[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-16440

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-02520-RWS

STEVEN W. BERNSTEIN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 

WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, 

FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, 

 Defendants-Appellees, 

MCCALLA RAYMER, LLC, 

 Defendant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(July 12, 2017)

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Before TJOFLAT, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In November 2007, Steven Bernstein gave Terrace Mortgage Company a 

security deed to secure a $400,000 note, the proceeds of which he used to refinance 

the mortgage on his residence. The deed and note were subsequently assigned to 

Wells Fargo. On February 22, 2010, Bernstein exercised his right to rescind the 

loan transaction under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq., 

specifically § 1635(a), by sending Wells Fargo a notice of his intent to rescind the 

transaction.1

 Under § 1635(b), Wells Fargo had 20 days after receipt of 

Bernstein’s notice to return to Bernstein “any money or property given as earnest 

money, down payment, or otherwise, and . . . take any action necessary or 

appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created upon the 

 1 Section 1635(a), Disclosure of obligor’s right to rescind, states in pertinent part:

[I]n the case of any consumer credit transaction . . . in which a security interest . . 

. is or will be retained or acquired in any property which is used as the principal 

dwelling of the person to whom credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right 

to rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business day following the 

consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission 

forms required under this section together with a statement containing the 

material disclosures required under this subchapter, whichever is later, by 

notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Bureau, of his 

intention to do so. The creditor shall clearly and conspicuously disclose, in 

accordance with regulations of the Bureau, to any obligor in a transaction subject 

to this section the rights of the obligor under this section. The creditor shall also 

provide, in accordance with regulations of the Bureau, appropriate forms for the 

obligor to exercise his right to rescind any transaction subject to this section.

15 U.S.C. § 1635(a).

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transaction.”2 If the creditor fails to take these steps, it is amenable to suit under § 

1640(e), which provides that an action may be brought in district court “within one 

year from the date of the occurrence of the violation.” Id. § 1640(e). Wells Fargo 

failed to take any of these steps. In consequence, Bernstein had “three years after 

the date of the consummation of the [loan] transaction,” to enforce his right to 

rescission; otherwise, it would expire. Id. § 1635(f). 

Bernstein brought this action pro se to enforce his right to rescission on July 

15, 2015.3

 He alleged that he exercised his § 1635(a) right to rescind on February 

22, 2010, by sending Wells Fargo a notice to that effect, and that when Wells 

Fargo failed to respond, the notice rendered both Wells Fargo’s security interest 

and the note he executed void by operation of law. Wells Fargo moved to dismiss 

Bernstein’s claim, arguing that § 1635(f)’s three-year provision did not apply 

 2 Section 1635(b), Return of money or property following rescission, states in pertinent part:

When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under subsection (a), he is not 

liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest given by the 

obligor, including any such interest arising by operation of law, becomes void 

upon such a rescission. Within 20 days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the 

creditor shall return to the obligor any money or property given as earnest money, 

down payment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or appropriate to 

reflect the termination of any security interest created under the transaction. If the 

creditor has delivered any property to the obligor, the obligor may retain 

possession of it. Upon the performance of the creditor's obligations under this 

section, the obligor shall tender the property to the creditor, except that if return of 

the property in kind would be impracticable or inequitable, the obligor shall 

tender its reasonable value. 

15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).

3 Bernstein’s complaint contained other claims arising out of the loan transaction not implicated 

in this appeal. 

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because the loan was a “residential mortgage transaction” and § 1635(e)(1) 

rendered that provision inapplicable.4

 It argued alternatively that the three-year 

provision provided Bernstein no benefit because he waited more than five years 

after sending his notice of intent to rescind before filing suit. 

The District Court gave Bernstein the benefit of the doubt as to whether the 

loan was a residential mortgage transaction such that § 1635(f)’s three-year 

provision was rendered inapplicable by § 1635(e)(1)’s bar, but nonetheless 

concluded that his TILA claim was untimely. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e), all 

TILA claims must be brought “within one year from the date of the occurrence of 

the [creditor’s] violation.” Wells Fargo’s failure to discharge its § 1635(b) 

obligations within 20 days after receiving Bernstein’s notice to rescind constituted 

a violation within the meaning of § 1640(e), and thus set the clock for the one-year 

period that section provides. That period began to run on March 14, 2011. 

Applying the three-year limitations period of § 1635(f), Bernstein had until March 

13, 2014 to sue. He waited too long, until July 15, 2014, to act. 

Bernstein urged the District Court to hold that he was enforcing “an alreadyeffective rescission of his mortgage, relying on Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home 

Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790 (2015), for the proposition that giving notice alone 

affects a rescission by operation of law.” Doc. 29 at 14. He posits that “pursuant 

 4 Section 1635(e)(1) provides that § 1635, which includes § 1635(f), does not apply to “(1) a 

residential mortgage transaction as defined in section 1602(w) of this title.”

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to the ‘roadmap’ provided by Jesinoski he did not have to file a lawsuit to compel 

rescission.” The burden was on Wells Fargo. Id. at 14–15. The District Court was 

not persuaded. Nor are we. We therefore affirm the District Court’s ruling that 

Bernstein’s claim is time-barred. In doing so, we reject his equitable-tolling 

argument as frivolous. We reject as meritless his argument that the Court erred in 

dismissing his claim for declaratory relief under the Georgia Declaratory Judgment 

Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2.

AFFIRMED. 

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