United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

PORT RISK 

MANAGEMENT 

Additional Federal 

Guidance Would Aid 

Ports in Disaster 

Planning and 

Recovery 

March 2007 

 

GAO-07-412 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2007

PORT RISK MANAGEMENT 

Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid 

Highlights of GAO-07-412, a report to Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery 

congressional committees 

U.S ports are significant to the U.S.

economy, handling more than 2

billion tons of domestic and 

import/export cargo annually. 

Since Sept. 11, 2001, much of the

national focus on ports’ 

preparedness has been on

preventing potential acts of terror,

the 2005 hurricane season renewed 

focus on how to protect ports from 

a diversity of threats, including

natural disasters. This report was 

prepared under the authority of the

Comptroller General to examine 

(1) challenges port authorities have

experienced as a result of recent

natural disasters, (2) efforts under

way to address these challenges, 

and (3) the manner in which port 

authorities plan for natural

disasters. GAO reviewed

documents and interviewed various

port stakeholders from 17 major 

U.S. ports. 

What GAO Recommends

To ensure that ports achieve 

adequate planning for natural 

disasters, GAO recommends that

the Secretary of Homeland Security

encourage port stakeholders to use

existing forums for discussing allhazards planning. 

DHS, DOT and DOD generally

agreed with the facts presented in

the report. However, DHS 

expressed concern about using

existing forums for planning. Our

work showed that these forums are

already being used for planning in

several cases which should be 

further encouraged. 

Ports, particularly those impacted by the 2005 hurricane season, experienced 

many different kinds of challenges during recent natural disasters. Of the 17

U.S. ports that GAO reviewed, port officials identified communications, 

personnel, and interagency coordination as their biggest challenges. 

Many port authorities have taken steps to address these challenges. 

Individually, ports have created redundancy in communications systems and 

other backup equipment and updated their emergency plans. Collectively, 

the American Association of Port Authorities developed a best practices 

manual focused on port planning and recovery efforts, as well as lessons 

learned from recent natural disasters. Even ports that have not experienced 

problems as a result of recent disasters, but are nonetheless susceptible to 

disaster threats, have responded to lessons learned by other ports. 

Additionally, federal maritime agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, the 

Maritime Administration, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have 

increased their coordination and communication with ports to strengthen 

ports’ ability to recover from future natural disasters and to build

stakeholders’ knowledge about federal resources for port recovery efforts. 

Most port authorities GAO reviewed conduct planning for natural disasters 

separately from planning for homeland security threats. Unlike security

efforts, natural disaster planning is not subject to the same type of specific 

federal requirements and, therefore, varies from port to port. As a result of 

this divided approach, GAO found a wide variance in ports’ natural disaster 

planning efforts including: 

• the level of participation in disaster forums, and 

• the level of information sharing among port stakeholders 

In the absence of appropriate forums and information sharing opportunities 

among ports, some ports GAO contacted were limited in their understanding 

of federal resources available for predisaster mitigation and postdisaster 

recovery. Other ports have begun using existing forums, such as their 

federally mandated Area Maritime Security Committee, to coordinate 

disaster planning efforts. Port and industry experts, as well as recent federal 

actions, are now encouraging an all-hazards approach to disaster planning 

and recovery. That is, disaster preparedness planning requires that all of the 

threats faced by the port, both natural (such as hurricanes) and man-made 

(such as terror events), be considered together. The Department of 

Homeland Security, which through the Coast Guard oversees the Area 

Maritime Security Committees, provides an example of how to incorporate a 

wider scope of activity for ports across the country. Additionally, the 

Maritime Administration should develop a communication strategy to 

inform ports of the maritime resources available for recovery efforts.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-412.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Katherine 

Siggerud at (202) 512-6570 or 

siggerudk@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5

Background 10

Recent Natural Disasters Created a Variety of Challenges; Some 

Recovery Efforts Were More Difficult Than Expected 18 

Port Authorities Have Various Efforts Under Way to Mitigate 

Challenges 23

Current Planning Approach Lessens Effective Coordination among 

All Port Stakeholders 31 

Conclusions 40

Recommendations for Executive Action 41 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 41 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 45 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 50 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 52 

Tables 

Table 1: Port Stakeholder Roles 11 

Table 2: Federal Agency Role at Ports 14 

Table 3: Natural Disaster Planning Forums at Ports GAO Visited 38 

Table 4: Key FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs 40 

Figures 

Figure 1: Ports Selected for Case Studies and Phone Interviews 4 

Figure 2: Port Experiences with Natural Disasters Since 1998 7 

Figure 3: Port Elements 13 

Figure 4: GAO Risk Management Framework 17 

Page i GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Abbreviations 

AAPA American Association of Port Authorities 

AMSC Area Maritime Security Committee 

COTP Captain of the Port 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOT Department of Transportation 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

GICA Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association 

LEA Local Emergency Management Agency 

MIRP Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan 

MSRAM Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model 

MTSA Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 

NIMS National Incident Management System 

NRP National Response Plan 

SAFE Port Act Security and Accountability for Every Port Act 

 of 2006 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

March 28, 2007 

Congressional Committees: 

U.S. ports and waterways handle more than 2 billion tons of domestic and 

import/export cargo annually, and more than 95 percent of U.S. 

international trade moves by water. As such, ports are a global gateway to

world markets and significant engines in the U.S. economy. As important

as they are, virtually every major U.S. port faces one or more types of 

natural disasters with potentially devastating consequences. Ports 

throughout the eastern seaboard and the Gulf Coast face the possibility of 

hurricanes, and ports on the West Coast are in areas that are highly 

susceptible to earthquakes. Losing a major port, even for a few weeks or 

months, could have a national economic impact, making effective recovery 

a concern not only for the local area but for the federal government as 

well. 

U.S. ports and waterways handle more than 2 billion tons of domestic and 

import/export cargo annually, and more than 95 percent of U.S. 

international trade moves by water. As such, ports are a global gateway to

world markets and significant engines in the U.S. economy. As important

as they are, virtually every major U.S. port faces one or more types of 

natural disasters with potentially devastating consequences. Ports 

throughout the eastern seaboard and the Gulf Coast face the possibility of 

hurricanes, and ports on the West Coast are in areas that are highly 

susceptible to earthquakes. Losing a major port, even for a few weeks or 

months, could have a national economic impact, making effective recovery 

a concern not only for the local area but for the federal government as 

well. 

Ports’ complexities exacerbate the difficulty of taking adequate steps to 

deal with possible natural disasters. Ports are often sprawling enterprises, 

and each port is unique. Further, a “port” is seldom a single entity. Rather, 

a port is usually a collection of varied maritime stakeholders. Ports usually 

include a public entity, such as a port authority. The role of port 

authorities varies from port to port. For example, the Port of Mobile 

operates a coal plant in the port, but it also has tenants that lease and 

operate their own facilities in the port area. Other ports, such as the Port 

of Miami, are owned and managed by county government,1

 but terminal 

operators are responsible for the day-to-day maintenance and repair of the 

terminal area. Besides port authorities, port stakeholders include shipping

companies and other tenants that may be leasing port authority facilities, 

factories and other industries located in the area, and local and state law 

enforcement and emergency management agencies. Terminals or facilities 

may also be privately owned. Federal agencies also have a role at ports 

including the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard), U.S. Army Corps of 

Ports’ complexities exacerbate the difficulty of taking adequate steps to 

deal with possible natural disasters. Ports are often sprawling enterprises, 

and each port is unique. Further, a “port” is seldom a single entity. Rather, 

a port is usually a collection of varied maritime stakeholders. Ports usually 

include a public entity, such as a port authority. The role of port 

authorities varies from port to port. For example, the Port of Mobile 

operates a coal plant in the port, but it also has tenants that lease and 

operate their own facilities in the port area. Other ports, such as the Port 

of Miami, are owned and managed by county government,

 

1

 but terminal 

operators are responsible for the day-to-day maintenance and repair of the 

terminal area. Besides port authorities, port stakeholders include shipping

companies and other tenants that may be leasing port authority facilities, 

factories and other industries located in the area, and local and state law 

enforcement and emergency management agencies. Terminals or facilities 

may also be privately owned. Federal agencies also have a role at ports 

including the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard), U.S. Army Corps of 

1

The Dante B. Fascell Port of Miami-Dade is owned and managed by the local government,

Miami-Dade County. 

Page 1 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Engineers, and the Maritime Administration.2

 Despite these complexities, 

ports have various forums in which these maritime stakeholders can 

coordinate on issues that affect the port as a whole. For terrorism 

concerns, for example, major U.S. ports have a Area Maritime Security 

Committee (AMSC)3

 that provides a venue for discussing security 

concerns. For disaster relief concerns, U.S. ports would work with the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regarding disaster 

assistance. 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, much of the focus on 

emergency preparedness has been on preparedness for preventing, 

mitigating the effects of, and responding to terrorist attacks. Through 

legislation and presidential directives, the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) is the primary federal organization responsible for 

preparing the nation both for terrorist attacks and for major disasters. 

Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5 and 8 require that DHS 

establish a single, comprehensive approach to and plans for the 

management of emergency events whether the result of terrorist attacks or 

large-scale natural or accidental disasters.4 As we have previously 

reported, the capabilities needed to respond to major disasters, whether 

the result of a terrorist attack or nature, are similar in many ways. The 

devastating hurricane season of 2005, which included Hurricanes Katrina,

Rita, and Wilma, focused renewed attention on the potential effects that 

natural disasters could pose to port operations. The numerous 

vulnerabilities port operations face, together with the limited resources 

available to deal with them, have also initiated a renewed look at how to 

protect ports from a variety of threats. 

In light of the continued attention both to port security and to federal 

natural disaster response, we are providing a comprehensive view of steps 

ports have taken to prepare and mitigate the impacts of natural disasters. 

Consequently, we conducted this review, initiated under the Comptroller 

General’s authority, to examine port disaster preparedness measures and 

 2

In this report, “port” usually refers to one of two things: (1) the port authority or (2) the

collective group of stakeholders. We have taken care to ensure that the reference intended 

is clear. Where necessary, we have inserted clarifying language (such as “port authority”) to

help ensure clarity. 

3

Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064. 

4

GAO, Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All- Hazards 

Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-652 (Washington, D.C.: July, 11, 2005). 

Page 2 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
to examine the federal role in helping ports plan and recover from natural 

disaster impacts. More specifically, this report examines (1) the challenges

port authorities have experienced as a result of recent natural disasters, 

(2) the efforts under way to address challenges from these disasters, and 

(3) the manner in which port authorities plan for natural disasters and the 

effect of this approach on their ability to share information with port 

stakeholders and access federal resources. 

To address the challenges port authorities experience as a result of recent

disasters and the efforts to address these challenges, we selected 17 U.S. 

ports for review (see fig. 1). We focused primarily on commercial ports 

and various commercial aspects of these ports. The criteria we used 

included selecting ports that (1) varied in size (based on cargo value) and

(2) varied in the degree to which they had experienced some type of 

natural disaster since 1998.5

 Based on guidance from DHS regarding the 

most significant natural disaster threats to ports, we limited the natural 

disasters we considered to earthquakes and hurricanes. In particular, we 

focused on ports impacted by the 2005 hurricane season; in all, 11 of the 

17 ports we selected were affected by hurricanes that year. We conducted

site visits at 7 of the 17 ports, where we interviewed various maritime 

stakeholders, including officials from the port authorities, emergency 

management agencies, and federal agencies such as the Coast Guard, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, Maritime Administration, and FEMA. We 

contacted the remaining 10 ports by telephone and conducted a more 

limited range of interviews. For all 17 ports, we reviewed numerous 

planning documents, including emergency operations plans, business 

continuity plans, and hurricane plans.

 5

We chose 1998 as the cutoff date for recent disasters based on the available data from 

FEMA.

Page 3 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Figure 1: Ports Selected for Case Studies and Phone Interviews 

PA

OR

NV

ID

MT

WY

UT

AZ

NM

CO

ND

SD

NE

TX

KS

OK

MN

IA

MO

AR

LA

IL

MS

IN

KY

TN

AL

FL

GA

SC

NC

VA

OH

NH

MA

RI MI

CA

WA

WI NY

ME

VT

WV

CT

NJ

DE

MD

DC

San Diego

Los Angeles

Oakland

Tacoma

Wilmington

Richmond

Savannah

Jacksonville

Miami

Freeport

Gulfport

Houston Pascagoula

New Orleans

Morg Mobile an City

Port Arthur

Sources: GAO, Map Resources (map).

Threat of hurricane

Threat of earthquake

Case study

Telephone interview

To determine the manner in which port authorities prepare for disasters 

and its effect on information sharing and access to federal resources, we 

relied primarily on information obtained from our 17 case studies and 

phone interviews, supplementing it as necessary with other information 

related to risk management and disaster planning. For perspective on risk 

management, we used our body of work related to risk management 

Page 4 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
throughout the federal government6

 and supplemented it with additional 

risk management models and tools from a wide range of federal, 

professional, and academic stakeholders, as well as interviews and 

documents from the Coast Guard and offices within DHS. We did not 

include any separate planning efforts conducted by private operators, for 

two key reasons: their roles and responsibilities vary greatly from port to 

port and; unlike their planning efforts for homeland security, their efforts 

for natural disasters are not subject to the same type of federal 

requirements or guidelines. We performed our work from December 2005 

through March 2007, in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. See appendix I for more detail regarding our 

objectives, scope, and methodology.

Port authorities reported experiencing many different kinds of challenges 

during recent natural disasters, with communication, personnel, and 

interagency coordination reported as the most problematic challenges. 

This was particularly true for ports that were impacted by the 2005 

hurricane season. Twelve of the 17 ports we reviewed had experienced at

least one hurricane or earthquake since 1998, and of these, 8 reported one 

or more types of challenges in responding (see fig. 2). The most visibly 

apparent challenge port authorities experienced was dealing with 

damaged infrastructure, including structural damage to buildings and 

piers, and silting and debris clogging key waterways. Port authorities also 

reported difficulties restoring power, water, and other utilities. However, 

the greatest challenges port officials said they experienced—and in many

cases did not anticipate—were in the following other areas:

Results in Brief 

• Communications. Many ports experienced difficulties in communicating 

both outside the port and with port personnel and other port stakeholders. 

Phone outages were extensive and cell phone reception was limited. For 

example, one port was without services for 2 to 4 weeks following 

Hurricane Katrina. 

• Personnel. When many port personnel around the Gulf area were 

evacuated from their homes, the evacuation caused problems both in 

locating personnel and also in letting them know they should return to 

work. 

 6

See, for example, GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks 

and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005). 

Page 5 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
• Coordination. Officials reported difficulties coordinating with local, state, 

and federal stakeholders, especially for planning and recovery efforts. For 

example, in some cases, port officials had difficulty re-entering the port 

because they lacked the credentials required by local police and other 

emergency management officials. Some ports also reported difficulty 

accessing federal resources for recovery efforts. For example, officials at 

some ports said they had problems understanding the process in filing for 

disaster assistance and coordinating damage assessments with FEMA or 

were unaware of resources available through the Maritime Administration, 

such as ships that could be used for housing or for conveying supplies. 

Page 6 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Figure 2: Port Experiences with Natural Disasters Since 1998 

Ports Threats Events Challenges

Freeport, TX

Houston, TX

Jacksonville, FL

Los Angeles, CA

Miami, FL

Mobile, AL

Morgan City, LA

New Orleans, LA

Oakland, CA

Pascagoula, MS

Port Arthur, TX

Richmond, VA

San Diego, CA

Savannah, GA

Tacoma, WA

Wilmington, NC

Gulfport, MS

Frances/Rita

Katrina

Rita

Katrina

Katrina

Katrina

Wilma

Katrina

Rita

Katrina

Rita

Rita

Rita

Ernesto

Ophelia, Katrina

Ernesto, Floyd

Nisqually

Infrastructure

Personnel

Communication

Utilities

(power)

Utilites

(water)

Coordination

Clearing debris/

aids to navigation

No recent

events

Threat of

hurricane

Threat of

earthquake

Source: GAO.

 Gray icons

indicate negligible 

or no challenge

Page 7 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Port authorities and other stakeholders reported taking a variety of steps 

to address these challenges. Port authorities have replaced, repaired, and

created redundancies for a variety of communications systems and 

physical infrastructure—for example, purchasing backup phone systems 

and power generators, creating alternative administrative sites, and 

developing alternative storage for computer information. Though the 2005 

hurricane season primarily affected Gulf ports, port authority officials 

elsewhere said the results of that season prompted them to improve their 

preparation as well. One key effort was undertaken by the American 

Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), an industry group. It convened 

work groups to discuss lessons learned and, based on the input, issued a 

manual with guidance for ports on such issues as developing alternative 

communications, setting up an emergency operations center, and 

identifying federal resources for recovery efforts. Port authorities reported 

their changes often extended to improving coordination with other 

stakeholders. Some ports adapted forums intended for security planning, 

such as their AMSC, while others with existing natural disaster forums 

took steps to strengthen them. Some port authorities also established 

plans for coordinating with neighboring ports. Actions have also been 

taken at the federal level. For example, the Maritime Administration, 

contributed to a one-time plan developed by FEMA—the Federal Support 

Plan. This plan was specifically cited for the 2006 Hurricane Season and 

was specific to the federal government’s response to support the State of

Louisiana. The Maritime Administration contributed to this plan by 

identifying government and commercial maritime capabilities that could 

be employed in response to a disaster. To date, while the Maritime 

Administration plans to provide a directive regarding capabilities to all of

their regional offices in June 2007, no plan exists for communicating this

information to ports. 

Port authorities we reviewed generally conducted their natural disaster 

planning separately from planning for homeland security threats, and this 

approach has reduced their ability to facilitate sharing natural disaster 

planning information among key stakeholders and to access federal 

resources. Planning for homeland security, an activity that is governed by

federal law, tends to be consistent from port to port. By contrast, natural 

disaster planning, which is not subject to the same type of specific federal 

requirements, varied considerably at the ports we reviewed in its extent 

and thoroughness. Separate planning for these two threats means that 

ports are not able to effectively estimate the impact of mitigation 

alternatives and optimize their investments in these alternatives based on

costs and benefits. Industry experts and port stakeholders, such as the 

Coast Guard, are now encouraging unified consideration of all risks faced 

Page 8 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
by ports, but we found few port authorities were taking a unified 

approach. One consequence of divided planning is that key stakeholders 

were not necessarily participating in natural disaster planning. Unlike 

security planning, where the Secretary of Homeland Security can establish 

an AMSC with broad representation across port stakeholders, natural 

disaster planning carries no such requirement. During our review, we 

found substantial variation in the maturity of, and participation in, natural 

disaster planning forums at ports. In particular, one port had no forum that 

brought together the port authority and the local disaster planning agency, 

which had knowledge of available federal resources, such as FEMA grant 

programs, as well as the expertise to deal with grant requirements. In the 

absence of such a forum, it is not surprising that some ports were limited 

in their understanding of federal resources available for predisaster 

mitigation and postdisaster recovery. To help improve information 

sharing, some ports have begun using their federally authorized AMSC, or 

some other similar forum with wide representation, in disaster planning 

efforts. DHS, which through the Coast Guard coordinates the AMSCs, 

provides an example of how to incorporate a wider scope of committee 

activity for ports across the country. 

To help ensure that ports achieve adequate planning for natural disasters 

and effectively manage risk to a variety of threats, we are recommending 

that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security encourage port 

stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing their all-hazards 

planning efforts and include appropriate representatives from DHS, the 

port authority, representatives from the local emergency management 

office, the Maritime Administration, and vessel and facility 

owner/operators. To help ensure that ports have adequate understanding 

of maritime disaster recovery resources, we recommend that the Secretary 

of the Department of Transportation direct the Administrator of the 

Maritime Administration to develop a communication strategy to inform 

ports of the maritime resources available for recovery efforts.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS, the Department of 

Transportation (DOT), and the Department of Defense (DOD) generally 

agreed with the facts presented. In its letter, DHS did not endorse placing 

responsibility for disaster contingency planning on existing committees in 

ports and said these responsibilities should remain with state and local

emergency management planners. Our recommendation was not to place 

responsibility for such planning within port committees, but rather to use 

these existing forums as a way to engage all relevant parties in discussing 

natural disaster planning for ports. DOT officials provided a number of 

comments and clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate to 

Page 9 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
ensure the accuracy of our report. The DOT generally concurred with 

GAO’s recommendation. The DOD provided technical comments and 

clarifications. 

Ports comprise many different stakeholders, both public and private. Port

authorities also may have jurisdiction over some or all of the geographical 

area of a port. The port authority can be an agency of the state, county, or

city in which the port is located. In most ports in North America, the actual 

task of loading and unloading goods is carried out by private operators 

who lease space or equipment from the port authority. (In some ports, the 

port authority also manages some of these stevedoring activities.) The 

percentage of the port area over which the port authority has jurisdiction, 

and the level of involvement of the port authority in the port’s operations, 

is different from port to port. This variability in port authority jurisdiction 

and operational involvement has direct consequences for portwide 

disaster preparedness. Even though a port authority may have a thorough 

disaster plan in place, that plan may not be binding on any of the private 

operators in the port. 

The stakeholders involved at any given port can vary but, in general, they

include port authorities, private-sector operators doing business within the 

port, government agencies, and information-sharing forums. Table 1 

summarizes these basic participants and their roles.7

Background 

Port Activities Involve 

Many Different Entities 

 7

See table 2 for federal agencies involved. 

Page 10 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Table 1: Port Stakeholder Roles 

Port stakeholder Stakeholder role 

Quasi-governmental 

Port authority • Provides a limited governance structure for the port. 

• Sometimes owns port assets such as cranes and pier space. 

• The role of the port authority varies from port to port. Some ports own and operate cargo 

terminals, while others lease their equipment and pier space to private operators. Others 

engage in a combination of both activities. 

Private sector

Facility/service operators • Ship owners and operators 

• Stevedoring companies 

• Rail carriers/operators 

• Trucking and shipping companies 

• Other operators to support the day-to-day activities of the port 

State and local governments 

State or local emergency management 

agency 

• May assist port in planning for natural disasters and security threats. May also help to 

coordinate disaster response services such as police, fire, and medical teams for the 

port. 

Information sharing forums

Area Maritime Security Committee • Federally established forum at all ports for all stakeholders to share information on

security issues through regularly scheduled meetings, electronic bulletins on suspicious 

activities around seaport facilities, and sharing of key documents.a

• The U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP)

b

 is authorized to establish and 

coordinate the AMSC and appoint members along with other duties as prescribed by 

regulation. 

Harbor Safety Committee • Forum at many ports for all stakeholders to advise on regulatory and nonregulatory 

safety-related issues, including disaster preparedness. Only two Harbor Safety 

Committees, at the Ports of Houston, Texas, and New Orleans, Louisiana, are federally 

mandated.c 

Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association • The Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association (GICA) is maritime trade association that is an 

advocate for issues regarding the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, which is an inland 

navigable waterway located along the Gulf Coast. One of GICA’s missions is to work 

with it members, as well as the Coast Guard and Corps, to identify opportunities to 

improve the safety and efficiency of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway. 

American Association of Port Authorities • A trade association that represents more than 150 public port authorities in the United 

States, Canada, the Caribbean, and Latin America. 

• Coordinated a series of working groups to develop best practices for disaster preparation 

and recovery. 

Source: GAO.

a

Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064, contains 

many of the homeland security requirements related specifically to port security. The Area Maritime 

Security Committees are authorized by section 102 of MTSA, as codified at 46 U.S.C. § 70112(a)(2).

b

A Coast Guard officer designated as the lead official to facilitate execution of Coast Guard duties in 

that area. 14 U.S.C. § 634. 

c

Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-241, § 18 and § 19, 105 Stat. 2208. 

Page 11 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
These various stakeholders interact in a variety of ways. The port 

authority provides a limited governance structure for the port. Many port 

authorities lease piers, or “terminals,” and equipment to stevedoring 

companies and shipping lines that are responsible for the actual loading 

and transport of cargo. Some port authorities also operate cargo terminals 

alongside the private operators. Figure 3 depicts the main elements of a 

typical port. Individual ports may not include all of these elements, or may 

include some not depicted here. 

Page 12 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Figure 3: Port Elements 

Federal channel

Port

controlled

channel

Port

controlled

channel

Cargo erminal 

The area for loading and 

unloading ships. It may be 

leased from the port authority 

by a private operator

Container ship 

Container ships bring 

goods to and from the port.

Trucking companies

Transport goods within the 

port and from the port to 

inland locations.

Rail carrier

Transport goods from the 

port to inland locations.

1

7

7

8

8

10

10

9

9

2

2

3

3

4

4

5

5

6

6

U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers

Maintains the federal 

channel leading to a port.

U.S. Coast Guard

Provides federal 

oversight of portwide 

safety and security.

1

Emergency Management Agency

State or local agency helps

coordinate disaster response 

services such as police, fire, 

and medical teams.

Information sharing forums

Provide a means of 

coordinating disaster 

planning among port 

stakeholders. 

Terminal 

The area for loading and 

unloading ships. It may be 

leased from the port authority 

by a private operator.

2

Port authority

Provides limited 

governance structure for 

the port and may own 

port assets.

Gantry crane

A gantry crane is used to 

transfer containers and other 

types of cargo between 

ships and trucks or trains.

Page 13 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Several federal agencies provide support to ports in natural disaster 

planning, response, and recovery (see table 2). These agencies have 

different missions that relate to port operations, including natural disaster 

planning and response. For example, the Coast Guard is the agency 

responsible for most federal oversight related to portwide safety and 

security. It plays the primary role in coordinating efforts for homeland 

security efforts. FEMA plays a role in homeland security planning and also 

administers several assistance programs for disaster preparation and 

recovery. The Maritime Administration plays a general role in coordinating 

efforts to strengthen the maritime system and also has the ability to 

provide maritime assets that could be used to support homeland security 

interests. These vessels are part of the country’s National Defense Ready 

Reserve Fleet, including ships and barges, which could be used for 

housing, power generation, or the movement of water and other supplies. 

Federal Role in Port 

Activities Is Extensive 

Table 2: Federal Agency Role at Ports 

Stakeholders Selected mission-related activities 

Department of Homeland Security

U.S. Coast Guard Promotes and carries out five operating goals at every U.S. port: Maritime 

Safety, Protection of Natural Resources, Mobility (i.e., facilitation of the 

movement of people and goods), Maritime Security, and National Defense. 

Coordinates the AMSC where they have been created. 

Responsible for closing the port to vessel traffic before or during a disaster 

and reopening the port to traffic following the incident. 

Reviews facility security plans and oversees compliance with these plans. 

FEMA Administers the Public Assistance Grant Program that provides funds for 

the repair, replacement, or restoration of disaster-damaged, publicly owned

facilities. Few ports have received funding for post-disaster recovery under 

this program. 

Administers the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program that provides funds to 

state and local governments to implement long-term hazard mitigation 

measures after a major disaster declaration. Ports may be included as subapplicants on a state or local government application. Very few ports have 

applied for and received hazard mitigation grants. 

Administers the Predisaster Mitigation Program that provides technical and 

financial assistance for hazard mitigation planning and the implementation

of mitigation projects prior to a disaster event. 

Preparedness Directorate–Office of Grants and Training Administers the Port Security Grant Program that provides funds each year 

to mitigate security threats to ports. Both port authorities and private 

operators may apply. The program has distributed $876,394,146 since its 

inception, and $168,052,500 in the fiscal year 2006 program. 

Page 14 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Stakeholders Selected mission-related activities 

Department of Transportation

Maritime Administration • Seeks to improve and strengthen the U.S. marine transportation 

system—including infrastructure, industry and labor—to meet the 

economic and security needs of the nation. 

• Provides ready reserve vessels that could be used to support vital 

homeland and national security interests.b

• Publishes a Port Risk Management and Insurance Guidebook that is 

currently being revised to include disaster preparedness guidance for 

ports. 

Department of Defense

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers • Maintains any federal channels leading to a port. Following disasters, 

surveys the channel, removes debris, and oversees any necessary 

dredging. 

Source: GAO.

a

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers maintains more than 12,000 miles (19,200 km) of inland 

waterways and operates 235 locks. 

b

The Maritime Administration manages this inactive inventory for the Department of Defense. 

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, prompted additional federal

efforts to address a broad spectrum of emergencies. The Homeland 

Security Act of 20028

 required DHS to develop a comprehensive National

Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS is intended to provide a 

consistent framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels 

regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of the situation and to define 

the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments, and 

various first responder disciplines at each level during an emergency 

event. To manage all major incidents, NIMS has a standard incident 

management system, called the Incident Command System, with five 

functional areas—command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance 

and administration. NIMS also prescribes interoperable communications 

systems and preparedness before an incident happens, including planning,

training, and exercises. 

Federal Disaster Planning 

Guidance 

In December 2004, DHS issued the National Response Plan (NRP), 

intended to be an all-discipline, all-hazards plan establishing a single, 

comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents 

where federal involvement is necessary. The NRP includes planning 

assumptions, roles and responsibilities, concept of operations, and 

 8

Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 

Page 15 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
incident management actions. The NRP also includes a Catastrophic 

Incident Annex, which provides an accelerated, proactive national 

response to a “catastrophic incident,” defined as any natural or man-made

incident, including terrorism, resulting in extraordinary levels of mass 

casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, 

infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or government 

functions. 

Developing the capabilities needed to deal with large-scale disasters is part 

of an overall national preparedness effort that should integrate and define

what needs to be done, where, based on what standards, how it should be 

done, and how well it should be done. Along with the NRP and NIMS, DHS 

has developed the National Preparedness Goal. Considered as a group, 

these three documents are intended to guide investments in emergency 

preparedness and response capabilities. The NRP describes what needs to 

be done in response to an emergency incident, either natural or man-made, 

the NIMS describes how to manage what needs to be done, and the 

National Preparedness Goal describes how well it should be done. The 

National Preparedness Goal is particularly useful for determining what 

capabilities are needed, especially for a catastrophic disaster. The interim 

goal addresses both natural disasters and terrorist attacks. It defines both 

the 37 major capabilities that first responders should possess to prevent, 

protect from, respond to, and recover from disaster incidents and the most 

critical tasks associated with these capabilities.9

 An inability to effectively 

perform these critical tasks would, by definition, have a detrimental 

impact on effective protection, prevention, response, and recovery 

capabilities. 

The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (MIRP), released by DHS in 

April 2006, applies these disaster preparedness documents to the maritime 

sector. The MIRP is intended to facilitate the restoration of maritime 

commerce after a terrorist attack or natural disaster and reflects the 

disaster management framework outlined in the National Response Plan.

The MIRP addresses issues that should be considered by ports when 

planning for natural disasters. However, it does not set forth particular 

actions that should be taken at the port level, leaving those determinations 

to be made by the port operators themselves. 

 9

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8). 

Page 16 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
The 9/11 Commission pointed out that no amount of money or effort can

fully protect against every type of threat. As a result, what is needed is an

approach that considers the relative risks these various threats pose and 

determines how best to use limited resources to prevent threats, where 

possible, and to respond effectively if they occur. While the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 call

for the use of risk management in homeland security, little specific federal 

guidance or direction exists as to how risk management should be 

implemented. In previous work examining risk management efforts for 

homeland security and other functions, we developed a framework 

summarizing the findings of industry experts and best practices.10 This 

framework, shown in figure 4, divides risk management into five major 

phases: (1) setting strategic goals and objectives, and determining 

constraints; (2) assessing the risks; (3) evaluating alternatives for 

addressing these risks; (4) selecting the appropriate alternatives; and 

(5) implementing the alternatives and monitoring the progress made and 

results achieved. 

Figure 4: GAO Risk Management Framework 

 

Strategic goals, objectives,

and constraints

Risk

assessment

Alternatives

evaluation

Management

selection

Implementation

and

monitoring

Source: GAO.

10GAO-06-91. 

Page 17 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Recent natural disasters—particularly Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita 

in 2005—challenged affected ports on several fronts, according to port 

authority officials. Since 1998, hurricanes have damaged buildings, cranes, 

and other equipment owned by seven of the port authorities we 

interviewed. Ports also reported damage to utility systems and 

experienced delays in water, sewer, and power restoration. Port 

authorities cited clearing waterways and debris removal as another 

difficulty. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, some ports, such as Gulfport 

and New Orleans, have not yet returned or took about 6 months to return 

to predisaster operational levels, respectively. Separate from the physical

impact of the disasters, challenges occurred with personnel,

communications and coordination issues and, according to port authority 

officials, these challenges proved more difficult than anticipated. In some 

cases, personnel had evacuated the area, and port officials were unsure 

when staff would be able to return to work. Given that many phone lines 

were down, there were delays in restoring phone service and, in most 

cases, ports did not have communications alternatives in place. Some port 

authorities also reported difficulties in working with local, state, and 

federal entities during the recovery process, including coordinating reentry to the port of port personnel and filing for FEMA disaster recovery 

assistance. 

Even though most ports anticipated and had plans in place to mitigate 

infrastructure damage from natural disasters, over half of the port 

authorities we contacted reported that the disasters created infrastructure 

challenges. Twelve of the 17 ports we reviewed had experienced a 

hurricane or earthquake since 1998, and among those 12 port authorities, 7 

reported challenges in restoring infrastructure (see fig.2). While we were 

unable to review a complete list of disaster assistance estimates, some 

port authorities were able to provide specific dollar amounts for repair 

damage to buildings, cranes, or other equipment. For instance, the Port of 

Miami reported spending more than $6 million on repairs as a result of 

Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita, including damage to facilities, 

signage, sea wall and storm drainage system. Likewise, The Port of 

Houston reported spending $200,000 for facility repairs following 

Hurricane Rita. Ports were still faced with these repair costs even though a 

majority of the port plans we reviewed included infrastructure damage 

mitigation. As a way to work around the damaged structures, ports also 

utilized temporary trailers for administrative and operational functions. 

For example, this occurred at the Port of Port Arthur, where the strategy 

Recent Natural 

Disasters Created a 

Variety of Challenges; 

Some Recovery 

Efforts Were More 

Difficult Than 

Expected 

Damage to Infrastructure

Affected Operations at 

Most Ports Experiencing 

Recent Natural Disasters 

Page 18 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
of reserving backup equipment with appropriate vendors was included in

that port’s Hurricane Readiness Plan. 

Besides the repair costs involved, another indication of the significance of

damage to infrastructure was the effect on port operations. In several 

cases, tenants left the port and moved elsewhere. For example, Port of 

New Orleans officials said that because they are unsure if departed tenants 

at the port will return, they have been reluctant to replace three severely 

damaged container cranes. Operations have been even more curtailed at 

the Port of Gulfport, also because of Hurricane Katrina. Port authority 

officials report that they have been able to repair only 3 of their 12 

warehouses, which limited their ability to accommodate storage for some 

of their major operators. These operators have since moved their 

operations to other nearby ports, such as Pascagoula, Mississippi, or 

Mobile, Alabama. 

Besides damage to buildings, cranes, and other equipment involved 

specifically in moving cargoes, port authorities also reported damages to 

their utility systems, including water, sewer, and power. For example, 

following Hurricane Katrina, the Port of Port Arthur was without power 

for approximately 2 weeks. Because of a lack of on-site generators, port 

officials limited port operations to daylight hours only. The power outage 

also limited operation of certain hangar doors that required electrical 

power to be opened. Ports with damage to water and sewer included 

Gulfport, where 2 months were needed to restore its sewer and water 

capacity. Similarly, the Port of Pascagoula had three damaged water wells 

as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Port officials told us one of those wells 

was still not operational almost a year later. While some ports included 

backup water and power resources in their contingency utility plans, 

officials at one port said their backup resources may not be adequate to 

address long-term or extensive outages. In fact, 10 of the 17 ports we 

reviewed did not have plans for utility system restoration. The lack of 

anticipation of these vulnerabilities was particularly apparent for ports 

affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita; only 4 of the 10 ports 

impacted by those storms had planned for utility challenges. For example, 

Port of New Orleans officials said their supply of 5 to 10 days of water and 

3 to 5 days of power through generators was not enough to sustain them 

through the outages caused by Hurricane Katrina.

While many ports indicated that several federal agencies were eventually

able to effectively aid in clearing the waterways and restoring aids to 

navigation, ports’ experiences varied. Their experiences also 

demonstrated that rapid clearing of waterways is key to reestablishing 

Page 19 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
port operations and emphasizes the need for ports to coordinate and 

arrange for debris removal and restoring aids to navigation ahead of time. 

Following are some examples: 

• Following Hurricane Katrina, the Port of Gulfport had to remove large 

amounts of debris, such as tree limbs that were hanging and leaning over 

roads, as well as containers, cargo, and other equipment that winds had 

scattered into the roadways. Port officials said that clearing these 

obstructions was essential to re-establishing port operations. Immediately 

after the hurricane, the local Navy construction battalion (called Seabees) 

volunteered to assist the port by clearing roads with their large bulldozers, 

which enabled supplies and cargo to move in and out of the port. The 

Seabees also cleared boat ramps so that Coast Guard search and rescue 

vessels could safely enter the waterway. Port officials estimated that, over

a period of 3 weeks, the Seabees cleared about 30 percent of the debris in

the port area. After the Seabees were called to other duties, Port of 

Gulfport officials hired a contractor to remove the remaining debris at a 

cost of about $5 million. Port of Gulfport officials said that they applied for 

FEMA reimbursement of these costs. Further, they explained that the use

of and planning for existing federal resources for debris removal, such as 

the Navy Seabees, could have saved even more time and possibly federal

dollars that would later be paid to the port in the FEMA reimbursement 

process. 

• Inside the port area, the Port of Mobile experienced challenges with debris 

removal that federal agencies such as the Corps or the Coast Guard were 

not responsible for removing. These challenges may have caused 

additional delays in restoring port operations. For instance, port officials 

explained that storm surge waters from Katrina loosened several oil rigs in

the Gulf, one of which made its way into the port’s pier area and damaged 

several piers. They said the port is currently in litigation to resolve who 

will pay for the damages. Port of Mobile officials also estimated that 

dredging expenses, including the removal of branches, sand, and silt from 

pier areas will be more than $7.5 million. Because the rig obstruction and 

other pier damages were not in the federal waterway or jurisdiction, Port

of Mobile officials said they were only able to receive limited assistance 

from federal agencies in resolving their internal damage issues. 

Page 20 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Officials of eight port authorities we contacted reported challenges related 

to personnel, communications, or coordination with port stakeholders as a 

result of hurricanes since 1998 and, in conversations with us, they 

indicated that these challenges were more difficult than anticipated. Port 

plans we reviewed addressed some of these types of vulnerabilities to 

natural disasters. However, ports still identified such vulnerabilities as a 

significant obstacle to their ability to return to predisaster operational 

levels. Several ports cited examples about how their personnel had 

evacuated and, for numerous reasons, were unable to return to work. For 

example, several Port of Gulfport employees lost their homes during 

Hurricane Katrina and had no local living arrangements for themselves or 

their families. Likewise, the Port of New Orleans said its operations were 

stifled by the lack of personnel and labor in both Hurricane Katrina and 

Hurricane Rita. At the Port of Port Arthur, lack of power for area homes 

kept employees from retuning immediately, causing temporary delays in 

port operations. 

Port authorities also did not anticipate the extent to which their 

communications systems would be impacted. High winds and flooding 

from the hurricanes rendered phone lines out of service. With phones lines 

down, port authorities were unable to get in touch with their staff or other 

port stakeholders to share information. For instance, we learned that 

approximately 50 percent of phones at the Port of Mobile were out of 

service for about 2 to 4 weeks. Other ports, including New Orleans, 

Pascagoula, and Port Arthur, also experienced phone outages and 

reported limitations in cell phone reception. 

Ports also identified coordination challenges with local, state, and federal

stakeholders while planning for and recovering from natural disasters. At 

the local level, one coordination problem port officials experienced was in

re-entering the port after the storm. For example, in Gulfport, port officials 

were denied entry to port property for the first 2 weeks following 

Hurricane Katrina. Similarly in Houston, law enforcement agencies 

blocked roads for access back into Houston after the Hurricane Rita 

evacuation. In some cases, port officials did not have the proper 

credentials required by local police and other emergency management 

officials to be allowed roadway access through the city to their port. 

In other instances, we found that ports experienced varied levels of 

coordination with local emergency management agencies, especially 

regarding planning efforts. For example, Mobile County Emergency 

Management officials affirmed that they have a close working relationship 

with the Port of Mobile, where they have helped the port conduct risk 

Difficulties with Personnel, 

Communication, and 

Coordination Issues Were 

Greater Than Expected 

during Recovery Efforts 

Page 21 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
assessments and emergency planning activities, and where they 

coordinate with port officials on other plans involving safety, security, and 

the environment. Conversely, Port of Gulfport and Harrison County 

Emergency Management officials in Mississippi said they had limited 

contact and coordination regarding emergency recovery. One county 

emergency management official said that although the agency has made 

efforts to share planning documents with the port, the agency is required 

to work through the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency and

follow any guidance in the state emergency plan to request resources from 

or provide assistance to the port. 

At the federal level, one coordination issue reported by port stakeholders

involved difficulties in coordinating with FEMA for recovery resources. 

Some local emergency management officials and port officials that we 

interviewed expressed concerns about the level of interaction with FEMA 

officials before an incident occurs. For example, Port of Jacksonville 

officials said they would like to see FEMA take a more active role in the 

disaster planning process, such as participation on the AMSC at the local 

level or coordinating with the Florida State Department of Community 

Affairs at the state level.11 Similarly, Port of Los Angeles officials said 

effective communication with FEMA is essential and that they would like 

to communicate more clearly with FEMA about reimbursement policies 

before a disaster takes place. In fact, in November 2006, port officials from 

Los Angeles and Oakland held a joint meeting with FEMA and the 

California Office of Emergency Services to discuss the current federal and 

state regulations and practices regarding disaster relief fund and 

reimbursement policy. 

Port stakeholders also expressed concerns about coordinating with FEMA 

after an incident occurred, including inconsistencies in information and 

difficulty in appropriately completing FEMA forms and other documents 

required for reimbursement. At the county emergency management level,

one agency official cited an inconsistency of the interpretation of FEMA 

policies and changing personnel as some of the challenges in working with 

FEMA. This official suggested that interacting with FEMA officials more 

frequently before a disaster would help the port authority better 

understand which personnel to contact in an emergency situation. The 

official said this coordination problem became obvious during the 

 11The Florida State Department of Community Affairs is the department that houses the

state emergency management agency. 

Page 22 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Hurricane Katrina recovery effort when, after the port had made several 

requests, FEMA did not send a representative to the area. Port officials in 

Gulfport also found it difficult to reconcile their damages using FEMA’s 

cost estimate process. To resolve the paperwork confusion, the Port of 

Gulfport hired an outside company to deal with FEMA directly and to 

handle all reimbursement-related issues on their behalf. While Port of 

Gulfport officials recognized that FEMA’s attention to detail was an effort 

to prevent fraud and abuse, they also said FEMA staff could have done a 

better job in providing guidance about the reimbursement process. 

Besides having coordination challenges with FEMA, we learned that 

several ports were unclear about resources that were available for 

recovery from the Maritime Administration. Immediately following 

Hurricane Katrina, the Gulf area was in need of critical resources such as 

power, water, and personnel. However, due to infrastructure damages 

around the area, it was difficult to get these resources into ports. As such, 

The Maritime Administration provided, with the concurrence of the 

Department of Defense, ready reserve vessels for FEMA’s use. These ready

reserve vessels are strategic sealift assets usually used for defense 

purposes that could be used for command and control, housing, power 

generation, or the movement of water and other supplies. We found that 

ports’ knowledge about these assets and how to request them was limited. 

For example, port authority officials at one port turned down the Maritime 

Administration’s offer for a housing vessel. The port determined that the 

deep draft and large size of the vessel might impede commercial traffic 

and block other vessels from entering their port. Port officials reached this 

determination without the knowledge that smaller vessels for the same 

purpose could have been provided by the Maritime Administration. The 

vessel offered by the Maritime Administration, however, was instead 

deployed to the Port of New Orleans area to house first responders. 

Many port authorities have taken steps to address the challenges resulting

from recent natural disasters. Individually, they have taken such steps as 

upgrading communications equipment, adding backup communications 

approaches and power equipment, and creating alternative sites for 

administrative operations and storage of computer data. Collectively, they

have shared best practices for disaster planning and response, most 

notably through an industry-wide publication with detailed planning steps 

and guidelines. Port authorities that were not directly impacted by recent

disaster events have also taken steps to revise their planning efforts, 

including greater coordination with other port stakeholders. Many port 

authorities have adapted or improved existing stakeholder forums to assist 

Port Authorities Have 

Various Efforts Under 

Way to Mitigate 

Challenges 

Page 23 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
in facilitating port planning for natural disasters. At the federal level, 

agencies such as the Maritime Administration have taken steps to assist 

ports in identifying federal resources available for disaster response and 

recovery. 

As a result of the lessons learned from recent natural disasters, port 

authorities report taking many steps to mitigate vulnerabilities. One 

mitigation tactic reported by many port authorities is to add equipment 

and develop redundant systems to help during any recovery efforts. The 

most frequent redundancy added was in creating communications 

alternatives. Various port authorities reported purchasing communications 

equipment that does not necessarily rely on traditional land lines for 

calling, such as analog pagers, wireless handheld devices, CB radios, and 

satellite phones. They also integrated more sophisticated communications 

hardware and software programs. Some ports, such as Houston and San

Diego, implemented 1-800 phone numbers to receive calls from port 

personnel. As an additional precaution, the Port of Houston utilizes call 

centers located out of state in areas that are less likely to have been 

impacted by the same storm. In another effort to route calls out of the 

impacted area, the Port of New Orleans has also been assigned phone 

numbers with alternative area codes.

Besides making improvements to communications systems, many port 

authorities took steps related to power and administrative operations. 

Seven port authorities reported purchasing or arranging for alternative 

power supplies that could be used during an outage. For example, the Port 

of New Orleans purchased generators after the 2005 hurricane season. 

Ports also recognized the need for administrative and information 

technology location alternatives. Four port authorities reported changing 

their alternative administrative sites since recent storms. Port authorities 

also told us that they have changed the way they back up and store their 

electronic data and equipment. For example, the Port of New Orleans 

previously had its alternative work site only 3 miles away from its regular 

operations location. Since both operations sites could be susceptible to

the same disaster event, Port of New Orleans officials have partnered with 

the Port of Shreveport, Louisiana, almost 200 miles away, to use 

Shreveport’s facilities as an alternate operations site if the Port of New 

Orleans is out of business for more than 5 days. Further, the two ports 

have prepared a mutual agreement, which includes cost sharing efforts for 

information technology infrastructure upgrades at the Port of Shreveport, 

to better accommodate New Orleans’ needs in a disaster. 

Steps Taken Include PortSpecific and Industry-Wide 

Actions 

Page 24 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Another mitigation tactic by ports has been the sharing of best practices 

and lessons learned from recent natural disasters. Through efforts by the 

AAPA, a nationwide industry group, ports from across the U.S. and Canada

participated in the development of an industry best practices document.12

In developing this document, AAPA organized various working groups, 

which included port officials from ports that had been affected by recent

natural disasters, as well as ports that had not been affected. Acting as a

forum for port officials to share their experiences with natural disasters, 

these working groups were able to develop a manual focused on port 

planning and recovery efforts. Vetted by AAPA members, the manual 

includes planning for emergency operations, communications, damage 

assessments, insurance and FEMA claims processes, coordinating with 

federal agencies, and overall emergency planning objectives.

Another industry group, the GICA,13 has worked closely with the Corps, 

Coast Guard and other maritime agencies to implement new practices for 

a more efficient response to maritime related incidents. Many of these 

efforts have been implemented as result of recent hurricanes. For 

example, a special Logistics Support Center is set up during response 

times for the sole purpose of assisting the Corps and Coast Guard with 

contracting special equipment, including water, fuel and crane barges, 

towing vessels, pumps, and generators. Regarding clearing the waterways, 

GICA barge members have provided knowledgeable waterway operators 

and state-of-the-art boats to assist Coast Guard personnel in conducting 

channel assessments immediately following a storm. In an effort to restore 

aids to navigation, GICA contacts also towed 50 temporary buoys and 

supplied aircraft for aerial surveillance of the waterways. Moreover, the 

Corps, Coast Guard, and GICA formed the Gulf Coast Inland Waterways 

Joint Hurricane Team to develop a protocol for storm response. Finalized

in July 2006, the Joint Hurricane Response Protocol14 is an effort to more 

fully develop lessons learned from previous hurricane seasons and 

 12Emergency Preparedness and Continuity of Operations Planning: Manual for Best

Practices, American Association of Port Authorities, Prepared by: Phyllis Saathoff, 

Managing Director, Port Freeport. September 2006. 

13GICA is maritime trade association that is an advocate for issues regarding the Gulf 

Intracoastal Waterway, which is an inland navigable waterway located along the Gulf 

Coast. One of GICA’s missions is to work with it members, as well as the Coast Guard and 

Corps, to identify opportunities to improve the safety and efficiency of the Gulf 

Intracoastal Waterway. 

14Gulf Coast Inland Waterways Joint Hurricane Response Protocol: Prepared by the Gulf

Coast Joint Hurricane Team. July 2006. 

Page 25 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
waterways management practices, with the goal of implementing an 

effective restoration of Gulf Coast maritime commerce following future 

storms. 

Ports that have not experienced problems as a result of recent disasters 

but that are nonetheless susceptible to disaster threats have also 

responded to these lessons learned by other ports. For example, the Port

of Tacoma hired a consultant to assist in developing a business continuity 

plan. The Port of Jacksonville has also undertaken a comprehensive 

enhancement to its continuity of operations plan. Likewise, as a result of 

lessons learned from the Loma Prieta Earthquake in Oakland, the Port of 

Los Angeles developed more stringent seismic building codes. 

Additionally, Port of Savannah officials told us that they, too, have 

changed their prehurricane crane operations based on lessons learned 

from hurricanes in the Gulf region. 

We found several examples of port efforts to improve stakeholder 

coordination, including utilizing existing forums to coordinate disaster 

planning, as well as realigning and enhancing their current plans. 

Regarding the use of existing forums, port authorities in both New Orleans 

and Mobile said they were using their AMSC to coordinate response and 

recovery efforts. Moreover, GAO has previously reported that in the wake 

of Hurricane Katrina, information was shared collaboratively through 

AMSCs to determine when it was appropriate to close and then reopen the 

port.15 Port-specific coordination teams, such as those at the Port of 

Houston, have also used their lessons learned to improve coordination for 

natural disaster planning. Houston’s port coordination teams are an 

outgrowth of the port’s relationships with other maritime stakeholders in

the Houston-Galveston Navigation Safety Committee,16 which includes a 

wide variety of waterway users and operators. In another example, the 

Port of Oakland works closely with the City Disaster Council on 

emergency planning and participates in various exercises with city, 

county, and state officials. 

Ports Have Taken Steps to 

Improve Stakeholder 

Coordination 

 15GAO, Maritime Security: Information Sharing Efforts are Improving, GAO-06-933T 

(Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006). 

16Also known as HOGANSAC, this committee’s 19 members include pilots associations, 

operators, and environmental and academic interests. The committee addresses a wide 

range of topics affecting navigation in the area. Other individuals with experience and 

interest in navigation safety issues serve on working groups established by the committee 

to examine other issues of local interest. 

Page 26 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
We also found several examples of how ports have aligned their local 

planning with the national planning structure and have identified various 

ways to enhance their current coordination plans. The national structure, 

which includes NIMS and NRP, is designed to provide a consistent 

framework and approach for emergency management. Port plans that we 

reviewed, in particular those from ports in hurricane impacted areas, have 

identified the importance of adapting to this national structure and 

emergency response system. For example, the Port of Mobile’s emergency 

operations plan explains that the complexity of incident management and 

the growing need for stakeholder coordination has increased its need for a 

standard incident management system. Therefore, the Port of Mobile’s 

emergency operations plan outlines the use of an incident management 

framework from which all agencies can work together in an efficient and

effective manner. Some port authorities making changes have not 

experienced any significant impact from recent disasters. For instance, 

Port of Jacksonville officials reported that Hurricane Katrina impacts in 

the Gulf region prompted them to revise their disaster preparedness plans, 

including reorganizing the plans to reflect NIMS language and alignment 

with NRP guidelines. Similarly, Port of San Diego officials said they hired a

consultant to assist them with drafting their emergency response and 

business continuity plan. San Diego’s plan prioritized risks, clarified roles 

and responsibilities of key departments, and laid out directions on how to 

better coordinate with local emergency management officials during a 

disaster event. 

Since the 2005 hurricane season, federal agencies have also taken steps to

help port authorities strengthen ports’ ability to recover from future 

natural disasters. These efforts have focused on increased coordination 

and communication with stakeholders and also on building stakeholders’ 

knowledge about federal resources for port recovery efforts. The efforts 

primarily involve four federal agencies that in some fashion work directly 

with ports—the Maritime Administration, the Coast Guard, FEMA and the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Efforts for those four agencies are as 

follows: 

Maritime Administration Efforts: The Maritime Administration has taken 

two main steps: developing an approach for activating maritime assets in 

disaster recovery, and updating a risk management guidebook. During the 

2005 hurricane season, the Maritime Administration emerged as a critical

resource for the Gulf area by providing vessels from the nation’s National 

Defense Ready Reserve Fleet to enable recovery operations and provide 

shelter for displaced citizens. Since that time, FEMA developed a one-time 

Federal Agencies Have 

Attempted to Help Ports 

Strengthen Recovery 

Efforts 

Page 27 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
plan—the Federal Support Plan, which was cited specifically for the 2006 

Hurricane Season and specific to the federal government’s response 

efforts in the State of Louisiana. The Maritime Administration contributed

to this plan by identifying government and commercial maritime 

capabilities that could be employed in response to a disaster.17 According 

to Maritime Administration officials, while the information is focused on 

the Gulf area, it could be easily adapted to other areas in the United States 

if a disaster occurred. To date, the Maritime Administration is completing 

the process of identifying needs and capabilities and plans to provide a 

directive regarding capabilities to its regional offices in June 2007. 

However, no strategy exists for communicating this information to ports. 

The Maritime Administration is also currently updating its publication 

titled Port Risk Management and Insurance Guidebook (2001). This 

publication is the Maritime Administration’s “best practices” guide for port 

risk management. Developed primarily to assist smaller ports in 

conducting risk management, it includes information on how ports can 

obtain insurance coverage, facilitate emergency management and port 

security, and apply risk management. The Maritime Administration began

updating the guidebook after the 2005 hurricane season. According to 

officials from the Maritime Administration, ports are actively using this 

guidebook, especially since many of the contributors are port directors 

and risk managers at the ports. 

While these efforts demonstrate the Maritime Administration’s increased 

involvement in assisting ports in planning for future disasters, we also 

observed that Maritime Administration regions vary in their level of 

communication and coordination with ports. According to a Maritime 

Administration official, the Gulf and East Coast regions have been working 

with FEMA regional offices to quickly activate needed assets in case of a 

disaster. However, while the Gulf and East Coast regions have been 

strengthening these relationships, other regions may not have the same 

level of coordination. We found, in general, port authorities’ interaction 

with the Maritime Administration was limited for natural disaster planning, 

and the ports we spoke to said they usually did not work directly with the 

 17The primary planning instrument for DOT remains the Emergency Support Function #1 

Annex to the National Response Plan; however, the annex does not detail site specific 

information as was done for this plan. 

Page 28 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
agency in disaster planning.18 This view was echoed by Maritime 

Administration officials who said that the relationship between the 

agency’s regional offices and the ports in their respective areas varied 

across the country. 

Coast Guard efforts: Coast Guard efforts in natural disaster planning 

varied considerably from port to port and were most extensive in the Gulf. 

While in general, the Coast Guard was considered successful in its 

missions during the 2005 hurricane season, its officials said they were 

taking additional steps in improving planning for recovery efforts with 

port stakeholders based on their experiences with recent natural disasters. 

For example, at the Port of Mobile, Coast Guard officials said that 

participating in an actual Incident Command System19emergency centers 

has been as helpful as exercises and, since the 2005 hurricane season, they

have utilized such a unified command at least 10 times in preparation for 

potential hurricane landfalls in the region. At other ports, the Coast Guard 

had a more limited role in assisting ports in planning for natural disasters. 

Even at ports that had not experienced substantial damage from a recent 

natural disaster, however, Coast Guard units were applying lessons 

learned from other ports’ experiences and increasing their level of 

involvement. For example, the Port of Houston sustained minimal damage 

from Hurricane Rita; however, Coast Guard officials said that they 

identified areas where they could make improvements. The Coast Guard at 

the Port of Houston leads a recovery planning effort through port 

coordination teams, which include stakeholders such as the port authority, 

Coast Guard, and private operators, working together during disaster 

recovery efforts. These teams are all-hazards focused and are activated 

differently for terrorist incidents or natural disasters. Coast Guard officials 

said that although the teams were successful in planning for Hurricane 

Rita, there were areas for improvement, including outreach and training

with port stakeholders and communication. Further, Coast Guard officials 

at the Port of Tacoma said that other ports’ experiences with recent 

 18According to officials from MARAD, the DOT Regional Emergency Transportation 

Coordinator and Representatives may play a supporting role with regards to

communicating and coordinating department response processes and building 

relationships with local authorities.

19The Incident Command System, established under NIMS, is a system for managing all 

types of major incidents. It defines the operating characteristics, interactive management 

components and structure of incident management and emergency response organizations

engaged throughout the life cycle of an incident. 

Page 29 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
natural disasters has generated interest in them becoming more involved

in the planning and coordination of natural disasters. They also indicated

they were interested in adapting, in some form, a planning forum similar to 

the Port of Houston’s port coordination teams. 

FEMA efforts: While state and local emergency management agencies 

assist in facilitating FEMA disaster planning at the port level, FEMA has 

several efforts under way to improve its assistance to ports for disaster 

recovery. For instance, FEMA officials said that through the Public 

Assistance Program, FEMA is able to provide assistance to ports that are 

eligible applicants after a major disaster or emergency. Based on lessons 

learned from Hurricane Katrina, FEMA is also reviewing and updating its 

policies and guidance documents associated with this program. To 

administer the program, FEMA will coordinate closely with federal, state, 

and local authorities (including emergency management agencies) through 

its regional offices. Officials also said that through planning, training, and 

exercise activities sponsored by DHS, they hope to have greater 

opportunities to interact and coordinate with port authorities and other 

local agencies before disasters occur. Further, officials agree that 

coordination with their local counterparts is an important part of 

emergency management and disaster recovery efforts. 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers efforts: Although the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers generally does not conduct natural disaster planning with ports, 

staff at the district level have made some efforts to increase their level of 

involvement in this process, particularly in the Gulf region. For example, 

district U.S. Army Corps of Engineers staff have (1) organized and chaired

yearly hurricane planning forums to which all ports in the region are

invited; (2) organized prestorm teleconferences for port stakeholders, 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Navy, and in some 

instances, the media; (3) participated in the Coast Guard’s Partner 

Emergency Action Team, which specifically address disaster 

preparedness; (4) geographically aligned with the Coast Guard to better 

facilitate coordination during an emergency; and (5) implemented 

informational training on planning for hurricanes to ports and other 

maritime stakeholders. Many of these improvements were implemented as 

a result of Hurricane Ivan (2001) and the hurricanes from the 2005 season. 

However, the extent of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers participation in 

natural disaster planning with ports varies. For instance, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers representatives in Savannah said they do not play a 

significant role in the port’s natural disaster planning for recovery efforts.

Similarly in Jacksonville, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officials explained 

that their primary natural disaster recovery duty at the Port of Miami is to 

Page 30 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
repair the federal channel and they do not participate in the port 

authority’s disaster planning efforts. However, the Jacksonville U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers does cooperate with the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety

Office in Jacksonville in the development of their hurricane preparedness

plan. For this effort, it assisted in determining what vessels could remain 

in port during a hurricane and what vessels would be required to leave. 

Most port authorities we reviewed conduct planning for natural disasters 

separately from planning for homeland security threats. Federal law 

established security planning requirements that apply to ports. Similar 

requirements do not exist with regard to natural disaster planning. The 

ports we contacted used markedly different approaches to natural disaster 

planning, and the extent and thoroughness of their plans varied widely. A 

few ports have integrated homeland security and natural disaster planning 

in what is called an all-hazards approach, and this approach appeared to 

be generating benefits and is in keeping with experts’ recommendations 

and with the newest developments in federal risk management policy. A 

consequence of the divided approach was a wide variance in the degree to

which port stakeholders were involved in natural disaster planning and the 

degree to which port authorities were aware of federal resources available 

for disaster recovery. For homeland security planning, federal law 

provides for the establishment of AMSCs with wide stakeholder 

representation, and some ports are using these committees or another 

similar forum with wide representation in their disaster planning efforts. 

DHS, which through the Coast Guard oversees the AMSCs, provides an 

example of how to incorporate a wider of scope of committee activity. 

Of the ports we visited, more than half developed plans for natural 

disasters separately from plans that address security threats. This is likely 

due to the requirement that port authorities carry out their planning for 

homeland security under the federal framework created by the Congress 

in the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA),20 under which all port 

operators are required to draft individual security plans identifying 

security vulnerabilities and approaches to mitigate them. Under the Coast 

Guard’s implementing regulations, these plans are to include such items as 

Current Planning 

Approach Lessens 

Effective 

Coordination among 

All Port Stakeholders 

Port-Level Natural Disaster 

Planning Is Primarily 

Conducted Separately 

from Other Threats 

 20The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 

2064 contains many of the homeland security requirements related specifically to port 

security. The Area Maritime Security Committees are authorized by section 102 of MTSA, 

(46 U.S.C. § 70112(a)(2)). 

Page 31 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
measures for access control, responses to security threats, and drills and 

exercises to train staff and test the plan.21 The plans are “performancebased”; that is, the security outcomes are specified, but the stakeholders 

are free to identify and implement appropriate solutions as long as these 

solutions achieve the specified outcomes. Because of the similarities in 

security and natural hazard planning these plans can be useful for guiding 

natural disaster response. 

MTSA also provided the Secretary of Homeland Security with the 

authority to create AMSCs at the port level. These committees—with 

representatives from the federal, state, local, and private sectors—offer a 

venue to identify and deal with vulnerabilities in and around ports, as well 

as a forum for sharing information on issues related to port security. The

committee assists the Coast Guard’s COTP in developing an area maritime 

security plan, which complements the facility security plans developed by

individual port operators. The plan provides a framework for 

communication and coordination among port stakeholders and law 

enforcement officials and identifies and reduces vulnerabilities to security 

threats throughout the port area. 

In contrast, port authority and operator natural disaster planning 

documents are generally not required by law and vary widely. According 

to one member from the AAPA, ports will have various interrelated plans,

such as hurricane readiness plans, emergency operations plans, 

engineering plans, and community awareness and emergency response 

plans. Taken as a whole, the distinct plans for a particular port may 

represent the port’s risk management approach to disaster planning. 

In addition, port natural disaster plans are not reviewed by the Coast 

Guard. Representatives of the Coast Guard at locations we visited 

confirmed they do not review port authority or port operator planning 

documents pertaining to natural disaster planning. For example, officials 

at the Port of Oakland and the Port of Tacoma said they do not review the 

port or port stakeholders planning documents for natural disaster 

planning. Coast Guard officials at the Port of Savannah also noted that 

they do not review the hurricane plans for port operators. They contended 

that they do not have the expertise to advise the operators on how to 

protect or restart their particular operations. Moreover, natural disaster 

 21The requirements for security plans are found in 33 C.F.R. Part 104, Subpart D for vessels, 

and 33 C.F.R. Part 105, Subpart D for facilities. 

Page 32 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
plans developed by port authorities generally do not apply to the port’s 

private operators. Only in one case did a port authority state that it 

required its private operators to draft a natural disaster plan. 

We found that the thoroughness of natural disaster plans varied 

considerably from port to port. For instance, the Port of Mobile had a 

relatively thorough plan. The Port of Mobile was affected by three major 

hurricanes in 2005-2006. Roughly a year after Hurricane Katrina, the 

Alabama State Port Authority completed an extensive emergency 

operations plan, based on an analysis that considered natural, man-made, 

and security-related hazards. The operations plan describes preparedness, 

response, recovery, and mitigation procedures for each identified threat, 

establishes requirements for conducting exercises, and establishes a 

schedule for regular plan reviews and updates.22 In contrast, the Port of 

Morgan City does not have a written plan for preparing for natural disaster 

threats but instead relies on port personnel to assess disaster risk and 

prepare appropriately. Following a disaster, the port authority relies on 

senior personnel to direct recovery efforts as needed. 

In the absence of uniform federal guidance for port disaster planning, 

some local governments have instituted local planning requirements. The 

differences in these local guidelines account for some of the variation in 

the content and thoroughness of port disaster plans. For example, the 

Miami-Dade County Emergency Management Office helps to coordinate 

disaster preparedness for all county agencies, including the Port of Miami. 

As such, the port submits its hurricane plans and continuity of operations 

plan to the office each year for review, which provides a certain level of 

quality assurance. By comparison, the Port of Los Angeles found local 

seismic building codes were insufficient to reach the desired level of 

preparedness, so the port developed its own seismic codes to guide 

infrastructure construction and repair. 

Under the Separate 

Approach, Disaster Plans 

Show Wide Variation 

 22Mobile’s plan, while relatively thorough, still has gaps in coordination with port

stakeholders. Port authority officials noted that they do not share their emergency plans 

with tenants or outside partners. While many tenants develop their own emergency plans, 

the port authority does not require them. 

Page 33 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
In contrast to the disjunctional planning for both natural disasters and 

security at ports, industry experts encourage the unified consideration of 

all risks faced by the port. Unified disaster preparedness planning requires 

that all of the threats faced by the port, both natural and man-made, be 

considered together. This is referred to as an all-hazards approach. 

Experts consider it to offer several advantages: 

• Application of planning resources to both security and natural disaster

preparedness. Because of the similarities between the effects of terrorist 

attacks and natural or accidental disasters, much of the planning, 

personnel, training, and equipment that form the basis of protection, 

response, and recovery capabilities are similar across all emergency 

events. As we have previously reported, the capabilities needed to respond 

to major disasters, whether the result of terrorist attack or nature, are 

similar in many ways.23 Unified risk management can enhance the 

efficiency of port planning efforts because of the similarity in recovery 

plans for both natural and security-related disasters. One expert noted that

responding to a disaster would likely be the same for a security incident

and a natural disaster incident from an operational standpoint.

• Efficient allocation of disaster-preparation resources. An all-hazards 

approach allows the port to estimate the relative impact of mitigation 

alternatives and identify the optimal mix of investments in these 

alternatives based on the costs and benefits of each. The exclusion of 

certain risks from consideration, or the separate consideration of a 

particular type of risk, gives rise to the possibility that risks will not be 

accurately assessed or compared, and that too many or too few resources 

will be allocated toward mitigation of a particular risk. Port risk 

management experts noted that, in the absence of an all-hazards risk 

management process, it is difficult to accurately assess and address the 

full spectrum of threats faced by a port. 

At the federal level, the Congress has introduced various elements of an 

all-hazards approach to risk management and assistance to ports. 

Examples are as follows: 

Combined All-Hazards 

Approach Shows Promise 

for Improved Planning 

Federal Actions Reflect 

Movement Toward All-Hazards 

Approach 

• Single response approach to all types of emergency events. NIMS and 

NRP, which were implemented by DHS, provide a unified framework for 

responding to security and natural disaster events. NIMS is a policy 

document that defines roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local 

 23GAO-05-652. 

Page 34 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
first responders during all types of emergency events. The NRP is designed 

to integrate federal government domestic prevention, protection, 

response, and recovery plans into a single operational plan for all-hazards 

and all-emergency response disciplines. Using the framework provided by 

NIMS, the NRP describes operational procedures for federal support to 

emergency managers and organizes capabilities, staffing, and equipment 

resources in terms of functions that are most likely to be needed during 

emergency events. In addition, along with the NRP and NIMS, DHS has 

developed the National Preparedness Goal, as required by Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 8. Considered as a group, these three 

documents are intended to guide investments in emergency preparedness

and response capabilities for all hazards. An inability to effectively 

perform these critical tasks would, by definition, have a detrimental 

impact on effective protection, prevention, response, and recovery 

capabilities. 

• Broadened focus for risk mitigation efforts. Security and Accountability 

for Every Port Act, passed in October 2006, contains language mandating 

that the Coast Guard institute Port Security Training and Exercise 

Programs to evaluate response capabilities of port facilities to respond to 

acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other emergencies.24

Officials from the DHS Preparedness Directorate’s Grants and Training 

Office also noted that the criteria for the Port Security Grant Program is 

beginning to reflect the movement toward all-hazards planning in the 

future. DHS officials stated that the program may evolve to focus more on 

portwide risk management, rather than on risk mitigation for particular 

assets. Furthermore, grant applications that demonstrate mitigation of 

natural hazard risks in addition to security risks may be more competitive. 

Other officials noted that while the program may focus more on all 

hazards in the future, it will remain focused on security priorities for now. 

Another agency-level movement toward the all-hazards approach is 

occurring in the Coast Guard’s improvement of a computer tool it uses to 

compare security risks for targets throughout a port, including areas not 

under the jurisdiction of a local port authority. This tool, called the 

Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model (MSRAM), provides information 

for the U.S. Coast Guard COPT to use in deciding the most efficient 

allocation of resources to reduce security risks at a port. The Coast Guard 

is developing an all-hazards risk assessment and management system, 

 24Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347, §113(a) 114(a) 

120 Stat. 1884 (SAFE Port Act). 

Page 35 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
partially fed by MSRAM, which will allow comparison of risks and riskmitigation activities across all goals and hazards. The Coast Guard directs 

the Area Maritime Security Committee to use MSRAM in the development 

of the Area Maritime Security Plan. Given that the Coast Guard is 

enhancing the MSRAM with a tool that will incorporate natural hazards, 

the risks addressed in the Area Maritime Security Plan could likely include 

both natural and security threats in the future. 

An all-hazards approach is in many ways a logical maturation of port 

security planning, which saw an aggressive homeland security expansion 

in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. One expert in 

seismic risk management we spoke with said port officials he contacted 

indicated that they were not focused on natural disaster risk because, in

their view, the federal government wanted them to focus on security risks 

instead. At some ports, hurricanes or earthquakes may be a greater threat 

than terrorism, and a case can be made that overall risk to a port might be 

more effectively reduced through greater investment in mitigating these 

risks. While federal law provides guidance on addressing security risks 

through MTSA25 and its implementing regulations, it does not provide 

similar guidance pertaining to mitigation of natural disaster threats. 

Our previous work on risk management has examined the challenges 

involved in comparing risk across broader threat categories.26 A risk 

management framework that analyzes risks based on the likelihood that 

they will occur and the consequences of their occurrence is a useful tool

for ensuring that program expenditures are prioritized and properly 

focused. In light of the competition for scarce resources available to deal

with the threats ports face, a clear understanding of the relative 

significance of these threats is an important step. 

Two port authorities we reviewed have begun to take an all-hazards 

approach to disaster planning by developing planning documents and 

structures that address both security risks and natural disasters, and 

officials at both ports said this approach yielded benefits.27 At the Port of 

Houston, the Coast Guard used its authority to mandate the creation of 

Port Authorities Using an AllHazards Approach Indicate 

Benefits Resulted 

 25Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002). 

26GAO-06-91. 

27A third port, the Port of Oakland has taken a step toward employing an all-hazards 

approach. The Area AMSC elected to add natural disaster planning information to their

Area Maritime Security Plan as a set of appendixes. 

Page 36 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
port coordination teams by creating teams that include all port 

stakeholders and combine planning and response efforts for both security 

and natural disaster threats. This unified approach to risk management has 

allowed the port to respond efficiently to disasters when they occur, 

according to port officials. In particular, they said, the organization of the 

team changes to match the nature of the threat. For security threats, the 

teams are organized geographically and do not require that the entire port 

close down, thereby appropriately matching resources to the threat being

faced. For natural disasters, the teams are organized functionally because 

of the more dispersed nature of the threat. 

Following the 2005 hurricane season, the Port of Mobile convened a task 

force to reorganize its disaster planning to address both security incidents 

and natural disasters. The task force, which recently completed its 

emergency operations plan, included the Port Authority Police Chief; 

Harbormaster; Environmental, Health and Safety Manager; and 

representatives of the port’s rail, cargo, intermodal and development 

divisions. A member of the county emergency management agency also 

served on the task force to provide expert guidance on emergency 

response planning. 

Port stakeholders in other ports that had not moved to an all-hazards 

approach also said preparedness and response practices for security 

incidents and natural disasters are sufficiently similar to merit combined 

planning. Officials in several ports said that although they are required to 

allocate certain resources to security risk mitigation, overall risk to the 

port would be more effectively reduced if they had the flexibility to 

allocate some of those resources to mitigating natural disaster risk. 

We have previously reported that, for homeland security planning, the 

AMSCs established under federal law have been an effective coordination

tool.28 These committees have provided a structure to improve the 

timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information sharing between 

federal and nonfederal stakeholders. Port stakeholders said that the 

committees were an improvement over previous information-sharing 

efforts because they established a formal structure for communicating 

information and new procedures for sharing information. Stakeholders 

stated that, among other things, the committees have been used as a forum 

Under the Separate 

Approach, Gaps Exist in 

Coordinating Maritime 

Stakeholders and 

Obtaining Information 

about Federal Resources 

 28GAO-06-933T. 

Page 37 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
for sharing assessments of vulnerabilities, providing information on illegal

or suspicious activities, and providing input on Area Maritime Security 

Plans. Stakeholders, including private operators, said the information 

sharing had increased their awareness of security issues around the port

and allowed them to identify and address security issues at their facilities. 

Likewise, Coast Guard officials said the information they received from 

nonfederal participants had helped in mitigating and reducing risks. 

In contrast to the regulatory requirements for the establishment of AMSCs, 

there are no nationwide federal mandates for all-hazards planning forums 

that involve a broad spectrum of stakeholders in disaster planning. In the 

absence of any consistent requirement or approach, we found substantial 

variation in the maturity of, and participation in, natural disaster planning 

forums at ports. As table 3 shows, the level of activity and the participants 

varied considerably. Some ports utilized their AMSC for both types of 

planning, while others conducted natural disaster planning efforts 

primarily within the local area’s broader emergency management forums, 

and still others conducted their planning piecemeal, with various entities 

meeting separately and not in one coordinated forum. 

Table 3: Natural Disaster Planning Forums at Ports GAO Visited

Port Description of forum

Tacoma The port does not have a central forum for coordinating stakeholder natural disaster planning efforts. Instead, 

occasional disaster preparedness exercises with the county emergency management agency and the Coast Guard 

provide stakeholders with opportunities to share lessons learned. However, the Port of Tacoma conducts planning 

activities with the county emergency management department. 

Oakland The port is an active member of the City’s Emergency Management Board (Disaster Council) which works closely 

with the Port of Oakland on emergency planning and testing of plans/exercises. The port is also involved in a number 

of city, county, and statewide exercises. 

Houston The port has an all-hazards forum through the Port Coordination Team and its constituent Port Coordination Centers. 

These centers and team include representatives from the port authority and the Coast Guard and a range of 

stakeholders from private entities. The forum plans for natural disasters and security threats and is activated 

differently depending on the type of event. However, the forum does not include representatives from the local 

emergency management office.

a

Mobile The port’s AMSC is the most significant forum for disaster planning. Following the 2005 hurricane season, the port 

authority convened a task force to reorganize its disaster planning to address both security incidents and natural 

disasters. The task force included stakeholders from across the port area. The port also works with the county 

emergency management agency. 

Gulfport The port authority meets once a year with customers and tenants to discuss hurricane preparedness and review the 

hurricane plan. The port provides training on transporting cargo during hurricanes and participates in separate 

response and recovery planning meetings with other maritime stakeholders, such as the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers. 

Miami The primary forum used to discuss natural disaster planning is the Safety First Committee, which discusses a variety 

of safety issues. The committee is led by the Port of Miami and meets monthly. To address individual private sector 

stakeholders, a subcommittee meets with individuals as needed. 

Page 38 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Port Description of forum

Savannah The port authority is involved in several port forums that discuss a variety of issues; emergency issues may be 

addressed in these forums if they are imminent. Externally, the port authority’s primary interactions are with the state 

for hazard mitigation programming and with the local emergency management office for response and evacuation. 

Until recently, interaction with the local emergency management office was limited. 

Source: GAO.

a

According to port officials, the Port of Houston does coordinate with the local emergency 

management agency during a disaster event. 

The Port of Savannah provides an example of how separate planning for 

natural disasters and security can lead to a lack of coordination and 

information-sharing. While officials from the local emergency management 

agency said they reviewed and provided comments on the Georgia Port 

Authority’s most recent Hurricane Plan and Draft Emergency Operations 

Plan, this had not traditionally been the case over the past several years. 

According to a representative from the emergency management agency, if

the port is not sharing its emergency operations plans, it makes it difficult 

for responders in the local area to understand what is happening within 

the port in terms of planning for natural disasters. Additionally, while the 

local EMA is enjoying an ongoing productive dialogue with port 

representatives in developing the Emergency Operations Plan and working 

on port safety and security issues, they are not having the same level of 

success with port representatives responsible for hurricane planning. Even 

so, officials said that they had seen marked improvement in the area of

portwide cooperation and involvement among stakeholders.

Port authorities’ lack of familiarity with FEMA’s programs is another 

example of the gaps that exist. We found that port authorities’

understanding of FEMA’s assistance was dependent on their relationship 

with the local or state emergency management office—a stakeholder that

is not necessarily involved in the forums where the port’s natural disaster 

planning occurs. We discussed three FEMA programs with officials from 

our seven case study ports: the Public Assistance Program, Hazard 

Mitigation Grant Program and the Predisaster Mitigation Grant Program 

(see table 4 for brief descriptions). These programs provide ports with 

funds for disaster mitigation efforts before and after disaster events and 

assist ports in avoiding costly damages. Of the three programs, port 

authorities were most knowledgeable about, and most involved with, the 

Public Assistance Program, although even with this program, some port 

authorities reported encountering challenges with the process during the 

2005 hurricane season. Their knowledge and participation in the two 

hazard mitigation grant programs was dependent on their involvement 

with the emergency planning office. FEMA officials told us that no ports 

Page 39 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
have applied as an applicant or subapplicant for the Predisaster Mitigation 

Program,29 and only a few had received assistance through the Hazard 

Mitigation Grant Program since 1998. AAPA officials made the same 

point—that many ports are unaware, unsure how to navigate or do not 

understand the resources that are available to them for disasters. In its 

new best practices manual for natural disaster planning, AAPA included a 

section regarding various federal resources available, including FEMA. 

Table 4: Key FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs 

Public Assistance ProgramaProvides grants for the repair, replacement, or restoration of disaster-damaged, publicly 

owned facilities and the facilities of certain private nonprofit organizations. The federal

share is not less than 75 percent of the eligible cost for emergency measures and 

permanent restoration. The state determines who pays the nonfederal share. 

Hazard Mitigation Grant ProgrambProvides grants to states and local governments to implement long-term hazard mitigation 

measures after a major disaster declaration. The purpose of program is to reduce the loss 

of life and property due to natural disasters and to enable mitigation measures to be 

implemented during the immediate recovery from a disaster. Provides up to 75% of the cost 

of hazard mitigation measures. The State or grantee must provide a 25% match. 

Predisaster Hazard Mitigation ProgramcThe program provides funds on a competitive basis to states, territories, Indian tribal 

governments, and communities for hazard mitigation planning and the implementation of 

mitigation projects prior to a disaster event. Funding these plans and projects reduces 

overall risks to the population and structures, while also reducing reliance on funding from

actual disaster declarations. The nonfederal share of the grant is at least 25%. Eligibility for 

a project grant is dependent on the applicant and sub-applicant having a FEMA approved

hazard mitigation plan. States are eligible as applicants for grants and ports are eligible as 

a subgrantee of the state. 

Source: GAO.

a

Established by Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act Pub. L. No. 93-288, 

88 Stat.143 (1974), codified in 42 U.S.C. ch. 68. 

b

Authorized in 42 U.S.C. § 5170c.

c

Authorized in 42 U.S.C. § 5133. 

The 2005 hurricane season emphasized the need for ports to plan for other 

threats in addition to security. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

2001, the country has focused on enhancing its security measures, and 

ports in particular have been targeted due to their vulnerability and their 

criticality to the U.S. economy. While ports have long prepared to some 

degree for hurricanes and earthquakes, the hurricanes of 2005 highlighted

key areas in which natural disaster planning was often inadequate. Even 

Conclusions 

 29Recently, the Port of Tacoma began participating in the Predisaster Hazard Mitigation 

Program as a subgrantee of the county. 

Page 40 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
ports that were not directly impacted by the hurricanes recognized their 

own vulnerabilities and took additional actions. As ports continue to 

revise and improve their planning efforts, available evidence indicates 

that, if ports take a system-wide approach, thinking strategically about 

using resources to mitigate and recover from all forms of disaster, they 

will be able to achieve the most effective results. The federally established 

framework for ports’ homeland security planning appears to provide 

useful elements for establishing an all-hazards approach and adopting 

these elements appears to be a logical starting point for an all-hazards 

approach for port authorities. In particular, greater coordination between

stakeholders appears important to ensure that available federal resources 

can be most effectively applied. A forum for sharing information and 

developing plans across a wide range of stakeholders, as occurs with a 

port’s AMSC, is critical for ensuring that local stakeholders can use federal 

resources effectively. This is especially the case for mitigation grants 

administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the 

Maritime Administration’s communication of information regarding 

making ships and other maritime resources available for disaster recovery. 

To help ensure that ports achieve adequate planning for natural disasters 

and effectively manage risk to a variety of threats, we are recommending 

that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security encourage port 

stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing all-hazards planning 

efforts and include appropriate representatives from DHS, the port 

authority, representatives from the local emergency management office,

the Maritime Administration, and vessel and facility owner/operators. 

To help ensure that ports have adequate understanding of maritime 

disaster recovery resources, we recommend that the Secretary of the 

Department of Transportation direct the Administrator of the Maritime 

Administration to develop a communication strategy to inform ports of the 

maritime resources available for recovery efforts.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOT, and DOD for their review 

and comment. 

In DHS’s letter, the department generally agreed existing forums provide a 

good opportunity to conduct outreach to and participation by stakeholders

from various federal, state, and local agencies and, as appropriate, 

industry and nongovernmental organizations. However, the department 

said it did not endorse placing responsibility for disaster contingency 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 41 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
planning on existing committees in ports and said these responsibilities 

should remain with state and local emergency management planners. Our 

recommendation was not to place responsibility for such planning within 

port committees, but rather to use these existing forums as a way to 

engage all relevant parties in discussing natural disaster planning for ports. 

The problem we found at various locations we visited was that all parties

have not been involved in these efforts. In our view, these committees 

represent a ready way to accomplish this task. While we understand Coast 

Guard’s concern with diluting existing statutorily mandated port-related 

committees, we found during the course of our fieldwork that some ports 

were already using existing port committees effectively to plan for all 

hazards. Further, we believe that the unique nature of ports and their 

criticality to goods movement warrants that all ports be encouraged to 

have a specific forum for all-hazard planning. DHS’s letter is reprinted in 

appendix II. DHS officials provided technical comments and clarifications, 

which we incorporated as appropriate to ensure the accuracy of our 

report. 

In general, DOT agreed with the facts presented in the report. Department 

officials provided a number of comments and clarifications, which we 

incorporated as appropriate to ensure the accuracy of our report. The 

department generally concurred with GAO’s recommendation. 

Additionally, DOD generally agreed with the facts presented in the report. 

Department officials provided some technical comments and

clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate to ensure the 

accuracy of our report. 

We will send copies of this report to the interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and other interested parties. 

We also will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 42 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-6570 or sigerrudk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix III. 

Katherine Siggerud 

Director, Physical Infrastructure 

Page 43 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
List of Committees 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Chairman 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd 

Chairman 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable James Oberstar 

Chairman 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable David E. Price 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 44 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

This report, initiated under the Comptroller General’s authority to 

examine government operations, examines (1) the challenges port 

authorities have experienced as a result of recent natural disasters, (2) the 

efforts under way to address challenges from these disasters, and (3) the 

manner in which port authorities prepare for disasters and the effect of 

this approach on their ability to share information with port stakeholders 

and access federal resources. 

To address these objectives, we focused much of our work on 17 U.S. 

ports. We focused primarily on commercial ports and various commercial 

aspects of these ports. The main criteria we used to select ports for study 

were as follows: 

• Size of port, based on the value of imported cargo. To ensure a varied size 

of ports, we selected ports that were among the top 50 in size, but within 

these 50, we chose ports whose total cargo values were greater than and 

less than the average cargo value for all 50 top ports. 

• Experience with recent natural disasters. We focused our efforts 

primarily—but not exclusively—on ports that had some degree of 

experience with a natural disaster since 1998. Based on Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) guidance about the most significant disaster 

threats and potential hazards, we limited our focus to ports that have 

hurricane or seismic threats. In particular, we included a number of ports 

affected by the 2005 hurricane season—primarily hurricanes Katrina, 

Wilma, and Rita. In all, 10 of the 17 ports we selected were affected by

hurricanes that year. 

• Operational type. We chose ports that reflected a range of operating 

types, including those that (1) manage port operations and provide all

services, (2) act as a landlord and lease operations and facilities to tenants,

and (3) conduct limited operations in the port and lease facilities to others. 

• Region of the United States. We selected ports from the East, Gulf, and 

West Coasts. There is an overrepresentation of Gulf region ports to ensure 

adequate coverage of hurricane affected ports. 

In making our selections, we used information from the Maritime 

Administration, including port demographics operational, legal type, and

region from the Public Port Finance Survey Report and Maritime 

Administration waterborne statistics which report the top 50 ports in 

terms of total cargo value. We determined that what we found at those 

ports is not generalizable to all U.S. ports. We used disaster data from 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assess how many 

Page 45 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

natural disasters had affected the counties in which each port was located. 

Based on our review of data documentation, we determined that the data

we used in applying our criteria for port selection were sufficiently reliable 

for our purposes. 

We took two approaches to reviewing these ports—site visits and 

telephone interviews. We conducted site visits at seven ports, as follows: 

• Tacoma, Washington 

• Houston, Texas 

• Oakland, California 

• Gulfport, Mississippi 

• Mobile, Alabama 

• Miami, Florida 

• Savannah, Georgia 

During these visits, we gathered information from various maritime 

stakeholders, including officials from port authorities, emergency

management agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, and the Maritime Administration. Although we talked to four 

private operators, we excluded interviewing other private operators 

because their roles and responsibilities vary greatly from port to port and 

because their efforts for natural disasters, unlike their efforts for 

homeland security, are not subject to federal requirements or guidelines. 

We designed our case study interview questions to provide insight on (1) 

general governance and operations of the port, (2) impacts from recent 

natural disasters, (3) lessons learned from previous natural disasters, (4) 

risk management procedures, and (5) stakeholder collaboration. 

We conducted telephone interviews with officials at 10 ports, as follows: 

• Freeport, Texas 

• Jacksonville, Florida 

• Los Angeles, California 

• Morgan City, Louisiana 

• New Orleans, Louisiana 

• Pascagoula, Mississippi 

• Port Arthur, Texas 

• Richmond, Virginia 

• San Diego, California 

• Wilmington, North Carolina 

Page 46 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

At these ports, we limited our telephone interviews to port authorities 

only. These semi-structured interviews addressed the same topics as the 

case study but focused more on damages and lessons learned as a result of 

recent natural disasters. For both sets of ports, we also reviewed 

numerous planning documents from port stakeholders including 

emergency preparedness plans, disaster recovery plans, hurricane 

operations, hurricane manuals, seismic guidelines, and business continuity 

plans. 

To assess the challenges port authorities experienced as a result of recent 

natural disasters, we used the interviews we conducted and the 

documents we obtained from officials at the 17 ports. To determine the 

efforts under way to address these challenges, we reviewed information 

from our interviews with and documents from American Association of 

Port Authorities (AAPA) officials and various federal agencies. In 

particular, we reviewed the Emergency Preparedness and Continuity of 

Operations Planning: Manual for Best Practices that was developed 

through several working groups coordinated by the AAPA. The working 

groups provided a forum for port officials across the United States and 

Canada to share their experience in planning for the impacts of recent 

natural disasters and to share their best practices. We conducted 

interviews with the Chair of the working groups and other AAPA officials 

to gather more information about the working group’s procedures and 

vetting process. Additionally, we interviewed various regional and 

headquarter officials of the Maritime Administration, U.S. Coast Guard 

(Coast Guard), Department of Transportation, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, FEMA, and DHS. We reviewed the following federal risk 

management plans: 

• The draft appendix for maritime resources for the Federal Support Plan.

The appendix is part of a one-time joint planning document between the 

Department of Transportation and FEMA for the state of Louisiana (2006 

Hurricane Season). The Maritime Administration, an agency within the 

Department of Transportation, developed this appendix to assist in future 

recovery efforts by identifying resources, protocols, and organizations for 

maritime resources. 

• The Port Risk Management and Insurance Guidebook, developed by the 

Maritime Administration. This publication is a best practices guide for port 

risk management, including information on how ports obtain insurance 

coverage and facilitate emergency management.

Page 47 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

To determine how port authorities plan for natural disasters and the 

effects of that approach on information-sharing among port stakeholders 

and access to federal resources, we reviewed port and federal disaster 

planning documents collected from various port stakeholders at each of 

the seven ports we visited in person. In order to gain an understanding of 

best practices for such planning efforts, we interviewed academic, 

industry, and government experts.1

 In particular, we interviewed risk 

management experts from the following organizations: 

• Georgia Institute of Technology’s Port Seismic Risk Management Team 

conducted damage assessments at seven ports in south Louisiana in 

October 2005 immediately following Hurricane Katrina. 

• ABS Consulting has worked with a variety of clients including the Coast 

Guard, Maritime Administration, and FEMA and thus helped develop 

several port risk management tools. 

• The Office of Grants and Training at DHS administers both Port Security 

and Homeland Security Grants. 

• The Coast Guard has expertise in utilizing the Maritime Security Risk 

Assessment Model (MSRAM) to assess security risk and has plans to 

incorporate natural disaster risks into the model. 

We also reviewed related laws and mandates that provide federal oversight 

to ports—namely the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 2

 and 

its implementing regulations and other applicable law. We also reviewed 

the Puget Sound area maritime security plan and attended an Area 

Maritime Security Committee meeting at the Port of Houston-Galveston.

To determine steps that federal agencies were taking with regard to allhazards risk management, we reviewed (1) the Security and 

Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act),3

 which addresses risk 

mitigation of transportation disruptions, including disruptions caused 

natural disasters and (2) policy documents including the National 

 1

For risk management, which is a central component of best practices, we limited our 

investigation to the context of emergency planning and did not address insurance-related 

risk management. 

2

Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002). 

3

Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act), Pub. L. No. 109-

347, 120 Stat. 1884. We also reviewed the SAFE Port Act Conference Report– House Report 

109-711. 

Page 48 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Response Plan and the National Incident Management System. We also 

reviewed a presentation on the Coast Guard’s MSRAM. 

Our work, which we conducted from December 2005 through February 

2007, was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

Page 49 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

of Homeland Security 

Page 50 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 51 GAO-07-412 Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 52 GAO-07-412 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact Katherine Siggerud, (202) 512-6570, siggerudk@gao.gov 

In addition to the individual named above, Sally Moino, Assistant Director; 

Casey Hanewall; Lindsey Hemly; Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt; Bert Japikse; 

Erica Miles; Sara Ann Moessbauer; Jamilah Moon; Sharon Silas; Stan 

Stenerson; and Randall Williamson made key contributions to this report. 

Port Disaster Preparedness and Risk Management

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(542083) 
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