United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats, and International Relations, 

Committee on Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

REBUILDING IRAQ 

More Comprehensive 

National Strategy Needed to 

Help Achieve U.S. Goals 

and Overcome Challenges 

Statement of David M. Walker 

Comptroller General of the United States 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Tuesday, July 11, 2006

 

GAO-06-953T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 11, 2006

REBUILDING IRAQ

More Comprehensive National Strategy 

Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals and 

Overcome Challenges 

Highlights of GAO-06-953T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-953T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Joseph 

Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or 

christoffj@gao.gov. 

In November 2005, the National

Security Council (NSC) issued the 

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq

(NSVI) to clarify the President’s 

strategy for achieving U.S. political, 

security, and economic goals in

Iraq. The U.S. goal is to establish a 

peaceful, stable, and secure Iraq. 

In addition, in June 2006, the 

administration issued a fact sheet

at Camp David discussing current 

progress and goals in Iraq.

This testimony (1) discusses the 

extent to which the NSVI and its

supporting documents address the 

six characteristics of an effective

national strategy, and (2) assesses

how security, political, and

economic factors will affect 

achieving the U.S. strategy for Iraq. 

In this testimony, the NSVI and 

supporting documents are 

collectively referred to as the U.S. 

strategy for Iraq. 

What GAO Recommends

A GAO report issued today

recommends that NSC, along with

the Departments of Defense and

State, complete the strategy by

addressing all six characteristics of

an effective national strategy in a 

single document. State commented 

that the NSVI’s purpose is to

provide a broad overview of the 

U.S. strategy in Iraq, not all details. 

GAO’s analysis was not based 

exclusively on the NSVI but 

included all key supporting 

documents. Consequently, GAO 

retained the recommendation for a 

more complete and integrated 

strategy. 

The NSVI is an improvement over previous U.S. planning efforts for 

stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. However, the NSVI and supporting 

documents are incomplete as they do not fully address all the characteristics

of an effective national strategy. Among its positive attributes, the strategy’s 

purpose and scope is clear; it identifies U.S. involvement in Iraq as a “vital 

national interest and the central front in the war on terror.” Also, the strategy 

generally addresses the threats and risks facing the coalition forces and 

provides a comprehensive description of U.S. political, security, and 

economic objectives in Iraq. However, the discussion of outcome-related 

performance measures to assess progress in achieving these goals and 

objectives is limited. Moreover, the strategy falls short in at least three 

areas. First, it only partially identifies the agencies responsible for 

implementing key aspects of the strategy. Second, it does not fully address 

how the U.S. will integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis and the 

international community, and it does not detail Iraq’s anticipated 

contribution to its future needs. Third, it only partially identifies the current 

and future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq, including maintaining U.S. 

military operations, building Iraqi government capacity, and rebuilding 

critical infrastructure. Furthermore, the June 2006 Camp David fact sheet 

provides additional detail but does not address these key shortfalls. 

Security, political, and economic factors will hamper U.S. efforts to stabilize 

Iraq and achieve key U.S. goals. First, the U.S. and Iraq are trying to stabilize 

Iraq by training and equipping additional Iraqi security forces and securing

Baghdad and other strategic cities. However, increases in attacks against the 

coalition and its Iraqi partners and the growing influence of militias will 

adversely affect U.S. and Iraqi efforts. Second, the U.S. and Iraq are trying to 

improve Iraq’s capacity to govern by reconciling sectarian groups and 

building the capacity of national and provincial governments to provide 

security and services. However, sectarian conflicts, the lack of capacity in 

the ministries, and corruption serve to hinder these efforts. Third, the U.S. 

and Iraqi governments are trying to revitalize Iraq’s economy and restore the 

oil, electricity, and other key sectors. However, these efforts have been 

impeded by security, corruption, fiscal, and other challenges. 

The formation of a permanent Iraqi government gives the U.S. an

opportunity to re-examine its strategy for Iraq and align its efforts with Iraq 

and the international community. As a first step, NSC should complete the 

strategy by defining and disseminating performance metrics, articulating 

clear roles and responsibilities, specifying future contributions, and 

identifying current costs and future resources. In addition, the United States, 

Iraq, and the international community should (1) enhance support 

capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, (2) improve the capabilities of the 

national and provincial governments, and (3) develop a comprehensive anticorruption strategy. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to appear today to discuss the U.S. government’s strategy for 

victory in Iraq. In November 2005, the National Security Council (NSC) 

issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the 

President’s existing strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, and 

economic goals in Iraq. The NSVI and supporting documents incorporate 

the same desired end-state for U.S. operations in Iraq first established by 

the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003: a peaceful, united, stable, 

secure Iraq, well-integrated into the international community and a full 

partner in the global war on terrorism. In addition, in June 2006, the 

administration issued a fact sheet at Camp David discussing current 

progress and goals in Iraq. 

My testimony is based on the report we are releasing today evaluating the 

NSVI and seven supporting documents, as well as related reports assessing

the challenges to achieving U.S. objectives in Iraq. My testimony assesses 

(1) the extent to which the NSVI and supporting documents collectively 

address the six key characteristics of an effective national strategy, and (2) 

how security, political, and economic factors will affect achieving the U.S. 

strategy for Iraq. In this testimony, the NSVI and supporting documents 

are collectively referred to as the U.S. strategy for Iraq. While we assessed 

unclassified and classified documents, the information in the statement is 

unclassified.

We conducted our reviews for these reports under my statutory authority 

as Comptroller General in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

The NSVI is an improvement over previous U.S. government planning 

efforts for stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. However, the NSVI and its 

supporting documents are incomplete because they do not fully address 

all of the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. On the 

one hand, the strategy’s purpose and scope is clear because it identifies 

U.S. involvement in Iraq as a “vital national interest and the central front in 

the war on terror.” The strategy also generally addresses the threats and 

risks facing the coalition forces, as well as provides a comprehensive 

description of the desired U.S. political, security, and economic objectives 

in Iraq. However, the discussion of outcome-related performance 

measures to assess progress in achieving these goals and objectives is 

limited and not transparent. On the other hand, the strategy falls short in 

at least three key areas. First, it only partially identifies which U.S. 

Summary 

Page 1 GAO-06-953T 
agencies are responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy or 

resolving conflicts among the many implementing agencies. Second, it 

does not fully address how U.S. goals and objectives will be integrated 

with those of the Iraqi government and the international community, and it

does not detail the Iraqi government’s anticipated contribution to its future 

security and reconstruction needs. Third, it only partially identifies the 

current and future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq, including the costs of 

maintaining U.S. military operations, building Iraqi government capacity at

the provincial and national level, and rebuilding critical infrastructure. The 

June 2006 Camp David fact sheet provides additional detail but does not

address the key shortfalls we identified in these three areas. 

Security, political, and economic factors are hampering U.S. efforts to 

stabilize Iraq and achieve key goals in the U.S. strategy. First, the U.S. and 

Iraqi governments are trying to stabilize Iraq by training and equipping

Iraqi security forces and securing Baghdad and other strategic cities. 

Although the number of the Iraqi security forces is increasing, these forces

still lack the logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities 

to operate independently. Moreover, increases in attacks against the 

coalition and its Iraqi partners and the growing influence of militias have 

adversely affected U.S. and Iraqi efforts. Second, the U.S. and Iraqi 

governments are trying to improve Iraq’s capacity to govern by reconciling

the conflicting sectarian groups and building the capacity of national and

provincial governments to provide security and deliver services. However, 

continuing sectarian conflicts and the lack of core competencies in the 

ministries, along with widespread corruption, are hindering these efforts. 

Third, the U.S. and Iraqi governments are trying to revitalize Iraq’s 

economy and restore essential services in the oil, electricity, and other key 

sectors, but these efforts have been impeded by security, corruption, 

fiscal, and other challenges. 

The formation of a permanent Iraqi government gives the United States a

new opportunity to re-examine its strategy for Iraq and more closely align 

its efforts with Iraq and the international community. The report we are 

releasing today recommends that the NSC, in conjunction with the 

Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, complete the U.S. strategy for 

Iraq by addressing all six characteristics of an effective national strategy in

a single document. In particular, the revised strategy should clarify 

agencies’ roles and responsibilities, specify future contributions, and 

identify current costs and future resources needed to implement the 

strategy. 

Page 2 GAO-06-953T 
DOD and State did not comment on the recommendations in a draft of the 

report released today. However, in its comments State noted that our 

report misrepresented the NSVI’s purpose—-to provide the public with a 

broad overview of the U.S. strategy for Iraq. Importantly, our analysis was 

not limited to the publicly available, unclassified NSVI but was based on 

the classified and unclassified documents that define the U.S. strategy for 

Iraq. Collectively, these documents still lack all of the key characteristics 

of an effective national strategy. 

Based on our other ongoing and completed work, the United States, Iraq 

and the international community could take additional actions to achieve 

success in Iraq. These actions include (1) sustaining the development of 

Iraqi security forces by enhancing their support capabilities (command 

and control, logistics, and intelligence); (2) expanding efforts to improve 

the capabilities of national and provincial governments, including greater 

technical assistance and training; and (3) developing a comprehensive 

anti-corruption strategy that improves the regulatory environment, 

strengthens accountability organizations, reduces subsidies, and enhances 

investment opportunities. 

Prior to the fall of 2005, the U.S. stabilization and reconstruction effort in 

Iraq lacked a clear, comprehensive, and integrated U.S. strategy. State 

assessments and other U.S. government reports noted that this hindered

the implementation of U.S. stabilization and reconstruction plans. A 

review of the U.S. mission completed in October 2005 found, among other 

things, that (1) no unified strategic plan existed that effectively integrated

U.S. government political, military, and economic efforts; (2) multiple 

plans in Iraq and Washington had resulted in competing priorities and 

funding levels not proportional to the needs of overall mission objectives;

(3) focused leadership and clear roles were lacking among State, DOD, 

and other agencies in the field and in Washington, D.C.; and ( 4) a more 

realistic assessment of the capacity limitations of Iraq’s central and local 

government was needed.

Background on the 

National Strategy for 

Victory in Iraq 

In November 2005, the National Security Council (NSC) issued the 

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President’s 

existing strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals 

in Iraq. According to this document, prevailing in Iraq is a vital U.S. 

national interest because it will help win the war on terror and make 

America safer, stronger, and more certain of its future. To achieve victory, 

the strategy requires the United States to maintain troops in Iraq until its 

objectives are achieved, adjusting troop strength as conditions warrant. 

Page 3 GAO-06-953T 
The strategy reorganized U.S. government stabilization and reconstruction 

efforts along three broad tracks—political, security, and economic—and 

eight strategic objectives (see fig. 1).

Figure 1: U.S. National Strategy for Victory in Iraq

Political

isolate-engage-build

8 principal 

objectives 

Transition 

Iraq to 

security

selfreliance

Help Iraqis 

forge a 

compact for 

democratic 

government

Help Iraq 

build 

government 

capacity and 

essential 

services

Help Iraq 

strengthen 

the 

economy 

Increase 

international 

support for 

Iraq

Strengthen 

public 

understanding of 

coalition efforts 

and public 

isolation of the 

insurgents 

Help Iraq 

strengthen 

the rule of 

law

Defeat 

terrorists; 

neutralize 

insurgents

Eight strategic objectives (pillars) and corresponding interagency working groups

Security

clear-hold-build

Economic

restore-reform-build

U.S. National Strategy for Victory in Iraq: November 2005

Source: GAO analysis of National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.

Overall, officials in DOD and State identified seven documents that 

describe the U.S. government strategy for Iraq in addition to the NSVI.1

Figure 2 shows the NSVI and key supporting documents. The U.S. 

government uses these documents to plan, conduct, and track efforts at 

the strategic, operational, and implementation levels. 

 1

Two separate campaign plans were included in our analysis: the August 2004 plan and the

April 2006 Joint Campaign Plan issued by the Chief of Mission and the Commander of the 

MNF-I. 

Page 4 GAO-06-953T 
Figure 2: NSVI and Key Supporting Documents

Source: GAO. 

Secretary 

of Defense

Secretary 

of State

Commander 

MNF-I

Chief of 

Mission 

Bagdad

National Security 

Council

Levels Documents

NSPD 36

U.S. administration

NSSI

Joint Mission Statement

Campaign 

plans

2207 

reports to 

Congress

Operations 

Order

National/strategic

level

Operational

level

Implementation and reporting

level

NSVI

MNF-I Multinational Forces - Iraq 

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive 

NSSI National Strategy for Supporting Iraq

Our work has identified six characteristics of an effective national 

strategy. National strategies with these characteristics offer policymakers 

and implementing agencies a management tool that can help ensure 

Page 5 GAO-06-953T 
accountability and more effective results. The six characteristics are (1) a 

clear purpose, scope, methodology; (2) a detailed discussion of the 

problems, risks, and threats the strategy intends to address; (3) the desired 

goals and objectives, and outcome-related performance measures; (4) a 

description of the U.S. resources needed to implement the strategy; (5) a 

clear delineation of the U.S. government’s roles, responsibilities, and 

mechanisms for coordination; and (6) a description of how the strategy is 

integrated internally (that is, among U.S. agencies) and externally (in this

case, with the Iraqi government and international organizations). These six 

characteristics can be subdivided into 27 separate elements. For a more 

detailed assessment, see appendix I.

The NSVI aims to improve U.S. strategic planning for Iraq; however, the 

NSVI and supporting documents do not fully address all of the six 

desirable characteristics of effective national strategies that GAO has 

identified through its prior work.2

 We used these six characteristics to 

evaluate the strategy—that is, the NSVI and supporting documents that 

DOD and State officials said encompassed the U.S. strategy for rebuilding 

and stabilizing Iraq. As figure 3 shows, the strategy generally addresses 

three of the six characteristics but only partially addresses three others, 

limiting its usefulness to guide agency implementation efforts and achieve

desired results. Moreover, since the strategy is dispersed among several 

documents instead of one, its effectiveness as a planning tool for 

implementing agencies and for informing Congress about the pace, costs,

and intended results of these efforts is limited. Although the June 2006 

Camp David fact sheet provides additional detail on recent U.S. and Iraqi

actions, it does not address the key shortfalls we identified in the three 

areas. 

National Strategy for 

Victory in Iraq and 

Supporting 

Documents Do Not 

Fully Address All Key 

Characteristics of an 

Effective National 

Strategy 

 2

See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National

Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004); and

Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Periodic Reporting Are Needed to

Gauge Progress and Costs of DOD’s Global Posture Restructuring, GAO-06-486C 

(Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006). 

Page 6 GAO-06-953T 
Figure 3: Extent U.S. Strategy for Iraq Addresses GAO’s Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy 

Generally addresses Partially addresses

Extent the U.S. Strategy for Iraq Addresses GAO’s Desirable

Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy

1. Clear purpose, scope, and methodology

2. Detailed discussion of problems, risks, and threats

3. Desired goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures

6. Description of future costs and resources needed

4. Delineation of U.S. government roles and responsibilities

5. Description of strategy’s integration among and with other entities













Sources: GAO analysis of NSC, State, and DOD data.

Strategy Generally 

Addresses Purpose and 

Scope, Risks and Threats, 

and Goals and Objectives 

The strategy provides (1) a clear statement of its purpose and scope; (2) a

detailed discussion of the problems, risks, and threats; and (3) an 

explanation of its goals, subordinate objectives, and activities but a limited

discussion of outcome-oriented performance measures. 

This characteristic addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of

its coverage, and the process by which it was developed. A complete 

description of purpose, scope, and methodology makes the document 

more useful to organizations responsible for implementing the strategies, 

as well as to oversight organizations such as Congress. The NSVI and 

supporting documents generally address this characteristic by identifying 

U.S. government efforts to rebuild and stabilize Iraq in terms of these three 

overarching objectives and address the assumptions that guided the 

strategy’s development. For example, to help Iraq achieve the strategic 

goal of forging a national compact for democratic government, the 

strategy’s subordinate objectives state that the United States would help 

promote transparency in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches 

of government, and help build national institutions that transcend regional

and sectarian interests, among other activities. 

Strategy Identifies Purpose and 

Scope 

This characteristic addresses the particular problems, risks, and threats 

the strategy is directed at, as well as risk assessment of the threats to and 

vulnerabilities of critical assets and operations. Specific information on 

both risks and threats helps responsible parties better implement the 

strategy by ensuring that priorities are clear and focused on the greatest 

needs. The NSVI and supporting documents generally address some of the 

problems, risks, and threats found in Iraq. For example, the NSVI identifies 

the risks posed by the insurgency and identifies three basic types of 

Strategy Identifies Problems, 

Risks, and Threats 

Page 7 GAO-06-953T 
insurgents—rejectionists, supporters of former Iraqi President Saddam 

Hussein, and terrorists affiliated with or inspired by al Qaeda—and the 

different actions needed to confront each one. In addition, various 

supporting documents provide additional information on the threats of the 

Shi’a militias and the corruption that could affect the Iraqi government’s 

ability to become self-reliant, deliver essential services, reform its 

economy, strengthen rule of law, maintain nonsectarian political 

institutions, and increase international support. 

This characteristic addresses the goals of the national strategy and the 

steps needed to attain those goals, as well as the priorities, milestones, and 

outcome-related performance measures to enable more effective oversight 

and accountability. The NSVI generally addresses goals and subordinate 

objectives by identifying 8 strategic objectives (pillars), 46 subordinate 

objectives, or “lines of action,” and numerous project activities, but only 

partially addresses outcome-related performance measures. The 

supporting strategy documents also provide information on how progress 

will be monitored and reported. In addition, the NSVI identifies the 

process for monitoring and reporting on progress via interagency working 

groups. It also identifies some metrics to assess progress, such as the 

number of Iraqis willing to participate in the political process, the quality 

and quantity of the Iraqi units trained, and barrels of oil produced and

exported. 

Strategy Discusses Goals, 

Objectives, and Activities but 

Provides Limited Discussion of 

Outcome-Related Performance 

Measures 

However, the metrics the strategy uses to report progress make it difficult

to determine the impact of the U.S. reconstruction effort. We reported 

previously that in the water resources and sanitation sector, little was 

known about how U.S. efforts were improving the amount and quality of 

water reaching Iraqi households or their access to the sanitation services 

because the U.S. government only tracked the number of projects 

completed or under way.3

 For instance, as of March 2006, Iraq had the 

capacity to produce 1.1 million cubic meters of water per day, but this 

level overestimated the amount of potable water reaching Iraqi 

households. U.S. officials estimate that 60 percent of water treatment 

output is lost due to leakage, contamination, and illegal connections. The 

U.S. mission in Iraq reported in December 2005 that it had developed a set 

of metrics to better estimate the potential impact that U.S. water and 

 3

See GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures

for Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities, GAO-05-872 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005). 

Page 8 GAO-06-953T 
sanitation reconstruction efforts were having on Iraqi households, but 

acknowledges it is difficult to measure how much water Iraqis are actually 

receiving or whether the water is potable. The mission report notes that 

without such comprehensive data, mission efforts to accurately assess the 

impact of U.S. reconstruction efforts on water and sanitation services is 

seriously limited. 

Strategy Partially 

Addresses Agency 

Responsibilities, 

Integration, and Costs 

The NSVI and supporting documents only partially (1) delineate the roles 

and responsibilities of key U.S. government agencies; (2) describe how the 

strategy will be integrated among U.S. entities, the Iraqi government, 

international organizations and the mechanisms for coordination; and (3) 

identify what the strategy will cost and the sources of financing. 

This characteristic addresses which U.S. organizations will implement the 

strategy as well as the roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for 

coordinating their efforts. The NSVI and the supporting documents 

partially address the roles and responsibilities of specific U.S. government 

agencies and offices and the process for coordination. For example, 

National Security Presidential Directive 36 makes the Department of State 

responsible for the non-security aspects of reconstruction and lays out key 

roles for the U.S. Chief of Mission in Baghdad and CENTCOM. It directs 

that the Commander of CENTCOM will, under the guidance of the Chief of 

Mission, oversee all U.S. government efforts to train and equip Iraq 

security forces. 

Strategy Partially Addresses 

U.S. Roles, Responsibilities, 

and Coordination Mechanisms 

However, it is not clear which agency is responsible for implementing the 

overlapping activities listed under the NSVI’s eight strategic objectives. 

For instance, one activity is to promote transparency in the executive, 

legislative, and judicial branches of the Iraqi government; however, the 

NSVI and supporting documents do not indicate which agency is 

responsible for implementing this activity, or who is to be held

accountable for results. Moreover, little guidance is provided to assist 

implementing agencies in resolving conflicts among themselves, as well as

with other entities. In our prior work, we found that delays in

reconstruction efforts sometimes resulted from lack of agreement among 

U.S. agencies, contractors, and Iraqi authorities about the scope and 

schedule for the work to be performed.4

 4

See GAO-05-872. 

Page 9 GAO-06-953T 
This characteristic addresses both how a national strategy relates to the 

goals and activities of other strategies, to other entities, and to documents 

from implementing organizations to help these entities understand their 

roles and responsibilities. The NSVI and supporting documents partially 

address how the strategy relates to other international donors and Iraqi 

government goals, objectives, and activities. For instance, the NSVI and 

supporting documents identify the need to integrate the efforts of the 

coalition, the Iraqi government, and other nations but do not discuss how 

the U.S. goals and objectives will be integrated. In addition, the strategy 

does not address what it expects the international community or the Iraqi 

government to pay to achieve future objectives. 

Strategy Partially Addresses 

Integration with Iraqi 

Government and International 

Donors 

This characteristic addresses what the strategy will cost; where resources 

will be targeted to achieve the end-state; and how the strategy balances 

benefits, risks, and costs. The November 2005 National Strategy for 

Victory in Iraq and related supporting documents do not clearly identify 

the costs of U.S. military operations, including the costs to repair and 

replace equipment used during operations. The strategy does not identify 

other key related costs, including the costs of training, equipping, and 

supporting Iraq’s security forces; the costs of rebuilding, maintaining, and 

protecting critical oil and electricity infrastructure; or the costs of building 

management capacity in Iraq’s central ministries and 18 provincial 

governments. In addition to these costs, the new Iraqi government will 

need significant help in building the procurement, financial management, 

accountability, and other key systems needed to govern and provide basic 

services to its citizens. 

Strategy Partially Addresses 

Future Costs and Resource 

Requirements 

U.S. government agencies have reported significant costs associated with

the global war on terror (GWOT), which includes military operations in 

Iraq. However, we have serious concerns about the reliability of DOD’s 

reported cost data. GAO’s prior work5

 found numerous problems with 

DOD’s processes for recording and reporting GWOT costs, including longstanding deficiencies in DOD’s financial management systems and 

businesses processes, the use of estimates instead of actual cost data, and 

the lack of supporting documentation. As a result, neither DOD nor 

Congress knows how much the war on terror is costing or how 

appropriated funds are being used. 

 5

See GAO, Global War on Terrorism: DOD Needs to Improve the Reliability of Cost Data 

and Provide Additional Guidance to Control Costs, GAO-05-892 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.

21, 2005). 

Page 10 GAO-06-953T 
The current financial picture is complicated by the extensive use of 

emergency supplemental funds to pay for the costs of U.S. activities in 

Iraq. While this funding mechanism might have been appropriate in the 

early months of the war, use of the regular budget process would promote 

greater transparency and accountability and better management of the 

stabilization and reconstruction effort. I will further address issues related 

to GWOT costs at subsequent hearings before this subcommittee. 

The dispersion of information across several documents limits the 

strategy’s overall coherence and effectiveness as a planning tool for 

implementing agencies and as an oversight tool for informing Congress 

about the pace, costs, and results of these efforts. Since the NSVI’s 

supporting documents were written by different agencies at different 

points in time, the information in the documents is not directly 

comparable, which diminishes their value. The June 2006 Camp David fact 

sheet provides some additional detail on recent U.S. government plans to 

help Iraq’s new national unity government achieve some of its short-term 

security, economic, and political objectives. However, it does not redress 

identified shortfalls in the U.S. strategy such as the lack of information on 

costs. 

Although the NSC and the Departments of Defense and State did not 

comment on the recommendation made in the report we are issuing today, 

State noted that we misrepresented the NSVI’s purpose—to provide the

public with a broad overview of the U.S. strategy for Iraq. However, our 

analysis was not limited to the NSVI but was based on all of the classified

and unclassified documents that collectively define the U.S. strategy for 

Iraq: (1) the National Security Presidential Directive 36 (May 2004), (2) 

Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) Campaign Plan (August 2004), (3) the 

MNF-I/ U.S. Embassy Baghdad Joint Mission Statement on Iraq (December 

2005), (4) the Multinational Corps-Iraq Operation Order 05-03 (December 

2005), (5) the National Strategy for Supporting Iraq (updated January 

2006), (6) the quarterly State Section 2207 reports to Congress (through 

April 2006), and (7) the April 2006 Joint Campaign Plan issued by the Chief 

of Mission and the Commander of the MNF-I. We also reviewed 

appropriations and budget documents. Collectively, these documents still 

lack all of the key characteristics of an effective national strategy. 

However, we refined our recommendation to focus on the need to improve 

the U.S. strategy for Iraq, not just the NSVI. 

Dispersion of the U.S. 

Strategy across Many 

Documents Limits Its 

Usefulness as a Planning 

Tool 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation of 

the National Strategy 

Page 11 GAO-06-953T 
Other GAO work shows that security, political, and economic factors have 

and will continue to hamper U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq and achieve key 

U.S. goals. First, increases in attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi 

partners, growing sectarian violence, and the influence of militias have 

adversely affected U.S. and Iraqi efforts to secure Baghdad and other 

strategic cities. Second, sectarian control over ministries and the lack of 

skilled employees hinder efforts to improve Iraq’s governance by building 

the capacity of ministries and reconciling differences among sectarian 

interests. Third, security, corruption, and fiscal problems limit U.S. and 

Iraqi plans to revitalize Iraq’s economy and restore essential services in the 

oil and electricity sectors. 

Other GAO-Related 

Work Shows that 

Security, Political, and 

Economic Factors 

Hamper U.S. Efforts 

to Achieve Strategic 

Goals 

Security Forces’ 

Capabilities Improving but 

Have Not Led to 

Improvements in Security 

A linchpin of the current U.S. strategy is that, as Iraqi forces “stand up,” 

U.S. forces will “stand down.” According to the NSVI, putting capable 

Iraqis forward in the fight against the enemy would increase the overall

effectiveness of U.S.-Iraqi operations, as Iraqis are better able to collect 

intelligence and identify the threats in neighborhoods. The Secretaries of

Defense and State have reported progress in developing Iraqi army and 

police units. According to State Department reports, the number of trained 

army and police forces has increased from about 174,000 in July 2005 to 

about 268,000 as of June 2006. This represents about 82 percent of the 

planned security force strength of 326,000. DOD has also reported that 

Iraqi army units are becoming increasingly capable of leading 

counterinsurgency operations with coalition support.6

 Although the 

number of Iraqi security forces is increasing, these forces still lack the 

logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities to operate 

independently. 

Even as the number and capabilities of Iraqi security forces have 

increased, overall security conditions have deteriorated, as evidenced by 

attack trends, sectarian violence, and the growth and influence of militias. 

Enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition, its Iraqi partners, and 

infrastructure have continued to increase over time (see fig. 4). Overall, 

attacks increased by 23 percent from 2004 to 2005. After declining in the

fall of 2005, the number of attacks rose to the highest ever in April 2006. 

The monthly attacks data for May and June remain classified. However, 

 6

For a description of how DOD measures the capabilities of Iraqi security forces, see GAO,

Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and Maintaining 

Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and Sustainable Progress, 

GAO-06-179T (Washington, D.C: Oct. 18, 2005). 

Page 12 GAO-06-953T 
DOD publicly reported in May 2006 that the average number of weekly 

attacks was higher for the February to May 2006 time period than for any 

previous period. Further, in late June 2006 the MNF-I Commanding 

General publicly stated that attack levels in Iraq had increased. Moreover, 

a senior U.S. military officer said that the recent security operation in 

Baghdad had led to an increase in the number of attacks in the area. 

Figure 4: Enemy-Initiated Attacks against the Coalition and Its Partners, by Category, June 2003 through April 2006

a

The data for 2006 does not separate attacks against Iraqi government officials from attacks against 

Iraqi civilians. 

I recently asked the Secretary of Defense to routinely declassify monthly 

attacks data in a timely manner. The enemy-initiated attacks data help

inform Congress and the American public on progress in improving Iraq’s

Page 13 GAO-06-953T 
security situation, an important consideration in any decision to reduce 

the U.S. military presence in Iraq. While attacks data alone may not 

provide a complete picture of Iraq’s security situation, we believe they 

provide a sound depiction of general security trends in the country.7

According to a June 2006 United Nations (UN) report, an increasingly 

complex armed opposition continues to be capable of maintaining a 

consistently high level of violent activity across Iraq. Baghdad, Ninewa, 

Salahuddin, Anbar, and Diyala have been experiencing the worst of the 

violence. Other areas, particularly Basra and Kirkuk, have recently 

witnessed increased tension and a growing number of violent incidents. 

Sectarian tensions and violence increased after the bombing of a holy Shi’a 

shrine in Samarra in February 2006. A June 2006 UN report states that, in

recent months, much of the violence was committed by both sides of the 

Sunni-Shi’a sectarian divide. Groups that are specifically targeted included 

prominent Sunni and Shi’a Iraqis, government workers and their families, 

members of the middle class (such as merchants and academics), people 

working for or associated with MNF-I, and Christians. 

The presence of militia groups in Iraq has become more prominent in 

recent months and threatens Iraq’s stability. Although the total number of 

militias is unknown, a DOD report said that more than a dozen militias 

have been documented in Iraq, varying in size, extent of organizational 

structure, and area of influence. The largest of the known militias include 

(1) the Badr Organization, a militia group of the Supreme Council for the 

Islamic Revolution in Iran, (2) the Mahdi Army, a militia group of radical 

Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and (3) the Kurdish Peshmerga, the primary 

security force for the Kurdish regional government, in the northern region 

of Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority developed a strategy for 

disbanding or controlling militias in May 2004, and the Iraqi Constitution 

prohibits the formation of militias outside the framework of the armed 

forces. Many militias, however, remain present in Iraq and threaten the 

country’s stability. Since the February 2006 Samarra bombing, the number 

of attacks by militia groups increased. According to the MNF-I 

Commanding General, Iran has increased its support of a variety of Shi’a 

extremist groups in southern Iraq since the beginning of this year. 

 7

GAO, DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and Security Indicators to 

Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq, GAO-06-152C (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 18, 2005).

Page 14 GAO-06-953T 
Iraq’s new government is addressing two critical issues—how to foster 

national reconciliation and how to strengthen government so it can deliver 

essential services and provide security to all Iraqis. However, Iraqi efforts 

to foster reconciliation are primarily confronted by sectarian divisions 

between Shi’a and Sunni groups. Moreover, U.S. and Iraqi efforts to 

strengthen government ministries face the daunting task of developing the 

ability of Iraq’s ministries to govern after 30 years of autocratic rule. 

On June 25, 2006, a few weeks after the formation of Iraq’s first permanent 

government, Iraq’s Prime Minister proposed a 24-point reconciliation plan 

for the nation. The plan’s provisions include initiating a national dialogue 

with all parties, including those opposed to the government; providing 

amnesty for detainees and others not involved in terrorist acts; and 

ensuring that Iraqi security forces do not intervene in politics.

Need for National 

Reconciliation and 

Enhanced Ministerial 

Capacity Hinders Efforts 

to Govern 

Sectarian Divisions Undermine 

Efforts to Foster Reconciliation 

The Iraqi government has taken several steps to foster national 

reconciliation and implement the provisions of this plan. For example, 

Iraq’s Foreign Minister met with the UN Security Council in mid-June. At 

that meeting, the UN agreed to support the League of Arab States in 

planning to convene a conference on Iraqi national accord. The Iraqi 

government also announced that it would release 2,500 detainees. As of 

mid-May, the Ministry of Human Rights reported that there are about 

28,700 detainees throughout Iraq. As of late June, the Iraqi government had 

released more than 1,000 detainees. Finally, the Iraqi Prime Minister 

confirmed that he had contacted groups through a third party which had 

been responsive to the reconciliation plan. He planned to hold direct talks 

with seven resistance groups. He also clarified that amnesty would not be 

granted to insurgents who killed Iraqis or coalition troops. In addition, 

following the February 22 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samara, the 

U.S. Embassy reported that it called upon Iraqi leaders to join together in 

unity and turn away from sectarian violence. 

Although the Iraqi government has taken positive steps, national 

reconciliation faces a long and difficult course because of sectarian 

divisions within Iraq. According to a June 2006 UN report, much of the 

violence in recent months stemmed from acts perpetrated by both sides of 

the Sunni-Shi’a sectarian divide. The report states that Iraqis are 

threatened by revenge attacks, the use of force by military and security 

forces, and militia activities, among other threats. In a prior report, the UN 

stated that militia power in Southern Iraq has resulted in systematic acts of 

violence against the Sunni community. The UN report concluded that 

unless there is progress towards national reconciliation soon, increased 

polarization and even civil war could occur. In addition, on June 7, 2006, 

Page 15 GAO-06-953T 
the coalition killed al-Zarqawi, the operational commander of the al-Qaeda 

movement in Iraq, who tried to incite civil war. According to the President

of the United States, his death is an opportunity for the new government to 

succeed. However, the President also cautioned that sectarian violence

will continue. 

The U.S. government faces significant challenges in improving the 

capability of national and provincial governments to provide security and 

deliver services to the Iraqi people. According to State, the Iraqi capacity

for self-governance was decimated after nearly 30 years of autocratic rule.

8

In addition, Iraq lacked competent existing Iraqi governmental 

organizations. According to an Inter-Agency Strategy for Iraqi Stability 

(ISIS) Working Group draft paper,9

 the Baathist regime had let

governmental infrastructure organizations deteriorate since the first Gulf 

War, and employment in these organizations had been based on cronyism 

and political correctness rather than managerial competence. 

Iraq Faces Challenges in 

Delivering Government 

Services 

Since 2003, the United States has provided Iraqis with various training and

technical assistance to improve their capacity to govern. U.S. agencies 

provided senior advisers to Iraqi ministries to help in the reconstruction of 

Iraq. For example, the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq 

continues to develop the ministerial abilities of the Ministries of Interior 

and Defense. 

In January 2006, State reported a new initiative—the National Capacity

Development Program—to improve the capabilities of key Iraqi ministries. 

In partnership with coalition allies and others, the program provides 

technical assistance and training for 3 years to help the government of Iraq 

improve managerial capacity. The program focuses on improving core

ministry functions, such as leadership and communication, financial and 

human resource management, and information technology, among others. 

It also includes extensive anti-corruption activities, such as standardized 

auditing and procurement reform and policies and practices that aim to 

eliminate patronage. 

 8

Quarterly Update to Congress, Section 2207 Report (January 2006). 

9

Methods of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment (draft), 

Inter-Agency Strategy for Iraqi Stability (ISIS) Working Group, Baghdad, Iraq (December 

2005). 

Page 16 GAO-06-953T 
Reforming Iraqi ministries will face challenges. According to a recent State 

Department report, corruption remains a critical impediment to the 

successful governance of Iraq. The report also stated that Iraq needs 

training in modern civil service policies. Another State assessment found 

that non-security ministries face challenges and have limited capabilities 

to carry out core functions, such as budgeting, procurement, and human 

resource management. 

U.S. officials recognize that increased technical assistance and training is 

important and the United States is working with the UN, the World Bank, 

and allies such as Italy, Denmark, and the United Kingdom in efforts to 

partner with staff from Iraqi ministries and provincial governments. 

Another important complement to these efforts is increased U.S. agency

and international partnering with Iraqi officials in areas such as planning,

financial management, budgeting and procurement, and human resource 

management. These efforts are aimed at providing the Iraqis with the 

essential management skills to govern effectively. GAO is also involved in

these efforts and is taking steps to partner with Iraq’s Commission on 

Public Integrity and the Board of Supreme Audit. 

Efforts to Restore Oil and 

Electricity Sectors Are 

Hindered by Security, 

Corruption, Fiscal, and 

Management Challenges 

The U.S. and Iraqi governments are trying to revitalize Iraq’s economy and

restore essential services in the oil and electricity sectors. However, these 

efforts have been hindered by security, corruption, fiscal, and

management challenges.

According to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Regional Division, 

DOD has added or restored more than 1,400 megawatts of potential 

generating capacity to the Iraq national electricity grid, as of June 2006. 

According to agency reporting, average daily hours of electricity across 

most of Iraq remained at 12 hours per day during the last two weeks of 

June 2006. Available power for Baghdad averaged 8 hours per day for the 

same period. In the oil sector, DOD has completed or is working on a 

number of projects to boost Iraq’s oil production, refining, and export 

capacity. 

Despite Efforts, Restoring 

Iraq’s Oil and Electricity 

Sectors Has Been Difficult 

However, key reconstruction goals have yet to be achieved (see table 1). 

As of June 25, 2006, oil and electricity sectors were below the planned U.S.

end-state. In June 2006, State reported that oil production was about 2.29 

million barrels per day (mbpd), which was below the desired goal of 3 

mbpd. In June 2006, electricity generation capacity was about 4,832 

Page 17 GAO-06-953T 
megawatts—above its prewar level but below the post-war peak of about 

5,400 megawatts and the planned U.S goal of 6,000 megawatts. In addition, 

it is unclear whether the current capacity can be sustained. 

Table 1: Reconstruction Goals Not Met for Oil and Electricity Sectors 

Sector Metric 

Pre-War 

(2003) Current (June 2006a) 

Planned U.S. 

end state 

Oil Crude Oil Production 

Capacity 

2.6 MBPD 2.29 MBPD 3.0 MBPD 

Electricity Peak Generation 

Capacity 

4,300 MW 4,832 MW (5,387 

MW peak in 7/14/05) 

6,000 MW 

MBPD = million barrels per day 

MW = megawatts

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data. 

a

June 2006 includes June 1 to June 25, 2006, data. Data for the last week of June is not yet available. 

A combination of insurgent attacks on crude oil and product pipelines, 

dilapidated infrastructure, and poor operations and maintenance have 

hindered domestic refining and have required Iraq to import significant 

portions of liquefied petroleum gas, gasoline, kerosene, and diesel. 

Security, Corruption, Fiscal, 

and Management Challenges 

Hinder Reconstruction and 

Stabilization efforts 

Both the oil and electricity sectors face a number of challenges to meeting 

Iraq’s needs. 

Improving infrastructure security. The insurgency has destroyed key

infrastructure, severely undermining progress. U.S. officials reported that

major oil pipelines continue to be sabotaged, shutting down oil exports 

and resulting in lost revenues. Major electrical transmission lines have

been repeatedly sabotaged, cutting power to other parts of the country. 

Current U.S. assistance is focused on strengthening the Strategic 

Infrastructure Battalions, which are Ministry of Defense forces that 

protect oil fields and pipelines. 

Security conditions in Iraq have, in part, led to project delays and 

increased costs for security services. Although it is difficult to quantify the 

costs and delays resulting from poor security conditions, both agency and 

contractor officials acknowledged that security costs have diverted a 

considerable amount of reconstruction resources and have led to 

canceling or reducing the scope of some reconstruction projects. 

Page 18 GAO-06-953T 
Deterring corruption. U.S. and international officials reported increased 

concerns about pervasive corruption in Iraq. Transparency International

ranked Iraq 137th of 159 countries in 2005 in terms of corruption. To 

combat corruption, U.S. and international officials reported that the Iraqi

government established the Commission on Public Integrity, which is 

charged with the criminal investigation of corruption cases, and the 

independent Inspectors General within individual Iraqi ministries, and 

revived the existing Board of Supreme Audit (BSA). The U.S. government, 

including GAO, is working directly with these institutions. 

The oil and electricity sectors remain particularly vulnerable to

corruption. Corruption in the oil sector presents a special problem, 

particularly because of the sector’s importance to the economy. According 

to State officials and reporting, about 10 percent of refined fuels are 

diverted to the black market, and about 30 percent of imported fuels are 

smuggled out of Iraq and sold for a profit. According to U.S. Embassy 

documents, the insurgency has been partly funded by corrupt activities 

within Iraq and from skimming profits from black marketers. Moreover, 

according to one analysis, corruption diverted much of Iraq’s oil revenue

from reconstruction to government officials and their accomplices in 

organized crime.10

Corruption in the electricity sector is also a problem. According to State’s 

Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) officials, the Ministry of 

Electricity contracts with tribal chiefs, paying them about $60 to $100 per 

kilometer, to protect transmission lines running through their areas. 

However, IRMO officials reported that the protection system is flawed and

encourages corruption. According to U.S. and UN Development Program 

officials, some of these tribes are also selling materials from downed lines 

and extracting tariffs for access to repair the lines. 

The lack of metering facilitates opportunities for corruption in the oil and 

electricity sectors. Despite a 2004 audit recommendation made by the 

International Advisory and Monitoring Board for the Development Fund 

for Iraq, and initial steps to install meters in accordance with standard oil 

industry practices, the Iraqi government still lacks an effective system of 

metering to measure production and export levels. According to U.S. 

 10Kenneth M. Pollack and the Iraqi Policy Working Group, “A Switch in Time: A New

Strategy for America in Iraq,” Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings 

Institution (February 2006).

Page 19 GAO-06-953T 
officials in the electricity section, about 30 percent of the meters in Iraq 

are damaged. Most meters are old mechanical meters that need to be

replaced with electronic ones so that the system may be better monitored. 

Addressing fiscal challenges. Iraq’s ability to contribute to its own 

rebuilding is dependent on addressing key fiscal challenges, particularly in 

the oil and electricity sectors. Current government subsidies constrain 

opportunities for growth and investment and have kept prices for oil and 

electricity low. 

Domestic fuel prices in Iraq are among the lowest in the world. U.S. and 

international officials report that these low prices have led to a rampant 

black market and fuel smuggling out of the country; inadequate 

maintenance and improvements; and over-consumption. According to U.S. 

and international officials, the Iraqi budget is directly affected, since stateowned refineries cover less than half the domestic demand, and the Iraqi 

government has to import the rest at world market prices. 

As part of its Stand-By Arrangement with the International Monetary Fund 

(IMF), Iraq must reduce government subsidies of petroleum products. By 

the end of 2006, the Iraqi government plans to complete a series of 

adjustments to bring fuel prices closer to those of other Gulf countries. 

According to State reporting, a new round of price increases for diesel, 

kerosene, and propane began to take effect in Baghdad and other areas the 

week of June 19, 2006, and is being extended countrywide. The Iraqi 

government committed itself to bring fuel prices closer to regional prices 

as part of its IMF reform program. Iraqis currently pay about $.44 per 

gallon for regular gasoline compared with about $.90 per gallon in 

neighboring countries. 

According to U.S. and international officials, the negative effects of the 

electricity subsidy are similar to those for fuels. The national grid is 

currently unable to satisfy the demand, and Iraqis must buy electricity 

from privately-operated small diesel generators which are inefficient 

sources of electricity. Moreover, according to World Bank reporting, 

increasing tariffs is complicated by the desire to preserve wide access to 

the grid and subsidize low-income groups. 

Iraq faces other fiscal challenges, such as generous wage and pension 

benefits, increased defense spending, and high external debt. Our April 

Page 20 GAO-06-953T 
2006 testimony before this committee provides additional details on these 

other challenges.11

Managing and sustaining new and rehabilitated infrastructure. The 

U.S. reconstruction program has encountered difficulties with Iraq’s ability 

to sustain the new and rehabilitated infrastructure and address 

maintenance needs. A June 2006 Congressional Research Service report 

noted that as more large-scale construction projects have been completed

with U.S. assistance, there has been increasing concern regarding the 

financial, organizational, and technical capacity of Iraqis to maintain the 

projects in the long run.12

More specifically, our prior reports and testimony note that the Iraqis’ 

capacity to operate and maintain the power plant infrastructure and 

equipment provided by the United States remains a challenge at both the 

plant and ministry levels. As a result, the infrastructure and equipment 

remain at risk of damage following their transfer to the Iraqis. U.S. officials

have acknowledged that more needs to be done to train plant operators 

and ensure that advisory services are provided after the turnover date. In 

January 2006, State reported that it has developed a strategy with the 

Ministry of Electricity to focus on rehabilitation and sustainment of 

electricity assets. 

The November 2005 NSVI and supporting documents represent the results 

of efforts to improve the strategic planning process for the challenging and 

costly U.S. mission in Iraq. Although the strategy is an improvement over

earlier efforts, it is incomplete even when considered in the context of all 

supporting documents, both classified and unclassified. Without additional

information on roles and responsibilities, future contributions and costs, 

and outcome-based metrics, the strategy does not provide the Congress 

with a clear road map for achieving victory in Iraq. The formation of the 

new Iraqi government provides an opportunity for the United States 

government to re-examine its strategy and more closely align its efforts 

and objectives with those of the Iraqi people and other donors. 

Conclusion 

 11See GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing 

Challenge, GAO-06-697T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2006). 

12See Congressional Research Service RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in

Reconstruction Assistance (Washington, D.C., June 2006).

Page 21 GAO-06-953T 
Based on our other ongoing and completed work, additional actions could

be taken to achieve U.S. objectives in Iraq. The United States, Iraq, and the 

international community should consider the following: 

• Focusing more attention on the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces 

rather than the number of forces. Although the number of the Iraqi 

security forces is increasing, these forces lack the logistical, command and 

control, and intelligence capabilities to operate independently. 

• Improving national and provincial governance. The Iraqis will need 

technical assistance, training, and more partnering opportunities with the 

United States, other countries, and international organizations to 

strengthen their national and provincial governments and provide results 

that matter to the Iraqi people, for example, safe streets, good jobs, 

reliable electricity, clean water, education, and health care. 

• Addressing the root causes of corruption. Strong and immediate measures 

must be taken to address Iraq’s pervasive corruption problems. An anticorruption strategy should establish a sound economic policy framework, 

reduce subsidies, strengthen accountability organizations, and enhance 

investment opportunities and job creation. 

Ultimately, the stability of Iraq hinges on reducing violence and 

establishing a capable, credible, and transparent system of government 

that is accountable to the Iraqi people.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 

prepared statement. At this time, I would be happy to answer any 

questions that you may have. 

For questions regarding this testimony, please call Joseph Christoff at 

(202) 512-8979. Other key contributors to this statement were Stephen 

Lord, Judith McCloskey, Tetsuo Miyabara, Lynn Cothern, Tracey Cross, 

B. Patrick Hickey, Rhonda Horried, Kathleen Monahan, Amy Sheller, and

Nanette Barton. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 22 GAO-06-953T 
Page 23 GAO-06-953T 

Appendix I: Extent the U.S. Strategy for Iraq 

Addresses GAO’s Desirable Characteristics of 

an Effective Strategy 
NSVI 

NSVI + 7

documents

Extent the U.S. Strategy for Iraq Addresses GAO’s Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy

4. Description of future costs and resources needed

5. Delineation of U.S. government roles and responsibilities

6. Description of strategy’s integration among and with other entities

4a. Identifies what the strategy will cost.

4b. Identifies the sources, e.g., federal, international, and private, and types of resources or investments needed, e.g., budgetary, human capital, 

information technology, research and development, and contracts.

5a. Addresses who will implement the strategy.

5b. Addresses lead, support, and partner roles and responsibilities of specific federal agencies, departments, or offices, e.g., who is in charge 

during all phases of the strategy’s implementation.

4c. Addresses where resources or investments should be targeted to balance risks and costs.

4d. Addresses resource allocation mechanisms.

4e. Identifies risk management principles and how they help implementing parties prioritize and allocate resources.

Risk management

5c. Addresses mechanisms and/or processes for parties to coordinate efforts within agencies and with other agencies.

5d. Identifies process for resolving conflicts.

6a. Addresses how the strategy relates to the strategies of other institutions and organizations’ and their goals, objectives, and activities 

(horizontal).

6b. Addresses integration with relevant documents from other agencies and subordinate levels (vertical).

Resources and investments

Coordination

Organizational roles and responsibilities

Sources: GAO analysis of NSC, State, and DOD data.

Partially addresses

Addresses

Does not address

(320434) Page 24 GAO-06-953T 
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