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THE LONDON ATTACKS:

TRAINING TO RESPOND IN A

MASS TRANSIT ENVIRONMENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY 

PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, 

AND TECHNOLOGY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 26, 2005

Serial No. 109–35

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California (Ex Officio) 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 

Science, and Technology ...................................................................................... 1

The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency 

Preparedness, Science and Technology .............................................................. 3 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 67 

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 28

The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of North Carolina ................................................................................................. 23

The Honorable Michael McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 30

The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress From the 

District of Columbia ............................................................................................. 62

The Honorable Stevan Pearce, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New Mexico ...................................................................................................... 25 

The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 29

The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Connecticut ....................................................................................................... 22

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Mr. Timothy Beres, Director, Preparedness Programs Division, Office for 

Domestic Preparedness, Office of State and Local Government Coordination 

and Preparedness: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7

Mr. Robert Jamison, Deputy Administrator, Federal Transit Administration: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14

PANEL II 

Ms. Polly Hanson, Chief of Metro Police, Washington Metro Area Transit 

Authority: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 34

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 36

Mr. Christopher Kozub, Associate Director, National Transit Institute: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 47

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 50

Mr. Paul Lennon, Director of Intelligence and Emergency, Preparedness 

Management, Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 44

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 46
Page

IV

Chief William A. Morange, Deputy Executive Director/Director of Security, 

State of New York: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 38

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 41 
(1)

THE LONDON ATTACKS: 

TRAINING TO RESPOND IN A 

MASS TRANSIT ENVIRONMENT 

Tuesday, July 26, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, 

SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:04 a.m., in Room 

210, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter King [chairman of 

the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives King, Simmons, Rogers, Pearce, 

Reichert, McCaul, Dent, Pascrell, Thompson, Dicks, Harman, Norton, and Etheridge. 

Mr. KING. [Presiding.] Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science 

and Technology will come to order. 

We thank our witnesses who came to be with us here today. 

The attacks in London the last several weeks have been a vivid 

wakeup call to all Americans and to all freedom-loving people 

around the world about the threat we face from international terrorism, specifically the threat we face to our mass transit systems. 

Throughout the world, mass transit systems have long been a 

target of terrorists attacks, but, again, in many ways, it took the 

recent attacks on London to remind us of such brutal reality. 

Algerian extremists set off bombs in subways in Paris in 1995 

and 1996. Palestinian terrorists have carried out suicide bombings 

on Israel’s buses. Al-Qa’ida terrorists killed 191 people and wounded hundreds more by detonating 10 bombs on Madrid’s commuter 

trains in 2004, Chechnyan terrorists killed 40 people by bombing 

the Moscow subway in 2004. And the first terrorist use of a chemical weapon by a Japanese terror group occurred in 1995 when they 

released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway. And, again, the events of 

the last several weeks make it clear that the threat continues. 

Mass transit is public and used by millions of people daily. I 

know in my city of New York we have 3 to 4 million people a day 

on the New York City subway system, and there are almost 500 

subway stations, and that does not even include the many suburban trains and routes coming into New York City. 

Because of the size and openness and the highly networked character of mass transit, there are no obvious checkpoints like those 

at airports to inspect passengers and parcels. Passengers are 
2

strangers, promising attackers anonymity and easy escape. And attacks on mass transit, the circulatory systems of urban areas, can 

cause widespread fear to really disrupt economic activity and kill 

or injure large numbers of people. 

Addressing transit security is complicated by the nature and 

scope of mass transit. More than 6,000 agencies provide mass transit services, such as bus, subway, ferry and light rail—more than 

26 million Americans on a daily basis. And to remain competitive, 

transit agencies must offer convenient, inexpensive and quality 

service. 

The deployment of metal detectors, X-ray machines, explosive detection devices, enhanced searches of passengers and baggage, 

which of course are accepted now at airports, cannot be transferred 

easily to subway and/or bus stops. Delays would be enormous and 

the costs would be extremely large and mass transit could in fact 

grind to a halt. 

But that does not mean that we should not be doing more to increase security. It is difficult and it is vulnerable, but it does not 

mean we should stand back and do nothing more. 

To the contrary, mass transit systems can develop many effective 

countermeasures to make attacks more difficult, increase the likelihood of detection, minimize casualties and disruption and reduce 

panic. 

Many measures involve only modest expense. Improving liaison 

with state and local first responders, conducting vulnerability and 

security assessments, establishing emergency management plans, 

instituting preventive controls, holding tabletop exercises and fullscale drills, and putting in place procedures to handling bomb 

threats and left or suspicious objects are not particularly costly undertakings. 

Just this weekend, in fact, I met a retired New York City police 

officer who mentioned the possibility—I am going to ask this of the 

MTA witnesses today—of allowing retired police officers to ride free 

on mass transit. Certainly, in New York City, there are thousands 

and thousands of retired police officers in their 40s and 50s, all of 

whom are still armed and well trained. To have them on mass 

transit every day would, in effect, be at a cost of maybe $150 a 

month. You would be getting the service of a fully trained police 

officer. 

These are things that I think should be looked into. A lot of this, 

certainly the others I mentioned, have been done already before the 

London attacks. 

But also, it is important to realize that there are calls for new 

and costly programs, and some of them may well be necessary. But 

what I do not want to do is to repeat over the next several months, 

the next year in response to the London attacks, are many of the 

mistakes we made after 9/11 where a lot of good money was thrown 

at programs which turned out not to work. 

And also it is important to realize that federal assistance for 

mass transit has been considerable since September 11, 2001, and 

this does not include the substantial sums that state and local governments and transit agencies have not made available for transitrelated security purposes over the past several years. 
3

We need to ensure that the hundreds of millions and potentially 

billions of dollars that remain in the pipeline for transit and other 

homeland security needs are used most effectively. We need to 

quicken our pace implementing transit security enhancements, but 

we must be careful not to rush the process to the extent that we 

will repeat the kind of wasteful spending that we saw in the first 

responder programs after 9/11. 

And in that context, we have to ensure that these funds are used 

to achieve clear, measurable and risk-based standards of preparedness benchmarks, not just feel-good items that may sound good but 

not necessarily increase safety. So we have to have more technology, we have to have more training, and we have to ensure that 

whatever we spend our money on has a reasonably good chance of 

being effective and getting the job done. 

Over the past several years, beyond funding, both the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation 

have provided invaluable technical assistance to transit agencies in 

conducting vulnerability assessments and drafting emergency response plans and have offered specialized training and exercises for 

mass transit personnel. 

The purpose of our hearing today will be precisely on those activities as they relate to training to respond to terrorist attacks in 

a mass transit environment, which present unique challenges that 

we must be ready to meet. 

We have to ensure that no stone is left unturned. At the same 

time, we do not want to be, again, throwing good money after bad. 

We have to find out what works and what does not, where more 

research should be done, where there should be more technological 

advances made, and that really is what we look forward to hearing 

from our witnesses today. 

So we are fortunate to have some of our top national experts 

here. I thank you for being here. I look forward to your testimony. 

I look forward to the questioning from both sides of the aisle. 

And with that, I recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving the committee a chance to explore emergency response training for transit 

employees and emergency responders nationwide. 

Many on this committee, on both sides of the aisle, have spoken 

loudly and repeatedly over the last few years for greater 

prioritization to be assigned to transit security. And the recent 

heartbreaking events in London have certainly brought this issue 

to the forefront in our own minds. 

Our hearts go out to the victims and their families. England has 

been a stalwart ally in the global war on terrorism. They will find 

no better friend than the United States as it continues to recover 

from these tragic attacks. 

At home these attacks provide a grim reminder of the terror that 

can easily be carried out on American rail systems. For anybody 

who has ever taken the train, this comes as no surprise. 

The United States rail sector must cooperate closely with the Department of Homeland Security to identify vulnerabilities in our 

U.S. rail system and to apply countermeasures. Importantly, our 

nation’s transit employees and emergency responders must have 
4

the training they need, they personnel they require and the funding they depend upon to maintain at least a baseline level of readiness. 

My fear is at this time that the federal government is failing to 

provide appropriate assistance in those three regards. According to 

a transit security survey by the American Public Transportation 

Association, necessary rail and transit security measures nationwide are at approximately $6 billion. 

This includes investment needed for such vital items as cameras. 

Need I say the significance in London of those cameras. Communications systems, need I remind us where we were on 9/11 on 

interoperability. And also the operational costs of training and additional personnel. Yet over the last 3 years, the federal government has spent $256 

million to improve rail and transit security. Amazingly, the Senate 

has just voted to cut rail and transit grants by one-third. Figure 

that out. This is an amazing breach of responsibility and intelligence, in my mind. During this same timeframe, however, we spent $12 billion for aviation security. So that is $10 per passenger on airlines; one 

penny per passenger on the number of folks that use the ferry, the 

bus, the train, the light rail, as the chairman pointed out just a few 

moments ago. I think that this is a misguided approach. 

New Jersey transit, for example, in my state, is enormously serious about maintaining its security throughout its systems and has 

taken the necessary steps to address vulnerabilities. Since 9/11, 

New Jersey transit has expanded its uniform police force by more 

than 70 percent, provided awareness and safety training to frontline employees, issued passenger and employee safety advisories, 

began serving as first responders at transit facilities in light of the 

new demands on local police units and is now collaborating with 

the New Jersey State Police to improve patrolling onboard those 

trains, in stations and around those facilities. 

However, with only 209 police officers, 6 explosive-detecting canine teams to protect and secure more than 3,000 buses, 600 

trains, serving $750,000 weekday passengers, New Jersey transit 

neither has the resources nor the budget to address these additional security concerns. 

And I might say, Mr. Chairman, it is the same in all the transit 

systems that I have reviewed in this country. New Jersey transit 

is not alone. I am sure our witnesses today from New York, LA and 

the Washington metro authorities can elaborate further on that 

point. 

I look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses today to 

learn the level of training that should be taking place and to see 

what degree transit workers are involved and the training with 

first responders. Training and personnel remain two of the biggest 

transit security needs, and I suspect that as we move forward on 

this topic, it will become more and more clear that there is simply 

not enough dedicated funding for mass transit security. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing us together today. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. 

The witnesses in our first panel today are Mr. Robert Jamison, 

Deputy Administrator of the Federal Transit Administration, and 
5

Mr. Tim Beres, the Director of Preparedness Programs Division, 

Office for Domestic Preparedness, Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness in the Department of Homeland Security. 

And we will lead off with Mr. Beres. 

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY BERES 

Mr. BERES. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member 

Pascrell and members of the committee. My name is Tim Beres, 

and I serve as director of Preparedness Programs Division within 

the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, the Office for Domestic Preparedness. 

Mr. KING. Can I interrupt for 1 second? If you can try to keep 

your statements to 5 minutes, we will certainly make your full 

statement part of the record. Thank you. 

Mr. BERES. Absolutely. 

ODP’s mission is to provide assistance and support to our state 

and local emergency prevention and response partners. We achieve 

this objective through financial assistance, training, exercise and 

technical assistance programs. A number of these programs directly support prevention and preparedness activities related to our 

nation’s transit systems. 

To be sure, our role is part of a larger federal effort to secure our 

nation’s various transportation systems, including aviation security, maritime security and surface transportation security. 

I am pleased to be joined by Robert Jamison from the Federal 

Transit Administration. We will discuss his agency’s important role 

in securing our nation’s transit systems. 

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Department 

has awarded approximately $8.6 billion in assistance through the 

State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative, of which funding can be applied to the purchase 

of equipment for the prevention, detection and response to attacks 

on transit systems. These funds can also be used to support exercises that test state and local emergency prevention response to 

terrorist events, as well as training designed to develop proficiency 

in preventing and respond to terrorist acts. 

ODP has administrative authority over a number of DHS transit 

security programs. We have designed these programs working in 

conjunction with our DHS and other federal partners, like FDA, to 

focus programmatic decisions and funding allocation decisions 

based on a more robust risk-based methodology. 

To this end, we recently announced the award of more than $134 

million under the fiscal year 2005 Transit Security Grant Program. 

This year’s program also places a strong emphasis on prevention 

and detection relative to improvised explosive devices. 

Transit systems selected for funding under the fiscal year 2005 

Transit Security Grant Program must conduct a risk assessment 

and use this data to create a security and emergency preparedness 

plan that specifically identifies how the transit agency intends to 

address any shortfall in improvised explosive device or other prevention detection or response capabilities identified in the assessment. 
6

In addition, the transit agency is eligible for the 2005 grants and 

must also participate in a Regional Transit Security Working 

Group. The purpose of the group is to develop a regional transit security strategy, which is intended to integrate individual agency 

needs into a regional perspective in order to holistically address 

identified transportation security vulnerabilities. 

In addition to providing financial assistance, ODP also provides 

extensive technical assistance to ensure that state and locals can 

more effectively develop their security programs and expend federal 

homeland security resources in an effective manner. 

As part of this overall effort in this area, ODP has developed the 

Mass Transit Technical Assistance Program to provide mass transit agencies with a risk management instrument to make resource 

allocation decisions. Our technical assistance can also assist states, 

urban areas and eligible transit systems to organize and form their 

Regional Transit Security Working Groups and develop and manage their regional transit security strategy. 

From March 2004 through November 2005, ODP will support 11 

exercises specifically involving mass transit and transportation systems. Of these, ODP provided direct support in either the planning 

or the execution for eight of the exercises. The remaining three exercises were conducted with the Department of Homeland Security 

funds. 

These exercises were conducted in a number of locations across 

the country, including the National Capital Region and New York 

City. And since 2002, ODP has directly supported 413 preparedness exercises across the country. And our latest data indicated 

that states are using their fiscal year 2004 State Homeland Security Grant Program and Urban Area Security Initiative funds to 

support 1,198 exercise-related projects from planning of an exercise 

to overtime costs associated with the actual conduct of an exercise. 

In New York City, ODP provided direct support to Operation 

Transit SAFE, a full-scale exercise in May of 2004 that simulated 

terrorist scenarios involving the detonation of two explosive devices, each placed in a small backpack on the northbound and 

southbound Metropolitan Transportation Authority subway trains 

at the Bowling Green station in Lower Manhattan. 

Among the preeminent needs of the emergency prevention and 

response community is training. Through a number of different 

course levels as well as delivery methods, ODP offers a wide array 

of courses for a broad spectrum of public safety disciplines. To meet 

these needs, ODP’s Training Division offers 50 planning, response 

and incidence management courses specific to the disciplines that 

would respond to a transit/rail incident as part of a larger WMD 

terrorism curriculum. 

These courses build the foundation for all types of responses. An 

example of this is the prevention of and response to suicide bombing incidents. 

In addition, ODP, in partnership with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, is developing a suite of intelligence training 

courses for state and local responders. 

The State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness 

Citizen Corps Program is also engaging citizens in the transit safety and security of their community. In Washington D.C., the Metro 
7

Citizens Corps is one example of how this community effort can 

work. 

The transit police assigned to Washington D.C.’s subway system 

launched the Metro Citizen Corps on December 1, 2004. Metro 

transit police officers, metro employees and a group of area residents have already participated in specialized training with their 

local jurisdictions, participate in day-long interactive coordination 

train-the-trainer sessions. 

In closing, ODP has and will continue to provide significant resources and support to secure the nation’s transit systems. 

Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any questions you 

have. 

[The statement of Mr. Beres follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIM BERES

Chairman King, Ranking Member Pascrell, and Members of the Committee, my 

name is Tim Beres, and I serve as Director of the Preparedness Programs Division 

within the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness’ 

Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP). The Preparedness Programs Division includes a Transportation Infrastructure Security Division, which administers a number of programs specifically designed to enhance transit and passenger rail security. 

I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss our efforts to secure our Nation’s 

transit and passenger rail systems. 

ODP has provided significant support to our Nation’s emergency prevention and 

response community since its establishment in 1998. As a component of the Office 

of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, ODP’s mission is 

to provide assistance and support to our State and local emergency prevention and 

response partners. We achieve this objective through financial assistance programs, 

including the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), as well as the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program. Our role is much broader, though, than providing financial assistance. We 

also administer training, exercise and technical assistance programs. A number of 

these programs directly support prevention and preparedness activities related to 

rail and mass transit systems. To be sure, our role is part of a larger Federal effort 

to secure our Nation’s various transportation systems, including aviation security, 

maritime security and surface transportation security.

Financial Assistance Programs 

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland Security has awarded more than $250 million in grants specifically for transit security. 

In FY 2003, under the UASI Transit System Security Grant Program, ODP awarded 

$67.8 million to nineteen transit systems for security enhancements. Funding allocation decisions were based solely on ridership, which at the time was the only reliable risk factor. In FY 2004, ODP provided an additional $49.7 million to twentyfive major transit systems for security enhancements under the UASI. For these 

funds, the Department added the additional criteria of track mileage to ridership 

to make final funding allocations. 

In recognition of the need to secure our Nation’s critical infrastructure sector, including mass transit and the transportation systems, the Administration proposed 

consolidating multiple stove-piped programs (Port Security, Rail/Transit Security, 

Intercity Bus, Trucking Industry Security and Buffer Zone Protection) into a Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program (TIPP). The request included $600 million 

for TIPP, which would allow the Department the flexibility to allocate preparedness 

grants to the highest risk infrastructure sites, including to our high risk transit operations, based upon the most recent threat information, rather than attempting to 

create numerous specific programs with a level of funding that may prove to be too 

little or too much given the risk environment. 

ODP recently announced an additional amount of more than $134 million under 

the FY 2005 Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP). The overarching goal of this 

program is to create a sustainable, risk-based effort for the protection of regional 

transit systems and the commuting public from terrorism, especially explosives and 

non-conventional threats that would cause major loss of life and severe disruption. 

This year’s program also places a strong emphasis on prevention and detection relative to improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as chemical, biological, radio-
8

logical, and nuclear agents. Of the $134 million, $107,900,000 was awarded for security enhancement for rail transit systems; $22,357,076 for security enhancements 

for intra-city bus systems; and $3,887,161 for ferry systems security. 

Under the FY 2005 TSGP program, the Department distributed rail security 

funds using a more robust risk-based formula. The formula for rail transit funding 

was based on several factors, including ridership, track mileage, the number of stations, and threat, as well as service to a defined UASI jurisdiction. Likewise, the 

formula for intra-city bus funding was based on ridership and location within a 

UASI jurisdiction. The funds dedicated to ferry system security were distributed 

through a competitive process, but eligible applicants were determined based on ridership and a location within a UASI jurisdiction. 

Throughout the program development and application process, ODP has worked 

closely with a number of governmental and non-governmental agencies to ensure an 

appropriate level of subject matter expertise and to solicit feedback from our Federal, State and industry partners. We have worked collaboratively with several DHS 

agencies, including officials from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), 

the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP), the 

United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the Science and Technology Directorate 

(S&T), as well as the Department of Transportation’s Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). We have also worked closely 

with State transportation officials from New Jersey, New York, and Washington, 

DC, and with industry groups, including the Association of American Railroads and 

the American Public Transportation Association. 

Further, a major focus of the FY 2005 TSGP is to establish and sustain a riskbased, regional planning process to ensure that transportation security priorities are 

addressed in a systematic, risk-based manner. To this end, a key enhancement to 

the FY 2005 TSGP is the requirement that transit agencies receiving funds through 

the program work with the states, urban areas and other transit systems in their 

defined region to develop a Regional Transit Security Strategy (RTSS). As the owners and/or operators of infrastructure that is vital to the well being of the states 

and urban areas they serve, it is imperative that transit system security efforts be 

incorporated into, and reflective of, regional preparedness planning efforts. 

Transit systems selected for funding under the FY 2005 TSGP must conduct a 

risk assessment and use this data to create a Security and Emergency Preparedness 

Plan (SEPP) that specifically identifies how the transit agency intends to address 

any shortfall in IED or other prevention, detection, and response capabilities identified in the needs assessment. In addition, the transit agencies eligible for the FY 

2005 TSGP must also participate in a Regional Transit Security Working Group 

(RTSWG) for the purpose of developing the RTSS. The RTSS—or Regional Transit 

Security Strategy—is intended to integrate individual agency needs into a regional 

perspective in order to holistically address identified transportation security 

vulnerabilities. The Department requires that all working groups include representation from the applicable state(s) and urban area(s) served by the transit systems 

receiving funds, and it is strongly recommended that other transit agencies not eligible to receive funds through the FY 2005 TSGP, but whose systems intersect with 

those of the grant recipients, also participate in the RTSWG process. In addition, 

for transit systems whose operations intersect with those of Amtrak in the Northeast Corridor and in Chicago, a representative of Amtrak must be included in the 

RTSWG, and close coordination with Amtrak on the expenditure of funds for security enhancements at shared facilities must occur. 

It is the Department’s intent that that RTSS serve as the integration point between the individual, risk-based SEPPs, and the overall security goals and objectives of the region. Therefore, the RTSS must demonstrate a clear linkage to the 

applicable state and urban area homeland security strategies developed or currently 

being revised. The SEPPs and the RTSS will serve as the basis on which funding 

is allocated to address regional transit security priorities, and the vehicle through 

which transit agencies may justify and access other funding and resources available 

on a region-wide basis through the UASI program. The RTSS should identify the 

overall vision of regional transit preparedness with specific goals and objectives essential to achieving the vision. The RTSS will serve as an overarching strategy for 

the region with mode-specific goals and objectives as they relate to Planning, Organization, Equipment, Training, and Exercises (POETE). Given the focus of this 

year’s program, each RTSS must also specifically address current and required detection and response capabilities relative to IEDs, as well as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear prevention, detection and response capabilities, and the actions necessary to address any gaps. In a similar fashion, our FY 2005 Homeland 

Security Grant Program application kit and guidance requires each jurisdiction to 
9

conduct one FSE utilizing an IED. We are strongly encouraging States to incorporate a mass transit component into the exercise scenario. 

ODP will work with an interagency Strategy Review Board (SRB) consisting of 

representatives from DHS Directorates and Offices (such as IAIP, TSA, and USCG), 

and representatives of other federal agencies (such as the FTA) to evaluate the 

strategies and make recommendations for approval or enhancement. Further, as the 

expenditure of funds is tied to approval of the strategies, ODP has set a goal of completing all review steps (including routing and approval notification) within 10 business days of receipt of the RTSS. 

While the TSGP provides support and assistance to State, local, and in some 

cases, private companies, the FY 2005 Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program provides funds and technical assistance to Amtrak for a risk assessment and 

security enhancements. Under this program, ODP awarded $7.1 million to Amtrak. 

Of these funds, $6,373,730 is for grants for security enhancements along Amtrak’s 

Northeast Corridor and at its hub in Chicago, Illinois. These represent the most 

highly travel passenger routes in the Nation. An additional $726,270 will be used 

to provide technical assistance in the development of a risk-based assessment of 

Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor and Chicago area operations. This assessment will 

help Amtrak identify and prioritize needs for security countermeasures, emergency 

response capabilities, and management of security enhancements. 

In order to promote the regionally-based approach to preparedness and security, 

the expenditure of these funds by Amtrak is contingent upon having an updated Security and Emergency Preparedness Plan, which is a comprehensive plan that provides written policies and procedures to guide activities for homeland security and 

emergency preparedness. Amtrak must also coordinate its funding allocation decisions with the RTSSs being developed in the National Capital Region, Philadelphia, 

New York, Boston, and Chicago. To facilitate this coordination, Amtrak is required 

to provide a representative to the Regional Transit Security Working Groups responsible for the development of the RTSS in these urban areas. 

Further, it should be noted that since September 11, 2001, the Department has 

awarded more than $8.3 billion in assistance through the State Homeland Security 

Grant Program and the UASI, of which funding can be applied to the purchase of 

equipment for the prevention and detection of attacks on transit systems. These 

funds can also be used to support exercises that test State and local emergency prevention and response to terrorist events, as well as training designed to develop proficiency in preventing and responding to terrorist acts. Data from the FY 2004 Biannual Strategy Implementation Report, which captures how States are spending their 

homeland security funds, indicate that 23 States directed more than $34 million toward transit-related security projects. Further, initial FY 2005 data from 39 States 

indicate that they plan to devote more than $5.7 million for transit security-related 

projects. 

Also, through the FY 2005 Buffer Zone Protection Program, the Department has 

made more than $90 million available for the protection of critical infrastructure 

and key resources. Under this program, we know that States are eligible to receive 

more than $5 million to assist in enhancing security at 102 sites in the transportation sector. 

The 103 sites in the transportation sector can be further broken down as follows: 

• Bridges: 47 sites 

• Busing: 2 sites 

• Ferries: 4 sites 

• Railways: 18 sites 

• Tunnels: 11 sites 

• Mass Transit (subways): 21 sites 

The BZPP funds will greatly enhance preparedness and protection efforts at our 

Nation’s most critical infrastructure and key resources, including those within the 

Nation’s transportation system.

Technical Assistance 

In addition to providing financial assistance, ODP also provides extensive technical assistance (TA) to ensure that States and localities can more effectively develop their security programs and expend Federal homeland security resources in 

an effective manner. Technical assistance is a process of providing help to resolve 

a problem and/or create innovative approaches to prevention, response, and recovery. TA seeks to provide state and local jurisdictions with assistance that can accomplish one or more of the following objectives: identify a problem; address an 

identified problem; address items in a corrective action plan (CAP) from a completed 

exercise; and, fill ‘‘gaps’’ between equipment, training and exercise programs. 
10

TA deliveries may take a variety of forms that can be combined or modified to 

meet the specific needs of each requesting state/local jurisdiction. As part of its overall effort in this area, ODP has developed a Mass Transit TA Program to specifically 

address the unique security challenges facing transit systems. 

To support the FY 2005 TSGP, ODP is providing TA designed to assist states, 

urban areas and eligible transit systems organize and form their RTSWGs, develop 

their RTSS and effectively manage the implementation of the strategy through the 

FY 2005 TSGP and other available resources. This assistance includes workshops 

and a facilitated strategy development session. 

In addition, for those transit systems that need assistance in conducting the required system-wide risk assessment necessary for development of the SEPP, ODP’s 

Mass Transit TA program also offers an ODP Technical Assistance Team to support 

the agency with a risk-based prioritization assessment. The overall risk assessment 

process includes implementing the ODP Special Needs Jurisdiction Tool Kit, which 

allows mass transit agencies to identify and prioritize security countermeasures and 

emergency response capability needs based on terrorist threats and relative risk as 

determined by both national and local authorities. This process enables agencies to: 

1. Prioritize security countermeasures and emergency response capability needs 

based on terrorist threats and risk; 

2. Develop a road map for future mass transit agency funding allocations for 

terrorist attack risk reduction; and, 

3. Prepare for future Federal funding requirements. 

To date, ODP has completed comprehensive risk assessment deliveries for seven 

(7) major transit systems, including the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, New Jersey Transit, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, and 

the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority. ODP is currently providing this 

assistance to an additional twelve (12) agencies, including the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA). 

In addition, lessons learned from its application nationwide are being used to 

identify other areas of needs and drive the development of additional assistance programs through a spiral development process. For example, ODP is currently piloting 

a new TA program with New Jersey Transit, a major transit system in the Northeast. Once fielded, this program will assist transit agencies with development of continuity of operations plans, a major area of need identified in the risk assessments 

conducted to date.

Exercises: 

From March 2004 through November 2005, ODP will have supported 11 exercises 

involving mass transit systems. Of these, ODP provided direct support in either the 

planning or the execution for eight of the exercises. The remaining three exercises 

were conducted with the State’s Department of Homeland Security funds. These exercises have been conducted in a number of locations across the country, including 

the NCR and New York City. 

All exercises were conducted using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). ODP has implemented the HSEEP to provide a means to 

assess terrorism prevention, response, and recovery capabilities at the Federal, 

State, and local levels. HSEEP is a threat- and performance-based exercise program 

that provides common doctrine and policy for the planning, conduct, and evaluation 

of exercises. In an attempt to standardize the language and concepts that have been 

adopted and utilized by various agencies and organizations in the exercise planning 

process, the HSEEP doctrine was designed to ensure consistent use of standard terminology and processes throughout all exercises. 

For example, in September 2004, a Command Post Exercise (CPX) was conducted, 

which simulated multiple terrorist bombing attacks, a bubonic plague outbreak, extreme heat, and rolling blackouts. The CPX was held at more than thirty command 

centers and involved hundreds of command personnel throughout the NCR. The exercise involved 700 players and 350 observers, including Federal, State, and local 

agencies. Participating Federal agencies included the FBI, the Federal Protective 

Service, the Pentagon Force Protection Agency, the U.S. Capitol Police, and the U.S. 

Supreme Court Police. The DC, Virginia, and Maryland Emergency Management 

Agencies were involved, as well as the DC Metropolitan Police Department. Additionally, surrounding counties from Virginia and Maryland were involved. In addition to these Federal, State and local agencies, Baltimore Gas & Electric, Dominion 

Virginia Power, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority participated in this exercise. The participants’ actions were guided by NCR CPX guidance 

procedures, participating agencies’ plans, policies, and procedures, and ODP’s 

HSEEP guidelines. 
11

In New York City, ODP provided direct support for the Operation Transit SAFE 

Full-Scale Exercise in May 2004. This simulated terrorist scenario involved the detonation of two explosive devices, each placed in a small backpack on northbound 

and southbound Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) subway trains at the 

Bowling Green Station in lower Manhattan. Over 500 responders participated, including local EMS providers and medical centers. In addition to multiple New York 

City agencies, the FBI, the Greater New York Chapter of the American Red Cross, 

the Salvation Army, and Con Edison participated as well. The participants’ actions 

were guided by the Operation SAFE Planning Team, emergency operations plans, 

the New York City Office of Emergency Management, and ODP’s HSEEP guidance. 

ODP is currently working with FTA and TSA to examine ways to leverage exercise programs already developed and funded by these agencies, and to ensure coordination of our efforts.

Training: 

Among the preeminent needs of the emergency prevention and response community is training. Through a number of different course levels (awareness, operations, 

planning, and management) as well as delivery methods (classroom,web instruction, 

etc.), ODP offers a wide array of courses for a broad spectrum of public safety disciplines. 

To meet these needs, the Training Division offers fifty planning, response, and incident management courses specific to the disciplines that would respond to transit/

rail incidents as part of a larger WMD/terrorism curriculum. These courses build 

the foundation for all types of responses whether man-made or natural. Examples 

of these are: Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings (awareness level); Incident 

Response to Terrorist Bombings (operations level); and Prevention of and Response 

to Suicide Bombing Incidents. These courses are designed to prepare emergency responders to perform effectively and safely during bombing incidents at all locations 

of an incident scene. The courses include detailed instruction on IEDs, explosive materials, and explosive effects, and comprehensive training on critical response actions during pre- and post-detonation operations. Extensive field training, including 

explosives effects demonstrations, are included. 

In addition, these courses address actions that emergency responders can take to 

prevent and/or deter terrorist attacks involving energetic materials. All of these 

courses include train-the-trainer programs to assist in sustaining and multiplying 

the effectiveness of deliveries throughout the nation. These examples are offered to 

multiple disciplines [Law Enforcement (including Transit Police), Emergency Medical Services, Fire Service, HazMat, Public Works, and public Safety Communications]. In addition, ODP, in partnership with the Federal Law Enforcement Training 

Center (FLETC), is developing a suite of Intelligence training courses for state and 

local responders. This suite of courses will present information to include intelligence gathering, the intelligence process (including data mining), types of intelligence, channels of communication, intelligence networks, and security of information and documentation of intelligence information. 

In FY 2004, building upon its existing capacity and capability, ODP awarded more 

than $33 million under the Competitive Training Grant Program (CTGP). Fourteen 

training programs were selected through a competitive, peer-panel review process 

which identified innovative training programs to address six issue areas designated 

by ODP as areas for increased attention. These areas were identified based on a 

trend analysis of the State Homeland Security Strategies submitted to ODP earlier 

in FY 2004. This analysis sought to identify shared training gaps among the 56 U.S. 

States and Territories. 

One of these awards was for the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation 

Authority (MTA). Under this award, MTA, in conjunction with the American Public 

Transportation Association (APTA), is developing a turn-key curriculum for private 

and non-sworn transportation security staff to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. Examples of specific topic areas 

within the curriculum are: Principles of Security and Counter-Terrorism in Public 

Transportation; Physical Security in Public Transportation; Security Surveillance in 

Public Transportation; and Threat Analysis, Assessment, and Identification. The 

MTA project is an example of coordination, uniting county supervisors, elected officials, the LA Sheriff’s Department, and union representation behind the common 

goal of enhanced terrorism prevention and preparedness specifically for mass transit 

security. Once completed, this curriculum will be distributed nationwide through 

APTA and ODP to all state and local public transportation agencies. 

In FY 2005, ODP issued a second Competitive Training Grant Program solicitation. Under the FY 2005 solicitation applicants again submitted proposals based on 

issue areas identified in State Homeland Security Strategies and more recently com-
12

pleted Initial Strategy Implementation Plans (ISIPs) provided by the States and territories. Of the six issue areas identified from the State Strategies and ISIPs, one 

focused on transit security: Training to enhance the transit systems’ (rail, bus, ferry) 

capacity to prevent and/or manage the consequences of terrorist attacks. 

We are currently reviewing the findings and recommendations of the CTGP peer 

review panels held this month and plan to announce proposals selected for funding 

in the coming weeks. We will keep this Committee posted on these selections and 

provide additional information as it becomes available.

Citizen Corps: 

SLGCP’s Citizen Corps program is engaging citizens in the transit safety and security of their community. The Washington, D.C. Metro Citizen Corps is one example of how this community effort can work. Transit police assigned to Washington 

D.C.’s subway system launched the Metro Citizen Corps on September 1, 2004. 

Metro Transit Police officers, Metro employees and a group of area residents who 

have already participated in specialized training within their local jurisdictions participate in day-long interactive coordination Train-the-Trainer sessions. The citizen 

trainers are known as area Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) coordinators and are from the District of Columbia, Virginia and Maryland. CERT, a Citizen Corps program partner, educates people about disaster preparedness for hazards that may impact their area and trains them in basic disaster response skills. 

Using the training learned in the classroom and during exercises, CERT members 

can assist others in their neighborhood or workplace following an event when professional responders are not immediately available to help. 

The D.C. CERT program was the first regional partner to participate in the training. Through the program, Metro Transit Police train Metro Citizen Corps volunteers in a number of different areas, including rail safety, system evacuation routes, 

and tunnel walks. They also receive information on the location of emergency trip 

stations and how to access them in case of an emergency. Already more than 60 

citizens, all regular commuters, have gone through the training. 

SLGCP’s Citizen Corps program is also exploring a nationwide partnership with 

the Department of Transportation’s Transit Watch program. Transit Watch is a nationwide safety and security awareness program designed to encourage the active 

participation of transit passengers and employees in working together to maintain 

a safe transit environment. It provides information and instructions to transit passengers and employees to ensure that they know what to do and whom to contact 

in the event of an emergency in a transit setting. The Transit Watch Toolkit containing a downloadable CD, fact sheet and other materials is available at no-charge 

on the Transit Watch website at http://transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/Security/

TransitWatch/default.asp.

Conclusion: 

In closing, ODP has and will continue to provide significant resources and support 

to secure our Nation’s passenger and transit systems. The system-wide plans under 

development will help identify and address key security needs to make our Nation’s 

transit system safer and function effectively. The Department, working alongside 

our Federal, State, and non-governmental partners, will continue our tireless efforts 

to ensure the safety of the commuting public and the transit sector. 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide information on the important work that 

the Office for Domestic Preparedness is undertaking to secure our Nation’s passenger and rail transit systems.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Beres. 

Mr. Jamison? 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT JAMISON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, 

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Mr. JAMISON. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on behalf 

of the Federal Transit Administration regarding the security of 

America’s transit systems and, in particular, the critical role of 

training and emergency preparedness. 

We are all dismayed by the recent tragic and despicable acts of 

violence in London. Our hearts go out to the victims, their families 
13

and their countrymen who, stood shoulder to shoulder with America in the wake of September 11. 

July 7 was a grim reminder of how difficult it is to balance economic prosperity, our freedoms and our security. 

Mass transit systems are essential to the freedom of movement 

that American cherish and enjoy. Every workday, transit and commuter rail systems move more than 14 million passengers in the 

United States. To do that effectively, transit must be open and accessible. 

The very characteristics of public transit systems that make 

them convenient and reliable also make providing effective security 

an ongoing challenge. Therefore, even as we continue to improve 

the security of our Nation’s transit systems, we must not lose sight 

of the need to improve our ability to respond to emergencies in 

order to save lives and minimize injuries. 

Immediately following September 11, FTA undertook an aggressive nationwide security program. With the assistance of national 

and international security experts, FTA identified and has focused 

on three important priorities: public awareness, employee training 

and emergency preparedness. 

Reports from both Madrid and London confirm that our focus is 

well-founded. Although opportunities to improve U.S. transit security still exist, we know that capital expenditures alone are not 

enough to assure security. 

Perimeter fencing, securing yards, tunnels and bridges, and even 

extensive use of security cameras did not and would not have prevented either the London or Madrid attacks. The fact is: good transit security is grounded in operations. 

Since September 11, the use and effectiveness of public awareness messages has significantly increased. Nevertheless, in most 

transit systems, there is still room for improvement. In addition to 

its important role of reporting suspicious activity and unattended 

bags, the public must be familiar with the operation of emergency 

exit doors, understand emergency evacuation procedures for each 

location on their route, and be prepared to facilitate a prompt and 

effective emergency response. 

FTA will be focusing its efforts in the future on improving the 

standard public awareness templates to help local transit agencies 

incorporate this important information. In addition, we are developing standard protocols for the content and frequency of security 

announcements for each Homeland Security threat level. 

The actions taken by transit employees in the critical moments 

immediately after an attack or an emergency can significantly reduce the severity of injuries and the number of deaths that result. 

Therefore, there is simply no substitute for transit employee training that builds the skills to prevent, detect and respond to security 

threats. These skills can be acquired through rigorous emergency 

planning, emergency drills and testing, and extensive training. 

Since September 11, over 77,000 transit employees from across 

the Nation have received FTA-funded security-related training. We 

will continue to focus on expanding the reach of important new 

training in the latest international counterterrorism techniques, 

operational protocols for chemical and biological agents, and terrorist activity recognition and reaction. 
14

While transit employee training is essential, there is no substitute for a good emergency response plan that has been tried and 

tested by the full array of emergency responders in the community. 

To assist in building those relationships and developing community-wide response plans, FTA, in conjunction with Office for Domestic Preparedness, has sponsored 18 ‘‘connecting communities’’ 

forums. 

These forums brought together transit, law enforcement, fire, 

medical, city and county officials for 3 days of regional planning 

and response exercises. In fact, I was pleased to participate with 

Congressman Reichert at our forum in Seattle when he served as 

the sheriff of King County, Washington. 

In addition, to date, 77 transit agencies have conducted full-scale 

emergency response drills funded by the Federal Transit Administration. FTA is currently updating its guidance on how to conduct 

emergency drills based upon the results of those drills. In addition, 

we plan to provide follow-up grants to conduct more full-scale 

drills. 

While we know that there is no substitute for practicing emergency response drills in an operating environment, we continue to 

look for ways to improve and practice skills more frequently at a 

lower cost than full-scale community drills. Therefore, FTA has piloted web-based emergency drills in Boston, Portland, Seattle, San 

Francisco, Rock Island, Illinois and Montgomery County, Maryland. 

This new approach will provide transit agencies with new tools for 

conducting tabletop drills more effectively, efficiently and 

affordably. 

Mr. Chairman, thanks in large measure to the efforts of the Nation’s transit operators, transit is more secure and better prepared 

to respond to emergencies than it has ever been. FTA will continue 

to support transit agencies throughout the Nation by providing security-related training for transit employees, materials and guidance to educate transit passengers and improve the emergency response planning and procedures. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today, and I will be 

pleased to answer any questions and to go into more detail about 

our programs and policies. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Jamison follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT D. JAMISON

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 

to testify before you today on behalf of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) 

regarding the security of America’s transit systems and in particular the critical role 

of training and emergency preparedness. 

We are all dismayed by the tragic and despicable acts of violence in London on 

July 7 and July 21. Our hearts go out to the victims, their families, and their countrymen who stood shoulder-to-shoulder with America in the wake of September 11. 

July 7 was a grim reminder of how difficult it is to balance economic prosperity, 

freedoms, and security. 

Mass transit systems are essential to the freedom of movement that Americans 

cherish and enjoy. They permit large numbers of people to travel rapidly and efficiently between home, work, and other activities on a daily basis. To do that effectively, transit must be open and accessible. 

Every workday, transit and commuter rail systems move more than 14 million 

passengers in the United States. In two weeks, transit and commuter rail systems 

carry more passengers than Amtrak carries in a year. In a single month, transit 

and commuter rail systems carry more passengers than U.S. airlines carry in a 

year. On a daily basis, 700,000 to 800,000 people take the Long Island Rail Road, 
15

Amtrak, NJTransit, and the New York City subways into Penn Station, and a similar number use Metro North Railroad and the New York City subway through 

Grand Central Terminal. • Prior to their destruction on September 11, the World Trade Center and Fulton Street subway stations handled over 380,000 people each day—the equivalent of the entire population of Miami, Sacramento, or Pittsburgh. 

• In 2004, 251 million trips were taken on Washington DC’s Metrorail. 

The very characteristics of public transit systems that make them convenient and 

reliable, also make providing effective security an ongoing challenge. Each year, 

more than 2.7 billion passengers use over 1,000 stations to access America’s heavy 

rail stations. Although passenger screening devices similar to those used in airports 

have been successfully tested in locations with limited access points and relatively 

few passengers, the widespread application of current passenger screening devices 

on mass transit—even on heavy rail—is unrealistic. During peak periods in New 

York’s Penn Station, for example, more than 1,500 people per minute would have 

to be screened to maintain current levels of mobility and access. Therefore, even as 

we continue to improve the security of our Nation’s transit systems, we must not 

lose sight of the need to improve our ability to respond to emergencies in order to 

save lives and minimize injuries.

FTA and America’s Transit Systems 

America’s public transportation is provided by more than 6,000 locally governed 

and operated transit systems. These systems range from very small bus-only operations in small and rural communities, to very large multi-modal systems in urban 

areas that may combine bus, light rail, subway, and commuter rail operations. 

The Federal Transit Administration provides capital funding to States and urbanized areas to develop new and extensions to existing public transportation systems, 

and to improve and maintain existing systems. Smaller urbanized areas with less 

than 200,000 population, may use FTA formula funds for limited support of their 

operations. However, FTA does not have regulatory authority over the day-to-day 

operations of transit agencies. 

Historically, FTA has shaped the practices of transit agencies through its training 

programs, the development of best practices and guidance, and by conducting research that is critical to the industry. Since September 11, we have used all of these 

techniques to significantly influence the security practices of transit agencies.

Response to September 11 

Immediately following September 11, 2001, FTA undertook an aggressive nationwide security program and led the initial Federal effort on transit security. With 

the creation of the Transportation Security Administration in 2001 and the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, lead responsibility for the Federal Government’s activities in the area of public transit security now rests by statute with 

DHS. DOT recognizes that DHS has primary responsibility for transportation security, and that DOT plays a supporting role, providing technical assistance and assisting DHS when possible with implementation of its security policies, as allowed 

by DOT statutory authority and available resources. While TSA is the lead federal 

agency for ensuring the security of all transportation modes, as part of its own authority, FTA conducts non-regulatory safety and security activities, including safety 

and security related training, research, and demonstration projects. 

With the assistance of national and international security experts, FTA identified 

and has focused on three important priorities: employee training, public awareness, 

and emergency preparedness, and we continue to work with our DHS partners in 

all of these areas. 

FTA’s initial response included conducting threat and vulnerability assessments 

in 37 large transit systems, 30 of which carry almost 90 percent of all transit riders. 

These assessments, conducted with the full cooperation and support of every transit 

agency involved and at no cost to the transit agencies, formed the basis of our security efforts. The assessments considered the entire transportation system and network in each area, not just the physical assets of one mode or site. Each assessment 

identified high risk and high consequence assets; evaluated security gaps; made recommendations to reduce security risks to acceptable levels; educated transit agencies on threat and vulnerability analysis; and reviewed agencies’ emergency response plans, particularly their degree of coordination with emergency responders 

throughout the region. 

Based on these assessments, FTA sent technical assistance teams to 46 transit 

agencies, and will begin four additional technical assistance visits in the next few 

months. These teams help transit agencies strengthen their security and emergency 

preparedness plans; implement immediate operational security improvements; and 

offer tailored assistance based on threat assessments. The results have also been 
16

utilized by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to assess the relative risks 

and requirements in the transit environment. Further, as part of a $3 million program involving 83 transit agencies, FTA funded emergency response drills conducted in conjunction with local fire, police, and other emergency responders. 

In 2002, to help guide transit agency priorities, FTA issued its Top 20 Security 

Action Item List to improve transit safety and security operations, particularly with 

regard to employee training, public awareness, and emergency preparedness. Since 

that time, the implementation of these action items by the 30 largest transit agencies has been one of four core accountabilities of every FTA senior executive, and 

I am pleased to report that FTA has achieved its goals in this area every year. 

In addition, to address concerns identified through its threat and vulnerability assessments, FTA developed and disseminated standard protocols for responding to 

chemical or biological incidents in rail tunnels and transit vehicle environments. 

More recently, FTA has developed Security Design Considerations for use by transit 

agencies as they design or redesign infrastructure, communications, access control 

systems, and other transit system components. Important considerations include designing stations for easy detection, so people cannot leave objects hidden out of 

sight; separating public and private spaces in facilities, so that access to controls 

and equipment can be restricted; and designing facilities for easy decontamination 

and recovery operations. FTA is incorporating security design as a component of the 

New Starts development and evaluation process. 

Since 9/11, FTA has also significantly improved its ability to communicate with 

transit agencies. We now utilize a voice system known as Dialogics to communicate 

security messages verbally to the general managers and security chiefs at the 30 

largest transit agencies. This system, which requires an affirmative acknowledgement that the message has been received, has been utilized extensively by both 

DHS and FTA in recent weeks. In addition, we maintain and utilize the capability 

to communicate electronically with the general managers and security chiefs of the 

100 largest transit agencies. 

We recognize that good intelligence must be America’s first line of defense against 

terrorism, and FTA has worked diligently with our partners to improve intelligence 

sharing in the transit industry. FTA funded and worked with the American Public 

Transportation Association to create the Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC), which is used by transit agencies throughout 

the country to obtain and share intelligence information that is specific to the industry. This system provides two-way communication between the intelligence community and the transit industry, as well as transit-specific intelligence analysis. The 

ST-ISAC is located at the Transportation Security Operations Center, TSA’s 24/7 

communications center that provides real time data on potential threats throughout 

all modes of transportation. In addition, FTA worked with the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) to enable transit agencies to participate on their local or regional 

FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), giving nearly all of the 30 largest transit 

agencies access to real-time intelligence information regarding their community and 

the ability to contribute information they may have regarding threats to their own 

operations.

Response to London Attacks 

In response to the London terror attacks, transit agencies across the country implemented ‘‘Orange Alert’’ protective measures, even before the threat level was officially raised. This quick response was a direct result of the extensive work done in 

identifying best practices, developing security-related guidance, and working collaboratively to plan and test emergency response procedures. 

Among the specific protective measures implemented by the 30 largest transit 

agencies immediately following the London attacks were: 

• Deployment of bomb-sniffing dogs to patrol transit stations; 

• More frequent reminders to passengers about how to identify and report suspicious activities and behaviors; 

• Deployment of transit police to the local police department command center; 

and 

• Deployment of additional transit agency staff and law enforcement personnel 

to increase patrols and visibility in public areas. 

In addition, I am pleased to report that DHS and FTA worked cooperatively for 

the benefit and safety of transit riders across the Nation. FTA provided input to 

DHS in the development of a DHS/FBI Joint Advisory regarding recommended 

measures for mass transit and passenger rail systems. DHS and FTA also consulted 

on the alert timing, level, and actions; utilized shared communication systems to 

reach out immediately to our transit agency partners; and met jointly with transit 

agency leaders via teleconference. 
17

As you know, the prevention of attacks like those in London will be grounded in 

useful intelligence that is promptly shared with local officials. Unfortunately, little 

intelligence was available prior to those attacks. 

Although opportunities to improve U.S. transit system security still exist, we 

know that capital expenditures alone are not enough to assure security. Perimeter 

fencing, securing yards, tunnels, and bridges, facial recognition technology, and even 

extensive use of security cameras did not and would not have prevented either the 

London or Madrid attacks. 

The fact is, good transit security is grounded in operations. Reports from both Madrid and London confirm that our focus on public awareness, employee training, and 

emergency preparedness is well-founded. In light of that knowledge, I would like to 

share some additional information about our efforts in these three areas, and our 

plans for the coming year.

Public Awareness 

Originally, many people were concerned that efforts to share security-related information with the riding public would generate fear and depress ridership. As a 

result, early efforts to increase public awareness, including FTA’s Transit Watch 

campaign materials, were general in nature, telling passengers to be on the lookout for suspicious individuals or activities. Over time, however, experience and research have indicated that people feel more secure and are more capable of responding if they receive more specific security-related information. 

As a result, transit agencies now focus their public awareness efforts on the specific actions that passengers should take. For example, one widely used public education campaign, originally developed by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority, instructs passengers to ask, ‘‘Is That Your Bag’’ if they see an unattended 

bag or package. Another campaign, using the tag line ‘‘See Something, Say Something,’’ tells passengers how to contact transit officials if they see something that 

seems out-of-place. Public awareness campaigns have also begun to focus more specifically on emergency evacuation procedures. 

Since September 11, the use and effectiveness of public awareness messages has 

significantly increased. Washington Metro has been a leader in ensuring that detailed emergency evacuation information is more widely and openly disseminated to 

transit riders and the general public. Nevertheless, in most transit systems, there 

is still room for improvement to ensure that the public is familiar with the operation 

of emergency exit doors, understands the emergency evacuation procedures for each 

location on their particular route, and is prepared to facilitate a prompt and effective emergency response. 

FTA will be focusing efforts to improve standard public awareness templates to 

help local transit agencies incorporate this important information. In addition, FTA 

is developing standard protocols for the content and frequency of security announcements for each Homeland Security threat level. Further, security and emergency 

preparedness messages are being developed in a variety of languages in an effort 

to better communicate with the diverse community of transit riders. 

Employee Training 

Transit employees are America’s first line of defense and will be our first responders in the event of a terrorist attack or other emergency on a transit system. The 

actions taken in the critical moments immediately after an attack or an emergency 

can significantly reduce the severity of injuries and the number of deaths that result. Therefore, there is simply no substitute for security awareness and emergency 

response training for transit employees. We must rely on—and cultivate—human 

capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to security threats. 

The 400,000-plus transit employees throughout America are the ‘‘eyes and ears’’ 

of our most important security system. Transit employees travel the same routes, 

maintain the same facilities, and see the same people every day as they go about 

their duties. They are in the best position to identify unusual packages, suspicious 

substances, and people who are acting suspiciously. But they need to develop an understanding of what to look for and skills in how to respond. These skills can be 

acquired through rigorous emergency planning, regular emergency testing and 

drills, and extensive training. 

FTA has developed and delivered guidance and security courses through the National Transit Institute (NTI), the Transportation Safety Institute (TSI) and Johns 

Hopkins University (JHU). Since September 11, over 77,000 transit agency employees from across the Nation have received security-related training. Among the newest training courses now being offered are:

• Terrorist Activity Recognition and Reaction. This course incorporates 

the latest in international counter-terrorism techniques to provide training to 
18

frontline transit employees. To date, over 4,200 transit employees from 28 of the 

30 largest transit agencies have taken this training. 

• Strategic Counter-Terrorism for Transit Managers. This course provides 

counter-terrorism management training to transit managers and transit security officials. It offers an effective approach to security planning and the tactical 

deployment of law enforcement personnel. The course will be delivered to the 

30 largest transit agencies beginning in August 2005. 

• Chemical/Biological Detection Protocols. This course will provide agencyspecific information for operations control personnel and train operators on 

chemical and biological incident management. The course is also slated for delivery to the 30 largest transit agencies beginning in August 2005. 

Despite widespread success and the significant numbers of transit agency employees who have received training, we recognize that hurdles, such as overtime costs 

and shift coverage, can negatively affect the ability of transit agencies to take advantage of the free training opportunities that are available through FTA. Therefore, we are working with transit stakeholders to identify strategies that will permit 

as many frontline employees as possible to be trained.

Emergency Preparedness 

While transit employee training is important, there is no substitute for a good 

emergency response plan that has been tried and tested by the full array of emergency responders in a community. However, the threat and vulnerability assessments conducted after September 11 suggested that most transit agencies had not 

even established working relationships with other emergency responders. 

To assist in building these relationships and developing community-wide response 

plans, FTA sponsored 18 Connecting Community Forums. These forums brought together transit, law enforcement, fire, medical, and city/county officials for three days 

of regional planning and response exercises FTA will work with DHS’s Office of 

State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness and Transportation Security Administration to hold ten additional Connecting Community Forums in the 

coming year that are customized to address weaknesses in those particular communities. Two of the forums will he held in conjunction with small and/or rural transit 

agencies. 

To date, 77 communities have conducted full-scale emergency response drills funded by FTA. One important condition of these grants was that the drills include the 

participation of local and regional police, fire and emergency response agencies. 

There is no doubt that the safety and security of our communities is significantly 

enhanced when public transportation systems are linked to police, fire, medical and 

other emergency response agencies. Community-wide planning, emergency response 

drills, and unified emergency command centers make this critical link effective. FTA 

is currently updating its guidance on how to conduct emergency drills based on the 

results of the drills held to date. In addition, we plan to provide additional grants 

to transit agencies to conduct full-scale drills. 

While we continue to believe that there is no substitute for practicing emergency 

response skills in an operating environment, we continue to look for ways to improve and practice skills more frequently and at a lower cost than full-scale community drills. Therefore, FTA has also piloted web-based emergency drills in Boston 

(MBTA), Portland (Tri-Met), Seattle (Sound Transit), San Francisco (BART), Rock 

Island, IL (Metrolink), and Montgomery County, MD (Ride On). This approach will 

provide transit agencies, particularly small and rural agencies, with a tool for conducting tabletop drills more effectively, efficiently, and affordably.

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, the Nation’s transit operators have responded admirably to the 

new threat environment. Thanks to their efforts, transit is more secure and more 

prepared to respond to emergencies than it has ever been. FTA will continue to support transit agencies throughout the Nation by providing security-related training 

for transit employees, materials and guidance to educate transit passengers, and improved emergency response planning and procedures. 

I appreciate the opportunity to provide this important update on transit safety 

and security, and look forward to working with you to keep Americans safe and 

moving on public transportation.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Jamison. 

Thank you, Mr. Beres. 

I have a multipart question, which I think the parts are all related. 
19

Both Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation 

do provide federal funding for mass transit, including anti-terror 

activities. I would like to know, one, what is the level of coordination between the two departments? Is there a memorandum of understanding between the two departments? If you can tell, how 

much money has been awarded since 9/11 which would be related 

to antiterrorism as far as mass transit? 

Also, if you can tell, the extent of money that would be available 

to state and local governments to be used on mass transit which 

is not specifically allocated to mass transit. What I mean is money, 

for instance, just in the grant system, $6 billion to $8 billion that 

is available out there. Is there anything to prevent local municipalities from using that money for mass transit, and to what extent 

do they request assistance for mass transit, and to what extent are 

those requests denied? 

Also, I ask on a somewhat related matter, since you have oversight of mass transit security, in view of what happened in London 

with the shoot-to-kill policy, are there any guidelines coming from 

the federal government toward local and state police entities regarding what to do with terrorist suicide bombers on mass transit 

systems? 

I will address the questions to the two of you. 

Mr. BERES. Thank you, Chairman King. 

We have awarded approximately $8.6 billion since September 11, 

all of which could be used for transit security. As you know, this 

funding goes out to the states and/or designated Urban Area Security Initiative jurisdictions and may have the ability to allocate 

those funds for prevention, protection, response or recovery activities that they see fit within their jurisdictions based on an overall 

state or Urban Area Security Initiative homeland security strategy 

that they have. So that funding has been available to establish security and protective measures within those jurisdictions. 

Also, since September 11 and prior to the Madrid bombings, we 

started allocating some funding directly to the transit systems, 

which has become approximately $256 million, specifically for transit systems since 9/11. 

And we have worked very closely with FTA on the coordination 

of these programs, the redesign of the transit programs this year 

to take a more regional and collaborative approach, use the activities that they have done in the past as far as the assessments that 

they have requested, metro transit agencies to do to make sure 

that we are not duplicating the efforts that have already been done 

and to make sure that those can feed in directly to our programs 

and to make sure that the types of things that are allowable to be 

used are similar and work with what FTA and the policies that 

they are looking at across their programs and are consistent with 

those. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Jamison? 

Mr. JAMISON. Yes. Let me try to address most of your questions 

in the order that you presented them. 

First on coordination, I think it is pretty evident by our testimony today that we have been working very closely with the Office 

for Domestic Preparedness in coordinating our training and emer-
20

gency preparedness forums as well as a lot of our security-related 

training. 

We do have an overarching MOU with DHS, and we are very 

close to signing a transit annex. However, I do not think we need 

a piece of paper to work in close collaboration since London. We 

have specifically been in close collaboration with the Department 

of Homeland Security in the response to London and the raising 

and lowering of the threat level, and we continue to work closely 

with them. 

I do think it is a valid point, though, that we need to continue 

to make sure that we have one plan and that we coordinate our 

resources to have the maximum input in the transit environment, 

and we are working very hard to do that. 

From your second point about funding availability, separately 

from the funding that DHS has provided, the Federal Transit Administration has provided approximately $25 million worth of technical assistance drill grants and other guidance and assistance materials to transit agencies. 

From an eligibility standpoint, with our formula in urban capital 

programs, which have a 1 percent safety and security requirement, 

that equates to about $36 million a year that is required to be 

spend on safety and security. And the programs are eligible for 

capital expenditures, and these programs are over $4 billion. If security capital is prioritized by the transit agency, they can use 

those funds for that purpose. 

And, finally, on the tragic incident in London, the shooting incident, I do not have enough information to comment on that specifically, but I think one thing is very apparent: That is underscores 

the importance of good training from our security forces and from 

our first-line responders. 

We have put a lot of focus into a terrorist recognition and response course that we are providing to the transit industry that 

helps transit agency employees identify suspicious behavior, know 

how to confront suspicious behavior, know how to report suspicious 

behavior and know how to react to suspicious behavior. And I think 

that event underscores the importance of good training in our system. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Pascrell? 

Mr. PASCRELL. Yes. 

Mr. Beres, the Department has stated several times, and you 

have stated today, that billions of dollars have been available for 

rail and transit security because states could have used their state 

homeland security grant funds for transit security. But you and I 

both know that states have to use most of those funds, and history 

is there, to meet the urgent training and equipment needs of police, 

fire fighters and paramedics. 

Given this situation, isn’t it a little disingenuous to claim that 

billions of dollars have been made available for transit security 

when you and I both know that states really had no choice but to 

spend this money really on first responders? 

So what you are doing, in my estimation, and I would like your 

opinion, is telling communities they have to choose between first 

responders or transit with the very money that you talked about. 

I would like to hear your answer. 
21

Mr. BERES. Those programs, sir, are designed to take a holistic 

approach to preparedness to prevent any attack from occurring, 

whether it is in a transit system, on a bus or the building, in the 

street, to be able to protect critical assets within jurisdictions as 

local areas determine those being critical assets, be able to respond 

across the system to any type of event that should occur and able 

to recover should any event occur. 

We asked each state and urban area to do a risk assessment to 

determine how they should allocate their funds and come up with 

a strategy. Parts of those assessments were obviously transit infrastructures within those urban areas, and then they had the ability 

to take a look at their preparedness programs from a holistic view 

to determine where they should allocate their assets based on their 

risk approach and their risk assessments. 

And they had the ability to allocate protection measures within 

those transit agencies as they saw fit or invest in response if they 

felt that protective measures within those transit agencies were not 

the best way to mitigate the risk at the time or other prevention 

measures, including developing fusion centers and sharing information across their agencies or with other state agencies. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Beres, you know that we provide money directly to the ports of this country. Why don’t we do the same thing 

to the transit systems throughout the United States of America? 

Then we would know we know what our vulnerabilities are. Then 

we would know where the money is going and if it is properly 

spent. Why don’t we do that way? 

Mr. BERES. Well, we have recognized, sir, obviously, that we do 

need to allocate some direct resources to the transit agencies in 

this country, and we have done that, actually, prior to the Madrid 

bombings and since then; that is, a total of $256 million in direct 

assistance to transit authorities, but—

Mr. PASCRELL. In the last 3 years. 

Mr. BERES. Right, understanding that those are still part of a 

larger operational whole within a community and one asset within 

those communities in which the overall preparedness look from an 

urban area or a state should take into account how they are going 

to respond if something should occur in the transit system or anywhere else. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Jamison, are you satisfied with the collaboration with the DHS on the strategy that you outlined before? And 

when is the plan really going to be sent to the Congress of the 

United States that was supposed to be to the Congress by April 1 

of this year? 

Mr. JAMISON. As for the specifics of the delivery date, I would 

have to defer to the Department of Homeland Security, which is in 

the process of finalizing that plan. I will say that we have been 

pleased with the amount of input that we have been able to provide, the collaboration and the new focus, I should say, especially 

after London. Specifically DHS has sought out our knowledge and 

our understanding of the industry, as well as the programs and 

guidance that we developed, and is incorporating this into the security plan. 

Mr. PASCRELL. What is the Department of Transportation’s role 

in the transportation security system? 
22

Mr. JAMISON. I think we play the important role of making sure 

that we are funneling information to the Department of Homeland 

Security so that they understand the industry and they can utilize 

our expertise. The Federal Transit Administration in particular, as 

you know, is primarily a grant-making agency. However, we have 

historically developed training programs for the industry on a 

broad variety of topics, we have developed guidance and best practices on a broad variety of topics, and we have conducted research 

that is critical to the industry. 

We will continue to play those roles in transit security in collaboration with DHS. In particular. we continue to make sure that we 

are informing DHS of our knowledge of the industry as they make 

prioritization decisions across the modes of transportation on security funding. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Simmons? 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony and for your dayto-day work trying to secure our homeland and in this particular 

instance our friends and neighbors who ride on the mass transit 

systems, to include my daughter who rides mass transit from 

Brooklyn to Manhattan twice a day, 5 days a week. So I thank you 

for your work. 

I chair the Intelligence and Information–Sharing Subcommittee, 

so I would like to focus a little bit on the topic of intelligence. And 

I noticed, Mr. Beres, that on page 8 of your testimony you state 

that the ODP is developing a suite of intelligence training courses 

for state and local responders by including information on intelligence gathering, data mining, types of intelligence, channels of 

communication, et cetera, et cetera, and I certainly welcome that 

activity. I think the more intelligence training our people have, the 

better off we are going to be. 

I also agree with a statement that Mr. Jamison made on page 

4 that capital expenditures alone are not enough to assure security. 

Clearly, in London, there were cameras, there were all sorts of security devices, capital expenditures were made. It was inadequate 

to prevent those attacks, and I remind my colleagues that the 

Great Wall of China was a terrific capital expenditure when it 

came to homeland security. So was the Maginot Line for that matter, more recent capital expenditure. But neither the Great Wall of 

China nor the Maginot Line worked. 

So we have to be smarter. Yes, we have to make some capital expenditures, but we also have to develop those intelligence capabilities that give us forewarning so that we can prevent these attacks 

in the first place. I mean, we can spend an infinite amount of 

money training for attacks on the assumption that they are going 

to occur, but if we can prevent them, then that is the best of all 

worlds. 

And, Mr. Jamison, you made the statement that prevention of attacks like those in London will be grounded in useful intelligence. 

Unfortunately, little intelligence was available prior to those attacks. 

For both of you, from the standpoint of prevention, from the 

standpoint of intelligence warning to prevent attacks, how can we 

do better? What more can we do? Where should we be focusing? It 
23

would seem to me that a relatively modest expenditure of money 

for prevention and intelligence capability would save us a huge expense of cleaning up the mess after the fact. 

Mr. JAMISON. I guess I will take it first. 

Congressman I agree with your comment that intelligence is critical in that transit security, as we learned from London, is definitely dependent on good intelligence as well as good training and 

emergency preparedness and public awareness. 

You know, I am not an intelligence expert but I do realize the 

importance of getting good information to transit security officials, 

so they are able to develop a strategy and deploy their security 

forces, explosion detection forces and other response techniques and 

preparedness techniques based on the threat that they know they 

are going to be facing. 

We focused on that early at DOT. We helped fund and develop 

a transportation ISACs Information Sharing and Analysis Center, 

that allowed us to put transit experts into a private confidential 

setting to interpret intelligence information and get it to the transit 

industry. 

We also focused on making sure that all the transit agencies 

were represented on their local JTTFs FBI Joint Terrorism Task 

Force, the ones that had not been able to participate in get on 

those forums. I am pleased to say that that flow of information has 

gotten much better extremely. But I am going to rely on the intelligence experts to tell me what we need to do to get better and 

more accurate intelligence. 

Mr. BERES. I have got to agree with your comments 100 percent. 

I believe if something has occurred, it is too late. We are cleaning 

up and trying to mitigate the damage after that. We need to make 

sure that we have the ability to prevent something from occurring 

so that we do not have to get into the response and recovery mode 

afterwards. 

I think we have an opportunity, and we have tried to press this 

through our grant programs, to harness our state and local partners that are out there, whether they are law enforcement officials, 

fire fighters, departments of transportation, other public works people who are on the ground every single day, in communities, within 

transit agencies, to have the ability to notice things that are out 

of place or wrong, take them to a place within their local community, be it a terrorism early warning group or an intelligence fusion 

center, and then share that information across the country back up 

to the Department of Homeland Security or to the JTTFs within 

those communities also. 

And we are working very hard to provide training to state and 

local public safety officials and others to notice what is out of place 

and the types of things to look for and also develop, as I mentioned 

earlier in my testimony, a suite of intelligence analyst courses so 

when that information reaches a fusion center at a state and local 

level the Department and the FBI and others have confidence in 

the training that those analysts have so that the analysis is good 

and solid analysis when it comes back up to us so that we can have 

the consistency in that information. 

Mr. KING. Gentleman from North Carolina? 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
24

Gentlemen, you have both talked about this whole issue of how 

you are working together to coordinate your public awareness campaigns. Let me ask this question: To what extent does FTA and 

DHS coordinate their public awareness campaigns? 

It follows on this very same thing, if you are not preparing and 

making people aware, then you are going to be cleaning up. So to 

what extent are you coordinating? 

Mr. JAMISON. Well, let me take that. First of all, early on, after 

we—

Mr. ETHERIDGE. And let me ask you to go one step farther as you 

are doing it. In addition to that, if you are not coordinating, then 

aren’t we sending a mixed message and people are not really sure 

what is going on? 

Mr. JAMISON. Let me respond to your second point first. I think 

it is very important that we have one message as the federal government, and that we do not duplicate programs unless there is a 

need to have several different delivery mechanisms to have an impact. 

Early on, we recognized the need for public awareness after we 

completed 37 vulnerability assessments across the nation’s largest 

transit agencies and early that public awareness—quite honestly 

we learned a lot of this from our colleagues in London—that effective public awareness campaigns are very important. So we developed a national strategy, a template for the ‘‘Transit Watch’’ program that we sent out to all the transit agencies in the country. 

It allowed them to use a standard template for posters, for messages on the PA announcement, for advertisements, and so forth 

and so on. 

And as we started working with DHS and with the Office for Domestic Preparedness, they recognized that we had gone a long way 

and they built upon our programs without recreating programs. I 

think that is a good example of the way we need to move forward 

on all of our programs, recognizing the work that has been done, 

the strengths and weaknesses of our federal partners and continuing to work together to improve transit security. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. To what extent are you coordinating, though, 

that is my question. I mean, if I walked out on the street and I 

stopped someone coming off the subway or somewhere else and I 

asked that question, what kind of answer would I get? 

Mr. JAMISON. I do not understand exactly what you are asking 

me. We are coordinating very closely to make sure that the funding 

requirement or the eligibility for funding that is available to roll 

out public awareness training and those types of activities is in coordination with DHS. Each individual transit agency takes our 

guidance and takes the funding that is developed by DHS and customizes that for their, a unique operating environment, their 

unique locations, their unique evacuation plans, and then rolls that 

out. 

Quite honestly, we have learned a lot from the transit agencies 

that have been on the cutting edge of that, and we continue to 

bring that information in to the national headquarters level, refine 

it and get it out to the other transit agencies so that they can learn 

from the experience of the nation as a whole. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Mr. Beres? 
25

Mr. BERES. Just to reiterate Mr. Jamison’s comments, that they 

have developed a program that we did not go back and redevelop. 

They put it out there amongst the transit agencies, we reference 

that in our grant guidance and other publications that we have out, 

that funds may be used to implement those programs so they can 

tailor their awareness campaigns as they see appropriate, as Mr. 

Jamison mentioned. And that is how the coordination works. 

A great benefit is obviously us not going back and reinventing 

the wheel on something that has already been created by FTA but 

leveraging our resources that we have at the state and local level 

to help implement the things that have already been done at that 

level. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Do we have any kind of assessment measure to 

know what kind of results we are getting? 

Mr. JAMISON. Actually, we are going to try to do a lot more work 

in that area, but I must say that the Federal Transit Administration 3 years ago put together a top 20 checklist of priority items 

that we felt transit agencies need to conduct in order to improve 

their security level, and we held our managers accountable for 

making sure that those were implemented at the largest agencies 

across the nation. 

Public awareness is high on that list, and every month we double 

check and make sure that we still have effectiveness in each of 

those areas. As I mentioned in my—

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Well, my question is, are we doing an assessment to know how the dollars are being spent, and are we getting 

the results for the dollars we are spending? You know, we do it to 

public schools, it is called a test. 

Mr. BERES. Right. We have been developing through Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 8, a series of target capabilities that 

each jurisdiction must be able to meet, and the tests that we will 

end up doing will be performance-based series of exercises to determine how well they are working to meet their prevention capabilities, their response capabilities and others. 

Even during this time right now, before those capabilities have 

been completed, we do have specific guidance in our Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program where when we do exercises 

within a transit agency, that we evaluate all the different capabilities primarily in this case full response, one of which would be how 

the public evacuation plans and those things work during the exercise themselves, which would have a direct effect on some of the 

public awareness. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Feedback on this I think is so critical because you are talking 

about life and death, and prevention is the critical piece of it. It 

gets to be what Mr. Simmons said earlier, you know, you can prevent it up-front, but you never know how well you are doing unless 

you do some kind of assessment into where you are coming out. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. KING. I thank the gentleman for his line of questioning. 

The gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Pearce? 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
26

Mr. Beres, to continue the line of questioning by Mr. Etheridge 

there, exactly how are you going about setting up this yardstick, 

this assessment tool? 

Mr. BERES. We have been working on this for quite some time 

now, working with our federal partners and our state and local 

partners to identify first the universe of tasks that are required 

across the government, state and local levels, to handle prevention 

and response and recovery aspects and protection pieces. And then 

we have put those tasks into what we call 36 universal capabilities, 

36 different capabilities that we believe jurisdictions must have to 

be able to prevent, respond or recover to incidents. 

Mr. PEARCE. So are we measuring those things now? 

Mr. BERES. What we are doing right now is putting the final—

Mr. PEARCE. Are we measuring those things now? 

Mr. BERES. We are measuring the majority of those things right 

now through our Homeland Security Exercise Program. We are 

putting the final touches on some of our—

Mr. PEARCE. So you actually go out and assess them. Mr. 

Etheridge was on point. Do you go out and assess those in our communities and why not? 

Mr. BERES. At the request of—actually, all of our dollars when 

state and locals are doing an exercise using any of our funds, they 

must use our homeland security exercise evaluations. 

Mr. PEARCE. You are talking about exercises, and the two of us 

are talking about assessment, and I am asking do you assess them 

in the communities right now? Do the communities know anything 

about it? 

Mr. BERES. I think we are—

Mr. PEARCE. Our office submitted to you about 4 months ago to 

Mr. Corey Gruber in ODP a certified community preparedness initiative that we went to a local university that does homeland security training. We thought that measurement tools were pretty critical too and assessment was pretty critical for the first responders. 

And your people have been sitting on that over there for 4 months. 

Meanwhile, you are preparing a duplicate thing, and people like 

Mr. Etheridge and myself find some level of frustration that we are 

not moving anywhere. 

Mr. Jamison, as far as the transit security grants, you have got 

about $250 million out there, about 4 percent. Four percent has 

been utilized. The 4 percent that has been utilized, do you have a 

team that goes around and looks at the money that has been spent 

to see if it has been spent properly? 

Mr. JAMISON. Actually, we do not. 

Mr. PEARCE. You know, we wasted $239 million on the northern 

border and the southern border from cameras that did not work, 

cameras that would not put in. So what verification do you intend 

as a department to go in and make sure this money is not squandered like the last $239 million that supposedly went for security 

cameras? 

Mr. JAMISON. First of all, I agree with your point that we must 

make sure that capital expenditures are made from a risk assessment standpoint, that funds are provided based on the threat environment, and also that transit-agencies have the operational re-
27

sources and the necessary maintenance and operations plans to 

make them effective. 

However, you are referring to the Department of Homeland Security Grant Program, so I will defer to my colleague, Tim, on the follow-up on how—

Mr. PEARCE. Tim, are you all the ones that oversee the Transit 

Security Grant Program of $250 million? 

Mr. BERES. We are. And we have a monitoring program that we 

go out after the projects have been implemented to go out and determine—

Mr. PEARCE. Is this the same monitoring program that was used 

by ICM? 

Mr. BERES. That was not a program that we managed in our office, and I am not familiar with their monitoring protocol. 

Mr. PEARCE. But you have been out and you have seen the cameras working? 

Mr. BERES. As those projects are finished, yes, sir, we would go 

out and monitor those projects to make sure that what they said 

they were going to spend the money on was spent accordingly and 

that those are functional. 

Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Jamison, there has been a great stir about an 

overall strategic plan. Why don’t we just mirror the plan that the 

European countries use, Britain or any of the ones that have had 

attacks? 

Mr. JAMISON. I think that the knowledge that we gain from 

international attacks is pulled into the plan. All of the strategy 

that we discussed—

Mr. PEARCE. No, I am asking, why don’t we just mirror the plans 

that they have in place? Surely, they have got strategic plans in 

place, don’t they? 

Mr. JAMISON. We have pulled a lot of the components—

Mr. PEARCE. Not you all, the British. Do they have a plan? 

Mr. JAMISON. I understand. We have pulled several components 

of British transit security best practices into the guidance that we 

provided and we will continue to do that. And I think we need to 

make sure that we follow up in a few weeks with the British and 

determine what new measures that they are taking, because they 

have dealt with this many more times than we have in the United 

States. 

Mr. PEARCE. You both have mentioned the importance of protecting against IEDs. Are you familiar with the blocking mechanism that we are using in Iraq right now? 

Mr. JAMISON. I am not specifically familiar with it. 

Mr. PEARCE. Well, we have an mechanism that will block the signal that is used to trigger an IED, and neither one of you are 

aware of it. 

Mr. BERES. No, I have heard of it. 

Mr. PEARCE. Heard of it. Are you, as an agency, actively engaging in it? If you are going to protect from IEDs, it seems like it 

would be a long way along the trek to having a blocking mechanisms on our train. 

Mr. Chairman, our time has expired. Thank you. 

Mr. KING. Gentleman from the state of Washington, Mr. Dicks? 
28

Mr. DICKS. I am still trying to understand the administration’s 

position, and I know my friend from New Jersey has already talked 

about this, but you are saying that $8.6 billion has been appropriated for the Urban Area Security Initiative and the State Homeland Security Grant Program and that can be used for transit security. Is that correct? 

Mr. BERES. That is correct. 

Mr. DICKS. How much of it has been used for transit security? 

Mr. BERES. When we ran our last numbers that we were looking at, I believe, in fiscal year 2004, it was approximately $25 million 

of that money had been used specifically for transit security items 

and somewhere around—I believe, actually, that was the total—

about $20 million in fiscal year 2004 and $5 million out of the initial plans for using fiscal year 2005 funds related specifically to 

transit security. 

Mr. DICKS. 2004 was, what did you say again? 

Mr. BERES. About $20 million, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Now, the American public transportation survey says that $6 billion is needed. Certainly, the Feds cannot fund all of 

that, but is $25 million enough? 

Mr. BERES. Well, I am not familiar with that study or what 

pieces they were looking at in that study. I think what you have 

to look at too is the totality of the $8.6 billion and how it is being 

used in the communities for overall response, prevention and recovery activities, not just those specific to security enhancements at 

transit agencies. We have also, as I mentioned earlier, dedicated 

$256 million specifically for transit security enhancements. 

Mr. DICKS. Is that through the Transit Security Grant Program? 

Mr. BERES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. And that is part of the Urban Area Security Initiative? 

Mr. BERES. It is. 

Mr. DICKS. We have a number of $142 million in transit security 

grants, rail and ferry in fiscal year 2005 to major metropolitan 

transit authorities throughout the United States. 

I guess the point I am trying to get to is, the people who looked 

at this think we are not doing enough, and what is the position of 

the Department? I guess now with the Transit Security Grant Program—but it actually only goes to the largest cities, right? 

Mr. BERES. It goes to the highest threat urban areas. 

Mr. DICKS. So the other communities would have to take part of 

their first responder money and then use that for transit security, 

because they would not have another source of funding, would 

they? 

Mr. BERES. If they had a major transit system within their area, 

but the 25 largest and highest risk transit agencies are within 

those high threat urban areas. 

Mr. DICKS. Now, I also understand that there was a major 

study—I am trying to find it here—there was a major study that 

was supposed to be done in April—oh, here it is. On April 5, 2005, 

Deputy Homeland Security Secretary Michael Jackson wrote the 

committee to report that the national transportation security strategy that was required to be completed and submitted to Congress 

before April 1, 2005 was not going to be finished. 
29

One of the reasons Deputy Jackson stated for the missed deadline was the need for further collaboration with the Department of 

Transportation. Given the events over the last 2 weeks, we believe 

that this strategy should be created sooner rather than later. Can 

you give us the status of this particular report? 

Mr. BERES. That report is not being directly managed through 

my office. I will be happy to go back to the Department and find 

out what the status is for the committee, but I do not have any 

knowledge right now of what the status of that report is. 

Mr. DICKS. Now, I also understand that there have been meetings between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation, and you have signed a memorandum, 

and the memorandum stated that the Department of Homeland Security has the lead for transportation security. Is that correct? 

Mr. BERES. That is correct. 

Mr. JAMISON. That is correct. 

Mr. DICKS. What is the Department of Transportation’s role in 

transportation security? None whatsoever? It is all Homeland Security? 

Mr. JAMISON. Well, as I mentioned before, I think we play a very 

valuable role in providing industry information, secondary information and specific knowledge to our individual modes. We need to 

make sure we feed that information into Homeland Security, as 

they use that information to prioritize threats, vulnerabilities and 

consequences across the transportation modes. 

We have been very heavily involved in providing input into the 

strategy that you mentioned earlier. We are awaiting the finalization of that by the Department of Homeland Security as well, but 

we play a very vital role in that area. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Dicks. 

And the other gentleman from the state of Washington, Sheriff 

Reichert? 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good to see you, Mr. Jamison. 

Mr. JAMISON. Good to see you. 

Mr. REICHERT. I have to come at this again, as I do just about 

every homeland security hearing from the street level and where 

the rubber meets the road or cops hit the street, so to speak. 

Everything you have said are words that we have heard before: 

Cops across the country, law enforcement agencies, sheriffs’ offices, 

police departments. I really appreciate the holistic point of view, I 

think that is certainly a way to go. We have to have a strategy. 

We should have studies, we have to have training, we have to have 

equipment, working groups and exercises and strategies, and all 

those words sound good. But, again, when it gets down to doing the 

job, cops want action and that is part of what is lacking. 

You know, just a few weeks ago, Commissioner Kelly of NYPD 

and the sheriff from Minneapolis–St. Paul testified that they are 

using resources from both of their police departments, and New 

York is an example that is certainly by far an extreme example, 

but they are spending $178 million a year of their own money on 

homeland security. 
30

Pre–September 11 they had 12 officers assigned to counterintelligence and intelligence work within their city. Now, they have over 

1,000. All of those officers, some, are spread across the world in 

other countries to gather intelligence not only on things happening 

in their city, in their airports but also in their transit system. 

They feel like I think most law enforcement agencies like the federal government’s let them down. I mean, it is good, again, to be 

trained. 

Brian Jenkins said, ‘‘Cops are it. We are going to win this at the 

local level.’’ According to Commissioner Kelly, we are protecting national interests here. We are doing a job for the national government, for the security of this nation. 

My point is that at some juncture here the Department of Homeland Security has to step up and say, ‘‘Local government cannot afford to provide bodies, personnel.’’ Everything else is there for us, 

but for NYPD to put out $178 million and 1,000 police officers and 

take them from duties that they were involved in before in fighting 

crime in that city is wrong. I need some federal assistance from the 

federal government. 

For my sheriff’s office in Seattle, to take 5 people out of 1,100 

employees, we are happy to do it, we want to protect this country, 

but we need help in providing personnel, especially when it comes 

to the metro systems, which we are responsible for in the Seattle 

area, the King County Sheriff’s Office. 

Can you respond to future plans to help us in providing personnel for the analysis of intelligence, prioritization of intelligence, 

assigning risk and threat and providing personnel to help protect 

our metro systems and our transit systems? 

Mr. BERES. Yes, sir. The Department views this in obviously all 

of homeland security as a shared responsibility between the federal 

government and the local units of government that has law enforcement responsibility operationally to prevent an activity from 

occurring within their own jurisdictions. And what we have done 

is allow some of our funds to be used, a certain percentage of our 

funds to be used to pay for overtime and back bill for participation 

on terrorism early warning groups—

Mr. REICHERT. I hate to interrupt for just a second. You saw 

what happened in London. It was the first responders who were 

there to respond to those bombings in London, and that is the kind 

of help we need. 

Mr. BERES. Yes, sir. The Department right now has not looked 

at using any of our grant funds for any hiring programs at this 

point, but—

Mr. REICHERT. Would you be willing to do that, examine that 

possibility, please? 

Mr. BERES. I will take that back, absolutely. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. Gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul? 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And this has been touched on before, but we have $250 million 

in transit security grants that have been authorized, but only 4 

percent have been drawn down of that $250 million. We also have 
31

about $8.2 billion in homeland security grants, and yet 70 percent 

of that funding remains in the pipeline. 

Some would argue we need to, in the Congress, appropriate more 

money for this purpose. It seems to me, given these figures, that 

the money is there, it is just not being drawn down and spent properly. Would you care to comment on that? 

Mr. BERES. I believe that the draw-down figures do not give an 

accurate picture of activity on those grants. They are an easy number to look at because they are very valuable. It is like looking at 

your checking account and what is in and what is out, but it does 

not show precisely what obligations have been made on those funds 

and what outlays have been made on those funds. 

It could very well be that funding has been laid out for certain 

pieces of equipment that is out there that has not been received or 

was received and damaged and they are sending it back, they have 

not paid the invoices. Having worked in federal assistance programs for the past 11 years, generally what you see are the drawdowns on funds are not made till the end of the grants anyway. 

And these are 2-year grants, so generally you see those drawdowns occur at the very end. 

The other part of this is that much of the funding can be allowed 

for exercises and training and for planning, which could occur over 

a 2-year period, and they would draw-down that funding as they 

acquired those costs and attended training or conducted exercises. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Jamison, you care to comment? 

Mr. JAMISON. I think it is just very important that as we embark 

on capital spending and as we prioritize those funds, that we make 

sure that we spend them in the correct manner, as the chairman 

indicated earlier. We must make sure we get the most out of that 

money and make sure that we have the operational resources to 

support capital spending. And I think that is some of the delay that 

you have seen in spending those funds, as people try to understand 

and implement—on very different systems across the country—individual counterterrorism and countermeasures to make their systems more secure. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And so in a sense these numbers may be a little 

bit misleading is what you are saying. Do you believe that the 

amount appropriated is sufficient for our transit security needs at 

this critical time in our history? 

Mr. BERES. I believe the secretary was before the full committee 

yesterday, and I will echo what his words were on this issue, which 

is anything that—the funding that should be appropriated should 

give the Department the maximum amount of flexibility to allocate 

the funds based on risk. And taking a look at risk, whether it is 

transit or ports, other places, people and all the other different 

things, and I believe that is the way we should look at this issue 

of having flexibility in allocating the funding. 

Mr. MCCAUL. My second question has to do with the analysis of 

what happened in Madrid and now recently in London. Typically, 

an organization will draw down lessons learned to better protect if, 

God forbid, it happens or there is a threat in our country. 

What are the lessons learned from these two bombings that 

Homeland Security has taken? And, secondly, what technologies 

are we looking at? I know in the London subway they have cam-
32

eras, surveillance cameras. Are we looking at something along 

those lines? 

Mr. BERES. Many of the requests for use of our funds have revolved around the use of cameras and close-circuit television. We 

are in the London subways. I know we are looking at lessons 

learned. In London, there is a joint contact group that is headed 

up by the Executive Director of our office that works with the British government on all things that are preparedness. We will end 

up taking those lessons learned as appropriate and putting those 

into our guidance and training and exercise program, as those become available and as we see where they fit in our vast array of 

programs that we have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, of course time is of the essence at this point. 

I would hope that you could do that rather quickly. And of course 

Madrid, I think, would provide some guidance as well. 

Mr. BERES. Agreed. 

Mr. JAMISON. And I will comment on that very quickly. We continue to look back at Madrid and we have been looking at London 

and will continue to look at London to make sure we are pulling 

that information into guidance that we prepare for the transit 

agencies. 

Lessons learned from Madrid: they did not have a lot of measures in place that London had in place, including a public awareness campaign and good training for a lot of their front-line employees. You know, London had those things in place. They are one 

of the best prepared subways in the world. However, even the 

CCTV closed circuit television and some other technologies did not 

prevent the attack. 

And I think that reinforces the point that we have got to make 

sure that we have got our operational personnel security trained, 

and we focus on good intelligence to make sure that we can direct 

that detection capability to the places that we need to deploy it. 

Also, to make sure that our passengers are helping us pinpoint suspicious activity, and that we are prepared to respond in case something happens. And we continue to work those areas, and we will 

continue to follow up. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, thank you. I see my time has expired. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. 

The time for the questioning of the first panel has expired, and 

the line of questioning has ended. However, I agree with Mr. 

Pascrell, I will ask one final question without opening up a second 

line of questioning. 

This really follows what Mr. McCaul was saying. On the question 

of technology research, apart from just looking at lessons learned 

from London and Madrid, it has become obvious through the testimony and through the questioning that mass transit is so different 

from aviation, it is a much larger problem in many ways. 

What are you doing as far as technology research to find out 

what will work? We cannot put cameras in every station, everywhere in the country, we cannot use everything that is being suggested. But what are you doing to find out, as far as through technology research, to find out where we can get the best results from 

the best type of new technology and what are you doing in that regard? 
33

Mr. BERES. I know our Directorate of Science and Technology is 

working on all different types of detection technologies and other 

types of technologies that would help in the detection and protection of critical assets. I would defer and like to take that question 

back to the Department to get back to you on the specific things 

that they are working at and provide that back to the committee. 

Mr. KING. I would appreciate if you would go back and have 

them get the information as soon as possible to us. Thank you. 

Mr. DICKS. One of the realities is we are facing these suicide 

bombers, and when you are looking at this, I mean, from a technology perspective, it would be interesting for the committee to 

know what specifically we are looking at to deal with suicide bombers. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. Thank you. 

Mr. Jamison? 

Mr. JAMISON. You know, we must continue to pursue screening 

technologies, chemical-biological sensors, surveillance techniques, 

intrusion detection technology, automatic vehicle locators so that 

we can track our equipment. And we have conducted research in 

chem-bio sensors and intrusion detection, those types of surveillance activities, but I must reiterate, as we continue to pursue that, 

security is hugely operational; London has told us that. 

We must continue to focus on training, even as we pursue those 

technologies, and make sure that when we do have an event that 

we can respond and continue to train. But we continue to pursue 

research in those areas. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Jamison. 

I want to thank the witnesses, Mr. Beres, Mr. Jamison, for their 

testimony. It was very informative, very responsive. So thank you 

for your time, thank you for what you are doing for our country. 

The witnesses are excused, and we ask the second panel to come 

forward. 

Mr. BERES. Thank you. 

Mr. JAMISON. Thank you. 

Mr. KING. Thank you very much. 

I would like to welcome all of our witnesses to the second panel 

and thank you for your appearances here today. 

We have Chief Polly Hanson, Metro Transit Police Department, 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; Chief Bill 

Morange, deputy executive director, director of security, New York 

State MTA; Mr. Paul Lennon, director of intelligence and emergency preparedness management, L.A. County Metropolitan Transportation Authority; and Mr. Christopher Kozub, associate director, 

National Transit Institute. 

I would like to ask Chief Hanson if she would go first. 

And, again, I would ask all the witnesses if they could possibly 

keep their statements to 5 minutes or less, and we will certainly 

incorporate the full testimony as part of the record. 

Chief Hanson? 
34

STATEMENT OF POLLY HANSON, CHIEF OF METRO POLICE, 

WASHINGTON METRO AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY 

Chief HANSON. Thank you, Chairman King and members of the 

committee. Good morning, and thank you for asking WMATA, 

which is the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority here 

in Washington, D.C., to testify this morning. 

I am Polly Hanson, chief of the Metro Transit Police. 

By way of background, WMATA was created in 1967 as an interstate compact agency through enactment of legislation by the Congress and the Commonwealth of Virginia, state of Maryland, District of Columbia. Each day we move 1.2 million trips on our rail 

and bus systems. We are the second largest subway system and 

fifth largest bus system in the United States. We are widely recognized as being critical to the operation of the federal government. 

Over 150,000 federal employees, about 45 percent of the region’s 

federal employees, participate in our MetroCheck Program, and 

nearly half of all Metrorail stations serve federal facilities. Approximately 10 percent of Metro’s daily ridership uses stations next to 

the Capitol and the Pentagon. 

The Metro Transit Police was established in 1976. We are the 

nation’s only non federal tri-state police force. We have an authorized strength of 400 sworn transit police officers and 101 special 

police officers, like guards. Our purpose is to prevent crime, protect 

Metro’s customers, employees, facilities and revenues, enforce laws, 

ordinances and rules and regulations. 

As the largest transit provider for the National Capital Region, 

Metro takes its responsibility in homeland security with the seriousness is demands. WMATA’s approach to transit security involves a partnership between employees, customers and the transit 

police and other police departments in the region and the federal 

government. Our training initiatives designed to enhance both 

WMATA and the region’s emergency preparedness reflect these 

partnerships. 

Just this spring, we launched a new training initiative entitled, 

‘‘Managing Metro Emergencies.’’ The training was devised and developed in response to the Madrid bombings as well as a recent series of service disruptions that forced thousands of customers to 

evacuate the Metrorail system. The ‘‘Managing Metro Emergencies’’ 

course is providing approximately 1,500 regional law enforcement, 

fire and rescue, Department of Transportation and WMATA personnel with enhanced training for mitigating, evacuating, transporting and recovering from a major service disruption in our system and was funded with Regional Urban Area Security Initiative 

ODP funds. 

WMATA also intends to use a portion of its fiscal year 2005 Department of Homeland Security Bus Transit Grant allocation towards the development of an anti-terror training initiatives focused 

on bus operators, and all the local and regional bus operators that 

feed into WMATA’s bus systems will be invited to participate. 

We have an emergency response facility that opened in 2002. It 

is the only transit facility of its kind in the nation that is available 

24 hours per day, 7 days a week to train emergency personnel. It 

includes a mock train tunnel that allows regional emergency responders to train for disasters’smoke/fire, collisions. 
35

WMATA’s emergency management team has trained over 2,000 

federal, local, state emergency personnel each year, and it was 

awarded the APTA Innovation Award in 2004. 

We continue to be an active participant in various regional exercises. We have sponsored a series of tabletop exercises with key regional players, the federal agencies, as part of our effort to enhance 

continuity of operations following the September 11, and WMATA 

also participates in regional drills and exercises sponsored by DHS, 

the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments and other 

local jurisdictions in the NCR. 

I note, Mr. Chairman, that your subcommittee also has jurisdiction over science and technology issues, and you have brought up 

those issues today. I would like to take a moment to tell you about 

some of our initiatives. 

We continue to serve as test bed for the federal government and 

a model for the country on transit security initiatives. We have a 

chemical detector system, commonly known as PROTECT. It has 

become a model for other transit agencies across the nation. Working with federal partners at DHS and DOT, WMATA continues to 

train and provide technical assistance on the PROTECT system to 

anybody interested. And that is just not here in the United States 

but our partners around the world. 

We are actively engaged with the Department of Homeland Security in efforts to leverage advances by PROTECT, maybe with toxic 

industrial chemicals and other emergency and emerging applications in chem, bio and explosive detection areas. 

In January of this year, the Metro Transit Police and TSA collaborated to enhance security at Metro stations during the presidential inauguration. It was the first time a partnership like this 

happened. We had the use of federal screeners with explosive trace 

detection gear, and canine teams from all over the United States 

supplemented our teams of canine officers to enhance the security 

of our system. 

And some of the lessons learned and SOPs developed will be 

made available to other transit properties and applied to other 

transit special events across the country. 

We are also working with DHS on expanding the application and 

training of personnel in the area of behavioral assessment screening. I think it is now called SPOT, and this is training provided by 

TSA. 

We have a long-standing productive relationship with FTA on a 

wide range of emergency preparedness initiatives. The FTA has 

provided WMATA and other transit agencies with technical assistance, support for continuity of operations planning, emergency 

drills, ongoing security forums and research conducted through the 

Volpe Center and the Transportation Safety Institute. 

In the case of training, the relationship is a two-way street with 

WMATA providing FTA with in-kind instructional support. 

A critical component toward ensuring that all training we conduct with our employees, first responders and federal government 

raises the region’s emergency preparedness level is all to constantly 

engage our customers. We have increased public announcements to 

our customers. Our recent campaign is, ‘‘See it, Say it’’—we hand 

these out at Metro stations—and, ‘‘Is that your bag,’’ that was de-
36

veloped after Madrid, which was noted by then former Department 

of Homeland Security Undersecretary Hutchinson as an effective 

tool for raising passenger awareness. 

We are also conducting open houses at rail stations where transit 

police and our Safety and Communications Department hand out 

literature, disseminate emergency preparedness and safety brochures and also expand upon emergency procedures that can be 

found at our web site. 

Last year, Metro Transit Police launched a Metro Citizens Corps 

Program that provides Metro-specific training ranging from rail 

safety and emergency preparedness and response to identification 

of terrorist activity. It builds on a citizen corps program. The participants come from Citizen Emergency Response Teams already 

organized in the District, Maryland and Virginia. 

We appreciates the important contributions training provides towards enhancing our emergency preparedness and response capabilities, but, however, we realize there is always room for improvement. And we will continue to seek opportunities to communicate 

more effectively with our customers, reinforce SOPs with all employees and work with our many partners in the National Capital 

Region and our own operations and public safety personnel to refine, expand upon the progress achieved to date. I am here and 

happy to answer any questions you may have, sir. 

[The statement of Chief Hanson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF POLLY L. HANSON

Chairman King and Members of the Committee, good morning and thank you for 

asking WMATA to testify at this hearing. I am Polly Hanson, Chief of the Metro 

Transit Police Department (MTPD) for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority (WMATA).

Background on WMATA and MTPD 

By way of background, WMATA was created in 1967 as an Interstate Compact 

agency through enactment of legislation by the U.S. Congress, and by the Commonwealth of Virginia, the State of Maryland, and the District of Columbia. The Metro 

System was designed to serve the constituencies of the National Capital Region, including employees of the federal government, the residents of the region, the citizens of our nation who come to Washington to do business with the federal government, and the millions of people who visit from throughout the world. 

Since the mid 1960’s, there has been dramatic growth and change in the National 

Capital Region. As population and employment in this region has skyrocketed, the 

demands on and expectations of WMATA have also grown exponentially. Each day 

we provide 1.2 million trips on our rail and bus systems. We are the second largest 

subway system and fifth largest bus system in the United States. Metro is widely 

recognized as being critical to the operation of the federal government. Over 150,000 

federal employees (45 percent of the region’s federal employees) participate in the 

Metrochek program. Nearly half of all Metrorail stations serve federal facilities, approximately 10 percent of Metro’s daily ridership uses stations next to the Capitol 

and Pentagon. 

The Metro Transit Police Department was established in 1976. MTPD is the nation’s first non federal tri-state transit police force. We have authorized strength of 

400 sworn transit police officers and 101 special police officers. Our purpose is to 

prevent crime, protect Metro’s customers, employees, facilities and revenues and enforce laws, ordinances, rules and regulations.

WMATA’s Regional Emergency Preparedness Training Initiatives 

As the largest transit provider for the National Capital Region, Metro takes its 

responsibility in homeland security with the seriousness is demands. WMATA’s approach to transit security involves a partnership between employees, customers, the 

transit police and other public safety departments in the region, and the federal government. Our training initiatives designed to enhance both WMATA and the region’s emergency preparedness reflect these partnerships. 
37

Just this spring, Metro Transit Police launched a new training initiative entitled 

‘‘Managing Metro Emergencies.’’ The training was devised and developed in response to the Madrid bombings as well as a recent series of service disruptions that 

forced thousands of customers to evacuate the Metrorail system. The ‘‘Managing 

Metro Emergencies’’ course is providing approximately 1,500 regional law enforcement, fire and rescue, department of transportation and WMATA personnel enhanced training for mitigating, evacuating, transporting and recovering from a 

major service disruption in our system. WMATA also intends to use a portion of its 

FY05 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Bus Transit Grant allocation towards the development of an anti-terror training initiative focused on bus operations. All the local and regional bus operators that feed into WMATA’s bus systems 

will be invited to participate. 

WMATA’s Emergency Response Training Facility opened in 2002, and is the only 

transit facility of its kind in the nation that is available 24 hours per day, seven 

days a week to train emergency personnel. The facility includes a mock train tunnel 

that allows regional emergency responders to train for disasters such as smoke/fire, 

collisions and potential terrorist incidents in a transit/tunnel environment. 

WMATA’s emergency management team trains an estimated 2000 federal, state and 

local emergency personnel each year. The facility was awarded the American Public 

Transportation Association’s Management Innovation Award for 2004. 

WMATA also continues to be an active participant in various regional exercises. 

WMATA sponsored a series of table top exercises with all key regional players, including federal agencies, as part of our effort to enhance continuity of operations 

planning (COOP) following the September 11, 2001 attacks. WMATA also participates in regional drills and exercises sponsored by the DHS, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments and various local jurisdictions in the National Capital Region.

Leveraging Federal Partnerships in Technology Development and Security 

Procedures 

I note Mr. Chairman that your subcommittee also has jurisdiction over science 

and technology issues and would like to take a moment to also discuss our training 

initiatives associated with our partnerships with the federal government in emerging detection technologies that are applicable to the transit environment. 

WMATA continues to serve as a test-bed for the federal government and model 

for the country on new transit security initiatives. Metro’s chemical detector system, 

commonly referred to as ‘‘PROTECT,’’ has become a model for other transit agencies 

across the nation and around the world. The early warning data flowing from PROTECT is fully integrated into our Operations Control Center and the data and live 

images can also be accessed at safe zones for use by incident commanders in the 

region responsible for responding to an event. Federal partners who worked with 

WMATA in the development of the PROTECT system include the Departments of 

Justice, Energy, Transportation and Homeland Security. Working with our federal 

partners, WMATA continues to offer training and technical assistance on the PROTECT system to interested transit systems in the United States and around the 

world. WMATA is actively engaging the Department of Homeland Security in efforts 

to leverage the advances obtained by the PROTECT program to other emerging applications in the chemical, biological and explosive detection areas. 

In January of this year, Metro Transit Police and Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation Security Administration (TSA) collaborated to enhance security 

at Metrorail stations and on trains during the days surrounding the presidential inauguration. The partnership with TSA, which included the use of federal screeners 

equipped with explosive trace detection gear and canines teams supplementing Metro’s teams of officers and explosive detection canines, performed without a hitch and 

is being applied to other special events across the country. We are also working with 

DHS on expanding the application and training of personnel in the area of behavior 

assessment screening of passengers in a transit environment. In accordance with 

HSPD-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Metro Transit Police officers have 

been NIMS/ICS trained and certified, and we have started to expand the training 

to key management and operations personnel. 

WMATA also has a long standing productive working relationship with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) on a wide range of emergency preparedness initiatives linked to training and exercises. The FTA has provided WMATA and other 

transit agencies technical assistance and support for continuity of operations planning (COOP), emergency drills, ongoing security forums and research coordinated 

through the Volpe Center, and emergency training through the Transportation Safety Institute. In the case of training, the relationship has been a two-way street, with 
38

WMATA providing the FTA with in-kind instructional support for rail safety and 

emergency management courses.

Public Awareness/Education Campaigns 

A critical component towards ensuring that all the training we conduct with our 

employees, first responders and federal government raises the region’s emergency 

preparedness level is to also constantly engage our customers. WMATA has increased public announcements to our customers, stressing the need to be attentive 

to their surroundings. Our recent public outreach efforts include campaigns known 

as, ‘‘See it, Say it’’ and ‘‘Is that your bag?,’’ which was cited by former Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) Under Secretary Hutchinson as an effective tool for 

raising passenger awareness and involvement in the transit environment. We are 

also conducting monthly ‘‘Open Houses’’ at rail stations during the morning rush 

hour. During these events, officials from the Metro Transit Police and our safety 

and communications departments are on hand to answer questions from customers 

as well as distribute emergency preparedness/safety brochures and expanding upon 

emergency evacuation procedures that can be found at our web site: 

www.wmata.com. 

Last year, Metro Transit Police launched a Metro Citizens Corps program that 

provides Metro-specific training ranging from rail safety and emergency preparedness and response to identification of terrorist activity. Citizen participation initially 

consists of Citizen Emergency Response Teams (CERT) already organized in the 

District of Columbia, suburban Maryland and Northern Virginia. 

In 2003, WMATA, the American Red Cross of the National Capital Area, the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Transit Administration co-sponsored a new national program designed to provide vital emergency preparedness information to the millions of American citizens who ride the subways, commuter 

trains and buses each day. The program, a partnership that also includes the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) features the distribution of ‘‘Together We Prepare’’ brochures to customers of transit systems.

Conclusion WMATA appreciates the important contribution training provides towards enhancing our emergency preparedness and response capabilities and will continue to seek opportunities to work with our many partners in the National Capital Region to refine and expand upon the progress 

achieved to date. I would be happy to answer any questions posed by the 

Committee.

Mr. KING. Thank you very much, Chief Hanson, for your testimony. 

Our next witness is Chief Bill Morange. I will just add a personal 

note. Before going to the MTA, he was in the NYPD for 39 years. 

He was actually chief of patrol on 9/11. 

As I understand, as you were coming out of the Battery tunnel, 

the second jet went into the south tower, almost directly overhead. 

So you certainly have on-the-ground experience and real-life experience. 

And with that, Chief Morange, I will ask for your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM MORANGE, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR/DIRECTOR OF SECURITY STATE OF NEW YORK 

Chief MORANGE. Thank you, sir. 

Good morning, Chairman King and members of the subcommittee. My name is William A. Morange, and I am the deputy 

executive director and director of security for the New York State 

Metropolitan Transportation Authority. 

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss what the MTA has done 

and continues to do in light of 9/11, the Madrid incident in 2004 

and the most recent events in London to train to respond to terrorists and other emergency incidents in our vast transportation system. 

Before I address the specifics of the topic at hand, permit me to 

tell you a little bit about the MTA. As you may know, the MTA is 
39

the largest multi-modal transportation provider in the Western 

Hemisphere and is comprised of several operating entities: the 

MTA New York City Transit, MTA Long Island Rail Road, MTA 

Long Island Bus, the MTA Metro–North Railroad, MTA Bus Company and the MTA Bridges and Tunnels. 

We provide some 8 million subway, rail and bus rides each day 

in a 4,000 square mile, 14 counties, 2-state metropolitan region, 

using 8,577 subway and commuter rail cars operating over 2,058 

miles of track and over 6,000 buses covering in excess of 3,200 

route miles. Our grand total of 2.4 billion rides a year accounts for 

approximately one-third of all transit rides taken in the United 

States. In addition, our 7 bridges and 2 tunnels carry approximately 900,000 vehicles a day. 

I know that you have my remarks for the record, so I would like 

to just tell you a little bit about myself and also how we have become prepared in the MTA. 

As you well know, as you said, Chairman, I was the chief of patrol for the New York City Police Department on 9/11, and 6 weeks 

prior to 9/11, we had a tabletop exercise that was done by the Office of Emergency Management, which was held in 7 World Trade. 

And the scenario called for the closing down of Manhattan. And all 

of us old chiefs looked at one another and said there is no way that 

we will ever close down Manhattan. 

Well, 6 weeks later, as you said, Mr. Chairman, when the second 

plane hit, I came out of the Battery underpass, and I thought the 

second building exploded and I said on the air, ‘‘Car 5, the second 

building has exploded.’’ And my driver at that time, who was my 

son, turned to me and said, ‘‘No, it did not.’’ He said, ‘‘I seen the 

nose come through.’’ And we were showered with all kinds of debris 

and all. 

But later on that day, after we moved our command post 4 times, 

we wound up at Pier 40 uptown, and we closed down Manhattan 

from Canal Street down. And it hit me like a ton of bricks that that 

was one I thought we would never see and we wound up closing 

down Manhattan. 

And I found out on that day how important the transportation 

industry is in our country, because we had to get people out of 

Manhattan, and we also needed equipment to come in to help in 

the rescue, which later on turned into recovery. And I found out 

that we were able to get equipment from New York City Transit, 

from Metro North and also from Long Island Railroad to bring in 

heavy duty equipment so that we could move a lot of the debris. 

We were also looking for ways to take people out of Manhattan, 

and we were using buses to take people out of Manhattan into 

Upper Manhattan. We were putting people on the Long Island 

Railroad, onto Metro North to make sure that they left the city. 

The reason why I talk about the drill that happened 6 weeks 

prior was that a lot of senior leadership was lost on the day of 9/

11, and I know there were a lot of reports come out about different 

things that were done and some things that might have been 

wrong with communications and all, but everything worked that 

day because everybody knew one another. And they knew one another because of their first names, because they were used to going 
40

to drills because we have done drills before, and they were used to 

talking to one another and they knew from other agencies. 

You know, at one time, one would say that the New York City 

Police Department was an entity of itself; it had 40,000 people. On 

that day, everybody molded together and worked together and that 

is what it is all about. 

Also, in the MTA, we make it a point that all of our chiefs along 

the right-of-ways and all get involved with all the OEMs, they do 

drills with all of the counties that our right-of-ways go through, 

and we get to know all of the other responders. It is probably the 

most important part of any response to any incident is that people 

get to know who one another is. 

And I still say to this day that because of the way we prepared 

prior to 9/11 some things did work. There were things out there 

that really did work, and people have said it was probably one of 

the biggest rescue missions that there ever was. But, again, like I 

say, people were working along with one another. 

And also I know we were talking earlier about the importance of 

all of our technology and all, but I really feel that the most important technology that is out there right there today is the human 

element. And it is very important that our customers and that our 

employees are fully made aware of their surroundings. And that is 

something that falls on us and that we have to continually make 

sure that we put out ad campaigns, that we talk to our employees. 

In the MTA, in New York State, we have give out pamphlets to 

all our employees, to the 66,000 employees, telling them what to 

look for. We have the See Something, Say Something Program, 

which in that program it started in early 2002. We have all kinds 

of advertisements on our vending machines. We have it on the Web 

site. We continually make announcements on the trains. We put 

posters all around. We do ‘‘seat’’ drops on the commuter rails. 

And it is something that we constantly change. Every 6 months 

we look for a different way of displaying our ‘‘See Something, Say 

Something.’’ And it works because our calls for suspicious packages 

have gone up tremendously since the start of this program. 

And also we have changed many ways with our employees. Like, 

we have track workers that used to go out and just look for safety 

issues, and we would tell them, ‘‘You go out and look for?you know 

what belongs on those tracks, we do not know what belongs on 

those tracks. We want you to go out and look out and let us know 

what you see is different, and we will respond.’’ We increased our 

canine units by—we had no dogs whatsoever before 9/11, and now 

we have 25 explosive detection canines. 

Just to give you some of the facts about the MTA? 

Mr. KING. If you could, sir, wrap it up, because we have other 

witnesses. 

Chief MORANGE. Since 9/11, the MTA has spent over $240 million on a series of operating and capital initiatives and enhanced 

security across the MTA system. We hired 200 additional MTA police officers, we hired 200 additional bridge and tunnel officers. We 

incurred $35 million in MTA overtime, police overtime, and also we 

have spent over $100 million in capital projects of our own money. 

[The statement of Chief Morange follows:]
41

REMARKS OF WILLIAM A. MORANGE

Good Morning Chairman King and members of the Subcommittee. My name is 

William A. Morange, and I am the Deputy Executive Director and Director of Security of the New York State Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA.) 

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss what the MTA has done and continues 

to do in light of 9/11, the Madrid incident in 2004 and the most recent events in 

London, to train to respond to terrorist and other emergency incidents in our vast 

transportation system. 

Before I address the specifics of the topic at hand, permit me to tell you a bit 

about the MTA. As you may know, the MTA is the largest multi-modal transit provider in the Western Hemisphere and is comprised of several operating entities: 

• MTA New York City Transit (NYCT) 

• MTA Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) 

• MTA Long Island Bus (LIBus) 

• MTA Metro-North Railroad (MNR) 

• MTA Bus Company (MTABus) 

• MTA Bridges and Tunnels (B&T) 

We provide some 8 million subway, rail and bus rides each day in a 4,000 square 

mile, 14 county, two-state metropolitan region, using 8,577 subway and commuter 

rail cars operating over 2,058 miles of track and over 6,000 buses covering in excess 

of 3,200 route miles. Our grand total of 2.4 billion rides a year accounts for approximately one-third of all transit rides taken in the United States. In addition, our 7 

bridges and 2 tunnels carry approximately 900,000 vehicles a day. 

The events of September 11th were certainly traumatic for our region and our system. We were front and center at Ground Zero, with three separate subway stations 

directly serving the World Trade Center site and with hundreds of local and express 

buses disembarking passengers at the perimeter of the complex. It is safe to suggest 

that more than 80% of the Trade Center’s 50,000 workers took one or more MTA 

services to get to work each day. 

But as tragic as the day was for New Yorkers and the nation, there was one overwhelmingly positive outcome on 9/11 for the MTA and for ALL our customers and 

employees. Despite the fact that our Cortland Street 1&9 station was completely destroyed by the collapse of the twin towers; that four other stations were completely 

put out of service for as much as a year after the tragedy, and; that Church and 

West Streets, major north- and south-bound local and express bus routes were 

blocked by massive amounts of debris, not a single MTA customer or employee was 

killed or seriously injured in or on our system that day. 

Why, you may ask? Was it simply luck? Perhaps in part, but much of the answer 

lies in the MTA’s long abiding commitment to preparing for emergencies. Our operating agencies have traditionally done more than simply writing volumes of emergency operating and response plans that sit on shelves. For many years, they have 

taken part in realistic multi-agency, multi-modal drills of those plans several times 

a year. 

On 9/11 in accordance with our plans and our drills, our subways whisked tens 

of thousands of riders from the virtual center of the World Trade Center site to safe 

locations north and south. Our buses carried hundreds of thousands of evacuees off 

Manhattan island. Our railroads transported shocked commuters safely to their 

homes and returned with dedicated rescue workers who had no other way to get 

into the City to help. Our bridges and tunnels played not only key evacuation roles, 

but, in the case of the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel, became the lifeline for emergency 

personnel and rescue equipment heading toward the scene. 

Some of those activities had been anticipated in previous emergency drills—

though admittedly not on as large or dramatic a scale. Nonetheless, the experience, 

lessons learned, and perhaps most importantly, the relationships forged in those exercises certainly saved lives that day. 

Since 9/11 we actually had a real life opportunity to test what we do on a regional 

scale and our preparation once again proved to be invaluable to protecting our customers and employees. When the lights went out on August 14th, 2003, we—along 

with our partners in emergency preparedness throughout the region—were able to 

execute the safe evacuation of over 400,000 subway and rail customers from both 

underground and elevated parts of our system. We are proud that there were also 

no customer or employee injuries in those instances—a truly amazing feat in that 

the entire service region I described earlier was affected. 

What I’d like to do is take you through what each of our agencies did prior to 

9/11—and continue to do—on a regular basis to prepare for emergencies in terms 

of both physical drills—with hundreds of participants—and table-top drills. I would 

then like to wrap up by describing what we have done to involve and educate our 
42

customers about how to prepare for potential emergency situations, something we 

believe is key to their safety.

New York City Transit (NYCT) 

NYCT is the largest member of the MTA family, operating over 8,000 subway and 

46,000 bus trips a day within the City of New York. NYCT’s Office of System Safety 

(OSS) oversees/coordinates four emergency drills annually: two for the Dept. of Subways; one for the Dept. of Buses, and; one for the Staten Island Railway. This just 

happens to be the same number of drills that were conducted pre-9/11. Only the size 

and scope of those drills may have changed a bit. 

Depending on the type of drill, participants hail from other parts of the MTA 

transportation family (i.e. the MTA PD, the LIRR, LIBus and MNR); the New York 

City Police Department (NYPD), the New York City Fire Department (FDNY), the 

Emergency Medical Service (EMS) and the Office of Emergency Management 

(OEM). 

Drills are conducted at key locations throughout the system, including at support 

facilities such as our Coney Island Rail Yard and at the MTA’s Transit Museum 

where a decommissioned station and more than a dozen old subway cars provide 

true-to-life underground conditions. 

After each event, OSS produces a series of ‘‘lessons learned,’’ ‘‘critiques’’ and ‘‘follow-ups’’ that are tracked, corrected and incorporated into the next exercise. 

Finally, in addition to performing emergency drills, all key NYCT operating employees are provided ongoing formal ‘‘eyes and ears’’ training; fire protection and 

evacuation training; and Dupont Safety training. To date, some 45,000 employees 

have been through these courses and personnel are rotated through that training 

on a regular basis.

Long Island Rail Road (LIRR); Metro-North Railroad (MNR) & Long Island Bus 

(LIBus) 

While Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regulations require one full-scale 

drill annually, the LIRR conducts a minimum of four major full-scale emergency 

preparedness exercises/drills annually, including one in New York’s Pennsylvania 

Station, the busiest railroad station in the country. Likewise, Metro-North Railroad 

conducts a number of drills during the year, including one in Grand Central Terminal. 

Like those at NYCT, the carefully crafted emergency scenarios require emergency 

responders to demonstrate skills in communications, fire fighting, rescue, extrication, hazardous material and first aid. 

Since the LIRR operates in three of NYC’s five boroughs (Manhattan, Brooklyn 

and Queens) as well as the counties of Nassau and Suffolk on Long Island, drills 

include a variety of players, most notably sister agency MTA LIBus, but also other 

members of the MTA family, including the MTA PD and NYCT. Other participants 

include the NYPD, the FDNY, NYC EMS as well as a host of county, village and 

town Police, Fire and Emergency Medical Services throughout Nassau and Suffolk. 

Metro-North, which serves two of NYC’s five boroughs (Manhattan and the Bronx) 

as well as Westchester, Orange, Rockland, Dutchess and Putnam counties in New 

York and Fairfield and New Haven counties in Connecticut, conducts its own drills 

with a similar mix of NYC agencies, as well as county, village and town police and 

emergency service personnel from both New York and Connecticut. 

Railroad emergency preparedness training is conducted at a number of locations: 

The LIRR uses Penn Station, its Hillside maintenance facility, field sites throughout 

Long Island and the Nassau County Fire Academy. Two retired LIRR railcars at 

the Fire Academy also help provide commuter railroad-focused training to federal 

and state law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the NYS Police. 

All major LIRR & MNR terminals, such as Flatbush/Atlantic Ave Terminal, Jamaica Station, Grand Central Terminal, 125th Street, New Haven, as well as shop/

yard facilities in New York and Connecticut have Emergency Action Plans that factor into the exercises and drills. 

In addition to MTA-sponsored full-scale exercises, both railroads and LIBus participate in numerous tabletop, functional and full-scale emergency response and 

counter-terrorism exercises hosted by local emergency response agencies and county 

OEMs throughout their service areas. 

Beyond drills and table-top exercises, both the LIRR and MNR provide ongoing 

training sessions for their own train crews as well as emergency responders from 

the NYPD, FDNY and EMS officials in the counties they serve. The LIRR is also 

intimately involved in the Penn Station Emergency Response Committee and the 

Penn Station Security Task Force which are comprised of operations, law enforcement and safety representatives from the LIRR, Amtrak and New Jersey Transit 
43

and representatives from the NYPD, FDNY, NYC OEM as well as State and Federal 

agencies. 

As is the case with NYCT, both railroads? exercises include extensive and formal 

critique/debriefing sessions that may, in fact, result in practice tabletop scenarios 

that test out new changes in procedures and protocols.

MTA Bridges and Tunnels 

MTA B&T operates 7 bridges and 2 tunnels within the City of New York. The 

most notable of those facilities include the nation’s longest suspension bridge, the 

Verrazano Narrows Bridge, as well as the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel and the Queens 

Midtown Tunnel, two of the busiest in the world. All told those facilities carry approximately 900,000 vehicles a day. 

Prior to 9-11 B&T exercises largely supported the NYPD’s own mobilization exercises. Up to that point, one of its biggest preparations was drilling the regional disaster recovery plan for Y2K. But B&T was also part of major Special Events planning, such as for the NYC Marathon, which begins on the Verrazano Bridge. Those 

plans always included emergency contingencies that were practiced in pre-event 

drills. 

On 9-11, B&T’s traffic and emergency response effort was transformed dramatically as the Towers collapsed. 

The Brooklyn Battery tunnel, itself engulfed in dust and debris, became the site 

of a major evacuation effort, as more than 500 customers were rescued by B&T personnel. Shortly thereafter 287 abandoned vehicles were removed from the Manhattan-bound tubes in order to allow emergency vehicles to pass. 

In the ensuing months, as many as 30 dump trucks an hour transported debris 

from the site. All this was handled in a very coordinated fashion with the NYPD 

and NYC OEM due to previously established exercise relationships. 

B&T has since conducted over twenty emergency preparedness drills. Many have 

been full scale multi-agency (MTA PD, NYPD, FDNY, MTA, OEM) exercises that 

have tested preparedness; response; inter-agency cooperation; perimeter security; 

Improvised Explosive Device (IED) mitigation; Hazardous Materials Spills, and; decontamination. 

B&T also participated in a state-wide exercise, conducted by the NYS Public Service Commission, designed to evaluate the NYS emergency load reduction program. 

As with its sister agencies in the MTA family, B&T is singularly focused on providing its employees with both formal and informal training opportunities that provide a safe and secure working environment. In that vein, B&T has also been fully 

engaged in Dupont Safety training since 1996.

Other MTA-Wide Emergency Preparedness Activities 

Certainly, as you’ve heard from me today, we’re committed to aggressively training and drilling our employees for potential emergencies. But over the past three 

and a half years we’ve also focused on making sure that our customers are aware 

of how they should respond in certain situations. 

Through the creation of the widely recognized ‘‘If You See Something, Say Something’’ customer information campaign, we’ve informed our customers about being 

vigilant and in the process have enlisted their help by giving them an outlet to report suspicious activities: 1–888–NYC–SAFE. Since 2002, we?ve produced print ads, 

10,000 posters a year and are in the process of producing a See Something, Say 

Something radio ad. Public response has been extremely positive and we have 

shared our materials with dozens of transit systems and municipalities around the 

country and the globe. 

Over the last year—and in direct response to the lessons learned from the Madrid 

bombings—we both customized our ads to focus on packages left in transit vehicles 

and produced Customer Train Evacuation Brochures and internet-based evacuation 

videos that show how to properly evacuate subway and commuter railroad cars in 

an emergency. Over 6,000 printed copies of this information were posted on our subway and rail cars and we made both the printed material and videos available to 

our customers on our website, www.mta.info. In addition, we’ve made hundreds of 

these videos available to local police departments, community groups and the general public since February. 

This year as a supplement to the more formalized training of our operating personnel, we also produced 65,000 Employee Safety Guides for all our employees that 

tells them what to look for and how to react in emergencies. 

There is no question about the MTA’s commitment—philosophically and organizationally—to doing whatever we can to be prepared for emergency situations, be they 

large or small. We believe that the current aggressive schedule of emergency drills 

that we conduct each year helps in the effort to protect our customers and our em-
44

ployees and to give them the peace of mind necessary to continue to go about their 

daily routines. 

Thank you and I look forward to any questions you may have.

Mr. KING. Thank you. 

Director Lennon? 

STATEMENT OF PAUL LENNON, DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE 

AND EMERGENCY, PREPAREDNESS MANAGEMENT, LOS 

ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY 

Mr. LENNON. Thank you, Chairman King and Congressman 

Pascrell and members of the subcommittee for providing the Los 

Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority an opportunity to discuss the key role that training plays in effectively responding to a terrorist attack on mass transit property. 

On January 26, 2005, a tragic rail incident occurred in the Los 

Angeles area. The accident was the deadliest passenger rail incident in the United States since 1999, killing 11 and injuring over 

180 individuals. That accident, it would be later be found, was 

caused by a deranged individual and not a terrorist, but its effects 

were just as devastating as the attacks the rocked London on July 

7, 2005. 

The response to the January 26th train disaster by the City of 

Los Angeles, my agency, Metro, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Department and the Los Angeles Police Department and Fire Department units, the City of Glendale’s first responders and numerous other emergency first-responders was immediate, positive and 

overwhelming. Within 5 minutes the first triage unit was set up 

and a host of other support services were put into place only moments later. 

The reason I cite the January 26th rail accident is simple: The 

tragic event provides a vivid illustration, which is fresh in my mind 

and those of my fellow transit security colleagues, that training to 

respond to a terrorist attack is vital. In fact, to ensure a rapid and 

effective response in the event of a terrorist attack on one of our 

rail cars, our buses or one of our hundreds of stations or facilities 

in Los Angeles County, training is not merely an option, it is mandatory. 

We trained at my agency to make mistakes, so we do not make 

mistakes when our exercises go from the comfort of a tabletop drill 

to a real world terrorist attack. 

The key elements of our agency’s program focuses on preparing 

to respond and preparing to prevent. First, we are focused on enhancing our interaction and coordination with our security partners 

at the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and with all other 

law enforcement and first responder agencies with jurisdiction 

within Los Angeles County. 

We can have the largest security force with the most modern 

equipment, but if they are not seamlessly communicating, coordinating and controlling our security and first responder assets, then 

we are not exercising command over any given threat. In point of 

fact, the lack of such coordination wd not do proper justice to the 

talent and technologies that are brought to play under such scenarios. 
45

With respect to my comment that we prepare to respond, it is for 

this reason that the LACMTA has a robust training program that 

conducts major interagency threat-focused security exercises. Our 

training regimen includes both tabletop and very realistic, onground simulations and exercises. 

The ‘‘real-world’’ on-ground simulations we conduct are tests of 

each agency’s first-response personnel and their training for their 

adequacy and ability to interface with other peer groups. The findings and result of these exercises are shared in the post-exercise 

critiques and debriefings, involving all the agencies that participated. These critiques, in turn, provide valuable lessons learned 

which are used to enhance the training of personnel of the agencies 

involved and to identify new needs, technologies and equipment 

that would be of benefit to agencies in dealing with actual threats. 

In terms of preparing to prevent a terrorist incident, we are very 

cognizant of the critical role our employees play. They are our eyes, 

ears and voice in our nation’s war against terrorism. We share the 

goals and tenets of the ‘‘System Security Awareness for Transit 

Employees’’ training course that was developed by the Federal 

Transit Administration and the National Transit Institute at Rutgers University. That excellent course, crafted in 2002, provided a 

very professional program to provide training and relevant materials to transit operators and other front-line employees. 

To effectively educate our employees at the LACMTA, we have 

also borrowed the best practices from some of the top transit systems in North America. New York Metropolitan Transportation 

Authority’s ‘‘See Something, Say Something’’ Program is but one 

example. The Washington Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s 

commitment to raise public and employee awareness of possible 

terrorist threats is yet another fine example of a program with an 

appropriate focus. 

The LACMTA has provided training for over 9,000 of our employees in situational awareness. This encompasses the who, what, 

why, where and how of dealing with unattended packages and suspicious behaviors. 

Our agency has also involved our law enforcement and security 

teams in a highly visible program of public engagement in which 

our deputy sheriffs move in, and through, our stations, trains and 

buses, making our customers aware of their presence through personal contact. 

We recognize that to conduct such comprehensive employee 

training and public awareness programs entails major costs, both 

in terms of labor and materials. Yet, the LACMTA views these programs as a proper investment in its employees as well as a major 

hardening effort by our agency against possible terrorist threats. 

When the attacks on London’s mass transit system occurred on 

the 7th and 21st of this month, our previous and ongoing training 

regimen gave us, and will continue to give us, the capability to initiate an immediate and forceful response. That response is in place 

today on our expansive rail and bus networks even as I share this 

testimony with you. 

Protecting a service area that spans 1,433 square miles is no 

simple task for the employees of the LACMTA. The fact that they 

have the training and know-how in responding to a possible ter-
46

rorist incident gives them the confidence to assure the general public that all possible measures are being undertaken to protect their 

welfare. 

Thank you for providing me the opportunity to share this information on behalf of the LACMTA with members of this distinguished subcommittee. 

[The statement of Mr. Lennon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL J. LENNON

Thank you Chairman King, Congressman Pascrell and Members of 

thesubcommittee for providing the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation 

Authority (LACMTA) an opportunity to discuss the key role training playsin effectively responding to a terrorist attack on a mass transit property. 

On January 26, 2005 a tragic rail incident occurred in the Los Angeles area. The 

accident was the deadliest passenger rail incident in the United States since 1999, 

killing 11 and injuring over 180 individuals. The accident, it would be later be 

found, was caused by a deranged individual and not a terrorist—but its effects were 

just as devastating as the attacks the rocked London on July 7, 2005. 

The response to the January 26th train disaster by the City of Los Angeles, my 

agency, the City of Glendale’s first responders and numerous other emergency firstresponders was immediate, positive and overwhelming. Within five minutes the first 

triage unit was set up and a host of other support services were put into place only 

moments later. 

The reason I cite the January 26th rail accident is simple. That tragic event provides a vivid illustration, which is fresh in my mind and those of my fellow transit 

security colleagues, that training to respond to a terrorist attack is vital. In fact, 

to ensure a rapid and effective response in the event of a terrorist attack on one 

of our rail cars, our buses or one of our hundreds of stations or facilities in Los Angeles County, training is not merely an option, it is mandatory. 

We train at my agency to make mistakes, so we do not make mistakes when our 

exercises go from the comfort of a table-top drill to a real world terrorist attack. 

Today I would like to share with members of this subcommittee several of the 

training techniques that the LACMTA has successfully used to prepare ourselves for 

a terrorist attack, like that which struck London earlier this month or earlier attacks on mass transit properties in Moscow and Madrid. 

The key part of our agency’s training program focuses on preparing to respond 

and preparing to prevent. 

First, we are focused on enhancing our interaction and coordination with our security partners at the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and with all other law 

enforcement and first responder agencies with jurisdiction within Los Angeles County. We can have the largest security force, with the most modern equipment, but 

if they are not seamlessly communicating, coordinating and controlling our security 

and first responder assets, then we are not exercising command over any given 

threat. 

In point of fact, the lack of such coordination does not do proper justice to the 

talent and technologies that are brought to play under such scenarios. 

With respect to my comment that we prepare to respond, it is for this reason that 

the LACMTA has a robust training program that conducts major interagency 

threat-focused security exercises. Our training regimen includes both table-top and 

very realistic, on-ground, simulations and exercises. 

These exercises involve, in some cases, as many as thirty agencies that are focused on multiple threats. These exercises anticipate responses to individual or 

groups of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, explosives and combinations 

thereof. Such exercises are always played out initially with a table-top exercise, 

where all the potential agency players and representatives are given insight into not 

only the threat faced, but also the role they will be expected to play. 

The ‘‘real-world’’ on-ground simulations we conduct are tests of each agency’s firstresponse personnel and their training for their adequacy and ability to interface 

with other peer groups. The findings and result of these exercises are shared in the 

post-exercise critiques and de-briefings, involving all the agencies that participated. 

These critiques in turn provide valuable lessons learned which are used to enhance 

the training of personnel of the agencies involved and to identify new needs, technologies and equipment that would be of benefit to agencies in dealing with actual 

threats. 
47

In terms of preparing to prevent a terrorist incident, we are very cognizant of the 

critical role our employees play. They are our ?eyes, ears and voice? in our nation’s 

war against terrorism. 

We share the goals of the ‘‘System Security Awareness for Transit Employees’’ 

training course that was developed by the Federal Transit Administration and the 

National Transit Institute at Rutgers University. That excellent course, crafted in 

2002, provided a very professional program to provide training and relevant materials to transit operators and other front-line employees. 

To effectively educate our employees at the LACMTA we have also borrowed the 

best practices from some of the top transit systems in North America. New York 

Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s ‘‘See Something?. . .Say Something!’’ program is but one example. The Washington Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s 

commitment to raise public and employee awareness of possible terrorist threats is 

yet another fine example of a program with an appropriate focus. 

The LACMTA has provided training for over 9,000 of our employee in situational 

awareness. This encompasses the who’s, what’s, why’s, where’s and how’s of dealing 

with unattended packages and suspicious behavior. 

Our agency has also involved our law enforcement and security teams in a highly 

visible program of public engagement in which our deputy sheriffs move in, and 

through, our stations, trains and buses, making our customers aware of their presence. We recognize that to conduct such comprehensive employee training and public 

awareness programs entails major costs, both in terms of labor and materials. Yet, 

the LACMTA views these programs as a proper investment in its employees as well 

as a major ‘‘hardening’’ effort by our agency against possible terrorist threats. 

If one mind-set permeates the LACMTA’s security posture it is a pro-active attitude to properly train our security personnel, our front-line employees and the general public. 

When the attacks on London’s mass transit systems occurred on the 7th and 21st 

of this month our previous and ongoing rigorous training regimen gave us and will 

continue to give us the capability to initiate an immediate and forceful response. 

That response is in place today on our expansive rail and bus network, even as I 

share this testimony with you. 

Protecting a service area the spans 1,433 square miles is no simple task for the 

employees of the LACMTA. The fact that they have the training and know-how in 

responding to a possible terrorist incident gives them the confidence to assure the 

general public that all possible measures are being undertaken to protect their welfare. 

Thank you for providing me the opportunity to share this information, on behalf 

of the LACMTA, with members of this distinguished subcommittee.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Lennon. I appreciate your testimony. 

Now, Mr. Kozub. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER KOZUB, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, 

NATIONAL TRANSIT INSTITUTE 

Mr. KOZUB. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

subcommittee. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to participate in this hearing and share some thoughts and insights. 

I am Christopher Kozub, the associate director at the National 

Transit Institute for the Workplace Safety and Security Program. 

As the chairman said, the testimonies will be entered, so instead 

of going laboriously through mine word for word, I am simply going 

to highlight a few points that I think complement some of the other 

testimonies you may have heard today. 

As Deputy Administrator Jamison pointed out, much of security, 

while technology is a key component of it, is operations based. 

There are three things that we, as a resource to the FTA and to 

other modal agencies as well as system agencies within DHS, have 

clearly recognized. 

Employee training is one of the center points of any good system 

security program. Employees need to be trained, as some of the 

other panelists have observed, to participate in a number of these 
48

systemwide programs. To encourage passengers and customers to 

report things that they see, whether it is an unattended package 

or suspicious behavior, requires them to report that information to 

an employee. Employees must be trained how to assess and analyze that information in order to effectively forward it on through 

the proper channels into law enforcement. 

Employees then themselves need to be trained on how to observe 

and properly report information that is suspicious in nature so that 

it can be followed up and investigated upon. 

And, ultimately, if prevention measures do not work, they need 

to be trained on how to effectively handle an incident, respond to 

it appropriately, as they are truly, while not trained to the degree 

of a law enforcement or fire and rescue personnel, they are the first 

person on the scene representing that agency and must take actions within the first few seconds and minutes to help shape and 

model the outcome of that incident so that when trained law enforcement and fire people do show up that the incident can be handled in a much more expeditious and safe fashion. 

We at NTI have been working with the FTA closely these past 

several years since 9/11 to put forth a number of training programs. Chief Morange from New York mentioned a pamphlet that 

they hand out. We, working with the FTA, have provided the transit industry close to a half million security pamphlets targeted at 

employee awareness and information of what is suspicious, what 

should be reported and what should be followed up on. 

We also have facilitated, either directly or through agencies such 

as those represented here today, the training of employees. We 

have reached through those training efforts 73,000 employees. 

While that number is something to make note of, the unfortunate 

reality is it only represents 20 percent of the total workforce of 

frontline employees within the transit industry. We have a lot more 

training to do, the agencies have a lot more training to do to effectively reach the majority if not all of the workforce out there putting service on the street. 

We have also worked outside of our direct relationship with the 

FTA with other modal agencies and other agencies within DHS. 

Working initially under the direction of the FTA, we produced a 

training program targeted at DOT, or Transportation employees. 

This effectively has helped reach close to 20,000 employees who are 

out there working on the highways and bridges. After all, transit, 

60 percent of it, is being delivered in a bus, operates on these very 

roads, bridges and tunnels. 

Another effort that we have undertaken, working with initially 

with the Washington State ferry system that is the largest system 

in the country but then eventually other systems and the Coast 

Guard, we have modified our programs to reach to the ferry and 

similar maritime sectors to effectively train over 1,000 people, not 

including the entire workforce of Washington State ferries in system security awareness. 

Lastly, we have worked closely with Amtrak, several freight railroads and most of all TSA within DHS who has funded this effort 

to produce a program that will deliver system security awareness 

to freight and passenger railroads of the country. Again, many of 

our commuter railroads operate, are operated by or on the same in-
49

frastructure that is operated and controlled by freight railroads 

and/or Amtrak. To this date, Amtrak has used this program to 

reach over half of their 20,000 employees. 

So along with what we have done in the transit traditional sector, those sectors such as highways and freight and Amtrak, which 

are all part of our transit and transportation system, we have 

reached effectively over 100,000 employees simply with the facilitated training effort that we have put forth. 

What we have noticed, however, and while drills are being conducted through federally funded efforts and systems such as those 

represented on the panel here with me today, have done very good 

local efforts to coordinate their training and their response plans. 

There is no national effort to establish competencies or standards 

for an emergency responder to respond to a transit incident. 

We, for many decades, have had national standards, codes and 

even regulations promulgated by such agencies, such as the FAA 

on what are the minimum competencies and training standards to 

respond to an aviation incident. We still do not have any national 

effort or standard put forth to do that on the transit or surface 

transportation side. 

In the events that happened this past month, the International 

Association of Fire Chiefs referenced the document put out by the 

U.S. Fire Administration, a study course entitled, ‘‘Emergency Response to Terrorist Incident.’’ Unfortunately, when we reviewed 

that course, there were only three very insignificant references to 

transit in the entire course. 

I use that example because I think it clearly illustrates the lack 

of national recognition to the fact that emergency responders, unless partaking in the programs that are done at the local effort, do 

not have the training resources and are not aware of the competencies that need to be there on how to handle what is potentially some of the biggest mass casualty incidents that they may 

encounter in their entire career. 

In closing, I would just like to make a simple comment. One of 

the words that are often used is system security. System security 

in transit is very critical, because system security needs to look at 

the entire system. What Madrid taught us is that simple security 

efforts such as law enforcement around major terminals is not 

enough. It needs to be every outlying station, every park-and-ride 

facility, every point of entry on a system needs to have equal protection if the system is going to be protected. 

Similarly, there has been much discussion about cameras and 

other technology. While all technology should be reviewed, should 

be researched for its application into this sector and into this industry, true security will happen in a systemic fashion; meaning, 

training of employees, alertness and diligence of passengers, good, 

solid law enforcement efforts within the transit agency and the 

community, coordinated efforts with other community responses, as 

well as the application and implementation of technology. 

I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to participate 

here and welcome any questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Kozub follows:]
50

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER A. KOZUB

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 

the opportunity to speak with you today and share some insights on the security 

of the United States’ transit systems, and specifically the importance of emergency 

preparedness and response training for transit employees and emergency responders. 

My name is Christopher Kozub, and I am the Associate Director for Workplace 

Safety and Security at the National Transit Institute (NTI) at Rutgers, The State 

University of New Jersey. Although the recent, tragic events in London have once 

again brought the issue of transit system security to the forefront of media headlines and American minds, NTI has served the safety and security training needs 

of transit agencies and their employees for a number of years. Under the direction 

of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and in partnership with transit system 

management and labor organizations, NTI has been steadfastly focused on developing and delivering security training materials since the attacks of September 

11th. It is NTI’s overall mission to provide training and education in support of public transportation and quality of life in the United States. When this quality of life 

is threatened, we must reevaluate our actions and precautions, not only in awareness and prevention measures, but in our reactions and response to terrorist threats 

and incidents. 

Collectively, the nation’s transit systems are responsible for providing a reliable, 

efficient, and rapid commute for 14 million passengers daily. Their biggest responsibility and priority however, must always be the safety and security of those passengers and the employees who are delivering this service. When transit’s infrastructure and operations are threatened or attacked, as it was twice in London this 

month, the desired effect to disrupt commerce, instill fear, and bring a bustling, 

thriving region to a grinding halt, is achieved. Unfortunately, the London incidents 

are merely the latest in a series of attacks on the world’s transit systems. 

• On March 20, 1995, Tokyo subway riders, at the height of the morning rush 

hour, were targeted in a deadly nerve gas attack by a doomsday cult, killing 

a dozen people, including two frontline employees and injuring approximately 

5,000 more. The first indication that anything was wrong was when passengers 

began to experience watering eyes and difficulty breathing—classic symptoms 

of exposure to the tasteless, colorless, and odorless Sarin agent that was used 

in the attack. Unfortunately, the two employees were killed when trying to remove the agent dispersal device. Neither one had received any training related 

to security awareness or incident response. 

• On October 17, 1995, eight people died and more than 200 were injured when 

a terrorist detonated a bomb on the Paris Metro. In the investigation police 

found the remains of a six pound cooking gas canister that had been filled with 

explosives and screws—to serve as shrapnel. 

• On February 6, 2004, an explosion in a Moscow Metro rail car killed 39 people and wounded 129 others, again during the morning rush hour. As with the 

most recent London bombings, the explosive device was thought to have been 

stored in a backpack or briefcase. 

• On March 11, 2004, a coordinated series of ten explosions aboard four packed 

commuter trains in Madrid killed 191 people and injured over 1,500 others. The 

attacks were carried out by terrorists boarding the system at outlying stations, 

deploying their device laden packages on the trains, and exiting before the predetermined time of detonation. This incident clearly illustrated that in order to 

secure a rail or transit system, security measures must be implemented and 

maintained system-wide. 

• On July 7, 2005, the London Transit system was attacked by four suicide 

bombers. Three of the devices were detonated on separate trains deep in the 

tubes of London’s Underground. The fourth was detonated over 30 minutes later 

on a double-decker bus. In total 56 people, including the four attackers, were 

killed and 700 others were injured. 

• Two weeks later on July 21, 2005, another four attacks were attempted on 

London’s transit system in which only one person was injured, but the system, 

and to a great extent London, were crippled for a considerable amount of time. 

This list obviously, does not include all of the hundreds of lesser bombings and 

attacks that have occurred against rail and bus transit systems throughout the 

world over the past ten years. While the following table shows the total number of 

surface transportation terrorist attacks for each year since 1995, including injuries 

and fatalities, it should be noted that the ratio of injuries and fatalities per incident 

is significantly higher for transportation targets than most other terrorist targets 
51

combined. This fact continues to make surface transportation systems, particularly 

transit operations, attractive targets for terrorist attacks. 

Terrorist attacks against surface transportation targets:

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 

Incidents 12 10 7 106 49 73 104 159 64 96 680

Injuries 5,313 256 156 553 231 355 695 846 580 1041 10,026

Fatalities 67 69 21 232 35 36 328 200 168 416 1,572

Source: MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base 

THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN CAPITAL 

Ironically, in an industry such as transit, which is seemingly burgeoning with 

technological ideas and investments, it is interesting to see how many reports, interviews, and testimonies regarding the referenced events, validate the limitations of 

employing currently-available security technology within the transit operating environment. Additionally, post-incident information often reveals the critical importance of the frontline employee in minimizing the impact of an incident. This was 

clearly proven on September 11th when PATH system employees quickly loaded and 

dispatched trains from the World Trade Center station. 

While we should not abandon research and deployment of new technologies, we 

need to recognize what has been proven to work here and now: employee training. • Encouraging passengers to report suspicious activity often relies on employees 

receiving and forwarding that information. This requires employees to be 

trained on how to assess this information and pass it forward through proper 

channels. 

• Preventing attacks relies on an alert and diligent workforce that can identify 

and react properly to suspicious activity and threats. 

• The outcome of an effective emergency response is often contingent on what 

frontline employees do or don’t do in the first few minutes of an incident. 

The FTA has clearly recognized this and has directed NTI and other resources to 

develop a number of courses and materials to better prepare employees for these 

responsibilities. This training focuses on improving their ability to observe, recognize, and report suspicious objects and activities, and being more cognizant of preattack activities. Heightened awareness of their on-the-job surroundings, and a familiarity with the warning signs of potential threats, will lead to increased security 

and safety on our nation’s transit systems. 

These materials have been developed through partnerships that bring transit system management, safety and security experts, organized labor, trade associations, 

and the FTA together to ensure that everyone’s concerns and issues are being addressed. The FTA and NTI have also considered the various methods utilized by 

each transit system to train their employees and have produced a range of materials 

in a variety of formats. This approach has lead to the development of materials that 

can be used for instructor-lead training and interactive, computer-based training. 

These efforts are complimented by the production and distribution of videos and reference materials. 

A number of transit systems have also recognized this and are utilizing NTI’s materials to provide employee training. Since September 11, 2001, almost 73,000 transit employees at more than 530 transit agencies have been trained. This includes 

51,000 employees who work for the top 30 systems which are located in the most 

densely populated regions of the country. Agencies such as Massachusetts Bay 

Transportation Authority (MBTA), Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad 

Corporation (METRA), San Francisco Municipal Railway, Denver Regional Transit 

District and New Jersey Transit have made comprehensive efforts to train the majority of their frontline employees. 

Unfortunately the number 73,000 only represents approximately twenty percent 

of the transit industry’s total workforce. Consequently, a large number of frontline 

transit employees in this country still lack proper training and preparedness for preventing and/or responding to incidents. This is largely due, according to many transit systems, to a lack of funding. While the materials from NTI are provided to transit agencies free-of-charge, and a portion of the training is actually conducted by 

NTI instructors, also free-of charge, systems still need to pay employees to keep 

buses and trains moving while other employees participate in training. Unlike other 

sectors, ‘‘in-service training’’ in transit and other transportation modes is incongruent with keeping service on the street. 

This training must also be conducted on an ongoing cycle. An employee can not 

be expected to effectively retain and apply information and skills which they are 
52

only exposed to once. There must be a continuing process of frequent informational 

reminders and periodic refresher training to keep the material at the forefront of 

their thinking and thus carried out in their actions. 

As such, while funding security technology research and deployment such as 

smart devices, chemical sensors, and cameras is important, a much greater emphasis and value needs to be placed on employee training and preparedness in order 

to effectively secure and safeguard the lives of transit passengers and employees.

NTI’S CONTINUING AND DIVERSIFIED ROLE IN SECURITY TRAINING 

While continuing to focus on our primary commitment to the FTA and the safety 

and security of transit industry employees, NTI has enhanced these efforts by collaborating on additional projects that have built upon these experiences and effectively served a broader range of transportation employees. 

• With an average of 60% of the nation’s daily transit trips occurring on buses, 

NTI, under the direction of the FTA, developed a modified version of the system 

security course to address Department of Transportation (DOT) personnel. Currently 1,744 DOT employees from 15 different agencies have received this training. These deliveries, as well as the development of an interactive CD–ROM 

version of the DOT course, have been funded by the National Cooperative Highway Research Program of the Transportation Research Board, within the National Academy of Sciences. Additionally, 9,800; 7,435; 1,450; and 450 employees 

have been trained internally by the Texas, Washington State, New Jersey and 

North Carolina DOTs, respectively. 

• Under heightened security concerns, the FTA and NTI assisted the Washington State Ferry (WSF) system in an effort to produce a comprehensive system security training program that included instructor-lead course material, a 

video, and an employee pocket guide. WSF then used these materials to train 

all of their vessel and terminal employees. Based on this project, NTI developed 

a training course for the rest of the ferry operations in the country. In compliance with the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) and specific portions of United States Coast Guard regulations currently in force for 

maritime security of vessels and maritime security of facilities, NTI has, to 

date, provided training in system security awareness to approximately 1,000 

passenger vessel employees. 

• Further adaptation of the NTI system security course occurred after being approached by Amtrak. With a need to train their 20,000 employees across the 

country in security awareness, Amtrak wisely decided to adopt the same program that was being used by a number of commuter rail systems throughout 

the country. With Amtrak and many of the commuter rail systems sharing 

much of the same infrastructure with freight railroads, the project grew to include the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), the Association of American 

Railroads, and the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association. The 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has funded this effort to produce 

a computer-based, security awareness training program that will provide a consistent baseline of security training for all freight and passenger rail employees 

throughout the country. The passenger component of this project was completed 

in January 2005 and Amtrak has used the material to train approximately 

10,000 of their employees to date. The freight component is under final development and the completed project will be released in the near future. 

These activities clearly illustrate that through prudent leadership by agencies 

such as the FTA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Government can produce quality and very cost-effective programs that will have nearterm, positive effects on the safety and security of many modes of surface transportation. This is of particular significance given the continuing move toward intermodal networks. 

Currently, NTI, the FTA and agencies within DHS are working on several new 

programs to continue this process: 

• A course is being developed to better train and prepare transit system operations control center personnel in assessing and responding to reports of chemical, biological, and explosive attacks within rail system tunnels. The course will 

compliment the existing FTA guidance document ‘‘Guidelines for Managing Suspected Chemical and Biological Agent Incidents in Rail Tunnel Systems.’’ Argonne National Labs, a leading source of expertise on chemical and biological 

terrorism and author of the FTA guidance document, is working with NTI to 

develop and deliver the new course. Initial deliveries are scheduled to begin in 

August 2005. 

• The FTA and NTI are also in the process of developing a series of training 

programs for transit employees on Incident/Emergency Management. These 
53

courses and corresponding materials will incorporate the new, nationally adopted NIMS (National Incident Management System) model so that transit employees, along with their colleagues in emergency response, will be able to effectively work together during an incident. The first of these courses will focus on 

the concept of passenger management during an incident. This has been identified as a challenge and an issue at every transit system attack and accident. 

Employees who are responsible for the safety and security of passengers during 

an incident need a clear understanding of the various behavioral characteristics 

that they’ll confront in an emergency so that they can most effectively direct 

them to safety. 

• The FTA, TSA, and the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) within the Department of Homeland Security have partnered with NTI to revise and deliver 

the FTA ‘‘Connecting Communities’’ forums. These forums were originally delivered in 17 cities to bring together transit systems and emergency responders. 

The revised program will incorporate the NIMS concept and will focus on a 

more substantive and facilitated discussion between the participants. The goal 

of these 12 workshops is to strengthen relationships between transit representatives and emergency response officers and develop an outline for a transit incident response plan. Among other aspects, this plan will include resource identification and availability, localized model response plans, and a proposed schedule for inter-agency, table-top and functional training exercises.

PREPARING EMERGENCY RESPONDERS FOR TRANSIT INCIDENTS 

While programs such as the ‘‘Connecting Communities’’ forums are important 

steps in improving interagency planning and response, they are merely the beginning of a long-overdue effort within transit and more so, the emergency response 

sector, to improve training and preparedness. 

Some agencies such as those represented by my distinguished colleagues have 

made great strides in developing programs with their local emergency services. 

Washington Area Metropolitan Transit Administration (WMATA) has created a lifesafety center and training program to better prepare local, state and federal responders for incidents within the WMATA system. The Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Administration (LACMTA) has worked with the LA County Sheriff’s 

office to train 200 of their officers in transit security and incident management concepts. A great many other agencies have and continue to conduct training drills to 

test the interoperability of their internal and external responders, resources, and 

procedures. 

Quite often, response to a passenger rail or rail transit incident has been done 

from a ‘‘seat-of-the-pants’’ perspective, not through the application of skills and 

knowledge obtained through a comprehensive training program. Although some 

training efforts are being carried out at the local level, there has yet to be a national 

recognition of the need to identify minimum competencies and develop baseline 

training standards for this type of response. 

As opposed to many of the facilities and operations that police and fire departments interact with, transit systems possess unique characteristics that may often 

contradict traditional response measures. 

• The presence of potentially live third-rail or overhead catenary, poses a real 

and present danger to initial responders. 

• Alternative fuel and hybrid buses present response challenges and safety hazards to responders 

• Initial tactics for transit incidents may need to consider maintaining system 

operation so that people can be moved quickly away from the scene and then 

evacuated or the ‘‘shelter in place’’ concept as opposed to immediate mass evacuation. 

• The large number of potential victims and ambulatory passengers at the 

scene may present the most significant challenge of the incident. This could be 

further compounded by the location of the incident: either in a tunnel or on a 

bridge. 

Unfortunately, these command decisions can only be made by police and fire officers who have a clear understanding of a transit systems infrastructure and operation. 

Aviation incidents, which also possess unique challenges and hazards to responders are often mass fatality, not mass casualty incidents, and therefore are quickly 

categorized as a recovery, not a rescue operation. Response measures for aviation 

incidents however have been addressed in a variety of national regulations, promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration and standards put forth by the National Fire Protection Administration. In comparison, transit incidents which, as 

statistically proven, can result in hundreds if not thousands of injuries, therefore 
54

demanding a faster, more coordinated rescue effort, have rarely been addressed 

through any national training effort. 

Following the London attacks of July 7th, the International Association of Fire 

Chiefs (IAFC) issued a press release urging fire chiefs to review their response plans 

for transit emergencies. In the release the IAFC referenced the Emergency Response 

to Terrorism Self-Study Course, produced by the United States Fire Administration, 

as a noteworthy resource. Unfortunately, the current version of this course has only 

three, rather insignificant references to transit in the entire text, once again illustrating the lack of inclusion of transit in emergency preparedness training at the 

national level. 

While, as DHS Secretary Chertoff observed, response to transit incidents is a local 

and state responsibility—because of the immediate need to triage and treat victims—the need to nationalize an effort to identify competencies and create standards for training still exists. Similar to what the FTA has done through NTI and 

other resources to serve the transit industry, a Federal agency, or agencies, needs 

to take on the responsibility to move this effort forward. Only when the dialogue 

on emergency responder preparedness and training for transit incidents is brought 

to the national level, will it become a priority for all transit systems and their respective response agencies. 

In closing, the efforts put forth by the FTA have been some of the most effective 

and successful security prevention and incident response programs in any sector. 

These efforts need to continue not only in terms of developing new programs, but 

more importantly in the expanded delivery and implementation of existing materials 

and courses. Clearly, including transit employees as a key component of a system 

security program is a prudent measure that will present an invaluable return for 

a relatively minimal investment in initial and ongoing training. And while there 

have been, and continue to be, many effective, coordinated programs in emergency 

preparedness conducted at the local level, we as a nation, to paraphrase Robert 

Frost, have promises to keep and miles to go before we sleep. 

I would like to thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to share my insights 

and provide information on the current state of transit incident preparedness. I look 

forward to continuing to work with you and my colleagues to improve the safety and 

security of transit passengers and employees and the effectiveness of emergency responders in managing transit incidents.crule

Mr. KING. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Kozub. 

I will address my questions in the interest of time to the three 

law enforcement witnesses, and it is a four-part question. One is, 

in view of the suicide incidents in London and the shoot-to-kill policy, what steps, if any, are you taking in training your officers regarding suicide bombers? 

Number two, if you can comment on the policy of random inspections which has been carried out in a number of localities, including the NYPD. 

Thirdly, a point I mentioned before to encourage retired police officers who are well trained and are armed to travel mass transit 

by giving them passes to work back and forth. Many of these men 

and women are in their 40s and 50s and are well equipped and 

well trained. 

And, finally, if you can turn it around, if you could get anything 

you needed from the federal government so that you could guarantee the money was being well spent, what would you be asking 

for the federal government to give you which it is not doing now? 

We will start with Chief Hanson. 

Chief HANSON. Well, in regards to suicide bombers, I think we 

have been working with local law enforcement, particularly the 

Capitol Police. In fact, we are having a training session today. I 

think the Capitol Police went over to Israel and really looked at 

some of the dynamics over there. We had worked with them earlier, particularly when we started bringing long guns into our system to develop procedures and we are reinforcing that now in light 

of London. 
55

Mr. DICKS. What is a long gun? 

Chief HANSON. A long gun is a weapon with a longer gun as opposed to hand gun. In our environment, there are MP5s, which 

could be qualified as a machine gun. A shotgun is a long gun, but 

it is?am I answering the question? 

So we do have procedures and we are reinforcing those procedures today with local law enforcement colleagues. 

In regard to random searches, we are going to New York on 

Thursday. We had examined and discussed this internally ourselves. We will be very interested in seeing how it is done in New 

York and seeing the application for WMATA. 

What we do is we have a program here, we are local law enforcement. The police officers and sheriffs in the region that represent 

WMATA. There are six jurisdictions, Maryland, Virginia and the 

District of Columbia. The law enforcement officers in those regions 

are allowed to ride when in uniform and in casual clothes, and that 

applies to sheriffs too. So that really kind of leverages our numbers. We do not do the retired program, they are active police officers that are allowed to use our system. 

On any given day, the Metropolitan Police have 300 people going 

to court, and the majority of those people are encouraged to ride 

the rails. We do training with local law enforcement, so they will 

well versed in the intricacies and challenges of operating in a transit environment. 

And then in regards to what would we want, I think it is a variety of different things. Certainly, more funding for training, for 

equipment. I would like to see more done in technology. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Morange? 

Chief MORANGE. As far as suicide bombers, we instruct our officers, we also put out posters on what to look for, how people act 

nervous, what type of clothing they may be wearing, if someone’s 

wearing heavy clothing in the warm weather, to look for loose-fitting clothing where they may be bulky underneath. We also put it 

in our pamphlet for all our employees so that they are continuously 

made aware of what they should be looking for. 

As far as random searches, we have started the random searches 

last week. The public seems to be very happy with it. They feel 

comfortable with what we are doing right now. NYPD is doing it 

throughout the New York City transit system, and we are doing it 

on the commuter rails. And, again, like I say, the public is really 

in favor of it at this time. 

As far as riding public transportation right now, all law enforcement personnel have passes to rid it. As far as retirees, I would 

bring that back to MTA for consideration. 

And the last, as far as how the federal government other than 

funds, we would definitely be looking for the technology that is out 

there to let us know what kind of technology works, because right 

now a lot of vendors and all come up and tell you they have the 

best thing since whatever, and when you look at it, it does not 

work. 

And that is one of the reasons why we do not want to just throw 

money right out there until we know what works, because we do 

not want to go back 2 years from now and have to change what 
56

we already did. What we are looking for is what works, what is off 

the shelf and what is maintainable. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Lennon? 

Mr. LENNON. Thank you. 

As far as suicide bombers, we have had the Israelis to come in 

here with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. There has 

been extensive training provided in recognition and reaction. We 

have also trained our employees on what to look for. So I think 

that program is?we started a program that looks really well focused with our employees and our law enforcement people. Again, 

the lessons of 7/7 and 7/21 will just reinforce those measures. 

Random searches, we are probably also be setting up probably. 

We have already talked about this before this hearing about sending a team to New York City and also Boston for their experiences 

conducting random searches with regards to both the RNC and the 

DNC. 

With regards to the use by off-duty police officers and retired police officers, that is something that has never come up in Los Angeles as an issue, and I think what we do have is a high use by uniform police officers and detectives using our transit systems, our 

commuter railroads and our existing bus and rail systems, but I 

will bring that back to my system study. And with our new mayor 

there, Mayor Villaraigosa, he may very much be interested in pursuing this with his colleagues in other communities. 

As far as the?I will only echo what Bill has said to my right and 

Polly Hanson We were thoroughly overwhelmed with the types of 

technologies that were made available or could be made available 

to us with a very limited amount of funding that was made available to us. 

We know what we want. We have conducted the assessments. 

We know exactly what we need across the board. We share, we are 

almost an incestuous industry. We talk. We talk about the applications, we talk about the equipment that is required. So we know 

how to spend the money, but, again, it is focused on we need more 

presence out there in terms of law enforcement. That is one key application, plus the technology. 

One thing I think that we really need to focus on, and it is just 

a cap-off in terms of what I have already heard this morning with 

regards to my colleagues that were here before us, is that if there 

is one area that we need to focus on and that is involving the public in a much more holistic role on this particular thing. We have 

a tendency to think in terms of the transit systems and indeed the 

employees and our law enforcement as being the ones that are responsible for security. 

Indeed, the persons that go, that are having the party this coming Saturday night think in terms of the people that are responsible for their security is the law enforcement. We need across the 

country, at a national level, at the local level, to involve the public. 

We almost have to have an Israeli focus on security. We have to 

involve the public beyond just the transit systems in making them 

aware and being part of the solution and not part of the problem. 

Thank you. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Lennon. 

The ranking member, Mr. Pascrell, has had to go to the floor. 
57

Mr. Dicks? 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Polly, I was very impressed with your tunnel and the fact that 

it is available for training and exercises. Is there another one in 

the country? Is that the only one? 

Chief HANSON. It is the only one, sir, and we make it available 

to anybody that wants to. We have done the Marines, we have done 

the FBI, Joint Terrorism Task Force, we have done local police and 

fire fighters. 

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you, we were talking about the funding 

for this effort and that Transportation now has turned this over to 

Department of Homeland Security. Are you worried about that? Do 

you think you are going to get less money now because of this? Was 

the Federal Transit Administration a source of grants for these 

kind of safety projects? 

Chief HANSON. The Federal Transit Administration supplies support in the way of training, the type of public outreach campaigns. 

The capital money that they give transit properties can be used for 

security initiatives. 

Mr. DICKS. Can they still be used even after this new? 

Chief HANSON. Well, because it is capital money that could be 

used for an upgrade of your security cameras, which has a dual 

purpose. But the fact of the matter is that accessing urban area security money that goes to regions and local states has been very 

difficult for transit properties. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, how much have you gotten under this new program? 

Chief HANSON. Well, I am going to be real honest and go back 

to September 11, before? 

Mr. DICKS. Well, you should be. 

Chief HANSON. Okay. Before the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, WMATA was the recipient of $49 million, and 

that was from both Congress and the White House, and it was 

spent on things you could see and touch, intrusion alarm upgrades, 

canines, explosive detection equipment, personal protective equipment for our employees. 

Since the creation of DHS and ODP’s Transit Grant Program, 

WMATA will or has received about $15 million, $3.7 million in fiscal year 2003? 

Mr. DICKS. So you got $46 million before and now $15 million 

since. 

Chief HANSON. $49 million. 

Mr. DICKS. $49 million before. 

Chief HANSON. And $15 million, including the money that we 

hope to get in fiscal year 2005. 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. 

Bill, what is your situation? How much did you get before 

DHS?what did you get recently? 

Chief MORANGE. Well, just to give you a little rundown on the federal side, FEMA for our capital programs we received $143 million. For ODP grants for 2003, we received $27.7 million. In 2004, 

from ODP, we received $14.1 million. And also in 2003, from ODP, 

for our MTA PD radio, we received $6.6 million. In addition, from 

FTA, we received $188,000 to perform drills. 
58

Mr. DICKS. Paul? 

Mr. LENNON. Prior to 9/11, we had a minimum amount of funding, primarily was focused on grants from the FTA, which was well 

received, but it was measured in the thousands of dollars. Since 9/

11, we received approximately $6.8 million in direct grants from 

the Office of Domestic Preparedness, Homeland Security monies, 

and we have received another like amount, about $6.9 million in 

monies that came through the Office of Domestic Preparedness, 

through the states, shared grants for projects for Los Angeles 

County and Orange County to do additional exercises and things 

like that. So it is about half has been through the state and half 

has come directly from the federal government. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. 

Mr. Kozub, you mentioned safety regulations, the FAA has it for 

workers involved in aviation but they do not have it for other forms 

of transportation. Who should do that? Who should have the responsibility for creating these rights in the federal government? 

Mr. KOZUB. Right now, the FTA no regulatory authority over 

transit systems as a DOT modal agency unless there was a regrouping there. The reality is, I believe, in my? 

Mr. DICKS. But Congress could give them the authority. Is that 

what you are suggesting? 

Mr. KOZUB. I am not suggesting. I am saying that is a possibility. 

What I am suggesting from an operational perspective is working 

with many of the systems that I have worked with across the country there is a desire on the part of many of the systems to do the 

training. However, the local funding, as you brought up during the 

first panel, is often dissected between other local issues and priorities and priorities within the agency, such as cameras and other 

tangible capital equipment. 

So quite often, unfortunately, the need to train employees, which 

has been shown time and again as a very effective security measure, is often put toward the bottom of the list. So whether it is 

done through a regulatory proposition through the FTA or another 

federal agency? 

Mr. DICKS. Or just providing the money. 

Mr. KOZUB. ?or simply providing the resources and the funding 

to do the job I think might be a more expeditious channel to go 

through. 

Mr. DICKS. And nobody does that at this juncture. 

Mr. KOZUB. To provide funding? 

Mr. DICKS. Right. 

Mr. KOZUB. Some of the agencies we have worked with have used 

some of their ODP or statewide DHS funding, but, no, there is no 

funding that I am aware of that. 

Mr. DICKS. There is no dedicated source. 

Mr. KOZUB. No. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Dicks. 

Congressman Reichert? 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I agree with a lot of what the panel has said this morning in regard to training communication coordination and working with the 

community. Sounds like community policing to me, and I think 
59

that that worked rather well in King County when I was the sheriff in Seattle just a few months ago. 

I would like to just go back and address a couple of comments 

made by some of the panelists. And thank you all for your service, 

by the way. 

Mr. Morange, you say you hired 400 additional officers after September 11?200 metropolitan and 200 bridges. 

Chief MORANGE. Two hundred MTA police officers, and it was 

260 additional bridge and tunnel officers, or peace officers. 

Mr. REICHERT. Where did that money come from? 

Chief MORANGE. That money came directly from the MTA. 

Mr. REICHERT. Now, you talked about the grants, $143 million, 

$27 million, $14.1 million, $6.5 million, $188,000. Any of that 

money go for personnel? 

Chief MORANGE. No. All of that money went strictly for equipment intrusion, fencing, lighting, and the $143 million is for capital 

construction. 

Mr. REICHERT. Yes. And you had an additional 25 bomb dogs and 

handlers, right? 

Chief MORANGE. That was all MTA. 

Mr. REICHERT. Okay. And, Chief Hanson, since September 11, 

have you hired any additional officers because of the added responsibilities of homeland security? 

Chief HANSON. I did apply for a COPS grant and got 10 police 

positions as a result of an analysis. We wanted to reduce the size 

of our beat area so that we could have people on six post assignments. I have had other increases that are directly related to other 

infrastructure improvements, such as increased number of garage 

spaces at WMATA, but besides the COPS grant, which is only partially paid for, all those are paid for by the local jurisdictions who 

pay for WMATA. 

Mr. REICHERT. Did you receive the COPS grant? 

Chief HANSON. Yes, I did, sir. 

Mr. REICHERT. Is that grant still in effect today? 

Chief HANSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. REICHERT. Did you apply for a similar grant today, do you 

know? Could you? 

Chief HANSON. I do not believe so, sir. 

Mr. REICHERT. Mr. Lennon, same question, have you hired additional police officers? 

Mr. LENNON. Yes, sir, we have. Yes, we have. We have increased 

approximately 26 police officers, sheriff’s deputies and put them to 

the system in the last 3 years. We have also put 110 fair enforcement officers, which are not post-certified, not peace officers, but to 

heighten the presence and focused on code enforcement, but their 

presence has been duly noted. So we have got about 135. We have 

increased staff to 135 but it has all been local money. 

Mr. REICHERT. Local money. 

Mr. LENNON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. 

Mr. Kozub, you made a point to say that from a systems perspective, a systems approach to this problem of protecting our transit 

across the country, that every park-and-ride, every outlying station 
60

and every tunnel must be protected. Does that part of that protection include people, personnel? 

Mr. KOZUB. A big part of that protection includes the people and 

the personnel. As we have heard before, the customers, many times 

transit systems, whether a subway system, bus or rail, have repeat 

customers. The same people get on the same train or the same bus 

every morning. They are some of the best at observing and knowing if someone is acting a little suspiciously or if there is a package 

or some other presence there that is out of the norm. 

The employees that work those regular routes and facilities are 

also very cognizant of what is normal and what is not normal. It 

is basic training and communication to these audiences that need 

to motivate them, to give them the confidence to report things, and 

it is also the cultural and system process within an agency itself 

that needs to have the follow up. You need to have the follow-up 

law enforcement within an agency that can follow up on these 

leads and do the traditional police work that needs to be done. 

Mr. DICKS. I guess the final point I would like to make, and you 

have actually made it for me, as the sheriff in King County in my 

previous life, I struggled with the same problems that you are 

struggling with right now. We had responsibility, and have today, 

for the Metro system. 

As we move forward in time, in the future, the difficulty in putting people and personnel in places that we know they are going 

to be needed to protect our transit systems across this country is 

going to become more and more difficult. The bottom line question 

is, how are we going to pay for that? 

You do not have to answer that, I will just leave it like that. My 

time has expired. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Congressman Reichert. 

Mr. Etheridge? 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you for 

being with us this morning in your testimony. 

We talked a lot about communications, understanding, listening. 

Let me ask each of you very quickly, Will, about this whole issue 

of interoperability. Obviously, first thing we want to do is prevent, 

but beyond that we ought to be able to communicate with first responders. 

Share withy us, if you would, how interoperability between you 

folks and first responders, is that a problem? Have you solved it? 

Do you need help? Where are we in that process, because I think 

it is a critical piece, and it seems to pop up every time we have 

a major problem. 

Would you talk to us about that for a moment? 

Chief HANSON. Do you want me to go first, sir? 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Please. 

Chief HANSON. Okay. WMATA and the metropolitan region, 

through COG, the Council of Governments here, has done a number of things. They have used Urban Area Security initiative ODP 

money to buy a cache of radios that can be accessed by both fleece 

and fire. There are SOPs that support that. That system does allow 

for interoperability at an incident, and they have been used several 

times for special events by both fleece and fire in this region. 
61

This region was fortunate to participate in some federally supported projects. Originally, the project was called, ‘‘Agile,’’ and now 

it is called, ‘‘Merge,’’ so it does allow some interoperability with police departments in this region. 

Recently, fire fighters received money from Urban Area Security 

Initiative money to improve their communication in the Metro by 

increasing the lines that are necessary for fire fighters or for police 

departments to go down in our system and still have communication, which I thin is important to note. Our environments are very 

different from being up on the street. 

So while there might be interoperability for police and fire fighters above the street, the transit environment because of the concrete and underground there is a different dynamic but there have 

been efforts, there is technical assistance available from ODP, and 

I would encourage more money in areas like that, not just to make 

the recommendations but once the recommendations are made by 

ODP for the funding to be there, then to help regions or properties 

or transit police and local fire fighters to be able to obtain those 

recommendations. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. So you are not saying the communication is adequate currently. 

Chief HANSON. I think that more can be done. I think in this particular region things have been done and things have been done 

with ODP Urban Area Security money. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Mr. Morange? 

Chief MORANGE. As you well know, in the MTA, in 1998, they 

merged the Long Island Railroad with the Metro North Police, so 

a lot of their communication was done via locomotive and conductors’ frequencies. Now, presently, we are part of the NYSWN Program, which is the New York State Wireless System. 

We are a pilot program, and we are looking all along the rightof-ways of improving our communication, and this system that once 

it is placed in was obtaining the frequencies and all, because the 

frequencies were not available. And now under the NYSWN Program, they are going to be made available to us. We are part of 

the pilot program. We have $50 million of our money invested right 

now. And I feel that this is really going to be a positive for the entire transportation industry and the MTA. 

As far as New York City, there are fiber optic cables and all and 

different systems that are in the tunnels so that they could communicate above grounds. They continually look to see where they can 

improve the system. I know the fire department uses it now. They 

are working on it along with the New York City Police Department 

to improve the communications there. They do look at the dead 

spots and they work on it from there. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Mr. Lennon? 

Mr. LENNON. Communications have always been a major priority 

for the citizens of Los Angeles and our emergency respond team 

has made sure that since we have built the Red Line tunnel, we 

have made sure that communications for both the Sheriff’s Department and for the fire departments as well as for the LAPD has 

been of paramount importance and they can communicate below 

ground as well above ground. 
62

Interoperability, I would characterize probably right now as 

being adequate for the situation. It can be enhanced, and I believe 

it is a priority, both for the fire and the police departments to do 

that. 

Again, our exercises that we have conducted, multiagency exercises, have reinforced the need for always continually enhancing 

our communications. 

Mr. KOZUB. On a national level, communications is basically a 

two-part problem. Communications from technology, as the chief 

just recognized, yes, there needs to be more emphasis placed on 

getting the equipment into the right hands so it can be used at the 

right time. 

However, as Chief Morange pointed out, the successes that have 

been seen in past incidents have largely been due to interrelationships, not just technological capabilities but the preexisting relationships between the policy makers, decision makers that need to 

manage an incident, both from the transit side and the emergency 

services side. 

So you need to look at both components, getting the right radios 

that can talk to each other, but you need to have training and 

drills and tabletops that can bring these people together hopefully 

before something would happen. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. So you develop relationships. 

Mr. KOZUB. Exactly. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. The gentlelady from the District of Columbia? 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I very much 

appreciate your calling this hearing, because I think the American 

people want to see whether we are paying any attention to London 

and its possible effects here. So I think you have done a public 

service and particularly in hearing from this panel, which is 

straight from the ground where it counts. 

The Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority, of course, here 

may be ahead of some others, perhaps not New York, I am not 

sure, but ahead of some other transportation systems, although I 

must tell you, to hear you testify about $15 million since 9/11 was 

not very comforting, Chief Hanson. 

Let me indicate that here there is an additional responsibility. 

There is the federal responsibility for 200,000 federal employees, 

that the federal government actually subsidizes to get them on the 

Metro every day because otherwise the roads would be so choked, 

you could not even get to the Capitol or to Washington. Now if of 

course something to the system which the federal government has 

encouraged to use, particularly given the large number of federal 

employees, we would be in very hot water. 

I really have two questions. One is to try to straighten out this 

dedicated versus other more general funds, and the other has to do 

with thinking outside the box all together about public transit security. 

Now, there was earlier testimony that everybody understands we 

are talking basically in dedicated funding about $250 million. Then 

when you ask, okay, what kinds of things would dedicated funding 

be used for, training would be one, overtime, I understand, is an-
63

other. If you get to the word, ‘‘capital improvement,’’ then you really stop me. That is such a huge expense that it seems to me once 

you decide to use money for that, you do not get to the other 

things. 

Which brings me to the $8.6 billion that we are told that you all 

would just go get it, it is there, and use for this purpose. Testimony 

earlier, $25 million from the, I will call it, large emergency responder, I will pool those two sets of grants, in 2004 used for public 

transportation security, $5 million, I understand, in 2005. 

I am trying to find out what difference dedicated funding means 

and whether there is a reluctance given the concern about first responder funding to simply take money from first responder funding 

or whether it would matter to local jurisdictions to have a pot of 

money that they knew would be dedicated to that, they knew upfront and would be used for that. We had a major debate on interoperability here on the authorization proposal. 

In New York, for example, continue to scream about first responder money. What difference does dedicated funding make or 

does it not make a difference? We have had dedicated funding for 

air security, we have had it for port security. Does it make any difference or do you think that the pot of money from the other set 

of grants could be used by major transportation systems just as 

well? 

Could I hear from each of you on that? 

Chief HANSON. I think dedicated funding is appropriate and necessary. I think that transit properties throughout the United States 

have had problems accessing regional, state, local, Urban Area Security Initiative money because there are competing priorities. It is 

a political process. 

I think prior to London people do not get it when it comes to 

transit. I think people now understand their local responsibilities 

in relation to securing infrastructure. You certainly get it with your 

secure transit and other initiatives to improve the infrastructure 

security of vital corridors in this country. However, locally, I am 

not sure folks are really engaged. We are competing with other priorities that folks have locally. 

I do think that there needs to be some tie-in, and the ODP threat 

risk vulnerability assessments are appropriate. You go get one, you 

have a list of priorities that have been outlined by the folks writing 

the check, and when you get dedicated funding that comes right to 

the transit property, you go down that list. And there are ways to 

ensure that it is being appropriately spent. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. 

Mr. Morange? 

Chief MORANGE. Well, in New York, we continue to look for all 

types of funding and dedicated funding. As far as any grants, sometimes we would like that there are certain parameters that are put 

on how we can spend that money, and we would like to show that 

maybe there is another way that we can spend it and should be 

spending it. 

I also believe that it is very important for the first responders, 

because that is one of our major weapons that we have against terrorism in our transit system. 
64

So, again, when it comes to any type of funding, we continually 

go out to look for funding, but we would like some kind of way that 

maybe instead of having to spend it exactly the way, to show that 

maybe there is a way that it could be spent in another area where 

it would be just as good. 

Ms. NORTON. For? 

Chief MORANGE. For transportation, yes. 

Ms. NORTON. For transportation funding. 

Mr. Lennon? 

Mr. LENNON. Yes. Thank you. There is no question about it, I 

agree with the people to my immediate right. We really do need a 

dedicated funding stream for transit. The way the money is being 

allocated to the states sets up circumstances of competing priorities 

here. 

We are talking about first responder communities here that really do need the money, there is no question about it. But when you 

go west of the Mississippi, in the case of California and specifically 

Los Angeles, we have a very, very vocal first responder community, 

very, very Professional, et cetera, but the focus on public transportation isn’t there in terms of the funding stream, albeit the people 

that use it, we have 1.3 million riders every day using our public 

transit. 

But we will find, when the smoke clears, that the majority of the 

monies do not get to the transit system itself. It goes to the first 

responder communities. That is why it is imperative for us to have 

a dedicated funding stream to the transit systems to ensure that 

they get what they need. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Kozub? 

Mr. KOZUB. Thank you. As I mentioned before, dedicated funding 

is a very vital component to this. It is emergency responder training, and I have been in the emergency services and the fire service 

for 25 years myself. It is a very vital component, as I have identified in the past. 

But one thing that cannot be ignored is training, not only initial 

training but continuing training for the frontline employees is very 

vital to that whole process. When the emergency responders get 

there, it is what has been done by those employees in the first few 

seconds and few minutes that is going to determine whether those 

fire and police units are on the scene for 2 hours or 2 days. 

So we cannot look at the emergency response as just those showing up in uniform on dedicated vehicles. Emergency response happens from the minute and the second an incident happens and goes 

from there. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, if I might ask one more question. 

It is a really thinking out of the box question. People rightly say, 

because it is the only analogy they can point to, how do you spend 

the kind of money that you spend on air travel and?we do not have 

that kind of money. I would be the first to agree with them. 

The chairman asked about random searches. In a real sense, I 

think that describes the pitiful state of where we are on mass transit funding. It is not that you do not know what to do. You are 

doing all that you have at your disposal now. 

But may I ask you whether you think at the federal level we 

should be encouraging our great entrepreneurial inventive private 
65

sector to help us think through an entirely new approach for mass 

transit security, where you would put a problem to them?limited 

resources, 19 billion passenger rides every year’some of the people 

you would be talking to would be technology people, some of the 

people you would be talking to would simply be analytical people. 

So the two-part question would be, help us think through technology that would be within our means that could help us protect 

mass transit where people have to go and come quickly. 

And the other part of the question would be simply analytical: 

Even without the technology, the people who think about security, 

what are the best ways to in fact reinvent security on mass transit? 

Do you think that that kind of proposition put out to the public, 

to security experts on the one hand, to people with technology on 

the other hand, would be the kind of federal leadership that would 

help you to solve the new problems that London and Madrid now 

present to you, essentially, as it is now to solve for yourselves? 

Chief HANSON. Couple of things that I am thinking outside of the 

box. Science and technology and DHS should be doing that, and 

they should be leveraging those kind of opportunities and partnerships. Our PROTECT Program was taking military technology and 

seeing if that could work in a transit property, and it was very successful. 

I agree with my colleague over here, there needs to be a list of 

standards and they cannot come out after you have bought all the 

equipment. It would help if there was a list of standards, and transit chiefs and transit properties have been asking for that for some 

time. There are a lot of snake oil salesmen. They see we have the 

money. They are calling every day wanting to sell us stuff. Somebody needs to do the evaluations to tell us what works and what 

does not. 

And on a very low tech dimension, I would suggest that September is National Preparedness Month. Let’s get serious about it. 

Our kids do fire drills in schools and why don’t our businesses and 

the folks who use transit get serious about preparedness during 

that month and try another alternative way to get to work, really 

seriously look at planning at home and sheltering in place and the 

other kind of activities that if we are really serious about preparedness, we should be engaging in as a nation and a country. 

I want to go back to Mr. Kozub whose training is absolutely fabulous. This video is dynamic. We just put it on our Intranet so all 

employees can access it. There are challenges in training operational employees. The emphasis has been on cops and fire fighters. Our operational employees are out there every day, and there 

is backfill overtime money for cops and fire fighters. There needs 

to be for our operational employees. It is very hard to take them 

out of the system?bus operators, train operators, custodians?to do 

the kind of training that Mr. Kozub has designed and is absolutely 

fabulous. 

So some of those are things that I think would really help us get 

where we need to go. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Morange? 

Mr. KING. If I could just interrupt, Chief Morange. To follow up 

on what Chief Hanson said about using military-type equipment. 
66

You also had some experience with that and it did not work out, 

as I recall. 

Chief MORANGE. Well, presently, we have the PROTECT system 

in Grand Central Terminal and we have been trying that out. And 

we also are looking to take it over from DHS. 

Mr. KING. Wasn’t there a system proposed to you by the Army 

that did not work in New York? 

Chief MORANGE. Well, the Army was something different. When 

I first came over, the Army was going to do some of the technology 

and all, but according to contracts and all, it just could not be done. 

But they talked about Lockheed Martin and other—Grumman and 

all that were involved in this type of technology, which we are looking into today. But we do, through DHS, use the PROTECT system, and we are also involved with New York City with the 

Biowatch Program. 

But getting into technology and the young minds, this is the 

greatest country in the world, and there are a lot of young minds 

that are out there, and I think that that is something that we 

should all be looking to tap and see what is out there, what we can 

do, and it should come through, one agency where they are just 

looking at that technology for us. 

As far as involving everyone, today, security is everyone’s business, and it is evident by the way you go into any of these transportation systems today and you see something, say something, the 

eyes and ear programs, how they all work, how a lot of people are 

making a lot more calls, and it is our responsibility that we respond to all of these calls and do what is proper. 

I mean, our employees, we have got 65,000 employees that we 

constantly tell them how important they are, ‘‘It does not matter 

what your assignment is in the system, you are very important to 

us.’’ And I think what you say about as far as involving everyone, 

involving the business community and all, that is a great idea in 

addition to having all this technology looked at and what is out 

there. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes, Mr. Lennon. 

Mr. LENNON. I think my colleagues have really pretty much summarized it very, very adequately, but I think you raised the right 

question, and that was the question that we have been talking 

about for 2 years. The snake oil salespeople that Polly has talked 

about has been an anathema to us in the industry. 

When you look at the technology that is in play right here at National Airport, it is the same technology that we used back in the 

seventies, shortly after I got out of the Marines. You came through 

after the federal sky marshals, the hijackings. It has been upgraded somewhat but we are still doing it, we are still queuing up 

to wait in line, to go through metal detectors. We are adding chemical detectors, we are talking about explosive detectors too. If we 

challenge the convention wisdom out there, as Bill has indicated, 

you get people focused on where we need to go with this. 

Using transit as probably the ultimate beneficiary, we will come 

up with a solution within a year to 2 years. We have never challenged the public. 

The other part, as I have already indicated, we need to really engage the public. We are doing everything that we can right now to 
67

train our employees. We are heightening public awareness at the 

local level. We need to engage the national public with a national 

mindset of what they need to be doing. We need to be a seamless 

focus on counting terrorism right now. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes, Mr. Kozub? 

Mr. KOZUB. I am not going to repeat anything that has been 

said. I will just throw in one caveat. Technology is a good step. 

There needs to be more research. However, let’s not forget that the 

PROTECT system in WMATA requires one of Chief Hanson’s officers within a control room that if it is set off to respond appropriately. A camera is a very good tool that can view a variety of 

areas, but you need a human being sitting there, viewing the output of that camera and assessing and analyzing that information 

and making snap decisions to respond to it appropriately. 

So while we need to look at exploring more technology, the research of it, the application of it, we also need to look at the human 

factor of all the technology and what is capable of one person or 

a group of people and a response and analytical perspective on a 

daily basis. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes. Finally, I am not even suggesting that technology is the answer, because I am not sure. I am suggesting that 

I would want to find out. I would want to ask these folks who can 

now tell us about how, for example, to use?that did not take much. 

It did not take us very long to find out that if you had a cell phone, 

you can now use a cell phone to set off a bomb throughout the New 

York subway or the Metro system, and that is pretty low tech. 

They can do that. It seems to me the same kind of technology 

might be able to help us stop that. 

But quite apart from that, I am also concerned? 

Mr. KING. Can you wrap it up, because we have to go to? 

Ms. NORTON. Yes. I am also concerned that there are other ways 

to approach mass transit. Ways that are very different from approaching air travel security need to be thought through, whether 

or not they involve technology. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. KING. Thank the gentlelady. 

And the ranking member of the full committee, gentleman from 

Mississippi, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I, too, 

join the other members in saying that this is quite an interesting 

panel. 

Couple questions. We heard the term, ‘‘no standards,’’ technology 

not being what it is, can the three transit authorities tell me 

whether or not you have ever received a directive from DHS about 

technology in terms of what is applicable for transit security? 

Chief HANSON. There are a variety of particulars that come out. 

We recently participated in something that ODP facilitated for us 

where trash cans are being tested. Many of us, the TSA requirement is to have bomb-containment cans or clear plastic, so we are 

very interested in ensuring that the products that we purchase 

with federal dollars do what they say they are going to do. 

There are other information bulletins that they put out. What 

they really have done, though, is to look at what we are doing and 

recommend things that they know. They do in DHS have science 
68

and technology as the directorate that I think could do more to advance. The recommendations are testing of some of the things that 

were discussed today and new technologies that are out there. 

Chief MORANGE. We have met with DHS. We have talked about 

standards that other agencies are using amongst ourselves to find 

out what are the best practices that are out there. They also have 

been involved with us with doing certain pilot programs. 

So it is a continuous effort of looking for what is out there, and 

we do get help from all agencies involved. I think it is not so much 

when we look at as far as receiving assistance and all. I think it 

is so much that all of us getting together, and I believe that is the 

most important part. We were down at the DHS. We did talk about 

explosive-detecting dogs, we talked about the trash containers. A 

lot of us brought up the fact that we did not feel that these trash 

containers were tested. We asked that they would be looked at. So 

we also bring back certain thing that we would like to see happen. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Lennon. 

Mr. LENNON. Yes, sir. The trash containers are the perfect example, I think, and probably the most prevalent example of what was 

recommended to us by TSA. They have a value, but what has to 

be conditioned in applying that value is where you place those 

trash barrels. Those barrels direct the explosion, a vertical plane, 

depending on the height of the ceiling, the fact that you are in a 

subway may or may not be the best place to put those barrels. We 

got the barrels through grant monies, I might add, and we are 

apply to our outdoor rail station because of what we have found in 

conducting our own tests. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, I am glad you talked about that but one 

other question is, what if I told you that as of today, we have no 

transit security plan that has been presented to Congress, even 

though we require that a transit security be produced by April 2 

of this year. And so whatever we are doing, it is based on what 

somebody thinks they should do. Because the Department has 

failed to meet the congressional mandate on producing a transit security plan for this country. 

Chief HANSON. What I would say is that the transit properties 

have been required to put forward plans and are required to 

present them to the FTA during a triennial review or any other 

audit that is conducted because FTA provides capital funds. What 

I would also say is that transit properties were required to submit 

plans to ODP in order to qualify for the next round of urban area 

security or transit grant monies. So we have certainly developed 

plans and put them together and submitted them to the appropriate folks. I am not at liberty to discuss what happened after 

that, but we have done our part. 

Mr. THOMPSON. And maybe I need to put the tail on the question 

to say, have you been consulted by the Department as to what a 

good transit security plan would include? 

Chief HANSON. FTA actually brought a number of the people that 

are at this table together to discuss that, and many of us were a 

part of making recommendations as to what should be in those 

plans and then guidance was published by FTA outlining what 

things should be in the plan. 

Mr. THOMPSON. But you have not seen the plan. 
69

Chief HANSON. Well, I have put together my plan, and I have 

seen their recommendations for the plan. But many of us at this 

table were a part of suggesting what would be appropriate to be 

in the plan. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Morange? 

Chief MORANGE. I think it is like Chief Hanson said. We have 

submitted our plans, we have talked?and I really believe that putting together a transit plan is not as easy as it may seem because 

of the different variables that are in the systems. An also if you 

take the New York City transit system, I mean, it is 100 years old. 

So, I mean, basic plans, yes, you could put in, but, again, you 

have to continually bring all of the transit agencies together so that 

they could share their best practices. And it is a continuous changing thing. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, Mr. Lennon, I will put it to you, say, if you 

indulge me. I am not talking about your individual department 

plans, which obviously you have done a very credible job. What I 

am concerned about is the fact that we do not have a national transit security plan for America. 

All of you have done your individual plans, but you run major 

operations yourself. And I am trying to get whether or not you 

have either been involved in helping DHS to do this soon to be produced transit security plan. Do you know of one in the works. 

Would you like to be included in consultation of such a plan? 

I know what you do individually, but we are charged with doing 

it for all of America and we are yet to have it. 

Mr. LENNON. Let me respond to that. We have been contacted by 

TSA when it first came into existence for copies about my security 

plan. I think they tapped into all the other major real transit systems and multimodal transit systems for copies of their plans. And 

that has been occurring for the past 2 years. We have shared our 

plan with the representatives from TSA when they touched down. 

We know they have been looking at our plan. The feedback that 

they gave us, as Chief Hanson has pointed out, that they noted the 

uniqueness. So I know they have seen other plans. They have 

noted the uniqueness of our system but noted the commonalities in 

our plan that are similar to the chief here and the chief further on. 

And that is because of the FTA’s role in developing standards. 

So there are standards for a system security plan despite the 

anomalies and the differences amongst all of us. We all have plans 

in place. We drill to our plans. 

If you tell me that would I like additional input into a national 

plan, most certainly, we would all welcome that, I think if nothing 

else, because I would like to see my plan as the role model, and 

so would Chief Hanson and so would Chief Morange. I think the 

communication is in place at our levels. 

We focus less on the uniqueness of my system versus Chief Hanson’s or Chief Morange’s. What we do is we come together multiple 

times during the year, our staff does too, and we do it as a national 

level through the APTA conferences and through round tables that 

the FTA hosts. And we share our best practices as well as our 

plans. 

I think we are at a very, very standard preparatory for response, 

too, at this point in time. 
70

Mr. THOMPSON. Not to cut you off, but I think we just have been 

fortunate that we have had good people running transit authorities 

in this country.. 

Mr. LENNON. I agree. 

Mr. THOMPSON. But our charge that we gave the Department is 

to come up with a plan for the country, and they have not done 

that. 

Mr. Chairman, I think maybe part of this hearing is that we 

need to, since we had the secretary before us yesterday, remind 

him that the committee and Congress, for that matter is still waiting on this transit security plan for Americans, noting the fact that 

within each individual transit authority they already have their 

own, but I think we have to have some national standards. 

Mr. KING. There is no doubt the plan is overdue. There is also 

no doubt that there is a strong bipartisan consensus on this committee that the plan should be put together as quickly as possible. 

I will certainly discuss it with Chairman Cox, and if Mr. Pascrell 

wants to discuss it, we can certainly submit a joint statement to 

the secretary to reemphasize the importance that we attach to that 

plan. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Mr. KING. I thank the ranking member. 

I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony. In addition 

to everything else, you have shown how complex the issue is, you 

have shown how wide-ranging it is. In New York, I am somewhat 

reassured that we have gotten over $190 million for the MTA in 

recent years, but I also realize the large job that is still out there. 

And if it is true in New York, it is true in Washington, it is true 

in Los Angeles, it is true everywhere in the country. 

So this is an issue that requires, as the ranking member said, 

for Homeland Security to be directly involved, and thankfully we 

do have people such as yourselves at the local level. 

I want to thank all of you for your testimony today, and, more 

importantly, for the job you do day in and day out, because, as Eleanor Holmes Norton said, you really are the troops that are on the 

front lines. We are in a war, you are on the front lines, you are 

doing a great job. We want to thank you for it. 

And with that, members of the committee may have some additional questions for the witnesses, and we would ask you to respond to them if you would in writing. We will keep the record 

open for 10 days. And also I ask unanimous consent that a letter 

from the American Public Transportation Association be admitted 

into the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

The subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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