An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-22

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 19 August 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

Macon County

Nos. 12 CRS 51062, 702006

ALFRED MICHAEL SCRUGGS

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 24 July 2013 by 

Judge Marvin P. Pope in Macon County Superior Court. Heard in 

the Court of Appeals 4 August 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney 

General Neil Dalton, for the State.

Jon W. Myers for defendant-appellant.

ERVIN, Judge.

Defendant Alfred Michael Scruggs appeals from judgments 

sentencing him to active terms of imprisonment based upon his 

convictions for driving while subject to an impairing substance

and driving while license revoked. On appeal, Defendant 

contends that the trial court erred by denying his motions to 

dismiss the driving while subject to an impairing substance and 

driving while license revoked charges that had been lodged 
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against him for insufficiency of the evidence. After careful 

consideration of Defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s 

judgments in light of the record and the applicable law, we 

conclude that the trial court’s judgments should remain 

undisturbed.

I. Factual Background

A. Substantive Facts

At approximately 1:00 a.m. on 18 October 2012, Corporal 

Michael Langley, Sr., of the Macon County Sheriff’s Office 

responded to a report that there had been a motor vehicle 

accident on West Old Murphy Road in Macon County. Upon arriving

at the scene of the accident, Corporal Langley observed a tan 

Ford Explorer lying in the middle of the road with the driver’s 

side of the vehicle against the pavement. As a result of the 

fact that Defendant was still in the vehicle, he had to be

extricated through the rear window and tailgate area. At the 

time of his removal from the wrecked vehicle, Defendant was 

“wobbly,” “unstable,” and needed assistance from emergency 

medical personnel. After Trooper Brandon Padgett of the North 

Carolina State Highway Patrol arrived on the scene, Corporal 

Langley turned responsibility for investigating the accident 

over to him.
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At the time that Trooper Padgett located Defendant, he was

standing in an ambulance completing various documents. After 

determining that the vehicle that had been involved in the 

accident was registered to Defendant, Trooper Padgett returned 

to the location at which Defendant was situated and asked him to 

step out of the ambulance. At the time that he left the 

ambulance, Defendant was unsteady on his feet and needed 

assistance. As he assisted Defendant, Trooper Padgett detected 

a “very strong” odor of alcohol about Defendant’s breath and 

person. When he began interviewing Defendant, Trooper Padgett

asked Defendant to lean against his patrol vehicle so that 

Defendant did not fall. According to Trooper Padgett,

Defendant was “very unsteady,” “[h]is speech was very slurred 

and mumble-ish,” his “eyes were very glassy and droopy,” and he 

“kept his head down.”

At the time that he spoke with Defendant, Trooper Padgett 

asked Defendant what had happened. In response, Defendant

stated that “‘I’m f[-]ed up,’ and ‘I really f[-]ed up,’ and ‘I 

didn’t do anything.’” After refusing to take a breath test or

perform any field sobriety tests, Defendant told Trooper Padgett 

to take him to jail. However, instead of being transported to 

the Macon County Jail, Defendant was taken to the hospital, 
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where Officer Padgett heard him tell medical personnel that he 

had consumed “[t]welve beers, no, eight, no, six.”

B. Procedural History

On 18 October 2012, citations charging Defendant with 

driving while subject to an impairing substance, reckless 

driving, driving while license revoked, and driving a vehicle 

containing an open container of an alcoholic beverage were 

issued. On 8 May 2013, Defendant was found guilty of driving 

while subject to an impairing substance and driving while 

license revoked.1 Based upon Defendant’s pleas, Judge Monica H. 

Leslie entered judgments sentencing Defendant to a term of 24 

months imprisonment based upon his conviction for driving while 

subject to an impairing substance and to a consecutive term of 

60 days imprisonment based upon his conviction for driving while 

license revoked. Defendant noted an appeal from Judge Leslie’s 

judgment to the Macon County Superior Court for a trial de novo.

On 17 June 2013, the State filed a notice announcing that 

it intended to prove as grossly aggravating factors that 

Defendant had been convicted of driving while subject to an 

impairing substance on two occasions within the seven years 

prior to 18 October 2012 and that Defendant’s license was 

revoked as the result of an impaired driving conviction on 18 

 

1The reckless driving and open container charges were 

dismissed at the end of the State’s evidence.
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October 2012. The charges against Defendant came on for hearing 

before the trial court and a jury at the 22 July 2013 criminal 

session of the Macon County Superior Court. On 24 July 2013, 

the jury returned verdicts convicting Defendant of driving while 

subject to an impairing substance and driving while license 

revoked and finding that Defendant “ha[d] two convictions for 

impaired driving which occurred within seven (7) years before 

the date of this offense” and that “Defendant drove at the time 

of the current offense, while [his] drivers license was revoked 

under [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 20-28 and the revocation was an 

impaired driving revocation under [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 20-

28.2(a).” At the conclusion of the ensuing sentencing hearing, 

the trial court determined that Defendant should be sentenced as 

an aggravated Level I offender in the case in which he had been 

convicted of driving while subject to an impairing substance and 

entered judgments sentencing Defendant to a term of 36 months 

imprisonment based upon his conviction for driving while subject 

to am impairing substance and to a consecutive term of 120 days 

imprisonment based upon his conviction for driving while license 

revoked. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial 

court’s judgments.

II. Substantive Legal Analysis
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In his brief, Defendant argues that the trial court erred 

by denying his motions to dismiss the driving while subject to 

an impairing substance and driving while license revoked charges 

that had been lodged against him for insufficiency of the 

evidence. More specifically, Defendant contends that the record 

evidence did not suffice to support a determination that he was 

operating a motor vehicle on the night of 18 October 2012. We 

do not find Defendant’s argument persuasive.

“‘Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal, the question for 

the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each 

essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense 

included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator 

of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.’” State 

v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (quoting 

State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914, 918 (1993)), 

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890, 121 S. Ct. 213, 148 L. Ed. 2d 150 

(2000). “In making its determination, the trial court must 

consider all evidence admitted, whether competent or 

incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State, giving 

the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and 

resolving any contradictions in its favor.” State v. Rose, 339 

N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994), cert. denied, 515 

U.S. 1135, 115 S. Ct. 2565, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995).
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“The essential elements of [driving while subject to an 

impairing substance] are: (1) Defendant was driving a vehicle; 

(2) upon any highway, any street, or any public vehicular area 

within this State; (3) while under the influence of an impairing 

substance.” State v. Mark, 154 N.C. App. 341, 345, 571 S.E.2d 

867, 870 (2002), aff’d, 357 N.C. 242, 580 S.E.2d 693 (2003) (per 

curiam) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-138.1). “To convict a 

defendant . . . of driving while his license is revoked the 

State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the defendant’s 

operation of a motor vehicle (2) on a public highway (3) while 

his operator’s license is revoked.” State v. Richardson, 96 

N.C. App. 270, 271, 385 S.E.2d 194, 195 (1989) (citing State v. 

Atwood, 290 N.C. 266, 271, 225 S.E.2d 543, 545 (1976)). The 

State must also prove that the defendant had actual or 

constructive knowledge of the revocation of his license. Id.

In reliance upon our decision in State v. Ray, 54 N.C. App, 

473, 475, 283 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1981) (holding that evidence that 

the defendant was observed “‘halfway [in] the front seat’” of a 

vehicle did not suffice to support a determination that the 

defendant had been driving the vehicle), Defendant claims that 

his mere presence in the wrecked vehicle, which is all that he 

conceded that the record showed, did not suffice to support a 

determination that he had been driving. We also noted in Ray, 
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however, that, even though “other circumstantial evidence . . . 

would have bolstered the State’s case,” none was offered. Id. 

The additional circumstantial evidence lacking in Ray is clearly 

present here.

The record developed at trial in this case demonstrated 

that (1) Defendant was found alone in the vehicle; (2) Defendant

could not extricate himself from the vehicle, allowing a 

reasonable juror to conclude that, if Defendant needed 

assistance to exit the vehicle, any other occupants would have

needed such assistance as well; (3) Defendant made remarks, such 

as “I really f[-]ed up,” which could be viewed as an 

incriminating admission that Defendant knew that he had done 

something that he should have refrained from doing; and (4) the 

vehicle was registered in Defendant’s name. In view of the fact 

that the evidence contained in this record showed considerably 

more than that Defendant had been discovered in a wrecked 

vehicle, we have no hesitation in concluding that the record 

provided ample justification for a decision that Defendant was 

driving the Ford Explorer involved in the accident on the night 

in question. As a result, the trial court did not err by 

denying Defendant’s dismissal motions.

III. Conclusion
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Thus, for the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s 

challenges to the trial court’s judgments lack merit. As a 

result, the trial court’s judgments should, and hereby do, 

remain undisturbed.

NO ERROR.

Judges ROBERT C. HUNTER and STEPHENS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).