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14-P-1612 Appeals Court

CUMBERLAND FARMS, INC. vs. CITY COUNCIL OF MARLBOROUGH.

No. 14-P-1612.

Middlesex. May 11, 2015. - October 15, 2015.

Present: Cypher, Meade, & Massing, JJ.

Practice, Civil, Relief in the nature of certiorari. License. 

Municipal Corporations, City council. Administrative Law, 

Judicial review.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 

November 12, 2013. 

The case was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., on a motion 

for judgment on the pleadings. 

Carey H. Smith for the plaintiff.

Cynthia M. Panagore Griffin for the defendant.

CYPHER, J. Cumberland Farms, Inc. (Cumberland Farms),

appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court upholding the 

denial by the city council of Marlborough (council) of 

Cumberland Farms's application for a G. L. c. 148, § 13, fuel 

storage license. Cumberland Farms argues that the judge applied 
2

an incorrect standard of review and that he based his decision 

on improper factors.

Background. Pursuing a plan for a gasoline station and a 

convenience store in the city of Marlborough, Cumberland Farms

filed with the council applications for a special permit, see 

G. L. c. 40A, § 9, and for a fuel storage license, see G. L. 

c. 148, § 13. Two meetings of the council's urban affairs 

committee were held between June, 2012, and March, 2013, on the 

special permit application; because the council did not consider

the final conditions to the special permit, it issued by 

constructive grant on March 28, 2013. The urban affairs 

committee then discussed the fuel storage license application on 

May 21, 2013, and June 19, 2013, but failed to take action at 

the latter meeting. On August 2, 2013, Cumberland Farms filed a 

complaint in the Superior Court seeking injunctive relief to 

require the council to take action. Before the complaint was 

considered in that court, the council voted on September 23, 

2013, to deny the application for a fuel storage license,

without providing any findings or an explanation of its 

reasoning. 

On November 12, 2013, Cumberland Farms filed in Superior 

Court the within action in the nature of certiorari, see G. L. 

c. 249, § 4, seeking judicial review of the council's decision. 

Following a hearing on Cumberland Farms's motion for judgment on 
3

the pleadings, a judge denied Cumberland Farms's motion and 

affirmed the council's decision. Judgment entered, and this 

appeal followed.

Discussion. Cumberland Farms requests that the judgment be 

reversed, arguing that the judge erroneously applied the 

arbitrary and capricious standard of review to the council's 

denial and that his decision is based on anecdotal evidence and 

conjecture.

"General Laws c. 148, § 13, . . . does not provide a right 

of appeal to any court; in the absence of a provision for 

judicial review of [a licensing authority's] decision, G. L. 

c. 249, § 4, provides that an aggrieved person may seek relief 

in a civil action in the nature of certiorari. . . . We 

reaffirm that a civil action in the nature of certiorari is the 

sole relief available to a party aggrieved by a discretionary 

decision of a local licensing authority." Bermant v. Selectmen 

of Belchertown, 425 Mass. 400, 403-404 (1997) (footnote 

omitted). Compare Johnson Prods., Inc. v. City Council of 

Medford, 353 Mass. 540, 545, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 296 (1968). 

As such, Cumberland Farms properly sought relief through an 

action in the nature of certiorari. 

Under G. L. c. 249, § 4, the standard of review "may vary 

according to the nature of the action for which review is 

sought." Forsyth Sch. for Dental Hygienists v. Board of 
4

Registration in Dentistry, 404 Mass. 211, 217 (1989). For 

example, in Saxon Coffee Shop, Inc. v. Boston Lic. Bd., 380 

Mass. 919, 924-925 (1980), the substantial evidence standard of 

review applied where a revocation proceeding was required by 

statute and was adjudicatory in nature. See Receiver of the 

Boston Hous. Authy. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 396 Mass. 

50, 59 (1985). But in Forsyth Sch. for Dental Hygienists, supra

at 217-218, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review 

applied because the board was free to use its judgment and to 

exercise administrative discretion. 

Here, the judge properly found that the council's 

proceedings were not adjudicatory in nature. He correctly noted 

that G. L. c. 148, § 13, does not "provide narrow and objective 

criteria for the Council to apply in evaluating applications." 

Contrast Caswell v. Licensing Commn. for Brockton, 387 Mass. 

864, 878 (1983). The meeting at which the council voted to deny 

the application was not an evidentiary proceeding. The judge 

stated that council "members expressed concerns over a range of 

topics including leaks and accidents affecting the nearby 

reservoir, compensation for affected neighbors, hours of 

operation, lighting, noise and odors, sidewalks on Walker 

Street, traffic, use of the station by large diesel trucks, 

opposition from residents, and competition with existing 

businesses." These concerns were recorded in a transcript of 
5

the meeting as opinions of the members, not as factual findings. 

As such, it is clear that the decision of the council, acting as 

the licensing authority, was a discretionary action, meriting 

review only for an arbitrary or capricious decision. See E.A.D. 

Realty Corp. v. Selectmen of Shrewsbury, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 826, 

828 (1978). 

The arbitrary and capricious standard of review "requires 

only that there be a rational basis for the decision." Howe v. 

Health Facilities Appeals Bd., 20 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 534 

(1985). Furthermore, in exercising its wide discretion to issue

or withhold licenses, a licensing authority may take into 

account other factors affecting public interests and welfare.

See Scudder v. Selectmen of Sandwich, 309 Mass. 373, 376 (1941);

Kidder v. City Council of Brockton, 329 Mass. 288, 290 (1952). 

"There is no longer any room for doubt that factors [such as 

noise, traffic, and adjacent residential areas] may properly 

form the basis of . . . a city council's decision to deny an 

application under [G. L. c. 148,] § 13." E.A.D. Realty Corp., 6 

Mass. App. Ct. at 827. See Hood Indus., Inc. v. City Council of 

Leominster, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 646, 650 (1987). "Within the area 

of discretion the power lies in the licensing authority and not 

in the court." Scudder, supra.

1

 

1 The judge, sua sponte, wondered whether "[o]ne might also 

question a decision [under G. L. c. 148, § 13,] that amounts to 
6

In very similar circumstances, the court in Kidder, 329 

Mass. at 290-291, stated:

"The council may have reasoned that another station would 

tend to increase traffic at an already burdened 

intersection; that [vehicles entering and exiting the 

station] would further interfere with the free flow of 

traffic; that the risk of accidents to children and others 

would be increased; that there would be additional noise 

and odors; and that there was no counterbalancing public 

demand for another station in this immediate vicinity. 

These were considerations for the council to weigh . . . . 

They are not matters for the court to pass upon."

While the council here had no burden to "justify the denial 

of a license" and had no "duty to state reasons for the denial," 

Johnson Prods., Inc., 353 Mass. at 543, the judge carefully 

examined these concerns, as discussed, supra. We conclude that 

the judge correctly determined that there was a rational basis 

for the council to exercise its discretion and that the 

council's decision was not arbitrary or capricious. No error of 

law or abuse of discretion appears.

Judgment affirmed.

 

regulation of a permitted land use without the protection of the 

procedures, uniformity requirements, and de novo review provided 

by G. L. c. 40A, §§ 4, 17." This question was not raised in the 

present case. Neither party has based any argument on the 

constructive grant of the special permit, and in any event "[w]e 

perceive nothing in G. L. c. 148, § 13, as amended, or in 

c. 40A, which indicates to us that a decision . . . in a zoning 

matter is binding on the local licensing authority." Davidson

v. Selectmen of Duxbury, 358 Mass. 64, 67-68 (1970).