2024 IL App (1st) 221101-U 

 Fourth Division

 Filed May 2, 2024 

 No. 1-22-1101 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent 

except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

LACOLE MURRAY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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) 

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) 

) 

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) 

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Appeal from the 

Circuit Court of Cook County 

No. 14 DV 75903 01 

The Honorable Laura Bertucci Smith, 

Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court. 

Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We reverse the denial of the defendant’s motion to vacate her plea where the motion 

was supported by the testimony of an expert in forensic clinical psychology.

¶ 2 LaCole Murray pleaded guilty to domestic battery (see 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 

2014)) and was sentenced to one year of probation. Murray appeals from the denial of her motion 

to withdraw that plea. We reverse, vacate her conviction, and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Murray was charged with domestic battery to a minor. It was alleged that on or about 

August 19, 2014, Murray slapped her 16-year-old son A.M.’s head with an open hand, punched 

him in the face with a closed hand, and choked him with both hands. The incident was witnessed 
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by a case worker from the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The case was 

eventually set for trial on March 17, 2015.

¶ 5 Emergency Order of Protection

¶ 6 The week before trial, on March 12, the parties appeared in court and defense counsel 

indicated that she would not be ready for trial because, based on discovery that had been tendered 

at the last court date and some other information she had received, she needed to interview two 

witnesses. The court struck the trial date and set the case for a status hearing on April 1.

¶ 7 After the conclusion of the hearing, A.M., who had come to the courthouse with his parents,

approached the prosecutor and asked to speak to him privately. After that conversation, and after 

Murray had left the courthouse to go to work, the case was recalled at the State’s request, and it 

filed a petition for an emergency order of protection. 

¶ 8 At the hearing that followed, A.M. testified that, in January 2015, Murray hit his arm twice 

using a belt after discovering a paper in his book bag saying that he had received an in-school 

suspension. A.M.’s father punched him in his chest and his arms and then grabbed him around the 

neck and choked him until he was dizzy. The day before Murray’s court appearance (i.e. March 11), 

A.M.’s father accused him of lying about the charged incident, and Murray told A.M.’s father to 

tell A.M. not to lie and to tell the truth. Murray also told A.M. that, if he wanted to start a war, he 

could start a war. Before coming to court that morning, A.M.’s father grabbed him by the neck

because he thought A.M. was taking too long to clean up a mess made by a dog. Also while at 

home that morning, Murray “was threatening to send [him] to a mental hospital and to have [him] 

locked up.” She also repeated her remark about starting a war. Then, at the courthouse, Murray 

whispered to him, “[G]ame on, b***,” as she walked past him to speak to her lawyer. After that 

remark, A.M. did not feel safe going home, so he spoke to the prosecutor privately. Murray’s public 

defender was in the courtroom and was permitted to cross-examine A.M. He testified on crossexamination that he did not want to live at home anymore and that he wanted to live with a friend 

whose parents wanted him to live there. He denied grabbing Murray and tackling her to the ground 
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during the charged incident, but he admitted pushing Murray over a couch during the January 2015 

incident. 

¶ 9 After hearing A.M.’s testimony, the court granted an emergency order of protection that 

would remain in effect until the April 1 status hearing.

¶ 10 Guilty Plea

¶ 11 On April 1, 2015, Murray’s counsel informed the court that Murray would plead guilty in 

exchange for a negotiated plea of one year of probation, a mental health evaluation, parenting 

classes, 100 hours of community service, and a one-year order of protection prohibiting Murray 

from having contact with A.M. and ordering her to stay away from him. Counsel represented that 

she had “extensively” advised Murray that there were “a lot of unknown consequences to agreeing 

to” the order of protection, that she would be giving up her right to ever possess a gun, and that 

she would have to “report as a violent offender for 10 years.” See 730 ILCS 154/10 (West 2014) 

(registration requirement under the Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration 

Act).

¶ 12 The trial court admonished Murray in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 

(eff. July 1, 2012). During the colloquy, Murray said she understood that she was charged with 

domestic battery, that she could be sentenced to probation, conditional discharge, or up to 364 days 

in jail, that she had a right to plead not guilty, that she had a right to a trial before a jury or a judge, 

and that by pleading guilty she was giving up her right to a trial, including her rights to see, hear, 

and question witnesses, present her own witnesses, and have the State prove her guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. She also said she understood that her guilty plea would require her to register 

“under the Violence Against Children Act [sic]” and that failing to do so would be a Class 4 felony.

When the court asked Murray whether she was pleading guilty of her own free will, she answered, 

“Yes.” The State presented, as a factual basis, that the evidence at trial would show that Murray 

slapped A.M. with an open hand, punched him in the face with a closed fist, and choked him with 

her hands around his neck. Finding that she understood the nature of the charge and the possible 
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penalties, that her plea was being given freely and voluntarily, and that a factual basis existed for 

the plea, the court accepted Murray’s plea and found her guilty of domestic battery.

¶ 13 The matter proceeded immediately to sentencing, and both sides rested on the plea 

agreement. The court then asked Murray if she wanted to make a statement before being sentenced. 

She responded as follows:

“THE DEFENDANT: Nothing—that, I just feel that my son is 

coerced, and I feel like I’m not going to win this trial because it’s been going 

on—the State never protected me in the beginning when I seeked help from 

them. That’s why the caseworker was there.

So I feel like I don’t have a winning—so I’m pleading guilty because I 

have two other kids at home. And all of this is causing a lot of issues with 

my [l]upus, my health, and everything. And it’s being taken away from my 

other two kids and they don’t deserve it. So if my son doesn’t want contact

with me, I give up. If he doesn’t want me to fight for his education and fight 

for him, I give up. 

So I’m guilty for that. And I accept my punishment. I accept my plea, 

and I’m guilty. I’m guilty for loving my child. Wanting my child to be in a 

great school. Wanting my child to do his all in school and be successful and 

productive in this world that black men is hard to strive in [sic]. I’m guilty 

for that. So I’m guilty. I’m guilty.” 

Murray’s statement prompted the following exchange with the court:

“THE COURT: Well, okay. You have—this is obviously your 

opportunity to say whatever you would like to say. You certainly—and you 

can plead guilty for whatever reason you wish to plead guilty. From what 

you said to me, it certainly sounds to me, like, you feel you may have some

sort of defense to this case. I don’t know if that’s true or not.

THE DEFENDANT: I’m tired. 
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THE COURT: But if you choose to take the State’s offer and plead 

guilty, you can do that for whatever reason you want to do that. And if 

you’re choosing to do that today, that’s fine. I will accept your plea. But you

understand, I’ve already gone through these rights, that you do have a right 

to have a trial and hold the State to prove the case beyond a reasonable 

doubt. You understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: No, the State has failed me already so— 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Could I just have a minute?

THE COURT: Ma’am, see when you say that, when you say the State, 

I’m talking about the State that’s prosecuting this case. The State’s 

Attorney’s Office right now on this case. All right?

THE DEFENDANT: I’m pleading. I’m pleading. I don’t— 

(Brief pause.)

THE COURT: Okay. So the one thing that I do want to say, is you 

understand that, you know, having a relationship with your son and any sort 

of contact with him is completely different from pleading guilty to a 

domestic battery charge to him.

THE DEFENDANT: That’s why this is going on because my son 

doesn’t want to live[1]

, I understand.

THE COURT: But you understand that—you understand that what 

we’re—I went through everything with you, I read you the charge?

THE DEFENDANT: I understand.

THE COURT: So you understand that we are dealing here today with 

the charge that you were charged with domestic battery to your son?

1

 Both the context of the case and her brief suggest that Murray was referring to her son’s desire 

not to live with her, not a wish to be dead.
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THE DEFENDANT: I understand.

THE COURT: And I understand there’s also an agreement to this 

Order of Protection, but regardless of that Order of Protection, this is—and 

in the contact or no contact with the child, that this, as I said, is a plea to the 

domestic battery charge.

THE DEFENDANT: I understand.

THE COURT: The Class A Misdemeanor. As I’ve already said to you 

through all of the admonishments I’ve given you. You understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: I understand.

THE COURT: All right. So is there anything else you want to say 

before I sentence you?

THE DEFENDANT: No.” 

In accordance with the plea bargain, the court then sentenced her to one year of probation and 

entered a plenary order of protection that was effective for one year and, among other things, 

ordered Murray to stay away from and not contact A.M. and prohibited her from visiting his school 

or residence.

¶ 14 Original Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea

¶ 15 About two weeks after the plea, on April 13, plea counsel appeared in court for Murray to 

ask for an order that would allow her to travel to Indiana for medical appointments. During the 

proceeding, counsel disclosed that, because the Calumet City Police Department did not provide a 

way to register as a violent offender against youth, Murray had been forced to comply with her 

registration requirement by registering as a sex offender, which could take as many as 60 days to 

get corrected in the state’s database.

¶ 16 On April 28, Murray, with assistance of counsel, filed a timely motion to withdraw her plea 

of guilty and vacate the judgment. The motion alleged first that, on the day she pleaded guilty, 

Murray had been “[p]hysically ill as well as mentally ill” as a consequence of learning that, after 
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her previous appearance in court, the State had obtained an ex parte emergency order of protection 

against her at the request of her son, who did not want to have any further contact with her. It 

alleged that, due to her “acute[]” lupus and the “emotional distress over the loss of her child,” 

Murray did not “fully comprehend” that she had a right to trial or a right to a hearing on a 

permanent order of protection. Second, the motion alleged that Murray did not fully understand 

the implications of her plea, including what it would mean to register as a violent offender and 

how that registration could impact her life, and that she would not have pleaded guilty “[h]ad she 

fully been advised of that by counsel.” Third, the motion alleged that Murray had a meritorious 

defense to the charge based on self-defense, which would be supported by evidence showing her 

son’s aggressive nature and previous instances of physical aggression against her. Along with the 

motion, counsel filed a Rule 604(d) certificate stating that she had consulted with Murray to 

ascertain her contentions of error in the plea of guilty, examined the court file and the transcript of 

the plea hearing, and prepared the motion to withdraw. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Feb. 16, 2013).

¶ 17 On June 29, 2015, a hearing was held on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Murray 

testified on direct examination that she was not in her “right mind” on the day she pleaded guilty.

She explained that, as a result of A.M. being “taken away from” her after the previous court date, 

she became very emotional and experienced a lupus flare-up that required her to go to the hospital. 

Murray testified that, when she entered her guilty plea, she did not understand the magnitude of 

her obligation to register as a violent offender against youth, including that it could have an effect 

on her career in accounting and finance. Murray also testified that the possibility of raising selfdefense was only mentioned “[a]t the last minute” and that she did not “fully” understand that she 

might have a meritorious defense. On cross-examination, Murray elaborated on her career 

concerns, testifying that she had not realized that being on the registry might cause her to lose her 

job—and thus her ability to support her children, including A.M.—once her employer conducted 

a thorough background check before transitioning her to a permanent role. When she testified that 

she was not sure whether her attorney fully understood the registration obligation and that she felt 

her attorney had not “properly educated” her about it, the court construed her to be claiming that 
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she had been denied the effective assistance of counsel, so it paused the proceedings and continued 

the hearing pending the appointment or assignment of a new attorney.

¶ 18 Modification of the Order of Protection

¶ 19 At a court appearance related to her probation in early August 2015, Murray informed the 

court that A.M. had been sent to, and then kicked out of, “Lincoln Challenge” and had nowhere to 

live because her uncle, with whom A.M. had been living, was refusing to take him back in. On 

August 19, plea counsel—who was still representing Murray on all matters other than the motion 

to withdraw the plea—filed an emergency motion to modify the order of protection. According to 

the motion and to statements made by counsel in court, since the order of protection’s entry, A.M. 

had lived first with Murray’s grandparents and then with her uncle before being sent to the Lincoln 

Challenge in Rantoul. On July 26, he left the Lincoln Challenge and went to a hospital before 

going to Murray’s home, where he spent the night. Murray’s uncle was now refusing to take A.M. 

back in, and his whereabouts were unknown, although Murray believed he was living with a friend. 

Murray had contacted DCFS, who had informed her that it could not help her locate A.M. or ensure 

that he was being housed. The motion also alleged that A.M. had contacted Murray online and in 

person at some point after the order of protection was entered and that he had returned to Murray’s 

home at least once since spending the night there on July 26. 

¶ 20 The court held a hearing on the motion to modify the order of protection on September 9. 

Murray called A.M., who testified that he did not want the order of protection to be in place, that 

he was not afraid of Murray or his father, and that he wanted to live with Murray and for her to be 

able to go to his school. On cross-examination, A.M. testified that he had been living at home with 

his parents for about two weeks and that there had been no incidents or problems. In response to a 

question from the court, A.M. explained why he had changed his mind about living with his 

parents:

“Q. Okay. So what made you decide—why did you change your 

mind? Why, why do you now feel like you can be safe in the house?
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A. I talked to my parents, and they’re the only people that can really 

take care of me until I’m 18. 

And I don’t want this—I’ve never wanted none of these charges against 

my mom. At the time I didn’t—I didn’t want to live with her because I 

wanted to do my own thing and stay with my friend, but now I see that’s not 

the best choice, and they’re the only people that can really take care of me. 

I really—really have my choice and interests or whatever if that make 

sense— 

Q. No, it makes sense. So you realize that it’s not easy to be out on 

your own as a 17 year old?

A. Yes.

¶ 21 The court inquired about DCFS’s involvement, and the assistant state’s attorney stated that 

DCFS had closed its investigation in December 2014 after finding that, despite an indication of 

abuse, the home was safe for A.M. “with minimal parental competency.” Based on that finding 

and A.M.’s testimony, the court struck the terms of the order of protection ordering Murray to stay 

away from A.M., not contact him, and not visit his school or residence, but the order still prohibited 

physical abuse, harassment, interference with personal liberty, and stalking.

¶ 22 Amended Motion to Withdraw the Plea

¶ 23 In June 2016, new counsel filed an amended motion to withdraw the plea and vacate the 

judgment. The amended motion alleged that Murray’s plea was not knowing and voluntary “in that 

she was physically and emotionally ill when she made her plea while also having an affirmative 

defense of self-defense.” It further alleged that Dr. Joan H. Leska, Psy.D., had examined Murray 

and opined that Murray’s “personal vulnerabilities and stressors surrounding her pleading guilty 

significantly compromised her cognitive abilities to think clearly, rationally and with forethought,” 

which meant that she “would have been unable to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntary plead 

guilty.” Counsel also filed a Rule 604(d) certificate specifying that she had consulted with Murray 
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“to ascertain her contentions of error in the entry of the plea of guilty.” The State filed a response 

arguing that the court had properly admonished Murray about her plea and that Murray’s “stress”

was not an adequate ground for permitting withdrawal. The court held a hearing on the amended 

motion in August 2016.

¶ 24 The primary witness at the hearing was Dr. Leska, who the parties stipulated was an expert 

in the field of forensic clinical psychology. Dr. Leska testified that she was asked to evaluate 

Murray to determine whether she had the ability to enter a guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily. She met with Murray for three hours to obtain her psychosocial, medical, and 

psychiatric history, to evaluate Murray’s psychosocial and emotional functioning at the time of the 

plea, and to investigate other stressors that may have been present in Murray’s life. She also spoke 

to plea counsel, reviewed contemporaneous medical records, and read the transcript from the plea 

hearing. 

¶ 25 Dr. Leska identified several “psychosocial stressors” that were affecting Murray when she 

pleaded guilty. The first was Murray’s arrest and subsequent prosecution for domestic battery. Not 

only was the charge a serious one, but she had never before been involved with the criminal justice 

system. The second was the prospect of enhanced charges. In the months after her arrest, Murray

had participated in services as directed by DCFS and believed that she would be able to “plea for 

probation.” That expectation was upset in January 2015 when her attorney told her that the State 

“wanted something else,” which Murray understood to mean filing more serious charges against 

her. The third was the events of March 12, 2015, about three weeks before the plea. Murray was 

already upset when she arrived at court because A.M. had been behaving aggressively and calling

her names at home. She was further upset when, in the hallway outside the courtroom, she got into 

a heated argument with the prosecutor and accused him of behaving unethically.2 When A.M. was 

2

 According to plea counsel, she advised Murray after the argument that the State might pursue 

more serious charges. It is not clear whether Murray misremembered the date when counsel 

advised her about the prospect of enhanced charges or whether the subject came up on two 

separate occasions.
No. 1-22-1101 

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taken away to a private room, Murray became so angry that she left the courthouse against the 

advice of her attorney, saying that she needed to go to work. According to Murray, these events 

overwhelmed her and left her feeling helpless. She told Dr. Leska that she “just wanted to give up 

and die.” By that point, she was having difficulty sleeping and eating, she was moody and irritable, 

and she felt like a failure. She began considering whether she should give up on A.M.—which she 

equated with no longer fighting in court—so she could focus on her other children. 

¶ 26 As part of her evaluation, Dr. Leska also spoke to plea counsel about Murray. According 

to plea counsel, at the start of the representation, Murray seemed to be organized, focused, credible, 

and a good self-advocate. Throughout the representation, Murray would frequently express feeling 

shocked, disturbed, and disappointed by the system. Murray was also prone to losing her temper, 

generally in response to some action taken by DCFS, which would prompt her to either start 

arguing with counsel or simply walk out of the room. Murray was often in bed when counsel called 

her, which Murray attributed to her lupus being aggravated by stress. Plea counsel also told Dr. 

Leska about what transpired on the day of Murray’s guilty plea. The matter had been set for status 

that day, but the State communicated a plea offer to counsel. Counsel passed the offer along to 

Murray and advised her to reject it, but Murray made up her mind to take the offer and plead guilty. 

She dismissed counsel’s efforts to discuss the plea—including its consequences—and refused to 

talk to counsel about other options she had. According to counsel, it was as though Murray was 

not hearing what she was saying. Instead, Murray was preoccupied with talking about what DCFS 

was saying about her, the State being against her, and how the system had failed her. 

¶ 27 Dr. Leska also testified that she had reviewed medical records documenting Murray’s 

hospital visits around the time of her plea. The records confirmed that she had been undergoing 

treatment for lupus at Rush University Medical Center since 2012. During a follow-up visit on 

March 17, 2015 (after the emergency order of protection was issued but before the guilty plea), 

Murray complained of fatigue, anxiety, and shortness of breath. There were indications in the 

records that Murray had visited the emergency room at some point in March or April 2015, but 

there were no details or records from that visit. The records of Murray’s visit on April 28, 2015, 
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included a physician’s note stating that she was prone to experiencing significant —and sometimes 

disproportionate—anxiety. The doctor prescribed her an antidepressant and advised her to follow 

up with her primary care physician for antianxiety medication.

¶ 28 Dr. Leska testified that, based on her evaluation, she concluded that the stressors present in 

Murray’s life at the time of her guilty plea “had affected her emotionally to the point where she 

was overwhelmed and anxious,” which “impaired her cognitive abilities so that she was unable 

to *** knowingly and intelligently plead guilty.” She explained that “there were really an 

extraordinary number of stressors that were going on in Ms. Murray’s life at the time,” which 

“were negatively affecting her emotionally and thus cognitively.” She noted that Murray’s 

cognitive impairment during that time period was evident in the medical record, her general 

behavior, and the transcript of the plea hearing, and she explained that the impairment was caused 

not only by the stressors themselves but by Murray’s “own personal vulnerabilities in terms of how 

she manages stress and how she copes with her emotions.” Dr. Leska therefore opined that, given 

the totality of the circumstances, Murray “would not have been able to knowingly and intelligently 

plead guilty to the offense of domestic battery” on the day of the plea hearing.

¶ 29 On cross-examination, Dr. Leska stated that she had testified as an expert witness in about 

450 cases, the majority of which were criminal. She acknowledged that she had never testified for 

the State. Dr. Leska agreed that she had not diagnosed Murray with any mental illnesses or 

deficiencies, and she described Murray’s apparent intellectual functioning as average. When asked 

whether Murray had not been truthful during the plea hearing when she said she understood the 

plea admonishments, Dr. Leska disagreed and explained that Murray’s answers to yes-or-no 

questions were less probative of her actual state of mind than her open-ended statement in 

allocution, which addressed matters that were peripheral or even irrelevant to the plea of guilty

such as her belief that her son had been coerced. 

¶ 30 In rebuttal, the State called plea counsel, who testified that she usually discussed with 

clients the benefits and drawbacks of any plea offers and the consequences of going to trial versus 

pleading guilty and believed that she had done so with Murray. Plea counsel also testified that, at 
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the plea hearing, the court admonished Murray about her guilty plea and that Murray indicated that 

she understood the admonishments.

¶ 31 After hearing argument, the trial court found that Murray had not met her burden of 

justifying why she should be permitted to withdraw her plea, and it denied the motion to withdraw.

¶ 32 Appeal from Denial of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

¶ 33 Murray appealed from the denial of her motion to withdraw and was appointed counsel, 

who filed a motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Finding that 

there was a nonfrivolous argument that the trial court erred when it rejected Dr. Leska’s 

uncontradicted testimony and noting that the trial court had not addressed Murray’s self-defense 

claim, we denied the motion to withdraw and ordered briefing. Murray was assigned a new 

attorney, who filed a brief that, in addition to raising the issue concerning Dr. Leska’s unrebutted 

testimony, argued that the attorney who filed the amended motion to withdraw had not filed a 

certificate in full compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Dec. 3, 2015). Without 

reaching the merits of the trial court’s rejection of the motion to withdraw, we remanded for strict 

compliance with Rule 604(d). People v. Murray, 2020 IL App (1st) 162748-U. 

¶ 34 Motion to Withdraw on Remand

¶ 35 Following remand, a private attorney appeared for Murray and filed a new motion to 

withdraw the guilty plea. The motion recited three grounds for withdrawal: (1) Murray did not 

fully understand the implications of her plea, particularly the registration requirement, and would 

not have pleaded guilty had plea counsel fully apprised her of the consequences; (2) Murray had a 

meritorious defense of self-defense, which would be supported by evidence that A.M. behaved 

aggressively and documentation showing that he had become physical with her on multiple other 

occasions; and (3) based on Dr. Leska’s opinion, Murray’s plea was not knowing and voluntary. 

Counsel filed a Rule 604(d) certificate, and the State filed a brief response contending, in effect, 

that the court had already rejected the same arguments.
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¶ 36 The court held a hearing on the motion on October 14, 2021. The parties stipulated to the 

testimony at the 2016 hearing on the amended motion to withdraw the plea and made brief 

arguments addressing Dr. Leska’s opinion. The court once again denied the motion to withdraw. 

Murray now appeals.

¶ 37 ANALYSIS

¶ 38 On appeal, Murray argues that the denial of her motion to vacate her plea should be 

reversed under the particular circumstances of her case, including the testimony of Dr. Leska that, 

insofar as multiple stressors were negatively affecting Murray physically, emotionally, and thus 

cognitively, at the time of her guilty plea, she did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 

plead guilty. She also contends that the possibility of raising self-defense was only brought to her 

attention “at the last minute” and, had she known she could raise that defense, she would not have 

pleaded guilty. 

¶ 39 A defendant who pleads guilty has no absolute right to withdraw the plea and has the burden 

of justifying any request to do so. People v. Canterbury, 313 Ill. App. 3d 914, 917 (2000). Due 

process, however, requires that a guilty plea be entered knowingly and voluntarily. People v. 

Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 370 (1999) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969)); 

see U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1; Ill. Const., art. I, § 2. A request to withdraw a guilty plea should 

be granted when the plea was based on a misunderstanding of the facts or the law or on 

misrepresentations by defense counsel. Canterbury, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 918. The defendant should 

also be permitted to withdraw a plea when there is doubt as to guilt, there is a defense worthy of 

consideration, or the ends of justice would be better served by having a trial. Id.

¶ 40 Whether to allow the defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is a decision committed to the 

trial court’s discretion, and our review is for an abuse of that discretion. Id. Generally, “[a]n abuse 

of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or 

where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Seymour v. Collins, 

2015 IL 118432, ¶ 41. Although that standard is highly deferential to the trial court’s decision, we 
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are mindful that the discretion to permit or reject a request to withdraw a guilty plea “ ‘should 

always be exercised in favor of innocence and liberty and in the light of the preference that is 

shown by law for a trial upon the merits by a jury.’ ” People v. McKirdie, 45 Ill. 2d 300, 302 (1970) 

(quoting People v. Morreale, 412 Ill. 528, 531 (1952)). “The withdrawal of the plea of guilty should 

not be denied in any case where it is evident that the ends of justice will be served by permitting 

the plea of not guilty in its stead.” People v. Jameson, 387 Ill. 367, 375 (1944); see also People v. 

Latsaras, 2022 IL App (3d) 190683-U, ¶ 14 (quoting Jameson).

¶ 41 The thrust of Murray’s argument is that Dr. Leska’s uncontradicted opinion demonstrated 

that her plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made as she was cognitively impaired due to the 

multiple stressors present in her life at the time of her plea and the impact of those stressors on her 

based on her individual psychological makeup. We agree.

¶ 42 Dr. Leska testified that, at the time of her guilty plea, Murray was not able to make a 

knowing and intelligent decision about whether to plead guilty. She explained that, although 

Murray had been able to give appropriate answers to yes-or-no questions during the plea colloquy, 

her statement in allocution revealed that “her thoughts were disorganized” and that “she was 

making irrational and irrelevant statements” and “bringing in all kinds of issues that were irrelevant 

to the plea.” Dr. Leska also testified that Murray’s cognitive dysfunction was the result of particular 

stressors present in her life, the most recent of which was learning that her son A.M. no longer 

wanted to live with her. Dr. Leska noted that, according to plea counsel, Murray reported that the 

stress was aggravating her lupus symptoms, which meant that she sometimes answered counsel’s 

phone calls from her bed. She also testified that records from Murray’s visits to her doctor on 

March 17 and April 28, 2015—on either side of her guilty plea—reflected that she was 

complaining of fatigue, anxiety, and shortness of breath, which Dr. Leska explained were physical 

manifestations of the stress that Murray was under. Dr. Leska also explained that the stressors in 

Murray’s life were “negatively affecting her emotionally and thus cognitively.” But it was not just 

the stressful events and circumstances themselves. It was also how they interacted with Murray’s 

particular psychological makeup. As noted by one of the doctors at Rush, Murray “had a propensity 
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for a great deal of anxiety and sometimes it was out of proportion to what the situation may be.” 

Dr. Leska explained that Murray’s cognitive abilities were “compromised” by both the 

circumstances of her life and “her own personal vulnerabilities in terms of how she manages stress 

and how she copes with her emotions and that sort of thing.” In other words, Murray’s unique 

psychological makeup meant that the effect of those stressors on her was much greater than it 

might have been for the average person. As a consequence of all of these circumstances unique to 

Murray and her life, Dr. Leska concluded that she would not have been able to knowingly and 

intelligently plead guilty. 

¶ 43 Having reviewed the transcript of the plea hearings, we find that nothing undermines Dr. 

Leska’s unrebutted opinion. 

¶ 44 The State contends that Dr. Leska’s opinion should be discounted because she failed to 

make a formal diagnosis of an intellectual disability, mental illness, or other psychological 

condition. Even so, Dr. Leska—an expert forensic psychologist—examined Murray, evaluated the 

available information from other sources about her cognitive functioning at the time of her plea 

deal, and concluded in light of her training and experience that Murray’s cognitive abilities were 

“compromised” at the time of her guilty plea. The State cites no authority holding that the absence 

of a formal diagnosis invalidates that considered expert opinion. 

¶ 45 The State also posits that, as a matter of law, psychological distress or emotional 

disturbance can never lead to a defendant being unable to make a knowing and intelligent decision 

to plead guilty. See People v. Jamison, 197 Ill. 2d 135, 157-58 (2001) (depression); People v. 

Bennett, 82 Ill. App. 3d 596, 600-01 (1980) (emotional upset and family pressure); People v. Jones, 

74 Ill. App. 3d 243, 245-46 (1979) (emotional strain). We observe that none of the cases cited by 

the State involved unrebutted expert testimony that there were significant factors preventing the 

defendant from being able to enter a knowing and intelligent plea. In Bennett and Jones, the 

defendants did no more than assert that their pleas were not entered knowingly and intelligently 

due to stress; there is no indication that those contentions were supported by expert testimony. See 

Bennett, 82 Ill. App. 3d at 598, Jones, 74 Ill. App. 3d at 245. In Jamison, the defendant’s claim that 
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medication he was taking for depression muddled his thinking and rendered his plea unknowing 

was supported by the testimony of a psychiatrist, but that expert witness only testified in general 

about the possible effects of the medication, never examined the defendant or reviewed his medical 

records, and apparently never opined as to the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the guilty 

plea. Jamison, 197 Ill. 2d at 148, 150. The only evidence about the defendant, specifically, came 

from his treating psychiatrist, who had testified that the medication did not appear to impair the 

defendant’s thinking. Id. at 146. In other words, as the court observed, “all of the psychiatric 

evidence indicated that [the] defendant *** was able to comprehend the consequences of his 

decision to plead guilty” (emphasis added). Id. at 157-58. The lesson to be taken from these cases 

is only that it is possible to knowingly and intelligently plead guilty even when under stress. It 

does not follow that there can be no circumstances under which a particular set of stressors, 

combined with complicating medical or psychological characteristics or other factors, might 

deprive a specific, individual defendant of the ability to knowingly and intelligently plead guilty, 

which is what Dr. Leska testified happened to Murray in this case.

¶ 46 We also reject the State’s argument that Murray’s refusal to consider any other options 

other than pleading guilty undermines Dr. Leska’s conclusion that Murray was not able to plead 

guilty knowingly and intelligently. Plea counsel’s account of Murray’s behavior on the day of the 

plea did not describe a person who had rationally resigned herself to pleading guilty. To the 

contrary, she characterized Murray as being unwilling to listen to reason. Plea counsel told Dr. 

Leska that Murray rejected her explicit advice not to take the plea deal and that, during their 

conversations that day, Murray “was not hearing her” and “refused to discuss any other options.” 

Instead, Murray was focused on “peripheral or irrelevant issues” involving DCFS, the state’s 

attorney’s office, and the “system,” which she thought “had failed her.” Based on plea counsel’s 

account, Dr. Leska explained that Murray “was not attending to” or “focusing on” her options in 

the criminal case, which showed “that she wasn’t really capable of ” considering those options or 

“rationally think[ing] about the consequences” of pleading guilty. That, in turn, obviously 

supported Dr. Leska’s opinion that the various stressors affecting Murray were impairing her 
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cognitive abilities to the point where she was not making a knowing and intelligent decision to 

plead guilty.

¶ 47 To this point, we have focused our analysis on Dr. Leska’s opinion. We think it important 

to recognize, however, that there are two other circumstances in this case that weighed in favor of 

allowing Murray to withdraw her plea. First, although her motions to withdraw and her testimony 

at the June 2015 hearing did not go into detail, Murray has repeatedly asserted that, were this 

matter to go to trial, she might be able to defeat the charge against her by raising self-defense, 

suggesting that she has a defense worthy of consideration. See Canterbury, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 918.

Second, it is apparent from the record that Murray pleaded guilty without thinking through the 

implications of being required to register as a violent offender against youth. In the days that 

followed her guilty plea, she realized that registration could affect her employability and her 

family’s economic security, and she filed a timely motion to withdraw the plea. Putting aside 

whether the plea was constitutionally valid as a technical matter, it is difficult to see how the 

interests of justice are served by holding Murray to a plea she entered—against the advice of 

counsel!—when she had not fully contemplated its ramifications. We need not decide whether 

these two circumstances would have, in and of themselves, required allowing the motion to 

withdraw. These circumstances, combined with Dr. Leska’s unrebutted expert opinion, leave us 

with the firm conviction that Murray should have been allowed to withdraw her guilty plea. 

¶ 48 A plea of guilty is not valid unless “the plea was entered intelligently and with full 

knowledge of its consequences.” People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 184 (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. 

at 240-244). Just as importantly, when a defendant asks to withdraw a plea, the court should always 

exercise its discretion in favor of innocence, liberty, and the fundamental right to hold the State to 

the burden of proving its allegations beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial. See McKirdie, 45 Ill. 2d 

at 302 (quoting People v. Morreale, 412 Ill. at 531). In this case, Dr. Leska testified without 

contradiction that, on April 1, 2015, Murray was not able to make the life-changing decision to 

plead guilty knowingly and intelligently. Furthermore, Murray had a potentially meritorious 
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defense. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, and in light of the law’s preference 

for a trial on the merits, we hold that the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea was in error. 

¶ 49 CONCLUSION

¶ 50 We reverse the trial court’s denial of Murray’s motion to withdraw her plea, vacate her 

conviction, and remand for further proceedings. 

¶ 51 Reversed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.