1 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

1050 FIRST STREET, N.E.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matter of ) 

 ) PMUR 611

Donald J. Trump Found., et al. ) MUR 7425

) 

 

STATEMENT OF REASONS OF CHAIRMAN ALLEN DICKERSON

AND COMMISSIONERS SEAN J. COOKSEY AND JAMES E. “TREY” TRAINOR, III

Although this file did not close until February 2022,1 the Commission disposed 

of it on January 14, 2021. Our colleagues, for reasons they have yet to explain, 

refused, for more than a year, to undertake the ministerial act of closing the file.2 As 

a result, this Matter3 languished despite a clear decision that enforcement would not 

proceed. 

Despite the passage of time, our votes must be understood in the context of 

January 2021, when they were cast. Because New York authorities had already acted 

on the underlying facts, including imposing a $2 million fine against Donald J. Trump 

personally, and because this Matter was severely imperiled by the statute of 

limitations, we voted to dismiss rather than adopt our Office of General Counsel’s 

(“OGC”) recommendation to proceed with an investigation with an eye toward future 

enforcement.4

1 Certification at 1, PMUR 611/MUR 7425 (Trump Found.) at 1, Jan. 25, 2022.

2 Certification at 2, PMUR 611/MUR 7425 (Trump Found.) at 2-3, Jan. 14, 2021. 

3 We received a referral from the Office of the Attorney General of New York State regarding the 

instant respondents, as well as a complaint that was filed by employees of the Campaign Legal Center. 

In accord with Commission nomenclature, the referral was tagged as a “Pre-Matter Under Review” or 

“PMUR,” while the complaint was tagged as a “Matter Under Review” or “MUR.” For simplicity, we 

refer to both the PMUR and MUR as a singular “Matter.”

4 We provide this Statement of Reasons pursuant to governing law, which requires it. See DCCC, 831 

F.2d at 1135 (establishing requirement that “[t]he Commission or the individual Commissioners” must 

provide a statement of reasons why the agency “rejected or failed to follow the General Counsel’s 

recommendation”); Common Cause v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 842 F.2d 436, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“A 

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I. BACKGROUND

During the 2016 primary season, Donald Trump held a fundraiser for veterans’ 

groups rather than attend a Republican primary debate.5 The fundraiser was 

organized by employees of his campaign committee and his longstanding § 501(c)(3) 

charitable nonprofit corporation, the Donald J. Trump Foundation (“Foundation”).6

The event “raised approximately $5.6 million” and, while some of the funds were held 

by the Foundation and then doled out at campaign events organized by the 

committee, all the funds raised were ultimately delivered to veterans’ organizations.7

This fundraiser and its aftermath caught the attention of law enforcement in 

the State of New York, which had jurisdiction over Mr. Trump and the Foundation.8

Ultimately, the New York Supreme Court9 oversaw the dissolution of the Trump 

Foundation and specifically found that Mr. Trump breached his fiduciary duties to 

the Foundation by “allowing his campaign to orchestrate the fundraiser [and] 

allowing his campaign, instead of the Foundation, to direct distribution of the funds... 

statement of reasons...is necessary to allow meaningful judicial review of the Commission’s decision 

not to proceed”); see also id. at 451 (R.B. Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“I 

concur in part III of the court’s opinion holding the DCCC rule applicable, prospectively, to all 

Commission dismissal orders based on tie votes when the dismissal is contrary to the recommendation 

of the FEC General Counsel”); Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 966 F.2d 

1471, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“We further held that, to make judicial review a meaningful exercise, the 

three Commissioners who voted to dismiss must provide a statement of their reasons for so voting. 

Since those Commissioners constitute a controlling group for purposes of the decision, their rationale 

necessarily states the agency’s reasons for acting as it did”) (citation omitted); Campaign Legal Ctr. & 

Democracy 21 v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 952 F.3d 352, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 

5 First Gen’l Counsel’s Report (“FGCR”) at 5, PMUR 611/MUR 7425 (Trump Found.), May 30, 2019. 

6 Id.

7 FGCR at 7; id. at 3(“Half of the $5.6 million was initially deposited into the Foundation’s bank 

account and disbursed to charitable organizations at the direction of Trump and the Committee over 

the next three months...The remainder of the $5.6 million, including $1 million from Trump 

personally, was given directly to veterans’ organizations”) 

8 See Stipulation of Final Settlement, People of the State of N.Y. v. Trump, No. 451130/2018, (N.Y. Sup. 

Ct. Nov. 7, 2019) (“Trump Found. Settlement”); id. at 4, ¶¶ 5-7 (“The Iowa Fundraiser and the 

Distribution of Its Proceeds (2016)”). 

9 A confusing label for those unfamiliar with the New York judiciary. The Supreme Court is a triallevel court of general jurisdiction, equivalent to a federal district court, and not the final court of appeal 

– a distinction held, appropriately enough, by the New York Court of Appeals. 

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to further [his] political campaign.”10 Accordingly, the court “direct[ed] Mr. Trump to 

pay... [a]$2,000,000” fine out of his personal assets.11 

In other words, New York state authorities disbanded one respondent, the 

Foundation, and ordered another, Mr. Trump, to pay restitution for his campaign’s 

involvement in the very fundraiser at issue here. 

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

OGC took the view that the Trump committee’s involvement with the 

fundraiser suggested a violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as 

amended (the “Act”). Specifically, OGC urged us to find reason to believe that Trump’s 

fundraiser ran afoul of 52 U.S.C. § 30125(e)(1)(A), which bars any “candidate” from 

“solicit[ing], receiv[ing], direct[ing], transfer[ing], or spend[ing] funds in connection 

with an election for Federal office...unless the funds are subject to the limitations, 

prohibitions, and reporting requirements of the Act.” That is, because the Trump 

fundraiser raised funds in excess of the individual contribution limits, OGC believed 

there was a potential soft money violation. 

The soft money ban only applies to funds raised “in connection” with a federal 

election, and the relevant statute specifically permits federal candidates to raise 

money for charity.12

But more importantly, this Matter came before the Commission for a vote just 

two weeks before the statute of limitations began to run, and just six months before 

it would run entirely.13 Moreover, OGC recommended that we authorize an 

investigation with compulsory process,14 indicating that the record would have to be 

further supplemented before the Commission’s lawyers could make a probable cause

recommendation. 

Simply put, we were out of time. Even if the Commission had chosen not to

investigate and instead moved to pre-probable cause conciliation, there would be little 

chance the Commission could successfully find probable cause and file an 

10 People of the State of N.Y. v. Trump, 66 Misc.3d 200, 204 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019). 

11 Id. 

12 52 U.S.C. § 30125(e)(4)(A).

13 FGCR at 1 (“EXPIRATION OF SOL: January 28, 2021/May 31, 2021”).

14 FGCR at 30-31.

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enforcement action before the total lapse of the statute of limitations at the end of 

May – and correspondingly little incentive for respondents to agree to a conciliation 

agreement. 

Furthermore, by the time we addressed this Matter, New York had already 

secured a $2 million penalty against Mr. Trump for legal violations related to the 

fundraiser, and the Foundation itself no longer existed. As we have noted previously, 

“[i]t has been the Commission’s longstanding practice to decline to pursue cases 

where there has already been adequate enforcement by other arms of the federal 

government.”15 Here, our decision not to obligate scarce Commission resources was 

informed by the fact that another law enforcement agency, albeit a state rather than 

federal entity, had already imposed a significant financial penalty directly related to 

the very conduct OGC wished to address. 

Finally, in January 2021, at one of our first executive sessions after the 

reconstitution of the quorum, our enforcement resources were unusually precious. At 

that time, as has been noted publicly, the Commission faced a substantial backlog of 

enforcement cases.16 In that position, we determined that our agency’s enforcement 

resources would be best spent addressing other matters where the Commission had 

a realistic chance of vindicating the interests of the United States in a timely fashion.

15 Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Dickerson and Comm’rs Cooksey and Trainor at 3, MUR 7696 

(Texans for Sen. John Cornyn, et al.), May 18, 2021. 

16 See Statement of Comm’r Weintraub on the Senate’s Votes to Restore the Federal Election 

Commission to Full Strength, Dec. 9, 2020, 

available at: https://www.fec.gov/resources/cmscontent/documents/2020-12-Quorum-RestorationStatement.pdf.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we voted to dismiss this Matter.17

_________________________________ _________________________ 

Allen Dickerson Date

Chairman

_________________________________ _________________________ 

Sean J. Cooksey Date

Commissioner 

_________________________________ _________________________ 

James E. “Trey” Trainor, III Date

Commissioner 

17 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 

February 22, 2022

February 22, 2022

February 22, 2022

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