UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ DANIEL B. GALINDO, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. GENTRY, Chief of Security, CCA; CORRECTIONAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA; ROBERT PATTON, Corrections Department Director; MOWERS, a/k/a Mauyers, Defendants - Appellees. No. 15-7062 (D.C. No. 6:14-CV -00269-JHP-SPS) (E.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before TYMKOVICH , Chief Judge, HARTZ , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Plaintiff Daniel Galindo, an inmate in th e custody of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (DOC), filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United St ates District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma alleging that he was denied his constitutional right to safe and appropria te housing while incarcerated at the Davis Correctional Facility (DCF), a prison in Holdenville , Oklahoma, run by the Co rrections Corporation of

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 30, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 America (CCA). As defendants, he named CCA, two of its employees (Gentry and Mowers), and DOC Direct or Robert Patton (Defendants). The district court dismissed without prejudice the claims against CCA, Gent ry, and Mowers, because Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit, as requi red by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). With regard to Defendant Patt on, the court dismisse d the complaint with prejudice because it did not allege any pe rsonal misconduct by Patton. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court’s judgment. The complaint’s factual allegations are spar se. They relate to Plaintiff’s treatment as a member of a prison gang or “s ecurity threat group” (S.T.G.): Our S.t.g. was not allowed to house in the yard upon arrival we were to be housed in Fox Unit in seg. of phases. Because a nother S.t.g. would not let our S.t.g. house in the yard and I got put on the yard after I was label a certain S.t.g. & denied access to yard by chief of security. But after my denied access along several other S.t.g.s. But then put to the yard without the othe r S.t.g.’s in my group. R. at 6. He contends that if one member of an S.T.G. is permitted to be in the yard, “all members should be allowed,” id. at 8; and he alleges that the supervisors knew that another S.T.G. did not allow his S.T.G. to be in the ya rd, and that he should not have been placed in the yard without the other members of his group. The district court did not reach the meri ts of Plaintiff’s cl aim against Defendants CCA, Gentry, or Mowers, a nd neither do we. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such admini strative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement r eaches “all inmate suits about3 prison life, whether they involve general ci rcumstances or partic ular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle , 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). There can be no question that Plaintiff’s suit falls un der this umbrella. DCF provides a three-step process for fili ng grievances: First, the prisoner is required to submit a Request to Staff (RTS) form to an appropriate staff member. Second, if the prisoner does not receive a re sponse to the RTS within 30 days or is not satisfied with the response, he may submit a grievance to the Grievance Coordinator. Third, the inmate may appeal the disposition of the grievance to the DOC Administrative Review Authority. Exhaustion requires completion of all three steps. An affidavit by DCF Grievance Coordinato r Terry Underwood states that he had reviewed the DCF logs and records and “Plain tiff submitted no grievances to my office.” R. at 46. And an affidavit by Mark K nutson, Manager of the DOC Administrative Review Authority, states that a “diligent search of th e records . . . [showed that Plaintiff] did not make any submissions to the Ad ministrative Review Authority during the relevant time period.” Id . at 49. Plaintiff does not dispute these affidavits. Instead, he argues that he submitted complaints thro ugh what he “thought were the right process[es].” Aplt. Br. at 2. He attaches two RTS forms to his appellate brief and points to complaints he made in segregation review s, complaints made in medical requests, and verbal complaints. But “the PLRA exhaus tion requirement requires proper exhaustion,” Woodford v. Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006), and his allegations and attachments do not satisfy DCF’s requirements. We therefore a ffirm the dismissal of the claims against CCA, Gentry, and Mowers without prejudice.4 As to Defendant Patton, the district court held that Plaintiff failed to state a valid claim because he did not allege that Patton personally particip ated in depriving him of his rights. We agree. The only portion of the co mplaint that mentions Patton states that “as a Derictor for the state of Oklahoma DOC, he allowes a private prison [to] decide how the S.t.g. program is ran.” R. at 7. This is insufficient to create liability under § 1983; the “plaintiff must show the defendant personally participated in the alleged violation.” Jenkins v. Wood , 81 F.3d 988, 994 (10th Cir. 1996). Supervisor liability can attach only when the “defendant-supervisor personally dir ected the violation or had actual knowledge of the violation and acquies ced in its continuance.” Id . at 995. Because the complaint fails to identify any personal participation by Patton, we a ffirm the district court’s dismissal with prejudice for fa ilure to state a claim. We also note that to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to sue Patton in his official capacity, the claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (“[A]bsent waiver by the State or valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal court. This bar remains in effect when State officials are sued for damages in their official capacity. That is so because . . . a judgment against a public servant in his official cap acity imposes liability on the entity that he represents.” (citations and inte rnal quotation marks omitted)).5 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Because this appeal was frivolous, Plaintiff is issu ed an additional STRIKE. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge