______________________________________ 

___________________________________________________________________ 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 

State of California
 

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP
 

Attorney General
 

OPINION :
 

: No. 89-602
 

of :
 

: JANUARY 11, 1990
 

JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP :
 

Attorney General :
 

:
 

RONALD M. WEISKOPF :
 

Deputy Attorney General :
 

:
 

THE HONORABLE ROBERT G. BEVERLY, MEMBER OF THE CALIFORNIA
 

SENATE, has requested an opinion on the following question:
 

Does a California city have the authority to prohibit the
 

parking of particular categories of vehicles, such as recreational
 

vehicles or motor vehicles which exceed a specified length or
 

width, on its residential streets during all or certain hours of
 

the day?
 

CONCLUSION
 

A California city has no authority to prohibit the
 

parking of particular categories of vehicles on its residential
 

streets during all or certain hours of the day, with the exception
 

of commercial vehicles having a manufacturer's gross vehicle weight
 

rating of 10,000 pounds or more.
 

ANALYSIS
 

This opinion addresses the question of whether a
 

California city may adopt an ordinance to prohibit the general
 

parking of particular classes of vehicles on its residential
 

streets. For example, we are asked whether a city might enact an
 

ordinance to specifically prohibit the parking on residential
 

streets of oversized vehicles, or the parking of recreational
 

vehicles.1 We will see that the authority for a city to adopt such
 

1

The question asked does not define the term "recreational
 

vehicle" and the term is not defined in the Vehicle Code. However,
 

the term does have a customary meaning in the industry and among
 

1. 89-602
an ordinance must be found in the specifics of the Vehicle Code,
 

and on examining its provisions we will conclude that with the
 

exception of being able to prohibit the parking of certain
 

commercial vehicles in residential areas, a city is without
 

authority to particularize other types of vehicles, as by size, or
 

kind, or use, in order to similarly prohibit their parking.
 

Section 7 of article XI of the California Constitution
 

provides that a city "may make and enforce within its limits all
 

local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not
 

in conflict with general laws." (Cal. Const, art. XI, § 7.) This
 

authority is often referred to as the "police power" (70
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 210, 211 (1987)), and an ordinance adopted under
 

it would be presumed to be valid as long as it did not conflict
 

with general, i.e., state law. (Cf., Freeman v. Contra Costa
 

County Water District (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 404, 408; Stanislaus Co.
 

etc. Assn. v. Stanislaus (1937) 8 Cal.2d 378, 383, 384.) 


But if a city ordinance adopted under the "police power"
 

does conflict with state law it would be void. ( People ex rel.
 

Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino (1984) 36 Cal.3d 476, 484; 72
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 180, 182 (1989).) Our Supreme Court has
 

summarized the notion of conflict:
 

"`"As defined by the cases the constitutional phrase
 

`conflict with general laws' ... may arise in several
 

different ways. It may grow out of the exact language of
 

the state and municipal laws [citations] or from a local
 

attempt `to impose additional requirements in a field
 

that is preempted by general law' [citations] or from the
 

state's adoption of `a general scheme for the regulation
 

of a particular subject' [citations]."'" (Baron v. City
 

of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 535, 541 [emphasis added];
 

see also People ex rel Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino,
 

supra, at 484-485; Lancaster v. Municipal Court (1972) 6
 

Cal.3d 805, 806, 808; 58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 519, 521-523,
 

529 (1975); 58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 13, 14, supra.)
 

"Conflict" with state law can thus arise in many ways,
 

and as pertinent herein, one of them occurs when the state has
 

enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme intended for uniform
 

application throughout the state and has indicated an intention to
 

preempt local regulation in the area. The Vehicle Code is such an
 

enactment and in fact contains its own preemption rule, found in
 

RV-users, where it normally includes vehicles which are self-


propelled or towed and which are designed to be slept in. Thus
 

"recreational vehicle" would include such vehicles as travel
 

trailers, van campers, truck campers, coaches, and motorhomes,
 

although taken on its face the term is broad enough to include any
 

vehicle used for "recreation." 


2. 89-602
 
 

its section 21.2 ( Rumford v. City of Berkeley (1982) 31 Cal.3d
 

545, 551; County of Los Angeles v. City of Alhambra (1980) 27
 

Cal.3d 184, 189; Pipoly v. Benson (1942) 20 Cal.2d 366, 371; City
 

of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 749,
 

755, 756; Mervynne v. Acker (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 561-562; 68
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 101, 102 (1985); 64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 707, 709­

710 (1981); 55 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 178, 179 (1972).) In that section
 

the State has expressed its plenary power and its preemption of the
 

entire field of traffic regulation and control. (Rumford v. City
 

of Berkeley, supra, [the entire field of traffic control]; City of
 

Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa , supra, at 755 [the area of
 

motor vehicle traffic control]; 64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 707, 709,
 

supra [the area of motor vehicle traffic regulation and control].)
 

Section 21 provides as follows:
 

"Except as otherwise expressly provided, the
 

provisions of this code are applicable and uniform
 

throughout the state and in all counties and
 

municipalities therein, and no local authority shall
 

enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by
 

this code unless expressly authorized therein."
 

Thus, "a city may regulate traffic on its public streets only to
 

the extent it is so expressly authorized in the Vehicle Code" (68
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 101, 102, supra; fn. omitted), and unless it has
 

been so expressly authorized, it "has no authority over vehicular
 

traffic control. [Citations.]" ( Rumford v. City of Berkeley,
 supra, 31 Cal.3d at 550.) What this means is that "a [c]ity does
 

not have a `very wide discretion' under the police power in
 

legislating in the field covered by the Vehicle Code. Instead it
 

has no police power in that area at all, `unless expressly
 

authorized' [therein] by the Legislature." (City of Lafayette v.
 

County of Contra Costa , supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at 749; emphases
 

original.)
 

The regulation of parking on public streets is an adjunct
 

to the control and regulation of vehicular traffic, and that field
 

too is now preempted by state law. (County of Los Angeles v. City
 

of Alhambra, supra, 27 Cal.3d 184, 192-193; Siegel v. City of
 

Oakland (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 351, 357, 358; Mervynne v. Acker,
 

supra, 189 Cal.App.2d at 561; Bentley v. Chapman (1952) 113
 

Cal.App.2d 1, 3; 64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 707, 710, supra.) 


It was not always so. Prior to 1935, the Vehicle Code
 

prohibited local authorities from enacting ordinances which in any
 

2

Further references to sections of the Vehicle Code will be by
 

section number only, and unidentified section references herein
 

should be understood to be to that Code unless context dictates
 

otherwise. 


3. 89-602
 
 

way conflicted with its provisions (see e.g., Veh. Code [1919], §
 

22(d); Stats. 1919, ch. 147, p. 223, § 13), but since the Code did
 

not address "the method or manner of parking vehicles on the
 

streets of cities or towns" (cf., Flynn v. Blesdoe Co. (1928) 92
 

Cal.App. 145, 152), it was held that "no conflict [was] created by
 

a city ordinance regulating the same." (Ibid.) With the enactment
 

of the Vehicle Code of 1935 (Stats. 1935, ch. 27, p. 93), "the
 

Legislature determined to ... preempt the field of local
 

legislation in the area of motor vehicle traffic control." (City
 

of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at
 

755.) Section 458 of that Code provided:
 

"The provisions of this division [i.e., division 11
 

entitled "Traffic Laws"] are applicable and uniform
 

throughout the State and in all counties and
 

municipalities therein and no local authority shall enact
 

or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this
 

division unless expressly authorized herein." (Stats.
 

1935, ch. 27, p. 164.)
 

But an undefined authority for local authorities to enact some
 

local parking regulations was found in section 472 of the Code, and
 

under it it was held that "local authorities [were] ... authorized
 

to enact special rules and regulations dealing with parking of
 

vehicles." (Pipoly v. Benson (1942) 20 Cal.2d 366, 373.)3
 

In 1953, however, the Legislature added former section
 

459.8 to the Vehicle Code to provide a specific, and as we shall
 

see a limited, grant of authority for local authorities to regulate
 

parking. (Stats. 1953, ch. 709, p. 1979, § 2.) The section
 

provided:
 

"The provisions of this division shall not prevent
 

local authorities, by ordinance or resolution, from
 

prohibiting the parking or standing of vehicles on
 

certain streets or highways, or portions thereof, at all
 

3

Section 472 of the Vehicle Code of 1935 provided:
 

"Curb Markings to Indicate Parking Regulations.
 

Whenever local authorities enact local parking
 

regulations and indicate them by the use of paint upon
 

curbs, the following colors only shall be used and such
 

colors indicate as follows: [red = no stopping; yellow =
 

stopping only to unload passengers or freight; white =
 

stopping only for loading or unloading of passengers;
 

green = time limit parking, as may be specified by local
 

ordinance.] [¶]Regulations indicated as above provided
 

shall be effective upon such days and during such hours
 

or times as may be prescribed by local ordinance."
 

(Stats. 1935, ch. 27, p. 169.)
 

4. 89-602
 
 

 

or certain hours of the day." (Stats. 1953, ch. 709, §
 

2, supra.)
 

The Legislature recodified the Vehicle Code in 1959, and
 

upon that recodification, "preempted the entire field covered by
 

[it] by substituting in place of section 458 the new section
 

21...." (City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 91
 

Cal.App.3d at 755.) As quoted above, it only permits local
 

authorities to enact ordinances on matters covered by the Code only
 

to the extent "expressly authorized therein." (Veh. Code, § 21,
 

supra.) Thus, to answer the question whether a city may prohibit
 

certain classes of vehicles from parking on residential streets,
 

under section 21 of the Vehicle Code we must look to its other
 

provisions to see the extent to which the Legislature has expressly
 

permitted local authorities to regulate parking. (Cf., Rumford v.
 

City of Berkeley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at 550; City of Lafayette v.
 

County of Contra Costa, supra, at 756; 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1, 4
 

(1984).)4
 

In several sections of chapter 9 (§ 22500 et seq.) of
 

division 11 of the Code, the Legislature has permitted local
 

authorities, such as cities, to adopt ordinances to regulate
 

parking within their jurisdiction in various situations.5 Most of
 

4

It should be noted that the regulation of vehicular use of
 

the public roads and highways by whatever means is outside the
 

"municipal affairs" constitutional grant of authority to chartered
 

cities, by which they are given power superior to that of the
 

Legislature to legislate on matters of "municipal" concern.
 

(Rumford v. City of Berkeley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at 550 fn. 3; 68
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 101, 102 fn. 2, supra; 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1, 4,
 

supra; cf., Cal.Const., art. XI, § 5; 72 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 180, 182
 

fn. 4, supra.) The regulation of parking is also not a "municipal
 

affair" in the sense of giving a chartered municipality control of
 

the matter in derogation of the power of the state. (County of Los
 

Angeles v. City of Alhambra, supra, 27 Cal.3d at 193; Siegel v.
 

City of Oakland, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d at 357; Mervynne v. Acker,
 

supra, 189 Cal.App.2d at 561-562, 564-565.)
 

5

A "local authority" is defined to mean "the legislative body
 

of every county or municipality having authority to adopt local
 

police regulations." (§ 385.) The terms "park" or "parking" are
 

defined to mean "the standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or
 

not, otherwise than temporarily for the purpose and while actually
 

engaged in loading or unloading merchandise or passengers." (§
 

463; see also, Fleming v. Flick (1934) 140 Cal.App. 14, 30 ["...the
 

term park ... [means] in substance, the voluntary act of leaving a
 

car on the main-traveled portion of the highway when not in use.
 

It means something more than a mere temporary or momentary stoppage
 

on the road for a necessary purpose."]; accord, 64
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 29, 34 & 34 fn. 4 (1981); 62 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 4
 

5. 89-602
 

 

the sections conferring that authority involve the adoption of
 

ordinances to address specific parking situations that are not
 

directly relevant because they do not involve the imposition of a
 

general restriction on parking in residential areas.6 But two of
 

the sections of the chapter require analysis. 


Section 22507, which derives from the aforementioned
 

section 459.8 that was added to the Vehicle Code of 1935 in 1953,
 

permits local authorities to adopt ordinances to prohibit or
 

otherwise restrict parking "on certain streets or highways, or
 

portions thereof, during all or certain hours of the day." And
 

section 22507.5 permits them to adopt ordinances prohibiting or
 

restricting the parking of vehicles on certain streets or highways
 

or portions thereof, between the hours of 2 a.m. and 6 a.m., and
 

ordinances to "prohibit or restrict the parking or standing, on any
 

street, or portion thereof, in a residential district, of
 

commercial vehicles having a manufacturer's gross vehicle weight
 

rating of 10,000 pounds or more."7 It is upon these sections that
 

(1979).)
 

6

(See e.g., §§ 22503.5 [ordinances providing special parking
 

regulations for two-wheeled or three-wheeled motor vehicles]; 22506
 

[ordinances prohibiting or restricting parking of vehicles on a
 

state highway within the jurisdiction]; 22507.6 [ordinances
 

prohibiting or restricting parking on designated streets or
 

highways for the purpose of street cleaning]; 22508 [ordinances
 

establishing parking meter zones and white-lined designated parking
 

spaces within which a vehicle must park]; 22509 [ordinances
 

requiring the blocking of wheels when vehicles are on hills in
 

business or residential districts]; 22510 [ordinances prohibiting
 

parking on highways, the width of which is restricted after snow
 

clearance]; 22511.7 and 22511.8 [ordinances designating special
 

parking for disabled persons and disabled veterans]; 22512
 

[ordinances reducing the state's 15 foot prohibited parking
 

distance from a fire hydrant]; 22519 [ordinances regulating,
 

prohibiting or restricting parking of vehicles in any offstreet
 

parking facility which the locality owns or operates].)
 

7

A "commercial vehicle" is "a vehicle of a type required to be
 

registered under the [Vehicle Code] used or maintained for the
 

transportation of persons for hire, compensation, or profit or
 

designated, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of
 

property. (§ 260, subd. (a).) It does not include a "vanpool
 

vehicle." (Id., subd. (c); cf., § 668.) 


The "manufacturer's gross vehicle weight rating" is "the
 

weight in pounds of the chassis of a truck or truck tractor with
 

lubricants, radiator full of water, full fuel tank or tanks plus
 

the weights of the cab or driver's compartment, body, special
 

chassis and body equipment and pay load as authorized by the
 

6. 89-602
 

a city would have to rely for authority to adopt the type of
 

ordinance contemplated in the question.
 

A. Section 22507.
 

We turn first to section 22507. It is the older of the
 

two sections and the one which gives local agencies the most
 

general authority to control parking. The section presently reads
 

as follows:
 

"Local authorities may, by ordinance or resolution,
 

prohibit or restrict the stopping, parking, or standing
 

of vehicles, including, but not limited to, vehicles
 

which are six feet or more in height (including any load
 

thereon) within 100 feet of any intersection, on certain
 

streets or highways, or portions thereof, during all or
 

certain hours of the day. The ordinance or resolution
 

may include a designation of certain streets upon which
 

preferential parking privileges are given to residents
 

and merchants adjacent to the streets for their use and
 

the use of their guests, under which the residents and
 

merchants may be issued a permit or permits which exempt
 

them from the prohibition or restriction of the ordinance
 

or resolution. With the exception of alleys, no such
 

ordinance or resolution shall apply until signs or
 

markings giving adequate notice thereof have been placed.
 

A local ordinance or resolution adopted pursuant to this
 

section may contain provisions which are reasonable and
 

necessary to ensure the effectiveness of a preferential
 

parking program." (Emphasis added.)
 

Section 22507 contains four parts: (i) a general grant
 

of authority to permit local authorities to prohibit parking on
 

certain streets and highways at all or certain hours of the day;
 

(ii) the specific inclusion of an authority to permit them to
 

prohibit or restrict the parking of vehicles over six feet in
 

height within 100 feet of an intersection; (iii) a grant of
 

authority for them to designate certain streets upon which
 

preferential parking privileges would be given to residents and
 

merchants; and (iv) a requirement that signs be posted to give
 

notice of any parking restriction imposed under the section. We
 

turn our attention to the first two of these components to
 

determine whether local authorities can prohibit the parking of
 

particular types of vehicles in residential areas.8 This will take
 

chassis manufacturer." (§ 390.)
 

8

It could not be successfully argued that such authority can
 

be eked from the authority found in the third component of the
 

section giving local authorities power to designate certain streets
 

upon which preferential parking privileges are given to residents
 

7. 89-602
 

 

us to a stepped analysis based on the chronological evolution of
 

the section.
 

1. The General Authorization To Prohibit Parking.
 

Section 22507 commences with a general grant for local
 

authorities to 


"... prohibit or restrict the ... parking ... of
 

vehicles .... on certain streets or highways, or portions
 

thereof, during all or certain hours of the day." 


As mentioned, this language dates almost verbatim from a 1953
 

addition to the Vehicle Code of 1935, and it was carried forward to
 

section 22507 when the Vehicle Code was recodified in 1959 (Stats.
 

1959, ch. 3, p. 1700, § 2). 9 To ascertain the intended scope of
 

this grant we look to its wording (cf., Moyer v. Workmen's Comp.
 

Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230; People v. Knowles (1950) 35
 

Cal.2d 175, 182; Rich v. State Board of Optometry (1965) 235
 

Cal.App.2d 591, 604), and interpret it according to the usual,
 

ordinary and generally accepted meaning of the words used to frame
 

it. (Cf., People v. Craft (1986) 41 Cal.3d 554, 560; People v.
 

Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884; Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v.
 

Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650,
 

658; Great Lakes Properties Inc . v. City of El Segundo (1977) 19
 

Cal.3d 152, 155-156.) Reference to the dictionary is helpful to
 

understand the common generally accepted meaning of a term. (Cf.,
 

People v. Spencer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 563, 565; People v. Medina
 

(1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 473, 479.) 


and their guests. That authority deals with "classes of persons,"
 

not "classes of vehicles" and it is inappropriate to extrapolate an
 

authority to restrict one from the authority to restrict the other.
 

(Cf., City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 91
 

Cal.App.3d at 756 fn. 2.)
 

9

As we have seen, in 1953 section 459.8 was added to the
 

Vehicle Code of 1935 to provide as follows: "The provisions of
 

this division shall not prevent local authorities, by ordinance or
 

resolution, from prohibiting the parking or standing of vehicles on
 

certain streets or highways, or portions thereof, at all or certain
 

hours of the day." (Stats. 1953, ch. 709, p. 1978, § 2.) Section
 

22507 of the Vehicle Code of 1959 provided: "Local authorities may
 

by ordinance or resolution prohibit the parking or standing of
 

vehicles on certain streets or highways, or portions thereof,
 

during all or certain hours of the day. (Stats. 1959, ch. 3, p.
 

1700, § 2.) In 1963 the Legislature added the words "or restrict"
 

to the sentence (Stats. 1963, ch. 1070, p. 2530, § 1), and in 1987
 

the word "stopping" was added. (Stats. 1987, ch. 455, p. ___, §
 

4.)
 

8. 89-602
 
 

Looking to the wording of the general grant of authority
 

found in section 22507 for local authorities to regulate parking,
 

we see that as added in 1953 and as it appears today, the
 

Legislature used the adjective "certain" to describe both the
 

places where ("streets and highways") and the times during which
 

("hours of the day") a city might prohibit or otherwise restrict
 

parking but that it did not use the term when referring to the
 

"vehicles" whose parking could be restricted. According to its
 

usual, ordinary and generally accepted meaning, the term "certain"
 

means, inter alia, 


"2a PARTICULAR: of a character ... unwise to specify
 

-- used to distinguish a person or thing not otherwise
 

distinguished or not distinguishable in more precise
 

terms." (Webster's Third New Intn'l. Dict. (1971 ed.) at
 

p. 367.)
 

This would indicate that by using the term to describe the places
 

where, and the times during which, a city might prohibit vehicular
 

parking, the Legislature did not intend to particularize those
 

places and times on a statewide basis, but intended instead to
 

leave those matters to the exercise of local discretion as varying
 

local needs demanded. As such, the section would "authorize[]
 

local authorities to restrict parking, at hours and places to be
 

determined locally...." (Capolungo v. Bondi (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d
 

346, 350.) 


In contrast, however, the Legislature did not similarly
 

use the word to modify what "vehicles" could be affected by the
 

exercise of that discretion. From that we believe the Legislature
 

did not intend local authorities to have discretion regarding the
 

kinds of vehicles covered by the ordinance. In other words we
 

believe that while the Legislature intended local authorities to
 

have discretion to designate the streets and highways on which
 

parking should be restricted, and the times of day during which
 

such restrictions would apply, they were not to have discretion to
 

designate particular types of vehicles for the purpose of applying
 

parking restrictions only to them. Any parking restrictions that
 

a local authority would choose to impose would have to apply to all
 

vehicles or none.10
 

10It is interesting to note that the concept of having local
 

regulations affecting traffic apply to all vehicles or none finds
 

expression at least as early as 1919. Subdivision (d) of section
 

22 of the Vehicle Code as amended that year provided, inter alia:
 

"Local authorities shall have no power to enact, enforce or
 

maintain any ordinance, rule or regulation in any way in conflict
 

with, contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this act,
 

or of any section or other subdivision thereof, and no such
 

ordinance, rule or regulation of said local authorities shall have
 

any force or effect, excepting however, that (1) such powers as are
 

now or may hereafter be vested in local authorities to enact
 

9. 89-602
This perception of the purport of section 22507 finds
 

support when we compare the treatment accorded provisions of the
 

Vehicle Code where the word "certain" is present and where it is
 

not. It is present in subdivision (c) of section 21101, which
 

authorizes local authorities to prohibit "the use of particular
 

highways by certain vehicles...." (Emphasis added.) In 55
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 178 (1955) we noted that the phrase "certain
 

vehicles" was not defined (id. at 182), but said that it was broad
 

enough to permit a city or county to prohibit the use of particular
 

highways or streets by certain classes of vehicles, such as those
 

determined to be excessively noisy. (Id. at 183.) Our conclusion
 

was cited in City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 91
 

Cal.App.3d 749, in support of the proposition that subdivision (c)
 

would permit a city to prohibit certain classes of vehicles, "such
 

as trucks, or tractors, or oversize or `excessively noisy'
 

vehicles, or those lacking air-inflated tires," from using
 

particular highways. (Id. at 756 fn. 2.) In 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen.
 

1, supra, we again considered the subdivision and concluded that
 

the phrase "certain vehicles" gave local agencies some limited
 

authority to restrict the roads on which certain cargoes, such as
 

hazardous material, might be transported in the jurisdiction. (Id.
 at 5-7.)
 

In contrast to its subdivision (c), the modifier
 

"certain" is absent from subdivision (a) of section 21101, which
 

permits local authorities to adopt an ordinance "[c]losing any
 

highway [which includes streets (§ 360)] to vehicular traffic when
 

in [its opinion it] is no longer needed for vehicular traffic." In
 

Rumford v. City of Berkeley, supra, 31 Cal.3d 545 and City of
 

Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d 749, the
 

courts considered the issue of whether that grant of authority
 

permitted a city to partially close a public street to some traffic
 

but not to other. Each case held that subdivision (a) did not
 

provide that discretion, and that a city would have to close the
 

street equally to all traffic or none. (31 Cal.3d at 554-558; 91
 

Cal.App.3d at 756-757.) We reached a similar conclusion in 68
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 101, supra, finding that the subdivision did not
 

permit a city to adopt an ordinance authorizing "controlled access"
 

to the public streets in a residential neighborhood. (Id. at 103.)
 

By analogy to the foregoing, we find that while section
 

22507's general authorization for local agencies to "prohibit or
 

restrict the ... parking ... of vehicles ... on certain streets or
 

highways ... during all or certain hours of the day" might accord
 

ordinances and regulations, applicable equally and generally to all
 

vehicles and other users of the highways, and providing for traffic
 

or crossing officers or semaphores, to bring about the orderly
 

passage of vehicles and other users of the public highways on
 

certain portions thereof, where the traffic is heavy and
 

continuous...." (Stats. 1919, ch. 147, § 13, p. 223.)
 

10. 89-602
 
discretion to a city to designate certain streets or highways and
 

certain hours of the day for parking restrictions to be imposed, it
 

does not provide authority to prohibit or restrict the parking of
 

only certain types of vehicles. 


2. The Specific Authorization To Restrict The Parking
 

of A Certain Class Of Vehicles.


 In 1984 the Legislature amended section 22507 to add in
 

the just-discussed general authorization of its first sentence, a
 

specific authority for local authorities to restrict the parking of
 

vehicles more than six feet in height within 100 feet of an
 

intersection. (Stats. 1984, ch. 181, p. 555, § 2.) As amended,
 

the section then permitted local authorities to prohibit or
 

restrict "the parking or standing of vehicles, including vehicles
 

which are six feet or more in height (including any load thereon)
 

within 100 feet of any intersection , on certain streets or
 

highways, or portions thereof, during all or certain hours of the
 

day." (§22507, as amended by Stats. 1984, ch. 181, § 2, supra;
 

emphasis added.) 


How was this meant to augment the existing general grant of
 

authority already found in the section?
 

"When determining the legislative purpose behind a
 

statutory amendment, [one] may properly consider committee reports
 

(Southland Mechanical Constructors Corp . v. Nixen (1981) 119
 

Cal.App.3d 417, 427), partisan caucus analyses (id. at p. 428), and
 

the digest of the Legislative Counsel. (People v. Superior Court
 

(Douglass) 1979 24 Cal.3d 428, 434)." (People v. Martinez (1987)
 

194 Cal.App.3d 15, 22; see also, People v. Aston (1985) 39 Cal.3d
 

481, 492-493; Hittle v. Santa Barbara County Employees Retirement
 

Assn. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 374, 387; California Teachers Assn . v.
 

Governing Board (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 606, 613; 68
 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 23, 25-26, fn. 3; 66 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 382, 386
 

(1983).) This is because it will be presumed that the Legislature
 

adopted the subject legislation with the intent and meaning
 

expressed in those documents. (People v. Martinez, supra, citing
 

People v. Superior Court (Douglass) , supra at 434, People v.
 

Swinney (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 332, 342, and Maben v. Superior Court
 

(1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 708, 713.)
 

From such type of documents in the legislative history of
 

the Bill (AB 286) that enacted the 1984 amendment to section 22507,
 

we learn that "[t]he vehicle height prohibition provisions [were]
 

intended to provide better visibility at intersections." (See
 

e.g., Assembly Office Of Research, Concurrence in Senate Amendments
 

To AB 286; Senate Republican Caucus, Digest To AB 286, p. 2; Senate
 

Transportation Committee, Analysis Of AB 286, p. 2.) The amendment
 

was thus wrought with an overall purpose of promoting one aspect of
 

traffic safety. (Cf., Capolungo v. Bondi, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d
 

346, 351, 352.)
 

11. 89-602
 
But why was the amendment necessary at all to achieve
 

that end, when section 22507 already gave local authorities the
 

authority "to prohibit or restrict the parking or standing of
 

vehicles on certain streets or highways, or portions thereof, at
 

all or certain hours of the day"? The Legislative Counsel's Digest
 

to the Bill (AB 286) which amended the section --again, a valuable
 

aid in determining the Legislature's reasons for the legislation-­

provides the answer. The Digest states:
 

"Existing law authorizes local authorities to
 

prohibit or restrict the parking or standing of vehicles
 

on certain streets or highways during all or certain
 

hours of the day. [¶] This bill would specifically
 

include vehicles which are 6 feet or more in height
 

(including any load thereon) within 100 feet of any
 

intersection as vehicles whose parking or standing may be
 

prohibited or restricted by local authorities ." (4
 

Stats. 1984, Sum. Dig. [AB 286], pp. 58-59; emphasis
 

added.)
 

We thus see that the amendment was enacted to specifically permit
 

local agencies to prohibit or restrict the parking of a particular
 

type of vehicle at a particular place - i.e., vehicles that are
 

more than six feet in height, within 100 feet of an intersection.
 

What we perceive that to mean is that without that specific
 

authorization, local authorities would have been without power to
 

single out such oversized vehicles in order to prohibit their
 

parking within 100 feet of an intersection, despite the broad
 

general language found in the introduction to section 22507. The
 

Legislature obviously considered the amendment necessary in order
 

to confer that authority on local agencies and permit them to
 

prohibit the parking of a specific type of vehicle because the
 

existing general authority to "prohibit or restrict the parking ...
 

of vehicles on certain streets" did not suffice to do so. Surely
 

if it already had, the Legislature's efforts to add the specific
 

authorization would have produced statutory surplusage, and that is
 

an interpretation of legislative efforts to be avoided. (Cf., City
 

and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 55;
 

California Mfgrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d
 

836, 844; Fields v. Eu (1976) 18 Cal.3d 322, 328.) 


We are thus reinforced in our conclusion that the general
 

grant of authority found in the introduction to section 22507 did
 

not enable local authorities to single out particular types of
 

vehicles in order to restrict their parking. 


This perception of the purport of the 1984 amendment is
 

consistent with the dictate that the delegation to local agencies
 

to make rules and regulations to regulate traffic is to be strictly
 

construed and that any grant of such authority must be expressly
 

declared by the Legislature in explicit and unmistakable terms.
 

(Cf., Rumford v. City of Berkeley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at 550, 553;
 

12. 89-602
 
 

City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d
 

at 756 & 756 fn. 3; People v. Moore (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 221, 228;
 

67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1, 4, supra.) 


The 1984 amendment to section 22507 also demonstrates
 

that when the Legislature has wanted to grant local authorities
 

power to enact an ordinance to prohibit the parking of a particular
 

type of vehicle for reasons of traffic safety, it knows how to do
 

so and has done so specifically. That it has not done so with
 

respect to other types of vehicles would indicate an intention that
 

local agencies were not to have authority to similarly prohibit or
 

otherwise restrict their parking. (Cf., Safer v. Superior Court
 

(1975) 15 Cal.3d 230, 236, 238; Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975)
 

50 Cal.App.3d 920, 927; see also, Wildlife Alive v. Chickering
 

(1976) 18 Cal.3d 190, 196; DeWeese v. Unick (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d
 

100, 106; Rich v. State Board of Optometry (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d
 

591, 607, discussing the doctrine of "expressio unius est exclusio
 

alterius," i.e., the rule that the expression of one thing in a
 

statute necessarily excludes other things not mentioned.)
 

In 1985 the Legislature again amended section 22507 to
 

add the phrase "but not limited to" after the word "including" in
 

the first sentence of the section. With that amendment local
 

authorities were given their presently worded authority to
 

"prohibit or restrict the parking ... of vehicles, including, but
 

not limited to, vehicles which are six feet or more in height ...
 

within 100 feet of any intersection, on certain streets or
 

highways, or portions thereof, during all or certain hours of the
 

day." (§ 22507 as amended by Stats. 1985, ch. 912, § 2. p. 2906;
 

emphasis added.) With the amendment, it now became clear that the
 

inclusion of the specific grant of authority to local agencies to
 

prohibit or restrict the parking of vehicles over six feet in
 

height within 100 feet of an intersection did not limit them to
 

enacting just that specified restriction. (Compare Television
 

Transmission v. Public Util. Com. (1956) 47 Cal.2d 82, 85; State
 

Compensation Ins. Fund v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (69 Cal.App.3d
 

884, 890; 11 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 11, 12 (1948), with People v.
 

Western Airlines (1954) 42 Cal.2d 621, 639; People v. Horner (1970)
 

9 Cal.App.3d 23, 27; Paramount Gen. Hosp. Co. v. National Medical
 

Enterprises, Inc. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 496, 501.) Local
 

authorities could now prohibit the parking of any vehicle within
 

100 feet of an intersection, if required by the needs of traffic
 

safety. Still, as we now see, this did not enable them to classify
 

vehicles by type or size in order to single out particular ones for
 

the sole purpose of restricting their parking in residential
 11
 areas.
 

11It is suggested that the "but not limited to" language
 

wrought by the 1985 amendment not only modifies "vehicles which are
 

six feet or more in height" but also modifies "within 100 feet of
 

any intersection." It is thus suggested that after the 1985
 

13. 89-602
Ordinarily, a grant of authority as is presently found in
 

the wording of section 22507 would not be one of limitation (cf.,
 

People v. Western Airlines, supra, 42 Cal.2d at 639; People v.
 

Horner, supra, 9 Cal.App.3d at 27; Paramount Gen. Hosp. Co. v.
 

National Medical Enterprises, Inc., supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at 501),
 

and from it one might ordinarily imply an ability on the part of
 

local agencies to impose other types of parking restrictions on
 

oversized vehicles than the one specifically mentioned in the
 

section, when required by the needs of traffic safety. Indeed,
 

from the broadest consequence of the use of the phrase "including,
 

but not limited to" one might even be able to ordinarily imply an
 

ability on the part of local authorities to impose parking
 

restrictions on those vehicles for reasons compelled by factors
 

other than traffic safety --such as general safety considerations,
 

or those of aesthetics. (Cf. fn. 2, ante.) But we do not deal
 

with an "ordinary" grant of legislative authority. 


The grant of authority found in section 22507 deals with
 

a facet of traffic regulation, and so when interpreting it we must
 

be ever mindful of the dictate that the Legislature's delegation to
 

local agencies of the power to make rules and regulations to
 

regulate traffic is to be strictly construed (Rumford v. City of
 

Berkeley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at 550, 553; City of Lafayette v. County
 

of Contra Costa, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at 756; People v. Moore,
 supra, 229 Cal.App.2d at 228; 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1, 4, supra) and
 

that "such authority must be `expressly (not impliedly) declared by
 

the Legislature'." (City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa,
 supra, quoting People v. Moore, supra (emphasis the court's);
 

accord, 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra.) " Expressly means `"in an
 

amendment, local authorities were given authority not only to
 

restrict the parking of any sized vehicle within 100 feet of an
 

intersection, but to prohibit any sized vehicle being parked at
 

places other than intersections, if required by the needs of
 

traffic safety. 


We reject the suggestion. It is more apparent from the
 

history of the added language than from the current sentence
 

structure, that the 1985 amendment was merely meant to clarify the
 

change that was made the year before. That as we have seen, was to
 

enable local agencies to provide better visibility at intersections
 

by prohibiting the parking of one particular size of vehicle within
 

the proximity of intersections. The 1985 amendment follows the
 

same structural pattern in the overall section and added an
 

authority to prohibit other categories of vehicles to the parking
 

ban within 100 feet of an intersection. Thus, following the rule
 

of strict construction for Vehicle Code provisions, we see this
 

added authority as being limited to restricting the parking of
 

additional categories of vehicles as would be reasonably calculated
 

to improve visibility at intersections, and not a carte blanche to
 

restrict their parking elsewhere. 


14. 89-602
 
express manner; in direct or unmistakable terms; explicitly;
 

definitely; directly."' [Citations.]" (City of Lafayette v. County
 

of Contra Costa, supra at 756 fn. 3; emphasis the court's.)" 


We have shown how the basic general authority for local
 

authorities to prohibit parking on certain streets and highways
 

that is found in section 22057, does not give them authority to
 

single out particular classes of vehicles for the imposition of
 

parking restrictions. We have also shown how the amendment to the
 

section in 1984 permitted local authorities to impose a parking
 

restriction or prohibition on one particular class of vehicle in a
 

particular situation involving parking near intersections, and how
 

that was augmented by the amendment to the section in 1985, to
 

permit them to impose the restriction on other types of vehicles in
 

the same situation. Nowhere in section 22057 has the Legislature
 

expressly, not impliedly, and in unmistakable language permitted
 

local authorities to designate a particular class of vehicle,
 

whether by type or size, solely to prohibit its parking in
 

residential areas. Accordingly, we conclude that the section does
 

not provide a basis for them to do so.
 

B. Section 22507.5.
 

In section 22507.5 the Legislature has addressed the
 

ability of local authorities to prohibit the parking of one
 

particular type of vehicle in residential areas. Indeed, in the
 

section the Legislature has permitted them to do so for
 

considerations other than traffic safety. 


Like section 22507, section 22507.5 confers authority on
 

local agencies to restrict vehicular parking on its streets. The
 

section deals with the situation of overnight parking in general,
 

but it also specifically permits local authorities to totally
 

prohibit the parking of certain commercial vehicles on residential
 

streets at any time. The section reads as follows: 


"(a) Notwithstanding Section 22507, local
 

authorities may, by ordinance or resolution, prohibit or
 

restrict the parking or standing of vehicles on certain
 

streets or highways, or portions thereof, between the
 

hours of 2 a.m. and 6 a.m., and may, by ordinance or
 

resolution, prohibit or restrict the parking or standing,
 

on any street, or portion thereof, in a residential
 

district, of commercial vehicles having a manufacturer's
 

gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or more.
 

The ordinance or resolution relating to parking between
 

the hours of 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. may provide for a system
 

of permits for the purpose of exempting from the
 

prohibition or restriction of the ordinance or resolution
 

handicapped persons and residents of high-density,
 

multiple-family dwelling areas or similar areas lacking
 

adequate offstreet parking facilities. The ordinance or
 

15. 89-602
 
resolution relating to the parking or standing of
 

commercial vehicles in a residential district, however,
 

shall not be effective with respect to any commercial
 

vehicle making pickups or deliveries of goods, wares, and
 

merchandise from or to any building or structure located
 

on the restricted streets or highways or for the purpose
 

of delivering materials to be used in the actual and bona
 

fide repair, alteration, remodeling, or construction of
 

any building or structure upon the restricted streets or
 

highways for which a building permit has previously been
 

obtained. [¶] (b) For the purpose of implementing this
 

section, each local authority may, by ordinance, define
 

the term `residential district' in accordance with its
 

zoning ordinance. The ordinance shall not be effective
 

unless the legislative body of the local authority holds
 

a public hearing on the proposed ordinance prior to its
 

adoption, with notice of the public hearing given in
 

accordance with Section 65090 of the Government Code."
 

(Emphases added.)
 

Examining the section, we see that it begins with the
 

phrase "Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 22507." That
 

indicates that section 22507.5 specifically controls over the
 

provisions of Section 22507. (Cf. In re Marriage of Dover (1971)
 

15 Cal.App.3d 675, 678 fn. 3; State of California v. Superior Court
 

(1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 637, 639-640; State of California v. Superior
 

Court (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 691, 693-695.) This may seem somewhat
 

puzzling because the relationship between the two sections is not
 

immediately apparent. But their interrelationship and the
 

established precedence of section 22507.5 is explained in their
 

history.
 

In 1969, section 22507 was amended to add the
 

requirement, now found in its third sentence, that signs or
 

markings giving adequate notice of a parking restriction first be
 

placed in order for the prohibition to apply. (Stats. 1969, ch.
 

541, p. 1168. § 1.) Section 22507.5 was adopted at the same time
 

to provide that "[n]otwithstanding [that provision], local
 

authorities may by ordinance ... prohibit or restrict the parking
 

or standing of vehicles on certain streets or highways ... between
 

the hours of 2 a.m. and 6 a.m." (Stats. 1969, ch. 541, p. 1168, §
 

2.) The Legislative Counsel's Digest to the Bill that enacted the
 

section tells that the "notwithstanding language" was used to
 

permit local authorities to restrict overnight parking "without
 

placing such signs or markings." (1969 (Reg.Sess.) Sum.Dig. [AB
 

699], p. 78.) Similarly, the Legislative Counsel's Digest to the
 

Bill that amended section 22507.5 in 1975 to provide specific
 

authorization for local authorities to exclude commercial vehicles
 

from parking in residential neighborhoods tells that that was done
 

to "permit[] local authorities to prohibit the parking ... of such
 

vehicles in a residential district without placing such signs or
 

markings...." (4 Stats. 1975, Sum.Dig. [AB 2272], p. 330; emphasis
 

16. 89-602
 
added.) Section 22507.5 thus understood, serves as a means by
 

which the Legislature has authorized local agencies to restrict
 

parking and to restrict the parking of certain vehicles without
 

having to post the signs or notices of the restrictions that would
 

otherwise be required by section 22507.
 

Looking now to the substance of the section we see that
 

it contains two basic authorizations for local authorities to
 

restrict parking. The first is general and permits them to
 

prohibit or restrict overnight "parking ... of vehicles on certain
 

streets or highways...." The second is more specific and pointed
 

for it authorizes a total ban on the parking of some commercial
 

vehicles in residential areas.
 

The wording of the first authorization follows that of
 

section 22507. In both sections, the Legislature has used the
 

adjective "certain" to modify the words "streets or highways" but
 

it has not used it to modify the word "vehicles." In our
 

discussion of section 22507, we showed how that construction was
 

indicative of an intent on the part of the Legislature to accord
 

local authorities authority to designate particular streets for a
 

parking restriction to apply, but not the authority to designate
 

particular types of vehicles to apply it to. The same result would
 

follow with the similarly worded authorization of section 22507.5.
 

While the section might authorize a city to prohibit all vehicles
 

from parking overnight on "certain streets or highways" in
 

residential areas, it would not provide them authority to apply
 

that restriction only to particularly designated types of vehicles.
 

As with section 22507, any overnight parking restriction imposed
 

for the streets of residential areas would have to equally apply to
 

all vehicles that might park there, or to none.
 

The second authorization of section 22507.5 permits local
 

authorities to totally prohibit the parking of commercial vehicles
 

having a manufacturer's gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000
 

pounds or more in residential districts. But other than
 

authorizing a blanket prohibition on the parking of such commercial
 

vehicles in residential districts, the section is silent as to what
 

other types of vehicles may be similarly excluded. Constrained as
 

we are to construe the authorization strictly and not imply things
 

not expressly stated by the Legislature (Rumford v. City of
 

Berkeley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at 550, 553; City of Lafayette v. County
 

of Contra Costa, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at 756; People v. Moore,
 

supra, 229 Cal.App.2d at 228; 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1, 4, supra), we
 

conclude that that silence is indicative of the Legislature's
 

intention that local agencies not have authority to prohibit or
 

otherwise restrict the parking of other types of vehicles on
 

residential streets. Moreover, even without the rule dictating
 

strict construction of Vehicle Code provisions, we would reach the
 

same result. As the 1984 amendment to section 22507 showed with
 

respect to the parking of oversized vehicles near intersections,
 

section 22507.5 demonstrates that when the Legislature has wanted
 

17. 89-602
 
 

to grant local authorities the power to enact an ordinance
 

prohibiting the parking of a particular type of vehicle in
 

residential areas, it has specifically done so. That it has not
 

with respect to other types of vehicles would indicate that local
 

agencies were not to have authority to similarly prohibit their
 

parking. (Cf. Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, supra, 18 Cal.3d at
 

196; Safer v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 236, 238; DeWeese
 

v. Unick, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at 106; Board of Trustees v. Judge,
 

supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at 927; Rich v. State Board of Optometry,
 

supra, 235 Cal.App.2d at 607.)
 

As our Supreme Court said in Rumford:
 

"Most traffic laws are to some extent
 

discriminatory. In large measure they determine which
 

traffic may use streets under what circumstances.
 

Nonetheless, localities have no carte blanche and, absent
 

express authority, may not determine which traffic shall
 

and which shall not use streets." (Rumford v. City of
 

Berkeley, supra, 31 Cal.3d 545, 554.)
 

Under section 22507.5, a municipality could exclude commercial
 

vehicles from parking in residential neighborhoods; indeed, it
 

could do so purely for reasons of aesthetics. (See e.g., People v.
 

Tolman (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, 10.) But "unless sanctioned
 

by some provision of state law" (Bentley v. Chapman, supra, 113
 

Cal.App.2d at 3), a city council would be without authority to
 

similarly prohibit other classes of vehicles from parking on those
 

streets as well. We have shown how neither section 22507 nor
 

section 22507.5 provides express authority for a city to designate
 

other classes of vehicles for the purpose of restricting their
 

parking in such areas, whether on public health grounds, on public
 

safety grounds, or on any other ground, and how no such authority
 

may be implied. 


We therefore conclude that other than prohibiting or
 

otherwise restricting the parking of commercial vehicles having a
 

manufacturer's gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or
 

more, a California city has no authority to prohibit the parking of
 

particular categories of vehicles on its residential streets.
 

* * * * *
 

18. 89-602