Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CC-624 | December 12, 2016 Page 1 of 8 

### MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

A TTORNEYS FOR A PPELLANTS Ronald A. Wright Marsha L. Hackenberg Wright & Associates, PC Carmel, Indiana A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLEE Thomas M. Connor Dinsmore & Shohl LLP Cincinnati, Ohio



### IN THE 

# COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Afsaneh S. Kleinman and Dr. Elliot Kleinman, A

ppellan t s-Plaintiffs,

v. 

### Fifth Third Securities, Inc., A

ppelle e -Defendant. December 12, 2016 Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1603-CC-624 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable John F. Hanley, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D11-1412-CC-41876

Vaidik, Chief Judge.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CC-624 | December 12, 2016 Page 2 of 8 

# Case Summary

[1] Afsaneh and Elliot Kleinman sued Fifth Third Securities, Inc., alleging that they had received bad investment advice. Fifth Third Securities responded with a motion to dismiss the case and to co mpel arbitration, claiming that the Kleinmans had agreed that any disputes would be arbitrated. The trial court granted the motion, and the Kleinmans a ppeal. Finding no error, we affirm. 

# Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 17, 2012, the Kleinmans deposited $500,000 into an account with Fifth Third Securities. Appellants’ App. p. 47. On December 19, Afsaneh met with Gregory Lutterman, a financial ad visor with Fifth Third Securities, to discuss how to invest the money. Lu tterman recommended that the Kleinmans put the funds into Unit Investment Trusts (“UITs”). He also gave Afsaneh a Brokerage Account Application (“Acco unt Application”) form and a UIT Explanation of Investments form to disc uss with Elliot. The parties dispute whether the Kleinmans agreed to the UI T investments on December 19, but two days later, Fifth Third Securities used the $500,000 to purchase units in four UITs, and it sent the Kleinmans a no tice confirming the transactions. Six weeks later, in February 2013, the Kl einmans met with Lutterman and signed an Account Application and a UIT Explan ation of Investments relating to the investments.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CC-624 | December 12, 2016 Page 3 of 8 [3] In December 2014, the Kleinmans filed suit against Fifth Third Securities. They did not provide us wi th a copy of their complaint, but they apparently alleged that Lutterman had given them ba d investment advice and that they had lost money as a result. In response, Fi fth Third Securities filed a motion to have the case dismissed and to compel arbitration on th e ground that the Kleinmans had agreed that any dispute woul d be resolved via arbitration. It relied on two documents: the Account Application that the Kleinmans had signed and a document called Broke rage Account Customer Agreement (“Customer Agreement”). The Account Application included the following provision, in a box and bold letters just above the parties’ initials and signatures:
Pre-Dispute Arbitration This account is governed by a pre-dispute arbitration clause, which appears on the last page of the Client Agreement, and you acknowledge that you have re ceived a copy of this clause.

Id . at 19. The last page of the Custom er Agreement began with the heading “Resolving Disputes – Arbitration” and provided, in part:
This agreement contains a pre-disp ute arbitration clause. Under this clause, which becomes binding on all parties when you sign your account application, you, we, and NFS [National Financial Services LLC] agree as follows:
[introductory provisions omitted]
All controversies that may arise between me, You and NFS concerning any subject matter, i ssue or circumstances whatsoever (including, but not limited to, controversies concerning anyCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CC-624 | December 12, 2016 Page 4 of 8 account, order or transaction, or the continuation, performance, interpretation or breach of th is or any other agreement between me, You and NFS whether entered in to or arising before, on or after the date this account is opened) shall be determined by arbitration in accordance with th e rules then prevailing of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) or any United States securities self-regulatory organization or United States securities exchange of which the pe rson, entity or entities against whom the claim is made is a member, as I may designate.

Id . at 25.

[4] While the motion to dismiss was pendin g, the Kleinmans deposed Lutterman. Lutterman testified that while he coul d not specifically recall giving the Kleinmans a copy of the Customer Agreement along with the Account Application, it was “standard practice ” to do so. Lutterman Depo. p. 14, 25 (included in Volume of Exhibits). Th e next month, the Kleinmans moved to publish the deposition. On November 13, 2015, the trial court granted that motion and also issued an order granti ng Fifth Third Securities’ motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration.

[5] The Kleinmans now appeal.



# Discussion and Decision

[6] The Kleinmans contend that the trial court erred by granting Fifth Third Securities’ motion to dism iss and to compel arbitration. We review such matters de novo. Brumley v. Commonwealth Bus. Coll. Educ. Corp. , 945 N.E.2d 770, 774-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CC-624 | December 12, 2016 Page 5 of 8 [7] As the party seeking to co mpel arbitration, Fifth Third Securities had the burden of showing that the parties en tered into an arbitration agreement and that the dispute at issue is covered by the agreement. Id . at 775-76. The Kleinmans maintain that Fifth Third Se curities failed to make these two showings. We disagree. 1 

## I. Existence of Arbitration Agreement

[8] The parties entered into an arbitratio n agreement. The Kleinmans signed the Account Application, and by doing so they acknowledged that (1) their account would be “governed by a pre-dispute ar bitration clause” an d (2) they “have received a copy of this clause.” Fifth Third Secu rities’ arbitration clause appears on the last page of its Cust omer Agreement, and the Kleinmans’ acknowledgement that they received a co py of the clause is corroborated by Lutterman’s deposition testimony that it was “standard practice” to provide a copy of the Customer Agreement along with th e Account Application.

[9] The Kleinmans make much of the fact th at the arbitration acknowledgement in the Account Application references a “Client Agreement,” whereas the document relied upon by Fifth Third Securities is called “Customer Agreement.” They note the lack of evidence that a document called “Client Agreement” even exists. But if th e Kleinmans were concerned about the

1 Fifth Third Securities correctly note s that “Indiana recognizes a strong policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements.” Koors v. Steffen , 916 N.E.2d 212, 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), reh’g denied . This appeal, however, primarily concerns whether an agreem ent to arbitrate the dispute at issue even exists

.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CC-624 | December 12, 2016 Page 6 of 8 absence of a document called “Client Ag reement,” the time to raise that concern was before signing the Account A pplication. Had they done so, Fifth Third Securities no doubt would have realized its imprecise drafting and explained that the relevant documen t is called “Customer Agreement.” Instead, the Kleinmans simply signed the Account Application, thereby acknowledging their receipt of the arbi tration clause. That acknowledgement— regardless of the precise name of the doc ument in which the arbitration clause appears—is the key fact for our purposes. This fact strongly suggests that the Kleinmans understood “Client Agreement” to be a reference to the “Customer Agreement” in which the ar bitration clause actually appears. The only other possibility is that the Kleinmans signed the Acco unt Application without reading it. If that is the case, they did so at their own peril. See Clanton v. United Skates of Am. , 686 N.E.2d 896, 899-900 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (“Under Indiana law, a person is presumed to unders tand the documents which he signs and cannot be released from the terms of a cont ract due to his failure to read it.”).

[10] In support of their argument that th ey did not agree to arbitration, the Kleinmans cite Webb v. First Tennessee Brokerage, Inc. , No. E2012-00934-COAR3-CV, 2013 WL 3941782 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2013), in which the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed a tr ial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration. In that decision, the court addressed th e law of Tennessee, not Indiana. Furthermore, the publicatio n status and precedential value of the decision are unclear—the court apparently did not designate it for publication in the Southwestern Reporter. In any ev ent, the trial court decision that wasCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CC-624 | December 12, 2016 Page 7 of 8 affirmed in that case turned in part on the fact that nowhere in the documents at issue did the customer “expressly say that she agrees to arbitrate.” 2013 WL 3941782 at *12. Here, on the other hand, the first line of the arbitration clause states, “This agreement contains a pre-di spute arbitration clause. Under this clause, which becomes binding on all parties when you sign your account application, you, we, and NFS agree as follows . . . .” Appellants’ App. p. 25 (emphasis added). This fact distinguishes this case from Webb

. 

## II. Scope of Arbitration Agreement

[11] The Kleinmans also assert th at even if an arbitratio n agreement exists, it does not cover the dispute at issue. They base this argument on the fact that they did not sign the Account Application until February 2013, six weeks after Fifth Third Securities put their money into the UITs. The Kleinmans contend that the agreement “was not in pl ace at the time the invest ment was made, therefore it does not apply to the actions take n by the bank in December 2012.” Appellants’ Br. p. 18. We cannot say th at this delay rendered the arbitration clause inapplicable to the parties’ dispute. The clause is written very broadly to cover “[a]ll controversies . . . conc erning any subject matter, issue or circumstances,” including “controversies concerning any account, order or transaction, or the continuation, performanc e, interpretation or breach of this or any other agreement between me, You and NFS whether entered into or arising before, on or after the date this account is opened [.]” Appellants’ App. p. 25 (emphasis added).Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CC-624 | December 12, 2016 Page 8 of 8 [12] In a final attempt to avoid the arbitr ation clause, the Kleinmans suggest that because they did not sign the Account Application until after Fifth Third Securities had completed the UIT transa ctions, Fifth Third Securities’ actions were taken “without authorization” and were “illegal” and therefore fall outside the scope of the arbitration agreem ent. Appellants’ Br. p. 19. They do not support this argument with cogen t reasoning, so it is waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a); City of Indianapolis v. Buschman , 988 N.E.2d 791, 795 (Ind. 2013). Waiver notwithstand ing, the Kleinmans’ claim that the transactions were not author ized is belied by the fa ct that when Fifth Third Securities sent them a notice confirming the transactions, th ey did not question the transactions or seek to have them reversed. Instead, the Kleinmans waited six weeks and then signed the Account Ap plication, thereby ratifying the earlier investments. In short, the time for clai ming that Fifth Third Securities’ initial actions were “illegal” has long passed.

[13] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.