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SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS:

EXPLORING THE NEED FOR REFORM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

CAPITAL MARKETS, INSURANCE AND 

GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 17, 2005

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services

Serial No. 109–65

(

(II)

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio, Chairman

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana 

DEBORAH PRYCE, Ohio 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

MICHAEL N. CASTLE, Delaware 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio 

SUE W. KELLY, New York, Vice Chair 

RON PAUL, Texas 

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio 

JIM RYUN, Kansas 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

WALTER B. JONES, JR., North Carolina 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio 

MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

RICK RENZI, Arizona 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

TOM PRICE, Georgia 

MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon 

JULIA CARSON, Indiana 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York 

JOE BACA, California 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

MELISSA L. BEAN, Illinois 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin, 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

Robert U. Foster, III, Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, INSURANCE AND GOVERNMENT SPONSORED

ENTERPRISES

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana, Chairman

JIM RYUN, Kansas, Vice Chair 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

MICHAEL N. CASTLE, Delaware 

PETER T. KING, New York 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

SUE W. KELLY, New York 

ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio 

VITO FOSSELLA, New York, 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota 

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas 

RICK RENZI, Arizona 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio 

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York 

JOE BACA, California 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

MELISSA L. BEAN, Illinois 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

November 17, 2005 ........................................................................................... 1

Appendix: 

November 17, 2005 ........................................................................................... 39

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2005

Bang, Kim, President and Chief Executive Officer, Bloomberg Tradebook 

LLC ........................................................................................................................ 27

Brodsky, William J., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Chicago Board 

Options Exchange, Inc. ........................................................................................ 7

Glauber, Robert R., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, NASD ................... 2

Ketchum, Richard G., Chief Regulatory Officer, New York Stock Exchange, 

Inc. ......................................................................................................................... 4

Lackritz, Marc E., President, Securities Industry Association ............................ 25

Plotkin, Ben A., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Ryan Beck & Co. ....... 29

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Oxley, Hon. Michael G. .................................................................................... 40

Baker, Hon. Richard H. ................................................................................... 42

Castle, Hon. Michael N. ................................................................................... 46

Kanjorski, Hon. Paul E. ................................................................................... 47

Bang, Kim ......................................................................................................... 48

Brodsky, William J. .......................................................................................... 78

Glauber, Robert R. ............................................................................................ 87

Ketchum, Richard G. ........................................................................................ 94

Lackritz, Marc E. .............................................................................................. 107

Plotkin, Ben A. .................................................................................................. 119

(1)

SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS: 

EXPLORING THE NEED FOR REFORM 

Thursday, November 17, 2005

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, INSURANCE, 

AND GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in Room 

2128 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Richard H. Baker 

[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Baker, Kelly, Fossella, Biggert, Kennedy, Feeney, Sherman, Clay, and Wasserman-Schultz. 

Also Present: Maloney. 

ChairmanBAKER. I will go ahead with my opening statement, 

and then we will proceed as members arrive. 

Today, the Capital Markets Subcommittee meets to continue its 

examination of the regulatory structure of our Nation’s securities 

markets. 

Over the past several Congresses, our committee has hosted a 

number of hearings on issues relating to the structure of markets, 

including the recently adopted Reg NMS. 

Today, we return our focus to a review of the self-regulatory organizations, generally known as SROs. Self-regulation of the securities markets and market participants is an essential cornerstone 

of our Federal securities law and market function. All broker-dealers are required to be a member of an SRO, and many SROs also 

operate and regulate market centers. 

SRO regulation, as opposed to direct SEC regulation, helps provide efficient and cost-effective oversight to markets. 

Thousands of market participants would make it cost prohibitive 

for the SEC alone to provide the necessary regulatory presence, in 

my opinion. 

While SROs provide benefits to the markets, there has been 

some concern expressed that conflicts of interest now exist in the 

regulatory regime when the SRO represents the competitive interests of its members and market center while, at the same time, 

regulating their conduct. 

Partially in response to those stated concerns, the SEC, in a November 2004 rule, required enhancing transparency and the corporate governance standards at SROs. In addition, the SEC also 

issued a concept release discussing various alternative regulatory 

models. 

2

Our markets and the manner in which trading is conducted continues to evolve at an ever accelerated pace and is very innovative, 

and the competition resulting is forcing change in the way these 

markets are regulated as well. 

As order flow migrates across multiple SRO market centers, 

broker-dealers are subjected to burdensome and duplicative rule 

books, inspections, and enforcement actions which cause both regulatory redundancies, ambiguities, and enhanced costs. 

Several SROs have taken the initiative to self-reform. The New 

York Exchange has already adopted many of the corporate governance enhancements in the proposed SEC rule. In addition, the 

NYSE and the NASD recently announced the possible pursuit of a 

partnership to share regulatory duties to reduce burden on the 180 

members of both SROs. 

The CBOE has also taken the initiative to allocate its sales practice examinations to the NASD to reduce duplicative regulation. 

I welcome all of these steps as appropriate and proper. 

The core mission of our Nation’s securities regulators is the protection of investors and the fostering of efficient and transparent 

markets. 

Today, I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses who have their particular insights to receive their thoughts 

on the current environment and their ideas as to the future of SRO 

regulation, and where appropriate, suggested steps that may be 

taken to further advance a more efficient and effective system of 

self-regulation. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Richard H. Baker can be found 

on page 42 in the appendix.] 

ChairmanBAKER. Couldn’t have said it better if I had said it myself. 

Mr. Feeney, do you have an opening statement? 

Mr.FEENEY. I do not, Mr. Chairman. You said it all for us. 

ChairmanBAKER. Thank you very much. 

At this time, I will proceed, pursuant to additional members’ arrival, who may wish to make additional statements, but it is my 

pleasure to welcome back the chairman and chief executive officer 

of the NASD, Mr. Robert Glauber, who has appeared here many 

times, and as is the usual custom, your full statement will be made 

part of the official record. 

Please proceed as you wish. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT R. GLAUBER, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NASD 

Mr.GLAUBER. Thank you very much, Chairman Baker, Congressman Feeney. 

Good afternoon. 

I am Robert Glauber, chairman and CEO of NASD, the private 

sector regulator of the U.S. securities industry. 

I am grateful to the subcommittee for inviting me to testify on 

the current and future state of the self-regulatory system. 

This is a terribly important subject, and the committee is to be 

commended for addressing it. 

This is a time of immense change in the securities industry, and 

regulation must not only keep pace, but stay ahead of that change. 

3

To do less would badly serve investors. Their protection is our 

number one goal. 

Mr. Chairman, the SEC’s November 2004 concept release quoted 

some alternatives to the present SRO system. 

They range from making some moderate adjustments to scrapping the whole system and replacing it with a so-called universal 

non-industry regulator along the lines of PCAOB that would oversee everything—brokers, firms, markets, and exchanges. 

NASD firmly believes in preserving a securities industry regulatory model that encompasses self-regulation supervised by the 

SEC. Self-regulation is a key component of the effective regulation, 

growth, and vitality of the U.S. securities markets, offering a range 

of benefits that non-industry or Government regulation alone could 

not provide. 

At the same time, there are inherent conflicts and inefficiencies 

present in the current regulatory environment. NASD believes that 

these shortcomings would be best addressed by adopting a form of 

the hybrid models set forth by the SEC in its concept release. 

Adopting this model would enhance efficiency by eliminating inconsistent member rules, eliminating redundant infrastructure, 

strengthening inter-market surveillance, and meaningfully reducing the current conflicts in the self-regulatory system. 

As you know, NASD was the creator, owner, and regulator of 

NASDAQ. 

By the late 1990s, NASD had created a separate subsidiary to 

house its regulatory activities, much as the New York Stock Exchange has done now, but in 2000, when NASDAQ decided to become a shareholder-owned publicly traded exchange, NASD determined that the existing subsidiary structure did not afford sufficient protection for investors. 

Operating an exchange to maximize profits for shareholders and 

simultaneously managing regulatory activities to fully protect investors could not be conducted under the same corporate structure 

without unmanageable conflicts, in our view. 

We, therefore, restructured NASDAQ and NASD as two wholly 

separate companies, with separate managements, separate funding 

sources, and separate non-overlapping boards of directors. 

This separation is complete except for the SEC designation of 

NASDAQ as an exchange and the sale of NASD’s remaining minority share ownership in NASDAQ, which we are seeking to complete 

within a year of NASDAQ exchange registration. 

NASD still monitors all trading on NASDAQ, and will continue 

to do so, pursuant to a contract, after NASDAQ becomes an exchange. 

Today, the New York Stock Exchange finds itself in a similar position as it merges with Archipelago and moves towards going public. 

Whether it should continue operating as a regulator after it begins operating as a for-profit company has been the subject of a 

great deal of healthy and needed debate in our industry. The concern is that for-profit publicly-traded exchanges will be faced with 

the conflicting goal of having to maximize profits while not compromising regulation. 

4

To solve this conflict, I believe that we should change how securities firms are regulated. 

The SEC’s hybrid model contemplates one self-regulatory organization that would be responsible for member regulation of all securities broker-dealers. 

A mechanism to bring that model to life would be to have the 

NYSE and NASD handle, in partnership, the regulation of the 180 

firms that are members of both organizations. Under such an arrangement, firms would be regulated according to one rule book, instead of two, examined by one corps of examiners, and disciplined 

by one set of enforcement attorneys. 

To best serve investors, Mr. Chairman, any new structure would 

have to solve the conflict inherent in both being a regulator and 

managing a for-profit exchange. 

It would also have to eliminate the redundancies and inefficiencies of having two regulatory groups performing the same functions. 

This would result in clear and consistent regulation of securities 

firms, regulation that provides more effective protection of investors. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I, of course, want 

to thank the committee again for inviting me, and I will be happy 

to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Robert R. Glauber can be found on 

page 87 in the appendix.] 

ChairmanBAKER. I thank the gentleman for his testimony. 

I understand that Mr. Fossella wishes to be recognized to make 

a comment at this time. 

Mr.FOSSELLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to welcome the panel, all three gentlemen, especially Mr. 

Brodsky—good to see you again—and it is my pleasure to also welcome Mr. Ketchum, the chief regulatory officer for the New York 

Stock Exchange since 2004. 

Mr. Ketchum has spent 12 years at the National Association of 

Securities Dealers and NASDAQ. He served as president of 

NASDAQ for three years and as president of NASD for seven. 

Prior to that, he was at the SEC for 14 years, eight of those 

years as director of market regulation. 

So to all three gentlemen, I say welcome, and thank you for your 

testimony in advance, and it is my pleasure to welcome, as well, 

Mr. Ketchum. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

ChairmanBAKER. Thank you, Mr. Fossella. 

Please proceed at your leisure, Mr. Ketchum. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD G. KETCHUM, CHIEF REGULATORY 

OFFICER, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. 

Mr.KETCHUM. Thank you. 

Chairman Baker, Congressman Fossella, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am Richard Ketchum, chief regulatory 

officer of the New York Stock Exchange, and I first want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on the important issues relating to securities self-regulation. 

5

Protecting investors and preserving confidence in market integrity is critical to the success of our securities markets, and the New 

York Stock Exchange is extremely proud of our role in contributing 

to that effect. 

New York Stock Exchange regulation has primary responsibility 

for regulating the activities of our members, member firms, and 

listed companies, as well as enforcing compliance with NYSE rules 

and Federal securities laws. Our nearly 400 firms, among the largest in the world, maintain 84 percent of the total public customer 

accounts, with assets of over $4 trillion. 

In that connection, the SEC has appointed New York Stock Exchange regulation as the designated examining authority for financial and operational issues for nearly all of the 170 firms that are 

members of both the New York Stock Exchange and the NASD. 

Here there is no overlap or duplication. 

In this regard, we believe it is essential, regardless of how the 

duplication issues that we discuss here today are resolved, that the 

expertise provided by the NYSE staff in ensuring the financial and 

operational soundness of the largest firms be maintained. 

Last year, the SEC issued a concept release that raised a series 

of thoughtful questions regarding the costs and benefits of possible 

changes in the present self-regulatory system. 

Underpinning those questions were concerns regarding both the 

management of conflict of interest and the impact of regulatory duplication in the present system. I would like to briefly address both 

of those concerns. 

As much as we believe in the wisdom of self-regulation, we believe just as passionately that independence is critical to our operations. 

In December of 2003, the New York Stock Exchange implemented, with the SEC’s approval, sweeping changes to its governance structure. The NYSE became the only SRO to require that all 

members of its board of directors, with the exception of CEO John 

Thain, be independent. 

NYSE regulation was also separated from market operations. 

A new position of chief regulatory officer, of which I am the first, 

was created. 

I report directly to the board of directors through its regulatory 

oversight committee. 

The result is that our decision making is independent from the 

business and market side. 

Once the merger of the New York Stock Exchange and the Archipelago is approved and a new for-profit publicly-traded holding 

company known as NYSE Group is created, the independence of 

NYSE regulation will be strengthened again. 

NYSE regulation will have its own board of independent directors, a majority from the NYSE Group, the remaining directors unaffiliated and independent from the marketplace, with the exception of myself. 

We will be self-funded from regulatory fees and from contractual 

commitments from the New York Stock Exchange and Archipelago. 

No NYSE regulation staff will receive stock or options from the 

New York Stock Exchange or otherwise be financially incented by 

the financial performance of the New York Stock Exchange. 

6

Because the conflicts of marketplace self-regulation have and can 

in the future be addressed, we feel strongly that the possibility 

raised in the concept release of the creation of a universal regulator 

or full dependence on Government regulation would be a tragic 

mistake. 

In simplest terms, self-regulation offers the benefit of greater expertise, the ability to leverage Government resources, and impose 

higher ethical standards than are required under Federal law. 

It should remain the cornerstone for the regulation of brokerdealers and the securities markets. 

The SEC also, in the concept release, properly expresses concerns 

identified by the securities industry regarding duplication. 

Many of these concerns stem from an important increase in the 

breadth and aggressiveness of both our program and the NASD’s, 

as well as the CBOE’s and other self-regulatory organizations. 

The committee should know—and I appreciate, Mr. Sherman, 

your acknowledging—that there are many ways in which New York 

Stock Exchange regulation and the NASD have already been coordinating efforts. 

Coordination of exams, rulemaking, and enforcement are three 

areas that have had the greatest impact in reducing regulatory duplication. 

With the tremendous support and leadership of Bob Glauber and 

Mary Shapiro at the NASD, our efforts to coordinate and eliminate 

duplication are improving constantly, but we understand the industry’s continuing concerns and recognize that more must be done. 

We understand that the SIA and some members of the securities 

industry favor the creation of a separate hybrid SRO that would 

oversee all broker-dealers doing business with the public. 

We believe that concept is a constructive proposal that we are 

willing to explore. However, we fear that the creation of a new separate hybrid regulator risks losing much of the expertise critical to 

self-regulation. 

Market surveillance and examination functions work closely together to ensure complete coverage of trading and market abuses. 

NYSE regulation brings unique credentials and market oversight 

knowledge to its regulatory efforts, just as the NASD and CBOE 

possess unique understanding of NASDAQ and derivative trading 

issues, respectively. Separating examination of market regulation, 

therefore, risks a less effective system. 

Nevertheless, we recognize our responsibility to aggressively expand our efforts with our regulators to further reduce or eliminate 

duplication. We believe that a dialogue among the SEC, securities 

industry, and self-regulatory organizations would be an important 

next step, and we stand ready to actively participate. 

Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any questions you 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Richard G. Ketchum can be found on 

page 94 in the appendix.] 

ChairmanBAKER. I thank you for your comments, sir, and at this 

time, I recognize Mrs. Biggert to make any introductory comments. 

Mrs.BIGGERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

7

I am very happy to introduce William J. Brodsky, who is the 

chairman and chief executive officer of the Chicago Board of Options Exchange. 

We are very proud in Illinois of all of our capital markets, and 

he has an outstanding career, serving more than 36 years in the 

securities industry, began as an attorney with Moddell Rowan & 

Company in 1968, then joined the American Stock Exchange, 

where he became head of options trading, and then served as executive vice president for operations, and then served as the AMEX 

representative on the board of the Options Clearing Corporation, 

and joined the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in 1982 as executive 

vice president and chief operating officer, and was then president 

and chief executive officer, and served in that capacity until joining 

the CBOE in February of 1997. 

So he has certainly had the experience on all of the exchanges. 

He also serves as a director of People’s Energy Corporation, Futures Industry Association, Swifts Futures and Options Association. 

We are very happy to welcome him. 

He holds an A.B. degree and J.D. degree from Syracuse University. 

Welcome. 

Mr.BRODSKY. Thank you. 

ChairmanBAKER. Let me add, certainly no stranger to the committee. 

Welcome back, sir. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. BRODSKY, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE, INC. 

Mr.BRODSKY. Thank you very much, and Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you and your fellow committee members for having hearings like this. 

I think this is a very constructive way of having the committee 

do oversight in terms of what is going on in the industry, and as 

my colleagues have said, this is a very significant time in our industry. 

Congressman Biggert makes me feel much older than I probably 

am, but I must say that, in my tenure in the business, the changes 

that we are undergoing now are probably more rapid and more significant than we have had in 25 years, and as my colleagues have 

said—and I want to mention both Bob Glauber and Rick Ketchum. 

We have been colleagues in many different ways, even as we 

have changed our careers along the way. 

These two gentlemen are the most dedicated professionals that 

you will find, and I think we agree on more things than we do not 

agree with and that the opportunity for a dialogue like this is very 

constructive. 

Let me start by mentioning that CBOE, which was the creator 

of the listed option business, is really a small player in this bigger 

conversation that we are having. 

We have 1,400 members. We have regulatory responsibility over 

a certain amount of firms, but in reality, we are really specialists 

in the option business and believe that where you can eliminate 

8

duplication, it’s a good thing, but this should not be done in a hasty 

way, and I am concerned that the proposals that the SEC promulgated, in some cases, a year ago, in two different releases, were in 

reaction to some of the events that recently occurred, and our view 

is—and I know, Mr. Chairman, our formal comments are in the 

record. Our view is that we should not proceed with haste here, because we are dealing with a very delicate balance. 

Let me explain a little bit about our regulatory program. 

We have and did establish a regulatory oversight committee composed solely of independent directors of ours. The committee is 

composed of four independent directors and is chaired by Susan 

Philips, who happens to be currently the dean of the George Washington School of Business but was formerly chair of the Commodity 

Futures Trading Commission and then served with great distinction on the Federal Reserve Board. We have other people of significant caliber who serve as an independent board committee overseeing our regulatory efforts, and we believe that this structure 

strikes a very healthy balance. 

Our chief regulatory officer reports to this group on a very regular basis, and this group actually meets with the SEC on an annual basis. 

So we believe that, although we don’t have the total separation 

that some people have advocated, that we have found a way to deal 

with the potential for conflicts of interest and that the opportunity 

that we have had to make this work along with SEC oversight is 

an effective way of dealing with our role as a self-regulatory organization. 

What I am advocating is that there should not be a once-size-fitsall solution to all these situations. It is important also to recognize 

that in the option business it is very important that there be the 

specialization because this is a very unique business, and since we 

have been the leaders in this realm since the creation of the industry, we take our responsibility very seriously. 

We believe that the existing model of multiple SROs, where each 

is responsible for regulating its own market, has been, for the most 

part, successful, and this model has permitted the specialization of 

knowledge that each exchange or SRO has in interpreting its own 

rules and procedures which can be brought to bear on the regulation of its markets. 

This also fosters competition in the development of new and 

more efficient regulatory systems, which benefits the overall quality of regulation. 

Congress has demonstrated its belief that, with appropriate safeguards, self-regulation can lead to better regulation of the securities markets by permitting this specialized knowledge and experience of those closest to the markets to be brought to bear through 

self-regulation. 

We do not think that a single SRO is the answer at this time. 

We believe that you should balance the pluses and minus of multiple SROs, and we believe that the best answer is not to delegate 

market regulation to a sole or single regulator that would be independent of and would not be involved in the operation of the markets. 

9

While delegation of regulatory responsibilities to a sole single 

regulator might well avoid some of the problems cited in the SEC’s 

concept release, the consequence of following this approach would 

be to destroy one of the major advantages of self-regulation. 

There are other choices for regulation. 

There are better ways to reduce duplicative costs and inefficiencies from multiple SROs. We are intrigued by the approach of the 

SIA, which would consolidate regulation and members into a single 

SRO but leaving regulation of trading to each individual market. 

The SIA’s proposal is designed to eliminate duplication by regulation of multiple SROs at the level where such regulation overlaps 

but maintain specialized regulation at the trading level where it is 

most needed. 

While the SIA approach is one way of achieving greater efficiencies, there are other alternatives which SROs can and do utilize. 

One approach is the use of SEC Rule 17D2 agreements, which 

are used by SROs to allocate regulatory responsibility with respect 

to common members. 

Another alternative that has great potential at eliminating duplication and increasing efficiency and enhancing overall quality of 

regulation is the use of a national market system plan to conduct 

regulatory functions that are common among SROs. 

For example, five U.S. options exchanges recently filed with the 

Commission a proposed options regulatory surveillance authority, 

which we call ORSA. The purpose of this plan is to enable the five 

exchanges to act jointly with respect to insider trading investigations involving options at any of the five participant exchanges. 

The functions that would govern ORSA could be expanded in the 

future. 

The core part of the plan, as currently proposed, is the delegation 

to the CBOE of a joint surveillance and enforcement facility for detecting and investigating possible instances of insider trading. 

By sharing the cost of these investigations and by sharing the 

regulatory information generated by ORSA, the five exchanges will 

be able to support a regulatory program that is comprehensive and 

eliminates duplicative efforts and costs. 

Under the plan, the five exchanges will establish a policy committee to oversee the operation of the plan. Thus, the governance 

of ORSA will remain with the five exchanges, and enforcement actions conducted will be done by each exchange as appropriate. 

The conduct of regulatory functions through ORSA would also 

eliminate concerns of uneven regulation among markets. ORSA 

shows that SROs working together can preserve the benefits of 

multiple SROs while reducing the cost of the regulation. 

I want to make one other comment as I wrap up, and that is that 

we think there is one area where the SEC could help improve its 

general oversight role, and that would be to have the Commission 

make clear written statements of the standards and best practices 

it believes it should apply to specific regulatory matters across all 

markets where it concludes that such clarification is warranted. 

In our view, too often, there are disparities in the way in which 

certain regulations are interpreted and applied from one exchange 

to another because of the absence of clear guidance from the ComVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:49 May 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 G:\DOCS\26755.TXT RODNEY
10

mission. We believe that if the SEC were to make its views known 

in such matters to all SROs in a clear and consistent way and to 

do so promptly upon the determination that such guidance is needed, SROs would have a better understanding of what is required 

of them and would be in a better position to regulate their markets 

and their members accordingly and in a uniform way. 

We had the pleasure of having a breakfast with Chairman Cox 

in Florida last Friday, and interestingly, without even hearing this 

particular concern, he was concerned about clarity and consistency 

of regulations. 

So I would hope that, in his new tenure, Chairman Cox may be 

able to address this issue, and I wanted to bring this issue to the 

committee’s attention. 

So I would like to thank the committee for holding this hearing. 

I think it, again, is very constructive, and I would be happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of William J. Brodsky can be found on 

page 78 in the appendix.] 

ChairmanBAKER. Thank you very much. 

I will start with you, Mr. Brodsky. 

I think I understand your concern with a pure, sole, self-regulatory structure is the potential loss of specialization in an area 

where you feel it is important to the applicability of your industry 

and that a line could be drawn, in your mind, as to where the rules 

and constraints and regulatory oversight that is applicable to all 

market participants would be at one level, but then at a—I do not 

want to say B-level, another level—there would be a specialized 

market function applicable, perhaps, only to your organization that 

would be maintained for adequate regulatory involvement. 

Do you think—and I am sure you—I know the answer before I 

ask, but I have to ask. 

Obviously, my concern is duplication of regulatory requirements 

and then the cost to do business. Does that really net us a gain in 

the elimination of duplication and fee-based relief for market participants? 

Mr.BRODSKY. I think that we can distinguish between those functions that are common to all firms and the trading on different 

markets. 

In our industry—when I say ‘‘our industry,’’ we are all in the securities industry, but the options business now includes six exchanges, where there is very intense competition. Each exchange 

does not have the same trading model as each other, and, therefore, the rules are different, and the SEC understands that. 

I think it is very important to have the expertise close to where 

the trading is done at the marketplace level for people who have 

that expertise to understand how those rules are designed and how 

the trading should occur in a proper fashion. I do not think that 

that has to be done at, what I will call, the super-regulator level. 

On the other hand, as we filed our comments to the SEC’s release back in March—and I will quote—we say here the SEC 

should encourage SROs to establish joint and coordinated regulatory efforts where it makes sense to reduce unnecessary costs and 

efficiencies. 

11

I think that we can sit around a table and figure out a way to 

avoid the duplication of effort and cost and still have a very effective program, and that is really what we are advocating most. 

ChairmanBAKER. Thank you. 

Mr. Glauber, from your perspective as a sole regulator of an 

independent entity for a period of time, do you have a countervailing view that a single regulator provides value added to the 

market in a consolidated regulatory function, or do you have an understanding that this bifurcated system offers some advantages? 

Mr.GLAUBER. I think, Mr. Chairman, you raise exactly the right 

question. 

My view is that there are conflicts that exist when regulation is 

embedded in a for-profit exchange, different from a not-for-profit 

exchange. But at the same time, that has to be weighed against the 

value of having, as Mr. Ketchum said, and Mr. Brodsky, regulation 

close to markets where it counts, and I think you have made exactly the right distinction, as has the SEC, at the layer of or level 

of what we call firm regulation, the regulation of what goes on in 

firms, as contrasted with the regulation of what goes on in markets, on the floor of Mr. Brodsky’s exchange or Mr. Ketchum’s exchange. There really is an important distinction. 

At the level of firm regulation, we think that we have—and have 

had since we were founded—enough knowledge of what goes on in 

firms to perform that regulation. 

I think, there, as it was suggested by the SEC, the values of 

eliminating obvious duplication and relieving these kinds of conflicts that I discussed, clearly outweigh any argument of being necessarily attached to a market. 

So as you have and as the SEC has, we would make the distinction and say the right place to start is with firm regulation, and 

to worry there about duplication, and try and construct the mechanism that would have a single regulator deal with all of these firms 

at once, and not have, as we have with the New York Stock Exchange, two regulators dealing with them twice. 

ChairmanBAKER. Understood. 

Mr. Ketchum, as sort of the group in transition, and particularly 

since I believe the merger approval is imminent, if not done, where 

do you see the regulatory function going, given the transitions the 

exchange has already gone through with Archipelago addition coming on? 

Mr.KETCHUM. Well, Chairman Baker, it is a great question, and 

we do still await SEC approval with respect to the merger, so there 

is still—as well as, perhaps most importantly, approval by the 

membership on a vote. So there are steps still to go. 

As I briefly alluded to in my comments, I am absolutely confident 

that—that we can create an environment that builds on where we 

are today that ensures absolutely the independence of decisionmaking by New York Stock Exchange regulation. 

We will operate as a separate, discrete corporation, with board 

members both of the holding company, to ensure that they buy into 

the importance of regulation, and unaffiliated board members to 

raise their hand if they have any concerns. 

I have found, with my connection with New York Stock Exchange 

board members, that they are passionately concerned about the inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:49 May 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 G:\DOCS\26755.TXT RODNEY
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tegrity of the markets. I would be shocked to find that that passion, concern, or the belief that that integrity is critical to the future and success of the New York Stock Exchange would change. 

So I think we will build in numerous means to protect and ensure that New York Stock Exchange regulation decisions are independent, while we continue to have access into the knowledge of 

how the exchange market really works, but none of that is to suggest that there is not more that must be done with respect to reducing duplication. 

It has been a pleasure to work with Bob Glauber—he is a great 

leader—in trying to identify ways—and I think we need to step 

back, each of our organizations, and look at means, even out of the 

box, to do far, far more, but I do confidently believe that the Exchange will be able to meet its regulatory obligations on the other 

side of the merger with Archipelago. 

ChairmanBAKER. Let me quickly add, because my time has long 

expired, I do not want to mislead that I have concerns about the 

adequacy of current regulatory structure. It is just that confidence 

of markets in the regulatory regime is extraordinarily important as 

we see more baby boomers seeking retirement and the growth in 

investment opportunities enormous on the horizon that if there is 

any hint of impropriety, the economic consequences for capital markets are significantly adverse. So I know we are all united in this. 

The difficulty is trying to figure out which model makes the most 

sense in the current environment. 

Mr. Clay? 

Mr.CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for conducting this hearing. 

I thank the witnesses for being here. 

I have a couple of questions that I would just like to ask all of 

the witnesses to attempt to answer, starting with Mr. Glauber and 

moving down the table. 

Of the options for regulation contained in the SEC’s concept release, tell me which ones you think are the worst, which ones are 

the best, and are there any other options that they may not have 

suggested? 

ChairmanBAKER. We can guarantee nobody at the SEC is listening. 

Mr.CLAY. I am certain. 

Mr.GLAUBER. Thank you for the question, and I can answer, I 

think, with confidence because the SEC has proposed these as just 

issues to discuss. 

My view is that the options that involve a layer of industry-based 

regulation, in particular, in the options they put forward, the hybrid model is the one that I think makes most sense. 

Models which would involve no industry involvement, either 

something like the PCAOB or direct regulation by the SEC, I 

think, are far less preferable, and they are, first, because as Mr. 

Ketchum said—and he knows very well because he has been a regulator in this industry for a number of years and an outstanding 

one—having industry involved in the regulation brings an expertise, brings a focus on ethics, brings a level of resources, non-taxpayer resources, to the job which I think is invaluable. 

13

So I think industry regulation should be preserved. Therefore, I 

prefer that to a PCAOB model or a non-industry model or direct 

SEC model, and as I have said before, I think the place to start 

in dealing with conflicts and with duplication is in trying to find 

a mechanism, as we are now discussing with the New York Stock 

Exchange, of uniting firm regulation so that we do not do the regulation of firms twice. 

Mr.CLAY. How about you, Mr. Ketchum? 

Mr.KETCHUM. I have found in many things over the years that 

I have agreed with Bob Glauber, and I certainly agree with him on 

what is worst here. 

As Bob indicates, I have been both an SEC regulator and a proud 

alumni of that agency and a self-regulator for some years, and I believe that the combination of strong and focused and stern SEC 

oversight with self-regulatory organizations that provide access, 

while making independent decisions, provides access for the industry to effectively raise issues, try to address concerns with respect 

to the burden or sense of particular regulations makes a great deal 

of sense. 

I’ve seen it work—not to suggest it has always worked perfectly, 

but I’ve seen it effectively work for my entire career, and I think 

a movement to full Government regulation or a single regulator 

that is removed from the industry is not a good idea. 

I believe the best approach would be, out of the SEC choices, to 

adopt, hopefully with care to reduce some duplicative and burdensome parts of it, their particular proposed specific rules that ensure 

a minimum level of independence and corporate governance of 

SROs and enhance their oversight of our activities, and at the 

same time, as Bill Brodsky mentioned, to provide the self-regulatory organizations continued time to work, as Bob indicates we 

continue to try to do together, to address issues of duplication. 

If we cannot demonstrate our ability to operate separate, completely separate from any conflicts and effectively, Chairman Baker 

made the right point. The most important thing is public investor 

confidence, and we must preserve that, but I am confident we can. 

Mr.CLAY. Thank you for that response. 

How about you, Mr. Brodsky? 

Mr.BRODSKY. I am in agreement with my colleagues that the 

least desirable alternative would be to have direct Government regulation: (a) It would be costly; (b) it would be terribly bureaucratic, 

and we do lose, as Bob Glauber said, the expertise from the industry. 

So to me, that would be, by far, the worst, and I think some variation of the hybrid is where we should strive to reach. In some respects, we have that now. 

I think what we are all trying to do, as Rick Ketchum said, is 

we want to maintain the public confidence and the output of what 

we have, but it is very important that we should let—there has 

been a lot of change that has occurred in all our organizations over 

the last couple of years. 

I think the SEC should give it a chance to work. 

The SEC should be the organization to whom you in Congress 

look to for oversight of the markets and their accountability to you. 

I do not think that some of the changes that have been brought 

14

about, either at the New York Stock Exchange or at our exchange, 

over the last couple of years have really been given a fair chance, 

and I feel that that should be done because we are very sensitive 

to the potential and real conflicts of interest. I, quite frankly, do 

not know whether it makes a difference whether you are for profit 

or de-mutualized or public as it relates to this issue. 

The goal in all our organizations is to have the confidence of investors, and if you do not have the confidence, it does not matter 

what form you are in, and we all are very conscious of these potential conflicts and are bending over backwards to make sure that the 

substance of what we do is much more important and contemplates 

the conflicts and overshadows them, and it is really for the SEC 

to make those evaluations and report back to you on that. 

Mr.CLAY. I thank each of you for your responses, and I appreciate your attendance at the hearing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

ChairmanBAKER. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Feeney? 

Mr.FEENEY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 

all of our witnesses. 

I especially want to thank Mr. Brodsky, who was my host as I 

went out to Chicago to tour the exchange, when I was out there. 

I hope you put your colleagues from the north side and south 

side back together again. The weekend I was out there, the White 

Sox fans were euphoric and the Cubs fans were just sort of disoriented watching the White Sox still playing at that time of year. 

Maybe you could give us an update on the transition that the 

Chicago Board of Options Exchange is making, where you are in 

your transition. 

Mr.BRODSKY. Well, thank you, and I was very glad to host you, 

and I will tell you that it will be interesting to see whether the 

White Sox are able to fill the stadium at each game next year, the 

way the Cubs do, whether they win or lose. 

We are actually moving in the same direction that some of the 

other exchanges around the country have done, and that is to move 

to a for-profit model. This change really relates more to governance 

and changing the way we operate, and we are beginning in January with the first part of that, and that is to go for-profit. Hopefully, later in the year, we will de-mutualize. 

The New York Stock Exchange is actually doing that in a different sort of way by merging with a public company. They’re skipping the pain and heartache that others have gone through. 

To the point of this program, I can only reiterate that we are 

very, very aware of the importance of regulation in what we do, 

and I think what is very important, some of which has been lost 

over the last few years, is that there are times when the relationship between the SEC and the SROs has become adversary, and it 

is very important for us to maintain the regulatory partnership 

that must exist because the Government, quite frankly, does not 

have the resources nor the expertise to do the front line work that 

the self-regulatory organizations must do. 

Mr.FEENEY. Do you anticipate any changes in your conflict of interest rules, your independence requirements for members of your 

SRO as a consequence of your likely change to for-profit status? 

15

Mr.BRODSKY. We have gone through dramatic changes. The SEC 

has a proposal out called Reg SRO which actually will have impact 

on what we do going forward. The problem, quite frankly, is that 

it was put out a while ago. We have all filed our comments, and 

we have not heard anything. 

So at a certain point, as Mr. Cox said to us recently at the Securities Industry meeting, so ably chaired by Mr. Lackritz, who is 

next on your witness list, and that is that we need clarity. 

The SEC can come out with lots of different things and we all 

can respond to them, but at a certain point in time, we say, ′′just 

tell us what the rules are.′′ Mr.FEENEY. This was the best practices that you are advocating 

that would be applied across the board to the different exchanges. 

Mr.BRODSKY. Well, the SEC has proposed things that relate to 

the governance of the organization. 

When I talk about best practices, I am saying that, in a competitive marketplace—in our case, it is options and in Mr. Ketchum’s, 

it is stocks—the SEC has established what we believe are standards or expectations, but we do not believe that they have enforced 

them evenly among the exchanges, and we have sought clarification on that, and I am hoping that, with new leadership with the 

SEC, we might actually obtain it. 

Mr.FEENEY. I would like to ask all the members of the board to 

tell us, as we contemplate certain changes to enhance investor confidence and do away with superfluous and duplicative regulations, 

what are our foreign competitors doing, and what is it that you 

worry about that we have in place now that is putting you at a 

competitive disadvantage or that we might do that would put you 

at a competitive disadvantage. 

Mr. Glauber, maybe we will start with you. 

Mr.GLAUBER. Well, again, let me start by saying that we do not, 

as you know, own an exchange—well, we own a minority interest 

in NASDAQ as an exchange, but we are selling that, and we will 

own none. 

So I cannot speak from the perspective of an exchange as well 

as Mr. Ketchum can, or Mr. Brodsky, but clearly, what has gone 

on in other countries is those exchanges have become publicly 

owned, shareholder-owned entities and, therefore, have access to 

the capital markets and can invest in technology and compete more 

effectively. I think that has been very important, and that is why 

I think it is a very good thing that both the exchanges that are represented here on this panel, as well as NASDAQ, have moved to 

public ownership, shareholder ownership, so that they have access 

to the capital markets and the benefits of being able to compete 

with capital in a robust way. 

I think that is as important as anything that can be done. 

The challenge they are going to face in Europe and the challenge 

we face here is adapting the regulatory model, the regulatory structure, to account for that very marked change in the way exchanges 

are owned and overseen. As I say, when NASDAQ did that, we separated completely from NASDAQ, and this is really the issue that 

is before you and before the SEC and that we are discussing. 

Mr.KETCHUM. I think Bob is absolutely right, that the primary 

challenge we must respond to in the United States—and let me 

16

say, I say this as an observer who has lived in both the regulatory 

and the market side of the U.S. securities industry for some time, 

because we really do mean the thing about separation between regulation and markets at the New York Stock Exchange, but without 

doubt, the European exchanges, in particular, are ahead of us from 

the standpoint of operating as public companies. That has enhanced their funding, has created a level of discipline that is important in their ability to compete. 

They are able, through their regulatory system, to get quick answers with respect to being able to make changes in how their 

trading systems operate, and I think those are all things that are 

important for exchanges and for the SEC to respond to in the 

United States. 

Mr.BRODSKY. I would add that we are at a great competitive disadvantage to our European exchanges for two reasons. 

One, the rules under which we operate in terms of making 

changes to our business are subject to great delays at the SEC, 

under the rules that have been in place for 30 years, when there 

were many exchanges but we weren’t really competing. 

We really compete now, and the system that we have is a disincentive to innovation and competition, and again, these are 

issues that we raised with Chairman Cox at the SIA meeting this 

past Friday. That is how recent we have had this conversation. 

The second is that, at least in my side of the business, which is 

the derivative business, in the United States, we have the bifurcated situation of having futures under the ag committees and 

under the CFTC and securities under the SEC and this committee, 

and as you well know, this raises issues of jurisdiction intramurally 

within this country and puts us, again, at a disadvantage to others 

because sometimes we end up spending time sparring with each 

other when other countries—England, for example, they have the 

FSA, where it is all combined. 

In fact, in virtually every country in the world except the United 

States, regulation is combined. I recognize that the solution is not 

so simple, but I am just trying to answer your question. 

ChairmanBAKER. No, my solution is real simple. 

The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mrs. Maloney. 

Mrs.MALONEY. A lot of us have been talking about that for a long 

time, but to get Congress to change, that is a real challenge. 

I really want to thank Chairman Baker for calling this, and as 

a representative of New York City, that has many financial institutions and markets there, I am particularly delighted to welcome to 

this hearing and to congratulate both the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ on the Justice Department’s approval yesterday of both of your proposed acquisitions, and of course, this development makes this hearing all the more important on reforming 

the SROs that govern the markets, and it makes it more timely. 

I also would like to welcome, also, Mr. Brodsky. You have hosted 

me in Chicago, and I had the pleasure of having one of your nephews work in my office for a while. So it is a delight to see you, also. 

Yesterday we passed out of this committee a regulatory relief 

bill, and we really tried to streamline some of the regulations on 

financial institutions. We had a lot of hearings and testimony 

17

where a lot of the paperwork was really a duplication, and if anything, it loaded down the system, and the real goal of looking for 

any type of corruption or money laundering was hindered. The law 

enforcement came in and testified in support of our reforms. 

So I would like to ask you if there are any duplications that are 

in the regulations that are just loading you down and not really 

helping in any way, in fact you would be more efficient and better 

able to serve our constituents without them, and I would also like 

to ask Mr. Ketchum and Mr. Glauber to comment further on the 

differences between the present regulatory structures of their two 

markets and which features of each they would point to as best addressing the potential for conflicts of interest in the SRO framework and anything else you would like to talk about. 

Mr.GLAUBER. Well, let me take them in the order in which you 

asked. 

First, on duplication, certainly the focus that I have, I think Mr. 

Ketchum has, Mr. Brodsky, all of us have, is on the way we implement the self-regulatory structure, and indeed, the thrust of my 

comments and Mr. Ketchum’s comments, and Mr. Brodsky’s, is on 

how we can handle duplication. 

One obvious place is in the way we presently regulate, self-regulate firms, and firms are presently regulated by both Mr. Ketchum 

and the New York Stock Exchange and by us, and we are talking 

about what we can do. 

We think a great deal can be done to coordinate, as Mr. Ketchum 

has said, and since his arrival, the level of coordination has gone 

way up. It is a model, I think, for coordination. Nevertheless, I 

think it would be best for investors if we spent all of our resources 

on examining and enforcing and regulating and less of them on the 

need for coordinating. That is why we are engaged in a discussion 

of whether there isn’t a structure that we could employ that would 

provide that coordination and rid us of the duplication that exists. 

On conflicts, I have made the point a number of times—and just 

let me say it one more time. We decided at NASD, when NASDAQ 

became a for-profit shareholder-owned exchange, that the best way 

to deal with conflicts was total separation. We thought that, for a 

director of the exchange who is also a director of the regulatory operation, that that director would have what I would characterize as 

unmanageable conflicts to deal with. They would owe a duty of loyalty to both a profit-making entity that has to provide for profits 

for shareholders and, of course, to the public as a regulator. 

We thought the best way of managing those conflicts was total 

separation, and I think, as you can understand, at this stage, the 

New York Stock Exchange has taken a different approach. 

That, I think, is a major focus of the issue of conflicts. 

Mr.KETCHUM. Congresswoman Maloney, your questions, as always, are both incisive and broad. Let me try to answer them, 

again, in pieces. 

First, I think the questions of regulatory reform that this committee has been so good at focusing regulators on remain important 

at multiple levels. 

From a rulemaking standpoint, we still have miles to go, where 

the SEC has shown leadership in rationalizing our financial regulaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:49 May 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 G:\DOCS\26755.TXT RODNEY
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tion into a global world and a world in which the products range 

beyond registered broker-dealers. 

Steps were made with respect to major firms in net capital. Additional steps probably need to be made. 

Additional steps need to be made in things like portfolio margining that stretch across our marketplaces, and we are absolutely 

committed to work with the SEC and other regulators, on all of 

those issues. 

The rule-filing process, as we mentioned earlier, must be faster, 

must be quicker, and allow markets to compete, and allow regulatory changes necessary to protect investors to be implemented 

and implemented quickly, and finally, steps must continue to be 

taken with respect to removing duplication. 

I do draw a slightly differently line than Bob from the standpoint 

of the uniqueness of an exchange trading environment. 

It is absolutely critical, after the exchange in Archipelago merger 

occurs, for us to protect the independence of New York Stock Exchange regulation, absolutely critical. We need a separate board. 

We need separate oversight. We need my reporting directly to that. 

It is also important for me and for my organization to have a special understanding of how the exchange operates, particularly as 

the exchange market structure changes, to be involved in those 

changes, to identify regulatory concerns, and make sure they get 

fixed up front. 

So I think there is a way to balance it, but you are asking absolutely the right questions. 

Mrs.MALONEY. Thank you very much. 

ChairmanBAKER. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Fossella. 

Mr.FOSSELLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Specifically, Mr. Ketchum, and anybody else who wants to answer, with respect to the non-independent directors on the board, 

what percentage of your boards are now independent? 

Mr.KETCHUM. Our entire New York Stock Exchange board, which 

was an innovation made by John Reed, as he shifted the governance in 2003, is independent, with the exception of John Thain. 

So in other words, each of those members are not affiliated either 

with a broker-dealer or with a listed company. 

Mr.FOSSELLA. How would you characterize that transformation? 

Mr.KETCHUM. I think it has been excellent. I think it is, to me, 

the new and appropriate balance of self-regulation. 

The beauty of self-regulation is a passion and fascination of what 

makes the industry and markets tick and an ability to provide access to the industry, to issue, spot, and identify areas where rules 

or interpretations need to change. 

It should not be about decision making. Decision making should 

be about independent persons that do not have the conflict space 

of being both representing the industry and representing the public 

interest. 

So I am very happy and I have been very impressed at how the 

New York Stock Exchange Board operates with that independence. 

Mr.FOSSELLA. Mr. Glauber or Brodsky, do you care to weigh in? 

Mr.BRODSKY. Yes, I would be happy to. Where we are right now 

is that our board is 50 percent independent and 50 percent memVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:49 May 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 G:\DOCS\26755.TXT RODNEY
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ber, and while I understand what caused the New York Stock Exchange to become 100-percent independent—and there were many 

things that were in the newspapers, and you know about that—I 

think that we have to recognize that our business, by its nature, 

is a very complex business, and we have, we think, a good balance, 

and the balance we have is 50-percent independent, 50-percent industry, because it is very difficult for independent directors who 

are truly independent to have the feel for the activities that go on 

in the market and the changes that are occurring, and I know the 

New York Stock Exchange has a separate—I call it a shadow board 

of industry people who advise the board of directors. 

I do not know if—without the issues that the New York Stock 

Exchange had two-and-a-half years ago—you would have ended up 

with what they have today. 

I think it has a very good ring to it, but I think there are practical ramifications, and so, in our case, we have half industry, half 

public, where in their case, they have a full independent board, but 

then they have a separate board that meets apparently prior to 

when the other board meets. 

What exists today is similar to our Federal system when Congress watches the States experiment as laboratories on similar 

issues. 

I think it is very important for SROs to be able to have a certain 

amount of flexibility provided that there is integrity in what they 

do. 

Mr.GLAUBER. Our board is presently about 60-percent independent, 40-percent industry, and it has been a majority independent or non-industry, public, for about 8 years. 

As Bill Brodsky just said—I guess it is a nice way of characterizing it. New York has taken a little different approach. It has 

what Mr. Brodsky called a shadow board, which is all industry, and 

its main board all independent, and that is a way of involving both 

points of view. 

We have chosen to put them in the same place on the board, with 

a majority always independent, so that our board is controlled by 

the independent members of the board, which is as it should be, 

and we provide the perspective of the industry in the board room, 

rather than through what Mr. Brodsky characterizes as a shadow 

board. 

Mr.FOSSELLA. Okay. 

Another question—Mr. Brodsky, you talked in, I guess, your testimony—to use your words, an adversarial approach to SROs from 

the SEC. 

What recommendations would you make specifically to strengthen this partnership that serves both the regulator and yourself 

and, ultimately, investors to improve not just communications but 

the overall relationship as we move forward to the reform itself? 

Mr.BRODSKY. Well, over the years, the relationship has been a 

very good one between the SEC and the SROs. We have been 

through a very difficult period that I do not have to recount to this 

group, over the last 5 or so years of scandals. This has created an 

atmosphere where the SEC has, I think, been—in their dealings 

with us—very different than they had in the past, not because we 

had done anything wrong, but because they felt under a certain 

20

amount of pressure, and, therefore, you could feel the change in the 

relationship. 

I am hoping that, with a new chairman and new members of the 

Commission—the Commission has now two members it did not 

have a few months ago—and the fact that things have settled 

down, that we can get back to what’s normal. 

So I do not think it is anything that has to be done other than 

the passage of time and some new members in the leadership of 

the Commission. 

That is my hope. 

Mr.FOSSELLA. I will just throw it out there, and if you have a 

quick response—you all talk about the competitive disadvantage 

about the lack—because of the lack of clarity, because of other sort 

of over-arching issues. 

What does that all mean? I mean, at the end of the day, how do 

you quantify what that means to our economy, what that means to 

the market, what it means to investors, to best articulate—other 

than the frustration everybody shares, acknowledging that it is 

self-evident that we are at a competitive disadvantage? 

Mr.BRODSKY. There is a cost in innovation and there is a cost in 

flexibility and there is certainly a cost among the exchanges of 

some people not being able to take advantage of or wanting to 

make a change quickly. If you look back to the Commodity Futures 

Modernization Act that passed this Congress 5 years ago, the futures exchanges, which again are much more closely related to my 

business, have the ability to make changes in their business and 

introduce new products virtually by filing with the CFTC and it is 

approved effective on filing. 

We could make an exactly comparable filing for a similar product 

or a similar rule change and have it languish at the SEC for a 

year. 

What is the cost in that? 

It is hard for me to tell you in dollars and sense, but there is 

clearly a cost. 

Mr.KETCHUM. I think Mr. Brodsky makes an excellent point. 

Again, the SEC is blessed in its staff with extraordinarily knowledgeable people who do an excellent job at identifying issues, but 

the process itself built into the rule-filing process—I do not know 

how to quantify it, Congressman Fossella, but it does impact the 

ability to quickly react, either for marketplaces or for regulators, 

and it is something that I believe would be a very good thing for 

Chairman Cox and the Commission to focus on in the coming year. 

Mr.BRODSKY. If I could, I would like to underscore what Rick is 

saying. 

This is not in any way directed in a negative way to the SEC 

staff. 

This is a statute that was passed by this Congress in 1975 in a 

very, very different competitive environment. 

Mr.FOSSELLA. Fair enough. 

Thank you. 

ChairmanBAKER. The gentleman yields back. 

Mrs. Biggert? 

Mrs.BIGGERT. At least we did not pass it. 

21

For all of you, the three witnesses on our second panel today, the 

Securities Industry Association and Bloomberg and Ryan Beck, oppose using market data fees to fund regulation. Could you comment 

on this and talk about support for a cost-based approach to market 

data fees? 

Mr.KETCHUM. Congresswoman Biggert, you raise two important 

and discrete points that are raised by them. 

First, I can speak for the New York Stock Exchange. New York 

Stock Exchange regulation is not directly funded from market data 

fees. We are funded—and we will move to the other side of becoming a public company to be funded directly by regulatory fees and 

by contracts with the marketplace. 

Of course, it is important that the marketplace be profitable and 

be able to meet its obligations for us from a contract standpoint, 

and that comes to your second point with respect to cost-based fees. 

Again, I speak only as an observer, emphasizing that it is best 

for the New York Stock Exchange market people to respond to 

that, but I do think the existing environment, where the SEC reviews any fees and identifies whether those fees are reasonable or 

not, does provide protections to ensure that those fees are appropriate, and it is, I guess, not clear to me personally that change 

really is required. 

Mrs.BIGGERT. Thank you. 

Mr. Glauber? 

Mr.GLAUBER. I think my perspective is the least valuable on this 

panel because we do not manage an exchange. I think the position 

of the exchange that we regulate, which we do as a separate entity 

under contract—that is, NASDAQ—ought to be provided you by 

NASDAQ. So let me defer both to Mr. Ketchum and to Mr. 

Brodsky. 

Mrs.BIGGERT. Mr. Brodsky, do you have any comment on that? 

Mr.BRODSKY. I would say, in the options industry, the market 

data fees are not nearly as substantial as they are on the stock 

side, but the SEC, in its request for comments, has taken up this 

issue, and this is something that the SEC currently is studying. 

It is obviously an important issue. We feel that it should be part 

of the work that the SEC is doing now. We look forward to discussing it with them. 

Mrs.BIGGERT. Thank you. 

Mr. Brodsky, I remember at one point we were discussing portfolio margining, and I think that you were—there was a problem 

with two regulators. Is that still an issue? Do you think that a single regulator will solve that? 

Mr.BRODSKY. Well, we will not have the luxury of having a single 

regulator in time to solve that. 

You may or may not be aware, but there is a bill that exists in 

the Senate side—and I know this will eventually happen in the 

House side, at the ag committee—to re-authorize the CFTC. Part 

of the reauthorization of CFTC deals with work that should have 

been done between the SEC and the CFTC over the last 5 years 

to achieve portfolio margining in single stock futures and options. 

Unfortunately, those agencies did not get it done, and the result 

of that is that now the presidential working group has directed the 

SEC and the CFTC to get it fixed, and the upshot of that is that, 

22

hopefully, the New York Stock Exchange and the CBOE will take 

the lead in proposing rules that will allow for portfolio margining 

on the securities side. Once those rules are clarified, there will be, 

hopefully, counterparts on the CFTC side. 

It is complicated by the fact that you do have two agencies, but 

I would say that, in this particular realm, and I appreciate the 

lengthy introduction that you gave to me, I did spend almost 15 

years on the futures side, and I will tell you that the futures industry is at least a decade ahead of the securities industry in portfolio 

margining, and all we are trying to do at the CBOE, in leading the 

six options exchanges, is to give us a chance to catch up because 

competitively, we are being harmed by the fact that we do not have 

portfolio margining available to customers, as the futures industry 

does. Again, this is one of those intramural things that we have to 

deal with, but this can be solved by not only the New York Stock 

Exchange and the CBOE working together, which we are, but with 

the leadership of the SEC in working with the CFTC. 

So I am hoping that sometime between now and the end of the 

year, there will be some rules filed for the SEC to approve. 

Mrs.BIGGERT. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

ChairmanBAKER. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mrs. Kelly 

Mrs.KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to ask our panelists—the SEC recently published 

Regulation SHO on naked short selling, and they are collecting the 

first information on the effectiveness of this rule. I would like each 

of you to explain to the committee how each structure that you recommended in your testimony is best able to stop illegal naked short 

selling and cut the incidence of failed trades down to the lowest 

possible level, and I do not care where you want to start, but I 

would really like to hear from each one of the three of you. 

Mr.KETCHUM. Congresswoman Kelly, let me start and be identified with your concern. 

Improper naked short selling, indeed, is a concern and a bad 

thing for efficient markets and something that we at the New York 

Stock Exchange and I know the NASD, with the SEC, are absolutely committed to ensuring strict enforcement. 

We have worked with the SEC, after the adoption of Reg SHO, 

which substantially tightened up the requirements for being able 

to ensure that you locate securities and do not engage in improper 

naked short selling. We worked in a sweep exam, which was a good 

example of coordination among the regulators, where we, the 

NASD and the SEC, split up firms across the entire industry. 

We have completed that. 

We have found generally strong compliance with the rules, but 

also instances of problems that we will address in a variety of 

ways, as will the NASD and the SEC, and I can just underline to 

you that we are absolutely committed to the strict enforcement of 

Reg SHO and believe in it very, very strongly. 

Mrs.KELLY. Thank you. 

Mr. Glauber? 

Mr.GLAUBER. Thank you. 

23

I am speaking to you now from our position as the contract regulator of the NASDAQ market. 

First, I would endorse exactly what Mr. Ketchum has said. 

Further, what we have done is submitted to the SEC a rule 

which would extend the mechanisms of Reg SHO to non-listed pink 

sheet securities. We submitted the original rule back in March. We 

amended it a couple of months ago, and, in fact, the SEC has now 

just put it out for comment. I assume that once the comment period 

expires, it will make whatever changes are necessary, and then 

that rule will become effective. 

So the protections of Reg SHO will be extended to the pink sheet 

securities, as well, and I think they are important protections. 

Mrs.KELLY. I agree. 

Mr. Brodsky. 

Mr.BRODSKY. Yes. 

First of all, I agree with the concept or the objective of Reg SHO, 

and that is that people who sell stock short must be in a position 

to borrow that stock before they sell the stock. 

That is a fundamental concept, and I agree with my two colleagues here, but this is an SEC rule. The SEC, I think, is in a 

good position to deal with this. I would say, Congresswoman Kelly, 

having come from New York and now living in Chicago for many 

years, I will tell you that we take a much more free market approach to short selling in general, and that is that the whole concept of having to sell at an up-tick is an anathema to free markets, 

and I cannot resist the opportunity to make this comment, but if 

you do sell short, you should be in a position to borrow the stock, 

and I, therefore, support the goal of Reg SHO. 

Mrs.KELLY. Good. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. Glauber—

Mr.GLAUBER. Yes. 

Mrs.KELLY. I have just had a very interesting experience with regard to fast-growing equities markets, and I do not think a lot of 

people really are aware that the fastest growing ones really are not 

in the United States or even in the Far East. They seem to be in 

Arabia and the Arabian Peninsula. 

I recently had an opportunity to visit that region, and I saw firsthand a commitment to professionalism in both men and women 

doing trading. 

These young traders were there actively engaged and working 

the world market. 

I understand that NASD has been working with some of these 

emerging exchanges, and I would really like you to share with the 

committee your experience in working with the emerging markets 

in the Middle East and the export potential of the professional 

market regulation services that you might have. 

Mr.GLAUBER. Thank you. 

We have, indeed. 

We have worked with the regulators in Jordan and in Saudi Arabia. 

We have done so because we have been told by them and we believe we do possess an expertise in regulation that they have 

sought. And we think that it is an appropriate responsibility for us 

24

to share that expertise when it is asked. We ask only that our costs 

be paid. We are not going to make any profit from this. 

We do so because we think that developing safer and better regulated markets in these countries is likely to foster the growth of 

capitalism and better provide a platform for democracy in these 

countries. We believe—more generally—that our markets will be 

better if they exist in a broad network of markets around the world 

that are safe, well regulated capital markets. 

So we have done that. It has provided us, I think, a useful opportunity. We have learned from it. I believe that our clients have 

learned from it, and we will continue to do it on a limited basis 

when markets come to us and tell us we can be helpful to them. 

Mrs.KELLY. Anyone else want to comment about that? 

Mr.BRODSKY. I would comment that CBOE has, in the last 12 

months, signed five memoranda of understanding with Chinese exchanges which provides for information sharing and cooperation in 

derivative markets. I will tell you that, having been to China a 

year ago, it is breathtaking the progress that has been made in 

that country. I must say the potential there is so enormous because 

of the size of the market, the industry of the people, and their love 

for trading. 

Mrs.KELLY. Thank you very much. 

It is an interesting experience to go to these markets, and I am 

delighted to hear that we are talking about having an impact on 

making sure that there is a professional regulation that is understood across the board. 

So thank you both. 

I yield back. 

ChairmanBAKER. I thank the gentlelady. 

Before I ask the panel to step aside, I would just observe that, 

in a world where digitalization is taking place enormously rapidly, 

and if it can be digitalized, it can be shipped anywhere, and if we 

currently have a market reg environment where there is the potential for market arbitrage to evade cost and enhance efficiency, we 

have got to be very sensitive to where we are going with this, and 

I know you are, but it bothers me greatly unless we can get our 

house in really top shape order. 

Let me express to each of you my appreciation for your appearance, your assistance. 

We know this is complicated business, but it is essential business, and we want to be a partner going forward, to be helpful as 

best we can. 

Thank you very much. 

I would ask now that, as appropriate, our members of the second 

panel come forward. 

ChairmanBAKER. Let me welcome each of the panelists here this 

afternoon. 

As you are familiar, we will ask that you attempt to keep the remarks to 5 minutes. Your formal statement will be made part of 

the record. 

We certainly appreciate the courtesy of your participation, and I 

welcome back, after many prior appearances, Mr. Marc Lackritz, 

president of the Securities Industry Association. 

Please proceed at your leisure. 

25

STATEMENT OF MARC E. LACKRITZ, PRESIDENT, SECURITIES 

INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION 

Mr.LACKRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the 

subcommittee. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify this afternoon on reforming the securities industry self-regulatory system. 

Our Nation’s securities markets, as you well know, are the most 

transparent, liquid, and dynamic in the world. New forms of competition, technological advances, globalization, and broader investor 

participation have driven phenomenal changes in the capital markets and securities industry over this past decade, further 

strengthening our capital markets’ global preeminence. 

Self-regulation has been a key ingredient in the regulatory 

framework in which our markets have thrived. The extensive expertise of members and their involvement in the rulemaking process has led to more effective and less costly self-regulatory rules. 

This tiered regulatory system, supplemented by Government oversight, has provided a greater level of investor protection than Government alone might have been able to achieve, but self-regulation 

does have significant drawbacks. 

First, conflicts of interest, which we just heard about, between 

SROs’ roles as both market operators and regulators, and second, 

regulatory inefficiencies resulting from duplication among multiple 

SROs. 

The proposed mergers between the New York Stock Exchange 

and Archipelago and the NASDAQ stock market and Instinet’s network add an additional concern about the profit motive of a shareholder-owned SRO detracting from self-regulation. 

We strongly believe that the proposed mergers present a unique 

opportunity now to address these concerns and to bring the structure of self-regulation into the 21st century. 

The SIA strongly supports adoption of the hybrid self-regulatory 

model as the best alternative to the current structure of self-regulation. 

The hybrid self-regulatory model would split regulation into two 

functions. 

Each marketplace would have its own SRO which would regulate 

and enforce all aspects of trading, markets, and listing requirements, but there would also be a single-member SRO that would 

handle regulations relating to the operations of broker-dealers. 

This body would be transparent to both the investing public and 

to its members. Both the public and broker-dealers would be involved in its governance, and the SEC would oversee its budget, 

funding, and performance. 

Combining the SRO broker-dealer regulatory programs into one 

centrally managed entity, the hybrid SRO, would eliminate the duplication, inefficiency, and redundancy that occurs with rulemaking, data reporting, examinations and enforcement actions. 

These regulatory inefficiencies consume time, energy, and money, 

thereby stunting innovation and growth. 

In addition to the waste of regulatory resources, the cost on 

broker-dealers, and especially the smaller firms, is heavy. Uniform 

efficient regulation would allow firms to use their internal compliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:49 May 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 G:\DOCS\26755.TXT RODNEY
26

ance resources much more effectively, further strengthening investor protection. 

A hybrid SRO would also remove the potential conflicts of interest between an SRO’s regulatory duties and its market functions 

by splitting regulation into two functions. Such a revamped selfregulatory structure will strengthen investor protection and increase the competitiveness of the U.S. capital markets. 

For the hybrid model to function effectively, however, the SEC 

will have to provide attentive, cost-effective regulatory oversight 

that includes vigilant review of the single-member SRO’s costs and 

fee structures. Strong public and member involvement will become 

even more important to prevent a single-member SRO from becoming an unresponsive bureaucracy with prohibitive cost structures. 

We also recommend that the SROs define the costs necessary to 

meet their self-regulatory obligations, prepare and make public a 

budget to meet those obligations, and then fairly apportion those 

costs among members. 

Regardless of the outcome of regulatory consolidation, the SEC 

should deal immediately with longstanding concerns by market 

participants about the opaque and non-accountable way in which 

market data fees are currently set. Congress certainly never intended for market data to generate revenues for SROs to subsidize 

their regulatory obligations or to fund competitive business activities in the manner that it does today. 

The purpose of disseminating market data is to create transparency in the prices that investors receive for buying and selling 

securities and, where there are competing market centers, to increase investor choice and opportunity. 

For that reason, we have advocated that the SEC adopt a narrow, cost-based approach for funding regulation that does not depend on revenue from market data fees. Our approach does not put 

the SEC in the role of rate-maker for data fees but, instead, encourages the agency to rely on its oversight role to ensure that access to this information is available on a fair and reasonable basis. 

Importantly, a cost-based approach will minimize the conflicts of 

interest that arise from control over a monopoly product with the 

ability to use the resulting revenue to subsidize other activities. 

We have reached the ideal moment now for implementing significant structural reform of self-regulation that will strengthen our 

global preeminence and ensure that investors are fairly protected. 

SIA is eager to work with Congress, this committee and subcommittee, the SEC, the SROs, and all interested parties to take 

advantage of this very unique opportunity to bring the structure of 

self-regulation into the present. 

In doing so, we will ensure our markets remain the most transparent, liquid, and dynamic, with unparalleled levels of investor 

protection. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Marc E. Lackritz can be found on 

page 107 in the appendix.] 

ChairmanBAKER. Thank you for your testimony, sir. 

Next, we welcome Mr. Kim Bang, president and chief executive 

officer of Bloomberg Tradebook. 

Welcome, sir. 

27

STATEMENT OF KIM BANG, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, BLOOMBERG TRADEBOOK, LLC 

Mr.BANG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. 

My name is Kim Bang. I am pleased to testify on behalf of 

Bloomberg regarding self-regulatory organizations, exploring the 

need for reform. 

Bloomberg L.P. provides multi-media analytic and news services 

to more than 250,000 financial professionals in more than 100 

countries worldwide. Bloomberg News is syndicated in over 350 

newspapers and on 550 radio and television stations worldwide. 

With the approval of the mergers and with major market structure initiatives pending, this is a good time to hold this hearing. 

The most significant consequences of the proposed New York 

Stock Exchange-Archipelago merger is, in fact, that the New York 

Stock Exchange will now become a for-profit entity. As a for-profit 

entity, a regulator, a marketplace, and a beneficiary of a Government-sponsored information monopoly, the New York Stock Exchange is playing a lot of roles, and many of them conflicting. 

As a for-profit entity, the New York Stock Exchange will have an 

incentive to extract maximum benefit for shareholders. 

The ramifications are substantial, and the need for regulatory 

and congressional oversight will be, as well. 

There are many perspectives from which to look at the SEC Reg 

SRO and the issue of how SROs should be governed and how they 

should act. 

Our preferred vantage point is how they will distribute market 

data and how much they will charge for this market data. 

Market data, as you know, is the oxygen of the financial markets. 

There are critical priorities here. Market data must be available 

and affordable for retail investors, and market participants must 

have the widest possible latitude to see best execution and add 

value to that data by devising analytics, databases, and other innovations. 

Before the New York Stock Exchange-Archipelago and NASDAQInstanet mergers were announced, the SEC launched a public discussion of market data revenues and whether they should be costbased. 

Bloomberg joined the SIA in strongly supporting cost-based limits on market data fees and believes the for-profit status of the 

SROs lends greater urgency to this initiative. 

In its 1999 concept release on market data, the Commission 

noted that market data should be for the benefit of the investing 

public. 

Indeed, market data originates with specialists, market makers, 

broker-dealers, and investors, and the exchanges in the NASDAQ 

marketplace are not the sources of this market data but, rather, 

the facilities through which market data are collected and disseminated pursuant to regulatory fee and without compensation to investors or their brokers. 

In its 1999 release, the SEC proposed a cost-based limit to market data revenues. 

28

A cost-based approach would not require the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ to sell data at cost. Instead, it would require 

the charges to be reasonably related to the costs of collecting and 

disseminating this data with a reasonable profit. 

Today, as not-for-profit entities, the SRO network spends ap- proximately $40 million on collecting and disseminating this data, 

and they receive over 10 times that much, $424 million in revenue. 

Yet, a detailed accounting of these revenues, including the underlying costs to the SROs and an account of the use of these revenues, has been unavailable. 

Would the State and local public service commissions that regulate other type of public utilities, those that supply us with electricity, gas, telephone, rail service—would they tolerate the idea of 

a 1000-percent markup over the cost? Hardly, but the Congress 

told the SEC in 1975 to regulate these data monopolies, including 

the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, as public utilities. 

Market data revenues come from investors. If investors were 

paying roughly 10 times the cost when dealing with not-for-profit 

entities, where significant competing venues were potentially restraining costs by giving away this market data, what will investors be paying now that the New York Stock Exchange and 

NASDAQ will no longer face that competition? 

On the best execution obligations, moreover, each broker-dealer 

and fiduciary is required by law to ascertain what trading venue 

has the best price in every stock, every millisecond. 

If having complete access to this data is effectively required by 

law, broker-dealers and fiduciaries have absolutely no capacity to 

bargain over the price of this data. 

Access to information will also be a challenge. Bloomberg L.P.’s 

3-year-long conflict with the New York Stock Exchange over Liquidity Quote and Open Book illustrate this point. 

With Liquidity Quote and Open Book, the New York Stock Exchange attempted to exploit its powers as a Government-sponsored 

monopoly to require certain vendors to sign contracts that would 

place severe restrictions on the use of this critical data. Those restrictions would have required vendors like Bloomberg to, one, refrain from integrating the Liquidity Quote data with data from 

other market centers; two, advantage the New York Stock Exchange over competing market centers when it came to display; 

and three, refrain from building value-added analytics using this 

data. 

In short, the New York Stock Exchange proposed to leverage its 

monopoly over market data downstream to unfairly disadvantage 

not only exchange and ECN competitors but also competitors in the 

information space. 

To its credit, the SEC unanimously struck down the New York 

Stock Exchange restrictive contracts. 

Tying regulatory powers to for-profit incentives will invite this 

kind of abusive behavior that undermines the goal of the national 

market system. 

While talking about market information, I would like to add that 

many market problems, especially the obstacles of meeting best 

executions, could be resolved in the event of display and limit order 

rules if they were simply updated for a decimalized environment. 

29

Decimalization has been a boon to investors. They have dramatically reduced spreads. However, the rules governing the display of 

this market data, rules that were crafted in an era of eights and 

sixteenths, have never been updated to reflect decimalization. 

Since decimalization induced 100 price points to the dollar in 

place of the previous eighth or sixteenth, the amount of liquidity 

available now at the national best bid and offer is so much smaller 

than it was before. As a result, there has been a dramatic diminution in transparency and liquidity at these inside quotations. 

The SIA, in commenting on Reg NMS, accurately observed, 

quote, ‘‘The value of the NBBO, the cornerstone of the market data, 

is less than it was before decimalization. We believe the SEC has 

the responsibility to address this issue,’’ end of quotation. 

The simplest resolution would be to require exchanges, market 

makers and other market centers to publish customer limit orders 

within five cents of their best published quotations. 

This is a modest proposal. 

The impact would only restore the transparency that has been 

lost as an unintended and unforeseen result of decimalization. 

As a policy matter, it is hard to argue that decimalization should 

leave the public with less transparency. 

I conclude by noting that the major market changes we are witnessing create enormous challenges for SROs and for the public 

they serve. 

We believe equal and fair access to market data and liquidity at 

a reasonable cost for all market participants is necessary for reforming self-regulatory organizations. 

This must be coupled with congressional and regulatory vigilance. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members. I am happy 

to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Kim Bang can be found on page 48 

in the appendix.] 

ChairmanBAKER. Thank you, sir. 

Our next witness is Mr. Ben A. Plotkin, chairman and CEO of 

Ryan Beck & Company. 

Welcome, sir. 

STATEMENT OF BEN A. PLOTKIN, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, RYAN BECK & CO. 

Mr.PLOTKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am chairman 

and chief executive officer of Ryan Beck & Company, a 60-year-old 

NASD member firm based in New Jersey. We have about 1,200 employees, 38 offices in 13 States, including Florida and New York 

City. We have a number of offices in each of New York and Florida. 

I am also chairman of the Securities Industry Association’s regional firms committee, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the 

entire committee, for the opportunity to testify on issues relating 

to need for structural reform for self-regulation, and especially to 

present the regional firms committee’s support of the hybrid selfregulation organizational model. These hearings are very timely, in 

light of the proposed merger involving the New York Stock Exchange. 

30

Regional securities firms play an important role in the U.S. markets. Many of the so-called regional firms, like Ryan Beck, do business from coast to coast. We are simply smaller and much more focused to serve clients in a way that larger national firms often cannot. 

Our client base, in many respects, are typical individual investors looking for quality advice, small businesses looking to access 

the capital markets, or municipalities with financing needs below 

the radar of large national firms. 

Our clients expect us to provide the full complement of services 

offered by national firms but on a personalized cost-efficient basis. 

Unlike national firms, we do not have the size to readily absorb 

the cost of regulatory duplication. Recently, 16 of the largest regional firms around the country signed a letter urging regulatory 

reform. These firms hailed from across the United States. 

Most regional firms are members of two national SROs, the New 

York Stock Exchange and the NASD. In addition, we are regulated 

by the SEC and, in the case of most regionals, 50 State regulators. 

All these regulators, for legitimate reasons, have been much 

more active in their rulemaking, examination, and enforcement initiatives in recent years. The cost of increased regulation presents 

significant challenges to regional firms in continuing to attract and 

retain a loyal client base with cost-competitive services. 

If left unaddressed, high regulatory costs will drive continued 

consolidation among regional firms, leading to fewer investor 

choices. 

Some firms, like Ryan Beck, have chosen to access the New York 

Stock Exchange through other broker-dealers to avoid duplicate 

regulation. These results are demonstrative of a situation that 

should not persist. All firms should be subject to the same regulatory process, one that is efficient and non-duplicative. 

Regulatory duplication can undermine investor protection because it means a firm’s compliance efforts are refocused towards 

complying with two sets of substantive standards, rather than focusing on monitoring and preventing conduct that could harm investors. 

While the industry is certainly appreciative of the regulators’ efforts to mitigate the negative effects of duplicative regulation, no 

amount of regulatory coordination can fully counteract the inefficiencies that are inherent in the current structure. 

In short, we believe in two strong regulators, not three. 

We are not advocating less in overall supervisory resources, instead that the same resources be allocated in a more efficient manner. 

Self-regulation has worked incredibly successfully over the years. 

Self-regulation and governmental regulation are, together, capable of achieving a level of expertise in investor protection that is 

truly greater than the sum of its individual parts. Given the current proposed mergers, now is the appropriate time to restructure 

and revitalize the self-regulatory system and truly bring it into the 

21st century. 

In order to effectively and efficiently address these concerns, the 

hybrid model proffered by the SEC in its SRO concept release presents an appealing and practical alternative to the current model. 

31

The hybrid model would minimize inconsistent regulation that 

results from duplicative SRO regulatory oversight. Regulatory resources would be expended more efficiently, as the regulators 

would have to spend less time writing or reconciling inconsistent 

rules or conducting duplicative examinations. 

There would also be benefits from concentrating regulatory expertise so that single-member SROs could maintain a talented, experienced regulatory staff, rather than having that talent and expertise fragmented across multiple SROs. 

In order to protect the interests of all member firms, the singlemember SRO would require significant involvement from both the 

investing public and broker-dealers. While non-industry representatives should comprise a majority of the SRO board of directors, 

adequate industry representation is essential to ensuring that a 

single-member SRO is embedded with the expertise necessary to efficiently regulate both large national firms and small regional 

firms. In short, we must keep the self in self-regulatory organizations. 

In conclusion, let me say that the U.S. securities markets are 

still the most efficient, transparent, and liquid in the world, but we 

cannot grow complacent. 

The implementation of the hybrid model will help to ensure that 

U.S. markets preserve their reputation in the years to come. 

I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today and am prepared to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ben A. Plotkin can be found on page 

119 in the appendix.] 

ChairmanBAKER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Lackritz, in Mr. Bang’s testimony, he went on at length concerning the troublesome aspects of market data, the fees associated 

with it. 

I would assume you would share his general observations about 

market data concerns? 

Mr.LACKRITZ. Yes, absolutely. 

In fact, I think we highlighted those in our longer written testimony. 

ChairmanBAKER. My point in raising this is to use that as the 

issue in discussing regulatory structure. 

Clearly, if there is the traditional SRO, which has conflicting 

task masters with shareholders on the one side and regulatory responsibility on the other, the ability of that regulator to assess the 

validity of the charges associated with market data would appear 

to me to be slightly impaired. 

How does the hybrid model markedly improve on that, even recognizing that an independent regulator might have the tendency to 

threaten more bureaucratic structure with less specialization of 

regulatory capability? 

What is more important, getting efficient value from market data 

and other lower-cost regulatory assessments or having an entity 

that is more specialized and, quote, ‘‘market sensitive’’ that is closer to you? 

I am having trouble figuring out where that animal lives. 

Mr.LACKRITZ. I think the answer to your question is yes, that we 

can walk and chew gum at the same time, and I think that what 

32

we are trying to do in the proposal, in the hybrid SRO, is to talk 

about both raising the quality and improving the quality and efficiency of regulation by making it cost-based so that, in fact, you 

would have a proposed budget for this regulator that would be 

open, transparent for the public, for the SEC, and for the industry 

to look at, and when there is an understanding of what is appropriate in terms of the level of regulation, that cost would be assessed across the membership, on a per-member basis, appropriately. 

At the same time we are saying that currently, under the current 

structure, market data fees are cross-subsidizing regulation because, as pointed out in Kim Bang’s testimony, they are 10 times 

the cost, roughly, of collecting the data. 

So rather than having market data cross-subsidize regulation—

ChairmanBAKER. Are we even sure that is where the money 

goes? 

Mr.LACKRITZ. Well, it certainly goes—you know, I heard Mr. 

Ketchum’s testimony that market data fees do not finance regulation, but at the same time, they are providing an enormous amount 

of revenue to the exchange, and the exchange has a variety of functions that it uses revenue for, and so, from the standpoint of improving market data dissemination, that also should be based on 

a cost-based formula, so that the cost of collecting the data should 

be what the markets charge for that data, and that is where the 

SEC really would come into effect as the overseer of that market 

data structure, but it needs to be cost-based, not whatever the traffic will bear or not what the monopolists would like to charge. 

ChairmanBAKER. Well, I also heard Mr. Brodsky make the case 

that we need people closer to us who share the specialization of talent that is necessary to understand our activity, which may be different from the equity side. What is your reaction to that necessity? 

Mr.LACKRITZ. Well, he is right, and our hybrid SRO model would 

provide for that because you would have—on the one hand, you 

would still have market-based surveillance activities, enforcement 

activities, trading regulation based on the marketplace. 

The hybrid member—single-member SRO would only do inspections, examinations, and audits and regulations of the broker-dealer at the member level, at the broker-dealer level, not at the market—not market-based. 

ChairmanBAKER. So you share the view that there can be a line 

drawn between the regulatory responsibilities that are applicable 

to all markets while recognizing the specialty skills for individual 

markets that can be transparent in its assessment of fees that is 

justifiable in light of the client use. 

Mr.LACKRITZ. Basically, yes. Yes, that is correct. You know, I 

think what we are trying to do is get the best of both possible 

worlds, you know, get centralized expertise, on the one hand, for 

operations that are similar across the board, at the member level, 

at the broker-dealer level, and that would be the single-member 

SRO, and at the same time, leave market-based surveillance, market-based expertise in the marketplaces to enforce the rules and 

regulations in those marketplaces. 

ChairmanBAKER. Mr. Bang, do you share that general perspective? 

33

Mr.BANG. Yes. I am not going to repeat everything that Marc 

said because obviously we agree with everything that he laid out, 

but to give you a little bit of perspective, you know, we have, in 

the past, heard justification for charging these—what we consider 

very large market data fees on the necessity of funding regulatory 

oversight. 

It was interesting to hear today from Rick Ketchum and also Mr. 

Glauber that, indeed, they are not—they do not believe that market data is being used to fund the regulatory oversight, and that 

seems to be sort of a change, a bit of a change, because historically, 

we have sort of heard different. 

ChairmanBAKER. I think I also heard him indicate that it was 

not that significant either. 

Mr.BANG. Right. 

ChairmanBAKER. Okay. 

Mr.BANG. So the question is, you know, what is a fair charge for 

this market data, and the costs that I quoted to you today is really 

just the cost for the NBBO, you know, the top-of-file dissemination, 

and as you can hear, we believe that we really should make—restore the sort of transparency that we had at the time of—in predecimalization, and, indeed, that is what the NASDAQ and New 

York Stock Exchange is in the process of doing with the—providing 

New York Open Book available in the marketplace for real time, 

which is essentially depth of book, and the NASDAQ has a program—I believe it is called Total View—which is also a depth of 

book program, which is really essentially in a—in this sort of marketplace that we operate in, because it is decimal pricing and that 

we have fiduciary obligations to seek best execution for our clients. 

So we need to consume that data; we need to buy the data. And 

that data is now being sold at an additional cost that I did not 

quote to you, right? 

This is on top of it, and it is coming as a result now of the mergers, because in the past, Archipelago, Instanet, Island, all of these 

ECNs—they did not charge for the data. 

It was made available free of charge. 

Now that it is going to be merged into these entities and they 

are going for profit, they are going to charge separately for providing this depth of data, and they are probably going to charge approximately the same that they charge for the current data. 

So essentially, you are going to get a doubling of data fees, close 

to a billion dollars in cost to the market participant and investor 

public, which we find is quite excessive. 

ChairmanBAKER. I want to do one more because Mrs. Kelly is 

here, and I have gone way over my time, but Mr. Plotkin, you have 

talked about the regulatory burden, the cost of compliance, particularly for a smaller firm, in managing business in the market. 

There was mention earlier of the growth of foreign exchanges 

and investment opportunities there. 

From your view, given the limitations that you face now, is that 

potentially something of concern to the Congress, that unless the 

regulatory burden is addressed, that we are going to see folks making decisions to move elsewhere? 

Mr.PLOTKIN. I think it is a good question. 

I mean what happens from a CEO’s seat is we do have choices. 

34

Companies can decide to either consolidate, go out of business, 

and there has been an increase in consolidation of regionals because the burdens are too high, or they can decide to choose regulatory bodies, which is not necessarily a good result, as well. 

So it is definitely possible in the way this is set up right now. 

ChairmanBAKER. Is the regulatory cost that is of concern to you 

principally market data, or is it the broader regulatory duplication 

and other issues? 

Mr.PLOTKIN. It is currently the redundancy. I mean, from my 

seat, we have—we have gone from about five people in compliance 

and legal to about 25 in the last 4 years, and we are a relatively 

clean firm in terms of, you know, supervisory issues. 

You know, my choice as the CEO is to have people focus internally to make sure we do not have a bad apple, that we are doing 

right by our customers, or to respond—or, often, they are spending 

their time responding to multiple regulatory inquiries. So that is 

the real issue. 

The market data issue is a separate question for us, because it 

is all about clarity. 

As a businessman, if I cannot measure it, I cannot manage it. 

I want to know my data cost, just like I want to know what my 

health care cost is, etcetera, etcetera, and that is the real issue on 

the market data, that it is very obfuscated right now. 

ChairmanBAKER. I would assume you would share Mr. Lackritz’s 

view about the advisability of the hybrid model. Or do you have 

other views? 

Mr.PLOTKIN. Well, the regional firms around the country support 

the hybrid model. 

We believe that what that means is consolidation of the brokerdealer regulation so we will have two strong regulators, an SRO, 

as opposed to multiple SROs, and the SEC, along with 50 State 

regulators. We think that is plenty cops on the beat. 

ChairmanBAKER. Yeah. I do not disagree. 

Mrs. Kelly? 

Mrs.KELLY. Thank you. 

I would like to ask Mr. Lackritz a question. 

Mr. Lackritz, on page 10 of your testimony, you talk about the 

issues that are conflicts between shareholders’ interests and the 

regulatory authority, and you talk about the New York Stock Exchange, and mention that they are going to move employees into 

a separated, affiliated—separate, affiliated, nonprofit entity, and I 

am quoting here, and you go and say, moreover, the very fact that 

the New York Stock Exchange apparently seeks to maintain regulation of its broker-dealer members under the NYSE name, with 

the oversight of some of its directors, rather than spin it off into 

a separate entity under a different name, with entirely separate directors, suggests that the New York Stock Exchange sees value in 

continued branding of its regulatory authority over broker-dealers. 

You know, the stock exchange has had over 200 years in self-regulation. 

It has not been all bad, and the experience level—the regulation—the members know what the regulations are, and that is 

what they use. 

They rely on it. 

35

I do not quite understand how this is different, actually, from the 

SIA branding that you have in your testimony you have provided 

here, using your own market success as an association to promote 

this in your own testimony. 

So maybe you could define for me, how is this different? 

Mr.LACKRITZ. Sure. 

Thank you. 

That is a good question. 

I think that the point we are trying to make is not that self-regulation has not worked. 

The point we are really trying to make, I think, is that in this 

new environment, as markets are evolving, as mergers are happening, as ECNs are competing with existing exchanges, as technology is dramatically changing the entire trading environment, 

what is the structure of self-regulation going forward that is going 

to be most effective for protecting investors and preserving our preeminence globally, and certainly the New York Stock Exchange has 

been extraordinarily effective in terms of its self-regulation. At the 

same time, it has imposed a huge amount of costs on the industry 

from duplication, redundancy, and inefficiency that we have talked 

about before. 

So we are not talking about taking regulation out of New York 

completely. 

We are saying keep market surveillance, keep trading, keep all 

the activities that you are doing in the marketplace that you have 

been doing, continue to do those, but at the same time, move the 

member regulation, the broker-dealer regulation, into one organization so you are not competing, providing conflicting interpretations, 

providing redundant rules with the NASD that is also regulating 

and overseeing that same group of firms. Let’s come up with a 

more efficient and a more effective structure without undermining 

any kind of self-regulation that is at the exchange or has been at 

the exchange for 200 years. 

Mrs.KELLY. When you are talking about redundant regulations, 

many of these regulations may be redundant, but are they essentially identical? Because that is what the need is. 

Mr.LACKRITZ. If they were identical, I don’t think we would have 

a problem. 

I think the difficulty is that they are very rarely identical. 

There are separate interpretations. 

They are somewhat different, you know, a little change here and 

a little change there. 

What we have found recently is we have made some progress 

with the two SROs combining to work on rules, for example, with 

respect to business entertainment gifts and travel, those kinds of 

things, but at the same time, those resources that are going toward 

coordination really shouldn’t go to coordination. 

They should really go to an effective examination, audit, and regulation. 

Those resources that are diverted toward coordination really 

can’t go to the regulation. If you had one body, you could effectively 

align those resources and have a much more effective and efficient 

regulatory structure. 

Mrs.KELLY. Thank you for clarifying. 

36

Thank you. I will yield back. 

ChairmanBAKER. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Lackritz, I just want you to help me with sort of a forwardlooking statement. 

With the move by the New York Exchange to engage in the 

merger with Archipelago and my view that the electronic trading 

platforms, because of speed, efficiency, and reliability, tend to grow 

in acceptability, that as I look at what has happened at the CBOE 

and other exchanges, maybe not tomorrow but somewhere down 

the road, we are looking at electronic transactions of significant 

proportion in relation to what we now call the specialist system. 

Doesn’t the applicability of electronic platforms diminish the necessity for a specific market-based supervisory function where the 

economic exchange, despite whether it is a future, option, or an equity, begins to merge here a bit, and doesn’t that really lend itself 

to the single regulatory model where we can get at all this duplication because the nature of the entity being regulated is, in essence, 

losing that uniqueness as we move forward into electronic markets? 

Explain to me why that doesn’t work. 

Mr.LACKRITZ. I think I understand what you are saying, and I 

think that the—you are absolutely right that technology is obviously playing a much more significant—

ChairmanBAKER. That is running everybody right now. 

Mr.LACKRITZ. Right. 

So then the question becomes how do you most effectively provide for market regulation in the marketplace as it evolves technologically, and certainly, technology is going to play a much more 

important role in providing that surveillance, and the question is 

whether you want to locate that centrally in one organization that 

is going to be immune from basically a monopoly organization or 

whether you are going to decentralize that in the different marketplaces because of the algorithms that are written, because of the 

software and the programming and everything else that is going 

into the marketplace. 

I think what our proposal says is it is better to have that surveillance closer to the market, in the marketplaces, where they are familiar with the technology and familiar with the trading patterns 

and the liquidity and the movement back and forth on the marketplace, rather than having it in a single SRO that is removed, really, from the marketplace, that maybe is gathering up information 

but doesn’t have the market expertise, doesn’t have familiarity 

with the trading patterns or the flow of volume during the course 

of the day, and so, I think I understand your point, but I think 

that, from the standpoint of effective and efficient regulation, by 

leaving that kind of surveillance of the marketplace in the marketplaces themselves, that provides the best solution, as long as you 

move the broker-dealer regulatory functions to a single member. 

ChairmanBAKER. Well, I just need to understand better because 

that would seem to argue that the SEC, as a single regulatory securities entity, would be better served by having divisions that sit 

in particular locations with expertise geographically located close to 

Chicago or wherever the trading platform might be. 

My understandings of how markets are merging and where our 

regulatory system currently stands is there is an extraordinary diVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:49 May 23, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 G:\DOCS\26755.TXT RODNEY
37

vergence, which I think is reflected by the concerns about duplication, cost, and so forth, but to get us back together again, I am not 

convinced yet that the hybrid model is responsive to the concerns 

that you have identified or at least I am not understanding how 

the hybrid model is appropriately responsive, and we may only 

pass this way once. Whatever we do I have a suspicion is going to 

be around for a while. When I look at Gramm-Leach-Bliley and 

other things of modest consequence that have occurred around 

here, you know, we are talking decades, and we are in a very formative, pivotal period in our securities market formation, and I think 

we owe it to our future investors and stakeholders to ask every 

possible question we can, knowing we won’t get it exactly right, but 

we need to get as close as we can. 

Mr.LACKRITZ. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your comment. I think 

that we completely agree this is a very unique moment, and we 

would like to make sure we get it right. 

Five years ago, we commissioned a white paper to explore each 

different alternative idea for self-regulation, going from completely 

done by the SEC to a PCAOB-type model to everything in between, 

and we went through the pluses and the minuses, the costs, the 

benefits, and came out saying that this hybrid model really makes 

the most sense from the standpoint of investor protection, from the 

standpoint of efficiency in terms of costs, and from the standpoint 

of maintaining market expertise and surveillance in the marketplaces themselves without creating a large bureaucracy on the one 

hand but also without duplicating inspections, examinations and 

audits which the firms have complained about for a number of 

years and which are getting better, but they are not getting better 

fast enough. 

ChairmanBAKER. Sure. 

Well, I am with you on the PCAOB. We can start that one off 

without disagreement. 

I am just not sure single regulator versus hybrid has yet 

emerged in my mind clearly enough to make an informed decision, 

but the meeting today was to bring to the committee’s attention the 

various perspectives, and certainly, we want to be open to your professional view. 

As stakeholders, you certainly understand market function much 

better than those of us on the committee, but we will have some 

partnership in this as we go forward, and we want to make sure 

we fully understand it. 

Unless there is further comment—yes, sir. 

Mr.BANG. Maybe I could make a comment on the hybrid for a 

moment. 

You may have suggested that the markets become more electronic, they start to look more alike, and perhaps they sort of operate in a more similar fashion and, therefore, maybe a single regulator could perhaps regulate efficiently all of these markets. 

I think when you get into the granular details, even though they 

are electronic, you can still find very significant different rules and 

competitive practices within those electronic venues. 

If you look at the ISE options exchange, it is quite different from 

the Chicago Board of Options Exchange versus the Boston BOX Exchange. 

38

There is probably more similarities on the cash side in terms of 

an Archipelago ECN and an Instanet ECN, but it doesn’t preclude 

in, you know, sort of future development that certain exchanges 

will have—like, for instance, the NASDAQ market has market 

opening crosses, end of day crosses that the others don’t have, or 

they have, but they operate somewhat differently. So having that 

expertise and understanding more on a local level doesn’t necessarily have to be on a physical presence, but people—that sort of 

oversight—overseeing those particular exchanges and those—the 

way they operate, I would say are significant benefit. 

The other thing is, having the SEC actively involved as oversight 

to the regional SROs, let’s say, is clearly critical. You know, in our 

citation on the Liquidity Quote and this Open Book, I think, illustrates that well, because the exchanges obviously, especially the 

for-profit, will have incentive to further their profitability and so 

forth. 

ChairmanBAKER. That is what led me to this questioning along 

the line of single regulator versus an SRO model, and that really 

is what started me, and then thinking through market function 

and where we are likely headed, it just seemed to be a logical question to ask. 

Let me suggest this, going forward. 

The committee’s work will continue for some time. We are not 

near any meaningful decision. We are just kind of foundering 

around. Please forward your own opinion and analysis; feel free, totally unsolicited, if necessary, but the committee would very much 

appreciate additional information going forward, as we discuss 

these issues into the coming months and perhaps years. 

Thank you very much for your kind participation. 

Our meeting stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(39)

A P P E N D I X

November 17, 2005

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