No. 2--00--0069

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	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	SECOND DISTRICT

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In re MARRIAGE OF	)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

STACY J. HUGHES,	)	of Ogle County.

	)

	Petitioner-Appellee,	)	

	)

and	)	No. 97--D--229

	)

RONALD C. HUGHES,	)	Honorable

	)	Michael T. Mallon,

	Respondent-Appellant.	)	Judge, Presiding.

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	NModified Upon Denial of Rehearing

	JUSTICE RAPP delivered the opinion of the court:

	Respondent, Ronald C. Hughes, appeals from orders of the

circuit court of Ogle County entered one year after his dissolution

of marriage from petitioner, Stacy J. Hughes, granting her petition

to increase child support.  Ronald argues that the trial court

erred in determining that a substantial change in circumstances had

occurred since the entry of the original judgment for dissolution

of marriage.  We reverse.

	The record indicates that a judgment for dissolution of

marriage was entered on December 2, 1998, between Stacy J. and

Ronald C. Hughes.  The judgment apparently was not by agreement of

the parties, as it was rendered after the court heard evidence and

arguments of the parties.  Pursuant to the judgment, Ronald was

ordered to pay child support in the amount of $1,113 per month and

nonmodifiable rehabilitative maintenance to Stacy in the amount of $788 per month for a period of 12 months, effective September 1,

1998.  Ronald was also ordered to pay 12 monthly payments on a

Honda Odyssey awarded to Stacy, after which time Stacy would be

responsible for the debt.

	On September 27, 1999, Stacy filed a petition to modify the

judgment for dissolution of marriage.  Stacy alleged that (1)

because of the termination of the maintenance and car payments,

Ronald's expendable income has increased by $1,038 per month; (2)

Ronald's income has substantially increased as a result of a

promotion; (3) her income is very limited; (4) the children's needs

have substantially increased; (5) her income has substantially

decreased as a result of the termination of maintenance payments;

and (6) her expenses have substantially increased as a result of

the termination of the car payments and her responsibility for

making the car payments in the amount of $250 per month.

	On October 25, 1999, Ronald filed a response denying the

allegations of Stacy's petition.  An evidentiary hearing on the

petition to modify the judgment for dissolution of marriage was

held on November 30, 1999.

	Stacy testified that she had become employed since the

dissolution and is now earning $1,000 per month as a part-time

college clerk, but that, even with the addition of $1,113 per month

in child support, she is unable to meet her estimated $3,500 in

monthly expenses.  She explained that she is unable to meet her

monthly expenses because she no longer receives maintenance and car

payments from Ronald.  She also testified that the needs of the children have increased based on day-care expenses, increased

school tuition, and extracurricular activities.

	Ronald testified as an adverse witness that he is still

employed as a new car manager at a car dealership and would earn

$72,000 in 1999, several thousand dollars more than in the previous

year.  Ronald also testified that the last quarter of each year is

slow in the automobile business.

	At the close of Stacy's case, Ronald moved for a judgment on

the ground that Stacy had failed to show that a substantial change

in circumstances had occurred since the 1998 judgment for

dissolution of marriage.  The court took the issues under

advisement.

	On December 15, 1999, the court entered an order granting

Stacy's petition to modify and ordered Ronald to pay $1,275 per

month for child support.  The court found that "there has been a

material change in circumstances requiring modification of the

child support as previously ordered."  The court reasoned:

	"[Stacy] has show[n] that [Ronald's] financial situation has

changed and that change has taken place by the fact that he is

no longer responsible [for] $788.00 in maintenance expenses

and[,] in addition[,] is not required to pay $250.00 per month

towards [Stacy's] automobile."

The court did not make any determination that the needs of the

children had substantially increased, although it did note that it

was not awarding any additional day-care expenses based on the fact

that Ronald is responsible for all uncovered medical, dental, and

optical expenses for the children.

	On January 7, 2000, the trial court entered a support order

and an employer's income withholding order to implement the new

child support amount.  On January 13, 2000, Ronald filed a timely

notice of appeal.

	Ronald submits that the court's finding of a substantial

change in circumstances was based on a misapprehension of law and

that, therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in

modifying the judgment for dissolution of marriage.  Ronald

contends that a determination of a "substantial change in

circumstances" cannot be based on changes in financial conditions

contemplated by the judgment for dissolution of marriage. 

Specifically, Ronald argues that the termination of maintenance and

car payments cannot form the basis for a modification of child

support because such termination of payments was contemplated by

the original judgment.  Stacy argues that there has been a

substantial change in circumstances in that Ronald now has more

expendable income due to the cessation of maintenance and car

payments to her.

	Motions to modify judgments awarding child support are

governed by section 510(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution

of Marriage Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 5/510(a) (West 1998)).  Section

510(a) provides, among other things, that an order for child

support may be modified only "upon a showing of a substantial

change in circumstances."  750 ILCS 5/510(a)(1) (West 1998).  To

satisfy this burden, the petitioner must show that a substantial

change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of the

judgment.  In re Marriage of Fazioli, 202 Ill. App. 3d 245, 251 (1990).  "After the threshold question of whether a substantial

change in circumstances has occurred is answered, then and only

then may the court determine the amount of the increase in child

support."  In re Marriage of Pylawka, 277 Ill. App. 3d 728, 731 (1996).

	The substance of this appeal revolves around whether a

"substantial change in circumstances," required under section

510(a)(1) of the Act to modify child support, may be founded on

changes in financial conditions contemplated by the judgment for

dissolution of marriage.  This is a question of the legal effect of

undisputed facts, which we review de novo.  Gay v. Dunlap, 279 Ill. App. 3d 140, 145 (1996); In re Marriage of Demattia, 302 Ill. App. 3d 390, 393 (1999).

	In order to establish a substantial change in circumstances,

the petitioning party must show an increased ability of the

supporting spouse to pay and an increase in the needs of the

children since the previous order.  In re Marriage of Schmerold, 88 Ill. App. 3d 348, 350 (1980).  The change in circumstances must

occur after the date of the decree.  Dixon v. Dixon, 45 Ill. App. 3d 934, 937 (1977).

	Here, the trial court found that a substantial change in

circumstances had occurred as a result of the termination of

maintenance and car payments to Stacy.  The increase in Ronald's

available income to pay child support following the termination of

maintenance and car payments did not constitute a substantial

change in circumstances because these events were contemplated and expected by the court when the judgment for dissolution of marriage

was entered.

	Stacy argues that the judge entering the judgment for

dissolution of marriage relied on inaccurate financial information

in establishing child support in the amount of $1,113.  A

petitioner cannot use a motion to modify as a vehicle for launching

a collateral attack on the accuracy of the evidence upon which the

court relied in formulating its judgment.  See In re Marriage of Bean, 181 Ill. App. 3d 671, 674 (1989).

	In any event, we have also examined this case under section

510(a)(2)(A) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/510(a)(2)(A) (West 1998)). 

Section 510(a)(2)(A) of the Act provides that an order for child

support may be modified without the necessity of showing a

substantial change in circumstances:

		"upon a showing of an inconsistency of at least 20%, but

no less than $10 per month, between the amount of the existing

order and the amount of child support that results from

application of the guidelines specified in Section 505 of this

Act unless the inconsistency is due to the fact that the

amount of the existing order resulted from a deviation from

the guideline amount and there has not been a change in the

circumstances that resulted in that deviation."  750 ILCS

5/510(a)(2)(A) (West 1998).

Here, the increase of child support from $1,113 to $1,275, a

difference of $162 or roughly 14.6%, does not meet the requirements

for the modification of an order for child support under section

510(a)(2)(A).    We have examined this case under section 510(a)(2)(A) of the Act merely to determine if an injustice has

been done.  We note that this same section is applicable by its own

terms only in cases in which a party is receiving certain support

services from the Illinois Department of Public Aid and only when

at least 36 months have elapsed since the order for child support

was entered or last modified.

	We conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law in

determining that a substantial change in circumstances permitting

the modification of child support had occurred since the entry of

the judgment for dissolution of marriage.

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court

of Ogle County is reversed.

	Reversed.

	GROMETER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.