FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-2487

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THOMAS JOHN POPE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Marianne L. Aho, Judge.

June 8, 2018

WINSOR, J.

In 2012, the Florida Legislature found it was “in the public 

interest to encourage a person who is aware of or present during 

another individual’s drug overdose to seek medical assistance for 

that individual.” Ch. 2012-36, Laws of Fla. The Legislature 

therefore enacted the “911 Good Samaritan Act,” which provides 

that anyone “acting in good faith who seeks medical assistance for 

an individual experiencing a drug-related overdose” is immune 

from prosecution for drug possession if the evidence “was obtained 

as a result of the person’s seeking medical assistance.” § 893.21(1), 

Fla. Stat. (2016). The issue in this case is whether that statutory 

immunity reaches Thomas Pope, who sought medical help for a 

young woman overdosing on heroin.
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Many facts are disputed, but the pertinent ones are not. 

Because neither side asks us to disturb the trial court’s factual 

findings, our obligation is to apply the law to those findings, which 

means our review is de novo. See Cuervo v. State, 967 So. 2d 155, 

160 (Fla. 2007).

In December 2016, Thomas Pope and two friends were doing 

heroin together at Pope’s home. One of the friends, a young woman

named Ashley, overdosed and stopped breathing. Pope 

immediately got on the phone with 911, providing his address and 

seeking help. He answered the 911 operator’s questions regarding 

Ashley’s condition, and he followed the operator’s instructions to 

monitor her breathing and tilt her head to open her airway. 

Emergency responders quickly arrived, recognized symptoms 

consistent with a heroin overdose, and successfully administered a 

medication to counteract the effects. Ashley survived.

Despite some admirable efforts to save his friend, Pope’s 

conduct was far from exemplary. At some point after the 911 call 

but before responders arrived, Pope moved Ashley to the front 

porch, leaving her briefly unattended. He tried to hide the heroin 

and rearranged things inside the home. When emergency 

responders arrived, he initially refused to answer the door, and 

when he finally did, he did nothing to help them help his friend. 

He denied knowing Ashley, saying he had no idea where she came 

from or what she had taken. He was belligerent, somewhat 

aggressive, and entirely uncooperative. 

The State charged Pope with possession of heroin and 

marijuana, both of which were found inside the home. Pope moved 

to dismiss under the 911 Good Samaritan Act, arguing that 

because authorities found the drugs only because of his seeking 

medical treatment in good faith, he could not be prosecuted. The 

court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion. The court 

found the whole episode was a “fluid situation” that involved some 

good faith and some bad faith. It explained that although Pope may 

have acted initially in good faith when seeking medical assistance, 

he was later not acting in good faith when he was “making things 

more difficult” for the responders. 

After the court denied Pope’s motion, he pleaded guilty, 

specifically reserving the right to appeal the denial of his 
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dispositive motion. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i). The court 

imposed a fifteen-month sentence, and Pope now appeals the order 

denying immunity.

It is undisputed that Pope contacted 911 for no reason other 

than to “seek[]medical assistance for an individual experiencing a 

drug-related overdose.” See § 893.21(1). And it is undisputed that 

evidence of Pope’s drug possession “was obtained as a result of 

[Pope’s] seeking medical assistance.” See id. The only issue on 

appeal is whether Pope acted in good faith in seeking the 

assistance. See id. (limiting immunity to “[a] person acting in good 

faith who seeks medical assistance”) (emphasis added).

Pope argues that by providing the 911 operator with Ashley’s 

location and condition, and then following the operator’s 

instructions in rendering medical aid, he met the statute’s “good 

faith” requirement. The trial court’s contrary conclusion—and the 

State’s argument on appeal—relate more to what Pope did after he 

sought medical assistance. The State argues (correctly) that Pope 

could have and should have done more. But the Legislature did not 

condition immunity on doing more than seeking medical 

assistance in good faith. The Legislature could have imposed more 

conditions. Indeed, other legislatures have. See, e.g., W. Va. Code 

§ 16-47-4 (2015) (limiting immunity to those who “[c]ooperate[] 

with and provide[] any relevant information requested by 

emergency medical assistance personnel or law-enforcement 

officers needed to treat the [overdosing] person”); Cal. Health & 

Safety Code § 11376.5 (West 2013) (limiting immunity to those 

who do “not obstruct medical or law enforcement personnel”); Del. 

Code. Ann. tit. 16, § 4769 (West 2013) (limiting immunity to those

who “provide[] all relevant medical information as to the cause of 

the overdose . . . when a medical provider arrives”).

Regardless of whether Pope should have behaved better, his 

purpose in contacting 911 was to save his friend. That was a goodfaith purpose. Under a plain reading of the 911 Good Samaritan 

Act, we conclude Pope was “[a] person acting in good faith who 

[sought] medical assistance.” § 893.21(1). The Act therefore gave 

him immunity from prosecution, so the trial court erred in denying 

the motion to dismiss. 

REVERSED.
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MAKAR and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Steven E. Woods,

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.