FOURTH DIVISION February 3, 2011 No. 1-10- 0598 DOW NTOW N DISPO SAL

SERVICES, INC., ) Appe al fro m the

) Ci rcu i t Cou rt of Pl ai n ti f f -A pp el l an t, ) Coo k C oun ty ) ) v. ) Nos. 08M1450748, 08M1450749 ) 08M1450750 & 08M1450751 THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a Mun ic ipa l ) Corpor ation, THE DEPARTMENT OF ) ADMI NI ST RATI VE HE ARIN GS and ) Ho no r ab le THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ) James M . Mc Ging ) Judge Presidin

g. Defendan ts-Appellees. )
JUS TI CE LAVI N de livered t he judg ment o f the co ur t , w ith o pinion. Pr esiding J ust ice Ga llagher and J ust ice Pu cinski co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. OPINI ON The Ci ty of Ch ic ago (t he Ci

ty) Departmen

t o f A dmi ni strative Heari

ngs (DOA

H) entered fo ur de fau lt jud gme nt s a ga inst Do wn t o wn Dis po sa l Se rvic es , I nc . ( DD ) , a c o r po r at io n, fo rce r t ain
o r din an ce vio lat io ns is su ed by t he Cit y’s De pa r t men t o f T r an sp o r t at io n ( DO T )
. DD su bse qu en t ly moved t o s et aside t he de fault judg ments , a lleging t hat t he Cit y did no t pr op er ly not ify DD o f the heari ngs regardi

ng the v iolations. Af

ter t he DOA

H deni ed the m ot ions , DD’s presi

dent Peter Van Thol en f i l ed i n th e tr i al cou rt pro se compl

ai nts for revi

ew under the A

dmi ni strative Rev

ie w Law (the Act) (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq . ( We st 20 08 ) )
. An a t t o rne y ap pe ar ed o n D D’ s be ha lf appr ox i mate l y si x mon th s af ter th e c om pl ai n ts were f i l ed . Sh ortl y th ereaf ter , the C i ty mov ed to dis mi ss the com

pla in ts on the basi s that Van Thol en was n ot a lic ensed attorney an

d, thus, was unaut horized t o fil

e co mplaints on behalf of a corpo rat ion. The t rial court grant ed t he City’s1-10-0598

2

m otion and den i ed DD ’smotion

to ame nd th e com plai nts to i nc l ude the si gna ture of i ts attorney. On appe al , DD con

tend s tha t itsconstituti

onal ri ghts f or due proc ess

and equal

proces s we

re vi ola ted b eca use i t di d not rec ei

ve noti ce of the D OA H proce edi

ngs and i ts com plai nts were unfairly dismissed o n t he bas is tha t t hey wer e no t signed and filed by an at t or ney. We r ever se t he tria l court’s deci sion an d rem and to the tri al

court f or fu rther proceed

i ngs . BACK GROUND As a thresh

old m atter , we note t hat several item s are abs ent from

the record. See Foutch v. O’Bryant , 99 Ill . 2d 389, 391-92 (1984) ( the appella nt carries the burden of

presenti ng a suf f i ci en tl y com pl ete re cord on

appe al ). N on eth

el es s, th e p ar

ti es ’ a rgum en ts o n appe al i n di ca te t hey app ar ent ly do no t dispu t e t hat t he pr oc eed ings as t o t he fo ur or dinance violat ions e nsue d in a substantially

si mi la r and paral

le l m ann er bef ore t he DOA

H and the trial

court . Accordin

gly , when
con si deri n g th e en ti rere cord r eg ardi

n g th e f our v i ol ati on s to geth er , w e a

resuf f i ci en tl y ab l e to
asc ertai n the nature of

the a bs en t item s to resol ve thi s ap peal
. The record shows that between Decem ber 2007 and March 2008, the DOT i ssued DD four adm in is trat iv e notices f

or violating C ity

ordinan ces pertain

in g to dumps

ters and that the four noti ce s, a l l of wh i ch were m ai l ed to the sa me addr es s, r eq ui red DD to appe ar a

t he ari ng s on Febr uar y 4, 2 008 , Ma rc h 5, 200 8, and Ap ril 30, 200 8. When DD failed t o a ppe ar at any of t he hear ings, t he DO AH ent er ed d efault judg ments , e ach r equ iring DD t o p ay $40 in administr at ive costs and $1,500 in

penal ties. On A

ugust 18, 2008, Van Tholen fi le d four m

ot ions to set asi de the def aul t ju dgm en ts, al l egi ng th at he did not rec ei

ve noti ce of the h eari ngs . At a consoli

dated heari

ng regardi

ng the f our motions on Septemb er 19, 2008, Van Tholen1-10-0598

3

essen tial ly represented that for the previous fi ve y ears, DD had m

ade seve ral attempts to change the address o n f

il e with the City, but t hat the City had not made the change i n i ts reco rds. Foll owing Van Tholen’s

testim ony, the adm

in is trat iv e l aw off ic er denied DD relie f, f

in din g that t he Cit y had se nt not ifi

cat ion t o t he ad dr ess o n fil e fo r D D and t hat DD ha d no t pr ovid ed a ny docum en tation showi ng th at DD h ad ch anged that addre ss b ef

ore the n otif i cations were m

ail ed. Foll owin g the adm i nistrativ e l aw off i cer’s determ i nation, the f

oll owin g col l oquy e

nsu ed: “A DMINISTRATIVE LAW OFFICER HA

RRIS: However, you do have a ri ght to appe al

the decision - - MR
. VA N T HO LE N: I will. AD MINIS TRATIVE LA W O FF ICER H

AR RIS: -- to the

Ci rcui t Court. T ha t ’s fine , sir
. Yo u h av e a r igh t t o ap pe al t he de cis io n t o t he Cir cu it Co ur t wit hin 35 da y s of today ’sdate, an

d y ou would do tha

t in Room 602 of the D aley

Cen ter.” Van Tholen si

gned an d fi le d four fi ll -in -the-bl ank pro se com

pl ai nts f or ad m i ni stra ti ve rev i ew on October 16, 2008. Att orney R ic hard D. Boonstra file d an appearan ce i n al l f our cases approxim ately si x m onths l ater in A

pril 2009. On Jul y 29, 2009, the Ci

ty m oved to dism

is s DD’s com

pla in ts pursuant to section 2- 61 9( a) (9 ) of

th e C ode of Ci v i l Pro ce du re(7 35 IL CS 5/

2- 61 9( a) (9 ) (W

est 20 08 )). The C i

ty argued that dism

is sal was requi

red because

DD was a corporat ion a

nd i ts complai

nt was im permissi bl y f il ed by Van Tholen, who was n

ot a lic ensed attorney. Speci fi cally , the City argued that a corpo ration m

ust appear by

counsel at all le gal proceedin

gs, in cl udin g the fi li ng of pl eadi ngs with the c ourt , and that any action f il ed by a corpor ation wi

thout an attor ney

is nul l a nd voi d,1-10-0598

4

even where al l s ubsequen t appearances are m

ade by a lic ensed attorney. The C ity al so argued that t he purpose of thi s strict rule is to dis courage fri

volous l iti gation, whi

ch m ay negati vel y a ff ect
a r ep r es en t ed pa r t y, b ut did no t ar gu e t ha t t he lit iga t io n a t ha nd wa s fr ivo lo us o rha d n eg at ive ly impa ct ed t he Cit y. A t t ac he d t o t he mo t io ns w er e D D’ s c o mpla int s a nd su mmo ns, t he de fau lt judgm ent orders, and copies of

a report in

dic ating tha

t DD was a corpo ration and i ts registered age nt was Bo ons t ra . T he Cit y also a t t ache d se ar ch r esu lts fr om t he At t or ney Reg istr at ion and Dis ci pli nary Comm is si on of the Suprem

e Court o f Il

li nois ’ webs ite wh

ic h i ndicated that Van Thol en wasnot a l

i censed attorney. On Septem

ber 23, 2009, DD, through Boo nstra, fi le d motions

for l eave to fi

le am ended
co mpla int s, alle gin g, in p er t ine nt pa r t , t ha t t he lac k o f an at t o rne y’s sig na t ur e w as a t ec hnic al, rather than sub stantiv

e, defect whi

ch DD sought to co rrect by f il in g an am ended com

pla in t sign ed by its att orney. On Octo ber 9, 2009, DD fi led f our responses t o t he Ci

ty’s m ot ion to dismi

ss, wh i ch rai se d sub sta

n ti al l y th e s am e a rgum en ts b ut al so a rgue d th at th e a pp l i ca ti on of th e n ul l i ty rule was not auto ma

tic an d should not be applie d where, as h ere, no legal

expertis e was requi

red t o c omp lete a fill

-in-t he- blank fo rm. I n add itio n, D D ar gue d t hat t he failure of t he fo rm co mplaint to state t hat an attorney’s signature is

necess ary wh

ere the compl

ai nan t is a corporation violated its ri ght to due process and that i t was unf ai r for the Ci

ty to inf orm DD of i

ts right to pursue adm in is trat iv e review wi

thout in form in g DD that it needed an

atto rney to do so. DD further
ar gu ed it wa s u nfa ir fo r“c o r po r at e p laint iffs t o be lur ed int o filing t he co mpla int o nly t o ha ve it
sum mari l y di sm i sse d.” On th e s am e day , the C i ty re sp on de d to D D’ s m

oti on s f or l ea v e to a men d i ts c om pl ai n ts1-10-0598

5

and rai sed essen

tial ly the sam e argume nts as i t did i n i ts motions to dism

is s. The Ci

ty also argued t hat DD c ou ld no t cur e t he de fect s re sult ing fro m the s igning and filing of DD ’s co mplaints by Van Thol en af ter the 3 5-day

statute of l i m i tations had pa sse d (735 ILCS 5/3-10 3 (West 200 8)). A pp rox i mate l y th re e m on th s l ate r, D D m ov ed f or s um mar y j udgm en t, a rgui n g, i n perti n en t pa rt, that t he Ci

ty was a m

unici pal corpo ration, that the in

div idua l wh o sign ed the ci tations was n

ot an atto rney and theref

ore, t he un

derly in g action f il ed by the Ci ty was v oid ab initio
. At a heari ng on Jan uary 29, 2010, the cases

were consoli

dated and the Ci

ty rai sed substantially

the sam e argume nts, contendin

g that t he pro se compl

ai nts were void ab initio , not wit hst anding t hat t hey wer e fill -in-t he- blank fo rms. The City ac kno wledg ed t hat on o cca sion, the pro se fil

ing o f a co mplaint had been e xcus ed, but not in the c ase of a co rp or at e pa rt y. The City also argued t hat incorpor ating a busi ness comes wi

th bot h ben

efi ts and respo nsi

bili ties, i n cl udi n g a pp ea ri n g th rough an attor n ey. D D a

rgue d, i n perti n en t pa rt, th at i t wou l d b e u n f ai r to f i n d th at th e c om pl eti on of th i s f orm com pl ai n t wa s th e u n au th ori ze d p ra cti ce of l aw an d to fo r ec lo se DD r elie f o n t ha t ba sis
. DD ar gu ed t ha t if t he co ur t de cid ed t o ap ply t he nu llit y ru le, it had to go fur

ther b ack to wh

en the C i ty f i l ed th e f our ci tations throug

h a l ay pers on. Following arguments, the co urt grant ed t he City’s m ot ions to dism

iss and denied DD’s
m otion s to am

end the com plai nt an d m otion s f or sum mary j udgm en t as m oot. The tri al

court found that “this i s a tro ublin g issue f or t he Court ” and stat ed that in admi ni strat iv e review cases, th e tr i al cou rt w as “ con f ron ted wi th n on attor n ey s f i l i n g p l eadi n gs ” on a dai l y b as i s b ut w as l ef t to follow Fi rst District case law . Af

ter not in g that t he appel

la te court had previ

ously found that fi l l i ng i n a f orm wa s the un

authorized practice

of l aw, the tri al

court stated as f

oll ows:1-10-0598

6 “If you revi ew the Compl

ai nt that’s fi

le d in the Adm in is trat iv e Revi ew ca se s, i t i s j us t th at. It i s a

pr ep ared f orm . It i s h an de d to a n y on e w h o wa l ksi n to t he Cler k’s o ffi

ce. The y merely have t o fill i n names and fil

l in the d at e t hat t he Fi n di n gsan d D ec i si on wa s e n tered ag ai n st th em , a n d i t h as f orm l an gu ag e a s to wh y they are a ppea l i ng th e m atter an d i t in i tia tes thi s proce ss.” The trial court stated t hat it was com pelle d to fol

low decisi ons of the Fi

rst District Ap pe llat e C o ur t an d t ha t it wa s no t in t he po sit io n t o cr ea t e n ew law bu t be lieve d t ha t ce r t ain issues m ay n eed to be revi sited by

that co urt . The t rial

cour t st ated as follows: “The a ct ual issu e in this c ase as t o t he fili ng o f this fo rm, is it t he unauthorized practice of l aw? And then there is [

sic ] o t her co nsider at ions, suc h as he re wher e t he r efili ng of an ac tion i s not availa

ble to t he party that i

t would be tim

e barred by

dis mi ssal of the pendi

ng acti on, is that too severe an action to im

pose? Coupled wi

th the cl early

erroneous legal

in structions whi

ch are b ei ng gi ven by the ad m i ni stra ti ve l aw of f i cers at the C i

ty of Ch i cago D ep artm

en t of Adm in is trat iv e Heari ngs, whe re they i nf orm nonattorneys wh

o appear bef

ore t hem representi ng corporat ions

that you, quot ation m

arks, ‘You have the ri

ght to appeal this ,’ and they

direct these people to t he 6 th Floor of Daley Center to fil

e an appeal in these m atter s.” The tria l court f urthe r ques tion ed wh ethe r a nonattorne

y repre sen tin g a corpora

te en tity be f ore the ad m i ni stra ti ve he ari ng s i n th e C i ty m i gh t not a l so b e eng ag ed

i n th e u na uthori ze d pr ac ti ceof1-10-0598

7

l aw on b eh al f of a c orporati

on b ut f oun d that the i ss

ueof the Ci ty f i l i ng a v i ol ati on b y a l ay pe rs on wa s a se pa ra te iss ue th at woul

d on l y h av e b een re ach ed h ad th e tr i al cou rt p roc ee de d to administr at ive review . T he t rial co ur t , r efer ring t o e ither t he qu est ion o f what co nst itu t es t he pr act ice o f law o r w hat is the re sult of t he una ut hor ized p ra ct ice o f law, s t at ed he hop ed t hat t he Fi rst District would revi si

t “this is sue” and tha

t “perhaps the l

aw i n thi s m atter would ch

ange, but as a trial judge I am n ot in a positi on to be creati

ng ne w la w, but to fol

low cl early delin eated Appel la te law.” On

February 26, 2010, DD fi

le d a notice of a

ppeal in all f our cases. DD app ealed fro m the o rd er gr ant ing t he Cit y’s mot ion t o d ismi ss, denying DD ’s mot ion t o a mend
an d den y i n g D D’ s m

oti on f or sum mar y j udgm en t. AD MINIS TRATIVE REVIEW On ap pe al, DD firs t as se r t s t ha t it wa s d en ied du e p r o ce ss be ca us e it wa s no t pr o pe r ly
serv ed wi th notice of the proce edi

ngs be f ore the D OA

H. We f i nd th i s i ssue i s n

ot properl y be f ore us. Th e Il l i noi s Adm i nistrati ve Rev i ew L aw ap

pli es to f i na l deci sions b y the D OA H. Silver Fox Limousine v. City of Chicago , 306 Ill . App. 3d 103, 108 (1999); see al so 735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq . ( West 200 8) . I t is well set t led t hat in administr at ive case s, o ur ro le is to re view t he adm i nistrati ve agen cy ’sdeci sion, rath er tha n the tri al court’s determ i na tion
. Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police Pensi on Board , 225 Ill . 2d 497, 531 (2006). Thi s rule is general ly applie d, however, to revi

ew of an agen cy ’sresol uti on of a cl ai m on i ts m eri ts. See, e.g. , id. at 531-4 3. In add itio n, a litigant gene ra lly may not see k jud icial relief fro m an administr at ive act ion u nless t he party ha s ex ha usted a l l av ail ab l e adm

i nistrati ve rem edi es. Arvia v. Madigan , 209 Ill . 2d 520, 531 (2 004 ). Unde r t he Act , “[ e] ver y act ion t o r eview a final administ ra t ive dec ision sha ll be1-10-0598

8

co mmenced by t he fili

ng o f a co mplaint and t he issua nce o f summons w ithin 35 days fro m the dat e t hat a co py of t he de cision s ou ght t o be re viewed was ser ved u po n t he pa rt y affect ed by t he deci sion.” 7 35 IL CS 5/3 -103 (W est 200 8). Her e, DD w as r equ ired t o p ro per ly commence a n act ion fo r a dministr at ive review in the t r ial c o ur t as a n ec es sa ry st ep pr io rt o se ek ing r ev iew in t his c o ur t o f t he DO AH ’s alle ge dly erroneous judgm

ent, which f

ound that DD had not shown that notice was i mproper. The trial
co ur t fo un d, ho we ve r , t ha t DD ha d n o t pr o pe r ly br o ug ht su it in t ha t co ur t , an d a s a r es ult , it dis mi ssed DD’s

compl ai nt without consi derin

g its cl ai m that notice

of the DOAH

proceedin

gs wa s imp r o pe r . Fo rt his c o ur t t o de cid e a n iss ue no t co nsid er ed by t he t r ial c o ur t wo uld pe rmit DD t o sk ip a ne ce ss ar y st ep in t he ad minist r at ive r ev iew pr o ce ss an d r en de rt he t r ial c o ur t ’s r o le i n adm i nistrati ve revi ew m ean i ngl ess . Cf. Gardziella v. City of Chicago , 337 Ill . App. 3d 181, 182 -8 5 ( 200 3) (w her e t he plaint iff pr op er ly f

iled a co mplaint fo r a dministr at ive review asse rt ing not ice o f administr at ive pr oc eed ings wa s impro per and t he t rial co ur t re ject ed t he as ser t ion, t he ap pe llat e c o ur t co nsid er ed t he iss ue )
. Alt ho ug h d efe nd an t co rr ec t ly st at es t ha t we ge ne r ally
re view t he de cision o f the age ncy rat her t han t he t rial co ur t , t his rule p re sup po ses t hat t he appellant has pro perly exhausted all avai labl e remedies so t hat t he chall enge t o t he agency’s deci sion i s prope

rl y be f ore the c ourt. Accor dingl

y, the o nly

issue before us is whether the t rial court cor rect ly dism issed DD’s compl ai nt pursuant to sect ion 2-619 b ecause Van Tholen ’s conduct i

n the trial court rendered DD ’s com pl ai nt a nu l l i ty , th ere by de f ea ti ng i ts c l ai m s ( 735 IL CS 5/2 -61 9(a

)(9 ) (W es t 200 8)) , or whet her t he co ur t er re d in app lyi ng t he nullity ru le so t hat t his cau se must be r ever sed and1-10-0598

9

reman ded for f urther proceedings. See City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc. , 224 Ill . 2d 390, 449 (2006) (where the trial court did n

ot reach al

l i ssues raised i

n the adm in is trat iv e review pr oc eed ings befo re it, re mand wa s ap pr op riat e so t hat t he t rial co ur t , r at her t han t he r eviewing
cou rt, c oul d f i rs t ad dr es s th e rem ai n i n g iss ue s) . We rev

i ew di sm i ss al of a c om pl ai n t pu rsua n t to section 2-619 de novo
. How ard v. Ch icago Tr

ansit Autho rity , 402 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 45 5, 458 ( 2010)
.
FORFEITURE Fir st , DD as se r t s t ha t t he Cit y has fo r feit ed t he r igh t t o se ek ap plic at io n o f t he nu llit y ru le based on Va

n Tholen’s

unauthorized practice of l aw becaus e the Ci

ty f ai le d to rais e this

is sue bef ore t he DOA

H. See Cook County B oard of Review v. Property Tax App eal Board , 39 5 I ll. Ap p. 3d 77 6, 786 ( 2009)(argum en ts not m ade b ef ore an adm i nistrati ve agen cy are f orfe i ted). DD h as n ot brough t to o ur atten

tion an y cas e add ress i ng th i s sp eci f i c f orfe i ture arg um en t. In response, the Ci

ty argues that i

t cannot have f

orfei ted this argum

ent becaus e the DOAH’ s rule s and r egu latio ns pe rmit a n aut hor ized r epr ese nt at ive to app ear on be half of a p ar t y at D OAH pr o ce ed ing s. Se e D ep ar t men t o f Ad minist r at ive He ar ing s R ule s a nd Re gu lat io ns § 5. 1 ( eff. Ju ly 14, 199 7) (“Parti es * ** m ay be repre sen ted by an attorney or authori

zed re pres en tativ e *** .”). Thu s, t he Cit y cont ends t hat Van T holen’ s ap pea ra nce be for e t he DO AH wa s pe rmissible and the re wasno b as i s to ob

j ec t at that ti

me. C ontr

ary to DD ’s sugge sti on, noth i ng i n th e re gul ati on at iss ue ind ica t es t ha t co r

po r at io ns a r e n o t pa r t ies o rt ha t co r po r at e p ar t ies ca nno t invo ke t his rule. Thus , it i s clear that Van Tholen could appear b efore the DOA H as DD’s a

uthorized repre sen tativ e.1-10-0598

10

Altho ugh no t ack now ledge d by t he pa rt ies, it is po ssible for an individual t o e ngag e in the
un au t ho r ize d p r ac t ice o f law be fo r e a n a dmin ist r at ive ag en cy, de sp it e a n a dmin ist r at ive rule permi tt in g a party to act t hrough a nonattorney. See Sudzus v. Department of Employment Secur ity , 39 3 Il l . A pp. 3d 8 14, 820 -21 (20 09)(notwi ths tan di ng the l eg i sl atu re’ s a uthori za ti on f or an ag ent t o r epr ese nt par t ies in unemplo yment insur ance cas es, only t he su pr eme co ur t has t he authority to defi

ne an d regulate the practic e of law) (citi ng People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass ’n v. Goodman , 366 Ill . 346, 352 (1937)). Nonethel ess, where, as h ere, DD has n

ot devel oped an
ar gument spe cifically

ident ify ing any act of V an T holen be for e t he DO AH t hat involved p ro viding le gal opini ons or advi ce, or required any le gal skill or knowledge, DD’s conc lus ory statemen t t hat Va n Thol en en gage d i n th e u na uthori ze d pr ac ti ceof l aw be f ore th e D OA H i s i ns uf f i ci en t to sh ow t hat t he Cit y shou ld have o bject ed a nd t hat its failur e t o d o s o fo rfeit ed it s right t o invo ke t he nul l i ty ru l e. EVIDE NCE BEFORE T HE TRIAL COURT DD al so asserts that t he trial court im properly granted the Ci

ty’s m ot ion to dismi

ss based on f acts n ot in the a dm i nistrati ve record, i.e. , DD’s undi

sputed status as a corpo ration and Va n Thol en ’s un dispute d s tatu s a s a

n on attor n ey. Rel y i n g on se cti on 3- 11 0 of th e A ct, DDas se

rts tha t ne w e vi de nc e m ay ne ve r b e c ons i dered

by the tri al cou rt i n a dm i ni stra ti ve ca se s, r eg ard l es s of the purpose for which the ev ide nce is bei ng used b y the court . Section 3-110 of the Ac t, which appl i esto the rev i ew of a f i na l ad m i ni stra ti ve de ci si on, sta tes , howe ve

r, that “ [n]o new

or addi ti ona l ev i de nc e i n s upp ort of or i n op pos i ti on to a ny f i nd i ng , ord er, de term

i na ti on or de ci si on of the adm

in is trat iv e agency shal l b e heard b

y the court .” 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2008); see1-10-0598

11

also B o a rd

o f Ed u ca t i o n o f R i ch T o wn sh i p H i g h S ch o o l D i st ri ct No
. 2 2 7

v. B ro wn , 311 Ill . App. 3d 4 78, 488 (1 999 ) ( in reviewing an ad mini st ra t ive dec ision, t he t rial co ur t canno t co nsider any ne w e vid en ce )
. T hu s, t his r ule ap plie s w he r e n ew ev ide nc e is be ing o ffer ed in su pp o r t o f o rin op po sitio n t o a n age ncy’s de t er minatio n. Stati ng the obv i ous , th e tri

al cou rt di d n ot even rea ch DD ’s ch al l en geto the propriety of the DOAH’ s deci si on, let alone consider new ev ide nce of D D’s corporat ion s tatus o r Van T ho len ’s no na t t o rne y st at us in r ev iew ing t he pr o pr iet y o f t he DO AH ’s de cis io n. On t he co nt r ar y, t he co ur t co nsider ed s uch e vidence only as it re late d t o it s de t er mini ng t he pr op riet y of t he proceedin gs bef ore t he court itsel f. DD’s argumen t is en tirel y m is pla ced. UNAU TH ORI ZED PRAC TI CE OF LAW We f urthe r clarif y that al though DD arg uesthat the

“A ppl i cation Of The ‘Nu l l i ty R ule’ To Di sm i ss A Fi l l -In -Th e-B l an ksFor m Com pl ai nt” vi ol ate s i ts c ons ti tutiona l righ ts, D D hasnot developed an

argum en t supported

by reas oni ng a nd c i tation to leg al authority as to wh y thi s court sh oul d dev i ate f rom pri or c as e l

aw h ol di n g th at f i l l i n g ou t an d s i gn i n g a f orm com pl ai n t, d es pi te its do-it-y ourself -nature, constitutes t he un authorized practic e of law. See Housing Authority of the County of Cook v. Tonsul , 115 Ill . App. 3d 739, 740-42 (1st Dist. 1983). Accordingl y, we do not question the trial

court ’s determi

nation tha t Van Tholen

engaged i

n the un authorized practic e of l aw wh en h e f i l l ed i n th e b l an kson th e f orm com pl ai n t. Se e I l l . S. Ct. R. 34 1(h)(7 ) (e f f . Se pt. 1, 2006 ). FOR FEITU RE OF CONS TITUTION

AL CLA IM As to DD’s assertion that t he appl ic ation of the n

ull ity rule i n thi s i nstance v iolated its due1-10-0598

12

pr oce ss an d e qu al protecti on

ri gh ts, th e C i ty con ten dsth at D D h

as f orf ei ted th i s iss ue b y f ai l i n g to info rm t he I llino is At t o rne y Ge ne r al t ha t DD wa s c ha lleng ing t he co nst it ut io na lit y o f I llino is stat utes, specif

ical ly , section 1 o f the Corpo ration Pract ice of Law Prohibition A ct (7 05 ILCS 220 /1 (Wes t 200 8) ), and s ect ion 1 of t he At t or ney Act (7 05 I LCS 205 /1 (Wes t 200 8) ). Pu rsu ant t o S upr eme Co ur t Rule 1 9( a) , a par t y challenging t he co nst itu t ionalit y of a st at ut e must ser ve noti ce of the cha l l enge up on the

Attorne y Gen eral . See Il

l . S. Ct. R. 19 (a) (ef

f . Sept. 1, 20 06); Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich , 21 1 I l l . 2d 10 6, 1 14(2 00 4) . Th

e pur pos e of th i s r ul e is to per mit t he At t or ney Gene ra l to inter vene in t he pr oc eed ing t o d efend t he co nst itu t ionalit y of t he statut e. See id. at 114. Fail ure to strictly

compl y w ith R ule 19, although n

ot a j urisdi

ctional defec t, may resul t in f orfei ture. See id. at 118 -19 ; Hill v. PS Illinois T rust , 368 Ill . App. 3d 310, 312 (2 006). Al though DD’s argum

ents throughout its brief

s could b e m

ore clearl y s tated, we unde rst and D D’s p os itio n t o be t hat it is no t challenging t he co nst itu t ionalit y of eit her st at ut e and
mer ely r efe r en ce d t he m in it s o pe ning br ief a s be ing r ela t ed st at ut es . DD r ep r es en t s t ha t it is ch alle ng ing t he co nst it ut io na lit y o f t he t r ial c o ur t ’s ap plic at io n o f t he nu llit y ru le, wh ich is frequen tly applie d by

court s i ndepen dently from the aforem

entione d statut es to render procee di ngs a n ull i ty w here a l ay pers on ap pears i n c ourt on be

ha l f of a nothe r i ndi vi dual or a co rp or at ion. Co nsist ent wit h t he r eco gnit ion t hat t he inhere nt po wer t o r egu late and d efine t he pr ac ti ce of l aw i n Il l i n oi s b el ongsto our

su pr em e c our t ( Applebaum v. Rush University Medical Center , 231 Ill . 2d 429, 438-39 (2008)) , we fi nd the n ull ity rule is a court-imposed cons equence for the unauthorized practice of la w, regardless

of whether the un

authorized practic e of law m ay1-10-0598

13

ha ve also v i ol ate d a sta tute. Ne i the r of the af orem en ti one d s tatute s a

ppe are d i n th e C i ty ’s moti on to dis mi ss or expressl

y ref er to the nul

li ty rule. See 705 ILCS 220/1 et seq. (West 2008); 705 ILCS 205/1 et. seq. (West 2008). Nonetheles s, because we need n

ot resolve the constitutional questions posed b

y D D, our disposition wil l n ot suf fer f rom lack of i

nput from the Attor ney General regardin g the constitutional

ity of any statut e. See City of Chicago v. Pow ell , 31 5 I ll. App. 3d 1 136 , 1 140 (2 000 ) ( a r eviewing c ou rt sho uld no t co nsider co nst itu t ional qu est ions if t he
case can be deci ded on other gro unds). DD’s c onstitutional chal le nges are b ased on the trial
cou rt ’s aut omatic app li

cat ion of the nulli

ty rule. We fin

d t hat co ntra ry to the t rial court ’s
un ders tan di ng , th e n ul l i ty rul e doesnot a

utom ati cal l y appl y to every i ns tan cewhere a l ay pers on has en gaged i n the un authorized practic e of law.

THE NULLIT Y RULE The City su gge st s t hat ou r r eview o f the nullity rule mus t be co nfined t o c ase s ap plying the rule i n the context of an

unl ic ensed pers on representi

ng a corporat ion, rather than a natural pe r so n. T he Cit y fails t o ac kn o wle dg e t ha t t his c o ur t ha s p r ev io us ly st at ed t ha t t he nu llit y ru le appl i es to the una uthori zed practice of

l aw on beha l f of c orporati ons a

nd n atural pers ons. Janiczek v. Dover Management C o. , 1 34 I ll. App. 3d 5 43, 546 (1 985 ). In a ddit ion, in examining t he nullity ru le as ap plied t o a co rp or at ion r epr ese nt ed by its age nt , t his co ur t , in at least one in stance, consi

dered a prior case i

nvol vi ng a n atural person wh

o was represented by

a di sbarred attorney. Berg v. Mid-America Industrial, Inc. , 2 93 I ll. App. 3d 7 31, 737 -3 8 ( 199 7) (c iting Janiczek , 134 Ill . App. 3d at 546). Simi la rly , in that very case where the di sbarred attor ney

had
re pr es ent ed t he n at ur al p er so n, t his c o ur t co nsid er ed ca se law invo lving t he r ep re se nt at io n o f a1-10-0598

14

m un i ci pal cor porati on b y i ts u n l i cen se d agen

t an d th e rep re se n tati on of a c orp ora

ti on b y i ts
em ploy ee. See Janiczek

, 134 Ill . App. 3d at 545 (citin g Tonsul , 11 5 Ill. App. 3d at 740 ; Marken Real Est ate & Management Corp. v. Adams, 56 I ll. A pp . 3d 42 6, 42 8 ( 19 77 ) )
. Fu r t he rmo r e, in
exam in in g the rule i

n the context of a l

ay person representi

ng the estate of a deceden t, o ur suprem e court addr essed a pri

or case in whi ch i t considered the rul

e i n the context of an

in div idua l wh o wa s rep res en

ted by prof es si ona l corp orati on l aw f i rms w hi ch l ac ke d re qui

red certi f i ca tesof
r eg ist r at io n. S ee ge ne r ally Applebaum , 231 Ill . 2d at 435-45 ( ci ting Ford Motor Credit C o. v. Sperry , 214 Ill . 2d 371 (2005)). T hese cases sh ow that not withs

tandin g the variety of procedural ci rcumstances whi

ch m ay le ad to t he un

authorized practic e of law, the nul li ty rule i tself , which sp ea ks t o t he co nse qu en ce o f a v io lat io n, is t he sa me. We find it wo uld be inapp r o pr iat e t o limit
o ur as se ss men t o f t he nu llit y rul e t o ca se s in vo lvin g t he r ep r es en t at io n o f aco r po r at io n by a l ay pers on. As st at ed, co rp or at ions mus t app ear in cou rt t hro ugh a licensed at t or ney, r at her t han a l ay pers on. Berg , 293 Ill . App. 3d at 737. In additi on, the City correct ly asserts that case l aw has stated t hat where a l

ay person practices l

aw on beh

al f of another party, any

proceedin

gs are a “n ull ity ” and an y res ulti ng j udgme

nt is rendered “

void.” Tonsul , 11 5 I ll. A pp . 3d at 74 0. “T his strict rule operates to void the j udgme nt even where the l

ay agent m erely fi le s the compl

ai nt over hi s own si gnature, and al

l s ubsequen t cour t appearances are m ade by a dul y l ic ensed attorney.” Tonsul , 115 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 740. Other ca ses

ha ve stated that such pr

ocedura l errors re nde r a judgm ent “v oid ab initio .” Siakpere v. City of Chicago , 374 Il l . Ap p. 3d 10 79, 108 1 (200 7); Berg , 2 93 I ll. App. 3d a t 738 . T he r ule is base d o n t he r eco gnit ion t hat re pr ese nt at ion by1-10-0598

15

unl i censed i ndi vi dual s i nv olv e i nh eren t ris ks to cl i en ts an d the i nteg ri ty of the l egal sy stem . Sperry , 2 14 I ll. 2d a t 389 -9 0. The pur po se o f the nullity rule is t o p ro t ect litigant s fro m the mistak es o f ignor ant individuals and t he sc hemes o f the unsc ru pulo us, as w ell as t o p ro t ect t he court i n i ts procee di

ngs f rom i ndi vi dual s wh o la ck th e requ

i si te ski l l s. Janiczek

, 134 Ill . App. 3d at 546. The rule was al

so in tended to ensure that co rporat ions recei ve the b enef

it of profes si onal l egal coun sel
. Berg , 29 3 I l l . A pp . 3d at 7 38 . We a

gr ee wi th th e C i ty th at l an gu ag e ref er ri n g to procee di ngs as a “n ull i ty” and “voi d” sugge sts that appl

i cation of the n ull i ty ru l e i s au tomati c. Mo r e imp o r t an t ly, o ur su pr eme co ur t ha s p r ev io us ly indic at ed t ha t t he nu llit y ru le’ s a pp lica t io n is
au tomati c. “ A cc ordi ngl y , i t i s w el l settl ed tha t the ‘e f f ec t of a p ers on’ s u

na uthori ze d pr ac ti ceon be ha l f of a p arty i s to require dismissal of t he ca use or t o t re at t he pa rt icular act ions t ake n by the repre sen tativ e as a n ull i ty.’ ” (Em phasi s ad ded.) Sperry , 214 Ill . 2d at 390 (quo ting PrattHoldampf v. Trinity Medical Center , 338 Il l . Ap p. 3d 10 79, 108 3 (3d D i st. 2003 )). De sp it e t his, ap pe llat e c o ur t de cis io ns h av e d iffer ed in t he ir a dh er en ce t o t he au t o mat ic appl i ca ti on of the nu l l i ty rul e. The Ci ty con ten dstha t cou rts h ave re cog ni ze d a l i m i ted exce ption to the nul li ty rule where the person provi din g representation was a

atto rney who, for techni

cal reasons l acked authority

to practice i

n Il li nois . See Janiczek v. Dover Management C o. , 13 4 I ll. App. 3d 543, 544-47 (1st Dist. 1985) (where an attor ney did n ot notif y h is clie nt that he had b een dis ba rr ed an d file d a co mpla int un de ran o t he rat t o rne y’s na me, t he r ev iew ing co ur t did no t ap ply th e n ul l i ty ru l e b ec au se

i ts p ur pos es wou l d n ot b e f ur th ered ); b ut cf. Fruin v. Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation, Inc. , 194 Ill . App. 3d 1061, 1062-64 (1st Dist. 1990) (where an individual’s co mplaint w as signe d and t imely fil ed by an a t t or ney licensed o nly i n Wisco nsin, and1-10-0598

16

an I lli nois a t t or ney subse que nt ly f iled an ap pea ra nce a fte r t he st at ut e o f li mitat ions ha d pa ssed , t he
re viewing co ur t affirmed t he dismissal o f the co mplaint w ith p re judice, dec lini

ng t o a pply t he ho lding o f Janiczek

and fi nding that t he plai

ntiff should have quest ioned his W isconsin atto rney’s ab i l i ty to practi cei n I l l i noi s) ; s eealso McEvers v. Stout , 21 8 I l l . A pp . 3d 46 9, 4 70 -7 2 ( 4th

Dist. 199 1) (w her e t he fact s pr ese nt ed w er e simil ar t o t hos e in Fruin , the rev i ewi n g c our t de cl i n ed to follow Fruinand rem

anded f or t he pl ai ntif fs ’ Illi nois atto rney to sign an

d fi le an am ended
com pl ai nt, f i nd i ng i t woul d b e l udi crou s to e xp ec t the

pl ai nti f f s to k now the i r attor ne y wa s n ot aut hor ized t o p ra ct ice law w hen it t oo k de fense c ou nsel mor e t han six mont hs t o r eco gnize t he probl em and tha t the pur poses of the n ull i ty ru l e woul d not b e f urthe red b y i ts appl i cation). T he Cit y fails t o r ec o gn ize , ho we ve r , t ha t t his c o ur t ha s d ec lined t o ap ply t he nu llit y ru le
even where the com

pla in t was fi le d by a l ay person. See Pratt-Holdampf v. Trinity Medical Center , 33 8 Il

l . A pp. 3d 1 079 , 10 80- 87 ( 3d D i st. 2 003 ) (w he re th e p l ai nti f f , sp ec i al ad m i ni stra tor of her f ather’s estate, foll

owed the erro neous advi

ce of he r Ill in ois-l ic ensed attorney, wh

o li ved
o ut o f st at e, t ha t sh e s ho ul d f ile a t imel y pro se com

pl ai n t al l eg i n g th e dec eden t’s wrongf ul de ath and h ave an atto rney la ter amend i

t, t he revi ewi ng court held that the plai ntif f s hould b e permi

tt ed to f i l e a n a men de d c om pl ai nt th at re l ate d b ac k to the ori

gi na l , sta ti ng tha t the nu l l i ty rul e doesnot auto matical

ly apply and that its pur poses wo uld not be furthered by i ts application); see also Paddoc k v. Depar

tment of Employm ent Secu rity , 184 Ill . App. 3d 945, 948-49 (1st Dist. 1989) (the revi ewi

ng court found the trial

court erred in

allowi ng the i ndi vi dual pla in tif f, wh o had fi le d a pro se compl

ai nt for adm

in is trat iv e review, to appear i

n court t hrough a lay

person and rem

anded f or the pl ai ntif f to appear pro se or re

tai n cou n se l); b ut cf. Ratcliff

e v. Apantaku , 318 Ill . App. 3d1-10-0598

17

621, 62 3-28 (1 st

Dis t. 2000) ( where the pro se pla in tif f f il ed a compl

ai nt on behal f of

her deceas ed
m oth er ’s estate , w as

l ate r a pp oi n ted as sp ec i al ad m i ni strator an d a pp aren tl y di d n ot att em pt to reta i n a n a ttorn ey to f i l e a n a men de d c om pl ai nt, the rev i ew i ng cou rt f oun d the p l ai nti f f coul d n ot represent the estate and rej ected her argum ent that the tr ia

l c ourt was requi

red to appoin

t counsel f or her)
. On at l ea st on e oc ca si on, thi s c ourt dec l i

ne d to a ppl y the nu l l i ty rul e w he re a corp orati on presi dent engaged i

n the un authorized practic e of law. See Moushon v. Moushon , 147 Ill . App. 3d 140, 147 (3d Dist.1986) (where a corporat ion f il ed a compl

ai nt signed b

y i ts presiden

t rat her than an attorney , the c omp l ai

nt rec i ted tha t the pl ai ntif f “c ome s by

i ts attorney

,” an d the record sho wed t he co rp or at ion wa s o t her wise r epr ese nt ed by co unse l at a ll times, t he co ur t did no t find the resul ting judgme

nt was void); but see Siakpere v. City of Chicago , 374 Ill . App. 3d 1079, 1080-82 (1st Dist. 2007) (where, foll owing a n adm in is trat iv e heari ng, a corporat e pl ai

ntif f was found l ia ble for vi olatin g Ci ty ordin ances, the corporation’s presi dent subse quently

fi le d a pro se com plai nt f or adm i nistrati ve revi ew on

beha l f of h i m sel f and the corporation an

d the tria l court granted the Ci

ty’s m ot ion to dismi

ss the com

pla in t, t he appel

la te court found the origin

al compl ai nt was nul

l a nd voi d ab initio and a n

ew compl ai nt was tim

e barred). We f

urther note t hat
co nt ra ry t o t he t rial co ur t ’s su gge st ion, t he First Dist rict of t his co ur t has d eclined t o a pply t he nul li ty rule on at least two occasions. See Paddock , 18 4 Ill. App. 3d at 948 -49 ; Janiczek , 13 4 I ll. App. 3d at 544-47. Sub se que nt to th e a f orem en ti one d opi ni ons , our su pre me c ourt rev

i si ted the “nu l l i ty-or void ness- ru le” in Applebaum
. Applebaum , 231 Ill . 2d at 435. After reciti ng the wel

l-se tt le d1-10-0598

18

purposes of the nul

li ty rule, the court stated, t hat “wh ere a person who i s not li

censed to practice la w in Ill in ois attempts to represent another part y i n legal proceedin

gs, this rule permits

dis mi ssal
o f t he ca us e, t he r eb y t r ea t ing t he pa r t icu lar ac t io ns t ak en by t ha t pe r so n a s a nu llit y.” ( E mph as is adde d.) Applebaum , 231 Ill . 2d at 435 (citin g Sperry , 214 Ill . 2d at 390). The court also stated th at “ [a ]l th oug h th e n ul l i ty ru l e is wel

l estab l i sh ed i n our cou rts , b ec au se

th e res ul ts o f i ts app licatio n ar e har sh it s hou ld be invok ed o nly where it fulfi lls i t s pu rp os es o f pro t ect ing bo t h t he publ ic and the i ntegrity of the court system

from the actions of

the unl ic ensed, an

d where n o ot her al ternative rem

edy is possible .” Applebaum , 231 Ill . 2d at 435-36 ( ci ting Sperry , 214 Ill . 2d at 380 , 39 0-9 1; Pratt-Holdampf , 33 8 Ill. App. 3d at 108 5; Rat cl iffe , 318 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 626). Unde r t he sp ecific pr oc edu ra l circu msta nces pr ese nt ed in Applebaum , our suprem e court ul ti mate l y f oun d that a n a ttorn ey ’s i na cti ve sta tusdi d n ot eq ua te to the u

na uthori ze d pr ac ti ceof la w and h el d that t he n

ull ity rule woul

d not be applie d to “v

oid” a com

pla in t file d by a lic ensed, bu t i na cti ve attorn ey , wh o repres en

ted the es tateof hi s dec ea se d f

ather a s i ts s pe ci al ad m i ni stra tor
an d w h o wa s th e s ol e b en ef i ci ar y of th e dec eden

t b ec au se appl y i n g th e r ul e w oul d n ot s er v e i ts purpos e. Applebaum , 231 Il l . 2d at 43 2-33, 4 36, 444 -48 (20 08). Alt ho ug h t he fa ct s o f Applebaum are cl early dis tingui shab le , particul arly

because , there, the pla in tif f di d not engage i

n the un authorized practic e of law, we cann ot ign ore Applebaum ’s chan ge i n reci tation of the nul

li ty rule. Contrary to prior case law us in g ma ndatory language, Applebaum states that t he n ull ity rule “ permi ts,” rat her than requi

res, dismi ssal where an unl i censed pers on en

gage s i n the prac tic e of l aw. Applebaum , 2 31 I ll. 2d a t 435 . I n add itio n, Applebaum cl early

states that t he rule “sh

ould be in voked onl y w here i t ful fi ll s i ts purposes.”1-10-0598

19

Applebaum , 23 1 I l l . 2d

at 4 35 -3 6. I

n l i gh t of th e f ore goi n g, we f i n d th at a pp l i ca ti on of th e n ul l i ty rule i s nei ther a utoma tic nor the mandatory

resu l t whe re the una uthori zed p ractice of l aw occurs. Ra t he r , co ur t s mu st co nsid er wh et he run de rt he sp ec ific fa ct s p r es en t ed , ap plic at io n o f t he rule
woul d s erv

e i ts purp ose s. S eealso Elustra v. Mineo , 595 F .3d 699 , 705 (7 th Cir. 201 0) (finding that pursuant to Ill

in ois State case l aw, in

cl udin g Applebaum , Illi

nois court s wil

l n ot dism iss a nonparty’ s f

il in g out of han

d but, rather, “would di stin guis h be tween a f il in g that merel

y a ll ows the par ty t o g o fo rwa rd a nd mor e gene ral pr ose cut ion o f the lawsu it”) ; Prime Location Properties

, LLC v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency , Ill . Poll ution Control Bd. Op. 09- 67, sl i p op. at 1 , 3- 9 (A

ug. 20, 200 9) (hol

di ng tha t pur suan t to Applebaum , th e a

ppl i ca ti on of the nul li ty rule was not automatic an d appl yi ng the rule would n

ot ful fi ll its purposes where a nonattor ney

tim el y f il ed the origi

nal compl ai nt and an atto rney subse quently

fi le d an am ended
com plai nt af ter the s tatute of l i m i tations had pa sse d). THE TRIAL COU RT’S APP LICATI ON OF TH E NULLI TY RULE Here, the trial

court dis mi ssed DD’s

compl ai nt solel y b ecause i

t erro neousl

y b elie ved ap plic at io n o f t he nu llit y ru le w as au t o mat ic. I n lig ht o f t he pe rmiss ive lan gu ag e u se d in Applebaum , we qu es t io n w he t he rt his c o ur t sho uld de cid e if t he pu r po se s o f t he nu llit y ru le w o uld be f urthered by

its appl ic ation unde

r these ci rcumstances or whether thi s determi nation i s a m atter b est l ef t to the d i scre ti on of th e tr i al cou rt. W e n ote th at Applebaum i s si

l en t on this que sti on. No ne t he les s, he r e, t he t r ial c o ur t ’s ex pr es s r elu ct an ce in d ismis sing t he co mpla int st r o ng ly indicat es t hat it w ou ld no t have a pplied t he nullity ru le if given the cho ice. Co nsist ent wit h t he t r ial c o ur t ’s co nc er ns, we find no fac t ua l o rleg al r ea so n t ha t ap plic at io n o f t he nu llit y ru le w o uld1-10-0598

20

further the rule’s purposes i n the case sub judice
. Her e, Van T holen a ppe ar ed o n DD’ s beha lf before t he DO AH. Afte r d enying the mot ions to s et a si de th e def aul t j udgm en ts, th e D OA

H s ai d to V an Thol en th at “ you do h av e a ri gh t to appe al” (em

phasi s ad ded) a nd a gai n s aid, “[y]ou have a right t o a ppe al” (e mphasis ad ded ). The DO AH al so s

tate d th at “ you would do tha

t in Room 602 of the D aley

Cen ter.” (Em phasi s ad ded.) Al though we do not impose upon the DOA H an obl iga tion to explai

n to Van Tholen

that DD was
re quir ed t o o bt ain an at t or ney to pur sue t hat app eal in the t rial co ur t , w e ca nnot say it w ou ld be
an y th i n g b ut rea son ab l e f or V an Thol en to b el i ev e th at hepersonally

had a ri ght to fi le a co mpla int fo rad minist r at ive r ev iew
. I t is u nd isp ut ed t ha t Va n T ho len did sig n a nd file t imely complai nts in the trial

cour t within 35 day

s of the DOAH’s decis ion. 735 ILCS 5/3- 103 (West 200 8). For

approx i mate l y si x m onth s, th e C i ty di d n ot noti cetha t DD ’s com pl ai nts were n ot signed by an at t or ney, w hich sug ges t s t hat unt il that po int, t he Cit y was no t suffer ing fro m the
sch em es of th e u n scru pul ous or th e m i sta ke s of th e i gn ora n t. Rath er , the C i ty n oti ce d th

e def ects i n the com plai nts on l y wh en DD attem

pted to properl

y appe ar i n c ourt through

an attorney. In
m ovi ng to di sm i ss the com pl ai nts , th e C i

ty rec ogn ize d the p urp ose s of

the nu l l i ty rul e, b ut di d n ot expl ai n how those purposes were i mpl ic ated in the case at han

d. Sim il arly , it appears f

romthe trial court ’s com

me nts that it did n

ot fi nd the proceedi

ngs h ad someh ow been corrupted by

Van Tholen ’s conduct or that DD was in a ny way harm ed by Van Tholen’s

conduct. We do not see ho w t he pu r

po se s o f t he nu llit y ru le h er e w o uld be fur t he r ed by it s a pp lica t io n u nd er t his s pe cific set of f acts. We al so f i nd th at the l ack of an attorney ’ssi

gna ture on the com

plai nts c an be eas i l y cured
.1-10-0598

21

I f t he nu llit y ru le is no t ap plie d, t he n t he o r igin al c o mpla int s a r e n o t “vo id” bu t wo uld r ema in tim el y f i l ed com plai nts. D D sh

oul d be perm i tted to fi l e am ended c omp l ai

nts, b eari ng th e si gna ture of i ts att orney, wh

ic h relate back to t he origi

nal compl ai nts. See Pratt-Holdampf

, 338 Ill . App. 3d at 1087. We re co gnize t hat in Siakpere , w h ere th e F i rs t Distr i ct w as pr es en ted wi th f acts substantially

si mi la r to the present case, the court found the i ni tial compl ai nt was nul

l a nd voi d ab initio and t hat a new co mplaint w ou ld be t ime barr ed, and it affirmed t he dismissal o f the compl ai nt. The Siakpere de ci si

on wasren

dered pri or to Applebaum and tr eat ed t he null ity rule’s applic ation as b ei

ng an automatic requi

remen t. Furt herm

ore, t he Siakpere cou

rt di d n ot ack now ledge t he T hird D istr ict’ s de cision in Pratt-Holdampf , w h ere th e p l ai n ti f f wa s p er m i tted to fi le an am ended com

pla in t. See Pratt-Holdampf

, 3 38 I ll. App. 3d a t 108 7. As a r esu lt, we find t ha t un de rt he se cir cu mst an ce s, pe rmit t ing DD t o file a n a men de d c o mpla int cu r ing t he de fec t in the origi nal compl ai nt is more appropriate than the h arsh resul t o f dism is si ng the origi

nal
com plai nt wi th pre j udice. I n c o nc lus io n, un de rt he se sp ec ific p r o ce du r al fa ct s, we find t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in gr an ti n g th e C i ty ’s moti on s to dism

i ss th e c om pl ai n ts b as ed on i ts d ete rm i n ati on th at th e n ul l i ty
ru le rend er ed t he co mplaint a nu lli t y. It follow s t hat t he co ur t incor re ct ly dete rmined t hat t he dismissal of t he co mplaints r ende re d DD ’s mot ions t o a mend and mot ion fo r su mmary judgment
moo t . Ac co rd ingly, we r ever se t he t rial co ur t ’s judg ment d ismi ssing t he co mplaints a nd de nying DD’ s mot ions t o a mend and for summary judg ment. On r emand, t he o riginal co mplaints mus t be reinstated, DD wil

l h ave the oppo rtu ni

ty to fi le am ended complai

nts and the part ies wi

ll ot herwise1-10-0598

22

conti nue wi th the pleadi ng process . Reversed a

nd rem anded.1-10-0598

23 REPORT ER OF D ECI SION S – ILLI NOIS APPE LLATE COURT

(Fron t Sh eet to be Attach ed to Each Case) Please Use Following Form: Complet e TITLE of Case DOW

NTOW N DI SPO SAL

SER VICES , INC. , )

) Plaintiff -Appe llant, )

) ) v. ) ) THE C ITY O F CH

ICAGO, a Mu

nicipal ) Corporation, THE DEPARTMENT OF ) AD MI NI STR ATI VE H EAR IN GS and ) THE DEPARTMENT OF TR ANSPOR TATION, )

) Defendant s-Appellees. ) Docke t No. COURT Opi ni on Filed No. 1-10-0598 Appellate Court o f Illino is Fir st D ist ri ct, FOURT H Divi sion February 3, 2011 (G ive m ont

h, da y and y ea r)
JUSTICES JU STI CE L AVIN de liv ered the ju dgment o f the co urt, w ith o

pini on. Gallagher , P.J., and Pucinski, J., concurred. APP EAL from the Cir cui t Ct . of Co ok Co un t y. Lo w er C ou rt and Trial J udg e( s) in f

orm indi ca te d in t he m argi n: The Honorables

James M. McGing, Judge Presiding.1-10-0598

24

For APPELL ANT S, Joh n Doe , of Chi cago. For APPEL LEES, Smith and Smi th of Chi cago, Joseph Brow n, (of Co unsel) Also add at tor ne ys for third- party ap pe ll an ts or appellees . Indicate if attorney represe nts APPELLANTS o

r APPELLEES and include attorneys o f co

unsel. Indicate the word NONE if not represe nted. Att orn eys for Plaintiff/Appellant: Ri cha rd D . B oo

nst ra Hoogendoorn & Tal bot LLP 122 S. Michigan Ave. Suite 1220 Chicago, IL 60603-6263 312.786.2250 Att orne y s f or Defen dan ts/A

ppel lees : Mar a S. Geor ges Corpo ration Counse l of the City o f Chicago Benna Ruth Solomon, My riam Zr eczny Kasper, and Chr istoph er S. Norborg, Of counsel 30 N. LaSalle St., suite 800 Chicago, IL 60602 312.742.0115