FILED 


OCTOBER 13, 2015 


In the Office of the Clerk of Court 


W A State Court of Appeals, Division III 


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 


DIVISION THREE 


STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) 

) No. 32718-3-111 

Respondent, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

ADRIAN ANGUIANO, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

) 

Appellant. ) 

SIDDOWAY, C.J. - Adrian Anguiano, a juvenile, was found guilty of attempted 

indecent liberties after he told a fellow resident at the Twin Rivers juvenile detention 

facility to perform oral sex on him while Mr. Anguiano's roommate held the victim in a 

chokehold against a wall. Mr. Anguiano challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

show that (1) he and his roommate worked in concert in the commission ofthe crime and 

(2) as the juvenile court implicitly found, Mr. Anguiano was attempting to have sexual 

contact with the victim. He also challenges three of the juvenile court's conclusions of 

law as erroneous, predicated entirely on his challenges to the two findings. 

Because substantial evidence supports the challenged findings, we affirm. 

FACTSANDPROCEDURALBACKGROlmD 

Fourteen-year-old Adrian Anguiano was a resident at Twin Rivers Community 

Facility, an all-male, minimum security facility for juvenile offenders. On March 28, 
No. 32718-3-II1 

State v. Anguiano 

2014, he was eating lunch with D.T., another Twin Rivers resident, who mentioned that 

he was going to stop at the front desk to get some lotion. Mr. Anguiano responded that 

he had some in his room and would "hook [him] up." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 22. 

D.T. grabbed some small cups from the salad bar and the two boys headed for Mr. 

Anguiano's room. 

After they entered his room, Mr. Anguiano pulled out his penis, held it in his hand, 

and said to D.T., "[C]ome on man just suck me up," and "it [i]sn't gay or nothing." RP at 

31,32. D.T. responded, "[N]o dude I ain't like that." RP at 32. Mr. Anguiano's 

roommate, George Thacker, came into the room, apparently shortly after Mr. Anguiano 

and D.T. entered, and was present as Mr. Anguiano continued to tell D.T. to "just do it." 

Id. Mr. Thacker grabbed D.T. from behind and wrestled him to the ground, placing him 

in a chokehold against the wall. D.T. "had one arm free" and "was swinging with it to 

keep [Mr. Anguiano] away." RP at 33. He estimated Mr. Anguiano was roughly five 

feet away from him at this point. 

William Chapin, a residential counselor at the facility, was doing a population 

count after lunch that day and went looking for Mr. Thacker, who was assigned to dish 

detaiL Upon arriving at Mr. Thacker's room, he saw Mr. Anguiano through the window; 

Mr. Anguiano's shorts were pulled down and he was holding his penis in his hand, "kind 

of dancing around." RP at 8. As soon as Mr. Anguiano saw Mr. Chapin, he pulled up his 

pants and his face reddened. Mr. Chapin opened the door, entered the room, and 

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No. 32718-3-111 

State v. Anguiano 

immediately saw that Mr. Thacker had D.T. in a hold against the wall and that D.T. was 

struggling to get away. Mr. Chapin estimated that Mr. Anguiano was three to four feet 

away from the two other boys. 

Mr. Chapin described both Mr. Anguiano and Mr. Thacker as laughing until they 

realized they had been caught. He described D.T. as also "kind of appear[ing] to be 

laughing," but was doing so awkwardly, as ifhe "didn't want to be there." RP at 9. 

Mr. Anguiano was charged with attempted indecent liberties by forcible 

compulsion in violation ofRCW 9A.44.100(1 )(a) and RCW 9A.28.020. The information 

charged him with "knowingly attempt[ing] to cause [D.T.], a person who was not hislher 

spouse, to have sexual contact with himlher by forcible compulsion, to-wit: tried to 

touched [sic] him with his penis while he was being held against his will." Clerk's 

Papers (CP) at 1. 

The matter proceeded to an adjudicatory hearing before the Benton County 

Juvenile Court. Following presentation of the evidence, the defense argued that the State 

failed to prove Mr. Anguiano had anything to do with the force used by Mr. Thacker 

because there was no evidence Mr. Anguiano asked Mr. Thacker to use force or that they 

had any sort ofplan or agreement. Also, because Mr. Anguiano was several feet away 

from D.T., defense counsel argued that the State could not establish that there was 

"forced sexual touching." RP at 43. 

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No. 32718-3-111 

State v. Anguiano 

The trial court rejected the defense arguments and found Mr. Anguiano gUilty. It 

orally announced its decision at the conclusion of the trial and later entered written 

findings and conclusions. Mr. Anguiano appeals. 

ANALYSIS 

Mr. Anguiano's opening brief mentions the requirement of the Juvenile Court 

Rules that when a juvenile case is appealed, the juvenile court must enter written findings 

and conclusions that "state the ultimate facts as to each element ofthe crime and the 

evidence upon which the court relied in reaching its decision." JuCR 7.11 (d). The 

argument portion of his brief implicitly complains that the court's findings do not meet 

this standard, repeatedly addressing matters that the court "did not find" or as to which it 

"made no findings." E.g., Br. ofAppellant at 7,9, and 10. Yet Mr. Anguiano has not 

assigned error to the trial court's failure to make sufficient findings. See RAP 10.3(a)(4) 

(each error claimed by an appellant must be identified under an appropriate heading by a 

separate concise statement of the alleged error). 

Ifhe had assigned error to the failure to make sufficient findings, we would first 

consider the trial court's oral findings for purposes of review. State v. Robertson, 88 Wn. 

App. 836, 843,947 P.2d 765 (1997). If review of both the written and oral findings fell 

short of the rule's requirements, we would remand for sufficient findings as long as there 

was evidence in the record from which a rational trier of fact could find the elements of 

the charged offense. State v. Alvarez, 128 Wn.2d 1, 19,904 P.2d 754 (1995). 

4 

No. 32718-3-III 

State v. Anguiano 

Mr. Anguiano's required assignments of error are to only two findings of fact and 

three conclusions of law. Br. ofAppellant at 1, Section "A. ASSIGNMENTS OF 

ERROR". Given Mr. Anguiano's decision not to assign error to any inadequacy of the 

court's findings under JuCR 7.l1(d), we will not address the Juvenile Court Rule 

requirements further. 

We first separately address Mr. Anguiano's assignments of error to two findings 

of fact. We then address collectively his assignments of error to the juvenile court's 

conclusions of law. 

Assignment ofError No.1. The court erred in finding: "The respondent 

and co-respondent, George Thacker, worked in concert in the commission 

ofthis crime." CP at 42. 

"Due process requires the State to prove all elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt." State v. Washington, 135 Wn. App. 42, 48, 143 PJd 606 (2006). Mr. 

Anguiano was charged with attempted indecent liberties by forcible compulsion. 

Although intent is not an element of indecent liberties, I crimes of attempt require proof of 

a specific intent to commit the offense. See, e.g., State v. Dunbar, 117 Wn.2d 587, 591, 

817 P.2d 1360 (1991) (while defendant may be guilty of murder even without an actual 

intent to kill, attempt to murder requires specific intent to kill); State v. Aumick, 73 Wn. 

I State v. Price, 17 Wn. App. 247, 249, 562 P.2d 256 (1977); State v. Thomas, 98 

Wn. App. 422,425-26,989 P.2d 612 (1999) (the necessary culpable mental state for the 

crime of indecent liberties is knowledge, which "is a less culpable mental state than, and 

does not necessarily include, intent"). 

5 

No. 32718-3-III 

State v. Anguiano 

App. 379, 383, 869 P.2d 421 (1994), ajJ'd, 126 Wn.2d 422,894 P.2d 1325 (1995) 

("Unlike the crime of rape, attempted rape requires proofof a specific intent to rape."). 

"A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, with intent to commit a specific 

crime, he or she does any act which is a substantial step toward the commission of that 

crime." RCW 9A.28.020(1). Attempt therefore consists oftwo elements: "(1) intent, and 

(2) a substantial step." Aumiek, 126 Wn.2d at 429. 

"The intent required is the intent to accomplish the criminal result of the base 

crime." State v. Johnson, 173 Wn.2d 895, 899, 270 PJd 591 (2012). To determine the 

required criminal result, the court looks to the definition ofthe base crime. Id. at 899. As 

relevant here, RCW 9A.44.100(1)(a) provides that a person is guilty of indecent liberties 

"when he or she knowingly causes another person to have sexual contact with him or her 

or another ... [b]y forcible compulsion." Because the requisite criminal result is that 

sexual contact occur by forcible compulsion, see State v. Tieeson, 26 Wn. App. 876, 880, 

614 P .2d 245 (1980), the intent required for the crime of attempted indecent liberties is an 

intent to cause sexual contact by forcible compulsion. "Forcible compUlsion" is defined 

in RCW 9A.44.010(6) to include "physical force which overcomes resistance." "Sexual 

contact" means "any touching ofthe sexual or other intimate parts of a person done for 

the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party or a third party." RCW 

9A.44.01O(2). 

6 

No. 32718-3-III 

State v. Anguiano 

The elements of a crime can be split between a principal and an accomplice. If 

one of them commits the necessary physical acts and the other has the necessary mental 

state, both can be convicted. State v. Walker, 182 Wn.2d 463, 483,341 P.3d 976 (2015); 

State v. Haack, 88 Wn. App. 423, 427-28, 958 P.2d 1001 (1997). The theory of 

accomplice liability need not be included in the charging document because it is the same 

as direct liability. State v. Carothers, 84 Wn.2d 256, 262, 525 P.2d 731 (1974). As the 

Supreme Court explained in Carothers: 

The legislature has said that anyone who participates in the commission of 

a crime is guilty of the crime and should be charged as a principal, 

regardless of the degree or nature of his participation. Whether he holds the 

gun, holds the victim, keeps a lookout, stands by ready to help the assailant, 

or aids in some other way, he is a participant. The elements of the crime 

remain the same. 

ld. at 264. 

An accomplice "need not participate in or have specific knowledge of every 

element of the crime nor share the same mental state as the principal." State v. Berube, 

150 Wn.2d 498,511, 79 P.3d 1144 (2003). A defendant can be charged as a principal 

and convicted as an accomplice; the jury need not determine the defendant's exact role in 

the crime. State v. Baylor, 17 Wn. App. 616, 618, 565 P .2d 99 (1977), A person is liable 

as an accomplice if, "[w lith knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission 

of the crime, he , , . (i) [s]olicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to 

7 

No. 32718-3-III 

State v. Anguiano 

commit it; or (ii) [a]iqs or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it." 

RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a). 

The first finding of the juvenile court challenged by Mr. Anguiano is its finding 

that he and Mr. Thacker "worked in concert in the commission of this crime." CP at 42. 

Where a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we must "view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the State and determine whether any rational trier 

of fact could have found the elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 

State v. Brown, 162 Wn.2d 422,428, 173 P.3d 245 (2007). In evaluating the sufficiency 

of the evidence, we "must defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, 

credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness ofthe evidence." State v. Thomas, 150 

Wn.2d 821,874-75,83 P.3d 970 (2004). 

"The elements of a crime can be established by both direct and circumstantial 

evidence." State v. Thompson, 88 Wn.2d 13, 16,558 P.2d 202 (1977). Circumstantial 

evidence is considered just as reliable as direct evidence. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 

634,638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980). 

Mr. Anguiano argues that there was no evidence that Mr. Thacker knew that Mr. 

Anguiano was attempting to commit indecent liberties by force. Br. ofAppellant at 9. 

Yet the evidence established that Mr. Thacker, having witnessed Mr. Anguiano; penis in 

hand, asking D.T. to "suck him up," wrestled D.T. to the floor while Mr. Anguiano stood 

three to five feet away. It established that Mr. Anguiano continued to face D.T. with his 

8 

No. 32718-3-111 

State v. Anguiano 

exposed penis in his hand and was dancing around as D.T. swung his free ann at Mr. 

Anguiano in an effort to fend him off. 

Mr. Anguiano would have us conclude that he and Mr. Thacker were engaged in 

independent horseplay without any demonstrated knowledge of the other's intent. But 

the element of intent "may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding 

the commission of an act or acts." State v. Bergeron, 105 Wn.2d 1, 19, 711 P.2d 1000 

(1985); State v. Abuan, 161 Wn. App. 135, 155,257 P.3d 1 (2011) (noting that specific 

criminal intent may be inferred "from conduct that plainly indicates such intent as a 

matter of logical probability"). The juvenile court inferred it here, and it was in the best 

position to weigh credibility and the persuasiveness ofD.T.'s and Mr. Chapin's 

perceptions. Their testimony was substantial evidence that Mr. Thacker's actions both 

encouraged and aided Mr. Anguiano in attempting to have sexual contact by providing 

the necessary force. Substantial evidence therefore supported the juvenile court's finding 

that Mr. Anguiano and Mr. Thacker worked in concert in the commission of the crime. 

Assignment ofError No.2. The court erred in finding: "[D. T.] used his 

free hand to prevent the respondent from having sexual contact with him. " 

CP at 43. 

The second factual finding challenged by Mr. Anguiano is the juvenile court's 

finding that "[D.T.] used his free hand to prevent the respondent from having sexual 

contact with him." CP at 43. Mr. Anguiano concedes that sufficient evidence supports 

the finding that D.T. was swinging his arm; what he challenges is the finding that he was 

9 

No. 32718-3-III 

State v. Anguiano 

doing this to prevent Mr. Anguiano from having sexual contact with him and the implied 

finding that Mr. Anguiano did have the intention of having sexual contact with D.T. 

D.T. testified that after being pulled to the ground and held by Mr. Thacker, "I had 

one arm free and I was swinging with it to keep Adrian away." RP at 33. He testified 

that Mr. Thacker wrestled him to the ground and held him after Mr. Thacker witnessed 

Mr. Anguiano with his penis in his hand, asking D.T. to "suck him up." RP at 32. When 

D.T. was asked how Mr. Anguiano appeared after D.T. had been wrestled to the ground 

and was in Mr. Thacker's hold, he testified "Well he had his, you know, his penis out 

and, you know, he kept saying that stuff like oh it ain't gay. I'm up with on you and stuff 

like that." RP at 33. 

Mr. Chapin testified consistently, recounting that he saw D.T. on the ground, in a 

hold, and "struggling to get away from [Mr. Thacker]," while Mr. Anguiano was three or 

four feet in front ofD.T., penis in hand, "kind of dancing around." RP at 8, 9. Mr. 

Chapin testified that upon seeing Mr. Chapin, Mr. Anguiano pulled up his pants, blushed, 

and "looked like he just knew that he just got caught doing something." RP at 9. D.T. 

testified that following the incident, Mr. Anguiano "told me not to snitch and stuff like 

that." RP at 34. 

This testimony from D.T. and Mr. Chapin is substantial evidence supporting both 

the juvenile court's finding that D.T. was swinging his arm to prevent Mr. Anguiano 

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No. 32718-3-111 

State v. Anguiano 

from having sexual contact with him and its implicit finding that Mr. Anguiano did have 

the intention of having sexual contact with D.T. 

Assignments ofError No.3, 4, and 5. The court erred in concluding: 

"The court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent in 

conjunction with the co-respondent, George Thacker, took a substantial 

step towardforcing [D.T] to have sexual contact with the respondent 

through forcible compulsion." CP at 43; 

"The state does not have to establish that the respondent alone provided 

the forcible compulsion." Id.; and 

Mr. Anguiano was guilty ofattempted indecent liberties by forcible 

compulsion. 

Mr. Anguiano's remaining challenges are to the juvenile court's three conclusions 

of law: (1) that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he, in conjunction with 

Mr. Thacker, "took a substantial step toward forcing [D.T.] to have sexual contact with 

[Mr. Anguiano] through forcible compulsion," (2) that the State does not have to 

establish that Mr. Anguiano alone provided the forcible compulsion, and (3) that Mr. 

Anguiano is guilty of the crime of attempted indecent liberties by forcible compulsion. 

CP at 43. 

In reviewing a conclusion of law, we decide whether it is supported by the 

juvenile court's findings. State v. B.J.s., 140 Wn. App. 91,97,169 P.3d 34 (2007). Our 

review is de novo. Id. We treat unchallenged findings of fact, of which there are several 

11 

No. 32718-3-111 

State v. Anguiano 

in this case, as verities on appeal. State v. Levy, 156 Wn.2d 709, 733, 132 P.3d 1076 

(2006). 

Mr. Anguiano's brief does not provide argument or authority for his challenge to 

the juvenile court's three legal conclusions. His assignment of error to the conclusions 

appears to be predicated entirely on his challenge to the underlying factual findings that 

he intended to have sexual contact with D.T. and acted in concert with Mr. Thacker. He 

evidently relies 'on the fact that ifthe critical findings fail, the conclusions will as well. 

We have held, however, that the challenged findings were supported by substantial 

evidence. 

Given no other suggestion as to why the conclusions oflaw are in error, Mr. 

Anguiano'S remaining assignments of error merit no further discussion. RAP 10.3(a)(6). 

Affirmed. 

A majority ofthe panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040. 1zdLo (5 

Siddoway, C.J. ~, fj" 

WE CONCUR: 

Brown, J. 

12