J-S58043-15

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*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JAMES WATSON

Appellant No. 216 MDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 31, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-08-CR-0000449-2001

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JANUARY 15, 2016

Appellant, James Watson, appeals from the order entered in the 

Bradford County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm. 

This Court previously set forth the relevant facts and procedural 

history of this case as follows: 

Generally, the evidence at trial, consisting of eyewitness 

testimony, established that in the afternoon of April 17, 

2001, an argument developed between Jason Ryans 

[(“Victim”)] and the Watson brothers [(Kenny Watson and 

Appellant)] at Kenny Watson’s home in Wilkes-Barre, 

Pennsylvania. The Watsons believed that [Victim] had 

stolen a handgun and a safe containing marijuana and 

money. During the argument, Kenny Watson punched 

[Victim]. In an ensuing struggle, Appellant grabbed a 

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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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knife and inflicted multiple wounds to [Victim’s] hands and 

arms. [Victim] was also punched and kicked repeatedly by 

the Watsons. The Watsons then bound the wrists of 

[Victim], either for the purpose of stopping his bleeding or 

to prevent his escape, or both. [Victim] was then placed in

a vehicle and transported to a rural area near the Village 

of Camptown in Bradford County. There, [Victim] was 

taken from the vehicle and shot twice in the back of the 

head by Appellant. [Victim] apparently died immediately. 

The evidence against Appellant and Kenny Watson 

diverged with respect to their criminal culpability following

the altercation in Wilkes-Barre. After [Victim] was bound, 

the Watsons then informed others at the house that they 

would be taking [Victim] to a hospital, but would seek a 

rural hospital. The evidence revealed that Appellant was in 

fact simply looking for a secluded place to murder [Victim], 

but the evidence also suggested that Kenny Watson, 

among others, was duped into accompanying Appellant to 

Bradford County. The jury at least had a reasonable doubt 

as to Kenny Watson’s complicity in any plan to kill 

[Victim], for it acquitted him of all charges of homicide and 

conspiracy to commit homicide. Kenny Watson’s counsel 

admitted to the jury that his client was guilty of assault, 

but denied his involvement in any action or plan intended 

to kill [Victim]. 

Procedurally, the jury reached a verdict on September 12, 

2002, convicting Appellant of first-degree murder, 

conspiracy to commit homicide, kidnapping, conspiracy to 

commit kidnapping, and other related offenses. The court 

sentenced Appellant on that day to life imprisonment for 

his murder conviction, but deferred sentencing on the 

remaining convictions. On November 22, 2002, the court 

imposed an aggregate sentence of forty-six (46) to ninetytwo (92) years’ imprisonment for Appellant’s remaining 

convictions, consecutive to Appellant’s life sentence. 

This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on August 

20, 2004, and our Supreme Court subsequently denied 

allowance of appeal on April 18, 2005. See 

Commonwealth v. Watson, 860 A.2d 1136 (Pa.Super. 

2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 717, 872 A.2d 1199 (2005). 

On May 18, 2005, Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA 
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petition. The court appointed counsel, who filed an 

amended PCRA petition on April 9, 2008. The court held 

hearings on the petitions on April 7, 2008, April 9, 2008, 

and January 6, 2010. The court denied PCRA relief on 

January 4, 2011.[2] On January 26, 2011, Appellant timely 

filed a notice of appeal.

2 The court determined it had improperly imposed 

separate sentences for each of Appellant’s conspiracy 

convictions; consequently, the court granted PCRA 

relief in that respect only. 

Commonwealth v. Watson, No. 202 MDA 2011, unpublished 

memorandum at 1-2 (Pa.Super. filed June 1, 2012) (some internal citations 

omitted). On appeal, this Court affirmed in part and remanded the case for 

the PCRA court to make additional findings with regard to two of Appellant’s 

issues. See id. Following remand, the PCRA court again denied relief on 

January 2, 2015. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on January 30, 

2015. The court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). After the court 

granted an extension, Appellant timely complied. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

DID THE PCRA COURT COMMIT ERROR REGARDING THE 

PRATO-BARR CONVERSATION WHEN, MAKING A 

CREDIBILITY DETERMINATION THAT PRATO’S TESTIMONY 

DID NOT NECESSITATE PCRA RELIEF FOR [APPELLANT], 

THE COURT FOUND THAT [APPELLANT] FIRST FAILED TO 

ESTABLISH THAT HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY KNEW OR SHOULD 

HAVE KNOWN OF THE PRATO-BARR CONVERSATION AND 

HAD PRATO TESTIFY AT TRIAL, AND SECOND, THAT 

[APPELLANT] FAILED TO ESTABLISHED PREJUDICE 

BECAUSE THE ABSENCE OF PRATO TESTIMONY AT 

TRIAL[?]
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DID THE COURT COMMIT ERROR REGARDING THE 

PRESERVATION OF [APPELLANT’S] APPELLATE RIGHTS IN 

FIRST NOT FINDING THAT [APPELLANT’S] APPELLATE 

RIGHTS WERE NOT PRESERVED NOT EMPLOYING A “PER 

SE” PREJUDICE STATEMENT IN THIS CASE, AND SECOND 

NOT REACHING REAL CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS[?]

(Appellant’s Brief at 4). 

In his first issue, Appellant argues that his former girlfriend, Jennifer 

Barr, had a conversation with Janelle Prato shortly after the incident (“PratoBarr conversation”), in which Ms. Barr indicated someone had been killed 

but Appellant was not the killer. Appellant contends the Prato-Barr 

conversation is evidence of Appellant’s innocence and contradicts Ms. Barr’s 

testimony at trial identifying Appellant as the person who killed Victim. 

Appellant claims the PCRA court failed to follow this Court’s remand 

instructions to make credibility determinations regarding the PCRA hearing 

testimony of Ms. Prato and defense counsel on the issue of whether defense 

counsel was aware of the Prato-Barr conversation. Appellant asserts Ms. 

Prato credibly testified that she relayed the conversation to counsel’s private 

investigator. Appellant concludes defense counsel’s failure to call Ms. Prato 

as a witness at Appellant’s trial constituted ineffective assistance. We 

disagree. 

Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to 

examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s 

determination and whether its decision is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 932 A.2d 179 (Pa.Super. 2007). This Court 
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grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the record 

contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 

A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 

(2007). If the record supports a post-conviction court’s credibility 

determination, it is binding on the appellate court. Commonwealth v. 

Knighten, 742 A.2d 679 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 563 Pa. 659, 759 

A.2d 383 (2000). 

The law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance. 

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 858 A.2d 1219, 1222 (Pa.Super. 2004), 

appeal denied, 582 Pa. 695, 871 A.2d 189 (2005). When asserting a claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner is required to make the 

following showing: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel 

had no reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and, (3) but for 

the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that 

the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. 

Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 312, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (1999). 

Because claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not self-proving, the

petitioner must develop each prong of the test in a meaningful fashion. 

Commonwealth. v. Spotz, 587 Pa. 1, 896 A.2d 1191 (2006). Boilerplate, 

undeveloped argument regarding counsel’s assistance is not sufficient to 

warrant PCRA relief. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Reaves, 592 Pa. 

134, 148, 923 A.2d 1119, 1128 (2007) (explaining specifically that collateral 
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attack under guise of ineffective assistance of counsel in collateral 

proceeding regarding alleged defaulted claims on appeal requires showing of 

actual prejudice). The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for 

ineffectiveness of counsel will cause the claim to fail. Gonzalez, supra. 

To establish counsel’s ineffectiveness for failure to call a witness, a 

petitioner must demonstrate: 

(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available; (3) 

counsel was informed of the existence of the witness or 

counsel should otherwise have known of [her]; (4) the 

witness was prepared to cooperate and testify for 

Appellant at trial; and (5) the absence of the testimony 

prejudiced Appellant so as to deny him a fair trial. A 

defendant must establish prejudice by demonstrating that 

he was denied a fair trial because of the absence of the 

testimony of the proposed witness. Further, 

ineffectiveness for failing to call a witness will not be found 

where a defendant fails to provide affidavits from the 

alleged witnesses indicating availability and willingness to 

cooperate with the defense. 

Commonwealth v. O’Bidos, 849 A.2d 243, 249 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal 

denied, 580 Pa. 696, 860 A.2d 123 (2004) (citations omitted). 

Instantly, the PCRA court reasoned as follows:

[Appellant] failed to prove that defense counsel knew or 

should have known about [the Prato-Barr conversation]. 

[Ms.] Prato herself testified that she provided her 

information to counsel’s private investigator, but there is 

no evidence that the investigator relayed [Ms.] Prato’s 

statements to counsel, and counsel denied having been 

told about the testimony [Ms.] Prato might have offered. 

The only evidence that defense counsel was informed prior 

to trial of [Ms.] Prato’s testimony came from [Appellant] 

himself, who claims that he asked defense counsel about 

calling [Ms.] Prato to testify. [Appellant’s] testimony was 
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not credible. 

When first questioned by the police, [Appellant] gave a 

detailed account of how he had been involved in the 

beating, kidnapping, and execution of [Victim], an account 

that was wholly consistent with the facts related by 

[Rodney] Watson, who was present at all times, and by

[Ms.] Barr, who was present for the kidnapping and 

murder[;] however, while testifying during the PCRA 

hearing, [Appellant] radically changed his story. He now 

claims that he was present when [Victim] was beaten, but 

then went home and remained home while [Victim] was 

kidnapped and killed. 

Because [Appellant’s] PCRA hearing testimony is not 

reliable, the court finds that [Appellant] has not 

established by a preponderance of the evidence that 

defense counsel knew or should have known that [Ms.] 

Prato could testify about [Ms.] Barr’s prior inconsistent 

statement. Further, there is no evidence that defense 

counsel was derelict in his selection of a private 

investigator, nor in relying on the investigator to provide 

him with any and all exculpatory evidence. 

The court also finds that [Appellant] has failed to satisfy 

the fifth element of a claim of ineffectiveness for failure to 

call a witness: The absence of [Ms.] Prato’s testimony was 

not so prejudicial to [Appellant] as to have denied him a 

fair trial. 

The evidence against [Appellant] at trial included the 

testimony of [Appellant’s] mother that [Appellant] has 

confessed to her that he had killed [Victim] because he 

believed that after [Victim] was beaten he represented a 

threat to Kenny Watson and his family. Rodney Watson 

testified that he personally witnessed [Appellant] shoot 

[Victim]. Numerous witnesses supplied testimony that 

[Appellant] orchestrated the kidnapping and the killing, 

and commanded the after-the-fact cover-up. [Ms.] Barr’s 

testimony was corroborated, often in fine detail, by Rodney 

Watson and, except for [Appellant’s] claim that Kenny 

Watson was the shooter, [Appellant’s] own statement to 

the police. The remarkable consistency of the statements 

of those involved leading to the moment of the execution 
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imbues [Ms.] Barr’s testimony with an authenticity that her 

prior inconsistent statement lacks. Moreover, [Ms.] Prato’s 

testimony about [Ms.] Barr’s inconsistent statement refers 

to a time before [Appellant’s] arrest and before [Ms.] Barr 

changed her initial statement to the police that Kenny 

Watson was the shooter. At the trial, [Ms.] Barr 

acknowledged that she had previously exculpated 

[Appellant], but explained that she did so because she was 

in fear of [Appellant]. Thus, [Ms.] Prato’s testimony was 

cumulative of an inconsistency that [Ms.] Barr readily 

acknowledged. The testimony of [Ms.] Prato would have 

carried little weight, if any. 

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed January 2, 2015, at 3-4). The record supports 

the PCRA court’s analysis. The court explicitly discredited Appellant’s PCRA 

hearing testimony. The court’s observation that defense counsel denied any 

awareness of the Prato-Barr conversation, when read in the context of the 

court’s conclusion that no evidence showed the Prato-Barr conversation was 

relayed to defense counsel, makes clear the court credited counsel’s 

testimony. Thus, Appellant failed to satisfy his burden to show defense 

counsel knew or should have known of Ms. Prato and her potential 

testimony. See Knighten, supra; O’Bidos, supra. Further, Appellant 

failed to satisfy the prejudice prong, particularly where Ms. Barr’s alleged 

statement to Ms. Prato was cumulative of her prior inconsistent statement to 

the police, which was introduced at trial, and Ms. Barr testified as to why she 

had initially attempted to exculpate Appellant. See id. Therefore, defense 

counsel was not ineffective for failing to call Ms. Prato as a witness. 

In his second issue, Appellant argues defense counsel, who also 

represented Appellant on direct appeal, did not discuss with him the matter 
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of a direct appeal, including the strengths and weaknesses of potential 

claims and the consequences of failing to raise a particular issue. Appellant 

concedes counsel informed him of the one issue that would be raised on 

direct appeal, i.e., the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for a mistrial. 

Nevertheless, Appellant disputes counsel’s testimony that they had 

discussed other possible appellate claims. Appellant contends the PCRA 

court again failed to make a specific credibility determination regarding the 

conflicting testimony of Appellant and defense counsel on this issue. 

Appellant concludes counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed 

to discuss potential appealable issues with Appellant. We cannot agree relief 

is warranted. 

Pennsylvania law makes clear:

[A]n accused who is deprived entirely of his right of direct 

appeal by counsel’s failure to perfect an appeal is per se

without the effective assistance of counsel, and is entitled 

to reinstatement of his direct appellate rights. In those 

extreme circumstances, where counsel has effectively 

abandoned his or her client and cannot possibly be acting 

in the client’s best interests, our Supreme Court has held 

that the risk should fall on counsel, and not his client.

However, it is also well-settled that the reinstatement of 

direct appeal rights is not the proper remedy when 

appellate counsel perfected a direct appeal but simply 

failed to raise certain claims. Where a petitioner was not 

entirely denied his right to a direct appeal and only some 

of the issues the petitioner wished to pursue were waived, 

the reinstatement of the petitioner’s direct appeal rights is 

not a proper remedy. In such circumstances, the appellant 

must proceed under the auspices of the PCRA, and the 

PCRA court should apply the traditional three-prong test 

for determining whether appellate counsel was ineffective.
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Commonwealth v. Grosella, 902 A.2d 1290, 1293-94 (Pa.Super. 2006) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Instantly, defense counsel filed a timely direct appeal on Appellant’s 

behalf following imposition of sentence. This Court disposed of Appellant’s 

single issue on the merits and affirmed the judgment of sentence. 

Therefore, Appellant was not entirely denied his right to a direct appeal. 

Consequently, Appellant must satisfy the traditional three-prong ineffective 

assistance test to determine whether counsel was ineffective for failing to 

raise certain issues on appeal. See Reaves, supra; Spotz, supra; 

Grosella, supra. Appellant, however, did not specify any additional issue 

he thought counsel should have raised on direct appeal. Moreover, 

Appellant presented no argument on any of the three prongs of the 

ineffective assistance of counsel standard. See id. Therefore, Appellant’s 

ineffective assistance claim fails.2 See Kimball, supra. Accordingly, we 

affirm. 

Order affirmed. 

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2 Appellant’s claim merits no relief even in the absence of a specific 

credibility finding. Here, Appellant had the benefit of a direct appeal decided 

on the merits. In any event, Appellant has not identified what additional 

issues he thought counsel should have raised on direct appeal. Additionally, 

in Appellant’s prior collateral appeal, this Court disposed of Appellant’s 

various other claims of ineffectiveness with respect to issues that 

conceivably could have been raised on direct appeal. See Commonwealth 

v. Watson, No. 202 MDA 2011 (Pa.Super. filed June 1, 2012) (unpublished 

memorandum). Therefore, his current claim merits no further attention. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/15/2016