TRAINING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

The U.S. Army Adapts to the 

Post–Cold War World

Colonel J. Michael Hardesty

and Jason D. Ellis

UNITED STATES

INSTITUTE OF PEACE
CONTENTS

Foreword v

Key Points vii

1 Introduction 1

2 Defining the Challenge 5

3 The Response 16

4 Conclusion 27

Notes 30

About the Authors 35

About the Institute 37
When the United States Institute of Peace

announced a joint fellowship program

with the U.S. Army War College, some

observers unfamiliar with the Institute’s work noted

an apparent irony: Why should an organization devoted to the peaceful resolution of international conflict work with an institution whose main job is

fighting wars? This publication, the first product of the

Institute-Army collaboration, demonstrates that there

is no irony at all in the relationship.

Colonel John Michael Hardesty arrived at the Institute in August 1995 to serve as the first Army War College fellow assigned to the Institute’s Jennings

Randolph Program for International Peace. He came

to the Institute having served with distinction in several peace operations conducted by the Army’s Tenth

Mountain Division.

Soon after Col. Hardesty began his fellowship year,

it became quite evident that his experiences in peace

operations had great relevance to the projects of other

Institute fellows, particularly those examining the implementation phase of peace settlements. While much

research has been done on the causes and sources of

conflict, less attention has been devoted to the often

crucial postconflict issues that can determine whether

a treaty or peace agreement can produce genuine

peace or become the framework for renewed conflict.

Our fellows soon came to realize that Col. Hardesty

could help supply the keys to understanding this part

of a conflict’s life cycle—the “nuts and bolts” of ensuring that the parties to a conflict do not lapse back into

mutually destructive behavior. 

As explained by Col. Hardesty and Jason Ellis, a

doctoral candidate at American University who collaborated on this project, the soldier’s task as peacekeeper is, in many ways, much tougher than carrying

out a combat operation. The objective of the soldier on

the battlefield is the swift defeat of the enemy. A peacekeeper confronts many time-consuming and delicate

tasks, all of which require careful, nuanced judgment—

from separating hostile forces to assisting in the reconstruction a war-ravaged society. 

Col. Hardesty’s military specialty is the management of human resources, an amalgam of responsibilities that are crucial to making an army unit run

efficiently. The most important part of his job, though,

is training—making sure the soldiers in his unit have

been adequately prepared and equipped to carry out

their missions.

As is the case with combat operations, the military

relies heavily on training to carry out entirely new

peacekeeping missions in the post–Cold War era—missions that are helping to redefine the role of this country’s armed services as we approach the twenty-first

century. As this study shows, the U.S. Army has made

remarkable strides in a relatively short time in updating its training for the peace operations that have become a major responsibility of our military in recent

years.

Training professionals for a new set of conflict management challenges is also an integral part of the Institute’s mission. Our Education and Training Program

has conducted numerous International Conflict Resolution Skills Training (ICREST) sessions, most recently in Kenya for the U.S. Agency for International

Development staff stationed in the Horn of Africa, and

in Greece for diplomatic practitioners from southeastern Europe. Other ICREST training sessions have

been conducted for nongovernmental organization

leaders and military personnel. Indeed, it was a series

of joint programs with the Army War College that led

to the creation of the Institute’s Army fellowship—an

ongoing collaboration that will continue to benefit

both organizations.

RICHARD H. SOLOMON

PRESIDENT

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

v

FOREWORD
vii

- Following the collapse of the Soviet Union,

U.S. military strategy had to go through some

rather dramatic changes. Shifting from a

decades-long training strategy of developing

and refining a joint, combined-arms approach

to war-fighting designed to defeat Cold War

opponents, the nation’s armed forces must

now also train their personnel for “operations

other than war,” including peacekeeping,

peace enforcement, and humanitarian-relief

operations. 

- This paper examines the relevance of the U.S.

Army’s training strategy for these new types of

operations through an analysis of the institutional changes resulting from lessons it

learned in successive peace operations, starting in 1989 with Operation Just Cause in

Panama. It also surveys recent policy debates

over the use of force, the role of contemporary

peace operations in U.S. foreign and national

security policy, and the doctrinal underpinnings of the army’s training for operations

other than war. 

- Peace operations have different operating principles than traditional combat missions. They

lack clear strategic direction, have an expanded scope, rely on limited intelligence, are

characterized by political and cultural diversity, involve the coordination of multiple actors, are media-intensive, typically take place

in “failed states” with a limited rule of law, employ constrictive rules of engagement, are

likely to occur in austere environments, are

dominated by small and independent unit operations, demand a visible presence, are set in

primarily built-up or urban areas, require close

coordination with Psychological Operations

and Civil Affairs units, and typically require extensive negotiation skills. 

- Commanders who have participated in recent

peace missions unequivocally argue that additional skills are required for today’s types of

military missions. To succeed, the army must

train commanders and staffs to cope with the

differences between these missions and traditional combat operations.

- The army’s professional military education

system has expanded its curriculum and improved its techniques to teach the operational

principles and tactics associated with the sixteen types of missions in the category of “operations other than war.” Each branch service

school has incorporated staff, situational, and

field training exercises to reinforce the doctrinal principles and tactics associated with its

training manuals. The courses of instruction at

the Command and General Staff College and

the Army War College have undergone similar

expansion. 

- After evaluating how the army has adjusted its

training strategy to accommodate the new realities of conflict in the post–Cold War era, it is

evident that the U.S. Army has been able to

maintain its war-fighting edge while simultaneously expanding its “playbook” to accommodate the myriad tasks associated with

contemporary peace operations.

- In addition, the army has intensified training

in urban environments and routinely incorporates new rules of engagement into its exercises. Its Combat Training Centers have

expanded their scenarios to incorporate peace

operations, testing a unit’s ability to apply

KEY POINTS
viii

appropriate small-unit tactics, whose success

often hinge on the unit’s effectively integrating

Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs personnel into its missions.

- Predeployment training covers detailed

cultural orientations and incorporates simulations involving interactions with governmental and nongovernmental organizations and

belligerent parties in order to enhance negotiating skills. Moreover, the army has developed

specific strategies to deal more effectively with

the media and trains its leaders accordingly. 

- Contemporary military thought has been revised to consider required tasks following the

conflict or crisis stage of an intervention. In addition, considerable attention has been devoted to reconstituting constabularies and to

rule-of-law issues that are necessary for the

long-term security of local populations. Efforts

to revise doctrine, professional military education, and unit training have made the U.S.

Army the world’s premier peacekeeper.

- The number of peace operations has effectively doubled since the end of the Cold War

era, and the potential exists for many similar

types of operations in the near future. Indeed,

a conflict-prone international environment underscores the possibility of even more frequent

deployments. Because of this, the army must

continue to refine its training strategy to accommodate such future challenges.

- Three areas require renewed emphasis: updating the curriculum of most Noncommissioned

Officer Academy courses, improving the negotiating skills of leaders throughout the army’s

ranks, and conducting more combined-arms

training in urban environments.

- The army has generally kept pace with the rigorous and increasing demands posed by recent peace operations. However, the increased

frequency of deployments, coupled with the

burden of expanded peace operations training, has increased the operational tempo of

units to unparalleled levels. This situation

begs a difficult and problematic question:

With increased mission requirements and a

continued decline in real defense expenditures, is the army capable of fielding forces for

the two “nearly simultaneous” combat missions envisioned in contemporary strategic

planning and conducting peace operations at

the same time?

- The army obviously benefits from the national

debate over maintaining both war-fighting and

peacekeeping missions. The ongoing review of

the necessity and requirements for such missions improves military planning and provides

better overall guidance for long-term training

needs. The U.S. Army has already made considerable progress in transforming its training

strategies in light of the relatively young debate over peace operations and how they serve

the national interest. 

- Undoubtedly, there will be more cases of massive humanitarian tragedy and civil breakdown in states and regions that involve the

national interest of the United States. The challenge for the U.S. Army will be to build on its

new base of knowledge and tactics to serve the

national interest in offering assistance and stability to these endangered populations.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the

short-lived euphoric expectations of a

more peaceful and prosperous “new world

order” have necessitated a reexamination of U.S.

national military strategy. Today, we face the sobering realities of worldwide armed conflict and humanitarian crises resulting from opposing ethnic,

religious, racial, and political ideologies, as well as

from natural disasters and failed states. 

The U.S. military had spent the previous two

decades developing and refining a joint, combined-arms approach to war-fighting designed to

defeat Cold War opponents. Preparations for such

combat inspired an integrated military strategy

that placed a premium on joint operations. Indeed,

the overwhelming victory achieved during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 was the culmination of

the previous two decades of military effort; the

structure, doctrine, equipment, and training for

U.S. armed forces withstood the tests of war. 

Now, with a significantly changed world situation, is it reasonable to expect the same degree of

military excellence from the U.S. Army as it participates in missions associated with military operations other than war? This study examines the

question in detail by tracing the evolution of U.S.

national strategic policy and how military strategy

has responded in recent operations, drawing

heavily on the experiences of the Tenth Mountain

(Light Infantry) and First Armored Divisions.1 It

also examines the factors that differentiate today’s

operations from war-fighting and the relevance of

the U.S. Army’s doctrine and training strategies for

today’s operations through an analysis of the institutional changes resulting from lessons the army

learned from Operation Just Cause in Panama

(1989) up to the present.

DEFINITIONS

Although there has been much debate in military

circles on how to differentiate and categorize military operations other than war, common definitions have emerged and have been incorporated

into the defense establishment’s lexicon. Recent

literature on peace operations and traditional warfighting missions has created some confusion,

since terms were being used interchangeably.

Since many contemporary military operations fall

within the mission category of peace operations

and are the primary subjects of this manuscript, it

is necessary to establish a common frame of reference by reviewing applicable definitions from the

Joint War-Fighting Center’s Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations and

FM (Field Manual) 100-23, Peace Operations:2

- Peace Operations: Encompasses peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement operations,

and other military operations conducted in

support of diplomatic efforts to establish and

maintain peace. For this study’s purposes, the

terms military operations other than war,

peace operations, contingency operations, and

stability operations are used interchangeably.

- Peacekeeping: Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a

dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire,

truce, etc.) and support diplomatic efforts to

reach long-term political settlement.

- Peace Enforcement: Application of military

force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel

1INTRODUCTION

1
compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. 

- Peacemaking: The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful

settlement that arranges an end to a dispute

and resolves issues that led to the conflict.

- Peacebuilding: Postconflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that

strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a

relapse into conflict. 

THE EVOLUTION OF POST–COLD WAR

STRATEGIC POLICY AND SUPPORTING

MILITARY DOCTRINE

Use of Force

The policy debate on criteria for the use of military

force came into sharp focus just over one year after

239 U.S. marines were killed in a suicide-bomb attack during an ill-defined 1983 peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. Shortly thereafter, Secretary of

Defense Caspar Weinberger established clearly defined criteria for the use of force abroad. Recalling

public antipathy toward the military resulting

from the Vietnam debacle and the Lebanon disaster, Weinberger emphasized the need to ensure

widespread popular support for U.S. forces for the

duration of a conflict:

- Forces should not be committed unless the action is vital to the U.S. national interest or that

of allies;

- forces should be committed wholeheartedly,

with the clear intention of winning, or they

should not be committed at all;

- if forces are committed, it should be with

clearly defined political and military objectives

and with a precise sense of how the forces deployed can achieve the objectives;

- the relationship between objectives and forces

must be continually reassessed and adjusted,

if necessary;

- before committing forces abroad there must

be some reasonable assurance of public and

congressional support; and

- the commitment of U.S. forces to combat

should only be as a last resort.3

Although Weinberger was discussing the commitment of U.S. troops to combat, the criteria are

also applicable to operations short of war. Taking

the lead to expand upon and revise Weinberger’s

criteria, Secretary of State George Shultz subsequently argued that the need sometimes exists to

employ armed force for objectives short of “vital”

national interests, particularly those that rest on

moral grounds. For Shultz, the use of force was justified when

- It helps liberate a people or support the yearning for freedom;

- its aim is to bring peace or to support peaceful

processes;

- it prevents others from abusing their power

through aggression or oppression; and

- it is applied with the greatest effort to avoid unnecessary casualties.4

In the post–Cold War era, President George

Bush extended this debate, arguing in an address

to cadets at West Point that “real leadership requires a willingness to use military force,” but that

at times such force “may not be the best way of

safeguarding something vital, while using force

might be the best way to protect an interest that

qualifies as important but less than vital.”5 Echoing this statement, senior Clinton administration

officials have repeatedly asserted that the “selective

but substantial” use of force might be necessary to

support coercive diplomacy even when nonvital

national interests are at stake.6

Peace Operations and U.S. Interests

While such debates revolve around the use of force

in general, the first three years of the Clinton administration were also marked by ongoing debates

over the nature, relevance, and desirability of

peace operations themselves. In its first national

2
security strategy document, released in July 1994,

the administration argued that “multilateral peace

operations are an important component of our

strategy. From traditional peacekeeping to peace

enforcement, multilateral peace operations are

sometimes the best way to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more

costly and deadly.”7

In the second and third versions of this document, released in February 1995 and February

1996, respectively, the administration differentiated among vital, important, and humanitarian interests.8 For the first, “we will do whatever it takes

to defend these interests.” For the second category

of interests, “military forces should be used only if

they advance U.S. interests, they are likely to be

able to accomplish their objectives, the costs and

risks of their employment are commensurate with

the interests at stake, and other means have been

tried and have failed to achieve our objectives.” For

humanitarian interests, the military “is generally

not the best tool, . . . but under certain conditions

the use of our armed forces may be appropriate.”

The administration believed that such conditions

would be fulfilled, for example, when a humanitarian catastrophe is clearly beyond the capacity of

civilian relief agencies to respond, when the need

for relief is urgent and only the military has the

ability to “jump-start” the longer-term response to

the disaster, when the response requires resources

unique to the military, and when the risk to U.S.

troops is minimal. 

While the Clinton administration was drafting

its first national security strategy document, bitter

congressional and public criticism following the

problematic U.S. experience in Somalia reduced

the administration’s interest in multilateral peace

operations. By February 1994, while still supporting U.S. involvement in such multilateral operations, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake

declared that “peacekeeping is not at the center of

our foreign or defense policy.”9 This position

became official U.S. policy in the final text of

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which

stated that peace operations could “prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts” and act as a reinforcing

mechanism for U.S. policy in general. PDD-25 established factors to be considered before deciding

whether to support a peace operation sponsored

by the United Nations or regional organizations.

These factors currently serve as the basis for U.S.

involvement in peace operations requiring military

intervention:10

- Whether UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and there is an international community

of interest for dealing with the problem on a

multilateral basis;

- whether there is a threat to or breach of international peace and security based upon international aggression, urgent humanitarian

disaster coupled with violence, sudden interruption of established democracy, or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence

or the threat of violence;

- whether there are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the

spectrum between traditional peacekeeping

and peace enforcement;

- for traditional peacekeeping operations,

whether a cease-fire is in place and the consent

of the parties is obtained before the force is deployed;

- for peace enforcement operations, whether the

threat to international peace and security is

considered significant;

- whether the means to accomplish the mission

are available, including the forces, financing,

and a mandate appropriate to the mission;

- whether the political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are

considered unacceptable; and

- whether the operation’s anticipated duration

is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria

for ending the operation.

In addition to asking the difficult question of

whether a proposed operation is in the U.S. national interest, PDD-25 asks whether the operation

could succeed without U.S. support and calls for

the consideration of other viable alternatives—including the option of doing nothing. Of particular

importance is the emphasis on the necessity for

sufficient resources and planning in addition to

3
4

popular and congressional support to conclude a

particular mission successfully. To some informed

observers, there is a clear recognition that neither

the United Nations, nor America’s European allies, nor any other country or organization can

substitute for U.S. leadership and involvement in

peace operations, owing to resource demands, political will, or logistical and infrastructure capabilities.11

Evolving Military Doctrine

Just as U.S. strategic policy has evolved, U.S. military doctrine has undergone a similar transformation in the post–Cold War international security

environment. Former Army Chief of Staff General

Gordon Sullivan best articulated the role of

doctrine in FM 100-1, The Army, by stating, “our

doctrine establishes a common language for professional soldiers, communicates institutional

knowledge, and establishes a shared understanding of organizational purpose. . . . [It] establishes

war-fighting principles for the employment of the

Army which are relevant to the contemporary environment . . . [and] represents the continuing

progression of the Army’s intellectual adaptation

to the changed strategic environment.”12

Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the army’s

capstone doctrine, FM 100-5, Operations, was

based on offense-oriented air-land battle principles that were focused primarily on a potential

conflict with Warsaw Pact forces. In the context of

a dramatically altered landscape of world politics

and entirely new sources of threats to U.S. national security, more attention to activities short of

war was clearly needed. Accordingly, FM 100-5

was updated in 1993. The new version included a

separate chapter that paid particular attention to

the unique operational principles in the sixteen

mission categories of operations other than war

(see note 2) and provided historical examples to

give its readers a better understanding of these

types of operations. By incorporating these

changes and retaining the tactics and operational

concepts covering the full range of military operations, the army has been able to link all military

operations to redefined national objectives. The

significance of this manual cannot be overemphasized, since it serves as the basis for all supporting

doctrinal manuals, their tactics, and their training

strategies.

Quick to expand its revised capstone doctrine,

the army published FM 100-23, Peace Operations, in December 1994. This manual summarized many of the lessons learned from recent

deployments like Operations Provide Comfort in

Iraq and Restore Hope in Somalia. Directly supporting FM 100-5, this doctrinal manual appropriately depicts the strategic context, organizational

principles, and operational imperatives that are

unique to peace operations. Considerable attention is paid to the planning considerations and coordination challenges posed by other U.S. and

foreign government agencies, multinational military forces, and nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs) typically converging in the area of operation. Similar doctrinal publications accompanied

the release of the Peace Operations manual. For

instance, FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, was distributed in July 1993, and FM 100-

23-1, Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian

Assistance Operations, appeared in 1995. Branch

and Integrating Centers, such as the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the

Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas, have made major strides in updating the

relevant tactical literature as well. These evolving

doctrinal principles and concepts, reinforced by

hard experience, have established the necessary

framework to enhance the military’s ability to execute contemporary operations effectively.
The very nature of recent peace operations

has tested the mettle of the participating

military commanders and their units. As

noted earlier, the army had been geared to fight on

the high-intensity battlefields of Europe, Korea,

and the Middle East. Conventional military operations were within the “comfort zone” of the military

hierarchy, which was more familiar with fighting

and winning wars than waging a soft peace. Units’

mission-essential tasks (those tasks that must be

performed with the utmost effectiveness to succeed on the battlefield) did not include conducting

peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or humanitarian-relief operations. As a result, commanders participating in initial post–Cold War operations,

such as Provide Comfort in war-torn Iraq and Restore Hope in Somalia, were faced with missions

for which they had not received appropriate training; they relied on their own best judgment to

guide, measure, and evaluate their actions. Although the deployed units consistently achieved

tactical success, after-action reports and the professional literature highlighted areas where improvement was needed. The army has responded to

these challenges by updating most of its doctrinal

literature and adjusting the curriculum at most of

its professional military education institutions. 

Many in the military establishment maintain

that specific units should be secured and trained

solely for peace operation engagements. Others argue that there is no need to establish a separate

training strategy for military operations other than

war; they assert that war-fighting tactics and procedures are easily modified for these types of missions. Arguably, the reality of a “downsized” army

with more frequent peace operation deployments

undermines the first argument, and a systematic

evaluation of the factors that differentiate these

types of operations from war discounts the second

argument. The U.S. Army has taken an approach

that considers both arguments by expanding the

capabilities of its fighting forces to accommodate

the special challenges of contemporary peace operations. 

Factors that differentiate war-fighting from

peace operations include operating principles;

lack of strategic direction; expanded scope; limited

intelligence; political and cultural diversity; multiple players; media intensity; the lack of (or limited)

rule of law; constrictive rules of engagement; likely

occurrence in austere environments; domination

by small and independent unit operations; the demand for a visible presence; operations set primarily in built-up or urban areas; the need to integrate

Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units;

and the need to conduct extensive negotiations.

Recent interventions highlight unit ineffectiveness

resulting from the inappropriate application of operational principles or the failure to understand

adequately the environmental characteristics of

past operations and the reasons for the success of

innovative tactics developed during these operations.13 The following discussion elaborates on the

differences between conventional military missions and contemporary peace operations to illustrate why the army has had to adjust its training

strategy to deal more effectively with the realities

of a post–Cold War world.

OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES 

The first and probably most important consideration is that there are significant differences between war-fighting principles and those that

govern peace operations. The elements of objective and security are common to both categories of

operations. Offense, mass, unity of command,

economy of force, maneuver, surprise, and simplicity remain the dominant principles for combat operations. However, as military operations become

5

2DEFINING THE

CHALLENGE
less “warlike,” various principles emerge from the

doctrinal literature that come to dominate military

actions: unity of effort, restraint, perseverance, and

legitimacy. The application of these principles can

determine mission success or failure.

Recent executive-branch planning guidance and

the actions of multilateral force participants in recent operations indicate that unity of command

may be impractical for contemporary peace operations. Indeed, PDD-25 clearly underscores “the fact

that the President will never relinquish command

of U.S. forces” to United Nations or other multinational commands.14 Italian forces’ failure to comply with command direction and mission tasking

in Somalia15 and a similar breach by a Swedish battalion in Bosnia that refused to relieve Canadian

forces in the eastern enclave of Srebrenica serve as

illustrative examples.16 Dual chains of command

and parallel command structures are not new; the

most notable recent example is the one established

in Bosnia between the Implementation Force

(IFOR) and the civilian High Representative responsible for coordinating and implementing the

nonmilitary aspects of the Dayton Accords. These

factors and the requirement to support and coordinate efforts with NGOs, which operate under independent charters, make unity of effort the guiding

principle for most peace operations. 

Restraint appears among the principles guiding

peace operations because, unlike conventional operations, which reward the use of overwhelming

force, the lack of restraint in peace operations can

result in unforeseen, and often adverse, consequences. Adam Roberts has described four possible dilemmas that must be considered before

applying force in peacekeeping and humanitarianrelief operations. First, although the use of force

may establish credibility, it also makes peacekeepers more vulnerable to attack by belligerent parties. Second, collateral civilian damage and deaths

create mass resentment, and accusations of brutality can weaken the political will of countries providing the military forces. Third, the use of force

may compromise the perception of impartiality.

And finally, countries are reluctant to leave to others the decision to use force when the lives of their

peacekeepers and their reputations are at stake.17

Perseverance is included among the principles

because of the long-term nature of peace operations, especially the peacebuilding phase of an intervention. Some analysts estimate that it may take

more than twenty years to provide the social

change required for the sustained avoidance of

conflict.18 The U.S. military’s continued engagement in Panama, the Sinai, Iraq, and Macedonia attest to this. Indeed, the Dayton Accords

acknowledge this principle by maintaining the

oversight responsibility of various international organizations over the Commissions on Human

Rights, Refugees, and National Monuments, established in the accords, for five years. The distinctive

nature of this protracted conflict mandates a longterm presence of the NGO community as well.

Finally there is a need to understand legitimacy

as a condition that “sustains the willing acceptance

by the people of the right of the government to

govern or a group or agency to make and carry out

decisions.”19 Typically, the U.S. military’s authority

to carry out decisions has been legitimized by UN

mandates. Conversely, the military’s inadvertent

dealings with criminal elements in the early phase

of the Somalia operation contributed to the legitimization of some inappropriate—or illegitimate—

actors. The same will hold true in Bosnia, where

commanders likely will be exposed to inadvertent

interaction with indicted war criminals.20 Accordingly, army doctrine warns personnel to use extreme caution when dealing with individuals and

organizations in countries or localities where no

government exists. 

LACK OF STRATEGIC DIRECTION

Unlike war, where the National Command Authority (the president and his most senior national security advisers, including the secretary of defense)

gives clear strategic guidance and mission parameters are evident, peace operations often suffer from

a lack of clarity and repeated changes of guidance.

The mission requirements and desired political

objectives of contemporary military operations

have been tough to define, often placing commanders in difficult situations. To stay within desired

mission boundaries prior to deploying his troops

to provide relief and assistance in the wake of

Hurricane Andrew and the Somali crisis, the

commanding general of the army’s Tenth Mountain Division, Major General S. L. Arnold, prepared

a mission statement including a description of 

the commander’s intent, success criteria, and desired end state. To save time, this statement was

forwarded to the leadership at every command

6
level simultaneously. Reacting to insufficient mission guidance that he believed would force him to

assume missions that were outside the desired

framework of the senior leadership, General

Arnold essentially established the parameters of

the operations himself.21

In Rwanda, Lieutenant General Daniel

Schroeder faced a similar challenge. He received

incremental guidance from the National Command Authority after the mission statement had already been issued by the commander-in-chief of

U.S. forces in Europe and after the mission analysis had been performed by the U.S. European

Command staff. In a draft after-action report, ten

separate objectives were cited ex post facto.22

The complex nature of peace operations makes

it difficult to develop strategic objectives that can

be easily translated into supporting operational

and tactical mission statements. The simplicity

and clarity of the directive from the Combined

Chiefs to General Dwight Eisenhower before the

Normandy invasion in World War II illustrate the

point that strategic direction in support of wartime

missions is easier to understand and execute. The

mission guidance, in its entirety, was as follows: 

Task. You will enter the continent of Europe and

in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany

and the destruction of her armed forces. The date

for entering the Continent is the month of May,

1944. After adequate channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed towards securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air

operations.23

Commanders cannot expect guidance for operations other than war that is similarly succinct, focused, or unrestrained.

EXPANDED SCOPE 

In recent operations, the role of the military has

been significantly expanded, at times catching the

commanders off guard. Despite their increasing attention to circumscribed roles for the peacekeepers, the United States and United Nations have

repeatedly failed to develop a strategy that effectively incorporates the military’s role in expanded

phases of missions, such as postconflict/crisis reconstruction or nation-building efforts. This

lacuna was well documented in the aftermath of

Operation Just Cause. As Richard Shultz explains,

“Looking back on the experience in Panama, it is

evident that the U.S. government was programmatically and structurally ill equipped for the situation that followed the fighting.”24 He concludes

that the planning challenge was hampered by six

obstacles:

- Failure to provide clear postconflict objectives—to restore democracy and critical government functions;

- exclusion of other civilian agencies from the

planning process;

- bifurcation of the planning process into warfighting and postconflict restoration;

- lack of experienced personnel in restoration

planning;

- failure to understand the impact of twenty

years of authoritarian rule; and

- failure to effectively determine who was in

charge.

According to Shultz, “There was no integrated

strategy for supporting nation building and democratization in Panama following Just Cause.”25

This situation exemplifies a tactical success that

could have resulted in a strategic failure because of

the ineffectual peacebuilding phase of the campaign plan and the military’s inability to recognize

that other U.S. government organizations, such as

the Departments of Justice or State, may not mobilize as quickly as the military. The lessons from

this operation also apply to later operations in Somalia and Rwanda, and perhaps Bosnia as well.

The expanded scope of Operation Restore

Hope, from a U.S.-led humanitarian-relief intervention to a conflict-resolution and nation-building

mission, further illustrates the point. Contemporary operations tend to encompass peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding

components, and all may occur simultaneously.

Only the broad scope—not the tactical failures—of

Restore Hope in Somalia was replicated during

Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. During the

Haiti operation, the Tenth Mountain Division’s focus changed from peace enforcement to nation

building as the situation stabilized. Perhaps it was

the international community’s recognition of this

7
expanded scope, and the accompanying means

that were provided, that account for this intervention’s success to date. Clearly, similar mission expansion is likely to occur in Bosnia as the situation

allows the belligerent parties to be separated.

Recent operations have increasingly strained

division and ad hoc headquarters because a relatively small commitment of forces is believed

sufficient to accomplish the mission. The Tenth

Mountain Division was the first to serve as an

Army Forces headquarters in recent times, significantly expanding the operational scope for which

this division’s headquarters was designed, performing this function during the Hurricane Andrew operation and again during Operation

Restore Hope. The division’s mission scope was

expanded further when it served as a Joint Task

Force headquarters during the Uphold Democracy

operation in Haiti. 

Although the division demonstrated that it

could perform these expanded roles with more

personnel (increasing the size of the headquarters

from its authorized strength of slightly more than

three hundred to approximately five hundred), the

staff officers’ limited experience with the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES)

compounded the deployment problems the U.S.

Transportation Command had already encountered with the software-driven system during other

operations. While JOPES is supposed to facilitate

logistical coordination in complex military operations, it functions only as well as the weakest link

in the chain—in this case, the training of the staff

members who will use it. Arguably, well over half

the problems identified in the Rwanda operation’s

after-action report were directly attributable to the

ad hoc nature of the staff and its lack of familiarity

with JOPES.26

Ultimately, the expanded scope of military operations will cause a unit’s mission-essential tasks to

change as it makes the transition from one phase

of the operation to another and as new missions

are assigned to traditional tactical and operational

headquarters. For example, a change in a mission’s

focus may change an infantry battalion’s tasks

from conducting air assault, area security, and

search-and-cordon operations to conducting humanitarian-relief, election monitoring, and refugee

relocation operations. Divisions must also be prepared to serve vastly expanded coordinating roles

as Army Forces or Joint Task Force headquarters

with little advance notice.

LIMITED INTELLIGENCE 

Recent military interventions have been devoid of

useful intelligence, typically occurring in locations

where human intelligence capabilities had not

been well established. This situation was most evident during Operations Provide Comfort (northern Iraq), Restore Hope (Somalia), and Support

Hope (Rwanda). To a lesser extent, it holds true for

the interventions in Haiti, Panama, and Bosnia.

This shortcoming is well articulated by Richard

Best, who argues that “Creating a capability to provide intelligence support to future peacekeeping

missions is a significant challenge. Potential opponents of peacekeeping missions may be relatively

small, clandestine groups that are difficult to monitor with systems designed for the surveillance of

highly sophisticated military establishments.”27

This void has led early-deploying units to take ineffective, and sometimes misguided, actions, such as

dealing with inappropriate actors. 

The Tenth Mountain Division recognized this

shortcoming during its mission in Somalia and developed a detailed patrol checklist to determine

the nature and extent of anticipated clan interference with military operations, as well as the condition and attitudes of the general populace. The

checklist proved so useful that similar checklists

were developed for airfield security, roadblocks,

and convoy operations. The efficient use of these

checklists greatly enhanced overall intelligence assessments and minimized the need for remedial

unit training.28

With the realization that human intelligence

was the most productive source of information in

Somalia, techniques to expand its use were developed. For instance, the threat from land mines

hampered operations along major supply routes

and at certain relief sites. Since satellite imagery

was of limited use in detecting mined areas, Somali

translators accompanied mine-sweeping teams

that contacted local village leaders to help identify

known mined sites. Because of the extent of mining in Bosnia (some estimates put the figure at upwards of three million mines) coalition forces will

have to cultivate human intelligence sources,

cooperate with local leaders, and exchange key

8
information with the various intelligence agencies.

Indeed, the United States has already authorized

certain foreign military officers to be aboard highly

classified U.S. signals intelligence flights over

Bosnia.29

POLITICAL AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 

With the exception of the U.S. intervention in

Panama and domestic disaster-relief operations,

recent military deployments have occurred where

the local population and foreign peacekeepers

have little familiarity with each other’s cultural and

political orientations. Recognition of and respect

for these differences are now emphasized as a

training requirement before each deployment.

Even though in the past, each U.S. predeployment

training program covered cultural and political orientations, the military’s insensitivity to cultural

differences has been identified as a factor contributing to tensions between the Somalis and UN

forces, significantly reducing the military’s effectiveness.30 As Mohammed Sahnoun, a former UN

envoy to Somalia, observes, “In Somali culture, the

worst thing you can do is humiliate them, to do

something to them you are not doing to another

clan. . . . It’s the kind of psychology the UN doesn’t

understand.”31 Although intended to be impartial,

the mandate for the UN phase of the mission in Somalia, which included disarmament, ran counter

to the long-term political objectives of Somali

leaders like General Aideed, prompting his hostile

military actions.

The outgoing UN commander of the Bosnia operation’s northeastern sector, Brigadier General

Hagrup Haukland of Norway, advised IFOR leaders that U.S. troops should balance peace enforcement aspects of the mission “with acts of goodwill

and respect for Bosnian ways and feelings.” Addressing IFOR commanders, Haukland cautioned

that while “providing security is the primary task 

. . . you also have to show the local population that

you care for them. It’s very important to have good

relations with the people. . . . They are proud people who want to be masters in their own house.”32

MULTIPLE PLAYERS

Although the U.S. government reserves the right 

to act unilaterally in defending its foreign policy

interests, as in Operation Just Cause, each U.S. military deployment from the beginning of the

post–Cold War period to the present has been as

part of a multilateral force. Operation Provide

Comfort involved participants from more than

twenty nations, Restore Hope had thirty-five, Able

Sentry fourteen, Support Hope seventeen, Uphold

Democracy twenty-seven, and Joint Endeavor

more than thirty. The complexity of peace operations increases even more with the presence of numerous nongovernmental organizations in an

operational sector. For example, 132 NGOs were

registered with the United Nations during Restore

Hope, 70 during Support Hope, and 164 are registered and operating throughout Bosnia. Not only

have NGOs been increasing in numbers, but the

scope of their missions has been expanding. In addition to their traditional functions of relief and development, more NGOs are including early

warning, human rights monitoring, and conflict

resolution in their repertoire of activities.33 While

the army has expanded the role of the Civil-Military Operations Center to facilitate dialogue with

these relatively new actors, the coordination requirements will increase as many more new players enter the field of contemporary peace

operations.34

The sheer number and diversity of the players

place increasing demands on commanders (especially those exercising command jurisdiction over

coalition forces) and bring with them entirely new

challenges. For instance, the court-martial of a private in a Canadian Airborne regiment for the torture and death of a Somali during Operation

Restore Hope, and the subsequent investigation

into the causes of this tragic event, sent shock

waves through the ranks of the Canadian military.35 During the UN Transitional Authority’s

mission in Cambodia, soldiers in the Bulgarian

battalion were dubbed “the Vulgarians” because 

of widespread allegations of sexual misconduct.36

In Bosnia, investigations centered on allegations 

of black-marketeering, prostitution, and drug dealing among various members of the multinational

forces, resulting in the expulsion of nineteen

Ukrainian and four Kenyan soldiers.37 Russian

peacekeepers have allegedly diverted UN fuel supplies to Serb forces and have exchanged the services of east European prostitutes for diesel fuel.38

9
MEDIA INTENSITY

Contemporary military interventions are typically

carried out in low-threat zones, enabling relatively

unimpeded access by the media. Somalia serves as

a case in point. Most military personnel who witnessed the initial phases of Operation Restore

Hope on television vividly recall the scenes of U.S.

Navy Seals attempting to conduct a stealth

predawn landing on Somali beaches amid the

glare of news crews’ camera lights. While foreign

policy analysts continue to debate whether the

“CNN effect” has been more than a contributing

factor in recent U.S. interventions, there is no disputing the fact that today’s almost instantaneous

news coverage of crises across the globe has created an immediacy that heavily influences government decision making in Washington and the

conduct of operations in the field. One academic

observer sums up the phenomenon, stating, “Today, when the body of a single American is dragged

through the streets of Mogadishu, the American

government reverses its foreign policy and begins

a withdrawal from the country.”39 Similarly, thenUN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping

Kofi Annan lamented that the “impression has

been created that the easiest way to disrupt a

peacekeeping operation is to kill Americans.”40

The immediate change in the rules of engagement

(ROEs) that occurred after the media televised U.S.

troops helplessly watching members of Haiti’s

FAd’H (the Forces Armées d’Haiti, which comprised members of the country’s military and national police) beating exuberant pro-Aristide

protesters—resulting in the death of a Haitian

woman—further illustrates the point. The ROEs at

the time did not permit U.S. soldiers to intervene,

but they were changed immediately after the incident in response to public outcry and political fallout, so that soldiers could use both nonlethal and

deadly force to prevent the loss of human life.41

LACKING THE (OR LIMITED) RULE OF

LAW

All the interventions examined in this study occurred in either nascent or failed states with

nonexistent or ineffective judicial systems. Sheer

anarchy perhaps best characterized the situations

in Somalia and Rwanda. The legal systems in

Panama, Haiti, and Bosnia have been severely

marginalized, a problem compounded by

politicized, maladministered, or dismantled constabularies. The U.S. military has been called upon

frequently to facilitate and assist constabularyforce training in crisis-ridden countries. Such efforts have proved essential in reconstructing

societies in Panama, Somalia, and Haiti, and may

be initiated to a limited extent in Bosnia. 

In a draft report highlighting the military’s role

in recent interventions, William Rosenau examines several cases of military support in reconstituting constabulary forces, among them a

U.S.-sponsored police training course that included combined U.S. military patrols with local

constabulary forces. Marines and army forces

helped train what were called “auxiliary forces” in

Somalia, and army personnel were involved in

establishing a new constabulary after the Haitian

military was disbanded following the U.S. intervention.42 While the Justice Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance

Program (ICITAP) has responsibility for such programs, Rosenau argues that ICITAP “has been

hampered . . . [by] the lack of a clear mission, inadequate funding, an inability to deploy quickly and

operate with [the Department of Defense], and

poor access to effective personnel.”43 While Rosenau makes some valid points, ICITAP’s efforts in

Haiti have been extremely successful. To date, it

has conducted basic law enforcement training for

over five thousand personnel who staff the reconstituted constabulary, significantly enhancing the

prospects for long-term democratic stability. The

lack of an effective rule of law in Bosnia may also

place new demands on the military as the International Police Task Force is established. Although

there are legal restrictions on U.S. forces’ conducting law-enforcement training, the military has

proved to be the only institution capable of effectively performing this mission in the early stages of

a peace operation.

CONSTRAINED BY RULES OF

ENGAGEMENT

The 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team was

one of the first units in recent times to experience

the challenges associated with ROEs that restricted

combat activities in a combat zone. Following

Desert Storm, the battalion was charged with establishing a five-thousand-square-mile security

10
zone in northern Iraq in order to provide humanitarian assistance to and promote cooperation

among the country’s Kurdish groups by denying

access to Iraqi forces. In the course of expanding

the security zone, the battalion developed innovative procedures during chance encounters with

Iraqi forces. Once visual contact was made, infantry elements immediately began establishing

well-protected defensive positions. Bradley fighting vehicles were placed in overwatch mode (able

to provide a rapid response capability if hostilities

erupted), while other elements maneuvered

around the flanks of the Iraqi forces, which were in

sight but out of small-arms range. Continuous air

cover circled the engagement. Once a strong defensive position was established, unit leaders

would initiate negotiations with the Iraqi unit commanders, demanding their withdrawal from the

security zone.44 The battalion also used mortarlaunched flares to illuminate the area to assist in

checkpoint operations, to identify and observe belligerent forces, and to demonstrate a military presence and the ability to respond at will. This tactic

not only constituted a show of force but helped

magnify the capabilities of the U.S. forces.45

During the second UN operation in Somalia

(UNOSOM II), the Tenth Mountain Division’s

quick-reaction force most often operated on a

graduated response principle, which was determined by the existing ROEs and the necessity to

minimize collateral damage. Throughout the

operation, the graduated response technique gave

belligerents the opportunity to surrender without

resorting to violence beforehand. In a typical cordon-and-search mission, the unit would infiltrate

an area, establish a cordon, and then announce

over loudspeakers that the belligerents were surrounded and would be injured or killed if they resisted. If the belligerents failed to surrender, tear

gas would be used to encourage them to leave

peacefully. If they continued to resist, the unit

would use concussion grenades to enter the area

forcefully and apprehend the belligerents. While

the Somalia after-action report highlighted successes in applying these techniques, it also listed

several considerations that must be evaluated before deciding to use surprise or graduated response tactics, including proximity of innocent

bystanders and belligerents, vulnerability to

attack, and the potential for and consequences of

attracting crowds.

The fact remains that ROEs are complex, and

they have varied with each peace operation.

Soldiers have the inherent right of self-defense

(use of deadly force) when responding to a hostile

act. The ability to respond to hostile intent is generally more constrained, complex, and subject to

interpretation; as such, it has been limited in peace

enforcement missions. In Somalia, for instance,

there was some apparent confusion over whether

the use of deadly force had been authorized to prevent theft of weapons or equipment. For example,

did ROEs justify the use of deadly force against a

Somali who had just stolen a soldier’s night-vision

goggles? Although the rules called for a gradual response to hostile intent, the decision of whether or

not to allow deadly force in this case was never officially published.46

A review of after-action reports and recent articles on military operations reinforces the need for

clearly defined rules of engagement. Certainly, the

U.S. military has not been immune to the inappropriate application of force. Gunnery Sergeant Harry

Conde, a U.S. Marine, was convicted of aggravated

assault after firing his weapon at a Somali who had

reached into his vehicle to steal his sunglasses during UNOSOM II. Other unfortunate incidents have

led commanders to reiterate the acute need for

training, not only for U.S. forces, but for other coalition forces as well. In Somalia, the senior U.S. military leadership encouraged other coalition forces to

adopt the existing ROEs, which were modified to

accommodate the country’s political and social

conditions, and many units did so. Other senior

military officials, such as General Schroeder, commander of the U.S. humanitarian-relief intervention

in Rwanda, argue that the ROEs should be standardized to facilitate common training programs

across various countries’ military services.47

Lieutenant Colonel William Martinez, who

served with the Tenth Mountain Division in Somalia, writes about the need for unit preparedness:

“Part of the training process for any peacekeeping

operation must . . . be ROEs. Creating different scenarios or situations to help soldiers practice the

ROEs will help them clarify in their minds the situations in which they can or cannot fire. The time to

learn this is before coming under fire or getting

into a situation that could cost a life.”48

OPERATING IN AUSTERE

ENVIRONMENTS 

11
With the exception of the U.S. intervention in

Panama, each operation examined in this study

has taken place in a location devastated by a natural disaster or ravaged by conflict. In the aftermath of Florida’s Hurricane Andrew in 1993, for

instance, the region looked as if a nuclear weapon

had been detonated there. The city that suffered

the hurricane’s greatest intensity was left with a

substantially degraded infrastructure, and a majority of homes, buildings, and government facilities

along the twenty-mile path of the hurricane were

severely damaged or destroyed outright. In Somalia, civil war left the country in a similar state. Most

buildings had been damaged either during combat

or by looting for building materials. There was no

commerce, agriculture, functioning government

institutions, or operating utilities. The country had

seemingly collapsed into a failed state, immersed

in total anarchy. Much of the local population was

destitute and almost totally dependent on humanitarian relief.49 Since control over the relief supplies

became a sudden source of power and wealth, humanitarian-relief efforts often inadvertently contributed to the renewal of violence.50

For instance, in and around Rwanda and neighboring Zaire, U.S. forces were surrounded by thousands of Tutsi refugees dying from malnutrition,

exhaustion, and a cholera epidemic. Their systematic slaughter at the hands of the Hutus reached

genocidal proportions, and the mass exodus of one

of Rwanda’s major tribes became an instant

refugee crisis for Zaire.

DOMINATED BY SMALL AND

INDEPENDENT UNIT OPERATIONS 

Small, independent operations are the rule rather

than the exception in most peace operations, and

they place enormous demands on young, relatively inexperienced unit leaders. Army Times correspondent Jim Tice described the experience of

squad leaders charged with observation duties 

in Macedonia. One leader summed up his new

responsibilities: “When we trained for this mission, I heard all the hoopla that squad leaders

would run this, and team leaders would run that,

and I didn’t believe it. . . . But this is reality. If anything goes wrong, it’s my fault, or it’s the team

leader’s fault. They have placed great trust and

responsibility in us, and that is a good thing for a

leader. We couldn’t ask for more.”51

In Somalia, Tenth Mountain Division operations ranged from the battalion task force to the

small-team level. Most missions, however, were

performed at company level or below. In one article describing such operations, Lawrence Vowels

and Major Jeffrey Witsken note that “junior leaders

must be confident and competent to make quick,

hard decisions. . . . [The] decisions had to be made

while operating relatively independently and out

of communication range with their superiors.”52

Likewise, the relatively broad scope of independent, small-unit checkpoint operations placed extraordinary demands on junior leaders in northern

Iraq. Lieutenant Colonel John Abizaid, the U.S.

Army infantry task force commander during Provide Comfort, emphasizes this point: “The pressures on junior leaders to make the right decisions

were enormous, and there was great temptation to

put all checkpoints under centralized battalion

control.”53 Abizaid considers his decision to trust

the instincts of his subordinates to be one of the

primary reasons the mission succeeded. 

Similarly, Brigadier General Michael Hurbottle,

commander of UN forces in Cyprus, concludes,

“There is no doubt in my mind that the success of

a peacekeeping operation depends more than anything else on the vigilance and mental alertness of

the most junior soldier and his noncommissioned

leader, for it is on their reaction and immediate

response that the success of the operation rests.”54

Senior officers have noted the difficulties involved

in making snap judgments in an uncertain environment, recognizing that mistakes have been—

and will continue to be—made. 

For example, consider the many rapid decisions

Major Martin Stanton had to make, as he and his

company arrived on the scene of an impending

riot at a food distribution warehouse in Somalia:

I looked at the looters. My instructions were

pretty clear: I was to go and secure the food site

[but] faced with the anarchy before me, it seemed

the proper thing was to try to stop [the looting]. I

was confident I had sufficient combat power to

handle any armed resistance and that the infantry

platoon with me could secure the warehouse and

eject any looters.

I made the decision to hand out the food. . . .

Unfortunately, I did not understand one of the basic economic realities [that] relief supplies were

money. When I began handing out supplies it was

like handing out free money. . . . At one time, I was

12
13

convinced that unless something was done to

force the crowd back, our soldiers were in

immediate danger. . . .The threat to the troops was

such that . . . only reinforcements or an extreme

measure such as lethal violence could have prevented us from having people killed or injured. . . .

Handing out the food as a crisis-defusing

mechanism failed disastrously. I could have informed representatives of each tribal group that I

would hand out a portion of the food to them for

distribution. . . . This might not have worked for

several reasons. First, many of the people involved in the riot were refugees with no local

tribal affiliation. Second, the crowd was looting

the food store because of a lack of faith in the distribution supervised by their authority figures.

Third, I didn’t know if all players were on hand. I

could have alienated a large group of the population by unwittingly not including them. . . . I realize that my basic error was in looking at it from an

American frame of reference. . . .What I should

have asked myself was: Is it worth getting any of

my people hurt over? Is it worth killing any Somalis over? What are the consequences of doing

nothing?55

DEMANDING A VISIBLE PRESENCE

Unlike conventional combat operations, which

place a premium on stealth during patrol, peace

operations generally use patrols to demonstrate a

visible presence and to obtain vital intelligence or

to assess the situation in a particular area. During

Operation Provide Comfort, for instance, the 3-

325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team was involved in what became known as the “checkpoint

war” once it established its security zone. To keep

the feuding Kurdish groups from engaging one another and to keep the Iraqi forces in check, the

team developed a “flying checkpoint” technique,

in which a mounted force (typically infantry, combat engineers, and anti-armor vehicles) would

move into areas and establish hasty roadblocks

where Iraqi or guerrilla fighters were known to be

operating. The U.S. unit always had sufficient firepower—air cover and mortar support, plus a quickreaction force, including anti-armor and infantry

carriers—held in reserve for reinforcement or extraction if necessary.56

In Somalia, the Tenth Mountain Division’s

Cavalry Squadron Ground Troop frequently

performed checkpoint operations. After a daylight

reconnaissance, the checkpoint was established after dark and continued to operate throughout the

night. Two anti-armor vehicles were placed at a

road checkpoint site, with their crews using nightvision devices to assist in early warning. Two other

vehicles were held in reserve for immediate reaction or to intercept vehicles that did not heed an

order to stop. Even though it used a small force,

this tactic proved sufficient for a low-threat environment and was instrumental in maintaining a

visible presence in a very large humanitarian-relief

sector.57

In Haiti, “presence patrols” were employed for

this purpose. When conducting an area assessment, a patrol would move into a densely populated location, break down into squad-sized

groups, and then work a particular area. The same

squad would continue to operate in the area so

that the local population would become familiar

with the soldiers, who would often converse with

the residents and shopkeepers and convey standard themes, such as the purpose of the U.S. presence or the efforts being made to establish a

legitimate government. The patrols also updated

the Haitian citizens in their sectors on world and

national news. Finally, the patrols were used to

identify and assist in local civic projects, such as

putting a new roof on a schoolhouse or moving a

small market out of an unsanitary open-sewerage

area. This type of civic affairs operation proved so

successful that the Haiti after-action report acknowledged that “the American Soldier and his

presence on the streets, market places, parks,

schools, and businesses of the cities and on the

roads, fields, and villages of the countryside were

the greatest weapon present to prevent oppression. Professionalism and the proper attitude towards the citizens of Haiti established a standard

for the Haitian police and military to follow.”58

OPERATING PRIMARILY IN BUILT-UP

AREAS

Most recent military operations have taken place

in urban areas, drawing on special tactics that have

not been employed since the U.S. engagement in

Vietnam. The Tenth Mountain Division’s 2-87 Infantry Battalion, for example, was one of the most

active units during Operation Restore Hope and

was often involved in independent or combined

cordon-and-search operations in various Somali

towns. The battalion effectively employed an air-
14

borne command post to coordinate unit actions,

enabling the commander to move quickly from

one side of a town to the other. To minimize the

likelihood of friendly-fire casualties, vehicles were

clearly marked, and the unit developed a graphic

display technique to divide cities into numbered

blocks and then put up signs or paint buildings to

identify unit boundaries and facilitate easy reference and rapid movement. Smoke grenades or

paint bombs were used to mark buildings to be

searched. The unit found squad-sized search

teams to be most effective, requiring visual coordination between flanks before moving into new

buildings when searching

a zone. Concertina wire

was found to be effective

in cordoning off an area. 

During the Haiti operation, the division found

that belligerents could

easily move weapons

caches from building to

building undetected. In response, a shift from the “known point” technique

was developed. Under this modified system, cache

targets are plotted, and a zone or target area established, then the zone is occupied by infantry forces

to limit weapons movement. Active patrolling,

supported by information culled from human intelligence sources, was then used to pinpoint and

isolate the cache.59

Operation Uphold Democracy presented the

Tenth Mountain Division with other challenges as

well. While the operation occurred in a “permissive,” or unopposed, environment, the division

was able to use urban terrain tactics that worked

extremely well. Infantry commanders found that a

combined unit, consisting of military police, psychological-operations specialists, and linguistic

support staff, proved invaluable in conducting

routine operations. This combination of specialists accompanying the normal infantry maneuver

force proved essential in assisting Haitian nationals or detaining belligerents and was successful in

preventing or defusing violence.

The division also employed innovative crowd

control procedures to manage demonstrations,

including the fifty-thousand-strong protest in 

Port-au-Prince in late September 1994. The division’s intent was to avoid violence and keep the

crowd from destroying facilities and homes; it

found that doctrinally modified tactics worked

extremely well, among them: showing a unit’s

strength up front, incorporating psychological

operations in crowd control, using armor as an

intimidator, displaying a professional appearance,

and integrating military police with maneuver

forces to defuse situations with a high potential for

violence.60 CH-47 helicopters equipped with water buckets were placed on standby in case the

demonstrations escalated.

Prior to Operation Restore Hope, doctrinal tactics that applied to army

aviation operating over urban terrain were limited. In

fact, what doctrine there

was called for aircraft to fly

patrols on the outskirts of

urban areas. In Panama

and Somalia, however,

army aviation was selected

as the prime operational

component because of the limited air threat and

the need to minimize collateral damage. Army aviation units found the usual attack methods inappropriate because the urban environment limited

the utility of deploying more than a single attack

aircraft and because targets typically could be seen

only along a one-gun target line.61

REQUIRING PSYCHOLOGICAL

OPERATIONS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

INTEGRATION

The army has made great use of Psychological Operations (“psyops”) and Civil Affairs units in recent

peace operations, whose after-action reports all

reinforce the need to integrate these Special Operations Command forces with conventional units.

Over the past decade, their utility has increased

almost exponentially. Operation Uphold Democracy was the culmination of previous experiences

with this type of combined-unit approach, effectively incorporating recently developed psyops

and civil affairs procedures into all levels of the

planning process and the execution phase of 

the operation. The ability to prepare the area of

operations for programs—ranging from “cash for

I

n many cases, young military

leaders are faced with perhaps

the most important negotiation

challenges of their careers.
15

guns,” using an improvised chit system to make it

easier for the local population to turn in its

weapons, to activities coordinated with a variety of

NGOs to prepare the population for the return of

President Aristide—was instrumental in minimizing the level of violence.62

The ability of the U.S. military to work effectively with the many NGOs that respond to humanitarian crises has been enhanced by the

creation of a separate Civil-Military Operations

Center. Some observers argue that “NGOs have

felt uneasy working with the military” and that

“military leaders tend to regard NGOs as undisciplined and their operations as uncoordinated and

disjointed,”63 but the coordination activities of this

center have helped to break down the barriers of

different organizational cultures and the perceptions that separate these two different types of institutions. The Tenth Mountain Division used this

facility during the Hurricane Andrew disaster-relief

operation, when the center helped coordinate the

division’s efforts with those of more than eighty

NGOs in providing immediate disaster assistance. 

The lessons the division learned in Florida were

tested just three months later in Somalia, this time

in a situation that was significantly more complex

because of the hostile environment. Every operation since then has capitalized on the center’s ability to work closely with civilian organizations to

increase the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian relief efforts. Not only have Civil Affairs

units filled the need for more personnel in the

Civil-Military Operations Center caused by limited

staffing in the division’s G5 (civil/military operations) section, but their teams have been well integrated into conventional forces. In Somalia, for

example, these teams were attached to maneuver

units and helped establish credibility with local village leaders by providing routine medical and dental services and keeping residents informed of

ongoing military activities as well as world and national news. The relationships they established not

only helped defuse potentially hostile situations

but also served as a valuable source of intelligence.

REQUIRING EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS

Beginning with Operation Just Cause, when army

personnel negotiated the surrender of General

Manuel Noriega, negotiating with belligerent parties has been a recurring theme in recent U.S. military interventions. In Somalia, military leaders

down to the platoon level were involved in direct

negotiations with local clans when trying to determine how to equitably distribute relief supplies in

a humanitarian-relief sector. Senior officers were

also actively engaged in such efforts. The commanding general of the Tenth Mountain Division

and his senior officers were frequently called upon

to negotiate settlements between warring factions

and were directly involved in disarmament talks.

In a Military Review article, General Arnold recalls

that “Political negotiation was an area that required extensive coordination. The ARFOR [army

forces] was involved in negotiations with clan elders in each small town and village.”64 To illustrate

this point further, when the Tenth Mountain Division was deployed to Haiti, the quick-reaction

force platoon leader from the 2-14 Infantry Battalion had to respond to a situation in which a heavily

armed FAd’H member was being harassed by the

local population and had barricaded himself in his

house. Although a large crowd had gathered

around the house, the young platoon leader was

able to negotiate a peaceful resolution between the

two sides.65

Recounting his experiences in northern Iraq,

Lieutenant Colonel Abizaid confirms the importance of negotiations at the junior-officer level—for

example, during routine checkpoint operations,

when Kurdish guerrillas wanted to pass to attack

Iraqi forces, or when Iraqi civil authorities wanted

to pass in the opposite direction to arrest local

Kurdish leaders. In many cases, young military

leaders are faced with perhaps the most important

negotiation challenges of their careers.66
Although today’s military leadership correctly argues that fighting wars remains

the most difficult mission and must remain the primary focus of training efforts, commanders who have participated in recent

deployments maintain that operations other than

war differ significantly from conventional operations and, as such, require additional skills. The

ability of a unit to operate effectively in peace operations is directly linked to a leader’s ability to apply the supporting operational principles. The very

nature of these operations mandates a training

strategy that accommodates the challenges posed

by much more complex missions. 

In order to succeed—however success is measured in these types of operations—the army must

train commanders and staffs to deal with the lack

of strategic direction and to accommodate the

likely expanded scope of such operations. This requires a deeper knowledge of tasks and increased

proficiency in performing them. Units must be prepared to operate in an urban environment, employing unconventional tactics. They must know

how to conduct a cordon-and-search operation

and establish and operate checkpoints, and they

must be proficient in crowd control techniques.

They must be capable of performing effectively 

in austere environments with few sources of

intelligence. Finally, they must interact with people

of different political and cultural orientations, in

areas governed by few or no commonly accepted

rule-of-law principles. 

The challenge of training the military’s leadership and units to meet the new demands of waging

peace is significant. The interactions that typically

occur among coalition forces that have different

values and beliefs, and an expanding NGO community, are the first items to be addressed on the

training agenda. The presence of the media

throughout the area of operations also presents a

new challenge for soldiers and commanders alike,

since the inappropriate behavior of a single soldier

can be instantaneously broadcast around the

world, prompting national debates or public outcry. These factors—as well as the requirement for

soldiers to shift rapidly from providing humanitarian-relief assistance to conducting limited combat

operations—magnify the challenge. Finally, negotiation skills must be a training priority, as reiterated

in a recently published article in the military journal Parameters:

Officers and NCOs [noncommissioned officers]

will be in close contact with combatant and noncombatant groups in situations where decentralized diplomacy and on-the-spot negotiating skills

can defuse a volatile situation, possibly saving

American, allied, and noncombatant lives. We

cannot place the lives of those officers and NCOs

at risk by failing to prepare for the challenges of

negotiating under adverse conditions with individuals from different cultures. We have to find

ways to adapt our formal training of officers and

NCOs to develop the skills they will need in such

situations.67

Because of the unique nature of these types 

of missions and the likelihood that our military

will frequently be called upon to perform them 

in the future, the army must incorporate peace

operations training into all professional military

education courses, starting with the Basic Noncommissioned Officer’s Course and continuing 

on up to the Senior Service College. Units that are

likely to be deployed for peace operation missions

must adapt their training strategy accordingly. The

rest of this section will focus on how well the army

has responded to this challenge.

In each operation examined in this study, the

U.S. Army made some strategic and tactical errors.

3

16

THE RESPONSE
However, instead of trying to dismiss or downplay its mistakes, the army has painstakingly

documented them in an attempt to minimize the

probability of their recurrence in subsequent missions. During an interview well after Operation

Just Cause had been concluded, General Maxwell

Thurman, former commander-in-chief of the U.S.

Southern Command, did not hesitate to point out

that he had focused his efforts primarily on the

war-fighting phase of the operation, while neglecting its peacebuilding phase.68

Such candor is complemented by each operation’s comprehensive after-action reports, produced by the Center for Army Lessons Learned at

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The center, which normally sends a team on each operation, documents

events and provides specific recommendations for

improvement. It is through its observations and

recommendations that command and control procedures, management of the various battlefield operating systems, planning and staff supervision

techniques, organizational structures required for

similar missions, and other functions and procedures are improved and enhanced. The reports,

which average more than two hundred pages, may

provide hundreds of recommendations for improvement, which are then tracked to ensure they

are implemented within funding constraints or

submitted for further analysis. These documents

are a crucial part of the army’s training process.

Army Branch Service Schools rely on them to update doctrine and the supporting tactics and procedures that are taught in all professional military

education courses; units deployed on similar missions use them to design predeployment training.

By adopting such a holistic approach to training,

the U.S. Army is better prepared to operate effectively in today’s complex peace operations.

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

As a large, complex, and vital organization, 

the army relies heavily on training, as do other

branches of the armed forces. The army has always

maintained that the quality and effectiveness of 

its fighting force is directly linked to its education

system. The first major component of the army’s

training strategy lies in the formal service schools,

where commissioned and noncommissioned officers receive a firm grounding in the tactics,

operational concepts, leadership principles, and

military values that will make them effective leaders in the field. This section will examine how this

training component has adapted to today’s realities by evaluating recent doctrinal and instructional innovations in all of the army’s formal

schools.

Branch Service Schools 

The U.S. Army Infantry School has taken the lead

in revising its doctrine and instruction to reflect

post–Cold War operational challenges. The school

has included specific tactics for operations other

than war in all its recently published tactical manuals. FM 7-30, The Infantry Brigade, was published

in October 1995 and contains a twenty-page appendix on operations other than war. The basic

branch manuals covering infantry battalion and

company operations, FM 7-20 and FM 7-10, respectively, also have appendixes covering low-intensity operations. The changed nature of conflict

and increased frequency of post–Cold War missions resulted in the publication of FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, in 1992. Based

on a well-circulated conceptual article on peace enforcement operations, FM 7-98 is now being updated to incorporate many of the lessons learned

in the Somalia and Haiti operations as well as the

predeployment training for the current mission in

Bosnia. Because of the increase in the number of

operations in urban environments, a ninety-fivepage addendum to FM 90-10-1, An Infantryman’s

Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas, was issued in

October 1995, including seven new appendixes on

tactics. 

The Infantry School’s efforts to update doctrine

have been supplemented by a concurrent project

to develop a viable training support package for

units scheduled to deploy in peace operations.

This draft publication, TC 7-98-1, Training Support

Package for Operations Other Than War, will

contain detailed instructor notes, lesson outlines,

and slides to support classroom and field training.

Tactics that are likely to be needed in future missions are included so that a unit can quickly establish a predeployment training program focusing

on only those tasks that are likely to be performed

based on the initial mission analysis. This publication has been validated during numerous Joint

17
Readiness Training Center rotations and was used

to assist both the Tenth Mountain Division before

its deployment to Haiti and units undergoing predeployment training for Operation Joint Endeavor

at the Combat Maneuver Training Center. 

Supported by current doctrine that is relevant

to today’s operational environment, classroom instruction and field training have been adjusted as

well. The advanced course for officers is based on a

small-group instruction format that is led by highly

qualified captains and majors who have successfully commanded companies participating in recent operations or have been through rotations at

one of the combat training

centers; their experience is

invaluable in discussions

of doctrinal principles and

tactics. Six days are devoted solely to operations

other than war to ensure

that students have mastered the concepts. The

first two days include doctrinal reviews, small-group

discussions, and practical

exercises involving the sixteen relevant missions (see

note 2). The next four days

are devoted to staff exercises and after-action reviews, in which the students, acting as a battalion

staff, go through the deliberate planning process

for three separate missions. The first involves an

infantry battalion task force being deployed to a

riot zone in a large metropolitan area. The second

is based on a Central American scenario, where an

infantry battalion task force is assigned the mission of finding and destroying illicit drug laboratories; the scenario includes an opposing hostile

infantry battalion operating under the orders of a

drug cartel in the task force’s operational sector.

The final exercise involves a noncombatant evacuation operation on the fictitious island of Cortina.

The deliberate planning for these types of missions

reinforces doctrinal principles and supporting tactics. The advanced course also televises the monthly National Training Center and Joint Readiness

Training Center teleconferences, during which

performance trends based on recent unit rotations

are candidly discussed.

The basic course for officers focuses on developing platoon leaders’ combat skills. Each class is organized as a platoon, rotating leadership positions

throughout the sixteen-week course. Each platoon

has a captain and two noncommissioned officers to

advise and lead students through the course. The

culmination of the basic course is a five-day field

training exercise, where the young officers’ tactical

knowledge is tested in a simulated combat environment. In addition to conventional operations, the

exercise exposes the officers to typical peace operation scenarios (that is, those that are constrained by

rules of engagement, occur in urban settings, and

require negotiations to end

disputes).

The small-group discussion approach is also used

at the Infantry School’s

Noncommissioned Officer

Academy. Although the

program of instruction devotes only one hour to operations other than war,

NCOs with experience in

peace operations attend almost every class, and their

contributions to the typical

dialogue that occurs in the

small groups give others

the flavor of such missions.

Similar efforts have been undertaken at the

Army Armor School. The Armored and Mechanized Infantry doctrinal manuals, from the company up through the brigade levels (Field Manuals

71-1 through 71-3), have been or are being updated to incorporate separate chapters on operations other than war. While the training focus

within the armor community appropriately remains on the critical combat tasks that are expected on high- to mid-intensity battlefields, a

concurrent training strategy has been implemented to make junior leaders proficient in the

tactics employed during peace operations. 

In addition to presenting and discussing principles of operations other than war in the NCO

Courses and the Basic and Advanced Officer

Courses, training vignettes have been added to officer field training and situational training exercises. As part of the Basic Course’s ten-day tactical

training exercise, future armor and scout platoon

18

The support branches in the

U.S. Army—such as engineers,

military intelligence, military

police, and transportation—

have been equally active in

adapting their training to 

peace operations.
leaders have the opportunity to practice tactics

that are likely to be employed in peace operations,

such as establishing a hasty roadblock, conducting

area security, patrolling, constructing and staffing

observation and listening posts, and performing

convoy escort and security. This training is supplemented with small-group discussions of the

mounted force’s role in contingency operations as

well as lessons culled from recent operations. The

Advanced Armor Course has developed a five-day

module for operations other than war. The training encompasses a series of situational exercises in

a scenario similar to the situation in Bosnia, requiring tactics and procedures ranging from company

team to brigade task force. This instruction, which

is aided by recently developed mission training

plans, helps prepare armor officers for small-unit

leadership and staff duties.

The Army Aviation School has expanded its

doctrine to incorporate the lessons of recent operations as well. Its capstone doctrine, FM 1-100,

Army Aviation Operations, is in the final update

stage, now clearly delineating aviation’s combat,

combat support, and combat service support tasks

in operations other than war. The manual organizes these activities into three main categories: security and limited conflict, peacekeeping and

humanitarian-relief operations, and support to domestic authorities. FM 1-100 also provides detailed descriptions of likely missions, such as show

of force, noncombatant evacuation operations,

and peace enforcement. The supporting manuals,

FM 1-111 (Aviation Brigades), FM 1-112 (Attack

Helicopter Operations), and FM 1-113 (Utility

Helicopter Operations), are also being updated.

Capitalizing on after-action reports and interviews

with participants in recent operations, each of

these publications devotes significant attention to

peace operation missions. FM 1-111 has an eightpage appendix on operations other than war, and

FMs 1-112 and 1-113 reinforce the necessary tactics to operate effectively during these types of missions.

This evolving doctrine has enabled the aviation

community to provide the necessary orientation

for its junior leaders. As with other combat arms

branches, the aviation focus remains on combat

skills, but operations other than war are incorporated throughout the one-year flight training and

basic course instruction. Noncommissioned

officers are provided a doctrinal overview as part of

their course of instruction in the NCO Academy. In

the Advanced Course, the school maximizes simulation in its flight training and staff instruction, including a five-phase staff exercise, in which

students must plan for deployment, forced entry,

mid- and low-intensity combat, and follow-on

peacekeeping missions. The officers have the opportunity to observe probable outcomes when

their plans are run through such war-fighting simulation models, and concepts are reinforced through

detailed discussions when the simulation violates

the established rules of engagement.

The support branches in the U.S. Army—such 

as engineers, military intelligence, military police,

and transportation—have been equally active in

adapting their training to peace operations. Each

service school has incorporated peace operations

training into its curriculum and has integrated

field training to reinforce the instruction on doctrinal principles. Like the combat arms branches, the

combat support and combat service support

branches have tailored their training to accommodate their particular areas of specialization. For example, the military intelligence community has

adjusted its doctrine and force structure to focus

more on the human intelligence aspects of operations (as opposed to signals intelligence and satellite reconnaissance, which tend to dominate

mission planning for modern combat operations).

The Military Police School has taken a slightly

different training approach than others, one that is

well suited to the demands placed on the law enforcement community in peace operations. In addition to covering the normal doctrinal material,

the Noncommissioned Officer and Basic and Advanced Officer Courses have four primary areas of

focus: task and skill proficiency, understanding

the human dimension and attitude development,

camaraderie and team building, and leadership

competence. Instruction is based on a “Leadership

Excellence Model,” which places the student in

various roles based on staged situations that teach

and emphasize tasks, conditions, and standards

throughout each course of instruction. A former

Military Police School commandant notes in a recent article, “By using active student involvement

in scenario-based instruction, the course blends

the best of task learning with the key ingredient of

learning how to think in challenging situations.”69

19
Command and General Staff College 

As would be expected, the ten-month college that

prepares majors for staff duties, from the battalion

to the unified or specified command levels, has

expanded its instruction for military operations

other than war. In addition to being exposed to

these activities during the normal classroom

discussions that follow doctrinal readings, each

student attends a fifteen-day core course. 

The first three lessons cover in detail the general

concepts, principles, and activities surrounding

the root causes of conflict. As part of these lessons

(which are conducted in small groups), each student must give a ten-minute oral presentation on

one of the sixteen types of operations other than

war using a historical example. One lesson is devoted to an expanded mission-analysis model that

covers the military, diplomatic, and economic aspects of national power; the model is then applied

to a case study of Operation Provide Comfort.

Once the students have demonstrated a firm understanding of the technique, they conduct a mission analysis of Vietnam using an early-1960s

frame of reference. This is followed by a role-playing exercise set in a pre-occupation Haiti scenario,

where the students are required to develop a

course-of-action decision brief for a commanderin-chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command. 

Other lessons cover senior-level leadership responsibilities, which include developing the desired end state, success criteria, vision, and

supporting unit-training strategy. Separate sections are devoted to peacebuilding, counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, domestic support,

antinarcotics operations, and humanitarian-relief

assistance. These classes are supplemented with

presentations by guest speakers from the State Department, the Federal Emergency Management

Agency, and noted experts in a variety of fields. Selected case studies are also discussed, such as the

counterinsurgency operations in El Salvador and,

more recently and closer to home, the 1989 San

Francisco earthquake and 1992 Los Angeles riots.

The course concludes with mission analysis and

decision briefs for hypothetical follow-on missions

in Rwanda and Bosnia.

The Command and General Staff College has

developed elective courses in logistics for operations other than war, military assistance in civilian

reconstruction, and peace operations, which are

similar in design and content to the Army War College classes discussed below. Students may also

take a “Research in Military Operations Other

Than War” elective and write a monograph for possible publication.

Army War College 

The army’s senior leadership course exposes officers to stability operations concepts and principles

during a ten-month period of instruction. As part

of its core curriculum, the course requires each

student to take a separate, one-week class in

operations other than war. The first two days are

devoted to discussions of the concepts and principles contained in army and joint publications and

recently published articles, reinforced by discussions of a study of Operation Restore Hope and

guest speaker presentations. The last three days

are devoted to a contingency exercise based on a

post-Castro Cuba scenario. During this exercise,

students prepare the command assessment and a

warning order for executive-branch officials after

receiving strategic guidance from the president

and secretary of defense, and conduct a comprehensive mission analysis and course-of-action

briefing for the theater commander-in-chief.

The Army War College curriculum also incorporates a two-week strategic crisis exercise conducted

in the latter part in the course. The exercise is set in

the early twenty-first century and is based on a

global scenario involving simultaneous military

conflicts in Bosnia, northern Africa, and southwest

Asia. It also involves scenarios in the areas of operation for the U.S. Pacific Command and Southern

Command, requiring a noncombatant evacuation

mission in Hong Kong, military-diplomatic interventions in a Spratly Islands dispute, and a border

dispute among Bolivia, Peru, and Chile. Within the

U.S. Atlantic Command area, the exercise requires

crisis planning for a series of natural disasters in the

United States. These planning exercises test the students’ ability to apply strategic and operational principles and concepts, requiring them to undertake a

leadership role in numerous governmental and

nongovernmental organizations as well as on the

various staffs of the relevant commander-in-chief.

These interactive exercises are aided by joint integrated contingency, crisis action, and game analysis

20
models to simulate probable outcomes of operational plans developed by the students. The variety

and complexity of the exercise scenarios provide a

rigorous basis for the practical application of conceptual principles presented in the core curriculum. They also give the students an appreciation 

for the roles of the various players involved in crisis

planning, as well as for the decision-making

coordination, integration, and synchronization

skills required to be an effective leader in the national security establishment.

The Army War College also offers three elective

courses that cover important components of peace

operations: “How to Negotiate: Strategy and

Process,” “Collective Security and Peacekeeping,”

and “Operational Issues in Peace Operations.” The

first course is designed to improve the student’s

negotiation skills through the use of a systematic

decision-making process that the student applies

to a series of increasingly complex practical exercises and case studies. The “Collective Security and

Peacekeeping” course not only covers basic concepts and principles but provides an analysis of

peace operation trends and concepts as they have

changed over the years. Each student must present

a thirty-minute briefing on an assigned case study,

covering the situation, mission, and outcome of

the operation and including an analysis of the tactics and procedures employed and the reasons for

the mission’s success or failure. The final elective,

“Operational Issues in Peace Operations,” focuses

on the strategic, operational, and tactical relationships in peace operations and the issues associated

with multinational efforts. Attention is devoted to

the military, political, and humanitarian dimensions of peace operations, with particular emphasis on command-and-control procedures, rules of

engagement, and transitional planning considerations. The course is supplemented with guest

speakers and panel discussions. 

UNIT TRAINING

The ability to fight and win this nation’s wars

remains the central focus of army training—and

properly so. For the past two decades, the army

has made incremental improvements in its ability

to train units for combat. In addition to its demanding home-base training, the army continually

upgrades its Combat Training Centers, which

remain the cornerstone of its training strategy.70

These centers, which use state-of-the-art training

equipment, including technologically sophisticated methods to simulate casualties and equipment losses, host task forces up to the brigade

level for intensive two- to three-week field training

exercises. During the course of a rotation, a unit

has the opportunity to practice many of its

wartime missions—including infiltration, search

and attack, passage of lines, attack/counterattack

by fire, and assault—against an expertly trained

opposition force permanently assigned to the center and familiar with the local terrain. After each

operation, after-action reviews are conducted that

detail the unit’s activities during the mission and

highlight causal factors for mission success or failure. Most unit commanders who have fought in

combat and participated in these exercises agree

that a combat training center rotation is usually

more difficult than the actual conflict. The goal is

for every combat arms battalion to go through a rotation at least once every two years.

The army has made equal strides in enhancing

the training made available to division and corps

staffs. The Battle Command Training Program,

part of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at

Fort Leavenworth, was designed to develop and

test the skills of division and corps commanders

and their staffs. During the typical “War-Fighter

Exercise,” commanders and their staffs go through

the rigors of the deliberate planning process, redefining the mission and developing the commander’s intent, the desired end state, success criteria,

and possible courses of action, based on a mission

tasking derived from a typical conflict scenario. After subjecting each alternative to a war game analysis, participants put together a decision briefing

recommending the optimal course of action. The

decision is then translated into a written campaign

plan, which serves as the backbone of what will become a series of computer-simulated battles. Like

the Combat Training Centers, the Battle Command Training Program has a staff that acts as an

opposition force, developing a plan that constitutes the other half of the gaming process. Over the

course of these two-week command-post exercises, adjustments resulting from the output of the

simulated battles are made to the base plan. These

exercises are typically scheduled once every two

years for each corps and division.

21
Focusing on this base-training methodology,

the remainder of this section will examine how the

army has adjusted the second major component 

of its training strategy to better prepare its units 

for the realities of the post–Cold War environment. A review of the Tenth Mountain Division’s

predeployment training strategies for Restore

Hope in Somalia and Uphold Democracy in Haiti

and the First Armored Division’s training for Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia will demonstrate

that the army’s training approach has capitalized

on lessons learned in each successive peace operation and has integrated new doctrinal concepts

along the way. In essence, the predeployment

training strategy for each mission has built upon

and improved the approach taken previously—the

army has never liked to reinvent the wheel.

Operation Restore Hope 

Operation Restore Hope (1992–93) was the second in a series of post–Cold War deployments that

would test the army’s ability to conduct humanitarian-relief interventions. Before discussing the

training plan for this mission, some background

on the division’s readiness strategy is in order. The

Tenth Mountain Division had tailored its training

to accommodate rapid deployment for combat operations in mid- to low-intensity combat zones.

The infantry battalion’s mission-essential tasks

were entirely focused on war fighting, including

tasks such as air-assault operations, attack/counterattack by fire, and defense in urban terrain. The

infantry battalion commanders had also reached a

consensus that cohesion; discipline; leader development; physical readiness; and frequent combined-arms, live-fire exercises strengthen units’

readiness. They focused their training efforts accordingly.71

In this case, the division had been given little

preparation time for the mission. Indeed, the first

combat unit to deploy to Somalia—the 2-87 Infantry Battalion—had only eleven days to prepare.

During this time, in addition to conducting a concurrent mission analysis with the division and

brigade staffs and undergoing normal administrative processing for overseas deployment, the battalion staff focused small-unit training on convoy,

checkpoint, and cordon-and-search operations.

They also conducted health and sanitation

training and a basic country-orientation seminar,

using a series of eight vignettes that had been developed to familiarize soldiers with the established

rules of engagement. Other units to be deployed

were taking similar approaches to predeployment

training. Meanwhile, the division headquarters

was focusing its efforts on deploying subordinate

units and continuing its mission analysis as the situation progressed and more information became

available. 

The division also sought the advice of recent operation participants and personnel with expertise

in Somalia. Lieutenant Colonel Abizaid, who commanded the 3-325 Infantry Battalion (Airborne

Combat Team) during Operation Provide Comfort

in northern Iraq, and Andrew Natsios from the

Agency for International Development were

brought in for this purpose. Their insights were instrumental in developing a predeployment training strategy that proved relatively effective, given

the short notice. In hindsight, crowd control and

negotiations were the only critical tasks that did

not receive adequate attention in the unit’s predeployment training plan.

Mission Fallout from Restore Hope. The U.S. and

UN missions in northern Iraq and Somalia not

only provided the impetus to expand army doctrine and professional military education, but also

resulted in other institutional changes that would

enhance the army’s ability to achieve its specific

military objectives in peace operations.

To this end, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute was established in 1993 as part of the Center

for Strategic Leadership at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Its mission is to study the strategic and

operational implications of peace operations, develop concepts and doctrine for the senior military

leadership, and refine interagency coordination

through studies, conferences, exercises, and war

games. As part of its training charter, the institute

developed an exportable training package for

units in the field and an annual peace-operations

command-post exercise for command-level staff

members. The institute has also been active in developing a predeployment training strategy for

subsequent peace operation missions.

The Army’s Combat Training Centers also undertook major changes as a result of experiences

relayed to them in successive post–Cold War

22
peace operations. The Joint Readiness Training

Center at Fort Polk was the first to expand its

peace operations strategy at the direction of its

head, Brigadier General Lawson Magruder, who finalized the design for two rotations that focused

entirely on peace operations.72 The first, in November 1993, was based on a border-dispute scenario that required a brigade-sized task force to

conduct a forced entry, establish a lodgment, move

to the disputed area, enact a defense, and conduct

a night attack. The exercise gave participants the

opportunity to cope with an unclear enemy, deal

with civilians and refugees in the combat zone,

and coordinate activities with the other governmental, nongovernmental, and media organizations in the area of operation. Units had to observe

the rules of engagement when separating the belligerents, demilitarizing a buffer zone, and protecting humanitarian-relief efforts and the local

population. The scenario also included sniper fire,

ethnic skirmishes, hostile checkpoint operations,

and ambushes along supply routes.73 The second

peace operation rotation was conducted in August

1994. While similar in design to the first rotation,

it was expanded to include the participation of a

division staff. The center now has the capability to

tailor a rotation to focus entirely on a peace enforcement mission. 

These exercises feature validated scenarios involving operations other than war, which are part

of each rotation. A typical exercise is based on a

scenario involving a conventional operation that is

tailored to the participating unit’s expected

wartime missions. However, commanders will undoubtedly experience the types of situations other

units have confronted in recent deployments, such

as dealing with local leaders, media, civilian

refugees, and other governmental and nongovernmental organizations that are operating throughout the simulated combat zone. All rotations

encounter this type of situation, but the degree

varies depending on the focus of the exercise.

Although the U.S. European Command prefers

to use the term “stability operations” when referring to peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, it has undertaken a similar effort to expand

the tasks performed at the Combat Maneuver

Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany.74 This

center’s training model includes a unit’s transition

to stability operations after it has participated in a

scenario that involves intense conventional operations. Adding a layer of reality to such training

operations, civilians, displaced persons, and reporters and camera crews appear throughout the

battlefield for the entire rotation. These preliminary efforts have been instrumental in establishing

base scenarios that were expanded for the units

undergoing predeployment training for peace operation missions in Macedonia and Bosnia. The

National Training Center has adopted a similar approach.

Even while Operation Restore Hope was under

way, the Center for Army Lessons Learned was

able to respond with training materials. Its special

edition Handbook for Somalia, published in January 1993, covered country orientation, emerging

doctrine, critical tactics, special techniques and

procedures units were using there, preventive

health and medical tips, and Somali customs. The

handbook was used to assist follow-on units in

their predeployment training. It was followed by a

seventy-page Operations Other Than War pamphlet, published in December 1993, specifically

devoted to peacekeeping and peace enforcement

operations. In addition to providing insights into

the type of environment in which these missions

occur, the pamphlet discusses in detail the tactics

and lessons learned from the previous checkpoint,

convoy, and military operations that had been conducted in Somali urban terrain. In July 1994, a

Handbook for the Soldier in Operations Other

Than War was published, containing descriptions

of many of the tactics and procedures developed in

recent operations; it also included tips on force

protection. The center has also produced recent

pamphlets for other missions, including civil disturbance, disaster assistance, and antinarcotics operations.

In addition to making the institutional changes

suggested by recent operations, the army began to

fill its ranks with officers experienced in peace operations who would play a vital role in assisting

with training leaders for subsequent missions. 

Operation Uphold Democracy 

Unlike the virtually impromptu deployment to Somalia, the Tenth Mountain Division had a month

and a half to prepare for its mission in Haiti; it received its warning order in early August 1994, and

23
the first troops did not arrive in country until September 19. In the interim, the division quickly

began planning for what was anticipated to be a

peace enforcement mission requiring a forced entry. While most of the soldiers in the division had

previously served in Somalia, normal personnel

turnover left roughly 25 percent of the officers in

need of leader training on the nature of peace operations.

The division selected as the lead task force its

First Infantry Brigade, which developed a comprehensive training plan consisting of a series of command post, field training, and live-fire exercises.

The brigade also conducted country orientations

and training in negotiations, media relations, and

other specialized topics. To achieve greater efficiency and standardization in preparing its maneuver battalions, the brigade developed three

situational exercise lanes, which took five days

each to complete. The first lane was devoted to defense of a fixed site and included tasks such as

handling detainees, controlling refugees, establishing hasty roadblocks, and conducting fixed-site security operations. The second lane, involving

daytime and nighttime company raids with a livefire exercise, required synchronization of fire-support elements, including Air Force AC-130

gunships. It also included convoy escort, reaction

to a live-fire ambush, and air assault and attack situations. The third lane was devoted to operations

in urban terrain, including a live-fire exercise and

civil-disturbance training. As part of the brigade’s

strategy, reinforcement training was devoted to

critical individual tasks; all soldiers were required

to qualify with their individual weapons and undergo training on the rules of engagement.75 According to the First Brigade commander, the rules

of engagement were the most difficult training

tasks, since separate rules were established for

each phase of the operation. This difficulty was

compounded by additional changes required as a

result of FAd’H members’ use of force against Haitian citizens.76

The contingency plan called for an air assault

launched from a navy aircraft carrier, requiring

supplemental training for the division’s aviation

brigade. Since conventional army aviation units

were not familiar with carrier operations, the

brigade’s aviators had to become deck-landing certified; this certification training occurred during

August aboard the USS Theodore Roosevelt. Fulldress rehearsals for the planned air assault took

place September 16–17 while en route to the area

of operation aboard the USS Eisenhower.

77

To assist in predeployment training, the Center

for Army Lessons Learned produced a handbook

in July 1994 providing an overview of the Haitian

political situation, tactics and procedures that

would likely be called for, and common conversational phrases in French and Creole. This

handbook was used as a country orientation and

tactical training aid for support troops.

While the units were executing their recently

developed training plans, the division headquarters, assisted by Fort Leavenworth’s Battle Command Training Program and the XVIII Airborne

Corps staff, was identifying the personnel requirements to operate as a Joint Task Force. Once the

additional personnel had arrived, including liaison

officers from each service and other government

organizations such as the State Department, the

staff immersed itself in the planning process. New

staff members were quickly trained on the division’s standard operating procedures and the mission analysis was updated to reflect the input of

the new staff. By reviewing lessons learned in Somalia, the division was able to organize for its present mission more efficiently. Because their use

would be limited, division artillery and air defense

personnel were used to augment the Civil-Military

Operations Center, which would once again play a

major role in the Haiti mission. By the time the division deployed, its headquarters was well organized and trained to assume the role of a Joint Task

Force.78

Follow-on Initiatives. During Operation Uphold

Democracy, the U.S. military was not only busy

training its own forces, but extended its expertise

to other participants as well. As part of the plan to

efficiently hand off control of the operation to the

UN Mission in Haiti, the army’s Battle Command

Training Program/Joint and Combined Operations Group was assigned to assist in training the

expanded staff. The stated objective of the training

program was to “produce a combined staff that can

plan, coordinate, and conduct UN peace operations in Haiti; . . . [build] a cohesive team with the

ability to perform deliberate and crisis-action

planning; and interact with the UN civilian staff,

24
Haitian Government, nongovernmental

organizations, the populace, and media.”79

The Battle Command Training Program

brought in personnel from the army’s branch

schools, the UN staff, and the U.S. Atlantic Command, as well as specialists on the country’s politics and society, such as the head of the Haitian

Institute at the University of Kansas, to teach a

structured week-long program of instruction and

to familiarize staff members with newly drafted

standard operating procedures. The training was

conducted March 5–10, 1995, in Haiti and consisted of a country orientation, discussion of the

roles and missions of other governmental and

nongovernmental organizations, refinement of the

deliberate planning process, three exercises involving civil-military cooperation, and initial military support planning for the scheduled

presidential elections. The program was well received by the two hundred military and civilian

participants and greatly assisted in the team-building process. The army’s after-action report attributes this program’s success to the personal

involvement of the incoming UN force commander, Major General Joseph W. Kinzer.80

As a separate initiative, army special operations

troops were active in training multinational force

participants from seven Caribbean nations. The

Third Special Forces Group developed a course to

reinforce basic infantry skills and build unit cohesion for what would become a composite Caricom

(Caribbean Command) Battalion set to deploy to

Haiti; this predeployment training was a significant factor in the mission’s success.

Throughout the Haiti mission, the Center for

Army Lessons Learned continued to produce relevant training materials, such as the Peace Operations Training Vignettes Newsletter, published in

March 1995. This was used as a training tool to orient the Twenty-Fifth Division (Light Infantry)

brigade task force that was scheduled to replace

Tenth Mountain Division units about to return to

their home base at Fort Drum, New York. The

newsletter contained a review of tactics and procedures for mission tasks such as patrolling, fixedsite security, checkpoints, cordon and search

activities, voting place security, and other operations. The Joint Readiness Training Center also

continued to play an important role in preparing

the units for peace operation duties. The Second

Armored Cavalry Regiment, the third combat replacement unit, went through a predeployment rotation that focused on Uphold Democracy’s basic

tasks, such as patrolling, traffic control, force protection, convoy escort, weapons seizure, and

quick-reaction force operations. The unit paid considerable attention to training on the rules of engagement, which was a vital part of each training

rotation. This specific training episode was significant, since it represents the first time a unit went

through predeployment training at a combat

training center, and was itself a universally acknowledged factor in the mission’s success.

Operation Joint Endeavor

The army’s European force has been redefining its

primary role ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm reinforced the perception of the U.S. Army in Europe

that it required a force-projection capability. Indeed, this lesson pervaded the military establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), ultimately giving birth to NATO’s Rapid

Reaction Corps. Appropriately, the training focus

went through a corresponding shift, from defending western Europe to preparing for contingency

operations elsewhere. Starting in 1993, training

strategy included peace operations rotations at major training centers for infantry and armored

brigades in the First Armored Division, a Battle

Command Training Program exercise based on a

Bosnian scenario, and planning exercises with NATO’s subsidiary Partnership for Peace (PFP) members. The latter exercises incorporated field

training on peacekeeping, search-and-rescue, and

humanitarian-relief operations.81 In September

1994, the “Cooperative Bridge” training exercise

was conducted in Poszan, Poland, with six NATO

and six PFP participants. This initial exercise led to

subsequent deployments with former Warsaw

Pact countries, which included peace operation rotations at the Combat Maneuver Training Center.

These exercises, along with peacekeeping operations in Macedonia, set the stage for the predeployment training strategy carried out by the First

Armored Division Task Force for Operation Joint

Endeavor.

As in previous operations, the division established specific qualifications for individual soldiers

25
and units before the deployment. Some of the general requirements included weapons qualification,

training in the use of protective suits and gas

masks, common soldier tasks such as first aid and

land navigation, dealing with the media, military

law, code of conduct, and friend/foe identification.

Theater-specific training focused on land-mine

awareness, cold weather injury prevention, checkpoint operations, rules of engagement, country orientation, and force protection. Crew and platoon

qualification training was also conducted, as was

training for rail- and air-load teams. 

Collective skills were enhanced through a series

of situational training exercises encompassing

rules of engagement, land-mine operations,

patrolling, checkpoints, assault, actions on the

objective, and logistical support. A series of firecoordination and deployment exercises were also

conducted. All this predeployment training culminated in the Combat Maneuver Training Center

validation exercises for deploying units; these exercises were linked to simultaneous division task

force command-post exercises that extended over

several months. 

In addition, a team from the Army Peacekeeping

Institute was brought in to assist in negotiation

training. The team’s guidance from the V Corps

Commander, Lieutenant General John N. Abrams,

was as follows: “Using a well-trained cadre of role

players, confront the command with a spectrum of

culturally accurate, interest-based situations designed to provide a laboratory in which the commanders experience the challenges of up to the

worst-case scenarios.”82 With the assistance of

Special Operations Command personnel and area

experts on the Balkans, institute personnel developed a series of simulations to facilitate the conduct of a “joint military commission” to resolve

contentious issues. In a series of role-playing exercises, Balkan leaders were played by personnel

who were well versed on the region’s political situation and familiar with the culture and leadership

style of the particular leader they were playing. Issues included determining meeting structure, adjudicating the control of separation zones, and

assessing potential violations of the peace accords.

These joint commission scenarios were integrated

throughout the command-post exercises and were

used to enhance the negotiating skills of the division’s senior leaders. 

Clearly, the division’s strategy encompassed the

lessons from other deployments and was specifically tailored to the demands of the Bosnian operation. In December 1995, the division was ready to

deploy after what was essentially three years of

preparation. 

26
As U.S. policy on the employment of military force has evolved from the Weinberger Doctrine to the operational

principles embodied in PDD-25, the army’s training strategy has evolved as well. As General George

A. Joulwan, commander-in-chief of the U.S. European Command, said, “With the end of the Cold

War, the U.S. military now has to focus on worldwide ‘peacetime engagements’ in operations other

than war with the same degree of commitment as it

prepared to fight and win its combat roles.”83 After

evaluating how the army has reoriented its training

strategy to accommodate post–Cold War realities,

it is evident that General Joulwan’s challenge has

been answered with enthusiasm and a commitment to excellence. The U.S. Army has been able to

maintain its war-fighting edge while simultaneously expanding its “playbook” to accommodate

the myriad tasks associated with contemporary

peace operations. Efforts to revise doctrine, professional military education, and unit training strategies have made the U.S. Army the world’s premier

peacekeeper.

The army has learned to operate comfortably

within the context of peace operations by learning

from past mistakes and applying new doctrine and

tactics. Its leadership understands the new operational principles of peace operations and knows

how to apply them. Clearly, such principles were

taken into account during the drafting of the Dayton Accords. Today, in a global political environment that confounds strategic guidance, the

military leadership seeks clarification of the desired political objectives before developing mission statements and proposing the necessary

forces to succeed. To better accommodate the expanded scope of contemporary operations, the

military has defined its role more explicitly by using specific language in peace accords and in congressional testimony.84

New procedures have been implemented to

maximize the human intelligence available to commanders and civilian leaders involved in interventions, and there is unprecedented cooperation

among the various intelligence agencies involved

in peace operations. Moreover, the army has intensified training in urban environments and routinely incorporates rules of engagement in its

exercises. Its Combat Training Centers have expanded their scenarios to incorporate peace operation missions, testing a unit’s ability to apply

appropriate small-unit tactics, whose success has

come to depend more and more on effectively integrating personnel from Psychological Operations

and Civil Affairs units. Predeployment training

covers detailed cultural orientations and incorporates simulations involving interaction with governmental and nongovernmental organizations, as

well as belligerent parties, in order to enhance negotiating skills. Additionally, the army has developed specific strategies to work with the media

more effectively, and it trains its leaders accordingly. More important, though, contemporary military thought has been expanded to consider the

tasks required beyond the immediate conflict or

crisis stage of an intervention. The army has devoted considerable attention to reconstituting constabularies and the rule of law in many of the

countries where it has been called upon to intervene, although there is little consensus on the military’s appropriate role in such tasks vis-à-vis the

civilian sector. Needless to say, such institutions

are necessary for the long-term security of the local

populations, and the military has proved a vital asset in this regard. During the Haiti intervention,

these efforts extended to the country’s judiciary,

where the State Department managed a seventeenmember team of U.S. military legal officers charged

with training and evaluating personnel in the Haitian judicial system.85

27

4CONCLUSION
To be sure, the army does not pursue these efforts on its own. Similar innovations are occurring

throughout the military and foreign policy communities and among other governmental and nongovernmental agencies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

has expanded its doctrine to include a capstone

manual on military operations other than war,

complemented by seven supporting publications,

including doctrine for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and domestic support operations.

Each of the theater commanders-in-chief has conducted exercises that include peace operation scenarios involving the participation of other

potentially relevant governmental and nongovernmental agencies. The Army Peacekeeping Institute

and the United States Institute of Peace conduct

ongoing interagency and NGO training and joint

seminars on conflict resolution. The military’s Senior Service Colleges have increased their spending requests to include nondefense participants.

The United Nations has expanded its training efforts as well. All these initiatives have helped to

break down the barriers of organizational culture

that once separated many organizations ostensibly

joined in a common endeavor; now there is a synergy that promotes unparalleled cooperation

among the various actors.

The number of peace operations has effectively

doubled—from thirteen during the Cold War to

twenty-six at present—and there is the potential for

many more such missions in the immediate

future.86 Indeed, a conflict-prone international environment portends the possibility of even more

frequent engagements. Because of this, the army

must continue to refine its training strategy to accommodate future challenges. Based on this research, three particular areas need renewed

emphasis. 

First, it is clear that small units dominate peace

operations. This reality notwithstanding, only a

two-hour block of instruction on operations other

than war is included in the curriculum of most

Noncommissioned Officer Academy courses.

Their instruction remains almost entirely focused

on the types of interventions characteristic of the

Cold War era. To prepare the army’s noncommissioned officers for the types of missions they are

likely to experience over the next few decades, the

curriculum must be expanded to reflect the nature

of contemporary conflict and appropriate intervention strategies.

Second, there is an acute need to improve the

negotiating skills of leaders throughout the army.

This requirement has not yet received adequate attention within the professional military education

system. Indeed, the only formal instruction offered

on this subject is an elective course at the Army

War College. Clearly, by institutionalizing structures such as “joint military commissions” down to

the battalion level, the army will minimize the risks

its commanders face with inadequate predeployment training. Army leadership training must be

expanded to fill this void, starting with the noncommissioned officer training courses. To reinforce this knowledge, perhaps the Combat

Training Centers could expand their repertoire of

training devices to incorporate negotiation simulations. Operation Joint Endeavor’s predeployment

training serves as an exemplary case in point.

Finally, the army must expand its training in urban terrain. Recent interventions demonstrate that

a combined-arms approach is necessary for mission success. However, personal observations and

numerous interviews indicate that most divisions

limit urban training to infantry units only. Aviation, logistics, field artillery, civil affairs, and other

appropriate personnel typically are not involved in

such training. Because this deficiency is a function

of inadequate training sites, the urban facilities

that are under construction at the Joint Readiness

Training Center should improve the army’s ability

to operate in urban environments. Site improvements are also necessary at the other combat training centers, branch service schools, and local

training areas. The Army Armor School has acknowledged this requirement and now has a major construction project in the design phase.

These shortcomings notwithstanding, the army

has generally kept pace with the rigorous and increasing demands contemporary peace operations

pose. This has not come without costs, however.

The increased frequency of deployments, coupled

with the burden of expanded operations training,

has increased the operational tempo of units to unparalleled levels. In a recent Army Times article,

for instance, Jim Tice reports that during a threeyear tour in Europe, soldiers in an armor battalion

spend 29 percent of their tour away from their

home base. Corresponding figures for a mechanized infantry battalion and the typical brigade

headquarters are 43 percent and 53 percent, respectively.87 These statistics were compiled even

28
before the Dayton Accords were signed and units

deployed for Operation Joint Endeavor. While the

operational tempo of tactical units in Europe was

driven in part by the potential deployment in

Bosnia, other divisions throughout the army are attempting to cope with a similar pace.

This situation begs a difficult and problematic

question: With increased mission requirements

and a continued decline in real defense expenditures, is the army capable of fielding forces for the

two “nearly simultaneous” combat missions envisioned in contemporary strategic planning and

conducting peace operations at the same time?88

The question should not be seen as a stark choice

for U.S. national security officials between a warfighting or a peacekeeping strategy for the nation’s

armed forces. Rather, it is a matter of ensuring appropriate and adequate resources for both. The

kind of balance and the priorities involved in

maintaining both basic missions will obviously be

part of the national debate, as reflected in the close

congressional scrutiny of the issues involved in

recent peace operations in Somalia, Haiti, and

Bosnia. 

The army obviously benefits from such discussion, since the ongoing review of the necessity and

requirements for such missions improves military

planning and provides better overall guidance for

long-term training needs. Indeed, it is remarkable

that the U.S. Army has achieved so much progress

in transforming its training strategies in light of the

relatively young debate over these types of missions and how they serve the national interest. 

We can expect such debate to continue, as the

United States assesses the potentials and demands

of its leadership in a world that is still reeling from

the massive geopolitical changes of the last half

decade. Undoubtedly, there will be more cases of

massive humanitarian tragedy and civil breakdown in states and regions that involve the national interest of the United States. The challenge

for the U.S. Army will be to build on its new base of

knowledge and tactics to serve the national interest in offering assistance and stability to these endangered populations.

29
1. The Tenth Mountain and First Armored Divisions have been heavily involved in successive

post–Cold War peace operations and so provide

a wealth of information on the U.S. Army’s preparation for and performance in the cases selected.

Of course, the marine corps, air force, and navy

have also participated in these or similar operations, but a comprehensive examination is beyond the scope of this study. For a comparative

assessment of army involvement vis-à-vis the

other service branches, see General Accounting

Office [hereafter, GAO], Peace Operations:

Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts, GAO/NSIAD-95-

51, March 1995; GAO, Peace Operations: Effect

of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on

Unit Capability, GAO/NSIAD-96-14, October

1995.

2. Joint Pub. 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense [hereafter, DOD], 1995),

lists sixteen types of missions: Arms Control,

Combating Terrorism, DOD Support to Counternarcotics Operations, Enforcement of Sanctions/ Maritime Intercept Operations, Enforcing

Exclusion Zones, Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight, Humanitarian Assistance,

Military Support to Civil Authorities, Nation Assistance/ Support to Counterinsurgency, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, Protection of

Shipping, Recovery Operations, Show of Force

Operations, Strikes and Raids, Support to Insurgency, and Peace Operations. See also Joint WarFighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander’s

Handbook for Peace Operations (Fort Monroe,

Va., February 1995): GL-5–8; and U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-23,

Peace Operations (December 1994): 2–12. 

3. Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace (New

York: Warner Books, 1990), 445–54.

4. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (New

York: Macmillan, 1993), 645–51. For a discussion

of the Weinberger-Shultz debates and subsequent modifications, see Stephen Daggett and

Nina Serafino, The Use of Force: Key Contemporary Documents, Report 94-805F (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service

[hereafter, CRS], October 1994).

5. White House press release, “Remarks by President Bush to Cadets at West Point Military Academy,” January 5, 1993.

6. See the transcript of the interview with Secretary

of Defense William Perry on “One on One with

John McLaughlin,” August 13, 1994; Anthony

Lake, “Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines:

Meeting New Security Challenges in the

Post–Cold War World,” address delivered at

George Washington University, Washington,

D.C., March 6, 1996.

7. A National Security Strategy of Engagement

and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], July 1994),

13. This White House document was later

echoed in a supportive national military strategy:

DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military

Strategy of the United States of America: A

Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement

(Washington, D.C.: DOD, February 1995).

8. A National Security Strategy of Engagement

and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: GPO, February 1995), 12–13, 16; see also the February

1996 revision, 18–19. 

9. Anthony Lake, “The Limits of Peacekeeping,” The

New York Times, February 6, 1994: 17. Still, General Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, and other senior officials have indicated

their support for involvement in operations other

than war, firmly rejecting the so-called Somaliasyndrome notion that the Pentagon should “only

do the big ones.” See General John Shalikashvili,

“Employing Forces Short of War,” Defense 95 3

(Autumn 1995): 3; Thomas E. Ricks, “Colin Powell’s Doctrine on Use of Military Force is Now Being Questioned by Senior U.S. Officers,” The

Wall Street Journal, August 30, 1995: A1; Bruce

30

NOTES
W. Nelan, “What Price Glory?” Time (November

27, 1995): 50–51.

10. The text of PDD-25, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace

Operations,” is reprinted in Mark M. Lowenthal,

Peacekeeping in Future U.S. Foreign Policy, Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: CRS, May

1994): 26–43. See also Nina Serafino, Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, Issue Brief 94040 (Washington, D.C.: CRS,

September 13, 1995): 2–3; Mark M. Lowenthal,

Peacekeeping and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implementing PDD-25, Issue Brief 94043 (Washington, D.C.: CRS, September 23, 1994): 1–9.

11. Stanley R. Sloan, Global Burdensharing in the

Post–Cold War World, Report for Congress 93-

982S (Washington, D.C.: CRS, October 1993).

12. General Gordon R. Sullivan, “Foreword,” in U.S.

Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-1,

The Army (Washington, D.C.: Department of the

Army, June 1994).

13. Specifically, the operations examined in this

study include Restore Hope (Somalia), 1993–94;

Uphold Democracy (Haiti), 1994–95; Able Sentry (Macedonia), 1993–95; Support Hope

(Rwanda), 1994; Provide Comfort (northern

Iraq), 1991–95; Joint Endeavor (Bosnia),

1995–96; and Hurricane Andrew disaster relief

(Florida), 1993.

14. Lowenthal, Peacekeeping and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implementing PDD-25: 1, 4–5.

15. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia

and Operation Restore Hope (Washington,

D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press,

1995), 40–43, 88, 144.

16. Tom Post, “Blues for the Blue Helmets,”

Newsweek (February 7, 1994): 22–23.

17. Adam Roberts, “The Crisis in Peacekeeping,”

Survival 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994): 93–120.

18. John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies

(Tokyo: United Nations University, November

1994), 36. (Also see the revised edition of this

work, forthcoming from the United States Institute of Peace Press.)

19. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-

5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of

the Army, June 1993), section 13-4.

20. Ivica Rajik, indicted war criminal at large and former Croatian militia officer, bluntly stated that

he was not afraid of arrest by NATO soldiers:

“What can NATO do to me? I run this town.” See

John Pomfret, “Wanted Man Tests NATO’s Mission,” Washington Post, December 14, 1995:

A37.

21. Interview with Major General S. L. Arnold,

Washington, D.C., January 9, 1996.

22. They included: assisting in the deployment of

the full contingent of UN forces, taking steps to

establish conditions that will permit the refugees

to return home to Rwanda, establishing and

managing an airfield hub in Uganda, and other

similar objectives. See the draft after-action report on Operation Support Hope by the Center

for Army Lessons Learned (Ft. Leavenworth,

Kans.), 17–18 (mimeo).

23. Edward J. Filiberti, “National Strategic Guidance:

Do We Need a Standard Format?” Parameters

25, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 42.

24. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., In the Aftermath of War:

U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation

Building in Panama Following Just Cause

(Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University

Press, August 1993), 17–24.

25. Shultz, In the Aftermath of War, 63–64. 

26. See the draft after-action report on Operation

Support Hope (mimeo, n.d.) by the Center for

Army Lessons Learned (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.).

Although the draft report made well over two

hundred observations on needed improvements, many of the problems could be attributed

to an ad hoc staff. For example, some of the

problems included a lack of understanding of

the functions of the joint staff, a lack of staff cohesion, unclear command-and-control relation31
ships, and a lack of established standard operating procedures for planning.

27. Richard A. Best, Jr., Peacekeeping: Intelligence

Requirements, Report for Congress 94-394F

(Washington, D.C.: CRS, May 6, 1994), 17.

28. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation

Restore Hope, 3 December 1992–4 May 1993:

Lessons Learned Report (Ft. Leavenworth,

Kans.: Center for Army Lessons Learned, November 15, 1993), section III.

29. R. Jeffrey Smith, “High-Tech Cooperation in

Bosnia,” Washington Post, January 19, 1996:

A30. According to the article, “At the heart of intelligence efforts in Bosnia is a brigade-sized unit

of the army’s V Corps consisting of more than

1,000 intelligence officers, analysts, signal officers, and counterintelligence specialists. Supplementing this group are dozens of small teams

composed of CIA, NSA [National Security

Agency], and Defense Intelligence Agency officers deployed in the field.”

30. Center for Naval Analysis, 1995 Annual Conference (Washington, D.C., October 26, 1995),

Breakout Session I, “The Military in Somalia—the

Wrong Tool for the Right Job?,” 5.

31. Louise Lief and Bruce B. Auster, “The Unmaking

of Foreign Policy,” U.S. News and World Report

(October 18, 1993): 35.

32. Bradley Graham, “Advice to an Incoming General: Be Firm, Friendly,” Washington Post, December 12, 1995: A28.

33. Lederach, Building Peace, 36–37.

34. See, for instance, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Conference

Report: Improving Coordination of Humanitarian and Military Operations (Washington, D.C.:

Department of State, June 1994).

35. Andrew Phillips, “A Few Bad Men,” Macleans

(March 28, 1994): 24–33. 

36. Dale Van Atta, “The Folly of U.N. Peacekeeping,”

Readers Digest (October 1995): 101–102. 

37. Post, “Blues for the Blue Helmets”: 22.

38. Lief and Auster, “The Unmaking of Foreign Policy”: 35.

39. John Adams, “The Role of the Media in Peacekeeping Operations,” Special Warfare (April

1994): 12–13.

40. Paul Lewis, “U.N. Official Reproves U.S. Over

Plan to Pull Out of Somalia,” The New York

Times, January 30, 1994: 10.

41. Altogether, five different sets of ROEs were established during Uphold Democracy. See Center for

Army Lessons Learned (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.),

Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, D-20 to D+40 (December 1994), 119–20.

42. William Rosenau, “Accepting the Unacceptable:

Peace Operations, the U.S. Military, and Emergency Law Enforcement” (paper presented to

the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces

and Society Biennial Conference, Baltimore,

Maryland, October 22, 1995).

43. Rosenau, “Accepting the Unacceptable,” 6–7.

44. Lawrence G. Vowels and Major Jeffrey R.

Witsken, “Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry,”

Armor (September–October 1994): 11–12.

45. U.S. Department of Defense, JULLS Long Report

No. 62714-89100 (06215), “The Use of Indirect

Fire Illum. in Supp. of Low Intensity and Peacekeeping Ops.” (mimeo).

46. Jonathan T. Dworken, “Rules of Engagement:

Lessons from Restore Hope,” Military Review

(September 1994): 26–34.

47. Lieutenant General Daniel Schroeder, “Lessons

of Rwanda,” Armed Forces Journal (December

1994): 31–33.

48. Lieutenant Colonel William Martinez, “Peace

Operations,” Infantry (May–June 1994): 39–40.

49. These are the personal observations of Colonel J.

Michael Hardesty, who served with the Tenth

Mountain Division during the Hurricane An32
drew relief operation (October–November

1993) and in Somalia (January–February 1993).

50. See Pamela Aall, NGOs and Conflict Management (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute

of Peace, February 1996); Stephen Buckley, “Aid

Groups Snared in African Violence,” Washington

Post, January 23, 1996: A9; Bread for the World

Institute, Countries in Crisis (Silver Spring, Md.:

Bread for the World Institute, 1996); ACTIONAID,

The Reality of Aid 95 (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1995).

51. Jim Tice, “Responsibility Comes Early,” Army

Times (October 30, 1995): 26.

52. Vowels and Witsken, “Peacekeeping with Light

Cavalry”: 29.

53. Lieutenant Colonel John P. Abizaid, “Lessons for

Peacekeepers,” Military Review (March 1993):

16–17.

54. See Joint War-fighting Center, Joint Task Force

Commander’s Handbook for Peace

Operations, passim.

55. Major Martin N. Stanton, “A Riot in Wanwaylen:

Lessons Learned,” Army (December 1994):

24–30. Emphasis in the original.

56. Vowels and Witsken, “Peacekeeping with Light

Cavalry”: 29.

57. Tice, “Responsibility Comes Early”: 26.

58. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation

Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions (Ft.

Leavenworth, Kans.: Center for Army Lessons

Learned, April 1995), section A-1.

59. U.S. Department of Defense, JULLS Long Report

No. 10450-55759 (00284), “Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures for Cache Strike Operations”

(mimeo).

60. U.S. Department of Defense, JULLS Long Report

No. 10447-74360 (00314), “Crowd Control

Techniques” (mimeo).

61. Center for Army Lessons Learned, U.S. Army

Operations in Support of UNOSOM II: 4 May

93–31 Mar. 94 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: Center

for Army Lessons Learned, n.d.), section I-6-1.

62. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation

Uphold Democracy (December 1994), passim.

63. Aall, NGOs and Conflict Management, 11;

Chris Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions (Carlisle,

Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic

Leadership, 1996), 5–8.

64. Major General S. L. Arnold, “Somalia: An Operation Other Than War,” Military Review (December 1993): 33.

65. U.S. Department of Defense, JULLS Long Report

No. 10446-58571 (00286), “Search and Clear—

‘Wait them out’” (mimeo).

66. Vowels and Witsken, “Peacekeeping with Light

Cavalry”: 17, 19.

67. William A. Stoft and Gary L. Guertner, “Ethnic

Conflict: The Perils of Military Intervention,”

Parameters (Spring 1995): 41.

68. Shultz, In the Aftermath of War, 16.

69. Brigadier General Salvatore P. Chidichimo,

“Training Leaders for a Force Projection Army,”

Military Review (March 1993): 20–25.

70. The army has three Combat Training Centers:

the National Training Center (California), the

Joint Readiness Training Center (Louisiana), 

and the Combat Maneuver Training Center

(Germany).

71. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Jim Sikes, former commander of the Second Battalion, EightySeventh Infantry, whose unit was the first to

deploy to Somalia from the Tenth Mountain Division on February 19, 1993.

72. The initial redesign began in January 1993 under

the leadership of Brigadier General George A.

Fisher, Jr., the center’s commanding general. The

project was finalized under Brigadier General

Lawson Magruder III, who assumed command

in July 1993 after an assignment as the assistant

division commander for operations in the Tenth

33
Mountain Division, where he served during the

Hurricane Andrew disaster relief operation and

as the Task Force/Kismayu commander in Somalia. 

73. U.S. Department of Defense, Catalog of Peace

Operations Training Activities (Washington,

D.C.: DOD, September 1994): 8–9.

74. Jim Tice, “The Busiest Major Command,” Army

Times, October 30, 1995: 22–24.

75. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation

Uphold Democracy (December 1994), 2–4.

76. Interview with Colonel Andy Berdy (U.S. Army),

Washington, D.C., February 22, 1996.

77. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation

Uphold Democracy (December 1994), 161–62.

78. Interview with Colonel Jim Campbell (U.S.

Army), former chief of staff for the Tenth Mountain Division during Operation Uphold Democracy, Washington, D.C., February 23, 1996.

79. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation

Uphold Democracy (July 1995), 67.

80. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation

Uphold Democracy (July 1995), 61.

81. Sarah B. Sewall, “Peace Operations: A Department of Defense Perspective,” SAIS Review

(Winter/Spring 1995): 128.

82. Interview with Colonel Ed McCarthy (U.S.

Army), Washington D.C., February 29, 1996.

83. General George A. Joulwan, “Operations Other

Than War: A CINC’s Perspective,” Military Review (February 1994): 5–10.

84. In Annex IA of the Dayton Accords, for instance,

the military’s role is clearly defined: “IFOR shall

have the unimpeded right to observe, monitor,

and inspect any force’s facility or activity in

Bosnia that the IFOR believes may have military

capability.” 

According to Secretary of Defense William

Perry, “The U.S. and NATO are not going to

Bosnia to fight a war. They are not going to

Bosnia to rebuild the nation, resettle refugees, or

oversee elections. They are not under UN control, and there will be no dual-key arrangement.

This force will have a clear line of command under NATO and a clear mission. That mission is to

implement the peace. The tasks of our forces are

clear and limited, and our soldiers understand

them. For example, they will mark and monitor a

four-kilometer-wide zone of separation between

the three factions. They will patrol this zone of

separation, and oversee the withdrawal of forces

and weapons away from the zone, back to cantonments. They will enforce the cessation of hostilities. The military objective of all of this is to

provide a secure environment in Bosnia, and

that will allow the international civilian organizations to start helping the Bosnian people rebuild

their nation, resettle refugees, oversee elections,

and achieve a stable balance of power.” See Perry,

Department of Defense briefing, December 11,

1995. 

85. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation

Uphold Democracy (July 1995), 152.

86. See, for instance, Thomas W. Lippman, “U.S. to

Back Burundi Peace Force,” Washington Post,

March 3, 1996: A3. Since President Clinton’s inauguration, the United Nations has undertaken

six new peacekeeping operations: Somalia (UNOSOM II), Georgia, Liberia, Haiti, and Rwanda.

Only Somalia involved U.S. troops, although the

United States contributed financially to the others. The late-1995 deployment to Bosnia took

place under the aegis of NATO, not the UN.

87. Tice, “The Busiest Major Command”: 22.

88. Current force planning is reflected in former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s The Bottom-Up

Review (Washington, D.C.: DOD, September

1993). For contending perspectives on the ability of the U.S. armed forces to accomplish this

mission statement, see Alan Tonelson, “Superpower Without a Sword,” Foreign Affairs 72

(Summer 1993): 166–80; Lawrence G. Korb, “An

Overstuffed Military,” Foreign Affairs 74 (November/ December 1995): 22–34.

34
Colonel J. Michael Hardesty was

the 1995–96 Army Peace Fellow

with the Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace at the

United States Institute of Peace.

Prior to his fellowship, Col. Hardesty was commander of the 46th

Adjutant General Battalion at Fort

Knox, Kentucky. He also served as

adjutant general for the Tenth

Mountain Division (Light Infantry)

during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and the

Hurricane Andrew disaster-relief operation in

Florida. He was deputy adjutant general with the

101st Airborne (Air-Assault) during Operations

Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Iraq. Following

his fellowship at the Institute, Col. Hardesty assumed command of the U.S. Army Garrison at Fort

Sam Houston, Texas.

Jason D. Ellis is a doctoral candidate at American University’s

School of International Service in

Washington, D.C. During 1995–96

he was Col. Hardesty’s research assistant at the United States Institute

of Peace. Currently, he is finishing a

coauthored book entitled Send

Guns and Money: Security Assistance and U.S. Foreign Policy

(Praeger 1997) and is completing

his doctoral dissertation on the Nunn-Lugar program for Soviet nuclear weapons dismantlement. 

35

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created by

Congress to promote research, education, and training on the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.

Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including

research grants, fellowships, professional training programs, conferences and workshops, library services,

publications, and other educational activities. The Institute’s board of directors is appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Chairman of the Board: Chester A. Crocker

Vice Chairman: Max M. Kampelman

President: Richard H. Solomon

Executive Vice President: Harriet Hentges

Board of Directors

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, 

Georgetown University

Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, Washington, D.C.

Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University 

Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, University of Notre Dame

Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University

Christopher H. Phillips, former U.S. ambassador to Brunei

Mary Louise Smith, civic activist; former chairman, Republican National Committee

W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts 

University

Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C.

Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

Members ex officio

Ralph Earle II, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Toby Trister Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research

Ervin J. Rokke, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National Defense University

Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

37
Peaceworks No. 12. First published February 1997.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily

represent those of the United States Army, the Department of Defense, the United States Institute

of Peace, the U.S. Army War College, or any other agency or department of the United States

Government.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

1550 M Street NW, Suite 700

Washington, DC 20005-1708

Phone: 202-457-1700

Fax: 202-429-6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Internet: www.usip.org

Other titles in the Peaceworks series:

Turkey’s Role in the Middle East: A Conference Report by Patricia Carley (Peaceworks No. 1)

Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption, and Identity by Nancy Lubin (Peaceworks

No. 2)

From the Managing Chaos conference:

Keynote Addresses by Les Aspin and Ted Koppel (Peaceworks No. 3)

Sources of Conflict: G.M. Tamás and Samuel Huntington on “Identity and Conflict,” 

and Robert Kaplan and Jessica Tuchman Mathews on “‘The Coming Anarchy’ and 

the Nation-State under Siege” (Peaceworks No. 4)

NGOs and Conflict Management by Pamela R. Aall (Peaceworks No. 5)

Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa by David R. Smock (Peaceworks No. 6)

Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession by Patricia

Carley (Peaceworks No. 7)

Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis by Vesna Pesic (Peaceworks No.

8)

Peace Operations and Common Sense: Replacing Rhetoric with Realism by Denis McLean

(Peaceworks No. 9)

State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military’s Role in Argentina, Brazil, and

Chile

by Wendy Hunter (Peaceworks No. 10)
UNITED STATES

INSTITUTE OF PEACE

1550 M Street NW

Washington, DC 20005 Peaceworks No. 12