[Cite as Perry v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2011-Ohio-2831.]

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center 

65 South Front Street, Third Floor 

Columbus, OH 43215 

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 

www.cco.state.oh.us

RAY A. PERRY 

 Plaintiff 

 v. 

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION 

 Defendant 

Case No. 2010-09752 

Judge Joseph T. Clark 

Magistrate Matthew C. Rambo 

DECISION

{¶ 1} This case is sua sponte assigned to Judge Joseph T. Clark to conduct all 

proceedings necessary for decision in this matter. 

{¶ 2} On March 7, 2011, plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment. On March 

21, 2011, defendant filed a memorandum contra to plaintiff’s motion and a motion for 

summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(B). On March 28, 2011, plaintiff filed two 

responses to defendant’s motion. On March 30, 2011, plaintiff filed an additional 

response to the motion. The motions are now before the court on a non-oral hearing 

pursuant to L.C.C.R. 4(D). 

{¶ 3} With regard to plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, plaintiff argues that 

defendant did not timely respond to his settlement demand and that he is thus entitled 

to judgment in his favor. Plaintiff’s motion is not well-taken and is DENIED. 

{¶ 4} Civ.R. 56(C) states, in part, as follows: 
{¶ 5} “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of 

evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as 

stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from 

the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable 

minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party 

against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to 

have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.” See also 

Gilbert v. Summit County, 104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, citing Temple v. Wean 

United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317. 

{¶ 6} Plaintiff asserts a claim for false imprisonment based upon his allegations 

that he completed his two-year sentence for the crime of escape and should have been 

released from defendant’s custody on January 9, 2009, but was not released until 

August 2, 2010. 

{¶ 7} “False imprisonment occurs when a person confines another intentionally 

‘without lawful privilege and against his consent within a limited area for any appreciable 

time * * *.’” Bennett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 107, 109, 

quoting Feliciano v. Kreiger (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 69, 71. The elements of a false 

imprisonment claim are: 1) expiration of the lawful term of confinement; 2) intentional 

confinement after the expiration; and, 3) knowledge that the privilege initially justifying 

the confinement no longer exists. Corder v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1994), 94 

Ohio App.3d 315, 318. 

{¶ 8} In support of its motion, defendant filed the affidavit of Melissa Adams, 

who states: 

{¶ 9} “1. I am the Chief of the Bureau of Sentence Computation (BOSC) of 

[defendant] and have held this position for one year. My job duties include but are not 

limited to direct responsibility for the BOSC, direct supervision of 45 staff members, 

review of sentence computations to ensure accuracy and compliance with Ohio law, 
monitor, review and enforce BOSC policies, develop procedures relevant to inmate 

records, and oversee the training for BOSC staff. 

{¶ 10} “2. I have personal knowledge and I am competent to testify to the facts 

contained in this Affidavit. 

{¶ 11} “3. In March, 1993, [plaintiff], under Case No. CR291732, was convicted 

of felonious assault, aggravated burglary, and carrying a concealed weapon. His 

conviction and subsequent sentencing took place in the Cuyahoga County Court of 

Common Pleas. 

{¶ 12} “4. Plaintiff was incarcerated on April 6, 1993, under DRC #273-070, 

serving a three year term for a gun specification consecutive with eight to twenty-five 

years for the felonious assault and aggravated burglary charges. In addition, he 

received ninety-nine days of jail time credit, Accordingly, the maximum expiration of his 

sentence at that time was computed as December 21, 2020. 

{¶ 13} “5. Plaintiff was paroled on August 22, 2001 and was ordered to complete 

the remainder of his sentence under the supervision of [APA]. 

{¶ 14} “6. Plaintiff was declared at large on January 15, 2002 and was not 

restored to parole until April 7, 2002. Due to his time at large, eighty-two days of lost 

time was added to his maximum expiration of sentence changing it to March 13, 2021. 

{¶ 15} “7. Plaintiff then committed another felony and was incarcerated on 

September 30, 2003, under DRC #434-102, to serve a two year term for escape plus 

three years of post-release control. He was sentenced in the Cuyahoga County Court 

of Common Pleas under Case No. CR420801. His parole was revoked on the previous 

charges and his sentences were aggregated. 

{¶ 16} “8. Plaintiff was paroled on November 2, 2004, but was still required to 

fulfill his reporting obligations until the end of his sentences in Case. No CR291732. He 

was declared at large on November 15, 2004, and was not restored to parole until July 

30, 2005. Consequently, he was assessed 257 days of lost time for the period of time 

he was at large. 

{¶ 17} “9. In 2005, plaintiff was indicted for, and pled guilty to, escape in Case 

No. CR464744A. In light of his plea, plaintiff was sentenced to one year of community 

control under the supervision of APA. He was contemporaneously ordered to serve 
fifty-five days in county jail after which his community control in Case No. CR464744A 

was terminated and he was released. 

{¶ 18} “10. Despite the fact that plaintiff fulfilled his 

obligations under the court order in Case No. CR464744A, his duty to report as a result 

of his conviction in Case No. CR291732 continued. 

{¶ 19} “11. Plaintiff, however, was once again declared at 

large on September 29, 2005 and was not restored to parole until February 15, 2007. 

Consequently, he was assessed 504 days for time lost during the at large period. 

{¶ 20} “12. As a result of the lost time amounts, plaintiff’s 

maximum expiration of sentence changed to April 13, 2023. 

{¶ 21} “13. Since plaintiff failed to meet his reporting 

obligations, he was indicted for, and convicted of, escape in Case No. CR474846. 

{¶ 22} “14. Plaintiff was incarcerated on September 27, 

2007, under DRC #534311, to serve a two year term for escape plus two years for postrelease control. He was sentenced in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

under Case No. CR474846. On the court’s journal entry, the Cuyahoga County 

Sheriff’s Office was instructed to calculate jail time credit. 

{¶ 23} “15. On March 16, 2009 the court awarded plaintiff 

with 132 days of jail time credit, which was thereafter applied to this sentence by 

[defendant]. The expiration of plaintiff’s two year term for escape under Case No. 

CR474846 will occur on May 6, 2009. 

{¶ 24} “16. Plaintiff’s parole in Case No. CR291732 was 

again revoked and the maximum expiration of his sentence became, and remains, April 

13, 2023. 

{¶ 25} “17. Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Lake Erie 

Correctional Institution as a result of his conviction in Case. No. CR474846 and the 

revocation of his parole in Case No. CR291732.”1

{¶ 26} Based upon the undisputed averments made by Adams, the court finds 

that inasmuch as plaintiff’s lawful term of imprisonment does not expire until April 13, 

2023, defendant was privileged to imprison or supervise plaintiff at all times relevant. 
 With regard to plaintiff’s claim that the APA improperly revoked his parole 

following his conviction for escape in 2007, it has been consistently held that the APA’s 

decision to revoke parole is an exercise of an executive function involving a high degree 

of official judgment or discretion pursuant to legislative authority and, as such, is not 

actionable under the discretionary immunity doctrine. Johnson v. Adult Parole Auth.

(Feb. 15, 2000), Franklin App. No. 99AP-522; see also Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 

Ohio St.3d 68. 

{¶ 27} To the extent that plaintiff is challenging the sentences imposed upon him 

by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, it is well-settled that a plaintiff may 

not substitute an action in the Court of Claims for a right of appeal in a different court. 

See Hardy v. Belmont Corr. Inst., Ct. of Cl. No. 2004-09631, 2006-Ohio-623. “R.C. 

2743.02 does not embrace jurisdiction to review criminal proceedings occurring in 

courts of common pleas.” Donaldson v. Court of Claims of Ohio (May 19, 1992), 

Franklin App. No. 91AP-1218; see also Troutman v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 

Franklin App. Nos. 03AP-1240 and 04AP-670, 2005-Ohio-334. 

{¶ 28} Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that defendant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment 

shall be granted and judgment shall be rendered in favor of defendant. 

Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center 

65 South Front Street, Third Floor 

Columbus, OH 43215 

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 

www.cco.state.oh.us 

RAY A. PERRY 

 Plaintiff 

 v. 

 1

Plaintiff states in his complaint that he was released from defendant’s custody on August 2, 2010, and 

the court’s docket shows that plaintiff is not currently in defendant’s custody. 
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION 

 Defendant 

Case No. 2010-09752 

Judge Joseph T. Clark 

Magistrate Matthew C. Rambo 

JUDGMENT ENTRY

 A non-oral hearing was conducted in this case upon defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment. For the reasons set forth in the decision filed concurrently 

herewith, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and judgment is 

rendered in favor of defendant. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff. The clerk 

shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. 

 _____________________________________ 

 JOSEPH T. CLARK 

 Judge 

cc: 

 

Emily M. Simmons 

Assistant Attorney General 

150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor 

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130 

Ray A. Perry 

1550 Superior Avenue 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114 

MR/cmd

Filed May 27, 2011 

To S.C. reporter June 7, 2011