This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

61427 

Vol. 71, No. 201 

Wednesday, October 18, 2006 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. NM355; Notice No. 25–06–10– 

SC] 

Special Conditions: Dassault Aviation 

Model Falcon 7X Airplane; Interaction 

of Systems and Structures, Limit Pilot 

Forces, and High Intensity Radiated 

Fields (HIRF) Protection 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed special 

conditions. 

SUMMARY: This action proposes special 

conditions for the Dassault Aviation 

Model Falcon 7X airplane. This airplane 

will have novel or unusual design 

features when compared to the state of 

technology envisioned in the 

airworthiness standards for transport 

category airplanes. These design 

features include interaction of systems 

and structures, limit pilot forces, and 

electrical and electronic flight control 

systems. The applicable airworthiness 

regulations do not contain adequate or 

appropriate safety standards for these 

design features. These proposed special 

conditions contain the additional safety 

standards that the Administrator 

considers necessary to establish a level 

of safety equivalent to that established 

by the existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: We must receive your comments 

by December 4, 2006. 

ADDRESSES: You must mail two copies 

of your comments to: Federal Aviation 

Administration, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Attn: Rules Docket (ANM– 

113), Docket No. NM355, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, Washington, 

98057–3356. You may deliver two 

copies to the Transport Airplane 

Directorate at the above address. You 

must mark your comments: Docket No. 

NM355. You can inspect comments in 

the Rules Docket weekdays, except 

Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 

4 p.m. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Thomas Rodriguez, FAA, International 

Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification 

Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 

Renton, Washington, 98057–3356; 

telephone (425) 227–1137; facsimile 

(425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite interested people to take 

part in this rulemaking by sending 

written comments, data, or views. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the special 

conditions, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. We ask that you send 

us two copies of written comments. 

We will file in the docket all 

comments we receive, as well as a 

report summarizing each substantive 

public contact with FAA personnel 

concerning these special conditions. 

You can inspect the docket before and 

after the comment closing date. If you 

wish to review the docket in person, go 

to the address in the ADDRESSES section 

of this preamble between 7:30 a.m. and 

4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive on or before the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring expense or delay. We 

may change these special conditions 

based on the comments we receive. 

If you want the FAA to acknowledge 

receipt of your comments on this 

proposal, include with your comments 

a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on 

which the docket number appears. We 

will stamp the date on the postcard and 

mail it back to you. 

Background 

On June 4, 2002, Dassault Aviation, 9 

rond Point des Champs Elyse ́es, 75008, 

Paris, France, applied for a type 

certificate for its new Model Falcon 7X 

airplane. The Model Falcon 7X is a 19 

passenger transport category airplane, 

powered by three aft mounted Pratt & 

Whitney PW307A high bypass ratio 

turbofan engines. The airplane is 

operated using a fly-by-wire (FBW) 

primary flight control system. This will 

be the first application of a FBW 

primary flight control system in a 

private/corporate use airplane. 

The Dassault Aviation Model Falcon 

7X design incorporates equipment that 

was not envisioned when part 25 was 

created. This equipment affects the 

interaction of systems and structures, 

limit pilot forces, and high intensity 

radiated fields (HIRF) protection. 

Therefore, special conditions are 

required to provide the level of safety 

equivalent to that established by the 

regulations. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, 

Dassault Aviation must show that the 

Model Falcon 7X airplane meets the 

applicable provisions of part 25, as 

amended by Amendments 25–1 through 

25–108. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the Model Falcon 7X because of a 

novel or unusual design feature, special 

conditions are prescribed under the 

provisions of § 21.16. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the Model Falcon 7X must 

comply with the fuel vent and exhaust 

emission requirements of 14 CFR part 

34 and the noise certification 

requirements of 14 CFR part 36 and the 

FAA must issue a finding of regulatory 

adequacy under § 611 of Public Law 92– 

574, the ‘‘Noise Control Act of 1972.’’ 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38, and 

they become part of the type 

certification basis under § 21.17(a)(2). 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same or similar novel 

or unusual design feature, the special 

conditions would also apply to the other 

model under § 21.101. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The Model Falcon 7X airplane will 

incorporate three novel or unusual 

design features: interaction of systems 

and structures, limit pilot forces, and 

electrical and electronic flight control 

systems. These proposed special 

conditions address equipment which 

may affect the airplane’s structural 

performance, either directly or as a 


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61428 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 201 / Wednesday, October 18, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

result of failure or malfunction; pilot 

limit forces; and electrical and 

electronic systems which perform 

critical functions that may be vulnerable 

to HIRF. 

These proposed special conditions are 

identical or nearly identical to those 

previously required for type 

certification of other Dassault airplane 

models. In general, the proposed special 

conditions were derived initially from 

standardized requirements developed 

by the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 

Committee (ARAC), comprised of 

representatives of the FAA, Europe’s 

Joint Aviation Authorities (now 

replaced by the European Aviation 

Safety Agency), and industry. 

Additional special conditions will be 

issued for other novel or unusual design 

features of the Dassault Model Falcon 

7X airplane. These additional proposed 

special conditions will pertain to the 

following topics: 

Dive Speed Definition With Speed 

Protection System, 

Sudden Engine Stoppage, 

High Incidence Protection Function, 

Side Stick Controllers, 

Lateral-Directional and Longitudinal 

Stability and Low Energy Awareness, 

Flight Envelope Protection: General 

Limiting Requirements, 

Flight Envelope Protection: Normal 

Load Factor (g) Limiting, 

Flight Envelope Protection: Pitch, Roll 

and High Speed Limiting Functions, 

Flight Control Surface Position 

Awareness, 

Flight Characteristics Compliance via 

Handling Qualities Rating Method, 

Operation Without Normal Electrical 

Power. 

Proposed special conditions have 

been issued for the Model Falcon 7X 

with the novel or unusual design feature 

pertaining to Pilot Compartment View–

Hydrophobic Coatings in Lieu of 

Windshield Wipers. This special 

condition was published for public 

comment in the Federal Register on July 

12, 2006 (71 FR 39235). 

Discussion 

Because of rapid improvements in 

airplane technology, the applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for these design features. Therefore, in 

addition to the requirements of part 25, 

subparts C and D, the following three 

special conditions apply. 

Special Condition No. 1. Interaction of 

Systems and Structures 

The Dassault Model Falcon 7X is 

equipped with systems that may affect 

the airplane’s structural performance 

either directly or as a result of failure or 

malfunction. The effects of these 

systems on structural performance must 

be considered in the certification 

analysis. This analysis must include 

consideration of normal operation and 

of failure conditions with required 

structural strength levels related to the 

probability of occurrence. 

Previously, special conditions have 

been specified to require consideration 

of the effects of systems on structures. 

The special condition proposed for the 

Model Falcon 7X is nearly identical to 

that issued for other fly-by-wire 

airplanes. 

Special Condition No. 2. Limit Pilot 

Forces 

Like some other certificated transport 

category airplane models, the Dassault 

Model Falcon 7X airplane is equipped 

with a side stick controller instead of a 

conventional wheel or control stick. 

This kind of controller is designed to be 

operated using only one hand. The 

requirement of § 25.397(c), which 

defines limit pilot forces and torques for 

conventional wheel or stick controls, is 

not appropriate for a side stick 

controller. Therefore, a special 

condition is necessary to specify the 

appropriate loading conditions for this 

kind of controller. 

Special Condition No. 3. High Intensity 

Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection 

The Dassault Model Falcon X will 

utilize electrical and electronic systems 

which perform critical functions. These 

systems may be vulnerable to HIRF 

external to the airplane. There is no 

specific regulation that addresses 

requirements for protection of electrical 

and electronic systems from HIRF. With 

the trend toward increased power levels 

from ground-based transmitters and the 

advent of space and satellite 

communications, coupled with 

electronic command and control of the 

airplane, the immunity of critical 

avionics/electronics and electrical 

systems to HIRF must be established. 

To ensure that a level of safety is 

achieved that is equivalent to that 

intended by the regulations 

incorporated by reference, a special 

condition is needed for the Dassault 

Model Falcon 7X airplane. This special 

condition requires that avionics/ 

electronics and electrical systems that 

perform critical functions be designed 

and installed to preclude component 

damage and interruption. 

It is not possible to precisely define 

the HIRF to which the airplane will be 

exposed in service. There is also 

uncertainty concerning the effectiveness 

of airframe shielding for HIRF. 

Furthermore, coupling of 

electromagnetic energy to cockpitinstalled equipment through the cockpit 

window apertures is undefined. Based 

on surveys and analysis of existing HIRF 

emitters, adequate protection from 

exists when there is compliance with 

either paragraph 1 or 2 below: 

1. A minimum threat of 100 volts rms 

(root-mean-square) per meter electric 

field strength from 10 KHz to 18 GHz. 

a. The threat must be applied to the 

system elements and their associated 

wiring harnesses without the benefit of 

airframe shielding. 

b. Demonstration of this level of 

protection is established through system 

tests and analysis. 

2. A threat external to the airframe of 

the field strengths indicated in the table 

below for the frequency ranges 

indicated. Both peak and average field 

strength components from the table are 

to be demonstrated. 

Frequency 

Field strength 

(volts per meter) 

Peak Average 

10 kHz–100 kHz ....... 50 50 

100 kHz–500 kHz ..... 50 50 

500 kHz–2 MHz ........ 50 50 

2 MHz–30 MHz ......... 100 100 

30 MHz–70 MHz ....... 50 50 

70 MHz–100 MHz ..... 50 50 

100 MHz–200 MHz ... 100 100 

200 MHz–400 MHz ... 100 100 

400 MHz–700 MHz ... 700 50 

700 MHz–1 GHz ....... 700 100 

1 GHz–2 GHz ........... 2000 200 

2 GHz–4 GHz ........... 3000 200 

4 GHz–6 GHz ........... 3000 200 

6 GHz–8 GHz ........... 1000 200 

8 GHz–12 GHz ......... 3000 300 

12 GHz–18 GHz ....... 2000 200 

18 GHz–40 GHz ....... 600 200 

The field strengths are expressed in terms 

of peak of the root-mean-square (rms) over 

the complete modulation period. 

The threat levels identified above are 

the result of an FAA review of existing 

studies on the subject of HIRF, in light 

of the ongoing work of the 

Electromagnetic Effects Harmonization 

Working Group of the Aviation 

Rulemaking Advisory Committee. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the Dassault 

Model Falcon 7X. Should Dassault 

Aviation apply at a later date for a 

change to the type certificate to include 

another model incorporating the same 

novel or unusual design feature, these 

special conditions would apply to that 

model as well. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features of the 


rmajette on PROD1PC67 with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 201 / Wednesday, October 18, 2006 / Proposed Rules 61429 

Dassault Model Falcon 7X airplane. It is 

not a rule of general applicability, and 

it affects only the applicant which 

applied to the FAA for approval of these 

features on the airplane. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Proposed Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for Dassault Aviation 

Model Falcon 7X airplanes. 

1. Interaction of Systems and Structures 

In addition to the requirements of part 

25, subparts C and D, the following 

proposed special conditions would 

apply: 

a. For airplanes equipped with 

systems that affect structural 

performance—either directly or as a 

result of a failure or malfunction—the 

influence of these systems and their 

failure conditions must be taken into 

account when showing compliance with 

the requirements of part 25, subparts C 

and D. Paragraph c below must be used 

to evaluate the structural performance of 

airplanes equipped with these systems. 

b. Unless shown to be extremely 

improbable, the airplane must be 

designed to withstand any forced 

structural vibration resulting from any 

failure, malfunction, or adverse 

condition in the flight control system. 

These loads must be treated in 

accordance with the requirements of 

paragraph a above. 

c. Interaction of Systems and 

Structures. 

(1) General: The following criteria 

must be used for showing compliance 

with this special condition for 

interaction of systems and structures 

and with § 25.629 for airplanes 

equipped with flight control systems, 

autopilots, stability augmentation 

systems, load alleviation systems, flutter 

control systems, and fuel management 

systems. If this special condition is used 

for other systems, it may be necessary to 

adapt the criteria to the specific system. 

(a) The criteria defined herein address 

only the direct structural consequences 

of the system responses and 

performances. They cannot be 

considered in isolation but should be 

included in the overall safety evaluation 

of the airplane. These criteria may, in 

some instances, duplicate standards 

already established for this evaluation. 

These criteria are applicable only to 

structures whose failure could prevent 

continued safe flight and landing. 

Specific criteria that define acceptable 

limits on handling characteristics or 

stability requirements when operating 

in the system degraded or inoperative 

modes are not provided in this special 

condition. 

(b) Depending upon the specific 

characteristics of the airplane, 

additional studies may be required that 

go beyond the criteria provided in this 

special condition in order to 

demonstrate the capability of the 

airplane to meet other realistic 

conditions, such as alternative gust or 

maneuver descriptions for an airplane 

equipped with a load alleviation system. 

(c) The following definitions are 

applicable to this paragraph. 

Structural performance: Capability of 

the airplane to meet the structural 

requirements of part 25. 

Flight limitations: Limitations that 

can be applied to the airplane flight 

conditions following an in-flight 

occurrence and that are included in the 

flight manual (e.g., speed limitations 

and avoidance of severe weather 

conditions). 

Operational limitations: Limitations, 

including flight limitations, that can be 

applied to the airplane operating 

conditions before dispatch (e.g., fuel, 

payload, and Master Minimum 

Equipment List limitations). 

Probabilistic terms: The probabilistic 

terms (probable, improbable, and 

extremely improbable) used in this 

Special Conditions are the same as those 

used in § 25.1309. 

Failure condition: The term failure 

condition is the same as that used in 

§ 25.1309. However, this Special 

Conditions applies only to system 

failure conditions that affect the 

structural performance of the airplane 

(e.g., system failure conditions that 

induce loads, change the response of the 

airplane to inputs such as gusts or pilot 

actions, or lower flutter margins). 

(2) Effects of Systems on Structures. 

(a) General. The following criteria 

will be used in determining the 

influence of a system and its failure 

conditions on the airplane structure. 

(b) System fully operative. With the 

system fully operative, the following 

apply: 

(1) Limit loads must be derived in all 

normal operating configurations of the 

system from all the limit conditions 

specified in subpart C (or used in lieu 

of those specified in subpart C), taking 

into account any special behavior of 

such a system or associated functions or 

any effect on the structural performance 

of the airplane that may occur up to the 

limit loads. In particular, any significant 

non-linearity (rate of displacement of 

control surface, thresholds or any other 

system non-linearities) must be 

accounted for in a realistic or 

conservative way when deriving limit 

loads from limit conditions. 

(2) The airplane must meet the 

strength requirements of part 25 (static 

strength, residual strength), using the 

specified factors to derive ultimate loads 

from the limit loads defined above. The 

effect of non-linearities must be 

investigated beyond limit conditions to 

ensure that the behavior of the system 

presents no anomaly compared to the 

behavior below limit conditions. 

However, conditions beyond limit 

conditions need not be considered, 

when it can be shown that the airplane 

has design features that will not allow 

it to exceed those limit conditions. 

(3) The airplane must meet the 

aeroelastic stability requirements of 

§ 25.629. 

(c) System in the failure condition. 

For any system failure condition not 

shown to be extremely improbable, the 

following apply: 

(1) At the time of occurrence. Starting 

from 1g level flight conditions, a 

realistic scenario, including pilot 

corrective actions, must be established 

to determine the loads occurring at the 

time of failure and immediately after 

failure. 

(i) For static strength substantiation, 

these loads multiplied by an appropriate 

factor of safety that is related to the 

probability of occurrence of the failure 

are ultimate loads to be considered for 

design. The factor of safety (FS) is 

defined in Figure 1. 


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61430 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 201 / Wednesday, October 18, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

(ii) For residual strength 

substantiation, the airplane must be able 

to withstand two thirds of the ultimate 

loads defined in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of 

this section. For pressurized cabins, 

these loads must be combined with the 

normal operating differential pressure. 

(iii) Freedom from aeroelastic 

instability must be shown up to the 

speeds defined in § 25.629(b)(2). For 

failure conditions that result in speed 

increases beyond VC/MC, freedom from 

aeroelastic instability must be shown to 

increased speeds, so that the margins 

intended by § 25.629(b)(2) are 

maintained. 

(iv) Failures of the system that result 

in forced structural vibrations 

(oscillatory failures) must not produce 

loads that could result in detrimental 

deformation of primary structure. 

(2) For the continuation of the flight. 

For the airplane in the system failed 

state and considering any appropriate 

reconfiguration and flight limitations, 

the following apply: 

(i) The loads derived from the 

following conditions (or used in lieu of 

the following conditions) at speeds up 

to VC/MC or the speed limitation 

prescribed for the remainder of the 

flight must be determined: 

(A) the limit symmetrical 

maneuvering conditions specified in 

§§ 25.331 and in 25.345. 

(B) the limit gust and turbulence 

conditions specified in §§ 25.341 and in 

25.345. 

(C) the limit rolling conditions 

specified in § 25.349 and the limit 

unsymmetrical conditions specified in 

§§ 25.367 and 25.427(b) and (c). 

(D) the limit yaw maneuvering 

conditions specified in § 25.351. 

(E) the limit ground loading 

conditions specified in §§ 25.473 and 

25.491. 

(ii) For static strength substantiation, 

each part of the structure must be able 

to withstand the loads in paragraph 

(c)(2)(i) of this special condition 

multiplied by a factor of safety, 

depending on the probability of being in 

this failure state. The factor of safety is 

defined in Figure 2. 


rmajette on PROD1PC67 with PROPOSALSEP18OC06.008</GPH> EP18OC06.009</GPH>
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 201 / Wednesday, October 18, 2006 / Proposed Rules 61431 

Qj = (Tj)(Pj) 

Where: 

Tj = Average time spent in failure condition 

j (in hours) 

Pj = Probability of occurrence of failure mode 

j (per hour) 

Note: If Pj is greater than 10¥3 per flight 

hour, then a 1.5 factor of safety must be 

applied to all limit load conditions specified 

in subpart C. 

(iii) For residual strength 

substantiation, the airplane must be able 

to withstand two thirds of the ultimate 

loads defined in paragraph (c)(2)(ii). For 

pressurized cabins, these loads must be 

combined with the normal operating 

differential pressure. 

(iv) If the loads induced by the failure 

condition have a significant effect on 

fatigue or damage tolerance, then their 

effects must be taken into account. 

(v) Freedom from aeroelastic 

instability must be shown up to a speed 

determined from Figure 3. Flutter 

clearance speeds V′ and V′′ may be 

based on the speed limitation specified 

for the remainder of the flight, using the 

margins defined by § 25.629(b). 

V′ = Clearance speed as defined by 

§ 25.629(b)(2). 

V′′ = Clearance speed as defined by 

§ 25.629(b)(1). 

Qj = (Tj)(Pj) 

Where: 

Tj = Average time spent in failure condition 

j (in hours) 

Pj = Probability of occurrence of failure mode 

j (per hour) 

Note: If Pj is greater than 10¥3 per flight 

hour, then the flutter clearance speed must 

not be less than V′′. 

(vi) Freedom from aeroelastic 

instability must also be shown up to V′ 

in Figure 3 above for any probable 

system failure condition combined with 

any damage required or selected for 

investigation by § 25.571(b). 

(3) Consideration of certain failure 

conditions may be required by other 

sections of this Part, regardless of 

calculated system reliability. Where 

analysis shows the probability of these 

failure conditions to be less than 10¥9, 

criteria other than those specified in this 

paragraph may be used for structural 

substantiation to show continued safe 

flight and landing. 

(d) Warning considerations. For 

system failure detection and warning, 

the following apply: 

(1) The system must be checked for 

failure conditions, not extremely 

improbable, that degrade the structural 

capability below the level required by 

part 25 or significantly reduce the 

reliability of the remaining system. As 

far as reasonably practicable, the 

flightcrew must be made aware of these 

failures before flight. Certain elements 

of the control system, such as 

mechanical and hydraulic components, 

may use special periodic inspections, 

and electronic components may use 

daily checks in lieu of warning systems 

to achieve the objective of this 

requirement. These certification 

maintenance requirements must be 

limited to components that are not 

readily detectable by normal warning 

systems and where service history 

shows that inspections will provide an 

adequate level of safety. 

(2) The existence of any failure 

condition, not extremely improbable, 

during flight that could significantly 

affect the structural capability of the 

airplane and for which the associated 

reduction in airworthiness can be 

minimized by suitable flight limitations 

must be signaled to the flightcrew. For 

example, failure conditions that result 

in a factor of safety between the airplane 

strength and the loads of part 25, 

subpart C, below 1.25 or flutter margins 

below V′′ must be signaled to the crew 

during flight. 

(e) Dispatch with known failure 

conditions. If the airplane is to be 

dispatched in a known system failure 

condition that affects structural 

performance or affects the reliability of 

the remaining system to maintain 

structural performance, then the 

provisions of these Special Conditions 

must be met, including the provisions of 

paragraph (b), for the dispatched 

condition and paragraph (c) for 

subsequent failures. Expected 

operational limitations may be taken 

into account in establishing Pj as the 

probability of failure occurrence for 

determining the safety margin in Figure 

1. Flight limitations and expected 

operational limitations may be taken 

into account in establishing Qj as the 

combined probability of being in the 

dispatched failure condition and the 

subsequent failure condition for the 

safety margins in Figures 2 and 3. These 

limitations must be such that the 

probability of being in this combined 

failure state and then subsequently 

encountering limit load conditions is 

extremely improbable. No reduction in 

these safety margins is allowed if the 

subsequent system failure rate is greater 

than 1E–3 per flight hour. 

2. Limit Pilot Forces 

In addition to the requirements of 

§ 25.397(c) the following special 

condition applies. 

The limit pilot forces are: 

a. For all components between and 

including the handle and its control 

stops. 

Pitch Roll 

Nose up 200 lbf 

(pounds force).

Nose left 100 lbf. 

Nose down 200 lbf Nose right 100 lbf. 

b. For all other components of the 

side stick control assembly, but 


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61432 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 201 / Wednesday, October 18, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

excluding the internal components of 

the electrical sensor assemblies to avoid 

damage as a result of an in-flight jam. 

Pitch Roll 

Nose up 125 lbf ........ Nose left 50 lbf. 

Nose down 125 lbf .... Nose right 50 lbf. 

3. High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) 

Protection 

a. Protection from Unwanted Effects 

of High Intensity Radiated Fields. Each 

electrical and electronic system which 

performs critical functions must be 

designed and installed to ensure that the 

operation and operational capability of 

these systems to perform critical 

functions is not adversely affected when 

the airplane is exposed to high intensity 

radiated fields. 

b. For the purposes of this special 

condition, the following definition 

applies: 

Critical Functions: Functions whose 

failure would contribute to or cause a 

failure condition that would prevent the 

continued safe flight and landing of the 

airplane. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 

10, 2006. 

Kalene C. Yanamura, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 06–8762 Filed 10–17–06; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. NM354; Notice No. 25–06–09–

SC] 

Special Conditions: Boeing 

Commercial Airplane Group, Boeing 

Model 777–200 Series Airplane; 

Overhead Cross Aisle Stowage 

Compartments 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed special 

conditions. 

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes special 

conditions for the Boeing Model 777–

200 series airplanes. This airplane, 

modified by Boeing Commercial 

Airplane Group, will have novel or 

unusual design features associated with 

overhead cross aisle stowage 

compartments. The applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for these design features. These 

proposed special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

that established by the existing 

airworthiness standards. 

DATES: We must receive your comments 

on or before November 7, 2006. 

ADDRESSES: You may mail or deliver 

comments on these special conditions 

in duplicate to: Federal Aviation 

Administration, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Attn: Rules Docket (ANM–

113), Docket No. NM354, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356. You must mark your 

comments: Docket No. NM354. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Jayson Claar, FAA, Airframe/Cabin 

Branch, ANM–115, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification 

Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., 

Renton, Washington 98057–3356; 

telephone (425) 227–2194; facsimile 

(425) 227–1232. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited 

We invite interested people to take 

part in this rulemaking by sending 

written comments, data, or views. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the special 

conditions, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. We ask that you send 

us two copies of written comments. 

We will file in the docket all 

comments we receive, as well as a 

report summarizing each substantive 

public contact with FAA personnel 

concerning these special conditions. 

You may inspect the docket before and 

after the comment closing date. If you 

wish to review the docket in person, go 

to the address in the ADDRESSES section 

of this preamble between 7:30 a.m. and 

4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive on or before the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring expense or delay. We 

may change these special conditions 

based on the comments we receive. 

If you want the FAA to acknowledge 

receipt of your comments on these 

proposed special conditions, include 

with your comments a pre-addressed, 

stamped postcard on which the docket 

number appears. We will stamp the date 

on the postcard and mail it back to you. 

Background 

On April 20, 2005, Boeing 

Commercial Airplane Group, Seattle, 

Washington, applied for a supplemental 

type certificate to permit installation of 

overhead cross aisle stowage 

compartments in Boeing 777–200 series 

airplanes. The Boeing Model 777–200 

series airplanes are large twin engine 

airplanes with four pairs of Type A 

exits, a passenger capacity of 440, and 

a range of 5000 miles. (The Boeing 777–

200 airplanes can be configured with 

various passenger capacities and range). 

The regulations do not address the 

novel and unusual design features 

associated with the installation of 

overhead cross aisle stowage 

compartments installed on the Boeing 

Model 777–200, making these special 

conditions necessary. Generally, the 

requirements for overhead stowage 

compartments are similar to stowage 

compartments in remote crew rest 

compartments (i.e., located on lower 

lobe, main deck or overhead) already in 

use on Boeing Model 777–200 and –747 

series airplanes. Remote crew rest 

compartments have been previously 

installed and certified in the main 

passenger cabin area, above the main 

passenger area, and below the passenger 

cabin area adjacent to the cargo 

compartment of the Boeing Model 777–

200, and –300 series airplanes. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of § 21.101, 

Boeing Commercial Airplane Group 

must show that the Boeing Model 777–

200, as changed, continues to meet the 

applicable provisions of the regulations 

incorporated by reference in Type 

Certificate No. T00001SE or the 

applicable regulations in effect on the 

date of application for the change. The 

regulations incorporated by reference in 

the type certificate are commonly 

referred to as the ‘‘original type 

certification basis.’’ The regulations 

incorporated by reference in Type 

Certificate No. T00001SE for the Boeing 

Model 777–200 series airplanes include 

Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations 

(CFR), part 25, as amended by 

Amendments 25–1 through 25–82, 

except for § 25.571(e)(1) which remains 

at Amendment 25–71, with exceptions. 

Refer to Type Certificate No. T00001SE, 

as applicable, for a complete description 

of the certification basis for this model, 

including certain special conditions that 

are not relevant to these proposed 

special conditions. 

If the Administrator finds the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(part 25 as amended) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the Boeing Model 777–200 because 

of a novel or unusual design feature, 

special conditions are prescribed under 

the provisions of § 21.16. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 


rmajette on PROD1PC67 with PROPOSALS