RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 23a0018p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FORESIGHT COAL SALES, LLC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

KENT CHANDLER, in his official capacity as Chairman 

and Commissioner of Kentucky Public Service 

Commission, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

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No. 21-6069

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Frankfort.

No. 3:21-cv-00016—Gregory F. Van Tatenhove, District Judge.

Argued: June 7, 2022

Decided and Filed: February 3, 2023

Before: BATCHELDER, CLAY, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Joshua I. Hammack, BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellant. Matthew F. Kuhn, OFFICE OF THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Joshua I. Hammack, Nicholas S. Johnson, 

BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP, Washington, D.C., Christopher D. Smith, BAILEY & GLASSER, 

LLP, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Matthew F. Kuhn, Brett R. Nolan, OFFICE OF 

THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee.

LARSEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which CLAY, J., joined in full. 

BATCHELDER, J. (pg. 19), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.

>
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 2

_________________

OPINION

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LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Kentucky imposes a severance tax on coal extracted within its 

borders. At the same time, Kentucky directs its utilities to buy the most competitive coal, with 

cost being one of the most important factors. Predictably, this combination of measures, along 

with the fact that many coal-producing states don’t impose a severance tax, makes Kentucky 

utilities less likely to buy Kentucky coal. Recognizing the problem, the Kentucky legislature 

decided to have its cake and eat it, too. The legislature directed the agency that regulates 

Kentucky utilities to evaluate the reasonableness of coal prices after subtracting any severance 

tax paid from the actual bid price. In practice, the policy makes coal from states with severance 

taxes, like Kentucky, cheaper for the utilities by the amount of the severance tax.

A coal producer from Illinois, where there is no severance tax, challenged the policy as a 

violation of the Commerce Clause. The Commission responded that it wasn’t discriminating 

against interstate commerce because it was only leveling the playing field tilted against 

Kentucky coal by its own severance tax. Twice the district court bought this argument. We do 

not.

I.

The Public Service Commission, a state agency, regulates utilities in Kentucky. 

The Commission is tasked with ensuring that energy rates remain “reasonable” for consumers. 

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 278.030; see id. § 278.040. One of the Commission’s regulations, the fuel 

adjustment clause, allows utilities to adjust the base rates they charge customers to account for 

fluctuating fuel costs. See 807 Ky. Admin. Regs. § 5:056(1)(1). If the rate charged to customers 

is unreasonable, the charges are disallowed, the utility eats the cost, and the utility may be 

suspended from using the fuel adjustment clause. Id. § 5:056(3)(1). To determine what charges 

are reasonable, the Commission conducts six-month and two-year reviews of each utility. Id. 

§ 5:056(3)(3)–(4). And one of the most substantial factors during review is the price the utility 
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 3

paid for raw materials, like coal. Basically, Kentucky utilities are encouraged to buy cheaper 

coal.

This setup is a problem for Kentucky coal producers, who must pay a severance tax equal 

to 4.5% of the gross value of the coal upon extraction. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 143.020. 

Compared to states with no severance tax, Kentucky coal is relatively expensive. So, because of 

the fuel adjustment clause and its reasonableness requirement, Kentucky utilities are 

discouraged, on the margin, from buying Kentucky coal.

Kentucky has tried several times to solve this problem. In 2019, the Kentucky House of 

Representatives adopted House Resolution 144, which encouraged the Commission “to amend 

its administrative regulations to consider all costs, including fossil fuel-related economic impacts 

within Kentucky, when analyzing coal purchases under the fuel adjustment clause.” H.R. 144, 

2019 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2019). Weeks later, the Commission issued a draft regulation stating that, 

in determining the reasonableness of fuel costs, the Commission would consider the cost of the 

fuel less the Kentucky severance tax. Simply put, the Commission would artificially discount 

the price of Kentucky coal by 4.5%. However, the Commission never adopted the drafted 

language out of concern that the regulation might violate the dormant Commerce Clause. 

Instead, the final regulation stated that the Commission would artificially discount a utility’s fuel 

costs by the amount of the severance tax paid to any jurisdiction.

In late 2019, Foresight Coal Sales, LLC, an Illinois coal producer, sent a letter to the 

Commission arguing that the amended regulation was still unconstitutional under the Commerce 

Clause. In response, the Commission briefly suspended enforcement. But the Kentucky 

Attorney General issued an opinion saying that the regulation was legal because, while it might 

benefit Kentucky coal relative to producers in some states, it might hurt Kentucky coal relative to 

others. So the Commission resumed its enforcement.

Foresight Coal sued in the Eastern District of Kentucky and sought a preliminary

injunction. The district court denied the motion, and Foresight Coal appealed to this court. The 

parties fully briefed the appeal, and oral argument was scheduled for December 4, 2020. Then, 
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 4

right before argument, the Commission agreed to rescind the regulation, and Foresight Coal 

dropped the case.

Kentucky wasn’t done, though. On March 25, 2021, the Kentucky Governor signed 

Senate Bill 257 into law. The new law requires the Commission to “evaluate the reasonableness 

of fuel costs in contracts and competing bids based on the cost of the fuel less any coal severance 

tax imposed by any jurisdiction.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 278.277(1). In form and function, the 

new law is the same as the old regulation. The new law went into effect on July 1, 2021.

Foresight Coal again sued the Commission members in their official capacities and, 

again, sought a preliminary injunction. With “a distinct sense of déjà vu,” the district court again 

denied the preliminary injunction. Foresight Coal Sales, LLC v. Chandler, No. 3:21-cv-00016-

GFVT, 2021 WL 5139491, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 3, 2021). Foresight Coal appeals.

II.

A court must balance four factors when considering a preliminary 

injunction: “(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether 

the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the 

injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be 

served by issuance of the injunction.” Union Home Mortg. Corp. v. Cromer, 31 F.4th 356, 365–

66 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass’n v. Schimmel, 751 F.3d 427, 430 

(6th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (per curiam)). We review the district court’s ultimate determination of 

whether these factors favor an injunction for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 366. But the 

likelihood of success on the merits is often the determinative factor. Dahl v. Bd. of Trs. of W. 

Mich. Univ., 15 F.4th 728, 735 (6th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). And that factor we review de novo. 

Union Home Mortg. Corp., 31 F.4th at 366.

Congress has the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” U.S. 

Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. “[T]he Commerce Clause is written as an affirmative grant of authority to 

Congress.” South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2018). And some have argued 

that, under the plain text of the Constitution, its reach ends there. E.g., Camps 

Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., 
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 5

dissenting). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has long held that the Commerce Clause goes 

further and imposes limitations on the states even when Congress hasn’t acted. Wayfair, 138 

S. Ct. at 2089. This negative, or dormant, Commerce Clause requires courts to preserve the “free 

flow of interstate commerce,” S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945), 

with the aim of preventing the “economic Balkanization” that plagued the early colonies, 

Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979)).

The Supreme Court has articulated two principles for applying the dormant Commerce 

Clause. “First, state regulations may not discriminate against interstate commerce.” Id. at 2091. 

Once a regulation is found to be discriminatory, it is “virtually per se” invalid. Granholm v. 

Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005) (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 

(1978)). Second, if the regulation isn’t discriminatory, the doctrine still asks whether the state 

has imposed an “undue burden[] on interstate commerce.” Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091. 

Specifically, state policies effectuating “a legitimate local public interest . . . will be upheld 

unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 

putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). A theme 

throughout is that courts should inquire whether the policy “is basically a protectionist measure.” 

City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; see also Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 378 

(6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (“The key point of today’s dormant Commerce Clause 

jurisprudence is to prevent States from discriminating against out-of-state entities in favor of instate ones.”); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court & State Protectionism: Making Sense of the 

Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091, 1092 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme 

Court has been “concerned exclusively with preventing states from engaging in purposeful 

economic protectionism”).

A.

Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is famously complex. See Saikrishna Prakash,

Our Three Commerce Clauses & the Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 

1149, 1169 (2003) (calling the doctrine “complicated and byzantine”). The Supreme Court itself 

has recognized the doctrine’s “very considerable judicial oscillation.” Prudential Ins. Co. v. 

Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 420 (1946); see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 6

203 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The ‘negative’ Commerce Clause is inherently 

unpredictable[.]”); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 706 (1981) 

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (calling the doctrine “hopelessly confused”). As a lower court, we 

must chart a course through the doctrine’s “cloudy waters.” Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of 

Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 17 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the 

judgment). 

The parties agree that “discrimination” in the Commerce Clause context “means 

differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and 

burdens the latter.” Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). 

They also agree that both laws that discriminate on their face and those that discriminate in effect 

run afoul of the doctrine. They debate the role of purpose, however. Foresight Coal points to 

statements from this court and the Supreme Court that could be read to suggest that a 

discriminatory purpose, standing alone, can serve to invalidate a state’s regulation of commerce. 

E. Ky. Res. v. Fiscal Ct. of Magoffin Cnty., 127 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir.1997) (“A [state 

regulation] can discriminate against out-of-state interests in three different ways: (a) facially, 

(b) purposefully, or (c) in practical effect.”); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 

(1984) (noting that a regulation may be unlawful because of a “discriminatory purpose or 

discriminatory effect” (citation omitted)). The Commission responds with Comptroller of the 

Treasury v. Wynne, which stated that “the Commerce Clause regulates effects, not motives, and it 

does not require courts to inquire into voters’ or legislators’ reasons for enacting a law that has a 

discriminatory effect.” 575 U.S. 542, 561 n.4 (2015) (emphasis added). The Commission reads 

Wynne to say both that motive without effect can never be enough, and that a discriminatory 

effect suffices to invalidate a law, even absent discriminatory purpose. Thoughtful scholarship 

has offered a third approach, noting that in a string of cases before Wynne (and unrepudiated by 

it), the Court had upheld even discriminatory laws “in cases without evidence of a subjective 

intention to distort competition.” Daniel Francis, The Decline of the Dormant Commerce 

Clause, 94 Denv. L. Rev. 255, 292 (2017) (collecting cases); see also Regan, supra, at 1092. On 

this theory, discriminatory purpose is necessary, though perhaps never sufficient; and Wynne

might be confined to the special realm of tax cases. Francis, supra, at 292.
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 7

Happily, we need not settle the place of protectionist purpose in the “quagmire” of 

Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 

(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). Here, the law discriminates, if not on its face, then in effect, and 

so we have no occasion to consider whether discriminatory purpose alone could ever suffice.1 

And, to the extent that a protectionist purpose is necessary, we find that too.

B.

The parties spend considerable energy debating whether SB 257, which does not mention 

any state by name, nonetheless discriminates on its face. Foresight Coal says that it does because 

it “extend[s] beneficial treatment to producers from severance-tax states” and denies them to 

others. Appellant Br. at 28. But in the Commission’s view, that “is an argument that a facially 

neutral statute discriminates in effect.” Id. at 24. Which party is right turns on how close a 

proxy must be before we may find facial discrimination. But, in this case, not much turns on the 

answer. Whether labeled as “facial” or “in effect” discrimination, SB 257 discriminates against 

out-of-state coal.

SB 257 requires the Commission to “evaluate the reasonableness of fuel costs in 

contracts and competing bids based on the cost of the fuel less any coal severance tax imposed 

by any jurisdiction.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 278.277(1) (emphasis added). A severance tax is a 

tax imposed by a state (or political subdivision) upon natural resources extracted or “severed” 

from the land within its borders.2 See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 759 (1981). Only 

the state from which a natural resource was extracted may impose a severance tax on it. Id.

(noting that “Louisiana ha[d] no sovereign interest in being compensated for the severance of 

resources” outside of its borders). So “any coal” that has paid a severance tax to “any 

1Still, we are skeptical. It’s hard to “imagine a case in which a state legislature intended to discriminate 

against interstate commerce but did not make that purpose clear in the statute (and thereby did not facially 

discriminate) and also failed to achieve that purpose (and thereby did not discriminate in effect).” Wynne v. 

Comptroller of Md., 228 A.3d 1129, 1142 n.28 (Md. 2020); see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Alviti, 14 F.4th 76, 

89 (1st Cir. 2021). Nor would such a case seem practically problematic. See Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 

511 U.S. 641, 654 (1994) (“[T]he flow of commerce is measured in dollars and cents, not legal abstractions.”).

2That a municipality could, in theory, impose a severance tax makes no difference for Commerce Clause 

purposes. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353, 357, 361 (1992) 

(rejecting the state’s argument that policies did “not discriminate against interstate commerce on their face or in 

effect because they” differentiated based on “county”).
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 8

jurisdiction” necessarily originated in that jurisdiction, and SB 257’s text requires the 

Commission to discount coal that has paid severance taxes. Quite plainly then, the statute 

demands that coal from non-severance taxing states (e.g., Illinois) be treated one way, and coal 

from severance-taxing states (e.g., Kentucky) another. Even coal from the various severancetaxing states is given further disparate treatment, depending on the amount of each state’s tax. 

Thus, applying SB 257 starts and ends with the state. The fact of the severance tax is, therefore, 

a near perfect proxy for the coal’s state of origin.

Acknowledging the proxy problem, the Commission argues that SB 257 doesn’t 

differentiate based on state because coal from the same state may be treated differently. For 

example, “Montana imposes a different severance tax based on how the coal is severed . . . and 

the coal’s heating quality.” Appellee Br. at 23. But regardless of whether all Montana coal is 

treated the same, Montana coal is treated differently from coal in other states by virtue of its 

being Montana coal. Applying SB 257 to Montana coal still starts and ends with the state, even 

if that state’s law is more complex.

Does this tight correlation mean that we should call SB 257’s severance-tax-based 

discrimination “facial” state-of-origin discrimination? The question is interesting but ultimately 

unimportant. Whether a law discriminates in explicit terms against out-of-state goods, or does so 

merely “in effect,” the result is the same. As is true of other constitutional doctrines, “[t]he 

commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious.” Best & Co. v. 

Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455 (1940); cf. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 

263, 270 (1993) (“A tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.”). So a law discriminatory in 

effect must be justified as if it discriminated on its face. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 

437, 454 (1992) (“When a state statute clearly discriminates against interstate commerce, it will 

be struck down, unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to 

economic protectionism.” (citation omitted)).

C.

The real question then is not whether SB 257 differentiates between in-state and out-ofstate coal but whether it impermissibly discriminates, as that term is used in the Commerce 
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 9

Clause. That is, does the law benefit in-staters and burden outsiders? Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. 

at 99. We conclude it does. SB 257 requires the Commission to treat coal that has paid 

severance taxes (to Kentucky or the handful of other states that impose them) better than it treats 

coal that has not paid such a tax: Coal from severance tax states is artificially discounted by the 

amount of the tax; other coal is not discounted at all. So, “[t]he [Kentucky] provision at issue 

here explicitly deprives certain products of generally available beneficial [regulatory] treatment 

because they are made in certain other States . . . .” New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 

U.S. 269, 274 (1988). 

The Commission points out that some out-of-state coal could benefit from SB 257—if 

that state had a higher severance tax than Kentucky. But that can’t save the statute. In Hunt v. 

Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, the Supreme Court held that a North Carolina 

statute forbidding nonfederal grading of apples violated the Commerce Clause because it 

stripped Washington of the competitive and economic advantages of its superior grading system, 

while giving a boost to North Carolina’s apples. 432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977). The North Carolina 

statute also benefitted apple producers from nearly half of the other states competing in the North 

Carolina apple market, which had no state grading systems of their own. See id. at 349. But that 

made no difference to the Court. Id.; see also Lohman, 511 U.S. at 645, 649–50 (rejecting the 

contention that the “overall effect of the use tax scheme across the State was to place a lighter 

aggregate tax burden on interstate commerce than on intrastate commerce”). Nor could it. “The 

facial unconstitutionality of [a state regulation] cannot be alleviated by examining the effect of 

legislation enacted by its sister States.” Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 

U.S. 232, 242 (1987); see also Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946) (“The immunities 

implicit in the Commerce Clause and the potential taxing power of a State can hardly be made to 

depend, in the world of practical affairs, on the shifting incidence of the varying tax laws of the 

various States at a particular moment.”). And, to violate the dormant Commerce Clause, a 

regulation needn’t discriminate against every state or industry. Limbach, 486 U.S. at 276 

(“[N]either a widespread advantage to in-state interests nor a widespread disadvantage to out-ofstate competitors need be shown.”); Lohman, 511 U.S. at 650 (“[D]iscrimination is appropriately 

assessed with reference to the specific subdivision in which applicable laws reveal differential 

treatment.”).
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 10

The Commission raises several arguments in response. First, it points us to the standard 

of review. The district court declined “to find at this time that S.B. 257 discriminates in effect,” 

concluding that there was “not enough evidence in the record to properly ascertain whether S.B. 

257 will disadvantage states that do not impose severance taxes.” Foresight Coal Sales, 2021 

WL 5139491, at *9. The Commission says this is a finding of fact that we may set aside only if 

“clearly erroneous.” City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass’n, 751 F.3d at 430. But, as we will 

show, the district court didn’t err by finding a wrong fact; it erred by asking the wrong question. 

So the district court’s determination that SB 257 likely doesn’t have a discriminatory effect (i.e., 

that it does not treat out-of-staters worse than in-staters) is a legal error that we review de novo. 

Id.

As for findings of fact, the district court found it “obvious that cost is an important factor 

in the reasonableness analysis” but that it is “only one factor that the Commission analyzes when 

conducting its reasonableness inquiry.” Foresight Coal Sales, 2021 WL 5139491, at *9. The 

Commission’s review is “holistic.” Id. And, at least once, a utility purchased more expensive 

coal based on “other considerations.” Id. From these facts, the district court essentially 

concluded that, even with SB 257 in effect, Kentucky utilities might still buy Illinois coal, based 

on factors besides cost, and still qualify for the fuel-adjustment clause. Id. Even if each of these 

findings is correct, they don’t lead to a legal conclusion that SB 257 isn’t discriminatory. 

The question the Commerce Clause cases ask is whether SB 257 burdens Illinois coal—

not whether that burden is so insurmountable that no Illinois coal will ever again be sold to a 

Kentucky utility. See Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99. The question isn’t even whether Foresight 

will necessarily lose market share. Instead, any economic disadvantage will do—whether 

measured in loss of market share or in lost profits due to decreased prices. W. Lynn Creamery, 

512 U.S. at 195 n.11 (forcing out-of-state industry “to cut its profits by reducing its sales price 

below the market price sufficiently to compensate” for an imposed disadvantage is “an economic 

barrier against competition”). We can see that in Hunt. There, the Court concluded that North 

Carolina’s forced “downgrading” of Washington apples would “[a]t worst, . . . have the effect of 

an embargo against those Washington apples in the superior grades,” and “[a]t best . . . will 

deprive Washington sellers of the market premium that such apples would otherwise command.” 
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 11

Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352. Either effect constituted impermissible “discrimination against 

commerce.” Id. at 353.

Here, Kentucky artificially discounts its own coal, and coal from other severance-tax 

states, by the amount of the tax. Because non-severance-tax state coal gets no such discount, the 

effect is to make Illinois coal relatively more expensive. That, in turn, will cause Illinois coal 

either to lose market share or to lower its price. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 195 

n.11. Either way, Illinois coal is worse off as a matter of basic economics and Supreme Court 

precedent. And either result is sufficient to find discrimination. Id.; Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53.

In this litigation, everyone agrees that cost is one of the most substantial factors for the 

utilities. This is also common sense. When Kentucky utilities incur high energy costs, they want 

to be able to pass them on to customers; the fuel adjustment clause lets them do that. See 807 

Ky. Admin. Regs. § 5:056(1)(1). But, to keep this ability, the utilities must pay “[]reasonable” 

prices for coal. Id. § 5:056(3)(3)–(4). Under SB 257, the Commission must discount severance 

taxes from the reasonableness calculation; the law gives it no discretion. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 

278.277. And we assume that the Commission will follow the law. Cf. U.S. Postal Serv. v. 

Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 10 (2001) (“[A] presumption of regularity attaches to the actions of 

Government agencies.” (citing United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926))). 

So coal from severance tax states will be treated as cheaper for the utilities (though not for their 

customers) by the amount of that severance tax. The district court may well be right that the 

amount of loss is still unknown. But “the magnitude and scope of the discrimination have no 

bearing on the determinative question whether discrimination has occurred.” Lohman, 511 U.S. 

at 650; see also Maryland, 451 U.S. at 759–60 (“It may be true that further hearings would be 

required to provide a precise determination of the extent of the discrimination . . . but this is an 

insufficient reason for not now declaring the Tax unconstitutional.”).

D.

SB 257 is also purposefully discriminatory. To determine the purpose of a statute, we 

start with the text. Am. Bev. Ass’n, 735 F.3d at 371. Usually, the text is sufficient to determine 

purpose. E. Ky. Res., 127 F.3d at 542. Such is the case here.
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 12

The text of SB 257 is plain: In calculating the reasonableness of fuel costs for 

Kentucky’s utilities, the Commission must consider the “cost of the fuel less any coal severance 

tax imposed by any jurisdiction.” The immediate goal of this text is to make severance-tax-state 

coal cheaper, which will, in turn, encourage Kentucky utilities to buy more coal from severancetax jurisdictions, like Kentucky, and less from other states. And, as we have explained above, 

that purpose is discriminatory.

The parties debate the importance of the prior regulation and of various floor 

statements—some suggesting that the aim of the bill was to prop up the Kentucky coal industry, 

others suggesting that the legislators had no intent to “run afoul of interstate commerce.” But 

none of that matters, at least not when the purpose is plain from the text. See Int’l Dairy Foods 

Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 648 (6th Cir. 2010). We note, moreover, that the Commission 

itself has offered only one purpose for SB 257: to “even out the playing field” between 

Kentucky coal and competing coal from non-severance tax states. And, as we explain next, that 

purpose is itself discriminatory.

III.

A.

The Commission’s primary defense of SB 257 is that the law does not impermissibly 

discriminate within the meaning of the Commerce Clause because Kentucky coal isn’t really 

advantaged by the policy; it’s just no longer disadvantaged by Kentucky’s own severance tax. 

Similarly, Illinois coal isn’t really burdened by the policy, it’s just no longer unfairly propped up 

by its state’s lack of a severance tax. As the Commission puts it, SB 257 at most “evens a 

playing field” that the severance-tax states have tilted against themselves. Appellee Br. at 13. 

The Commission believes that such a law cannot be discriminatory. But a discriminatory policy 

is no less discriminatory because it has a “leveling” effect. In fact, the “leveling” effect may be 

precisely what is discriminatory.3 See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 351 (holding that a state statute which 

had “a leveling effect” violated the Commerce Clause).

3The Commission offers Lebamoff Enters. Inc. v. Whitmer, where we briefly suggested in dictum that 

“evening the playing field” might be a “legitimate goal.” 956 F.3d 863, 874 (6th Cir. 2020). But Lebamoff is a 
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 13

This conclusion follows naturally from three principles in the Supreme Court’s dormant 

Commerce Clause jurisprudence. First, one state’s discriminatory policy doesn’t authorize 

another’s. See Limbach, 486 U.S. at 278 (“[E]ven if [an] Indiana subsidy were invalid [under the 

Commerce Clause], retaliatory violation of the Commerce Clause by Ohio would not be 

acceptable.”). Such a tit for tat is precisely the kind of economic balkanization the dormant 

Commerce Clause seeks to prevent. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089. And “[a]ny other rule 

would mean that the constitutionality of [a regulation] would depend” on the laws in “49 other 

States.” Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644–45 (1984). So SB 257 isn’t somehow 

justified by Illinois’ policy not to have a severance tax.

Second, with one exception discussed below, a policy that benefits out-of-state interests 

doesn’t justify another that burdens them. In Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, the Court rejected West 

Virginia’s argument that it could exempt local manufacturers from a gross receipts tax because 

they paid “a much higher manufacturing tax.” 467 U.S. at 641–42. In Tyler Pipe, the Court 

invalidated Washington’s exemption to its manufacturing tax for goods sold locally, even though 

“absent the exemption, a local manufacturer might be at an economic disadvantage because it 

would pay both a manufacturing and a wholesale tax, while the manufacturer from afar would 

pay only the wholesale tax.” 483 U.S. at 243. And, in Baldwin, the Court held that New York 

couldn’t protect local milk, which had to conform to New York minimum price laws, from 

Vermont milk, which had no such minimum price restrictions. 294 U.S. at 520, 528. The 

caselaw is clear: SB 257 must be judged discriminatory or not, regardless of other Kentucky 

policies that might benefit out-of-state coal. So SB 257 isn’t justified by Kentucky’s severance 

tax.

Third, a policy is discriminatory if its claim to neutrality depends on another state 

enacting the same policy. See id. at 521 (“New York has no power to project its legislation into 

Vermont.”). The Court has repeatedly rejected attempts by states to condition favorable 

Twenty-First Amendment case, which has an “accordion-like interplay” with the Commerce Clause and, therefore, 

requires a “different” test. Id. at 869, 871. “The Twenty-first Amendment ‘gives the states regulatory authority that 

they would not otherwise enjoy.” Id. (quoting Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Assoc. v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 

2474 (2019)). Lebamoff didn’t consider Limbach, Hunt, or the other dormant Commerce Clause cases. Anyway, 

our comment about legitimate ends was just one response to a “doubtful” piece of legislative history that didn’t 

affect the outcome. Id. at 874.
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 14

treatment for out-of-state interests on reciprocal or similar legislation. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe, 483 

U.S. at 242; Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 380–81 (1976); Sporhase v. 

Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). In Limbach, the state regulation at issue gave 

tax subsidies to local ethanol as well as to out-of-state ethanol that returned the favor. 486 U.S. 

at 272. Nonetheless, the Court found that the state regulation was facially discriminatory, even 

though “many States” would be treated equally. Id. at 271; see also Hunt, 432 U.S. at 349 

(holding that North Carolina’s statute banning state grading of apples was discriminatory even 

though six other states also had no state grading). So, here, SB 257’s discrimination isn’t 

alleviated either by the fact that some states already impose severance taxes (in varying amounts) 

and that others may choose to impose severance taxes of their own. See Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 

242 (1987) (noting that a discriminatory policy cannot be alleviated by “examining the effect of 

legislation” in other states).

A contrary result in this case would violate these three principles. And it would mean 

that a state could “force its own judgments” on other states by using access to its market to 

encourage them to enact certain policies. See Cottrell, 424 U.S. at 380. A state with a high 

minimum wage, like Illinois, or California, might, for example, manipulate its sales tax to “level 

out” its high labor costs relative to states like Kentucky, whose policy has been to track the 

federal minimum wage. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 337.275. This process could play out in every 

state; no doubt every tapestry of regulations has some economic effects to “even out.” But the 

principal aim of the dormant Commerce Clause cases is to avoid such “commercial warfare.” 

See H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949).

B.

The Commission draws our attention to the one exception where the Supreme Court has 

deemed leveling a permissible purpose. In Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., the Supreme Court 

held that a 2% use tax on out-of-state goods did not violate the Commerce Clause because it was 

equivalent to the 2% sales tax on goods sold in the state. 300 U.S. 577, 579–81 (1937). The 

Court pointed to the complementary nature of the two taxes, noting that “retail sellers in 

Washington will be helped to compete upon terms of equality with retail dealers in other states 

who are exempt from a sales tax or any corresponding burden.” Id. at 581. The Commission 
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 15

compares SB 257 to the use tax in Silas Mason, arguing that SB 257 helps Kentucky coal 

“compete upon terms of equality” with Illinois coal not subject to a severance tax. See id.

Initially, we note that Silas Mason confirms our conclusion that leveling the playing field 

is discriminatory under the Commerce Clause. A compensatory tax à la Silas Mason is still a 

facially discriminatory tax, just one that is sufficiently justified. See Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 

102 (“Though our cases sometimes discuss the concept of the compensatory tax as if it were a 

doctrine unto itself, it is merely a specific way of justifying a facially discriminatory tax as 

achieving a legitimate local purpose that cannot be achieved through nondiscriminatory 

means.”).

And Silas Mason created a narrow exception. See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 

325, 344 (1996) (“While we doubt that . . . a [compensatory tax] showing can ever be made 

outside the limited confines of sales and use taxes, it is enough to say here that no such showing 

has been made.”); Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 105 n.8 (calling the compensatory tax cases 

“carefully confined”). The compensatory tax exception exists to ensure that states can collect 

revenue through sales taxes, see generally Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2096, but it has not extended 

further, Fulton, 516 U.S. at 338 (The Supreme Court “ha[s] shown extreme reluctance to 

recognize new compensatory categories”; indeed, “use taxes on products purchased out of state 

are the only taxes [the Court] ha[s] upheld in recent memory under the compensatory tax 

doctrine”). It does not apply here.

First, SB 257 is not a tax. Silas Mason appears to extend only to use taxes—not even 

other kinds of taxes—so it certainly doesn’t apply to regulatory schemes that aren’t taxes at all. 

See Fulton, 516 U.S. at 344. Expanding Silas Mason to a non-tax would hardly keep the 

doctrine “carefully confined,” as the Supreme Court has directed us to do. Id. at 335 (quoting 

Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 105 n.8). Second, even if SB 257 were a tax, it wouldn’t qualify for 

the Silas Mason exception. Compensatory taxes must meet three criteria. First, the State must 

identify a “burden for which the State is attempting to compensate.” Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 242 

(quoting Maryland, 451 U.S. at 758). Second, the State must demonstrate “[e]qual treatment of 

interstate commerce.” Id. at 243 (quoting Bos. Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 331) (alteration in 

original). Third, the State must show “‘substantially equivalent’ events on which the ‘mutually 
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 16

compensating taxes’” are imposed. Id. at 244 (quoting Armco, 467 U.S. at 643). SB 257 doesn’t 

pass the test.

The “substantially equivalent” prong asks whether the taxes fulfill the same purpose. 

Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 244. But the purpose of the severance tax and SB 257 are different. We 

know this because the Supreme Court told us so in a remarkably similar case. In Maryland v. 

Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that a severance tax is not substantially equivalent to a use 

tax. 451 U.S. at 759. There, Louisiana had a 7-cent severance tax for natural gas, imposed per 

thousand cubic feet extracted. Id. at 731. Concerned about the influx of gas from federal 

reserves in the Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana imposed an equivalent use tax on gas coming from 

territories without a severance tax. Id. Most states had a severance tax equal to Louisiana’s at 

the time and would have been treated equally, but the Court still found that the use tax could not 

be justified as a compensatory tax; instead, it violated the Commerce Clause. Id. at 758–59. The 

Court emphasized the difference between a sales tax and a severance tax. Specifically, a 

severance tax serves the “interest in protecting [the State’s] natural resources.” Id. at 759. But a 

use tax could not be “designed to meet these same ends since Louisiana ha[d] no sovereign 

interest in being compensated for the severance of resources from [federally owned land].” Id. 

Here, Kentucky has no interest in the extraction of natural resources from Illinois land, so it can’t 

enact a Silas Mason-like tax to level the effects of its severance tax. Id.

C.

Framing the argument another way, the Commission contends that Illinois coal did not 

“earn” whatever advantage it had before the enactment of SB 257, so Kentucky is free to nullify 

it. But that argument also misunderstands Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Commission 

gleans its “earned advantage” principle from Hunt. There, the Supreme Court held a statute 

unenforceable where it stripped away “the competitive and economic advantages [the 

Washington apple industry] ha[d] earned for itself through its expensive inspection and grading 

system.” Hunt, 432 U.S. at 351. But Hunt didn’t say that “unearned” advantages could be 

stripped away. The cases remark on whether there is an advantage; they do not turn on how it is 

derived. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99 (focusing on “differential treatment,” not the 
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 17

source of the difference); W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194 (asking whether the state policy

“neutraliz[es] advantages belonging to the place of origin” (quoting Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 527)).

What’s more, the Commission does not tell us what it means by “earned.” It might mean 

that only the fruits of human labor and ingenuity, perhaps combined with the blessings of nature, 

are protected by the Commerce Clause. The Commission suggests, for example, that if Foresight 

had shown that its “coal [was] of a better quality” or that it could “transport its coal more cheaply 

or quickly,” those advantages would be protected. Appellee Br. at 13. That leaves in the 

unprotected category state-created advantages, like (the lack of) a severance tax. But this 

argument is squarely foreclosed by Hunt itself; it was the Washington “state legislature [that] 

ha[d] sought to enhance the market for Washington apples through the creation of . . . the 

Washington State Apple Advertising Commission.” 432 U.S. at 336. The state’s “stringent, 

mandatory inspection program, administered by the State’s Department of Agriculture” graded 

the apples. Id. And this state-created grading system was the advantage protected in Hunt. Id. 

The dormant Commerce Clause prohibited North Carolina from leveling the playing field that 

Washington law had tilted toward itself. Id. at 350. 

Limbach, too, stands in the way. There, the Court took note of Indiana’s cash subsidy 

“program for in-state ethanol producers,” remarking that it was surely “effective in conferring a 

commercial advantage over out-of-state competitors.” Limbach, 486 U.S. at 278. Still, the Court 

cautioned that Ohio could not erase the effects of this state-created advantage through a 

discriminatory tax: “Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of 

[the Commerce Clause]; discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does.” Id. 

In any event, the Commission never explains how it would have us distinguish between 

human (or nature)-created and state-created advantages. How much of a business’s “economic 

and competitive advantage” is traceable to natural resources or individual pluck? And what 

portion shall we assign to labor policies, the educational system, corporate tax rates, or 

environmental policy in the State? For good reason, the caselaw doesn’t parse whether an 

advantage is state created. See Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 234 (manufacturing taxes); Limbach, 486 

U.S. at 271 (ethanol tax credits).
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 18

D.

Foresight Coal is likely to be able to show that SB 257 discriminates against interstate 

commerce. There remains, however, the question whether that discrimination can nonetheless be 

justified. Laws that discriminate against interstate commerce are “virtually per se” invalid, City 

of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. But a few survive. E.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 

(1986) (upholding absolute ban on the importation of baitfish into Maine because of 

environmental risks). Here, the Commission has proffered no explanation for SB 257 except that 

it is designed to nullify the competitive disadvantages created by Kentucky’s severance tax. See 

City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (noting that the “crucial inquiry” is whether the policy “is 

basically a protectionist measure” or is instead directed “to legitimate local concerns” with only 

“incidental” effects on interstate commerce). Because Kentucky may not level the playing field 

in this way, Foresight Coal is likely to succeed on the merits.

* * *

Having concluded that Foresight Coal was not likely to succeed on the merits, the district 

court declined to address the rest of the preliminary injunction factors. We remand for the 

district court to examine the other three factors in the first instance. See Nationwide Biweekly 

Admin., Inc. v. Owen, 873 F.3d 716, 738 (9th Cir. 2017).

We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
No. 21-6069 Foresight Coal Sales, LLC. v. Chandler, et al. Page 19

______________________________________

CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT

______________________________________

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. While I agree 

with the majority’s conclusion, I depart slightly from the underlying analysis. 

As I see it, SB 257 is not facially discriminatory. To be sure, SB 257 treats different 

states differently based on their differing severance taxes. But suppose Kentucky were to repeal 

its coal severance tax. In that scenario, SB 257 would not favor Kentucky, meaning it would not 

discriminate against out-of-state interests. Therefore, SB 257 does not discriminate on its face; it 

discriminates in effect due to the existence of Kentucky’s coal severance tax. 

SB 257 is discriminatory in effect because Kentucky’s coal severance tax makes it 

discriminatory. By requiring the Commission to pretend that the price of Kentucky coal is 4.5% 

lower than its true price, SB 257 gives Kentucky coal a comparative price advantage over out-ofstate coal that does not receive this pretend discount. This is virtually the same case as New 

Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988), in which the Court rejected Ohio’s attempt to deny 

its tax credit to Indiana’s ethanol. I would stop there and take the analysis no further.