari Ghar mountains. Air assault forces on these

heights safeguarded their passage. The movement of the enemy was

very slow since they waited as the air assault forces moved along

the high ground to secure passage for them. They reached Kadu in

the morning. It took them from 0800-1600 hours to travel the

remaining 11 kilometers from Kadu to our base. At the end of the

canyon was the village of Mayu. There, the ground column split. The

main body continued east toward the village of Bandaki.

Our base camp was to the east of Bandaki, located in a saddle

between the Caki Ghar and Dumunaray Ghar mountains. Again, air

assault forces on the heights safeguarded their passage. The other

part of their column was a flanking detachment. It turned south at

Mayu through the village of Shahbed and then to the south of

Dumunaray Ghar mountain to block our escape and to shoot at our

base. Their tanks reached our base in the afternoon. As they neared

our position, they put in the fifth and sixth LZ to not only secure their

advance but also to attack down from the high ground. Haji Pir

Mohammad was using a ZGU on hill 1722. Amir Mohammad
Chapter 11, Vignette 14 Page 337

engaged a helicopter coming toward them, but missed. The helicopter went over the crest of the hill where Abdul Ghani was waiting

with a RPG. Abdul yelled that the helicopter was landing infantry

and he would get it. He shot it with his RPG. Only four or five personnel had gotten out of the helicopter when he hit it. The remains

of that helicopter were there for more than year.

We had deployed our forces to maximize the fire power of our

seven 82mm recoilless rifles, five ZGU-1 machine guns, six DShK

machine guns and many RPG-7s. We also had some mortars, but we

could not use the mortars very well. A mortar is good against a

stationary target, but is hard to use against a moving target. Most of

the fighting was between their armored vehicles and our recoilless

rifles and RPGs. They were so close that we could hear their Russian

voices. They were also using loudspeakers telling us to surrender

since our plight was hopeless and we would be killed. That language

was Pushto from their Afghans. We answered these broadcasts with

fire and destroyed seven tanks and APCS. We shot down one jet and

they intensified their fire. As they launched their attacks against us,

they would show their location to the supporting aircraft with red

smoke. This kept their own aircraft from attacking them.

Night fell and everything was confused and chaotic as we lost

command and control. No one knew where the Soviets were and where

the Mujahideen were. We Mujahideen fought on until 0200 or 0300

hours in the morning. Then, as we ran out of ammunition, we began

to slip away to the northeast. A close friend of Pir Mohammad's was

standing close to him when he was killed. Pir Mohammad carried his

body to high ground, where he left the body in a safe place and left the

area. There were 220 Mujahideen in the base. We had 22 KIA—21 of

our Mujahideen and one guest who was spending the night at our

base. Most ofthe 198 survivors escaped to the northeast. The Soviets

now owned the base. They spent 24 hours there, looted it, and

destroyed as much of our installation as they could.

Before Commander Razek had left Chaghni, he had sent groups out

to scout the road. They reported that the roads from Kandahar and

Arghestan were closed. He sent out scouts again the next night and

they reported that the roads were still blocked. The next day, toward

late afternoon, he went to Shahr-e Safa by tractor and then north into

the mountains and then turned and followed the Arghandab River

Valley down to Kandahar. The trip took five days. At Kandahar, he

discovered that the airport was very busy as waves of aircraft flew

in and out. He was told that the ground detachment had also left
Page 338 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

and was headed northeast. He did not have much communications at

that time. In the late afternoon, he learned that the fighting was

focused at his base. He went to his other bases in Kandahar and

gathered Mujahideen and MRL. He then took the same circuitous

route back to his base. As they reached Shahr-e Safa, the Soviets had

already gone, so he sent his Kandahar reinforcements back and

went on to Chaghni. The survivors were gone and those left were all

dead. It was a mess. Everything destroyed or damaged. Booby traps

and mines were all over the area. Gradually the surviving Mujahideen returned. Commander Razek decided that this was no longer a

safe place for a permanent base and converted it to a mobile base for

50 Mujahideen. Five days after we buried our dead, we packed 150

rockets and went to exact revenge on the Kandahar airport.

One night, some two weeks later, we buried our rockets or put

them in hideouts or safe-houses near Khoshab to the north of the

airfield. We had to do this very secretly, as we did not want the locals

to know. The next night, we set up our 150 rockets with remotecontrol firing devices aimed at the airfield. The remote control firing

devices were essential because it is impossible to stay in the

open area after firing. The first salvo of 50 rockets fired at night.

After the first salvo, planes took off and hit the area at random. The

next salvo fired at sunrise and the third salvo at 0700 hours—

about one hour later. After each salvo of 50 rockets, planes would

fly over and shoot at random, but there were no Mujahideen in the

area. After the third salvo, the enemy sent armored vehicles into

the area to search. They encircled the area and sent dismounted

infantry into the cordon. They found the spent launchers.

Most of the Soviet aircraft losses were from rocket attacks on

planes parked on the ground, not from air defense. This attack reportedly damaged many aircraft. Before Stingers, Soviet and Chinese

SA-7s proved very ineffective. We only brought down two aircraft in

the Kandahar area with SA-7s.

COMMENTARY: The Soviet advance on Chaghni was slow, but the

Soviets were finally learning to dominate the high ground before

they moved their ground force. Apparently the Soviets had good

intelligence to support this attack. However, the Soviets did not

block all escape routes and the bulk of the Mujahideen force escaped.

Mujahideen reconnaissance, on the other hand, was lacking and

they were surprised. Still, the Mujahideen had plenty of time to hit

the Soviets or evacuate their base during the slow Soviet advance.
Chapter 11, Vignette 14 Page 339

They took few precautions and were not aggressive in contesting

the Soviet advance. The Mujahideen showed a lack of command

and control—reflecting the absence of their leader and a working

chain of command. Further, the commander had not trained his

mortar crews in engaging moving targets.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY

The Mujahideen safe-havens in Pakistan and Iran were absolutely essential for the survival of their force. Pakistan was particularly

important since most of the external aid came through Pakistan.

These safe havens allowed the Mujahideen a place to shelter their

families, resupply, treat their wounded, train, sell war booty to

support their families, rest and exchange tactical information and

intelligence. Pakistan provided forward supply depots near the

border and the Mujahideen built most of their major supply depots

near the Pakistan border. These Mujahideen major supply depots

were a constant target of the Soviets and DRA. In some areas, the

Mujahideen developed forward supply depots and tried to move

most of the supplies forward. In contested areas, the Mujahideen

moved their forward supply depots about to avoid capture. The major

supply depots, however, were stationary and vulnerable. A dictum of

guerrilla warfare is that the guerrilla should not hold ground.

Mujahideen logistics forced the Mujahideen to hold ground.

Mujahideen defenses were built around heavy crew-served

weapons. The popular image ofthe guerrilla is a small force carrying

an assortment of small arms. Most insurgencies start that way, but

successful insurgencies need heavy weapons. The problem with

heavy weapons is that they and their ammunition are hard to transport. The Mujahideen became very adept at field fortifications and

developed shelters which protected them from intense air and

artillery attack. On the other hand, throughout the war, the

Mujahideen had difficulty fighting air and artillery systems and had

to learn how to survive them—particularly when defending. The

introduction of the Stinger man-portable air defense missile in 1986

provided upgraded Mujahideen air defense and forced the Soviets to

change their aerial tactics to avoid losing aircraft.

Soviet assaults on Mujahideen defenses were initially hampered

by their reluctance to fight at night, their over-reliance on firepower

at the expense of maneuver, and their reluctance to operate far from

their armored vehicles. As the war progressed, the Soviets developed
Page 340 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

better light infantry, began conducting more night combat and moreskillfully employed air assault and ground combat tactical elements

together. Still, throughout the war, the Soviets were hampered by

lack of sufficient infantry forces.
CHAPTER 12

COUNTERAMBUSH

Counterambush is a tedious, time-consuming effort requiring

route planning, patrols, timely intelligence, counterambush drills

and flank security. Planning should ensure that alternate routes and

times of travel are used, that potential ambush sites are cleared and

that movement through areas is coordinated with local forces.

Movement details need to be safeguarded and deception measures

taken to prevent ambush.

I jf\ Mazer-e

/ff—* Sharif

/ KABUL

2/ JfAsadabad

Herat

Gardez ^

^Jalalabad

Afghanistan

Chapter 12

, KandaharX^*^ Incidents
Page 342 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

KOTOLAK

Map 12-1 4 KM
VIGNETTE 1

CAUGHT IN A SOVIET AMBUSH

by Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch

In 1983, we had one GMC pickup truck to support my force. We

called GMC pickups ahu (deer), since they were fleet and nimble. It

was the month of Ramadan and we were going from our base in Qalae Naw to Kotalak to get some gasoline. Soviet soldiers were the main

source of our gasoline. We would buy it from them. Our rendezvous

point for gasoline was north of Kotolak. We left early in the afternoon

and drove along the river avoiding the main roads (Map 12-1 -

Kotolak). There was a Kochi1in our truck who had visited our base

and we were giving him a ride back to his village camp. As we got

about 10 kilometers south of Kotolak, we saw the Kochi's camp near

the river. We stopped, both to let our. passenger off and to wait for

dark, since we were now within 50 kilometers of the Soviet base at

Delaram and should not travel any further in the day light. We

watched as the Kochi entered the woods some 500-600 meters away

on his way to his camp. We saw some people attack him and drag him

to the side. We didn't know what was going on and thought that it

was a fight between Kochis. "What's going on?" we yelled. They did

not answer so we fired some shots into the air. The people who

grabbed the Kochi realized that they had been seen and started firing

at us. We exchanged fire for about a half hour until helicopters landed behind the wooded area. The other group boarded the helicopters

and left. It was late afternoon.

We had prematurely and inadvertently triggered a Soviet

ambush. We were on the western bank of the Khash Rud river and

the ambush force was on the eastern bank. Soviet ambushes were

always better planned and prepared than those of the DRA. The

Soviets would drop their ambush party by helicopter at night and the

party would walk into position so that their ambush could not be

detected. This ambush party was probably from Delaram2and had

Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch is from Nimroz province. His base was at Lowkhai, the Khash

Rud district capitol on the Khash Rud river. He was initially with Malawi Mohammad Nabi

Mohammadi of the Harakat-e lnqelab-i Islami (HAR). Later, on he switched to HIK (Khalis).

[Map sheet 1680].

1 Kochi are nomadic tribesmen of Afghanistan. They live primarily by herding and trading

sheep, goats and camels.

2 More probably, these were Spetsnaz from Lashkar Gah.
Page 344 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

probably moved into their wooded position the previous night. The

Soviets suffocated the Kochi who had been our passenger and had

killed another Kochi earlier in the same fashion. The river was fordable, so after the helicopters left, we forded the river to look at the

ambush sight. Villagers found the bodies of the two murdered Kochi.

We crossed back to the west side, got in our truck and began driving

on the road to Kotolak since it was now night.

About two kilometers south of Kotolak the Soviets had set another

ambush in some hills straddling the road. We were moving in enemy

territory and I considered the route dangerous so we stopped short of

the hills and I had seven of my men dismount and walk the road to the

other side of the hills checking for ambushers. If they saw nothing,

then we would move the truck forward. This left eight Mujahideen

with the truck—three in the cab and five in the pickup bed. My seven

walkers walked past the hills, checked for ambush and gave us an allclear sign—a signal rocket.

The ambush party let my walkers pass through unmolested. When

we saw the rocket, we moved out confidently. Suddenly, I thought that

someone had set us on fire. We were in an ambush kill zone and bullets were flying all around us. Two men in the truck bed and the man

next to me in the cab were killed. The driver was wounded in the

shoulder. One tire was hit. The driver slammed the truck into reverse

gear and tried to drive out of the kill zone. He drove the truck behind

a sheltering hillock and stopped it. I had three KIA and two WIA. We

changed the tire and left the area in the dark. My walkers continued

to Kotolak. Later on, the walkers returned individually to my base

camp. As we were reversing the truck out of the kill zone, the body of

one of my dead Mujahideen fell out of the truck bed. The next day

when we returned to recover his body, we discovered that it was booby

trapped. We had to tie a rope to our dead comrade and drag him for a

distance, before it was safe to carry him home for burial.

COMMENTARY: At the first ambush site, the Soviets failed to put out

flank observers and consequently were surprised by the Mujahideen in

their stationary truck. This failure compromised their ambush.

At the second ambush site, the Mujahideen walkers walked around

the hills, not along the military crest where the ambushers should be.

The ambushers wisely let the patrol pass to concentrate on the vehicle.

However, the Soviets failed to employ directional, command-detonated

mines or an RPG to effectively stop the truck in the kill zone. Further,

the ambush commander did not know the size of the Mujahideen force
Chapter 12, Vignette 1 Page 345

and, following the ambush, did not pursue the Mujahideen or push out

a patrol to determine the Mujahideen's position and status.

After the first ambush, the Soviets knew that the Mujahideen

intended to move north. It was also clear that the Soviets were in the

area, yet the Mujahideen did not contact other local Mujahideen

groups to check on Soviet and DRA activities in the area. The factionalized nature of the resistance prevented the spread of tactical intelligence which may have saved the Mujahideen from disaster.
Page 346 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

FARZA

Map 12-2 t

1 2 KM
VIGNETTE 2

AMBUSHED AT FARZA

by Commander Sofi Lai Gul

In April 1984, the regional Mujahideen called for a shura (local

council) to discuss local issues and decide on common approaches. Sofi

Rasul and myself were to attend as the local Mujahideen commanders

from Farza. The meeting would be held five kilometers to our north in

Estalif. We were accompanied by 28 Mujahideen armed with AK47s

and two RPG-7s. Someone must have been working for DRA intelligence in our area, since the DRA knew about our plans and set an

ambush on the trail near Farza.

We left Farza while it was still dark so that the enemy would not

see us. Our route took us between two hills near a DRA air defense

battery position (Map 12-2 - Farza). We were about halfway to Estalif

at a point which we call Wotaq, when the enemy opened fire on us from

the surrounding hills. A DRA force had set up the ambush during the

night. There is no doubt that they knew the exact route we would take.

We went to ground in the kill zone and tried to find good fighting positions. The firing was fierce, we were totally surprised and we did not

know the enemy strength and exact positions. Our return fire was

ineffective and uncontrolled.

As dawn broke, our situation improved slightly, but we were still in

shock. I had no command or control over my men and they acted as

individuals trying to break contact and leave the kill zone. Enemy fire

was still heavy. During a lull in the fighting, I managed to find a few

Mujahideen sheltering in a ditch. I led them to the safety ofthe mountains in the west. Twelve Mujahideen eventually reached the safety of

the terrain folds and mountain valleys in the west. Two others and

myself were wounded. We remained hidden in the valley until we saw

the ambush force leave that afternoon. Then we returned to the

ambush site where we discovered that 18 of our comrades were killed.

Some of their bodies were mutilated by the enemy and most had their

clothing shredded. Late that afternoon, we moved their bodies for

burial. I do not know if there were any enemy casualties, but during

Commander Sofi Lai Gul is from Farza village of Mir Bacha Kot District. This is about

25 kilometers north of Kabul. He was affiliated with Mojaddedi's Afghanistan National

Liberation Front of Afghanistan (ANLF) during the war with the Soviets. Commander Sofi

Lai Gul concentrated his efforts on the Kabul-Charikar highway. [Map sheet 2886, vie

grid 0350].
Page 348 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

the fighting, I saw helicopters landing and taking off. They may have

come to evacuate dead and wounded.

COMMENTARY: This successful DRA ambush inflicted more than 60

percent loss on the Mujahideen force. Soviet/DRA recruitment of local

agents and informants gradually expanded their intelligence network

in the Afghan rural areas. Often, agent/informant information was not

timely, but when it was, the Soviet/DRA planners reacted to it.

Intelligence was central to Soviet/DRA ambush planning and attempts

to assassinate Mujahideen commanders. The Soviets/DRA usually

conducted ambushes based on hard information and seldom placed

random ambushes on the hope that a force might stumble into it.

Ifthe Mujahideen felt that they were moving through uncontested

territory, they often failed to post route security or send a forward and

flanking patrols. This lack of attention to tactical security stemmed

from the notion that they completely controlled the countryside and

that the DRA/Soviet forces were unable to operate covertly in the countryside for long. This over-confidence cost the Mujahideen dearly. The

Soviet/DRA forces exploited this Mujahideen hubris by setting

ambushes even in areas located deep inside Mujahideen-controlled

territory.

When ambushed, the Mujahideen had difficulty maintaining command and control. This exacerbated the situation and increased their

casualties. Mujahideen commanders often failed to train their personnel in drills and counter-ambush procedures. In this example, the

commander lost control immediately and failed to regain it. This was

a contributing factor to the very-high Mujahideen losses. Further, the

middle of a kill zone is no place to establish a defense. Ifthe commander had a counterambush battle drill where his men immediately

assaulted into the teeth of the ambush, more of his force might have

survived.
VIGNETTE 3

BLASTING OUT OF AN AMBUSH

by Amir Mohammad

It was in 1985. We had a large truck that we were hauling

weapons, rockets and ammunition in from Pakistan to our base camp

in the Argandab river valley (No map). We were taking a circuitous

route. We neared Lora near sunset when we saw a helicopter. There

was nowhere to hide since we were on an open plain. The helicopter

landed and Soviet soldiers jumped out of it and took up positions all

around us. We stopped the truck, jumped out and took up positions all

around the truck. We had 13 Mujahideen and there were 10-12

Soviets. The Soviets had the advantage of better weapons, position

and fire power. We started firing at each other. The Soviets started to

advance on us. The driver was afraid that we would be captured, so he

took a jerry can of gasoline, poured the gasoline onto the truck and set

it on fire. He yelled at us to take cover. Despite the Soviet small-arms

fire, we scurried to new positions for cover. Soon, the fire reached the

ammunition and rockets and the truck exploded with a tremendous

roar. The rockets and rounds were not stacked neatly, but were

stacked in every possible direction. Consequently, the rockets and bullets were exploding and streaking off in every possible direction. It

was spectacular. The explosion and flying rounds frightened the

Soviets. They ran back to their helicopter and took off. After the helicopter left and things stopped exploding, we walked to a nearby village. Neither side had any casualties, but we lost a good truck and lots

of ammunition and we had to walk back to our base camp.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen felt that they were in a secure area

and were driving during the day. Usually, Mujahideen trucks moved

at night. Evidently the Soviets hoped to capture the truck or they

would have shot it up and created the same explosion that the

Mujahideen did.

Amir Mohammad was a combatant in Abdul Razik's group in the Shahr-e Safa district

northeast of Kandahar, there is no map with this vignette.
VIGNETTE 4

CAUGHT IN A DRA AMBUSH

by Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch

In 1986, we were moving three pickup trucks full of ammunition

from Iran to our base. We had two motorcyclists patrolling five kilometers in front of the pickup trucks. We were near the border of Iran

at Shand near Helmond lake. There is a point where two hills constrict

the road and limit maneuver. The DRA border guard set up an ambush

there (No map). Our two motorcyclists rode through the ambush zone

and the DRA let them pass. As the motorcyclists cleared the ambush

zone, they saw the DRA. They dismounted their motorcycles and took

up firing positions on an adjacent hill. Our trucks rolled into the kill

zone. The motorcyclists opened fire on the ambushers to warn the

pickup trucks and to distract the ambushers. The DRA opened fire and

hit the middle truck. The first pickup truck drove out of the kill zone

while the Mujahideen in the last truck dismounted and attacked the

ambushers. The DRA fled. We lost two Mujahideen KIA and one truck

was damaged. There were no known DRA casualties.

COMMENTARY: When Mujahideen felt that they were in a secure area,

they would move supplies during the day. The Mujahideen felt secure

in this area since they were moving in the daylight. Still, they had a

forward patrol checking for ambush. The patrol, however, seems road

bound and did not get off the road to check likely ambush sites carefully. The patrol had no communication with the main body, so when

the motorcyclists finally detected the ambush, they were unable to

immediately contact them. Consequently, two ofthe three trucks were

in the kill zone by the time the motorcyclists opened fire. Still, there

was enough spacing between trucks which prevented the entire force

from being in the kill zone simultaneously

The Mujahideen showed aggressive spirit and resolve by immediately assaulting the ambushers and driving them from the scene. The DRA

controlled the dominant terrain and had the opportunity to prepare

fighting positions. They should have been able to stand, yet they fled in

the face of Mujahideen resolve. The immediate assault into the ambush

probably saved the Mujahideen convoy.

Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch is from Nimroz province. His base was at Lowkhai, the capital of Khash Rud district on the Khash Rud river. He was initially with Mawlawi Mohammad

Nabi Mohammadi of the Harakat-e lnqelab-i Islami (HAR). Later, on he switched to HIK

(Khalis). There is no map with this vignette.
VIGNETTE 5

AMBUSHED ON THE HIGH PLAIN

by Commander Hajj Aaquelshah Sahak

In May 1987, we were moving supplies from Peshawar, Pakistan to

our base west of Kabul. We followed the Logar route from Parachinar,

Pakistan across the Afghanistan border to Jaji in Paktiya Province.

From there, we followed mountain canyons to Dobandi. Past Dobandi,

the mountains ended and we had a broad plain to cross before we

reached the mountains near our base. We finally reached Dobandi and

stayed there for three days (Map 12-3 - Dobandi). We waited there

while I made sure that the way was clear because the Soviets would set

ambushes to interdict our supplies. I went from Dobandi to Kafar

Dara canyon for information on Soviet activity. The Mujahideen at

Kafar Dara did not have any information either, so I went on to Sepets

where there were several Mujahideen bases belonging to HAR and

Hezb-e Islami. These Mujahideen gave us two guides—Akhunzada of

HAR and Mulla Nawab. We brought up all our supplies to Sepets in

the late afternoon. Including the guides, I had 31 Mujahideen with

me. I planned to go forward, clear the route, establish security positions on key terrain and likely ambush sites and then bring the supplies forward. I moved in the middle of the column.

We moved across the open plain from Sepets. There is a place

called the Childrens' cemetery where we stopped to offer our late afternoon prayers. Since it was still daylight, we moved well spread out

with a distance between every Mujahideen. This was a precaution

against air attacks. I told the guide, Mulla Nawab, to stay with us

until we passed through this area and reached the Gardez highway.

We followed a stream bed through a brush-covered area. We neared

the water mill midpoint between Sepets and Khato Kalay at 1920

hours, when I looked at my watch to see if it was time for evening

prayer. There was high ground on both sides of us. Suddenly machinegun fire opened up in front of me. At first, I thought that it was my

Mujahideen firing, but then I saw Soviets to the north firing on us. My

Mujahideen immediately scattered and crouched behind bushes. The

Soviets fired at the bushes, but my Mujahideen held their fire. The

Soviets assumed that they had killed all my Mujahideen and jumped

Commander Haji Aaquelshah Sahak is from the Chardehi district of Kabul (a southern suburb). He was affiliated with NIFA. [Map sheet 2884, vie grid 3058].
Page 352 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
Chapter 12, Vignette 5 Page 353

up from their positions. As I saw the Soviets jump up, I yelled "Allah

Akbar"(God is the greatest) and we opened fire on them. This led to a

prolonged fire fight. My Mujahideen were spread in a single file and I

was the 16th person in the column. Dadgul was next to me, but we did

not really know exactly where the Soviets were and they did not know

exactly where we were. We fired at each other off and on. At approximately 2200 hours, we heard the sound of armored vehicle engines

moving toward us. They had come from the northwest at Pul-e Alam.

Mamur Abdul Ali began firing rockets in our support from his base in

Sepets. One landed close to us and the next went further on. The fifth

rocket landed in the enemy column. This slowed down the enemy column. Akhunzada also started firing rockets at the enemy column from

his base. I instructed my Mujahideen to fall back to the mountains

near Abchakan and then move south of Sepets to the mountain valley

where the Mujahideen bases were located. It was 0200 when we

reached Akhunzada base. Sixteen of my Mujahideen were missing—

those who were in front ofme in the column. The next morning at 1000

hours, we went forward and found Mohammaday, who was wounded

and my RPG-7 man who was killed. The rest of my Mujahideen had

gone on to Logar. I do not know what the Soviet losses were, but there

were reports that they had casualties. The Soviets never used that

particular ambush site again.

COMMENTARY: The Soviet ambush party probably came from the 108th

Motorized Rifle Division or the 103rd Airborne Division. Both were

garrisoned in Kabul. The 56th Air Assault Brigade at Gardez was

closer to the site, but the relief element came from the Kabul direction.

The Soviet ambush site was not well laid out. There was no attempt

to seal the kill zone. There were no firing lanes cleared, no aiming

stakes emplaced, no directional mines employed and no indirect fire

planned on the kill zone. The Soviet ambush was triggered by a lone

gunner and not by massed fire directed by the ambush commander.

The Soviet commander evidently did not know that he had a strungout Mujahideen column, which could not mass fires, to his front. Once

night fell, the Mujahideen did not break contact and the ambush

commander then evidently felt that he was in contact with a large force

and called for an armored column to rescue him.

The Mujahideen movement plan was commendable. The commander did not hazard his supplies until he had cleared the route and posted security at key points. He coordinated with other factions to obtain

information and tactical intelligence. He moved spread out on open
Page 354 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

terrain so he did not present an air target and moved in the middle of

the column where he could best exert control. He gets low marks for

following the guide down a stream bed without sending flankers to

sweep the high ground. But, when his force was hit, the commander

was able to ascertain that his column was not in immediate danger of

annihilation and shut down return fire. This allowed his men to determine where their ambushers were and to draw them out of position.

The commander ordered an escape to the northeast and then a move

south in the safety of the mountains rather than retracing their route

and risking another ambush or drawing the relief column into the

Sepets area.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY

Successful counterambush is the result of careful planning, battle

drills, rehearsals, information security, patrolling, current tactical

intelligence, and deception measures. Movement of supplies needs to

vary by route, time and composition of the supply column.

Mujahideen supplies were moved on mule, horse, donkey, camel,

truck and human porter. While some factions had their own transport, the bulk of Mujahideen supplies were carried by contracted

teamsters and muleteers. The cost of transport was high and a group

with a reputation of getting ambushed would be hard put to find willing teamsters.

In some areas, the Mujahideen only had to transport ammunition,

but in other areas they had to transport food, clothing, and forage as

well. Ammunition requirements for a small ambush by a 20-man

group armed with Enfields, Kalashnikovs, an RPG-7, a PK medium

machine gun, and five antitank mines, might exceed 375 pounds. The

weight of required ammunition shoots up dramatically as mortars,

recoilless rifles and heavy machineguns are added.3 Even ifthe ammunition was furnished free, the cost of getting it to where it was needed

was considerable and the wise Mujahideen commander carefully

protected his supplies against interdiction. «

3

'The Logistics System of the Mujahideen", page 55, unpublished government contract

study written in 1987.
CHAPTER 13

ENCIRCLEMENT

The Soviets developed their encirclement technique to deal with

opposing mechanized forces. If enemy soldiers abandoned their vehicles to escape the encirclement, the result was still the same—the

mechanized force was defeated. The Mujahideen were not mechanized

and they discovered that the Soviet encirclement was usually porous

and that the Soviet/DRA force did not have enough dismounted

infantry to hold them in the pocket, particularly when it got dark.

However, the Soviets and DRA routinely conducted large-scale encirclements, as part of cordon and search operations, and occasional

smaller tactical encirclements of marauding bands.

Asadabad

Jalalabad

Afghanistan

Chapter 13

Incidents
VIGNETTE 1

A TRIP TO THE "GOVERNOR'S HOUSE" GOES BAD

BY COMMANDER SARSHAR

The governor of Parwan Province had his residence in the city of

Charikar. It was located next to the Numan High School. There was

also a security post in an enclosed house next to the governor's residence and the high school. This post was called the Wali house and

there were normally 30 soldiers in it. Everyone called the security post

"the Governor's House", although it was not. In January 1983, we

planned a raid on this security post (No map). I had about 200

Mujahideen armed with a 76mm mountain gun, five 82mm mortars,

two 82mm recoilless rifles, 20 RPG-7s, Goryunov heavy machine guns,'

PK medium machine guns and Kalashnikov rifles. This was a severe

winter and we moved across the mountains at night in the bitter cold.

We came to the village of Ofian-e Sharif where we spent the day and

planned our raid. I constituted a heavy weapons support team serving

the 76mm gun, the mortars and the recoilless rifles. I constituted two

security groups—one of which would secure the area to the north

behind the heavy weapons support team and one to the south which

would secure the approaches to Numan High School. I constituted an

assault team to seize the outpost.

At night, we moved from Ofian-e Sharif onto the Ofian plain outside another security post at Qal-e Maqbul, which is just north of the

target in Charikar. I launched the attack at night, but right as the

assault group was moving forward in the attack, the mortar and recoilless rifle rounds landed in the middle of the assault group. I had 18

KIA and WIA. I aborted the attack and began evacuating the dead and

wounded. Coincidently the enemy had planned a major cordon and

search operation which began the next morning. Early the next morning, the enemy moved through the area and cordoned it off with hundreds of tanks and APCs. They encircled hundreds of Mujahideen in

the Bagram, Kohistan and Charikar area. We were trapped in our

Commander Sarshar was a police officer in Parwan and worked clandestinely with the

Mujahideen: When his cover was about to be blown, he became a Mujahideen commander in Ghorband. He commanded a mobile group in the Ghorband front near Charikar.

[Map sheet 2887].

1 There is no map for this vignette. This operation is describe in Chapter 10, Vignette 4,

"Defending Against a Cordon and Search Operation in Parwan" by Commander Haji Abdul

Qader.
Chapter 13, Vignette 1 Page 357

position. As the enemy approaphed us, we were glad to have the 20

RPGs. We joined the local Mujahideen in the fray. The battle went on

for 12 days and we killed 1.2 armored vehicles during that time. We

tried to break out ofthe encirclement. We moved through the villages

to Pul-e Matak at the mouth of the Ghorband Valley. There, we exfiltrated through gaps in the enemy lines to the Ghorband Valley. We

had 18 killed and two wounded. We destroyed 12 armored vehicles and

four supply trucks. During the 12-15 days that the Soviets and DRA

cordoned the area, they succeeded in entering many parts of the area

and clearing it. Many Mujahideen managed to escape, but the Soviets

and DRA arrested about 800 Mujahideen and civilians in the area.

COMMENTARY: Coordination of fire and maneuver elements is a problem for trained armies. It is a bigger problem for irregular forces. In

this case, the Mujahideen fire support fell short of the target with

deadly results. Although Mujahideen gunners who conducted regular

shelling attacks against fixed targets were able to register their

weapons over time, Mujahideen gunners supporting ground attacks

seldom had the luxury of registering their weapons prior to the attack.

This added greater risk to the assault force.
Page 358 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

KOHE

MUSA

QALEH

FAHRAD

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VIGNETTE 2

THE BATTLE FOR MUSA QALEH

BY AKHUND ZADA QASEM

We started the resistance using very simple methods. We had few

antitank weapons and so our main defenses were antitank ditches and

Molotov cocktails that we made in the villages. The people would wait

in their antitank ditches with axes to sort it out. I remember one fight

where I became so frustrated with our inability to stop armored vehicles that I set my turban on fire and threw it at the tank. However, we

eventually received better weapons and set about regaining control of

our country. In the summer of 1980, we Mujahideen liberated Musa

Qaleh District and established our base there. (Map 13-1 - Qaleh)

Musa Qaleh is in a heavily-populated green zone on the Musa Qaleh

Stream which empties into the Helmond River. The area around Musa

Qaleh is high desert plain.

In June 1983, the Soviets launched an offensive to control Helmond

Province. They began with an attack from Girishk moving north

toward Nawzad (which is to the west of Musa Qaleh). This column

attacked the Mujahideen of HIH at their base in the Farhad Mountain.

The Mujahideen of Musa Qaleh sent their MRL to this fight to strike

the Soviets. After the Soviets reduced the HIH base, they sent two

columns to attack Musa Qaleh. The column that had destroyed the

HIH base turned east and moved against us while a second column

moved from Girishk along the river roads and approached us from the

southwest. The columns met and cordoned Musa Qaleh.

We had established a perimeter defense and we fought the Soviets

for seven days in late June and early July 1983. We lost 472

Mujahideen KIA. Civilian deaths were much higher. I was in charge

of the hospital at that time and it was overflowing. During the fighting, Soviet tanks arrived from the east and were just 300 meters south

Akhund Zada Qasem was a commander with Harakat-e Ingilab-i Islami (HAR) of Mawlawi

Nabi Mohammadi. He was also in charge of medical support to the Musa Qaleh Front in

Helmond Province. This was a major Mujahideen stronghold under the late Mawlawi

Nasim Akhund Zada. Akhund Zada was one of the major Mujahideen regional commanders. After his assassination in 1986, his brother Mawlawi Sediq Akhund Zada took over.

This front was in control of much of Helmond Province during the war and was one of the

few major unified Mujahideen commands. The front was supported by and became rich

from the drug trade. Qasem was in charge of medical support and was a member of the

counsel of the command. [Map sheet 1981].
Page 360 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

of my hospital. They began shelling the hospital and I had to evacuate

the wounded. We managed to move the hospital outside of the cordoned area to the north at night. We carried the wounded on stretchers for about 500 meters where we were met by other Mujahideen from

the Baghran front. The Baghran front sent trucks and moved our

wounded to safety on the trucks. After I evacuated the wounded, I

returned to Musa Qaleh at about 2200 hours. The front council met

and we decided to break out -of the encirclement. That night, the

weather cooperated with the breakout. There was a heavy gusty wind

which blew sand around. The noise ofthe wind and the dust concealed

us as we moved between the enemy tanks. There were many

Mujahideen in that cordon. There were Mujahideen from two districts

and other areas as well. About 2,000 Mujahideen escaped into the

night. The dust and wind also helped the civilians exfiltrate and covered their escape. When we got out, the wind died down. Later on,

people said that this was the hand of God that got them out. The

Mujahideen went to the surrounding mountains. I went to Kohe Musa

Qaleh, the small mountain just north of Musa Qaleh.

After this heavy defeat, we decided to keep a presence in Musa

Qaleh but to establish a mountain base where we would keep our

heavy weapons, ammunition stocks and supplies. We set up our

mountain base in Ghulmesh Ghar (mountain) about 30 kilometers

northeast of Kajaki dam. The base was in a narrow canyon leading

into the mountain. The canyon opened up into a bowl in the mountain.

The canyon was about 10 kilometers deep. We protected this base with

ZGU-ls and DShKs. We named the base Islamabad (built by

Muslims).

The following year, in October 1984, the Soviets attacked

Islamabad. They sent a major column from Girishk and again laid

siege to Musa Qaleh, while another moved further north and attacked

Islamabad. There were few Mujahideen in the mountain base since

the majority were in Musa Qaleh. The Soviets landed air assault

troops on the high ground and attacked with the ground column to capture the base after three day's fighting. They destroyed the base and

left it unusable due to all the mines that they left behind.

We then moved our base and stores to Khanjak Mazar south of

Kalata-e Baghni. We distributed our ammunition to different bases

and districts so that the capture of our central base would not cripple

us completely.

COMMENTARY: The area around Musa Qaleh is open, flat tank country
Chapter 13, Vignette 2 Page 361

and the Soviets were able to move freely around the perimeter of the

green zone. The Mujahideen field fortifications within the green zone

enabled them to hold on for seven days, but at a very high price. The

Mujahideen wanted to control Musa Qaleh for its political value as a

district capital. The political considerations overrode the military and

the front still kept the bulk of its force there once they had built a

strong mountain base.
Page 362 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War
VIGNETTE 3

ESCAPE FROM THE ARGHANDAY ENCIRCLEMENT

BY COMMANDER HAJI MOHAMMAD SEDDIQ

In July 1986, I took a detachment of 13 Mujahideen to abduct a

DRA officer from his house in the western Kot-e Sangi section ofKabul.

For several days, we gathered information about the officer—his time

of arrival and departure from his house and the road he took to and

from his residence. We gathered the information with the help of a

contact at the Kot-e Sangi gas station. We discovered that the officer

did not stay at his residence overnight, but spent a few hours in the

evening at home and then returned to his unit. We decided to abduct

him during those hours he was at his house.

We spent the night in the nearby Deh-Bori section of Kabul. The

next day, at dusk, we met with our gas station contact who reported

that the officer was at his residence. I took three men who were

dressed in army uniform with me. I had on traditional clothing. We

went to the officer's home which was located between Qala-e Shada

security outpost and the Kot-e Sangi Police station. When we reached

the house, the uniformed Mujahideen knocked on the door. The officer's daughter answered the door. One ofthe Mujahideen told her that

there was an urgent message for the officer from his unit. A few minutes later, the officer came to the door. As he stepped out, I stepped

around from behind the corner and told him to follow us and make no

attempt to escape because we would shoot him on the spot. The officer

and,I knew each other and he recognized me. He was nervous but

made no attempt to escape. We escorted him through the streets to

Qala-e Shada and from there to the Mujahideen base at Arghanday. At

Arghanday, we turned the officer over to a Paghman commander

named Zahed. The officer supposedly had killed several Mujahideen

from Zahed's group.

We spent the night at the residence/base of Shafeh, a local commander. Early the next morning, at about 0400 hours, we woke up to

Haji Mohammad Seddiq is from No-Burja Village in Logar Province. The village is in the

Tangi-Wardak area which connects the Saydabad District of Wardak Province to the Baraki

Barak District in the Logar Province. Commander Seddiq's village is located on the border

between the two provinces. Therefore, his command fought in both provinces in coordination with other Mujahideen. Commander Haji Mohammad Seddiq was affiliated with

Hekmatyar's HIH. [ Map sheet 2785].
Page 364 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

the noise, of tanks approaching the village (Map 13-2 - Arghanday). At

first, we thought that the noise was from normal military traffic resupplying the security outposts along the Kabul-Ghazni highway. Then

Shafeh's father climbed to the roof top and saw that the village was

surrounded by tanks and other vehicles. Soviet soldiers and DRA militia men from Rashid Dostum's Militia group occupied the surrounding

hills. We were trapped. Shafeh took us to a hideout near the house.

It was a cave that they had dug to hide the Mujahideen during the

enemy's cordon and search operations. After a while, we heard movement and noticed that the Soviet/DRA search party had posted a guard

at the entrance of the cave. The guard called out and asked if there

was some one inside. Then he asked for anyone inside to come out.

Next, he stooped over to check out the cave. At that point, Alam Gul

(who we nicknamed the Uzbek—because he looked like an Uzbek) shot

the soldier. The soldier's body fell into the cave. We pulled his body

aside and rushed out of the cave. As we came out, we encountered

soldiers in the streets. We fought our way to a natural ditch at the

edge of the village.

We jumped in the ditch and faced in both directions. We all had

AK-47s plus one RPG-7. We fought from this position until 1300 hours.

At that time, some Mujahideen units at Kot-e Ashro, about 10 kilometers to the southwest, started shelling the area with BM-12 fire.

The rockets' explosions forced the enemy away from the south side of

the village. We took advantage of this and slipped out of the encirclement through the southern gap and fled to Kot-e Ashro through the

mountains. One of my Mujahideen was wounded.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY

The porous nature ofthe Soviet and DRA encirclement allowed the

Mujahideen to exfiltrate. It helped to have other distracters such as

incoming artillery, sand storms and nightfall to escape. The

Mujahideen were skilled exfiltrators and often small groups of Soviets

or DRA guarding the cordon would allow the Mujahideen to escape

rather than risk a fire fight at uneven odds. The Soviets resorted to

scatterable mines, ground sensors, parachute flares and other technology to prevent escapes, but Mujahideen groups would exfiltrate singly,

or in small groups, and regroup outside the encirclement.
CHAPTER 14:

URBAN COMBAT

Urban guerrillas are surrounded by potential informants and

government spies. They must frequently move around unarmed and

the government can usually react to their actions much faster than

they can in the countryside. For this reason, urban guerrilla groups

were usually small and fought back with short-duration actions. Many

urban guerrillas lived in the countryside or suburbs and only entered

the cities for combat.

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VIGNETTE 1

KIDNAPING A SOVIET ADVISER

by Commander Shahabuddin

We were in contact with an Afghan driver from Paktia Province

who drove for a civilian Soviet adviser. The adviser worked with the

DRA mining industry. We wanted to kidnap the adviser. The driver

had trained for a short time in the USSR and so the adviser trusted

him. The driver agreed to help us, but we did not trust the driver and

asked him to prove his loyalty. He stated "I will bring my family to

stay in a Mujahideen-controlled area as proof of my trustworthiness".

The driver came to our camp with his wife and family. I sent his family to my village of Shewaki to stay while we captured the adviser.

One day the driver informed us that the adviser's wife was coming

from the Soviet Union to join him. The driver would take the adviser

to the airport to meet his wife. We gave the driver a small hand-held

radio and told him to contact us if there were any changes. We would

contact him within twenty minutes of his call. The driver called us one

morning. He reported that the adviser's wife was arriving that day

and that no one would accompany the adviser to the airport but the

driver. We dressed one of our Mujahideen in a DRA military officer's

uniform and put him in a car and sent him to wait at the bridge over

the Kabul River at the micro rayon in East Kabul. He got out of the

car and waited for the Soviet adviser's car. Soon, the Soviet adviser's

car arrived. The driver pointed at our Mujahideen and told the adviser "That's my brother. He's going to the airport. Can we give him a

ride?" The adviser agreed and they stopped to pick up "the officer". He

got into the back seat behind the adviser and pulled out a pistol. He

held the pistol to the adviser's back and ordered the driver to drive to

Shewaki. Another car, carrying eight of our Mujahideen armed with

pistols with silencers, followed the adviser's car. We had no trouble

with the checkpoints since the guards saw the DRA officer's uniform,

saluted and waived the car and its "security tail" right through.

We took the adviser to Shewaki and burned his car. The government launched a major search effort, so we moved the adviser again to

the Abdara Valley. Government helicopters strafed Shewaki after we

left and landed search detachments trying to find the adviser. We kept

Commander Shahabuddin is from Shewaki Village south of Kabul. There is no map for this

vignette. Kabul map sheets are 2885 and 2886.
Chapter 14, Vignette 1 Page 367

the adviser in the Abdara Valley near the Chakari monument (the

Buddhist pinnacle) for two days. Then we moved him to Tezin, near

Jalalabad, for a few more days. Finally, we took him across the border

to Peshawar, Pakistan, where we turned him over to one of the factions. I do not know what happened to him.
VIGNETTE 2

FOUR URBAN BOMB ATTACKS

by Haji Mohammad Yakub

Bombing is a necessary part of being an urban guerrilla. The object

is to create fear and take out selected individuals. We got our explosives from Pakistan, Commander Azizuddin and Commander

Meskinyar were our contacts in Paghman District who forwarded the

explosives and detonators to us. They used elderly people as our gobetweens to carry messages and explosives to us.

[1] In April 1980, we carried out an attack on the Radio

Afghanistan building. This housed the central offices for Afghanistan

radio and television broadcasting. Soviet advisers worked at the

building where they oversaw radio and television broadcasting and

edited and cleared the news before broadcast. The Soviets were our

targets. We received a bomb from our contacts and gave it to a woman

who worked in the radio station. She smuggled it into the station and

armed it. The bomb went off at 1000 hours on a workday. The explosion killed two Afghan Party activists and two Soviets. It also wounded a DRA soldier. For some time after the blast, Afghanistan Radio

and TV stopped broadcasting. After this, the security procedures for

the building were greatly increased and everyone was carefully

searched. Our lady contact later managed to get herself transferred

to the payroll office of Kabul University.

[2] The communist regime converted Kabul University into a

center for communist indoctrination. We decided to target the primary Party Organization at Kabul University in January 1981. Bombing

seemed to be our best option. By this time, our lady contact at Radio

Afghanistan was working in the payroll office at Kabul University.

We gave her two bombs. She planted one in the University Administration building and set the timer for 1100. She set the second in the

primary Party Organization building and set that timer for 1145. The

theory was that, after the first bomb went off, people would mill

around the site and then the key party activists would gather in the

primary Party Organization building to discuss the bombing. The

Haji Mohammad Yakub, whose nickname was Mansur (Victor), was an urban guerrilla in

Kabul. He belonged to the HIH faction. There is no map with this vignette.
Chapter 14, Vignette 2 Page 369

second bomb would attack this concentration. Our plan worked as we

thought it would. Following the blast in the administration building,

the party secretaries of all the various communist organizations gathered in the primary Party Organization building. The blast killed a

Soviet adviser and several party secretaries. The bombs killed a total

of 10 and wounded an unknown number.

[3] On 6 May 1983, we bombed the Ministry of Interior building

in Kabul. We had planted 27 kilograms of explosive in a room on the

second floor of the building close to the office of the Minister. The

bombs were hidden in four large flower pots that had been there for

some time. We had a contact who was a gardener for the Ministry of

the Interior. He agreed to smuggle in the explosives, plant the bombs

and set them for detonation. We trained him how to do the job. He

mixed the explosives with limestone and smuggled them in plastic

bags over a period of time. We planned to detonate the bombs during

the daytime for maximum casualties. However, our HIH headquarters in Peshawar overruled us and told us to set the bombs off at

night. HIH wanted to keep Minister of the Interior Gulab Zoy alive

since he was a leading member of the Khalq faction and his survival

would insure that the friction between the Khalq and Parchim

communist party factions continued.

The gardener set all the time pencils for 2300 hours when he went

home at 1600 hours. There was no sense setting different times since

the building would virtually be deserted. .The time bombs went off on

time and killed four duty officers and damaged the Minister's office.

If we had set off the bombs during the day, we would have killed

Gulab Zoy, Ghazi (his body guard), Sheruddin (his aide-de-camp) and

perhaps a hundred others. The DRA closed roads around the building for 24 hours and conducted an investigation. However, they

thought that the blast was connected to some internal quarrel within the communist leadership and never suspected our gardener.

[4] The Soviets lived in the eastern Micro rayon region of Kabul.

We decided to attack the Soviets right where they were living. There

was a bus stop in the area where the Soviets would wait for their

buses to work. We checked the timing ofthe buses. There was a daily

0745 morning bus that drew the most Soviets. We needed to establish a pattern so that we could leave a bomb without drawing attention. We got a push cart and loaded it with the best fruits and

vegetables that we could, get. The produce came from Parwan
' Page 370 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Province. We charged reasonable prices. The Soviets and local

people got used to seeing us there and buying from us. We kept this

up for several days. At night, we would work on the pushcart. We

put in a false bottom in the cart so that we could put our bombs in the

bottom of the cart and they would be undetected even ifthe cart were

inspected. We attacked on the 2nd of October 1983. We loaded five

bombs into the bottom of the cart. We inserted time pencil fuses in

the bombs and set them for 0743. Then we put in the false bottom

and loaded the cart with produce. Six Mujahideen carried out the

attack. None of us carried weapons. We brought the cart to the bus

stop as usual. Thirteen Soviets crowded around it to see what was on

sale. We slipped away from the cart and mixed with the local people.

The bombs went off at 0743 just before the bus arrived. The blast

killed 13, wounded 12 and damaged a nearby store. The DRA

searched the crowd but made no arrests from our group.

COMMENTARY: Many people find such bombing attacks morally reprehensible, yet have no qualms when much larger bombs are dropped

from aircraft. Neither type of bombing attack is surgical and both

types kill innocent bystanders. The only real difference is in the size

of the bomb and the means of delivery. The Mujahideen lacked an air

force but retained a limited bombing option. The Soviets had an air

force and conducted large-scale bombing attacks throughout the war.
VIGNETTE 3

INCIDENT AT QALA-E JABAR

by Mohammad Humayun Shahin

During Ramadan (June) of 1981, five Mujahideen were assigned to

meet with a Soviet soldier in Qala-e Jabar to buy some Kalashnikov

magazines from him. Qala-e Jabar is some three kilometers south of

the Darulaman Soviet military base. Our group leader was Alozai, who

was known as Sher Khan. Hukum Khan, two others and I made up the

group. We went to Qala-e Jabar and met with the Soviet soldier. He

said that his name was Hasan and he showed us his merchandise. We

agreed to buy the magazines and pulled out a wad of 50 Afghani notes

to pay him with. The Soviet soldier was not familiar with the 50

Afghani note. He demanded that we pay in 100s. Since we could not

speak Russian, Sher Khan tried to show him that two 50 Afghani notes

equaled one 100 Afghani note. He even wrote it on a scrap of paper.

The Soviet, however, apparently did not understand and kept demanding 100 Afghani notes. We did not have any 100 Afghani notes.

As we tried to communicate, the Soviet got louder and louder. We

were fairly close to the Soviet camp and were beginning to worry that

this might be a trap. Hukum Khan grabbed the Soviet in a headlock and

wrestled him to the ground while Commander Sher Khan stabbed the

Soviet to death. Then we grabbed the rifle magazines, plus the Soviet's

AK-74 assault rifle and left the area.

COMMENTARY: There was a regular commerce between the Soviet

soldiers and the Afghan populace. Soviet conscripts would sell fuel,

ammunition, weapons, batteries and military equipment for hashish,

food and Afghan money. They would use the money in the bazaars of

Kabul to buy western stereos, music tapes, cigarettes and clothing.

Some goods were available in the Soviet PX, but conscripts had little

access or cash so they tried to shop locally for items they wanted.

Mohammad Humayun Shahin joined the Mujahideen as a high school student and served as

a combatant and commander in the HIH urban guerrillas in the southwestern suburbs of

Kabul in the Chardehi District. His high school student identification enabled him to move

around Kabul until he graduated in 1981. Then, he was provided with forged documents

showing that he had completed military service. This enabled him to stay in the city and

avoid being press-ganged into the army. His group often conducted combined actions with

the famed Mohseni urban guerrillas. After the collapse of the communist regime, Shahin was

appointed regiment commander under the Islamic government and promoted to Brigadier

General. There is no map with this vignette.
Page 372 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

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VIGNETTE 4

AFSHAR AMBUSH

by Commander Asil Khan

On 28 May 1982,1 led a group of four Mujahideen in an ambush at

the very gates of the Soviet garrison in Kabul. At that time, elements

ofthe Soviet 103rd Airborne Division and some other units were based

in Darulaman about 10 kilometers southwest of downtown Kabul. The

headquarters of the Soviet 40th Army was also located there in the

Tajbeg Palace. I was a small unit commander in my father's front. My

father is Haji Dawlat and the Front's main base was at Morghgiran, 10

kilometers west of Darulaman.

I selected the ambush site after we spent several days in reconnaissance and surveillance of the Soviet traffic around Darulaman.

During the reconnaissance, we detected a pattern in Soviet vehicular

movement along the road from Kabul to the Soviet headquarters in

the Tajbeg palace. Just north of the Soviet Darulaman base is the

small village of Afshar. (Map 14-1 - Afshar) It has a typical suburban bazaar with several grocery and fresh fruit stores and stalls.

Soviet soldiers frequented this bazaar and would stop their vehicles

there to buy cigarettes, food and imported vodka. Afshar looked like

a good ambush site. Soviet soldiers felt secure there, there was room

enough to set up an ambush, and site entrance and exit were fairly

easy. The path to and from the ambush was mostly concealed and we

could easily reach Mujahideen bases and safe houses in the Chardehi

District using this path.

We spent the day of the ambush in Qala-e Bakhtiar~a village six

kilometers to the west of the ambush site. We had four AK-47s and a

non-Soviet manufactured light anti-tank grenade launcher. In the

early evening, we moved out toward Afshar. It was the Muslim month

of Ramadan when Muslims fast during the entire day. Few people

were out at sunset since this is the time to break the daily fast. Since

our ambush site was in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet base, I

decided to conduct a very quick attack on a single Soviet vehicle and to

take prisoners if possible.

We moved through a narrow street of Afshar which opened onto

the main road north ofthe Darulaman palace. Around 1930 hours, as

Commander Asil Khan was a famed urban guerrilla commander in Kabul. He served the

NIFA faction.
Page 374 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

my leading riflemen reached the street intersection, a Soviet GAZ-66

truck approached from the east on its way to the military camp. The

truck had five passengers—a driver, a soldier in the right front seat

and three soldiers in the back. One of the soldiers had a back-packed

radio. I told my anti-tank gunner to fire when the vehicle was in the

kill zone. He fired, but he narrowly missed the truck. The truck came

to a sudden halt and its occupants jumped out of the vehicle, took up

positions and started firing at random.

During the brief fire fight, we killed one Soviet soldier. Two soldiers ran away to the southwest toward their camp. One soldier

crawled under the truck near the rear tires. The radio-man rushed

into an open grocery store and hid there. One of my Mujahideen was

close to the shop behind a concrete electric pylon. I told him to follow

the Soviet radio-man into the front of the shop while I went into the

shop's back door and introduced myself as a "friend". The Soviet

soldier was flustered at first, but when he saw the foreign light antitank weapon in the hands of my Mujahideen, he uttered "dushman"

[enemy]. He kept quiet as we bound his hands and led him out back.

I recalled my team and we quickly left the area. The whole action

lasted only a few minutes.

Fearing enemy retaliation, we moved out swiftly in the dark, heading to Qala-e Bakhtiar. From there, we went on to Qala-e Bahadur

Khan, Qala-e Jabar Khan and Qala-e Qazi until we reached our Front's

base at Morghgiran around 2200 hours. We kept our prisoner there for

three days and then transferred him to NIFA headquarters in

Peshawar, Pakistan.

COMMENTARY: Detailed reconnaissance and knowledge of the

enemy's movement and security arrangements contributed to a workable ambush right in the heart of the Soviet garrison area. The

Soviets had not posted a vulnerable point adjacent to their garrison-

-either through overconfidence or negligence on the part of lowerlevel commanders.

Selection of a small group of fighters with an effective mix of

weapons, and good selection of the ambush site played a significant

role in the action. However, using a non-standard anti-tank weapon

probably caused the gunner to miss a large target at close range. One

wonders if the gunner had any training or practice with the weapon

before he used it. An RPG-7 and an experienced gunner were needed.

One wonders why the Soviets stopped their truck in the middle of

a kill zone once the Mujahideen rocket missed them. Since the
Chapter 14, Vignette 4 Page 375

Mujahideen rocket missed the vehicle, there was no need for the truck

to stop and the soldiers could have escaped through the small-arms fire

before the anti-tank gunner had a chance to reload. The Soviets failed

to react effectively. Stopping in the kill zone under small-arms fire was

a risky and unwise move that cost the Soviets the life of one soldier

while another one was captured.
Page 376 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

! QALA-E

MCHITGAR

BAHADURKHAN

AFSHAR SHAR r ^^P

!

DARULAMAN PALACE

A (MINISTRY OF DEFENSE)

TAJBEG PALACE

40th ARMY HQ

ALIMARDAN

Map 14-2

1KM
VIGNETTE 5

REMOTE-CONTROL ATTACK ON A CONVOY IN THE SUBURBS

by Mohammad Humayun Shahin

There were some 40 guerrillas in my force. We lived inside Kabul

and in the suburbs. Most of the men were ethnic Pashtun, but there

were seven Dari speakers from outside Kabul as well. The Pashtu

speakers often mingled with the Kochi nomads who would pitch their

tents and graze their herds on the outskirts of Kabul. The Dari speakers posed as dairy product buyers when the DRA checked the area.

In October 1982, I was a combatant, not a commander. Our

commander was Qarar. He led us on a convoy attack against the Kote Sangi-Darulaman road near Qala-e Alimardan (Map Alimardan). It

was a combined action involving HIH forces under Commander Didar,

Commander Firoz and Commander Qarar, as well as fighters from the

Mohseni faction. The combined force numbered 76 men. We expected

a convoy from Darulaman to Kabul the next day. We all moved to the

area at night and surrounded the area. Our mining teams emplaced

seven remote-controlled (shartaki) mines. Then they camouflaged

them. After positioning two observation posts and designating a detonation team, the Mujahideen withdrew. A Mujahideen known as Sher

Bach-e Khala (a Hazara) and I were the detonation team. Commander

Qarar was at the Darulaman observation post and another observer

was by the mined area. Sher Bach-e Khala and I spent the night in a

clover field some 200 meters from the road.

The next morning, Commander Qarar came down the road on his

bicycle. He told us that the Soviet convoy was moving from

Darulaman. We moved into our detonation position. Commander

Qarar then moved to the other observation post. He told the observer

to take off his turban and wave it when the first two vehicles had

passed the mined stretch ofthe road. He would do this since we could

not see the mined stretch from the detonation position. A moment

later, the convoy reached the site and the observer took off his turban,

waved it and moved to a safe spot. We operated the detonator and four

of the seven mines exploded. The explosion destroyed or damaged one

BMP and three trucks. The four-man Mujahideen group safely

escaped from the area.

Mohammad Humayun Shahin provided the material for a previous vignette in this chapter.
Page 378 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

COMMENTARY: It is always a good idea for a detonation party to be able

to see the target area. Mujahideen communications were often primitive and, in this case, depended on one visual signal. The attack, like

most urban attacks, was a quick, single strike followed by an immediate withdrawal. Such harassing attacks seldom had any major impact

other than on morale. It was a good idea to have a small detonation

group, but a 76-man force to secure the area while it was mined seems

too large. Kabul was under a night-time curfew and a large group

could be detected by patrols along main roads.
VIGNETTE 6

ATTACK ON THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

by Mohammad Humayun Shahin

In November 1982, some 60 Mujahideen from HIH and Mohseni's

Harakat-e Islami launched a night attack on the DRA Ministry of

Defense located in the Darulaman Palace (Map 14-3 - Darulaman).

The security in the area was very tight and the area between the

Darulaman Palace and the Tajbeg Palace (headquarters of the Soviet

40th Army) was heavily patrolled. We decided to limit the attack to

a short-range RPG attack. The HIH group were armed with AK-47

Kalashnikovs, while the Mohseni group had British Sten guns1and

other weapons. The Mohnseni had the RPG-7 we used in the attack.

Both sides provided ammunition for the RPG.

We assembled in the staging area at Char Qala in the late afternoon. Char Qala is about three kilometers north of the target. From

there, we moved south in groups to the intermediate villages of

Qala-e Pakhchak and Qala-e Bahadur Khan and Qala-e Bakhtiar.

Our attack position was a water mill outside the Juvenile

Penitentiary close to the Darulaman Palace. As we moved, we

dropped off security elements. Most of the men in the group were

assigned to provide security during movement to and from the

target area. Security elements were positioned at key locations,

which facilitated our infiltration and withdrawal. Once our forward

security elements secured the fifing area, the RPG-7 gunner Saadat

(from the Mohseni faction) took his position. He was about 250

meters from the target. He fired two rockets at the building. The

enemy response was immediate. Guards from around the palace

filled the night with heavy small-arms fire. We did not return their

fire. Instead, we immediately began retracing our steps and pulled

out along the route held by our security detail. We then scattered

into hiding places and safe houses in the villages of Chardehi. Some

years later, a prison inmate who was on the DRA side during the

night attack told a Mujahideen contact that about 20 people were

killed or injured in our attack.

Mohammad Humayun Shahin provided the material for the previous vignette.

1 The British Sten gun is a 9mm World War II submachine gun. It has a 32 round magazine and a rate of fire of some 540 rounds per minute.
Page 380 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

(' SjAUE CHITGAR

QALA-E WAZIRV^J^ ^

QALA-E

PAKHCHAK

QALA-E BAHADUR KHAN

yDARULAMAN PALACE

(MINISTRY OF DEFENSE)

TAJBEG PALACE

(40th ARMY HQ)

DARULAMAN

Map 14-3

1KM
Chapter 14, Vignette 6 Page 381

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen urban warfare tactics were low-level

and fairly unsophisticated. Their actions were usually limited to a single strike followed by an immediate withdrawal to avoid decisive

engagement with a better-armed and supported regular force.

Survival dictated the tactics, but their impact was political and psychological rather than military. The work and risk that the urban

guerrillas accepted was great and the results were often minimal or

not immediately evident.

Mujahideen success in the urban areas was due primarily to the

support of the population and the lack of DRA/Soviet control outside

the areas that they physically controlled. The cities were under nighttime curfew, but the patrols enforcing the curfew could hardly move

safely off the main city roads. The Mujahideen had great freedom of

action outside the main thoroughfares and in the suburbs. However,

they could not fully exploit this advantage due to insufficient training,

poor organizational structure, a lack of modern weapons and equipment, an ineffective command and control system and a lack of tactical cohesiveness among the various Mujahideen combatant groups.

Lack of communications equipment, particularly in the early days of

the war, severely hampered the Mujahideen.
VIGNETTE 7

ALCOHOL CAN BE DEADLY

by "The Mountain Man"

The DRA 8th Infantry Division was garrisoned in Kabul. We had a

contact who was an officer in that division. Over the years he provided

us with lots of good information. His cooperation put him, and his

family, at risk. He wanted to defect to the Mujahideen. We helped engineer his defection while hurting the enemy. We told our contact to

arrange a party on September 24, 1983. He invited the Political Officer

of the 8th Infantry Division with two Soviet advisers who worked with

them to his home in Kot-e Sangi. The three accepted his invitation and

arrived at night driving their military jeep. Our officer had plenty of

Western whiskey and shish kebabs on hand. The Soviets and the

Political Officer ate and drank and became totally drunk. They passed

out. Then our officer summoned us. We came into his house and carried

the unconscious drunks out to their jeep. We drove them to the village

of Qala-e Qazi located to the southwest of Kabul. Since we were in their

jeep, no one stopped us or challenged us. We took the drunks out and

sent the jeep back to the officer. He loaded his family into the jeep and

took his family to Pakistan. Then he joined our cause openly.

We carried the drunks to a hideout in the Morghgiran Mountain

village.2 When the drunks sobered up the next day, we offered them the

chance to convert to Islam and to choose a righteous path. The Soviets

became very angry and began cursing us and insulting us. They stated

that "There is no way back from the path chosen. Afghanistan will be

communist. We will not accept you or your dirty religion." They refused

to cooperate. We could not get them out of the area without some cooperation on their part and we could not shoot them because the shots

might draw attention from nearby security outposts. So, we buried

them all alive. We kept their clothing and papers which we eventually

sent to HIH headquarters in Peshawar. The next day, the Soviets surrounded the area, so we left and went to Parwan and Maidan. While the

Soviets were looking for us, they had a clash with Mawlawi Rahmatgul's

forces. After the clash, the Soviets found where we had buried the three.

They were all dead and their bodies had turned black.

After we interviewed this source, the authors agreed that he should be provided anonymity. There is no map with this vignette.

c Morghgiran means "chicken snatchers".
VIGNETTE 8

RAID ON BALAHESSAR FORTRESS

by Commander Shahabuddin

A Soviet regiment was garrisoned in the Balahessar Fortress in

Kabul. In September or October of 1983, we decided to raid a security

outpost south of Balahessar. This outpost formed part of the security

belt around the fortress. I had 62 Mujahideen in my group. My armaments included eight RPG-7s and two 82mm recoilless rifles. My base

was some ten kilometers south of Kabul at Yakhdara. We planned the

raid in our base at Yakhdara, moved in the late afternoon to the village

of Shewaki and waited until dark. We moved out at dark. On the

way, there were several regime outposts. I detailed a five-man security element against each one as we passed it. The main outpost was at

Akhozi and others were at Bagh-e Afzal and Qalacha. The security

elements mission was to secure our return trip so that we wouldn't be

ambushed by the enemy.

We reached Balahessar fortress which is surrounded by several

security posts. I retained a 15-man attack group and posted the rest

of my command as security elements guarding the other outposts. I

divided my attack group into a five-man support group and a 10-man

assault group. We crept up to the outpost, climbed the wall, got up on

the roof of the outpost and then attacked it. I led the assault group.

We hit the sentry with a RPG and he vaporized. We blew open the

doors with RPG rockets and opened fire on the soldiers in the courtyard. We killed 12 of the DRA and captured three of their wounded.

The rest escaped through a secret covered passage into Balahessar

fortress, I had two KIA. One was Zabet Halim.3 We took our dead

with us. We could not carry the wounded prisoners so we left them

there. We captured 16 weapons—Kalashnikovs and machine guns, a

mortar and a RPG. As we left, there was a commotion in Balahessar

and tanks moved out of the fortress in our direction. One tank came

close to us and we destroyed it with an RPG. The other tanks then quit

coming toward us—they had lost their taste for a fight. We just wanted to get out of there, so we left for our assembly area. We had a

Commander Shahabuddin is from Shewaki Village south of Kabul. There is no map with

this vignette.

3

Zabat Halim was a legendary urban guerrilla who had been an NCO in the Royal Afghan

Army. His death was a blow to the Mujahideen.
Page 384 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

designated assembly area and, as we approached it, we were challenged and responded with the password. Once I assembled my entire

group, we left. My security elements guaranteed a safe return. This

raid was on the 10th day of the first month of the Islamic Lunar

calendar—the Day of Ashura. This day commemorates the anniversary of the massacre of the Prophet Mohammad's grandson Hussein

and his 72 followers at Karbala in Iraq. It is a day ofmourning, reflection and solemn thinking for Shia and others. On this Day ofAshura,

we thought of our own dead who died defending truth and righteousness. They had died appropriately on the Day ofAshura.

COMMENTARY: Many of the urban guerrilla commanders maintained

their main operating base within the suburbs or outlying villages

where it was easier to assemble and train a group of men without

government observation. The guerrilla commanders maintained a net

of informers and supporters who aided their entry and passage

through the urban area. Still, guerrilla groups operating within an

urban area had to secure their route of entry and withdrawal which

took the bulk of their force.
VIGNETTE 9

RAID ON THE KABUL METROPOLITAN

Bus TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY

by Commander Shabuddin

The Kabul Metropolitan Bus Transportation Authority is located

on the eastern side of the city and served as the central bus terminal

for 130 buses. In October 1983, I assembled 120 Mujahideen for the

raid at our base at Yakhdara. We had 16 RPG-7s, three mortars,

three 82mm recoilless rifles and numerous small arms. I divided the

force into three 20-man teams to attack the Bagrami textile company, the police station, and our main objective, the city bus transportation authority. Sixty men constituted the security element

which would secure our route of advance and withdrawal. A primary

consideration of the urban guerrilla is always covering his route of

retreat. We moved our force from our base and spread out into the

surrounding villages. To preserve mission security, only my subcommanders and I knew the plan. Once we were in position, the commanders would brief their men and tell them what to do. The first

group went to the textile mill. The second group, reinforced with a

82mm recoilless rifle, a mortar and some RPG-7s, set out to attack

the police station at Kart-e Naw. I commanded the main attack

against the bus authority. As we moved, we posted security elements

outside all the security outposts in the area. I sent one group of

Mujahideen to the Eqbal cinema to attack the security outpost located there so that they would not interfere with our raid. As our

Mujahideen were getting ready to attack the outpost, a roving jeep

patrol came by. They destroyed the jeep with a rocket. The soldiers

in the security outpost saw the burning jeep and ran away. The

Mujahideen captured three Kalashnikovs at this site.

I led my group to the large enclosure of the bus transportation authority. When we got there, I posted a few guards to prevent

anyone from surprising us. Then we attacked the security detachment at the bus park. We killed eight, captured two and torched 127

buses in the enclosure. Only three buses escaped destruction. We

also captured 13-14 Kalashnikovs and 155 bayonets! We withdrew

over our escape route to our base camp. I learned that the group

Commander Shahabuddin is from Shewaki Village south of Kabul. There is no map with

this vignette.
Page 386 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

attacking against the textile mill fired their mortar and heavy

weapons and inflicted damage on the building. Kabul was without

full bus transportation for a good while.

COMMENTARY: The urban guerrilla attacks the credibility of the

government by chipping away at morale, attacking notable government targets and disrupting the daily life of the populace. The bus

terminal was an optimum target since it clearly demonstrated the

reach of the Mujahideen and slowed the life of the capital city

considerably.
VIGNETTE 10

WEAPONS RAID IN CHARIKAR

by Commander Sarshar

Charikar, the capital of Parwan Province, has a compact city core,

approximately one kilometer by one kilometer, and a large suburb.

The northern section of Charikar is called the "new jail" area. The

headquarters of the DRA militia forces (self-defense units) was in the

"new jail" area. Malek Shah was our contact inside that headquarters.

In October 1983, he promised to get us inside the militia compound

when the commander of the compound was asleep. I brought 65

Mujahideen from my base camp for this mission. We were armed with

two Goryunov heavy machine guns, three PK medium machine guns,

four RPG-7s, and Kalashnikov and Enfield rifles. I divided my force

into three security groups and an assault group. One security group

deployed near the road northeast of the headquarters, while the other

deployed to the northwest ofthe headquarters to cover the other flank.

These two security groups protected the assault group. The third security group secured our withdrawal route north to Ofian-e Sharif.

We approached the target in the night at 0200 hours. At 0300

hours, we got a flashlight signal from the headquarters. I climbed the

wall and the eight other Mujahideen in the assault group followed me.

We were all inside the compound and Malek Shah was just starting to

point out the three rooms of the compound building when one of the

sleeping militia got up. He saw us and began shouting. We had no

time, so we burst into the three rooms firing as we went. I led the

group into their commander's room. We killed 20 and I lost one KIA

and one WIA. We captured 16 Kalashnikovs and I got their commander's Makarov pistol. Since all the firing was inside the rooms, much

of the noise was muffled and the other security outposts did not react.

Apparently the other security posts did not know that we had taken

this post. We left the post before dawn. We went back to Ofian-e

Sharif and the following night returned to our base camp in Ghorband.

COMMENTARY: The side streets of Charikar are narrow and crooked.

Security of the flanks and withdrawal route were always a prime

Commander Sarshar was a police officer in Parwan and worked clandestinely with the

Mujahideen. When his cover was about to be blown, he became a Mujahideen commander in Ghorband. He commanded a mobile group in the Ghorband front near Charikar.

There is no map with this vignette. Charikar is found on Map sheet 2887.
Page 388 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

consideration and took most of the urban fighters personnel. In this

instance, 87% of the force was used for security. It was probably not

excessive. One wonders about the effectiveness of Charikar's security

system when 20 soldiers are killed with automatic weapons at 0300

hours in the morning—and nobody notices.
VIGNETTE 11

NIGHT RAID ON A CITY OUTPOST

by Ghulam Farouq

I was a high school student in Kandahar. I used my student identification to move freely around the city to support the Mujahideen. I

would try to make contacts with DRA soldiers in the government

outposts during the day and then the Mujahideen would use the

soldiers' information to attack them at night. One day in January

1984,1 made contact with a soldier who showed a willingness to cooperate with the Mujahideen in capturing his outpost. This was the

Saray-e Saat-ha security outpost in Kandahar. The post was located

on the second floor of a building in the Bazaar-e Shah section of the

city. This is across from the road junction ofAlizai street and Bazaare Shah. The outpost was located there since the Mujahideen used

Alizai street to enter the city and the outpost controlled this path.

I took the soldier with me on my bicycle to Chardewal—some six

kilometers south of the city. There, we met with my commander, Ali

Yawar. We all discussed our plan and then I brought the soldier back

to the city on my bicycle. That night, our group of 30 Mujahideen

assembled. We entered the city on the south side near the Shekarpur

gate (Rangrez-ha street). From there, we moved along Sherali Khan

street near Bazaar-e Herat and from there to Wali Mohammad street.

As we moved along this path, we posted security so we could withdraw

safely. We had agreed with my contact that we would arrive at 2200

hours. We arrived on time and, as we approached the outpost, we

signaled with a flashlight. Our contact answered our signal. We

crossed the paved road and posted our men at the gate. There were

22 Mujahideen now securing the route and gate. The remaining eight

of us entered the gate and climbed to the second floor. Everyone

appeared to be asleep. There was one soldier who just had completed

his turn as sentry and we assumed that he was asleep. He wasn't. He

grabbed his Kalashnikov and fired at us, killing one! The dead

Mujahideen's brother returned fire, killing the soldier and two of his

sleeping comrades. We captured four other DRA soldiers plus nine

Kalashnikovs and a pistol. My contact deserted to us.

Ghulam Farouq was a urban guerrilla in Kandahar. He belonged to the Islamic Movement

(HI-- Harakat-I Islami) of Ayatollah Shaikh Asef Muhseni which is a minority Shia Muslim

faction. His nickname is Gulalai. There is no map with this vignette.
Page 390 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

The firing alerted DRA forces and it would be hard to leave the city

carrying a body, so we started to take the body to a safe house where

we could leave it for the night. As we were moving down the street, one

of our four captives escaped. A Mujahideen tried to fire at him, but

discovered that he was out of ammunition. We knew that the escaped

DRA soldier would report our whereabouts to the authorities and,

since he escaped near the safe house, we could not now risk leaving the

body there. So we left the body hidden near a bakery. We covered the

blood trail with dirt and then withdrew along the same route we

entered. We exited the city at 0200 hours.

Since the government knew that we had left our dead behind, they

blocked all entrances into the city. We tried to return for our dead the

next night but could not get in. On the third night, we tried a different route from the north of town through the Chawnay suburbs. We

traveled from Kalacha-e Mirza to Chawnay. We got into the city and

we went to the bakery. The government had not found the body, so we

retrieved it and took it outside oftown for a decent burial. The person

who was killed was Hafizullah—a graduate of Kabul university.

COMMENTARY: Movement through a city is high risk unless the route

is secured. In this case, over two-thirds of the available force secured

the route. This got the force out safely. On the other hand, prisoner

security was not too good. Prisoners should be bound, gagged and

roped together in small groups for firm control. If possible, they should

be blindfolded so that they remain disoriented and unable to give much

immediate information should they escape. Finally, a raiding force

should be kept small, but the correlation of Mujahideen to DRA was

almost one to one. Surprise gave the Mujahideen an advantage, but

the non-sleeping soldier offset that advantage.
Vignette 12

Raid on Kandahar Communications Center

by Ghulam Farouq

I continued to use my high school student identification to get

around Kandahar. I would deliver messages for the Mujahideen and

try to contact DRA soldiers who might give me valuable information or

agree to cooperate with the resistance. In August 1984,1 again found

a DRA soldier who wanted to cooperate. His name was Hanif and he

worked in the Kandahar Telephone Exchange Center. He and his

friend in the DRA agreed to help us, so I took Hanif to our base south

of the city in Chardewal to talk to my commander, Ali Yawar. Ali

Yawar said that the exchange was too strong to take in a raid, but

Hanif said that he and his friends would help.

Several nights later, Ali Yawar assembled 120 Mujahideen for the

raid. We used the northern approach from Kalacha-e Mirza

Mohammad Khan to Chawnay suburb. From Chawnay, we went to

Topkhana—the Shia section of the city. Then we moved down Bala

street. Ali Yawar posted about 100 Mujahideen as security along our

route. Finally, we arrived at a point directly across from the outpost

which guarded the telephone exchange. We gave our flashlight signal and Hanif answered it. Ali Yawar posted additional security and

then we crossed the street one at a time. Twelve of us went inside the

walled compound. It had a guard house and other buildings. Hanif

took us all into the guard house. We sat there while the roving DRA

security patrol passed outside. As usual, the security patrol came

from the east and passed by the compound. They did not notice

anything unusual. Hanif told us to remain quiet since another

roving patrol was due from the west. We waited until they passed.

There were three other sentries inside the compound that we had

to neutralize. Hanif had held a tea break during the three previous

nights. After the two roving patrols passed, the sentries would gather individually in the guard house to talk and drink Hanif's tea

and eat his cakes. As the first sentry entered the guard house, we

overpowered him, bound and gagged him and took him to the outside

security group who took him away. In this fashion, we got rid of the

three sentries.

We spent some 35 minutes in the guard room dodging the patrols

Ghulam Farouq contributed to the previous vignette. There is no map with this vignette.
Page 392 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

and getting rid of the sentries. We exited the guard room carrying our

jerry cans of gasoline. We planned to burn down the telephone

exchange and surrounding compound. As we entered the main telephone exchange building, the guard who was sleeping inside woke up.

As we were climbing the stairs to the second floor, he took his

Kalashnikov and began shooting. He killed Mohammad Nabi from

Chardewahl and Sherandam. He wounded Ghulam Reza. Things

became very chaotic at that point. We were firing in all directions and

other people were firing back. No one knew what was going on. We

grabbed nine Kalashnikovs and our dead and wounded and left. In our

haste, we did not set anything on fire. We retraced our steps and

reached Kalacha-e Mirza Mohammad Khan about 0230 in the morning. The next day, we learned that we killed four DRA soldiers plus

some of their relatives who were staying there with them.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen had a good movement plan through

the city, but no plan for action once they were inside the compound.

Consequently, there was no rehearsal before the raid. The commander

left the critical inside plan to the collaborator—which is not always a

good idea. In effect, the commander surrendered his command to an

outsider at the critical phase of the raid. The raiding force spent 35

minutes all together inside the guard house. This is very risky. The

concentrated raiding force was very vulnerable in case the collaborator

had not really turned. Further, sleepers don't always sleep throughout

the night and guard houses get a lot of visitors. The raiders needed a

covering force inside the compound. Maybe there was no other way to

neutralize the other sentries, but this was high risk to the raiding

party. The collaborator should have known about the sentry inside the

telephone exchange, but apparently made no plan to silence him before

the force entered the building. A raiding force needs to get in and out

in a hurry. Since the commander had abrogated his command for the

critical phase, when things went bad, everyone acted on his own. The

Mujahideen evacuation of dead and wounded and their capture of

enemy weapons is commendable, but no one took 30 seconds to spill

some gasoline and light a match. The main objective was to torch the

exchange—and that did not happen.
VIGNETTE 13

ATTACK ON KHAD HEADQUARTERS

by Mohammad Humayun Shahin

On the evening of 13 August 1986, I led a five-man attack on the

KHAD headquarters in Kabul. The building ofthe First Directorate of

the KHAD was located near Darulaman at Alia uddin in the south of

Kabul. The directorate worked round the clock and was located in a

well-protected part of town (Map 14-4 - KHAD). Therefore, we had to

use a small group and hit the target and leave. We took an RPG-7

grenade launcher and four AK-47s. Our plan was to sneak up on the

building at night, fire a rocket at the building and leave. In the group

were my brother, Nurullah, Mamur Abdul, Shah Mohammad and

Mohammad Zaher.

I had an underground headquarters in Qala-e Chitgar Village,

which is located some 2.5 kilometers from the western edge of Kabul.

We kept our weapons there. After each mission, we would clean and

lubricate our weapons and then wrap them in cotton cloth and then

put them into sealed plastic bags. We would hide the plastic bags in

sewer pipes and other out-of-the-way, hidden spots. We prepared for

the mission, took out our weapons and waited for dark. We left Qalae Chitgar in the late evening. The village is some four kilometers west

of the target building. When we reached a concealed area outside the

KHAD building, I put my security and RPG gunner in position. My

regular RPG gunner was absent and so I had to assign another

Mujahideen to fire the RPG. Since we were urban guerrillas, we

did not have much opportunity for target practice and the gunner

had never fired the RPG before. I served as his assistant gunner. I

carried his rockets and helped him load the weapon. From the lights

in the windows, I judged that the second floor was the most crowded

and told him to aim for a second floor window. I did not have any ear

protectors for any of us, so I wanted the gunner to keep his mouth

open during the firing to equalize the pressure. In order to do this, I

told him to loudly chant "Allahu Akbar" [God is the greatest] three

times before firing. My new gunner, who was a Shia, smiled and said

he would do so but would add "Ya Ali" at the end of the litany.4

Mohammad Humayun Shahin contributed to other vignettes in this chapter.

4

"Ya Ali" is a saying commonly chanted by Shia when asking for heavenly help.
Page 394 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

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Chapter 14, Vignette 13 Page 395

My gunner aimed, chanted and fired the RPG-7. The rocket flew,

but instead of hitting the second floor, it hit the fourth floor. A major

commotion ensued, but no one fired at us. We immediately left the

area and withdrew to our base. Later on, we were told that more than

20 people had been killed or wounded by our attack.

COMMENTARY: There are better sites for weapons instruction and qualification than in the middle of a mission. In this case, the target was

large enough that it was difficult to miss. Still, the gunner was off by

two stories. Training to standard was a constant problem for

Mujahideen commanders. The best training was conducted in training

camps in Pakistan or in mountain bases. Unless urban guerrillas were

sent out for training, they had very little live-fire training other than

actual combat. Usually, urban guerrillas would detail a large security

party to hold the withdrawal route. In this case, the five-man team

relied on local contacts to watch the area rather than posting route

security.
Vignette 14

Raid on 15 Division Garrison

by Commander Akhtarjhan

The DRA 15th Infantry Division was garrisoned in Kandahar city.

We had contacts within the division. In the fall of 1987, our contacts

invited us to come and seize the weapons from the division's military

police company. We gathered about 100 Mujahideen for the operation. I commanded a group of 15 within the larger group. We crossed

the Argandab River from our base camp at Chaharqulba to Baba

Walisaheb and, from there, we went through the suburb of Chawnay.

Local guerrillas secured our passage through Chawnay. We finally

reached the division's main garrison. We waited until the moon set

around midnight. The military police company building was at the

end ofthe main compound. We crept to the building and saw that our

contacts had placed a ladder against the wall for us. Some 50 of our

group took up positions outside the compound while our raiding

group of 50 climbed the ladder up onto the roof of the building. Then

we climbed down from the roof inside the compound walls.

Some of our contacts were on sentry duty, so we had no troubles.

Our contacts met us and led us into the barracks building. We assembled in a large empty room. Our contacts then took us to different

rooms where the soldiers were sleeping—five or six soldiers per room.

Their weapons were stored in the rooms. We took their weapons. Next

to the barracks was a larger arms room. After disarming the sleeping

soldiers, we raided the arms room and took hundreds of weapons. We

then started carrying all the weapons onto the roof and passing them

down to our fellows outside the compound walls. While we were doing

this, the company political officer got out of bed and saw us. He started to make a noise, so we killed him with some ofthe bayonets. We finished getting the weapons out and left for our base camp. Our contacts

deserted the DRA and came with us. We had some Arabs who were

with us for jihad credit. They had a video camera and all they wanted

to do was to take videos. They were of no value to us.

Commander Akhtarjhan was a Jamiat-e-lslami (JIA) commander in Arghandab District

northwest of Kandahar. He was an elementary school student when he joined the jihad at

the age of twelve. At end of the war, he was 25 years old and a commander. He joined

the Jihad since he had two brothers in the Jihad and they were both killed. He took their

place as family tradition dictated. He served under Mulla Naqib, the most powerful Jamiat

commander in the area. There is no map with this vignette. Kandahar map sheet is 2180.
Chapter 14, Vignette 14 Page 397

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen penetration of the DRA was essential

for successful raids like this. Entering a sleeping compound is always

a high-risk proposition since someone is always awake, or wakes up,

besides the sentries. A secure approach and withdrawal route is essential to urban guerrillas. Having local guerrillas secure the route

allowed the force to bring enough people to carry the weapons without

worrying about being ambushed on the way out.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY

Urban combat is difficult for the urban guerrilla and the regular

force. Throughout the war, the Soviets and DRA were never able to

completely control Kandahar and Herat. Finally, the Soviets dealt

with the Herat guerrillas by bombing 75% ofthe city into rubble. That

still failed to stop the urban guerrilla. The DRA had more success in

controlling Kabul—but still were unable to stop the rocket attacks and

guerrilla actions. On the other hand, surviving urban guerrillas are

harder to find to interview. The urban guerrilla must be anonymous

and ruthless to survive. The Soviets and DRA devoted a great deal of

effort to finding and eliminating the urban guerrilla.
CHAPTER 15

CONCLUSION

"As a nation, we believed that history repeats itself. What

happened in the 19th Century to the invading British would also be

the fate of the Soviet invaders. Philosophically, the Soviets believed

that history is unidirectional, progressive and does not repeat itself.

History did repeat itself and we did prevail."

General Abdul Rahim Wardak

The Mujahideen understood that guerrilla war is a contest of

endurance and national will. Battlefield victory is almost irrelevant,

provided that the guerrilla survives to fight the next of a thousand

battles before passing the torch to his children. The Mujahideen did

not necessarily expect to win this war but fought because it was the

right thing to do—it was a religious and national obligation. They

accepted an asymmetry of casualties which eventually, but unexpectedly, led to the Soviet withdrawal.

In many respects, the tactics of the Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839

1842, 1878-1880, 1919) still applied. Technology has added range

and accuracy, but the terrain still dictates tactics and the Mujahideen

were quite comfortable applying their time-honored tactics against a

modern foe. Much more innovation was required from the Soviet

forces. Two modern systems, the helicopter and the antipersonnel

mine, created severe tactical problems which were outside the

Mujahideen historical experience. Tactical innovation occurs only

where tactical innovation is required and the Mujahideen eventually

found ways to work around the problem technology. Where innovation was not required, the Mujahideen stayed with the tried and true.

Thus the basic Mujahideen ambush and pursuit were little changed

from last century whereas their actions against an air assault or a

fortified security post were quickly developed out of necessity.
Page 400 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Technology

Technology can provide advantages but is not decisive in this type

of war. Soviet smart bombs had a decided impact when an appropriate target set could be identified. U.S.-supplied, shoulder fired

Stinger air defense missiles, in the hands of the Mujahideen, created

a great deal of consternation and led to a dramatic change in Soviet

air tactics. Neither system, however, was a war winner. The Soviet

equipment was designed for a different war on different terrain. It

failed to function optimally in the mountains and deserts of

Afghanistan. The Kalashnikov assault rifle was not always better

than the World War I-designed British bolt-action Enfield rifle. The

Enfield shot further accurately and would penetrate flak jackets

designed to stop Kalashnikov bullets.

The RPG-7 antitank grenade launcher was the Mujahideen weapon

of choice. It is a light-weight technology killer that destroys tanks,

armored personnel carriers, trucks and helicopters. The Soviets and

DRA tried to stay at least 300 meters away from the Mujahideen—out

of Kalashnikov and RPG-7 range. This tactical timidity led to

Mujahideen acquisition of crew-served weapons. Over time, heavy

machine guns, recoilless rifles, mortars and portable multiple rocket

launcher systems became an essential part of the Mujahideen arsenal

which the Mujahideen used to pin their enemy in place in order to get

close enough to use their Kalashnikovs and RPGs. Crew-served

weapons also limited guerrilla mobility.

Soviet high performance jet fighters and bombers played a significant strategic role, but not a tactically significant one. The Soviets

used their air forces to devastate the countryside and force the

populace to leave in order to deny food to the Mujahideen. The Soviet

air force destroyed farms, crops, animal herds, orchards and irrigation systems and forced millions of people to flee. The Mujahideen

were then forced to carry their rations along with the other impedimenta of war. However, the Mujahideen seldom presented a target

set that the Soviet air force or artillery could fully exploit to influence

the tactical fight.

Technology did serve the Soviets as a force multiplier. Besieged

garrisons could be maintained indefinitely by aerial resupply. Carpet

bombing could stave off immediate disaster. Helicopter medical evacuation could save personnel who could later be returned to duty.

Sensors could provide reconnaissance data in isolated areas..
Chapter 15 Page 401

Disunity of Command

The Mujahideen were nominally divided into seven main factions,

but the disunity was much greater. There were factions within the

factions. Old disputes and disagreements were not always put aside

for the duration of the war. There were frequent armed clashes

between Mujahideen of different factions. The reputation of certain

factions was that they were more interested in fighting other

Mujahideen than Soviets. Still, the ISI struggled to coordinate the

actions of the various factions into some comprehensive plan. In

some combat zones, such as Kandahar, the Mujahideen of different

factions cooperated readily despite the politics of their factions.

In the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were

controlled by a strict chain of command in a clear hierarchy. This was

considered a strength of the communist forces and the United States

spent a lot of effort trying to find and decapitate the central leadership. The Mujahideen structure would be difficult to fit into a lineand-block chart and there was never a central leadership that was

critical to the cause. Yet this inefficient disunity may have been a

strength of the Mujahideen. No matter which commanders or leaders were killed, the Mujahideen effort would continue and the Soviets

would never be short of enemies.

On the tactical level, the Mujahideen were prepared for a long

war. Their goal was to hit, survive and fight again. Thus, the

Mujahideen could not exploit success. After a victory, they went

home. Group leaders, let alone loose coalitions, could not hold a force

together for long after a fight. As was earlier noted by the British

fighting the hill tribes, the mountain warriors could not stay together in victory or defeat. Thus, tactical victory could not be converted

into operational gain.

Role of Military Professionals

Not more than 15% of the Mujahideen tactical leaders were

professional military officers. However, the Afghan military officer

corps played a major role in stalemating or defeating the Soviet

invasion. The most important role ofthe Afghan military officers who

stayed in uniform was their lack of cooperation with the government

and their subversion directed against the communist regime and

its Soviet backers. In 1978 and 1979, Afghan military officers staged

numerous, spontaneous uprisings against the regime in Herat,

Paktia, Asmar, Bala-hessar (in Kabul) and many others sites. Many

Afghan military officers passed information to the Mujahideen. In
Page 402 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

the mid-1980s, the entire leadership ofthe Intelligence Directorate of

the Ministry of Defense, including the head of the directorate

(General Khalil—who was later executed by the regime), was arrested for its secret collaboration with the Mujahideen. Most of the

serving Afghan officers refused communist party membership. Many

of those who were forced to join the party were not loyal to the

regime. Many of them secretly carried membership cards in one of

the Mujahideen factions. Such lack of cooperation foiled all efforts by

the Soviet Union to create a viable, indigenous military power in

Afghanistan. Consequently the Soviet Union was forced to use mostly its own soldiers to carry the fight to the Mujahideen.

Afghan military officers who openly joined the Mujahideen faced

many obstacles in integrating fully into the resistance hierarchy,

based in Pakistan. Some faction leaders saw these former military

officers as a challenge to their leadership and their factional

interests and tried to sideline the professionals. Factions with a

fundamentalist Islamic orientation were generally more opposed to

accepting those military officers who had trained in and served under

the old regimes. Therefore, many well-trained military officers who

could bring effective leadership and organization to the ranks of the

resistance forces, were sidelined by the factional politics of the jihad.

Nevertheless, the former officers proved to be the most effective

tactical and operational leaders that the Mujahideen had during the

long years of war with the Soviet forces.

Logistics

Initially, the Mujahideen lived in the villages they defended and

the villagers provided their food and shelter. Ammunition, weapons

and other material came from the local bazaar or from Iran or

Pakistan. The Soviets decided to break this link between the populace and the guerrilla by driving the populace out of the countryside.

Soviet air and artillery attacked villages, standing crops, orchards,

animal herds, granaries, water mills and irrigation systems.

Eventually the populace was driven out of many rural areas and the

Mujahideen could no longer readily subsist in these areas. With the

agricultural system destroyed, the Mujahideen had to transport

their own food and forage. The Mujahideen factions responded to this

crisis by establishing fixed supply bases within Afghanistan. The

larger supply bases were located in the mountains near the Pakistan

border. Smaller supply bases were caches hidden outside the towns

and villages. The Soviets then concentrated on finding and destroy-
Chapter 15 Page 403

ing the large and small supply bases. The Mujahideen dependence on

the large fixed supply bases meant that they had to defend them.

This provided a viable target set for Soviet air and artillery.

Although weapons and material were furnished free to the

Mujahideen in the essential safe haven of Pakistan, there were significant costs to the Mujahideen in getting it to where it was needed.

Often, the issued material was not what the commander needed in his

area. So the material had to be traded or sold for what he needed.

Then, the material had to be transported. Transportation was usually

by commercial teamsters using donkeys, mules, camels or pickup

trucks.1 Commanders and faction leaders who established their own

transportation systems discovered that it was cheaper and easier to

stay with the established teamsters and muleteers. Once the materials were loaded and in transit, there were still taxes and fees to be

paid. Every time the supplies crossed into a different tribe or faction

area, there was a tax or tariff—often 10% of the goods. Mujahideen

groups located well within Afghanistan were at the end of the pipeline

and found that perhaps 40% of their material had gone to other

Mujahideen groups between issue and final receipt. Western nations

preferred to distribute aid in goods. Mujahideen leaders, particularly

in the interior, preferred cash. They could always buy the needed

mines, ammunition, food and material in the local bazaar. Saudi

Arabia usually provided cash as aid.2 Often, the Mujahideen needed

more material than they were receiving through the factions and

raised their own funds to buy it. Gem stones and narcotics, two traditional exports, provided some of these funds.

As the Mujahideen acquired more crew-served weapons, the

ammunition tonnages required rose dramatically. At the same time,

Soviet airstrikes on animal herds and their widespread use of

scatterable mines along trails and mountain passes killed many of

the transport animals. There was more demand for transport and

fewer animals to transport the goods. The United States tried to

solve the 'mule-gap" by providing Missouri mules. Unfortunately

1 Animal carrying capabilities are: mule—250 to 335 pounds[H. W. Daly, Manual of Pack

Transportation, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917, page 18]; camel—400 to

600 pounds [ Lewis Burt Lesley, Uncle Sam's Camels: The Journal of May Humphreys

Stacey Supplemented by the Report of Edward Fitzgerald Beale (1857-1858), Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1929, page 9]; and central Asian horse—215 pounds [William

H. Carter, Horses Saddles and Bridles, Baltimore: The Lord Baltimore Press, 1902, pages

262-263]. Donkey figures unavailable.

2

"The Logistics System of the Mujahideen", unpublished government contract study written in 1987.
Page 404 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

these required more food, carried less and died more quickly than the

local variety.

Medical care and medical evacuation was a Mujahideen weakness.

There were few Mujahideen doctors, although established Afghan

doctors frequently treated Mujahideen casualties at great personal

risk. Some Mujahideen groups had a medic who had graduated from

a eight-month to a year course in Pakistan or other countries. Most

groups were lucky to have a graduate of a six-week first aid course.

Some French doctors worked inside Afghanistan while many other

western doctors worked in the border areas of Pakistan. Ifthe wounded Mujahideen managed to survive the harrowing trip to Pakistan, he

probably survived. However, a seriously wounded Mujahideen inside

Afghanistan usually died.

Tactics

Guerrilla warfare demands quantities of quality light infantry on

both sides. The Soviets never fielded enough. The Mujahideen were

natural light infantry. They were hardy, tough, courageous and local.

They had high morale, the warrior spirit and excellent tactical intelligence. They were naturals at the ambush and pursuit. They were

raised from childhood with weapons, but they lacked unit training and

discipline. Training varied from valley to valley and force to force. The

Pakistani ISI provided some training courses and the former military

officers from the Afghan Army who joined the Mujahideen tried to

train the Mujahideen to a standard. Still, the Mujahideen were not

trained to a standard and the quality of the individual groups was a

function of their leadership.

The Mujahideen had warrior spirit and their focus was on battle,

not easy LOC targets. They wanted noise, excitement, personal glory

and the spoils of war. The Pakistani ISI cajoled and threatened, but it

was difficult to persuade the Mujahideen to attack the lucrative and

easy oil pipelines when security outposts were available.3The

Mujahideen had some distinct tactical faults. Ifthey were in their own

area, they tended to ignore local security and could be surprised. They

were very predictable in their selection of ambush sites and shelling

sites. The Soviets, however, seemed unaware of this predictability.

The Mujahideen would habitually reuse the same sites, but there is little evidence of the Soviets exploiting this pattern with aggressive foot

patrols, site raids, mining or plotting artillery fire on these sites.

3 Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story, London:

Leo Cooper, 1992, 36.
Chapter 15 Page 405

The overall Mujahideen air defense posture was weak. The introduction of the Stinger shoulder-fired air defense missile toward the

end ofthe war helped, but the Soviets countered the new system with

a change in tactics. The tactical threat to Mujahideen were Su-25

close air support aircraft, helicopter gunships and helicopter lift

ships carrying air assault forces. The Mujahideen developed the air

defense ambush as an answer to the threat of these aircraft. There

are several variations of the ambush, but basically the Mujahideen

would position air defense weapons in optimum firing positions and

then bait the ambush to draw aircraft into the kill zone. The most

popular firing positions were caves dug into canyon walls where

heavy machine guns could fire horizontally across the narrow canyon.

The bait would lure the aircraft into the canyon where multiple

machine guns would open up on its flight path. Other aircraft would

be unable to engage these machine guns since they could not get an

approach shot at the caves. The Mujahideen also learned to identify

likely helicopter landing zones and mine them. They would position

machine guns and RPG-7 gunners around the landing zone. As the

helicopter landed, massed RPG and machine gun fire would tear

into the aircraft. The Mujahideen also liked to hit aircraft parked on

airfields and would stage shelling attacks for the purpose of killing

aircraft on the ground. A large percentage of total Mujahideen

aircraft kills was from mortar and multiple rocket launcher attacks

on airfields.

Antipersonnel mines were a major problem for the Mujahideen. The Soviets employed millions of mines in Afghanistan. They

surrounded installations, garrisons, security posts and government

facilities with minefields. They mined the road banks along critical

stretches of road. They dispersed scatterable mines over trails,

mountain passes, cropland and grazing pasture. Most of the mines'

components were nonmetallic and hard to detect. These antipersonnel mines were designed to maim, not kill. Thus, the mine would rip

off a Mujahideen's leg and the Mujahideen's comrades would then

have to transport the crippled combatant back to Pakistan. Should

he survive the slow, painful trip, he would probably never fight again,

but the trip back would involve six or eight Mujahideen who could

have been fighting. Mine detectors were in short supply and not too

effective against plastic mines. Mujahideen would breach minefields

with captured vehicles, flocks of sheep, by firing consecutive recoilless rifles rounds to create a path, or by hurling large rocks across the

minefield to create a path. None of these methods were too effective.
Page 406 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Although disinclined to dig in the hard, rocky soil of Afghanistan,

the Mujahideen soon learned the value of field fortifications against

Soviet artillery, armored vehicles and airstrikes. Field fortifications

came to play a dominant role in the war as the Mujahideen learned to

build sturdy, redundant, camouflaged bunkers and fighting positions

which ensured their survivability.

Finally, the Mujahideen were a tactical force with a tactical focus,

but, when the occasion demanded, they were capable of operationallevel actions. Such actions as operation Gashay, Zhawar II and the

defense against operation Magistral demonstrated this capability.

Such actions were usually under the planning or leadership offormer

officers of the Afghan Army. What the Mujahideen were not capable

of was transitioning quickly into a conventional force. After the

Soviets withdrew, the Mujahideen tried and failed to take Jalalabad

and Kabul by a conventional attack. These efforts ended in disorganized chaos as the DRA found heart and battled on successfully. It

would be years before the DRA collapsed and the Mujahideen tried to

unite to rebuild Afghanistan.
GLOSSARY

Afghanistan National Liberation Front (ANLF)—Jebh-e-Nejat-iMelli Afghanistan}) founded by Sebqhatullah Mojadeddi. The

party is moderate.

AGS-17—A Soviet-manufactured, tripod-mounted automatic grenade

launcher which fires 30mm grenades from a thirty round drum

magazine. The maximum range of the AGS-17 is 1,700 meters.

Air assault—Helicopter borne assault into an area.

ANLF—Afghanistan National Liberation Front of Mojadeddi.

AO—Area of operations.

APC—Armored personnel carrier, any of the wheeled or tracked

Soviet-manufactured combat vehicles used to transport

soldiers.

Bernau—Czechoslovak M26 light machine gun which fires from a toploading 20-round magazine. This excellent 7.9mm weapon was

developed between World War I and II and was sold abroad as

the M30 to China, Yugoslavia and Romania. The British Bren

gun is based on the M26 design. The Mujahideen called them

20-shooters.

BM-1—Single barrel 107mm rocket launcher.

BM-12—An obsolete Soviet multiple rocket launcher. The Chinese

improved and manufactured it as the Type 63. Most

Mujahideen BM-12s were actually Chinese Type 63s. It is

ground-mounted, has twelve barrels and fires 107mm rockets to

a distance of 8,500 meters. It weighs 611 kilograms.

BM-21—A truck-mounted, 40-tube multiple rocket launcher which

fires 122mm rockets to a distance of 20.5 kilometers. The

Mujahideen mostly called this the BM-40.

BM-22—A truck-mounted, 16-tube multiple rocket launcher which

fires 220mm rockets to a distance of 40 kilometers. The type of

rocket warheads include high-explosive fragmentation, chemical, incendiary and remotely delivery mines. The Soviet nick-
Page 408 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

name for this lethal system is Uragan (Hurricane). Western

analysts initially identified this system as the BM27.

BMP—A Soviet tracked infantry fighting vehicle that carries a threeman crew and a squad of eight soldiers. The BMP-1 mounts a

73mm cannon, a 7.62mm machine gun and an antitank missile.

The BMP-2 carries a 30mm automatic gun and a different antitank missile and launcher.

BRDM—A Soviet four-wheeled armored car used primarily for reconnaissance. It has two auxiliary wheels for extra mobility. In its

various configurations, it carries either a 12.7mm machine gun,

a 7.62mm machine gun or both.

BMD—A Soviet air-dropable, armored personnel carrier that carries

up to nine men (usually a maximum of seven). It has the same

turret as the BMP, so the BMD-1 has the 73mm cannon of the

BMP-1 and the BMD-2 has the 30mm automatic gun of the

BMP-2. They were widely used by Soviet airborne and air

assault force. The Mujahideen called them "commando tanks".

BTR—A Soviet eight-wheeled armored personnel carrier that can

carry up to an 11-man squad, It mounts 14.5mm and 7.62mm

machine guns and can carry antitank weapons as well. The

BTR and BMP were the most common infantry carriers of the

Soviet Forces.

Commander—During the war against the Soviets, the Mujahideen

had no rank structure, so the term commander applied to all

military commanders whether they led 10 men or 1,000.

Dari—Afghan Farsi or Persian spoken by about 50% ofthe population.

DRA—Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The communist government ofAfghanistan.

DShK—Soviet-manufactured 12.7mm heavy machine gun. It is a

primary armament on Soviet-manufactured armored vehicles

and is effective against ground and air targets. It has a

wheeled carriage, tripod and mountain mount for ground and

air defense firing. It has rate of fire of 540-600 rounds per

minute with a maximum range of 7000 meters and an effective

range of 1500 meters against ground targets and 1000 meters

against air targets.

Enfield—British-manufactured .303 bolt-action rifle which was the

standard British infantry weapon from 1895 through the
Glossary Page 409

Korean War. It saw wide service on the North-West Frontier

and its long range and powerful cartridge made it a favorite in

India and Afghanistan. It has a maximum range of 2550

meters and an effective range of 800 meters. It has a 10-round

magazine and can carry an additional round in the chamber, so

the Mujahideen called them 11-shooters.

Etehad-e Islami (EIA)—Mujahideen faction led by Abdurab Rasul

Sayaf.

Ghar—Pushto term for mountain.

Green zone—Agricultural region of gardens, orchards, fields and

vineyards bisected by a network ofirrigation ditches. They normally border rivers and some sections of highway and most are

practically impassible for vehicles.

Goryunov—The heavy machine gun SGM Stankovy Goryunou

Modernizovanniy M-49 was adopted by the Soviet Army during

World War II and modernized versions are in service with the

Russian Army today. It is a gas-operated, air-cooled, companylevel, 7.62mm weapon that has vehicle and ground mounts. It

has a rate offire of 650 round per minute and a maximum range

of 2,500 meters and an effective range of 1,000 meters.

Haji—The title of a person who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Harbakai—Pashtu tribal policemen or regulators..

HI—Islamic Movement ofAyatollah Shaikh Asef Muhsini.

HIH—Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar.

HIK—Islamic Party of Mawlawi Yunus Khalis.

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)—Pakistan's intelligence service

for internal and external security, political and military intelligence and counterintelligence. The ISI was responsible for funneling aid to the Mujahideen and providing training to

Mujahideen combatants and support personnel.

IRMA—Islamic Revolutionary Movement of Afghanistan of Mawlawi

Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi.

Islamic Party (HIH)— (Hezb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin) founded in 1974 to

fight the Daoud government. It later split as cofounders

Rabanni and Khalis founded their own factions. Its leader,

Gulbuddin Hikmatyar is a fundamentalist internationalist.

Hikmatyar's party received more outside aid from Pakistan, the

United States and Saudi Arabia than any other party.
Page 410 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Islamic Party (HIK)—(Hezb-e-Islami-Khalis) was founded by

Mawlawi Mohammed Yunis Khalis who left Afghanistan for

Pakistan in 1973 after the Daoud coup. Khalis is from

Nangahar Province. His most famous commanders include

Abdul Haq in Kabul and Jalladuddin Hagani of Paktia

Province. The party is fundamentalist.

Islamic Revolutionary Movement (IRMA)—(Harakat-e-Inqilab-iIslami) was founded by Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. The

party is moderate (traditional Islamist).

Islamic Movement (HI)—(Harakat-i Island) was founded by

Ayatollah Asef Muhsini in Iran as a minority Shia faction. The

party has a traditional Islamic orientation.

Islamic Society (JIA)—(Jamiat-i-Islami) was founded by Burhanud-din Rabbani who fled to Pakistan in 1974. His most

famous commanders are Ahmd Shah Masood and Ismail

Khan. The party is primarily fundamentalist and dominated

by ethnic Tadjiks.

Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (IUA)—

(Itttihad-i-Islami) was founded by Abd Al-Rab Abdul-Rassul

Sayyaf. This used to be called the EIA until 1981. The faction

is fundamentalist. In the mid-1980s, they again changed the

name to the Islamic Union ofAfghanistan.

JIA—Islamic Society öf Rabbani.

Jihad—Holy war conducted for preservation of the faith.

Kal—Local term in Farah Province for canyon

Kalashnikov—Soviet automatic assault rifle. The AK-47 and AKM

Kalashnikovs fire a 7.62mm round while the AK-74 fires a

5.45mm round.

Kandow—Pushto term for mountain pass.

Karez—An Afghanistan system of underground tunnels used for the

collection of ground water and for carrying water for surface

irrigation. The Mujahideen used them for shelter and ambush.

KHAD—The secret police of the Afghan government responsible for

detecting and eradicating domestic political opposition, subverting the mujahideen, penetrating opposition groups abroad

and providing military intelligence to the armed forces through

its military wing. The KHAD was patterned after the Soviet

KGB and GRU and apparently reported to the KGB.

Khalq—(Farsi for masses or people). One of the two communist factions of the PDPA.

KIA—Killed in action.
Glossary Page 411

Kochi—Kochi are nomadic tribesmen of Afghanistan. They live

primarily by herding and trading sheep, goats and camels.

Koh—Dari term for mountain.

Lashkar—A Pushto term for tribal armed force.

LOC—Lines of communication.

LZ—Landing zone.

Madrassa—Arabic term for an Islamic religious school.

Markaz—Mujahideen base.

Mawlawi—Islamic religious scholar.

MIA—Missing in Action.

Model 1938 Mortar—The Soviet Model 1938 107mm mortar was originally the standard regimental mortar for mountain units. It is

a reduced size version of the 120mm mortar suitable for transport on a pack animal. It can fire 15 rounds per minute and has

a maximum range of 5150 meters firing the heavy round and

6300 meters firing the light round.

Mulla—Islamic religious leader or Imam.

Mosin-Nagant—The Model M1891/30 is a Russian/Soviet bolt-action

rifle or carbine which fires the 7.62x54 cartridge. It was used

in the Russo-Japanese War, World War I and World War II.

Many models come with a folding bayonet. The rifle has a maximum range of 2000 meters and an effective range of 400

meters. The Mujahideen called them five-shooters.

MRL (Multiple rocket launcher)—A ground-mounted or truckmounted rocket artillery system capable of firing a salvo of

rockets at a target.

Mujahideen (holy warrior)—A member of the Afghan resistance.

National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA)—(Mahaz-e-Melli

Islami}). Founded by Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani, this moderate

party attracted a number of former officers from the Afghan

Army and moderate technocrats.

NIFA—National Islamic Front ofAfghanistan of Gailani.

OP—Observation Post.

Parcham—(Farsi for flag) Faction of the communist PDPA.

PDPA—Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan—the communist

party ofAfghanistan.

Pir—Title designating sainthood and leader in the Sufi orders.
Page 412 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

PK—Soviet 7.62mm company machine gun which replaced the

Goryunov machine gun. It weighs 16.5 kilograms and has an

effective range of 1000 meters. The Mujahideen call them 100-

shooters since they fire out of a 100 round box of linked

ammunition.

POL—Petroleum, oil and lubricants.

Pushtun—The dominant ethnic group (nearly 50%) of Afghanistan

who speak Päshtu. The British historically referred to these

people as Pathans.

Qawm—The basic subnational Afghan identify based on kinship, residence and sometimes occupation.

Ramadan—The Islamic holy month of fasting.

RDM—Remotely delivered mines. Mines which can be emplaced by

aviation, artillery or MRL fire.

RPG-7—Soviet manufactured shoulder-fired antitank weapon which

fires a shaped-charge rocket. It has an effective range of 300

meters.

RPG-18—Soviet manufactured single-shot, shoulder-fired antitank

weapon which fires a 66mm shaped-charge rocket. The rocket is stored in an extendable storage tube which also functions

as a launcher. The launcher is thrown away after use. It has

an effective range of 135 meters and is a copy of the

USM72A2 LAW.

Saqar—Egyptian 107mm or 122mm MRL. It has one, two, three and

four-barrel light-weight launchers. The 107mm (Saqar 20) has

a maximum range of 8000 meters and the 122mm (Saqar 30)

has a maximum range of 10,800 meters. The 107mm model was

more common in Afghanistan. Some Mujahideen state that

they had special rounds which enabled the Saqar to reach 20

kilometers and the Saqar 30 to reach 30 kilometers. Saqar

means "eagle" in Egyptian.

Sarandoy—DRA Ministry of the Interior armed forces, a heavily

armed police force. They were organized into six brigades or

regiments (numbering about 60,000 men) and were based in

Kandahar, Badakhstan, Baghlan and Paravan provinces plus

two in Kabul. The Sarandoy had an additional estimated 6,000

men in operational and mountain battalions.

Shaheed—Martyr. The plural is shaheedan or shuhada..
Glossary Page 413

Shia—The minority Islamic community in Afghanistan following the

Imami Shiism (the dominant faith in neighboring Iran) or

Ismaili Shiism.

SKS—(Samozaryadiy karabin Simonova}) gas-operated semi-automatic Soviet carbine with a folding bayonet. It has a ten-shot magazine and fires the 7.62x39 cartridge to a maximum range of

1000 meters with a 400 meter effective range. The first models

were fielded in 1931 and it was a standard weapon ofthe Soviet

Army during World War II through the early 1950s. The

Mujahideen simply called them carbines.

SOP—Standard operating procedures.

Spetsnaz—Soviet forces trained for long-range reconnaissance, commando and special forces type combat.

Sufi—A mystic branch of Islam with considerable influence in

Afghanistan. Sufis are more widespread among Sunnis.

Sunni—The majority Islamic community in Afghanistan. Over twothirds of the populace are Sunnis, followers of the Hanafi

School.

Tadjik—Ethnic Afghans from the northeastern regions ofAfghanistan

who make up about 25% of the population.

Tsadar—All purpose cloth that Afghans carry and wear. It serves as

a ground cloth, sleeping bag, camouflage covering, bundle wrap

and shroud.

Uzbek—Ethnic Afghans primarily in the north central part of

Afghanistan who make up 10% of the population and speak

Turkic.

WIA—Wounded in Action.

ZGU—(Zenitnaya gornaya ustanovka}) Mountain air defense weapons

mount. Any Soviet air defense weapon that can disassembled

for transport into the mountains by pack animals or porters.

Usually this means that the weapons mount or pedestal has no

wheels.

ZGU-1—A ZPU-1 mounted on a ZGU mount.

ZPU-1—A Soviet 14.5mm ground-mounted antiaircraft machine gun

which is towed on a light, two-wheeled carriage. The system is

built around a single-barreled KPV heavy machine gun which

has a cyclic rate of fire of 600 rounds per minute and a practi-
Page 414 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

cal rate of fire of 150 rounds per minute. The belt-fed machine

gun feeds from a 150 round box and has a maximum horizontal

range of 7000 meters and a maximum effective antiaircraft

range of 1400 meters. It weighs 581 kilograms.

ZPU-2—A twin-barrel version of the ZPU-1.

ZSU-23-4—A Soviet self-propelled air defense weapon which fires four

23mm machine guns simultaneously. The Soviets used this

weapon for counter ambushes and in the destruction of ground

targets.
SYMBOLS LIBRARY

Red = Soviet or DRA Forces

Blue = Mujahideen

O

T

1

i

Rifleman

Light Machine Gun

Medium Machine

Gun

Heavy Machine

Gun

Heavy Anti-Aircraft

Machine Gun

RPG-7

AGS-17

Recoiless Rifle

Mortar

Multiple Rocket

Launcher

122mm Howitzer

122mm Howitzer

Fire Base

Truck

Vehicle

Armored Personnel

Carrier (BTR or BMD)

Infantry Fighting

Vehicle (BMP)

Tank

Convoy

Attack

Failed Attack

Withdrawal

Defensive Position

Ambush

Ambush
Page 416 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

A

A

A

6

Strong Point, Check

Point, Observation Post

Command Post

Platoon

Command Post

Company

Mosque

Cemetary

o

Bridge

Windmill

fo O O) Remotely Delivered

S> O J Minefield

Anti-Tank Minefield

Anti-Personnel

Minefield

Mixed Minefield

6

Gully

Air Strike

Heliborne

Insertion

L ? T Helicopter Gunship

l—p—T~l Attack

O

o

m

Air Patrol

Airfield

Garrison or

Field Lager

Command Post

Battalion

Regiment

Brigade
INDEX

Abdul-Rahman, Mawlawi 167, 169, 323

Abdullah-e Burj bridge 31-33, 163-165

Akbar, Mohammad 5

Ahngar 100-102, 118-121, 184, 192, 229, 233

Alishang 145,216-218

Alkozai, Doctor Abdul Qudus 229-234

Asef, Assadullah Mohammad 271

Assadullah, Commander 329-334

Bagram 31-33, 159, 162-164, 212-215, 257-259, 356

Baloch, Mawlawi Mohayddin 297-301, 341, 350

Balots, Abdul Baqi 251

Baraki Barak 39, 55, 242-246, 363

Chamtala plain 73-74

Charikar 23-25, 71, 135, 159, 164, 257-259, 347, 356-357, 387-388

DRA units

8th Infantry Division 75, 87, 137, 177, 184, 243, 247, 256, 382

11th Infantry Division 184, 235

25th Infantry Division 169, 174, 320

60th Infantry Division 177

71st Infantry Regiment 119, 218

81st Infantry Regiment 119

4th Border Guards Brigade 291, 300

8th Border Guards Brigade 177

18th Border Guards Brigade 177

15th Tank Brigade 75, 81, 177, 243

37th Commando Brigade 59, 75, 243, 247, 256, 320

38th Commando Brigade 320

Durow canyon 15, 275, 279

Faizan, Mawlawi 63

Farouq, Ghulam 389, 391

Ghamsharik, Haji Zaman 179, 191, 195

Ghani, Abdul 307, 337

Ghorband 71, 358, 389
Page 418 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Gul, Commander Wazir 89, 93, 97

Gul, Sofi Lai 23, 27, 159

Habib, Tsaranwal Sher 73, 247

Hanif, Haji Sayed Mohammad 13, 275, 279

Haqani, Jalaluddin 169, 174, 199, 319-327

Haqani, Mawlawi Nezamuddin 169, 170, 174, 319, 323

Hayat, Commander 5

Hemat, Toryalai 9, 27, 129, 235

Ibrahim, Engineer Mohammad 285

Kako, Mohammad Shah 307

Kama district 107-113, 251-256, 263-266

Karokhel, Wali Khan 81, 82

Karokhel, Hasan Khan 59, 81-85, 89

Khan, Asef 179, 191

Khan, Asil 49-52, 87, 373

Khan, Haji Badshah 151

Khan, Nawaz 119-122

Khayat, Doctor Wali 6, 8, 9

Kochay, Major Sher Aqa 59, 81-85

Kochi 73-75, 320, 343-346, 377

Lewano Kandow 81-85

Malajat 37, 43, 44, 303-310

Malang, Mulla 35, 43-46, 123-126, 143, 205, 207, 208

Malang, Lala 45

Malangyar, Haji 130

Mamur Hotel 5-13

Mohammad Agha District 5-13, 243

Mohammad, Amir 335, 337, 349

Mohhamad, Haji Pir 335, 337, 338

Mulla Omar 59, 81-84, 89-96

Ofian-e Sharif 71, 356, 387

Omar, DRA General Jamaluddin 201, 203

Omar, Lieutenant 167, 323, 329

Padshah, Commander Sher 145, 147, 217, 283 '

Panjshir 31, 32

Panjwayee District 34, 35, 37, 38, 123-126

Qader, Haji Abdul 31, 32, 163, 213-216, 257, 259-261

Qasab, Haji 3, 32

Qasem, Akhund Zada 205, 361

Qasem, Mawlawi 205

Rahim, LTC Haji Mohammad 21, 22, 77
index Page 419

Razek, Abdul 335

Sadeq, Doctor Mohammad 17, 127, 219, 223

Sahak, Haji Aaquelshah 155, 351

Sarobi 31, 59, 81, 82, 89, 93, 163, 177, 179, 181, 183-185, 188

Saroti Pass 151, 153, 170, 172, 174

Sarshar, Commander 71, 356, 387

Satakandow Pass 151, 153, 170, 172, 174

Seddiq, Haji Mohammad 39, 53, 363

Shah, Mawlawi Mohammad 285, 287, 289, 291, 292, 295

Shahabuddin, Commander 76, 366, 383

Shahin, Mohammad Humayun.371, 377, 379, 393

Sheragai, Commander 73

Sheragha 145, 147

Sidiqullah, Commander Haji 101, 119-121, 229, 233

Soviet units

40th Army 135, 167, 373, 379

5th Motorized Rifle Division 35, 295

108th Motorized Rifle Division 71, 75, 243, 247, 257, 353

103rd Airborne Division 75, 243, 247, 257, 303, 353, 373

345th Separate Airborne Regiment 213

56th Air Assault Brigade 235, 243, 353

66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade 107, 108, 113, 218, 223, 235,

251,263

70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade 35, 108, 303, 309

Tangi Waghjan Gorge 13, 15

Tani, DRA General Shanawaz 320, 322

Tayeb, Qazi Guljan 55, 243

Topkhana, Sultan Mohammad of 303

Wakil, Doctor Mohammad 53, 135

Wali, Saranwal Abdul 44

Wardak, General Abdul Rahim 81, 177, 184, 186, 192, 194

Yakub, Haji Mohammad 366

Yasini, Mawlawi Shukur 107, 113, 263

Zadran, General Gulzarak 167, 169, 173-175, 199, 204
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Ali Ahmad. Jalali is a former Afghan Army Colonel. A distinguished

graduate of the Military University in Kabul, he has also attended the

Infantry Officers Advanced Course in Fort Benning, Georgia; the

British Army Staff College in Camberley; the U.S. Naval Postgraduate

School in Monterey, California; the Frunze Academy in Moscow and

the Institute of World Politics in Washington, DC. He taught in the

Military Academy and advanced military schools in Kabul. He joined

the Mujahideen in 1980 and served as the top military planner on the

directing staff of the Islamic Unity ofAfghan Mujahideen (an alliance

of three moderate Mujahideen factions) during the early 1980s before

he joined Voice of America (VOA). As a journalist, he has covered

Central Asia and Afghanistan over the past 15 years. He is the author

of several books including works on the Soviet Military, works on

Central Asia and a three-volume Military History ofAfghanistan.

Lester W Grau is a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel. He served

as an infantry officer and a Soviet Foreign Area Officer (FAO) throughout his career. He fought in Vietnam. In 1981, he completed one year

of Russian language training at the Defense Language Institute at

Monterey, California and then graduated from the U.S. Army Russian

Institute (USARI) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany in 1983.

USARI was a two-year post-graduate school which dealt with all

aspects of the then Soviet Union and all classes were taught in

Russian. He has served in Moscow and traveled extensively in the former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet Union and continues that travel

today. Since 1983, his work has focused on Russian and Soviet tactics

and operations. He has written a book on Soviet tactics in

Afghanistan. Mr. Grau currently works at the Foreign Military

Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth where he continues to

work on operational and tactical issues.
The Other Side of the Mountain:

Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Text in New Century Schoolbook 11 point type

Book Editing and Design by Jonathan W. Pierce

Cover Design and Final Map Graphics by Emily Pierce

Initial Map Graphics by Rhonda Gross