NASA LogoNTRSNTRS - NASA Technical Reports ServerSearchmore_vertCollectionsAboutNewsHelpLogin Back to ResultsIndependent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the purge, vent and drain subsystemThe results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter PV and D (Purge, Vent and Drain) Subsystem hardware. The PV and D Subsystem controls the environment of unpressurized compartments and window cavities, senses hazardous gases, and purges Orbiter/ET Disconnect. The subsystem is divided into six systems: Purge System (controls the environment of unpressurized structural compartments); Vent System (controls the pressure of unpressurized compartments); Drain System (removes water from unpressurized compartments); Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS) (monitors hazardous gas concentrations); Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS) (maintains clear windows and provides pressure control of the window cavities); and External Tank/Orbiter Disconnect Purge System (prevents cryo-pumping/icing of disconnect hardware). Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Four of the sixty-two failure modes analyzed were determined as single failures which could result in the loss of crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any of twelve single failures occurred. Two of the criticality 1/1 failures are in the Window Cavity Conditioning System (WCCS) outer window cavity, where leakage and/or restricted flow will cause failure to depressurize/repressurize the window cavity. Two criticality 1/1 failures represent leakage and/or restricted flow in the Orbiter/ET disconnect purge network which prevent cryopumping/icing of disconnect hardware. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.Document ID19900001653Acquisition SourceLegacy CDMSDocument TypeContractor Report (CR)AuthorsBynum, M. C., III*(McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Co. Houston, TX, United States)*Date AcquiredSeptember 6, 2013Publication DateNovember 18, 1987Subject CategorySpace TransportationReport/Patent NumberNAS 1.26:185547REPT-1.0-WP-VA87001-04NASA-CR-185547Accession Number90N10969Funding Number(s)CONTRACT_GRANT: NAS9-17650Distribution LimitsPublicCopyrightWork of the US Gov. Public Use Permitted.Available DownloadsNameType19900001653.pdfSTIcloud_downloadcontent_copyvisibilityRelated RecordsThere are no records associated with this record.visibility_offNo Preview Available
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