FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-0980

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JOHANNA BEANBLOSSOM,

Appellant,

v.

BAY DISTRICT SCHOOLS, BAY 

COUNTY, FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.

James B. Fensom, Judge.

January 14, 2019

PER CURIAM.

Johanna Beanblossom appeals the denial of her motion for 

leave to amend her complaint. Beanblossom argues that the trial 

court abused its discretion because she had never previously 

sought to amend her complaint, the case was still in the 

summary judgment stage, and the amendments were based upon 

similar facts. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

I.

Beanblossom filed a two-count complaint against Bay 

District Schools in December 2013, alleging in Count I a whistleblower claim under section 112.3187, Florida Statutes, and in 

Count II a negligent retention claim. The complaint alleged that 
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Bay District Schools did not properly investigate her complaints, 

fired her for making these complaints, and failed to fire the 

employee she complained about. 

Over a year later, Bay District Schools filed a motion for 

summary judgment on Count I and, despite the response 

Beanblossom filed on the morning of the hearing almost a year 

later, the trial court granted the motion. Beanblossom does not 

assert any error as to Count I in this appeal. 

Bay District Schools’ answer to Beanblossom’s complaint 

alleged as to Count II that Beanblossom failed to comply with 

section 768.28(6)(a), Florida Statutes, which requires notice to be 

provided to the State prior to bringing an action. Over two years 

later, Bay District Schools filed a motion for summary judgment 

on Count II on this basis. Beanblossom responded with plainly

meritless arguments as the November 8, 2016, hearing date drew 

closer until November 7, at 11:34 p.m., when she filed a motion 

for leave to amend her complaint. This proposed amended 

complaint would add an additional defendant and assert four

counts, including another negligence claim based on a different 

factual theory and a claim asserting a First Amendment

violation. Bay District Schools objected.

After the November 8 hearing, the trial court entered an 

order granting Bay District Schools’ motion for summary 

judgment as to Count II. The order also denied Beanblossom’s 

motion for leave to amend the complaint, finding the following: 

Plaintiff’s motion to amend comes three years into 

this litigation, after extensive discovery, and on the eve 

of a hearing for final summary judgment. This last 

minute request appears to be an attempt to circumvent 

summary judgment and escape the effects of failing to 

comply with section 768.28 despite being aware of the 

statute and having time to cure well within the 

statutory period. Moreover, the addition of a new 

defendant and the [Federal section] 1983 claim 

introduces new issues into the litigation. . . . Under 

these circumstances, the Court finds it appropriate to 

deny Plaintiff’s motion to amend.
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After the trial court denied Beanblossom’s motion for rehearing, 

she filed this appeal.1

II.

“The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure encourage a policy of 

liberality in allowing litigants to amend their pleadings, 

especially prior to trial; this policy exists so that cases will be 

tried on their merits.” Morgan v. Bank of New York Mellon, 200 

So. 3d 792, 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). Although permitting 

pleading amendments is encouraged, when making this 

determination, trial courts should consider prejudice to the 

opposing party, abuse by the moving party, and whether the 

proposed amendments would be futile. Id. (quoting Cedar 

Mountain Estates, LLC v. Loan One, LLC, 4 So. 3d 15, 16 (Fla. 

5th DCA 2009)). We review this ruling for abuse of discretion. Id.

Taking the last of these considerations first, we note that 

Beanblossom asserts that the additional claims she raised in the 

proposed amended complaint are not futile. We disagree. She 

asserted a new theory of negligence against Bay District Schools, 

but it suffers the same notice defect as her prior claim. And her 

First Amendment claim—that she was retaliated against for 

speaking as a citizen when making complaints to various school 

district personnel—is futile because she did not speak as a 

citizen. See Slay v. Hess, 621 Fed. Appx. 573, 576 (11th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F. 3d 1333, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007))

(“In complaining to her superiors at work about how time was 

allotted, she was speaking as an employee, and when a 

government employee speaks as an employee ‘there can be no 

First Amendment issue, and the constitutional inquiry ends.’”). 

Because the proposed amendments would have been futile, the 

 1 Beanblossom also appeals the order granting summary 

judgment in favor of Bay District Schools on Count II. We find no 

error in this order.
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trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing the 

amendments.2

III.

Trial courts are encouraged to allow amendments to 

pleadings, but the right to amend is not unlimited. Because we 

find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that 

the amendments were unwarranted, we AFFIRM.

MAKAR, WINOKUR, and WINSOR, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Cecile M. Scoon of Peters & Scoon, Panama City, for Appellant.

Heather K. Hudson and Dixon Ross McCloy, Jr., of Harrison, 

Sale, and McCloy, Panama City, for Appellee.

 2 Because we find that the proposed amendments would have 

been futile, we need not address whether they would have caused 

prejudice to the opposing party or whether they constituted 

abuse.