2021 IL App (1st) 191247-U

No. 1-19-1247 

Order filed March 31, 2021 

 FOURTH DIVISION

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent 

except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) 

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

JUAN MENESES, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of Cook County. 

No. 94 CR 28535 03 

The Honorable

William Raines, 

Judge, presiding.

 

 PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Justices Reyes and Martin concurred in the judgment.

 ORDER 

¶ 1 HELD: Defendant, who was 16 years old at the time of the offense, has 

established cause and prejudice to file a successive postconviction petition 

seeking a resentencing pursuant to the principles established in Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Pursuant to People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, 

we remand for resentencing. 
No. 1-19-1247 

2 

¶ 2 Defendant Juan Meneses, age 16 at the time of the offense, appeals from 

the trial court’s denial of leave to file a successive pro se petition for 

postconviction relief. 

¶ 3 The 16-year-old defendant was convicted after a jury trial of first degree 

murder and two counts of attempted murder and sentenced in 1997 to a total of 

60 years with the Illinois Department of Corrections. 

¶ 4 In his petition, defendant seeks a resentencing pursuant to Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012), the case which articulated the factors a 

trial court must consider before sentencing a juvenile offender such as 

defendant to life in prison. On appeal, the State concedes that defendant 

established cause for not raising his claim earlier but argues that defendant 

failed to demonstrate prejudice. The State makes one argument concerning 

prejudice: that defendant’s sentence is not a de facto life sentence as, at the time 

defendant was sentenced, he was eligible for day-for-day sentencing credit. See 

730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2) (West 1994). 

¶ 5 The State acknowledges that this court has rejected its argument

numerous occasions in multiple published opinions, and that our supreme court 

is expected to decide this issue shortly in a case that is pending before it. People 

v. Dorsey, 2016 IL App (1st) 151124-U, petition for leave to appeal allowed, 

No. 123010 (2020). The list of multiple published opinions includes: People v. 
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Peacock, 2019 IL App (1st) 170308, ¶ 19, People v Thornton, 2020 IL App 

(1st) 170677, ¶ 22; People v. Figueroa, 2020 IL App (1st) 172390, ¶¶ 27-35; 

People v. Daniel, 2020 IL App (1st) 172267, ¶¶ 21-26; People v. Quezada, 

2020 IL App (1st) 170532, ¶¶ 12-18; People v. Hill, 2020 IL App (1st) 171739, 

¶¶ 34-41. We decline the State’s request to find these appellate cases wrongly 

decided. 

¶ 6 The State “agree[s]” that, if we reject its argument, then “this Court need 

not remand for further postconviction proceedings, but should remand for 

resentencing consistent with Miller and its progeny.” As explained below, 

pursuant to People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, we vacate defendant’s sentence 

and remand for resentencing. 

¶ 7 BACKGROUND

¶ 8 Since the parties raise no issues concerning the facts established at trial or 

at sentencing, we summarize them below.

¶ 9 The evidence at trial established that on November 8, 1994, defendant 

and two fellow members of the Latin Kings confronted three members of the La 

Raza, a rival street gang, in an alley on the southwest side of Chicago. During 

the confrontation, defendant shot and killed Hiram Martinez, one of the three 

La Raza members. At trial, defendant testified that, when he observed one of 

the three La Raza members pull a handgun from his waist, defendant pulled out 
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his weapon and started firing while backing up. A forensic scientist testified 

that the hands of one of the La Raza members tested positive for gunshot 

residue. The jury found defendant guilty of Martinez’s murder and the 

attempted murder of the other two La Raza members. 

¶ 10 At sentencing, the trial court stated that it considered defendant’s age,

family background, and prior criminal history, including a prior armed robbery. 

Although the court stated, after it announced defendant’s sentence, that it had 

also considered defendant’s rehabilitative potential, it did not find that 

defendant was incorrigible or without rehabilitative potential. The trial court 

imposed a 60-year sentence for the murder, to run concurrently with two 

concurrent 30-year sentences for the attempted murders. Defendant’s 

conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Meneses, No. 1-97-3761 

(Aug. 11, 1999) (unpublished pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23). 

Defendant’s first postconviction petition was dismissed at the first stage, and its 

dismissal was affirmed on appeal. People v. Meneses, No. 1-00-3761 (Aug. 27, 

2007) (unpublished pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 11 ANALYSIS 

¶ 12 In the case at bar, the trial court denied defendant leave to file a 

successive pro se postconviction petition. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act 

(Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)) provides a statutory remedy for 
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5 

criminal defendants who claim their constitutional rights were violated at trial. 

People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21. 

¶ 13 Although our supreme court has made clear that the Act contemplates 

only one postconviction proceeding, “[n]evertheless, [the supreme] court has, in 

its case law, provided two bases upon which the bar against successive 

proceedings will be relaxed” (Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 22). The two bases 

are (1) cause and prejudice and (2) actual innocence. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, 

¶ 22. In the instant case, defendant alleges cause and prejudice. 

¶ 14 At this early stage, when a defendant is seeking leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition, he simply has to make “a prima facie showing of cause 

and prejudice.” People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24. To determine whether 

a defendant has made a prima facie showing, we apply a de novo standard of 

review. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 13. De novo consideration means that a 

reviewing court performs the same analysis that a trial judge would perform. 

People v. Van Dyke, 2020 IL App (1st) 191384, ¶ 41. 

¶ 15 Under the cause-and-prejudice test, a defendant must establish both (1) 

cause for his or her failure to raise the claim earlier and (2) prejudice stemming 

from his or her failure to do so. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 22 (citing People 

v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459 (2002)). The State concedes that 

defendant has established the first prong. The State’s brief to this court states 
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that defendant claims, “and the People agree, that he established ‘cause’ 

because he could not bring his claim until after the United States Supreme 

Court made Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which held that the Eighth 

Amendment prohibits mandatory sentencing of life in prison for juvenile 

homicide offenders like him, retroactive on collateral review in Montgomery v. 

Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718, 736 (2016).” Defendant was sentenced in 1997, over 

a decade before either Miller or Montgomery were decided. Thus, as the State 

concedes, defendant has established cause. 

¶ 16 With respect to prejudice, the State argues only that defendant’s 60-

year sentence was not a de facto life sentence because he was eligible for dayfor-day good-time credit. The State acknowledges that this court has repeatedly 

rejected this argument. Peacock, 2019 IL App (1st) 170308, ¶ 19, Thornton, 

2020 IL App (1st) 170677, ¶ 22; Figueroa, 2020 IL App (1st) 172390, ¶¶ 27-

35; Daniel, 2020 IL App (1st) 172267, ¶¶ 21-26; Quezada, 2020 IL App (1st) 

170532, ¶¶ 12-18; Hill, 2020 IL App (1st) 171739, ¶¶ 34-41. This court has 

written on this issue numerous times before and we adopt here what we have 

said before, without repeating it. Also, this issue is pending before our supreme 

court. Dorsey, 2016 IL App (1st) 151124-U, petition for leave to appeal 

allowed, No. 123010 (2020). Thus, we adhere to our precedent until, and 

unless, our supreme court directs otherwise.
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¶ 17 In addition, the State attaches a sheet to the appendix of its brief that 

purports to set forth defendant’s expected release date. If the State believed 

there was a need to supplement the record on appeal, it should have moved to 

do so. An appendix should be limited to documents already in the record; and 

placing documents in a brief’s appendix does not make them part of the 

appellate record. See People v. Carter, 2019 IL App (1st) 170803, ¶ 44 (“ 

‘[t]he inclusion of evidence in an appendix is an improper supplementation of 

the record with information dehors the record’ ” (quoting People v. Wright, 

2013 IL App (1st) 103232, ¶ 38)); Ill. S. Ct. R. 342 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019) (an 

appendix may include “materials from the record that are the basis of the appeal 

or pertinent to it”). “[I]f the materials are not taken from the record, they may 

not generally be placed before the appellate court in an appendix and will be 

disregarded.” Oruta v. B.E.W., 2016 IL App (1st) 152735, ¶ 32. “This is 

particularly true” when “the document that is affixed to the appendix is an 

essential component” needed “to evaluate the specific argument raised” by the 

party “on appeal.” Carter, 2019 IL App (1st) 170803, ¶ 44. 

¶ 18 Rejecting the State’s argument as our precedent requires, we find that this

16-year-old defendant’s 60-year sentence is a de facto life sentence pursuant to 

People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 41-42 (a prison sentence of more than 40 

years imposed on a juvenile offender constitutes a de facto life sentence). 
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Having made that finding, we look to Buffer for further direction. In Buffer, as 

in our case, the defendant raised a Miller challenge to his sentence in a 

postconviction petition, claiming that his sentence was a de facto life sentence. 

Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 7. The Buffer court found that, “to prevail on a claim 

based on Miller and its progeny, a defendant sentenced for an offense 

committed while a juvenile must show that (1) the defendant was subject to a 

life sentence, mandatory or discretionary, natural or de facto, and (2) the 

sentencing court failed to consider youth and its attendant characteristics in 

imposing the sentence.” Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 27. As discussed above, we 

found defendant established the first prong of this test. 

¶ 19 With respect to the second prong, the Buffer court found that the trial 

court had not “considered defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics” 

and remanded directly for a resentencing. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 46-47 

(remanded for resentencing “in the interests of judicial economy”). In the case 

at bar, the State does not argue that the sentencing court “considered 

defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics” (Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 

46), and so we too remand directly for resentencing. 

¶ 20 As in Buffer, we vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for a new 

sentencing hearing, in accord with the new statutory scheme. Our supreme 

court found that “defendant is entitled on remand to be sentenced under the 
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scheme prescribed by section 5-4.5-105 of the United Code of Corrections.” 

Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 47 (referring to 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016)). 

¶ 21 On remand, the sentencing court may impose a de facto life sentence 

“ ‘only if the trial court determines that the defendant’s conduct showed 

irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption 

beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.’ ” People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 

34 (quoting People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46). The trial court may 

make an appropriate sentencing decision “ ‘only after considering the 

defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics.’ ” Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 

34 (quoting Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46). The factors which it must 

consider are now codified in our statutes. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016). 

Under the new scheme, firearm enhancements are no longer mandatory. 730 

ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West 2016) (the sentencing court “may, in its discretion, 

decline to impose any otherwise applicable sentencing enhancement based upon 

firearm possession”). 

¶ 22 CONCLUSION

¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate defendant’s sentence and reverse 

and remand for a new sentencing hearing, with directions.

¶ 24 Sentence vacated; remanded for resentencing, with directions.