____________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________ 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

C hief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan	 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED JULY 27, 2001
 

NICOLE M. BEAUDRIE,
 

Plaintiff-Appellant,
 

v	 No. 114261
 

PAULINE HENDERSON,
 

Defendant-Appellee,
 

and
 

CITY OF DEARBORN, and DEARBORN


POLICE DEPARTMENT,
 

Defendants.
 

YOUNG, J.
 

Plaintiff was abducted, assaulted, and raped by her
 

ex-boyfriend. This case pertains to the actions of defendant
 

Pauline Henderson, a police dispatcher and friend of the
 

assailant’s mother. Defendant Henderson allegedly was
 

contacted at her place of employment by the assailant’s mother
 
while plaintiff was being held captive. Plaintiff alleged
 

that defendant was grossly negligent and engaged in active
 

misconduct when she failed to notify the police of the
 

whereabouts of plaintiff’s assailant and acted in concert with
 

the assailant’s mother in withholding information from
 

authorities. Defendant argued that the public duty doctrine
 

shielded her from liability, and moved for summary disposition
 

under MCR 2.116(C)(8). The trial court denied defendant’s
 

motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed.
 

We granted leave to consider whether the public duty
 

doctrine, first recognized by this Court in White v Beasley,
 

453 Mich 308; 552 NW2d 1 (1996), should be extended to protect
 

governmental employees other than police officers who are
 

alleged to have failed to provide protection from the criminal
 

acts of third parties. We conclude that, given the
 

comprehensive governmental immunity statute, MCL 691.1407,1
 

1MCL 691.1407 provides, in relevant part:
 

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act,


a governmental agency is immune from tort liability


if the governmental agency is engaged in the


exercise or discharge of a governmental function.


Except as otherwise provided in this act, this act


does not modify or restrict the immunity of the


state from tort liability as it existed before July


1, 1965, which immunity is affirmed.
 

(2) Except as otherwise provided in this


section, and without regard to the discretionary or


ministerial nature of the conduct in question, each


officer and employee of a governmental agency, each


(continued...)
 

2
 
this judicially created doctrine should not be so extended.
 

Thus, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
 

remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
 

I. Factual and Procedural Background
 

Because this appeal arises under MCR 2.116(C)(8), we take
 

all material facts from plaintiff’s first amended complaint.
 

According to her complaint, plaintiff was abducted by her
 

ex-boyfriend, David Wilke, on April 6, 1994. Earlier that
 

day, plaintiff had given preliminary examination testimony
 

against Wilke in a case that arose out of a series of prior
 

1(...continued)


volunteer acting on behalf of a governmental


agency, and each member of a board, council,


commission, or statutorily created task force of a


governmental agency is immune from tort liability


for an injury to a person or damage to property


caused by the officer, employee, or member while in


the course of employment or service or caused by


the volunteer while acting on behalf of a
 

governmental agency if all of the following are


met:
 

(a) The officer, employee, member, or
 

volunteer is acting or reasonably believes he or


she is acting within the scope of his or her


authority.
 

(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the


exercise or discharge of a governmental function.
 

(c) The officer's, employee's, member's, or


volunteer's conduct does not amount to gross


negligence that is the proximate cause of the


injury or damage. As used in this subdivision,


"gross negligence" means conduct so reckless as to


demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for
 

whether an injury results.
 

3
 
assaults committed by Wilke against her, including criminal
 

sexual conduct. Wilke was released on bond.
 

At approximately 1:21 a.m. on April 7, 1994, the Dearborn
 

Police Department issued an all points bulletin (APB)
 

regarding the suspected abduction, including a description of
 

Wilke and the vehicle that was believed to be involved. The
 

police knew that plaintiff had parked her own vehicle in her
 

driveway, but never made it inside her home. The police also
 

knew that Wilke had criminal charges pending against him
 

involving plaintiff, that he had been released on bond, that
 

he had threatened to kill plaintiff in the past, and that he
 

had access to handguns.2
 

Around 9:30 a.m., defendant, who was working as a
 

dispatcher at the Dearborn Police Department, received a call
 

from Wilke’s mother, who was defendant’s personal friend.
 

Wilke’s mother informed defendant that Wilke was missing, that
 

she believed him to be armed and dangerous, and that it
 

appeared that he had taken plaintiff with him.
 

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint further alleged that
 

2Plaintiff’s amended complaint specifically quotes the


following portion of the APB:
 

The victim parked her vehicle in the driveway


and never made it inside at her home in the south
 

end of our city. The victim has pending csc


charges out against the suspect, and he was freed


on bond today. He has threatened to kill her in
 

the past and he does have access to handguns.
 

4
 
defendant suspected that Wilke had taken plaintiff to a
 

family-owned trailer at Camp Dearborn. Plaintiff alleged that
 

defendant contacted Camp Dearborn, represented herself as a
 

Dearborn police dispatcher, and requested that Camp Dearborn
 

employees verify whether the suspect vehicle was there. She
 

gave the employees a description of the vehicle, its license
 

plate number, and warned them not to approach the vehicle.
 

Approximately fifteen minutes later, defendant received
 

notification that Wilke and the vehicle were indeed at Camp
 

Dearborn. At that point, defendant contacted Wilke’s mother.
 

Plaintiff alleged that the two women agreed to withhold
 

information from the police until Wilke’s mother could contact
 

Wilke’s attorney. Wilke’s mother, having spoken with Wilke’s
 

attorney, allegedly contacted defendant again at approximately
 

11:45 a.m., at which time they agreed to withhold information
 

about Wilke’s whereabouts. At approximately noon, defendant
 

left Dearborn Police Dispatch, picked up Wilke’s mother and
 

sister, and drove to Camp Dearborn.
 

According to plaintiff’s first amended complaint, “[a]s
 

a direct and proximate result of these acts and/or omissions
 

by Defendant Pauline Henderson, the brutal rape, beating and
 

abduction of Plaintiff Nicole Beaudrie was allowed to
 

continue, and the suspect, David James Wilke, was allowed the
 

opportunity to escape the fenced perimeter of Camp Dearborn
 

with his victim.” Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against
 

5
 
defendant,3 alleging that defendant’s conduct amounted to
 

“intentional misconduct . . . active malfeasance, and gross
 

negligence,” and that plaintiff’s continued victimization was
 

“a direct and proximate result” of defendant’s actions.
 

Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR
 

2.116(C)(8) on the ground that, under the public duty
 

doctrine, she did not owe any duty to plaintiff. The trial
 

court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals then reversed
 

in a split decision.4
 

We granted plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal.
 

463 Mich 888 (2000).
 

II. Standard of Review
 

The trial court granted summary disposition to defendants
 

under MCR 2.116(C)(8). We review that decision de novo.
 

Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A
 

motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(8)
 

tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint on the basis of
 

the pleadings alone. The purpose of such a motion is to
 

determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which
 

relief can be granted. The motion should be granted if no
 

factual development could possibly justify recovery. Spiek v
 

3Plaintiff also brought suit against the city of Dearborn


and the Dearborn Police Department. However, those parties


are not involved in this appeal.
 

4Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued December 4, 1998


(Docket No. 202304).
 

6
 
Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201
 

(1998).
 

Summary disposition of a plaintiff’s gross negligence
 

claim is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(8) if the plaintiff fails
 

to establish a duty in tort. See Maiden, supra at 135.
 

Whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of care is a
 

question of law for the court. Id. at 131.
 

III. History of the Public Duty Doctrine
 

It appears that the origins of the common-law public duty
 

doctrine can be traced to South v Maryland, 59 US (18 How)
 

396; 15 L Ed 433 (1855). There, the plaintiff was kidnapped
 

and held for ransom. Upon his release, the plaintiff sued the
 

county sheriff, alleging that, despite the plaintiff’s request
 

for protection, the sheriff neglected and refused to protect
 

him or to otherwise keep the peace. In rejecting the
 

plaintiff’s claim, the United States Supreme Court held that
 

the sheriff’s duty to preserve the public peace was “a public
 

duty, for neglect of which he is amenable to the public, and
 

punishable by indictment only.” Id. at 403. The Supreme
 

Court of Tennessee has noted that a clear majority of state
 

courts considering the issue adhere to the public duty
 

doctrine in one form or another. See Ezell v Cockrell, 902
 

SW2d 394, 399, n 5 (Tenn, 1995).
 

Before our 1996 decision in White, supra, this Court had
 

not recognized the public duty doctrine. However, the lead
 

7
 
 

opinion in White noted that our Court of Appeals had
 

consistently relied on the doctrine as early as 1970. See id.
 

at 322, n 7. A majority of the Court agreed that the public
 

duty doctrine serves a useful purpose and should apply in
 

Michigan. Id. at 316 (Brickley, C.J., joined by Riley and
 

Weaver, JJ.), 330 (Cavanagh, J., joined by Mallett, J.).
 

IV. The Scope of the Public-Duty Doctrine under White
 

Before we can determine the future of the public-duty
 

doctrine in Michigan, it is necessary to examine its current
 

state. At issue in White was whether the defendant police
 

officer who failed to assist and protect the plaintiff from a
 

criminal assault by a third party was liable in tort. This
 

Court invoked the public duty doctrine and found no liability.
 

Chief Justice Brickley’s lead opinion in White adopted
 

the following articulation of the public duty doctrine from
 

Justice Cooley’s leading 19th century treatise on torts:
 

[I]f the duty which the official authority


imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a


failure to perform it, or an inadequate or
 

erroneous performance, must be a public, not an


individual injury, and must be redressed, if at


all, in some form of public prosecution. On the
 

other hand, if the duty is a duty to the
 

individual, then a neglect to perform it, or to


perform it properly, is an individual wrong, and


may support an individual action for damages.


[White, supra at 316, quoting 2 Cooley, Torts (4th


ed), § 300, pp 385-386.]
 

However, it is not entirely clear from our fractured
 

decision in White whether application of the public duty
 

8
 
 

doctrine was intended to apply to all government employees or
 

only to police officers who are alleged to have failed to
 

provide police protection. The lead opinion suggested an
 

expansive application of the doctrine:
 

In conclusion, we find that the public-duty


doctrine still serves useful purposes. . . .


Government employees should enjoy personal


protection from tort liability based on their


action in conformity with, or failure to conform


to, statutes or ordinances not intended to create


tort liability. The job titles of government
 

employees alone should not create a duty to
 

specific members of the public. [Id. at 319.]
 

Fairly read, nothing in the lead opinion indicated an intent
 

to limit application of the public duty doctrine to any
 

particular class of governmental employees.
 

Justice Boyle agreed with the statement in the lead
 

opinion that “[a]pplied to police officers, the public-duty
 

doctrine insulates officers from tort liability for the
 

negligent failure to provide police protection . . . .” Id.
 

at 325. She noted that “a contrary result could lead to
 

officers arresting (and detaining) all persons who might
 

conceivably jeopardize a foreseeable plaintiff.” Id. at 329­

330. However, Justice Boyle argued that, even when limited to
 

police officers, the doctrine should only apply to cases
 

involving nonfeasance, i.e., “‘passive inaction or the failure
 

to actively protect others from harm.’” Id. at 328, quoting
 

Williams v Cunningham, 429 Mich 495, 498-499; 418 NW2d 381
 

(1988).
 

9
 
Justice Cavanagh would have limited the decision “to only
 

those cases in which liability is alleged on the basis of the
 

police officer’s failure to protect an individual from the
 

actions of a third party.” Id. at 330 (Cavanagh, J.,
 

concurring in part and dissenting in part). He opined that
 

the case “should have no bearing in a case involving an injury
 

caused by the police officer’s own actions.” Id. Justice
 

Cavanagh noted that “the public-duty doctrine recognizes that
 

police officers and their departments must make discretionary
 

or policy decisions in order to carry out the duties imposed
 

on them.” Id. at 331. However, Justice Cavanagh also
 

suggested that the public duty doctrine should apply to “fire
 

fighters, life guards, and similar governmental safety
 

professionals.” Id. at 331, n 1.
 

Justice Levin dissented, arguing that the public-duty
 

doctrine is inconsistent with the governmental immunity
 

statute, which “hold[s] governmental officers and employees,
 

except those at the highest levels, subject to liability on
 

the basis of gross negligence, defined as reckless conduct.”
 

Id. at 342-343.
 

Clearly then, the various opinions in White offered
 

relatively little guidance to lower courts regarding the scope
 

of the doctrine recognized in that case. Since White, the
 

Court of Appeals has not hesitated broadly to apply the public
 

10
 
 

duty doctrine outside the police protection context.5
 

V. The Future of the Public Duty Doctrine in Michigan
 

We now address the issue left open in White: should the
 

public duty doctrine apply in cases other than those alleging
 

a failure to provide police protection from the criminal acts
 

of a third party? As illustrated by our differing opinions in
 

White, as well as the split decision in the Court of Appeals
 

in this case, the doctrine has proven to be difficult to
 

define and apply. Even more important, further expansion of
 

the doctrine is unwarranted because the governmental immunity
 

statute already provides government employees with significant
 

protections from liability.
 

Thus, we reject further expansion of the public duty
 

doctrine. The liability of government employees, other than
 

those who have allegedly failed to provide police protection,
 

should be determined using traditional tort principles without
 

regard to the defendant’s status as a government employee.
 

5See, e.g., Elmadari v Filiak, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d


___ (2001) (a city maintenance worker owed no duty to a child


injured by an allegedly dangerous slide); McGoldrick v Holiday
 

Amusements, Inc, 242 Mich App 286; 618 NW2d 98 (2000) (a state


ski lift inspector owed no duty to an injured skier); Koenig
 

v South Haven, 221 Mich App 711; 562 NW2d 509 (1997), rev’d in


part on other grounds 460 Mich 667; 597 NW2d 99 (1999) (city


officials owed no duty to decedent who was swept off a pier


into a lake during inclement weather); Reno v Chung, 220 Mich


App 102; 559 NW2d 308 (1996), aff’d on other grounds 461 Mich


109; 597 NW2d 817 (1999) (a medical examiner owed no duty to


the plaintiff who was mistakenly convicted of murder in part


because of the examiner’s report).
 

11
 
 

A. Shortcomings of the Public Duty Doctrine
 

As stated, the public duty doctrine is widely applied.
 

The lead opinion in White set forth two commonly cited
 

justifications for retaining the doctrine: “First, the
 

doctrine protects governments from unreasonable interference
 

with policy decisions, and, second, it protects government
 

employees from unreasonable liability.” Id. at 317. However,
 

as the Supreme Court of Colorado recognized in Leake v Cain,
 

720 P2d 152, 158 (Colo, 1986):
 

[A] growing number of courts have concluded


that the underlying purposes of the public duty


rule are better served by the application of


conventional tort principles and the protection


afforded by statutes governing sovereign immunity


than by a rule that precludes a finding of an


actionable duty on the basis of the defendant’s


status as a public entity.
 

Indeed, a number of courts that have examined the doctrine in
 

detail have rejected it.6
 

As formulated by Justice Cooley, the public duty doctrine
 

provides only that a plaintiff cannot rely on the fact that a
 

public employee owes general duties to the public at large to
 

support a claim of negligence. Justice Cooley explained:
 

6See, e.g., Adams v State, 555 P2d 235 (Alas, 1976); Ryan
 

v State, 134 Ariz 308; 656 P2d 597 (1982); Leake, supra;


Commercial Carrier Corp v Indian River Co, 371 So 2d 1010


(Fla, 1979); Jean W v Commonwealth, 414 Mass 496; 610 NE2d 305
 

(1993); Maple v Omaha, 222 Neb 293; 384 NW2d 254 (1986);


Brennen v City of Eugene, 285 Or 401; 591 P2d 719 (1979);


Hudson v East Montpelier, 161 Vt 168; 638 A2d 561 (1993);


Coffey v Milwaukee, 74 Wis 2d 526; 247 NW2d 132 (1976).
 

12
 
“The failure of a public officer to perform a


public duty can constitute an individual wrong only


when some person can show that in the public duty


was involved also a duty to himself as an
 

individual, and that he has suffered a special and


peculiar injury by reason of its nonperformance.”


[2 Cooley, Torts (4th ed), § 300, p 386 (citation


omitted).]
 

Such an analysis merely states the obvious: a plaintiff must
 

show some common-law duty owed to him by the public employee.
 

However, application of the public duty doctrine has not
 

been so limited. In our view, application of the doctrine has
 

been reduced to a conclusory statement that where there is a
 

duty to all, there is a duty to none. Such a “reformulation”
 

of the doctrine is tantamount to a grant of common-law
 

governmental immunity, an area already dealt with by statute
 

in many jurisdictions, including Michigan. The Supreme Court
 

of Alaska was one of the first courts to reject the doctrine
 

on precisely this basis. In Adams v State, 555 P2d 235 (Alas,
 

1976), the plaintiffs were injured in a hotel fire. The hotel
 

had been inspected eight months earlier by the state fire
 

marshall’s office. It was alleged that the state inspectors
 

had failed to abate several hazards that they had discovered.
 

Rejecting the argument that the state owed a duty only to the
 

public generally, the Supreme Court of Alaska noted that an
 

application of the public duty doctrine in that case would
 

have resulted in a finding of no duty even though “a private
 

defendant would have owed such a duty . . . .” Id. at 242.
 

13
 
In the absence of statutory immunity, the court declined to
 

make it more difficult to establish a duty when the state is
 

the defendant. Id.7
 

Other courts have also recognized that routine
 

application of the public duty doctrine has resulted in an
 

artificial distinction between so-called “public” and
 

“private” duties. In Commercial Carrier Corp v Indian River
 

Co, 371 So 2d 1010, 1015 (Fla, 1979), the Florida Supreme
 

Court explained that it is
 

circuitous reasoning to conclude that no cause of


action exists for a negligent act or omission by an


agent of the state or its political subdivision


where the duty breached is said to be owed to the


public at large but not to any particular person.
 

In rejecting the public duty doctrine in Ryan v State, 134
 

Ariz 308, 310; 656 P2d 597 (1982), the Arizona Supreme Court
 

found the attempt to distinguish between public and individual
 

duties to be a “speculative exercise.”8
 

We agree with these sentiments. The fact that a public
 

employee owes general duties to the public at large does not
 

logically preclude the imposition of a private, individual
 

7

As noted in Wilson v Anchorage, 669 P2d 569, 571 (Alas,
 

1983), the Alaska Legislature has since conferred upon


municipalities immunity from liability arising from negligent


inspections.
 

8Following the decision in Ryan, the Arizona Legislature


enacted various immunity provisions. See Clouse v Dep’t of
 

Public Safety, 194 Ariz 473, 476-477; 984 P2d 559 (Ariz App,


1998).
 

14
 
duty. These duties are not mutually exclusive. Consequently,
 

any attempt to draw a distinction between a government
 

employee’s “public duty” and “private duty” has proven to be
 

confusing and prone to arbitrary and inconsistent application.
 

Consider, for example, the case of building inspectors.
 

As did the Adams court, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in
 

Coffey v Milwaukee, 74 Wis 2d 526; 247 NW2d 132 (1976),
 

imposed on a building inspector an actionable duty of care to
 

perform fire safety inspections in a reasonable manner. The
 

court held that there was no distinction in that case between
 

“a ‘public duty’ and a ‘[private] duty.’” Id. at 540.
 

Reaching the opposite result, in Lynn v Overlook Development,
 

98 NC App 75, 78; 389 SE2d 609 (1990), aff’d in part and rev’d
 

in part 328 NC 689; 403 SE2d 469 (1991), the Court of Appeals
 

of North Carolina held that the duty to carry out building
 

inspections was owed “not to the plaintiffs, individually, but
 

to the general public.”9 However, the conclusory analysis in
 

Lynn merely begs the question why a duty to carry out building
 

inspections, which undeniably benefits the general public,
 

cannot also give rise to an individual duty in an appropriate
 

9We note that, although it did not expressly overrule
 

Lynn, the Supreme Court of North Carolina recently decided


that the public duty doctrine should no longer apply outside


the police protection context. Thompson v Waters, 351 NC 462,


464-465; 526 SE2d 650 (2000).
 

15
 
case.10
 

From these examples it is clear that the courts “have not
 

managed to draw an intellectually defensible line between
 

immune ‘public’ duties and actionable negligence.” Jean W v
 

Commonwealth, 414 Mass 496, 510; 610 NE2d 305 (1993) (citation
 

omitted). We will not attempt to do so because a traditional
 

common-law duty analysis provides a far more familiar and
 

workable framework for determining whether a public employee
 

owes a tort-enforceable duty in a given case. Moreover, as
 

explained below, the need for an expanded application of the
 

public duty doctrine has been undermined by the protections
 

afforded governmental employees by our state’s broad
 

governmental immunity statute.
 

B. 	Relationship Between the Public Duty Doctrine and the


Governmental Immunity Act
 

A government employee is immune from tort liability under
 

the governmental immunity statute if all the following
 

conditions are met:
 

(a) The officer . . . is acting or reasonably


believes he or she is acting within the scope of


his or her authority.
 

(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the


exercise or discharge of a governmental function.
 

(c) The officer’s . . . conduct does not
 

10Indeed, Justice Cooley himself recognized that, in the


inspection context, “duties are imposed in respect to the


public and also in respect to individuals.” 2 Cooley, Torts


(4th ed), § 304, p 403.
 

16
 
amount to gross negligence that is the proximate


cause of the injury or damage. As used in this
 

subdivision, “gross negligence” means conduct so


reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of
 

concern for whether an injury results. [MCL


691.1407(2).]
 

In our view, the Legislature has expressed through these
 

provisions its intent to subject lower-level government
 

employees to potential liability for performing their jobs in
 

a grossly negligent manner.11 This is so even though the
 

governmental agency itself would be exempt from liability.
 

See MCL 691.1407(1). Thus, expanding the common-law public
 

duty doctrine to shield all government employees from tort
 

liability is at least arguably inconsistent with this
 

statutory scheme.12
 

Even if that were not the case, the fact that the
 

governmental immunity statute makes public employees immune
 

from liability for conduct that does not amount to “gross
 

negligence” and is not “the proximate cause” of the injury
 

certainly undermines the need for the common-law “immunity”
 

11Judges, legislators, and the elective or highest


appointive executive officials of all levels of government


are, of course, absolutely immune from liability for their


policy-making decisions. See MCL 691.1407(5).
 

12However, we reject Justice Levin’s suggestion in
 

White, supra at 355, that MCL 691.1407 “defines the duty


pursuant to which a governmental employee is subject to


liability.” The statute does not create a cause of action.
 

Plaintiffs are still required to establish a common-law duty.
 

17
 
granted by the public duty doctrine.13
 

The Supreme Court of Vermont employed similar reasoning
 

in Hudson v East Montpelier, 161 Vt 168, 179; 638 A2d 561
 

(1993), where it “[d]ecline[d] to adopt the confusing and
 

inconsistent public duty doctrine as a means of limiting
 

liability of government employees who are already protected to
 

some extent by [statutory immunity.]”
 

We recognize that public employees often are required to
 

perform various tasks by virtue of their position. However,
 

“[p]rivate persons [also] have affirmative duties arising from
 

their employment responsibilities that others do not have.”
 

Jean W, supra at 508. Again, the governmental immunity act
 

contemplates that government employees may be held liable for
 

performing their jobs in a grossly negligent manner. Indeed,
 

the Legislature has expressly authorized government agencies
 

to defend and indemnify employees facing potential tort
 

liability for injuries caused by the employee “while in the
 

course of employment and while acting within the scope of his
 

or her authority . . . .” MCL 691.1408(1).
 

In sum, the Legislature, through the governmental
 

immunity statute, has signified that a defendant’s status as
 

13Although we recognized in White, supra, that the public


duty doctrine is part of tort law, id. at 323, the effect of


the rule arguably is identical to that of governmental


immunity. “Under both doctrines, the existence of liability


depends entirely upon the public status of the defendant.”


Leake, supra at 160.
 

18
 
 

a government employee alone does not preclude liability. We
 

choose not to undermine that public policy choice by expanding
 

the application of the judicially created public duty
 

doctrine.
 

Consistent with our decision in White, we will, however,
 

continue to apply the public duty doctrine, and its
 

concomitant “special relationship” exception,14 in cases
 

involving an alleged failure to provide police protection.15
 

We agree with Chief Justice Brickley’s statement in White that
 

14Under the “special relationship” test adopted and


applied by a majority of the Court in White, a police officer


may be exposed to liability for failure to protect a plaintiff


from the criminal acts of a third party only if the following


elements are met:
 

“(1) an assumption by the municipality,


through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty


to act on behalf of the party who was injured;
 

(2) knowledge on the part of the
 

municipality’s agent that inaction could lead to


harm;
 

(3) some form of direct contact between the
 

municipality’s agents and the injured party; and
 

(4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the


municipality’s affirmative undertaking . . . .”


[White, supra at 320 (citation omitted).]
 

15The Supreme Court of North Carolina has adopted such a


distinction. Thompson v Waters, 351 NC 462, 464-465; 526 SE2d


650 (2000). As has the Supreme Court of Georgia. See
 

Hamilton v Cannon, 267 Ga 655; 482 SE2d 370 (1997); Dep’t of
 

Transportation v Brown, 267 Ga 6; 471 SE2d 849 (1996).


Interestingly, in its decision limiting application of the


public duty doctrine to the police protection context, the


Supreme Court of North Carolina cited the same concerns that


we express today. Thompson, supra.
 

19
 
“[p]olice officers must work in unusual circumstances. They
 

deserve unusual protection.” Id. at 321. Moreover, the
 

public duty doctrine as applied in White is consistent with
 

the general common-law rule that no individual has a duty to
 

protect another who is endangered by a third person’s conduct
 

absent “a ‘special relationship’ either between the defendant
 

and the victim, or the defendant and the third party who
 

caused the injury.” Murdock v Higgins, 454 Mich 46, 54; 559
 

NW2d 639 (1997).
 

However, for purposes of determining the liability of
 

public employees other than police officers, we will determine
 

a government employee’s duty using the same traditional
 

common-law duty analysis applicable to private individuals.
 

VI. Application
 

The Court of Appeals relied solely on the public duty
 

doctrine in ordering that summary disposition be entered in
 

defendant’s favor under MCR 2.116(C)(8). As stated,
 

application of the public duty doctrine is limited to cases
 

like White involving an alleged failure of a police officer to
 

protect a plaintiff from the criminal acts of a third party.
 

We agree with plaintiff that this case clearly does not fall
 

within the circumstances presented in White. Accordingly, the
 

Court of Appeals erred in relying on the public duty doctrine
 

to dismiss plaintiff’s case.
 

VII. Conclusion
 

20
 
Distinguishing between a government employee’s “public”
 

and “private” duties has proven to be an unwieldy exercise.
 

Moreover, the need for expanding the public duty doctrine
 

outside the police protection context is undermined by the
 

comprehensive protections from liability provided to
 

government employees by the governmental immunity statute.
 

Therefore, we decline to do so. The decision of the Court of
 

Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial
 

court for further proceedings.
 

CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, and MARKMAN, JJ.,
 

concurred with YOUNG, J.
 

21
 
____________________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
 

SUPREME COURT
 

NICOLE M. BEAUDRIE,
 

Plaintiff-Appellant,
 

No. 114261
 

PAULINE HENDERSON,
 

Defendant-Appellee,
 

and
 

CITY OF DEARBORN, and DEARBORN


POLICE DEPARTMENT,
 

Defendants.
 

CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).
 

I join parts I and II of the majority opinion, which
 

accurately discuss the pleadings. I also join the majority’s
 

decision to reverse. I write separately, however, because I
 

believe the majority goes beyond what is necessary to resolve
 

the limited question before us. I would hold only that (1)
 

the plaintiff successfully pleaded a claim upon which relief
 

may be granted, and (2) that the defendant failed to overcome
 
the plaintiff’s amended pleadings because the defendant’s
 

claim of nonstatutory immunity was predicated on inapplicable
 

precedent. 


I believe the majority’s discussion of the history and
 

wisdom of the public duty doctrine is misplaced, given that we
 

are examining a motion for summary disposition that tests only
 

the sufficiency of the pleadings. MCR 2.116(C)(8). Therefore,
 

I would not delve into the statutory issues discussed by the
 

majority. Instead, I would resolve this case on the basis of
 

the narrow grounds discussed in this opinion.
 

I
 

MCR 2.116(C)(8) “tests the legal sufficiency of the claim
 

on the pleadings alone to determine whether the plaintiff has
 

stated a claim on which relief may be granted. The motion
 

must be granted if no factual development could justify the
 

plaintiffs' claim for relief.” Spiek v Dep’t of
 

Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). The
 

plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleged that the defendant
 

had engaged in gross negligence and active misconduct.1 The
 

most direct discussion of gross negligence and active
 

misconduct can be found at the first paragraph 27 of the
 

plaintiff’s amended complaint, which states as follows:
 

1 The plaintiff labels her claims under the title, “Count


I-Gross Negligence/Active Misconduct.”
 

2
 
At all relevant times, Defendant Pauline
 

Henderson committed acts of intentional misconduct,


and active malfeasance, and gross negligence, which


are not protected by the Public Duty Doctrine


and/or governmental immunity including, but not


limited to, the following:
 

a. Representing herself to be conducting


official police business for improper purposes;
 

b. Using her authority as a Dearborn Police


Dispatcher to verify the location of the suspect


for improper purposes;
 

c. Actively withholding and concealing


information from the authorities regarding the


verified location of a felony suspect which she


otherwise would have provided without hesitation;
 

d. Purposefully accepting instruction from


the suspect’s mother and criminal attorney in


contravention of her duties;
 

e. Intentionally conspiring to keep the
 

verified whereabouts of the suspect concealed
 

despite actual knowledge of a police emergency;
 

f. Affirmatively abrogating her obligations


in order to prevent the authorities from
 

apprehending a known suspect in the commission of a


brutal felony;
 

g. Intentionally abandoning her post as a


police dispatcher in order to engage in misconduct;
 

h. Driving to Camp Dearborn to meet with the


suspect;
 

i. Engaging in other active misconduct, gross


negligence and/or intentional malfeasance which may


become known prior to trial.
 

Further in support of her claim, the plaintiff repeatedly
 

alleged that the defendant conspired and agreed to abrogate
 

her duties as a police dispatcher and to conceal information
 

3
 
from the authorities. The complaint also specifically alleged
 

that the defendant’s active misconduct was “intended to
 

prevent police authorities from saving a rape and kidnapping
 

victim,” that the defendant’s intentional acts and omissions
 

proximately resulted in the continued abuse of the plaintiff
 

for an additional ten hours, and that damages resulted from
 

the defendant’s acts and omissions.
 

II
 

In response to the allegations raised by the plaintiff,
 

the defendant brought a motion for summary disposition
 

pursuant to MCR 2.116 (C)(8). In support of its position that
 

no amount of factual development could justify the plaintiff’s
 

claim, the defendant argued that defendant Henderson is
 

protected by the public duty doctrine. 


The basis of defendant’s public duty doctrine claim
 

The defendant’s brief in support of summary disposition
 

claimed that “Under the public duty doctrine, a public
 

employee owes a duty to the general public and not to any one
 

individual unless a special relationship exists between the
 

employee and the individual.” In the defendant’s view, the
 

plaintiff in the present case failed to establish that a
 

special relationship existed, citing White v Humbert, 206 Mich
 

App 459; 522 NW2d 681 (1994), and Reno v Chung, 220 Mich App
 

102, 105; 559 NW2d 308 (1996), aff'd sub nom Maiden v Rozwood,
 

4
 
461 Mich 109; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). As such, the public duty
 

doctrine would bar recovery. In response to the defendant’s
 

motion for summary disposition, the plaintiff argued that the
 

defendant was not protected by the public duty doctrine
 

because the doctrine applies only to cases involving
 

nonfeasance. The present complaint alleged active misconduct
 

amounting to malfeasance. Further, the plaintiff alleged that
 

the defendant’s actions arose out her relationship with David
 

Wilke and his mother. Thus, plaintiff argued, the public duty
 

doctrine would be inapplicable. The defendant filed a reply
 

brief, arguing that the malfeasance versus nonfeasance
 

argument advocated by the defendant was unsupportable because
 

“[t]here is no allegation or implication that Henderson took
 

any dynamic step toward aiding David Wilke in his criminal
 

activity.”
 

I cannot agree with the defendant that the public duty
 

doctrine shields her from liability. I believe that the
 

defendant applies the public duty doctrine too broadly, and
 

ignores the plaintiff’s allegations that she called Camp
 

Dearborn, confirmed Wilke’s presence there, left work, drove
 

to Camp Dearborn, and collaborated with Kondzer and Wilke’s
 

attorney in addition to deciding to withhold information from
 

the authorities.
 

5
 
As noted in the majority opinion, the public duty
 

doctrine on which the defendant builds her argument was the
 

subject of much discussion in White v Beasley, 453 Mich 308,
 

552 NW2d 1 (1996). There, in separate opinions, a majority of
 

this Court adopted a formulation of the doctrine that provides
 

that an officer may be shielded from an individual action for
 

damages when the officer is being charged with failing to
 

perform or inadequately performing a duty to the public. Yet,
 

the opinion did not preclude the possibility that the officer
 

nonetheless might owe an individual enforceable duty in tort.2
 

Though in Beasley, this Court acknowledged a “special
 

relationship exception” to the public duty doctrine, the Court
 

did not hold that the doctrine is so broad that a public
 

officer would automatically be protected from liability under
 

the public duty doctrine when the officer’s abrogation of
 

2
 

“[I]f the duty which the official authority


imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a


failure to perform it, or an inadequate or
 

erroneous performance, must be a public, not an


individual injury, and must be redressed, if at


all, in some form of public prosecution. On the
 

other hand, if the duty is a duty to the
 

individual, then a neglect to perform it, or to


perform it properly is an individual wrong, and may


support an individual action for damages.”


[Beasley at 316, quoting 2 Cooley, Torts (4th ed),


§ 300, pp 385-386.]
 

6
 
duties and personal involvement in the circumstances
 

surrounding the plaintiff allegedly caused the plaintiff’s
 

injuries to result. 


Though the defendant tries to squeeze her case into the
 

parameters of Beasley, her efforts must fail because this case
 

is distinguishable from Beasley. The plaintiff is not
 

asserting that the defendant should be liable simply because
 

the defendant was a police dispatcher who owed a general
 

governmental duty to the plaintiff as a member of the public.
 

Instead, the pleadings assert that the defendant became
 

personally involved by acting upon special knowledge that she
 

obtained because of a personal relationship with the assailant
 

and his mother, and that the defendant chose to abrogate
 

rather than perform her duties as a police dispatcher, despite
 

the fact that she received information while on duty.
 

According to the complaint, the relationship between the
 

defendant, Kondzer, and Wilke made the defendant privy to
 

special information about the alleged attack on the plaintiff.
 

Thus, it was not the defendant’s position as a police
 

dispatcher that gave rise to the alleged misconduct, it was
 

her relationship with the assailant’s mother. Additionally,
 

the complaint alleged various ways in which the defendant
 

actively engaged in conduct that delayed apprehension of Wilke
 

so that injury to the plaintiff resulted. 


7
 
The allegations throughout the plaintiff’s amended
 

complaint, and specifically listed in the first paragraph 27,
 

state that the defendant knowingly and intentionally abrogated
 

her duties as a police dispatcher and became involved in the
 

case for personal reasons. I believe that the plaintiff’s
 

repeated references to the relationship between the defendant,
 

Kondzer, and Wilke, if accepted as true, would support a claim
 

for a common-law cause of action. As such, I am not persuaded
 

that this is the type of case in which the public duty
 

doctrine of Beasley should be applied. Thus, the basis for
 

the defendant’s MCR 2.116(C)(8) motion collapses, as does the
 

decision of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, I join the
 

majority’s decision to reverse.
 

III


 I agree with the trial court that the defendant failed
 

to establish that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon
 

which relief may be granted. As such, summary disposition was
 

correctly denied. Therefore, I would reverse the decision of
 

the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further
 

proceedings.
 

KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.
 

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