a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

July 2006 REBUILDING IRAQ

More Comprehensive 

National Strategy 

Needed to Help 

Achieve U.S. Goals

GAO-06-788
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 2006

REBUILDING IRAQ

More Comprehensive National Strategy 

Highlights of GAO-06-788, a report to Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals 

congressional committees 

According to the National Strategy

for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) issued by

the National Security Council

(NSC), prevailing in Iraq is a vital 

U.S. interest because it will help 

win the war on terror and make

America safer, stronger, and more

certain of its future. 

This report (1) assesses the 

evolving U.S. national strategy for

Iraq and (2) evaluates whether the 

NSVI and its supporting documents 

address the desirable 

characteristics of an effective

national strategy developed by

GAO in previous work (see fig.). In

this report, the NSVI and

supporting documents are 

collectively referred to as the U.S. 

strategy for Iraq. 

What GAO Recommends

To help improve the U.S. strategy’s 

usefulness to Congress, this report 

recommends that the NSC, along 

with Defense and State, complete

the strategy by addressing all six 

characteristics of an effective

national strategy in a single

document. 

State and DOD did not comment on 

GAO’s recommendations. State 

noted that the NSVI’s purpose is to 

provide a broad overview. 

However, without detailed 

information on costs and roles and 

responsibilities, the strategy does

not provide Congress with a clear 

road map for achieving victory in 

Iraq. 

The November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and supporting 

documents incorporate the same desired end-state for U.S. stabilization and 

reconstruction operations that were first established by the coalition in 2003: 

a peaceful, united, stable, and secure Iraq, well integrated into the 

international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism. 

However, it is unclear how the United States will achieve its desired endstate in Iraq given the significant changes in the assumptions underlying the 

U.S. strategy. The original plan assumed a permissive security environment. 

However, an increasingly lethal insurgency undermined the development of 

effective Iraqi government institutions and delayed plans for an early

transfer of security responsibilities to the Iraqis. The plan also assumed that 

U.S. reconstruction funds would help restore Iraq’s essential services to 

prewar levels, but Iraq’s capacity to maintain, sustain, and manage its rebuilt 

infrastructure is still being developed. Finally, the plan assumed that the 

Iraqi government and the international community would help finance Iraq’s 

development needs, but Iraq has limited resources to contribute to its own 

reconstruction, and Iraq’s estimated future needs vastly exceed what has 

been offered by the international community to date. 

 

The NSVI is an improvement over previous planning efforts. However, the 

NSVI and its supporting documents are incomplete because they do not fully 

address all the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. On 

one hand, the strategy’s purpose and scope is clear because it identifies U.S.

involvement in Iraq as a vital national interest and central front in the war on 

terror. The strategy also generally addresses the threats and risks facing the 

coalition forces and provides a comprehensive description of the desired 

U.S. political, security, and economic objectives in Iraq. On the other hand, 

the strategy falls short in three key areas. First, it only partially identifies the 

current and future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq, including the costs of 

maintaining U.S. military operations, building Iraqi government capacity at 

the provincial and national level, and rebuilding critical infrastructure. 

Second, it only partially identifies which U.S. agencies implement key 

aspects of the strategy or resolve conflicts among the many implementing 

agencies. Third, it neither fully addresses how U.S. goals and objectives will

be integrated with those of the Iraqi government and the international 

community, nor does it detail the Iraqi government’s anticipated 

contribution to its future security and reconstruction needs. In addition, the 

elements of the strategy are dispersed among the NSVI and seven supporting 

documents, further limiting its usefulness as a planning and oversight tool. 

Generally

addresses

Partially

addresses

Extent the U.S. Strategy for Iraq Addresses GAO’s Desirable Characteristics of an

Effective National Strategy

1. Clear purpose, scope, and methodology

2. Detailed discussion of problems, risks, and threats

3. Desired goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures

4. Description of future costs and resources needed

5. Delineation of U.S. government roles and responsibilities

6. Description of strategy’s integration among and with other entities











 Sources: GAO analysis of NSC, State, and DOD data.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-788.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Joseph 

Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or 

christoffj@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

NSVI Retains Original Desired End-State, but Changing Assumptions 

and Circumstances Make it Unclear How It Will Achieve These 

Objectives 9

The NSVI and Its Supporting Documents Do Not Address All the 

Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy, thus Limiting Its 

Usefulness as a Planning Tool 16

Conclusion 27

Recommendation for Executive Action 28

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 33

Appendix II: GAO’s Description of the Six Characteristics of an Effective 

National Strategy 36

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State 41

GAO Comments 47

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense 51

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 52

Related GAO Products 53

Tables Table 1: National Strategy for Victory in Iraq 6

Table 2: Desirable Characteristics for an Effective National 

Strategy 37

Figures Figure 1: NSVI and Key Supporting Documents 8

Figure 2: Evolution of the Objectives and Assumptions of U.S. 

Stabilization and Reconstruction Efforts in Iraq 10

Figure 3: Extent the U.S. Strategy for Iraq Addresses GAO’s 

Desirable Characteristics of an Effective Strategy 18
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Abbreviations

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CPA Coalition Provincial Authority

DOD Department of Defense

IMF International Monetary Fund

IRRF2 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Fiscal Year 2004

ISF Iraqi Security Forces

ISSF Iraq Security and Stabilization Fund

IT information technology

mbpd million barrels per day

MNF-I Multinational Forces-Iraq 

MNC-I Multinational Corps-Iraq

NSC National Security Council

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive

NSSI National Strategy for Supporting Iraq

NSVI National Strategy for Victory in Iraq

R&D research and development

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

July 11, 2006 Letr

Congressional Committees 

In November 2005, the National Security Council (NSC) issued the National 

Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President’s existing 

strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq. 

According to this document, prevailing in Iraq is a vital U.S. national 

interest because it will help win the war on terror and make America safer, 

stronger, and more certain of its future. To achieve victory, the strategy 

requires the United States to maintain troops in Iraq until its objectives are 

achieved, adjusting the number up or down as conditions warrant. 

Currently, the United States deploys about 130,000 U.S. troops in support of 

the Iraqi government. Between fiscal years 2003 and 2006, the U.S. 

government has allocated about $311 billion to support U.S. stabilization 

and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including over $34 billion for 

reconstruction assistance alone. Moreover, the administration has 

requested about an additional $51 billion to support U.S. stabilization and 

reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in fiscal year 2007.1

We initiated this review under the Comptroller General’s authority because 

of broad based congressional interest in Iraq issues.2

 This report (1) 

describes the evolution of the U.S. national strategy for Iraq in response to 

changing, security, reconstruction, and economic circumstances and (2) 

evaluates whether the NSVI and its supporting documents include the 

desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. In this report, the 

NSVI and its supporting documents are referred to as the U.S. strategy for 

Iraq.

1

These figures include funds appropriated in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 

Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror and Hurricane Recovery 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-234, 

signed into law by the President on June 15, 2006. The supplemental includes $54.9 billion 

for defense operations in Iraq, plus $3 billion to develop Iraqi security forces and $1.5 billion 

to continue reconstruction efforts in Iraq. For fiscal year 2007, the defense budget request 

includes $50 billion that the Office of Management and Budget terms “bridge funding” to 

continue the global war on terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department of State’s 

2007 budget submission requests an additional $771 million for reconstruction activities in 

Iraq.

2

Since 2003, GAO has issued 22 reports and testimonies on the rebuilding of Iraq. See the list 

of Related GAO Products at the end of this report.
Page 2 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

To accomplish our objectives, we obtained and analyzed records, reports, 

and data from U.S. government and military officials in Washington, D.C., 

and Baghdad, Iraq. We also examined the reports of other oversight entities 

that performed internal control and management reviews. We assessed the 

strategy using the six desirable characteristics of an effective national 

strategy developed in previous GAO work. For example, GAO has used this 

methodology to assess and report on the administration’s strategies 

relating to terrorism and restructuring the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

global force posture.3

 National strategies with these characteristics offer 

policy makers and implementing agencies a management tool that can help 

ensure accountability and more effective results. The six characteristics 

are (1) a clear purpose, scope, methodology; (2) a detailed discussion of 

the problems, risks, and threats the strategy intends to address; (3) the 

desired goals and objectives, and outcome-related performance measures; 

(4) a description of the U.S. resources needed to implement the strategy; 

(5) a clear delineation of the U.S. government roles, responsibilities, and 

mechanisms for coordination; and (6) a description of how the strategy is 

integrated internally among U.S. agencies and externally with the Iraqi 

government and international organizations. These six characteristics can 

be subdivided into 27 separate elements for more detailed assessment.

We evaluated the NSVI alone and in conjunction with seven related 

classified and unclassified supporting documents that Department of State 

(State) and DOD officials said encompassed the U.S. strategy: (1) the 

National Security Presidential Directive 36 (May 2004), (2) Multinational 

Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) Campaign Plan (August 2004), (3) the MNF-I/ U.S. 

Embassy Baghdad Joint Mission Statement on Iraq (December 2005), (4) 

the Multinational Corps-Iraq Operation Order 05-03 (December 2005), (5) 

the National Strategy for Supporting Iraq (updated January 2006), (6) the 

quarterly State Section 2207 reports to Congress (through April 2006),4

 and 

(7) the April 2006 Joint Campaign Plan issued by the Chief of Mission and 

the Commander of the MNF-I. See appendix I for a more detailed 

3

See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 

Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004) and GAO,

Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Periodic Reporting Are Needed to 

Gauge Progress and Costs of DOD’s Global Posture Restructuring. GAO-06-486C

(Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006).

4

Required by section 2207 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense 

and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, fiscal year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106.
Page 3 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

description of our scope and methodology. See appendix II for details on 

GAO’s six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. 

We conducted our review from October 2005 through June 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief The NSVI and supporting documents incorporate the same desired endstate for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq that the 

coalition established in 2003: a peaceful, united, stable, and secure Iraq, 

well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the 

global war on terrorism. Since then, however, the strategy’s underlying 

security, reconstruction, and economic assumptions have evolved in 

response to changing circumstances. First, the original plan assumed a 

permissive security environment, which never materialized. An active and 

increasingly lethal insurgency undermined the development of effective 

Iraqi governmental institutions and delayed plans for an early transfer of 

security responsibilities to the Iraqis. Second, the United States assumed 

that its U.S.-funded reconstruction activities would help restore Iraq’s 

essential services—oil production, electricity generation, and water 

treatment—to prewar levels. However, U.S. efforts to achieve this goal 

have been hindered by security, management, and maintenance challenges 

that undermine efforts to improve the lives of the Iraqi people. For 

example, a March 2006 poll of Iraqi citizens indicated that a majority 

thought Iraq was heading in the wrong direction, and growing numbers of 

people believe that the security situation, the provision of electricity, and 

corruption have worsened. Third, the strategy assumes that the Iraqi 

government and international community will help finance Iraq’s 

development needs. However, Iraq has limited resources to contribute to 

its own reconstruction, and while the international community has offered 

some assistance, Iraq’s estimated reconstruction needs vastly exceed what 

has been offered to date. As a result, it is unclear how the United States will 

achieve its desired end-state in Iraq given these significant changes in the 

underlying assumptions.

The NSVI aims to improve U.S. strategic planning for Iraq; however, the 

NSVI and its supporting documents are incomplete because they do not 

fully address all the desirable characteristics of an effective national 

strategy. On one hand, the strategy’s purpose and scope is clear because it 

identifies U.S. involvement in Iraq as a vital national interest and central 

front in the war on terror. The strategy also discusses the threats and risks 

facing the coalition forces and provides a comprehensive description of 
Page 4 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

U.S. political, security, and economic goals and objectives in Iraq. However, 

discussion of outcome-related performance measures to assess progress in 

achieving these goals and objectives is limited. The strategy falls short in 

three key areas. First, it neither identifies the current and future costs of 

U.S. involvement in Iraq, such as the costs of maintaining U.S. military 

operations, building Iraqi government capacity at the provincial and 

national level, completing the training and equipping of Iraqi security 

forces, and rebuilding critical infrastructure, nor does it address how these 

efforts should take the risk of corruption into account when assessing the 

costs of achieving U.S. objectives in Iraq. Second, the strategy does not 

clearly identify who will implement key aspects of the strategy or a process 

for resolving conflict among the many implementing agencies, a problem 

identified in prior State and other agency reviews. Third, while the strategy 

recognizes the need to integrate U.S. goals and objectives with the efforts 

of the international partners and the Iraqi government, it neither addresses 

how their goals and objectives are to be integrated with those of the United 

States, nor does it provide details on the Iraqi government’s contribution to 

its future financing requirements. In addition, the elements of the strategy 

are dispersed among a number of supporting documents, further limiting 

its usefulness as a planning and oversight tool.

To help improve the strategy’s effectiveness as a planning tool and to 

improve its usefulness to Congress, this report recommends that the NSC 

in conjunction with the DOD and State complete the strategy by addressing 

all six characteristics of an effective national strategy in a single document. 

In particular, the revised strategy should address the current costs and 

future military and civilian resources needed to implement the strategy, 

clarify the roles and responsibilities of all U.S. government agencies 

involved in reconstruction and stabilization efforts, and detail potential 

Iraqi and international contributions to future military and reconstruction 

needs. State and DOD did not comment on our recommendations. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, State asserted that GAO 

misrepresented the NSVI’s purpose—to provide the public a broad 

overview of the U.S. strategy in Iraq. Our analysis was not limited to the 

publicly available, unclassified NSVI. With input from DOD and State, we 

included in our assessment all the classified and unclassified documents 

that collectively define the U.S. strategy in Iraq. Collectively, these 

documents still lack all the key characteristics of an effective national 

strategy. However, we refined our recommendation to focus on the need to 

improve the U.S. strategy for Iraq.
Page 5 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Background Prior to the fall of 2005, the U.S. stabilization and reconstruction effort in 

Iraq lacked a clear, comprehensive, and integrated U.S. strategy. State 

assessments and other U.S. government reports noted that this hindered 

the implementation of U.S. stabilization and reconstruction plans. A review 

of the U.S. mission completed in October 2005 found, among other things, 

that (1) no unified strategic plan existed that effectively integrated U.S. 

government political, military, and economic efforts; (2) multiple plans in 

Iraq and Washington have resulted in competing priorities and funding 

levels not proportional to the needs of overall mission objectives; (3) 

focused leadership and clear roles are lacking among State, DOD, and other 

agencies in the field and in Washington, D.C.; and (4) a more realistic 

assessment of the capacity limitations of Iraqi central and local government 

is needed.

The study made a series of recommendations that led to the creation of the 

November 2005 NSVI, including (1) creating a single, joint civil-military 

operational plan to clarify organizational leads; (2) providing better 

strategic direction and more coordinated engagement with Iraqi 

government and international donors; (3) establishing three mission teams 

to address political, security, and economic tasks; and (4) establishing 

provincial reconstruction teams to engage Iraqi leadership and foster 

flexible reconstruction, local governance, and “bottom-up” economic 

development. The study also called for a streamlined interagency support 

office in Washington, D.C., to assist the mission’s working groups and 

provide needed institutional memory and continuity. In response, the 

administration created the NSVI in November 2005 to reorganize U.S. 

government stabilization and reconstruction efforts around three broad 

tracks—political, security, and economic—and eight strategic objectives 

(see table 1).
Page 6 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Table 1: National Strategy for Victory in Iraq

Source: NSVI, November 2005.

Overall, officials in DOD and State identified seven documents that 

describe the U.S. government strategy for Iraq in addition to the NSVI. The 

U.S. government uses these documents to plan, conduct, and track 

different levels of the U.S. stabilization and reconstruction strategy as 

follows:

• National/strategic level: The President and the NSC established the 

desired end-state, goals and objectives, and the integrated approach 

incorporated in the NSVI. The May 2004 NSPD 36 made State 

responsible for all U.S. activities in Iraq through its Chief of Mission in 

Baghdad (Ambassador), with the exception of U.S. efforts relating to 

security and military operations, which would be the responsibility of 

DOD. The directive also continued the U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM) responsibility for all U.S. government efforts to organize, 

Purpose Definition of victory

Integrates U.S. efforts along three 

tracks Objectives

To articulate the 

President’s 2003 

statement on the U.S. 

strategy:

“The United States has no 

intention of determining the 

precise form of Iraq’s new 

government.... Yet we will 

ensure that one brutal 

dictator is not replaced by 

another. All Iraqis must 

have a voice in the new 

government and all citizens 

must have their rights 

protected. Rebuilding Iraq 

will require a sustained 

commitment from many 

nations, including our own: 

we will remain in Iraq as 

long as necessary, and not 

a day more.”

--President Bush, February 

26, 2003

Victory in Iraq is a vital national 

interest. Prevailing in Iraq will 

help win the war on terror as it 

will make America safer, 

stronger, and more certain of its 

future.

Victory is tied to conditions on 

the ground and defined in the 

following stages:

Short term: Steady progress 

fighting terrorists, meeting 

political milestones, building 

democratic institutions, 

standing up security forces.

Medium term: Iraq leads fight 

to defeat terrorists and provides 

own security, constitutional 

government fully in place and is 

on its way economically.

Long term: Peaceful, united, 

stable, secure, well integrated 

into the international 

community, and a partner in war 

on terror.

Political (Isolate, Engage, Build)

• Isolate hardened enemies from those 

who can be won over.

• Engage those outside the political 

process and invite peaceful 

participation.

• Build stable, pluralistic, and effective 

national institutions that can protect the 

interests of all Iraqis.

Security (Clear, Hold, Build)

• Clear areas of enemy control.

• Hold freed areas by ensuring they 

remain under Iraqi government and Iraqi 

security forces (ISF) control.

• Build ISF and local institutions to deliver 

services, advance rule of law, and 

nurture civil society. 

Economic (Restore, Reform, Build)

• Restore infrastructure.

• Reform economy.

• Build Iraqi capacity to maintain 

infrastructure, rejoin the international 

economic community, and improve 

general welfare of all Iraqis.

Encompasses the following 

eight strategic objectives:

1. Defeat the terrorists and 

neutralize the insurgency.

2. Help Iraq’s security forces 

become self-reliant.

3. Help Iraqis forge a 

national compact for 

democratic government.

4. Help Iraq build 

government capacity and 

provide essential 

services.

5. Help Iraq strengthen its 

economy.

6. Help Iraq strengthen rule 

of law and promote civil 

rights.

7. Increase international 

support for Iraq.

8. Strengthen public 

understanding of U.S.-led 

coalition efforts and public 

isolation of insurgents.
Page 7 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

equip, and train Iraqi security forces. MNF-I oversees the effort to 

rebuild the Iraqi security forces through a subordinate command. The 

National Strategy for Supporting Iraq (NSSI) serves as a management 

tool to match and coordinate U.S. stabilization and reconstruction needs 

and priorities and provides updates on activities associated with each 

strategic objective.

• Operational level: The Joint Mission Statement clarified the roles and 

responsibilities between the Chief of Mission in Baghdad and the 

Commander of MNF-I and established mission milestones and target 

dates for their achievement. The August 2004 campaign plan elaborated 

and refined the original plan for transferring security responsibilities to 

Iraqi forces.5

 In April 2006, Commander of the MNF-I and the Chief of 

Mission in Baghdad issued a new classified Joint Campaign Plan 

incorporating the changes in organization laid out in the NSVI, although 

some of the annexes to this campaign plan are being reworked and were 

not available as of May 2006.

• Implementation and reporting level: Operations Order 05-03 

incorporates revised missions and objectives for the Multinational 

Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), the MNF-I unit responsible for command and 

control of operations throughout Iraq. This November 2005 order was 

issued in anticipation of the New Joint Campaign Plan incorporating the 

NSVI’s new objectives and organizational arrangements, according to 

DOD officials. The campaign plans and the operations order also 

established metrics for assessing their progress in achieving MNF-I’s 

objectives. State’s 2207 reports track mission activity and funding status 

by mission objective and funding sector.

Figure 1 depicts the relationship of the NSVI and the key supporting 

strategy documents.

5

For changes and updates in the campaign plan, see GAO’s classified report, GAO,

Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and Security 

Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq, GAO-05-868C (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 

2005). 
Page 8 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Figure 1: NSVI and Key Supporting Documents

In addition to these documents, senior State officials stated that 

Congressional Budget Justifications and publications on Iraq spending 

Source: GAO. 

Secretary 

of Defense

Secretary 

of State

Commander 

MNF-I

Chief of 

Mission 

Bagdad

National Security 

Council

Levels Documents

NSPD 36

U.S. administration

NSSI

Joint Mission Statement

Campaign 

plans

2207 

reports to 

Congress

Operations

Order

National/strategic

level

Operational

level

Implementation and reporting

level

NSVI

MNF-I Multinational Forces - Iraq

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive 

NSSI National Strategy for Supporting Iraq
Page 9 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

provide additional details on the U.S. government resources, investments, 

and risk management. DOD officials stated that its quarterly reports to 

measure the results of its fiscal year 2005 Iraq Security and Stabilization 

Fund programs in Iraq also provide information, but DOD did not cite these 

reports as supporting documentation for the NSVI. 

NSVI Retains Original 

Desired End-State, but 

Changing Assumptions 

and Circumstances 

Make it Unclear How It 

Will Achieve These 

Objectives 

The NSVI, issued by the NSC in November 2005, incorporates the same 

desired end-state for U.S. operations in Iraq that first was established by 

the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003: a peaceful, united, 

stable, secure Iraq, well integrated into the international community, and a 

full partner in the global war on terrorism.6

 Since then, however, the 

strategy’s underlying security, reconstruction, and economic assumptions 

have changed in response to changing circumstances (see fig. 2). First, the 

original plan assumed a permissive security environment that never 

materialized. Second, the CPA assumed that U.S. funded reconstruction 

activities would help restore Iraq’s essential services to prewar levels but 

has failed to achieve these goals. Third, the strategy assumes that the 

international community and Iraqi government will help finance Iraq’s 

development needs; however, these expectations have not yet been met. As 

a result, it is unclear how the United States will achieve its desired 

end-state in Iraq given these changes in assumptions and circumstances.

6

The CPA, established in May 2003, was a U.N.-recognized entity responsible for the 

temporary governance of Iraq, and for overseeing, directing, and coordinating the 

reconstruction effort. In August 2003, the CPA began to draw up a multiyear strategy to 

implement the reconstruction and stabilization of Iraq based on 10 spending categories 

identified in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for 

Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106, which made available 

$18.4 billion for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. The CPA was dissolved once a 

sovereign Iraqi government assumed power on June 28, 2004. Management authority and 

responsibility of the U.S. reconstruction program also transitioned from DOD to State at 

that time.
Page 10 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Figure 2: Evolution of the Objectives and Assumptions of U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction Efforts in Iraq 

Political

isolate-engage-build

Provide 

essential 

services at acceptable 

standard accessible 

by all 

citizens

Provide market structures/ fiscal 

and regulatory 

conditions to 

sustain growth, 

private sector, 

jobs and rising 

living standards

Representative 

government that 

promotes rights of all, 

democratically agreed 

constitution, transparent 

electoral process, 

political institutions

intolerant of corruption

Use strategic communications to foster unity of 

effort among 

Iraqis, coalition, and

international 

community 

Defeat 

terrorists/ 

Ba’athists

and

provide a secure 

environment

Ensure 

legitimate 

elections

in

Jan. 2005

Create 

jobs and 

provide 

essential services

Establish 

foundation 

for strong 

economy 

Promote 

rule of 

law

Increase 

international 

support 

Neutralize 

insurgents; 

maintain 

domestic 

order

Six 

principal 

objectives

Key

assumptions

Key

assumptions

Five

principal 

objectives 

Key

assumptions

Eight

principal

objectives 

Permissive security environment requires 162,000 Iraqi troops and police

Hostile security environment requires 271,000 Iraqi troops and police

U.S. priority: restore infrastructure to prewar state by focusing on 2,300 projects over 3 years

Emphasis and funding shifted from long-term 

infrastructure projects to higher or immediate impact programs to address security situation and pending Iraqi elections

Iraqis, coalition, and international organizations to provide traditional development

U.S. reallocations to elections, agriculture, and private sector provide up to 800,000 short- and long-term jobs

Transition 

Iraq to 

security

self-reliance

Help Iraqis forge 

a compact for 

democratic 

government

Help Iraq build 

government 

capacity and 

essential 

services

Help Iraq

strengthen 

the 

economy 

Increase 

international 

support for 

Iraq

Strengthen public 

understanding of 

coalition efforts and 

public isolation of 

the insurgents 

Help Iraq

strengthen 

the rule of 

law

Defeat 

terrorists; 

neutralize 

insurgents

Security environment requires 326,000 Iraqi troops and police. Coalition forces will remain to fight terrorists and train Iraqi 

forces until the mission is done, adjusting troop levels only as conditions warrant

Eight strategic objectives (pillars) and corresponding interagency working groups

U.S. priority: assist the Iraqi government develop the capacity to manage and sustain its own reconstruction

International assistance is needed to help Iraq rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure in order to help it achieve its economic potential

Security

clear-hold-build

Economic restore-reform-build

CPA Strategic Plan: 2003–2004

State Plans and Reports: September 2004-January 2005

U.S. Strategy for Iraq: November 2005

Sources: GAO analysis of CPA plans, NSSI, NSVI, and State 2207 reports.

Desired end-state

for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq:

a peaceful, united, stable, and secure Iraq, well integrated into the 

international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism
Page 11 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Permissive Security 

Environment Never 

Materialized

According to senior CPA and State officials, in 2003 the CPA assumed that 

Iraq would have a permissive security environment. CPA expected that a 

relatively small internal security force would replace the disbanded Iraqi 

Army and would quickly assume responsibility for providing security from 

the coalition forces. However, growing insurgent attacks led to (1) the 

collapse of Iraqi forces in April 2004; (2) the delay of coalition plans to turn 

responsibility for security over to the new Iraqi security forces beginning in 

early 2004; and (3) the postponement of plans to draw down U.S. troop 

levels below 138,000 until the end of 2005. In October 2004, State reported 

to Congress that the uncertain security situation affected all potential 

economic and political developments in Iraq and that enhanced Iraqi 

security forces were critically needed to meet the new threat environment. 

The coalition’s military commander and the U.S. Chief of Mission 

conducted strategic and programmatic reviews in mid-2004 and reached 

similar conclusions, noting that the hostile security situation required the 

creation of substantially larger Iraqi security forces with coalition 

assistance. 

As a result, between 2003 and 2006, the projected Iraq security force 

structure doubled in size, while U.S. appropriations for support of the Iraqi 

security forces more than quadrupled. CPA projected the need for a 

security force of about 162,000 personnel (including about 77,000 armed 

forces and National Guard troops and 85,000 police) in 2003. Current plans 

call for 325,500 security personnel to be organized under coalition 

direction: including completing the initial training and equipping of the 

137,500 in the Iraqi Armed Forces and 188,000 police and other interior 

ministry forces by the end of December 2006. U.S. assistance appropriated 

for Iraqi security forces and law enforcement has grown from $3.24 billion 

in January 2004 to approximately $13.7 billion in June 2006.7

 As GAO 

recently reported, the insurgency remains strong and resilient in 2005 and 

early 2006, the intensity and lethality of attacks have been growing, and the 

insurgency threatens to undermine the development of effective Iraqi 

governmental institutions.8

 

7

This figure includes $5 billion from the IRRF2 funds, $5.7 billion to support Iraqi security 

forces appropriated in the Emergency Supplemental Act for Defense, the Global War on 

Terror and Tsunami Relief 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, and $3 billion in supplemental fiscal year 

2006 funds to support Iraqi security forces.

8

See GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing 

Challenges GAO-06-697T (Washington D.C.: Apr. 25, 2006).
Page 12 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Essential Services Have Not 

Been Restored to Prewar 

Levels, Undermining Efforts 

to Improve the Lives of Iraqi 

People 

The U.S. strategy initially assumed that its U.S.-funded reconstruction 

activities would help restore Iraq’s essential services—including oil 

production, electricity generation, and water treatment—to prewar levels. 

However, the U.S. efforts have yet to restore Iraq’s essential services to 

prewar levels, and efforts to achieve these goals have been hindered by 

security, management, and maintenance challenges. As a result, the United 

States has yet to prove that it has made a difference in the Iraqi people’s 

quality of life. 

According to senior CPA and State officials responsible for the strategy, the 

CPA’s 2003 reconstruction plan assumed (1) that creating or restoring basic 

essential services for the Iraqi people took priority over jobs creation and 

the economy and (2) that the United States should focus its resources on 

long-term infrastructure reconstruction projects because of the expertise 

the United States could provide. According to the senior CPA official 

tasked with developing the reconstruction plan, CPA drew up a prioritized 

list of more than 2,300 construction projects in 10 sectors to be completed 

in about 3 years, which were to be funded by the $18.4 billion made 

available in the fiscal year 2004 supplemental appropriation for the 2004 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF2).9

 The U.S. reconstruction 

effort focused primarily on building or restoring essential services to 

prewar levels—or to a standard acceptable to and accessible by all Iraqi 

citizens–over the long-term with less emphasis on more immediate 

development tasks. CPA initially allocated about two-thirds of the IRRF2 

funds to restore essential services in the oil, water, and electricity sectors, 

while more immediate projects in democracy building, private sector 

development, and the employment sector received about 3 percent. 

However, the coalition’s decision in November 2003 to accelerate the 

return of power to a sovereign Iraqi interim government and changes in the 

security situation altered these assumptions, leading the U.S. 

administration to reallocate a total of $3.5 billion between January 2004 

and April 2006 from the water resources and sanitation and electric sectors 

to security, law enforcement, justice, and democracy building and 

employment programs. For example, the mission reallocated over $555 

9

The 10 sectors are: (1) security and law enforcement: (2) justice, public safety, and civil 

society (including democracy building activities); (3) electric sector; (4) oil infrastructure; 

(5) water resources and sanitation; (6) transportation and telecommunications; (7) roads, 

bridges, and construction; (8) health care; (9) private sector development; and (10) 

education, refugees, human rights, and governance. 
Page 13 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

million in IRRF2 funds to democracy programs and reallocated $105 

million to improve productivity and employment in the agriculture sector 

to support the Iraqi government as it prepared for elections. A World Bank 

report stated that the agriculture sector employed 18 percent of Iraq’s labor 

force and accounted for about 10 percent of gross domestic product in 

2004. Before this time, the United States had devoted no IRRF2 resources 

to the agricultural sector.

U.S. expectations about Iraq’s capacity to manage and sustain its own 

reconstruction efforts have not been realized and have resulted in greater 

U.S. emphasis on capacity development. As reported in prior GAO reports, 

the U.S. reconstruction effort has encountered difficulties in maintaining 

new and rehabilitated infrastructure, resulting in some U.S.-funded 

projects becoming damaged or inoperable after being turned over to the 

Iraqis.10 For example, as of June 2005, U.S.-funded water and sanitation 

projects representing about $52 million of approximately $200 million 

spent on completed projects were inoperable or were operating at lower 

than normal capacity. Recent U.S. mission assessments have noted the Iraqi 

government’s limited capacity to provide services to the Iraqi people due to 

weak technical expertise, limitations in managers’ skills and training, and 

an inability to identify and articulate strategic priorities, and other factors. 

As a result, the administration reallocated $170 million for government 

capacity building programs and $133 million for infrastructure operations 

and maintenance needs in 2005 and early 2006.

As GAO has reported previously, these challenges contributed to the 

cancellation or delay of projects in the essential services sectors, affecting 

U.S. efforts to achieve its targets in the oil, electricity, and water sectors, 

and undermining its efforts to improve the quality of life for the Iraqi 

people. A March 2006 poll of Iraqi citizens indicated that over half the 

respondents thought Iraq was heading in the wrong direction. Moreover, 

the poll reports that over the last year, growing numbers believe that the 

security situation, the provision of electricity, the prevalence of corruption, 

and the state of the economy worsened.11

10See GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges, 

GAO-06-428T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2006), and GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and 

Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained 

Resources for Maintaining Facilities, GAO-05-872 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005).

11Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion, International Republican Institute (Washington, D.C.: 

March 23-31, 2006).
Page 14 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Expected Level of Iraq and 

International Community 

Financial Support for Iraq’s 

Developmental Needs Have 

Not Yet Been Met 

From the outset of the reconstruction and stabilization effort, the U.S. 

strategy assumed that the Iraqis and the international community would 

help finance Iraq’s developmental needs. However, these expectations have 

not yet been met, and Iraq’s estimated future reconstruction needs vastly 

exceed what has been offered to date. According to a CPA report and 

senior CPA and State officials, the 2003 CPA plan assumed that the Iraqis 

and the international community would support development needs that 

were not financed by the United States. For example, a CPA report 

assumed that Iraqi oil revenues could help pay for reconstruction costs 

because it estimated that Iraq’s oil production would increase to about 2.8 

to 3.0 million barrels per day (mbpd) by the end of 2004, a one-third 

increase over 2002 levels, and generate about $15 billion in oil export 

revenue for the year. 

These expectations about Iraq’s ability to contribute to and manage its own 

reconstruction have not been realized in practice. U.S. agency documents 

estimated Iraq’s 2003 actual prewar crude oil production at 2.6 mbpd. In 

March 2006, State reported that oil production was about 2 mbpd. A 

combination of insurgent attacks on crude oil and product pipelines, 

dilapidated infrastructure, and poor operations and maintenance have 

hindered domestic refining and have required Iraq to import significant 

portions of liquefied petroleum gas, gasoline, kerosene, and diesel. In 

addition, although the capacity for export is theoretically as high as 2.5 

mbpd, export levels averaged about 1.4 mbpd in 2005. Shortfalls in 

expected oil production levels and increased security spending contributed 

to reductions in Iraq’s own projections of how much of the budget would be 

available to contribute to its own reconstruction.12 In 2005, Iraq’s 

government budgeted approximately $5 billion for capital expenditures, 

but a senior U.S. mission official stated that they managed to spend only a 

few hundred million by the end of the year. He attributed this to Iraq 

ministries’ lack of expertise to manage projects, write contracts, and 

provide effective controls on the contracting process. 

The strategy’s assumptions about the need for extensive international 

donor support for rebuilding Iraq’s reconstruction have not significantly 

changed since 2003, although the estimated cost of restoring Iraq’s 

12As of April 2006, Iraq’s security-related spending is currently projected to be about $5.3 

billion in 2006, growing from 7 to about 13 percent of projected GDP. The amount reflects 

the rising costs of security and the transfer of security responsibilities from the United 

States to Iraq.
Page 15 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

infrastructure has grown significantly since October 2003. At that time, a 

World Bank, United Nations, and CPA assessment initially estimated that it 

would cost about $56 billion to meet reconstruction needs across a variety 

of sectors in Iraq. The United States committed about $24 billion for relief 

and reconstruction in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, with the expectation the 

Iraqis and the international community would provide the rest. Other 

foreign donors pledged about $13.6 billion to rebuild Iraq. According to 

State documents, international donors have provided over $3.5 billion in 

the form of multilateral and bilateral grants as of April 2006.13 About $10 

billion, or 70 percent, of the pledged amount is in the form of loans, 

primarily from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 

and Japan. As GAO has reported previously, however, Iraq currently owes a 

combined $84 billion to victims of its invasion of Kuwait and other external 

creditors, which may limit its capacity to assume more debt. Moreover, 

Iraq's needs are greater than originally anticipated due to severely 

degraded infrastructure, postconflict looting and sabotage, and additional 

security costs. In the oil sector alone, Iraq will now likely need an estimated 

$30 billion over the next several years to reach and sustain an oil 

production capacity of 5 million barrels per day, according to industry 

experts and U.S. officials. For the electricity sector, Iraq projects that it will 

need $20 billion through 2010 to boost electrical capacity, according to the 

Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration. While the 

NSVI does not identify the magnitude of additional financing needed, it 

acknowledges that there is “room for the international community to do 

more.” 

13Donors also have provided bilateral assistance for Iraq reconstruction activities; however, 

complete information on this assistance is not readily available.
Page 16 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

The NSVI and Its 

Supporting Documents 

Do Not Address All the 

Characteristics of an 

Effective National 

Strategy, thus Limiting 

Its Usefulness as a 

Planning Tool

The NSVI aims to improve U.S. strategic planning for Iraq; however, the 

NSVI and its supporting documents are incomplete because they do not 

fully address the six desirable characteristics of effective national 

strategies that GAO has identified through its prior work.14 We used these 

six characteristics to evaluate the NSVI and the supporting documents that 

DOD and State officials said encompassed the U.S. strategy for rebuilding 

and stabilizing Iraq. As figure 3 shows, the strategy generally addresses 

three of the six characteristics but only partially addresses three others, 

limiting its usefulness to guide agency implementation efforts and achieve 

desired results.15 Moreover, since the strategy is dispersed among several 

documents instead of one, its effectiveness as a planning tool for 

implementing agencies and for informing Congress about the pace, costs, 

and intended results of these efforts is limited. 

14GAO-04-408T.

15We use the term “strategy” collectively to refer to the NSVI and its supporting documents.
Page 17 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

[This page left blank intentionally.]
Page 18 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Figure 3: Extent the U.S. Strategy for Iraq Addresses GAO’s Desirable Characteristics of an Effective Strategy

Goals and subordinate objectives

NSVI 

NSVI + 7

documents

Extent the U.S. Strategy for Iraq Addresses GAO’s Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy

1. Clear purpose, scope, methodology

2. Detailed discussion of problems, risks, and threats

3. Desired goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures

1a. Identifies the impetus that led to the strategy being written, such as a statutory requirement, mandate, or key event. 

1b. Discusses the strategy’s purpose.

2a. Includes a detailed discussion or definition of the problems the strategy intends to address.

2b. Includes a detailed discussion of the causes of the problems.

2c. Includes a detailed discussion of the operating environment.

1d. Discusses the process that produced the strategy, e.g., what organizations or offices drafted the document, whether it was the result of a working 

group, or which parties were consulted in its development.

1e. Discusses assumptions or the principles and theories that guided the strategy’s development.

1c. Defines or discusses key terms, major functions, mission areas, or activities the strategy covers. 

Scope 

2d. Addresses a detailed discussion of the threats at which the strategy is directed.

2e. Discusses the quality of data available, e.g., constraints, deficiencies, and “unknowns.”

3a. Addresses the overall results desired, i.e., an “end-state.” 

3b. Identifies strategic goals and subordinate objectives.

3c. Identifies specific activities to achieve results.

Purpose

Methodology

Risk assessment

Activities

Problem definition

Sources: GAO analysis of NSC, State, and DOD data.

Partially addresses

Addresses

Does not address

3d. Addresses priorities, milestones, and outcome-related performance measures. 

3e. Identifies process to monitor and report on progress.

3f. Identifies limitations on progress indicators.

Performance measures
Page 19 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

NSVI 

NSVI + 7

documents

Extent the U.S. Strategy for Iraq Addresses GAO’s Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy

4. Description of future costs and resources needed

5. Delineation of U.S. government roles and responsibilities

6. Description of strategy’s integration among and with other entities

4a. Identifies what the strategy will cost.

4b. Identifies the sources, e.g., federal, international, and private, and types of resources or investments needed, e.g., budgetary, human capital, 

information technology, research and development, and contracts.

5a. Addresses who will implement the strategy.

5b. Addresses lead, support, and partner roles and responsibilities of specific federal agencies, departments, or offices, e.g., who is in charge 

during all phases of the strategy’s implementation.

4c. Addresses where resources or investments should be targeted to balance risks and costs.

4d. Addresses resource allocation mechanisms.

4e. Identifies risk management principles and how they help implementing parties prioritize and allocate resources.

Risk management

5c. Addresses mechanisms and/or processes for parties to coordinate efforts within agencies and with other agencies.

5d. Identifies process for resolving conflicts.

6a. Addresses how the strategy relates to the strategies of other institutions and organizations’ and their goals, objectives, and activities

(horizontal).

6b. Addresses integration with relevant documents from other agencies and subordinate levels (vertical).

Resources and investments

Coordination

Organizational roles and responsibilities

Sources: GAO analysis of NSC, State, and DOD data.

Partially addresses

Addresses

Does not address
Page 20 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Strategy Discusses Purpose 

and Scope, Identifies Risks 

and Threats, and Discusses 

Desired Goals and 

Objectives

The strategy generally addresses three of the six characteristics. As figure 3 

shows, the strategy provides: (1) a clear statement of its purpose and 

scope; (2) a detailed discussion of the problems the strategy intends to 

address; and (3) an explanation of its goals, subordinate objectives, and 

activities.

U.S. Strategy Identifies Purpose 

and Scope

This characteristic addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of 

its coverage, and the process by which it was developed. A complete 

description of purpose, scope, and methodology make the document more 

useful to organizations responsible for implementing the strategies, as well 

as to oversight organizations such as Congress. The strategy identifies U.S. 

involvement in Iraq as a vital national interest, identifies the risks and 

threats facing coalition forces, and discusses overarching U.S. political, 

security, and economic objectives. Specifically, the NSVI identifies U.S. 

government efforts to rebuild and stabilize Iraq in terms of three 

overarching political, security, and economic objectives and addresses the 

assumptions that guided its development. For example, to help Iraq achieve 

the strategic goal of forging a national compact for democratic 

government, the strategy’s subordinate objectives state that the United 

States would help promote transparency in the executive, legislative, and 

judicial branches of government, and help build national institutions that 

transcend regional and sectarian interests, among other activities. To help 

achieve another strategic goal, building government capacity and providing 

essential services, the strategy also states that the U.S. government is 

helping to achieve this objective by rehabilitating critical infrastructure in 

the fuel and electric power sectors. It is also rehabilitating schools, 

providing new textbooks, computers, and materials; and training teachers 

and school administrative staff. One supporting document, State’s 2207 

report to Congress, provides additional supporting details and data for the 

specific activities and projects funded through the $18.4 billion in fiscal 

year 2004 reconstruction funds. 

Strategy Identifies Risks and 

Threats 

This characteristic addresses the particular risks and threats the strategy is 

directed at, as well as risk assessment of the threats to and vulnerabilities 

of critical assets and operations. Specific information on both risks and 

threats helps responsible parties better implement the strategy by ensuring 

that priorities are clear and focused on the greatest needs. The NSVI and 

the supporting documents generally address some of the problems, risks, 

and threats found in Iraq. For example, the NSVI identifies the risks posed 

by the insurgency and identifies three basic types of insurgents—
Page 21 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

rejectionists, supporters of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, and 

terrorists affiliated with or inspired by al Qaeda—and the different actions 

needed to confront each one. In addition, various supporting documents 

provide additional information on the threats the Shi’ite militias present, 

and the corruption that could affect the Iraqi government’s ability to 

become self-reliant, deliver essential services, reform its economy, 

strengthen rule of law, maintain nonsectarian political institutions, and 

increase international support. 

Strategy Discusses Goals, 

Objectives, and Activities but 

Has Limited Discussion of 

Outcome-Related Performance 

Measures

This characteristic addresses what the national strategy strives to achieve 

and the steps needed to garner those results, as well as the priorities, 

milestones, and outcome-related performance measures to gauge results. 

Identifying goals, objectives, and outcome-related performance measures 

aids implementing parties in achieving results and enables more effective 

oversight and accountability. In addition, identifying and measuring 

outcome-related performance rather than output measures allow for more 

accurate measurement of program results and assessment of program 

effectiveness. 

The strategy generally addresses goals and subordinate objectives by 

identifying 8 strategic objectives (pillars), 46 subordinate objectives, or 

“lines of action,” and numerous project activities but only partially 

addresses outcome-related performance measures. The supporting 

strategy documents also provide information on how progress will be 

monitored and reported. In addition, the NSVI identifies the process for 

monitoring and reporting on progress via interagency working groups. It 

also identifies some metrics to assess progress, such as the number of 

Iraqis willing to participate in the political process, the quality and quantity 

of the Iraqi units trained, and barrels of oil produced and exported. The 

NSVI also notes that detailed metrics on the results of training Iraqi 

security forces and improvements in the economy and infrastructure are 

collected and available elsewhere but did not include them in the strategy. 

Supporting documents also identify some performance measures.

The metrics the strategy uses to report progress make it difficult to 

determine the impact of the U.S. reconstruction effort. We reported 

previously that in the water resources and sanitation sector little was 

known about how U.S. efforts were improving the amount and quality of 

water reaching Iraqi households or their access to the sanitation services 

because the U.S. government only tracked the number of projects 
Page 22 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

completed or under way.16 For instance, as of March 2006, Iraq has the 

capacity to produce 1.1 million cubic meters of water per day, but this level 

overestimates the amount of potable water reaching Iraqi households. U.S. 

officials estimate that 60 percent of water treatment output is lost due to 

leakage, contamination, and illegal connections. The U.S. mission reported 

in December 2005 that it had developed a set of metrics to better estimate 

the potential impact of U.S. water and sanitation reconstruction efforts on 

Iraqi households, but acknowledges it is impossible to measure how much 

water Iraqis are actually receiving or whether the water is potable. The 

report notes that without the comprehensive data these key measures 

would provide, mission efforts to accurately assess the impact of U.S. 

reconstruction efforts on water and sanitation services are seriously 

limited.

In April 2006, we reported that in the electric sector U.S. agencies primarily 

reported on generation measures such as levels of added or restored 

generation capacity and daily power generation of electricity; numbers of 

projects completed; and average daily hours of power. However, these data 

did not show (1) whether the power generated was uninterrupted for the 

period specified (e.g., average number hours per day), (2) if there were 

regional or geographic differences in the quantity of power generated, or 

(3) how much power was reaching intended users.17 Moreover, State’s 2005 

assessment of its reconstruction effort noted that the reconstruction effort 

lacked measurable milestones that tied short-term program objectives to 

long-term strategic goals. 

Strategy Partially Address 

Costs, Agency 

Responsibilities, and 

Integration 

As figure 3 shows, the NSVI and supporting documents only partially (1) 

identify what the strategy will cost and the sources of financing; (2) 

delineate the roles and responsibilities of key U.S. government agencies, 

and the mechanisms for coordination; (3) describe how the strategy will be 

integrated among U.S. entities, the Iraqi government, and international 

organizations. 

16See GAO-05-872.

17See GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing 

Challenges, GAO-06-697T (Washington D.C.: Apr. 25, 2005).
Page 23 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Strategy Partially Addresses 

Future Costs and Resource 

Requirements

This characteristic addresses what the strategy will cost; where resources 

will be targeted to achieve the end-state; and how the strategy balances 

benefits, risks, and costs. Guidance on costs and resources needed using a 

risk management approach helps implementing parties allocate resources 

according to priorities; track costs and performance; and shift resources, 

as appropriate. Such guidance also would assist Congress and the 

administration in developing a more effective strategy to achieve the 

desired end-state. 

The strategy neither identifies the current and future costs of implementing 

the strategy, nor does it identify the sources of funding (U.S. government, 

international donors, or Iraqi government) needed to achieve U.S. political, 

security, and economic objectives in Iraq. These costs would include the 

costs of maintaining U.S. military operations, including the costs to repair 

and replace equipment used during these operations, building the capacity 

of key national ministries and the 18 provincial governments, completing 

the U.S. program for training and equipping Iraqi security forces, and 

restoring essential services. For example, between fiscal years 2003 and 

2006, about $311 billion was allocated to support U.S. objectives in Iraq. 

Approximately $276 billion has been provided to support U.S. military 

operations and forces as of June 2006, which currently number about

130,000 troops, and over $34 billion to develop capable Iraqi security 

forces, restore essential services, and rebuild Iraqi institutions. The 

administration has also requested about $51 billion more for military and 

reconstruction operations for fiscal year 2007: including $50 billion that the 

Office of Management and Budget terms “bridge funding” to continue the 

global war on terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan and an additional $771 

million for reconstruction operations in Iraq. 

These cost data are not included in the strategy. As a result, neither DOD 

nor Congress can reliably determine the cost of the war, nor do they have 

details on how the appropriated funds are being spent or historical data 

useful in considering future funding needs.18 Moreover, the strategy states 

that the war in Iraq yields benefits in the global war on terrorism but does 

not discuss substantial financial and other costs. In addition, GAO has 

previously found numerous problems in DOD’s processes for accounting 

for and reporting cost data for its operations in Iraq, which constitute about 

18See GAO, Global War on Terrorism: DOD Needs to Improve the Reliability of Cost Data 

and Provide Additional Guidance to Control Costs, GAO-05-882 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

21, 2005).
Page 24 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

90 percent of estimated total U.S. government costs. Given the current 

fiscal challenges facing the U.S. government, such an assessment would 

help clarify the future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq. 

The strategy also fails to project future costs and contributions from nonU.S. sources. It does not address the extent to which the Iraqi government 

will contribute financially to its own rebuilding effort. While supporting 

documents provide some information on current spending plans and 

allocations, the dispersion of this budget information across numerous 

budget documents makes it difficult to analyze how the objectives of the 

NSVI will be funded. For example, State’s quarterly 2207 reports to 

Congress describe the current status of the Iraq reconstruction funding 

allocations and the status of international donations for reconstruction. In 

February 2006, State issued two supplemental documents that provide 

some additional information on how IRRF2 funds and fiscal year 2006 and 

2007 budget appropriations were to be spent across the NSVI’s three tracks 

(political, security, and economic). Other supporting documents partially 

address these resource issues but do not identify future resource needs. 

The unclassified version of the MNF-I/ U.S. Embassy Baghdad Joint 

Mission Statement on Iraq indicates that budgetary and human capital 

resources will be needed, and funding is expected from Congress and the 

Iraqi government. However, it does not identify the specific amounts 

needed to meet key U.S. goals. The 2207 reports discuss international 

donor contribution levels and reports on the progress of projects funded 

with international grants but does not relate these amounts to Iraqi 

requirements. 

In addition, none of the strategy documents takes into account the total 

cost of Iraq’s reconstruction, which will be more than originally 

anticipated, due to severely degraded infrastructure, postconflict looting 

and sabotage, and additional security costs. Initial assessments in 2003 

identified a total of $56 billion in Iraqi reconstruction needs in various 

sectors, but more recent cost estimates suggest that the oil infrastructure 

and electric sectors alone will require about $50 billion in the next several 

years. These funding concerns have grown as resources have been shifted 

from reconstruction projects to security needs. For example, between 

January 2004 and April 2006, the administration reallocated $3.5 billion 

from the water resources and sanitation and electric sectors to security; 

justice, public safety, and civil society; and democracy building activities; 

and other programs. This contributed to the cancellation, delay, or scaling 

back of water and electricity projects and will complicate efforts to achieve 

the objectives for these essential service sectors. 
Page 25 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Although the NSVI acknowledges that rampant corruption is a challenge 

threatening the success of U.S. reconstruction and stabilization efforts, the 

strategy does not address how reconstruction efforts should take the risk 

of corruption into account when assessing the costs of achieving U.S. 

objectives in Iraq. For instance, IMF, the World Bank, Japan, and European 

Union officials cite corruption in the oil sector as an especially serious 

problem. In addition, according to State officials and reporting documents, 

about 10 percent of refined fuels are diverted to the black market, and 

about 30 percent of imported fuels are smuggled out of Iraq and sold for a 

profit. By not addressing this risk, the strategy cannot provide adequate 

guidance to implementing parties trying to assess priorities and allocate 

resources.

Strategy Partially Addresses U.S. 

Roles, Responsibilities, and 

Coordination Mechanisms 

This characteristic addresses which U.S. organization will implement the 

strategy and their roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for coordinating 

their efforts. Addressing this characteristic fosters coordination and 

enhances both implementation and accountability. 

The NSVI and the supporting documents partially address the roles and 

responsibilities of specific U.S. government agencies and offices and the 

process for coordination. To organize U.S. efforts in Iraq, the NSVI breaks 

down the political, security, and economic tracks of the strategy into eight 

strategic objectives (pillars) that have lines of action assigned to military 

and civilian units in Iraq. Each strategic objective has a corresponding 

interagency working group to coordinate policy, review and assess the 

progress, develop new proposals for action, and oversee implementation of 

existing policies. National Security Presidential Directive 36 made the 

Department of State responsible for nonsecurity aspects of reconstruction 

and lays out key roles for the U.S. Chief of Mission in Baghdad and 

CENTCOM. It directed that the Commander of CENTCOM will, with the 

Chief of Mission’s policy guidance, direct all U.S. government efforts in 

support of training and equipping Iraq security forces. It also established 

the roles for the mission’s two supporting offices: the Iraq Reconstruction 

Management Office and the Projects and Contracting Office. 

Although the NSVI organizes the U.S. strategy along three broad tracks and 

eight strategic objectives, it does not clearly identify the roles and 

responsibilities of specific federal agencies for achieving these specific 

objectives, or how disputes among them will be resolved. For example, 

GAO found only one reference in the NSVI to the reconstruction 

responsibilities of a particular U.S. government agency in Iraq when it 

noted that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other U.S. agencies 
Page 26 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

would assist an Iraqi antimajor crimes task force in the investigation of 

terrorist attacks and assassinations. Thus, it is not clear which agency is 

responsible for implementing the overlapping activities listed under the 

eight strategic objectives. For instance, one activity is to promote 

transparency in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Iraqi 

government; however, the strategy does not indicate which agency is 

responsible for implementing this activity, or who to hold accountable for 

results. Moreover, little guidance is provided to assist implementing 

agencies in resolving conflicts among themselves, as well as with other 

entities. In our prior work, we found that delays in reconstruction efforts 

sometimes resulted from lack of agreement among U.S. agencies, 

contractors, and Iraqi authorities about the scope and schedule for the 

work to be performed. For example, in the water resources and sanitation 

sector, Iraqi and U.S. officials’ disagreements over decisions to repair or 

replace treatment facilities or to use brick instead of concrete have delayed 

project execution.19

Strategy Partially Addresses 

Integration with Iraqi 

Government and International 

Donors 

This characteristic addresses both how a national strategy relates to the 

goals, objectives, and activities of other strategies, to other government 

and international entities, and relevant documents from implementing 

organizations. A clear relationship between the strategy and other critical 

implementing documents helps agencies and other entities understand 

their roles and responsibilities, foster effective implementation, and 

promote accountability. 

The NSVI and supporting documents partially address how the strategy 

relates to other international donors and Iraqi government goals, 

objectives, and activities.20 For instance, the NSVI and supporting 

documents identify the need to integrate the efforts of the coalition, the 

Iraqi government, and other nations but do not discuss how the U.S. goals 

and objectives are integrated with the strategies, goals, and objectives of 

the international donors and the Iraqi government. The NSVI does identify 

Web sites where other documents can be obtained but does not address 

how these documents are integrated with the NSVI. 

19See GAO-05-872.

20Past GAO work has highlighted the importance of integrated cooperation between the 

United States, host governments, and foreign donors in such operations. See GAO, Foreign 

Assistance: Observations on Post-Conflict Assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, and 

Afghanistan, GAO-03-980T (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2003).
Page 27 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

GAO has previously reported that victory in Iraq cannot be achieved 

without an integrated U.S., international, and Iraqi effort to meet the 

political, security, and economic needs of the Iraqi people. However, the 

strategy has only partially addressed how it relates to the objectives and 

activities of Iraq and the international community and does not address 

what it expects the international community or the Iraqi government to pay 

to achieve future objectives. This affects the strategy’s ability to address 

the challenge of conducting an integrated operation dependent upon Iraq’s 

limited capacity to contribute to its own reconstruction. For example, GAO 

has reported that Iraq’s weak national and provincial governments limit 

Iraq’s ability to operate and sustain new and rehabilitated infrastructure 

projects. This has contributed to the failure to achieve key reconstruction 

goals. 

Dispersion of the U.S. 

Strategy across Many 

Documents Limits Its 

Usefulness as a Planning 

Tool 

The dispersion of information across several documents limits the 

strategy’s overall coherence and effectiveness as a management tool for 

implementing agencies and as an oversight tool for informing Congress 

about the pace, costs, and results of these efforts. Since these other 

documents were written by different agencies at different points in time, 

the information in them is not directly comparable, which diminishes their 

value. State and DOD have separately released budget requests totaling 

about $121 billion to continue U.S. stabilization and reconstruction 

programs through fiscal year 2007. However, these documents do not 

provide an estimate or range of estimates as to what it will cost to achieve 

U.S. objectives in Iraq in the short-, medium-, and long-term. In addition, 

these documents further disperse information about how the government 

is addressing the key elements of an effective national strategy for Iraq.

Conclusion The November 2005 NSVI represents the results of efforts to improve the 

strategic planning process for the challenging and costly U.S. mission in 

Iraq. Although the NSVI is an improvement over earlier efforts, it and the 

supporting documents are incomplete. The desired end-state of the U.S. 

strategy has remained unchanged since 2003, but the underlying 

assumptions have changed in response to changing security and economic 

conditions, calling into question the likelihood of achieving the desired 

end-state. Moreover, the collective strategy neither identifies U.S. or other 

resources needed to implement the objectives nor does it address its 

integration with the efforts and funding plans of the Iraqi government or 

the international community. The formation of the new Iraqi government 
Page 28 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

provides an opportunity to the United States government to reexamine its 

strategy and more closely align its efforts and objectives with those of the 

Iraqi people and other donors. 

The dispersion of information across the NSVI and seven supporting 

documents further limits the strategy’s usefulness as a tool for planning and 

reporting on the costs, progress, and results of the U.S. mission in Iraq. 

Since the current disparate reporting mechanisms do not provide a 

comprehensive assessment of U.S. government efforts in Iraq, Congress 

may lack critical information to judge U.S. progress in achieving objectives 

and addressing key political, security, and economic challenges. In 

addition, the strategy could be more useful to implementing agencies and 

Congress if it fully addressed these characteristics in a single document. 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

To help improve the strategy’s effectiveness as a planning tool and to 

improve its usefulness to Congress, this report recommends that the 

National Security Council, in conjunction with DOD and State, complete 

the strategy by addressing all six characteristics of an effective national 

strategy in a single document. In particular, the revised strategy should 

address the current costs and future military and civilian resources needed 

to implement the strategy, clarify the roles and responsibilities of all U.S. 

government agencies involved in reconstruction and stabilization efforts, 

and detail potential Iraqi and international contributions to future military 

and reconstruction needs. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the NSC and to the Departments of 

Defense and State for their review and comment. We received a written 

response from State that is reprinted in appendix III. State also provided us 

with technical comments and suggested wording changes that we 

incorporated as appropriate. DOD deferred comment to the NSC; its letter 

is reprinted in appendix IV. We did not receive oral or written comments 

from the NSC in response to our request. 

State did not comment on our report recommendations. In commenting on 

a draft of this report, State asserted that our draft report misrepresented 

the NSVI’s purpose—to provide the public a broad overview of the U.S. 

strategy in Iraq and not to provide details available elsewhere. We 

acknowledge that the purpose of the NSVI was to provide the public with 

an overview of a multitiered, classified strategy and not to set forth every 
Page 29 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

detail on information readily available elsewhere. Our analysis was not 

limited to the publicly available, unclassified NSVI. With input from DOD 

and State, we included in our assessment all the classified and unclassified 

documents that collectively define the U.S. strategy in Iraq: (1) the National 

Security Presidential Directive 36 (May 2004), (2) Multinational Forces-Iraq 

(MNF-I) Campaign Plan (August 2004), (3) the MNF-I/ U.S. Embassy 

Baghdad Joint Mission Statement on Iraq (December 2005), (4) the 

Multinational Corps-Iraq Operation Order 05-03 (December 2005), (5) the 

National Strategy for Supporting Iraq (updated January 2006), and (6) the 

quarterly State Section 2207 reports to Congress (through April 2006), and 

(7) the April 2006 Joint Campaign Plan issued by the Chief of Mission and 

the Commander of the MNF-I. Collectively, these documents still lack all 

the key characteristics of an effective national strategy. However, we 

refined our recommendation to focus on the need to improve the U.S. 

strategy for Iraq.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees. We will also make copies available to other on request. In 

addition, this report is available on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If 

you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-8979 or 

christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Joseph A. Christoff

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Page 30 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

List of Committees

The Honorable Mitch McConnell 

Chairman 

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, 

and Related Programs 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar 

Chairman 

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

United States Senate 
Page 31 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Jim Kolbe 

Chairman 

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 

and Related Programs 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Chairman 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Chairman 

The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, 

and International Relations 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 
Page 32 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde 

Chairman 

The Honorable Tom Lantos 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on International Relations 

House of Representatives
Page 33 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

As part of GAO’s review of reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq 

initiated under the Comptroller General’s authority, we examined the U.S. 

strategy for achieving victory in Iraq. Specifically, we (1) assess the 

evolution of the U.S. national strategy for Iraq in response to changing 

political, security and economic circumstances and (2) evaluate whether 

the November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) and its 

supporting documents include the desirable characteristics of an effective 

national strategy. In this report, the NSVI and its supporting documents are 

referred to as the U.S. strategy for Iraq.

To describe the goals and objectives of the U.S. national strategy for Iraq 

and its relationship to other existing strategy documents, we interviewed 

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), U.S. government, and Iraqi officials, 

and reviewed planning and reporting documents obtained from the former 

CPA; Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD), and U.S. Agency for 

International Development; the U.S. mission in Baghdad; and the 

Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I). We analyzed records, reports and data 

from the Iraqi government, and from U.S. government and military officials 

in Washington, D.C., and Baghdad, Iraq. We also examined the reports of 

other oversight entities that performed internal control and management 

reviews, including audits of the Special Inspector General for Iraq and 

internal U.S. Mission Baghdad reports and briefings. We also collected and 

reviewed documents from the United Nations, the World Bank, the 

International Monetary Fund, and the Iraqi government‘s National 

Development Strategy for 2005-2007. 

We evaluated the NSVI along with seven related classified and unclassified 

supporting documents identified as having key details about the strategy by 

State’s Office of the Coordinator for Iraq, the Bureau of Near Eastern 

Affairs, and by DOD’s Defense Reconstruction Support Office and Near 

Eastern South Asian Affairs office. These included (1) the National Security 

Presidential Directive 36 (May 2004), (2) the MNF-I Campaign Plan (August 

2004), (3) the MNF-I/ U.S. Embassy Baghdad Joint Mission Statement on 

Iraq (December 2005), (4) the Multinational Corps-Iraq Operation Order 05-

03 (December 2005), (5) the National Strategy for Supporting Iraq (updated 

January 2006), (6) the quarterly State’s 2207 reports to Congress (January 

and April 2006); and (7) the April 2006 Joint Campaign Plan issued by the 

Chief of Mission and the Commander of the MNF-I. In particular, we 

discussed the relationship between the NSVI, the National Strategy for 

Supporting Iraq (NSSI), and the MNF-I Campaign Plan with the Secretary of 

State’s Special Coordinator for Iraq and his staff, National Security Council 

staff, and DOD’s Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 34 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Reconstruction Support Office. In addition to these documents, we also 

reviewed other U.S. government documents not identified as key 

supporting documents by State and DOD officials but which also provide 

useful information, including the fiscal year 2006 supplemental funding 

request, the fiscal year 2007 budget request, and two reports issued by State 

in February 2006: Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Achievements Through the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund; and Advancing the President’s National 

Strategy for Victory in Iraq: Funding Iraq’s Transition to Self-Reliance in 

2006 and 2007 and Support for the Counterinsurgency Campaign. We 

also reviewed DOD’s periodic reports on the status of its security and 

stability programs financed by the fiscal year 2005 supplemental Iraq 

Security and Stabilization Fund (ISSF) and DOD’s report to Congress under 

Section 1227 of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 

(Pub. L. No. 109-163). Finally, we reviewed the NSVI for consistency with 

the administration’s National Security Strategy of the United States of 

America released in March 2006.

To assess whether the NSVI contains all the desirable characteristics of an 

effective national strategy, we first developed a checklist using the six 

desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy developed in prior 

GAO work as criteria. Three analysts independently assessed two selected 

strategy documents using the checklist to verify its relevance and then 

convened as a panel to test their ability to apply the checklist to the 

information contained in the document. The team concluded that the 

checklist was relevant and appropriate for assessing the NSVI. The three 

analysts independently assessed the NSVI and recorded the results on 

separate checklists and then met as a panel to reconcile the differences in 

their scores. A separate panel of three other analysts also independently 

assessed the NSVI using the same methodology, and then the two panels 

met as a group to discuss similarities and resolve differences in their 

scoring. In addition, the first panel of three analysts evaluated seven 

additional documents applying the same criteria in the checklist. On the 

basis of these evaluations, we developed a consolidated summary of the 

extent that the NSVI and the supporting documents addressed the 27 

elements and six characteristics of an effective national strategy. These 

results are presented in figure 3 of this report.

We gave each of the 27 elements under the six characteristics an individual 

rating of either: “addresses,” “partially addresses,” or “does not address.” 

According to our methodology, a strategy “addresses” an element of a 

characteristic when it explicitly cites all parts of the element, and the 

document has sufficient specificity and detail. Within our designation of 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 35 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

“partially addresses,” there is a wide variation between a strategy that 

addresses most parts of an element of a characteristic and a strategy that 

addresses few parts of an element of a characteristic. A strategy “does not 

address” an element of a characteristic when it does not explicitly cite or 

discuss any parts of the element of that characteristic or any implicit 

references are either too vague or general to be useful. See appendix II for 

a more detailed description of the six characteristics. We further evaluated 

the six related classified and unclassified documents that State and DOD 

officials said provided key details about the strategy. Three analysts 

evaluated each of these documents using the same methodology described 

above. 

We conducted our review from October 2005 through June 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 36 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Appendix II

GAO’s Description of the Six Characteristics 

of an Effective National Strategy ApendxiI

In a prior report, GAO identified six desirable characteristics of an effective 

national strategy that would enable its implementers to effectively shape 

policies, programs, priorities, resource allocations, and standards and that 

would enable federal departments and other stakeholders to achieve the 

identified results.1

 GAO further determined in that report that national 

strategies with the six characteristics can provide policy makers and 

implementing agencies with a planning tool that can help ensure 

accountability and more effective results. To develop these six desirable 

characteristics of an effective national strategy, GAO reviewed several 

sources of information. First, GAO gathered statutory requirements 

pertaining to national strategies, as well as legislative and executive branch 

guidance. GAO also consulted the Government Performance and Results 

Act of 1993, general literature on strategic planning and performance, and 

guidance from the Office of Management and Budget on the President’s 

Management Agenda. In addition, among other things, GAO studied past 

reports and testimonies for findings and recommendations pertaining to 

the desirable elements of a national strategy. Furthermore, we consulted 

widely within GAO to obtain updated information on strategic planning, 

integration across and between the government and its partners, 

implementation, and other related subjects.

GAO developed these six desirable characteristics based on their 

underlying support in legislative or executive guidance and the frequency 

with which they were cited in other sources. GAO then grouped similar 

items together in a logical sequence, from conception to implementation. 

Table 2 provides these desirable characteristics and examples of their 

elements.

1

GAO-04-408T and GAO-06-486C.
Appendix II

GAO’s Description of the Six Characteristics 

of an Effective National Strategy

Page 37 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Table 2: Desirable Characteristics for an Effective National Strategy

Source: GAO.

The following sections provide more detail on the six desirable 

characteristics. 

Desirable characteristic Description Examples of elements

Purpose, scope, and 

methodology 

Addresses why the strategy was produced, the 

scope of its coverage, and the process by 

which it was developed. 

• Principles guiding development

• Impetus: e.g., legislation

• Definition of key terms 

• Process and methodology to produce strategy (via 

interagency task force, private input, etc.)

Detailed discussion of 

problems, risks, and 

threats 

Addresses the particular national problems 

and threats at which the strategy is directed. 

• Discussion or definition of problems, causes, and 

operating environment

• Risk assessment, including analysis of threat and 

vulnerabilities

• Quality of data: constraints, deficiencies, unknowns

Desired goals, objectives, 

activities, and outcomerelated performance 

measures 

Addresses what the strategy is trying to 

achieve, steps to achieve those results, as well 

as the priorities, milestones, and performance 

measures to gauge results. 

• Overall results desired: end-state

• Hierarchy of goals and subordinate objectives

• Priorities, milestones, and performance measures to 

gauge results

• Specific performance measures and activities to achieve 

results

• Limitations on progress indicators

Description of future costs 

and resources needed 

Addresses what the strategy will cost, the 

sources and types of resources and 

investments needed, and where resources 

and investments should be targeted by 

balancing risk reductions and costs. 

• Resources and investments associated with strategy

• Types of resources required

• Sources of resources

• Economic principles, e.g., balancing benefits and costs

• Resource allocation mechanisms, such as grants, in-kind 

services, loans.

• Mandates/incentives to spur action 

• Importance of fiscal discipline

• Linkage to other resource documents, e.g., federal budget

• Risk management principles

Delineation of U.S. 

government roles, 

responsibilities and 

coordination mechanism

Addresses who will be implementing the 

strategy, what their roles will be compared to 

others, and mechanisms for them to 

coordinate their efforts. 

• Lead, support, and partner roles and responsibilities

• Accountability and oversight framework

• Potential changes to structure

• Specific coordination processes

• Conflict resolution mechanism

Description of strategy’s 

integration among and 

with other entities

Addresses how a national strategy relates to 

other strategies’ goals, objectives, and 

activities and to subordinate levels of 

government and their plans to implement the 

strategy.

• Integration with other national strategies (horizontal)

• Integration with relevant documents from other 

implementing organizations (vertical)

• Implementation guidance

• Details on subordinate strategies and plans for 

implementation (e.g., human capital, enterprise 

architecture)
Appendix II

GAO’s Description of the Six Characteristics 

of an Effective National Strategy

Page 38 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Purpose, Scope, and 

Methodology

This characteristic addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of 

its coverage, and the process by which it was developed. For example, a 

strategy should discuss the specific impetus that led to its being written (or 

updated), such as statutory requirements, executive mandates, or other 

events like the global war on terrorism. Furthermore, a strategy would 

enhance clarity by including definitions of key, relevant terms. In addition 

to describing what it is meant to do and the major functions, mission areas, 

or activities it covers, a national strategy would ideally address its 

methodology. For example, a strategy should discuss the principles or 

theories that guided its development, the organizations or offices that 

drafted the document, or working groups that were consulted in its 

development.

Problems, Risks, and 

Threats

This characteristic addresses the particular national problems and threats 

at which the strategy is directed. Specifically, this means a detailed 

discussion or definition of the problems the strategy intends to address, 

their causes, and operating environment. In addition, this characteristic 

entails a risk assessment, including an analysis of the threats to and 

vulnerabilities of critical assets and operations. If the details of these 

analyses are classified or preliminary, an unclassified version of the 

strategy should at least include a broad description of the analyses and 

stress the importance of risk assessment to implementing parties. A 

discussion of the quality of data available regarding this characteristic, 

such as known constraints or deficiencies, would also be useful.

Goals, Objectives, Activities, 

and Outcome-Related 

Performance Measures

This characteristic addresses what the national strategy strives to achieve 

and the steps needed to garner those results, as well as the priorities, 

milestones, and performance measures to gauge results. At the highest 

level, this could be a description of an ideal end-state, followed by a logical 

hierarchy of major goals, subordinate objectives, and specific activities to 

achieve results. In addition, it would be helpful if the strategy discussed the 

importance of implementing parties’ efforts to establish priorities, 

milestones, and performance measures, which help ensure accountability. 

Ideally, a national strategy would set clear desired results and priorities, 

specific milestones, and outcome-related performance measures while 

giving implementing parties flexibility to pursue and achieve those results 

within a reasonable time frame. If significant limitations on performance 

measures exist, other parts of the strategy should address plans to obtain 
Appendix II

GAO’s Description of the Six Characteristics 

of an Effective National Strategy

Page 39 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

better data or measurements, such as national standards or indicators of 

preparedness.

Future Costs and Resources 

Needed

This characteristic addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and 

types of resources and investments needed, and where those resources and 

investments should be targeted. Ideally, a strategy would also identify 

appropriate mechanisms to allocate resources. Furthermore, a national 

strategy should elaborate on the risk assessment mentioned earlier and 

give guidance to implementing parties to manage their resources and 

investments accordingly. It should also address the difficult, but critical, 

issues about who pays and how such efforts will be funded and sustained in 

the future. Furthermore, a strategy should include a discussion of the type 

of resources required, such as budgetary, human capital, information, 

information technology (IT), research and development (R&D), 

procurement of equipment, or contract services. A national strategy should 

also discuss linkages to other resource documents, such as federal agency 

budgets or human capital, IT, R&D, and acquisition strategies. Finally, a 

national strategy should also discuss in greater detail how risk 

management will aid implementing parties in prioritizing and allocating 

resources, including how this approach will create society-wide benefits 

and balance these with the cost to society. Related to this, a national 

strategy should discuss the economic principle of risk-adjusted return on 

resources. 

U.S. Government Roles and 

Responsibilities and 

Coordination Mechanism

This characteristic addresses what organizations will implement the 

strategy, their roles and responsibilities, and mechanisms for coordinating 

their efforts. It helps to answer the question about who is in charge during 

times of crisis and during all phases of the victory in Iraq efforts: 

prevention, vulnerability reduction, and response and recovery. This 

characteristic entails identifying the specific federal departments, agencies, 

or offices involved, as well as the roles and responsibilities of private and 

international sectors. A strategy would ideally clarify implementing 

organizations’ relationships in terms of leading, supporting, and partnering. 

In addition, a strategy should describe the organizations that will provide 

the overall framework for accountability and oversight, such as the 

National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, Congress, or 

other organizations. Furthermore, a strategy should also identify specific 

processes for coordination and collaboration between sectors and 

organizations—and address how any conflicts would be resolved.
Appendix II

GAO’s Description of the Six Characteristics 

of an Effective National Strategy

Page 40 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Strategy’s Integration 

Among and with Other 

Entities

This characteristic addresses both how a national strategy relates to other 

strategies’ goals, objectives, and activities (horizontal integration)—and to 

subordinate levels of government and other organizations and their plans 

to implement the strategy (vertical integration). For example, a national 

strategy should discuss how its scope complements, expands upon, or 

overlaps with other national strategies of the Iraqi government and other 

international donors. Similarly, related strategies should highlight their 

common or shared goals, subordinate objectives, and activities. In addition, 

a national strategy should address its relationship with relevant documents 

from implementing organizations, such as the strategic plans, annual 

performance plans, or the annual performance reports the Government 

Performance and Results Act requires of federal agencies. A strategy 

should also discuss, as appropriate, various strategies and plans produced 

by the state, local, private, or international sectors. A strategy also should 

provide guidance such as the development of national standards to link 

together more effectively the roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of the 

implementing parties.
Page 41 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

Page 42 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

Page 43 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

See comment 5.

See comment 6.
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

Page 44 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

See comment 9.
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

Page 45 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

See comment 10.

See comment 11.

See comment 12.

See comment 13.
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

Page 46 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

See comment 14.
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

Page 47 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter 

dated June 30, 2006.

GAO Comments 1. We notified the Department of State (State) of the scope of our review. 

After the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) was released in 

November 2005, we focused our review on whether the new strategy 

and related planning documents identified by State and the Department 

of Defense (DOD) addressed the desirable characteristics of an 

effective national strategy. On February 10, 2006, we met with senior 

State officials from the Bureau of Near East and Asia and the office of 

the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq 

Affairs to describe our plans and methodology for assessing the NSVI. 

State officials acknowledged our methodology and identified the key 

documents (both unclassified and classified) that, when combined with 

the NSVI, served as the collective U.S. strategy for Iraq. 

2. We modified figure 1 to place the National Strategy for Supporting Iraq 

(NSSI) at the strategic level. However, we disagree that the NSSI links 

goals to resources. In fact, State’s comments note that the NSSI does 

not specify the future military and civilian resources necessary for 

achieving U.S. strategic objectives, and it is in the process of 

incorporating the fiscal year 2006 supplemental budget into the NSSI. 

Until State completes this linkage, it is difficult to assess whether the 

NSSI will adequately link goals to resources. 

3. We disagree with State’s contention that we did not take into account 

the fiscal year 2006 supplemental and the fiscal year 2007 budget 

requests in our assessment of the NSVI. We evaluated these as part of 

our review. Even though State officials did not include these documents 

among those they identified as supporting the strategy. In addition, we 

reviewed other U.S. government documents that provided useful 

context and information, including two related reports issued by State 

in February 2006: (1) Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Achievements Through the 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund; and (2) Advancing the 

President’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq : Funding Iraq’s 

Transition to Self-Reliance in 2006 and 2007 and Support for the 

Counterinsurgency Campaign. 

4. We acknowledge that the purpose of the NSVI was to provide the public 

with an overview of a multitiered, classified strategy and not to set 

forth every detail on information readily available elsewhere. Our 
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

Page 48 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

analysis was not limited to the publicly available, unclassified NSVI. 

With input from DOD and State, we included in our assessment all the 

classified and unclassified documents that collectively define the U.S. 

strategy in Iraq: (1) the National Security Presidential Directive 36 

(May 2004), (2) Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) Campaign Plan 

(August 2004), (3) the MNF-I/ U.S. Embassy Baghdad Joint Mission 

Statement on Iraq (December 2005), (4) the Multinational Corps-Iraq 

Operation Order 05-03 (December 2005), (5) the National Strategy for 

Supporting Iraq (updated January 2006), and (6) the quarterly State 

Section 2207 reports to Congress (through April 2006), and (7) the April 

2006 Joint Campaign Plan issued by the Chief of Mission and the 

Commander of the MNF-I. Collectively, these documents still lack all 

the key characteristics of an effective national strategy. However, we 

refined our recommendation to focus on the need to improve the U.S. 

strategy for Iraq.

5. We disagree with State’s comment that helping restore essential 

services to prewar levels was not an assumption of the early U.S. 

reconstruction strategy. According to the key architects of the original 

Coalition Provisional Authority plan, restoring essential services to a 

prewar level was a key assumption of the U.S. strategy. 

6. Documents we received from State and the Department of Energy 

estimated that Iraq’s 2003 actual prewar crude oil production was 2.6 

million barrels per day. State did not provide any additional 

documentation to support their contention. In addition, the 4,300 

megawatts figure cited by State is below the postwar peak of 5,400 

megawatts and the planned U.S. goal of 6,000 megawatts.

7. We agree that it is not possible to make definitive statements about the 

number of people nationwide with access to clean drinking water 

during the prewar period because reliable data did not exist. We have 

noted this problem in previous reports and testimonies. This report 

describes U.S. mission efforts announced in December 2005 to develop 

an improved set of metrics to better estimate the potential impact of 

U.S. water and sanitation reconstruction efforts on Iraqi households. 

We reviewed excerpts from this reporting and included it in our report. 

However, State has not complied with our request to provide us with a 

complete copy of its metrics plan to better allow us to judge the results 

of its efforts. 
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

Page 49 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

8. As we have previously reported, subsidies for food, fuel, and electricity, 

rising costs for security forces, and high costs to sustain Iraq’s 

bureaucracy limit Iraq’s ability to contribute to its own reconstruction 

efforts. While Iraq budgeted about $5 billion for capital expenditures in 

2005, it only provided a few hundred million dollars by the end of the 

year. Accordingly, it is too early to determine if the Iraqi government 

will spend the $6.2 billion it has budgeted for capital expenditures in 

2006. 

9. We clarified the report to characterize the 2003 World Bank study as an 

initial estimate and not a comprehensive survey. While acknowledging 

that more than $56 billon will be needed to bring Iraq to a status 

equivalent to other oil-producing developing nations, State does not 

think that “costs” have gone up. However, recent State and Department 

of Energy cost estimates show that the oil infrastructure and electric 

sectors alone will require about $50 billion in the next several years. In 

addition, June 2006 reporting from the Department of Energy states 

that Iraq could need $100 billion or more for long-term reconstruction 

efforts. 

10. We agree that the Iraq and U.S. governments have succeeded in 

achieving debt relief for Iraq from the Paris Club and commercial 

creditors. However, there is a significant amount of debt remaining, 

amounting to $84 billion. This debt includes war reparations that Iraq 

owes from its invasion of Kuwait. This remaining debt imposes a 

continuing financial burden on the country. 

11. We revised our report to include updated April 2006 figures.

12. We included the $30 billion estimate for the oil sector to illustrate the 

significant future costs to restore a critical sector—a sector from which 

Iraq derives 90 percent of its budgetary revenues. State’s Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office developed these estimates. In 

addition, as noted in comment 9 above, Iraq could need $100 billion or 

more for long-term reconstruction, according to a June 2006 report by 

the Department of Energy. 

13. We agree that it is very difficult to accurately account for corruption as 

a cost in achieving the overall goals for Iraq. We recognize that State 

launched an anticorruption strategy in December 2005, but this strategy 

was not reflected in the documents we reviewed. We included State 

estimates that help describe the magnitude of the corruption problem. 
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

Page 50 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

For example, State reports that 10 percent of refined fuels are diverted 

to the black market, and about 30 percent of imported fuels are 

smuggled out of Iraq and sold for a profit. 

14. The recently announced International Compact could be a useful 

vehicle for better international coordination, but the details of the 

compact’s scope and function and linkage to the new donor 

coordination process have not been specified. The International 

Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq provides a coordination 

mechanism among United Nations agencies, but its linkage to U.S.-

funded projects is also unclear. More importantly, no single document 

describes how the goals and projects of the United States, Iraq, and the 

international community are or will be linked to achieve maximum 

effectiveness and avoid duplication of effort. 
Page 51 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiIV
Page 52 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

Appendix V

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiV

GAO Contact Joseph A. Christoff, Director, (202) 512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov

Staff 

Acknowledgments

Stephen M. Lord, Assistant Director; Kelly Baumgartner; Lynn Cothern; 

Jared Hermalin; B. Patrick Hickey; Rhonda Horried; Guy Lofaro; and Alper 

Tunca made key contributions to this report. Terry Richardson provided 

technical assistance.
Page 53 GAO-06-788 Rebuilding Iraq

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(320401)
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