Filed 8/15/23 P. v. Griffin CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

FREDERICK GRIFFIN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B322522 

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. VA003749)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Raul A. Sahagun, Judge. Affirmed.

Jennifer Peabody and Sydney Banach, under 

appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 
2

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S. 

Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent. 

_________________________________________

Frederick Griffin was convicted of 13 counts of 

residential robbery and one count of first degree felony

murder. He appeals from the trial court’s order denying his 

petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.

1 

He argues the trial court erred when it determined he acted 

with reckless indifference to human life without considering

he was 19 years old at the time of the murder. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

From October 1989 to May 1990, appellant Frederick 

Griffin and several companions committed a series of armed

residential robberies, resulting in the murder of Jay Tryon. 

During the robberies preceding Tryon’s murder, the 

appellant was identified as a perpetrator who: (1) held a gun 

to the head of victims; (2) threatened to kill victims; and (3) 

physically assaulted victims, including stepping on the back 

of a victim who was nine months pregnant. During the final 

robbery, involving victim Tryon, a neighbor witnessed Tryon 

wrestling with one of the robbers on his porch and the robber 

1 Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was 

renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 

58, § 10.) We hereafter cite to section 1172.6 for ease of reference. 

Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

calling out to his companions who all joined in the struggle, 

hitting Tryon. After one of the men yelled “‘blast him,’” a 

shot rang out, and the men fled the scene. Tryon died from a 

single gunshot wound to the head.

In 1991, a jury convicted appellant of 13 counts of 

residential robbery and one count of first degree felony

murder. The jury further found appellant personally used a 

firearm in the commission of each offense. Appellant was 

sentenced to state prison for 62 years and four months to 

life. This court affirmed the judgment on appeal. (People v. 

Griffin (Jan 14, 1993, B062398 [nonpub. opn.].)

In February 2021, appellant filed a petition for 

resentencing under section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95)

based on various changes in the law regarding felony murder 

liability. On June 14, 2022, after an evidentiary hearing, the 

trial court concluded appellant was not entitled to 

resentencing, finding the prosecutor had proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt that appellant was a major participant who 

acted with reckless indifference to life.

2

DISCUSSION

A. Section 1172.6

The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-

2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) “to amend the felony murder rule 

2 The parties stipulated the superior court could rely on the trial 

transcripts in deciding the matter and neither party submitted any 

new evidence.
4

and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it 

relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not 

imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act 

with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the 

underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to 

human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); accord, § 

189, subd. (e).) SB 1437 also added now section 1172.6,

providing a procedure for defendants whose cases are final to

seek retroactive relief by petitioning the sentencing court to 

vacate the conviction and resentence on any remaining 

counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)

B. People v. Jones Does Not Require Remand

In this appeal, appellant does not argue the trial 

court’s findings – that appellant was a major participant in 

the underlying felonies who acted with reckless indifference 

to human life – are unsupported by substantial evidence. 

Instead, citing People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076

(Jones) and the de novo standard of review, appellant argues 

the matter must be remanded to the trial court because it 

“failed to consider appellant’s youth at the time of the 

crimes.” However, a review of People v. Jones shows why 

remand is not warranted in this case. 

In Jones, defense counsel argued the defendant “‘was 

barely 20 years old at the time of [the] crime,’” “‘immature’”

and “‘still developing.’” (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 

1091.) The trial court issued a detailed explanation of its 
5

denial of the resentencing motion, but “did not mention [the 

defendant’s] age or maturity level.” (Ibid.) 

On appeal, the court observed that “[i]n the usual case, 

the fact that a court did not specifically mention certain 

evidence does not mean that the court ‘ignored’ that 

evidence.” (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1092.) 

Rather, the court will “presume the trial court followed the 

law in exercising its duties and duly considered the evidence 

presented to it.” (Ibid.) The court determined, however, the

“unusual circumstances” of the case before it required 

remand “for the court’s consideration of all relevant factors 

consistent with prevailing law.” (Id. at pp. 1079, 1093.) 

In so concluding, the court pointed out that In re Moore

(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, which “squarely” held a

defendant’s youth is one relevant factor in the major 

participant/reckless indifference analysis, was not issued 

until months after the trial court’s decision denying Jones’

resentencing motion. (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 

1092.) To the extent another case, People v. Harris (2021) 60 

Cal.App.5th 939 (Harris), had previously indicated youth 

was a relevant factor, that opinion was issued “just a few 

weeks” before the trial court’s rejection of Jones’

resentencing petition and without any “remonstrance by 

defense counsel.” (Jones, supra, at pp. 1091-1092.) 3 

3 In Harris, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 939, abrogated on other 

grounds in People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, the court remanded 

the matter for a resentencing hearing under (former) section 1170.95 

because the record of conviction did not establish as a matter of law 

(Fn. is continued on the next page.)
6

Accordingly, and “in the interest of justice,” the court 

remanded the matter for “the trial court to have a 

meaningful opportunity to consider [Jones’] youth . . . 

consistent with prevailing law.” (Id. at p. 1093.)

Here, the “unusual circumstances” identified in Jones, 

are not present. That is, appellant’s evidentiary hearing 

took place on June 14, 2022, more than ten months after the

Moore decision, sixteen months after the Harris decision,

and after additional opinions, referenced in Jones, had been 

issued on the youth factor. (See Jones, supra, 86 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 1091-1092; citing People v. Ramirez

(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 990-991 [no substantial evidence 

defendant acted with reckless indifference in light of his 

youth] and In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 467-472 

(Harper) [habeas corpus petition denied where defendant’s 

youth, even if a factor, did not change his culpability].) 

In the trial court, defense counsel argued that

appellant and his cohorts were “kids” and “young men” when 

they committed the robbery that led to Tryon’s death. 

Appellant concedes that information regarding his age was 

included in the underlying criminal record admitted at the 

the defendant was ineligible for resentencing relief. (Harris, supra, at 

pp. 944, 959-961.) In remanding the matter, the court observed in 

dictum that given Harris’s youth at the time of the crime (he was 17 

years old) it was “far from clear” he was aware of the dangers posed by 

the nature of the crime. (Id. at p. 960.) 
7

evidentiary hearing.4 And the court remarked that in 

preparation for the evidentiary hearing, it had “read all of 

the papers” and had “reviewed the trial transcript.”

Although the court did not expressly discuss appellant’s age 

in issuing its final ruling on appellant’s petition, it was not 

required to do so and there is no affirmative indication it 

refused to consider the point.

5 (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 

Cal.4th 1107, 1114 [“[W]here a statement of reasons is not 

required and the record is silent, a reviewing court will 

presume the trial court had a proper basis for a particular 

finding or order”];

6 contrast People v. Chambers (1982) 136 

Cal.App.3d 444, 457 [presumption the court follows the law 

does not apply where the sentencing law is not yet 

established].) Accordingly, appellant has failed to identify 

4 Appellant points out the underlying record demonstrates he was 

19 years old at the time of the offense. Respondent adds that the 

probation report, also admitted as part of the underlying criminal 

record, reflects the murder of Tryon occurred only “12 days prior to 

appellant’s twentieth birthday.”

5 In denying relief, the trial court stated appellant not only 

“created a lot of [the] danger” in the earlier robberies in which he 

participated but that he “assisted in creating [] additional danger”

during the murder of Tryon, by either calling to his confederates for 

help to subdue Tryon or joining in the melee. (Cf. Harper, supra, 76 

Cal.App.5th at p. 472 [stating defendant’s youth “in no way 

undermine[d]” reckless indifference/major participant finding given 

defendant’s willing participation in a robbery that carried a high risk 

the victim would die and his conduct before and after the crime].) 

6 Section 1172.6 does not require a statement of reasons following 

an evidentiary hearing.
8

any circumstances that would warrant a remand in this 

case. (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1091.) 

DISPOSITION

The order denying appellant’s resentencing petition is 

affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MORI, J.

We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P. J.

ZUKIN, J.