*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

JUN 10 2003

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

ALI SHERKAT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOHNSON COUNTY DISTRICT

COURT,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 02-3406

(D. Kan.)

(D.Ct. No. 02-CV-2487-KHV)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
1We liberally construe his pro se pleadings. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka,

318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).

2The doctrine’s name is derived from the two United States Supreme Court

cases from which it arose: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

-2-

Mr. Ali Sherkat, acting pro se1, appeals the district court’s sua sponte

dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

Mr. Sherkat, acting pro se, brought an action against the Johnson County,

Kansas, District Court alleging a violation of his equal protection and due process

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He claimed the Johnson County District

Court found him guilty of abuse without proof, took away his parenting rights,

and jeopardized his right to appeal by failing to record the hearing. Mr. Sherkat

requested the United States district court dismiss and/or reverse the orders of the

Johnson County District Court and sought an award of damages, including five

million dollars in punitive damages. Acting sua sponte, the district court

dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine.2

 Mr. Sherkat now appeals that ruling, and has filed

two emergency motions regarding his appeal. 

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine ‘bars a party losing in state court from

seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a

United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state

judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’” Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d
-3-

1107, 1116 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Kiowa Indian Tribe v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163,

1169 (10th Cir. 1998)). This doctrine “not only prohibit[s] direct review of state

judgments by lower federal courts, but it also prohibit[s] those federal courts from

issuing any declaratory relief that is inextricably intertwined with the state court

judgment.” Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotation marks

and citations omitted). 

We review a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. U.S.

West, Inc. v. Tristani, 182 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528

U.S. 1106 (2000). Here, Mr. Sherkat essentially seeks a dismissal and/or reversal

of the state court proceedings, and the constitutional claims raised and relief

sought are inextricably intertwined with the substance and procedure of the state

court judgment. This is precisely the type of meddling in state court affairs the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine proscribes.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Sherkat’s

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. Further, Mr. Sherkat’s two emergency motions are denied as moot. 

Entered by the Court:

TERRENCE L. O’BRIEN

United States Circuit Judge