IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2017-CA-01641-COA IN RE ESTATE OF HARRY J. GREEN, DECEASED: ELIDE CRISTINA GARRIDO GREEN APPELLANT

v. SHIRLEY COOLEY AND WILFORD GREEN APPELLEES
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/11/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. C. MICHAEL MALSKI COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: LEE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: MARK NOLAN HALBERT CYNTHIA TRANELL LEE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES: CHRISTOPHER G. EVANS NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - W ILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/10/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND C. WILSON, JJ. LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Cristina Green appeals t he decision of the Lee County Chancery Court to award eight
of h er late husband’s properties to his sister, Shirley Cooley

. The chancery c ourt f ound that Harry delivered the Decem ber 31, 2003 deeds to Shirley , and that Harry intended that Shirley own the properties in question. W e af f irm

. FACTS ¶2. During h is lif

e t i me , H a r r y G r e e n a ma s s e d a l a r g e e state consisting of various properties. O n Decem

b er 31, 2003, Green had his attorney draf t eight deeds t hat c onvey ed
the f ollowing properties to his sister Shirley :1. 1201 Nixon Drive, Tupelo, MS

2. The “Main Street W arehouse,” Shannon, MS
3. The Monroe County Land, Nettleton, MS
4. The “Shannon Lot”
5. Tem

ple Circle, Shannon, MS
6. The “W hite Lane Property ,” Nettleton, MS
7. The “Two Houses and Green Valley Lab,” Shannon, MS
8. The Sum m it 1 Shirley was not present w hen these deeds were signed. In f act, both partie s a gree that she

was at her hom e in Texas a t that tim e. Further, there is n o i ndication i n the record that she

ever knew the t ransaction o ccurred in Decem ber 2003. A f

ter the deeds were properly acknowledged bef

ore a notary public, Harry took the deeds with him f o r saf e keeping. Harry
did n o t d e l i v er t he deeds t o Shirley at that t im e, nor d id he f ile them in the county clerk’s
of f ice. 2

1 T h e S u m m i t p r o p erty is n o t co n sid ered in th is a p p eal. A t trial, S h irley testif ied t h at sh e sig n ed a d eed th at tran sf erred th e S u m m it p ro p erty b ack to H arry tw i ce. S h e f irst sig n ed o n Jan u a ry 1 5 , 2 0 0 4

. Y ears lat e r , i n 2 0 0 9 , h o w ev er, H arry c am e b a ck to S h irley an d to ld h er sh e n eed ed to re-co n v ey th e p ro p erty b ecau s e h e w a n t e d to g et a “h o m estead ex em p tio n ,” an d b u ild a h o m e f o r h im an d C ristin a
. B ecau s e th e S u m m it p ro p erty w as in H a rry ’s n am e at th e t im e o f h i s d e ath , it p assed to C ristin a an d w as n o t at i ssu e at th e trial lev el. T h e ch an cello r, h o w e v er, to o k th is as a sig n o f H arry ’ s in t en t. M a i n ly , th a t if H arry w a n t ed t h e o th er p ro p erties i n h i s n am e, h e w o u ld h av e ask e d S h irley t o sig n th e d eed s an d reco rd th em

lik e h e d id w i th th e S u m m it p ro p erty

.
2 T h e D ecem

b er 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 d eed s sig n ed b y H arry to S h irley w ere later f iled i n th e L ee C o u n ty C h an cery C lerk ’s o f f ice o n D ecemb e r 4 , 2 0 0 4 an d w ere d eliv ered to S h irley b y

2¶3. Later, on January 1 5, 2004, Shirley was visiting Harry and t heir m other in Mississippi.

Harry asked Shirley to c om e with him to his attorney ’s of f i ce i n Houston, Mississippi to sign

som e papers. Shirley t estif ied that she signed “ e very thing that wa s p u t in f

ront of [ her].”
The record indicates t hat Shirley signed the f ollowing warranty deeds on January 15, 2004: (1) 1201 Nixon Drive; (2) the Main Street W a r ehouse; (3) the Monroe C ounty Land; (4) the
Shannon Lo t ; ( 5 ) Tem

p le Circle; and (6) the Beauty Shop and House in Monroe County

. Shirley told the chancellor that Harry did not t ell her any

thing about why h e wanted her to sign the deeds, but that she just trusted Harry

. The warranty deeds signed on January 15 were

never properly acknowledged or f i led. Harry took the deeds with him when he lef t, and those
deeds were never f

o und. 3 ¶4. H a r r y me t Cristina in 2003. O n January 31, 2004, Harry m arried Cristin a i n L a s Vegas, Nevada. Cristina testif ied at trial that Harry “never told [ her]” that S hirley owned any of his properties, includ i n g t h e h om e on Nixon D rive that t he newly w eds were living in. Likewise, Cristina t estif

ied that her husband kept his business af f airs secret. However, Lisa Diallo, a deputy clerk f

or Lee C ounty , testif

ied that Harry told h e r his properties were in Shirley ’s n am e because he trusted her and his “wif e [ was] f rom across the water,” and he did

not want her to take the property

. The chancellor specif ically cited this f

act in h is opinion. ¶5. On Novem

ber 26, 2004, Harry convey ed by q u i t c l a i m d e e d the ninth property , the

H a rry th at sam e m o n t h

.
3 C o p ies o f th e sig n ed , n o n -ack n o w led g ed , u n f iled d eed s w ere later f

o u n d in th e atto rn ey ’s o f

f ice, b u t th e o rig in al d eed s H arry

to o k w i th h im

w e r e n ev er f

o u n d

. 3Plantersville property , to Shirley

. Like the deeds signed on D ecem ber 31, 2 003, Shirley was
not p resent and the deed w as p r o p e r l y acknowledged. A f ew day s later, on Decem

ber 3, 2004, Harry traveled to Texas a nd delivered all of the Decem ber 31, 2003 wa r ranty deeds
and t he Novem

b er 26, 200 4 q u i t c l a i m deed t o Shirley

. Shirley testif i ed t hat she “put the
deeds away ,” and that Harry told h er that in the case som ething h appened to him , she would
“know what to do.” T he Decem ber 31, 2003 d e e d s w e r e r ecorded on Decem ber 4, 2004, except f or the Monroe County properties (W hite L ane a nd t he M onroe County l and). Shirley

a ctually f iled the W hite Lane p roperty and the Monroe County land warranty deeds af te r Harry ’s death in 2010. ¶6. Harry c ontinued to pay taxes on the pr o perties, do routine m aintenance, and collect

rent. W hen H arry went to borrow m oney against the P lantersville property i n 2010, however,
he asked Shirley to sign th e p a p e r s r e q u i r ed to do so. Shirley testif ied that Harry had also
borrowe d a g a inst the hom e at 1201 Nixon Drive twice bef o re. These transactions also required h er signature f

or approval. The chancellor’s opinion used these f acts to support his
f actual determ ination t hat Harry intended to transf er the properties to his sister instead of to his new spouse. ¶7. Harry Green died on July 6, 2010. In 2 007, Harry updated h is will to devise all of his property to his wif

e Cristina and his grandchildren. The property listed in t he will included
the properties Harry deeded t o Shirley on Decem ber 31, 2003. Because Shirley t ook control
of the properties af

ter Harry ’s death, Cristina f iled a com plaint f or an a ccounting of the estate

4and a declaratory judgm ent as to the owner of the property at issue. Cristina argued that the

deeds signed on January 1 5 , 2 004, were properly accepted by Harry , and the properties were
to pass a s dictated b y

Harry ’s will. The estate was never able to f i nd the unacknowledged original deeds s igned o n January 15, 2004, a nd those deeds were never f i l e d i n t he land
records or the clerk’s of

f i ce. Copies of the deeds s i gned t hat day were retrieved f rom Harry ’s attorney , but there is no record of Shirley ever signing a deed to convey the “Two Houses and Green Valley

Lab” back to Harry

. ¶8. The chancellor f

ound that, af

ter reviewing all of Harry ’s act i o n s , h e i n t e n ded f or Shirley to possess the properties. As a result, the court f o u n d t hat Shirley was the rightf ul

owner of t he eight properties in d ispute. 4 Cristina tim ely appealed the chancellor’s decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶9. Our review of the chancellor’s decision is lim ited. The f indings of a chancery

court will n o t be disturbed “unless the [ court] abused its discretion, applied an e rroneous legal standard, or its f

indings are m anif

estl y w r o n g or clearly erroneous.” Matter of Estate of
Smith v. Boolos , 204 So. 3d 291, 305 (¶22) ( Miss. 2016) (citing In re Estate of Baumgardner ,

4 In th e ch an cello r’s o r ig in a l m em o ran d u m o p in i o n an d j u d g m en t f iled o n N o v em

b er 7 , 2 0 1 7 , h e f

o u n d th at S h irley w as th e rig h tf u l o w n er o f s i x p r o p e rties c o n v ey ed o n D e cem b er 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 (1 2 0 1 N ix o n A v en u e, th e Wh ite L an e p ro p e r ty in M o n ro e C o u n ty , th e M ain S treet Wareh o u se in S h an n o n , t h e M o n ro e C o u n t y l an d , T e m p le C i rcle, an d th e S h an n o n L o t). L ater, o n F eb ru ary 2 1 , 2 0 1 8 , t h e ch a n c e l l o r en tered a o r d er clarif y in g h is m em o ran d u m o p in io n an d j u d g m en t. In h is clarif y in g o rd er, th e ch an cello r f o u n d th at th e G r een V a lley L ab p ro p erty b elo n g ed to S h irley

. A d d itio n ally , h e f o u n d th at S h i rley o w n ed th e h o u s e an d 9 .5 acres i n P lan tersv ille. A t th e tim e o f t h i s ap p e al, S h irley w as a d j u d g ed to b e th e rig h tf

u l o w n er o f

all eig h t p ro p erties.

582 So. 3 d 592, 598 ( ¶15) (Miss. 2012)). Questions of law, and i ssues of constructive trusts,

we review de novo. Id

. ANALYSIS ¶10. Cristina argues t h r e e i s s u e s o n a p p e a l

. B e c a use h er f irst two issues deal with acceptance and delivery of the d eeds s igned o n January 15, 2004, we consider them as one issue

. F i r s t , C r istina claim s that the chancellor erred in a warding all eight properties to Shirley because Harry had properly accepted the deeds signed on January 15, 2004. Second,
she a rgues a constructive trust was created when Shirley took possession of the properties, and the properties should have been distributed as dictated in Harry ’ s will. ¶11. The laws of this State concerning the validity of deeds a n d the transf er of real property

are well settled. For t here to be a valid convey a nce of real property , there m ust be delivery
and acceptance of a val i d d e e d. I n re Estate of Hardy , 910 So. 2d 1052, 1054 (¶7) (Miss. 2005)

. D e l i v ery constitutes a “transf er of [ a deed] f

rom the grantor to the grantee or his agent or t o som e third person f or t he grantee’s u se, in such m anner as to deprive the grantor of t he right to recall i t at his option, and with intent to convey title.” Id

. at ( ¶ 8 ) ( c i t i n g 23
Am

. Jur. 2d Deeds §120, at 156 (1983) )

. Bef ore d elivery is com

plete, a deed is “without
f orce o r ef f ect and is m erely a ‘scroll under control of the g r a n t o r who is f ree t o withdraw it, destroy it, or com

plete its execution by delivery .’” Morrow v. Morrow , 219 So. 3d 142,
146 (¶13) (Miss. 2013). The Mississippi Sup r e m e Court has f ound t hat a deed that was signed and acknowledged, but never delivered, was void f or lack of delivery

. Id

. at 1055 (¶8)

6(citing Grubbs v. Everett , 236 Miss. 698, 701, 111 So. 2d 923, 924 (1959)).

¶12. Cristina claim s that the chan c e l l o r e rred in awarding a ll eight properties t o Shirley
because Harry had properly a ccepted the deeds signed on January 15, 2 004. She argues that Harry ’s a c t i o n s leading up to the convey ance on January 15, 2004 showed his intent was alway s f or the properties to return to him

. Harry had the deeds that c o nvey ed the properties
f rom him to Shirley (signed on Decem ber 31, 2 003) and the deeds that transf erred them back (signed o n January 1 5, 2004) created at the sam e tim e. Additionally , the short p eriod of t im e between the convey ances, Cristina argues, m akes it clear that Shirley was not the intended

owner. The chancellor d isagreed, and f ound that Harry ’s actions i ndicated he wanted Shirley

t o o w n t h e properties at issue. For t wo equally com p elling r easons, we f

ind tha t t h e chancellor’s judgm ent should be af f irm ed and t hat Shirley is the rightf ul o wner o f t h e properties. 5 ¶13. First, the chancellor f actually f ound, af ter considering the e vidence presented at trial,
that Harry intended the p roperties in question to be t ransf erred to Shirley

. W e are bound to af f irm that f actual f i nding unless it was m a n if estly i n error or clearly e r

roneous. Here, am

ple
evidence supports the chancellor’s f inding. The chancellor’s d ecision w as based on “Harry ’s words, acts[ ,] and the circum stances surrounding the transaction.” F rom t hat, the chancellor

5 T h e d issen t asserts th a t t h e m aj o rity “p r im arily relies” o n th e “ n e w ” th eo ry t h at H a rry co u ld n o t accep t th e Jan u ary 2 0 0 4 d e e d s b ecau s e S h irley co u l d n o t

d e v i se w h at sh e d id n o t o w n u n til D ecem b er 2 0 0 4

. T h at stat e me n t i s c o n trary to t h e l an g u ag e in th is sen ten ce, w h ere th e m aj o rity c learly in d icates “tw o eq u ally co m p ellin g reaso n s ” to af

f irm th e ch a n c e llo r
. 7determ ined Harry “did not intend to, and th u s d i d not accept, t he convey ance” of the

properties. W e agree. Cristina testif ied at trial that her husband was renting their hom e at 1201 Nixon Drive: Q. -- y ’all were renting the Nixon hom e A. Yeah [ . . . .]
Thi s w a s d uring the tim e that Shirley was the o wner of record f o r the 1201 Nixon Drive property

. Further, testim o ny proved that Shirley signed f o r deeds of t rust a s the o wner of the properties, and S hirley re-signed the deed to the Sum m i t property af t e r s he had signed it previously

on January

15. In addition to all o f this, the chancellor heard testim ony that the
deeds Harry ultim ately delivered to Shirley were the warranty deeds he signed on Decem ber 31, 2003. The January 15, 2004 deeds were not f i led and were, i n f

act, never f

ound. All of
these f acts, coupled with the a dditiona l testim ony a nd evidence at trial, support the
chancellor’s f

actual f indings and conclusion of law and do not rise to the level of m anif est error or clearly

erroneous. W e theref

ore af f irm the chancellor’s decision in this case. ¶14. Further, equally com pelling is the argum ent by S hirley that she did not have the ability

to t ransf er title o n January 15, 2004, since she did not legally own the properties until Harry
delivered the Decem

ber 31, 2003 warranty deeds t o h er in Decem b er 2004. 6 This Court f

inds

6 T h e d issen t c o m

p lain s th at th is arg u m en t w as f irst m ad e d u rin g o ral arg u m en t. T h e d issen t arg u es th at th is “n e w th eo ry ” sh o u ld n o t b e ru led u p o n b y th is C o u rt. T h is is n o t a “n ew th eo ry ” o r a n ew assig n m en t o f erro r b u t i s a q u estio n o f law

. I t is n ew lo g ic ap p l ied to th e sam e f

acts in v o lv in g th e law at i ssu e in th i s litig atio n sin ce th e b eg in n in g

— w h o o w n s th e p ro p erties, H arry ’ s i n ten t , a n d th e d eliv e ry an d accep t an ce o f th e d e ed s in q u e stio n
. T h is 8that Shirley was unable t o legally perf ect the January 1 5, 2 004 convey ance because she did

not have title on t hat date. W hen Harry s igned the original Decem ber 3 1, 2 003 deeds, his
convey ance to Shirley was n o t com plete until he delivered those deeds on Decem ber 3, 2004. ¶15. Convey ances of real property require both delivery and acceptance o f a valid deed f or that c onvey ance to have legal e f f ect. I n r e E s t a t e o f H ardy , 910 So. 2d 1052, 1054 (¶7) (Miss. 2 005). Delivery c onstitutes a “transf er of [ a d eed] f

rom the grantor to the grantee or his agent or to som e third person f or the grantee’s use, i n such m anner as to de p r i v e t he grantor of the right to recall i t a t his option, and with intent to convey title.” Id

. at (¶8) (citing
23 A m
. J u r
. 2d Deeds § 120, at 156 (1983)). Pursuant to this law, Shirley ’s deeds dated January 15, 2004 to Harry w ere never valid. She h ad n o o wnership interest to transf er on that date, because Harry

had not y et delivered the Decem b er 31, 2003 d eeds to her w hich gave her an ownership interest. W hile the chancellor d id not specif ically f i nd this, this Court has
the authority , a nd indeed the m andate, to d ecide c ases based on the law and not just what was presented to us by

the attorney s. ¶16. The suprem e court a nd t his Court have held num erous tim es that appellate courts m ay “af f i rm a c hancellor’s decision that reached the right result but f or t he w rong reason.” Timms

v. Pearson , 876 S o. 2d 1 0 83, 1 086 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). See also Cummings v. Goolsby , 255 So. 3 d 1257, 1258 (¶8) (Miss. 2018). Theref ore, f ollowing that precedent and

w a s m erely an altern ativ e a r g u me n t p u t f o rth d u rin g o ral arg u m en t o n a q u estio n o f law cen tral to th e issu es in th is litig a tio n
. 9logic, w e af f irm the decision of the chancellor based on new logic applied to the f acts of this

c a s e
. The chancellor’s f

indings of f

act a s to Harry ’s i ntent are supported by the evid e n c e
. The law requiring delivery and a cceptance b ef ore a convey a nce is legally ef f e c tive supports the chancellor’s conclusions. ¶17. The d issent applies the d octrine o f a f t e r a cquired t itle in an ef f ort to preclude the
argum ent m ade by Shirley ’s counsel o n appeal. The dissent would f ind t hat t he chancellor

was m anif

estly wrong when he f

ound that S hirley owned the p roperties. The dissent argues that the January 15, 2004 transf er f rom Shirley to Harry becam e valid once Harry delivered
the Decem

ber 31, 2 0 03 deeds to S hirley on Decem ber 3 , 2004 as a result of the af ter acquired
title doctrine. The doctrine of af t er acquired title provides:
W h ere a grantor who has no title, whose title is def e c t i ve, or whose e s tate is less than that w hich he assum es t o pass, convey s by warranty or covenants of like im port and subsequently acquires the title or estate which he purports to convey , or perf

ects his t itle, such af

ter-acquired or perf

ected title will inure to the grantee, or to his benef it, by way of estoppel.
Turner v. Miller , 276 So. 2d 690, 693 (Miss. 1973). T h e dissent claim s that this doctrine f its
“this case perf

ectly ” and, m a kes the chancellor’s judgm ent c learly e rroneous. W e disagree. ¶18. The doctrine of af

ter acquired title d erives f rom the p rinciples o f equitable estoppel.
Crooker v. Hollingsworth , 2 10 Miss. 636, 642, 46 So. 2d 541, 544 ( 1 9 5 0 )

. T h e doctrine prevents harm to the grantee w ho, in theory , paid consideration f or property they thought they

were buy i ng f

rom a grantor. If i t turns out that the owner did, in f act, not own the property
at the tim e of the sale, b ut later acquires that property , the t itle is then vested to the grantee.

1 0The courts, however, “will not give ef f e ct t o estoppel w h e r e the parties are equally well
inf orm ed as to t he essential f acts, or where the m eans of k nowl e d g e w e r e e q u ally open to them .” Id

. (citing 19 Am

. Jur., p. 742). Additionally , “ a party w h o i n v o k es [ the doctrine]

m ust have lost som e thing or [ been] placed at som e disadvantage by t he conduct of the other party .” Id

. Cristina would have to show that som ehow Harry lost som e thing or was placed at disadvantage and that she should theref ore own the properties by invoking the equitable estoppel doctrine on his behalf

. I t is hard t o im agine how H arry was taken advantage of , or

was not aware of every

thing going on in these transactions, when he orchestrated and caused
every m ove. ¶19. As with m any aspects of t he law, the equitable estoppel of af ter a c quired title doctrine
has several exceptions, som e of which directly

control in this case. Three such e xceptions
are as f ollows: (1) W hen a quitclaim d eed convey s o n l y the grantor’s present interest, it does not convey

any af ter acquired title; 7 (2) W hen a grantee knew of the d ef iciencies in the grantor’s title, n o af ter acquired title is convey ed; 8 (3) The d octrine will n ot be applied where the p arties a r e e qually w ell inf orm e d as to essential f

a cts, or the m eans of knowledge w ere equally open to them

. 9

7 M cL a u rin v. R o

ya lties In c., 2 3 1 M i ss. 2 4 0 , 9 5 S o . 2 d 1 0 5 (1 9 5 7 ).

8 C ro o ker v. H

o llin g sw o rth , 2 1 0 M iss. 6 3 6 , 4 6 S o . 2 d 5 4 1 (1 9 5 0 )

.
9 B u ch a n a n v. S tin so n , 3 3 5 S o
. 2 d 9 1 2 , 9 1 4 (M iss. 1 9 7 6 ). 1 1All three of these exceptions apply

in this case. ¶20. First, the transf

e r o f t h e P l a n t e r s v ille property was by q uitclaim d eed and not a warranty deed. S econd, Harry was certainly aware that Shirley ’s title w hich was the subject
of the January 15, 2004 deeds was def icient. Harry never delivered the original Decem ber 31, 2003 d eeds to Shirley as required by law. He caused the d ef i ciency

. Theref

ore, if Harry
knew of t hat def

iciency since h e n ever delivered t he deeds t o Shirley , then he cannot claim , through Cristina, the af

ter a cquired title doctrine. Finally , as to the “equally well i nf orm ed” exception, the record indicates that Harry was intricately involved in every aspect of the
transf e r s a n d orchestrated each and every step. H e originally had his attorney m ake the
Decem ber 31, 2003 deeds, he s igned those deeds and had them dully notarized, a nd then took
the deeds with him

. Still in posses s i on of those deeds, he had Shirley s ign a com pletely
identical set of deeds convey ing the Decem ber 31 properties back to him

. Those deeds were
not n otarized, a n d he took t hose deeds with him a s well. F urther, Harry was the original grantor i n the Decem

ber 31, 2003 deeds and the grantee of t he January 15, 2 004 deeds and held in his possession both sets of deeds. Cristina, party

to neither set of deeds, was never

a grantor or grantee and s hould not be allowed to c laim an e quitable estoppel doctrine in an
attem pt to claim t itle to p r op e r t ies that she bought f r om no one. The c h ancellor f actually
f ound Harry

had intended to transf

er to Shirley

. ¶21. T h e e q uitable estoppel doctrine was not designed f or such purposes b ut r a t h e r t o transf er ownership when a grantor (in January 2004—that would be Shirley ) p urports to sell

1 2a n i n terest to an uninf o rm ed grantee (Harry ) and later o btains title that i s n ot owned at the
tim e o f t he sale but later is obtained. Harry was acting as both g rantor and grantee over the

c o u r s e of these transactions and h ad f ull knowledge o f the actual ownership interest o f a l l parties, including the def

iciencies in Shirley ’s t itle, and he actually authorized and f acilitated
both transactions. There is s im ply no way he was not e q ual l y w e l l i nf

orm ed. To the contrary , his actions, as f

ound by the chancellor, showed h e was very well i nf orm ed. Harry

never f iled the January 15, 2004 deeds that Cristina at t e m p t s t o u se as a basis f

or her

o w n e r s h i p. He f

iled the deeds convey ing t he l and i n question to Shirley

. Further, h e d e l i v e r ed the original Decem ber 31, 2003 deeds (nine m onths af ter holding b oth sets o f deeds), which the chancellor f ound not o nly com

pleted h is convey ance to Shirley , on Decem ber 3, 2004, but also was indicative of his intent in t hese transactions. T he dissent’s
argum ent of af

ter acquired title was never raised b y the parties and sim p ly does not apply to the f acts of this case and the clearly

set f orth exceptions under Mississippi law. ¶22. As to Cristina’s second issue, we decline to consider w hether the trial court erred in

not im posing a constructive t rust. A constructive t rust i s “a judicially im posed rem edy used

to prevent unjust enrichm ent when one party w rongf ully retains t itle to property .” Presbytery of S t. Andrew v. First Presbyterian Church PCUSA o f Starkville , 2 40 So. 3 d 399, 405 (¶27) (Miss. 2018). Because we f ind that the c hancellor was not in error i n f i nding Shirley was the rightf ul owner of the properties in question, C ristina’s argum ent as t o a constructive trust is

m oot. For these reasons, we af f irm the decision of the chancellor.

1 3¶23. AFFIRMED.

B A R N E S , C.J., CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, M c D O N A L D , McCARTY AND C. W I L S O N , JJ., CONCUR. J. WILSON, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY TINDELL, J. J. WILSON, P.J., DISSENTING: ¶24. This d i s s e n t p r i ma rily addresses six of the eight properties t hat are at issue in this appeal. 10 There i s no dispute t hat Shirley signed warranty d e e d s r econvey i ng those six properties to Harry

. T here is also no dispute that S hirley signed those deeds a t Harry ’s lawy er’s of

f ice at Harry ’s specif

i c r e q u e s t

. And there is no d ispute that Harry took possession of

the deeds, continued to pay insurance and t axes on the properties f or the rest

o f his lif e, and continued t o m ake im provem e n ts and repairs and collect rents o n t h e properties. The chancellor nonetheless f ound that Harry d id not “accept” the d eeds to these properties. I respectf

ully disagree with the chancellor’s conclusion. I would reverse and render judgm e nt in f

avor of Cristina as to these six properties.
I. The January 15, 2004 Warranty Deeds ¶25. W i th respect to six of the p roperties at issue in this appeal, there is no dispute (a) that Harry signed deeds convey ing the properties to Shirley on Decem ber 3 1, 2 003, and (b) that Shirley then signed warranty deeds reconvey ing the properties to Harry on January 15, 2004.

10 T h e o th er tw o p ro p e rties— (1 ) th e “T w o H ous e s an d G reen V alley L ab ” in S h an n o n an d (2 ) a h o u se an d n in e a n d a h alf acres in P l an t ersv ille— raise d if f e ren t issu es b ecau se th ere is n o ev id en ce th at S h irley sig n e d d eed s reco n v ey i n g th em to H arry
. I ad d ress th o se tw o p ro p erties in P a rt II. 1 4These include f our properties in Lee County and two in Monroe County : 1. 1201 Nixon Drive in the Lee Acres s u bdivision in Tupelo (Lee County ) (Exhibits 1-A and 1-B);
2. the “ Main Street W arehouse” in Shannon (Lee County ) (Exhibits 2-A and 2-B);
3. the “Shannon Lot” in Shannon (Lee County ) (Exhibits 4-A and 4-B);
4. “Tem

ple Circle” in Shannon (Lee County ) (Exhibits 5-A and 5-B);
5. “Monroe Coun t y Land” in or a round Nettleton (Monroe County ) (Exhibits 3-A and 3-B); and
6. a beauty shop, house, and a c r e age at 30023 W hite Lane in Nettleton (Monroe County ) (Exhibits 6-A and 6-B). Shirley signed the six deeds reconvey ing the properties t o Harry at Harry ’s specif ic request at the of f ice of Harry ’s lawy er, John Fox. ¶26. The Decem

ber 3 1, 2003 d eeds f

or the f our L ee C o unty properties were not recorded
until D e c e mber 4, 2 004. The D ecem ber 31, 2003 deeds f

or the two Monroe County properties were not recorded until af ter H arry ’ s death. On J uly 29, 2010, a bout t hree weeks
af ter Harry died, Shirley recorded those two deeds in Monroe County

. The January 15, 2004 deeds reconvey ing the six properties f rom Shirley to Harry were never recorded. ¶27. Although the deeds r econvey ing the prop e r t i e s f r om Shirley to Harry w ere neither acknowledged nor recorded, that does n ot af f ect their validity as between Shirley and Harry or their heirs. Miss. Code Ann. § 89-5-3 (Supp. 2018) (providing that a deed “shall . . . be
valid and binding” “ as between the parties and their heirs” even if it is n ot acknowledged or

1 5recorded); Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co. of Miss. v. Bennett , 611 So. 2d 973, 976 (Miss. 1992);

Cotton v. McConnell , 435 So. 2d 683, 687 ( Miss. 1983); Metro. N at’l Bank v. United States , 901 F.2d 1297, 1302 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990). The c hancellor recognized this point in his order deny ing sum m ary judgm ent, and Shirley does not dispute i t o n a p peal. The chancellor correctly s tated that the “one central question rem aining in this cause” is “ w h e t h e r H a rry accepted the six deeds on January 15, 2004.” ¶28. “[ A ] c c e p t a n c e b y t h e grantee [ is] e ssential t o the v alidity of a deed.” Odom v.
F o r b e s , 5 0 0 So. 2d 9 97, 1001 (Miss. 1987). T he grantee’s intent to accept the deed i s “m anif ested by h is w ords, acts and the circum stances surrounding the transaction.” Id. The
chancellor in this case noted that Mississippi case law addressing the grantee’s intent to accept a deed is “sparse.” ¶29. In Martin v. Adams , 216 Miss. 270, 6 2 S o
. 2 d 3 2 8 ( 1953), the C ourt held that the grantee, Mrs. Adam s, did not accept a deed f rom the grantor, her husband. W hen M r. Adam s tol d h is wif

e that he had executed a deed convey ing certain land to her, she “im m ediately declined to accept the deed, and rem onstrated with him f or what h e had done.” Id. at 277,
62 So. 2 d at 329. She “took the deed to an attorney f or his interpretation o f it,” but the deed

was then “returned to [ Mr. A dam s] and rem ained in his c ontr o l

. ” I d. at 277-78, 62 So. 2d

at 329. The Court held that the deed was void due to Mrs. Adam s’s express r ef usal to accept it. I d. ¶30. The Court also held that deeds were n ot accepted in In re Estate of Hardy , 910 So. 2d

1 61052, 1054-55 (¶¶7-10) (Miss. 2 0 05). In that case, H ardy executed deeds convey ing property

t o h e r t h r e e daughters, but she died bef ore she delivered t he deeds. Id. at 1055 (¶9). T h e deeds were f

ound in her purse a f

t e r her death, and “each o f [ her daughters] testif ied unequivocally

that she never accepted the deed.” Id. Thus, the problem in H ardy was not just that the deeds were not “accepted” but that they were not even delivered. Id. at (¶10). ¶31. In S

almon v. Thompson , 3 91 S o. 2d 984 (Miss. 1980), t he Court held that a deed was not accepted because the of f eree f ailed to pay

the purchase price f

or the property . Salm on orally agreed to buy 55 acres f rom Thom

pson f or a specif

ied price. I

d. at 985. S ix m onths later, Thom

pson wrote to Salm o n. Id. He enclosed an e xecuted deed and instructed Salm on
to return a copy of the d eed with a check f or the purchase price if he still wanted to buy the
p r o p erty

. Id. For m ore than two y ears thereaf ter, Salm on d id not pay f or the prop e r t y o r record the deed, and Thom p son f inally i n f o r me d S a l mon that he was selling the land to another party

. Id. at 9 85-86. Salm on then a ttem p ted t o record t he d eed a nd p ay f or the property

. Id. However, the C ourt held that Thom pson h ad withdrawn the of f er to sell bef

ore Salm on accepted the deed. Id. at 987. The Court held that Thom pson’s initial “letter with
instructions

. . . constituted a qualif ied delivery o f t he deed,” but Salm on f ailed to accept the
deed when he f

ailed to com

ply with those instructions f

or m ore than two y e ars. Id. ¶32. In each o f the f

o regoing cases, t he evidence that the grantee did not accept the deed

was clear. There is no s im ilarly clear evidence of non-acceptance in this case. In f act, there
is am pl e e v i dence that Harry did accept the deeds. There is no dispute that Harry asked

1 7Shirley to go to the F ox law of f ice and sign the deeds re c o n v e y ing the properties to him

. There is also no dispute that Harry took possession of the deeds a nd lef t t he Fox law of

f ice
with them

. Harry then continued t o pay the t axes and insurance on the properties, continued

to m ake repairs and im

provem ents o n the propert i e s , a n d continued t o collect r ent on the properties. In addition, m o re t han three y ears later, Harry had a new will prepared in which he specif ically devised at least som e of

the properties at issue. He specif ically devised the
“W hite L ane” property in Nettleton to his g randchildren, and he devised “[ t]he G r e e n r e al

estate apartm e nts and h ouses” to Cristina. 1 1 In a residual c lause, Harry devised all of his

rem aining real property to Cristina. Harry a lso borrowed m oney against the N ixon Drive property and used the f

unds to build a new m ari t a l h o m e on a nother of his properties. In short, with respect to these six properties, Harry e x ercised the ordinary rights and f ulf illed
the ordinary obligations of property ownership. A s the chancellor put it, “Harry ’ s d ay -to-day behavior with regard to the property was consistent with ownership.” ¶33. The evidence that Shirley cites does not dem onstrate a lack of acc e p t a n c e
. S hirley

em phasizes that Harry never had the deeds n otarized and f iled. However, as discussed above, that does not render t he deeds invalid as between the p arties or their heirs. 12 Shirley

11 T h e p recise n atu re o f all six o f th e p ro p erties i s n o t c l ear f ro m t h e reco rd ; h o w e v er, a t l e a st so m e o f t h e m a re ren tal p ro p erties th at a p p ear to f

all w ith in th is d e v ise. S h i r l e y ack n o w led g ed at trial th at sh e ch an g ed th e lo ck s o n th e p ro p erties an d b eg an co llectin g ren t o n th e p ro p erties af

ter H arry ’s d eath

.
12 M o re o v e r, as n o ted ab o v e, w ith resp ect to th e tw o M o n ro e C o u n ty p r o p erties, n eith er th e D ecem

b er 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 d e ed s f

ro m H arry t o S h irley n o r th e J an u ary 1 5 , 2 0 0 4 d eed s f ro m S h irley to H a rry w ere reco rd ed p rio r to H arry ’ s d eath

. It w as o n ly af ter H arry d ied t h at 1 8also notes that Harry a sked her to s ign deeds of trust f or the Nixon Drive property

. However,
it is h ardly surprising that the bank wanted S hirley —the record o w n e r o f the property —to sign the deed of trust. Shirley next points out that Harry f requently reviewed the properties
under her nam e at the Lee County chancery clerk’s o f f ice. H owever, that sim

ply shows that Harry knew that the Lee C ounty land records showed that Shirley was the owner o f record, which is not in dispute. ¶34. Shirley also relies o n Cristina’s i n a b i l ity to produce t he original signed deeds that Harry took with him f

rom the Fox law of

f ice. Shirley speculates that Harry m ay have lost or destroy ed the originals. However, even if that is what happened, the subsequent loss or
destruction of the originals would not render Harry ’s acceptance o f the deeds i nvalid. See
W ood v. Johnson , 234 Miss. 874, 880, 108 So. 2d 202, 204 (1959) (“The rule has generally
been a dhered to in t his jurisdiction that where a deed has once been signed a nd delivered, a subsequent surrender and d estruction of it does not d ivest the g rantee of t itle to the land.”); Lisloff v
. H

art , 25 M iss. 245, 250 (1852) (“The deed m a d e t o t he son by Hanah vested the
title to the land in h im , a nd the subsequent destru c t i o n of it did not divest it. The second deed, m a de by Hanah to Charles Lislof f , Sen., is inoperative, and cannot def eat the right of
the son t o the prem ises.”). The relevant issue is whether Harry accepted the deeds when they

were executed and delivered to him in January 2 004—not what h e m ay have done with t hem

S h irley reco rd ed h er d eed s. It is u n clear w h y S h irley ’s u n ilateral actio n af ter H a rry ’s d eath sh o u ld m a k e th o se d eed s m o re v alid th an th e d e ed s th at S h irley sig n ed to reco n v ey th e sam e p ro p erties to H arry
. 1 9som etim e later.

¶35. Shirley also cites vague testim ony of h e r b r o t h e r , Wi lf ord Green, that Harry

and
Cristina w r o t e a n u mber of “rent” checks to L arry W illiam s f or “around $500” while the couple resided on Nixon Drive. W ilf ord said t hat W illiam s was a “f r iend” of theirs. Shirley suggests that Harry would n ot have paid “rent” to a “third party ” i f he r eally owned t he Nixon
Drive p roperty

. The suggestion m a kes no sense. To begin with, W i lf ord had little knowledge o f the checks a nd did not clearly testi f y t h a t t h e y were rental pay m ents f or the
Nixon Drive hom e. Bey ond that, there is no evidence t hat Lar ry W illiam s owned the property or that he w as collecting rent on behalf Shirley

. It i s S hirley ’s position in this litigation that she owned the Nixon Drive p roperty at that t im e. Yet S hirley f ails to explain why Harry would have been pay ing rent to Larry W illiam s or how that would tend to prove that she owned t he prope r t y
. I s Shirley suggesting that Harry m istakenly believed that his
f riend Larry

W illiam s owned the property ? And, if so, what would that prove? 13 ¶36. Finally , the chancellor f ound it signif

icant that Harry had S hirley execute two deeds
reconvey ing the m arital hom e in “The Sum m it” subdivision in T upelo. The Sum m it property

13 T h e m aj o rity o p in io n q u o tes a sn ip p et o f C ristin a’s testim o n y to m ak e it ap p ear t h at C r istin a ad m itted th at sh e a n d h e r h u sb an d w e re ren tin g th e N ix o n D riv e h o m e. A n te at ¶1 3

. C r istin a, w h o is f

ro m V en ezu ela, ap o lo g ized d u rin g h er testim o n y t h at h er “E n g lish is so b ad .” S h e also testif

ied th at sh e an d H arry d id n o t p ay r en t f o r th e p ro p e rty an d th a t th ey d id n o t h av e a lan d lo r d

. A l l t h at sh e clearly articu lated w as th at sh e o n ce o v erh e ard H arry m ak e s o me u n s p ecif

ied co m m en t to h is secretary ab o u t ren t in g th e p r o p erty

. F u rth erm o re, th e m aj o r ity also f

ails to ex p lain w h y

H arry o r C ristin a w o u l d h av e b een p ay in g ren t to L a rry Willia m s i f

, as th e m a

j o rity co n ten d s, S

h i rley o w n ed th e p ro p erty

. 2 0i s n o t a t i s sue in this appeal b ecause Shirley does not dispute that C ristina is i ts rightf ul

owner. Like the six properties discussed above, H arry signed a deed convey ing t he Sum m it property t o Shirley on Decem ber 31, 2003, and Shirley then signed a d eed convey ing the property back to Harry on January 15, 2004, although the latter d eed w as never r ecorded. In 2009, Harry asked Shirley to execute a second deed convey ing the Sum m it property to h im

so t hat he could f

ile f or a hom e stead exem

ption on t he property

. Shirley com plied, and that
deed was both acknowledged and rec o r ded. The chancellor suggested that t he 2009 deed
“m ay have b een unnecessary if Harry had truly accepted t he 2004 convey a nce.” However,
the m u ch sim pler e xplanation f

or Harry ’ s requ e s t f

o r a second deed is j ust what he told Shirley : he needed an acknowledged, recorded deed to f ile f or his hom estead exem

ption. 14 Harry ’s request r egarding the Sum m it property should n ot be interpreted as evidence of what he did or did not believe about the six other properties. ¶37. I n sum m ary , the chancellor was entirely correct in f inding that “Harry ’s d ay -to-day behavior with regard to the property was consistent with ownership.” Harry asked Shirley

to sign deeds reconvey ing the properties to him , a nd he took possession of those deeds. He also paid the taxes and insurance on the properties, he m ade im provem ents and repairs, he

14 S ee M iss. C o d e A n n
. § 2 7 -3 3 -1 7 (f ) ( R ev
. 2 0 1 7 ) ( “If title is h eld b y d eed

. . . , su ch in stru me n t s h a l l b e d ated an d ack n o w led g ed o n o r b ef o re Jan u a ry 1 o f t h e y ear f o r w h ich h o m estead ex em

p tio n is ap p lied an d sh all b e f iled f o r reco rd w ith th e ch an cery clerk o n o r b ef o r e J an u ary 7 o f th e y ear f o r w h ich h o m estead ex em p tio n i s ap p lied

. . . .”); M iss. C o d e A n n
. § 8 9 -3 -1 (S u p p
. 2 0 1 8 ) (“U n less [ a d eed ] is [ p ro p erly ] ack n o w led g ed

. . . , t h e [ ch an cery clerk ] m ay

ref u s e to [ reco rd th e d e ed ] .”).

2 1collected r ent, a n d he even devised the properties in his will. The various other pieces of

evidence c ited by Shirley d o not prove a lack of acceptance. B e c a u s e H a r ry accepted the deeds, I would reverse and render judgm ent in f avor of Cristina.
II. Constructive Trust ¶38. Cristina’s com

plaint sought a constructive trust as to a ll eigh t p r o p e r t ies t hat are in dispute in this appeal. As to the six properties discussed above in Part I , Cristina m akes an in-the-alternative argum ent that, “ [ t]o the extent there i s any question concerning [ Harry ’s] acceptance of the s ix signed deeds, [ the] evidence is suf f i c i e n t t o establish a constructive
trust as to the properties.” Cristina also a rgues that a constructive trust should be im posed on two additional properties: (1) the “Two Houses and Green Valley Lab” in Shannon and (2) a house and nine and a half acres in Plantersville. There are no deeds to show that Shirley

ever convey ed these p roperties back to Harry ; however, Cristina argues that S hirley held the properties “solely

f o r the benef

it of Harry .” ¶39. A constructive trust is an equitable cl a i m a g a i n s t a p a rty who holds legal title to a property

. Joel v. J

oel , 4 3 S o. 3d 424, 431 ( ¶23) (Miss. 2 010); McNeil v. Hester , 753 So. 2d 1057, 1 064 (¶24) (Miss. 2000). Theref ore, the m ajority ’s determ ination that S hirley has title

to the six properties discussed a bove in Part I does not def e a t C r i s t ina’s claim f

or a constructive trust. Nor is Cristina’s lack of d eeds f or the other two pr o p e r t i e s d i s positive with respect to those two properties. ¶40. I would n ot address C ristina’s claim f o r a constructive tru s t a s t o the six properties

2 2discussed above in Part I only b ecause I would hold t hat the January 15, 2004 w arranty deeds

f rom Shirley to Harry were valid a nd ef f ectively convey ed title to the properties. Theref ore, a constructive trust should be unnecessary as to those properties. ¶41. As to the rem aining two p roperties—the T wo Houses and Green Valley Lab and the
Plantersville property

—I w ould af

f i rm t h e c h ancellor’s denial of a constructive trust. 15
Unlike the six properties discussed above, there is no evidence that Shirley signed a warranty deed convey ing either of

those properties back to Harry . Although there is som e evidence

to support Cristina’s claim t hat Shirley h eld the propertie s solely f or Harry ’s benef

it, the
evidence is also open to other interpretations. I cannot say t hat t he chancellor clearly erred by f i nding that Cristina f

ailed to m e e t h er burden of p roving this claim by clear and convincing evidence.
CONCLUSION ¶42. I would af

f irm the d enial of Cristina’s c laim f or a constructive trust w i t h r e s p e ct to the Two Houses and Green Valley Lab and the Plantersville property

. However, with respect
to the six properties discussed in P art I, I would hold that t he evidence i s open to only one interpretation: Harry accepted the signed warranty deeds reconvey ing the properties to him

. Theref ore, those d eeds were valid and ef f ective, a nd I would reverse and render as to those six properties. I respectf

ully dissent.

15 T h e S u p rem e C o u rt’s d e cisio n in Jo e l , 4 3 S o
. 3 d a t 4 3 0 -3 1 (¶¶2 2

- 2 4 ), su m m arizes th e b asics o f

th e law o n co n stru ctiv e tru sts. 2 3TINDELL, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

2 4