United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial 

Management, Government Information, and 

International Security, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

2010 CENSUS

Costs and Risks Must be 

Closely Monitored and 

Evaluated with Mitigation 

Plans in Place 

Statement of Brenda S. Farrell 

Acting Director, 

Strategic Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:30 p.m. EST 

Tuesday, June 6, 2006

 

GAO-06-822T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 6, 2006

2010 CENSUS

Costs and Risks Must Be Closely 

Monitored and Evaluated, With Mitigation 

Plans in Place 

Highlights of GAO-06-822T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Federal 

Financial Management, Government 

Information and International Security, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

The decennial census is a 

constitutionally mandated activity, 

with immutable deadlines. It 

produces data used to allocate 

about $200 billion yearly in federal 

financial assistance, reapportion 

the seats of the House of

Representatives, and provide a 

profile of the nation’s people to 

help guide policy decisions. The 

U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) 

estimates the 2010 Census will cost 

$11.3 billion, making it the most 

expensive census in the nation’s 

history, even after adjusting for 

inflation. Based primarily on GAO’s 

issued reports, this testimony

addresses the extent to which the 

Bureau has (1) developed detailed 

and timely cost data for effective

oversight and cost control, (2) 

reduced nonresponse mail follow 

up costs, and (3) produced risk 

mitigation plans to address

identified challenges.

What GAO Recommends

The Bureau is taking action on 

several of GAO’s recommendations

to reduce nonresponse time and 

mitigate contract-related risks. A

January 2004 report contained 

recommendations to the Bureau for 

improving the transparency of the 

2010 Census’ life-cycle costs. While 

the Bureau did not agree with this 

recommendation, the Bureau

stated that in response it would 

develop a comprehensive project 

plan that would include milestones, 

itemized estimated costs, and 

measurable goals. 

The Bureau’s most recent life-cycle cost estimate for the 2010 Census does 

not reflect the most current information from testing and evaluation nor 

provide complete information on how changing assumptions may affect 

cost. As GAO reported in January 2004, the Bureau derived its initial cost 

estimate by considering the cost of the 2000 Census along with certain 

assumptions that drive costs, such as staffing needs, the nonresponse rate 

for mailing back the census questionnaire, census worker productivity and 

pay rates, and inflation; however, GAO’s ongoing work has found that the 

most recent (September 2005) estimate does not incorporate current 

information on certain 2001 assumptions. For example, the 2004 Census Test 

suggests some assumptions about staffing and space associated with new 

technology have changed. Specifically, Bureau evaluations indicate that 

more staff at the local census office was needed to support the use of the 

new hand-held mobile computing device (MCD) and additional storage space 

was needed for the MCDs. 

Since 2000, the Bureau has reengineered the decennial census and has begun

new initiatives to reduce nonresponse follow up costs. Key to the Bureau’s 

steps to reduce the costs of nonresponse follow up is successfully using the 

MCDs to eliminate millions of paper questionnaires and maps. Importantly, 

the Bureau must first resolve the MCD’s technological challenges. During 

2004 and 2006 tests, the MCDs had significant reliability problems. For 

example, in the 2004 test the MCDs experienced transmission problems,

memory overloads, and difficulties with the mapping feature. Bureau 

officials have contracted the design and implementation for a new MCD that 

will not be ready until the 2008 Dress Rehearsal. If after the Dress Rehearsal 

the MCD is found not to be reliable, the Bureau could be faced with the 

remote but daunting possibility of having to revert to the costly paper-based 

Census used in 2000. 

The Bureau does not have risk mitigation plans to address certain identified 

challenges to a cost-effective census. Most notably, the Bureau does not 

have a plan to assess additional resources that may be needed to update the 

address and map file for areas affected by hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Moreover, the Bureau has not yet assessed whether new procedures will be 

necessary nor whether local partners will be available to assist in updating 

address and map data. Updating address files to reflect the changes caused 

by the hurricanes will be formidable, in part because, according to Red 

Cross estimates, nearly 525,000 people were displaced in a 90,000 square

mile area. Another risk to be mitigated stems from the need to closely 

monitor the performance of about $1.9 billion in contracts. The Bureau has 

agreed to take steps to mitigate some of those risks. For example, the 

Bureau has said it will enhance the ability of key contract project offices to 

better manage contracts through such actions as developing mitigation plans 

with milestones for key activities and regularly briefing senior managers. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-822T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Brenda S. 

Farrell at (202) 512-6806 or farrellb@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Carper, and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the life-cycle 

costs of the 2010 Census as well as the actions that the U.S. Census Bureau

(Bureau) is taking to contain those costs. The Bureau estimates the 2010 

Census will cost $11.3 billion, which would make it the most expensive 

census in our country’s history, even after adjusting for inflation. Since the 

2000 Census, we have monitored how the Bureau has incorporated lessons 

learned from the 2000 Census into its planning for the next decennial 

census, as well as its cost and design. My overall point today is that the 

decennial’s cost and risks must be closely monitored and evaluated, with

mitigation plans in place to help ensure that accurate results are delivered

on time and within projected costs. Based primarily on our issued reports, 

this testimony addresses the extent to which the Bureau has (1) developed 

detailed and timely cost data for effective oversight and cost control, (2) 

reduced nonresponse mail follow-up costs, and (3) produced risk 

mitigation plans to address identified challenges, such as assessing the 

resources that may be needed to update address files and maps in areas 

affected by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. I will also present the preliminary 

results of ongoing work—on which we plan to issue a report later this 

month—on the Bureau’s efforts to build a complete and accurate address 

list, the foundation of a successful census. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the decennial census is a crucial, 

constitutionally mandated activity undertaken by the Bureau. The stakes 

for a successful census are very high. The data that the census produces 

are used to reapportion the seats of the U.S. House of Representatives; 

realign the boundaries of the legislative districts of each state; allocate 

about $200 billion dollars each year in federal financial assistance; and 

provide a social, demographic, and economic profile of the nation’s people 

to guide policy decisions at each level of government. Further, businesses 

use census data to target new services and products and to tailor existing 

ones to demographic changes. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend the subcommittee for calling 

today’s hearing, as past experience has shown that strong and continuing

congressional involvement—especially while there is still time to make 

cost-effective decisions and influence the direction of the decennial 

census—is essential to the decennial’s ultimate success. Today’s hearing is 

particularly timely because the Bureau is currently holding the 2006 

Census Test in the central portion of Travis County, Texas, and at the 

Cheyenne River American Indian Reservation and Tribal Trust Lands in 

South Dakota, where the Bureau is evaluating key operations and 

Page 1 GAO-06-822T 
equipment it plans to employ for the full enumeration in 2010. After this 

test, the Bureau will have only one more opportunity to assess its censustaking-procedures—a “Dress Rehearsal” scheduled for 2008. Moreover, 

after the Dress Rehearsal, the Bureau will begin to transition from 

preparatory to operational activities, leaving little room for delays or 

design changes, which at that point could significantly increase the cost of 

2010 Census. 

Importantly, for decades we have been reviewing the national 

enumeration on behalf of Congress. Over the years, through a series of 

reports and testimonies, we have acquired broad institutional knowledge 

that gives us a historical view of the census. I want to highlight several 

broad themes that have emerged from our work. 

First, completing the decennial census is a monumental undertaking, and 

the Bureau recognizes that streamlined and efficient operations are critical 

for the census’ cost-effectiveness. The Census’ sheer size and complexity 

make it a risky and fragile enterprise. The 2000 Census, for example, 

involved the hiring of more than 500,000 enumerators on a temporary 

basis, opening 511 local census offices nationwide and 24,000 

questionnaire assistance centers, processing 1.5 billion sheets of paper, 

and in 10 weeks following up with 42 million nonrespondent households. 

The size of the census means that small problems can magnify quickly, and

big problems could be overwhelming. For example, 60 seconds might 

seem like an inconsequential amount of time, but in 2000, if enumerators 

had spent just 1 minute more at each household during nonresponse 

follow-up, it could have added almost $10 million to the cost of the census,

assuming a pay rate of around $13 per hour (wages ranged from $8.25 to

$18.50 per hour for enumerators in 2000, depending on location). 

Second, sound risk management is important to a successful census 

because many risks are interrelated, and a shortcoming in one operation

could cause other operations to spiral downward. For example, a low mail

response rate would drive up the follow-up workload, which in turn would 

increase staffing needs and costs. (Of course, the reverse is also true, 

where a success in one operation could have a number of positive 

downstream impacts.) Rigorous up-front planning and testing, and where 

needed, risk mitigation plans are the best ways to stave off these 

problems. In the 2000 Census, the Bureau successfully planned and 

mitigated risk in recruiting and hiring workers by using management 

information systems capable of tracking key operations with real-time 

measures. To recruit the vast army of people needed to fill the ranks of its 

workforce for the 2000 Census, the Bureau set a recruitment goal of 2.4 

Page 2 GAO-06-822T 
million qualified applicants. Because the Bureau tracked the progress local 

census offices were making in meeting their individual goals, it was able to

mitigate risk by quickly raising pay rates and taking other actions at those 

offices where recruitment was lagging. In the end, the Bureau exceeded its 

recruitment goal by 100,000 people. 

Third, the census is conducted against a backdrop of immutable deadlines, 

and the census’ elaborate chain of interrelated pre- and post-Census Day 

activities are predicated upon those dates. The Secretary of Commerce is 

legally required to (1) conduct the census on April 1 of the decennial year,

(2) report the state population counts to the President for purposes of 

congressional apportionment by December 31 of the decennial year, and 

(3) send population tabulations to the states for purposes of redistricting 

no later than 1 year after the April 1 census date. To meet these legally

mandated reporting requirements, census activities need to take place at 

specific times and in the proper sequence. Bureau officials have recently 

stated, and we agree, that the design and plans being implemented are too 

far down the road and time is too short to allow for significant 

adjustments. In fact, as Census Day approaches, the tolerance for any 

operational delays becomes increasingly small. Indeed, considerable risk 

and cost increases could accompany design changes that occur late in the

decade. This requires the Bureau to have risk-based mitigation plans in 

place now to ensure that 2010 Census operations are ready and that few, if 

any, changes to the fundamental design happen after the 2008 Dress 

Rehearsal. 

Based on the Bureau’s desire to address the issues associated with the 

2000 enumeration, in designing the 2010 Census the Bureau had four goals 

in mind: (1) increase the relevance and timeliness of data, (2) reduce 

operational risk, (3) increase coverage and accuracy, and (4) contain 

costs. To achieve these goals, three components—all new operations—are 

important to the Bureau’s plans for 2010: 

• enhancing procedures for its address list (the MAF—Master Address 

File) and the associated geographic information system (the 

TIGER®—Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and 

Referencing database1

), 

 1

 The TIGER database is a mapping system that identifies all visible geographic features, 

such as type and location of streets, housing units, rivers, and railroads. To link TIGER to 

the master address file (MAF), the Bureau assigns every housing unit in the MAF to a 

specific location in the TIGER, a process called “geocoding.” TIGER is a registered 

trademark of the U.S. Census Bureau. 

Page 3 GAO-06-822T 
• replacing the census long-form questionnaire with the American 

Community Survey (ACS)2

, and 

• conducting a short-form only decennial census that is supported by 

early research and testing. 

My remarks today are based primarily on reports that GAO issued from 

2002 through May 2006 on the planning and development of the 2010 

Census. These reports are listed in appendix I. We analyzed Bureau 

documents and data and interviewed key Bureau officials regarding the

2004 and 2006 Census Tests. In that regard, we visited the Texas and South 

Dakota test sites; Queens, New York; and several counties in rural southcentral Georgia, where an earlier field test was held in 2004. During these 

visits we observed the address canvassing operation—where workers go 

door to door verifying addresses and updating maps as part of the 

Bureau’s effort to build a complete and accurate address list, and we 

observed the nonresponse follow-up operation—where enumerators 

collect information from those households that do not return their initial 

questionnaire. We conducted our work in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

The Bureau’s $11.3 billion life-cycle cost estimate for the 2010 Census 

lacks timely and complete supporting data. The supporting data of the 

estimate is not timely because it does not contain the most current 

information from testing and evaluation. Also, the supporting data of the 

estimate is not complete because it does not provide sufficient information 

on the how changing assumptions could affect cost. 

The Bureau’s $11.3 

Billion Cost Estimate 

for 2010 Census Lacks 

Timely and Complete 

Data 

Cost for Each Decennial 

Census Continues to 

Significantly Increase 

In January 2004, we reported that the Bureau’s cost projections for the 

2010 decennial census continue an escalating trend.3

 As noted above, the 

Bureau now estimates the 2010 Census will cost $11.3 billion, making it the 

most expensive in history, even after adjusting for inflation. Although 

some cost growth can be expected, in part because the number of housing 

units—and hence the Bureau’s workload—has become larger, the cost 

growth has far exceeded the increase in the number of housing units. The 

 2

 ACS is intended to be a monthly survey of 250,000 households that, under the Bureau’s

plans, will replace the long-form census questionnaire. 

3

 GAO, 2010 Census: Cost and Design Issues Need to Be Addressed Soon, GAO-04-37 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 15, 2004). 

Page 4 GAO-06-822T 
Bureau estimates that the number of housing units for the 2010 Census 

will increase by 10 percent over 2000 Census levels. At the same time, as 

shown in figure 1, the average cost per housing unit for 2010 is expected to

increase by approximately 29 percent from 2000 levels (from $56 per 

housing unit to $72 per housing unit in 2000 inflation-adjusted dollars).4

Figure 1: Decennial Census Average Cost per Housing Unit (Fiscal Year 2000 

Inflation-Adjusted Dollars) 

The risk exists that the actual, final cost of the census could be 

considerably higher. Indeed, the Bureau’s initial cost projections for 

previous censuses proved to be too low because of such factors as 

unforeseen operational problems or changes to the fundamental design. 

For example, the Bureau estimated that the 2000 Census would cost 

around $4 billion if sampling was used, and a traditional census without 

sampling would cost around $5 billion. However, the final price tag for the 

2000 Census (without sampling) was over $6.5 billion, a 30 percent 

increase in cost. Today’s climate of large federal deficits and other fiscal 

challenges requires holding the decennial’s costs as low as possible, while 

promoting an accurate, timely census. 

 4

 These figures include the 10-year costs for ACS replacement for the census long form and 

the costs of MAF/TIGER.

Page 5 GAO-06-822T 
2010 Cost Estimate Lacks 

Timely and Complete 

Information 

Despite a history of cost increases, the Bureau’s most recent cost estimate 

is not based on timely and complete information. Table 1 shows the 

Bureau’s latest revised estimate that was released in September 2005. 

Based on this table, the bulk of the funds will be spent between fiscal 

years 2007 through 2013.

Table 1: Bureau’s Revised September 2005 Estimate of Life-cycle Costs for the 2010 Decennial Census Program (in millions

of dollars, nominal) 

Program component FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005

FY 2006 

budget 

request 

Subtotal

FY01-06 

FY 2007-

FY 2013

(est.)

Total

(est.)

American Community 

Survey $23.6 $29.0 $56.8 $64.1 $144.1 $169.9 $487.5 $1,219.8 $1,707.3

MAF/TIGER 

Enhancements Program $0 $15.0 $47.0 $82.4 $81.2 $79.8 $305.4 $228.9 $534.3

 Short Form 2010 

Census $0 $21.0 $41.6 $106.0 $163.0 $214.5 $546.1 $8,466.8 $9,012.9

Total $23.6 $65.0 $145.4 $252.5 $388.3 $464.3 1,339.0 $9,915.5 $11,254.6

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 

Note: These figures have not been audited by GAO.

As we stated in our January 2004 report5

, in June 2001, the Bureau derived

its 2010 cost estimate by using the actual cost of the 2000 Census 

combined with assumptions about cost drivers, such as (1) staffing needs, 

(2) enumerator productivity, (3) pay rates for census workers, (4) the 

nonresponse rate for mailing back the questionnaires6

, and (5) inflation. 

However, the most recent life-cycle cost estimate7

 does not incorporate 

current information about those 2001 assumptions. One key assumption, 

that has not been updated pertains to the use of a new technology—

specifically, new hand-held, GPS-enabled mobile computing devices 

(MCDs)—that would be important to the success of the 2010 census by 

automating and streamlining address canvassing, nonresponse follow-up, 

 5

GAO-04-37. 

6

Lower mail-back response rates increase costs by necessitating costly follow-up visits by 

enumerators to nonresponding households and/or the mailing of a follow-up questionnaire.

7

U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Estimated Life Cycle Costs for Reengineering the 

2010 Decennial Census Program (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2005). 

Page 6 GAO-06-822T 
coverage measurement, and payroll operations. The Bureau anticipated 

that the use of MCDs would facilitate reductions in administrative and 

support costs in the Bureau’s field offices, including a 50 percent 

reduction in clerical and administrative local census office staff costs and

a 50 percent reduction in space at each local census office. However, the 

Bureau’s existing assumptions about the use and reliability of the MCD 

were not updated to reflect information from the 2004 test, which showed 

that assumptions about staffing and space associated with the new 

technology had changed since the June 2001 estimate. The Bureau’s 

evaluations about those test results indicate that more help desk staff at 

the local census office were needed to support the use of the MCD, and 

additional storage space was needed for the devices. However, the Bureau 

did not use this information when revising its cost estimate in 2005 

because, according to Bureau officials, they conduct field tests for 

operational purposes only—not to inform the cost estimates. In our view, 

revising cost estimates on the most recent information—including test 

results that are pertinent to cost assumptions—can assist the Bureau and 

external decision makers to oversee costs and make necessary resource 

allocations to help ensure a successful, cost-effective, census. 

The Bureau’s cost estimate lacked complete information, such as a 

sensitivity analysis regarding assumptions that could affect cost drivers. 

OMB Circular A-94 provides guidelines for cost-benefit analysis of federal 

programs and recommends that agencies develop a sensitivity analysis for 

major projects with significant uncertainty, like the decennial census. The

circular provides a method for determining how sensitive outcomes are to 

changes in assumptions. In January 2004, we reported that the Bureau 

could provide more robust information on the likelihood that the values 

the Bureau assigned to key cost drivers could differ from those initially

assumed and be timelier—previously the life-cycle cost estimate had been

provided at 2-year intervals.8

 The Bureau’s latest life-cycle cost document 

does not contain a sensitivity analysis on assumptions that impact cost; it 

did, however, indicate that the life-cycle cost would be updated annually. 

Having transparent information about cost estimates is especially 

important because decennial costs are sensitive to many key assumptions. 

In fact, for the 2000 Census, the Bureau’s supplemental funding request for 

$1.7 billion in fiscal year 2000 primarily involved changes in assumptions 

related to increased workload, reduced employee productivity, and 

 8

GAO-04-37. 

Page 7 GAO-06-822T 
increased advertising. Given the cost of the census in an era of serious 

national fiscal challenges, it would be beneficial for the Bureau and 

Congress to have sensitivity information about the likelihood—high, 

medium, or low—that certain assumptions would drive costs. By providing 

this information, the Bureau would better enable Congress to consider 

funding levels in this uncertain environment. 

Our January 2004 report also highlighted the challenge that the Bureau 

would have in containing the cost of the 2010 Census. To increase the 

transparency of the census’ life-cycle costs for Congress, we 

recommended that Office of Management and Budget (OMB) establish 

triggers that would signal when the annual 2010 Census costs and/or lifecycle 2010 Census costs exceeded some predetermined amount. We also 

recommended, among other things, that OMB ensure the Bureau analyzes

the sensitivity of the cost figures to specific assumptions. However, OMB 

disagreed with our recommendation, because it said it already has internal 

procedures within its budget reviews to monitor 2010 Census costs. OMB 

shared our view that the costs and risks associated with the 2010 Census 

must be carefully monitored and evaluated throughout the decade. OMB 

also agreed that it is essential to understand the key cost drivers and said 

that it is working with the Bureau to ensure that the Bureau develops highquality, transparent life-cycle cost estimates. 

In addition, we recommended in our 2004 report that the Bureau develop a 

comprehensive project plan that would be updated as needed to (1) 

include milestones for completing key activities; (2) itemize the estimated

cost of each component; (3) articulate a clear system of coordination 

among project components; and (4) translate key goals into measurable, 

operational terms to provide meaningful guidance for planning and 

measuring progress. Some, but not all, of this information is available in 

various documents, and to be useful, it would need to be pieced together. 

As a result, we recommended that the Bureau combine this information 

into a single, comprehensive document. The Bureau disagreed with our 

recommendation, although it said it would develop such a plan 

nonetheless and provide it to GAO, Congress, and other stakeholders. The 

Bureau has not yet issued such a document. 

Page 8 GAO-06-822T 
Since 2000, the Bureau has reengineered the decennial census and has 

begun to implement new initiatives. These include (1) using a short-formonly census questionnaire; (2) automating field operations; and (3) using a 

targeted second mailing to households that fail to respond to the initial 

census questionnaire, instead of sending an enumerator to visit houses 

that have not responded. These initiatives could reduce the workload and 

cost of nonresponse follow-up. While these initiatives show promise, the 

Bureau will need to address technological challenges with the MCD that 

will be used to collect data for nonresponse follow-up. 

Bureau Has Taken 

Steps to Reduce 

Nonresponse Followup Costs, But 

Challenges with 

Technology Remain 

The Bureau is finding it increasingly difficult to locate people and get them 

counted in the census. As in previous censuses, the major cost for the 2010 

Census is what the Bureau calls “field data collection and support 

systems,” accounting for over half of the life-cycle costs of the decennial 

census. 

First, the Bureau plans to contain the cost of nonresponse follow-up by 

increasing mail response through a short-form-only census. The overall 

mail response rate has been declining steadily since 1970. In the 1980 

Census, the mail response rate was 75 percent, 3 percentage points lower 

than it was in the 1970 Census. In the 1990 census, the mail response rate 

dropped to 65 percent and, in 2000, appeared to be leveling off at about 64 

percent. Contributing to this decline is the public’s unwillingness to 

complete the long form. Specifically, the response rates in 1990 and 2000 

to the short form have been higher than the response rate to the long form. 

Bureau data suggest a 1 percent increase in the mail response rate would 

result from conducting a short-form-only census.

Secondly, by using the MCD, the Bureau plans to automate field data 

collection to contain the cost of nonresponse follow-up. The MCD allows 

the Bureau to automate operations and eliminate the need to print millions 

of paper questionnaires and maps used by census workers to conduct 

address canvassing and nonresponse follow-up, as well as managing field 

staff’s payroll. As stated above, the benefits of using the MCD have been 

tested in the 2004 and 2006 tests. For example, during the 2004 Census 

Test, the MCD allowed the Bureau to successfully remove over 7,000 late

mail returns from enumerators’ assignments, reducing the total 

nonresponse follow-up workload by nearly 6 percent. The ability to 

remove late mail returns from the Bureau’s nonresponse follow-up 

workload reduces costs, because census workers no longer need to make 

expensive follow-up visits to households that return their questionnaire 

late, after the mail-back deadline. If the Bureau had possessed this 

capability during the 2000 Census, it could have eliminated the need to 

Page 9 GAO-06-822T 
visit nearly 773,000 late-responding households and saved an estimated 

$22 million (based on our estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in 

workload could add at least $34 million in direct salary, benefits, and 

travel costs to the price tag of nonresponse follow-up9

). Moreover, 

operations that traditionally had to be done in sequence, such as 

nonresponse follow-up and then verifying the housing unit status for 

addresses marked vacant, can now be performed simultaneously by using 

the MCD, which may shorten the time needed for local census offices to 

stay open. 

However, the Bureau’s ability to collect and transmit data using the MCD 

is not known and, at this point, constitutes a risk to the cost-effective 

implementation of the 2010 Census. During the 2004 test of nonresponse 

follow-up and the 2006 test of address canvassing, the MCDs experienced

significant reliability problems. 

During the 2004 Census Test, the MCDs experienced transmission 

problems, memory overloads, and difficulties with a mapping feature—all

of which added inefficiencies to the nonresponse follow-up operation.10

During the 2006 Census Test, for address canvassing, the device was slow 

to pull up and exit address registers, accept the data entered by the census

workers, and link map locations to addresses for multiunit structures. 

Furthermore, the MCDs would sometimes lockup, requiring workers to 

reboot them. 

Census workers also found it difficult to transmit an address and map 

location that were identified for deletion. Because the Bureau could not 

fix this problem, workers returned to the local census office so 

technicians could address the problem. The MCD’s global positioning 

system (GPS) receiver, a satellite-based navigational system to help 

workers locate street addresses and collect coordinates for each structure 

in their assignment area, was also unreliable. Some workers had trouble 

receiving signals, and when a signal was available, the receiver was slow 

to find assignment areas and correct map locations, according to Bureau 

officials. The Bureau extended the operation 10 days and still was unable

 9

 GAO, 2000 Census: Contingency Planning Needed to Address Risks That Pose a Threat 

to a Successful Census, GAO/GGD-00-06 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 1999).

10 GAO, 2010 Census: Basic Design Has Potential, but Remaining Challenges Need

Prompt Resolution, GAO-05-9, (Washington, D.C.: January 12, 2005). 

Page 10 GAO-06-822T 
to complete the job, leaving census blocks in Austin, Texas and on the 

Cheyenne River Reservation, South Dakota, unverified. 

The Bureau has acknowledged that the MCD’s performance is an issue but

believes it will be addressed through a contract awarded on March 30, 

2006, to develop a new MCD. However, the new MCD will not be tested 

until the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, and if problems do emerge, little time will 

be left to develop, test, and incorporate refinements. Given that, it will be 

important that the Bureau have a risk mitigation plan in place to help 

ensure the successful testing of the MCD at the Dress Rehearsal. In our 

May 2006 report, we highlighted the tight time frames to develop the MCD 

and recommended that systems being developed or provided by 

contractors for the 2010 Census—including the MCD—be fully functional

and ready to be assessed as part of the 2008 Dress Rehearsal.11 The 

Department of Commerce, the Census Bureau’s parent agency, noted in its 

comments on our draft report that the Bureau provided competitors for 

the contract with information about the design, requirements, and 

specification for the 2006 test in the request for proposals. Commerce also 

noted that the Bureau would share preliminary results from the 2006 test 

with the firm that was awarded the contract, upon the availability of those 

results. The Bureau, however, did not specify when preliminary results 

would be available. However, if after the 2008 Dress Rehearsal the MCD is 

found not to be reliable, the Bureau could be faced with a remote but 

daunting possibility of having to revert to the costly, paper-based census 

used in 2000. 

Finally, a targeted second mailing to households that fail to respond to the 

initial census questionnaire could reduce the workload and cost of 

nonresponse follow-up. According to Bureau studies, sending a second

questionnaire could yield a gain in overall response of 7 to 10 percent from

non-responding households. In reports, we have highlighted how a second

mailing could boost the mail response rate by several percentage points, 

which in turn would result in considerable savings by reducing the number 

of costly personal visits enumerators would need to make to nonresponding households. The Bureau has never before included this 

operation as part of a decennial census and over the decade has been 

testing its feasibility. The targeted second mailing is a part of the 2006 

 11 GAO, 2010 Census: Census Bureau Generally Follows Selected Leading Acquisition 

Planning Practices, but Continued Management Attention Is Needed to Help Ensure

Success, GAO-06-277 (Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2006). 

Page 11 GAO-06-822T 
test, the results of which will allow the Bureau to identify and resolve any 

operational issues; to demonstrate a more refined plan as part of the 2008 

Dress Rehearsal; and, ultimately, to increase the likelihood that the second

mailing will produce the desired cost savings and other benefits in 2010. 

Recent work that we have conducted has identified several challenges 

that, if not properly managed, could increase the cost of the 2010 Census. 

As the Bureau moves from testing to demonstrating the design in the Dress 

Rehearsal, it will be important for the Bureau to have risk mitigation plans 

in place to reduce the severity of challenges to a cost-effective census. 

These challenges include (1) overseeing contractors responsible for 

conducting key census-taking operations, (2) successfully updating 

address and map files, and (3) assessing the resources that will be needed 

to update the address files and maps for areas affected by hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. 

Bureau Lacks Risk 

Mitigation Plans for 

Certain Challenges 

Increased Reliance on 

Contractor Support for the 

2010 Census Introduces 

Risk 

The Bureau is relying extensively on contractors to supply mission-critical 

functions and technologies for the 2010 Census. The Bureau estimates that 

they will spend $1.9 billion, or nearly 17 percent, of the Bureau’s overall 

decennial costs to award seven major contracts for the 2010 Census. To 

date, the Bureau has awarded three of its seven major contracts. These 

three contracts support (1) MAF/TIGER modernization; (2) the 

development and operation of the Decennial Response and Integration 

System (DRIS)—a system planned to integrate paper, Internet, and 

telephone responses; and (3) the Field Data Collection Automation 

(FDCA) program—a system designed to provide field staff with the 

equipment and infrastructure needed to collect census data.

Contractors can help the Bureau address the challenges it faces as it plans

for and implements the 2010 Census, especially as it becomes increasingly 

difficult for the Bureau to count the nation’s population with its in-house 

staff and capabilities. The contractors that the Bureau relied on to perform 

major decennial activities during Census 2000 generally performed well.12

However, increased reliance on contractors entails certain management 

challenges, including the oversight of contractors to ensure that they meet

 12 For example, the data capture system exceeded its performance goals for accuracy, and 

the advertising campaign blanketed the country with more than 250 advertisements in 17 

languages, which helped boost the response rate higher than the Bureau had expected. 

Page 12 GAO-06-822T 
the Bureau’s needs in an effective, economical, and timely manner. For 

example, according to the Department of Commerce Office of Inspector 

General, the Bureau did not have sufficient program management staff to 

efficiently acquire systems and manage complex, high-dollar contracts 

during Census 2000.13 As a result, the cost of the Bureau’s data capture 

system increased from $49 million to $238 million by the end of that 

decennial. 

As we noted in our May 2006 report, the Bureau has not yet awarded four 

other major contracts for the 2010 Census, but has already pushed back 

the award dates of two of the remaining contracts because of changes in 

its acquisition approach. The Bureau’s tight schedule for systems 

development and testing as well as the interdependence of decennial 

systems could affect its ability to develop fully functional and sufficiently 

mature systems that can be demonstrated in concert with other operations 

during the 2008 Dress Rehearsal. We previously reported that during the 

1998 Dress Rehearsal for the 2000 Census, a number of new features were 

not test-ready; as a result, the Bureau said it could not fully evaluate them 

with any degree of assurance as to how they would affect the census.14

These late design changes and untested systems resulted in additional 

costs to the census. 

Closely monitoring major contracts continues to be important. In March 

2006, we testified that while project offices responsible for the DRIS and

FDCA contracts had carried out initial acquisition management activities, 

neither office had the full skill sets needed to effectively manage the 

acquisitions.15 For DRIS, the Bureau’s project office had established 

baseline requirements, but the Bureau had not validated the requirements 

and had not implemented a process for managing them. Also, the project 

office had identified the project’s risks but had not written mitigation 

plans or established milestones for completing key risk mitigation 

activities. As for FDCA, the Bureau again had specified baseline 

requirements but had not validated them. While, the project office had 

 13 Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General, Improving Our Measure of

America: What Census 2000 Can Teach Us in Planning for 2010, OIG-14431 

(Washington, D.C.: Spring 2002). 

14 GAO-05-9. 

15 GAO, Census Bureau: Important Activities for Improving Management of Key 2010 

Decennial Acquisitions Remain to be Done, GAO-06-444T , (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1,

2006). 

Page 13 GAO-06-822T 
begun to oversee the contractor’s performance, it had not determined 

which performance measures it would use, and the office had not 

implemented a risk management process. Until these basic management 

activities are implemented, both systems could face increased risks of cost 

overruns, schedule delays and performance shortfalls. We have made 

recommendations addressing those issues, such as developing mitigation 

plans with milestones for key activities and regularly briefing senior 

managers. The Bureau has agreed to complete these activities as soon as 

possible. 

As part of its effort to allow respondents to use the Internet during the 

decennial census, the Bureau proposed to develop the use of the Internet 

under the DRIS contract. However, in May 2006, Bureau officials informed 

us that the Internet response option was no longer a contract requirement 

and that they are uncertain whether Internet response would be an option 

for the 2010 Census. The removal of the Internet from the DRIS contract is

an unexpected change, because just 3 months earlier in our March 2006 

testimony,16 we reported that the DRIS contract was expected to process 

Internet responses for the 2010 Census. 

High-level Bureau officials explained that they made the decision to 

remove the Internet from the contract partly because of the potential risks 

associated with computer security attacks. In addition, according to a 

Bureau official, the Bureau’s testing to date showed nothing to indicate 

that offering an Internet response option would improve overall response 

rates or save any money. According to Bureau officials, if the Internet 

response option is included in the design, it will be developed in-house by 

Bureau staff. Bureau officials emphasized that they only have one chance 

every 10 years to collect this information; moreover, any public perception

of an unsecured Internet Web site could result in residents not responding 

to the census, and in the long term could cost more than if the Internet had

not been used. It should be noted that there are security techniques to 

address Internet attacks, and other federal agencies use the Internet to 

successfully meet many missions. According to a Bureau official, the 

Bureau believes it made a sound business decision by removing the 

Internet from the DRIS contract requirements. Further, the official told us

that the Bureau did not develop a formal business case document on this 

decision. 

 16 GAO-06-444T. 

Page 14 GAO-06-822T 
Address and Mapping 

Challenges Pose a Risk to 

a Cost-Effective Census 

To contain decennial costs, long-standing and emerging issues related to 

the Bureau’s address lists and maps need to be addressed. A complete and 

accurate address list is the cornerstone of a successful census because it 

identifies all households that are to receive a census questionnaire and 

serves as the control mechanism for following up with households that fail 

to respond. Although the Bureau went to great lengths to build a complete

and accurate MAF for the 2000 Census, of the 116 million housing units 

contained in the database, the Bureau estimates it incorrectly included 2.3

million housing units and missed another 2.7 million housing units. In light 

of these and other problems, the Bureau concluded that enhancements to 

MAF/TIGER were necessary to make census data more complete and

accurate. 

The Bureau has conducted research and testing to help resolve each of the 

problems experienced in the 2000 Census, including addresses that were 

duplicated, missed, deleted, and incorrectly located on a map (a problem 

known as “geocoding error”). For example, the Bureau is researching 

ways to capture missed addresses for housing units that were hard to 

find—often associated with apartments in small multiunit structures. 

However, some deadlines for completing research are not firm, while 

other deadlines that have been set continue to slip. As a result, it is not 

known whether the research and evaluation efforts underway will be 

completed in sufficient time to allow the Bureau to develop new 

methodologies and procedures for improving the MAF by June 2007—the 

Bureau’s announced deadline for determining the baseline for all program 

requirements. 

In addition, one major research effort using software to identify duplicate 

addresses (an estimated 1.4 million duplicate addresses were removed 

during the 2000 Census) did not work and will not be used in 2010. As a 

result, duplicate addresses may still be a problem for the 2010 MAF, and if 

not detected, can result in increased cost when nonresponse enumerators 

attempt to collect data from a duplicate address incorrectly listed in the 

MAF. 

New issues surrounding the schedule of address activities have emerged.

One such issue revolves around the planning and development of the 2010 

Census amid tight and overlapping schedules for updating addresses and 

map files. For example, Bureau officials estimate that TIGER maps for 600 

to 700 counties of 3,232 counties in the United States will not be updated 

in time to be part of local update of census address (LUCA)—the Bureau’s

program to give local, state, and tribal government officials the 

Page 15 GAO-06-822T 
opportunity to review the address lists and maps and suggest corrections.17 

LUCA participation is important because local knowledge contributes to a 

more complete and accurate address file. Not having the most current 

TIGER maps could affect the quality of a local government’s review and 

could potentially increase the cost of conducting the census. For example, 

to the extent LUCA participants are not able to use the maps to identify 

duplicate and nonexistent addresses, and if subsequent address operations 

also fail to identify those same addresses, then nonresponse follow-up 

enumerators would make unnecessary and costly attempts to locate these 

incorrectly included addresses. 

Bureau Does Not Have a 

Plan to Assess Resources 

Needed to Update Address 

and Map Files in Areas 

Affected by Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita 

The Bureau does not have a plan to assess additional resources that may 

be needed to update the address and map file for areas affected by 

hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The task of updating Census address files to 

reflect the changes caused by the hurricanes will be formidable and 

possibly costly, as much has changed to the landscape since the 2000 

Census. On August 29, 2005, hurricane Katrina devastated the coastal 

communities of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. A few weeks later, 

hurricane Rita hit the border areas of Texas and Louisiana. Damage was 

widespread. For example, the Red Cross estimated that nearly 525,000

people were displaced as a result of hurricane Katrina and approximately 

90,000 square miles were affected. In some places, entire communities 

were obliterated. Homes were declared uninhabitable, and streets, 

bridges, and other landmarks were destroyed. 

For the 2010 Census, locating housing units and the people who reside in 

them will be critical to accurate population counts of places hit by the 

hurricanes, especially since it is estimated that hundreds of thousands of 

people have—either temporarily or permanently—migrated to other areas 

of the country. The Bureau anticipates that by 2009, residents will have 

decided whether to return to the region. However, Bureau officials have

not provided information regarding the basis of this conclusion. Given the 

magnitude of the area, population, and infrastructure affected, it would be 

prudent for the Bureau to begin assessing whether new procedures will be 

necessary, determining whether additional resources may be needed, and 

identifying whether local partners will be available to assist the Bureau in 

 17In the Census Address List Improvement Act (Pub. L. No. 103-430, Oct. 31, 1994), 

Congress required the Bureau to develop a local address review program giving local 

governments and tribal governments greater input into the Bureau’s address list 

development process. 

Page 16 GAO-06-822T 
its effort to update address and map data, as well as other census-taking 

activities. Without having done a resource analysis, the Bureau remains 

uncertain about whether additional funds will be needed to help locate 

and count residents affected by the hurricanes. 

In summary, the 2010 Census is an expensive but vitally important 

undertaking, the success of which is needed to meet the information 

requirements of policymakers at all levels of government, as well as 

business interests, and academic researchers. The Bureau responded to 

concerns about the accuracy, completeness, and cost-effectiveness of the 

2000 Census by reengineering the heretofore paper-based processes used 

in all previous censuses. 

At the same time, the projected life-cycle cost of $11.3 billion makes the 

next decennial census the most expensive in our history, and many factors 

can cause the 2010 Census to be more expensive. It is important to 

consider that some factors that may increase the costs of the census—

such as counting more people than ever who do not speak English or who 

live in alternative, hard-to-find housing—are inherent in the characteristics 

of the population that needs to be counted. Largely, demographically 

related cost factors will continue to exist, regardless of actions taken by 

the Bureau, and must be treated as givens by Bureau planners. Still, other

factors that can cause cost increases can and should be mitigated. While

needed, the reengineering introduced by the Bureau presents new 

challenges and increased risks. The Bureau needs to ensure that its new 

MCDs work as designed, and that contractors perform according to 

requirements, on schedule, and at cost. Moreover, the Bureau still needs to 

fully resolve preexisting issues related to the accuracy and completeness 

of the address list. 

Overall, we have long recognized that redesigning massive enterprises 

entail risks and uncertainties. Such risks and uncertainties need to be 

managed through the use of adequate planning and risk management by 

Bureau management. Such tools also serve the oversight requirements of 

external stakeholders—most notably Congress, which is being asked to 

authorize and appropriate more funds than ever to pay for the census. 

In January 2004, recognizing the cost escalation risks of the 2010 Census, 

we concluded that the Bureau’s plans for 2010 lacked the needed 

budgetary supporting detail, supporting analysis, and other information, 

making it difficult for Congress and us to oversee the Bureau’s operations 

and assess the feasibility of the Bureau’s design and the extent to which it 

Page 17 GAO-06-822T 
would lead to greater cost-effectiveness. While the Bureau has made 

progress in planning and designing the 2010 Census, the Bureau will need 

to continue to take steps to manage and mitigate risks for a 

comprehensive, accurate, and cost-effective population count in 2010. 

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to 

respond to any questions you or other members of the Subcommittee may 

have. 

For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Brenda S. Farrell, 

on (202) 512-6806, or by email at farrellb@gao.gov Individuals making 

contributions to this testimony include Betty Clark, Robert Goldenkoff, 

Ernie Hazera, Shirley Hwang, Krista Loose, Lisa Pearson, Scott Purdy, 

Cynthia Scott, and Tim Wexler. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgements 

Page 18 GAO-06-822T 
Page 19 GAO-06-822T 

Appendix I: Related Products by GAO 

GAO Products 2010 Census: Census Bureau Generally Follows Selected Leading 

Acquisition Planning Practices, but Continued Management Attentions 

Is Needed to Help Ensure Success. GAO-06-277. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 

2006. 

Census Bureau: Important Activities for Improving Management of Key 

2010 Decennial Acquisitions Remain to Be Done. GAO-06-444T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2006. 

2010 Census: Planning and Testing Activities Are Making Progress. 

GAO-06-465T. Washington D.C.: March 1, 2006. 

Information Technology Management: Census Bureau Has Implemented

Many Key Practices, but Additional Actions Are Needed. GAO-05-661. 

Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2005. 

2010 Census: Basic Design Has Potential, but Remaining Challenges 

Need Prompt Resolution. GAO-05-09. Washington, D.C.: January 12, 2005. 

Data Quality: Census Bureau Needs to Accelerate Efforts to Develop and 

Implement Data Quality Review Standards. GAO-05-86. Washington, 

D.C.: November 17, 2004.

Census 2000: Design Choices Contributed to Inaccuracies in Coverage 

Evaluation Estimates. GAO-05-71. Washington, D.C.: November 12, 2004. 

American Community Survey: Key Unresolved Issues. GAO-05-82. 

Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2004. 

2010 Census: Counting Americans Overseas as Part of the Decennial 

Census Would Not Be Cost-Effective. GAO-04-898. Washington, D.C.: 

August 19, 2004. 

2010 Census: Overseas Enumeration Test Raises Need for Clear Policy 

Direction. GAO-04-470.Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004. 

2010 Census: Cost and Design Issues Need to Be Addressed Soon. GAO04-37. Washington, D.C.: January 15, 2004. 

Decennial Census: Lessons Learned for Locating and Counting Migrant 

and Seasonal Farm Workers. GAO-03-605. Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2003. 
Decennial Census: Methods for Collecting and Reporting Hispanic 

Subgroup Data Need Refinement. GAO-03-228. Washington, D.C.: January 

17, 2003. 

Decennial Census: Methods for Collecting and Reporting Data on the 

Homeless and Others Without Conventional Housing Need Refinement. 

GAO-03-227. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2003. 

2000 Census: Lessons Learned for Planning a More Cost-Effective 2010 

Census. GAO-03-40. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2002. 

The American Community Survey: Accuracy and Timeliness Issues. 

GAO-02-956R. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2002. 

Page 20 GAO-06-822T (450498) 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER