Opinion filed January 15 , 2015



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________ 

### No. 11

- 12

- 00313

- CR

__________ 

### ESPERANZA ESQUIVEL , Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 385th District Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR39984

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N After a bench trial, the trial court convicted Esperanza Esquivel of driving
while intoxicated while a child passenger was in the vehicle

. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. § 49.045 (West 2011). The trial court assessed punishment at confinement for one year in the S tate J ail Division of the Texas Department of2 Criminal Justice

. In one issue on appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress be cause the investigating officer lack ed reasonable suspicion to justify his initial stop of Appellant

. We affirm. Background Facts Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence arising from her

arrest

. On appeal, she contends that the arresting o fficer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle

. Officer Stephen Truex of the Midland Police Department testified at the suppression hear ing that he was dispatched at 2:00 a

. m

. on May 8, 2012 , to a “ robbery call

. ” He arrived at 3210 Whittle Way to talk to the complainant, who told Officer Truex about a possible “ disturbance /robbery” coming from the parking lot of the Bradford Apartments. The Bradford Apartments were located behind the complainant’s home. Of ficer Truex testified
that he was familiar with the Bradford Apartments because he was the courtesy officer for the property and visit ed the property every night.
There was an alley lo cated behind 3210 Whittle Way that was used by tenants of the Bradford Apartments. A minute after entering the alley
, Officer Truex hear d tires spinn ing. He then saw a maroon “ Chevy ” pickup ; the driver of that pickup twice attempt ed to jump a curb in an effort to quickly leave the parking lot of the Bradford Apartments . Officer Truex stated that the maroon pickup was the only vehicl e in the parking lot or alley. He observed that the driver
was eventual ly able to jump over the curb. Officer Truex testified that the driver
of the pickup turned westward and began driving toward him . He flashed his
flashl ight several times to stop the vehicle. As Officer Truex approached Appellant’s vehicle , he had his flashlight and his weapon in his hands

. At the suppression hearing, w hen asked why he stopp ed Appellant’s vehicle,
Officer Truex replied, “ Just because of time of day, we just had a robbery in3 p rogress, a vehicle was leaving a parking lot that was unusual like something had just happened, like they were trying to leave in a hurry. ”
After Officer Truex approach ed Appellant’s vehicle, he learned from Appellant that she was involved in a n argument with her ex

- boyfriend
, her sister
, and her husband

. Appellant ha d her two young children, ages eight and eleven,
with her in the vehicle. Officer Truex then noticed that Appellant had “ [ s ] lurred speech, bloodshot e yes, and the odor of alcohol.” Officer Truex testified that Appellant admitted she was intoxicated. Officer Truex subsequently conducted field sobriety test s to determine whethe r Appellant was able to drive. H e concluded that Appellant w as intoxicated due to alcohol. Officer Truex arrested Appellant for driving while intoxicated while a child passenger was in the ve hicle

. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress without making explicit findings of fact or conclusions of law. Analysis A trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Arguellez v. State , 409 S.W.3d 657, 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We review a trial court’s ruling under a bifurcated standard of review. Amador v.
State , 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State , 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Almost complete deference is given to its
determinati on of historical facts, especially if those facts are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor. Crain v. State , 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ; Amador , 221 S.W.3d at 673 (citing Guzman , 955 S.W.2d at 89)

. We review de novo a trial court’s application of the law to the facts. Wade v. State , 422 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ; Valtierra v. State , 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Regardless of whether the trial court granted or
denied th e motion, appellate courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling. Wade , 422 S.W.3d at 666; State v. Woodard , 341 S.W.3d 404, 4104 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably grounded in the rec ord and correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.
Wade , 422 S.W.3d at 667, Valtierra , 310 S.W.3d at 447

– 48. When the trial court does not issue findings of fact, we imply findings that support the trial court’s ruling if the evidence supports those findings. State v. Kelly , 204 S.W.3d 808,
818

– 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). There are three distinct types of police

- citizen interactions: ( 1) consensual encounters that do not implicate the Fourth Amendment; ( 2) investigative
detentions that are Fourth Amendment seizures of limited duration and scope
, which must be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and ( 3) arrests that are reasonable only if supported by probable cause. Wade , 422 S.W.3d at 667; Wood ard , 341 S.W.3d at 410

– 11 (citing Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 30

– 31 (1968); Gerstein v. Pugh
, 420 U.S. 103, 111

– 12 (1975)). A detention occurs when a reasonable person, taking into account all circumstances, feels they are not at libert y to ignore the police and go about their business. Kaupp v. Texas , 538 U.S. 626, 629 (2003) (citing Bostick , 501 U.S. at 437 )

. There is no dispute that Officer Truex detained Appellant when he stopped her vehicle and prohibit ed her from leaving the scen e. A police officer has reasonable suspicion for a detention if he has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has been, or
soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Wade , 422 S.W.3d at 66 7

– 6 8;
Derichsweiler v. State , 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). This is an objective standard that disregards the actual subjective intent of the arresting officer and looks, instead, to whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for
the detention. Wade , 422 S.W.3d at 668; Derichsweiler , 348 S.W.3d at 914. The
standard also looks to the totality of the circumstances; individual circumstances5 may seem innocent enough in isolation, but if they combine to reasonably suggest the imminence of criminal conduct, an investigative detention is justified. Wade
, 422 S .W.3d at 668; Derichsweiler , 348 S.W.3d at 914. The standard requires only “some minimal level of objective justification” for the stop. Foster v. State , 326 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). Whether the facts known to the officer amount to reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review. State v. Mendoza , 365 S.W.3d 666, 669

– 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)

. Appellant contends that the citizen

- infor mant’s complaint and
Officer Truex’s independent observations , under the totality of the circumstances
, did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion

. We disagree

. Officer Truex testified that he responded to a complainant’s ti p about a robbery in progress. The identity of the complainant was not known to Officer Truex

. However, the complainant provided Officer Truex with the tip at the complainant’s residence during a face

- to

- face meeting.

A citizen’ s tip may justify the initiation of a stop if the tip co ntains “sufficient indicia of reliability.” Arizpe v. State , 308 S.W.3d 89, 92 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2010, no pet.) ( quoting Florida v. J.L. , 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) )

. Because the complainant’s identity is unknown, the information provided to
Officer Truex is considered an anonymous tip. We evaluate four factors in determining the reliability of an anonymous citizen ’ s information: “(1) whether the informant provide[d] a detailed description of the wrongdoing; (2) whether the
informant observed the wro ngdoing firsthand; (3) whether the informant is somehow connected with the police (e.g. [ , ] a paid informant); and (4) whether the informant place[d] himself in a position to be held accountable for the report.” Id. ( citing Pipkin v. State , 114 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2003, no6 pet.))

. When determining an informant ’ s reliability, courts distinguish between anonymous 911 callers and unidentified informants who give unsolicited
information to officers in a face

- to

- face manner. Id. at 92

– 93. The face

- to

- face informant is inherently more reliable than the anonymous 911 caller because the
face

- to

- face informant places himself in a position to be held responsible for his
intervention. Id. at 93

. Appellant contends that the citizen

- informant su pplied an anonymous tip
and that that tip must be adequately corroborated by the officer. Corroboration does not mean that Officer Truex must personally observe the conduct that caused him to reasonably suspect that a crime is being, has been, or is about to be
committed. Brother v. State , 166 S.W.3d 255, 259 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Adams v. Williams , 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) ) . “Rather, corroboration refers to whether the police officer, in light of the circumstances, confirms enough facts to reasonably conclude that the information given to him is reliable and a temporary detention is thus justified.” Id. (citing Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325,
330

– 31 (1990)). Officer Truex cited the time of night, the “ robbery/disturbance ” in progress, the hurried and unusual exit by Appellant from the parking lot, and the lack of other people in the area as reasons why he detained Appella nt

. Time of day is one factor in determining reasonable suspicion. Foster , 326 S.W.3d at 613 (citing
Curtis v. State , 238 S.W.3d 376, 38 0

– 8 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Location is also important in determining the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 61 3 & n.10. Appellant was stopped in the same area where a possible robbery in progress was just reported. As stated above, an officer’s reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred or will soon occur in the future is a permissible basis for a traffic stop. Terry , 392 U.S. at 22; Ford v. State , 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)

. Appellant also le ft the scene of a possible robbery in an expedited manner. A7 video taken from the front dash of Officer Truex’s patrol car was admitted into
evidence. On that video
, the sound of tires squealing can be heard moments prior

to the time that Officer Truex e ncounter ed Ap pellant’s vehicle. Based on the time of day, the proximity to a report of a possible robbery in progress by an informant
in a face

- to

- face meeting with the police office r , and the hurried manner in which Appellant left the parking lot, we conclude that Officer Truex had reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant’s vehicle. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that Officer Truex had reasonable suspicion to initiate the investigatory stop. Consequently, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY
JUSTICE

January 15, 2015 Do not publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., Willson, J., and Bailey, J.