IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES,

Defendant and Respondent; 

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,

Real Party in Interest and Respondent. 

S262663

Third Appellate District

C080349

Sacramento County Superior Court

34-2014-80001842CUWMGDS

August 15, 2022

Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, 

Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred.

Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion.
1

COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

S262663

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

Article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution 

requires the state to reimburse local governments “[w]henever 

the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or 

higher level of service . . . .” (Cal. Const., art. XIII B, § 6, subd. 

(a).) In this case, several community college districts seek 

reimbursement for regulations that specify various conditions

the districts must satisfy to avoid the possibility of having their

state aid withheld. The conditions describe standards governing 

several core areas of community college administration, 

including matriculation requirements, hiring procedures, and 

curriculum selection. 

The districts filed a claim with the Commission on State 

Mandates, “ ‘ “a quasi-judicial body [that] has the sole and 

exclusive authority to adjudicate whether a state mandate 

exists” ’ ” (California School Boards Assn. v. State of California

(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1200; see Gov. Code, § 17551),

arguing that reimbursement was required under Article XIII B, 

section 6 because: (1) the regulations imposed a legal duty to 

satisfy the conditions described therein (“legal compulsion”); or 

(2) the regulations otherwise compelled compliance as a 

practical matter (“practical compulsion”). (See Department of 

Finance v. Commission on State Mandates (2003) 30 Cal.4th 

727, 741 (Kern) [“reimbursable state mandate arises” when 
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2

entity is compelled to comply; distinguishing legal and practical 

compulsion]; Department of Finance v. Commission on State 

Mandates (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1365–1366 (Department

of Finance) [reimbursement not required “if a local government 

participates ‘voluntarily,’ i.e., without legal compulsion or 

compulsion as a practical matter, in a program with a rule 

requiring increased costs”].) 

The Commission rejected the claims, concluding that the 

districts had failed to show they were legally compelled to 

comply with the regulations because there was no provision 

creating a mandatory duty that they do so; instead, 

noncompliance merely raised the possibility that some portion 

of their state funding would be withheld. The Commission 

further concluded that the districts had failed to establish they 

were compelled to comply as a practical matter, explaining that

no evidence had been submitted demonstrating the districts 

were unable to function without state funding or that they

otherwise lacked any true choice but to comply with the 

conditions. 

In subsequent mandate proceedings, the trial court 

affirmed the Commission’s findings with respect to both legal 

and practical compulsion. The Court of Appeal reversed, 

concluding that the districts were legally compelled to comply 

with the regulations because those regulations “apply to the 

underlying core functions of the community colleges, functions 

compelled by state law.” The court also rejected the

Commission’s finding that legal compulsion was inapplicable 

because noncompliance merely placed the districts at risk of 

having some portion of their state aid withheld. According to 

the court, state laws that required the funding of community 
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colleges and other evidence in the record demonstrated the 

districts rely on state aid to function, leaving them no choice but 

to comply with the regulations. Having found the districts had 

a legal duty to comply with the regulations, the court declined 

to review the trial court’s conclusion that the districts had failed 

to show practical compulsion. 

We reverse. Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s 

interpretation, the fact that the standards set forth in the 

regulations relate to the districts’ core functions (matriculation, 

hiring of faculty and selecting curriculum, etc.) does not in itself 

establish that the districts have a mandatory legal obligation to 

adopt those standards. (See Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 741.) 

The regulations make clear that if a district fails to comply, the 

California Community Colleges Chancellor has discretion to 

pursue any number of remedial measures that range from 

taking no action to “withhold[ing] or reduc[ing] all or part of the 

district’s state aid.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 51102, subd.

(b)(5).) Thus, the districts are not legally obligated to adopt the 

standards described in the regulations, but rather face the risk 

of potentially severe financial consequences if they chose not to

do so. Because the regulations induce rather than obligate 

compliance, legal compulsion is inapplicable. (See Kern, supra, 

30 Cal.4th at p. 742 [legal compulsion applicable when a local 

entity “has a legal obligation” to comply].) 

Moreover, while the Court of Appeal appears to have 

reasoned that the districts have no true choice to comply with 

the regulations insofar as they depend on state aid to function, 

those arguments sound in practical, rather than legal, 

compulsion. (See generally City of Sacramento v. State of 

California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51, 74 (City of Sacramento) [finding 
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practical compulsion where “[t]he alternatives were so far 

beyond the realm of practical reality that they left the state 

‘without discretion’ to depart from federal standards”].) Because 

the Court of Appeal chose not to address whether the districts

established practical compulsion, we will remand the matter to 

allow the court to evaluate that issue in the first instance. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Summary of Applicable Statutes

1. Proposition 4 and implementing legislation 

“Article XIII A (adopted by the voters in 1978 as 

Proposition 13), limits the taxing authority of state and local 

government. Article XIII B (adopted by the voters in 1979 as 

Proposition 4) limits the spending authority of state and local 

government.” (Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 735.) 

Section 6 of article XIII B provides: “Whenever the 

Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or 

higher level of service on any local government, the State shall 

provide a subvention of funds to reimburse such local 

government for the costs of such program or increased level of 

service.” The purpose of section 6 “is to preclude the state from 

shifting financial responsibility for carrying out governmental 

functions to local agencies, which are ‘ill equipped’ to assume 

increased financial responsibilities because of the taxing and 

spending limitations that articles XIII A and XIII B impose.” 

(County of San Diego v. State of California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 

81 (County of San Diego).)

In 1984, the Legislature adopted statutory procedures for 

determining whether a statute or executive action (which 

includes executive orders and regulations) imposes state-
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mandated costs on a local agency. (See Gov. Code, § 17500 et 

seq.) That legislation provides a two-step procedure. First, a 

local agency seeking reimbursement must file a “test claim” with 

the Commission on State Mandates, a quasi-judicial body 

established to “hear and decide” such matters. (Id., § 17551, 

subds. (a)–(b).) The test claim process allows the claimant and 

other interested parties to present written evidence and 

testimony at a public hearing. (Id., § 17553, subd. (a)(1)); see 

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 1183.1, subd. (b) [authorizing multiple 

claimants “to file a test claim as a joint effort” and providing that

“[o]ther similarly situated affected agencies may participate in 

the process”].) Based on that evidence, the Commission must 

decide whether the challenged statute or executive order 

mandates a new program or increased level of service. 

In making that determination, the Commission is 

required to address a series of questions. First, it must decide 

whether the legal provision for which subvention is sought

compels the local agency to act or merely invites voluntary 

action. If the provision compels action, the Commission must 

next decide whether the compelled activity requires the agency 

to provide “a new program or higher level of service.” (Cal. 

Const., art. XIII B, § 6.) Finally, if the Commission finds a 

statute or executive action mandates a new program or higher 

level of service, it must consider if any of the enumerated 

exceptions to reimbursement apply.

1

 This case involves only the 

1

 Those exceptions include, among other things: (1) when 

the state has imposed the new program or service to comply with 

a federal mandate; (2) when the state has provided the local 

agency offsetting savings that are commensurate with costs of 
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first of those inquiries: whether the regulations at issue compel

community college districts to act or, alternatively, merely

invite voluntary action. 

If the Commission ultimately determines there is a 

reimbursable mandate, it must then “determine the amount to 

be subvened to local agencies and school districts for 

reimbursement. In so doing it shall adopt parameters and 

guidelines for reimbursement of any claims relating to the 

statute or executive order.” (Gov. Code, § 17557, subd. (a); see 

County of San Diego, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 81.)

2. Statutes and regulations governing community 

colleges

California community colleges offer two-year degree 

programs and other forms of instruction. There are currently 

73 community college districts that collectively operate 116 

community colleges. Each community college district is run by 

a board of trustees (district board) (see Ed. Code, § 70902, subd. 

(a)(1)) that is responsible for “establish[ing], maintain[ing], 

operat[ing], and govern[ing] [the community colleges it 

oversees] in accordance with law.” (Ibid.) Under what is 

commonly referred to “as the ‘permissive code’ concept” (Service 

Employees Internat. Union v. Board of Trustees (1996) 

47 Cal.App.4th 1661, 1666), district boards are permitted to 

“initiate and carry on any program, activity, or may otherwise 

act in any manner that is not in conflict with . . . any law and 

that is not in conflict with the purposes for which community 

the new program or service; or (3) when the local agency is 

authorized to fund the new program or service by imposing fees 

or assessments. (See Gov. Code, § 17556.)
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college districts are established.” (Ed. Code, § 70902, subd. 

(a)(1).) Thus, the “only limitation placed on a [district] board’s 

authority under the permissive code is that the board may not 

act in any manner” that is inconsistent with any law. (Service 

Employees Internat. Union, at p. 1666.)

The Legislature has, however, cabined the authority of 

district boards in some ways. Education Code section 66010.4, 

subdivision (a), for example, sets forth the general mission and 

functions of the community colleges, requiring that they: “offer 

academic and vocational instruction . . . through, but not 

beyond, the second year of college” (id., subd. (a)(1)); offer 

courses to provide “remedial instruction for those in need of it”

(id., subd. (a)(2)(A)); “instruct[] in English as a second language”

(ibid.); and offer “adult noncredit instruction” (ibid.).

The Legislature has assigned general oversight authority 

of the districts to the Board of Governors of the California 

Community Colleges (the Board of Governors), which enacts 

regulations and reviews major decisions of community college 

districts, such as the creation of new colleges. (See Ed. Code, § 

70901, subd. (b).) The Board of Governors is headed by the 

California Community Colleges Chancellor, who is responsible 

for carrying out and enforcing the Board’s regulations and 

overseeing the annual apportionment of state funds.

In 1988, the Legislature passed new statutory directives 

requiring the Board of Governors to establish two categories of 

regulations. (See Stats. 1988, c. 973, § 8 [adding Ed. Code, § 

70901].) First, the Board was required to adopt regulations 

establishing “minimum standards as required by law” for 

various aspects of community college operations. (Ed. Code, § 

70901, subd. (b)(1).) Those regulations (hereafter operating 
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standards regulations) set out mandatory “minimum standards” 

related to (among other things) “graduation requirements,” “the 

employment of academic and administrative staff,” student 

discipline, and curriculum. (Ibid.; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 

5, §§ 53000–59606.)2 

The Legislature also directed the Board of Governors to 

adopt separate regulations that “[e]stablish minimum 

conditions entitling districts to receive state aid for support of 

community colleges” and to adopt procedures to “periodic[ally] 

review” whether each district has met those minimum 

conditions. (Ed. Code, § 70901, subd. (b)(6)(A); see Cal. Code 

Regs., tit. 5, § 51000.) Pursuant to those provisions, the Board 

passed 19 regulations (see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, §§ 51002–

51027; hereafter funding entitlement regulations), many of 

which overlap with (and in some cases directly incorporate) 

requirements set forth in the operating standards regulations.3 

2 Except where otherwise noted, all further references to 

“Regulation” or “Regulations” are to title 5 of the California 

Code of Regulations. 

3 Regulation 51002, for example, directs the districts to 

“adopt regulations consistent with the standards of scholarship 

contained in articles 2 through 5 (commencing with section 

55020) of subchapter 1 of chapter 6” of the Regulations, which 

refers to the operating standards regulations that govern 

scholarship. Similarly, Regulation 51004 directs the districts to 

“adopt regulations consistent with regulations contained in 

articles 6 and 7 (commencing with section 55060) of subchapter 

1 of chapter 6,” which refers to the operating standards

regulations that govern the issuance of degrees and certificates. 

As discussed in more detail below (see post, at pp. 13–14), the 
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Unlike the operating standards regulations, the districts 

are not expressly required to comply with the funding

entitlement regulations. Instead, the Education Code and its

implementing regulations provide that noncompliance 

authorizes the Chancellor to initiate a process that may result 

in withholding or reduction of state funding. (See Ed. Code, § 

70901, subd. (b)(6); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, §§ 51000, 51102.) If 

the Chancellor determines a district is out of compliance with 

some or all of the funding entitlement regulations, she must 

provide the district notice identifying the noncompliance issues 

and request a response. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 51102, 

subd. (a).) Once the district responds (or time has lapsed to do 

so), the Chancellor “shall pursue one or more . . . courses of 

action” that include (among other things) accepting the district’s 

response, requiring the district to adhere to a remedial plan or 

“withhold[ing] or reduc[ing] all or part of the district’s state aid.” 

(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 51102, subd. (b).) The regulations 

further require that the remedy the Chancellor selects “shall be 

related to the extent and gravity of noncompliance.” (Id., subd. 

(c).)

B. Procedural History

1. The Commission’s resolution of the test claims

In June 2003, the Los Rios, Santa Monica, and West Kern 

community college districts filed test claims seeking 

reimbursement for costs associated with 27 sections of the 

Education Code and approximately 140 related regulations. 

Court of Appeal’s decision found that numerous other provisions 

in the funding entitlement regulations overlap with 

requirements in the operating standards regulations. 
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The test claims included (among other provisions) the operating 

standards regulations and the funding entitlement regulations. 

After nearly a decade of review, the Commission issued a 164-

page statement of decision that authorized reimbursement for 

over 90 of the alleged mandates, many of which related to the 

operating standards regulations implemented pursuant to 

Education Code section 70901, subdivision (b)(1). The 

Commission later adopted parameters and guidelines for the 

reimbursement of those mandates.

However, the Commission rejected all claims related to 

the funding entitlement regulations, concluding that the 

districts had failed to establish those regulations compelled 

them to take any action. The Commission reasoned that unlike 

the operating standards regulations, compliance with the 

funding entitlement regulations was not legally mandated, but 

instead operated to remove the possibility that the Board of 

Governors might withhold some portion of the noncomplying 

district’s state aid. The Commission further explained that the 

regulations provided the Chancellor and the Board of Governors 

discretion to choose what “actions to take” in response to a 

district’s noncompliance, meaning that a district might still 

retain all its aid even if it chose not to comply. The Commission 

noted that the districts’ evidence showed only one case in which 

the Chancellor had ever recommended that the Board of 

Governors withhold funding from a district, which occurred 

after the San Mateo Community College had failed to comply 

with an equal opportunity hiring regulation when choosing its 

new superintendent. The Board, however, ultimately rejected 

the Chancellor’s recommendation to withhold funding and chose

instead to increase monitoring over the district. The 
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Commission concluded the case demonstrated that while “there 

is . . . a possible loss of funding, [there is no] . . . evidence of the 

certainty of this loss.” 

2. The trial court’s ruling 

The districts filed a writ petition seeking reversal of the 

Commission’s finding that the funding entitlement regulations 

did not qualify as a mandate. Although the Department of 

Finance (the Department) joined the Commission in opposing 

the petition, the Department chose not to seek review of the 

portion of the Commission’s decision finding that over 90 

statutes and regulations (including most of the operating 

standards regulations) qualified as reimbursable mandates.

The trial court affirmed the Commission’s decision and 

adopted most of its reasoning. The court concluded that the 

districts “are not legally compelled to comply with the minimum 

conditions. Instead, . . . [they] only have to comply with the 

minimum conditions if they want to become entitled to receive 

state aid.” (Italics omitted.) The court also rejected the districts’ 

assertion that even if not legally compelled to comply, they were 

nonetheless practically compelled to do so “because they cannot 

operate without state funding and thus have no meaningful 

choice but to comply with the minimum conditions.” The court 

explained that it could not evaluate that assertion because the

districts had “cite[d] no evidence in their briefs about how much 

community colleges receive from state aid, how much they 

receive from property taxes, and how much they receive from 

other funding sources. . . . With no evidence on this 

issue, . . . [the districts] fail to prove the key point (i.e., that they 

cannot operate without state funds).” (Italics omitted.) 
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The trial court further concluded that even if there were

sufficient evidence to support a finding that the districts relied 

on state funds to operate, the districts had failed to show that 

noncompliance was reasonably likely to result in the 

withholding of state funds. The court reasoned that while the 

funding entitlement regulations authorized the Chancellor “to 

withhold state aid if a district fails to comply,” the districts had 

not proved that “loss of state aid is . . . reasonably certain to 

occur” or that the amounts withheld would necessarily be 

“severe.” Like the Commission, the trial court cited evidence 

regarding the disciplinary action the Board of Governors had 

taken against San Mateo Community College District for failing 

to comply with funding entitlement regulations related to equal 

opportunity hiring. The trial court noted that the Board’s 

meeting minutes showed it had rejected the Chancellor’s 

recommendation to withhold $500,000 in state aid because “of 

the worry that doing so would negatively impact students.” In 

the court’s view, these actions showed that it was “unlikely that 

a district would actually lose any state aid if it failed to comply 

with the minimum conditions.”

3. The Court of Appeal’s partial reversal

The Court of Appeal reversed in part, concluding that the 

districts had shown they were legally compelled to comply with 

the funding entitlement regulations because those regulations 

related to the community college districts’ core functions: “[T]he 

[funding entitlement regulations] apply to the underlying core 

functions of the community colleges, functions compelled by 

state law. . . . California community colleges are required to 

provide specified academic, vocational, and remedial 

instruction, along with support services. (Ed. Code, § 66010.4.) 
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The [funding entitlement regulations] direct the community 

college districts to take specific steps in fulfilling those legallycompelled core mission functions, including requirements 

pertaining to scholarship, degrees, courses, campuses, 

counseling, and curriculum.”

The court further concluded that while the Commission 

had found “the [funding entitlement regulations] are not legally 

compelled because the community colleges are free to decline 

state aid,” that conclusion was “inconsistent with the statutory 

scheme and the appellate record.” The court explained that the 

California Constitution requires “a specific minimum level of 

state General Fund revenues be guaranteed and applied for the 

support of community college districts” and further requires

that the state provide districts sufficient funding “to permit 

them to carry out their mission.” Without citing a specific

source, the court noted that “in the most recent year for which 

the appellate record in this case provides information, more 

than half of California community college funding came from the 

state General Fund. In that same year, other funding sources, 

including federal funds, local funds, and student fees, provided 

significantly less support. Like public school districts in 

general, community college districts are dependent on state 

aid.” (Italics omitted.) Because the court found that the 

districts were legally compelled to comply with the funding 

entitlement regulations, it declined to address the trial court’s 

alternative finding that the districts had failed to demonstrate 

they “faced practical compulsion based on severe and certain 

penalties.” 

The Court of Appeal went on to rule, however, that the 

districts were not entitled to reimbursement for many of the 
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funding entitlement regulations because the programs or 

services described within those regulations were duplicative of 

requirements imposed under the operating standards 

regulations, which the Commission had previously found to be 

reimbursable. In total, the Court of Appeal found that only six 

of the nineteen funding entitlement regulations involved 

programs or services that did not overlap with operating 

standards regulations or other statutory requirements the 

Commission had already found to be reimbursable. For those 

six regulations, the court remanded the matter back to the 

Commission to evaluate whether they imposed a new program 

or higher level of service within the meaning of the mandate law.

The Commission and the Department (collectively

respondents) filed petitions for review challenging the Court of 

Appeal’s conclusion that the districts were legally compelled to 

comply with the funding entitlement regulations.4

4 The Commission has also requested review of a separate 

portion of the Court of Appeal’s decision that directs the 

Commission to make further findings regarding the districts’ 

entitlement to reimbursement for various sections of the 

Education Code that are unrelated to the regulations discussed 

above. The Commission asserts it lacks fundamental 

jurisdiction to address those sections of the Education Code 

because: (1) the districts’ test claims do not expressly reference 

those statutes; and (2) some of those statutes were the subject 

of a prior test claim. The Department, which has not joined in 

this argument, is of the view that while a claimant might be 

procedurally barred from seeking reimbursement for statutes 

that were not listed in a test claim or were the subject of a prior 

test claim, those circumstances do not result in a jurisdictional 

bar. 
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II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

“Courts review a decision of the Commission to determine

whether it is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] 

Ordinarily, when the scope of review in the trial court is whether 

the administrative decision is supported by substantial 

evidence, the scope of review on appeal is the same. [Citation.] 

However, the appellate court independently reviews conclusions 

as to the meaning and effect of constitutional and statutory 

provisions. [Citation.] The question whether a statute or 

executive order imposes a mandate is a question of law. 

[Citation.] Thus, we review the entire record before the 

Commission . . . and independently determine whether it 

supports the Commission’s conclusion that the conditions here 

were not . . . mandates.” (Department of Finance v. Commission 

on State Mandates (2016) 1 Cal.5th 749, 762.) 

B. Analysis

Respondents argue the Court of Appeal erred in finding 

the districts were legally compelled to comply with the funding 

entitlement regulations. They further contend that although 

the Court of Appeal did not reach the issue, we should 

additionally find that the districts failed to establish they were 

practically compelled to comply with those regulations.

Although the Commission’s arguments regarding this 

secondary issue fall within the scope of our order granting 

review, we decline to address them. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.516(b)(3) [“The court need not decide every issue the parties 

raise or the court specifies”].) 
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1. Distinction between legal compulsion and practical 

compulsion 

When evaluating whether a statute or executive action 

compels compliance for purposes of subvention claims, we have 

identified two distinct theories of mandate: legal compulsion 

and practical compulsion. Legal compulsion occurs when a 

statute or executive action uses mandatory language that 

“ ‘require[s]’ or ‘command[s]’ ” a local entity to participate in a 

program or service. (Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 741; see Long 

Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. State of California (1990) 

225 Cal.App.3d 155, 174 [construing the term “mandates” in art. 

XIII B, § 6 to mean “ ‘orders’ or ‘commands’ ”].) Stated 

differently, legal compulsion is present when the local entity has 

a mandatory, legally enforceable duty to obey. This standard is

similar to the showing necessary to obtain a traditional writ of 

mandate, which requires the petitioning party to establish the

respondent has “a clear, present, and usually ministerial duty 

to act. . . . Mandate will not issue if the duty is . . . mixed with 

discretionary power.” (Los Angeles County Prof. Peace Officers’

Assn. v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 866, 869.) 

Thus, as a general matter, a local entity’s voluntary or 

discretionary decision to undertake an activity cannot be said to 

be legally compelled, even if that decision results in certain 

mandatory actions. In Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, for example, 

we held that school districts were not entitled to reimbursement 

for costs associated with a law that imposed new requirements 

related to the administration of certain voluntary, state-funded 

educational programs. Under the original statutes governing

these voluntary educational programs, “participating school 

districts [we]re granted state or federal funds to operate the 
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program, and [we]re required to establish . . . advisory 

committees [to] . . . administer the program.” (Id. at p. 732.) 

The new law required participating districts to make those 

advisory committee meetings open to the public and provide the 

public notice of the meetings and post meeting agendas. 

In rejecting the districts’ reimbursement claim for those 

new open meeting requirements, we explained that because the 

“notice and agenda provisions [were merely] mandatory 

elements of [voluntary] programs” (Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 

p. 731), the districts were not legally compelled to comply with 

those provisions. (See id. at p. 742 [“activities undertaken at the 

option or discretion of a local government entity . . . do not 

trigger a state mandate and hence do not require 

reimbursement of funds — even if the local entity is obliged to 

incur costs as a result of its discretionary decision to participate 

in a particular program or practice”]; but see San Diego Unified 

School Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates (2004) 33 Cal.4th 

859, 887 [declining to adopt a bright-line rule precluding 

reimbursement “whenever an entity makes an initial 

discretionary decision that in turn triggers mandated costs”].)

Kern also discussed the concept of “practical compulsion,”

a theory of mandate that arises when a statutory scheme does 

not command a local entity to engage in conduct, but rather

induces compliance through the imposition of severe 

consequences that leave the local entity no reasonable 

alternative but to comply. (See Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 

pp. 748–752.) Relying on our decision in City of Sacramento, 

supra, 50 Cal.3d 51, the claimants in Kern argued that we

should construe section’s 6’s mandate provision (see Cal. Const., 

art. XIII B, § 6) to encompass both legal and practical 
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compulsion. City of Sacramento addressed a different provision 

in article XIII B — section 9 — which lists various categories of 

appropriations that are excluded from the spending limitations 

article XIII B otherwise places on state and local governments. 

One of those exceptions excludes “[a]ppropriations required to 

comply with mandates of . . . the federal government.” (Cal. 

Const., art. XIII B, § 9, subd. (b).) As summarized in Kern, our 

decision in City of Sacramento examined whether section 9’s 

federal mandate exclusion applied to a federal law that provided 

substantial tax incentives for states to extend their 

unemployment insurance programs to cover public employees. 

To retain these significant tax advantages, our Legislature 

passed a statute requiring that government entities (including 

local entities) include their employees within the state 

unemployment program. The question we had to decide was 

whether the federal law constituted a “federal mandate,” which 

would mean that local governments could exclude the costs of 

complying with the new state statute from their constitutional 

spending limits. (Kern, at p. 749.)

Although we found the federal law did not legally compel 

states to extend unemployment insurance coverage to all public 

employees, we nevertheless concluded that “because the 

financial consequences to the state and its residents of failing to 

participate in the federal plan were so onerous and punitive —

we characterized the consequences as amounting to ‘certain and 

severe federal penalties’ including ‘double . . . taxation’ and 

other ‘draconian’ measures [citation] — as a practical matter, 

for purposes of article XIII B, section 9, the state was mandated 

to participate in the federal plan to extend unemployment 

insurance coverage.” (Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 749 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

19

[summarizing City of Sacramento]; see City of Sacramento, 

supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 76 [practical compulsion determination 

“must depend on such factors as the nature and purpose of the 

federal program; whether its design suggests an intent to coerce; 

when state and/or local participation began; the penalties, if 

any, assessed for withdrawal or refusal to participate or comply; 

and any other legal and practical consequences of 

nonparticipation, noncompliance, or withdrawal”].) 

The claimants in Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, argued that

for purposes of consistency we should likewise construe the state 

mandate provision in article XIII B, section 6 to encompass both 

legal and practical compulsion. (See Kern, at p. 750 [“claimants 

argue, the word ‘mandate,’ used in two separate sections of 

article XIII B, should not be given two different meanings”].) 

The Department, however, contended we should interpret 

section 6’s mandate provision more “narrowly . . . to include only 

programs in which local entities are legally compelled to 

participate.” (Id. at p. 751.)

We declined to resolve that issue, explaining that even if 

we were to assume “that our construction of the term ‘federal 

mandate’ . . . applies equally in the context of article XIII B, 

section 6” (Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 751), the claimants had 

failed to identify any “ ‘certain and severe . . . penalties’ ” or 

other “ ‘draconian’ consequences” that “reasonably could 

constitute . . . a ‘de facto’ reimbursable mandate.” (Id. at 

p. 754.) Rather, the record demonstrated that the new laws

merely required each school district to decide whether to 

continue participating in the voluntary school programs, “even 

though the school district also must incur program-related costs 

associated with the notice and agenda requirements . . . . 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

20

Presumably, a school district will continue to participate only if 

it determines that . . . , on balance, the funded program, even 

with strings attached, is deemed beneficial.” (Id. at p. 753, 

italics omitted.)5

2. The districts have failed to show legal compulsion 

We first address the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the 

districts were legally compelled to comply with the funding 

entitlement regulations. Education Code section 70901, 

subdivision (b)(6)(A) directs the Board of Governors to 

“[e]stablish minimum conditions entitling districts to receive 

state aid for support of community colleges” and to periodically 

review whether districts are in compliance with those 

conditions. (See ante, at pp. 8–9.) The implementing 

regulations, in turn, set forth the applicable funding entitlement 

requirements and describe how the Chancellor is to proceed in 

the event of noncompliance. The regulations direct that after 

soliciting a response from a noncompliant district, the 

5 While Kern’s general discussion of the distinction between 

legal and practical compulsion is helpful for evaluating the 

parties’ arguments in this case, the specific nature of the 

mandate claim at issue in Kern is factually somewhat distinct 

from the districts’ claims here. As discussed above, 

participation in the underlying school programs that triggered 

the challenged costs in Kern was completely voluntary. (Kern, 

supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 744.) Thus, nonparticipation in the 

underlying programs would have left the claimant school 

districts in the same position they would have been in otherwise, 

i.e., with no additional costs. By contrast, as discussed in more 

detail below, the districts here allege that choosing not to comply 

with the funding entitlement regulations results in unavoidable 

severe consequences, namely placing their state aid in jeopardy. 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

21

Chancellor may pursue a variety of remedies that range from 

accepting the district’s response to an inquiry to withholding 

some or all of the district’s state aid. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 

5, § 51102, subd. (b).)

We are not persuaded that this enforcement scheme 

legally compels the districts to comply with funding entitlement 

regulations. As summarized above, Education Code section 

70901, subdivision (b) required the Board of Governors to adopt 

two distinct sets of regulations: the operating standards 

regulations that the Commission previously found to impose 

mandates (see Ed. Code, § 70901, subd. (b)(1)) and the funding 

entitlement regulations at issue in this case (see Ed. Code, § 

70901, subd. (b)(6)). (See ante, at pp. 7–9.) Unlike the 

mandatory language governing the operating standards 

regulations, which directs the Board to “[e]stablish minimum 

standards as required by law” (Ed. Code, § 70901, subd. (b)(1), 

italics added) and which requires that districts shall establish 

policies consistent with those standards (see Ed. Code, § 70902, 

subd. (b) [“board of each community college district shall” 

establish policies and procedures that are consistent with the 

operating standards]), Education Code section 70901, 

subdivision (b)(6) and its implementing regulations contain no

language “command[ing]” (Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 741)

that the districts comply with the funding entitlement 

regulations. Instead, those provisions make clear that districts 

that fail to comply may be subject to certain consequences, the 

most severe of which is withholding of state funds. (See Ed.

Code, § 70901, subd. (b)(6)(A) [directing board to establish 

minimum conditions “entitling districts to receive state aid”; 

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 51102, subd. (b) [describing actions 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

22

Board may take in response to noncompliance, including 

withholding of state aid].)

While the districts argue that the threat of such a penalty 

effectively forces community colleges to comply with the 

regulations (an issue discussed in more detail below), there is 

nothing in the statute or regulations that creates a mandatory

legal obligation that they do so, which is the appropriate test for 

legal compulsion. If a community college district is willing to 

risk the possibility of losing some or all its state aid, there does 

not appear to be any mechanism (or at least none the parties 

have identified) that would allow the Chancellor or any other 

state entity to compel compliance as a matter of law.

6

6

 At oral argument, counsel for the districts argued that 

several of the funding entitlement regulations include the word 

“shall,” which is generally indicative of a mandatory duty. (See 

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, §§ 51002 [district “shall [¶] . . . adopt 

regulations consistent with the standards of scholarship 

contained in articles 2 through 5 (commencing with section 

55020),” italics added]; 51004 [district “shall [¶] . . . adopt 

regulations consistent with regulations contained in articles 6 

and 7 (commencing with section 55060),” italics added]; 51006 

[district “shall adopt” a policy making courses open to any 

enrolled students, italics added].) Those regulations, however, 

must be read in the context of — and in conjunction with —

Education Code section 70901, subdivision (b)(6) and Regulation 

51002, which explain the consequences of failing to comply with 

regulations, i.e., the Chancellor and Board of Governors are 

given discretionary authority to withhold state aid. (See ante, 

at pp. 8–9.) Regardless of whether those consequences are 

sufficient to support a claim of practical compulsion (an issue we 

do not reach here [see post at pp. 27–29]), the risk that funding 

might be withheld does not create a mandatory legal duty to 

comply with the regulations, which is the applicable test for 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

23

The Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion, 

finding that the districts were legally compelled to comply with 

the regulations because the funding entitlement regulations

“apply to the underlying core functions of the community 

colleges, functions compelled by state law.” In support, the court 

cited to Education Code section 66010.4, which describes the 

“missions and functions” of community colleges, including 

(among other things) “academic and vocational 

instruction . . . through but not beyond the second year of 

college.” (Ed. Code, § 66010.4, subd. (a)(1).) In the appellate

court’s view, the funding entitlement regulations “direct the 

community college districts to take specific steps in fulfilling

those legally compelled core mission functions, including 

requirements pertaining to scholarship, degrees, courses, 

campuses, counseling, and curriculum.” 

We do not dispute that many of the funding entitlement 

regulations are “in connection with” or relate to the “core 

functions” that community colleges are required to perform. We 

are not persuaded, however, that such a relationship is 

sufficient to establish legal compulsion. As we have previously

explained, “[T]he proper focus under a legal compulsion inquiry 

is upon the nature of claimants’ participation in the underlying 

programs themselves.” (Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 743.) 

Applying that standard here, the proper inquiry is whether the 

language of the funding entitlement provisions legally obligates

legal compulsion. (Cf., Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 745

[regulation directing that school districts “shall” establish 

certain policies did not create a legal duty where other 

provisions made clear compliance was only necessary if the 

school districts chose to participate in a voluntary program].) 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

24

the districts to comply with the conditions described therein, not

whether those conditions relate to the core functions of the 

districts. Section 70901, subdivision (b)(6) provides that 

compliance with the minimum conditions “entitl[es] districts to 

receive state aid” (italics added), while Regulation 51102, 

subdivision (b) describes the remedial actions the Chancellor 

may impose in the event of noncompliance, up to and including 

withholding of state aid. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 51102, 

subd. (b)(5).) Because these provisions do not create an

enforceable obligation to comply with the funding entitlement 

conditions, but rather describe conditions the districts must 

satisfy to avoid the possibility of having their state aid reduced 

or withheld, the enactments are not “mandates” under a legal 

compulsion theory. 

The Court of Appeal also disagreed with the Commission’s 

conclusion that compliance with the funding entitlement 

regulations is not “legally compelled” because “community 

colleges are free to decline state aid.” In rejecting this 

argument, the court noted that various statutes and 

constitutional provisions require the state to provide the

community college system sufficient funding to carry out its 

mission. Without citing a specific source, the court further 

explained that in the most recent year for which information 

was available “more than half of California community college 

funding came from the state General Fund. . . . [while] other 

funding sources . . . provided significantly less support. (Italics 

omitted.) Like public school districts in general, community 

college districts are dependent on state aid.” 

While the Court of Appeal may be correct that some (if not 

most) community college districts are heavily reliant on state 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

25

aid — and thus have no true alternative but to act in a manner 

that secures their funding — those arguments sound in 

practical compulsion, rather than legal compulsion.7(See 

generally Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 731, 751 [practical 

compulsion occurs when the local entity has “ ‘no true option or 

choice’ ”]; City of Sacramento, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 74 [finding 

practical compulsion where the consequences of noncompliance 

“were so far beyond the realm of practical reality that they left 

the state ‘without discretion’ to depart from federal standards”].)

The Court of Appeal’s reasoning is consistent with the

primary argument the districts have raised throughout these 

proceedings, which also sounds in practical compulsion. In the 

trial court, for example, the districts argued that “the most 

serious error in the [Commission’s] decision is the conclusion 

that the ‘minimum conditions’ of receiving state aid are not 

mandates because the Colleges may choose not to receive state 

funding. That conclusion is erroneous because the Colleges 

truly have no meaningful choice [but to comply].” In support, 

they cited City of Sacramento, supra, 50 Cal.3d 51, a case that 

turned on practical compulsion. (See ante, at pp. 17–19.) The

districts’ briefing in the Court of Appeal contains essentially

identical language, asserting that because noncompliance with 

7

 The administrative record includes a letter the Chancellor 

submitted to the Commission in 2008 acknowledging that three 

(and in some prior years four) community college districts did 

not receive any general apportionment funding because they 

derived sufficient revenue from other sources (primarily 

property tax allocations from their respective counties) to meet 

their funding needs. This evidence suggests that some districts

may rely on state funding more heavily than others. 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

26

the funding entitlement regulations could result in the “drastic 

loss” of funding necessary “to provide educational 

services, . . . the [c]olleges have no true choice but to comply.” 

Those same arguments remain central in the districts’ briefing 

before this court, where they again contend that “[t]he most 

serious error in the . . . Commission decision is . . . the 

conclusion that the minimum conditions of receiving State aid 

are not mandates because the [districts] may somehow choose 

not to receive state funding. This conclusion is erroneous 

because the [districts] have no true choice. . . . [¶] . . . Put 

simply, the [districts] contend community colleges cannot 

function without state aid.”8 Like the Court of Appeal, the 

districts’ focus on the consequences of noncompliance, and the

purported absence of any true choice, sounds in practical rather 

than legal compulsion. That the financial situation of some (or 

most) districts may leave them with no reasonable alternative 

but to comply with the funding entitlement regulations does not 

transform this case into one involving legal compulsion. 

In sum, while many of the directives in the funding 

entitlement regulations relate to the districts’ core educational 

functions, that is insufficient to show legal compulsion. Rather, 

to establish legal compulsion, the claimants had to show they 

had a mandatory duty to comply with the regulations. The 

districts have pointed to no such provision. Instead, they have 

8 The districts’ answers to respondents’ petitions for review 

likewise focused on the consequences of noncompliance, arguing 

that they had not “voluntarily” complied with the funding 

entitlement regulations, but rather were “required to do so at 

risk of drastic fiscal loss of funds” and had no “true choice” but 

to comply given their reliance on state aid. 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

27

asserted that because they rely on state aid to carry out their 

core functions, they have no true choice but to comply. For the 

reasons discussed above, we conclude that argument should be

evaluated under the lens of practical, rather than legal, 

compulsion. 

3. On remand, the Court of Appeal should consider 

practical compulsion 

The districts also argue that regardless of whether legal 

compulsion applies in this case, the record makes clear they

were compelled to comply with the funding entitlement 

regulations as a practical matter. (See Kern, supra, 30 Cal. 4th 

at p. 731 [“we do not foreclose the possibility that a reimbursable 

state mandate might be found in circumstances short of legal 

compulsion”]; id. at p. 736 [leaving open question 

“whether . . . there are some circumstances in which a state 

mandate may be found in the absence of legal compulsion”]; id. 

at p. 744; see also Department of Finance, supra, 170 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1365–1366 [“if a local government 

participates ‘voluntarily,’ i.e., without legal compulsion or 

compulsion as a practical matter, in a program with a rule 

requiring increased costs, there is no requirement of state 

reimbursement”].) 

The Department, however, contends (as it did in Kern) 

that we should narrowly interpret article XIII B, section 6 to 

require reimbursement only when a local government has been 

legally compelled to provide a new program or higher level of 

service. (See Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 736 [“the 

Department . . . asserts that article XIII B, section 6, reflects an 

intent on the part of the drafters and the electorate to limit 

reimbursement to costs that are forced upon local governments 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

28

as a matter of legal compulsion”].) Alternatively, respondents

collectively argue that even if practical compulsion is a valid 

theory of mandate (or is assumed to be so), claimants in this case 

have failed to introduce any evidence establishing that 

noncompliance with the applicable regulations is “reasonably 

certain to [result in] ‘ “severe,” ’ ‘ “draconian” ’ consequences.” 

(Quoting Kern, at pp. 750–751; see id. at p. 751 [finding it 

“unnecessary to resolve whether” practical compulsion is a valid 

theory of mandate where claimants had failed to demonstrate 

noncompliance would result in severe penalties].) More 

specifically, respondents contend the districts have failed to 

show either that noncompliance is likely to result in withholding 

of a significant amount of state aid,

9

or that the risk of such 

withholding leaves them with no true alternative but to comply. 

Because the Court of Appeal found the districts were 

compelled to comply with the funding entitlement regulations

as a matter of legal compulsion, it chose not to address any of 

9

 As noted above, there appears to be substantial overlap 

between the directives described in the operating standards 

regulations (which the Commission has already found to qualify 

as mandates) and those set forth in the funding entitlement 

regulations. (See ante, at pp. 8, fn. 3; 13–14.) Thus, while the 

record before us is not clear on the point, the districts may 

already be compliant with (and reimbursed for) many or most of 

the activities described in the funding entitlement regulations. 

Given that the funding entitlement regulations direct that any 

remedy the Chancellor chooses to impose must relate to the 

“extent and gravity of noncompliance” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 

51102, subd. (c)), the fact that districts may already be 

compliant with (and compensated for) many of the conditions 

described in the funding entitlement regulations could be 

relevant to determining the appropriate remedy, including the 

size and scope of any withholding. 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

29

the parties’ arguments regarding practical compulsion (also 

referred to as “nonlegal compulsion” [Kern, supra, 30 Cal.4th.at 

p. 754]). Having now rejected the Court of Appeal’s conclusion 

regarding legal compulsion, we find it “appropriate to remand 

for the [court] to resolve . . . in the first instance” whether the 

districts may be entitled to reimbursement under a theory of 

nonlegal compulsion. (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. (2000) 

22 Cal.4th 1127, 1149 [“It is appropriate to remand for the Court 

of Appeal to resolve . . . in the first instance” issues that the 

court chose “not [to] reach because of its holdings”]; see People 

v. Goolsby (2015) 62 Cal.4th 360, 368 [reversing finding that 

Pen. Code, § 654 barred retrying defendant for a lesser offense 

and remanding with directions that appellate court “decide . . .

in the first instance” the unresolved question of whether retrial 

was barred under double jeopardy principles]; see Central Coast 

Forest Assn. v. Fish & Game Com. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 594, 606; In 

re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 820.)10 

10 The concurrence agrees that the Court of Appeal erred in 

finding the statutes and regulations the parties have relied on 

throughout this litigation (namely Education Code section 

70901, subdivision (b)(6) and Regulation 51102) legally compel 

the districts to comply with the funding entitlement regulations. 

Rather than remand the matter to address only practical 

compulsion, however, the concurrence would remand with 

directions that the appellate court also consider whether a 

different section of the Education Code, section 70902, might be 

interpreted to legally compel the districts to comply with the 

challenged regulations. The success or failure of such an 

argument, the concurrence explains, would appear to turn on 

whether there may be another “enforcement mechanism” apart 

from the provisions in Regulation 51102 that could be used to 

compel the districts to comply with the funding entitlement 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

30

III. DISPOSITION

The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed and the matter 

is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

regulations. (See conc. opn. of Liu, J, post, at pp. 3–5.) The 

concurrence identifies no such alternative mechanism, but 

hypothesizes that because one might exist, we should provide 

the parties an opportunity to explore the issue further.

As the concurrence expressly acknowledges, no party has 

ever presented such a theory at any point during this litigation, 

which has now been ongoing for almost two decades. (See conc. 

opn. of Liu, J, post, at p. 5.) From the start of the proceedings, 

the districts’ reimbursement claim has focused on Education 

Code section 70901 and its implementing regulations. That is 

not particularly surprising given that section 70901 is the 

statute that describes (and distinguishes) the operating 

standards regulations and the funding entitlement regulations. 

In any event, as a court of review, our role is to evaluate the 

arguments the parties have presented, not “construct 

[alternative] theor[ies that might be] supportive” of their claims. 

(People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; see also In re 

Harris (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1085, 1100 [“it is not our role to 

make arguments for petitioner or to consider arguments not 

raised or . . . addressed below,” fn. omitted]; cf. Jibilian v. 

Franchise Tax Bd. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 862, 866, fn. 3 [“it is 

not our role to construct theories or arguments that would 

undermine the judgment”].) Accordingly, we decline to direct 

the Court of Appeal to consider undeveloped legal theories that 

neither party has advocated for. 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST.

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

31

GROBAN, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

KRUGER, J.

JENKINS, J.

GUERRERO, J.
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST. 

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

S262663

Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu

The Court of Appeal in this case concluded that 

community college districts are legally compelled to comply with 

the regulations setting forth the “minimum conditions entitling 

districts to receive state aid” (Ed. Code, § 70901, subd. (b)(6)(A)) 

based on its view that the regulations “direct the community 

college districts to take specific steps in fulfilling th[eir] 

legally-compelled core mission functions.” I agree with today’s 

opinion that the Court of Appeal’s reasoning and conclusion are 

incorrect, and I therefore concur in the judgment of reversal. 

However, given the way the parties argued this case, I do not 

think we have enough information to conclude that the 

minimum conditions are not legally compelled. I would remand 

for further consideration of this issue in light of the relevant 

statutory and regulatory provisions.

I.

This case concerns the legal obligations of California’s 

community college districts. Two sets of potential obligations 

are at issue: “minimum standards” and “minimum conditions.” 

(Ed. Code, § 70901, subd. (b)(1), (b)(6).) These two sets of 

regulations describe a variety of requirements related to 

community colleges’ operations and academic offerings, and 

they overlap substantially.
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST. 

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Liu, J., concurring

2

It is uncontested that the community college districts are 

legally obligated to comply with the minimum standards, 

making costs incurred in compliance with those regulations 

subject to reimbursement under provisions added to the 

California Constitution by Proposition 13. (See Dept. of Finance 

v. Com. on State Mandates (2003) 30 Cal.4th 727, 743 [costs that 

are “legally compelled . . . constitute reimbursable state 

mandates”].) The court below determined that the districts are 

legally compelled to comply with the minimum conditions

regulations as well. We are asked to review that decision.

The Education Code tells us where to look to understand 

the legal obligations of community college districts. 

Section 70900 of the Education Code says that “local districts 

shall carry out the functions specified in Section 70902.” (Ed. 

Code, § 70900.) Section 70902 of the Education Code 

(section 70902) then sets forth in detail the obligations of 

community college districts. Certain provisions of that section 

specifically instruct districts to comply with at least some of the 

minimum standards. For instance, subdivision (b) states that 

“each community college district shall [¶] . . . [¶] [e]stablish 

academic standards, probation and dismissal and readmission 

policies, and graduation requirements not inconsistent with the 

minimum standards” and shall “[e]mploy and assign all 

personnel not inconsistent with the minimum standards.” (Ed. 

Code, § 70902, subd. (b), (b)(3), (b)(4).)

Section 70902 does not specifically mention the minimum 

conditions. But several provisions of section 70902 appear to 

create broad legal requirements for community college districts 

that might include compliance with those regulations. For 

example, subdivision (a)(2) says districts “shall establish rules 

and regulations not inconsistent with the regulations of the 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST. 

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Liu, J., concurring

3

board of governors,” the state’s supervisory entity that issues 

both the minimum standards and minimum conditions 

regulations. (Ed. Code, § 70902, subd. (a)(2); see also § 70901, 

subd. (b)(1), (6) [requiring board of governors to establish 

minimum standards and minimum conditions].) Section 70902 

also requires districts to initiate and operate their programs in 

ways that are “not in conflict with or inconsistent with, or 

preempted by, any law and that [are] not in conflict with the 

purposes for which community college districts are established.” 

(Ed. Code, § 70902, subd. (a)(1).) These provisions could be read 

to require community colleges to comply with some or all of the 

specific requirements of the minimum conditions regulations.

Because this statutory language is not free of ambiguity, 

we look to applicable regulations to discern what consequences 

may flow from noncompliance with the minimum conditions in 

order to decide whether they are legally compelled. 

Sections 51100 and 51102 of title 5 of the California Code of 

Regulations govern the investigation and enforcement of the 

minimum conditions. When a district is found to be in 

noncompliance with the minimum conditions, section 51102 

describes several penalties that may be imposed, which include 

withholding or reduction of state funding. (Cal. Code Regs., 

tit. 5, § 51102, subd. (b).) But section 51100 further instructs 

that “[t]he enforcement procedures and remedies set forth in 

this subchapter are in addition to any and all other enforcement 

mechanisms and remedies provided by law for violation of the 

provisions of this chapter” (i.e., the minimum conditions). (Cal. 

Code Regs., tit. 5, § 51100, subd. (d).)

Section 51100 does not say what other enforcement 

mechanisms and remedies are available for violations of the 

minimum conditions. And we have received no briefing or 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST. 

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Liu, J., concurring

4

argument about what legal obligations related to the minimum 

conditions may be imposed by section 70902 or what 

enforcement mechanisms besides withholding of funds are 

contemplated by section 51100. Without further information 

about the meaning of those provisions, I do not see how we can 

determine whether compliance with the minimum conditions is 

legally compelled.

II.

Today’s opinion focuses instead on the language of 

section 70901 of the Education Code, the part of the Code that 

describes the obligations of the state board of governors. (See 

Ed. Code, § 70900 [“The board of governors shall carry out the 

functions specified in Section 70901, [and] local districts shall 

carry out the functions specified in Section 70902 . . . .”].) The 

court reasons that because subdivision (b)(6) of section 70901 

“and its implementing regulations contain no language 

‘command[ing]’ [citation] that the districts comply with the 

[minimum conditions] regulations,” compliance with the 

minimum conditions is not compelled by statute. (Maj. opn., 

ante, at p. 21.)

But, as noted, section 70901 does not set forth the legal 

duties of community college districts; it addresses the duties of 

the state board of governors. The statute that describes the 

legal responsibilities of community college districts is 

section 70902, which today’s opinion does not consider in its 

assessment of the minimum conditions.

Further, the court explains the procedure under 

section 51102 of the regulations by which state funding may 

potentially be withheld from districts for noncompliance with 

the minimum conditions. It then declares that this is “the most 
COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST. 

v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES

Liu, J., concurring

5

severe” consequence for noncompliance. (Maj. opn., ante, at 

p. 21.) If that were true, I would agree that the consequences 

for noncompliance with the minimum conditions are insufficient 

to impose a legal mandate. But we do not know whether 

withholding of funds is “the most severe” consequence districts 

may face. The court does not discuss section 51100, 

subdivision (d) — the regulation that makes that consequence 

nonexclusive — nor do we have any information about what 

other consequences are authorized by the regulations.

The parties have not supplied briefing or argument on the 

language in section 70902 that may obligate districts to follow 

the minimum conditions or the provision of section 51100 of the 

regulations that makes withholding of funds a nonexclusive 

remedy for noncompliance. They have focused instead on the 

language of section 70901, as the court does. But we must 

consider all relevant provisions before reaching a conclusion as 

to whether compliance with the minimum conditions is legally 

compelled. Indeed, the fact that neither the parties nor the 

courts below have discussed section 70902 or section 51100 is 

exactly why I would not go as far as the court does today. (Cf. 

maj. opn., ante, at pp. 29–30, fn. 10.) I would hold only that the 

Court of Appeal’s analysis was incorrect and remand for that 

court to consider in the first instance any other theories of legal 

or practical compulsion, including any mandate that may be 

imposed by section 70902 or section 51100. Without due 

consideration of those provisions, I would not hold, as today’s 

opinion does, that community college districts are not legally 

compelled to comply with the minimum conditions.

I concur only in the judgment of reversal.

LIU, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Coast Community College District v. Commission 

on State Mandates

__________________________________________________________ 

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published) XX 47 Cal.App.5th 415

Review Granted (unpublished) 

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________ 

Opinion No. S262663

Date Filed: August 15, 2022

__________________________________________________________ 

Court: Superior

County: Sacramento

Judge: Christopher E. Krueger

__________________________________________________________ 

Counsel:

Dannis Woliver Kelley, Christian M. Keiner, William B. Tunick, 

Juliane S. Rossiter, Chelsea Olson Murphy and Chelsea A. Tibbs for 

Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Jennifer B. Henning for California State Association of Counties as 

Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Lozano Smith, Sloan R. Simmons, Nicholas J. Clair; and Robert Tuerck 

for California School Boards Association’s Education Legal Alliance as 

Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Juliana F. Gmur and Camille Shelton for Defendant and Respondent. 

Kamala D. Harris, Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, 

Matthew Rodriquez, Acting Attorney General, Michael J. Mongan, 

State Solicitor General, Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy State 

Solicitor General, Douglas J. Woods and Thomas S. Patterson, 
Assistant Attorneys General, Samuel T. Harbourt, Deputy State 

Solicitor General, Paul Stein, Tamar Pachter and P. Patty Li, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 

publication with opinion):

Christian M. Keiner

Dannis Woliver Kelley

555 Capitol Mall, Suite 645

Sacramento, CA 95814

(916) 978-4040

Juliana F. Gmur

Senior Commission Counsel

980 9th Street, Suite 300

Sacramento, CA 95814

(916) 323-2611

Samuel T. Harbourt

Deputy State Solicitor General

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102

(415) 510-3919