UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-1973

LINDA MATARESE; DOMENIC MATARESE,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

ARCHSTONE COMMUNITIES, LLC; SMITH PROPERTY HOLDINGS PARC VISTA, 

LLC; MALCOLM MCGREGOR; MITCHELL MANN; AMILCAR GARCIA,

Defendants – Appellants,

and

ARCHSTONE PENTAGON CITY, f/k/a Parc Vista; ARCHSTONE MULTIFAMILY 

SERIES I TRUST; ARCHSTONE; DEEQA NUR; KATRINA WOOD, 

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District 

Judge. (1:09-cv-00857-GBL-JFA)

Submitted: February 23, 2012 Decided: February 28, 2012

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Michael P. DeGrandis, Stuart Alan Raphael, HUNTON & WILLIAMS, 

LLP, McLean, Virginia, for Appellants. Linda & Domenic 
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Matarese, Appellees Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Archstone Apartment building residents Linda and 

Domenic Matarese, a married couple, brought a civil action 

against the Archstone Apartment building owner and managers 

(collectively, “Archstone”), alleging disability discrimination 

in violation of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 3601 — 3631 (2006) and Virginia Fair Housing Law (“VFHL”), 

Va. Code Ann. §§ 36-96.1 — 36-96.23 (2000). Mrs. Matarese 

alleged that her chemical sensitivities qualify her as 

handicapped under the FHA and VFHL. 

After a partial grant of Archstone’s motion for 

summary judgment, the court held a six-day bench trial 

addressing the Matareses’ remaining claims. The district court 

found that Mrs. Matarese did not have a physical or mental 

impairment that substantially limited one or more of her major 

life activities, but that because Archstone regarded her as 

having such an impairment and discriminated against her on that 

basis, the Matareses were entitled to damages. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 3604(f)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). In addition to awarding 

attorneys fees, costs, and compensatory damages to the 

Matareses, the district court also awarded punitive damages as 

well as equitable and injunctive relief. 

On appeal, Archstone argues that the district court 

erred in (1) finding that Archstone “regarded” Mrs. Matarese as 
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suffering from a physical or mental impairment substantially 

limiting one or more of her major life activities; (2) awarding 

punitive damages; and (3) requiring Archstone to provide 

reasonable accommodations, given that the district court found, 

and neither party now disputes, that Mrs. Matarese is not 

handicapped.1 Under the FHA, it is unlawful to discriminate in 

the rental, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to 

a renter because of a handicap of the renter. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 3604(f)(1). The FHA defines “handicap” as (1) a physical or 

mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such 

person’s major life activities; (2) a record of having such an 

impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. 

42 U.S.C. § 3602(h).2 Because “handicap” is clearly defined to 

include “being regarded as” suffering from a physical or mental 

impairment substantially limiting one or more of her major life 

activities, and because there is sufficient evidence in the 

record supporting the finding that Archstone regarded Mrs. 

Matarese as having such an impairment, we conclude that the 

district court did not err in finding that Archstone regarded 

 1 On appeal, the Matareses do not dispute the district 

court’s finding that Mrs. Matarese does not, in fact, suffer 

from a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 

one or more of her major life activities.

2 The VFHL largely tracks the FHA; accordingly, the parallel 

claims are analyzed under the same standards.
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Mrs. Matarese as having such an impairment, even though she 

actually did not. We further determine that, given Archstone’s

treatment of the Matareses, the district court did not err in 

awarding punitive damages.

However, because we hold that the district court’s 

award of injunctive and equitable relief requires Archstone to 

do nothing more than follow the law it is already required to 

follow, we vacate that portion of the judgment. See United 

States v. Grand Labs, Inc., 174 F.3d 960, 965 (8th Cir. 1999) 

(“An injunction should not ordinarily issue simply because a law 

has been violated.”). We deny the Matareses’ motion to dismiss 

the appeal as untimely. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

VACATED IN PART