2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-30-2011

USA v. William Colon

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 10-2549

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"USA v. William Colon" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 978.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/978
NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 10-2549

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

WILLIAM COLON,

 Appellant

_____________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. Crim. No. 09-cr-00297-001)

District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno

____________

Argued: April 28, 2011

____________

Before: BARRY, HARDIMAN and TASHIMA,

* Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: June 30, 2011)

____________

Keith M. Donoghue, Esq. (Argued)

Michael D. Raffaele, Esq. 

Brett G. Sweitzer, Esq. 

Elizabeth Toplin, Esq. 

Defender Association of Philadelphia 

Suite 540W 

601 Walnut Street 

The Curtis Center 

 

 

* Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
2

Philadelphia, PA 19106 

Counsel for Appellant

David L. Axelrod, Esq. (Argued)

Office of United States Attorney 

615 Chestnut Street 

Suite 1250 

Philadelphia, PA 19106-0000

Counsel for Appellee

____________

OPINION

____________

BARRY, Circuit Judge

William Colon received the statutory maximum of 120 months‟ imprisonment

after a jury found him guilty of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). In this appeal, he contends that the District Court erred in 

admitting the testimony of two jailhouse informants and in calculating his Guidelines 

range. We will affirm.

I. Background

A. The First Trial and the Motion in Limine

On April 30, 2009, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Colon with one 

count of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Trial began on September 16, 2009, 

and it ended with a hung jury.
3

Prior to the re-trial, the government moved to admit the testimony of two newly 

discovered witnesses, Hon Phock and Sica Lam. Each would testify that Colon had told 

them, while incarcerated at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, that he 

possessed a gun on the night in question because he was going to shoot a man named 

“Face” over a drug debt. 

Prior to the re-trial, the District Court first heard argument on the motion in limine, 

indicating that it understood Colon‟s argument “[t]hat it‟s going to be confusing, and . . . 

the prejudicial effect will outweigh the probative value.” (A104.) It ultimately decided 

not to rule on the motion until during the re-trial, at which time it explained,

I guess it has been said that he either was going to shoot someone, or he 

was going to shoot a drug dealer over a PCP debt. . . . [T]he fact that he was

going to shoot someone I think is a different way of saying that he had a 

gun.

Not that separate from that to that effect is also an admission. That is, you 

can‟t shoot somebody unless you have a gun. I think that‟s a reasonable 

interpretation. . . .

(A261.) Slightly later, it ruled,

[M]y take on what is going on here is that the statements by the two 

inmates would be admissible to the extent that they can testify that the 

defendant admitted to the possession of the gun in the night in question, 

and that the defendant had admitted that he possessed the gun because he 

intended to shoot someone that evening. 

. . . I find that both the possession of the gun and shooting someone would 

be intrinsic evidence. Additionally, under 404(b), that evidence would 

have proper purpose to show the circumstances of the case, and the reason 

why the defendant who now denies having the gun, had a gun that night. It 

would also be relevant in that this is a possession case, and the probative 
4

value, that is the admission, is not substantially outweighed by any amount 

of unfair prejudice.

(A264-65.) The District Court thus permitted Phock and Lam to testify that Colon 

admitted to possessing the gun because he was going to shoot a man named Face, but 

excluded any testimony as to a drug debt.

B. The Evidence at the Re-trial

1. The Officers

At the re-trial, the principal testimony was that of Philadelphia Police Officers 

Rollie Ramos and Joseph Slobodrian. Each testified that on the night of April 11, 2009, 

they were assigned to patrol Philadelphia‟s 25th District. While heading northbound on 

the 2900 block of 5th Street, they noticed Colon, whom they believed was walking 

suspiciously and had his hands near his waistband. Colon would not answer the officers‟ 

questions about what he was doing in the area and began to run.

Colon ignored the officers‟ repeated commands to stop and instead ran towards a 

lot covered in debris and glass. To prevent him from reaching the lot, Ramos discharged 

his Taser into Colon‟s back. Colon refused to place his hands behind his back and

instead attempted to run. After Ramos discharged the Taser two more times, the officers 

subdued Colon and placed him in handcuffs. Slobodrian, who actually cuffed Colon, 

testified that he was unable to cuff him as securely as he typically would. Slobodrian 

quickly frisked Colon, though he also did not do so thoroughly.

As Slobodrian led Colon to the police cruiser, Colon broke free. Although his 
5

hands were cuffed, he was able to access a hidden handgun and — according to 

Slobodrian‟s testimony — point the gun at both officers. The gun fell to the floor 

without being fired, but during the ensuing scuffle, Colon repeatedly kicked the officers, 

and the officers punched and kicked Colon. Ramos also discharged the Taser at him four 

more times. Colon was eventually subdued, and the firearm was recovered.

2. The Informants

Consistent with the District Court‟s ruling on the motion in limine, both Phock 

and Lam testified that Colon had informed them that he possessed the gun on the night in 

question because he was planning to shoot a man named Face.

C. Sentencing

At the sentencing hearing on May 27, 2010, the District Court adopted the PreSentence Report (“PSR”) in substantial part. The PSR calculated that the base offense 

level was 20, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4). It added two levels pursuant to § 

2K2.1(b)(4)(A), because the firearm was stolen; four levels pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(6), 

because Colon used or possessed the firearm in connection with another felony offense, 

and six levels pursuant to § 3A1.2(c), because Colon had assaulted a law enforcement 

officer during the offense.

The District Court accepted each of the enhancements except the two-level 

enhancement for the stolen firearm, yielding a total offense level of 30. Given Colon‟s 

criminal-history category of III, this yielded an advisory range of 121 to 151 months 
6

(without regard to the statutory maximum of 120 months). The District Court ultimately 

imposed the maximum lawful sentence of 120 months.

II. Discussion1

A. The Evidentiary Ruling

Colon‟s main contention is that by permitting Phock and Lam to testify that he 

intended to shoot “Face,” the District Court violated Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 

which provides that relevant evidence may excluded “if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. While 

Colon does not fault the District Court for permitting Phock and Lam to testify that he

had admitted possessing the gun, he argues that the additional information that he

planned to shoot Face would only inflame the jury.

Because the District Court explained its evidentiary ruling on the record, we 

review that ruling for abuse of discretion. United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 318 

(3d Cir. 1997). Colon cannot show such an abuse, for as we have previously held, a 

motive to commit gun violence may be properly admitted in a prosecution for unlawful 

possession of a firearm:

The Dissent questions whether motive is “relevant in a case such as this . . . 

[because] we are not faced with a situation where answering „why‟ would 

help solve the crime. . . .” Motive is one of the permissible purposes listed 

in Rule 404(b) not because the “why” helps solve a crime, but because it is 

highly relevant to show that a defendant had a motivation to commit the 

crime for which he is being charged. In a case like this, where Lee is 

 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
7

asserting that he never had a gun on the day in question, it is important to 

know that he had a personal motivation to possess a gun. Indeed, someone 

who is involved in an ongoing feud — a feud during which guns have been 

used — is far more likely to have a gun in his possession than someone 

who is not involved in such a feud.

United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 187 n.19 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted and 

emphasis added); see also United States v. Harris, 587 F.3d 861, 868 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(holding that evidence of gang membership was admissible because “[t]he testimony also 

reflected Harris‟s motive for possessing these particular firearms”); United States v. 

Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that evidence that defendant‟s residence 

“was a drug house” was relevant because it “gave Weems a motive to have the gun on 

him”).

In light of our precedent holding that evidence of motive is admissible to prove 

possession of a firearm, the District Court‟s evidentiary ruling was not an abuse of 

discretion.

B. The Sentencing Issues

Colon also challenges the two sentencing enhancements applied by the District 

Court that arose from his assault of the officers (that is, § 2K2.1(b)(6) and § 3A1.2(c)). 

We “review factual findings relevant to the Guidelines for clear error.” United States v. 

Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007). “When a sentencing court clearly errs in 

making factual findings, the resulting sentence will generally be deemed unreasonable 

and, subject to the doctrines of plain and harmless error, will result in remand to the 
8

district court for resentencing.” United States v. Ali, 508 F.3d 136, 143 (3d Cir. 2007). 

In applying these two enhancements, the District Court noted that “both officers 

testified that the defendant pointed the gun at them during the course of an arrest.” 

(A553.) As Colon argues, this recollection was incorrect; Slobodrian testified that Colon 

pointed the gun at him and Ramos (A302), but Ramos testified that he did not see the 

handgun until it had fallen to the floor. (A177.) This error was harmless, however, as 

Slobodrian‟s undisputed testimony that the gun was pointed at him was a sufficient basis 

for the District Court to apply the two enhancements. In other words, had the District 

Court found that the gun was pointed only at Slobodrian, its Guidelines calculations 

would have been identical. Because Colon does not raise a challenge to the substantive 

reasonableness of his sentence, we need not determine whether the District Court‟s 

incorrect recollection of Ramos‟s testimony might have been relevant under Section 

3553.2

III. Conclusion

We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

 

2 Colon also contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) exceeds Congress‟s power under the 

Commerce Clause. We have considered and rejected this argument, and as Colon 

concedes, we are bound by United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001).
1

United States v. William Colon,

No. 10-2549

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Because I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial, I respectfully 

dissent. 

This was a close case, and the 403 evidence played a pivotal role in the re-trial, 

which ended with a conviction, after the first trial ended in a hung jury. Two jailhouse 

informants, Hon Phock and Sica Lam, testified that defendant Colon admitted to them 

that he possessed a gun on the night in question, and that he possessed the gun because he 

intended to shoot a man named “Face” over a drug debt. The defense’s objection that the 

second half of this statement – about the purpose for which Colon possessed a gun –

should be excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 403 was overruled.

Although, as the majority points out, the District Court did state that “the 

probative value, that is the admission, is not substantially outweighed by any amount of 

unfair prejudice,” Maj. Op. at 3-4 (quoting District Court’s ruling), we have held that 

such a conclusory statement, without more, does not constitute a “rational explanation” of 

the trial court’s reasoning. United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 852 (3d Cir. 

1997), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 

(1999). The District Court’s reasoning on the Rule 403 objection is not apparent from the 
2

record in this case.1 Therefore, I believe our review of the District Court’s ruling on this 

point should be de novo. See United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 745 n.9 (3d Cir. 

1996); United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 781 (3d Cir. 1994). 

The majority concludes that the District Court did not abuse its discretion because 

“evidence of motive is admissible to prove possession of a firearm.” Maj. Op. at 7. Like 

the District Court, however, the majority engages in only half the inquiry required by 

Rule 403. Evidence does not need to lack any probative value whatsoever to be subject 

to exclusion under Rule 403. Instead, the Rule 403 analysis is a balancing test that 

requires the District Court to balance the probative value against the danger of unfair 

prejudice. The greater the danger of unfair prejudice, the more probative the evidence 

needs to be to pass muster under the test. See United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 319 

(3d Cir. 1997). 

The majority cites to our recent holding in United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170 (3d 

 

1

In an initial discussion with counsel of the defense’s objection to the 

testimony prior to trial, the District Judge appeared to be weighing the Rule 403 factors 

of probative value and undue prejudice. But the District Judge did not rule on the issue 

that day. Instead, he discussed the objection with counsel again in a sidebar during the 

trial. During this discussion, the District Judge focused mainly on the Rule 404(b) 

analysis, discussing, for example, whether testimony that Colon planned to shoot Face 

and that the shooting would have been over a drug deal constituted “intrinsic” evidence.

Eventually the District Judge concluded that the fact that Colon planned to shoot Face 

“would be intrinsic evidence” and “would have proper purpose” under Rule 404(b) “to 

show the circumstances of the case, and the reason why the defendant . . . had a gun that 

night.” He then made the conclusory statement that “the probative value, that is the 

admission, is not substantially outweighed by any amount of unfair prejudice.”
3

Cir. 2010), but that case is clearly distinguishable for several reasons. First, the court in 

that case found that the evidence in dispute was “highly probative.” Id. at 190. The 

defendant in that case had, like Colon, been convicted of being a felon in possession of a 

firearm. Id. at 174. He had stated to a police officer that he did have access to guns and 

would use them against anyone who threatened him or his family; however, he denied 

possessing any guns at the time that he was charged, and the government’s case was 

based largely on circumstantial evidence. Id. at 175-76. Lee’s statements about his 

willingness to shoot people, because they showed that he had a motive to possess a gun, 

were highly probative in the context of the rest of the available evidence. Here, in 

contrast, the government also offered testimony that Colon had admitted that he had a 

gun on the night in question. While the Face testimony does supply a motive for 

possession, motive is of little probative value when a flat-out confession is offered into 

evidence. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185 (1997) (the probative value

of a piece of evidence should be evaluated in comparison to the probative value of 

“evidentiary alternatives”); cf. United States v. Universal Rehabilitation Servs., 205 F.3d 

657, 667 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (deciding against Rule 403 exclusion in part because 

alternative evidence was not equally probative with the evidence in dispute). 

Second, the danger of unfair prejudice from the admitted evidence in Lee was far 

less than in this case. Lee had simply stated that he was willing to use guns in response 

to threats. But the testimony in this case was that Colon planned to commit a 
4

premeditated murder that was not motivated by self-defense. 

Here, the prejudicial effect of the statement was devastating – Colon was, in 

effect, being charged with a much more serious crime – premeditated murder – than the 

crime for which he was on trial. And the government, in closing argument, impressed the 

jury with this fact.2 The District Court gave no limiting instruction.3

In Old Chief, the Supreme Court was faced with a similar Rule 403 issue of 

whether, in a § 922(g) prosecution, the government was entitled to admit the identity and 

description of the prior offense, as well as the fact of the prior conviction. Noting that 

“there can be no question that evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense 

generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant,” 519 U.S. at 185, the Court 

answered the question in the negative. Id. at 191-92. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that 

evidence of the purpose or motive for which Colon was carrying a gun was highly 

prejudicial. And the District Court erred by not, explicitly on the record, weighing this 

prejudicial effect against the statement’s additional probative value, as required by Rule 

403 and our case law.

In the circumstances of this case, I cannot conclude that the error was harmless. 

 

2

The government referred to this testimony several times during its closing 

argument, noting at one point that Colon was out on the street because “he was going to 

hit up a man named Face. He was going to hit him up. He was going to shoot him.”

3 Colon did not request a limiting instruction and I am not suggesting that the 

District Court erred by not giving one sua sponte; however, the absence of a limiting 

instruction undoubtedly aggravated the prejudicial effect of the Face testimony.
5

Not only was this case tried twice, but the testimony of the Philadelphia police officers 

was riddled with inconsistencies, including inconsistencies with the Taser’s internal 

records. On the record of this case, I am unable to conclude that it is “highly probable” 

that the evidence “did not contribute to the jury’s judgment of conviction.” United States 

v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 219-20 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 

529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 1976)).

Because I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial, I respectfully 

dissent.