IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

March 23, 2016 Session at Lincoln Memorial University1

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ARDELL ALLEN

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County

No. S62065 R. Jerry Beck, Judge

No. E2015-00825-CCA-R3-CD – Filed July 25, 2016

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Based on a tip from a confidential informant, police stopped the Defendant and ultimately

discovered cocaine in his pocket. He was charged with possession of more than 0.5 

grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a daycare, a Class B felony. The Defendant filed a 

motion to suppress the evidence, which the trial court granted. The State appeals, 

arguing that the confidential informant‟s credibility and basis of knowledge were 

sufficiently established, giving officers reasonable suspicion to seize the Defendant. 

Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Reversed; 

Case Remanded

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which NORMA 

MCGEE OGLE and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Ahmed A. Safeeullah, Assistant 

Attorney General; Barry Staubus, District Attorney General; and Josh D. Parsons, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellant, State of Tennessee.

Gene G. Scott, Jr., Jonesborough, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Ardell Allen.

 

1 Oral argument was heard in this case before law students at Lincoln Memorial 

University‟s Duncan School of Law.
2

OPINION

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At the motion to suppress hearing, Corporal Micah Johnson testified that around 

5:30 or 6:00 p.m. on the date that the Defendant was arrested, he received a call from a 

confidential informant regarding the Defendant. Corporal Johnson testified that he had 

previously dealt with the confidential informant and that the confidential informant had 

provided the Kingsport Police Department with accurate information on five or six prior 

occasions over a period of three to four months. The confidential informant told 

Corporal Johnson that the Defendant “would be delivering a quantity of crack cocaine to 

the apartments at the corner of Charlemont and Broad Street.” Corporal Johnson testified 

that he had known the Defendant for several years, and he knew that the Defendant drove 

a black, mid-sized Ford SUV with University of Tennessee tags. After speaking with the 

confidential informant, Corporal Johnson and Detective Daniel Lane proceeded to the 

apartment complex. Corporal Johnson testified that other marked patrol units were in the 

area and looking for the Defendant‟s vehicle, awaiting word from Corporal Johnson 

about how they should proceed. 

The confidential informant called Corporal Johnson a second time and informed 

him that the Defendant “had just pulled up in front of the apartments” on the Charlemont 

side of the complex. While on the phone with the confidential informant, Corporal 

Johnson apprised Officer Rob Coffey that the Defendant had arrived and instructed him 

to stop the Defendant. At the time, Corporal Johnson was in the back alley of the 

apartment complex, several hundred yards away from the front of the complex. Officer 

Coffey got into his car and proceeded to the front of the building. Corporal Johnson and 

Detective Lane did not immediately accompany Officer Coffey because they were 

speaking with another individual. Corporal Johnson estimated that he arrived at the front 

of the complex one minute later. Corporal Johnson saw the Defendant at the front of the 

building, and police arrested the Defendant. Corporal Johnson testified that he did not 

participate in the search of the Defendant. 

Officer Coffey testified that he had known the Defendant “for a long time” at the 

time of the stop. Officer Coffey had known the Defendant to drive a black Ford Escape 

with University of Tennessee tags for “[a]t least a year or two” and had seen the 

Defendant driving the vehicle multiple times. Officer Coffey testified that he went to the 

apartment complex “to assist Vice officers.” Officer Coffey pulled into the back alley of 

the apartment complex and spoke with Corporal Johnson. Corporal Johnson was on the 

phone when he walked over to Officer Coffey and told him that the Defendant was 

“around front right now making a — supposed to be making a drug deal.” Officer Coffey

asked Corporal Johnson if the Defendant was still driving the black Ford Escape with 
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Tennessee tags, and Corporal Johnson responded affirmatively. Officer Coffey 

“immediately” got into his car and went to the front of the complex. He estimated that 

twenty or thirty seconds elapsed between his conversation with Corporal Johnson and his 

arrival at the front of the complex. 

When Officer Coffey arrived at the front of the building, he saw the Defendant‟s 

car parked against the curb. Officer Coffey could see the back of the driver‟s head and 

that a woman was in the front passenger‟s seat. He also saw a second woman leaning in 

the passenger‟s side window. Officer Coffey started to exit his cruiser, and the woman

leaning in the passenger‟s window saw the cruiser. Officer Coffey testified that the 

woman got “this wide-eyed look,” and she began backing up as if to flee. Officer Coffey 

instructed her to stop, but she took several more steps backwards. As a result, Officer 

Coffey activated his blue lights and exited his cruiser. He estimated that he instructed the 

woman “four or five times not to run.” The woman returned to the Defendant‟s car, and 

Officer Coffey approached the Defendant. He asked the Defendant what he was doing, 

and the woman in the passenger‟s seat started shouting, “What‟s this all about,”

continually interrupting Officer Coffey as he attempted to speak with the Defendant. 

Officer Coffey explained that he asked the Defendant to exit the car so that the two could 

speak because he could not effectively communicate due to the shouting of the female 

passenger. The Defendant willingly exited the vehicle, and Officer Coffey asked the 

Defendant if Officer Coffey could frisk him. The Defendant agreed, and after the frisk, 

Officer Coffey asked the Defendant if he would go to the rear of the police cruiser. 

Officer Coffey continued to question the Defendant at his police car. He asked the 

Defendant what he was doing, and the Defendant “really couldn‟t provide an explanation. 

He mumbled around, wouldn‟t give why he was there.” Officer Coffey asked the 

Defendant if he was in possession of any illegal narcotics. The Defendant replied that he 

was not while simultaneously placing “his left pocket up against the trunk” of Officer 

Coffey‟s cruiser. This behavior seemed suspicious to Officer Coffey, and he asked the 

Defendant if he could search him. Officer Coffey testified that the Defendant consented 

to the search. Officer Coffey discovered “a Kleenex that was neatly folded” in the 

Defendant‟s left pocket. He shook the Kleenex, and rocks of crack cocaine fell to the 

ground. After the cocaine fell to the ground, Officer Coffey informed the Defendant that 

he was under arrest. 

Officer Coffey testified that he had received numerous drug complaints about the 

apartment complex in the past. He stated that he knew that the Defendant did not live in 

the apartment complex and that the woman leaning into the passenger‟s side window 

acted as though she was going to flee when Officer Coffey arrived. He explained that his 

observations and knowledge led him to believe that a drug transaction was taking place. 

He testified that even without the information from Corporal Johnson, he would have 
4

stopped and investigated the scene. He said that he asked for consent to search the 

Defendant based on Corporal Johnson‟s information and his own observations of the 

scene. Officer Coffey testified that had the Defendant refused his consent to search, 

Officer Coffey would not have conducted the search. He testified that he was not aware 

of the possibility that cocaine was involved in the case. 

On February 19, 2015, the trial court issued a written order granting the motion to 

suppress. The court found that the confidential informant was credible based on the fact 

that he had provided accurate information in earlier cases. The court found that the 

confidential informant did not describe a basis of knowledge concerning the impending 

drug transaction or a basis of knowledge that the Defendant possessed drugs. The court 

found that the State had not established specific reasonable suspicion that a criminal act 

was being or about to be committed. The court found that the Defendant was seized 

when Officer Coffey activated his blue lights and that this seizure was not supported by 

reasonable suspicion, invalidating the Defendant‟s subsequent consent to the search. On 

February 29, 2015, the trial court issued an order dismissing the Defendant‟s indictment. 

The State filed a timely notice of appeal. 

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred when it granted the 

Defendant‟s motion to suppress. The State contends that the confidential informant‟s 

credibility and basis of knowledge was established prior to the Defendant‟s seizure, 

providing Officer Coffey reasonable suspicion to seize the Defendant. The Defendant

responds that the trial court properly granted the motion to suppress. 

A trial court‟s factual determinations in a suppression hearing will be upheld on 

appeal unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 

(Tenn. 1996). Questions regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight or value of the 

evidence, and determinations regarding conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to 

the trial judge as the trier of fact. State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tenn. 2010). 

“The party prevailing in the trial court is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the 

evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate 

inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 

473 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23). The trial court‟s application of the 

law to the facts is reviewed de novo. State v. Carter, 16 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tenn. 2000).

Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 

7 of the Tennessee Constitution provide protection for individuals against unreasonable 

searches and seizures. State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 900-01 (Tenn. 2008). “[A] 

warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a 
5

result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or 

seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant 

requirement.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).

An exception to the warrant requirement is a brief investigatory stop of an 

automobile that is supported by reasonable suspicion. State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 

866 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d 776, 781 (Tenn. 1998). “However, 

when law enforcement officials initiate an investigative stop as a result of information 

provided by an anonymous informant, Tennessee law requires some showing of both the 

informant‟s veracity or credibility and his or her basis of knowledge.” Keith, 978 S.W.2d 

at 866 (citing Simpson, 968 S.W.2d at 781); cf. State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 

(Tenn. 1989) (discussing the showing required when an anonymous informant‟s tip is 

relied upon to establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant). Our supreme court 

has held that “„while independent police corroboration could make up in deficiencies in 

either prong [of the test for reliability], each prong represents an independently important 

consideration that „must be separately considered and satisfied in some way.‟” State v. 

Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d at 436).

When a confidential informant‟s tip is being used to establish reasonable 

suspicion, rather than probable cause, for an investigatory stop, “the two[-]pronged test of 

reliability is not as strictly applied.” Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 866. Circumstances 

surrounding the tip, such as reporting an incident at or near the time of its occurrence or 

having contemporaneous police corroboration of the tip, may enhance the reliability of 

the tip. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d at 782. In evaluating whether a police officer has a 

reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, a court must consider 

the totality of the circumstances. State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000).

“Those circumstances include the objective observations of the police officer, 

information obtained from other officers or agencies, information obtained from citizens, 

and the pattern of operation of certain offenders.” Day, 263 S.W.3d at 903. 

Additionally, the court “must also consider the rational inferences and deductions that a 

trained police officer may draw from the facts and circumstances known to him.” State v. 

Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 

(1968)). 

On numerous occasions, both this court and our supreme court have addressed the 

the use of an informant‟s tip as the basis of reasonable suspicion for a stop, and an 

examination of several of these cases is instructive in our analysis. In State v. Coleman, 

791 S.W.2d 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989), an informant told an officer “that between 

2:00 and 2:30 p.m. on August 10, a white female, between 25 and 35 years of age and 

whose first name was Carla, would be en route to Robertson County from Davidson 

County on Highway 431 South.” Id. at 504. The informant further told the officer that 
6

the woman would be driving an older model black Monte Carlo, would be in possession 

of seven pounds of marijuana, and would ultimately drive to a location on Washington 

Road. Id. Officers had not used the informant in any previous investigations, and she 

provided no basis of her knowledge of the drug transaction. Id. Officers later spotted an 

older model black Monte Carlo traveling along the route predicted by the informant 

around 2:30 p.m., and a license plate check revealed that the driver‟s name was Carla 

Coleman. Id. at 505. After learning the driver‟s name, an officer turned on his blue 

lights and seized the defendant. Id. This court concluded that the stop was not supported 

by reasonable suspicion because neither the credibility of the informant nor the basis of 

her knowledge was established. Id. at 506-07. The court noted “[t]hat the car was in fact 

registered in the name of Carla Coleman, innocent in and of itself, was the only 

independently acquired fact supporting the tip‟s veracity.” Id. at 506. The court 

observed that officers did not investigate the defendant‟s reputation regarding the use or 

sale of illegal drugs and that the stop occurred before she reached her predicted final 

destination. Id. The court also concluded that “[t]he tip was neither „immediately 

verifiable at the scene‟ nor did it possess, even by way of inference, the basis for the 

informer‟s knowledge.” Id. at 507. 

Our supreme court addressed a similar set of facts in State v. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d 

776 (Tenn. 1998). In Simpson, a confidential informant contacted a member of the 

sheriff‟s department and informed him that the defendant and a second individual were 

transporting 100 dilaudid pills from Memphis to McNairy County. Id. at 777. The 

informant told the officer that the defendant was traveling from Memphis on Highway 64 

in a two-door, cream or beige colored Oldsmobile and would arrive in Selmer “any 

minute.” Id. The officer indicated that he knew the informant “through previous contacts 

as a confidential informant” and that he considered the information reliable. Id. at 777-

78. Officers proceeded to Highway 64, where they spotted the vehicle and stopped it 

based upon the information from the informant. Id. at 778. Our supreme court noted that 

the officer had previous contacts with the person as a confidential informant; that officers 

corroborated several facts provided by the informant, such as the location and direction of 

travel, the time of arrival, and the description of the car, before initiating the stop; and 

that the informant predicted the defendant‟s future behavior. Id. at 782. The court 

concluded that “[t]he preexisting relationship between [the officer] and the confidential 

informant, as well as the independent police corroboration of the facts predicting the 

defendant‟s future behavior given by the informant, sufficiently satisfy the credibility 

prong of the Jacumin test.” Id. at 782. The court acknowledged that the informant did 

not make an explicit statement conveying a basis of knowledge, but the court concluded 

that “the circumstances under which the tip was given indicate that the informant was an 

eye witness.” The court concluded that “[t]he circumstances surrounding the tip, 

including the police corroboration of facts supporting an eye-witness basis of knowledge, 

are sufficient to establish the informant‟s basis of knowledge under Jacumin.” Id. at 782-
7

83. Additionally, the court distinguished Coleman, noting that the informant in Coleman 

had never been utilized as a confidential informant in any prior police investigations, 

officers received the information two days before the alleged transaction was to occur, 

and the informant provided no explicit statement relating his basis of knowledge. Id. at 

783 n.11. 

In State v. Gonzalez, 52 S.W.3d 90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), a confidential 

informant contacted a police officer and told him that the defendant was “en route to 

purchase cocaine on Cadet Lane.” Id. at 93. The informant indicated that the defendant 

would be a passenger in a blue Ford Taurus with damage to the driver‟s side and that the 

defendant would purchase the cocaine. Id. The officer was familiar with both the 

defendant and the blue Taurus, and a second officer testified that he had received 

information from the informant on prior occasions that led to arrests. Id. at 93, 94. The 

second officer also testified that the informant was not someone who would be at the 

drug sale. Id. at 94. One hour after receiving the tip, the officer had not received any 

additional information from the informant and did not know whether the defendant had 

purchased cocaine, but he saw the blue Taurus in a residential area where he was 

patrolling. Id. at 93. This court concluded that “there was limited evidence as to the 

informant‟s credibility, but absolutely no evidence as to the informant‟s basis of 

knowledge.” Id. at 100. The court noted that the only information corroborated by 

officers, that the defendant was with another individual in a blue Taurus with damage to 

the driver‟s side, was “completely innocent” information. Id. The court observed that 

while the officer was familiar with the defendant and the blue Taurus, he did not see the 

defendant in the area where the informant said he was going to purchase cocaine. Id. 

The court further stated that the officer did not see the defendant until an hour after the 

informant told him that the defendant was “en route” to purchase cocaine. Id. Based on 

this evidence, the court concluded that the informant‟s information was not sufficiently 

corroborated and held that the tip did not provide the officer with reasonable suspicion to 

believe that the defendant had been involved in criminal activity. Id. 

In State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468 (Tenn. 2012), which the trial court relied 

upon in denying the motion to suppress in this case, an anonymous tipster called 9-1-1 

and reported “[a]n armed party and possible robbery in progress” at a motel. Id. at 470-

71. The 9-1-1 dispatcher informed police officers of the complaint, and one officer 

“stated that the dispatch included „a possible description of two subjects‟” and that the 

defendant matched one of the descriptions. Id. at 471. The officer also testified that he 

was aware that the motel “was „a place where local prostitutes, addicts, and sellers hang 

out.‟” Id. Six officers were sent to the scene, with some remaining on the first floor 

while others proceeded to the second floor. Id. at 470. The defendant was on the second 

floor, and an officer frisked him after prompting from an unnamed person at the scene 

and discovered a small revolver. Id. at 470, 471. Our supreme court concluded that the 
8

anonymous tip did not provide reasonable suspicion to seize the defendant. Id. at 480. 

The court noted that the tip did not describe the defendant or provide any “„predictive 

information,‟ which would allow police „to test the informant‟s knowledge or 

credibility.‟” Id. (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000)). The court also 

observed that the possession of a firearm was not “per se illegal,” and “the caller did not 

offer any articulable facts indicating that the Defendant unlawfully possessed a gun, and 

the information at the scene did not demonstrate the unlawfulness of its possession until 

after the frisk.” Id. at 480, 481. While noting that “those cases in which the Supreme 

Court upheld stops and frisks occurring in high-crime areas have included significant 

other factors, such as the reliability of the informant or the police officer‟s own 

observations,” the court concluded that none of these factors were present. Id. at 481.

Comparing the facts in the case sub judice with the facts in the above-cited cases, 

Corporal Johnson received information from a confidential informant that the defendant 

would be delivering crack cocaine to a specific apartment complex. Unlike the 

informants in Coleman and Williamson, who were simply anonymous tipsters, the 

confidential informant in this case was known to Corporal Johnson. He testified that he 

had previously utilized the informant and that the informant had provided accurate 

information regarding criminal investigations five or six times in the prior three or four 

months. Additionally, the informant accurately predicted the defendant‟s future behavior

when the informant told officers that the defendant would be arriving at the apartment 

complex. See Simpson, 968 S.W.2d at 782.

The confidential informant identified the specific location at which the defendant 

would arrive, implying “an eyewitness basis of knowledge.” Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 32 

(“When an informant reports an incident at or near the time of its occurrence, a court can 

often assume that the report is first-hand, and hence reliable.”). Both officers testified 

that they were familiar with the defendant‟s black Ford SUV. Officer Coffey recognized 

the defendant‟s vehicle when he arrived at the location specified by the informant, thus 

“confirming the content of the tip” and indicating a basis for the informant‟s knowledge. 

Simpson, 968 S.W.2d at 782 (stating that officers confirmed the content of the 

informant‟s tip that the defendant‟s vehicle was due to arrive “any minute” when they 

“drove immediately to Highway 64 and found the vehicle described by the informant, 

occupied by the defendant”). Further, Officer Coffey testified that he had received 

“numerous drug complaints” at the apartment complex. Based on his own observations 

of the scene, Officer Coffey testified that as soon as he pulled his cruiser behind the 

Defendant‟s vehicle, and before he spoke to any of the people in and around the vehicle, 

it appeared as though a drug transaction was taking place. We conclude that the 

information from the confidential informant and Officer Coffey‟s personal observations 

were sufficient to create reasonable suspicion to justify a brief investigatory stop. 

Because the stop was lawful, the Defendant‟s subsequent consent to the search that 
9

yielded the crack cocaine is also valid. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial 

court, reinstate the charge against the Defendant, and remand the case for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and 

remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

_________________________________

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE