United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 18-3440

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Dustin Reinard, Individually and as Parent of B.R. and K.R.; Misty Reinard

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

Crown Equipment Corporation

 Defendant - Appellee

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Waterloo

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Submitted: September 24, 2020

 Filed: December 30, 2020 

____________ 

Before COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

____________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Dustin and Misty Reinard brought a products liability action against forklift 

manufacturer Crown Equipment Corp. (“Crown”). After the district court1 admitted 

1

The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of Iowa, now retired. 
-2- 

evidence over the Reinards’ objections in limine, the jury returned a verdict for 

Crown, and the district court denied the Reinards’ motion for a new trial. We affirm.

I.

On July 22, 2014, Dustin Reinard was injured while operating a stand-up 

forklift manufactured by Crown. By design, the forklift’s operator compartment 

lacked a door. As Reinard was backing the forklift in a warehouse, the side of the 

forklift where the entrance was located struck a pole. Because Reinard’s left foot

was outside the operator compartment at the time of impact, it was crushed against

the pole, and Reinard’s left leg had to be amputated. 

The Reinards, citizens of Iowa,sued Crown in Iowa state court. Crown, which 

is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Ohio, removed the case to 

federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See generally 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332(a). In their complaint, the Reinards alleged that the forklift’s design was 

defective because it omitted a door. Crown contested this allegation on the ground

that the risks of adding a door outweighed the utility. According to Crown, the 

presence of a door leads to more serious injuries in off-dock and tip-over accidents 

by preventing the operator from escaping the falling forklift. 

Before trial, the Reinards filed a motion in limine to prevent Crown from 

introducing certain video simulations of off-dock and tip-over accidents in forklifts 

with doors. The district court denied the motion. Prior to voir dire, the district court 

permitted each party a “mini-opening” during which that party could display three 

“visual aids” to the prospective jurors, and Crown displayed photographs that were 

taken while some of the simulations were being filmed. Crown also referenced the 

simulations during its opening statement at trial. But it was the Reinards who first

introduced the simulations as evidence, showing them to the jury during their casein-chief. In their opening brief on appeal, the Reinards explained that, “because 

[their] pretrial efforts to have [the simulations] excluded were denied, reasonable 
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litigation strategy demanded that [they] try to mitigate the damage caused by the 

admission of the evidence by discussing it first.” 

The jury returned a verdict for Crown, and the district court denied the 

Reinards’ motion for a new trial. The Reinards appeal, challenging the district 

court’s admission of the simulations and denial of their motion for a new trial. 

II.

Typically, we review for abuse of discretion both “the district court’s 

admission of evidence,” United States v. Young, 644 F.3d 757, 759 (8th Cir. 2011), 

and “the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial,” Jones v. Swanson, 341 

F.3d 723, 732 (8th Cir. 2003). But if the appellant forfeited his objections to a ruling, 

then we review the ruling only for plain error. Young, 644 F.3d at 759 n.2. And if 

the appellant waived his objections to a ruling, then we do not review the ruling at 

all. Id. As the Supreme Court has explained, forfeiture is the “failure to make the 

timely assertion of a right,” whereas waiver is the “intentional relinquishment or 

abandonment of a known right.” Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs., 583 U.S. --

-, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2017).

In Huff v. Heckendorn Manufacturing Co., we held that by “intentionally 

plac[ing evidence] in the record,” a party “waive[s] any claim of error” in the 

admission of that evidence. 991 F.2d 464, 467 (8th Cir. 1993). We held that this

rule applies even if the party had filed a motion in limine raising objections to the 

admission of the evidence; even if the trial court in its ruling on that motion in limine

had “made it abundantly clear” that it “was overruling those objections”; and even 

if the opposing party had referred to the evidence earlier at trial, leaving little doubt 

that it would have introduced the evidence had the formerly objecting party not done 

so first. Id. at 465, 467. If under these circumstances the formerly objecting party 

adopts the “strategy” of “attacking the issue head-on and introduc[ing the] evidence” 

itself, then that party “waives any objection that [it] may have had” to the admission 

of the evidence. Id. at 468; see also Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 755 (2000) 
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(“Generally, a party introducing evidence cannot complain on appeal that the 

evidence was erroneously admitted.”); Canny v. Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Bottling Grp., 

439 F.3d 894, 904 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that by “preemptively . . . introduc[ing]” 

evidence at trial, the defendant “waived its challenge to the admission of the 

evidence on appeal”). 

Here, the Reinards were the first to introduce the video simulations. The 

Reinards point out, correctly, that they had filed a motion in limine to exclude the 

simulations, the district court had denied that motion, and Crown had referred to the 

evidence in its opening statement, leaving little doubt that Crown would have 

introduced the evidence had the Reinards not done so first. But Huff held that, even 

in these circumstances, “intentionally plac[ing evidence] in the record . . . waive[s] 

any claim of error” in the admission of the evidence. 991 F.2d at 467. Therefore, 

the Reinards waived their objections to the district court’s admission of the video 

simulations.

2

 

The Reinards present three arguments against our application of Huff. First, 

they argue that Huff is no longer good law. In 2000, Rule 103 of the Federal Rules 

of Evidence was amended to provide that “[o]nce the court rules definitively on the 

record—either before or at trial—a party need not renew an objection . . . to preserve 

a claim of error for appeal.” Fed. R. Evid. 103(b). The Reinards argue that this 

amendment abrogated Huff by making a definitive pretrial ruling that evidence is 

admissible sufficient to preserve objections to the admission of the evidence for 

appeal. 

2

In their briefs, the Reinards sometimes frame their evidentiary challenge as a

challenge to the district court’s denial of their motion in limine to exclude the 

simulations. Reframing the Reinards’ challenge in these terms would not change 

our analysis: the “waiver rule” applies equally to objections to the admission of 

evidence at trial and objections to pretrial rulings that the evidence was admissible. 

See Ohler, 529 U.S. at 755-57 (holding that “appellate review of an in limine ruling” 

that evidence is admissible is unavailable to the party that introduced the evidence). 
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The Reinards misread Rule 103(b). On its face, Rule 103(b) merely provides 

that once the court has definitively rejected an objection to the admissibility of 

evidence, failure to renew the objection does not constitute a forfeiture of the 

objection. It does not follow that preemptively introducing the evidence does not 

constitute a waiver of the objection. The Advisory Committee Notes on the 2000 

amendment to Rule 103 make this very point, emphasizing that “[t]he amendment 

does not purport to answer whether a party who objects to evidence that the court 

finds admissible in a definitive ruling, and who then offers the evidence to ‘remove 

the sting’ of its anticipated prejudicial effect, thereby waives the right to appeal the 

trial court’s ruling.”3

 

Indeed, Huff pointed out the compatibility between its holding and the 

substance of what is now Rule 103(b). By the time we decided Huff in 1993, we had 

already recognized an exception to the general rule that “a motion in limine does not 

preserve error for appellate review” for cases in which “the district court made a 

definitive pre-trial ruling that affected the entire course of the trial.” Sprynczynatyk 

v. Gen. Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1118 (8th Cir. 1985). The plaintiffs in Huff

appeared to invoke this exception, protesting that the trial court’s pretrial rulings had 

3

The dissent objects to our reading of Rule 103(b), noting that the rule speaks 

of “preserv[ing] . . . for appeal” rather than avoiding “forfeiture.” Post, at 9. The 

dissent perceives a difference between these phrases, insisting that “[n]ot forfeiting 

an objection is different than preserving it.” Id. Contra Muiruri v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 

984, 987 (8th Cir. 2015) (“An error . . . is forfeited—that is, not preserved for 

appeal—by the failure to make timely assertion of the right.” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Although we fail to see the distinction, we need not quibble over 

semantics. While Rule 103(b) undoubtedly provides that failure to renew an 

objection after a definitive ruling does not constitute failure to preserve the objection 

(i.e., forfeiture), it simply does not address what might constitute a waiver of the 

objection. For example, suppose that, after a definitive ruling, the objecting party 

changes its mind and decides to stipulate to the admissibility of the evidence. In that

case, we presume, the party has waived its objection, Rule 103(b) notwithstanding. 

See Blodgett v. Comm’r, 394 F.3d 1030, 1040 (8th Cir. 2005) (indicating that 

stipulation constitutes waiver). Likewise if the party “decide[s] preemptively to 

introduce” the evidence. Canny, 439 F.3d at 904. 
-6- 

“made it abundantly clear that the nature of [the plaintiffs’] objections were known 

and that the trial court was overruling those objections.” 991 F.2d at 467. We did 

not deny that the exception existed or that it may have excused the plaintiffs from 

having to renew their objection at trial to avoid forfeiting it on appeal. Instead, we 

held the exception inapplicable because the plaintiffs’ “strategy” of “attacking the 

issue head-on and introduc[ing the] evidence” first “waive[d] any objection that 

[they] may have had.” Id. at 467-68. Rule 103(b) merely confirms what our caselaw 

had already implied and Huff explicitly acknowledged; namely, that the plaintiffs 

may have had an objection that they need not have renewed at trial to avoid forfeiting 

on appeal. As Huff points out, this is consistent with holding that the plaintiffs 

waived any such objection by preemptively introducing the evidence. 

Furthermore, the notion that the 2000 amendment to Rule 103 abrogated Huff

does not square with our 2006 decision in Canny, for two reasons. First, Canny

reiterated that “a party introducing evidence” has “waived its challenge to the 

admission of the evidence.” 439 F.3d at 904. If the 2000 amendment to Rule 103 

abrogated Huff, then this statement would have been false. Second, although Canny

did not cite Huff, it did cite Ohler, 529 U.S. at 755, in which the Supreme Court held 

that “a party introducing evidence” has “waived his objection” to the admission of 

the evidence and therefore “cannot complain on appeal that the evidence was 

erroneously admitted.” See Canny, 439 F.3d at 904. But if the 2000 amendment to 

Rule 103 abrogated Huff, then it also abrogated Ohler, which was decided on May 

22, 2000, roughly six months before the amendment to Rule 103 took effect on 

December 1, 2000. Therefore, if the 2000 amendment to Rule 103 abrogated Huff, 

then Canny’s reliance on Ohler would have been misplaced. The notion that the 

2000 amendment to Rule 103 abrogated Huff thus conflicts with both Canny’s 

reasoning and Canny’s reliance on Ohler. Consequently, even if Rule 103(b) were 

susceptible to an interpretation on which it abrogated Huff, our decision in Canny

would foreclose this interpretation.

Second, the Reinards argue that Huff is factually distinguishable from this 

case. As the Reinards point out, by the time they introduced the simulations, Crown 
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had not only referenced the simulations during its opening statement at trial but also 

displayed photographs from the filming ofsome of the simulations to the prospective 

jurors during its “mini-opening” before voir dire. 

Although Crown’s use of the photographs during its “mini-opening” does 

mark a difference between this case and Huff, this difference is immaterial. Crown 

did not play the video simulations or even excerpts from the video simulations. 

Indeed, Crown did not even display freeze-frames from the video simulations. 

Crown merely displayed still photographs—no more than three—that were taken 

while some of the simulations were being filmed. We view this as analogous to 

referencing the simulations during an opening statement. And Huff held that 

preemptively introducing evidence constitutes a waiver of any objection to the 

evidence’s admission even if the opposing party referenced the evidence in its 

opening statement. 991 F.2d at 465, 467; see also Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 

1134-35 (7th Cir. 2013) (indicating that using a demonstrative during an opening 

statement is not the same as introducing it as evidence). Therefore, the Reinards’ 

preemptive introduction of the simulations constitutes a waiver of their objections 

to the simulations’ admission even though Crown displayed photographs from the 

filming of some of the simulations during its “mini-opening.”

Third, the Reinards argue that even if they waived their objections to the 

admission of the simulations, we should review the district court’s admission of the 

simulations for plain error. This contention finds support in Spencer v. Young, where 

we proceeded to “review the district court’s evidentiary ruling for plain error” after 

concluding that the appellant had “waived his right to appeal the issue” by 

“introduc[ing] the . . . evidence” at trial. 495 F.3d 945, 950 (8th Cir. 2007). 

On this point, however, Spencer is contradicted by prior circuit precedent 

holding that waiver, as distinguished from forfeiture, precludes appellate review. 

See, e.g., Blodgett, 394 F.3d at 1040 (holding that waiver eliminates “any right to 

appellate plain error review”). “[F]aced with conflicting panel opinions,” we must 

follow “the earliest opinion.” Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 
-8- 

2011) (en banc). Accordingly, we refrain from reviewing the district court’s 

admission of the simulations for plain error. 

Having addressed the district court’s admission of the simulations, we turn to 

the district court’s denial of the Reinards’ motion for a new trial. The Reinards’ only 

argument that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motion for a 

new trial is based on the claim that the admission of the simulations was prejudicial 

error. As we have explained, the Reinards waived this claim by preemptively

introducing the simulations. Therefore, they have failed to show that the district 

court abused its discretion in denying their motion for a new trial. 

III. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

GRASZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

The district court correctly characterized Crown’s experimental evidence (its 

videos) as “the most critical in the case.” And it forthrightly stated that if it 

improperly admitted that evidence, doing so “was prejudicial” and would “entitle[] 

the Reinards to a new trial.” Several issues, then, must be addressed to decide if the 

Reinards are entitled to a new trial. Specifically, they need favorable answers to 

three questions: (1) Did they preserve their challenge to the videos’ admission?; 

(2) Was that admission legal error (and thus, an abuse of discretion)?; and (3) Was 

that error harmful? The court answers “no” to the first question and ends its analysis. 

Because I would answer “yes” to each question, I dissent.

A party preserves an evidentiary error with a timely, specific objection about 

an error affecting its substantial rights. Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1). “Once the court 

rules definitively on the record—either before or at trial—a party need not renew an 

objection . . . to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” Fed. R. Evid. 103(b). Today, 

this court concludes that the Reinards waived their ability to challenge error because 
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they introduced Crown’s videos—videos of crash-test dummies dressed in overalls 

slamming their heads or backs onto hard surfaces—first.4

 Ante at 4. To reach that 

conclusion, the court treats Rule 103(b) as unhelpful to the Reinards and relies on 

cases which, I believe, are distinguishable.

The court explains that “[o]n its face, Rule 103(b) merely provides” that a 

definitively-rejected-yet-unrenewed objection “does not constitute a forfeiture[.]” 

Ante at 5. However, I read the plain text (which says nothing about forfeiture) to 

mean that a definitive evidentiary ruling preserves a party’s right to appeal that 

ruling. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(b). As the court notes, the Supreme Court has defined 

“forfeiture” as “the failure to make the timely assertion of a right.” Ante at 3. 

Reading “forfeiture” into Rule 103(b) seems to render the words “preserve . . . for 

appeal” meaningless if those words somehow mean that a party “did not fail to 

timely assert its right to object.” Not forfeiting an objection is different than 

preserving it.5

4

In deciding that waiver renders the claim of error unreviewable, the court 

concludes that the Reinards cannot receive plain-error review. In reaching that 

conclusion, the court relies on the waiver-versus-forfeiture distinction that stems 

from a seminal criminal case, United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–36 (1993), 

which interprets Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), the plain-error standard for criminal cases. 

Ante at 3, 7. While a prior panel seems to have extended Olano’s plain-error review 

standard to at least some civil cases, it did so only when error was not preserved. 

See Wiser v. Wayne Farms, 411 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that 

“[t]he law in our circuit on the plain-error test in a civil context . . . [wa]s not entirely 

clear” but deciding “an unpreserved error in the civil context must meet at least the 

Olano standard to warrant correction”) (emphasis added)). 

5

I believe that this distinction between error-preservation and forfeitureavoidance tracks Supreme Court guidance on the difference between waiver and 

forfeiture. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733 (“Waiver is different from forfeiture.”). The 

difference between waiver and forfeiture matters a great deal to parties whose 

appeals we cannot hear.
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Along similar lines, I agree that the advisory committee did not decide if a 

party can challenge a definitive, unfavorable evidentiary ruling after offering the 

same evidence (that it tried but failed to keep out) to “remove the sting” of that 

evidence’s “anticipated prejudicial effect[.]” See Fed. R. Evid. 103, cmt. to 2000 

amendments. But in explaining what it did not decide, the advisory committee only

cited cases when parties tried to “remove the sting” from their own actions (and 

mostly with prior-conviction evidence). See id. (citing cases).6

Further, even if the cases relied upon by the court can be harmonized with the 

amended Rule 103(b), those sting-removing cases all dealt with evidence of a party’s 

own conduct. See Huff v. Heckerndorn Mfg., Co., 991 F.2d 464, 467 (8th Cir. 1993) 

(after an unfavorable ruling on evidence about his own negligent use of a product, a 

mechanic preemptively introduced evidence to show the manufacturer failed to warn 

buyers about product use); Ohler, 529 U.S. at 755 (after an unfavorable ruling that 

would allow the government to use a prior conviction for impeachment purposes, 

testifying criminal defendant introduced that evidence on direct examination); 

Canny v. Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 439 F.3d 894, 904 (8th Cir. 2006) 

(after a favorable ruling limited an employee’s use of an employer’s settlement letter 

to the contents of the letter, the employer preemptively introduced that letter’s 

contents on direct examination).

6

See United States v. Fisher, 106 F.3d 622, 627–29 (5th Cir. 1997) (criminal 

defendant did not waive error by introducing prior-conviction on direct examination 

after government received favorable ruling to use that evidence on crossexamination), abrogated by Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 755 (2000) (“[W]e 

conclude that a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior 

conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such 

evidence was error.”); Judd v. Rodman, 105 F.3d 1339, 1340–42 (11th Cir. 1997) 

(plaintiff introduced evidence about her own sexual history, plastic surgery, and 

work history when she alleged defendant wrongfully transmitted a sexuallytransmitted disease to her); Gill v. Thomas, 83 F.3d 537, 539–41 (1st Cir. 1996) 

(plaintiff introduced evidence about his prior criminal convictions in excessive force 

suit); United States v. Williams, 939 F.2d 721, 722–23 (9th Cir. 1991) (criminal 

defendant introduced evidence about his prior criminal conviction).
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That is not what happened here. Instead, the evidence went straight to the 

merits. To prevail, the Reinards needed to prove all six design-defect elements. See

Verdict Form at 1, ECF No. 106, July 26, 2018 (“On the Reinards’ ‘design defect’ 

claim, as explained in Instruction No. 5, in whose favor do you find?”); see also Jury 

Instrs. at 12–14, ECF No. 107, July 30, 2018 (providing six elements for designdefect claim). Of those six elements, four hinged on whether the forklift door 

presented “a reasonable alternative safer design[.]” See Jury Instrs. at 12–13, ECF 

No. 107, July 30, 2018 (elements two through five). So, deciding against the door 

as an alternative safer design would also decide the case against the Reinards.

Two times before the Reinards presented any evidence, Crown emphasized 

how it would use the videos. First, in its mini-opening, Crown showed the jury 

pictures of the testing used in its videos. Then, in its opening statement, Crown told 

the jury that its videos would show that adding a door would create “a fatal risk” to 

operators seven times out of ten. The Reinards’ expert addressed that evidence to 

discredit Crown’s already-presented central defensive theory (that a door would kill 

operators) which also contradicted the Reinards’ theory of the case (that a door 

would not). Cf. L. Timothy Perrin, Pricking Boils, Preserving Error: On the Horns 

of a Dilemma After Ohler v. United States, 34 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 615, 670 (2001) 

(“Ohler addresses the disclosure of a prior conviction under Rule 609 and is 

particularly concerned with the prosecution’s right to decide for itself whether to use 

the conviction during cross-examination. Those concerns do not exist with evidence 

that relates to the merits of the dispute[.]”).

Because I conclude waiver does not apply here, I would reach the merits of 

this case.

“[W]e have explained that ‘experimental evidence falls on a spectrum and the 

foundational standard for its admissibility is determined by whether the evidence is 

closer to simulating the accident or to demonstrating abstract scientific principles.’” 

Dunn v. Nexgrill Indus., Inc., 636 F.3d 1049, 1055 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
-12- 

McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396, 1402 (8th Cir. 1994)). We have 

also explained that “[a] court may properly admit experimental evidence if the tests 

were conducted under conditions substantially similar to the actual conditions.” 

McKnight, 36 F.3d at 1401 (citing Champeau v. Fruehauf Corp., 814 F.2d 1271, 

1278 (8th Cir. 1987) (cleaned up)). “[W]here the experimental tests do not purport 

to recreate the accident, but instead . . . are used to demonstrate only general 

scientific principles, the requirement of substantially similar circumstances no 

longer applies.” Id. (citing Champeau, 814 F.2d at 1278). In McKnight, we 

connected the “foundational standard” for admissibility to the need to avoid juror 

confusion. Id. We predicted that jurors were not likely to confuse abstract 

demonstrations of scientific principles with events on trial, but we also 

acknowledged that “more troublesome cases” could be “rife with the risk of 

misunderstanding” of experimental evidence that demonstrates “some [scientific] 

principles of some kind . . . but in a fashion that looks very much like a recreation of 

the event that gave rise to the trial.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Fusco v. Gen. Motors 

Corp., 11 F.2d 259, 264 (1st Cir. 1993)).

The district court did not apply the foundational admissibility standard for 

experimental-evidence. Compare McKnight, 36 F.3d at 1401, with Doc. 79 at 24, 

31. On appeal, Crown argues that it used the videos not as recreations but to show 

the “forces generated” during certain accidents (i.e., how hard and fast the forklifts 

would fall or tip over). In turn, its experts relied on those videos to testify that if 

operators stayed inside forklifts during accidents, the “forces” could cause “serious 

injury or death.” Crown, however, stops short of describing the crashes in its videos 

as illustrating general principles about physics (or any other scientific discipline).

I am skeptical any juror needed any help (let alone, a scientific demonstration) 

to know that a fast crash into a hard surface could cause serious injury or death. So 

then, what scientific principle did the dummies demonstrate? Under McKnight, the 

district court needed to ask. McKnight, 36 F.3d at 1401. Crown does not suggest 

that the dummies were connected to a scientific principle. So, without an articulated 

scientific principle, and with no argument about substantial similarity, that 
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experimental evidence could not come in. Id. Because the district court admitted 

that evidence without applying McKnight, it based its ruling on an erroneous view 

of the law and abused its discretion. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 

384, 405 (1990) (“A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based 

its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of 

the evidence.”); see also Doc. 79 at 24, 31.

We will only disturb the jury’s verdict if the evidentiary error affected the 

Reinards’ substantial rights. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 (harmless-error review). We 

look at the jury’s verdict to decide if the challenged evidence prejudiced the Reinards 

and affected their substantial rights. See, e.g., Coterel v. Dorel Juvenile Grp., Inc., 

827 F.3d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 2016).

As mentioned, the design-defect verdict required the jury to unanimously 

agree that a safety door was a reasonable alternative safer design. See Verdict Form 

at 1, ECF No. 106, July 26, 2018 (directing the jury to Instruction No. 5 to decide 

the design-defect claim); see also Jury Instrs. at 12–14, ECF No. 107, July 30, 2018 

(providing six elements for design-defect claim). A “no” answer would decide the 

case for Crown. Id. The verdict does not require speculation about how Crown’s 

evidence impacted the outcome. Cf. Coterel, 827 F.3d at 808.

Nor did the district court. It was “virtually certain that this evidence 

substantially affected the jury’s deliberations and verdict.” See Order Den. Pls.’ 

Mot. New Trial at 2, ECF No. 115, Oct. 15, 2018. It characterized the videos as “the 

foundation of Crown’s defense” as well as “the most critical” evidence in the case 

“because many of Crown’s trial witnesses relied on [it].” In recognition of this, 

when the district court denied a new trial, it candidly stated that if it had improperly 

admitted Crown’s evidence, then that error “was prejudicial and entitle[d] the 

Reinards to a new trial.”
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If Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61’s harmless-error standard applies here, 

as I conclude it does, we should reverse because “justice requires” it and the errors 

“affect[ed]” the Reinards’ “substantial rights.”

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