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26–515 PDF 2005

ENSURING THE SECURITY OF AMERICA’S BORDERS

THROUGH THE USE OF BIOMETRIC PASSPORTS

AND OTHER IDENTITY DOCUMENTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC 

SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE 

PROTECTION, AND CYBERSECURITY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 22, 2005

Serial No. 109–24

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND

CYBERSECURITY

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California (Ex Officio) 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Economic Security, 

Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic 

Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity .................................... 3 

The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 8

The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From the 

U.S. Virgin Islands ............................................................................................... 32

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 27

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island ........................................................................................... 31

The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Georgia .............................................................................................................. 26

The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California .......................................................................................................... 19 

The Honorable Stevan Pearce, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New Mexico ...................................................................................................... 29

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Ms. Elaine Dezenski, Acting Assistant Secretary, Director for Border and 

Transportation Security, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 9

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11

Mr. Frank Moss, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Consular Affairs, Department 

of State: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14

PANEL II 

Dr. Martin Herman, Information Access Division Chief, National Institute 

of Standards and Technology: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 42

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 43

Mr. C. Stewart Verdery, Jr. Principal, Mehlman, Vogel, and Castagnetti, 

Inc.: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 46

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 48
Page

IV

Mr. Gregory Wilshusen, Director of Information Security Issues, Government 

Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 55

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 57 
(1)

ENSURING THE SECURITY OF AMERICA’S 

BORDERS THROUGH THE USE OF BIOMETRIC 

PASSPORTS AND OTHER INDENTITY 

DOCUMENTS 

Wednesday, June 22, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND CYBERSECURITY

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:04 a.m., in Room 

2257, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Lungren [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Lungren, Cox, Linder, Souder, Pearce, 

Sanchez, Thompson, Dicks, Christensen, Lofgren, and Langevin. 

Mr. LUNGREN. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection 

and Cybersecurity will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on ensuring the security of America’s borders through the use of biometric 

passports and other identity documents. 

I would like to start by thanking the witnesses on both panels 

for being with us today and on relatively short notice. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine the current and future use of biometric technology in travel documents. The issues of 

document integrity and identity verification are key to our national 

efforts to enhance border security and combat terrorist travel. 

Today’s hearing provides an opportunity to examine progress 

made in this area by reviewing two recent announcements by the 

Department of Homeland Security: Number one, the changes in the 

passport requirements for Visa Waiver Program travelers and, two, 

the pilot program to test the use of contact with chips in passports. 

On June 15, 2005, the Department of Homeland Security announced that Visa Waiver Program countries would be required to 

producer tamper-resistance digital photographs on newly issued 

passports, beginning on October 26, 2005. Within another year 

their passports would be required to have an integrated chip capable of storing biographic and biometric information. 

The announcement grew out of requirements enacted into law as 

part of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act 

of 2002, which required that each visa waiver country government 

certify by October 26, 2004 that it had established a program to 

issue tamper-resistance, machine-readable passports that incor-
2

porate a biometric identifier matching standards established by the 

International Civil Aviation Organization. 

Faced with the certainty that very few countries would meet the 

original deadline, last year Congress approved an extension of the 

deadline by an additional year to October of 2005. The announcement last week represents the Department’s proposed compromise 

between the administration, the Congress and the VWP countries, 

many of whom would have still failed to meet the deadline had the 

Department of Homeland Security insisted that the Visa Waiver 

Program country passports actually contain a biometric chip as of 

the date, October 2005. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the rationale 

behind these decisions, how these new requirements will strengthen security and actually be implemented in the field and how they 

will be integrated with existing security programs, particularly 

US–VISIT. 

I also look forward to exploring the security limits of our strategy, as outlined to date, particularly with respect to the use of biometrics to actually help us confirm traveler identity and screen for 

potential terrorists, criminals and immigration law violators. 

With over 15 million Visa Waiver Program travelers entering the 

United States each year, travel facilitation is essential, as is ensuring that this program will not become an avenue for terrorists to 

gain entry into the U.S. 

The 9/11 Commission report released last year highlighted the 

issue of terrorist travel and terrorist exploitation of travel documents. The Commission report stated, in part, ‘‘Terrorists must 

travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, case target and gain access to attack.’’ In their travels, terrorists use evasive methods, 

such as altered and counterfeit passports and visas, specific travel 

methods and routes, liaisons with corrupt government officials, 

human smuggling networks, supportive travel agencies and immigration identity fraud. 

Strengthening document security and our ability to verify travelers’ identity is essential if we are to prevent terrorists easy access 

to America. Information sharing between governments is thus a 

critical layer in our security system. The Department’s announcement last week also contained new requirements for the Visa Waiver Program countries concerning lost and stolen passports, and 

that is extremely important. 

Having access to a list of potentially compromised passports will 

enable inspectors and consular officers overseas to have a greater 

ability to judge legitimate documents. 

Finally, this hearing will provide the subcommittee with an opportunity to examine where the field of biometrics is headed and 

how with proper privacy safeguards this technology can be used to 

strengthen our capabilities to intercept, disrupt and prevent terrorists from entering the U.S. 

Again, I thank the witnesses for being here and for the effort 

that went into their testimony. 

Again, I thank our witnesses for being here, and for the effort 

that went into their testimony. 
3

I now recognize the ranking member, the gentlelady from California, for any opening statement she may wish to make at this 

time.

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HON. DANIEL E. LUNGREN

I would like to start by thanking the witnesses on both panels for being with us 

today, and on relatively short notice. The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine 

the current and future use of biometric technology in travel documents. The issues 

of document integrity and identity verification are key to our national efforts to enhance border security and combat terrorist travel. 

Today’s hearing provides an opportunity to examine progress made in this area 

by reviewing two recent announcements by the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS): 

1. changes in the passport requirements for Visa Waiver Program (VWP) travelers, and 

2. a pilot program to test the use of contactless chips in passports. 

On June 15, 2005, the Department of Homeland Security announced that Visa 

Waiver Program countries would be required to produce tamper-resistant digital 

photographs on newly-issued passports starting on October 26, 2005. Within another year, their passports would be required to have a integrated chip capable 

of storing biographic and biometric information. 

This announcement grew out of requirements enacted into law as part of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, which required that 

each Visa Waiver Country government certify by October 26, 2004, that it had established a program to issue tamper-resistant, machine-readable passports that incorporate a biometric identifier matching standards established by the International 

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Faced with the certainty that very few countries would meet that original deadline, last year Congress approved an extension 

of the deadline by one additional year, to October of 2005. 

The announcement last week represents the Department’s proposed compromise 

between the Administration, Congress, and the VWP countries, many of whom 

would have still failed to meet the deadline had DHS insisted that the VWP country 

passports actually contain a biometric chip as of October 2005. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the rationale behind these decisions, how these new requirements will strengthen security and actually be implemented in the field, and how they will be integrated with existing security programs, such as US–VISIT. I also look forward to exploring the security limits of our 

strategy as outlined to date, particularly with respect to the use of biometrics to actually help us confirm traveler identity and screen for potential terrorists, criminals, 

and immigration law violators. 

With over 15 million VWP travelers entering the United States each year, travel 

facilitation is essential—as is ensuring this program is not an avenue for terrorists 

to gain entry to the U.S. The 9/11 Commission report, released last year, highlighted the issue of terrorist travel and terrorist exploitation of travel documents. 

The Commission report stated: ‘‘Terrorists must travel clandestinely to meet, train, 

plan, case targets, and gain access to attack. . .In their travels, terrorists use evasive methods, such as altered and counterfeit passports and visas, specific travel 

methods and routes, liaisons with corrupt government officials, human smuggling 

networks, supportive travel agencies, and immigration and identity fraud.’’ 

Strengthening document security and our ability to verify travelers’ identity is essential to preventing terrorists easy access to America. Information sharing between 

governments is thus a crucial layer in our security system. The Department’s announcement last week also contained new requirements for VWP countries concerning lost and stolen passports. Having access to a list of potentially compromised 

passports will enable inspectors and consular officers overseas to have greater ability to judge legitimate documents. 

Finally, this hearing will provide the Subcommittee with an opportunity to examine where the field of biometrics is headed and how, with proper privacy safeguards, 

this technology can be used to strengthen our capabilities to intercept, disrupt, and 

prevent terrorists from entering the United States.

Mr. LUNGREN. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the 

gentlelady from California, for any opening she may wish to make. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, let me 

thank you for holding this hearing. I think it is a very important 

hearing. 
4

And thank the witnesses for presenting for us today. 

I am pleased that we are holding this on biometric passports and 

other identity documents. I think these are two very specific passport initiatives. There are two very specific passport initiatives that 

I hope that our witnesses will address today. The first is the elimination of the Western Hemisphere passport exemption in the 9/11 

bill, and the second is the Visa Waiver Program. 

I represent a district in California. It is based on a lot of tourism. 

We have Disneyland, we have Los Angeles Airport not too far from 

us, the port is the third largest entry port of cargo coming in. We 

have a border to the south of us, about an hour and a half drive 

from where we are. And if there is a threat to our country, California would be one of the first places that we would look at and 

some of the other border states. So this is a very important issue 

to us about how people get in to our country. 

I think we need to do everything we can to secure borders, but 

we have also got to understand that there is a lot of commerce that 

happens through the port, through the airport and across our land 

borders, and there is a lot of movement of goods and people. And 

it is critical for our economy, for our prosperity that we sort of get 

a handle on how we are moving things and how we are checking 

things come in. 

So I am interested in hearing what the Department of Homeland 

Security and the State Department are doing to ensure that the 

implementation of the Western Hemisphere travel initiative goes 

smoothly. 

And I would specifically to have you talk a little bit about what 

is happening or what you intend to happen at the security entry 

of travelers. We have SENTRI, we have NEXUS, we have FAST, 

which are all pre-enrollment programs, basically allowing expedited inspection in return for more information from the traveler. 

Now we have the passport initiative, and now I hear that the Department of Homeland Security may allow the TSA’s registered 

traveler card to be used as an alternate document to the passport. 

So I want to know what impact all of these new initiatives, if 

any, will have on NEXIS, on SENTRI, on FAST. I have a lot of people in my area who have gone through extensive background 

checks, paid their money. I even know of some who have been denied because we have been looking at all of this. How is that going 

to affect the people who are already doing some of this? 

And, finally, with regards to the Visa Waiver Program, I think 

that the biometric passports are important and they are part of the 

solution, but I do not know that they are entirely the solution. I 

mean, first of all, what control do we have over an issuing country’s 

vetting process for how it makes its passport decisions, for example? And perhaps an even greater concern is the fact that the Visa 

Waiver Program traveler can still get on a plane to the United 

States without first being checked against our watch list. 

So I think there are a lot of things here we need to get the details on, and there are some things we need to fix, Mr. Chairman, 

and I am looking forward to the testimony of our experts. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentlelady. 

The Chair would now recognize the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Cox, for his statement. 
5

Mr. COX. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is a very 

important hearing. I regret that we are in such a small room, because there is a long line of people outside who also want to be in 

here to observe these proceedings. So that is a testament, I think, 

to the importance of the topic that you put before the committee 

today. 

The impetus for today’s hearing, of course, is the recent policy 

announcement by DHS, as you described, Mr. Chairman, regarding 

implementation of the biometric passports requirements in the 

Visa Waiver Program. But I hope that this hearing will quickly 

move us beyond this specific decision to a broader discussion of how 

our nation can, working with other countries around the world, develop a system that is fast, reliable and affordable, and protective 

of personal privacy that will instantly establish a genuine biometric 

link between individuals and documents in order to confirm traveler identity. 

At the same time, while we are making admirable progress in developing tamperproof IDs, we have got to focus renewed and redoubled attention on keeping official travel documents that are nicely 

tamperproof out of the hands of terrorists and other criminals. In 

this vein, we will discuss today the choice of facial recognition by 

the Department of Homeland Security in the form of a digitized 

photograph as the qualifying biometric for visa waiver country 

passports to meet the statutorily imposed deadline of October 26 of 

this year. 

I want first to begin by commending the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State for exercising flexibility 

and good judgment and not insisting on a biometrically encoded 

chip for visa waiver country passports by this October, since doing 

so would have caused severe disruption to legitimate trade and 

travel with little security benefit in return. 

Now, I want to emphasize the importance of that connection. I 

think disrupting commercial activity if there is some security payback is at least worth discussing. But disrupting commercial activity without any appreciable security payback is not a wise decision. 

The digitized photograph requirement will, in the short term, 

provide some additional security benefits in terms of tamper resistance. But even when we move to encoding the digital photographs 

into the passport chip, as ultimately called for under the Department’s policy and the biometric standards established by ICAO, we 

will still be relying on a Customs and Border Protection officer to 

perform a visual comparison of the person’s digital photograph 

against the actual person presenting himself or herself at the port 

of entry. 

In other words, the use of digital photos on these visa waiver 

passports will only undergo a manual human verification of the 

passport holder’s identity. It will not undergo a computerized check 

or any digital or authentically biometric check against either a 

database of photographs or a single photograph of the passport 

holder that was taken at the time of entry. 

So the biometric requirement under current law is, in essence, a 

tool to help reduce tampering and fraudulent alteration of passports. That in itself is of course useful. But as currently designed, 

this biometric encoding of passports simply will not help us to con-
6

firm travelers’ identities through the use of technology, such as 

matching digitized photographs or, better yet, fingerprints stored in 

travel documents and national and international databases against 

those of the traveler seeking entry at our ports. 

We also need to focus on how terrorists can circumvent this biometric passport system through the use of false breeder documents, 

through the acquisition of lost and stolen passports or other ways 

and how we can make better use of all available information from 

our databases about known or suspected terrorists. 

In short, we need to clarify what the goal is that we are trying 

to achieve. Are we merely trying to verify that the person to whom 

the official travel document was issued is the same person who is 

using the document to gain entry into the United States or are we 

seeking to deploy a comprehensive border security system, which 

begins at the time the travel document is created and issued? 

I believe we should be moving toward an international system 

based on biometrics that screens people before they obtain travel 

documents so that we verify people are who they say they are and 

ensure that they are not suspected terrorists or criminals. The object, after all, is not to give terrorists or criminals tamperproof fake 

IDs. 

I am pleased to hear that the Department of Homeland Security 

recognizes that this biometric requirement for visa waiver country 

passports is a starting point and not the ending point of this important discussion on how to combat terrorist travel. Both these passports and our own U.S. passports will be equipped with computerized chips that are able to accommodate additional biometric identifiers such as fingerprints. 

I look forward to hearing from the Department of Homeland Security about its vision of border security through the use of biometric technology and how these passport requirements can ultimately 

be integrated with other programs aiming to achieve the same goal 

of ensuring secure and efficient travel, both within and across the 

U.S. borders, programs such as NEXIS, FAST, SENTRI, TWIC and 

Registered Traveler. 

I am also pleased the Department does not intend to change its 

policy that visa waiver travelers must enroll in US–VISIT when 

they arrive at U.S. ports of entry. This program affords us the opportunity to check travelers’ fingerprints against available databases to help determine if the person has a terrorist connection or 

otherwise has violated U.S. criminal or immigration laws. If visa 

waiver passports were encoded with fingerprints, we would also be 

able to match with much greater precision the identity of the passport holder to the person to whom the travel document was originally issued. I hope we can explore this and other issues during today’s hearing. 

I want again to thank our witnesses, I want to thank the chairman for scheduling this important hearing and the Ranking Member, and I of course yield back the balance of my time.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. CHRISTOPHER COX

Thank you, Chairman Lungren for holding this hearing today on the very important issue of combating terrorist travel through the use of biometrics. And I, too, 

would like to welcome and thank all of our witnesses for their testimony today. 
7

The impetus for today’s hearing is, as Chairman Lungren described, the recent 

policy announcement by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regarding implementation of the biometric passport requirement for countries in the Visa Waiver 

Program—or VWP. But I hope that this hearing will quickly move us beyond this 

specific decision to a broader discussion of how our Nation can, working with other 

countries around the world, develop a truly secure system for confirming traveler 

identity and keeping official travel documents out of the hands of terrorists and 

other criminals. 

In this vein, we will discuss today the choice of DHS to use facial recognition, in 

the form of a digitized photograph, as the qualifying biometric identifier for VWP 

country passports to meet the statutorily imposed deadline of October 26, 2005. I 

want to first begin by commending the Department of Homeland Security and the 

Department of State for exercising flexibility and good judgment in not insisting on 

a biometrically-encoded chip for VWP country passports by this October, since doing 

so would have caused severe disruption to legitimate trade and travel—with little 

security benefit in return. 

The digitized photograph requirement will, in the short term, provide some additional security benefit in terms of tamper resistancy. But even when we move to 

encoding the digital photograph into the passport chip—as ultimately called for 

under the Department’s policy and the biometric standard established by ICAO—

we will still be relying on a CBP officer to perform a visual comparison of the person’s digital photograph against the actual person presenting themselves at the port 

of entry. In other words, the use of digital photos VWP passports will only undergo 

a manual human verification of the passport holder’s identity, but will not undergo 

a computerized check against either a data base of photographs or a single photograph of the passport holder taken at the time of entry. 

The biometric requirement under current law is, in essence, a tool to help reduce 

tampering and fraudulent alteration of passports. That is, in itself, important and 

useful. But as currently designed, this biometric encoding of passports will not help 

us confirm traveler’s identities through the use of technology—such as matching 

digitized photographs or, better yet, fingerprints stored in travel documents and national and international databases against those of the traveler seeking entry at our 

port. 

We also need to focus on how terrorists can circumvent this biometric passport 

system through the use of false breeder document or through acquisition of lost and 

stolen passports, and how we can better make use of all available information from 

our databases about known or suspected terrorists. 

In short, we need to clarify what the goal is that we are trying to achieve: Are 

we merely trying to verify that the person to whom the official travel document was 

issued is the same person who is using the document to gain entry into the United 

States? Or are we seeking to deploy a comprehensive border security system, which 

begins at the time the travel document is created and issued? I believe that we 

should be moving towards an international system, based on biometrics, that 

screens people before they obtain travel documents, so that we verify people are who 

they say they are, and ensure that they are not suspected terrorists or criminals. 

I am pleased to hear that the Department of Homeland Security recognizes that 

this biometric requirement for VWP country passports is the starting point, and not 

the ending point, of this important discussion on how to combat terrorist travel. 

Both these passports and our own U.S. passports will be equipped with computerized ‘‘chips’’ that are able to accommodate additional biometric identifiers, such as 

fingerprints. I look forward to hearing from the Department of Homeland Security 

about its vision of border security through the use of biometric technology, and how 

these passport requirements can ultimately be integrated with other programs aiming to achieve the similar goal of ensuring secure and efficient travel both within 

and across U.S. borders—programs such as NEXUS, FAST, SENTRI, TWIC, and 

Registered Traveler. 

I also am pleased that the Department does not intend to change its policy that 

VWP travelers must enroll in US–VISIT when they arrive at U.S. ports of entry. 

This program affords us the opportunity to check travelers’ fingerprints against 

available databases to help determine if the person has a terrorist connection, or 

otherwise has violated U.S. criminal or immigration laws. If VWP passports were 

encoded with fingerprints, we also would be able to match, with much greater precision, the identity of such passport holders to the person to whom the travel document was originally issued. I hope we can explore this and other issues during today’s hearing. 

I again want to thank our witnesses and I yield back the balance of my time.
8

Mr. LUNGREN. The Chair would now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. 

Thompson, for any statement he might make. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. 

I would like to also welcome our witnesses for this hearing today 

and associate myself with the chairman of the full committee’s 

comments apologizing for the size of the room. I am sure we will 

work on that at some point. 

Mr. LUNGREN. We will. And I just might say we looked diligently 

to find a room that Mr. Dicks had never seen since he came with 

the building and we did find it. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. I am pleased that the Department of Homeland Security is here to brief us on the status of 

the biometric passport requirements for the Visa Waiver Program. 

Congress has directed the Homeland Security Department to 

work with the State Department to ensure that visa waiver countries add biometric identifiers to their passport system. Last week, 

however, DHS announced that it would give the 27 countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program another year to fully implement biometrics. I am concerned about this deadline extension and 

am hopeful that the witnesses today can explain in more detail 

why it was necessary. 

I ask this because in my experience when you keep pushing out 

deadlines, it is harder to be taken seriously. When I start to think 

about all the deadlines the Department has missed or moved, I feel 

like I am waiting for the cable guy to install my cable between the 

hours of noon and 5. 

[Laughter.] 

You do not know when he is coming, if he is coming or how many 

times you are going to have to call to get service. It is hard to tell 

when deadlines legitimately need to be extended and when the Department is just dropping the ball. 

I look forward to hearing any clarification as to how this extension may be different. At the same time, I understand that we need 

to make sure that we get biometric passports right. 

Last year, the DHS Inspector General issued a report that concluded that aliens applying for admission to the U.S. using stolen 

passports have little reason to fear being caught and are usually 

admitted into the country. This is simply unacceptable in the post–

9/11 environment. 

There are a number of basic questions I look forward to having 

answered here today. Namely, on the resource side, do we have 

adequate infrastructure to implement a machine-readable biometric passport system? 

On the technology side, do we have a plan to make the various 

machines readable and biometric tools interoperable? 

On the privacy and security side, can we ensure that passengers’ 

biometric information stored on a chip in a passport cannot be improperly scanned by terrorists or other criminals. There is enough 

identity theft issues we are dealing with these days in the U.S. The 

U.S. government should not be increasing the odds on this. 
9

On the big picture side, how much more security are we getting 

with the biometric passports if we are not checking passengers 

until they are already in flight to the U.S.? 

That is a real question, Mr. Chairman. It has been raised in a 

couple of statements by others, and I look forward to the answer, 

and I look forward to the testimony. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. 

Other members of the committee are reminded that their statements may be submitted for the record. 

I ask unanimous consent that the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Dr. Christensen, who is not a member of this subcommittee 

but a member of the full committee, be able to participate in today’s hearing, without objection. 

We are pleased to have two distinguished panels of witnesses before us today on this important topic. 

Let me just remind the witnesses that your entire written statement will appear in the record. We ask that due to the number of 

witnesses on our panels today, you strive to limit your oral testimony to no more than 5 minutes. We will also allow each panel to 

testify before questioning any of the witnesses. 

I would like to now call the first panel and recognize Ms. Elaine 

Dezenski, the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Border and Transportation Security Directorate for the Department of Homeland Security to testify. 

STATEMENT OF ELAINE DEZENSKI, ACTING ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE BORDER AND TRANSPORT 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Thank you very much. 

Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Sanchez, other distinguished members of the committee and subcommittee, I am very 

pleased to be here today to talk about the Visa Waiver Program biometric requirements and the broader vision within the Department for the use of biometrics. 

As you know, DHS is charged with the responsibility of securing 

our travel infrastructure and preserving the integrity of our borders. While at the same time, we need to keep the flow of legitimate travel and trade moving as efficiently as possible. 

In executing this mandate, we are always mindful to keep an appropriate balance between these two goals. 

Biometrics in particular play a critical role in managing this 

process. Within DHS, we are using biometrics to strengthen the integrity of travel documents, to verify identity as part of our entry 

and exit process and to assist with access, control and ID as part 

of our Transportation Worker Identity Program. These are but a 

few examples of how we are using biometrics. 

Today, I would like to talk just a bit more about our commitment 

to requiring biometrics in passports and specifically within the context of the VWP program. 

Last week, Secretary Chertoff announced a policy directive that 

clarifies the passport requirements for countries participating in 

the VWP. VWP allows for visa-free travel for citizens of 27 countries around the world. The policy ensures that the standards for 

biometric requirements, as set forth in the Enhanced Border Security Act of 2002, are clearly understood and adhered to by all coun-
10

tries in this program and that our security goals are met as quickly 

as possible. 

Under the policy, VWP countries will be required to adopt specific security and biometric standards. First, VWP travelers must 

be in possession of passports that are machine-readable. This requirement goes into full effect this coming Sunday, June 26. A machine-readable strip on a passport is absolutely critical to ensuring 

that the biographic data in the passport can be confirmed as legitimate. 

The second requirement is the incorporation of a digital photograph into the data page of passports issued by VWP countries on 

or after October 26, 2005. Now, why is this important? It is important because a digital photo incorporated into the data page greatly 

reduces the likelihood of tampering with that photo. 

Our announcement last week also called on VWP countries to 

present a plan by October of this year outlining how they will 

produce what we refer to as the e-passport, one that contains an 

embedded, contactless, integrated circuit chip that stores both biographic information as well as biometric information, in this case 

which would be the digital photo. The chip allows us to electronically authenticate both biometric and biographic data associated 

with the travel document. VWP countries must achieve full implementation of these e-passport requirements no later than October 

of 2006. 

Now, in addition to these enhancements, we are also requiring 

VWP countries to help us tackle the important problem of lost and 

stolen passports. Many of these make their way to the black market and could end up in the hands of terrorists, and, certainly, this 

is something we need to stop. 

A condition of membership in VWP includes the reporting of lost 

and stolen passports to INTERPOL and to DHS no later than 10 

days after discovery. Most times it happens much sooner than that. 

Also, we are requiring countries to share with us any information 

they have on trends related to lost and stolen passports. 

One of the byproducts of the development of this e-passport policy is a unique international collaboration that continues to grow. 

Through ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, we 

have been working with VWP countries over the last couple years 

to test and perfect technical requirements that will ultimately 

make it possible for e-passports to be interoperable with our readers at ports of entry. 

As Secretary Chertoff announced last week, we anticipate full deployment of our readers by October 2006, which is consistent with 

the full implementation of the e-passport requirements for VWP 

countries. As part of this development process, DHS will host a 

technical conference this summer with all VWP countries and 

ICAO to address technical and interoperability issues that remain. 

Beyond VWP, DHS is pursing biometrics on many fronts. One of 

the most important efforts is the expansion of the so-called Registered Traveler concept that I think was mentioned a bit earlier 

by the chairman. We believe there is significant opportunity to develop a RT-type card that could be used in multiple ports of entry 

and would serve in lieu of a passport at land borders where we are 
11

facing implementation of the Western Hemisphere travel requirements. 

We envision this card as being the same size as a driver’s license, 

linked to a background check and with biometric capabilities, such 

as the contactless chip. I brought with me a sample of our Registered Traveler card which is currently being piloted in the U.S. 

It gives you an idea of what this card could look like and what we 

are already producing as part of that pilot. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look 

forward to addressing your questions on this important topic. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Ms. Dezenski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELAINE DEZENSKI

Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Sanchez and other distinguished Members 

of the Subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the approach that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is taking in our efforts to 

improve the security of the United States by the use of biometrics in travel documents. 

DHS is committed to secure travel and our recent decision to clarify the deadline 

for Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries to produce ‘‘e-passports’’ is emblematic of 

how the Department and the State Department (DOS) are working to keep our borders safe but open for legitimate travelers. 

Programs such as the VWP advance our shared goals of protecting travel and preserving the integrity of our borders—while stopping terrorists and those who mean 

us harm. DHS is committed to continuing the VWP while strengthening it by closing down vulnerabilities such as fraudulent passport use. One means to do this is 

through the requirement that biometric information be incorporated into travel documents. 

Biometrics are the way forward in enhancing security by helping us to deprive 

potential terrorists of a tool they use to threaten our country and other countries 

around the world: the ability to cross our borders using false documents and violate 

our immigration laws without detection. Biometric identifiers protect our visitors by 

making it extremely difficult for anyone else to assume their identities should their 

travel documents be stolen or duplicated. The use of biometric identifiers gives governments an increased security capability and a foundation it can build on over 

time. Properly used, biometrics have been shown to be highly effective in verifying 

identity. 

The U.S. Congress mandated in the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry 

Reform Act of 2002, as amended, that any passport issued on or after October 26, 

2005, and used for VWP travel to the United States, must incorporate biometric 

identifiers that meet internationally accepted standards established by ICAO. The 

Administration’s recently announced policy furthers the intent of the statute by providing for the adoption of biometrics and strengthening the overall management of 

this important program. 

More specifically, we, in consultation with Congress and the Department of State, 

have established policy that requires VWP countries to begin producing machinereadable passports with digital photographs on the passport’s data page by October 

26, 2005. Digital photographs provide more security against counterfeiting than traditional photographs. Digital photos can be electronically stored and accessed, making it easier to verify whether the individual currently presenting the passport is 

the same person to whom the passport was issued. In addition, DHS has established 

a policy requiring all VWP countries to produce passports with an integrated circuit 

chip, known as ‘‘e-passports,’’ capable of storing biographic information from the 

data page of a passport, a digitized photograph, and other biometric information no 

later than October 26, 2006. This information will allow us to achieve a new level 

of identity authentication. 

The effect of this policy is that VWP countries will be required to issue passports 

that have at a minimum a digital photo by this October and that a VWP traveler 

to the United States must present a machine-readable passport which includes a 

digital photograph to enter the United States. These requirements apply only to 

passports issued on or after October 26, 2005. Valid passports issued before October 

26, 2005, will still be valid for travel under the VWP, provided that they are ma-
12

chine-readable. We believe the vast majority of the VWP nations will be in compliance with the digital photo requirement by October. 

The Department recognizes that some countries are very close or have even 

launched their production of ‘‘e-passports. Obviously, those countries will also be in 

compliance with the upcoming deadline. In order to facilitate compliance with epassport requirements, we will work with each country on a bi-lateral basis with 

regard to biometrics as well as other security provisions required of VWP countries. 

Further, DHS will create a validation process for VWP countries to test their biometric passports prior to issuance. In support of this effort, DHS will host a technical conference this summer to address interoperability issues with reader technology and with U.S. passport technology. DOS is leading the U.S. effort in production of e-passport for our own citizens. 

In further steps forward on ‘‘e-passports,’’ DHS and DOS are conducting a ‘‘live 

test’’ with the governments of Australia and New Zealand. The ‘‘live test’’ began last 

week at Los Angeles International Airport and at the Sydney Airport in Australia, 

and will continue throughout the summer. Airline crew and officials from United 

Airlines, Air New Zealand and Qantas Airlines have volunteered to use the e-passport when arriving at either airport. Their participation will enable DHS to further 

test operations, equipment and software needed to read and verify the information 

contained in an e-passport. 

Finally, VWP countries will be held to several measures concerning lost and stolen passports such as—reporting all lost and stolen passports to INTERPOL and 

DHS, as quickly as possible; sharing information on trends and analysis of lost and 

stolen passports; and providing detailed information on passport security features. 

The progress made toward the ‘‘e-passport’’ is a milestone in our global path to 

secure and streamlined travel for VWP nationals. We appreciate the cooperation of 

our international partners and the effort they have put forth in this very serious 

matter. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you for the 

opportunity to present this testimony today. I would be pleased to respond to any 

questions that you might have at this time.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you, Ms. Dezenski. 

The Chair would now recognize Mr. Frank Moss, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Consular Affairs for the Department of State, for 

his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF FRANK MOSS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECURITY 

OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. MOSS. Good morning, Chairman Cox, Chairman Lungren, 

Ranking Member Sanchez, distinguished members of the committee. 

Good morning. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the efforts of the Department of State to introduce biometric elements 

into the U.S. passport, arguably the most valuable identity and 

citizenship document in the world. Without question, biometrics 

will strengthen U.S. border security by ensuring that the person 

carrying a U.S. passport is the person to whom the passport was 

issued. 

The United States adopted the facial image as the first generation of passport biometric identifiers. Our new passport includes a 

contactless chip in the rear cover that will contain the same data 

as that found on the biographic data page, including a digital 

image of the photograph. Looking to the future, we decided to require 64 kilobytes of writable memory on the contactless chip in 

the event that we subsequently decide to include additional biometrics. Should we decide to change the biometric requirements, 

we will, of course, vet this change through the Federal Register 

process. 

We are aware of concerns that data written to the contactless 

chip may be susceptible to unauthorized reading. Several members 
13

of the subcommittee have mentioned that this morning. To help reduce this risk, we will include anti-skimming materials that prevent the chip from being read when the passport is closed or mostly 

closed. We are also engaged with technical experts in the private 

sector and our colleagues from the National Institute of Standards 

and Technology, both to assess the risk of unauthorized reading, 

and to evaluate the efficacy of our countermeasures. 

Finally, we are seriously considering adopting a technical process 

called Basic Access Control, to strengthen further the defenses of 

the U.S. passport against unauthorized reading. 

The bottom line is that the State Department will not issue biometric passports to the general public until we have successfully 

addressed these concerns. 

In addition to biometrics, two other aspects of the Department of 

State’s passport program enhance U.S. national security: The adjudication process itself and the security features of the passport. By 

making certain that U.S. passports are only issued to American 

citizens, that they are more difficult to counterfeit, and that the 

bearer of the passport is the same person to whom the passport 

was issued, we are actively enhancing the security of this nation. 

Increased information sharing is one of the most effective ways 

of securing the adjudication process. We have long-standing and effective data share programs with federal law enforcement agencies 

that target passport applicants of particular concern. Currently, 

there are nearly 50,000 names of fugitives or other individuals of 

interest to law enforcement in the passport lookout system. We are 

working to add to our lookout system an extract of FBI fugitive 

warrants from the NCIC wanted persons file. 

We also have an agreement with INTERPOL that allows us to 

share information about approximately 620,000 lost and stolen U.S. 

passport with INTERPOL member states. We have also implemented a cooperative relationship with the National 

Counterterrorism Center, NCTC, to provide that agency with direct 

online access to our database that includes images of the passport 

application for all valid passports. And we will also sign in the very 

near future an agreement with the Terrorist Screening Center that 

will add to our database information on American citizens who may 

have a nexus to terrorism. 

We have also undertaken a comprehensive review of our fraud 

prevention efforts to strengthen that aspect of the adjudication 

process. We have implemented a number of initiatives, including 

organizational improvements, enhanced training, regulatory 

changes, new tools and new programmatic activities with domestic 

and international partners. 

We enjoy excellent cooperation and support from the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security at the Department of State, which has the responsibility for criminal investigations involving passport fraud, 

and our focus on fraud prevention is already paying dividends. So 

far in fiscal year 2005, Diplomatic Security has opened over 2,400 

passport investigations and made nearly 400 arrests, a significant 

increase over prior years. 

We have recently completed the first cover-to-cover redesign of 

the United States passport in more than a decade in order to combat counterfeiting or the fraudulent use of lost or stolen passports. 
14

The passport includes a host of advance security features, including 

sophisticated new artwork, printing techniques used in the current 

generation of U.S. currency, and utilizing a variety of other techniques, many of which are visible only under ultraviolet light. 

I am happy to share with members of the committee samples of 

the new passport, and my written testimony includes additional 

elements about the enhanced technology we used to create it. 

To put the scope of our efforts in context, during the last fiscal 

year, the Department of State processed a record-setting 8.8 million U.S. passport applications. Passport demand continues to rise 

and we are track to adjudicate more than 10 million passports by 

the end of this fiscal year. 

Taking into account recent legislation concerning the documentary requirements for travel within the Western Hemisphere, we 

anticipate that passport applications will total about 12 million in 

fiscal year 2006. Projections beyond that date are admittedly less 

precise, but we are currently planning that U.S. passport demand 

will reach about 14 million in fiscal year 2007 and an estimated 17 

million by 2008. 

Security must always be our first priority, but we must also recognize our responsibility to adjudicate passport applications in a 

timely and efficient manner to facilitate the travel of U.S. citizens. 

The free movement of people and goods is essential to U.S. national 

security, as is our international engagements through personal, 

commercial, educational and research activities with other nations. 

Mr. Chairman, integrating biometrics into U.S. passports will 

further protect the integrity of the world’s most respected travel 

document. Together with our improvements to the adjudication 

process and the physical security of the passport itself, the Department’s comprehensive passport program serves to enhance U.S. 

border security. 

At this time, I am happy to answer your questions. Thank you 

very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Moss follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK E. MOSS

Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Sanchez, Distinguished Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you the progress that the 

Department of State has made in introducing biometric elements to the U.S. passport. This innovation represents a significant enhancement to the security of our 

borders and international travel. In addition to the inclusion of biometrics in U.S. 

passports, two other aspects of the Department of State’s passport program are critical to enhancing U.S. national security: the adjudication process, and the security 

features of the passport itself. Taken together, these elements constitute a comprehensive approach to passport security. By making sure that U.S. passports are 

only issued to American citizens, that they are more difficult to counterfeit and that 

the bearer of the passport is the same person to whom the passport was issued, the 

Department of State actively enhances the security of this nation. 

Today I would like to describe the many ways that the Department of State demonstrates its commitment to the important responsibility for providing passport 

services. The U.S. passport is arguably the most valuable identity and citizenship 

document in the world. We at the Department of State are certainly aware of how 

sought after this document is, not only by American citizens with legitimate travel 

plans but by illegal immigrants, as well as terrorists and others who would do this 

nation harm. As portable proof of identity and nationality, the U.S. passport literally opens doors around the world to American citizens who travel or reside 

abroad or may require assistance from an American Embassy or Consulate. The 
15

U.S. passport is also essential for many American citizens to enter the United 

States upon returning from international travel. 

During the last fiscal year the Department of State processed 8.8 million U.S. 

passport applications. This set a record, exceeding the total from the previous year 

by more than one million applications and representing a workload increase of some 

22 percent. This year, the Department of State forecast a 9 percent increase in passport demand, but is experiencing a 14 percent rise. As of today, the Department has 

already processed close to 7 million passport applications during this fiscal year and 

we are on track to adjudicate more than 10 million passports by the end of fiscal 

year 2005. 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 also contains a 

provision addressing the documentary requirements for travel within the Western 

Hemisphere, referred to as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI). The 

legislation requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with 

the Secretary of State, develop and implement by January 1, 2008 a plan to require 

U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens currently exempt from presenting a passport for 

travel within the Western Hemisphere to present a passport or other authorized 

documentation that denotes identity and citizenship when entering the United 

States. The Department of State, after analyzing the scope of WHTI and other projected growth in passport demand, expects that applications for passports will total 

about 12 million in FY-2006, about 14 million in FY-2007 and reach a potentially 

sustainable annual demand of 17 million by FY-2008. 

As the Department of State develops plans to address the increase in demand for 

U.S. passports resulting from normal growth in international travel and the WHTI, 

we are dedicated to ensuring that security vulnerabilities are not inadvertently created by our efforts to address the increase in workload. While keeping security imperatives in mind, the Department of State also recognizes its responsibility to adjudicate passport applications in a timely and efficient manner to facilitate the travel 

of U.S. citizens. The free movement of people and goods is essential to U.S. national 

security, as is our international engagement through personal, commercial, educational and research activities with other nations. We are actively pursuing initiatives to improve the U.S. passport program designed to support both of these objectives. 

Strengthening the Adjudicatory Process 

A key objective of the Department of State’s Office of Passport Services in the Bureau of Consular Affairs is to ensure that U.S. passports are issued only to persons 

who are legitimately entitled to them. This is particularly important in an era when 

terrorists, transnational criminals and others seeking to enter the U.S. illegally view 

travel documents as valuable tools, and when improvements to the physical security 

of the U.S. passport, such as the use of a digital photograph of the bearer, make 

it increasingly difficult to counterfeit. 

One of the most effective ways to ensure that only those entitled to U.S. citizenship receive a passport is increased information sharing, both within the United 

States Government and beyond. The Department of State has actively worked to establish data exchange programs with other agencies in a manner that is mutually 

beneficial and that will keep U.S. passports out of the hands of those who are not 

eligible to receive them. For example, the Department has a partnership with the 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that ensures that parents with 

child support arrearages, who are ineligible to receive passports, do not receive 

them. The incorporation of over 3 million names in the HHS database into the Department’s passport lookout system has also resulted in the recovery of more than 

$50 million in delinquent child support. 

In April 2004, the Department signed a memorandum of understanding with the 

Social Security Administration (SSA) that would permit the Department to verify 

the SSNs of U.S. passport applicants with information in SSA’s SSN database. This 

measure provides another verification tool for passport specialists and consular officials adjudicating passport applications by allowing them to correlate the data provided by a passport applicant with information in SSA’s system and use this information to support decisions about an applicant’s identity. 

The Department has a long-standing and effective working relationship with federal law enforcement agencies that targets passport applicants of particular concern. 

Today, we have nearly 50,000 names of fugitives or other individuals of interest to 

law enforcement in the passport lookout system. Half of these were entered individually as a result of our outreach efforts. The other half of these entries are based 

on U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) federal fugitive warrants, a process that the Department took the initiative to obtain. 
16

To complement the USMS information, work is well underway to add to the passport lookout system an extract of FBI fugitive warrants from the NCIC Wanted Person File. To encourage information exchange with law enforcement officials at the 

state and local levels, the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs wrote 

to all the states’ attorneys general. 

In 2004, the Department reached an agreement with INTERPOL to provide the 

Department’s lost and stolen passport database to the U.S. National Central Bureau 

(NCB). The NCB shares the data with INTERPOL, which in turn makes this information available to all INTERPOL member states. The U.S. lost and stolen passport 

database currently contains the passport numbers of over 620,000 passports. 

The Department’s Office of Passport Services is also currently working on an 

agreement with the Terrorist Screening Center that would provide information on 

American citizens who are either subject to a federal felony arrest warrant or who 

are considered persons of concern due to a nexus to terrorism or an ongoing investigation. This datashare program will enable the Terrorist Screening Center to learn 

of the passport application of an individual of interest and, under appropriate circumstances, take law enforcement action. 

In addition, the Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs has implemented a cooperative relationship with the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) to provide that organization with direct online access to the Passport Records Imaging 

System Management (PRISM). This database includes images of the passport applications for all valid passports. The NCTC utilizes this information as a verification 

tool to support its terrorist watch list responsibilities. 

Another important element in safeguarding the adjudicatory process is maintaining an aggressive fraud prevention program. In that regard, the Department of 

State has undertaken a comprehensive review of its fraud prevention efforts and implemented a number of initiatives, including organizational improvements, enhanced training, regulatory changes, new tools, and new programmatic activities 

with domestic and international partners. All senior passport specialists now rotate 

through the fraud prevention office at domestic passport facilities to give them specialized experience in fraud detection. Regulatory changes have been implemented, 

for example, to require that both parents consent to the issuance of a passport for 

a child, and to require the presence of children under the age of 14 when passport 

applications are executed on their behalf, in order to combat fraud and international 

parental child abduction. We are making greater use, with the appropriate respect 

for privacy concerns, of commercial databases to assure that persons applying for 

passports are who they claim to be. 

The focus on fraud prevention is already paying dividends. Statistics for this fiscal 

year show an increase in referrals to fraud prevention offices, as well as an increase 

in the referral of presumptive fraud cases to the Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security (DS) for further investigation. The Bureau of Consular Affairs enjoys excellent cooperation and support from DS, which has the responsibility for criminal investigations involving passport fraud. The statistics about the efficacy of joint Consular Affairs-Diplomatic Security efforts are compelling: so far in fiscal year 2005, 

DS opened 2401 passport investigations and made 375 arrests, a significant increase 

over previous years.

Redesigning the Passport 

Efforts to strengthen the adjudication process and augment fraud prevention efforts would be less effective if we did not attend to the other key elements of passport security with equal fervor. Turning to the passport itself, the Department recently completed the first cover-to-cover redesign of the document in more than a 

decade. The new passport includes a host of new security features, including sophisticated new artwork, adopting printing techniques used in the current generation 

of U.S. currency, and utilizing a variety of other techniques, many of which are only 

visible under ultraviolet light. 

Our objective in designing the new passport is to raise further the bar against 

counterfeiting or the fraudulent use of lost or stolen passports. Advances including 

color shifting ink, microprinting, latent image lettering and a security laminate over 

the biographic data page that includes optical variations, all serve to deter counterfeiters and forgers. The biographic data page has been relocated from the inside of 

the front cover to the first inside page for added security. The inventory control 

number for each book is now the same as the passport number. Imagery on the inside pages of the passport incorporates more colors, stylized depictions of iconic 

American scenes, and includes famous quotations from American history. The new 

passport, combined with security enhancements in the adjudication process, helps 

to ensure that only qualified applicants receive U.S. passports. 
17

I am happy to share with the members of the Subcommittee samples of the new 

passport. 

Beyond the physical content of the book itself, we scrutinize each step in the production and delivery process to eliminate vulnerabilities. In addition to improving 

the quality of the U.S. passport, the Department of State, building on an already 

excellent collaboration with the Government Printing Office (GPO), is working to secure further the delivery of blank passport books to domestic passport facilities by 

engaging armored truck service. This mode of delivery service is used by the Department of Treasury to move currency and other valuable documents around the country.

Biometrics 

This next generation of U.S. passport, the e-passport, includes biometric technology that will further support the Department’s border security goals. Without 

question, biometrics will strengthen U.S. border security by ensuring that the person carrying a U.S. passport is the person to whom the Department of State issued 

that passport. 

Consistent with globally interoperable biometric specifications adopted by the 

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in May 2003, the United States 

has adopted the facial image as the first generation of biometric identifiers. The new 

U.S. passport includes a contactless chip in the rear cover of the passport that will 

contain the same data as that found on the biographic data page of the passport, 

including a digital image of the bearer’s photograph. This data includes the following information about the bearer: the photograph, the name, the date and place 

of birth, as well as the passport number and the date of issuance and expiration. 

Looking to the future, the Department decided to require 64 KB of writeable memory on the contactless chip in the event that we subsequently decide to introduce 

additional biometrics. Should the United States Government decide to change the 

biometric requirements, this change will be subject to vetting through the Federal 

Register process. 

On June 15, the Department, partnering with the Department of Homeland Security and in collaboration with Australia and New Zealand, launched an operational 

field test to measure the overall performance of the e-passport, issuing approximately 250 U.S. e-passports to select airline personnel employed by United Air 

Lines and who fly from Los Angeles to Australia and New Zealand. The Department 

of Homeland Security has developed separate lanes and installed e-passport readers 

to test their efficiency. Later this year we will expand this pilot program to include 

diplomatic and official passports, with national deployment of the e-passport scheduled for 2006. 

The Department of State is well aware of concerns that data written to the 

contactless chip in the e-passport may be susceptible to unauthorized reading. To 

help reduce this risk, anti-skimming materials that prevent the chip from being 

read when the passport book is closed or mostly closed will be placed in the passport. 

The Department is also seriously considering the adoption of Basic Access Control 

(BAC) technology to further strengthen the privacy of the data contained on the 

chip. ICAO recently identified BAC technology as a ‘‘best practice’’ for passport security. BAC technology will prevent the chip from being read until the passport is 

opened and its machine-readable zone is read electronically. This will serve to 

‘‘unlock’’ the chip and permit the chip and reader to communicate through an 

encrypted session. We are engaged with technical experts from the private sector 

and the National Institute of Standards and Technology both to assess the risk of 

unauthorized reading and to evaluate the efficacy of countermeasures. The bottom 

line is that we will not issue biometric passports to the general public until 

we have successfully addressed these concerns. 

The Department is confident that the new e-passport, including biometrics and 

other improvements, will take security and travel facilitation to a new level. Naturally, the Department will test comprehensively the operation and durability of the 

e-passport and work to resolve any issues as they occur. In fact, the Department 

of State is engaged in a continuous product improvement effort with regard to the 

U.S. passport. We will continue to monitor technical developments and help conduct 

research to ensure that we produce a passport that is highly secure, tamper resistant and globally interoperable. 

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunity today to share with you the Department of State’s comprehensive approach to enhancing U.S. border security by 

augmenting the security of all aspects of the U.S. passport program. The introduction of biometrics is an important advance in continuing to protect the integrity of 

the world’s most respected travel document. At this time I am happy to answer any 
18

questions you, the Ranking Member and the other distinguished members of the 

Subcommittee might have about the Department’s biometric passport program or 

the other facets of the U.S. passport program that I have discussed.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you both for your testimony, and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes to begin the questions. 

Mr. Moss, what was the number you gave of lost and stolen U.S. 

passports? 

Mr. MOSS. We have provided INTERPOL information on about 

620,000 lost U.S. or stolen passports. This is several years’ worth 

of data, and that has to be compared, I would suggest, to the fact 

that we have roughly 63 million U.S. passports in circulation. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I guess I should know this but I do not. Is there 

any legal obligation on the bearer of the passport to report within 

a period of time if it is stolen or lost? 

Mr. MOSS. There is no legal obligation. When we find out that 

most people have reported their passport stolen, it is either they 

realize it and tell us promptly or they go to use it, realize it is lost 

and then come to us. The other aspect, of course, is that people do 

lose their passports while traveling abroad, and we have processes 

to replace those rather quickly. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Do we have any estimate of how many are stolen 

or lost that we do not know about? I mean, is there any idea, estimate or study? 

Mr. MOSS. I think we are dealing with one of the intangibles, 

what we do not know, we do not know. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Right. 

Mr. MOSS. I would not even want to hazard a guess, really, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Given that the fingerprint technology and fingerprint databases are much more readily available, that they are the 

cornerstone of our main border screening system, the US–VISIT 

Program, and that many other countries have that biometric, can 

each of you describe why the U.S. and ICAO chose facial recognition rather than fingerprint as the biometric standard for official 

travel documents? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Sure. There are a couple key reasons. The first is 

that from a cultural and even from somewhat of a political perspective, the facial image is something that most people do not have 

privacy concerns over. It is much easier to obtain across the board 

when we are looking at documents like passports and visas. 

But it is important to keep in mind that even though the passport may not have fingerprints, we are using fingerprints as part 

of the enrollment process for both US–VISIT and of course to obtain a visa. So there is a visa biometric that involves fingerprints 

and utilizes those databases in the process of admitting foreigners 

to the U.S. 

Mr. LUNGREN. But the fingerprints are not part of the passport 

document itself. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. That is correct. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And you suggest that that is, I do not want to put 

words in your mouth, but my understanding of what you just said 

is that it is culturally difficult or politically difficult for us to get 

acceptance of fingerprints. Yet 9/11 changed the world. 

And if we are serious about the terrorist threat, it seems to me 

we ought to be moving in the direction of that biometric which is 
19

going to most protect us. Perhaps what we ought to be doing is explaining that this is a superior biometric to at least any other that 

I am aware of, both because of the accuracy with which it conveys 

information and the universality of fingerprints as the identifier for 

various databases, particularly those that would, I assume, be the 

basis for watch lists of all sorts. 

How do both of you, or your departments, view the essential difference in degree of efficacy in the facial recognition versus the fingerprint identification? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. We do think there is value in the use of the digital image. I think it is important to put into context that when we 

talk about the biometrics features of the passport, it is going to an 

ICAO requirement or an ICAO recommended process, if you will, 

which has gone through a process via the international community. 

So there was actually a tremendous amount of discussion about 

what could be adopted in the short term, what would be the most 

efficient and what would allow us to get to the standard with the 

biometrics that many countries could work with. 

I think I would again emphasize that when it comes to our own 

processes, US–VISIT, for example, we are in fact using the biometric fingerprint process, and we feel that that is very important to 

ensure that we can check against relevant databases. The use of 

the biometric digital image in the passport, as part of the data 

page, which is what I defined as one of the requirements in the 

VWP Program, is, first and foremost, about being able to detect 

tampering with that document. If the digital photo is part of the 

data page, which is in fact our requirement, it is much more difficult to carve out that picture, affix a new picture, or otherwise 

tamper with the document. 

Ms. LOFGREN. So goes the tamperproof nature of the document 

as opposed to me really knowing whether the person in front of me 

is the person he or she says he or she is. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Well, that is the first point. The second point is 

that we need to link up that digital photo to the integrated circuit 

chip. Through the integrated circuit chip, we are actually able to 

write that biometric information within the passport along with the 

biograph data in the cover page, on data pages of the passport, and 

we can do a check to ensure that the person standing in front of 

us is in fact the same person whose image is coming up now on 

the screen in front of the inspector. 

So there is that link, and we do think that that gives us an 

added layer of security. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I have got a lot more questions, but my time is 

expired. 

The gentlelady is recognized. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, although you are the 

chairman, so if you—

Mr. LUNGREN. We are going to have a lot questions here. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. We all have a lot of questions. 

I am looking at the passport you are passing around. Do you 

have chips in these or are we just pretending? 

Mr. MOSS. No, Congresswoman, those passports have a chip embedded in the rear cover, and in fact the data that has been written 

to the data page has been copied to that chip. The chip is very 
20

small. Look at the passport you are holding, and turn to the passport’s to the rear cover, it is in the upper left—I have got to think 

my own geography here—it is in the upper left corner. 

It is very, very small. It is approximately an eighth of an inch, 

[perhaps an eighth of an inch] square plus the antenna. It is designed to be small even though it contains a great deal of data so 

that it is not obvious to the individual. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. We just wondered. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Now it is. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MOSS. Sir, we are not making it secret. We just do not want 

it to be bulging out of the back, if you would. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. That technology, do you think it will last for the 

10 years of the issuance of the passport? Because, I mean, my passport goes in the back of my jeans, through the washing machine 

and God knows what else. 

Mr. MOSS. I guess the first point I would make is that passports 

and water do not mix well, nor do electronic passports, water and 

chips mix well. The point, though, about overall durability, is that 

we have actually contacted with our colleagues at the National Institute of Standards and Technology to do extensive testing on the 

new passport, including looking at the issue of chip durability. 

That is one of the key factors as we assess proposals from vendors. 

We are certainly looking for a 10-year chip and the industry 

assures us that the chips will last for 10 years. We believe in ‘‘trust 

but verify’’. That is why we have hired NIST to help us do that. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I have several other questions. The last one I have 

for you is these 600,000 passports that are missing in action. Are 

those invalidated? Do we keep a list? Can I come use my—

Mr. MOSS. We have actually changed our regulatory practice so 

that once you report a passport as being lost or stolen, it is invalid 

for international travel. We report it to INTERPOL, we share that 

data with our colleagues at the Department of Homeland Security, 

and I strongly urge anyone who loses a passport and then finds it 

and has reported it to the State Department, not to travel on it. 

It may not be a pleasant experience. 

But, yes, it is an invalid travel document. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And to the Department of Homeland Security, this 

subcommittee has held on the Registered Traveler Program, and 

the estimate from the Department put the potential membership in 

that program might be up to 4 million United States travelers. TSA 

has yet to decide whether it is going to continue the program or 

what it is really going to look like. We just spent some time with 

them these past 2 weeks. 

However, it is my understanding that the Department is considering using the biometric registered travel card as an alternative 

to passports required under the Western Hemisphere travel initiative; is that correct? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. No. Actually, that is not the case. We are looking 

at a RT-type concept as part of the solution to meet the Western 

Hemisphere travel requirements, but we have not made a decision 

that the current RT pilot programs and the card that we are 

issuing as part of those pilot programs would be an acceptable form 

of identification and citizenship validation to meet the Western 
21

Hemisphere requirements. So I think we just need to make that 

distinction here. 

We think there are opportunities to take the RT-type concept and 

expand it to a border management process. 

And, Ranking Member Sanchez, you mentioned the SENTRI Program, the NEXUS Program and other programs that we have already that serve somewhat in that capacity, and it is our goal to 

take those programs and combine them as part of a global enrollment system within the Department. 

We want to get a handle on all of our registered travel type programs and link them into a system that is much more uniform and 

that allows for much more consistency in terms of background 

checks and requirements and what the card would look like and all 

those details that are associated with these type of programs. 

So when I mentioned that the Registered Traveler-type concept 

might be applicable, that is the vision that we have. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So you are talking to the other pieces of the Department to make sure that as they are going along on theirs you 

might have interoperability between everything? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Absolutely. And that is already happening. We 

have a tremendous amount of activity within the Department 

mainly involving US–VISIT, Customs and Border Protection and 

TSA. Those are the three entities that have some piece of the Registered Traveler issue, if you will, and we are already looking at 

those issues of interoperability. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And then I have a question for both of you. How 

many places does the State Department currently issue passports? 

And how many places does DHS currently issue NEXUS, FAST, 

SENTRI cards, et cetera? 

Mr. MOSS. The State Department has over 7,000 passport acceptance facilities around the United States. I should make it clear: 

They are not our offices but they are post offices, they are clerks 

of court, offices like this where people can apply for a U.S. passport. We also have 16, soon to be 17, passport agencies that handle 

essentially walk-in traffic. But the big issue is, we do have these 

7,000 agencies. I can actually share with you a list of those in California. I think there are over 600 in California alone. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Cox, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COX. I want to thank you very much, both of you, for your 

testimony. 

We have been passing around up here on the dais some of the 

sample passports and this Registered Traveler pilot program card, 

which is also embedded with a chip. And I am struck in the case 

of the passports in this card and virtually everything else that we 

have been discussing here this morning with the, in my view, misuse of the term, ‘‘biometric,’’ to describe a photograph. 

In my view, biometric must include some measurement, that is 

the whole point. But the way that we are using the digital photograph, at least in the near term, is simply to have a human being, 

a government employee look at the picture, visually inspect the 

person who is presenting themselves and try and match the individual with the photograph. That is not a biometric identification, 
22

in my view. This is really no different than the Matthew Brady 

technology of the U.S. civil war. It is a picture, that is all it is. 

The chip, which may serve to frighten people across the country 

concerned about privacy, is really nothing more than information 

that could be written out inside the passport. It is data, which is 

information about the individual, place of birth, presumably, a 

whole lot of other things that you might seek to include, but there 

is no mysticism to it. It could be written out and enhanced as well 

as put on this chip. 

So talking about it as a biometric, we are talking about the 

length between the chip and the picture in a computer. I think 

masks the fact that there is no biometric identifier that is being 

used to connect the person to the document. We have to remember 

why we are here and what the point of all of this is, because it is 

supposed to be security. The purpose is to connect intelligence 

about terrorists to terrorist travel. So if a known terrorist were 

traveling under an unknown alias, we want to be able to stop him 

anyway. 

I am very concerned, Ms. Dezenski, about what you said, it is the 

first time I have heard the U.S. government say this in an official 

forum about fingerprints, that somehow facial recognition technology, which measures the bridge of my nose, the distance between my irises or an iris scan, which I have already subjected myself to as part of the Registered Traveler Program, is somehow less 

intrusive than getting a fingerprint. 

I do not think the U.S. government has any information that establishes that, that people believe that it is more intrusive to take 

a fingerprint than these other kinds of biometric measurements. 

But if you have data to support what you said, I would certainly 

like to know about it. Can you tell me what you are relying upon 

to make that statement? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Certainly. The comments that I made earlier reflected the outcome of the ICAO process. As I mentioned, we have 

been working very closely with visa waiver countries and with 

ICAO to move toward the adoption of biometric requirements. And 

although I was not part of those discussions with ICAO, it is my 

understanding that in the process of this international collaboration, the decision was made that a biometric digitized photo would 

in fact meet the requirement of a biometric within the travel document and that that was the preferred biometric. 

Mr. COX. That I understand, but you made a different statement 

which is that in your view there is cultural resistance to the use 

of a fingerprint as a biometric. What is the basis for stating that? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Again, that is a reflection of the ICAO discussion 

where many countries came to the table and although in our country we may not have the same concerns about using fingerprints, 

obtaining fingerprints, providing those fingerprints, it is not necessarily shared with the rest of the world. And oftentimes there is 

the perception that if you are fingerprinting travelers, it is akin to 

booking someone on a criminal charge, for example. I mean, these 

are the kinds of perceptions that are out there in the international 

environment. I am not saying that that is necessarily what we believe here in the U.S. 
23

Mr. COX. I think you need to be rather methodical about the way 

we go forward and not say that we simply cannot use biometrics. 

We are instead going to have a human being look at a picture, the 

same old rough justice form of identification that has been in use 

for years. What we do not want is for terrorists to be able to get 

good government documents because they have got fake breeder 

documents and they have got ways to essentially secrete themselves in the form of somebody else whose picture looks exactly like 

them, at least to the naked eye. 

If you will indulge me, Mr. Chairman, I will just remind our colleagues of a question that Eleanor Holmes–Norton asked at one of 

our hearings a few years ago. We were talking about Canadian 

truck travel across the northern border, and the Canadians had a 

card like this with a biometric, and we were all excited about the 

fact that this was going to much more rigorously identify who was 

coming across the border. 

And she asked during the hearing, ‘‘At what point do we check 

the biometric? How does that work? When does the person slide 

this card through something or whatever to check the biometric?’’ 

And the answer came back that only happens if the person in the 

booth thinks that the driver looks suspicious. 

So it was very clear that the lack of a biometric, the human 

interface, the judgment, the rough justice part of it introduced civil 

liberties concerns itself so that the crime of driving while looking 

suspicious turns out to be the way that we drill down into individual suspects rather than just knowing who we are dealing with. 

It would actually, in my view, it would be a big improvement 

from a civil rights, civil liberties standpoint to be able to say, ‘‘You 

are you, we know that,’’ reduce the size of the haystack. A lot of 

voluntary programs like Registered Traveler can help us do that. 

There is ubiquitous technology right now. You can touch your finger to open your laptop. I do not believe there is any cultural resistance to this whatsoever, and I also believe that the ubiquitousness of the fingerprint as an identifier with criminal detective work 

around the world means that we are going to be able to tap into 

a lot more useful information if we do that than if we take the fanciest technology that somebody tries to sell us in the form of facial 

recognition software, what have you. 

Thank you for allowing me that extra time, but, Mr. Chairman, 

I do think that the Department is making the right decision here, 

but I think that is because I think there is so little security payback from this whole system, even if we get to the intended destination. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentleman for his comments. 

The gentleman from Mississippi, the Ranking Member Thompson, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. And I want to take off 

from the chairman’s comments. What if someone steals the chip 

and puts it on the passport, and have we not altered the biometrics? 

Mr. MOSS. Sir, in fact you have not. The technology that is being 

used is a technology that once the data is written to the chip by 

the United States or Germany or any other government, that data 
24

is effectively locked down. It can be read thousands of times, it can 

only be written to the chip once. 

And if the data is changed on the chip, we use a technology 

called [a version of] Public Key Infrastructure, which serves to authenticate that data. Literally, if one bit of data on the chip is 

changed, it will throw off a mathematical calculation and help to 

point out to the well-trained border inspector or consular officer at 

a post abroad looking at the same passport that something had 

been done to this passport. So just stealing the chip really does not 

do someone a lot of good. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Dezenski, in May of this year, we had two 

airlines diverted to Bangor, Maine, and it was said that en route 

the match on the name list indicated some problem. Why can’t we 

do the match before the plane leaves? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Well, that is exactly where we are heading. You 

may be familiar with what is called APIS data, Advance Passenger 

Information, data that we now receive from air carriers about 15 

minutes after a flight takes off. It is essentially a manifest that is 

equivalent to the information on the data page of your passport. So 

the biographic information that is captured in the passport is generally the same as what is collected by the air carrier and what we 

call APIS data. 

We actually have two rulemakings that are related to this topic. 

The first was a rule that came out in early April requiring some 

additional data elements that fall under this category of APIS data. 

The second rule, which has not yet been released but is in the final 

coordination period within the Department and with OMB, is our 

APIS plus rule, which essentially will move that process back so 

that we are no longer receiving that information 15 minutes after 

the flight takes off. 

Because the rule is not final, I am not at liberty to talk about 

exactly what the timeframe will be, but I can tell you that we have 

had pretty intense discussions with the air carriers and other parts 

of the aviation community about how to get through the technical 

and operational challenges to receiving that information. Because 

we are working in pretty much a just-in-time environment within 

the airport, it is sometimes difficult to get that information well in 

advance. 

We are often asked the question, ‘‘Well, what about the information that we receive or could be received at the point of purchase, 

for example, as a person buys their ticket, is it possible that we 

could get some of the data from that point onward? And it is very, 

very difficult to obtain that information from numerous sources if 

you think about how people buy their tickets these days. So we are 

really dependent upon the air carrier and when that person is 

checking in for their flight to get the full complement of APIS data 

that we need. 

Now, sometimes we have passengers that are transferring from 

other flights. Sometimes we have folks that are diverted, their 

flight is canceled, whatever the case may be. And so there will always be instances where we do not have all of the APIS data at 

the point where we would like to. So we are trying to come up with 

a solution that allows us to get as much of that data as possible, 

and our intent is to run those checks before that flight leaves so 
25

that we can deal with those potential threats before that flight 

takes off, and that will obviously help with reducing the number 

of diversions. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So are you now going to put an additional burden on the carriers to get additional information? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. There are two pieces. We asked for two or three 

additional data elements. That regulation already went into effect 

in April. We think that is fairly straightforward. We have not had 

a lot of major concerns coming up. The more problematic piece is 

the timeframe in which we asked for that information, and that is 

where we have had a lot of negotiations, a lot of discussions with 

affected parties about the viability of getting that information. 

And then, of course, we have to run our checks on that data. So 

it has to be early enough in the process that we can run it through 

our system and get the information back to, in this case, the carriers if in fact we do not want to have a particular person board 

the aircraft.

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

Question: Can you tell me, what kind of extra data do you ask for? (Page 45, line 

1034) 

Answer: We ask for the following information: country of residence; passport expiration date, if a passport is required; and address while in the United States (number and street, city, state, and zip code), except that this information is not required 

for U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, crew members, or persons who are in 

transit to a location outside the United States.

Mr. THOMPSON. Can you tell me, what kind of extra data do you 

ask for? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. I cannot remember all of the elements. One was 

the destination address in the U.S. That was something we were 

not collecting beforehand, and we wanted to have a sense for where 

people were going. There were, I think, two other elements which 

I would be happy to get for you. 

Mr. THOMPSON. How can you prove where somebody is going? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. There is no 100 percent guarantee. It is another 

piece of information that we can add into our equation, but there 

is never a guarantee. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, I guess if you are putting the burden on 

the carrier to give you information that cannot be verified, it just 

looks like you are putting an additional burden on the carrier. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Well, we believe that the additional data elements 

will in fact help us make a better risk assessment decision. Again, 

there is never 100 percent guarantee, but we do need to work with 

the carriers to get this type of information. 

Mr. THOMPSON. If I say I am going to Washington, D.C., and I 

am staying at the Hyatt on Capitol Hill, how can you verify that? 

If you are requiring the carrier to give you this information, are 

you now making the carrier policemen too? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. No. In fact, our goal with this APIS process is to 

take the process of checking information against our watch list in 

house. Right now, we are asking carriers to do a check against the 

no-fly list, for example. We want that process within the government. We want to own that process, we need to own that process. 
26

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, I think all of us want the process to be the 

best possible, but I cannot see the rationale for asking for information that cannot be verified. 

Well, lastly, what is the timeline on the rule for APIS Plus? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. We are looking probably over the next couple 

months to get that issued. It is difficult for me to predict with 100 

percent certainty, given that we must complete OMB review and 

go through the final review process. But we are working as quickly 

as we can to get that out. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Linder, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

How many other nations use digitized photos on their passports? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Well, certainly, within the VWP Program, the 

vast majority do. I think about 25 of the 27 countries use digitized 

photos. Beyond the VWP group of countries, I am not sure. 

Mr. MOSS. Digitized photos are widely used around the world. 

They are utilized by many countries. China uses them, Russia uses 

them, many others, because they have a tremendous security advantage over physical photographs. They have really eliminated 

the problem of photo substitution—of literally changing the photograph in the passport. 

Mr. LINDER. Are you having a problem with people putting on 

makeup to make themselves look like the photo in the passport, 

have you? 

Mr. MOSS. No, we have not, but that is of course one of the 

issues that having the data written to the chip and having the 

image there will help us with. 

Mr. LINDER. How many visitors to our country that do not live 

here come with a passport from, say, Saudi Arabia with the fingerprints or a digitized photo? 

Mr. MOSS. Any visitor from Saudi Arabia will of course require 

a U.S. visa. They will have been subjected to a thorough screening, 

including the collection in almost all cases of two fingerprints as 

part of the visa application process. The State Department then 

shares that data with our colleagues at the Department of Homeland Security and that data populates the US–VISIT database. 

And then when that traveler arrives with their Saudi Arabia travel 

documents, they are verified as being the same person who applied 

previously for the visa in Jeddah or Riyadh. 

Mr. LINDER. By fingerprint. 

Mr. MOSS. By fingerprint, yes. 

Mr. LINDER. Why don’t you do that for everybody? 

Mr. MOSS. Well, sir, we in fact do that for all travelers who arrive here using a visa. 

Mr. LINDER. But not for American passports. 

Mr. MOSS. We do not include finger scans as part of the U.S. 

passport process. 

Mr. LINDER. Why? 

Mr. MOSS. The international community has focused on the issue 

of facial recognition as a globally interoperable biometric. That is 

what we have selected, I would emphasize,as our first generation 

biometrics. As we see what happens in terms of biometric stand-
27

ards and in terms of efficacy, we may make additional decisions. 

But right now we are looking at facial recognition as our first generation biometric. 

Mr. LINDER. Do you disagree with Chairman Cox’s definition of 

biometric? 

Mr. MOSS. I never disagree with committee chairmen. 

[Laughter.] 

I would say, however, that in our experience in other aspects of 

the visa process where we have actually used facial recognition 

software in what are called, ‘‘One to Many Applications,’’ we have 

found some very, very impressive results from facial recognition 

software and its ability to match visa applicants against the same 

person applying literally using disguises or applying multiple times 

for the same benefit. 

Mr. LINDER. This picture we saw is going to be judged by an individual standing there looking at it, not facial recognition software; 

is that correct? 

Mr. MOSS. I think it is fair to say in the first generation of applications, even at the ports of entry, it will probably be producing on 

the inspector’s screen, first of all, a much larger image. They will 

no longer be comparing a traveler to a one and a half-inch square 

photograph. It will be coming up as a large-size photograph. I think 

it is also fair to say that the Department of Homeland Security, in 

addition to its reliance on finger scans for US–VISIT, continues to 

have interest in the possible reliance on facial recognition software. 

That technology, though, is still evolving, and we will see where it 

goes over the next couple of years. 

Mr. LINDER. Ms. Dezenski, did you see The Washington Post this 

morning on the US–VISIT Program? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Yes, I did. 

Mr. LINDER. Would you care to comment on the name matching 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Well, I think it is important to put that article 

into context. When we talk about 150 crew members that may have 

had some issues moving through the US–VISIT process, that is a 

very, very small fraction of the number of people that move 

through that program on a daily, weekly, yearly basis. We are talking about a very small fraction. 

Of the 150, I think, who were identified as having problems, only 

about half of those had a specific redress issue with the VISIT system. The others were hits on our IBIS database and were referred 

to secondary for additional screening and clearing, as needed. 

Mr. LINDER. With fingerprints? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Some of them were, yes. I do not know the specifics of any other cases. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Dicks is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DICKS. Our committee has been concerned that we made a 

mistake with the 2-finger system versus using 10 fingers, and it is 

10 fingers. Now, I understand, obviously, that does cause a cultural 

concern. I mean, I think we have to recognize that other countries 

may not think that is—they feel that they are being treated like 

criminals. And so it does present a problem. So maybe the facial 

digital picture is something that was done through ICAO, which is 

our UN, United Nations, group of experts on travel. This may not 

be a bad outcome. 
28

The only other thing I would say is, I do not see anything wrong 

with having a person to have to put down where they are going to 

be. I think one of the questions we have had over the years is that 

people got into the country and we had no idea where they were. 

At least you have some place to start, and assuming that some people put legitimate information and I think most people would about 

where they are going to stay or what hotel they are going to be at, 

et cetera. I mean, it cannot be verified, but at least it is a start 

of collecting information about where these people are in the country. We need to get them out of here or find them. At least we have 

some place to start. So I feel that that ought to be considered. 

Again, I am having a real hard time understanding why we ever 

got ourselves into a system that allows a person to get on the airplane, fly to Maine for eight hours and then take them off the airplane. To me, that just does not make any sense. I am to glad to 

hear you are trying to go in a different direction, but why did we 

do this in the first place? I mean, it is so ridiculous on the face of 

it, I cannot understand why we ever got ourselves into this. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. We are living in the post–9/11 environment, and 

the parameters under which we operate are aviation systems, the 

parameters that we use to collect data, to accept risk and deal with 

that risk is much different than it was pre–9/11. And so I think 

what we are seeing here is the use of legacy systems and legacy 

approaches that now have to be updated based on how we want to 

manage our system, how we want to deal with our threats and 

vulnerabilities now. 

And it is not uncommon that we run into scenarios like this 

where we may have access to some data but not all data. We may 

get some data at the time we need it but maybe not all of it. And 

so as we go through the systematic review process and we respond 

to mandates like we have in the Intelligence Reform Act, for example, to get the safest data sooner in the process. We are going to 

make those course corrections, but I think we would fully agree 

with you that the old way of doing things and getting that data 

late in the game is not where we want to be to identify those 

threats and deal with those threats as quickly as possible. 

Mr. DICKS. Why didn’t we set it up so you could check before the 

flight leaves rather than 15 minutes after it leaves? I mean, that 

is not that much of a time difference. Why was it done that way? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. I cannot speak to—

Mr. DICKS. Isn’t there a way it can be done technically? Is that 

what you were saying? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Well, there are most certainly technical limitations to when we can get all the data. I think it is mostly a reflection, though, of the fact that in previous times perhaps the threat 

and vulnerabilities did not necessitate that that information be received any sooner in the process. And now we know that is not the 

case. We need to get it sooner, we need to deal with those issues. 

Mr. DICKS. Did you say this would be resolved? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. We are trying to get the rule out as quickly as 

we can. Now, it will go through a notice and comment period. 

Mr. DICKS. It does have a great record of keeping its commitments on reports or getting information back or doing things in a 

certain timeframe. How solid is this 2 months? 
29

Ms. DEZENSKI. Well, we are doing the best we can to get this one 

out. Again, I think I have alluded to a lot of the concerns that we 

have been dealing with in trying to come up with a timeframe that 

is reasonable and does not have a negative impact on the operations for air carriers. We have a lot of things to consider in this 

process, and the last thing we want to do is put a requirement out 

there that leads to an effect that is worst than what we started 

with. So we really need to do this right. 

Mr. DICKS. I can understand there might be a few last minute 

changes of people getting on this airplane that would then necessitate doing a check after the plane left. But there has got to be 

at least 95 percent of the people on that plane we know are going 

to be on that plane well before the plane takes off. So why couldn’t 

they check it before it takes off, and then if they have to update 

it, update it. But at least do a check before the plane takes off. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. You are absolutely right, some of that data is 

available. Some people come to the airport three hours in advance 

of their international flight. That data is available. We could start 

to do those checks. But it is not the case for every passenger that 

we are dealing with, so we have got to figure out what is the shortest window in which we can operate where we can get the vast majority of that data and perform our check and be able to get back 

to the air carrier with that board or no-board decision for that list 

of passengers. And of course this happens thousands and thousands of times, every time a flight takes off. So there are a tremendous number of operational issues and technical issues to take a 

look at on implementation of this requirement. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The gentleman from Washington’s time has expired. I just might say that I am constantly refreshed by the enthusiasm and intensity of your feelings on this, and I appreciate it. 

Now I know why you went to the Rose Bowl. 

Gentleman, Mr. Pearce, is recognized. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There seems to be questions whether or not fingerprints should 

be involved in a biometric passport. Briefly, do you all have an 

opinion? 

Mr. MOSS. I think you have to recognize that any requirement 

that we would attempt to impose on other governments would then 

expect us to meet the same requirement. I think it is fair to say 

the administration has no position on the issue of fingerprinting 

American citizens as part of the passport process. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. I can tell you that we are looking very closely at 

the enrollment process for US–VISIT and our biometric standards 

across the board to determine whether we want to move, for example, from a 2-print enrollment process to a 10-print enrollment 

process. There is a lot of discussion about how to get to the best 

use of fingerprints. We would certainly defer to the State Department on any thoughts with regard to using fingerprints, catching 

fingerprints as part of the U.S. passport issuance process. 

I can tell you that some European countries are looking at adopting fingerprints, although I do not believe that any final decisions 

have been made, and they are looking at the use of those fingerprints within the E.U., not, for example, information that we could 

access. 
30

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you. I think I am the only member in the 

committee with a border along the Mexican border, so I am very 

familiar with the WHTI and how it is supposed to aid in security 

along the border. I am also concerned that many residents in our 

district need to travel back and forth frequently, and so we worry 

about having a friendly border at the same time having a secure 

border, and that is a difficult balance. 

As far as the efforts to implement WHTI, what efforts to date 

have been made to implement the processes of that, and is it going 

to be implemented by December 2007? 

Mr. MOSS. Thank you very much for the question. The first point 

I would bring up is that we have still not published the Advance 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. It is very close to that publication. 

It should happen in the next, I would say, couple of weeks. 

Elaine and I have traveled thousands of miles, literally, doing 

outreach. In fact, I was just last week in Arizona doing the same 

thing. We are trying to educate people, we are trying to make people understand that there is more than one phase to this program, 

that it does not all go into effect at one point. 

Both State and the Department of Homeland Security recognize 

that different travel documents work better for different uses. For 

example, if someone is getting on an airplane or getting on a cruise 

ship and going abroad, that really is travel for which almost exclusively the passport is the appropriate document. We all recognize 

that the land border is a huge challenge. 

In this regard, during the month of July, the State Department 

is contracting to have surveys done at 16 border crossing areas to 

help us get our handle on perhaps our key unknown piece of—

Mr. PEARCE. Will it be ready to go by 2007? 

Mr. MOSS. That is what the law says, sir. [We are—] 

Mr. PEARCE. Are the RT cards going to be allowed to be one of 

the documents used? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. We are looking again at the RT concept. We have 

a couple of frequent traveler type programs that are in existence, 

which we have referenced as part of our outreach on this. We are 

going to move toward global enrollment in uniform Registered 

Traveler type programs to facilitate at the land borders—

Mr. PEARCE. Are we going to have the program kickoff to make 

sure that we can sustain it? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Absolutely. 

Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Moss, what efforts is the State Department 

making to ensure that if we want to require passports to cross, that 

you can actually keep up with the load in a timely fashion? Again, 

these are my constituents who are going to be calling me asking 

me to call you, and I would like your home phone number as well 

if you have it. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MOSS. I will provide it, sir. The reality is that we are making 

major investments in cooperation with the Congress, and we will 

be talking to you about certain aspects of that, because we do need 

to increase capacity. Right now, this year, we are already issuing 

10 million passports a year, some of them are probably to WHTIrelated travelers. But as we look out a couple of years, we think 

that number could get up into the range of 15 to 17 million a year. 
31

That is a big challenge for us, we have lots of initiatives underway, 

but we are going to need help from Congress as well. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The gentleman, Mr. Langevin, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Chairman. 

I want to thank you both for being here testifying today. 

I wanted to turn my attention back to the durability lifespan of 

the biometric chip. I know the company that you are working with 

has assured us that it will last for the 10 years that it is expected 

to, according to what you just testified to, but one of the problems 

that I see is with a passport that has been somehow physically 

damaged, you can obviously see it, but if a chip has been damaged 

or we have all been in the situation where you are too close a magnetic source and the data on your credit card gets wiped off. And 

that is not going to be very obvious until the traveler gets to the 

airport. 

So what are you going to do in that case when a traveler gets 

to the airport and his or her passport is damaged, the data is gone 

off the chip and they are about to get on a plane? 

The second thing is if I am a potential terrorist and I know that 

they are going to look the other way or when I get to the airport 

they are going to let me on the plane, then they are going to do 

something to physically damage, intentionally damage the passport 

and the data chip and hopefully try to get on the plane without 

proper biometric screening. So can you address those questions for 

me? 

Mr. MOSS. Certainly. I think the first point I would like to reassure you and others is that if the chip is damaged, as we say in 

our own rulemaking we will replace a passport with a damaged 

chip at no cost to the bearer. But the other point is, just as is the 

case right now, at the end of the day the default, if you will, security mechanism in the chip is actually the data page itself. As long 

as the data page is intact, you as a legitimate traveler will be able 

to board that aircraft. 

You may, I would add, be subjected to some additional scrutiny, 

either entering the United States or entering another country without an operational chip, but I think you will be able to travel. [You 

will be able to travel, there is no ‘‘think’’ about it.] 

I think on the point of deliberately damaging the chip and things 

of this nature, it is another issue. Clearly, I think part of the answer to that is data share. I talked a little bit about that before, 

about trying to identify [mollified] terrorist travelers before they 

travel. 

I also think it is important to note in that regard that in some 

cases the only biometric we ever have on a truly dangerous traveler 

is in fact a photograph that has been acquired in some cases, getting back again to the value of a photograph. 

Damaged chip, admittedly, they could do that, but we think that 

the chip is going to be very durable unless it really is deliberately 

attacked, and that will probably leave some evidence which would 

make an inspector or an airline official somewhat suspicious about 

the traveler. 
32

Mr. LANGEVIN. Now, on that point, with respect to a chip potentially being damaged or if technology changes so quickly, have you 

thought about the issue of reducing the timeframe from 10 years 

down to 5 years, both to allow us to incorporate new technology or 

to ensure that the information is current or the chip is not damaged? 

And within that, have you also factored in, even if you leave it 

over 10 years, you factored in data migration issues? As a former 

Secretary of State, we were always grappling with the issue of the 

new machines being able to read the old technology, and that is 

something that I would like you to address? 

And can the State Department handle the additional production 

costs and associated activities that would go into reducing that 

timeframe? 

Mr. MOSS. [Okay.] Let me see if I can deal, first of all, with the 

validity period, because I think that deals with two or three of the 

other issues. We have looked at the validity period issue, sir, and 

if we were to take our projected demand of 12, 15 million passports 

a year and go from a 10-year book to a 5-year book, it would not 

exactly double but it would probably go up by about two-thirds. 

So now we would be back here with Congress looking for resources to build a passport system that could sustain 25 million 

passport adjudications or replacements a year. That would be a 

daunting challenge, I think. It certainly would be for State. [I think 

DHS would agree with me, the same way.] 

In terms of technology, what we have tried to do is two things. 

One is, as I said in my earlier testimony, we have considerable unused capacity on the chip, so we are trying to, in one case, futureproof the technology so that if we decide, for example, to go with 

iris scans as a second biometric, additional photographs, finger 

scans, something of this nature, we do not have to change our technology. 

The third point is, as technology evolves, one of our baseline objectives will be that it is always backwardly compatible so that the 

DHS passport reader in 2012 will be able to read passports issued 

in 2012 as well as in 2006. That is why the State Department is 

paying a lot of very bright people in the private sector, at NIST 

and at the Government Printing Office to help ensure that we can 

do that. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentlelady from Virgin Islands, Dr. Christensen, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am sure you know we are heavily dependent on tourism for our 

economic livelihood. Because so many of our visitors come from the 

U.S. mainland, I am going to be extremely concerned. Just yesterday I answered one question to the press on that, and I want your 

assurance today that my constituents and myself will not have the 

requirement imposed on us as it has been posed on the other countries in the Western Hemisphere. 

Mr. MOSS. I would certainly invite you to make that comment as 

part of our advance notice of proposed rulemaking process, but I 

can assure you on both the State Department and DHS’ side, we 

both recognize your constituents are U.S. citizens and people trav-
33

eling to the Virgin Islands or Puerto Rico from the United States 

are also U.S. citizens. We have no concept whatsoever, no thought 

whatsoever of imposing essentially an internal passport requirement on travel between U.S. territories and the United States, the 

main ones, I should say. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Music to my ears. 

[Laughter.] 

I am also concerned about the rest of the Caribbean as well and 

the impact of the initiative on my neighboring Caribbean islands. 

And in December of this year, the passport or other executive document, as you will determine, will be required for all travelers to or 

from the Caribbean, Bermuda, Central America and South America. 

You have just extended the time on the Visa Waiver Program, 

and there is a lot of concern in the Caribbean. What is the possibility that you would extend the time on the Western Hemisphere 

another year as well? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. As I think we mentioned earlier, the advance notice of proposed rulemaking on the Western Hemisphere Initiative 

is still in the process of being cleared by the Department, both 

State and DHS, and ultimately OMB. We have most certainly 

taken into consideration the concerns that have come up about 

travel to and from the Caribbean, and we do understand that there 

are potential implications. We have looked at a couple different 

ways to phase in these options. 

One of the reasons why we are doing this as an advance notice 

of proposed rulemaking is precisely because of some of these concerns and that we need to consider them as early in the process 

as possible. So although we have not issued specifics on what the 

proposed implementation date may be, we are certainly looking at 

some flexible requirements. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. What is in place for the visa waiver countries 

to prevent someone from fraudulently obtaining a passport overseas in another country, who is not on a watch list or in our databases, and entering the U.S. under the assumed identity based on 

their biometrics? 

Mr. MOSS. I think I actually have some rather good news for you 

in that regard. The countries that are in the Visa Waiver Program 

have to meet a variety of requirements, but one of the things we 

also look at is the integrity of their passport system. These are all 

very sophisticated countries. Quite honestly, many of them have 

database access, for example, national registries of births and 

deaths and things of this nature, which do not exist in the United 

States. 

I am very confident in the integrity of the way the U.S. passport 

is adjudicated. I certainly share that feeling about the way passports are adjudicated in the other visa waiver program countries as 

well. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you. There has been a request to have a 

short second round before we go to the next panel. 

Let me just ask this, and we may be beating this to death, but 

it is very important for us in terms of a homeland security perspective, to make sure that the person standing before us is the person 

he or she purports to be. And some of us got excited about the ter-
34

minology, ‘‘biometrics,’’ but I share the chairman’s concern that 

what we are really doing is looking at a picture. The picture may 

be embedded in the chip so that you can see it come up in a comparison, but that is recalls you all are doing. It is not any sort of 

software analysis of the face. 

Fingerprints are ubiquitous, and I understand the E.U. is more 

than thinking about it, I understand the decision is made that they 

are going to put fingerprints in their passports. But is the problem 

that if they put fingerprints in their passport, we cannot read them 

technically or that we will not be granted permission to utilize that 

against any database that they have? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. My understanding at this point is that they would 

only be considering the use of those fingerprints within the E.U. 

proper. So, for example, if they are stored on the biometric chip, 

we would not be able to access that information when we scan that 

passport at the U.S. port of entry. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Does that mean we would not be able to read it 

or we would not be able to read it and then access their database 

for identification purposes? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Well, actually, both. We would not be able to read 

that information on the chip, and there would be no link back to 

an E.U. or a member country database for any type of check. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I understand the concerns you are expressing. My 

thought is, and I do not know if it is shared by other members of 

the panel, but that we ought to be in the vanguard of creating 

identifiers which will really answer the question, who is it in front 

of me, to the greatest extent possible. 

For the life of me, I do not see anything better than fingerprints. 

I share Mr. Dicks’ thoughts that if we are going to do that, we 

ought to go to 10 prints rather than 2. We ought to be in advance 

of that and then work our way in the diplomatic circles to try and 

get others to understand why it is important for us to have access. 

It is in their interest, it is in our interest if we are in a worldwide 

battle against terrorism. 

That is why I understand what you are saying. I am not trying 

to harp on you, but my feeling is we ought to be in the vanguard, 

we ought be presenting it, we ought to be making the case for why 

this is the way to make sense. As the chairman has said many 

times, we are looking for needles in a haystack, and right now we 

are looking at the largest haystack possible, whether it has gone 

through passports or whether it is forcing people to go through 

checks. 

And I have always thought, in terms of law enforcement and everything else that the idea is to limit the scope of the suspects that 

you are looking for. And to the extent we do not do that or give 

ourselves the tools to do that, we are making it more difficult for 

ourselves and we are making it far more expensive for ourselves. 

So just sort of an expression of frustration that I have. 

The gentlelady from California, if she has any more questions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I would agree with the chairman. I am just 

amazed that we would require another country to put a chip in 

their passports and then when they come to our country we do not 

really use that. I mean, why are we putting those requirements on 

them if we are really not going to have any access to it? 
35

Ms. Dezenski, I want to go back to the last question you did not 

get to answer. Could you answer that question for me, how many 

places currently issue NEXUS cards, how many issue FAST cards, 

how many issue SENTRI cards? And how many places do you believe your Department is going to plan to issue Registered Traveler 

cards?

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

Question: Could you answer that question for me, how many places currently 

issue NEXUS cards, how many issue FAST cards, how many issue SENTRI cards? 

And how many places do you believe your Department is going to plan to issue Registered Traveler cards? (Page 68, line 1613) 

Answer: Cards for NEXAS, FAST and SENTRI are issued by CBP at local (port 

of entry) enrollment center. The Current totals for each are as follows:

NEXUS—5 (Plus NEXUS Air Pilot) 

Enrollment Centers Crossings 

Blaine, WA Peace Arch 

Pacific Highway 

Point Roberts 

Buffalo, NY Peace Bridge 

Rainbow Bridge 

Whirlpool Bridge (NEXUS-only) 

Detroit, MI Ambassador Bridge 

Windsor/Detroit Tunnel 

Port Huron, MI Blue Water Bridge 

Champlain, NY Champlain 

Highgate Springs (VT) 

NEXUS Air Pilot is operational at Vancouver International Airport, BC.

FAST—17

Southwest Border Locations: Northern Border Locations:.

Brownsville, TX Belleville, New Brunswick (Houlton ME) 

Calexico, CA South Derby Line, Vermont 

El Paso, TX Champlain, NY 

Laredo, TX Fort Erie, Ontario (Buffalo, New York) 

Otay Mesa, CA Windsor, Ontario (Detroit, Michigan) 

Pharr, TX Port Huron, MI 

Nogales, AZ Pembina, North Dakota 

Portal, North Dakota 

Sweetgrass, Montana 

Blaine, WA 

SENTRI—2

Enrollment Centers Crossings 

Ca—Otay Mesa Otay Mesa 

San Ysidro 

TX—El Paso—Ysletta Port of Entry El Paso—Stanton Street Bridge 

With regard to the Registered Travel (RT) program, TSA’s RT pilot tests are operating at five airports across the country: Minneapolis St. Paul (MSP); Los Angeles 

Internation (LAX); Houston George Bush Intercontinental (IAH); Boston Logan 

(BOS); and Reagon National (DCA). A new pilot at Orlando has been launched to 

assess the feasiblity and effectiveness of using a public/private sector business 

model to implement RT.
36

Ms. DEZENSKI. I do not have the specific numbers with me, but 

I can certainly follow up for the record to get those enrollment sites 

for you. 

I can tell you that it is fairly limited. I think it is important to 

keep in mind that NEXUS and FAST and SENTRI were never envisioned as alternatives to passports. We think they are tools that 

can be useful in meeting Western Hemisphere requirements, but 

the way that the enrollment process is set up for these types of programs, it is normally at our busiest crossings and caters to those 

folks who cross very frequently. So we, again, have focused on 

those ports of entry where we have the highest volume. 

Now, we are expanding all of those programs over the next couple years, but I think it is important to get back to this idea of the 

Registered Traveler concept, because we need to look more broadly 

at how to encompass into some type of global process that would 

facilitate some type of card, particularly at the land borders. 

As far as the RT Program goes, we are in of course the pilot 

phase. We have agreed to extend that pilot I believe through September, and then we will make some determinations at the Department level about how we continue that program. 

So decisions about the number of enrollment centers, for example, will be linked into the broader discussion within the Department about where we want that program to go. So there is no specific decision on that right now. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And then, Mr. Moss, when I was younger I used 

to live in Italy and I had an American passport, and during my 

stay there, during one of the years my passport expired and I went 

down to the embassy and I redid it. Compared to what was issued 

here, it was pretty much hand-done, it seemed to me, at the embassy. 

My question for you is two-pronged. When you lose your passport 

in a place like Italy and you go to the embassy, do you get a temporary passport to go back or do you get issued a new passport? 

At that time, I had a new passport issued within 3 days, for example, which was a re-up of another 7 years or 10 years or whatever the time was at the time. 

So under the two cases, if I lost it or if I was living in a different 

country and I needed to go and get it renewed, would I even get 

the same kind of passport that I had issued with the embedded 

chip and everything from an outpost like Rome, Italy, versus if I 

am in Uzbekistan or some other place? 

A load of questions there, but I am trying to understand what 

do we really have in hand? 

Mr. MOSS. Let me deal with the case of someone who is living 

in Italy or living in Uzbekistan and their passport is about to expire. They live there, they contact our embassy, they turn in their 

old passport, we do data entry, scan the photograph and that data 

then moves electronically back to one of our production facilities in 

the United States. They make the passport the same day, and it 

comes FedEx, as of July 5, back to the embassy abroad. In a place 

like Rome, Italy, you will usually have it within 3 or 4 days after 

you walk in the embassy. 

In the case of someone who is traveling abroad and may be in 

Italy today and in Germany tomorrow, we will issue a 1-year tem-
37

porary passport. When you return to the United States after your 

trip, you turn that into us and you then get a full 10-year validity 

passport, paying for it only once. 

We went to the decision, by the way, of repatriating the production back to the United States because it gave us the security system. We make the same passport that is available in Rome as is 

available in New York or Washington. More importantly, it was 

also a good use of money. 

Placing this highly sophisticated passport production and personalization equipment overseas [just] simply is not a good use of the 

taxpayers’ money. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is the difficulty having 120 different countries that—

Mr. MOSS. Actually, I think you can get a passport at I think it 

is 240 different posts around the world. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. There are only 120—okay. Thank you. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The chairman of the full committee, Mr. Cox, is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to begin by again thanking our witnesses. You are working on some very important matters here. 

I also want to see if I can peel down a little bit further on this 

question of where we are going, why and what is the purpose of 

all of this. I hope that our purpose is data security to the extent 

that we are imposing new requirements on travelers, our allies and 

other countries around the world, and that it is not an exercise, it 

is not something for its own sake. So I think it is a fair question 

to always ask, ‘what is the security payback’? 

My judgment is that there is little to no security payback in the 

so-called biometrics that is the subject of the Department’s recent 

decision, and that is why I think it is fine to put if off. Because, 

quite honestly, when it is all in place, there is still no real additional security or at least it is of marginal value. 

I do agree, for example, that looking at a bigger picture on the 

screen instead of looking at a little picture is a marginal improvement. It has been commented on several times during this hearing 

that we are still just looking at a picture. That is all we are doing. 

I am struck that the mandatory biometric of facial recognition is 

essentially useless in finding known terrorists because there is no 

existing database. The same is true for iris scans or all the other 

fancy things that we might, as Americans, subject ourselves to. 

As Chairman Lungren was pointing out, there are international 

databases of criminals’ fingerprints that someday we might reach 

some international understanding to share a little bit more broadly. 

I have to say that putting the chip on the card, linking the chip 

to the photo, with all of its shortcomings, sent me down a path that 

I am even less comfortable with than the fingerprints. I do not 

know what is going to go on the chip. It is a rather elaborate undertaking to avoid doing the obvious, which is checking a real biometric, such as a fingerprint, for a passenger, a traveler through 

the airport just by touching something. 

But to be very explicit about it, my privacy interest in the distance between the ridges on my fingertips compared to my privacy 
38

interest in my tax records, my credit card usage, the library books 

I read, my medical history, my employment history and so on, all 

of which I think we would all agree in this room ought not to find 

its way into the chip on this card, is negligible. 

I do not want the government to know what I am reading, I do 

not want the government to know anymore than it needs to know 

about my medical history or all the other things that make me 

Chris Cox. I do think that something that establishes that I am 

Chris Cox and not Tom or somebody else around here so that I can 

go through the airport and proceed on my way is a help to me. 

So the point that we are trying to establish here is what is it 

going to take to find these terrorists? And if the iris scan that I 

have subjected myself to as a participant in the Registered Traveler Program is not going to produce a database that has terrorists 

in it, it is of relatively less value. I do think the chairman’s right 

that we can reduce the size of the haystack that way, so it is a voluntary program, the Registered Traveler is, and maybe that is fine. 

But for most people who may not want to participate in such a 

voluntary program, the question is, how are we going to not focus 

on them in the most efficient, cheap, fastest way if they are not terrorists? And it seems to me that that question is put very neatly 

by your predecessor who is going to testify on the next panel, Stewart Verdery, and I just want to quote from his testimony and ask 

you to react. 

He says, ‘‘I recommend that the United States match the bold 

steps of the European Union to include fingerprints in passports. 

The U.S. should advocate for fingerprints as a mandatory biometric 

in passports at ICAO,’’ and of course that underscores the fact that 

that is not the U.S. position. 

And, Mr. Moss, you said there is no administration position on 

this one way or the other, I believe, a moment ago. So we are not 

leaving it in ICAO, we are just simply saying that they have adopted fingerprints as a secondary way to do this after facial recognition, and we are just going along with the flow. 

Quoting from Mr. Verdery, ‘‘At a time when we are going to great 

lengths to build antiterrorism and law enforcement systems based 

on fingerprints, we will never be able to fully engage other countries if we decline, ourselves, to do what is needed.’’

So I would just ask for your reaction to that? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. I think my former colleague makes some good 

points. I want to go back to something Frank Moss said a while 

ago, which is we are at the beginning stages of using biometrics. 

We are really just starting, and I think we are going to see the evolution of the use of biometrics, we are going to see more interoperability between databases, we are going to see more cooperation on 

the international front. 

But we have got to start somewhere, and I think if I want to 

leave you with one message it is not to think that we are somehow 

not utilizing fingerprints. It seems to be the focus of where you 

want to go, and the use of fingerprints starts very early in the 

process. 

If you need to obtain a visa, if you are outside of the Visa Waiver 

Program countries, when you apply to the U.S. consulate, you are 

required to give 10 fingerprints. It is used to run a check against 
39

what is called IDENT and IAFIS, which contains extracts of criminal records and what not. So that process happened when we are 

issued a visa. 

If you are in a Visa Waiver Program country, not only do you 

have the biometric requirements that we talked about in the past, 

but you are also enrolling on your first time entering the U.S. End 

of the program using your fingerprints. Right now it is two. We 

may at some future time look to expand to a 10-print, but those 

fingerprints are captured and when you come back for your subsequent visits you are checked against that fingerprint database. 

Again, we are at the beginning stages but there are multiple layers in this process that utilize biometrics in different types of ways. 

And there are two issues: One is verifying you are who you say you 

are, and the second piece is being able to run a test to ensure that 

you are clean. So we use biometrics to achieve both of those objectives. 

Mr. COX. I am glad that that is where we were headed. I think 

it is manifest that we are not there now, and I hope we will increasingly see our way clear to doing these things. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Dicks? 

Mr. DICKS. I want to make sure I got this straight. You said that 

for visa waiver countries, countries that are in the Visa Waiver 

Program, you check two fingerprints, right? Why can’t you, if the 

person who has got the passport, can that same person check the—

if this person says he is this person and he is from a Visa Waiver 

Program, can he check the fingerprints at the same time? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Can the inspector check the fingerprints? 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Yes. Let me walk you through the process of 

someone traveling from a VWP country, enters the U.S., and let’s 

assume that they have e-passport, so it has the digital photo and 

the biometric chip. When that person enters at the U.S. port of 

entry, their passport would be scanned in and read by our reader. 

It would look at the biographic data and would compare that to 

what is in the passport, and this chip would be unlocked, if you 

will, to display the picture that is encoded, which should match 

with the person standing in front of them and with the digital 

photo embedded in the actual passport. 

The second part of this process is the use of fingerprints for that 

VWP traveler. If it is their first time into the country under the 

US–VISIT requirement, we do an enrollment process which checks 

their fingerprint against numerous databases and ensures that 

they do not have some terrorist link. And as they come in for subsequent visits, they are again asked for their fingerprint. We also 

take a photo, by the way, but they are asked for their fingerprint, 

and we do another check to make sure that the fingerprint in fact 

matches the record that we have on file for that person. So it is 

a two-part process. 

Mr. DICKS. And that is done right there when the person comes 

through. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. At primary. 

Mr. DICKS. But it is not part of the passport. You have to go into 

the U.S.? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. The fingerprint is not encoded on the passport. 
40

Mr. DICKS. Right. We know that. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Right. That is right. 

Mr. DICKS. But you have to use the US–VISIT system in order 

to use it. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. That is right, but it is all integrated into the reader. 

Mr. DICKS. On non-visa waiver countries, you use 10 fingerprints. Now, in the testimony it says if you get into the question 

of quality of fingerprints, you are much better off to have 10. Why 

did we not do 10? I know there was a big rush to get something 

deployed, but the 10 is so much more effective. And if we did it for 

the non–Visa Waiver Program countries, why didn’t we do it for 

visa waiver countries? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. There are a couple of reasons. One, of course, is 

the facilitation piece. When you apply for a visa, there is more time 

in the process. You can take 10 prints, you could run that check 

if it takes 20 minutes or 30 minutes, usually you are still in the 

consular office. 

Mr. DICKS. That is whether it is a visa country or a non-visa 

country, right? 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Well, you are only applying for a visa if you are 

outside of the VWP. So this would affect travelers coming from—

right. So that is a different scenario than when you are at the port 

of entry standing in line along with thousands of other people, and 

we need to facilitate you through US–VISIT. There is no doubt, a 

2-print process is much quicker, but I will tell you that there has 

been a lot of discussion about whether we move to a 10-print enrollment versus a 2-print. The initial decision was made to use a 

two-print process. We will be looking at that as we move forward 

to determine whether or not we need to revise that policy. 

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Dicks, I would just like to clarify just so that we 

do not leave you with a misunderstanding. At this point, though, 

even in the visa waiver traveler situation, we are still only collecting two fingerprints from the traveler at this time. Our goal 

over the next couple of years, as not only State and DHS ramp up, 

but so do the agencies that have to read these prints ramp up their 

capacity, is to migrate towards 10. But right now, if you are applying, as someone asked me in Saudi Arabia, we are taking your two 

index fingers at this point in time. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. I stand corrected. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, okay. That is important to know because you 

would wonder why if you are doing 10 there, why wouldn’t you do 

10 in the other situation? That is the only question I had. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Before we let you go, let me just ask one last 

question here. You say in this program not only do you have your 

embedded passport and you run it through the scanner or reader 

once we have the readers in place, but then a separate action is 

to capture the two fingerprints. And on the first occasion the person comes in you run those fingerprints against our watch list 

database, correct? But, obviously, we are not running them against 

any European database. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. We are not, but we do receive information from 

INTERPOL, for example, that is routinely put into our system and 
41

used for those types of checks. So although we do not have a realtime link to INTERPOL, we do get information from those sources 

and put that into our system. 

Mr. LUNGREN. So even if the E.U. passport had embedded in it 

fingerprints, we could not read that, so there would be no way for 

us to check the fingerprint of the person who is actually presenting 

themselves with the fingerprint that is embedded in the European 

passport at some time when they have that as captured. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. We would only be able to read it if they allowed 

us to do so. So they would have to put the information on the chip 

and give us permission to read it. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I understand. I understand. What you are saying 

is when we check it against our watch list, if they are not on our 

watch list, they get a pass on that. And then you are saying when 

they come back, we match their prints with the previous prints 

given so that we just make sure they are using the same alias they 

used before. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. That is correct, but there is also a continual vetting process. So as we get new information—

Mr. LUNGREN. No, I understand that. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. —we are checking our files. 

Mr. LUNGREN. It just strikes me that in the law enforcement and 

in the criminal justice community, we know how many mistakes 

are made with facial identification. Eyewitness testimonies are 

often times thrown out or are wrong and so forth. I know we are 

going to have trained people looking at it and they have got the one 

picture and the other picture. But you have got someone with fingerprints, you have got them dead to right. That is why I am just 

saying our whole experience has been that fingerprints are the way 

to go. 

I appreciate it, and I just want to thank you for your testimony. 

It has been very, very helpful for us. We appreciate the work that 

you are doing. 

Other members may have other questions they might submit in 

writing to you, and we would ask if you would respond to that in 

a timely fashion. 

And we appreciate the work you are doing. Thanks. 

Ms. DEZENSKI. Thank you. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I now call the second panel. 

I would tell the other members that are here, we are expecting 

a vote around 1 o’clock. We are supposed to have a 15-minute vote, 

followed by a 10-minute debate, followed by a 15-minute vote, followed by a 5-minute vote. It would be my thinking that when we 

have the first vote called, go back and vote then and then come 

back here because we have about a 30-minute period of time if you 

look at the two 15-minute votes and the 10-minute debate, and resume. 

I appreciate the indulgence of the second panel, having sat 

through the first bit of testimony. As I explained, we will have a 

vote momentarily. My expectation is that we will go over there and 

vote, come back for perhaps a half hour, then go back for the last 

two votes and then return. 
42

I recognize at this time Dr. Martin Herman, the information access division chief for the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology, to testify. 

And, again, I would just mention that your full written testimony 

will be placed in the record in its entirety, and we would ask you 

to try and limit your opening remarks to 5 minutes. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MARTIN HERMAN, INFORMATION ACCESS 

DIVISION CHIEF, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

Mr. HERMAN. Thank you, Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member 

Sanchez and members of the subcommittee. And thank you for the 

opportunity to testify today about the biometric activities at the 

National Institute of Standards and Technology, which will help secure Americas’ borders. 

Under the USA Patriot Act and the Enhanced Border Security 

and Visa Entry Reform Act, the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, through NIST, were directed to make recommendations for means of verifying the identity of travelers entering the 

United States with visas. 

These recommendations were made in a joint report to Congress 

dated February 2003. Since this report was issued, NIST has continued to conduct an extensive biometric research and evaluation 

program. 

NIST, in close collaboration with the Department of Homeland 

Security, Justice, Defense and State, has performed many tests of 

fingerprint and face recognition systems in support of its statutory 

mandates. Fingerprint tests have been performed at NIST on the 

FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, or 

IAFIS, on DHS’ IDENT system, which is of course part of the US–

VISIT system, and we have also done tests on many commercial 

vendor systems. 

In the face recognition area, we have done tests on many commercial as well academic systems. 

To support these tests, NIST has acquired very large sets of 

data, including 128 million fingerprint images taken from 18 million subjects by several federal, state and county agencies. 

NIST Patriot Act recommendations are as follows: For one-to-one 

verification matching, NIST recommends the use of one face image 

and two index fingerprints, and all three biometrics should be 

stored in image form. 

For one-to-many identification matching, NIST recommends the 

use of 10-slap fingerprint images, and these 10 would be used for 

enrollment and checking of large databases. 

For both recommendations, the fingerprint images should conform to the ANSI/NIST 2000 standard. This standard, is also used 

in law enforcement for the electronic exchange of fingerprint images and is used to exchange fingerprints between the FBI and 

INTERPOL as well as with FBI and United Kingdom’s home office. 

Face images are not recommended by NIST for large-scale identification applications if fingerprints can be used. 

For verification matching, NIST tests have shown that contemporary fingerprint systems are substantially more accurate than 

face recognition systems in operational environments. However, 
43

this should be qualified by the fact that any advances in face recognition technology since the last NIST face test, which occurred 

in the year 2002, any advances in technology have yet to be evaluated. And we do believe there have been improvements in face recognition since then. 

The two fingerprint accuracy for the US–VISIT two fingerprint 

matching system is 99.6 percent with a one in 1,000 false positive 

rate. This means that one in 1,000 imposters will falsely be permitted to pass the checkpoint. The best 2002 face recognition accuracy using a single-face image with controlled illumination was 

only 90 percent when one in 100 imposters are allowed through. 

When outdoor illumination, which of course is totally uncontrolled, was used in 2002, the best accuracy was 54 percent. 

Currently, in the US–VISIT system, illumination is uncontrolled 

when face images are obtained using the US–VISIT cameras. 

Clearly, for the current US–VISIT implementation, two fingerprints are a much better solution than a single uncontrolled face 

image. 

For identification matching, expensive testing by NIST of commercial fingerprint systems has confirmed the requirement of 10-

slap fingerprints. For all systems tested, the accuracy increases as 

the number of fingers increase. So the accuracy of searches using 

four or more fingers was higher than the accuracy of two finger 

searches, which is higher than the accuracy of single finger 

searches. 

For the US–VISIT fingerprint matching system, the overall accuracy using index finger pairs is 96 percent. For low-quality fingerprint data, the accuracy falls to 53.6 percent, while for high-quality 

data, the accuracy is 99.6 percent. 

The only tested method for improving matching accuracy for 

databases with lower image quality, or lower fingerprint quality, is 

to increase the number of fingers used. When 10 fingers are used, 

the accuracy for the most accurate commercial system tested exceeded 99.95 percent. 

Iris recognition is a potentially valuable technology that needs 

considerably more testing to determine its accuracy in operational 

environments. NIST is planning an iris data collection effort using 

10,000 individuals over the next year and will perform iris tests 

over the next 2 years. 

Thanks for the opportunity to testify, and I would be happy to 

answer any questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Herman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MARTIN HERMAN

Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Sanchez, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the biometric activities of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) that will help secure America’s boarders. 

Under the USA Patriot Act (Public Law 107–56) and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (Public Law 107–173), the Attorney General, and 

the Secretary of State, in consultation with NIST were directed to make recommendations for means of verifying the identity of travelers entering the United 

States with visas. These recommendations were made in the joint report to Congress entitled ‘‘Use of Technology Standards and Interoperable Databases with Machine-Readable, Tamper-Resistant Travel Documents,’’ dated February 2003. 
44

Since this report was issued NIST has continued to conduct an extensive biometric research and evaluation program. In particular, NIST is studying three types of 

biometric technologies: fingerprints, facial recognition, and iris recognition. These 

three biometrics were specified for international travel documents by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). ICAO has specified face biometrics as 

required for such documents, while fingerprints and iris are optional. 

NIST, in close collaboration with the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, 

Defense, and State has performed many tests of fingerprint and face recognition systems to support its statutory mandates. Fingerprint tests have been performed on 

the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), used to 

perform criminal background checks; DHS’s Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), used as part of the US–VISIT system; and many commercial vendor 

systems. Face recognition tests have been performed on many commercial and academic systems. 

To support these tests, NIST has acquired very large sets of data. For example, 

NIST has obtained 128 million fingerprint images taken from 18 million subjects 

by several Federal, State and County agencies. This data includes rolled, slap, and 

flat fingerprints captured either from paper using ink or from live-scan readers. A 

rolled fingerprint involves capturing the full finger image as it is rolled from one 

edge of the fingernail to the other. Slap fingerprints involve capturing the four fingers of a hand placed together on a flat surface, followed by a separate capture of 

the thumb. A flat fingerprint captures the image of only a single finger placed on 

the surface. 

NIST has performed tests of both verification matching and identification. 

Verification is a one-to-one comparison in which the biometric system attempts to 

confirm an individual’s claimed identity. The individual’s biometric information is 

submitted and compared to an existing template. In US–VISIT, this occurs during 

the time of border crossing when the system determines whether the person holding 

the travel document is the same person to whom the document was issued. 

Identification is a one-to-many comparison where the biometric system attempts 

to determine the identity of an individual. An individual’s biometric information is 

collected and compared to all the templates in a database. In US–VISIT, this occurs 

during the time of enrollment when a person is checked against a watchlist derived 

in part from the FBI criminal database as well as the IDENT databases. First a 

database is checked to determine whether the person is on the watchlist. Second a 

database is checked to ensure that the person has not been previously enrolled in 

the database under a different name. 

NIST’s activities require substantial financial and logistical support from external 

agencies, whom we are fortunate to collaborate with. For example, research and 

evaluation activities are coordinated through the National Science & Technology 

Council’s Subcommittee on Biometrics. NIST has also been actively working with 

several standards development organizations in development of fingerprint, face, 

and iris standards. These organizations include the International Organization for 

Standardization (ISO), the International Committee for Information Technology 

Standards (INCITS), and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI).

PATRIOT ACT RECOMMENDATIONS 

For one-to-one verification matching, NIST’s Patriot Act recommendation is to use 

one face image and two index finger prints. All three biometrics should be stored 

in image form. The face image should conform to the ANSI/INCITS 385–2004 standard. The fingerprint images should conform to the ANSI/NIST–ITL 1–2000 standard 

with 500 dots per inch (dpi) scan resolution. 

For one-to-many identification matching, NIST recommends the use of ten slap 

fingerprint images stored in type 14 ANSI/NIST–ITL 1–2000 formatted records. 

These 10 fingerprints could be used for enrollment and checking of large databases. 

This ANSI/NIST standard, entitled ‘‘Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial, & Scar Mark & Tattoo (SMT) Information,’’ is also used for the electronic exchange of fingerprint images, and is currently used for law enforcement 

purposes to exchange fingerprints between the FBI and Interpol as well as with the 

United Kingdom’s Home Office. 

Face images are not recommended by NIST for large scale applications. 

It is important to note that NIST’s process for arriving at these recommendations 

and therefore the recommendations themselves, do not take into account likely impacts of implementing these recommendations on the U.S. economy, international 

reaction or contemplate the resources necessary to implement. 

Again these recommendations were issued in a joint report to Congress. Since this 

report was issued, NIST has conducted extensive testing of biometric systems that 

continue to support these recommendations. 
45

VERIFICATION 

To verify a person’s identity, NIST tests have shown that contemporary fingerprint systems are more accurate than face recognition systems in operational environments. However, this should be qualified by the fact that NIST has not tested 

facial recognition since the 2002 Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT). We believe 

there have been improvements in facial recognition since then. Department of State, 

for example, reports having success with facial recognition, both in one-to-one and 

one-to-many verification, with its Diversity Visa Program and in certain nonimmigrant visa applications. Also the Face Recognition Grand Challenge, a development effort funded by multiple federal agencies and managed by NIST, aims to reduce the error rate by and order of magnitude over these levels. Preliminary results 

show that the community has met this goal in laboratory environments, but a definitive answer will not be available until completion of FRVT 2005. 

Based on what we found in 2002, the two-fingerprint probability of verification 

(or true accept rate, TAR) for the US–VISIT two-fingerprint matching system is 99.6 

while the best 2002 face recognition probability of verification was 90 percent using 

a single face image with controlled illumination. (Controlled illumination involves 

controlled light sources that illuminate the face while taking the picture). Additional 

FRVT 2002 results show that face recognition performance decreases significantly 

under uncontrolled conditions; the best probability of verification was 54 percent 

when using outdoor illumination. Currently in the US–VISIT system, illumination 

is uncontrolled when face images are obtained. Based on the 2002 data, even under 

controlled illumination, the error rate of face recognition is 25 times higher than the 

two-fingerprint results. Clearly, for the current US–Visit implementation, two fingerprints are much better solution than a single uncontrolled face image.

IDENTIFICATION 

For identification applications, extensive testing by NIST of commercial fingerprint systems has confirmed the requirement for ten slap fingerprints. During the 

Fingerprint Vendor Technology Evaluation, 2003, again funded by multiple federal 

agencies and managed by NIST, eighteen different companies? products were tested, 

and thirty-four systems were evaluated. Different data subtests measured accuracy 

for various numbers and types of fingerprints, using operational fingerprint data 

from a variety of U.S. Government sources. 48,105 sets of fingerprints (393,370 distinct fingerprint images) from 25,309 individuals were used for analysis. 

For all systems tested, the accuracy increases as the number of fingers increase. 

The improvement is both large and consistent. Although the actual benefits were 

found to vary by dataset and by system, the general trend was quite consistent. The 

accuracy of searches using four or more fingers was higher than the accuracy of twofinger searches, which was higher than the accuracy of single-finger searches. 

These results are strongly dependent on fingerprint image quality. For the US–

VISIT fingerprint matching system, using Department of State (DOS) Mexican visa 

Border Crossing Card (BCC) data, the probability of identification (or true accept 

rate, TAR) using index finger pairs is independent of background database size over 

the range from 100,000 entries to 6,000,000 entries. Using the operational thresholds, the probability of identification is 96 percent. If, however, fingerprint quality 

rather that database size is the controlling factor, then for low-quality data, the 

probability of identification falls to 53.6 percent. With high quality fingerprint images, the probability of identification is 99.6 percent. Image quality is important 

since the fingerprint quality of most archival law enforcement databases is lower 

than the quality of the data presently being collected by US–VISIT and will remain 

so for some time into the future. The only tested method for improving matching 

accuracy for databases with lower image quality is to increase the number of fingers 

used. When 10-fingers are used, the probability of identification for the most accurate commercial system tested exceeded 99.95 percent, with a false accept rate 

(FAR) of 0.01 percent. 

Details for all the results described here can be obtained at http://

www.itl.nist.gov/iad/894.03/pact/pact.html.

IRIS 

Iris recognition is a potentially valuable technology that needs considerably more 

testing to determine its accuracy in operational environments. A recent non-NIST 

study of iris recognition has shown failure-to-enroll rates of about 2 percent. This 

means that 2 percent of the time, the system cannot perform an iris match. Fingerprints have close to zero failure-to-enroll rates. NIST is planning an iris data collection effort using 10,000 individuals over the next year to obtain a vendor-neutral 

data set in operational environments. This plus other large-scale data sets will then 

be used to perform iris recognition tests over the next two years.
46

CONCLUSION 

As the Committee can see, NIST, in close partnership with federal sponsors and 

partners, has a vibrant biometrics program in the areas of fingerprint and facial recognition, and is also planning activities in the area of iris recognition. NIST tests 

have demonstrated that fingerprints are significantly more accurate than facial recognition for current US–VISIT applications, while iris recognition needs further assessment. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy to answer any questions the Committee might have.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Dr. Herman, for your testimony. 

Now, the Chair would recognize Mr. Stewart Verdery, Jr., principal at Mehlman, Vogel and Castagnetti, to testify. 

STATEMENT OF STEWART VERDERY, PRINCIPAL, MEHLMAN, 

VOGEL, AND CASTAGNETTI, INC. 

Mr. VERDERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Sanchez, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity 

to return to your committee to talk about how we should be using 

biometrically enhanced documents to secure our borders. 

As you mentioned, I am at Mehlman, Vogel, Castagnetti. I am 

also Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies. 

As was mentioned by Chairman Cox during the prior round, I 

was Assistant Secretary for Border and Transportation Policy the 

first few years of the Department, and I am excited to have the 

chance to be here, along with my former colleagues, Frank Moss 

and Elaine Dezenski. We had a great relationship with State, you 

can see all these programs are working together, and Elaine is 

doing a great job of following in our footsteps and moving the ball 

forward on a number of these key issues. 

During my time at DHS, the Department deployed revolutionary 

uses of biometrics to secure our borders and transportation systems, and the most famous of these was US–VISIT and it seems 

it is now getting a lot of, I believe, misplaced criticism for not yet 

encompassing 100 percent entry-exit systems. 

Secretary Ridge took the bold step of being willing to build a system in increments, because for many, many years before nobody 

could figure out how to do it all at once, essentially, and so nothing 

happened. And so he took the steps that we are going to airports 

and seaports, we are going to do exits, we are going to land borders 

in stages, in increments. And because of that decision, we now have 

100 percent biometric review of all foreign visitors at air and seaports, of all visa holders at certain land ports of entry and of certain visitors departing the country at designated air and seaports. 

And I might just mention the 9/11 Commission took a very hard 

look at US–VISIT and basically said that DHS was on the right 

track, just to do it faster and better. 

The announcement last week by Secretary Chertoff concerning 

the Visa Waiver Program I believe was an appropriate one. As has 

been mentioned today, the original and worth goal of the Enhanced 

Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 was to bring 

biometrics to the border and to leverage ICAO to make that happen. The decision by ICAO to mandate a digital facial image, which 

could be compared to the person presenting the passport, could rep-
47

resent a marginal increase in security by detecting persons with 

forged or stolen passports. 

However, as my colleague just mentioned, the software that 

would allow effective comparisons in actual field environments 

without generating unacceptable numbers of false positives is still 

under development. Allowing an additional year until October of 

next year to ensure interoperability of documents and document 

readers and enhancements to the facial recognition software is a 

wise one. 

As Mr. Moss outlined, biometrics will soon play a key role in the 

security of passports issued to U.S. citizens. It is clear that a welldesigned U.S. passport program is essential to securing our own 

borders to detect foreign imposters and perhaps even those entitled 

to a U.S. passport with ties to terrorism or serious criminal behavior. 

It is more important to deploy an effective program, utilizing the 

best technology and procedures and privacy protections than to 

rush pilot projects out the door. 

Moving forward, biometrics can provide significantly greater benefits to securing our borders and facilitating international travel, 

and my testimony goes into a number of these, I will mention a 

couple here briefly. 

I do agree that DHS needs to go move to an 8-or 10-print solution as opposed to 2-print. This was in our original proposal that 

when it was announced that we would migrate to this because of 

the reasons mentioned of the overload of the IDENT and the possibility that some latent prints might not be picked up under the 

two-print system but no one should think that that means we 

should get rid of IDENT. The IAFIS system is incapable of operating as a real-time system, so the system has to built on 10 prints 

in IDENT, not IAFIS. 

Second, as Chairman Cox mentioned, the United States has 

never advocated mandatory collection of fingerprint information in 

foreign passports, in part, because we have never required our own 

citizens to provide fingerprints in our passport applications. And 

the United States the larger world community then are essentially 

building out two elaborate but somewhat conflicting border management systems. 

In one, governments are going to great lengths to collect fingerprints, to share those amongst their own agencies, to share them 

internationally through INTERPOL and other mechanisms. In the 

second system, we are building out elaborate systems of tamper-resistance passports and travel documents and readers of those documents capable of doing biometric comparisons. However, the mandatory biometric of facial recognition cannot be utilized to find a 

known terrorist or criminal from the database because there is no 

such database. 

And I agree with the chairmen, both Chairman Lungren and 

Chairman Cox, and others, the historical resistance of government 

to fingerprint law-abiding citizens, not only in the U.S. but in 

Japan and Australia and other places, is weakening. The collective 

weight of 28 million successful enrollments in US–VISIT without 

privacy violations, without slowing down commerce, without horror 

stories is huge. 
48

People are now becoming more willing to put aside nervousness 

about fingerprints aside to cut off the lifeblood of terrorists and 

that is mobility across borders. I recommend that the U.S. match 

the bold step of the European Union to include fingerprints in 

passports and that we should go back to ICAO and advocate it as 

a mandatory biometric. 

Talk for just a second about how biometrics can help on the land 

border, an issue that came up earlier. It is absolutely critical that 

Congress aggressively fund US–VISIT, that land border implementation is not delayed. Travel documents have to be retrofitted or reissued to include information capable of being read wirelessly. 

Travel lanes have to be constructed or altered to allow that 

connectivity. 

The exit feature is no less daunting. A reasonable goal over the 

next couple of years is construction of a system that would tell us 

when people have left, whether or not they have abided by the 

terms of their visa. The air side is also tricky. I think they are now 

ready to make decisions on how the air component is going to work 

with biometrics. 

Recently, I had a great example in Texas of finding a sexual 

predator trying to get on a plane, went to check out, US–VISIT 

caught him, law enforcement officials got him before he got on the 

plane, and he is now in jail. 

In my prepared testimony, I talk for a bit about what a guest 

worker program should look like, the use of biometrics to secure 

that. Just three quick recommendations: Any new applicant for a 

guest worker program should be required to submit 10 fingerprints 

for an IDENT/IAFIS review for terrorism and criminal activity; any 

new entrant should have a unique biometrically enhanced identification card that can serve as a travel document and an employer 

verification document. I will skip over the part about international 

registered traveler; absolutely critical to have that done. 

The last thing I would mention, it is very important that DHS 

and the rest of the government, the State Department increase 

their engagement with the international community. That means 

bilateral negotiations on fingerprint sharing and other biometric 

and biographic information sharing to make those checkpoints useful. We only can do what we do, and sharing information is absolutely critical. 

It is absolutely imperative to begin negotiations now with the 

European Union to make interoperability between US–VISIT and 

our bio-visa program, on one hand, and their visa information system that is being developed, on the other hand, interoperable. People are not going to accept the fact that they know something we 

do not and vise-versa, and we have to go back and work with them. 

With that, I will be happy to answer any questions, and I thank 

you for the opportunity to be here today. 

[The statement of Mr. Verdery follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF C. STEWART VERDERY, JR. 

INTRODUCTION 

Chairman Lungren and Ranking Member Sanchez, I thank you for the opportunity to return to your committee to discuss the use of biometrically-enhanced documents to secure our country’s borders. I am currently a principal at the consulting 

firm Mehlman Vogel Castagnetti, Inc. I also serve as an Adjunct Fellow at the Cen-
49

ter for Strategic and International Studies, although the views in this testimony are 

my own and do not represent CSIS which does not take policy positions. 

As you know, following confirmation by the Senate in 2003, I served as Assistant 

Secretary for Border and Transportation Security Policy and Planning until my resignation from the Department of Homeland Security in March of this year. In this 

capacity, I was responsible for policy development within the Border and Transportation Security Directorate, reporting to Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson and Secretary Tom Ridge. BTS coordinated policy development and operational activities in 

the fields of immigration and visas, transportation security, law enforcement, and 

cargo security which largely were carried out in the field by BTS agencies—U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE), and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 

I am excited to have the opportunity to appear after the Committee has heard 

from the Department of State’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services 

Frank Moss and Acting Assistant Secretary for BTS Policy Elaine Dezenski. I am 

proud of the extremely productive relationship DHS formed with the State Department during my tenure and especially of the many initiatives I was privileged to 

pursue with Mr. Moss. And both as my former deputy and as my successor as Assistant Secretary, Ms. Dezenski has demonstrated great skill in tackling difficult 

public policy issues such as those being discussed today.

BACKGROUND 

During my time at DHS, the Department deployed revolutionary uses of biometrics to better secure our borders and domestic transportation systems. Most famous of these success stories was the US–VISIT program. This initiative, discussed 

in full below, has come under criticism in recent months for not yet encompassing 

a 100% entry-exit system. These criticisms fail to recognize the necessity of deploying US–VISIT in manageable stages to ensure success. Before Secretary Ridge took 

the bold step of allowing an entry-exit system to be built in increments, year after 

year went by with no deployment because nobody could figure out how to deploy 

a universal system that would actually find unwanted criminals and terrorists without crippling international trade and sparking outrage among the business persons, 

students, and tourists we need to attract to our country. Under the incremental system, we now have biometric review of all foreign visitors except diplomats, children, 

and the elderly at our air and sea ports, all visa holders at our busiest land ports 

of entry, and certain visitors departing the country at designated air and sea ports. 

In addition to US–VISIT, DHS has utilized biometrics to facilitate secure travel 

across our northern and southern borders with the NEXUS and SENTRI programs. 

An even more ambitious international registered traveler program was announced 

by Secretary Ridge in January of this year to expedite known international travelers 

through immigration and customs processing. 

An important and overdue integration of biometric systems occurred over the past 

year when CBP reached full integration of its Border Patrol facilities utilizing the 

IDENT fingerprint booking system with the FBI’s IAFIS fingerprint system. This 

capability, reached ahead of schedule, means that CBP will be aware of any undocumented immigrants detained by the Border Patrol whose fingerprints reside in the 

IAFIS system because they have a prior criminal conviction or outstanding warrant, 

or left a latent fingerprint at a crime scene. CBP can thus make more informed decisions as to whether to detain such an individual or allow him or her to accept voluntary departure due to overcrowding in ICE detention space. 

While these programs are aimed at foreign visitors, biometrics will soon play a 

key role in the security of passports issued to American citizens. Under the electronic passport program being developed by the Department of State and the Government Printing Office, U.S. passports will include a biometric facial image and 

biographic information which will be read via a contactless chip by passport readers 

deployed by DHS. The United States, like many countries around the world developing biometric passports, has seen deployment of this round of e-passports delayed 

while technical issues have been ironed out in international organizations and privacy concerns have been addressed. It is clear, however, that a well-designed U.S. 

passport program is essential to securing our own borders to detect foreign imposters and perhaps even those entitled to a U.S. passport with ties to terrorism or serious criminal behavior. It is more important to deploy an effective program utilizing 

the best technology and procedures available than to rush pilot portions of the program out the door. I have great faith in the Department of State team to navigate 

these difficult issues and produce this necessary result. 

Also, while not the subject of this hearing, TSA has been building our biometrically-based systems to support the Registered Traveler program, to conduct background checks of HAZMAT drivers and foreign flight crews, and to secure access to 
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sterile areas of transportation facilities through the Airport Access Control program 

and the Transportation Worker Identification Card. And, of course, numerous agencies have been improving their use of biometrically enhanced identification documents for employees and contractors, a process that will improve significantly with 

the full implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 issued by 

the President in August of 2004.

US–VISIT 

For many years after it was technologically possible, the United States lacked an 

automated entry and exit system that would allow us to know when foreign visitors 

arrive and when they depart. Following the bombing of the first World Trade Center 

in 1993, Congress demanded that an entry and exit system be installed at our ports 

of entry, but it did not happen, and none was in place on 9/11. Remarkably, on that 

date INS continued to rely on a paper system, and employees literally hand-keyed 

in departure information into a database weeks after the fact. With no exit system, 

and only a minimal, unreliable entry system, our entry and exit data was spotty 

at best, and criminals were able to come and go across our border, some of them 

dozens of times under different aliases, without detection. 

But in 2004, DHS rolled out the entry-exit system known as ‘‘US–VISIT’’. We improved on the Congressional plan by adding a biometric requirement to the system. 

To capture biometrics, US–VISIT electronically scans a visitor’s index fingers and 

takes a digital photograph at a kiosk—all in the space of seconds. The biometrics 

captured by US–VISIT allow consular and immigration officials to confidently tie 

travelers to the visas and passports they are carrying, and permit the development 

of an internationally uniform standard for identifying travelers. 

As of May 31, 2005, DHS has enrolled 28,169,895 travelers in US–VISIT, with 

each watchlist check taking an average of 6 seconds. US–VISIT has allowed DHS 

to unravel the assumed identities of hundreds of foreign nationals attempting to unlawfully enter the United States. For example, an individual sought admission after 

flying into Newark International Airport. Everything appeared normal until his fingerprints were scanned. It turns out that the man was traveling under an alias and 

was in fact a convicted rapist. He had previously been deported from the United 

States, and had a traveled here before, using 9 different aliases and 4 dates of birth. 

US–VISIT has helped us to identify and to reject over 600 other undesirable individuals. These cases have utilized information originally collected in many different 

settings: by DOS during visa applications into the Consolidated Consular Database; 

by FBI during crime investigations into the IAFIS database; by foreign governments 

into Interpol; and by intelligence services. It is not possible to know how many terrorists or criminals have been frightened away from attempting to enter our country 

because of US–VISIT, but I have no doubt that the number is substantial. 

However, certain analyses of the program, most notably a major piece in May 23’s 

Washington Post, have misunderstood the program and the decisions that led to its 

staged deployment. 

The article insinuates that key decisions made concerning US–VISIT were made 

by a handful of program officials and government contractors. Nothing could be further from the truth. Nearly all aspects of the program have undergone exacting 

scrutiny from the White House Office of Management and Budget and the Homeland Security Council, following robust debate and interaction with other key departments including Justice, State, and Commerce. During my tenure at DHS, Secretary Tom Ridge, Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson, Customs and Border Protection 

Commissioner Robert Bonner, and many others were intimately involved in developing policy guidance, interacting with other federal agencies and foreign governments, and supervising operations. The US–VISIT program team, led by Director 

Jim Williams, deserves great credit for effectively managing the program but they 

have done so under tight direction from the DHS leadership. 

The 9/11 Commission took a hard look at the US–VISIT and basically said that 

DHS was on the right track, just to deploy the system more quickly. As the program 

tackles difficult increments ahead, the public should know that its public servants 

have, despite immense technological and political challenges, deployed a system that 

truly has enhanced our security without destroying the attractiveness of the United 

States as a place to study, conduct research or business, or see friends or family. 

In short, US–VISIT is a government program that actually works.

VISA WAIVER PROGRAM 

As it is the most recent development in this area, the announcement last week 

by DHS Secretary Chertoff concerning the application of the statute requiring biometric identifiers established by the International Civil Aviation Organization for 

travelers utilizing passports issued after October 26, 2005 for travel to the U.S. 

under the Visa Waiver Program merits discussion. I believe the outcome announced 
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by DHS is an appropriate one. The original, and worthy, goal of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 was to leverage the international 

nature of ICAO to bring biometrics to the border. The decision by ICAO to mandate 

a digital facial image which could be compared to the person presenting the passport could represent a marginal increase in security by detecting persons with 

forged or stolen passports. However, the software that will allow such effective comparisons in actual field environments without generating unacceptable numbers of 

false positives is still under development. Allowing an additional year until October 

of 2006 to ensure interoperability of documents and document readers and enhancements to the facial recognition software is a wise decision. In addition, the damage 

to our economic relations and to the willingness of VWP countries and the European 

Union to work cooperatively on border management issues that enforcement of this 

year’s deadline would have caused hardly would have been worth the marginal improvements in security possible this year. It is also very important to remember that 

when the EBSVERA was enacted, there was no US–VISIT program to find terrorists or criminals about whom we have biometric information. Thus a reinterpretation of a somewhat vague statute to reflect changed circumstances is a reasonable 

resolution of a looming crisis.

NEXT STEPS FOR USING BIOMETRICS TO SECURE OUR BORDERS 

However, while the programs described above represent effective use of biometrics, this technology can and should provide significantly greater benefits to securing our borders and facilitating legitimate travel. Among the key recommendations I would like to provide the Committee to best put biometric technology to work 

include:

• Transition to 10-Fingerprint Collection 

It appears to have been somewhat forgotten amid the success of the 2-fingerprint 

system utilized by US–VISIT, but DHS promised from the beginning that a transition to 8 or 10 prints would be necessary at some point to address two separate 

weaknesses with the 2-print program. First, leading scientists at NIST and elsewhere have long believed that an IDENT database populated by millions of 2-print 

records would eventually begin to generate unacceptable levels of false matches. 

While I am not aware that this scenario has begun to occur, it must be tackled 

ahead of a crisis. Second, I understand that a small but potentially important number of latent fingerprints collected from crime scenes or terrorist investigations may 

elude matching in IDENT if they come from different digits, such as from thumbs, 

than are collected under US–VISIT. Deploying 10-print readers to consular posts 

abroad and U.S. ports of entry is a necessary transition over the next several years. 

While many have discussed this issue in the context of the relative merits of the 

IDENT and the FBI’s IAFIS fingerprint databases, the need for DHS and DOS to 

capture 10 fingerprints should not lead one to conclude that our border management 

systems could be based on the IAFIS system. IAFIS was not designed to run on a 

real-time basis, meaning it is an unlikely candidate to serve as the platform for an 

entry-exit system. DHS requested fingerprints held in IAFIS to load into IDENT 

and has received increasing cooperation from DOJ in this regard, but it is critical 

to remember that the overwhelming majority of IAFIS prints are of U.S. citizens 

who do not register with US–VISIT. The linkages between the systems need continued improvement but it would take a major overhaul of IAFIS to even consider utilizing it for real-time entry-exit purposes.

• Collection of Fingerprints in U.S. Passports 

The United States has never advocated mandatory collection of fingerprint information in foreign passports, in part because it has never required that U.S. citizens 

provide fingerprints in their own passport applications. This decision needs to be reexamined. In part due to this decision, the United States and the larger world community are building out two elaborate but conflicting border management systems. 

In the first, governments are going to great lengths to collect terrorist fingerprints 

along with biographic information, to share such information with other governments, and to ensure that agencies within their government are sharing relevant 

fingerprints. Within the U.S. government alone, massive efforts have been expended 

to ensure sharing of relevant biometric information between agencies. In the second 

system, countries are building elaborate systems of tamper-resistant passports and 

passport readers capable of doing biometric comparisons; however, neither the mandatory biometric of facial recognition nor one of the optional biometrics, iris scan, 

can be utilized to find a known terrorist or criminal from a database, because such 

databases do not exist. 

The historical resistance of governments to fingerprint law-abiding citizens, not 

only in the U.S. but in Japan, Australia, and numerous other nations, is weakening. 
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The collective weight of the 28 million enrollments in US–VISIT is huge. The program applies to all nationalities and races, has generated no privacy complaints, 

and has not impacted the speed of border crossings. At a time when terrorists have 

killed large numbers of people in Asia, Europe, Africa, and other areas of the globe, 

in addition to North America, people are understandably willing to put aside nervousness about fingerprinting in order to cut off the lifeblood of terrorists—mobility 

across borders. 

Thus I recommend that the U.S. match the bold step of the European Union to 

include fingerprints in passports and that the U.S. should advocate for fingerprints 

as a mandatory biometric in passports at ICAO. At a time when we are going to 

great lengths to build anti-terrorism and law enforcement systems based on fingerprints, we will never be able to fully engage other countries if we decline ourselves 

to do what is needed. Taking this step for U.S. citizens who travel internationally 

might also allow us to avoid a national identification card that many believe is appropriate for border security purposes. 

Of course the U.S. government could attempt to build a regime to allow one-toone biometric check between the person who applied for a passport and the person 

appearing for reentry to the U.S. based on an iris, hand geometry or facial recognition match. Such a system, however, leaves extensive fingerprint information unutilized and denies us the ‘‘bully pulpit’’ to ask ICAO and other governments to march 

down the fingerprint path. It is also worth noting that current policy does not allow 

U.S. applicants to be vetted biometrically against criminal or terrorist databases before they are issued passports, meaning we may miss potential imposters or homegrown terrorists or criminals. Nor are we in a strong position to ask other countries 

to vet their applicants against watchlists they maintain or have rights to access. I 

am encouraged by the strong efforts of DOS to vet applicants against name-based 

databases such as the Terrorist Screening Center and certain lists of persons with 

outstanding warrants, but a fingerprint capability would augment those efforts considerably.

• Biometrics Are The Solution at Our Land Ports of Entry 

The next handful of years will see a convergence of major initiatives affecting how 

traffic flows across our land borders with Mexico and Canada: the deployment of 

US–VISIT to primary lanes of our land ports of entry and exit; the requirement that 

U.S. citizens, Canadians, and residents of certain Caribbean nations present a secure travel document to enter or reenter the U.S.; and the possibility of a new guest 

worker program to ensure that foreign workers able to pass a security check are 

allowed to work for willing employers in the U.S. These three issues need to be considered in conjunction as border management systems are developed. 

First, it is absolutely critical that the Congress aggressively fund US–VISIT so 

that land border implementation is not delayed. This project is extremely difficult 

but essential. Travel documents for Mexican nationals, most significantly Border 

Crossing Cards used for millions of trips a year, must be retrofitted or reissued to 

include information capable of being read wirelessly at land ports of entry. Entry 

traffic lanes must be constructed or altered to allow for wireless connectivity to 

identify watchlist or criminal hits in time for an inspector to refer a potential entrant to secondary processing. While it may not be feasible to conduct a one-to-one 

check on all applicants (i.e., is the person holding the identification card the same 

person to whom it was issued), a one-to-many check (i.e. does the information on 

the card indicate a watchlist hit) should be feasible. 

The exit feature of the land borders is no less daunting as we currently have no 

exit infrastructure at all. A reasonable goal over the next several years is construction of a system that will inform DHS whether persons departing the U.S. have 

complied with the terms of their entry, with relationships built with Mexican and 

Canadian authorities to assist with the very rare case of a departing individual who 

needs to be apprehended immediately. 

In addition, I understand that maintaining current levels of funding for US–VISIT 

may delay full implementation of the exit component at air and sea ports. DHS has 

had enough pilot testing done on a variety of biometric exit models involving kiosks, 

departure receipts, and gate confirmation to make decisions on the best system to 

deploy. It is time to round out that aspect of our entry-exit system to identify those 

who violate the terms of their visa and the occasional but important instances 

where a known terrorist or violent criminal is attempting to depart the country. 

US–VISIT’s recent identification of a sexual predator seeking to leave the country 

in Texas is a great example of an exit enforcement capability. I also believe that 

having a robust exit system may allow the country to consider changes to the current statutory standard that visa applicants prove that they are unlikely to overstay 

their visas. 
53

Lastly, US–VISIT’s end state will include a ‘‘person-centric’’ inventory of all relevant enforcement and immigration services information. When fully-funded and 

implemented, the program should put an end to the unwieldy and confusing system 

of records maintained regarding travel and immigration and will result into better 

service to legitimate travelers and students, and better enforcement tools as well. 

Second, the passage of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative last year as part 

of the intelligence bill means that millions of U.S. citizens returning the U.S. and 

many Canadians and nationals of certain Caribbean nations will be required to 

produce a secure travel document such as a passport or SENTRI or NEXUS card 

beginning in 2008. I congratulate the Congress for this important security enhancement, but recognize that the law will create immense workload challenges for DOS 

and lifestyle changes for border residents. This increased workload makes the challenges to deploy US–VISIT and next generation passports all the more important. 

Third, discussion about a temporary worker program has intensified since President Bush’s 2004 request that Congress enact such a program in line with his immigration principles. Some commentators have presented the issue as a choice between 

a new worker program and enhanced border security. Such analysis is wrong. It is 

the passage of a properly developed guest worker program that will bring massive 

improvements in border security and thus homeland security. Millions of undocumented aliens have crossed the border illegally in search of work who present no 

risk of terrorism or organized criminal activity. Border Patrol agents in the field, 

however, have no way to differentiate between the individuals that make up this 

flood of human migration and the small but crucial number of potential terrorists 

or criminals that attempt to blend into the masses. Providing those who want to 

work and have no prior criminal or terrorist record a means to enter the country 

legally through ports of entry will make it much more likely that the Border Patrol 

will be able to locate and arrest the criminals and terrorists who will lose their 

cloak of invisibility that the current situation offers. 

However, those who are skeptical of this argument have understandable reasons 

for this view. For decades, enforcement tools to combat illegal immigration went underutilized, underfunded, or unsupported by the employer community. While DHS 

has made substantial progress in enforcing the current regime, deploying a new 

guest worker program will require significant new resources for border and employer enforcement and for port of entry operations and facilities, development and 

issuance of tamper-proof identification documents, streamlining of the legal regimes 

that adjudicate the status of border crossers and undocumented aliens, and new 

avenues of cooperation between the U.S. and Mexican government. 

All of these enhancements to our current enforcement posture should support a 

basic motto of any new legislation: ‘‘deter and reward.’’ Those who are seeking to 

enter our country to work must be faced with a reality that crossing our borders 

illegally or attempting to work without proper certifications will be detected and 

punished with long-term consequences for violations. In contrast, those that follow 

the rules on applying for work, passing a security check, and crossing the border 

legally should be able to work and receive retirement and travel privileges. 

Among the specific recommendations I would like to provide the Committee concerning the proposed temporary worker program related to biometrics are the following: 

• Interview and Criminal History Background Checks: Any new applicant 

should be required to submit ten fingerprints for a IDENT and IAFIS review to demonstrate, in addition to any employment criteria designed to ensure that the entrant’s employment is not likely to be filled by a U.S. worker, that he or she has no ties to terrorism or history of prior criminal behavior other than non-violent illegal entry to the U.S.; 

• Use of Biometrically-Enhanced Identification Documents: Any new entrant should be required to obtain a unique, biometrically-enhanced identification document that can serve as a document for entry under US–VISIT 

at a port of entry and as an employment verification document; 

• Employment ‘‘Insta-check’’: Employers should only be able to hire new 

temporary workers from outside the U.S. after DHS and fellow agencies 

have developed and deployed a ‘‘insta-check’’ system pulling biometric information off travel documents to verify eligibility for employment and reviewing Social Security and driver’s license numbers from new workers asserting U.S. citizenship; 

These proposals address the machinery by which new entrants, legal and illegal, 

should be handled. Of course, any new temporary worker program also must be 

structured to allow existing undocumented workers to apply for employment. The 

security imperative for this class of aliens is that they undergo a vetting for ties 

to terrorism and criminal behavior before they are authorized for further employ-
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ment in the U.S. Understanding that a principal reason for the program is to continue an adequate supply of workers for current jobs, there is no reason that this 

security review cannot be conducted while the worker remains in the U.S. However, 

just as one of our bedrock principals of our overseas visa process is collection of biometrics by a trained U.S. government official to ensure that the applicant is not an 

imposter, consideration should be given to requiring provision of biometrics by this 

population to a U.S. government official, especially if the resulting document will 

be utilized for international travel.

• International Registered Traveler Programs 

A key component of continuing to attract foreign travelers to the U.S. should be 

an international registered traveler program. This program would build on the existing CBP NEXUS and SENTRI programs for land and air travel between the U.S., 

Canada, and Mexico and bring to life the vision of Secretary Ridge’s January 2005 

announcement of such a pilot operating between the Netherlands and the U.S. 

While it would be beneficial to travelers who undergo enhanced vetting to receive 

preferential treatment at a foreign departure airport, the main use of biometrics 

would be to exempt IRT enrollees from normal immigration and customs processing 

at U.S. ports of entry. Enrollees would simply have their travel documents scanned 

at a kiosk, provide fingerprints to ensure a match to the documents, and proceed 

to pick up their luggage. This system will require construction of real-time 

connectivity to the IRT kiosks. On the front end, enrollees would need to be vetted 

for any connection to inadmissible behavior, including terrorism, criminal behavior 

or prior immigration violations. Especially for Visa Waiver Program travelers who 

have not been required to undergo a terrorism check because they did not apply for 

a visa, such a scrub will need to be thorough and include an interview by a trained 

U.S. inspector. If done correctly, the program would be an excellent example of risk 

management to enable CBP to focus on riskier visitors. It would also send a strong 

signal to the customers, clients, and coworkers of the world, whose travel we need 

to be able to expedite, that the U.S. is open for business.

• International Cooperation 

By definition, border management systems involve international cooperation, and 

the effectiveness of our use of biometrics will depend greatly on our ability to operate effectively in the bilateral and multilateral environments. Negotiating information-sharing agreements or playing a leading role in international standards-setting 

bodies may not be as sexy as deploying new high-tech biometric equipment but both 

are crucial to our success. 

Developing information-sharing agreements with foreign partners is a laborious 

process that has to deal with varying privacy regimes, technical challenges, and concerns about revealing sources and methods of intelligence. However, we know that 

terrorists and other criminals must use international travel to develop their plots 

and the development of robust sharing agreements of biometric and biographic 

watchlist information should be a high priority. Especially with allies like the 

United Kingdom and Canada, these types of agreements dramatically increases the 

odds of using travel checkpoints to find those who need to be detected. 

I would make a special mention of the European Union’s Visa Information System 

due to come on-line in the next several years. Having negotiated the treaty on airline passenger data with the EU last year, I know how difficult it may be to build 

interoperability between the VIS and our BioVisa/US–VISIT program. Now is the 

time to begin to tackle that challenge as our citizenries should expect these systems 

to share valuable intelligence when they are both operational. 

In addition, DHS needs to increase dramatically its engagement with foreign governments and international standards setting bodies such as ICAO. The proposed 

merging of the BTS Policy office, the DHS Office of International Affairs, and other 

policy entities in DHS into a robust policy office is a necessary first step. DHS needs 

to develop a cadre of country specialists and DHS attaches to represent the department in key international locations and to ensure that DHS policymaking does not 

stop at the water’s edge.

CONCLUSION 

I congratulate the Committee and Subcommittee for its continued cooperation 

with and oversight of DHS and its component agencies. I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and look forward to your questions.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Verdery, for your testimony. 
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The Chair will now recognize Mr. Gregory Wilshusen, the director of information security issues for the Government Accountability Office. 

And at the end of the testimony of our entire panel, I would suggest we go over and vote and then come back. We will have about 

a half-hour period before the next vote. 

STATEMENT OF GREGORY WILSHUSEN, DIRECTOR OF 

INFORMATION SECURITY ISSUES, GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. WILSHUSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Sanchez and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be 

here today to present a summary of GAO’s work on radio frequency 

identification, or RFID, technology. As requested, I will present a 

brief overview of RFID technology and discuss the security, privacy 

and other considerations associated with its implementation. My 

testimony today is based upon GAO’s recently issued report on this 

topic. 

RFID is an automated data capture technology that can be used 

to electronically identify, track and store information contained on 

electronic chip or tag. A radio frequency reader scans the tag for 

stored information and transmits the information to a database or 

display device using wireless communications. 

Several federal agencies have already begun testing and using 

this technology, including the State Department, which plans to 

use it in its electronic passport. The proposed U.S. electronic passport is to have an embedded contactless chip. The chip is to store 

the same information printed on the data page of the passport and 

will include a digital photograph. 

Several security issues are associated with federal and commercial use of RFID technology. These issues relate to protecting the 

confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information on the 

tags and in the databases. 

In particular, key security considerations include ensuring that 

only authorized readers or personnel can access or read the information on the tags and in the databases, maintaining the integrity 

of that information, ensuring that critical data is fully available 

when needed and protecting against attacks such as skimming, 

which is the surreptitious reading of electronic information without 

the holder’s knowledge, and eavesdropping, the interception of information from the tag while it is being read by another reader. 

Without effective security controls, data on the tag can be read 

by any compliant reader, data transmitted through the air can be 

intercepted and read by unauthorized devices, and data stored in 

the databases can be accessed by unauthorized users. 

Information security tools and practices are available to address 

these issues. Complying with a risk-based framework mandated by 

the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, or 

FISMA, and employing encryption and authentication technologies 

can help agencies achieve a stronger security posture. 

Among the key privacy issues are using the technology to obtain 

or process information about an individual without that individual’s knowledge or consent, tracking an individual’s movements 

and profiling an individual’s habits, tastes or predilections. 
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The Privacy Act of 1974 limits federal agencies’ use and disclosure of personal information, and the privacy impact assessments 

required by the E–Government Act of 2002 provide a framework for 

agencies to follow in assessing the impact on privacy when implementing RFID technology. 

Additional controls are proposed to mitigate privacy issues, such 

as using as the deactivation mechanism on the tag and incorporating blocking technology to disrupt transmission are in 

progress. 

In addition to security and privacy, there are other issues to consider when implementing this technology. These include the interoperability and reliability of the tags and readers, the placement 

and orientation of the tags and the cost and benefits associated 

with implementation. 

To summarize, the use of RFID technology can provide many 

benefits; however, security, privacy and other considerations need 

to be adequately addressed in any implementation of this technology. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Wilshusen follows:]
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Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the panel for their statements. 

We are going to recess now to go over and vote. I am coming 

back. I hope some other members can come back. It is one vote. 

Well, it is one vote, then a 10-minute debate, then 15-minute 

vote—oh, they changed it now. 

Well, if the gentlemen would like to start, I will let him start 

then. 

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you, Mr. Herman and Mr. Verdery, one 

of the things I was concerned about was when the decision was 

made by DHS to use in the US–VISIT Program 2 fingerprints 

versus 10 fingerprints. Now, NIST did a big study on this, and one 

of the concerns they had was that here you have got the FBI system that is built on 10 fingerprints and it would be much better 

if we had a consistent system. 

And everybody on Capitol Hill was trying to tell this to the administration. We had Asa Hutchinson up here for a private meeting to explain to him that the technology with 10 is much better, 

and the only answer we got back was, ‘‘Well, we have to do this 

incrementally.’’ This is Mr. Verdery’s position. But if it is wrong 

and it is less effective and it is going to have to be redone, why 

do it? Why didn’t we do it right the first time? 

Dr. Herman, do you have any wisdom on this? 

Mr. HERMAN. Well, this is certainly what we recommended in 

that 2003 report. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Verdery, why did the administration against all 

of this advice go the opposite direction, which could be extremely 

costly if we have to redo this system? 

Mr. VERDERY. A couple of things. One, it is not costly. The 

amount of money that went out for the readers is a pittance compared to the overall cost of the program. To deploy the little small 

fingerprint readers is a drop in the bucket compared to the budget 

of this program, much less the rest of the Department. 

Second, we would have no program if we had waited to do a 10-

print deployment because it would require retrofitting overseas of 

all the consular posts at the little windows. There is no way to put 

a 10-print reader there without retrofitting those offices. And also 

the connectivity required to build out 10-print. 

Now, the things is I think people will get confused sometimes. 

The 10 prints has nothing to do with the fact the FBI has a 10-

print system. It is more data that reduces the chance of making a 

mistake. But it is not because the FBI has 10, it is because you 

have more data. 

Mr. DICKS. Yes, but you get that database, right. If you had 10 

fingerprints, you would get—

Mr. VERDERY. You cannot, because IAFIS cannot work on a realtime basis. It can only work when they give us prints ahead of time 

and we load them into IDENT. And that is what they have been 

giving DHS is prints that are built into IDENT. There is no realtime connectivity at IAFIS because it does not work that way. It 

takes days to get an answer from IAFIS. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Herman, do you have any comments on this? 

Mr. HERMAN. Well, just that if IAFIS were to be used for background checks, there is certainly the real-time issue, I agree, but 

if it were to be used for background checks, it would have to be 10 
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fingers because IAFIS will not accept two fingers. The only way to 

use the FBI criminal database for background checks is to use 10 

fingers. 

Mr. DICKS. So by going with two fingerprints, we, in essence, 

eliminated the ability to use IAFIS. 

Mr. VERDERY. No, no, because we requested and got cooperation 

slowly from the FBI to build in the prints of foreign-born criminals 

and people with outstanding warrants and a number of other classes into IDENT so you get that capability. It does not check on a 

real-time basis against all 43 million IAFIS prints, most of which 

are U.S. citizens because that is just not possible. If we were trying 

to run it as a real-time system against IAFIS, people who landed 

at Dulles—

Mr. DICKS. All these experts who said it was possible, all kinds 

of companies said it could be done, that this was a major mistake. 

Mr. VERDERY. I have never seen—sorry. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, we have got SAGEM Morpho, a French company who has done a number of countries, said this could have 

been done, 10 fingers was the right way to go, and this was a major 

mistake that would wind up costing a lot of money to fix later. 

Now, maybe you are wrong on this but this was certainly called 

to the Department’s attention, and to me I am still—I am glad to 

hear all these different views. I am still trying to find out just exactly why the Department did what it did. 

Mr. VERDERY. There are separate questions. There is the 2 

versus 10, which I agree, we should move to 10, but we would still 

be waiting to do 10 now. We would have had no system the last 

2 years, this town over 600 people. We would be just doing nothing. 

So that is the question, do you want the 2-print system that has 

a great record or nothing while you are building out the 10-print 

system is the first question? And the second question is, can IAFIS 

work as a backbone of a 10-print system, and the answer I have 

never seen anyone say anything but no. But I agree with you, we 

do need to go over 10 prints over time, as it is feasibly possible. 

Otherwise, you have nothing. 

And just in terms of how this happened, under the law, the Attorney General, the DHS Secretary and the Secretary of State all 

had to agree on the two-print system and that was agreed to by 

Attorney General Ashcroft—

Mr. DICKS. They did not go a very good job of explaining back 

up here on the Hill why they felt—the effort was pretty minimal 

in terms of trying to explain it to us about all these facts. I am glad 

you explained it better. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. LUNGREN. I will just reconvene the subcommittee. 

I am sorry, we have had some unexpected votes that are of a procedural matter, and we do not know how long that is going to go 

on, so rather than have you just sit here, I thought I would come 

back and at least get one round of questions in before I have to go 

back for the next vote. 

Dr. Herman, according to studies by the NIST and others, various biometrics show promise in identification capabilities, the iris 

biometrics versus the fingerprint one; however, as far as I know, 

there is no existing repository of data on irises. So what is the util-
81

ity of that for which we are investing in those kinds of technologies? 

Mr. HERMAN. Well, iris could be used for the on-to-one match. So 

you mentioned some programs, Registered Traveler. It can be used 

where checking against the terrorist database is one thing, checking to see whether you are the same person issued a travel document is different. And iris can certainly be used in that. Those are 

the kinds of applications that most people are think gin about for 

iris. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Verdery, what do you say about the application of iris? Because in the back of my mind on all of this is how 

practical are these things, how do we make them work effectively 

and efficiently? It just seems to me fingerprints seem to be the 

most capable of being utilized for various different identification 

and matching purposes. 

Mr. VERDERY. Well, a couple things. And you always have to 

think of what is the point of what you are trying to do, and, usually, this means trying to conduct a one-to-one match, as was just 

mentioned. Is the person standing in front of you the person that 

they claim they are? And also a one-to-many match is the person 

standing in front of you, no matter who they claim to be, are they 

a problem based on the terrorist database or other database? And 

in some cases, you are not quite as worried about the second one, 

access to a facility where you have got other layers of security, 

where you might not be as worried about a one-to-many check 

every time. So an iris could work in those circumstances. 

But also as a good backup there are a small but when you load 

up the numbers a decent amount of people whose fingerprints cannot be read due to historical factors and the like, and so having a 

backup is very good in those kinds of cases. That is why it was 

done during the Registered Traveler pilot as a backup in some 

cases. 

So, no, it is not good for finding a terrorist out of the group, but 

it can be used in certain specialized situations. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Do you have any sense or have you seen any surveys or was there any research done on whether there is some cultural reluctance for American citizens to submit to fingerprint as 

opposed to iris identification? 

Mr. VERDERY. I am not aware of any scientific research. I am 

sure there is some, but I am not privy to it. Again, I felt a little 

bad for my colleague, Ms. Dezenski, sitting here answering these 

questions when, in all actuality, the decision to go to ICAO and advocate for facial recognition as a biometric standard in documents 

was not DHS, it was the rest of the government. It actually occurred just before DHS came into existence in early 2003, and the 

State Department carried that message, but it was a U.S. government decision. It was not DHS’ decision. 

The question is now should we go back and try to reverse that 

position, and I think, again, as I testified, I think it would be a 

wise move, although I would not want to lead anyone into thinking 

that it would be met with easy success. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Wilshusen, what are the privacy concerns considering RFID technology? And what has been done to improve the 

security of these chips? 
82

Mr. WILSHUSEN. Well, there are several privacy issues, and these 

include using the technology to obtain or process information from 

an individual without that individual’s knowledge or consent. That 

could be, for example, done by skimming. Also, just—

Mr. LUNGREN. How do you do that? I mean, practically, if I have 

got a card myself, what would—

Mr. WILSHUSEN. Well, one would need for an individual, or unauthorized user, if you will, would need to have a reader pick up the 

radio frequency emitted by that particular chip or tag and be able 

to access the data on that tag. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Is that difficult technologically? 

WILSHUSEN; No, not necessarily, no. It would be the same type 

of readers and available that are used for legitimate purposes, but 

it would have to be compliant and meet the same standards that 

are set up for that application. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Do you have to be in close proximity, physical 

proximity? 

Mr. WILSHUSEN. Generally, so, yes. How close is a matter or 

function of what type of chip and what radiorequency is being used 

in that application. 

Mr. LUNGREN. So, obviously, it is whatever information is there. 

The information is merely the name. Okay. So name, address, birth 

date, which could just be as easily printed on there and someone 

could read it themselves. 

Mr. WILSHUSEN. That is correct. 

Mr. LUNGREN. What is the durability of these devices? Do we 

have to be concerned about how readily they can be interfered with 

or destroyed or through accidental exposure to water or something 

that renders them inoperable? 

Mr. WILSHUSEN. In terms on the e-passports? 

Mr. LUNGREN. Yes. 

Mr. WILSHUSEN. Well, our particular review was at a government-wide level where we looked at and identified initiatives across 

the different agencies. We did not do an in-depth review of e-passports specifically but how long the chips can last, depends upon, 

their use. I will actually defer to the gentleman from NIST on how 

long they may last. I think there might have been a question earlier. 

Mr. HERMAN. That is outside of my area of expertise. There is 

a different part of NIST, and I guess it needs to be explained. We 

do the work in the biometrics area. There is a different part of 

NIST that does work on RFID chips. And we could certainly get information for you if you want, but that is just outside my area of 

expertise. 

Mr. LUNGREN. My thought is that we ought to know that. I 

mean, I do not know. I do not have any idea. I would hope that 

whatever we move to is going to last as long as the passports we 

have or if there is a need for us to update—I am trying to think 

whether there would be a need for us to update information on a 

regular basis, probably not. 

This is just basic information, Mr. Verdery; is that correct? 

Mr. VERDERY. That is right. That is right. And also, I mean, it 

is worth pointing out that even outside the government’s fears, as 

important as it is, the topic of today’s hearing, the commercial sec-
83

tor is exploding with uses of RFID, your EZ Pass and your Smart 

Tag at the gas station and a zillion other uses. So they are going 

to lead the way in the technology standards and durability for purposes outside the government perspective, and it is a huge industry, domestic suppliers, foreign suppliers, and that is going to lead 

the agenda here on durability and other factors. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Can you tell me why it takes so long for us to develop these things? I mean, if in fact you are talking about how the 

private sector takes the lead on this and we have these technology 

changes and so forth, they seem to come with such rapidity, is it 

because of the privacy concerns that we have that it takes us such 

a long time to really kind of put these things in train and start 

them moving? 

Mr. VERDERY. Well, I think there are a lot of different factors. 

I mean, when Congress passed the law in late 2002 asking for 

ICAO to come up with the standard, they began the motions to do 

that. ICAO is your typical international organization. It moves as 

quickly as it can but it is bringing, whatever, 187 countries into 

general consensus with difficult technical standards. They were 

moving as quickly as they can. I think the program, if Frank Moss 

was still here, has now been held up for some period of time due 

to the privacy concerns outside of kind of the ICAO process. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Were you involved in the ICAO process before? 

Mr. VERDERY. Tangentially. The US–VISIT staff that was within 

our directorate led our efforts kind of on the technical level in Montreal and other places to try to build up that technical level. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Do you have any insight into why the E.U. has 

reluctance to share their fingerprints with us? 

Mr. VERDERY. Well, I think it is a very fair question. My guess 

is if they were here, they would say, ‘‘Well, what are you going to 

share with us?’’ We have nothing to share with them, we do not 

take fingerprints. And so they have taken the step of—

Mr. LUNGREN. But we have—

Mr. VERDERY. Not in passports. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Not in passports. 

Mr. VERDERY. So they are building out fingerprints in their internal documents for the E.U. purposes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Right. 

Mr. VERDERY. And they have said that they are currently planning on keeping that E.U.-only system a closed system. But that 

is all the more reason for us to be bold in doing it ourselves so we 

have something to negotiate with. Right now it would be a one-way 

trade. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The suggestion I thought I got from the previous 

panel was that we were not doing it because the European countries would not share with us but we do not have anything, as you 

suggest, to share with them. 

Mr. VERDERY. We can share US–VISIT. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Right, I understand that, but in terms of our passport. 

Mr. VERDERY. That is right. If you travel overseas, there is nothing for them to access in our passport fingerprint-wise because it 

is not there. 
84

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, let me just ask you this then: What security 

benefits would you see coming out of us putting fingerprints on our 

passports beyond the US–VISIT Program? 

Mr. VERDERY. Well, the benefits for us doing it on our own are 

a couple. One, if we ran checks of people at the time of application, 

you might be able to find imposters or other criminals or terrorists 

at the time of application and State is doing a lot now on the biographic side, as Frank testified to, but that does not catch the biometric hits that would come up. 

Second, we could run those people through US–VISIT when they 

travel back and forth. That currently is not done. So that would 

again find those types of imposters or criminals if we wanted to do 

that. 

And, third, is I think the point I was getting at before, it would 

allow us to offer other countries who are worried about Americans, 

legitimately or not, coming into their shores, allow us to build out 

an international system of interoperability built on travel documents. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The compatibility of the fingerprint system with 

most of these countries around the world is not repeated with any 

other mechanism of identification. I mean, we have our fingerprint 

system for our criminal justice programs, they have their fingerprint system. I mean, fingerprint system started in England, for 

goodness sake. 

Mr. VERDERY. You have INTERPOL as a kind of repository of 

that trade. But, again, that is of criminals, not of just your average 

tourist who has not shown up on a terrorist database. 

LUNGREN; We have another vote going on there. I think I am 

finished with all my questions, but if you can stick around a little 

bit longer, I have got to find out whether my Ranking Member is 

coming back. Do we know? Maybe we can check. Otherwise, I 

might be able to let you go. 

Mr. VERDERY. Sir, if I could, while we have open mike day. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Open mike, right here, open mike Friday, but it 

is on Wednesday. 

Mr. VERDERY. It does not happen very often, but I am not sure 

I actually responded to your question about kind of the cultural 

issues. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Yes. 

Mr. VERDERY. Again, I think the experience of world travelers 

coming to US–VISIT, travelers or all nations, all races, all everything, except for kids and old people and diplomats, basically having no problem with the system, takes 6 seconds. Some people 

think it is actually kind of cool, it is kind of neat. I think it is producing a sea change around the world as to, ‘‘Hey, look, this is no 

big deal.’’

And the other thing is that fingerprints can differentiate people 

who otherwise might get caught up in some kind of biographic confusion. John Smith, the terrorist, causing all the other John Smiths 

traveling some travel problems. The biometrics would clear that 

person, essentially. 

And, so, again, I think there is a sea change underway. We have 

been leading that, I think we need to continue to lead that. But 

this is the first worldwide use of biometrics, and I think it has been 
85

a great experience and hopefully has convinced travelers and governments around the world that that is the way to go. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And who are excepted from that? You say children 

and—

Mr. VERDERY. Under 14, I think over 79 or maybe it is 69 and 

diplomats. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And the reason for the first two being exempted 

from that? 

Mr. VERDERY. Initially, it was a workload issue. We did not want 

to overload the system, and the odds of these folks being terrorists, 

I think, were considered to be low or visa overstayers. And so I 

think that was the reason. And diplomats obviously for reciprocity 

concerns. 

Mr. LUNGREN. That is what I keep telling TSA about secondary 

checks of my 2-year-old granddaughter. I do not think there is 

much chance of her being a terrorist. 

I want to thank the witnesses for appearing. I understand no one 

else is coming back. And I would just say for the record that some 

members may want to submit some written questions to you, and 

if they do, if you could respond in a timely fashion. 

I thank you for your testimony. 

And this subcommittee hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:06 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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