United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

SECURITY 

ASSISTANCE 

Lapses in Human 

Rights Screening in 

North African 

Countries Indicate 

Need for Further 

Oversight 

July 2006 

 

GAO-06-850 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 2006

SECURITY ASSISTANCE 

Lapses in Human Rights Screening in 

North African Countries Indicate Need for 

Further Oversight 

Highlights of GAO-06-850, a report to 

congressional requesters 

Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are

important U.S. allies in the war on 

terrorism. The United States 

provides these countries with 

security assistance, however, 

Congress restricts funding when 

credible evidence exists that 

foreign security units have

committed gross human rights 

violations. GAO (1) describes the 

goals of U.S. security assistance to

these countries and examines U.S. 

agencies’ assessment of this

assistance, (2) assesses U.S.

agencies’ implementation in

Morocco and Tunisia of State’s

policy to screen foreign security 

forces to ensure compliance with

congressional human rights

funding restrictions, and (3) 

examines agencies’ efforts to 

monitor the use of U.S.-origin 

defense articles provided through 

U.S. security assistance programs 

in the three countries, including 

Western Sahara, to ensure that they

are not misused or diverted. GAO 

visited U.S. posts in Morocco and 

Tunisia and analyzed trainee files 

to determine compliance with 

human rights vetting policy.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the

Secretary of State, in consultation 

with the Secretary of Defense,

strengthen the process for human 

rights vetting of foreign security

forces by establishing a systematic

monitoring mechanism that will 

ensure that State’s vetting 

procedures are carried out at

overseas posts. State concurred 

with our recommendations. 

The goals of the U.S. security assistance programs in Algeria, Morocco, and 

Tunisia are to support counterterrorism and broader security cooperation 

goals, such as maintaining regional stability and security, building the 

military capacity of foreign partners, and promoting interoperability with 

U.S. forces. To support these goals, the Departments of State (State) and 

Defense (DOD) have allocated approximately $146.6 million, from fiscal 

years 2002 to 2005, to train and equip security forces in these countries. 

DOD and State assess these programs together with other related activities 

through evaluations of security cooperation, counterterrorism, and other 

country goals. 

State policy requires human rights vetting of individuals and units of foreign 

security forces receiving U.S.-provided training. In Morocco and Tunisia, 

GAO found lapses in the vetting of trainees during fiscal years 2004 and 2005. 

These lapses include more than 400 trainees for whom no vetting files 

existed at the posts. In addition, even though posts maintained vetting files 

on 468 trainees, GAO estimates that 27 percent of these files did not have 

evidence of vetting. The lapses in vetting trainees resulted from unclear 

guidance on vetting procedures, undefined roles and responsibilities for 

vetting, and the lack of a systematic monitoring mechanism to ensure that 

procedures were followed. Although State has issued a guide to clarify 

procedures and has required posts to assign an official responsible for 

vetting, it does not monitor whether posts are following vetting procedures. 

Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin defense 

articles subject to DOD’s systematic monitoring requirements, such as 

physical inventory and inspection requirements. According to DOD officials 

and human rights organizations, no allegations of unauthorized use of U.S.-

origin equipment have been made that would call for greater scrutiny of end 

use by these countries. 

The United States Provides Excess Defense Articles to Morocco and Tunisia 

Source: DOD.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-850.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Joseph 

Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or 

christoffj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

U.S.-Provided Security Assistance Is Intended to Support 

Counterterrorism and Other Security Cooperation Goals and Is 

Assessed Collectively with Other Activities 9 

Lapses in Human Rights Vetting of Foreign Trainees Resulted from 

Unclear Procedures and the Lack of Monitoring to Ensure Posts’ 

Compliance with State Policy 17 

Morocco and Tunisia Do Not Have U.S.-Origin Defense Articles

that Require Systematic Monitoring 23 

Conclusion 26

Recommendations for Executive Action 26 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 28 

Appendix II Human Rights Vetting Process in Morocco and 

Tunisia as of February 2006 31 

Appendix III Tables on Number of Trainees with No Evidence 

of Vetting in Morocco and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 

2004-2005 33 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of State 35 

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 37 

Tables 

Table 1: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Algeria, Fiscal Years 

2002–2005 13

Page i GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Table 2: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Morocco, Fiscal 

Years 2002–2005 14 

Table 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Tunisia, Fiscal Years 

2002–2005 15

Table 4: Offices Implementing Training Programs in Morocco and 

Tunisia 19

Table 5: Estimated Number of Trainees with No Vetting Files,

Fiscal Years 2004-2005 33 

Table 6: GAO Sample of Files Maintained on Training Nominees in 

Morocco and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004–2005 34 

Figures 

Figure 1: Total Security Assistance Allocations to Algeria, 

Morocco, and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2002–2005 11 

Figure 2: Total Security Assistance Allocations by Program to 

Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2002–2005 12 

Abbreviations 

ACES Abuse Case Evaluation System 

ALP Aviation Leadership Program 

ATA Antiterrorism Assistance 

CTFP Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program 

DOD Department of Defense 

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

EDA Excess Defense Articles 

EUCOM U.S. European Command

FMF Foreign Military Financing 

IMET International Military Education and Training 

INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 

JCET Joint Combined Exchange Training 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

PART Program Assessment Rating Tool 

UN United Nations 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page ii GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

July 28, 2006

The Honorable Tom Coburn 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government 

 Information, and International Security 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

Chairwoman

Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia 

Committee on International Relations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Ted Poe 

House of Representatives 

The U.S. government views Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia as stable Islamic 

countries that are key partners in the war on terrorism. These countries 

are adjacent to vast expanses of ungoverned desert and have porous 

borders vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist organizations. The 

Department of State (State) and the Department of Defense (DOD) 

provide these countries with security assistance1

 to further U.S. foreign 

policy and security goals, such as supporting counterterrorism, promoting 

stronger bilateral relationships, strengthening self-defense capabilities, 

and promoting greater respect for democracy and human rights. To further 

human rights goals, Congress restricts certain security assistance funds 

from being provided to any units of foreign security forces when credible

evidence exists that such units have committed gross violations of human 

 1

For the purposes of this report, we defined security assistance as U.S. government

assistance aimed at training or equipping foreign security forces (military and police).

Page 1 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
rights.2

 However, we recently found lapses in State’s process for human 

rights screening, or vetting,3

 of foreign candidates for U.S.-funded training 

in other countries.4

 Additionally, an unresolved territorial dispute in the 

Western Sahara is viewed as an impediment to regional cooperation and 

contributes to concerns about human rights abuses. 

In response to your request, this report (1) describes the goals of U.S. 

security assistance to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia and examines U.S. 

agencies’ assessment of this assistance; (2) assesses U.S. agencies’ 

implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of State’s policy to screen foreign 

security forces to ensure compliance with congressional human rights 

funding restrictions; and (3) examines U.S. agencies’ efforts to monitor the 

use of U.S-origin defense articles provided through U.S. security assistance 

programs in the three countries, including in Western Sahara, to ensure 

that they are not misused or diverted for unauthorized uses. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant State and DOD 

planning, funding, and evaluation documents, and the agencies’ policies 

and procedures. We spoke with State and DOD officials in Washington,

D.C.; Rabat, Morocco; and Tunis, Tunisia. We also interviewed DOD 

officials at the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany. 

In addition, we met with government officials from Morocco to discuss 

U.S.-provided security assistance and spoke with the commander of the 

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in Western Sahara regarding 

Morocco’s military presence there. In Rabat and Tunis, we analyzed a 

stratified random probability sample of 273 out of 468 available human 

rights vetting case files to determine U.S. agencies’ compliance with 

State’s human rights vetting policy. These State and DOD files were 

 2

This restriction, commonly referred to as the “Leahy Amendment,” first appeared in 

the1997 Foreign Operations Export Financing and Related Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-

208) and only applied to funds appropriated to State’s International Narcotics Control 

program. It was broadened in fiscal year 1998 to apply to all funds appropriated under the

1998 Foreign Operations Export Financing and Related Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-118). 

In fiscal year 1999, a similar provision appeared in the Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act, 1999 (P.L. 105-262), which applied to funds appropriated under the act. 

The two provisions have appeared each year since in the annual Foreign Operations

Appropriations Acts and the Department of Defense Appropriations Acts, respectively. 

3

Human rights vetting involves checking the names of individuals or units proposed for

training against files, databases, and other sources of information to ensure that they do 

not have records of gross human rights violations. 

4

GAO, Southeast Asia: Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning Needed for 

U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces, GAO-05-793 (Washington, D.C.: July 2005). 

Page 2 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
maintained for nominees for U.S.-provided training during fiscal years 

2004 and 2005. We did not collect data on whether any individual or unit 

trained by the United States, whether vetted or not, had committed human 

rights violations. We did not visit Algeria because the United States 

provides much less security assistance to Algeria than it does to Morocco 

and Tunisia. Appendix I contains a more detailed description of our scope 

and methodology. We performed our work from October 2005 to July 2006 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

The goals of the U.S. security assistance programs in Algeria, Morocco, 

and Tunisia are to support counterterrorism and broader security 

cooperation goals, such as maintaining regional stability and security, 

building the military capacity of foreign partners, and promoting 

interoperability with U.S. forces. To support these goals, State and DOD 

have allocated5

 approximately $146.6 million to train and equip security 

forces in these countries from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2005. All

three countries participated in a variety of U.S.-provided training programs 

for their domestic and military security forces. The U.S. government also 

provided Morocco and Tunisia with excess military equipment from U.S. 

stockpiles, such as used transport vehicles and 1960s-era helicopters. The

government also provided Foreign Military Financing grants, which were 

used to purchase spare parts to refurbish and maintain the equipment. 

State and DOD assess whether and how these security assistance 

programs, in addition to other activities such as humanitarian assistance 

and military-to-military events, support U.S. foreign policy and security 

goals through evaluations of security cooperation and counterterrorism 

goals. 

Results in Brief 

In Morocco and Tunisia, we found lapses in the human rights vetting of 

foreign security forces receiving U.S.-funded training in fiscal years 2004 

and 2005. We found that the lapses in vetting took two forms: (1) no files 

existed to determine whether vetting occurred for approximately 438 

trainees and (2) for the 468 trainees for whom posts maintained files, we 

estimate that 27 percent of the files (127 trainees)

6

 lacked evidence of

 5

We use the terms allocated and allocations to include appropriations, expenditures, or

estimated values dependent upon the data available for each program. 

6

We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of total files with no evidence of vetting is

between 24 and 31 percent and that the total number of files with no evidence of vetting is 

between 110 and 143. 

Page 3 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
vetting. These lapses in vetting trainees resulted from unclear guidance on

vetting policies and procedures, undefined roles and responsibilities for 

vetting, and a lack of a systematic monitoring mechanism to ensure that 

procedures were followed. In July 2005, we found similar lapses at U.S. 

posts in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Since then, State has 

taken steps to address two of the three weaknesses. State has clarified 

vetting policies and procedures by issuing a guide to human rights vetting

for posts. State has also defined roles and responsibilities by requiring 

each post to assign a single point of contact with responsibility for 

oversight of vetting procedures. However, State has not established a 

systematic monitoring mechanism. In Morocco and Tunisia, we found that 

the assigned points of contact did not routinely monitor whether vetting 

procedures were followed at the posts. In addition, State headquarters 

does not monitor whether posts are following procedures for vetting 

foreign security forces. 

Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin 

equipment subject to DOD’s systematic monitoring requirements, which 

include physical inventory and inspection requirements. U.S. law generally

limits the transfer of defense articles and services to countries for 

purposes of internal security, legitimate self-defense, or regional or 

collective arrangements. To ensure compliance with these limitations, 

DOD employs an end-use monitoring program, which requires systematic 

monitoring only for the most sensitive defense articles, such as stinger 

missiles and night vision devices. For nonsensitive articles, DOD guidance 

directs security assistance officers at overseas posts to conduct 

monitoring in conjunction with other routine visits with host country 

officials. According to DOD officials and human rights organizations, there 

have been no allegations of unauthorized use of U.S.-origin equipment in 

Tunisia, Morocco and Western Sahara that would require greater scrutiny. 

Because there are no sensitive U.S.-origin defense articles or allegations of 

unauthorized use, DOD officials have not conducted end-use monitoring 

activities involving Morocco’s use of equipment in Western Sahara. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 

Secretary of Defense, further strengthen the process of human rights 

vetting of foreign security forces by establishing a systematic monitoring 

mechanism that will ensure that State’s vetting procedures are carried out 

at overseas posts. Specifically, we recommend the following two actions: 

Page 4 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
• The point of contact responsible for human rights vetting at each post 

should verify that the various offices implementing U.S. training at the 

post comply with State’s vetting policy. 

• Posts should report the results of their monitoring efforts to a designated

State headquarters unit to provide State with assurance of posts’ 

compliance with its human rights vetting policy.

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and State 

for their review and comment. DOD did not comment on our draft. State 

provided a written response that is reprinted in appendix IV and technical 

comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate. In 

commenting on our draft and in a subsequent e-mail, State concurred with 

our recommendations and indicated that they are taking steps to 

implement them. State also noted that our review did not uncover any 

evidence that the U.S. government has trained any individual or unit that 

has committed gross violations of human rights. However, our review only 

focused on whether State and the posts in Rabat and Tunis vetted trainees. 

We did not collect data on whether any individual or unit trained by the 

United States, whether vetted or not, had committed human rights 

violations. 

State and DOD provide a variety of security assistance programs to train 

and equip security forces (military and police) in North Africa. Many of 

these programs are funded by State and implemented by DOD. DOD 

manages security assistance under its Theater Security Cooperation 

umbrella along with a variety of other activities.7

 The European Command, 

which is the U.S. military entity responsible for these countries’ programs, 

focuses its security cooperation activities on assisting allies and partner 

countries to develop the capabilities to conduct peacekeeping, participate 

in the war on terrorism, and perform contingency operations with U.S. 

forces. 

State funds the following programs to train and equip foreign security 

forces: 

Background 

 7

These activities include multinational exercises, military-to-military contacts, and 

humanitarian assistance. 

Page 5 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
• Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) provides strategic, operational, and 

technical training and equipment to foreign law enforcement agencies to 

assist them in detecting and eliminating terrorist threats and in protecting 

facilities, individuals, and infrastructure. State implements this program. 

• Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides grants and loans for the 

acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training by foreign 

governments. The goal of these grants is to enable key allies to improve 

their defense capabilities and to foster closer military relationships 

between the United States and recipient nations. DOD implements the 

program. 

• International Military Education and Training (IMET) provides training to 

foreign military and related civilian personnel. IMET training is intended to

promote professional militaries around the world and strengthen U.S. 

military alliances. DOD implements the program. 

• International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) seeks to 

enhance the law enforcement capabilities of foreign governments in 

combating criminal, drug, and terrorist threats. INCLE programs support 

counternarcotics, intelligence, border patrol, and interdiction activities. 

State implements the program through interagency agreements with other 

U.S. government agencies, including the Departments of Justice and 

Homeland Security. 

DOD funds and implements several programs to train foreign security 

forces. 

• The Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) 

provides education and training on counterterrorism activities to foreign 

military and related civilian officials. This training is intended to bolster 

the capacity of friendly foreign nations to detect, monitor, and interdict or

disrupt the activities of terrorist networks. 

• Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) permits U.S. special operations 

forces to train with foreign military forces to enhance readiness through 

language proficiency, cultural immersion, knowledge of foreign 

environments, and instructor skills. The training primarily benefits U.S. 

forces. Benefits to the host nation’s security forces are incidental. 

• The Aviation Leadership Program (ALP) is a U.S. Air Force-funded 

program that provides undergraduate pilot training to a small number of 

international students from friendly, less developed countries. 

Page 6 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
• Regional Centers for Security Studies provide a forum for bilateral and 

multilateral communication, and military and civilian exchanges within a 

region. Activities at five regional centers range from extended academic 

programs to conferences on topics such as regional security issues, 

defense planning, and civilian-military relations. 

• DOD’s three service academies conduct traditional academic exchange 

programs of varying length and content. Up to 60 foreign students may 

attend one of the service academies as members of an academy class. The 

goal of the program is to expose future foreign leaders to their U.S. peers 

and to promote military professionalism. 

State and DOD also coordinate to provide nonappropriated assistance for 

foreign security forces. 

• Excess Defense Articles (EDA) is nonappropriated assistance to help build 

the defense capabilities of friendly countries in the form of excess U.S. 

defense articles drawn from DOD stocks. Defense articles declared as 

excess by the military departments can be transferred in an “as-is, whereis” condition to the recipient. 

• Drawdown is nonappropriated assistance that transfers in-stock defense 

articles and services from DOD’s inventory, as well as from any other U.S.

agency of the U.S. government, to foreign countries and international 

organizations in response to unforeseen military emergencies, 

humanitarian catastrophes, peacekeeping needs, or counternarcotics 

requirements. 

The governments of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are considered stable, 

although State has reported problems with their human rights practices.8

• Algeria. Algeria has emerged from a period of terrorist and related 

violence during the 1990s when more than 100,000 lives were lost, 

according to State. Since then, as Algeria has made progress toward 

democratization, casualties have declined sharply. Although Algerian 

government actions have weakened terrorist groups domestically, 

Algerians have been found among suicide bombers and terrorists captured 

in Iraq. Terrorist cells operate in the Algerian east and far south and in the 

Sahel, the area bordering southern Algeria. State’s most recent human 

 8

See State’s 2005 country reports on human rights practices, 

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005. 

Page 7 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
rights report stated that the Algerian government had several human rights 

problems, including impunity of security forces, allegations of abuse and 

torture of detainees, and arbitrary arrest and prolonged pretrial detention.

State also credited the Algerian government for taking steps to strengthen 

human rights, which resulted in fewer such incidents than in the past. 

• Morocco. The United States views Morocco as a stable, moderate Arab 

regime; an ally against terrorism; and a free trade partner. King 

Mohammed VI retains ultimate power, including over the military. In May 

2003, Moroccan suicide bombers attacked several sites in Casablanca. In

response, the government arrested an estimated 3,000 people and 

sentenced at least 900 for crimes under counterterrorism laws, according 

to State. Moroccan-born extremists associated with al Qaeda affiliates 

were implicated in the March 2004 train blasts in Madrid. According to 

State’s human rights report, Morocco’s human rights record “remained 

poor in many areas.” The report highlighted accusations of excessive force 

and harsh sentences against demonstrators in Western Sahara and torture 

of human rights activists in that region. Also included among the human 

rights problems were reports of police impunity, arbitrary arrest, and 

incommunicado detention. 

• Western Sahara. Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular Front 

for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) have 

disputed the independence of Western Sahara since the 1970s, when Spain

decolonized the territory.9

 Following a long war in Western Sahara 

between Morocco and the Polisario, the UN brokered a ceasefire that went 

into effect in 1991, and a UN peacekeeping force remains in the region. 

Morocco currently occupies 80 percent of Western Sahara. The United 

States, which does not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western 

Sahara, supports efforts to reach a mutually acceptable resolution under 

UN auspices; however, the situation remains at an impasse. This issue is 

the main impediment to improving bilateral relations between Morocco 

and Algeria, as Algeria backs the Polisario. 

• Tunisia. Tunisia has a stable yet authoritarian government with a 

dominant majority political party and a president who has been in power 

since 1987. The Tunisian government harshly suppressed an Islamist 

opposition movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s. More recently, 

 9

Western Sahara, a Spanish possession from the 1880s until the 1970s, is a desert area that 

has a population of approximately 267,000, bordering the Atlantic Ocean between 

Mauritania and Morocco. It has valuable phosphate resources and fishing grounds and the

possibility of off-shore oil reserves. 

Page 8 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
suspected terrorists bombed a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba 

in 2002 and Tunisian expatriates have been arrested in Europe and North 

America on terrorism-related charges. State’s human rights report stated 

that Tunisia’s human rights record remained poor. Among the human 

rights problems reported were incidents of torture and abuse of prisoners 

and detainees, police impunity, and sanctioned attacks by police on 

citizens who criticize the government.

The United States uses security assistance to Algeria, Morocco, and 

Tunisia to support the broad goals of security cooperation and 

counterterrorism. Security assistance programs provide these countries a 

mixture of training and equipment through programs such as IMET, FMF, 

EDA for foreign military forces, and counterterrorism and other training 

for domestic security forces. To carry out these security assistance 

programs, State and DOD have allocated10 the equivalent of approximately 

$146.6 million from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. The contributions of these 

security assistance programs to achieving security cooperation and 

counterterrorism goals are assessed collectively with those of other 

activities, such as military-to-military events and economic and 

humanitarian assistance.

In Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, the goals for U.S.-provided security 

assistance programs are to enhance security and political relationships, 

fight terrorism, improve foreign military capabilities and interoperability, 

and increase U.S. access for overflight rights and port visits. The security 

assistance programs in each of these countries may support one or more 

of these goals. Security assistance programs attempt to achieve these 

goals by training and equipping foreign security forces. 

State has a mission performance process in which the posts outline goals 

for their countries and identify the security assistance and other programs 

that would support those goals. For example, State has a goal to increase 

U.S.-Provided 

Security Assistance Is 

Intended to Support 

Counterterrorism and 

Other Security 

Cooperation Goals 

and Is Assessed 

Collectively with 

Other Activities

U.S. Security Assistance 

Programs Are to Support 

Counterterrorism and 

Security Cooperation 

Goals 

 10We use the terms allocated and allocations to describe a broad mix of appropriated and 

nonappropriated assistance provided to foreign security forces in Algeria, Morocco, and

Tunisia. For State’s FMF, IMET, and INCLE programs, we used appropriations as allocated 

by State to these countries’ programs. For State’s ATA program and DOD’s CTFP, JCET,

and other funded programs, we used expenditure data because no separate appropriation

and country allocation data existed. The EDA and Drawdown programs are

nonappropriated equipment transfers. 

Page 9 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Tunisia’s antiterrorism capabilities. State planning documents list the ATA 

program, which provides training in airport security and crisis 

management, as one of the resources it will employ to meet its goal. 

Additionally, State has a goal to cooperate with Morocco on 

counterterrorism and provides communications equipment and 

intelligence officer training, under the FMF and IMET programs, as a 

means to achieve this goal. 

Similarly, DOD develops country campaign plans that include country 

security cooperation goals and implementation activities, which 

encompass security assistance programs. For example, DOD’s goals in 

Algeria are to increase military professionalization and interoperability. To 

achieve these goals, DOD uses security assistance programs, such as IMET 

and JCET. Additionally, DOD links its goals to State’s mission planning 

documents. 

State and DOD collectively allocated approximately $146.6 million through 

their security assistance programs to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia from 

fiscal years 2002 to 2005. Tunisia was the largest recipient of U.S.-provided 

security assistance in this region, receiving $74.8 million, although about 

40 percent of this came from the estimated value of excess U.S. equipment

delivered in fiscal year 2002 under the EDA program. Morocco received 

approximately $66.9 million, and Algeria received $5 million. Figure 1 

illustrates a breakdown of total assistance to each North African country.

State and DOD Provided 

Security Assistance to 

Train and Equip Security 

Forces in Algeria, 

Morocco, and Tunisia 

Page 10 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Figure 1: Total Security Assistance Allocations to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, 

Fiscal Years 2002–2005 

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

Algeria Morocco Tunisia

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data.

Country

Dollars in thousands

Page 11 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Figure 2 shows the total allocations by program that Algeria, Morocco, and 

Tunisia received from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. 

Figure 2: Total Security Assistance Allocations by Program to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2002–2005 

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

Tunisia

Morocco

Algeria

FMF EDA Drawdown IMET INCLE CTFP ATA JCET Other

 0 0 0 2,321 0 247.5 1,847.5 212.8 293.1

 33,468 13,931 0 6,533 2,992 508.2 8,394.1 246 836.3

 28,634 30,929 5,000 6,272 0 158.3 1,999.8 311 1,480.7

Dollars in thousands

Programs

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data.

State and DOD allocated approximately $5 million to Algeria in security 

assistance from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2005. The IMET and ATA 

programs were the principal security assistance programs (85 percent of 

funding) in Algeria. IMET was used to train approximately 263 Algerian

security force personnel during this period.11 Unlike Morocco and Tunisia, 

Algeria does not receive FMF funding or EDA equipment transfers. Table 1 

shows the U.S. agency, program, allocations, and examples of U.S.-

provided security assistance. 

Security Assistance to Algeria 

Primarily Funded Training for 

Military Forces 

 11The data provided for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia did not allow us to determine if some 

individuals received training in more than one fiscal year. Therefore, there may be some

over-counting of trainees in the numbers reported from 2002 to 2005.

Page 12 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Table 1: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Algeria, Fiscal Years 2002–2005 

Dollars in thousands 

Funding 

 agency Program Allocation Examples of assistance provided

State IMET $2,321.0 Trained approximately 263 Algerian 

security personnel in courses such 

as intelligence, English, and basic 

officer training.

ATA 1,847.5 Trained Algerian security personnel 

in hostage negotiation and incident 

management. 

DOD CTFP 247.5 Trained 25 Algerian security 

personnel in counterterrorism.

JCET 212.8 Provided joint training for U.S. 

Special Operations Forces and

Algerian security forces. 

Other $293.1 Provided training for 182 Algerian 

security personnel at Regional

Centers for Strategic Studies.

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data. 

State and DOD allocated approximately $66.9 million in security assistance 

to Morocco for training and equipment from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. Of

U.S. security assistance programs in Morocco, FMF and EDA are the 

largest, accounting for about $47 million (71 percent) of the total. IMET 

trained approximately 458 Moroccan security forces. Also, State-funded 

training was provided in fiscal year 2005 through the INCLE program for 

border security at ports-of-entry. Morocco is an active user of the EDA 

program, acquiring hundreds of used U.S. 5-ton and 2.5-ton trucks, which 

they use for spare parts. Additionally, Morocco uses the FMF program to 

obtain spare parts to sustain aging equipment. According to DOD officials 

in Morocco, as the equipment continues to age, it will become 

unsustainable, and Morocco will need to find resources to replace this 

equipment. Table 2 shows the U.S. agency, program, allocations, and 

examples of U.S.-provided security assistance. 

Security Assistance to Morocco 

Funded a Mixture of Training 

and Equipment Programs for 

Security Forces 

Page 13 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Table 2: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Morocco, Fiscal Years 2002–2005 

Dollars in thousands 

Funding

agency Program Allocation Examples of assistance provided

State FMF $33,468.0 Purchased spare parts for aircraft and other 

vehicles, radio equipment, and packaging 

and shipping charges for EDA transfers. 

IMET 6,533.0 Trained approximately 458 Moroccan 

security personnel in logistics readiness, 

munitions inspections, and command and 

general staff training. 

INCLE 2,992.0 Trained Moroccans in border interdiction and

border control.

ATA 8,394.1 Funded hostage negotiation, management of 

mass casualty, and cyberterrorism training. 

DOD EDA 13,931 Provided several hundred 2.5-ton-cargo and 

other truck acquisitions. 

CTFP 508.2 Trained 19 Moroccan security personnel in 

counterterrorism. 

JCET 246.0 Provided joint training for U.S. Special 

Operations Forces and Moroccan security 

forces. 

Other $836.3 Provided one slot for Morocco at the U.S. Air 

Force Academy in fiscal years 2003 and 

2004. Provided training at Regional Centers 

for Strategic Studies. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data. 

State and DOD allocated approximately $74.8 million for training and 

equipment to Tunisia from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. FMF and EDA were 

the largest security assistance programs in Tunisia, accounting for 80 

percent of the country’s total security assistance. EDA value is based on 

DOD’s estimated value of the equipment at the time of delivery. Tunisia 

received EDA in fiscal year 2002 only. The United States offered Tunisia 15 

UH-1H 1960s-era helicopters in fiscal year 2005, 7 of which are being 

refurbished as of April 2006 and will be delivered thereafter, according to 

DOD officials. DOD would like to refurbish one or two additional 

helicopters, if additional funds can be found. As in Morocco, the 

equipment becomes unsustainable as it ages, and Tunisia will need to find

resources to replace it, according to State and DOD officials. IMET 

funding was used to train approximately 406 Tunisian security personnel 

from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2005. State provided ATA training in 

Security Assistance to Tunisia 

Primarily Funded Equipment 

Procurement Programs 

Page 14 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
fiscal years 2003 and 2004, but not in 2005. Table 3 shows the U.S. agency, 

program, allocations, and examples of U.S.-provided security assistance.

Table 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2002–2005 

Dollars in thousands 

Funding

agency Program Allocation Examples of assistance provided

State FMF $28,634.0 Purchased spare parts for vehicles and 

radios, helicopter refurbishment, and 

miscellaneous equipment. 

IMET 6,272.0 Trained approximately 406 Tunisian 

security personnel in English language 

skills, crisis command and control, and 

water treatment. 

ATA 1,999.8 Provided training in crisis management and 

airport security. 

DOD EDA 30,929.0 Provided surplus guided chaparral missiles, 

guided missile system, and tool kits. 

CTFP 158.3 Trained 19 Tunisian security personnel in

counterterrorism. 

JCET 311.0 Provided joint training for U.S. Special 

Operations Forces and Tunisian security 

forces. 

Drawdown 5,000.0 Provided maintenance of C-130 aircraft to 

Tunisia in fiscal year 2002. 

Other $1,480.7 ALP provided two scholarships to two cadets 

at the Tunisian Air Force Academy in fiscal 

year 2003. The United States also provided 

several slots for Tunisians to attend U.S. 

service academies in fiscal years 2004 and 

2005. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data. 

State and DOD Assess the 

Broader Goals of Security 

Cooperation and 

Counterterrorism 

For these countries, State and DOD assess whether and how security 

assistance programs support U.S. foreign policy and security goals through 

their evaluation of how broad goals, such as counterterrorism, regional 

stability goals, and security cooperation goals, are being achieved. State 

assesses these goals in its annual mission planning process. While the 

goals are rated for the degree to which they are being achieved, the 

effectiveness of specific programs, such as FMF or IMET, is not assessed. 

State officials in Tunis and Rabat said that the assessments of goals in 

country planning documents are qualitative and that the outcomes or 

Page 15 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
results are difficult to measure, requiring professional judgment to 

determine the progress made from one year to the next. 

DOD assesses the collective effectiveness of its programs, which include 

security assistance and other activities. DOD’s unified command for the 

region, EUCOM, is developing a new evaluation tool to assess how they 

are achieving their country goals. This tool will attempt to measure the 

degree to which desired outcomes, such as reduction in terrorist activities, 

are achieved. EUCOM plans to use these assessments to allocate its 

resources and set priorities. 

Although neither State nor DOD conducts assessments for specific 

security assistance programs, results from some programs are periodically 

reported to Congress, and some results indicators are monitored for other 

programs.12 The ATA program annually reports to Congress on program 

activities and provides some examples of how these activities were 

implemented worldwide. For example, the ATA fiscal year 2005 report 

states that Morocco’s use of ATA cyberterrorism training supported U.S. 

efforts to arrest a primary terrorism suspect. The IMET program tracks 

individuals trained through IMET if they rise to important positions within 

their government. IMET program officials are also developing a survey

tool to be administered to foreign trainees to measure whether the training

has affected their preparedness for joint military activities with the United 

States and has instilled respect for U.S. values of democracy, human 

rights, rule of law, and civilian control of the military. 

 12The Office of Management and Budget assesses government programs using the Program

Assessment Rating Tool (PART), which is intended to help form conclusions about

program benefits and whether the program is meeting its annual and long-term goals. The 

ATA program was included in a PART assessment of State and international assistance 

programs, in which the worldwide ATA program was rated effective. In addition, State 

officials expect a PART review of security assistance to the Middle East and North African 

countries in August 2006. 

Page 16 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
In Morocco and Tunisia, lapses in vetting trainees for human rights abuses 

occurred in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. We found that these lapses 

consisted of (1) the absence of vetting files at posts for approximately 438 

trainees13 and (2) the absence of vetting evidence in an estimated 27 

percent14 (127 of 468 trainees15) of the vetting files maintained at posts.16

These lapses resulted from unclear vetting procedures, undefined roles for 

vetting, and the lack of a monitoring mechanism to ensure posts’ 

compliance with vetting procedures. State took steps in December 2005 to

address the need for clear procedures and defined vetting roles. However, 

we found that responsible officials at the posts in Morocco and Tunisia did 

not monitor whether offices within each post were following vetting 

procedures, and State headquarters did not monitor the efforts of the posts 

to vet trainees. 

Lapses in Human 

Rights Vetting of 

Foreign Trainees 

Resulted from 

Unclear Procedures 

and the Lack of 

Monitoring to Ensure 

Posts’ Compliance 

with State Policy 

 13We were unable to determine if specific individuals in this set of training instances 

participated in more than one course; consequently, there may be fewer than 438 unique

individuals. 

14We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of total files with no evidence of vetting 

is between 24 and 31 percent. 

15We are 95 percent confident that the total number of files with no evidence of vetting is 

between 110 and 143. 

16In this report, we determined no evidence of vetting to mean that a post could not locate 

at least some documentation or indication that the post or State headquarters responded to

the sponsoring office with vetting results, which would demonstrate that training 

candidates had been screened for human rights abuses. 

Page 17 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts since 1998 has 

included a provision, commonly referred to as the Leahy Amendment, that 

restricts the provision of assistance appropriated in these acts to any 

foreign security unit when the Secretary of State has credible evidence 

that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights.17 DOD’s 

appropriations acts have contained a similar restriction on DOD-funded 

training since fiscal year 1999.

18 While the legal provisions restrict funding 

to “any unit of the security forces of a foreign country,” State policy 

applies the restrictions to individual members of security forces, as well. 

To Comply with U.S. Laws, 

State Policy Calls for 

Human Rights Vetting of 

Foreign Security Forces 

Receiving U.S. Assistance 

To implement these legislative restrictions, State’s guidance calls for posts 

and State headquarters units to vet individuals or units proposed for 

training or assistance to determine whether these foreign security forces 

have committed gross human rights violations. The various State or DOD 

offices that implement different training programs at each post initiate the 

vetting process by submitting names of training candidates for vetting by 

post officials. These offices also receive the results of human rights vetting

conducted at each post and State headquarters, and they maintain vetting

files for trainees. See table 4 for various offices implementing training in 

Morocco and Tunisia. See app. II for details on the description of the 

human rights vetting process. 

 17Specifically, the most recent provision in the Foreign Operations Export Financing and

Related Appropriations Act for 2006 (P.L. 109-102, §551) states, “None of the funds made

available by this Act may be provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country 

if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross 

violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and reports to the Committees 

on Appropriations that the government of such country is taking effective measures to 

bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.” The provision has also

appeared in prior Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts. See P.L. 105-118, §570 (FY1998); 

P.L. 105-277, §568 (FY1999); P.L. 106-113, § 564 (FY2000); P.L. 106-429, §563 (FY2001); P.L. 

107-115, §556 (FY2002); P.L. 108-7, § 553 (FY2003); P.L. 108-199, § 553 (FY2004); P.L. 108-

447, §551 (FY 2005). 

18The most recent provision in the DOD Appropriations Act for 2006 states, “None of the 

funds made available by this Act may be used to support any training program involving a

unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of Defense has received 

credible information from the State that the unit has committed a gross violation of human 

rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.” (P.L. 109-148 §8069) Similar 

provisions have also appeared in prior DOD appropriations acts. See P.L. 105-262, §8130 

(FY1999); P.L. 106-79, §8098 (FY2000); P.L. 106-259, §8092 (FY2001); P.L. 107-117, §8093 

(FY2003); P.L. 107-248, §8080 (FY2003); P.L. 108087, §8077 (FY2004); P.L. 108-287, §8076 

(FY 2005). 

Page 18 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Table 4: Offices Implementing Training Programs in Morocco and Tunisia 

Office implementing training at posts Applicable training program 

Office of Defense Cooperation (DOD) IMET, CTFP, FMF, ALP 

Defense Attaché Office (DOD) Regional centers, service academies 

Office of Regional Security (State) ATA, INCLE 

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data. 

Lapses in Human Rights 

Vetting Existed at Posts 

Due to Unclear Guidance 

In Morocco and Tunisia, we found two categories of lapses in human 

rights vetting in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. The first category consisted of 

approximately 438 trainees19 for whom posts did not maintain vetting files. 

The second category consisted of files that were maintained at the posts 

but lacked evidence of vetting. Based on our review of 273 out of 468 files, 

we estimate that 27 percent (127 trainees)20 lacked evidence of vetting.21

Of the 438 trainees for whom posts maintained no vetting files, post 

officials stated that no vetting occurred for approximately 148 Moroccan 

and Tunisian trainees.22 These trainees included those who attended DODimplemented IMET and CTFP training courses outside of the United 

States, as well as attendees of regional centers and service academies. In

addition, we found that the two posts did not maintain vetting

documentation on approximately 290 trainees and were, therefore, unable 

to determine whether vetting occurred. These trainees, who may not have 

been vetted for human rights abuses, attended State-provided training, 

including all 168 trainees who attended fiscal year 2004 INCLE courses in 

Morocco, all 42 trainees who attended fiscal year 2004 ATA courses in 

Tunisia, and some (80) of the trainees who attended fiscal year 2005 ATA 

 19We were unable to determine if specific individuals in this set of training instances 

participated in more than one course; consequently, there may be fewer than 438 unique

individuals. 

20We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of total files with no evidence of vetting 

is between 24 and 31 percent and that the total number of files with no evidence of vetting 

is between 110 and 143. 

21In this report, we determined no evidence of vetting to mean that post could not locate at

least some documentation or indication that the post or State headquarters responded to

the implementing office with vetting results, which would demonstrate that training 

candidates have been screened for human rights abuses. 

22We identified the approximate number of trainees for whom no vetting files existed by

using trainee data provided by State and DOD reports and officials. 

Page 19 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
courses in Morocco. See table 5 in app. III for more information on the 

number of trainees and types of training for which no vetting files existed 

at the two posts. 

The two posts did maintain vetting files for 468 trainees. However, we 

estimated that 27 percent (127 trainees) of the files did not contain 

evidence of human rights vetting. This estimate is based on a stratified 

random sample of 273 of 468 available files at the two posts. For these files 

lacking vetting evidence, posts could not locate any documentation 

indicating that either the posts or State headquarters provided the 

implementing office with results on vetting. Based on the results of our 

sample, we estimate that 100 percent of the files for DOD-implemented 

training in Tunisia had evidence of vetting. In Morocco, however, we 

estimate that about two-thirds of the files for DOD-implemented training 

contained no evidence of vetting. We also reviewed all the available files of 

State-implemented training in Morocco and found that about one-sixth of

them contained no evidence of vetting. Table 6 in app. III shows the results 

of the sample of trainees we reviewed at each post for evidence of human

rights vetting. 

According to agency officials at both posts, lapses in vetting candidates in 

fiscal years 2004 and 2005 were generally attributable to unclear guidance 

that had been provided over the past decade. The guidance did not clearly

identify all types of training to which the vetting requirement applied. Until 

December 2005, the guidance had been issued through multiple cables 

from headquarters to posts dating from January 1994 through February 

2005. Moreover, in Tunisia, State officials stated that, in keeping with their 

understanding of standard State record retention policies, which were 

distinct from human rights vetting guidance on record retention, they 

destroyed files that may have contained evidence of vetting for attendees

of ATA training courses. Additionally, in Morocco, a State official stated 

that he did not know if past vetting occurred because staff responsible for 

implementing training at that time had rotated to a new post. 

Page 20 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Lapses in vetting occurred in prior years because of weaknesses in 

agencies’ management controls: lack of clear and consistent vetting 

procedures at departments and posts; lack of clear roles and 

responsibilities for vetting foreign officials; and lack of an established 

system to monitor compliance with these procedures at State and posts.23

Although State has taken steps to correct the first two weaknesses, State 

still lacks a mechanism to monitor compliance. 

To address our prior recommendation for State to establish clear and 

consistent vetting procedures, State drafted a standard guide to human 

rights vetting and distributed it to overseas posts in December 2005. This 

guide clarifies the vetting procedures, outlines key steps in the vetting

process, requires each post to assign a single point of contact with 

responsibility for vetting procedures, and provides required vetting 

documentation and record retention policy. Moreover, the guide suggests 

that each post develop standard vetting operating procedures that take 

into consideration its needs and circumstances. In Morocco and Tunisia, 

State officials established post-specific vetting procedures. For example, 

the procedures at both posts require that the office implementing training

prepare a standard memorandum and send it to other offices within the 

post to request vetting of training candidates. According to these officials, 

the issuance of a written guide has clarified post officials’ understanding 

of vetting requirements under State’s policy. For example, the two posts 

did not always maintain the records of completed vetting results in fiscal 

years 2004 and 2005. The new State guidance and posts’ standard 

operating procedures now specify a requirement to maintain these records 

for 3 years. 

Furthermore, in response to our prior recommendation that State 

establish clear roles and responsibilities at posts for human rights vetting,

State has required that each post assign a point of contact with

responsibility over human rights vetting. Specifically, State’s December 

2005 guide specified that this official would have responsibility for 

State Has Clarified 

Procedures and 

Responsibilities for Human 

Rights Vetting, but Lacks a 

Monitoring System to 

Ensure that Posts Comply 

with Vetting Procedures 

State Has Taken Steps to 

Clarify Procedures and 

Responsibilities for Vetting 

State Has Required Points of 

Contact at Posts 

 23In the July 2005 report reviewing human rights vetting in Southeast Asia, we 

recommended that State establish clear and consistent vetting procedures, clear roles and 

responsibilities for human rights vetting, and monitoring mechanisms to verify that vetting

procedures are carried out properly. See GAO, Southeast Asia: Better Human Rights 

Reviews and Strategic Planning Needed for U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces, 

GAO-05-793 (Washington, D.C.: July 2005). 

Page 21 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
oversight of vetting procedures. At the posts in Morocco and Tunisia, an 

official from the political affairs section serves as the designated point of 

contact responsible for human rights vetting. 

As we found in Southeast Asian countries, post officials in Morocco and 

Tunisia, along with officials from State headquarters office, do not monitor 

posts’ compliance with State’s human rights vetting procedures. However, 

our internal control standards state that an organization should ensure 

that ongoing monitoring occurs as part of normal operations to assess the 

quality of performance over time. State’s December 2005 guide states that 

each post’s point of contact should have oversight of vetting procedures, 

with the Chief of Mission responsible for ensuring that vetting procedures 

are in place and being followed. However, neither post had established 

specific activities to carry out this oversight responsibility. For example, 

the points of contact did not regularly verify with the State and DOD 

offices implementing training at posts that all relevant trainees were 

vetted. Also, they did not monitor whether these offices were following 

vetting procedures, such as maintaining documentation of completed 

vetting of trainees. 

State Lacks a Monitoring 

Mechanism to Ensure Posts’ 

Compliance with State Policies 

Furthermore, as of June 2006, no headquarters office within State is 

charged with monitoring posts’ compliance with State’s human rights 

vetting procedures. State’s December 2005 guide specifically states that no

single bureau is tasked with monitoring human rights vetting procedures. 

According to State, some oversight is provided through the established 

channel of periodic post inspections conducted by the Office of the 

Inspector General (OIG). However, as of May 2006, assessments of posts’ 

compliance with State’s human rights vetting process were not part of 

State OIG’s post inspections. In March 2006, State officials requested the 

OIG to include reviews of human rights vetting procedures in post 

inspections. In May 2006, a State OIG official stated that the OIG workplan 

for inspection would incorporate a check that posts are vetting candidates 

appropriately. However, inspections of a post would be conducted 

approximately once every 5 or 6 years, according to a State OIG official. 

This periodic inspection of posts’ compliance does not meet our standard 

for ongoing monitoring. 

Without a monitoring system in place, State has no means of determining 

whether posts are complying with required procedures intended to ensure

that trainees do not have records of human rights abuses. Consequently, 

State lacks the information it needs to ensure that all posts are following 

procedures to prevent foreign security forces with suspected human rights 

records from receiving U.S. assistance. 

Page 22 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
To comply with the Arms Export Control Act, DOD established the Golden 

Sentry program to monitor countries’ use of U.S.-origin defense articles 

provided through government-to-government transfers. This program 

requires systematic monitoring, such as conducting physical inventories, 

of only the most sensitive defense articles. Morocco and Tunisia do not 

have any sensitive U.S.-origin equipment subject to this systematic 

monitoring, and Algeria does not participate in any programs involving 

government transfers of U.S.-origin equipment, such as foreign military 

sales or EDA. Monitoring of non-sensitive defense articles is done in 

conjunction with other assigned duties with no reporting requirements or 

additional resources. DOD officials in Rabat have not conducted any enduse monitoring in Western Sahara. Additionally, according to State and

based on our work, there have been no allegations of unauthorized use of 

U.S.-origin equipment in Tunisia, Morocco, and the Western Sahara that 

would trigger greater scrutiny of end use. 

Morocco and Tunisia 

Do Not Have U.S.-

Origin Defense 

Articles that Require 

Systematic 

Monitoring 

Page 23 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
In compliance with the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended,24 

DOD established an end-use monitoring program called Golden Sentry to 

ensure the proper end-use monitoring of government-to-government 

transfers.25 To make optimum use of the limited resources available for 

such monitoring purposes, the Golden Sentry program requires different 

levels of monitoring for different types of defense articles. For those 

articles deemed sensitive by Golden Sentry such as man-portable air 

defense systems and night vision devices, systematic monitoring, including

physical inventory and inspection procedures, is required. In addition, 

other conditions or events can affect the level of monitoring that may 

occur. For example, allegations of a country’s misuse, a country’s 

development of ties with countries prohibited from receiving U.S. exports, 

or unusual political or military upheaval can result in greater scrutiny. 

End-Use Monitoring 

Program Established to 

Comply with Arms Export 

Control Act 

The monitoring of nonsensitive defense articles and services, such as 

trucks and spare parts, is referred to as routine end-use monitoring. This 

routine end-use monitoring is performed by DOD officials in conjunction 

with other assigned duties. Because DOD applies its resources to end-use 

monitoring of sensitive items, it does not expend additional resources nor 

 24In 1996, P.L. 104-164, Title 1, section 150(a), amended the Arms Export Control Act (22 

U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) to require the President to establish an end-use monitoring program for

defense articles and services sold, leased, or exported under the act or the Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1961. The provision requires that, to the extent practicable, such a 

program shall be designed to provide reasonable assurances that the recipient is complying 

with the requirements imposed by the U.S. government with respect to the use, transfer, 

and security of defense articles and services, and that such articles and services are being

used for the purposes for which they are provided. 22 U.S.C. 2785. 

25Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, provides that defense articles and

defense services shall be sold or leased to friendly countries solely for internal security, 

legitimate self-defense, preventing or hindering the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction, participation in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent 

with the Charter of the United Nations, or otherwise to permit the recipient country to

participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of 

maintaining or restoring international peace or security, or for the purpose of enabling

foreign military forces in less-developed friendly countries to construct public works or

engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social development of friendly 

countries. 22 U.S.C 2754. The Arms Export Control Act does not provide any further 

standards or definitions to apply in determining whether these eligibility criteria are met.

The Act does provide that either the President, by a report to Congress, or Congress by

joint resolution, may determine whether a violation has occurred that will render a country 

ineligible for further assistance. 22 U.S.C. 2753(c)(3)(A). Under the statute the President is

required to report promptly to Congress upon receipt of information that a substantial 

violation of an agreement entered into under the Arms Export Control Act may have 

occurred. 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2753(c)(2). 

Page 24 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
require specific reporting on routine monitoring that is performed 

incidental to its normal business contacts in these countries. 

Only routine end-use monitoring is required in Morocco and Tunisia 

because these countries do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin equipment. 

The U.S. government gives these countries excess equipment through the 

EDA program and sells them material to sustain their aging stocks of U.S.-

origin equipment with the help of FMF grants. Algeria does not obtain any 

defense articles from the U.S. government. In accordance with DOD and 

EUCOM guidelines for routine end-use monitoring, DOD officials at the 

posts in Morocco and Tunisia stated that they visit a sample of host 

country bases while conducting other business, such as meetings, 

exercises, or exchange events, at those locations. These visits help DOD 

officials confirm the proper use and condition of non-sensitive U.S.-origin

equipment. Additionally, according to DOD officials from EUCOM, DSCA, 

and at the posts in Rabat and Tunis, there have been no allegations of 

unauthorized use of U.S.-origin equipment, including in Western Sahara, 

that would trigger greater scrutiny. 

Morocco’s Use of 

Equipment in Western 

Sahara 

According to State, the United States has not placed any special 

restrictions on Morocco’s use of equipment in Western Sahara beyond 

those provided for in the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign 

Assistance Act.26 Since DOD officials in Morocco do not generally conduct

other business in the Western Sahara, they have not conducted end-use 

monitoring activities involving Morocco’s use of equipment in Western 

Sahara, according to a DOD official in Rabat. This official and a DSCA 

official responsible for DOD’s end-use monitoring program noted that, 

given the absence of sensitive defense articles or allegations of misuse, 

DOD has no reason to commit resources to inspections there. According 

to State and other officials, State representatives do, however, visit 

Western Sahara on other business including fact finding and humanitarian 

activities. In addition, a State official stated and DOD guidance indicate 

 26In congressional testimony in 1980, State and DOD articulated the U. S. position that the 

use of U.S.-origin defense articles by Morocco in Western Sahara was consistent with the

Arms Export Control Act’s criteria. State officials told us that this position has not changed 

and noted that it does not imply U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western

Sahara. See testimonies of Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 

and South Asian Affairs, Department of State; and Lieutenant General Ernest Graves, 

Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency before the U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific 

Affairs and on Africa (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 1980).

Page 25 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
that, should an allegation of misuse arise, procedures exist for 

investigation. In addition, the commanding general of the UN

peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara stated that there had been no 

allegations of Moroccan military misuse of U.S.-origin equipment in the 

Western Sahara. Representatives of the human rights organizations we 

spoke with also reported that they had no reports of misuse. 

Security assistance is used as a tool to advance U.S. foreign policy and

security goals, including respect for human rights. In 2005, we reported 

that U.S. agencies did not have adequate assurance that U.S. training funds

were used to train and equip only foreign security forces with no 

violations of human rights. Although State has taken steps to ensure more 

consistent human rights vetting of foreign security forces receiving U.S.-

provided training, it still lacks a mechanism to monitor whether or not 

posts are following its guidance, which is intended to ensure that trainees 

do not have records of human rights abuses. State’s guide, issued in 

December 2005, assigned responsibility for monitoring the vetting process 

to points of contact at U.S. posts but did not provide them with guidance 

in carrying out this responsibility. Posts’ points of contact in Morocco and 

Tunisia were not monitoring posts’ compliance with vetting procedures, 

and State headquarters lacks assurance that posts are following its vetting

policy. This suggests that additional action is needed to strengthen the 

monitoring element of internal controls. Although State OIG inspections of 

posts once every 5 years may be a means of monitoring whether posts 

follow vetting guidelines, internal control standards recommend ongoing 

monitoring in the course of normal operations. A routine monitoring 

mechanism would provide greater assurance that all individuals are 

properly vetted for human rights issues before receiving U.S. assistance 

and that any lapses in the proper screening of recipients of U.S. assistance 

could be corrected. 

To provide assurance that foreign candidates of U.S. security assistance 

programs comply with existing legislative restrictions and State policies 

on human rights, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in

consultation with the Secretary of Defense, further strengthen the process 

of human rights vetting of foreign security forces by establishing a 

systematic monitoring mechanism that will ensure that State’s vetting 

procedures are carried out at overseas posts. Specifically, we recommend 

the following two actions: 

Conclusion 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Page 26 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
• The point of contact responsible for human rights vetting at each post 

should verify that the various offices implementing U.S. training at the 

post comply with State’s vetting policy. 

• Posts should report the results of their monitoring efforts to a designated

State headquarters unit to provide State with assurance of posts’ 

compliance with its human rights vetting policy.

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and State 

for their review and comment. DOD did not comment on our draft. State 

provided a written response that is reprinted in appendix IV and technical 

comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate. In 

commenting on our draft and in a subsequent e-mail, State concurred with 

our recommendations and indicated that they are taking steps to 

implement them. State also noted that our review did not uncover any 

evidence that the U.S. government has trained any individual or unit that 

has committed gross violations of human rights. However, our review only 

focused on whether State and the posts in Rabat and Tunis vetted trainees. 

We did not collect data on whether any individual or unit trained by the 

United States, whether vetted or not, had committed human rights 

violations. 

We are providing copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and 

State and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies

available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available 

on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix V. 

Joseph A. Christoff 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 27 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the goals of U.S. security assistance and how these goals are 

assessed, we interviewed officials from the Department of Defense (DOD) 

and the Department of State (State) in Washington, D.C., responsible for 

overseeing security assistance programs. We also interviewed DOD 

officials at the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany; U.S. 

Embassy officials in Rabat, Morocco, and Tunis, Tunisia; and foreign 

government officials in Rabat. We did not include Algeria in our site visits 

because its level of participation in U.S. security assistance programs was 

significantly lower than Morocco’s and Tunisia’s. Additionally, we 

reviewed State’s Mission Performance Plans and DOD’s Country Campaign 

Plans for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as a variety of other State 

and DOD documents to determine how U.S. security assistance programs 

were linked to State and DOD goals. We obtained data on the nature and 

extent of the activities funded by these programs in Algeria, Morocco, and

Tunisia from program officials and State and DOD documents. We 

reviewed the reliability of funding data provided by State and DOD by 

comparing it with similar data obtained from other sources to check for 

completeness, consistency, and reasonableness. We also interviewed 

program officials responsible for managing the data to assess how it was 

developed and maintained. We found the data sufficiently reliable for 

representing the nature and extent of program funding and activities. 

To assess U.S. agencies’ implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of State’s

policy to screen foreign security forces to ensure compliance with 

congressional human rights funding restrictions, we reviewed relevant 

statutes and implementing guidelines. These include the fiscal years 2004 

through 2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts and the DOD 

Appropriations Acts, and the DOD Security Assistance Management 

Manual. We also reviewed program policy and procedures issued by State

and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and at the posts in Rabat and 

Tunis. To understand human rights vetting requirements and processes, 

we interviewed relevant officials in Washington, D.C., the U.S. European

Command, and the two posts to discuss vetting requirements and 

processes. We also reviewed the recommendations made in our July 2005 

report on human rights vetting in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, we 

communicated with a State Office of Inspector General (OIG) official to 

determine the extent to which State OIG has oversight of human rights 

vetting at posts. To obtain a general understanding of the human rights 

situation in Morocco and Tunisia, we met with State human rights officers 

and representatives of nongovernmental organizations involved with 

human rights issues. 

Page 28 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the extent to which the two posts complied with human 

rights vetting policy in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, we asked the relevant 

State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and at each post to determine 

the number of foreign security force personnel receiving training 

implemented at the posts in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. We further asked 

post officials to identify the total number of vetting files maintained at the 

post for trainees in this time frame. To identify the approximate number of 

trainees for whom posts did not maintain vetting files and, therefore, who 

may not have been vetted, we used training data provided by agency

reports as well as State and DOD officials. For vetting files that were 

available at the posts, we drew a stratified random probability sample of 

273 of 468 trainee vetting files available at the U.S. posts in Morocco and 

Tunisia. With our probability sample, each member of the study 

population had a nonzero probability of being included, and that 

probability could be computed for any member. We stratified the 

population by country and by agency implementing training into the 

Morocco DOD, Morocco State, and Tunisia DOD case files. Each sample 

case file was subsequently weighted in the analysis to account statistically 

for all the case files in the population, including those who were not 

selected. We reviewed the files for compliance with State human rights 

vetting policy. To conduct the file review, we used a data collection 

instrument to systematically capture whether key steps in the post’s 

human rights vetting process occurred, such as whether the political 

affairs office at each post was involved. We did not collect data on 

whether any individual or unit trained by the United States, whether vetted 

or not, had committed human rights violations. 

Because we followed a probability procedure based on random selections, 

our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have 

drawn. Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we 

express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results 

as 95 percent confidence intervals (e.g., plus or minus 7 percentage 

points). These are intervals that would contain the actual population 

values for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. As a result, we 

are 95 percent confident that each of the confidence intervals in this 

report will include the true values in the study population. 

To examine U.S. agencies’ efforts to monitor the use of U.S.-origin defense 

articles provided to these countries, we reviewed relevant federal laws 

governing the use of arms exports, including the Arms Export Control Act 

of 1976, as amended, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,

and reviewed DOD end-use monitoring guidance. We interviewed DOD 

officials responsible for end-use monitoring at the Defense Security 

Page 29 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Cooperation Agency (DSCA), EUCOM, and the posts in Rabat and Tunis to

determine what monitoring activities took place in these countries, 

whether these countries have any sensitive defense articles requiring 

systematic monitoring under DOD guidelines, and whether there have 

been any allegations of misuse of U.S.-origin equipment. Algeria does not 

receive U.S.-origin defense articles from the U.S. government. We also 

interviewed State human rights officers in Rabat, Tunis and Washington, 

D.C. as well as representatives of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 

International to determine if there have been any allegations of misuse 

involving U.S.-origin defense articles. Furthermore, we spoke with the 

commander of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Western Sahara 

regarding Morocco’s military presence there. We also received intelligence 

briefings from EUCOM and DIA officials. To determine U.S. policy on the 

use of U.S.-origin equipment by Morocco in Western Sahara, we 

interviewed State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and at the post in 

Morocco and reviewed relevant State and DOD congressional testimony 

regarding Western Sahara. 

We conducted this review from October 2005 to July 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 30 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Appendix II: Human Rights Vetting Process in

Appendix II: Human Rights Vetting Process in

Morocco and Tunisia as of February 2006 

Agency vetting of candidates for human rights concerns in Morocco and 

Tunisia typically includes the following steps. First, the office at the post 

implementing the training programs receives names of training candidates

and reviews background information from the host government. 

Second, the implementing office forwards the names of training 

candidates to the point of contact at State’s political affairs office at the 

post for screening, which includes searches using paper and electronic 

files, for evidence of the candidates’ involvement in human rights 

violations. The political office may also consult human rights 

nongovernmental organizations for any information they have on the 

candidates. The implementing office also circulates the candidates’ names 

to other relevant offices within the post, such as State’s regional security 

office and consular affairs office, for vetting. These offices respond to the 

implementing office with their vetting results. 

The point of contact in the post’s political affairs office sends the training 

candidates’ names via cable to the relevant regional bureau, such as the 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, to request human rights screening by State 

headquarters. The regional bureau checks candidates’ names against 

bureau files, and then forwards these names to other bureaus at State 

headquarters for further vetting. These bureaus—including the Bureaus of 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Intelligence and Research; and 

Political-Military Affairs—screen candidates’ names using paper and 

electronic files available to them and then report vetting results to the 

regional bureau. 

Finally, the regional bureau communicates State headquarters’ vetting 

results via cable to the post to inform the point of contact and the 

implementing office whether credible evidence of gross human rights 

violations existed for training candidates. 

When vetting candidates’ names, the political affairs office at posts and the 

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor access State’s Abuse 

Case Evaluation System (ACES), a database that contains information on 

alleged human rights abuses. Data in the system come from post reporting, 

the press, nongovernmental organizations, national human rights 

commissions, and other sources. Users at posts and State headquarters 

enter comments on allegations, and the Bureau of Democracy, Human 

Rights, and Labor validates information for completeness and accuracy. In

screening training candidates, post officials use ACES to conduct vetting 

checks by entering names into the database to determine whether it 

contains derogatory information on an individual. Although State 

Page 31 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Morocco and Tunisia as of February 2006 

implemented ACES in February 2005, officials at posts and State 

headquarters informed us that ACES does not contain entries for Morocco 

and Tunisia because they had no derogatory information on specific 

individuals to report as of June 2006.

Page 32 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Appendix III: Tables on Number of Trainees

with No Evidence of Vetting in Morocco and Appendix III: Ta

Tunbles on Number of T isia, Fiscal Years 2004-2005 rainees 

with No Evidence of Vetting in Morocco and 

Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004-2005 

We obtained the estimated number of trainees for whom posts lacked 

vetting files using data provided by State and DOD training reports and 

agency officials. See Table 5 for more information on the types of training

which lacked vetting files. 

Table 5: Estimated Number of Trainees with No Vetting Files, Fiscal Years 2004-

2005 

Implementing agency and country

Number of trainees with

no files maintained at 

 posts

DOD 

International Military Education and Training, Morocco 29

International Military Education and Training, Tunisia 25

Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, 

Morocco 6

Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, 

Tunisia 10

Regional centers, Morocco 29

Regional centers, Tunisia 35

Service academies, Morocco 1

Service academies, Tunisia 13

DOD subtotal 148

State 

Antiterrorism Assistance, Morocco 80

Antiterrorism Assistance, Tunisia 42

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, 

Morocco 168

State subtotal 290

Total 438

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data. 

Our review of a sample of human rights vetting files showed that an 

estimated 27 percent had no evidence of vetting. Details by the 

implementing office and country are shown in Table 6. 

Page 33 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Appendix III: Tables on Number of Trainees

with No Evidence of Vetting in Morocco and 

Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004-2005 

Table 6: GAO Sample of Files Maintained on Training Nominees in Morocco and

Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004–2005 

Implementing agency and

country

Number of 

trainees with

files maintained 

at posts

GAO sample

size by

agency/ 

country

Estimated 

percentage of files 

with no evidence of 

vetting

DOD 

Moroccoa148 49 65%

Tunisiab143 47 0%

State 

Moroccoc177 177 17%

Morocco subtotald325 226 39%

Tunisia subtotal

e

143 47 0%

Total

f

468 273 27%

Source: GAO.

a

This number is composed of training nominees for International Military Education and Training 

(IMET), the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), and Foreign Military

Financing. We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of DOD Morocco files with no evidence of 

vetting is between 53 percent and 76 percent. 

b

This number is composed of training nominees for IMET, CTFP, and the Aviation Leadership 

Program. We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of DOD Tunisia files with no evidence of 

vetting is between 0 percent and 6 percent. 

c

This number is composed of Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) training nominees for whom State 

maintained vetting files. Some training nominees may not have attended the training course due to 

cancellations. State’s data indicated that Morocco held additional ATA courses; however, we did not 

find vetting files for training nominees for these courses. The sample size represents the entire 

population of available State-provided training courses with vetting files. 

d

We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of Morocco files with no evidence of vetting is 

between 34 and 44 percent. 

e

See table note b.

f

We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of total files with no evidence of vetting is between 

24 and 31 percent. 

Page 34 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department Appendix IV of State : Comments from the 

Department of State 

Page 35 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 36 GAO-06-850 Security Assistance
Appendix V: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 37 GAO-06-850

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Joseph Christoff (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov

In addition, Muriel Forster, Assistant Director; Lynn Cothern; Howard 

Cott; David Dornisch; James Krustapentus; Victoria Lin; Mary Moutsos; 

and Sidney Schwartz made key contributions to this report. 

Security Assistance

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320382) 
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