THEATER 

LARGER UNITS: 

ARMY--ARMY GROUP--FIELD ARNY 

Combat Studies Institute 

U.S. Army Command and Gener-1. Staff College port Leavenwsrth, L -- Kansan vvvlr 

- ^AJanuary 1983 

Prepared for the Concept Development DirecJorate, 

Combined Arms Combat Development Actlvlty, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 

in support of the Theater Army Concept Development 

Project 
CSI REPORTS are short-term research papers prepared in response to official inquiries. 

REPORTS are based mainly on secondary sources and provide basic information an 

the subject under consideration. The views, expressed in a CSI REPORT are those of 

the author and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department 

of Defense. 

COMBAT STUDIES BNSTCTUTE 

sitms 

The Combat Studies institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a departmentlevel activity within the U.S. Army Cammarrd and Genera! Staff College, Fort Leavenwarth, Kansas. CSI has the fatIowing missioffs: 

1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns of the 

Army and publish the results in a variety of formats for the Active Army armd 

eserve Componenk 

2. Prepare and present irrstruction in military history at USACGSC and assist other 

US&CGSC departments in i~te~rat~~g mititary history into their instruction, 

3. Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s executive agent for the 

development and coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military 

history ~~~tr~ct~o~ in the TRADOC service school system. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Preface..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 

Chapter 1. 

Chapter 2. 

Chapter 3. 

Chapter 4. 

Chapter 5. 

Chapter 6. 

Chapter 7. 

Appendix A 

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . = . . 1 

by Lieutenant Colonel Gary L. Bounds 

Large Units in North Africa and the 

Mediterranean. . 2-1 

by Dr. Gary J. Bjorge' ' ' * l ' l l ' 

World War II Euronean Theater of Onerations: 

Echelons AbovekCorps . . . . . : . . . 

by Dr. Robert H. Berlin 

Divided Command in the Pacific: 

SWPA and POA. . . . . . . . . . . . . by Dr. George W. Gawrych 

Organization of Large Units During the Korean War . . . . . . . . . , . . by Major Scott R. McMichael 

Vietnam: Command and Control . . s . . . by Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade 

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . by Lieutenant Colonel Gary L. Bounds 

Doctrine Evolution. . . . . . . . . . . . by Lieutenant Colonel Gary L. Bounds 

3-l 

4-1 

5-1 

6-l 

7-l 

A-l 

89-00444 
Charts 

Chapter 2 

1. AFHQ Organization, 1 November 1942 . . . . Z-10 

2. Chain of Command for Operation Torch . . . 2-12 

3. Allied Command, Mediterranean, 

March 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18 

4. Command Structure for Operation Husky . . . 2-20 

5. Proposed System of Command in the . . . . . 2-24 

Mediterranean, 5 December 1943 

6. Command Structure for Operations 

Anvil-Dragoon . . , . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27 

Chapter 3 

1. Predecessor Organizations to SHAEF . . . . 3-7 

2. Chain of Command, Allied Expeditionary 

Force, 13 February 1944 . . . . . . . . . . 3-10 

3‘ Operational Chain of Command, AEF, 

1 April 1944 . . . . . + . . . . . . . . . 3-12 

4. Chain of Command, Allied Expeditionary 

Force, 6 June 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14 

5. Chain of Command, Allied Expeditionary 

Force, 1 August 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16 

6. Operational Chain of Command, AEF, 

k September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-18 

7. Operational Channels, First Allied 

Airborne Army, 28 November 1944 . . . . . 3-23 

8. Operational Chain of Command, AEF, 

18 December 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-25 

9. Operational Chain of Command, AEF, 

27 March 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-27 

10. Operational Chain of Command, AEF, 

lMay1945........... . . . . . 3-28 

Vi 
Chapter 

1. 

Chapter 

1. 

2. 

3. 

Chapter 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

Chapter 

1. 

2. 

ILLUSTRATIONS 

4 

Maps 

Pacific Areas of Operation . . . . . . . . 

6 

South Vietnam, Its Provinces and Corps Tactical Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Major Tactical Units Supported . . . . . . 

Location of Area Commands . . . . . . . . 

Figures 

5 

UNClFEC Organization, 23 September 1950 . . 

Joint Task Force 7 . . , . . . . . . . . m 

Channels of Command, July 1951 . . . . . . 

UN Command/Far East Command, 

Major Ground Forces, 1 July 1951 . . . . . 

Operational Command a . . e . . . . . = . 

Administrative Command . . . . a . . . . . 

Advisory Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Comparison of EUSAK to a 1952 Type Field Army e . . . . . e . e . . . u . . . 

HQt Eighth U.S. Army (Korea), 15 June 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . s . . . 

4 

Summary of the Case For and Against Unified SEACOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Summary For or Against a 

Combined Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4-4 

6-5 

6-37 

6-38 

5-5 

5-7 

5-9 

5-10 

5-12 

5-14 

5-14 

5-15 

5-17 

6-13 

6-23 

V 
Chapter 4 

1. Organization of ABDACOM, 

January-February 1942 . . . . . . . . . . 

2. Command Organization in the Pacific, 

July 1942 . . . . s . . . e . . . . . ; . 

3. Generalized Organization of the Southwest 

Pacific Area, December 1944 . e . . . . . 

4. Organization of Expeditionary Troops for 

the Ryukyus Campaign, January 1945 . . . . 

5. Organization of Central Pacific Task 

Forces for the Ryukyus Campaign, January 1945 . . . . . . . . . , . . . I . 

6. Organization of U.S. Army Forces in the 

Pacific, 1 July 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . 

7. Organization of Forces for Olympic . . . . 

Chapter 6 

1. Chain of Command for Typical Theater 

of Operations . . . . . . . . , . . . . * . 

IA. Theater Army Organizations . . . . . . . . 

2. 'Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, 1956 . . . a . . . . . . . . . . 

3. Chain of Command, Vietnam, 1962 . e . s . 

4. U.S. Command Structure, 1964 . l . . . . . 

5. United States Mission, Vietnam . . . . . . 

6, U.S. Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam . . . . e . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7. Pacific Command Relationships . . . . . . 

8. Chain of Command, 1967 . . . . . . . . . . 

9. Command and Control of Military Operations in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . 

10. Command and Control of the AIRWAR . . . . 

11. USARV Headquarters, 1966 . . . . . . . . e 

vii 

4-2 

4-5 

4-8 

4-10 

4-13 

4-21 

4-22 

6-3 

6-4 

6-6 

6-8 

6-9 

6-PO 

6-12 

6-14 

6-15 

6-17 

6-18 

6-20 
12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

16, 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

Command and Control of the Ground War . . . 

Tactical Ground Forces . v . . . . . . . , 

Command Relationships, I Corps, 1968 I . . 

Command and Control for Riverine 

Operations . . . e . . v e . . . . . . . . 

CORDS Field Organization e . . . . . . . * 

Advisory Relationships .......... 

U.S. Army, Vietnam, 1969 ......... 

1st Logistical Command, 1967 . . . . s . . 

Proposed Command and Control . . . . . . . 

6-22 

6-25 

6-28 

6-30 

6-32 

6-33 

6-35 

6-36 

6-40 

viii 
PREFACE 

The current U.S. Army doctrine for larger unit 

operations predates the AirLand Battle doctrine. As a 

result, the Combined Arms Center's Concept Development 

Directorate and the Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint and Combined Operations are updating the older doctrine with a new field manual on larger unit 

operations. The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) was tasked 

support this project by preparing historical 

izrspective on the echelons of field army, a&y group and 

theater army organization during wartime. The following 

study is the result of CSI's efforts. 

The military philosopher J. F. C. Fuller noted that 

"looking back is the best way of looking forward." CSI"s 

task in looking back was to uncover common principles of 

command and organization in order to highlight past 

mistakes and successes. To do this, the study begins with 

World War II and moves forward to the Vietnam Conflict. 

The study focuses on the organization, command 

relationships, functions, and logistics of operational theaters. 

The study uncovered unity of command as a guiding principle for larger unit organization, and many other 

lessons are developed as well in the individual chapters. 

It is hoped that this study will help provide the 

historical foundation for the revised larger unit manuals. 

ix 
CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION 

The American Civil War marked the beginning of the 

U.S. force structure's evolution toward larger units. 

Prior to the Civil War there were few occasions when 

Americans mobilized sufficient forces to constitute even 

one small army. During the Civil War, millions of men 

were mobilized and for the first time the United States 

possessed massive forces dispersed in multiple theaters of 

operation. The mobilization. of large units produced the 

need for corresponding command and control elements. It 

was during the Civil War that we saw the evolution in the 

U.S. force structure of a single commander directly controlling more than one Army, a case in point being when 

U. S. Grant was placed in charge of all field forces in 

1864. From that time, Grant exercised command over all 

U.S. land forces, and the Civil War became the U.S'. Army's 

first experience in command, control, and support of corps and Army-size unit operations.1 

During World War I the French General Joffre directly 

commanded eight armies prior to the Battle of.the Marne in 

September 1914, and Von Moltke directly commanded seven 

German armies. The Russian leader, Grand Duke Nicholas, 

commanded six armies but organized his command structure 

differently. His armies were widely dispersed, and he 

established an organization with two groups, thus placing 

an additional level of command and control between the 

armies and the general headquarters.2' Gradually the 

idea of the. army group as an intermediary headquarters 

developed, and by the end of World War I, all major powers 

ha: experimented with the army group echelon of command 

control. General Pershing and the American 

Expeditionary Force (AEF) .never actually used the army 

group extensively, preferring instead that the army 

commanders deal directly with the general headquarters.3 

Pershing went to Europe in 1917 with a direct 

appointment from the Secretary of War as the Commanding 

General, AEF. Inherent in this appointment was the 

establishment of a general headquarters (GHQ) for the 

prosecution of the war. This status, according to some 

interpretations, placed Pershing as a coequal of the Army 

Chief of Staff and he reported directly to the Secretary of War.4 Pershing"s independent and somewhat arrogant 

qritten by Lieutenant Colonel Gary L. Bounds 

l-l 
nature contributed to this somewhat unique relationship. 

Upon arrival in Europe, Pershing estimated the nature and 

scope of the U.S. involvement in 

requested twent 

war J 

the war and pr;;pkkz divisions plus supporting troops. 

progresse , Pershing periodically increased his 

requests, and by the time of the German collapse, the 

United States had forty-three of its sixty-two infantry divisions in France.5 

Throughout this buildup, Pershing constantly resisted 

pressure by Britain and France to integrate American 

troops piecemeal into Allied units. Pershing's adamant 

resistance set a precedent repeated during World War 11 

and in later conflicts that American forces must fight 

under American commanders. (Pershing actually consented 

to U.S. forces being committed to combat with Allied 

units, but these forces were usually of battalion size.)6 

Logistically, the AEF was organized in much the same 

way as an army in a modern thea,ter of war. Pershing 

established a Line of Communication HQ which was later 

designated the Service of Supply (SOS). This headquarters 

had several sections deployed at various places in the 

communications zone to facilitate supply and evacuation 

operations. By the summer of 1918, the War Department proposed that the supply function be made a separate 

operation, thus freeing Pershing to pursue operations. This would .have further expanded the War DepartmentIs role 

in the supply operation, but Pershing insisted it was his 

prerogative as theater commander to control the support 

operations of his theater. In addition, Pershing quick1 

designated his chief of staff as commander of the SOS. f; 

The United States emerged from World War I with 

considerable experience on which to base future practices 

and procedures. By 1921, having been elevated to Army Chief of Staff, General Pershing became instrumental in a 

number of reforms that helped prepare America for the next 

major war. The reforms included an increased role for the 

general staff in operational planning. Pershing agreed to 

the findings of the Harbord Board which established the 

War Plans Board (later OPD), a development which paved the 

way for the general staff to play a major operational role 

in World War II.8 

During the interwar period, the United States 

continued to borrow doctrinally from the French. In 1924, 

our first manual on larger unit operations, a direct 

translation from the post-World War I French publication, 

l-2 
was released. This manual outlined the command, 

organization and tactical emplo ment of large units, but 

none larger than the field army. B 

In '1930, the War Department published a Manual for 

Commanders of Larger Units (Provisional). Volume 1, 

was the first American effort to articulate a 

m;sed on recent U.S. initiatives to guide larger units in the field. This early equivalent to later 

FM 100-15s described the philosophy of American 

participation in a mature theater of war. The regulation 

established the general headquarters (GHQ) to oversee the 

forces in the field and defined the various other echelons 

of command as required, i.e., army groups, field armies, 

corps, and divisions. At this time the division was 

considered to be a larger unit, 

largest tactical unit. 

and the army group was the 

Much of what is depicted in the 

1930 manual directly reflects Pershing's influence as well 

as a number of his reforms. The GHQ established to direct 

field forces mirrored the AEF organization of World War 1, 

and the larger units discussed reflected the echelons of 

command many World War I veterans 

operations in a mature theater.10 

felt were required for 

Throughout the 192Os, and early 193Os, General Pershing and other reformers fought to enhance the Army's position 

by seeking increased resources for a skeletonized force. 

By 1930, when General Douglas MacArthur was appointed Chief of Staff, it was becoming evident that World War I 

was not "the war to end all wars.” MacArthur, although 

under strict materiel and personnel constraints, continued 

the battle for a viable force structure. Organizationally, he was able to establish a framework for mobilization and 

force expansion in case of war. 

1920s, Although proposed in the the establishment of Army areas in CONUS was not 

realized until 1932, when four field army headquarters 

were established to facilitate general mobilization. The 

headquarters were to be exercise and planning agencies providing staff and commanders with experience to take to 

the field. MacArthur also proposed a skeletonized Arm 

group headquarters, but this idea did not materialize. 1Y 

By the summer of 1939, the Regular Army was still 

scattered around 130 posts in mostly battalion-size 

units. 

and 

Field armies existed for 'exercise purposes only, the corps structures were: primarily administrative 

headquarters. As the U.S. prepared to enter the war, it 

was evident to many military leaders that the conflict 

might become a multitheater war. 12 

l-3 
Doctrinally, 

headquarters 

the 1930 manual called for a general 

to be established for expeditionary forces 

which would direct the various aspects of war fighting. However, by this time many Army leaders, to include Chief 

of Staff General George C. Marshall, believed the current 

doctrinal organization to be insufficient to meet the 

challenges of a multi-theater war, 

operational mission, 

a training mission, an 

evolving air force. 

and the complications of a rapidly As a result, 

was effected, 

a reorganization study and on 9 March 1942, the findings were acted 

on by creating a division of responsibilities. The Army Ground Force was created to train the field forces while 

the general staff was to control operations. Thus, on the 

eve of active participation in the war, the United States 

Army had established- a command center for worldwide combat 

operations *13 

Changes brought about by the Army reorganization of 

March 1942 necessitated revision of the 1930 field manual 

on larger unit operations, and in June 1942, the new 

FM 100-15 appeared. Preparation for operations were 

already in progress in England, the framework for larger 

but this FM would provide unit 

World War II.14 operations throughout 

l-4 
NOTES 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, Tactical 

and Strategic Studies: A Group of Armies (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: The Command and General Staff School 

Press, 1923), 5. 

Ibid., 5-6. 

Ibid., 3. 

Russell F. Weigley, History of ,the United States Army (New York: Macmillan Co., 196/), 377-78. 

Ibid., 358-60. 

Ibid., 381. 

Ibid., 369-70, 381. 

Ibid., 405. 

France, Ministry of War, Provisional Instructions for 

the Tactical Employment of Large Units (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: The General Service School Press, 

1924). 

U.S. War Department, A Manual for Commanders of Large 

Units (Provisional), vol. 1, Operations (Washington, 

DC, 1930) . 

U.S. War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff to 

Commanding Generals of Corps Area and Departments, Letter, Subject: "Establishment of Field Armies," 9 

August 1932. 

Weigley, History of the United States Army, 419. 

Ibid., 405, 440-44. 

U.S. War Department, 100-15 Field Service 

Regulations, (Washington, E, 29 June'1942). 

l-5 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

France. Ministry of War Provisional Instructions for the 

Tactical Employment of Large Units. Fort Leavenworth, KS: The General Service School Press, 1925. 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff School. Tactical and 

Strategic Studies: A Group of Armies, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: The C'ommand and General Staff School 

Press, 1923. 

U.S. War Department, Fm 100-15. Field Service 

Regulations. Washington, D.C., 29 June 1942. 

Manual 

(P;ovisAional). 

for Commanders of Large Units 

Vol. 1. Operations. Washington, D.C., 193U. 

df 

Office of the Chief of Staff to Commanding Generals 

Corps Area and Departments. Letter, Subject: *'Establishment of Field Armies." 9 August 1932. 

Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army. New York: Macmillan Co., 1967. 

1-7 
CHAPTER 2 

LARGE UNITS IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN* 

Introduction 

When the United States became a belligerent in World 

War II on 7 December 1941. U.S. Armv large unit 

organization was still guided by A Manual -for C&manders 

of Large Units (Provisional). This manual, which had been 

published by the chief of staff in 1930, was rooted in the 

experiences- of the Army during World War I and was 

considered inadequate to meet 

posed by World War II. 

the military challenges 

the war, on 

Six months after U.S. entry into 

29 June 1941, Chief of Staff George C. 

Marshall promulgated a new doctrinal statement on large units, FM lQQ-15, Field Service Regulations, 'Units. Larger This document, in addition to describing the 

functions and operations of army groups and armies as the 

1930 manual did, 

operations and 

also discussed joint land, sea, and air 

placed much greater emphasis 

large-scale, extensive "theaters of onerations." Fieyi SerGice Regulations, Larger Units, June 1942, did not, 

however, use the term "theater army,“’ and there was no 

mention of combined operations wi>th- Allied forces. SUCh 

concepts and practices were soon to emerge, however, as 

the war against the Axis powers developed. 

This chapter examines the beginning efforts of 

American and British military leaders to create large unit 

structures that could successfully plan, organize, and 

carry out the massive military operations that were 

required in World War II. It further examines the 

evolution of larger units brought about by the experiences 

gained in North Africa and the Mediterranean area. 

Starting with the first phases of Anglo-American military cooperation, this chapter discusses the establishment of 

the European Theater of Operations (ETO), the involvement 

of ET0 in the invasion of North Africa, the establishment 

of the North African Theater of Operat$ons (NATO), subsequent organizational changes within NATO, the 

establishment of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

*Written by Dr. Gary J. Bjorge. 

2-l 
(MTO), and later organizational changes within MTO. What 

emerges is a picture that exemplifies how American and 

British military leaders successfully met the military challenge before them by creating .effective large unit 

structures. 

American-British Cooperation Before Pearl Harbor -.--- 

'United States-United Kingdom cooperation in military 

matters began well before U.S. entry into World War II. 

In October 1940, Major General James E. Chaney of the Army Air Corps was sent to England to observe the air war over 

Britain. He submitted his report to the War Department in 

December 1940 and predicted 

to defeat Britain. 

that Germany would be unable 

the U.S. 

On 29 January 1941, representatives of 

Army chief of staff and chief of naval operations 

met with representatives of the British chiefs of staff in 

a series of meetings known as ABC-l (for American-British 

staff conversations). The purpose of these meetings was 

to establish principles and methods for acting together 

against the Axis powers entering the war. in the eventuality of the U.S. 

It was agreed at these meetings to 

exchange military missions and coordinate planning, and in 

May 1941, the U.S. mission, 

or SPOBS, began operating 

named Special Observer Group, 

Chaney in command. 

in London with Major General 

The -entire group consisted 'of eigkteen officers and eleven enlisted men.1 

The first task of SPOBS was to establish liaison with 

the British and begin learning about their equipment and 

methods of operation. SPOBS was also tasked to help 

coordinate the allocation of the equipment that was being 

shi ped to Britain under the American 

Len t3 provisions of 

-Lease Act of 11 March 1941. In mid-1941, SPOBS 

became involved in the American occupation of Iceland. It 

was also * 

stationing $;vY.S. responsibility for preparing for the 

and elsewhere 

forces in Northern Ireland, Scotland, 

in the British< Isles, in case the United 

States became an active participant in the war. At the 

time all of this work was being done, the United States 

remained o'fficially neutral and SPOBS had to be careful 

not to overtly violate that neutrality. 

United States Buildup in Great Britain 

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and United States 

entry into the war dramatically altered the 

American-British relationship. The two nations were now 

2-2 
at war against common foes. In December 1941, Prime 

Minister Churchill traveled to Washington, D.C., and in a 

series of meetings known as the Arcadia C,onference reached 

agreement with President Roosevelt on broad global strategy and a combined prosecution of the war. The 

Combined Chiefs of Staff WCS) organization was 

established to coordinate military operations and allocate 

resources, and the British Chiefs of Staff appointed a 

permanent party called the Joint Staff Mission to stay in 

Washin ton to work with 4 the American Army-Navy Joint 

Board. This established unity of command at the 

highest level and made it 'possible for the United States 

and Great Britain to proceed with a joint war effort. 

In early 1941, the United States moved quickly to 

establish a military presence in Great Britain6 On 

8 January, the first step toward establishing a U.S. Army headquarters in England was taken with the activation of 

Headquarters, * Forces in the British 

Isles (USAFBI)U.n31te~aj",:a'eGSen~~~:: Chaney was designated the commander, On 24 January, the first ground command 

was established when United. States Army Northern Ireland 

Force (USANIF) was officially announced.4 On 

26 January, four thousand American troops debarked at 

Belfast, Northern Xreland. 

AS the number of American forces in Great Britain grew during the next several months, so, too, did the debate 

over how to organize and command them. General Chaney and 

most members of his staff favored regional commands. The 

Operations Division (OPD) in the War Department and Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, favored 

functional commands. On 14 May, General Marshall sent a 

letter directive to General Chaney informing him that U.S. 

forces in the United Kingdom were to be organized along 

the same pattern as the new War ,Department structure with 

three coordinate functional commands, one each for air, 

ground, and services.5 OPD envisioned that General 

Cbaney's headquarters would be organized like a command 

post, with Army Air Forces in Great Britain largely 

autonomous under an air command, and administrative and 

supply functions passing to a theater-wide services 

command. Establishing an air command was not such a 

difficult matter, but the establishment of a theater-wide 

services command cr.eated serious disagreements. 

Marshall's 14 May directive gave broad powers to Supply of 

Services (SOS) in the United Kindom, and after SOS, USAFBI 

was established in London on 24 May,~ its commanding 

general, Major General John C. H. Lee, set out to take 

over virtually all supplYand administrative functions in 

USAFBI. On 28 May, he submitted a draft general order 

which proposed that all supply arms and services except 

2-3 
for the minimum amount needed ' 

administration of Headquarters, USAF~I 

the supply and 

SOS. 

be placed under 

General Chaney and his staff felt'that this proposal infringed too much on 

the broad powers given 

their areas of responsibility, but 

SOS in the 14 May directive made 

them uncertain of their position. On 23 May, Chaney's chief of staff, Brigadier General Charles L. Bolte/, sent a 

memorandum to the visiting chief of OPD, Major General 

Dwight D. Eisenhower, asking him to help clarify the 

situation. What was needed, Bolt& said, was a ‘basic 

directive to the Commanding General, USAFBI, his authority, responsibility, and mission."6 concerning 

The controversy over how best to 0rganize.U.S. forces 

in Great Britain had been of deep concern to General 

Marshall for some time. In A ril 1942, 

to London to argue for plan Bo !l ero, 

during his visit 

a plan which envisaged 

a great American buildup in Great Britain and a 

cross-channel assault, he had sensed that the American 

officers on dutv there "were not familiar with the broader 

problems and objectives of the War Department."7 he returned to Washington, he directed the chief of 

General Eisenhower, to travel to London to see what 

be done about correcting the situation. Marshall 

told Eisenhower that he wanted him to 

recommendations involving future "bring 

development of our European forces."8 organiz#ation 

After 

OPD, 

could 

also 

b::: 

European Theater ofOperations 

General Eisenhower's visit to the United Kingdom left 

him convinced that General Chaney and his staff had to be 

replaced and that a European 

"absolute unity of command 

Theater of Operations with 

exercised by the Theater 

Commander" should be esiablished.9 On 8 June, he 

presented General Marshall with a draft directive entitled 

"Directive for the Commanding General, European Theater of 

Operations“ that provided for unified command of all 

American forces in the European area.10 

the directive was 

That very day, 

of Operations, 

sent out establishing European Theater 

United States Army (ETOUSA), with General 

Chaney as commander. later, on 11 June, Marshall 

-Three days told Eisenhower to prepare to leave OPD and 

relieve General Chaney as Commanding General, ETOUSA. On 

24 June, Eisenhower arrived in London and assumed command. 

The 8 June directive that established ETOUSA gave the 

Commanding General, ETO, the "tactical, strate ical, 

territorial, and administrative duties of a tester i? 

2-4 
commander."11 In keeping with the principle of unity of 

command, he was to exercise planning and operational control over all U.S. forces, including naval forces, assigned to the theater. U.S. forces were ins;;;fz,";d by the directive to cooperate with British . 

operations against the Axis powers, but it was ali: 

specified that U.S. forces were to be maintained as 

distinct and separate components in such operations. 

Before Eisenhower left Washington, he visited the 

Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, and was 

told by King that he would do everything possible to make 

sure that Eisenhower was, in fact, the actual "commander" 

of naval forces assigned to ETO. King stressed the point that this would be the "first deliberate attempt by the 

American fighting services to set up a unified command in 

the field for a command of indefinite length."12 He 

told Eisenhower that there should be no talk of the ET0 

commander's authoritzy resting upon "'cooperation"' "paramount interest, and that any violation of by: authority by naval units should be reported to King personally. 

Admiral King's position assured interservice unity of 

command in ETO. Shortly after Eisenhower assumed command 

of ETOUSA, he also worked to resolve the intraservice 

issue of how SOS fit into the theater command structure. 

On 20 July, General Order 19, which restated the 

responsibilities of SOS and its position in ETOUSA, was 

issued. The authority of commanding general, SOS, as a 

corps area commander was restricted so as not to apply to 

areas where another commander already had such authority. More staff sections (eight) were made residents of theater 

headquarters, and the remaining ten staff sections were to 

have senior representatives selected by the theater 

commander there. General Lee was assigned the additional 

responsibility of administrative and supply planning for 

theater operations. He was also given authority to 

communicate directly with British officials and the War 

Department on supply matters without going through theater 

headquarters. This was a compromise solution, and General 

Eisenhower apparently considered this arrangement to be 

temporary. However, other events intervened and General 

Order 19 governed ETOUSA organization for the 

year.13 

next 

Allied Force Headwarters .-- ---- 

When General Eisenhower became Commanding General, 

ETOUSA, Allied planning was still directed towards a 

2-5 
buildup of U.S. forces in the United Kingdom and a 

cross-channel assault. Then in late July, it was decided 

that an invasion of Northwest Africa, code named Operation 

Torch, would be undertaken. On 26 July, General Marsha.11 

informed Eisenhower that he would be appointed commander 

in chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force that would 

carry out Torch.14 Eisenhower began organizing a 

headquarters staff immedj.ately, and by the time that he 

was officially notified of his appointment on 14 August, 

the organization of his headquarters was largely 

complete. When this headquarters, which was called Allied 

Force Headquarters (AFHQ) 9 officially announced its 

existence on 12 September with the publication of General 

Order 1, it was actually already a month old.15 

AFHQ was a headquarters without precedent in history. For several months General Eisenhower had been involved 

with the establishment of an efficient joint command 

structure for U,S. forces in Great Britain. Now he had 

the task of creating a combined headquarters that fused 

the different services of two nations into an effective 

fighting force. He accomplished this task by adhering to 

three principles: unity of command, a close balance of 

American and British personnel in staff sections, and the 

use of the best person for the job regardless of 

nationality. He firmly insisted on a unity of spirit that 

held no room for nationalistic sentiments. To enforce his 

position, Eisenhower had at least two American officers 

removed from their duties and sent back to the U.S. for 

making disrespectful remarks about the British.16 

Unity of command was the firm foundation upon which 

AFHQ was constructed. As noted by Eisenhower: 

Alliances inthe past have often done no more 

than to name the common foe, and "unity of 

command I’ has been a pious aspiration thinly 

disguising the national jealousies, ambitions and 

recriminations of high ranking officers, 

unwilling to subordinate themselves or their 

forces to a command:of different nationality or 

different service . . . I was determined, from 

,the first, to do all in my power to make this a 

truly Allied Force, with real unity of command 

and centralization of administrative 

responsibility.17 

General Eisenhower had to fight to obtain the unity of 

command that he 

chiefs sought. A draft directive from the 

British of staff to Lieutenant General 

Kenneth A. N. Ander.son placing him and British First Army 

2-6 
under Eisenhower”s command contained a clear ,limitation to 

Eisenhower’s command authority . The draft directive 

stated that if the Allied Commander in Chief gave an order 

that imperiled any British troops in the Allied force, 

even those not under Anderson’s command, Anderson would be 

"at liberty to a 

[wad executed. ” Eki eal to the War Office before the order 

Eisenhower received of this 

draft directive and quickly expressed his ~b~~!~ions in a 

letter to General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Churchill’s Chief 

of Staff: 

I anticipate that as fighting develops in the 

new theater there will be times that 

detachments of both United St%?:: and Br’itish 

forces are definitely imperiled. . * . But I 

have constantly endeavored to maintain in all my relationships with the Br it ish Government and 

Armed Services, with the American War Department, 

and with my staff and subordinate commanders, 

that we are undertaking a single, unified effort 

in pursuit of a common object stated by the two 

governments; and that for the attainment of this 

object our sole endeavor must be to use every 

resource and asset for the common good. I think 

this view is correct and that our best interests 

will be served if all concerned are imbued with a 

similar purpose e Consequently, departures from 

normal practices of command should be tolerated 

only in cases of urgent necessity. 

In view of the above, I believe that this 

directive should be written in the form of a 

short statement of principles, emphasizing unity of the whole, and stressing the great desirability of keeping the integrity of national 

forces. I should give to General Anderson the 

right, in what he may consider to be grave and 

exceptional circumstances, to appeal to his home 

government, but he should be instructed first to 

notify the Allied Commander in Chief that he 

intends so to appeal, giving his reasons 

therefore. 

As a final “word, I should like to say that I 

do not present the above from any personal 

viewpoint whatsoever, since any order issued 

directly by the War Office to General Anderson 

could have no other effect than to relieve me of 

a portion of very responsibility. I" am 

heavy burden of 

speaking solely from 

2-7 
conviction, and, while I believe that the British 

Chiefs of Staff probably see this matter exactly 

as I do, I think the wording of their directive 

is such as to weaken rather than to support the 

spirit that should be developed and sustained 

among the ranks participating in this 

enterprise .19 great 

In response to General Eisenhower’s comments, the 

British Chiefs of Staff changed their directive to General 

Anderson. It now included the following two paragraphs: 

His Majesty’s Government and the Government 

of the United States have agreed that singleness 

of purpose and unified direction are essential to 

the speedy success of these operations. To this 

end, the First Army has been placed under the 

Supreme command of the Allied Commander in Chief, 

Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, United 

States Army. In the exercise of his command, the 

national forces at his disposal will be used 

towards the benefit of the United Nations and in 

pursuit of the common object. You will carry out 

any orders issued by him. 

In the unlikely event of your receiving an 

order which, in your view, will give rise to a 

grave and exceptional situation, you have the 

right to appeal to the War Office, provided that 

by so doing an opportunity is not lost, nor any 

part of the Allied Force endangered. You will, 

however) first inform the Allied Commander in 

Chief that you intend so to appeal, and you will 

give him your reasons.20 

The revised directive completely satisfied 

Eisenhower. In an endorsement he wrote: 

I consider its terms completely 

satisfactory. In .fact it so definitely expresses the views I hold with respect to appropriate 

instructions to a National Commander under the 

conditions prevailing in thisUn;;i;, that I w;; forwarding a copy to the m States 

Department in the hope that it will serve as a 

model in future cases of ,this kind.21 

Personnel policies were used to strengthen the 

organizational unity established 

command. Operational staff sections through unity of 

were integrated as 

far as possible, and the principle of balanced personnel 

2-8 
was observed. Whenever an assistant chief of staff or 

chief of a section was of one nationality, an officer of 

the other nationality of near or equal rank was designated 

his deputy. This pr$ctice was almost general enough to be 

called the “Principle of the opposite number" and often 

extended down to subsections within staff sections. Below 

this level, the rest of the personnel was recruited as 

equally as possible from American and British sources. 

None of these practices precluded finding the best 'person for the job. 

Balanced personnel did IClot apply to most 

administrative and supply staff sections. 

differences 

In these cases, in organization, procedures, and channels of 

communication made it advisable not to have 

sections. integrated Instead, parallel and separate American and 

British staff sections were established, each with their 

own personnel. Eisenhower did not want these sections to 

have an "international facade . . the administration 

which would prejudice and maintenanc*e of the armies 

which the success of [his] operations would depend."22 upon 

Coordination between the American and British 

administrative and supply sections was provided by establishing the position of Chief Administrative Office 

(CAO). This position, which General Eisenhower called 

"unique in the history of war,'"23 was filled by a 

British officer, Lieutenent General Sir Humfrey Gale. His 

responsibilities included the following: 

1) Coordination of all operational logistical matters 

(British and American) in the theater. 

2) Coordination of American and British Army, Navy, and Air Administrative staffs. 

3) Convocation of GAO conferences to facilitate the 

exchange of information and expedite coordination.24 

The organizational structure of AFHQ on the eve of the 

invasion of North Africa is shown on chart 1. General 

Eisenhower was Allied Commander in Chief, and another 

American, Lieutenant Mark W. Clark, was Deputy Allied 

Commander in Chief. Clark's 

designated Originally, position had been 

a British position, but due to a desire to 

ensure that Torch would still have an American facade in 

case something happened to Eisenhower, Clark was given the 

appointment, It was assumed that in light of French 

bitterness toward the British because of Dunkirk, the 

2-9 
r 

2-10 
French in North Africa would resist a British-led 

invasion. The Chief of Staff, AFHQ , was also an 

American, and headquarters organization and staff 

procedures were along American. lines. 

Operation Torch 

As finally agreed upon, Operation Torch consisted of 

amphibious landings by three task forces on 

8 November 1942. The Western Task Force landed at 

Casablanca) Morocco. The Central Task Force landed at 

Oran, Algeria. The Eastern Task Force landed at Algiers, Algeria. The Western Task Force was composed entirely of 

American ground, naval, and air forces that came directly from the United States. The Center Task Force was also 

American, but it sailed from the United Kingdom with 

British naval support. The Eastern Task Force was 

f 

redominantly British, but it carried an American assault 

orce in order to project an American image to the French. 

General. Eisenhower, as Allied Commander in Chief, 

exercised direct control over the commanding generals of 

the task forces and indirect command over the senior naval 

commanders of both nationalities through a British Naval 

Commander in Chief, Expeditionary Force, Admiral Sir 

Andrew Browne Cunningham. Eisenhower exercised command 

over land aviation through British and American Air Force 

commanders.25 

Admiral Cunningham was responsible to the Allied 

Commander in Chief for the sea security of Torch and for 

naval support to the amphibious landings in the western 

Mediterranean. For operations other than Torch in the 

western Mediterranean and in the North Atlantic, however, 

Admiral. Cunningham remained directly responsible to the 

British Admiralty. The American naval forces that came 

directly from the United States were under the command of 

Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, until they crossed the meridian of 400 west longitude. They then 

came under command of Commander in Chief, Allied ,Force. 

When the assault operations were finished and these naval 

forces were released by Commander in Chief, Allied Force, they reverted back to the command of Commander in Chief, 

U.S. Atlantic Fleet. The Sea Frontier Forces of the U.S. 

Navy along the Atlantic Moroccan coast were under the 

command of the Commanding General, Western Task Force. 

The U.S. naval operating base at Oran was under the 

command of Commanding General, Center Task Force.26 The 

chain of command for Operation Torch is shown in chart 2. 

2-11 
w 

0 

2-12 
AFHQ exercised overall planning and logistical control 

for Torch as well as oper.ational control. Officers were 

borrowed from ETOUSA and SOS for planning purp0ses, but 

there was still insufficient liaison and communication 

between AFHQ and these two headquarters. The result was 

that SOS was responsible f,or implementing a supply 2f rogram 

that had been planned by another organization. This 

was considered to be a distinct handicap, and General Lee, 

Gommanding General, SOS, later said that one of the 

principal lessons of Torch was that supply planning and 

operations must be closely coordinated with tactical 

planning and operations.28 

Supply of the Torch task forces was initially carried 

out from their respective points of origin. Because 

Central Task Force was made up of American forces, its 

source of supply was shifted to the United States from the 

United Kingdom as soon as its position ashore was 

consolidated. The British ran the Port of Algiers. The 

ports of Oran and Casablanca were run by the Americans. 

AFHQ G4 had plannned that at these two ports specially organized SOS units would come ashore after the area had 

been secured and would establish base sections. This 

occurred at Oran. The first echelon of the Mediterranean 

Base Section (MBS) came ashore on 11 November. On 

6 December, MBS was established and was soon handling tremendous quantities of supplies. At Casablanca, 

however, the situation was much different. The Western 

Task Force commander deferred the transfer of the SOS unit 

that was supposed to establish the Atlantic Base Section 

(ABS) , and the first echelon didn't arrive until 

24 December. Supply troops of the Western Task Force were 

given the jobs of base section and port operation. Due to 

a lack of training, however, they couldn"t handle these 

tasks properly. Many essential 

lost before order was establis~enf.s29wer~h~spe~p~rdie~~~ 

@Wk;d out the necessity of having organized service 

included in an invasion force. On 30 December 

1942, in order to better coordinate the activities of MBS, 

ABS, and the port of Algiers, the two base sections were 

removed from the jurisdiction of the Task Force commanders 

and were placed, as the port of Algiers had been from the 

start, directly under the command of AFHQ,3O which since 

25 November had been located in Algiers. 

North African Theater of Operations 

Operation Torch was 

operation within the ETO. planned and carried out as an On 18 August, to accommodate 

2-13 
this" action, ETU boundaries were expanded to include the 

previously excluded European countries of Portugal, Spain, and Italy, and all of, Northwest Africa. Even as that was 

being done, however, 

Horth Africa 

it was foreseen that the campaign in 

could not forever remain a part of ETO. 

General Eisenhower, who at the time was already both 

Commanding General, ETOUSA, and Commander in Chief, Allied 

Expeditionary Force, suggested that as soon as the Torch 

force was firmly established, the North African ‘area 

should be detached from ETOUSA and a new theater 

established. He predicted that this could be done 

approximately two months after the landings.31 

AFHQ moved to Algiers on 25 November 1942, but it was 

not until February that the break with ET0 was made. On 

3 February 1943, the boundaries of ET0 were redrawn to 

exclude Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Northwest Africa, and 

these areas were incorporated into a new theater called 

the North African Theater of Operations, under General 

Eisenhower. On 4 February, NATOUSA was established. 

General Eisenhower was relieved of his position as Commanding General, ETOUSA, and was appointed Commanding General, NATOUSA. This same day, ET0 received a new 

commanding general. 

NATOUSA was created to handle the administration of 

the ever-growing American forces in the area, matters that 

were not properly of Allied concern. At first, like 

General Eisenhower, many of its military personnel were 

working as both Allied force and theater officers. Later, 

sections AFHQ would 

ZZ~arZZYtesections in ON~TOUSA.~~ 

be transferred to 

As Allied Commander in Chief and theater commander, 

General Eisenhower's time was in great demand. He 

required the assistance of another general officer who 

could tend to the dYetails of the theater command. This 

need was filled by the appointment of Brigadier General 

Everett S. Hughes to be the deputy theater commander (DTC) of the new theater. 

""relieving 

General Hughes saw his responsibility 

Ztails."'33 

the theater commander of all possible 

In many respects the American DTC was to 

become much like the British CAO, and when necessary Generals Hughes and Gale cooperated in problem solving. 

An interesting point concerning the position of DTC is 

that American Army organization did not provide for such a 

position. General Hughes was sensitive.to this fact and 

wished to have his position and duties clarified by being 

2-14 
designated also as Commanding General, Communications Zone 

(COMZ) * The duties of a COMZ commander were defined in 

U.S. Army Field Service Regulations and coincided with 

those that would be undertaken by the DTC , namely, American territorial defense, administration, and supply 

in the rear of the combat zone. Designating General 

Hughes as Commanding General, COMZ, did not mean that a 

headquarters separate from HQ, NATOUSA, was being 

activated. It merely gave the DTC a more understandable 

definition of duties using traditional army terms. On 

9 February, General Eisenhower designated, General Hughes 

as CG, COMZ.34 

On 15 February, SOS, NATOUSA,, was established. All 

supply activities and personnel from ABS, MBS, and the 

newly 

were 

created Eastern Base S~:zz;~ (EBS) at Constantine 

assigned to this new . Brigadier General 

Thomas B. Larkin was designated Commanding General, SOS, 

NATOUSA, with headquarters at Oran. He reported to the 

DTC in all matters related to supply. The commanders' of 

the base sections reported to the DTC in all matters 

related to the operation of their bases. This command was 

to relieve GS, AFHQ, of operational functions, but 

problems of communication and coordination between the two 

commands often arose. To correct this problem, a colonel 

from SOS was appointed as SOS representative at AFHQ "for 

conferences and for the transmission of information to the 

Commanding General, SOS."35 

While the changes in administrative and supply command 

structures discussed above were occurring, numerous 

changes in larger unit operational commands were. also 

being implemented. On 1 January 1943, the Eastern Task 

Force was redesignated the British First Army. On 

4 January, the U.S. Fifth Army under the command of 

General Mark Clark was activated at Ojuda, Morocco. The 

missions of this Army were to preserve' the territorial 

integrity of French Morocco and Algeria,- prepare a strike 

force for amphibious operations,' prepare ! 

lans, and work 

with French civil and military authorities. 6 

Organizational adjustments were also being made 

because of the employment of French forces in the Allied 

military effort. On 22 November, the French regime in 

North Africa s'igned agreements 'in which they pledged the 

aid of French forces to assist the U.S. and its Allies in 

the war against the Axis powers. As these agreements were 

implemented, however, complications quickly arose because 

the French refused to fight under British command. As a 

way to break the impasse, on 13 January, General 

Eisenhower assumed direct command over American, 

2-15 
British, and French units and established what amounted to 

E&t 

intermediate army group headquarters, AFHQ Command 

Constantine, to 

Eisenhforwoyt made frequent 

exercise this command,37 

the after 13 trips to this command post and 

January, but this was not 

satisfactory solution to the French command problem. Thi: 

problem was solved after several weeks by the lar e 

restructuring of Allied forces that was agreed to by t i? e 

CCS at the Anfa Conference of 13-23 January. 

The Anfa Conference, held outside Casablanca, Moracco, 

was an important series of meetings that involved not only the CCS but the political leaders of the U.S. and the 

United Kingdom. Progress to date was assessed and future 

plans were made. One of the major problems faced at the 

conference was that of creating a command structure that 

would permit the coordination of ground, air, and sea 

forces in North Africa with those in the Middle East. The 

a pr;:oach of the British Eighth Army to the southern border 

o !i Tunisia made this decision imperative. 

The solution for the ground forces was to establish an 

intermediate army group headquarters between AFHQ and the 

headquarters of the British First Army in northern Tunisia 

and the British Eighth Army that was about to enter 

southeastern Tunisia. General Sir Harold R. L. G. 

Alexander, 

Commander, 

Commander in Chief, Middle SEast, was appointed 

18th Army Group, Allied Force.38 

and Deputy Commander in Chief, 

The 18th Army Group assumed, to a large 

extent, the operational responsibilities of AFHQ. Among 

other tasks, it developed tactical plans and issued 

directives for operations, in the Tunisian area. It 

commanded all ground forces in the Tunisian area and 

coordinated army operations with air and naval forces. It 

also was responsible for keeping itself informed on the 

logistical situation to and in Tunisia and for controlling the level of supplies made 

Although an Allied 

available to each army.39 command, 18th Army GrQup was 

predominantly British and was organized. along British 

staff lines. WheT818th Army Group was activated at 

Constantine on February, AFHQ Command Post, 

Constantine, was closed., 

During the invasion of North Africa, the lack of a 

unified air command below the level of Allied Commander in 

Chief had to be problem. Therefore 

5 December 19y2yeGajor Genera? Carl Spaatz (Americanj w:: 

appointed Acting Deputy Commander in Chief for Air, Allied 

Force, in addition to his other duties, to unify the 

separate air forces. On 5 January, this organization was 

2-16 
officially constituted, and its name later became the 

Northwest African Air Command (NAAC). Its component 

elements were the Amer'ican Twelfth Air Force, the Royal Air Force (RAF) Eastern Air Command, and such French units 

as might be attached. 

When the Western Desert Air Force came into Tunisia 

with the British Eighth Army, it was necessary to 

coordinate its activities with those of the NAAC. The 

result was the activation on 17 February 1943 of the 

Mediterranean Air Command, with headquarters at AFHQ. Air 

Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, GCB, RAF, was designated 

Air Commander . Chief Mediterranean. His command 

comprised the M;zdle East Air Command RAF Malta Air 

Command, and Northwest African Air Forces. His area of 

responsibility extended beyond the boundaries of NATO, and 

for air operations outside NATO, he was independent of 

General Eisenhower. 

Coordination of naval forces in the western 

Mediterranean, including Malta, was achieved when a new 

command structure went into effect on 20 February. Admiral Cunningham's designation was changed from 

Commander in Chief, Naval Expeditionary Force, to 

Commanderin Chief, Mediterranean. He was responsible for 

all naval operations in NATO under the command of General 

Eisenhower as Allied Commander in Chief. Chart 3 shows 

the Allied command structure that resulted from all of the 

organizational changes described above. 

,Operation Husky 

At, the Anfa Conference, the CCS agreed that after 

defeating, Axis forces in Tunisia, Allied forces would 

invade Sicily. The operation was set for the period of 

the favorable July moon and code named Husky. 

23 January 1943, .General Eisenhower was given a 2% 

directive which designated him as Supreme Commander, 

General Alexander as deputy commander in chief, Admiral 

Cunningham, as naval commander, and Air Chief Marshal 

Tedder as Air commander.40 General Eisenhower wa;enzi;y 

directed to establish, in consultation with 

Alexander, IFa special operational and administrative 

staff, with its own Chief of Staff, for planning and 

preparing the operation. . . .I'41 

The first meeting of the Husky planning staff was held 

on 10 February 1943 in room 141 of the St. George Hotel in 

Algiers. This meeting place suggested the name for the 

2-17 
ALLZED FORCE HQ I 

NWAFRICP 

AIRFORCE 

i MID RAF EAST' I a 1 ic_ 

I us 

CORPS 

(2 DIVS] 

(4 DIVS> (2 DIVS) Cl DIV) (2 DIVS) (.3 DIV! 

SOURCE: George F. Howe, Northpest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West {Washington, D.C.; Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 19781, 486 

chart 3. APlied Ccmmand, Mediterranean, March 1943 

2-98 
staff, and on 12 February, they officially announced the 

existence of Headquarters, Force 141. At this time, Headquarters, Force 141, was not independent; it was a 

subsection of G3, AFHQ. However, it was free from all 

responsibilities for the Tunisian campaign. The welding together of elements from the different countries and 

services into the overall plan was accomplished through close liaison between Headquarters, Force 141, and the 

Joint Planning Staff of AFHQ. 

The experience gained ' creating AFHQ and 

Headquarters, 18th Army Group, zlped solve the problems encountered, in creating Headquarters, Force 141, and the 

operation developed on schedule. On 13 March, the first 

commander's meeting was held, and the appointments of 

Lieutenant General George S. Patton as Commanding General, 

Force 343 (American Task Force), and General Sir Bernard 

L. Montgomery as Commanding General, Force 545 (British Task Force), were announced. On 15 May, four days after 

the surrender of the last Axis forces in Tunisia, General 

Alexander's 18th Army Group was disbanded with mclst of the 

6 

ersonnel bein 

6: augmented into Headquarters, Force 141. n this same ay, the headquarters became an independent 

operational headqu‘arters. In June, Headquarters, Force 

141, moved from Algiers to LaMarsa in Tunisia to have 

closer control of its units. In early July, Tactical 

Headquarters, Force 141, moved to Malta, and it was from 

there, on the morning of 10 July, that General Eisenhower, General Alexander, and Admiral Cunningham observed the 

successful landings on Sicily. They maintained contact 

'from there with Air Marshal Tedder, who was at his Air 

Headquarters in Tunis. 

On the day of the in;;rsiz; of Sicily, the new command 

designations for the involved * Husky were 

announced. Headquarters, Force 141, beZ:me 15th Army 

Group with General Alexander in command. Force 343, 

formerly I Armored Corps, Reinforced, became U.S. Seventh 

;-r;zrunder Patton. Force 545 became British Eighth Army Montgomery.42 Command structure for Operation Husky is shown on chart 4. 

There was close Army-Navy planning for Husky. improve naval fire support, fire control parties from eacTI: 

artillery battalion received some training in observing and controlling naval gunfire. Arrangements were made for 

air observation and control of naval fire. Each infantry division had a naval gunfire liaison officer assigned.43 

The utilization of air assets in Husky was based on 

the principle that air strength should be kept under a 

2-19 
MEDITERRANEAN 

T$EF EASTERN 

TASK NAVAL 

1 FORCE TASK 

L FORCE 

acommand of all seaborne forces rested with Naval Commanders during amphibious phase. 

b General support missions were given all major subordinate units. 

cMi.ssion - direct support of the assault of.Sicily. 

SOURCE: Wendt, et. al., 77. 

Chart 4. Command St'ructure for Operation Husky 

Z-20 
single command instead of being divided by sector. The 

objective was greater flexibility. The U.S. XII Air 

Support Command, which had the mission of providing air 

support for the Seventh Army, only had direct control of 

its one reconnaissance squadron. Its six squadrons of 

fighter bombers and ten squadrons of day fighters were all 

under the RAF's Malta Command and under NATAF itself.44 

Because of concern over neutralizing enemy air, strategic 

targets, armed reconnaissance, and cover over the beaches, 

little attention was given to providing close air support to the ground forces during the operation. During the 

critical first forty-eight hours of the campaign, not a 

single close air support mission was flown in support of 

the Seventh .Army;45 

The logistics situation for Husky followed previously established practices. Each of the two armies was 

supplied and supported by its own logistical system. 

However, because the British were landing in an area with 

three major ports and the Americans were going to be 

dependent on beach maintenance, it was agreed that after 

the British had opened the port of Syracuse and the 

campaign was fourteen days old, the British would send one 

thousand tons of supply a day to Seventh Army.46 

The Sicilian campaign ended successfully on 17 August, only thirty-eight days after it began. All CCS objectives 

were achieved with less difficulty than had been 

expected. However, there were problem areas. There was a 

lack of close air support for ground forces. The 

direction of the campaign seemed to favor Montgomery over 

Patton, placing the Seventh Army in a subordinate and 

supporting mission to the British Eighth Army. In 

addition, the high level command structure, with three 

service commanders in widely separated headquarters, made 

it difficult to react quickly to major changes in the 

military situation: Alexander's ground headquarters was 

in Sicily; Tedder's air 

Cunningham's headquarters was in Tunis; 

naval headquarters was Malta 

Eisenhower"s headquarters was in Algiers. Ntt plan had 

been drawn up for joint action to prevent the Germans and 

Italians from evacuating Sicily. When it became evident 

during the last 

were 

tentpeys ;f,l;Ed carn;;kr that Axis forces 

evacuating . service 

this 'from happening. 

acted 

independently to prevent General 

Eisenhower was not presented with the problem, and no 

joint operation was undertaken. As a result, the Germans 

and Italians were able to carry out one of the most 

successful evacuations ever conducted from a beleaguered shore.47 

2-21 
Operation Avalanche 

At the Trident Conference, held at Quebec in May 1943, 

the CCS decided to direct General Eisenhower to -prepare plans for invading mainland Italy. Various options were 

prepared and presented to CCS Finally, on 16 August, only one day before final victory in Sicily, it was 

decided to carry out two landings in Italy. The British 

Eighth Army was to carry out Operation Baytown, an attack 

across the Straits of Messina. The U.S. Fifth Army was to 

carry out Operation Avalanche, a landing on the beaches 

near Salerno, a city some 150 miles to the north. Fifth 

Army was selected because of the Seventh Army's involvement in the campaign to capture Sicily. 

The command structure for the 

mainland Italy was 

operations similar to that of Husky. against The 15th 

Army Group was responsible for planning the operations 

allocated by AFHQ and for commanding the operations of 

Fifth and Eighth armies. Since plans for mainland Italy 

did not include the active participation of the Seventh 

Army, on 3 October .it reverted to direct command of AFHQ 

from 15th Army Group. This was one day before General 

Alexander Santo 

Spirito.48 o,pened his headquarters in Italy at 

The Baytown landings took place on 3 September. On 

9 September, the Fifth Army landed at Salerno. By 1 October 1943, the combined ground,, air, and naval forces 

of the Allies had established a secure foothold on the 

Italian mainland, and the need for better coordination of 

administration and supply was apparent. In response, on 

15 October, a new combined organization known as AFHQ 

Advanced Administrative Echelon (FLAMBO) was established. 

FLANBO"s relationship with 15th Army Group was described 

as being like that between "the operational and 

administrative portions of -a single headquarters."49 However, it was first of all an '"administrative advanced 

AFHQ and not a rear HQ of Fifteenth Army Group."50 

FLAMBO washeaded by Major General Sir Brian H. Robertson 

(British), whose official title was Deputy' Chief 

Administrative Officer, FLAMBO. Among other 

responsibilities, FLAMBQ coordinated lo istics in forward 

areas for both American and British f orces, supervised Italian ports, and controlled and directed aI-1 British 

general military administration on the mainland of, Italy. 

2-22 
Mediterranean Thea_ter of Operations 

As the campaigns in Tunisia, Sicily, and mainland 

Italy broughtthe forces commanded by AFHQ and the forces 

commanded by General Headquarters (GHQ) 8 Middle Eastern 

Forces (MEF), into ever closer contact, it became more and 

more obvious that unified 

Mediterranean should abe created. 

command for the entire 

In the situation which 

existed, command relationships were not clear-cut. The 

Allied air commander in chief, as the commander of air 

forces under both AFHQ and GHQ, MEF, had two different 

commanders to whom he was responsible, The Allied (naval) 

Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, had responsibility for 

the strategic disposition of naval forces in both the 

western and eastern Mediterranean, but he did not have 

executive command in the eastern Mediterranean. General 

Eisenhower reported to the CCS in Washington, while 

General Sir Henry Maitl,and Wilson,, commander of the 

British Middle East theater, the British 

chiefs of staff.51 reported to 

Coordination between the two 

theaters was largely on a liaison basis and was simply "unwieldy, improvised, and inadequate."52 Since the 

great preponderance of Allied forces in the Mediterranean 

was under the control of AFHQ, it didn't seem proper for 

GHQ, MEF, to possess half of the command authority in the 

region. Clearly, the combined operations in the 

Mediterranean required a unified command. 

On 10 December 1943, the CCS acted to resolve the 

issue of unity of command in the Mediterranean by 

establishing the Mediterranean Theater of 

(MTO). Operations MTQ represented an expansion of NATO to include 

the Balkan countries, Hungary, all of Turkey, and the 

eastern Mediterranean. General Eisenhower was designated Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater. Below him, 

ground, air,' and naval forces in the theater were unified 

under their respective service commanders in chief, 

Control over air forces, however, would. soon not include 

strategic bomber forces based in MTO. On 1 January 1944, 

these fordes came under control ,of a new headquarters 

called U.S. Strategic Air Forces Europe (USSAFE) that was 

located in the United Kingdom. The American theater 

retained its desigyh;pn of NATOUSA, and General 

Eisenhower retained ' command. Chart 5 shows the 

command system for the MT0 as proposed by the CCS on 

5 December 1943 and implemented on 10 December. 

On the same day that MT0 was established, General 

Eisenhower was informed by CCS that he was to be appointed Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force and would be 

2-23 
Ii--- 
leaving, the MTO. Two weeks later General Wilson, Commander in Chief, MEF, was selected to be his 

replacement. General Eisenhower's departure set off a 

chain of command changes that resulted in MT0 becoming a 

British theater reporting the CCS through the British 

chiefs of staff. During the next few months, there were 

also a number of refinements made to the larger unit 

command structure in MTO. Fundamentally, however, the 

command system depicted on chart 5 remained in effect in 

MT0 up to the end of the war. 

One of the more important organizational changes that 

occurred after the establishment of MT0 and General 

Eisenhower's departure for the United Kingdom involved one 

of his former commands, NATOUSA. There had long been 

concern about the large number of personnel on the staffs 

at HQ, NATOUSA and at AFHQ. An inspector general's report 

in August 1943 had called the number excessive. General 

Eisenhower"s successor as Commanding General, NATOUSA, Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, acted quickly to 

consolidate staffs and economize personnel. In February 1944, directives were issued which distributed most of HQ, 

NATOUSA's functions, on the policy and operations side to 

AFHQ and on the territorial, supply, and administrative 

side to SOS, NATOUSA. The office of deputy theater 

commander was abolished and the Commanding General, SOS ) NATOUSA, assumed command of the communications 

(CQMZY , zone 

North African theater. HQ, SOS, NATOUSA, thus 

became HQ, COMZ, NATOUSA, but for the sake of convenience, 

it maintained its title of SOS, NATOUSA.53 

Another important organizational adjustment that took 

place in early 1944 was the change taking place in HQ, 

15th Army Group. As the campaign in Italy progressed, this command took on functions that were beyond those of 

army group and more akin to those of a force 

t:adquarters. The 15th Army Group continued to exercise 

operational control over all Allied ground troops within 

its geographical' area. At the same time, it assumed a 

number of administrative functions as AFHQ decentralized 

its own administrative responsibilities. On 4 March 1944, 

FLAMBO was absorbed into General Alexander's 

headquarters. On the same day, General Alexander gained 

some control over the supply agency for American Fifth 

Army when the Commanding General Peninsular Base Section 

(PBS) was made responsible to him for the ground defense 

of the PBS area.54 On 9 March 1944, General Alexander's 

headquarters was designated HQ, Allied Armies Italy (AAI). 

Throughout the war, the titles assigned to 

headquarters and tbeir commanders were important. Since 

2-25 
titles could, and sometimes did, cause confusion in 

establishing communication channels, 

changes 

and command authority 

were not uncommon. 

therefore that 

It is interesting to note, 

9 March, Alexander's headquzters 

tl0t only did General 

receive .a new title, but the 

title of Allied Commander in Chief, MTO, was also changed 

to Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.55 

Operational Anvil-Dragoon 

In May 1944, the Allied armies broke the winter 

stalemate in Italy and moved rapidly northward to capture Rome on 4 June. Two days later, 

launched in Normandy. 

Operation Overlord was 

Originally, Allied plans had 

envisioned launching an amphibious assault code named 

Anvil against southern France 

Normandy invasion. 

on the same day as the 

The objective was to tie down German 

troops that used to defend 

cross-channel might be the 

assault. German against resistance 

made it impossible to meet this schedule. 

in Italy had 

Now, with Rome 

captured, it was possible to cons'ider using MT0 forces to 

attack southern France. Planning on the operation, now 

renamed Dragoon, proceeded rapidly, and on 15 August, MTQ 

forces under the command of General Wilson, Supreme Allied 

Commander, Mediterranean, came ashore east of Toulon. 

The command structure for Operation Anvil-Dragoon is 

shown on chart 6. It is of special interest because of 

the large French contingent. in the 

Two French corps were used 

operation, and after both were 

Headquarters, 

ashore, 

French Army B, was established. This army 

was still controlled, however, by U.S. Seventh Army, which 

in this case acted as an army group headquartersGeneral Wilson and General Eisenhower had agreed beforehand that after the Anvil-Dragoon forces moved far 

enough north, they would be integrated into 

Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force CSHAEF). Supreme This 

was to be accomplished by activating an army group headquarters (6th Army Group) under S,HAEF command. The 

objective was to maintain U.S. control of the operation and provide a mechanism for coordinating civil affairs.56 

MT0 forces made a junction with Overlord forces on 

4 September. in accordance with a CCS 

order, 

On 15 September, 6th Army Group became operational under the command 

of General Devers, former Commanding General, NATOUSA. 

Sixth Army Group controlled the First French 

(formerly French Army B) and 

Army 

the U.S. Seventh Army. 

2-26 
r 

J 

- 

2-27 

I I FW 
SHAEF did not take over the maintenance of Sixth Army Group immediately, so as to take advantage of reserve 

stocks of supplies still located in the Mediterranean. 

The administration, logistical support, and maintenance of 

Anvil-Dragoon forces in southern France continued to be 

the responsibility of AFHQ. AFH 

civil affairs Q/ in southern France.5 

was also in charge of 

Operation Anvil-Dragoon was a great success. Within a 

month after landing, Allied forces had advanced over four 

hundred miles and were nearing the German border. This 

success, however, was purchased at the price of stagnation 

in the MT0 and on the Italian front. Large numbers of 

troops, equipment, and supplies were removed from Italy 

and used in Operation Anvil-Dragoon. Thus weakened, the 

Italian campaign, in the words of the 

history, “sank to the level of a 

official Army 

operation.“58 great holding 

This holding operation was carried out 

during the remaining months of the war using fundamentally the same larger unit organizational structure and command 

system that has been described above. 

Conclusion 

Larger units at the echelons of theater army, group army, and army were created in the Mediterranean area to conduct 

military operations. The structure of these commands and 

their evolution during the course of World War II have 

been described above. This conclusion briefly discusses 

some of the most important organizational principles and 

practices involved in the deployment of these large units. 

AFHQ , the theater headquarters for operations in the 

Mediterranean area, was a combined command headed by an 

Allied commander in chief. He was the supreme commander 

of the theater and exercised operational control over the 

ground) air I and nava 1 forces through subordinate 

commanders in chief for the various services. The 

administrative and supply see t ions of AFHQ consisted of 

separate and parallel American and British groups that 

were coordinated by a British chief administrative 

officer. The CA0 exercised control over British 

services. American administration and supply were 

accomplished through an American theater, NATOUSA. 

At the heart of AFHQ was the principle of unity of 

command. The efficient operation of .AFHQ and the 

subordinate headquarters was possible only because there 

was a s upr eme commander who exercised final command 

2-28 
authority in the theater. General Eisenhower had worked 

hard to obtain unity of command for AFHQ. His efforts 

were rewarded by the effective functioning of his command. 

The important contribution that personnel policies made toward making AFHQ an effective combined headquarters 

cannot be understated. 

with their close 

The integrated operational staffs, 

balance of American and British 

personnel, helped create a common sense of purpose. They 

gave AFHQ a strength of organization that made it possible 

to change S for example, the MTQ from an American theater 

to a British theater without difficulty. 

The use of separate and parallel British and American 

staffs for administration and supply was decided upon 

because these two 

efficiently. systems could not be 

The willingness not to force integrated 

integration where it was impractical showed that those who created 

AFHQ were not doctrinaire.. They used the unique position of the GAO to achieve the overall coordination and unity of action that was needed. 

Combat experience in the NATO and the MTO demonstrated 

the importance of employing national forces together in 

the largest possible units. 

North Af r ican campaign , During the first phase of the 

troops from different nations were 

sometimes assigned piecemeal to larger units from other 

countr ies. This meant that troops were sometimes asked to 

do things that were contrary to their own training and 

tactical doctrine. The result was often lowered troop morale and reduced combat effectiveness. 

As a rule, the NATO and the MT0 ground, naval, air, 

and logistical headquarters sought to locate close to the 

forces under their control. This led to better 

communications between these headquarters and their 

subordinate units. However, the wide dispersion of 

headquarters often hampered communication and coordination 

between the force headquarters and between the force 

headquarters and the theater headquarters. Liaison 

officers were assigned to improve communications between 

headquarters, but this method of achieving coordination 

tended to be unwieldy. 

Planning was a given a high priority in the NATO and 

the MTO and was generally very good. The planning for 

operation Husky was a model of how to plan for a future 

operation while still conducting a major campaign. Unity of command was most effectively exercised at the planning 

stage. Once operations were underway, it was not easy to 

2-29 
implement previously unplanned joint combined 

operations. This was shown by the Allied faP:ure to halt 

the successful Axis evacuation of Sicily in August 1945, 

The principle of unity of command when translated into 

practice tended to concentrate authority. For example, 

MT0 was established by expanding NATO and bringing more 

forces under its control, However, there were also 

factors at work which encouraged the dispersion of 

authority. One was the limit of time and energy possessed by one person, General Eisenhower. Eisenhower created the 

position of deputy theater commander in the American 

theater in order to free himself from many administrative burdens as possible. Another proabSLem was 

the inefficiency caused by the great distances between 

decision makers and the their 

responsibilities. AFHQ r s 

geographical. areas of 

decision to decentralize a 

number of tasks to AA1 in 1944 was due in part to the 

distance be,tween Algiers and central Italy. 

The final point to be made about 

examined iti 

the large unit 

structures this chapter is that these 

structures were ultimately successful. While they were 

created quickly in response to unprecedented military 

challenges and may not have represented the ideal 

solutions for organizing the Allied military forces, these 

structures did accomplish the mission assigned to 

them-- the de,feat of Axis forces in North Africa and the 

Mediterranean area. 

Z-30 
NOTES 

1. Roland 6. Ruppenthal, Lo istical 

* Support of the 

Armies, U.S Army in Worl II, 2 vols. 1953-59 . Reprint. (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of 

Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), 1:14. 

2. In February 1942 the Army-Navy Joint Board became the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

3. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, 1:21. 

4. Ibid., 23. 

5. Ibid., 36. 

6. Ibid, 39. 

7. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: 

~a Cape Press, 1983), 49. 

8. Ibid. 

9. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, 2 ~01s. (New York: 

Simon and Schuster, 1983), 1:152. 

10. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 50. 

11. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, 1:39. 

12. E,isenhower, Crusade in Europe, 51. 

13. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, 1:44. 

14. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 71. 

15. George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the 

Initiative in the West U.S. Army in World War II 

7lk057; reprint, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief 

of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), 33. 

16. Ambrose, Eisenhower, 1:186. 

17. Allied Force Headquarters, Historical Section, and 

U.S. Army, North African/Mediterranean Theater of 

Operations, Historical Section, History of Allied 

Force Headquarters, 9 vols. (N.P.: Allied Force 

Headquarters, [1945]), pt 1, 13 (hereafter cited as 

History, AFHQ). 

Z-31 
18. 

19. 

20. 

21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

26. 

27. 

28. 

29. 

30. 

31. 

32. 

33. 

34. 

35. 

36. 

37. 

38. 

39. 

40. 

41. 

History, AFHQ, pt. 1, 9. - 

Ibid. 

Ibid., 10. 

Ibid. 

Ibid, 13. 

Ibid, 32. 

Ibid. 

Howe, Northwest Africa, 37. 

History, AFHQ, pt. 1, 6. 

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, 1:90. 

Ibid, 99. 

U.S. Army, North African/Mediterranean Theater. of 

Operations, Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-4, and 

Special Staff Sections, Logistical NATOUSA/MTOUSA, 11 August 1942 

History of 

30 November Ivri-5 

(Naples, Italy: G. Montanino, 194: , 21. 

Ibid, 22. 

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, 1:112. 

Howe, Northwest Africa, 495. 

History, AFHQ, pt 2, sect. 1, 193 

Ibid., 194. 

Ibid, 202. 

Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York:' 

Brothers, 1950), 145. 

History, AFHQ, pt 2, sect. 1, 109. 

Howe, Northwest Africa, 354. 

History, AFHQ, pt 2, sect. 1, 113-15. 

Ibid., 132. 

Ibid., 133. 

2-32 

Harper and 
42. Ibid., 140. 

43. Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, Sicily and 

the Surrender of Italy U.S. Army in Worm rr 

xl965 : reprint, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief 

of Militar*y History, Unites'States Army, 1970), 106. 

44. Ibid., 107. 

45. Ibid., 421. 

46. Ibid., 89. 

47. Ibid., 421. 

48. History, AFHQ, pt 2, sect. 1, 142. 

49. Ibid., 205. 

50. Ibid., 206. 

51. History, AFHQ, pt 3, sect. I, 621. 

52. Ibid., p. 620. 

53. Ibid., p. 712. 

54. Ibid., p. 718. 

55. Ibid, p 639. 

56. Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command U.S. Army in 

World War IL (1954; reprint, Washington, DC: Office 

of the Chief of Military History, Department of the 

Army, 1978), 265. 

57. Ibid, 266. 

58, Ernest F. Fisher, Cassing to the Alps U.S. Army in 

World War 

History, Illit(eWdashington, DC: Center of Military * States Army, 1977), 235. 

2-33 

_-.- ---- ____-- -- 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Allied Force Headquarters. Historical Section. 2nd U./S. 

Army. North African/Mediterranean Theater of 

Operations. Historical Section. History of Allied 

Force Headquarters. 9 ~01s. N.p.: Allied Force 

Readquarters, L1943). 

Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower. 2 vols. New York: 

Simon and Schuster, 1983. 

Blumenson, Martin. Salerno to Casino. U.S. Army in World 

War II. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of 

Military History, United States Army, 1969. 

Clark, Mark W. Calculated Risk. New York: Harper and 

Brothers, 1950. 

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. New York: Da 

Cape Press, 1983. 

Fisher, Ernest F., Cassino to the Alps. U.S. Army in 

World War II. Washington, DC: Center of Military 

History, United States Army, 1977. 

Garland, Albert N., and Howard McGaw Smyth. Sicily and 

the Surrender of Italy. U.S, Army in World War II. 

1965. Reprint. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief 

of Military History, United States Army, 1970. 

Howe a George F. Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative 

in the West. U.S. Army in World War II. 1957. 

Re rint. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of 

Mi P itary History, Department of the Army, 1970. 

Pogue, Forrest C. The Supreme Command. U.S. Army in 

World War II. 1934 Reprint. Washington, DC: 

Office of the Chief of *Military History, Department of 

the Army, 1978. 

Ruppenthal, Roland G. Logistical Support of the Armies. 

U.S. Army in World War II. 2 vols. 1953-59 

Reprint. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of 

Military History, Department of the Army, 1969-70. 

U.S. Army. North African/Mediterranean Theater of 

Operations. Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-4, and 

Special Stazff Sections. Logistical History of 

NATOUSA-MTOUSA, 11 August 1942 to 30 November 1945. 

Naples Italy: G. Montanino, 1945. 

2- 3 5 
Wendt, William Ii., et al. Organization and Command 

Relationships During World War IL. Uortoik VA 

Armed Forces Staff College, '1951: 

2-36 
EUROPEAN THEATER 

WORLD WAR 

CHAPTER 3 

OF OPERATIONS UNITED STATES ARMY, 

II: ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS* 

Introduction 

On 6 June 1944, divisions, organized an Allied Expeditionary Force of five 

into four corps, two field armies, 

and one army group landed on the German-occupied coast of 

FE;;zndy. Eleven months later on 7 May 1945, when that 

completed its mission, it included eighty-seven divisions organized into twenty-three corps, nine field 

armies, and three army groups. From the invasion to 

victory in Europe, the organization of the Allied 

Expeditionary Force changed and developed to accommodate 

the increasing number of units and to confront operational demands. Personalities also played a significant part in 

changing organizational structure at echelons above 

car s. The creation, and 

fie P d functions, armies, army groups, 

relationships of 

and the supreme headquarters in 

the World War II European Theater of Operations revolved 

around the search for organizational structures capable of 

controlling Allied forces and defeating the enemy in 

Western Europe. 

The requirement for proper organization of an army was 

evident long before World War II: 

of 

“From a strategic point view one should never ask what the strength of a 

division or corps ought to be. The proper question is how 

many divisions or corps an army should have.“1 The 

question posed here by Karl von Clausewitz faces all large armies. Finding the opt imum command structure and 

organization for a particular mission requires a careful 

effort. The development of a command structure for the 

decisive battle against Germany on the European Continent 

in World War II began for the United States Army three 

years prior to the Normandy invasion. 

A study of the organization of echelons above the 

corps in the European Theater of Operations United States 

Army in World War II can be divided into four periods. 

The first begins with the establishment of a prewar 

*By Dr. Robert H. Berlin 

3-l 
observer group in Great Britain and ends -with the founding of the European Theater of Operations United States Army 

(ETOUSA) in June 1942. The second period commences with 

the founding of ETOUSA and ends with the foundation of 

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in 

January 1944. The third period covers from the founding of SHAEF to 1 September 1944, when SHAEF assumed 

f 

round 

command on the Continent of Europe. Finally, the our th 

period goes from 1 September 1944 to the end of the war in 

Europe in May 1945. For purposes of this study, the third 

and fourth periods are most important because they include 

the ac.tivation of new field armies and army groups. However, an understanding of command relationships in the 

theater prior to the invasion is vital to an appreciation 

of later developments. 

Organization: May 1941-June 1942 

After the beginning of the conflict in Europe in 

September 1939, the United States sent an increasing 

number of military observers to the embassies abroad. One 

of these observers was Major General James E. Chaney, an 

Air Corps officer who arrived in England in October 1940 

to study the aerial battles then in progress. 

1941, as a result of the American-British '"s tz 

Conversations held in Washington, Chaney was selected to 

head the U.S. military mission in Britain, known as 

Special Observer Group or SPOBS. The functions of SPOBS 

were more than observation. Chaney was ordered to 

coordinate the reception of American forces sent to Great 

Britain and to establish channels of coo eration between 

the armed forces of the two countries. I”r SPOBS was a 

small group with many tasks, including preparing for U.S. 

forces to occupy Ireland and establishing a base in 

Northern Ireland. 

Following the Pearl Harbor attack and the declaration 

of war between the United States and Germany, the War 

Department took the first step to establish a U.S. Army 

headquarters in Great Britain in January 1942, by 

activating the United States Army Forces in the British 

Isles (USAFBI) with Chaney as commander. USAFBI 

initially commanded all American forces in the British 

Isles and eventually became the European Theater of 

Operations. In January 1942, Headquarters, V Corps, was 

sent to Northern Ireland. Also, the first ground force 

command was established in Great Britain, United States 

Army Northern Ireland Force (USANIF). The V Corps served 

under USANIF. USAN IF, including V Corps, was initially 

both a tactical and administrative headquarters.3 

3-2 
The organization of both USAFBI and USANIF was a 

prelude to increased commitment of American forces to 

Europe. Before that commitment could expand, combined 

command arrangements had to be made. American and British 

military leaders organized an overall command agency, the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Chiefs ordered a 

study of options for offensive action on the European 

Continent. Out of this study and at the urging of the 

U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George 6. Marshall, came 

the first definite plans for a large-scale, cross-channel 

invasion. The code name Bolero was given to the invasion 

buildup preparation, and an assault in Northwest Europe for 1943 was code-named Roundup.4 

The United States was committed to a strategic policy of making its major military effort in the European 

theater and defeating Germany first. The creation of the 

Bolero plan involved a great buildup of American forces in 

Britain and an eventual invasion of the Continent. These 

plans clearly indicated the need for an agency to 

administer logistic preparations and for the creation of a 

full-scale theater of war which would adhere to the 

concept of unity of command. In May 1942, the Services of 

Supply (SOS) was established under the command of Major General John C. H. Lee. SOS was authorized to coordinate 

all logistic arrangements, supply, and administrative 

services for the soon to be created theater of war. 

Following the new 1942 War Department organization of 

three coordinate commands--one each for air, ground, and 

services--- SOS would free the theater headquarters to be 

organized along the general pattern of a command post with 

a minimum of supply and administrative services.5 

BY the close of May 1942, the United States Army 

agreed to send ground forces to Britain for the purpose of 

invading the Continent. An agency to supply these forces 

was established. However, the need for the creation of a 

theater of war to replace USAFBI became evident. USAFBI 

was not created to handle large numbers of troops and 

lacked a specific mission statement. The inadequacies of 

USAFBI were clear to both its commander, Major General 

Chaney, and to a visitor to London from Washington, the 

chief of the War Department's Operations General Dwight D. Eisenhower.6 

Division, Major 

Major General Eisenhower and General Marshall had both 

returned from inspection trips to England dissatisfied 

with the organization, approach, and leadership of 

USAFBI. On 8 June 1942, Eisenhower asked Marshall to read 

a draft directive for the commander of the European 

3-3 
Theater of Operations United States Army (ETOUSA), ad;;m; 

originated by Eisenhower. Eisenhower, in his 

directive, urged that absolute unity of command should be 

exercised by the theater commander. 

the document to Marshall, 

When Eisenhower gave he asked the chief of staff to 

study it carefully because it could be an important document. Marshall responded that he did, indeed, want to 

read it, 

it!7 

for Eisenhower might be the man who executed 

On 8 June 1942, the War Department established the 

European Theater of 

(ETOUSA). Operations United States Army ETOUSA followed from USAFBI whose commander, 

Major General Chaney, became the first commander of 

ETOUSA. The directive creating ETOUSA was based in part 

on the one given General Pershing in World War I. The 

directive emphasized unity of command and charged the 

ETOUSA commander with the responsibilities of theater 

command over all U.S. forces assigned to the theater. The 

mission of the Commanding General ETOUSA was "To prepare for and carry on military operations in the European 

Theater against the Axis powers and their Allies, under 

strategical directives of the combined U.S.-British Chiefs 

of Staff."8 On 17 June, Eisenhower was assigned as 

Commanding General ETOUSA, the boundaries of which 

included most of Western Europe. 

A little more than a year after the Special Observers 

Group began work in London, the United States Army had 

organized a full-scale operational theater of war and 

began to develop a buildup for an invasion of the 

Continent. It was a lasting organizational achievement, 

but the critical substances %f war--operational plans and 

the tactical forces to carry them out--were still lacking. 

Planning: June 1942-January 1944 

The preparation and conduct of Allied operations in 

North Africa and the Mediterranean during 1942 and.1943 

shifted the development of U.S. armies away from Britain. 

The invasion of North Africa, Torch, diverted Allied 

resources from the Bolero buildup. Delay continued as 

campaigns developed in Sicily and Italy. Xn August 1942, 

Lieutenant General Eisenhower was designated Commander in 

Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Forces for Torch. While 

conducting operations in North Africa, Eisenhower rema.ined 

in command of ETOUSA, exercising command through a deputy until February 1943, when the North African Theater of 

Operations United States Army (NTOUSA) was established. 

3-4 
At this time Eisenhower became commander of NTOUSA and 

other officers assumed command of ETOUSA.9 Eisenhower 

did not resume command of ETOUSA until 16 January 1944. 

Despite the postponement of a cross-channel invasion, 

preparations for operations on the Continent continued. 

Decisions reached at the Casablanca Conference, a meetin 

of the U.S. and British government heads and the Combine 5 

Chiefs of Staff in January 1943, emphasized a commitment 

to operations on the Continent. The conferees decided to 

resume the Bolero buildup, to have a united command with a 

Supreme Allied Commander, and to create a Chief of Staff 

to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) to conduct 

preliminary planning for the cross-channel invasion. A 

British officer, Lieutenant General Frederick E. Morgan, 

was chosen to head the COSSAC staff. The appointment of a 

Supr.eme Commander was postponed until closer to the 

invasion date.10 

The COSSAC staff developed the invasion plan, code-named Overlord. COSSAC's initial Overlord plan 

called for a three-division assault led by a British army 

commander. When an American army was established in 

France, Allied field command wouid shift to a British army 

grou , P 

which would continue to have operational control 

unti either the capture of the Brittany peninsula or the 

establishment of a U.S. army group in France. The COSSAC 

planners envisioned having a British supreme commander and 

a larger initial British participation in the operation. 

Thus, they recommended a British chain of command.11 

The buildup of U.S. forces in Britain during 1943 altered 

the plan, but the emergence of conflicting demands over 

the nationality of commanders remained a controversial 

subject. 

By August 1943, the need for the United States to 

develop command and organizational arrangements for the 

cross-channel invasion was apparent. ETOUSA had three 

major subordinate commands: Eighth Air Force, Services of 

Supply, and V Corps. As the highest ground force 

headquarters in the theater, V Corps was incapable of 

commanding and controlling the large forces which were 

organizing for the invasion, nor could it develop actual 

tactical battle plans for the invasion.12 

In September 1943, General Marshall wrote a letter 

describing his concept of what the eventual organization 

of the European Theater should be like. Marshall raised 

two major subjects: first, "that all U.S. Army forces in 

the theater should be administered by one supreme U.S. 

3-5 
Headquarters under one commander,"' and second, "that field 

force command-ers should be relieved of as many 

administrative responsibilities as possible."' Marshall 

declared that Army group commanders and the Supreme Allied 

Commander were field force commanders.13 This ,letter 

firmly established that there would be an overall U.S. 

headquarters for operations on the Continent. 

Another impetus to the creation of U.S. ground force 

commands came in July 1943 when the British established a 

skeleton organization for their total Over lord ground 

force command. The British activated Second British Army, First Canadian Army, and the 21st Army Group. Lieutenant 

General Morgan of COSSAC urged the Americans to create 

reciprocal headquarters to carry on detailed invasion 

planning and eventually command U.S. forces in the 

invasion. 14 

After some delay, the War Department moved to create a 

headquarters for a field army and army group. Lieutenant 

General Omar N. Bradley was selected to organize and lead 

these organizations. Bradley led II Corps to victory in 

North Africa and Sicily, assignment.15 

and he was pleased with his new 

After at tending conferences , 

Washington, Bradley arrived in Britain in early Octobi: 

1943 to begin his new tasks. 

First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) was activated on 

16 October 1943. First U.S. Army Group's initial mission 

was operational planning under the direction of ETOUSA. 

First U.S. Army (FUSA) was also activated in October 

1943. FUSA took over operational control of all U.S. 

ground forces in Britain from V Corps. All ground forces 

were assigned to First Army 'instead of V Cor s for 

administration and training. Bradley commande B both 

units. The 1st Army Group's main concern was planning, mainly with the British Zlst Army Group. First Army 

became the overall U.S. field force headquarters in Great 

Britain and soon controlled four corps .I6 First U.S. 

Army became the nucleus of the U.S. invasion force for 

operation Overlord (chart 1). 

BY the close of October 1943, both the U.S. and 

Britain had established an army group and field armies to 

plan for, train for, and conduct the actual invasion 

operation. The question of coalition command arrangements still remained unanswered. Two decisions facilitated 

invasion preparations but did not completely resolve the 

issue of ground force command. 

3-6 
Name Abbreviation 

Special Observers Group 

U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles 

U.S. Army Northern Ireland Force 

European Theater of Operations U.S. Army 

Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied 

Commander (designate) 

First U.S. Army Group 

First U.S. Army 

Date Formed 

SPCBS May 1941 

USAFBI January 1942 

USANIF January 1942 

ETOUSA 

COSSAC 

FUSAG 

FUSA 

Chart 1. Predecessor Organizations to SHAEF 

June 1942 

April 1943 

October 1943 

October 1943 

3-7 
First, in November 1943, Lieutenant General Morgan, head of COSSAC, after conversations with General Marshall, 

announced the organization of ground forces for the 

assault. Acting for the Supreme Allied Commander (still unnamed), Morgan directed the 21st Army Group Commander, 

then British General Bernard Paget, along with the naval 

and air force commanders to plan the actual assault. The 

21st Army Group Commander was also ordered to be 

responsible for execution of the operation, "until such 

time as the Supreme Allied Commander allocates an area of 

responsibility to the Commanding General, First Army 

Group." The 21st Army Group would have overall ground command in the invasion. The Commander of 21st Army Group 

was "made de facto commander of the ground forces in the 

assault but was never given the title of 

commander."'17 ground 

American historians of the preinvasion command 

arrangements agree that the Zlst Army Group commander was 

to be the overall ground commander only in the initial 

phase of the operation. His tenure was definitely limited 

to the early stages of Overlord.18 Unfortunately, a 

specific time was not chosen for the transfer of ground command from Commander, 21st Army Group to the Supreme 

Allied Commander. 

In December 1943, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and 

the Chief, Imperial General Staff, selected General Sir 

Bernard L. Montgomery to command 21st Army Group, 

replacing General Paget. Montgomery was selected because 

of his considerable combat experience as head of the 

British Eighth Army in Africa, Sicil 

64 

and Italy and 

because Churchill highly regarded him. Montgomery was . and 

ierZ:nt egotistical man. His efforts to be named 

Allied ground commander were to cause 

considerable tension among other Allied commanders. 

A second important decision shaping Allied command was 

the selection of a Supreme Commander. The question of 

whether the Supreme Commander would be British or American 

was resolved at the Allied heads of state conference at 

Cairo late in 1943, when Marshal Joseph Stalin asked who 

would lead the cross-channel attack. Although General 

Marshall's name was frequently suggested for the position, 

President Franklin Roosevelt stated that he could not 

sleep at night with the Chief of Staff out of the 

country. On 7 December 1943, General Eisenhower was 

notified of his selection Supreme Commander by 

President Roosevelt. EisenhoweraSassumed command of Allied 

3-8 
forces in mid-January 1944. His headquarters in England 

was designated Supreme Headquarters, 

Force (SHAEE)*O (chart 2). 

Allied Expeditionary 

SHAEF took over the duties and staff of COSSAC and 

Eisenhower also assumed command of ETOUSA for the second 

time. Thus, the U.S. Theater Commander was also the 

Supreme Allied Commander. 

whereby 

A reorganization took place SOS and ETOUSA were consolidated and the 

Commanding General, SOS, was named Theater 

Commander. By this Deputy reorganization, SHAEF exercised 

control over all ground tactical planning and operations, supplanting ETOUSA, which functioned 

administrative and logistic areas.21 mainly in the 

By early 1944, the 

organizational structure to carry out Overlord was nearly complete. 

activated. 

Field army and 

Supreme army group headquarters were 

Headquarters was operating and a 

Supreme Commander oversaw operational planning. 

Preparation and Invasion: January 1944-September 1944 

The third period in this study begins with the 

creation of SHAEF in January 1944 and concludes with the 

assumption of ground command by the SHAEF Commander on 1 

September 1944. During this period Allied forces landed 

in Normandy and liberated most of France. They conducted 

operations according to the mission directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in February 1944. General 

Eisenhower was directed as follows: 

1. You are hereby directed as Supreme Allied 

Commander of the forces placed under your orders 

for operations the Germans. 

for the :-it;;atfinllof bE,Urope from 

Your ’ 

Commander Allied Expeditionary Force. 

Supreme 

2. Task. You will enter the continent of 

Europe, and, in conjunction with the other United 

Nations, 

of 

undertake operations aimed at the heart 

Germany and the destruction of her armed 

forces. The date for entering the Continent is 

the month of May 1944. 

ports have 

After adequate channel 

been secured, exploitation will be 

directed to securing an area that will facilitate 

both round 

a 

and air operations against the 

enemy. 

This directive left the Supreme Commander considerable 

freedom to exercise command of operations against Germany. 

3-9 
f 6 

r \ \ \ \ 

3-10 
Serving under his command was the greatest Allied military 

force in history. The three elements of General 

Eisenhower ’ s command were: the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force , whose mission was to take the invasion forces to 

France ; the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, which 

controlled the British and American tactical air forces ; and the invasion ground force units of the British and 

American armies. 

In January 1944, the American ground force 

organization included only the 1st Army First Army. Group and the 

To complete the headquarters required for the 

invasion and to administer the new divisions arriving in 

England another U.S. field army headquarters was 

established. Third U.S. Army Headquarters under command 

of Lieutenant General George S. Patton was created in late 

January. Army troops for the headquarters and the bulk of 

staff officers came from Third Army Headquarters in Texas 

where it had served as a training army. Lieutenant 

General Patton also brought a nucleus of staff officers 

from his Seventh Army in North Africa. Third Army served 

under the 1st Army Group. Lieutenant General Patton’s 

presence in England was used to deceive the Germans into 

the belief there would be a second landing. Using false 

communications the Allies sought to convince the Germans 

Patton actually led another U.S. army group in Britain. 

With the establishment of Third U.S. Army, the combat 

command organization for Overlord was finalized.23 

Sever al months prior to the invasion, General 

Montgomery was 

On 1 June 

selected to command Allied ground forces. 

1944, Eisenhower declared that until several 

armies were deployed on a secure beachhead and until 

developing operations indicated 

command reorganization, 

the desirability of a 

all ground forces on the Continent 

[would beI under the Commander-in-Chief, 21st 

Group .11*4 Army 

restricted Wi;$e the area of operations in Normandy was 

it was necessary to keep Supreme Headquarters in Britain, 

control of 

Eisenhower believed he must place the land battle with Montgomery. However, Eisenhower retained responsibility for 

operational plans (chart 3). approving major 

The command of ground forces for Overlord was from the 

Supreme Commander to the 21st Army Group Commander to the 

First U.S Army Commander and to the Second British Army Commander to corps and divisions. While both military and 

political considerations 

both required the participation of 

American and British troops in Overlord, the 

different administrative and logistical organizations of 

3-11 
. ..e. 

c 

f 

i 

3-12 

l-l 
the U.S and British armies meant that armies of one 

nationality would not pass through the beachhead 

established and controlled by the other. Thus, the two 

invasion armies used five separate beaches for their 

successful simultaneous landings on 6 June 194425 

(chart 4). 

The initial operational command arrangement was 

clearly delineated and successful. Logistic arrangements also adapted to the invasion. SOS was 

Communications Zone (COMZ). redesignated The change signified a shift 

from operating an extension of the zone of interior in 

Britain to 

operations in providiY% France. logistical support for combat 

As Allied forces moved from Britain to France, the 

command structure expanded. On 14 July 1944, the First 

U.S Army Group became the 12th Army Grou . Group’s 

The 12th Army mission was the same as that o P the First U.S. 

Army Group--to prepare and conduct operations ’ 

accordance with directives from SHAEF. First U.S. Ariy Group continued to exist for purposes of deception to act 

as a phantom army group, fooling the Germans into 

believing there would be a second invasion. First U.S. 

Army Group was maintained on paper until 18 October 1944, when it was-officially disbanded.27 

By mid-July the number of U.S. divisions in combat 

favored the formation of two armies, but the congested 

state of supply and the limited area for maneuver caused 

one army headquarters to remain in control. The plan for 

operation Cobra, the breakout of late July, influenced 

organizational arrangements because the operation should 

have been controlled by a single army commander. Planners 

expected divisions and corps to become mixed up, and one 

army commander could best rearrange them. However, when 

U.S. forces reached the base of the Cotentin Peninsula, 

two army headquarters were required to control divergent 

lines of advance. Accordingly, 1 August was selected as 

the best time to to an 

organization.28 change army group On that date, the U.S. 12th Army Group 

became operational in Fr ante commanded by Lieutenant 

General Bradley. Because the advance element of SHAEF was 

not ready to move to the Continent, 12th Army Group 

remained under the te2mgorary overall command of the 

British 21st Army Group. 

An important date in the history of the command and 

organization of echelons above corps of the U.S. Army is 

1 August 1944. On that date, the U.S. Army proved its 

3-13 
=- 

= -5 

z c -.. sr= . - 

- 
ability to adjust and enlarge its command arrangements. With 12th Army Group being operational, Bradley was 

replaced at First Army by his assistant in command, 

Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges (chart 5). 

Also on 1 August, Third U.S. Army under Lieutenant 

General Patton became operational. Patton was ordered to 

form the six divisions on First Army’s right into two 

corps while they were on the move. This was accomplished, 

and Patton controlled these two corps and two new corps formed of divisions brought from Britain.30 

It is important to stress the viral role played by a 

u.s field army as both a combat and an administrative 

agency in World War II. The corps was a combat 

organization only, while for purposes of administration 

and supply, the army was supposed to bypass the corps. 

The organization of armies and corps was flexible and 

proved adaptable changing circumstances in 

campaigns in Europe d:qing World War II. 31 

the 

Before World War II, the American Army had little 

experience with army group command. During the final four 

weeks of World War I, in 1918, General John J. Pershing commanded an army group controlling the First and Second 

U.S. armies, 32 According to pre-World War II U.S. Army 

doctrine, the army group commander “assigns tasks to his 

armies ~ leaving commander. “‘33 

the details of execution to the army Lieutenant General Bradley believed that 

he was free, in terms of tactics, to command 12th Army Group as he wished. Bradley gave broad missions to his 

field army commanders and closely controlled the execution 

of the mission.34 

To effectively command 12th Army Group, Bradley 

divided his headquarters into three sections. The 12th 

Army Group’s code name was Eagle, so the three sections 

were named Eagle Tat, Eagle Main, and Eagle Rear. Eagle 

Tat was a highly mobile forward command headquarters outfitted in vans. Eagle Tat began with 200 officers and 

men and within three months grew to 400.35 Eagle Tat 

was established because Bradley “intended to keep up a fast pace and stay close to the front whenever the 

tactical situation permitted.“36 Eagle Main and Eagle 

Rear were large staff and support headquarters which 

operated from buildings in the rear area. Ea le Tat 

closely followed its armies, making ten moves P orward, 

while Main and Rear made four moves .37 At its peak 12th 

Army Group numbered 1.3 million men and was the largest force ever commanded by an American field commander. 

3-15 
3-16 
The activation of 12th Army Group produced a curious 

command situation. While Bradley controlled the U.S. zone 

in France, including the COMZ, overall control of 

operations of the ground forces rested with General 

Montgomery, 

This 

the commander of the British 21st Army Group. 

situation brought a critical response from the 

AGm;En;;n press and prompted General Marshall to urge Eisenhower to promptly establish SHAEF 

Headquarters on the Continent and assume the 

command. While startled by ground this criticism, Eisenhower 

agreed SHAEF should move to the Continent as soon as the 

establishment of communication 

was planned for 1 September. 

links would permit; this 

On that date SHAEF became 

operational on the Continent and the Supreme Commander 

assumed direct operational command of both army groups.38 

The Advance to Victory: September 1944-May 1945 

When SHAEF became operational, its forces consisted of 

two army groups, 21st and 12th, and four armies, First 

U.S., Third U.S., First Canadian, and Second British. 

Another army group and three armies soon were added to the 

SHAEF force structure. One of the additional armies was 

the Ninth, commanded by Lieutenant General William H. 

Simpson. It became operational on 5 September 1944 and 

was assigned to the 12th Army Group. The Ninth U.S. Army took over control of the forces in the Brittany peninsula 

which had been part of Third Army, even though General 

Patton and most of his forces were on the opposite side of 

Fr ante . joined The other two armies and the army group which 

SHAEF came from the Southern France invasion 

force39 (chart 6). 

On 15 August 1944, the Seventh U.S. Army invaded 

Southern France. Initially, Seventh Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch, controlled both 

U.S. and French invasion forces. Overall operational control of Seventh Army was with the Strategic Allied 

Command in the Mediterranean, and logistic support came 

from North African Theater of Operations U.S. 

(NATOUSA). Army As these forces advanced inland, they were to 

be transferred to Eisenhower's command. To facilitate 

this transfer and to eventually command the Seventh Army 

and a French Army, the 6th U.S. Army Group was activated 

on 1 August in Corsica under the command of Lieutenant 

General J. L. Devers. The invasion of Southern France was 

a success, and the forces made rapid progress. On 11 

September, elements of French Army B met the 

French 2d Armored Division of the Third U.S. Army.40 On 

3-17 
I 

n 

3-18 
15 September, Headquarters, 6th Army Group, assumed 

control of the Seventh U.S. Army and the First French 

Army, which was organized from French elements with the 

Seventh Army. Also on 15 September, command of the 6th 

Army Group f assed 

Eisenhower. 1 

to the Supreme Allied Commander, General 

Logistic Arrangements 

As the armies advanced across France and into Germany, 

the COMZ expanded and 

administrat’ion. 

behind them, controlling supply The COMZ was both a geo raphic 

the rear of army areas of responsi % ility 

;;;a to 

organization subordinate to ETOUSA responsible f:: 

logistic support of American armies on the Continent. 

Throughout the campaigns in Europe during World War II, 

there was confusion and overlap between theater and COMZ 

organization.42 

The American section of SHAEF attempted to act as a 

theater staff, since Eisenhower was both theater commander 

and Allied commander. Field commanders faced poorly 

&iined lines of authority on logistic issues because of 

confusion between theater and communications zone 

staffs. Communications zones developed a massive 

infrastructure with immense support demands of its own. 

yt;; COMZ moved its headquarters to Par is in September valuable truck and plane 

from’ supplying the 

transports were diver ted 

field armies at a time when supplies 

were short. This restricted offensive actions. A 

Southern Line of Communications developed after the 

invasion of southern France and the organization of 6th 

Army Groups. operated February 1945 as a 

separate but subiidinate headq~~~~~rs of COMZ.43 

COMZ developed its organization as the armies advanced 

to Germany. COMZ established a territorial organization 

which ultimately included three base sections, two 

intermediate sections, and two advance sections. Advance 

sections were the first to be established on the 

Continent. They served as advance subcommands of COMZ in 

close support of the field armies. They provided an 

immediate supply source. Intermediate sections were 

established between advance and base sections to handle 

communications, transportation, and supplies. Base 

sections were established at Brittany, Normandy, and the 

Channel coast, where ports were 

sections were firmly 

locattheed; 44 

established, enabled When c:E 

logisticians to fully support the drive into Germany, 

3-19 
Ground and Air Operations 

A brief examination of air force support for ground 

a erations 

!s 

in ETOUSA should evaluate command and control 

0 tactical and strategic air elements and the use of air 

assets in tactical roles. The 1943 doctrine defined the 

principal tasks of air forces supporting ground operations. In order of priority these were (1) to 

establish and maintain control. of the air in the critical 

area for the purpose of eliminating the enemy's capacity to interfere from the air; (2) to isolate the battlefield 

by interdicting enemy movements of troops and supplies; and (3) to render immediate support to the ground forces 

on the battlefront. To carry out these missions, air 

forces were doctrinally coequal to land forces, neither 

force being an auxiliary of the other.45 

To implement this doctrine in support of the SHAEF 

mission, new commands were established and command and 

control questions resolved. At British request, U.S. and 

British tactical air forces came under a single Allied 

command. of the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff, 

With the authority COSSAC in November 1943 directed RAF Air Chief 

Marshall Leigh Mallory establish the Allied 

Expeditionary Air Force (AEZ). AEAF served :under the 

Supreme Allied Commander and gave him operational control 

over the British and American tactical air forces 

committed to the invasion, The Ninth U.S. Tactical Air 

Force came under. the operational command of AEAF. 

However, due to the personality of the AEAF Commander -and 

the resistance of the U.S. Air Force to accept his 

direction, the need arose for reorganization. Allied 

Expeditionary Air Force was dissolved on 15 October 1944, 

and its functions were assumed by SHAEF. AEAF was 

unsuccessful as a combined command, but the tactical air 

forces did develop effective means of cooperation with 

ground forces.46 

In 1944 the largest single advantage the Allies had 

over the Germans was command of the air. GeneraL 

Eisenhower as Supreme Commander sought to utilize air 

power to assure the success of the invasion, and he 

demanded that the strategic air forces be pyAyd under 

this command. The British, particularly Bomber 

Command, sought to remain independent to carry out their 

bombing offensive. Eventually, Eisenhower 

operations.47 gained 

direction of all strategic air He 

utilized control of strategic air power to isolate the 

invasion area, destroy the German Air Force, and aid the 

ground forces to breakout. After the Allied forces were 

3-20 
established on the Continent, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

in September 1944 removed the strategic air forces from 

direct command by SHAEF.48 

The tactical air forces remained under SHAEF command, 

and they developed means of cooperation with Army groups and U.S. field armies. 

forces, 

To support the American ground Ninth Air Force became the most powerful single 

tactical air force engaged ’ operations during World War II. The IX Tactical Commzd (TAC) General Elwood R. 

led by Major (Pete) Quesada, and the XIX Tactical 

Command, led by Brigadier General Otto P. Weyland, cooperated closely with ground Germany. 

forces from Normandy to 

Ninth Air Force maintained advanced headquarters 

alongside those of 12th Army Group. Each American field 

army had a tactical air command in direct support, and 

flexibility was maintained to support operations by develzFng transferring units between air commands. 

The IX, XI, XIX, and XXIX Tact ical Air commands 

supported, respectively, the First, Seventh, Third, and 

Ninth armies. Requests for air support went from an air 

support officer at division headquarters to the G3 Air 

Section at army headquarters for transmission to the 

tactical air command. The forward air 

usually located at army headquarters , headquarters, decided on the 

feasibility of a mission and assigned aircraft to conduct 

it.50 If weather cooperated, the American armies could 

depend on powerful close air support facilitated by close 

air-ground cooperation. 

Additional Armies and Command Changes 

An important addition to the SHAEF forces came from 

the establishment of the First Allied Airborne Army in 

August 1944. The First Allied Airborne Army was formed as 

a major command operationally subordinate to SHAEF and not 

under an Army group. The Airborne Army was established to 

coordinate the air and ground forces required for airborne 

operations. To assist in the conduct of airborne 

operations and to simplify command difficulties, the 

Airborne Army was an 

headquarters. integrated U.S.-British The U.S. components of the First Allied 

Airborne Army were administered by Headquarters, European 

Theater of Operations, 21st Army Group. 

and the British components by the 

Upon commitment of its airborne troops, the First Allied Airborne Army was habitually relieved of 

command of the troops, and they became components of the 

army in whose zone they were dropped. This command was 

3-21 
composed of the XVIII U.S. Airborne Corps with the 82d, 

10lst, h‘lth, and 13th U.S. Airborne divisions, the British 

Airborne Command with the 1st and 6th British Airborne 

divisions, the IX U.S. Troop Carrier Command, an,d two 

Royal Air Force groups51 (chart 7). 

For administrative purposes, in September 1944, the 

21st, lZth, and 6th Army groups were designated as the 

Northern, Central, and Southern groups of armies 

respectively. This had no effect on the operations of 

their headquarters or the numerical designations, and no 

new headquarters were established under these titles. The 

21st Army Group consisted of the First Canadian and Second 

British armies. The 12th Army Group consisted of the 

First, Third, Ninth, and the new Fifteenth U.S. armies, 

and the 6th Army Grou 

First French armies.5 ;f) was made up of the Seventh U.S. and 

The Fifteenth Army, the final U.S. Army for ETOUSA, 

was activated in the United States in August 1944 and 

began operations in Britain in late November. The 

Fifteenth Army became operational on the Continent on 

6 January 1945, and Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow 

became its commander.53 Fifteenth Army became 

responsible for the coordination of all movement of field 

forcle units from the beaches to army areas. In l"Earch it 

took over control of containing forces in Brittany and in 

April the occupation of the Rhineland. Besides 

occupational duties, Fifteenth Army did not have 

operational responsibilities for the offensive ' 

Germany. Fifteenth Army never had more than two tori: 

assigned to it. The Army was used to prepare forces for 

occupati al 

Germany. 88 responsibilities following the defeat of 

Prior to assuming operational control of his army 

groups on the Continent, the Supreme Commander declared 

that the Allied "command system has functioned exactly as 

planned and in accordance with the tactical and strategic situation." General Eisenhower asserted that "no hitches 

have occurred and no frictions that I know of have 

developed."'55 Eisenhower's optimism was merited after 

the successful Allied pursuit across France. However, as 

Eisenhower gathered his armies for the attack on Germany, 

his optimism was soon tarnished by forces within and 

without the Allied camp. 

The force within was Field Marshal 

Commander of Zlst Army Group.56 Montgomery, Montgomery's conflict 

with Eisenhower involved a personality clash, strategic 

3-22 
k 

3-23 
differences, and differing philosophies of command. 

Montgomery continually urged that he be made the sole 

ground force commander, leaving the Supreme Commander on a 

higher strategic level. This Eisenhower rejected, and the 

tension between the two men continued until the end of the 

war.57 

General Eisenhower, in December 1944, carried a large 

burden as the Theater Army Commander, SHAEF Commander, 

Supreme Allied Commandert and head of ETOUSA. Eisenhower 

realized that he had many more burdens than his field army and army group commanders. He informed General Marshall 

that his (Eisenhower's) visits to various lower 

headquarters had shown him that the corps, army, and army 

group commanders were standing up well because they had 

only to worry about tactics and local maintenance. 

According to Eisenhower, these commanders did not have "to 

burden themselves with politics, priorities, shipping, and 

Maquis" on the one hand, and they did not have to undergo the "more direct battle strains of a division commander on 

the other."58 

A major realignment of commands occurred in December 

1944 as a result of the German counteroffensive in the 

Ardennes, known as the Battle of the Bulge. The German 

counteroffensive never came close to reaching its goal of 

Antwerp and the division of Allied forces. The 

counteroffensive did catch the Allies weak and unprepared in the Ardennes, and the Germans were able to achieve 

surprise and penetrate over fifty miles beyond the Allied 

front line. The bulge which formed separated Lieutenant 

General Bradley's 12th Army Group Headquarters on the 

southern flank of the salient from the major part of the 

First U.S. Army and the Ninth U.S. Army, which were 

located on the northern flank. Communications between 

group and army headquarters were cut. To remedy this 

situation, Eisenhower's staff recommended that the 

American Ninth and First armies be shifted to the command 

of Montgomery's 2lst Army Group which was in the north. 

On 20 December 1944, Eisenhower ordered the shift of 

forces59 (chart 8). 

This change in command left Lieutenant General Bradley in control of only one army, the Third, while placing four 

armies under Field Marshal Montgomery's control. Bradley 

claims he made one of his biggest mistakes of the war by failing to resist the command change. "Giving Monty 

operational. control of my First and Ninth armies," Bradley confided later, "was the worst possible mistake Ike could 

3-24 
I I 

3-25 
have made."60 Indeed, while Montgomery continued 

assert his strategic and command concepts, he failed EE 

destroy the German forces in the Ardennes. 

When contact between the First and Third armies was 

renewed after reduction of the German salient in the 

Ardennes, command of 

However, 

First Army reverted to Bradley. the Ninth Army remained under Montgomery until 

the reduction of 'the Ruhr pocket was completed in 1945 

(chart 9). 

The shift of armies in December 1944 reveals both 

strengths and weaknesses in the Allied command system. 

The flexibility of the system was clearly evident in the 

ease with which armies could be moved among army groups. The Allied Expeditionary Force chain of command was 

adaptable to changing circumstances. On the other hand, differing personalities and nationalities bred distrust 

the Army group :zz$iuarters and SHAEF. headquarters and between those 

BY the end of March 1945, the Allied armies had 

crossed the Rhine River 

offensive 

in force and were conducting operations in Germany (chart 10). These 

offensives led to the end of the war in Germany. On 7 May 1945, Eisenhower submitted a terse but accurate message to' 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff: "The mission of this Allied 

Force was fulfilled at 0241 local time."61 The role of 

Allied field army commanders now changed to that of 

occupational authorities and military governors. Their 

primary mission was complete. nine field armies 

The three army groups and 

were separated from the Allied 

Expeditionary Force 

other duties. 

and either dissolved or prepared for 

Conclusion 

The establishment and organization of echelons above 

corp‘s‘in ETOUSA took place during four periods. A theater 

organization developed during the first period, which 

culminated in the creation of ETQUSA in June 1942. 

the second period, During the Allies established organizations to 

plan for the invasion of the Continent. The third period 

began with the founding of SHAEF in September 1944 and 

concluded with SHAEF's assumption of ground : command. 

SHAEF governed preparation for the greatest successful 

military invasion in history. During the fourth Period, 

which concluded with V-E Day, command, advanced 

new armies joined the Allied 

across France, and were victorious 

3-26 
3-27 
r-l 

3-28 
against Germany. There are several reasons which account 

for the successful organization and operation of echelons 

above corps in ETOUSA. First and foremost, the Allied 

civilian and military leaders accepted and adhered to the 

principle of unity of command. The Supreme Allied 

Commander, General Eisenhower, always supported unity of 

command. Second, ETOUSA became a mature theater of war. 

Logical progression of planning and preparation led to a 

successful 6 June 1944 invasion. The invasion armies had 

time pr ior to combat in ‘France to organize, plan, and 

prepare for the test of combat. Many commanders gained 

experience in other theaters of war before facing the 

challenges on the Continent. 

A third reason for success was the combined command of 

SHAEF. Despite personal jealousies and squabbles between 

commanders over issues both significant and otherwise, and 

in the face of rivalries and contentions based on 

nationality or branch of service, SHAEF was a successful 

combined command. SHAEF accomplished its mission because 

it united sea, air, and ground power. There were problems 

in maximizing air and logistic support, but these problems 

were either overcome or were not allowed to become 

crucial. SHAEF logically arranged its armies by 

nationality, Yet maintained flexibility by allowing 

divisions of one nationality to serve in corps or armies 

of another when circumstances demanded it. 

SHAEF was a combined operational command for ETOUSA. 

Logistics and administration were the responsibility of 

Britain, and the U.S. utilized ETOUSA and the COMZ for 

these purposes. This arrangement worked, although not 

without difficulties and some confusion in the logistics 

area. 

During World War II, the United States created a 

theater of operations in Europe, participated in a unified 

combined command, and fielded and supported three army 

group headquarters and six field armies. The United 

States Army in Europe was America ’ s largest and best 

organized fighting force. 

3-29 
1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

NOTES 

Karl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by 

Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1976), 293. 

~;AK$ GGoTuppenthal Lo istical Support of the . 1 May Ib&er 1944, United States 

Army ih World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the 

Chief of Military History, 1953), 13-21. 

Ibid., 23. 

Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command_, United States 

Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the 

Chief of Military History, 1954), 100. 

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 36. 

Gen.) J-h Maj. Gen. (later Lt. C H L had high opinion of 

himself. Lee"sn critics g"a"ve him aa nickname based on 

his initials, J.C.H.- "Jesus Christ Himself." 

Ibid., 39. 

(New Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Vol. 1, Soldier, 

General of the Army, Preszex Elect, 1890-1952 

York: Simon and Schusterx983), 152-53. 

Ruppenthal, Logistical St jpport, 39-40; Report of the 

General Board. United 1 States Forces European Theater, Study of the 'Organization of the European Theater of 

it, p eratlon_s_, ereafter cited as 

Report of the General Board, 2). 

Pogue, Supreme Command, 100-101. Col. William R. 

Wendt et al., "Os;ation and Command Relationships During World War II," A committee study done at the 

U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, 17 December 1951. 

Pogue, Supreme Command, 25, 103. 

Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, United 

States Army in World War II (Washin ton DC: Office 

of the Chief of Military History, 195f), io7. 

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 190. 

Gen G. C. Marshall to Lt. Gen. J. L. Devers, 

24 September 1943. Extracts of the letter are in: 

Robert W. Coakley, The Administrative and Logistical 

3-31 
14. 

15. 

16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

, 

21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

26. 

27. 

28. 

History of the European Theater of Operations, Pt. 2, Organization 

Operations, 

and Command in the European Theater of 

Historical unpublished manuscript 

Division, U.S. prepared by the 

Army Forces, European Theater (hereafter cited as Coakley, "Organization and Command"). 

Ruppenthal, LQgistical Support, 191. 

Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 201. 

Report of the General Board, 2: 47-48; Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 191. The four corps were V, VII, 

VIII, and XV. 

Pogue, Supreme Command, 45. 

Ibid.; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 115-18; 

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 194. 

Nigel Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield: Monty's War Years, 1942-1944 (New York: -- McGraw-Hill, 19831, 

chap. 6, '"Who Will Command OVERLORD?" See also 

Pogue, Supreme Command, 49. 

Pogue, Supreme Command, 24-63. The SHAEF Deputy Supreme Commander was Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur 

W. Tedder. Gen. Eisenhower chose Lt. Gen. Walter 

Bedell Smith as Chief of Staff of SHAEF. Eisenhower 

trusted and utilized both officers. 

Report of the General Board, 2: 50; Ruppenthal, 

Logistical Support, 201, 

Pogue, Supreme Command, 53. The directive was issued 

on 12 February 194&T 

Coakley , "Organization and Command,"' 40-44; 

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 203. 

Pogue, Supreme Command_, 180. 

Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 106. - 

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 206. 

Coakley, "'Organization and Command,"' 154-55. 

Ibid. 

3-32 
29. Ibid., 156. 

30. Pogue, Supreme Command, 

31. Kent Roberts Greenfield 

Ground Combat Troops, War II (Washington, DC: Historical Division, U.S. 

Army, 1947), 364-65. 

32. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 196/), 385. 

33. U.S. War Department, 

Units (Provisional), DC: Government Printing Office, 1930), 13-14. 

34. 

35. 

Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, 283-84. 

Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry Holt, 1951), 362. 

36. 

37. 

Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, 284. 

Bradley, A Soldier's Story, 362. Other codes names 

were: Lion f 21 A Group, Master for First 

U.S. Army, Lucok'y fo:tThittYU.S. Army, and Conquer for . Ninth Army. 

38. 

39. 

40. 

41. 

42. 

Pogue, Supreme Command, 263-65. 

Ibid., 265. 

Coakley, "Organization and Command," 226-31. 

Report of the General Board, 2: 26. 

James A. Houston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775-1953 (Washington, DC : Office of the 

Chief of Military History, 1966), 530-31. 

43. 

44. 

45. 

Ibid. 

46. 

Ibid.; Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 211-19. 

FM 100-20, 21 July 1943, quoted in Wesley Frank 

Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in 

World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 

1951) 3 , : 186, 807. 

Craven and Gate, Army Air Forces_, 2: 739-40, 3: 

620-23; Pogue, Supreme Command, 274-75. 

et al., The Organization of 

United States Army in World 

204. 

3-33 
47 . Eisenhower threatened to resign as Supreme Commander 

unless the bombers came under his command. Ambrose, 

Eisenhower, 1890-1952, 287; Craven and Gate, Army Air 

Forces, 3: /9-83. 

48. Pogue, Supreme Command, 272-74. 

49. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, 3: 107-13, 243-45, 

597. 

50. Charles P. MacDonald, The Last Offensive, United 

States Army in Warld War II (Washington, DC: Office 

of the Chief of Military History, 1973), 13-14. 

51. Ibid., 26; Pogue, Supreme Command, 269-71. 

Originally named the Combined Airborne Headquarters, it was. renamed the First Allied Airborne Army at the 

suggestion of its commander Lt. Gen. Lewis A. 

Brereton, former commander of the Ninth Air Force. 

52. Report of the General Board, 2: 26. 

53. Pogue, Supreme Command, 266-67. 

54. Coakkey, "Organization and Command,'" 264. 

55. Gen . Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 

23 August 1944, in Ibid., 162. 

56, Montgomery was promoted to Field Marshall on 1 

September 1944. His official biographer claims it 

was for having won "the greatest battle of the war in 

the west." Hamilton, Master, 833. Lt. Gen. Bradley 

believed Montgomery was promoted so that Eisenhower"s 

assumption of ground command would not be perceived 

demotion for Montgomery. zSGe\eral's Life, 321. 

Bradley and Blair, 

57. Stephen E. Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The War 

Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (Garden City, 

: Doubleday, 1969 7 1910) , 61-,6 . 

58. Pogue, Supreme Command, 315. On 16 December 1944, 

Eisenhower was promoted to the newly created five 

star rank General of the Army. This made him equal 

in rank to Marshall and Montgomery. 

59. Ibid., 378. 

60. Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, 363-68. 

61. Ambrose, Eisenhower, 1890-1952, 407. 

3-34 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

BOOKS 

Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower. Vol. 1. Soldier, General of the Army President Elect, 1890-1952. New 

York: Simon and Schuster, 1983 . 

The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General 

Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 

Bradley, Omar N. A Soldier's Story. New York: 

Holt, 1951. Henry 

Bradley, Omar N. and Clay Blair. A General's Life. New 

York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. 

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate, The Army Air 

Forces in World War II. Vols. 2 and 3. Chicago: The 

University of Chicago Press, 1951. 

Hamilton, Nigel. Master of the Battlefield: Monty's War 

Years 1942-1944. New York: McGraw Hill, 1983. 

Harrison, Gordon A. Cross-Channel Attack. United States 

Army in World War II. Washington, DC: Office of the 

Chief of Military History, 1951. 

Houston, James A. The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1774-1953. Washington, DC: Otfice of the Chief ot 

Military History, 1966. 

Pogue, Forrest C. The Supreme Command. United States 

Army in World War II. Washington, DC: Office of the 

Chief of Military History, 1954. 

Ruppenthal, Roland G. Logistical Support of the Armies. 

Vol. 1. 

World May 1941-September 1944. United States Army in War II. Washington, DC: Office of the 

Chief of Military History, 1953. 

FIELD MANUALS, REPORTS, AND STUDIES 

Coakley, Robert W "The Administrative and Logistical \ 

History of the European Theater of Operations." Pt. 2. "Organization and Command in the European Theater of 0 erations." 

prepared by R Unpublished manuscript t e Historical Division, U.S. Army Forces, European Theater, 1945-1946. 

3-35 
Repor;hiEt;:e General Board, United States Forces European . Study of the Organization of the European 

Theater of Operations. Study No. 2. 1945. 

U.S. War Department. A Manual for Commanders of Large 

Units, (Provisional). Vol. 1. 

1 : overnment Printing Office, 

Wendt, Col. William R., and others. "'Organization and 

Command Relationships During World War II." A 

committee study done at the U.S. Armed Forces Staff 

College, 17 December 1951. 

3-36 
CHAPTER 4 

DIVIDED COMMAND IN THE PACIFIC: SWPA AND POA* 

In 1942 the United States assumed primary responsibility for the war effort in the Pacific, yet interservice rivalry between the Army and the Navy prevented the creation of a unified command for the entire 

region. Instead, what resulted was the establishment of 

two separate and distinct theaters 'with each service in 

command of its own area. Divided command in the Pacific 

proved a constant problem, especially in major operations 

that involved combat forces from both theaters. Unity of 

command within each theater, however, allowed the theater 

commander to organize and use his land, naval, and air 

forces in ways that he thought would best prosecute the 

war against Japan. As a result of this arrangement, distinct differences in high command developed between the 

two theaters, and the purpose of this study is to examine 

those differences, while at the same time paying due 

regard to the similarities. 

Creation of Two Theaters 

The division of responsibility in existence in the 

Pacific before Pearl Harbor remained a salient feature of 

the U. S. war effort throughout the period 1941 to 1945. 

At the outbreak of the conflict, the United States 

possessed four major commands: the United States Army 

Forces in the Far East, the Asiatic Fleet, the Pacific 

Fleet, and the Hawaiian Department (the former two located 

in the Philippines and the latter two in Hawaii). In the 

face of the Japanese advance, Washington joined on 

10 January 1942 with other concerned parties in 

establishing the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command 

(ABDACOM), an Allied and joint command under British 

General Wavell, who in the capacity of Supreme Commander 

reported directly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (see 

chart 1). ABDACOM lasted barely two months, however, 

crumbling under the pressure of Japanese victories as it 

attempted to muster sufficient forces to defeat the 

enemy. A new command emerged in the wake of its collapse 

*Written by Dr. George W. Gawrych. 

4-1 
4-2 
prompted by Britain's decision to abandon its primary role 

in the Southwest Pacific so that it could concentrate its 

efforts in the Indian theater. The Pacif3c Ocean, thus, 

became an area of exclusive American responsibility under 

the direction of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(JCS).l 

Left with this mission, the JCS proved unsuccessful in 

establishing a unified command for the Pacific, as both 

the Army and the Navy wanted to be in charge, and neither 

side was willing to make a major concession. To solve 

this impasse in a diplomatic manner, the JCS on 30 March 

1942 divided the Pacific into two separate and distinct 

theaters. General Douglas MacArthur, who recently had 

escaped from the Philippines, became the Supreme Commander 

of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), whereas Admiral 

Chester Nimitz received the designation Commander in Chief 

of the Pacific Ocean Area (POA). JCS directives specified that MacArthur an,d Nimitz were to report to the JCS, who 

exercised jurisdiction over operational strategy for both 

theaters. Orders from JCS went through the head of each 

service, so that MacArthur received his instructions from 

General Marshall, the chief of staff, and Nimitz his 

orders from Admiral King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. 

Command in the Pacific was thus clearly divided according 

to geographic areas of responsibility.* 

The JCS assigned MacArthur a joint and allied command 

with SWPA also comprising a U.S. Army theater. MacArthur 

thus came to occupy a dual position as commander of an 

Allied theater and as commander of U.S. Army forces in 

SWPA. The JCS directive creating SWPA enjoined MacArthur 

from directly commanding any national forces 

interfering with their internal administration. ThE 

arrangement reflected the realization that at the onset 

sizable human resources in SWPA would come from the 

Australians, the British, and the Dutch. In POA, on the 

other hand, Nimitz received a different command 

structure. His area was divided into three subordinate 

regions: the North, Central, and South Pacific (see 

map). Nimitz was to exercise direct command of all forces 

in the first two areas, but in the South Pacific, he had 

to work through a regional (subtheater) commander, 

eventually Admiral Halsey3 (see chart 2). The 

composition of forces was overwhelmingly American, thus 

making POA more a U.S. joint theater rather than an Allied 

command. 

The creation of SWPA and POA caused competition over 

resources and divided military effort. Serious problems 

arose when forces from both theaters joined together in 

4-3 
f u+- x. -7 

i 

0 Y 

4-4 
3-j 

za 8 P 

I 

I I 

n I 

4-5 
one operation. In the conflict 

American 

over Leyte Gulf, two 

fleets were under the separate commands of' 

MacArthur and Nimitz, a situation that nearly produced disaster. In the engagement, Admiral Halsey, who remained 

under Nimitz's command, moved his naval forces to the 

north without informing Admiral Kinkaid, whose own task 

group was under MacArthur's control. This move exposed Kinkaid's flank and jeopardized the entire operation. 

Sharing military forces between theaters presented another source of .tension. MacArthur, for example, borrowed naval and army (XXIV Corps) units from POA, and 

his refusal to release ships on schedule weakened naval 

gunfire in support of the Marine landings on Iwo Jima. 

This may well have contributed to high casualties as 

claimed by the --Marine 

Smith.4 Commander, General Holland 

The problem of unity of command plagued the 

American war effort in the Pacific up to and including the 

planning for the invasion of Japan. 

Command and Organization within Each Theater 

MacArthur and Nimitz organized command differently in 

their respective areas Of responsibility. MacArthur 

established his headquarters--initially located in 

Melbourne and then 'moved to Brisbane--and created three 

separate commands: Allied Land, Air, and Naval Forces. 

Allied Land Forces went to General Thomas Blarney, an 

Australian, who exercised tactical control through task 

forces created for each campaign, whereas Americans 

commanded Allied Naval and Allied Air Forces. For 

purposes of operational control, MacArthur exercised 

command through these three commanders5 (see chart 2). 

,After 'the establishment of SWPA under his command, 

MacArthur moved to address the problems of administration 

and supply for American forces in the theater. On 20 July 194,2, he redesignated U.S. Army Forces in Australia, 

originally formed to be an air and supply base for the 

Philippines, as U.S. Army Serviees of Supply (USASOS). Its mission was to serve as the administrative and service 

agency for all American units, with the exception of 

certain air elements. Operational control of all American 

ground troops remained with Blarney, the Commanding General 

of Allied Land Forces. As the American war effort grew in 

the theater, MacArthur's general staff faced increasing administrative and operational duties. To relieve his 

general staff of its heavy workload, MacArthur established 

on 27 February 1943,. the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East 

4-6 
(USAFFE) as his administrative command. USAFFE, thus, became the highest American headquarters in SWPA, functioning as a theater army with a se arate headquarters 

but with no tactical combat mission. 8 As a result of 

this reorganization, MacArthur strengthened his direct 

control over U.S. ground and air units by assuming two 

hats. As Commanding General, SWPA, he exercised 

operational but not administrative control over ground, 

air, and sea forces of the United States, Australia, the 

Netherlands, and Great Britain. In his capacity of 

Commanding General, USAFFE, he possessed administrative 

command of all major American elements. By late 1944, this included the Sixth and Eighth Armies, the Far East 

Air Forces, and USASOS, the latter continuing to function 

as the support a&ency for U.S. ground troops7 (see chart 

3). 

In theory, SWPA constituted an Allied and a joint command, but MacArthur avoided forming a joint staff and 

instead staffed his headquarters with army officers. 

General Headquarters, SWPA, thus functioned as a U.S. Army staff, with liaison officers from the other services and 

nationals.8 Rear Admiral Raymond Tarbuch, who served in 

SWPA as chief naval advisor and naval liaison officer at 

GHQ from mid-1943 to late 1944, complained of the "Army mentality" prevalent among the MacArthur staff.9 

As the war dragged on and the United States committed 

more forces to SWPA, air forces and naval forces remained 

under Allied commanders, whereas MacArthur slowly reorganized land forces so as to bypass Blarney. At first, 

the only combat units available to MacArthur were the 41st 

Division (U.S.) and two Australian divisions (less two 

brigades in Ceylon). In July 1942, JCS approved the 

formation of a corps headquarters under Major General 

Robert L. Eichelberger, who found himself under Blarney's command. At the beginning of 1943, the Sixth Army was 

constituted under Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, but 

in order to avoid placing such a large American force 

under the operational control of General Blarney, MacArthur 

conveniently transformed the Sixth Army into Alamo Force 

(April 19t13), under his own direct command. This ensured 

that Sixth iArmy never came under Blarney's control. It 

also meant that the Australian general's task forces 

became increasingly Australian in composition. The 

hollowness of the title Allied Land Forces Commander in 

charge of all ground troops became even more apparent 

after the South Pacific Area was closed as a combat area 

and most of the army units, including XIV Corps, went to 

SWPA. The addition of forces to SWPA together with the 

planned invasion of the Philippines created the need for a 

4-7 
4-8 
reorganization of command. MacArthur dissolved Alamo 

Force on 25 September 1944 and from that time on issued 

orders directly from general headquarters to headquarters, 

with Sixth Army ignoring Blarney completely. MacArthur 

employed the same procedure for the Eighth Army when it 

went into the field under General Eichelberger. Americans 

command.16 

thus, were no longer to serve under Australian 

At Leyte, on the assault day of 20 October 1944, 

MacArthur was able for the first time to commit a field 

army into battle. Sixth Army began the operation and 

Eighth Army took control of the mopping up phase on 

26 December, thus freeing Krueger to move on Luzon. 

Krueger invaded Leyte with two corps--X and XXIV with a 

strength of 53,000 and 51,500 respectively--supported by 

two reserve divisions (32d at 14,500 and the 77th at 

14,000 soldiers). The total number of ground troops under 

his command was around 202,500. For the invasion of 

Luzon, MacArthur released the X and XXIV Corps to 

Eichelberger for the completion of the Leyte campaign and 

gave I and XIV Corps to Krueger as the main units for the 

reconquest of Luzon. At this time, Eichelberger gained 

three army corps under his command, though he relinquished operational control of XI Corps to Krueger for Luzon. 

Throughout the Philippines campaign, MacArthur chose not 

to form an army group headquarters, instead preferring to 

exercise direct operational control over both field armies 

(see chart 3). 

Just as SWPA evolved into a U.S. Army operation, so 

the war in POA developed into a U.S. naval enterprise, 

with Admiral Nimitz as the theater commander. Naval 

commanders exercised operational control over Army forces 

throughout the war. The only employment of a field army 

in POA occurred in the Central Pacific when the Tenth Army took part in the Ryukyus campaign. Activated on 20 June 

1944 at Ft. Houston, it passed to the command of 

Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., who had 

been in charge of the Alaska Defense Command. Among the 

major units involved in the Ryukyus operation were the 

XXIV Corps, released from action in the Philippines on 

10 February 1945, and the III Amphibious Corps (Marine). 

The size of the total force numbered around I 8 3 , 0.0 0 

personnel for the assault phases, with approximately 

154,000 men in seven combat divisions. The 81st Division 

was excluded as it remained in New Caledoniall (see 

chart 4). 

The Tenth Army differed in several respects from field 

armies in other theaters, including those employed in 

-- 

4-9 
4-10 
Europe and the Mediterranean. First of all, Tenth Army 

remained under the operational direction of a naval 

commander throughout its land campaign. Second, unlike 

the Sixth or Eighth armies, it constituted a joint task 

force containing Marine (III Amphibious Corps), Navy (Naval Forces, Ryukyus), and Air (Tactical Air Force, 

Ryukyus, under a Marine major general) elements under its 

direct command. Third, as a result of this mixture of 

forces from different services, Buckner organized his 

staff to include naval and marine officers.12 (Other differences concerned responsibility for logistics and 

base development, which will be discussed below.) 

A study of field armies in the Pacific during World 

War II thus presents a nice, comparative framework for 

analysis owing to the fact that the Army and the Navy assigned to their respective field armies different 

command structures and organizations. Sixth and Eighth armies were composed of army units, whereas Tenth Army was 

a joint command. 

Command Relationships in Amphibious Operations 

As noted by Eichelberger, "Every troop movement in the 

Pacific depended upon Navy and the Air for success.tt13 

Over a forty-one day period, for example, the Eighth Army conducted fourteen major 

ones, all supported by landin $ ships. 7 

and twenty-four minor 

This island hopping 

warfare meant that naval forces had to be used in initial 

phases of operations and demanded the employment of naval 

amphibious doctrine. Here, again, differences existed 

between the two theaters. 

In SWPA, Vice Admiral Kinkaid, who commanded Allied 

Naval Forces, doubled as the head of task forces. In the 

Leyte assault, he was in charge of Task Force 77 that 

contained combat, transport, and cargo ships of the 

Seventh Fleet. He divided Task Force 77 into two smaller 

attack forces: Rear Admiral Daniel Barbey, in charge of 

Task Force 78, transported and supported Major 

General I. P. Swift's I Corps; while Rear Admiral Theodore 

Wilkinson, with Task Force 79, carried the XIV Corps of 

Major General 0. W. Griswold to shore. General Krueger, 

Commanding General, VI Army, assumed control of ground 

troops only upon his arrival on shore and after notifying 

Kinkaid. In practice, however, during the amphibious 

phase, Kinkaid refrained from issuing orders to land 

forces without prior consultation with Krueger.16 

General George Kenney, who controlled Army Air Forces, 

4-11 
deployed American air elements in a manner similar to that 

of the Navy. On Luzon, for example, when both field 

armies were simultaneously in action, Kenney assigned General Wurtsmith"s Thirteenth Air Force to work with 

Eiehelber er 

'$; 

and Whiteheadfs Fifth Air Force to work with 

Krueger.1 Liaison officers from the three services 

provided the cohesion necessary for the operations involving Army, Navy, and Air forces. 

During landing operations in SWPA, control transferred 

from naval to ground commanders, starting from the bottom 

and moving upwards. When an infantry division commander 

assumed control ashore, he passed from the control of the 

task group commander to that of the next higher level of 

naval command, the task force. A commanding general of a 

corps, upon setting foot on land, moved from under the 

immediate authority of the amphibious task force commander 

to that of Admiral Kinkaid. Kinkaid kept command of both 

naval and land elements, reporting directly to MacArthur, 

until Krueger landed and established a functioning headquarters for the Sixth Army. At that point, Krue r 

directed land operations under MaeArthur's authority. 78 

On Leyte, Krueger assumed command of Sixth Army on 

24 October, four days after the initial 

American troops.'? landing of 

Matters worked somewhat differently in POA, indicating 

the Navy's own unique practice. For Operation Iceberg (Ryukyusl, Nimitz placed Admiral Spruanee, Commander in 

Chief of the Central Pacific Task Forces, in overall 

command of the amphibious operations, in addition to his 

responsibility for all naval forces in the subtheater. 

Admiral Turner, in turn, headed the Joint Expeditionary Force (Task Force 51) composed of Army, Navy, and Marine 

elements, whose mission was to capture and develop Okinawa 

and other islands in the Ryukyus chain (see chart 5). SWPA did not employ such a system. If Kinkaid had done so 

for Luzon, this would have meant remaining in charge of 

the amphibious phase while another naval. commander, using 

a separate headquarters and staff, would have been in 

charge of the land operations proper. Kinkaid declined to 

do this, instead choosing to follow SWPA practiee.2G 

In the battle of Okinawa , .Task Force 55 and Task Force 

53, both under rear admirals, handled the landings of XXIV 

Corps and III Amphibious Corps respectively. Lieutenant 

General Buckner, the highest ranking army officer, 

commanded Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 56), which once 

ashore became Tenth Army. During the amphibious phases of 

the Ryukyus campaign, Buckner reported directly to Turner, 

4-12 
c .I . 

4-13 
the commander of the Joint. Expeditionary Force, but when 

that part of the operations came to an end, the commanding 

general of the Tenth Army moved under Spruance"s direct 

command (Central Pacific Task Forces) for the purposes of 

defending and developing captured positions.. 

Nimitz, as CINCPOA, 

In time, 

would relieve Spruance of direct 

command, in the process making Buckner, the commander of 

Ryukyus Force (a joint task force of ground, air, and 

naval troops), 

islands, responsible for the defense of the Ryukyus base development, within twenty-five miles 

and the protection of sea lanes 

of shore.21 Here the chain of 

command and mission of Tenth Army differed considerably with those of the two field armies in SWPA. 

Logistics 

The war in the Pacific presented U.S. forces with 

gargantuan problems of communication and supply that both 

theater commanders solved .e' by showing flexibility of 

command. The invasion of Okinawa, ,for instance, required the initial transportation of 183,000 troorjs and 747,000 

kens of cargo, from eleven involving over 430 assault ships embarking different ports and stretching across the 

Pacific from Seattle to Leyte. troops 

Some 87,000 additional 

would come later. Meeting such formidable 

challenges in logistics 

Eichelberger once noted: 

demanded unorthodox methods, as 

out the window 

""We threw logistical textbooks 

and examined the facts.f122 For the 

support of a field army, this meant the creation of two 

similar logistical commands. 

To put an entire army i,n the field, both theater 

commanders formed special commands to handle logistics, for army commanders lacked sufficient personnel for the 

task. 

neat Island-hopping operations prevented the early and organization of a theater into the typical combat 

zone, army service area, and communications zone.23 In 

SWPA, USASOS performed the functions of a communications 

zone. When the time came to employ a field army for the 

Leyte operation, GHQ, SWPA, created a new organization called the Army Service Command (ASCOM) whose mission was 

"to relieve the combat forces of the burden of detailed 

logistical planning and operations necessary to support 

the farce and 

development.t~24 implement the required base 

USASOS and Sixth both 

personnel for ASCOM, Army provided and a new ASCOM was formed for each 

major operation. Planning normally began three to six 

months in advance of a campaign, by the task force commander, 

with priorities being set 

in this case Krueger. On 

4-14 
23 July 1944 USASOS, for example, constituted an ASCOM as . an Advance Section, Communications Zone, for the Leyte 

operation and placed it under the command of Sixth Army on 

115 September. At that time, ASCOM was required to 

maintain close liaison with USASOS. A new ASCOM came into 

being to support Sixth Army in the Luzon campaign (see chart 3). 

During the actual combat operations, (i.e. from their 

commencement to conclusion), logistical support of a field 

army went through three distinct phases. In the landing 

phase, corps aspects of 

and divisions became responsible for all 

supply and construction, a period normally lasting for the first five days. Then, ASCOM would 

relieve these commands of many responsibilities, in the 

process centralizing as much as possible into a base 

area. Finally, USASOS would take over everything from the 

Sixth Army, of which ASCOM had been a part. ASCOM's Among the 

main functions were construction and 

rehabilitation within the service area; discharge of 

troops and cargo ships; operation and maintenance of all 

supply points, service installations, and communications 

in the service area; hospitalization and evacuation; 

administration of civil affairs, including the recruitment 

and maintenance of civilian labor; handling of prisoners; and base development.25 

In POA the counterpart to an ASCOM was an Island 

Command (ISCOM), and its creation also awaited the 

formation of a field army. On 1 July 1944, to keep up with the accelerating pace of warfare in POA, Lieutenant 

General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., formed the Central 

Pacific Base Command (CPBC) as the first communications 

zone in the area with responsibilities for the defense of 

Hawaii and adjacent islands; it also handled logistics and 

planning for Army units stationed or staging in Hawaii. 

CPBC also maintained supply levels at advance bases as 

directed for an emergency. Here there was a significant 

difference with USASOS in SWPA, in that units and 

installations assigned to forward areas fell outside the 

concern of CPBC. On Okinawa, base development became the 

responsibility of Tenth Army, which, in turn, charged it 

to the care of ISCOM, which had been established at Oahu 

on 13 December 1944. Unlike an ASCOM, which was attached 

to Sixth Army just prior to an operation and in the third 

phase reverted to USASOS, the ISCOM was under Tenth Army 

and remained so, becoming the agent for executing 

Buckner's base development mission (see chart 4). In this 

role, ISCOM contained within its command Army, Navy, and 

Marine units for the defense of -the Ryukyus Islands after 

4-15 
they were made secure.26 It was in the early phases of 

an operation that the responsibilities of an ASCOM and an 

ISCOM were similar. 

Fire Support 

TO achieve the most efficient success, joint operations called for eoordination of artillery, naval 

gunfire, and air support. As a direct result of its 

experiences during the Ryukyus campaign, the Tenth Army suggested the development of 'Ia standard army doetrine of 

the procedure for the employment of naval gunfire in 

support of landing operations.TF27 It naturally recommended that its practice at Okinawa translate into 

official doctrine. 

At Okinawa, the Commander of the Joint Expeditionary 

Force, Vice Admiral Turner, maintained overall 

responsibility for the coordination and actual 

bombardments, but decentralization governed the use of 

fire support throughout the area of conflict.' The Navy allocated most of the fire support ships and aircraft to 

the two army corps and assigned zones of responsibility to 

both the army and two corps commanders based on the depth of operations. Once a corps commander assumed control 

ashore, the corps left its own representative on the 

flagship of the particular task force, and this army 

officer worked closely with the naval gunnery officer. 

The Tenth Army had its own sufficient number of vessels 

for deep support missions so that Buckner did not have to 

take fire support ships away from the two corps. His 

targets did not interfere with those of the two corps 

either, for there existed a clear boundary delineating _' zones of responsibility.2S 

The Commanding General, Tenth Army, remained on the 

same flagship as of the Joint Expeditionary Force 

eommander for eighteen days after the first assault, at 

which point he established his command post on land. At 

that time, the army naval gunfire officer, an army 

lieutenant colonel, stayed aboard the flagship to continue 

coordination and to maintain representation and liaison 

for the artillery section. The assistant naval gunfire 

officer and the naval liaison officer went ashore prior to 

the arrival of the remainder of the artillery section, 

Daily communication kept the shore units informed of 

available naval assets. A similar procedure worked for 

corps operations. Coordination between corps was not 

necessary until 7 May, at which time the front narrowed 

4-16 
and maneuver forces came in close proximity to one 

another. Then the Commanding General, Tenth Army, ordered 

lateral communication between the two corps, with the army artillery officer intervening to settle disagreements and 

allocate fire support when demand exceeded 

availability.29 On Leyte, a similar situation occurred 

when the two corps became for the first time contiguous, and Krueger appointed a liaison officer for the two 

corps.30 

Buckner appointed the army artillery officer to be 

"responsible for the preparation of fire support plans and 

for the coordination of artillery, naval gunfire, and air 

support."31 In order to facilitate the preparation of 

fire support plans, he had the army, corps, and divisions 

establish within their respective echelons a Target Information Center (TIC). Representatives from the other 

support arms were present in this section. The rule of 

thumb in terms of priority of assignments of missions to 

the support arms was artillery first, followed by navy, 

and air last, unless .the nature of the mission dictated 

otherwise. If the army artillery officer determined the 

need for fire support from the Navy, he then made his 

formal request through his own naval gunfire officer 

(NGO); a specially trained artillery officer to the naval 

commander. One such NGO worked on each of the staffs of 

the army 

j2 

corps, and division, coordinating naval gunfire 

support. According to a self-evaluation report made 

by the Tenth Army, the above system worked well and needed 

to be incorporated in Army doctrine on the use of naval 

gunfire in support of amphibious operations.33 

Amphibious warfare in the Central Pacific led to the 

innovation in late 1943 of Joint Assault Signal Companies 

(JASCO). JASCO contained five hundred to six hundred 

communication specialists from the Army, Army Air Force, 

and Navy who received training in joint procedures in 

order to provide vital communication links among land, 

sea, and air elements.j4 This organization saw service 

on the Philippines, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and in the European theater. Based on its experiences on Okinawa, the Tenth 

Army recommended that JASCO "must be considered the 

primary factor in the control and delivery of naval 

gunfire in close support after troops have landed."'35 

Although detailed information was unavailable, it 

appears that fire support for the Sixth and Eighth armies 

followed the broad outlines used by the Tenth Army. Corps 

commanders arranged naval gunfire support with 

the Navy and A ir support elements when poss Both 

4-17 
MacArthur and Nimitz left it to army and corps commanders 

to coordinate fire support with naval and air elements 

through liaison officers from all services. 

Command and Control 

The personal philosophies and styles of the various 

commanding generals shaped the nature of command and 

control in the Pacific. MacArthur considered himself a 

grand strategist and therefore preferred to remain at GHQ 

so that he could keep in touch with the big picture.. Egeberg, MacArthur's personal physician during most of the 

war, described the general's philosophy of high command 

thus: 

. ..He (MacArthur) went on to tell me that a good 

division commanding general could still relate to 

his troops, knew many of them, both officers and 

men. He could lead in a personal way, belonging 

to a group that one could'encompass. He could 

show concern, sadness.... A division commander 

was a good man, and in his work, usually a 

satisfied man; but to find a man who could 

command an army was an entirely different 

proposition. An army commander had to divorce 

himself from the men of his divisions, had to 

work with his. staff, relate to them in an 

entirely different way. His work was more on an 

intellectual level; he couldn"t think of 

individuals.37 

At his GHQ 2 MacArthur, in order to have time for 

contemplation and formulation of strategy, delegated a 

great deal of authority for staff matters to his Chief of 

Staff, General Sutherland, who, though very unpopular with 

many colleagues, fulfilled his mission of keeping peopl.e 

away from the general.38 MacArthur's staff, with some 

exceptions, tended to follow the general's example and 

stayed close to headquarters, a practice that brought 

great distress to Eiehelberger, who believed the GHQ was 

at times ill-informed about the true nature of combat 

conditions.39 

As a rule, MacArthur left the tactical, operational, 

and logistical aspects of his major plans to Krueger and 

Eichelberger. In this, according to Rear Admiral Barbey, MacArthur delegated far more authority to his commanders 

than most.40 During the Leyte campaign, MacArthur, although he established his advance headquarters on the 

4-18 
island, met infrequently with Krueger, commander only three times in a 

visiting his army 

two month period. Krueger, in turn, visited MacArthur seven times during that same interval: six in the first month, but only once 

in the second. Neither corps commander saw MacArthur 

after the operat ion was a few days along.41 Yet 

MacArthur daily followed the progress of operations, and 

even encouraged Krueger to move faster.42 

of staying away from combat areas 

This practice changed drastically on 

Luzon where MacArthur had a low 3 personal stake in 

retaking Manila. There he dashed from one sector to 

;;:t,;;yG3 pro~~in~necomle an”Macen”ret”hu~oviansgsesbsaetdtal~~~~ 

Krueger was moving his troops Loward Manila too slowly, so 

he established his own advance General Headquarters some 

fifty to sixty miles ahead of Sixth Army’s command post, 

thereby hoping to encourage Krueger to quicken his pace toward the capital of the Philippines.44 

Krueger and Eichelberger were competent generals in 

their own right. Like MacArthur, they tended to give a 

great deal of freedom to their corps commanders, keeping 

orders to a minimum, 

judgment .45 Both menS.hehroewbeYvearjlo~~~~evfeodr t!h”a4cep~~%~e~sf 

needed to maintain daily communication with their 

subordinates, to visit their troops, and to inspect installations regularly. Krueger, for example, cautioned 

against a 

bound. lF46 headquarters staff that was “command post Eichelberger was noted for his mobility. During a ninety-day period in the spring of 1945, he 

traveled in the air on seventy different days. He 

referred to his airplane--Miss Em--as ‘Ia magic carpet for 

me. Iv47 -- General Buckner also visited the front once 

ashore and was killed by enemy fire on one such occasion. 

Krueger provides a good example of the flexibility 

necessary to command at the field army level and above. 

He willingly created ad hoc committees to handle pressing problems not directly related to combat. Throughout November on Leyte, for example, the assignment of areas to 

units presented difficulties. To solve this problem, Krueger established an Area Allocation Group whose task 

was to handle requests for space. This organization consisted of representatives from MacArthur’s GHQ, the 

Sixth Army, the Air Forces, the Navy I and ASCOM. 48 

Another example of Krueger’s flexibility in command 

concerned shipping. TO review the backlog for the 

unloading of cargo, Krueger formed a 

committee.49 

priorities 

4-19 
Staff planning for both theaters followed a similar 

practice. When operations involved the employment of 

sizable elements from both the Navy and the Army, the 

practice was to formulate. plans by temporarily assigning Army officers to permanent naval staffs and vice versa, 

rather than by relying on mutual cooperation between Army and Navy commanders and/or their staffs.50 

flexibility, 

In summary, mobility, land regular communication 

constituted important ingredients of effective eommand. 

Command for the Invasion of Japan 

Interservice rivalry plagued the war effort in the 

Pacific right up to the very end when the question of who 

would be commander in chief for the invasion of Japan surfaced as a pressing item for discussion. The final 

answer undermined, once again, the principle of unity of 

command. In the planning for the assault on the Japanese islands, the JCS redeployed- forces from SWPA and POA, 

creating in the process an organization that resembled an 

army group. 

On 3 April 1945, the JCS designated MacArthur, who had 

been promoted to General. of the Army, to be Commander in 

Chief of the United States Army Forces in the Pacific 

(CINCUSAFPAC), They expanded his responsibilities to 

include both operational and administrative control over 

all army units in the Pacific except the Twentieth Air 

Force and certain troops in Alaska and the Southeast 

Pacific Area. This command involved the transfer by Mimitz to MacArthur of all army forces in the Ryukyus, 

including the Tenth Army. As commanding general, MacArthur was to have under his direct command the First, 

Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth armies. Nimitz, in turn, 

received control from MacArthur of the Seventh Fleet under 

Kinkaid. This step placed all naval forces in the Pacific 

under Nimitz, who now served as Commander in Chief of the 

U.S. Pacific Fleet. The Twentieth Air' Force became a 

separate command under General Spaatz who was to receive 

his orders from General Arnold in. Washington. In forming these three separate commands, each responsible for its 

own logistics, the JCS decided against a unified command. 

Interserviee rivalry was again a problem (see chart 6). Although MacArthur exercised primary responsibility for 

Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, he had to rely on 

cooperation from the Navy and Air in the execution of the 

operation51 (see chart 7). Realizing the need for some 

unity, JCS in May directed that MacArthur could exercise 

control of the actual amphibious assault through the 

4-20 
4-21 

i .i 
4-22 
appropriate naval commander in case of 

although these 

exi encies, situations were not defined. 5 2 In 

planning for the invasion of Honshu (Coronet) that would 

involve First and Eighth armies, MacArthur expected to 

establish the advance echelon of his general head uarters 

as the army group headquarters in the field.5 'j This 

intention was consistent with MacArthur's practice in the 

Philippines, where he directly commanded both field armies. 

Other organizational changes took place within the 

Army. USAFFE became a nominal agency for financial 

matters in the Philippines. On 1 June 1945, Lieutenant 

General Wilhelm Styer assumed command of the new U.S. Army Forces in the Western Pacific CAFWESPAC), a logistical 

organization for the theater directly under MacArthur. 

AFWESPAC thus took over the functions of USAFSOS, continuing the policy of having a separate ASCOM for each 

major operation involving field armies. Lieuienant 

General Richardson received control of U.S. Army Forces in 

the Middle Pacific (AFMIDPAC), which entailed command of 

army forces and installations in the POA and the Hawaiian 

Department, as Nimitz released these from his operational 

control. Because area boundaries remained in the Pacific, 

Richardson was under the control of both MacArthur and 

Nimitz. SWPA continued as an allied command under 

MacArthur. The Americans wanted the British to take 

authority for areas south of the Philippines, but Great 

Britain felt unready to do so until 1 January 1946.54 

On 15 August 1945, the day on which the United States 

received notification of Japan's capitulation, MacArthur 

became the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces for the 

invasion of Japan, and the question of unity of command in 

combat no longer constituted an issue with the signing of 

the peace treaty. 

Conclusion 

By dividing the Pacific into separate theaters, the 

JCS created a situation that gave rise to Army and Navy squabbling over resources for their respective areas of 

responsibility. The problem of divided command became 

most acute when sizable forces from both theaters 

participated in a single, major operation with each 

theater commander controlling his own units. Interserviee 

rivalry prevented any resolution of this dilemma up to and 

including the planning for the invasion of Japan. Unity 

of command within each theater, however, permitted both 

MacArthur and Nimitz to use their forces effectively. 

4-23 
Field armies in the two theaters differed in command, 

organization, and mission. In SWPA, the Sixth and Eighth armies were composed of army elements supported by air and 

naval forces under the command of their respective service 

commanders, who reported to the theater commander. When both armies entered combat in the Philippines, MacArthur 

avoided forming an army group headquarters, and for the 

assault on Honshu, he wanted his own general headquarters to perform that function. 

joint task force 

The Tenth Army in POA formed a 

--including air and naval units--under the 

operational direction of a naval commander, It was also charged with base development and defense, One must note that the plans for the invasion of Japan gave large Marine 

assets to the Sixth and Eighth armies, making these field 

armies more closely resemble the composition of the Tenth 

Army in its assault on Okinawa. 

Flexibility characterized command * 

Corps moved from one army command to anoltnher the Pacific 

in order to facilitate operations. Both MacArthur and Nimitz created 

new logistical commands called ASCOM and ISCOM to handle 

the enormous problems of suPPlY* Ad hoc committees 

tackled noncombat difficulties. Theater, army, and corps commanders exercised a great deal of freedom in planning, fire support, and maneuver, 

depending on circumstances. though in varying degrees and 

The problem of divided command--where forces from two 

theaters joined together for major operations--was never 

solved during the war in the Pacific. But the conduct of 

the war does stand as an interesting and unique example of 

how the Army could fight for four years under navy command 

and do so successfully. 

4-24 
1. 

in the 

Office of 

Pacific (1962;. reprint, Washington, DC: 

the Chief of Military History, Departmenl of the Army, 1973), 161-80. 

2. 

3. 

Ibid. 244-50. 

Ibid. 249. For the two directives see Appendices C 

and D in Morton's study. 

4. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, vol. 2, 

1941-1945 (Boston, Houghton and Mifflin, 19151, 631. 

5. Morton, Strategy, 494. 

6. Virgil Ney, Evolution of a Theater of 

Headquarters, 

Operations 

1941-1967, CORG Memorandum CORG-M-318 

(Fort Belvoir, VA: 

Research Group, Prepared by Combat Operations Technical Operations, Inc., for U.S. 

7. Ibid., 48-53. 

8. Morton, St,rategy, 253-55; U.S Armed Forces Staff 

College, Organization and Command 

During World War 

.[by] WilliamI'~~ 

Relationships committee 

submitted.. Wetdt et study al.(Norfolk, 

VA, 1951), 13 (hereafter cited a$ Wendt, et al., 

"Organization"). 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

NOTES 

Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two 

Years, United States Army in World War II: The War 

Army Combat Developments Co&and, December 1967), 48, r;? J3. 

James, MacArthur, 358. 

D. M. Horner, High Command: Australia and Allied 

1939-1945 (New York: Allen and Unwin, . This work is an excellent study of the 

American-Australian problems during the War. * 

Roy Appleman, et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle, 

United States Army in World War II: The War In the 

Pacific (1948; reprint, Washington, DC: Historical 

Division, Department of the Army, 1971), 21-26. 

Lida Mayo. The Ordna, 

Batt 

Technical Service 

:lefiont 

nce Department: On Beachhead and 

- 2 United States Army in World W II: The 

!s (Washington, DC: OffTEe of the 

Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1968), 

448. 

4-25 
13. 

14. 

3.5. 

L6. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

26. 

27. 

28. 

Robert Eichelberger, York, 

Our Jungle Road to Tokyo (New Viking, 1950), 248. 

Ibid., 200. 

Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, United 

Spates Army in World War II: The War ir 1 the Pacific 

(1963; reprint, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief 

of Military History, 34. Department of the Army, 19821, 

George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports (New York: 

Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1949) Y . 

Smith, Triumph, 33-34. 

U.S. Army, 6th Army, Report of the Leyte Operations: 

20 October-25 December 1944 (N,p., n.d.), 40. 

Appleman, Okinawa, 23-25; Smith, Triumph, 34. 

Appleman, Okinawa, 23. 

Eichelberger, Jungle Road, 233. 

Robert W. May, "'The Army Service Command," Military 

Review 26 (December 1946):52. 

Ibid., 56. 

Ibid., 55. See also 

123-25, 

6th Army, Leyte Operations, 214; and Walter Krueger, From Down Under to 

+ 

Ni on (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 19531, 

Mayo, Ordnance, 448; Appleman, Okinawa, 39. 

U.S. Army, 10th Army, 

March-30 June 

"Action Report: 

1945,'" chap. Ryukyus, 26 

11, sect.. 5, p. 17. 

Ibid., chap. 11, sect. 5, pp. 9, 13 and chap. 11, 

sect. 8, pp* l-2. 

4-26 
29. Ibid., chap. 11, sect. 5, p 

8, p. 3. 

14, and chap. 11, sect. 

See also U.S. Army, 10th Army, "Tentative 

Operations Plan l-45," annex 5, pp. l-9. 

30. 6th Army, Leyte Operations, 226. Because of the 

difficult terrain, Krueger established a no-fire zone 

1000 yards on either 

the two corps. 

side of the boundary separating Any fire in this area required the 

prior approval of Sixth Army Headquarters. 

31. 10th Army, "Tentative Operations Plan l-45," annex 8, 

p. 5. 

32. Ibid., annex 5, pp. 2-4, See also 10th Army, "Action 

Report," chap. 11, sect. 5, pp. 13-15. 

33. Ibid., chap. 11, sect. 5, p. 17. 

34. George Raynor Thompson and Dixie R. Harris, The 

Signal Corps: The Outcome, -- United States Army in 

World War II: The Technical Services (1966; reprint, 

Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1970), 231-33. 

35. 10th Army, "Action Report,'" chap. 11, sect. 5, p. 17. 

36. 6th Army, Leyte Operations, 198; Krueger, From Down 

Under, 213-14. 

37. 

38. 

39. 

Roger Olaf Egeberg, The General: MacArthur and the 

Man He Called 'Doe' (New York, Hippcrene Books, 

2 26-2/ . 

Ibid., 37-41; Kenney, General Kenney Reports, 26. 

Robert Eichelberger, Dear Miss Em: General 

Eichelberger's War in the Pacific,k942-1944 edited 

by Jay Luvaas (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press', 1972), 

60-64, 272. 

40. Daniel Barbey, MacArthur's Amphibious Navy 

(Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 

1969), 24. For a similar statement see Eichelberger, Jungle Road, 189. 

41. James, MacArthur , 592. 

42. Egeberg, The General, 76. 

43. James, MacArthur, 629-30; Smith, Triumph, 364. 

4-27 
44, James, MacArthur, 623, 628-29: Egeberg, The General, 

116. 

45. Eichelberger, Dear Miss Em, 240, and Jungle Road, 

224; Cannon, Leyte, 244. 

46. 6th Army, Leyte Operations, 206, 208. 

47. Eichelberger, Jungle Road, 216. 

48. Cannon, Leyte, 189. 

49. Ibid., 191. 

50. Wendt, et al., Organization, 11; Krueger, From Down 

Under, 136-37. In the later reference, Krueger 

provides a brief description of joint planning 

sessions. 

51. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Reports of 

General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the 

Pacific (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 1:389. 

52. Grace Person Hayes, The History of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan 

(1953; reprint, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 

Press, 1982), 706. 

53. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, /Reports, 

1~423. 

54. Ibid., 389-92. 

4-28 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Appleman, Roy, et. al. Okinawa: The Last Battle. United 

States Army in World War II: T3??-%?ir in the 

Pacific. 1948. Reprint. Washington, DC: 

Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1971. 

Barbey, Daniel. MacArthur's Amphibious Nav 

MD: . lg;.. Annapolis, United States Naval Institute, 

Cannon, M. Hamlin. Leyte: The Return to the Philippines. United States in World War II: The- War in i?he 

Pacific. 1954. Reprint. Washington, DC: Office of 

the Chief of Military History, Department of the 

Army, 1973. 

Egeberg, Roger Olaf. The General: MacArthur and the Man 

He Called 'Dot'. New York: -Hippocxne Books, lm 

Eichelberger, Robert. Dear Miss Em: General 

Eichelberger's War in thePacific, 1942-1944. Edited 

by Jay Luvaas. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1972. 

e Our Jungle Road to Tokyo. New York: Viking, 

1950 . 

Hayes, Grace Person. The HistTOhreYWOafrtAhea~~~tJaCh~~:s y:,,. Staff in World War II: g P 

Reprint. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982. 

Horner, D. M. High Command: Australia and Allied 

Stratem, 1939-1945. New York: Allen and Unwin, 

1982.~ -- - 

James D. Clayton. The Years of MacArthur, Vol 2. 

1941-1945: Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1975. 

Kenney, George C. General Kenney Reports. New York: 

Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1949. - 

Krueger, Walter. From Down Under to Nippon. Washington, 

DC: Combat Forces Press, m 

May, Robert W "The Army Service Command." Military Review 26 (December 1946): 52-56. 

Mayo, Lida. The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and 

Battlefront. United States in World W . The 

Technical Services. Washington. DC: Ofafrice of the 

Chief of Military History, UGited States Army, 1968. 

4-29 
Morton, Louis. Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, 

United States Army in World War II: The War in the 

Pacific. 1962. Reprint. Washington, DC: Office of 

the Chief of Military History, Department of the 

Army, 1973. 

Ney , Virgil. Evolution of a.Theater of Operations Headquarters, 1941-196/ 

CORG-M-318. Fort Belvoir. l VA: 

CORG Memorandum 

nrenared bv Combat 

Operations Research Group, Technikal operations, Inc., for U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, 

December 1967. 

Smith, Robert Ross. Triumph in the Philippines.' United 

States Army in World War IX: The War in the Pacific. 

1963. Reprint. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief 

of Military History, Department of the Army, 1982. 

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Reports of 

General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the 

Pacific. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2966. 

Thompson, George Raynor, and Dixie R. Harris. 

,Corps: The Outcome. 

The Sif;akar 

United States Army in Wor 

II: The Technical Services. 1966. Reprint. 

Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1970. 

U.S. Armed Forces Staff College. "'Organization and Command 

Relationships During World War II.'" A committee 

study submitted.. .[by] William R.' Wendt, et al. 

Norfolk, VA, 1951. 

U.S. Army. 6th Army. Report of the Leyte OFrations: 20 

October-25 December 1944. N.p., N.d.- _--UP - 

U.S. Army, 10th Army. ‘“Act ion Report"': Ryukyus, 26 

March-30 June 1945.'" 

e '"Tentative Operations Plan l-45."' 

Wendt, William R., et. al. Organization and Command 

Relationships During World War II. Norfolk, VA, 1951. 

4-30 
CHAPTER 5 

ORGANIZATION OF.LARGE UNITS DURING THE KOREAN WAR* 

The Korean .War is unique in the annals of U,S. 

military history in that it was America's first standing 

start war. Because of the total surprise and quick 

success achieved by the North Korean invasion, America was 

forced to go to war with the existing forces in the 

theater. As a result, several months were to pass before 

the military organizations committed to the Korean War by the U.S. and its UN Allies formed into mature, permanent 

structures. For this reason, this report on the 

organization of large units in the Korean War is divided 

into three main descriptive sections: the status at the 

outbreak of war, the bu,ildup phase, and the organization 

of the mature theater. In addition, a section on 

logistics has been added because of the unique nature of 

the logistical system established in the theater to 

support the ground force. The report terminates with 

conclusions drawn from an analysis of the information in 

the preceding sections. 

Status at the Outbreak of War_. 

When the North Korean People's Army struck the 

Republic of Korea (ROK) in an unprovoked surprise attack 

on 25 June 1950, the U.S. theater command in that area of 

the world was the Far Eastern Command (FEC), located in 

Tokyo and commanded by General Douglas MacArthur. In 

addition to his role as Commander in Chief, Far East 

(CINCFE), MacArthur held the post of Supreme Commander 

Allied Powers' (SCAP) and Governor,, Ryukyu Islands'. With 

respect to the prosecutionc of the war in Korea, however, the key command was the FEC, Under its joint umbrella, 

MacArthur commanded all the U.S. armed forces in the 

Western Pacific. The Eighth Army, Far East Air Forces 

(FEAF), and U.S. Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE) comprised 

its three component arms.. 

Gene 

infa 

In 1950, the Eighth Army, commanded by Lieutenant 

ral Walton Walker, comprised four understrength 

ntry divisions, scattered throughout Japan. The FEAF 

disposed 350 fighter aircraft organized into nine groups 

*By Major Scot t R. McMichael 

5-l 
Of eighteen squadrons (of which only four were within 

effective range of Korea). In addition, the FEAF included 

a light bomber wing and a troop carrier wing in Japan. The only medium bomber wing (of the Strategic Air Command) in the Far East was on Guam. Vice Admiral Charles Turner 

Joy commanded NAVFE. At the outbreak of the war, his 

command included one cruiser, four destroyers, and a 

number of amphibious and cargo vessels. Seventh Fleet,, 

l-lot initially under MacArthur's command, was ordered in 

late June to place itself under the operational control of 

NAVFE.l 

Prior to the war, MacArthur had no military responsibilities in Korea except to logistically support 

the U.S. Embassy and the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). The KMAG consisted of five hundred officers and 

men charged with advising Seoul on the development and 

training of the RGK Army. In this capacity, advisors down to battalion level.2 

it placed 

In June of 1950, the ROK Army consisted of 

approximately one hundred thousand men organized into 

eight ill-trained and poorly equipped divisions, plus 

support units. The South Korean Air Force had twenty-two 

liaison aircraft and trainers. Finally, the South Korean 

Navy consisted of four patrol boats, one LST, fifteen 

former U.S. mine sweepers, and other smaller craft.3 

ten former Japanese minelayers, 

The Buildup Phase 

The rapid collapse of the South Korean defenses forced 

the U.S. and the UN to take prompt military action to 

secure South Korea against downfall. On 26 June, 

President Truman authorized MacArthur to send a survey 

team to Korea to assess the situation. Soon thereafter, 

the JCS directed MacArthur to assume operational control 

of all U.S. military activities in Korea. MacArthur 

designated the survey team as the FEC GHQ (general 

headquarters) Advance Command and Liaison Group (ADCGM) 

and instructed its head, Brigadier General John H. Church, 

to do all he could to help the ROK Army stop the enemy's drive. KMAG was subordinated to ADCOM.4 

Pessimistic reports from ADCOM and from MacArthur's 

personal inspection of the battlefield led to Truman"s 

decision to use American ground troops in Korea. On 30 

June, MacArthur ordered the Eighth Army Commander to 

dispatch the 24th Infantry Division to Korea at once. The 

Division Commander, Major General William F. Dean, was 

directed to take command of all U.S. forees in Korea 

5-2 
(USAFIK), superseding ADCOM.5 Task Force Smith, formed 

around 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, arrived in Korea on 

2 July as the first U.S. Army unit committed to action. 

Meanwhile, the rest of the 24th Infantry Division prepared 

to join TF Smith. 

Although USAFIR was activated on 4 July, it was soon 

preempted by MacArthur's order to General Walker to take 

command of U.S. military operations in Korea. 

Accordingly, Lieutenant General Walker established HQ, 

Eighth U, S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), at Taegu on 13 July, 

and USAFIK dissolved. In the interim, the FEAF had 

established a Joint Operations Center (JOC) in Korea at 

Taejon on 5 July. On 14 July, the JOC moved to Taegu to 

collocate with HQ, EUSAK. Six days later the advance 

headquarters 

Taegu.6 

of the FEAF joined Walker's headquarters in 

By this time the FEAF controlled aircraft from 

the Navy and Marines as well as its own. 

Simultaneous with U.S. unilateral actions to support 

South Korea, the UN stepped into the conflict. Following 

several resolutions from the Security Council and the 

General Assembly, the UN asked President Truman to take 

control of the UN forces being sent to the theater. on 8 

July, Truman designated General MacArthur as the Commander 

in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC). MacArthur's 

FEC GHQ thereby also became the UNC GHQ. 

On 14 July 1950, President Syngman Rhee of South Korea 

direeted the ROK Army Chief of Staff, General Chung 11 

Kwon, to place himself and his forces under MacArthur as 

part of the UNC. MacArthur, in turn, ordered Walker to 

assume command of the ROK Army. No written document 

formalized this relationship, but the pattern established 

in July 1950 was followed throughout the war. Walker 

directed the operations of the ROK Army indirectly through 

the ROK Chief of Staff, who issued the formal orders to 

the ROK units. This unusual relationship is explained in 

more detail in the next section of this report, but it is 

worth noting at this point that it caused no problems on 

the battlefield. The ROK Army was eager to follow the 

lead of the U,S. commander and--anxious to redeem itself.? 

The growth of the UNC proceeded rapidly. By the 1st 

of August, four divisions of the Eighth Army--the 25th, 

24th, and 2d Infantry divisions and the Ist Calvary 

Division--plus the 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) had 

closed in Korea. The 7th Infantry Divison remained in 

Japan as the GHQ Reserve. The 1st Marine Brigade 

(Provisional), in advance of the arrival of the entire 1st 

Marine Division, came ashore on 2 August. The ROK Army at 

this time had reconstituted itself into five infantry 

5-3 -_ 
divisions--the 1st, 6th, 3d, 8th, and Capital divisions --organized into the I and II ROK Corps. The 

British 27th Brigade arrived in late August; it was the 

first UN ground force to arrive. 

The bulk of the air and naval forces available to 

MacArthur were American. On 27 August, MacArthur 

designated the FEAF and NAVFE as part of the UN Command, 

setting the pattern for the assignment of other UN air and 

naval forces to the FEAF and NAVFE as they arrived.8 

S'imilarly, as UN ground forces arrived in Korea, they were' 

integrated. into existing U.S. formations. All of the UN 

ground forces, aside from the U.S. forces, were 

brigade-size or smaller. 

It was not until September 1950 that, by directive of 

the FEC (following DA approval), the Eighth Army organized 

its U.S. divisions into corps, the U.S. corps headquarters 

having been activated stateside and shipped over.9 The 

organizations of the FEC and Eighth Army at this time is 

shown in figure 1. 

During the first four to five months of the war, both 

GHQ FEC and HQ Eighth Army conducted operational 

planning. Eighth Army was responsible for the day-by-day 

ground combat, while GHQ approved Eighth Army plans, 

planned for future operations, and maintained a GHQ 

Reserve. The first major operational plan of the GHQ was 

the Inchon amphibious operation* A product of MacArthur's 

fertile mind, the Inchon plan was undertaken initially by 

the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), 

headed by Brigadier General Wright, who was also the GHQ 

63. Later, for reasons of secrecy, the operation was 

turned over to the headquarters group of the Special 

Planning Staff (SPS), GHQ.10 Simultaneously, a corps 

was being raised in Japan as the GHQ Reserve. On 26 

August, with DA approval, MacArthur activated 

Headquarters, X Corps? from the SPS and assigned all units 

in the GHQ Reserve to it, thus forming the ground force 

for the Inchon invasion. Major General Edward Almond, 

Chief of Staff, FEC, assumed command of the X Corps on 26 

August but retained his duties as Chief of Staff even 

after the X Corps was ashore --an unusual arrangement to 

say the 1east.l' 

GHQ FEC also controlled the U.S.-UN air and naval 

forces and allocated these assets to close support of 

EUSAK, interdiction, long-range bombing, and for other 

support operations as it saw fit. EUSAK directly 

controlled no air or naval forces; it requested such 

support through the Fifth Air Force or GHQ. CINCNAVFE 

5-4 
I ARMY CHIEF 

OF STAFF, 

GOVER%:OR, 

RYUKYU ISLAWS . 

---T--- 

UN COWND/ 

FAR EAST COMMA”u”Db . ALLIED POKERS 

I 

1 BRIT 27 BDE/ 

f 1 ROK DIV 

CAPITAL DTV 

aThe Army Chief of Staff was designated as the executive agent for the JCS. 

"?%e CINCUNC/CINCFEC exercised operational control only over the FEAF and NAVFE. 

%e X Corps actually was RG longer in GHQ Reserve on 23 September. By this time 

it had been com-lritted on the Inchon amphib-lous invasion. 

Figure 1. UNC/FEC Organization, 23 September 1950 

5-5 
organized his vessels into task forces with specific territorial and functional missions.12 For the Inchon 

and Wonsan amphibious operations, Joint Task Force 7 (JTF 7) was formed to carry out the landings. Admiral Struble, Commander, Seventh Fleet, also commanded JTF 7, which 

included seven subordinate task forces (see figure 2). 

Surprisingly, after the Inchon landing, when the 

Eighth Army and the X Corps had linked up and had formed a 

contiguous defense, the X Corps was not assigned to the 

Eighth Army. Instead, MacArthur retained control of the 

X Corps, pulled it out of the line, and explained to 

General Walker that he was reconstituting the reserve for 

a coming GHQ-directed operation--the Wonsan amphibious operation. 

MacArthur's controversial decision to keep the two 

commands separate had several unfortunate results. As the 

7th Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division 

outloaded at Inchon and Pusan, the X Corps priority on 

logistical support and transport facilities severely disrupted supplies flowing to the Eighth Army. Depot stocks intended for EUSAK fell to low levels. Ultimately, the advance of the Eighth Army into North Korea was slowed 

by the emphasis placed on getting X Corps provisioned and 

outloaded for the Wonsan operation.13 Second, the delay of the UN drive into North Korea, as a result of the 

repositioning of the X Corps, permitted large numbers of 

the enemy force to escape. Finally, the Wonsan amphibious operation proved unnecessary. The ROK I Corps captured Wonsan overland on 10 October; the X Corps made an 

administrative into the 

25-28 October. 14 

landing port city from 

Once the X Corps was ashore, MacArthur still refused 

to relinquish control of the corps to Walker. Ostensibly, he based this decision on tactical considerations. 

Operational plans at this time called for Eighth Army to 

advance into North Korea along the west coast, the X Corps (with ~ROK I Corp attached) to advance along the east 

coast. The two commands were separated by the rugged Taebaek range of mountains through which ran only a few 

east-west trails and no good roads. Physical liaison was 

impossible. MacArthur reasoned that as long as the two 

commands could maintain radio and teletype contact, with 

their flanks connected by daily reconnaissance flights, there was no reason to place X Corps under Eighth Army. 

Inexplicably, however, MacArthur charged Walker with 

logistical support of the X corps while denying him 

tactical control. These confusing and nondoctrinal 

5-6 
.- 

a 

pG$zyq 

t 

ill* 

TF 90 TF 92 

x CORPS lp$q +I jjj pq $i-Ti 

ATTACK LANDING PATROL/\ 3LOCKADE/ FAST LOGISTICAL FLAGSHIP 

FORCE FORCE RECO8NATSSAXE COVERING CARRIER SUPPORT GROUP 

FORCE FORCE FORCE FORCE 

INCHON OPERATION 

JOINT TASK FORCE 

(Adm Struble) 

j TF95 j jTF95.6j 1 TF96.2/ / TFT7 / 1 TF39 j 

ADVAI'CE MINESIVEEPIWG PATROL/ 

R&OKNAISSAlKE 

FAST LOGISTICS 

FORCE GROUP CARRIER SUPPORT 

GROUP FORCE 

W%!SA?4 OPERATION 

a.dmiral Struhle was also the Seventh Fleet commander. 

Source: Roy Appleman, South to the ?&&tong, North to the Yalu (Washington, D.C.: 

Office of the Chief of Military Hisro-il;, Department of Army, 1973), 497 

and 6,713. 

Figure 2. Joint Task Force 7 

5-7 
arrangements were opposed by senior members of MacArthur's 

own staff--the acting Chief of Staff, the G3, and the G4. 

Yet the CINC insisted on doing things his way.15 

It was not until December 1956 that the X Corps was 

absorbed into the Eighth Army, forming one ground command 

in the theater. This development followed the shocking 

retreat of the Eighth Army to a line below Seoul and the 

evacuation of the X Gorps 'through Wonsan, both events , coming as a result of the massive Chinese intervention. 

By this time General Walker had been killed in a jeep accident. His replacement, Lieutenant General Matthew B. 

Ridgway, obtained control of the X Corps when it was 

reintroduced, into the line after refitting at Pusan 

following its evacuation from the north. Another 

significant change took place after Ridgeway's elevation 

to command. From this time on, MacArthur was content to 

leave virtually all the ground 

Ridgway's staff.16 

operational planning to 

Ridgway was careful to keep his boss 

informed on planned operations, authority abridged, as 

but at ntei;rnf? was his 

Walker's had 

events, therefore, combined in 1951 to l 

Three 

permit the 

evolution of the mature theater: the combination of all 

ground forces into one field army, the stabilization of 

the Pines, and the concentration of ground force 

operational planning at one HQ--EUSAK. 

The Organization of the Mature Theater 

By June 1951, the FEC-UNC, with subordinate commands, 

had taken the shape shown on figure 3. This organization 

remained without significant change through the end of the 

war. NAVFE continued to organize its forces into task 

forces and task groups with specific functional and 

territorial missions. Eventually, the FEAF evolved into 

three subordinate commands. The Bomber Command included 

B29 wings and reconnaisance elements; generally, it 

executed the strategic bombing plan and performed 

interdiction. The Fifth Air Force, augmented by Marine, 

South Korean, and UN air squadrons, conducted close air 

support, air-to-air operations, and interdiction. The l 

315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) provided logistical 

airlift to the command.18 

EUSAK remained the field force of the FEC. Its 

detailed organization is shown in figure 4. Figure 4.also 

depicts the maintenance of a GHQ Reserve, a force retained 

for several reasons. First, the principles of war mandate 

the existence of a reserve as a tool for the commander to 

influence the battlefield. Second, the reserve divisions 

5-8 
I Pettef CV 

l---J 

Depatiment 

of Deiense c of Defense i 

CO-OrdLtiOn 

i 

I 

i Governor, Ryukyu I I UN. Con~r;cnd,‘For Supreme Ccnmand, 

I Edcnds 

I 

Ecsf COmmOnd c Allied i)owers 

I 1 

Sfrafeck Air 

Corn. -znd 

i 

Source: Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and FQ$%ting Front (Washington, DC: 

Office of the Chief of Military Histlory, Department of the Army, 

19731, 54. 

Figure 3. Channels of Command, July 1951 

5-9 
CINCUNC and CINCFE 

(General Matthew B. Ridgway) 

I 

I 

In Korea In Japan I 

U,N. RECEPTION CENTER 

COLOMBIAN BATTALION 

ETHIOPIAN BATTALION 

I 

EIGHTH ARNY 

' (LTG James A. Van Fleet) 

I 

- I U.S. 45TH INFANTRY DIV 

I U.S, CORPS 

ROK 1ST DIVISION 

BRITISH 29TH BRIGADE 

U.S. 1ST CAVALRY DIV 

CANADIAN 25111 BDE 

BRITISH 28TH BDE 

GREEK BATTALION THAILAND BATTALIOPJ 

U.S. 3D INFANTRY DIV 

ROK 9TH DIVISION 

PHILIPPINE 1OTH BN U-S. 25TH INFANTRY DIV 

TURKISH BRIGADE 

ROK I CORPS 

ROK CAPITAL DIVISION 

ROK 1lTH DIVISION 

ROK 3D DIVISION 

7 

IX U.S. CORPS 

ROK 2D DIVISION 

U.S. 24TH INFANTRY DIV 

ROK 6TH DIVISION 

LJ.S, 7TH INFANTRY DIV 

X U.S. CORPS 

ROK 7TH DIVISION 

U.S. 1ST MARINE DIV 

ROK STH DIVISION 

U.S. 2D INFANTRY DIV 

FRENCH BATTALION 

NETHERLANDS BN 

ROK 8TH DIVISION 

Source: Hq Eighth Army, Command Report, ACofS, G-3, bk. 4, pt. 1, 1 Jul 51, 

NOTE: Chart reproduced from Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (FVashington, 

D.C. : Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. 1973), 56.. 

Figure 4. UN Command/Far East Command, Major Ground Forces, 1 July 1951 

5-10 
were rotated with the EUSAK divisions to share the burden 

of combat. Third, because of the dual hats worn by Ridgway, who succeeded MacArthur as CINCUNC and CINCFEC in 

April 1951, he needed to retain an uncommitted force for 

the defense of Japan and other territories. The perceived conflicting responsibilities of his dual roles, U.S. 

Theater Commander vice UN Commander, caused Ridgway to 

seek resolution of these conflicts through comprehensive dialogue with the JCS. The products of this dialogue were 

the prioritization of Ridgway's responsibilities and the 

clarification and reconciliation of past directives from 

the JCS to FEC.19 

Returning to figure 4, it is evident that UN forces 

were integrated directly into U.S. divisions and corps. Also worthy of note is the EUSAK responsibility for the UN 

Reception Center. This function is one of many theater or 

communications zone (COMMZ) functions which were charged 

to the Eighth Army. In effect, Korea was a theater of 

operations, but no onshore COMMZ was ever established. 

Eighth Army was responsible for the logistic support of 

the entire UN force, to include the ROK Army. EUSAK HQ 

fulfilled a wide range of responsibilities far beyond those doctrinally required of an operational field army 

HQ. Thus, Eighth Army functioned as both a field army and 

a theater army or army group HQ. This issue is explored 

more fully in the next section--Logistics. 

The relationship of Eighth Army to the FEAF and NAVFE 

conformed to doctrine. The FEAF placed TACPs (tactical 

air control parties) down to regimental level. Requests for air support were passed through G3 and Air Force 

channels. The Fifth Air Force continued to locate a CP 

(command post) element with the Eighth Army main and 

advance CPs, as did the FEAF regarding the JOC. 

Ultimately, GHQ resolved any disputes concerning the 

allocation of air assets. Similar procedures regulated the use of NAVFE forces in support of the Eighth Army. 

The relationship of the Eighth Army to the ROK Army 

settled into an unusual but efficient pattern. Basically the relationship took three forms. The CG, Eighth Army, exercised operational command of ROK forces through the 

ROK Chief of Staff (for the ROK Corps and separate ROK 

units) and through the U.S. corps commanders having ROK 

divisions assigned (figure 5). The U.S. Commanding General, however, always exercised the policy of 

restricting operational command to tactical matters in 

order to respect the independence and integrity of the ROK 

government to control its own forces through the ROK Chief 

5-l 1 
Figure 5. Operational Command 
of Staff. As noted earlier, this arrangement worked very 

well and had no adverse effects from a military point of 

view.20 

As shown in figure 6, no direct administrative command 

existed between EUSAK and the ROB Army. Administrative 

control was maintained separately in each army. Few 

problems resulted from this arrangement; those that did 

were resolved quickly through other &hannels.*l 

‘The third form of the EUSAK/ROK Army relationship 

concerned the KMAG. Throughout the war, the KMAG 

continued to place advisors in the ROK structure (figure 

7). These advisors had no command responsibilities. They 

did, however, provide guidance, make suggestions, authenticate ROK requisitions of U.S. supplies, and assist 

their units in any way possible. The existence of the 

KMAG was vital to the smooth functioning of the U.S.-ROK 

relationship.22 

A study done at the U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College (USACGS~) in 1952 compared the composition of EUSAK to the doctrinal type field army of 1952.23 

Significant differences were noted (see figure 8). For 

example, the type field army projected a twelve division 

structure --nine infantry divisions and three armored. In 

contrast, EUSAK disposed five infantry, no armored, one 

Calvary, and one Marine division (U.S. divisions only are 

considered here). The type field army forecasted a 

division strength of 217,854; in March 1952, EUSAK 

division strength totalled 137,264. The type field army 

also included strong armor, artillery, engineer, and 

chemical elements which far exceeded EUSAK's strength in 

these branches. Opposite imbalances existed in regard to 

service support elements; EWSAK CSS elements comprised 30 

percent of the force compared to 20.5 percent in the type field army. 

Generally, the nature of the theater and the manner in 

which it evolved caused these differences. ROK and UN 

forces ) for example, made up the shortfall in U.S. 

divisions. The U.S. divisions which were committed in 

theater were those most available in June 1950, not those 

necessarily most desirable. UN air and naval supremacy 

reduced the need for armored cavalry and artillery in 

EUSAK. Moreover, Korean terrain generally did not favor 

the use of armor. The extra logistical requirements of 

EUSAK required a heavier CSS 'structure; as noted earlier, 

EUSAK supported the entire UN force in Korea. In 

addition, use of the Korean Service Corps to prepare and 

5-13 
p&---li 

I 

us CoRPs J 

jus pi 

t- 

-- 7- -----I 

--,,,-,,---.-----.-4 

Figure 6. Administrative Command 

SEPWXTS _ _ _ _ 

EIGHTH 

- - -[C/S ROKA 1 

source : U.S. Army, 8th Army (Korea), l%Xmnand and Administrative Relationships 

Between the Eighth U.S. Amy and Republic af Korea Army," (23 March 

19533, Em1 1-3. 

Figure 7. Advisory Control 

5-14 
u?;I'i' OR BRA!!CH -ZTRE:iG'TH 

HE.~QUARiEKS 3,079 1.2 2,109 0.5: 972 

DIvISIoxs 137,264 55.: 217,S56 ‘2 -51 

ARWR 42 0.C 18,983 4.5: 

ARTILLERY 19,701 7-s 52,773 2.7: 

CHEMICXL 718 0,2 2,928 Q,?( 1,056 

ENGIXEER 8,039 3.2 27,591 6.6: 16,570 

IfiF.Xl?RY REGT (SEP) 4,452 I.5 7,558 1.8: 

MEDIC&L 6,832 

IIILITXRY POLICE 4,982 

ORDNAXCE 11,147 

QUARTERMASTER 9,732 

SIGh'AL 8,iO3 

TRX&SPORTPiTIO?u; 10,978 

MISCELLaxOUS 4,070 

TOTAL 173,265 69.8 329,826 '9. SC 74,442 

TOTAL STRENGTH 247,707 414,779 

DTVIS‘IONS 

IT\'F.kXTRY 5-9427s 9-169695 

.W~IOITED 0 j-48159 C.<<:l LRY . l-17851 

SEXRISE l-25138 

TOT4L 9( 7-137,264 ,2-217,854 

% TOTAL A&W 55.3 52;s 

ARW HQ STRENGTH 1843 Ii462 

,- 

SOURCE I I!.,C. .Ir?y Cornand and Geneml Staff College, Assistant fi 

StU.I)- cm Service Support for .??Ighth U.S. Army Kmea,"' (15 

----- 

2,295 

IO,450 

14,100 

3,500 

17,512 

13,054 

9,872 

8,424 

4,796 

84,953 

0.56 

2.52 

3.40 

1.0s 

4.23 

3.13 

2.38 

2.03 

1.17 

20.50 

.cf of Staff, G4, "Stzff 

April 1953). 

Figure 8. Coutparison of EUSM to a 1952 Type Field Amy 

5-15 
$ 

support the battle’field in Korea reduced the need for 

engineers. In short, EUSAK did not confarm to a 

doetrina.1, type field army structure. Its organization evolved in response to the peculiar strategic situation 

and tactical environment of the Korean theater. Thus, in 

this respect $ it may be improper to regard the Eighth Army 

as a field army. In reality, it was a combined army under 

U.S. command) having in addition, administrative and 

logistic responsibilities normally performed by a theater 

army or COMMZ. 

The Eighth Army HQ also differed significantly fro’m a 

type field army HQ. This is not surprising given the 

caveats noted above. Figure 9 illustrates the manner in 

which the HQ was organized in order to fulfill its 

standard operational functions and its extra 

responsibilities previously noted. Although EUSAK was 

considerably smaller than a type field army, its 

headquarters was larger--l,843 versus 1,062.24 The same 

was true of respective corps headquarters. This fact, of 

course, also reflects the added nondoctrinal 

responsibilities given the army headquarters. 

Under Ridgway, the GHQ also resumed a greater role in 

operational planning. Most of the time this role was 

confined to the establishment of restrictions on Van 

Fleet’s operations. The most common rest’riction was the 

imposition of a line limiting the advance of Eighth Army forces. Ridgway also limited the number of troops which 

Van Fleet could permit to become decisively engaged. At 

various times, Ridgway ordered Van Fleet to restrict his 

operations against the enemy almost entirely to aggressive 

patrolling, artillery bombardments, and air strikes; he 

refused to allow the commitment of forces larger than a 

division (to local offensives only) without his own 

approval. There were three main reasons for these 

restrictions. First $ by the winter of 1951, the lines had 

stabilized to the point that both sides occupied heavily 

fortified defenses in depth that were somewhat 

invulnerable to artillery. Any major offensive would 

ultimately lead to heavy casualties. In fact, the U.S. 

offensives in the summer and fall of 1951 to take Bloody 

Ridge, Heartbreak Ridge, and the Punch Bowl had produced unacceptably high levels of casualties. Second, the UNC 

had no hope of achieving total victory without the 

injection of substantial addit ional forces to offset the 

huge manpower advantage of the Chinese. Ridgway knew that 

such reinforcements were unavailable, thus total victory 

was not within reach unless atomic bombs were used. 

Again, this option had been ruled out by Truman. Third, 

5-16 
5-17 
as long as peace 

opinion 

talks were being conducted, U.S. public 

prohibited the expenditure of U.S. lives for 

terrain which might well turn out to be worthless in the 

long run. 

enforced a 

Under these conditions, 

strategy Ridgway essentially which aimed at 

lasses through indirect fires maximizing Chinese 

and which minimized U.S. 

losses by reducing troop exposure. 

to keep a close Thus, it was necessary rein on the Eighth Army to accomplish these objectives. 

On 1 October 1952, HQ, (USAFFE} was activated and 

US Army Forces, Far East 

. ..assigned the responsibility for all Army operations in Japan. Headquarters FEC and UNC 

were then streamlined by transferring the 

majority of the special staff sections and their 

functions to HQ, USAFFE, leaving only the general staff sections and necessary special staff 

activities in the headquarters.25 

Thus, the activation of USAFFE relieved the GHQ of 

administrative functions which it had been performing for 

army troops in Japan. As such, USAFFE represented the 

closest organization to a theater army established within 

the FEC. However, the establishment of USAFFE in no way relieved EUSAK of the administrative functions which it 

was performing in Korea w USAFFE also exercised no 

operational control of field units. Its impact was 

limited to administrative 

Japan.26 support of army troops in 

In January 1953, the GHQ, FEC/UNC reorganized into a 

joint staff in accordance 

iQ0-15, 

with doctrine defined in FM 

Field Service Regulations, reorganization provided for more 

Larger Units. The 

joint representation on 

the staff, reflecting the three commands: 

USAFFE, NAVFE, AND FEAF.27 component 

The change served to make 

GHQ staff operations more efficient and representative. 

It was the last major change to the theater organization. 

Logistics 

The U.S. entered the Korean War on a logistical shoestring. The stocks initially on hand for provisioning 

the combat units were quite inadequate.28 Furthermore, service units suffered from a dismal personnel situation. 

Already manned at a low level, these units were stripped of additional 

units.29 manpower to strengthen deploying combat 

No infrastructure existed to push the Eighth 

5-18 
Army out of Japan or to receive it in Korea. Upon arrival 

in Pusan, the 24th Infantry Division had to unload its own 

equipment. All of these problems originated from one 

central deficiency mentioned at the beginning of this 

report: for the first time in history, U.S. troops were 

moving directly from peacetime barracks to the field of 

combat.30 Already a matter of extreme urgency, the 

logistical situation worsened further on 1 July 1950 when 

MacArthur directed Walker to assume support of all UN 

forces in Korea, particularly the ROK Army, which had to 

be reequipped almost entirely following its devastating tactical reverses. 

To meet these compelling requirements, Eighth Army organized itself into Eighth U.S. Army Korea (EUSAK) and 

Eighth Army Rear. Eighth Army Rear comprised the service 

units, headquarters, and instalJ.ations in Japan which 

equipped and provisioned EUSAK. In the absence of clear 

procedures and precedents, expedient methods were 

established to accomplish the logistic mission. Automatic 

resupply of the deployed force was instituted because no 

central requisitioning agency existed in Ko/rea to identify 

unit needs. Chartered Japanese vessels with ,Japanese 

crews and U.S. vessels carried supplies to Korea by 

water. Eighth Army Rear relied extensively on local 

procurement to obtain essential supplies. For example, contracts with Japanese firms in August 1950 called for 

the production of 68,000 vehicles to equip the ROK Army. Japanese firms' also provided dynamite, 'flares, mines, oil 

drums, locomotives, railway cars, an cl many other vital 

items.31 

The creation of the Japan Logistical Command (JLCOM) 

on 25 August 1950 as a major subordinate' command 'of the 

FEC released Eighth Army from responsibility for 

logistical support activities and installations in 

Japan.32 The units and activities formerly assigned to 

Eighth Army Rear passed to JLCOM, and Eighth Army Rear 

dissolved. Logistical commands had only recently entered 

the U.S. doctrinal lexicon; the Korean War validated the 

concept. The JLCOM functioned as the support link between 

EUSAK and the Zone of the Interior. All EUSAK-originated requisitions were made on JLCOM. 

'Within Korea, an ad hoe organization called the Pusan 

Base Command was initially created to operate the port city of Pusan and to establish a 

country.33 logistical base in 

This base command Ca World War II concept) on 19 September 1950 was redesignated the 2d Logistical Command and assigned as a subordinate command to 

5-19 
EUSAK.34 Eventually, it came to support EUSAK and the 

entire UN force, except for specially designated elements 

that remained responsible for their own support. Like the 

JLCGM, the 2d Logistical Command validated the then 

untested logistical doctrine developed after World War 

II. However l there were a number of twists in the manner 

in which the 2d Logistical Command operated. 

Although the 2d Logistical Command had been intended 

to function 

EUSAK, 

as the principal requisitioning agency for 

it was slow to realize this objective because it 

took some time, given the fluid tactical situation, to 

establish time-based norms for requisition of certain 

supplies, EUSAK, for example, could not 

control to relinquish the 2d Logistical Command for the 

requisitioning of Class I (perishable), Class III, or 

Class v supplies because the need for these items 

fluctuated widely. The EUSAK G4 requisitioned these items 

directly from JLCOM.35 

Another twist to the operation of the 2d Logistical Command was its reliance on provisional units composed of 

unqualified personnel, instead of TOE structures.36 

As more of South Korea was liberated and other port 

cities opened for traffic, additional logistical commands 

were established. For example, the 3d Logistical Command 

assumed responsibility for unloading and provisioning 

through the port of Inchon, particularly to support the 

movement of X Corps for the Wonsan- amphibious operation 

and to support EUSAK operations into North Korea. 

Assigned to EUSAK on 7 October 1950, the 3d Logistical Command was attached, in turn, by General Walker to the 2d 

Logistical Command.37 

As noted earlier in this chapter, the Eighth Army 

discharged many responsibilities not normally assigned to 

a field army. Among these, the logistical support of UN 

forces, the equipping of ROK divisions, the operation of 

the UN Reception Center, and the establishment and use of 

the 60,000 man Korean Service Corps have already been 

mentioned. These functions were 'shared between the EUSAK 

HQ and the 2d Logistical Command. Other COMMZ/theater 

respansibilities handled by EUSAK which bear iteration 

were: the construction and administration of POW camps, 

the operation and maintenance of the ground lines of 

communication (including ports, railroads, and pipelines), labor procurement, civilian relief, establishment and 

operation of the Civil Transport Corps, and rear area 

security. Apparently, neither Ridgway nor his successor 

5-20 
Lieutenant ,General Van Fleet gave serious thought to the 

establishment of a CGMMZ HQ to perform these burdensome 

functions. From the start of the war, Ridgway had 

maintained that his responsibilities for operations in 

Korea began at the shoreline; Van Fleet never tried to 

change the situation.38 Each commander obviously preferred to retain total control of all military activities, whether operational or logistical in nature, 

conducted within the territorial confines of the peninsula. 

Conclusions 

An analysis of the history of the organization and 

operations of the Eighth Army during the Korean War, as 

summarized in this study, leads to a number of important 

conclusions and observations. Certainly the most 

significant conclusion of this report is that the Eighth Army existed simultaneously as a (combined) field army and 

a theater army p owing to the unique geographical conditions of the Korean theater and the combined nature 

of the command. Although this arrangement had no basis in 

formal doctrine, it proved itself viable after the first 

year of the war--the time required for the command to 

evolve into a stable structure. In essence, the dual 

functions practiced by the Eighth Army established the 

principle of flexibility of organization at ‘army level and 

higher. It seems both logical and likely that the same 

kinds of conditions which shaped the Eighth Army into a 

one-of-a-kind structure might well shape future armies in 

much the same manner. Thus, doctrinally based type armies 

must be considered at best as models only, which will be 

modified upon employment into specific theaters to meet 

specific conditions. 

The Eighth Army succeeded in the accomplishment of its 

dual functions. In so doing, it demonstrated a feasible 

combined structure for the assimilation, integration, and 

employment of various national forces under one banner. 

From the point of view of interoperability, therefore, the 

experience of the Eighth Army has high historical value. 

In the same way f the successful and efficient 

relationships between EUSAK, FEAF, and NAVFE provides a 

positive example of interservice cooperation and 

coordination during joint operations and at the theater 

level. 

From a negative point of view, MacArthur’s refusal to 

unify the X Corps and Eighth Army under Walker’s command 

and the continuing, deep involvement of the GHQ in 

operational planning after the Inehon invasion -led more or 

5-21 
less directly to the fragmenting of the UN Command in the 

far reaches af North Korea just prior to the massive 

Chinese intervention. These unfortunate events point out 

the necessity for one unified ground command (in a theater 

the size of Korea) and a clear separation of 

responsibility for operational planning. It was a mistake 

for MacArthur’s GHQ, 750 miles away in warm, secure 

facilities in Tokyo, to act as the primary planning HQ for 

operations in Korea. In contrast, the depth of 

involvement characterized by Ridgway and his staff was 

entirely appropriate to the tactical and political situation of the moment, there being a meaningful 

difference between the direction of operations (MacArthur) 

and the imposition of operational restrictions (Ridgway). 

Finally, the undisputed success of the logistic 

support provided to the UNC and EUSAK by the JLCOM and the 

2d Logi.stical Command validated the Army’s post-WWII 

doetrine on logistical organizations. This doctrine 

remains in force today with relatively few changes in 

concept, although significant changes in force structure 

have taken place. 

5-22 
1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

NOTES 

Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong; North to the 

Yalu. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of 

Mil'itary History, Department of the Army, 19731, 

49-50. 

Ibid., 13. 

Ibid., 17. 

Ibid., 43. 

Lawton J. Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and 

Lessons of Korea. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 

Company, 19691, 47. 

Appleman, 95. 

Collins, 83, and Appleman, 111. 

Appleman, 639. 

Ibid., 544. 

Ibid., 489-90. 

Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, New 

York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 13671, 169-170. It 

is not clear why MC Almond retained his position as 

FEC Chief of Staff. Perhaps MacArthur intended to 

return him to GHQ quickly. Whatever the reason, it 

was impossible for Almond to act as FEC Chief of 

Staff while commanding a corps in Korea. 

Appleman, 497. 

Collins, 158. 

Ibid., 169. 

Appleman, 610. See also Collins 162 and 170, and 

Ridgway, 48. MacArthur's decision to keep the two 

commands separate under overall GHQ control is a 

subject of controversy even today, although most 

military commentators criticize the decision because 

it violated the principle of unity of command. 

Interestingly, MacArthur consulted neither Walker nor 

Almond regarding post-Inchon operations nor about his 

5-23 
decision to keep the commands separate during the 

advance into North Korea. MacArthur stated in 1955 

that his decision followed standard military practice 

for the handling and control of widely separated forces where lateral communications were difficult if 

not impossible. Of course, it was J4acArthurfs plan 

which created these conditions in the first place. 

The weight of criticism disputes the wisdom of these 

command arrangements. 

16. Collins, 239. 

17. General Ridgway praised MacArthur for the tactical 

latitude which he delegated to Ridgway. He also 

praised the air and naval components of the FEC for 

their sincere willingness to support the ground 

operations of Eighth Army in every way possible. See 

Ridgway, 83, 101-704. It is not clear why MacArthur 

kept such tight control of the Eighth Army when it 

was commanded by Walker. Some have suggested that he 

did not have full confidence in LTG Walker although 

there are no apparent reasons for such a lack of 

confidence. The tactical reverses of the Chinese 

intervention and the arrival of the highly respected Ridgway probably led to his decision after Walker's 

death to leave operations in the hands of the Army 

Commander. 

18. United Nations Command, "G3 Operations Report, from 

QOO~I 6 May 1952 to 24OOI 6 May 1952,". (NO. 682, 6 

May 1952), 7-8. 

19. Collins, 298-302. 

20. U.S. Army ), 8th Army (Kqrea), "'Command and 

Administrative Relationships Between the Eighth U.S. 

Army and Republic of Korea Army,'" (24 March 19532, 1. 

21. Ibid., 2. 

22. Ibid. 

23. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 

Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, "'Staff Study on Serviee 

Support for Eighth U.S. Army Korea,"-(15 April 1953). 

24. Ibid., 6. 

25. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: MacMillan Company, 1967I, 36. 

5-24 
26. 

27. 

28. 

29. 

30. 

31. 

32. 

33. 

34. 

35. 

36. 

37. 

38. 

Virgil Hey, Evolution of a Theater of Operations 

Headquarters, 1941-1967, CORG Memorandum CORG-M-318 

7Fort Belvoir, -VA: Combat Operations Research Group, 

Technical Operations, Inc., for the Combat 

Developments Command, December 19671, 64. 

Ibid. 

U.S. Army, 8th Army (Korea), Logistical Problems and 

Their Solutions (1 July 19521, 5. 

Ibid., 15. 

Ibid., 3. 

Ibid., 13-14, 

Appleman, 114. 

Logistical Problems, 24. 

Appleman, 574. The assignment of the logistical 

command to the Eighth Army differed from World War II 

practice, when base commands normally were not 

subordinate commands of the armies that they 

supported. 

Logistical Problems, 25. 

Ibid., 26. 

Appleman, 639. 

Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front 

(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 19731, 70. 

5-25 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the 

Yalu. United States Army in the Korean War. 1961. 

Reprint. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of 

Military History; Department of the Army, 1973. 

Collins,, J. Lawton. War in Peacetime. The History and 

Lessons of Korea. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 

1969. 

Hermes, Walter G. Truce Tent and Fighting Front. United 

States Army in the Korean War. 1966. 

Washington, D.C.: Reprint. Office of the Chief of-Military History, Department of the Army, 1973. 

ion of a Theater of Operations 

341-1967. CORG Memorandum BORG-M-318. Ney, Virgil. Evolut: 

Headquarters, t! 

Fort Belvoir, VA: Combat Operations Research Group, Technical Operations, Inc., for the Combat 

Developments Command, December 1967. 

Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean War. Garden City, New 

York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967. 

United Nations Command. "G3 Operations Report, from 00011 

6 May 1952 to 24001 6 May 1952." No. 682, 6 May 1952. 

U.S. Army. Field Manual 100-15. Field Service 

Regulations, Larger Units. Washington, D.C.: 

Department of the Army, June 1950. 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Assistant 

Chief of Staff, G4. "Staff Study on Service Support for Eighth U.S. Army Korea.,, 15 April 1953. 

U.S. Army. 8th Army (Korea). rtCommand and Administrative 

Relationships Between the Eighth U.S. Army and 

Republic of Korea Army." 24 March 1953. 

Solutions. 1 'J 

Logistical Problems and Their 

uly 1952. 

1951. . "Organization of G3 Section, EUSAK.', 

"Staff Directory, Headquarters, 

Eighth U.S. Aimy Korea (EuSAK)." 15 June 1951. 

5-27 
Weigley, Russell F. The History of the Wnited States Army. New York: MacMillan Company, 1967. 

5-28 
CHAPTER 6 

VIETNAM: COMMAND AND CONTROLJc 

Introduction 

The final case. study in this report covers the 

organizational composition of the United States force 

structure in the Vietnam theater during that conflict. 

The Vietnam theater was unusual because the forces there 

FzE, upon an existing Military Assistanc;h;dvi;;;Js Group * Organizational doctrine in was 

sufficiently flexible to allow for this evolutionary force 

buildup But the dot tr ine did not allow for 

fragmentation of command and effort, a fragmentation tha: 

deveLoped from the three separate wars waged in Vietnam: 

the air war, the ground war, and the pacification effort. 

These wars will be discussed separately in this chapter, 

supporting the conclusion that sufficient unity of command 

was not achieved in Vietnam. Two organizational decisions 

contributed to this lack of unity: EaiLure to form a 

separate I unified command and failure to form a combined 

command. While the U-S. military had existing doctrine to 

promote unity of command and effort, this doctrine was not 

assiduously followed. In sum, the organization of the 

Vietnam theater evolved from a MAAG, fragmented into 

separate wars, and developed into a disunified command. 

In 1963, U.S. Army doctrine for theater operations called for a unified team of land, naval, and air forces 

“based upon the principle that effective utilization of 

the military power of the nation requires that the efforts 

of the separate services be 

integrated e “1 

military closely 

In addition, the doctrine stated that 

unity of effort amon 

level with the f 

the services began at the national 

presi ent and the secretary of defense and 

then moved through the secretaries of the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS 

directed strategic planning, and the miEitary departments 

provided joint commands to implement these plans.2 

The U.S. Army forces to execute these plans were 

organized so that each echelon of command had a specific and essential role. No echelon was to usurp or duplicate 

*By Lieutenant Colonel Gary H, Wade. 

6-1 
the role of the next lower echelon.3 To accomplish that 

task, the army component (shown on chart 1) would have 

normally become the theater army, answerable to one 

unified commander. For a large-scale theater (chart lA), the subordinate headquarters of the theater army would be 

an army group headquarters, followed by field army, then 

corps headquarters. All of these units were connected by 

operational command or command lines starting at the 

unified command and running straight down the chain of 

command through corps to the divisions. Naval and air 

components had similar command lines, also beginning with 

the unified commander. 

A similar arrangement was to take place in the event 

of the formation of a combined command. National 

identities would have been maintained, but the command 

lines would all end at the same individual, a supreme allied commander. 

Logistics was a service responsibility. Army logistics were centrally logistical command and a support command assigned to zi% managed by a theater 

field army. 

The purpose for this command and control doctrine and 

for the preparation of proposed chain of command charts 

was to promote and ensure unity of effort. According to 

FM 100-5, 19 February 1962, "the decisive applicat'ion of 

full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of 

command would obtain unity of effort by the coordinated 

action of all forces toward a common goal. While 

coordination may be attained by cooperation, it is best 

achieved by vesting a single commander with the requisite authority. '4 

U.S. army doctrine in ctah;le;arly 196Os, as writtent;: various field manuals, for and provided 

structure for unity of command. Unfortunately, this 

doctrine was not followed in Vietnam. 

The evolutionary process by which U.S. forces were 

committed to Vietnam influenced the organization of the 

command. The war did not begin with a massive, 

conventional force invasion of the south by North 

Vietnam. Nor did the United States begin the war with a 

massive influx.of troops backed by wholehearted national 

support. The war evolved and the U.S. effort was built 

upon a Military Assistance Advisory Group. 

6-2 
K-K-Xn . . LiGENo 

(FM 160-15, December 1963) 

Chart 1. Chain of Command for Typical Theater of Operations 
@M 100-15, December 1963) 

Chart 1A. Theater Army Organization 

The Beginnings 

Following the defeat of France in Indochina, the 1954 

Geneva Agreements established the boundary between North 

and South Vietnam at the 17th parallel on the coast, and 

inland along the Ben Hai River to Laos (see map 1). A 

Communist regime formally assumed control of North Vietnam 

on 10 October 1954, and on 23 October, the United States 

offered military aid to South Vietnam. South. Vietnam 

accepted the offer, and in January 1955, the United States 

began direct military aid (anRnNTdvisory South Vietnamese Army assi;$nce through 

to the 

Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam.5 

Military 

During the next five years, the Republic of Vietnam 

was proclaimed, national elections were held, and a 

constitution developed. But North Vietnam continued 

infiltration and began a military campaign to unite the 

two Vietnams by force. By 1960, the South was requesting increased military assistance. On 18 October 1961, the 

Republic of Vietnam declared a state of national emergency and asked the United States for combat troops. The United 

States provided combat support and combat service su port units, plus additional material aid and more advisors. F! 

These units initially came under the control of the 

Military Assistance Advisory Croup, Vietnam (chart 2). 

More U.S. Army units arri.ved, and on 6 February 1962, the 

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV), was 

6-4 
-c A u 0 

:_ -’ , *, ” 

- :-- 

--- 

- rlrrr*m 

4 -SW-n 

(Echardt, p. 2) 

Map 1. South Vietnam, Its Provinces and Corps 

Tactical Zones 

6-5 
(Echardt, pa 17) 

Chart 2, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, 1956 

6-6 
created.7 The chain of command for the assigned units 

is depicted on chart 3. USMACV would continue to be the 

building block for the remainder of the American 

commitment to Vietnam. 

Also in 1962, logistical support in Vietnam that had 

been provided by an eleven-man logistical support team 

from Okinawa became the responsibility of the U.S. Army 

Ryukyu Islands Support Group. This g.roup was soon 

redesignated U.S. Army Support Group, Vietnam, and by 1964 

had become the U.S. Army Support Command, Vietnam 

(USASCV).$ 

would 

As it became likely that thelf:ited *States 

commit the Logistical Command, .ground combat units, 

upon its activation on 1 April 1965, assumed the 

responsibility for logistics. USASCV converted into 

Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV). 

In May 1965, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), the 

first U.S. ground combat maneuver unit, began to arrive at 

Bien Hoa and Vung Tau air bases, and by 12 May, the 

brigade was conducting combat patrols.9 

The Commitment of Larger Units 

The 173d, as well as the combat support and service 

support units, fell under the operational control of 

USMACV. The national chain of command is shown on chart 

4. This chart shows that the ambassador had policy control. President Johnson, however, made it clear in 

1964 that the ambassador was the boss on all matters 

concerning support to South Vietnam. Presidx Johnson 

stated that General Maxwell Taylor, the new ambassador to 

South Vietnam, was to "have and exercise full 

responsibility for the effort of the United States 

Government in South Vietnam... I wish it clearly understood 

that this overall responsibilit 6 

includes the whole 

military effort in South Vietnam.'"1 

The ambassador's organization to accomplish this task 

was the United States Mission (caLled the country team), 

shown on chart 5. USMACV was only one component of the 

country team. General William C. Westmoreland, appointed Commander of USMACV in 1964, stated that "It [the mission 

organization] was [a] complex, awkward arrangement."11 

Fortunately, General Taylor delegated control of the 

war to military authorities, and subsequent ambassadors, 

for the most part, left the direction of the armed forces 

to the military chain of command. That chain of command 

6-7 
Depattnmt 

DftheAmly . 

T :.~*................*.......s....~..*....* 

U.S. &my, 

1 

Ryukyu Wands Command, Vietnam 

: 

1-j $ $ ..*.....‘m.......I‘.....e. 

I Designated 

Army Units I 

Command 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Operatkwl Cammand 

(Echardt, p. 32) 

Chart 3. Chain of Command, Vietnam, 3962 
THE 

PRESIDENT 

x 

1 

ec of 

STATE 

I I I L 

t -------------_------_____________ 

Command ----- Policy Cdntrol 

xxx Advice 

CSharp, p. 38) 

Chart 4. U.S. Command Structure, 1964 

6-9 
f 

GORPS DlVlStDN SECTOR 

I 

3 EWE&-Agency for International Development, U.S. Operations Mission to 

Vietnam. 

2 JUSPAQ--Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office. 

3 USASCV--U.S. Army Support Command, Vietnam. 

4 HSAS--Headquarters, Support Activity, Saigon. 

5 NAG--Naval Advisory Group. 

(BDM study, pC 2-32) 

Chart 5, United States Mission, Vietnam 

6-10 
at (chart 4) shows the Commander in Chief, Pacific 

(CINCPAC), as the theater commander, and USMACV as a 

subordinate, unified command. General Westmoreland, 

however, still had two immediate supervisors, the 

ambassador and CINCPAC. 

The Headquarters, USNACV, is depicted on chart 6. 

This chart shows that USMACV was a joint command. 

However, it was not a separate, unified command, and its 

responsibility was eonf ined to the borders of South 

Vietnam. 

Prior to the formation of this organization for the 

Headquarters, USMACV, the JCS proposed forming a unified 

command of all U.S. forces in South Vietnam that would 

report directly to it. Admiral Harry D. Felt (at that 

time CINCPAC) objected to this proposal. He thought that 

the Communists were threatening all of Southeast Asia and 

that, therefore, CINCPAC should continue to direct a 

unified military effort in Vietnam. In addition, 

eon t ingency plans for joint or combined operations in 

Southeast Asia called for a headquarters commanded by the 

Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S., Army, Pacific, under the 

control of CINCPAC.12 

After the war the BDM. Corporation studied the issue of 

a separate unified command for Southeast Asia. A summary 

of this study is at figure 1. 

Viewed with the principles of war in mind, the 

arguments for a separate command far outweighed those 

against them. The arguments for a separate command were 

that it provided for greater unity of effort, flexibility, and mass, and that it would have been doctrinally sound. 

Unfortunately; discussions are not always based solely on 

the principles of war. 

Nevertheless, the Department of State and the 

President agreed with Admiral Felt&s view. Thus, the 

headquarters for U.S. military forces in Vietnam remained 

in Honolulu with CINCPAC in command.13 

Chart 7 shows the Pacific Command relationships as 

they existed in 1967. Just due to organizational size and 

the diverse lines of operational control, weak operational control would have existed and coordination and 

cooperation would have been difficult to attain. -Add the 

national level of command to this already confusing web of 

relationships and the loss of unity of command becomes 

even more readily apparent, as seen by chart 8. 

6-11 
:. I.... ~.. * 

(BDM Study, p. 2-35) 

Chart 6. U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

6-12 
FACTORS 

POLITICAL 

FOR AGAINST 

o CUBAN MISSILE 0 SENSITIVITY OF THAIS, CRISIS PRECIDENT LAOTIANS & CAMBODIANSo VEHICLE FOR POSSIBLE 

SEATO PARTICIPATION. o PROBABLE WORLDWIDE 

IMPACT. 

o CLOSER REGIONAL o “WE SEEK NO W'IDER WAR."" COQRDINATION OF o REDUCTION OF US US POLICIES AMBASSADORS' INFLUENCE 

o REMOVAL OF CINCPAC As AND COUNTRY TEAM CONCEPT. wOBSTACLE AND IRRITANT.n o SINGLE, POWERFUL "WAR 

o COULD HAVE PRODUCED LORD." 

PRESSURE FOR BETTER 

INTERAGENCY COORDINATING IN USC. 

MILITARY 

o UNITY OF EFFORT o SPAN OF CONTROL OF 

(FLEXIBILITY, MASS, SEACOM. 

ETCjt o POSSIBLE THREATS IN OTHER 

o DOCTRINALLY SOUND. PACOM AREAS. 

o COMMUNICATIONS/DATA o RESTRICTION 6N SHXFTING CAPABILITIES. FORCES WITHIN PACOM. 

o BETTER CGODINATION OF o PROBABLE CLOSER WASHINGTON 

US INTELLIGENCE CONTROL OF GROUND OPERAGENCIES. ATIONS. 

o USkSEATO CONTINGENCY o CINCPAC USUALLY SUPPORTED 

PLANS. MACV VIEWS WITH JCS. 

o BETTER CONTROL OF US o POSSIBLE DIMINUTION OF 

AIRPOWER MORE PACOM SUPPORT OF SEACOM 

ECONIMICAL. (LOGISTICS, ETC). 

o ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP 

FOR POSSIBLE COMBINED 

COMMAND. 

o COULD,HAVE REDUCED 

INTERFERENCE BY PACOM 

COMPONENTS COMMANDS. 

(BIIM Study, p. 11-49) 

Figure 1. Summary of the Case For and Agaitiat Unified SEACOM 

6-13 
! 

,i--,, i----,-,,-,i ------jj- 

-1 

l -“-‘C-------r 

L, 1 2&F 1 y%z22yG” 1 1 k7!&z%% J I 

-----*------~-------------------------------------------- 

(Echardt, ppe 66-67) 

Chart 7. Pacific Command Relationships 

6-14 
‘I , I 

-- --- -i 

6-15 
The fragmented, compartmentalized manner which 

characterized the prosecution of the war in Vietnam also 

affected unity of effort. The Under Secretary of the Air 

Force, Townsend Hoopes, noted in 1969 “‘that the United 

States was actually fighting ‘three separate or only 

loosely related struggles. There was the large-scale, conventional war.. . there was the confused ‘pacification’ effort based on political-sociological prescriptions of 

astronomical proportions...and there was the curiously 

remote air war against North Vietnam.““14 Three wars in 

Vietnam --ground, air, and the pacification effort--will be 

discussed in detail later in the chapter. 

Along with these separate wars there were a number of 

commanders vying for control in Southeast Asia. General 

Westmoreland said there were five commanders: “CINCPAC, 

COMUSMACV, and the American ambassadors to Thailand, Laos, 

and South Vietnam. “15 That does IlOt include the 

prerogatives of the president and the secretary of defense 

to step in anywhere along the chain. These many 

commanders helped to fragment the war effort, particularly the air war. 

The Air War 

Brigadier General Dave Palmer rightly noted that the 

air war “remained a separate and distinct operation from 

the war in South Vietnam, directed from a different 

headquarters and subject to different olicy 

considerations. Yet it obviously was a part 0 f the 

Vietnam War, 

the South.“16 

always related to and affected by events in 

CINCPAC, the Strategic Air Command (SAC), 

and USMAC.V were all headquarters directing the air 

campaign , and Washington, through the JCS, was suppose to 

be the controlling authority. However, according to the 

military strategist Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., “with 

several minute exceptions ‘not a senior level officer 

above the rank of office director or colonel in any U.S. 

agency dealt full-time with Vietnam before 1969. ’ “17 

WashingtonIs efforts helped to further divide the control 

of the war and complicate the theater commander’s mission. 

The theater commander, Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp 

(CINCPAC, ‘;,“,“,:““9”‘, controlled a large portion of the 

air war. taken from his book, Strategy for 

Defeat, shows relatively straight command lines f the 

control of military operations in Vietnam. But ‘: BDM 

Corporation study (chart 10) completed after the war shows 

a somewhat different story for the air war. Chart >O 

6-16 
CINC cl USAR 

PAC 

CINC 

rPAC 

FLT 

___ -.-‘.- --4 Cm4 

( 7th FLT 

I 

I 

t COM t-------.- TF y7 

COMMAND 

=COQRDINATION 

xxxADVICE 

(Sharp, p. 78) 

Chart 9. Command and Control of Military Operations in X.etnam 

6-17 
US 

7\ 

c YY---- WINGS 

(BDX Study, p. 11-53) 

Chart 10. Command and Control of the AIRWAR 

6-18 
shows three command 

PACOM. Notice, also, 

was not connected, a 

were expected. 

lines from JCS, then' three from 

the Republic of Vietnam's Air Force 

lthough cooperation and coordination 

According to doctrine, PACOM as theater headquarters, 

could have had three or more command lines running from 

it. The problem stems from the Vietnamese fighting their 

own air war, General Westmoreland fighting his air war 

south of the 17th parallel, Admiral Sharp fighting the air 

war in the north, SAC involved in all, and Washington 

providing directives to everyone. A coordinated effort 

was not achieved. Obviously, the reason for this was that 

there was no unity of command. 

The Ground War 

The Pacific Command was also the theater headquarters 

for the ground war (refer to chart 7), but Admiral Sharp 

left the direction of the ground war, within the borders 

of South Vietnam, to the COMUSMACV, General Westmoreland. 

This ground war eventually involved over half a million 

troops. 

From the landing of the 173d Airborne Brigade in May 

1965 to the end of that year, U.S. Army strength in 

Vietnam increased fivefold to more than one hundred 

thousand. To command administratively these increasing 

numbers, USASCV was designated Headquarters, U.S. Army 

Vietnam (USARV), in July 1965 and placed under the 

operational control of COMUSMACV.18 General 

Westmoreland as COMUSMACV was also designated CG, USARV. 

U.S. Army, Pacific, retained command, less operational 

control. A close look at chart 7 shows that General 

Westmoreland was a subordinate and an equal to U.S. Army, 

Pacific, and his own subordinate as CG, USARV. Senior 

commanders often wore several hats, and it was not unusual 

t0 have separate administrative and operational 

headquarters. But building on an advisory command had 

serious implications for the future. 

Thus, two sizable headquarters for command of the war 

evolved: USMACV retained operational control of the 

maneuver units, and USARV, as the army component command, 

retained command, less operational control, of most U.S. 

Army units throughout the war. The organization of USARV 

headquarters is shown at chart 11. 

6-19 
---mm 

I-J 

t 

0 I 

;7j ; 

t 

. 

. 

L-l 

I ’ 

I : 

1: 

, 

r-l 

4 t 

:_i 

3 : 

t I - 

i 

i 

i 

; 

i 

i 

i 

i 

i 

i 

i 

i 

i 

i 

i 

i 

i 

r 

---4- .: 

-I 

. L 

*f 

Ii 

I . 

’ I 

Ii 

:i 

6-20 
The command and control of the ground war is depicted 

at chart 12. Unlike the air war, U.S. operational control 

of the ground forces within the borders of South Vietnam 

ap eared 

re P ationship 

on the surface to be clearly defined. But the 

with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

(ARVN) and other allied forces was based on cooperation 

and coordination. A combined command was not 

established. Colonel Summers commented, "within Vietnam 

itself the command structure was convoluted and confused 

with overlapping authority and responsibility diffused 

among Military Assistance Command Vietnam, the Army 

Republic of Vietnam Joint General Staff, United States 

Army Vietnam and the 'Free World Military Forces.'"'19 

In his memoir, General Westmoreland gave his reasons 

for not forming a combined command : "I consistently resisted suggestions that a single, combined command could 

more efficiently prosecute the war. I believed that 

subordinating the Vietnamese forces to U.S. control would 

stifle the growth of leadership and acceptance of 

responsibility essential to the development of Vietnamese 

Armed Forces capable eventually of defending their 

country. Moreover, such a step would be counter to our 

basic objective of assisting Vietnam in a time of 

emergency and of leaving a strong, the time of our withdrawal.“20 independent country at 

A BDM Corporation study summed up the arguments on a 

combined command at figure 2. Those arguments for a 

combined command are sound, can be proven by historical 

examples, and 

war. The 

are based on time-honored pr:tci:n;s of 

arguments against a combined are 

subjective evaluations, based on outdated situations. 

Perhaps more importantly, neither the Vietnamese nor the 

Koreans supported the idea of a combined command. As a 

consequence, General Westmoreland decided against this 

type of command. This decision had implications for the 

future, after U.S. forces withdrew from Vietnam. 

Ultimately, the U.S. did not leave a strong, 

independent Vietnam. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

collapsed in 1975. It did so to a large degree because of 

an ineffectual leadership which grew out of the Vietnamese 

system of officer procurement, shaky political 

appointments, and corrupt ion. The U.S. command could only influence the Vietnamese by persuasion and by withholding support. This sort of control was not effective. We 

should have had a combined command situation where we 

would have had the authority to fire incompetent 

leaders --an authority that might have fostered growth of 

6-21 
a0000 0 

/T-i-v--- 

Chart 12. Command and Control of the Ground War 

6-22 
000 sz I 00000000 0 0’0 

!i I + c I . . 

< 

6-23 
leadership and acceptance of responsibility better than 

leaving the Vietnamese forces under their own president. 

The Republic of Korea 

into the command structure. 

forces also were not integrated Here, as with the Vietnamese, 

the command relationship rested on coordination and 

cooperation. With two allied forces outside the chain of 

command, it would have seemed that the U.S. organization 

would have been straightforward and 

doctrine. according to But the decision of General Westmoreland not to 

establish a combined command destroyed unity of effort at 

the tactical level. 

Chart 13 shows the organization of the tactical ground 

forces. If this diagram had reflected doctrine, then 

USMACV would have been named the subordinate unified 

command. Its subordinate commands would have been called 

corps. As forces increased, a field army, then an army 

group headquarters, 

corps. As it 

could have been superimposed on the 

happened, the corps headquarters were 

III Marine Amphibious Force and the two Field Force 

headquarters. - General Westmoreland in A Soldier Reports 

gave the reasons for this organization: 

For several reasons I chose not to designate the American headquarters as corps. I wanted to 

avoid confusion with the four existing Vietnamese 

corps 

each headquarters and also to emphasize that 

American headquarters was supporting the 

Vietnamese--a force in the field supporting a 

corps, thus a 'field force.' Nor was the 

headquarters a corps in the usual tactical sense, 

since the commander had territorial 

responsibilities as well as tactical ones and 

eventually, I anticipated would also be in charge of pacification. 

Because the III Marine Amphibious Force at 

Danang already constituted a corps-type 

headquarters, it served as the American 

headquarters in the northern provinces alongside 

the South Vietnamese I Corps. A U.S. Army headquarters, the I (Eye) Field Force, Vietnam, 

located at Nha Trang served with the Vietnamese 

II Corps, responsible for. the central provinces; and another U-S, Army headquarters the II Field 

Force, Vietnam, at Bien Hoa served with the 

Vietnamese III Corps in the region around 

Sai on. 

f 

Since I contemplated no major American 

dep oyment in the Mekong Delta, no comparable 

headquarters served with the Vietnamese IV Corps. 

6-24 
pi&$+----- -III-- 

I - - - Co-ordination 

(Echardt, p. 83) 

Chart 13. Tactical Ground Forces 

6-25 
This organizational concept flexibility that was essential, provided for who coul: 

predict exactly how the battle would develop? If 

necessary, for example, field force 

headquarters might assume the arole of a field 

army headquarters with one or more tactical corps subordinate to it. In later months, after 

introducing U.S. Army troops into the northern 

provinces to help meet an enemy threat, I found 

it necessary to put a corps headquarters within 

the zone of III Marine Amphibious Force, to 

operate as a true tactical headquarters without 

advisary or territorial responsibilities, so that 

the flexibility paid off.21 

In sum, the major subordinate headquarters were called 

field forces instead of corps for several reasons: to 

preserve the preeminence of the Vietnamese corps; to 

prevent problems in communications and coordination that 

would develop through the existence of a senior U.S. 

tactical headquarters, designated as a U.S. corps, but 

functioning in the same area as a Vietnamese corps; and to 

avoid the connotation of a unilateral U.S. effort.22 in 

such a situation, the methods and mentality of advisors 

predominated over doctrine because the subordinate unified 

command was a former military assistance advisory group. 

In addition, major commanders always had to balance 

command and advisory duties, as the operations of field 

forces demonstrated. 

The operations of a field force also differed from the 

operations of a conventional U.S. corps m These 

differences included the close coordination required with 

ARVN and Free World Military oAfSsi;Vt;nce (FWMA) armed 

forces, the civilian agencies and other U.S. . 

a(:;;;;:53 located in the various corps tactical zones, 

All corps-type headquarters coordinate, but in Vietnam 

military operations were planned by arbitration, as 

described in a 1966 USARV report: 

Military operations are planned and 

controlled on the basis of cooperation and 

coordination between commanders of US/FWMAF and 

Vietnam commanders at all echelons. 

For military operations involving both RVNAF 

[Republic of Vietnam 

forces, planning is 

Armed Forces] and UfSa/rFWMAF 

accomplished as in 

advance as possible in which the responsible 

RVNAF and US/FWMAF commanders achieve agreement 

on the purpose, overall objectives, concept of 

6’-26 
operations, forces to be committed, and general timing. Selected staff personnel designated by 

those commanders join together to plan the 

operations in detail. Before the initiation of 

hostilities the responsible RVNAF and US/FWMAF 

commanders establish collocated command posts to 

facilitate coordination, co?teration, mutual 

assistance and decision making. 

Clearly, the U.S. field forces did not control all the 

military forces in their sectors. 

This war by committee was not the most efficient means 

of applying force. Moreover, it did not leave the South 

Vietnamese 

military 

leaders with a firm grasp of how to conduct 

operations. The field force 

however, headquarters, did accomplish their missions vis-a-vis the U.S. 

forces. In the end, it did not matter whether they were 

called a field force or a corps. But they should have had 

one command, and they should have had that command over 

all the military forces in their geographical area. 

As stated earlier, the organization in the Vietnamese 

I Corps area was somewhat different. Here a Marine 

headquarters functioned as the field force 

headquarters. corps or In 1968, this headquarters took on the role 

of a field army. The headquarters, 

Force (MAF)', was 

III Marine Amphibious subordinate to USMACV and controlled a 

U.S. army corps (refer to chart 14). The problem with 

this organization, as with the field force headquarters, 

was the dependence on coordination and cooperation with 

the I Corps ARVN and 2d ROK Marine Brigade. There were 

also further difficulties involved in having Marine and 

Army units mixed. This 

logistic operations. 

created problems in air and 

Before 1968, there were two managers for air assets in 

the I Corps zone. The deputy commander for air operations 

(USMACV) had operational control of 7th Air Force's men 

and equipment and the Navy air 

77. support from Task Force 

The Commanding General of III Marine Amphibious 

Forces (MAF) had operational control of the resources of 

the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). the Marines, and the 7th Air Force, 

The 1st MAW supported the Army. In 1968 

General Westmoreland appointed his deputy for air . 

;&:t;;::.2a3s the manager for all air assets in the I 

Logistics for the Marine-Army mix remained a problem. USARV was responsible for the supply of the three southern 

combat zones, while the Naval Supply Activity at Danang 

6-27 
Tacflcal Air Support Elemenf 

and Ailarine G-2 and G-3 

Seventh Air Force 

TacticaE Air Contral Center 

t Direct Air Commanding tinerat. III I f Support Center Marine Amphibious Force 

Tactiw&i;ations 

I I’ 

Combat Operations Center I 

Corps Tactical 

Operations Cecnter 

(U.S. Amy and 

Mariner arj Vietnamese Army) 

Direct Air Support 

Center, Vietnam 

(U.S. Air Force and 

Marines and Vietnamese Air Force) 

..Um,..=...= Co-ordination and Co-operation 

(Echardt, p. 76) 

Chart 14. Command Relationships, I Corps, 1968 

6-28 
served the I Corps area. The Commanding General, III MAF, 

was also responsible for supplying items needed 

exclusively by Marine units. As more Army units were 

assigned to I Corps, the Navy and Marine facilities could 

no longer meet the demand. As a result, USARV expanded its efforts into the area. An official history of the 

command and control in Vietnam commented: "While the 

logistic support operations in the I Corps area during 

this period were efficiently carried out* they were 

accomplished through a complicated control arrangement involving Army, Navy and Marine headquarters."26 

Besides the somewhat unusual Marine-Army structure in 

the I Corps area, the delta had an even more unorthodox 

organization comprised of Navy and Army elements. 

Although General Westmoreland originally foresaw RQ lar e 

scale deployment of U.S. forces in the Delta, a sizab f e 

force was in fact committed. 

Infantry Division 

The 2d Brigade of the 9th 

and the Mobile Riverine Force conducted 

operations in the Mekong Delta from 1 June 1967 until 25 

August 1969.27 Unlike Marine and Army forces in the 

north, the Riverine forces did not even have a semblance 

of a joint command structure. As seen in chart 15, these 

operations were primarily based on coordination and mutual 

support. 

In preparing for the r iver ine operations, General Westmoreland had proposed a joint task force to be 

commanded by the assistant commander of the 9th Division, 

who would have a small joint staff for operations, logistics, and communications. Admiral Sharp, however, 

wanted Task Force CTF116, the naval river patrol force 

already conducting operations in the Delta, to have 

operational control. A compromise developed which placed U.S. Army units under the operational control of XI Field 

Force, and Navy units under operational control of the 

Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam. Thus, riverine 

operations were conducted with Army and Navy units 

commanded separately, with the Navy providing close 

support based on coordination.28 

Again, unity of 

the organizational structure did not support command or effort. But in this case, the 

operations were deemed a success by the participants. 

After-action reports listed no unusual problems or lack of 

support. 

6-29 
(Echardt, pw 79) 

Chart 15. Command and Control for RFverine Operations 

G-30 
Pacification 

The third war was the pacification effort. General 

Westmoreland, 

unity of prior to becoming COMLJSMACV, realized that command ‘ 

needed?9 

the U.S. pacification effort in 

Vietnam was But little progress was made 

during 1964 and 1965. 

The total U.S. pacification effort involved several 

independent civil agencies as well as the military, and 

U.S. actions were not. well-coordinated. High-level meetings held among agencies of the U.S. Mission in Saigon and the Washington Vietnam Coordinating Committee 

recognized the problem, but little improvement was made 

except to change the name of the advisory effort.30 

General Westmoreland attempted his own improvements. He elevated the MACV Revolutionary Development Sup ort 

Division (as the pacification effort was called in 1 g 66) to directorate level and placed a major general in 

charge. He also appointed directors for each of the four 

regions. General Westmoreland further directed the 

commanding generals of the III MAF, I and II Field Forces, 

and the senior advisor to the IV Corps to give all 

necessary assistance to the Yet 

effective civil and regional directors.31 military actions in 

pacification remained an elusive goal.3? 

support of 

In 1967, President Johnson decided to integrate the 

civilian and military U.S. pacification support efforts 

under General Westmoreland. The Assistance 

Command now assumed responsibility MiEary pacification. 

There were two basic reasons for assigning the task to 

General Westmoreland. First, security, a prerequisite to 

pacification, was primary responsibility of the 

Vietnamese armed fotrces which were advised by the 

Military Assistance Command--Westmoreland's headquarters. Second, the greater part of U.S. advisory and 1;5istic 

resources were under General Westmoreland's control. 

Pacification came to be called Civil Operations and 

Rural Development Support (CORDS), under an appointed deputy to General Westmoreland with a rank of ambassador. 

Chart 16 shows the CORDS organization. By 1967, the U.S. 

pacification effort had finally been centralized. But, . the lack of, a combined command hampered efforts. 

$?zknthe Vietnamese relationship is added, as in chart 17, 

6-31 
- P --w I 

(Echardt, p. 72) 

chart 16. CORDS Field Organization 

6-32 
ii -cuti . . . Adv xxxxxxxxxxxxx

(BDH Study, p. 14-28) 

Chart 17. Advisory Relationships 

6-33 
the haziness of the command and control relationships of 

the pacification effort can be seen. Author &enter Lewy provided an astute summary of the pacification effort: 

Americans 

lack of 

in the field also pointed out the 

coordination between the different 

elements of the pacification effort. ARVN 

commanders often refused to accept the authority 

of the district chief; American, Korean and South 

Vietnamese commanders failed to coordinate their 

military operations with those responsible for 

pacification or with each other. 

The one proposal which might have gone a long 

way toward solving most of these 

difficulties --the idea of a combined command--was 

rejected by the military commanders of the 

American, South Vietnamese and Korean 

fighting in Vietnam.34 

forces 

Logistics 

Logistic responsibilities were centralized for U.S. 

Army forces on 28 April 1965 with the reactivation in 

Vietnam of the 1st Logistical Command, from Fort Hood, 

Texas. This unit, a major subordinate command of USARV 

(chart 18)) in May 1965. 

assumed a type B logistical command structure 

The logistical command’s headquarters of 329 personnel had a directorate staff that commanded subordinate area 

commands and separate units (see chart 19). The 

organization by 1969 had a strength of approximately 50,000 military and 30,000 civilian personnel, and it 

supported 

Vietnam.35 

over 500,000 U.S. and Free World forces in 

Map 2 shows the major tactical units supported by the 

1st Logistical Command and map 3 the location of the four 

area commands. . Although many problems were encountered in 

structuring the command, no battles were lost due to lack 

of support. Other problems surfaced 

coordination with supported units (as in concerning I Corps, as 

discussed earlier), but the static situation in Vietnam 

lent itself to successful support operations. 

The logistic effort in Vietnam may be summed up by 

stating that the U.S. soldier was the best-equipped and 

cared for fighting man in the world. 

6-34 
1sT LOGISTICAL 1ST AVIATION 

d 

I '4bTEa MEDICAL f8TH MILITARY 

E BRIGADE I I ifi+ %ciD E I 

NOTE: em-- OPEXATIONAL CONTROL 

* G3ASTRATCcFM-PAC EXERCISES COMMAND 

(USARV Logistics, VOL I, p* II-61 

Chart 18. U.S. Army, Vietnam,. 1969 

6-35 
T 

CWMANDINC GENERAL 

DEPUPY 

COHMANDING CtiAL 

DIR DIR DIR 

FQL PRO0 R&D 

STAFT 

-----i------7 

LJEFXDt 

z-w STAFF StlFEXVISION 

--- - WERATIONAL CORTRQL 

(USARY Logistics, vol,II, p* A611 

Chart 19. 1st Logfstieal Command, 1967 

6-36 
USASUPCCRf - DA NANG 

c 

‘r S II CT2 

c 

(USARY Logistics, VOL I, p* 11-S) 

ST AT 

Map 2. Major Tactical Units Supported 

6-37 

.___. -____---.--- 
(USARV Logistics, vol. I, pe 11-g) 

Map 3. Location of Area Commands 

6-38 
General 

conclusions 

the Vietnam 

Conclusion 

Westmoreland provided the following in his memoir on the command and control of 

War: 

Many of the errors could be traced to strong control of the conduct of the war from 

Washington, a policy born jointly of the failure 

of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in k961, which demonstrated the perils of 

decentralization, and of the successful outcome 

of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, which seemed 

to indicate that command from the White House was 

the only way to handle .crisis and war in the 

nuclear Yet never was there created a 

central age. 

organization in Washington capable of 

exercising the necessary control; in the final 

analysis only the President could make a decision 

and then only after having listened to a host of 

sometimes conflicting voices. 

Creating a unified command for all of 

Southeast Asia would have gone a long way toward 

mitigating the unprecedented centralization of 

authority in Washington and the preoccupation with minutia at the Washington level. A unified 

commander provided with broad policy guidance and 

political adviser 

tureaucratic wrangles 

would have obviated the 

that raged and resulted * 

in Washington military influenced by svilian d,ecisions 

officials strongly who, however 

well-intentioned, lacked military expertise either from experience or study. Instead of five 

"commanders'--CINCPAC, COMUSI+ACV, and the 

American ambassadors to Thailand, Laos, and South 

Vietnam --there would have been one man directly answerable to the President on everything. Although that kind of organization might have 

created ripples within the service-conscious 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs 

traditionally fall in line when the Commander in 

Chief speaks. eliminated Such an arrangement would have 

the problem of coordination between 

the air and ground tars that was inevitable with 

CINCPAC managing one, COMUSMACV the other.36 

A unified command would have solved some of the 

problems, but a combined unified command would have been 

the best solution. In this case, a combined command would 

6-39 
not have been an innovative solution but one which would 

have. followed existing doctrine. It would have also 

fulfilled the missing goal of unity of effort. 

A Center of Military History monograph on the command 

and control of Vietnam proposed the command arrangement shown on chart 20 as a solution to future Vietnam type conflicts. 

This was a combined unified command. In addition, the 

pacification (CORDS) and advisor groups are shown under 

the operational command of the component forces. The 

important point to note is that a supreme commander is in 

charge, not a military as,sistance commander. This 

proposal, if put in force, would ensure a vast improvement 

over the or anization used in Vietnam, .and it should serve 

as a model P or the future. 

Opemtional Command 

- - - - - CORDS Coordination 

...ss..w.~..~- MAAG Chwxdinstbn 

* Include U.S., indigenous, and Free Wodd forcer 

l * Includsr Merinc Carp6 unite 

(Echardt, pa 88) 

Chart 20. Proposed Command and Control 

6-40 
NOTES 

1. U.S, Department of the Army, Regulations: Larger 

FM 100-15, Field Service 

Units, (Washington, u.c., 

December 1963,) with change 1 March 1966), 5. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

Ibid. 

Ibid., 11. 

Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in 

Context. 

Institute, (Carlisle Barroeks,/Pa: Strategic Studies 

U.S Army War College, 23 March 1982), 87. 

5. U.S. Arm * 

(1 Decem i!i erv~~~?~m' Organization and Functions Manual 

QV, h ereafter cited as Functions 

Manual). 

6. 

7. 

Ibid. 

Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, A History (Hew York: The 

Viking Press, 1983), 680. 

8, 

9. 

10 *. 

Functions Manual, V. 

Ibid. 

William C. Westmoreland, 

York: 

A Soldier Reports,' (New Dell Publishing Co., 1980) * 84 a 

11. 

12. 

Ibid., 94. 

George S. Eckhardt, Command and Control, 1950-1969. 

Department of the Army, 1'314 , 26-2/ . 

13. 

14. 

15. 

16. 

Ibid,, 27. 

Summers, On StrateB, 91. 

Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 543. 

Dave Richard Palmer, Summons of the 

U.S.-Vietnam in Trumpet: Perspective San Rafael, : 

Presidio Press, 1978), 122-23. 

17. Summers, On Strategy, 91. 

18. Functions Manual, V. 

19, Summers, On Strategy, 98. 

6-41 
{ 

20. 

21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

26. Ibid., 77. 

27. Ibid., 80. 

28. Ibid. 

29. 

30. 

31. 

I 

32. 

Ibid., 68. 

Ibid. 

33. Ibid., 69. 

Ibid. 102-3. 

Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 201-2. 

U.S. Army, Vietnam, Report Subject: lEQuestions by 

USAC & GSC on Military Operations in Vietnam," to 

Commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 August 1966. 

Inclosure 1, 3. 

Ibid., 2. 

Ibi'd. 

Eckhardt, Command, 75. 

Ibid., 65. 

Ibid. 

34. Guenter Lewy, America In Vietnam (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1978), 121. 

35. U.S. Army, Vietnam, The Logistics Review, U.S. Army 

Vietnam, 1965 to 1969, vol. I, Systems, Overviews, 

tn.p., n.d,), 11-Z. 

36. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 543. 

6-42 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Books 

Eckhardt, George S., Vietnam Studies. Command and Control, 

1950-1969. Washington,DC: Department of the Army, L 

Karnow, Stanley'. Vietnam, A History. New York: The 

Viking Press, 1983. 

Lewy , Guenter. America in Vietnam. New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1918. 

Palmer, Dave Richard. Summons of the Trumpet: U.S. - Vietnam in Perspective. San Rafael, CA: Presidio 

Press, 1978. 

Sharp, U.S. Grant. Strategy For Defeat, Vietnam in 

Retrospect. San Raf,ael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978. 

Summers, Harry G., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in 

Context. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 23 March 1982. 

Westmoreland, William C., A Soldier Reports. New York: 

Dell Publishing Co. 

Field Manuals, Reports, Studies. 

BDM Corporation. 

Vietnam. Vo 

of the War. 

VA, 1980. 

1. 

A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in 

5 Planning the War. 

Book 2. 

Vol. 6. Conduct 

Functional Analysis. McLean, 

f+q, Virgil. Evolution of a Theater of Operations 

Headquarters, 1941-1967. Fort Belvoir, VA: 

bY 

Prepared Technical Operations, Inc., Combat Operations 

Research Group for Headquarters, United States Army Combat Developments Command, 1967. 

6-43 

_------- 
U.S. Army, Vietnam. The Logistics Review, U.S. 

Army Vietnam, 1965 to 1969. Vol. I, Systems 

Overvod Management. N.p., 

n. d. 

U.S. Army, Vietnam. Organization and Functions Manual. 1 

Deeember 1967, 1 October 1966, and 1 Januarym 

U.S. Army l Vietnam, to Commandant, U.S* Army Command 

and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

Report, Subject: "Questions by USAC & GSC on Military 

Operations in Vietnam, 16 August k966. 

6-44 
CHAPTER 7 

CONCLUSION* 

General 

The preceding chapters provide a frame of reference 

from which to study force structures over the 

forty-five years of U.S. military past involvement in various 

worldwide conflicts. Throughout the period, general 

similarities in theaters may be observed, but each theater 

army reflected its own geographic area, mission, and 

special requirements. The effects of various 

personalities also shaped high command and organization, 

as in the case of MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific 

Area. These five case studies provide the reader with a 

general picture of U,S * doctrinal philosophies for the 

periods under consideration. 

The United States had doctrinal concepts for "type" force structures for the corps and field army prior to 

becoming involved in both World War II and the Korean 

War. These concepts provided guidance for determining the 

number of nondivisional units needed to support a given 

number of divisions. By determining the number of 

divisions to be supported, the number of corps and army headquarters could be calculated for a projected 

divisional force. However, the actual force structures 

did not always mirror planning but often developed as a 

result of such factors as mission, enemy forces, tactics, 

and terrain. 

Organization 

Organizationally, there were numerous similarities, as 

well as dissimilarities, among theaters. Theater 

commanders adapted to the conditions of their particular 

areas. Generally, each of the theaters began as a 

combined operation, with the commitment of an observer 

group to work with the host nation forces CETO, North 

Africa, Korea, and Vietnam). Initially, U.S. forces 

worked closely with the host nation forces as a matter of 

*Written by Lieutenant Colonel Gary L. Bounds 

7-l 
necessity because the .U.S. lacked the personnel and 

lagistical support for independent commands and operations. 

Political considerations were another 

influencing factor early organizations. In SWPA, conditions 

warranted the creation of ABDA, a combined command with an 

t;;:;zlian as the ground forces commander. In Morth , 

eontroi, 

the 18th Army Group was created under Eisenhower’s 

with the political goal of inducing French forces 

to join the Allied effort. 

political considerations During the Vietnam War, surpassed most other 

considerations, with the U.S. ambassador during the early 

phases of the war having overall responsibility for 

military operations in the country ti In this case I 

politics dictated a nonstandard organization, with 

splintered areas of responsibility and command, with U.S. 

Army, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and ROK forces 

pursuing separate ground wars without any pretense of a 

combined command. 

Commands were evolutionary in nature, and 

organizations were developed and discontinued based on the 

needs created by specific operations. In the NATO, after 

the Allies achieved victory in ,Tunisia, 18th Army Group 

was disbanded and its staff integrated into Headquarters, 

Force 141, the planning staff for the, invasion of Sicily* On the day that the invasion was launched, this 

headquarters became Headquarters, 15th Army Group. During 

the initial phases of the Korean conflict, assets for the 

corps echelon of command were not available and therefore 

not used. The nucleus for the corps headquarters had to 

be activated stateside and then shipped to the theater of 

operation. A mature theater did not emerge until 1951. A 

similar situation developed in the ET0 during World War 

II. As the force structure expanded during Overlord, so 

did the number of army groups. In the case of Third Army, 

the headquarters was established stateside and shipped to 

England. In the ETO, span of control and the operational 

area affected the way larger unit headquarters were 

established. As the buildup continued, additional field 

armies became operational. The span of control 

increased, and two army groups were created, with SHAEF 

becoming the combined headquarters directin 

the battle. (Eisenhower assumed the role o f 

all phases of 

ground forces 

commander after the lodgement on the Continent.) 

Organization was also affected by operational 

factors. In the ET0 t during the Ardennes 

counteroffensive, U.S. field armies were placed under the 

command of the British 21st Army Group until the bulge was 

7-2 
reduced and normal 

reflected 

conditions prevailed. These changes the flexible nature of ETO's organizational 

structure. 

A number of features were unique to 

theaters. specific 

command. 

SWPA never emloyed the army group echelon of 

b 

This was probably a theater-dependent decision 

t ri e 

MacArthur and was also due to the geographic nature of 

predominantly waterborne theater. Field armies in 

this theater were kept under MacArthur's direct control, 

thereby making them more responsive to his needs. 

The evolution of the theater army as an administrative 

headquarters involved logistical responsibilities. ETOUSA, in this context, should be viewed as the father of 

the modern theater army, an organization which took its 

most characteristic form as USARV. Theater armies have 

more often been established after a theater of operations 

has been in action for some time, as demonstrated ,by the 

reorganization of ETQUSA in 1944, the late establishment 

of USAFE and USAWESPAC in SWPA and USAFFE in Japan. In 

these case studies, 

administrative 

theater armies usually exercispodnt;Eiy command and not operational , thereby making them responsive to his needs. 

Command 

One of the most significant conclusions of this study 

is that unity of command was necessary for the effective 

organization and operation of larger units in the field. 

This principle of war probably bad the greatest influence 

on the successful command and control of forces. Examples indicate that when unity of command was not established 

(SWPAIPOA cross-theater operations, the UNC advance into 

North Korea and Vietnam), serious problems developed in 

combat operations. In contrast, 

observed when the greater effectiveness was 

time-honored principle of unity of 

command was observed (as in ETQ, MTQ, and FEC under 

Ridgway) by large unit commanders. 

Factors affecting the establishment of unity of 

command were political considerations, as in Vietnam, and 

interservice rivalries and geographic considerations, as 

in the Pacific. In the Pacific, the division of the area 

into two primary theaters, one under U.S. Army control and 

one under U.S. Navy control, resulted in different 

missions and organizations for field armies. In the case 

of the POA, tbe U.S. Army had to conform to the directives 

of senior naval commanders. For the Tenth Army, this 

7-3 
meant fighting as a joint task force consisting of Marine, 

Army, Navy, and tactical Air assets, Okinawa, Upon the conquest of 

the Tenth Army assumed the mission of base 

development but still remained under Navy control. In 

contrast, Sixth and Eighth armies (SWPA) fought under Army control throughout the war. This was a clear example of 

how geography and prewar commitments provided the basis 

for wartime command structures. But only in the case of 

the PQA did the Navy command all theater assets for any 

period of time. 

Another consideration influencing unity of command was 

the consistent effort by national forces under combined 

command to retain command of the largest organizations 

possible to avoid their being placed under nonnational 

commands. For example, * Korea 

brigades and other Commonwiilth forkes separate British 

were eventually 

organized into a Commonwealth Division, and the Turkish 

Brigade always fought as a brigade and not as individual 

battalions. In the MT0 and ETO, national lines of 

organization were always followed to the highest level of 

organization; the few exceptions to this rule were 

temporary expedients. 

This study demonstrates that the U.S. established or 

maintained U.S. theater commands which were parallel and 

complementary to the combined or Allied command. In fact, 

staffs and commanders usually had dual roles, as in Korea, where the CINCFEC was also CINCUNC and his FEC, GHQ also 

functioned as the UNC, GHQ. Similarly, in addition to 

being Supreme Commanders of their theaters, Eisenhower and 

MacArthur were also U.S. theater commanders, and their 

U.S. theater staffs formed the backbone of the combined 

staffs. 

Flexibility, in addition to unity of command, was a 

;;;,vy;t !c 

rinciple in the organization and command of 

orces. Field armies. were sametimes combined 

commands; for example, British or French corps were 

attached to American armies in the MT0 and the ETO, and 

the ROK Army was integrated into EUSAK in Korea. On the 

other hand, field armies rarely had joint structures, the 

Tenth Army in the PQA being an exception. Army groups 

were usually not established, except in th,e case of North 

Africa and the ETO, where there was a large ground theater. 

Under the generic heading of command, theater and army 

commands built on the foundation of existing MAAGs 

experienced problems. In Korea, 

subordinated to EUSAK. 

the KMAG was quickly In contrast,' one of the reasons 

7-4 
for the ineffectiveness of MACV in Vietnam was its growth out of a prewar MAAG and its retention of MAAG attitudes 

and philosophies on fighting the war. 

warfare Mid-intensity demanded that the 

submit to the higher military assistance effort 

priority of conventional combat 

operations. 

Another problem associated with unity of command was 

the tendency of a supreme commander to retain command of 

ground forces, corn onent commanders were 

appointed 

while separate for the air and naval P orces. MacArthur, for 

instance, commanded his own (American) ground component 

and even created Alamo Force in order to bypass a combined 

forces ground commander, in this instance an Australian. 

This action circumvented non-American control of U.S. 

ground forces. MacArthur continued this practice in Korea 

by retaining control of X Corps when it logically should 

have' come under EUSAK control. In ETO, Eisenhower acted 

as his own ground force commander after 1 September 1944, 

as did Westmoreland for the Vietnam conflict. 

officers 

U.S. Army who became supreme commanders often retained 

command of ground forces, 

In a case where there was a separation of the air and 

ground wars, as in Vietnam, constituted 

it may have appeared that this 

a deviation from standard practice. Such 

situations, however, were far from unique. A strategic 

bombing campaign, ground pursued independently from an associated 

war, has been the norm for U.S. theater 

operations. The Combined Chiefs of Staff controlled 

strategic bombing in the ET0 rather than Eisenhower. 

CINCUNC controlled strategic bombing in Korea, with 

minimal input from Eighth Army. CINCPAC, .rather. than 

Westmoreland, controlled strategic bombing in Vietnam. 

Tactical air support in Vietnam was not separated from the 

ground command. It was either attached, controlled by, or 

extremely responsive to the ground force in the theater. 

Logistics 

Combat service support for larger unit operations 

generally followed national lines. 

combined 

In the first major operation of World War II, Operation Torch, 

Allied headquarters provided for separate and parallel combat service support systems. Three task forces 

(Western, Central, and Eastern) were established, and 

during the initial phase, the Western Task Force (U.S. 

forces) was supplied directly from the U.S., the Central 

Task Force (U.S. ground forces) was supplied by SOS, 

7-5 
ETOUSA, and the Eastern Task Force (predominantly British) 

was supplied by the British Supply Service. After the 

lodgement in North Africa was secure, a COMZ was 

established, and U.S. support was orchestrated by an 

American acting in the dual capacity of COMZ commander and 

deputy theater commander. The unique position of chief 

administrative officer (filled by a British general) was 

established in AFHQ to coordinate the work of the American 

and British supply systems. 

The ETO was a logical outgrowth of lessons learned and 

procedures established in North AfricB. and the 

Mediterranean theaters. Logistics, in this context, followed national lines to the degree that the Allies used 

separate beach areas for Overlord to facilitate follow-on 

supply operations. Once the lodgement was established, SHAEF assumed command of ground forces. Subsequently, two 

Army groups were made operational, each primarily along national lines, and a COMZ established to support combat 

operations. A flexible organization was thereby 

established to ensure responsiveness to special situations, as in the establishment of the Southern Line 

of Communication which supported the southern invasion of 

France. This organization was a separate but subordinate 

headquarters of HQ, COMZ, ETO. 

In SWPA and the POA, the waterborne theaters prevented 

neat boundaries and zones, but the theaters used similar 

methods to achieve desirable logistical support. In each 

case, when an operation was in the planning stages, a 

logistics cell would be designated consisting of personnel from SOS and the supported field army. This cell would do 

the logistical planning receive additional support units 

for the operation, and execute the mission of sustaining the landing force. These agencies, called an Army Support 

Command -(ASCOM) in SWPA and an Island Support Command 

(ISCOM) in the POA, were created for each operation and 

remained in support until the landing force moved away 

from the beaches, at which time the SOS would resume 

responsibility. 

Korea presented a unique instance where a field army 

acted, for a period of' time, as a theater army, taking on 

much of the responsibilities normally associated with that 

level of command. EUSAK was charged with logistical 

support for all United Nations forces in Korea. Although 

not exercising administrative control over the ROK forces, 

EUSAK still operated the UN Reception Center, processing 

all replacements. In country, EUSAK operated logistics base commands that were supported by the Japan Logistics 

Command, which, in essence, was the offshore 

communications zone. 

7-6 
During the Vietnam conflict, logistics mirrored the 

operational picture to some degree. 

was established early 

A logistics command 

to support combat operations for 

Army forces. However, clear lines of operational responsibliity precluded the simplification of logistics 

support. Army Logistics 

Naval Supply 

assets were used to support the 

Activity Marines in I Corps. (Dana@, which supper ted the 

Marine 

Moreover, Army units attached to 

headquarters were sometimes 

Marine channels for logistics support. 

forced to rely on 

soldiers Although American 

history, 

in Vietnam were the best supplied soldiers in 

clear lines of responsibility for their support 

were often lacking 

The case studies presented demonstrate the need for 

clear doctrinal guidelines for the pursuit of combat 

.operations. The United States entered each of the 

conflicts with general guidelines based on the mission, 

geographic area, enemy forces, and politics. The United 

States, however, 

those needs. developed organizations tailored to fit 

when unity Larger unit operations invariably fared well of command was observed but fared less well 

when this principle was not incorporated into the overall 

plan. The pr.ocess was evolutionary, and policies changed 

as conditions warranted. 

roles: for‘ instance, 

Personalities often played major MacArthur perpetuated policies in 

Korea that were begun in SWPA. 

The conclusions and common historical characteristics 

of Larger units described in the preceding pages will hold 

true for U.S operations at least in the near future. 

Thus, this study has value for the U.S. Army in its . current 'and future efforts to organ 

units for battle. 

ize and field larger 

7-7 
APPENDIX A 

THE EVOLUTION GF DOCTRINE: LARGER UNITS, 1924-1973 

Introduction 

This appendix contains a synopsis of existing doctrine 

pertinent to larger units (theater army, army group, field 

army) over the period from 1924-1973. FM 100-15 or its 

equivalent was used to collate the data. Information was 

selected and synopsized by functional areas for each year from separate the 

manuals that were published to illustrate 

evolution of doctrine for larger units over an 

a proximate 

R fifty year span. Manuals examined include 

t 'ose for the years 1924, 1930, 1942, 1950, 1963, 1968, 

and 1973. 

command, 

Functional areas considered were organization, strategic/tactical functions, air-ground operations, ground operations, and combat service support. 

Organization 

1930 

Theater Army 1930-73 

The headquarters of a field force in a theater of war 

is a general headquarters and will be established by order 

of the President of the United States. This headquarters will be small in personnel when operating in contiguous territory, whereas while operating beyond the sea, it is 

large so as to perform many of the duties performed by the 

War Department. 

1942 

FM 100-15, dated 20 June 1942, was 

document governing large 

the primary unit 

World War II. operations This during 

early 

some detail a theater 

war publication addresses in 

of aperations, of which a number 

existed at the time. interest is the role 

of the War Department 

Of particular 

long-range 

General Staff in the planning of 

strategic operations. The Chief of Staff, as 

*By Lieutenant Colonel Gary L. Bounds. 

A-l 
the immediate adviser of the Secretary of War, is charged 

with the planning , development, and execution of the 

military program. Subordinate commanders would * 

missions according to the general plan. The thea&T’gF operations designates an area of land, sea, and air of a 

theater of war where military operations and the 

administration pursuant to such operations would be 

per formed. The terms “theater of operation” and “base 

command, ” with minor differences, relate to that level of 

operation. 

The term theater army was not specifically used as an 

echelon of command, although an echelon analogous to what 

is commonly termed “theater army headquartersIr existed in 

each of the theaters of operation. 

The largest unit specifically described was the group 

of armies, and it was to operate under the War Department 

or a theater commander. The group of armies was described 

as a tactical unit with no territorial jurisdiction and 

few supply and administrative functions unless assumed by the theater commander. 

1950 

The Chief of Staff, USA, designates the theater army 

commander. Theater army forces include all army units and 

personnel assigned to the theater and constitute the army 

component of the theater commander. Theater army forces 

are organized under a headquarters into army groups or 

armies and COMMZ forces. The army forces in a’ land mass 

theater are usually under the control of a theater army 

commander, while in an oceanic environment, they are 

usually under a theater joint force commander. 

1963 

The term ‘“theater of operation” connotes a uni-service 

operation; area of operation connotes a joint operation. 

The theater army consists of headquarters elements 

necessary to provide command and a valuable number of 

field armies or army groups. The theater army is under 

the operational, command of the theater commander. The 

theater army consists of a headquarters commanded by the 

army component commander of a unified command and of the 

individuals, units, detachments, and organizations placed 

under his command. It is organized to perform strategic, 

tactical) and administrative operations. The theater is 

divided into a combat zone and a COMMZ. The combat zone 

may be divided into army groups, army, corps, or division 

A-2 
zones. The combat zone’s rear boundary is designated by the theater army commander and is charged to conform to 

movements of the field armies. 

1968 

The organization of a theater army includes a 

headquarters (TDA unit), Theater Army Support Command 

(TASCON) , and attached theater USA Strategic 

Communications Cogand and may include an Air Defense 

Brigade/Command, a civil affairs command, an MI group, a 

special forces group, and a psyops group. The theater 

army is the army component of the unified command and is a 

component of the unified command and is a component 

command of the theater. In peacetime, the theater army 

may include training, administration and CSS with certain 

interzonal services, co”mbat r.eadiness, and effectiveness 

of assigned army forces. In wartime, the theater army 

will be involved primarily with C’SS to army elements. 

Rarely is the theater army commander assigned an 

operational tactical missi.on but when he is, he issues 

strategic guidance through LOIS to assigned combat 

forces. The field army and the TASCOM are on the same 

command level, each having CSS means to perform their 

missions in combat zones and COMMZ respectively. 

1973 

The theater army will contain a headquarters, a 

variable number of field armies, army groups, a TASCOH, a 

Theater Army Communications Command (TACCOM) and based on 

the mission --air defense brigade, civil affairs brigade, 

an MI group, a special forces group, and a psyops grou . The headquarters is a TDA unit. The mission may E e 

tactical operations, training, administration, css, 

welfare and preparedness, combat readiness, and 

effectiveness of assigned army forces ‘I When tactical 

missians are assigned, strategic plans are carried out by 

broad directives or LOIS. The field army and the TASCOM 

are on the same command level: both have CSS means to 

perform their missions in the combat zone and COMMZ, 

respectively. 

Command 

1930 

A Commander in Chief (CIK) exercises command over a 

theater of war, which may consist of more than one mutually 

A-3 
dependent theater of operations. The CINC draws up and 

issues strategical plans. in accordance with general 

policies prescribed by the President. The CPNC acts as 

army commander wb en there is a single commander (when there is a single group), or hear::; a::?:! 

command to another officer. In any case, no officer will 

act as commander of a large unit and also command one of 

its component units. The CINC is responsible for the 

success or failure of the campaign and must plan in 

ad vanee and allocate assets to accom lish 

P 

designated tasks t The CINC specifies the personnel supplies for his 

field forces and establishes policies/priorities for 

distribution. The CINC influences the battle by personal contact and must know the personalities of his 

subordinates as well as those of the enemy leaders. 

,1942 

This manual was the first FM that moved away from a 

GHQ/CINC concept, but it did not specifically address the 

theater army. This level of control evolved as the force 

structure matured, and it was not until later in the war 

that specific duties were described. 

1950 

The theater army commander is in the direct chain of 

command under the theater commander and is responsible for 

planning the conduct of operations and the administration 

of army forces in the theater. He is responsible for 

tactical operations of all army 

joint task forces or unified 

forces not ;yiynedd to 

commands. is 

executed through commanders of army groups, armies, army 

reserve forces, the COMMZ , and the army replacement 

command. The theater commander assigns missions to army 

forces f administers them, and logistically supports them. 

1963 

Normally the senior U.S. Army officer assigned to a 

unified command (and qualified for command) is designated 

as the theater army commander. The theater army commander 

commands all U.S. Army forces assigned to the theater 

except those assigned to a subordinate unified command 

established by the theater command, a uniservice command 

reporting directly to the theater commander, a J.T.F., or 

a functional command attached or established by the 

theater commander F The theater army commander may be 

designated as the Combined Land Force Commander; however, in a combined arena, strategies and tactical direction for 

A-4 
units usually come under a headquarters other than the 

theater army W The theater army is then primarily an 

adminllog support headquarters for U.S. Army forces. In 

independent unified command the U.S theater 

ZEmmander may be designated to direct the t*acticak anda::: 

operations for all U.S. Army forces. Overall, the theater 

army commander must make recommendations to the theater 

commander for employment of the army component. The 

theater army commander communicates directly with the Army 

Chief of Staff on uniserviee matters relative to admin, 

personnel, training, logistics, communications, do,ctrine, 

combat development, and intelligence. The TA staff is 

devoted to policy planning and the coord inat ing of 

operations, The staff prepares plans and estimates and 

maintains close liaison with the theater staff. The TA 

staff is not usually involved in operations. 

1968 

The theater army (TA) commander is appointed by the 

Army Chief of Staff. Normally (qualified for command), excluding the theat”e’r”yco~~~d”~“rr 

the senior . 

and the joint staff, is designated the TA commander. The 

TA commander is primarily a supervisor, planner, and 

coordinator, providing centralized direction and doctrine 

for the decentralized execution of assigned missions. In 

peacetime; the TA ‘commander commands all army troops, 

activities, and installations assigned to the theater. In 

wartime, the TA commander normally relinquishes 

operational control of army combat forces, air defense 

forces, CS forces, and other units required to accomplish the theater operational mission (theater commander usually 

assumes control of operational units). The TA commander 

may be designated to retain control of operational units, 

but this is not normally the case. In wartime, the TA 

commander normally only maintains under his command the 

forces necessary 

functions (technica:‘intelligence and CSS), per form theater-wide specialized 

In a combined 

arena, the TA is pr imar i ly an administrative 

headquarters. If the TA, commander is also the unified 

commander (in emergency); he uses separate and distinct 

staffs to exercise operational and component command. The 

TA commander communicates directly with the CofS USA on 

uniservice matters dealing with admin, logistics, 

personnel, training, doctrine, combat developments, and 

intelligence matters primarily of Army interest. 

1973 

The CofS, USA, appoints the TA commander, and it is 

usually the senior army officer (qualified for command), 

A-5 
with the exception of the unified commander and J,T.F. staff. Only in an emergency is the unified commander and 

the TA commander the same person, and if so, he has 

separate and distinct staffs for operational and component 

command. The TA commander coordinates his activities with 

other service component commanders and makes 

recommendations to the unified commander on employment of 

the army component. The TA commander communicates 

directly with CofS, USA, on uniservice matters relating to 

administration, personnel, training, communications, doctrine, combat intelligence, logi;;ics, 

on 

intelligence matters primarily of army interest. The TA 

has a general and special staff organized to permit 

decentralized operation. Similar functions are grouped 

for standardized operations. When special commands are 

formed, the commander may be a theater staff officer, 

i.e., ENCOM commander is the theater engineer. 

Strategical/Tactical Functions 

1930 

The CINC is responsible for strategy, and he should 

take into consideration the personality of the enemy leaders. Planning must be one campaign ahead of current 

operations, and the general headquarters is responsible Ezfce;repayh;g a plan of concentration for the field . CINC is concerned with tactics after 

strategy. Subordinate elements make tactical plans and 

execute them. The army group and army commanders should 

provide input for the CINC's decision making process. The 

reserves for the GHQ consists of tanks, artillery, 

aviation, chemical troops, and engineers. Specifically, a 

general headquarters reserve is maintained along with such 

corps and divisions as may be held in strategic reserve. 

The strategic reserve influences the battle by maneuver, 

combat, or by reinforcing large units. 

1942 

The theater army is not specifically addressed. 

1950 

The TA commander receives missions from the theater 

commander, develops the army portion of a theater campaign 

plan, and conducts estimates of the situation to develop 

courses ;io,adction. for, the campaign. The TA commander 

issues directives to subordinate commanders 

A-6 
reflecting the overall scheme of maneuver, phasing of the 

action, forces and supplies available to each command, 

support from the theater navy, and air force assets 

available. Specific missions are allowed for each 

subordinate command. The TA develops an analysis of army force requirements for a campaign and forecasts fukure 

administrative and logistical requirements, projecting planning as far as possible into the future. The TA 

commander designates the rear boundary of the combat zone 

when established and changes it based on movement of the 

armies. The TA maintains close liaison with theater navy and air force commanders. 

1963 

The TA commander’s operational mission is to carry out 

strategic plans and instructions of higher headquarters. Plans are issued to subordinate units in the form of broad 

directions or LOIS and indicate the overall plan of 

maneuver, phasing, forces, supplies available to each 

command, support available from other services, and the 

missions of each subordinate command a The TA commander’ 

conducts long-range CSS planning. The TA commander is 

responsible for internal administration and discipline (except where the theater commander is responsible), training, logistical functions normal to the army 

component forces, and the army intelligence matters. 

1968 

In a JTF environment, the TA commander provides CSS to 

other components as directed by the theater commander. 

Normally, echelons above field army do not have tactical 

0 erations 

!f 

centers because they engage ’ long-range 

p anning and not day-to-day operations. Th: TA conducts 

stability operations in concert with the host country to 

prevent or defeat insurgency. Other missions of the TA 

include civil affairs, air defense as part of the theater 

air defense, special forces operations, special ammunition 

support, and training in army doctrine, techniques, and 

tactics. 

1973 

The TA is responsible for training in army doctrine, 

techniques, and tactics, and for providing CSS functions 

normal to ‘the army component . The TA commander is 

responsible for the employment of forces assigned to his 

operational control by the theater commander. The TA 

commander recommends geographic organization of the area 

A-7 
into a combat zone and a COMMZ and assigns geographic 

areas of responsibility to the AG, FA, and TASCOM 

commanders. The TA commander provides overall direction 

and coordination of intelligence efforts of army forces. 

This involves collection and processing intelligence and 

counterintelligence (technical, scientific, and target). The TA will provide assistance to host countries to 

prevent or defeat insurgency movements. The TA commander 

may establish a Command and Control Operations Center 

(CCOC) to provide the commander with a high-speed 

communications link to the unified commander, higher authorities, and subordinate commands. The air force 

component commander and the TA commander integrate the 

theater air defense effort through a theater air defense 

organization. Other missions of the TA are army intelligence matters, psyops matters, enemy POWs, captured u*s. military personnel policy and planning, civil. 

affairs, special forces operations, cover, deception, EW 

operations, and special ammunition support. 

Combat Service Support 

193Q 

The War Department will procure supplies at home, 

while the GHQ ClNC normally will procure supplies abroad. 

Whether. in friendly or enemy territory, the theater of 

operations must be exploited to the limit of its capacity for supply of the military forces. Utilization of local 

supplies will be carried out with due regard to the needs 

of the local population. Local supplies will be acquired 

with active cooperation of the inhabitants, and just payment will be rendered and continued production encouraged. 

1942 

Not addressed in PM 100-15, 

1950 

Normally each service force within a joint theater has 

its own organization for providing service support. The 

theater commander may designate one component -to organize 

overall logistical support for the theater or a joint logistics force for common support of all components (with 

a joint staff). The TA commander is responsible for 

administrative and logistical support to Army forces of a 

A-8 
joint task force and other forces as directed by the 

theater commander. Army forces receive logistical support 

from the theater logistical command, if so organized. 

1963 

The TA will coordinate acquisition, storage, movement, 

distribution, maintenance,' evacuation, and disposition of 

materiel; movement and evacuation of personnel; facility 

construction, maintenance, operation and acquisition; and 

the furnishing of services. Normally the service forces 

of a theater are organized unilaterally; exceptions are by 

agreement or assignment. The administrative mission of 

the TA is to organize and operate supply, maintenance, and 

services for CSS of U.S. Army forces in the theater. The 

TA may supply common items and common services to the USAF 

and Navy elements per agreements. The TA allocates and 

regulates critical items of supply* The TA provides 

engineer construction support to Navy, USAF, and Allied 

Forces per agreements. The TA provides CSS to Army 

components of a JTF as directed. TA G4 and other TA staff 

members normally perform no operations functions. The TA 

Replacement System operates under the TA commander and is 

res'ponsible for theater processing and training of 

replakements, including hospital returnees, isolated 

individuals, and units. 

1968 

Although the TA commander normally delegates authority 

and execution responsibility for CSS to TASCOM and field 

Army commanders, he retains overall control of css 

operations to ensure uniformity of effort. The TA 

commander issues policy, mission directives, broad 

planning, and priorities on CSS operations. The TA 

commander exercises technical. supervision and ' 

responsible for material readiness of Army equipment, t;l: 

movement and evacuation of personnel, the acquisition or 

construction and maintenance, operation and disposition of 

facilities. The TASCOM and FASCOM maintain close 

liaison. The TASCOM is responsible for interzonal 

services and throughput shipments of supplies and 

personnel originating in the TASCOM area and for use of 

tactical airllft aircraft to support certain aspects of 

the CSS mission. The TASCOM provides GS to COMMZ and rear 

area security within the COMMZ. 

1973 

The TA commander retains overall control of CSS to 

ensure uniformity of effort. The TA commander exercises 

A-9 
control by issuing policies, mission directives, broad 

planning, program guidance, allocations, and priorities. 

In the JTF arena, the TA provides css to U.S., Army 

components as directed. The TA commander is responsible 

for the exercise of technical supervision (inspections and 

instructions) by CSS commander's to the force as a whole 

and is responsible for logistical readiness of Army 

equipment. The TA is charged with the acquisition, 

storage, movement,, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, 

and disposition of materiel; the movement and evacuation 

of. personnel; the acquisition or construction, 

maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and 

the acquisition and furnishing of services. The TA 

commander discharges his responsibility for construction 

and real property maintenance activities (RPMA) through 

the Engineer Command (ENCOM), which may be under the TA 

commander or TASCOM commander. The TASCOM may have a 

PERSCOM, MATCOM, ENCOM, TRANSCOM, MEDCOM, and TAACOMS. 

The TASCOM is responsible for interzonal services and 

throughput shipments of supplies and personnel originating 

in the TASCOM area and for use of allocated tactical 

airlift assets. 

A-10 
Army Group 1938-73 

Organization 

1930 

The Army Group (AG) is established to ensure unity of 

command when two or more armies are operating in the same 

area. Unity of command, decentralized 

coordination of effort are guiding 

o erations, 

!k 

and 

princip es. When the 

number of armies is small, the AG cdr acts as CINC, Field 

Forces. When too large to be controlled by a GHQ, two or 

more AGs will be formed. Armies engaged in the same 

operation should be assigned to the same group. The CINC 

may regroup armies under his direct control. Tbere are no 

group troops, but large reserves may be designated. The 

AG staff consist of a small general staff, an adjutant general's section, and representatives of the service in 

such numbers as needed to operate the HQ. 

1942 

The group of armies (AG) consists of two or more 

armies with reinforcements under a designated commander 

for the accomplishment of a particular task, the execution 

of which requires coordination and control by one 

commander. Combat aviation and armored and motorized 

formations are allotted for the execution of assigned missions. Large armored formations are authorized in 

order to pursue powerful offensive operations (terrain dependent). The AG is a tactical unit. The AG will have 

general and special staff officers and utilize experienced LNOs to ensure mutual exchange of information. 

1950 

The Army Group (AG) is a tactical unit organized for 

strategic and tactical operations with a headquarters and 

required troops, a variable number of field armies, and 

separate divisions and corps. theater commander, The AG may operate under a 

unified 

theater army commander, or be organized 

as a command so directed by the theater 

commander. The mission, area of operation, and 

forces will influence the composition of additional t~~~~~ 

allotted to the AG commander. 

staffs will be occupied 

The general and specialized 

more with operational vice 

administrative matters. Liaison officers will be used to 

facilitate exchange of information. An. LO1 will set the 

organization (armies, units, etc.) of the AG. 

A-11 
1943 

The army group (AG) has a headquarters and 

i;adtq;trt;rrs units necessary for command and communication 

more field armies and sometimes independent 

corps and separate divisions. There is no TOE for an AG 

headquarters, but it is organized for strategic and 

tactical purposes to translate theater army. dirktives 

into combat action. E 

It is primarily a tactical unit with limited CSS 

responsibilities, and actual composition is based on the 

campaign plan, mission, area of operation, and enemy forces. The headquarters is usually echeloned with a 

small. rear echelon for administration concerning support of the main echelon and a tactical CP that can be 

established. The AG has a general staff to provide 

policy, control, coordination, and direction in the field 

of personnel and administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, and civil affairs; and it has a special staff 

for technical and administrative services. These 

functions approximate those of the field army or corps but 

are more concerned with control and allocation of means 

over a longer period of time and are less concerned with 

small unit actions. 

1968 

The AG HQ is a TDA unit organized for a specific 

operation or campaign. The AG consists of a HQ and two or 

more field armies and those units necessary for command, 

communication and admin SUppO?Z t . Separate corps and 

divisions may be assigned. Composition 2s determined by 

the Army CBT Forces Commander based on campaign plans and 

missions. HQ is usually echeloned with a small rear 

echelon concerned primarily with admin support of main 

echelon. The AG may organize a tactical CP based on the 

tactical situation and adequacy of communication assets. 

C'ommunications are provided by the Theater Army Comm 

System (TAGS); internal comm is provided by a Signal Nedium HQ Opn Company. The AG has an army general staff 

to assist the AG commander in planning and supervision. 

1973 

The AG may operate under the direction of a combined 

force HQ or have Allied units in it. The AG consists of 

an HQ; those units necessary for command, communication, 

operations, intelligence, and administrative support; and 

two or more field armies and sometimes 

A-12 
separate corps and divisions. The AG HQ is a TDA unit 

organized for a specific operation or campaign. HQ is 

echeloned with a small rear echelon that 

administrative support to the main echelon. pKides AG 

commander may organize a tactical CP based on need. The 

actual composition of the AG is based on campaign plans, mission, area of operation, enemy, and probable courses of 

action. The AG has a U.S. Army general staff organization 

that provides policy, control, coordination, and direction 

for personnel and administration, operations, intelligence, logistics, psychops, and civil affairs. The 

communications link for the AG is provided by TACS. 

Command 

1930 

The commander of the AG will be the commander of the 

forces in the field when the number of armies is small. 

The AG commander exercises territorial responsibilities 

and hyheiupply, administrative, only 

and strategical functions 

the AG IS the headquarters of a theater of 

operation. The AG is a tactical unit. No commander will 

act simultaneously as the commander of a large unit'and as 

the commander of one of its component units. The 

commander should know his personnel well enough to pred 

their actions. Personal involvement is an attribute 

command. 

ict 

of 

1942 

The AG operates under the War Department or a theater 

commander, and its commander may be designated by the 

theater he is under or by the War Department. An LOI, or 

order 

dazsignate supplemented by an LOI, is usually issued to 

the composition of the AG and when an action is 

effective. The AG commander exercises no territorial 

jurisdiction and few supply and administrative functions 

exce t when he becomes the theater commander. 

staf F 

The general deals primarily with operational matters rather than 

administrative ones. 

1950 

The AG commander will operate under either a theater 

or theater army commander and may be designated by the 

theater commander or Department of the Army, usually by an 

LO1 or an order supplemented by an LOI. 

A-13 
1963 

The AG commander is usually designated by DA or the 

theater army commander and orders are received through LOIS. The TA commander normally assigns territorial 

responsibility to the AG for the combat zone and this 

includes rear area security, traffic control. 

area damage control, and 

Territorial responsibility is usually further assigned down to the field army commander. 

1968 

The AG commander is designated by DA or Army component 

commander. The AG commander normally has territorial 

responsibility for the CBT zone to include RAP, highway 

management, traffic control, air defense, and civil 

affairs. The AG commander normally publishes directives 

in the form of an LOI. The AG commander normally assigns territorial responsibility to 

The principles of 

the field army commanders. 

the 1968 FM applies equally when 

operations are with Allied units or as part of a combined 

command. 

1973 

The AG commander is designated by DA or the Army 

component commander and normally has territorial 

responsibility for the CRT zone to include RAP, 

traffic defense, and highwa 

management, control, air civi K 

affairs. The AG is primarily a tactical echelon of 

command with few CSS responsibilities. The AG commander 

publishes guida-ne to the field armies via LOIS. 

Strategical and Tactical Functions 

1930 

The AG commander assigns assets and missions to 

subordinate elements. The AG commander, in accordance 

with assigned missions, draws up tactical plans; issues 

orders to armies, special troops and reserves under his 

command; apportions forces; allocates zones of action or 

sectors; and coordinates movements and efforts. Detailed 

planning and execution is left to the army commanders. 

The AG HQ may directly control deep air reconnaissance or 

assign the mission to the armies, Deep cavalry 

reconnaissance by a number of cavalry divisions under one 

commander is conducted under the direct control of the 

AG. In the defense, the AG commander indicates the 

A- 14 
general nature of the defense and establishes conditions 

under which to begin a withdrawal or counteroffensive. In 

the defense, the AG commander designates the Limit of army responsibility for distant air reconnaissance. If the 

need exists to form a new army, a nucleus is designated and the army created by adding the necessary troops and 

services. The AG commander may retain large reserves to 

influence the action. 

1942 

The AG commander prepares plans (current and future), 

allots assets, subordinate and assigns clear and specific missions to 

units based on mission taskings. The AG 

commander assigns objectives, zones of action or sectors, and coordinates the movement/efforts of major elements. 

The AG commander monitors the allocates 

additional operations, 

assets, and makes recommendations for 

additional assets. The reserve will be constituted from 

assets allotted to the AG, from other subelements, or from 

both. 

battle, 

The reserve is the major means to influence the 

must be kept mobile and secure 

attack. The reserve is committed in ffyr;eair/ round 

an f not 

piecemeal. 

1950 

The AG commander conducts offensive and defensive 

operations. He is charged with planning future 

operations; allocation of forces; and 

objectives to 

assigning missions 

action; 

field armies; assigning and coordinating movements 

zones/sectors of 

of major subelements. 

The AG is also charged with shifting major CBT forces, 

reallocation of field arty, control. of log resources, and 

the employment of ABI\J forces (if allocated from TA). The 

AG commander may shift TACAIR allocations to influence the 

action in a desired sector. 

with employment 

The AG commander is charged of any guided missiles held under his 

control. 

employed 

The AG reserve will be mobile and concealed, be 

en masse vice piecemeal 

means to influence the action. 

and constitute a major 

1963 

The AG implements broad strategic plans of the theater 

army by translating them into operational plans. .The AG. 

conducts long-range planning and provides 

o erational 

long-range 

K 

direction while directing all land forces in 

t e army group area. The AG allots assets, assigns broad 

missions and objectives, conducts long-range strategic and 

A-15 
short-range tactical planning, and assigns zones to the 

field armies. The retention of a reserve at AG depends on 

the tactical plan of the commander, missions assigned to 

the field armies, area of 

forces, operation, availability of and the enemy. Normally a maneuver element will 

not be retained due to a lack of forces; however, newly arrived or reconstituted forces may be used on a temporary basis. The AG may retain a reserve of special weapons received from TA, and some of these may be 

delivered by USAF assets and may be inte~~~~~“ds into the 

interdiction mission. 

1968 

The AG commander provides the field armies with a 

concept of operation, assigns missions and obj,ectives, plans future operations, plans and conducts tactical 

operations, assigns zones of action or sectors of 

responsibility to field armies and other subordinate 

elements, and maintains liaison with higher, adjacent and 

subordinate units. Retention of a reserve at AG depends 

on the tactical plan, area of operation, forces, availability of 

enemy forces, and probable courses of actions. 

But normally the AG commander does not retain a maneuver 

element in reserve. As conditions Grant, new units or 

reconstituted units may be used as an AG reserve. The AG 

usually retains a reserve of nuclear weapons received by TA to be integrated into the tactical air interdiction 

plan. The AG commander normally retains a portion of the 

allocated tactical air support in reserve. 

l-973 

The AG commander plans future operations, plans and 

conducts tactical operations, translates directives into 

tactical actions for execution, assigns missions to fiekt’ 

armies, and assigns zones of action, sectors 

responsibility, and- objectives. The AG commander directs 

all ground operations within the AG boundaries and allots 

forces to those operations.. The AG commander continually coordinates the movements of major units, analyzes AO, the 

enemy, probable courses of action, and determines the 

assets needed for such operations. The AG is responsible for cover and deception planning and may allocate and 

dispatch forces for RAP missions.’ The AG normally does 

not retain a maneuver element in reserve, due to 

availability of forces. However, newly arrived or 

reconstituting forces may temporarily constitute an A6 

reserve. The AG normally integrates its nuclear weapons into the tactical air interdiction plan. 

A-16 
Air/Ground Operations 

1930 \ 

Air assets are not addressed in the 1930 Manual except 

as stated above. 

1942 

The 1942 Manual relates one mission of the Air Force 

is to conduct close support missions, but they should not 

prejudice success of air superiority missions. Combat 

aviation support may address the 

bombardment, following missions: 

reconnaissance, enemy defenses , enemy 

reserves, and reinforcements, hostile mechanized forces, 

support of friendly armor/motorized forces; and support of 

airborne forces in the air and on the ground. The primary 

mission of combat aviation is air superiority, but 

aircraft are vulnerable ‘and not as 

artillery. easily replaced as 

GAS missions are affected by a number of 

factors, such as the distance from target, weather, target identification, and duration of attack. 

1950 

A separate section for AG reference air-ground ops is 

not included in the 1950 manual with the exception of 

pointing out the option of the AG commander to shift air 

resources allotted to the AG to other sectors to influence 

the action. A generic,air-ground statement that applies 

to air ops in general includes the role of air forces to 

gain and maintain air superiority, isolate the 

battlefield, render close support to ground troops 1 and 

conduct reconnaissance missions. Close support and 

assistance will support operations to mobilize, disperse, 

or destroy hostile ground forces. 

1963 

The AG and tactical air force missions are 

complementary in the same general areas of operation and 

include counter-air f CAS, air interdiction, and tactical 

air reconnaissance. AG air/ground assets include G2/G3 

air personnel, a photo interpretation team, communications 

personnel, and liaison teams. Planning is broad at AG 

level, detailed at lower echelons. The Tactical Air 

Commander determines the amount of air effort based on 

mission, assets available, and AG preplanned requirements, 

and these assets are allocated to the AG and, in turn, are 

usually allofated to the field army in terms of sorties 

A-17 
for a period of time. The tactical air commander may reallocate assets based on desires of the AG commander to 

consolidate assets in one field army area. 

1968 

The AG and supporting air force have complementary missions, but air assets extend deep into the AO. Air 

operations include air interdiction, CAS, and 

reconnaissance, and maybe naval or marine assets. The TA 

commander determines apportionment of air assets, and the 

AG comm~;ljer ensures establishment of FSCL (usuaLly) by 

corps that it is coordinated with Tactical Air 

Commander. The TAX is collocated with the FATOC while 

the DASC is collocated with the CTOC. 

from bn through field army. 

TACPS are provided 

1973 

The AG chapter in FM 100-15 does not have a separate 

section on tactical air for the AG, but the chapter on 

Army planning does outline applicable guidance for the 

AG-tactical air operation. Air operations include USAF, 

Navy * and Marine sulaport ' the form of CAS 

reconnaissance, and airlift. CALSnmissions are controlled 

by the tactical air control system, while reconnaissance 

and airlift provide direct support to army operations. 

Assets are allocated based on analyses of subcommands' 

requirements and consist of those that cannot be serviced 

by Army aviation or field artillery resources. The Air 

Force component commander bases his 

recommendations on 

apportionment his m.ission, enemy air threat, 

available resources, and requirements of subcommands. The 

army component commander suballocates most of his 

allocated air assets to subcommands. The AG commander may 

retain a part of his air assets as a reserve. 

Combat Service Support 

1930 

The AG commander has administrative and 

responsibilities only when acting as the logistical theater 

commander, and in those instances, the AG commander will 

ensure that and well-formulated are 

effected. systematic pLans Just payments will be made for locally 

procedured suppkies. This encourages active cooperation 

of the inhabitants and encourages continued production. 

A-18 
1942 

The AG commander has few administrative and logistical functions except when he becomes the theater commander, 

however )‘ he exercises control over supplies and credits 

for his forces and in some instances establishes supply 

installations. Strong signal assets are required for the 

successful operation of an AG. 

1950 

The AG usually has few supply or administrative 

functions and usually does not operate supply or admin 

installations. The AG does exercise control over supplies 

and credits for forces and allots to the field armies 

additional admin support that is provided by higher HQ. 

The AG maintains liaison with higher, lower, and adjacent units and sets movement priorities and exercises traffic 

control. Strong signal assets are required for both 

operational and other duties. 

1963 

The AG allocates available service troops to major 

subordinate commands, establishes priorities for movement , ensures adequate movements and traffic control, 

establishes priorities for aLlocation of replacements, and 

normally controls the allocation of ammunition. The AG 

commander recommends the locations of field army rear 

boundaries to theater army. The AG ensures conformity to 

su ply and administrative procedures by the field armies, 

al B ocates special weapons and CSS assets provided by the 

theater army. The AG commander may dispatch troops to 

solve COMMZ security problems (command of these forces may 

pass to COMMZ local security force commander or to TA 

commander). 

1968 

The AG is primarily a tactical unit and does not 

normally operate css installations. It is not an 

automated system of css. The AG discharges its css 

functions either through the TACOM transmits 

requirements to TA, who in turn directs the GiCOM. The AG 

is involved in establishing priorities for movements, 

ensuring adequate movements and traffic control I 

establishing priorities for supplies and credits for 

assigned and attached units, establishing priorities for 

allocation of replacements to major subcommands, allots 

available CSS assets to subcommanders and ensures subunits 

A-19 
are supported. The AG also recommends the location of 

field army rear boundaries, normally controls allocation 

of ammunition, and may control allocation of other items. 

The AG assigns territorial responsibility to the field 

armies. 

1973 

The AG is primarily a tactical unit and normally does 

not operate CSS installations and has only limited CSS 

responsibilities. The AG HQ is not an automated CSS 

sys tern. The AG discharges its CSS role by directing field 

armies to conform to AG established allocations and 

priorities, by recommending allocation priorities to TA 

HQS establishing priorities and credits for subunits, 

establishing movement priorities and priorities for 

replacements to major subunits. The AG normally controls 

the allocation of ammo, allocates css troops to 

subcommands, and ensures adequate support for subunits. 

The AG also recommends field army rear boundaries. 

A-20 
The Field Army 1924-73 

Organization 

1924 

The field army (FA) is a strategic unit whose orgn varies according to the mission but normally consists of 

several army corps, large cav units and air svc units. 

The FA is a unit of command with a general staff, special 

trps and svcs. 

1930 

The FA is the largest self-contained unit and consists 

of a cdr, stf, special army trps and svcs, and two or more 

army corps. It may have GHQ avn, reserve arty, cav 

divisions, and other auxiliary trps. The FA has a general 

and special stf that assist the cdr by providing basic 

info and technical advice for the preparation and 

execution of battle. ^ The GofS translates the cdr’s 

decisions into orders and the stf prepares estimates from 

the c&r’s guidance. The FA has territorial, tactical, 

administrative, and support functions. 

1942 

The FA is the largest self-contained unit, consistin 

of an HQ, organic army trps, and a var i’able number o Fs 

corps and divisions. It is the fundamental unit of 

strategic maneuver. A fixed orgn is not desirable but is 

determined by mission, enemy, terrain, and trps 

available. The orgn of the general and special stf is 

omitted. 

1950 

The FA is the largest self-contained unit and has both 

tactical and administrative functions. The FA consists of 

a HQ, organic army trps, and a variable number of corps 

and divisions. A fixed orgn is not desirable but is 

structured based on mission, terrain, weather, and 

probable enemy forces. The cbt forces may be armor or 

Infantry heavy or structured to meet special needs. (Stf 

org and functions are not addressed in the 1950 FM.) 

1963 

The FA is a tactical and administrative orgn with an 

HQ* certain assigned army trps, and a variable numbers of 

A-21 
corps and divisions. The composition is not fixed but is 

organized under the TOE 51 Series. 

of forces is based on mission, 

The actual composition 

of forces, 

area of opn, availability and contemplated opns. Units are assigned to 

the FA by higher HQ on a relatively permanent basis and 

may be assigned down to corps. Nuclear weapons are 

allocated to the FA for specific periods of time or for a 

specific mission. The HQ and stf are organized under TOE 

51-l with the general and special stf under the control of 

the CofS. The staff prepares estimates for input to the 

cdr's concept and prepares detailed plans to support FA 

plans. A USASA Gp is attached to the FA for EW, 

intelligence, and security support. (The 1966 chap to FM 

loo-15 added an insurgency role for the FA). 

1968 

The FA is a tactical and administrative orgn with a 

HQ, assigned army trps, divisions. 

and a variable number of corps and 

TOE 51-b prescribes the orgn of the FA HQ. 

The composition of the FA is prescribed by higher HQ and 

is based on mission, area of opn, availability of units, 

and contemplated opns. Support may be recommended from 

other army forces or other svcs. During cbt, the FA HQ 

has two echelons: the main and alternate CP, and the rear 

CP. The FA stf provides info based on thorough analysis. 

1973 

The composition of an FA is not fixed, the number and 

types of units assigned or attached depend on the mission, 

area of opn, availability of units, and the contemplated 

opns. Missions assigned to FA usually are broad in nature 

and permit latitude in their accomplishment. FA mission 

taskings are analyzed for implied missions. TOE 51-l 

prescribed the orgn of the FA HQ. Units attached or 

assigned to the FA may be further assigned or attached to 

corps. The stf of an FA consists of a CofS, Gl-G5 general stf, and special stf. The FA may operate directly under 

an army gp, theater army, unified command, a subordinate 

unified command, or a combined force HQ. 

Command 

1924 

The FA cdr gives orders to cdrs of corps, arty, engrs, 

air svc, 

detailed 

and tanks of the FA by issuing orienting and 

instructions to ensure success. The army cdr 

bases his plans on guidance received from the CINC or the 

A-22 
cdr of an army gp. He ensures unity of action of the army 

corps by personal supervision, impressing his personality 

on both the concept and execution. 

the action of the corps 

He personally follows 

and influences the action by utilizing army arty and by modifying zones of action. 

1930 

The 1930 Larger Units Manual has extensive information 

on command. It stresses the philosophy of command and the 

role of the army cdr to direct corps and other large units 

under his control. It states his responsibility for 

mutual understanding among subordinates. 

1942 

The FA has territorial responsibility and is the ‘basis 

for planning and executing Detailed planning is strategic and tactical’ opns. 

the responsibility of the FA edr. 

Plans must be flexible to exploit favorable situations and 

correct unfavorable ones. During operations, this 

flexibility permits the transfer of major units and 

missions among corps. The information cycle must move up 

and down the chain of command to be effective. 

1950 

The FA cdr executes bold and daring plans 

careful analysis and sound planning. Planning 

flexible to exploit or react to enemy situations 

based on 

must be 

and must 

project well into the future. The FA cdr issues orders in 

concert with the general plan and allots divisions and 

supporting trps. He is with coordination of 

boundaries and charged actions between and among corps. The 

nature of FA opns is offensive, the defensive being but a 

preliminary to counteroffensive opns. 

1963 

The FA cdr ‘s decision is based on the concept of the 

opn and is based on TA orders. Missions are assigned to 

the corps in phases to include be prepared missions. A FA 

‘TT;tical Opn Center (FATOC) may be organized to assist the I controlling The 

(FASC;) edr is respotnhzibFk?for rear 

FA Support Command 

security and area 

damage control in the FA svc area. 

A-23 
1968 

U.S. Th;hTfte;perates cUdn,der an army gp, a unified command, 

army '?kAT&) 

combined force HQ. A Fi 

tactical opns center may be established to 

facilitate opns. 

1973 

The FA I-IQ, during cbt opns, .has ;fmain and rear 

echelon. The main echelon consists main and 

alternate CP. (Cdr has option of establishin: a tactical 

opn CP--FATOC). The rear echelon is concerned with CSS. 

During opns, the FA cdr's concept of the . 

specifically directed in para 3a. of the cdrfs t"apc"tici? 

plan. 

Strategical/Tactical Functions 

1924 

The FA cdr, is responsible for the conduct of opns to 

achieve the tasking of higher HQ, directs the cdrs of his 

arty, air svc, tanks, and engrs, and oversees the 

application of these assets in cbt. He gives guidance to 

his stf for planning and operational purposes. 

1930 

The FA is the fundamental unit of strategic maneuver, 

carrying out broad phases of tactical opns, while acting 

independently or as part of a group of armies; The FA 

produces tactical and administrative plans to coordinate 

the efforts of corps and army trps, designates zones of 

action,. allocates divisions and special trps to corps, and 

influences the battle by use of army tanks, air forces, 

army arty, coordination of corps arty, and by use of the 

reserves. The army cdr, based on recommendations of the 

army chief of arty, allocates army and GHQ arty to the 

corps. The army cdr determines if and what kind of -arty 

Prep will be fired, controls H&I fires, length of 

counterpreps, and determines the time they will be fired. 

Heavier calibers of arty are usually held at army level 

while smaller ones are allocated to corps. The army cdr 

exercises direct control over engr, medical, and other 

support and administrative trps or allocates them to corps 

or divisions. 

A-24 
1942 

The FA cdr coordinates the major efforts of the FA by issuing orders to subordinates, allocating divisions and 

support trps to corps, and by making provisions for 

special task forces. 

execution of 

He is charged with the planning and 

assigned missions. 

planning well into the future, 

The FA cdr must project covering considerable 

periods of time, while directing current opns. 

1950 

The FA cdr influences the action by personal leadership, and assigns missions and boundaries to the 

corps. Continuity of action is 

coordination with 

ensured by tactical thorough AF assets, employment of 

reserves a and the provision of adequate logistical 

support ‘ The FA cdr is also charged with the movement of 

forces between and among corps and the rotation of reserve 

divisions to frontline corps. 

1963 

The FA receives missions from the army gp or theater 

army in the form of an LOI. The FA allocates cbt power and missions to corps and plans opns two or three phases 

in advance. 

the 

The field arty develops fire plans to support dominant element of maneuver 

environment). (nonnuclear The FA normally allocates all of its field 

arty to the corps for control or further allocation. The 

,regional ADA cdr will normally delegate control of organic -ADA systems within the FA area to the FA cdr (he may 

delegate a portion to the corps). allocates FA cbt support assets. 

The FA supervises and 

1968 

The PA receives LOIS from higher HQ and translates 

them into operational guidance. Plans are made beyond 

current opns, perhaps two or three phases ahead. Opns are 

usually phased based on a change in the form of man’euver 

or a major regrouping of forces. The FA publishes 

operation orders 

initial phases establishing the concept of opn for the 

and outlining succeeding phases I The FA 

allocates forces. 

1973 

The FA plan supports the plan of the next higher HQ. 

The FA projects its planning well beyond current opns. 

A-25 
While one opn progresses, the stf plan the next two or 

three opns. The FA interprets the LOI from higher HQ and 

ascertains missions. FA opns will normally be phased when 

there is a change in the nature of the opn or a major regrouping of forces. The FA allocates each corps assets 

commensurate ,with mission tasking. The FA, planning 

includes integration of allocated tactical air support. 

The FA is responsible for rear area protection in the, FA 

security area (FASA). The FA, although not normally 

deployed in support of stability opns, maeote ;;q;ired to 

train, equip, and dispatch elements opns. 

Nuclear weapons are allocated/assigned to an FA for a 

specific period, mission, or phase of an opn by higher 

HQ* Communication support at the FA level is provided by 

a. command communications system, an area communications 

system, and an air defense arty communication system. The 

FA cdr has operational considerations for maneuver units, 

fire SUppOrt r nuclear weapons employment, chemical 

weapons, tactical air support, attack helicopter opns, 

naval support, and electronic warfare. 

Air-Ground Operations 

1924 

The air division, employed en masse, fights as part of 

the FA by bombardment and machine-gun fire. With close 

coordination, avn assets are used for protection against 

hostile aircraft and for reconnaissance and may be used as 

an element of maneuver for instant intervention. 

1930 

The FA cdr contols avn assigned or attached to the FA 

but attaches it to the corps when required. The FA cdr 

has an army chief of avn to coordinate avn (attack and 

reconnaissance) among the army's assets. Attack avn 

assets should be used in the same manner as machine guns 

and arty. 

1942 

Combined air-ground opns must be closely coordinated 

by the supported ground cdr. Avn assets will be allocated 

on a need basis ; standard allocations will seldom be 

made. Avn assets in close support of ground opns can be 

horizontal or dive-bomb attacks, with chemicals and 

machine guns, or entail ,re,yn and flank security opns. Dive-bombers will be against precise targets, 

horizontal bombing against area targets. Sufficient avn 

A- 26 
assets will seldom be available to suballocate to 

subordinate elements of the supported unit. Avn support is dependent on weapons, enemy air and antiaircraft fires, 

and discretion will be used in pitting aircraft against well-defended targets due to aircraft vulnerability. 

1950 

The USAF gains and maintains air superiority, isolates 

the battlefield, renders close support to ground trps and 

conducts r econ missions. Close support and assistance 

will support opns to immobilize, disperse, or destroy 

hostile ground forces. 

1963 

The unified cdr will normally apportion air assets to 

support the tactical air mission based on recommendations 

of the air and land component cdrs. The TACC at FA 

provides broad guidance for planning and committing 

preplanned and immediate air support requests. Air assets 

within the FA HQ will normally be coordinated in the G2/G3 

air section. Gnd and air opns are mutually supporting and 

the FA cdr may redirect allocated air assets based on 

greater priorities. Immediate air requests are forwarded 

through the TACP’s to the DASC. 

1968 

FA ground opns and supporting air opns are integrated 

and complementary. FA G2, G3, and G4 are involved in the 

planning and integration of recon, close air, and air-land 

support for the FA. Air assets are allocated to the FA by 

army a3 or higher HQ. Preplanned and immediate air 

support requests are forwarded to the TASE at FA level. 

TACPs are located at levels of command from bn to FA. If 

requests exceed FA allocated capabilities, the cdr may 

request army gp or higher HQ reapportion available air 

assets or make aircraft available by diverting it from 

another mission. MIBARS units produce and disseminate 

intelligence obtained by USAF recon efforts and serve as 

liaison between the FA and the tactical USAF recon units 

supporting the FA. 

1973 

FA ground opns and tactical air ops are 

complementary. Tactical air support includes GAS, 

tactical air recon, and tactical airlift. An Army GLO 

assists and advises tactical fighter units on matters 

pertaining to army opns. 

A-27 
The G21G3 air personnel plan and coordinate CAS and 

recon activities for the FA.. AF TACPs are collocated with 

the TASE and provide liaisonand technical assistance with 

the AF Tat Air Control Center (TACC) (if TACC and TASE are 

collocated, no TACP is required at FA level). The G?/G4 

jointly plan and coordinate tactical airlift opns 

(G3-Operational lifts/G4 admin lifts). Missions are 

preplanned or immediate, and when requests exceed 

allocations, the FA cdr can request additional allocations 

or divert allocated reserves to higher priority missions. 

A MLBARS element is assigned to the FA TV support the air 

recon effort. 

Ground Operations 

1924 

The FA conducts offensive and defensive ground opns in 

accordance with mission taskings. The FA, in the offense, develops a plan of maneuver based on its mission, Corps formations are wide and deep when the enemy is distant but 

contract in depth when approaching the enemy. Ca;h;ndlE;; 

work in cancer t to provide reconnaissance. 

elements gain contact and drive in resistance. Massed 

fires start the 

b”EgTil.e attack, while tanks break down works not destroyed by arty. Avn bomb and 

machine-gun fires support the attack. During the battle, 

the FA cdr reinforces corps, allots remaining art 

monitors the battle, and positions the reserve. In t K ;? 

defense, plans include general disposition of the FA, 

corps zones, arty, air, and cav missioris. Defensive opns 

are echeloned in depth with a good system of fires, 

judicious orgn of the ground forces, and rapid handling of 

the reserves, Phases include reserve positions, rest 

positions, reliefs, and periods of stabilization. The FA 

plan fixes the priority of work. Rest positions include 

dense barrages, continuous observation, and switch 

positions to counter enemy threats. Interior orgn must 

plan for destruction of. breakthrough forces. The arty 

covers forward up to 2,000 meters and fires counterpre s 

on order V Counterattacks are immediate, and withdrawa P s 

should be made in hrs of darkness. If possible, the FA 

cdr holds a complete . and does not 

hesitate to throw in his ~~~~sre~~tv~~s~~v~ain victory. 

1930 

In the offense, the FA moves corps abreast or in 

columns with cav and avn leading to establish contact. In 

the passive defense, corps are employed abreast; in the 

A-28 
active defense, a reserve (up to a corps) is held to 

eoun ter enemy actions. Army arty fires include 

counterpreps, defensive fires, and interdiction fires. 

Large counterattacks are usually executed by an FA 

reserve S and narrow frontages are given to areas of 

greater effort. The defense is the basis of planning for 

a counterattack, and successful defensive opns depend on the offensive spirit, The army may hold one or more 

divisions in reserve, and reserve arty may be sent to 

reinforce a forward unit’s arty. 

1942 

In the offense, the FA cdr assigns the corps tasks and 

objectives, directions or zones of advance or zones of 

action. Forces are organized to provide decisive mass in 

decisive direction at the decisive time. METT-T 

daetermines the allocation of forces to main and secondary 

attacks a and the FA, force, 

when attacking as a part of a larger 

may have its main attack and objective designated 

by that higher HQ. Plans will provide contingencies for 

enemy counteractions. As part of a larger force, the FA 

may execute enveloping maneuvers in support of other FA 

frontal attacks. Appropriate weapons and trps should be 

made available to leading elements to destroy enemy 

antitank defenses. The FA in the defense will usually act 

as part of a larger force and be ( integrated into the 

general scheme of defense. A FA acting alone will have 

great latitude in selecting defensive positions* The 

frontage assigned to the corps depends on the type of 

defense (position or retrograde) and on METT-T. The cdr 

must anticipate enemy mobility and be organized in depth, 

stressing fixed and mobile anti tank weapons and 

obstacles. The defensive is characterized by the 

offensive spirit, and this spirit is pronounced in the 

counterat tack. Daring and boldness characterize 

counteroffensive opns but not at the expense of careful 

analysis. The FA cdr decisively employs combat avn, field 

arty, and reserves to influence the battle. 

1950 

The FA is the ground unit of maneuver E The cdr 

assigns corps missions, objectives, .directions of advance, 

or zones of action. Main and secondary attacks will be 

designated and based on METT-T and will provide decisive 

mass at decisive times. The FA cdr must anticipate great 

depth in organized enemy defenses and should ensure 

leading elements have the capability to destroy or 

neutralize organized antitank defenses. The main attack 

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of the FA may be designated by a higher HQ. The FA, when 

it is part of interior lines, will usually make frontal 

attacks or penetrations, while if it is employed in a 

flank position and part of a larger force it may perform 

an enveloping maneuver t FA defensive forces are organized 

in to covering forces, battle positions, and reserves. 

Covering forces are normally the responsibility of the 

corps f as supervised by the army, 

for the battle positions are 

Detailed responsibili:: the responsibility 

division and corps cdrs and are supervised by the army cdr. Priority of effort for defensive orgn for the FA cdr 

is battle positions prepared in depth, disposition of 

reserve I and major counterattacks by the reserve. The 

defense is organized to stop frontal attacks and block and 

defeat armor/motorized attacks. Rapid moving penetrations 

must be anticipated, and the counterattack should manifest 

the offensive spirit of the defense. 

1963 

The FA conducts offensive, defensive, and retrograde 

these 

doEZf!ion. 

are usually phased due to scope and 

Enemy capabilities, courses of action, friendly 

force disposition, areas of opn and log support all affect 

phasing, but changes in maneuver and major regrouping are 

the major factors that dictate this. The FA uses all 

forms of maneuver, but the turning movement is used more 

often at FA and corps level than at lower levels. The FA 

cdr rarely directs the form of maneuver for the corps but 

does assign zones of action. FA defensive opns include a 

security echelon, forward defense echelon, and a reserve 

echelon. At FA level, an enemy avenue of approach is one 

that will facilitate the unrestricted maneuver of one f+) 

division-size force. A mobile strike force will be 

physically located in the rear area and directed by the FA 

to support rear area opns. ACRs and separate bdes may be 

allocated to corps to act as a mobile strike force for 

rear area opns, or they may be held as an FA reserve. 

Retrograde opns are usually ordered by a higher HQ. The 

FA reserve is established to the rear of the forward 

defense echelon, consists of maneuver units and fires, and 

may be used to exploit success or friendly counterattack 

penetrations or to provide rear or flank security. In the 

offense, the FA reserve can be released to the corps. and 

committed by the corps or kept directly under the control 

of the FA cdr. A detailed plan is not developed by the FA 

to use the reserve as a counterattacking force due to time 

and space. In a nuclear environment, nuclear weapons may constitute a reserve. The FA retains no significant 

reserve during an exploitation. The FA will not usually 

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be involved in unconventional warfare opns. (The 1966 

chap to FM 100-15 allocates one 

to each FA). long-range recon company 

1968 

The FA employs three basic forms of offensive 

maneuver: the frontal attack, the penetration, and the 

envelopment. Elements of an FA may use all of these forms 

in one opn. Normally the FA and frontal 

attacks; the division uses frontal attCaOcrkPsS .s""",art of a 

corps qr FA. The FA rarely specifies the form of maneuver 

but does assign zones of action. The FA may be involved 

in meeting engagements, exploitations, and pursuit ops. A 

nuclear saturated battlefield may maneuver capability. drastically reduce 

The FA cdr will eRsure contaminated 

units are rapidly reconstituted and reequipped. The FA 

defends by employing corps in a mobile or area defense and 

by assigning a definite sector to each corps. Defense 

echelons consist of the security echelon, forward defense 

echelons, and the reserve echelon. The security echelon 

(forward of FEBA) is usually controlled by corps, but 

coordination points are designated by the FA cdr to; ensure 

unity of action. The general trace of the EEBA is 

determined by the FA cdr by designating corps coordination 

points and boundaries. The FA cdr selects boundaries that 

allocate each major avenue of approach'to a single corps. 

Force allocation is based on the FA cdr's visualization of 

how the corps will defend. Dispersion Fequired by nuclear 

weapons invites defeat in detail. The FA reviews and 

analyzes corps counterattack plans to ensure they are in 

concert with the FA perceived threat. The FA may retain 

divisions, AGRs, or separate bdes in reserve and 

uncommitted assets of their forces may be used to 

supplement FASCOM rear area protection forces. Maneuver 

is dominant in the nonnuclear battlefield. In the nuclear 

battlefield, maneuver may be planned around fire support. Normally all tube arty is attached to corps. ADA units 

within the FA area carry out the assigned missions with 

the policies cdr. and procedures established by the theater 

Nuclear weapons are assigned to the FA for a 

specific period, mission, or phase of an opn. cs support for the FA is multifaceted. The FA may train, equip, and 

dispatch forces involved in stability opns. Armed 

helicopter and aerial arty units are normally placed in 

support of lower echelons. In a nuclear environment, nuclear weapons may form a major part of the reserve. 

Time and space are major factors in the placement of 

reserve. The reserve, on occasion, may be directly controlled by FA cdr but is almost always released to the 

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corps in the offense, who in turn assigns missions and 

releases it to action. In some instances, the FA. may 

designate the reserve of a corps as the reserve of the FA 

and place special restrictions on its use. 

plans 

FA continge:kz 

normally designate the forces to constitute 

reserve. 

1973 

The FA conducts offensive, defensive, and retrograde 

opns . During of-fensive opns, the FA concept of opn is SO 

stated to enable the corps to plan one phase of the FA opn 

in detail and initiate planning for succeeding phases. 

The FA uses the penetration, envelopment, and frontal 

attacks as basic forms of maneuvers. In the defense, all 

corps of the FA are normally employed in the forward 

defense area. An avenue of approach into an FA defense 

area is one that permits the unrestricted maneuver of one 

or more division-size enemy units. Except for long-range 

ballistic missile delivery systems, the FA usually 

attaches all of its field arty and aerial field arty to 

corps. The FA cdr usually constitutes .a reserve of 

maneuver and fire support elements (including nuclear 

weapons) that may consist of divisions, an ACR, or a 

separate bde. He may also desi nate 

P 

the reserve of one ‘or 

more corps as the FA reserve special restraints will be 

placed an the corps’ use of their reserve). The reserve 

will normally be released to the corps for combat. The FA 

reserve may be released before the engagement of major 

enemy units I before the penetration of the forward defense 

echelon, after the forward defense 

echelon I 

the penetration of 

or after the corps has committed all or part of 

its reserve. 

Combat Service Support 

1924 

During the conduct of battle, the FA cdr manages the 

rear area, creates svcs as necessary, and arranges for the 

opn of his svcs * svc agencies maintain depots and 

establish services to include light railways, workshops, 

storehouses, and hospitals . FA practice 

flow of ammo as far forward as possible. 

is to assists the 

1930 

The FA cdr has logistical responsibilities and 

exercises direct control over support trps or allots them 

A- 32 
to corps and divisions as needed. Vol. 1, Operation FM 

100-15 does not address CSS functions to any degree. css 

was covered in a separate volume. 

1942 

The FA has admin responsibiiities to the elements of 

the army. Also it must 

planning 

perform long-range logistical 

detailed estimates of support and evacuation 

routes, traffic control, and transportation activities. 

1950 

The FA cdr is responsible for the orgn and opn of an 

effective administration and highly flexible logistical 

system. The FA must do deta-kled personnel, 

evacuation Sq@Y I routes, and tank estimates to support the 

overall army plan. The FA has territorial 

responsibilities. 

1963 

The.FA will exercise its log support functions through 

the establishment of FA support commands (FASCOM). The 

FASCOM is for its 

mutual 

responsible 

assistance with 

own local security and 

adjacent units. COMMZ 

transportation Will deliver 75 percent of support requirements to the support bdes with a 25 percent bypass 

to the DISCO&f (when feasible) 

1968 

The theater army or other appropriate HQ allocates CSS 

means to army gps or FAs. FA further allocates or employs 

assets to support the corps and divisians. FA stf plans 

include the allocation of CSS assets to support the 

tactical mission. The FA support command (FASCOM) is 

responsible to the FA cdr for providing CSS to the FA to 

include planning for long-range and immediate opns and day 

to day coordination with units of the TASCOM in the 

COMMZ . FA HQ employs management by exception techniques, 

while monitoring FASCOM opns. A typical FASCOM can 

support three corps of four divisions each. Tailoring is 

required to support larger. forces. Civil affairs 

authority is normally delegated to the FASCOM cdr. Rear 

area protection is also the responsibility of the FASCOM 

Cdr. Other FA (FASCOM) responsibilities incl"ude POW 

facilities and medical opns. 

A=-33 
1973 

CSS, assets are allocated from the theater army or 

other appropriate HQ. 

based on plans 

The FA allocates or employs assets 

and recommendations to support the co'rps 

and divisions. The FA is organized with an FA support 

command (FASCOM) that develops detail.ed plans, policies, and directives for CSS. The FASCOM performs the stf 

functions of pOliCy development, planning guidance, 

priorities, and allocations. It also develops army-wide 

estimates and analyses of the overail requirements of the 

FA. FASCOMs are tailored based on the size of the FA and 

opns primarily through an MMC and an MCC. 

Bde provides 

The Army Spt 

DS and GS to all army units and other svc 

units located or passing through the FA svc area. The 

Corps SPt Bde provides GS 

transportation, personnel svcs, 

support maintenance, 

and financial support to 

divisions and separate bdes and DS and GS to nondivisional 

units within the corps area. Other FASCOM elements are 

the medical and transportation bdes, MP bde (when 

assigned) and a civiL affairs bde. 

A-34 

$9-00444-1000-2 Dee 88