U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

24–204PDF 2006

THE U.S.-INDIA GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: THE

IMPACT ON NONPROLIFERATION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 26, 2005

Serial No. 109–135

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

DOUG SEAY, Professional Staff Member 

JEAN CARROLL, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Neil Joeck, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory ................................................................ 10

The Honorable Robert J. Einhorn, International Security Program, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies ............................................................. 14

Mr. David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security ......................................................................................................................... 21

Mr. Henry Sokolski, Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education 

Center .................................................................................................................... 25

Mr. Leonard Spector, Deputy Director, Monterey Institute of International 

Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies .................................................... 58

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Neil Joeck, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................................. 12

The Honorable Robert J. Einhorn: Prepared statement ....................................... 17

Mr. David Albright: Prepared statement ............................................................... 23

Mr. Henry Sokolski: Prepared statement .............................................................. 29

Mr. Leonard Spector: Prepared statement ............................................................ 60

(1)

THE U.S.-INDIA GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: THE 

IMPACT ON NONPROLIFERATION 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:36 a.m., room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee), presiding. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. President 

Bush has repeatedly said that preventing the spread of nuclear 

weapons is the most important challenge facing our world. No responsible person can dissent from that statement as the consequences of failure are beyond measure and constitute not merely 

a threat to our national survival but to civilization itself, for there 

is no margin for miscalculation. 

Unwarranted hopes, cavaliered guesses and needless haste are 

likely only to speed our progression toward destruction. Every proposed change to U.S. or global nonproliferation policy requires the 

closest scrutiny. No grandly awaited triumph, no dream of fame, no 

nervous urgency, no insistent explanation, can be allowed to encourage us to knowingly undertake needless risks to summon Armageddon. 

It is to ensure that we give sufficient respect to this reality that 

today’s hearing is being held. The Administration’s recently announced ‘‘global partnership’’ with India is in itself to be welcomed. 

For too long our two countries have been opposed to one another 

for reasons that have little grounding in any objective factor and 

have been blind of the logic of their own interest. I will refrain 

from casting blame on either side and will say only that I hope we 

are now past the era of squandered opportunities. 

This agreement outlines many areas for joint action from space 

to the environment to the promotion of democracy. But by far, the 

most significant provision is that concerning cooperation on civilian 

nuclear energy. For any country, such an endeavor would be of 

enormous consequence and require considerable deliberation. I 

might point out that a similar agreement with China took 13 years 

to come fully into force, but for India, this potential cooperation 

carries with it a special significance, as it cannot proceed without 

our restructuring long-standing United States and global nonproliferation policy. 

To implement the nuclear cooperation elements of the agreement, congressional assent must be obtained in the form of amending the relevant laws now forbidding such cooperation with India 

2

and other countries which are not in compliance with key nonproliferation practices and conventions. Given the primacy of this 

subject and the many unknowns surrounding the overall agreement, there is much work to be done before that assent can be 

given. 

I would like to address the subject of process in order to avoid 

any misunderstanding that might arise. Let me begin by stating for 

the record that I have as yet come to no settled conclusions regarding the merits of this aspect of the agreement. And I hope that I 

speak for the Members of this Committee in stating that I plan to 

seek the input of many different sources before I can feel the requisite confidence in doing so. 

This panel today and others to follow are part of that process of 

consideration as we seek the analysis of experts long practiced in 

this arcane subject and solicit their recommendations for how the 

Congress might best consider the agreement and any modifications 

that may be required. For these reasons, it would be grossly irresponsible for this Committee and for Congress as a whole to act 

with unnecessary haste regarding a subject which can bear no false 

steps. 

I am both gratified and concerned by statements from the Administration regarding this process, although this Committee and 

the Congress as a whole have received little, if any, information 

from the Administration regarding either the details of its ongoing 

discussions with the Indian Government, or the legislation it plans 

to introduce. I am certain that this oversight will be soon corrected. 

As it stands, the situation is both strange and unusual in that the 

Indian authorities know more about this important proposal than 

we in Congress. However, I trust this will soon be ameliorated. 

Clearly, there is ample time for extensive consultations to be 

held and I am aware of no pressing deadline for action. I was 

pleased to hear Under Secretary Burns state at our last hearing 

that the Administration plans to work closely with this Committee 

and not seek to circumvent it in favor of a more hasty, unconsidered and, frankly, quite dangerous approach. These same points 

were conveyed in a recent letter to Secretary Rice that was signed 

by the Chairman and Ranking Members of our Committee and 

those of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 

Having said that, I am troubled by a number of public statements by Administration officials that congressional support for the 

overall agreement is broad and that our consent is virtually guaranteed. I do not understand how these statements could be made 

with Congress having yet to be fully consulted. I know I have not 

been. I attribute these to a robust confidence that the Legislative 

and Executive Branches can find a mutually acceptable approach, 

an expectation I fully share. 

But it is important to keep in mind that although the Executive 

Branch has wide latitude to conclude agreements with countries, it 

is the province of the Congress to make or amend laws. Our responsibility to the American people and to posterity simply will not 

permit any course other than a full and complete consideration of 

the many profound consequences, both those obvious and those not 

readily revealed to impatient eyes. 

3

Now let me turn to my friend, Mr. Lantos, the Distinguished 

Ranking Democratic Member for such comments as he may wish 

to make, after which the Members will have 1 minute to make an 

opening statement, should they choose. Mr. Lantos? 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me 

identify myself with your carefully crafted and very thoughtful 

opening statement. Before I come to my prepared statement, I 

would like to make a couple of observations. 

First, we rarely have a panel as distinguished and as knowledgeable and as widely admired for their technical expertise as we have 

this morning and I want to thank them in advance for what I know 

is superb testimony which I read with great interest. 

Secondly, I would like to ask unanimous consent to have the letter signed by Chairman Lugar, yourself, Ranking Member Joe 

Biden and myself be inserted in the record, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Without objection. 

Mr. LANTOS. And then I will make an overall observation. To the 

best of my knowledge, none of us on this Committee has the technical expertise that our witnesses do. But after we have been instructed and advised on all of the technical aspects of this incredibly complex and important issue, at the end of the day, we will 

still be left with the necessity of making decisions on the basis of 

political and strategic criteria. Some of us are delighted that, at 

long last, the world’s largest democracy, India, and the world’s oldest democracy, the United States, are developing an increasingly 

significant, broad-based, and, we hope, permanent political-strategic alliance. And while I am convinced that the objections that 

many of our distinguished witnesses have to a hasty conclusion of 

an imperfect arrangement are likely to be dealt with as we perfect 

the proposed agreement between India and the United States, and 

then recognize that there are overarching strategic political criteria 

which must be brought into play before Congress decides to act. 

I also agree with you, Mr. Chairman, very strongly, that there 

is no hurry in reaching a decision on this matter. This is a matter 

of utmost gravity and importance, and it must be dealt with with 

extreme care and caution. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for convening today’s hearing, the 

second in a series on the agreement announced last July between 

the United States and India, and what it might mean for the international effort to slow the spread of nuclear weapons. 

Mr. Chairman, as I said in our last hearing on this subject, I believe that the July 18 agreement is a historic breakthrough in 

United States-Indian relations, and I was among the first in Congress to support it. At that hearing, I also expressed my deep concern over India’s relationship with Iran. I observed that unless 

New Delhi were to help United States and European efforts to 

pressure Iran, a key trading partner, to verifiably halt its suspicious nuclear activities, the prospects for expanding United 

States peaceful nuclear cooperation with India would be in serious 

jeopardy in the Congress. 

I am pleased, Mr. Chairman, that India has since then demonstrated that it takes this new partnership with Washington seriously. Last month, India gave critical support to United States efforts in the International Atomic Energy Agency to refer Iran’s susVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:19 Jun 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\102605\24204.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
4

picious nuclear activities to the UN Security Council. Defying expectations, India’s representative voted with the United States and 

the European Union to find that Iran was not in compliance with 

its safeguard obligations. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to underscore the importance of India’s 

vote in the IAEA. Iran is the most active state sponsor of terrorism 

in the world today. India’s vote and its willingness to align itself 

with United States and European efforts to keep Iran from developing the ultimate terror weapon have come as a shock to the Ayatollahs of Terror in Tehran. Tehran had reportedly counted on an 

‘‘eastern strategy,’’ of relying upon its neighbors and trading partners to undermine any attempts to hold Iran to its solemn commitment under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty not to acquire or 

develop nuclear weapons. That strategy is failing—due in no small 

measure to India’s vote. 

Tehran’s crude threats to punish India and others with oil cutoffs 

and trade restrictions only increase these countries’ suspicions and 

resolve to hold Tehran accountable. Tehran has since backed down 

from its threats, aware as never before that it has more to suffer 

from trade sanctions than those it would punish. 

Mr. Chairman, I submit that India’s vote and continued support 

in stopping the Iranian nuclear weapons program is in keeping 

with the nonproliferation regime established in the United StatesIndia initiative. With India’s strong support in the months and perhaps years to come, I am more hopeful than ever that diplomatic 

and economic pressure may yet turn the Ayatollahs in Tehran from 

their demented path toward nuclear weapons and the consequent 

further economic ruin of their long suffering country. 

I would also like to highlight at least one other crucial but 

underappreciated benefit to the global nonproliferation regime from 

the U.S.-India Joint Statement. By committing to continue its moratorium on further nuclear weapons tests and part of a United 

States-India bilateral undertaking, New Delhi has, in effect, agreed 

to an international agreement not to test again, so long as both 

sides fulfill their pledges. This is a very important development, 

Mr. Chairman. 

If India does not test, then Pakistan may also not test again. 

Islamabad did not test its nuclear weapons until India had first 

done so. In practical effect then, India’s commitment could have 

significant regional nonproliferation benefits. If the Nuclear Suppliers Group, of which the United States is a founding member, 

agrees to allow member states to cooperate with India under similar terms as the joint statement, then India’s nontesting commitment could expand into a binding multilateral deal. That, I submit, 

Mr. Chairman, would be an even greater benefit to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. 

Mr. Chairman, for purposes of today’s hearing, I think it is important to remember that the details of the United States-India 

agreement are still being worked out. Approval and implementation of the agreement may take considerable time in both hemispheres. India has to decide when and how to separate and safeguard its military from its civilian nuclear activities. 

The United States Congress will, in time, have to consider a formal Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation as required by 

5

U.S. law. And member states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group made 

clear last week at their Vienna meeting that they will await the 

final details of the United States-India agreement and its implementation before they decide whether or not to permit Nuclear 

Supplier Group members to expand nuclear-related exports to 

India. 

Both the United States and India are well aware of the road 

ahead and of the many and diverse audiences which are watching 

their progress. I am confident that they will arrive at the destination we all desire, a strengthening of the international nonproliferation regime and India’s full and valuable support for the 

world’s nonproliferation efforts. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. The Chair will entertain 1-minute opening statements from such Members as choose to 

make them. And if you wish, indicate to the Chair. Mr. Rohrabacher? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me 

note that I expressed support and still support the concept of better 

relations with India. I think that if we are going to have peace and 

stability in the world and the democratic movement in this world 

is to have progress, there are four pillars of friendship that need 

to be established. An alliance between the United States and Japan 

being two of the pillars. And the newcomers would be India and, 

if they so choose, Russia, a democratic Russia. Russia is in question 

now, but the Administration was moving forward with a strategic 

concept of a relationship with India, that is a good thing. However, 

the devil is always in the details. And I agree with Mr. Hyde and 

Mr. Lantos that we need to have oversight on the details. I applaud 

the Chairman’s leadership on making sure that the Legislative 

Branch and this Committee is playing its role and insuring that 

the details accomplish the mission and that we are doing what we 

said we are going to do. 

So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I will follow your 

leadership on this issue. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. Berman? 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be curious 

about the witnesses’ reactions about how they think the Congress 

should play in this whole area? United States-India relationships 

are very important. Things that can make them stronger, as others 

have said, I think are important. But the proliferation issue to me 

is paramount and the question is, should Congress, rather than 

simply waiving the laws that now restrict the ability to have cooperation with an Indian civilian nuclear program, should we on 

the other hand draft neutral provisions that authorize that kind of 

cooperation with countries that meet certain very tough and rigorous conditions? Conditions on fissile material, production ends, 

moratoriums on the testing of nuclear weapons, the separation of 

civilian and military nuclear facilities, i.e., safeguards, kinds of export control laws that would have to be adopted and implemented 

in countries, and take a more sort of affirmative approach in promoting a more rigorous anti-proliferation regime and to use this as 

6

essentially the case study of enhancing proliferation while ties with 

India? 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Royce of 

California? 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for holding another hearing on the proposed U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear 

Cooperation Agreement. The agreement struck by the Administration is very consequential, meriting this Committee’s close attention. As others have stated, our relationship with India has come 

very far in a short time. We should be applauded. We have a 

strong interest in deepening our relationship with India, an increasingly important country. And this has strong congressional 

support. 

This nuclear agreement, whose specifics remain to be determined, has consequences beyond the United States-India relationship. As I said when the Administration testified, the goal of curbing nuclear proliferation, which is a global concern, should trump 

other factors when gauging this deal. WMD proliferation is that 

great a threat. The Administration states that this agreement 

strengthens the nonproliferation team. Others differ. I am interested in hearing about how this agreement impacts the nonproliferation treaty, the bedrock of nonproliferation efforts. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Ackerman of New York. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Without question, the July 18 statement is a 

dramatic change in U.S. nonproliferation policy, but the fact of the 

matter is that it makes sense for the United States to welcome 

India as one of the leading states with advanced nuclear technology. Over the last 30 years, India had demonstrated not only a 

successful mastery of a complicated technology, but the ability to 

insure that such technology does not get transferred into the wrong 

hands. It is here, Mr. Chairman, where I think opponents of the 

announced agreement get it wrong. 

India is not a proliferation risk in the sense that it would share 

its own or our technology with rogue states or with terrorists. Simply because India made the sovereign decision not to sign the NPT 

does not make it a proliferation risk. In fact, the Administration 

has won many concessions from India regarding separating its civil 

and military programs to clearing its civilian program to the IAEA, 

signing additional protocol, continuing its moratorium on nuclear 

testing, to name just a few. These concessions have produced an 

uproar of opposition in New Delhi, yet the point is that the Indians 

have voluntarily undertaken them. Opponents of the agreement 

suggest that the entire fabric of the global nonproliferation regime 

has been rendered with this single decision, but let us examine 

that argument. 

Clearly before the agreement, India was outside the mainstream 

of nonproliferation reforms. It is now committed to uphold or adhere to those norms. How can this be identified as anything but 

progress? Is not the implicit commitment to adhere to the Nuclear 

Suppliers Group guidelines and missile technology control regime 

exactly what we have been trying to get India to do for decades? 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Poe of Texas. 

7

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the 60s, India signed a 

30 year agreement with the United States to only develop peaceful 

uses for their nuclear technology we exported to them. However, 

India broke its word and detonated a test nuclear bomb in 1974. 

India then refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and 

today almost all of India’s nuclear facilities are not subject to the 

IAEA safeguards. Now we have United States officials actually proposing to join India in breaking its words, looking the other way 

and rewarding India for bad behavior. This is unacceptable. We either have a treaty or we do not and if we allow India to have a 

pass, there are a long line of other countries that would expect the 

same pass. If not, they must certainly consider the word of the 

United States to be as good as India’s when it broke its word in 

1960. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, in 1974, India exploded its 

first nuclear device. As a result, the United States refused nuclear 

cooperation with India for some 25 years. The United States pleaded with the so-called nuclear have nations as well as with the 

United Nations that if the world community is really serious about 

nonproliferation, then certainly those that have nuclear weapons 

need to be serious about dismantling totally the madness of having 

them, the right of the possession of these nuclear weapons. And I 

have to commend India for this singular effort in trying to plead 

with the world community, especially the Nuclear Five Club. What 

right is it that they have exclusive right to hold nuclear weapons 

and that any other country cannot? And I think India made that 

case very well. I am very happy that on July 18, 2005, President 

Bush and Prime Minister Singh signed a new global partnership 

and President Bush said it would work to achieve full civil nuclear 

energy cooperation with India that would also seek agreement with 

Congress to adjust United States laws and policies. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. You are welcome. Ms. Lee of California. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like to thank 

our witnesses for being here and thank you for this hearing. I was 

quite frankly surprised to learn that the joint agreement following 

Prime Minister Singh’s visit in July included a series of concessions 

that effectively circumvents 37 years of nuclear nonproliferation 

work by the United States and nonproliferation activists around 

the world and really could undermine the coerce of power of the 

NPT. This agreement for me raises more questions than it answers 

and I am not sure that the Administration has thought through the 

long term consequences of it. 

For instance, how will the agreement affect our ability to negotiate and disarm North Korea and Iran? What is to prevent suppliers like France, Russia and China from making exceptions and 

taking risks by supplying nuclear technologies to other non NPT 

signatory nations? And finally, just given the arsenal which we 

have, the United States has, of nuclear weapons, how do we continue to dissuade other nations from acquiring nuclear weapon 

technologies? We do need better cooperation and closer ties with 

India on all fronts and I, too, would like to see how this agreement 

8

really leads to an overall nonproliferation effort. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank the gentlelady. Mr. Crowley of New 

York? 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Chairman and thank you, gentlemen, 

for your testimony today. I have been following this debate very 

closely with Secretary Burns and Joseph in September and your 

discussion today. I think what the debate has done is bringing 

some rationale to what is a reality, the fact that India is a nuclear 

power. 

What we need to do is to make sure that whatever decision our 

Government makes, that it comports with the long term goals and 

aims of the United States. And also at the same time, we also need 

to recognize again, we need to find a way to bring India and other 

such nations under a tent, an NPT, a nonproliferation tent. And 

how we go about doing that, I think, will also be, is very much in 

the aim and the goal of our country and, I think, the rest of the 

nuclear powers, as well. So with that I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Schiff of California. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this is probably 

one of the most important issues that our Committee will wrestle 

with. And a number of issues that I would like the Committee to 

try to address or some of the suggestions for congressional action, 

one that was alluded to by my California colleague, Howard Berman, and that is, should we not carve out India, but rather address 

de facto states on a global basis? Second, should we oppose modifying the NPT to increase the number of recognized weapon states 

beyond the original five? Third, should we require the Administration to certify that de facto states are nonproliferating with nuclear 

transfers? Fourth, do we bar subsidies to support nuclear energy 

cooperation with de facto states? Five, do we renounce or require 

states like India to renounce an increase in the size of their nuclear 

weapons arsenal? And six, do we enact as a policy the goal of moving these states into the NPT, a goal of disarmament from a nuclear point of view and movement into the NPT? These are some 

issues that I would love to hear about. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. Ms. Watson 

of California. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. I want to thank the witnesses as well and I want to refer to 

something the Chair has said in the opening statement. And that 

is that we are not sure of the details of the agreement between the 

President and the Prime Minister of India. I would hope that our 

Committee would play a very strong oversight position in watching 

this as it develops. And so I raise a question and I hope the panel 

will respond. And one issue is that this agreement should address 

what steps either country will take and as an example, should 

India accomplish most of all of its obligations to separate its military from civilian nuclear facilities before the United States begins 

to export significant nuclear equipment and materials? Or should 

the U.S. begin exporting some items before completion of this step? 

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Ms. WATSON. These are details that we need to address. Thank 

you. 

9

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman HYDE. Who is seeking recognition? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Ackerman. 

Chairman HYDE. Yes, Mr. Ackerman? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like at this time to respectfully ask the Chair if he would yet again reconsider the policy 

of allowing Members only 1 minute? It is very noticeable that the 

attendance of Members at hearings as important as this is dwindling to the point of lacking. It is very hard to complete a thought. 

Most of us have stopped thanking, as we would like to, the Chair 

and Ranking Member, for calling the hearing because that takes up 

15 percent of our time, taking away from the things that we should 

be saying. 

It is very important to hear the thoughts of the Chairman and 

the Ranking Member. That adds so much to advance public policy, 

but in the interest of math, I point out that the time consuming 

by the Chair and Ranking Member take up 20 percent more of the 

time than all of the Members of the whole entire Committee who 

speak on the issue. And I think that we might benefit greatly by 

at least allowing people to finish. 

Chairman HYDE. Well, I thank the gentleman for his comment. 

I would just state that the practice of giving Members a 1-minute 

opening statement is something we are trying out on a trial basis. 

I find one of the most disappointing aspects of these hearings is the 

imposition on witnesses who must sit and listen to what sometimes 

seem endless speeches from Members. 

I know I never learned anything while I was talking. And I 

would like to have the witnesses testify and I know Members want 

to have something to say, too, and I want them to. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I appreciate the Chair’s comments. I, for one, 

and I am sure I speak for most on the Committee, benefit from listening to the Chair speaking. And I think that perhaps we help to 

educate each other when we do that. An additional 60 seconds, I 

think, would not impose too greatly on the witnesses in any panel. 

Rare exceptions are to be taken into consideration. 

But I think it is important in order for us to have a meaningful 

deliberation of the issues that we be able to express our views in 

a time a little bit more generous than 60 seconds. 

Chairman HYDE. Well, the Chair will take under consideration 

the suggestion of the gentleman. I think we can adapt that time 

schedule, depending on the number of witnesses, the urgency, their 

availability. But I will take it under consideration, Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the Chair for that. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Mr. Burton of Indiana? 

Mr. BURTON. I thank my colleagues for that educational interlude and I want to say to my learned Chairman that I do appreciate his and the Ranking Member’s expertise on these issues. And 

I have listened to them. That is about 15 seconds of my minutes, 

so I better speed it up. 

Let me just say that I will not comment on the hearing today, 

but I would like to say that Prime Minister Singh and President 

Musharaff have taken giant strides, in my opinion, in the last few 

months in bringing about a peaceful solution to a very thorny issue 

over in that part of the world. 

10

And they are to be congratulated again and again for what they 

are doing. And toward that end, I, with the Chairman’s approval 

and the Ranking Member’s approval, we are taking a codel at the 

end of this month of probably 10 or 15 Members of Congress to 

both Dehli and Pakistan to talk to the leaders about this issue, the 

catastrophe that just took place over there and a number of other 

issues. 

So I would just like to say, with all due respect, they are to be 

congratulated for what they doing in spite of a lot of the odds that 

are facing them. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back to the 

house my time. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Dr. Neil Joeck’s extensive experience on nonproliferation issues includes service as Director for 

Counterproliferation Strategy at the National Security Council and 

as a member of the Policy and Planning Staff at the Department 

of State. He is currently a senior fellow at the Center for Global 

Security Research at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

and an adjunct professor of Political Science at the University of 

California, Berkeley. 

Our second witness, Robert J. Einhorn, is a Senior Advisor in the 

CSIS International Security Program, where he works on a broad 

range of nonproliferation arms control and other national security 

issues. Before coming to CSIS, he served in the U.S. Government 

for 29 years, including Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation at 

the Department of State. 

David Albright, a physicist who conducts and publishes scientific 

research, is President of the Institute for Science and International 

Security. Mr. Albright has testified may times on nuclear issues before the Congress and trained many government officials in nonproliferation policy making. 

We also welcome back to the Committee Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. He 

has served in the office of the Secretary of Defense, as a Senate 

aide to Dan Quayle and in several capacities in the private sector. 

Lastly, the Committee will hear from Leonard Spector, who is 

Deputy Director of the Monterey Institute of International Studies 

Center for Nonproliferation Studies and leads the center’s Washington, DC, office. Mr. Spector joined CNS from the U.S. Department of Energy, where he served as Assistant Deputy Administrator for Arms Control and Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration. 

Thank you all for coming today. I ask each of you to provide a 

5-minute summary of your prepared testimony. Your full statement 

will be made a part of the record and so we will start with Dr. 

Joeck. 

STATEMENT OF NEIL JOECK, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER 

FOR GLOBAL SECURITY RESEARCH, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE 

NATIONAL LABORATORY 

Mr. JOECK. Thank you, Chairman Hyde, Congressman Lantos, 

Distinguished Members of the Committee. It is an honor to appear 

before you today to discuss the impact of nonproliferation of the 

United States-India global partnership. As you noted, I am currently a Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Security Research 

11

at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, but none of my 

comments represent the view of the Livermore National Laboratory 

or the U.S. Government. As you requested, I will summarize my 

written testimony, but request that the text be submitted for the 

record. 

I would like to stress three broad points. First, the new bilateral 

agreement with India not only provides long term strategic benefits, but also makes India an active member of the international 

nonproliferation regime. The United States, in my view, should not 

miss this opportunity to work with India toward nonproliferation 

objectives that both sides value and that will enhance international 

security. 

Second, this new agreement does not come at the expense of current nonproliferation efforts. The NPT and the NSG will continue 

to serve as mainstays of global nonproliferation policy. There is no 

question that the new agreement does raise serious questions in 

the minds of many NSG and NPT partners, as it does here in Congress and there is clearly a lot of work to be done to address these 

questions and hopefully allay the attendant concerns. 

Third, nonproliferation has historically adapted to new conditions 

and new opportunities. We should continue to adapt in order to 

achieve the overall goal of nonproliferation policy, a more secure 

world. Regarding the new agreement, this new policy gives the 

United States an additional ally in the international effort to restrict the flow of nuclear technology. One manifestation of India’s 

new approach is its agreement adhere to the NSG and MTCR 

guidelines. As India further develops its advanced technology, insuring that it take part in the international agreements to limit the 

spread of this technology will enhance international security. 

The agreement with India contains a second benefit in that it 

recognizes the value of safeguards and the role of the IAEA in ensuring against diversion of sensitive technology. India has accepted 

this norm by agreeing to separate its civilian and military facilities, 

agreeing to place safeguards on its civilian reactors and accepting 

IAEA monitoring of the civilian facilities. Again, important concerns have been raised about the details of these safeguards and, 

again, there is a lot of hard work to be done as both sides negotiate 

the agreement. But we should not overlook the powerful symbolism 

of the step that India has already taken. 

A long sought item on the international nonproliferation agenda 

has been to end fissile material production worldwide and to sign 

a fissile material control treaty. India’s commitment to work toward this long standing nonproliferation objective represents another key advantage in the new partnership. 

Again, critics have rightfully asked whether the United States 

could have gotten a better deal by insisting that India cap its production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapon purposes? This is a reasonable criticism of any deal, you can always 

hold out for more. 

I would argue that the totality of the new relationship with India 

makes it a deal worth having, rather than risking that it start to 

come apart because of this omission. 

The new agreement with India recognizes that international security is achieved through a layered approach. For years, India has 

12

1The views expressed here are the author’s own; they do not represent either the Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory or the U.S. Government. 

been on the margins of the global nonproliferation regime. Indeed, 

India was a target of certain nonproliferation measures. Despite 

those efforts, Indian leaders concluded that they needed nuclear 

weapons to enhance their national security. 

Like other responsible parties, however, India has now committed itself to stopping proliferation by adopting many of the 

measures that the United States values. The new agreement formalizes a cooperative relationship that will increase international 

security, thus addressing the fundamental goal of U.S. nonproliferation policy. 

Regarding our current nonproliferation efforts, the new policy 

does not require that the U.S. abandon the NPT, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, or any of the effective measures adopted over the 

years to stop proliferation. The NPT remains a powerful, multilateral security device that has enhanced international security. Similarly, the NSG continues to control and monitor the flow of sensitive nuclear technology. This will not change. 

The price to the United States for these changes and the inclusion of India as a member of the nonproliferation community, 

though not of the NPT, appears to be high. Congress must change 

or amend the law, which is no small accommodation. With India 

having now agreed to place safeguards on its civilian program, we 

must consider whether to change the law, thereby taking advantage of India’s new thinking, or maintain the law and leave all of 

India’s nuclear facilities unsafeguarded. Changing or amending the 

law would not mean that we or the rest of the nonproliferation 

community will incautiously transfer sensitive nuclear technology. 

It also would not mean that we or other states will stop working 

to further global nonproliferation objectives. It will not be the death 

knell for the NSG. 

Changing or amending the law would, however, provide an incentive to India not only to adopt valuable nonproliferation objectives 

that we value highly, but also become an active member of the nonproliferation community. Since my time is about to expire, I will 

end my comments at that point. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Joeck follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NEIL JOECK, PH.D.,1 SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR

GLOBAL SECURITY RESEARCH, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY

Chairman Hyde, Congressman Lantos, distinguished members of the committee: 

it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the impact on nonproliferation 

of the U.S.-India global partnership. I am currently a Senior Fellow at the Center 

for Global Security Research at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, but 

none of my comments represent the views of the Livermore National Laboratory or 

the U.S. Government. I will summarize my written testimony but request that the 

text be submitted for the record. 

The United States and India have launched an ambitious new global partnership 

with strategic, economic, and energy dialogues. One component of the energy dialogue would allow the US to transfer nuclear technology to India as India takes a 

number of nonproliferation steps, including measures to safeguard its civilian nuclear infrastructure. The civilian nuclear element of the new partnership requires 

that we keep two balls in the air at the same time. Although we want to expand 

our bilateral relationship with India, we also want to maintain our strong nonproliferation policy. Neither should come at the expense of the other. 

13

This hearing addresses the nonproliferation side of the agreement. In the eyes of 

many nonproliferation specialists, some of whom you are hearing from today, this 

new relationship rewards India for its recalcitrance regarding the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); it undercuts countries that accepted nuclear constraints; 

it compromises longstanding U.S. nonproliferation policy and the global nonproliferation regime. Such concerns are reasonable. They deserve a thoughtful answer before implementing the new policy. 

The history of nonproliferation policy has been one of adaptation and change. Our 

nonproliferation policy goes back to the 1940s with the Baruch Plan and the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan. These early ideas for nuclear technology control met with resistance from the Soviet Union, so we developed the Atoms for Peace approach. If 

the spread of nuclear technology could not be stopped, if bilateral measures were 

unavailable, then international monitoring might be a means of control. This approach did not stop new states from developing weapons, however, so the NPT was 

negotiated, incorporating some of the earlier approaches. India’s nuclear test in 

1974, shortly after the NPT entered into force, made clear that additional layers 

would have to be added to the nonproliferation regime. The Zangger Committee and 

the Nuclear Suppliers Group were formed to restrict nuclear technology before it 

was transferred, rather than just monitoring its use after it was received. Congress 

added a number of elements to the nonproliferation regime by amending the Atomic 

Energy Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, and the amendments as well. The evasive 

actions of North Korea made clear the need for the Additional Protocol. More recently, additional measures have been added such as UNSCR 1540, the Proliferation 

Security Initiative, and President Bush’s enrichment and reprocessing proposals. Although we must continue to implement policies that work, our history shows that 

new contingencies frequently require policy adaptation or change. 

It is necessary to look for new ways to achieve our nonproliferation and security 

objectives: the agreement with India represents such an effort. The new policy does 

not require that we abandon the NPT, the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), or any 

of the effective measures we have adopted over the years to stop proliferation. In 

marking its 35th anniversary, President Bush called the NPT the ‘‘key legal barrier’’ 

to nuclear weapons proliferation. The NPT remains a powerful multilateral security 

device that has enhanced international security. It has not eliminated all insecurities by any means—some states chose not to sign up, some that did have pursued 

nuclear weapons despite their commitments to the contrary, and the context for 

global disarmament remains elusive. So long as international insecurities and security competition persist, therefore, the world must find new ways to address them. 

The new agreement with India recognizes that international security is achieved 

through a layered approach. We have added to our nonproliferation and 

counterproliferation tool kit over the years. The agreement with India, while acknowledging the reality of India’s nuclear weapons program, will supplement global 

efforts to enhance global security. For years, India has been on the margins of the 

global nonproliferation regime. Indeed, India was a target of some of the nonproliferation measures cited above. Despite those efforts, Indian leaders concluded 

that they needed nuclear weapons to enhance India’s security. Like other responsible powers, however, India has now committed itself to stopping proliferation by 

adopting many of the measures that we value. The new agreement formalizes a cooperative relationship that will increase international security, thus addressing the 

fundamental goal of our nonproliferation policy. We have an opportunity to work 

with New Delhi on shared nonproliferation objectives as India takes steps to align 

its nonproliferation posture with prevailing international norms and practices. 

The new relationship with India contains important advantages for international 

nonproliferation efforts. Looked at broadly, we now have an additional ally in the 

international effort to restrict the flow of nuclear technology. One manifestation of 

India’s new approach is its agreement to adhere to the NSG and MTCR guidelines. 

As India further develops its advanced technology, ensuring that it take part in 

international agreements to limit the spread of this technology will enhance international security. The agreement with India contains a second valuable element for 

the nonproliferation regime in that it recognizes the value of safeguards and the role 

of the IAEA in ensuring against diversion of sensitive technology. India has accepted this norm by agreeing to separate its civilian and military facilities, agreeing to 

place safeguards on its civilian reactors, and accepting IAEA monitoring of the civilian facilities. A long-sought item on the international nonproliferation agenda has 

been to end fissile material production worldwide and to sign a Fissile Material 

Control Treaty. India’s commitment to work with us toward this longstanding nonproliferation objective represents another key advantage in the new partnership. 

Taken as a whole, these measures demonstrate India’s endorsement of key nonproliferation objectives. 

14

The price to the United States for these changes and the inclusion of India as a 

member of the nonproliferation community (though not of the NPT) appears to be 

high. Congress must change or amend the law, which is no small accommodation. 

If the law represents fundamental American values or principles, we should not 

seek to change it. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), an amendment 

to the Atomic Energy Act, requires that a state adopt safeguards on its entire nuclear infrastructure before the US will transfer it any sensitive nuclear technology. 

It was adopted to achieve nonproliferation and national security objectives. With 

India having now agreed to place safeguards on its civilian program, we must consider whether to change the law, thereby taking advantage of India’s new thinking, 

or maintain the law and leave all of India’s nuclear facilities unsafeguarded. Changing or amending the law would not mean that we or the rest of the nonproliferation 

community will incautiously transfer sensitive nuclear technology; it also would not 

mean that we or other states will stop working to further global nonproliferation 

objectives; it will not be the death knell for the NSG. Changing or amending the 

law would, however, provide an incentive for India not only to adopt valuable nonproliferation objectives that we value highly, but also become an active member of 

the nonproliferation community. 

Having changed the Atomic Energy Act in 1978 to require full-scope safeguards 

as a condition of nuclear supply, the US in turn pressured the NSG to adopt similar 

standards. The NSG finally did so in 1993; full scope safeguards have been the 

standard for nuclear technology transfer ever since. A number of states that gave 

up nuclear ambitions are now members of the NSG and can be expected to demand 

to know why an exception should be made for India. The answer goes back to the 

goals of the NPT. Nonproliferation is at heart national security policy. Each nation 

that joined either the NPT or the NSG did so as sovereign states making careful 

judgments about how best to ensure their own and international security. Because 

of those decisions, the NPT continues to be the strongest and broadest multilateral 

security treaty in existence; the NSG continues to be a powerful tool for controlling 

the flow of sensitive technology; forgoing nuclear weapons continues to be the wisest 

policy choice for most states to enhance security. The new agreement with India 

does not alter those conclusions. Instead, the new agreement expands the list of 

countries committed to preventing further proliferation, thereby enhancing global 

security. 

To conclude, let me reiterate that U.S. nonproliferation policy has changed over 

the years to meet new challenges to security. The new partnership with India provides an opportunity to increase global security while adapting our nonproliferation 

policy to new conditions. This concludes my testimony; I would now be happy to 

take questions from the committee.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Einhorn? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT J. EINHORN, 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. EINHORN. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Lantos, thank you 

for giving me the opportunity to testify this morning. My guess, 

Mr. Chairman, is that everyone on this panel and probably everyone in your Committee supports a fundamentally improved United 

States-Indian bilateral relationship. At issue is whether we should 

pursue that important goal in a way that undermines another goal 

of equal or perhaps even greater importance—preventing nuclear 

proliferation. The Administration claims that the July 18 joint 

statement is a net nonproliferation gain. I think the deal at least 

as it currently stands is a loss for nonproliferation. 

According to the Administration, a key benefit of the agreement 

is that it brings India into the international nonproliferation mainstream. But India, to its credit, has been moving in that direction 

for quite some time. The commitments made by India on July 18 

add very little. For the most part, they are either reaffirmations of 

existing Indian positions or codification of existing Indian policies 

and practices. The genuinely new element, the pledge to separate 

15

military and civilian nuclear activities and place civilian facilities 

under IAEA safeguards, is largely symbolic. It has no effect on India’s ability to continue producing fissile material for nuclear weapons at facilities not designated as eligible for safeguards. 

In any event, the nonproliferation gains of the joint statement 

are meager compared to the damage to nonproliferation goals that 

would result if the deal goes forward as it currently stands. The 

Bush Administration’s initiatives in the Nuclear Supplies Group to 

tighten export controls would be harder to achieve if at the same 

time we are asking the group to relax its rules to suit the United 

States, because we no longer support the rule. By seeking an exception to the rules to accommodate America’s new friendship with 

India, the deal will make other suppliers less inhibited about engaging in risky nuclear cooperation with their own special friends—

Iran in the case of Russia, Pakistan in the case of China. By sending the signal that the United States will tolerate and eventually 

accommodate a decision to acquire nuclear weapons, it will reduce 

the perceived costs to states that might consider going nuclear in 

the future. 

In the near term, it will make it more difficult to deal with proliferation challenges like Iran. Already the Iranians are asking 

publicly while they, as an NPT party, should give up their right to 

an enrichment capability while India, which rejected the NPT and 

acquired nuclear weapons, is being offered nuclear cooperation. 

This argument wins support for Iran internationally. 

In general, the deal conveys the message that the United States, 

the country the world has always looked to as the leader in the 

fight against proliferation, is now giving nonproliferation a back 

seat to other foreign policy goals. And this will give others a green 

light to assign a higher priority to commercial and political considerations relative to nonproliferation. In my view, the damage, the 

nonproliferation damage likely to result from the deal can be minimized if several improvements are made, either by the United 

States and India acting themselves, by the U.S. Congress, by the 

Nuclear Suppliers Group or by a combination of these. 

I would recommend four improvements. The first and most important would be an Indian decision to stop producing fissile material for nuclear weapons, perhaps as part of a multilateral moratorium. A multilateral production halt would make a major contribution to fighting nuclear terrorism by capping stocks of bomb making materials worldwide and thereby making those stocks easier to 

secure against theft or seizure. 

Without such a production moratorium in place, the United 

States-India deal could actually facilitate an increase in India’s nuclear weapons capability. India’s indigenous uranium supplies are 

quite limited and must now be used to meet their civil and military 

requirements. A newly acquired ability to import uranium for civil 

needs would free up domestic supplies to be used exclusively in the 

weapons program, permitting a substantial build up if the Indian 

Government so decided. 

India has said that it is willing to assume the same responsibilities and practices as the other nuclear powers. It so happens that 

the five original nuclear reference states have all stopped proVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:19 Jun 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\102605\24204.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
16

ducing fissile material for nuclear weapons. India should be asked 

to join them. 

Second, India should be asked to play a more active role in helping the United States address today’s most acute proliferation challenges, especially Iran. India’s yes vote on the recent IAEA board 

resolution that found Iran in noncompliance with its nonproliferation obligations was a welcome step. But since that vote, Indians 

have tried to mollify Iran, saying that they had acted in Iran’s interest by getting the Europeans to back off from pursuing referral 

to the UN Security Council. The key test in the months ahead will 

be whether India makes a sustained and determined effort to persuade Iran to forego its enrichment capability and whether, if it becomes necessary, it votes in favor of a resolution referring the issue 

to the UN Security Council. 

Third, the risks of the nuclear deal could be reduced by preserving a distinction between NPT parties and non parties in terms 

of the nuclear exports they would be permitted to receive. By calling for full nuclear cooperation with India, the deal undermines the 

long standing principle of giving NPT parties benefits in the civil 

nuclear energy area that are unavailable to non parties. We should 

preserve a semblance of that principle by excluding from permissible cooperation with India equipment, materials and technology 

related to enrichment, reprocessing and other sensitive fuel cycle 

facilities. This would permit India to acquire uranium, fuel supplies 

and the nuclear reactors, but it would retain the ban on transfers 

of those items that are most closely related to a nuclear weapons 

program. 

Fourth and finally, I believe nonproliferation risks could be reduced by implementing the nuclear deal in a country neutral matter, not as a special exception to the rules for India alone. A problem with the India only exception is that it accentuates concerns 

that the United States is acting selectively and self-servingly on 

the basis of its own foreign policy calculations, rather than on the 

basis of objective factors related to nonproliferation performance. 

To avoid this pitfall without opening the door to nuclear cooperation in cases where it is not yet merited, modifications should be 

made in U.S. law and in Nuclear Supplies Group guidelines that 

would permit nuclear cooperation with any state not party to the 

NPT that meets certain rigorous requirements of responsible nuclear behavior. My prepared statement outlines what those criteria 

might be. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, taken together, I believe these improvements in the July 18 nuclear deal would transform a net nonproliferation loss into a net nonproliferation gain. They would enable the United States to advance its strategic goals with India as 

well as its nonproliferation interests, not serve one at the expense 

of the other. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Einhorn follows:]

17

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT J. EINHORN, INTERNATIONAL

SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

THE U.S.-INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee on 

the nonproliferation implications of the recent agreement between the United States 

and India on civil nuclear cooperation. 

The United States has an important national interest in strengthening relations 

with India and making it a strategic partner in the 21st century. But efforts to 

strengthen the U.S.-Indian relationship should not be pursued in a way that undermines a U.S. national interest of equal and arguably greater importance—preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That is precisely what the Bush Administration has done in the nuclear deal reached this past summer during Prime 

Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Washington. 

In the Joint Statement released on July 18th, India agreed to take several steps 

to demonstrate its commitment to being a responsible nuclear power and a supporter of nonproliferation goals. In exchange, the U.S. Administration agreed to seek 

changes in U.S. law and multilateral commitments to permit exports of nuclear 

equipment and technology to India—a radical departure from longstanding legal obligations and policies that precluded nuclear cooperation with states not party to the 

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). 

Administration officials have claimed that the deal, by aligning India more closely 

with the policies and practices of the international nonproliferation regime, is a net 

gain for nonproliferation. In his testimony before this Committee on September 8th, 

Under Secretary of State Robert Joseph maintained that ‘‘India’s implementation of 

its agreed commitments will, on balance, enhance our global nonproliferation efforts, 

and we believe the international nuclear nonproliferation regime will emerge stronger as a result.’’ Upon close scrutiny, however, it appears that the nonproliferation 

benefits of the July 18th Joint Statement are rather limited. 

Nonproliferation gains are modest 

Several of the steps pledged by India are simply reaffirmations of existing positions, including India’s commitments to continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, strengthen its national system of export controls, and work 

toward the conclusion of a multilateral fissile material cutoff treaty. In view of unsuccessful efforts for over a decade to get negotiations underway on a fissile material cut-off treaty and no near-term prospect of removing obstacles to beginning negotiations, this last pledge is unlikely in the foreseeable future to have any effect 

on India’s ongoing program to produce more fissile materials for nuclear weapons. 

Other Indian commitments in the Joint Statement break new ground, but their 

actual nonproliferation gain is modest. For example, the pledge to refrain from 

transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to countries that do not already possess them is welcome. But since India—to its credit—has never transferred 

those technologies and has no plans to do so, it will have little practical consequence. Moreover, adherence to the guidelines of the Missile Technical Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is also positive; but it is a step New 

Delhi was already planning to take before the July 18th Joint Statement as part 

of a U.S.-Indian dialogue on technology transfer and export control called ‘‘Next 

Steps in the Strategic Partnership.’’

The commitment that has drawn the most criticism within India is the pledge to 

separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and place civilian facilities voluntarily under IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol. Indian critics claim that, 

because of the co-location of civilian and military activities at a number of Indian 

nuclear facilities, implementation of the commitment could be expensive and timeconsuming and could impose unwarranted constraints on military programs. In response to these concerns, Indian officials have stressed that India alone will decide 

which facilities are subject to safeguards and have suggested that only a relatively 

small number will be put on the civilian list. While recognizing that the designation 

of civilian facilities (i.e., those eligible for safeguards) is an Indian prerogative, U.S. 

officials have made clear that, to be credible, any list should be complete. 

However, regardless of how inclusive or selective the list turns out to be, the nonproliferation value of India’s commitment to place certain nuclear facilities under 

IAEA safeguards will be rather limited. The purpose of IAEA safeguards for nonnuclear weapon states party to the NPT is to verify that no nuclear materials are 

diverted to a nuclear weapons program. But as long as India continues to produce 

fissile materials for nuclear weapons (at facilities not included on the safeguards 

list), its willingness to apply safeguards to facilities designated as civilian serves 

primarily a symbolic function—to reduce the perceived discrimination between counVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:19 Jun 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\102605\24204.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
18

tries that are obliged to accept safeguards on all their facilities and those that are 

not. 

Beyond this symbolic value, willingness to put civilian facilities under safeguards 

also serves a more practical function. If members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 

change their rules and permit nuclear cooperation with India, they will presumably 

confine such cooperation to safeguarded facilities in India. (NPT Article III(2) 

obliges them to engage in nuclear cooperation only with safeguarded facilities in 

non-weapon states. Since the Bush Administration is not seeking to give India nuclear weapon state status under the NPT, III(2) will continue to apply to India.) The 

list of safeguarded Indian facilities will therefore serve to define the scope of permissible nuclear cooperation. For India, the trade-off will be between broadening the 

list (to expand opportunities for cooperation) and narrowing the list (to shield facilities from international scrutiny). However it chooses, the fundamental shortcoming 

of India’s July 18th safeguards commitment remains—it has no effect on India’s 

ability to continue producing fissile material for nuclear weapons at facilities not 

designated as eligible for safeguards. 

Downsides of the deal 

Administration officials are right that the various pledges contained in the Joint 

Statement move India closer, both in rhetorical and practical terms, to the international nonproliferation mainstream it has shunned for over 30 years. Still, the 

nonproliferation gains of the U.S.-India nuclear deal are meager compared to the 

major damage to nonproliferation goals that would result if the deal goes forward 

as it currently stands. 

The U.S.-India deal would make it harder to achieve key Bush Administration 

nonproliferation initiatives. The U.S. is now asking the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers 

Group to permit nuclear cooperation only with countries that adhere to the IAEA’s 

Additional Protocol and to ban transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not already possess fuel-cycle facilities. But getting NSG 

partners to tighten the rules in ways favored by the U.S. will be an uphill battle 

if they are also being asked to bend one of their cardinal rules (i.e., no nuclear trade 

with non-parties to the NPT) because it no longer suits the U.S. 

By seeking an exception to the rules to accommodate America’s new special 

friendship with India, the deal would reinforce the impression internationally that 

the U.S. approach to nonproliferation has become selective and self-serving, not consistent and principled. Rules the U.S. initiated and championed would be perceived 

as less binding, more optional. Russia and China would feel less inhibited about engaging in nuclear cooperation that the U.S. might find risky and objectionable with 

special friends of their own—Iran and Pakistan, respectively. 

The nuclear deal in its present form has produced resentment on the part of close 

U.S. friends like Japan, Germany, and Brazil who were forced to choose between 

nuclear weapons and civil nuclear cooperation. They chose the latter, giving up the 

weapons option and joining the NPT to realize the benefits of nuclear cooperation. 

Now that India has been offered the opportunity to have its cake and eat it too, 

many non-nuclear NPT parties feel let down. Not wishing to harm relations with 

either India or the United States, they are unlikely to make a public fuss over the 

sudden reversal of U.S. policy (on which they were not consulted). But they will be 

less inclined in the future to make additional sacrifices in the name of nonproliferation. 

The U.S.-India deal could also reduce the perceived costs to states that might consider ‘‘going nuclear’’ in the future. In calculating whether to pursue nuclear weapons, a major factor for most countries will be how the U.S. is likely to react. Implementation of the deal would inevitably send the signal, especially to countries with 

good relations with Washington, that the U.S. will tolerate and eventually accommodate to a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. 

In the near term, U.S. plans to engage in nuclear cooperation with India will 

make it more difficult to address proliferation challenges such as Iran. Of course, 

Iran’s interest in nuclear weapons long pre-dated the India deal. But the deal has 

strengthened the case Iran can make—and is already making—internationally. 

Why, Iranian officials ask publicly, should Iran give up its right as an NPT party 

to an enrichment capability when India, a non-party to the NPT, can keep even its 

nuclear weapons and still benefit from nuclear cooperation? It is an argument that 

resonates well with many countries and weakens the pressures that can be brought 

to bear on Tehran. 

In general, the Bush Administration’s policy shift conveys the message that the 

United States—the country the world has always looked to as the leader in the global fight against proliferation—is now de-emphasizing nonproliferation and giving it 

a back seat to other foreign policy goals. Other countries can be expected to follow 

19

suit in assigning nonproliferation a lower priority relative to political and commercial considerations in their international dealings, and this would have negative, 

long-term consequences for the global nonproliferation regime. 

Making the deal a nonproliferation gain 

The damage can be minimized—and the deal transformed from a net nonproliferation loss to a net nonproliferation gain—if several improvements are made in the 

course of implementing the July 18th Joint Statement, either by the governments 

of India and the U.S. themselves, by the U.S. Congress in adopting new legislation, 

by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in modifying its guidelines, or by a combination of 

these. 

The most important improvement would be an Indian decision to stop producing 

fissile materials for nuclear weapons. India need not stop such production unilaterally, but as part of a multilateral moratorium pending completion of an international fissile material cutoff treaty. A multilateral production halt would make a 

major contribution to fighting nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism by capping stocks of bomb-making materials worldwide and thereby making those stocks 

easier to secure against theft or seizure—in India, Pakistan, or elsewhere. 

Without a moratorium on fissile material production, the U.S.-India deal could actually facilitate the growth of India’s nuclear weapons capability. India’s indigenous 

uranium supplies are quite limited. Under current nonproliferation rules—with 

India unable to buy natural uranium on the world market—India must use those 

limited supplies for both civil power generation and nuclear weapons, and the tradeoff will become increasingly painful. Under new rules, India could satisfy the needs 

of the civil program through imports, freeing up domestic uranium supplies for the 

weapons program and permitting, if the Indian government so decided, a continuing 

and even major increase in bomb-making material. A production moratorium would 

preclude such an increase. 

Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said in July that India ‘‘is willing to assume the same responsibilities and practices—no more and no less—as other nuclear states.’’ It so happens that the five original nuclear weapon states (U.S., Russia, France, U.K., China) have all stopped producing fissile materials for nuclear 

weapons. Applying the ‘‘no more, no less’’ standard, it would be reasonable to ask 

India to join the others. India claims that it does not have a strategic requirement 

for parity with the other nuclear powers (including China) and that it seeks only 

a ‘‘credible minimum deterrent capability.’’ If that is the case, then perhaps it can 

soon decide that it has sufficient plutonium for its deterrence needs and can afford 

to forgo further production. 

Another way to strengthen the July 18th agreement would be for India to assume 

a more active and constructive role in helping the United States address today’s 

most acute proliferation challenges, especially the challenge posed by Iran. Given 

its desire to make Iran a long-term source of energy supplies, India has been reluctant to press Iran on its nuclear program. During a September visit to Tehran, Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh made public remarks supportive of Iran’s position on the nuclear issue and critical of the approach taken by the United States. 

The remarks produced a sharp backlash by Members of Congress across the political 

spectrum, including several strong supporters of India, who made clear that India’s 

failure to side with the U.S. on the Iran nuclear issue would jeopardize Congressional support for the legislative changes needed to implement the U.S.-India nuclear deal. 

In response to these Congressional warnings and tough messages conveyed in person by President Bush and Secretary Rice to their Indian counterparts, the Indians 

on September 24th joined the U.S. and Europeans in voting yes on an International 

Atomic Energy Agency Board resolution finding Iran in noncompliance with its nonproliferation obligations but deferring the matter of when and how the Iran question 

would be referred to the United Nations Security Council. This was a positive step 

but not yet an indication that India is prepared to use its influence in a sustained 

and determined way to get Iran to abandon its plans for an enrichment facility capable of producing both fuel for civil nuclear reactors and fissile material for nuclear 

bombs. Indeed, since the IAEA vote, the Indians have sought to mollify the Iranians, stating that they had acted in Iran’s interest by persuading the Europeans 

to back down from seeking an immediate referral to the UNSC. The key test in the 

months ahead will be whether India makes a real effort to persuade Iran to forgo 

an enrichment capability and whether it eventually supports referral to the Council, 

which is required by the IAEA Statute after a Board finding of noncompliance. 

The risks of the nuclear deal could also be reduced by preserving some distinction 

between NPT parties and non-parties in terms of the nuclear exports they would 

be permitted to receive. A long-standing element of the nonproliferation regime has 

20

been the ‘‘NPT preference policy’’—giving NPT parties benefits in the civil nuclear 

energy area not available to those outside the NPT. The Joint Statement undermines that policy by calling for ‘‘full’’ nuclear cooperation with India. A way of maintaining some preferential treatment for NPT parties would be to modify U.S. law 

and the NSG guidelines to permit nuclear-related exports to non-parties except

equipment, materials, or technologies related to sensitive fuel-cycle facilities, including enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production. Such a distinction would 

permit India to acquire natural uranium, enriched fuel, nuclear reactors, and a wide 

range of other nuclear items, but would retain the ban on transfers of those items 

that are most closely related to a nuclear weapons program. 

In addition to precluding any cooperation with India in the area of sensitive fuelcycle capabilities (even under IAEA safeguards), the U.S. should permit cooperation 

in less sensitive nuclear areas only under safeguards. As noted earlier, India will 

remain a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS) as defined by the NPT, and Article 

III(2) allows nuclear exports to NNWSs only under IAEA safeguards. Moreover, consistent with existing U.S. law, such exports should only be permitted to facilities 

that are under safeguards in perpetuity (under facility-specific, or INFCIRC/Rev.2, 

safeguards agreements with the IAEA)—not to facilities under voluntary safeguards 

arrangements that allow countries to withdraw materials or facilities from safeguards for national security reasons. The choice would be up to India. If it wished 

to benefit from nuclear cooperation at a particular facility, it would have to put in 

place a facility-specific safeguards agreement at that facility. 

Nonproliferation risks could also be reduced by implementing the nuclear deal in 

a country-neutral manner—not as a special exception to the rules for India alone. 

Although the Administration has been slow to indicate how specifically it would 

seek to adjust U.S. law and NSG guidelines, it has suggested that one option would 

be to leave the general rules in place but waive their application in the special case 

of India because of its qualifications as ‘‘a responsible state with advanced nuclear 

technology.’’ A problem with that option is that it would accentuate concerns that 

the U.S. is acting selectively on the basis of foreign policy considerations rather than 

on the basis of objective factors related to nonproliferation performance. Moreover, 

in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, where changing the guidelines requires a consensus, some countries—notably China—might well resist a country-specific approach and press for permitting nuclear cooperation with other non-parties to the 

NPT with whom they are friendly (e.g., Pakistan). 

To avoid the pitfalls of making a country-specific exception without opening the 

door to nuclear cooperation in cases where it is clearly not yet merited, the Administration should propose modifications of U.S. law and the NSG guidelines that would 

permit nuclear cooperation (except in sensitive parts of the fuel cycle or in 

unsafeguarded facilities) with any state not party to the NPT that meets certain criteria of responsible nuclear behavior. To avoid creating an incentive for countries 

to withdraw from the NPT, the modified rules should apply only to countries that 

were outside the NPT as of a specified date, which should be chosen to exclude 

North Korea and include only India, Pakistan, and Israel. For such non-NPT states 

to be eligible to receive U.S. nuclear exports under a revised U.S. law, the President 

should be required to certify that the state:

• has provided public assurances that it will not test nuclear weapons;

• has provided public assurances that it will not produce fissile materials for 

nuclear weapons and is fulfilling that assurance;

• has placed under IAEA safeguards its civil nuclear facilities, including all nuclear power reactors and R&D facilities related to electricity generation;

• is playing an active and constructive role in helping address acute nuclear 

proliferation challenges posed by states of proliferation concern;

• has established, and is rigorously implementing, a national export control system that meets the highest international standards, including stringent rules 

and procedures banning unauthorized contacts and cooperation by personnel 

with nuclear expertise;

• has provided public assurances that it will not export enrichment or reprocessing equipment or technologies and is fulfilling that assurance;

• is working actively on its own and in cooperation with other countries in stopping illicit nuclear transactions and eliminating illicit nuclear commercial 

networks, including by fully sharing the results of any investigations of illicit 

nuclear activities; and

• is applying physical protection, control, and accountancy measures meeting 

the highest international standards to any nuclear weapons and to all senVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:19 Jun 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\102605\24204.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
21

sitive nuclear materials and installations, both military and civilian, on its 

territory.

These criteria could be written into U.S. law. They could also be adopted by the 

NSG as criteria for deciding, by consensus, whether a particular non-party to the 

NPT should be eligible for nuclear transfers from NSG member states. While such 

an approach would be country-neutral, it would enable both the U.S. Government 

and NSG members to distinguish among the non-parties to the NPT in terms of 

whether—and how soon—they would be eligible for nuclear cooperation. 

Staunch supporters of the NPT can be expected to argue that these criteria do 

not go far enough—and that only NPT adherence should make a country eligible 

for nuclear cooperation. But it is unrealistic to expect India or the other non-parties 

ever to join the NPT, and continuing to insist on adherence as a condition for nuclear cooperation could forfeit the contribution to nonproliferation that steps short 

of NPT adherence could make. 

Those who strongly favor the July 18th Joint Statement can be expected to argue 

that the criteria are too demanding and could result in India’s walking away from 

the nuclear deal. But even the most demanding criterion—ending fissile material 

production—is a step India, in principle, supports and says it is willing to take when 

its minimum deterrence needs are satisfied. If India is prepared now to stop production, it could readily meet the remaining criteria. If not, the door would be open for 

India to walk through at a time of its own choosing. 

The approach suggested here would clearly be less attractive to the Indians than 

the less demanding one that Bush Administration was prepared to settle for on July 

18th. But it would be a major change from the status quo that has prevailed for 

decades, in which the door to nuclear cooperation for India and the other non-parties has been locked as a matter of law and policy. 

In its ardent desire to transform U.S.-Indian relations, the Bush Administration 

has given too little weight to the damaging implications of its actions for the nonproliferation regime. The remedy should not be to reject the deal struck in July but 

to require that it be pursued in a way that enables the U.S. to advance its strategic 

goals with India as well as its nonproliferation interests—not serve one at the expense of the other.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Mr. Albright? 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID ALBRIGHT, PRESIDENT, 

INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman and Congressman Lantos and 

Members of the Committee, it is an honor to testify today and I 

thank you for the invitation. At the heart of the nuclear components of the United States-Indian agreement is an Indian commitment to separate its civil and military nuclear programs. However, 

attempts to separate military and civil nuclear programs in the five 

acknowledged nuclear weapons states have been fraught with difficulty. In practice, the effective meaningful separation of these 

programs has required additional steps that are largely absent 

from the U.S.-India agreement. I would like to discuss several conditions currently absent from this agreement that are needed to insure that a real barrier exists between military and civil nuclear 

programs. Without these measures, it will be difficult to have confidence that the agreement will not cause serious damage to nonproliferation. 

The first one is one Bob just mentioned, although I would say it 

a little more starkly. India should simply unilaterally cut off production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. All other acknowledged nuclear states have done that. India already has enough 

fissile material for its defense needs and does not need to produce 

more. We estimate it can make approximately 80 nuclear weapons 

from the material it has already produced. 

A cap on production would help convince the United States and 

other countries that India has indeed adopted the global standards 

22

of the international nonproliferation regime. To make this step 

more politically appealing, India should then call upon Pakistan to 

halt such production itself and negotiate at least a bilateral, 

verifiable halt in production. Without India halting production of 

fissile material for its nuclear weapons programs, nuclear weapons, 

particularly any in the areas involving the fuel cycle, would likely 

spill over into India’s nuclear weapons programs. 

Nuclear assistance to India should also be predicated upon India 

developing an adequate nuclear national export control system, 

fully consistent with international export control systems and mature national export control systems. Although India is developing 

export control laws and regulations, its current system lacks adequate enforcement and cannot stop the leakage of dangerous and 

nuclear related items. If India receives more nuclear and dual-use 

items, it can be expected, based on past experience, to increase its 

ability to sell similar items to others. It may inadvertently become 

a valuable source for proliferant states seeking nuclear weapons. 

Several countries including Iran, North Korea and perhaps, ironically, Pakistan would be expected to seek such items illicitly in 

India. 

Compounding the development of effective export controls, India 

has a long history of illicitly acquiring items for its unsafeguarded 

nuclear facilities. India’s elicit efforts are not as extensive as Pakistan’s. Nonetheless, India’s nuclear programs seek a variety of nuclear dual-use items from overseas suppliers without revealing 

fully and honestly that the end users are unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. In essence, India has created a system giving suppliers 

plausible deniability. For India to become a responsible member of 

the international community, it must stop any illegal or questionable overseas procurement. The Indian Government also needs to 

commit to instill a more responsible culture within the nuclear establishment and associated industries to reduce the chance of illicit 

nuclear trade. 

United States and Indian officials have stated that all civil nuclear facilities would be safeguarded by the International Atomic 

Energy Agency and I commend them for that. A reasonable expectation is that India would also commit not to use these facilities for 

nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive purposes. The agreement, 

however, does not contain such an explicit commitment. Congress 

should insist upon such a commitment from India. In addition, the 

United States should insist that the IAEA safeguards applied to 

India are consistent with the application and intention of safeguards in non-nuclear weapons states. The safeguards in India 

should not undercut or weaken the effectiveness of safeguards in 

non-nuclear weapon states. One implication of this is that more facilities in India need to be safeguarded, particularly reprocessing 

and uranium enrichment facilities. I talk more about that point in 

my testimony. 

However, India does have a large civil nuclear program and it 

will require extensive IAEA resources to safeguard. And if this deal 

is going to go forward, the IAEA should not have to fund the safeguards in India from its normal safeguards budget, which is already stretched too thin. India should provide the extra funding, 

23

perhaps with the United States, necessary to safeguard its civil facilities. 

Unfortunately, the remedies discussed above and by others may 

not be sufficient to provide the United States a net benefit from the 

nuclear rated portion of this agreement. I would like to join the 

voices of others, particularly the Chairman, that Congress needs to 

answer the many troubling questions raised by this deal before it 

considers changing long-standing, nonproliferation laws which, as 

Bob has stated, we are the leader. And if we pull our finger out 

of the dike, we do not know what is going to happen. 

Certainly Congress should resist any attempt by the Administration to seek changes in law quickly or without proper congressional 

and public oversight. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID ALBRIGHT, PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE

AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

The agreement announced on July 18, 2005 by President George Bush and Prime 

Minister Manmohan Singh regarding the establishment of a ‘‘global partnership’’ 

aims to profoundly alter long-standing US non-proliferation laws and policies and 

dramatically increase nuclear commerce with India. Based on discussions with both 

US and Indian government officials, the agreement was negotiated quickly with little analysis of the implications for international nonproliferation measures that the 

United States historically has helped develop and strengthen, including the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), US and international export control policies, and 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. 

This agreement could pose serious risks to the security of the United States. If 

fully implemented, it could catapult India into a position as a major supplier of both 

nuclear and nuclear-related materials, equipment, and technology. With a weak and 

poorly enforced export control system, Indian companies could become major suppliers to the nuclear weapon programs of adversaries of the United States, in some 

cases possibly using technology which the United Sates originally provided. The 

United States may have already signaled to supplier nations previously constrained 

by US leadership that nuclear trade with their ‘‘friends’’ is permissible. This agreement may lead other major suppliers, such as Russia and China, to seek their own 

exceptions to long-standing non-proliferation rules. In addition, this agreement has 

diminished the value of the NPT and sent dangerous signals to Iran and North 

Korea. 

Congress should conduct a thorough, public assessment of the costs and benefits 

of this agreement before modifying any US non-proliferation laws. It should also 

carefully monitor the actions of other supplier nations that may view this agreement 

as a long desired green light to weaken their own controls on the transfer of nuclear 

and nuclear-related equipment, materials, and technology to India and other nations, some of which are hostile to the United States. 

At the heart of this agreement is an Indian commitment to separate its civil and 

military nuclear programs. The implication is that after such a separation, international civil nuclear commerce could proceed with India and would be prevented 

from spreading to the military sector. However, attempts to separate military and 

civil nuclear programs in the five internationally acknowledged nuclear weapon 

states, as defined by the NPT, have been fraught with difficulty. In practice, the 

effective separation of military and civil nuclear programs has required additional 

steps that are largely absent from the US/India agreement. 

Based on experiences in other states, several conditions currently absent from the 

agreement are needed to ensure that a real barrier exists between military and civil 

nuclear programs. Without these measures, it will be difficult to have confidence 

that the agreement will not cause serious damage to nonproliferation. 

Unilaterally Ending Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons 

India should end its production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear 

explosive purposes, as has been done voluntarily and unilaterally by the five official 

nuclear weapon states. This step has been announced by the United States, United 

Kingdom, Russia, and France, and is understood to have been taken by China. India 

already has enough fissile material for its defense needs and does not need to 

produce more. A cap on production would help convince the United States and other 

24

countries that India has indeed adapted the global standards of the international 

non-proliferation regime. 

To make this step more politically appealing, India should then call upon Pakistan to halt such production and negotiate a bilateral, verifiable halt to production. 

The current commitment by India to work toward a universal FMCT is not sufficient as it is unlikely to be completed on a schedule consistent with the announced 

implementation goal for the US-India deal. Without India halting production of 

fissile material for its nuclear weapons programs, nuclear assistance, particularly 

any in the areas involving the fuel cycle, would likely spill over to India’s nuclear 

weapons programs. 

Implementing an Adequate Export Control System 

Nuclear assistance to India should be predicated upon India developing an adequate national export control system fully consistent with the international export 

control system and mature national export control systems. Although India is developing export control laws and regulations, its current system lacks adequate enforcement and cannot stop the leakage of dangerous nuclear and nuclear-related 

items. Leakage could become an even greater problem if expanded international nuclear commerce allowed Indian companies to develop and sell more sophisticated 

and dangerous items. 

If India receives more nuclear and dual-use items, it can be expected, based on 

past experience, to increase its ability to sell similar items to others. It may inadvertently become a valuable source for proliferant states seeking nuclear weapons. 

Several countries, including Iran, North Korea, and perhaps Pakistan, would be expected to seek such items illicitly in India with its weakly enforced export control 

laws. As was learned following the revelations about the Khan network, newer nuclear suppliers group (NSG) members supposedly in good standing were no match 

for determined proliferators. Helping ramp up India’s ability to import and export 

nuclear dual-use items without an adequate nationals export control system is not 

in the interests of the United States or the non-proliferation regime. 

Compounding the development of effective export controls, India has a long history of illicitly acquiring items for its own unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Many 

of India’s nuclear programs have depended on extensive foreign procurement for materials, equipment, and technology. Indian nuclear organizations use a system that 

hires domestic or foreign non-nuclear companies to acquire items for these nuclear 

organizations. Such procurement appears to continue for its secret gas centrifuge 

enrichment plant near Mysore. In an attempt to hide its true purpose from suppliers and others when it started this project in the 1980s, India called the facility 

the Rare Materials Plant (RMP) and placed it under Indian Rare Earths (IRE) Ltd, 

an Indian Department of Atomic Energy company focused on mining and refining 

of minerals. Since the mid-1980s, IRE has served as a management company for 

RMP and appears to be the declared end-user of its procurements of centrifuge-related equipment and materials. 

India’s illicit efforts are not as extensive as Pakistan’s efforts, which involve wellcoordinated national organizations aimed at acquiring a wide range of items while 

systematically disguising the true end use of the items. Nonetheless, Indian nuclear 

programs seek a variety of nuclear dual-use items from overseas suppliers without 

revealing fully and honestly that the end users are unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. 

In essence, India has created a system giving suppliers plausible deniability. If the 

supplier does not actively work to determine the end-user, then it would not know 

that the item was going to a nuclear facility or program. 

For India to become a responsible member of the international community, it 

must stop any illegal or questionable overseas procurement. The Indian government 

also needs to commit to instill a more responsible culture within the nuclear establishment and associated industries to reduce the chance of illicit nuclear trade. 

Safeguarding India’s Civil Nuclear Facilities 

US and Indian officials have stated that all civil nuclear facilities would be safeguarded by the IAEA. A reasonable expectation is that India would also commit not 

to use these facilities for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive purposes. The agreement, however, does not contain such an explicit commitment. Congress should insist upon such a commitment from India. 

India may want similar considerations as the five nuclear weapon states. These 

states accept IAEA safeguards voluntarily, but in general offer no commitments not 

to use such facilities for nuclear weapons purposes. Granting India the same safeguards conditions as the nuclear weapon states would make this agreement worthless. 

25

In addition, the United States should insist that IAEA safeguards applied in India 

are consistent with the application and intention of safeguards in non-nuclear weapon states. The safeguards should not only verify an Indian commitment not to use 

these facilities and contained items for nuclear weapons purposes, but they should 

not undercut or weaken the effectiveness of safeguards in non-nuclear weapon 

states. 

Toward this goal, the US should insist that the RMP, India’s main uranium enrichment plant, should be placed under safeguards and committed to non-nuclear 

explosive purposes. Based on open sources, this facility appears to be dedicated 

mainly to producing highly enriched uranium for naval reactors, including a prototype land reactor and planned submarine reactors. Exempting the RMP facility from 

safeguards could undermine efforts to safeguard such facilities in non-nuclear weapon states. Brazil accepted safeguards on its enrichment plants at Aramar dedicated 

to the production of naval reactor fuel. Safeguards applied in India should be consistent with the IAEA’s approach in Brazil. 

Because India has a large nuclear program and many facilities not designed for 

the application of safeguards, applying safeguards in India would require extensive 

IAEA resources. The IAEA should not have to fund safeguards in India from its normal safeguards budget, which is already stretched too thin. India should provide the 

extra funding necessary to safeguard its civil facilities. 

As a cost-saving measure, the focus of safeguards should be Indian reprocessing 

and uranium enrichment facilities, the main facilities able to produce weapons-usable nuclear material. In addition to the RMP enrichment plant, India has at least 

two reprocessing facilities that would be expected to be listed as civil sites, one at 

Tarapur and the other at Kalpakkam. 

Policing the Barrier Separating Civil and Military Nuclear Programs 

India’s extensive military and civil nuclear programs are often connected, sharing 

personnel and infrastructure. In addition, some facilities currently have both a military and civilian purpose. 

Even in the best of circumstances, the barrier between a military and civilian program can be porous. With increased nuclear assistance, India’s military nuclear facilities could more easily acquire dual-use items through reverse engineering of 

items received at civil facilities or through other types of manipulation of export 

control laws. Expertise gained in a more advanced civil program could be easily 

transferred to a weapons program. 

To combat such transfers, India needs to create domestic legislation banning the 

transfer of materials, equipment, and technology from its civil to military programs. 

Limiting Dual-Use Exports to India 

Because India will continue to operate a nuclear weapons program, the United 

States and other major suppliers will need to continue prohibiting exports to certain 

Indian facilities. It would be irresponsible to provide Indian nuclear weapons facilities with dual-use items that enable India to make more sophisticated nuclear weapons. As a result, members of the NSG will need India to provide assurances that 

it will not try to obtain items for its nuclear weapons facilities from abroad. In addition, these suppliers will need a complete list of facilities involved in India’s nuclear 

weapons program. 

Conclusion 

Unfortunately, the remedies discussed above and by others may not be sufficient 

to provide the United States a net benefit from the nuclear-related portions of this 

agreement. Congress needs to answer the many troubling questions raised by this 

deal before it considers changing long-standing non-proliferation laws. At least, Congress should slow down any attempt by the administration to seek changes in law 

quickly or without proper Congressional and public oversight. 

In addition, Congress may need to start worrying about the long term damage already done to the nuclear non-proliferation regime since this agreement was announced. It should carefully monitor the actions of other supplier nations that may 

view this agreement as signaling a US acceptance of weakened controls on the 

transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related equipment, materials, and technology to 

India and other nations, some of which are hostile to the United States.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Albright. Mr. Sokolski? 

STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY SOKOLSKI, EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Mr. Chairman, I understand you are a Cubs fan? 

26

Chairman HYDE. Currently, I am flip-flopping. I am a Sox fan 

today. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. I can tell you, as a University of Chicago graduate 

student, I spent many, many hours learning in the bleachers and 

I can just say, it is good to see you are coming around. 

Chairman HYDE. I remember when it was 50 cents to sit in the 

bleachers. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Well, I am not quite that old, but it was $1.50. 

Chairman HYDE. Back in the days of Queen Victoria. [Laughter.] 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. In any case, by the way, I think Congress should 

look at the White Sox and think long and hard about how incapable they are of having an impact on important things like this deal. 

You do make a difference, you should know that and you should 

be much more vocal than you have been about what is coming 

down the pike. I just think you need to start speaking up. I will 

come back to that in my testimony. 

I would ask for the forbearance of the Committee that I could 

place three items in the record. One is a study that my center is 

releasing today and I will speak to briefly. It is about the Indian 

ICBM program by Dr. Richard Speier, who used to work for me in 

the Department of Defense. And the other is a matching set of view 

graphs which give pictures to the words that are in the testimony 

and numbers, which are useful to think about when you are talking 

about nuclear weapons and space launch vehicles. 

My general recommendation to you today is that Congress should 

authorize nuclear cooperation with India, but only after New Delhi 

commits to the restrictions that other responsible, advanced nuclear states have done themselves. Congress should do this by 

amending the Atomic Energy Act to allow U.S. nuclear cooperation 

with non-NPT states if, and only if, they meet five minimal conditions. First, they must foreswear producing fissile materials for 

military purposes and, if they have a nuclear arsenal, forswear increasing the net number of nuclear weapons in their arsenal. Such 

states would also have to pledge eventually to dismantle their nuclear arsenals as have all other NPT weapon states, that is, the 

United States, that is China, that is Russia, France and the U.K. 

We are essentially saying, yeah, you have to meet those standards, 

the ones we meet. 

Second, they must identify all reactors supplying electricity, all 

research reactors claimed to be for peaceful purposes, all spent fuel 

that these reactors have produced and all fuel making plants supplying these reactors as being civilian and, therefore, subject to 

routine, compulsory international inspections. 

Third, they must uphold all previous bilateral nuclear nonproliferation obligations they might have had with the U.S. and 

other countries. 

Fourth, they must publicly adopt the principals of the Proliferation Security Initiative and finally, they must be free of any U.S. 

nuclear or nuclear capable missile sanctions for at least 2 years 

and have cleared up any outstanding sanctionable actions before 

U.S. cooperation is formalized. I will not get into it, but no one 

should be voting on anything until they get a briefing from the intelligence community on what India is doing. It is my understanding, without getting into classified information, that you will 

27

not have a briefing that consists of nothing. It will be a very interesting briefing, I can assure you, and you need to get it. There are 

actions insured that may be still actionable and pending with regard to U.S. laws, which you need to investigate. 

Those in a hurry to seal the nuclear and space deals with India 

will object to these conditions, but insisting on them is both necessary and consistent with the agreement reached July 18. After 

all, both the United States and India agree that the United States 

would not regard India as a nuclear weapons state under the NPT 

and you heard Mr. Joseph say that September 8. As such, the 

IAEA inspections India will to allow of its civilian nuclear facilities 

can be much tighter, and ought to be much tighter, than the voluntary spot checks done of Russia, the United States, China, 

France and the U.K. Also, at the time both United States and Indian officials agreed that India would assume those restraints that 

advanced responsible nuclear states already had. Among the most 

important of these is foreswearing the expansion of ones nuclear 

arsenal, by renouncing the further production of fissile material for 

military purposes and capping the net number of military weapons 

one has. 

Under these conditions, one could possess nuclear weapons, modernize them, or dismantle them, as the United States, Russia, U.K. 

and France have all done; but that would be it. It should be noted 

that demanding these conditions is more than merely desirable. 

They must all be met. These are minimal criteria if the deal’s backers claim that these deals with space and nuclear cooperation are 

really going to enhance the case of global nonproliferation. In this 

regard, I want to associate myself with the comments made by everyone previously. 

The United States and allied efforts, after all, that curb proliferation in Iraq, Iran and North Korea, have actually depended on having these rules. We use them for justifying our tough stand against 

these countries. The NPT bargain of giving up nuclear weapons to 

secure international civilian nuclear cooperation has also been critical to securing Libya’s voluntary agreement to give up its nuclear 

activities in South Africa’s and the Ukraine’s surrender of their 

arms. They did it, they claim, not because of U.S. pressure, but because they had signed the NPT and they were going to be compliant with it. 

In the Indian case, things are different. We will allow it to hold 

onto its nuclear weapons, but the whole world is watching as to 

what the conditions will be. The United States and its allies certainly have an interest in making India behave more like the U.K. 

and Japan than it does having it behave like China or Iran. 

More than a few of the deal’s backers, of course, believe that to 

enhance United States security against a hostile China, we should 

not press these points too hard. They are even willing to let the 

United States indirectly help India build more nuclear weapons. In 

this view graph submission to the Committee, you will see that the 

numbers are quite significant. Twelve uranium bombs or 75 plutonium bombs a year could be displaced by us just sending lightly enriched uranium to cover the Tarapur reactor’s requirements. That 

is not nothing, that is significant. 

28

They recognize that United States enriched reactor fuel sales will 

free up India’s uninspected nuclear plants to focus entirely on making bombs. Some openly argue that this is necessary. They also 

seem unconcerned that United States space launch cooperation 

might directly help India build its first ICBM. This study that I am 

releasing today details their ICBM program, which is not required 

to hit any targets in China. They already have a rocket that they 

are working on to cover those targets. The ICBM, when it was last 

justified by Indian officials, was claimed to be targeted against Europe and the United States. We need to pay attention to this. 

The indifference or realism of the deal’s backers, I think, reflects 

unwarranted defeatism. Certainly the last thing in anyone’s security interest is to help India compete against China with nuclear 

arms. China has five to ten times the number of deployed nuclear 

weapons as India and hundreds more advanced medium and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Although China no longer makes 

fissile material for weapons, it has stockpiled thousands of additional weapons’ worth of highly enriched uranium and separated 

plutonium. It has shied from converting this material into bombs 

for fear of sparking a rivalry with Japan, who could also go nuclear 

by bolting the NPT and militarizing its own massive stockpile of 

separated plutonium. To be sure, the current Indian Government 

is not interested in dramatically ramping up Indian nuclear weapons or ICBM production, but its opponents clearly are. And if you 

read the Indian press, it is quite interesting, starting with the BJP. 

If they were to return to power and no cap was placed on India’s 

nuclear weapons efforts, more Indian weapons would be likely 

built, which in turn could provoke China into a self-defeating nuclear arms rivalry that would not only promote more competition 

between India and Pakistan, but between China, Japan and the 

United States. 

As for U.S. cooperation in space, the safest, most cost effective 

approach would be to make affordable launch capabilities in the 

United States accessible to India. Transferring satellite integration 

and space launch technology to India, on the other hand, is a surefire way to repeat the frightening developments of the 1990s, when 

United States satellite launch integration assistance literally boosted China’s ICBM modernization efforts. 

For this and all the other reasons noted, the House and the Senate should make clear to its leadership and the Executive that any 

enabling legislation should not be placed on any omnibus spending 

bill. Moreover, I think it is quite important that Congress make its 

views on this particular agreement known before the Administration finalizes its negotiation with India. 

I think you need to weigh in because you will have a legislative 

role in changing the law. If it was just the Executive exercising its 

treaty-making power, then I would not say that. But they are asking you to change the law, so you need to weigh in before they preempt your legislative power. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sokolski and material submitted 

for the record follows:]

29

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY SOKOLSKI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want to thank you for asking me to 

testify on the nonproliferation impact of the U.S.-India nuclear and space cooperation deals announced July 18, 2005. Unlike the many other mutually favorable deals 

announced July 18, 2005, these two, if not properly clarified by Congress, are 

fraught with danger. We certainly should be in no rush to get their implementation 

wrong. My general recommendation to you today is that Congress should authorize 

implementing these agreements’ only after India commits to the limits other responsible, advanced nuclear states have assumed. This should be done in a country-neutral fashion by properly amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to allow U.S. nuclear cooperation with advanced, responsible nuclear states that are not members 

of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) if they meet certain minimal criteria. 

In specific, Congress should delay endorsing such cooperation until any such state 

1. forswears producing fissile materials for military purposes or, if it has a nuclear 

arsenal, increasing the net number of nuclear weapons it currently possesses, which 

would allow modernization but not expansion of any existing nuclear arsenal. Such 

weapons states would also have to pledge eventually to dismantle their nuclear arsenals as all other NPT weapons states have. 

2. identifies all reactors supplying electricity to its distribution grid, all research 

reactors claimed to be for peaceful purposes to be civilian, all spent fuel these reactors produced, and all fuel making plants supplying these reactors to be subject to 

routine, compulsory International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections 

3. upholds all previous bilateral nuclear nonproliferation obligations with the US 

and other countries 

4. publicly adopts the principles of the PSI 

5. is free of any US nuclear or nuclear-capable missile proliferation sanctions for 

at least two years and clears up any outstanding sanctionable actions before US nuclear cooperation is formalized. 

To be sure, insisting on these requirements will initially displease those in a 

hurry to seal the nuclear and space deals with India. Yet, in no way would insisting 

on such conditions move the goalposts or raise the bar on the agreement reached 

July 18, 2005. At the time, both the U.S. and India agreed that the U.S. would not 

regard India as a nuclear weapons state under the NPT. The U.S. insisted on this. 

As such, whatever IAEA inspections India agreed to of its civilian nuclear facilities 

need not be as loose as the voluntary spot checks Russia, the U.S., China. France 

and the UK are allowed. 

Also, at the time, both U.S. and Indian officials agreed that India would assume 

all those restraints that ‘‘advanced, responsible nuclear states’’ already had assumed. Among the most important of these is forswearing the expansion of one’s nuclear arsenal by renouncing the further production of fissile material for military 

purposes and capping the net number of nuclear weapons one has. Under these conditions, one could possess nuclear weapons, modernize them, or (as the U.S., Russia, 

UK and France, have done) dismantle them, but that would be it. It should be noted 

that demanding that these conditions is more than merely desirable. The must be 

met if, as the deal’s backers have claimed repeatedly, the nuclear and space deals 

are to enhance the cause of global nonproliferation and U.S. security. The U.S., after 

all, has an interest in making India behave as the U.K. and Japan does, not as 

China or Iran. 

Unfortunately, India has yet to express interest in meeting these conditions. Nor 

has the Bush administration pushed very hard to secure them. This all might be 

acceptable to Congress. If so, Congress need only endorse the loose nuclear inspections arrangements India and the Executive Branch are currently negotiating and 

approve legislation to relax US Atomic Energy Act and missile technology controls 

in the sole case of India. But Congress should understand that if it does this, it will 

put the US in the dubious position of 

1. helping India expand its nuclear weapons arsenal by freeing up nuclear fuel 

making capacity that otherwise would be needed to supply civilian reactors, such 

as those at Tarapur, with lightly enriched uranium (see viewgraph 5). 

2. lending technical support to India’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 

project, a n incredibly massive, inherently vulnerable, first-strike missile derived directly from its civilian satellite launch system (the Polar Space Launch Vehicle). 

India already has a medium-range missile, the Agni, which it is upgrading to reach 

all of China and can be made road and rail-mobile. Indian officials and the CIA, 

meanwhile, claim India’s ICBM is intended to deter Europe and the U.S. (see 

viewgraphs 6, 7, and 8 and NPEC’s newly released study by Dr. Richard Speier). 

30

3. undermining U.S. and international efforts to restrict nuclear and missile technology exports to states such as North Korea and Iran by giving such help to a state 

that has not yet signed the NPT, capped its nuclear weapons program, rectified proliferation transactions that are sanctionable under U.S. law, endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative’s principles, or placed all of its nuclear activities under compulsory IAEA nuclear inspections as all responsible, advanced nuclear states have 

(see viewgraph 4). 

For most people, avoiding these pitfalls would be worth considerable effort. Yet, 

more than a few of the deals’ backers cynically believe that encouraging these developments is necessary to enhance U.S. security against a hostile China or Iran. This, 

however, reflects an unwarranted, panic-driven defeatism in dealing with China 

that is unworthy of the U.S. More important, it is strategically misguided in regarding India and cooperation with the U.S. on at least three critical counts: 

1. India’s Foreign Secretary and Prime Ministers are insistent India’s July 18th 

understandings with the U.S. are not ‘‘directed against any third country.’’ In fact, 

India struck a strategic agreement with Iran in January 2003 known as the New 

Delhi Declaration not only to help develop Iranian oil and gas fields, but to assure 

continued cooperation with Iran against the Taliban in Afghanistan, many of whom 

threaten the peace in Kashmir. Indian officials also are insistent that India’s vote 

on Iranian IAEA noncompliance was cast to help prevent referral to the UN. As for 

China, the current Indian government sees economic cooperation with Beijing as a 

key to India’s future development. 

2. The last thing in anyone’s security interest is to help India compete against 

China with nuclear arms. China has five to ten times the number of deployed nuclear weapons as India. Although it no longer makes fissile materials for weapons, 

it has stockpiled thousands of additional weapons’ worth of highly enriched uranium 

and separated plutonium. It has shied from converting all of this material into 

bombs for fear of sparking an arms rivalry with the U.S. and Japan, who could go 

nuclear by bolting the NPT and militarizing its own massive stockpile of separated 

plutonium. To be sure, the current Indian government is not interested in dramatically ramping up Indian nuclear weapons production. Its main opponents, the BJP, 

however, clearly are. If they were to return to power and no cap had been placed 

on India’s nuclear weapons efforts, more Indian weapons would likely be built, 

which, in turn, could provoke China and a revived, self-defeating nuclear arms rivalry, not only between India and Pakistan, but between China, Japan, and the U.S. 

3. Every rupee India invests in developing nuclear weapons, ICBMs, and missile 

defense is one less that will otherwise be available to enhance security cooperation 

with the U.S. in the imperative areas of anti-terrorism, intelligence sharing, and 

maritime cooperation in and near the Indian Ocean. India’s entire annual military budget of about $20 billion (which supports a military of over 1.3 million active duty 

soldiers) is roughly what the U.S. spends on its nuclear arsenal and missile defenses 

alone. Encouraging India to spend in these areas could easily hollow out its conventional military in the very areas most promising for U.S.—Indian cooperation. 

This then brings us to the weakest and least credible arguments for pushing nuclear and space cooperation on an urgent basis and that is that India must have 

substantial U.S. cooperation in these fields immediately to sustain its economic 

growth. In fact, for the near-term just the reverse is the case. As is detailed in the 

viewgraph submission to this committee (see viewgraphs 9 though 16), investing in 

the expansion of nuclear power in India for the next decade is the very least leveraged way to address India’s growing need for more and cleaner energy. Instead, at 

least the next decade, one should focus on increasing efficiencies in India’s consumption, distribution, and generation of energy (including but not limited to its electrical sector). This would entail transitioning to cleaner uses of coal and restructuring India’s coal industry to meet demand; introducing market mechanisms and 

curbing massive energy theft and subsidies; and expanding the use of renewable energy, e.g., biomass, small hydro, wind, etc., (both connected and unconnected to the 

grid). So long as the Indian nuclear sector continues to be preoccupied with extremely complicated thorium-fuel cycle systems and breeder reactors and relies on 

dysfunctional state secrecy and monopoly style management, investing in this energy sector will be self-defeating. Instead, the U.S. and others should encourage India’s nuclear sector to acquire a more reasonable set of goals and open itself up to 

foreign ownership and management. This will take several years. 

As for space cooperation in the space launch area, by far the safest, most costeffective form of cooperation would be to make affordable U.S. launch capabilities 

more accessible to India. Certainly, the recent announcement that the U.S. intends 

to include Indian astronauts in upcoming U.S. space shuttle missions is the proper 

path to take. Transferring satellite integration and space launch technology to 

India, on the other hand, is a sure-fire way to repeat the frightening development 

31

that Loral and Hughes produced in the l990s with China when their satellite launch 

integrate assistance literally boosted China’s ICBM modernization efforts. 

For this and all the other reasons noted above, Congress should exercise due diligence in sorting out the specifics of U.S.—Indian nuclear and space cooperation. 

Both Houses should make it clear to its leadership and the Executive that any enabling legislation to implement U.S.-India space and nuclear cooperation must be referred to the appropriate committees rather than rushed on any legislative spending 

vehicle. Congress and the appropriate committees also should make their own views 

known on what legislative conditions they believe the proper implementation of nuclear and space cooperation with India and similar non-NPT states require. In this 

regard, it would be desirable for Congress to voice its legislative views before the 

Executive finalizes its negotiations with India. Under no circumstances, should Congress allow itself to be rushed. 

32


24204a0001.eps
33


24204a0002.eps
34


24204a0003.eps
35


24204a0004.eps
36


24204a0005.eps
37


24204a0006.eps
38


24204a0007.eps
39


24204a0008.eps
40


24204a0009.eps
41


24204a0010.eps
42


24204a0011.eps
43


24204a0012.eps
44


24204a0013.eps
45


24204a0014.eps
46


24204a0015.eps
47


24204b0001.eps 24204b0002.eps
48


24204b0003.eps 24204b0004.eps
49


24204b0005.eps 24204b0006.eps
50


24204b0007.eps 24204b0008.eps
51


24204b0009.eps 24204b0010.eps
52


24204b0011.eps 24204b0012.eps
53


24204b0013.eps 24204b0014.eps
54


24204b0015.eps 24204b0016.eps
55


24204b0017.eps 24204b0018.eps
56


24204b0019.eps 24204b0020.eps
57


24204b0021.eps 24204b0022.eps
58

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Sokolski. Mr. Spector. 

STATEMENT OF MR. LEONARD SPECTOR, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 

MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES 

Mr. SPECTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to 

testify this morning, and thank you Congressman Lantos. I think 

all of us appreciate that the matter before us is quite weighty and 

that we do not want to change and alter existing U.S. law which 

has been in place for so many years. And the principle of requiring 

recipients of our exports to replace all of their facilities under international inspection unless there are compelling reasons and unless 

the individual country receiving these benefits is worthy of this 

special privilege. 

I think there are several criteria that need to be employed as we 

decide whether India meets this standard. Some of them have been 

articulated by my colleagues and I will, in a sense, be echoing a 

number of their important remarks. First, there is no question that 

there must not be external proliferation by India. I think the record 

here looks pretty good, but we have just heard from Dr. Sokolski 

that there my be elements that deserve further attention. 

Second, and this is a point that Bob Einhorn and others have 

made, we want more than mere ‘‘doing no harm.’’ We want India 

to be a real partner and an advocate for nonproliferation. Here, 

again, I think we are seeing some progress, but it is not clear how 

far the Indians are prepared to go. The vote of the IAEA in September was significant, but it has been diluted by some of the information we are hearing after the fact regarding the basis for the 

vote and how the Indians are justifying it. So we want to see more 

about how India is going to assist us in that setting. 

There is a third criterion, however, which I think has not really 

been discussed here except very briefly in Henry Sokolski’s testimony and that is the need for the state itself that is going to receive this benefit from us, to have an unambiguous history of compliance with international nuclear agreements. Here, unfortunately, India’s history is very difficult indeed. 

As you know from reading what you have done and from a familiarity with the history, India has used a research reactor supplied 

by Canada as a peaceful use reactor, for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. That is widely understood and I think it is a central 

aspect of the Indian situation today. The situation here is not simply what occurred back in the 70s when not only was the reactor 

misused, but also heavy water that we had supplied, but also the 

fact that this is a continuing situation that currently contributes to 

the Indian nuclear weapons program. 

I have in the footnotes to my written testimony some of the language from the original agreement which is explicit that the reactor was to be used for peaceful purposes only and the same was 

true for the heavy water we supplied. David Albright and others 

have listed precisely which facilities are being used now for the nuclear weapons program, and the CIRUS reactor features prominently. It may represent, let us say, a third, 25 percent, of the plutonium that is now available for nuclear weapons, all done in fundamental violation of the agreement with the Canadians. 

59

Now there will be some counter arguments that we are going to 

hear. Certainly the Indians will say, ‘‘Well, the Canadians are not 

thumping the table on this one, but I do not think that is really 

the issue for us.’’ What matters is that the question of whether or 

not the United States should undertake nuclear commerce with a 

country which is currently misusing old nuclear commerce, partly 

from us but principally from Canada. Is that an appropriate basis 

for going forward when this outstanding issue is still there? And 

this is not, you know, a secondary issue. This is front and center. 

This is in the nuclear weapon program itself. 

It is clear the Administration would not consider nuclear sales to 

Iran for many reasons, but one of which is they are out of compliance with IAEA inspections. We would not consider dealing with 

North Korea because they violated, in the view of the Administration, the 1994 Agreed Framework. Well, the Indian behavior, although I do not want to make a comparison between these countries, but in this particular respect, the behavior of the Indian nuclear establishment is all too similar to the disregard shown by 

these other states for their international and nuclear commitments. 

Now India is going to have to make a fundamental decision and 

all of us have alluded to this, whether individual reactors are treated as civil or military. If the CIRUS reactor is treated as a military 

reactor, that is India thumbing its nose at Canada and at the international community, taking what was previously, what was given 

as a peaceful reactor and then telling the world, ‘‘Nope, it is military.’’ And there is simply no justification for that. 

So I think what needs to be done is we need to press India to 

consider some means of rectifying this historical problem. I have 

proposed that they place the CIRUS reactor on the civilian list and 

that they allow IAEA inspections. And therefore, if the reactor 

itself is a peaceful-use reactor, we treat the plutonium it produced 

as peaceful-use plutonium and put that under inspection, as well. 

Colleagues that I have discussed this with all agree this is a bit 

of a stretch in a sense, but the offense that was perpetrated here 

is so direct and so well known that for the United States to go forward with nuclear commerce as though this was not part of the 

history, as though this was not an ongoing offense, I think would 

be a terrible mistake. 

The most important recommendation I have to make today, however, is one that the Committee has already adopted, not because 

you heard it from me but because it is so embedded in the Committee’s thinking. That is the need to proceed cautiously and clearly 

on this very delicate matter and to exercise the prerogatives of the 

Congress. This is going to be a very complex undertaking, change 

of laws, hearing about the negotiations. And I think we do not 

want to see a rush to judgment here. There is some talk about a 

legislation that may be working its way around the Senate that 

would somehow announce certain waivers for India immediately 

and then we would pick up the pieces, the details later on. I think 

that would be a terrible mistake and that we really need to proceed 

in a very deliberate fashion, as the Chairman and Congressman 

Lantos and others have said. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Spector follows:]

60

1The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author. The Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies does not take positions on policy questions as a corporate entity. 2The Nuclear Suppliers Group now has 44 member states. Members voluntarily agree to 

apply a uniform set of rules in making nuclear exports. These are embodied in the Nuclear Supplier Group Guidelines, which contain lists of exports to be controlled and rules governing export 

licensing decisions, including the full-scope safeguards requirement. See http://

www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/ 3 Eventually Russia backed down on sales beyond two reactors whose transfer, it argued, was 

agreed to before the NSG rule was adopted in 1992. 4 Indeed, in negotiations with China over this point, the Bush Administration obtained China’s 

agreement that China’s civil nuclear transfers to Pakistan would be limited to completion of one 

additional nuclear power plant at Chasma, pursuant to a contract China and Pakistan signed 

before China joined the NSG. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf 

stated, ‘‘We would prefer that no such cooperation occur.’’ See ‘‘Congress Questions U.S. Support 

for China Joining Nuclear Group,’’ Arms Control Today, June 2004. http://www.armscontrol.org/

act/2004l06/China.asp (accessed October 22, 2005) 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. LEONARD SPECTOR, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, MONTEREY

INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES1

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to testify on U.S. nuclear cooperation with India in the wake of the July 18, 2005, summit between President George 

W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 

I. 

In understandings reached at that meeting, as you know, President Bush agreed 

to permit sales to India of U.S. civilian nuclear power equipment and materials, reversing twenty-five years of carefully wrought U.S. policy. That policy, known as the 

‘‘full-scope safeguards’’ requirement, prohibits most U.S. nuclear commerce with 

states, like India, that are not recognized as nuclear weapon states under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and that refuse to place all of their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection or ‘‘safeguards,’’ a step that precludes the use of the state’s nuclear facilities and materials 

for nuclear weapons. States refusing to accept such full-scope safeguards are either 

keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in the future or, like India, 

have actually used facilities not subject to IAEA monitoring to develop nuclear 

arms. The full-scope safeguards requirement has two broad goals. It enshrines the principle that we should not contribute in any way to the nuclear weapon potential of 

states in this category, because capabilities acquired in the civilian nuclear sector 

can be all too easily transferred to nuclear weapon programs. Secondly, the rule has 

the effect of imposing a targeted economic sanction against states that keep open 

the option of developing nuclear arms (or that actually develop them) and, at the 

same time, provides an incentive for states to accept full-scope safeguards, for example, by joining the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). 

It is important to remember that the United States was one of the first countries 

to apply the full-scope safeguards requirement to its civil nuclear exports, beginning 

in the late 1970s, and thereafter we became its principal champion in international 

fora, eventually persuading the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to adopt this rule 

in 1992.2

Thereafter, the United States devoted great diplomatic effort to ensure that Supplier Group members adhered to the rule in practice. During the 1990s, for example, 

the United States vehemently opposed attempts by Russia to bend narrow exceptions the rule so as to permit nuclear power plant sales to India.3 The Bush Administration, moreover, worked assiduously to bring China into the Nuclear Suppliers 

Group, persuading it, inter alia, to accept the group’s requirement that recipient 

states extend IAEA safeguards to all of their nuclear activities, a requirement that 

in China’s case will restrict future civilian nuclear transfers to Pakistan.4

I raise these points to underscore that for the United States to abandon this principle in the case of India represents a highly visible and far-reaching change of 

course that should only be taken for the most worthy states and only for the most 

compelling reasons. I believe that India does not meet these standards at this time. 

However, if certain aspects of the U.S.-India understanding regarding civilian nuclear transfers can be implemented effectively, this calculation might change. 

II. 

To be worthy of benefiting from a modification of current U.S. law, which, to reiterate, conditions U.S. civil nuclear transfers on a recipient’s accepting IAEA inspections on all of its nuclear activities, I believe a state must meet three conditions.

61

5 UN Security Council Resolution 1540, ‘‘Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,’’ 

April 28, 2004, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsclresolutions04.html (accessed October 22, 2005). 

The Bush Administration deserves credit for championing this important initiative and gaining 

its approval by the UN Security Council. 6 India’s long-standing opposition to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty adds to the significance of its decision help the United States to enforce the treaty’s requirements against Iran. 

Unfortunately, India’s history of disregarding nonproliferation undertakings, discussed below, 

undercuts the moral authority of its vote. 7See ‘‘Administration To Seek Congress’ Support for Nuclear Pact; State Department’s Burns 

Praises India’s Record on Nonproliferation,’’ Press Briefing by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2005/Jul/20–858577.html (accessed October 22, 

2005). The context for Secretary Burns’s comment is as follows: 

‘‘UNDER SECRETARY BURNS: One of the factors by which we judge the performance of 

other countries is to look at the record of commitment to nonproliferation. And if you look at 

what India has done as it’s developed its civil nuclear power sector, its economy and how it’s 

treated fissile material, other sensitive materials and nuclear technologies, India has not been 

a proliferator. India has not sold or transferred those materials and equipment to third parties 

that do not have them. India has been responsible. And India has now opened itself up to a 

degree of transparency that assures us that this agreement can be verified and will be verified. 

There’s a significant amount of trust between India and the United States, but there’s also 

verifiability in this agreement.’’

• First, the state in question must have a strong record of not contributing to 

proliferation by other nations. Publicly available information suggests that 

India may largely meet this requirement today, although it will be important 

for the Committee to verify that the classified record of India’s compliance 

with international export control norms is also satisfactory. If India were to 

explicitly adopt the export control standards of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 

and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as contemplated under 

the U.S.-India understandings of July, India would take an important step 

forward that would reinforce its commitment to future export restraint. It 

may be pointed out, however, that totally apart from its understandings with 

the United States, India is already legally obligated to implement measures 

of this kind by UN Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted in April 2004, 

requiring states to enact and enforce effective WMD export control measures 

(and effective measures to control WMD materials domestically).5

• Second, the state should be required to demonstrate that it is actively working 

with us to halt proliferation elsewhere. India is definitely moving in this direction, as seen by its September 24, 2005, vote at the IAEA to declare that Iran 

is not in compliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations because of its pursuit of an undeclared uranium enrichment capability. I would stress that Russia and China abstained on this vote, so India’s decision to condemn a violation of international nonproliferation rules is a noteworthy and very positive 

step. However, the true test of Indian commitment to international nonproliferation norms will come when a decision at the IAEA must be made to 

refer Iran’s noncompliance to the UN Security Council. Sadly, judging from 

the way the Singh administration is portraying India’s IAEA vote at home, 

it is unlikely that India will be prepared to stand with us when the crucial 

test comes at the IAEA later this year.6

• There is a third standard, however, that a state must also meet, in my view, 

before it can be considered for a waiver of 25 years of restrictive U.S. nuclear 

transfer policy: the state must have an unambiguous record of compliance 

with its civil nuclear transfer agreements. As all of us in this room who are 

familiar with the history of the Indian nuclear weapons program know, India 

does not meet this test. 

Indeed, at this very moment, I consider India to be violating a core international commitment applying to civilian nuclear transfers it has received, by 

using restricted plutonium for its nuclear weapons program. In fact, it may 

be disregarding more than one such commitment.

Why would the United States consider opening civil nuclear cooperation with a 

state that has a clear history of abusing agreements covering such transfers? How 

could it be confident that India would abide by its agreements in the future? 

When Under Secretary Burns declared that ‘‘India has not been a proliferator,’’ 7

he told only part of the story. He focused only on India’s external behavior—not on 

that country’s misuse at home of civilian nuclear technology it had received in the 

past.

62

8The operative language in the Indo-Canadian Agreement states: ‘‘Article III. The Government of India will ensure that the reactor and any products resulting from its use will be employed for peaceful purposes only.’’ Agreement on the Canada-India Colombo Plan Atomic Reactor Project, April 28, 1956. http://meaindia.nic.in/treatiesagreement/1956/chap131.htm (accessed 

October 22, 2005). 

The operative language in the Indo-U.S. heavy water contract states, ‘‘9. The Government 

agrees that neither this Agreement nor any Interest thereunder shall be assigned. The heavy 

water sold hereunder shall be for use only in India by the Government in connection with research into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and shall be retained by the 

Government, or by other parties authorised by the Government to receive it, and not resold or 

otherwise distributed.’’ Agreement and between the United States Atomic Energy Commission 

and the President of India, March 16, 1956. http://www.nci.org/a/1956ld20.htm. I would like 

to express my appreciation to Paul Leventhal and the Nuclear Control Institute for making this 

document available. 

The reactor and heavy water were supplied before bilateral or IAEA inspections became a 

norm for nuclear commerce, and thus the reactor has never been subject to IAEA monitoring. 

The current status of U.S. heavy water is not known. It may have been exhausted or a portion 

of the original charge could still be in CIRUS. India has never provided an accounting to the 

United States of the disposition of the material. 9 In 1997, it should be added, AP reported that the individual leading the testing group in 

India in 1974, Dr. Raja Ramanna, declared during an address in western India, ‘‘The Pokhran 

test was a bomb, I can tell you now.’’ AP, October 10, 1997, New Delhi. This statement was 

brought to my attention by Paul Leventhal, founding president of the Nuclear Control Institute.

III. 

‘‘India chose to totally disregard its commitments to Canada and, in 1974, detonated 

a nuclear device using plutonium reprocessed from spent fuel from the CIRUS reactor.’’

—Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 

http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nndi-agency/non-proliferation-en.asp (accessed October 22, 2005)

‘‘The NSG was created following the explosion in 1974 of a nuclear device by a nonnuclear-weapon State, which demonstrated that nuclear technology transferred for 

peaceful purposes could be misused.’’

—‘‘History of the NSG,’’ from the organization’s official website, http://www.nsgonline.org/history.htm (accessed October 22, 2005)

India’s misuse of plutonium produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS research 

reactor is not a matter of ancient history; it is an ongoing offense. The original 

transgression took place in the 1970s, when India misused the reactor, along with 

U.S.-supplied heavy water that was essential for the reactor’s operation, in order to 

produce the plutonium for India’s 1974 nuclear detonation. 

India had pledged to Canada and the United States that the reactor and heavy 

water, respectively, together with any plutonium produced through their use, would 

be used for peaceful purposes only.8 The offense is continuing today because, as 

David Albright points out in his testimony, a significant fraction of the plutonium 

currently used in the Indian nuclear arsenal was produced in CIRUS. While India 

cynically proclaimed in 1974 that its nuclear test was a ‘‘peaceful nuclear explosion’’ 

and therefore did not violate its agreements with Canada and the United States, 

India has since made absolutely clear that its nuclear explosives today are nuclear 

weapons.9 Thus there is no possible way to justify this use of CIRUS-origin material 

as consistent with India’s ‘‘peaceful use’’ pledges.

India and its champions will put forward a smokescreen of arguments to counter 

the assertion that India is currently violating an international nuclear transfer 

agreement and that this should be a bar to renewed U.S. nuclear cooperation.

• Canada, they will argue, has not raised the CIRUS problem as an objection 

to the proposed new U.S.-India nuclear deal. 

But Canada’s views are not the key issue. What matters is whether the 

United States should undertake nuclear trade with a known violator of civil 

nuclear agreements—and, as the Canadian government website quoted above 

makes clear, Canada most certainly believes that India cheated on its commitments. 

The Administration would not consider nuclear sales to Iran, for example, 

because of its non-compliance with IAEA inspections, and on this basis, it is 

strongly urging Russia to halt construction of a nuclear power plant now 

nearing completion in Bushehr. Moreover, the Administration ended U.S. 

support for the development of a nuclear power plant in North Korea, once 

it concluded that Pyongyang was not complying with the 1994 U.S.-North 

63

10The Canada-India agreement on CIRUS has no termination date. 11This said, any future agreement for cooperation with India must include facility-specific, inperpetuity IAEA safeguards coverage. See Frederick McGoldrick, Harold Bengelsdorf, and Lawrence Scheinman, ‘‘The U.S.-India Deal: Taking Stock,’’ Arms Control Today, October 2005. 12 It may be whispered that it is unrealistic to expect India to give up such an important element of its nuclear weapons capability at this time and, indeed, that it is not in the interest 

of the United States to press it to do so. 

I would reply that, in fact, India would gain strategically from this approach because the 

country would quiet critics of its nuclear posture and establish itself as a genuinely responsible 

advanced nuclear state, with strong nonproliferation credentials, locking in improved nuclear 

trade ties with the United States that would more easily endure beyond the current Administration. India’s reduced stocks of plutonium would still be ample for a minimum deterrent and, 

most likely, the number warheads it could develop from these stocks would be in rough balance 

with the number of the strategic delivery systems it has fielded. U.S. nonproliferation policy, 

moreover, can hardly be founded on promoting the enlargement of nuclear arsenals based upon 

disregard for nonproliferation agreements. 13See Agreement Between the Government of India and the Government of Canada in Collaboration in the Development of Heavy Water Power Reactor Systems, New Delhi, 16 December 

1963, http://meaindia.nic.in/treatiesagreement/1963/chap290.htm (accessed October 22, 2005), 

amended December 16, 1966. 

Korea Agreed Framework. Although one hesitates to place India in the same 

category as Iran and North Korea, the behavior of the nuclear establishments 

of the three states is all too similar.

• India will also argue that its agreement with Canada over CIRUS is no longer 

in force and therefore no longer controls the plutonium created in the reactor. 

But that means India believes that a reactor obtained one day under a 

guarantee of exclusively peaceful use can later be turned to military use, as 

if the guarantee had never been given. Does the United States want to bend 

long-standing international nonproliferation rules to engage in nuclear trade 

with a state taking such a position, a state that takes cover behind a legalism 

to shield its misappropriation of highly sensitive nuclear technology? Is this 

a paragon we wish to champion to the world as a model of behavior worthy 

of special treatment? 10

Even if the United States could somehow obtain a double-ironclad guarantee in 

a new agreement for cooperation with India, specifying that Indian pledges of nonexplosive use of our future transfers would continue ‘‘in perpetuity.’’ I am not sure 

we could be confident that India would stand by these pledges, given this history. 

Opening nuclear trade with India must be based not only on exquisite legal drafting, but also on underlying trust that India is a credible nuclear trading partner.11

IV. 

India will soon be forced to show its true colors regarding the CIRUS reactor and 

the plutonium the facility has produced. In his understanding with President Bush, 

Prime Minister Singh agreed to identify India’s nuclear facilities as civilian or military, and voluntarily to place the former under IAEA inspection. How will the Indian government characterize CIRUS? 

Will India thumb its nose at Canada, and the wider international community, and 

baldly renounce all restrictions on the facility by declaring it to be a military installation, or will India demonstrate to the world that it is, indeed, respectful of international nonproliferation norms and list CIRUS as a civilian facility? 

It is also necessary to look not only at the future use of CIRUS, but also to address the plutonium produced by the reactor over the years. If CIRUS is declared 

civilian because of the terms under which it was provided, then presumably the 

peaceful-use pledge would cover the plutonium it generated, and this would need 

to be sequestered apart from India’s military stockpile and placed under IAEA monitoring.12

V. 

I noted earlier that India may be transgressing a second nuclear trade agreement. 

I have in mind its agreement with Canada covering the Rajasthan Atomic Power 

Station, whose nuclear power reactors were supplied by Canada.13 Those reactors 

are under IAEA safeguards, and there have been no concerns about the misuse of 

the plutonium produced in them. 

However, India has replicated these reactors and is now operating eleven additional Canadian-style reactors—two at Kaiga, two at Kakrapar, two at Kalpakkam, 

two at Narora, two at the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (in addition to the original two supplied by Canada), and one at Tarapur. These facilities are not under 

64

14 I have heard, although I have not been able to confirm, that the Rajasthan reactors were 

provided by Canada under ‘‘replication’’ restraints, such that all of the assurances concerning 

the use of the Rajasthan units were to carry over to any additional reactors based on their technology. If so, the case that India should place all plutonium produced through the use of the 

replicated Canadian-style reactors under IAEA safeguards would be still stronger. 15 Variations on these principles could also be effective, for example, if India, without admitting any past wrong-doing, shut down CIRUS on the grounds of obsolescence and declared a 

portion of the country’s high-quality plutonium to be ‘‘excess to its defense needs’’ and placed 

it under IAEA inspection. The United States and Russia have made similar declarations of excess fissile material, and this has been or will be placed under IAEA monitoring. 16 A number of my colleagues have stressed the importance of capping India’s nuclear potential by requiring India to accept a freeze on the future production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons (that is, production of these materials outside of IAEA safeguards), by means of a ‘‘fissile material cut-off’’ agreement leading to an international Fissile 

Material Cut-Off Treaty. I believe the Administration is also actively pursuing this goal. I agree 

that this is a most important objective, but the approach that I have suggested accomplishes 

the goal of limiting Indian fissile material stocks more effectively. 

First, it immediately eliminates production of plutonium by one of India’s two plutonium production reactors and does so verifiably, since IAEA safeguards would apply; the ‘‘Fissile Material 

Cut-Off Treaty’’ espoused by the Administration would not be verifiable. Second, the approach 

I have outlined eliminates the possibility that newly produced plutonium from India’s large-scale 

Canadian-style nuclear power plants might be used to contribute to the Indian nuclear arsenal. 

Third, and most important, the approach I have suggested would capture and place under IAEA 

inspection past production of plutonium by India that is based on the use of the CIRUS reactor 

and the Canadian-style power reactors, thus immediately reducing the amount of Indian fissile 

material available for weapons, a nonproliferation outcome superior to a mere freeze on new 

production. It would be many years before India would be able to rebuild its fissile material 

IAEA monitoring. There is a distinct possibility that plutonium produced in these 

facilities (which are well suited for producing especially high-quality plutonium) has 

been incorporated into Indian nuclear weapons. 

Presumably, these facilities will now be declared civilian and placed under IAEA 

monitoring, but the issue Congress must focus on is whether any separated plutonium and plutonium-bearing spent fuel the reactors have produced over the years 

will also be placed under IAEA safeguards. If not, depending on the terms governing 

replication of technology from the Rajasthan reactors, we could confront a similar 

question to that posed by CIRUS, where India has improperly appropriated nuclear 

technology originally supplied under non-explosive use pledges and holds open the 

option of using the reactors’ past output for nuclear arms.14

VI. 

How should the Congress respond to the points I have raised? 

The single most important step that the Congress can take is to exercise its authority under the Atomic Energy Act to review and vote upon new agreements for cooperation. I would hope that the House of Representatives, in particular, would be 

attentive to this authority, since the Atomic Energy Act provides one of the few opportunities for the House to rule upon international agreements, a prerogative normally reserved to the Senate. I would therefore urge this Committee to forcefully oppose any effort by the Administration to bypass the normal process for considering 

such agreements, for example, by appending special legislation authorizing nuclear 

sales to India to an omnibus appropriations bill or other such ‘‘unopposable’’ legislation. 

Second, I would urge the Committee to demand that India’s past violations of 

international nuclear transfer agreements be rectified before the United States will 

consider renewed nuclear trade, by requiring that India declare CIRUS to be a civilian facility and place that reactor, and the plutonium it has produced, under IAEA 

safeguards so as to preclude their use for nuclear weapons. Locking down the past 

and future plutonium production potential of India’s Canadian-style nuclear power 

reactors is also critical in this regard.15

Third, if these conditions are met and:

• if the Congress determines after examining the classified record, that India 

is, indeed, not engaged in activities that promote proliferation elsewhere; and

• if India continues to demonstrate its commitment other international nonproliferation norms by adopting internationally accepted export control standards and supporting key U.S. nonproliferation initiatives (including those regarding Iran at the IAEA),

then opening the door to renewed civil nuclear cooperation with India under strict 

controls might be justified.16

65

stocks to current levels, by which time a global Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty will likely be 

in place. 17See e.g., ‘‘US wants to help India be a superpower.’’ Agence France Presse, March 26, 2005, 

http://sify.com/news/othernews/fullstory.php?id=13702274 (accessed October 22, 2005). 18 I would also point out that it is most difficult to predict China’s future orientation—whether 

it will emerge as a peaceful, status quo power focused on its own economic development and 

political evolution, or as an assertive, ambitious player on the international stage, with expansionist goals. Obviously it is in the U.S. interest to promote the former outcome, but an explicit 

policy of developing a counter-China military alliance with India could be perceived in Beijing 

as a hostile initiative that could drive China in the opposite direction. 

In these circumstances, the United States would not only have promoted closer 

ties with a natural ally, but it would have genuinely advanced crucial nonproliferation goals and established important boundaries that do not now exist on India’s nuclear weapons potential, while also respecting its status as a nuclear weapon power. 

VII. 

Earlier in my remarks, I stated that to amend U.S. nuclear cooperation policy, 

there must both be a worthy partner and compelling reasons to make the change. 

The Administration considers its nuclear concessions to be part of a larger set of 

initiatives aimed at building a ‘‘strategic partnership’’ with India. The unstated goal 

of this strategic partnership is to build India into a political and military counterweight to China.17

I strongly support closer ties with India and agree with the premise that our two 

countries’ commitments to pluralistic democracy create the basis for strong political 

bonds. But I find it most difficult to imagine that we will transform India into a 

de facto military ally, one that might support us, for example, by placing its forces 

on alert, during a U.S.-China crisis over Taiwan. Sacrificing an important nonproliferation standard in pursuit of such a will-o-the-wisp alliance hardly seems defensible. Moreover, even if a military alliance were practicable, when one examines 

our relations with two other non-NPT states, it is clear that we have successfully 

built such alliances with Israel and, as part of the Global War on Terrorism, with 

Pakistan, without the need to bend our nuclear transfer rules. 

In addition, of course, India in its own self-interest has already established what 

it considers to be a sufficient countervailing military and political presence vis-a-vis 

China, without the need for external alliances.18 Nor is it necessary for the United 

States to incentivize India to oppose radical Islam. India is already committed to 

this path for reasons we all know, and hardly needs the reward of U.S. nuclear 

trade to continue this policy. 

In sum, geo-politics and grand strategy do not appear to provide compelling reasons for changing our nonproliferation rules. 

Finally, as I have mentioned, it is possible that more specific nonproliferation undertakings by India could offer a justification for such changes, but it is very premature to make such a judgment. Many of the undertakings India presented in the 

understanding of July 18 are, as I mentioned, already required under international 

law, while others—such as the pledge to continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing—are little more than a restatement of current Indian policy. 

There is much work to be done to better understand what India is preparing to 

offer as part of the bargain over renewed U.S. nuclear cooperation. In this setting, 

I urge the Congress to proceed cautiously and avoid taking major decisions before 

all of the pending issues are satisfactorily clarified.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Spector. Mr. Rohrabacher of 

California? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

again, I would like to thank Chairman Hyde for his leadership on 

this issue. We are trying to fine tune a grand strategy, that is what 

it sounds like to me. Because I was very gratified by the Administration’s India offensive, if you would, as part of a grand strategy 

for a better world. And if we are going to have a better world, we 

have to have a good relationship with India and a positive relationship. But, you know, great strategies can be brought down by small 

details, what seem small details, maybe a small part of the agreement will undermine everything else, and that is what we are talking about here today. 

66

Let me just note that the current Pakistani Prime Minister, at 

one point when he was asked why Pakistan must develop its own 

nuclear weapons, talked about how important it was for Pakistan 

to have the weapons. And I remember he said if it means that our 

people have to eat grass, we need to have this capability. 

I would hope that the Indian Government is listening to what is 

happening here today and take very seriously this issue so that the 

objections that we are looking at can be dealt with, rather than 

thinking that their people will eat grass like the Pakistanis in 

order to achieve certain capabilities. 

This is for the whole panel. First of all, let me ask this. Is this 

about two things, the production of electricity for India so they will 

have the energy to produce the electricity without having a byproduct of this capability, something that will help them produce nuclear weapons? And, number two, about the technology needed to 

make sure that we are working with them on their space program? 

Is that what this is really all about, those two issues? Please, yes, 

sir? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. No, I do not think it is. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Move forward, then, tell me what it is. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. In the briefing materials that go with this testimony, there are charts that show what the energy needs of India 

are for the next 10 years. You can say eventually we are going to 

all need fusion and hydrogen, but for the next decade, nuclear is 

a bad investment for a lot of structural, technical and financial reasons. But it is a very emotional issue in India. We should not, 

though, let emotions get in the way of strategy. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do they think that the nuclear energy issue 

is their electricity? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. The people we are negotiating with run their 

atomic energy program. You will be stunned to hear that they 

think that. But we do not negotiate with a lot of other people who 

do not get any electricity, because the grid does not go where it 

needs to go. I think if you are worried about a long term relationship with the people of India, you are going to have to think a little 

bit bigger than the few people we are negotiating with. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So what we need to do, in your estimation, 

is to basically break that mindset that India needs the nuclear energy plants in order to produce electricity when, in fact, they need 

other sources of electricity? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. It is on the list, but as the Department of Energy 

laid out in its own dialogue agenda, it is the last item on a long 

list and it is not urgent. That is the reason you have time to get 

this right. They are not running out of electricity because they do 

not have nuclear power plants, that is for sure. 

Regarding the space launch——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Excuse me, before you go onto that second 

issue, so you would suggest that we would talk to India about alternative sources of energy rather than——

Mr. SOKOLSKI. One of the good things about the cooperation on 

energy is all of the non-nuclear things that are on that list. And 

those things are cost effective, they are efficient, they are timely 

and they should be acted on first. 

67

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay and we should be pushing them in that 

direction? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Well, you know, if we do not want to be subsidizing and guaranteeing our own exploits and having the Indian 

Government continuing to have monopoly power over the nuclear 

sector, which is how they run it. Every other part of the energy sector is being opened up to the free market. The nuclear sector is 

closed and run by state monopoly. 

If we want to get them off of that, I think we had better start 

helping India where they do have more free market mechanisms 

and that is everywhere else. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have to convince them of that? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. No, no, they have already convinced themselves 

that the free market can operate everywhere else but in nuclear. 

So we have a simple rule. We invest where we can, not where we 

have to guarantee all the loans. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. This makes it much more complicated. Thank 

you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. Mr. Lantos? 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first 

commend all five of our witnesses for singularly valuable and 

thoughtful testimony. I have learned a great deal and I am sure 

my colleagues have, as well. 

Mr. Chairman, the issues that we raise are very complex and we 

have five brilliant people in front of us. I would nevertheless hope 

that you could basically say yes or no to these questions, because 

finally we will have to vote yes or no and all of the footnotes become irrelevant. 

As I listened to you and as I read your testimony, all of you are 

saying that with improvements you are prepared to support the 

agreement reached between the American Administration and the 

Indian Government, which leads me to the magical question, are 

any of the improvements that you are recommending in your best 

judgment deal breakers? Are they non-stoppers? Dr. Joeck? 

Mr. JOECK. Thank you. I believe a number of them are deal 

breakers. This has been a complicated relationship running back a 

number of years and it is not just on nuclear issues as we all know. 

I believe there will be another hearing to discuss the breadth of the 

agreement. But there are other elements to be considered. 

Mr. LANTOS. Dr. Einhorn? 

Mr. EINHORN. I do not know if it is a deal breaker. The hardest 

one for India would be to stop producing fissile material for nuclear 

weapons. But I should remind the Committee, India in principle 

supports a fissile material cut off. It says that it does not have a 

strategic requirement for parity with China or with anybody else. 

All it wants to do is to insure that its credible minimum deterrent 

needs are met. 

Now India has produced a lot of plutonium and I was involved 

in negotiations with them in the late 90s in which they said we are 

not prepared to stop production now. We need more plutonium for 

our credible minimum deterrent. 

Mr. LANTOS. In your view, are your criteria deal breakers? 

Mr. EINHORN. The Indians may be reluctant to stop production 

now, but if not now, within a half year or a few years, I think it 

68

should be possible for them to meet their minimum deterrent requirements. 

Mr. LANTOS. Dr. Albright? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I do not think any of the conditions I put forth 

are deal breakers, but they will slow down the deal. Can I add one 

thing to your first question? I would say, no. I think that these conditions may not be enough, yet what we need to keep in mind, 

again, obviously, to go slow, is what damage has already been 

caused? What are China and Russia going to do? Are they going 

to look for exemptions to nonproliferation rules? 

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Sokolski? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. They will be a deal breaker for a bad deal, but 

they are essential for a good one and you can get it and you should 

take your time to get it. We did it with China, you can do it with 

India. 

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Spector? 

Mr. SPECTOR. Well, I guess one question is whether the nuclear 

dimension is a deal breaker in itself or could it be foregone? We 

have excellent relations with another state that is in the same category as India and with whom we have no nuclear relations. We 

have a basic alliance with this country. So I think the error here 

is to make this aspect, the nuclear dimension, so large in this relationship. I mean, we all know the relationship is vast and that this 

is actually a speck that happens to be politically important to the 

Indians and to us, as well. But in reality, the relationship is there 

and that is not going to be broken if the nuclear matter gets 

dragged out, if we have further debates and the rest. So I think we 

need to put it in context. 

Mr. LANTOS. May I just follow up with a second general question? A number of you have made references to equal treatment of 

all countries. There is growing reluctance in the Congress and in 

the country to buy that as a principle, not vis-a-vis this issue, but 

vis-a-vis all issues. Equal treatment of all countries led us to having the Sudans of this world chair the United Nations Human 

Rights Commission. So if you expect us, gentlemen, to be politically 

valued blind in dealing with India, we will not meet your expectations. 

One of you referred to our North Korea review; this is how North 

Korea will view this. Well, we do not view North Korea as equivalent to India. India is a democracy, an open country with around 

the world reasonably good human rights record. So we will not be 

blinded by an automatic mechanistic, robotic view of what we have 

to do in the field of international relations. 

We, in fact, will take into account our view of India as an entity, 

as a democratic, friendly, human rights respecting, law abiding 

country. And we will not meet your criteria if your criteria includes 

a mechanistic, universal approach to all countries. The fact that we 

do not view Iran’s right as identical to India’s right in our judgment is well founded. Iran is a supporter of terrorism, it is running 

a dictatorial police state internally, it hates our values and we will 

have a different policy vis a vis Iran than we will vis a vis India. 

If any of you would care to comment? 

Mr. JOECK. I would like to second that. I think that is exactly 

right with respect to India and is one of the reasons why we should 

69

look carefully at why an exception should be made for India with 

respect to the proliferation elements of the agreement. 

Mr. LANTOS. Dr. Einhorn? 

Mr. EINHORN. Sure, we treat different countries differently depending on their behavior. But we should look at India’s own 

standard, its own statement. It says at the most senior levels, it 

is prepared to assume the same responsibilities, to adopt the same 

policies and practices, as the other nuclear weapons states. It is 

their own position. We should hold them to that. 

We should also adopt country neutral criteria, the same criteria 

applied across the board. Now differing countries will fulfill those 

criteria to different degrees and that is where the differences come 

in. 

Mr. LANTOS. Dr. Albright? Mr. Sokolski? 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. I think Bob has got it exactly right. We are selling 

this, they are buying this, because they are going to be treated as 

an advanced, responsible, nuclear state. Now that is not everybody 

and that is not mechanistic, but you better make darn sure that 

you get those criteria to match up to those words. And they are not 

there yet, you are not there yet. 

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Spector? 

Mr. SPECTOR. I think you do have to make distinctions, but I also 

believe that you must have certain universal principles that you 

can work from and draw the international community behind you 

in the appropriate case. A country that—and now I am thinking of 

Iran—a country that grossly cheats on international IAEA inspections all those years, you do not want to have to take them on 

alone. You want every other country to say this was wrong and 

that is what we are getting. 

So I do not think you want to forsake multilateral treaties and 

other mechanisms of this kind, even as you want to attempt to give 

preferences and penalties to particular countries. So I think there 

is a balance to be struck. You do not want to go to one extreme 

or the other. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Boozman? Mr. Royce? 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Albright, in your 

statement, you said you were skeptical about safeguards. I think 

your word were, even in the best of circumstances, the barrier between a military and civilian program can be porous. I wanted to 

see if the other panelists agreed with that, and if so, what are the 

implications for any agreement like this and is there language, and 

maybe Dr. Sokolski could start on this one, is there language that 

could cinch this up? You know, how do we make the criteria match 

the words. How do we help develop it? 

Second and my last question to the panelists, does this proposed 

agreement affect the Administration’s ability to affect the specific 

case that President Bush made back in 2004 that the NPT loophole 

needs to be closed? And by loophole, that is the interpretation that 

countries have the right to highly enriched uranium and processed 

plutonium and then just let them be a step away from possessing 

nuclear weapons? Do you see any implications on that? 

70

Mr. SOKOLSKI. First for the record, I am not a doctor. I once got 

in trouble, somebody thought I was. I am an ABD, all but dissertation, higher degree. 

Mr. ROYCE. I stand corrected. You certainly professorial. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Thank you. You can call me Henry. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Henry. 

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Okay. You had three questions. First, ultimately 

the only way you can absolutely be certain about anything is to 

have people everywhere and treaties that are legally binding, and 

all sorts of goodwill. You are not going to probably have all that, 

even in the case of India, but I think it is a friendly country. On 

this, I think Mr. Lantos is making sound enough points. It is not 

North Korea. 

However, I do think legally Congress should insist that India go 

on the record that it will meet these minimum criteria that I laid 

out in my testimony and some of the other ideas that were presented can be entertained, as well. 

As for the loophole, if you read the President’s speech carefully, 

he actually says two things. First he says that that there is a loophole, then he says it is being cynically manipulated, which suggests 

it is not a loophole, that it is the way in which the treaty is interpreted. As I have testified before here, I think the treaty actually 

does not have explicitly that loophole, but we have lazily interpreted the treaty as if it actually says those words, that enrichment 

and reprocessing and nuclear fuel making is a right. It does not say 

that. It says that you have the rights to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy. And that has some criteria that we should be much 

more explicit about. 

Chairman HYDE. We have——

Mr. EINHORN. Can I just address the question, does it make it 

harder? Mr. Royce asked this question, does it make it harder for 

the Administration to achieve the objective of discouraging additional countries from acquiring enrichment and reprocessing capabilities? I think it makes it much harder. We are asking NPT parties not just to give up nuclear weapons, but also enrichment and 

reprocessing capabilities. It goes, you know, considerably beyond 

what they thought their obligation was. 

In other words, we are trying to raise the bar for NPT parties 

when we are lowering the bar for countries that have not even 

joined the NPT. So I think it puts an additional burden on that initiative. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. We have two votes on the Floor now. I think 

I will ask the panel if they will accept questions in writing that are 

not asked, if we adjourn? But rather than have you hang around 

indefinitely, we will adjourn the meeting with deep thanks for very 

instructive testimony. Very helpful, thank you. Committee stands 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

Æ