* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 02-40944

Summary Calendar

_____________________

DEBORAH L. BRITTAIN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

TRANE AMERICAN STANDARD,

Defendant - Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No.: 6:01-CV-540

_________________________________________________________________ January 17, 2003

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Deborah L. Brittain appeals the dismissal of her action

against her employer, Trane American Standard. We AFFIRM.

I

Brittain was employed by Trane. After being absent from work

since October 1999, Brittain was discharged by Trane on May 5,

2000.

Brittain, proceeding pro se

, filed her complaint using a form

provided by the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Texas entitled “Complaint Under Title VII of the Civil2

Rights Act of 1964.” Paragraph 8 of the complaint form contains

blanks labeled “race,” “color,” “sex,” “r eligion,” and “national

origin,” for the plaintiff’s use in indicating the basis of the

alleged discrimination. It also contains blanks for the plaintiff

to indicate the adverse employment acti on taken by the employer.

Brittain checked the blank beside “terminated plaintiff’s

employment,” but did not check any of the blanks for race, color,

sex, religion, or national origin. Paragraph 9 of the form

complaint provides space for the plai ntiff to describe the

circumstances of the alleged discrimination. Brittain’s

allegations of discrimination consisted of the following:

Invasion of Privacy Act. Taking Information

from Computer Manually Cutting off Benefits

Before Time was up. Not offering FMLA time.

Breaking Department of Labor Laws. Not

excepting Letter of explaination from Dr. and

a rel ease form. Also Not taking An Unknown

date of return on a 44 wk. (S&A) Sickness and

Accident Benifits[.]

Paragraph 11 of the form complaint states that the charges filed

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission “are submitted as

a brief statement of the facts supporting this complaint.”

Included among the documents attached to the complaint was a copy

of Brittain’s EEOC charge, in which she stated that she “was

termin ated on May 5, 2000, due to my disability” and that she

believed she had “been discriminated against because of disability

in violation of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, as

ameneded [ sic ].”3

Also attached to the complaint was Brittain’s application for

a leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act. In that

application, Brittain stated that her disability began December 23,

1999. The portion of the form completed by her health care

provider stated her diagnosis as “rec urrent sinusitis and

bronchitis” and stated further that the date she could return to

work was unknown.

Also attached to the com plaint was a copy of a letter dated

July 12, 2000 (over two months after B rittain’s discharge) from

Brittain’s physician to Trane’s Personnel D epartment. In that

letter, Brittain’s physician stated that Britta in “had been

chronically ill with a hysterectomy in October of [19]99, followed

by persistent chronic sinusitis, very slow to resolve through March

of 2000,” that she had suffered from urinary incontinence on an

ongoing basis. He stated further that the primary reason for

Brittain’s absence from work fromMarch through June 2000 was

psychiatric, as s he suffered from anxiety and depression. In

addition, Brittain attached to the complaint a copy of a letter

written by her psychiatrist on June 11, 2001. The psychiatrist

stated in that letter that he had been treating Brittain since

December 27, 2000 for depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress

disorder.

Trane moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a

claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule4

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, for a more definite

statement. On February 5, 2002, the district court ordered

Brittain to file, within twenty days, an amended complaint stating

a cause of action, and to notify the court of the reason she failed

to timely file suit. The court warned Brittain that failure to

comply with either of those orders would result in the dismissal of

her action. In response, Brittain filed a handwritten document

entitled “Amended Complaint,” in which she stated:

In Response to your letter asking for Amended

Complaint to Civil Action No. 6:01CV540.

Complaint is Title VII the Americans with

disabilities Act. By my calculations your

honor the Right to sue letter was sent on Aug.

23, 2001 So from that day it was to be filed

by Nov. 27, 2001. I filed on Nov. 20, 2001 at

3:53 P.M. that was in the 90 day period of

filing the Civil Action Against Trane American

Standard. I have filed the Alleged Title VII

Act of a disability in this Civil Acti on to

the best of my knowledge in a appropriate time

frame . I have sent the letters and the

Dismissal Notice of Rights in With All the

other things that was filed on No v. 20,

2001[.]

A copy of Brittain’s original complaint, including the attachments,

was attached to Brittain’s “Amended Complaint.”

In an order entered on May 16, 2002, the district court noted

that B rittain’s letter adequately addressed the issue of the

timeliness of her suit, but that her letter “wholly fails to comply

with the court’s order that she file an amended complaint stating

a cause of action.” Accordingly, the district court dismissed5

Brittain’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Brittain filed a timely notice of appeal.

II

On appeal, Brittain is represented by counsel. Relying on the

EEOC charge attached to her original complaint, Brittai n argues

that her original complaint stated a claim under the Americans with

Disabilities Act. She also argues that she complied with the

district court’s order to file an amended complaint. Finally,

Brittain argues that, because she was proceeding pro se in the

district court, her complaint should have been construed liberally.

A c omplaint is required to contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” F E D

. R. C IV

. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give

the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” S wierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.

, 534

U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted “unless it appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

[her] claim that would entitle [her] to relief.” C onley v. Gibson

,

355 U.S . 41, 45-46 (1957). “In analyzing the complaint, we will

accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff.” G reat Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan

Stanley Dean Witter & Co. , 2002 WL 31600862, at *4 (5th Cir. Dec.6

9, 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We will

not, however, accept as true conclusory allegations or unwarranted

deductions of fact.” Id . (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted); see also ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk , 291

F.3d 336, 348 (5th Cir. 2002) (“conclusory allegations or legal

conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to

prevent dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).”). Although we construe p ro

se complaints liberally, such complaints nevertheless “mus t set

forth facts giving rise to a claim on which relief may be granted.”

Johnson v. Atkins , 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993).

Brittain’s original complaint did not comply with the simple

requirements of Rule 8(a), because it failed to give Trane fair

notice of her claims and the grounds upon which they rest. S ee

Sorema

, 534 U.S. at 514. Brittain’s complaint includes references

to Title VII, the “Invasion of Privacy Act,” “Department of Labor

Laws,” and the “FMLA” (Family Medical Leave Act). In addition, it

cont ains vague allegations regarding the denial of sickness and

a ccident benefits. The EEOC charge attached to the complaint

contains only conclusory allegations that Trane terminated

Brittain’s employment in violation of the Americans with

Disabilities A ct. Other attachments to the complaint seem to

allege violations of the Family Medical Leave Act. It is unclear

what Brittain is attempting to allege in her vague references to

“Taking Information from Computer Manually,” “Cutting off Benefits7

Before Time was up,” “Not excepting Letter of explaination from Dr.

and a release form,” and “Not taking An Unknown date of return on

a 44 wk. (S&A) Sickness and Accident Benifits[.]” In contrast, the

plaintiff in Sorema alleged that he was discharged because of his

national origin in violation of Title VII and because of his age in

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 534 U.S. at

514. In addition, “[h]is complaint detailed the events leading to

his termination, provided relevant dates, and included the ages and

nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved

with his termination.” Id

.

Despite the district court’s warning to Britta in that her

complaint would be dismissed unless she filed an amended complaint

stating a cause of action, she merely attached a co py of her

original complaint to a handwritt en letter to the district court

entitled “Amended Complaint.” Neither the original complaint nor

Brittain’s letter to the district court conta in coherent

allegations giving Trane fair notice of the basis for her claims.

Brittain does not contend that the district court should have

allowed her another opportu nity to amend her complaint prior to

dismissing it with prejudice. In any event, although Brittain is

represented by counsel on appeal, her appellate brief contains no

indication that she could prove any set of facts in support of her

claim that would entitle her to relief, even if she were given

another opportunity to amend her complaint.8

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district court

did not commit reversible error in dismissing Brittain’s complaint

for failure to stat e a claim upon which relief could be granted.

The judgment of the district court is, therefore,

A F F I R M E D.