Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, 

Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST 

Thursday, February 12, 2004 AVIATION SECURITY

Challenges Exist in 

Stabilizing and Enhancing 

Passenger and Baggage 

Screening Operations 

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice 

GAO-04-440T 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-440T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Cathleen A. 

Berrick, (202) 512-8777, Berrickc@gao.gov.. 

Highlights of GAO-04-440T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Aviation, 

Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, House of Representatives 

February 12, 2004

AVIATION SECURITY

Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and 

Enhancing Passenger and Baggage 

Screening Operations 

TSA met its mandate to establish a federal screener workforce by November 

2002, but continues to face challenges in hiring and deploying passenger and 

baggage screeners. Staffing shortages at some airports and TSA’s hiring 

process have hindered TSA’s ability to fully staff screening checkpoints 

without using additional measures, such as overtime. In addition, while TSA 

has taken steps to enhance its screener training programs, staffing shortages 

and lack of high-speed connectivity at airport training facilities have made it 

difficult for screeners at some airports to fully utilize these programs. 

TSA has also undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance of 

passenger screeners in detecting threat objects. These efforts include 

increasing covert testing at screening checkpoints and conducting annual 

recertifications of screeners. While TSA is making progress in measuring the 

performance of passenger screeners, it has collected limited performance 

data related to its baggage screening operations. However, TSA has begun 

collecting additional performance data related to its baggage screening 

operations, and plans to increase these efforts in the future. 

TSA also continues to face challenges in deploying and leveraging screening 

equipment and technologies. TSA deployed Explosive Detection Systems 

and Explosive Trace Detection equipment to all airports to screen checked 

baggage. However, TSA has been unable to fully utilize this equipment to 

screen 100 percent of checked baggage due to screener shortages, and 

equipment out of service for maintenance and/or repairs. When this 

equipment is not available, TSA continues to screen checked baggage using 

alternative means. TSA also has ongoing initiatives designed to increase the 

efficiency of screening checked baggage, including implementing in-line 

baggage screening systems and streamlining screening processes. 

TSA is also conducting research and development (R&D) activities to 

strengthen passenger and baggage screening. These efforts are designed to 

improve detection capability, performance, and efficiency for current 

technologies, and to develop next generation screening equipment. TSA 

faces a number of challenges with its R&D program, including balancing 

funding with competing priorities, and working with other components of 

the Department of Homeland Security to develop a strategy for merging their 

R&D programs. 

Securing commercial aviation is a 

daunting task—with hundreds of 

airports and thousands of flights 

daily carrying millions of 

passengers and pieces of baggage. 

In an effort to strengthen the 

security of commercial aviation, 

the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) was created 

and charged with making 

numerous enhancements to 

aviation security, including 

federalizing passenger and baggage 

screening and screening checked 

baggage using explosive detection 

systems. To assess the progress of 

passenger and baggage screening 

operations, GAO was asked to 

describe TSA’s efforts to (1) hire 

and deploy passenger and baggage 

screeners, (2) train the screening 

workforce, (3) measure screener 

performance in detecting threat 

objects, and (4) leverage and 

deploy screening equipment and 

technologies. 

In prior reports, GAO has made 

numerous recommendations 

designed to strengthen airport 

passenger and baggage screening. 

GAO also have several ongoing 

reviews related to the issues 

addressed in this testimony, and 

will issue separate reports related 

to these areas at later dates, with 

additional recommendations as 

appropriate. 
Page 1 GAO-04-440T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing to discuss 

progress and challenges in airport passenger and baggage screening. 

Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task—with hundreds of 

airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands of flights daily carrying 

millions of passengers and pieces of baggage. In an effort to strengthen the 

security of commercial aviation, the President signed into law the Aviation 

and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) on November 19, 2001.1

 ATSA 

created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and mandated 

actions designed to strengthen aviation security, including the 

federalization of passenger and baggage screening at over 440 commercial 

airports in the United States by November 19, 2002, and the screening of 

all checked baggage using explosive detection systems.2

 Notwithstanding 

these efforts, recent reviews and covert testing conducted by us, the 

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Inspector General, 

and TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review revealed 

continuing weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the screening system. 

My testimony today focuses on the progress TSA is making in developing 

and deploying tools to enhance and measure screener performance and 

the challenges that remain. In particular, my testimony highlights four key 

areas, including TSA’s efforts to (1) hire and deploy passenger and 

baggage screeners, (2) train the screening workforce, (3) measure 

screener performance in detecting threat objects, and (4) leverage and 

deploy screening equipment and technologies. My testimony is based on 

our prior work and preliminary observations from our ongoing reviews of 

TSA’s passenger and baggage screening programs, and research and 

development efforts. 

 1

Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

2

According to TSA, Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and Explosive Trace Detection 

(ETD) are the only technologies available to TSA for meeting ATSA’s requirement to screen 

100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems. EDS operate in an 

automated mode and use probing radiation to examine objects inside baggage and identify 

the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. ETD works by detecting vapors and 

residues of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs, 

which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of explosive materials. 
Page 2 GAO-04-440T 

In summary: 

While TSA met its mandate to establish a federal screener workforce by 

November 2002, it continues to face challenges in hiring and deploying its 

screener workforce. To accomplish its security mission, TSA needs a 

sufficient number of passenger and baggage screeners trained and 

certified in the latest TSA screening procedures and technology. However, 

staffing shortages and TSA’s hiring process have hindered the ability of 

some Federal Security Directors (FSD)3

 to provide sufficient resources to 

staff screening checkpoints and oversee screening operations at their 

airports. 

TSA has taken steps to enhance its training programs for passenger and 

baggage screeners. In addition to strengthening its basic and recurrent 

training programs, TSA is also enhancing and standardizing remedial 

training for screeners who fail covert tests conducted by TSA’s Office of 

Internal Affairs and Program Review. TSA has also established leadership 

and technical training programs for screening supervisors. Although TSA 

continues to make progress in this area, staffing shortages and lack of 

high-speed connectivity4

 at many airport training facilities have made it 

difficult for screeners to fully utilize these programs and complete 

required training. 

While TSA has undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance 

of passenger screeners in detecting threat objects, it has collected limited 

data related to the performance of baggage screeners. In response to its 

July 2003 Passenger Screener Performance Improvement Study, TSA 

developed a short-term action plan that identified key actions TSA planned 

to take to strengthen the performance of passenger screeners. These 

actions built on several initiatives that TSA already had underway, 

including enhancing training for screeners and supervisors, increasing 

covert testing, completing installation of the Threat Image Projection 

 3

Federal Security Directors are responsible for overseeing security at each of the nation’s 

commercial airports. 

4

High-speed connectivity refers to broadband access to TSA’s field operations training sites 

and checkpoints. 
Page 3 GAO-04-440T 

System (TIP),5 and conducting annual recertification of screeners. TSA has 

focused on assessing the performance of passenger screeners, but has 

collected limited data related to the performance of baggage screeners. 

However, TSA has begun collecting additional performance data related to 

its baggage screening operations, and plans to increase these efforts in the 

future. 

Although TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening 

operations, it continues to face operational and funding challenges in its 

efforts to screen all checked baggage using Explosive Detection Systems 

(EDS) or Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) systems. TSA deployed this 

equipment to all airports to screen checked baggage, but has been unable 

to fully utilize this equipment due to screener and equipment shortages 

and equipment being out of service for maintenance and/or repairs. When 

EDS and ETD equipment cannot be used, TSA continues to use alternative 

screening means identified in ATSA,6

 including K-9 teams, manual 

searches, and positive passenger bag match.7

 TSA has ongoing initiatives 

to increase the efficiency of screening all checked baggage using EDS and 

ETD, including the development and construction of in-line baggage 

screening systems—which streamlines screening processes8

 and airport 

operations at larger airports. In addition, although TSA is funding research 

and development (R&D) on several technologies designed to improve the 

effectiveness of screening checked baggage and passengers for explosives, 

progress has been delayed due to competing priorities in a tight budget 

environment. 

 5

TIP is designed to test screeners’ detection capabilities by projecting threat images, 

including guns and explosives, into bags as they are screened. Screeners are responsible 

for positively identifying the threat image and calling for the bag to be searched. Once 

prompted, TIP identifies to the screener whether the threat is real and then records the 

screener’s performance in a database that could be analyzed for performance trends. 

6

Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 110, 115 Stat. 597, 617, requires the use of alternative means for 

screening any piece of checked baggage not screened by an explosive detection system. 

Authorized alternative means include a bag match program, manual search, K-9 explosive 

detection units, and other means or technology approved by the Under Secretary. 

7

Positive passenger bag match is an alternative means of screening checked baggage, 

conducted by the airline, which requires that the passenger be on the same aircraft as the 

checked baggage. 

8

In-line baggage screening systems integrate EDS equipment into airport baggage handling 

systems to improve the pace of checked baggage screening (i.e., throughput). 
Page 4 GAO-04-440T 

The security of the U.S. commercial aviation system has been a longstanding concern. Over the years, numerous initiatives have been 

implemented to strengthen aviation security. However, as we and others 

have documented in numerous reports and studies, weaknesses continue 

to exist. It was due in part to these weaknesses that terrorists were able to 

hijack four commercial aircraft on September 11, 2001, with tragic results. 

Concerns continue to exist regarding the security of the aviation system, 

as evidenced by the recent cancellations of several, mostly transatlantic 

flights to and from the United States in response to intelligence 

information regarding specific threats to those flights. 

In response to the attacks of September 11th, ATSA mandated specific 

actions designed to strengthen aviation security, and established 

ambitious deadlines for completing many of these initiatives. 

Consequently, TSA initially focused on attempting to meet these deadlines, 

particularly creating a federalized screener workforce at commercial 

airports nationwide by November 19, 2002. TSA also focused on screening 

100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems by the 

original deadline of December 31, 2002.9

 These efforts resulted in the 

deployment of more than 55,000 federal screeners at over 440 commercial 

airports nationwide by November 19, 2002, as well as the deployment of 

thousands of EDS and ETD systems. 

Virtually all aviation security responsibilities now reside with TSA. Two of 

the most important of these responsibilities are passenger and checked 

baggage screening. Passenger screening involves the use of metal 

detectors, X-ray machines, ETDs, and manual searches to examine 

passengers and their carry-on baggage to identify threat objects. Checked 

baggage screening involves the use of EDS, ETDs, K-9 teams, positive 

passenger bag match, and manual searches to screen checked baggage. 

Performing these screening functions can be cognitively demanding and 

difficult for screening personnel. 

The results I am presenting today are based on our preliminary 

observations of TSA’s passenger and baggage screening programs and 

related research and development efforts, based on our ongoing reviews of 

 9

Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 425, 116 Stat. 2135, 2185-86 

(2002), the deadline for screening all checked baggage using explosive detection systems 

was extended until December 31, 2003, at airports the Under Secretary of Transportation 

for Security determined could not meet the December 31, 2002, deadline due to TSA’s 

inability to deploy sufficient explosive detection systems to those airports. 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-04-440T 

these areas for this committee. As part of our ongoing reviews of TSA’s 

passenger and baggage screening operations, we interviewed TSA officials 

and visited 15 category X airports; 11 category I airports; and 7 category II, 

III, and IV airports.10 During these visits, we observed screening operations 

and interviewed FSDs, their staffs, and, at some airports, airport authority 

and airline officials. We plan to visit additional airports and conduct 

additional analysis during the remainder of our review, including 

conducting a survey of all 158 FSDs regarding their screening operations. 

Additionally, we will continue to assess TSA’s and DHS’s research and 

development programs and the views of a panel of security and technology 

experts that we convened with the assistance of the National Academy of 

Sciences. We will report on the results of these reviews later this year. 

Although TSA successfully met its mandate to establish a federal screener 

workforce by November 2002, it continues to face challenges in hiring and 

deploying passenger and baggage screeners. To accomplish its security 

mission, TSA needs a sufficient number of passenger and baggage 

screeners trained and certified in TSA security procedures and 

technologies. TSA has acknowledged that its initial staffing efforts created 

imbalances in the screener workforce and is taking steps to address these 

imbalances. However, staffing shortages at some airports and TSA’s hiring 

process have hindered the ability of some FSDs to fully staff screening 

checkpoints without using additional measures, such as overtime and the 

use of a National Screening Force.11

TSA accomplished a significant goal by hiring and deploying more than 

55,000 passenger and baggage screeners by November 19, 2002. However, 

TSA continues to struggle to maintain an adequate number of screeners at 

airport checkpoints, and has not yet achieved a stable screener workforce. 

Recognizing these difficulties, TSA has taken several steps to address 

staffing imbalances—including enhancing its workforce planning efforts, 

and deploying a National Screening Force to airports with pressing 

screening needs. 

 10There are five categories of airports—X, I, II, III, and IV. Category X airports have the 

largest number of enplanements and category IV airports have the smallest number. 

11TSA’s National Screening Force provides screening support to all commercial airports in 

times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under other special circumstances that require a 

greater number of screeners than currently available to FSDs. 

Although Progress 

Has Been Made, 

Concerns Remain 

Regarding Hiring and 

Deploying the 

Screener Workforce 

Staffing Shortages Affect 

Screening Operations 
Page 6 GAO-04-440T 

After meeting its deadline of deploying over 55,000 screeners by November 

19, 2002, TSA recognized that its initial efforts created imbalances in the 

screener workforce, as some airports had too many screeners while others 

had too few. To address these imbalances, as well as congressional 

concerns regarding screener-staffing levels, TSA began attempting to rightsize its screener workforce. Specifically, TSA established a goal to reduce 

its screener workforce by 3,000 screeners by June 1, 2003, and an 

additional 3,000 screeners by September 30, 2003. These reductions were 

achieved through attrition, voluntary transfers from full to part-time, and 

involuntary transfers to part-time or terminations based on screeners’ 

scores on competency-based examinations.12

Currently, a congressionally imposed staffing cap13 prohibits TSA from 

exceeding a screener staffing level of 45,000 full-time equivalents (FTE).14

Figure 1 shows that based on annualized FTE data, TSA is currently below 

the 45,000 cap.15 

 12TSA instructed FSDs to use competency-based testing at airports that were over their 

authorized screener staffing levels as the identification method for involuntary conversions 

to part-time and reductions-in-force. Based on an airport’s staffing plan, the FSD was 

required to identify the number of screeners and screening supervisors to be converted to 

part-time or be reduced-in-force. Screeners were ranked based on testing scores. The 

competency-based tests consisted of two computer-based tests, including image 

recognition and knowledge of standard operating procedures. 

13The fiscal year 2004 Department of Homeland and Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 

No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137, 1141-42 (2003). 

14One full-time-equivalent is equal to one work year or 2,080 non-overtime hours. 

15According to TSA, an annualized number represents an estimate of the usage of FTEs 

over the fiscal year assuming that the usage in a given pay period remains constant over all 

future pay periods. 

Screener Imbalances 
Page 7 GAO-04-440T 

Figure 1: TSA Full-Time Equivalent Screeners, May 2003 through January 2004 

30000

35000

40000

45000

50000

55000

17-May-03

14-Jun-03

12-Jul-039-Aug-03

6-Sep-03

4-Oct-031-Nov-03

29-Nov-03

27-Dec-03

24-Jan-04

End of Pay Period

Full Time Equivalents

Screener FTEs Fiscal Year 2004 Screener Cap

Source: TSA annualized data.

According to TSA officials, TSA has experienced an average annual 

attrition rate of 14 percent for screeners. However, attrition among the 

nation’s more than 440 commercial airports is sometimes considerably 

higher. For example, at 8 category X airports visited during our review, 

FSDs reported that average annual attrition ranged from 15 to 36 percent. 

TSA has also experienced difficulties in hiring new staff, particularly parttime staff. FSDs at 11 of the 15 category X airports we visited reported that 

they were below their authorized staffing levels due to attrition and 

difficulties in hiring new staff. In addition, 3 of these FSDs noted that they 

were never successful in hiring up to the authorized staffing levels. FSDs 

said that some of the factors contributing to their inability to hire and 

retain screeners were the location of their airport, the lack of accessible 

and affordable parking and/or public transportation, and the high cost of 

living. 

In addition, FSDs at several of the airports we visited stated that they 

experienced difficulty in attracting needed part-time screeners, which they 

believed to be due to low pay and benefits, as well as undesirable hours. 

Additionally, FSDs stated that very few full-time screeners were interested 

in converting to part-time status, and TSA officials stated that attrition 

rates for part-time screeners were considerably higher than those for full-
Page 8 GAO-04-440T 

time screeners. TSA began actively recruiting part-time screeners during 

the summer of 2003, and continues to recruit part-time screeners at more 

than 80 airports. 

Due to screener shortages, FSDs at 6 of the category X airports we visited 

stated that they frequently had to require mandatory overtime, particularly 

during the holiday season, to accomplish passenger and baggage screening 

functions. FSDs’ use of overtime was particularly high during peak 

summer and holiday travel seasons. Figure 2 shows that between May 2003 

and January 2004, TSA used the equivalent of an annualized average of 

2,315 full-time-equivalent screeners in overtime hours per pay period 

(every 2 weeks). 

Figure 2: TSA Screener Overtime in Full-Time Equivalents, May 2003 through 

January 2004 

1500

1700

1900

2100

2300

2500

2700

2900

3100

17-May-03

14-Jun-03

12-Jul-03

9-Aug-036-Sep-03

4-Oct-03

1-Nov-03

29-Nov-03

27-Dec-03

24-Jan-04

End of Pay Period

Full Time Equivalents

Overtime

Source: TSA annualized data.

In an effort to right-size and stabilize its screener workforce, TSA hired a 

consultant in September 2003 to conduct a study of screener staffing levels 

at the nation’s commercial airports. Specifically, the consultant was tasked 

with: 

• evaluating TSA’s current staffing methodology and systems to establish a 

baseline for model development; 

Workforce Planning Efforts 
Page 9 GAO-04-440T 

• developing a method for collecting and analyzing data to realistically 

portray specific airport conditions rather than using a generalized 

large/small airport protocol; 

• developing a comprehensive modeling approach with appropriate details 

to account for the considerable variability that occurs among airports;16

• integrating modeling parameters into TSA’s screener scheduling system; 

• implementing a staffing analysis model to be used as a management tool to 

determine daily and weekly staffing levels and deploy the model to 

commercial airports nationwide; and 

• delivering user-friendly simulation software that will determine optimum 

screener staffing levels for each of the more than 440 commercial airports 

with federal screeners. 

TSA expects the consultant’s study to be completed in April 2004. In the 

interim, TSA officials stated that they will continue to review the staffing 

allocation provided through their internal modeling efforts, which, among 

other things, assesses air carrier and airport growth patterns, and makes 

adjustments as appropriate. We will continue to review TSA’s efforts to 

determine appropriate staffing levels for passenger and baggage screeners 

during the remainder of our review. 

To compensate for screener shortages and to enable operational flexibility 

to respond to changes in risk and threat, in October 2003, TSA established 

a National Screening Force to provide screening support to all airports in 

times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under other special 

circumstances that require a greater number of screeners than regularly 

available to FSDs. This force replaced the Mobile Screening Force—a 

regionally-based force—that was created in early 2002 primarily to support 

the initial deployment of federal screeners to commercial airports. The 

National Screening Force currently consists of over 700 full-time 

passenger and baggage screeners, of which about 10 percent are screening 

supervisors. Members of the National Screening Force volunteer to 

participate on the force for a 1-year period. TSA officials stated that while 

these screeners have a home airport to which they are assigned, they 

travel to airports in need of screening staff approximately 70 percent of 

the year. 

 16TSA officials stated that it required the contractor to validate the staffing model using 

statistical samples of all staff and equipment operations at all category X airports and as 

many category I, II, III, and IV airports as necessary. 

National Screening Force 
Page 10 GAO-04-440T 

TSA officials stated that they determine where to deploy members of the 

National Screening Force based on four priorities. The highest priority is 

given to those airports that need additional screeners in order to be able to 

screen 100 percent of checked baggage using EDS and ETD. The second 

priority is given to small airports that have never met their authorized 

screener staffing levels and have no permanent screeners. TSA officials 

stated that several small airports have screening checkpoints that are 

entirely staffed by the National Screening Force. They also stated that 

some National Screening Force staff are deployed to airports, particularly 

small airports, where they are only needed on a part-time basis. The third 

priority is given to airports that are so understaffed that significant 

screening delays would occur without additional staff. Finally, the fourth 

priority is given to those airports with peak seasonal needs, such as Palm 

Springs, airports that have a shortage of female passenger screeners;17 and 

airports offering new commercial service. Additionally, when DHS 

recently increased the threat condition from yellow (elevated) to orange 

(high),18 TSA reportedly redeployed about 50 percent of the National 

Screening Force to airports determined to be at a higher risk based on 

intelligence data. 

TSA is also currently drafting standard operating procedures for the 

National Screening Force. We will continue to examine TSA’s use of the 

National Screening Force during the remainder of our review. 

TSA’s hiring process is designed to ensure that its hiring practices are 

standardized and consistent throughout all airports. However, this process 

has hindered the ability of some FSDs to adequately staff passenger and 

baggage screening checkpoints. Several FSDs we interviewed expressed 

concern that TSA’s hiring process was not responsive to their needs, and 

wanted to have more input in the hiring process. These FSDs faced 

screener shortages that hindered their screening capability. 

 17TSA’s standard operating procedures require that a screener of the same gender as the 

passenger conduct secondary searches (i.e., hand wanding and pat downs) of the 

passenger. 

18DHS’s Homeland Security Advisory System consists of 5 threat conditions, ranging from 

low (green) to severe (red). 

TSA’s Hiring Process Not 

Fully Responsive to FSD 

Needs 
Page 11 GAO-04-440T 

To ensure consistency in its hiring process, TSA headquarters manages 

hiring centrally through its Aviation Operations and Human Resources 

offices. In general, the process includes the following steps. 

• FSDs identify their need for additional passenger or baggage screeners, 

within their authorized allocation of screeners, and request headquarters 

to initiate the hiring process. 

• Aviation Operations reviews and prioritizes each request in consultation 

with FSDs. 

• Human Resources develops a hiring plan that identifies a schedule of 

hiring events – from vacancy postings to the establishment of centers at 

which the applicants’ skills are assessed.19

• A recruiting contractor receives and assesses all screener applications to 

ensure the applicants meet the basic requirements for employment, 

including U.S. citizenship and specific education and work experience. All 

applicants that meet the minimum qualifications are invited to schedule 

themselves for the assessment process.20

• Upon successfully completing the assessment process, the recruiting 

contractor sends the list of qualified applicants to TSA’s hiring/personnel 

contractor responsible for making job offers. 

• The hiring contractor schedules the candidates for orientation and training 

once they have accepted the offers. 

Many of the FSDs we interviewed expressed concern with the lack of a 

continuous hiring process to backfill screeners lost through attrition, and 

their lack of authority to conduct hiring on an as needed basis. The FSDs 

also complained of the time lag between their request for additional staff 

 19An assessment center is a temporary testing site that TSA’s hiring contractor assembles to 

conduct assessments of screener applicants. The centers are generally constructed at 

locations such as hotels and TSA training facilities that are in close proximity to the 

airport(s) where FSDs have requested additional staff. 

20The assessment process consists of three phases. Phase I includes three computer-based 

tests (1) the English Proficiency Test; (2) the Screener Object Recognition Tests, which 

assesses an applicant’s ability to identify an X-ray images through visual observation and 

identification and mental rotation; and (3) the Aviation Security Screener Employment 

Test, which evaluates interpersonal skills such as customer service and dependability and 

work values. Applicants who pass Phase I of the assessment process are scheduled to 

attend Phase II, which includes (1) a structured interview; (2) physical ability tests, such as 

luggage lift and baggage search; (3) a medical examination such as vision, color vision, 

hearing, physical coordination, and motor skills; and (4) a drug test. Applicants who pass 

Phase II proceed to Phase III, which entails a background investigation including credit and 

criminal checks. TSA officials reported that approximately 8 percent of applicants pass 

both the Phase I and II assessments, and about 90 percent of applicants pass Phase III. 

Officials further reported that nearly 80 percent of offers made are accepted. 
Page 12 GAO-04-440T 

and having trained and certified screeners on board. FSDs at 4 of the 

category X airports we visited stated that the time lag between their 

request for additional staffing and the opening of an assessment center 

took several months. For example, one FSD stated that in response to 

continued attrition at his airport, he notified TSA in advance that 

additional screeners would be needed before the peak summer travel 

season. However, an assessment center was not opened until mid-June 

and the initial training did not begin until July. The FSD reportedly had to 

rely on the Mobile Screening Force and overtime to accommodate the 

demand during the peak summer season. This same FSD also stated that 

the lengthy hiring process limited his ability to address screener 

performance issues, such as absenteeism or tardiness, and contributed to 

screener complacency because screeners were aware that they were 

unlikely to be terminated due to staffing shortages. In another example, 

an FSD at one large airport found it difficult to fill the more than 100 parttime approved screener positions because the nearest assessment center 

was too far away for local applicants to be processed. 

Several FSDs we interviewed also stated that not all of the applicants who 

were offered positions showed up for initial basic screener training. For 

example, in November 2003, at one large category X airport, the FSD 

reported that 80 individuals who accepted screener positions were 

scheduled to report for basic screener training, but following orientation, 

only 15 individuals (less than 20 percent) reported for training. TSA 

headquarters reported that an average of 13 percent of screeners who are 

hired fail to attend basic screener training.21

FSDs also expressed concern regarding the lack of input they had during 

the hiring process. Specifically, they stated that they do not have a role in 

reviewing applications, interviewing applicants, or making hiring 

decisions. In response to these concerns, TSA officials reported that they 

plan to redesign and streamline their hiring process, particularly the 

assessment center process (Phase II), to allow for more involvement by 

FSDs and their staff. Specifically, officials reported that they are beginning 

to (1) ensure that the recruiting contractor includes the FSD in 

recruitment planning, including obtaining input regarding where and how 

the contractor recruits; (2) allow FSDs to participate with the contractor 

in the structured interview of the candidates during Phase II of the hiring 

 21TSA attempts to contact hired screeners who do not show up for basic screener training, 

and reschedule training when possible. 
Page 13 GAO-04-440T 

process; and (3) ensure that FSDs swear in the candidates and provides 

organizational briefings on their first day of orientation. Officials also 

reported that they plan to establish an advisory council of FSDs to help 

guide the piloting and implementation of this new process. The goal of 

these efforts is to make the hiring process more responsive to the wide 

range of airports’ needs while ensuring efficiency and quality. We will 

continue to review these initiatives as part of our ongoing review of TSA’s 

process for hiring and deploying passenger and baggage screeners. 

TSA has taken steps to enhance its training programs for passenger and 

baggage screeners. However, staffing shortages and lack of high-speed 

connectivity22 at airport training facilities have made it difficult for 

screeners to fully utilize these programs. Specifically, TSA recently 

revamped its screener training program to include three main 

components: (1) dual training for both passenger and baggage screeners 

(replaces basic screener training); (2) recurrent (skills refresher) screener 

training; and (3) technical screener training/certification for EDS.23 In 

addition to strengthening its basic and recurrent training programs, TSA is 

also enhancing and standardizing remedial training for screeners who fail 

a covert test conducted by TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program 

Review. Despite these efforts, however, FSDs at 5 of the 15 category X 

airports we visited stated that ensuring screeners received required 

training continued to be a challenge. 

As required by ATSA, TSA established a basic screener training program 

comprised of a minimum of 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 

hours of on-the-job training for passenger and baggage screeners. The 

initial basic screener training courses were updated at the end of 2003, 

respectively, to incorporate changes to standard operating procedures. In 

addition to these updates, TSA officials stated that they recently developed 

a new basic screener training program, “dual function screener training,” 

to address technical aspects of both passenger and baggage screening. 

This training will utilize modular courses to provide skills refresher 

(recurrent) training or to cross-train screeners, such as refreshing baggage 

screening skills for a screener who has worked predominately as a 

 22High-speed connectivity refers to broadband access to TSA’s field operations training 

sites and checkpoints. 

23TSA plans to develop other certifications as new technologies are utilized and integrated 

into the screening process. 

TSA Has Enhanced Its 

Screener Training 

Programs, but Access 

to Programs Is 

Sometimes Limited 

Dual Passenger and 

Baggage Screener Training 
Page 14 GAO-04-440T 

passenger screener. TSA officials reported that beginning in April 2004, all 

newly hired screeners will receive dual function screener training in order 

to provide FSDs with the flexibility to staff them as either passenger or 

baggage screeners. 

Comprehensive and frequent training is key to passenger and baggage 

screeners’ ability to detect threat objects. TSA requires passenger and 

baggage screeners to participate in 3 hours of recurrent training per week, 

averaged over each quarter. One hour is required to be devoted to x-ray 

image interpretation, and the other 2 hours on screening techniques or 

reviews of standard operating procedures. 

We reported in September 2003 that TSA had not fully developed or 

deployed a recurrent training program for passenger screeners.24 Since 

then, TSA has developed 12 recurrent training modules for passenger and 

baggage screeners. Two of these modules have been deployed to airports 

nationwide,25 while 9 additional modules are expected to be deployed by 

March 2004. The final module, a Web-based x-ray image interpretation 

tool, is scheduled for implementation in April 2004. 

As we reported in September 2003, many of the passenger screeners and 

supervisors we interviewed expressed the need for recurrent training.26

Screeners were particularly interested in receiving additional training 

related to recognizing x-ray images of threat objects, and also identified an 

interest in more realistic training for the detection of improvised explosive 

devices. FSDs and training coordinators also emphasized that screeners 

needed to receive more hands-on training using threat simulators and 

emulators. TSA headquarters also identified these training needs as part of 

a study of passenger screener performance, and developed and deployed 

training tools to help address these needs.27 For example, TSA officials 

 24U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations 

on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 

2003). 

25The 2 completed modules are videos that provide training on procedures for conducting 

handheld metal detector, pat down, and manual bag searches. 

26As we did not select statistical samples of passenger screeners and supervisors to 

interview, the views of those we interviewed should not be considered representative of 

the views of all screeners and supervisors at the airports we visited. 

27While the study was focused on passenger screening, TSA officials stated that many of the 

performance issues identified also pertained to baggage screening. 

Recurrent Training 
Page 15 GAO-04-440T 

reported that they provided every airport with at least one Modular Bomb 

Set kit and one weapons training kit. These Modular Bomb Sets and 

weapons training kits are intended to fill an identified gap in training by 

allowing screeners to touch and feel the threat objects that they are 

looking for. TSA also instituted a training program called “Threat In the 

Spotlight” that provides screeners with the latest in threat information 

regarding terrorist attempts to get threat objects past screening 

checkpoints. 

TSA is also in the process of developing specialized certification training 

for technologies used by passenger and baggage screeners. TSA has 

developed only one course, for EDS use, but plans to develop other 

certifications and courses as new technologies are utilized and integrated 

into the screening process. Additionally, in October 2003, TSA fielded an 

Online Learning Center—a Web-based tool with 366 self-guided training 

courses available to all screening staff. The courses provided on the 

Online Learning Center Web site capture common developmental needs 

identified by TSA. The Online Learning Center also enables screeners to 

view the list of required and optional training courses and materials, 

review their training records, and track their training progress. 

Consistent with ATSA, TSA requires remedial training for any passenger or 

baggage screener who fails an operational test, and prohibits screeners 

from performing the screening function related to the tests they failed 

until they successfully complete the training.28 FSDs must certify that 

screeners identified as requiring remedial training complete the training 

before they can perform the screening function identified as a 

performance weakness. 

TSA is in the process of enhancing and standardizing remedial training 

requirements required after failure of covert operational tests. Program 

enhancements will provide specific guidance regarding materials to be 

reviewed during remedial training and standardize the practice of 

demonstrating proper techniques and procedures in the area of deficiency 

noted during the failed test. 

 28Screening supervisors and managers may also require screeners to participate in 

corrective action training based on their observations of performance deficiencies, such as 

failure to follow a standard operating procedure. 

Remedial Training 
Page 16 GAO-04-440T 

TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review identified a lack of 

supervisory training as a cause for screener testing failures. In addition, 

both FSDs and TSA headquarters officials have recognized the need to 

enhance the skills of screening supervisors through supervisory training. 

As we reported in September 2003, TSA had begun working with the 

Department of Agriculture (USDA) Graduate School to tailor USDA’s offthe-shelf supervisory course to meet the specific needs of TSA’s screening 

supervisors. According to TSA, 500 screening supervisors participated in 

the course during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2003.29 Since then, TSA 

reportedly has sent an additional 1,500 of its approximately 3,600 

screening supervisors to the enhanced USDA Graduate School supervisory 

course, and expects all screening supervisors to have received this training 

by April 2004. TSA officials also stated that they intend to schedule 

recently promoted supervisors to attend the USDA Graduate School 

supervisory course after March 2004 if they had not yet attended, and plan 

to extend the course offering to include screening managers, once 

screening supervisors are trained. 

In addition to the USDA Graduate School supervisory course, TSA officials 

reported that the agency plans to have a Web-based technical training 

course–required for all screening leads, supervisors, and managers–by the 

end of February 2004. This course will cover technical issues such as 

resolving alarms at screening checkpoints. Additionally, TSA’s Online 

Learning Center includes over 60 supervisory courses designed to develop 

leadership and coaching skills. TSA officials noted that they focused their 

efforts on training supervisors that were initially hired into supervisory 

roles, rather than internally promoted supervisors. 

While TSA has begun developing and fielding recurrent training modules 

to airports, staffing shortages and a lack of high-speed connectivity at 

airports have made it difficult for all screeners to access these courses. 

Specifically, due to staffing shortages, FSDs at 5 of the 15 category X 

airports we visited stated that it was difficult, if not impossible, to comply 

with the requirement that screeners receive 3 hours of recurrent training 

each week, averaged over a 3-month period. FSDs stated that due to 

staffing shortages, they were unable to let screeners take this training 

because it would impact the FSDs’ ability to provide adequate screener 

 29The USDA course covers topics related to supervising staff within the federal 

government. 

Supervisory Training 

Challenges Exist in 

Providing Screeners 

Access to Available 

Training 
Page 17 GAO-04-440T 

coverage. Consequently, screeners received an average of only 3 hours of 

recurrent training per month. In an attempt to ensure screeners receive 

required training, several FSDs provided training through overtime, or 

established training relief teams with the sole purpose of staffing 

screening checkpoints while screeners participated in training. 

The lack of high-speed connectivity at airport training facilities has also 

limited access to TSA’s training tools. TSA’s Online Learning Center was 

established to provide passenger and baggage screeners with high-speed 

access to over 350 training courses. However, TSA did not begin deploying 

high-speed connectivity to its training sites and checkpoints until May 

2003. Currently, TSA has reportedly provided high-speed connectivity to 71 

airport locations, including training sites where 927 training computers are 

fully connected.30 TSA expects to install high-speed connectivity at up to 

81 additional airports by the end of fiscal year 2004. Until high-speed 

connectivity is fully achieved, TSA plans to continue to distribute new 

training products using multiple delivery channels, including written 

training materials and CD-ROMs. 

TSA has undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance of 

passenger screeners in detecting threat objects. However, TSA has 

collected limited data related to the performance of baggage screeners. In 

July 2003, TSA completed a study of the performance of its passenger 

screening system, which identified numerous performance deficiencies. 

These deficiencies were determined to be caused by a lack of skills and 

knowledge, low motivation, ineffective work environment, and wrong or 

missing incentives. In response to this study, TSA developed a short-term 

action plan that identified key actions TSA plans to take to strengthen the 

performance of passenger screeners. These actions build on several 

initiatives that TSA already had underway, including enhancing training 

for screeners and supervisors, increasing covert testing conducted by 

TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs, completing installation of the TIP, and 

conducting annual recertifications of screeners. While TSA is making 

progress in each of these areas, it has collected limited data on the 

performance of its baggage screening operations. Officials stated that they 

have collected limited performance data related to baggage screeners due 

 30TSA defines fully connected as a training computer with the new network image installed 

and connected to the TSA broadband network. 

TSA Continues to 

Strengthen its Efforts 

to Measure Screener 

Performance in 

Detecting Threat 

Objects 
Page 18 GAO-04-440T 

to their focus on passenger screener performance, but plan to collect 

additional performance data in the future. 

In July 2003, TSA completed a Passenger Screener Performance 

Improvement Study designed to identify root causes for gaps between the 

current performance of passenger screeners and TSA’s desired 

performance—defined as 100 percent interception of prohibited items 

coming through screening checkpoints. The study identified many of the 

performance deficiencies that FSDs reported to us during our site visits to 

more than 30 airports, including inadequate staffing and poor supervision 

of screeners. While the study was focused on passenger screening, TSA 

officials stated that many of the performance issues cited also pertained to 

baggage screeners. TSA officials stated that they plan to assess the 

performance of baggage screeners after recommendations from the 

performance improvement study relative to passenger screening have 

been implemented. 

In October 2003, to address passenger screener performance deficiencies 

identified in the Screener Performance Improvement Study, TSA 

developed a “Short-Term Screening Performance Improvement Plan.” This 

plan included nine action items that TSA plans to pursue to provide 

tangible improvements in screener performance and security, and 

identified 6 week, 3 month, 6 month, and, in some cases, milestones of 1 

year or more. These action items include increasing covert testing at 

screening checkpoints, completing installation of TIP at all airports, 

enhancing screener training, and strengthening supervisor’s skills through 

leadership and technical training. TSA is also establishing a longer-term 

plan that addresses identified deficiencies, such as the need to establish 

adequate training facilities at airports and to reconfigure checkpoints to 

eliminate screener distractions. Table 1 provides a summary of TSA’s 

short-term action items for strengthening passenger screener 

performance. 

Performance Improvement 

Study and Short-Term 

Action Plan 
Page 19 GAO-04-440T 

Table 1: Summary of TSA’s Short-Term Action Items for Strengthening Passenger Screener Performance 

Category Action Item Description Benefit 

People 

 1 Increase FSD 

support and 

accountability 

Hold FSDs accountable for screening 

performance and delivery of security 

Management accountability is driven down to the 

local airport 

FSD performance is linked to screener 

performance, creating incentives for maintaining 

and improving security 

 2 Enhance training Provide ongoing training for screeners and 

supervisors to maintain their skills and 

provide new skills and techniques based on 

evolving threats and lessons learned 

Maintains and improves knowledge base of 

screeners 

Ensures proper oversight by supervisors 

Ensures that screeners are capable of addressing 

evolving threats 

 3 Increase Internal 

Affairs covert 

testing 

Increase the frequency of TSA covert 

testing 

Improved identification of systemic vulnerabilities 

in airport security systems 

Immediate implementation of limited remedial 

actions 

 4 Continue to pursue 

human 

performance 

improvements 

Better understand reasons and causes for 

human errors and interactions with 

technology in order to identify opportunities 

for performance improvements with a goal 

of identifying optimum work conditions 

Reduces human-based errors 

Increases workforce morale and working 

conditions, leading to improved performance 

Technology 

 5 Continue to 

identify screening 

technology 

improvements 

Continue to research alternative 

technologies and seek short-term 

technological solutions, especially for 

potential vectors. 

Identifies threats more accurately and quickly 

Decreases number of false positives from 

equipment 

 6 Finish installing 

TIP 

The TIP system is a series of 2,400 images 

of threat objects that can be automatically 

fed into X-Ray machines during actual 

screening 

Maintains alertness of screeners 

Identifies individual screener performance issues 

 7 Expedite highspeed connectivity 

to checkpoints and 

training computers 

Connect all TSA offices, checkpoints and 

screening equipment (X-rays, EDS 

machines) to the internet in order to 

automate and improve processes that are 

currently done manually or not at all 

Provides immediate feedback on and response to 

screener performance issues 

Improves communication with managers in the 

field 

Process 

 8 Refresh aviation 

operations policy, 

procedures and 

practice 

Conduct a thorough and expedited review 

of all policies and procedures developed 

during the rollout of TSA with a focus on 

increasing screening performance and 

capabilities 

Maintains “freshness” of standard operating 

procedures based on most recent intelligence 

about security threats 

Removes or updates outdated or unnecessary 

screening techniques based on lessons learned 

 9 Improve workforce 

management 

Determine the optimal workforce staffing 

levels based on latest passenger flows and 

other factors 

Maximizes utilization of existing resources 

Source: TSA 
Page 20 GAO-04-440T 

TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review conducts 

unannounced covert tests of passenger and baggage screeners to assess 

their ability to detect threat objects and adherence to TSA-approved 

procedures. These tests, in which TSA undercover agents attempt to pass 

threat objects through screening checkpoints, are designed to identify 

systematic problems affecting the performance of screeners related to 

their adherence to standard operating procedures and handling of 

equipment. TSA’s testing to date has identified weaknesses in the ability of 

passenger and baggage screeners to detect threat objects. 

In November 2003, we reported that the Office of Internal Affairs and 

Program Review had conducted 733 covert tests at 92 airports of 

passenger screeners at screening checkpoints.31 Since then, TSA has 

conducted an additional 362 passenger screening checkpoint tests through 

January 17, 2004, for a total of 1,095 tests, and estimates that it will double 

the number of tests conducted during fiscal year 2004. However, even with 

the doubling of these tests, only a small percentage of the screener 

workforce is subject to a covert test. 

TSA initially focused most of its resources on testing passenger rather 

than baggage screeners. While TSA began conducting covert tests of 

passenger screeners in September 2002, it did not begin conducting covert 

tests of checked baggage screeners until January 2003—after Congress’s 

initial deadline for 100 percent screening of checked baggage using 

explosive detection systems had passed. Between January 2003 and 

September 2003, TSA conducted checked baggage tests as part of the 

Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening selectee testing protocol.32 In 

November 2003, TSA developed a protocol specifically designed to test 

checked baggage. From January 2003 through January 17, 2004, TSA 

conducted 192 checked baggage tests at 128 airports, and plans to increase 

the number of checked baggage tests it conducts this fiscal year. We plan 

to review the Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review’s covert 

testing in more detail during the remainder of our reviews. 

 31U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and 

Address Challenges, GAO-04-232T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003). 

32The Computer Assisted Passenger Screening System is a stand-alone application residing 

in an air carrier’s reservation system that analyzes certain behavioral patterns to score and 

calculate each passenger’s risk level for determining the appropriate level of screening. 

Covert Testing 
Page 21 GAO-04-440T 

Another key source of information on screener performance in detecting 

threat objects is the TIP system, which places images of threat objects on 

the X-ray screen during actual operations and records whether screeners 

identify the threat objects. TIP was shut down immediately following the 

September 11th terrorist attacks due to concerns that it would result in 

screening delays and panic, as screeners might think that they were 

actually viewing threat objects. Recognizing that TIP is a key tool in 

maintaining and enhancing screener performance, TSA began reactivating 

and expanding TIP in October 2003. Additionally, TSA has increased the 

number of TIP-ready X-ray machines at passenger screening checkpoints 

from about 1,300 in October 2003 to over 1,770 as of January 20, 2004. In 

January 2004, TSA also reported that it had installed a new library of 2,400 

threat images on all existing TIP ready X-ray machines—a significant 

increase from the 200 images the Federal Aviation Administration had in 

place. TSA has ordered an additional 30 TIP-ready X-ray machines and 

expects TIP to be 100 percent operational by April 2004. 

With an operational TIP program, FSDs have the capability to query and 

analyze passenger screening performance data in a number of ways, 

including by individual screeners, checkpoints, terminals, and airports. 

However, until high-speed connectivity is available at screening 

checkpoints, collecting this information for reporting and analysis 

purposes will continue to be cumbersome.33 For example, at airports 

where high-speed connectivity is not available, TIP data have to be 

downloaded onto a disk and mailed to a remote location where they are 

uploaded for analysis. 

Although TIP is available to measure the performance of and train 

passenger screeners, it is not currently available for baggage screeners. 

TSA officials stated that they are currently working to resolve technical 

challenges associated with using TIP for checked baggage screening on 

EDS machines and have started EDS TIP image development. 

ATSA requires that TSA collect performance information on all passenger 

and baggage screeners by conducting an annual proficiency evaluation to 

ensure each screener continues to meet all qualifications and standards 

related to the functions that he or she performs. To meet this requirement, 

TSA established an annual recertification program. Currently, there are 

 33TSA began deploying high-speed connectivity to screening checkpoints in May 2003. 

Threat Image Projection 

System 

Annual Recertification 

Program 
Page 22 GAO-04-440T 

two parts to recertification: a knowledge and skills assessment program 

and a final rating on a screener’s annual assessment. The knowledge and 

skills assessment is comprised of three modules: (1) knowledge of 

standard operating procedures, (2) image recognition, and (3) a practical 

demonstration of skills. To be certified, a passenger screener must pass all 

applicable modules of the knowledge and skills assessment program and 

have a rating of “met” or “exceeded” standards on a screener’s annual 

assessment. However, baggage-only screeners are not required to 

complete the image recognition test.34 If a screener does not meet the 

recertification requirements, he/she is not certified and may not continue 

employment as a screener.35 According to TSA officials, approximately 200 

screeners have been terminated to date for failure to pass the 

recertification program. 

TSA began implementing its recertification program in October 2003, and 

expects to complete testing at all airports in March 2004.36 As of January 

30, 2004, TSA reportedly had completed modules one and two of its annual 

screener recertification program at 100 percent of federalized airports, and 

had completed module three at 50 percent of these airports. TSA does not 

have a recertification track specifically for cross-trained screeners. 

However, TSA officials stated that they plan to establish a dual functioning 

screener recertification track for the 2004-2005 recertification cycle. 

Currently, all screeners who are cross-trained and actively performing 

both passenger and baggage screening functions are considered passenger 

screeners for the purpose of recertification. However, the current 

recertification program ensures that cross-trained screeners pass the 

image interpretation test for x-ray threat image interpretation, as well as 

the ETD system and manual bag search, which are also performed in 

checked baggage screening. We will continue to examine TSA’s progress 

in administering its annual recertification program during the remainder of 

our reviews. 

 34Checked baggage screeners will not recertify on EDS as part of the current recertification 

program. EDS is a separate certification program under development. The need for other 

skills or equipment-certifications is under consideration for future certification programs. 

35Screeners that fail any module will receive study time, remediation, and one retest 

opportunity. 

36At the time the recertification testing began, TSA considered about 28,000 screeners as 

having already completed the first two components of the knowledge and skills assessment 

because they successfully passed competency tests TSA administered at many airports as 

part of a screener workforce reduction effort. 
Page 23 GAO-04-440T 

TSA’s Performance Management Information System (PMIS) is designed 

to collect, analyze, and report passenger and baggage screening 

performance data. While PMIS does not contain information on screener 

performance in detecting threat objects, it collects information on 

operational performance, such as wait times at selected airports, workload 

data, and the performance and utilization of passenger and baggage 

screening equipment. TSA headquarters uses PMIS data to support 

external reporting on performance and internal decision-making 

processes. 

TSA recently surveyed FSDs or members of their staff who use PMIS by 

inputting or analyzing data, to solicit their feedback on the usefulness of 

the system.37 PMIS users who responded to the survey identified several 

areas for improvement, including additional capabilities, such as the 

ability to customize reports, and enhanced technical features, such as split 

screen report viewing and data entry. TSA reported that, to the extent 

possible, they plan to use feedback from the survey to make 

enhancements to the system. 

TSA provides FSDs and other PMIS users with monthly PMIS system 

updates that include new functionalities and improvements to the system. 

These enhancements have allowed TSA to collect additional information 

with which to better analyze its operations. For example, when TSA began 

collecting employee census data in June 2003, it only collected information 

on the number of screeners. TSA is now able to collect more detailed 

information on screeners including the number of part-time screeners, 

hours worked per week, and screener gender. TSA also developed pilot 

programs in order to determine the usefulness of PMIS data before making 

systemwide changes. For example, TSA began to collect additional data 

regarding checked baggage screening operations during the spring of 2003 

at 36 airports. Among other things, the 36 airports collect data on the 

number of checked bags screened, number of prohibited items 

confiscated, and number of law enforcement officer interventions. TSA is 

evaluating whether to expand collection of baggage screening data to 

additional airports. TSA plans to continuously enhance the system as it 

learns what data are needed to best manage the agency. 

 37The PMIS user survey was conducted in July 2003 and had a response rate of 21.9%. Given 

this low response rate, the results of the survey may not be representative of the views and 

opinions of PMIS users. TSA plans to administer a second survey in March 2004. 

Performance Management 

Information System 
Page 24 GAO-04-440T 

To help ensure the quality of the data, TSA has also developed PMIS user 

guides and procedures. TSA officials reported that headquarters’ staff and 

contactors provide consultation to and review the input from FSDs to 

ensure that the data provided are complete and consistent. The PMIS also 

contains checks for data entries that are out of normal bounds. However, 

because the PMIS system relies on self-reporting by FSDs, there may be 

inconsistencies in the way in which the data are reported, reducing the 

overall usefulness of the system in aiding management decisions. We will 

continue to review TSAs plans to enhance the system and its reliability 

during the remainder of our review. 

In September and November 2003, we reported that in addition to making 

improvements to PMIS, TSA was developing performance indexes for both 

individual passenger and baggage screeners and the screening system as a 

whole. The screening performance index will measure the effectiveness of 

the screening system through nationwide TIP results and covert testing 

data; efficiency through a calculation of dollars spent per passenger 

screened or dollars spent per bag screened; and customer satisfaction 

through a national poll, customer surveys, and customer complaints at 

both airports and TSA’s national call center. TSA is currently developing 

baseline data for fiscal year 2004 and plans to report the indexes to the 

DHS in fiscal year 2005 in support of its Government Performance and 

Results Act performance measures.38

 38The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285, 

shifts the focus of government operations from process to results by establishing a 

foundation for examining agency mission, performance goals and objectives, and results. 

Under the act, agencies are to prepare 5-year strategic plans that set the general direction 

for their efforts, and annual performance plans that establish connections between the 

long-term strategic goals outlined in the strategic plans and the day-to-day activities of 

managers and staff. Finally, the act requires that each agency report annually on the extent 

to which it is meeting its annual performance goals and the actions needed to achieve or 

modify those goals that have not been met. 

Performance Indexes for 

Screeners and Screening 

Systems 
Page 25 GAO-04-440T 

TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening operations, but 

continues to face operational and funding challenges in screening all 

checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by 

ATSA. Although TSA has deployed EDS and ETD equipment to all airports, 

TSA has not been able to fully utilize this equipment to screen 100 percent 

of checked baggage for explosives by December 31, 2003, due to screener 

and equipment shortages and equipment being out of service for 

maintenance and/or repairs. When TSA cannot screen 100 percent of 

checked baggage using EDS and ETD, TSA continues to use alternative 

means outlined in ATSA, including K-9 teams, manual bag search, and 

positive passenger bag match. TSA has ongoing initiatives to increase the 

efficiency of screening checked baggage using EDS, including the 

development and construction of in-line baggage screening systems at 

larger airports—which, streamlines the screening processes. TSA is also 

conducting research and development activities to strengthen passenger 

and baggage screening. These efforts are designed to improve detection 

capability, performance, and efficiency for current technologies, and to 

develop the next generation of EDS equipment. 

While TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening processes, 

it continues to face challenges in attaining 100 percent screening using 

explosive detection systems39 100 percent of the time. Since its creation in 

November 2001, TSA has deployed over 1,100 EDS machines and 6,000 

ETD machines to over 440 airports nationwide. However, TSA has not 

been able to fully utilize this equipment to screen 100 percent of checked 

baggage due to screener and equipment shortages, and equipment being 

out of service for maintenance and/or repairs. 

In its effort to meet ATSA’s original requirement to screen 100 percent of 

checked baggage using explosive detection systems by December 31, 2002, 

TSA deployed hundreds of EDS and thousands of ETD machines to over 

440 airports. As it became apparent that TSA would be unable to attain the 

December 31, 2002, deadline, the Congress authorized an extension of that 

 39According to TSA, Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and Explosive Trace Detection 

(ETD) are the only technologies available to TSA for meeting ATSA’s requirement to screen 

100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems. EDS operate in an 

automated mode and use probing radiation to examine objects inside baggage and identify 

the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. ETD works by detecting vapors and 

residues of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs, 

which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of explosive materials. 

TSA Faces Challenges 

in Its Efforts to 

Deploy and Leverage 

Screening Equipment 

and Technologies 

TSA Is Not Fully Utilizing 

Equipment for Meeting the 

100 Percent Checked 

Baggage Screening 

Requirement 
Page 26 GAO-04-440T 

deadline for noncompliant airports until December 31, 2003. In its effort to 

meet these deadlines, in June 2002, TSA and its contractors began to 

deploy EDS and ETD equipment to the nation’s commercial airports. This 

effort involved designing and implementing facility modifications for EDS 

and ETD equipment, installing equipment, and developing and 

administering equipment training for baggage screeners. As EDS and ETD 

were being deployed to airports, TSA implemented interim solutions to 

screen 100 percent of checked baggage, until more permanent solutions 

could be designed and constructed. For example, many large airports were 

equipped with stand-alone EDS machines that were not integrated with 

baggage conveyor systems. These minivan-sized machines were 

sometimes deployed in airport lobbies, which led to crowding as 

passengers filled lobbies waiting to have their checked baggage screened. 

In addition, stand-alone EDS machines are both labor and time intensive 

to operate since each bag must be physically carried to an EDS machine 

for screening and then moved back to the baggage conveyor system prior 

to being loaded onto an aircraft. 

Realizing the inefficiencies of these interim solutions, TSA and some 

airport authorities are developing more permanent solutions, such as inline systems. TSA also continues to look for ways to improve the 

efficiency and effectiveness of the baggage screening process, especially 

ways that reduce reliance on screener personnel. 

TSA has made progress during 2003 in its efforts to deploy equipment to 

screen 100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems. 

However, some airports are currently unable to use this equipment to 

screen all checked baggage for explosives, or reported that they do not 

have enough EDS or ETD to conduct baggage screening. These airports 

are unable to achieve the requirement to screen 100 percent of checked 

baggage, 100 percent of the time, using EDS and ETD due to insufficient 

screener staff to operate screening equipment, insufficient staff and 

equipment to meet surges in passenger volume, and equipment being out 

of service for maintenance and/or repairs. As a way to monitor baggagescreening operations, FSDs are expected to report, using TSA’s PMIS, 

when they are unable to screen all checked baggage using EDS and ETD 

and the reasons that prevented them from doing so.40 We reviewed TSA’s 

Aviation Operations division’s report on the status of checked baggage 

screening (based on PMIS data), dated January 5, 2004, to determine 

 40FSDs are expected to list all reasons that prevented them from screening 100 percent of 

checked baggage using EDS and ETD. Also, FSDs are to report when they do attain 100 

percent screening of checked baggage using EDS and ETD. 
Page 27 GAO-04-440T 

whether airports were conducting 100 percent screening using EDS and 

ETD, and to identify reasons for not achieving this deadline. Our 

preliminary review of that data showed that the most frequently cited 

reasons for not being able to meet the requirement—noted by about twothirds of the FSDs that reported they were not conducting 100 percent 

screening using EDS or ETD41 ---were staff shortages, absenteeism, and a 

lack of training. Almost half of these FSDs also identified that they did not 

have sufficient EDS and ETD equipment to screen all checked baggage, 

and/or that some of their EDS and ETD equipment was inoperable. 

Of the airports reporting that they were not screening 100 percent of 

checked baggage using EDS or ETD, the number of consecutive days that 

they were not conducting this screening ranged from 1 to 371 days. In 

addition, almost one-third of these FSDs reported that they did not 

conduct 100 percent screening using EDS or ETD less than 10 consecutive 

days, while half of the FSDs reported not conducting 100 percent 

screening using EDS or ETD for more than 200 consecutive days. This 

reporting status can change daily as the events that caused airports to not 

conduct 100 percent screening using explosive detection systems may be 

corrected. FSDs are also expected to report whenever there is need to use 

alternative screening means because fewer than 100 percent of checked 

bags are being screened using EDS and ETD. 

Furthermore, in our visits to several category X and I airports, FSDs 

identified EDS and ETD machines that were unable to be used due to an 

insufficient number of screeners to operate the equipment or because the 

equipment was not in the locations where it was needed. FSDs at some of 

these airports expressed concerns about not being able to resolve 

operational issues that were causing them to be noncompliant with the 

requirement for 100 percent screening using explosive detection systems. 

 41The number of airports unable to attain 100 percent screening of checked baggage using 

EDS and ETD is Sensitive Security Information and, therefore, is not included in this 

testimony. 
Page 28 GAO-04-440T 

To comply with a requirement from the Homeland Security Act that TSA 

report on its status in achieving the checked baggage-screening deadline,42

TSA provides classified reports monthly to selected committees of the 

Congress identifying its progress in deploying EDS and ETD equipment to 

screen 100 percent of checked baggage. As of December 31, 2003, TSA 

reported that it fell short of this goal at several large airports, primarily 

because these airports did not have the EDS and ETD equipment needed 

and/or experienced staffing shortages to operate the equipment. We 

compared TSA’s January 5, 2004, Aviation Operations Reports to the 

December 2003 monthly report provided to the selected congressional 

committees, and identified additional airports that were not using EDS and 

ETD to screen checked baggage 100 percent of the time. TSA officials 

stated that the discrepancies were caused because the primary focus of 

their report to the selected congressional committees was on initial 

deployment of the equipment, rather than fluctuations in staffing and 

maintenance issues that affect TSA’s ability to utilize the equipment. We 

will continue to monitor TSA’s compliance with the requirement to screen 

100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems during 

the remainder of our review. 

TSA has two major initiatives underway to achieve efficiencies in its 

baggage screening operations—integrating EDS machines into the 

airports’ baggage handling systems and resolving EDS alarms using 

computer images, referred to as on-screen resolution. Reconfiguring 

airports for in-line checked baggage screening could be extensive and 

costly, especially when new construction or extensive conveyor belt 

systems are required. TSA estimates that the systemwide costs to 

complete installations of in-line baggage screening systems may be as high 

as $3 to $5 billion, not including the costs of EDS and ETD equipment. In 

addition, TSA’s efforts to develop protocols for on-screen resolution, 

 42The baggage-screening requirements of 49 U.S.C. § 44901(d)(1), on which TSA must 

report, include: (A) that explosive detection systems are deployed as soon as possible to 

ensure that all airports described in § 44903(c) have sufficient explosive detection systems 

to screen all checked baggage no later than December 31, 2002 (as discussed earlier, the 

Homeland Security Act extended this deadline to December 31, 2003, for airports that the 

Under Secretary of Transportation for Security determines could not meet the original 

deadline), and that as soon as these systems are in place at an airport, all checked baggage 

at the airport is screened by those systems; (B) that all systems deployed under 

subparagraph (A) are fully utilized; and (C) if explosive detection equipment at an airport is 

unavailable, all checked baggage is screened by an alternative means. 

TSA Faces Funding and 

Operational Challenges in 

Achieving Efficiencies in 

Checked Baggage 

Screening 
Page 29 GAO-04-440T 

which may permit more efficient screening operations without increasing 

security risks, have taken longer than anticipated. 

Many large airports are planning to install in-line baggage screening 

systems—installing EDS machines as an integrated part of the airport 

baggage handling systems—to improve throughput of baggage and reduce 

crowding in airport lobbies. These in-line systems have been funded in 

part through letters of intent (LOI) signed by TSA.43 To date, TSA has 

signed 6 LOIs covering 7 airports promising multiyear financial support 

totaling about $772 million for in-line integration of EDS equipment. For 

example, LOIs are to provide $87 million in airport modifications at 

Boston Logan International Airport, and over $104 million at Dallas/Fort 

Worth International Airport. In addition, TSA is negotiating LOIs with 4 

additional airports. The 7 airports with signed LOIs and the 4 airports 

negotiating LOIs with TSA are shown in table 2. 

Table 2: Airports Receiving or Negotiating Letters of Intent 

Letter of intent issued Letter of Intent in negotiation 

Airport Amount Airport Amount

BOS – Boston $87,000,000 ATL – Atlanta $175,700,000

DEN – Denver $71,250,000 IAH – Houston $101,520,000

DFW – Dallas/Fort 

Worth $104,437,359

 MCO – Orlando 

$80,000,000

LAS – Las Vegas $93,750,000 PHX – Phoenix $65,565,000

LAX/ONT – Los 

Angeles International 

and Ontario $256,467,000

 

SEA – Seattle $159,000,000 

Source: Transportation Security Administration 

Note: Amounts reflected are TSA’s contribution, which is 75% of funding needed for an in-line EDS 

screening solution. 

 43A letter of intent represents a nonbinding commitment from an agency to provide 

multiyear funding to an entity beyond the current authorization period. Thus, that letter 

allows an airport to proceed with a project without waiting for future federal funds 

because the airport and investors know that allowable costs are likely to be reimbursed. 
Page 30 GAO-04-440T 

TSA also reported that 23 additional airports, shown in table 3, have 

requested LOIs.44

 44In addition, in-line systems have been funded through the Federal Aviation 

Administration’s AIP funds. The Airport Improvement Program trust fund is used to fund 

capital improvements to airports, including some security enhancements, such as terminal 

modifications to accommodate explosive detection equipment. Thirteen airports are using 

AIP funds to make infrastructure upgrades to support EDS equipment that TSA will supply. 
Page 31 GAO-04-440T 

Table 3: Additional Airports Requesting Letters of Intent 

Airports 

SNA – Orange County, California TPA – Tampa 

CLE – Cleveland MCI – Kansas City, Missouri 

PVD – Providence MIA – Miami 

PHL – Philadelphia FLL – Fort Lauderdale 

SJC – San Jose MDW – Chicago-Midway 

RSW – Ft. Meyers SFO – San Francisco 

SAN – San Diego SLC – Salt Lake City 

MSP – Minneapolis/St. Paul PDX – Portland, Oregon 

STL – St. Louis MKE – Milwaukee 

ANC – Anchorage PBI – West Palm Beach 

RIC – Richmond BDL – Bradley, Connecticut 

GPT – Gulfport-Biloxi 

Source: TSA. 

TSA officials stated that they are assessing requested LOIs based on a 

security evaluation, as well as a determination of return on investment. 

Officials stated that top priority would be given to airports that need inline systems to comply with the requirement for 100 percent screening of 

checked baggage using explosive detection systems. However, officials 

stated that they would also assess other airports that are currently 

conducting 100 percent baggage screening using EDS and ETD. Officials 

gave the following reasons why these airports may be good candidates for 

in-line checked baggage screening systems. 

• airports that will fall out of compliance at peak passenger load times due 

to seasonal fluctuations and/or carrier moves, additions, or changes; 

• airports with highly disruptive operational implementations and high 

staffing levels; and 

• airports with a heavy reliance on ETDs that would benefit by improved 

operational efficiencies and cost reductions. 

In December 2003, the Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization 

Act shifted the funding formula for LOIs from a 75 percent TSA (25 

percent local contribution) to a 90 percent TSA (10 percent local 

contribution). 45 This increase in TSA’s required contribution for both 

 45Pub. L. No. 108-176, § 605, 2490 Stat. 2566-68 (2003). 
Page 32 GAO-04-440T 

future and previously issued LOIs could diminish TSA’s capacity to 

accommodate additional LOIs. 

In addition, TSA has not yet approved protocols for on-screen resolution 

of EDS alarms. TSA’s promulgation of these protocols is an important 

element in enabling efficiencies in in-line baggage screening systems and 

affects the design of the systems being constructed or planned.46 Under 

these protocols, EDS operators would be able to view images of alarmed 

bags and either clear the bags or divert them for further screening. Using 

on-screen resolution, baggage screeners could be able to view images of 

the baggage from a remote location electronically connected to the EDS 

machines, raising the throughput rate of bags screened. Currently, TSA is 

testing protocols for on-screen resolution at 4 airports. Officials from 

TSA’s Office of Security Technologies initially reported that they 

anticipated the protocols being completed by December 2003. However, to 

date, the protocols have not been approved for nationwide use. Advance 

knowledge of on-screen resolution protocols could assist airports in 

developing in-line systems by providing valuable information that could be 

used to design the systems for optimal efficiency. We are examining TSA’s 

baggage screening program, including both development of in-line systems 

and its issuance of letters of intent, in an ongoing review. 

TSA is funding R&D on several technologies designed to improve the 

screening of checked baggage and passengers at the nation’s airports. 

However, while the majority of these technologies are scheduled for pilot 

testing within the next 12 to 18 months, they are not scheduled to be 

deployed in quantity for 2 to 5 years. Furthermore, progress on this 

research was delayed in fiscal year 2003 when TSA used more than half of 

its R&D funds for other programs that TSA viewed as higher priorities. As 

TSA moves forward with its R&D program, it faces a number of 

challenges, including maintaining its schedule while planning for a merger 

with the DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate. TSA must also 

balance funding for competing priorities in a tight budget environment, not 

only between R&D and other requirements, but also between aviation and 

other modes of transportation. 

 46On-screen resolution could also be used with stand-alone EDS machines to potentially 

increase screening efficiencies. 

TSA is Funding R&D on 

Screening Technologies, 

but Deployment Is Years 

Away, and TSA Faces 

Several Challenges 
Page 33 GAO-04-440T 

To improve the detection capability and operational efficiency of its 

current checked baggage-screening program, TSA has both near-term (2 to 

5 years) and long-term (more than 5 years) approaches designed to 

develop, test, acquire, and deploy checked baggage screening equipment. 

In fiscal year 2003, TSA obligated about $12 million for near-term 

activities, significantly more than the $75,000 it obligated for long-term 

activities. For fiscal year 2004, TSA has budgeted $45 million for the 

development of next generation explosive detection systems, which 

encompass technologies for screening checked baggage, carry-on baggage, 

and individuals. The President’s fiscal year 2005 budget requests a total of 

$155 million for TSA’s R&D program, of which $45 million is planned for 

the development of next generation explosive detection systems. 47

The near-term activities for developing next-generation checked baggage 

screening equipment are largely reflected in the Phoenix program, which 

is funded jointly by government and industry. In September 2003, TSA 

obligated about $9.4 million of the $12 million obligated for near-term 

activities to enter into five cooperative agreements with private sector 

firms under the Phoenix program.48 While the five agreements are designed 

to enhance existing systems and develop new screening technologies, TSA 

was not able to provide us with scheduled deployment dates. The five 

agreements are described below: 

• Two cooperative agreements, totaling $4.7 million, provide enhancements 

to existing systems. These upgrades are intended to reduce false alarm 

rates, advance screener user-interface tools, and improve service 

diagnostics, thereby increasing reliability, maintainability, and availability. 

 47The President’s fiscal year 2005 budget is requesting a total of $155.2 million for TSA’s 

R&D program. 

48The remaining about $2.7 million was obligated for continuous improvement to currently 

deployed equipment and for contractor support activities for the Phoenix program. 

Checked Baggage Screening 

Technologies 
Page 34 GAO-04-440T 

• One cooperative agreement, for $1.2 million, is intended to enhance 

detection capabilities and reduce false alarm rates by combining two new 

and emerging detection technologies, X-ray diffraction, and quadrupole 

resonance, with currently deployed EDS technology, and computed 

tomography.49 

• Two cooperative agreements, totaling $3.5 million, are aimed at 

developing new screening technologies that perform substantially better 

than current technologies. One technology is intended to triple the pace of 

checked baggage screening (throughput), reduce false alarms by 75 

percent, and enhance detection through superior spatial resolution. The 

other technology is intended to take up less space at less than half the unit 

cost of current systems. 

In addition to these checked baggage-screening technologies, TSA is 

testing radio frequency identification (RFID) baggage tags at several 

airports, including those in Jacksonville, Atlanta, San Francisco, and Las 

Vegas.50 The RFID tags, which identify baggage much more accurately than 

the bar code tags that are currently used, are intended to allow TSA to 

track luggage, such as bags that must be searched by hand because they 

triggered alarms. The tags are also intended to allow TSA to redirect bags 

that require further screening because of receipt of updated intelligence 

information or interactions with the passenger who checked the bag. TSA 

expects these tags to also benefit industry by reducing the incidence of 

lost, mishandled, or misdirected luggage. TSA expects the pilot systems at 

the previously mentioned airports to be fully operational by May 2004. 

TSA’s long-term approach for improving checked baggage screening 

systems, called the Manhattan II program, is in the planning stages. This 

program will consist of several initiatives and technologies that are 

designed to achieve “revolutionary” improvements in detection capability 

and operational efficiency in 5 to 10 years using new screening 

 49X-ray diffraction technology is based on the detection of scatter patterns as X-rays 

interact with crystal lattice structures of materials. Quadrupole resonance uses radio 

frequency pulses to probe bags by eliciting unique responses from explosives based on 

their chemical characteristics. Computed tomography uses an X-ray source that rotates 

around a bag, obtaining a large number of cross-sectional images that are integrated by a 

computer, which displays the densities of objects in the bag. The machine automatically 

triggers an alarm when objects with high densities, characteristic of explosives, are 

detected. 

50RFID is a technology that uses radio waves to automatically identify individual items, 

such as checked luggage, for tracking purposes. 
Page 35 GAO-04-440T 

technologies. TSA intends to award this project’s first contracts in fiscal 

year 2004. 

To better detect explosives and weapons that an individual may try to 

carry into an aircraft cabin, TSA obligated about $1.2 million in fiscal year 

2003 for research, development, testing, and evaluation of checkpoint 

screening technologies. As mentioned previously, for fiscal year 2004, TSA 

has budgeted $45 million for the development of next-generation explosive 

detection systems, which encompass technologies for screening checked 

baggage, carry-on baggage, and individuals. For example: 

• TSA has conducted tests of two explosive trace detection portals at 

airports in Orlando and Knoxville. These portals analyze the air for 

explosives as passengers pass through them. TSA anticipates that these 

portals will be ready for limited deployment in 2004. 

• TSA is funding the development of a document scanner capable of 

detecting traces of explosives on a document handled by a passenger, 

such as a boarding pass. TSA anticipates that the scanner will be ready for 

limited deployment in 2004. 

• TSA is evaluating body-scanning technologies—such as backscatter X-ray, 

millimeter wave energy analysis, and terahertz wave technology51—that 

can detect a variety of weapons and explosives on passengers. However, 

TSA acknowledges that it needs to resolve issues related to passenger 

privacy before deploying any of these technologies. 

As TSA moves forward with passenger and baggage screening R&D, it 

faces a number of organizational, funding, and coordination challenges. 

One challenge will be to sustain its R&D efforts during a period of 

organizational uncertainty and a possible merger. Under the Homeland 

Security Act, TSA is mandated to operate as a distinct entity until 

November 25, 2004, but after that date its organizational future is not 

specified in statute. According to a DHS official, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security intends to transfer TSA’s R&D program from DHS’s 

Border and Transportation Security Directorate to DHS’s Science and 

 51Backscatter X-ray detects reflected X-ray energy, providing an image that highlights 

organic materials such as explosives on a passenger. Millimeter wave energy analysis 

provides a 360-degree image of the human body in order to detect weapons and explosives. 

Terahertz imaging penetrates many common materials and reveals not only the shape but 

also the composition of hidden objects, including explosives. 

Passenger Screening 

Technologies 

Future Challenges 
Page 36 GAO-04-440T 

Technology Directorate, which is responsible for homeland security R&D. 

One of the key areas that we will be reporting on later this year is the 

extent to which TSA and DHS have developed strategies for the merger of 

their R&D programs. 

Balancing funding for competing priorities may also pose challenges for 

TSA. In a tight budget environment, TSA may be under pressure to use 

R&D funds for other purposes, as it did during fiscal year 2003, when it 

reprogrammed about $61 million, or more than half of its $110 million 

R&D appropriations to programs outside of R&D. As a result, TSA had to 

delay several key R&D projects, including developing a device to detect 

weapons, liquid explosives, and flammables in containers found in carryon baggage or passengers’ effects, and further development and testing of 

a walk-through chemical trace detection portal for detecting explosives on 

passengers. Competition for resources may also increase the difficulty that 

TSA already faces in allocating funds to address security threats in modes 

of transportation other than aviation. While aviation has historically faced, 

and continues to face, significant security threats, and improving aviation 

security is an important goal, TSA is also responsible for security in the 

other transportation modes, and these modes have significant 

vulnerabilities that remain to be addressed.52

Having achieved many of ATSA’s deadlines designed to strengthen 

passenger and baggage screening, TSA has begun to focus on longer-term 

planning to assist in stabilizing its screener workforce and screening 

operations. Carefully considering how it strategically hires, deploys, and 

manages its screener workforce will help TSA meet its mission and 

stabilize its passenger and baggage screening operations. We are 

encouraged that TSA is undertaking efforts to develop the tools needed to 

train its screener workforce and measure their performance. However, as 

TSA works toward improving the performance of individual screeners and 

screening operations, it will also be important that the agency deploy and 

leverage screening equipment and technologies and sustain its research 

and development efforts. 

 52U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help 

Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-843 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003). 

Concluding 

Observations 
Page 37 GAO-04-440T 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at 

this time. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact 

Cathleen A. Berrick at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key 

contributions to this testimony include David Alexander, Lisa Brown, 

Tammy Conquest, Kevin Copping, Gerald Dillingham, Christine Fossett, 

David Goldstein, Christopher Jones, Lemuel Jackson, Noel Lance, Thomas 

Lombardi, Jan Montgomery, Jobenia Odum, Jean Orland, Maria Strudwick, 

Mark Tremba, and Susan Zimmerman. 

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