NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

VALENTIN QUINTERO AISPURO,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10318

D.C. No.

1:13-cr-00182-AWI-BAM-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 13, 2016**

San Francisco, California

Before: W. FLETCHER, CHRISTEN, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Defendant-Appellant Valentin Quintero-Aispuro (“Aispuro”) appeals the 

district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence found at one of his 

residences—a home on Martinho Avenue (the “Martinho” address). Aispuro 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 15 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 

argues that the search warrant for the residence was unsupported by probable 

cause. We affirm. 

“A search warrant is supported by probable cause if the issuing judge finds 

that, ‘given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair 

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 

place.’” United States v. Underwood, 725 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). The relevant inquiry is 

whether the issuing judge had a “substantial basis” for concluding that probable 

cause existed. Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39). 

As reflected in the police officer affidavit that was used to seek a search 

warrant for the Martinho residence, a reliable confidential informant had told 

police that Aispuro was dealing drugs out of an address on Vetter Street, but that 

he had a second home on Martinho Avenue, where he kept the profits. That 

officer also observed activity consistent with drug dealing at the Vetter address and 

observed Aispuro at the Vetter address and his vehicle at the Martinho address. In 

addition, when Aispuro was pulled over for a vehicle code violation, Aispuro

stated that he lived at the Martinho address. 

This court has “recognized that in narcotics cases ‘evidence is likely to be

found where the dealers live.’” United States v. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F.3d 973, 

978 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Angulo–Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 
 3 

(9th Cir. 1986)). Here, there was “a ‘reasonable nexus’ between the contraband 

sought and the residence . . . . [because] it would be reasonable to seek the 

evidence there.” Id. (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 869 F.2d 479, 484 (9th 

Cir. 1989)). That Aispuro lived at the Martinho address, along with the 

information contained in the affidavit, was enough for the issuing judge to 

reasonably infer that evidence was likely to be found at the Martinho address. See 

Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d at 1399.

Even if the warrant was unsupported by probable cause, the good-faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule would apply here because the “evidence [was] 

obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a 

detached and neutral magistrate.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900 

(1984). Aispuro argues that the “the affidavit upon which the warrant is based is 

so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable officer could rely upon it 

in good faith.” United States v. Crews, 502 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2007).

But, for the same reasons explained above, the totality of the circumstances in this 

case provided sufficient indicia of probable cause that a reasonable officer could 

rely on the warrant in good faith.

AFFIRMED.