United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on 

Readiness, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

MILITARY TRAINING 

Management Actions 

Needed to Enhance 

DOD’s Investment in 

the Joint National 

Training Capability 

August 2006 

 

GAO-06-802 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

August 2006

MILITARY TRAINING

Management Actions Needed to Enhance 

DOD’s Investment in the Joint National 

Training Capability 

Highlights of GAO-06-802, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee 

on Armed Services, House of

Representatives 

The extent to which the JNTC initiative is improving joint training overall is 

unclear because DOD has not yet assessed the program’s results; however, 

GAO’s review of five JNTC-enhanced training events found indications of 

some joint training improvements. Prior GAO work and the 2006

Quadrennial Defense Review Report have stressed the importance of 

performance metrics to gauge program success. While DOD’s initial training

transformation assessment set a basic framework for measuring future 

program performance, DOD has not developed a strategy to evaluate the 

overall impact of the JNTC initiative that includes metrics, time frames, and 

processes for gathering data. Without such a plan, DOD will not know 

whether the money invested in the initiative will produce desired results or 

maximize the benefit for the investment. 

Reserve units have participated in JNTC training events, but the unique 

training needs of the reserve components have not been fully considered 

because Joint Forces Command has not established an ongoing working 

relationship with them. The Training Transformation Strategic Plan 

recognizes that the reserve components face unique training requirements 

and circumstances that must be considered. However, the command has not 

established a liaison position for any of the reserve components and has not 

included the reserve components in working groups and planning sessions, 

as it has done with the active service components and the combatant 

commands. Until the command incorporates the reserves more fully into the 

JNTC initiative, the reserve components will continue to have limited ability 

to enhance their joint training skills. 

The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop an accreditation process 

to facilitate the JNTC initiative’s goals, but it has not emphasized new and 

emerging missions, taken steps to ensure that accredited joint tasks will 

continue in future training rotations, or incorporated the National Guard. 

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report declares that training 

transformation should emphasize new and emerging mission areas, such as 

irregular warfare and combating weapons of mass destruction. The Joint 

Forces Command has allowed services and combatant commands to 

nominate existing training programs to be accredited, but these programs 

may not reflect the priorities established in the Quadrennial Defense Review 

Report because nomination guidance does not emphasize the need to 

accredit programs that will improve proficiency in new and emerging 

mission areas. Further, no training programs specific to the National Guard 

are currently being considered for accreditation. Until the department 

establishes nomination guidance and reaccreditation standards and includes 

the National Guard in the accreditation process, JNTC events may not reflect

DOD’s training priorities, the services may not continually incorporate JNTC 

enhancements into their training exercises, and the National Guard will 

continue to have limited ability to enhance its joint training skills. 

The Department of Defense (DOD)

established its Training

Transformation Program to ensure

combatant commanders that forces

deploying to their theaters have

had experience operating jointly. 

The centerpiece of this effort is the

Joint National Training Capability 

(JNTC) initiative, which accounts

for 84 percent of the $2 billion the

department plans to invest by 2011 

to provide a persistent global

network that will increase the level 

of joint training. 

GAO assessed the extent to which

(1) JNTC has improved the ability 

of the services and combatant 

commands to train jointly, (2) the 

reserve components are benefiting 

from the JNTC initiative, and 

(3) the Joint Forces Command has 

developed an accreditation process

to facilitate program goals. To 

address these objectives, GAO 

obtained and analyzed key DOD 

and JNTC documents. GAO also 

reviewed and analyzed 5 of 16

events selected in 2005 as JNTC 

training events, and observed 2 of 

those events firsthand.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Defense take a 

number of actions to further 

enhance the quality of joint training

for active and reserve components. 

In response to a draft of this report, 

DOD generally agreed with GAO’s

recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-802.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Janet St. 

Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or 

stlaurentj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on 

Training Programs, but Our Analysis Found Indications of 

Improvements 9

Reserve Components Have Potentially Benefited from JNTC, but 

Joint Forces Command Has Not Fully Embraced the Reserves’ 

Unique Training Needs 18 

JNTC Training Program Accreditation Process Does Not Give 

Priority to New and Emerging Missions, Ensure Consistent Use 

of JNTC Capabilities, or Include the National Guard 22 

Conclusions 30

Recommendations for Executive Action 30 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 31 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 34 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 37 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 41 

Related GAO Products 42 

Tables 

Table 1: Description of the Five Training Exercises Examined 13 

Table 2: Analysis of Attributes Indicating Potential Improvements 

in Joint Training for Five JNTC-Enhanced Exercises in 

Fiscal Year 2005 15 

Table 3: Programs Accredited in Fiscal Year 2005 and Nominated 

for Accreditation in Fiscal Year 2006 26 

Table 4: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment 36 

Page i GAO-06-802 Military Training
Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

JNTC Joint National Training Capability 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-06-802 Military Training
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

August 11, 2006 

The Honorable Joel Hefley 

Chairman 

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Readiness 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Effective joint operations are fundamental to the ability of the U.S. military 

to decisively defeat its adversaries, and the Secretary of Defense has 

stated that in the new and evolving security environment, “Achieving

jointness in wartime requires building jointness in peacetime.” In the 2001

Quadrennial Defense Review Report,

1

 Department of Defense (DOD) 

leadership emphasized that meeting the challenges of an uncertain 

security environment would require transformations in education and 

training. The Defense Planning Guidance 2003-2007 directed the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to work with the 

services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combatant 

Commander of the Joint Forces Command to develop a plan for 

transforming military training that would better enable joint force 

operations. Consequently, the department created the Training 

Transformation Program, which is focused on providing dynamic, 

capabilities-based education and training for DOD in support of national 

security requirements across the full spectrum of service (active and 

reserve components), joint, interagency, intergovernmental (state and 

local), and multinational operations. The ultimate goal of DOD’s training 

transformation is to provide combatant commanders with better-prepared 

individuals, units, staffs, and organizations that are aligned with their joint 

operational needs.

DOD plans to invest almost $2 billion in the Training Transformation 

Program by 2011. The centerpiece of this effort is the Joint Forces 

Command’s Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) initiative, which 

accounts for 84 percent of the department’s planned spending. The 

primary goal of the initiative is to provide a persistent global network of 

 1

 The Quadrennial Defense Review is a congressionally imposed DOD effort to be 

conducted every 4 years to set defense strategy and goals. 

Page 1 GAO-06-802 Military Training
live, virtual, and constructive capabilities2

 that will enhance the level of 

joint training in existing service and combatant command training 

programs. The JNTC initiative is expected to enhance the joint operational 

environment by providing more specific guidance on conducting joint 

mission essential tasks,3

 creating a persistent joint communication 

network to support joint training with more virtual and constructive 

capability, and accrediting training programs to ensure the appropriate 

joint environment exists. The initiative expects to have established a 

global network of accredited joint training programs across the services 

and combatant commands by 2010. 

You asked us to review the JNTC initiative’s implementation. Specifically, 

we assessed (1) the extent to which the JNTC initiative has improved the 

ability of the services and combatant commands to train jointly, (2) the 

extent to which the reserve components are benefiting from the JNTC 

initiative, and (3) the extent to which the Joint Forces Command has 

developed an accreditation process to facilitate program goals. 

To address the above objectives, we obtained and analyzed key DOD and 

JNTC documents, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2006

revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan and the JNTC 

initiative strategic plan. We reviewed and analyzed 5 of 16 combatant 

command and service training events that were selected in 2005 as JNTC 

training events. Our analysis evaluated a number of attributes for each of

these training events to determine the extent to which the JNTC initiative 

enhanced their joint training capability. Additionally, we observed two of

the selected events firsthand to obtain a real-time assessment of the past 

and planned evolution of the exercises and feedback from exercise 

participants, including the planners, on the extent of joint training. We also 

met with key officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the 

Joint Staff, as well as officials from the combatant commands and service 

organizations that are affected by the JNTC initiative. Additionally, we 

examined the extent to which the reserve components participated in

selected training events enhanced by the JNTC initiative and formal 

collaboration mechanisms, as well as the development and initial 

implementation of the JNTC initiative’s accreditation process. We also 

 2

 “Live training” refers to live simulations involving real people operating real systems in a 

live environment. “Virtual training” involves virtual simulations using real people operating 

simulated systems. “Constructive training” refers to simulated people operating simulated 

systems, often referred to as war games. 

3

 Joint mission essential tasks are tasks selected by a joint force commander deemed 

essential to mission accomplishment and defined using the common, universal language. 

Page 2 GAO-06-802 Military Training
interviewed key National Guard and reserve component officials to further 

evaluate the benefits that the reserve components derive from the JNTC 

initiative. We discussed our methods and assumptions with agency 

officials to obtain their input, and we also assessed the quality of 

information and determined that it was sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes. We performed this review from August 2005 through May 2006 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Further information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I. 

DOD does not know the extent to which the JNTC initiative has improved 

the services’ and combatant commands’ ability to train jointly because it

has not yet assessed the program’s impact. Our analysis of five service and 

combatant command training events selected to be enhanced by the JNTC 

initiative provided some indications of potential improvements in joint 

training. However, the department’s first assessment of the Training 

Transformation Program in 2005 did not include an evaluation of the 

collective impact of the JNTC initiative on joint training because the 

initiative is still early in its implementation. Instead, the department has 

established a basic framework for measuring the performance of joint 

training in future assessments. However, the department has not finalized 

a plan for its 2007 training transformation assessment that includes 

metrics, processes it will employ, and time frames for obtaining data. Our 

prior work has stressed the importance of performance metrics that set up

time frames and measurable outcomes to gauge the success of a program’s 

implementation. The department’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 

Report also emphasizes that to ensure the department’s objectives are 

being met, each organization is accountable for measuring performance 

and delivering results that support the departmentwide strategy. 

Furthermore, the Training Transformation Plan requires periodic reviews 

to measure the impact of training transformation initiatives, including the 

JNTC initiative, on joint training. The training events we analyzed from 

fiscal year 2005 provided indications of improved joint training, such as 

more joint objectives than the prior year’s exercises and more 

participation by other services. For example, one Air Force exercise we 

reviewed focused on achieving service-specific objectives before being 

enhanced by the JNTC initiative. Since then, these objectives were 

modified to include some joint training objectives. However, without a 

strategy that clearly identifies how the department’s next training 

transformation assessment will evaluate the impact the JNTC initiative is 

having on military joint training, the department will not be in a position to 

know whether the money invested in the initiative will produce the desired 

results or maximize the benefit for the investment. To support the efforts 

of the Joint Forces Command to enhance the level of joint training, we 

Results in Brief 

Page 3 GAO-06-802 Military Training
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness to fully develop a strategy for the 

next training transformation assessment to evaluate the overall impact of

the JNTC initiative’s implementation on joint training, including time 

frames, outcome-oriented performance metrics, roles and responsibilities, 

and outcomes. DOD agreed with this recommendation and stated it is 

taking actions to implement it. 

Through the participation of selected units and individuals in JNTCenhanced events, the reserve components have benefited from the JNTC 

initiative, but the unique training needs of the reserve components have 

not been fully considered because Joint Forces Command has not 

established an ongoing working relationship with them. According to Joint 

Forces Command officials, the command has not established a liaison 

position for any of the reserve components and has not included the 

reserve components in working groups and planning sessions, as it has 

done with the active service components and the combatant commands. 

According to service and reserve officials, the initiative’s process action 

teams, which are responsible for joint program coordination, are 

composed of representatives from the services and combatant commands 

but do not receive input from any of the reserve components. The Training 

Transformation Strategic Plan recognizes that the reserve components 

face several unique training requirements and circumstances that must be 

considered at each step of this process, from strategic planning through 

implementation. For example, compared to active duty service members, 

reservists and National Guard members generally have less time to train, 

less access to current technologies, and an additional responsibility to 

conduct joint domestic missions related to homeland defense. Until the 

Joint Forces Command incorporates the reserve components more fully 

into the JNTC initiative, the reserve components will continue to have 

limited ability to enhance their joint training skills. To increase the 

benefits of joint training programs for the reserve components, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Forces 

Command to establish liaison officers for the reserve components and 

include representatives from the reserve components as active 

participants in JNTC initiative working groups and planning sessions. DOD 

partially concurred with this recommendation, agreeing a liaison position 

was needed for the National Guard, but that the current service liaison 

structure was adequate to represent the other reserve components. We 

continue to believe that the entire reserve component would benefit if they 

had a more active voice in JNTC working groups and planning sessions. 

The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop a process for accrediting

active service and combatant command training programs to facilitate the 

Page 4 GAO-06-802 Military Training
goals of the JNTC initiative, but it has not emphasized new and emerging 

missions, taken steps to ensure that accredited joint tasks will continue to

be incorporated into future training rotations after programs complete 

initial accreditation, or accredited any National Guard-specific training 

programs. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report declares that 

training transformation should emphasize new and emerging mission 

areas, such as irregular warfare, complex stabilization operations, 

combating weapons of mass destruction, and information operations. The 

JNTC accreditation process is intended to ensure that all units 

participating in joint training, regardless of location, experience a 

recurring, consistent, realistic training environment. The Joint Forces 

Command has allowed active services and combatant commands to 

nominate specific joint tasks within their existing training programs to be 

accredited. During fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command 

conditionally accredited joint tasks in 4 training programs and plans to 

grant accreditation to tasks in as many as 23 additional programs during 

2006. However, the Joint Forces Command’s nomination guidance does 

not emphasize the need to accredit service and combatant commander 

training programs that will improve proficiency in new and emerging 

mission areas. Currently, in some instances, nominations for accreditation 

are based on the services’ needs to enhance joint training for the 

maximum number of participants. In addition, the Joint Forces Command 

plans to reaccredit programs every 3 years, but the command has not 

established standards or a process for reaccreditation that would ensure 

that service and combatant command training programs continuously 

incorporate and expand upon previously accredited joint training tasks. 

Further, no training programs specific to the National Guard are currently

being considered for accreditation by the Joint Forces Command because

there is no mechanism in place for nominating them. For example, the 

National Guard has approached the Joint Forces Command to accredit its 

Vigilant Guard exercise program outside the normal nomination process 

because there is not a mechanism in place that allows the National Guard 

to nominate programs. Currently, this request is being discussed by Joint 

Forces Command and National Guard leadership. Until the department 

establishes nomination guidance and reaccreditation standards, JNTC 

events may not reflect DOD’s training priorities and the services and 

combatant commands may not continually incorporate JNTC 

enhancements into future rotations of their training exercises.

Additionally, until Joint Forces Command incorporates the National Guard 

into the accreditation process, the National Guard training programs may 

not be able to take full advantage of JNTC resources, such as participation 

from other components, access to new technologies and modeling, and 

training environments that realistically portray overseas and domestic 

joint operations. To support the efforts of the Joint Forces Command to 

Page 5 GAO-06-802 Military Training
enhance the level of joint training and to increase the benefits of joint 

training programs for the reserve components, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 

and Readiness to (1) establish guidelines for the services and combatant 

commands to follow when nominating programs for future accreditation 

that reflect the importance of new and emerging missions, as emphasized 

by DOD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report; (2) establish 

reaccreditation standards and criteria that will ensure that a recurring, 

consistent, realistic joint training environment exists for all units 

participating in future rotations of accredited joint training programs; and 

(3) expand the accreditation process to include National Guard training 

programs. DOD agreed with these recommendations and is planning 

actions to implement them. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall

responsibility for the Training Transformation Program and, through the 

use of the Training Transformation Executive Steering Group and the 

Training Transformation Senior Advisory Group, oversees the execution of

three capabilities or initiatives: JNTC, the Joint Knowledge Development 

and Distribution Capability, and the Joint Assessment and Enabling 

Capability. According to the 2006 Training Transformation 

Implementation Plan,

4

 these 3 initiatives are designed to prepare 

individuals, units, and staff for the new strategic environment and to 

provide enabling tools and processes to carry out joint missions. 

Specifically:

Background 

• The JNTC, focusing on collective training, is expected to prepare forces 

by providing units and command staff with integrated live, virtual, and 

constructive training environments. This initiative would add enhanced 

service and combatant command training that emphasizes jointness 

and enables global training and mission rehearsal in support of 

combatant command operations. 

• The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability, which 

focuses on individual training, is intended to prepare future decision 

makers and leaders to better understand joint operations and the 

common operational picture, as well as to respond innovatively to 

adversaries. It develops and distributes joint knowledge via a dynamic, 

global-knowledge network that provides immediate access to joint 

education and training resources. 

 4

 Department of Defense, Training Transformation Implementation Plan, 2006 – 2011

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006). 

Page 6 GAO-06-802 Military Training
• The Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability is expected to assist 

leaders in assessing the value of transformational training initiatives to 

individuals, organizations, and processes, and to link the impact of the 

Training Transformation Program to combatant commanders’

readiness requirements. This initiative is also supposed to provide the 

processes and tools to continuously improve joint training. 

The JNTC initiative, the leading initiative for training transformation, is 

managed by a Joint Management Office within the Joint Forces 

Command’s Joint Trainer Directorate. This Joint Management Office, 

which was established in 2003, manages the operational, technical and

program resources necessary to implement the initiative. The Joint 

Management Office coordinates its management efforts of the initiative 

with the Office of the Secretary of Defense through senior and executive 

advisory groups. The overall purpose of the JNTC initiative is to provide a 

persistent capability to combatant command and service training 

programs to create an appropriate, realistic joint operating environment 

within their existing training activities. To accomplish this, DOD plans to

spend about $1.5 billion on the JNTC initiative through fiscal year 2011, or

84 percent of training transformation total funding. The JNTC initiative 

was deemed by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness to 

be operationally capable in October 2004—indicating that the initial 

infrastructure of networked sites and systems needed to enhance the joint

environment of training exercises was in place. During fiscal year 2005, 16

combatant command and service training events were selected by the 

Joint Forces Command to enhance their joint training environment 

through the JNTC initiative. 

The JNTC initiative includes several key efforts to enhance the joint 

training environment of combatant commands and services. These efforts 

include the following: 

• Development of joint task articles. This is an effort to enhance the 

level of details associated with joint mission essential tasks that are 

identified by the combatant commands as critical to joint operations, 

and to provide joint trainers specific guidance for developing exercises 

and other joint training activities. These task articles are a set of 

processes, procedures, or actions that address critical horizontal 

(actions between services) and vertical (actions between a service and 

a higher joint force command) elements of interoperability for specific 

joint mission essential tasks. Currently, the JNTC initiative has 

developed 156 approved articles and has 88 under various stages of 

development. 

Page 7 GAO-06-802 Military Training
• Joint training and experimentation network. The joint network is 

intended to be a large-capacity communications network that will 

provide persistent support to joint training exercises, service standalone events, exercise preparation and rehearsal, experimentation, 

evaluation of advanced training technologies, and evaluation of new 

warfighting concepts. The network, when complete, will enable the 

Joint Forces Command to use live, virtual, and constructive 

simulations in concert to enhance the joint training environment for 

combatant commands and services. By the end of fiscal year 2005, the 

joint network had been expanded to 33 sites, including one in Hawaii 

and one in Germany. 

• Accreditation and certification programs. The JNTC accreditation 

program works toward ensuring that combatant command and service 

joint training programs include the appropriate joint environment for 

the joint tasks being trained. Accreditation is program-centric, whereby 

entire service and combatant command training programs are 

evaluated and accredited for training selected joint tasks in a joint 

environment that meets specific joint standards or conditions. The 

intent of this effort is to establish a process that ensures delivery of a 

recurring, consistent, realistic training environment for all units 

participating in joint training, regardless of the locations from which 

they are participating. The Joint Forces Command accredited 4 training 

programs during fiscal year 2005 and is expecting to accredit 23 more 

programs during 2006. JNTC’s certification effort concurrently ensures 

that the technical aspects of the training programs—the sites and the 

systems comprising the training infrastructure, networks, and ranges—

support the accredited training program. 

The JNTC initiative, now 1 year after being deemed initially operational 

capable, is expected to reach full operational capability in 2010 when it 

will provide a global joint training network that allows live, virtual, and 

constructive participation by services, combatant commands, and 

coalition and interagency partners in accredited training programs. 

Page 8 GAO-06-802 Military Training
The full extent to which the JNTC initiative has improved the ability of the 

services and combatant commands to train jointly is not clear because 

DOD has not yet assessed the full impact of the JNTC initiative efforts on 

joint training or developed a strategy for conducting such an assessment. 

Based on our examination of 5 of the 16 fiscal year 2005 exercises that the 

Joint Forces Command helped to fund and enhance through the JNTC 

initiative, we found indications that the JNTC initiative has begun to 

improve joint training. Examples we found include increases in the use of 

joint objectives and increases in participation by other services. Without a 

comprehensive assessment of the JNTC initiative’s enhancement of joint 

training programs, DOD has no assurance that its investment in the 

initiative will produce the desired results. 

DOD has not yet assessed the full impact of JNTC efforts on joint training; 

therefore both the overall impact the JNTC initiative is having on joint 

training programs and the extent to which it is achieving the program’s 

goals are unclear. The Training Transformation Implementation Plan does 

not include a requirement for the JNTC Joint Management Office to assess

whether the JNTC initiative has improved the ability of the services and 

combatant commands to train jointly. The JNTC Joint Management Office 

receives feedback through working with the services and combatant 

commands, but no formal evaluation of JNTC efforts has been conducted. 

The individual services and combatant commanders are aware of JNTC 

enhancements to their specific training programs and resulting 

improvements and are documenting some of these enhancements in after 

action reports and lessons learned reports. For example, the Navy’s 

preliminary assessment of its Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint 05-2 

exercise stated that the value added through rapid delivery and improved 

interoperability and repeatability of the Fleet Synthetic training capability 

and the joint network will save operating costs while providing quality 

joint and coalition training to the warfighter. Additionally, as a result of a 

lesson learned during Terminal Fury 05, JNTC funds were used to develop

an analytical tool that enabled analysts to search through recorded 

exercise model data and replay selected training exercises, which helped 

explain to the exercise control group and the training audience how and 

why a particular event occurred. However, these types of reports do not 

provide an overall assessment of the collective impact JNTC efforts are 

having on joint training. 

DOD Has Yet to 

Assess the Overall 

Impact of the JNTC 

Initiative on Training 

Programs, but Our 

Analysis Found 

Indications of 

Improvements 

DOD Has Yet to Assess the 

Overall Impact of the 

JNTC Initiative on Training 

Programs 

DOD’s most recent assessment of its training transformation efforts, 

conducted by the Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability in support of 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 

is known as the training transformation block assessment. This block 

Page 9 GAO-06-802 Military Training
assessment, conducted for the first time in 2005, is the primary mechanism 

for providing feedback to senior DOD leadership on how well DOD is 

meeting its training transformation goals. The block assessment is to 

provide an assessment every 2 years that measures, guides, and evaluates

the progress of the training transformation initiatives, including the JNTC 

initiative. These evaluations are intended by DOD to be an innovative use

of performance assessment tools, techniques, and policies, using welldefined metrics to provide a feedback capability to the leadership. 

Additionally, DOD recently announced its plans to conduct a Joint 

Training Program Review during mid-2006 to examine training 

transformation efforts and to realign these efforts with the recent 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report and program strategic guidance. 

Our prior work,5

 the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and 

DOD’s Training Transformation Implementation Plan emphasize the 

importance of establishing performance metrics that set up time frames 

and measurable outcomes to gauge the success of a program 

implementation. GAO’s Human Capital: A Guide on Assessing Strategic

Training Programs and Development Efforts in the Federal Government

emphasizes the importance of using program performance information to 

assess the progress that training and development programs make toward 

achieving results. The guide states that agencies should keep in mind that 

they need to collect data corresponding to established training objectives 

throughout the implementation process to refine and continually improve, 

deliver, and enhance learning. Furthermore, the guide asserts that it is 

important for agencies to develop and use outcome-oriented performance 

measures to ensure accountability and to assess progress toward 

achieving results aligned with the agencies’ missions and goals. The 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report emphasizes that each initiative is 

accountable for measuring performance and delivering results that 

support the departmentwide strategy. DOD’s Training Transformation 

Implementation Plan requires periodic reviews to assess the success of 

its Training Transformation Program. According to the plan, every 2 years, 

a formal program assessment should be conducted to measure the impact 

of training transformation initiatives on joint force readiness. The results 

of those assessments are intended to help leaders decide strategy 

modifications and subsequent investments. 

 5

 GAO, Human Capital: A Guide on Assessing Strategic Training Programs and 

Development Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G (Washington, D.C.: March

2004). 

Page 10 GAO-06-802 Military Training
DOD’s initial 2005 training transformation block assessment did not 

evaluate the JNTC initiative’s collective impact on joint training. 

According to DOD officials, this assessment was not expected to provide a 

comprehensive evaluation of the JNTC initiative’s impact on joint training

because the initiative is still early in its implementation. Instead, it served 

as a baseline or framework for identifying joint training measurements for 

future assessments, and provided a status of the JNTC initiative’s efforts 

implemented to date. However, the 2005 assessment did not address 

training efficiency measured by specific cost, schedule, and outcomeoriented performance metrics. Specifically, the 2005 assessment 

highlighted some progress: (1) the JNTC initiative is providing more joint 

training through accreditation and certification; (2) combatant command 

joint mission essential tasks are addressed in events and integrated into

training objectives for each event; and (3) rapidly configurable, persistent 

training networks, such as the Joint Training and Experimentation 

Network, are a current reality and are being improved. However, the 2005 

Training Transformation Assessment Report noted that because of a 

wide variation of joint training activities, the task of developing metrics 

that supported effective assessment and corresponding program status 

progress was unduly complicated. 

The 2005 block assessment did identify 10 metrics DOD is considering for 

its future assessments, such as the 2007 block assessment. These metrics 

include the percentage of combatant command joint mission essential 

tasks trained in the joint exercise; the number of programs accredited and

certified; and the number of participants using JNTC resources. However, 

many of these metrics are output oriented and not outcome performance 

measures, which are necessary to gauge the success of program 

implementation. Additionally, one of the block assessment’s 

recommendations is to institutionalize a process to develop metrics for 

training transformation exercises for use in future assessments. However, 

it has not finalized its plans for which metrics are to be assessed or 

identified the time frames and processes it will employ for obtaining data. 

Because DOD has not finalized its metrics or identified a process to collect 

the data, training transformation officials stated that it may be difficult to

show the impact of JNTC efforts on joint training even in the 2007 block 

assessment. Without a comprehensive assessment of JNTC’s enhancement

of joint training programs, DOD has no assurance that the money invested 

in the JNTC initiative will produce the desired results of providing 

combatant commanders with better prepared forces aligned with their 

joint operational needs or maximize the benefit for DOD’s investment. 

Page 11 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Even though DOD has yet to assess the overall impact of the JNTC 

initiative on joint training, our analysis found indications of potential 

improvements, such as events that include more joint objectives and allow

for more joint participation. 

Indications Are That the 

JNTC Initiative Has Begun 

to Improve Joint Training 

According to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction,6

 joint training 

is defined as “Military training based on joint doctrine or joint tactics, 

techniques, and procedures to prepare joint forces and/or joint staff to 

respond to strategic and operational requirements deemed necessary by 

combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. Joint training

involves forces of two or more Military Departments interacting with a 

combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander; involves 

joint forces and/or joint staffs; and is conducted using joint doctrine or 

joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.” 

Based on this definition, we selected several attributes to evaluate the 

effect the JNTC initiative had on joint training. Specifically, we determined 

whether selected JNTC events conducted in 2005 reflected the following: 

• increased use of joint training objectives, 

• increased use of joint task articles, 

• increased involvement of other services, 

• increased use of virtual and constructive training capabilities, and 

• persistent capabilities added to exercises funded by the JNTC 

initiative. 

DOD officials reviewed the attributes listed above and agreed their use 

was appropriate in evaluating the effect of the JNTC initiative on joint 

training. 

We analyzed 5 of 16 exercises conducted in fiscal year 2005 that the Joint 

Forces Command helped to fund and enhance through the JNTC initiative. 

Table 1 describes the exercises selected for our analysis. 

 6

 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01C, Joint Training Policy and 

Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

Page 12 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Table 1: Description of the Five Training Exercises Examined

Exercise Description

Terminal Fury Terminal Fury is a combatant command exercise designed to 

train and evaluate the staff of the Pacific Command 

Headquarters and one of its joint task forces in conducting 

crisis action planning. The exercise makes extensive use of 

constructive models. The only live participants in the exercise

are the staff of the Pacific Command Headquarters and the

staff of the Joint Task Force. 

Air Warrior I Air Warrior I is a live exercise designed to train aircrews and

ground personnel in the planning and execution of close air 

support. The Air Force’s aircraft deploy to and operate from 

Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. The Air Force ground units 

involved in coordinating the close air support attacks deploy

to and operate with their associated Army units at Fort Irwin, 

California. 

Fleet Synthetic Training – 

Joint 

Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint is a virtual and constructive

exercise designed to develop and maintain warfighting 

proficiency of naval units through tactical exercises 

conducted by ships while they are in port. It uses shorebased and ship-embedded simulation, stimulation systems,

and distribution networks to conduct the exercise. 

National Training Center The Army conducts several live exercises each year at the 

National Training Center that are designed to prepare 

brigade combat teams for operations. While historically these 

exercises have involved armored tank units clashing in the 

desert, over the past 3 years training has changed to meet 

the demands of ongoing operations in Operation Iraq 

Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The National 

Training Center is located at Fort Irwin, California, and the 

Army holds the exercises in conjunction with the Air Force’s

Air Warrior I exercises. (See above.) 

Marine Corps Weapons 

and Tactics Instructors 

Course 

The Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course is

a graduate level course of instruction, which is required for 

the Marine Corps’ aviation squadron weapons and tactics 

instructors. The 7-week class involves academics, a flight 

phase, and live exercises. The course is taught at the Marine

Corps Air Station, Yuma, Arizona. 

Source: DOD. 

Enhancements to the exercises brought about by the JNTC initiative were 

many and varied. Some of the improvements purchased with JNTC funds7

included radios, aircraft instrument pods, threat emitters that imitated 

 7

 JNTC funds were distributed between the Joint Forces Command and the services. These 

funds were channeled through the Operations and Maintenance; Other Procurement; and 

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation appropriations. 

Page 13 GAO-06-802 Military Training
ground base enemy radar, and cruise missile simulators. The Air Force 

used JNTC funds to help establish an Air Support Operations Center that 

improved the realism of the Air Warrior I exercise by including real-world 

joint operational organizations. The Joint Forces Command also used 

JNTC funds to make improvements in computer models used in the 

Terminal Fury exercise. Aircraft, including former Russian aircraft, were 

obtained with JNTC funds to act as opposing forces in the Weapons and 

Tactics Instructor course. JNTC funds were also used to hire personnel 

and place them at service and combatant command headquarters to assist 

in improving the joint environment of existing exercises. Finally, the joint

network is supported and funded by JNTC funds, allowing a large number 

of simulators and constructive models from around the country to connect 

and interact in support of training programs. 

To analyze the exercises, we developed a comparative analysis8

 based on 

the attributes discussed above. This practice allowed us to determine the 

measure of change in attributes for each selected training exercise prior to 

fiscal year 2005 and afterwards. We obtained and reviewed exercise 

documentation, such as exercise planning documents and after action 

reports for selected exercises to determine the measure of change in the 

exercise based on our attributes. Our analysis revealed indications that 

some joint training improvements were made in each of the exercises we 

assessed. Table 2 summarizes the results of our analysis. 

 8

 A cost analysis was not done because the data needed were not readily available. 

Specifically, the JNTC funds resided in different appropriations; the source of cost 

information was spread over a number of organizations; and some fixed costs, such as

installation of the joint network, sustainment of the joint network, and maintenance of 

existing exercise infrastructure, represented a number of exercises and other activities. 

Page 14 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Table 2: Analysis of Attributes Indicating Potential Improvements in Joint Training

for Five JNTC-Enhanced Exercises in Fiscal Year 2005

Terminal 

Furya

Air 

Warrior I 

Fleet 

Synthetic

Training —

Joint 

National 

Training

Center 

Weapons

and Tactics 

Instructor

Course 

Increased use of 

joint training 

objectives 

 X X X X 

Increased use of 

joint task articles 

 X X 

Increased

involvement of 

other services 

 X X X X 

Increased use of 

virtual and 

constructive 

training 

capabilities 

 X X X 

Persistent 

capabilities 

added to 

exercises funded 

by the JNTC

initiative 

 X X X X X 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information and documents. 

Note: An X indicates where the JNTC initiative has improved the joint training to some degree. 

a Terminal Fury is a historical joint combatant command exercise; therefore the level of increase in its 

 joint training environment was not as apparent as it was for service exercises. 

Our analysis of the five exercises and discussions held with exercise 

planners at two of these exercises revealed several key areas in which 

indications exist that the JNTC initiative has begun to improve joint 

training. 

• Increased use of joint training objectives. Our analysis found 

that for four of the five exercise events we reviewed, the services 

increased the number of joint training objectives to which they trained. 

For example, prior to being enhanced by the JNTC initiative, Air 

Warrior I’s exercise objectives were determined by the squadron 

commanders and were focused on achieving service-specific

objectives. After JNTC, service-specific training objectives were 

modified to include some joint training objectives, such as conducting 

a joint, live-fire event within a realistic combat scenario and employing 

Page 15 GAO-06-802 Military Training
real-time joint and combined fires. In another exercise, according to 

the exercise planner, JNTC efforts enabled the Navy Fleet Synthetic 

Training — Joint exercise to include Army and Air Force units in its 

exercise. Through the participation of the Army and Air Force units, 

the Navy began including joint interoperability training objectives in 

exercise planning documents for both Navy Fleet Synthetic Training — 

Joint 05-2 and 06-1. The National Training Center’s primary focus, both 

before and after the JNTC initiative, has been on accomplishing 

service-specific training objectives. However, after the JNTC initiative’s 

involvement, the National Training Center has added some joint and 

interoperability tasks in its exercises, although these tasks are 

subordinate to the service-specific training objectives. Prior to the 

JNTC initiative, the Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor 

course trained to the six functions of Marine Corps aviation, which had 

some joint aspects. After JNTC designation, the Marine Corps 

continued to train to the six functions of Marine Corps aviation, but it 

began using several joint tactical tasks and joint training objectives in 

the exercise.

• Increased use of joint task articles. The Air Force and the Navy 

used joint task articles in enhancing their Air Warrior I and Fleet 

Synthetic Training — Joint exercises. Joint task articles detail the 

integrated tasks and steps necessary to provide a specific warfighting 

capability to a joint force commander and are based on the joint 

mission essential tasks. Air Force officials compared the task article 

for close air support with current practices at Air Warrior I and 

identified deficiencies in the procedures used during these exercises 

prior to 2005. Steps were then taken to correct the deficiencies which 

included adding an Air Support Operations Center. Consequently, Air 

Warrior I exercises are now conducted more in line with close air 

support joint doctrine. The Navy also made extensive use of the task 

articles in preparing for its accreditation review.

• Increased involvement of other services. Four of the five 

exercises we examined showed that participation had expanded to 

include more services when compared to years before the JNTC 

enhancements were included. The fifth exercise was a combatant 

command exercise that was already joint and did not show an increase 

in the participation of other services as a result of JNTC efforts. Joint 

training requires the involvement of two or more services; therefore the 

JNTC initiative used a variety of means, such as additional funding and 

the Joint Training and Experimentation Network, to increase the 

participation of other services in an exercise. As a result, Navy and 

Marine air units and the staff of the Commander, Third Fleet, 

participated in the National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercises in 

2005. Army and Air Force units participated in the Navy’s Fleet 

Page 16 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Synthetic Training — Joint in 2005 and 2006. A NATO Airborne 

Warning and Control aircraft joined the Marine Corps Weapons and 

Tactics Instructor course exercise in 2005, and a similar unit from the 

United Kingdom plans to participate in 2006. 

• Increased use of virtual and constructive training 

capabilities. Our analysis showed that key virtual and constructive 

training capabilities made possible by the use of the Joint Training and 

Experimentation Network have had a positive impact on three of the 

five exercises we examined. The joint network is a persistent, rapidly 

reconfigurable communications network that connects multiple 

training sites. According to Navy training exercise planners, the joint 

network is what allowed the Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint exercises 

to include Army and Air Force simulators to participate in the exercise.

For example, we observed during a recent Fleet Synthetic Training — 

Joint exercise, Army and Navy operators, using virtual and constructive 

capabilities, track an incoming missile attack and coordinate a joint 

response. Without the joint network, the Fleet Synthetic Training — 

Joint exercises would likely have remained solely a Navy exercise. 

According to Terminal Fury exercise planners, the joint network 

improved Terminal Fury by increasing the capacity to include a larger 

number of constructive models in the exercise. For example, Tactical

Simulation is a very large intelligence model used to simulate the entire 

spectrum of intelligence operations. Prior to the joint network, the 

Tactical Simulation model was not included in the exercise because the 

model was too large to transport to Hawaii. The joint network provided 

the means to connect the Tactical Simulation model to the exercise 

from its home station in the continental United States. In addition, 

Terminal Fury participants are spread out over a wide area, including 

several sites in Hawaii and the continental United States. According to 

Terminal Fury exercise planners, two tools made possible by the joint 

network, Video Teleconferencing and Voice Over Internet Protocol, 

provided the means by which these geographically separated sites 

could coordinate the execution of the exercise. Finally, according to a 

Marine Corps official, the joint network has aided the Marine Corps 

Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course in developing exercise

scenarios, executing the exercise, and connecting a virtual Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicle to the exercise. 

• Persistent capabilities added to exercises funded by the JNTC 

initiative. All five exercises reviewed received enhancements that will 

continue to benefit these exercises into the future. Each exercise 

received a persistent link to the joint network and embedded Support 

Element staff hired to assist service and combatant command 

headquarters in adding joint capabilities to their exercises. In addition, 

the Air Force received radios and aircraft instrument pods for Air 

Page 17 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Warrior I, computer model improvements were made for Terminal 

Fury, and the National Training Center received surrogate weapons for 

its opposing force. All these persistent capabilities were procured with 

JNTC funds. 

In addition to the improvements noted above, we also found that the JNTC 

initiative has reduced some of the travel and transportation costs 

associated with one of the five exercises we examined. Specifically, a 

number of the constructive models used in the Terminal Fury exercise are 

based in the continental United States. In prior years, the hardware and 

supporting personnel would have to travel to Hawaii to participate in the 

exercise. Since the joint network connected these models to the exercise 

from their home stations, there was no need to move the hardware and 

support staff to Hawaii for the exercise. 

Finally, there are a number of JNTC efforts under way to further improve 

joint training. For example, in future iterations of the National Training 

Center/Air Warrior I exercise, the Air Force would like to use the joint 

network to include a Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 

aircraft simulator to create a realistic joint environment. Due to their 

limited number and the high demand for these aircraft, the planes are not 

always available to participate in the exercises. The joint network will 

allow the use of these aircraft simulators in the National Training 

Center/Air Warrior I exercise by having them participate virtually from 

their home stations. In addition to increasing the availability of these 

aircraft virtually in future exercises, the joint network will also reduce the 

travel, transportation, and fuel costs of deploying and using the actual 

aircraft in the National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercises. 

Reserve component members have benefited from JNTC-enhanced 

training events, but the unique training needs of the reserve components 

have not been fully considered because the Joint Forces Command has not 

established an ongoing working relationship with them. 

Reserve Components 

Have Potentially 

Benefited from JNTC, 

but Joint Forces

Command Has Not 

Fully Embraced the 

Reserves’ Unique 

Training Needs 

Page 18 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Members of the reserve components have potentially benefited from 

JNTC-enhanced training when they participate in active service- and 

combatant command-sponsored combat training programs enhanced by 

the JNTC initiative, such as predeployment and mission rehearsal exercise 

programs. For example, based on our analysis of five training events 

enhanced by the JNTC initiative, reserve and guard units and individuals 

have participated to a limited extent in all but one of the five events. 

Specifically, Air National Guard personnel participated in a fiscal year 

2005 Air Warrior I exercise, Army reservists participated in a fiscal year 

2005 National Training Center exercise, Navy reservists participated in a

fiscal year 2005 Fleet Synthetic Training—Joint exercise, and Marine 

Corps reservists participated in a fiscal year 2006 Weapons and Tactics 

Instructor Course exercise. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 

Reserve Affairs officials stated that reserve participation in many of these 

events occurred, in part, because active duty units were unavailable to

fully participate and reserve units were asked to fill in. According to JNTC 

and service officials, reserves participating in these events may benefit 

from many of the same JNTC enhancements to the joint training 

environment as do active forces. To date, Joint Forces Command officials 

said they have relied on active service components and combatant 

commands to involve the reserve components in JNTC-enhanced training. 

In an effort to develop and manage active service and combatant 

command training programs, the Joint Forces Command has developed

formal coordination mechanisms, including liaison officers, planning 

conferences, and process action teams that involve numerous participants

from various organizations within the active service and combatant 

commands, but these coordination mechanisms do not include reserve 

personnel. For example, the Joint Forces Command has established onsite liaison officer positions to serve as the active service representative 

on a daily basis to communicate with the JNTC officials and aid in the 

development of the business and operational processes related to the 

JNTC initiative. Currently, all liaison officer positions include 

representatives from the active services with no representatives from the 

reserve components. According to Joint Forces Command officials and 

service liaison officers, these active service liaison officers primarily 

represent their respective active service components’ needs and issues 

and do not specifically communicate the needs of the reserve component 

to Joint Forces Command officials. 

Reserve Units Have 

Participated in JNTC 

Training Events 

Joint Forces Command 

Has Not Established a 

Working Relationship with 

the Reserve Components 

Active services and combatant command personnel also regularly attend

planning conferences to organize upcoming training exercises. These 

meetings occur periodically throughout the initial, middle, and final 

Page 19 GAO-06-802 Military Training
planning stages of an exercise, and to date, the Joint Forces Command has 

not reached out specifically to the reserve components to include them in

these planning conferences. The Joint Forces Command has also 

established nine process action teams organized by functional areas in 

operations, technical, and program management to discuss JNTC 

implementation and development. These process action teams perform a 

vast array of responsibilities, such as 

• developing JNTC event requirements and timelines; 

• defining required operational capabilities in order to fully coordinate 

live, virtual, and constructive opposition forces into joint training; 

• defining technical goals for data systems that will enable joint 

distributed training; 

• selecting advanced training technologies to ensure integration of live, 

virtual, and constructive components into a seamless joint training 

environment; and 

• developing all JNTC budget and program activities. 

According to Joint Forces Command officials, the reserve components are 

not formally invited to participate in these process action teams. 

DOD guidance regarding reserve components and joint training requires 

full integration of the reserve components into every aspect and each 

stage of the overall process in developing a joint training initiative. For 

example, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report specifically

highlights the need for joint training to include the reserve components in 

ensuring the readiness of the total force. In addition, the Training 

Transformation Strategic Plan identifies that the reserve components face 

several unique training requirements and circumstances that must be 

considered at each step of this process, from strategic planning through 

implementation. Further, the 2005 training transformation block 

assessment calls for including the reserve components’ training in 

transformation training events. Specifically, the assessment states that the 

reserve components (1) should participate in training transformation 

events in order to integrate the reserve component with the active 

component and (2) may have special needs for training, and training 

events should be tailored to meet these needs. 

During discussions with Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 

Reserve Affairs, officials, they noted the following unique reserve training 

circumstances that should be considered when developing the JNTC 

enhancements: 

Page 20 GAO-06-802 Military Training
• Geography. Since members of the National Guard and reserves are 

often not physically located at their respective home duty stations, the 

scheduling of training is more complex. 

• Limited training time. Reservists are constrained to 39 training days 

per year. Only if a reservist is activated or volunteers can he/she 

exceed this limitation. 

• Competing requirements. Reservists must complete training 

requirements similar to the active core training requirements, such as 

general military training and physical training, as well as satisfying any 

other reserve requirements. Reservists must also consider and manage 

their civilian careers along with their military obligations. 

• Limited training assets. Resources, such as classrooms and 

computer simulation systems and networks for joint training (such as 

those that enable live, virtual, and constructive participation), are not 

readily available to National Guard members and reservists. 

• Lack of training predictability. Since reserve components are 

currently not included in the scheduling of joint training events, 

planning for joint training opportunities is much more difficult and 

erratic. 

Along with these unique training requirements, National Guard Bureau 

officials stated that some of the National Guard’s missions, such as 

homeland defense and responding to natural disasters, should be included 

as a part of the JNTC initiative that currently are not. 

As a result of the absence of formal reserve component representation in 

the development of the JNTC initiative, the unique characteristics of the 

reserve component have not been incorporated into the initiative’s 

development of joint training requirements. According to Joint Forces 

Command officials, the inclusion of unique reserve component training 

needs into the JNTC initiative is a long-term goal. To date, there has been

no specific effort made by the Joint Forces Command to develop joint 

tasks or technical enhancements associated with the needs and missions 

of the reserve components. 

The JNTC initiative’s priority remains on active services and combatant 

commands, as the development of joint tasks and technical enhancements 

has been primarily for existing active service and combatant command 

training programs. According to Joint Forces Command officials, the 

process for the development of joint articles has involved the active 

services and combatant commands and focused on developing tasks for 

combat missions, such as close air support, joint force targeting, and joint 

fires. Although reserve members deploying to overseas operations are 

expected to perform these combat tasks as appropriate, Joint Forces 

Page 21 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Command officials have stated that the development of joint articles has

not significantly focused on tasks unique to the reserve components, such

as disaster relief and homeland defense. Further, the reserve components 

were not included in the team responsible for the development of joint 

articles. Additionally, the development of the Joint Training and 

Experimentation Network has established permanent capability 

throughout the continental United States at active service and combatant

command facilities. The joint network has been coordinated with existing 

active training networks, such as the Navy’s Continuous Training 

Environment, according to Navy officials, and the Air Force’s Distributed 

Mission Operations Center. According to Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense, Reserve Affairs officials, interfaces with reserve and guard 

networks have not yet occurred. The continued lack of focus on the joint 

training needs of the reserve components will limit their ability to enhance 

their joint training skills. 

The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop a process of accrediting 

training programs and joint tasks to facilitate the JNTC goals. However, 

the command has not (1) placed priority on accrediting training programs 

related to new and emerging missions, as highlighted in the most recent 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report; (2) taken steps to ensure that 

accredited joint training will continue to occur after initial accreditation; 

and (3) accredited any National Guard-specific training programs. 

In fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command began a process of 

accrediting active services’ and combatant commands’ training programs 

on specific joint tasks, in an effort to facilitate the goals of the JNTC 

initiative. The intent of the accreditation process is to validate that the

training programs can provide the training audience, regardless of 

location, with a recurring, consistent, realistic environment for the joint 

tasks being trained. An accreditation review is not an inspection or a 

report card, but can be compared to accrediting a university, where 

JNTC Training 

Program 

Accreditation Process 

Does Not Give 

Priority to New and 

Emerging Missions, 

Ensure Consistent 

Use of JNTC 

Capabilities, or 

Include the National 

Guard 

Joint Forces Command 

Has Begun an 

Accreditation Process 

Page 22 GAO-06-802 Military Training
individual courses of instruction are officially approved.9

 Initially, the 

JNTC initiative used an event-centric approach that focused on enhancing 

single designated training events. Starting in fiscal year 2005, the Joint 

Forces Command began employing a program-centric approach that 

focused on establishing permanent joint capabilities, which can be used 

for all rotations of active service and combatant command training 

programs. Previously, the event-centric approach only provided a limited 

number of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines with an opportunity to 

experience a JNTC-enhanced joint training event. Specifically, one 

rotation of the Navy’s Fleet Synthetic Training — Joint exercise would 

have been enhanced by the JNTC initiative, and the one event would have 

incorporated enhanced joint capabilities. However, in the program-centric 

approach, the number of training opportunities using JNTC enhancements 

significantly increases. Now, every rotation of the Fleet Synthetic Training

— Joint exercise has the opportunity to include enhanced joint training. 

The accreditation process involves several steps, beginning with the 

nomination process and ending with the Joint Forces Command’s 

recommendation. The key steps of the accreditation process are 

summarized below: 

• The Joint Forces Command sends a message to the active services and 

combatant commands, requesting that they nominate training programs 

and joint tasks to be accredited. 

• Once the active services and combatant commands submit their 

training programs for nomination, the Joint Forces Command reviews 

and selects these programs, and consolidates and prioritizes a master 

schedule of those nominated programs to include joint tasks to be 

performed by each program. 

• To familiarize the active services and combatant commands with the 

accreditation process, the Joint Forces Command’s Accreditation 

Review Team develops a Web site for each training program and 

provides training for the services and combatant commands. 

• The Joint Forces Command schedules site visits with cognizant active 

service and combatant command officials to perform its accreditation 

review. 

• The Joint Forces Command team conducts the review and makes a 

recommendation to the Commander, who will grant the appropriate 

 9

 Similar to the accrediting of a university, a training program is accredited, not the training

audience. As the accrediting agency, the Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center

ensures that the training program has the required resources and addresses key elements

to provide quality joint training to the training audience. 

Page 23 GAO-06-802 Military Training
level of accreditation status to that training program on specific joint 

tasks, in the final accreditation report.10

JNTC Nomination 

Guidance for Accreditation 

Does Not Emphasize 

Priorities Identified by the 

2006 Quadrennial 

Defense Review Report 

Although the Joint Forces Command has begun its accreditation process 

to facilitate the JNTC goals, it has not emphasized nominating training 

programs that place a priority on new and emerging missions as stressed 

in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. These new and 

emerging mission areas include irregular warfare, complex stabilization 

operations, combating weapons of mass destruction, and information 

operations, which may emphasize additional skill sets than offensive 

combat operations, such as cultural awareness training and coordination 

with other agencies. In the past nomination cycles, there has been no 

guidance that provides criteria for nominating training programs and joint 

tasks. In lieu of established nomination guidance, we found that the active 

services nominated training programs based on several reasons. For 

example, Army and Marine Corps officials told us they selected programs 

based on their need to enhance joint tasks for the maximum number of 

participants. The Navy nominated programs based on their ability to 

provide joint and coalition training. The Air Force nominated programs 

based on their perceived gains from adding jointness to the training 

environment. While there have been no specific nomination criteria, the 

Joint Forces Command has established criteria it uses for selecting 

programs once nominated. These criteria focus on (1) programs that 

address critical joint training issues that are affecting warfighting 

capabilities; (2) the mission of organizations that will receive joint 

training; (3) programs that provide predeployment training; and (4) joint 

throughput, or the number of multi-service and joint units that can be

trained on required joint training. These criteria do not emphasize skill 

sets required for new and emerging mission areas. 

Currently, the Joint Forces Command is in the process of developing 

guidance for future use that will provide criteria for nominating programs. 

These criteria ask active services and combatant commands to nominate 

programs that have the following traits: (1) primary training audience 

composed of units or staff; (2) established system for providing training 

feedback; (3) established training cadre and/or exercise control structure; 

and (4) realistic threat portrayal (i.e., opposing forces) within the training

programs. Additionally, it provides nomination criteria for accrediting the

joint tasks within the program. The criteria requires that the joint tasks 

 10 When the Joint Forces Command considers a training program for accreditation, it

assesses the program and determines if it merits being fully accredited, conditionally 

accredited, or not qualified to be accredited. 

Page 24 GAO-06-802 Military Training
(1) come from the Universal Joint Task List11 or the latest approved list of 

joint tasks, and (2) fall within the normal core competencies and normal 

training environment of the nominated training programs. Although the 

Joint Forces Command has proposed nomination guidance, its draft 

guidance still has not emphasized the need to accredit tasks within active 

service and combatant command training programs that will improve 

proficiency in new and emerging mission areas. Until DOD establishes 

such nomination guidance, new and emerging missions will not be given 

priority in the accreditation process and thus be able to incorporate the 

JNTC enhancements. 

By the end of fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command had 

conditionally accredited joint tasks in 4 programs and plans to grant 

accreditation to joint tasks in as many as 23 additional programs by the 

end of 2006. Most of these training programs focus primarily on traditional

combat missions. For example, the Navy’s Fleet Synthetic Training — 

Joint program has been conditionally accredited on seven joint tasks, 

including developing and sharing intelligence, conducting joint fires, 

conducting air and missile defense operations, and conducting defensive 

counter air operations. Additionally, the Joint Forces Command 

anticipates that the active services and combatant commands will 

nominate 3 or 4 additional programs for accreditation in 2007. Table 3 

shows the total nominated programs, including the 4 programs 

conditionally accredited in fiscal year 2005 and the 23 programs planned to 

be accredited for 2006. 

 11 The Universal Joint Task List is a menu of capabilities that may be selected by a joint

force commander to accomplish the assigned mission. 

Page 25 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Table 3: Programs Accredited in Fiscal Year 2005 and Nominated for Accreditation in Fiscal Year 2006 

Active service/combatant command Training program 

Army Battle Command Training Programa

Joint Readiness Training Center 

National Training Center 

Combat Maneuver Training Center 

Air Force Blue Flaga

Air Warrior I 

Air Warrior II 

Virtual Flag 

Red Flag

Cope Thunder

Warrior Prep Center (nominated by European Command) 

Navy Fleet Synthetic Training – Joint

a

Joint Task Force Exercise 

Marine Corps Marine Aviation Weapons Training Squadron 1 

Marine Air Ground Task Force Staff Training Program 

Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Center 

Mountain Warfare Training Center 

Joint Forces Command Unified Endeavor Mission Rehearsal Programa

Pacific Command Pacific Command Joint Task Force Training Program 

Central Command Internal Look 

Northern Command Ardent Sentry 

European Command Joint Training Requirements and Exercise Division

Warrior Prep Center 

Strategic Command Strategic Command Training Program

Special Operations Command Able Warrior/Able Focus 

Southern Command Southern Command Joint Exercise Program

Transportation Command Turbo Challenge 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documentation.

a

Indicate training programs conditionally accredited in fiscal year 2005 by Joint Forces Command. 

Page 26 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Accreditation Process Has 

No Mechanism to Ensure 

Recurring Use of JNTC 

Capabilities 

The Joint Forces Command has not taken steps to ensure that accredited 

joint training will consistently reoccur in active service and combatant 

command training programs. As previously noted, the intent of the 

accreditation process is to ensure that all units participating in joint 

training, regardless of location, experience a recurring, consistent, 

realistic joint environment. In addition, DOD has directed the services to 

conduct joint training to the maximum extent possible in accredited 

exercises. As previously noted, in fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces 

Command began to transition its JNTC initiative from an event-centric 

approach to a broader program-centric approach, focusing on establishing 

permanent joint capabilities, which can be used for all rotations of training 

events, not just a single designated training event. 

However, the Joint Forces Command has not taken steps to ensure that 

joint tasks previously accredited will consistently be incorporated in 

future service and combatant commander training events. According to 

DOD officials, the services and combatant commands should participate in

the accreditation process in order to obtain JNTC funding for their 

nominated training programs. However, according to a Joint Forces 

Command official, the command cannot require the services and 

combatant commands to train to the joint tasks that have been accredited. 

Service officials we spoke with stated that currently there are no 

consequences for them not continuing to include accredited joint tasks in 

future training rotations. While service officials recognized the value of 

training to accredited joint tasks, they also recognized that there are 

competing demands for their time and resources that may preclude them 

from training to joint tasks. Situations that compete for their time and 

resources include service-specific unit training requirements, shortage of 

training funds, and the deployment of personnel and equipment to 

overseas operations. While the Joint Forces Command provides financial

contributions to the services to help offset the costs associated with 

incorporating the JNTC enhancements, it is not clear if the JNTC 

initiative’s financial contributions are significant enough to function as 

leverage to encourage the repeated training of accredited joint tasks. For 

example, an Army official stated that the Army has budgeted $640 million 

to support its combat training centers in fiscal year 2006, and that the Joint 

Forces Command’s support for the Army’s combat training centers 

amounts to $11.6 million. 

The Joint Forces Command is taking a proactive step to help support the 

active services and combatant commands in embedding JNTC 

enhancements in their training programs. It is hiring Support Elements—

JNTC representatives placed permanently at service and combatant 

command training programs—to help ensure that the program officials 

Page 27 GAO-06-802 Military Training
implement the JNTC initiative by creating a supporting relationship 

between organizations. Additionally, the Support Elements are to assist 

program officials with joint training planning and executions at their 

locations and ensure that standards are maintained in accreditation 

reviews. However, according to JNTC officials, these individuals alone 

may not be able to ensure that accredited joint training will continue to 

occur. Furthermore, it is too early to determine if the services will 

continue to include joint tasks on a regular basis, since the Joint Forces 

Command only began the accreditation process in 2005 and only recently 

established positions to be filled by Support Element representatives. 

The Joint Force Commander plans to reaccredit training programs every 3 

years but has not established criteria for their reaccreditation process that 

would ensure that services and combatant commanders continue to 

incorporate and expand on previously accredited joint tasks. According to

the JNTC Accreditation Concept of Operations, a reaccreditation process 

will be used to reaffirm accredited status upon expiration (following 3 

years) or determine the status of a training program that has undergone 

such significant change that the existing program is considerably different

from the program that last received accreditation status. However, this 

concept of operations does not address what standard of training needs to 

be accomplished or what level of accredited tasks should be trained to 

receive reaccreditation. Without providing adequate reaccreditation 

guidance, the Joint Forces Command may risk not accomplishing the 

intent of JNTC’s accreditation efforts. Moreover, until DOD establishes 

standards for reaccrediting training programs that ensure the consistent 

incorporation of JNTC enhancement in future training rotations, DOD 

risks not maximizing its investment in the JNTC initiative. 

No National Guard 

Training Programs Have 

Been Considered for JNTC 

Accreditation 

DOD encourages the integration of the reserve components into joint 

training. Specifically, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report

reinforces the need for joint training to include the reserve components in 

ensuring the readiness of the total force, and a DOD directive on military 

training12 says that to the maximum extent possible, all components shall 

conduct joint training in accredited events. Our analysis found that the 

National Guard has developed joint training exercise programs dealing 

with missions involving homeland defense and security. However, no 

National Guard training programs have currently been considered for 

JNTC accreditation. Joint Forces Command officials stated they have not 

placed a priority on involving the National Guard in the JNTC 

 12 Department of Defense Directive, 1322.18, Military Training.

Page 28 GAO-06-802 Military Training
accreditation process, and incorporating the National Guard into the JNTC 

initiative is still a long-term goal for the Joint Forces Command. The Joint 

Forces Command has not sent request messages seeking nominations for 

joint training accreditation to the National Guard as it has done for the 

active services and combatant commands. In addition, we found that the 

Joint Forces Command has not established a process for nominating and

accrediting National Guard-specific training programs. 

The National Guard Bureau has approached the Joint Forces Command 

about considering the Vigilant Guard training program—a series of 

training exercises that will further enhance the preparedness of the 

National Guard to perform roles and responsibilities related to homeland 

defense and defense support to civil authorities—for the JNTC 

accreditation process. The training program involves 4 to 6 states per 

event with a focus on the training and coordination of the newly 

established state joint force headquarters and state joint task forces.

Vigilant Guard provides the National Guard the opportunity to execute

core joint tasks, such as (1) acquire and communicate operational-level 

information and maintain status; (2) establish, organize, and operate a 

joint force headquarters; and (3) provide theater support to other DOD 

and government agencies. However, National Guard officials stated that 

Vigilant Guard has not yet been considered for accreditation by the Joint 

Forces Command. 

National Guard Bureau officials have also recently discussed with the 

Joint Forces Command officials the potential for linking the National 

Guard’s GuardNet network to JNTC’s joint network. GuardNet is a 

network for delivering telecommunications services to National Guard 

users in 54 U.S. states and territories, providing persistent connectivity. It 

consolidates video and data functions to support simulation, training, 

mobilization command and control, and computer emergency response, in 

addition to operational missions assigned to the National Guard. These 

telecommunications capabilities have helped to reduce stress on the 

National Guard force by decreasing personnel travel and increasing home 

station time available for training. To date, National Guard officials stated 

that GuardNet has not been integrated into JNTC’s joint network design. 

Although Joint Forces Command and National Guard officials have had 

meetings regarding the inclusion of both Vigilant Guard and GuardNet into 

the JNTC joint network, National Guard Bureau officials stated that no 

action has yet been taken. Without specific JNTC-accredited training 

programs and linkages with JNTC’s joint network, National Guard training 

programs may not be able to take full advantage of JNTC resources, such

as participation from other components, access to new technologies and 

Page 29 GAO-06-802 Military Training
modeling, and training environments that realistically portray overseas 

and domestic joint operations. 

In the new security environment, U.S. forces are conducting significantly 

more complex operations requiring increased joint interoperability among 

participants in the theater and on the battlefield. DOD’s JNTC initiative is 

designed to help the services and combatant commands meet these 

challenges. Without thoroughly assessing the progress of the Joint Forces 

Command’s training transformation efforts, DOD does not know the value 

added to the readiness of services and combatant commands resulting 

from the significant investment of resources devoted to the JNTC 

initiative. Furthermore, recent domestic events and ongoing overseas 

operations have placed extremely high demands on the reserve 

components, which play a critical role in executing our national defense 

strategy. Once mobilized, reservists and National Guard members operate 

in the same joint environment as active service members. Unless the 

reserve components receive the training necessary to allow them to 

operate seamlessly in this environment, reservists may be unprepared to 

face the full range of responsibilities they are called upon to perform both 

at home and abroad. Until the Joint Forces Command embraces the 

reserve components, incorporating their unique training needs into the 

development of the JNTC initiative’s joint training enhancements, the 

reserve and the National Guard forces will not be able to take full 

advantage of the enhanced joint training offered through this initiative. 

Additionally, without clear criteria to guide the accreditation and 

reaccreditation process, DOD will have no assurance that the joint training

initiative reflects DOD’s training priorities on new and emerging threats or 

that the services and combatant commands will continually take 

advantage of the resources and capabilities provided by the JNTC 

initiative. Without consistently training its forces in a recurring, realistic, 

joint operating environment, DOD will lack assurance that forces deployed 

to its theaters will have the necessary skills to operate effectively in 

today’s complex, multinational, interagency operations. Also, without 

incorporating the National Guard into the accreditation process, DOD has 

no assurance that the National Guard will experience realistic overseas 

and domestic joint operational training environments portrayed by JNTC 

enhancements. Furthermore, DOD needs to address the issues highlighted 

above in order to ensure that the joint training benefits from its $1.5 billion 

investment in the JNTC initiative are being optimized. 

To further enhance the quality of joint training and to increase the benefits

of the JNTC initiative for the reserve components, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense take the following five actions: 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Page 30 GAO-06-802 Military Training
• direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 

fully develop a strategy for the next training transformation assessment 

to evaluate the overall impact of the JNTC initiative’s implementation 

on joint training, including time frames, outcome-oriented performance 

metrics, roles and responsibilities, and outcomes; 

• direct the Joint Forces Command to establish liaison officers for the 

reserve components and include representatives from the reserve 

components as active participants in JNTC working groups and 

planning sessions; 

• direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 

establish guidelines for the services and combatant commands to 

follow when nominating programs for future accreditation that reflect 

the importance of new and emerging missions, as emphasized by 

DOD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report; 

• direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 

establish reaccreditation standards and criteria that will ensure that a 

recurring, consistent, realistic joint training environment exists for all 

units participating in accredited joint training programs; and 

• direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 

expand the accreditation process to include National Guard training 

programs. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with four 

recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation to 

establish reserve liaisons. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. 

Specifically, DOD agreed with our recommendation that the department 

develop a strategy for evaluating the overall impact of the JNTC initiative

as part of its 2007 training transformation assessment. DOD stated that it 

is in the process of developing a plan for its 2007 assessment that will 

include detailed metrics and roles and responsibilities and will address the 

impact of transformation initiatives on DOD-wide training. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DOD also agreed with our recommendations to (1) establish guidelines 

that emphasize the need for the services and combatant commands to 

consider new and emerging issues when nominating programs for 

accreditation, (2) establish reaccreditation standards and criteria, and 

(3) expand the accreditation process to include National Guard training 

programs. DOD stated that its accreditation guidance will be refined to 

include consideration of new and emerging missions during the next phase 

of accreditation reviews. Additionally, DOD stated that the Joint Forces 

Command will ensure that the accreditation concept of operations is 

strengthened to include specific reaccreditation standards. Further, DOD 

stated it will add National Guard training programs with the appropriate 

joint environment to the accreditation nomination list. Moreover, it noted

Page 31 GAO-06-802 Military Training
that the JNTC Joint Management Office is actively discussing this action 

with National Guard leadership to develop a plan for inclusion of National 

Guard joint training programs. 

Finally, DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Joint 

Forces Command establish liaison officers for the reserve components 

and include reserve component representatives as participants in JNTC 

working groups and planning sessions. The department agreed it should 

establish liaison officers for the National Guard and include Guard 

representatives as participants in JNTC working groups and planning 

sessions. However, DOD stated that the joint training requirements of the 

other reserve components are adequately addressed through the current 

service liaison officer structure within JNTC and the assigned reserve 

Joint Warfighting Center. DOD’s approach would require that the Army, 

Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corp reserves continue to voice their training

needs indirectly through their respective service headquarters rather than 

through direct participation. However, as discussed in this report, Training 

Transformation documents and officials from the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense’s Office of Reserve Affairs have recognized that the reserve 

components have some unique training requirements and that these 

requirements have yet to receive priority in the Joint Forces Command’s 

JNTC initiative. We continue to believe that all reserve components would 

benefit if the Joint Forces Command would establish liaison officers for 

both the National Guard and the service reserve components and include 

them as active participants in JNTC working groups and planning sessions 

to allow them to voice their unique training needs and enhance their 

awareness of new developments and opportunities in joint training. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Commander of

the U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 32 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix III. 

Janet A. St. Laurent, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 33 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the extent to which the Joint National Training Capability 

(JNTC) initiative has improved the ability of the services and combatant 

commands to train jointly, we analyzed 5 of the 16 training exercises 

selected by the Joint Forces Command to incorporate JNTC 

enhancements in fiscal year 2005. We reviewed relevant exercise planning 

documents pertaining to the exercises and JNTC enhancements. We also

discussed the impact of the JNTC initiative with a variety of officials in the

Office of the Secretary of Defense, service headquarters, combatant 

commands, and Joint Chiefs of Staff who were involved in this effort. 

Additionally, we discussed our methods, the attributes to be assessed, and 

the information collected with agency officials and determined that they

were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. Results from nonprobability 

samples cannot be used to make inferences about a population, because 

some elements of the population have no chance of being selected. 

Specifically, we did the following: 

• To select the five exercises, we reviewed the descriptions and training 

profiles provided by JNTC initiative officials, and in consultation with 

these officials, we identified one event selected by the Joint Forces 

Command to be enhanced by the JNTC initiative from each of the 

military services and one sponsored by a combatant command. 

• To analyze the exercises, we identified attributes that would allow us 

to quantitatively discern the differences in selected exercises prior to 

their JNTC designation and afterwards. We then developed a detailed 

data collection instrument to precisely and consistently gather attribute 

information for comparative analysis. Our analysis of these attributes 

allowed us to determine the measure of change in a selected fiscal year 

2005 training exercise prior to fiscal year 2005 and afterwards. We 

obtained and reviewed exercise documentation, such as exercise 

planning documents, and after action reports for selected exercises to 

determine the measure of change in the exercises based on our 

attributes. 

• To augment our documentation review of the JNTC initiative’s impact 

on existing service and combatant exercises, we met with service, 

combatant command, and JNTC officials to discuss their perspectives 

on the overall value added to joint training by the JNTC initiative. We 

then visited and observed 2 of the 5 exercises to obtain a real-time 

assessment of the past and planned evolution of the exercises and 

feedback from exercise participants, including the planners. 

To determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) had assessed the 

full impact of the JNTC effort on joint training through its first training 

transformation assessment, we reviewed and analyzed key DOD and JNTC 

documents, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2006 revised 

Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2005 Training 

Page 34 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Transformation Assessment Report, and the JNTC initiative’s strategic 

plan. Additionally, we met with Office of the Secretary of Defense officials 

directly involved in conducting the training transformation assessment to 

discuss the methodology for the current assessment and plans for future 

assessments. 

To determine the extent to which the reserve components are benefiting

from the JNTC initiative, we obtained and analyzed key DOD and JNTC 

documentation, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2006

revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2006 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and the JNTC strategic and 

implementation plans, to identify program guidance on the inclusion of the 

reserve components in training transformation initiatives and assess the 

level of coordination established between the JNTC initiative and the 

reserve components. We also examined the extent to which the reserve 

components participated in JNTC current events and formal collaboration

mechanisms to further evaluate the effectiveness of the program to benefit 

the reserve components. Additionally, we conducted interviews with key 

reserve, National Guard, Office of the Secretary of Defense, service, and 

JNTC representatives to discuss the overall impact of the JNTC initiative

on the reserve components. 

To determine the extent to which the Joint Forces Command has 

developed an accreditation process that facilitates program goals, we 

obtained and reviewed key accreditation documentation, such as the 

Accreditation Concept of Operations, JNTC accreditation program briefing 

slides, the draft accreditation handbook and DOD’s 2006 Quadrennial 

Defense Review Report. We also reviewed and analyzed key DOD and 

JNTC documents, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2006

revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan and the JNTC 

strategic plan, to identify program guidance and critical milestones. 

Additionally, we reviewed selected training programs’ JNTC accreditation 

reports. To augment our documentation review, we met with service, 

combatant command, and JNTC officials to discuss the status and intent of

the accreditation process. Specifically, we inquired about the status of the 

accreditation effort, the nomination process, and the reaccreditation 

process. We also examined to what extent the reserve components 

participated in the JNTC initiative’s accreditation process. Table 4 lists the 

organizations and locations we visited during the course of this review. 

Page 35 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Table 4: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment 

Organization Locations

Headquarters Department of the Army, Army Training, Collective 

Training Division, Washington, D.C. 

Army 

Army National Guard, Readiness Center, Arlington, Virginia

Headquarters Air Force, Joint Exercises and Training Innovation, 

Washington, D.C. 

Air Force 

Air Combat Command, Joint Training and Exercise Directorate, 

Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 

Headquarters, Marine Corps Training and Education Command, 

Quantico, Virginia 

Marine Corps 

U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia 

Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Ranges and Fleet Training 

Branch, Arlington, Virginia 

Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia 

Tactical Training Group, Atlantic, Dam Neck, Virginia 

Navy 

USS McFaul, (DDG-74), Norfolk, Virginia 

National Guard National Guard Bureau, Alexandria, Virginia 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, 

Washington D.C. 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Readiness and Training Policy 

and Programs, Washington, D.C. 

 - Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability Joint 

 Management Office, Alexandria, Virginia 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. 

 - Operational Plans and Joint Force Development 

 Directorate, Washington, D.C. 

U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia

 - Joint National Training Capability Joint Management Office, 

 Suffolk, Virginia 

 - Joint Training Directorate and Joint Warfighting Center,

 Suffolk, Virginia 

U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii

 - Headquarters, Joint Training Directorate, Camp Smith, 

 Hawaii 

U.S. Pacific Air Force, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii 

U.S. Pacific Fleet, Makalapa Compound, Hawaii 

Joint organizations 

Headquarters, Joint Task Force 519, Hawaii

Source: GAO.

We performed this review from August 2005 through May 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 36 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

 Page 37 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

 Page 38 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

 Page 39 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

 Page 40 GAO-06-802 Military Training
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 41 GAO-06-802

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland, Assistant Director; 

Fred Harrison; Joe Faley; Bonita Anderson; Angela Watson; Yong Song;

Kevin Keith; Susan Ditto; and Rebecca Shea also made major 

contributions to this report. 

Acknowledgments 

Military Training
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Management Approach and Processes Not 

Well-Suited to Support Development of Global Information Grid. GAO-06-

211. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2006. 

Military Training: Funding Requests for Joint Urban Operations 

Training and Facilities Should Be Based on Sound Strategy and 

Requirements. GAO-06-193. Washington, D.C.: December 8, 2005. 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and 

Equipment Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, D.C.: 

October 20, 2005. 

Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve 

Personnel and Equipment Shortages. GAO-05-660. Washington, D.C.: 

July 12, 2005.

Military Training: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD’s Program to 

Transform Joint Training. GAO-05-548. Washington, D.C.: June 21,

2005. 

Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and 

Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD’s Efforts to

Transform Military Capabilities. GAO-05-70. Washington, D.C.: 

December 17, 2004. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to 

Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for 

Combat Training Centers. GAO-05-8. Washington, D.C.: January 28,

2005. 

Military Education: DOD Needs to Develop Performance Goals and 

Metrics for Advanced Distributed Learning in Professional Military 

Education. GAO-04-873. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004.

Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas

and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2004. 

Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and 

Development Efforts in the Federal Government. GAO-04-546G. 

Washington, D.C.: March 2004.

Military Training: Strategic Planning and Distributive Learning 

Could Benefit the Special Operations Forces Foreign Language 

Program. GAO-03-1026. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2003. 

Page 42 GAO-06-802 Military Training
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Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues 

Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces. GAO-03-505. Washington, 

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Military Transformation: Progress and Challenges for DOD's 

Advanced Distributed Learning Programs. GAO-03-393. Washington, 

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Military Transformation: Actions Needed to Better Manage DOD's 

Joint Experimentation Program. GAO-02-856. Washington, D.C.: 

August 29, 2002. 

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in Readiness Reporting. GAO-02-525. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 

2002. 

Defense Budget: Need to Better Inform Congress on Funding for Army 

Division Training. GAO-01-902. Washington, D.C.: July 5, 2001. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Units Better Equipped, but Training

and Readiness Reporting Problems Remain. GAO-01-27. Washington, 

D.C.: November 14, 2000.

Force Structure: Army Is Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces, 

but Challenges Remain. GAO/NSAID-00-162. Washington, D.C.: July 18,

2000. 

Army National Guard: Enhanced Brigade Readiness Improved but 

Personnel and Workload Are Problems. GAO/NSAID-00-114. Washington,

D.C.: June 14, 2000. 

(350724) Page 43 GAO-06-802 Military Training
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