The Honorable Mark R. Kravitz, of the United States District Court * for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation. 1 08-6182-cr United States v. Owad

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F OR T HE S ECOND C IRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER

RULI NGS BY SU MMA RY ORD ER DO NOT HAVE PRE CED ENT IAL EF FEC T . C ITA TIO N T O ASU MMARY ORD ER FIL ED ON OR AFT ER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PE RMI TTE D AND IS GOV ERN ED BY F EDE RAL RULE OF A PPE LLA TE P ROC EDU RE 32.1 AN D T HIS C OUR T ’ S L OCA L RULE 32.1.1. W HEN CITI NG A SUMMAR Y O RDE R I N ADO CUMENT FI LED WI TH THI S C OUR T , AP ART Y MUS T CIT E EIT HERTH E F EDE RAL A PPE NDI X O R AN ELE CTR ONI C D ATABAS E ( WIT H T HE NOT ATI ON “ SUMMAR Y O RDE R ”). APA RTY CI TIN G ASU MMARY ORD ER MUS T S ERV E ACO PY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NO T R EPR ESE NTE D B Y C OUN SEL .

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 3 day of February, two thousand and ten. rd

Present: RICHARD C. WESLEY,

GERARD E. LYNCH

Circuit Judges , MARK R. KRAVITZ,

District Judge . *

________________________________________________ UNITED STATES, Appellee ,

- v. - (08-6182-cr) CHRISTINE OWAD, Defendant-Appellant .

__________________________________________________ Appearing for Appellant: ARZA FELDMAN, Feldman and Feldman, Uniondale, New York. Appearing for Appellee: PAUL D. SILVER and JOSHUA VINCIGUERRA, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Andrew T. Baxter, United States Attorney2 for the Northern District of New York, Albany, New York.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, J. ). 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 2 AND DECREED that the judgment of the United States District 3 Court for the Southern District of New York be AFFIRMED . 4 On October 17, 2007, Defendant-Appellant Christine Owad 5 entered a plea of guilty for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. 6 On December 8, 2008, Owad was sentenced to a fifteen-month 7 term of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of 8 supervised release. Owad now challenges the special 9 conditions imposed as terms of her supervised release and 10 the district court’s order that she pay restitution for her 11 crimes. Specifically, Appellant argues that the district 12 court erred in requiring that she participate in a mental 13 health program and in the computer restriction and 14 monitoring program, and that the district court failed to 15 adequately consider her financial circumstances and the 16 mandatory factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2) in 17 imposing its restitution order. We presume the parties’ 18 familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural 19 history of the case, and the issues on appeal.3 1 When, as in this case, the Appellant failed to 2 challenge the imposition of a condition of supervised 3 release before the district court, this Court reviews the 4 propriety of the conditions for plain error. United States 5 v. Dupes , 513 F.3d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 2008). We have, 6 however, “[o]n occasion, . . . reviewed unobjected to 7 sentencing errors without rigorous application of plain 8 error standards.” United States v. Sofsky , 287 F.3d 122, 9 125 (2d Cir. 2002). We have held that relaxation of the 10 plain error standard was warranted when “the challenged 11 condition of supervised release was not recommended in the 12 PSR.” Id. Even under a relaxed plain error standard of 13 review, we conclude that the district court did not commit 14 error — plain or otherwise — in imposing the challenged 15 special conditions of supervised release or in setting the 16 schedule for Appellant’s payment of restitution. 17 District courts have “broad discretion to tailor 18 conditions of supervised release.” United States v. Gill , 19 523 F.3d 107, 108 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). In order to 20 fall within this broad discretion, a condition of supervised 21 release must involve “no greater deprivation of liberty than 22 is reasonably necessary to implement the statutory purposes4 1 of sentencing,” id. at 109 (internal quotation marks and 2 citation omitted), must be “consistent with pertinent 3 Sentencing Commission policy statements, id. , and must be 4 “reasonably related to the factors set forth in section[s] 5 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D).” 18 U.S.C. 6 § 3583(d)(1). 7 A district court is permitted to “require as a special 8 condition of [supervised release] that a defendant 9 participate in a mental health program ‘[i]f the court has 10 reason to believe that the defendant is in need of 11 psychological or psychiatric treatment.’” United States v. 12 Peterson , 248 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) 13 quoting U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(d)(5)). The condition requiring 14 that Owad participate in a mental health program was 15 reasonably related to her “history and characteristics.” 18 16 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 17 Imposition of the special condition requiring that 18 Appellant participate in the computer restriction and 19 monitoring program was not error. We have held that 20 “[r]estrictions on Internet use may serve several sentencing 21 objectives, chiefly therapy and rehabilitation, as well as 22 the welfare of the community (by keeping the offender away5 1 from an instrumentality of his [or her] offenses).” United 2 States v. Johnson , 446 F.3d 272, 281 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, 3 the district court stopped short of imposing an outright ban 4 on Appellant’s use of computers and the Internet. Cf. id. 5 at 282. The special condition is reasonably related to “the 6 nature and circumstances of the offense,” the need to 7 “afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” and the 8 need to “protect the public from further crimes of the 9 defendant.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), and 10 (a)(2)(C). 11 The district court properly ordered that restitution 12 was due and payable immediately and set a schedule for 13 Appellant to make the required payments. Under a 14 deferential standard of review, see United States v. Amato , 15 540 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2008), we find the district 16 court’s order proper. In imposing a restitution order, the 17 district court is not required to “explicitly recite that 18 she had considered the mandatory factors.” United States v. 19 Nucci , 364 F.3d 419, 421 (2d Cir. 2004). There is nothing 20 in the record that indicates that the district court failed 21 to consider the appropriate factors in requiring Owad to 22 adhere to the payment schedule it devised in connection with6 1 its restitution order. See United States v. Fiore , 381 F.3d 2 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2004). To the contrary, the court’s 3 statements that it based the restitution amount on Owad’s 4 “overall financial resources and assets,” and that it 5 declined to require a fine based upon “the restitution order 6 and [Owad’s] financial situation,” are sufficient for us to 7 find that it considered the relevant factors. See United 8 States v. Mortimor , 52 F.3d 429, 436 (2d Cir. 1995). We 9 therefore affirm. 10 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s remaining arguments 11 and finds them to be without merit. Accordingly, the 12 judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED . 13 14 For the Court 15 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 16 17 18