FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463 

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matter of ) 

 ) 

Joaquin Castro ) MUR 7635 

 ) 

 

STATEMENT OF REASONS OF VICE CHAIR ALLEN DICKERSON AND 

COMMISSIONERS SEAN J. COOKSEY AND JAMES E. “TREY” TRAINOR, III

In this matter, we voted to approve the Office of General Counsel’s recommendations to 

find no reason to believe that Joaquin Castro violated 52 U.S.C. § 30111(a)(4) and 11 C.F.R. § 

104.15(a). 

For the purposes of 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8), we attach our proposed Factual and Legal 

Analysis in this matter. 

__________________________________ December 3, 2021 

Allen Dickerson Date

Vice Chair

_________________________________ December 3, 2021 

Sean J. Cooksey Date

Commissioner

_________________________________ December 3, 2021 

James E. “Trey” Trainor, III Date

Commissioner

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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

FACTUAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS

RESPONDENT: Joaquin Castro MUR 7635 

This matter was generated by a Complaint filed with the Federal Election Commission 

(the “Commission”).1 The Complaint alleges that Congressman Joaquin Castro violated the 

“sale and use provision” of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended (the 

“Act”),2 when, shortly after the August 3, 2019, shooting in El Paso, Texas, he used information 

obtained from Commission disclosure reports (“FEC data”)3 in a posting on Twitter, which 

contained the names and employer information of individuals in the San Antonio area who made 

maximum contributions to Donald J. Trump’s 2020 presidential re-election campaign.4 The 

Complaint asserts that Castro’s actions subjected these donors to a “substantial likelihood of 

repeated solicitations and other harassing communications, intimidation, and potentially even 

violence.”5 In response, Castro acknowledges that the tweet originated from his campaign but 

argues that the Act’s sale and use provision places limits only with respect to using FEC data for 

the purpose of soliciting contributions or commercial purposes, neither of which is present here.6 

1

 See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1).

2

 Id. § 30111(a)(4); see also 11 C.F.R. § 104.15.

3

 The term “FEC data” refers to any information published in the Commission’s online database of reports 

and statements filed by political committees.

4

 Compl. ¶¶ 3, 9-12 (Aug. 9, 2019).

5

 Id. ¶ 19.

6

 Resp. at 2 (Oct. 3, 2019).

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Castro contends that the tweet was a “political communication” to which the sale and use 

provision does not apply.7

 

As discussed below, the available information does not support an inference that Castro 

used FEC data in violation of the sale and use provision. Accordingly, the Commission finds no 

reason to believe that Joaquin Castro violated 52 U.S.C. § 30111(a)(4) and 11 C.F.R. 

§ 104.15(a). 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 On August 5, 2019, two days after the shooting in a Walmart store in El Paso, Texas, the 

campaign Twitter account of Joaquin Castro, who represents Texas’s 20th congressional district, 

tweeted the following message: 

Sad to see so many San Antonians as 2019 maximum donors to Donald Trump — 

the owner of @BillMillerBarBQ, owner of the @HistoricPearl, realtor Phyllis 

Browning, etc. 

Their contributions are fueling a campaign of hate that labels Hispanic 

immigrants as ‘invaders.’8

 The tweet also includes an image showing the names of forty-four individuals from the 

San Antonio area along with information about their occupations and employers.9

 Each of these 

individuals reportedly contributed maximum amounts to Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. 

(“DJTFP”), the authorized committee of President Trump’s re-election campaign.10 The tweet 

7

 Id. at 3.

8

 Joaquin Castro (@Castro4Congress), Twitter (Aug. 5, 2019, 8:13 PM), https://twitter.com/castro4con

gress/status/1158576680182718464?lang=en (“Castro Tweet”) (accessed on December 5, 2019).

9

 Appendix (screenshot of the Castro Tweet).

10 These individuals contributed $5,600 to DJTFP ($2,800 for the primary and $2,800 for the general 

election). DJTFP, Amended July 2019 Quarterly Rpt. (Sept. 12, 2019); DJTFP, Amended Oct. 2019 Quarterly Rpt. 

(Nov. 13, 2019); see Price Index Adjustments for Contribution & Expenditure Limitations & Lobbyist Bundling 

Disclosure Threshold, 84 Fed. Reg. 2,504, 2,506 (Feb. 7, 2019).

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cites the source of the contribution information as “Federal Elections [sic] Commission.”11 As 

of December 5, 2019, Castro’s tweet was re-tweeted over 23,000 times and had received over 

47,000 likes.12

 In his Response, Castro admits distributing the message via Twitter but denies that it 

resulted in a violation of the Act.13 Castro argues that his use of FEC data constitutes core 

“political speech” protected by the First Amendment.14 He contends that the tweet furthered the 

disclosure interest underlying the Act by educating the public regarding the source of campaign 

money.15 The Response also emphasizes that Castro’s tweet did not contain a solicitation or 

otherwise have a commercial purpose.16 

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

The Act requires political committees to report the identification of each person whose 

aggregate contributions exceed $200 within the calendar year (or election cycle, in the case of an 

authorized committee), along with the date and amount of any such contributions.17 

11 Castro Tweet. According to Commission disclosure reports, each of the individuals were, in fact, reported 

to be maximum contributors to DJTFP for the 2020 election cycle. See supra note 10.

12 Id. 

13 Resp. at 1. The Response states, however, that the image containing the donor information was not created 

by Castro or his campaign staff. Id. Castro does not provide any information regarding the source of the image or 

how it was obtained. 

14 Id.

15 See id. at 2 (“Congress enacted FECA in order to require the disclosure of campaign contributions and 

contributors. This disclosure was necessary in order to inform the electorate where campaign money comes from, to 

deter corruption, and to effectively enforce the [A]ct’s contribution limitation requirements.” (citing Buckley v. 

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68, (1974))).

16 Id. at 1, 3.

17 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A); see also 11 C.F.R. § 104.15(a). For contributions by individuals, 

“identification” consists of name, mailing address, occupation, and employer. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(13)(A).

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Correspondingly, the Act requires the Commission to make political committees’ reports 

available for public inspection and copying.18

 Under the Act’s sale and use provision, information copied from the reports “may not be 

sold or used by any person for the purpose of soliciting contributions or for commercial 

purposes, other than using the name and address of any political committee to solicit 

contributions from such committee.”19 “[S]oliciting contributions includes soliciting any type of 

contribution or donation, such as political or charitable contributions.”20 

 The Commission has stated that “the purpose of the prohibition is to prevent contributor 

information from being used for commercial purposes or for making solicitations.”21 Therefore, 

in instances in which the use of FEC data was determined to be motivated by “political 

purposes” or was “informational” in nature, the Commission has found there was no violation.22

For example, in Advisory Opinion 1984-02 (Gramm), the Commission concluded that a 

candidate could use contributor information contained in a non-connected political committee’s 

disclosure reports to contact and inform contributors that the non-connected committee, which 

had an allegedly misleading name, was not authorized.23 As the Commission explained, “[t]he 

18 52 U.S.C. § 30111(a)(4).

19 Id. § 30111(a)(4) (emphasis added); see also 11 C.F.R. § 104.15(a). The Commission’s implementing 

regulation exempts “newspapers, magazines, books or other similar communications,” as long as “the principal 

purpose . . . is not to communicate any contributor information listed on such reports for the purpose of soliciting 

contributions or for other commercial purposes.” 11 C.F.R. § 104.15(c). 

20 11 C.F.R. § 104.15(b). 

21 AO 2013-16 at 6 (PoliticalRefund.org). “When determining if sale or use of information obtained from 

FEC disclosure reports constitutes a violation, the Commission has looked to whether the purpose was solicitationrelated.” Factual & Legal Analysis at 5-6, MURs 6960 & 6991 (SW Technologies, LLC) (“F&LA”) (citing cases); 

see, e.g., AO 1988-02 at 2 (Chicago Board of Options Exchange II); AO 1985-16 at 2 (Weiss).

22 E.g., F&LA at 6, MURs 6053 & 6065 (HuffingtonPost.com) (approving use of FEC data by a newspaper in 

connection with an online database that it operated where the purpose for using contributor information appeared to 

be “informational”); AO 1984-02 at 2 (Gramm); AO 1995-09 at 6 (NewtWatch).

23 AO 1984-02 at 2 (Gramm).

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prohibition is intended to prevent the use of contribution information taken from disclosure 

documents . . . to make solicitations. It is not intended to foreclose the use of this information 

for other, albeit political purposes . . . .”24

In Advisory Opinion 1995-09 (NewtWatch), the Commission approved a political 

committee’s proposal to operate a website upon which it would post the names, cities, and states 

of residence, but not addresses, of contributors who gave $200 or more to select candidates.25 

The Commission found the proposal was similar to the circumstances considered by the Second 

Circuit in FEC v. Political Contributions Data, which involved compilations of FEC data 

(names, recipients, occupations, and amounts, but not addresses) for research into issues related 

to campaign finance.26 The Second Circuit deemed the usage of FEC data permissible because it 

was “for informative purposes (similar to newspapers, magazines, and books), not for 

commercial purposes (similar to soliciting contributions or selling cars).”27 Relying on this 

holding, and further observing that the website presented “little risk, if any, of solicitation or 

harassment of contributors,” the Commission found that the use of FEC data was not 

prohibited.28 

Other instances in which the Commission found that the proposed use of FEC data was 

for informative or political purposes, and thus permissible, include: (1) informing contributors 

about a candidate’s change in position and of their right to seek a refund;29 (2) notifying 

24 Id. (emphasis added).

25 AO 1995-09 at 6-7 (NewtWatch).

26 Id. at 6.

27 FEC v. Political Contributions Data, 943 F.2d 190, 196-97 (2d Cir. 1991) (“PCD”); accord AO 1995-09 at 

6 (NewtWatch).

28 AO 1995-09 at 6-7 (NewtWatch).

29 AO 2013-16 at 4-6 (PoliticalRefund.org).

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contributors that a candidate changed party affiliation and offered to refund contributions;30

(3) posting contribution data on bulletin boards located in an area accessible by members of 

separate segregated fund;31 and (4) a candidate contacting the contributors of his opponent to 

respond to allegedly defamatory statements made by the opponent.32

Considering these authorities and precedents, the Commission finds that the available 

information does not indicate that there is reason to believe there was a violation of the Act’s 

sale and use provision. It appears that Castro’s tweet was for political or informational purposes 

which, in line with the Commission’s treatment of similar matters discussed above, does not 

contravene the Act’s sale and use provision. Because the available information does not indicate 

that FEC data was misused in contravention of the Act, the Commission finds no reason to 

believe that Castro violated 52 U.S.C. § 30111(a)(4) and 11 C.F.R. § 104.15(a). 

30 AO 2009-19 at 3 (Club for Growth).

31 AO 1988-02 at 2 (Chicago Board of Options Exchange II); see also 11 C.F.R. § 114.5.

32 AO 1981-05 at 2 (Findley).

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APPENDIX

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