PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 

Agee, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 

BARBARA MEEKS 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 062452 SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 

 November 2, 2007 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 In this appeal, the defendant, Barbara Meeks, challenges 

her conviction for credit card theft, contending that the 

evidence was insufficient to prove venue in the City of 

Alexandria. 

I 

 Meeks was charged in a two-count indictment in the Circuit 

Court of the City of Alexandria with felony credit card theft, 

in violation of Code § 18.2-192, and with misdemeanor credit 

card fraud, in violation of Code § 18.2-195. Only the 

conviction for credit card theft is the subject of this appeal. 

A jury found Meeks guilty of credit card theft, and, in 

accordance with the jury's verdict, the trial court sentenced 

her to 30 days in jail. The trial court, however, suspended the 

sentence. 

 Meeks appealed the trial court's judgment to the Court of 

Appeals, alleging, inter alia, that the evidence was 

insufficient to prove that venue was proper in the City of 

Alexandria. A judge of the Court of Appeals, in a per curiam 
2

order, denied the appeal. Meeks v. Commonwealth, Record No. 

2773-05-4 (May 10, 2006). Thereafter, a three-judge panel of 

the Court of Appeals also denied the appeal. Meeks v. 

Commonwealth, Record No. 2773-05-4 (Oct. 23, 2006). We awarded 

Meeks this appeal. 

II 

 Pursuant to well-established authority, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 

prevailing party at trial. On May 27, 2005, Cheryl Ghauri, a 

mental health supervisor with the Fairfax County Community 

Service Board, was working in a group home in Fairfax County 

when she discovered that her wallet was missing. Ghauri's 

wallet contained several credit cards, including a Visa card 

issued by SunTrust Bank. Ghauri reported her missing wallet to 

the Fairfax County Police Department. 

 Also on May 27, 2005, Meeks was visiting her son at the 

group home. During a portion of her visit, Meeks and her son 

were alone on the home's first floor where Ghauri had left her 

purse containing her wallet. 

 Later that day, Meeks registered for a room under Ghauri's 

name at a Holiday Inn in Alexandria, using Ghauri's Visa card as 

payment. She also obtained $20 in cash from the hotel, using 

the card. The next day, the police found Meeks in a room in the 
3

hotel. Ghauri had not given Meeks permission to have or use her 

Visa card. 

 At trial, a hotel desk clerk identified Meeks as the person 

who had used Ghauri's credit card to pay for the room. The 

clerk previously had identified Meeks in a police photo spread. 

III 

A 

 Code § 18.2-192 defines credit card theft, in pertinent 

part, as follows: 

 (1) A person is guilty of credit card or credit 

card number theft when: 

 (a) He takes, obtains or withholds a credit card 

or credit card number from the person, possession, 

custody or control of another without the cardholder's 

consent or who, with knowledge that it has been so 

taken, obtained or withheld, receives the credit card 

or credit card number with intent to use it or sell 

it, or to transfer it to a person other than the 

issuer or the cardholder. 

Code § 18.2-198.1 provides, in pertinent part, that "a 

prosecution for a violation of this article [for offenses 

relating to credit cards] may be had in any county or city in 

which (i) any act in furtherance of the crime was committed or 

(ii) an issuer or acquirer, or an agent of either, sustained a 

financial loss as a result of the offense." 

 Meeks contends that her conviction for credit card theft 

should be reversed because the Commonwealth failed to prove that 

venue was proper in the City of Alexandria. She asserts that 
4

any theft of the credit card occurred and was completed in 

Fairfax County. She further states that, because the theft was 

completed in Fairfax County, her conduct in Alexandria "could 

not, as a matter of law, have been 'in furtherance' of the crime 

of credit card theft." (Footnote omitted.) 

 The Commonwealth contends, on the other hand, that a person 

who retains a credit card with intent to unlawfully use or 

transfer it is guilty of withholding the card and, therefore, of 

credit card theft. The Commonwealth further asserts that, 

"[w]hen there is a strong presumption that such person has 

committed an act in furtherance of the crime in a particular 

city or county, prosecution of the credit card offense is proper 

in that jurisdiction." 

B 

 When an issue of statutory construction is involved, the 

"[s]tatutory interpretation presents a pure question of law and 

is accordingly subject to de novo review by this Court." 

Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 634 S.E.2d 310, 

313 (2006). Therefore, this Court must "determine the General 

Assembly's intent from the words contained in [the] statute." 

Id. 

 In doing so, "the general rule of statutory construction is 

to infer the legislature's intent from the plain meaning of the 

language used." Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. Partnership, 255 Va. 
5

335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998). Thus, "[a]n undefined 

term must be 'given its ordinary meaning, given the context in 

which it is used.' " Sansom v. Board of Supervisors, 257 Va. 

589, 594-95, 514 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1999) (quoting Department of 

Taxation v. Orange-Madison Coop. Farm Serv., 220 Va. 655, 658, 

261 S.E.2d 532, 533-34 (1980)). Furthermore, "[t]he plain, 

obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is to be preferred 

over any curious, narrow, or strained construction," 

Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391, 395, 507 S.E.2d 608, 609 

(1998), and a statute should never be construed in a way that 

leads to absurd results, Washington, 272 Va. at 455, 634 S.E.2d 

at 313. 

 In deciding whether venue in a particular jurisdiction was 

proved, a court must determine whether the evidence, when viewed 

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, gave rise to a 

"'strong presumption' that the offense was committed within the 

jurisdiction of the court." Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 

36, 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990) (quoting Pollard v. Commonwealth, 

220 Va. 723, 725, 261 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1980)). This may be 

accomplished by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. 

IV 

 As previously noted, a prosecution for credit card theft 

"may be had in any county or city in which . . . any act in 

furtherance of the crime was committed." Code § 18.2-198.1(i). 
6

In the present case, therefore, in order to establish venue in 

the City of Alexandria, the Commonwealth was required to produce 

evidence that established a "strong presumption" that an act in 

furtherance of credit card theft occurred in Alexandria. 

 In Cheatham v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 286, 208 S.E.2d 760 

(1974), we addressed the crime committed when an individual 

"withholds" a credit card.∗ In Cheatham, the defendant was found 

in possession of a credit card that had been stolen in a robbery 

eleven days earlier. Id. at 287, 208 S.E.2d at 761. There was 

no evidence that the defendant had used or attempted to use the 

card. Id. at 290, 208 S.E.2d at 763. We stated the following: 

 So far as we can ascertain the word "withhold," 

as used in the context of the credit card theft 

statute, has never been construed. It must, however, 

import something more than mere retention, for mere 

retention could be consistent with innocent intent. 

The retention must be accompanied by an intent to 

deprive the owner of possession and to use the card, 

or to sell it, or to transfer it to a person other 

than the issuer or the cardholder. . . . But in the 

present case there is no evidence to show how long 

Cheatham had the credit card . . . or that he had any 

intent to use it, sell it, or transfer it. 

Id. 

 We now conclude that Cheatham wrongly added the element of 

retention to credit card theft. Credit card theft and credit 

 

∗

 In Cheatham, we interpreted the predecessor statute, former 

Code § 18.1-125.3 (Supp. 1974). Code § 18.2-192 contains the 

additional phrase, "or credit card number," but is otherwise not 

materially different from former Code § 18.1-125.3. 
7

card fraud are different offenses. If retention of a credit 

card may be prosecuted as credit card theft, the distinction 

between the two offenses is not made. Under the holding of 

Cheatham, a person could be charged with credit card theft in 

every jurisdiction entered while still in possession of the 

stolen credit card or number with the intent to use it. We hold 

that credit card theft is completed where the card or number is 

unlawfully taken from its rightful owner or is received with 

knowledge that it has been taken and with the intent to use it, 

sell it, or transfer it. To the extent that Cheatham is to the 

contrary, it is overruled. Venue in this case was, therefore, 

not proper in the City of Alexandria because the credit card 

theft was completed in Fairfax County. Accordingly, we will 

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and dismiss the 

indictment. 

Reversed and dismissed.