RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2356-20

H.S.O.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

M.A.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted March 16, 2022 – Decided March 29, 2022

Before Judges Hoffman and Geiger.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, 

Docket No. FV-12-1415-20.

M.A., appellant pro se.

Wernik & Salvatore, attorneys for respondent (David 

Salvatore, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-2356-20

Defendant M.A.1appeals from a final restraining order (FRO) entered in 

favor of plaintiff H.S.O. under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act 

(PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. We affirm. 

We take the following facts from the record. Plaintiff and defendant were 

married in 2014. They have one child. The parties separated in January 2018. 

A divorce action was pending. 

On January 18, 2020, a domestic violence temporary restraining order 

(TRO) was issued in favor of plaintiff based on a predicate act of harassment, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. The domestic violence action was transferred, without 

objection, from Monmouth County to Middlesex County, where the divorce 

action was pending. 

After multiple continuances, a FRO hearing was conducted on March 12, 

2021. Both parties were represented by counsel. Plaintiff and defendant were 

the sole testifying witnesses. The court entered a FRO in favor of plaintiff based 

upon the predicate act of harassment and the need to protect plaintiff from future 

acts of domestic violence. 

1

 We identify the parties by initials to protect the identity of the victim of 

domestic violence. R. 1:38-3(d)(9).
3

A-2356-20

Sitting as the factfinder, the trial judge recounted the testimony in detail 

in her oral decision. We need not repeat the testimony at length in this opinion. 

Plaintiff testified about an incident that occurred on January 18, 2020, at 

the Tinton Falls Police Department headquarters, during a biweekly parenting 

time exchange of the parties' daughter. Defendant, who was angry and 

aggressive, told plaintiff to get in the car and that she was not going anywhere, 

and blocked her vehicle, which scared her and their daughter. She testified this 

outburst by defendant was one of several that week. 

On November 15, 2019, their daughter's school called plaintiff about 

defendant, who was not authorized to pick her up, hovering in the area, which 

led to their daughter being expelled from the school on January 17, 2020, based 

on his behavior. 

Plaintiff also described other incidents. Early in the marriage, defendant 

slapped plaintiff twice. On one occasion, defendant broke a locked door while 

plaintiff was nursing their daughter. On another occasion, defendant broke into 

the bedroom. In 2018, defendant punched a humidifier out of plaintiff's hand 

while she was holding their child. Plaintiff testified that defendant was 

emotionally and physically abusive throughout the marriage, is violent and 

destructive, curses her out, and engages in name-calling. 
4

A-2356-20

Plaintiff described defendant's cyclical behavior that includes aggression 

with explosive outbursts, followed by depression and apologies. She indicated 

that she feared defendant's erratic and unpredictable behavior, and felt that 

things could worsen without a restraining order. She stated that without a 

restraining order, defendant would verbally abuse, harass, and put his hands on 

her. She described feeling threatened and terrified by him and predicted he 

would do it again. 

The judge found defendant's testimony regarding his demeanor during an 

incident at their child's school to be "very difficult to believe" and "very 

incredible that he would have been calm and relaxed" given the circumstances. 

Defendant claimed that he was not the reason their child was expelled from 

school. He basically denied all of plaintiff's allegations. The judge found his 

testimony was internally inconsistent and "also inconsistent with his behavior." 

Considering his comportment, the judge "[did] not deem his testimony to be 

credible." The judge doubted and rejected defendant's claims that he acted 

calmly and rationally. In contrast, the judge found plaintiff's testimony to be 

credible. 

The judge found defendant committed the predicate act of harassing 

plaintiff by engaging in conduct proscribed by subsections (a) and (c) of 
5

A-2356-20

N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, and that his actions were "meant to harass [plaintiff] and cause 

annoyance and alarm." Regarding the need for a FRO to protect plaintiff from 

immediate danger or future acts of domestic violence, the judge found a 

"continued pattern of behavior" evidencing a need to protect plaintiff from 

future acts of harassment by defendant. This appeal followed. 

Defendant raises the following points for our consideration: 

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A 

FINAL RESTRAINING ORDER (FRO) JUDGMENT 

TO DEFENDANT BASED ON A VERBAL 

STATEMENT BY PLAINTIFF ONLY.

POINT II

PLAINTIFF QUESTIONED THE INTEGRITY OF 

TRO GRANTED TO DEFENDANT IN TINTON 

FALLS.

POINT III

TRIAL COURT JUDGE HAS BEEN IN 

RETALIATION AGAINST DEFENDANT POST HIS 

COMPLAINT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 

OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT.

Generally, our scope of review of Family Part orders is limited. Cesare v. 

Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). "We review the Family Part judge's findings 

in accordance with a deferential standard of review, recognizing the court's 
6

A-2356-20

'special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters.'" Thieme v. AucoinThieme, 227 N.J. 269, 282-83 (2016) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413). 

Deference is especially appropriate in bench trials when the evidence is "largely 

testimonial and involves questions of credibility." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 

(quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)). A trial 

judge who observes witnesses and listens to their testimony is in the best 

position to "make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses who 

appear on the stand," N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 

(2008), a perspective a reviewing court does not enjoy, Pascale v. Pascale, 113 

N.J. 20, 33 (1988) (citing Gallo v. Gallo, 66 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1961)). 

Thus, a trial court's factual findings "are binding on appeal when supported by 

adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12 (citing 

Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). However, 

"we review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo." Thieme, 227 N.J. at 283 

(citing D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245-46 (2012)). 

The PDVA defines domestic violence by referring to a list of predicate 

offenses found within the New Jersey Criminal Code. J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 

458, 473 (2011) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)). The commission of a predicate 

act constitutes domestic violence if the plaintiff meets the definition of a victim 
7

A-2356-20

of domestic violence under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d). Ibid. Harassment is a 

predicate offense under the Act. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(13). 

To determine whether the entry of a FRO is appropriate, the court must 

first "determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the 

credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 

2C:25-19[(a)] has occurred." Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125 (App. 

Div. 2006). 

Second, the court must determine whether a FRO is required to protect the 

party seeking restraints from future acts or threats of domestic violence. Id. at 

126-27. While the second inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident, 

the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary . . . to protect 

the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 127. 

Here, the judge concluded defendant committed the predicate act of 

harassment. 

[A] person commits [the] petty disorderly persons 

offense [of harassment] if, with purpose to harass 

another, he:

a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or 

communications anonymously or at extremely 

inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, 

or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;
8

A-2356-20

b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or 

other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or

c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or 

of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or 

seriously annoy such other person. 

[N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.]

Because direct proof of intent is often absent, "purpose may and often 

must be inferred from what is said and done and the surrounding circumstances," 

and "[p]rior conduct and statements may be relevant to and support an inference 

of purpose." State v. Castagna, 387 N.J. Super. 598, 606 (App. Div. 2006). In 

evaluating a defendant's intent, "'a purpose to harass may be inferred from' . . . 

common sense and experience." H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 327 (2003) 

(quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577 (1997)). 

Defendant contends the court erred in granting a FRO based on plaintiff's 

testimony alone. We are unpersuaded. A plaintiff in a domestic violence 

proceeding is not obligated to provide the testimony of additional witnesses. 

Indeed, FRO hearings commonly involve the testimony of only the plaintiff and 

defendant. This is hardly surprising since domestic violence incidents 

frequently take place behind closed doors. Nor was plaintiff required to 

introduce surveillance video footage. 
9

A-2356-20

Plaintiff testified at length about defendant's conduct and was subject to 

cross-examination. Her testimony described multiple incidents of defendant's 

harassing behavior. Defendant likewise testified at length. His testimony was 

largely comprised of denials of plaintiff's description of his behavior during 

those incidents. The judge found plaintiff's testimony to be credible and deemed 

defendant's testimony not credible. 

Our careful review of the record convinces us that substantial credible 

evidence adduced during the FRO hearing supports the trial judge's factual 

findings, credibility determinations, and legal conclusion that defendant 

committed the predicate act of harassment as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), 

(c). We are further satisfied that there was sufficient credible evidence 

establishing the need for a FRO to protect plaintiff from future acts of 

harassment. The detailed recounting of plaintiff's testimony, which the judge 

found to be credible, established the need for a FRO to protect plaintiff from 

defendant, considering his "previous history of domestic violence, . . . including 

threats, harassment, and physical abuse[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1). We 

therefore discern no factual or legal basis to disturb the FRO entered against 

defendant. 
10 A-2356-20

Defendant's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant 

extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

In Point II of his brief, defendant argues that the allegations set forth in 

plaintiff's domestic violence complaint differed from her verbal statement to the 

police. He contends that plaintiff and her attorney "manipulat[ed] the court 

system [by] leveraging the attorney's connection." He alleges that plaintiff 

should be investigated for perjuring herself, and her attorney should be 

investigated for suborning perjury. These allegations lack sufficient merit to 

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Lastly, we address defendant's argument that the trial judge retaliated 

against him because of a complaint he filed against the judge with the Advisory 

Committee on Judicial Conduct in 2019. For the following reasons, we decline 

to consider this argument. 

"The filing of allegations concerning a judge shall not automatically 

require the judge's recusal from a matter involving the grievant." R. 2:15-24. 

Moreover, "a judge need not 'withdraw from a case upon a mere suggestion that 

he is disqualified unless the alleged cause of recusal is known by him to exist or 

is shown to be true in fact.'" Chandok v. Chandok, 406 N.J. Super. 595, 603 
11 A-2356-20

(App. Div. 2009) (quoting Panitch v. Panitch, 339 N.J. Super. 63, 66-67 (App. 

Div. 2001)). Defendant chose not to elaborate on the contents of his complaint. 

In addition, defendant did not file a motion to recuse the judge. Nor did 

defendant raise this issue during the FRO hearing. Consequently, neither the 

judge nor plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to respond to this contention

other than claiming the judge lacked legal expertise. See State v. Robinson, 200 

N.J. 1, 20 (2009) ("There is an instinct of fairness due both the trial judge . . . 

and a litigant's adversary, a sense that . . . the trial judge should have a clear first 

chance to address the issue." (quoting Frank M. Coffin, On Appeal: Courts, 

Lawyering, and Judging 84-85 (1994))). 

"Generally, an appellate court will not consider issues, even constitutional 

ones, which were not raised below." State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 383 (2012). 

"For sound jurisprudential reasons, with few exceptions, 'our appellate courts 

will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial 

court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available.'" State v. Witt, 

223 N.J. 409, 419 (2015) (quoting Robinson, 200 N.J. at 20). Appellate courts 

do not "consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court 

when an opportunity for such a presentation is available 'unless the questions so 

raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of 
12 A-2356-20

great public interest.'" Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) 

(quoting Reynolds Offset Co. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 

1959)). 

Defendant's argument is not jurisdictional in nature and does not 

substantially implicate matters of great public interest. Moreover, the record is 

insufficient to permit the adjudication of defendant's delayed challenge. 

Because we review the trial court's ruling in view of the record before us, we 

decline to consider this belated, unsupported argument, which was not raised 

before the trial court. 

Affirmed.