C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS PROVI DI AN B ANCORP SER VI CES N/K/A WASHI

NGTONMUTUAL

AND F/D/B /A PROVI DI AN F I NANCIAL CORPOR ATI ON, Ap pe lla nt,

v. CONSTANCE THOMAS, Appellee

. § § § § § § § No. 08-07-00246- CV

Appea l from the County Court at L aw No. 5 of El Paso County , Texas (TC#2004-4101)

O P I N I O N P ro vidian Ba

ncorp Ser

vices n/k/a Washing ton Mutual and f/d/b/a Providian Fina ncial Corporation (“Providian” ) appea ls the trial court’s confirmation of an ar bitration awa

rd in favor

of Ap pe lle e , Co ns tanc e Th oma s. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

. I. BACKG ROUND I n April of 2003, Thomas e ntere d into a written employ ment ag ree ment (the “ Employ ment Ag ree ment”) w ith Providi an. Thomas, a n Afric an-America

n fema le, was hired to w ork as a te am manag er in Providian’s El Paso fac ility

. Soon a fter she was hire d, Thomas conc luded that she wa s being subjected to ra cial discrimination by Providian. On September

27, 2004, Thoma s f

il e d s u it a g ainst Providian and J ackie Warner, he r super ior. Thomas asser

ted claims for

employ ment discrimination and reta liation, pur suant to the Texas L abor Code, see T EX . L AB . C ODE ANN . §§ 21.051 and 21.055, and for assault and battery

. Among other t h i n g s , T h o m a s a l l e g e d t h a t , at o r n e ar t h e t i m e t h a t P r o v i d i an h i r e d h e r , i t h i r e d a y ou ng e r, le ssqualified, non -Afr ican- Americ an male, to whom it paid a hig her sa lary ; that Warner c alled her“B londi e, ” wh i ch Thomas took to be a de rog atory comment conc erningher r ace ; that, after she complained a

bout her tre atment, Providian continually changed h er team member s and her shift times; and that Warner slappe d her on one occa sion. Providian moved to compel ar bitration and to stay

the proc eeding s, based upon a n arbitration

c la us e (t he “ Ar bit ra tio n Cl a us e ” ) c on ta ine d in

he r E mploy

men t Ag re e me nt, wh ic h p ro vid e d, in pe rt ine nt p art : [I ]n c a se of any dis pute or dis a g re e me nt a ri sin g out of

or in a ny wa y re late d to thi s Ag ree ment, y our employ ment with us, or the termination of y our em p l o y m ent (including , but not lim ited to, claims of discrimi n ati on, hara ssment, wrong ful dis c ha rg e , bre a c h of co ntr a c t, tor tio us c on du c t, statut or

y vio latio ns or any

inj ur y to y our p hy sic a l, m e nta l or e c on omi c int e re sts ), y ou and the Com pa ny a g re e to s ub mit th e di sp ute or

dis a g re e me nt t o b ind ingarb itr a tio n b e fo re JAMS/ En dis pute (o r i ts su c c e sso r or a mut

ua lly -a g re e d up on arb itr a tor a t A AAif JAMS/ En dis pute is una

ble or unwi lli ngto h e ar t

he dis pute ), purs ua

nt t o th e Ca lif

or nia Ar bi tr a tio n A c t, C CP § 1 2 8 0 e t s e q . T h e c o s t s an d

f e e s o f t h e ar b i t r a t o r s h a l l b e p a i d

b y t h e C o mp an y, except that wher e y ou initiate a rbitration under this pa

rag raph, y ou will be require d to pay a fe e equal to a

n initial cour

t f iling fee

. Any party to the arbitration shall be entitled to take discove ry

as provided under the California Arbitration Act , and ea ch pa rt y wi ll be e nti tle d to a ll r e me die s a s p ro vid e d b y the su bs tanti ve law p ur su ant t o which the c laims are m ad e. T he Rules of Evidenc e will apply . Any decision or aw ar d b y t h e a r b i t ra t o r s h al l b e i nwr i t i n g an d s h al l i n cl u d e as u m m ary o f f i n d i n gs of fa ct and law

on which the de cision or awa rd is b as ed , an d such dec ision is final and bin din g , s ub

je c t to jud ic ia l re vie w a s pr ov ide d by the Ca lif or nia Ar bit ratio n A c t. On Marc h 1 4, 20 05 , the tr ia l c ourt g ra nte d the mot ion s and

or de re d th e pa

rt ie s to pr oc e e d to arbitration before for

me r ju d g e E nr iq

u e Pe ñ a , a n a rbitrator e mploy ed by

Texas Arbitration Mediation Se rv ic e s, I nc . ( “ TA MS” ). On May 16 , 2 00 5, the pa

rt ie s’ a tto rn e y s e nte re d int o a le tte r a g re e me nt, pursuant to Te xa s Ru le o f Ci v il Pr o c e d

u r e 1 1 ( th e “ Ru le 1 1 A g r e e me n t” ) , in w h ic hv ar io us ag ree ments were made concer ning the pending arbitration proce eding

. First, the pa rties ag ree d that the Rule 11 Ag ree ment would be in addition to all other terms and c onditions of the Arbitration Cla us e . Th e Rul e 11 Ag re e me nt furt he r pr ov ide d that “th e pa

rt ie s h a ve a lso a g re e d th a t th e TA MS rules (‘TAMS Rules’) will apply

. To the ex tent the TAMS Rules or this ag ree ment conflict with theArbitration Clause, the pa rties ag ree that the TAMS Rules or this ag ree ment will apply .” F ollowing the fore g oing statement wer e various provisions conce rning discovery and sche duling. Subseque nt to these, the Rule 11 Agreement provided that, “to the extent that the ag ree ments set forth above conflict with the TAMS Rules, this ag ree ment, set forth her ein, shall control.” T he fina l provision of the R u l e 1 1 Agr eement stated that “judicial re view will be conduc ted pursuant to the Te x as Gene ral Ar

bitration Act. C IV . P R AC [.] & R EM . C ODE §171.001 et seq.” Following a hea

ring , Arbitrator

Peña issued

a wr itten a war d which conta ined his findings a nd conclusions. Peña f

ound that Thomas fa iled to establish her c laims of either r acia l discrimination or retaliation. The a

rbitrator did find, howe ver, that, although the re w as conf licting testimony

of the event, Warne r assa

ulted Thomas by

slapping her on the back of the hea d. Fo r t he assa

ult, the arbitrator awa

rded Thoma s damag es in the amount of $1; h o we v er, he also awa rded a total of $2 4, 50 0 in

a tto rn e y s’ fe e s to he r t

wo a tto rn e y s. Thomas broug ht a motion to confirm the arbitrator’s awa rd, and Providian moved to modify the attorne y s’ fe es portion of the a war d. Followinga hea

ring on the motions, the trial court ente red an orde r deny

ing Providian’ s motion and confirming the arbitrator’s award. Providian a ppeals the decision of the tr ial court a nd reque sts that this Court reve rse the trial court a nd modify

the awa rd of attorne y s’ fe es to Thomas to zero.II. DI SCU SSIO N A. Standard of

Review We r eview c onfirmation of a n arbitration awar d de novo

. GJR Mgmt. Holdings, L.P. v. Jack R a us, Ltd. , 1 26 S.W. 3d

25 7, 26 2 ( Te x. Ap p. -- San A nto nio 20 03 , p e t. d e nie d) ; Am e ric an Re alt y Trust, Inc. v. JD

N Real Estate-Mc

Kinney, L.P. , 7 4 S. W.3 d 5 27 , 5 31 (T e x. Ap p. -- Da lla s 2 00 2, pe t. denied) . I n Texas, reviewof an a rbitration awa

rd is ext re m el y

narr ow. Hisaw & Assocs. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cornerstone Concre te Sys., Inc

. , 1 15 S.W. 3d 16 , 1 8 ( Te x. App .--F or

t Wor th 20 03 , p e t. d e nie d) ; Co o

p e r v . B u shong , 1 0 S

. W .3d 20, 24 (Tex. App.--Austin 1999, pet. de nied). We indulge e very

rea s o n able pr esumption in order to uphold the ar bitration awa

rd. Hisaw , 115 S.W. 3d a t 18 ; Cooper , 10 S.W .3d at 24. “[T]he autho ri t y of ar bitrators is derive d from the

arb itr a tio n a g re e me nt and is l imi te d to a de c isi on of the matte rs su

bmi tte d th e re in e ith e r e xpre ssl y or by nece ssary

implication.” Gu lf Oi l Cor p. v . G uid

ry , 160 Tex. 139, 143, 327 S.W .2d 406, 408, 37 L ab. Cas. (CCH) ¶

65,669 (1959). Traditional contr act pr inciples are used to interpre t arbitration agree ments. I n r e Phelps Dodge M agnet W ire Co. , 2 2 5 S

. W.3d 599, 603 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2005, orig inal proce eding [m and. denied]). We will enforc e an a rbitration ag ree ment acc ording to its pl ain meaning

. Y sle ta Indep. Sc h. Dist. v. Godinez , 998 S.W .2d 700, 702 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1999, no pet.)

. B. Th e Ar bitration Award I n its sole issue on appeal, Providian c halleng es the trial c o u rt ’s conf irmation of the arbitrator’s aw ard of

attorney s’ fee s and ar g ues that the a war d should be modified to eliminate any

awa rd of f ees. “Abse nt a

n alleg ation of a statutory or common law g round to vac ate or modify an arbitration awar d, a re viewing court lac ks jurisdiction to revie w t he arbitrator’s de cision.” Lee v. E l Pa so Cou nty , 965 S.W .2d 668, 671-72 (Te x . App.--E l Paso 1998, pet. denied) . Providian does notAl t h ou g h t h e s t at u t e pr ov i des t h at a t t or n ey ’ s f ee s ma y be a wa r ded t o “ t h e pr ev ai l i n g pa r t y ” i n a c h apt er 21 1 p ro c e e d ing , suc h fee s a re ra re ly aw a rd e d to su c c e ssfu l d e fe n d a n ts. See, e. g. , Wi l ts hi r e v . H um pa l P hys i cal Ther ap y, P. C. , 2 0 0 5 W L 20 9 1 0 9 2 , at * 9 (T ex. A p p . - - C o rpus C hri st i A ug. 3 1 , 2 0 0 5 , no p et

. ) (me m . o p .); b ut cf

. E l ga gh i l v. T a rra n t C o u n ty J

u n io r C o ll. , 4 5 S .W .3 d 1 3 3 (T e x . A p p .-- F o rt W o rth 2 0 0 0 , p e t. d e n ie d ) (a tto rn e y’s f e e s a w a rd e d to pr ev ai l i n g de f

en dan t w h er e ch apt er 21 pl ai n t i f f ’ s c l ai ms w er e g r ou n dl es s a s a ma t t er of l aw )

. Pr ov i di an doe s n ot compl ai n a bou t t h e ar bi t r at or ’ s f ai l u r e t o awa r d i t an y at t or n ey ’ s f ee s bas ed u pon i t s s u cc es s i n t h e ch apt er 21 por t i on o f t he p roce ed i ng. a sse rt a c omm on law g ro un d to mod if

y the jud g me nt; ins te a d, it c on te nd s th a t it is e nti tle d to modification pursuant to the Te x as Ge nera l Arbitration Act ( “TGA A”)

. Under the TGAA , a cour

t shall modify

or cor rec t an ar bitration awa

rd if: (1 ) t he awa rd c on ta ins : (A) a n evident miscalc ulation of numbers; or (B ) a n e vid e nt m ist ake in t

he descripti on

of a pe rs on , th ing , o r p ro pe rt y ref err ed to in the awa

rd; (2) the a rbitrators have made an aw ard w ith respec t to a matter not submitted to them and the a war d may be cor rec ted without affe ctin g t h e m erits of the decision made with respec t to the issues that were submitt ed; or (3) the f orm of the a

war d is imperfec t in a manner not affe ctin g t h e m er i t s o f t he c o n t r o v e r s y. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 171.091(a ). Providian argues that the a war d may

be

m o d i f i e d , b e c a u s e i ti s i mp e r f

e c ti nf o r mn o ta f f e c t i n g t h e m e r i t s o f

t h e c o n tr o v e r s y. Pr ov idi an ma

ke s tw o a rgume nts in su ppor

t. F ir st, it c on te nd s th a t th e Ar bit ratio n Cl a

us e limit s the parties to the r ecove ry to which they

would be entitled under the substantive law at issue and that, under

such law, the re w as no basis for Thomas to r ecove r attorney ’s fee s. The L abor Code allows a c ourt to awa

rd reasonable attorney ’s fees t o the prevailing party on claims broug ht under chapte r 21. SeeT EX . L AB . C ODE ANN . § 21.259. Acc ording ly , had T h o m as p re v ai led upon her

1 discrimination claim or her reta liation claim, t here would have been a statutory basis for a

n awa rd of attorne y s’ fe es to her. H oweve r, the only claim upon which Thoma s preva iled was he r common-law a ssa

ult c la im. Th oma s d oe s n ot d isp ute that, u nd e r T e xas law , sh e wo uld no t be e nti tle d to

rec over attorney ’s fee s for pre vailing on a common-law a ssault claim. See Z.A.O., I nc. v. Yarbrough Dr iv e Ctr

. J

oin t V e ntu re , 50 S.W .3d 531, 550 (Tex. App.--E l Paso 2001, no pet.) (“ attorney ’s fe es

are not rec overa

ble in tort actions”) . I nstead, she a rgues that the Rule 11 Ag ree ment provides that TAMS Rules apply to the arbitration and that the arbitrator had authority under those rules to awa rd he r atto rn e y ’s fe e s. Th e Ar bit ratio n Cl a us e pr ov ide s that “[a ]ny pa rt y to t he arb itr a tio n s ha ll b e e nti tle d .

. . to a ll

r e me die s a s p rovided by

the substantive law pursuant t o which the claims are made ” (e mph a sis added) . Prior to the arbitration, however , the par ties entere d into the Rule 1 1 Ag ree ment, which provides that TAMS Rules would apply and that, to the extent that TAMS Rules conflict with the Arbitration Clause, TA MS Rul es or the Rule 11 A g ree ment would apply . Thus, we must deter mine whether there is a conflict be tween the particula r TAMS rule at issue and the Ar bitration Clause. The TAMS rule states that “[t] he arbitrator or ar bitral tribunal may

g rant a ny reme dy or re lief that: The ar

bitrator or a

rbitral tribunal deems just and equitable, including, a ny reme dy or re lief the parties would be entitled to as if the matter was he ard in c ourt . .

. .” Clearly , the provisi on contained in t he Ar bit ratio n Cl a

us e re str ic ts the arb itr a tor to t ho se re me die s ava ila

ble un der t he a

pp lic a ble substantive law, whe rea s the latter pr ovision gra nts the arbitrator broad a utho rity to cra ft the

reme dies he deems “just and equitable.” I f the rule provided that the a rbitrator ma

y g rant a ny reme dy or relief t o wh ic h th e p arti e s w o u ld b e e n ti tl e d

a s if th e matt e r

w e r e h e ar d

in c o u rt, th e nth e tw o pr ov isi on s w ou ld h ave e sse nti a lly the same e ff e c t and the re wo uld

be no c on fl ic t. H ow e ve r, that is not the case and, bec ause the clause s do conflict, the pa rties’ Rule 11 Ag re em en t d i ctates that theProvi di an ar gu es t hat t her e i s no conf l i ct b et ween t he T A M S R ul es an d t he part i es ’ ar bi t r at i on ag r eement as 2 m o d i f i ed b y t he R ule 1 1 A gre em en t , b ec au se t he T A M S R ules d o no t sp ec i f i ca l l y ad d ress the a w ard o f att o rne ys’ f

ee s. H o w ev er, ne i t he r t he A rb i t rati o n C l au se no r t he R ule 1 1 A gre em en t ad d resse s att o rne ys’ f ee s. TA MS r ule a pp lie s. 2 Providian’s second a

rgument is that the parties a g ree d that judicial revie w would be conducte d pursuant to the TGAA, which does not pe rmit the awa rd of attorne y s’ fe es, unless they

are provided for in the ag ree ment to a rbitrate or “by law for a rec overy in a civil action in the district court on a cause of ac tion on which any part of the awa

rd is based.” T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 171.048(c) . Providian contends that the agr eeme nt to arbitrate di d not provide for attorney ’s fee s and that there was no statutory basis for a

n aw ar d o f fe es . Providian argues that sec tion 17 1

. 0 4 8 (c ) applies, because the Rule 11 Ag ree ment states that judicial re view will be conduc ted pursuant to the TGAA. Thus, Providian appea rs to c ontend that the ref

ere nce to “judicial re view” in the Rule 11 Ag ree ment meant that all provisions of the TG AA, includin g s ec t i o n 171.048(c) , g overne d the entire arbitration procee ding a nd not merely

the proc edure s for subseque nt review

. A plain re ading of t he Rule 11 Ag ree ment indicates that the pa rties intended to supplant the TGAA r ules for the arbitration pr ocee ding with those of the TAMS Rules and the specific discovery and sche duling a g ree ments set out in the Rule 11 Ag ree ment and intended that any subseq uent

re v ie w o f th e ar

b it r a ti o n aw ar d w o u ld b e c o n d u c te d p u r s u an t to th e p r o c e d u r e s c o n ta in e d in the TGAA. I n this reg ard, it is helpful to look at the structure of t he TGAA itself. The TGA A is divided i n t o fo u r s u

b ch ap t er s : S u

b ch ap t er A c o n t ai n s gen er al p ro v i sions; subch ap t er B i n v o l v es p ro ce ed i n gs to compel or stay

arbitration; subchapter C conta ins various rules for the arbitration proce eding ; and subchapte r D c ontains rules for subsequent court proc eeding s, including c onfirmation, vac ation, and mod if ic a tio n o f a

n a rb itr a tio n a

wa rd . N ota bly , s e c tio n 171 .0 48 (c ), up on wh ic h Pr ov idi an r e lie s, isc on ta ined in su bc ha pte r C , w hic h d e a ls w ithru le s f or the arb itr a tio n p ro c e e din g , a nd no t in

su bc ha pte r D. Ac c or din g ly , it do e s no t a pp e ar t hat th e pa rt ie s in te nd e d th a t se c tio n 1 71 .0 48 (c ) l imi t the scope of the a

rbitrator’ s awa

rd. Even if se ction 171.048(c) wer e to apply , it would not prec lude t he award of fee s in this case. The pa rties’ a g ree ment vested the arbitrator with the authority to awa rd any reme dy or relief that he d ee m ed j u s t an d equitable. This is sufficie ntly broad to include an aw ard of attorney ’s fe es. See Gi lli sp ie v . V illage of F

ra nk lin Pa rk, 405 F. Supp. 2d 904, 913, 97 Fa ir Empl. Prac. Cas. (B NA) 604 (N.D. I ll. 2005) (noting that a rule a llowing a ny reme dy or re li ef d ee med just and equitable, including a

ny re m ed y or re lief that would have been a vailable in cour

t, was a c apac ious gr ant of authority sufficie nt to allow an awa rd of attorney ’s fe es ). Moreove r, the TGA A, within the subchapte r g overning court re view, provide s that “[t] he fa ct that the re lief g rante d by the ar bitrators could not or would not be g rante d by a court of law or equity is not a g round for vaca ting or ref using to confirm the awa

rd.” T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 171.090. Acc ording ly , the fa ct that there was not a statutory

or other ba sis for a c ourt to awa rd attorney ’s fee s would not ha ve been a n appropr iate g round for

the trial cour

t to refuse to confirm the a war d. See A nchor Pavin g Co. v. Trinh , No. 01-99-01199- CV, 2000 WL 567645, at *3 (Tex. A pp.--Houston [1st Dist.] May 11, 2000, pet. denied) (not desig nated fo r p u b l ication) (district c ourt proper ly ref used to vac ate a

war d of attorney ’s fe es, bec ause se ction 171.090 preva iled over se ction 171.048(c) (2))

. Providian relies on Pheng Inv estments, Inc . v. Rodriguez , 196 S.W .3d 322 (Tex. App.--F ort Worth 2006, no pet.). In Pheng , the purcha ser of an apa rtment building brought claims ag ainst the seller f or bre ach of

contra ct, statutory

fra ud, common law fraud, and various other claims. Id. at 327. The c ase pr ocee ded to ar

bitration, and the a

rbitrator f ound that the seller ma de fa lse and misleading statements to the purc haser to induce the sale of the prope rty . The a rbitrator a war ded the pur chase rdamag es and attorney ’s fee s in the amount of $50,000. The buy er move d to confirm the a war d under the TGAA , and the se ller moved to vac ate it under the TGAA, Fe dera l A rbitration Act, c ommon law, and public policy

. The dist rict court confirme d the arbitration awa rd i n all respe cts. On appe al, the F or t Worth Co urt of App e a ls m od if ie d th e arb itr a tio n a

wa rd to e lim inate the awa

rd of a tto rn e y s’ fee s. Id. at 3 3 4

. T h e court noted that under the TGAA, a n arbitrator may

only awa rd fe es as permitted by

section 171.048(c ). Id. at 333. The c ontrac t at issue betwee n the par ties provided that the pr e va ili ngpa

rt y in a ny le g a l pr oc e e din g br ou g ht in r e latio n to the c on tr a c t w ou ld b e e nti tle d to

rea sonable attorney ’s fe es. Id. Howeve r, there was no evidenc e that the f ees w ere rea sonable. Id. Although se ction 27.01 of the Texas B usiness and Commerce Code may have pr ovided a statutory basis for the a

war d, it required pr oof that fe es we re r easona ble and necessa

ry . Be cause the re cord contained no evidenc e that the f ees a war ded we re r easona

ble and ne cessa

ry , the cour

t modified the

awa rd. Id. at 333-34. The issue in Pheng

was whe ther ther e wa s ev i d en ce that the fee s awa rded pur suant to the pa rt ie s’ arb itr a tio n a g re e me nt w e re re a so nable and ne c e ssa ry . In th e pr e se nt c a se , th e iss ue is whether the ar bitration ag ree ment permitted the a rbitrator to a

war d fee s, and Pheng

do e s n ot a dd

re ss this iss ue. He re, the parties a g reed that the ar bitrator could a

war d any rec overy or re medy

that he de e me d ju st a

nd e qu ita ble . We be lie ve that th is w a s b ro a d e no ug h to pe rm it a n a wa rd of a tto rn e y s’ fe e s in thi s c a se . We de ny

Pr ov idi an’ s so le iss ue on a pp e a l.III . C ON CL USI ON

We t he re fo re a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

.

KENNET H R. CARR, J ustice May 15, 2008 B e f o r e C h e w , C

. J. , M c C l u r e , a n d C ar r , JJ.