J-S69017-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF 

PARENTAL RIGHTS TO M.A.S.W., JR.,

A/K/A M.A.W., JR., A MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: C.L.W., MOTHER

No. 617 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree entered March 15, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County,

Orphans' Court, at No(s): 84435.

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED OCTOBER 06, 2016

C.L.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the Decree involuntarily terminating 

her parental rights to M.A.W., Jr., (“Child”) pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and (b). Concluding that her appeal is frivolous, Mother’s 

counsel has filed an application to withdraw. We grant counsel’s application 

to withdraw, and affirm the Decree terminating Mother’s parental rights. 

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mother has had a long history with Berks County Children and Youth 

Services (“the Agency”), beginning when she herself was a child. In March 

2008, at the age of fourteen and while in foster care, Mother gave birth to 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge Assigned to the Superior Court.
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her first child, a son. Due to issues with Mother’s inability and, at times 

refusal to parent, the child was removed from her care. On January 10, 

2013, Mother executed an affidavit of consent to the child’s adoption.

In November 2012, Mother gave birth to her second child, a daughter. 

Because Mother had not remediated ongoing concerns regarding her 

unstable housing, mental health, drug abuse, and lack of appropriate 

parenting skills, the child was promptly removed from Mother’s care. 

Thereafter, Mother made minimal effort to engage in services and missed 

many appointments. Although at times Mother would state she would take 

certain steps towards her goals, she never followed through. Several 

evaluations conducted throughout Mother’s involvement with the Agency all 

indicated that Mother (1) had a consistent pattern of seeking partners who 

were abusive or drug-involved; and (2) needed to engage in long-term 

mental health treatment. Mother’s parental rights to her second child were 

involuntarily terminated on August 14, 2013.

While she was pregnant with Child, the subject of this appeal, Mother 

experienced physical and emotional abuse from M.A.W., Sr., (“Father”). In 

March 2015, Mother gave birth to Child. At the hospital, Mother and Father 

had a heated argument, which culminated in Father’s spitting in Mother’s 

face and hospital security becoming involved. As a result of this 

confrontation, Mother suffered a panic attack. Given her prior involvement 

with the Agency, there were immediate concerns regarding her ability to 
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parent and to keep Child safe. The Agency obtained immediate emergency 

custody of Child.

The Orphans’ Court subsequently adjudicated Child dependent and 

awarded custody to the Agency for placement purposes. The court ordered 

the primary goal to be adoption with a concurrent goal of return to the most 

appropriate parent. The court ordered Mother to participate in services 

including parenting education, visitation, domestic violence evaluation and 

treatment, mental health treatment, casework services, and to establish and 

maintain stable and appropriate housing and income.1 The court found that 

aggravated circumstances existed because Mother’s parental rights to her 

second child had been involuntarily terminated.

At the first permanency review hearing on August 18, 2015, the court 

found that Mother had made no progress toward remediating the 

circumstances that had led to Child’s placement. Mother and Father had 

been offered casework services on an as-requested basis. However, they 

often failed to attend sessions after they requested them, and argued with 

one another and the Agency’s staff when they did attend. In individual 

counseling sessions, Mother expressed feelings of depression and agreed 

that Father was violent, physically and verbally abusive, controlling, and not 

____________________________________________

1 These same goals were established for Father. The Orphans’ Court granted 

the Agency’s subsequent petition to terminate his parental rights. Father did 

not appeal.
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appropriate for her or Child. She nonetheless made excuses for him and 

otherwise justified his behavior. 

On September 22, 2015, the Agency filed a petition to terminate the 

parental rights of Mother (“TPR petition”) pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), and (5), and § 2511(b). Despite the receipt of notice of the 

TPR petition, Mother continued to comply only minimally with her goals. 

Mother was uncooperative and dishonest in her drug and alcohol 

evaluations. She failed to accept responsibility for Child’s continuing 

placement and placed blame on others, including the Agency’s staff.

On February 3, 2016, the Agency informed Mother that it would be 

requesting a hearing date on the TPR petition. Later that month, Mother 

confirmed the Agency’s suspicions that she was pregnant with her second 

child with Father. On doctor’s orders, Mother stopped taking medication 

prescribed to treat her mental health issues.

Despite domestic violence issues which prompted her to inform the 

Agency on several occasions that the she was leaving Father, she resided 

with him until February 19, 2016, and left him only after learning that he 

had been unfaithful. Mother began residing at a Berks Women in Crisis 

shelter, then obtained housing on March 1, 2016, through Berks Counseling 

Center’s transitional housing program. Mother did not consistently begin to 

seek domestic violence treatment until January 2016, and, at the time of the 

TPR hearing, had yet to achieve any of her goals. 
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At the beginning of TPR Hearing on March 14, 2016, Mother’s counsel 

informed the court that because Mother had “started to resolve a lot of her 

issues,” she was “requesting the Court to consider giving a three-month 

delay in having the termination hearing in order to allow [Mother] to 

continue with all of her services.” N.T., 3/14/16, at 23. The Orphans’ Court 

deferred decision on Mother’s request and heard evidence regarding the 

Agency’s TPR petition. The Agency presented the testimony of an expert 

regarding domestic violence and mental health, and the adoption caseworker 

who had worked with Mother. Mother testified on her own behalf. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the Orphans’ Court denied Mother’s request for a 

continuance and took the TPR petition under advisement. By Decree 

entered March 15, 2016, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights. 

Mother timely appealed. 

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Mother raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Did the [Orphans’] Court err by terminating [Mother’s] 

parental rights because [the Agency] did not establish 

by clear and convincing evidence that [Mother’s] 

parental rights should be terminated pursuant to [the] 

Pennsylvania Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1)?

2. Did the [Orphans’] Court err by terminating [Mother’s] 

parental rights by failing to consider Mother’s

presentation of evidence that she had remedied 

conditions leading to [Child’s] placement based on the 

grounds for involuntary termination set forth in 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2)?

3. Did the [Orphans’] Court err by terminating [Mother’s] 

parental rights by abusing its discretion in failing to take 
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into consideration [Mother’s] presenting evidence that 

she remedied the circumstances for which [Child] had 

been removed from her care and the strides she made 

post filing [of the TPR petition] on September 15, 2015 

when [the Orphans’] Court had consolidated [the TPR 

hearing] with [the] Permanency Review Hearing?

Mother’s Brief at 3. We will address these claims together.

COUNSEL’S APPLICATION TO WITHDRAW

On June 28, 2016, 2013, Mother’s counsel filed an application to

withdraw as counsel and an Anders2 brief. We begin by addressing the 

motion to withdraw before reaching the merits of the issues raised in the 

Anders brief. See Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. 

Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 700 A.2d 1301, 1303 

(Pa. Super. 1997)) (stating, “[w]hen faced with a purported Anders brief, 

this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first 

passing on the request to withdraw”). 

In In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992), this Court 

extended the Anders principles to appeals involving the termination of 

parental rights. We stated that counsel appointed to represent an indigent 

parent on a first appeal from a decree involuntarily terminating parental 

rights may, after a conscientious and thorough review of the record, petition 

this Court for leave to withdraw representation and must submit an Anders

____________________________________________

2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 

(1967).
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brief. Id. at 1275. To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must: 1) 

petition the Court for leave to withdraw, certifying that after a thorough 

review of the record, counsel has concluded the issues to be raised are 

wholly frivolous; 2) file a brief referring to anything in the record that might 

arguably support the appeal; and 3) furnish a copy of the brief to the 

appellant and advise the appellant of his or her right to obtain new counsel 

or to file a pro se brief to raise any additional points that the appellant 

deems worthy of review. In re V.E., 611 A.2d at 1273. Thereafter, this 

Court examines the record and determines whether the appeal is wholly 

frivolous. Id. 

Our Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 

(Pa. 2009), stated that an Anders brief must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; 

and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to 

the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. 

The Santiago Court reaffirmed the principle that indigents “generally 

have a right to counsel on a first appeal, [but] . . . this right does not include 
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the right to bring a frivolous appeal and, concomitantly, does not include the 

right to counsel for bringing such an appeal.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 357

(citation omitted). Our Supreme Court stated:

In the Court’s view, this distinction gave meaning to the Court’s 

long-standing emphasis on an indigent appellant’s right to 

“advocacy.” . . . As the Court put it, “[a]lthough an indigent 

whose appeal is frivolous has no right to have an advocate make 

his case to the appellate court, such an indigent does, in all 

cases, have the right to have an attorney, zealous for the 

indigent’s interests, evaluate his case and attempt to discern 

nonfrivolous arguments.”

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 357-358 (citation omitted). Mother’s counsel has 

complied with all of the requirements of Anders/Santiago. We thus 

proceed to consider her assessment of Mother’s claims. 

LEGAL ANALYSIS

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires 

appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations 

of the trial court if they are supported by the record.” In re Adoption of 

S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012). “If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion.” Id. We may reverse a decision based on an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of “manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. We may not reverse, however, 

merely because the record would support a different result. Id. at 826-827. 

We give great deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. In re T.S.M., 71 
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A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). The Orphans’ Court is free to believe all, part, or 

none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility 

determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 

68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). In addition, in order to affirm the termination 

of parental rights, this Court need only agree with any one subsection under 

Section 2511(a). See, e.g., In re B.L.W. 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We 

have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is 

defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of 

the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citations omitted).

Termination Pursuant to 2511(a)(1)

Section 2511(a)(1) provides that the trial court may terminate 

parental rights if the Petitioner establishes that for six months, the parent 

demonstrated a settled intent to relinquish a parental claim or a refusal or 

failure to perform parental duties:

a) The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be 

terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of 
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the petition has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1). This Court has interpreted this provision as 

requiring the Petitioner to demonstrate a settled intent to relinquish a 

parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to parent:

To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the moving 

party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, 

sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the 

termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to 

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to 

perform parental duties.

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations 

omitted). 

This Court has defined “parental duties” in general as the obligation to 

affirmatively and consistently provide safety, security and stability for the 

child:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. 

Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of 

a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and 

support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be 

met by a merely passive interest in the development of the 

child. Thus, this Court has held that the parental 

obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative

performance. This affirmative duty ... requires continuing 

interest in the child and a genuine effort to maintain 

communication and association with the child. Because a 

child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty requires 

that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of 

importance in the child’s life. 

Id. 

Moreover, a parent must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting 

obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent child relationship: 
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Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively 

with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every 

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship 

to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult 

circumstances. A parent must utilize all available 

resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must 

exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed 

in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. 

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations 

omitted).

Most importantly, “parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a 

more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities 

while others provide the child with her physical and emotional needs.” Id.

In the instant case, the Orphans’ Court properly concluded that the 

Agency met the requirements of Section 2511(a)(1). The Orphans’ Court 

found that, in the relevant period prior to the Agency’s filing of the TPR 

Petition on September 22, 2015, Child had remained in placement, and 

Mother had failed to meet her established goals. While recognizing Mother 

had recently taken positive steps toward achieving an ability to parent, the 

court concluded that Child’s need for permanency should not await Mother’s 

attempt to reach her goals in the future:

Mother [has] failed to perform [her] parental duties for a 

full year and [has] not remedied the conditions that led to 

Child’s placement. . . . Until recently, Mother failed to 

extricate herself from the abusive relationship with Father. 

She put her needs above Child’s. She has yet to 

successfully complete domestic violence and mental health 

treatment, parenting education, and casework services. 

She has failed to obtain and maintain stable housing and 

income. She has only recently entered transitional 
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housing and has stated no plan for what she is 

transitioning to. Mother’s recent, short period of 

“independent” living has not been long enough to 

demonstrate that she is, or will remain, free of her cycle of 

abusive relationships. Mother remains at a high risk of 

returning to Father or another abusive relationship. 

Independent living will be difficult for her, especially since 

she has only part-time employment that does not provide 

an income sufficient to support herself, let alone Child too.

Mother asked that she be given three months to show 

she is ready to have Child returned to her. The [Agency’s] 

testimony reflected that Mother would need a minimum of 

six months to demonstrate that has remedied the 

conditions that led to Child’s placement. Mother expects 

that her parental rights should for some reason be 

preserved until a time that is more suitable for her; 

however, she has already had a full year to comply with 

services and show she can keep herself and Child safe and 

has not done so. Allowing Mother another three to six 

months, or more, to remedy the conditions that led to 

Child’s placement is not reasonable under the 

circumstances and would not best serve the needs and 

welfare of Child.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, dated 5/25/16, at 8-9. 

Mother argues that the termination of her parental rights is not 

supported by the evidence of record, because the Agency failed to meet its 

burden under Section 2511(a)(1). According to Mother, the evidence 

presented during the TPR Hearing “failed to establish that [she] showed a 

settled purpose, refused or failed to perform parental duties.” Mother’s Brief 

at 20. Moreover, she asserts that her testimony demonstrates that “she has 

shown effort and consistency in making progress with services required by 

the [Orphans’ Court] and [the Agency] to remediate issues for which [Child] 

came into care.” Id. at 17. 
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Our review of the record refutes Mother’s claims. It was for the 

Orphans’ Court, as a matter of credibility, to accord the weight to be given 

Mother’s testimony. In re M.G., supra. Moreover, even if Mother is now 

truly making strides toward her ability to parent, she presented no evidence 

as to why she had made no progress toward her goals prior to that time. 

Finally, we note that the Orphans’ Court was not to consider Mother’s efforts 

made after the TPR petition was filed when considering termination under 23 

Pa.C.S. section 2511(a)(1). See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) (providing that 

“[w]ith respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), 

the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving 

of notice of the filing of the [TPR Petition].”

Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), and we need 

not consider the other bases for termination under this section. See 

B.L.W., supra. 

Termination Pursuant to Section 2511(b)

While Mother does not expressly challenge the termination of her 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), we also agree with the 

Orphans’ Court’s determination that the Agency met its burden under that 

subsection, and that terminating Mother’s parental rights is in the best 

interest of the Child. The court explained:
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Child has been receiving his essential parental care, 

control, protection, and subsistence from a foster family 

for his whole life, and he is bonded with this family. 

Severing any bond that Child might have with [Mother] in 

favor of giving him a permanent, healthy, and safe home 

where his developmental, physical, and emotional needs 

will be met clearly is in his best interest.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/25/16, at 8-9.

CONCLUSION

In sum, our review of the record supports the conclusion by Mother’s 

counsel that the claims Mother wished to raise on appeal are frivolous. We 

agree with the Orphans’ Court’s conclusion that the Agency met its burden 

of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s parental rights 

should be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1) and 2511(b). 

Accordingly, we grant Mother’s counsel’s application to withdraw and affirm.

Application to Withdraw granted. Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/6/2016