United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Lack of a 

Synchronized 

Approach between the 

Marine Corps and 

Army Affected the 

Timely Production 

and Installation of 

Marine Corps Truck 

Armor 

June 2006 

 

GAO-06-274 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 2006

DEFENSE LOGISTICS

Lack of a Synchronized Approach 

between the Marine Corps and Army 

Affected the Timely Production and 

Installation of Marine Corps Truck Armor 

Highlights of GAO-06-274, a report to 

congressional committees 

The increasing threat of improvised

explosive devices (IED) in Iraq has 

led to widespread interest by 

Congress and the public regarding 

the availability of critical force

protection equipment. GAO 

initiated a series of engagements 

under the Comptroller General’s 

authority to address these 

concerns. In March 2006, GAO

reported on factors that affected

the production and installation of 

armor for the Army’s medium and 

heavy trucks. This engagement 

examines issues affecting the 

production and installation of

armor for the Marine Corps’

medium and heavy trucks. The 

objectives were to (1) determine

the extent to which truck armor 

was produced and installed to meet 

identified requirements, (2) identify

what factors affected the time to 

provide truck armor, and 

(3) identify what actions the 

Marine Corps and DOD have taken 

to improve the timely availability of 

truck armor. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that DOD 

(1) establish a process for sharing 

information on developing materiel

solutions and (2) clarify the point

at which the joint requirements 

process should be utilized. DOD

concurred with the second 

recommendation but believes 

communication is sufficient to

satisfy the first recommendation.

GAO disagrees. DOD also provided

comments related to the context

and accuracy of the report, which

we incorporated as appropriate. 

The Marine Corps met its requirements for the production and installation of 

add-on truck armor in September 2004---8 months after the requirements 

were identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck armor requirements, 

the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In the first phase, the 

Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in January 2004 to armor 1,169 

trucks for protection against IEDs and other similar threats. Due to the 

immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by March 2004, the Marine

Corps installed interim armor that did not provide sufficient IED protection, 

which Marine Corps officials acknowledged, stating that their intent was to 

field some level of protection until a more robust armor solution became 

available. In the second phase, the Marine Corps increased its armor 

requirement to 1,438 trucks in April 2004 and fully met that requirement in 

September 2004 with armor that provided enhanced IED protection. In the 

third phase, the Marine Corps is upgrading to integrated armor for its 7-ton 

trucks, which provides improved protection because the armor is built into 

the body of the vehicle. They expect to complete installation by May 2006. 

Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine Corps 

truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the Marine

Corps and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and solutions 

resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor requirements and 

seeking armor solutions 2 months after the Army. Consequently, this delay 

may have limited the Marine Corps’ ability to field interim armor that met 

IED protection requirements in the first phase, and may have contributed to 

the time to provide add-on truck armor to deployed Marine Corps forces in 

the second phase. The Marine Corps did not officially identify a requirement 

for truck armor and did not begin seeking out armor materials from industry 

until January 2004—2 months after the Army began its truck armor program 

in November 2003. According to Marine Corps officials, the armor-grade 

steel needed for sufficient IED protection was not available from suppliers in 

time to meet the Marine Corps’ deployment timeline of March 2004. As a 

result, the Marine Corps fielded the interim armor with only limited IED 

protection. Second, mission needs restricted the rate at which the Marine

Corps could replace its interim armor with add-on armor and install 

integrated armor. 

The Marine Corps and DOD have taken actions to improve the timely 

availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment. For 

example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for integrated 

armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The Marine Corps is also

taking longer-term actions, such as developing a plan to address the 

availability of truck armor for future operations. In addition, DOD 

established a joint requirements process to improve coordination and 

accelerate the process of fielding urgent wartime solutions. However, it is

unclear whether this process applies to urgent wartime needs such as armor

because it excludes the development of new technology solutions. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-274.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William M. Solis

at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 5

Marine Corps Met Truck Armor Requirements in September 2004 9 

Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Services and

Mission Needs Affected the Time to Provide Truck Armor to 

Marine Corps Forces 15 

Marine Corps and DOD Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor 

Availability 17

Conclusions 19

Recommendations for Executive Action 20 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 20 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 24 

Appendix II Assessment of Marine Corps Truck Armoring 

Efforts 26 

Multipurpose 5-Ton Trucks 26 

Logistics Vehicle System 29 

Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement 32 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 35 

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 47 

Table 

Table 1: Marine Corps Armor Phases and Types of Armor 8 

Figures 

Figure 1: Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim 

Armor Protection 10 

Figure 2: Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim and 

Add-on Armor Protection 12 

Page i GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Figure 3: Requirement, Production, and Installation of Integrated 

Armor 14

Figure 4: Unarmored Marine Corps 5-Ton Multipurpose Truck 26 

Figure 5: 5-Ton Truck Requirements, Production, and Installation 

of Interim and Add-on Armor 28 

Figure 6: Armored Cab of the Marine Corps Logistics Vehicle 

System 29

Figure 7: LVS Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim 

and Add-on Armor 31 

Figure 8: Armored Medium Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Replacement 32 

Figure 9: MTVR Truck Requirements, Production, and Installation 

of Interim, Add-on, and Integrated Armor 34 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

June 22, 2006 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

When combat operations were declared over during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF), U.S. and coalition forces transitioned to stabilization 

operations to restore public order and infrastructure in Iraq. Since that 

time, U.S. forces have come under frequent and deadly attacks from 

insurgents using a variety of weapons— including improvised explosive 

devices (IED), mortars, and rocket launchers—and there have been 

numerous attacks on military convoys as they carry supplies and 

equipment throughout the region. The threat of IEDs, in particular, has 

become increasingly frequent and has been ranked as the number one 

killer of U.S. troops in Iraq. The explosives used in IEDs consist mainly of 

dynamite, land mines, old artillery shells, or other types of military 

ordnance. Many IEDs are hidden and disguised along traffic routes, and 

are remotely detonated against unsuspecting military personnel. 

When combat operations were declared over during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF), U.S. and coalition forces transitioned to stabilization 

operations to restore public order and infrastructure in Iraq. Since that 

time, U.S. forces have come under frequent and deadly attacks from 

insurgents using a variety of weapons— including improvised explosive 

devices (IED), mortars, and rocket launchers—and there have been 

numerous attacks on military convoys as they carry supplies and 

equipment throughout the region. The threat of IEDs, in particular, has 

become increasingly frequent and has been ranked as the number one 

killer of U.S. troops in Iraq. The explosives used in IEDs consist mainly of 

dynamite, land mines, old artillery shells, or other types of military 

ordnance. Many IEDs are hidden and disguised along traffic routes, and 

are remotely detonated against unsuspecting military personnel. 

As a result of experiences in Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and 

the services have taken several immediate steps to improve the protection 

of military forces operating in the region. Among these is the fielding of 

new capabilities to counter emerging threats encountered in Iraq, to 

include such improvements as add-on and integrated armor for trucks, 

body armor, and systems for detecting and defeating IEDs. 

As a result of experiences in Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and 

the services have taken several immediate steps to improve the protection 

of military forces operating in the region. Among these is the fielding of 

new capabilities to counter emerging threats encountered in Iraq, to 

include such improvements as add-on and integrated armor for trucks, 

body armor, and systems for detecting and defeating IEDs. 

In response to increasing widespread interest by Congress and the public

regarding the availability of critical force protection equipment for 

deployed troops, such as body armor and armor for high-mobility 

multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and other vehicles, we initiated 

In response to increasing widespread interest by Congress and the public

regarding the availability of critical force protection equipment for 

deployed troops, such as body armor and armor for high-mobility 

multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and other vehicles, we initiated 

Page 1 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
a series of engagements under the authority of the Comptroller General of

the United States to examine this issue. In April 2005 we reported on 

shortages of a number of critical items during OIF, to include certain 

protective items such as body armor and armored HMMWVs.1

 We 

identified a number of systemic causes for these shortages, including 

inaccurate requirements, delayed funding, and ineffective distribution 

processes. As a result, we made several recommendations to the Secretary

of Defense calling for actions, such as ensuring the accuracy of Army war 

reserve requirements and developing and exercising deployable 

distribution capabilities, to improve DOD’s system for supplying items to 

U.S. forces. In March 2006, we reported on several factors that affected the

production and installation of Army truck armor during OIF and other 

current wartime operations.2

 These factors included the Army’s failure to 

fully capitalize on previously identified truck armor requirements and 

awarding contracts for amounts less than total requirements due to 

increasing needs for truck armor and inadequate funding. In our report, we 

made a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense calling for the Army 

to establish a process for documenting and communicating all urgent 

wartime funding requirements for supplies and equipment when they are

identified and the disposition of funding decisions. 

This current engagement examines issues affecting the production and 

installation of armor for medium and heavy trucks used by Marine Corps 

forces during OIF and other ongoing operations in the U.S. Central 

Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility.3

 Our objectives were to 

(1) determine the extent to which Marine Corps truck armor was 

produced and installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what 

factors affected the time to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what 

actions the Marine Corps and DOD have taken to improve the timely 

availability of truck armor. 

 1

 GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items 

during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).

2

 GAO, Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Procurement and Installation of 

Army Truck Armor During Current Wartime Operations, GAO-06-160 (Washington D.C.:

Mar. 22, 2006). 

3

 CENTCOM is one of DOD’s five geographic combatant commands, whose area of

responsibility encompasses 27 countries in Southwest Asia, South and Central Asia, and 

the Horn of Africa. In addition to Operation Iraqi Freedom, CENTCOM is involved in 

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The other four geographic combatant 

commands are U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, 

and U.S. Northern Command.

Page 2 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
In conducting this review, we focused on medium and heavy tactical 

trucks used by Marine Corps forces in the CENTCOM area of 

responsibility, which included those in Iraq and Afghanistan.4

 To identify 

the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed to meet 

identified requirements and what factors affected the time to provide 

armor, we visited Marine Corps organizations to obtain data on the 

requirements, funding, production, and installation of truck armor kits. We 

considered the armor requirement as met for each type of truck when the 

quantity of add-on and integrated armor produced and installed on 

vehicles equaled the requirement. Based on the information gathered, we

identified factors that affected the time to provide truck armor to deployed 

forces. We also identified the Marine Corps’ short-term and long-term 

efforts to improve the availability of truck armor. We assessed the 

reliability of the data we obtained and determined that they were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We performed our 

review from April 2005 to March 2006 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. A more detailed discussion of 

our scope and methodology is located in appendix I. 

The Marine Corps met its requirements for the production and installation 

of add-on truck armor in September 2004—8 months after that 

requirement was identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck armor 

requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In the first 

phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in January 2004 to

armor 1,169 trucks for protection against IEDs and other similar threats. 

Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by March 2004,

the Marine Corps addressed this initial requirement by installing interim 

armor on all 1,169 trucks. However, the interim armor did not meet 

requirements because it did not provide sufficient protection from the 

fragmentation effects of IEDs. Marine Corps officials acknowledged that

the interim armor provided protection against the prevalent ballistic threat 

at the time but offered only limited protection against IEDs. These officials 

stated that their intent was to field some level of protection until a more 

robust armor solution became available. In the second phase, the Marine 

Corps increased its armor requirement to 1,438 trucks in April 2004 and 

Results in Brief 

 4

 The Marine Corps also developed armor for HMMWVs, a light tactical wheeled vehicle. 

We examined availability of armor for HMMWVs in our prior report on wartime supply 

availability, so we did not include them in this review. See GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions 

Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items during Current and Future

Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).

Page 3 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
fully met that requirement in September 2004 with add-on armor that 

provided the required IED protection. In the third phase, the Marine Corps 

is upgrading armor protection from add-on armor to integrated armor for 

900 7-ton trucks in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were included in the 1,438

trucks armored in the second phase. As of March 2006, 803 integrated 

armor kits have been installed, and the Marine Corps expects to complete 

installation of integrated armor by May 2006. The other trucks (5-ton truck 

and 22-ton bulk hauler) are not receiving integrated armor because they 

are at the end of their economic life cycle and will be replaced. 

Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine 

Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the 

Marine Corps and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and 

solutions resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor 

requirements and seeking armor solutions 2 months later than the Army. 

This delay may have limited the Marine Corps’ ability to field interim 

armor that met IED protection requirements in the first phase, and may 

have contributed to the time to provide add-on truck armor to deployed 

Marine Corps forces in the second phase. The Marine Corps did not 

officially identify a requirement for truck armor and did not begin seeking 

out armor materials from industry until January 2004. According to Marine 

Corps officials, the armor-grade steel needed for sufficient IED protection 

was not available from suppliers in time to meet the Marine Corps’ 

deployment timeline of March 2004. As a result, the Marine Corps fielded 

the interim armor with only limited IED protection. However, the Army 

identified its initial truck armor requirement in November 2003 and begun 

developing armor kits using the preferred type of steel at this time. Had 

the Marine Corps began seeking armor solutions in November 2003, it 

might have been able to acquire the preferred type of steel in time for its 

March 2004 deployment to Iraq given the average lead times for this steel 

during this time and the willingness of industry to work with the Marine 

Corps to expedite the availability. Second, mission needs restricted the 

rate at which the Marine Corps could replace its interim armor with addon armor and install integrated armor. As a result, the fielding of add-on 

armor and integrated armor was stretched out over a longer period, 

placing troops at greater risk as they conducted wartime operations in 

vehicles without the preferred level of protection. 

The Marine Corps and DOD have taken several actions to improve the 

timely availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment. 

For example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for 

integrated armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The Marine 

Corps also is taking longer-term actions, such as developing a plan to 

Page 4 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
address the availability of truck armor for future operations. While we did 

not evaluate this plan, we did note that it is aimed at identifying long-term 

requirements for truck armor and developing solutions to address these 

requirements. In addition, DOD established the Rapid Validation and 

Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) process to 

improve coordination of wartime combatant commander requirements, 

and to accelerate the process of fielding urgent wartime solutions that are 

outside the services’ established requirement processes. However, it is 

unclear whether this process applies to urgent wartime needs such as 

armor because it excludes the development of new technology solutions. 

To ensure that the services make informed and coordinated decisions 

about what materiel solutions are developed and procured to address 

common urgent wartime requirements, we are making recommendations 

that the Secretary of Defense (1) direct the service secretaries to establish 

a process to share information on developed or developing materiel 

solutions and (2) clarify the point at which the JUONS process should be 

utilized when materiel solutions require research and development. In 

written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the 

second recommendation, but stated it believes that multiple layers of 

communication already exist between the Marine Corps and the Army to 

satisfy the first recommendation. However, as evidenced in our report, 

these various layers of communication were not sufficient to bring the 

services’ two truck armor programs together in a more uniform and 

coordinated approach from the beginning to ensure that requirements 

were identified and solutions developed for both services at the same time.

DOD also provided additional comments related to the context and 

accuracy of the report, which we incorporated as appropriate. The 

department’s written comments and our evaluation of them are discussed 

in appendix III. 

Marine Corps convoys carrying supplies and equipment in CENTCOM’s 

area of responsibility have been subjected to deadly attacks by insurgents 

using IEDs and other weapons. In response to these attacks, the Marine 

Corps has undertaken several force protection measures, such as adding

armor to a number of medium and heavy trucks operating in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and other CENTCOM locations. The Marine Corps fielded 

truck armor after identifying requirements and then designing and 

procuring three different levels of armor and fielding that armor in three 

different phases. 

Background 

Page 5 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Military convoys operating in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility have been 

subjected to deadly attacks by enemy forces. In particular, attacks in Iraq 

by insurgents using IEDs have placed trucks and personnel at tremendous 

risk as they carry supplies and equipment throughout the region. In May 

2003, U.S. and coalition forces began stabilization operations in Iraq that 

continue today. However, since that time, the United States has incurred 

more casualties than during major combat operations, mostly due to 

ambushes and IED attacks by insurgents operating in Iraq. The threat from

IEDs has grown progressively, from single mortar rounds, to multiple 

explosives linked together, to suicide car bombs. In the spring of 2004, 

nearly every attack from an IED resulted in a coalition casualty. In 

particular, U.S. military convoys have been the targets of these types of 

attacks. In addition to Iraq, U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan also have

been subjected to IED attacks. 

IEDs take a variety of shapes and sizes and have been employed in a 

number of different ways. They can contain commercial or military 

explosives, homemade explosives, or military ordnance and ordnance 

components. For example, mortar and artillery projectiles have been 

employed as IEDs in Iraq. In addition, IEDs have been placed in many 

vehicles—from small sedans to large cargo trucks—stationed along the 

roadways. Furthermore, “person-borne” suicide bombs have also been 

used, with explosives contained in a vest, belt, or clothing that is 

specifically modified to conceal and carry this material. 

In light of the threat posed by IEDs and other weapons, such as mortars 

and rocket launchers, the Marine Corps has undertaken several force 

protection measures, including adding armor to a number of medium and 

heavy trucks operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other CENTCOM 

locations.5

 The trucks being armored by the Marine Corps include the 

Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR, or 7-ton truck), the 

multipurpose 5-ton truck, and the 22-ton Logistics Vehicle System (LVS). 

The MTVR and 5-ton are multipurpose medium trucks that transport all 

types of supplies. The LVS is a heavy truck that transports a variety of 

supplies and equipment such as bulk liquids (fuel and water), ammunition, 

bulk and palletized cargo, and bridging equipment. Appendix II contains a 

Deployed U.S. Forces Face 

a Significant Threat from 

IEDs 

Outfitting Marine Corps 

Trucks with Armor 

 5

 Other force protection measures taken include the fielding of personal body armor and

electronic IED countermeasures, as well as changes to unit-level training. 

Page 6 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
detailed description of each Marine Corps vehicle and a discussion of 

armor production and installation. 

Processes for Developing 

Wartime Requirements and 

Solutions 

The Marine Corps identified wartime truck armor requirements and 

initiated a procurement program to develop armor solutions, which 

involved seeking funding from a variety of sources, identifying and 

contracting with suppliers for armor materials and components, designing 

and testing armor solutions, and installing armor onto trucks. 

When a need for new equipment is identified by Marine Corps warfighters, 

units make official requests through the Marine Corps’ requirements 

process by submitting a universal needs statement, which acts as a “work 

request” for current and future wartime capabilities. For example, the 

universal needs statements for truck armor described an urgent need to 

protect all Marine Corps vehicles from the fragmentation effects of IEDs 

and other threats and specified the numbers and types of trucks to be 

armored. Universal needs statements are forwarded from units to the 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, Virginia, 

where they are validated and approved for funding by the Marine 

Requirements Oversight Council.6

 Upon validation, the statements are 

forwarded to the Program and Review office at Marine Corps headquarters 

to obtain funding and to Marine Corps Systems Command for 

procurement. The Marine Corps validated its first requirement for truck 

armor in January 2004 prior to the deployment of the First Marine 

Expeditionary Force to Southwest Asia. 

Process for Developing 

Wartime Requirements 

To address validated requirements for truck armor, the Marine Corps 

initiated a procurement program to develop armor solutions for its 

deployed trucks. The Marine Corps obtained funding for its armor 

program from a variety of sources. While the services can reprogram a 

Development of Truck Armor 

Solutions 

 6

 The Marine Requirements Oversight Council advises the Commandant of the Marine

Corps on policy matters related to concepts, force structure, and requirements validation. 

It is chaired by the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and is composed of

permanent and associate members. At the direction of the Commandant, the council is to: 

(1) conduct comprehensive reviews of critical issues and programs to develop optimal, 

balanced Marine Corps positions by considering current operational needs, desired future 

capabilities, and feasible alternatives based on resource constraints; (2) review, prioritize,

and approve Mission Need Statements, Operational Requirements Documents, and force 

structure recommendations; and (3) develop recommendations for Marine Corps

requirements, related strategies, and positions that are supported and funded by external 

agencies and other services. 

Page 7 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
small amount of funds from one program budget to another, the majority 

of funding had to be approved by the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Comptroller) and, in some cases, Congress. Specifically, to 

obtain funding for truck armor, the Marine Corps sought approval from 

the DOD Comptroller and Congress to reprogram funding from other 

procurement or appropriations accounts,7

 requested funding from the 

DOD-managed Iraqi Freedom Fund,8

 and requested funding through 

supplemental appropriations. 

The Marine Corps Systems Command was the activity responsible for 

developing truck armor solutions to address validated Marine Corps 

requirements. Systems Command’s armoring efforts consisted of a phased

approach to develop and field three distinct levels of armor: interim armor 

components, add-on armor kits, and integrated armor. Table 1 shows the 

Marine Corps’ armoring phases with the type of armor used in each phase.

Table 1: Marine Corps Armor Phases and Types of Armor 

Phase I Phase II Phase III 

Interim armor Add-on armor Integrated armor 

Kevlar/ceramic and 3/16-

inch high hard steel (HHS) 

3/8-inch rolled homogeneous 

armor (RHA) 

Armor integrated into the 

body of the vehicle 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Marine Corps data. 

The phase one interim armor consisted of commercial off-the-shelf and 

Marine Corps depot-produced armor components, such as 3/16-inch high 

hard steel (HHS)9

 armor doors, ballistic blankets, and Kevlar/ceramic 

panels. Recognizing that the interim armor provided limited protection 

from IED fragments, the Marine Corps subsequently produced a more 

robust solution of add-on armor for phase two that provided greater 

 7

 The services are allowed to reprogram, without DOD approval, a total of up to $20 million 

per year into the procurement account that includes armor kits. However, because the 

funding needed for armor kits exceeded this amount, the services had to request approval 

from the DOD Comptroller for any reprogramming of funds in excess of the $20 million, 

which in turn had to be approved by Congress.

8

 The Iraqi Freedom Fund is a special account providing funds for use of military forces in 

Iraq and those operations authorized by Pub. L. No. 107-40 (2001), Authorization for use of

Military Force, and other operations and related activities in support of the global war on

terrorism. 

9

 High hard steel has a high surface hardness level which provides good protection against 

projectiles. 

Page 8 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
protection against IEDs and roadside bombs. This add-on armor initially 

included 3/8-inch rolled homogeneous armor (RHA)10 steel doors and side 

panels, and ballistic glass. Later, as the threat became more lethal, the 

Marine Corps began producing and installing additional add-on armor 

coverage for phase two that included underbodies, roofs, tailgates, rear 

cab plates, and gunner shields. To produce add-on armor kits, Systems 

Command used its own Logistics Command to produce and ship the addon armor kits. The Logistics Command obtained the armor panels and 

components directly from suppliers and manufactured some parts in its 

depot, and shipped kits directly to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility for 

installation. 

As an improvement over add-on armor already fielded, in phase three the 

Marine Corps is currently installing an integrated armor kit for the MTVR. 

Unlike add-on armor, integrated armor is a permanent modification and is 

designed for the life of the vehicle. Integrated armor provides the greatest 

level of protection through more comprehensive coverage. The integrated 

truck armor kits are produced by Oshkosh Truck Corporation. Installing 

integrated armor is much more complex than add-on armor because it 

requires stripping the truck to its frame and rebuilding. It takes a fiveperson crew more than 300 hours per vehicle to complete the installation 

of integrated armor. 

The Marine Corps met its requirements for production and installation of

add-on truck armor in September 2004—-8 months after that initial 

requirement was identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck armor 

requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In the first 

phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in January 2004 to

armor 1,169 trucks for protection against IEDs and other similar threats. 

Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by March 2004,

the Marine Corps addressed this initial requirement by installing interim 

armor on all 1,169 trucks. However, the interim armor did not meet 

requirements because it did not provide sufficient protection from the 

fragmentation effects of IEDs. In the second phase, the Marine Corps 

increased its armor requirement to 1,438 trucks in April 2004 and fully met 

that requirement in September 2004 with add-on armor that provided the 

required IED protection. In the third phase, the Marine Corps is upgrading 

Marine Corps Met 

Truck Armor

Requirements in 

September 2004 

 10 Rolled homogeneous steel has a lower surface hardness than high hard steel and 

provides good protection against both projectiles and the fragmentation effects of IEDs. 

Page 9 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
armor protection from add-on armor to integrated armor for 900 7-ton 

trucks in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were included in the 1,438 trucks 

armored during the second phase. 

First Phase Requirement 

Addressed with Interim 

Armor 

In its first phase of truck armoring, the Marine Corps validated its initial 

requirement to armor 1,169 trucks in January 2004. However, they 

addressed the requirement by installing interim armor that did not provide 

sufficient protection against IED fragments. Figure 1 shows Marine Corps 

production and installation of the interim armor protection over the 2-

month period taken to address the initial requirement. 

Figure 1: Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim Armor Protection 

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

Jan. Feb. Mar. 

Number of trucks

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Marine Corps data. 

Year 2004 

Required trucks

Armor installed 

Armor produced 

Interim armor

Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were unavailable, so the line in the 

graph simply indicates that sufficient purchase, production, and installation occurred to meet the 

requirements. 

Due to the immediacy of the need for armor and because forces were 

preparing to deploy in 2 months, in January 2004 Marine Corps officials 

purchased truck armor that was readily available, could be quickly 

Page 10 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
shipped to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility, and was easily installed. 

This interim solution consisted of a mix of Kevlar/ceramic armor plates 

purchased off the shelf from commercial companies to protect doors, and 

3/16-inch HHS armor plates produced by a Marine Corps depot to protect 

doors and cargo areas. Officials said the interim armor protected against 

the prevalent ballistic threat at the time and was readily available off the 

shelf from industry. However, this interim armor did not meet the 

validated requirements. Part of this requirement was to address an urgent 

need to protect all Marine Corps vehicles from the fragmentation effects of

IEDs. Marine Corps officials said an integral part of the Marine Corps’ 

armoring strategy was to procure and install armor on all vehicles prior to 

going to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility, using the best materials 

readily available at the time. According to congressional testimony by the

Systems Command’s Commanding General, the Marine Corps always 

made clear the fact that they would pursue a more robust solution as 

better raw material steel became available.11 As a result, the interim armor 

fielded by the Marine Corps offered limited protection from IEDs and 

troops were placed at greater risk as they conducted operations in 

vehicles equipped with insufficient protection. 

Second Phase 

Requirement Met with 

Add-On Armor 

The second phase of truck armoring began in April 2004, when a second 

requirement to armor 1,438 trucks with 3/8-inch RHA steel was validated 

and then met 5 months later using add-on armor that provided the required

IED protection. To meet this requirement, the Marine Corps had to rearmor the existing 1,169 trucks that had interim armor, plus armor an 

additional 269 trucks with the required IED protection. Installation of addon armor on the trucks was completed in September 2004, 5 months after 

establishment of the April requirement and 8 months after establishment 

of the initial requirement. Figure 2 shows Marine Corps production and 

installation of the add-on armor protection over the 5-month period 

needed to meet the April requirement. 

 11 “Marine Corps Vehicle Armoring,” Testimony Before the House Armed Services

Committee by Major General (Sel) William D. Catto, Commanding General, Marine Corps 

Systems Command, May 5, 2005. 

Page 11 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Figure 2: Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim and Add-on Armor

Protection 

0 

200 

400 

600 

800 

1,000 

1,200 

1,400 

1,600 

Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. 

Number of trucks

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Marine Corps data.

Year 2004 

Required trucks

Armor installed 

Armor produced 

Interim armor Add-on armor 

Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were unavailable, so the line in the 

graph simply indicates that sufficient production and installation occurred to meet the requirements. 

Dotted line over the graph indicates some overproduction occurred. 

Since the time the Marine Corps met its second phase armor requirement 

with the installation of 3/8-inch RHA add-on armor, it continued to make 

improvements to that armor during the second phase to better protect 

against IED fragments. According to officials, the upgrades included 

expanding armor coverage to the underbodies, tailgates, roofs, and gunner 

shields of the trucks. For example, the Marine Corps installed underbodies 

on 87 of the 5-ton trucks12 and underbodies on all 235 LVS trucks. 

Upgraded add-on armor has also been installed on the MTVRs until the 

MTVRs with integrated armor could be fielded. According to Marine Corps 

 12 The Marine Corps has 123 5-ton trucks, but because the 5-ton trucks are being phased out 

of theater operations, 87 will receive upgraded protection, such as underbody kits, because 

the remaining trucks will not be used outside the forward operating bases. 

Page 12 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
officials, this improved add-on armor offers significant protection of 

vehicles, including coverage for the seams to better shield against 

explosive blasts and fragments. 

Third Phase Requirements 

To Be Met with Integrated 

Armor 

In the third phase of truck armoring, the Marine Corps established two 

requirements to armor MTVRs with integrated armor. The first 

requirement to armor 1,018 MTVRs was validated in October 2004, but was 

reduced to 900 in June 2005 primarily due to the rotation of fewer troops 

and trucks in and out of CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. The Marine 

Corps plans to install armor on 900 MTVRs for forces in Iraq and 

Afghanistan by May 2006. As of March 2006, the Marine Corps had 

completed installation of integrated armor on 803 MTVRs. Figure 3 shows 

Marine Corps production and installation of the integrated armor 

protection. 

Page 13 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Figure 3: Requirement, Production, and Installation of Integrated Armor

Number of trucks

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Marine Corps data. 

Required trucks

Armor installed 

Armor produced 

Fiscal year 

Integrated armor 

0 

200 

400 

600 

800 

1,000 

1,200 

2004 2005 

Au

Sept. 

Oct. 

Nov. 

Dec. 

Jan.

g. 

Oct. 

Nov. 

Dec. 

Jan. 

Feb. 

Mar. 

Apr. 

May 

Jun. 

Jul. 

Feb. 

Mar. 

2006 

Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were unavailable, so the dotted line in 

the graph simply indicates the amount of armor produced by March 2006 to meet the requirements. 

According to Marine Corps officials, since the MTVR is at the beginning of

its economic life cycle, the Marine Corps decided to armor this truck with 

armor that was integrated into the body of the truck. Marine Corps 

officials said that only the MTVR trucks will receive the integrated armor 

because both of the other types of trucks used (the 5-ton and 22-ton bulk

hauler) are at the end of their economic life cycle and are expected to be

replaced over the next 5 years by the MTVRs and the Logistics Vehicle 

System Replacement (LVSR). 

Page 14 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine 

Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the 

Marine Corps and the Army on truck armor requirements and solutions 

resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor requirements and 

seeking armor solutions 2 months later than the Army. Second, mission 

needs also affected the Marine Corp’s ability to replace its interim armor 

with add-on armor and to install integrated armor. As a result, the total 

length of time to field add-on armor and integrated armor was stretched 

out over a longer period, placing troops at greater risk as they conducted 

wartime operations in vehicles without the preferred level of protection. 

A lack of synchronization between the Marine Corps and Army in 

identifying truck armor requirements and coordinating an armor solution 

from industry may have limited the Marine Corps’ ability to field interim 

armor that met IED protection requirements and may have contributed to 

the time to provide the second phase armor protection to deployed Marine 

Corps forces. The Marine Corps began procuring 3/8-inch RHA armor for 

effective protection against IED fragments in late February 2004—3 

months after the Army identified this armor as a solution for IED 

protection in November 2003. After testing many types of armor materials 

to protect against IEDs, the Army subsequently issued armor protection 

guidance in December 2003 recognizing HHS and Kevlar/ceramic plates, 

which the Marine Corps purchased for its interim armor solution in 

January 2004, as ineffective against IED fragments. The guidance also 

stated that 3/8-inch RHA steel offered good protection against IED blasts 

and fragments. Marine Corps officials said they were aware of the Army’s 

armor protection guidance and had pursued acquiring 3/8-inch RHA steel 

in January, but it was not available from industry to meet their needs. As a 

result, as an interim solution to meet deployment deadlines, they 

purchased the best armor steel available, although it did not provide 

sufficient IED protection. 

Lack of a 

Synchronized 

Approach between 

the Services and 

Mission Needs 

Affected the Time to 

Provide Truck Armor 

to Marine Corps 

Forces 

Lack of Synchronization 

between the Marine Corps 

and Army in Identifying 

Truck Armor 

Requirements and 

Developing Solutions May 

Have Affected Armor 

Availability For Deploying 

Units 

To verify whether a shortage of 3/8-inch RHA steel occurred during the 

January and March 2004 time frame, we asked several steel suppliers who 

had supplied steel to an Army and Marine Corps steel distributor whether 

3/8-inch RHA was in short supply. Industry officials told us that if the 

Marine Corps had requested 3/8-inch RHA steel directly from them, they 

could have made it available sooner despite a lead time that varied from 30 

Page 15 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
days to 4 months. In fact, according to industry officials, both the 3/16-inch 

HHS and 3/8-inch RHA steel required the same amount of lead time. 

Ultimately, in early February 2004, the Marine Corps approached industry 

with the assistance of congressional staff, and by the end of February, 3/8-

inch RHA steel became available. By March 2004, the Marine Corps began 

producing 3/8-inch RHA add-on armor for their second phase armor effort. 

A formal process did not exist to require the military services to

coordinate when developing common wartime requirements, such as truck 

armor, or share information on research, development, and procurement 

efforts supporting solutions to those requirements. Both the Marine Corps 

and Army have separate and distinct requirements determination 

processes to address their warfighters’ urgent needs. The two services 

share information only through informal communication channels, which 

may not always occur in the timeliest manner. For example, the Marine 

Corps validated its first requirement to armor vehicles against IEDs and 

other explosive devices in January 2004, 2 months after the Army had 

validated a similar requirement in November 2003. In addition, in 

November 2003, the Army had built a prototype armor kit for production 

made out of 3/8-inch RHA steel, which is what the Marine Corps officials 

said they began seeking 2 months later but were unable to obtain. If both 

the Marine Corps and Army had coordinated requirements earlier and had 

worked together to purchase 3/8-inch RHA steel from industry in 

November 2003, the Marine Corps might have had 3/8-inch RHA available 

for its first armor phase instead of the 3/16-inch HHS it used for interim 

armor, or might have completed its second armor phase sooner than 

September 2004. Without a formal process for coordinating common 

urgent wartime requirements and the development of materiel solutions 

across military services, the Army and Marine Corps could continue to 

develop different solutions with varying degrees of effectiveness in 

response to the same warfighter needs. 

Mission Needs Affected 

Production and 

Installation of Truck 

Armor 

The production and installation of truck armor was also affected by 

mission needs. Specifically, mission needs restricted the rate at which 

armor could be installed onto vehicles in the theater of operations. 

According to Marine Corps officials, the need to install armor without 

jeopardizing theater missions limited the number of vehicles that could be

taken out of action at any one time. As a result, installation rates for the 

Marine Corps’ add-on and integrated armor were paced with the rotation 

of trucks into the maintenance area as they returned from missions. In 

addition, the installation of integrated armor on the MTVR trucks also has 

been constrained by lengthy installation times—on average it takes a fivePage 16 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
person crew more than 300 hours per vehicle to install a single kit. As a 

result of these constraints, the installation of add-on and integrated truck 

armor was stretched out over a longer period, and the Marine Corps 

provided funding and set production rates for add-on armor components 

to match the limited rate of installation. Consequently, troops were placed 

at greater risk as they conducted operations in vehicles that were 

equipped with the interim armor that provided limited protection from 

IEDs. 

The Marine Corps and DOD have taken several actions to improve the 

timely availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment. 

For example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for 

integrated armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The Marine 

Corps is also developing a longer-term plan to address the availability of

truck armor for future operations. In addition, DOD established the Rapid 

Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) 

process to improve coordination of combatant commander wartime 

requirements common to multiple services and to accelerate the process 

of fielding urgent wartime solutions that are outside the services’ 

established requirements processes. However, it is unclear whether this 

policy applies to urgent wartime needs such as armor because it excludes

the development of new technology solutions. 

The Marine Corps is taking short-term and long-term actions to improve 

the availability of truck armor. In the short term, to address current armor 

needs for deployed forces in Iraq and other CENTCOM locations, the 

Marine Corps accelerated the rate of installation by increasing the number 

of installation sites for integrated armor kits. For example, as of August 

2005, the Marine Corps had installed integrated armor on 41 MTVRs using 

one installation site in Iraq, and as of October 2005 it had installed armor 

on 177 MTVRs using two sites—one in Iraq and one in Kuwait. The Marine 

Corps opened a third site in November 2005 at the Marine Corps Logistics 

Command in Albany, Georgia to further increase installation rates. As a 

result of the increased number of installation sites, total installation of 

integrated armor increased to 803 MTVRs as of March 2006.

Marine Corps and 

DOD Took Actions to 

Improve Truck Armor 

Availability 

Marine Corps Is Taking 

Short-and Long-Term 

Actions to Improve Armor 

Availability 

The Marine Corps is also taking longer-term actions to improve the 

availability of truck armor for future operations. For example, the Marine 

Corps has developed a strategic plan for tactical wheeled vehicles that 

addresses future truck armor needs. According to Marine Corps officials, 

the plan involves ongoing assessments of the Marine Expeditionary Force 

Page 17 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
concept of warfare—the need to stay light and expeditionary—and 

limitations of available airlift and seabasing that impact the amount of 

armor applied to a vehicle. In addition, the Marine Corps is also 

investigating future kit-armoring strategies with the Army using the “A” kit 

and “B” kit concept identified in the Army’s long-term strategy. Under this

strategy, the Army’s plan for add-on armor for trucks requires two kits. 

The A kit provides a basic framework of fixtures for all trucks ready to 

accept armor and includes hard-to-install parts and permanent mounting 

provisions for the B kit. The B kit contains the actual armor to be applied

to all trucks fitted with an A kit and includes modular components that 

can be installed and removed by two people. The Marine Corps currently 

plans to incorporate this A kit/B kit armor concept onto its LVSR and 

MTVR as new vehicles are produced. Marine Corps officials told us that 

this concept addresses some of the concerns raised by Marine Corps 

officials, such as wear and tear on the vehicles due to the additional 

weight of the armor. Other long-term Marine Corps efforts underway 

include studies on future armoring needs and solutions. These studies are 

evaluating the ground transportation needs of the Marine Corps in an 

expeditionary context and will make recommendations regarding the 

value of current vehicle systems and necessary changes to develop and 

maintain a tactical wheeled vehicle fleet that meets Marine Corps 

requirements through 2020. While we did not evaluate these studies, we 

did note that they are aimed at identifying longer-term requirements for 

truck armor and developing solutions to address these requirements. 

DOD Has Taken Steps to 

Improve Coordination of 

Requirements across 

Services 

DOD has taken steps to improve coordination of urgent wartime needs 

across the services by developing the JUONS process. DOD established 

the JUONS process in July 2005 to improve coordination of combatant 

commanders’ urgent wartime requirements that are outside the services’ 

established processes to accelerate the fielding of wartime solutions that 

may be purchased off the shelf or warrant minor modification. However, 

according to Army officials, it is not clear whether the JUONS process 

addresses urgent wartime needs that may emerge in the same fashion as 

armor. The acquisition of an armor solution was in part an off-the-shelf 

purchase combined with some level of research and development of new 

technology. According to the JUONS instructions, solutions that involve 

the development of a new technology or capability should not be 

processed under the instruction’s procedures. However, the instruction 

also allows the minor modification of an existing system to adapt to a new 

or similar mission. Army officials said they were unclear whether urgent 

wartime requirements such as armor should be processed under JUONS

given that the armor solution can be described as both an off-the-shelf 

Page 18 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
solution with minor modification and a solution that required the 

development of new technology. For example, according to Army officials, 

the recently fielded armor solutions were readily available off the shelf 

and required some modification. However, officials also said that the 

armor solutions can be described as new and developing technology 

because research was needed to identify effective armor protection 

standards and new technology was necessary to integrate and apply armor 

onto vehicles. As a result, it is not clear if similar future requirements are 

to be processed under JUONS or other requirements generation processes. 

Until the types of solutions about which the JUONS process applies are 

more clearly defined, it is uncertain whether this process would apply to

joint urgent wartime requirements for items needing some level of 

research and development, such as truck armor. 

The results of our work on Marine Corps truck armor indicate a broader 

systemic problem with a lack of synchronization between the Marine 

Corps and Army in identifying common urgent wartime requirements and 

developing solutions to those requirements. Because there was no formal 

process requiring a synchronized approach between the two services for 

identifying requirements or developing solutions, the Marine Corps did not 

identify a requirement for truck armor or begin developing armor 

solutions until 2 months after the Army had done so. A more unified and

coordinated approach between the Marine Corps and the Army might have 

allowed the Marine Corps to field a better interim armor solution that 

provided sufficient protection against IEDs. In addition, earlier 

coordination may also have enabled the Marine Corps to begin developing 

and fielding its second phase of armor, which provided the required IED 

protection, sooner. Further, due to the lack of a formal process for sharing 

requirements information between the services, official documentation 

was not available to determine whether the Marine Corps made informed 

decisions about the materials it selected for its interim armor or to assess 

the basis for these decisions. While the work we performed focused on the 

Marine Corps and Army, the lack of a DOD-wide framework for 

coordinating wartime requirements and solutions impacts on all of the 

military services. 

Conclusions 

Subsequent to the procurement and installation of Marine Corps add-on 

truck armor, DOD established a new joint process, called JUONS, to 

ensure that the development of wartime requirements common to the 

Marine Corps, Army, and other services are coordinated. However, 

because this new process does not apply to the development of new 

technologies, it is not clear whether it will improve interservice 

Page 19 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
coordination when solutions involve some level of research and 

development, like truck armor. Without a formal process for coordinating 

all common wartime requirements and the development of materiel 

solutions across military services, the Army, Marine Corps, and other 

services could continue to develop different solutions with varying 

degrees of effectiveness in response to the same warfighter needs. It is 

likely that DOD will again face urgent wartime requirements common to 

multiple services to rapidly develop materiel solutions to improve force 

capability or protection of deployed forces. The effective coordination of 

common requirements and sharing of information on materiel solutions in 

development are critical to ensure the needs of the warfighter are met in 

the timeliest and most effective manner possible. Without improved 

coordination, deployed military personnel and their missions may be 

placed at significant risk because they lack the appropriate equipment at 

the critical times it may be needed. Furthermore, until a formal process for 

coordinating and sharing information on all common urgent wartime 

requirements and solutions is established, Congress and the Secretary of 

Defense may be unable to exercise effective oversight of decisions made 

to address urgent wartime requirements. 

To ensure that the services make informed and coordinated decisions 

about what materiel solutions are developed and procured to address 

common urgent wartime requirements, we recommend that the Secretary 

of Defense take the following two actions: (1) direct the service 

secretaries to establish a process to share information between the Marine

Corps and the Army on developed or developing materiel solutions, and 

(2) clarify the point at which the JUONS process should be utilized when 

materiel solutions require research and development. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with 

our recommendations. Regarding the first recommendation that DOD 

direct the services to establish a process to share information between the 

services on materiel solutions in development, DOD partially concurred, 

and stated that it believes that multiple layers of communication already

exist between the Marine Corps and the Army. For example, DOD cited 

the Marine Corps’ participation in the Army’s armor kit working group. 

DOD also noted that the Marine Corps coordinated with the Army 

Research Lab and the Army’s Aberdeen Test Center on armor kit design 

and testing. While we agree that the coordination between the Marine 

Corps and Army on truck armoring was beneficial to the Marine Corps’ 

program, these processes were generally informal in nature. As evidenced 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 20 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
in our report, these various layers of communication were not sufficient to

bring the services’ two truck armor programs together in a more uniform 

and coordinated approach from the beginning to ensure that requirements 

were identified and solutions developed for both services at the same time.

Instead, the Army identified its first truck armor requirements and began 

developing solutions in November 2003, while the Marine Corps did not 

begin its program until January 2004. As we reported, had the Marine 

Corps began seeking truck armor solutions in November 2003, if might 

have been able to acquire the preferred type of steel in time for its March 

2004 deployment to Iraq given the average lead times for this steel during 

this time period and the willingness of industry to work with the Marine 

Corps to expedite its availability. 

DOD further stated that it believes it met the intent of our 

recommendation with the creation of the Army-Marine Corps Board and 

the Navy-Marine Corps Board. As noted by DOD, these Boards address 

issues at the 3-star level and provide a means to share information 

between the services. According to DOD, the Army-Marine Corps Board 

was not mature enough to influence the initial development of truck 

armor, but in 2005 it was used to coordinate production delivery priority 

between the Army and Marine Corps for the up-armored HMMWV. While 

we agree that these Boards enhance the coordination between the two 

services, they represent an agreement between the services, initiated by

the services. The intent of our recommendation is for DOD to develop a 

more comprehensive DOD-wide process that requires synchronization and

coordination between the services in identifying common urgent wartime 

requirements and developing solutions to those requirements. 

In response to our second recommendation to clarify the point at which 

the JUONS process should be utilized, DOD concurred, stating that the 

Joint Staff is working on an update to the JOUNS process instruction. 

According to DOD, this update will clarify when and if the JOUNS process 

can be used when materiel solutions require development of a new 

technology or capability. The update is expected to be completed by 

September 2006. 

DOD provided additional comments related to the context of the report. 

Specifically, DOD noted that it believes the Marine Corps exhibited due 

diligence in providing armor protection for its deployed tactical wheeled

vehicle fleet. It further described in detail the Marine Corps’ approach to 

first develop an interim solution using commercially available materials, 

including 3/16-inch HHS, to ensure all vehicles entering Iraq would have at 

least some protection until armor with a better level of protection could be

Page 21 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
fielded. We agree that the Marine Corps exercised diligence in armoring its 

trucks for Iraq and other deployed locations given the circumstances and 

we believe this information is accurately presented in the report. However, 

as noted in the report, a more unified and synchronized approach between 

the Army and the Marine Corps may have improved the availability of the 

preferred 3/8-inch RHA for the Marine Corps’ interim armor. 

DOD also provided additional comments related to the accuracy of the 

report which we have incorporated in the report as appropriate. The 

department’s specific comments and our responses to them are discussed 

in detail in appendix III. In summary, the department disagreed with our 

statements regarding the (1) lack of coordination between the Marine 

Corps and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and 

solutions, (2) lack of a formal departmentwide process to ensure 

interservice coordination, and (3) delays in the Marine Corps’ 

identification of the requirement for 3/8-inch RHA and its attempts to 

acquire and install this improved armor. While we acknowledge that the 

Marine Corps made attempts to coordinate with the Army through various

informal processes, evidence showed that the lack of a synchronized 

approach between the services led to differing processes within the 

services for generating armor requirements and solutions. Similarly, while 

we agree that the department had a number of interservice working 

groups and committees designed to enhance interservice coordination, we 

continue to believe that the lack of a more formal interservice

coordination process precluded the Marine Corps and the Army from 

identifying armor requirements and solutions for both services at the same 

time. Lastly, while the department refuted our evidence that the Marine 

Corps did not identify a requirement for 3/8-inch RHA until April 2004, it 

was unable to adequately document its position. See appendix III for a 

more detailed discussion of these issues. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army and the 

Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Director of the 

Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to 

others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge 

on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report, 

please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

Page 22 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix IV.

William M. Solis, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 23 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To address our objectives, we examined the Marine Corps’ programs to 

provide armor for each of its medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles, 

or trucks, operating in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of 

responsibility.1

 The Marine Corps trucks we examined included the 5-ton,

Logistics Vehicle System, and Marine Tactical Wheeled Vehicle 

Replacement. Descriptions of each of these trucks along with detailed 

information on the availability of armor for each truck are included in 

appendix II.

To determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed 

to meet identified requirements and the factors that affected the time to 

provide armor, we interviewed Marine Corps officials involved in 

identifying armor requirements, providing funding, and acquiring truck 

armor for deployed forces. We conducted interviews at the Marine Corps 

Systems Command and Marine Corps Combat Development Command in 

Quantico, Virginia; the Marine Corps Logistics Command in Albany, 

Georgia; Army headquarters in Arlington, Virginia; and the U.S. Army 

Development Test Command at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. We

also collected and analyzed armor supply data such as requirements, 

funding levels, production levels, and installations for the period between

January 2004 (when truck armor requirements were first formally 

identified) and March 2006, which we obtained from Marine Corps bases 

or source documents. We considered the armor requirement as met for 

each type of truck when the quantity of add-on or integrated armor 

produced and installed on vehicles equaled the requirement. We did not, 

however, visit CENTCOM’s area of responsibility to validate the extent to

which armor had been installed and was actually in use by trucks. Based 

on the information gathered, we identified factors that affected the time to

provide truck armor to deployed forces. 

To determine what actions the Marine Corps and the Department of 

Defense took to improve the availability of truck armor for current and 

future operations, we interviewed Marine Corps and Joint Staff personnel 

to identify short- and long-term efforts. We also reviewed the service’s 

 1

 The Marine Corps also developed armor for the high mobility multipurpose wheeled 

vehicle (HMMWV), a light tactical wheeled vehicle. We examined availability of armor for 

HMMWVs in our prior report on wartime supply availability, so we did not include them in 

this review. See GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of 

Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 8, 2005). 

Page 24 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

studies related to addressing future truck armor needs. However, we did 

not evaluate the identified solutions’ potential for success. 

We assessed the reliability of the truck armor supply data we obtained for

this review by interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data 

and corroborating them with other information gathered from other 

Marine Corps organizations. We determined that the data were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of this report. We performed our audit from April 

2005 through March 2006 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

Page 25 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix

Truc

 II: Assessment of Marine Corps 

k Armoring Efforts 

Page 26 GAO-06-274

Appendix II: Assessment of Marine Corps 

Truck Armoring Efforts 

We examined the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed 

to meet identified requirements for the following vehicles: the 

multipurpose 5-ton truck, the logistics vehicle system (LVS), and the 

medium tactical vehicle replacement (MTVR, or 7-ton truck). This 

appendix provides an assessment for each of these three truck types. Each

assessment presents a general description of each truck and our 

evaluation of the extent to which armor kits were produced and installed 

when required. 

The Marine Corps multipurpose 5-ton trucks provide transportation, 

hauling, and towing of just about everything in the equipment inventory. 

These trucks transport troops, supplies, ammunition, construction 

materials, and other items. These trucks also tow many types of trailers, 

artillery guns, and vans. Almost all Marine Corps units are equipped with 

5-ton trucks. As the primary truck transport asset of the Marine Corps, it is 

available in cargo, dump, tractor, and wrecker configurations. Figure 4 

shows an example of the 5-ton truck in a cargo configuration.

Multipurpose 5-Ton 

Trucks

Figure 4: Unarmored Marine Corps 5-Ton Multipurpose Truck

Source: U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command.

Defense Logistics
Appendix II: Assessment of Marine Corps 

Truck Armoring Efforts 

To meet requirements, the Marine Corps installed armor protection for the 

5-ton trucks in two phases. The first phase of armoring used interim 

armor, which included 3/16-inch HHS doors, Kevlar/ceramic panels, and 

ballistic blankets, and offered limited protection against improvised 

explosive devices (IEDs). The second phase of armoring used add-on 

armor, which offered better protection against IEDs because it included a 

better grade steel (3/8-inch rolled homogeneous steel), ballistic glass, and 

additional protection for the underbody, tailgate, roof, and other 

components. There is also an additional type of armor protection used by 

the Marine Corps, called integrated armor. However, integrated armor 

requirements were not established for the 5-ton truck because the 5-ton 

truck is at the end of its life cycle and is being replaced by MTVRs, or 7-ton 

trucks. In addition, according to Marine Corps officials, the 5-ton trucks 

make poor candidates for integrated armor because the added weight of 

the armor significantly reduces the payload capacity and usefulness of the 

trucks. 

Extent Truck Armor Was 

Produced and Installed to 

Meet Identified 

Requirements 

The Marine Corps armored its 5-ton trucks in two phases, responding to 

two validated requirements. The requirement addressed in the first phase, 

to armor 171 trucks, was validated in January 2004. Marine Corps officials 

said they met this requirement 2 months later, in March 2004, by installing 

an interim armor solution before the First Marine Expeditionary Force 

was deployed to Iraq. However, Marine Corps officials were unable to 

provide monthly data on the number of installations completed. Our 

analysis showed that, at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 123 door 

sets between April and September 2004 at the Marine Corps Logistics 

Command Maintenance Center in Albany, Georgia, and procured 3,830 

Kevlar/ceramic panels from commercial sources to address the 

requirement. According to Marine Corps officials, some of these 

Kevlar/ceramic panels were used to armor the 5-ton trucks. Due to the 

immediate need for armor prior to deployment, the Marine Corp met 

armor needs with the best available materials at the time—3/16-inch HHS

and Kevlar/ceramic plates. However, the armor did not provide sufficient 

IED protection. 

The requirement met in the second phase, to armor 185 5-ton trucks 

(including re-armoring the 171 trucks with interim armor), was validated 

in April 2004. Marine Corps officials said they met this requirement 5 

months later, in September 2004, by installing add-on armor kits that met 

requirements for IED protection, but they were unable to provide monthly 

data on the number of installations completed. Our analysis showed that, 

at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 199 5-ton armored door sets 

Page 27 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix II: Assessment of Marine Corps 

Truck Armoring Efforts 

between April and September 2004 to meet the requirement. Figure 5 

shows the requirements and installation levels for both interim armor and 

add-on armor for the 5-ton truck over time. As of September 2005, the 

Marine Corps had 123 add-on armored 5-ton trucks operating outside 

forward bases in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. Eighty-seven of them 

also received underbody armor.1

Figure 5: 5-Ton Truck Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim and 

Add-on Armor

Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were unavailable, so the dotted line in 

the graph simply indicates that sufficient production and installation occurred to meet the 

requirements, but is not representative of actual production quantities at given points in time. Dotted 

line over the graph also indicates some overproduction occurred. 

 1

 The Marine Corps has 123 5-ton trucks in theater, but because the 5-ton trucks are being 

phased out of theater operations, 87 received upgraded protection such as underbody kits 

while the rest will not be used off the forward operating bases. 

Page 28 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix II: Assessment of Marine Corps 

Truck Armoring Efforts 

The Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) is a heavy tactical transport vehicle

system for fuels and bulk cargos that was first fielded in the mid-1980s. It

is a modular system consisting of a front power unit (cab) that is designed 

to have interchangeable rear body units. The truck has an off-road payload 

of 12.5-tons and an on-road payload of 22.5-tons. Figure 6 shows the front 

body unit, which can tow five different rear body units. Rear body units 

include a wrecker, a fifth-wheel semitrailer adapter, a dropside cargo unit,

a self-loading container, and bridge transporter. 

Logistics Vehicle 

System

Figure 6: Armored Cab of the Marine Corps Logistics Vehicle System 

Source: U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command.

The Marine Corps installed armor protection on the LVS in two phases to 

meet requirements. The first phase of armoring used interim armor, which 

included Kevlar/ceramic panels, 3/16-inch HHS doors, and ballistic 

blankets, and offered limited protection against IEDs. The second phase of 

armoring used add-on armor, which offered better protection against IEDs 

because it included a better grade (3/8-inch rolled homogeneous) steel, 

ballistic glass, and additional protection for the underbody, tailgate, roof,

and other components. There is an additional type of armor protection 

established by the Marine Corps, called integrated armor, but, as with the 

5-ton truck, a requirement for this type of protection was not established 

Page 29 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix II: Assessment of Marine Corps 

Truck Armoring Efforts 

for the LVS because it will ultimately be replaced by a new truck called the 

Logistic Vehicle System Replacement during the 2008–2009 time frame. 

Extent Truck Armor Was 

Produced and Installed to 

Meet Identified 

Requirements 

The Marine Corps armored the LVS in two phases, responding to two 

requirements. The requirement addressed in the first phase, to armor 204 

trucks, was validated in January 2004. Marine Corp officials said they met

this requirement by installing an interim armor solution 2 months later, in

March 2004, before the First Marine Expeditionary Force was deployed to

Iraq. However, Marine Corps officials were unable to provide monthly data 

on the number of installations completed. Our analysis showed that, at a 

minimum, the Marine Corps produced 105 armored door sets at the Marine

Corps Logistic Command Maintenance Center between April and 

September 2004 and procured 3,830 Kevlar/ceramic panels from a 

commercial company, some of which were used to armor the LVS. Due to 

the immediate need for armor prior to deployment, the Marine Corps met 

armor needs with the best available materials at the time—3/16-inch HHS

and Kevlar/ceramic plates. However, this armor did not provide sufficient

protection against the fragmentation effects of IEDs. 

The requirement met in the second phase, to armor 221 trucks (including 

re-armoring the 204 trucks with interim armor), was established in April 

2004. Marine Corps officials said they met this requirement 5 months later, 

in September 2004, with add-on armor kits that met the validated 

requirements for protection from IEDs, but they were unable to provide 

monthly data on the number of installations completed. Our analysis 

showed that, at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 261 armored door 

sets between April and September 2004 at the Marine Corps Logistic 

Command Maintenance Center and procured 3,830 Kevlar/ceramic panels 

from a commercial company to meet the requirement. According to 

Marine Corps officials, some of the Kevlar/ceramic doors were used to 

armor the LVS. As of January 2006, Marine Corps fielding data revealed 

that 235 LVS trucks operating outside forward bases in CENTCOM’s area 

of responsibility had add-on armor. Figure 7 shows the requirements, 

production, and installation levels for both interim armor and add-on 

armor for the LVS over time. 

Page 30 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix II: Assessment of Marine Corps 

Truck Armoring Efforts 

Figure 7: LVS Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim and Add-on

Armor 

Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were unavailable, so the dotted line in 

the graph simply indicates that sufficient production and installation occurred to meet the 

requirements, but is not representative of actual production quantities at given points in time. Dotted 

line over the graph indicates some overproduction occurred. 

Page 31 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix II: Assessment of Marine Corps 

Truck Armoring Efforts 

The Marine Corps Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) is 

designed to replace the existing fleet of 5-ton trucks with a new and more 

robust fleet of 7-ton trucks. Figure 8 shows the MTVR as a troop carrier; 

however, it is also used as a wrecker, dump truck, cargo carrier, and 

convoy escort. According to a Marine Corps official, the service needed to

replace its existing medium 5-ton truck fleet with a vehicle capable of 

carrying larger payloads, at a faster speed, over more difficult terrain, and 

that can be airlifted. A contract was awarded to Oshkosh Truck 

Corporation in December 1998, and production is underway. 

Medium Tactical 

Vehicle Replacement 

Figure 8: Armored Medium Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Replacement 

Source: U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command.

To meet requirements, the Marine Corps installed armor protection for the 

MTVR in three phases. The first phase used interim armor, which includes 

Kevlar/ceramic panels, 3/16-inch HHS doors, and ballistic blankets, and 

offers limited protection against IEDs. The second phase used add-on 

armor, which provides greater protection from IEDs than the interim 

armor because it included 3/8-inch rolled homogeneous armor, ballistic 

glass, and additional protection for the underbody, side panels, tailgate, 

and other components. The Marine Corps continues to design and produce 

improvements to this add-on armor. The final armor phase used integrated 

Page 32 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix II: Assessment of Marine Corps 

Truck Armoring Efforts 

armor that is installed on the vehicle chassis and provides overlapping 

seams that prevent penetration from ballistics and IEDs. Figure 9 shows 

the requirements, production, and installation of each type of armor on the 

MTVR. 

Extent Truck Armor Was 

Produced and Installed to 

Meet Identified 

Requirements 

The Marine Corps is armoring the MTVR in three phases, responding to 

four requirements. The requirement addressed in the first phase, to armor 

794 trucks, was validated in January 2004. Marine Corps officials said they 

met this requirement by installing an interim armor solution 2 months 

later, in March 2004, before the First Marine Expeditionary Force was 

deployed to Iraq. However, Marine Corps officials were unable to provide 

data on the number of installations completed. Our analysis showed that, 

at a minimum, the Marine Corps produced 174 doors between April and 

September 2004 and procured 3,830 Kevlar/ceramic panels from a 

commercial company for the requirement. An unspecified number of these 

Kevlar/ceramic panels were used to armor the MTVR. Due to the 

immediate need for armor prior to deployment, the Marine Corp met 

armor needs with the best available materials at the time—3/16-inch HHS

and Kevlar/ceramic plates. However, this armor did not provide sufficient

protection against the fragmentation effects of IEDs. 

The requirement met in the second phase, to armor 1,032 MTVRs 

(including re-armoring the 794 trucks armored with interim armor), was 

validated in April 2004. Marine Corps officials said they met this 

requirement 5 months later, in September 2005, by installing add-on armor 

kits that met the validated requirements for protection from IEDs. 

However, they were unable to provide data on the number of installations 

completed. Our analysis showed that, at a minimum, the Marine Corps 

produced 1,966 armored doors between April and September 2004 to meet 

the requirement. The Marine Corps also produced 962 cargo panel sets 

(i.e., which were steel plated to protect the sides of the cargo unit) to 

protect transported troops. 

The armor protection installed in the third phase had two requirements. 

The first requirement, to armor 1,018 MTVRs (trucks that were already 

provided with add-on armor) with integrated armor, was validated in 

October 2004. However, in June 2005 this requirement was reduced to 

installing integrated kits on 900 MTVRs by May 2006, because fewer trucks 

than initially anticipated will be rotated into theater in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Since the MTVR is at the beginning of its economic life cycle, 

the Marine Corps made the decision to armor this truck with armor that 

was integrated into the body of the truck. Integrated armor is a permanent

Page 33 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix II: Assessment of Marine Corps 

Truck Armoring Efforts 

modification that requires stripping the truck to its frame and rebuilding. It

takes a five-person crew more than 300 hours to complete a single 

installation. As of March 2006, the Marine Corps has installed 803 

integrated kits on the MTVRs. 

Figure 9: MTVR Truck Requirements, Production, and Installation of Interim, Add-on, and Integrated Armor

Note: Precise monthly armor production and installation figures were unavailable, so the dotted line in 

the graph simply indicates that sufficient production and installation occurred to meet the 

requirements, but is not representative of actual production quantities at given points in time. Dotted 

line over the graph indicates some overproduction occurred. 

Page 34 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 35 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 37 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 38 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

See comment 1. 

See comment 2. 

See comment 3. 

Page 39 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

See comment 4. 

Page 40 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

See comment 5. 

See comment 6. 

See comment 7. 

See comment 8. 

Page 41 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

See comment 9. 

See comment 10. 

See comment 11. 

See comment 12. 

See comment 13. 

Page 42 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

1. DOD stated that our statement identifying a number of systemic 

causes for shortages in armor such as inaccurate requirements is 

misleading and that it implies that the Marine Corps did not consider 

the current threat analysis. However, this statement does not refer to 

the Marine Corps’s truck armor program. Rather, the statement is from 

the introduction of the report, where we discussed our prior work 

leading up to this review. Specifically, we noted that in April 2005 we 

reported on a number of critical supply shortages during OIF—

including armored HMMWVs, body armor, and other items—and 

inaccurate requirements was one of the systemic causes identified in 

the April 2005 report. 

GAO’s Responses to 

DOD’s Technical 

Comments 

2. DOD disagreed with our statement that the Marine Corps’ interim 

armor did not meet requirements, noting that armor protection 

requirements changed quickly over time and migrated from a small 

arms ballistic focus to a fragmentation focus, as the lethality of IEDs 

encountered increased. However, the December 2003 requirement 

document that the Marine Corps provided to us during our review 

clearly stated the need to protect all vehicles from improvised

explosive devices, mines, and other explosive ordnances. Documents 

we obtained from both the Marine Corps and Army recognized IEDs as 

a significant threat at the time. In fact, in DOD’s comments to this 

report, it noted that “in December 2003, both the Army and Marine 

Corps recognized that IEDs, RPGs, 7.62mm projectiles, and mines 

were the predominate threats.” Further, in November 2003, the Army 

had identified a requirement to protect vehicles from IEDs and 

recognized a need to purchase rolled homogenous armor (RHA), a type

of armor that proved effective against both the ballistic and IED threat 

after testing many armor types. 

3. DOD disagreed with our statement that a lack of coordination between 

the Marine Corps and Army on addressing truck armor requirements 

and solutions caused the Marine Corps to make decisions about the 

types of armor to use without having all the information that was 

available on protective capabilities of various armor types. We 

acknowledge that the Marine Corps made attempts to coordinate 

through various informal processes, such as the Armor Kit Working 

Group Integrated Process Team. However, evidence showed that a 

lack of a synchronized approach among the services was due to each

service having separate and distinct processes that generated the 

requirements to armor vehicles. The individual requirements processes 

led to the Marine Corps validating a requirement to armor vehicles 2 

months after the Army validated a similar requirement to armor its 

vehicles. 

Page 43 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Ultimately, the Marine Corps began seeking RHA armor in February 

2004—3 months after the Army began producing armor kits made out 

of RHA armor. Marine Corps officials told us that they began seeking 

RHA armor from industry earlier—in January 2004—but were told it 

was in short supply. However, Marine Corps officials have not 

provided documentary evidence to substantiate this claim. For 

example, in DOD’s comments to this report, it stated that the first 

purchase order for 3/8-inch RHA was on January 12, 2004. However, 

when we subsequently requested to see the purchase order, the Marine 

Corps noted that it was actually an Army purchase order. According to 

the Marine Corps, they made a phone inquiry to a steel vendor in 

January 2004, but have not provided documentation to support this 

assertion. In addition, we spoke with other steel suppliers about the 

availability of RHA during the January and March 2004 time frame. 

These industry officials told us that despite lead times for RHA that 

ranged from 30 days to 4 months, they could have made RHA available 

to the Marine Corps quicker if the Marine Corps had approached them 

directly. Moreover, although we agree that formal processes are in 

place for the Marine Corps to test armor types through the Army’s 

Testing Center (ATC), the Marine Corps coordination with the Army to 

install RHA armor kits on vehicles did not occur until the Marine 

Corps’ second phase of armoring. Furthermore, while the Marine 

Corps cited the Army-Marine Corps Board (AMCB) and the Joint IED 

Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) as other examples of Army and Marine 

Corps coordination in the development of armor solutions, these 

additional avenues for communication were not sufficient to bring the 

services’ two truck armor programs together in a synchronized 

approach to ensure that requirements were identified and solutions 

developed for both services at the same time. We further clarified this 

position in the report. 

4. DOD disagreed with our statement that the Marine Corps did not 

identify a requirement for 3/8-inch RHA until April 2004. It stated that 

the need for RHA armor was identified earlier but was in short supply 

from industry. While some Marine Corps officials told us that the 

Marine Corps was not seeking 3/8-inch RHA for its interim armor, 

other Marine Corps officials subsequently told us they became aware 

of the need for 3/8-inch RHA in December 2003 and first inquired about 

the availability of RHA steel with industry in January 2004. However, 

these officials have not provided adequate documentation to support 

the assertion or that RHA was not available from industry (see note (3) 

above). Further, a Marine Corps Logistics Command report on its 

armoring efforts indicated that the Marine Corps did not make the 

decision to use 3/8-inch RHA until March 2004. However, it was not 

Page 44 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

until April 2004 that the Marine Corps officially identified a need for 

3/8-inch RHA when it validated the requirement for the second armor 

phase. Due to the conflicting information, it remains unclear exactly 

when the Marine Corps became aware of the need for RHA. 

5. DOD disagreed with our statement that no formal process was in place 

to ensure interservice coordination. DOD acknowledged that there was 

no standing joint activity that addressed specific servicewide vehicle

hardening requirements at the time, and cited participation in and 

coordination with the AKWG IPT, ATC, AMCB and JIEDDO as 

instrumental in developing the Marine Corps’ truck armor solutions. 

While we agree that these organizations may have provided valuable 

information to the Marine Corps, as stated previously, this 

coordination was not sufficient to bring the services together to 

identify requirements and develop solutions for both services at the 

same time. 

6. DOD disagreed with our statement that troops were placed at greater 

risk as a result of the time required to replace the interim armor with 

add-on RHA armor and integrated armor. It noted that to accelerate 

the replacement of interim armor by taking a larger amount of vehicles 

out of service would create inherent risk to the operational 

commanders. We did not intend to suggest that the Marine Corps 

should have made this decision or that it could have done anything 

different given the operational conditions in the theater. Rather, we 

were simply stating that because of the time needed to replace the 

interim armor with the second generation RHA armor coupled with 

mission requirements, the vehicles were operating with less than the 

preferred armor solution. 

7. See note (1) and note (2).

8. See note (6). 

9. See note (3) and note (5).

10. See note (3) and note (4).

11. We agree that attempts were made to share information between the 

Army and Marine Corps, but we recommended a DOD-wide formal 

process to require interservice coordination (see also note 5).

12. See note (4). 

Page 45 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

13. In response to our discussion on the Marine Corps’ investigating 

future-kit armoring strategies using the “A” kit and “B” kit concept for 

armor kits, DOD added that the Marine Corps is now planning to 

incorporate this concept on its Logistics Vehicle Replacement (LVSR) 

and the MTVR. DOD further noted that the LVSR will be the first 

military vehicle to incorporate the A and B kit concept. We 

incorporated the current status of this program into the report. 

Page 46 GAO-06-274 Defense Logistics
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contacts and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 47 GAO-06-274

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, David Schmitt, Assistant Director; 

Renee S. Brown, Judith C. Collins, Kenneth E. Patton, Richard G. Payne, 

Maria-Alaina I. Rambus, Paulina T. Reaves, Cary B. Russell, Patricia SariSpear, Rebecca Shea, John D. Strong, and Gerald Winterlin also made key 

contributions to this report. 

Defense Logistics

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(350785) 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER