II 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 588 

To impose sanctions and other measures in response to the failure of the 

Government of the People’s Republic of China to allow an investigation 

into the origins of COVID–19 at suspect laboratories in Wuhan. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 1, 2023 

Mr. RUBIO (for himself, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. MARSHALL, Mr. LANKFORD, Mr. 

CRAMER, Mr. WICKER, Ms. LUMMIS, Mrs. BLACKBURN, Mr. TILLIS, Mr. 

HOEVEN, Mr. DAINES, Mr. BRAUN, Mrs. HYDE-SMITH, Mr. SCOTT of 

South Carolina, and Mr. SCOTT of Florida) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To impose sanctions and other measures in response to the 

failure of the Government of the People’s Republic of 

China to allow an investigation into the origins of 

COVID–19 at suspect laboratories in Wuhan. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Coronavirus Origin 

5 Validation, Investigation, and Determination Act of 2023’’ 

6 or the ‘‘COVID Act of 2023’’. 


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1 SEC. 2. MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO FAILURE OF THE GOV2 ERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 

3 CHINA TO ALLOW AN INVESTIGATION OF SUS4 PECT LABORATORIES IN WUHAN. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—If, by not later than the date that 

6 is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

7 the President is unable to certify that the Government of 

8 the People’s Republic of China has allowed a transparent 

9 international forensic investigation of suspect laboratories 

10 in Wuhan to commence, including of the Wuhan Institute 

11 of Virology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (in this 

12 section referred to as ‘‘CAS’’), the President shall— 

13 (1) impose the sanctions described in subsection 

14 (c) with respect to— 

15 (A) individuals who hold positions of lead16 ership in the state-run CAS, including its affili17 ated institutes and laboratories, local branches, 

18 and universities; and 

19 (B) individuals who— 

20 (i) are officials of the Chinese Com21 munist Party, the People’s Liberation 

22 Army, or the State Council of the People’s 

23 Republic of China, including its subordi24 nate agencies, such as the Ministry of 

25 Science and Technology, the National 

26 Health Commission, the Chinese Center 


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1 for Disease Control and Prevention, the 

2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry 

3 of Emergency Management, and the Min4 istry of Public Security; and 

5 (ii) were involved in concealing the 

6 initial outbreak of COVID–19 in the Peo7 ple’s Republic of China from the inter8 national community, restricting the release 

9 of information related to the outbreak, un10 derstating the severity of the outbreak, or 

11 obstructing an international investigation 

12 into the origin of the outbreak; 

13 (2) prohibit Federal funding for any joint re14 search or other collaborative projects between United 

15 States-based researchers and CAS researchers 

16 across all academic fields, including those employed 

17 by the affiliated institutes and laboratories of CAS, 

18 its local branches or universities, or the science and 

19 technology enterprises based in the People’s Repub20 lic of China that were created by CAS or founded 

21 with CAS investment; and 

22 (3) prohibit United States-based researchers 

23 and institutions that receive Federal funding from 

24 engaging in collaborative projects involving gain-of25 function research of concern on viruses with individVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:35 Mar 10, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S588.IS S588

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1 uals or institutions based in the People’s Republic of 

2 China. 

3 (b) TERMINATION.—The requirements of subsection 

4 (a) shall terminate on the date on which the Government 

5 of the People’s Republic of China allows the transparent 

6 international forensic investigation described in that sub7 section to be conducted and concluded without— 

8 (1) imposition of restrictions on the scope or 

9 subject matter of the investigation; or 

10 (2) limitations on the access of investigators to 

11 physical sites, persons of interest, information on 

12 laboratory biosafety incidents, or relevant molecular, 

13 genetic, epidemiological, serological, and virological 

14 data. 

15 (c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions to be 

16 imposed under subsection (a)(1) are the following: 

17 (1) ASSET BLOCKING.— 

18 (A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall ex19 ercise all of the powers granted to the President 

20 under the International Emergency Economic 

21 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the ex22 tent necessary to block and prohibit all trans23 actions in property and interests in property de24 scribed in subparagraph (B) if such property 

25 and interests in property are in the United 


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1 States, come within the United States, or are or 

2 come within the possession or control of a 

3 United States person. 

4 (B) PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROP5 ERTY DESCRIBED.—The property and interests 

6 in property described in this subparagraph are 

7 property or interests in property of— 

8 (i) an individual described in sub9 section (a)(1); or 

10 (ii) any family member or associate 

11 acting for or on behalf of an individual de12 scribed in subsection (a)(1) and to whom 

13 that individual transfers such property or 

14 interests in property after the date on 

15 which the President designates the indi16 vidual for the imposition of sanctions 

17 under that subsection. 

18 (2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR

19 PAROLE.— 

20 (A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An 

21 alien described in subsection (a)(1) is— 

22 (i) inadmissible to the United States; 

23 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other 

24 documentation to enter the United States; 

25 and 


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1 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted 

2 or paroled into the United States or to re3 ceive any other benefit under the Immigra4 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et 

5 seq.). 

6 (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.— 

7 (i) IN GENERAL.—An alien described 

8 in subsection (a)(1) is subject to revocation 

9 of any visa or other entry documentation 

10 regardless of when the visa or other entry 

11 documentation is or was issued. 

12 (ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revoca13 tion under clause (i) shall— 

14 (I) take effect immediately; and 

15 (II) automatically cancel any 

16 other valid visa or entry documenta17 tion that is in the alien’s possession. 

18 (d) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.— 

19 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex20 ercise the authorities provided to the President 

21 under sections 203 and 205 of the International 

22 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 

23 and 1704) to the extent necessary to carry out this 

24 section. 


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1 (2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at2 tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a 

3 violation of subsection (c)(1) or any regulation, li4 cense, or order issued to carry out that subsection 

5 shall be subject to the penalties set forth in sub6 sections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Inter7 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 

8 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that 

9 commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) 

10 of that section. 

11 (e) EXCEPTIONS.— 

12 (1) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVI13 TIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply 

14 to any activity subject to the reporting requirements 

15 under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 

16 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intel17 ligence activities of the United States. 

18 (2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTER19 NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND FOR LAW ENFORCE20 MENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under subsection 

21 (c)(2) shall not apply with respect to an alien if ad22 mitting or paroling the alien into the United States 

23 is necessary— 

24 (A) to permit the United States to comply 

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1 quarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake 

2 Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force 

3 November 21, 1947, between the United Na4 tions and the United States, or other applicable 

5 international obligations; or 

6 (B) to carry out or assist law enforcement 

7 activity in the United States. 

8 (3) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF

9 GOODS.— 

10 (A) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and re11 quirements to impose sanctions authorized 

12 under this section shall not include the author13 ity or a requirement to impose sanctions on the 

14 importation of goods. 

15 (B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph, 

16 the term ‘‘good’’ means any article, natural or 

17 manmade substance, material, supply, or manu18 factured product, including inspection and test 

19 equipment, and excluding technical data. 

20 (f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

21 (1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms 

22 ‘‘admission’’, ‘‘admitted’’, and ‘‘alien’’ have the 

23 meanings given those terms in section 101 of the 

24 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101). 


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1 (2) GAIN-OF-FUNCTION RESEARCH OF CON2 CERN.—The term ‘‘gain-of-function research of con3 cern’’ means, with respect to the study of viruses— 

4 (A) the use of genetic engineering or nu5 cleic acid synthesis methods reasonably antici6 pated to increase a pathogen’s transmissibility, 

7 or pathogenicity to humans, or to alter a patho8 gen’s host tropism to include humans; 

9 (B) the use of serial passage methods in a 

10 laboratory culture or in laboratory animals rea11 sonably anticipated to increase a pathogen’s 

12 transmissibility, or pathogenicity to humans, or 

13 to alter a pathogen’s host tropism to include 

14 humans; or 

15 (C) any research conducted in a laboratory 

16 setting less than Biosafety Level Three that in17 volves pathogens or potential pathogens known 

18 to be, or that can be reasonably anticipated to 

19 be, infectious to humans through the inhalation 

20 route of exposure, and known to cause, or that 

21 can be reasonably anticipated to cause, serious 

22 to fatal disease. 

23 (3) TRANSPARENT INTERNATIONAL FORENSIC

24 INVESTIGATION.—The term ‘‘transparent inter25 national forensic investigation’’, with respect to inVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:35 Mar 10, 2023 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S588.IS S588

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1 vestigating the origin of SARS–CoV–2, means an in2 quiry that is objective, data-driven, inclusive of 

3 broad expertise, subject to independent oversight, 

4 and properly managed to exclude individuals with 

5 conflicts of interest and under which the following 

6 takes place: 

7 (A) Relevant research funding agencies, 

8 funding contractors, laboratories, and hospitals 

9 open their records to examination by the inves10 tigative team and grant the investigative team 

11 unfettered access to any and all facilities, per12 sonnel, and other sites of interest, and to any 

13 and all forms of epidemiological or virological 

14 data of interest, including serological records 

15 pertaining to the earliest confirmed or sus16 pected cases of COVID–19, or cases of similar 

17 illnesses that may have been misdiagnosed, 

18 which appeared in and around Wuhan in the 

19 fall and winter of 2019. Investigators document 

20 the veracity and source of the data upon which 

21 their analysis is based in a manner that allows 

22 independent experts to reproduce their analysis 

23 and validate any conclusions they may draw. 

24 (B) The international team is allowed to 

25 perform a full forensic investigation of the 


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1 Wuhan Institute of Virology, the Wuhan Center 

2 for Disease Prevention and Control, and the 

3 Wuhan Institute of Biological Products, and all 

4 other laboratories in Wuhan that the team 

5 might identify as warranting examination. The 

6 team is allowed to review the biosafety level 

7 under which bat coronavirus research was con8 ducted, and to interview any and all personnel 

9 currently or previously employed at those lab10 oratories, or related experts who may have in11 formation pertinent to the investigation. All lab12 oratory logs and notebooks kept by Shi Zhengli 

13 and other researchers at the Wuhan Institute of 

14 Virology who have conducted gain-of-function 

15 experiments between 2007 and the date of the 

16 enactment of this Act, as well as their published 

17 and unpublished work in Chinese and English, 

18 are presented in a full and unaltered condition 

19 for examination by the team. The team is given 

20 unlimited access to the full range of virus cul21 tures, isolates, genetic sequences, databases, 

22 and patient specimens stored at these facilities 

23 as well as all chimeric synthetic viruses grown 

24 in vitro by cell culture passaging or engineered 

25 by genomic editing between 2007 and the date 


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1 of the enactment of this Act. Such access must 

2 include the opportunity to examine the Wuhan 

3 Institute of Virology’s database of approxi4 mately 22,000 samples and virus sequences, in5 cluding 15,000 taken from bats, which was pre6 viously available to the public but taken offline 

7 in September 2019. The team is further allowed 

8 to examine in full all training procedures in ef9 fect at the laboratory prior to the pandemic, in10 cluding those pertaining to record-keeping and 

11 safety procedures and strategies to prevent the 

12 accidental escape of potential pathogens. 

13 (C) The investigative team analyzes in de14 tail all research related to the 293 bat 

15 coronaviruses reportedly identified by Shi 

16 Zhengli and her team at the Wuhan Institute of 

17 Virology between 2012 and 2015, particularly 

18 RaTG13, RaBtCoV/4991, and all other viruses 

19 from the abandoned copper mine in Mojiang 

20 Hani Autonomous County in Yunnan province, 

21 where Wuhan Institute of Virology researchers 

22 are known to have collected bat virus speci23 mens, including specimens of RaTG13, during 

24 the decade preceding the date of the enactment 

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1 tures. The Wuhan Institute of Virology dis2 closes the content of all classified and unpub3 lished studies that the Institute reportedly con4 ducted with the People’s Liberation Army if 

5 such studies involved gain-of-function research. 

6 The team is able to test all laboratory personnel 

7 for antibodies and other serological indicators 

8 of past infection of COVID–19. The team is 

9 given access to all other records kept by the 

10 Wuhan Institute of Virology, including security 

11 logs, surveillance video footage, audio record12 ings, and electronic logs of employees entering 

13 and leaving the facility. The investigative team 

14 is permitted to take samples and conduct test15 ing of the physical facilities where gain-of-func16 tion research has been conducted, including, if 

17 necessary, sewer samples. Unfettered access is 

18 also granted to the copper mine in Mojiang 

19 Hani Autonomous County in Yunnan province 

20 referred to in the first sentence of this subpara21 graph. 

22 (D) The international team is comprised of 

23 members chosen by the governments of the 

24 United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, 

25 France, the Netherlands, Germany, Australia, 


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1 Japan, and India. The team includes molecular 

2 biologists, virologists, epidemiologists, and ex3 perts in biosafety and biosecurity. Individuals 

4 who have previously ruled out the possibility of 

5 either zoonotic transmission or a laboratory 

6 leak are disqualified from participation. The 

7 Government of the People’s Republic of China 

8 may appoint Chinese experts to accompany and 

9 advise the team as it conducts its work in the 

10 People’s Republic of China, but the Government 

11 of the People’s Republic of China has no au12 thority to dictate the selection of team members 

13 and cannot obstruct the participation of any in14 dividual selected by the individual’s government 

15 for the team. The central, provincial, and mu16 nicipal authorities of the People’s Republic of 

17 China facilitate the work of the investigative 

18 team and refrain from imposing any restrictions 

19 on the scope, scale, and duration of the inves20 tigation. 

21 (4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term 

22 ‘‘United States person’’ means— 

23 (A) an individual who is a United States 

24 citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for perma25 nent residence to the United States; 


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1 (B) an entity organized under the laws of 

2 the United States or any jurisdiction within the 

3 United States, including a foreign branch of 

4 such an entity; or 

5 (C) any person in the United States. 

Æ 


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