Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Underwood, 2019 IL App (3d) 170623

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

SONJA L. UNDERWOOD, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District 

No. 3-17-0623

Rule 23 order filed

Motion to

publish allowed

Opinion filed

December 11, 2019

December 18, 2019

December 18, 2019

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 16-TR-57041; the 

Hon. Chrystel L. Galvin, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

James E. Chadd, Peter A. Carusona, and Dimitri Golfis, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.

James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Patrick Delfino, 

Thomas D. Arado, and Mark A. Austill, of State’s Attorneys Appellate 

Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
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Panel JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices McDade and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant, Sonja L. Underwood, was convicted following a bench trial of driving while 

license suspended. On appeal, she argues the State failed to introduce independent evidence 

corroborative of her admission and thus failed to establish the corpus delicti. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The State charged defendant by citation with driving while license suspended (625 ILCS 

5/6-303(a) (West 2016)). Defendant subsequently waived her right to a jury trial, and a bench 

trial commenced on May 19, 2017.

¶ 4 Officer William Otis of the Joliet Police Department testified that he responded to the scene 

of an accident on August 14, 2016. Otis testified that upon his arrival at the scene, he observed 

that “[t]here were two vehicles already pulled into the BP gas station at 6 McDonough.” The 

two vehicles were a Ford Explorer and an Acura. Otis testified that he spoke with “both drivers 

of the vehicles,” though he could not recall whether the drivers were inside or outside of their 

respective vehicles when he arrived.

¶ 5 Otis testified that he spoke with the driver of the Ford Explorer, who he identified as 

defendant. According to Otis, defendant told him that she was attempting to turn at the 

intersection of McDonough Street and Chicago Street when the other driver struck her vehicle. 

Otis observed damage to both vehicles that corresponded to the version of events provided by 

defendant. Otis testified that part of his training to become a police officer included training in 

the reconstruction of traffic accidents. He had undertaken additional accident reconstruction 

courses since that original training.

¶ 6 On cross-examination, Otis agreed that he did not know the amount of time the two vehicles 

had been parked at the gas station prior to his arrival. He also agreed that the registered owner 

of the Ford Explorer was Richard Williamson. On redirect, Otis testified that defendant 

admitted to driving the Ford Explorer when it was involved in the accident. The State submitted 

into evidence a driving abstract, which established that a suspension of defendant’s driver’s 

license was in effect on the day of the accident.

¶ 7 The court found defendant guilty of driving while license suspended. Defendant was 

sentenced to a term of 24 months’ conditional discharge and 300 hours of community service. 

Defendant appeals.

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 9 On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. More specifically, she argues that the State failed to establish the corpus delicti by 

providing sufficient independent evidence corroborative of her extrajudicial admission.

¶ 10 In Illinois, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt two basic propositions 

at trial: “(1) that a crime occurred, i.e., the corpus delicti; and (2) that the crime was committed 

by the person charged.” People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 183 (2010). As a matter of law, the 
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State’s proof of the corpus delicti may not consist exclusively of the defendant’s extrajudicial 

admission. Id. “Where a defendant’s confession is part of the proof of the corpus delicti, the 

prosecution must also adduce corroborating evidence independent of the defendant’s own 

statement. [Citation.] If a confession is not corroborated in this way, a conviction based on the 

confession cannot be sustained.” Id.

¶ 11 The amount or nature of independent corroborative evidence required by the corpus delicti

rule is “far less” than that needed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Lara, 

2012 IL 112370, ¶ 45. That same evidence need not be corroborative of every element of the 

charged offense. Id. ¶ 50. “[T]he independent evidence need only tend to show the commission 

of a crime.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 18.

¶ 12 In Lara, our supreme court made clear that “direct corroborating evidence” is not 

mandatory under the corpus delicti rule. (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 31. In reaching that 

conclusion, the court discussed its prior decision in People v. Perfecto, 26 Ill. 2d 228 (1962). 

Lara, 2012 IL 112370, ¶¶ 31-32. In Perfecto, the court cited numerous pieces of circumstantial 

evidence in finding that the defendant’s confession was properly corroborated. Perfecto, 26 Ill. 

2d at 229-30. The Lara court approved of that analysis, as well as the prior court’s statement 

of the applicable law: “The true rule is that if there is evidence of corroborating circumstances 

which tend to prove the corpus delicti and correspond with the circumstances related in the 

confession, both *** may be considered in determining whether the corpus delicti is 

sufficiently proved in a given case.” (Emphases in original and internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Lara, 2012 IL 112370, ¶ 32 (quoting Perfecto, 26 Ill. 2d at 229, quoting People v. 

Gavurnik, 2 Ill. 2d 190, 194 (1954)).

¶ 13 In the present case, defendant was charged with driving while license suspended. That 

offense requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) defendant was driving a 

motor vehicle on a highway of this state while (2) her driver’s license was suspended. 625 

ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2016). The State proved the second of these propositions through direct 

evidence. The primary evidence of the first element—that defendant was driving a motor 

vehicle—was established through defendant’s confession to that fact. Thus, we must consider 

what evidence corroborates that account.

¶ 14 According to Otis’s testimony, defendant told him that the accident had occurred when she 

attempted to turn at an intersection and had been struck by the other vehicle. Further, Otis 

testified that when he arrived at the scene of the accident, there were only two people in the 

vicinity of the two vehicles.

¶ 15 To be sure, that corroborative evidence cannot be characterized as strong or especially 

compelling. Nevertheless, Lara does not require corroborative evidence to meet a particularly 

high evidentiary threshold, one “far less” than that required to prove a defendant guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Lara, 2012 IL 112370, ¶ 45. Here, defendant’s accurate knowledge of the 

traffic accident and her being the only person in the vicinity of the Ford Explorer correspond 

with her admission that she was driving the vehicle. Id. ¶ 32.

¶ 16 Defendant correctly points out that the State’s corroborative evidence demonstrates, at 

most, “that [defendant] saw the accident happen” and does not eliminate other possible 

scenarios. For example, the corroborative evidence presented by the State here does not 

eliminate the possibility that defendant was a passenger in the Ford Explorer during the 

accident and that the actual driver fled on foot after pulling into the gas station. Nor does it 
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eliminate a scenario in which defendant witnessed the accident as a pedestrian and then stood 

in the vicinity of the vehicle after the driver had fled.

¶ 17 The requirement that corroborative evidence tend to show the commission of a crime 

cannot be construed to require that the same corroborative evidence foreclose every other 

possible explanation of that evidence. Indeed, we are aware of no case that would indicate the 

corroborative evidence necessary for satisfaction of the corpus delicti rule must be so strong 

as to eliminate all other possibilities. Defendant was the only person in the vicinity of the Ford 

Explorer in the aftermath of the accident and was able to accurately detail the accident for Otis. 

While other possible explanations for that evidence are apparent, that defendant was the driver 

of the vehicle is the simplest explanation. That evidence corresponds with defendant’s 

admission and tends to show that she was driving the Ford Explorer. Under the low threshold 

described in Lara, the corroborative evidence was sufficient for the court to consider 

defendant’s admission to driving the vehicle as evidence.

¶ 18 Finally, defendant discusses a number of cases applying the corpus delicti rule in the 

context of traffic accidents. See People v. Foster, 138 Ill. App. 3d 44 (1985); People v. Lurz, 

379 Ill. App. 3d 958 (2008); People v. Call, 176 Ill. App. 3d 571 (1988); People v. Rhoden, 

253 Ill. App. 3d 805 (1993). Of those cases, however, only in Foster did the court find the 

State had failed to provide sufficient corroborative evidence. Foster, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 47. In 

that case, two people were found, asleep, in the passenger cabin of a vehicle, a fact that 

significantly distinguishes that case from the one in question. Id. at 45.

¶ 19 Regarding the remaining cases, in which the court found the corroborative evidence to be 

sufficient, defendant emphasizes facts present in those cases but not present here. For example, 

in Lurz, the defendant was the owner of the vehicle and had in his possession the keys to the 

vehicle. Lurz, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 972. Defendant argues that the absence of such facts is thus 

indicative that the corroborating evidence is insufficient in the present case.

¶ 20 That certain evidence is sufficiently corroborative in one fact-specific case, however, does 

not mean that the absence of such evidence in another case is fatal. There was no evidence here 

that defendant had the keys to the Ford Explorer, but she was able to give accurate details 

regarding the accident the vehicle had just sustained. Defendant was not the registered owner 

of the vehicle, but she was the only person in the vicinity of the vehicle after the accident. The 

facts of each case will inevitably be different. In this case, we find that the State’s evidence 

was sufficiently corroborative of defendant’s admission to satisfy the corpus delicti rule.

¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 22 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

¶ 23 Affirmed.