62664 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

10 CFR Parts 50, 72, and 73 

RIN 3150–AG63 

Power Reactor Security Requirements 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is proposing to 

amend the current security regulations 

and add new security requirements 

pertaining to nuclear power reactors. 

Additionally, this rulemaking includes 

new security requirements for Category 

I strategic special nuclear material 

(SSNM) facilities for access to enhanced 

weapons and firearms background 

checks. The proposed rulemaking 

would: Make generically applicable 

security requirements imposed by 

Commission orders issued after the 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 

based upon experience and insights 

gained by the Commission during 

implementation; fulfill certain 

provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 

2005; add several new requirements that 

resulted from insights from 

implementation of the security orders, 

review of site security plans, and 

implementation of the enhanced 

baseline inspection program and forceon-force exercises; update the regulatory 

framework in preparation for receiving 

license applications for new reactors; 

and impose requirements to assess and 

manage site activities that can adversely 

affect safety and security. The proposed 

safety and security requirements would 

address, in part, a petition for 

rulemaking (PRM 50–80) that requests 

the establishment of regulations 

governing proposed changes to facilities 

which could adversely affect the 

protection against radiological sabotage. 

DATES: Submit comments by January 9, 

2007. Submit comments specific to the 

information collection aspects of this 

rule by November 27, 2006. Comments 

received after the above dates will be 

considered if it is practical to do so, but 

assurance of consideration cannot be 

given to comments received after these 

dates. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by any one of the following methods. 

Please include the following number 

‘‘RIN 3150–AG63’’ in the subject line of 

your comments. Comments on 

rulemakings submitted in writing or in 

electronic form will be made available 

for public inspection. Because your 

comments will not be edited to remove 

any identifying or contact information, 

the NRC cautions you against including 

any information in your submission that 

you do not want to be publicly 

disclosed. 

Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attn: 

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. 

E-mail comments to: SECY@nrc.gov. If 

you do not receive a reply e-mail 

confirming that we have received your 

comments, contact us directly at (301) 

415–1966. You may also submit 

comments via the NRC’s rulemaking 

Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. 

Address questions about our rulemaking 

Web site to Carol Gallagher (301) 415– 

5905; E-mail CAG@nrc.gov. Comments 

can also be submitted via the Federal eRulemaking Portal http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

Hand deliver comments to: 11555 

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 

20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. 

Federal workdays (telephone (301) 415– 

1966). 

Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission at (301) 

415–1101. 

You may submit comments on the 

information collections by the methods 

indicated in the Paperwork Reduction 

Act Statement. 

Publicly available documents related 

to this rulemaking may be viewed 

electronically on the public computers 

located at the NRC’s Public Document 

Room (PDR), O1–F21, One White Flint 

North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

MD 20852–2738. The PDR reproduction 

contractor will copy documents for a 

fee. Selected documents, including 

comments, may be viewed and 

downloaded electronically via the NRC 

rulemaking Web site at http:// 

ruleforum.llnl.gov. 

Publicly available documents created 

or received at the NRC after November 

1, 1999, are available electronically at 

the NRC’s Electronic Reading Room at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. From this site, the public 

can gain entry into the NRC’s 

Agencywide Document Access and 

Management System (ADAMS), which 

provides text and image files of NRC’s 

public documents. If you do not have 

access to ADAMS or if there are 

problems in accessing the documents 

located in ADAMS, contact the NRC 

PDR Reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 

301–415–4737, or by e-mail to 

PDR@nrc.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

Richard Rasmussen, Office of Nuclear 

Security and Incident Response, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone 

(301) 415–0610; e-mail: RAR@nrc.gov or 

Mr. Timothy Reed, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001; telephone (301) 415– 

1462; e-mail: TAR@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents 

I. Background 

II. Rulemaking Initiation 

III. Proposed Regulations 

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis 

V. Guidance 

VI. Criminal Penalties 

VII. Compatibility of Agreement State 

Regulations 

VIII. Availability of Documents 

IX. Plain Language 

X. Voluntary Consensus Standards 

XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental 

Impact 

XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement 

XIII. Public Protection Notification 

XIV. Regulatory Analysis 

XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification 

XVI. Backfit Analysis 

I. Background 

Following the terrorist attacks on 

September 11, 2001, the NRC conducted 

a thorough review of security to ensure 

that nuclear power plants and other 

licensed facilities continued to have 

effective security measures in place 

given the changing threat environment. 

Through a series of orders, the 

Commission specified a supplement to 

the Design Basis Threat (DBT), as well 

as requirements for specific training 

enhancements, access authorization 

enhancements, security officer work 

hours, and enhancements to defensive 

strategies, mitigative measures, and 

integrated response. Additionally, in 

generic communications, the 

Commission specified expectations for 

enhanced notifications to the NRC for 

certain security events or suspicious 

activities. 

Most of the requirements in this 

proposed rulemaking are derived 

directly from, or through 

implementation of, the following four 

security orders: 

• EA–02–026, ‘‘Interim 

Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order,’’ 

dated February 25, 2002 (March 4, 2002; 

67 FR 9792). 

• EA–02–261, ‘‘Access Authorization 

Order,’’ dated January 7, 2003 (January 

13, 2003; 68 FR 1643). 

• EA–03–039, ‘‘Security Personnel 

Training and Qualification 

Requirements (Training) Order,’’ dated 

April 29, 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68 FR 

24514), and 

• EA–03–086, ‘‘Revised Design Basis 

Threat Order,’’ dated April 29, 2003 

(May 7, 2003; 68 FR 24517). 


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Nuclear power plant licensees revised 

their security plans, training and 

qualification plans, and safeguards 

contingency plans in response to these 

orders. The NRC completed its review 

and approval of all of the revised 

security plans, training and 

qualification plans, and safeguards 

contingency plans on October 29, 2004. 

These plans incorporated the 

enhancements instituted through the 

orders. While the specifics of these 

changes are Safeguards Information, in 

general, the changes resulted in 

enhancements such as increased patrols, 

augmented security forces and 

capabilities, additional security posts, 

additional physical barriers, vehicle 

checks at greater standoff distances, 

enhanced coordination with law 

enforcement and military authorities, 

augmented security and emergency 

response training, equipment, and 

communication, and more restrictive 

site access controls for personnel, 

including expanded, expedited, and 

more thorough employee background 

checks. 

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 

2005), signed into law on August 8, 

2005, is another source of some of the 

proposed requirements reflected in this 

rulemaking. Section 653, for instance, 

allows the NRC to authorize licensees to 

use, as part of their protective strategies, 

an expanded arsenal of weapons, 

including machine guns and semiautomatic assault weapons. Section 653 

also requires that all security personnel 

with access to any weapons undergo a 

background check that would include 

fingerprinting and a check against the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) 

National Instant Criminal Background 

Check System (NICS) database. These 

provisions of EPAct 2005 would be 

reflected in the newly proposed §§ 73.18 

and 73.19, and the proposed NRC Form 

754. Though this rulemaking primarily 

affects power reactor security 

requirements, to implement the EPAct 

2005 provisions efficiently, the NRC 

expanded the rulemaking’s scope in 

newly proposed §§ 73.18 and 73.19 to 

include facilities authorized to possess 

formula quantities or greater of strategic 

special nuclear material, i.e., Category I 

SSNM facilities. Such facilities would 

include production facilities, spent fuel 

reprocessing facilities, fuel processing 

facilities, and uranium enrichment 

facilities. Additionally, Section 651 of 

the EPAct 2005 requires the NRC to 

conduct security evaluations at selected 

licensed facilities, including periodic 

force-on-force exercises. That provision 

also requires the NRC to mitigate any 

potential conflict of interest that could 

influence the results of force-on-force 

exercises. These provisions would be 

reflected in proposed § 73.55. 

Through implementing the security 

orders, reviewing the revised site 

security plans across the fleet of 

reactors, conducting the enhanced 

baseline inspection program, and 

evaluating force-on-force exercises, the 

NRC has identified some additional 

security measures that would provide 

additional assurance of a licensee’s 

capability to protect against the DBT. 

Finally, a petition for rulemaking 

submitted by the Union of Concerned 

Scientists and San Luis Obispo Mothers 

for Peace (PRM 50–80), requested the 

establishment of regulations governing 

proposed changes to facilities which 

could adversely affect their protection 

against radiological sabotage. This 

petition was partially granted on 

November 17, 2005 (70 FR 69690). The 

proposed new § 73.58 contains 

requirements to address the remaining 

issues. 

The proposed amendments to the 

security requirements for power 

reactors, and for enhanced weapons 

requirements for power reactor and 

Category I SSNM facilities, would result 

in changes to the following existing 

sections and appendices in 10 CFR part 

73: 

• 10 CFR 73.2, Definitions. 

• 10 CFR 73.55, Requirements for 

physical protection of licensed activities 

in nuclear power reactors against 

radiological sabotage. 

• 10 CFR 73.56, Personnel access 

authorization requirements for nuclear 

power plants. 

• 10 CFR 73.71, Reporting of 

safeguards events. 

• 10 CFR 73, Appendix B, General 

criteria for security personnel. 

• 10 CFR 73, Appendix C, Licensee 

safeguards contingency plans. 

• 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, Reportable 

safeguards events. 

The proposed amendments would 

also add three new sections to part 73: 

• Proposed § 73.18, Firearms 

background checks for armed security 

personnel. 

• Proposed § 73.19, Authorization for 

use of enhanced weapons. 

• Proposed § 73.58, Safety/security 

interface requirements for nuclear 

power reactors. 

The proposed rule would also add a 

new NRC Form 754 under the newly 

proposed § 73.18. 

EPAct 2005 Weapons Guidelines 

In order to accomplish Sec. 161A. of 

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended (AEA), concerning the 

transfer, receipt, possession, transport, 

import, and use of enhanced weapons 

and the requirements for firearms 

background checks, the NRC has 

engaged with representatives from the 

U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the 

FBI, and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

(ATF), to develop guidelines required 

by Sec. 161A.d of the AEA. The 

provisions of Sec.161A. of the AEA take 

effect upon the issuance of these 

guidelines by the Commission, with the 

approval of the Attorney General. The 

Commission will publish a separate 

Federal Register notice on the issuance 

of these guidelines. This proposed rule 

would not rescind the authority of 

certain NRC licensees, currently 

possessing automatic weapons through 

alternate processes, to possess such 

enhanced weapons; however, these 

licensees would be subject to the new 

firearms background check 

requirements of Sec. 161A. of the AEA. 

Information on new provisions (§§ 73.18 

and 73.19) that would implement Sec. 

161A. may be found in Section III. 

Conforming and Corrective Changes 

Conforming changes to the 

requirements listed below are proposed 

in order to ensure that cross-referencing 

between the various security regulations 

in part 73 is preserved, and to avoid 

revising requirements for licensees who 

are not within the scope of this 

proposed rule. The following 

requirements contain conforming 

changes: 

• Section 50.34, ‘‘Contents of 

applications; technical information’’

would be revised to align the 

application requirements with the 

proposed revisions to appendix C to 10 

CFR part 73. 

• Section 50.54, ‘‘Conditions of 

licenses’’ would be revised to conform 

with the proposed revisions to sections 

in appendix C to 10 CFR part 73. 

• Section 50.72, ‘‘Immediate 

notification requirements for operating 

nuclear power reactors’’ would be 

revised to state (in footnote 1) that 

immediate notification to the NRC may 

be required (per the proposed § 73.71 

requirements) prior to the notification 

requirements under the current § 50.72. 

• Section 72.212, ‘‘Conditions of 

general license issued under § 72.210’’

would be revised to reference the 

appropriate revised paragraph 

designations in proposed § 73.55. 

• Section 73.8, ‘‘Information 

collection requirements: OMB 

approval’’ would be revised to add the 

newly proposed requirements (§§ 73.18, 

73.19, 73.58, and NRC Form 754) to the 

list of sections and forms with Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) 


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information collection requirements. A 

corrective revision to § 73.8 would also 

be made to reflect OMB approval of 

existing information collection 

requirements for NRC Form 366 under 

existing § 73.71. 

• Section 73.70, ‘‘Records’’ would be 

revised to reference the appropriate 

revised paragraph designations in 

proposed § 73.55 regarding the need to 

retain a record of the registry of visitors. 

Additionally, § 73.81, ‘‘Criminal 

penalties’’ which sets forth the sections 

within part 73 that are not subject to 

criminal sanctions under the AEA, 

would remain unchanged since willful 

violations of the newly proposed 

§§ 73.18, 73.19, and 73.58 may be 

subject to criminal sanctions. 

Appendix B and appendix C to part 

73 require special treatment in this 

rulemaking to preserve, with a 

minimum of conforming changes, the 

current requirements for licensees and 

applicants to whom this proposed rule 

would not apply. Accordingly, sections 

I through V of appendix B would remain 

unchanged, and the proposed new 

language for power reactors would be 

added as section VI. Appendix C would 

be divided into two sections, with 

Section I maintaining all current 

requirements, and Section II containing 

all proposed requirements related to 

power reactors. 

II. Rulemaking Initiation 

On July 19, 2004, NRC staff issued a 

memorandum entitled ‘‘Status of 

Security-Related Rulemaking’’

(accession number ML041180532) to 

inform the Commission of plans to close 

former security-related actions and 

replace them with a comprehensive 

rulemaking plan to modify physical 

protection requirements for power 

reactors. This memorandum described 

rulemaking efforts that were suspended 

by the terrorist activities of September 

11, 2001, and summarized the securityrelated actions taken following the 

attack. In response to this 

memorandum, the Commission directed 

the staff in an August 23, 2004, Staff 

Requirements Memorandum (SRM) 

(COMSECY–04–0047, accession number 

ML042360548) to forego the 

development of a rulemaking plan, and 

provide a schedule for the completion of 

security-related rulemakings. The staff 

provided this schedule to the 

Commission by memorandum dated 

November 16, 2004 (accession number 

ML043060572). Subsequently, the staff 

revised its plans to amend the part 73 

security requirements to include a 

requirement for licensees to assess and 

manage site activities that could 

compromise either safety or security 

(i.e., the safety/security interface 

requirements). This revision is 

discussed in a memorandum dated July 

29, 2005 (accession number 

ML051800350). Finally, by 

memorandum dated September 29, 2005 

(COMSECY–05–0046, accession number 

ML052710167), the staff discussed its 

plans to incorporate select provisions of 

the EPAct 2005 into the power reactor 

security requirements rulemaking. In 

COMSECY–05–0046, dated November 1, 

2005 (accession number ML053050439), 

the Commission approved the staff’s 

approach in incorporating the select 

provisions of EPAct 2005. 

III. Proposed Regulations 

This section describes significant 

provisions of this rulemaking: 

1. EPAct 2005 weapons requirements. 

The new §§ 73.18 and 73.19 would 

contain requirements to implement 

provisions of section 161A of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended 

(AEA). Section 653 of the EPAct 

amended the AEA by adding section 

161A, ‘‘Use of Firearms by Security 

Personnel.’’ Section 161A provides new 

authority to the Commission to enhance 

security at certain NRC licensee and 

certificate holder facilities by 

authorizing the security personnel of 

those licensees or certificate holders to 

transfer, receive, possess, transport, 

import, and use an expanded arsenal of 

weapons, to include: Short-barreled 

shotguns, short-barreled rifles, and 

machine guns. In addition, section 161A 

also provides that NRC-designated 

licensees and certificate holders may 

apply to the NRC for authority to 

preempt local, State, or certain Federal 

firearms laws (including regulations) 

that prohibits the transfer, receipt, 

possession, transportation, importation, 

or use of handguns, rifles, shotguns, 

short-barreled shotguns, short-barreled 

rifles, machine guns, semiautomatic 

assault weapons, ammunition for such 

guns or weapons, and large capacity 

ammunition feeding devices. Prior to 

granting either authority, however, the 

Commission must determine that the 

proposed use of this authority is 

necessary in the discharge of official 

duties by security personnel engaged in 

protecting: (1) Facilities owned or 

operated by an NRC licensee or 

certificate holder and designated by the 

Commission, or (2) radioactive material 

or other property that is owned or 

possessed by an NRC licensee or 

certificate holder, or that is being 

transported to or from an NRC-regulated 

facility, if the Commission has 

determined the radioactive material or 

other property to be of significance to 

the common defense and security or 

public health and safety. Licensees and 

certificate holders must receive 

preemption authority before receiving 

NRC approval for enhanced weapons 

authority. Finally, the NRC may 

consider making preemption authority 

or enhanced-weapons authority 

available to other types of licensees or 

certificate holders in future 

rulemakings. 

Under the provisions of section 

161A.d, section 161A takes effect on the 

date that implementing guidelines are 

issued by the Commission after being 

approved by the U.S. Attorney General. 

Following enactment of the EPAct 2005, 

NRC staff began discussions with staffs 

from the U.S. Department of Justice 

(DOJ) and its subordinate agencies the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

(ATF) to develop these guidelines. 

Issuance of these guidelines is a 

prerequisite for the issuance of a final 

rule on §§ 73.18 and 73.19, and the 

conforming changes in § 73.2. The 

proposed language for §§ 73.18 and 

73.19, and the conforming changes in 

§ 73.2, set forth in this proposed rule is 

consistent, to the extent possible, with 

the discussions between NRC and DOJ. 

However, because NRC and DOJ staffs 

continue to work to resolve the 

remaining issues, the guidelines have 

not been finalized as of the issuance of 

this notice. Once the final guidelines are 

issued, the Commission will, if 

necessary, take the appropriate actions 

to ensure that the language of proposed 

§§ 73.18, 73.19, and 73.2, conforms with 

the guidelines. The Commission is 

utilizing this parallel approach to 

provide the most expeditious process 

for promulgating the necessary 

regulations implementing section 161A; 

thereby enhancing the security (i.e., 

weapons) capabilities of NRC-licensed 

facilities, while being mindful of our 

obligations to provide stakeholders an 

opportunity to comment on proposed 

regulations. 

2. Safety/Security interface 

requirements. These requirements are 

located in proposed § 73.58. The safety/ 

security requirements are intended to 

explicitly require licensee coordination 

of potential adverse interactions 

between security activities and other 

plant activities that could compromise 

either plant security or plant safety. The 

proposed requirements would direct 

licensees to assess and manage these 

interactions so that neither safety nor 

security is compromised. These 

proposed requirements address, in part, 

a Petition for Rulemaking (PRM 50–80) 

that requested the establishment of 

regulations governing proposed changes 


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to the facilities which could adversely 

affect the protection against radiological 

sabotage. 

3. EPAct 2005 additional 

requirements. The EPAct 2005 

requirements that would be 

implemented by this proposed 

rulemaking, in addition to the weaponsrelated additions described previously, 

consist of new requirements to perform 

force-on-force exercises, and to mitigate 

potential conflicts of interest that could 

influence the results of NRC-conducted 

force-on-force exercises. These proposed 

new requirements would be included in 

proposed § 73.55 and appendix C to part 

73. 

4. Accelerated notification and 

revised four-hour reporting 

requirements. This proposed rule 

contains accelerated security 

notification requirements (i.e., within 15 

minutes) in proposed § 73.71 and 

appendix G to part 73 for attacks and 

imminent threats to power reactors. The 

proposed accelerated notification 

requirements are similar to what was 

provided to the industry in NRC 

Bulletin 2005–02, ‘‘Emergency 

Preparedness and Response Actions for 

Security-Based Events,’’ dated July 18, 

2005. The proposed rule also contains 

two new four-hour reporting 

requirements. The proposed rule would 

direct licensees to report to the NRC 

information pertaining to suspicious 

activities as described in the proposed 

requirement. The proposed rule would 

also include a new four-hour reporting 

requirement for tampering events that 

do not meet the current threshold for 

one-hour reporting. 

5. Mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel 

requirements. These requirements 

would be incorporated into proposed 

§ 73.55 for licensees who propose to use 

MOX fuel in their reactor(s). These 

proposed requirements are in lieu of 

unnecessarily rigorous part 73 

requirements (e.g., §§ 73.45 and 73.46), 

which would otherwise apply because 

of the MOX fuel’s low plutonium 

content and the weight and size of the 

MOX fuel assemblies. The proposed 

MOX fuel security requirements are 

intended to be consistent with the 

approach implemented at Catawba 

Nuclear Station through the MOX lead 

test assembly effort. 

6. Cyber-security requirements. This 

proposed rule would contain more 

detailed programmatic requirements for 

addressing cyber security at power 

reactors, which build on the 

requirements imposed by the February 

2002 order. The proposed cyber-security 

requirements are designed to be 

consistent with ongoing industry cybersecurity efforts. 

7. Mitigating strategies. The proposed 

rule would require licensees to develop 

specific guidance and strategies to 

maintain or restore core cooling, 

containment, and spent fuel pool 

cooling capabilities using existing or 

readily available resources (equipment 

and personnel) that can be effectively 

implemented under the circumstances 

associated with the loss of large areas of 

the plant due to explosions or fire. 

These proposed requirements would be 

incorporated into the proposed 

appendix C to part 73. 

8. Access authorization 

enhancements. The proposed changes 

would improve the integration of the 

access authorization requirements, 

fitness-for-duty requirements, and 

security program requirements. The 

proposed rule would include an 

increase in the rigor for some elements 

of the access authorization program 

including requirements for the conduct 

of psychological assessments, 

requirements for individuals to report 

arrests to the reviewing official, and 

requirements to clarify the 

responsibility for the acceptance of 

shared information. The proposed rule 

would also add requirements to allow 

NRC inspection of licensee information 

sharing records and requirements that 

subject additional individuals, such as 

those who have electronic access via 

computer systems or those who 

administer the access authorization 

program, to the access authorization 

requirements. 

9. Training and qualification 

enhancements. The proposed rule 

includes modifications to the training 

and qualification requirements that are 

based on insights from implementation 

of the security orders, review of site 

security plans, and implementation of 

the enhanced baseline inspection 

program and force-on-force exercises. 

These new requirements would include 

additional physical requirements for 

unarmed security personnel to assure 

that personnel performing these 

functions meet physical requirements 

commensurate with their duties. 

Proposed new requirements also 

include a minimum age requirement of 

18 years for unarmed responders, 

qualification scores for testing required 

by the training and qualification plan, 

qualification requirements for security 

trainers, qualification requirements of 

personnel assessing psychological 

qualifications, armorer certification 

requirements, and program 

requirements for on-the-job training. 

10. Security Program Implementation 

insights. The proposed rule would 

impose new enhancements identified 

from implementation of the security 

orders, review of site security plans, and 

implementation of the enhanced 

baseline inspection program and forceon-force exercises. These new 

requirements would include changes to 

specifically require that the central 

alarm station (CAS) and secondary 

alarm station (SAS) have functionally 

equivalent capabilities such that no 

single act can disable the key functions 

of both CAS and SAS. The proposed 

additions would also include 

requirements for new reactor licensees 

to position the SAS within the protected 

area, add bullet resistance and limit the 

visibility into SAS. Proposed additions 

also require uninterruptible backup 

power supplies for detection and 

assessment equipment, ‘‘video-capture’’

capability, and qualification 

requirements for drill and exercise 

controllers. 

11. Miscellaneous. The proposed rule 

would eliminate some requirements that 

the staff found to be unnecessary, while 

still providing high assurance that 

activities involving special nuclear 

material are not inimical to the common 

defense and security and do not 

constitute an unreasonable risk to the 

public health and safety. One such 

requirement to be eliminated provides 

for guards to escort operators of motor 

vehicles within the protected area if the 

operators are cleared for unescorted 

access. The proposed rule would also 

add new requirements, including 

predefined provisions for the 

suspension of safeguards measures for 

severe weather conditions that could 

result in life-threatening situations for 

security personnel (e.g., tornadoes, 

floods, and hurricanes), and reduced 

overly-prescriptive requirements 

through the inclusion of performancebased language to allow flexibility in the 

methods used to accomplish 

requirements. 

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis 

IV.1. New Weapons Requirements 

This proposed rulemaking would 

implement new weapons requirements 

that stem from the EPAct 2005. This is 

the only portion of this proposed 

rulemaking that involves facilities other 

than nuclear power reactors. The newly 

proposed weapons requirements would 

apply to power reactors and facilities 

authorized to possess a formula quantity 

or greater of strategic special nuclear 

material whose security plans are 

governed by §§ 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46. 

The new requirements would be in 

three different sections and would 

include the utilization of an NRC Form: 

• Revised proposed § 73.2, 

‘‘Definitions’’. 


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• Proposed § 73.18, ‘‘Firearms 

background checks for armed security 

personnel’’. 

• Proposed § 73.19, ‘‘Authorization 

for use of enhanced weapons’’. 

• Proposed NRC Form 754, ‘‘Armed 

Security Personnel Background Check’’. 

Under proposed § 73.18, after the NRC 

approves the licensee’s or certificate 

holder’s application, all security 

personnel must have a satisfactorily 

completed firearms background check to 

have access to covered weapons. 

Licensees and certificate holders would 

be required under proposed § 73.19 to 

notify the NRC that they have 

satisfactorily completed a sufficient 

number of firearms background checks 

to staff their security organization. The 

firearms background checks required by 

proposed § 73.18 would be intended to 

verify that armed security personnel are 

not prohibited from receiving, 

possessing, transporting, or using 

firearms under Federal or State law. A 

firearms background check would 

consist of two parts, a check of an 

individual’s fingerprints against the 

FBI’s fingerprint system and a check of 

the individual’s identity against the 

FBI’s National Instant Criminal 

Background Check System (NICS). The 

NRC would propose a new NRC Form 

754 for licensee or certificate holder 

security personnel to submit the 

necessary information to the NRC for 

forwarding to the FBI to perform the 

NICS portion of the firearms background 

check. The requirement to satisfactorily 

complete a firearms background check 

would apply to security personnel 

either directly employed by the licensee 

or certificate holder or employed by a 

security contractor to the licensee or 

certificate holder and whose official 

duties require access to covered 

weapons (i.e., armed security personnel) 

[see also new definitions for covered 

weapons, enhanced weapons, and 

standard weapons in § 73.2]. 

Additionally, the requirement for 

licensees or certificate holders to ensure 

that their security personnel have 

satisfactorily completed a firearms 

background check would apply to 

licensees and certificate holders who 

have applied for and received NRC 

approval of preemption authority or 

enhanced-weapons authority. In order 

to simplify the rule language, § 73.18 

would only refer to applications for 

preemption authority because 

preemption authority would always be 

a necessary prerequisite for the receipt 

of enhanced weapons authority. 

The NRC would propose that a 

licensee or certificate holder may begin 

firearms background checks on armed 

security personnel after the licensee or 

certificate holder has applied to the 

NRC for the preemption authority 

section 161A of the AEA. Because the 

NRC has not previously had the 

authority to require its licensees or 

certificate holders to complete firearms 

background checks on security 

personnel, in most instances these 

requirements would be new to licensees 

and uncertainties exist over the amount 

of time to complete these checks. Thus 

delays in completing the checks (e.g., 

the time necessary to resolve any errors 

of fact in the FBI’s NICS databases) 

could reduce the number of available 

security officers and create fatigue or 

minimum staffing level issues. 

Therefore, the NRC envisions working 

with licensees and certificate holders on 

a case-by-case basis to establish the date 

for NRC approval of an application for 

preemption authority; and thereby 

ensure that the licensee’s or certificate 

holder’s security organizations can 

continue to adequately protect the 

facility when the approval is issued. 

The Commission has not yet 

determined whether licensees and 

certificate holders may apply for 

preemption authority alone or combined 

preemption and enhanced-weapons 

authority prior to issuance of a final 

rule. In anticipation that the 

Commission does permit applications 

for section 161A authority prior to 

promulgation of a final rule, the 

proposed rule would include language 

to support a transition to these 

regulations from requirements imposed 

by Commission orders granting section 

161A authority. The proposed rule 

would not, however, require a licensee 

or certificate holder to repeat a firearms 

background check for security personnel 

who previously satisfactorily completed 

a firearms background check that was 

required under Commission order. 

Consequently, this approach would 

provide both the Commission and 

industry with the maximum flexibility 

to expeditiously implement the security 

enhancements authorized by section 

161A. The exception to this requirement 

would be for security personnel who 

have had a break in employment with 

the licensee or certificate holder or their 

security contractor, or who have 

transferred from another licensee or 

certificate holder (who previously 

completed a firearms background check 

on them). In either case these security 

personnel would be treated as new 

security personnel and they would be 

subject to a new firearms background 

check. 

The proposed rule would also provide 

direction on how security personnel 

who have received an adverse firearms 

background check (i.e., a ‘‘denied’’ or 

‘‘delayed’’ NICS response) may: (1) 

Obtain further information from the FBI 

on the reason for the adverse response, 

(2) appeal a ‘‘denied’’ response, or (3) 

provide additional information to 

resolve a ‘‘delayed’’ response. Security 

personnel would be required to apply 

directly to the FBI for these actions (i.e., 

the licensee or certificate holder may 

not appeal to the FBI on behalf of the 

security personnel). Only after such 

personnel have successfully appealed 

their ‘‘denied’’ response, and have 

subsequently received a ‘‘proceed’’

NICS response, would they be permitted 

access to covered weapons. 

Security personnel who receive a 

‘‘denied’’ NICS response are presumed 

by ATF to be prohibited from possessing 

or receiving a firearm under federal law 

(see 18 U.S.C. 922) and may not have 

access to covered weapons unless they 

have successfully appealed the 

‘‘denied’’ NICS response and received a 

‘‘proceed’’ NICS response. Because of 

the structure of section 161A, the 

proposed rule would not require 

licensees or certificate holders to 

remove personnel with a ‘‘denied’’

response until after the NRC has 

approved the licensee’s or certificate 

holder’s application for preemption 

authority (i.e., licensee’s and certificate 

holders would not be subject to the 

requirements of § 73.18 until after the 

NRC’s approval of their application for 

preemption authority is issued). 

However, the NRC’s expectation is that 

current licensees or certificate holders 

who receive a ‘‘denied’’ response for 

current security personnel would 

remove those personnel from any 

security duties requiring possession of 

firearms to comport with applicable 

Federal law and ATF regulations. 

The NRC would propose to charge the 

same fee for fingerprints submitted for 

a firearms background check as is 

currently imposed for fingerprints 

submitted for other NRC-required 

criminal history checks including 

fingerprints (i.e., an NRC administrative 

fee plus the FBI’s processing fee). In 

addition, the NRC would charge an 

administrative fee for processing the 

NICS check information; however, no 

FBI fee would be charged for the NICS 

check. 

The proposed § 73.19 would only 

apply to power reactor licensees and 

Category I special nuclear material 

licensees; therefore, only these two 

classes of licensees would be subject to 

the firearms background check 

provisions of § 73.18. The NRC may, 

however, consider making stand-alone 

preemption authority or combined 

enhanced-weapons authority and 

preemption authority available to other 


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types of licensees or certificate holders 

in future rulemakings. 

In § 73.19, the NRC would propose 

requirements for a licensee or certificate 

holder to apply for stand-alone 

preemption authority or to apply for 

combined enhanced-weapons authority 

and preemption authority. Licensees 

and certificate holders who apply for 

enhanced-weapons authority, must also 

apply for and receive NRC approval of 

preemption authority as a necessary 

prerequisite to receiving enhancedweapons authority. The NRC would 

propose limiting either authority to 

power reactor licensees and Category I 

SSNM licensees at this time. The NRC 

may consider applying this authority to 

other types of licensees, certificate 

holders, radioactive material, or other 

property (as authorized under section 

161A) in future rulemakings. Obtaining 

enhanced-weapons authority from the 

NRC would be a necessary prerequisite 

for a licensee or certificate holder to 

apply under ATF’s regulations for a 

Federal firearms license for these 

weapons. The NRC would propose that 

licensees and certificate holders who 

want to apply for enhanced-weapons 

authority must provide the NRC, for 

prior review and approval, a new or 

revised security plan, training and 

qualification plan, and safeguards 

contingency plan to reflect the use of 

these specific new weapons the licensee 

or certificate holder intends to employ 

and to provide a safety assessment of 

the onsite and offsite impact of these 

specific enhanced weapons. 

The proposed rule would also provide 

direction on acceptable training 

standards for training and qualification 

on enhanced weapons. The NRC would 

require licensees and certificate holders 

to complete training and qualification of 

security personnel on any enhanced 

weapons, before these personnel employ 

those weapons to protect the facility. 

The NRC would also require 

Commission licensees and certificate 

holders to notify the NRC of any adverse 

ATF findings associated with ATF’s 

inspections, audits, or reviews of their 

Federal firearms license (FFL) (i.e., an 

FFL held by an NRC licensee or 

certificate holder). 

Finally, the NRC would propose to 

treat enhanced weapons the same as 

existing weapons for the purpose of 

‘‘use’’ of these weapons; and therefore 

§ 73.19 would cross reference to existing 

regulation in §§ 73.55 and 73.46 on the 

use of weapons by reactor licensees and 

by Category I SSNM licensees ( i.e., the 

NRC is not proposing separate 

requirements on enhanced weapons 

versus standard weapons; rather, 

requirements on the use of any 

weaponry possessed by the licensee or 

certificate holder should be appropriate 

for the facility). 

To implement the new weapons 

provisions, three new terms would be 

added to § 73.2: covered weapon, 

enhanced weapon, and standard 

weapon. 

The proposed new weapons 

requirements and supporting discussion 

for the proposed language are set forth 

in more detail (including the proposed 

new definitions) in Table 1. 

IV.2. Section 73.55, ‘‘Requirements for 

Physical Protection of Licensed 

Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors 

Against Radiological Sabotage’’ 

Proposed § 73.55 contains security 

program requirements for power reactor 

licensees. The security program 

requirements in § 73.55 would apply to 

all nuclear power plant licensees that 

hold a 10 CFR part 50 license and to 

applicants who are applying for either a 

part 50 license or a part 52 combined 

license. Paragraph (a) of § 73.55 would 

identify the licensees and applicants for 

which the requirements apply, and the 

need for submitting to NRC (for review 

and approval) a ‘‘Physical Security 

Plan,’’ a ‘‘Training and Qualification 

Plan,’’ and a ‘‘Safeguards Contingency 

Plan.’’ Paragraph (b) of § 73.55 would 

set forth the performance objectives that 

govern power reactor security programs. 

The remaining paragraphs of § 73.55 

would implement the detailed 

requirements for each of the security 

plans, as well as for the various features 

of physical security. 

This section would be extensively 

revised in an effort to make generically 

applicable security requirements 

imposed by Commission orders issued 

after the terrorist attacks of September 

11, 2001, based upon experience and 

insights gained by the Commission 

during implementation, fulfill certain 

provisions of the EPAct of 2005, and 

add several new requirements that 

resulted from evaluation insights from 

implementation of the security orders, 

review of site security plans, and 

implementation of the enhanced 

baseline inspection program and forceon-force exercises. The proposed 

regulations would require an integrated 

security plan that begins at the owner 

controlled area boundary and would 

implement defense-in-depth concepts 

and protective strategies based on 

protecting target sets from the various 

attributes of the design basis threat. 

Notable additions to the proposed 

§ 73.55 are summarized below. 

Cyber Security Requirements 

The current security regulations do 

not contain requirements related to 

cyber security. Subsequent to the events 

of September 11, 2001, the NRC issued 

orders to require power reactor licensees 

to implement measures to enhance 

cyber security. These security measures 

required an assessment of cyber systems 

and the implementation of corrective 

measures sufficient to provide 

protection against the cyber threats at 

the time the orders were issued. 

The proposed requirements maintain 

the intent of the security orders by 

establishing the requirement for a cyber 

security program to protect any system 

that, if compromised, can adversely 

impact safety, security, or emergency 

preparedness. 

Requirements for CAS and SAS To Have 

Functionally Equivalent Capabilities 

Such That No Single Act Can Disable 

the Function of CAS and SAS 

Current regulatory requirements 

ensure that both CAS and SAS have 

equivalent alarm annunciation and 

communication capabilities, but do not 

explicitly require equivalent 

assessment, monitoring, observation, 

and surveillance capabilities. Further, 

the current requirement of § 73.55(e)(1) 

states ‘‘All alarms required pursuant to 

this part must annunciate in a 

continuously manned central alarm 

station located within the protected area 

and in at least one other continuously 

manned station not necessarily onsite, 

so that a single act cannot remove the 

capability of calling for assistance or 

otherwise responding to an alarm.’’ The 

Commission orders added enhanced 

detection and assessment capabilities, 

but did not require equivalent 

capabilities for both CAS and SAS. The 

security plans approved by the 

Commission on October 29, 2004, 

varied, due to the performance-based 

nature of the requirements, with respect 

to how the individual licensees 

implemented these requirements, but all 

sites were required to provide a CAS 

and SAS with functionally equivalent 

capabilities to support the 

implementation of the site protective 

strategy. 

The proposed rule would extend the 

requirement for no single act to remove 

capabilities to the key functions of the 

alarm stations and would require 

licensees to implement protective 

measures such that a single act would 

not disable the intrusion detection, 

assessment, and communications 

capabilities of both the CAS and SAS. 

This proposed requirement would 

ensure continuity of response 


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operations during a security event by 

ensuring that the detection, assessment, 

and communications functions required 

to effectively implement the licensee’s 

protective strategy are maintained 

despite the loss of one or the other 

alarm station. For the purposes of 

assessing the regulatory burden of this 

proposed rule, the NRC assumed that all 

licensees would require assessments 

and approximately one third of the 

licensees would choose to implement 

hardware modifications. 

The NRC has concluded that 

protecting the alarm stations such that 

a single act does not disable the key 

functions would provide an enhanced 

level of assurance that a licensee can 

maintain detection, assessment and 

communications capabilities required to 

protect the facility against the design 

basis threat of radiological sabotage. For 

new reactor licensees, licensed after the 

publication of this rule, the Commission 

would require CAS and SAS to be 

designed, constructed, and equipped 

with equivalent standards. 

Uninterruptible Power for Intrusion 

Detection and Assessment Systems 

Current regulatory requirements 

require back-up power for alarm 

annunciation and non-portable 

communication equipment, but do not 

require this back-up power to be 

uninterruptible. Although not 

specifically required, many licensees 

have installed uninterruptible power to 

their security systems for added 

reliability of these electronic systems. 

However, the Commission had not 

required uninterruptible power for 

assessment systems. For the purposes of 

assessing the regulatory burden of this 

proposed rule, the NRC assumed that 

only a small number of licensees would 

require hardware modifications to meet 

this proposed requirement. 

Through implementation of the 

Commission-approved security plans, 

baseline inspections, and force-on-force 

testing, the NRC has concluded that 

uninterruptible back-up power would 

provide an enhanced level of assurance 

that a licensee can maintain detection, 

assessment and communication 

capabilities required to protect the 

facility against the design basis threat of 

radiological sabotage. This new 

requirement would reduce the risk of 

losing detection, assessment, and 

communication capabilities during a 

loss of the normal power supply. 

‘‘Video-Capture’’ Capability 

Current regulatory requirements 

address the use of closed circuit 

television systems, but do not explicitly 

require them. Although not specifically 

required, all licensees have adopted the 

use of video surveillance in their site 

security plans. Many of the licensees 

have adopted advanced video 

surveillance technology to provide realtime and play-back/recorded video 

images to assist security personnel in 

determining the cause of an alarm 

annunciation. For the purposes of 

assessing the regulatory burden of this 

proposed rule, the NRC assumed that a 

small percentage of licensees would 

require hardware modifications to 

comply with this proposed requirement 

for advanced video surveillance 

technology. 

Through implementation of the 

Commission-approved security plans, 

baseline inspections, and force-on-force 

testing, the NRC has concluded that 

advanced video technology would 

provide an enhanced level of assurance 

that a licensee can assess the cause of 

an alarm annunciation and initiate a 

timely response capable of defending 

the facility against the threat up to and 

including the design basis threat of 

radiological sabotage. Therefore the 

proposed rule would require advanced 

video surveillance technology. 

Implementation of § 73.55 is linked 

principally to the application of 

appendix B to part 73, ‘‘General criteria 

for security personnel,’’ and appendix C 

to part 73, ‘‘Licensee safeguards 

contingency plans,’’ both of which 

would be revised in this proposed 

rulemaking. Proposed changes to these 

appendices are discussed in Sections 

IV.6 and IV.7 of this document. 

Table 2 sets forth the proposed § 73.55 

language as compared to the current 

language, and provides the supporting 

discussion for the proposed language 

including new definitions for security 

officer and target set that would be 

added to § 73.2. Because § 73.55 would 

be restructured extensively, Table 9 (See 

Section VIII) provides a cross reference 

to locate individual requirements of the 

current regulation within the proposed 

regulation. 

The Commission is interested in 

obtaining specific stakeholder input on 

the impacts and burdens for certain 

areas of proposed changes to § 73.55. 

Due to the accelerated rulemaking 

schedule, the NRC staff’s assessments of 

impacts to individual licensees as a 

result of the proposed new requirements 

have not been informed by stakeholder 

insights on potential implementation 

issues. Consequently, the Commission 

recognizes that its views on the 

feasability, costs, and time necessary to 

fully implement certain portions of this 

proposed rule (e.g., alarm station, 

supporting systems, video systems, and 

cyber security issues) by selected 

licensees may not be fully informed. 

Accordingly, the Commission is 

requesting persons commenting on this 

proposed rule to address the following 

questions: 

1. What insights and estimates can 

stakeholders provide on the feasability, 

costs, and time necessary to implement 

the proposed rule’s changes to existing 

alarm stations, supporting systems, 

video systems, and cyber security? 

2. Are there any actions that should 

be considered, such as authorizing 

alternative measures, exemptions, 

extended implementation schedules, 

etc., that would allow the NRC to 

mitigate any unnecessary regulatory 

burden created by these requirements? 

IV.3. Section 73.56, ‘‘Personnel Access 

Authorization Requirements for Nuclear 

Power Plants’’

This section would continue to apply 

to all current part 50 licensees and to all 

applicants who are applying for a new 

reactor license under parts 50 or 52, but 

would be extensively revised. Proposed 

§ 73.56 would retain the requirement for 

a licensee to determine that an 

individual is trustworthy and reliable 

before permitting the individual to have 

unescorted access to nuclear power 

plant protected areas and vital areas. 

The majority of the revisions in 

proposed § 73.56 reflect several 

fundamental changes to the NRC’s 

approach to access authorization 

requirements since the terrorist attacks 

of September 11, 2001, and the NRC’s 

concern with the threat of an active or 

passive insider who may collude with 

adversaries to commit radiological 

sabotage. These changes would include: 

(1) An increase in the rigor of some 

elements of the access authorization 

program to provide increased assurance 

that individuals who have unescorted 

access authorization are trustworthy and 

reliable; (2) an elimination of temporary 

unescorted access provisions [prior to 

the completion of the full background 

check]; (3) an elimination of the 

provisions that permit relaxation of the 

program when a reactor is in cold 

shutdown; and (4) the addition of a new 

category of individuals who would be 

subject to § 73.56. 

Proposed § 73.56(b)(ii) would require 

licensees’ access authorization programs 

to cover individuals whose job duties 

and responsibilities permit them to 

access or use digital computer systems 

that may affect licensees’ operational 

safety and security systems, and 

emergency response capabilities. 

Historically digital computer systems 

have played a limited role in the 

operation of nuclear power plants. 

However, the role of computer systems 


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at nuclear power plants is increasing, as 

licensees take advantage of computer 

technology to maximize plant 

productivity. In general, licensees 

currently exclude from their access 

authorization programs, individuals 

who may electronically access 

equipment in the protected areas of 

nuclear power plants to perform their 

job functions, if their duties and 

responsibilities do not require physical 

unescorted access to the equipment 

located within protected or vital areas. 

However, because these individuals 

manage and maintain the networks that 

connect to equipment located within 

protected or vital areas and are 

responsible for permitting authorized 

and/or trusted personnel to gain 

electronic access to equipment and 

systems, they are often granted greater 

electronic privileges than the trusted 

and authorized personnel. With 

advancements in electronic technology 

and telecommunications, differences in 

the potential adverse impacts of a 

saboteur’s actions through physical 

access and electronic access are 

lessening. Thus, the proposed rule 

would require those individuals who 

have authority to electronically access 

equipment that, if compromised, can 

adversely impact operational safety, 

security or emergency preparedness of 

the nuclear power plants, to be 

determined to be trustworthy and 

reliable. 

The proposed revisions to § 73.56 

would also address changes in the 

nuclear industry’s structure and 

business practices since this rule was 

originally promulgated. At the time the 

current § 73.56 was developed, 

personnel transfers between licensees 

(i.e., leaving the employment of one 

licensee to work for another licensee) 

with interruptions in unescorted access 

authorization were less common. Most 

licensees operated plants at a single site 

and maintained an access authorization 

program that applied only to that site. 

When an individual left employment at 

one site and began working for another 

licensee, the individual was subject to a 

different access authorization program 

that often had different requirements. 

Because some licensees were reluctant 

to share information about previous 

employees with the new employer, 

licensees often did not have access to 

the information the previous licensee 

had gathered about the individual and 

so were required to gather the necessary 

information again. The additional effort 

to collect information that another 

licensee held created a burden on both 

licensees and applicants for unescorted 

access authorization. But, because few 

individuals transferred, the burden was 

not excessive. 

However, since 1991, the industry has 

undergone significant consolidation and 

developed new business practices to use 

its workforce more efficiently. Industry 

efforts to better use staffing resources 

have resulted in the development of a 

transient workforce that travels from site 

to site as needed, such as roving outage 

crews. Although the industry has 

always relied on contractors and 

vendors (C/V) for special expertise and 

staff for outages, the number of transient 

personnel who work solely in the 

nuclear industry has increased and the 

length of time they are on site has 

decreased. Because the current 

regulations were written on the basis 

that the majority of nuclear personnel 

would remain at one site for years, and 

that licensees would maintain 

independent, site-specific access 

authorization programs and share 

limited information, the current 

regulations do not adequately address 

the transfer of personnel between sites. 

In light of the NRC’s increased 

concern with an insider threat since 

September 11, 2001, the increasingly 

mobile nuclear industry workforce has 

heightened the need for information 

sharing among licensee access 

authorization programs, including C/V 

authorization programs upon which 

licensees rely, to ensure that licensees 

have information that is as complete as 

possible about an individual when 

making an unescorted access 

authorization decision. To address this 

need, the access authorization orders 

issued by the NRC to nuclear power 

plant licensees on January 7, 2003, 

mandated increased sharing of 

information. In addition, proposed 

§ 73.56 would require licensees and 

C/V to collect and share greater amounts 

of information than under the current 

rule, subject to the protections of 

individuals’ privacy that would be 

specified in proposed § 73.56(m) 

[Protection of information]. As a result, 

individuals who are subject to this 

section would establish a detailed 

‘‘track record’’ within the industry that 

would potentially cover their activities 

over long periods of time and would 

follow them if they change jobs and 

move to a new position that requires 

them to be granted unescorted access 

authorization by another licensee. The 

proposed requirement acknowledges the 

industry initiative to develop and utilize 

a database to ensure accurate 

information sharing between sites. This 

increased information sharing is 

necessary to provide high assurance that 

individuals who are granted and 

maintain unescorted access 

authorization are trustworthy and 

reliable when individuals move 

between access authorization programs. 

In addition, the increased information 

sharing would reduce regulatory burden 

on licensees when processing 

individuals who have had only short 

breaks between periods of unescorted 

access authorization. 

Another change in the NRC’s 

proposed approach to access 

authorization requirements is the result 

of a series of public meetings that were 

held with stakeholders during 2001–

2004 to discuss potential revisions to 10 

CFR part, 26, ‘‘Fitness-for-Duty 

Programs.’’ Part 26 establishes 

additional steps that the licensees who 

are subject to § 73.56 must take as part 

of the process of determining whether to 

grant unescorted access authorization to 

an individual or permit an individual to 

maintain unescorted access 

authorization. These additional 

requirements focus on aspects of an 

individual’s behavior, character, and 

reputation related to substance abuse. 

They require the licensee and other 

entities who are subject to part 26 to 

conduct drug and alcohol testing of 

individuals and an inquiry into the 

individual’s past behavior with respect 

to illegal drug use or consumption of 

alcohol to excess, as part of determining 

whether the individual may be granted 

unescorted access authorization. 

However, historically there have been 

some inconsistencies and redundancies 

between the § 73.56 access authorization 

requirements and the related 

requirements in part 26. These 

inconsistencies have led to 

implementation questions from 

licensees, as well as inconsistencies in 

how licensees have implemented the 

requirements. The redundancies have, 

in other cases, imposed an unnecessary 

regulatory burden on licensees. 

During public meetings held to 

discuss potential changes to part 26, the 

stakeholders pointed out ambiguities in 

the terms used in both part 26 and 

§ 73.56, apparent inconsistencies and 

redundancies in the related 

requirements, and reported many 

experiences in which the ambiguities 

and lack of specificity and clarity in 

current § 73.56 had resulted in 

unintended consequences. Although 

these meetings did not focus on § 73.56, 

many of the stakeholders’ comments 

directly resulted in some of the 

proposed changes to § 73.56. 

(Summaries of these meetings, and any 

comments provided through the Web 

site, are available at http:// 

ruleforum.llnl.gov/cgi-bin/ 

rulemake?source=Part26_risk&st=risk.) 

In response to stakeholder requests, the 


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NRC has proposed language changes to 

improve the clarity and specificity of 

the requirements in proposed § 73.56 

and substantially reorganized the 

section to present the requirements 

generally in the order in which they 

would apply to licensees’ access 

authorization processes. The proposed 

changes are expected to result in more 

uniform implementation of the 

requirements, and, consequently, greater 

consistency in achieving the goals of 

§ 73.56. Table 3 sets forth the proposed 

§ 73.56 language as compared to the 

current language, and discusses the 

proposed language. 

The Commission is interested in 

obtaining specific stakeholder input on 

the following two issues: 

1. The Commission requests public 

comment specific to the appropriateness 

of the framework for the Insider 

Mitigation Program as specified by the 

proposed 10 CFR 73.55(b)(7)(i) and 

73.55(b)(7)(ii). The proposed rule 

specifies that the Insider Mitigation 

Program include elements of the access 

authorization program, fitness-for-duty 

program, behavioral observation 

program, and various physical security 

measures for the purpose of providing 

assurance that insider activities would 

be detected before adverse affects could 

be realized. 

2. The Commission requests public 

comment on the feasibility of adding a 

requirement to the proposed rule to 

require a modified escorted visitor 

access provision which would allow site 

visits by members of the public to 

limited areas of the facility for the 

purpose of enhancing public education 

and awareness through informational 

briefings and tours at the facility. 

IV.4. Section 73.58 ‘‘Safety/Security 

Interface Requirements for Nuclear 

Power Reactors’’

The NRC is proposing to add a new 

requirement to part 73 addressing the 

safety/security interface for nuclear 

power reactor licensees. The need for 

the proposed new requirement is based 

upon the NRC’s experience in reviewing 

licensees’ implementation of a 

significant number of new security 

requirements since the terrorist attacks 

of September 11, 2001. Licensees have 

always been required to ensure that any 

changes to safety functions, systems, 

programs, and activities do not have 

unintended consequences on other 

facility safety functions, systems, 

programs, and activities. Likewise, 

licensees have been required to ensure 

that any changes to security functions, 

systems, programs, and activities do not 

have unintended consequences on other 

facility security functions, systems, 

programs, and activities. However, the 

Commission has concluded that the 

pace, number, and complexity of these 

security changes warrant the 

establishment of a more formal program 

to ensure licensees properly assess the 

safety/security interface in 

implementing these changes. 

On April 28, 2003, the Union of 

Concerned Scientists and the San Luis 

Obispo Mothers for Peace submitted a 

petition for rulemaking (PRM–50–80) 

requesting that, in part, the NRC’s 

regulations establishing conditions of 

licenses and requirements for evaluating 

proposed changes, tests, and 

experiments for nuclear power plants be 

amended to require licensee evaluation 

of whether the proposed changes, tests, 

and experiments cause protection 

against radiological sabotage to be 

decreased and, if so, that the changes, 

tests, and experiments only be 

conducted with prior NRC approval. In 

SECY–05–0048, dated March 28, 2005, 

the NRC staff recommended that the 

Commission approve rulemaking for the 

requested action, but did not necessarily 

endorse the specific amendments 

suggested by the petition. In SECY–05–

0048, dated June 28, 2005, the 

Commission directed the staff to 

develop the technical basis for such a 

rule and to incorporate its provisions 

within the ongoing power reactor 

security requirements rulemaking. This 

proposed rule addresses, in part, the 

petitioner’s request by incorporating 

proposed § 73.58 within this 

rulemaking. 

The Commission has determined that 

the proposed safety/security interface 

rule requirements are necessary because 

the current regulations do not 

specifically require evaluation of the 

effects of plant changes on security or 

the effects of security changes on plant 

safety. Further, current regulations do 

not require communication about the 

implementation and timing of changes, 

which would promote awareness of the 

effects of changing facility conditions 

and result in appropriate assessment 

and response. 

The NRC is aware of a number of 

occurrences of adverse safety/security 

interactions at nuclear power plants 

over the years to justify consideration of 

a new rule. Examples of adverse 

interactions include: (1) Inadvertent 

security barrier breaches while 

performing maintenance activities (e.g., 

cutting of pipes that provided 

uncontrolled access to vital areas, 

removing ventilation fans or other 

equipment from vital area boundary 

walls without taking compensatory 

measures to prevent uncontrolled access 

into vital areas); (2) Blockage of bullet 

resisting enclosure’s (or other defensive 

firing position’s) fields of fire; (3) 

Erection of scaffolding and other 

equipment without due consideration of 

its impact on the site’s applicable 

physical protection strategy; and (4) 

Staging of temporary equipment within 

security isolation zones. 

Security could also adversely affect 

operations because of inadequate 

staffing of security force personnel on 

backshifts, weekends, and holidays, to 

support operations during emergencies 

(e.g., opening and securing vital area 

access doors to allow operations 

personnel timely access to safety-related 

equipment). Also, security structures, 

such as vehicle barriers, delay barriers, 

rerouted isolation zones, or defensive 

shields could adversely affect plant 

equipment such as valve pits, fire 

stations, other prepositioned emergency 

equipment, blowout panels, or 

otherwise interfere with operators 

responding to plant events. 

The NRC considered many factors in 

developing this proposed new 

requirement. One of the factors 

considered is that existing change 

processes are focused on specific areas 

of plant activities, and that 

implementation of these processes is 

generally well understood by licensees. 

An example is found in § 50.54(p), 

which provides that a reactor licensee 

may make changes to its safeguards 

contingency plans without Commission 

approval provided that the changes do 

not decrease the safeguards 

effectiveness of the plan. Similarly, 

§ 50.65(a)(4) provides that a reactor 

licensee shall assess and manage the 

increase in risk that may result from 

proposed maintenance activities. 

However, neither §§ 50.54(p) (security) 

nor 50.65(a)(4) (safety) require that an 

assessment for potential adverse 

impacts on safety/security interface be 

made before the proposed changes are 

implemented. The proposed § 73.58 

would address this gap by requiring 

that, before implementing allowed 

changes, licensees must assess the 

changes with respect to the safety/ 

security interface and, if potential 

adverse interactions are identified, take 

appropriate compensatory and/or 

mitigative action before making the 

changes. 

The proposed rule reflects a 

performance-based approach and 

language which is sufficiently broad 

that, in addition to operating power 

reactors, it could be applied to other 

classes of licensees in separate 

rulemaking(s), if conditions warrant. In 

addition to the requirements in 

proposed § 73.58, a new definition for 


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safety/security interface would be added 

to § 73.2. 

Table 4 sets forth the proposed § 73.58 

language and provides the supporting 

discussion for the proposed language, 

including a new definition for safety/ 

security interface that would be added 

to § 73.2. 

IV.5. Section 73.71 ‘‘Reporting of 

Safeguards Events’’

The events of September 11, 2001, 

emphasized the need for the capability 

to respond to coordinated attacks that 

could pose an imminent threat to 

national infrastructure such as nuclear 

power reactor sites. Prompt licensee 

notification to the NRC of a security 

event involving an actual or imminent 

threat would initiate the NRC’s alerting 

mechanism for other nuclear facilities in 

recognition that an attack or threat 

against a single facility may be the 

prelude to attacks or threats against 

multiple facilities. In either case, timely 

communication of this event to the 

NRC, and the NRC’s communication of 

the threat or attack to other licensees 

could reduce the adversaries’ ability to 

engage in coordinated attacks and 

would strengthen the licensees’

response posture. NRC would also 

initiate notifications to the Homeland 

Security/Federal response networks for 

an ‘‘Incident of National Significance,’’

as defined by the National Response 

Plan (NRP). 

Currently, § 73.71(b)(1) requires 

power reactor licensees to notify the 

NRC within one hour of discovery, as 

described in Paragraph I of appendix G 

to 10 CFR part 73, ‘‘Reportable 

safeguards events.’’ In addition, § 50.72 

establishes reporting requirements for 

events requiring an emergency 

declaration in accordance with a 

licensee’s emergency plan. Licensee 

notification under § 50.72(a)(3) is 

required only after the threat is 

assessed, an ‘‘Emergency Class’’ is 

declared, and initial notification of 

appropriate State and local agencies are 

completed first (i.e., not upon 

discovery). The current timing of 

requirements of this notification would 

not allow the NRC to warn other 

licensees of a potential threat to their 

facilities in a prompt manner to allow 

other licensees to change their security 

posture in advance of a threat or 

potential attack. The Commission has 

previously advised licensees of the need 

to expedite their initial notification to 

the NRC. The proposed accelerated 

notification requirements are similar to 

those provided to licensees in NRC 

Bulletin 2005–02, ‘‘Emergency 

Preparedness and Response Actions for 

Security-Based Events,’’ dated July 18, 

2005. 

The proposed amendments to § 73.71 

would add a new expedited notification 

requirement for licensees subject to the 

provisions of § 73.55 to notify the NRC 

Operations Center as soon as possible 

after the discovery of an imminent or 

actual threat against the facility as 

described in appendix G to part 73, but 

not later than 15 minutes after 

discovery. The proposed amendments to 

§ 73.71 and appendix G to part 73 

would also add two additional fourhour notification requirements for 

suspicious events and tampering events 

not otherwise covered under appendix 

G to part 73. The proposed § 73.71 

would retain the requirement for the 

licensee to maintain a continuous 

communications channel for one-hour 

notifications upon request of the NRC. 

The proposed rule would not require a 

continuous communications channel for 

four-hour notifications, because of the 

lesser degree of urgency of these events. 

For 15-minute notifications, the NRC 

may request the licensee establish a 

continuous communications channel 

after the licensee has made any 

emergency notifications to State officials 

or local law enforcement and if the 

licensee has taken action to stabilize the 

plant following any transient [associated 

with the 15-minute notification]. In NRC 

Bulletin 2005–02, ‘‘Emergency 

Preparedness and Response Actions for 

Security-Based Events,’’ dated July 18, 

2005, the NRC had indicated a 

continuous communications channel 

was not necessary for the new 15- 

minute notifications. However, in 

developing this proposed rule the 

Commission has evaluated the need to 

promptly obtain information of an 

unfolding event versus imposing an 

unreasonable burden on licensees in the 

midst of a rapidly unfolding event and 

possible plant transient. The 

Commission considers that the 

proposed regulation would provide a 

reasonable balance between these two 

objectives. Table 5 sets forth the 

proposed amendments to § 73.71 

language as compared to the current 

language, and provides the supporting 

discussion for the proposed language. 

Table 8 sets forth the proposed 

amendments to the appendix G to part 

73 language as compared to the current 

language, and provides the supporting 

discussion for the proposed language. 

The Commission is interested in 

obtaining specific stakeholder input on 

the proposed changes to § 73.71 and 

appendix G to part 73 . Accordingly, the 

Commission is requesting persons 

commenting on this proposed rule to 

address the following question: 

1. For the types of events covered by 

the proposed four-hour notification 

requirements in § 73.71 and appendix G 

to part 73, should the notification time 

interval of all or some of these 

notifications be different (e.g., a 1-hour, 

2-hour, 8-hour, 24-hour notification)? If 

so, what notification time interval is 

appropriate? ‘‘Notification time 

interval’’ is meant to be the time from 

when a licensee recognizes that an event 

has occurred or is occurring to the time 

that the licensee reports the event to the 

NRC. 

IV.6. Appendix B to Part 73, ‘‘General 

Criteria for Security Personnel’’

Appendix B to part 73 provides 

requirements for the training and 

qualification of security personnel to 

ensure that security personnel can 

execute their duties. Following the 

events of September 11, 2001, the 

Commission determined that tactical 

proficiency and physical fitness 

requirements governing licensees’

armed security force personnel needed 

to be enhanced. The proposed 

amendments to appendix B to part 73 

make generically applicable security 

requirements imposed by Commission 

orders issued after the terrorist attacks 

of September 11, 2001, based upon 

experience and insights gained by the 

Commission during implementation and 

add several new requirements that 

resulted from evaluation insights from 

force-on-force exercises. 

Notable additions to the proposed 

appendix B to part 73 requirements are 

summarized as follows: 

Additional Physical Requirements and 

Minimum Age Requirements for 

Unarmed Members of the Security 

Organization 

Unarmed security personnel perform 

duties similar to armed security 

personnel, such as detection, 

assessment, vehicle and personnel 

escort, and vital area controls. The 

current requirements for unarmed 

members of the security organization 

state, in part, that these individuals 

shall have no physical weaknesses or 

abnormalities that would affect their 

performance of assigned duties. 

However, the current rule does not 

require unarmed personnel to pass a 

physical examination to verify that they 

meet standards for vision, hearing, or 

some portions of psychological 

qualifications. The proposed rule would 

include a requirement to assure that 

unarmed security personnel are 

physically capable of performing their 

assigned duties. 

Additionally, the current rule 

specifies a minimum age of 21 years old 


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for armed security personnel, but does 

not specify a minimum age requirement 

for unarmed security personnel. The 

proposed rule would require that 

unarmed members attain the age of 18 

prior to assignment to establish a 

minimum age requirement for unarmed 

members of the security organization at 

a power reactor facility. 

These proposed additional 

requirements would assure that 

personnel performing security 

functions, whether armed or unarmed, 

meet appropriate age, vision, hearing 

and psychological requirements 

commensurate with their assigned 

security duties. 

Qualification Scores for Program 

Elements Required by the Training and 

Qualification Plan 

The current rule includes daylight 

qualification scores of 70 percent for 

handguns, 80 percent for semiautomatic 

rifles, 50 percent for shotguns and a 

requirement for night fire 

familiarization with assigned weapons. 

The April 29, 2003, Training Order 

imposed new requirements for the 

firearms training and qualification 

programs at power reactor licensees. 

The Training Order retained the current 

daylight qualification scores of 70 

percent for handguns, 80 percent for 

semiautomatic rifles and superceded the 

daylight qualification score of 50 

percent for the shotgun. The order did 

not specify a qualification score for the 

daylight course of fire for the shotgun, 

only an acceptable level of proficiency. 

The order superceded the current rule 

for night fire familiarization and added 

courses of fire for night fire and tactical 

training with assigned weapons. 

The proposed rule would retain the 

qualification scores of the existing 

regulations and add specific 

qualification scores for the daylight 

course of fire for the shotgun and/or 

enhanced weapons, the night fire 

qualification for shotguns, handguns, 

semiautomatic rifles and/or enhanced 

weapons and the tactical course of fire 

for all assigned weapons to remain 

consistent with the qualification scoring 

methodology contained in the current 

rule. The scoring methodology for the 

current rule and the proposed rule is 

consistent with the scoring methodology 

used for firearms programs at the local, 

State and Federal levels and is 

consistent with approved courses of fire 

from the law enforcement community 

and recognized national entities. 

The proposed rule would also include 

a requirement for a qualification score of 

80 percent for the annual written exam. 

The current rule does not provide a 

requirement for an annual written exam 

score. Likewise, the April 29, 2003, 

Training Order that required licensees 

to develop and implement an annual 

written exam also did not specify a 

qualification score. The Commission has 

determined that a score of 80 percent 

demonstrates a minimum level of 

understanding and familiarity of the 

material necessary to adequately 

perform security-related tasks. The 80- 

percent score would be consistent with 

minimum scores commonly utilized 

throughout the nuclear industry. 

Qualification Requirements for Security 

Trainers, Personnel Assessing 

Psychological Qualifications and 

Armorer Certifications 

The current rule and the security 

orders do not specifically address the 

qualification or certification of 

instructors, or other personnel that have 

assigned duties and responsibilities for 

implementation of training and 

qualification programs of power reactor 

licensees. 

The proposed rule includes specific 

references to personnel that have 

assigned duties and responsibilities for 

implementation of training and 

qualification programs to ensure these 

persons are qualified and/or certified to 

make determinations of security 

personnel suitability, working condition 

of security equipment, and overall 

determinations that security personnel 

are trained and qualified to execute 

their assigned duties. 

On-the-Job Training 

The current rule states in part that 

each individual who requires training to 

perform assigned security duties shall, 

prior to assignment, be trained to 

perform these tasks and duties. Each 

individual shall demonstrate the 

required knowledge, skill and ability in 

accordance with specific standards of 

each task. 

The proposed rule would specify the 

new requirement that the licensee 

include on-the-job training as part of the 

training and qualification program prior 

to assigning an individual to an 

unsupervised security position. This 

requirement is in addition to formal and 

informal classroom training. The on-thejob training program would provide the 

licensee the ability to assess an 

individual’s knowledge, skill and ability 

to effectively carry-out assigned duties, 

in a supervised manner, within the 

actual work environment, before 

assignment, to an unsupervised 

position. 

The proposed revision to appendix B 

of part 73 required special treatment in 

this rulemaking to preserve, with a 

minimum of conforming changes, the 

current requirements for licensees and 

applicants to whom this proposed rule 

would not apply. Accordingly, Section 

I through V of appendix B to part 73 

would remain unchanged, and the 

proposed new language for power 

reactors would be added as Section VI. 

Table 6 sets forth the proposed 

amendments to appendix B to part 73 

and provides the supporting discussion 

for the proposed language. Because this 

section would be extensively 

restructured, Table 10 (See Section VIII) 

provides a cross-reference to locate 

individual requirements of the current 

regulation within the proposed 

regulation. 

IV.7. Appendix C to Part 73, ‘‘Licensee 

Safeguards Contingency Plans’’

Appendix C to part 73 provides 

requirements that govern the 

development of safeguards contingency 

plans. Following the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, the NRC conducted 

a thorough review of security to 

continue to ensure that nuclear power 

plants had effective security measures 

in place given the changing threat 

environment. The proposed appendix C 

would increase the information required 

in the safeguards contingency plans for 

responses to threats, up to and 

including, design basis threats, as 

described in § 73.1. Notable additions to 

the proposed appendix C to part 73 

requirements are summarized below: 

Mitigating Strategies 

Current regulations do not include 

requirements to develop mitigating 

strategies for events beyond the scope of 

the design basis threat. The orders 

issued after September 11, 2001, 

included a requirement to preplan 

strategies for coping with such events. 

The proposed appendix C to part 73 

would contain this element of the orders 

to require that licensees preplan 

strategies to respond to and mitigate the 

consequences of potential events, 

including those that may result in the 

loss of large areas of the plant due to 

explosions or fire. 

Qualification Requirements for Drill and 

Exercise Controllers 

The current rule and the security 

orders do not specifically address the 

qualification of personnel that are 

assigned duties and responsibilities for 

implementation of training and 

qualification drills and exercises at 

power reactor licensees. 

The proposed rule includes specific 

references to personnel who function as 

drill and exercise controllers to ensure 

these persons are trained and qualified 

to execute their assigned duties. Drills 


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and exercises are key elements to 

assuring the preparedness of the 

licensee security force and must be 

conducted in a manner that 

demonstrates the licensee’s ability to 

execute the protective strategy as 

described in the site security plans. 

Additionally, drills and exercises must 

be performed properly to assure they do 

not negatively impact personnel or plant 

safety. 

The proposed revision to appendix C 

of part 73 required special treatment in 

this rulemaking to preserve, with a 

minimum of conforming changes, the 

current requirements for licensees and 

applicants to whom this proposed rule 

would not apply. Accordingly, 

appendix C to part 73 would be divided 

into two sections, with Section I 

maintaining all current requirements, 

and Section II containing all proposed 

requirements related to nuclear power 

reactors. 

Table 7 sets forth the proposed 

amendments to appendix C to part 73 

and provides the supporting discussion 

for the proposed language. Because this 

section would be extensively 

restructured, Table 11 (See Section VIII) 

is a cross-reference showing where 

individual requirements of the current 

regulation would be in the proposed 

regulation. 

IV.8. Appendix G to Part 73, 

‘‘Reportable Safeguards Events’’

Proposed appendix G to part 73 

provides requirements regarding the 

reporting of safeguards events. Proposed 

appendix G would contain changes to 

support the revised and accelerated 

reporting requirements which would be 

incorporated into this rulemaking. 

Proposed appendix G to part 73 would 

also contain revised four-hour reporting 

requirements that would require 

licensees to report to the NRC 

information of suspicious surveillance 

activities, attempts at access, or other 

similar information as addressed in 

Appendix G, section III (a)(1) and (2). 

Following September 11, 2001, the NRC 

issued guidance requesting that 

licensees report suspicious activities 

near their facilities to allow assessment 

by the NRC and other appropriate 

agencies. The proposed new reporting 

requirement would clarify this 

expectation to assure consistent 

reporting of this important information. 

Additionally, the proposed rule would 

contain an additional four-hour 

reporting requirement for tampering 

events that do not meet the threshold for 

reporting under the current one-hour 

requirements. The proposed reporting 

requirements for tampering events 

would allow NRC assessment of these 

events. Table 8 sets forth the proposed 

amendments to appendix G to part 73 

and provides the supporting discussion 

for the proposed language. 

The Commission is interested in 

obtaining specific stakeholder input on 

the following issue: 

1. The Commission requests public 

comment on the need to establish an 

additional requirement for licensees to 

establish and maintain predetermined 

communication protocols, such as 

passwords, with the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission in order to verify the 

authenticity of communications during 

a security event, to include 

requirements for uniform protocols to 

verify the authenticity of reports 

required under this proposed rule. 

IV.9. Conforming and Corrective 

Changes 

The following conforming changes 

would also be made: §§ 50.34 and 50.54 

(references to the correct paragraphs of 

revised appendix C of part 73), § 50.72 

(changes to § 73.71 reports), §§ 72.212 

and 73.70 (references to the correct 

paragraphs due to renumbering of 

§ 73.55), and § 73.8 (adding § 73.18, 

§ 73.19, and revised to reflect new NRC 

form 754 to reflect recordkeeping or 

reporting burden). A corrective change 

would also be made to § 73.8 to reflect 

an existing recordkeeping or reporting 

burden for NRC Form 366 under § 73.71. 

However, no changes would be made to 

§ 73.81(b) (due to the new §§ 73.18, 

73.19, and 73.58), because willful 

violations of §§ 73.18, 73.19, and 73.58 

may be subject to criminal penalties. 

TABLE 1.—PROPOSED PART 73.18 AND 73.19 AND CONFORMING CHANGES TO PART 73.2 

[Firearms background checks for armed security personnel and authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of enhanced weapons] 

Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.18 Firearms background checks for armed security personnel. 

(a) Purpose. This section sets forth the requirements for completion of 

firearms background checks on armed security personnel at selected 

NRC-regulated facilities. Firearms background checks are intended 

to verify that security personnel whose duties require access to covered weapons are not prohibited from receiving, possessing, transporting, importing, or using such weapons under applicable Federal 

or State law. Licensees and certificate holders listed under paragraph (c) of this section who have applied for preemption authority 

under § 73.19 (i.e., § 73.19 authority), or who have been granted preemption authority by Commission order, are subject to the requirements of this section. 

This new section would implement the firearms background check requirements of new section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 

as amended. Section 161A was added by section 653 of the Energy 

Policy Act of 2005. 

The proposed rule language in §§ 73.18 and 73.19, and conforming 

changes to § 73.2 would be consistent with the guidelines required 

by section 161A.d to implement the provisions of section 161A. Section 161A.d requires the Commission to issue guidelines, with the 

approval of the Attorney General, for section 161A to take effect. In 

parallel and separate from this rulemaking effort, guidelines are 

being developed by staffs from the NRC and the Department of Justice (DOJ), [including staffs from the FBI and ATF]. 

During development of these guidelines, the DOJ indicated that the 

firearms background check provisions of section 161A only take effect if a triggering event occurs. A triggering event would occur when 

a licensee or certificate holder applies to the NRC to use the standalone preemption authority or the combined enhanced-weapons and 

preemption authority of section 161A. Therefore, armed security personnel of both current and future licensees and certificate holders 

would not be subject to the firearms background check provisions of 

the proposed § 73.18, unless their employing licensee or certificate 

holder applies for and receives § 73.19 authority from the NRC. 


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TABLE 1.—PROPOSED PART 73.18 AND 73.19 AND CONFORMING CHANGES TO PART 73.2—Continued 

[Firearms background checks for armed security personnel and authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of enhanced weapons] 

Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.18(b) General Requirements. (1) Licensees and certificate holders listed in paragraph (c) of this section who have received NRC 

approval of their application for preemption authority shall ensure 

that a firearms background check has been satisfactorily completed 

for all security personnel requiring access to covered weapons as 

part of their official security duties prior to granting access to any 

covered weapons to those personnel. Security personnel who have 

satisfactorily completed a firearms background check, but who have 

had a break in employment with the licensee, certificate holder, or 

their security contractor of greater than one (1) week subsequent to 

their most recent firearms background check, or who have transferred from a different licensee or certificate holder (even though the 

other licensee or certificate holder satisfactorily completed a firearms 

background check on such individuals), are not excepted from the 

requirements of this section.

Paragraph (b)(1) would require current and future licensees and certificate holders who have received NRC approval of their application for 

preemption authority to ensure that all security personnel whose official duties require access to covered weapons satisfactorily complete 

a firearms background check. The firearms background check must 

be satisfactorily completed to permit access to covered weapons. 

The Commission intends for duties ‘‘requiring access to a covered 

weapon’’ to include such duties as: Security operations activities; 

training and qualification activities; and weapons’ maintenance, handling, accountability, transport, and use activities. [See also new definitions for covered weapons, enhanced weapons, and standard 

weapons in § 73.2 at the end of Table 1]. A new firearms background check would be required for security personnel who have a 

break in employment or who have transferred from another licensee 

or certificate holder irrespective of whether the individual previously 

satisfactorily completed a firearms background check (i.e., such individuals would be treated as new security personnel and subject to a 

new firearms background check). 

§ 73.18(b)(2) Security personnel who have satisfactorily completed a 

firearms background check pursuant to Commission orders are not 

subject to a further firearms background check under this section, 

unless these personnel have a break in service or transfer as set 

forth in paragraph (b)(1) of this section.

The NRC staff recognizes that the Commission has not yet made a 

final decision on whether licensees and certificate holders may apply 

for preemption authority alone or combined preemption and enhanced-weapons authority prior to issuance of a final rule; however, 

the proposed rule would include language to support a transfer from 

any orders associated with such applications for section 161A authority to regulations and thereby provide both the Commission and 

industry with the maximum flexibility to expeditiously implement the 

security enhancements of section 161A. 

Paragraph (b)(2) would exempt previously checked personnel from a 

recheck, except in the case of a break in service or transfer [as in 

paragraph (b)(1)]. 

§ 73.18(b)(3) A change in the licensee, certificate holder, or ownership of a facility, radioactive material, or other property designated 

under § 73.19, or a change in the security contractor that provides 

security personnel responsible for protecting such facilities, radioactive material, or other property, shall not constitute ‘a break in 

service’ or ‘transfer,’ as those terms are used in paragraph (b)(2) of 

this section.

(4) Licensees and certificate holders listed in paragraph (c) of this section may begin the application process for firearms background 

checks under this section for security personnel whose duties require 

access to covered weapons immediately on application to the NRC 

for preemption authority.

(5) Firearms background checks do not replace any other background 

checks or criminal history checks required for the licensee’s or certificate holder’s security personnel under this chapter.

Paragraph (b)(3) would indicate that changes in the security contractor 

or ownership of the licensee or certificate holder are not triggering 

events that require a new firearms background check. 

Paragraph (b)(4) would indicate that Licensee and certificate holders 

may begin submitting their security personnel for firearms background checks after the licensee or certificate holder has applied to 

the NRC for preemption authority alone or combined preemption and 

enhanced weapons authority (i.e., § 73.19 authority). 

Paragraph (b)(5) would indicate that firearms background checks are in 

addition to access authorization or security clearance checks that security personnel currently undergo under other NRC regulations 

(e.g., §§ 11.15, 25.17 or 73.57). The NRC expects licensees and certificate holders who become aware of any new potentially derogatory 

information on current security personnel (through the completion of 

a firearms background check), to evaluate any such information for 

applicability as required by the licensee’s or certificate holder’s access authorization or security clearance programs. 

§ 73.18(c) Applicability. This section applies to licensees or certificate 

holders who have applied for or received NRC approval of their application for § 73.19 authority or were issued Commission orders requiring firearms background checks.

Paragraph (c) would define the applicability of § 73.18 to licensees or 

certificate holders who have applied for or received Commission approval of stand-alone preemption authority or combined enhancedweapons and preemption authority [see considerations below for 

§ 73.19(c) on the applicability of licensee and certificate holder under 

this proposed rule]. 

Note: portions of this section would apply to licensee or certificate 

holder who has applied for, but not yet received preemption authority 

(e.g., requirements for submission of fingerprints) or those portions 

that would only apply to licensees or certificate holders who have received NRC approval of their application (e.g., requirements for removal of security personnel who have not yet satisfactorily completed a firearms background check). This section would also apply 

to power reactor and Category I SSNM licensees or certificate holders issued Commission orders requiring completion of firearms background checks [see consideration for paragraph (b)(2) above]. 

§ 73.18(d) Firearms background check requirements. A firearms background check for security personnel must include—

(1) A check of the individual’s fingerprints against the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) fingerprint system; and 

(2) A check of the individual’s identifying information against the 

FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check System 

(NICS). 

Paragraph (d) would identify the two components of a firearms background check that are required by section 161A (i.e., a fingerprint 

check and a NICS check). 

The NICS was established pursuant to section 103.(b) of the Brady 

Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Pub. L. 103–159) and is maintained by the FBI. 


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TABLE 1.—PROPOSED PART 73.18 AND 73.19 AND CONFORMING CHANGES TO PART 73.2—Continued 

[Firearms background checks for armed security personnel and authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of enhanced weapons] 

Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.18(e) Firearms background check submittals. 

(1) Licensees and certificate holders shall submit to the NRC, in accordance with § 73.4, for all security personnel requiring a firearms 

background check under this section—

(i) A set of fingerprints, in accordance with paragraph (n) of this 

section, and 

(ii) A completed NRC Form 754. 

Paragraph (e) would indicate the process for submitting to the NRC the 

two components of the firearms background check. Accomplishment 

of the NICS check would be based upon information submitted by 

the licensee or certificate holder to the NRC under new NRC Form 

754 (see Section VIII of this notice for further information on this 

NRC Form). 

§ 73.18(e)(2) Licensees and certificate holders shall retain a copy of 

all NRC Forms 754 submitted to the NRC for a period of one (1) 

year subsequent to the termination of an individual’s access to covered weapons or to the denial of an individual’s access to covered 

weapons.

Paragraph (e)(2) would establish the records retention requirements for 

submitted NRC Forms 754. 

§ 73.18(f) NICS portion of a firearms background check. The NRC will 

forward the information contained in the submitted NRC Forms 754 

to the FBI for evaluation against the NICS. Upon completion of the 

NICS check, the FBI will inform the NRC of the results with one of 

three responses under 28 CFR part 25; ‘‘proceed,’’ ‘‘denied,’’ or ‘‘delayed,’’ and the associated NICS transaction number. The NRC will 

forward these results and the associated NICS transaction number to 

the submitting licensee or certificate holder. The licensee or certificate holder shall provide these results to the individual who completed the NRC Form 754.

Paragraph (f) would indicate that the NRC is forwarding the information 

from submitted NRC Forms 754 to the FBI for evaluation against the 

NICS. The FBI will return one of the three results from the NICS 

check (per the FBI’s regulations) and a NICS transaction number. 

The NRC will forward this returned information to the submitting licensee or certificate holder for forwarding to the individual security 

officer. The NICS transaction number is necessary for any future 

communications with the FBI on the NICS check (e.g., an individual’s 

appeal of a ‘‘denied’’ NICS response). 

§ 73.18(g) Satisfactory and adverse firearms background checks. 

(1) A satisfactorily completed firearms background check means a 

‘‘proceed’’ response for the individual from the NICS. 

(2) An adversely completed firearms background check means a ‘‘denied’’ or ‘‘delayed’’ response from the NICS. 

Paragraph (g) would set forth the criteria for a satisfactory firearms 

background check based upon the specific NICS response. The fingerprint checks mandated by section 161A support the accomplishment of the NICS check and resolution of any adverse NICS 

records; therefore, the NRC would not specify a [satisfactory or adverse] completion criteria for the fingerprint portion of the firearms 

background check. 

§ 73.18(h) Removal from access to covered weapons. Licensees or 

certificate holders who have received NRC approval of their application for § 73.19 authority shall ensure security personnel are removed 

from duties requiring access to covered weapons upon the licensee’s 

or certificate holder’s knowledge of any disqualifying status or the occurrence of any disqualifying events under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) or (n), 

and the ATF’s implementing regulations in 27 CFR part 478.

Paragraph (h) would require the licensee or certificate holder to remove personnel who are prohibited from possessing or receiving 

firearms from duties requiring access to covered weapons. Disqualifying status or occurrences are found under the United States Code, 

Title 18, Section 922 and ATF’s implementing regulations (see 27 

CFR 478.32 and 478.11). See also considerations for § 73.18(b)(5). 

§ 73.18(i) [Reserved] .............................................................................. Paragraph (i) would not be used to avoid confusion with the use of 

sub-sub paragraph (i). 

§ 73.18(j) Security personnel responsibilities. Security personnel assigned duties requiring access to covered weapons shall promptly 

[within three (3) working days] notify their employing licensee’s or 

certificate holder’s security management (whether directly employed 

by the licensee or certificate holder or employed by a security contractor to the licensee or certificate holder) of the existence of any 

disqualifying status or upon the occurrence of any disqualifying 

events listed under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) or (n), and the ATF’s implementing regulations in 27 CFR part 478 that would prohibit them 

from possessing or receiving a covered weapon.

Paragraph (j) would require security personnel who become prohibited 

from possessing or receiving firearms due to a disqualifying status or 

occurrence of a disqualifying event to notify their licensee or certificate holder within three (3) days of this fact. 

This paragraph would work in conjunction with the requirements of 

paragraphs (k), (m), and (n) and would require security personnel to 

self report the occurrence of any disqualifying status or events. 

§ 73.18(k) Awareness of disqualifying events. Licensees and certificate holders who have received NRC approval of § 73.19 authority 

shall include within their NRC-approved security training and qualification plans instruction on—

(1) Disqualifying status or events specified in 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and (n), 

and ATF’s implementing regulations in 27 CFR part 478 (including 

any applicable definitions) identifying categories of persons who are 

prohibited from possessing or receiving any covered weapons; and 

(2) The continuing responsibility of security personnel assigned duties 

requiring access to covered weapons to promptly notify their employing licensee or certificate holder of the occurrence of any disqualifying events. 

Paragraph (k) would require licensees and certificate holders to train 

security personnel on disqualifying status or events to facilitate self 

reporting of such status or events by security personnel under paragraph (j). And to train security personnel on their ongoing responsibility to report disqualifying status or events to their licensee or certificate holder. 

§ 73.18(l) [Reserved] .............................................................................. Paragraph (l) would not be used to avoid confusion with the use of 

sub-paragraph (1) [see also paragraph (i) above]. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62678 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 1.—PROPOSED PART 73.18 AND 73.19 AND CONFORMING CHANGES TO PART 73.2—Continued 

[Firearms background checks for armed security personnel and authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of enhanced weapons] 

Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.18(m) Notification of removal. Within 72 hours after taking action 

to remove security personnel from duties requiring access to covered 

weapons, because of the existence of any disqualifying status or the 

occurrence of any disqualifying event—other than due to the prompt 

notification by the security officer under paragraph (j) of this section—licensees and certificate holders who have received NRC approval of § 73.19 authority shall notify the NRC Operations Center of 

such removal actions, in accordance with appendix A of this part.

Paragraph (m) would require licensees or certificate holders to report 

instances where security personnel (with current access to weapons) 

are removed from armed duties because of the occurrence of any 

disqualifying status or event. The timeliness of this notification would 

be based upon the need for appropriate NRC followup of a potential 

criminal violation, rather than the followup necessary for an ongoing 

security event (i.e., the individual no longer has access to covered 

weapons). Appendix A provides contact information for the NRC Operations Center. 

§ 73.18(n) Reporting violations of law. The NRC will promptly report 

suspected violations of Federal law to the appropriate Federal agency or suspected violations of State law to the appropriate State agency.

Paragraph (n) would indicate that if the NRC becomes aware of suspected violations of criminal law (e.g., a prohibited person actually 

possessing weapons as a security officer) it is obligated to report 

suspected violations of Federal or State law to the appropriate government agency or agencies. 

§ 73.18(o) Procedures for processing of fingerprint checks. (1) Licensees and certificate holders who have applied for § 73.19 authority, 

using an appropriate method listed in § 73.4, shall submit to the 

NRC’s Division of Facilities and Security one (1) completed, legible 

standard fingerprint card (Form FD–258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, 

where practicable, other fingerprint record for each individual requiring a firearms background check, to the NRC’s Director, Division of 

Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T6–E46, ATTN: Criminal History 

Check. Copies of this form may be obtained by writing the Office of 

Information Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001, by calling (301) 415–5877, or by e-mail to 

FORMS@nrc.gov. Guidance on what alternative formats, including 

electronic submissions, may be practicable are referenced in § 73.4.

Paragraph (o) would prescribe the location, method, and requirements 

for submission of fingerprints to the NRC as part of a firearms background check. 

The proposed language would be essentially identical to that contained 

to the current fingerprint submission requirements under the current 

access authorization regulations in § 73.57(d). 

§ 73.18(o)(2) Licensees and certificate holders shall indicate on the 

fingerprint card or other fingerprint record that the purpose for this 

fingerprint check is the accomplishment of a firearms background 

check.

See considerations for § 73.18(o). This provision will permit proper internal routing of fingerprints within the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division to support the NICS checks. 

§ 73.18(o)(3) Licensees and certificate holders shall establish procedures to ensure that the quality of the fingerprints taken results in 

minimizing the rejection rate of fingerprint cards or records due to illegible or incomplete information.

See considerations for § 73.18(o). 

§ 73.18(o)(4) The Commission will review fingerprints for firearms 

background checks for completeness. Any Form FD–258 or other fingerprint record containing omissions or evident errors will be returned to the licensee or certificate holder for corrections. The fee for 

processing fingerprint checks includes one (1) free re-submission if 

the initial submission is returned by the FBI because the fingerprint 

impressions cannot be classified. The one (1) free re-submission 

must have the FBI Transaction Control Number reflected on the resubmission. If additional submissions are necessary, they will be 

treated as an initial submittal and require a second payment of the 

processing fee. The payment of a new processing fee entitles the 

submitter to an additional free re-submittal, if necessary. Previously 

rejected submissions may not be included with the third submission 

because the submittal will be rejected automatically. Licensees and 

certificate holders may wish to consider using different methods for 

recording fingerprints for resubmissions, if difficulty occurs with obtaining a legible set of impressions.

See considerations for § 73.18(o). 

§ 73.18(o)(5)(i) Fees for the processing of fingerprint checks are due 

upon application. Licensees and certificate holders shall submit payment with the application for the processing of fingerprints, and payment must be made by corporate check, certified check, cashier’s 

check, money order, or electronic payment, made payable to ‘‘U.S. 

NRC.’’ a Combined payment for multiple applications is acceptable.

See considerations for § 73.18(o). 

(ii) The application fee is the sum of the user fee charged by the FBI 

for each fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted by the 

NRC on behalf of a licensee or certificate holder, and an administrative processing fee assessed by the NRC. The NRC processing fee 

covers administrative costs associated with NRC handling of licensee 

and certificate holder fingerprint submissions. The Commission publishes the amount of the fingerprint check application fee on the 

NRC’s public Web site.b The Commission will directly notify licensees 

and certificate holders who are subject to this regulation of any fee 

changes.


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62679 

TABLE 1.—PROPOSED PART 73.18 AND 73.19 AND CONFORMING CHANGES TO PART 73.2—Continued 

[Firearms background checks for armed security personnel and authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of enhanced weapons] 

Proposed language Considerations 

Footnotes: 

aFor guidance on making electronic payments, contact the NRC’s Security Branch, Division of Facilities and Security, Office of Administration at (301) 415–7404. bFor information on the current fee amount, refer to the Electronic Submittals page at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/eie.html and select the 

link for the Criminal History Program.

§ 73.18(o)(6) The Commission will forward to the submitting licensee 

or certificate holder all data received from the FBI as a result of the 

licensee’s or certificate holder’s application(s) for fingerprint background checks, including the FBI’s fingerprint record.

See considerations for § 73.18(o). 

§ 73.18(p) Appeals and correction of erroneous system information ....

(1) Individuals who require a firearms background check under this 

section and who receive a ‘‘denied’’ NICS response or a ‘‘delayed’’

NICS response may not be assigned duties requiring access to covered weapons during the pendency of an appeal of the results of the 

check or during the pendency of providing and evaluating any necessary additional information to the FBI to resolve the ‘‘delayed’’ response, respectively.

(2) Licensees and certificate holders shall provide information on the 

FBI’s procedures for appealing a ‘‘denied’’ response to the denied individual or on providing additional information to the FBI to resolve a 

‘‘delayed’’ response.

(3) An individual who receives a ‘‘denied’’ or ‘‘delayed’’ NICS response 

to a firearms background check under this section may request the 

reason for the response from the FBI. The licensee or certificate 

holder shall provide to the individual who has received the ‘‘denied’’

or ‘‘delayed’’ response the unique NICS transaction number associated with the specific firearms background check.

(4) These requests for the reason for a ‘‘denied’’ or ‘‘delayed’’ NICS response must be made in writing, and must include the NICS transaction number. The request must be sent to the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation; NICS Section; Appeals Service Team, Module A–1; PO 

Box 4278; Clarksburg, WV 26302–9922. The FBI will provide the individual with the reasons for the ‘‘denied’’ response or ‘‘delayed’’ response. The FBI will also indicate whether additional information or 

documents are required to support an appeal or resolution, for example, where there is a claim that the record in question does not pertain to the individual who was denied.

Paragraph (p)(1) would indicate that individuals who have received a 

‘‘denied’’ response or a ‘‘delayed’’ response may not be assigned 

duties requiring access to covered weapons during their appeal of 

the denial or resolution of the delay. 

Paragraph (p)(2) would indicate that the licensee or certificate holder 

will provide information on the FBI’s appeals process to the denied 

individual. The NRC and FBI are considering creating a brochure describing the appeals process or resolution process that would be 

similar to the FBI’s current brochure [describing the NICS appeals 

process] provided by federal firearms licensees to individuals receiving a ‘‘denied’’ NICS response (see example at the FBI’s NICS information website at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/nics/index.htm). 

Paragraph (p)(3) would indicate that the individual who receives a ‘‘denied’’ or ‘‘delayed’’ response must personally make any requests to 

the FBI on the reason for the NICS response; and the licensee or 

certificate holder may not make such requests upon the individual’s 

behalf. 

Paragraph (p)(4) would provide the FBI’s address for correspondence. 

Additionally, in response to the individual’s request the FBI would 

provide the person the reason for the denial or the delay to facilitate 

any appeals or to facilitate providing supplemental information to resolve a ‘‘delayed’’ response. 

§ 73.18(p)(5) If the individual wishes to challenge the accuracy of the 

record upon which the ‘‘denied’’ or ‘‘delayed’’ response is based, or if 

the individual wishes to assert that his or her rights to possess or receive a firearm have been restored by lawful process, he or she may 

make application first to the FBI. The individual shall file an appeal of 

a ‘‘denied’’ response or file a request to resolve a ‘‘delayed’’ response within 45 calender days of the date the NRC forwards the results of the firearms background check to the licensee or certificate 

holder. The appeal or request must include appropriate documentation or record(s) establishing the legal and/or factual basis for the 

challenge. Any record or document of a court or other government 

entity or official furnished in support of an appeal must be certified by 

the court or other government entity or official as a true copy. The individual may supplement their initial appeal or request—subsequent 

to the 45 day filing deadline—with additional information as it becomes available, for example, where obtaining a true copy of a court 

transcript may take longer than 45 days. The individual should note 

in their appeal or request any information or records that are being 

obtained, but are not yet available. 

(6) If the individual is notified that the FBI is unable to resolve the appeal, the individual may then apply for correction of the record directly to the agency from which the information forming the basis of 

the denial was originated. If the individual is notified by the originating agency, that additional information or documents are required 

the individual may provide them to the originating agency. If the 

record is corrected as a result of the appeal to the originating agency, the individual may so notify the FBI and submit written proof of 

the correction. 

Paragraph (p)(5) would set a time limit for filing an initial appeal of a 

‘‘denied’’ response or to request resolution of a ‘‘delayed’’ response 

to encourage timely resolution of such cases and facilitate FBI disposition of interim records. The individual filing the appeal would be 

required to set forth the basis for the appeal and provide information 

supporting their claim. Copies of records would be required to be 

true copies (i.e., certified by a court or other government entity). Because some supplemental information may take longer than 45 days 

to obtain, individuals filling an appeal or requesting resolution should 

not delay their filing in order to gather all necessary information, but 

would indicate that additional supporting information will be forthcoming. 

Paragraph (p)(6) would indicate that if an individual cannot resolve a 

record with the FBI, the individual may apply to the originating agency to correct the record and notify the FBI of those results. 

The originating agency may respond to the individual’s application by 

addressing the individual’s specific reasons for the challenge, and by 

indicating whether additional information or documents are required. 

If the record is corrected as a result of the appeal to the originating 

agency, the individual may so notify the FBI, which would, in turn, 

verify the record correction with the originating agency (assuming the 

originating agency has not already notified the FBI of the correction) 

and take all necessary steps to correct the record in the NICS system. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62680 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 1.—PROPOSED PART 73.18 AND 73.19 AND CONFORMING CHANGES TO PART 73.2—Continued 

[Firearms background checks for armed security personnel and authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of enhanced weapons] 

Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.18(p)(7) An individual who has satisfactorily appealed a ‘‘denied’’

response or resolved a ‘‘delayed’’ response may provide written consent to the FBI to maintain information about himself or herself in a 

Voluntary Appeal File (VAF) to be established by the FBI and 

checked by the NICS for the purpose of preventing the erroneous 

denial or extended delay by the NICS of any future NICS checks.

(8) Individuals appealing a ‘‘denied’’ response or resolving a ‘‘delayed’’

response are responsible for providing the FBI any additional information the FBI requires to resolve the ‘‘delayed’’ response.

Paragraph (p)(7) would indicate that an individual who has successfully 

resolved a ‘‘denied’’ or ‘‘delayed’’ response may consent to the FBI 

maintaining information about himself or herself in the FBI’s VAF 

(i.e., the basis for the successful resolution). The FBI will issue such 

individuals a VAF number that can be entered on an NRC Form 754 

or ATF Form 4417 to prevent repetition of excessive delays in completing any future NICS checks (both for checks as security personnel and for checks of individuals engaging in a firearms transaction as a private person). 

A VAF file would be used only by the NICS for this purpose. The FBI 

would remove all information in the VAF pertaining to an individual 

upon receipt of a written request by that individual. However, the FBI 

may retain such information contained in the VAF as long as needed 

to pursue cases of identified misuse of the system. If the FBI finds a 

disqualifying record on the individual after his or her entry into the 

VAF, the FBI may remove the individual’s information from the file. 

Paragraph (p)(8) would indicate that the responsibility for providing 

any necessary additional information to the FBI to appeal the ‘‘denied’’ response or resolve the ‘‘delayed’’ rests with the individual, not 

with the FBI. 

§ 73.19 Authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of enhanced weapons. 

(a) Purpose. This section sets forth the requirements for licensees and 

certificate holders to obtain NRC approval to use the expanded authorities provided under section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 

1954, as amended (AEA), in protecting NRC-designated facilities, radioactive material, or other property. These authorities include ‘‘preemption authority’’ and ‘‘enhanced-weapons authority.’’

This new section would implement the provisions of new section 161A 

of the AEA with respect to preemption authority alone or combined 

enhanced-weapons authority and preemption authority. This section 

would permit, but not require, selected classes of licensees and certificate holders to apply to the NRC for these authorities. 

Paragraph (a) would provide the overall purpose and indicate that this 

section applies to defending NRC-designated facilities, radioactive 

material, or other property. 

§ 73.19(b) General Requirements. Licensees and certificate holders 

listed in paragraph (c) of this section may apply to the NRC, in accordance with the provisions of this section, to receive stand-alone 

preemption authority or combined enhanced weapons authority and 

preemption authority.

(1) Preemption authority, as provided in section 161A of the AEA, 

means the authority of the Commission to permit licensees or certificate holders, or the designated security personnel of the licensee or 

certificate holder, to transfer, receive, possess, transport, import, or 

use one (1) or more category of standard and enhanced weapons, 

as defined in § 73.2, notwithstanding any local, State, or certain Federal firearms laws (including regulations).

(2) Enhanced weapons authority, as provided in section 161A of the 

AEA, means the authority of the Commission to permit licensees or 

certificate holders, or the designated security personnel of the licensee or certificate holder, to transfer, receive, possess, transport, 

import, and use one (1) or more category of enhanced weapons, as 

defined in § 73.2, notwithstanding any local, State, or certain Federal 

firearms laws (including regulations).

Paragraph (b) would contain general requirements and overview of the 

advantages of these two authorities. The ability of licensees and certificate holders to apply to the NRC for stand-alone preemption authority or combined enhanced-weapons authority and preemption authority would be limited to the classes of licensees set forth in paragraph (c) of this section. 

Licensees and certificate holders may apply for preemption authority 

alone. However, licensees and certificate holders who apply for enhanced-weapons authority would also be required to apply for preemption authority, because of restrictions on the possession of enhanced weapons require the preemption of certain regulations. The 

NRC would create this separate, but parallel, structure to provide licensees with flexibility in choosing security capabilities versus security costs. 

Paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) provide definitions of these two authorities. 

§ 73.19(b)(3) Prior to receiving NRC approval of enhanced-weapons 

authority, the licensee or certificate holder must have applied for and 

received NRC approval for preemption authority, in accordance with 

this section or under Commission orders.

(4) Prior to granting either authority the NRC must determine that the 

proposed use of this authority is necessary in the discharge of official 

duties by security personnel engaged in protecting—

(i) Facilities owned or operated by a licensee or certificate holder 

and designated by the Commission under paragraph (c) of this 

section, or 

(ii) Radioactive material or other property that is owned or possessed by a licensee or certificate holder, or that is being transported to or from an NRC-regulated facility. Before granting such 

approval, the Commission must determined that the radioactive 

material or other property is of significance to the common defense and security or public health and safety and has designated such radioactive material or other property under paragraph (c) of this section.

Paragraph (b)(3) would indicate that to receive enhanced-weapons authority, a licensee or certificate holder must also have received preemption authority. 

Paragraph (b)(4) would describe the criteria of section 161A the Commission must determine are present for a licensee or certificate holder to apply to the NRC for stand-alone preemption authority or combined enhanced-weapons authority and preemption authority for 

other types of facilities, radioactive material, or other property. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62681 

TABLE 1.—PROPOSED PART 73.18 AND 73.19 AND CONFORMING CHANGES TO PART 73.2—Continued 

[Firearms background checks for armed security personnel and authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of enhanced weapons] 

Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.19(c) Applicability. (1) The following classes of licensees or certificate holders may apply for stand-alone preemption authority—

(i) Power reactor facilities; and 

(ii) Facilities authorized to possess a formula quantity or greater of 

strategic special nuclear material with security plans subject to 

§§ 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46. 

(2) The following classes of licensees or certificate holders may apply 

for combined enhanced-weapons authority and preemption authority—

(i) Power reactor facilities; and 

(ii) Facilities authorized to possess a formula quantity or greater of 

strategic special nuclear material with security plans subject to 

§§ 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46. 

Paragraph (c)(1) would limit the types of licensees who could apply for 

stand-alone preemption authority alone to two classes of NRC-regulated facilities—power reactor facilities and fuel cycle facilities authorized to possess Category I quantities of SSNM. Such SSNM fuel 

cycle facilities would include: production facilities, spent fuel reprocessing facilities, fuel fabrication facilities, and uranium enrichment facilities. However, they would not include hot cell facilities, independent spent fuel storage installations, monitored retrievable storage installations, geologic repository operations areas, non-power reactors, byproduct material facilities, and the transportation of spent 

fuel, high level waste, and special nuclear material. 

Paragraph (c)(2) would also limit the types of licensees who could 

apply for combined enhanced-weapons authority and preemption authority to these same two classes of licensed facilities. 

The Commission is proposing under this rulemaking to limit the range 

of facilities, radioactive material, or other property [for which these 

authorities are appropriate] to power reactor facilities and fuel cycle 

facilities authorized to possess Category I quantities of strategic special nuclear material. The Commission would take this approach to 

be consistent with the scope of this rulemaking. The Commission 

may consider other types of facilities, radioactive material, or other 

property as appropriate for these authorities in future rulemakings. 

Additionally, the Commission would use the parallel structure in 

paragraph (c) to facilitate future rulemakings. Specifically, the Commission recognizes that enhanced-weapons authority may not be appropriate for all present and future classes of licensees with armed 

security programs; whereas the applicability of preemption authority 

to all present and future classes of licensees with armed security 

programs may be much broader. 

§ 73.19(c)(3) With respect to the possession and use of firearms by 

all other NRC licensees or certificate holders, the Commission’s requirements in effect before [effective date of final rule] remain applicable, except to the extent those requirements are modified by Commission order or regulations applicable to such licensees and certificate holders.

Paragraph (b)(3) would indicate that the provisions of this section do 

not supersede existing Commission regulations or orders for nonpower reactor and non-Category I SSNM licensees, unless specifically indicated. 

§ 73.19(d) Authorization for stand-alone preemption of firearms laws. 

(1) Licensees and certificate holders listed in paragraph (c) of this 

section may apply to the NRC for the preemption authority described 

in paragraph (b)(1) of this section. Licensees and certificate holders 

seeking such authority shall submit an application to the NRC in writing, in accordance with § 73.4, and indicate that the licensee or certificate holder is requesting preemption authority under section 161A 

of the AEA.

(2) Licensees and certificate holders who have applied for preemption 

authority under this section may begin firearms background checks 

under § 73.18 for their armed security personnel.

(3) Licensees and certificate holders who have applied for preemption 

authority under this section and who have satisfactorily completed 

firearms background checks for a sufficient number of security personnel (to implement their security plan while meeting security personnel fatigue requirements of this chapter or Commission order) 

shall notify the NRC, in accordance with § 73.4, of their readiness to 

receive NRC approval of preemption authority and implement all the 

provisions of § 73.18.

Paragraph (d)(1) would describe the process for a licensee or certificate holder to apply for preemption authority. This would be a voluntary action. Based upon the Commission’s conclusion that the 

classes of facilities listed under paragraph (c) are appropriate for the 

use of such preemption authority, no additional documentation or 

supporting information would be required by a licensee or certificate 

holder to apply for preemption authority other than the licensee or 

certificate holder is included within the list of licenses and certificate 

holders in paragraph (c). 

Paragraph (d)(2) would permit licensees and certificate holders who 

have applied for preemption authority to begin submitting their security personnel for firearms background checks under § 73.18. 

Paragraph (c)(3) would require licensees and certificate holders who 

applied for preemption authority to subsequently notify the NRC of 

their readiness to fully implement § 73.18 without adverse impact on 

the security organization (i.e., the provisions in § 73.18 requiring removal from armed duties of personnel with a ‘‘denied’’ or ‘‘delayed’’

response would not adversely affect the licensee’s or certificate holder’s security organization). 

§ 73.19(d)(4) Based upon the licensee’s or certificate holder’s readiness notification and any discussions with the licensee or certificate 

holder, the NRC will document in writing to the licensee or certificate 

holder that the Commission has approved or disapproved the licensee’s or certificate holder’s application for preemption authority.

Paragraph (d)(4) would indicate that the NRC will rely upon the licensee’s or certificate holder’s determination that sufficient numbers of its 

security personnel have satisfactorily passed the firearms background check to fully implement the provisions of § 73.18. The NRC 

would document in writing its approval or disapproval of the licensee’s or certificate holder’s application for preemption authority. The 

NRC may also rely upon discussions with the licensee or certificate 

holder to reach a conclusion. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62682 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 1.—PROPOSED PART 73.18 AND 73.19 AND CONFORMING CHANGES TO PART 73.2—Continued 

[Firearms background checks for armed security personnel and authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of enhanced weapons] 

Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.19(e) Authorization for use of enhanced weapons. (1) Licensees 

and certificate holders listed in paragraph (c)(2) of this section may 

apply to the NRC for enhanced-weapons authority described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section. Licensees and certificate holders applying for enhanced-weapons authority shall have also applied for preemption authority. Licensees and certificate holders may make these 

applications concurrently.

(2) Licensees and certificate holders seeking enhanced-weapons authority shall submit an application to the NRC, in accordance with 

§ 73.4, indicating that the licensee or certificate holder is requesting 

enhanced-weapons authority under section 161A of the AEA. Licensees and certificate holders shall also include with their application—

(i) The additional information required by paragraph (f) of this section; 

(ii) The date they applied to the NRC for preemption authority (if 

not concurrent with the application for enhanced weapons authority); and 

(iii) If applicable, the date when the licensee or certificate holder 

received NRC approval of their application for preemption authority under this section or via Commission order. 

Paragraph (e)(1) would describe the process for a licensee or certificate holder to apply for combined enhanced-weapons authority and 

preemption authority. A licensee or certificate holder would be permitted to apply for preemption authority in conjunction with an application for enhanced-weapons authority, or the licensee or certificate 

holder may apply for preemption authority first. Only the classes of licensees and certificate holders listed under paragraph (c)(2) would 

be permitted to apply for combined enhanced-weapons authority and 

preemption authority. 

Paragraph (e)(2) would require a licensee or certificate holder to include specific information with their application as set forth in 

§ 73.19(f). The licensee or certificate holder would also be required 

to include information on the date they applied for, and/or received 

NRC approval of their application for preemption authority under 

§ 73.19, or under Commission order prior to the effective date of a 

final rule. 

§ 73.19(e)(3) The NRC will document in writing to the licensee or certificate holder that the Commission has approved or disapproved the 

licensee’s or certificate holder’s application for enhanced-weapons 

authority. The NRC must approve, or have previously approved, a licensee’s or certificate holder’s application for preemption authority 

under paragraph (d) of this section, or via Commission order, to approve the application for enhanced weapons authority.

Paragraph (e)(3) would indicate that the NRC would document in writing the approval or disapproval of an application for combined enhanced-weapons authority and preemption authority. The NRC’s approval would also indicate the total numbers, types, and calibers of 

enhanced weapons that are approved for a specific licensee or certificate holder. 

§ 73.19(e)(4) Licensees and certificate holders who have applied to 

the NRC for and received enhanced-weapons authority shall then 

apply to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) for a federal firearms license (FFL) and also register 

under the National Firearms Act (NFA) in accordance with ATF regulations under 27 CFR parts 478 and 479 to obtain the enhanced 

weapons. Licensees and certificate holders shall include a copy of 

the NRC’s written approval with their NFA registration application.

Paragraph (e)(4) would indicate that after the licensee or certificate 

holder has received NRC approval of its application to use enhanced 

weapons, it must then apply to ATF to obtain a FFL and also register 

under the NFA to obtain these weapons. Because ATF has indicated 

it would rely upon the NRC’s technical evaluation [on whether the 

specific weapons listed in the NRC’s approval are appropriate for the 

licensee or certificate holder] in processing the licensee’s or certificate holder’s NFA registration application, licensees and certificate 

holders would include a copy of the NRC’s approval with their NFA 

registration application. 

This paragraph would require licensees to obtain a FFL in addition to 

registering under the NFA. Based upon conversations with ATF, the 

NRC understands that while ATF’s regulations do not mandate that 

persons who obtain NFA weapons also have an FFL, NRC licensees 

and certificate holders desiring to obtain enhanced weapons would 

benefit from status an ATF FFL. Advantages would include reduced 

time to process requests to transfer NFA weapons to or from the licensee or certificate holder (e.g., initial receipt, repair, or disposition), 

simplification of the ATF’s review of an NFA registration application, 

and elimination of transfer taxes for NFA-weapons transactions. The 

NRC also understands that status as an FFL would create obligations for such licensee’s and certificate holders. Obligations would include payment of an annual special occupational tax, additional recordkeeping requirements, and a requirement to permit ATF inspectors access to the licensee’s or certificate holder’s facilities possessing enhanced weapons to inspect ATF-licensed weapons and 

corresponding records. 

§ 73.19(f) Application for enhanced-weapons authority additional information. (1) Licensees and certificate holders applying to the Commission for enhanced-weapons authority under paragraph (e) of this 

section shall also submit to the NRC for prior review and written approval new, or revised, physical security plans, security personnel 

training and qualification plans, safeguards contingency plans, and 

safety assessments incorporating the use of the specific enhanced 

weapons the licensee or certificate holder intends to use. These 

plans and assessments must be specific to the facility, radioactive 

material, or other property being protected.

Paragraph (f)(1) would describe the additional information a licensee or 

certificate holder would be required to submit along with their application for preemption and enhanced-weapons authority. This information would be submitted to the NRC for prior review and approval 

and would describe and address the specific weapons to be employed. In addition to addressing the enhanced weapons in the security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans, a licensee or certificate holder would also provide a safety assessment 

on the use of the specific enhanced weapons to be employed. Licensees and certificate holders who apply for authority alone under 

paragraph (d) would not be subject to the requirements of paragraph 

(f). 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62683 

TABLE 1.—PROPOSED PART 73.18 AND 73.19 AND CONFORMING CHANGES TO PART 73.2—Continued 

[Firearms background checks for armed security personnel and authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of enhanced weapons] 

Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.19(f)(2) In addition to other requirements set forth in this part, 

these plans and assessments must—

(i) For the physical security plan, identify the specific types or models, calibers, and numbers of enhanced weapons to be used; 

(ii) For the training and qualification plan, address the training and 

qualification requirements to use these specific enhanced weapons; and 

(iii) For the safeguards contingency plan, address how these enhanced and any standard weapons will be employed by the licensee’s or certificate holder’s security personnel in meeting the 

NRC-required protective strategy, including tactical approaches 

and maneuvers. 

Paragraph (e)(2) would describe specific information the license or certificate holder would include in the plans and assessments accompanying the application for enhanced-weapons authority. The paragraph would also describe the scope of the safety assessments and 

would require evaluation of both onsite and offsite impacts from the 

use of the specific enhanced weapons to be employed. The safety 

assessment would be required to only address the enhanced weapons the license or certificate holder intends to employ. 

§ 73.19(f)(2)(iv) For the safety assessment—

(A) Assess any potential safety impact on the facility, radioactive 

material, or other property from the use of these enhanced 

weapons; 

(B) Assess any potential safety impact on public or private facilities, public or private property, or on members of the public in 

areas outside of the site boundary from the use of these enhanced weapons; and 

(C) Assess any potential safety impact on public or private facilities, public or private property, or on members of the public from 

the use of these enhanced weapons at training facilities intended for proficiency demonstration and qualification purposes. 

See considerations for § 73.19(f)(2). 

§ 73.19(f)(3) The licensee’s or certificate holder’s training and qualification plan on possessing, storing, maintaining, qualifying on, and 

using enhanced weapons must include information from applicable 

firearms standards developed by nationally-recognized firearms organizations or standard setting bodies or standards developed by Federal agencies, such as: the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the U.S. Department of 

Energy’s National Training Center, and the U.S. Department of Defense.

(4) Licensees or certificate holders shall submit any new or revised 

plans and assessments for prior NRC review and written approval 

notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 50.54(p), 70.32(e), and 76.60 of 

this chapter which otherwise permit a license or certificate holder to 

make changes to such plans ‘‘that would not decrease their effectiveness’’ without prior NRC review.

Paragraph (f)(3) would specify acceptable standards for the licensee or 

certificate holder to use in creating a training and qualification plan 

for enhanced weapons. This paragraph would not create any new requirements for training standards for standard weapons. 

Paragraph (f)(4) would require the submission of revised plans for prior 

NRC review and approval, irrespective of whether the licensee or 

certificate holder concludes that the use of these enhanced weapons 

would not cause ‘‘a decrease in security effectiveness’’ under the applicable NRC regulation. 

§ 73.19(g) Completion of training and qualification prior to use of enhanced weapons. 

Licensees and certificate holders who have applied for and received 

enhanced-weapons authority under paragraph (e) of this section 

shall ensure security personnel complete required firearms training 

and qualification in accordance with the licensee’s or certificate holder’s NRC-approved training and qualification plan. Such training must 

be completed prior to security personnel’s use of enhanced weapons 

to protect NRC-designated facilities, radioactive material, or other 

property and must be documented in accordance with the requirements of the licensee’s or certificate holder’s training and qualification plan. 

Paragraph (g) would require licensees and certificate holders to ensure 

security personnel are trained and qualified on the use and employment of enhanced weapons before the licensee or certificate holder 

deploys these enhanced weapons to defend the facility, radioactive 

material, or other property. 

Documentation of completion of this training would be consistent with 

the licensee’s or certificate holder’s approved training and qualification plan. 

§ 73.19(h) Use of enhanced weapons. Requirements regarding the 

use of enhanced weapons by security personnel in the performance 

of their official duties are contained in §§ 73.46 and 73.55 and in appendices B and C of this part, as applicable.

Paragraph (h) would indicate that § 73.19 does not supercede requirements on the use of weapons under the power reactor and Category 

I fuel cycle facility security regulations found in Part 73. 

§ 73.19(i) [Reserved] .............................................................................. Paragraph (i) would not be used to avoid confusion with the use of 

sub-sub paragraph (i). 

§ 73.19(j) Notification of adverse ATF findings or notices. NRC licensees and certificate holders with an ATF federal firearms license 

(FFL) and/or enhanced weapons shall notify the NRC, in accordance 

with § 73.4, of instances involving any adverse ATF findings or ATF 

notices related to their FFL or such weapons.

Paragraph (j) would require NRC licensees or certificate holders to notify NRC, should the licensee or certificate holder receive any adverse findings based upon an ATF inspection, audit, or review of the 

enhanced weapons possessed by the licensee or certificate holder 

under an ATF FFL. This would allow the NRC to appropriately respond to any public or media inquiries associated with such findings 

in a timely manner. 

§ 73.2 Definitions .................................................................................... Three new definitions would be added to this section as conforming 

changes supporting the new §§ 73.18 and 73.19 that would include: 

covered weapon, enhanced weapon, and standard weapon. The 

NRC would use these three terms to envelope the weapons, ammunition, and devices listed under section 161A of the AEA. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62684 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 1.—PROPOSED PART 73.18 AND 73.19 AND CONFORMING CHANGES TO PART 73.2—Continued 

[Firearms background checks for armed security personnel and authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of enhanced weapons] 

Proposed language Considerations 

Other new definitions that would be added as conforming changes to 

this section in support of other regulations (e.g., safety/security interface and target set) are discussed in other tables in this proposed 

rule. 

Covered weapon means any handgun, rifle, shotgun, short-barreled 

shotgun, short-barreled rifle, semi-automatic assault weapon, machinegun, ammunition for any such gun or weapon, or large capacity 

ammunition feeding device as specified under section 161A of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. As used here, the terms 

‘‘handgun, rifle, shotgun, short-barreled shotgun, short-barreled rifle, 

semi-automatic assault weapon, machinegun, ammunition, or large 

capacity ammunition feeding device’’ have the same meaning as set 

forth for those terms under 18 U.S.C. 921(a). Covered weapons include both enhanced weapons and standard weapons. However, enhanced weapons do not include standard weapons.

A definition for covered weapon would be used as an overall term to 

encompass the firearms (weapons), ammunition, and devices listed 

in section 161A. The meanings of the specific terms for the firearms, 

ammunition, or devices encompassed within this definition would 

have the same meaning for those terms as is those found under 

Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 921(a) [18 U.S.C. 

921(a)]. 

Enhanced weapon means any short-barreled shotgun, short-barreled 

rifle, or machinegun. Enhanced weapons do not include destructive 

devices, including explosives or weapons greater than 50 caliber 

(i.e., weapons with a bore greater than 1.27 cm [0.5 in] diameter).

Standard weapon means any handgun, rifle, shotgun, semi-automatic 

assault weapon, or a large capacity ammunition feeding device.

Definitions for enhanced weapon and standard weapon would be 

added to support the differing scope of these new sections. The relationship between covered weapon, enhanced weapon, and standard 

weapon would be explained. 

Also, the definition for enhanced weapons would not include destructive devices as defined under ATF’s regulations, since the NRC’s authority under section 161A of the AEA does not permit licensees or 

certificate holders to possess destructive devices. 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors 

against radiological sabotage.

Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors 

against radiological sabotage.

This title would be retained. 

(a) Introduction ................................................. This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

§ 73.55 By December 2, 1986, each licensee, 

as appropriate, shall submit proposed 

amendments to its security plan which define 

how the amended requirements of Paragraphs (a), (d)(7), (d)(9), and (e)(1) will be 

met.

(a)(1) By [date—180 days—after the effective 

date of the final rule published in the FEDERAL REGISTER], each nuclear power reactor licensee, licensed under 10 CFR part 

50, shall incorporate the revised requirements of this section through amendments 

to its Commission-approved Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, 

and Safeguards Contingency Plan, referred 

to collectively as ‘‘approved security plans,’’

and shall submit the amended security 

plans to the Commission for review and approval.

This requirement would be added to discuss 

the types of Commission licensees to whom 

the proposed requirements of this section 

would apply and the schedule for submitting 

the amended security plans. The Commission intends to delete the current language, 

because it applies only to a past rule 

change that is completed. The proposed requirements of this section would be applicable to decommissioned/ing reactors unless 

otherwise exempted. 

§ 73.55 Each submittal must include a proposed implementation schedule for Commission approval.(a)(2) The amended security plans must be 

submitted as specified in § 50.4 of this 

chapter and must describe how the revised 

requirements of this section will be implemented by the licensee, to include a proposed implementation schedule.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

reference to the current § 50.4(b)(4) which 

describes procedural details relative to the 

proposed security plan submission requirement. 

§ 73.55 The amended safeguards requirements of these paragraphs must be implemented by the licensee within 180 days after 

Commission approval of the proposed security plan in accordance with the approved 

schedule.

(a)(3) The licensee shall implement the existing approved security plans and associated 

Commission orders until Commission approval of the amended security plans, unless otherwise authorized by the Commission.

This requirement would be added to clarify 

that the licensee must continue to implement the current Commission-approved security plans until the Commission approves 

the amended plans. The phrase ‘‘unless 

otherwise authorized by the Commission’’

would provide flexibility to account for unanticipated situations that may affect the licensee’s ability to comply with this proposed requirement. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62685 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(b)(1)(i) The licensee is responsible to 

the Commission for maintaining safeguards 

in accordance with Commission regulations 

and the licensee’s security plan.

(a)(4) The licensee is responsible for maintaining the onsite physical protection program in accordance with Commission regulations and related Commission-directed orders through the implementation of the approved security plans and site implementing 

procedures.

This requirement would retain the current requirement that the licensee is responsible 

for meeting Commission regulations and 

the approved security plans. The phrase 

‘‘through the implementation of the approved security plans and site implementing 

procedures’’ would be added to describe 

the relationship between Commission regulations, the approved security plans, and 

implementing procedures. The word ‘‘safeguards’’ would be replaced with the phrase 

‘‘physical protection program’’ to more accurately focus this requirement to the security program rather than the broad ‘‘safeguards’’ which includes safety. 

The Commission views the approved security 

plans as the mechanism through which the 

licensee meets Commission requirements 

through implementation, therefore, the licensee is responsible to the Commission 

for this performance. 

(a)(5) Applicants for an operating license 

under the provisions of part 50 of this chapter, or holders of a combined license under 

the provisions of part 52 of this chapter, 

shall satisfy the requirements of this section 

before the receipt of special nuclear material in the form of fuel assemblies.

This requirement would be added to describe 

the proposed requirements for applicants 

and to specify that these proposed requirements must be met before an applicant’s 

receipt of special nuclear material in the 

form of fuel assemblies. 

(a)(6) For licenses issued after [effective date 

of this rule], licensees shall design, construct, and equip the central alarm station 

and secondary alarm station to equivalent 

standards.

This requirement would be added to describe 

the Commission expectations for new reactors. Based on changes to the threat environment the Commission has determined 

that the functions required to be performed 

by the central alarm station are a critical 

element of the licensee capability to satisfy 

the performance objective and requirements 

of the proposed paragraph (b) of this section. 

Therefore, to ensure that these critical capabilities are maintained, the Commission has 

determined that this proposed requirement 

would be a prudent and necessary measure 

to ensure the licensee’s ability to summon 

assistance or otherwise respond to an 

alarm as is currently required by 

§ 73.55(e)(1) and therefore satisfy the performance objective and requirements of the 

proposed paragraph (b) of this section. 

(a)(6)(i) Licensees shall apply the requirements for the central alarm station listed in 

paragraphs (e)(6)(v), (e)(7)(iii), and (i)(8)(ii) 

of this section to the secondary alarm station as well as the central alarm station.

This requirement would be added for consistency with and clarification of the proposed 

requirement of paragraph (a)(6) of this section. The Commission has determined that 

these construction standards that were previously applied to only the central alarm 

station should also be built into the secondary alarm station for new reactor licensees. 

(a)(6)(ii) Licensees shall comply with the requirements of paragraph (i)(4) of this section such that both alarm stations are provided with equivalent capabilities for detection, assessment, monitoring, observation, 

surveillance, and communications.

This requirement would be added for consistency with and clarification of the proposed 

requirement of paragraph (i)(4) of this section and to clarify that for new reactors, 

both the central and secondary alarm stations must be provided ‘‘equivalent capabilities’’ and not simply equivalent ‘‘functional’’

capabilities as is stated in the proposed 

paragraph (i)(4) of this section. The Commission has determined that these capabilities must be equivalent for new reactors to 

ensure that the secondary alarm station is 

redundant to the central alarm station. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62686 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(a) General performance objective and 

requirements.

(b) General performance objective and requirements.This header would be retained. The proposed 

requirements of this section are intended to 

represent the general outline for a physical 

protection program that would provide an 

acceptable level of protection if effectively 

implemented. The proposed actions, standards, criteria, and requirements of this section are intended to be bounded by the description of the design basis threat identified 

by the Commission in § 73.1. 

§ 73.55(a) The licensee shall establish and 

maintain an onsite physical protection system 

and security organization which will have as 

its objective to provide high assurance that 

activities involving special nuclear material 

are not inimical to the common defense and 

security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.

(b)(1) The licensee shall establish and maintain a physical protection program, to include a security organization which will 

have as its objective to provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear 

material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an 

unreasonable risk to the public health and 

safety.

This requirement would retain the current performance objective of § 73.55(a) with two 

minor changes. First, the phrase ‘‘an onsite 

physical protection system’’ would be replaced with the phrase ‘‘a physical protection program’’ to more clearly state the 

Commission’s view that the physical protection system elements described in this proposed rule combine to make the licensee 

physical protection program. Second, the 

word ‘‘and’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘to include a’’ to clarify the Commission’s view that the security organization is 

not considered to be independent of the licensee physical protection program but 

rather, is a component of that program. 

§ 73.55(a) The physical protection system 

shall be designed to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as 

stated in § 73.1(a).

§ 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) Requiring responding 

guards or other armed response personnel to 

interpose themselves * * *. 

(b)(2) The physical protection program must 

be designed to detect, assess, intercept, 

challenge, delay, and neutralize threats up 

to and including the design basis threat of 

radiological sabotage as stated in § 73.1(a), 

at all times.

This requirement would contain a substantial 

revision to provide a more detailed and performance based requirement for the design 

of the licensee physical protection program. 

Most significantly, the word ‘‘interpose’’

would be replaced with the words ‘‘detect, 

assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and 

neutralize’’. The current requirement of 

§ 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) requires the licensee to 

‘‘interpose’’ for the purpose of preventing 

radiological sabotage, however, the definition of ‘‘radiological sabotage’’ stated in 

§ 73.2 does not contain a performance 

based element by which the Commission 

can measure this capability and therefore, 

this proposed requirement would provide 

the six performance based elements or capabilities ‘‘detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize.’’ The first element, ‘‘detect’’, would be provided through 

the use of detection equipment, patrols, access controls, and other program elements 

required by this proposed rule and would 

provide notification to the licensee that a 

potential threat is present and where the 

threat is located. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62687 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

The second element, ‘‘assess’’, would provide 

a mechanism through which the licensee 

would identify the nature of the threat detected. This would be accomplished through 

the use of video equipment, patrols, and 

other program elements that would be required by this proposed rule and would provide the licensee with information about the 

threat upon which the licensee would determine how to respond. The third, fourth, and 

fifth elements would comprise the component actions of response and would be provided by personnel trained and equipped in 

accordance with a response strategy. The 

third element ‘‘intercept’’ would be the act 

of placing a person at an intersecting defensive position directly in the path of advancement taken by the threat, and between the threat and the protected target or 

target set element. The fourth element 

‘‘challenge’’ would be to verbally or physically confront the threat to impede, halt, or 

otherwise interact with the threat with the 

intent of preventing further advancement of 

the threat towards the protected target or 

target set element. 

The fifth element ‘‘delay’’ would be to take 

necessary actions to counter any attempt 

by the threat to advance towards the protected target or target set element. The 

sixth element ‘‘neutralize’’ would be to place 

the threat in a condition from which the 

threat no longer has the potential to, or capability of, doing harm to the protected 

item. The Commission does not intend to 

suggest that the action, ‘‘neutralize’’, would 

require the application of ‘‘deadly force’’ in 

all instances. The phrase ‘‘threat of radiological sabotage’’ would be replaced with 

the phrase ‘‘threats up to and including the 

design basis threat of radiological sabotage’’ to clarify the Commission’s view that 

the licensee must provide protection against 

any element of the design basis threat, to 

include those that do not rise to the full capability of the design basis threat. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62688 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(a) To achieve this general performance objective, the onsite physical protection 

system and security organization must include, but not necessarily be limited to, the 

capabilities to meet the specific requirements 

contained in paragraphs (b) through (h) of 

this section.

§ 73.55(e)(1) * * * so that a single act cannot 

remove the capability of calling for assistance 

or otherwise responding to an alarm. 

(b)(3) The licensee physical protection program must be designed and implemented 

to satisfy the requirements of this section 

and ensure that no single act, as bounded 

by the design basis threat, can disable the 

personnel, equipment, or systems necessary to prevent significant core damage 

and spent fuel sabotage.

This requirement would retain and revise two 

current requirements to provide a performance based requirement for the design of 

the physical protection program. The first 

significant revision would expand the current requirement for alarm stations to be 

protected against a single act, and would 

require that the licensee physical protection 

program be designed to ensure that a single act can not disable the personnel, 

equipment, or systems necessary to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel 

sabotage which would result in the loss of 

the capability to prevent radiological sabotage. The Commission’s view is that because of changes to the threat environment, it is necessary to emphasize the ‘‘remove the capability’’ requirement of the current § 73.55(e)(1) such that the single act 

protection requirement would apply to personnel, equipment, and systems required to 

perform specific functions that if disabled 

would remove the licensee capability to prevent radiological sabotage. The second significant revision would provide a measurable and performance based requirement 

against which the Commission would measure the effectiveness of the licensee’s physical protection program to prevent radiological sabotage. 

The Commission’s view is that the goal of the 

licensee’s physical protection program must 

include an acceptable safety margin to assure that the performance objective of public health and safety is met. This safety 

margin would be established by designing 

and implementing a physical protection program that protects against radiological sabotage by preventing significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage which describes the undesirable consequences that 

could result from the destruction of a target 

set or all elements of a target set and 

would be a precursor to radiological sabotage. The Commission’s view is that significant damage to the core or sabotage to 

spent fuel would result in a condition in 

which the performance objective of ‘‘High 

Assurance’’ could no longer be provided 

and therefore, prevention of significant core 

damage and spent fuel sabotage are a 

measurable performance criteria against 

which the Commission would evaluate the 

effectiveness of the licensee physical protection program. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62689 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

The phrase ‘‘as bounded by the design basis 

threat’’ would be used to clarify the Commission’s view that the licensee must ensure that the physical protection program is 

designed to protect against the design 

basis threat and all other threats that do not 

rise to the level of the design basis threat. 

The phrase ‘‘the capabilities to meet the 

specific requirements contained in paragraphs (b) through (h) of this section’’

would be replaced by the phase ‘‘implemented to satisfy the requirements of this 

section’’ to account for the reformatting of 

this proposed rule and to describe the 

Commission view that the licensee is responsible to implement Commission requirements through the approved security 

plans and procedures. 

(b)(4) The physical protection program must 

include diverse and redundant equipment, 

systems, technology, programs, supporting 

processes, and implementing procedures.

This requirement would be added to apply defense-in-depth concepts as part of the 

physical protection program to ensure the 

capability to meet the performance objective of the proposed paragraph (b)(1) of this 

section is maintained in the changing threat 

environment. The terms ‘‘diverse and redundant’’ are intended to describe defensein-depth in a performance based manner 

and would be a critical element for meeting 

the proposed requirement for protection 

against a single act described in the proposed paragraph (b)(3) of this section. 

§ 73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission, the licensee shall demonstrate the ability of the 

physical security personnel to carry out their 

assigned duties and responsibilities.

(b)(5) Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission, the licensee 

shall demonstrate the ability to meet Commission requirements through the implementation of the physical protection program, including the ability of armed and unarmed personnel to perform assigned duties and responsibilities required by the approved security plans and licensee procedures.

This requirement would retain the current requirement for demonstration and would 

contain minor revisions to apply this requirement to the licensee’s ability to implement the physical protection program and 

not be limited to only the ability of security 

personnel to carry out their duties. This proposed requirement would clarify the Commission’s view that the licensee must also 

demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, procedures, and equipment to accomplish their 

intended function within the physical protection program. 

(b)(6) The licensee shall establish and maintain a written performance evaluation program in accordance with appendix B and 

appendix C to this part, to demonstrate and 

assess the effectiveness of armed responders and armed security officers to perform 

their assigned duties and responsibilities to 

protect target sets described in paragraph 

(f) of this section and appendix C to this 

part, through implementation of the licensee 

protective strategy.

This requirement would be added to specify 

that this performance evaluation program 

would be the mechanism by which the licensee would demonstrate the capabilities 

described by the performance based requirements of the proposed paragraphs 

(b)(2) through (4) of this section. The 

phrase ‘‘target sets’’ would be used consistent with the proposed (b)(3) of this section to describe the combination of equipment and operator actions which, if all are 

prevented from performing their intended 

safety function or prevented from being accomplished, would likely result in significant 

core damage (e.g., non-incipient, non-localized fuel melting, and/or core disruption) 

barring extraordinary action by plant operators. 

A target set with respect to spent fuel sabotage is draining the spent fuel pool leaving 

the spent fuel uncovered for a period of 

time, allowing spent fuel heat up and the 

associated potential for release of fission 

products. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62690 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(d)(7) The licensee shall: 

(i) Establish an access authorization system * * *. 

(b)(7) The licensee shall establish, maintain, 

and follow an access authorization program 

in accordance with § 73.56.

This requirement would be retained and revised to require the licensee to provide an 

Access Authorization Program. 

(b)(7)(i) In addition to the access authorization 

program required above, and the fitnessfor-duty program required in part 26 of this 

chapter, each licensee shall develop, implement, and maintain an insider mitigation 

program.

This proposed requirement would be added to 

establish the insider mitigation program 

(IMP). The licensee’s IMP should integrate 

specific elements of the licensee AA and 

FFD programs to focus those elements on 

identifying potential insider threats and denying the opportunity for an insider to gain 

or retain access at an NRC licensed facility. 

(b)(7)(ii) The insider mitigation program must 

be designed to oversee and monitor the initial and continuing trustworthiness and reliability of individuals granted or retaining 

unescorted access authorization to a protected or vital area and implement defensein-depth methodologies to minimize the potential for an insider to adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, the licensee capability to prevent significant core damage or 

spent fuel sabotage.

This proposed requirement would be added to 

provide a performance based requirement 

for the design and content of the IMP. The 

Commission has concluded that, by itself, 

the initial determination of trustworthiness 

and reliability is not adequate to minimize 

the potential opportunity for an insider to 

gain or retain access, and that only through 

continual re-evaluation of the information 

obtained through these processes can the 

licensee provide the level of assurance necessary. The Commission has also determined that defense-in-depth would be provided through the integration of physical 

protection measures with access authorization and fitness-for-duty program elements, 

to ensure the licensee capability to identify 

and mitigate the potential activities of an insider, such as, but not limited to, tampering. 

The Commission does not intend that a licensee would limit the IMP to any one or 

more elements, but rather that the licensee 

would identify and add additional elements 

as necessary to ensure the site’s IMP satisfies the performance requirements specified 

by the Commission. 

The Commission has determined that no one 

element of the physical protection program, 

access authorization program, or fitness-forduty program would, by itself, provide the 

level of protection against the insider necessary to meet the performance objective of 

the proposed paragraph (b) and therefore, 

the effective integration of these three programs is a necessary requirement to 

achieve defense-in-depth against the potential insider. 

(b)(8) The licensee shall ensure that its corrective action program assures that failures, 

malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective equipment and nonconformances in 

security program components, functions, or 

personnel are promptly identified and corrected. Measures shall ensure that the 

cause of any of these conditions is determined and that corrective action is taken to 

preclude repetition.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement to ensure 

that the licensee implements and completes 

the required corrective actions in a timely 

manner and that actions would be taken to 

correct the cause of the problem to ensure 

that the problem would not be repeated. 

(c) Security plans ............................................. This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(c)(1) Licensee security plans. Licensee security plans must implement Commission requirements and must describe: This requirement would be added to describe 

the purpose of the licensee Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, 

and Safeguards Contingency Plan in a performance based requirement and to introduce the general types of information to be 

discussed. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62691 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(c)(1)(i) How the physical protection program 

will prevent significant core damage and 

spent fuel sabotage through the establishment and maintenance of a security organization, the use of security equipment and 

technology, the training and qualification of 

security personnel, and the implementation 

of predetermined response plans and strategies; and 

This requirement would be added to describe 

the performance based requirement to be 

met by the physical protection program and 

the basic elements of the system that must 

be described in the security plans. 

(c)(1)(ii) Site-specific conditions that affect implementation of Commission requirements.This requirement would be added to reflect 

the Commission’s view that licensees must 

focus attention on site-specific conditions in 

the development and implementation of site 

plans, procedures, processes, response 

strategies, and ultimately, the licensee capability to achieve the performance objective of the proposed paragraph (b)(1) of this 

section. 

(c)(2) Protection of security plans. The licensee shall protect the approved security 

plans and other related safeguards information against unauthorized disclosure in accordance with the requirements of § 73.21.

This requirement would be added to emphasize the requirements for the protection of 

safeguards information in accordance with 

the requirements of § 73.21. 

(c)(3) Physical security plan ............................ This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(c)(3)(i) The licensee shall establish, maintain, 

and implement a Commission-approved 

physical security plan that describes how 

the performance objective and requirements 

set forth in this section will be implemented.

This requirement would be added to specify 

the requirement for a physical security plan. 

(c)(3)(ii) The physical security plan must describe the facility location and layout, the 

security organization and structure, duties 

and responsibilities of personnel, defensein-depth implementation that describes 

components, equipment and technology 

used.

This requirement would be added to describe 

the general content of the physical security 

plan and specify the general types of information to be addressed. Because the specifics of defense-in-depth required by the 

proposed § 73.55(b)(4) would vary from 

site-to-site, the terms ‘‘components,’’

‘‘equipment’’ and ‘‘technology’’ would be 

used to provide flexibility. 

(c)(4) Training and qualification plan ............... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

§ 73.55(b)(4)(ii) Each licensee shall establish, 

maintain, and follow an NRC-approved training and qualifications plan * * *.

(c)(4)(i) The licensee shall establish, maintain, 

and follow a Commission-approved training 

and qualification plan that describes how 

the criteria set forth in appendix B ‘‘General 

Criteria for Security Personnel,’’ to this part 

will be implemented.

This requirement would retain and separate 

two current requirements of § 73.55(b)(4)(ii). 

This proposed requirement would require 

the licensee to provide a training and qualification plan. 

§ 73.55(b)(4)(ii) * * * outlining the processes 

by which guards, watchmen, armed response 

persons, and other members of the security 

organization will be selected, trained, 

equipped, tested, and qualified to ensure that 

these individuals meet the requirements of 

this paragraph.

(c)(4)(ii) The training and qualification plan 

must describe the process by which armed 

and unarmed security personnel, 

watchpersons, and other members of the 

security organization will be selected, 

trained, equipped, tested, qualified, and requalified to ensure that these individuals 

possess and maintain the knowledge, skills, 

and abilities required to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities effectively.

This requirement would retain the requirement 

for the licensee to outline the processes in 

this plan with minor revisions. The phrase 

‘‘guards, watchmen, armed response persons’’ would be replaced by the phrase 

‘‘armed and unarmed security personnel, 

watchpersons’’ to generically identify all 

members of the security organization. The 

Commission does not intend that administrative staff be included except as these 

personnel would be used to perform duties 

required to detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize a threat, to include compensatory measures used to 

maintain these capabilities in the event of a 

failed component. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62692 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

The phrase ‘‘meet the requirements of this 

paragraph’’ would be replaced by the 

phrase ‘‘possess the knowledge, skills, and 

abilities required to effectively carry out 

their assigned duties and responsibilities’’ to 

clarify that the focus of this proposed requirement would be to ensure these individuals possess these capabilities. 

(c)(5) Safeguards contingency plan ................. This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

§ 73.55(h)(1) Safeguards contingency plans 

must be in accordance with the criteria in appendix C to this part, ‘‘Licensee Safeguards 

Contingency Plans’’.

(c)(5)(i) The licensee shall establish, maintain, 

and implement a Commission-approved 

safeguards contingency plan that describes 

how the criteria set forth in section II of appendix C, ‘‘Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans,’’ to this part will be implemented.

This requirement would retain the current requirement of § 73.55(h)(1) to provide a 

safeguards contingency plan with minor revisions. Most significantly, the reference to 

appendix C to part 73 would be revised to 

reflect the reformatting of the proposed appendix C to part 73 which would have a 

section II that applies only to power reactors. 

(c)(5)(ii) The safeguards contingency plan 

must describe predetermined actions, 

plans, and strategies designed to intercept, 

challenge, delay, and neutralize threats up 

to and including the design basis threat of 

radiological sabotage.

This requirement would be added to generally 

describe the content of the Safeguards 

Contingency Plan. 

(c)(6) Implementing procedures ....................... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

§ 73.55(b)(3)(i) Written security procedures 

that document the structure of the security 

organization and detail the duties of guards, 

watchmen, and other individuals responsible 

for security.

(c)(6)(i) The licensee shall establish, maintain, 

and implement written procedures that document the structure of the security organization, detail the specific duties and responsibilities of each position, and implement 

Commission requirements through the approved security plans.

This requirement would retain the requirement 

for written security procedures with minor 

revisions. The phrase ‘‘and implement 

Commission requirements through the approved security plans’’ would be added to 

clarify the requirement that the licensee implements Commission requirements through 

procedures as well as the approved security plans. 

(c)(6)(ii) Implementing procedures need not 

be submitted to the Commission for prior 

approval, but are subject to inspection by 

the Commission.

This requirement would be added to address 

the current and proposed procedural details 

for implementing procedures. 

(c)(6)(iii) Implementing procedures must detail 

the specific actions to be taken and decisions to be made by each position of the 

security organization to implement the approved security plans.

This requirement would be added to describe 

the content of implementing procedures to 

clarify the current requirement ‘‘detail the 

duties of guards, watchmen, and other individuals responsible for security.’’

§ 73.55(b)(3) The licensee shall have a management system to provide for * * *. (c)(6)(iv) The licensee shall: This requirement would be retained and 

would separate the two current requirements of § 73.55(b)(3) with minor revisions. 

The phrase ‘‘management system’’ would 

be replaced with the word ‘‘process.’’ The 

current requirement to have a management 

system would be addressed in the proposed § 73.55(d)(2). 

§ 73.55(b)(3) * * * the development, revision, 

implementation, and enforcement of security 

procedures.

(c)(6)(iv)(A) Develop, maintain, enforce, review, and revise security implementing procedures.This requirement would retain the requirement 

to develop, revise, implement, and enforce 

security procedures. The words ‘‘maintenance and review’’ would be added to clarify these tasks as necessary functions. The 

word ‘‘implementation’’ would be deleted 

because implementation is addressed in the 

proposed paragraphs (c)(6)(i) through (iii) of 

this section. 

§ 73.55(b)(3)(ii) Provision for written approval 

of these procedures and any revisions to the 

procedures by the individual with overall responsibility for the security functions.

(c)(6)(iv)(B) Provide a process for the written 

approval of implementing procedures and 

revisions by the individual with overall responsibility for the security functions.

This requirement would retain the current requirement for written approval with minor 

revisions. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62693 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(c)(6)(iv)(C) Ensure that changes made to implementing procedures do not decrease the 

effectiveness of any procedure to implement and satisfy Commission requirements.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that the licensee process for making 

changes to implementing procedures includes a process to ensure that changes do 

not result in a reduction of effectiveness or 

result in a conflict with other site procedures. 

(c)(7) Plan revisions. The licensee shall revise 

approved security plans as necessary to 

ensure the effective implementation of 

Commission regulations and the licensee’s 

protective strategy. Commission approval of 

revisions made pursuant to this paragraph 

is not required, provided that revisions meet 

the requirements of § 50.54(p) of this chapter. Changes that are beyond the scope allowed per § 50.54(p) of this chapter shall be 

submitted as required by §§ 50.90 of this 

chapter or § 73.5.

This requirement would be added to outline 

the three methodologies for making 

changes to the Commission-approved security plans and clarify that the licensee would 

make necessary plan changes to account 

for changes to site specific conditions and 

lessons learned from implementing the approved security plans. 

§ 73.55(b) Physical Security Organization ....... (d) Security organization .................................. This header would be retained with a minor 

revision. 

§ 73.55(b)(1) The licensee shall establish a 

security organization, including guards, to 

protect his facility against radiological sabotage.

(d)(1) The licensee shall establish and maintain a security organization designed, 

staffed, trained, and equipped to provide 

early detection, assessment, and response 

to unauthorized activities within any area of 

the facility.

This requirement would retain the current requirement for a security organization to protect against radiological sabotage. This proposed requirement would be revised to describe a more performance based requirement consistent with the proposed paragraphs (b)(2) through (4) of this section. 

The phrase ‘‘including guards, to protect his 

facility against radiological sabotage’’ would 

be replaced with the phrase ‘‘designed, 

staffed, trained, and equipped to provide 

early detection, assessment, and response 

to unauthorized activities’’ to describe those 

elements of the security organization needed to provide the capabilities described in 

the proposed paragraph (b). The phrase 

‘‘within any area of the facility’’ would be 

added to clarify the Commission’s expectation that the licensee must implement 

measures consistent with site security assessments and the licensee response strategy, to facilitate the identification of a threat 

before an attempt to penetrate the protected area would be made. 

§ 73.55(b)(3) The system shall include: (d)(2) The security organization must include: This requirement would be retained with 

minor revisions. The word ‘‘system’’ would 

be replaced by the phrase ‘‘security organization.’’ Although, the security ‘‘system’’

would include the security organization, this 

proposed requirement focuses only on the 

security organization. 

§ 73.55(b)(3) The licensee shall have a management system * * *. (d)(2)(i) A management system that provides 

oversight of the onsite physical protection 

program.

This requirement would retain the requirement 

for a management system with minor revisions. Most significantly this proposed requirement would not limit the licensee management system to only provide for the development, revision, implementation, and 

enforcement of security procedures which 

are addressed in the proposed paragraph 

(c)(6)(iv) of this section. The Commission 

expectation would be that the licensee 

management system oversees all aspects 

of the onsite physical protection program to 

ensure the effective implementation of 

Commission requirements through the approved security plans and implementing 

procedures. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62694 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(b)(2) At least one full time member of 

the security organization who has the authority to direct the physical protection activities 

of the security organization shall be onsite at 

all times.

(d)(2)(ii) At least one member, onsite and 

available at all times, who has the authority 

to direct the activities of the security organization and who is assigned no other duties 

that would interfere with this individual’s 

ability to perform these duties in accordance with the approved security plans and 

licensee protective strategy.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revisions. The phrase ‘‘who is assigned no other duties which would interfere with’’ would be added to ensure that 

the designated individual would not be assigned any duties that would prevent or 

interfere with the ability to direct these activities when needed. 

§ 73.55(b)(4)(i) The licensee may not permit 

an individual to act as a guard, watchman, 

armed response person, or other member of 

the security organization unless the individual 

has been trained, equipped, and qualified to 

perform each assigned security job duty in 

accordance with appendix B, ‘‘General Criteria for Security Personnel,’’ to this part.

(d)(3) The licensee may not permit any individual to act as a member of the security 

organization unless the individual has been 

trained, equipped, and qualified to perform 

assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with the requirements of appendix 

B to part 73 and the Commission-approved 

training and qualification plan.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revisions. 

(d)(4) The licensee may not assign an individual to any position involving detection, 

assessment, or response to unauthorized 

activities unless that individual has satisfied 

the requirements of § 73.56.

This requirement would be added to clarify 

the prerequisite qualifications for assignment to any position involving a function 

upon which detection, assessment, or response capabilities depend. 

§ 73.55(b)(1) If a contract guard force is utilized for site security, the licensee’s written 

agreement with the contractor that must be 

retained by the licensee as a record for the 

duration of the contract will clearly show that: 

(d)(5) If a contracted security force is used to 

implement the onsite physical protection 

program, the licensee’s written agreement 

with the contractor must be retained by the 

licensee as a record for the duration of the 

contract and must clearly state the following 

conditions: 

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. The phrase ‘‘utilized for site 

security’’ would be replaced with the phrase 

‘‘used to implement the onsite physical protection program’’ to focus on the implementation of the onsite physical protection program. 

§ 73.55(b)(1)(i) The licensee is responsible to 

the Commission for maintaining safeguards 

in accordance with Commission regulations 

and the licensee’s security plan.

(d)(5)(i) The licensee is responsible for maintaining the onsite physical protection program in accordance with Commission orders, Commission regulations, and the approved security plans.This requirement would be retained with 

minor revisions. Most significantly, the word 

‘‘safeguards’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase’’ onsite physical protection program’’

to more accurately describe the focus of 

this requirement. 

§ 73.55(b)(1)(ii) The NRC may inspect, copy, 

and take away copies of all reports and documents required to be kept by Commission 

regulations, orders, or applicable license conditions whether the reports and documents 

are kept by the licensee or the contractor.

(d)(5)(ii) The Commission may inspect, copy, 

retain, and remove all reports and documents required to be kept by Commission 

regulations, orders, or applicable license 

conditions whether the reports and documents are kept by the licensee or the contractor.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revisions. 

(d)(5)(iii) An individual may not be assigned to 

any position involving detection, assessment, or response to unauthorized activities 

unless that individual has satisfied the requirements of § 73.56.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the proposed requirements of the 

proposed paragraph (d)(4) of this section. 

This proposed requirement would be stipulated in a contract because it relates to a 

function of the contract. 

§ 73.55(b)(1)(iv) The contractor will not assign 

any personnel to the site who have not first 

been made aware of these responsibilities.

§ 73.55(b)(4)(i) The licensee may not permit 

an individual to act as a guard, watchman, 

armed response person, or other member of 

the security organization unless the individual 

has been trained, equipped, and qualified to 

perform each assigned security job duty in 

accordance with appendix B * * *. 

(d)(5)(iv) An individual may not be assigned 

duties and responsibilities required to implement the approved security plans or licensee protective strategy unless that individual has been properly trained, equipped, 

and qualified to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with 

appendix B to part 73 and the Commissionapproved training and qualification plan.

This requirement would retain and combine 

two current requirements of § 73.55(b)(1)(iv) 

and § 73.55(b)(4)(i) with minor revisions 

necessary for consistency with the proposed rule. 

§ 73.55(b)(1)(iii) The requirement in paragraph 

(b)(4) of this section that the licensee demonstrate the ability of physical security personnel to perform their assigned duties and 

responsibilities includes demonstration of the 

ability of the contractor’s physical security 

personnel to perform their assigned duties 

and responsibilities in carrying out the provisions of the Security Plan and these regulations, and * * *. 

(d)(5)(v) Upon the request of an authorized 

representative of the Commission, the contractor security employees shall demonstrate the ability to perform their assigned 

duties and responsibilities effectively.

This requirement would be retained to describe the current requirement for demonstration by contract security personnel. 

The language of this current requirement 

would be deleted and replaced by the proposed language of the proposed 

§ 73.55(b)(5). 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62695 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(d)(5)(vi) Any license for possession and ownership of enhanced weapons will reside 

with the licensee.

This requirement would be added to implement applicable portions of the EPAct 2005, 

and to require any security force contract to 

include a statement that would ensure that 

all licenses relative to firearms and enhanced weapons reside with the licensee, 

not the contractor. 

§ 73.55(c) Physical barriers .............................. (e) Physical barriers. Based upon the licensee’s protective strategy, analyses, and site 

conditions that affect the use and placement of physical barriers, the licensee shall 

install and maintain physical barriers that 

are designed and constructed as necessary 

to deter, delay, and prevent the introduction 

of unauthorized personnel, vehicles, or materials into areas for which access must be 

controlled or restricted.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for determining the use and placement of physical 

barriers required for protection of personnel, 

equipment, and systems, the failure of 

which could directly or indirectly endanger 

public health and safety. 

The phrase ‘‘Based upon the licensee protective strategy, analyses, and site specific 

conditions’’, would be used to ensure that licensees consider protective strategy requirements and needs, as well as any analyses conducted by the licensee or required 

by the Commission to determine the effects 

the design basis threat could have on personnel, equipment, and systems, and any 

site specific condition that could have an 

impact on the capability to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage. 

The Commission considers these factors to 

be necessary considerations when determining the appropriate use and placement 

of barriers in any area. 

(e)(1) The licensee shall describe in the approved security plans, the design, construction, and function of physical barriers and 

barrier systems used and shall ensure that 

each barrier and barrier system is designed 

and constructed to satisfy the stated function of the barrier and barrier system.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

mechanism by which the licensee would 

confirm information regarding the use, 

placement, and construction of barriers to 

include the intended function of specific 

barriers as they relate to satisfying the proposed requirements of this section. 

§ 73.55(c)(9)(iii) Protect as Safeguards Information, information required by the Commission pursuant to § 73.55(c)(8) and (9).

§ 73.55(c)(9)(iv) Retain, in accordance with 

§ 73.70, all comparisons and analyses prepared pursuant to § 73.55(c)(7) and (8). 

(e)(2) The licensee shall retain in accordance 

with § 73.70, all analyses, comparisons, and 

descriptions of the physical barriers and 

barrier systems used to satisfy the requirements of this section, and shall protect 

these records as safeguards information in 

accordance with the requirements of 

§ 73.21.

This requirement would retain and combine 

the current requirements of § 73.55(c)(9)(iii) 

and (9)(iv) with minor revisions. 

(e)(3) Physical barriers must: This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(e)(3)(i) Clearly delineate the boundaries of 

the area(s) for which the physical barrier 

provides protection or a function, such as 

protected and vital area boundaries and 

stand-off distance.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for the use 

of barriers. 

§ 73.55(c)(8) Each licensee shall compare the 

vehicle control measures established in accordance with § 73.55(c)(7) to the Commission’s design goals (i.e., to protect equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure of which could directly or indirectly endanger public health and safety by exposure 

to radiation) and criteria for protection against 

a land vehicle bomb.

(e)(3)(ii) Be designed and constructed to protect against the design basis threat commensurate to the required function of each 

barrier and in support of the licensee protective strategy.

This requirement would be added to apply the 

current requirement of § 73.55(c)(8) to compare vehicle control measures against 

Commission design goals, to all barriers, 

such as but not limited to, channeling barriers, delay barriers, and bullet resisting enclosures, and not limit this comparison to 

only vehicle barriers. The Commission’s 

view is that the physical construction, materials, and design of any barrier must be sufficient to perform the intended function and 

therefore, the licensee must meet these 

standards. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62696 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(e)(3)(iii) Provide visual deterrence, delay, and 

support access control measures.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for physical 

barriers. Because of changes to the threat 

environment the Commission believes emphasis on the use of physical barriers would 

be appropriate. 

(e)(3)(iv) Support effective implementation of 

the licensee’s protective strategy.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for physical 

barriers. Because of changes to the threat 

environment the use of physical barriers 

within the licensee protective strategy would 

be considered essential. 

(e)(4) Owner controlled area. The licensee 

shall establish and maintain physical barriers in the owner controlled area to deter, 

delay, or prevent unauthorized access, facilitate the early detection of unauthorized 

activities, and control approach routes to 

the facility.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement to provide 

enhanced protection outside the protected 

area relative to detecting and delaying a 

threat before reaching any area from which 

the threat could disable the personnel, 

equipment, or systems required to meet the 

performance objective and requirements 

described in the proposed paragraph (b) of 

this section. 

(e)(5) Isolation zone ......................................... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

§ 73.55(c)(3) Isolation zones shall be maintained in outdoor areas adjacent to the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected 

area * * *.

(e)(5)(i) An isolation zone must be maintained 

in outdoor areas adjacent to the protected 

area perimeter barrier. The isolation zone 

shall be: 

This requirement would retain the current requirement for an isolation zone. 

§ 73.55(c)(3) Isolation zones * * * and shall 

be of sufficient size to permit observation of 

the activities of people on either side of that 

barrier in the event of its penetration.

(e)(5)(i)(A) Designed and of sufficient size to 

permit unobstructed observation and assessment of activities on either side of the 

protected area barrier.

This requirement would retain and revise the 

current requirement for isolation zone design to provide observation. Most significantly, the words ‘‘designed’’ and ‘‘unobstructed’’ would be added to provide a more 

performance based requirement. The 

phrase ‘‘of people’’ would be deleted to 

focus the proposed requirement on ‘‘activities’’. 

§ 73.55(c)(4) Detection of penetration or attempted penetration of the protected area or 

the isolation zone adjacent to the protected 

area barrier shall assure that adequate response by the security organization can be 

initiated.

(e)(5)(i)(B) Equipped with intrusion detection 

equipment capable of detecting both attempted and actual penetration of the protected area perimeter barrier and assessment equipment capable of facilitating timely evaluation of the detected unauthorized 

activities before completed penetration of 

the protected area perimeter barrier.

This requirement would be retained and revised to require intrusion detection equipment within an isolation zone and provide a 

performance based requirement for that 

equipment. The phrase ‘‘shall assure that 

adequate response by the security organization can be initiated’’ would be moved 

from this proposed requirement to the proposed § 73.55(i)(9)(v). 

(e)(5)(ii) Assessment equipment in the isolation zone must provide real-time and playback/recorded video images in a manner 

that allows timely evaluation of the detected 

unauthorized activities before and after 

each alarm annunciation.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for assessment equipment utilized for the isolation 

zone. The Commission has determined that 

based on changes to threat environment 

the use of technology that allows for the assessment of activities before and after an 

alarm annunciation is necessary to facilitate 

a determination of the level of response 

needed to satisfy the performance objective 

and requirements of the proposed paragraph (b) of this section. The Commission 

believes the application of this commonly 

used technology would be an appropriate 

use of technological advancements that 

would effectively enhance licensee capabilities to achieve the performance objective 

and requirements of the proposed paragraph (b) of this section. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62697 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(c)(3) If parking facilities are provided 

for employees or visitors, they shall be located outside the isolation zone and exterior 

to the protected area barrier.

(e)(5)(iii) Parking facilities, storage areas, or 

other obstructions that could provide concealment or otherwise interfere with the licensee’s capability to meet the requirements of paragraphs (e)(5)(i)(A) and (B) of 

this section, must be located outside of the 

isolation zone.

This requirement would be retained and revised to provide a performance based requirement for the areas outside the isolation 

zone. Most significantly, the phrase ‘‘storage areas, or other obstructions which 

could provide concealment or otherwise 

interfere’’ would be added to ensure that 

areas inside, outside, and adjacent to the 

protected area barrier would be maintained 

clear of obstructions to ensure observation 

and assessment capabilities. 

(e)(6) Protected area ....................................... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(e)(6)(i) The protected area perimeter must be 

protected by physical barriers designed and 

constructed to meet Commission requirements and all penetrations through this barrier must be secured in a manner that prevents or delays, and detects the exploitation 

of any penetration.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for physical 

barriers and penetrations though the protected area barrier to be secured to prevent 

and detect attempted or actual exploitation 

of the penetration. The Commission’s view 

is that penetrations must be secured equal 

to the strength of the barrier of which it is a 

part and that attempts to exploit a penetration must be detected and response initiated. 

§ 73.55(c)(2) The physical barriers at the perimeter of the protected area shall be separated from any other barrier designated as a 

physical barrier for a vital area within the protected area.

(e)(6)(ii) The protected area perimeter physical barriers must be separated from any 

other barrier designated as a vital area 

physical barrier, unless otherwise identified 

in the approved physical security plan.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. The phrase ‘‘unless otherwise identified in the approved physical security plan’’ would be added to provide flexibility for an alternate methodology to be described in the Commission-approved security plans. 

§ 73.55(e)(3) All emergency exits in each protected area and each vital area shall be 

alarmed.

(e)(6)(iii) All emergency exits in the protected 

area must be secured by locking devices 

that allow exit only and alarmed.

This requirement would retain and separate 

the two current requirements with minor revision. The phrase ‘‘secured by locking devices which allow exit only’’ would be added 

to provide a performance based requirement relative to the function of locking devices with emergency exit design to prevent 

entry. Vital areas would be addressed in 

the proposed § 73.55(e)(8)(vii). 

(e)(6)(iv) Where building walls, roofs, or penetrations comprise a portion of the protected 

area perimeter barrier, an isolation zone is 

not necessary, provided that the detection, 

assessment, observation, monitoring, and 

surveillance requirements of this section are 

met, appropriately designed and constructed barriers are installed, and the area 

is described in the approved security plans.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for instances where this site condition would 

exist. 

§ 73.55(c)(6) The walls, doors, ceiling, floor, 

and any windows in the walls and in the 

doors of the reactor control room shall be 

bullet-resisting.

§ 73.55(d)(1) The individual responsible for 

the last access control function (controlling 

admission to the protected area) must be isolated within a bullet-resisting structure as described in Paragraph (c)(6) of this section to 

assure his or her ability to respond or summon assistance 

§ 73.55(e)(1) The onsite central alarm station 

must be considered a vital area and its walls, 

doors, ceiling, floor, and any windows in the 

walls and in the doors must be bullet-resisting. 

(e)(6)(v) The reactor control room, the central 

alarm station, and the location within which 

the last access control function for access 

to the protected area is performed, must be 

bullet-resisting.

This requirement would retain the locations 

identified in the current § 73.55(c)(6), (d)(1), 

and (e)(1). Specific reference to walls, 

doors, ceiling, floor, and any windows in the 

walls, doors, ceiling, and floor would be deleted to clarify that all construction features 

would be required to meet the bullet resisting requirement, and therefore remove the 

potential for confusion where a structural 

feature such as sky-lights would not be listed. The Commission does not intend to 

suggest that penetrations, such as heating/ 

cooling ducts be made bullet-resistant, but 

rather that the licensee implement appropriate measures to prevent the exploitation 

of such features in a manner consistent 

with the intent of the bullet-resisting requirement to ensure the required functions performed in these locations are protected and 

maintained. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62698 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(e)(6)(vi) All exterior areas within the protected area must be periodically checked to 

detect and deter unauthorized activities, 

personnel, vehicles, and materials.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for monitoring exterior areas of the protected area 

to facilitate achievement of the requirements described by the proposed paragraph (b). 

(e)(7) Vital areas .............................................. This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

§ 73.55(c)(1) The licensee shall locate vital 

equipment only within a vital area, which in 

turn, shall be located within a protected area 

such that access to vital equipment requires 

passage through at least two physical barriers of sufficient strength to meet the performance requirements of paragraph (a) of 

this section.

(e)(7)(i) Vital equipment must be located only 

within vital areas, which in turn must be located within protected areas so that access 

to vital equipment requires passage through 

at least two physical barriers designed and 

constructed to perform the required function, except as otherwise approved by the 

Commission in accordance with paragraph 

(f)(2) of this section.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. The phrase ‘‘of sufficient 

strength to meet the performance requirements of paragraph (a) of this section’’

would be replaced with the phrase ‘‘designed and constructed to perform the required function’’ for consistency with the 

proposed requirements for physical barriers 

discussed throughout this proposed 

§ 73.55(e). The phrase ‘‘except as otherwise approved by the Commission in accordance with paragraph (f)(2) of this section’’ would be added to account for the 

condition addressed by paragraph (f)(2). 

§ 73.55(c)(1) More than one vital area may be 

located within a single protected area.

(e)(7)(ii) More than one vital area may be located within a single protected area.This requirement would be retained. 

§ 73.55(e)(1) The onsite central alarm station 

must be considered a vital area and * * *.

§ 73.55(e)(1) Onsite secondary power supply 

systems for alarm annunciator equipment 

and non-portable communications equipment 

as required in paragraph (f) of this section 

must be located within vital areas. 

(e)(7)(iii) The reactor control room, the spent 

fuel pool, secondary power supply systems 

for intrusion detection and assessment 

equipment, non-portable communications 

equipment, and the central alarm station, 

must be provided protection equivalent to 

vital equipment located within a vital area.

This requirement would retain and combine 

two current requirements from 10 CFR 

73.55(e)(1), for protecting these areas 

equivalent to a vital area. The Commission 

added the ‘‘spent fuel pool’’ to emphasize 

the Commission view that because of 

changes to the threat environment the 

spent fuel pool must also be provided this 

protection. The phrase ‘‘alarm annunciator’’

would be replaced with ‘‘intrusion detection 

and assessment’’ to clarify the application 

of this proposed requirement to intrusion 

detection sensors and video assessment 

equipment as well as the alarm annunciation equipment. 

(e)(7)(iv) Vital equipment that is undergoing 

maintenance or is out of service, or any 

other change to site conditions that could 

adversely affect plant safety or security, 

must be identified in accordance with 

§ 73.58, and adjustments must be made to 

the site protective strategy, site procedures, 

and approved security plans, as necessary.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement consistent 

with the proposed § 73.58 Safety/Security 

Program. 

§ 73.55(e)(3) All emergency exits in each protected area and each vital area shall be 

alarmed.

§ 73.55(d)(7)(D) Lock and protect by an activated intrusion alarm system all unoccupied 

vital areas. 

(e)(7)(v) The licensee shall protect all vital 

areas, vital area access portals, and vital 

area emergency exits with intrusion detection equipment and locking devices. Emergency exit locking devices shall be designed to permit exit only.

This requirement would retain and combine 

two current requirements 10 CFR 

73.55(e)(3) and (d)(7)(D) with minor revision for formatting purposes. The phrase 

‘‘Emergency exit locking devices shall be 

designed to permit exit only’’ would be 

added to provide a performance based requirement to describe the function to be 

provided by emergency exit locking devices. 

§ 73.55(d)(7)(D) Lock and protect by an activated intrusion alarm system all unoccupied 

vital areas.

(e)(7)(vi) Unoccupied vital areas must be 

locked.

This requirement would retain the current requirement to lock unoccupied vital areas 

with minor revision for formatting purposes. 

The current requirement to alarm all vital 

areas would be moved to the proposed 

paragraph (e)(7)(v) of this section. 

(e)(8) Vehicle barrier system. The licensee 

must: 

This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62699 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(c)(7) Vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems, must be established to protect against use of a land vehicle, as specified by the Commission, as a 

means of transportation to gain unauthorized 

proximity to vital areas.

(e)(8)(i) Prevent unauthorized vehicle access 

or proximity to any area from which any vehicle, its personnel, or its contents could 

disable the personnel, equipment, or systems necessary to meet the performance 

objective and requirements described in 

paragraph (b) of this section.

This requirement would be retained and revised to provide a requirement for protection against any vehicle within the context 

of the design basis threat described in 

§ 73.1. Because of changes to the threat 

environment, the meaning of the word 

‘‘proximity’’ remains the same but is applied 

to include all locations from which the design basis threat could disable the personnel, equipment, or systems required to 

prevent radiological sabotage. 

(e)(8)(ii) Limit and control all vehicle approach 

routes.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

requirement for limiting and controlling vehicle access routes to the site for the purpose 

of protecting the facility against vehicle 

bomb attacks and the use of vehicles as a 

means of transporting personnel and materials that would be considered a threat. Because of changes to the threat environment 

the Commission has determined that control of all vehicle approach routes is a critical element of the onsite physical protection program. 

(e)(8)(iii) Design and install a vehicle barrier 

system, to include passive and active barriers, at a stand-off distance adequate to 

protect personnel, equipment, and systems 

against the design basis threat.

This requirement would be added to require 

the licensee to determine the potential effects a vehicle bomb could have on the facility and to establish a barrier system at a 

stand-off distance sufficient to protect personnel, equipment and systems. Because 

of changes to the threat environment, the 

Commission views stand-off distances to be 

a critical element of the onsite physical protection program and which require continuing analysis and evaluation to maintain 

effectiveness. 

(e)(8)(iv) Deter, detect, delay, or prevent vehicle use as a means of transporting unauthorized personnel or materials to gain unauthorized access beyond a vehicle barrier 

system, gain proximity to a protected area 

or vital area, or otherwise penetrate the 

protected area perimeter.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

the licensee maintains the capability to 

deter, detect, delay, or prevent unauthorized access beyond a vehicle barrier system. Because of changes to the threat environment, the Commission views the vehicle 

threat to be a critical element of the onsite 

physical protection program that requires 

continual analysis and evaluation to maintain effectiveness. This proposed requirement would include vehicles that do not 

reach the full capability of the design basis 

threat. 

(e)(8)(v) Periodically check the operation of 

active vehicle barriers and provide a secondary power source or a means of mechanical or manual operation, in the event 

of a power failure to ensure that the active 

barrier can be placed in the denial position 

within the time line required to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required standoff distance.

This requirement would be added consistent 

with the current requirement of § 73.55(g)(1) 

and would apply to the operation of active 

vehicle barriers within time lines required to 

prevent unauthorized vehicle access, despite the loss of the primary power source. 

The term ‘‘periodically’’ would be intended 

to allow the licensees to establish checks at 

a frequency necessary to ensure active barriers remain effective for both denial and 

non-denial operation. 

(e)(8)(vi) Provide surveillance and observation 

of vehicle barriers and barrier systems to 

detect unauthorized activities and to ensure 

the integrity of each vehicle barrier and barrier system.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

requirement for the licensee to monitor the 

integrity of barriers to verify availability 

when needed and to prevent or detect tampering. Because of changes to the threat 

environment, the Commission views the vehicle bomb consideration to be a critical 

element of the onsite physical protection 

program which requires continuing analysis 

and evaluation to maintain effectiveness. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62700 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(e)(9) Waterways ............................................. This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(e)(9)(i) The licensee shall control waterway 

approach routes or proximity to any area 

from which a waterborne vehicle, its personnel, or its contents could disable the 

personnel, equipment, or systems necessary to meet the performance objective 

and requirements described in paragraph 

(b) of this section.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

requirement for controlling waterway approach routes consistent with the requirement of the proposed paragraph (e)(9)(ii) of 

this section. Because of changes to the 

threat environment, the Commission views 

waterway approach routes and control 

measures to be a critical element of the onsite physical protection program and one 

that requires continual analysis and evaluation to maintain effectiveness. 

(e)(9)(ii) The licensee shall delineate areas 

from which a waterborne vehicle must be 

restricted and install waterborne vehicle 

control measures, where applicable.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

requirement for notifying unauthorized individuals that access is not permitted, and 

the installation of barriers where appropriate. 

(e)(9)(iii) The licensee shall monitor waterway 

approaches and adjacent areas to ensure 

early detection, assessment, and response 

to unauthorized activity or proximity, and to 

ensure the integrity of installed waterborne 

vehicle control measures.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

requirement for monitoring waterway approaches consistent with other monitoring 

and surveillance requirements of this proposed section. 

(e)(9)(iv) Where necessary to meet the requirements of this section, licensees shall 

coordinate with local, State, and Federal 

agencies having jurisdiction over waterway 

approaches.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

requirement to coordinate where necessary 

with other agencies having jurisdictional authority over waterways to ensure that the 

proposed requirements of this section 

would be met. 

(e)(10) Unattended openings in any barrier 

established to meet the requirements of this 

section that are 620 cm2 (96.1 in2) or greater in total area and have a smallest dimension of 15 cm (5.9 in) or greater, must be 

secured and monitored at a frequency that 

would prevent exploitation of the opening 

consistent with the intended function of 

each barrier.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

requirement for all openings in any OCA, 

PA, or VA barrier to ensure that the intended function of the barrier is met. The 

phrase ‘‘consistent with the intended function of each barrier’’ would describe the criteria for making a determination to secure 

or monitor openings of this size where the 

intended function of the barrier would be 

compromised if the opening is not secured 

or monitored. The size of the opening described is a commonly accepted standard 

throughout the security profession for application to any security program and one that 

represents an opening large enough for a 

person to exploit. 

Therefore, the Commission has determined 

that openings meeting the stated criteria require measures to prevent exploitation. 

(f) Target sets .................................................. This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(f)(1) The licensee shall document in site procedures the process used to develop and 

identify target sets, to include analyses and 

methodologies used to determine and 

group the target set equipment or elements.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for the licensee to document how each target set 

was developed to facilitate review of the licensee methodology by the Commission. 

The Commission has determined that because of changes to the threat environment 

the identification and protection of all target 

sets would be a critical component for the 

development and implementation of the licensee protective strategy and the capability of the licensee to prevent significant 

core damage and spent fuel sabotage, 

therefore, providing protection against radiological sabotage and satisfying the performance objective and requirements stated 

in the proposed paragraph (b) of this section. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62701 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(f)(2) The licensee shall consider the effects 

that cyber attacks may have upon individual 

equipment or elements of each target set or 

grouping.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

cyber attacks associated with advancements in the area of automated computer 

technology are considered and the affects 

that such attacks may have on the integrity 

of individual target set equipment and elements is accounted for in the licensee protective strategy. 

(f)(3) Target set equipment or elements that 

are not contained within a protected or vital 

area must be explicitly identified in the approved security plans and protective measures for such equipment or elements must 

be addressed by the licensee’s protective 

strategy in accordance with appendix C to 

this part.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement to identify 

and account for this condition in the approved security plans, if it exists at a site. 

(f)(4) The licensee shall implement a program 

for the oversight of plant equipment and 

systems documented as part of the licensee protective strategy to ensure that 

changes to the configuration of the identified equipment and systems do not compromise the licensee’s capability to prevent 

significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage.

This requirement would be added to require 

the licensee to establish and implement a 

program that focuses on ensuring that certain plant equipment and systems are periodically checked to ensure that unauthorized configuration changes or tampering 

would be identified and an appropriate response initiated. Based on changes to the 

threat environment, the Commission has 

determined this would be an appropriate 

enhancement to the licensee onsite physical protection program. 

(g) Access control ............................................ This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(g)(1) The licensee shall: This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

§ 73.55(d)(1) The licensee shall control all 

points of personnel and vehicle access into a 

protected area.

(g)(1)(i) Control all points of personnel, vehicle, and material access into any area, or 

beyond any physical barrier or barrier system, established to meet the requirements 

of this section.

This requirement would be retained and revised with minor revisions. Most significantly, the phrase ‘‘a protected area’’ would 

be replaced by the phrase ‘‘any area, or beyond any physical barrier or barrier system, 

established to meet the requirements of this 

section’’ to clarify that the focus of this proposed requirement would not be limited to 

only protected area access but would apply 

to any area for which access must be controlled to meet complimentary requirements 

addressed in this proposed rule. In addition, 

the word ‘‘material’’ would be added to emphasize that the control of material into 

these areas would also be a critical element 

of the onsite physical protection program to 

facilitate achievement of the performance 

objective of the proposed paragraph (b) of 

this section. 

§ 73.55(d)(7)(i)(B) Positively control, in accordance with the access list established pursuant to paragraph (d)(7)(i) of this section, all 

points of personnel and vehicle access to 

vital areas.

(g)(1)(ii) Control all points of personnel and 

vehicle access into vital areas in accordance with access authorization lists.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revisions. 

§ 73.55(d)(7)(i) * * * limit unescorted access 

to vital areas during nonemergency conditions to individuals who require access in 

order to perform their duties. To achieve this, 

the licensee shall: 

(g)(1)(iii) During non-emergency conditions, 

limit unescorted access to the protected 

area and vital areas to only those individuals who require unescorted access to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.

This requirement would be retained and revised with minor revisions. Most significantly, the phrase ‘‘protected area’’ would 

be added to emphasize that the same ‘‘assigned duties and responsibilities’’ criteria 

apply to both vital and protected areas. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62702 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(g)(1)(iv) Monitor and ensure the integrity of 

access control systems.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

requirement for ensuring the integrity of the 

access control system and prevent its unauthorized bypass. Based on changes to 

the threat environment, the Commission 

has determined that emphasis would be 

necessary to ensure that the integrity of the 

access control system is maintained 

through oversight and that attempts to circumvent or bypass the established process 

will be detected and access denied. 

(g)(1)(v) Provide supervision and control over 

the badging process to prevent unauthorized bypass of access control equipment located at or outside of the protected area.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

requirement for ensuring the integrity of the 

access control process. Based on changes 

to the threat environment, the Commission 

has determined that specific emphasis on 

access control equipment outside the protected area would be necessary to ensure 

that the integrity of the access control system is maintained for those process elements that are not contained within the protected area. 

§ 73.55(d)(1) The individual responsible for 

the last access control function (controlling 

admission to the protected area) must be isolated within a bullet-resisting structure as described in paragraph (c)(6) of this section to 

assure his or her ability to respond or to 

summon assistance.

(g)(1)(vi) Isolate the individual responsible for 

the last access control function (controlling 

admission to the protected area) within a 

bullet-resisting structure to assure the ability 

to respond or to summon assistance in response to unauthorized activities.

This requirement would be retained and revised with minor revisions. Most significantly, the phrase ‘‘as described in paragraph (c)(6) of this section’’ would be deleted because the specific criteria for bulletresisting would no longer be addressed in 

the referenced paragraph. Specific criteria 

would be addressed in standards published 

by the Underwriters Laboratory (UL). 

(g)(1)(vii) In response to specific threat and 

security information, implement a two-person (line-of-sight) rule for all personnel in 

vital areas so that no one individual is permitted unescorted access to vital areas. 

Under these conditions the licensee shall 

implement measures to verify that the two 

person rule has been met when a vital area 

is accessed.

This requirement would be added to require 

two specific actions to be taken by the licensee where credible threat information is 

provided. This proposed requirement would 

first require that the two-person rule be implemented, and second, that measures be 

implemented to verify that the two-person 

rule is met when access to a vital area is 

gained. This proposed requirement would 

include those areas identified in the proposed (e)(8)(iv) of this section to be protected as vital areas. Based on changes to 

the threat environment, the Commission 

has determined that the proposed requirement is necessary to facilitate licensee 

achievement of the performance objective 

of the proposed paragraph (b) of this section. 

(g)(2) In accordance with the approved security plans and before granting unescorted 

access through an access control point, the 

licensee shall: 

This requirement would be added to specify 

the basic functions that must be satisfied to 

meet the current and proposed requirements for controlling access into any area 

for which access controls are implemented. 

§ 73.55(d)(1) Identification * * * of all individuals unless otherwise provided herein must 

be made and * * *.

(g)(2)(i) Confirm the identity of individuals ...... This requirement would retain the current requirement with minor revisions for formatting purposes. 

§ 73.55(d)(1) * * * authorization must be 

checked at these points.

(g)(2)(ii) Verify the authorization for access of 

individuals, vehicles, and materials.

This requirement would retain the current requirement with minor revisions for formatting purposes. 

§ 73.55(d)(1) * * * search of all individuals 

unless otherwise provided herein must be 

made and * * *.

(g)(2)(iii) Search individuals, vehicles, packages, deliveries, and materials in accordance with paragraph (h) of this section.This requirement would retain the current requirement with minor revisions for formatting purposes. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62703 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(g)(2)(iv) Confirm, in accordance with industry 

shared lists and databases, that individuals 

have not been denied access to another licensed facility.

This requirement would be added to describe 

an acceptable information sharing mechanism used by licensees to share information 

about visitors and employees who have requested either escorted or unescorted access to at least one site. Based on changes 

to the threat environment, the Commission 

has determined that this proposed requirement would be a prudent enhancement to 

the licensee capabilities. 

(g)(3) Access control points must be: This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(g)(3)(i) Equipped with locking devices, intrusion detection equipment, and monitoring, 

observation, and surveillance equipment, as 

appropriate.

This requirement would be added to describe 

the types of equipment determined to be 

acceptable to satisfy the desired level of 

performance intended by the proposed requirements of this section. The phrase ‘‘as 

appropriate’’ would be used to provide the 

flexibility needed to provide only that equipment that is required to accomplish the desired function of the specific access control 

point. 

§ 73.55(d)(1) The licensee shall control all 

points of personnel and vehicle access into a 

protected area.

(g)(3)(ii) Located outside or concurrent with, 

the physical barrier system through which it 

controls access.

This requirement would be added to clarify 

the location of access control points to ensure personnel and vehicles do not gain access beyond a barrier (i.e., stand-off distance) before being searched. 

(g)(4) Emergency conditions ............................ This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

§ 73.55(d)(7)(ii) Design the access authorization system to accommodate the potential 

need for rapid ingress or egress of individuals during emergency conditions or situations that could lead to emergency conditions. To help assure this, the licensee shall: 

(g)(4)(i) The licensee shall design the access 

control system to accommodate the potential need for rapid ingress or egress of authorized individuals during emergency conditions or situations that could lead to emergency conditions.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. Most significantly, the 

phrase ‘‘access authorization system’’

would be replaced with the phrase ‘‘access 

control system’’ to clarify that the focus of 

this proposed requirement is on controlling 

access during emergency conditions. The 

need for rapid ingress and egress is a 

physical action and would more appropriately be addressed through access controls. 

Also, the phrase ‘‘authorized individuals’’

would be added to indicate that access authorization requirements are satisfied by the 

individual in advance of the need for access. In addition, the phrase ‘‘To help assure this, the licensee shall:’’ would be deleted because it would no longer be needed. 

§ 73.55(d)(7)(ii)(A) Ensure prompt access to 

vital equipment.

(g)(4)(ii) Under emergency conditions, the licensee shall implement procedures to ensure that: 

(g)(4)(ii)(A) Authorized emergency personnel 

are provided prompt access to affected 

areas and equipment. 

(g)(4)(ii)(B) Attempted or actual unauthorized 

entry to vital equipment is detected. 

(g)(4)(ii)(C) The capability to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage 

is maintained. 

This requirement would be retained and revised to add a performance based requirement that the licensee develop and maintain a process by which prompt access to 

vital equipment is assured while at the 

same time ensuring the detection of unauthorized entry, and that this process would 

be implemented in a manner that is consistent with the proposed requirements of 

this section and ensures the licensee capability to satisfy the performance objective of 

the proposed paragraph (b) of this section. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62704 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(g)(4)(iii) The licensee shall ensure that restrictions for site access and egress during 

emergency conditions are coordinated with 

responses by offsite emergency support 

agencies identified in the site emergency 

plans.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for coordination of security access controls during 

emergencies with the access needs of 

emergency response personnel. This proposed requirement is intended to provide 

the necessary level of flexibility to the licensee to ensure access by appropriate 

personnel while maintaining the necessary 

security posture for controlling access to 

areas where dangerous conditions exist, 

such as violent conflict involving weapons. 

(g)(5) Vehicles .................................................. This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

§ 73.55(d)(4) The licensee shall exercise positive control over all such designated vehicles 

to assure that they are used only by authorized persons and for authorized purposes.

(g)(5)(i) The licensee shall exercise control 

over all vehicles while inside the protected 

area and vital areas to ensure they are 

used only by authorized persons and for 

authorized purposes.

This requirement would be retained and revised to apply to all vehicles and not be limited to only designated vehicles. Most significantly, the phrase ‘‘all such designated 

vehicles’’ would be deleted to remove this 

limitation and clarify that the proposed requirement applies to any vehicle granted 

access. The word ‘‘positive’’ would be deleted to remove uncertainties regarding the 

meaning of this word. 

§ 73.55(d)(4) All vehicles, except designated 

licensee vehicles, requiring entry into the protected area shall be escorted by a member of 

the security organization while within the protected area, and * * *.

(g)(5)(ii) Vehicles inside the protected area or 

vital areas must be operated by an individual authorized unescorted access to the 

area, or must be escorted by an individual 

trained, qualified, and equipped to perform 

vehicle escort duties, while inside the area.

This requirement would be retained and 

would contain a significant revision to relieve the licensee from the current requirement to escort a vehicle operated by an individual who otherwise has unescorted access and relief from the requirement that a 

member of the security organization must 

escort vehicles. The phrase ‘‘escorted by a 

member of the security organization’’ would 

be replaced with the phrase ‘‘operated by 

an individual authorized unescorted access 

to the area, or must be escorted while inside the area’’ to allow personnel authorized unescorted access, to operate the vehicle without escort and to allow a vehicle 

to be escorted by an individual other than a 

member of the security organization if the 

operator is not authorized unescorted access. Training and qualification requirements for escorts would be addressed in 

the proposed § 73.55(g)(7) and (g)(8). 

§ 73.55(d)(4) Designated licensee vehicles 

shall be limited in their use to onsite plant 

functions and shall remain in the protected 

area except for operational, maintenance, repair security and emergency purposes.

(g)(5)(iii) Vehicles inside the protected area 

must be limited to plant functions or emergencies, and must be disabled when not in 

use.

This requirement would be retained and revised. Most significantly, the phrase ‘‘Designated licensee’’ would be deleted to 

broaden the scope of this proposed requirement to all vehicles. Also, the phrase ‘‘shall 

remain in the protected area except for 

operational, maintenance, repair security 

and emergency purposes’’ would be deleted because it would no longer be needed. The word ‘‘disabled’’ would be added to 

specify that when not in use all vehicles 

must be rendered non-operational such that 

the vehicle would not be in a ready-to-use 

configuration. 

(g)(5)(iv) Vehicles transporting hazardous materials inside the protected area must be 

escorted by an armed member of the security organization.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

the control of hazardous material deliveries. 

The Commission has determined that the 

level of control described by this proposed 

requirement is prudent and necessary to 

satisfy the performance objective of the proposed paragraph (b) of this section. 

(g)(6) Access control devices .......................... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62705 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(d)(5) A numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected 

areas without escort.

(g)(6)(i) Identification badges. The licensee 

shall implement a numbered photo identification badge/key-card system for all individuals authorized unescorted access to the 

protected area and vital areas.

This requirement would be retained and revised with minor revisions. Most significantly, the phrase ‘‘and vital areas’’ is 

added to provide necessary focus that 

badges apply to both the protected area 

and vital areas. Access to the protected 

area does not include access to a vital area 

except as required to perform duties. 

§ 73.55(d)(5)(ii) Badges may be removed from 

the protected area when measures are in 

place to confirm the true identity and authorization for access of the badge holder upon 

entry to the protected area.

(g)(6)(i)(A) Identification badges may be removed from the protected area only when 

measures are in place to confirm the true 

identity and authorization for unescorted access of the badge holder before allowing 

unescorted access to the protected area.

This requirement would be retained and revised with minor revisions. Most significantly, the phrase ‘‘upon entry to the protected area’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘before allowing unescorted access 

to the protected area’’ to clarify that the performance to be achieved would be to confirm and verify access authorization before 

granting access to any individual. 

§ 73.55(d)(5)(ii) Badges shall be displayed by 

all individuals while inside the protected area.

(g)(6)(i)(B) Except where operational safety 

concerns require otherwise, identification 

badges must be clearly displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area 

and vital areas.

This requirement would retain the current requirement to display badges at all times 

and would be revised to address the exception to this proposed requirement. The 

phrase ‘‘Except where operational safety 

concerns require otherwise,’’ would be 

added to account for considerations such 

as radiological control requirements or foreign material exclusion requirements, that 

may preclude this requirement. In addition, 

the word ‘‘clearly’’ would be added to describe the expected performance that 

badges would be visible to provide an indication of authorization to be in the area. 

(g)(6)(i)(C) The licensee shall maintain a 

record, to include the name and areas to 

which unescorted access is granted, of all 

individuals to whom photo identification 

badge/key-cards have been issued.

This requirement would be added to account 

for technological advancements commonly 

associated with electronically based 

badging systems used by licensees. The 

Commission has determined that this proposed requirement is prudent and necessary because such a record would be 

automatically made as a standard function 

and intent of this type of system. In addition, badging systems commonly used by licensees include the ability to program remote card-readers which are designed to 

grant or deny access to specific areas 

based upon the information electronically 

associated with specific badges/key-cards. 

This proposed requirement would not specify the media in which this record must be 

maintained to allow for electronic storage. 

§ 73.55(d)(8) All keys, locks, combinations, 

and related access control devices used to 

control access to protected areas and vital 

areas must be controlled to reduce the probability of compromise.

(g)(6)(ii) Keys, locks, combinations, and passwords. All keys, locks, combinations, passwords, and related access control devices 

used to control access to protected areas, 

vital areas, security systems, and safeguards information must be controlled and 

accounted for to reduce the probability of 

compromise. The licensee shall: 

This requirement would be retained and revised with minor revisions. Most significantly, the word ‘‘passwords’’ would be 

added to account for technological advancements associated with the use of 

computers. The phrase ‘‘security systems, 

and safeguards information’’ would be 

added to emphasize the need to control access to these items. The phrase ‘‘and accounted for’’ would be added to confirm 

possession by the individual to whom the 

access control device has been issued. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62706 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(d)(8) The licensee shall issue keys, 

locks, combinations, and other access control 

devices to protected areas and vital areas 

only to persons granted unescorted facility 

access.

(g)(6)(ii)(A) Issue access control devices only 

to individuals who require unescorted access to perform official duties and responsibilities.

This requirement would be retained and revised with minor revisions. Most significantly, the phrase ‘‘protected areas and 

vital areas’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘to perform official duties and responsibilities’’ to account for access control 

devices to items or systems that may be located outside of protected and vital areas, 

such as to computer systems and safeguards information storage cabinets. The 

phrase ‘‘keys, locks, combinations, and 

other access control devices’’ would be replaced by the phrase ‘‘access control devices’’ to generically describe these items 

and account for other technological advancements that may occur in the future. 

(g)(6)(ii)(B) Maintain a record, to include 

name and affiliation, of all individuals to 

whom access control devices have been 

issued, and implement a process to account for access control devices at least 

annually.

This requirement would be added to facilitate 

achievement of the current requirement to 

control access control devices to reduce the 

probability of compromise. The use of key 

control logs and annual inventories is a 

commonly used mechanism for any security 

system and therefore, the Commission has 

determined that this proposed requirement 

is a prudent and necessary enhancement to 

facilitate the licensee’s capability to achieve 

the performance objective of the proposed 

paragraph (b) of this section. 

§ 73.55(d)(8) Whenever there is evidence or 

suspicion that any key, lock, combination, or 

related access control device may have been 

compromised, it must be changed or rotated.

(g)(6)(ii)(C) Implement compensatory measures upon discovery or suspicion that any 

access control device may have been compromised. Compensatory measures must 

remain in effect until the compromise is corrected.

This requirement would be retained and revised to provide a performance based requirement for compensatory measures 

taken in response to compromise. Most significantly, the phrase ‘‘it must be changed 

or rotated’’ would be captured in the proposed § 73.55(g)(6)(ii) (D) and (E). The 

phrase ‘‘Compensatory Measures must remain in effect until the compromise is corrected’’ would be added to provide focus 

specific to when compensatory measures 

would no longer apply. 

§ 73.55(d)(8) Whenever there is evidence or 

suspicion that any key, lock, combination, or 

related access control devices may have 

been compromised, it must be changed or 

rotated.

(g)(6)(ii)(D) Retrieve, change, rotate, deactivate, or otherwise disable access control 

devices that have been, or may have been 

compromised.

This requirement would be retained and revised with minor revisions. Most significantly, the words ‘‘retrieve’’, ‘‘deactivate’’, 

and ‘‘disable’’ would be added to ensure 

focus is provided on these actions relative 

to ensuring control of access control devices and to account for electronic devices. 

§ 73.55(d)(7)(C) Revoke, in the case of an individual’s involuntary termination for cause, 

the individual’s unescorted facility access and 

retrieve his or her identification badge and 

other entry devices, as applicable, prior to or 

simultaneously with notifying this individual of 

his or her termination.

§ 73.55(d)(8) Whenever an individual’s 

unescorted access is revoked due to his or 

her lack of trustworthiness, reliability, or inadequate work performance, keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices 

to which that person had access must be 

changed or rotated.

(g)(6)(ii)(E) Retrieve, change, rotate, deactivate, or otherwise disable all access control 

devices issued to individuals who no longer 

require unescorted access to the areas for 

which the devices were designed.

This requirement would retain and combine 

two current requirements to specify the actions required to control access control devices issued to personnel who no longer 

possess a need for access. The Commission has determined that the cause for revocation of unescorted access authorization 

does not effect the actions needed to reduce the probability of compromise. Therefore, the same actions are necessary 

whether access is revoked under favorable 

or unfavorable conditions. Whenever an individual no longer requires access to an 

area the access control devices issued to 

that individual would be retrieved, changed, 

rotated, deactivated, or otherwise disabled 

to provide high assurance that the individual would not continue to have access to 

the item or location. 

(g)(7) Visitors ................................................... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62707 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(d)(6) Individuals not authorized by the 

licensee to enter protected areas without escort shall be escorted by a watchman or 

other individual designated by the licensee 

while in a protected area and shall be 

badged to indicate that an escort is required.

(g)(7)(i) The licensee may permit escorted access to the protected area to individuals 

who do not have unescorted access authorization in accordance with the requirements 

of § 73.56 and part 26 of this chapter. The 

licensee shall: 

This requirement would retain the current requirement to provide escorted access with 

minor revisions. This proposed requirement 

would address visitor access and would 

specify that anyone who has not satisfied 

the requirements of § 73.56 and part 26 of 

this chapter would be considered to be a 

visitor. The current requirement for escorts 

would be addressed in proposed 

§ 73.55(g)(8). 

(g)(7)(i)(A) Implement procedures for processing, escorting, and controlling visitors.This requirement would be added to require 

implementing procedures that describe how 

visitors would be processed, escorted, and 

controlled. 

(g)(7)(i)(B) Confirm the identity of each visitor 

through physical presentation of a recognized identification card issued by a local, 

State, or Federal Government agency that 

includes a photo or contains physical characteristics of the individual requesting escorted access.

This requirement would be added to require 

the verification of the true identity of nonemployee individuals through the presentation of photographic government issued 

identification (i.e., driver’s license) which 

provides physical characteristics that can 

be compared to the holder. The word ‘‘recognized’’ would be used to provide flexibility 

for other types of identification that may be 

issued by local, State or Federal Governments. 

§ 73.55(d)(6) In addition, the licensee shall require that each individual register his or her 

name, date, time, purpose of visit, employment affiliation, citizenship, and name of the 

individual to be visited.

(g)(7)(i)(C) Maintain a visitor control register in 

which all visitors shall register their name, 

date, time, purpose of visit, employment affiliation, citizenship, and name of the individual to be visited before being escorted 

into any protected or vital area.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. 

§ 73.55(d)(6) Individuals not authorized by the 

licensee to enter protected areas without escort shall * * * be badged to indicate that an 

escort is required.

(g)(7)(i)(D) Issue a visitor badge to all visitors 

that clearly indicates that an escort is required.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision for formatting purposes. Most 

significantly, the word ‘‘clearly’’ would be 

added to focus on display of the badge in a 

manner that easily identifies the individual 

as requiring an escort. 

§ 73.55(d)(6) Individuals not authorized by the 

licensee to enter protected areas without escort shall be escorted by a watchman or 

other individual designated by the licensee 

while in a protected area and * * *.

(g)(7)(i)(E) Escort all visitors, at all times, 

while inside the protected area and vital 

areas.

This requirement would retain the requirement 

for escort with minor revision for formatting 

purposes. Most significantly, the requirement for who performs these escort duties 

is moved to the proposed paragraph (g)(8) 

of this section. 

§ 73.55(d)(5)(i) An individual not employed by 

the licensee but who requires frequent and 

extended access to protected and vital areas 

may be authorized access to such areas 

without escort provided that he receives a 

picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be returned upon exit 

from the protected area and which indicates: 

(g)(7)(ii) Individuals not employed by the licensee but who require frequent and extended unescorted access to the protected 

area and vital areas shall satisfy the access 

authorization requirements of § 73.56 and 

part 26 of this chapter and shall be issued 

a non-employee photo identification badge 

that is easily distinguished from other identification badges before being allowed 

unescorted access to the protected area. 

Non-employee photo identification badges 

must indicate: 

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revisions. Most significantly, the 

phrase ‘‘shall satisfy the access authorization requirements of § 73.56 and part 26 of 

this chapter’’ would be added to clarify the 

requirement that these individual’s satisfy 

the same background check requirements 

and Behavior Observation Program participation that would be applied to any other licensee employee for unescorted access 

authorization. In addition, the phrase ‘‘which 

must be returned upon exit from the protected area’’ would be deleted because removal of badges from the protected area 

would be addressed in the proposed paragraph (g)(6)(i)(A). 

§ 73.55(d)(5)(i)(A) Non-employee, no escort 

required; 

(g)(7)(ii)(A) Non-employee, no escort required This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision for formatting purposes. 

§ 73.55(d)(5)(i)(B) Areas to which access is 

authorized; and 

(g)(7)(ii)(B) Areas to which access is authorized.This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision for formatting purposes. 

§ 73.55(d)(5)(i)(c) The period for which access 

has been authorized.

(g)(7)(ii)(C) The period for which access is authorized.This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision for formatting purposes. 

(g)(7)(ii)(D) The individual’s employer ............. This requirement would be added to facilitate 

identification of this type of non-employee 

and the type of activities this individual 

should be performing. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62708 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(g)(7)(ii)(E) A means to determine the individual’s emergency plan assembly area.This requirement would be added for emergency planning purposes. 

(g)(8) Escorts. The licensee shall ensure that 

all escorts are trained in accordance with 

appendix B to this part, the approved training and qualification plan, and licensee policies and procedures.

This requirement would be added to provided 

performance based requirements for satisfying the escort requirements of this proposed rule and would provide regulatory 

stability through the consistent application 

of visitor controls at all sites. Based on 

changes to the threat environment, the 

Commission has determined that emphasis 

on the identification and control of visitors is 

a prudent and necessary enhancement to 

facilitate licensee achievement of the performance basis of the proposed paragraph 

(b)(1) of this section. 

(g)(8)(i) Escorts shall be authorized 

unescorted access to all areas in which 

they will perform escort duties.

This requirement would be added to establish 

a basic qualification criteria for individuals 

performing escort duties. Individuals not authorized unescorted access to an area must 

be escorted and therefore, would not be 

qualified to perform escort duties in that 

area. 

(g)(8)(ii) Individuals assigned to escort visitors 

shall be provided a means of timely communication with both alarm stations in a 

manner that ensures the ability to summon 

assistance when needed.

This requirement would be added to establish 

a basic qualification criteria for individuals 

performing escort duties. The phrase ‘‘timely communication’’ would mean the ability to 

call for assistance before that ability can be 

taken away. 

(g)(8)(iii) Individuals assigned to vehicle escort duties shall be provided a means of 

continuous communication with both alarm 

stations to ensure the ability to summon assistance when needed.

This requirement would be added to establish 

a basic qualification criteria for individuals 

performing escort duties. The word ‘‘continuous communication’’ would mean possession of a direct line of communication for 

immediate notification, such as a radio. 

(g)(8)(iv) Escorts shall be knowledgeable of 

those activities that are authorized to be 

performed within the areas for which they 

are assigned to perform escort duties and 

must also be knowledgeable of those activities that are authorized to be performed by 

any individual for which the escort is assigned responsibility.

This requirement would be added to establish 

a basic qualification criteria for individuals 

performing escort duties. The primary responsibility of an escort would be the identification and reporting of unauthorized activities, therefore, to perform escort duties the 

individual must possess this knowledge in 

order to be an effective escort and recognize an event involving an unauthorized activity. 

(g)(8)(v) Visitor to escort ratios shall be limited 

to 10 to 1 in the protected area and 5 to 1 

in vital areas, provided that the necessary 

observation and control requirements of this 

section can be maintained by the assigned 

escort over all visitor activities.

This requirement would be added to establish 

a basic restriction to ensure that individuals 

performing escort duties are able to maintain control over the personnel being escorted. The phrase ‘‘provided that the necessary observation and control requirements of this section can be maintained’’

would provide flexibility for the licensee to 

reduce the specified ratios to facilitate 

achievement of the performance objective 

of the proposed paragraph (b). 

(h) Search programs ........................................ This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

§ 73.55(d)(2) At the point of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area, all handcarried packages shall be searched for devices such as firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices, or other items which could 

be used for radiological sabotage.

(h)(1) At each designated access control point 

into the owner controlled area and protected area, the licensee shall search individuals, vehicles, packages, deliveries, and 

materials in accordance with the requirements of this section and the approved security plans, before granting access.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revisions. Most significantly, the 

phrase ‘‘for devices such as firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices, or other 

items which could be used for radiological 

sabotage’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘in accordance with the requirements of this section and the approved security plans’’ to provide language that would 

make this proposed requirement generically 

applicable to all searches. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62709 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(d)(2) At the point of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area, all handcarried packages shall be searched for devices such as firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices, or other items which could 

be used for radiological sabotage.

(h)(1)(i) The objective of the search program 

must be to deter, detect, and prevent the 

introduction of unauthorized firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or other unauthorized materials and devices into designated areas in which the unauthorized 

items could be used to disable personnel, 

equipment, and systems necessary to meet 

the performance objective and requirements 

of paragraph (b) of this section.

This requirement would be retained and revised to focus this proposed requirement on 

the objective of the search program for all 

areas and not limit the search function to 

only protected and vital areas. The Commission has determined that because of 

changes to the threat environment, the 

focus of protective measures must be to 

protect any area from which the licensee 

capability to meet the performance objective and requirements of the proposed paragraph (b) of this section could be disabled 

or destroyed. 

§ 73.55(d)(1) The search function for detection 

of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices must be accomplished through the use 

of both firearms and explosive detection 

equipment capable of detecting those devices.

(h)(1)(ii) The search requirements for unauthorized firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or other unauthorized materials and 

devices must be accomplished through the 

use of equipment capable of detecting 

these unauthorized items and through visual and hands-on physical searches, as 

needed to ensure all items are identified 

before granting access.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revisions. The phrase ‘‘or other unauthorized materials and devices’’ would be 

added to account for future technological 

advancements. The phrase ‘‘and through 

visual and hands-on physical searches’’

would be added to ensure these aspects of 

the search process are considered and applied when needed. 

(h)(1)(iii) Only trained and qualified members 

of the security organization, and other 

trained and qualified personnel designated 

by the licensee, shall perform search activities or be assigned duties and responsibilities required to satisfy observation requirements for the search activities.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the current § 73.55(b)(4)(i), and 

clarification for ‘‘observation’’ of search activities by personnel. The phrase ‘‘other 

trained and qualified personnel designated 

by the licensee’’ would be used to account 

for non-security personnel who would be 

assigned search duties relative to supply or 

warehouse functions or other types of bulk 

shipments. 

(h)(2) The licensee shall establish and implement written search procedures for all access control points before granting access 

to any individual, vehicle, package, delivery, 

or material.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the current § 73.55(b)(3)(i). 

(h)(2)(i) Search procedures must ensure that 

items possessed by an individual, or contained within a vehicle or package, must be 

clearly identified as not being a prohibited 

item before granting access beyond the access control point for which the search is 

conducted.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the current § 73.55(d)(1) relative 

to the use of search equipment and to 

specify a requirement for the licensee to 

identify items that may be obscured from 

observation by equipment such as X-ray 

equipment. This requirement would ensure 

that human interaction with search equipment is effective and that assigned personnel are aware of all items observed or 

are not identified by search equipment. 

(h)(2)(ii) The licensee shall visually and physically hand search all individuals, vehicles, 

and packages containing items that cannot 

be or are not clearly identified by search 

equipment.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the current § 73.55(d)(1), relative 

to the purpose of the search function to 

identify items that may be obscured from 

observation by equipment such as X-ray 

equipment. This proposed requirement intends to ensure that the licensee take appropriate actions to ensure all items granted 

access to the PA would be identified before 

granting access. 

§ 73.55(d)(1) Whenever firearms or explosives 

detection equipment at a portal is out of service or not operating satisfactorily, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat-down 

search of all persons who would otherwise 

have been subject to equipment searches.

(h)(3) Whenever search equipment is out of 

service or is not operating satisfactorily, 

trained and qualified members of the security organization shall conduct a hands-on 

physical search of all individuals, vehicles, 

packages, deliveries, and materials that 

would otherwise have been subject to 

equipment searches.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revisions. The phrase ‘‘firearms or 

explosives detection equipment at a portal’’

would be replaced with the phrase ‘‘search 

equipment ‘‘ to generically describe this 

equipment. The phrase ‘‘a physical patdown search’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘a hands-on physical search’’ to update the language commonly used to describe this activity. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62710 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(d)(1) When the licensee has cause to 

suspect that an individual is attempting to introduce firearms, explosives, or incendiary 

devices into protected areas, the licensee 

shall conduct a physical pat-down search of 

that individual.

(h)(4) When an attempt to introduce unauthorized items has occurred or is suspected, 

the licensee shall implement actions to ensure that the suspect individuals, vehicles, 

packages, deliveries, and materials are denied access and shall perform a visual and 

hands-on physical search to determine the 

absence or existence of a threat.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revisions to provide additional performance based requirements relative to 

achieving the desired results. 

(h)(5) Vehicle search procedures must be performed by at least two (2) properly trained 

and equipped security personnel, at least 

one of whom is positioned to observe the 

search process and provide a timely response to unauthorized activities if necessary.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for performing vehicle searches. This proposed requirement would ensure that unauthorized 

activities would be identified and a timely 

response would be initiated at a vehicle 

search area, to include an armed response. 

Based on changes to the threat environment, the Commission has determined that 

this requirement would facilitate achievement of the performance objective and requirements of the proposed paragraph (b) 

of this section. 

§ 73.55(d)(4) Vehicle areas to be searched 

shall include the cab, engine compartment, 

undercarriage, and cargo area.

(h)(6) Vehicle areas to be searched must include, but are not limited to, the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and 

cargo area.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revisions. 

(h)(7) Vehicle search checkpoints must be 

equipped with video surveillance equipment 

that must be monitored by an individual capable of initiating and directing a timely response to unauthorized activity.

This requirement would be added to provide 

additional performance based requirements 

relative to achieving the desired results for 

vehicle searches at any location designated 

for the performance of vehicle searches. To 

satisfy this proposed requirement, the individual assigned to monitor search activities 

need not be located in the CAS or SAS, but 

rather may be located in any position from 

which the monitoring and notification requirements of this section could be assured. 

§ 73.55(d)(1) * * * except bona fide Federal, 

State, and local law enforcement personnel 

on official duty to these equipment searches 

upon entry into a protected area.

§ 73.55(d)(4) * * * except under emergency 

conditions, shall be searched for items which 

could be used for sabotage purposes prior to 

entry into the protected area.

(h)(8) Exceptions to the search requirements 

of this section must be submitted to the 

Commission for prior review and approval 

and must be identified in the approved security plans.

This requirement would retain, combine, and 

revise two current requirements 

§ 73.55(d)(1) and (4) to generically account 

for those instances where search requirements would not be met before granting access beyond a physical barrier. This proposed requirement would require that the licensee specify in the approved plans the 

specific circumstances under which search 

requirements would not be satisfied. 

§ 73.55(d)(3) * * * except those Commission 

approved delivery and inspection activities 

specifically designated by the licensee to be 

carried out within vital or protected areas for 

reasons of safety, security or operational necessity.

(h)(8)(i) Vehicles and items that may be excepted from the search requirements of this 

section must be escorted by an armed individual who is trained and equipped to observe offloading and perform search activities at the final destination within the protected area.

This requirement would be retained and revised. Most significantly, this requirement 

would be revised to ensure that vehicles 

and items excepted from search requirements before entry into the protected area 

are escorted by an armed individual and 

searched when offloaded to provide assurance that unauthorized personnel and items 

would be detected and reported. 

§ 73.55(d)(4) * * * to the extent practicable, 

shall be off loaded in the protected area at a 

specific designated materials receiving area 

that is not adjacent to a vital area.

(h)(8)(ii) To the extent practicable, items excepted from search must be off loaded only 

at specified receiving areas that are not adjacent to a vital area.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. 

(h)(8)(iii) The excepted items must be 

searched at the receiving area and opened 

at the final destination by an individual familiar with the items.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement that would 

ensure that the proposed requirement for 

search is met at the receiving area. 

§ 73.55(i) Detection and assessment systems. This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62711 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(i)(1) The licensee shall establish and maintain an intrusion detection and assessment 

system that must provide, at all times, the 

capability for early detection and assessment of unauthorized persons and activities.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the current requirement of 10 

CFR 73.55(e)(1) and the proposed 

§ 73.55(b)(2) through (4). The phrase ‘‘intrusion detection and assessment system’’

would be intended to describe all components (i.e., personnel, procedures, and 

equipment) designated by the licensee as 

performing a function(s) required to detect 

or assess unauthorized activities in any 

area to which access must be controlled to 

meet Commission requirements. The term 

‘‘system’’ refers to how these components 

interact to satisfy Commission requirements. This proposed requirement does not 

mandate specific intrusion detection equipment for any specific area, but rather requires that the system provide detection 

and assessment capabilities that meet 

Commission requirements. The phrase ‘‘at 

all times’’ is used to describe the Commission’s view that the licensee must have in 

place and operational a mechanism by 

which all threats will be detected and an 

appropriate response initiated, at any time. 

The Commission does not mean to suggest 

that a failure of any component of a system 

would constitute an automatic non-compliance with this proposed requirement provided the failure is identified and compensatory measures are implemented within a 

time frame consistent with the time lines 

necessary to prevent exploitation of the failure, beginning at the time of the failure. 

§ 73.55(e)(1) All alarms required pursuant to 

this part must annunciate in a continuously 

manned central alarm station located within 

the protected area and in at least one other 

continuously manned station not necessarily 

onsite, so that a single act cannot remove 

the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an alarm.

(i)(2) Intrusion detection equipment must annunciate, and video assessment equipment 

images shall display, concurrently in at 

least two continuously staffed onsite alarm 

stations, at least one of which must be protected in accordance with the requirements 

of paragraphs (e)(6)(v), (e)(7)(iii), and 

(i)(8)(ii) of this section.

This requirement would be retained with three 

significant revisions. The most significant 

revision would be the deletion of the current 

language that describes where the secondary alarm station may be located. Because of changes to the threat environment 

the Commission has determined that to ensure the functions required to be performed 

by the central alarm are maintained, both 

alarm stations must be located onsite. As 

all current licensees have their secondary 

alarm station onsite, the Commission has 

determined that deletion of the ‘‘not necessarily onsite’’ provision, would have no 

impact. 

The second significant revision is the addition 

of the word ‘‘concurrently’’ to provide a performance based requirement that focuses 

on the need to ensure that both alarm station operators are notified of a potential 

threat, are capable of making a timely and 

independent assessment, and have equal 

capabilities to ensure that a timely response 

is made. This proposed requirement would 

be necessary for consistency with the current requirement to protect against a single 

act. The third significant revision would be 

the addition of the phrase ‘‘and video assessment equipment images shall display’’

to add a performance based requirement 

that focuses on the relationship between 

detection and assessment. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62712 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(i)(3) The licensee’s intrusion detection system must be designed to ensure that both 

alarm station operators: 

(i)(3)(i) Are concurrently notified of the alarm 

annunciation.

(i)(3)(ii) Are capable of making a timely assessment of the cause of each alarm annunciation.

(i)(3)(iii) Possess the capability to initiate a 

timely response in accordance with the approved security plans, licensee protective 

strategy, and implementing procedures.

This requirement would be added to provide 

performance based requirements consistent 

with the current § 73.55(e)(1), and the proposed requirements of this proposed section. The proposed requirement for dual 

knowledge and dual capability within both 

alarm stations provides a defense-in-depth 

component consistent with the proposed requirement for protection against a single 

act. 

Based on changes to the threat environment 

the Commission has determined this proposed requirement is a prudent clarification 

of current requirements necessary to facilitate the licensee capability to achieve the 

performance objective of the proposed 

paragraph (b)(1) of this section. 

(i)(4) Both alarm stations must be equipped 

with equivalent capabilities for detection 

and communication, and must be equipped 

with functionally equivalent assessment, 

monitoring, observation, and surveillance 

capabilities to support the effective implementation of the approved security plans 

and the licensee protective strategy in the 

event that either alarm station is disabled.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the current § 73.55(e)(1) and the 

proposed requirements for defense-in-depth 

and protection against a single act. The 

word ‘‘equivalent’’ would require the licensee to provide both alarm stations with 

detection and communication equipment 

that ensures each alarm station operator is 

knowledgeable of an alarm annunciation at 

each alarm point and zone, and can communicate the initiation of an appropriate response to include the disposition of each 

alarm. The phrase ‘‘functionally equivalent’’

would require that both alarm stations be 

equally equipped to perform those assessment, surveillance, observation, and monitoring functions needed to support the effective implementation of the licensee protective strategy. 

This proposed requirement would clarify the 

Commission expectation that those video 

technologies and capabilities used to support the effective implementation of the approved security plans and the licensee protective strategy are equally available for use 

by both alarm station operators to ensure 

that the functions of detection, assessment, 

and communications can be effectively 

maintained and utilized in the event that 

one or the other alarm station is disabled. 

Based on changes to the threat environment the Commission has determined that 

this proposed requirement is a prudent and 

necessary clarification of current requirements and Commission Orders necessary 

to ensure the performance objective and requirements of the proposed paragraph (b) 

of this section are met. 

§ 73.55(e)(1) * * * so that a single act cannot 

remove the capability of calling for assistance 

or otherwise responding to an alarm.

(i)(4)(i) The licensee shall ensure that a single 

act cannot remove the capability of both 

alarm stations to detect and assess unauthorized activities, respond to an alarm, 

summon offsite assistance, implement the 

protective strategy, provide command and 

control, or otherwise prevent significant 

core damage and spent fuel sabotage.

This requirement would be retained and revised to provide additional clarification regarding the critical functions determined essential and which must be maintained to 

carry out an effective response to threats 

consistent with the proposed performance 

objective and requirements of paragraph (b) 

of this section. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62713 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(e)(1) Onsite secondary power supply 

systems for alarm annunciator equipment 

* * *.

(i)(4)(ii) The alarm station functions in paragraph (i)(4) of this section must remain operable from an uninterruptible backup 

power supply in the event of the loss of 

normal power.

This requirement would retain the current requirement for secondary power with two 

significant revisions. First, the phrase ‘‘annunciator equipment’’ would be replaced 

with the phrase ‘‘alarm station functions’’ to 

ensure that the equipment required by each 

alarm station to fulfill its assigned functions, 

are available and operational without interruption due to a loss of normal power. Second, the word ‘‘uninterruptible’’ would be 

added to clarify the Commission’s view that 

the operation of detection and assessment 

equipment must be maintained without 

interruption, in the event of a loss of normal 

power. Backup power supply for non-portable communication equipment is addressed in the proposed paragraph (j)(5) of 

this section. Based on changes to the 

threat environment, the Commission has 

determined that this proposed requirement 

is prudent and necessary to facilitate 

achievement of the performance objective 

and requirements of the proposed paragraph (b) of this section. 

(i)(5) Detection. Detection capabilities must be 

provided by security organization personnel 

and intrusion detection equipment, and 

shall be defined in implementing procedures. Intrusion detection equipment must 

be capable of operating as intended under 

the conditions encountered at the facility.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the current § 73.55(c)(4) and to 

provide a performance based requirement 

for detection equipment to be capable of 

operating under known/normal site conditions such as heat, wind, humidity, fog, 

cold, snowfall, etc. Equipment failure and 

abnormal or severe weather cannot always 

be predicted but compensatory measures 

would be required in accordance with the 

proposed requirements of this section to 

ensure compliance. 

(i)(6) Assessment. Assessment capabilities 

must be provided by security organization 

personnel and video assessment equipment, and shall be described in implementing procedures. Video assessment 

equipment must be capable of operating as 

intended under the conditions encountered 

at the facility and must provide video images from which accurate and timely assessments can be made in response to an 

alarm annunciation or other notification of 

unauthorized activity.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the current § 73.55(c)(4) and to 

provide a performance based requirement 

for assessment equipment to be capable of 

operating under known/normal site conditions such as heat, wind, humidity, fog, 

cold, snowfall, etc. Equipment failure and 

abnormal or severe weather cannot always 

be predicted but compensatory measures 

would be required in accordance with the 

proposed requirements of this section to 

ensure compliance. 

(i)(7) The licensee intrusion detection and assessment system must: This requirement would be added for formatting purposes. 

(i)(7)(i) Ensure that the duties and responsibilities assigned to personnel, the use of 

equipment, and the implementation of procedures provides the detection and assessment capabilities necessary to meet the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement relative to 

the design of the licensee detection and assessment system and to clarify that this 

system would include all three components. 

§ 73.55(e)(2) The annunciation of an alarm at 

the alarm stations shall indicate the type of 

alarm (e.g., intrusion alarms, emergency exit 

alarm, etc.) and location.

(i)(7)(ii) Ensure that annunciation of an alarm 

indicates the type and location of the alarm.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. The phrase ‘‘at the alarm 

stations’’ and the listed examples would be 

deleted because they would no longer be 

needed. 

§ 73.55(e)(2) All alarm devices including transmission lines to annunciators shall be tamper 

indicating and self-checking.

(i)(7)(iii) Ensure that alarm devices, to include 

transmission lines to annunciators, are tamper indicating and self-checking.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision for formatting purposes. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62714 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(i)(7)(iv) Provide visual and audible alarm annunciation and concurrent video assessment capability to both alarm stations in a 

manner that ensures timely recognition, acknowledgment and response by each alarm 

station operator in accordance with written 

response procedures.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the proposed requirement for 

equivalent capabilities in both alarm stations. The phrase ‘‘visual and audible’’

would provide redundancy to ensure that 

each alarm would be recognized and acknowledged when received. 

§ 73.55(e)(2) * * * e.g., an automatic indication is provided when failure of the alarm system or a component occurs, or when the system is on standby power.(i)(7)(v) Provide an automatic indication when 

the alarm system or a component of the 

alarm system fails, or when the system is 

operating on the backup power supply.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision for formatting purposes. 

§ 73.70(f) A record at each onsite alarm annunciation location of each alarm, false 

alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication 

that identifies the type of alarm, location, circuit, date, and time. In addition, details of response by facility guards and watchmen to 

each alarm, intrusion, or other incident shall 

be recorded.

(i)(7)(vi) Maintain a record of all alarm 

annunciations, the cause of each alarm, 

and the disposition of each alarm.

This requirement would be added for consistency with § 73.70(f). The Commission expects that this record would be a commonly 

maintained record in electronic form which 

is generated as an automatic function of the 

intrusion detection system. 

(i)(8) Alarm stations ......................................... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

§ 73.55(e)(1) All alarms required pursuant to 

this part must annunciate in a continuously 

manned central alarm station located within 

the protected area and in at least one other 

continuously manned station * * *.

(i)(8)(i) Both alarm stations must be continuously staffed by at least one trained and 

qualified member of the security organization.

This requirement would retain the current requirement § 73.55(e)(1) for continuously 

staffed alarm stations and would be revised 

to describe the necessary qualifications that 

would be required of the assigned individuals. 

§ 73.55(e)(1) The onsite central alarm station 

must be located within a building in such a 

manner that the interior of the central alarm 

station is not visible from the perimeter of the 

protected area.

(i)(8)(ii) The interior of the central alarm station must not be visible from the perimeter 

of the protected area.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. Most significantly, the 

phrase ‘‘located within a building’’ would be 

deleted because it would be considered unnecessary. 

§ 73.55(e)(1) This station must not contain 

any operational activities that would interfere 

with the execution of the alarm response 

function.

(i)(8)(iii) The licensee may not permit any activities to be performed within either alarm 

station that would interfere with an alarm 

station operator’s ability to effectively execute assigned detection, assessment, surveillance, and communication duties and responsibilities.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revisions to provide a performance 

based requirement regarding the primary 

duties required to satisfy the current requirement ‘‘execution of the alarm response 

function.’’

(i)(8)(iv) The licensee shall assess and respond to all alarms and other indications of 

unauthorized activities in accordance with 

the approved security plans and implementing procedures.

This requirement would be added for consistency with current requirements. The specific requirements of the current 

§ 73.55(h)(4) are retained in detail in the 

proposed appendix C to part 73. 

(i)(8)(v) The licensee implementing procedures must ensure that both alarm station 

operators are knowledgeable of all alarm 

annunciations, assessments, and final disposition of all alarms, to include but not limited to a prohibition from changing the status of a detection point or deactivating a 

locking or access control device at a protected or vital area portal, without the 

knowledge and concurrence of the other 

alarm station operator.

This requirement would be added for consistency with related requirements of this proposed section and to ensure that the licensee provides a process by which both 

alarm station operators are concurrently 

made aware of each alarm and are knowledgeable of how each alarm is resolved 

and that no one alarm station operator can 

manipulate alarm station equipment, communications, or procedures without the 

knowledge and concurrence of the other. 

(i)(9) Surveillance, observation, and monitoring.This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(i)(9)(i) The onsite physical protection program 

must include the capability for surveillance, 

observation, and monitoring in a manner 

that provides early detection and assessment of unauthorized activities.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for ensuring surveillance, observation, and monitoring capabilities in any area for which 

these measures are necessary to meet the 

requirements of this proposed section. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62715 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(i)(9)(ii) The licensee shall provide continual 

surveillance, observation, and monitoring of 

all areas identified in the approved security 

plans as requiring surveillance, observation, 

and monitoring to ensure early detection of 

unauthorized activities and to ensure the integrity of physical barriers or other components of the onsite physical protection program.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for ensuring surveillance, observation, and monitoring capabilities in any area for which 

these measures are necessary to meet the 

requirements of this proposed section. The 

word ‘‘continual’’ would mean regularly recurring actions such that designated areas 

would be checked at intervals sufficient to 

ensure the detection of unauthorized activities. 

(i)(9)(ii)(A) Continual surveillance, observation, 

and monitoring responsibilities must be performed by security personnel during routine 

patrols or by other trained and equipped 

personnel designated as a component of 

the protective strategy.

This requirement would be added to provide 

necessary qualifying requirements for performance of observation and monitoring activities. The word ‘‘continual’’ would mean 

the same as used in the proposed paragraph (i)(9)(ii) of this section. 

(i)(9)(ii)(B) Surveillance, observation, and 

monitoring requirements may be accomplished by direct observation or video technology.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for ensuring that surveillance, observation, and monitoring capabilities that may be met through 

the use of video technology or direct human 

observation. 

(i)(9)(iii) The licensee shall provide random 

patrols of all accessible areas containing 

target set equipment.

This requirement would be added to focus a 

performance based requirement on the protection of target set equipment. Target set 

equipment would be addressed in detail in 

the proposed paragraph (f) of this section. 

The term ‘‘random’’ provides flexibility to the 

licensee and requires patrols at unpredictable times within predetermined intervals to 

deter exploitation of periods between patrols. The phrase ‘‘accessible areas’’ would 

exclude areas such as locked high radiation 

areas or other such areas containing a significant safety concern that would preclude 

the conduct of the patrol function. 

(i)(9)(iii)(A) Armed security patrols shall periodically check designated areas and shall 

inspect vital area entrances, portals, and 

external barriers.

This requirement would be added to focus on 

the items that, because of changes to the 

threat environment, the Commission has 

determined would require focus by armed 

security patrols. The term ‘‘periodically’’ provides flexibility to the licensee. The phrase 

‘‘designated areas’’ means any area identified by the licensee as requiring an action 

to meet the proposed requirements of this 

section. 

(i)(9)(iii)(B) Physical barriers must be inspected at random intervals to identify tampering and degradation.This requirement would be added for consistency with the current requirement 

§ 73.55(g)(1) and to focus on verifying the 

integrity of physical barriers to ensure that 

the barrier would perform as expected. The 

word ‘‘random’’ would mean that the required inspection would be performed at 

unpredictable times to deter exploitation of 

periods between inspections. 

§ 73.55(b)(4)(i) The licensee may not permit 

an individual to act as a guard, watchman, 

armed response person, or other member of 

the security organization unless the individual 

has been trained, equipped, and qualified to 

perform each assigned security job duty.

(i)(9)(iii)(C) Security personnel shall be trained 

to recognize indications of tampering as 

necessary to perform assigned duties and 

responsibilities as they relate to safety and 

security systems and equipment.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the current requirement 

§ 73.55(b)(4)(i) to provide necessary focus 

on the threat of tampering and the need to 

ensure that personnel are trained to recognize it. 

(i)(9)(iv) Unattended openings that are not 

monitored by intrusion detection equipment 

must be observed by security personnel at 

a frequency that would prevent exploitation 

of that opening.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement to ensure 

that unattended openings that cross a security boundary established to meet the proposed requirements of this section would 

not be exploited by the design basis threat 

of radiological sabotage to include the use 

of tools to enlarge the opening. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62716 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(h)(4) Upon detection of abnormal 

presence or activity of persons or vehicles 

* * *, the licensee security organization shall 

* * *.

(i)(9)(v) Upon detection of unauthorized activities, tampering, or other threats, the licensee shall initiate actions consistent with 

the approved security plans, the licensee 

protective strategy, and implementing procedures.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision to provide flexibility for the licensee to determine if all or only part of the 

protective strategy capabilities would be 

needed for a specific event. The phrase 

‘‘abnormal presence or activity of persons 

or vehicles’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘unauthorized activities, tampering, 

or other threats’’ to clarify the types of activities that would be expected to warrant a 

response by the licensee. 

(i)(10) Video technology ................................... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(i)(10)(i) The licensee shall maintain in operable condition all video technology used to 

satisfy the monitoring, observation, surveillance, and assessment requirements of this 

section.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the current requirement 

§ 73.55(g)(1) and would provide a performance based requirement for ensuring video 

technology is operating and available when 

needed. 

(i)(10)(ii) Video technology must be: This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(i)(10)(ii)(A) Displayed concurrently at both 

alarm stations.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the other proposed requirements 

for dual alarm stations and would focus on 

the need for video technology to be provided to both alarm stations at the same 

time to ensure that an assessment would 

be made and a timely response would be 

initiated. 

(i)(10)(ii)(B) Designed to provide concurrent 

observation, monitoring, and surveillance of 

designated areas from which an alarm annunciation or a notification of unauthorized 

activity is received.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the other proposed requirements 

for dual alarm stations and would focus on 

the need for the same capabilities to be 

provided to both to ensure observation, 

monitoring, and surveillance requirements 

are met. 

(i)(10)(ii)(C) Capable of providing a timely visual display from which positive recognition 

and assessment of the detected activity can 

be made and a timely response initiated.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for video 

technology which focuses on the need for 

clear visual images from which accurate 

and timely assessment can be made in response to alarm annunciations. 

§ 73.55(h)(6) To facilitate initial response to 

detection of penetration * * * preferably by 

means of closed circuit television or by other 

suitable means which limit exposure of responding personnel to possible attack.

(i)(10)(ii)(D) Used to supplement and limit the 

exposure of security personnel to possible 

attack.

This requirement would retain the current requirement to use video technology to limit 

the exposure of security personnel while 

performing security duties with minor revision to add patrols. 

(i)(10)(iii) The licensee shall implement controls for personnel assigned to monitor 

video technology to ensure that assigned 

personnel maintain the level of alertness required to effectively perform the assigned 

duties and responsibilities.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement relative to 

controlling personnel fatigue related to extended periods of monitoring video technology. The Commission has determined 

that each individual’s alertness is critical to 

the effective use of video technology and 

the licensee capability to achieve the performance objective of this proposed section. 

Therefore, licensee work hour controls 

should ensure that assigned personnel are 

relieved of these duties and assigned other 

duties at intervals sufficient to ensure the 

individual’s ability to effectively carry out assigned duties and responsibilities. 

(i)(11) Illumination ............................................ This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62717 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(c)(5) Isolation zones and all exterior 

areas within the protected area shall be provided with illumination sufficient for the monitoring and observation requirements of paragraphs (c)(3), (c)(4), and (h)(4) of this section, but * * *.

(i)(11)(i) The licensee shall ensure that all 

areas of the facility, to include appropriate 

portions of the owner controlled area, are 

provided with illumination necessary to satisfy the requirements of this section.

This requirement would be retained and revised. Most significantly, this proposed requirement would expand a performance 

based lighting requirement to all areas designated by the licensee as having a need 

for detection, assessment, surveillance, observation, and monitoring capabilities in 

support of the protective strategy and not 

limit it to only the isolation zone and all exterior areas within the protected area. This 

requirement would not require deterministic 

illumination levels but rather would require 

that illumination levels be sufficient to provide the detection, assessment, surveillance, observation, and monitoring capabilities described by the licensee in the approved security plans. This description 

would be required to consider the requirements of the proposed (i)(11)(ii) and (iii). 

§ 73.55(c)(5) Isolation zones and all exterior 

areas within the protected area shall be provided with illumination * * * not less than 0.2 

footcandle measured horizontally at ground 

level.

(i)(11)(ii) The licensee shall provide a minimum illumination level of 0.2 footcandle 

measured horizontally at ground level, in 

the isolation zones and all exterior areas 

within the protected area, or may augment 

the facility illumination system, to include 

patrols, responders, and video technology 

with low-light technology capable of meeting the detection, assessment, surveillance, 

observation, monitoring, and response requirements of this section.

This requirement would be retained and revised to provide a performance based requirement for illumination. Most significantly, this proposed requirement would 

maintain the current 0.2 footcandle lighting 

requirement but would also provide flexibility to a licensee to provide less than the 

0.2 footcandle where low-light technology 

would be used to maintain the capability to 

meet the performance level for detection, 

assessment, surveillance, observation, 

monitoring, and response. The word ‘‘or’’

would be used specifically to mean that the 

licensee need satisfy only one of the two 

options such that the 0.2 footcandle requirement must be met in the isolation zone 

and all exterior areas within the protected 

area unless low-light technology is used. 

However, the word ‘‘augment’’ would be 

used to represent the Commission’s view 

that sole use of low-light technology is not 

authorized as this approach would be contrary to defense-in-depth and could be susceptible to single failure where a counter 

technology is developed or used. 

(i)(11)(iii) The licensee shall describe in the 

approved security plans how the lighting requirements of this section are met and, if 

used, the type(s) and application of lowlight technology used.

This requirement would be added to clarify 

the need for lighting to be described in the 

approved security plans and how the lighting ‘‘system’’ would be used to achieve the 

performance objective. 

§ 73.55(f) Communication requirements .......... (j) Communication requirements ...................... This header would be retained. The current 

requirements under this header are retained 

and reformatted to individually address 

each current requirement. Significant revisions would be specifically identified as 

each current requirement is addressed. 

§ 73.55(f)(1) Each guard, watchman or armed 

response individual on duty shall be capable 

of maintaining continuous communication 

with an individual in each continuously 

manned alarm station required by paragraph 

(e)(1) of this section * * *.

(j)(1) The licensee shall establish and maintain, continuous communication capability 

with onsite and offsite resources to ensure 

effective command and control during both 

normal and emergency situations.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. Most significantly, the specific language of the current requirement 

would be revised to a more performance 

based requirement. The word ‘‘continuous’’

would be used to mean that a communication method would be available and operating any time it would be needed to communicate information. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62718 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(f)(1) * * * who shall be capable of 

calling for assistance from other guards, 

watchmen, and armed response personnel 

and from local law enforcement authorities.

(j)(2) Individuals assigned to each alarm station shall be capable of calling for assistance in accordance with the approved security plans, licensee integrated response 

plan, and licensee procedures.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. Most significantly, in order to 

provide flexibility and to capture the proposed requirements of appendix C to part 

73 for an Integrated Response Plan, this 

proposed requirement replaces the specific 

list of support entities to be called with a 

performance based requirement to follow 

predetermined actions. 

§ 73.55(f)(1) Each guard, watchman or armed 

response individual on duty shall be capable 

of maintaining continuous communication 

with an individual in each continuously 

manned alarm station required by paragraph 

(e)(1) of this section * * *.

(j)(3) Each on-duty security officer, 

watchperson, vehicle escort, and armed response force member shall be capable of 

maintaining continuous communication with 

an individual in each alarm station.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revisions. Most significantly, this proposed requirement would update the titles 

used to identify the listed positions and 

would add ‘‘vehicle escorts’’ for consistency 

with the proposed paragraph (g)(8) of this 

section. 

§ 73.55(f)(3) To provide the capability of continuous communication * * * and shall terminate in each continuously manned alarm station required by paragraph (e)(1) of this section.(j)(4) The following continuous communication 

capabilities must terminate in both alarm 

stations required by this section: 

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision for formatting purposes. 

§ 73.55(f)(2) The alarm stations required by 

paragraph (e)(1) of this section shall have 

conventional telephone service for communication with the law enforcement authorities 

as described in paragraph (f)(1) of this section.

(j)(4)(i) Conventional telephone service ........... This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. Most significantly, the 

phrase ‘‘with the law enforcement authorities as described in paragraph (f)(1) of this 

section’’ would be deleted because site 

plans and procedures would contain protocols for contacting support personnel and 

agencies. 

§ 73.55(f)(3) To provide the capability of continuous communication, radio or microwave 

transmitted two-way voice communication, either directly or through an intermediary, shall 

be established, in addition to conventional 

telephone service, between local law enforcement authorities and the facility and * * *.

(j)(4)(ii) Radio or microwave transmitted twoway voice communication, either directly or 

through an intermediary.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. Most significantly, the 

phrase ‘‘shall be established, in addition to 

conventional telephone service, between 

local law enforcement authorities and the 

facility and’’ would be deleted because site 

plans and procedures would contain protocols for contacting support personnel and 

agencies. 

(j)(4)(iii) A system for communication with all 

control rooms, on-duty operations personnel, escorts, local, State, and Federal 

law enforcement agencies, and all other 

personnel necessary to coordinate both onsite and offsite responses.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the proposed requirements of this 

section and to provide a performance 

based requirement for communications consistent with the proposed Integrated Response Plan addressed in the proposed appendix C to part 73. 

§ 73.55(f)(4) Non-portable communications 

equipment controlled by the licensee and required by this section shall remain operable 

from independent power sources in the event 

of the loss of normal power.

(j)(5) Non-portable communications equipment 

must remain operable from independent 

power sources in the event of the loss of 

normal power.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. Most significantly, the 

phrase ‘‘controlled by the licensee and required by this section’’ would be deleted because there would be no requirement for 

non-portable communications equipment 

that is not under licensee control or not required by this section. 

(j)(6) The licensee shall identify site areas 

where communication could be interrupted 

or cannot be maintained and shall establish 

alternative communication measures for 

these areas in implementing procedures.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

the capability to communicate during both 

normal and emergency conditions, and to 

focus attention on the requirement that the 

licensee must identify site areas in which 

communications could be lost and account 

for those areas in their procedures. 

73.55(h) Response requirement ...................... (k) Response requirements ............................. This header would be retained. 

(k)(1) Personnel and equipment ...................... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62719 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(k)(1)(i) The licensee shall establish and 

maintain, at all times, the minimum number 

of properly trained and equipped personnel 

required to intercept, challenge, delay, and 

neutralize threats up to and including the 

design basis threat of radiological sabotage 

as defined in § 73.1, to prevent significant 

core damage and spent fuel sabotage.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for determining the minimum number of armed responders needed to protect the facility 

against the full capability of the design 

basis threat. The phrase ‘‘to intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize threats up to 

and including the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as defined in § 73.1, to 

prevent significant core damage and spent 

fuel sabotage’’ would be used for consistency with the proposed paragraphs (b)(2) 

through (4) of this section. 

(k)(1)(ii) The licensee shall provide and maintain firearms, ammunition, and equipment 

capable of performing functions commensurate to the needs of each armed member of 

the security organization to carry out their 

assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with the approved security plans, 

the licensee protective strategy, implementing procedures, and the site specific 

conditions under which the firearms, ammunition, and equipment will be used.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement to ensure 

that the licensee provides weapons that are 

capable of performing the functions required for each armed individual to fulfill 

their assigned duties per the licensee protective strategy. For example, if an individual is assigned to a position for which 

the protective strategy requires weapons 

use at 200 meters, then the assigned 

weapon must be capable of that performance as well as the individual. 

(k)(1)(iii) The licensee shall describe in the 

approved security plans, all firearms and 

equipment to be possessed by and readily 

available to, armed personnel to implement 

the protective strategy and carry out all assigned duties and responsibilities. This description must include the general distribution and assignment of firearms, ammunition, body armor, and other equipment used.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that the licensee provides, in the approved 

security plans, a description of the weapons 

to be used and those equipment designated 

as readily available. 

(k)(1)(iv) The licensee shall ensure that all 

firearms, ammunition, and equipment required by the protective strategy are in sufficient supply, are in working condition, and 

are readily available for use in accordance 

with the licensee protective strategy and 

predetermined time lines.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement to ensure 

the availability and operability of equipment 

needed to accomplish response goals and 

objectives during postulated events. The 

term ‘‘readily available’’ would mean that required firearms and equipment are either in 

the individuals possession or at pre-staged 

locations such that required response time 

lines are met. 

(k)(1)(v) The licensee shall ensure that all 

armed members of the security organization 

are trained in the proper use and maintenance of assigned weapons and equipment 

in accordance with appendix B to part 73.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement to ensure 

that all armed personnel meet standard 

training program requirements and specific 

training requirements applicable to the specific weapons they are assigned, to include 

the maintenance required for each to ensure operability. The ability for armed personnel to trouble-shoot a problem, such as 

a jammed round during an actual event, 

would be considered a critical function necessary to achieve the performance objective. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62720 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(h)(5) The licensee shall instruct every 

guard and all armed response personnel to 

prevent or impede attempted acts of theft or 

radiological sabotage by using force sufficient 

to counter the force directed at him including 

the use of deadly force when the guard or 

other armed response person has a reasonable belief it is necessary in self-defense or 

in the defense of others.

(k)(2) The licensee shall instruct each armed 

response person to prevent or impede attempted acts of theft or radiological sabotage by using force sufficient to counter the 

force directed at that person including the 

use of deadly force when the armed response person has a reasonable belief that 

the use of deadly force is necessary in selfdefense or in the defense of others, or any 

other circumstances as authorized by applicable state law.

This requirement would be retained with some 

revision. The term ‘‘guard’’ was removed as 

the term is no longer used. The phrase ‘‘or 

any other circumstances as authorized by 

applicable state law’’ would be added to 

clarify that applicable state law specifies the 

conditions under which deadly force may be 

applied. It is important to note that the use 

of deadly force should be a last resort when 

all other lesser measures to neutralize the 

threat have failed. The conditions under 

which deadly force would be authorized are 

governed by state laws and nothing in this 

proposed rule should be interpreted to 

mean or require anything that would contradict such state law. The term ‘‘it’’ is replaced with the phrase ‘‘deadly force’’ to 

more clearly describe the action. 

(k)(3) The licensee shall provide an armed response team consisting of both armed responders and armed security officers to 

carry out response duties, within predetermined time lines.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement that would 

retain the current requirement for armed responders and add a category of armed security officer to clarify the division of types 

of armed response personnel and their 

roles. 

(k)(3)(i) Armed responders .............................. This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

§ 73.55(h)(3) The total number of guards, and 

armed, trained personnel immediately available at the facility to fulfill these response requirements shall nominally be ten (10), unless specifically required otherwise on a case 

by case basis by the Commission; however, 

this number may not be reduced to less than 

five (5) guards.

(k)(3)(i)(A) The licensee shall determine the 

minimum number of armed responders necessary to protect against the design basis 

threat described in § 73.1(a), subject to 

Commission approval, and shall document 

this number in the approved security plans.

This requirement would be retained and revised to remove the specific minimum numbers of 10, but no less than 5, to provide a 

performance based requirement that meets 

the proposed requirement of paragraph 

(k)(1)(i) of this section. This proposed requirement would ensure that the licensee 

would provide the requisite number of 

armed responders needed to carry-out the 

protective strategy, the effectiveness of 

which would be evaluated through annual 

exercises and triennial exercises observed 

by the Commission. 

§ 73.55(h)(3) The total number of guards, and 

armed, trained personnel immediately available at the facility to fulfill these response requirements * * *.

(k)(3)(i)(B) Armed responders shall be available at all times inside the protected area 

and may not be assigned any other duties 

or responsibilities that could interfere with 

assigned response duties.

This requirement would be retained and revised. Most significantly, this proposed requirement would specify the conditions that 

must be met to satisfy the meaning of the 

word ‘‘available’’ as used. 

(k)(3)(ii) Armed security officers ...................... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(k)(3)(ii)(A) Armed security officers designated 

to strengthen response capabilities shall be 

onsite and available at all times to carry out 

assigned response duties.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for the licensee to identify a new category of armed 

personnel to be used to supplement and 

support the armed responders identified in 

the proposed paragraph (k)(3)(ii)(A) of this 

section. 

§ 73.55(h)(3) The total number of guards, and 

armed, trained personnel immediately available at the facility to fulfill these response requirements shall nominally be * * *.

(k)(3)(ii)(B) The minimum number of armed 

security officers must be documented in the 

approved security plans.

This requirement would be added to require licensees to document the number of armed 

security officers to be used. 

(k)(3)((iii) The licensee shall ensure that training and qualification requirements accurately reflect the duties and responsibilities 

to be performed.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the current requirement 

§ 73.55(b)(4)(ii) for an approved T&Q plan 

and the current requirement for licensees to 

document how these personnel are to be 

trained and qualified. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62721 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(k)(3)(iv) The licensee shall ensure that all 

firearms, ammunition, and equipment needed for completing the actions described in 

the approved security plans and licensee 

protective strategy are readily available and 

in working condition.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the current § 73.55(g)(1) to ensure that all firearms and equipment required by each member of the armed response team would be operable and in the 

possession of or available at pre-staged locations, to ensure that each individual is 

able to meet the time lines specified by the 

protective strategy. This includes those 

equipment designated as readily available. 

(k)(4) The licensee shall describe in the approved security plans, procedures for responding to an unplanned incident that reduces the number of available armed response team members below the minimum 

number documented by the licensee in the 

approved security plans.

This requirement would be added to provide 

regulatory consistency for the period of time 

a licensee may not meet the minimum numbers stated in the approved plans because 

of illness or injury to an assigned individual 

or individuals while on-duty. 

(k)(5) Protective Strategy. Licensees shall develop, maintain, and implement a written 

protective strategy in accordance with the 

requirements of this section and appendix 

C to this part.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for the development of a protective strategy that 

specifies how the licensee will utilize onsite 

and offsite, the resources to ensure the performance objective of how the proposed 

paragraph (b) of this section is met. 

(k)(6) The licensee shall ensure that all personnel authorized unescorted access to the 

protected area are trained and understand 

their roles and responsibilities during security incidents, to include hostage and duress 

situations.

This proposed requirement would be added to 

ensure that both security and non-security 

organization personnel are trained to recognize and respond to hostage and duress 

situations. This proposed training would 

also include the specific actions to be performed during these postulated security 

events. 

§ 73.55(h)(4) Upon detection of abnormal 

presence or activity of persons or vehicles 

within an isolation zone, a protected area, 

material access area, or a vital area; or upon 

evidence or indication of intrusion into a protected area, a material access area, or a vital 

area, the licensee security organization shall: 

(k)(7) Upon receipt of an alarm or other indication of threat, the licensee shall: This requirement would be retained and revised for consistency with the proposed requirements of this section. Reference to the 

specific site areas would be deleted because the performance based requirements 

of this proposed section would be applicable to all facility areas, and therefore such 

reference would not be needed. 

§ 73.55(h)(4)(i) Determine whether or not a 

threat exists, 

(k)(7)(i) Determine the existence of a threat in 

accordance with assessment procedures.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. 

§ 73.55(h)(4)(ii) Assess the extent of the 

threat, if any, 

(k)(7)(ii) Identify the level of threat present 

through the use of assessment methodologies and procedures.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. 

§ 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) Requiring responding 

guards or other armed response personnel to 

interpose themselves * * *. 

(k)(7)(iii) Determine the response necessary 

to intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize the threat in accordance with the requirements of appendix C to part 73, the 

Commission-approved safeguards contingency plan, and the licensee response 

strategy.

This requirement would be retained with revision for consistency with the proposed 

paragraph (b) of this section. 

§ 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(B) Informing local law enforcement agencies of the threat and requesting assistance.(k)(7)(iv) Notify offsite support agencies such 

as local law enforcement, in accordance 

with site procedures.

This requirement would be retained with revision for consistency with the Integrated Response Plan. 

§ 73.55(h)(2) The licensee shall establish and 

document liaison with local law enforcement 

authorities.

(k)(8) Law enforcement liaison. The licensee 

shall document and maintain current agreements with local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies, to include estimated 

response times and capabilities.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. Most significantly, this proposed requirement addresses the need to 

identify the resources and response times 

to be expected in order to facilitate planning 

development. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62722 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(l) Facilities using mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel assemblies. In addition to the requirements 

described in this section for protection 

against radiological sabotage, operating 

commercial nuclear power reactors licensed 

under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52 and using 

special nuclear material in the form of MOX 

fuel assemblies shall protect unirradiated 

MOX fuel assemblies against theft or diversion.

This paragraph would be added to provide 

general provisions for the onsite physical 

protection of unirradiated mixed oxide 

(MOX) fuel assemblies in recognition of the 

fact that some nuclear power reactor facilities currently have chosen or may choose 

to possess and utilize this type of special 

nuclear material at their sites. Because 

weapons grade plutonium is utilized in the 

fabrication of MOX fuel assemblies, the 

Commission has determined that a threat of 

theft applies and that it is prudent and necessary to apply certain security measures 

for MOX fuel that are in addition to those 

that are currently required at other nuclear 

power reactor facilities. Therefore, the requirements proposed in this paragraph are 

provided to ensure that these additional requirements are identified and met by those 

licensees who have chosen or may choose 

to utilize MOX fuel. 

(l)(1) Licensees shall protect the unirradiated 

MOX fuel assemblies against theft or diversion in accordance with the requirements of 

this section and the approved security plans.

This requirement would be added to identify 

applicability of this paragraph. 

(l)(2) Commercial nuclear power reactors 

using MOX fuel assemblies are exempt 

from the requirements of §§ 73.20, 73.45, 

and 73.46 for the onsite physical protection 

of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.

This requirement would be added because 

the Commission has determined that due to 

the low plutonium concentration, composition of the MOX fuel, and configuration 

(size and weight) of the assemblies, the 

physical security protection measures identified in the listed regulations are 

superceded by those requirements addressed in this proposed section for 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies at nuclear power reactor facilities. 

(l)(3) Administrative controls ............................ This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(l)(3)(i) The licensee shall describe in the approved security plans, the operational and 

administrative controls to be implemented 

for the receipt, inspection, movement, storage, and protection of unirradiated MOX 

fuel assemblies.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that the licensee describes the onsite physical protection measures in the approved 

security plans. 

(l)(3)(ii) The licensee shall implement the use 

of tamper-indicating devices for unirradiated 

MOX fuel assembly transport and shall 

verify their use and integrity before receipt.

This requirement would be added to provide 

assurance that the unirradiated fuel assemblies were not accessed during transport. 

(l)(3)(iii) Upon delivery of unirradiated MOX 

fuel assemblies, the licensee shall: 

This requirement would be added for formatting purposes. 

(l)(3)(iii)(A) Inspect unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies for damage.This requirement would be added to ensure 

that unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies are 

in an acceptable condition before use or 

storage. 

(l)(3)(iii)(B) Search unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies for unauthorized materials.This requirement would be added to ensure 

that no unauthorized materials were introduced within the unirradiated MOX fuel assembly during transport. 

(l)(3)(iv) The licensee may conduct the required inspection and search functions simultaneously.This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement that provides flexibility for accomplishment of the 

proposed requirements. 

(l)(3)(v) The licensee shall ensure the proper 

placement and control of unirradiated MOX 

fuel assemblies as follows: 

This requirement would be added for formatting purposes. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62723 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(l)(3)(v)(A) At least one armed security officer, 

in addition to the armed response team required by paragraphs (h)(4) and (h)(5) of 

appendix C to part 73, shall be present during the receipt and inspection of 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.

This requirement would be added to provide 

deterrence and immediate armed response 

to attempts of theft or tampering. This proposed armed responder’s duty would be 

solely to observe and protect the 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies upon receipt and before storage. 

(l)(3)(v)(B) The licensee shall store 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies only within a spent fuel pool, located within a vital 

area, so that access to the unirradiated 

MOX fuel assemblies requires passage 

through at least three physical barriers.

This requirement would be added to reduce 

the risk of theft by providing three delay 

barriers before gaining unauthorized access 

to the MOX fuel assembles while in storage. 

(l)(3)(vi) The licensee shall implement a material control and accountability program for 

the unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies that 

includes a predetermined and documented 

storage location for each unirradiated MOX 

fuel assembly.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that a material control and accountability 

program would be established and implemented and would focus on recordkeeping 

which describes the inventory and location 

of the SSNM within the assemblies. 

(l)(3)(vii) Records that identify the storage locations of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies are considered safeguards information 

and must be protected and stored in accordance with § 73.21.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

restricted access to records which describe 

or identify the location of unirradiated MOX 

fuel assemblies within the spent fuel pool. 

(l)(4) Physical controls ..................................... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(l)(4)(i) The licensee shall lock or disable all 

equipment and power supplies to equipment required for the movement and handling of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for administrative controls over equipment and power 

supplies to equipment required to physically 

move the unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies 

to ensure that at least two security measures must be disabled before this equipment could be used. 

(l)(4)(ii) The licensee shall implement a twoperson line-of-sight rule whenever control 

systems or equipment required for the 

movement or handling of unirradiated MOX 

fuel assemblies must be accessed.

This requirement would be added to provide 

an administrative control to reduce the risk 

of the insider threat and theft. 

(l)(4)(iii) The licensee shall conduct random 

patrols of areas containing unirradiated 

MOX fuel assemblies to ensure the integrity 

of barriers and locks, deter unauthorized 

activities, and to identify indications of tampering.

This requirement would be added to provide 

surveillance activities for the detection of 

unauthorized activities that would pose a 

threat to MOX fuel assemblies in addition to 

any similar requirements of this proposed 

section. 

(l)(4)(iv) Locks, keys, and any other access 

control device used to secure equipment 

and power sources required for the movement of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies 

or openings to areas containing unirradiated 

MOX fuel assemblies must be controlled by 

the security organization.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that the security organization would be responsible for the administrative controls 

over access control devices. 

(l)(4)(v) Removal of locks used to secure 

equipment and power sources required for 

the movement of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies or openings to areas containing 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies must require approval by both the on-duty security 

shift supervisor and the operations shift 

manager.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that both the licensee security and operations management level personnel would 

be responsible for the removal of locks securing MOX fuel assemblies. 

(l)(4)(v)(A) At least one armed security officer 

shall be present to observe activities involving the movement of unirradiated MOX fuel 

assemblies before the removal of the locks 

and providing power to equipment required 

for the movement or handling of 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that immediate armed response capability is 

provided before accessing equipment used 

to move unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62724 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(l)(4)(v)(B) At least one armed security officer 

shall be present at all times until power is 

removed from equipment and locks are secured.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that immediate armed response capability is 

provided during any activity involving the 

use of equipment used to move 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies. 

(l)(4)(v)(C) Security officers shall be trained 

and knowledgeable of authorized and unauthorized activities involving unirradiated 

MOX fuel assemblies.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that assigned security officers possess the 

capability to immediately recognize, report, 

and respond to unauthorized activities involving unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies. 

(l)(5) At least one armed security officer shall 

be present and shall maintain constant surveillance of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies when the assemblies are not located 

in the spent fuel pool or reactor.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

physical protection of unirradiated MOX fuel 

assemblies when not located within an area 

that meets the three barrier requirement of 

this proposed rule. 

(l)(6) The licensee shall maintain at all times 

the capability to detect, assess, intercept, 

challenge, delay, and neutralize threats to 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies in accordance with the requirements of this section.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the proposed paragraph (b) of 

this section. 

(m) Digital computer and communication networks.This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(m)(1) The licensee shall implement a cybersecurity program that provides high assurance that computer systems, which if compromised would likely adversely impact 

safety, security, and emergency preparedness, are protected from cyber attacks.

This requirement would be to ensure that nuclear power plants are protected from cyber 

attacks via minimizing the potential attack 

pathway and the consequences arising 

from a successful cyber attack. 

(m)(1)(i) The licensee shall describe the 

cyber-security program requirements in the 

approved security plans.

This requirement would be added to ensure licensees have a comprehensive security 

plan by integrating cyber-security into the 

overall onsite physical protection program. 

As licensees take advantage of computer 

technology to maximize plant productivity, 

the role of computer systems at nuclear 

power plants is increasing. Therefore, the 

Commission has determined that incorporation of a cyber-security program into the 

Commission-approved security plans would 

be a prudent and necessary security enhancement. 

(m)(1)(ii) The licensee shall incorporate the 

cyber-security program into the onsite physical protection program.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that the computer systems used in onsite 

physical protection systems are protected 

from cyber attacks. With advancements in 

computer technology, many systems in nuclear power plants rely on computers to 

perform their functions, including some security functions. Therefore, the Commission 

has determined that the integration of security measures covering these systems 

would be a prudent and necessary action. 

(m)(1)(iii) The cyber-security program must be 

designed to detect and prevent cyber attacks on protected computer systems.

This requirement would be added to ensure licensees actively and proactively secure 

their plants from cyber attacks. The Commission has determined that because specific cyber threats and the people who seek 

unauthorized access to, or use of computers are constantly changing, protected 

computer systems must be protected 

against these attacks and mitigation measures implemented. 

(m)(2) Cyber-security assessment. The licensee shall implement a cyber-security assessment program to systematically assess 

and manage cyber risks.

This requirement would be added to require licensees to systematically determine the 

status of their plant’s cyber risks and identify vulnerabilities that need to be mitigated 

to reduce risks to acceptable levels. 

(m)(3) Policies, requirements, and procedures This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62725 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(m)(3)(i) The licensee shall apply cyber-security requirements and policies that identify 

management expectations and requirements for the protection of computer systems.

This requirement would be added to create a 

computer security program that establishes 

specific goals and assigns responsibilities 

to employees to meet those goals. 

(m)(3)(ii) The licensee shall develop and 

maintain implementing procedures to ensure cyber-security requirements and policies are implemented effectively.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

the licensee develops, implements, and enforces, detailed guidance documents that licensee employees would be required to follow to meet the stated security goals. 

(m)(4) Incident response and recovery ........... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(m)(4)(i) The licensee shall implement a 

cyber-security incident response and recovery plan to minimize the adverse impact of 

a cyber-security incident on safety, security, 

or emergency preparedness systems.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that each licensee would be prepared to respond to computer security incidents in a 

manner that ensures that plants are safe 

and secure. A computer security incident 

could result from a computer virus, other 

malicious code, or a system intruder, either 

an insider or as a result of an external attack and could adversely impact the licensee’s ability to effectively maintain safety, security, or emergency preparedness. Without 

an incident response and recovery plan, licensees would respond to a computer security incident in an ad hoc manner. However with an incident response and recovery plan, licensees would respond to an incident in a quick and organized manner. 

This would minimize the adverse impact 

caused by a computer security incident. 

(m)(4)(ii) The cyber-security incident response 

and recovery plan must be described in the 

integrated response plan required by appendix C to this part.

This requirement would be added to ensure licensees have a comprehensive incident response plan by integrating cyber-security 

into the overall security of their plants. As licensees take advantage of computer technology to maximize plant productivity, the 

role of computer systems at nuclear power 

plants is increasing as well as the possibility for adverse impact from a computer 

mishap. Therefore, the Commission has determined that it would be a prudent and 

necessary action for licensees to develop 

and implement a comprehensive response 

plan that includes a cyber incident response 

and recovery plan. 

(m)(4)(iii) The cyber-security incident response and recovery plan must ensure the 

capability to respond to cyber-security incidents, minimize loss and destruction, mitigate and correct the weaknesses that were 

exploited, and restore systems and/or 

equipment affected by a cyber-security incident.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that licensees acquire the capability to respond to cyber incidents in a manner that 

contains and repairs damage from incidents, and prevents future damage. An incident handling capability provides a way for 

plant personnel to report incidents and the 

appropriate response and assistance to be 

provided to aid in recovery. 

(m)(5) Protective strategies. The licensee 

shall implement defense-in-depth protective 

strategies to protect computer systems from 

cyber attacks, detecting, isolating, and neutralizing unauthorized activities in a timely 

manner.

This requirement would be added to incorporate the approach of delay, detect, and 

respond. The use of multiple and diverse 

layers of defense would delay the threat 

from reaching those systems that, if compromised, can adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness of the 

nuclear power plants. This delay in attack 

would allow more time to detect the attack 

and would allow time to respond. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62726 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(m)(6) Configuration and control management 

program. The licensee shall implement a 

configuration and control management program, to include cyber risk analysis, to ensure that modifications to computer system 

designs, access control measures, configuration, operational integrity, and management process do not adversely impact facility safety, security, and emergency preparedness systems before implementation 

of those modifications.

This requirement would be added to implement configuration management to ensure 

that the system in operation is the correct 

version (configuration) of the system and 

that any changes to be made are reviewed 

for security implications. Configuration management can be used to help ensure that 

changes take place in an identifiable and 

controlled environment and that they do not 

unintentionally harm any of the system’s 

properties, including its security. 

(m)(7) Cyber-security awareness and training. This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(m)(7)(i) The licensee shall implement a 

cyber-security awareness and training program.

This requirement would be added to ensure licensees implement cyber-security awareness and training programs to ensure that 

appropriate personnel are aware of cybersecurity requirements and have the cybersecurity skills and competencies necessary 

to secure affected plant systems and equipment. 

(m)(7)(ii) The cyber-security awareness and 

training program must ensure that appropriate plant personnel, including contractors, are aware of cyber-security requirements and that they receive the training required to effectively perform their assigned 

duties and responsibilities.

This requirement would be added to implement a cyber-security awareness and training program to: 

1. Improve employee awareness of the need 

to protect computer systems; 

2. Develop employee skills and knowledge so 

computer users can perform their jobs more 

securely; and 

3. Build in-depth knowledge, as needed, to 

design, implement, or operate security programs for organizations and systems. 

(n) Security program reviews and audits ......... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

§ 73.55(g)(4)(i)(A) At intervals not to exceed 

12 months or * * *.

(n)(1) The licensee shall review the onsite 

physical protection program at intervals not 

to exceed 12 months, or 

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision for formatting purposes. 

§ 73.55(g)(4)(i)(B) As necessary, based on an 

assessment by the licensee against performance indicators * * *.

(n)(1)(i) As necessary based upon assessments or other performance indicators.This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. 

§ 73.55(g)(4)(i)(B) * * * as soon as reasonably practicable after a change occurs in personnel, procedures, equipment, or facilities 

that potentially could adversely affect security 

but no longer than 12 months after the 

change.

(n)(1)(ii) Within 12 months after a change occurs in personnel, procedures, equipment, 

or facilities that potentially could adversely 

affect security.

This requirement would be retained and revised. Most significantly, the phrase ‘‘as 

soon as reasonably practicable’’ would be 

deleted and the current requirement ‘‘12 

months’’ would be moved to the beginning 

of the sentence to eliminate potential for 

misunderstanding and improve consistency. 

§ 73.55(g)(4)(i)(B) In any case, each element 

of the security program must be reviewed at 

least every 24 months.

(n)(2) As a minimum, each element of the onsite physical protection program must be reviewed at least every twenty-four (24) 

months.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. 

§ 73.55(g)(4)(i) The licensee shall review implementation of the security program by individuals who have no direct responsibility for 

the security program either: 

§ 73.55(g)(4)(ii) The results and recommendations of the security program review * * * 

must be documented * * *. 

(n)(2)(i) The onsite physical protection program review must be documented and performed by individuals independent of those 

personnel responsible for program management and any individual who has direct responsibility for implementing the onsite 

physical protection program.

This requirement would be retained and revised to combine two current requirements. 

Most significantly, the word ‘‘documented’’

would be added for consistency with the 

current § 73.55(g)(4)(ii). The phrase ‘‘security program’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘program’’ for consistency with use 

of the phrase ‘‘onsite physical protection 

program’’. 

§ 73.55(g)(4)(ii) The security program review 

must include an audit of security procedures 

and practices, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical protection system, an 

audit of the physical protection system testing 

and maintenance program, and an audit of 

commitments established for response by 

local law enforcement authorities.

(n)(2)(ii) Onsite physical protection program 

reviews and audits must include, but not be 

limited to, an evaluation of the effectiveness 

of the approved security plans, implementing procedures, response commitments by local, State, and Federal law enforcement authorities, cyber-security programs, safety/security interface, and the 

testing, maintenance, and calibration program.

This requirement would be retained and revised to provide additional examples. Most 

significantly, the phrase ‘‘but not be limited 

to’’ would be added to clarify that the proposed examples are not all inclusive. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62727 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(d)(7)(ii)(B) Periodically review physical 

security plans and contingency plans and 

procedures to evaluate their potential impact 

on plant and personnel safety.

(n)(3) The licensee shall periodically review 

the approved security plans, the integrated 

response plan, the licensee protective strategy, and licensee implementing procedures 

to evaluate their effectiveness and potential 

impact on plant and personnel safety.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. The phrase ‘‘Integrated Response Plan’’ would be added to emphasize the importance of this proposed plan 

and to emphasize its relationship to other 

site plans. The term ‘‘implementing’’ procedures would be added for consistency with 

this proposed section. 

(n)(4) The licensee shall periodically evaluate 

the cyber-security program for effectiveness 

and shall update the cyber-security program 

as needed to ensure protection against 

changes to internal and external threats.

This requirement would be added to account 

for the use of computers and the need to 

ensure that required protective measures 

are being met and to evaluate the effects 

that changes or other technological advancements would have on systems used 

at nuclear power plants. 

(n)(5) The licensee shall conduct quarterly 

drills and annual force-on-force exercises in 

accordance with appendix C to part 73 and 

the licensee performance evaluation program.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for the 

conduct of force-on-force drills and exercises. 

§ 73.55(g)(4)(ii) The results and recommendations of the security program review, management’s findings on whether the security 

program is currently effective, and any actions taken as a result of recommendations 

from prior program reviews must be documented in a report to the licensee’s plant 

manager and to corporate management at 

least one level higher than that having responsibility for the day-to-day plant operation.

(n)(6) The results and recommendations of 

the onsite physical protection program reviews and audits, management’s findings 

regarding program effectiveness, and any 

actions taken as a result of recommendations from prior program reviews, must be 

documented in a report to the licensee’s 

plant manager and to corporate management at least one level higher than that 

having responsibility for day-to-day plant 

operation.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. The phrase ‘‘security program review’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase’’ onsite physical protection program 

reviews and audits’’ for consistency with the 

format of the proposed rule. The phrase 

‘‘on whether the security program is currently effective’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘regarding program effectiveness’’

for plain language purposes. 

(n)(7) Findings from onsite physical protection 

program reviews, audits, and assessments 

must be entered into the site corrective action program and protected as safeguards 

information, if applicable.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that security deficiencies and findings would 

be tracked through the site corrective action 

program until corrected, and information regarding specific findings would be protected 

in accordance with the sensitivity and potential for exploitation of the information. 

(n)(8) The licensee shall make changes to the 

approved security plans and implementing 

procedures as a result of findings from security program reviews, audits, and assessments, where necessary to ensure the effective implementation of Commission regulations and the licensee protective strategy.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for the revision of approved security plans where 

plan changes are necessary to account for 

implementation problems, changes to site 

conditions, or other problems that adversely 

affect the licensee capability to effectively 

implement Commission requirements. 

(n)(9) Unless otherwise specified by the Commission, onsite physical protection program 

reviews, audits, and assessments may be 

conducted up to thirty days prior to, but no 

later than thirty days after the scheduled 

date without adverse impact upon the next 

scheduled annual audit date.

This requirement would be added to provide 

necessary flexibility to allow licensees to 

conduct audits/reviews within a specified 

time period without changing future scheduled audit/review dates. This requirement 

provides regulatory stability and flexibility to 

account for unforseen circumstances that 

may interfere with regularly scheduled 

dates, such as forced outages. 

§ 73.55(g) Testing and maintenance ............... (o) Maintenance, testing, and calibration ........ This header would be retained and revised to 

include ‘‘calibration’’ of equipment to ensure 

the accuracy of readings provided from 

such equipment. 

(o)(1) The licensee shall: This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(o)(1)(i) Implement a maintenance, testing 

and calibration program to ensure that security systems and equipment are tested for 

operability and performance at predetermined intervals, are maintained in operable 

condition, and are capable of performing 

their intended function when needed.

This requirement would be added to comprehensively address all security equipment 

in consistent terms. This proposed requirement would clarify the current requirement 

for ensuring that security equipment operates and performs as stated in the approved security plans. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62728 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(o)(1)(ii) Describe the maintenance, testing 

and calibration program in the approved 

physical security plan. Implementing procedures must specify operational and technical details required to perform maintenance, testing, and calibration activities to 

include, but not limited to, purpose of activity, actions to be taken, acceptance criteria, 

the intervals or frequency at which the activity will be performed, and compensatory 

actions required.

This requirement would be added to address 

the maintenance, testing and calibration of 

security equipment in non-specific terms 

and describe the types of documentation 

and level of detail needed. 

(o)(1)(iii) Document problems, failures, deficiencies, and other findings, to include the 

cause of each, and enter each into the site 

corrective action program. The licensee 

shall protect this information as safeguards 

information, if applicable.

This requirement would be added for consistency with the proposed requirement for addressing findings from security program reviews and audits and how specific information concerning security deficiencies and 

findings must be protected so that noted 

deficiencies could not be exploited. 

§ 73.55(g)(1) The licensee shall develop and 

employ compensatory measures including 

equipment, additional security personnel and 

specific procedures to assure that the effectiveness of the security system is not reduced by failure or other contingencies affecting the operation of the security related 

equipment or structures.

(o)(1)(iv) Implement compensatory measures 

in a timely manner to ensure that the effectiveness of the onsite physical protection 

program is not reduced by failure or degraded operation of security-related components or equipment.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. 

§ 73.55(g)(2) Each intrusion alarm shall be 

tested for performance at the beginning and 

end of any period that it is used for security. 

If the period of continuous use is longer than 

seven days, the intrusion alarm shall also be 

tested at least once every seven (7) days.

(o)(2) Each intrusion alarm must be tested for 

operability at the beginning and end of any 

period that it is used for security, or if the 

period of continuous use exceeds seven (7) 

days, the intrusion alarm must be tested at 

least once every seven (7) days.

This requirement would be retained and revised to correct the use of the phrase ‘‘tested for performance’’, as stated in the current § 73.55(g)(2). The testing performed at 

the beginning and end of any period is intended to be a ‘‘go, no-go’’ test or operational test that is used to simply indicate 

that the equipment functions in response to 

predetermined stimuli. A performance test 

is a more elaborate test that would test a 

system through the entire range of its intended function or stimuli. 

§ 73.55(g)(2) Each intrusion alarm shall be 

tested for performance at the beginning and 

end of any period that it is used for security.

(o)(3) Intrusion detection and access control 

equipment must be performance tested in 

accordance with the approved security 

plans.

This requirement would be retained and revised to correct the periodicity of performance testing stated in the current 

§ 73.55(g)(2) and to add ‘‘access control 

equipment’’ due to the widespread use of 

access control technologies and to focus on 

the need to ensure that this equipment is 

functioning as intended in response to the 

predetermined stimuli (e.g., biometrics). The 

phrase ‘‘each intrusion alarm’’ would be replaced with the phrase ‘‘Intrusion detection 

and access control equipment’’ to more accurately describe the equipment to be performance tested. 

§ 73.55(g)(3) Communications equipment required for communications onsite shall be 

tested for performance not less frequently 

than once at the beginning of each security 

personnel work shift.

(o)(4) Equipment required for communications 

onsite must be tested for operability not 

less frequently than once at the beginning 

of each security personnel work shift.

This proposed requirement would be retained 

and revised to correct the use of the phrase 

‘‘tested for performance’’, as stated in the 

current § 73.55(g)(3). The testing performed 

at the beginning and end of any period is 

intended to be a ‘‘go, no-go’’ test or operational test that is used to simply indicate 

that the equipment functions in response to 

predetermined stimuli. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62729 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(g)(3) Communications equipment required for communications offsite shall be 

tested for performance not less than once a 

day.

(o)(5) Communication systems between the 

alarm stations and each control room, and 

between the alarm stations and offsite support agencies, to include back-up communication equipment, must be tested for 

operability at least once each day.

This requirement would be retained and revised to include both ‘‘onsite’’ and offsite 

communication equipment associated with 

integrated response and to correct the use 

of the term ‘‘performance test,’’ as stated in 

the current § 73.55(g)(3). The testing performed at least once each day is intended 

to be a ‘‘go, no-go’’ test or operational test 

that is used to simply indicate that the 

equipment functions. 

(o)(6) Search equipment must be tested for 

operability at least once each day and tested for performance at least once during 

each seven (7) day period and before being 

placed back in service after each repair or 

inoperative state.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that search equipment is tested for operability and performance at intervals that 

provide assurance that unauthorized items 

would be detected as required. This proposed requirement is added to address the 

widespread use of search equipment technologies, such as explosives and metal detectors, and x-ray equipment and to provide 

a performance based requirement that focuses on the importance for accurate performance of this equipment. 

§ 73.55(g)(1) All alarms, communication 

equipment, physical barriers, and other security related devices or equipment shall be 

maintained in operable condition.

(o)(7) All intrusion detection equipment, communication equipment, physical barriers, 

and other security-related devices or equipment, to include back-up power supplies 

must be maintained in operable condition.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. Most significantly, back-up 

power supplies are added to ensure this 

critical element is maintained in operable 

condition. 

(o)(8) A program for testing or verifying the 

operability of devices or equipment located 

in hazardous areas must be specified in the 

approved security plans and must define alternate measures to be taken to ensure the 

timely completion of testing or maintenance 

when the hazardous condition or radiation 

restrictions are no longer applicable.

This requirement would be added to account 

for those circumstances when a licensee 

cannot satisfy testing requirements due to 

safety hazards or radiation restrictions. Vital 

component area portals located within facility radiological controlled areas that are inaccessible due to safety hazards or established radiation restrictions may be excluded from the testing requirements of this 

section. 

(p) Compensatory measures ........................... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

§ 73.55(g)(1) The licensee shall develop and 

employ compensatory measures * * *.

(p)(1) The licensee shall identify measures 

and criteria needed to compensate for the 

loss or reduced performance of personnel, 

equipment, systems, and components, that 

are required to meet the requirements of 

this section.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. The word ‘‘compensate’’ is 

used to provide a performance based requirement that requires the identified compensatory measure to be ‘‘developed and 

employed’’. 

§ 73.55(g)(1) The licensee shall develop and 

employ compensatory measures including 

equipment, additional security personnel and 

specific procedures to assure that the effectiveness of the security system is not reduced by failure or other contingencies affecting the operation of the security related 

equipment or structures.

(p)(2) Compensatory measures must be designed and implemented to provide a level 

of protection that is equivalent to the protection that was provided by the degraded 

or inoperable personnel, equipment, system, or components.

This requirement would be retained and revised to focus on the Commission’s view 

that compensatory measures must provide 

a level of protection that satisfies the Commission requirement which was otherwise 

satisfied through use or implementation of 

the failed component of the onsite physical 

protection program. 

(p)(3) Compensatory measures must be implemented within specific time lines necessary to meet the requirements stated in 

paragraph (b) of this section and described 

in the approved security plans.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for timely 

implementation of compensatory measures. 

The phrase ‘‘within specific time lines necessary to meet the requirements stated in 

paragraph (b)’’ would provide qualifying details against which specific time lines would 

be developed. 

(q) Suspension of safeguards measures ......... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

(q)(1) The licensee may suspend implementation of affected requirements of this section 

under the following conditions: 

This requirement would be added for formatting purposes. The phrase ‘‘implementation of affected requirements’’ would be 

used to ensure the licensee only suspends 

those measures that cannot be met as a direct result of the condition. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62730 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(a) In accordance with §§ 50.54(x) and 

50.54(y) of this chapter, the licensee may 

suspend any safeguards measures pursuant 

to § 73.55 in an emergency when this action 

is immediately needed to protect the public 

health and safety and no action consistent 

with license conditions and technical specification that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent.

(q)(1)(i) In accordance with §§ 50.54(x) and 

50.54(y) of this chapter, the licensee may 

suspend any safeguards measures pursuant to this section in an emergency when 

this action is immediately needed to protect 

the public health and safety and no action 

consistent with license conditions and technical specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. 

§ 73.55(a) This suspension must be approved 

as a minimum by a licensed senior operator 

prior to taking the action.

This suspension of safeguards measures 

must be approved as a minimum by a licensed senior operator prior to taking this 

action.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision to report this information to 

the control room. This proposed requirement is intended to ensure that at least one 

onsite, licensee management level person 

who is knowledgeable and aware of reactor 

operations and reactor status at the time, is 

the individual who would approve the suspension and has the knowledge to determine and the authority to direct appropriate 

compensatory measures to include, but not 

limited to, modifications to the licensee protective strategy during the suspension period. 

(q)(1)(ii) During severe weather when the suspension is immediately needed to protect 

personnel whose assigned duties and responsibilities in meeting the requirements of 

this section would otherwise constitute a life 

threatening situation and no action consistent with the requirements of this section 

that can provide equivalent protection is immediately apparent.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement that accounts for the suspension of safeguards 

measures during severe weather conditions 

that could result in life threatening situations 

such as tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, etc., 

for those individuals assigned to carry out 

certain duties and responsibilities required 

by Commission regulations, and the approved security plans and procedures. 

Suspension of safeguards due to severe 

weather must be initiated by the security 

supervisor and approved by a licensed senior operator prior to taking this action.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

requirement for who is authorized to approve suspensions under severe weather 

conditions. 

(q)(2) Suspended security measures must be 

reimplemented as soon as conditions permit.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for reimplementing suspended security measures. 

§ 73.55(a) The suspension of safeguards 

measures must be reported in accordance 

with the provisions of § 73.71.

(q)(3) The suspension of safeguards measures must be reported and documented in 

accordance with the provisions of § 73.71.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision for documenting suspended 

security measures. 

§ 73.55(a) Reports made under Section 

§ 50.72 need not be duplicated under § 73.71.

(q)(4) Reports made under § 50.72 of this 

chapter need not be duplicated under 

§ 73.71.

This requirement would be retained. 

(r) Records ....................................................... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

§ 73.55(b)(1)(ii) The NRC may inspect, copy, 

and take away copies of all reports and documents required to be kept by Commission 

regulations, orders, or applicable license conditions whether the reports and documents 

are kept by the licensee or the contractor.

(r)(1) The Commission may inspect, copy, retain, and remove copies of all records required to be kept by Commission regulations, orders, or license conditions whether 

the records are kept by the licensee or a 

contractor.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. The phrase ‘‘reports and 

documents’’ would be replaced with the 

word ‘‘records’’ to account for all information collection requirements regardless of 

media, to include electronic record keeping 

systems. 

§ 73.55(g)(4) These reports must be maintained in an auditable form, available for inspection, for a period of 3 years.(r)(2) The licensee shall maintain all records 

required to be kept by Commission regulations, orders, or license conditions, as a 

record until the Commission terminates the 

license for which the records were developed and shall maintain superceded portions of these records for at least three (3) 

years after the record is superseded, unless 

otherwise specified by the Commission.

This requirement would be retained and revised to consolidate multiple current records 

retention requirements rather than state the 

same requirement multiple times for each 

record throughout this rule. The phrase 

‘‘unless otherwise specified by the Commission’’ would be used to address any conflict 

that may arise between other records retention requirements such that the more restrictive requirement would take precedence. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62731 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(s) Safety/security interface. In accordance 

with the requirements of § 73.58, the licensee shall develop and implement a 

process to inform and coordinate safety and 

security activities to ensure that these activities do not adversely affect the capabilities of the security organization to satisfy 

the requirements of this section, or overall 

plant safety.

This requirement would be added to provide 

specific reference to the proposed § 73.58 

for Safety and Security Interface requirements. 

(t) Alternative measures ................................... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

§ 73.55(a) The Commission may authorize an 

applicant or licensee to provide measures for 

protection against radiological sabotage other 

than those required by this section if the applicant or licensee demonstrates that the 

measures have the same high assurance objective as specified in this paragraph and that 

the overall level of system performance provides protection against radiological sabotage 

equivalent to that which would be provided 

by Paragraphs (b) through (h) of this section 

and meets the general performance requirements of this section.

(t)(1) The Commission may authorize an applicant or licensee to provide a measure for 

protection against radiological sabotage 

other than one required by this section if 

the applicant or licensee demonstrates that: 

(i) The measure meets the same performance 

objective and requirements as specified in 

paragraph (b) of this section, and 

(ii) The proposed alternative measure provides protection against radiological sabotage or theft of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies, equivalent to that which would be 

provided by the specific requirement for 

which it would substitute.

This requirement would be retained and revised to provide a performance based requirement for alternative measures that 

focus attention on the Commission’s view 

that an alternative measure is an 

unanalyzed substitute for a specific Commission requirement of this proposed section and therefore, must be individually and 

knowingly reviewed and approved by the 

Commission before implementation to ensure consistency with these proposed Commission regulations. The Commission has 

determined that the requirements described 

in this proposed section have been carefully 

analyzed by the Commission and therefore, 

an alternative measure to a proposed requirement of this section must also be carefully analyzed through the process addressed in 10 CFR 50.90 before implementation. Specifically, the language used by 

this proposed requirement addresses alternative measures ‘‘individually’’ rather than 

collectively to clarify that each proposed alternative measure is unique by itself and 

must be analyzed as such. In addition, the 

phrase ‘‘have the same high assurance objective’’ is replaced with the phrase ‘‘meets 

the same performance objective and requirements as specified in paragraph (b) of 

this section’’. 

The proposed paragraph (b) of this section retains the same ‘‘high assurance objective’’

referred to by the current requirement and 

incorporates by reference the performance 

based requirements of this proposed section that facilitate licensee achievement of 

the intended high assurance objective. 

§ 73.55(c)(9)(i) For licensees who choose to 

propose alternative measures as provided for 

in 10 CFR 73.55(c)(8), the proposal must be 

submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90 

and include the analysis and justification for 

the proposed alternatives.

(t)(2) The licensee shall submit each proposed alternative measure to the Commission for review and approval in accordance 

with §§ 50.4 and 50.90 of this chapter before implementation.

This requirement would be retained and revised to expand the application of the current provision for alternative measures to all 

proposed requirements of this section and 

would provide the process by which alternative measures would be submitted for 

Commission review and approval. 

§ 73.55(c)(8)(ii) Propose alternative measures, 

in addition to the measures established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7), describe 

the level of protection that these measures 

would provide against a land vehicle bomb, 

and compare the costs of the alternative 

measures with the costs of measures necessary to fully meet the design goals and criteria.

(t)(3) The licensee shall submit a technical 

basis for each proposed alternative measure, to include any analysis or assessment 

conducted in support of a determination 

that the proposed alternative measure provides a level of protection that is at least 

equal to that which would otherwise be provided by the specific requirement of this 

section.

This requirement would be retained and revised to expand the application of the current provision for alternative measures to all 

proposed requirements of this section and 

to provide a description of the detailed information needed to support the technical 

basis for a request for Commission approval of an alternative measure. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62732 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 2.—PART 73 SECTION 73.55—Continued 

[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(c)(8)(ii) The Commission will approve 

the proposed alternative measures if they 

provide substantial protection against a land 

vehicle bomb, and it is determined by an 

analysis, using the essential elements of 10 

CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting 

the design goals and criteria are not justified 

by the added protection that would be provided.

(t)(4) Alternative vehicle barrier systems. In 

the case of alternative vehicle barrier systems required by § 73.55(e)(8), the licensee 

shall demonstrate that: 

(i) The alternative measure provides substantial protection against a vehicle bomb, and 

(ii) Based on comparison of the costs of the 

alternative measures to the costs of meeting the Commission’s requirements using 

the essential elements of 10 CFR 50.109, 

the costs of fully meeting the Commission’s 

requirements are not justified by the protection that would be provided.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision. The phrase ‘‘The Commission will approve the proposed alternative 

measures’’ would be deleted because approval would be based on NRC review. The 

proposed language clearly stipulates that 

alternative measures will be reviewed by 

the staff and approval would be contingent 

upon the justification provided by the licensee to include an analysis that examines the costs and benefits of the alternative measure consistent with 10 CFR 

50.109. 

§ 73.55 Definitions ......................................... This requirement would be added to clarify 

the use of the listed terms used in this proposed rule. 

Security Officer means a uniformed individual, 

either armed with a covered weapon or unarmed, whose primary duty is the protection 

of a facility, of radioactive material, or of 

other property against theft or diversion or 

against radiological sabotage.

This definition would be added to clarify what 

is meant by the term ‘‘Security Officer’’ as 

used in this document. 

Target Set means the combination of equipment or operator actions which, if all are 

prevented from performing their intended 

safety function or prevented from being accomplished, would likely result in significant 

core damage (e.g., non-incipient, non-localized fuel melting, and/or core disruption) 

barring extraordinary action by plant operators. A target set with respect to spent fuel 

sabotage is draining the spent fuel pool 

leaving the spent fuel uncovered for a period of time, allowing spent fuel heat-up and 

the associated potential for release of fission products.

This definition would be added to clarify what 

is meant by the term ‘‘Target Set’’ as used 

in this document. 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(a) General ........................................... (a) Introduction ................................................. This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. This proposed § 73.56(a) would 

amend and reorganize current § 73.56(a) 

[General]. The current § 73.56(a) required licensees to develop and implement access 

authorization (AA) programs. The proposed 

§ 73.56(a) would update these requirements. The title of this paragraph would be 

revised to more accurately capture the topics addressed in the proposed § 73.56(a), 

which would include a description of the 

NRC-regulated entities who would be subject to the section and the methods by 

which the NRC intends that licensees would 

implement the amended AA programs. 

These proposed changes to the language 

and organization of current § 73.56(a) would 

be made to enhance the clarity of the requirements in this section, for the reasons 

discussed in Section IV. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62733 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(a) General. (1) Each licensee who is 

authorized on April 25, 1991, to operate a 

nuclear power reactor pursuant to §§ 50.21(b) 

or 50.22 of this chapter shall comply with the 

requirements of this section. By April 27, 

1992, the required access authorization program must be incorporated into the site 

Physical Security Plan as provided for by 10 

CFR 50.54(p)(2) and implemented. By April 

27, 1992, each licensee shall certify to the 

NRC that it has implemented an access authorization program that meets the requirements of this part.

(a)(1) By [date—180 days—after the effective 

date of the final rule published in the FEDERAL REGISTER], each nuclear power reactor licensee, licensed under 10 CFR part 

50, shall incorporate the revised requirements of this section through amendments 

to its Commission-approved access authorization program and shall submit the 

amended program to the Commission for 

review and approval.

This requirement would be added to discuss 

the types of Commission licensees to whom 

the proposed requirements of this section 

would apply and the schedule for submitting 

the amended access authorization program. 

The Commission intends to delete the current language, because it applies only to a 

past rule change that is completed. The 

proposed requirements of this section 

would be applicable to decommissioned/ing 

reactors unless otherwise approved by the 

Commission. This proposed requirement 

would add a requirement for Commission 

review and approval of the amended access authorization program to ensure that 

access authorization programs meet the objective of providing high assurance that individuals who are subject to the requirements 

of this section are trustworthy and reliable, 

and do not constitute an unreasonable risk 

to public health and safety or the common 

defense and security, including the potential 

to commit radiological sabotage. 

(a)(2) The amended program must be submitted as specified in § 50.4 and must describe how the revised requirements of this 

section will be implemented by the licensee, 

to include a proposed implementation 

schedule.

This requirement would be added to provide a 

reference to the current § 50.4(b)(4) which 

describes procedural details relative to the 

proposed security plan submission requirement. 

(a)(3) The licensee shall implement the existing approved access authorization program 

and associated Commission orders until 

Commission approval of the amended program, unless otherwise authorized by the 

Commission.

This requirement would be added to clarify 

that the licensee must continue to implement the current Commission-approved security plans until the Commission approves 

the amended plans. The phrase ‘‘unless 

otherwise authorized by the Commission’’

would provide flexibility to account for unanticipated situations that may affect the licensee’s ability to comply with this proposed requirement. 

(a)(4) The licensee is responsible to the Commission for maintaining the authorization 

program in accordance with Commission 

regulations and related Commission-directed orders through the implementation of 

the approved program and site implementing procedures.

This requirement would be added to clarify 

that the licensee is responsible for meeting 

Commission regulations and the approved 

security plans. The phrase ‘‘through the implementation of the approved program and 

site implementing procedures’’ would be 

added to describe the relationship between 

Commission regulations, the approved authorization program, and implementing procedures. The Commission views the approved security plans as the mechanism 

through which the licensee implements 

Commission requirements. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62734 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(a)(2) Each applicant for a license to 

operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to 

§§ 50.21(b) or 50.22 of this chapter, whose 

application was submitted prior to April 25, 

1991, shall either by April 27, 1992, or the 

date of receipt of the operating license, 

whichever is later, incorporate the required 

access authorization program into the site 

Physical Security Plan and implement it.

§ 73.56(a)(3) Each applicant for a license to 

operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to 

§§ 50.21(b) or 50.22 of this chapter and each 

applicant for a combined construction permit 

and operating license pursuant to part 52 of 

this chapter, whose application is submitted 

after April 25, 1991, shall include the required 

access authorization program as part of its 

Physical Security Plan. The applicant, upon 

receipt of an operating license or upon receipt of operating authorization, shall implement the required access authorization program as part of its site Physical Security 

Plan. 

(a)(5) Applicants for an operating license 

under the provisions of part 50 of this chapter, or holders of a combined license under 

the provisions of part 52 of this chapter, 

shall satisfy the requirements of this section 

upon receipt of an operating license or 

upon notice of the Commission’s finding 

under § 52.103(g) of this chapter.

This requirement would be added to describe 

the proposed requirements for applicants 

and to specify that the proposed requirements of this section must be met upon receipt of an operating license or upon notice 

of the Commission’s finding under 

§ 52.103(g) of this chapter. This proposed 

requirement would retain the meaning of 

the current § 73.56(a)(3), which requires applicants for a license to operate a nuclear 

power plant to incorporate an access authorization program in their Physical Security Plan and implement the approved access authorization program when approval 

to begin operating is received. This proposed requirement would also add a requirement for Commission review and approval of an applicant’s Physical Security 

Plan incorporating the requirements of this 

proposed section for the reasons discussed 

with respect to proposed § 73.56(a)(1). The 

Commission intends to delete the current 

§ 73.56(a)(2) because there are no remaining applicants for an operating license 

under §§ 50.21(b) or 50.22 of this chapter 

who have not implemented an AA program 

under the current requirements. Therefore, 

the current paragraph is no longer necessary. 

The proposed paragraph would retain the current requirement for licensees and applicants to implement access authorization 

programs upon receipt of an operating license or operating authorization, respectively, and add a requirement for these entities to maintain their access authorization 

programs. The requirement to maintain AA 

programs would be added to convey more 

accurately that § 73.56 includes requirements for maintaining AA programs, in addition to requirements for implementing 

them. 

§ 73.56(a)(4) The licensee may accept part of 

an access authorization program used by its 

contractors, vendors, or other affected organizations and substitute, supplement, or duplicate any portion of the program as necessary to meet the requirements of this section. In any case, the licensee is responsible 

for granting, denying, or revoking unescorted 

access authorization to any contractor, vendor, or other affected organization employee.

(a)(6) Contractors and vendors (C/Vs) who 

implement authorization programs or program elements shall develop, implement, 

and maintain authorization programs or program elements that meet the requirements 

of this section, to the extent that the licensees and applicants specified in paragraphs 

(a)(1) and (a)(5) of this section rely upon 

those C/V authorization programs or program elements to meet the requirements of 

this section. In any case, only a licensee or 

applicant shall grant or permit an individual 

to maintain unescorted access to nuclear 

power plant protected and vital areas.

Proposed § 73.56(a)(6) would amend current 

§ 73.56(a)(4), which permits licensees to 

accept a C/V authorization program to meet 

the standards of this section. The proposed 

paragraph would retain the current permission for licensees to accept C/V authorization programs, in full or in part, but would 

also add C/Vs to the list of entities who are 

subject to proposed § 73.56 in order to convey more clearly that C/Vs may be directly 

subject to NRC inspection and enforcement 

actions than the current rule language implies. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62735 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

This change is necessary to clarify the applicability of the rule’s requirements to a C/V’s 

authorization program because several requirements in the current section could be 

interpreted as implying that a C/V is accountable to the licensee but not to the 

NRC, should significant weaknesses be 

identified in the C/V’s authorization program 

upon which one or more licensees rely. 

However, this interpretation would be incorrect. Therefore, proposed § 73.56(a)(6) 

would include C/V authorization programs 

and program elements upon which licensees and applicants rely within the scope of 

this section to convey more accurately that 

these C/Vs are directly accountable to the 

NRC for meeting the applicable requirements of § 73.56. This clarification is also 

necessary to maintain the internal consistency of the proposed rule because some 

provisions of the proposed section apply 

only to C/Vs, including, but not limited to, 

the second sentence of proposed 

§ 73.56(n)(7). The proposed paragraph 

would also retain the intent of the current 

requirement that only licensees and applicants have the authority to grant or permit 

an individual to maintain unescorted access 

to nuclear power plant protected and vital 

areas. 

The phrases, ‘‘program elements’’ and ‘‘to the 

extent that * * *,’’ would replace the second sentence of current § 73.56(a)(4), 

which permits licensees to accept part of an 

authorization program used by its contractors, vendors, or other affected organizations and substitute, supplement, or duplicate any portion of the program as necessary to meet the requirements of this 

section. The proposed change would retain 

the meaning of the current provision, but 

would clarify the intent of the provision in 

response to implementation questions from 

licensees. The phrase, ‘‘program elements,’’

would replace ‘‘part of an access authorization program,’’ to more clearly convey that 

the parts of an authorization program to 

which this provision refers are the program 

elements that are required under current 

and proposed § 73.56, including a background investigation; psychological assessment; behavioral observation; a review procedure for adverse determinations regarding an individual’s trustworthiness and reliability; audits; the protection of information; 

and retaining and sharing records. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62736 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

The phrase, ‘‘to the extent that the licensees 

and applicants rely upon C/V authorization 

programs or program elements,’’ would be 

used in proposed § 73.56(a)(6) to clarify 

that C/Vs need only meet the requirements 

of this section for those authorization program elements upon which licensees and 

applicants who are subject to this section 

rely. This change would be made to address two issues. First, ‘‘to the extent that’’

would be used to indicate that C/Vs need 

not implement every element of an AA program in order for licensees to rely on the 

program elements that a C/V does implement in accordance with the requirements 

of this section. For example, if a C/V conducts background investigations upon which 

licensees rely in making unescorted access 

authorization determinations, the background investigations must meet the requirements of current § 73.56(b)(2)(i) [or 

proposed § 73.56(d)]. However, the C/V 

need not also perform psychological assessments or any other services for licensees in order for licensees to rely on the 

background investigations that the C/V performs. Second, the phrase, ‘‘to the extent 

that,’’ would also indicate that any elements 

of an authorization program that a C/V implements that are not relied upon by licensees need not meet the requirements of this 

section. 

For example, if the same C/V in the previous 

example also offers psychological assessment services, in addition to conducting 

background investigations for licensees, but 

no licensees or applicants who are subject 

to this section rely on those psychological 

assessment services to make unescorted 

access authorization decisions, then the C/ 

V need not meet the requirements of current § 73.56(b)(2)(ii) [or proposed 

§ 73.56(e)] for conducting those psychological assessments. These proposed 

changes to the terms used in current 

§ 73.56(a)(4) would be made for increased 

clarity in the language of the rule. 

(b) Individuals who are subject to an authorization program.

(b)(1) The following individuals shall be subject to an authorization program: 

A new § 73.56(b) [Individuals who are subject 

to an AA program] would specify the individuals who must be subject to an AA program, based on their job duties and responsibilities. Current § 73.56 requires only that 

individuals who have unescorted access to 

protected and vital areas shall be subject to 

an AA program. The proposed rule would 

add several categories of individuals who 

would be subject to the proposed AA program, for the reasons discussed with respect to each paragraph that addresses the 

additional categories of individuals who 

would be covered. 

Proposed § 73.56(b) would be added for clarity in the organization of the proposed section by grouping together in one list the individuals who would be subject to the proposed regulations. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62737 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(b) General performance objective and 

requirements. (1) The licensee shall establish 

and maintain an access authorization program granting individuals unescorted access 

to protected and vital areas * * *.

(b)(1)(i) Any individual to whom a licensee or 

applicant grants unescorted access to nuclear power plant protected and vital areas.

Proposed § 73.56(b)(1)(i) would retain the current requirement that any individual who 

has unescorted access to nuclear power 

plant protected and vital areas shall be subject to an AA program that meets the requirements of this section. The current requirement is embedded in the first sentence 

of current § 73.56(b) [General performance 

objective and requirements]. The proposed 

paragraph would list this category of individuals separately for organizational clarity in 

the rule. 

(b)(1)(ii) Any individual whose assigned duties 

and responsibilities permit the individual to 

take actions by electronic means, either onsite or remotely, that could adversely impact a licensee’s or applicant’s operational 

safety, security, or emergency response capabilities; and 

A new § 73.56(b)(1)(ii) would require that individuals who are assigned duties and responsibilities that permit them to take actions by electronic means that could adversely impact a licensee’s or applicant’s 

operational safety, security, or emergency 

response capabilities would be subject to 

an AA program. 

The proposed provision would be consistent 

with the intent of current § 73.56, which is 

to ensure that anyone who has unescorted 

access to equipment that is important to the 

operational safety and security of plant operations must be trustworthy and reliable. 

As discussed in Section IV.3, because of 

the increased use of digital systems and 

advanced communications technologies in 

nuclear power plants, the current regulations, which focus on individuals who have 

physical access to equipment within protected and vital areas, do not provide adequate assurance of the trustworthiness and 

reliability of persons whose job duties and 

responsibilities permit them to take actions 

through electronic means that can affect 

operational safety, security, and emergency 

response capabilities, but who, because of 

advances in electronic communications, 

may not require physical access to protected and vital areas. For example, some 

licensees have installed systems that permit 

engineers or information technology technicians to take actions from remote locations 

that may affect the operability of safety-related components, or affect the functionality 

of operating systems. 

Because the potential impact of actions taken 

through electronic means may be as serious as actions taken by an individual who 

is physically present within a protected or 

vital area, the NRC has determined that 

subjecting this additional category of individuals to the AA program is necessary. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62738 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(b)(1)(iii) Any individual who has responsibilities for implementing a licensee’s or applicant’s protective strategy, including, but not 

limited to, armed security force officers, 

alarm station operators, and tactical response team leaders; and 

Proposed § 73.56(b)(1)(iii) would require that 

certain individuals who are members of the 

licensee’s or applicant’s security organization shall be subject to an AA program, 

based on their responsibilities for implementing a licensee’s protective strategy. 

Current § 73.55 requires that any armed 

members of the security organization must 

be subject to an AA program, but the proposed rule would also list them here for 

clarity and completeness in the requirements of this section. The proposed paragraph would also include any individual who 

has responsibilities for implementing the licensee’s protective strategy, which may include individuals who are not armed. In 

practice, the NRC is not aware of any licensees, applicants, or C/Vs who do not 

subject this broader category of individuals 

to an AA program. 

However, the proposed rule would specify 

that these individuals shall be subject to an 

AA program because of their critical responsibilities with respect to plant security 

and, therefore, the need for high assurance 

that they are trustworthy and reliable. 

(b)(1)(iv) The licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s 

reviewing official.

Proposed § 73.56(b)(1)(iv) would introduce a 

new term, ‘‘reviewing official,’’ to § 73.56 to 

refer to an individual who is designated by 

a licensee, applicant, or C/V to be responsible for reviewing and evaluating information about persons who are applying for 

unescorted access authorization and determining whether to grant, deny, maintain, or 

unfavorably terminate unescorted access 

authorization. The proposed paragraph 

would require reviewing officials to be subject to the AA program because of the key 

role these individuals play in providing high 

assurance that persons who are granted 

unescorted access to protected areas and 

electronic access to operational safety, security, or emergency response systems 

within protected or vital areas are trustworthy and reliable. 

In addition, reviewing officials’ actions affect 

the confidence that the public, management, the NRC, and individuals who are 

subject to the AA program have in the integrity of the program and the accuracy and 

reliability of the authorization decisions that 

are made under the program. Therefore, 

the NRC believes that reviewing officials 

must meet the highest standards for trustworthiness and reliability, including the requirements of an AA program. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62739 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(b)(2) At the licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s 

discretion, other individuals who are designated in access authorization program 

procedures may be subject to an authorization program that meets the requirements of 

this section.

Proposed § 73.56(b)(2) would recognize the 

long-standing industry practice, which has 

been endorsed by the NRC, of subjecting 

additional individuals to authorization requirements during periods when those individuals do not require and have not been 

granted unescorted access to protected or 

vital areas. For example, some C/Vs, 

whose personnel may be called upon by a 

licensee to work at a licensee’s site under 

contract, implement full authorization programs to cover those personnel. Similarly, 

some licensees require employees who are 

normally stationed at their corporate headquarters to be subject to an authorization 

program, for such access, is referred to as 

having ‘‘unescorted access’’ (UA). 

The proposed paragraph would be added to 

give licensees, applicants, and C/Vs who 

implement authorization programs that meet 

the requirements of this part the authority to 

do so under the proposed rule. 

§ 73.56(b) General performance objective and 

requirements. (1) The licensee shall establish 

and maintain an access authorization program granting individuals unescorted access 

to protected and vital areas with the objective 

of providing high assurance that individuals 

granted unescorted access are trustworthy 

and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the 

public including a potential to commit radiological sabotage.

(c) General performance objective. Access 

authorization programs must provide high 

assurance that the individuals who are 

specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, 

and, if applicable, (b)(2) of this section are 

trustworthy and reliable, such that they do 

not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety or the common defense and security, including the potential to 

commit radiological sabotage.

Proposed § 73.56(c) would retain the meaning 

of the current program performance objective, which is embedded in current 

§ 73.56(b), but would separate it from the 

requirement in the current paragraph for licensees to establish and maintain an AA 

program. The requirement to establish and 

maintain AA programs would be moved to 

proposed § 73.56(a), where it would be imposed on each entity who would be subject 

to the section, for organizational clarity. The 

performance objective would be revised to 

add cross-references to the categories of 

individuals who must be subject to an authorization program, as specified in proposed § 73.56(b), because the proposed 

rule would require that certain individuals, in 

addition to those who have unescorted 

physical access to protected and vital areas 

of a nuclear power plant, would be subject 

to the AA program, as discussed with respect to § 73.56(b). 

In addition, the phrase, ‘‘common defense 

and security,’’ would be added to the proposed paragraph to convey the purpose of 

authorization programs more specifically, 

which would include protection of the public 

from the potential insider activities defined 

in current § 73.1(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2)(B). 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62740 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(2) Except as provided for in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section, the 

unescorted access authorization program 

must include the following: (i) A background 

investigation designed to identify past actions 

which are indicative of an individual’s future 

reliability within a protected or vital area of a 

nuclear power reactor. As a minimum, the 

background investigation must verify an individual’s * * *.

(d) Background investigation. In order to grant 

unescorted access authorization to an individual, the licensees, applicants and C/Vs 

specified in paragraph (a) of this section 

shall ensure that the individual has been 

subject to a background investigation. The 

background investigation must include, but 

is not limited to, the following elements: 

Proposed § 73.56(d) would amend current 

§ 73.56(b)(2)(i), which requires authorization 

programs to include a background investigation and describes the aspects of an individual’s background to be investigated. 

Proposed § 73.56(d) would retain the requirements of the current paragraph, but increase the level of detail with which they 

are specified in response to implementation 

questions from licensees and in order to increase consistency among authorization 

programs, as discussed in Section IV.3. Because the requirements in the proposed 

rule would be more detailed, the current 

paragraph would be restructured and subdivided to present requirements for each 

element of the background investigation in 

a separate paragraph. This change would 

be made for increased clarity in the organization of the rule. The cross-references to 

paragraphs (c) and (d) in the current provision would be deleted because they would 

no longer apply in the reorganized section. 

The proposed provision would use the 

phrase, ‘‘ensure that the individual has 

been subject to a background investigation,’’ because completion of every element 

of a background investigation may not be 

required each time an individual applies for 

UAA. As discussed with respect to proposed § 73.46(h)(1) and (h)(2), the proposed rule would permit licensees, applicants, and C/Vs, in order to meet the requirements of this section, to accept and 

rely on certain background investigation 

elements, psychological assessments, and 

behavioral observation training conducted 

by other licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

who are subject this section. This permission would reduce unnecessary regulatory 

burden by eliminating redundancies in authorization program elements that cover the 

same subject matter and periods of time. 

However, as discussed with respect to proposed paragraphs (h) and (i)(1) of this section, the proposed rule would establish time 

limits on the permission to accept and rely 

on authorization program elements to which 

the individual was previously subject, based 

upon how far in the past the background investigation element, psychological assessment, and behavioral observation training 

was conducted. 

These time limits are discussed in more detail 

with respect to the specific provisions in the 

proposed rule that address them. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62741 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(d)(1) Informed consent. The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) 

of this section may not initiate any element 

of a background investigation without the 

knowledge and written consent of the subject individual. Licensees, applicants, and 

C/Vs shall inform the individual of his or her 

right to review information collected to assure its accuracy and provide the individual 

with an opportunity to correct any inaccurate or incomplete information that is developed by licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

about the individual.

Proposed § 73.56(d)(1) would require the entities who are subject to this section to obtain 

written consent from any individual who is 

applying for UAA before the licensee, applicant, or C/V initiates any element of the 

background investigation that is required in 

this section. The practice of obtaining the 

individual’s written consent for the background investigation has been endorsed by 

the NRC and incorporated into licensees’

Physical Security Plans since § 73.56 was 

first promulgated. It is necessary to protect 

the privacy rights of individuals who are applying for UAA. The proposed paragraph 

would also require licensees, applicants, 

and C/Vs to inform the individual of his or 

her right to review information that is developed by the licensee, applicant, or C/V to 

verify its accuracy, and have the opportunity to correct any misinformation. 

Proposed § 73.56(o)(6) would further require 

the licensee, applicant, or C/V to ensure 

that any necessary corrections are made to 

information about the individual that has 

been recorded in the information-sharing 

mechanism that would be required under 

proposed § 73.56(o)(6), as discussed with 

respect to that paragraph. These are also 

industry practices that have been endorsed 

by the NRC and incorporated into licensees’ Physical Security Plans. Permitting the 

individual to review and have the opportunity to correct personal information that is 

collected about him or her is necessary to 

maintain individuals’ confidence in the fairness of authorization programs by protecting individuals from possible adverse 

employment actions that may result from an 

inability to gain unescorted access to protected areas, based upon incorrect information. Requiring the entities who are subject 

to this section to correct information contained in the information-sharing mechanism, as would be required under proposed 

§ 73.56(o)(6), is necessary to maintain the 

integrity of the personal information shared 

among the entities who would be subject to 

the proposed section, and the effectiveness 

of AA programs. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62742 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(d)(1)(i) The subject individual may withdraw 

his or her consent at any time. The licensee, applicant or C/V to whom the individual has applied for unescorted access 

authorization shall inform the individual 

that—

(A) Withdrawal of his or her consent will 

withdraw the individual’s current application for access authorization under 

the licensee’s, applicant’s or C/V’s authorization program; and 

(B) Other licensees, applicants and C/Vs 

will have access to information documenting the withdrawal through the information-sharing mechanism required 

under paragraph (o)(6) of this section. 

Proposed § 73.56(d)(1)(i) would specify that 

an individual who has given his or her written consent for a background investigation 

under proposed § 73.56(d)(1) may withdraw 

that consent at any time. However, because 

a background investigation is one of the requirements for granting UAA, and because 

the background investigation cannot be 

completed without the subject individual’s 

consent, proposed § 73.56(d)(1)(i)(A) would 

specify that the licensee, applicant, or C/V 

to whom the individual has applied for UAA 

must inform the individual who has withdrawn consent that withdrawal of consent 

will terminate the individual’s current application for UAA. In addition, the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V would be required by proposed § 73.56(d)(1)(i)(B) to notify the individual that other licensees, applicants, and 

C/Vs will have access to information documenting the withdrawal through the information-sharing mechanism required under proposed § 73.56(o)(6). That proposed paragraph would require that information specified in the licensee’s or applicant’s Physical 

Security Plan about individuals who have 

applied for UAA, must be recorded and retained in a database that is administered as 

an information-sharing mechanism by licensees and applicants subject to § 73.56. 

(d)(1)(ii) If an individual withdraws his or her 

consent, the licensees, applicants and C/Vs 

specified in paragraph (a) of this section 

may not initiate any elements of the background investigation that were not in 

progress at the time the individual withdrew 

his or her consent, but shall complete any 

background investigation elements that are 

in progress at the time consent is withdrawn. In the information-sharing mechanism required under paragraph (o)(6) of this 

section, the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall 

record the individual’s application for 

unescorted access authorization; his or her 

withdrawal of consent for the background 

investigation; the reason given by the individual for the withdrawal, if any; and any 

pertinent information collected from the 

background investigation elements that 

were completed.

Proposed § 73.56(d)(1)(ii) would establish 

several requirements related to a withdrawal of consent by an individual who has 

applied for UAA. The proposed paragraph 

would require the entities who are subject 

to this section to document the individual’s 

withdrawal of consent, and complete and 

document any elements of the background 

investigation that had been initiated before 

the time at which an individual withdraws 

his or her consent, and would prohibit the 

initiation of any element that was not in 

progress. For example, if a licensee had 

submitted a request to a credit history reporting agency before an individual withdrew his or her consent, the proposed paragraph would require the licensee to document the credit history information that is 

obtained about the individual, even if the licensee receives the credit history report 

after the date on which the individual withdrew his or her consent. However, if the licensee had not yet requested information 

about the individual’s military service history 

at the time the individual withdraws consent, the proposed provision would prohibit 

the licensee from initiating a request for 

military service history information. There 

are many reasons that an individual may 

withdraw his or her consent for the background investigation. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62743 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

In most instances, the reason that an individual withdraws his or her consent is legitimate, such as a change in the individual’s 

work assignment. However, in some instances, the NRC is aware that individuals 

have withdrawn consent for the background 

investigation in order to attempt to prevent 

the discovery of adverse information or the 

sharing of adverse information already discovered about the individual by the licensee 

with other licensees. If the licensee were to 

stop all information gathering at the time at 

which the individual withdrew his or her 

consent, the likelihood that the adverse information would be discovered would be reduced. As a result, the individual could be 

afforded an opportunity to create a risk to 

public health and safety and the common 

defense and security by having physical access to a protected or vital area, and most 

importantly, be in a position to observe the 

licensee’s security posture by obtaining access to a licensee facility under escort, because a rigorous background investigation 

is not required for individuals who ‘‘visit’’ a 

nuclear power plant under escort. 

Similarly, if information that had been requested by the licensee, such as a criminal 

history report under proposed § 73.57 [Requirements for criminal history checks of individuals granted unescorted access to a 

nuclear power facility or access to safeguards information by power reactor licensees] of this chapter or the credit history report under proposed § 73.56(d)(5), was received by the licensee after the time the individual withdrew consent and contained 

adverse information, but that adverse information was not documented in the information-sharing mechanism required under proposed paragraph (o)(6) of this section, the 

individual also could be inappropriately permitted to visit under escort the same or another site because the adverse information 

would not be available for review. Therefore, the proposed provisions would be necessary to maintain the effectiveness of AA 

programs in protecting public health and 

safety and the common defense and security by ensuring that all available information 

about individuals who have applied for UAA 

is documented and shared, while also protecting the privacy rights of individuals by 

initiating no further elements of the background investigation when an individual 

withdraws his or her consent. 

The proposed paragraph would also require licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to create a 

record, accessible to other licensees, applicants, and C/Vs, of the fact that an individual withdrew his or her consent to the 

background investigation and the reason for 

the withdrawal. This record would need to 

be created in the information-sharing mechanism required by proposed § 73.56(o)(6), 

in order for licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

to carry out the notice requirement in proposed § 73.56(d)(1)(i)(B). 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62744 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(4) Failure by an individual to report 

any previous suspension, revocation, or denial of unescorted access to nuclear power 

reactors is considered sufficient cause for denial of unescorted access authorization.

(d)(1)(iii) The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

specified in paragraph (a) of this section 

shall inform, in writing, any individual who is 

applying for unescorted access authorization that the following actions related to providing and sharing the personal information 

under this section are sufficient cause for 

denial or unfavorable termination of 

unescorted access authorization: 

(A) Refusal to provide written consent for 

the background investigation; 

(B) Refusal to provide or the falsification 

of any personal history information required under this section, including the 

failure to report any previous denial or 

unfavorable termination of unescorted 

access authorization; Proposed 

§ 73.56(d)(1)(iii) would replace current 

§ 73.56(b)(4). The proposed paragraph 

would retain the intent of the current 

provision in proposed § 73.56(d)(4), but 

would add other actions related to providing and sharing personal information 

that would be sufficient cause for a reviewing official to deny or unfavorably 

terminate an individual’s UAA. Proposed paragraph (d)(1)(iii)(B) of this 

section would add falsification of any 

personal history information as a sufficient reason to deny or unfavorably terminate UAA in order to deter falsification attempts. 

(C) Refusal to provide written consent for 

the sharing of personal information with 

other licensees, applicants, or C/Vs required under paragraph (d)(4)(v) of this 

section; and 

(D) Failure to report any arrests or formal 

actions specified in paragraph (g) of 

this section. 

Proposed paragraph (d)(1)(iii)(D) of this section would add failure to comply with the arrest-reporting requirements of proposed 

paragraph (g) of this section as a sufficient 

reason to deny or unfavorably terminate 

UAA in order to deter individuals from delaying or failing to report such incidents. 

The additional actions that would be sufficient cause for denial or unfavorable termination would include: refusing to provide 

written consent for the background investigation that would be required under proposed paragraph (d)(1)(iii)(A) of this section; refusing to provide personal history information required under paragraph (d)(2) 

of this section, in proposed (d)(1)(iii)(B); 

and refusing to provide written consent for 

the individual’s personal information to be 

shared among the entities who would be 

subject to this section that would be required under paragraph (d)(4)(v) of this section, in proposed paragraph (d)(1)(iii)(C). 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62745 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

The proposed rule would specify these requirements for the disclosure and sharing of 

personal information because implementation of the AA programs required under this 

section requires individuals to disclose and 

permit the sharing of such personal information, subject to the protections of such 

information that would be provided in proposed § 73.56(m). The proposed paragraph 

would also require the entities who are subject to this section to inform individuals of 

the potential consequences of these actions 

so that individuals understand the requirements to which they are subject and, therefore, would be more likely to comply with 

them. The proposed paragraph would delete the terms, ‘‘suspension’’ and ‘‘revocation,’’ and replace them with the term, ‘‘unfavorable termination.’’ Historically, there 

have been some inconsistencies between 

§ 73.56 access authorization requirements 

and related requirements in 10 CFR part 26 

that have led to implementation questions 

from licensees, as well as inconsistencies 

in how the licensees have implemented the 

requirements. 

During the public meetings discussed in Section IV.3, the stakeholders provided examples of ambiguities in the terms used in 

§ 73.56 and how these ambiguities and lack 

of clarity in § 73.56 had resulted in unintended consequences. Therefore, to address stakeholder requests for clarity and 

consistently describe the actions of denying 

UAA to an individual and terminating an individual’s UAA for cause in proposed 

§ 73.56, only the terms, ‘‘deny or denial’’

and ‘‘unfavorably terminate or unfavorable 

termination,’’ would be used in the proposed paragraph and throughout the proposed section. 

(d)(2) Personal history disclosure. 

(i) Any individual who is applying for 

unescorted access authorization shall disclose the personal history information that 

is required by the licensee’s, applicant’s, or 

C/V’s authorization program and any information that may be necessary for the reviewing official to make a determination of 

the individual’s trustworthiness and reliability. 

Proposed § 73.56(d)(2) would require an individual who is applying for UAA to provide 

the personal information that is required 

under the licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s 

authorization program, and any information 

that may be necessary for the reviewing official to evaluate the individual’s trustworthiness and reliability. The proposed 

provision would be added to impose a requirement on individuals to divulge personal 

information in order to be granted UAA, in 

response to stakeholder requests at the 

public meetings discussed in Section IV.3. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62746 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

The proposed paragraph would not specify 

the nature of the information that individuals 

may be required to disclose because the information may vary widely, depending upon 

a number of factors, including, but not limited to, whether or not the individual has 

previously held UAA; the length of time that 

has elapsed since his or her last period of 

UAA was terminated; the job duties and responsibilities that the individual would perform for which UAA is required; and whether any adverse information about the individual is disclosed or discovered as a result 

of the background investigation, psychological assessment, or the suitable inquiry 

and drug and alcohol testing required under 

part 26 of this chapter. Although the 

amount and nature of information to be disclosed would vary depending on the factors 

described, individuals applying for UAA 

would be required to disclose some personal history information each time he or 

she applies for UAA, as discussed with respect to proposed § 73.56(h) [Granting 

unescorted access authorization]. 

(d)(2)(ii) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs may 

not require an individual to disclose an administrative withdrawal of unescorted access authorization under the requirements 

of paragraphs (g), (h)(7), or (i)(1)(v) of this 

section, if the individual’s unescorted access authorization was not subsequently 

denied or terminated unfavorably by a licensee, applicant, or C/V.

Proposed § 73.56(d)(2)(ii) would prohibit a licensee, applicant, or C/V from requiring an 

individual to report an administrative withdrawal of UAA that may be required under 

proposed § 73.56(g), (h)(7), or (i)(1)(v), except if the information developed or discovered about the individual during the period 

of the administrative withdrawal resulted in 

a denial or unfavorable termination of the 

individual’s UAA. The proposed paragraph 

would ensure that a temporary administrative withdrawal of an individual’s UAA, 

caused by an administrative delay in completing an evaluation of any formal legal action, or any portion of a background investigation, re-investigation, or psychological 

assessment or re-assessment that is not 

under the individual’s control, would not be 

treated as an unfavorable termination, except if the reviewing official determines that 

the delayed information requires denial or 

unfavorable termination of the individual’s 

UAA. This proposed provision would be 

necessary to maintain the public’s and individuals’ confidence in the fairness of AA 

programs by protecting individuals from 

possible adverse employment actions that 

may be based upon administrative delays 

for which they are not responsible. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62747 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * true identity, and develop 

information concerning an individual’s employment history, education history, credit 

history, criminal history, military service, and 

verify an individual’s character and reputation.

(d)(3) Verification of true identity. Licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs shall verify the true 

identity of an individual who is applying for 

unescorted access authorization in order to 

ensure that the applicant is the person that 

he or she has claimed to be. At a minimum, 

licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall validate the social security number that the individual has provided, and, in the case of 

foreign nationals, the alien registration number that the individual provides. In addition, 

licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall also 

determine whether the results of the 

fingerprinting required under § 73.21 confirm the individual’s claimed identity, if such 

results are available.

Proposed § 73.56(d)(3) would expand on the 

portion of current § 73.56(b)(2)(i) that requires licensees to verify an individual’s 

true identity. The proposed paragraph 

would require the entities who are subject 

to this section, at a minimum, to validate 

the social security number, or in the case of 

foreign nationals, the alien registration number, that the individual has provided to the 

licensee, applicant or C/V. The term, ‘‘validation,’’ would be used in the proposed 

paragraph to indicate that licensees, applicants and C/Vs would be required to take 

steps to access information in addition to 

that provided by the individual from other 

reliable sources to ensure that the personal 

identifying information the individual has 

provided to the licensee is authentic. This 

validation could be achieved through a variety of means, including, but not limited to, 

accessing information from databases that 

are maintained by the Federal Government, 

or evaluating an accumulation of information, such as comparing the social security 

number the individual provided to the social 

security number(s) included in a credit history report and information obtained from 

other sources. 

The proposed paragraph would also require 

using the information obtained from 

fingerprinting individuals, as required under 

proposed § 73.21, to confirm an individual’s 

identity, if that information is available. The 

proposed requirement clarifies the NRC’s 

intent with respect to this portion of the 

background investigation. 

§ 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * and develop information 

concerning an individual’s employment history * * *.

(d)(4) Employment history evaluation. Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall ensure that 

an employment history evaluation has been 

completed, by questioning the individual’s 

present and former employers, and by determining the activities of individuals while 

unemployed.

Proposed § 73.56(d)(4) would amend the portion of current § 73.56(b)(2)(i) that requires 

licensees to develop information concerning 

an individual’s employment history, education history, and military service. This 

paragraph would be added in response to 

many implementation questions about these 

requirements from licensees. Because the 

proposed paragraph would add several 

clarifications of the current requirements, it 

would be subdivided to present each requirement separately for organizational clarity in the rule. Considered together, the requirements of proposed § 73.56(d)(4) would 

clarify the NRC’s intent that periods of unemployment, education, and military service 

must be evaluated only if the individual 

claims them instead of typical civilian employment. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62748 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Proposed § 73.56(d)(4) would require licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to demonstrate a 

best effort to complete the employment history evaluation. The term, ‘‘best effort,’’

would be added to clarify the requirements 

and increase consistency between § 73.56 

and related requirements in 10 CFR 

26.27(a). The best effort criterion recognizes licensees’, applicants’, and C/Vs’ status as commercial entities with no legal authority to require the release of the information from other private employers and educational institutions. Because of privacy and 

potential litigation concerns, some private 

employers and educational institutions may 

be unable or unwilling to release qualitative 

information about a former employee or student. Therefore, the best effort criterion 

would first require licensees, applicants, 

and C/Vs to seek employment information 

from the primary source (e.g. a company, 

private employer, or educational institution 

that the applicant has listed on his or her 

employment history), but recognizes that it 

may not be forthcoming. In this case a licensee, applicant, or C/V would be required 

to seek information from an alternate, secondary source when the information from 

the primary source is unavailable. 

The proposed provision would use the 

phrase, ‘‘ensure that the employment history evaluation has been completed,’’ because a licensee, applicant, or C/V may not 

be required to conduct an employment history evaluation for every individual who applies for UAA. As discussed with respect to 

proposed § 73.56(h)(3) and (h)(4), the proposed rule would permit licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to accept and rely on elements of the background investigations, 

psychological assessments, and behavioral 

observation training conducted by other entities who are subject to this section to meet 

the requirements of this section. Therefore, 

the need for and extent of the employment 

history evaluation would vary, depending 

upon how much recent information was 

available to the licensee, applicant, or C/V 

from any previous periods during which the 

individual may have held UAA. In the case 

of individuals whose UAA has been interrupted for 30 or fewer days, proposed 

§ 73.56(h) would not require an employment 

history evaluation for the reasons discussed 

with respect to that paragraph. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62749 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

However, proposed § 73.56(h) would establish 

time limits on the permission to accept and 

rely on AA program elements to which the 

individual was previously subject, based 

upon how far in the past the background investigation, psychological assessment, and 

behavioral observation training elements 

were completed. These time limits are discussed in more detail with respect to the 

specific provisions in the proposed rule that 

address them. The proposed provision 

would also require licensees, applicants, 

and C/Vs to determine the activities of individuals during periods in which the individual was unemployed. The proposed rule 

would add this requirement to make certain 

that, during the periods that individuals 

claim to have been unemployed, (1) they 

were not engaged in activities that may reflect adversely on their trustworthiness and 

reliability, such as confinement for periods 

of incarceration or in-patient drug or alcohol 

treatment, or (2) they intentionally failed to 

disclose periods of employment that were 

ended unfavorably. 

(d)(4)(i) For the claimed employment period, 

the employment history evaluation must ascertain the reason for termination, eligibility 

for rehire, and other information that could 

reflect on the individual’s trustworthiness 

and reliability.

A new § 73.56(d)(4)(i) would specify the purpose of the employment history evaluation, 

which would be to ascertain information 

about the individual’s trustworthiness and 

reliability, and the types of information that 

the licensee, applicant, or C/V would seek 

from employers regarding an individual who 

is applying for UAA. The proposed paragraph would require the entities who are 

subject to this section to ascertain, consistent with the ‘‘best effort’’ criterion established in proposed § 73.56(d)(4), the reason 

that the individual’s employment was terminated, his or her eligibility for rehire, and 

other information that could reflect on the 

individual’s trustworthiness and reliability. 

The term, ‘‘ascertain,’’ would be used in the 

proposed paragraph because it is consistent with the terminology used by the industry to refer to the actions taken with respect to conducting the employment history 

evaluation and would, therefore, improve 

the clarity of this requirement for those who 

must implement it. 

In addition, there may be instances in which it 

is unnecessary for a licensee, applicant, or 

C/V to conduct the employment history 

evaluation, as discussed with respect to 

proposed § 73.56(d)(4), because proposed 

§ 73.56(h)(2) would permit the entities who 

implement authorization programs to rely on 

employment history evaluations conducted 

by other entities who are subject to this 

section. In such cases, the licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s reviewing official would not 

review information that was developed 

under his or her AA program, but would ascertain the subject individual’s employment 

history by reviewing information that had 

been collected by others. The proposed requirement would be added in response to 

implementation questions that have arisen 

about the employment history check that is 

required in current § 73.56(b)(2)(i). 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62750 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * the background investigation must * * * develop information concerning an individual’s * * * military service 

* * *.

(d)(4)(ii) If the claimed employment was military service, the licensee, applicant, or C/V 

who is conducting the employment history 

evaluation shall request a characterization 

of service, reason for separation, and any 

disciplinary actions that could affect a trustworthiness and reliability determination.

Proposed § 73.56(d)(4)(ii) would amend the 

portion of current § 73.56(2)(i) that requires 

licensees to develop information about an 

individual’s military service. The proposed 

paragraph would clarify the NRC’s intent 

that verification and characterization of the 

individual’s military service would be required only if the individual claims military 

service as employment within the periods 

during which the individual would be required to disclose his or her employment 

history, as specified in proposed § 73.56(h) 

[Granting unescorted access authorization]. 

This clarification would respond to implementation questions from licensees and 

stakeholder requests at the public meetings 

discussed in Section IV.3. 

§ 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * and develop information 

concerning an individual’s * * * education 

history, * * *.

(d)(4)(iii) Periods of self-employment or unemployment may be verified by any reasonable method. If education is claimed in lieu 

of employment, the licensee, applicant, or 

C/V shall request information that could reflect on the individual’s trustworthiness and 

reliability and, at a minimum, verify that the 

individual was actively participating in the 

educational process during the claimed period.

Proposed § 73.56(d)(4)(iii) would be added at 

the request of stakeholders at the public 

meetings discussed in Section IV.3 to clarify the NRC’s intent with respect to periods 

of self-employment, unemployment, or education, if the individual claims such activities 

within the periods during which the individual would be required to disclose his or 

her employment history, as specified in proposed § 73.56(h). 

The proposed paragraph would permit licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to use any reasonable means, consistent with the ‘‘best 

effort’’ criterion discussed with respect to 

proposed § 73.56(d)(4), to verify the individual’s activities during claimed periods of 

self-employment and unemployment. Reasonable means to verify the individual’s activities may include, but would not be limited to, a review of business or tax records 

documenting the individual’s self-employment, copies of unemployment compensation checks, or interviews with business associates or acquaintances. To verify education in lieu of employment, the proposed 

paragraph would require the entities who 

are subject to this section to request information from the claimed educational institution that could reflect on the individual’s 

trustworthiness and reliability. However, for 

reasons that are similar to those discussed 

with respect to proposed § 73.56(d)(4), the 

NRC recognizes that it may be difficult to 

obtain information from an educational institution about the individual’s behavior while 

a student. Therefore, the proposed paragraph would permit licensees, applicants, 

and C/Vs to verify, at a minimum, that the 

applicant was attending and actively participating in school during the claimed period(s). 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62751 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(d)(4)(iv) If a company, previous employer, or 

educational institution to whom the licensee, applicant, or C/V has directed a request for information refuses to provide information or indicates an inability or unwillingness to provide information within 3 business days of the request, the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall document this refusal, 

inability, or unwillingness in the licensee’s, 

applicant’s, or C/V’s record of the investigation, and obtain a confirmation of employment or educational enrollment and attendance from at least one alternate source, 

with questions answered to the best of the 

alternate source’s ability. This alternate 

source may not have been previously used 

by the licensee, applicant, or C/V to obtain 

information about the individual’s character 

and reputation. If the licensee, applicant, or 

C/V uses an alternate source because employment information is not forthcoming 

within 3 business days of the request, the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V need not delay 

granting unescorted access authorization to 

wait for any employer response, but shall 

evaluate and document the response if it is 

received.

Proposed § 73.56(d)(4)(iv) would further clarify 

the NRC’s intent with respect to the actions 

that licensees, applicants, and C/Vs would 

take to meet the best effort criterion in proposed § 73.56(d)(4), in response to many 

implementation questions received from licensees. The proposed paragraph would 

address circumstances in which a primary 

source of information refuses to provide 

employment information or indicates an inability or unwillingness to provide it within 3 

days of the request. Licensees and other 

entities would be required to document that 

the request for information was directed to 

the primary source and the nature of the response (i.e., a refusal, inability, or unwillingness). If a licensee, applicant, or C/V encounters such circumstances, the proposed 

paragraph would require the licensee, applicant, permit, or C/V to seek employment 

history information from an alternate 

source, to the extent of the alternate 

source’s ability to provide the information. 

An alternate source may include, but would 

not be limited to, a co-worker or supervisor 

at the same company who had personal 

knowledge of the applicant, if such an individual could be located. 

However, the proposed rule would prohibit the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V from using the 

alternate source of employment information 

to meet the requirements in proposed 

§ 73.56(d)(6) for a character reference, in 

order to ensure that the scope of the background investigation is sufficiently broad to 

provide high assurance that individuals who 

are granted UAA are trustworthy and reliable. The proposed paragraph would permit 

licensees and other entities to grant UAA, if 

warranted, when a response has been obtained from an alternate source, without 

waiting more than 3 days after the request 

for information was directed to a primary 

source. The 3-day period would be established because industry and NRC experience in implementing current § 73.56 has 

shown that if an employer or educational institution intends to respond to the request 

for information, the response will be forthcoming within this period. Therefore, there 

is no added benefit to public health and 

safety or the common defense and security 

in requiring licensees, applicants, or C/Vs to 

wait longer than 3 days before implementing the alternative methods of meeting 

the employment history evaluation requirements that would be permitted in the proposed paragraph. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62752 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

However, should the licensee, applicant, or C/ 

V receive an employer response to the request for information after the 3-day period, 

the proposed paragraph would require that 

the implications of the information must be 

evaluated with respect to the individual’s 

trustworthiness and reliability and the information documented, so that it is available 

to other licensees, applicants, and C/Vs. 

These changes would be made to reduce 

unnecessary regulatory burden while maintaining high assurance that individuals who 

are subject to an AA program are trustworthy and reliable. 

(d)(4)(v) When any licensee, applicant, or C/V 

specified in paragraph (a) of this section is 

legitimately seeking the information required 

for an unescorted access authorization decision under this section and has obtained 

a signed release from the subject individual 

authorizing the disclosure of such information, a licensee, applicant, or C/V who is 

subject to this section shall disclose whether the subject individual’s unescorted access authorization was denied or terminated unfavorably. The licensee, applicant, 

or C/V who receives the request for information shall make available the information 

upon which the denial or unfavorable termination of unescorted access authorization 

was based.

Proposed § 73.56(d)(v) would require licensees, applicants, and C/Vs who are subject 

to this section to share employment history 

information that they have collected, if contacted by another licensee, applicant, or C/ 

V who has a release signed by the individual who is applying for UAA that would 

permit the sharing of that information. This 

proposed provision would amend the requirement to release employment history information in current § 73.56(f)(2) and would 

be consistent with related requirements in 

10 CFR part 26. The proposed provision 

would also clarify that the information must 

also be released to C/Vs who have authorization to programs when the C/V has obtained the required signed release from the 

applicant. This proposed clarification is necessary because some licensees have misinterpreted current § 73.56(f)(2) as prohibiting the release of employment history information to C/Vs who administer authorization programs under this section. These requirements are necessary to ensure that 

adequate information to serve as a basis 

for UAA decisions can be obtained by a licensee, applicant, or C/V. 

(d)(4)(vi) In conducting an employment history 

evaluation, the licensee, applicant, or C/V 

may obtain information and documents by 

electronic means, including, but not limited 

to, telephone, facsimile, or email. The licensee, applicant, or C/V shall make a 

record of the contents of the telephone call 

and shall retain that record, and any documents or files obtained electronically, in accordance with paragraph (o) of this section.

Proposed § 73.56(d)(4)(vi) would permit licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to use electronic means of obtaining the employment 

history information to increase the efficiency 

with which licensees, applicants, and C/V 

could obtain the employment history information. The proposed paragraph would be 

added in response to stakeholder requests 

at the public meetings discussed in Section 

IV.3, and would be consistent with related 

requirements in 10 CFR part 26. The proposed paragraph would also add a crossreference to the applicable records retention requirement in proposed § 73.56(o) 

[Records] to ensure that licensees, applicants, and C/Vs are aware of the applicability of these requirements to the employment history information obtained electronically. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62753 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * and develop information 

concerning an individual’s * * * credit history, 

* * *.

(d)(5) Credit history evaluation. The licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph 

(a) of this section shall ensure that the full 

credit history of any individual who is applying for unescorted access authorization has 

been evaluated. A full credit history evaluation must include, but would not be limited 

to, an inquiry to detect potential fraud or 

misuse of social security numbers or other 

financial identifiers, and a review and evaluation of all of the information that is provided by a national credit-reporting agency 

about the individual’s credit history.

Proposed § 73.56(d)(5) would retain the requirement for a credit history evaluation that 

is embedded in current § 73.56(b)(2)(i) and 

provide more detailed requirements, in response to stakeholder requests at the public meetings discussed in Section IV.3. The 

proposed paragraph would require the credit history evaluation to include an inquiry to 

detect any past instances of fraud or misuse of social security numbers or other financial identifiers. This requirement would 

be added because most credit-reporting 

agencies require a specific request for this 

information before they report it, and the 

NRC has determined that instances of fraud 

or misuse of financial identifiers, such as 

social security numbers or the names that 

an individual has used, may provide important information about an individual’s trustworthiness and reliability. The proposed 

paragraph would also require the entities 

who are subject to this section to review all 

of the information that is provided by the 

national credit-reporting agency, as part of 

the background investigation process. 

The proposed paragraph would use the term, 

‘‘full’’ to convey that there is no time limit on 

the number of years of credit history information that the reviewing official would consider or other limitations on using information contained in the credit history report to 

assist in determining the individual’s trustworthiness and reliability. In the past, licensees’ AA program procedures limited 

the number of years of the individual’s credit history that reviewing officials were required to consider in determining an individual’s trustworthiness and reliability. As a result, some reviewing officials may not have 

considered credit history information for 

several years, even if the reporting agency 

provided it. As a result, individuals who 

were subject to different authorization programs were evaluated inconsistently. Furthermore, credit history reporting agencies 

also provide employment data that can be 

compared to the information disclosed by 

the applicant for UAA to validate the individual’s disclosure. However, some AA program procedures did not require the reviewing official to make this comparison. 

Therefore, the proposed paragraph would require the reviewing official to consider the 

‘‘full’’ credit history report, in order to 

strengthen the effectiveness of the credit 

history evaluation element of AA programs 

and increase the consistency with which licensees, applicants, and C/Vs would conduct the credit history evaluation. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62754 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * and develop information 

concerning an individual’s * * * character 

and reputation.

(d)(6) Character and reputation. The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall ascertain the 

character and reputation of an individual 

who has applied for unescorted access authorization by conducting reference checks. 

Reference checks may not be conducted 

with any person who is known to be a close 

member of the individual’s family, including 

but not limited to, the individual’s spouse, 

parents, siblings, or children, or any individual who resides in the individual’s permanent household. The reference checks 

must focus on the individual’s reputation for 

trustworthiness and reliability.

Proposed § 73.56(d)(6) would expand on the 

requirement in current § 73.56(b)(2)(i) for licensees to verify an individual’s character 

and reputation. The proposed provision 

would require the entities who implement 

AA programs to develop information about 

an individual’s trustworthiness and reliability 

by contacting and interviewing associates of 

the individual who would have knowledge of 

his or her character and reputation, but who 

would not be a member of the individual’s 

immediate family or reside in his or her 

household. Family and household members 

would be excluded because these individuals are typically reluctant to reveal any adverse information, if it exists. The term, 

‘‘ascertain,’’ would replace ‘‘verify,’’ in the 

proposed paragraph because it is consistent with the terminology used by the industry to refer to the actions taken with respect to determining an individual’s character and reputation and would, therefore, 

improve the clarity of this requirement for 

those who must implement it. 

In addition, there would be instances in which 

it is unnecessary for a licensee, applicant, 

or C/V to conduct the character and reputation evaluation because proposed 

§ 73.56(h)(4) would permit the entities who 

implement AA programs to rely on the 

background investigations conducted by 

other entities who are subject to this section. In such cases, the licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s reviewing official would not 

review information that was collected under 

his or her AA program, but would ascertain 

the subject individual’s character and reputation by reviewing information that had 

been collected by others. The last sentence 

of the proposed paragraph would clarify 

that the scope of the reference checks 

would be limited to developing information 

that would be useful to the reviewing official 

in determining the individual’s trustworthiness and reliability for the UAA decision. This requirement would be added in 

response to stakeholder requests at the 

public meetings discussed in Section IV.3 

for increased clarity and specificity in the 

regulation’s requirements. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62755 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * and develop information 

concerning an individual’s * * * criminal history * * *.

(d)(7) Criminal history review. The licensee’s, 

applicant’s, or C/V’s reviewing official shall 

evaluate the entire criminal history record of 

an individual who is applying for unescorted 

access authorization to assist in determining whether the individual has a record 

of criminal activity that may adversely impact his or her trustworthiness and reliability. The criminal history record must be 

obtained in accordance with the requirements of § 73.57.

Proposed § 73.56(d)(7) would amend the requirement in current § 73.56(b)(2)(i) for licensees to develop information about an individual’s criminal history. The proposed 

provision would eliminate the current requirement to develop criminal history information because proposed § 73.57 [Requirements for criminal history checks of individuals granted unescorted access to a nuclear power facility or access to Safeguards 

Information by power reactor licensees] 

would establish the methods by which 

criminal history information about individuals who are applying for UAA would be 

obtained and it is unnecessary to repeat 

those requirements in this section. The proposed paragraph would require the reviewing official to review the individual’s entire 

criminal history record. This requirement 

would be necessary because, in the past, 

some licensees limited the criminal history 

review to the individual’s history over the 

past 5 or fewer years, but did not consider 

criminal history information from earlier 

years, even if the reporting agency provided 

it. However, the NRC has determined that a 

review of all of the criminal history information that is provided in a criminal history 

record provides higher assurance that any 

instances or patterns of lawlessness are 

considered when determining whether an 

individual is trustworthy and reliable. 

Therefore, the proposed rule would incorporate this requirement in order to strengthen the effectiveness of AA programs. 

§ 73.56(d) Requirements during cold shutdown. (1) The licensee may grant unescorted 

access during cold shutdown to an individual 

who does not possess an access authorization granted in accordance with paragraph (b) 

of this section provided the licensee develops 

and incorporates into its Physical Security 

Plan measures to be taken to ensure that the 

functional capability of equipment in areas for 

which the access authorization requirement 

has been relaxed has not been impaired by 

relaxation of that requirement. (2) Prior to incorporating such measures into its Physical 

Security Plan the licensee shall submit those 

plan changes to the NRC for review and approval pursuant to § 50.90. (3) Any provisions 

in licensees’ security plans that allow for relaxation of access authorization requirements 

during cold shutdown are superseded by this 

rule. Provisions in licensees’ Physical Security Plans on April 25, 1991 that provide for 

devitalization (that is, a change from vital to 

protected area status) during cold shutdown 

are not affected.

Deleted ............................................................. Current § 73.56(d) [Requirements during cold 

shutdown] would be eliminated from the 

proposed rule. Because of an increased 

concern with a potential insider threat, as 

discussed in Section IV.3, the NRC has determined that the relaxation of UAA requirements permitted in the current provision 

does not meet the Commission’s objective 

of providing high assurance that individuals 

who have unescorted access to protected 

areas in nuclear power plants are trustworthy and reliable. Therefore, the current 

permission to grant unescorted access to 

an individual without meeting all of the requirements of proposed § 73.56 would be 

eliminated from the proposed rule. Licensees and applicants would continue to be 

permitted to seek an exemption from the requirements of proposed § 73.56 under current § 73.5 [Specific exemptions]. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62756 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(b)(2)(ii) A psychological assessment 

designed to evaluate the possible impact of 

any noted psychological characteristics which 

may have a bearing on trustworthiness and 

reliability.

(e) Psychological assessment. In order to assist in determining an individual’s trustworthiness and reliability, the licensees, applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph 

(a) of this section shall ensure that a psychological assessment has been completed 

of the individual who is applying for 

unescorted access authorization. The psychological assessment must be designed to 

evaluate the possible adverse impact of any 

noted psychological characteristics on the 

individual’s trustworthiness and reliability.

Proposed § 73.56(e) would amend current 

§ 73.56(b)(2)(ii), which requires AA programs to include a psychological assessment, by adding several requirements to 

the current rule. Because the requirements 

in the proposed rule would be more detailed, the current paragraph would be restructured and subdivided to present the 

new requirements in separate paragraphs. 

This change would be made for increased 

clarity in the organization of the rule. The 

proposed paragraph would retain the current requirement for the psychological assessment to be designed to evaluate the 

implications of the individual’s psychological 

characteristics on his or her trustworthiness 

and reliability in a separate sentence for 

clarity. For the same reason, ‘‘adverse’’

would be added to more clearly describe 

the intended purpose of the psychological 

assessment. The proposed provision would 

retain the intent of the current requirement 

for AA programs to include a psychological 

assessment, but would use the phrase, 

‘‘has been completed,’’ because licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs may not be required 

to complete the psychological assessment 

each time that an individual applies for 

UAA. 

As discussed with respect to proposed 

§ 73.56(h)(1), AA programs would be permitted to rely on psychological assessments 

that were completed by other AA programs. 

Individuals who have been subject to a psychological assessment, which was conducted in accordance with requirements of 

this proposed section and resulted in the 

granting of UAA, within the time period 

specified in the licensee’s or applicant’s 

Physical Security Plan [as discussed with 

respect to proposed § 73.56(i)(1)(v)], would 

not be required to be assessed again in 

order to be granted UAA. 

(e)(1) A licensed clinical psychologist or psychiatrist shall conduct the psychological assessment.Proposed § 73.56(e)(1) would establish minimum requirements for the credentials of individuals who perform the psychological assessments that are required under current 

§ 73.56(b)(2)(ii), which are not addressed in 

the current rule. The proposed provision 

would require a licensed clinical psychologist or psychiatrist to conduct the psychological assessment, because the extensive 

education, training, and supervised clinical 

experience that these professionals must 

possess in order to be licensed under State 

laws would provide high assurance that 

they are qualified to conduct the psychological assessments that are required under 

the rule. 

The proposed rule would impose this new requirement because of the key role that the 

psychological assessment element of AA 

programs plays in assuring the public 

health and safety and common defense and 

security when determining whether an individual is trustworthy and reliable. Therefore, 

the proposed provision would be added to 

strengthen the effectiveness of AA programs. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62757 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(e)(2) The psychological assessment must be 

conducted in accordance with the applicable ethical principles for conducting such 

assessments established by the American 

Psychological Association or American Psychiatric Association.

A new § 73.56(e)(2) would require psychological assessments to be conducted in accordance with ethical principles for conducting such assessments that are established by the American Psychological Association or the American Psychiatric Association, as applicable. In order to meet State licensure requirements, clinical psychologists 

and psychiatrists are required to practice in 

accordance with the applicable professional 

standards. However, the proposed rule 

would add a reference to these professional 

standards to emphasize the importance that 

the NRC places on the proper conduct of 

psychological assessments, in order to ensure the rights of individuals, consistent 

treatment, and the effectiveness of the psychological assessment component of AA 

programs. 

(e)(3) At a minimum, the psychological assessment must include the administration 

and interpretation of a standardized, objective, professionally accepted psychological 

test that provides information to identify indications of disturbances in personality or 

psychopathology that may have implications 

for an individual’s trustworthiness and reliability. Predetermined thresholds must be 

applied in interpreting the results of the psychological test, to determine whether an individual shall be interviewed by a psychiatrist or licensed clinical psychologist under 

paragraph (e)(4)(i) of this section.

Proposed § 73.56(e)(3) would establish new 

requirements for the psychological testing 

that licensees, applicants, and C/Vs would 

conduct as part of the psychological assessment. The proposed paragraph would 

require the administration and interpretation 

of an objective psychological test that provides information to aid in identifying personality disturbances and psychopathology. 

The proposed rule would specify psychological tests that are designed to identify indications of personality disturbances and 

psychopathology because some of these 

conditions may reflect adversely on an individual’s trustworthiness and reliability. The 

proposed rule would not prohibit the use of 

other types of psychological tests, such as 

personality inventories and tests of abilities, 

in the psychological assessment process, 

but would establish the minimum requirement for a test that identifies indications of 

personality disturbances and psychopathology because the identification of 

these conditions is most relevant to the purpose of the psychological assessment element of AA programs. The proposed provision would also require the use of standardized, objective psychological tests to reduce 

potential variability in the testing that is conducted under this section. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62758 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Decreasing potential variability in testing is 

important to provide greater assurance than 

in the past that individuals who are applying 

for or maintaining UAA are treated consistently under the proposed rule. The proposed rule would not prohibit the use of 

other types of psychological tests, such as 

projective tests, in the psychological assessment process, but would establish the 

minimum requirement for a standardized, 

objective test to facilitate the psychological 

re-assessments that would be required 

under proposed § 73.56(i)(1)(v). Comparing 

scores on a standardized, objective test to 

identify indications of any adverse changes 

in the individual’s psychological status is 

simplified when the testing that is performed for a re-assessment is similar to or 

the same as previous testing that was conducted under this section, particularly when 

the clinician who conducts the re-assessment did not conduct the previous testing. 

The proposed paragraph would also require 

licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to establish 

thresholds in interpreting the results of the 

psychological test, to aid in determining 

whether an individual would be required to 

be interviewed by a psychiatrist or licensed 

clinical psychologist under proposed paragraph (e)(4)(ii) of this section. 

The NRC is aware of substantial variability in 

the thresholds used by authorization programs in the past to determine whether an 

individual’s test results provided indications 

of personality disturbances or psychopathology. Different clinical psychologists 

providing services to the same or different 

AA programs would vary in the thresholds 

they applied in determining whether an individual’s test results indicated the need for 

further evaluation in a clinical interview. As 

a consequence, whether or not individuals 

who had the same patterns of scores on 

the psychological test would be subject to a 

clinical interview would vary both within and 

between AA programs. The proposed rule 

would add a requirement for predetermined 

thresholds to reduce this variability in order 

to protect the rights of individuals who are 

subject to AA programs to fair and consistent treatment. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62759 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(e)(4) The psychological assessment must 

include a clinical interview—

(i) If an individual’s scores on the psychological test in paragraph (e)(3) of this 

section identify indications of disturbances in personality or psychopathology that may have implications 

for an individual’s trustworthiness and 

reliability; or 

(ii) If the licensee’s or applicant’s Physical 

Security Plan requires a clinical interview based on job assignments. 

A new § 73.56(e)(4) would establish requirements for the conditions under which the 

psychological assessment must include a 

clinical interview. Proposed § 73.56(e)(4)(i) 

would require a clinical interview if an individual’s scores on the psychological test 

identified indications of disturbances in personality or psychopathology that would necessitate further assessment. The clinical 

interview would be performed by a licensed 

clinical psychologist or psychiatrist, consistent with the ethical principles for conducting psychological assessments that are 

established by the American Psychological 

Association or the American Psychiatric Association. The purposes of the clinical interview would include, but would not be limited 

to, validating the test results and assessing 

their implications for the individual’s trustworthiness and reliability. Proposed 

§ 73.56(e)(4)(ii) would also require a clinical 

interview for some individuals who would be 

identified in the licensee’s or applicant’s 

Physical Security Plan. In general, the individuals who would always receive a clinical 

interview before being granted UAA would 

be those who perform critical operational 

and security-related functions at the licensee’s site. 

The proposed requirements are necessary to 

ensure that any noted psychological characteristics of individuals who are applying 

for or maintaining UAA do not adversely affect their trustworthiness and reliability. 

(e)(5) If, in the course of conducting the psychological assessment, the licensed clinical 

psychologist or psychiatrist identifies indications of, or information related to, a medical 

condition that could adversely impact the individual’s fitness for duty or trustworthiness 

and reliability, the psychologist or psychiatrist shall inform the reviewing official, who 

shall ensure that an appropriate evaluation 

of the possible medical condition is conducted under the requirements of part 26 of 

this chapter.

A new § 73.56(e)(5) would require the psychologist or psychiatrist who conducts the 

psychological assessment to report to the 

reviewing official any information obtained 

through conducting the assessment that indicates the individual may have a medical 

condition that could adversely affect his or 

her fitness for duty or trustworthiness and 

reliability. For example, some psychological 

tests identify indications of a substance 

abuse problem. Or, an individual may disclose during the clinical interview that he or 

she is taking prescription medications that 

could cause impairment. In these instances, 

the proposed rule would require the reviewing official to ensure that the potential impact of any possible medical condition on 

the individual’s fitness for duty or trustworthiness and reliability is evaluated. The 

term, ‘‘appropriate,’’ would be used with respect to the medical evaluation to recognize 

that healthcare professionals vary in their 

qualifications. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62760 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

For example, a psychiatrist who conducts the 

assessment would be qualified to assess 

the potential impacts on an individual’s fitness for duty of any psychoactive medications the individual may be taking, whereas 

a substance abuse professional, nurse 

practitioner, or other licensed physician may 

not. The NRC is aware of instances in 

which indications of a substance problem or 

other medical condition that could adversely 

affect an individual’s fitness for duty or 

trustworthiness and reliability were identified 

during the psychological assessment, but 

were not communicated to fitness-for-duty 

program personnel and, therefore, were not 

evaluated as part of the access authorization decision. The proposed paragraph 

would be added to ensure that information 

about potential medical conditions is communicated and evaluated. This provision 

would be added to strengthen the effectiveness of the access authorization process. 

§ 73.56(b)(2)(iii) Behavioral observation, conducted by supervisors and management personnel, designed to detect individual behavioral changes which, if left unattended, could 

lead to acts detrimental to the public health 

and safety.

(f) Behavioral observation. Access authorization programs must include a behavioral observation element that is designed to detect 

behaviors or activities that may constitute 

an unreasonable risk to the health and 

safety of the public and common defense 

and security, including a potential threat to 

commit radiological sabotage.

Proposed § 73.56(f) [Behavioral observation] 

would replace current § 73.56(b)(2)(iii), 

which requires licensees’ AA programs to 

include a behavioral observation element, 

to be conducted by supervisors and management personnel, and designed to detect 

individual behavioral changes which, if left 

unattended, could lead to acts detrimental 

to the public health and safety. The proposed paragraph would amend the requirements of the current paragraph and add 

others. Proposed § 73.56(f) would amend 

the objective of the behavioral observation 

element of AA programs in the current provision. The proposed paragraph would 

eliminate the current reference to behavior 

changes which, if left unattended, could 

lead to detrimental acts. Although detecting 

and evaluating behavior changes in order to 

determine whether they may lead to acts 

detrimental to the public health and safety 

is important, the behavioral observation element of fitness-for-duty programs that is required under 10 CFR 26.22(a)(4) also addresses this objective. Therefore, the proposed paragraph would be revised, in part, 

to eliminate this redundancy. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62761 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

In addition, the current provision’s requirement for behavioral observation to focus 

only on detecting behavior changes is too 

narrow. The NRC intends that behavioral 

observation must also be conducted in 

order to increase the likelihood that potentially adverse behavior patterns and actions 

will be detected and evaluated before there 

is an opportunity for such behavior patterns 

or acts to result in detrimental consequences. For example, experience in 

other industries has shown that an individual’s unusual interest in an organization’s 

security activities and operations that are 

outside the scope of the individual’s normal 

work assignments may be an indication that 

the individual is gathering intelligence for 

adversarial purposes. If the behavioral observation element of AA programs focuses 

only on behavior changes, and an individual 

has demonstrated a pattern of ‘‘unusual interest’’ since starting work for the licensee, 

other persons who are aware of the individual’s behavior pattern may not consider the 

behavior to be a potential concern and, 

therefore, may not raise the concern. As a 

result, an opportunity to detect and evaluate 

this behavior pattern would be lost. 

Therefore, in order to increase the effectiveness of the behavioral observation element 

of AA programs and more clearly convey 

the NRC’s intent, the proposed paragraph 

would be revised to clarify that the objective 

of behavioral observation is to detect behavior or activities that have the potential to 

constitute an unreasonable risk to the 

health and safety of the public and common 

defense and security, including a potential 

threat to commit radiological sabotage. The 

portion of current § 73.56(b)(2)(iii) that addresses who must conduct behavioral observation (i.e., supervisors and management personnel) would be moved to a separate paragraph for increased organizational clarity in this section, and would be 

amended for the reasons discussed with respect to proposed § 73.56(f)(2). 

(f)(1) The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

specified in paragraph (a) of this section 

shall ensure that the individuals specified in 

paragraph (b)(1) of this section and, if applicable, (b)(2) of this section are subject to 

behavioral observation.

Proposed § 73.56(f)(1) would clarify the intent 

of the current requirement by specifying the 

individuals who must be subject to behavioral observation. The proposed paragraph 

would be added to address stakeholder requests at the public meetings discussed in 

Section IV.3, for increased specificity in the 

language of the rule. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62762 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(f)(2) The individuals specified in paragraph 

(b)(1) and, if applicable, (b)(2) of this section shall observe the behavior of other individuals. The licensees, applicants, and C/ 

Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this section 

shall ensure that individuals who are subject to this section also successfully complete behavioral observation training.

The proposed paragraph would amend the 

portion of current § 73.56(b)(2)(iii) that requires only supervisors and management 

personnel to conduct behavioral observation by requiring all individuals who are subject to an authorization program to conduct 

behavioral observation. Increasing the number of individuals who conduct behavioral 

observation would enhance the effectiveness of AA programs by increasing the likelihood of detecting behavior or activities that 

may be adverse to the safe operation and 

security of the facility and may, therefore, 

constitute an unreasonable risk to the 

health and safety and common defense and 

security. This change is necessary to address the NRC’s increased concern with a 

potential insider threat discussed in Section 

IV.3. Proposed § 73.56(f)(2) also would require licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to ensure that individuals who are subject to an 

authorization program successfully complete behavioral observation training. The 

means by which licensees, applicants, and 

C/Vs would demonstrate that an individual 

has successfully completed the training 

would be through the administration of the 

comprehensive examination discussed with 

respect to proposed § 73.56(f)(2)(iii). 

Because all individuals who are subject to the 

AA program would be required to conduct 

behavioral observation, training is necessary to ensure that individuals have the 

knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to 

do so. 

(f)(2)(i) Behavioral observation training must 

be completed before the licensee, applicant, or C/V grants an initial unescorted access authorization, as defined in paragraph 

(h)(5) of this section, and must be current 

before the licensee, applicant, or C/V grants 

an unescorted access authorization update, 

as defined in paragraph (h)(6) of this section, or an unescorted access authorization 

reinstatement, as defined in paragraph 

(h)(7) of this section; 

Proposed § 73.56(f)(2)(i) would require all personnel who are subject to this section to 

complete behavioral observation training 

before the licensee, applicant, or C/V grants 

initial unescorted access authorization to 

the individual, as defined in proposed paragraph (h)(5) [Initial unescorted access authorization]. The proposed rule would also 

require that an individual’s training must be 

current before the licensee, applicant, or C/ 

V grants an unescorted access authorization update or reinstatement to the individual, as defined in proposed paragraphs 

(h)(6) [Updated unescorted access authorization] and (h)(7) [Reinstatement of 

unescorted access authorization reinstatement] of this section, respectively. Annual 

refresher training, which would be the 

means by which licensees, applicants, and 

C/Vs would meet the requirement for training to be ‘‘current,’’ would be addressed in 

proposed § 73.56(f)(2)(ii). 

The proposed requirement to complete behavioral observation training before initial 

unescorted access authorization is granted 

is necessary to ensure that individuals have 

the knowledge, skills, and abilities required 

to meet their responsibilities for conducting 

behavioral observation under proposed 

paragraph (f)(2)(i). The basis for requiring 

refresher training is discussed with respect 

to proposed paragraph (f)(2)(ii) of this section. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62763 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(f)(2)(ii) Individuals shall complete refresher 

training on a nominal 12-month frequency, 

or more frequently where the need is indicated. Individuals may take and pass a 

comprehensive examination that meets the 

requirements of paragraph (f)(2)(iii) of this 

section in lieu of completing annual refresher training; 

Proposed § 73.45(f)(2)(ii) would require annual refresher training in behavioral observation, at a minimum, with more frequent 

refresher training when the need is indicated. The proposed paragraph would require annual or more frequent refresher 

training in order to ensure that individuals 

retain the knowledge, skills, and abilities 

gained through initial training. Refresher 

training may also be necessary if an individual demonstrates a failure to implement 

behavioral observation requirements in accordance with AA program procedures or 

new information is added to the behavioral 

observation training curriculum. 

The proposed paragraph would also permit individuals who pass a comprehensive ‘‘challenge’’ examination that demonstrates their 

continued understanding of behavioral observation to be excused from the refresher 

training that would otherwise be required 

under the proposed paragraph. The proposed rule would require that the ‘‘challenge’’ examination must meet the examination requirements specified in proposed 

paragraph (f)(2)(iii) of this section and individuals who did not pass would undergo remedial training. Permitting individuals to 

pass a comprehensive ‘‘challenge’’ examination rather than take refresher training 

each year would ensure that they are retaining their knowledge, skills, and abilities 

while reducing some costs associated with 

meeting the annual refresher training requirement. 

(f)(2)(iii) Individuals shall demonstrate the successful completion of behavioral observation training by passing a comprehensive 

examination that addresses the knowledge 

and abilities necessary to detect behavior 

or activities that have the potential to constitute an unreasonable risk to the health 

and safety of the public and common defense and security, including a potential 

threat to commit radiological sabotage. Remedial training and re-testing are required 

for individuals who fail to satisfactorily complete the examination. 

Proposed § 73.56(f)(2)(iii) would require individuals to demonstrate that they have successfully completed behavioral observation 

training by passing a comprehensive examination. The proposed provision would require remedial training and re-testing for individuals who fail to achieve a passing 

score on the examination. These proposed 

requirements would be modeled on other 

required training programs that have been 

successful in ensuring that examinations 

are valid and individuals have achieved an 

adequate understanding of the subject matter. 

(f)(2)(iv) Initial and refresher training may be 

delivered using a variety of media (including, but not limited to, classroom lectures, 

required reading, video, or computer-based 

training systems). The licensee, applicant, 

or C/V shall monitor the completion of training. 

Proposed § 73.56(f)(2)(iv) would permit the 

use of various media for administering training in order to achieve the efficiencies associated with computer-based training, for 

example, and other new training delivery 

technologies that may become available. 

Permitting the use of various media to administer the training would improve the efficiency of AA programs and reduce regulatory burden, by providing flexibility in the 

methods that licensees and other entities 

may use to administer the required training. 

The proposed paragraph would also require 

the completion of training to be monitored 

by the licensee, applicant, or C/V. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62764 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

This requirement is necessary to ensure that 

individuals who are subject to an authorization program actively participate in and receive the required training. The NRC is 

aware that some individuals have engaged 

in successful litigation against licensees on 

the basis that they were not aware of the 

requirements to which they were subject, in 

part, because of deficiencies in licensee 

processes for ensuring that individuals are 

trained. Therefore, the proposed rule would 

add this requirement to improve the effectiveness of the training element of AA programs. 

(f)(3) Individuals who are subject to an authorization program under this section shall report to the reviewing official any concerns 

arising from behavioral observation, including, but not limited to, concerns related to 

any questionable behavior patterns or activities of others.

Proposed § 73.56(f)(3) would require individuals to report any concerns arising from behavioral observation to the licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s reviewing official. This 

specificity is necessary because the NRC is 

aware of past instances in which individuals 

reported concerns to supervisors or other licensee personnel who did not then inform 

the reviewing official of the concern. As a 

result, the concern was not addressed and 

any implications of the concern for the individual’s trustworthiness and reliability were 

not evaluated. 

Therefore, the proposed rule would require individuals to report directly to the reviewing 

official, to ensure that the reviewing official 

is made aware of the concern, has the opportunity to evaluate it, and determine 

whether to grant, maintain, administratively 

withdraw, deny, or terminate UAA. The proposed provision would be added to clarify 

and strengthen the behavioral observation 

element of AA programs by increasing the 

likelihood that questionable behaviors or activities are appropriately addressed by the 

licensees and other entities who are subject 

to the rule. 

(g) Arrest reporting. Any individual who has 

applied for or is maintaining unescorted access authorization under this section shall 

promptly report to the reviewing official any 

formal action(s) taken by a law enforcement 

authority or court of law to which the individual has been subject, including an arrest, 

an indictment, the filing of charges, or a 

conviction. On the day that the report is received, the reviewing official shall evaluate 

the circumstances related to the formal action(s) and determine whether to grant, 

maintain, administratively withdraw, deny, 

or unfavorably terminate the individual’s 

unescorted access authorization.

A new § 73.56(g) would establish requirements related to the arrest, indictment, filing 

of charges, or conviction of any individual 

who is applying for or maintaining UAA 

under this section. The proposed paragraph 

would require individuals to promptly report 

to the reviewing official any such formal action(s) to ensure that the reviewing official 

has an opportunity to evaluate the implications of the formal action(s) with respect to 

the individual’s trustworthiness and reliability. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62765 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

The proposed rule includes other provisions 

that would also ensure that the reviewing 

official is aware of and evaluates the implications of any formal action(s) to which an 

individual may be subject, including the requirement for a criminal history review 

under proposed § 73.56(d)(7) and regular 

updates to the criminal history review under 

proposed § 73.56(i)(1)(v). However, these 

proposed provisions would not provide for 

prompt evaluation of any formal action(s) 

that arise in the intervening time period 

since a criminal history review was last conducted. Therefore, this requirement would 

be added to ensure that the reviewing official is made aware of formal actions at the 

time that they occur, has the opportunity to 

evaluate the implications of these formal 

actions with respect to the individual’s trustworthiness and reliability, and, if necessary, 

take timely action to deny or unfavorably 

terminate the individual’s UAA, if the reviewing official determines that the formal 

actions cast doubt on the individual’s trustworthiness and reliability. The proposed 

rule would also specifically require the formal action(s) to be reported to the licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s reviewing official. 

This specificity is necessary because the 

NRC is aware of past instances in which individuals reported formal actions to supervisors who did not then inform the reviewing official. As a result, some individuals 

were granted or maintained UAA without 

the high assurance that they are trustworthy 

and reliable that AA programs must provide, as discussed with respect to proposed 

§ 73.56(c) [General performance objective]. 

Therefore, a specific requirement for individuals to report directly to the reviewing official is necessary to ensure that the reviewing official is aware of the actions, has the 

opportunity to evaluate the circumstances 

surrounding the actions, and determine 

whether to grant, maintain, administratively 

withdraw, deny, or terminate UAA. The proposed paragraph would not establish a specific time limit within which an individual 

would be required to report a formal action 

because the time frames within which different formal actions occur may vary widely, 

depending on the nature of the formal action and characteristics of the locality in 

which the formal action is taken. However, 

nothing in the proposed provision would 

prohibit licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

from establishing, in program procedures, 

reporting time limits that are appropriate for 

their local circumstances. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62766 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

The proposed rule would use the term, 

‘‘promptly,’’ to clarify the NRC’s intent that 

individuals are responsible for reporting any 

formal action(s) of the type specified in the 

proposed paragraph without delay. The proposed paragraph would also require the reviewing official to evaluate the circumstances related to the formal action and 

decide whether to grant, maintain, administratively withdraw, deny, or unfavorably terminate the individual’s UAA on the day that 

he or she receives the report of an arrest, 

indictment, the filing of charges, or conviction. The proposed requirement is necessary because the NRC is aware of past 

instances in which reviewing officials have 

been informed of a formal action, but have 

not acted promptly to evaluate the information and determine its implications with respect to the individual’s trustworthiness and 

reliability. As a result, some individuals 

were granted or maintained UAA without 

the high assurance that they are trustworthy 

and reliable that AA programs must provide, as discussed with respect to proposed 

§ 73.56(c) [General performance objective]. 

The proposed paragraph would provide for 

the administrative withdrawal of UAA without a positive determination that the individual is trustworthy and reliable (which 

would permit the granting or maintaining of 

UAA) or a negative determination of the individual’s trustworthiness and reliability 

(which would require the denial or unfavorable termination of UAA), because the reviewing official may not have sufficient information on the day that the report is received to make the determination. However, 

if, based on the information available to the 

reviewing official, he or she is unable to 

make either a positive or negative determination, the proposed rule would require 

the administrative withdrawal of UAA until 

such a determination can be made. The administrative withdrawal of the individual’s 

UAA would be necessary to protect public 

health and safety and the common defense 

and security when the trustworthiness and 

reliability of an individual cannot be positively determined. 

§ 73.56(c) Existing, reinstated, transferred, 

and temporary access authorization. (1) Individuals who have had an uninterrupted 

unescorted access authorization for at least 

180 days on April 25, 1991 need not be further evaluated. Such individuals shall be subject to the behavioral observation requirements of this section.

(c)(1) Deleted ................................................... The proposed rule would eliminate current 

§ 73.56(c)(1), which permitted individuals 

who had an uninterrupted unescorted access authorization for at least 180 days on 

April 25, 1991, to retain unescorted access 

authorization and required them to be subject to behavioral observation. The current 

paragraph would be eliminated because 

these requirements no longer apply. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62767 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(c) Existing, reinstated, transferred, 

and temporary access authorization.

(h) Granting unescorted access authorization. 

The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall 

implement the requirements of this paragraph for granting initial unescorted access 

authorization, updated unescorted access 

authorization, and reinstatement of 

unescorted access authorization.

Proposed § 73.56(h) would replace and 

amend current § 73.56(c), which permits AA 

programs to specify conditions for reinstating an interrupted UAA, for transferring 

UAA from another licensee, and for permitting temporary UAA. As discussed in Section IV.3, the requirements in proposed 

§ 73.56 are based upon several fundamental changes to the NRC’s approach to 

access authorization since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and an increased concern for an active or passive insider who may collude with adversaries to 

commit radiological sabotage. 

The primary concern, which many of the 

amendments to § 73.56 are designed to address, is the necessity of increasing the 

rigor of the access authorization process to 

provide high assurance that any individual 

who is granted and maintains UAA is trustworthy and reliable. Proposed § 73.56(h) 

would identify three categories of proposed 

requirements for granting UAA: (1) Initial 

unescorted access authorization, (2) updated unescorted access authorization, and 

(3) reinstatement of unescorted access authorization. The proposed categories, which 

are based upon whether an individual who 

has applied for UAA has previously held 

UAA under § 73.56 and the length of time 

that has elapsed since the individual’s last 

period of UAA ended, would be defined in 

proposed § 73.56(h)(5) [Initial unescorted 

access authorization], proposed 

§ 73.56(h)(6) [Updated unescorted access 

authorization], and proposed § 73.56(h)(7) 

[Reinstatement of unescorted access authorization]. 

Proposed § 73.56(h) would direct licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs to use the criteria for 

granting UAA that are found in proposed 

§ 73.56(h)(5), (h)(6), and (h)(7), depending 

on which of the proposed paragraphs would 

apply to the individual seeking UAA. Current § 73.56 permits authorization programs 

to specify conditions for reinstating an interrupted UAA or transferring UAA from another licensee, but it does not use the concepts of ‘‘initial unescorted access authorization,’’ ‘‘updated unescorted access authorization,’’ or ‘‘reinstatement of 

unescorted access authorization.’’ These 

concepts would be used in proposed 

§ 73.56 to focus the requirements for UAA 

more precisely on whether the individual 

has established a ‘‘track record’’ in the industry, and to specify the amount of original 

information-gathering that licensees, applicants, and C/Vs would be required to perform, based on whether previous AA programs have collected information about the 

individual. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62768 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

For individuals who have established a favorable track record in the industry, the steps 

that licensees, applicants, and C/Vs would 

complete in order to grant UAA to an individual would also depend upon the length 

of time that has elapsed since the individual’s last period of UAA was terminated and 

the amount of supervision to which the individual was subject during the interruption. 

(the term, ‘‘interruption,’’ refers to the interval of time between periods during which 

an individual maintains UAA under § 73.56 

and will be discussed in reference to 

§ 73.56 (h)(4)). In general, the more time 

that has elapsed since an individual’s last 

period of UAA ended, the more steps that 

the proposed rule would require licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs to complete before 

granting UAA to the individual. However, if 

the individual was subject to AA program 

elements in the recent past, the proposed 

rule would require licensees, applicants, 

and C/Vs to complete fewer steps in order 

to grant UAA to the individual. Individuals 

who have established a favorable work history in the industry have demonstrated their 

trustworthiness and reliability from previous 

periods of UAA, so they pose less potential 

risk to public health and safety and the 

common defense and security than individuals who are new to the industry. 

Much is known about these individuals. Not 

only were they subject to the initial background investigation requirements before 

they were initially granted UAA, but, while 

they were working under an AA program, 

they were watched carefully through ongoing behavioral observation, and demonstrated the ability to consistently comply 

with the many procedural requirements that 

are necessary to perform work safely at nuclear power plants. Therefore, the proposed 

rule would decrease the unnecessary regulatory burden associated with granting UAA 

under § 73.56 by reducing the steps that AA 

programs would be required to take in order 

to grant UAA to such individuals. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62769 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(h)(1) Accepting unescorted access authorization from other authorization programs. Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs who are 

seeking to grant unescorted access authorization to an individual who is subject to another authorization program that complies 

with this section may rely on the program 

elements completed by the transferring authorization program to satisfy the requirements of this section. An individual may 

maintain his or her unescorted access authorization if he or she continues to be subject to either the receiving licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s authorization program or 

the transferring licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/ 

V’s authorization program, or a combination 

of elements from both programs that collectively satisfy the requirements of this section. The receiving authorization program 

shall ensure that the program elements 

maintained by the transferring program remain current.

Proposed § 73.56(h)(1) would permit licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to rely upon the 

authorization programs and program elements of other licensees, applicants or C/ 

Vs, as well as other authorization programs 

and program elements that meet the requirements of proposed § 73.56, to meet 

the requirements of this section for granting 

and maintaining UAA. Proposed 

§ 73.56(h)(1) would update the terminology 

used in current § 73.56(a)(4), which states 

that licensees may accept an AA program 

used by its C/Vs or other organizations provided it meets the requirements of this section. The proposed paragraph would also 

modify current § 73.56(c)(2), which permits 

AA programs to specify conditions for transferring UAA from one licensee to another. 

The proposed paragraph would require the 

AA program who is receiving an unescorted 

access authorization that was granted 

under another AA program to ensure that 

each of the AA program elements to which 

individuals must be subject, such as behavioral observation training and psychological 

re-assessments, remain current, including 

situations in which the individual is subject 

to a combination of program elements that 

are administered separately by the receiving and transferring AA programs. 

The proposed paragraph would increase the 

specificity of the requirements that must be 

met by licensees, applicants, or C/Vs for 

granting UAA and establish detailed minimum standards that all programs must 

meet. These proposed detailed minimum 

standards are designed to address recent 

changes in industry practices that have resulted in a more transient workforce, as discussed in Section IV.3. The authorization 

programs of licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

would be substantially more consistent than 

in the past under these proposed detailed 

standards. Therefore, permitting licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs to rely on other AA 

programs to meet the proposed rule’s requirements is reasonable and appropriate. 

In addition, the proposed provisions would 

reduce unnecessary regulatory burden by 

eliminating redundancies in the steps required to grant UAA to an individual who is 

transferring from one program to another. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62770 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(h)(2) Information sharing. To meet the requirements of this section, licensees, applicants, and C/Vs may rely upon the information that other licensees, applicants, and 

C/Vs who are subject to this section have 

gathered about individuals who have previously applied for unescorted access authorization and developed about individuals 

during periods in which the individuals 

maintained unescorted access authorization.

A new § 73.56(h)(2) would permit licensees 

and other entities to rely upon information 

that was gathered by previous licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs to meet the requirements of this section. Because information 

will be shared among licensees, applicants, 

and C/Vs, this proposed provision would 

substantially decrease the likelihood that an 

individual would be inadvertently granted 

UAA by another licensee after having his or 

her UAA denied or unfavorably terminated 

under another program. It also recognizes 

that there have been changes in staffing 

practices at power reactors, including a 

greater reliance on personnel transfers and 

temporary work forces, as discussed in detail in Section IV.3. For individuals who 

have previously been evaluated under an 

authorization program, were granted UAA 

within the past 3 years, and successfully 

maintained UAA, this proposed provision 

would eliminate the need to repeat efforts 

that were completed as part of the prior access authorization process, thereby saving 

substantial duplication of effort and expenditure of resources. The proposed provision 

would work in conjunction with proposed 

§ 73.56(o)(6), which would require a mechanism for information sharing. 

The provision is consistent with the recent access authorization orders and with NRC-endorsed guidance, as well as current industry practices. 

(h)(3) Requirements applicable to all 

unescorted access authorization categories. 

Before granting unescorted access authorization to individuals in any category, including individuals whose unescorted access authorization has been interrupted for 

a period of 30 or fewer days, the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V shall ensure that—

Proposed § 73.56(h)(3) would establish requirements that the licensee, applicant, or 

C/V would be required to meet before 

granting UAA to individuals in any of the 

categories described in paragraphs (h)(5), 

(h)(6), or (h)(7) of this section, including individuals whose UAA has been interrupted 

for a period of 30 or fewer days. The proposed paragraph would clearly specify that 

the requirements for granting UAA contained in the paragraph are intended to be 

applied without exceptions to individuals in 

the specified categories. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62771 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(h)(3)(i) The individual’s written consent 

to conduct a background investigation, 

if necessary, has been obtained and 

the individual’s true identity has been 

verified, in accordance with paragraphs 

(d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section, respectively; 

(ii) A credit history evaluation or re-evaluation has been completed in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (d)(5) or (i)(1)(v) of this section, 

as applicable; 

(iii) The individual’s character and reputation have been ascertained, in accordance with paragraph (d)(6) of this section; 

(iv) The individual’s criminal history 

record has been obtained and reviewed or updated, in accordance with 

paragraphs (d)(7) and (i)(1)(v) of this 

section, as applicable; 

(v) A psychological assessment or reassessment of the individual has been 

completed in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (e) or 

(i)(1)(v) of this section, as applicable; 

(vi) The individual has successfully completed the initial or refresher, as applicable, behavioral observation training 

that is required under paragraph (f) of 

this section; and 

Proposed § 73.46(h)(3)(i) through (h)(3)(vii) 

would specify the steps required to grant 

UAA to any individual. The proposed paragraph would require licensees, applicants, 

and C/Vs to ensure that the individual’s 

written consent for the background investigation in proposed paragraph (h)(3)(i) of 

this section has been obtained; complete a 

verification of the individual’s true identity in 

proposed (h)(3)(ii) of this section; ensure 

completion of the credit history evaluation 

or re-evaluation, as applicable, in proposed 

paragraph (h)(3)(ii) of this section; ensure 

completion of the reference checks required 

to ascertain the individual’s character and 

reputation in proposed paragraph (h)(3)(iii) 

of this section; ensure completion of the initial or updated criminal history review, as 

applicable, in proposed paragraph (h)(3)(iv) 

of this section; ensure completion of the 

psychological assessment or re-assessment, as applicable, in proposed paragraph 

(h)(3)(v) of this section; ensure completion 

of initial or refresher training in proposed 

paragraph (h)(3)(vi) of this section; and ensure that the individual has been informed, 

in writing, or his or her arrest-reporting responsibilities in paragraph (h)(3)(vii) of this 

section. 

(vii) The individual has been informed, in 

writing, of his or her arrest-reporting responsibilities under paragraph (g) of 

this section. 

The bases for each of the proposed requirements listed in proposed § 73.56(h)(3)(i) 

through (h)(3)(vii) are discussed in detail 

with respect to proposed § 73.56(d)(2), 

(d)(3), (d)(5) through (d)(7), and (e) through 

(g), respectively. The bases for the proposed requirements for updates to the credit history evaluation, criminal history review, 

and psychological assessment are discussed with respect to proposed 

§ 73.56(i)(1)(v). The requirements that authorization programs would be required to 

meet in order to grant UAA to individuals in 

every access authorization category would 

be listed in these paragraphs, in response 

to stakeholder requests at the public meetings discussed in Section IV.3 for increased 

clarity in the organizational structure of requirements for granting UAA. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62772 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(h)(4) Interruptions in unescorted access authorization. For individuals who have previously held unescorted access authorization under this section but whose 

unescorted access authorization has since 

been terminated under favorable conditions, 

the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall implement the requirements in this paragraph for 

initial unescorted access authorization in 

paragraph (h)(5) of this section, updated 

unescorted access authorization in paragraph (h)(6) of this section, or reinstatement 

of unescorted access authorization in paragraph (h)(7) of this section, based upon the 

total number of days that the individual’s 

unescorted access authorization has been 

interrupted, to include the day after the individual’s last period of unescorted access 

authorization was terminated and the intervening days until the day upon which the licensee, applicant, or C/V grants unescorted 

access authorization to the individual. If potentially disqualifying information is disclosed or discovered about an individual, licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall take 

additional actions, as specified in the licensee’s or applicant’s physical security plan, in 

order to grant or maintain the individual’s 

unescorted access authorization.

Proposed § 73.56(h)(4) would describe the 

term ‘‘interruption,’’ which would be used in 

proposed § 73.56(h)(5) [Initial unescorted 

access authorization], proposed 

§ 73.56(h)(6) [Updated unescorted access 

authorization], and proposed § 73.56(h)(7) 

and § 73.56(h)(8) [Reinstatement of 

unescorted access authorization] to refer to 

the interval of time between periods during 

which an individual holds UAA under 

§ 73.56. Licensees, applicants, or C/Vs 

would calculate an interruption in UAA as 

the total number of days falling between the 

day upon which the individual’s last period 

of UAA or UA ended and the day upon 

which the licensee, applicant, or C/V grants 

UAA to the individual. This change would 

be made to enhance and clarify the access 

authorization requirement in current 

§ 73.56(c)(2), which does not define the 

meaning of the term ‘‘interrupted access 

authorization.’’

(h)(5) Initial unescorted access authorization. 

Before granting unescorted access authorization to an individual who has never held 

unescorted access authorization under this 

section or whose unescorted access authorization has been interrupted for a period 

of 3 years or more and whose last period of 

unescorted access authorization was terminated under favorable conditions, the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall ensure that 

an employment history evaluation has been 

completed in accordance with paragraph 

(d)(4) of this section. The period of the employment history that the individual shall 

disclose, and the licensee, applicant, or C/V 

shall evaluate, must be the past 3 years or 

since the individual’s eighteenth birthday, 

whichever is shorter. For the 1-year period 

immediately preceding the date upon which 

the individual applies for unescorted access 

authorization, the licensee, applicant, or C/ 

V shall ensure that the employment history 

evaluation is conducted with every employer, regardless of the length of employment.

A new § 73.56(h)(5) [Initial unescorted access 

authorization] would establish the category 

of ‘‘initial unescorted access authorization’’

requirements to apply both to individuals 

who have not previously held UAA under 

this section and those whose UAA has 

been interrupted for a period of 3 or more 

years and whose last period of UAA ended 

favorably. In general, the longer the period 

of time since the individual’s last period of 

UAA ended, the greater the possibility that 

the individual may have undergone significant changes in lifestyle or character that 

would diminish his or her trustworthiness 

and reliability. Therefore, this paragraph 

would require an individual who has not 

been subject to an AA program for 3 or 

more years to undergo the same full and 

extensive screening to which an individual 

who has never held UAA would be subject. 

The proposed paragraph would require the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V, before granting 

UAA to an individual, to complete an evaluation of the individual’s employment history over the past 3 years. The 3-year time 

period to be addressed in the employment 

history evaluation would be consistent with 

requirements established in the access authorization orders issued by the NRC to nuclear power plant licensees on January 7, 

2003, as discussed in Section IV.3. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62773 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

For the remaining 2-year period, the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V shall ensure that the employment history evaluation is conducted 

with the employer by whom the individual 

claims to have been employed the longest 

within each calendar month, if the individual 

claims employment during the given calendar month.

In addition, this 3-year time period has been 

used successfully within AA programs since 

§ 73.56 was first promulgated and has met 

the NRC’s goal of ensuring that individuals 

who are granted UAA are trustworthy and 

reliable. Therefore, the 3-year time period 

would be retained in proposed § 73.56. The 

employment history evaluation would focus 

on the individual’s employment record during the year preceding his or her application 

for UAA by requiring licensees, applicants, 

and C/Vs to make a ‘‘best effort,’’ as described with respect to proposed 

§ 73.56(d)(4), to obtain and evaluate employment history information from every employer by whom the individual claims to 

have been employed during the year. The 

proposed rule would require this focus on 

the year preceding the individual’s application for UAA because the individual’s employment history during the past year provides current information related to the individual’s trustworthiness and reliability. For 

the earlier 2 years of the employment history period, the proposed paragraph would 

require the licensee, applicant, or C/V to 

conduct the employment history with every 

employer by whom the applicant claims to 

have been employed the longest within 

each calendar month that would fall within 

that 2-year period. 

The proposed provision would permit this 

‘‘sampling’’ approach to the employment 

history evaluation for the earlier 2-year period because industry experience has 

shown that employers are often reluctant to 

disclose adverse information to other private employers about former employees, 

and that the longer it has been since an individual was employed, the less likely it is 

that a former employer will disclose useful 

information. Experience implementing AA 

programs has also shown that the shorter 

the time period during which an individual 

was employed by an employer, the less 

likely it is that the employer retains any 

useful information related to the individual’s 

trustworthiness and reliability. Therefore, 

the proposed paragraph would not require 

licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to conduct 

the employment history evaluation with 

every employer by whom the individual 

claims to have been employed, but, rather, 

to contact only the employer by whom the 

individual claims to have been employed 

the longest within each calendar month that 

falls within that 2-year period (i.e., the 

‘‘given’’ calendar month). Contacting these 

employers would increase the likelihood 

that the employers would have knowledge 

of the applicant and would be willing to disclose it. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62774 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(h)(6) Updated unescorted access authorization. Before granting unescorted access authorization to an individual whose 

unescorted access authorization has been 

interrupted for more than 365 days but 

fewer than 3 years and whose last period of 

unescorted access authorization was terminated under favorable conditions, the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall ensure that 

an employment history evaluation has been 

completed in accordance with paragraph 

(d)(4) of this section. The period of the employment history that the individual shall 

disclose, and the licensee, applicant, or C/V 

shall evaluate, must be the period since 

unescorted access authorization was last 

terminated, up to and including the day the 

applicant applies for updated unescorted 

access authorization. For the 1-year period 

immediately preceding the date upon which 

the individual applies for unescorted access 

authorization, the licensee, applicant, or C/ 

V shall ensure that the employment history 

evaluation is conducted with every employer, regardless of the length of employment.

Proposed § 73.56(h)(6) [Updated unescorted 

access authorization] would establish a category of ‘‘updated unescorted access authorization’’ to apply to individuals whose 

UAA has been interrupted for more than 

365 days but less than 3 years and whose 

last period of UAA was terminated favorably. The proposed requirements for granting updated UAA would be less stringent 

than the proposed requirements for granting 

initial UAA. The proposed requirements 

would be less stringent because the individual who is applying for updated UAA 

would have a more recent ‘‘track record’’ of 

successful performance within the industry. 

Also the licensee, applicant, or C/V would 

have access to information about the individual seeking UAA from the licensee, applicant, or C/V who last granted UAA to the 

individual as a result of the increased information-sharing requirements of the proposed rule. However, the licensee, applicant, or C/V would not have information 

about the individual’s activities from the period during which the individual’s UAA was 

interrupted. Therefore, the proposed rule’s 

requirements for updated UAA would focus 

on gathering and evaluating information 

from the interruption period. 

For the remaining period since unescorted access authorization was last terminated, the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V shall ensure that 

the employment history evaluation is conducted with the employer by whom the individual claims to have been employed the 

longest within each calendar month, if the 

individual claims employment during the 

given calendar month.

For example, in the case of an individual 

whose last period of UAA ended 2 years 

ago, the licensee, applicant or C/V would 

gather information about the individual’s activities within the 2-year interruption period. 

Similarly, if an individual’s last period of 

UAA ended 13 months ago, the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V would gather information 

about the individual’s activities within the 

past 13 months. For the reasons discussed 

with respect to proposed § 73.56(h)(5), the 

proposed paragraph would require the employment history evaluation to be conducted 

with every employer in the year preceding 

the individual’s application for updated 

UAA, and to contact only the employer by 

whom the individual claims to have been 

employed the longest within any earlier calendar month (i.e., the ‘‘given’’ calendar 

month) that would fall within the interruption 

period. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62775 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(h)(7) Reinstatement of unescorted access 

authorization (31 to 365 days). In order to 

grant authorization to an individual whose 

unescorted access authorization has been 

interrupted for a period of more than 30 

days but no more than 365 days and 

whose last period of unescorted access authorization was terminated under favorable 

conditions, the licensee, applicant, or C/V 

shall ensure that an employment history 

evaluation has been completed in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 

(d)(4) of this section within 5 business days 

of reinstating unescorted access authorization. The period of the employment history 

that the individual shall disclose, and the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall evaluate, 

must be the period since the individual’s 

unescorted access authorization was terminated, up to and including the day the applicant applies for reinstatement of 

unescorted access authorization. The licensee, applicant, or C/V shall ensure that 

the employment history evaluation has 

been conducted with the employer by 

whom the individual claims to have been 

employed the longest within the calendar 

month, if the individual claims employment 

during a given calendar month.

Proposed § 73.56(h)(7) [Reinstatement of 

unescorted access authorization] would establish a category of ‘‘reinstatement of 

unescorted access authorization,’’ which 

would apply to individuals whose UAA has 

been interrupted for a period of more than 

30 days but no more than 365 days and 

whose last period of UAA was terminated 

favorably. The proposed steps for reinstating an individual’s UAA after an interruption of 365 or fewer days would be less 

stringent than those required for initial UAA 

or an updated UAA. This is because these 

individuals have a recent, positive ‘‘track 

record’’ within the industry and that record 

provides evidence that the risk to public 

health and safety or the common defense 

and security posed by a less rigorous employment history evaluation is acceptable. 

The proposed paragraph would limit the period of time to be addressed in the employment history to the period of the interruption 

in UAA and require that the employment 

history evaluation must be conducted with 

the employer by whom the individual claims 

to have been employed the longest within 

each calendar month, if the individual 

claims employment during a given calendar 

month. 

If the employment history evaluation is not 

completed within 5 business days due to 

circumstances that are outside of the licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s control and 

the licensee, applicant, or C/V is not aware 

of any potentially disqualifying information 

regarding the individual within the past 5 

years, the licensee, applicant, or C/V may 

maintain the individual’s unescorted access 

authorization for an additional 5 business 

days. If the employment history evaluation 

is not completed within 10 business days of 

reinstating unescorted access authorization, 

the licensee, applicant, or C/V may maintain the individual’s unescorted access authorization for an additional 5 business 

days. If the employment history evaluation 

is not completed within 10 business days of 

reinstating unescorted access authorization, 

the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall administratively withdraw the individual’s 

unescorted access authorization until the 

employment history evaluation is completed.

An employment history for earlier periods of 

time would be unnecessary because the 

granting licensee, applicant, or C/V would 

have access to information about the individual from the licensee, applicant, or C/V 

who had recently terminated the individual’s 

UAA. However, the licensee, applicant, or 

C/V would not have information about the 

individual’s activities during the period of 

interruption, so the proposed rule’s requirements for reinstating UAA would focus on 

gathering and evaluating information only 

from the interruption period. By contrast to 

the proposed requirements for an initial 

UAA and an updated UAA, proposed 

§ 73.56(h)(7) would permit the licensee, applicant, or C/V to reinstate an individual’s 

UAA without first completing the employment history evaluation. As would be required for an updated UAA, the proposed 

rule would limit the period of time to be addressed by the employment history evaluation to the interruption period. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62776 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

However, the proposed paragraph would permit the licensee, applicant, or C/V to reinstate the individual’s UAA before completing the employment history evaluation 

because these individuals have a recent, 

positive track record within the industry and 

that record demonstrates that they would 

pose an acceptable risk to public health 

and safety or the common defense and security. If the employment history evaluation 

is not completed within the 5-day period 

permitted, the proposed paragraph would 

permit the licensee, applicant, or C/V to 

maintain the individual’s UAA for up to 10 

days following the day upon which UAA 

was reinstated, but only if the licensee, applicant, or C/V is unaware of any potentially 

disqualifying information about the individual. If the employment history evaluation 

is not completed within the 10 days permitted, the proposed paragraph would require the licensee, applicant, or C/V to administratively withdraw the individual’s UAA 

until the employment history evaluation is 

completed. The proposed rule would not 

establish employment history requirements 

for individuals whose UAA has been interrupted for 30 or fewer days. 

Proposed § 73.56(h)(3) would require the entities who are subject to this section to obtain 

and review a personal history disclosure 

from the applicant for UAA that would address the period since the individual’s last 

period of UAA was terminated. However, 

the licensee, applicant, or C/V would be 

permitted to forego conducting an employment history evaluation for individuals 

whose UAA has been interrupted for such a 

short period, because there would be little 

to be learned. 

§ 73.56(b)(3) The licensee shall base its decision to grant, deny, revoke, or continue an 

unescorted access authorization on review 

and evaluation of all pertinent information developed.

(h)(8) Determination basis. The licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s reviewing official shall determine whether to grant, deny, unfavorably 

terminate, or maintain or amend an individual’s unescorted access authorization status, based on an evaluation of all pertinent 

information that has been gathered about 

the individual as a result of any application 

for unescorted access authorization or developed during or following in any period 

during which the individual maintained 

unescorted access authorization.

Proposed § 73.56(h)(8) would amend but retain the meaning of current § 73.56(b)(3), 

which requires licensees to base a decision 

to grant, deny, revoke, or continue UAA on 

review and evaluation of all pertinent information developed. The terms used in the 

proposed paragraph, such as ‘‘unfavorably 

terminate’’ to replace ‘‘revoke’’ and ‘‘maintain’’ to replace ‘‘continue,’’ would be updated for consistency with the terms currently used by the industry and in other portions of the proposed section. In addition, 

the proposed paragraph would include references to the reviewing official, rather than 

the licensee, to convey more accurately 

that the only individual who is authorized to 

make access authorization decisions under 

this section is the designated reviewing official. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62777 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

The licensee’s, applicant’s or C/V’s reviewing 

official may not determine whether to grant 

unescorted access authorization to an individual or maintain an individual’s 

unescorted access authorization until all of 

the required information has been provided 

to the reviewing official and he or she determines that the accumulated information 

supports a positive finding of trustworthiness and reliability.

The terms, ‘‘all pertinent’’ and ‘‘accumulated 

information,’’ would be used in the proposed paragraph because some of the information that a reviewing official must have 

before making a determination is gathered 

under the requirements of 10 CFR part 26, 

such as drug and alcohol test results and 

the results of the suitable inquiry. In addition, the proposed paragraph would expand 

on the current requirement for a review and 

evaluation of all pertinent information by 

adding a prohibition on making an access 

authorization decision until all of the required information has been provided to the 

reviewing official and the reviewing official 

has determined that the information indicates that the subject individual is trustworthy and reliable. These changes would 

be made to more clearly communicate the 

NRC’s intent by improving the specificity of 

the language of the rule. 

§ 73.56(c)(3) The licensee shall grant 

unescorted access authorization to all individuals who have been certified by the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission as suitable for such 

access.

(h)(9) Unescorted access for NRC-certified 

personnel. The licensees and applicants 

specified in paragraph (a) of this section 

shall grant unescorted access to all individuals who have been certified by the NRC 

as suitable for such access including, but 

not limited to, contractors to the NRC and 

NRC employees.

Proposed § 73.56(h)(9) would update but retain the meaning of current § 73.56(c)(3), 

which requires licensees to grant 

unescorted access to individuals who have 

been certified by the NRC as suitable for 

such access. This provision ensures that licensees and applicants are allowed to 

grant UAA to individuals whom the NRC 

has determined require such access, and 

whom the NRC has investigated and is certifying as suitable for access, without requiring the licensees or applicants to meet all 

of the requirements that would otherwise be 

necessary before granting unescorted access to these individuals. In addition to 

avoiding duplication of effort, this proposed 

provision would help to ensure that NRCcertified individuals will obtain prompt 

unescorted access to protected and vital 

areas, if necessary. The proposed paragraph would update the entities who are 

subject to this requirement by adding applicants to reflect the NRC’s new licensing 

processes for nuclear power plants, as discussed with respect to proposed § 73.56(a). 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62778 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(b)(4) Failure by an individual to report 

any previous suspension, revocation, or denial of unescorted access to nuclear power 

reactors is considered sufficient cause for denial of unescorted access authorization.

(h)(10) Access prohibited. Licensees and applicants may not permit an individual, who 

is identified as having an access-denied 

status in the information-sharing mechanism required under paragraph (o)(6) of this 

section, or has an access authorization status other than favorably terminated, to enter 

any nuclear power plant protected area or 

vital area, under escort or otherwise, or 

take actions by electronic means that could 

impact the licensee’s or applicant’s operational safety, security, or emergency response capabilities, under supervision or 

otherwise, except if, upon review and evaluation, the reviewing official determines that 

such access is warranted. Licensees and 

applicants shall develop reinstatement review procedures for assessing individuals 

who have been in an access-denied status.

A new § 73.56(h)(10) would prohibit the entities who are subject to this section from 

permitting any individual whose most recent 

application for UAA has been denied or 

most recent period of UAA was unfavorably 

terminated from entering any protected or 

vital area, or to have the ability to use nuclear power plant digital systems that could 

adversely impact operational safety, security, or emergency response capabilities. 

The proposed paragraph would be added 

because the NRC is aware that, in the past, 

some licensees permitted individuals whose 

UAA was denied or unfavorably terminated 

to enter protected areas as visitors. Licensees’ current Physical Security Plans require 

that any visitor to a protected area or vital 

area must be escorted and under the supervision of an individual who has UAA 

and, therefore, is trained in behavioral observation, in accordance with the requirements of this section and related requirements in part 26. However, in the current 

threat environment, the NRC believes that 

permitting any individual who has been determined not to be trustworthy and reliable 

to enter protected or vital areas does not 

adequately protect public health and safety 

or the common defense and security. 

Therefore, the proposed paragraph would 

prohibit this practice. 

The proposed paragraph would also prohibit 

individuals whose UAA has been denied or 

unfavorably terminated from electronically 

accessing licensees’ and applicants’ operational safety, security, and emergency response systems. The proposed prohibition 

on electronic access would be consistent 

with other requirements in the proposed 

regulation and is necessary for the same 

reasons that physical access would be prohibited. An individual whose most recent 

application for UAA was denied, or whose 

most recent period of UAA was terminated 

unfavorably could be considered again for 

UAA, but only if the applicable requirements 

are met, as specified in the licensee’s or 

applicant’s Physical Security Plan, and the 

reviewing official makes a positive determination that the individual is trustworthy 

and reliable, and, therefore, that UAA is 

warranted. These provisions are necessary 

to strengthen the effectiveness of AA programs. 

(i) Maintaining access authorization ................ A new § 73.56(i) [Maintaining access authorization] would establish the conditions that 

must be met in order for an individual who 

has been granted UAA to maintain UAA 

under this section, and present them together in one paragraph for organizational 

clarity in the rule. The proposed paragraph 

would be added in response to stakeholder 

requests for this clarification at the public 

meetings discussed in Section IV.3. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62779 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(i)(1) Individuals may maintain unescorted access authorization under the following conditions: 

(i) The individual remains subject to a behavioral observation program that complies with the requirements of paragraph (f) of this section; 

(ii) The individual successfully completes 

behavioral observation refresher training or testing on the nominal 12-month 

frequency required in (f)(2)(ii) of this 

section; 

Proposed § 73.56(i)(1)(i) and (i)(1)(ii) would 

reiterate the requirements for subjecting individuals who are maintaining UAA to behavioral observation in proposed paragraph 

(f) of this section and for successfully completing refresher training or passing a 

‘‘challenge’’ examination each year during 

which the individual maintains UAA in proposed paragraph (f)(2)(ii) of this section. 

These proposed requirements would be reiterated in this paragraph to emphasize 

their applicability to maintaining UAA for organizational clarity in the proposed rule. 

The bases for these proposed requirements 

are discussed in detail with respect to proposed § 73.56(f) and (f)(2)(ii), respectively. 

(i)(1)(iii) The individual complies with the licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s authorization 

program policies and procedures to which 

he or she is subject, including the arrest-reporting responsibility specified in paragraph 

(g) of this section; 

Proposed § 73.56(i)(1)(iii) would require an individual, in order to maintain UAA, to comply with the policies and procedures to 

which the individual is subject, including the 

arrest-reporting requirement in proposed 

paragraph § 73.56(g). The requirement to 

comply with the applicable licensee’s, applicant’s, and C/V’s policies and procedures 

would be added because licensees and applicants would establish AA policies and implementing procedures in their Physical Security Plans, required under proposed 

§ 73.56(a), which would include, but would 

not be limited to, a description of the conditions under which an individual’s UAA must 

be unfavorably terminated. These policies 

and procedures would prohibit certain acts 

by individuals, and individuals would be required to avoid committing such acts, in 

order to maintain UAA. In addition, part 26 

requires licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

also to develop, implement, and maintain 

fitness-for-duty program policies and procedures with which individuals must comply in 

order to maintain UAA. For example, 10 

CFR 26.27(b)(3) requires the unfavorable 

termination of an individual’s UAA, if the individual has been involved in the sale, use, 

or possession of illegal drugs within a nuclear power plant protected area. 

The proposed rule would require compliance 

with these authorization policies and procedures, as well the arrest-reporting requirement in proposed § 73.56(g), for clarity in 

the proposed rule. The basis for the arrestreporting requirement is discussed with respect to proposed § 73.56(g). 

(i)(1)(iv) The individual is subject to a supervisory interview at a nominal 12-month frequency, conducted in accordance with the 

requirements of the licensee’s or applicant’s 

Physical Security Plan; and 

Proposed § 73.56(i)(1)(iv) would require individuals, in order to maintain UAA, to be 

subject to an annual supervisory review 

during each year that the individual maintains UAA. The supervisory review would 

be conducted for the purposes and in the 

manner that licensees and applicants would 

specify in the Physical Security Plans required under proposed § 73.56(a). The proposed paragraph would include a requirement for these annual supervisory reviews 

for completeness and organizational clarity 

in the proposed rule. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62780 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(i)(1)(v) The licensee, applicant, or C/V determines that the individual continues to be 

trustworthy and reliable. This determination 

must be made as follows: 

(A) The licensee, applicant, or C/V shall 

complete a criminal history update, 

credit history re-evaluation, and psychological re-assessment of the individual within 5 years of the date on 

which these elements were last completed, or more frequently, based on 

job assignment; 

(B) The reviewing official shall complete 

an evaluation of the information obtained from the criminal history update, 

credit history re-evaluation, psychological re-assessment, and the supervisory interview required under paragraph (i)(1)(iv) of this section within 30 

calendar days of initiating any one of 

these elements; 

(C) The results of the criminal history update, credit history re-evaluation, psychological re-assessment, and the supervisory interview required under 

paragraph (i)(1)(iv) of this section must 

support a positive determination of the 

individual’s continued trustworthiness 

and reliability; and 

A new § 73.56(i)(1)(v) would establish requirements for periodic updates of the criminal 

history review, credit history evaluation, and 

psychological assessment in order for an 

individual to maintain UAA. The proposed 

rule would add these update and re-evaluation requirements because it is necessary 

to ensure that individuals who are maintaining UAA over long periods of time remain 

trustworthy and reliable. The proposed update requirements would also apply to transient workers who, under the proposed provisions for granting updated UAA in proposed § 73.56(h)(6) and a reinstatement of 

UAA in proposed § 73.56(h)(7), may be 

granted UAA without undergoing the criminal history review, credit history evaluation, 

and psychological assessment that are required to grant initial UAA in proposed 

§ 73.56(h)(5) each time that the individual 

transfers between licensee sites or applies 

for UAA after an interruption period. It is 

also necessary to ensure that these transient workers remain trustworthy and reliable. Proposed § 73.56(i)(1)(v)(A) would require that the updates and re-evaluation 

must occur within 5 years of the date on 

which the program elements were last completed. 

(D) If the criminal history update, credit 

history re-evaluation, psychological reassessment, and supervisory review 

have not been completed and the information evaluated by the reviewing official within 5 years of the initial completion of these elements or the most recent update, re-evaluation, and re-assessment under this paragraph, or 

within the time period specified in the 

licensee’s or applicant’s Physical Security Plans, the licensee, applicant, or 

C/V shall administratively withdraw the 

individual’s unescorted access authorization until these requirements have 

been met. 

The 5-year interval is consistent with the update requirements of other Federal agencies and private entities who impose similar 

requirements on individuals who must be 

trustworthy and reliable. More frequent updates and re-evaluations would be required 

for some individuals, as specified in the licensee’s or applicant’s Physical Security 

Plan, based on the nature of their job assignments, for the reasons discussed with 

respect to proposed § 73.56(e)(4)(ii). The 

new § 73.56(i)(1)(v)(B) would also require licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to conduct 

the required re-evaluation activities that are 

specified in the proposed paragraph, and 

the supervisory review required under proposed § 73.56(i)(1)(iv), within 30 days of the 

initiating any one of these elements. This 

requirement is necessary to ensure that the 

reviewing official has the opportunity to review the information collected in the proper 

context, comparing each element to the 

other, which would then provide the best 

possible composite representation of the individual’s continued trustworthiness and reliability. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62781 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

In a case in which a medical evaluation had 

been determined to be necessary through 

the conduct of the psychological re-assessment, the results of the medical evaluation 

would also become part of the data reviewed by the reviewing official during the 

30 day period. Proposed § 73.56(i)(1)(v)(C) 

would require the reviewing official to determine that the results of the update support 

a positive determination of the individual’s 

continuing trustworthiness and reliability in 

order for the individual to maintain UAA. 

Whereas, § 73.56(i)(1)(v)(D) would require 

the reviewing official to administratively 

withdraw the individual’s UAA if a positive 

determination cannot be made, because the 

information upon which the determination 

must be made is not yet available. These 

requirements are necessary to provide high 

assurance that any individuals who are 

maintaining UAA have been positively determined to continue to be trustworthy and 

reliable. 

(i)(2) If an individual who has unescorted access authorization is not subject to an authorization program that meets the requirements of this part for more than 30 continuous days, then the licensee, applicant, or 

C/V shall terminate the individual’s 

unescorted access authorization and the individual shall meet the requirements in this 

section, as applicable, to regain unescorted 

access authorization.

Proposed § 73.56(i)(2) would require licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to terminate an 

individual’s UAA if the individual, for more 

than 30 [consecutive] days, is not subject to 

an authorization program that meets the requirements of this section. The requirements of the proposed paragraph would 

permit an individual to be away from all elements of an AA program for 30 consecutive 

days in order to accommodate vacations, 

extended work assignments away from the 

individual’s normal work location, and significant illnesses when the individual would 

not be reasonably available for behavioral 

observation. The proposed paragraph 

would be consistent with industry practices 

that have been endorsed by the NRC and 

related requirements in part 26, and added 

in response to stakeholder requests at the 

public meetings discussed in Section IV.3. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62782 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(j) Access to vital areas. Each licensee and 

applicant who is subject to this section shall 

establish, implement, and maintain a list of 

individuals who are authorized to have 

unescorted access to specific nuclear 

power plant vital areas to assist in limiting 

access to those vital areas during nonemergency conditions. The list must include 

only those individuals who require access 

to those specific vital areas in order to perform their duties and responsibilities. The 

list must be approved by a cognizant licensee or applicant manager, or supervisor 

who is responsible for directing the work 

activities of the individual who is granted 

unescorted access to each vital area, and 

updated and re-approved no less frequently 

than every 31 days.

Proposed § 73.56(j) would amend, and move 

into § 73.56, current § 73.55(d)(7)(i), which 

establishes requirements for managing 

unescorted access to nuclear power plant 

vital areas. The proposed paragraph would 

be moved into § 73.56 for organizational 

clarity in the rule. The proposed requirement is necessary to support the mitigation 

of the insider threat postulated in 10 CFR 

73.1. Specifically, individuals’ access to vital 

areas must be controlled to ensure that noone may enter these vital areas without 

having a work-related need, and when the 

need no longer exists, access to the vital 

areas must be terminated. The NRC is 

aware of many circumstances in the past in 

which some licensees routinely allowed access to all vital areas for all persons who 

had been granted unescorted access to a 

licensee protected area, even during periods when the individuals were not assigned 

to be working at the licensee site. The defense-in-depth required to mitigate the insider threat requires that even though persons have been determined to be trustworthy and reliable for unescorted access 

to a protected area and are under behavioral observation, access to vital areas must 

be restricted to current work-related need. 

(k) Trustworthiness and reliability of background screeners and authorization program personnel. Licensees, applicants, and 

C/Vs shall ensure that any individuals who 

collect, process, or have access to personal 

information that is used to make unescorted 

access authorization determinations under 

this section have been determined to be 

trustworthy and reliable.

A new § 73.56(k) would require licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to ensure that any individuals who collect, process, or have access to the sensitive personal information 

that is required under this section are, 

themselves, trustworthy and reliable. The 

proposed rule would add this provision because the integrity and effectiveness of authorization programs depend, in large part, 

on the accuracy of the information that is 

collected about individuals who are applying 

for or maintaining UAA. Therefore, it is critical that any individuals who collect, process, or have access to the personal information that is used to make UAA determinations are not vulnerable to compromise 

or influence attempts to falsify or alter the 

personal information that is collected. Although the NRC is not aware of any instances in which individuals who collected, 

processed, or had access to personal information were compromised or subject to influence attempts, there have been past circumstances in which it was discovered that 

persons collecting and reviewing such personal information were found to have extensive criminal histories, which clearly calls 

into question their trustworthiness and reliability. Therefore, the proposed requirements would be added to strengthen the effectiveness of AA programs. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62783 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(k)(1) Background screeners. Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs who rely on individuals 

who are not directly under their control to 

collect and process information that will be 

used by a reviewing official to make 

unescorted access authorization determinations shall ensure that a background check 

of such individuals has been completed and 

determines that such individuals are trustworthy and reliable. At a minimum, the following checks are required: 

(i) Verification of the individual’s identity; 

(ii) A local criminal history review and 

evaluation from the State of the individual’s permanent residence; 

(iii) A credit history review and evaluation; 

(iv) An employment history review and 

evaluation for the past 3 years; and 

(v) An evaluation of character and reputation. 

Proposed § 73.56(k)(1) would impose new requirements for determining the trustworthiness and reliability of the employees 

of any subcontractors or vendors that licensees, applicants, or C/Vs rely upon to 

collect sensitive personal information for the 

purposes of determining UAA. The majority 

of licensees contract (or subcontract, in the 

case of C/Vs) with other businesses that 

specialize in background investigation services, typically focused on verifying the employment histories and character and reputation of individuals who have applied for 

UAA. The proposed paragraph would require that the employees of these firms are 

themselves trustworthy and reliable, and 

would establish means by which licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs would obtain 

verification from the subcontractor or vendor that the employees meet the trustworthiness and reliability standards of the licensee, applicant, and C/V. 

Proposed § 73.56(k)(1)(i) through (v) would 

require a background investigation of these 

subcontractor or vendor employees to include a verification of the employee’s identity, a review and evaluation of the employee’s criminal history record from the State 

in which the employee permanently resides, 

a credit history review and evaluation, an 

employment history review and evaluation 

from the past 3 years, and an evaluation of 

the employee’s character and reputation, 

respectively. These requirements would be 

added for the reasons discussed with respect to proposed § 73.56(k). 

(k)(2) Authorization program personnel. Licensees, applicants and C/Vs shall ensure 

that any individual who evaluates personal 

information for the purpose of processing 

applications for unescorted access authorization including, but not limited to a clinical 

psychologist of psychiatrist who conducts 

psychological assessments under paragraph (e) of this section; has access to the 

files, records, and personal information associated with individuals who have applied 

for unescorted access authorization; or is 

responsible for managing any databases 

that contain such files, records, and personal information has been determined to 

be trustworthy and reliable, as follows: 

(i) The individual is subject to an authorization program that meets requirements of this section; or 

(ii) The licensee, applicant, or C/V determines that the individual is trustworthy 

and reliable based upon an evaluation 

that meets the requirements of paragraphs (d)(1) through (d)(5) and (e) of 

this section and a local criminal history 

review and evaluation from the State of 

the individual’s permanent residence. 

A new § 73.56(k)(2) would require that individuals who evaluate and have access to any 

personal information that is collected for the 

purposes of this section must be determined to be trustworthy and reliable, and 

establishes two alternative methods for 

making this determination. Proposed 

§ 73.56(k)(2)(i) would permit licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to subject such individuals to the process established in this proposed section for granting UAA. Proposed 

§ 73.56(k)(2)(ii) would permit licensees, applicants, or C/Vs to subject such individuals 

to the requirements for granting UAA in proposed paragraphs (d)(1) through (d)(5) and 

(e) of this section and a local criminal history review and evaluation from the State of 

the individuals permanent residence, rather 

than the criminal history review specified in 

proposed § 73.56(d)(7). Proposed 

§ 73.56(k)(2)(ii) recognizes that, in some 

cases, licensees cannot legally obtain the 

same type of criminal history information 

about authorization program personnel as 

they are able to obtain for other individuals 

who are subject to § 73.56. Therefore, this 

proposed provision would permit licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs to rely on local criminal history checks in such cases. These requirements would be added for the reasons 

discussed with respect to proposed 

§ 73.56(k). 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62784 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(e) Review procedures. Each licensee 

implementing an unescorted access authorization program under the provisions of this 

section shall include a procedure for the review, at the request of the affected employee, of a denial or revocation by the licensee of unescorted access authorization of 

an employee of the licensee, contractor, or 

vendor, which adversely affects employment. 

The procedure must provide that the employee is informed of the grounds for denial 

or revocation and allow the employee an opportunity to provide additional relevant information, and provide an opportunity for an objective review of the information on which the 

denial or revocation was based. The procedure may be an impartial and independent internal management review. Unescorted access may not be granted to the individual 

during the review process.

(l) Review procedures. Each licensee, applicant, and C/V who is implementing an authorization program under this section shall 

include a procedure for the review, at the 

request of the affected individual, of a denial or unfavorable termination of 

unescorted access authorization. The procedure must require that the individual is informed of the grounds for the denial or unfavorable termination and allow the individual an opportunity to provide additional 

relevant information, and provide an opportunity for an objective review of the information on which the denial or unfavorable termination of unescorted access authorization 

was based. The procedure may be an impartial and independent internal management review. Licensees and applicants may 

not grant or permit the individual to maintain unescorted access authorization during 

the review process.

Proposed § 73.56(l) would retain the meaning 

of current § 73.56(e) but update some of 

the terms used in the provision. The proposed paragraph would replace the term, 

‘‘revocation,’’ with the term, ‘‘unfavorable 

termination,’’ for the reasons discussed with 

respect to proposed paragraph (d)(1)(iii) of 

this section. In addition, the proposed paragraph would add references to applicants to 

reflect the NRC’s new licensing processes 

for nuclear power plants, as discussed with 

respect to proposed § 73.56(a). Reference 

to C/Vs would also be added for completeness, as discussed with respected to proposed § 73.56(a)(3). 

§ 73.56(f) Protection of information. (1) Each 

licensee, contractor, or vendor who collects 

personal information on an employee for the 

purpose of complying with this section shall 

establish and maintain a system of files and 

procedures for the protection of the personal 

information.

(m) Protection of information. Each licensee, 

applicant, or C/V who is subject to this section who collects personal information about 

an individual for the purpose of complying 

with this section shall establish and maintain a system of files and procedures to 

protect the personal information.

Proposed § 73.56(m) would retain current 

§ 73.56(f)(1) but update it to include reference to applicants and C/Vs for internal 

consistency in the proposed rule. The current requirement for a system of files and 

procedures for the protection of information 

would be moved to proposed § 73.56(m)(5) 

for organizational clarity in the rule. 

§ 73.56(f)(2) Licensees, contractors, and vendors small make available such personal information to another licensee, contractor, or 

vendor provided that the request is accompanied by a signed release from the individual.

(f)(2) Deleted .................................................... Current § 73.56(f)(2) would be deleted, but the 

intent of the requirement would be incorporated into proposed § 73.56(m)(1) for organizational clarity in the rule. 

§ 73.56(f)(3) Licensees, contractors, and vendors may not disclose the personal information collected and maintained to persons 

other than: 

(ii) NRC representatives; 

(iii) Appropriate law enforcement officials 

under court order; 

(iv) The subject individual or his or her representative; 

(v) Those licensee representatives who 

have a need to have access to the information in performing assigned duties, including audits of licensee’s, contractor’s, 

and vendor’s programs; 

(vi) Persons deciding matters on review or 

appeal; or 

(vii) Other persons pursuant to court order. 

This section does not authorize the licensee, contractor, or vendor to withhold 

evidence of criminal conduct from law 

enforcement officials. 

(m)(1) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall 

obtain a signed consent from the subject individual that authorizes the disclosure of the 

personal information collected and maintained under this section before disclosing 

the personal information, except for disclosures to the following individuals: 

(i) The subject individual or his or her 

representative, when the individual has 

designated the representative in writing 

for specified unescorted access authorization matters; 

(ii) NRC representatives; 

(iii) Appropriate law enforcement officials 

under court order; 

(iv) A licensees, applicant’s or C/V’s representatives who have a need to have 

access to the information in performing 

assigned duties, including determinations of trustworthiness and reliability, 

and audits of authorization programs; 

(v) The presiding officer in a judicial or 

administrative proceeding that is initiated by the subject individual; 

(vi) Persons deciding matters under the 

review procedures in paragraph (k) of 

this section; and 

(vii) Other persons pursuant to court 

order. 

Proposed § 73.56(m)(1) would amend current 

§ 73.56(f)(3), which prohibits licensees, applicants, and C/Vs from disclosing personal 

information collected under this section to 

any individuals other than those listed in the 

regulation. The proposed paragraph would 

continue to permit disclosure of the personal information to the listed individuals, 

but would add permission for the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V to disclose the personal 

information to others if the licensee or other 

entity has obtained a signed release for 

such a disclosure from the subject individual. The proposed provision would be 

added because some licensees have misinterpreted the current requirement as prohibiting them from releasing the personal information under any circumstances, except 

to the parties listed in the current provision. 

In some instances, such failures to release 

information have inappropriately inhibited 

an individual’s ability to obtain information 

that was necessary for a review or appeal 

of the licensee’s determination for UAA. 

Therefore, the explicit permission for licensees and other entities to release personal 

information when an individual consents to 

the release, in writing, would be to have access to a full and complete evidentiary 

record in review procedures and legal proceedings. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62785 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Proposed § 73.56(m)(1)(i) through (m)(1)(vii) 

would list in separate paragraphs the individuals to whom licensees and other entities would be permitted to release personal 

information about an individual. Proposed 

§ 73.56(m)(1)(ii), (m)(1)(iii), and (m)(1)(vii) 

would retain the current § 73.56 permission 

for the release of information to NRC representatives, appropriate law enforcement 

officials under court order, and other persons pursuant to court order. Proposed 

§ 73.56(m)(1)(i) would retain the current 

permission for the release of information to 

the subject individual and his or her designated representative. The proposed paragraph would add requirements for the individual to designate his or her representative 

in writing and specify the UAA matters to 

be disclosed. The proposed changes would 

be made in response to implementation 

questions from licensees who have sought 

guidance from the NRC related to the manner in which an individual must ‘‘designate’’

a representative. Proposed § 73.56 

(m)(1)(iv) would amend the current reference to licensee representatives who 

have a need to have access to the information in performing assigned duties. The current rule refers only to individuals who are 

performing audits of access. 

The intent of the provision was that licensees 

and C/Vs would be permitted to release information to their representatives who must 

have access to the personal information in 

order to perform assigned job duties related 

to the administration of the program. Therefore, the proposed rule would clarify the 

provision by adding licensee representatives who perform determinations of trustworthiness and reliability as a further example of individuals who may be permitted access to personal information but only to the 

extent that such access is required to perform their assigned functions. Proposed 

§ 73.56(m)(1)(v) and (m)(1)(vi) would 

amend the portion of current 

§ 73.56(f)(3)(vi) that refers to ‘‘persons deciding matters on review or appeal.’’ The 

proposed changes would be made in response to implementation questions from licensees, including whether the rule covers 

persons deciding matters in judicial proceedings or only the internal review process 

specified in current § 73.56(e) [Review procedures] as well as whether information 

could be released in a judicial proceeding 

that was not initiated by the subject individual. The proposed rule would clarify that 

the permission includes individuals who are 

presiding in a judicial or administrative proceeding, but only if the proceeding is initiated by the subject individual. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62786 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(f)(3)(i) Other licensees, contractors, or 

vendors, or their authorized representatives, 

legitimately seeking the information as required by this section for unescorted access 

decisions and who have obtained a signed 

release from the individual.

(m)(2) Personal information that is collected 

under this section must be disclosed to 

other licensees, applicants, and C/Vs, or 

their authorized representatives, who are 

seeking the information for unescorted access authorization determinations under this 

section and who have obtained a signed release from the subject individual.

Proposed § 73.56(m)(2) would enhance the 

current requirement for the disclosure of relevant information to licensees, applicants, 

and C/Vs, and their authorized representatives who have a legitimate need for the information and a signed release from an individual who is seeking UAA under this 

part. This proposed provision would be 

added to further clarify current § 73.56 requirements because some licensees have 

misinterpreted the current provision as prohibiting the release of information to C/Vs 

who have licensee-approved authorization 

programs and require such information in 

determining individuals’ trustworthiness and 

reliability. The proposed change would be 

made in order to further clarify the NRC’s 

intent that C/Vs shall have access to personal information for the specified purposes. 

(m)(3) Upon receipt of a written request by 

the subject individual or his or her designated representative, the licensee, applicant or C/V possessing such records shall 

promptly provide copies of all records pertaining to a denial or unfavorable termination of the individuals unescorted access 

authorization.

A new § 73.56(m)(3) would require the licensee, applicant, or C/V possessing the 

records specified in § 73.56(m) to promptly 

provide copies of all records pertaining to a 

denial or unfavorable termination of the individual’s UAA to the subject individual or 

his or her designated representative upon 

written request. This paragraph would be 

added to protect individuals’ ability to have 

access to a full and complete evidentiary 

record in review procedures and legal proceedings. 

(m)(4) A licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s contracts with any individual or organization 

who collects and maintains personal information that is relevant to an unescorted access authorization determination must require that such records be held in confidence, except as provided in paragraphs 

(m)(1) through (m)(3) of this section.

Proposed § 73.56(m)(4) would require that a 

licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s contracts 

with any individual or organization who collects and maintains personal information 

that is relevant to a UAA determination 

must require that such records be maintained in confidence. The paragraph would 

make an exception for the disclosure of information to the individuals identified in 

§ 73.56(m)(1) through (m)(3). This paragraph would be added to ensure that entities who collect and maintain personal information use and maintain those records with 

the highest regard for individual privacy. 

(m)(5) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs who 

collect and maintain personal information 

under this section, and any individual or organization who collects and maintains personal information on behalf of a licensee, 

applicant or C/V, shall establish, implement, 

and maintain a system and procedures for 

the secure storage and handling of the personal information collected.

A new § 73.56(m)(5) would require licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs, and any individual or 

organization who collects and maintains 

personal information on their behalf, to establish, implement, and maintain a system 

and procedures to ensure that the personal 

information is secure and cannot be 

accessed by any unauthorized individuals. 

The proposed rule would add this specific 

requirement because the NRC is aware of 

circumstances in which the personal information of individuals applying for UAA has 

been removed from a C/V’s business location and transported to the personal residences of its employees. 

The proposed provision would prohibit such 

practices in order to further protect the privacy rights of individuals who are subject to 

the proposed rule. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62787 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(f)(3)(vii) Other persons pursuant to 

court order. This section does not authorize 

the licensee, contractor, or vendor to withhold 

evidence of criminal conduct from law enforcement officials.

(m)(6) This paragraph does not authorize the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V to withhold evidence of criminal conduct from law enforcement officials.

Proposed § 73.56(m)(5) would retain the 

meaning of the second sentence of current 

§ 73.56(f)(3)(vii), which states that the protection of information requirements in current § 73.56(f)(3)(vii) do not authorize the licensee to withhold evidence of criminal 

conduct from law enforcement officers, but 

renumber the second sentence as a separate paragraph. The first sentence of current § 73.56(f)(3)(vii) permits licensees to 

release personal information about an individual without his or her written consent 

under a court order. Therefore, the proposed rule would present the second sentence of current § 73.56(f)(3)(vii) is a separate paragraph to emphasize that the prohibition on withholding personal information 

from law enforcement officials applies to 

any information that may be developed 

under the requirements of this section. This 

change would be made to improve the clarity of the rule. 

§ 73.56(g) Audits ..............................................

§ 73.56(g)(2) Each licensee retains responsibility for the effectiveness of any contractor 

and vendor program it accepts and the implementation of appropriate corrective action. 

(n) Audits and corrective action. Each licensee and applicant who is subject to this 

section shall be responsible for the continuing effectiveness of the authorization 

program, including authorization program 

elements that are provided by C/Vs, and 

the authorization programs of any C/Vs that 

are accepted by the licensee and applicant. 

Each licensee, applicant, and C/V who is 

subject to this section shall ensure that authorization programs and program elements 

are audited to confirm compliance with the 

requirements of this section and that comprehensive actions are taken to correct any 

non-conformance that is identified.

Proposed § 73.56(n) [Audits and corrective 

action] would rename and amend current 

§ 73.56(g) [Audits]. The phrase, ‘‘and corrective action,’’ would be added to the section title to emphasize the NRCs intent that 

licensees, applicants, and C/Vs must ensure that comprehensive corrective actions 

are taken in response to any violations of 

the requirements of this section identified 

from an audit. The second sentence of proposed § 73.56(n) would restate the requirement for AA program audits in current 

§ 73.56(g)(1) and add a requirement for 

comprehensive corrective actions to be 

taken to any violations identified as a result 

of the audits. These changes would be 

made because NRC is aware that some licensees have met the requirements for 

scheduling audits in current § 73.56(g)(1), 

but have not acted promptly to resolve violations that were identified. Therefore, the 

proposed requirements would clarify the 

NRC’s intent that comprehensive corrective 

actions must be taken in response to audit 

findings. The first sentence of proposed 

§ 73.56(n) would be added to clarify that licensees and applicants are responsible for 

the continued effectiveness of their AA programs, as well as those C/V programs or 

program elements upon which they rely to 

meet the requirements of this section. 

The proposed sentence would retain the 

meaning of the last sentence of current 

§ 73.56(g)(2), which states that each licensee retains responsibility for the effectiveness of any contractor and vendor program it accepts and the implementation of 

appropriate corrective action, but would 

move it to proposed § 73.56(n) for organizational clarity. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62788 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(g)(1) Each licensee shall audit its access authorization program within 12 months 

of the effective date of implementation of this 

program and at least every 24 months thereafter to ensure that the requirements of this 

section are satisfied.

(n)(1) Each licensee, applicant and C/V who 

is subject to this section shall ensure that 

their entire authorization program is audited 

as needed, but no less frequently than 

nominally every 24 months. Licensees, applicants and C/Vs are responsible for determining the appropriate frequency, scope, 

and depth of additional auditing activities 

within the nominal 24-month period based 

on the review of program performance indicators, such as the frequency, nature, and 

severity of discovered problems, personnel 

or procedural changes, and previous audit 

findings.

Proposed § 73.56(n)(1) would retain the required 24-month audit frequency in current 

§ 73.56(g)(1). Licensees, applicants, and C/ 

Vs would be required to monitor program 

performance indicators and operating experience, and audit AA program elements 

more frequently than every 24 months, as 

needed. In determining the need for more 

frequent audits, the entities who are subject 

to this section would consider the frequency, nature, and severity of discovered 

program deficiencies, personnel or procedural changes, previous audit findings, as 

well as ‘‘lessons learned.’’ The proposed 

change is intended to promote performance-based rather than compliance-based 

audit activities and clarify that programs 

must be audited following a significant 

change in personnel, procedures, or equipment as soon as reasonably practicable. 

The NRC recognizes that AA programs 

evolve and new issues and problems continue to arise. A high rate of turnover of AA 

program personnel in contracted services 

exacerbates this concern. Licensee audits 

have identified problems that were associated in some way with personnel changes, 

such as new personnel not understanding 

their duties or procedures, the implications 

of actions that they took or did not take, 

and changes in processes. The purpose of 

these focused audits would be to ensure 

that changes in personnel or procedures do 

not adversely affect the operation of a particular element within the AA program, or 

function in question. Accordingly, the proposed audit requirement would ensure that 

any programmatic problems that may result 

from significant changes in personnel or 

procedures would be detected and corrected on a timely basis. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62789 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(g)(2) Each licensee who accepts the 

access authorization program of a contractor 

or vendor as provided for by paragraph (a)(4) 

of this section shall have access to records 

and shall audit contractor or vendor programs 

every 12 months to ensure that the requirements of this section are satisfied.

(n)(2) Authorization program services that are 

provided to a licensee, or applicant, by C/V 

personnel who are off site or are not under 

the direct daily supervision or observation 

of the licensee’s or applicant’s personnel 

must be audited on a nominal 12-month frequency. In addition, any authorization program services that are provided to C/Vs by 

subcontractor personnel who are off site or 

are not under the direct daily supervision or 

observation of the C/V’s personnel must be 

audited on a nominal 12-month frequency.

Proposed § 73.56(n)(2) would add a new requirement specifying that if a licensee or 

applicant relies upon a C/V program or program element to meet the requirements of 

this section, and if the C/V personnel providing the AA program service are off site 

or, if they are on site but not under the direct daily supervision or observation of the 

personnel of the licensee or applicant, then 

the licensee or applicant must audit the C/V 

program or program element on a nominal 

12-month frequency. The proposed rule 

would also require that any authorization 

program services that are provided to C/Vs 

by subcontractor personnel who are off site 

or are not under the direct daily supervision 

or observation of the C/V’s personnel must 

be audited on a nominal 12-month frequency. The activities of C/V personnel who 

work on site and are under the daily supervision of AA program personnel would be 

audited under proposed § 73.56(n). The 

proposed rule expands and clarifies the current requirement in § 73.56(g)(2), which requires licensees who accept the access authorization program of a contractor or vendor to audit the C/V programs every 12 

months, but does not distinguish between 

C/V personnel who work off site and other 

C/V personnel, and does not address personnel who work as subcontractors to C/Vs. 

Requiring annual audits for C/V personnel 

who work off site and for C/V subcontractors is necessary to ensure that the services provided continue to be effective, given 

that other means of monitoring their effectiveness, such as daily oversight, are unavailable. 

(n)(3) Licensees’ and applicants’ contracts 

with C/Vs must reserve the right to audit 

the C/V and the C/V’s subcontractors providing authorization program services at 

any time, including at unannounced times, 

as well as to review all information and documentation that is reasonably relevant to 

the performance of the program.

Proposed § 73.56(n)(3) would add a new requirement that addresses contractual relationships between licensees, applicants, 

and C/Vs. The proposed rule would specify 

that contracts between licensees, applicants, and C/Vs must allow the licensees or 

applicants the right to audit the C/Vs and 

the C/V’s subcontractors providing authorization program services at any time, including at unannounced times, as well as to 

review all information and documentation 

that is reasonably relevant to the performance of the AA program. The proposed 

paragraph would apply to any C/V with 

whom the licensee or applicant contracts 

for authorization program services. The proposed rule would specify that contracts 

must allow audits at unannounced times, 

which the NRC considers necessary to enhance the effectiveness of the audits. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62790 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Such unannounced audits could be necessary, for example, if a licensee or applicant receives an allegation that an off-site 

C/V is falsifying records and the licensee or 

applicant determines that an unannounced 

audit would provide the most effective 

means to investigate such an allegation. 

The proposed paragraph would ensure that 

the licensee’s or other entity’s contract with 

the C/V would permit the unannounced 

audit as well as access to any information 

necessary to conduct the audit and ensure 

the proper performance of the AA program. 

(n)(4) Licensees’ and applicants’ contracts 

with C/Vs, and a C/V’s contracts with subcontractors, must also require that the licensee or applicant shall be provided with, 

or permitted access to, copies of any documents and take away any documents, that 

may be needed to assure that the C/V and 

its subcontractors are performing their functions properly and that staff and procedures 

meet applicable requirements.

A new § 73.56(n)(4) would ensure that licensees’ and applicants’ contracts with C/Vs 

permit the licensee or applicant to be provided with or permitted to obtain copies of 

and take away any documents that auditors 

may need to assure that the C/V or its subcontractors are performing their functions 

properly and that staff and procedures meet 

applicable requirements. This proposed provision would respond to several incidents in 

which parties under contract to licensees 

did not permit AA program auditors to remove documents from a C/V’s premises 

that were necessary to document audit findings, develop corrective actions, and ensure 

that the corrective actions were comprehensive and effective. 

(n)(5) Audits must focus on the effectiveness 

of the authorization program or program 

element(s), as appropriate. At least one 

member of the audit team shall be a person 

who is knowledgeable of and practiced with 

meeting authorization program performance 

objectives and requirements. The individuals performing the audit of the authorization program or program element(s) shall 

be independent from both the subject authorization programs management and from 

personnel who are directly responsible for 

implementing the authorization program(s) 

being audited.

A new § 73.56(n)(5) would require audits to 

focus on the effectiveness of AA programs 

and program elements in response to industry and NRC experience that some licensees’ AA program audits have focused 

only on the extent to which the program or 

program elements meet the minimum regulatory requirements in the current rule. Consistent with a performance-based approach, 

the proposed paragraph would more clearly 

communicate the NRC’s intent that AA programs must meet the performance objective 

of providing high assurance that individuals 

who are subject to the program are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute 

an unreasonable risk to public health and 

safety or the common defense and security, 

including the potential to commit radiological sabotage. The proposed paragraph 

would also require that the audit team must 

include at least one individual who has 

practical experience in implementing all facets of AA programs and that the team 

members must be independent. These provisions would be added in response to 

issues that have arisen since the requirements for AA programs were first promulgated, in which licensee audits were ineffective because the personnel who conducted the audits: 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62791 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(1) lacked the requisite knowledge to evaluate 

the wholistic implications of individual requirements or the complexities associated 

with meeting the rule’s performance objective and, therefore, could not adequately 

evaluate program effectiveness, or (2) were 

not independent from the day-to-day operation of the AA program and, therefore, 

could not be objective, because in some 

cases, these persons were auditing their 

own activities. The proposed requirements 

would be necessary to correct these audit 

deficiencies. 

(n)(6) The result of the audits, along with any 

recommendations, must be documented 

and reported to senior corporate and site 

management. Each audit report must identify conditions that are adverse to the proper performance of the authorization program, the cause of the condition(s), and, 

when appropriate, recommended corrective 

actions, and corrective actions taken. The 

licensee, applicant or C/V shall review the 

audit findings and take any additional corrective actions, to include re-auditing of the 

deficient areas where indicated, to preclude, within reason, repetition of the condition. The resolution of the audit findings and 

corrective actions must be documented.

Proposed § 73.56(n)(6) would clarify the requirements for documentation and dissemination of audit results. Section 73.56(h)(2) 

of the current rule specifies that licensees 

shall retain records of results of audits, resolution of the audit findings, and corrective 

actions. The proposed rule would retain the 

requirement that licensees, applicants, and 

C/Vs document audit findings. The proposed rule would add a requirement that 

any recommendations must be documented, and also would add a requirement 

that findings and recommendations must be 

reported to senior corporate and site management. The proposed rule specifies more 

fully than the current rule what an audit report must contain. 

The second sentence of the proposed paragraph would require each audit report to 

identify conditions that are adverse to the 

proper performance of the AA program, the 

cause of the condition(s), and, when appropriate, recommended corrective actions, 

and corrective actions already taken. The 

third sentence of the proposed paragraph 

would require the licensee, applicant, or C/ 

V to review the audit findings and, where 

warranted, take additional corrective actions, to include re-auditing of the deficient 

areas where indicated, to preclude, within 

reason, repetition of the condition. Finally, 

the proposed rule would require the resolution of the audit findings and corrective actions to be documented. The current rule 

does not state explicitly that resolution of 

the audit findings and corrective actions 

must be documented; it provides only that 

records of resolution of the audit findings 

and corrective actions must be retained for 

3 years. The additional sentences in the 

proposed rule would provide consistency 

with Criterion XVI in appendix B to 10 CFR 

part 50 and would indicate that AA audit reports must be included in licensees’ and 

applicants’ corrective action programs, and 

that any nonconformance is not only identified, but corrected. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62792 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(n)(7) Licensees and applicants may jointly 

conduct audits, or may accept audits of C/ 

Vs that were conducted by other licensees 

and applicants who are subject to this section, if the audit addresses the services obtained from the C/V by each of the sharing 

licensees and applicants. C/Vs may jointly 

conduct audits, or may accept audits of its 

subcontractors that were conducted by 

other licensees, applicants and C/Vs who 

are subject to this section, if the audit addresses the services obtained from the subcontractor by each of the sharing licensees, 

applicants and C/Vs.

Proposed § 73.56(n)(7) would clarify the circumstances in which licensees, applicants, 

and C/Vs may accept and rely on others’

audits. The current rule in § 73.56(g) states 

only that licensees may accept audits of 

contractors and vendors conducted by other 

licensees. The proposed rule would amend 

the current provision to incorporate specific 

permission for licensees and other entities 

to jointly conduct audits as well as rely on 

one anothers audits, if the audits upon 

which they are relying address the services 

obtained from the C/V by each of the sharing licensees or applicants. These proposed 

changes would make the rule consistent 

with current licensee practices that have 

been endorsed by the NRC and reduce unnecessary regulatory burden by reducing 

the number of redundant audits that would 

be performed. 

(n)(7)(i) Licensees, applicants and C/Vs shall 

review audit records and reports to identify 

any areas that were not covered by the 

shared or accepted audit and ensure that 

authorization program elements and services upon which the licensee, applicant or 

C/V relies are audited, if the program elements and services were not addressed in 

the shared audit.

Proposed § 73.56(n)(7)(i) would require licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to identify any 

areas that were not covered by a shared or 

accepted audit and ensure that any unique 

services used by the licensee, applicant, or 

C/V that were not covered by the shared 

audit are audited. The proposed provision is 

necessary to ensure that all authorization 

program elements and services upon which 

each of the licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

relies are audited, and that elements not included in the shared audits are not overlooked or ignored. 

§ 73.56(g)(2) * * * Licensees may accept audits of contractors and vendors conducted by 

other licensees.

(n)(7)(ii) Sharing licensees and applicants 

need not re-audit the same C/V for the 

same period of time. Sharing C/Vs need not 

re-audit the same subcontractor for the 

same period of time.

Proposed § 73.56 (n)(7)(ii) would add a new 

paragraph clarifying that licensees, applicants, and C/Vs need not re-audit the same 

C/V for the same period of time, and that C/ 

Vs who share the services of the same 

subcontractor with other C/Vs or licensees 

and applicants, need not re-audit the same 

subcontractor for the same period of time. 

The proposed rule would include this provision in response to implementation questions from stakeholders at the public meetings discussed in Section IV.3 who reported 

that some industry auditors and quality assurance personnel have misunderstood the 

intent of the current provision and have required licensees to re-audit C/V programs 

that have been audited by other licensees 

during the same time period. However, 

such re-auditing would be unnecessary, as 

the shared program elements and services 

should be identical, and the period of time 

covered by the audit should be the same 

nominal 12-month period. Therefore, the 

proposed provision would be added to clarify the intent of current § 73.56(g)(2). 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62793 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(g)(2) * * * Each sharing utility shall 

maintain a copy of the audit report, to include 

findings, recommendations and corrective actions.

(n)(7)(iii) Each sharing licensee, applicant and 

C/V shall maintain a copy of the shared 

audit, including findings, recommendations, 

and corrective actions.

Proposed § 73.56(n)(7)(iii) would retain the requirement in current § 73.56(g)(2) that each 

sharing entity shall maintain a copy of the 

shared audit report. The proposed provision 

would specify that the requirement to retain 

a copy of a shared audit report includes a 

requirement to retain a copy of findings, 

recommendations, and corrective actions, 

and that the requirement pertains to each 

sharing licensee, applicant and C/V. This 

provision is necessary to ensure that the 

audit documents are available for NRC review. 

§ 73.56(h) Records ...........................................

§ 73.56(h)(1) Each licensee who issues 

an individual unescorted access authorization shall retain the records on which 

the authorization is based for the duration of the unescorted access authorization and for a five-year period following 

its termination. 

(o) Records. Each licensee, applicant, and 

C/V who is subject to this section shall 

maintain the records that are required by 

the regulations in this section for the period 

specified by the appropriate regulation. If a 

retention period is not otherwise specified, 

these records must be retained until the 

Commission terminates the facility’s license, 

certificate, or other regulatory approval.

Proposed § 73.56(o) [Records] would establish a requirement that licensees, applicants 

and C/Vs who are subject to this section 

must retain the records required under the 

proposed rule for either the periods that are 

specified by the appropriate regulation or 

for the life of the facility’s license, certificate, or other regulatory approval, if no 

records retention requirement is specified. 

The proposed rule would replace the current records requirement in § 73.56(h)(1), 

which requires retention of records on 

which UAA is granted for a period of 5 

years following termination of UAA, and retention of records upon which a denial of 

UAA is based for 5 years, and in 

§ 73.56(h)(2), which requires retention of 

audit records for 3 years. The proposed 

records retention requirement is a standard 

administrative provision that is used in all 

other parts of 10 CFR that contain substantive requirements applicable to licensees and applicants. 

(o)(1) All records may be stored and archived 

electronically, provided that the method 

used to create the electronic records meets 

the following criteria: 

(i) Provides an accurate representation of 

the original records; 

(ii) Prevents unauthorized access to the 

records; 

(iii) Prevents the alteration of any 

archived information and/or data once 

it has been committed to storage; and 

(iv) Permits easy retrieval and re-creation 

of the original records. 

Proposed § 73.56(o)(1) would permit the 

records that would be required under the 

provisions of the proposed section to be 

stored and archived electronically if the 

method used to create the electronic 

records: (1) Provides an accurate representation of the original records; (2) prevents 

access to the information by any individuals 

who are not authorized to have such access; (3) prevents the alteration of any 

archived information and/or data once it has 

been committed to storage; and (4) allows 

easy retrieval and re-creation of the original 

records. The proposed paragraph would be 

added to recognize that most records are 

now stored electronically and must be protected to ensure the integrity of the data. 

Records are now stored electronically and 

must be protected to ensure the integrity of 

the data. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62794 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(o)(2) Each licensee, applicant, and C/V who 

is subject to this section shall retain the following records for at least 5 years after the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V terminates or denies an individual’s unescorted access authorization or until the completion of all related legal proceedings, whichever is later: 

(i) Records of the information that must 

be collected under paragraphs (d) and 

(e) of this section that results in the 

granting of unescorted access authorization; 

(ii) Records pertaining to denial or unfavorable termination of unescorted access authorization and related management actions; and 

(iii) Documentation of the granting and 

termination of unescorted access authorization. 

Proposed § 73.56(o)(2) would require licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to retain certain 

records related to UAA determinations for 

at least 5 years after an individual’s UAA 

has been terminated or denied, or until the 

completion of all related legal proceedings, 

whichever is later. The proposed requirement to retain records until the completion 

of all related legal proceedings would address the fact that legal actions involving 

records of the type specified in the proposed paragraph can continue longer than 

the 5 years that the current rule requires 

these records to be retained. Adding a requirement to retain the records until all legal 

proceedings are complete would protect individuals’ ability to have access to a full and 

complete evidentiary record in legal proceedings. The proposed rule would identify 

more specifically the records to be retained 

than the current rule, which in § 73.56(h)(1) 

specifies only ‘‘the records on which authorization is based’’ and ‘‘the records on which 

denial is based.’’ Proposed § 73.56(o)(2) 

would require licensees, applicants, and C/ 

Vs to retain three specified types of 

records: 

(1) Records listed in proposed § 73.56(o)(2)(i), 

which specifies records of the information 

that must be collected under § 73.56(d) 

[Background investigation] and § 73.56(e) 

[Psychological assessment] of the proposed 

rule that results in the granting of UAA; (2) 

records listed in proposed § 73.56(o)(2)(ii), 

which specifies records pertaining to denial 

or unfavorable termination of UAA and related management actions; and (3) records 

listed in proposed § 73.56(o)(2)(iii), which 

specifies documentation of the granting and 

termination of UAA. Proposed 

§ 73.56(o)(2)(iii), requiring retention of 

records that are related to the granting and 

termination of an individual’s UAA, would 

be added to ensure that licensees, applicants, and C/Vs who may be considering 

granting UAA to an individual can determine which category of UAA requirements 

would apply to the individual, based upon 

the length of time that has elapsed since 

the individual’s last period of UAA was terminated and whether the individual’s last 

period of UAA was terminated favorably. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62795 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.56(h)(2) Each licensee shall retain 

records of results of audits, resolution of the 

audit findings and corrective actions for three 

years.

(o)(3) Each licensee, applicant, and C/V who 

is subject to this section shall retain the following records for at least 3 years or until 

the completion of all related legal proceedings, whichever is later: 

(i) Records of behavioral observation 

training conducted under paragraph 

(f)(2) of this section; and 

(ii) Records of audits, audit findings, and 

corrective actions taken under paragraph (n) of this section. 

Proposed § 73.56(o)(3)(i) and (ii) would require licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to retain records related to behavioral observation training and records related to audits, 

audit findings, and corrective actions for at 

least 3 years, or until the completion of all 

related legal proceedings, whichever is 

later. Proposed § 73.56(o)(3)(i) would add a 

new requirement, not addressed in the current rule, to retain records of behavioral observation training. Because the proposed 

rule is adding a requirement that all individuals who are subject to the AA program 

must perform behavioral observation, and 

therefore that they must all be trained in behavioral observation, this proposed record 

retention requirement is necessary to allow 

the NRC to review the implementation of 

the training requirement. Proposed 

§ 73.56(o)(3)(i) would retain the 3-year recordkeeping requirements of the current rule 

in § 73.56(h)(2) for audit findings and corrective action records. 

(o)(4) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall 

retain written agreements for the provision 

of services under this section for the life of 

the agreement or until completion of all 

legal proceedings related to a denial or unfavorable termination of unescorted access 

authorization that involved those services, 

whichever is later.

Proposed § 73.56(o)(4) would add a new requirement that licensees, applicants, and C/ 

Vs shall retain written agreements for the 

provision of authorization program services 

for the life of the agreement or until completion of all legal proceedings related to a denial or unfavorable termination of UAA that 

involved those services, whichever is later. 

The proposed requirement for retention of 

the agreement for the life of the agreement 

would ensure that the agreement is available for use as a source of information 

about the scope of duties under the agreement. The proposed requirement to retain 

the written agreements for any matter under 

legal challenge until the matter is resolved 

is necessary to ensure that the materials 

remain available, should an individual, the 

NRC, a licensee, or another entity who 

would be subject to the rule require access 

to them in a legal or regulatory proceeding. 

(o)(5) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall 

retain records of the background checks, 

and psychological assessments of authorization program personnel, conducted under 

paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, for 

the length of the individual’s employment by 

or contractual relationship with the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V, or until the completion of 

any legal proceedings relating to the actions of such authorization program personnel, whichever is later.

Proposed § 73.56(o)(5) would be added to require licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to retain records related to the background 

checks and psychological assessments of 

AA program personnel, conducted under 

proposed paragraphs (d) and (e) of § 73.56, 

for the length of the individual’s employment by or contractual relationship with the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V, or until the completion of all related legal proceedings, 

whichever is later. The proposed period 

during which these records must be maintained would be based on the NRC’s need 

to have access to the records for inspection 

purposes and the potential need for the 

records to remain available should an individual, the NRC, a licensee, or another entity who would be subject to this rule require 

access to them in a legal or regulatory proceeding. However, the proposed rule would 

establish a limit on the period during which 

the records must be retained in order to reduce the burden associated with storing 

such records indefinitely. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62796 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(o)(6) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall 

ensure that the information about individuals who have applied for unescorted access authorization, which is specified in the 

licensee’s or applicant’s Physical Security 

Plan, is recorded and retained in an information-sharing mechanism that is established and administered by the licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs who are subject to his 

section. Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

shall ensure that only correct and complete 

information is included in the informationsharing mechanism. If, for any reason, the 

shared information used for determining an 

individual’s trustworthiness and reliability 

changes or new information is developed 

about the individual, licensees, applicants, 

and C/Vs shall correct or augment the 

shared information contained in the information-sharing mechanism.

A new § 73.56(o)(6) would require licensees, 

applicants and C/Vs to establish and administer an information-sharing mechanism 

(i.e., a database) that permits all of the entities who are subject to § 73.56 to access 

certain information about individuals who 

have applied for UAA under this section. 

The information that must be shared would 

be specified in the Physical Security Plans 

that licensees and entities would be required to submit for NRC review and approval under proposed § 73.56(a). The proposed paragraph would require licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs to enter this information about individuals who have applied for 

UAA into the information-sharing mechanism and update the shared information, if 

the licensee, applicant or C/V determines 

that information previously entered is incorrect or develops new information about the 

individual. The proposed requirement for an 

information-sharing mechanism is necessary to address several long-standing 

weaknesses in the sharing of information 

about individuals among licensee and C/V 

authorization programs that is required 

under current § 73.56. 

If the changed or developed information has 

implications for adversely affecting an individual’s trustworthiness and reliability, the licensee, applicant, or C/V who has discovered the incorrect information, or develops 

new information, shall inform the reviewing 

official of any authorization program under 

which the individual is maintaining 

unescorted access authorization of the updated information on the day of discovery. 

The reviewing official shall evaluate the information and take appropriate actions, 

which may include denial or unfavorable 

termination of the individual’s unescorted 

access authorization. If, for any reason, the 

information-sharing mechanism is unavailable and a notification of changes or updated information is required, licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall take manual actions to ensure that the information is 

shared, and update the records in the information-sharing mechanism as soon as reasonably possible. Records maintained in 

the database must be available for NRC review.

Although the industry has maintained a database for many years, some licensees did 

not participate, some programs did not 

enter complete information, some programs 

did not enter the information in a timely 

manner, and C/Vs who were implementing 

authorization programs were not permitted 

to participate. As a result, some licensees 

and C/Vs were at risk of granting UAA to 

individuals without being aware, in a few instances, that the individual’s last period of 

UAA had been terminated unfavorably or 

that potentially disqualifying information 

about the individual had been developed by 

a previous licensee after the individual was 

granted UAA by a subsequent licensee, because that additional information was not 

communicated. Therefore, the proposed 

rule would require establishing and administering an information-sharing mechanism 

to strengthen the effectiveness of authorization programs by ensuring that information 

that has implications for an individual’s 

trustworthiness and reliability is available in 

a timely manner, accurate, and complete. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62797 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

The proposed paragraph would also require licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to inform the 

reviewing official of any licensee, applicant, 

or C/V who may be considering an individual for UAA or has granted UAA to an 

individual of any corrected or new information about that individual on the day that incorrect or new information is discovered. 

The proposed requirement to inform the 

subsequent licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s 

reviewing official would be added to ensure 

that the corrected or new information is actively communicated, in addition to entering 

it into the information-sharing mechanism. 

The proposed rule would also require the 

receiving reviewing official to evaluate the 

corrected or new information and determine 

its implications for the individual’s trustworthiness and reliability. If the information 

indicates that the individual cannot be determined to be trustworthy and reliable, the 

proposed rule would require the receiving 

reviewing official to deny or unfavorably terminate the individual’s UAA. 

The proposed requirement to inform subsequent AA programs of corrected or new information is necessary because receiving 

AA programs would not otherwise become 

aware of the information unless and until 

the individual seeks UAA from another AA 

program or is subject to the re-evaluation 

required under proposed § 73.56(i)(1)(v). 

The proposed paragraph would also require 

licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to take 

manual actions to share the required information, if the industry database is unavailable for any reason. These manual actions 

could include, but would not be limited to, 

telephone contacts, faxes, and email communications. However, the proposed rule 

would also require that any records created 

manually must be entered into the database 

once it is again available. These provisions 

would be necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the information-sharing component of AA programs. Finally, the proposed 

paragraph would also require the information-sharing mechanism to be available for 

NRC review. This requirement is necessary 

to ensure that NRC personnel have access 

to the information-sharing mechanism for 

required inspection activities. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62798 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 3.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.56—Continued 

[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(o)(7) If a licensee, applicant, or C/V administratively withdraws an individual’s 

unescorted access authorization under the 

requirements of this section, the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V may not record the administrative action to withdraw the individual’s 

unescorted access authorization as an unfavorable termination and may not disclose 

it in response to a suitable inquiry conducted under the provisions of part 26 of 

this chapter, a background investigation 

conducted under the provisions of this section, or any other inquiry or investigation. 

Immediately upon favorable completion of 

the background investigation element that 

caused the administrative withdrawal, the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall ensure that 

any matter that could link the individual to 

the temporary administrative action is eliminated from the subject individual’s access 

authorization or personnel record and other 

records, except if a review of the information obtained or developed causes the reviewing official to unfavorably terminate the 

individual’s unescorted access.

A new § 73.56(o)(7) would ensure that the 

temporary administrative withdrawal of an 

individual’s UAA, caused by a delay in completing any portion of the background investigation or re-evaluation that is not under 

the individual’s control, would not be treated 

as an unfavorable termination, except if the 

reviewing official determines that the delayed information requires denial or unfavorable termination of the individual’s UAA. 

This proposed provision would be necessary to ensure that individuals are not unfairly subject to any adverse consequences 

for the licensee’s or other entity’s delay in 

completing the background investigation or 

other requirements of the proposed section. 

TABLE 4.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.58 

[Safety/security interface] 

Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.58 Safety/security interface requirements for nuclear power reactors.Proposed § 73.58 would be a new requirement in part 73. The need for 

the proposed rulemaking is based on: (i) The Commission’s comprehensive review of its safeguards and security programs and requirements, (ii) the variables in the current threat environment, (iii) 

the analyses made during the development of the changes to the 

Design Basis Threat, (iv) the plant-specific security analyses, and (v) 

the increased complexity of licensee security measures now being 

required with an attendant increase in the potential for adverse interactions between safety and security. Additionally, it is based on plant 

events that demonstrated that changes made to a facility, its security 

plan, or implementation of the plan can have adverse effects if the 

changes are not adequately assessed and managed. The Commission has determined that the proposed safety/security rule requirements are necessary for reasonable assurance that the public health 

and safety and common defense and security continue to be adequately protected because the current regulations do not specifically 

require evaluation of the effects of plant changes on security or the 

effects of security plan changes on plant safety. Further, the regulations do not require communication about the implementation and 

timing of changes, which would promote awareness of the effects of 

changing conditions, and result in appropriate assessment and response. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62799 

TABLE 4.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.58—Continued 

[Safety/security interface] 

Proposed language Considerations 

Each operating nuclear power reactor licensee with a license issued 

under part 50 or 52 of this chapter shall comply with the requirements of this section. 

(a)(1) The licensee shall assess and manage the potential for adverse 

affects on safety and security, including the site emergency plan, before implementing changes to plant configurations, facility conditions, 

or security. 

The introductory text would indicate this section would apply to power 

reactors licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52. Paragraph (a)(1) of 

this section would require licensees to assess proposed changes to 

plant configurations, facility conditions, or security to identify potential 

adverse effects on the capability of the licensee to maintain either 

safety or security before implementing those changes. The assessment would be qualitative or quantitative. If a potential adverse effect 

would be identified, the licensee shall take appropriate measures to 

manage the potential adverse effect. Managing the potential adverse 

effect would be further described in paragraph (b). The requirements 

of the proposed § 73.58 would be additional requirements to assess 

proposed changes and to manage potential adverse effects contained in other NRC regulations, and would not be intended to substitute for them. The primary function of this proposed rule would be 

to explicitly require that licensees consider the potential for changes 

to cause adverse interaction between security and safety, and to appropriately manage any adverse results. Documentation of assessments performed per paragraph (a)(1) would not be required so as 

not to delay plant and security actions unnecessarily. 

(a)(2) The scope of changes to be assessed and managed must include planned and emergent activities (such as, but not limited to, 

physical modifications, procedural changes, changes to operator actions or security assignments, maintenance activities, system reconfiguration, access modification or restrictions, and changes to the security plan and its implementation).

Paragraph (a)(2) of this section would identify that changes identified 

by either planned or emergent activities must be assessed by the licensee. Paragraph (a)(2) of this section would also provide a description of typical activities for which changes must be assessed 

and for which resultant adverse interactions must be managed. 

(b) Where potential adverse interactions are identified, the licensee 

shall communicate them to appropriate licensee personnel and take 

compensatory and/or mitigative actions to maintain safety and security under applicable Commission regulations, requirements, and license conditions.

Paragraph (b) of this section would require that, when potential adverse interactions would be identified, licensees shall communicate 

the potential adverse interactions to appropriate licensee personnel. 

The licensee shall also take appropriate compensatory and mitigative 

actions to maintain safety and security consistent with the applicable 

NRC requirements. The compensatory and/or mitigative actions 

taken must be consistent with existing requirements for the affected 

activity. 

TABLE 5.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.71 

[Reporting of safeguards events] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(a) Each licensee subject to the provisions of 

§ 73.55 shall notify the NRC Operations 

Center,1 as soon as possible but not later 

than 15 minutes after discovery of an imminent or actual safeguards threat against the 

facility and other safeguards events described in paragraph I of appendix G to this 

part 2.

Footnote: 1. Commercial (secure and non-secure) telephone number of the NRC Operations Center are specified in appendix A to 

this part. 

Footnote: 2. Notifications to the NRC for the 

declaration of an emergency class shall be 

performed in accordance with § 50.72 of 

this chapter. 

This paragraph would be added to provide for 

the very rapid communication to the Commission of an imminent or actual threat to a 

power reactor facility. The proposed 15- 

minute requirement would more accurately 

reflect the current threat environment. Because an actual or imminent threat could 

quickly result in a security event, a shorter 

reporting time would be required. This 

shortened time would permit the NRC to 

contact Federal authorities and other licensees in a rapid manner to inform them of this 

event, especially if this event is the opening 

action on a coordinated multiple-target attack. Such notice may permit other licensees to escalate to a higher protective level 

in advance of an attack. The Commission 

would expect licensees to notify the NRC 

Operations Center as soon as possible 

after they notify local law enforcement 

agencies, but within 15 minutes. The Commission may consider the applicability of 

this requirement to other types of licensees 

in future rulemaking. 

Footnote 1 would provide a cross reference to 

appendix A to part 73 which contains NRC 

contact information. Footnote 2 would remind licensees of their concurrent emergency declaration responsibilities under 10 

CFR 50.72. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62800 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 5.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.71—Continued 

[Reporting of safeguards events] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(a)(1) When making a report under paragraph 

(a) of this section, the licensees shall: 

The proposed rule would include this introductory statement, which provides a structure 

for the following list of information to be 

provided in the 15-minute report. 

(a)(1)(i) Identify the facility name; and This requirement would be added to ensure 

the licensee’s facility is clearly identified 

when a report is made. 

(a)(1)(ii) Briefly describe the nature of the 

threat or event, including: 

This requirement would be added to ensure 

the nature and substance of the event 

would be clearly articulated based on the 

best information available to the licensee at 

the time of the report. The information 

should be as factual and as succinct as 

possible. Additional information regarding 

the identification of events to be reported 

and the nature of the information to be provide will be described in guidance. 

(a)(1)(ii)(A) Type of threat or event (e.g., 

armed assault, vehicle bomb, credible 

bomb threat, etc.); and 

This requirement would be added to provide 

for a minimum, succinct categorization of 

the information described in the report. This 

would allow the licensee the opportunity to 

provide a scope for the information included 

in the report. The information should be as 

factual and as succinct as possible at the 

time of the report. Additional information regarding identification of events to be reported will be provided in guidance. 

(a)(1)(ii)(B) Threat or event status (i.e., imminent, in progress, or neutralized). This requirement would be added to provide 

information regarding the most current status of the event or information being reported. The information should be as factual as possible at the time of the report. 

(b)(2) This notification must be made in accordance with the requirements of Paragraphs (a) 

(2), (3), (4), and (5) of this section.

(a)(2) Notifications must be made according 

to paragraph (e) of this section, as applicable.

This paragraph would be revised to reflect the 

new location for the methods for these notifications. The requirements for the methods 

all of the verbal notifications [under this 

section] would be consolidated under paragraph (e). 

(a)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of 

§§ 73.25, 73.26, 73.27(c), 73.37, 73.67(e), or 

73.67(g) shall notify the NRC Operations 

Center1 within one hour after discovery of 

the loss of any shipment of SNM or spent 

fuel, and within one hour after recovery of or 

accounting for such lost shipment.

Footnote: 1. Commercial telephone number of 

the NRC Operation Center is (301) 816–5100.

(b) Each licensee subject to the provisions of 

§§ 73.25, 73.26, 73.27(c), 73.37, 73.67(e), 

or 73.67(g) shall notify the NRC Operations 

Center within one (1) hour after discovery 

of the loss of any shipment of special nuclear material (SNM) or spent nuclear fuel, 

and within one (1) hour after recovery of or 

accounting for the lost shipment. Notifications must be made according to paragraph 

(e) of this section, as applicable.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

retained with minor revision. Footnote (1) 

would be relocated to new paragraph (a) 

and revised. The acronym ‘‘SNM’’ would be 

spelled out as ‘‘special nuclear material.’’

The word ‘‘nuclear’’ would be added to 

‘‘spent fuel’’ to be consistent with terminology used elsewhere in part 73. Reference to the methods of telephonic reporting would be added to specify paragraph 

(e) of this section. 

(b)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of 

§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, 

or 73.67 shall notify the NRC Operations 

Center within 1 hour of discovery of the safeguards events described in Paragraph I(a)(1) 

of appendix G to this part.

(c) Each licensee subject to the provisions of 

§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, 

or 73.67 shall notify the NRC Operations 

Center within one (1) hour after discovery 

of the safeguards events described in paragraph II of appendix G to this part. Notifications must be made according to paragraph 

(e) of this section, as applicable.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

retained with minor revision. The words ‘‘1 

hour of’’ would be replaced by the words 

‘‘one (1) hour after’’ to clarify the time frame 

established by this requirement. The reference to appendix G would be revised as 

a conforming change to specify the events 

to be reported. Reference to the methods of 

reporting would be added to specify paragraph (e) of this section. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62801 

TABLE 5.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.71—Continued 

[Reporting of safeguards events] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(d) Each licensee subject to the provisions of 

§ 73.55 shall notify the NRC Operations 

Center, as soon as possible but not later 

than four (4) hours after discovery of the 

safeguards events described in paragraph 

III of appendix G to this part. Notifications 

must be made according to paragraph (e) 

of this section, as applicable.

This paragraph would be added to provide a 

requirement for power reactor licensees to 

notify the Commission of suspicious activities, attempts at access, etc., that may indicate pre-operational surveillance, reconnaissance, or intelligence gathering activities targeted against the facility. This would 

more accurately reflect the current threat 

environment; would assist the Commission 

in evaluating threats to multiple licensees; 

and would assist the intelligence and homeland security communities in evaluating 

threats across critical infrastructure sectors. 

The reporting process intended in this proposed rule would be similar reporting process that the licensees currently use under 

guidance issued by the Commission subsequent to September 11, 2001, and would 

formalize Commission expectations; however, the reporting interval would be lengthened from 1 hour to 4 hours. 

The Commission views this length of time as 

reasonable to accomplish these broader objectives. This reporting requirement does 

not include a followup written report. The 

Commission believes that a written report 

from the licensees would be of minimal 

value and would be an unnecessary regulatory burden, because the types of incidents to be reported are transitory in nature 

and time-sensitive. The proposed text 

would be neither a request for intelligence 

collection activities nor authority for the conduct of law enforcement or intelligence activities. This paragraph would simply require 

the reporting of observed activities. The 

Commission may consider the applicability 

of this requirement to other types of licensees in future rulemaking. 

(a)(2) This notification must be made to the 

NRC Operations Center via the Emergency 

Notification System, if the licensee is party to 

that system.

(e) The licensees shall make the notifications 

required by paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) 

of this section to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System, 

or other dedicated telephonic system that 

may be designated by the Commission, if 

the licensee has access to that system.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

revised as a conforming change to new 

paragraph (d). Other revisions would include changing the phrase ‘‘This notification 

must be made to’’ would be replaced by the 

active-voice phrase ‘‘The licensee shall 

make’’ to clarify that it would be the licensee who takes the notification action. 

The phrase ‘‘or other dedicated telephonic 

system that may be designated by the 

Commission’’ would be added to allow flexibility to address advances in communications systems. 

(a)(2) If the Emergency Notification System is 

inoperative or unavailable, the licensee shall 

make the required notification via commercial 

telephonic service or other dedicated telephonic system or any other methods that will 

ensure that a report is received by the NRC 

Operations Center within one hour.

(e)(1) If the Emergency Notification System or 

other designated telephonic system is inoperative or unavailable, licensees shall make 

the required notification via commercial telephonic service or any other methods that 

will ensure that a report is received by the 

NRC Operations Center within the timeliness requirements of paragraphs (a), (b), 

(c), and (d) of this section, as applicable.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

retained with minor revision. The phrase 

‘‘within one hour’’ would be replaced with 

the phrase ‘‘within the timeliness requirements of paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) of 

this section, as applicable.’’ This would provide consistency with the varying submission intervals for notifications under paragraphs (a) through (d). 

(a)(2) The exemption of Section 73.21(g)(3) applies to all telephonic reports required by this 

section.

(e)(2) The exception of § 73.21(g)(3) for emergency or extraordinary conditions applies to 

all telephonic reports required by this section.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

retained with minor revision to provide clarity [and consistency with § 73.21 safeguards 

information regulations] on what types of 

telephonic notifications are exempt from the 

secure communications requirements of 

§ 73.21. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62802 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 5.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.71—Continued 

[Reporting of safeguards events] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(a)(3) The licensee shall, upon request to the 

NRC, maintain an open and continuous communication channel with the NRC Operations 

Center.

(e)(3) For events reported under paragraph 

(a) of this section, the licensee may be requested by the NRC to maintain an open, 

continuous communication channel with the 

NRC Operations Center, once the licensee 

has completed other required notifications 

under this section, § 50.72 of this chapter, 

or appendix E of part 50 of this chapter and 

any immediate actions to stabilize the plant. 

When established, the continuous communications channel shall be staffed by a 

knowledgeable individual in the licensee’s 

security or operations organizations (e.g., a 

security supervisor, an alarm station operator, operations personnel, etc.) from a location deemed appropriate by the licensee.

This requirement would be retained and revised into three separate requirements. The 

first sentence would be reworded to reflect 

the renumbered event reports under this 

section. For the 15-minute reports, the 

paragraph would indicate that a licensee 

may be requested to establish a ‘‘continuous communications channel’’ following 

the initial 15-minute notification. The establishment of a continuous communications 

channel would not supercede current emergency preparedness or security requirements to notify State officials or local law 

enforcement authorities, nor would it 

supercede requirements to take immediate 

action to stabilize the reactor plant (e.g.≤, in 

response to a reactor scram or to the loss 

of offsite power). 

The continuous communications channel may 

be established via the Emergency Notification System or other dedicated telephonic 

system that may be designated by the 

Commission, if the licensee has access to 

that system, or a commercial telephonic 

system.

A new requirement would be added for the 

person communicating to be knowledgeable 

and from the licensee’s security or operations organization. This language would 

provide licensees with flexibility in choosing 

personnel to fulfill this communications role 

and in choosing the location for this communication (e.g., control room, security 

alarm station, technical support center, 

etc.). This language would also provide licensees direction and flexibility on the telephonic systems that may be used for this 

communications channel. 

(a)(3) The licensee shall, upon request to the 

NRC, maintain an open and continuous communication channel with the NRC Operations 

Center.

(e)(4) For events reported under paragraphs 

(b) or (c) of this section, the licensee shall 

maintain an open, continuous communication channel with the NRC Operations Center upon request from the NRC.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

retained with minor revision to support the 

renumbering of existing paragraphs (a) and 

(b) to new (b) and (c). 

(e)(5) For suspicious events reported under 

paragraph (d) of this section, the licensee is 

not required to maintain an open, continuous communication channel with the NRC 

Operations Center.

This would be a new requirement. For suspicious activity reports, no continuous communication channel would be required. The 

Commission’s view is that because these 

reports are intended for law enforcement, 

threat assessment, and intelligence community purposes, rather than event followup 

purposes, a continuous communications 

channel is not necessary. 

(c) Each licensee subject to the provisions of 

§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, 

or each licensee possessing SSNM and subject to the provisions of § 73.67(d) shall maintain a current log * * *.

(f) Each licensee subject to the provisions of 

§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, 

or each licensee possessing SSNM and 

subject to the provisions of § 73.67(d) shall 

maintain a current safeguards event log.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

retained with minor revision. The term 

‘‘safeguards event’’ would be added between ‘‘current’’ and ‘‘log’’ to provide greater clarity and consistency with appendix G. 

(c) * * * and record the safeguards events described in Paragraphs II (a) and (b) of appendix G to this part within 24 hours of discovery 

by a licensee employee or member of the licensee’s contract security organization.

(f)(1) The licensee shall record the safeguards 

events described in paragraph IV of appendix G of this part within 24 hours of discovery.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

retained with revision. This paragraph 

would also be revised to reflect the renumbering of appendix G. The language on discovery by a licensee or licensee contractor 

would be removed to reduce confusion. The 

Commission expects all logable events to 

be recorded, irrespective of who identifies 

the security issue (i.e., recordable events 

discovered by licensee staff, contractors, 

NRC or State inspectors, or independent 

auditors should be logged). 

(c) * * * The licensee shall retain the log of 

events recorded under this section as a 

record for three years after the last entry is 

made in each log or until termination of the license.

(f)(2) The licensees shall retain the log of 

events recorded under this section as a 

record for three (3) years after the last entry 

is made in each log or until termination of 

the license.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

retained with minor revision by adding ‘‘(3)’’

after ‘‘three’’ [years]. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62803 

TABLE 5.—PROPOSED PART 73 SECTION 73.71—Continued 

[Reporting of safeguards events] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(a)(4) The initial telephonic notification must be 

followed within a period of 60 days by a written report submitted to the NRC by an appropriate method listed in § 73.4.

(g) Written reports. (1) Each licensee making 

an initial telephonic notification under paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this section shall 

also submit a written report to the NRC 

within a period of 60 days by an appropriate method listed in § 73.4.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

retained with revision. The current text 

would be retained requiring a written 60-day 

report be submitted for 1-hour notifications 

under paragraph (b) and (c). A written 60- 

day report would also be required for 15- 

minute notifications under paragraph (a). 

(g)(2) Licenses are not required to submit a 

written report following a telephonic notification made under paragraph (d) of this section.

This paragraph would be a new requirement. 

Licensees would not be required to submit 

a written report for a suspicious activity notification made under paragraph (d) as no 

‘‘security event’’ has occurred. Any followup 

that might be necessary would be handled 

through the Commission’s threat assessment procedures. 

(d) Each licensee shall submit to the Commission the 60-day written reports required 

under the provisions of this section that are 

of a quality that will permit legible reproduction and processing. * * *.

(g)(3) Each licensee shall submit to the Commission written reports that are of a quality 

that will permit legible reproduction and 

processing.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

retained. The timing requirement and the 

quality requirement would be split into paragraph (g)(1) and (g)(3), respectively. 

(d) * * * [I]f the facility is subject to § 50.73 of 

this chapter, the licensee shall prepare the 

written report on NRC Form 366. If the facility 

is not subject to § 50.73 of this chapter, the licensee shall not use this form but shall prepare the written report in letter format * * *.

(g)(4) Licensees subject to § 50.73 of this 

chapter shall prepare the written report on 

NRC Form 366.

(g)(5) Licensees not subject to § 50.73 of this 

chapter, shall prepare the written report in 

letter format.

These requirements would be renumbered 

and retained. 

(a)(4) In addition to the addressees specified in 

§ 73.4, the licensee shall also provide one 

copy of the written report addressed to the 

Director, Division of Nuclear Security, Office 

of Nuclear Security and Incident Response.

(g)(6) In addition to the addressees specified 

in § 73.4, the licensees shall also provide 

one copy of the written report and any revisions addressed to the Director, Office of 

Nuclear Security and Incident Response.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

retained with minor revision. The paragraph 

would be revised to change the organization within the NRC, that should receive an 

extra copy of the written, or any revisions to 

the written report, in addition to the standard submission addresses under § 73.4. 

The phrase ‘‘Director, Division of Nuclear 

Security’’ would be replaced with the ‘‘Director, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response.’’ to reflect changes within 

the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident 

Response and reduce the need for future 

changes to this regulation with realignment 

of the NRC’s internal structure. 

(a)(4) The report must include sufficient information for NRC analysis and evaluation.(g)(7) The report must include sufficient information for NRC analysis and evaluation.This requirement would be retained and be 

renumbered. 

(a)(5) Significant supplemental information 

which becomes available after the initial telephonic notification to the NRC Operations 

Center or after the submission of the written 

report must be telephonically reported to the 

NRC Operations Center and also submitted 

in a revised written report (with the revisions 

indicated) to the Regional Office and the 

Document Control Desk.

(g)(8) Significant supplemental information 

which becomes available after the initial telephonic notification to the NRC Operations 

Center or after the submission of the written 

report must be telephonically reported to 

the NRC Operations Center under paragraph (e) of this section and also submitted 

in a revised written report (with the revisions indicated) as required under paragraph (g)(6) of this section.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

revised. Language would be added to clarity the updating of notifications made under 

paragraph (e) and to require revised written 

reports. Written initial and revised reports 

would be submitted in accordance with 

paragraph (g)(6) of this section. 

(a)(5) Errors discovered in a written report must 

be corrected in a revised report with revisions 

indicated.

(g)(9) Errors discovered in a written report 

must be corrected in a revised report with 

revisions indicated.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

retained. 

(a)(5) The revised report must replace the previous report; the update must be a complete 

entity and not contain only supplementary or 

revised information.

(g)(10) The revised report must replace the 

previous report; the update must be complete and not be limited to only supplementary or revised information.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

retained with minor grammatical changes. 

(a)(5) Each licensee shall maintain a copy of 

the written report of an event submitted 

under this section as record for a period of 

three years from the date of the report.

(g)(11) Each licensee shall maintain a copy of 

the written report of an event submitted 

under this section as record for a period of 

three (3) years from the date of the report.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

retained with minor revision by adding ‘‘(3)’’

after ‘‘three’’ [years]. 

(e) Duplicate reports are not required for events 

that are also reportable in accordance with 

§§ 50.72 and 50.73 of this chapter.

(h) Duplicate reports are not required for 

events that are also reportable in accordance with §§ 50.72 and 50.73 of this chapter.

This requirement would be retained and be 

renumbered. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62804 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B to Part 73 ........................................

General Criteria for Security Personnel .............

Appendix B to Part 73 .....................................

VI. Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification Plan 

This proposed Paragraph VI and header 

would be added to the current appendix B 

to replicate current requirements, ensure 

continuity between training and qualification 

programs and requirements for security personnel, and provide for the separation, 

modification, addition, and clarification of 

training and qualification requirements as 

they apply specifically to operating nuclear 

power reactors. 

Introduction ......................................................... A. General Requirements and Introduction ..... The phrase ‘‘General Requirements and’’

would be added to this header for formatting purposes. 

Appendix B, Introduction, Paragraph 1: Security 

personnel who are responsible for the protection of special nuclear material on site or in 

transit and for the protection of the facility or 

shipment vehicle against radiological sabotage should, like other elements of the physical security system, be required to meet minimum criteria to ensure that they will effectively perform their assigned security-related 

job duties.

A.1. The licensee shall ensure that all individuals who are assigned duties and responsibilities required to prevent significant core 

damage and spent fuel sabotage, implement the Commission-approved security 

plans, licensee response strategy, and implementing procedures, meet minimum 

training and qualification requirements to 

ensure each individual possesses the 

knowledge, skills, and abilities required to 

effectively perform the assigned duties and 

responsibilities.

This requirement would retain the requirement 

for security personnel to meet minimum criteria to ensure that they will effectively perform their assigned security-related job duties. The phrase ‘‘security personnel’’ would 

be replaced with the phrase ‘‘all individuals’’

to describe the Commission determination 

that any individual who is assigned to perform a security function must be trained 

and qualified to effectively perform that security function. The phrase ‘‘on site or in 

transit and for the protection of the facility 

or shipment vehicle’’ would be deleted to 

remove language not applicable to power 

reactors. The phrase ‘‘against radiological 

sabotage’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘required to prevent core damage 

and spent fuel sabotage,’’. The phrase ‘‘implementation of the Commission-approved 

security plans, licensee response strategy, 

and implementing procedures’’ would provide a detailed list of programmatic areas 

for which the licensee must provide effective training and qualification to satisfy the 

performance objective for protection against 

radiological sabotage. The word ‘‘should’’

would be deleted because training and 

qualification would be required not suggested. 

The phrase ‘‘like other elements of the physical security system, be required to meet 

minimum criteria to ensure that they will effectively perform their assigned security-related job duties’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘meet minimum training and qualification requirements to ensure each individual possesses the knowledge, skills, and 

abilities required to effectively perform the 

assigned duties and responsibilities’’ to describe the Commission determination that 

minimum training and qualification requirements are met to provide assurance that 

assigned individuals possess the knowledge, skills, and abilities that are required 

to effectively perform the assigned function. 

Appendix B, Introduction: In order to ensure 

that those individuals responsible for security 

are properly equipped and qualified to execute the job duties prescribed for them, the 

NRC has developed general criteria that 

specify security personnel qualification requirements.

A.2. To ensure that those individuals who are 

assigned to perform duties and responsibilities required for the implementation of the 

Commission-approved security plans, licensee response strategy, and implementing procedures are properly suited, 

trained, equipped, and qualified to perform 

their assigned duties and responsibilities, 

the Commission has developed minimum 

training and qualification requirements that 

must be implemented through a Commission-approved training and qualification plan.

This requirement would retain the requirement 

for the licensee to ensure that all personnel 

assigned security duties and responsibilities 

are properly trained and qualified. The 

word, ‘‘suited’’ would be added to reflect the 

suitability requirements of the current appendix B. The word, ‘‘trained’’ would be 

added to reflect the training requirements of 

the current appendix B. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62805 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

The phrase ‘‘responsible for security’’ would 

be replaced with the phrase ‘‘who are assigned to perform duties and responsibilities 

required for the implementation of the Commission-approved security plans, licensee 

response strategy, and implementing procedures’’ to identify the major programmatic 

areas from which security duties are derived. The phrase ‘‘execute the job duties 

prescribed for them’’ would be replaced 

with the phrase ‘‘perform their assigned duties and responsibilities’’ to for consistency 

with the updated language used in the proposed rule. The acronym ‘‘NRC’’ would be 

replaced with the word ‘‘Commission’’ to remove the use of this acronym. The phrase 

‘‘general criteria that specify security personnel qualification requirements’’ would be 

replaced with the phrase ‘‘minimum training 

and qualification requirements’’ for consistency with the use of the word ‘‘minimum’’

and the phrase ‘‘general criteria that specify’’. The phrase ‘‘that shall be implemented 

through a Commission-approved training 

and qualification plan’’ would be added for 

consistency with the proposed 10 CFR 

73.55. 

Appendix B, Introduction: These general criteria 

establish requirements for the selection, training, equipping, testing, and qualification of individuals who will be responsible for protecting special nuclear materials, nuclear facilities, and nuclear shipments.

Appendix B, Introduction: When required to 

have security personnel that have been 

trained, equipped, and qualified to perform 

assigned security job duties in accordance 

with the criteria in this appendix, the licensee 

must establish, maintain, and follow a plan 

that shows how the criteria will be met.

A.3. The licensee shall establish, maintain, 

and follow a Commission-approved training 

and qualification plan, describing how the 

minimum training and qualification requirements set forth in this appendix will be met, 

to include the processes by which all members of the security organization, will be selected, trained, equipped, tested, and qualified.

This requirement for selection, training, equipping, testing, and qualification would be retained and reformatted to combine two current requirements. An expansion of the plan 

requirements would describe the content of 

an approved training and qualification plan 

that would demonstrate how the requirements in the appendix are met. 

Appendix B, II.D: Each individual assigned to 

perform the security related task identified in 

the licensee physical security or contingency 

plan shall demonstrate the required knowledge, skill, and ability in accordance with the 

specified standards for each task as stated in 

the NRC approved licensee training and 

qualifications plan.

A.4. Each individual assigned to perform security program duties and responsibilities 

required to effectively implement the Commission-approved security plans, licensee 

protective strategy, and the licensee implementing procedures, shall demonstrate the 

knowledge, skills, and abilities required to 

effectively perform the assigned duties and 

responsibilities before the individual is assigned the duty or responsibility.

This requirement to demonstrate knowledge, 

skills would be retained. The requirement to 

demonstrate knowledge, skills, and abilities 

prior to assignment would be added to ensure that each individual demonstrates the 

ability to apply formal classroom training to 

assigned duties and responsibilities. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. * * * shall consider 

job-related functions such as strenuous activity, physical exertion, levels of stress, and exposure to the elements as they pertain to 

each individual’s assigned security job duties 

for both normal and emergency operations.

A.5. The licensee shall ensure that the training and qualification program simulates, as 

closely as practicable, the specific conditions under which the individual shall be required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.

This requirement would be based upon the 

current requirement of appendix B, Paragraph I.C., and require that due to changes 

in the threat environment that personnel 

must be trained in a manner which simulates the site specific conditions under 

which the assigned duties and responsibilities are required to be performed. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62806 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Introduction: Security personnel 

who are responsible for the protection of special nuclear material on site or in transit and 

for the protection of the facility or shipment 

vehicle against radiological sabotage should, 

like other elements of the physical security 

system, be required to meet minimum criteria 

to ensure that they will effectively perform 

their assigned security-related job duties.

A.6. The licensee may not allow any individual to perform any security function, assume any security duties or responsibilities, 

or return to security duty, until that individual satisfies the training and qualification 

requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification 

plan, unless specifically authorized by the 

Commission.

This requirement would be based upon the 

current appendix B, Introduction. Due to 

changes to the threat environment, this requirement would identify the applicability of 

appendix B training and qualification standards to all security-related duties, whether 

they be performed by traditional security organization personnel or other plant staff. Licensees would be required by the proposed 

rule to describe how non-security personnel 

would be trained to perform the specific 

functions to which they are assigned in accordance with the Commission-approved 

training and qualification plan, and that nonsecurity personnel would be required to 

meet the requirements of this proposed appendix that are specifically articulated and 

necessary to perform the required, specific 

duty or responsibility assigned. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.E. At least every 12 

months, central alarm station operators shall 

be required to meet the physical requirements of B.1.b of this section, and guards, 

armed response personnel, and armed escorts shall be required to meet the physical 

requirements of Paragraphs B.1.b(1) and (2), 

and C of this section.

A.7. Annual requirements must be scheduled 

at a nominal twelve (12) month periodicity. 

Annual requirements may be completed up 

to three (3) months before or three (3) 

months after the scheduled date. However, 

the next annual training must be scheduled 

twelve (12) months from the previously 

scheduled date rather than the date the 

training was actually completed.

This annual training requirement would be retained and revised for consistency with the 

proposed § 73.55. The intent would be to 

provide regulatory stability and consistency 

by requiring annual training at a nominal 12 

month intervals, while providing for those 

instances when a licensee may not be able 

to conduct annual training on the scheduled 

date due to site specific conditions or 

unforseen circumstances. This would provide needed flexibility in accomplishing required training. This requirement would provide for annual training to be conducted up 

to three (3) months prior to, or three (3) 

months after the scheduled initial date. 

However, to insure that the required training 

period would be not repeatedly extended 

beyond the required 12 months, this requirement would require that the next subsequent training date be 12 months from 

the originally scheduled date. The intent 

would be to provide licensees with the necessary flexibility to resolve scheduling 

issues due to unexpected circumstances 

such as forced outages, unforseen weather 

conditions, and ensure that training would 

be completed within the minimum required 

frequency. 

I. Employment suitability and qualification ......... B. Employment suitability and qualification ..... This header would be retained without 

change. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.A. Suitability: B.1. Suitability .................................................. This header would be retained without 

change. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.A.1. Prior to employment, or assignment to the security organization, an individual shall meet the following 

suitability criteria: 

B.1.a. Before employment, or assignment to 

the security organization, an individual 

shall: 

This requirement would be retained with only 

minor grammatical changes. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.A.1.a. Educational development—Possess a high school diploma 

or pass an equivalent performance examination designed to measure basic job-related 

mathematical, language, and reasoning skills, 

ability, and knowledge, required to perform 

security job duties.

B.1.a.(1) Possess a high school diploma or 

pass an equivalent performance examination designed to measure basic mathematical, language, and reasoning skills, 

abilities, and knowledge required to perform 

security duties and responsibilities; 

This requirement to possess a high school diploma or pass an equivalent performance 

examination would be retained. The title 

‘‘Educational development’’ would be deleted because it would not be needed. The 

phrase ‘‘job-related’’ would be deleted because it would be addressed by the phrase 

‘‘required to perform’’. The word ‘‘job’’

would be replaced with the word ‘‘responsibilities’’ to more accurately reflect the 

skills required. The word ‘‘ability’’ would be 

replaced with the word ‘‘abilities’’ to correct 

grammar. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62807 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.A.2. Prior to employment or assignment to the security organization in an armed capacity, the individual, in 

addition to (a) and (b) above, must be 21 

years of age or older.

B.1.a.(2) Have attained the age of 21 for an 

armed capacity or the age of 18 for an unarmed capacity; and 

This age requirement for armed personnel 

would be retained. The phrase ‘‘or the age 

of 18 for an unarmed capacity’’ would be 

added to specify a minimum age since the 

current NRC approved training and qualification plans for all licensees requires unarmed members to have attained the age of 

18 prior to assignment. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.A.1.b. Felony convictions—Have no felony convictions involving 

the use of a weapon and no felony convictions that reflect on the individual’s reliability.

B.1.a.(3) An unarmed individual assigned to 

the security organization may not have any 

felony convictions that reflect on the individual’s reliability.

The phrase ‘‘Have no felony convictions involving the use of a weapon’’ would be deleted because the proposed rule would address this requirement in 10 CFR 73.18 for 

an armed member of the security organization. The phrase ‘‘An unarmed individual 

assigned to the security organization may 

not have any felony convictions’’ would be 

added to retain the current requirement for 

unarmed individuals. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II.C. The qualifications 

of each individual must be documented and 

attested by a licensee security supervisor.

B.1.b. The qualification of each individual to 

perform assigned duties and responsibilities 

must be documented by a qualified training 

instructor and attested to by a security supervisor.

The ‘‘attested to by a security supervisor’’ requirement would be retained. The phrase 

‘‘to perform assigned duties and responsibilities’’ would be added to clarify the performance standard for documentation. The 

phrase ‘‘by a qualified training instructor’’

would be added to require that the security 

supervisor must attest to the fact that the 

required training for each individual was administered by a qualified instructor and documentation was obtained and properly completed. The word ‘‘licensee’’ would be deleted because a contract security supervisor 

may attest to an individual’s qualification. 

These changes would better describe the 

requirement for verification and documentation of training by a supervisor. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B. Physical and mental qualifications.B.2. Physical qualifications .............................. This header would be retained and the two 

topics separately addressed. The word 

‘‘mental’’ is deleted because psychological 

qualifications are set forth separately. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1. Physical qualifications: B.2.a. General Physical Qualifications ............ This header would be retained. The word 

‘‘General’’ would be added to indicate that 

site specific physical qualifications would be 

applicable if not addressed herein. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.a. Individuals 

whose security tasks and job duties are directly associated with the effective implementation of the licensee physical security and 

contingency plans shall have no physical 

weaknesses or abnormalities that would adversely affect their performance of assigned 

security job duties.

B.2.a.(1) Individuals whose duties and responsibilities are directly associated with 

the effective implementation of the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures, may not have any physical conditions that would adversely affect their performance.

The requirement would be retained. The 

phrase ‘‘tasks and job duties’’ would be replaced with the phrase ‘‘duties and responsibilities’’ to reflect current language usage. 

The phrase ‘‘licensee physical security and 

contingency plans’’ would be replaced with 

the phrase ‘‘Commission-approved security 

plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures’’ to specify the 

source of the duties and responsibilities. 

The phrase ‘‘of assigned security job duties’’ would be deleted because it would be 

addressed by the phrase ‘‘whose duties 

and responsibilities’’ at the beginning of this 

proposed requirement. The phrase ‘‘weaknesses or abnormalities’’ would be replaced 

with ‘‘conditions’’ to specify that all physical 

attributes affecting performance should be 

considered. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62808 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b. In addition to a. 

above, guards, armed response personnel, 

armed escorts, and central alarm station operators shall successfully pass a physical examination administered by a licensed physician. The examination shall be designed to 

measure the individual’s physical ability to 

perform assigned security job duties as identified in the licensee physical security and 

contingency plans.

B.2.a.(2) Armed and unarmed members of the 

security organization shall be subject to a 

physical examination designed to measure 

the individual’s physical ability to perform 

assigned duties and responsibilities as 

identified in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, 

and implementing procedures.

This physical examination requirement would 

be retained. Proposed revisions would combine two current requirements, reflect current language usage, and describe the requirement for measuring the individual’s 

physical ability to assure they can perform 

assigned duties. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b. In addition to a. 

above, guards, armed response personnel, 

armed escorts, and central alarm station operators shall successfully pass a physical examination administered by a licensed physician.

B.2.a.(3) This physical examination must be 

administered by a licensed health professional with final determination being made 

by a licensed physician to verify the individual’s physical capability to perform assigned 

duties and responsibilities.

This physical examination requirement would 

be retained. Proposed revisions would describe the minimum qualifications of the individual administering the physical examination and separate the professional qualifications that must be met by the individual(s) 

administering the physical examination and 

the person making the determination of the 

individual’s physical capability to perform 

assigned duties. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b. Armed personnel shall meet the following additional 

physical requirements: 

B.2.a.(4) The licensee shall ensure that both 

armed and unarmed members of the security organization who are assigned security 

duties and responsibilities identified in the 

Commission-approved security plans, the licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures, meet the following 

minimum physical requirements, as required to effectively perform their assigned 

duties.

The physical requirements requirement would 

be retained. Proposed revisions due to 

changes to the threat environment would 

describe the minimum physical requirements for both armed and unarmed security 

personnel. Inclusion of unarmed personnel 

would be necessary to account for those instances where the two types of security 

personnel share similar duties and responsibilities required to implement the approved plans and procedures. The requirement would not apply to administrative security staff, such as clerks or secretaries, 

for the performance of their assigned administrative duties and responsibilities. 

However, should such personnel, or other 

non-security personnel be assigned to perform security functions required to implement the Commission-approved security 

plans and implementing procedures, these 

personnel must be trained and qualified to 

perform these duties and possess appropriate vision, hearing, and physical capabilities that are required to effectively perform 

the assigned duties or responsibilities. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(1) Vision: B.2.b. Vision: This header would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(1)(a) For each 

individual, distant visual acuity in each eye 

shall be correctable to 20/30 (Snellen or 

equivalent) in the better eye and 20/40 in the 

other eye with eyeglasses or contact lenses.

B.2.b.(1) For each individual, distant visual 

acuity in each eye shall be correctable to 

20/30 (Snellen or equivalent) in the better 

eye and 20/40 in the other eye with eyeglasses or contact lenses.

This requirement would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(1)(a) Near visual acuity, corrected or uncorrected, shall be 

at least 20/40 in the better eye.

B.2.b.(2) Near visual acuity, corrected or uncorrected, shall be at least 20/40 in the better eye.This requirement would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(1)(a) Field of vision must be at least 70 degrees horizontal 

meridian in each eye.

B.2.b.(3) Field of vision must be at least 70 

degrees horizontal meridian in each eye.

This requirement would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(1)(a) The ability 

to distinguish red, green, and yellow colors is 

required.

B.2.b.(4) The ability to distinguish red, green, 

and yellow colors is required.

This requirement would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(1)(a) Loss of vision in one eye is disqualifying.B.2.b.(5) Loss of vision in one eye is disqualifying.This requirement would be retained. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62809 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(1)(a) Glaucoma 

shall be disqualifying, unless controlled by 

acceptable medical or surgical means, provided such medications as may be used for 

controlling glaucoma do not cause undesirable side effects which adversely affect the 

individual’s ability to perform assigned security job duties, and provided the visual acuity 

and field of vision requirements stated above 

are met.

B.2.b.(6) Glaucoma is disqualifying, unless 

controlled by acceptable medical or surgical 

means, provided that medications used for 

controlling glaucoma do not cause undesirable side effects which adversely affect the 

individual’s ability to perform assigned security job duties, and provided the visual 

acuity and field of vision requirements stated previously are met.

This requirement would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(1)(a) On-the-job 

evaluation shall be used for individuals who 

exhibit a mild color vision defect.

B.2.b.(7) On-the-job evaluation must be used 

for individuals who exhibit a mild color vision defect.

This requirement would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(1)(a) If uncorrected distance vision is not at least 20/40 in 

the better eye, the individual shall carry an 

extra pair of corrective lenses.

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(1)(b) Where 

corrective eyeglasses are required, they shall 

be of the safety glass type.

B.2.b.(8) If uncorrected distance vision is not 

at least 20/40 in the better eye, the individual shall carry an extra pair of corrective 

lenses in the event that the primaries are 

damaged. Corrective eyeglasses must be of 

the safety glass type.

The vision requirements in Paragraphs 

I.B.1.b.(1)(a) and I.B.1.b.(1)(b) would be retained and combined. The phrase ‘‘in the 

event that the primaries are damaged’’

would be added to ensure that the individual would continue to meet minimum vision requirements should one pair be damaged and not usable. The phrase ‘‘carry an 

extra pair of corrective lenses’’ would include any future technological advancements in vision correction and would include glasses and/or contact lenses, or 

other materials by any name whose purpose would be to correct an individual’s vision. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(1)(c) The use of 

corrective eyeglasses or contact lenses shall 

not interfere with an individual’s ability to effectively perform assigned security job duties 

during normal or emergency operations.

B.2.b.(9) The use of corrective eyeglasses or 

contact lenses may not interfere with an individual’s ability to effectively perform assigned duties and responsibilities during 

normal or emergency conditions.

This requirement would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(2) Hearing: B.2.c. Hearing: This header would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.b.(2)(a) Individuals 

shall have no hearing loss in the better ear 

greater than 30 decibels average at 500 Hz, 

1,000 Hz, and 2,000 Hz with no level greater 

that 40 decibels at any one frequency (by 

ISO 389 ‘‘Standard Reference Zero for the 

Calibration of Puritone Audiometer’’ (1975) or 

ANSI S3.6–1969 R. 1973) ‘‘Specifications for 

Audiometers’’). ISO 389 and ANSI S3.6–

1969 have been approved for incorporation 

by reference by the Director of the Federal 

Register.

B.2.c.(1) Individuals may not have hearing 

loss in the better ear greater than 30 decibels average at 500 Hz, 1,000 Hz, and 

2,000 Hz with no level greater that 40 decibels at any one frequency.

The requirement concerning hearing loss 

would be retained. Referenced standards 

would be deleted. The NRC staff has determined that reference to specific calibration 

standards would no longer be necessary 

and that it would not be appropriate to require these standards by this proposed rule 

because such standards may become outdated and obsolete, and equipment may 

change due to technological advancements, 

which would require future rule changes to 

update the referenced documents. The expectation would be that a licensed professional will perform this examination using 

professionally accepted standards to include calibration standards for equipment 

used. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(2)(b) A hearing 

aid is acceptable provided suitable testing 

procedures demonstrate auditory acuity 

equivalent to the above stated requirement.

B.2.c.(2) A hearing aid is acceptable provided 

suitable testing procedures demonstrate auditory acuity equivalent to the hearing requirement.

This requirement would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(2)(c) The use of 

a hearing aid shall not decrease the effective 

performance of the individual’s assigned security job duties during normal or emergency 

operations.

B.2.c.(3) The use of a hearing aid may not 

decrease the effective performance of the 

individual’s assigned security job duties during normal or emergency operations.

This requirement would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(3) Diseases— B.2.d. Existing medical conditions ................... This requirement would be revised to require 

that the licensee consider all existing medical conditions that would adversely effect 

performance and not limit consideration to 

only pre-existing conditions or ‘‘diseases.’’


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62810 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(3) * * * Individuals shall have no established medical history or medical diagnosis of epilepsy or diabetes, or, where such a condition exists 

* * *. 

B.2.d.(1) Individuals may not have an established medical history or medical diagnosis 

of existing medical conditions which could 

interfere with or prevent the individual from 

effectively performing assigned duties and 

responsibilities.

The requirement concerning medical history 

would be retained. Proposed revisions 

would require that the licensee consider 

any existing medical conditions and not limit 

this consideration to only specified conditions. The phrase ‘‘epilepsy or diabetes, or, 

where such a condition exists’’ would be replaced with the phrase ‘‘existing medical 

conditions which could interfere with or prevent the individual from effectively performing assigned duties and responsibilities’’ to state the requirement that the licensee must consider all medical conditions 

that could adversely affect performance. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(3) * * * the individual shall provide medical evidence that 

the condition can be controlled with proper 

medication so that the individual will not 

lapse into a coma or unconscious state while 

performing assigned security job duties.

B.2.d.(2) If a medical condition exists, the individual shall provide medical evidence that 

the condition can be controlled with medical 

treatment in a manner which does not adversely affect the individual’s fitness-forduty, mental alertness, physical condition, 

or capability to otherwise effectively perform 

assigned duties and responsibilities.

This requirement to provide medical evidence 

that a condition can be controlled would be 

retained. The phrase ‘‘proper medication’’ is 

replaced with the phrase ‘‘medical treatment’’ to account for conditions that may be 

treated without medication and future 

changes in medicine. The phrase ‘‘so that 

the individual will not lapse into a coma or 

unconscious state while’’ would be replaced 

with the phrase ‘‘in a manner which does 

not adversely affect the individual’s fitnessfor-duty, mental alertness, physical condition, or capability to otherwise effectively’’ to 

describe the requirement that the ability to 

perform duties would be the criteria and not 

be limited to the current specific conditions 

of coma or unconscious state. The phrase 

‘‘job duties’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘duties and responsibilities’’ to reflect plain language requirements. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(4) Addiction—

Individuals shall have no established medical 

history or medical diagnosis of habitual alcoholism or drug addiction, or, where such a 

condition has existed, the individual shall provide certified documentation of having completed a rehabilitation program which would 

give a reasonable degree of confidence that 

the individual would be capable of performing 

assigned security job duties.

B.2.e. Addiction. Individuals may not have any 

established medical history or medical diagnosis of habitual alcoholism or drug addiction, or, where this type of condition has existed, the individual shall provide certified 

documentation of having completed a rehabilitation program which would give a reasonable degree of confidence that the individual would be capable of effectively performing assigned duties and responsibilities.

This requirement regarding addiction would 

be retained. The word ‘‘effectively’’ would 

be added to describe the requirement that 

the individual must be able to carry out 

tasks in a manner that would provide the 

necessary results. The phrase ‘‘job duties’’

would be replaced with the phrase ‘‘duties 

and responsibilities’’ to satisfy plain language requirements. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(5) Other physical requirements—An individual who has 

been incapacitated due to a serious illness, 

injury, disease, or operation, which could 

interfere with the effective performance of assigned security job duties shall, prior to resumption of such duties, provide medical evidence of recovery and ability to perform such 

security job duties.

B.2.f. Other physical requirements. An individual who has been incapacitated due to a 

serious illness, injury, disease, or operation, 

which could interfere with the effective performance of assigned duties and responsibilities shall, before resumption of assigned duties and responsibilities, provide 

medical evidence of recovery and ability to 

perform these duties and responsibilities.

This requirement to provide medical evidence 

of recovery from an incapacitation would be 

retained. The phrase ‘‘job duties’’ would be 

replaced with the phrase ‘‘duties and responsibilities’’ for consistency with other 

proposed rule and plain language requirements. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.2. Mental qualifications: B.3. Psychological qualifications: This mental qualifications requirement would 

be retained. The word ‘‘mental’’ would be 

replaced by the word ‘‘psychological’’ to be 

consistent with other proposed changes 

and plain language requirements. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62811 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.2.a. Individuals 

whose security tasks and job duties are directly associated with the effective implementation of the licensee physical security and 

contingency plans shall demonstrate mental 

alertness and the capability to exercise good 

judgment, implement instructions, assimilate 

assigned security tasks, and possess the 

acuity of senses and ability of expression sufficient to permit accurate communication by 

written, spoken, audible, visible, or other signals required by assigned job duties.

B.3.a. Armed and unarmed members of the 

security organization shall demonstrate the 

ability to apply good judgment, mental alertness, the capability to implement instructions and assigned tasks, and possess the 

acuity of senses and ability of expression 

sufficient to permit accurate communication 

by written, spoken, audible, visible, or other 

signals required by assigned duties and responsibilities.

This requirement to demonstrate good judgement, ability to implement instructions/tasks, 

and to communicate would be retained. The 

phrase ‘‘Individuals whose security tasks 

and job duties are directly associated with 

the effective implementation of the licensee 

physical security and contingency plans’’

would be replaced with the phrase ‘‘Armed 

and unarmed members of the security organization’’ to describe the requirement that 

these mental requirements are minimum 

standards that must apply to both armed 

and unarmed security personnel because 

they share similar duties and responsibilities for the physical protection of the site. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.2.b. Armed individuals, and central alarm station operators, in 

addition to meeting the requirement stated in 

Paragraph a. above, shall have no emotional 

instability that would interfere with the effective performance of assigned security job duties. The determination shall be made by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist, or physician, or other person professionally trained to 

identify emotional instability.

B.3.b. A licensed clinical psychologist, psychiatrist, or physician trained in part to identify emotional instability shall determine 

whether armed members of the security organization and alarm station operators in 

addition to meeting the requirement stated 

in Paragraph a. of this section, have no 

emotional instability that would interfere 

with the effective performance of assigned 

duties and responsibilities.

The requirement regarding emotional instability would be retained. The phrase ‘‘Armed 

individuals, and central alarm station operators’’ would be replaced with the phrase 

‘‘armed members of the security organization and alarm station operators’’ to refer to 

both alarm station operators, and for consistency with the terminology used in the 

proposed rule. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.2.b. Armed individuals, and central alarm station operators, in 

addition to meeting the requirement stated in 

Paragraph a. above, shall have no emotional 

instability that would interfere with the effective performance of assigned security job duties. The determination shall be made by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist, or physician, or other person professionally trained to 

identify emotional instability.

B.3.c. A person professionally trained to identify emotional instability shall determine 

whether unarmed members of the security 

organization in addition to meeting the requirement stated in Paragraph a. of this 

section, have no emotional instability that 

would interfere with the effective performance of assigned duties and responsibilities.

Section B.3.c. would be added to describe 

that these emotional instability requirements 

are minimum standards that must apply to 

armed and unarmed security personnel because they share similar duties and responsibilities for the physical protection of the 

site. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. Medical examinations and physical fitness qualifications.B.4. Medical examinations and physical fitness qualifications.This header would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. Guards, armed response personnel, armed escorts and other 

armed security force members shall be given 

a medical examination including a determination and written certification by a licensed 

physician that there are no medical contraindications as disclosed by the medical examination to participation by the individual in 

physical fitness tests.

B.4.a. Armed members of the security organization shall be subject to a medical examination by a licensed physician, to determine the individual’s fitness to participate in 

physical fitness tests.

This medical examination requirement would 

be retained. Current requirements for an 

examination and certification would be reformatted to separate the two requirements 

in order to specify the requirements for 

medical examinations and certifications. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. Guards, armed response personnel, armed escorts and other 

armed security force members shall be given 

a medical examination including a determination and written certification by a licensed 

physician that there are no medical contraindications as disclosed by the medical examination to participation by the individual in 

physical fitness tests.

B.4.a. The licensee shall obtain and retain a 

written certification from the licensed physician that no medical conditions were disclosed by the medical examination that 

would preclude the individual’s ability to 

participate in the physical fitness tests or 

meet the physical fitness attributes or objectives associated with assigned duties.

This requirement for written certification would 

be retained. Current requirements for an 

examination and certification would be reformatted to separate the two requirements 

in order to specify the requirements for 

medical examinations and certifications. 

The licensee must obtain and retain a written certification from the licensed physician 

who performed the examination, which 

clearly states that the individual has no 

medical condition that would cause the licensee to doubt the individual’s ability to 

perform the physical requirements of the fitness test and therefore, could not effectively perform assigned duties. The phrase 

‘‘associated with assigned duties’’ would be 

added to require that the test simulates the 

conditions under which the assigned duties 

and responsibilities are required to be performed. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62812 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. Subsequent to this 

medical examination, guards, armed response personnel, armed escorts and other 

armed security force members shall demonstrate physical fitness for assigned security 

job duties by performing a practical physical 

exercise program within a specific time period.

B.4.b. Before assignment, armed members of 

the security organization shall demonstrate 

physical fitness for assigned duties and responsibilities by performing a practical 

physical fitness test.

This medical examination and physical fitness 

requirement would be retained. The phrase 

‘‘guards, armed response personnel, armed 

escorts and other armed security force 

members’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘armed members of the security organization’’ for consistency with terminology 

used in the proposed rule. The phrase ‘‘security job duties’’ would be replaced with 

the phrase ‘‘assigned duties and responsibilities’’ for consistency with terminology 

used in the proposed rule. The phrase ‘‘exercise program’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘practical physical fitness test’’ for 

consistency with terminology used in the 

proposed rule. The term ‘‘practical’’ would 

mean that the test must be representative 

of the physical requirements of duties and 

responsibilities assigned to armed members 

of the security organization. The phrase 

‘‘specific time period’’ would be deleted because specific time periods are delineated 

in Commission-approved security plans. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. The exercise program performance objectives shall be described in the license training and qualifications plan and shall consider job-related functions such as strenuous activity, physical exertion, levels of stress, and exposure to the 

elements as they pertain to each individual’s 

assigned security job duties for both normal 

and emergency operations.

B.4.b.(1) The physical fitness test must consider physical conditions such as strenuous 

activity, physical exertion, levels of stress, 

and exposure to the elements as they pertain to each individual’s assigned security 

job duties for both normal and emergency 

operations and must simulate site specific 

conditions under which the individual will be 

required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.

This requirement related to physical conditions would be retained. The phrase ‘‘and 

shall consider job-related functions such as 

strenuous activity, physical exertion, levels 

of stress, and exposure to the elements as 

they pertain to each individual’s assigned 

security job duties for both normal and 

emergency operations’’ is replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘The physical fitness test must consider physical conditions such as strenuous 

activity, physical exertion, levels of stress, 

and exposure to the elements as they pertain to each individual’s assigned security 

job duties for both normal and emergency 

operations’’ for consistency with the terminology used by the proposed rule. The 

phrase ‘‘and shall simulate site specific conditions under which the individual will be required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities’’ would be added to specify 

that site specific conditions such as facility 

construction and layout, weather, terrain, 

elements, should be simulated to the extent 

reasonably practical. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. The exercise program performance objectives shall be described in the license training and qualifications plan * * *. B.4.b.(2) The licensee shall describe the 

physical fitness test in the Commission-approved training and qualification plan.

This approved plan requirement would be retained and separated to address this requirement individually. The phrase ‘‘The exercise program performance objectives 

shall be described in the license training 

and qualifications plan’’ would be replaced 

with the phrase ‘‘The licensee shall describe the physical fitness test in the Commission-approved training and qualification 

plan’’ to reflect plain language requirements. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. * * * shall consider 

job-related functions such as strenuous activity, physical exertion, levels of stress, and exposure to the elements as they pertain to 

each individual’s assigned security job duties 

for both normal and emergency operations.

B.4.d.(3) The physical fitness test must include physical attributes and performance 

objectives which demonstrate the strength, 

endurance, and agility, consistent with assigned duties in the Commission-approved 

security plans, licensee protective strategy, 

and implementing procedures during normal 

and emergency conditions.

This requirement would be based on the current appendix B, Paragraph I.C. and would 

require that the licensee include, as part of 

the physical fitness test, performance objectives that are designed to demonstrate the 

ability of each individual to meet the physical attributes required of assigned duties 

and responsibilities. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62813 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. The physical fitness qualification of each guard, armed response person, armed escort, and other security force member shall be documented 

and attested to by a licensee security supervisor.

B.4.b(4) The physical fitness qualification of 

each armed member of the security organization must be documented by a qualified 

training instructor and attested to by a security supervisor.

This documentation and attesting requirement 

would be retained. This requirement would 

be intended to include adequate oversight 

and verification of qualification while providing flexibility to the licensee to determine 

how to best use management resources. 

The phrase ‘‘by a qualified training instructor’’ would be added to specify the training 

instructor observes and documents that the 

qualification criteria are met while the security supervisor attests to the fact that the required training for each individual was administered by a qualified instructor and documentation was obtained and properly completed. The word ‘‘licensee’’ would be deleted because the proposed rule would permit a contract security supervisor to attest 

to an individual’s qualification. The phrase 

‘‘guard, armed response person, armed escort, and other security force member’’

would be replaced with the phrase ‘‘each 

armed member of the security organization’’

for consistency with the terminology used in 

the proposed rule. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.E. Physical requalification—B.5. Physical requalification ............................. This header would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.E. At least every 12 

months, central alarm station operators shall 

be required to meet the physical requirements of B.1.b of this section, and guards, 

armed response personnel, and armed escorts shall be required to meet the physical 

requirements of Paragraphs B.1.b (1) and 

(2), and C of this section.

B.5.a. At least annually, armed and unarmed 

members of the security organization shall 

be required to demonstrate the capability to 

meet the physical requirements of this appendix and the licensee training and qualification plan.

This requirement to demonstrate the capability to meet the physical requirements 

would be retained. The phrase ‘‘every 12 

months’’ would be replaced with the word 

‘‘annually’’ to specify that annual requirements must be scheduled at a nominal 12 

month periodicity but may be conducted up 

to three (3) months prior to three (3) 

months after the scheduled date with the 

next scheduled date 12 months from the 

originally scheduled date. This requirement 

would be intended to provide flexibility to 

the licensee to account for those instances 

when site specific conditions, such as outages, preclude conducting requalification at 

the scheduled dates, while ensuring that 

the intent of the requirement would be still 

met without requiring the next scheduled 

date to be changed to correspond with the 

month in which the requalification is performed. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.E. The physical fitness 

qualification of each guard, armed response 

person, armed escort, and other security 

force member shall be documented and attested to by a licensee security supervisor.

B.5.b. The physical requalification of each 

armed and unarmed member of the security 

organization must be documented by a 

qualified training instructor and attested to 

by a security supervisor.

This documentation and attesting requirement 

would be retained. This requirement would 

be intended to include adequate oversight 

and verification of qualification while providing flexibility to the licensee to determine 

how to best use management resources. 

The phrase ‘‘by a qualified training instructor’’ would be added to specify the training 

instructor observes and documents that the 

qualification criteria is met while the security 

supervisor attests to the fact that the required documentation is retained and properly completed. The phrase ‘‘guard, armed 

response person, armed escort, and other 

security force member’’ would be replaced 

with the phrase ‘‘each armed and unarmed 

member of the security organization’’ for 

consistency with the terminology used in 

the proposed rule. The word ‘‘licensee’’

would be deleted because the proposed 

rule would permit a contract security supervisor attest to an individual’s qualification. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62814 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

II. Training and qualifications ............................. C. Duty training ................................................ This new header would be added to provide a 

section under which the current and proposed non-weapons-related training requirements may be grouped. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. Training requirements. Each individual who requires training 

to perform assigned security-related job tasks 

or job duties as identified in the licensee 

physical security or contingency plans shall, 

prior to assignment, be trained to perform 

these tasks and duties in accordance with 

the licensee or the licensee’s agent’s documented training and qualifications plan.

Appendix B, Paragraph II.B. 

Qualification requirement. Each person who 

performs security-related job tasks or job duties required to implement the licensee physical security or contingency plan shall, prior 

to being assigned to these tasks or duties, be 

qualified in accordance with the licensee’s 

NRC-approved training and qualifications 

plan.

C.1. Duty training and qualification requirements. All personnel who are assigned to 

perform any security-related duty or responsibility, shall be trained and qualified to perform assigned duties and responsibilities to 

ensure that each individual possesses the 

minimum knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively carry out those assigned duties and responsibilities.

This training requirement would be retained 

and revised to combine the two current requirements of appendix B, Paragraph II.A. 

and II.B. This requirement would account 

for those instances where the licensee may 

use, in addition to members of the security 

organization, site personnel from outside of 

the security organization to perform security 

related duties, such as, but not limited to, 

escorts, tampering, detection, and compensatory measures. The Commission views 

are that security personnel must obtain the 

requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities of 

all security-related duties prior to unsupervised assignment. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II.D. The areas of 

knowledge, skills, and abilities that shall be 

considered in the licensee’s training and 

qualifications plan are as follows: 

[NOTE: The list of 100 specific training 

subjects is omitted here for conservation 

of space.].

C.1.a. The areas of knowledge, skills, and 

abilities that are required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities must be 

identified in the licensee’s Commission-approved training and qualification plan.

This requirement would be retained and revised to replace the current list of 100 topic 

areas with a requirement for the licensee to 

provide a site specific list in the approved 

security plans and specify assigned duties 

in the training and qualification plan. The 

Commission has determined that the current list would no longer be necessary to 

ensure that the listed topic areas are addressed by each licensee. In accordance 

with this proposed appendix, all licensees 

are required to ensure that all personnel 

are trained and qualified to perform their 

assigned duties and responsibilities. Those 

requirements would encompass topics that 

are currently listed, making it unnecessary 

to specifically list the 100 areas of knowledge, skills, and abilities. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. Each individual 

who requires training to perform assigned security-related job tasks or job duties as identified in the licensee physical security or contingency plans shall, prior to assignment, be 

trained to perform these tasks and duties in 

accordance with the licensee or the licensee’s agent’s documented training and qualifications plan.

C.1.b. Each individual who is assigned duties 

and responsibilities identified in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee 

protective strategy, and implementing procedures shall, before assignment,: (1) be 

trained to perform assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with the requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification 

plan.

This training requirement would be retained. 

The requirement would specify training of 

all individuals assigned to perform security 

functions required to implement the Commission-approved security plans, licensee 

response strategy, and implementing procedures. The phrase ‘‘requires training to perform assigned security-related job tasks or 

job duties as’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘is assigned duties and responsibilities’’ to reflect changes to terminology 

used. The phrase ‘‘in the licensee physical 

security or contingency’’ would be replaced 

with the phrase ‘‘Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, 

and implementing procedures’’ to reflect 

changes to terminology used. The phrase 

‘‘these tasks and duties’’ would be replaced 

with the phrase ‘‘assigned duties and responsibilities’’ to reflect changes to terminology used. The phrase ‘‘licensee or the licensee’s agent’s documented training and 

qualifications plan’’ would be replaced with 

the phrase ‘‘requirements of this appendix 

and the Commission-approved training and 

qualification plan’’ to reflect changes to terminology used. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62815 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph II.B. Each person who 

performs security-related job tasks or job duties required to implement the licensee physical security or contingency plan shall, prior 

to being assigned to these tasks or duties, be 

qualified in accordance with the licensee’s 

NRC-approved training and qualifications 

plan.

C.1.b. (2) meet the minimum qualification requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification 

plan.

This qualification requirement would be retained. The requirement would specify the 

qualification standard for all individuals assigned to perform security functions required to implement the Commission-approved security plans, licensee response 

strategy, and implementing procedures. The 

phrase ‘‘be qualified in accordance with’’

would be replaced with the phrase ‘‘meet 

the minimum qualification requirements of 

this appendix and’’ to specify that the approved T&Q plan implements the requirements of this proposed rule. The phrase ‘‘licensee’s NRC-approved’’ would be replaced with the phrase ‘‘Commission approved’’ to reflect changes to terminology 

used. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. Training Requirements—Each individual who requires training 

to perform assigned security-related job tasks 

or job duties as identified in the licensee 

physical security or contingency plans shall, 

prior to assignment, be trained to perform 

these tasks and duties in accordance with 

the licensee or licensee’s agent’s documented training and qualification plan.

C.1.b. (3) be trained and qualified in the use 

of all equipment or devices required to effectively perform all assigned duties and responsibilities.

This requirement would be based on the current appendix B, Paragraph II.A. and specify the requirement for training in the use of 

equipment required to effectively perform all 

assigned duties and responsibilities. The 

Commission views this as facilitating the 

performance objective of the proposed 

§ 73.55 B.1. 

C.2. On-the-job training ................................... This new header would be added for consistency with the format of this proposed paragraph. This new topic area would be intended to specify the requirement that the 

licensee training and qualification program 

must include an on-the-job training program 

to ensure that assigned personnel have 

demonstrated an acceptable level of performance and proficiency within the actual 

work environment, prior to assignment to an 

unsupervised position. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. Training Requirements—Each individual who requires training 

to perform assigned security-related job tasks 

or job duties as identified in the licensee 

physical security or contingency plans shall, 

prior to assignment, be trained to perform 

these tasks and duties in accordance with 

the licensee or licensee’s agent’s documented training and qualification plan.

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(1)(a) On-the-job 

evaluation shall be used for individuals who 

exhibit a mild color vision defect.

C.2.a. The licensee training and qualification 

program must include on-the-job training 

performance standards and criteria to ensure that each individual demonstrates the 

requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities 

needed to effectively carry-out assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with 

the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures, before the individual is 

assigned the duty or responsibility.

This new requirement would be based on the 

current appendix B, Paragraph II.A. and 

would specify the requirement that the licensee include on-the-job training as part of 

the training and qualification program to ensure each individual demonstrates, in an 

on-the-job setting, an acceptable level of 

performance and proficiency to carry-out 

assigned duties and responsibilities prior to 

an assignment. The expectation would be 

that on-the-job training would be conducted 

by qualified security personnel who will observe the trainee’s performance and provide input for improvement and final qualification of the trainee and allow each individual to develop and apply, in a controlled 

but realistic training environment, the knowledge, skills, and abilities presented in formal and informal classroom settings. This 

requirement would be in addition to licensee specific classroom training that may 

include instruction on security practices and 

theory and other training activities for security-related duties. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62816 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. Training Requirements—Each individual who requires training 

to perform assigned security-related job tasks 

or job duties as identified in the licensee 

physical security or contingency plans shall, 

prior to assignment, be trained to perform 

these tasks and duties in accordance with 

the licensee or licensee’s agent’s documented training and qualification plan.

C.2.b. In addition to meeting the requirement 

stated in paragraph C.2.a., before assignment, individuals assigned duties and responsibilities to implement the Safeguards 

Contingency Plan shall complete a minimum of 40 hours of on-the-job training to 

demonstrate their ability to effectively apply 

the knowledge, skills, and abilities required 

to effectively perform assigned duties and 

responsibilities in accordance with the approved security plans, licensee protective 

strategy, and implementing procedures. Onthe-job training must be documented by a 

qualified training instructor and attested to 

by a security supervisor.

This new requirement would be based on the 

current appendix B, Paragraph II.A. and 

would specify the requirement for on-the-job 

training. This requirement would specify 

that 40 hours is the minimum time for practical skill development and performance 

demonstration necessary to fully assess an 

individual’s knowledge, skills, and abilities 

to effectively carry-out assigned duties and 

responsibilities prior to assignment to an 

unsupervised position. This requirement 

would be in addition to formal and informal 

classroom instruction. The phrase ‘‘by a 

qualified training instructor’’ would be added 

to require that the security supervisor must 

attest to the fact that the required training 

for each individual was administered by a 

qualified instructor and documentation was 

obtained and properly completed. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.1.b.(1)(a) On-the-job 

evaluation shall be used for individuals who 

exhibit a mild color vision defect.

Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. The exercise program performance objectives shall be described in the license training and qualifications plan and shall consider job-related functions such as strenuous activity, physical exertion, levels of stress, and exposure to the 

elements as they pertain to each individual’s 

assigned security job duties for both normal 

and emergency operations.

Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. Training Requirements—Each individual who requires training 

to perform assigned security-related job tasks 

or job duties as identified in the licensee 

physical security or contingency plans shall, 

prior to assignment, be trained to perform 

these tasks and duties in accordance with 

the licensee or licensee’s agent’s documented training and qualification plan.

Appendix B, Paragraph II.D. The areas of 

knowledge, skills, and abilities that shall be 

considered in the licensee’s training and 

qualifications plan are as follows: 

[NOTE: The list of one hundred specific 

training subjects is omitted here for conservation of space.].

C.2.c. On-the-job training for contingency activities and drills must include, but is not 

limited to, hands-on application of knowledge, skills, and abilities related to: 

(1) Response team duties. 

(2) Use of force. 

(3) Tactical movement. 

(4) Cover and concealment. 

(5) Defensive-positions. 

(6) Fields-of-fire. 

(7) Re-deployment. 

(8) Communications (primary and alternate). 

(9) Use of assigned equipment. 

(10) Target sets. 

(11) Table top drills. 

(12) Command and control duties. 

This new requirement would be based on the 

current requirements appendix B, Paragraph II.A. and appendix B, Paragraph II.D. 

This requirement would provide a list of 

minimum generic topics which are applicable to all sites and must be addressed, but 

are not intended to limit the licensee such 

that site specific topics are not also included. This requirement would also specify 

that the licensee identify and document in 

the training and qualification plan, the specific knowledge, skills, and abilities required 

by each individual to perform their assigned 

duties and responsibilities and would generically include any specific items that are 

currently listed in the current appendix B, 

Paragraph II.D., and therefore, would require that any applicable topics from the deleted list are addressed. 

C.3. Tactical response team drills and exercises.This new header would be added for formatting. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. Training Requirements—Each individual who requires training 

to perform assigned security-related job tasks 

or job duties as identified in the licensee 

physical security or contingency plans shall, 

prior to assignment, be trained to perform 

these tasks and duties in accordance with 

the licensee or licensee’s agent’s documented training and qualification plan.

C.3.a. Licensees shall demonstrate response 

capabilities through a performance evaluation program as described in appendix C to 

this part.

This requirement would be based on the current appendix B, Paragraph II.A. Due to 

changes in the threat environment, the requirement would specify that the licensee 

develop and follow a performance evaluation program designed to demonstrate the 

effectiveness of the onsite response capabilities. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. Training Requirements—Each individual who requires training 

to perform assigned security-related job tasks 

or job duties as identified in the licensee 

physical security or contingency plans shall, 

prior to assignment, be trained to perform 

these tasks and duties in accordance with 

the licensee or licensee’s agent’s documented training and qualification plan.

C.3.b. The licensee shall conduct drills and 

exercises in accordance with Commissionapproved security plans, licensee protective 

strategy, and implementing procedures.

This requirement would be based on the current appendix B, Paragraph II.A. Due to 

changes in the threat environment, the requirement would specify that the licensee 

conduct drills and exercises to demonstrate 

the effectiveness of security plans, licensee 

protective strategy, and implementing procedures. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62817 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. Training Requirements—Each individual who requires training 

to perform assigned security-related job tasks 

or job duties as identified in the licensee 

physical security or contingency plans shall, 

prior to assignment, be trained to perform 

these tasks and duties in accordance with 

the licensee or licensee’s agent’s documented training and qualification plan.

C.3.b.(1) Drills and exercises must be designed to challenge participants in a manner which requires each participant to demonstrate requisite knowledge, skills, and 

abilities.

This requirement would be based on the current appendix B, Paragraph II.A. Due to 

changes in the threat environment, the requirement would specify that the licensee 

conduct drills and exercises that are designed to demonstrate each participants 

requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to 

perform security responsibilities. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. Training Requirements—Each individual who requires training 

to perform assigned security-related job tasks 

or job duties as identified in the licensee 

physical security or contingency plans shall, 

prior to assignment, be trained to perform 

these tasks and duties in accordance with 

the licensee or licensee’s agent’s documented training and qualification plan.

C.3.b.(2) Tabletop exercises may be used to 

supplement drills and exercises to accomplish desired training goals and objectives.

This requirement would be based on the current appendix B, Paragraph II.A. Due to 

changes in the threat environment, the requirement would convey the Commission 

view that licensees may use tabletop exercises to supplement drills and exercises as 

a means of achieving training goals and objectives. 

D. Duty qualification and requalification .......... This new header would be added for formatting purposes. The word ‘‘duty’’ would 

be used to clarify that the following sections 

relate to non-weapons training topics. 

D.1. Qualification demonstration ...................... This new header would be added for formatting purposes. 

§ 73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission, the licensee shall demonstrate the ability of the 

physical security personnel to carry out their 

assigned duties and responsibilities.

D.1.a. Armed and unarmed members of the 

security organization shall demonstrate the 

required knowledge, skills, and abilities to 

carry out assigned duties and responsibilities as stated in the Commission-approved 

security plans, licensee protective strategy, 

and implementing procedures.

This requirement would be based on the current requirement of 10 CFR 73.55(b)(4)(i). 

Due to changes in the threat environment, it 

is the Commission’s view that licensees 

must be able to demonstrate the ability of 

security personnel to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities. 

§ 73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission, the licensee shall demonstrate the ability of the 

physical security personnel to carry out their 

assigned duties and responsibilities.

D.1.b. This demonstration must include an annual written exam and hands-on performance demonstration.This requirement would be based on the current requirement of 10 CFR 73.55(b)(4)(i) 

and would specify a licensee requirement to 

perform written examinations and hands-on 

performance tests to demonstrate knowledge of the skill or ability being tested. The 

Commission’s view is that written examinations and hands-on performance tests are 

two components that are necessary to demonstrate the overall qualification and proficiency of an individual performing security 

duties. 

§ 73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission, the licensee shall demonstrate the ability of the 

physical security personnel to carry out their 

assigned duties and responsibilities.

(1) Written Exam. The written exams must include those elements listed in the Commission-approved training and qualification plan 

and shall require a minimum score of 80 

percent to demonstrate an acceptable understanding of assigned duties and responsibilities, to include the recognition of potential tampering involving both safety and security equipment and systems. (2) Handson Performance Demonstration. Armed and 

unarmed members of the security organization shall demonstrate hands-on performance for assigned duties and responsibilities by performing a practical hands-on 

demonstration for required tasks. The 

hands-on demonstration must ensure that 

theory and associated learning objectives 

for each required task are considered and 

each individual demonstrates the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively perform the task.

This requirement would be based on the current requirement of 10 CFR 73.55(b)(4)(i). 

Due to changes in the threat environment, 

the rule would require a minimum exam 

score of 80 percent using accepted training 

and evaluation techniques. The Commission has determined that a score of 80 percent demonstrates the minimum level of understanding and familiarity of the material 

acceptable and would be consistent with 

minimum scores commonly accepted 

throughout the Nuclear Industry. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62818 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission, the licensee shall demonstrate the ability of the 

physical security personnel to carry out their 

assigned duties and responsibilities.

D.1.c. Upon request by an authorized representative of the Commission, any individual assigned to perform any security-related duty or responsibility shall demonstrate the required knowledge, skills, and 

abilities for each assigned duty and responsibility, as stated in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective 

strategy, or implementing procedures.

This requirement would be based upon the 

current requirement of 10 CFR 

73.55(b)(4)(i) and would include, upon request, that an individual assigned security 

duties or responsibilities demonstrate 

knowledge, skills and abilities required for 

such assignments or responsibilities. This 

requirement would be distinct from the required annual written demonstration above 

and would be necessary for regulatory consistency. This rule would require that any 

individual who is assigned to perform any 

security-related duty or responsibility must 

demonstrate their capability to effectively 

perform those assigned duties or responsibilities when requested, regardless of the 

individual’s specific organizational affiliation. 

These demonstrations would provide the 

Commission with independent verification 

and validation that individuals can actually 

perform their assigned security duties. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II.E. Requalification— D.2. Requalification .......................................... This header would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II.E. Security personnel 

shall be requalified at least every 12 months 

to perform assigned security-related job tasks 

and duties for both normal and contingency 

operations.

Appendix B, Paragraph II.E. Requalification 

shall be in accordance with the NRC-approved licensee training and qualifications 

plan.

D.2.a. Armed and unarmed members of the 

security organization shall be requalified at 

least annually in accordance with the requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification 

plan.

This requalification requirement would be retained and revised to combine two requirements of the current appendix B, Paragraph 

II.E. The rule would require that armed and 

unarmed members of the security organization must be requalified annually to demonstrate that each individual continues to 

be capable of effectively performing assigned duties and responsibilities. The 

phrase ‘‘Security personnel’’ would be replaced with the phrase ‘‘Armed and unarmed members of the security organization’’ for consistency with the proposed rule. 

The phrase ‘‘every 12 months’’ would be replaced with the word ‘‘annual’’ for consistency with the proposed rule. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II.E. The results of requalification must be documented and attested by a licensee security supervisor.D.2.b. The results of requalification must be 

documented by a qualified training instructor and attested by a security supervisor.

The requalification requirement would be retained. The proposed rule would require 

that the licensee provide adequate oversight and verification of qualification process. The phrase ‘‘by a qualified training instructor’’ would be added to specify that the 

training instructor observes and documents 

that qualification criteria is met while the security supervisor attests to the fact that the 

required documentation is retained and 

properly completed. The word ‘‘licensee’’

would be deleted to provide flexibility to the 

licensee to determine the best use of management resources and to specify that contract security supervisors may be used to 

satisfy this requirement. 

III. Weapons training and Qualification .............. E. Weapons training ........................................ This header would be retained and revised. 

The word ‘‘Qualification’’ would be deleted 

because ‘‘qualification’’ is addressed individually in this proposed rule. 

E.1. General firearms training .......................... This new header is added for formatting purposes. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62819 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. Guards, armed response personnel and armed escorts requiring weapons training to perform assigned security related job tasks or job duties shall be 

trained in accordance with the licensees’ documented weapons training programs.

E.1.a. Armed members of the security organization shall be trained and qualified in accordance with the requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan.This training requirement would be retained 

and revised to specify that the training be 

conducted in accordance with the appendix 

and training and qualification plans. The 

phrase ‘‘Guards, armed response personnel 

and armed escorts’’ would be replaced with 

the phrase ‘‘Armed members of the security 

organization’’ for consistency with language 

used in the proposed rule. The phrase ‘‘requiring weapons training to perform assigned security related job tasks or job duties’’ would be deleted because that requirement is implied in the proposed rule 

language. The phrase ‘‘licensees’ documented weapons training programs’’ would 

be replaced with the phrase ‘‘Commissionapproved training and qualification plan’’ for 

consistency with language used in the proposed rule. 

E.1.b. Firearms instructors ............................... This new header would be added for formatting purposes. 

Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. Each individual 

shall be proficient in the use of his assigned 

weapon(s) and shall meet prescribed standards in the following areas: 

E.1.b.(1) Each armed member of the security 

organization shall be trained and qualified 

by a certified firearms instructor for the use 

and maintenance of each assigned weapon 

to include but not limited to, qualification 

scores, assembly, disassembly, cleaning, 

storage, handling, clearing, loading, unloading, and reloading, for each assigned weapon.

This requirement would be based on the current appendix B, Paragraph III.A. and would 

be revised to incorporate current requirements in approved training and qualification 

plans. 

Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. Each individual 

shall be proficient in the use of his assigned 

weapon(s) and shall meet prescribed standards in the following areas: 

E.1.b.(2) Firearms instructors shall be certified 

from a national or State recognized entity.

This requirement would be based on the current appendix B, Paragraph III.A. and revised to require that licensees only use certified instructors. It is the Commission view 

that certification would be required from a 

national or State recognized entity such as 

Federal, State military or nationally recognized entities such as National Rifle Association (NRA), International Association of 

Law Enforcement Firearms Instructors 

(IALEFI). 

Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. Each individual 

shall be proficient in the use of his assigned 

weapon(s) and shall meet prescribed standards in the following areas: 

E.1.b.(3) Certification must specify the weapon or weapon type(s) for which the instructor is qualified to teach.This requirement would be based on the current appendix B, Paragraph III.A. and revised to establish minimum standards for 

those conducting firearms instruction. This 

requirement would not intend that each firearm instructor be certified on the different 

manufacturers or brands, but rather that 

certification be obtained by weapon type 

such as handgun, shotgun, rifle, machine 

gun, or other enhanced weapons since 

each type requires different skills and abilities. 

Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. Each individual 

shall be proficient in the use of his assigned 

weapon(s) and shall meet prescribed standards in the following areas: 

E.1.b.(4) Firearms instructors shall be recertified in accordance with the standards recognized by the certifying national or state 

entity, but in no case shall re-certification 

exceed three (3) years.

This requirement would be based upon the 

current appendix B, Paragraph III.A. and revised to establish minimum standards for 

those conducting firearms instruction. Firearms instructor skills are perishable and 

therefore the proposed rule would require 

periodic re-qualification to demonstrate proficiency. The Commission has determined 

that three (3) years is a commonly accepted interval for re-certification throughout the 

firearms community. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62820 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV. Qualification firing 

for the handgun and the rifle must be for daylight firing, and each individual shall perform 

night firing for familiarization with assigned 

weapon(s).

Appendix B, Paragraph IV. Each individual shall 

be requalified at least every 12 months.

E.1.c. Annual firearms familiarization. The licensee shall conduct annual firearms familiarization training in accordance with the 

Commission-approved training and qualification plan.

This requirement would be based upon the 

current appendix B, Paragraph IV. Due to 

changes in the threat environment, the 

Commission seeks to establish minimum 

standards for weapons familiarization. This 

requirement would require individuals receive basic firearms familiarization and 

skills training with each weapon type such 

as nomenclature, stance, grip, sight alignment, sight stance, grip, sight alignment, 

sight picture, trigger squeeze, safe handling, range rules, prior to participating in a 

qualifying course of fire. The specifics of 

the familiarization must be included in the 

Commission-approved plan. 

Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. Each individual 

shall be proficient in the use of his assigned 

weapon(s) and shall meet prescribed standards in the following areas: 

1. Mechanical assembly, disassembly, 

range penetration capability of weapon, 

and bull’s-eye firing. 

2. Weapons cleaning and storage. 

3. Combat firing, day and night. 

4. Safe weapons handling. 

5. Clearing, loading, unloading, and reloading 

6. When to draw and point a weapon. 

7. Rapid fire techniques. 

8. Close quarter firing. 

9. Stress firing. 

10. Zeroing assigned weapon(s). 

E.1.d. The Commission-approved training and 

qualification plan shall include, but is not 

limited to, the following areas: 

(1) Mechanical assembly, disassembly, 

range penetration capability of weapon, 

and bull’s-eye firing. 

(2) Weapons cleaning and storage. 

(3) Combat firing, day and night. 

(4) Safe weapons handling. 

(5) Clearing, loading, unloading, and reloading. 

(6) When to draw and point a weapon. 

(7) Rapid fire techniques. 

(8) Closed quarter firing. 

(9) Stress firing. 

(10) Zeroing assigned weapon(s) (sight 

and sight/scope adjustments). 

(11) Target engagement. 

(12) Weapon malfunctions. 

(13) Cover and concealment. 

(14) Weapon transition between strong 

(primary) and weak (support) hands. 

(15) Weapon familiarization. 

This proposed rule would retain the current 

standards listed in appendix B, Paragraph 

III.A as weapons training areas to be addressed in the Commission-approved T&Q 

plan. Due to changes in the threat environment, it is the Commission view that additional areas of demonstrated weapon proficiency should be added to the current regulations. The proposed rule would require 

an individual demonstrate proficiency in the 

following areas: target engagement, weapon malfunctions, cover and concealment 

weapon transition between strong (primary) 

and weak (support) hands, and weapon familiarization (areas 11 through 15.) 

Appendix B, Paragraph II.D. Security knowledge, skills, and abilities—Each individual assigned to perform the security-related task 

identified in the licensee physical security or 

contingency plan shall demonstrate the required knowledge, skill, and ability in accordance with the specified standards for each 

task as stated in the NRC approved licensee 

training and qualifications plan. The areas of 

knowledge, skills, and abilities that shall be 

considered in the licensee’s training and 

qualifications plan are as follows: The use of 

deadly force.

E.1.e. The licensee shall ensure that each 

armed member of the security organization 

is instructed on the use of deadly force as 

authorized by applicable State law.

The requirements of appendix B, Paragraph 

II.D. would be modified to clarify training requirements regarding the use of deadly 

force. The proposed rule would specify that 

the substance of training in the use of 

deadly force should be focused on applicable state laws. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV.D. Individuals shall 

be weapons requalified at least every 12 

months in accordance with the NRC approved licensee training and qualifications 

plan, and in accordance with the requirements stated in A, B, and C of this section.

E.1.f. Armed members of the security organization shall participate in weapons range 

activities on a nominal four (4) month periodicity. Performance may be conducted up 

to five (5) weeks before to five (5) weeks 

after the scheduled date. The next scheduled date must be four (4) months from the 

originally scheduled date.

This requirement would be based upon the 

current requalification requirements stated 

in appendix B, Paragraph IV.D. It is the 

Commission view that the proposed rule, 

requiring weapons range activities, would 

ensure individuals maintain proficiency in 

the use of assigned weapons and associated perishable skills. 

IV. Weapons qualification and requalification 

program.

F. Weapons qualification and requalification 

program.

This header would be retained. 

F.1. General weapons qualification requirements.This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV. Qualification firing 

for the handgun and the rifle must be for daylight firing, and each individual shall perform 

night firing for familiarization with assigned 

weapon(s).

F.1.a. Qualification firing must be accomplished in accordance with Commission requirements and the Commission-approved 

training and qualification plan for assigned 

weapons.

The requirement would retain the qualification 

requirements stated in appendix B, Paragraph IV. The proposed rule would specify 

that such qualifications have to be accomplished in accordance with Commission-approved training and qualification plans. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62821 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

The results of weapons qualification and requalification must be documented by the licensee or the licensee’s agent.F.1.b. The results of weapons qualification 

and requalification must be documented 

and retained as a record.

This weapons qualification and requalification 

requirement would be retained. The word 

‘‘must’’ would be replaced with the word 

‘‘shall’’ for consistency with this proposed 

rule. The phrase ‘‘by the licensee or the licensee’s agent’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘and retained as a record’’ for consistency with the terminology used in the 

proposed rule. 

Each individual shall be requalified at least 

every 12 months.

F.1.c. Each individual shall be re-qualified at 

least annually.

This requalification requirement would be retained. The phrase ‘‘every 12 months’’

would be replaced with the word ‘‘annually’’

for consistency with this proposed rule. 

Energy Policy Act of 2005 .................................. F.2. Alternate weapons qualification. Upon 

written request by the licensee, the Commission may authorize an applicant or licensee to provide firearms qualification programs other than those listed in this appendix if the applicant or licensee demonstrates 

that the alternative firearm qualification program satisfies Commission requirements. 

Written requests must provide details regarding the proposed firearms qualification 

programs and describe how the proposed 

alternative satisfies Commission requirements.

This new requirement would be added for 

consistency with the proposed § 73.19. The 

proposed rule would require the licensee to 

request NRC authorization to implement alternative firearms qualification programs 

pursuant to the licensee’s request for authorization to use ‘‘enhanced weapons’’ as 

defined in the proposed § 73.19. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV. Qualification firing 

for the handgun and the rifle must be for daylight firing, and each individual shall perform 

night firing for familiarization with assigned 

weapon(s).

F.3. Tactical weapons qualification. The licensee Training and Qualification Plan 

must describe the firearms used, the firearms qualification program, and other tactical training required to implement the 

Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures. Licensee developed 

qualification and re-qualification courses for 

each firearm must describe the performance criteria needed, to include the site 

specific conditions (such as lighting, elevation, fields-of-fire) under which assigned 

personnel shall be required to carry-out 

their assigned duties.

This requirement would be based upon the 

current qualification requirement in appendix B, Paragraph IV. Due to changes to the 

threat environment, the proposed rule 

would require that the licensee develop and 

implement a site specific firearms qualification program and other tactical training to 

simulate site conditions under which the 

protective strategy will be implemented. The 

examples given (lighting, elevation and 

fields-of-fire) are intended to be neither all 

inclusive nor limiting. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV. Qualification firing 

for the handgun and the rifle must be for daylight firing, and each individual shall perform 

night firing for familiarization with assigned 

weapon(s).

F.4. Firearms qualification courses. The licensee shall conduct the following qualification courses for weapons used.This requirement would be based upon the 

current qualification requirements in appendix B, Paragraph IV. The proposed rule 

would specify performance expectations for 

weapons courses. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62822 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV. Qualification firing 

for the handgun and the rifle must be for daylight firing, and each individual shall perform 

night firing for familiarization with assigned 

weapon(s).

Appendix B, Paragraph IV.A. Handgun—

Guards, armed escorts and armed response 

personnel shall qualify with a revolver or 

semiautomatic pistol firing the national police 

course, or an equivalent nationally recognized course.

Appendix B, Paragraph IV.B. Semiautomatic 

Rifle—Guards, armed escorts and armed response personnel, assigned to use the semiautomatic rifle by the licensee training and 

qualifications plan, shall qualify with a semiautomatic rifle by firing the 100-yard course 

of fire specified in section 17.5(1) of the National Rifle Association, High Power Rifle 

Rules book (effective March 15, 1976), (1) or 

a nationally recognized equivalent course of 

fire.

Appendix B, Paragraph IV.C. Shotgun—

Guards, armed escorts, and armed response 

personnel assigned to use the 12 gauge 

shotgun by the licensee training and qualifications plan shall qualify with a full choke or 

improved modified choke 12 gauge shotgun 

firing the following course: 

F.4.a. Annual daylight qualification course. 

Qualifying score must be an accumulated 

total of 70 percent with handgun and shotgun, and 80 percent with semi-automatic 

rifle and/or enhanced weapons, of the maximum obtainable target score.

This requirement would combine the current 

appendix B, Paragraph IV.A., B., and C. 

Because of changes to the threat environment, it is the Commission view that a higher qualification percentage is required. The 

Commission has determined that among 

law enforcement authorities, 70 percent is a 

commonly accepted fire qualification value 

requirement for handguns and shotguns 

and that 80 percent is the commonly accepted value for semi-automatic and enhanced weapons. The proposed rule would 

increase the acceptable level of proficiency 

to 70 percent for handgun and shotgun, 

and 80 percent for the semi-automatic rifle 

and enhanced weapons. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV. Qualification firing 

for the handgun and the rifle must be for daylight firing, and each individual shall perform 

night firing for familiarization with assigned 

weapon(s).

F.4.b. Annual night fire qualification course. 

Qualifying score must be an accumulated 

total of 70 percent with handgun and shotgun, and 80 percent with semi-automatic 

rifle and/or enhanced weapons, of the maximum obtainable target score.

This requirement would combine the qualification standards stated in the current appendix B, Paragraph IV.A., B., and C. Because 

of changes to the threat environment, it is 

the Commission view that a higher qualification percentage is required. The Commission has determined that among law enforcement authorities, 70 percent is a commonly accepted night fire qualification value 

requirement for handguns and shotguns 

and that, under the same conditions, 80 

percent is the commonly accepted value for 

semi-automatic and enhanced weapons. 

The proposed rule would increase the Night 

Fire qualification score from familiarization 

in the current rule, to an acceptable level of 

proficiency of 70 percent for handgun and 

shotgun, and 80 percent for the semi-automatic rifle and enhanced weapons. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62823 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV. Qualification firing 

for the handgun and the rifle must be for daylight firing, and each individual shall perform 

night firing for familiarization with assigned 

weapon(s).

F.4.c. Annual tactical qualification course. 

Qualifying score must be an accumulated 

total of 80 percent of the maximum obtainable score.

This requirement would combine the current 

qualification requirements in appendix B, 

Paragraph IV.A., B., and C. In the proposed 

rule, the annual tactical course of fire would 

be developed and implemented to simulate 

the licensee protective strategy in accordance with the Commission-approved training and qualification plan. Licensees would 

not be not required to include every aspect 

of its site protective strategy into one tactical course of fire. Instead, licensees 

should periodically evaluate and change 

their tactical course of fire to incorporate 

different or changed elements of the site 

protective strategy so that armed security 

personnel are exposed to multiple and different site contingency scenarios. In the 

current threat environment, LLEA tactical 

teams typically require a minimum qualification score of 80 percent to ensure that a 

higher percentage of rounds hit the intended target to neutralize the threat. This 

correlates to licensee protective strategies 

in which a higher percentage of rounds that 

hit the intended target increase the ability of 

the security force to neutralize the adversarial threat to prevent radiological sabotage. As a result, the proposed rule would 

specify 80 percent as the minimum acceptable qualification score for the Tactical 

Qualification Course. 

F.5. Courses of fire .......................................... This heading would be added to clarify the 

subsequent information and to be consistent with the remainder of this appendix. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV.A. Handgun— F.5.a. Handgun ................................................ This heading would be brought forward from 

current rule and would be renumbered accordingly. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV.A. Guards, armed 

escorts and armed response personnel shall 

qualify with a revolver or semiautomatic pistol 

firing the national police course, or an equivalent nationally recognized course.

F.5.a.(1) Armed members of the security organization, assigned duties and responsibilities involving the use of a revolver or semiautomatic pistol shall qualify in accordance 

with standards and scores established by a 

law enforcement course, or an equivalent 

nationally recognized course.

The qualification requirement would be retained. The phrase ‘‘national police course’’

would be replaced with ‘‘law enforcement 

course’’ for consistency with the terminology used nationally in reference to firearms standards and courses. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV.A. Qualifying score 

shall be an accumulated total of 70 percent 

of the maximum obtainable score.

F.5.a.(2) Qualifying scores must be an accumulated total of 70 percent of the maximum 

obtainable target score.

This requirement would be brought forward 

from current rule and would be renumbered 

accordingly. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV.B. Semiautomatic 

Rifle—

F.5.b. Semiautomatic rifle ................................ This header would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV.B. Guards, armed 

escorts and armed response personnel, assigned to use the semiautomatic rifle by the 

licensee training and qualifications plan, shall 

qualify with a semiautomatic rifle by firing the 

100-yard course of fire specified in Section 

17.5(1) of the National Rifle Association, High 

Power Rifle Rules book (effective March 15, 

1976), (1) or a nationally recognized equivalent course of fire.

F.5.b.(1) Armed members of the security organization, assigned duties and responsibilities involving the use of a semiautomatic 

rifle shall qualify in accordance with the 

standards and scores established by a law 

enforcement course, or an equivalent nationally recognized course.

The qualification requirement would be retained. The phrase ‘‘national police course’’

would be replaced with ‘‘law enforcement 

course’’ for consistency with the terminology used nationally in reference to firearms standards and courses. 

Qualifying score shall be an accumulated total 

of 80 percent of the maximum obtainable 

score.

F.5.b.(2) Qualifying scores must be an accumulated total of 80 percent of the maximum 

obtainable score.

This requirement would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV.C. Shotgun— F.5.c. Shotgun .................................................. This header would be retained. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62824 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV.C. Guards, armed 

escorts, and armed response personnel assigned to use the 12 gauge shotgun by the licensee training and qualifications plan shall 

qualify with a full choke or improved modified 

choke 12 gauge shotgun firing the following 

course: 

F.5.c.(1) Armed members of the security organization, assigned duties and responsibilities involving the use of a shotgun shall 

qualify in accordance with standards and 

scores established by a law enforcement 

course, or an equivalent nationally recognized course.

The qualification requirement would be retained. The phrase ‘‘national police course’’

would be replaced with ‘‘law enforcement 

course’’ for consistency with the terminology used nationally in reference to firearms standards and courses. The phrase 

‘‘12 gauge’’ would be deleted to account for 

future changes and because this specific 

requirement would be no longer needed in 

this proposed appendix. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV.C. To qualify the individual shall be required to place 50 percent 

of all pellets (36 pellets) within the black silhouette.

F.5.c.(2) Qualifying scores must be an accumulated total of 70 percent of the maximum 

obtainable target score.

The qualification requirement would be retained. Due to changes in the threat environment, the qualification score would be 

increased from 50 percent in the current 

rule, to an acceptable level of proficiency. 

The proposed 70 percent requirement is a 

commonly accepted minimum qualification 

score, for shotguns in the law enforcement 

community. 

F.5.d. Enhanced weapons ............................... This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. Each individual 

shall be proficient in the use of his assigned 

weapon(s) and shall meet prescribed standards in the following areas: 

F.5.d.(1) Armed members of the security organization, assigned duties and responsibilities involving the use of any weapon or 

weapons not described above, shall qualify 

in accordance with applicable standards 

and scores established by a law enforcement course or an equivalent nationally recognized course for these weapons.

This new requirement would be added to account for future technological advancements in weaponry available to licensees. 

The phrase ‘‘national police course’’ would 

be replaced with ‘‘law enforcement course’’

for consistency with the terminology used 

nationally in reference to firearms standards 

and courses. Examples of ‘‘Law enforcement course or an equivalent nationally recognized course for such weapons’’ includes 

those by the Departments of Justice, Energy, or Defense. 

Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. Each individual 

shall be proficient in the use of his assigned 

weapon(s) and shall meet prescribed standards in the following areas: 

F.5.d.(2) Qualifying scores must be an accumulated total of 80 percent of the maximum 

obtainable score.

This new 80 percent qualification score requirement would be consistent and comparable with the requirements for semiautomatic rifles. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV.D. Requalification— F.6. Requalification .......................................... This header would be retained. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV.D. Individuals shall 

be weapons requalified at least every 12 

months in accordance with the NRC approved licensee training and qualifications 

plan, and in accordance with the requirements stated in A, B, and C of this section.

F.6.a. Armed members of the security organization shall be re-qualified for each assigned weapon at least annually in accordance with Commission requirements and 

the Commission-approved training and 

qualification plan.

This requalification requirement would be retained. The phrase ‘‘every 12 months’’

would be replaced with the word ‘‘annually’’

for consistency with this proposed rule. The 

phrase ‘‘Individuals shall be weapons requalified’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘Armed members of the security organization shall be re-qualified for each assigned weapon’’ to reflect changes in the 

terminology used to describe this topic. The 

phrase ‘‘the NRC approved licensee training and qualifications plan, and in accordance with the requirements stated in A, B, 

and C of this section’’ would be replaced 

with the phrase ‘‘Commission requirements 

and the Commission-approved training and 

qualification plan’’ to reflect changes in the 

terminology used to describe this topic. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV.D. Individuals shall 

be weapons requalified at least every 12 

months in accordance with the NRC approved licensee training and qualifications 

plan, and in accordance with the requirements stated in A, B, and C of this section.

F.6.b. Firearms requalification must be conducted using the courses of fire outlined in 

Paragraph 5 of this section.

This requalification requirement would be retained. Due to changes in the threat environment, the proposed rule would specify 

the criteria for weapons requalification. 

V. Guard, armed response personnel, and 

armed escort equipment.

G. Weapons, personal equipment and maintenance.This heading would be retained and modified 

by adding the word ‘‘maintenance’’ for clarity. 

G.1. Weapons .................................................. This header was added for formatting purposes. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62825 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. Each individual 

shall be proficient in the use of his assigned 

weapon(s) and shall meet prescribed standards in the following areas: 

10 CFR 73.55 b.(4)(i) The licensee may not 

permit an individual to act as a guard, watchman armed response person, or other member of the security organization unless the individual has been trained, equipped, and 

qualified to perform each assigned security 

job duty in accordance with appendix B, in 

accordance with appendix B, ‘‘General Criteria for Security Personnel,’’ to this part. 

Section 653 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 

G.1.a. The licensee shall provide armed personnel with weapons that are capable of 

performing the function stated in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee 

protective strategy, and implementing procedures.

This new requirement would be based upon 

the current 10 CFR 73.55 b.(4)(i) and appendix B, Paragraph III.A. It also reflects 

new requirements that would implement the 

Energy Policy Act of 2005. This requirement would be intended to account for 

technological advancements in this area. 

Under the proposed rule, licensees could 

request Commission authorization to possess and use enhanced weapons that may 

otherwise be prohibited by individual state 

laws. This authority has been granted to the 

NRC through Section 653 of the Energy 

Policy Act of 2005. 

G.2. Personal equipment ................................. This header would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A. Fixed Site—Fixed 

site guards and armed response personnel 

shall either be equipped with or have available the following security equipment appropriate to the individual’s assigned contingency security related tasks or job duties as 

described in the licensee physical security 

and contingency plans: 

G.2.a. The licensee shall ensure that each individual is equipped or has ready access to 

all personal equipment or devices required 

for the effective implementation of the Commission-approved security plans, licensee 

protective strategy, and implementing procedures.

This requirement would be based upon the 

current appendix B, Paragraph V.A. This requirement would be intended to specify that 

the licensee is responsible for ensuring that 

each individual is provided all personal 

equipment required to effectively perform 

assigned duties and responsibilities. The 

phrase ‘‘has ready access to’’ would mean 

that equipment or devices, that are required 

to perform assigned duties, are available as 

described in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.5.(a) Helmet, Combat. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.5.(b) Gas mask, full 

face. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.5.(c) Body armor 

(bullet-resistant vest). 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.5.(d) Flashlights 

and batteries. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.5.(e) Baton. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.5.(f) Handcuffs. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.5.(g) Ammunitionequipment belt. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.6. Binoculars. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.7. Night vision aids, 

i.e., hand-fired illumination flares or equivalent. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.8. Tear gas or 

other nonlethal gas. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.9. Duress alarms. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.10. Two-way portable radios (handi-talkie) 2 channels minimum, 1 operating and 1 emergency. 

G.2.b. The licensee shall provide armed security personnel, at a minimum, but is not limited to, the following. 

(1) Gas mask, full face. 

(2) Body armor (bullet-resistant vest). 

(3) Ammunition/equipment belt. 

(4) Duress alarms. 

(5) Two-way portable radios (handi-talkie) 

2 channels minimum, 1 operating and 

1 emergency. 

This requirement combines the current requirements appendix B, Paragraph 

V.A.5(b), 5(c), 5(g), 9, and 10. Due to 

changes in the threat environment, the 

NRC has determined that this list of equipment would be the minimum required to effectively perform response duties. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62826 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.5.(a) Helmet, Combat. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.5.(b) Gas mask, full 

face. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.5.(c) Body armor 

(bullet-resistant vest). 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.5.(d) Flashlights 

and batteries. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.5.(e) Baton. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.5.(f) Handcuffs. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.5.(g) Ammunitionequipment belt. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.6 Binoculars. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.7. Night vision aids, 

i.e., hand-fired illumination flares or equivalent. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.8. Tear gas or 

other nonlethal gas. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.9. Duress alarms. 

Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.10. Two-way portable radios (handi-talkie) 2 channels minimum, 1 operating and 1 emergency. 

G.2.c. Based upon the licensee protective 

strategy and the specific duties and responsibilities assigned to each individual, the licensee should provide, but is not limited to, 

the following. 

(1) Flashlights and batteries. 

(2) Baton or other non-lethal weapons. 

(3) Handcuffs. 

(4) Binoculars. 

(5) Night vision aids (e.g. goggles, weapons sights). 

(6) Hand-fired illumination flares or equivalent. 

(7) Tear gas or other non-lethal gas. 

This requirement would be based upon the 

current appendix B, Paragraph V.A.5. The 

NRC has determined that this list of additional equipment must be provided because 

such equipment is required to effectively 

implement the licensee protective strategy 

and the specific duties and responsibilities 

assigned to each individual. The current requirement appendix B, Paragraph V.A.5.(a) 

‘‘Helmet, combat’’ would be deleted because the NRC has determined that although the use of this item is recommended 

it is an optional item that is not required to 

effectively implement a protective strategy 

or perform assigned duties and responsibilities. The proposed addition in (2) ‘‘ . . . or 

other non-lethal weapons’’ would recognize 

that the use of batons and other non-lethal 

weapons by armed security officers is subject to state law. Related to the use of nonlethal weapons, each state has minimum 

training requirements for armed private security officers. 

G.3. Maintenance ............................................. This heading would be added for formatting 

purposes. 

Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. Each individual 

shall be proficient in the use of his assigned 

weapon(s) and shall meet prescribed standards in the following areas: 

G.3.a. Firearms maintenance program. Each 

licensee shall implement a firearms maintenance and accountability program in accordance with the Commission regulations 

and the Commission-approved training and 

qualification plan. The program must include: 

(1) Semiannual test firing for accuracy 

and functionality. 

(2) Firearms maintenance procedures 

that include cleaning schedules and 

cleaning requirements. 

(3) Program activity documentation. 

(4) Control and Accountability (Weapons 

and ammunition). 

(5) Firearm storage requirements. 

(6) Armorer certification. 

This requirement would be based upon the 

current appendix B, Paragraph III.A. This 

proposed rule would require a firearms 

maintenance program to ensure weapons 

and ammunition are properly maintained, 

function as designed, and are properly 

stored and accounted for. In order to certify 

armorer, each weapon manufacturer provides training regarding the maintenance, 

care and repair of weapons they provide to 

licensees. The Commission believes that 

armorers must be certified to ensure that 

the quality of maintenance, care and repair 

of the weapons are in accordance with 

manufacturers specifications. 

H. Records ....................................................... This heading would be added formatting purposes. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. The licensee or 

the agent shall maintain documentation of the 

current plan and retain this documentation of 

the plan as a record for three years after the 

close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under 

each license for which the plan was developed and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain the material that is superseded 

for three years after each change.

H.1. The licensee shall retain all reports, 

records, or other documentation required by 

this appendix in accordance with the requirements of § 73.55(r).

This requirement would be added to replace 

the current appendix B, Paragraph II.A, for 

consistency with the proposed § 73.55(r), 

and to specify the records retention requirement. This requirement would be intended 

to consolidate all records retention requirements. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62827 

TABLE 6.—PROPOSED PART 73 APPENDIX B—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. The physical fitness qualification of each guard, armed response person, armed escort, and other security force member shall be documented. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. The licensee shall 

retain this documentation as a record for 

three years from the date of each qualification. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.E. The licensee shall 

document each individual’s physical requalification and shall retain this documentation of 

requalification as a record for three years 

from the date of each requalification. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II.B. The qualifications 

of each individual must be documented. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II.B. The licensee shall 

retain this documentation of each individual’s 

qualifications as a record for three years after 

the employee ends employment in the security-related capacity and for three years after 

the close of period for which the licensee 

possesses the special nuclear material under 

each license, and superseded material for 

three years after each change. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II.E. The results of requalification must be documented. 

Appendix B, Paragraph II.E. The licensee shall 

retain this documentation of each individual’s 

requalification as a record for three years 

from the date of each requalification. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV. The results of 

weapons qualification and requalification 

must be documented by requalification must 

be documented by the licensee or the licensee’s agent. 

Appendix B, Paragraph IV. The licensee shall 

retain this documentation of each qualification as a record for three years from the date 

of the qualification or requalification, as appropriate. 

H.2. The licensee shall retain each individual’s initial qualification record for three (3) 

years after termination of the individual’s 

employment and shall retain each re-qualification record for three (3) years after it is 

superceded.

This requirement would combine all record retention requirements currently in appendix 

B. 

Appendix B, Paragraph I.F. The results of suitability, physical, and mental qualifications 

data and test results must be documented by 

the licensee or the licensee’s agent. The licensee or the agent shall retain this documentation as a record for three years from 

the date of obtaining and recording these results.

H.3. The licensee shall document data and 

test results from each individual’s suitability, 

physical, and psychological qualification 

and shall retain this documentation as a 

record for three years from the date of obtaining and recording these results.

This requirement would combine two requirements currently in appendix B. 

I. Audits and reviews ....................................... This heading would be added to ensure consistency with the structure of the appendix. 

The licensee shall review the Commission-approved training and qualification plan in accordance with the requirements of 

§ 73.55(n).

This requirement would be added for consistency with audit and review requirements of 

the proposed 10 CFR 73.55(n). 

Definitions ........................................................... J. Definitions .................................................... This heading would be brought forward from 

the current rule and would be renumbered 

accordingly. 

Terms defined in parts 50, 70, and 73 of this 

chapter have the same meaning when used 

in this appendix.

Terms defined in parts 50, 70, and 73 of this 

chapter have the same meaning when used 

in this appendix.

This requirement would be brought forward 

from the current rule and would be renumbered accordingly. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62828 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 7.—PART 73 APPENDIX C SECTION II 

[Nuclear Power Plants Safeguards Contingency Plans] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix C ......................................................... Section II: Nuclear power plant safeguards 

contingency plans.

This paragraph and header would be added 

to independently address Nuclear Power 

Reactor Safeguards Contingency Plan requirements without impacting other licensees. The proposed requirements addressed 

in this proposed paragraph retain and incorporate the requirements of the appendix C. 

Introduction ......................................................... (a) Introduction ................................................. This requirement would be retained. 

The safeguards contingency plan must describe how the criteria set forth in this appendix will be satisfied through implementation and must provide specific goals, objectives and general guidance to licensee personnel to facilitate the initiation and completion of predetermined and exercised responses to threats, up to and including the 

design basis threat described in § 73.1(a)(1).

This requirement would be added to generally 

describe the Commission’s expectations for 

the content of the safeguards contingency 

plan. 

Contents of the Plan .......................................... Contents of the plan ........................................ This requirement would be retained. 

Each licensee safeguards contingency plan 

shall include five categories of information: 

1. Background. 

2. Generic Planning Base. 

3. Licensee Planning Base. 

4. Responsibility Matrix. 

5. Procedures. 

(b) Each safeguards contingency plan must 

include the following twelve (12) categories 

of information: 

(1) Background. 

(2) Generic Planning Base. 

(3) Licensee Planning Base. 

(4) Responsibility Matrix. 

(5) Primary Security Functions. 

(6) Response Capabilities. 

(7) Protective Strategy. 

(8) Integrated Response Plan. 

(9) Threat Warning System. 

(10) Performance Evaluation Program. 

(11) Audits and Reviews. 

(12) Implementing Procedures. 

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The current categories of information (1) through (5) would be retained 

with (5) being reformatted to (12) and renamed ‘‘Implementing Procedures’’ to update the terminology used to identify this 

category of information. The proposed categories of information (5) through (11) 

would be added to improve the usefulness 

and applicability of the safeguards contingency plan. 

1. Background .................................................... (c) Background ................................................. This header would be retained with editorial 

changes. 

Under the following topics, this category of information shall identify and define the perceived dangers and incidents with which the 

plan will deal and the general way it will handle these: 

(c)(1) Consistent with the design basis threat 

specified in § 73.1(a)(1), licensees shall 

identify and describe the perceived dangers, threats, and incidents against which 

the safeguards contingency plan is designed to protect.

This requirement would be retained with information added to identify specific goals, objectives and general information for the development of the safeguards contingency 

plan. 

1.b. Purpose of the Plan—A discussion of the 

general aims and operational concepts underlying implementation of the plan. Introduction: The goals of licensee safeguards contingency plans for responding to threats, thefts, 

and radiological sabotage are: 

(c)(2) Licensees shall describe the general 

goals and operational concepts underlying 

implementation of the approved safeguards 

contingency plan, to include, but not limited 

to the following: 

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The header ‘‘Purpose of the 

Plan’’ would be deleted because purpose is 

described in the proposed paragraph (a)(2). 

The phrase ‘‘A discussion of the general 

aims and’’ would be deleted because the 

specific goals and objectives discussed in 

the proposed paragraph (c)(1) would include ‘‘general aims’’, therefore, it is not 

necessary to further break this topic area 

into individual components. The phrase ‘‘, 

to include, but not limited to the following’’

would be added to provide flexibility for the 

licensee to add information not specifically 

listed. 

1.c. Scope of the Plan—A delineation of the 

types of incidents covered in the plan.

(c)(2)(i) The types of incidents covered ........... This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The header ‘‘Scope of the 

Plan’’ would be deleted because the scope 

of the safeguards contingency plan under 

this proposed rule would not be limited to 

only a delineation of the types of incidents 

covered in the plan. 

Introduction: A licensee safeguards contingency 

plan is a documented plan to give guidance 

to licensee personnel in order to accomplish 

specific defined objectives * * *.

(c)(2)(ii) The specific goals and objectives to 

be accomplished.

This requirement would be retained with additional information added for the identification of specific goals and objectives to be 

accomplished to ensure the plan is appropriately oriented toward mission accomplishment. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62829 

TABLE 7.—PART 73 APPENDIX C SECTION II—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Plants Safeguards Contingency Plans] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Background: Under the following topics, this 

category of information shall identify and define the perceived dangers and incidents with 

which the plan will deal and the general way 

it will handle these: 

(c)(2)(iii) The different elements of the onsite 

physical protection program that are used 

to provide at all times the capability to detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay, 

and neutralize threats, up to and including 

the design basis threat relative to the perceived dangers and incidents described in 

the Commission-approved safeguards contingency plan.

This requirement would be retained with additional information added to describe defense-in-depth concepts as they apply at 

each site and how the individual components that make up the onsite physical protection program would work together to ensure the capability to detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize the 

threats consistent with the proposed requirements of § 73.55. 

Introduction: The goals of licensee safeguards 

contingency plans * * * are: 

(1) to organize the response effort at the licensee level, 

(c)(2)(iv) How the onsite response effort is organized and coordinated to ensure that licensees, capability to prevent significant 

core damage and spent fuel sabotage is 

maintained throughout each type of incident 

covered.

This requirement would be retained with additional information added to describe the elements of a site integrated response to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel 

sabotage. 

Introduction: The goals of licensee safeguards 

contingency plans * * * are: 

(3) to ensure the integration of the licensee 

response with the responses by other 

entities, and; 

Introduction: It is important to note that a licensee’s safeguards contingency plan is 

intended to be complimentary to any 

emergency plans developed pursuant to 

appendix E to part 50 or to § 70.22(I) of 

this chapter. 

(c)(2)(v) How the onsite response effort is integrated to include specific procedures, 

guidance, and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent 

fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing 

or readily available resources (equipment 

and personnel) that can be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant 

due to explosions or fires.

This requirement would be retained with additional information provided for an integrated 

response as addressed in the proposed 

paragraph (j). Reference to appendix E to 

part 50 or to § 70.22(I) would no longer be 

required because the performance standard 

for this proposed requirement would be 

broad enough to include these references 

and any other emergency plans developed 

as a result of Commission mandated enhancements. 

1.d. Definitions—A list of terms and their definitions used in describing operational and technical aspects of the plan.(c)(2)(vi) A list of terms and their definitions 

used in describing operational and technical 

aspects of the approved safeguards contingency plan.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The header ‘‘Definitions’’ is 

deleted because it would no longer be required under the new format of this proposed rule. The phrase ‘‘approved safeguards contingency’’ would be added to reflect changes to the terminology used to describe this topic. 

2. Generic Planning Base .................................. (d) Generic planning base ............................... This requirement would be retained. 

2. Under the following topics, this category of 

information shall define the criteria for initiation and termination of responses to safeguards contingencies together with the specific decisions, actions, and supporting information needed to bring about such responses: 

(d)(1) Licensees shall define the criteria for 

initiation and termination of responses to 

threats to include the specific decisions, actions, and supporting information needed to 

respond to each type of incident covered by 

the approved safeguards contingency plan.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The phrase ‘‘Under the following topics’’ would be replaced with the 

phrase ‘‘The licensee shall define’’ to establish the required action to be taken by the 

licensee. The phrase ‘‘safeguards contingencies’’ would be replaced by the word 

‘‘threats’’ to reflect changes in the terminology used to describe this topic. The 

phrase ‘‘together with’’ would be replaced 

with the phrase ‘‘to include’’. The phrase 

‘‘bring about such responses’’ is replaced 

by the phrase ‘‘respond to each type of incident covered by the approved safeguards 

contingency plan.’’

2.a. Such events may include alarms or other 

indications signaling penetration of a protected area, vital area, or material access 

area; material control or material accounting 

indications of material missing or unaccounted for; or threat indications—either 

verbal, such as telephoned threats, or implied, such as escalating civil disturbances.

(d)(2) Licensees shall ensure early detection 

of unauthorized activities and shall respond 

to all alarms or other indications of a threat 

condition such as, tampering, bomb threats, 

unauthorized barrier penetration (vehicle or 

personnel), missing or unaccounted for nuclear material, escalating civil disturbances, 

imminent threat notification, or other threat 

warnings.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. Reference to specific site 

areas would be deleted. The licensee would 

be required to respond to unauthorized activities where detection has occurred. Examples provided would be revised for consistency with the terminology used in the 

proposed rule and would not be intended to 

be all inclusive. 

Appendix C—Introduction. An acceptable safeguards contingency plan must contain: (d)(3) The safeguards contingency plan must: This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The phrase ‘‘an acceptable’’

is deleted because the requirements of this 

proposed rule address what would be acceptable. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62830 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 7.—PART 73 APPENDIX C SECTION II—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Plants Safeguards Contingency Plans] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

2.a. Identification of those events that will be 

used for signaling the beginning or aggravation of a safeguards contingency according to 

how they are perceived initially by licensee’s 

personnel.

(d)(3)(i) Identify the types of events that signal 

the beginning or initiation of a safeguards 

contingency event.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The phrase ‘‘according to 

how they are perceived initially by licensee’s personnel’’ would be deleted because 

the concept of perceived is captured 

through assessment. 

Introduction: The goals of licensee safeguards 

contingency plans * * * are: (2) to provide 

predetermined, structured responses by licensees to safeguards contingencies, 

(d)(3)(ii) Provide predetermined and structured responses to each type of postulated 

event.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The phrase ‘‘safeguards 

contingencies’’ has been replaced with 

‘‘each type of postulated event’’ to include a 

wider range of potential events. 

2.b. Definition of the specific objective to be accomplished relative to each identified event.(d)(3)(iii) Define specific goals and objectives 

for response to each postulated event.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The word ‘‘goals’’ would be 

added for consistency with the proposed 

Paragraph (a)(3). 

2.b.(1) a predetermined set of decisions and 

actions to satisfy stated objectives, 

(d)(3)(iv) Identify the predetermined decisions 

and actions which are required to satisfy 

the written goals and objectives for each 

postulated event.

This requirement would be retained with more 

specific information being provided to ensure that written goals and objectives are 

identified for each postulated event. 

2.b.(2) an identification of the data, criteria, procedures, and mechanisms necessary to efficiently implement the decisions, and; (d)(3)(v) Identify the data, criteria, procedures, 

mechanisms and logistical support necessary to implement the predetermined decisions and actions.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The word ‘‘efficiently’’ would 

be deleted because it is considered to be 

an arbitrary term that would not describe 

the performance standard of this proposed 

requirement. 

2.b.(3) a stipulation of the individual, group, or 

organizational entity responsible for each decision and action.

(d)(3)(vi) Identify the individuals, groups, or 

organizational entities responsible for each 

predetermined decision and action.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The use of the word ‘‘predetermined’’ has been inserted to organizationally align decisions and actions to responsible entities. 

2.b.(3) a stipulation of the individual, group, or 

organizational entity responsible for each decision and action.

(d)(3)(vii) Define the command-and-control 

structure required to coordinate each individual, group, or organizational entity carrying out predetermined actions.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The required elements of 

command and control have been added to 

establish clear lines of authority. 

Introduction: The goals of licensee safeguards 

contingency plans * * * are: (4) to achieve a 

measurable performance in response capability.

(d)(3)(viii) Describe how effectiveness will be 

measured and demonstrated to include the 

effectiveness of the capability to detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize threats, up to and including the design basis threat.

This requirement has been retained with editorial changes. A change has been made to 

replace the word ‘‘response’’ with the 

phrase ‘‘detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize’’ to provide a 

more detailed description of system effectiveness. 

3. Licensee Planning Base ................................ (e) Licensee planning base ............................. This requirement would be retained. 

This category of information shall include the 

factors affecting contingency planning that 

are specific for each facility or means of 

transportation. To the extent that the topics 

are treated in adequate detail in the licensee’s approved physical security plan, they 

may be incorporated by cross reference to 

that plan. The following topics should be addressed: 

(e) Licensees shall describe the site-specific 

factors affecting contingency planning and 

shall develop plans for actions to be taken 

in response to postulated threats. The following topics must be addressed: 

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The phrase ‘‘or means of 

transportation’’ is deleted because this 

phrase does not apply to nuclear power reactor licensees. The phrase ‘‘To the extent 

that the topics are treated in adequate detail in the licensee’s approved physical security plan, they may be incorporated by 

cross reference to that plan’’ would be deleted because this information would be required to be specifically detailed in contingency planning. 

3.a. Licensee’s Organizational Structure for 

Contingency Responses. A delineation of the 

organization’s chain of command and delegation of authority as these apply to safeguards 

contingencies.

(e)(1) Organizational Structure. The safeguards contingency plan must describe the 

organization’s chain of command and delegation of authority during safeguards contingencies, to include a description of how 

command-and-control functions will be coordinated and maintained.

This requirement has been retained with more 

detailed information being provided for the 

integration of command groups, succession 

of command, and control functions. 

3.b. Physical Layout ........................................... (e)(2) Physical layout ....................................... This requirement would be retained. 

3.b.(i) Fixed Sites. A description of the physical 

structures and their location on the site * * *.

(e)(2)(i) The safeguards contingency plan 

must include a site description, to include 

maps and drawings, of the physical structures and their locations.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The header ‘‘Fixed Sites’’

would be deleted because it would not be 

necessary for the purpose of this proposed 

rule. Specific information to permit orientation and familiarization of the site would 

also be included. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62831 

TABLE 7.—PART 73 APPENDIX C SECTION II—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Plants Safeguards Contingency Plans] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

3.b.(i) A description * * * and a description of 

the site in relation to nearby towns, roads, 

and other environmental features important to 

the effective coordination of response operations.

(e)(2)(i)(A) Site Description. The site description must address the site location in relation to nearby towns, transportation routes 

(e.g., rail, water, air, roads), pipelines, hazardous material facilities, onsite independent spent fuel storage installations, 

and pertinent environmental features that 

may have an effect upon coordination of response operations.

This requirement has been retained with more 

detailed information being included to consider the site’s geographic relationship to 

the community and environment. 

3.b.(i) Particular emphasis should be placed on 

main and alternate entry routes for law enforcement assistance forces and the location 

of control points for marshaling and coordinating response activities.

(e)(2)(i)(B) Approaches. Particular emphasis 

must be placed on main and alternate entry 

routes for law enforcement or other offsite 

support agencies and the location of control 

points for marshaling and coordinating response activities.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The word ‘‘should’’ has been 

replaced with the word ‘‘must’’ to establish 

this language as a requirement. 

(e)(2)(ii) Licensees with co-located Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations 

shall describe response procedures for both 

the operating reactor and the Independent 

Spent Fuel Storage Installation to include 

how onsite and offsite responders will be 

coordinated and used for incidents occurring outside the protected area.

This requirement would be retained with more 

detailed information being provided for response to incidents occurring outside the 

protected area and for the utilization of assets. 

3.c. Safeguards Systems Hardware. A description of the physical security and accounting 

system hardware that influence how the licensee will respond to an event. Examples of 

systems to be discussed are communications, alarms, locks, seals, area access, armaments, and surveillance.

(e)(3) Safeguards Systems Hardware. The 

safeguards contingency plan must contain a 

description of the physical security and material accounting system hardware that influence how the licensee will respond to an 

event.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes to specify hardware for material accountability. 

3.d. Law Enforcement Assistance ...................... (e)(4) Law enforcement assistance ................. This requirement would be retained. 

3.d. A listing of available local law enforcement 

agencies and a description of their response 

capabilities and their criteria for response; 

and * * *.

(e)(4)(i) The safeguards contingency plan 

must contain a listing of available local, 

State, and Federal law enforcement agencies and a general description of response 

capabilities, to include number of personnel, 

types of weapons, and estimated response 

time lines.

This requirement would be retained with more 

detailed information being provided for documenting supporting agency capabilities 

and assets. 

3.d. * * * and a discussion of working agreements or arrangements for communicating 

with these agencies.

(e)(4)(ii) The safeguards contingency plan 

must contain a discussion of working agreements with offsite law enforcement agencies to include criteria for response, command and control protocols, and communication procedures.

This requirement would be retained with the 

addition of written information to be included in working agreements with offsite 

law enforcement agencies. 

3.e. Policy Constraints and Assumptions. A discussion of State laws, local ordinances, and 

company policies and practices that govern 

licensee response to incidents. Examples 

that may be discussed include: 

(1) Use of deadly force; 

(2) Use of employee property; 

(3) Use of off-duty employees; 

(4) Site security jurisdictional boundaries. 

(e)(5) Policy constraints and assumptions. 

The safeguards contingency plan must contain a discussion of State laws, local ordinances, and company policies and practices that govern licensee response to incidents and must include, but is not limited 

to, the following.

(i) Use of deadly force. 

(ii) Recall of off-duty employees. 

(iii) Site jurisdictional boundaries. 

(iv) Use of enhanced weapons, if applicable. 

This requirement would be retained. The text 

of 3.e.(2) ‘‘Use of Employee property’’

would be deleted because this information 

would not be considered relevant for discussion under policy constraints and assumptions. The requirement would be 

added to implement applicable provisions 

from the EPAct of 2005. This requirement is 

not applicable to licensees that possess 

such weaponry under authority separate 

from EPAct 2005. 

3.f. Administrative and Logistical Considerations—(e)(6) Administrative and logistical considerations.This requirement would be retained. 

3.f. Descriptions of licensee practices that may 

have an influence on the response to safeguards contingency events. The considerations shall include a description of the procedures that will be used for ensuring that all 

equipment needed to effect a successful response to a safeguards contingency will be 

easily accessible, in good working order, and 

in sufficient supply to provide redundancy in 

case of equipment failure.

(e)(6)(i) The safeguards contingency plan 

must contain a description of licensee practices which influence how the licensee responds to a threat to include, but not limited 

to, a description of the procedures that will 

be used for ensuring that all equipment 

needed to effect a successful response will 

be readily accessible, in good working 

order, and in sufficient supply to provide redundancy in case of equipment failure.

This requirement would be retained with information added to reflect changes in the terminology used to describe this topic. 

4. Responsibility Matrix ...................................... (f) Responsibility matrix ................................... This requirement would be retained. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62832 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 7.—PART 73 APPENDIX C SECTION II—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Plants Safeguards Contingency Plans] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

This category of information consists of detailed 

identification of the organizational entities responsible for each decision and action associated with specific responses to safeguards 

contingencies.

(f)(1) The safeguards contingency plan must 

describe the organizational entities that are 

responsible for each decision and action 

associated with responses to threats.

This requirement would be retained with information added to reflect changes in the terminology used to describe this topic. 

For each initiating event, a tabulation shall be 

made for each response entity depicting the 

assignment of responsibilities for all decisions 

and actions to be taken in response to the 

initiating event. (Not all entities will have assigned responsibilities for any given initiating 

event.).

(f)(1)(i) For each identified initiating event, a 

tabulation must be made for each response 

depicting the assignment of responsibilities 

for all decisions and actions to be taken.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The parenthetical phrase 

‘‘(Not all entities will have assigned responsibilities for any given initiating event)’’

would be deleted because it is considered 

to be constricting information. 

The tabulations in the Responsibility Matrix 

shall provide an overall picture of the response actions and their interrelationships.

(f)(1)(ii) The tabulations described in the responsibility matrix must provide an overall 

description of response actions and interrelationships.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The word ‘‘shall’’ has been 

replaced with ‘‘must’’ to establish this language as a requirement. 

Safeguards responsibilities shall be assigned in 

a manner that precludes conflict in duties or 

responsibilities that would prevent the execution of the plan in any safeguards contingency.

(f)(2) Licensees shall ensure that duties and 

responsibilities required by the approved 

safeguards contingency plan do not conflict 

with or prevent the execution of other site 

emergency plans.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. 

Safeguards responsibilities shall be assigned in 

a manner that precludes conflict in duties or 

responsibilities that would prevent the execution of the plan in any safeguards contingency.

(f)(3) Licensees shall identify and discuss potential areas of conflict between site plans 

in the integrated response plan required by 

Section II(b)(8) of this appendix.

This requirement would be retained with 

added written discussion (text) in the plan 

to document consideration of other plans to 

preclude conflict between multiple plans. 

(f)(4) Licensees shall address safety/security 

interface issues in accordance with the requirements of § 73.58 to ensure activities by 

the security organization, maintenance, operations, and other onsite entities are coordinated in a manner that precludes conflict during both normal and emergency 

conditions.

This requirement would be added to address 

communication between licensee safety 

and security entities, to ensure that activities involving one organizational entity do 

not adversely affect another. Details would 

be addressed in the proposed § 73.58 safety/security interface. 

(g) Primary security functions .......................... This requirement would be added to improve 

the usefulness and applicability of the safeguards contingency plan. 

§ 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) Requiring responding 

guards or other armed response personnel to 

interpose themselves between vital areas 

and material access areas and any adversary 

attempting entry for the purpose of radiological sabotage or theft of special nuclear 

material and to intercept any person exiting 

with special nuclear material, and, * * *.

(g)(1) Licensees shall establish and maintain 

at all times, the capability to detect, assess, 

and respond to all threats to the facility up 

to and including the design basis threat.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The phrase ‘‘radiological 

sabotage’’ is replaced with the phrase ‘‘all 

threats up to and including the design basis 

threat’’ to more accurately represent the 

standard that the licensee also protect 

against perceived threats not contained in 

the design basis threat. 

§ 73.55(h)(6) To facilitate initial response to detection of penetration of the protected area 

and assessment of the existence of a threat, 

a capability of observing the isolation zones 

and the physical barrier at the perimeter of 

the protected area shall be provided, preferably by means of closed circuit television or 

by other suitable means which limit exposure 

of responding personnel to possible attack.

(g)(2) To facilitate initial response to a threat, 

licensees shall ensure the capability to observe all areas of the facility in a manner 

that ensures early detection of unauthorized 

activities and limits exposure of responding 

personnel to possible attack.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. Early detection has been 

added to permit a timely and effective response. The goal is to observe and detect 

potential threats as far from the facility as 

possible. 

(g)(3) Licensees shall generally describe how 

the primary security functions are integrated 

to provide defense-in-depth and are maintained despite the loss of any single element of the onsite physical protection program.

This requirement would be added to describe 

the concept of defense-in-depth for improved system effectiveness. 

(g)(4) Licensees’ description must begin with 

onsite physical protection measures implemented in the outermost facility perimeter, 

and must move inward through those 

measures implemented to protect vital and 

target set equipment.

This requirement would be added to further 

describe the concept of defense-in-depth 

for improved system effectiveness. 

(h) Response capabilities ................................ This requirement would be added. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62833 

TABLE 7.—PART 73 APPENDIX C SECTION II—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Plants Safeguards Contingency Plans] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) Requiring responding 

guards or other armed response personnel to 

interpose themselves between vital areas 

and material access areas and any adversary 

attempting entry for the purpose of radiological sabotage or theft of special nuclear 

material and to intercept any person exiting 

with special nuclear material, and, * * *.

(h)(1) Licensees shall establish and maintain 

at all times the capability to intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize threats up to 

and up to and including the design basis 

threat.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The phrase ‘‘radiological 

sabotage’’ is replaced with the phrase ‘‘all 

threats up to and including the design basis 

threat’’ for consistency with the proposed 

§ 73.55. 

Appendix C, Paragraph 4. For each initiating 

event, a tabulation shall be made for each response entity depicting the assignment of responsibilities for all decisions and actions to 

be taken in response to the initiating event.

(h)(2) Licensees shall identify the personnel, 

equipment, and resources necessary to 

perform the actions required to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage in response to postulated events.

The requirement would be retained with information added to identify the allocation of 

personnel and the availability of assets required to be implemented in response to 

postulated events. 

(h)(3) Licensees shall ensure that predetermined actions can be completed under the 

postulated conditions.

This requirement would be added. The word 

‘‘predetermined’’ is used to provide for the 

accomplishment of automatic actions to 

achieve the security mission. 

§ 73.55(h)(3) The total number of guards, and 

armed, trained personnel immediately available at the facility to fulfill these response requirements shall nominally be ten (10), unless specifically required otherwise on a case 

by case basis by the Commission; however, 

this number may not be reduced to less than 

five (5) guards.

(h)(4) Licensees shall provide at all times an 

armed response team comprised of trained 

and qualified personnel who possess the 

knowledge, skills, abilities, and equipment 

required to implement the Commission-approved safeguards contingency plan and 

site protective strategy. The plan must include a description of the armed response 

team including the following: 

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The requirement would be 

based on § 73.55(h)(3) and would describe 

the performance standard for personnel assigned armed response duties. 

§ 73.55(h)(3) The total number of guards, and 

armed, trained personnel immediately available at the facility to fulfill these response requirements shall nominally be ten (10), unless specifically required otherwise on a case 

by case basis by the Commission; however, 

this number may not be reduced to less than 

five (5) guards.

(h)(4)(i) The authorized minimum number of 

armed responders, available at all times inside the protected area.

This requirement would be retained with information added to establish the number of 

personnel required to be assigned armed 

response duties within the protected area. 

This is intended to ensure that predetermined positions documented in approved 

contingency plans and are occupied during 

threat situations. 

§ 73.55(h)(3) The total number of guards, and 

armed, trained personnel immediately available at the facility to fulfill these response requirements shall nominally be ten (10), unless specifically required otherwise on a case 

by case basis by the Commission; however, 

this number may not be reduced to less than 

five (5) guards.

(h)(4)(ii) The authorized minimum number of 

armed security officers, available onsite at 

all times.

This requirement would be retained with information added to establish the number of 

personnel required to be assigned armed 

response duties on site. This is intended to 

ensure that predetermined positions documented in approved contingency plans and 

are occupied during threat situations. 

(h)(5) The total number of armed responders 

and armed security officers must be documented in the approved security plans and 

documented as a component of the protective strategy.

This requirement would be added to document the number of armed response personnel and their roles and relationships to 

the protective strategy. 

(h)(6) Licensees shall ensure that individuals 

assigned duties and responsibilities to implement the Safeguards Contingency Plan 

are trained and qualified in accordance with 

appendix B of this part and the Commission-approved security plans.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

assigned personnel are trained to perform 

their assigned duties and responsibilities. 

(i) Protective strategy ....................................... This header is added for formatting purposes. 

(i)(1) Licensees shall develop, maintain, and 

implement a written protective strategy that 

describes the deployment of the armed response team relative to the general goals, 

operational concepts, performance objectives, and specific actions to be accomplished by each individual in response to 

postulated events.

This requirement would be added to provide 

tactical planning information for the armed 

response team and each individual in response to threats. 

(i)(2) The protective strategy must: This header is added for formatting purposes. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62834 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 7.—PART 73 APPENDIX C SECTION II—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Plants Safeguards Contingency Plans] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

§ 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) Requiring responding 

guards or other armed response personnel to 

interpose themselves between vital areas 

and material access areas and any adversary 

attempting entry for the purpose of radiological sabotage or theft of special nuclear 

material and to intercept any person exiting 

with special nuclear material, and, * * *.

(i)(2)(i) Be designed to prevent significant 

core damage and spent fuel sabotage 

through the coordinated implementation of 

specific actions and strategies required to 

intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize 

threats up to and including the design basis 

threat of radiological sabotage.

This requirement would be retained and revised to describe the design of the licensee 

protective strategy consistent with the proposed § 73.55(b)(2). Most significantly, the 

word ‘‘interpose’’ would be replaced by the 

phrase ‘‘intercept, challenge, delay, and 

neutralize’’ to provide a measurable performance based requirement that identifies 

the specific actions required to satisfy the 

action ‘‘interpose’’ as required by the current § 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A), and to provide a 

measurable performance based requirement against which the effectiveness of the 

licensee protective strategy could be measured. 

(i)(2)(ii) Describe and consider site specific 

conditions, to include but not limited to, facility layout, the location of target set equipment and elements, target set equipment 

that is in maintenance or out of service, and 

the potential effects that unauthorized electronic access to safety and security systems may have on the protective strategy 

capability to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage.

This requirement would be added based on 

changes to the threat environment the 

Commission has determined that it is necessary to emphasize consideration of the 

listed areas for design and planning purposes. 

(i)(2)(iii) Identify predetermined actions and 

time lines for the deployment of armed personnel.

This requirement would be added to identify 

‘‘predetermined actions’’ to provide for automatic actions toward accomplishing the security mission. 

(i)(2)(iv) Provide bullet resisting protected positions with appropriate fields of fire.This requirement would be added to provide a 

performance based requirement for the 

placement/location of Bullet-Resisting Enclosures (BREs). This proposed requirement would ensure that each position would 

be of sufficient strength to enhance survivability of armed personnel against the design basis threat and would ensure that assigned areas of responsibility are clearly 

visible and within the functional capability of 

assigned weapons. 

§ 73.55(h)(6) To facilitate initial response to 

detection of penetration * * * which limit exposure of responding personnel to possible 

attack.

(i)(2)(v) Limit exposure of security personnel 

to possible attack.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes added to describe the ballistic protection or use of available cover 

and concealment for security personnel. 

§ 73.55(f)(1) Each guard, watchman or armed 

response individual on duty shall be capable 

of maintaining continuous communication 

with an individual in each continuously 

manned alarm station required by paragraph 

(e)(1) of this section, who shall be capable of 

calling for assistance from other guards, 

watchmen, and armed response personnel 

and from local law enforcement authorities.

(i)(3) Licensees shall provide a command and 

control structure, to include response by offsite law enforcement agencies, which ensures that decisions and actions are coordinated and communicated in a timely manner and that facilitates response in accordance with the integrated response plan.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes added to describe the elements of integrated incident command during postulated events. 

(j) Integrated Response Plan ........................... This new header would be added for formatting purposes. 

Introduction: It is important to note that a licensee’s safeguards contingency plan is intended 

to be complimentary to any emergency plans 

developed pursuant to appendix E to part 50 

or to § 70.22(i) of this chapter.

(j)(1) Licensees shall document, maintain, and 

implement an Integrated Response Plan 

which must identify, describe, and coordinate actions to be taken by licensee personnel and offsite agencies during a contingency event or other emergency situation.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The requirement would describe integrated and coordinated responses to threats. 

(j)(2) The Integrated Response Plan must: This requirement would be added to improve 

the usefulness and applicability of the safeguards contingency plan. 

(j)(2)(i) Be designed to integrate and coordinate all actions to be taken in response to 

an emergency event in a manner that will 

ensure that each site plan and procedure 

can be successfully implemented without 

conflict from other plans and procedures.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

the design of an integrated response plan 

that has been developed in coordination 

and conjunction with other plans. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62835 

TABLE 7.—PART 73 APPENDIX C SECTION II—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Plants Safeguards Contingency Plans] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(j)(2)(ii) Include specific procedures, guidance, 

and strategies to maintain or restore core 

cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool 

cooling capabilities using existing or readily 

available resources (equipment and personnel) that can be effectively implemented 

under the circumstances associated with 

loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fires.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

the design of an integrated response plan 

that addresses a myriad of postulated 

events within the design basis threat environment and to develop mitigating strategies for events that may exceed the design 

basis threat. 

(j)(2)(iii) Ensure that onsite staffing levels, facilities, and equipment required for response to any identified event, are readily 

available and capable of fulfilling their intended purpose.

This requirement would be added to describe 

the availability of systems and assets to ensure a high state of readiness is maintained 

for postulated events. 

(j)(2)(iv) Provide emergency action levels to 

ensure that threats result in at least a notification of unusual event and implement procedures for the assignment of a predetermined classification to specific events.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that event information is communicated in a 

timely and accurate manner. 

(j)(2)(v) Include specific procedures, guidance, 

and strategies describing cyber incident response and recovery.

This requirement would be added to consider 

advanced threats related to computer technology. 

(j)(3) Licensees shall: This new header is added for formatting purposes. 

(j)(3)(i) Reconfirm on an annual basis, liaison 

with local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies, established in accordance 

with § 73.55(k)(8), to include communication 

protocols, command and control structure, 

marshaling locations, estimated response 

times, and anticipated response capabilities 

and specialized equipment.

This requirement would be added to establish 

a periodic standard for maintaining liaison 

with off-site law enforcement resources to 

ensure a continual and ongoing understanding of all aspects of a response to potential threats. 

(j)(3)(ii) Provide required training to include 

simulator training for the operations response to security events (e.g. loss of ultimate heat sink) for nuclear power reactor 

personnel in accordance with site procedures to ensure the operational readiness 

of personnel commensurate with assigned 

duties and responsibilities.

This requirement would be added to provide 

for training of personnel to ensure they possess the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities. 

(j)(3)(iii) Periodically train personnel in accordance with site procedures to respond to a 

hostage or duress situation.

This requirement would be added to provide 

training of personnel to ensure they possess the tactical and negotiations skills, 

knowledge and abilities needed to respond 

to a hostage or duress situation. 

(j)(3)(iv) Determine the possible effects that 

nearby hazardous material facilities may 

have upon site response plans and modify 

response plans, procedures, and equipment 

as necessary.

This requirement would be added to provide 

for the identification of site specific operational conditions that may affect how the licensee responds to threats. 

(j)(3)(v) Ensure that identified actions are 

achievable under postulated conditions.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that actions identified in the safeguards 

contingency plan, protective strategy, integrated response plan, and any other emergency plans, are achievable under postulated conditions. 

(k) Threat warning system ............................... This new header is added for formatting purposes. 

(k)(1) Licensees shall implement a ‘‘Threat 

warning system’’ which identifies specific 

graduated protective measures and actions 

to be taken to increase licensee preparedness against a heightened or imminent 

threat of attack.

This requirement would be added to provide 

for progressive steps to gradually enhance 

security based on perceived or identified 

threat. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62836 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 7.—PART 73 APPENDIX C SECTION II—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Plants Safeguards Contingency Plans] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(k)(2) Licensees shall ensure that the specific 

protective measures and actions identified 

for each threat level are consistent with the 

Commission-approved safeguards contingency plan, and other site security, and 

emergency plans and procedures.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

preplanned actions (protective measures) 

are consistent with other plans. The Commission has determined that because of 

changes to the threat environment this proposed requirement would be needed to emphasize the importance of coordinating all 

site plans in a manner that precludes conflict. 

(k)(3) Upon notification by an authorized representative of the Commission, licensees 

shall implement the specific protective 

measures assigned to the threat level indicated by the Commission representative.

This requirement would be added to provide 

for the implementation of preplanned actions in response to specific threat levels or 

conditions. 

(l) Performance Evaluation Program ............... This new header would be added for formatting purposes. 

(l)(1) Licensees shall document and maintain 

a Performance Evaluation Program that describes how the licensee will demonstrate 

and assess the effectiveness of the onsite 

physical protection program to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage, and to include the capability of armed 

personnel to carry out their assigned duties 

and responsibilities.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that the licensee maintains a Performance 

Evaluation Plan to test, evaluate, determine 

and improve upon the effectiveness of onsite physical protection program to protect 

the identified targets and target sets in accordance with the security mission. 

(l)(2) The Performance Evaluation Program 

must include procedures for the conduct of 

quarterly drills and annual force-on-force 

exercises that are designed to demonstrate 

the effectiveness of the licensee’s capability 

to detect, assess, intercept, challenge, 

delay, and neutralize a simulated threat.

This requirement would be added to establish 

procedures and frequencies for the conduct 

of drills and exercises to ensure that system effectiveness determinations are made. 

(l)(2)(i) The scope of drills conducted for training purposes must be determined by the licensee as needed, and can be limited to 

specific portions of the site protective strategy.

This requirement would be added to provide 

for the conduct of drills for training purposes only. 

(l)(2)(ii) Drills, exercises, and other training 

must be conducted under conditions that 

simulate as closely as practical the site 

specific conditions under which each member will, or may be, required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

drills and exercises are realistic in that they 

simulate as closely as possible, the physical conditions (running, lifting, climbing) 

and mental stress levels (decision making, 

radio communications, strategy changes) 

that will be experienced in an actual event. 

(l)(2)(iii) Licensees shall document each performance evaluation to include, but not limited to, scenarios, participants, and critiques.This requirement would be added to ensure 

that comprehensive records are maintained. 

(l)(2)(iv) Each drill and exercise must include 

a documented post exercise critique in 

which participants identify failures, deficiencies, or other findings in performance, 

plans, equipment, or strategies.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that comprehensive reports are developed 

to ensure that observed issues are identified in the after action report. 

(l)(2)(v) Licensees shall enter all findings, deficiencies, and failures identified by each performance evaluation into the corrective action program to ensure that timely corrections are made to the onsite physical protection program and necessary changes are 

made to the approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that corrective action plans are developed 

and tracked to provide resolution. 

(l)(2)(vi) Licensees shall protect all findings, 

deficiencies, and failures relative to the effectiveness of the onsite physical protection 

program in accordance with the requirements of § 73.21.

This requirement would be added to provide 

for the appropriate level of protection for the 

type of information being developed. Information involving findings, deficiencies and 

failures is considered sensitive and must be 

protected accordingly. 

(l)(3) For the purpose of drills and exercises, 

licensees shall: 

This new header would be added for formatting purposes. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62837 

TABLE 7.—PART 73 APPENDIX C SECTION II—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Plants Safeguards Contingency Plans] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(l)(3)(i) Use no more than the number of 

armed personnel specified in the approved 

security plans to demonstrate effectiveness.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that realistic tests are conducted against 

those forces available onsite on a routine 

basis. Conducting drills under other than 

with actual or non typical staffing levels 

would not provide for accurate system effectiveness determinations. 

(l)(3)(ii) Minimize the number and effects of 

artificialities associated with drills and exercises.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that exercises are conducted as realistically 

as possible. Artificialities if not minimized 

would result in inaccurate system effectiveness determinations. 

(l)(3)(iii) Implement the use of systems or 

methodologies that simulate the realities of 

armed engagement through visual and audible means, and reflects the capabilities of 

armed personnel to neutralize a target 

though the use of firearms during drills and 

exercises.

This requirement would be added to provide 

for the utilization of technological advancements for simulating live fire combat situations in a controlled environment. These 

may include but are not limited to the use 

of laser engagement systems or dye marking cartridges. 

(l)(3)(iv) Ensure that each scenario used is 

capable of challenging the ability of armed 

personnel to perform assigned duties and 

implement required elements of the protective strategy.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that scenarios are developed to stress the 

protective strategy in manner that deficiencies or weaknesses can be identified. 

(l)(4) The Performance Evaluation Program 

must be designed to ensure that: 

This requirement would be added to improve 

the usefulness and applicability of the safeguards contingency plan. 

(l)(4)(i) Each member of each shift who is assigned duties and responsibilities required 

to implement the approved safeguards contingency plan and licensee protective strategy participates in at least one (1) drill on a 

quarterly basis and one (1) force on force 

exercise on an annual basis.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that individual members of the security 

force participate in drills at a frequency that 

provides them with knowledge and performance based experience applying the protective strategy. 

(l)(4)(ii) The mock adversary force replicates, 

as closely as possible, adversary characteristics and capabilities in the design basis 

threat described in § 73.1(a)(1), and is capable of exploiting and challenging the licensee protective strategy, personnel, command and control, and implementing procedures.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that the mock adversary force is capable of 

portraying the design basis threat in terms 

of size, activity, movement, tactics, equipment and weaponry. 

(l)(4)(iii) Protective strategies are evaluated 

and challenged through tabletop demonstrations.

This requirement would be added to provide 

an opportunity to evaluate protective strategies focusing on incident command in an 

open discussion format. 

(l)(4)(iv) Drill and exercise controllers are 

trained and qualified to ensure each controller has the requisite knowledge and experience to control and evaluate exercises.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

the use of qualified controllers who are 

knowledgeable of safety, environmental 

conditions, hazards, tactics, weapons 

equipment, and physical security systems. 

(l)(4)(v) Drills and exercises are conducted 

safely in accordance with site safety plans.

This requirement would be added to ensure licensee safety plans are considered in the 

conduct of drills and exercises. 

(l)(5) Members of the mock adversary force 

used for NRC observed exercises shall be 

independent of both the security program 

management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the 

security program, including contractors, to 

avoid the possibility for a conflict-of-interest.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that the mock adversary force is not influenced by security management or personnel responsible for security. This mitigates the potential for the scenario to be 

compromised or not carried out to the desired expectation. This proposed requirement is based on the EPAct 2005 section 

651. 

(l)(6) Scenarios 

(l)(6)(i) Licensees shall develop and document 

multiple scenarios for use in conducting 

quarterly drills and annual force-on-force 

exercises.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that varying scenarios with differing adversary configurations are used against all target sets for increased readiness. This permits a better determination of overall system effectiveness. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62838 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 7.—PART 73 APPENDIX C SECTION II—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Plants Safeguards Contingency Plans] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

(l)(6)(ii) Licensee scenarios must be designed 

to test and challenge any component or 

combination of components, of the onsite 

physical protection program and protective 

strategy.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that scenarios are developed in a manner 

that each aspect of the security system and 

strategy will be analyzed to determine effectiveness. 

(l)(6)(iii) Each scenario must use a unique target set or target sets, and varying combinations of adversary equipment, strategies, 

and tactics, to ensure that the combination 

of all scenarios challenges every component of the onsite physical protection program and protective strategy to include, but 

not limited to, equipment, implementing procedures, and personnel.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

that scenarios are developed in a manner 

that each aspect of the security system and 

strategy will be analyzed to determine overall system effectiveness. 

(l)(6)(iv) Licensees shall ensure that scenarios 

used for required drills and exercises are 

not repeated within any twelve (12) month 

period for drills and three years (3) for exercises.

This requirement would be added to ensure 

the development of scenarios with differing 

adversary configurations against varying 

target sets. This promotes increased readiness and permits a better determination of 

overall system effectiveness. 

Audit and Review ............................................... (m) Records, audits, and reviews .................... This header would be retained and revised to 

add records retention requirements. 

App. C 5.(1) For nuclear power reactor licensees subject to the requirements of § 73.55, 

the licensee shall provide for a review of the 

safeguards contingency plan either: 

App. C 5.(1)(i) At intervals not to exceed 12 

months, or * * * 

App. C 5.(1)(ii) As necessary, based on an assessment by the licensee against performance indicators, and as soon as reasonably 

practicable after a change occurs in personnel, procedures, equipment, or facilities 

that potentially could adversely affect security, but no longer than 12 months after the 

change. 

App. C 5.(1)(ii) * * * In any case, each element 

of the safeguards contingency plan must be 

reviewed at least every 24 months. 

App. C 5.(2) A licensee subject to the requirements of either § 73.46 or § 73.55, shall ensure that the review of the safeguards contingency plan is by individuals independent of 

both security program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the security program. 

Appendix C Paragraph 5(3). The licensee shall 

document the results and the recommendations of the safeguards contingency plan review, management findings on whether the 

safeguards contingency plan is currently effective, and any actions taken as a result of 

recommendations from prior reviews in a report to the licensee’s plant manager and to 

corporate management at least one level 

higher than that having responsibility for the 

day-to-day plant operation. 

(m)(1) Licensees shall review and audit the 

Commission-approved safeguards contingency plan in accordance with the requirements § 73.55(n) of this part.

This requirement would be revised to ensure 

that the protective strategy is revised as a 

result of any significant changes that would 

effect the ability to respond in accordance 

with the existing contingency plan. 

Appendix C Paragraph 5.(2) The review must 

include an audit of safeguards contingency 

procedures and practices, and an audit of 

commitments established for response by 

local law enforcement authorities.

(m)(2) The licensee shall make necessary adjustments to the Commission-approved 

safeguards contingency plan to ensure successful implementation of Commission regulations and the site protective strategy.

This requirement would be revised to ensure 

that the protective strategy is revised as a 

result of any significant changes that would 

affect the ability to respond in accordance 

with the existing contingency plan. 

Appendix C Paragraph 5.(2) The review must 

include an audit of safeguards contingency 

procedures and practices, and an audit of 

commitments established for response by 

local law enforcement authorities.

(m)(3) The safeguards contingency plan review must include an audit of implementing 

procedures and practices, the site protective strategy, and response agreements 

made by local, State, and Federal law enforcement authorities.

This requirement would be revised to ensure 

that an audit of the safeguards contingency 

plan is conducted to validate essential aspects of the plan. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62839 

TABLE 7.—PART 73 APPENDIX C SECTION II—Continued 

[Nuclear Power Plants Safeguards Contingency Plans] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Appendix C Paragraph 5.(3) The report must 

be maintained in an auditable form, available 

for inspection for a period of 3 years.

(m)(4) Licensees shall retain all reports, 

records, or other documentation required by 

this appendix in accordance with the requirements of § 73.55(r).

This requirement would be added to improve 

the usefulness and applicability of the safeguards contingency plan. 

Appendix C Paragraph 5. Procedures ............... (n) Implementing procedures ........................... This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. The word ‘‘Implementing’’

has been added to further define the requirement. 

In order to aid execution of the detailed plan as 

developed in the Responsibility Matrix, this 

category of information shall detail the actions to be taken and decisions to be made 

by each member or unit of the organization 

as planned in the Responsibility Matrix. Contents of the Plan: Although the implementing 

procedures (the fifth category of Plan information) are the culmination of the planning 

process, and therefore are an integral and 

important part of the safeguards contingency 

plan, they entail operating details subject to 

frequent changes.

(n)(1) Licensees shall establish and maintain 

written implementing procedures that provide specific guidance and operating details 

that identify the actions to be taken and decisions to be made by each member of the 

security organization who is assigned duties 

and responsibilities required for the effective implementation of the Commission-approved security plans and the site protective strategy.

This requirement would be revised to ensure 

that plans are developed to cover security 

force routine, emergency, administrative, 

and other operational duties. 

Contents of the Plan: The licensee is responsible for ensuring that the implementing procedures reflect the information in the Responsibility Matrix, appropriately summarized 

and suitably presented for effective use by 

the responding entities.

(n)(2) Licensees shall ensure that implementing procedures accurately reflect the 

information contained in the Responsibility 

Matrix required by this appendix, the Commission-approved security plans, the Integrated Response Plan, and other site plans.

This requirement would be revised to ensure 

that plans are developed to cover security 

force routine, emergency, administrative, 

and other operational duties. The phrase 

‘‘appropriately summarized and suitably 

presented for effective use by the responding entities’’ would be deleted because this 

concept would be covered under demonstration. 

Contents of the Plan: They need not be submitted to the Commission for approval, but 

will be inspected by NRC staff on a periodic 

basis.

(n)(3) Implementing procedures need not be 

submitted to the Commission for approval 

but are subject to inspection.

This requirement would be retained with editorial changes. 

TABLE 8.—PART 73 APPENDIX G 

[Reportable safeguards events] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

[Introductory text to App. G] 

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.71 (b) 

and (c), licensees subject to the provisions of 

10 CFR 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, 73.60, 

and 73.67 shall report or record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events.

[Introductory text to App. G] 

Under the provisions of § 73.71(a), (d), and (f) 

of this part, licensees subject to the provisions of § 73.55 of this part shall report or 

record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events under paragraphs I, II, III, 

and IV of this appendix. Under the provisions of § 73.71(b), (c), and (f) of this part, 

licensees subject to the provisions of 

§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.60, and 73.67 of 

this part shall report or record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events 

under paragraphs II and IV of this appendix. Licensees shall make such reports to 

the Commission under the provisions of 

§ 73.71 of this part.

This appendix would be revised by adding 

new requirements for nuclear power reactor 

licensees. Power reactor licensees subject 

to the provisions of § 73.55 would be required to notify the Commission (1) within 

15 minutes after discovery of an imminent 

or actual threat against the facility and (2) 

within four hours of discovery of suspicious 

events. The proposed 15-minute requirement would more accurately reflect the current threat environment. Because an actual 

or potential threat could quickly result in an 

event, a shorter reporting time would be required. However, the requirement for Commission notification within 15 minutes would 

be applied only to nuclear power reactor licensees, at this time. The Commission may 

consider the applicability of this requirement 

to other licensees in future rulemaking. The 

new 4-hour notification would be intended 

to aid the Commission, law enforcement, 

and the intelligence community in assessing 

suspicious activity that may be indicative of 

pre-operational surveillance, reconnaissance, or intelligence gathering efforts. 

Events reported under paragraphs I or II 

would require a followup written report. 

Events reported under paragraph III would 

not require a followup written report. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62840 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 8.—PART 73 APPENDIX G—Continued 

[Reportable safeguards events] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

I. Events to be reported as soon as possible, 

but no later than 15 minutes after discovery, followed by a written report within 

sixty (60) days.

(a) The initiation of a security response 

consistent with a licensee’s physical 

security plan, safeguards contingency 

plan, or defensive strategy based on 

actual or imminent threat against a nuclear power plant. 

Paragraph I would be added to establish the 

type of events to be reported within 15 minutes. Because the identification of information relating to an actual or imminent threat 

could quickly result in an event, which 

might necessitate expedited Commission 

action (e.g., notification of other licensees 

or Federal authorities), a shortened reporting time would be required. This proposed 

requirement would also ensure that threatrelated information would be made available to the Commission’s threat assessment process in a timely manner. Initiation 

of response consistent with plans and the 

defensive strategy that are not related to an 

imminent or actual threat against the facility 

would not need to be reported (e.g false, or 

nuisance responses). Additional information 

regarding identification of events to be reported would be provided in guidance. 

I.(b) The licensee is not required to report security responses initiated as a result of information communicated to the licensee by 

the Commission, such as the threat warning 

system addressed in appendix C to this 

part.

This provision would be added to reduce unnecessary regulatory burden on the licensees to notify the Commission of security responses initiated in response to communications from the Commission (e.g., 

changes to the threat level). 

I. Events to be reported within one hour of discovery, followed by a written report within 60 

days.

II. Events to be reported within one (1) hour 

of discovery, followed by a written report 

within sixty (60) days.

This requirement would be retained and renumbered. 

(a) Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has committed or caused, 

or attempted to commit or cause, or has 

made a credible threat to commit or cause: 

II.(a) Any event in which there is reason to 

believe that a person has committed or 

caused, or attempted to commit or cause, 

or has made a threat to commit or cause: 

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision and renumbered. The term 

credible would be removed. The Commission’s view is that a determination of the 

‘‘credibility’’ of a threat is not a licensee responsibility, but rests with the Commission 

and the intelligence community. 

(1) A theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear material; or II.(a)(1) A theft or unlawful diversion of special 

nuclear material; or 

This requirement would be retained and renumbered. 

(2) Significant physical damage to a power reactor or any facility possessing SSNM or its 

equipment or carrier equipment transporting 

nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel, or to the 

nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel a facility or 

carrier possesses; or 

II.(a)(2) Significant physical damage to any 

NRC-regulated power reactor or facility possessing strategic special nuclear material or 

to carrier equipment transporting nuclear 

fuel or spent nuclear fuel, or to the nuclear 

fuel or spent nuclear fuel facility which is 

possessed by a carrier; or 

This requirement would be retained with 

minor editorial changes to improve clarity 

and readability and renumbered. The 

phrase ‘‘NRC-regulated’’ would be added to 

specify that all Commission licensed facilities and transport would be covered by this 

requirement. This change would simplify the 

language in this section while retaining the 

basic requirement. 

(3) Interruption of normal operation of a licensed nuclear power reactor through the 

unauthorized use of or tampering with its machinery, components, or controls including 

the security system.

II.(a)(3) Interruption of normal operation of 

any NRC-licensed nuclear power reactor 

through the unauthorized use of or tampering with its components or controls, including the security system.

This requirement would be retained with 

minor revision and renumbered. The word 

‘‘machinery’’ would be deleted since ‘‘components’’ includes machinery and other 

physical structures at a licensed facility. 

This proposed requirement would continue 

to be applied only to nuclear power reactors 

licensed by the Commission, at this time. 

The Commission may consider the applicability of this requirement to other classes of 

licensees in future rulemaking. 

(b) An actual entry of an unauthorized person 

into a protected area, material access area, 

controlled access area, vital area, or transport.

II.(b) An actual or attempted entry of an unauthorized person into any area or transport 

for which the licensee is required by Commission regulations to control access.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

revised to delete the previously specifically 

mentioned areas (‘‘protected area, material 

access area, controlled access area, vital 

area’’) requiring access controls and 

change the language to include the actual 

or attempted entry of an unauthorized individual into any area required to be controlled by Commission regulations. This 

change would more accurately reflect the 

current threat environment. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62841 

TABLE 8.—PART 73 APPENDIX G—Continued 

[Reportable safeguards events] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

The revision also reflects Commission experience with implementation of the 2003 security order’s requirements and review of revised license security plans. Licensee’s defensive strategies and revised Safeguards 

Contingency Plans have introduced additional significant locations (e.g. target sets) 

that may not be limited to the previously 

specified areas. Additional information regarding identification of events to be reported will be provided in guidance. 

(c) Any failure, degradation, or the discovered 

vulnerability in a safeguard system that could 

allow unauthorized or undetected access to a 

protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for 

which compensatory measures have not 

been employed.

II.(c) Any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system 

that could allow unauthorized or undetected 

access to any area or transport for which 

the licensee is required by Commission regulations to control access and for which 

compensatory measures have not been 

employed.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

revised to delete the previously specifically 

mentioned areas (‘‘protected area, material 

access area, controlled access area, vital 

area’’) requiring access controls and to 

broaden the language to include any area 

required to be controlled by the Commission regulations (see considerations for 

paragraph II.(b) above). Additional information regarding identification of events to be 

reported will be provided in guidance. 

(d) The actual or attempted introduction of contraband into a protected area, material access area, vital area, or transport.II.(d) The actual or attempted introduction of 

contraband into any area or transport for 

which the licensee is required by Commission regulations to control access.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

revised to delete the previously specifically 

mentioned areas requiring access controls 

and change the language to include the actual or attempted entry of an unauthorized 

individual into any area or transport required to be controlled by Commission regulations (see considerations for paragraph 

II.(b) above). Additional information regarding identification of events to be reported 

will be provided in guidance. 

NRC Information Assessment Team (IAT) 

Advisories dated October 16, and November 

15, 2001; May 20, 2003; March 1, 2004; and 

October 5, 2005.

FBI’s ‘‘Terrorist Threats to the U.S. Homeland: 

Reporting Guide for Critical and Key Resource Owners and Operators’’ dated January 24, 2005, (Official Use Only). 

III. Events to be reported within four (4) hours 

of discovery. No written followup report is 

required.

(a) Any other information received by the 

licensee of suspicious surveillance activities or attempts at access, including: 

(1) Any security-related incident involving suspicious activity that may 

be indicative of potential pre-operational surveillance, reconnaissance, or intelligence-gathering activities directed against the facility. 

Such activity may include, but is 

not limited to, attempted surveillance or reconnaissance activity, 

elicitation of information from security or other site personnel relating 

to the security or safe operation of 

the plant, or challenges to security 

systems (e.g., failure to stop for 

security checkpoints, possible tests 

of security response and security 

screening equipment, or suspicious entry of watercraft into 

posted off-limits areas). 

(2) Any security-related incident involving suspicious aircraft overflight activity. Commercial or military aircraft activity considered routine by the licensee is not required 

to be reported. 

This paragraph would add a requirement for 

power reactor licensees to report suspicious 

activities, attempts at access, etc., that may 

indicate pre-operational surveillance, reconnaissance, or intelligence gathering targeted against the facility. This change 

would more accurately reflect the current 

threat environment; would assist the Commission in evaluating threats to multiple licensees; and would assist the intelligence 

and homeland security communities in evaluating threats across critical infrastructure 

sectors. The reporting process intended in 

this proposed rule would be similar to the 

reporting process that the licensees currently use under guidance issued by the 

Commission subsequent to September 11, 

2001, and would formalize Commission expectations; however, the reporting interval 

would be lengthened from 1 hour to 4 

hours. The Commission views this length of 

time as reasonable to accomplish these 

broader objectives. This reporting requirement does not include a followup written report. The Commission believes that a written report from the licensees would be of 

minimal value and would be an unnecessary regulatory burden, because the types 

of incidents to be reported are transitory in 

nature and time-sensitive. The proposed 

text would be neither a request for intelligence collection activities nor authority for 

the conduct of law enforcement or intelligence activities. This paragraph would 

simply require the reporting of observed activities. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC61 with PROPOSALS2
62842 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

TABLE 8.—PART 73 APPENDIX G—Continued 

[Reportable safeguards events] 

Current language Proposed language Considerations 

Paragraphs III(a)(1) and (2) provide broad examples of events that should be reported, 

or need not be reported. Additional information regarding identification of events to be 

reported will be provided in guidance. The 

Commission may consider the applicability 

of this requirement to other licensees in future rulemaking. 

III.(a)(3) Incidents resulting in the notification 

of local, State or national law enforcement, 

or law enforcement response to the site not 

included in paragraphs I or II of this appendix; 

This paragraph would be added to establish a 

performance standard for additional types 

of incidents or activities involving law enforcement authorities not otherwise specified in paragraphs I and II of this appendix. 

Additional information regarding identification of events to be reported will be provided in guidance. 

III.(b) The unauthorized use of or tampering 

with the components or controls, including 

the security system, of nuclear power reactors.

This paragraph would be added to address 

‘‘tampering’’ events that do not rise to the 

significance of affecting plant operations as 

specified in paragraph II.(a)(3) and would 

use similar language to the proposed paragraph II.(a)(3). 

III.(c) Follow-up communications regarding 

these incidents will be completed through 

the NRC threat assessment process via the 

NRC Operations Center 1.

Footnote: 1. Commercial (secure and non-secure) telephone numbers of the NRC Operations Center are specified in appendix A of 

this part. 

This requirement would be added to establish 

a performance standard for any follow-up 

communication between licensees and the 

Commission regarding the initial report of 

‘‘suspicious’’ activity. This process has been 

set forth in guidance documents and the 

Commission intends that licensees would 

continue to implement the existing process 

with little change. 

II. Events to be recorded within 24 hours of discovery in the safeguards event log.IV. Events to be recorded within 24 hours of 

discovery in the safeguards event log.

This requirement would be retained and renumbered. 

(a) Any failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability in a safeguards system that could 

have allowed unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access 

area, controlled access area, vital area, or 

transport had compensatory measures not 

been established.

IV.(a) Any failure, degradation, or discovered 

vulnerability in a safeguards system that 

could have allowed unauthorized or undetected access to any area or transport in 

which the licensee is required by Commission regulations to control access had compensatory measures not been established.

The current requirement would be renumbered and revised to delete the previously 

specifically mentioned areas (‘‘protected 

area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area’’) requiring access 

controls and change the language to include the actual or attempted entry of an 

unauthorized individual into any area required to be controlled by Commission regulations (see considerations for paragraph 

II.(b) above). Additional information regarding identification of events to be recorded 

will be provided in guidance. 

(b) Any other threatened, attempted, or committed act not previously defined in appendix 

G with the potential for reducing the effectiveness of the safeguards system below that 

committed to in a licensed physical security 

or contingency plan or the actual condition of 

such reduction in effectiveness.

IV.(b) Any other threatened, attempted, or 

committed act not previously defined in this 

appendix with the potential for reducing the 

effectiveness of the physical protection program below that described in a licensee 

physical security or safeguards contingency 

plan, or the actual condition of such a reduction in effectiveness.

This requirement would be renumbered and 

retained with minor revisions. This paragraph would be changed to replace ‘‘the 

physical protection system’’ with ‘‘the safeguards system’’ and ‘‘described’’ for ‘‘committed.’’ These changes would reflect Commission experience with implementation of 

security order requirements and reviews of 

revisions to licensee security plans. 

V. Guidance 

The NRC is preparing new regulatory 

guides that will contain detailed 

guidance on the implementation of the 

proposed rule requirements. These 

regulatory guides, currently under 

development, will consolidate and 

update or eliminate previous guidance 

that was used to develop, review, and 

approve the power reactor security 

plans that licensees revised in response 

to the post-September 11, 2001, security 

orders. Development of the regulatory 

guides is ongoing and the publication of 

the regulatory guides is planned after 

the publication of the final rule. Because 

this regulatory guidance may contain 

Safeguard Information (SGI) and/or 

classified information, these documents 

would only be available to those 

individuals with a need-to-know, and 

are qualified to have access to SGI and/ 

or classified information, as applicable. 

However, the NRC has determined that 

access to these guidance documents is 

not necessary for the public or other 

stakeholders to provide informed 

comment on this proposed rule. 

VI. Criminal Penalties 

For the purposes of Section 223 of the 

Atomic Energy Act, as amended, the 

Commission is proposing to amend 10 


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CFR parts 50, 72, and 73 under sections 

161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA. 

Criminal penalties, as they apply to 

regulations in part 73, are discussed in 

§ 73.81. The new §§ 73.18, 73.19, and 

73.58 are issued under Sections 161b, 

161i, or 161o of the AEA, and are not 

included in § 73.81(b). 

VII. Compatibility of Agreement State 

Regulations 

Under the ‘‘Policy Statement on 

Adequacy and Compatibility of 

Agreement States Programs,’’ approved 

by the Commission on June 20, 1997, 

and published in the Federal Register 

(62 FR 46517; September 3, 1997), this 

rule is classified as compatibility 

‘‘NRC.’’ Compatibility is not required for 

Category ‘‘NRC’’ regulations. The NRC 

program elements in this category are 

those that relate directly to areas of 

regulation reserved to the NRC by the 

AEA or the provisions of Title 10 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), 

and although an Agreement State may 

not adopt program elements reserved to 

NRC, it may wish to inform its licensees 

of certain requirements via a mechanism 

that is consistent with the particular 

State’s administrative procedure laws, 

but does not confer regulatory authority 

on the State. 

VIII. Availability of Documents 

The following table indicates which 

documents relating to this rulemaking 

are available to the public and how they 

may be obtained. 

Public Document Room (PDR). The 

NRC’s Public Document Room is located 

at the NRC’s headquarters at 11555 

Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. 

Rulemaking Web site (Web). The 

NRC’s interactive rulemaking Web site 

is located at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. 

These documents may be viewed and 

downloaded electronically via this Web 

site. 

NRC’s Electronic Reading Room 

(ERR). The NRC’s electronic reading 

room is located at http://www.nrc.gov/ 

reading-rm.html. 

Document PDR Web ERR (ADAMS) 

Environmental Assessment ...................................................................................................................... X X ML061920093 

Regulatory Analysis 

Regulatory Analysis—appendices ............................................................................................................ X X ML061920012 

ML061380796 

ML061440013 

Information Collection Analysis ................................................................................................................ X X ML062340362 

ML062830016 

NRC Form 754 ......................................................................................................................................... X X ML060930319 

Memorandum: Status of Security-Related Rulemaking (July 19, 2004) .................................................. X X ML041180532 

Commission SRM (August 23, 2004) ....................................................................................................... X X ML042360548 

Memorandum: Schedule for Part 73 Rulemakings (November 16, 2004) ............................................... X X ML043060572 

Revised Schedule for Completing Part 73 rulemaking (July 29, 2005) ................................................... X X ML051800350 

COMSECY–05–0046 (September 29, 2005) ........................................................................................... X X ML052710167 

SRM on COMSECY–05–0046 (November 1, 2005) ................................................................................ X X ML053050439 

EA–02–026, ‘‘Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order’’(67 FR 9792) ........................................... X X ML020520754 

EA–02–261, ‘‘Issuance of Order for Compensatory Measures Related to Access Authorization’’ (68 

FR 1643).

X X ML030060360 

EA–03–039, ‘‘Issuance of Order for Compensatory Measures Related to Training Enhancements on 

Tactical and Firearms Proficiency and Physical Fitness Applicable to Armed Nuclear Power Plant 

Security Force Personnel’’ (68 FR 24514).

X X ML030980015 

NRC Bulletin 2005–02, ‘‘Emergency Preparedness and ResponseActions for Security-based Events’’ X X ML051740058 

Petition for Rulemaking (PRM–50–80) ..................................................................................................... X X ML031681105 

SECY–05–0048, Petition for Rulemaking on Protection of U.S.Nuclear Power Plants Against Radiological Sabotage (PRM–50–80).X X ML051790404 

SRM–SECY–05–0048, Staff Requirements on SECY–05–0048 ............................................................. X X ML053000500 

Table 9 Cross-walk table for proposed § 73.55 ..................................................................................... X X ML060910004 

Table 10 Cross-walk table for proposed 10 CFR part 73 appendix B .................................................. X X ML060910006 

Table 11 Cross-walk table for proposed 10 CFR part 73 appendix C .................................................. X X ML060910007 

IX. Plain Language 

The Presidential memorandum dated 

June 1, 1998, entitled ‘‘Plain Language 

in Government Writing’’ directed that 

the Government’s writing be in plain 

language. This memorandum was 

published on June 10, 1998 (63 FR 

31883). In complying with this 

directive, the NRC made editorial 

changes to improve the organization and 

readability of the existing language of 

the paragraphs being revised. These 

types of changes are not discussed 

further in this document. The NRC has 

used the phrase ‘‘may not’’ throughout 

this proposed rule to indicate that a 

person or entity is prohibited from 

taking a specific action. The NRC 

requests comments on the proposed rule 

specifically with respect to the clarity 

and reflectiveness of the language used. 

Comments should be sent to the address 

listed under the ADDRESSES caption of 

the preamble. 

X. Voluntary Consensus Standards 

The National Technology Transfer 

and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. 

104–113, requires that Federal agencies 

use technical standards that are 

developed or adopted by voluntary 

consensus standards bodies unless 

using such a standard is inconsistent 

with applicable law or is otherwise 

impractical. The NRC is not aware of 

any voluntary consensus standard that 

could be used instead of the proposed 

Government-unique standards. The NRC 

will consider using a voluntary 

consensus standard if an appropriate 

standard is identified. 

XI. Finding of No Significant 

Environmental Impact 

The Commission has determined 

under the National Environmental 

Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the 

Commission’s regulations in subpart A 

of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule, if 

adopted, would not be a major Federal 

action significantly affecting the quality 

of the human environment and, 

therefore, an environmental impact 

statement is not required. 

The determination of this 

environmental assessment is that there 

will be no significant offsite impact to 


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62844 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

the public from this action. However, 

the general public should note that the 

NRC is seeking public participation; 

availability of the environmental 

assessment is provided in Section VIII. 

Comments on any aspect of the 

environmental assessment may be 

submitted to the NRC as indicated 

under the ADDRESSES heading. 

The NRC has sent a copy of the 

environmental assessment and this 

proposed rule to every State Liaison 

Officer and requested their comments 

on the environmental assessment. 

XII. Paperwork Reduction Act 

Statement 

This proposed rule contains new or 

amended information collection 

requirements that are subject to the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 

U.S.C. 3501, et seq.). This rule has been 

submitted to the Office of Management 

and Budget for review and approval of 

the information collection requirements. 

Type of submission, new or revision: 

Revision and new. 

The title of the information collection: 

10 CFR part 73, ‘‘Power Reactor Security 

Requirements’’ proposed rule, and NRC 

Form 754, ‘‘Armed Security Personnel 

Background Check.’’

The form number if applicable: NRC 

Form 754. 

How often the collection is required: 

Collections will be initially required 

due to the need for power reactor 

licensees to revise security plans and 

submit the plans for staff review and 

approval. New records requirements are 

imposed to: document target sets in 

procedures, maintain records of storage 

locations for unirradiated MOX fuel, 

document the onsite physical protection 

system review, document problems and 

deficiencies, implement a cyber security 

program including the requirement to 

develop associated implementing 

procedures, implement a cyber incident 

response and recovery plan, implement 

a cyber security awareness and training 

plan, and implement the access 

authorization program. New annual 

collection requirements will be imposed 

including requirements to maintain a 

record of all individuals to whom access 

control devices were issued. Collections 

will also be required on a continuing 

basis due to new proposed reporting 

requirements which include: to notify 

the NRC within 72 hours of taking 

action to remove security personnel per 

proposed § 73.18, to notify the NRC 

within 15 minutes after discovery of an 

imminent threat or actual safeguards 

threat against the facility including a 

requirement to follow this report with a 

written report within 60 days, and a 

requirement to report to NRC within 4 

hours of incidents of suspicious activity 

or tampering. A new NRC form 754 

background check would be required to 

be completed by all security personnel 

to be assigned armed duties. 

Who will be required or asked to 

report: Power reactor licensees will be 

subject to all the proposed requirements 

in this rulemaking. Category I special 

nuclear material facilities will be 

required to report for only the 

collections in proposed § 73.18 and 

§ 73.19. 

An estimate of the number of annual 

responses: 10 CFR part 73—15,156 

(8,523 annualized one-time plus 6,644 

annual responses). 

The estimated number of annual 

respondents: 65 to 68 and, additionally, 

decommissioning sites for § 73.55(a)(1). 

An estimate of the total number of 

hours needed annually to complete the 

requirement or request: 10 CFR 73—

145,613 hours (84,190 hours annualized 

one-time and 49,013 hours annual 

recordkeeping [732 hours per 

recordkeeper] plus 821 hours 

annualized one-time and 11,590 hours 

annual reporting [173 hours per 

licensee]; NRC form 754—1,250 hours 

(or an average of 18.7 hours per site) for 

one-time collections and 261 hours (or 

an average of 3.9 hours per site) 

annually. 

Abstract: The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is proposing to 

amend the current security regulations 

and add new security requirements 

pertaining to nuclear power reactors. 

Additionally, this rulemaking includes 

new security requirements for Category 

I strategic special nuclear material 

(SSNM) facilities for access to enhanced 

weapons and firearms background 

checks. The proposed rulemaking 

would: (1) Make generically applicable 

security requirements imposed by 

Commission orders issued after the 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 

based upon experience and insights 

gained by the Commission during 

implementation, (2) fulfill certain 

provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 

2005, (3) add several new requirements 

that resulted from insights from 

implementation of the security orders, 

review of site security plans, and 

implementation of the enhanced 

baseline inspection program and forceon-force exercises, (4) update the 

regulatory framework in preparation for 

receiving license applications for new 

reactors, and (5) impose requirements to 

assess and manage site activities that 

can adversely affect safety and security. 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission is seeking public comment 

on the potential impact of the 

information collections contained in 

this proposed rule and on the following 

issues: 

1. Is the proposed information 

collection necessary for the proper 

performance of the functions of the 

NRC, including whether the information 

will have practical utility? 

2. Estimate of burden? 

3. Is there a way to enhance the 

quality, utility, and clarity of the 

information to be collected? 

4. How can the burden of the 

information collection be minimized, 

including the use of automated 

collection techniques? 

A copy of the OMB clearance package 

may be viewed free of charge at the NRC 

Public Document Room, One White 

Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Room 

O–1 F21, Rockville, MD 20852. The 

OMB clearance package and rule are 

available at the NRC worldwide Web 

site: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/ 

doc-comment/omb/index.html for 60 

days after the signature date of this 

notice and are also available at the rule 

forum site, http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. 

Send comments on any aspect of 

these proposed information collections, 

including suggestions for reducing the 

burden and on the above issues, by 

November 27, 2006 to the Records and 

FOIA/Privacy Services Branch (T–5 

F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001, or by Internet electronic mail to 

INFOCOLLECTS@NRC.GOV and to the 

Desk Officer, John A. Asalone, Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

NEOB–10202, (3150–0002 and 3150- 

new), Office of Management and 

Budget, Washington, DC 20503. 

Comments received after this date will 

be considered if it is practical to do so, 

but assurance of consideration cannot 

be given to comments received after this 

date. You may also e-mail comments to 

John_A._Asalone@omb.eop.gov or 

comment by telephone at (202) 395–

4650. 

XIII. Public Protection Notification 

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, 

and a person is not required to respond 

to, a request for information or an 

information collection requirement 

unless the requesting document 

displays a currently valid OMB control 

number. 

XIV. Regulatory Analysis 

The Commission has prepared a draft 

regulatory analysis on this proposed 

regulation. The analysis examines the 

costs and benefits of the alternatives 

considered by the Commission. The 

Commission requests public comments 

on the draft regulatory analysis. 

Availability of the regulatory analysis is 


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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62845 

1Other requirements for immediate notification 

of the NRC by licensed operating nuclear power 

reactors are contained elsewhere in this chapter, in 

particular §§ 20.1906, 20.2202, 50.36, 72.216, and 

73.71, and may require NRC notification before that 

required under § 50.72. 

provided in Section VIII. Comments on 

the draft analysis may be submitted to 

the NRC as indicated under the 

ADDRESSES heading. 

XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification 

In accordance with the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the 

Commission certifies that this rule 

would not, if promulgated, have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

This proposed rule affects only the 

licensing and operation of nuclear 

power plants, production facilities, 

spent fuel reprocessing or recycling 

facilities, fuel fabrication facilities, and 

uranium enrichment facilities. The 

companies that own these plants do not 

fall within the scope of the definition of 

‘‘small entities’’ set forth in the 

Regulatory Flexibility Act or the size 

standards established by the NRC (10 

CFR 2.810). 

XVI. Backfit Analysis 

The NRC evaluated the aggregated set 

of requirements in this proposed 

rulemaking that constitute backfits in 

accordance with 10 CFR 50.109 to 

determine if the costs of implementing 

the rule would be justified by a 

substantial increase in public health and 

safety or common defense and security. 

The NRC finds that qualitative safety 

benefits of the proposed part 73 rule 

provisions that qualify as backfits in this 

proposed rulemaking, considered in the 

aggregate, would constitute a substantial 

increase in protection to public health 

and safety and the common defense and 

security, and that the costs of this rule 

would be justified in view of the 

increase in protection to safety and 

security provided by the backfits 

embodied in the proposed rule. The 

backfit analysis is contained within 

Section 4.2 of the regulatory analysis. 

Availability of the regulatory analysis is 

provided in Section VIII. 

List of Subjects 

10 CFR Part 50 

Antitrust, Classified information, 

Criminal penalties, Fire protection, 

Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear 

power plants and reactors, Radiation 

protection, Reactor siting criteria, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

10 CFR Part 72 

Administrative practice and 

procedure, Criminal penalties, 

Manpower training programs, Nuclear 

materials, Occupational safety and 

health, Penalties, Radiation protection, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Security measures, Spent 

fuel, Whistleblowing. 

10 CFR Part 73 

Criminal penalties, Export, Hazardous 

materials transportation, Import, 

Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants 

and reactors, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements, Security 

measures. 

For the reasons set out in the 

preamble and under the authority of the 

AEA, as amended; the Energy 

Reorganization Act of 1974, as 

amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC is 

proposing to adopt the following 

amendments to 10 CFR parts 50, 72, and 

73. 

PART 50—DOMESTIC LICENSING OF 

PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION 

FACILITIES 

1. The authority citation for part 50 is 

revised to read as follows: 

Authority: Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 

182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 938, 

948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 

234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 

2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2201, 2232, 2233, 

2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 

202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 

1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 1704, 

112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); Energy 

Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 

Stat. 594 (2005). Section 50.7 also issued 

under Pub. L. 95–601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 

(42 U.S.C. 5841). Section 50.10 also issued 

under secs. 101, 185, 68 Stat. 955, as 

amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, 2235); sec. 102, 

Pub. L. 91–190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). 

Sections 50.13, 50.54(dd), and 50.103 also 

issued under sec. 108, 68 Stat. 939, as 

amended (42 U.S.C. 2138). 

Sections 50.23, 50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also 

issued under sec. 185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 

2235). Sections 50.33a, 50.55a and appendix 

Q also issued under sec. 102, Pub. L. 91–190, 

83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.34 

and 50.54 also issued under sec. 204, 88 Stat. 

1245 (42 U.S.C. 5844). Sections 50.58, 50.91, 

and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L. 97–415, 

96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2239). Section 50.78 

also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 

U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80–50.81 also 

issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as 

amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Appendix F also 

issued under sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 

2237). 

2. In § 50.34, footnote 9 is removed 

and reserved, and paragraph (d) is 

revised to read as follows: 

§ 50.34 Contents of applications; technical 

information. 

* * * * * 

(d) Safeguards contingency plan. (1) 

Each application for a license to operate 

a production or utilization facility that 

will be subject to §§ 73.50 and 73.60 of 

this chapter must include a licensee 

safeguards contingency plan in 

accordance with the criteria set forth in 

section I of appendix C to part 73 of this 

chapter. The ‘‘Implementation 

Procedures’’ required per section I of 

appendix C to part 73 of this chapter do 

not have to be submitted to the 

Commission for approval. 

(2) Each application for a license to 

operate a utilization facility that will be 

subject to § 73.55 of this chapter must 

include a licensee safeguards 

contingency plan in accordance with 

the criteria set forth in section II of 

appendix C to part 73 of this chapter. 

The ‘‘Implementation Procedures’’

required in section II(g)(12) of appendix 

C to part 73 of this chapter do not have 

to be submitted to the Commission for 

approval. 

* * * * * 

3. In § 50.54, paragraph (p)(1) is 

revised to read as follows: 

§ 50.54 Conditions of licenses. 

* * * * * 

(p)(1) The licensee shall prepare and 

maintain safeguards contingency plan 

procedures in accordance with 

appendix C of part 73 of this chapter for 

affecting the actions and decisions 

contained in the Responsibility Matrix 

of the safeguards contingency plan. The 

licensee may make no change which 

would decrease the effectiveness of a 

physical security plan, or guard training 

and qualification plan, prepared under 

§ 50.34(c) or part 73 of this chapter, or 

of any category of information with the 

exception of the ‘‘Implementation 

Procedures’’ category contained in a 

licensee safeguards contingency plan 

prepared under § 50.34(d) or part 73 of 

this chapter, as applicable, without 

prior approval of the Commission. A 

licensee desiring to make such a change 

shall submit an application for an 

amendment to the licensee’s license 

under § 50.90. 

* * * * * 

4. In § 50.72, paragraph (a), footnote 1 

is revised and the heading of paragraph 

(a) is republished for the convenience of 

the user to read as follows: 

§ 50.72 Immediate notification 

requirements for operating nuclear power 

reactors. 

(a) General Requirements.1 * * * 

* * * * * 


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PART 72—LICENSING 

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 

INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF SPENT 

NUCLEAR FUEL, HIGH-LEVEL 

RADIOACTIVE WASTE, AND 

REACTOR-RELATED GREATER THAN 

CLASS C WASTE 

5. The authority citation for part 72 is 

revised to read as follows: 

Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69, 

81, 161, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 

929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953, 954, 

955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as 

amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 

2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233, 

2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub. 

L. 86–373, 73 Stat. 688, as amended (42 

U.S.C. 2021); sec. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 

88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 

U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); Pub. L. 95–601, sec. 

10, 92 Stat. 2951 as amended by Pub. L. 102–

486, sec. 7902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 

5851); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91–190, 83 Stat. 853 

(42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 131, 132, 133, 135, 

137, 141, Pub. L. 97–425, 96 Stat. 2229, 2230, 

2232, 2241, sec. 148, Pub. L. 100–203, 101 

Stat. 1330–235 (42 U.S.C. 10151, 10152, 

10153, 10155, 10157, 10161, 10168); sec. 

1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); 

Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–

58, 119 Stat. 549 (2005). 

Section 72.44(g) also issued under secs. 

142(b) and 148(c), (d), Pub. L. 100–203, 101 

Stat. 1330–232, 1330–236 (42 U.S.C. 

10162(b), 10168(c), (d). Section 72.46 also 

issued under sec. 189, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 

2239); sec. 134, Pub. L. 97–425, 96 Stat. 2230 

(42 U.S.C. 10154). Section 72.96(d) also 

issued under sec. 145(g), Pub. L. 100–203, 

101 Stat. 1330–235 (42 U.S.C. 10165(g). 

Subpart J also issued under secs. 2(2), 2(15), 

2(19), 117(a), 141(h), Pub. L. 97–425, 96 Stat. 

2202, 2203, 2204, 2222, 2224 (42 U.S.C. 

10101, 10137(a), 10161(h). Subparts K and L 

are also issued under sec. 133, 98 Stat. 2230 

(42 U.S.C. 10153) and sec. 218(a), 96 Stat. 

2252 (42 U.S.C. 10198). 

6. In § 72.212, paragraphs (b)(5)(ii), 

(b)(5)(iii), (b)(5)(iv), and (b)(5)(v) are 

revised to read as follows: 

§ 72.212 Conditions of general license 

issued under § 72.210. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(5) * * * 

(ii) Storage of spent fuel must be 

within a protected area, in accordance 

with § 73.55(e) of this chapter, but need 

not be within a separate vital area. 

Existing protected areas may be 

expanded or new protected areas added 

for the purpose of storage of spent fuel 

in accordance with this general license. 

(iii) For purposes of this general 

license, personnel searches required by 

§ 73.55(h) of this chapter before 

admission to a new protected area may 

be performed by physical pat-down 

searches of persons in lieu of firearms 

and explosives detection equipment. 

(iv) The observational capability 

required by § 73.55(i)(7) of this chapter 

as applied to a new protected area may 

be provided by a guard or watchman on 

patrol in lieu of closed circuit 

television. 

(v) For the purpose of this general 

license, the licensee is exempt from 

§§ 73.55(k)(2) and 73.55(k)(7)(ii) of this 

chapter. 

* * * * * 

PART 73—PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF 

PLANTS AND MATERIALS 

7. The authority citation for part 73 is 

revised to read as follows: 

Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 149, 68 Stat. 930, 

948, as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 

U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2169, 2201); sec. 201, as 

amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 

1245, sec. 1701, 106 Stat. 2951, 2952, 2953 

(42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f); sec. 1704, 112 

Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); Energy 

Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 

Stat. 594 (2005). 

Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 

141, Pub. L. 97–425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 

U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also 

issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96–295, 94 

Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 

is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99–399, 100 

Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169). 

8. In § 73.2, definitions for covered 

weapon, enhanced weapon, safety/ 

security interface, security officer, 

standard weapon, and target set are 

added in alphabetical order to read as 

follows: 

§ 73.2 Definitions. 

* * * * * 

Covered weapon means any handgun, 

rifle, shotgun, short-barreled shotgun, 

short-barreled rifle, semi-automatic 

assault weapon, machinegun, 

ammunition for any such gun or 

weapon, or a large capacity ammunition 

feeding device as specified under 

section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act 

of 1954, as amended. As used here, the 

terms ‘‘handgun, rifle, shotgun, shortbarreled shotgun, short-barreled rifle, 

semi-automatic assault weapon, 

machinegun, ammunition, or large 

capacity ammunition feeding device’’

have the same meaning as set forth for 

these terms under 18 U.S.C. 921(a). 

Covered weapons include both 

enhanced weapons and standard 

weapons. However, enhanced weapons 

do not include standard weapons. 

* * * * * 

Enhanced weapon means any shortbarreled shotgun, short-barreled rifle, or 

machinegun. Enhanced weapons do not 

include destructive devices, including 

explosives or weapons greater than 50 

caliber (i.e., weapons with a bore greater 

than 1.27 cm [0.5 in] diameter). 

* * * * * 

Safety/Security interface (SSI) means 

the actual or potential interactions that 

may adversely affect security activities 

due to any operational activities, or vice 

versa. 

* * * * * 

Security officer means a uniformed 

individual, either armed with a covered 

weapon or unarmed, whose primary 

duty is the protection of a facility, of 

radioactive material, or of other 

property against theft or diversion or 

against radiological sabotage. 

* * * * * 

Standard weapon means any 

handgun, rifle, shotgun, semi-automatic 

assault weapon, or a large capacity 

ammunition feeding device. 

* * * * * 

Target set means the combination of 

equipment or operator actions which, if 

all are prevented from performing their 

intended safety function or prevented 

from being accomplished, would likely 

result in significant core damage (e.g., 

non-incipient, non-localized fuel 

melting, and/or core disruption) barring 

extraordinary action by plant operators. 

A target set with respect to spent fuel 

sabotage is draining the spent fuel pool 

leaving the spent fuel uncovered for a 

period of time, allowing spent fuel heat 

up and the associated potential for 

release of fission products. 

* * * * * 

9. In § 73.8, paragraph (b) is revised 

and paragraph (c) is added to read as 

follows: 

§ 73.8 Information collection 

requirements: OMB approval. 

* * * * * 

(b) The approved information 

collection requirements contained in 

this part appear in §§ 73.5, 73.18, 73.19, 

73.20, 73.21, 73.24, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 

73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, 

73.56, 73.57, 73.58, 73.60, 73.67, 73.70, 

73.71, 73.72, 73.73, 73.74, and 

Appendices B, C, and G to this part. 

(c) This part contains information 

collection requirements in addition to 

those approved under the control 

number specified in paragraph (a) of 

this section. These information 

collection requirements and control 

numbers under which they are 

approved are as follows: 

(1) In § 73.18, NRC Form 754 is 

approved under control number 3150- 

xxxx; 

(2) In § 73.71, NRC Form 366 is 

approved under control number 3150–

0104; and 


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(3) In §§ 73.18 and 73.57, Form FD–

258 is approved under control number 

1110-yyyy. 

10. Section 73.18 is added to read as 

follows: 

§ 73.18 Firearms background check for 

armed security personnel. 

(a) Purpose. This section sets forth the 

requirements for completion of firearms 

background checks on armed security 

personnel at selected NRC-regulated 

facilities. Firearms background checks 

are intended to verify that armed 

security personnel whose duties require 

access to covered weapons are not 

prohibited from receiving, possessing, 

transporting, importing, or using such 

weapons under applicable Federal or 

State law. Licensees and certificate 

holders listed under paragraph (c) of 

this section who have applied for 

preemption authority under § 73.19 (i.e., 

§ 73.19 authority), or who have been 

granted preemption authority by 

Commission order, are subject to the 

requirements of this section. 

(b) General requirements. (1) 

Licensees and certificate holders listed 

in paragraph (c) of this section who 

have received NRC approval of their 

application for preemption authority 

shall ensure that a firearms background 

check has been satisfactorily completed 

for all security personnel requiring 

access to covered weapons as part of 

their official security duties prior to 

granting access to any covered weapons 

to those personnel. Security personnel 

who have satisfactorily completed a 

firearms background check, but who 

have had a break in employment with 

the licensee, certificate holder, or their 

security contractor of greater than one 

(1) week subsequent to their most recent 

firearms background check, or who have 

transferred from a different licensee or 

certificate holder (even though the other 

licensee or certificate holder 

satisfactorily completed a firearms 

background check on such individuals), 

are not excepted from the requirements 

of this section. 

(2) Security personnel who have 

satisfactorily completed a firearms 

background check pursuant to 

Commission orders are not subject to a 

further firearms background check 

under this section, unless these 

personnel have a break in service or 

transfer as set forth in paragraph (b)(1) 

of this section. 

(3) A change in the licensee, 

certificate holder, or ownership of a 

facility, radioactive material, or other 

property designated under § 73.19, or a 

change in the security contractor that 

provides security personnel responsible 

for protecting such facilities, radioactive 

material, or other property, shall not 

constitute ‘a break in service’ or 

‘transfer,’ as those terms are used in 

paragraph (b)(2) of this section. 

(4) Licensees and certificate holders 

listed in paragraph (c) of this section 

may begin the application process for 

firearms background checks under this 

section for security personnel whose 

duties require access to covered 

weapons immediately on application to 

the NRC for preemption authority. 

(5) Firearms background checks do 

not replace any other background 

checks or criminal history checks 

required for the licensee’s or certificate 

holder’s security personnel under this 

chapter. 

(c) Applicability. This section applies 

to licensees or certificate holders who 

have applied for or received NRC 

approval of their application for § 73.19 

authority or were issued Commission 

orders requiring firearms background 

checks. 

(d) Firearms background check 

requirements. A firearms background 

check for security personnel must 

include—

(1) A check of the individual’s 

fingerprints against the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation’s (FBI’s) fingerprint 

system; and 

(2) A check of the individual’s 

identifying information against the FBI’s 

National Instant Criminal Background 

Check System (NICS). 

(e) Firearms background check 

submittals. (1) Licensees and certificate 

holders shall submit to the NRC, in 

accordance with § 73.4, for all security 

personnel requiring a firearms 

background check under this section—

(i) A set of fingerprints, in accordance 

with paragraph (o) of this section, and 

(ii) A completed NRC Form 754. 

(2) Licensees and certificate holders 

shall retain a copy of all NRC Forms 754 

submitted to the NRC for a period of one 

(1) year subsequent to the termination of 

an individual’s access to covered 

weapons or to the denial of an 

individual’s access to covered weapons. 

(f) NICS portion of a firearms 

background check. The NRC will 

forward the information contained in 

the submitted NRC Forms 754 to the FBI 

for evaluation against the NICS. Upon 

completion of the NICS portion of the 

firearms background check, the FBI will 

inform the NRC of the results with one 

of three responses under 28 CFR part 25; 

‘‘proceed,’’ ‘‘denied,’’ or ‘‘delayed,’’ and 

the associated NICS transaction number. 

The NRC will forward these results and 

the associated NICS transaction number 

to the submitting licensee or certificate 

holder. The submitting licensee or 

certificate holder shall provide these 

results to the individual who completed 

the NRC Form 754. 

(g) Satisfactory and adverse firearms 

background checks. (1) A satisfactorily 

completed firearms background check 

means a ‘‘proceed’’ response for the 

individual from the FBI’s NICS. 

(2) An adversely completed firearms 

background check means a ‘‘denied’’ or 

‘‘delayed’’ response from the FBI’s 

NICS. 

(h) Removal from access to covered 

weapons. Licensees or certificate 

holders who have received NRC 

approval of their application for § 73.19 

authority shall ensure security 

personnel are removed from duties 

requiring access to covered weapons 

upon the licensee’s or certificate 

holder’s knowledge of any disqualifying 

status or the occurrence of any 

disqualifying events under 18 U.S.C. 

922(g) or (n), and the ATF’s 

implementing regulations in 27 CFR 

part 478. 

(i) [Reserved]. 

(j) Security personnel responsibilities. 

Security personnel assigned duties 

requiring access to covered weapons 

shall promptly [within three (3) working 

days] notify their employing licensee’s 

or certificate holder’s security 

management (whether directly 

employed by the licensee or certificate 

holder or employed by a security 

contractor to the licensee or certificate 

holder) of the existence of any 

disqualifying status or upon the 

occurrence of any disqualifying events 

listed under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) or (n), and 

the ATF’s implementing regulations in 

27 CFR part 478 that would prohibit 

them from possessing or receiving a 

covered weapon. 

(k) Awareness of disqualifying events. 

Licensees and certificate holders who 

have received NRC approval of § 73.19 

authority shall include within their 

NRC-approved security training and 

qualification plans instruction on—

(1) Disqualifying status or events 

specified in 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and (n), 

and ATF’s implementing regulations in 

27 CFR part 478 (including any 

applicable definitions) identifying 

categories of persons who are prohibited 

from possessing or receiving any 

covered weapons; and 

(2) The continuing responsibility of 

security personnel assigned duties 

requiring access to covered weapons to 

promptly notify their employing 

licensee or certificate holder of the 

occurrence of any disqualifying events. 

(l) [Reserved]. 

(m) Notification of removal. Within 72 

hours after taking action to remove 

security personnel from duties requiring 

access to covered weapons, because of 


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1For guidance on making electronic payments, 

contact the NRC’s Security Branch, Division of 

Facilities and Security, Office of Adminsitration at 

(301) 415–7404. 

2For information on the current fee amount, refer 

to the Electronic Submittals page at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/site-help/eie.html and select the link 

for the Criminal History Program. 

the existence of any disqualifying status 

or the occurrence of any disqualifying 

event—other than due to the prompt 

notification by the security officer under 

paragraph (j) of this section—licensees 

and certificate holders who have 

received NRC approval of § 73.19 

authority shall notify the NRC 

Operations Center of such removal 

actions, in accordance with appendix A 

of this part. 

(n) Reporting violations of law. The 

NRC will promptly report suspected 

violations of Federal law to the 

appropriate Federal agency or suspected 

violations of State law to the 

appropriate State agency. 

(o) Procedures for processing of 

fingerprint checks. (1) Licensees and 

certificate holders who have applied for 

§ 73.19 authority, using an appropriate 

method listed in § 73.4, shall submit to 

the NRC’s Division of Facilities and 

Security one (1) completed, legible 

standard fingerprint card (Form FD–258, 

ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where 

practicable, other fingerprint record for 

each individual requiring a firearms 

background check, to the NRC’s 

Director, Division of Facilities and 

Security, Mail Stop T6–E46, ATTN: 

Criminal History Check. Copies of this 

form may be obtained by writing the 

Office of Information Services, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, by calling 

(301) 415–6157, or by e-mail to 

FORMS@nrc.gov. Guidance on what 

alternative formats, including electronic 

submissions, may be practicable are 

referenced in § 73.4. 

(2) Licensees and certificate holders 

shall indicate on the fingerprint card or 

other fingerprint record that the purpose 

for this fingerprint check is the 

accomplishment of a firearms 

background check. 

(3) Licensees and certificate holders 

shall establish procedures to ensure that 

the quality of the fingerprints taken 

results in minimizing the rejection rate 

of fingerprint cards or records due to 

illegible or incomplete information. 

(4) The Commission will review 

fingerprints for firearms background 

checks for completeness. Any Form 

FD–258 or other fingerprint record 

containing omissions or evident errors 

will be returned to the licensee or 

certificate holder for corrections. The 

fee for processing fingerprint checks 

includes one (1) free re-submission if 

the initial submission is returned by the 

FBI because the fingerprint impressions 

cannot be classified. The one (1) free resubmission must have the FBI 

Transaction Control Number reflected 

on the re-submission. If additional 

submissions are necessary, they will be 

treated as an initial submittal and 

require a second payment of the 

processing fee. The payment of a new 

processing fee entitles the submitter to 

an additional free re-submittal, if 

necessary. Previously rejected 

submissions may not be included with 

the third submission because the 

submittal will be rejected automatically. 

Licensees and certificate holders may 

wish to consider using different 

methods for recording fingerprints for 

re-submissions, if difficulty occurs with 

obtaining a legible set of impressions. 

(5)(i) Fees for the processing of 

fingerprint checks are due upon 

application. Licensees and certificate 

holders shall submit payment with the 

application for the processing of 

fingerprints, and payment must be made 

by corporate check, certified check, 

cashier’s check, money order, or 

electronic payment, made payable to 

‘‘U.S. NRC.’’ 1 Combined payment for 

multiple applications is acceptable. 

(ii) The application fee is the sum of 

the user fee charged by the FBI for each 

fingerprint card or other fingerprint 

record submitted by the NRC on behalf 

of a licensee or certificate holder, and an 

administrative processing fee assessed 

by the NRC. The NRC processing fee 

covers administrative costs associated 

with NRC handling of licensee and 

certificate holder fingerprint 

submissions. The Commission 

publishes the amount of the fingerprint 

check application fee on the NRC’s 

public Web site.2 The Commission will 

directly notify licensees and certificate 

holders who are subject to this 

regulation of any fee changes. 

(6) The Commission will forward to 

the submitting licensee or certificate 

holder all data received from the FBI as 

a result of the licensee’s or certificate 

holder’s application(s) for fingerprint 

background checks, including the FBI’s 

fingerprint record. 

(p) Appeals and correction of 

erroneous system information. (1) 

Individuals who require a firearms 

background check under this section 

and who receive a ‘‘denied’’ NICS 

response or a ‘‘delayed’’ NICS response 

may not be assigned duties requiring 

access to covered weapons during the 

pendency of an appeal of the results of 

the check or during the pendency of 

providing and evaluating any necessary 

additional information to the FBI to 

resolve the ‘‘delayed’’ response, 

respectively. 

(2) Licensees and certificate holders 

shall provide information on the FBI’s 

procedures for appealing a ‘‘denied’’

response to the denied individual or on 

providing additional information to the 

FBI to resolve a ‘‘delayed’’ response. 

(3) An individual who receives a 

‘‘denied’’ or ‘‘delayed’’ NICS response to 

a firearms background check under this 

section may request the reason for the 

response from the FBI. The licensee or 

certificate holder shall provide to the 

individual who has received the 

‘‘denied’’ or ‘‘delayed’’ response the 

unique NICS transaction number 

associated with the specific firearms 

background check. 

(4) These requests for the reason for 

a ‘‘denied’’ or ‘‘delayed’’ NICS response 

must be made in writing, and must 

include the NICS transaction number. 

The request must be sent to the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation; NICS Section; 

Appeals Service Team, Module A–1; PO 

Box 4278; Clarksburg, WV 26302–9922. 

The FBI will provide the individual 

with the reasons for the ‘‘denied’’

response or ‘‘delayed’’ response. The 

FBI will also indicate whether 

additional information or documents are 

required to support an appeal or 

resolution, for example, where there is 

a claim that the record in question does 

not pertain to the individual who was 

denied. 

(5) If the individual wishes to 

challenge the accuracy of the record 

upon which the ‘‘denied’’ or ‘‘delayed’’

response is based, or if the individual 

wishes to assert that his or her rights to 

possess or receive a firearm have been 

restored by lawful process, he or she 

may make application first to the FBI. 

The individual shall file an appeal of a 

‘‘denied’’ response or file a request to 

resolve a ‘‘delayed’’ response within 45 

calender days of the date the NRC 

forwards the results of the firearms 

background check to the licensee or 

certificate holder. The appeal or request 

must include appropriate 

documentation or record(s) establishing 

the legal and/or factual basis for the 

challenge. Any record or document of a 

court or other government entity or 

official furnished in support of an 

appeal must be certified by the court or 

other government entity or official as a 

true copy. The individual may 

supplement their initial appeal or 

request—subsequent to the 45 day filing 

deadline—with additional information 

as it becomes available, for example, 

where obtaining a true copy of a court 

transcript may take longer than 45 days. 

The individual should note in their 

appeal or request any information or 


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records that are being obtained, but are 

not yet available. 

(6) If the individual is notified that 

the FBI is unable to resolve the appeal, 

the individual may then apply for 

correction of the record directly to the 

agency from which the information 

forming the basis of the denial was 

originated. If the individual is notified 

by the originating agency, that 

additional information or documents are 

required the individual may provide 

them to the originating agency. If the 

record is corrected as a result of the 

appeal to the originating agency, the 

individual may so notify the FBI and 

submit written proof of the correction. 

(7) An individual who has 

satisfactorily appealed a ‘‘denied’’

response or resolved a ‘‘delayed’’

response may provide written consent 

to the FBI to maintain information about 

himself or herself in a Voluntary Appeal 

File (VAF) to be established by the FBI 

and checked by the NICS for the 

purpose of preventing the erroneous 

denial or extended delay by the NICS of 

any future NICS checks. 

(8) Individuals appealing a ‘‘denied’’

response or resolving a ‘‘delayed’’

response are responsible for providing 

the FBI any additional information the 

FBI requires to resolve the ‘‘delayed’’

response. 

11. Section 73.19 is added to read as 

follows: 

§ 73.19 Authorization for preemption of 

firearms laws and use of enhanced 

weapons. 

(a) Purpose. This section sets forth the 

requirements for licensees and 

certificate holders to obtain NRC 

approval to use the expanded 

authorities provided under section 161A 

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), 

in protecting NRC-designated facilities, 

radioactive material, or other property. 

These authorities include ‘‘preemption 

authority’’ and ‘‘enhanced-weapons 

authority.’’

(b) General requirements. Licensees 

and certificate holders listed in 

paragraph (c) of this section may apply 

to the NRC, in accordance with the 

provisions of this section, to receive 

stand-alone preemption authority or 

combined enhanced weapons authority 

and preemption authority. 

(1) Preemption authority, as provided 

in section 161A of the AEA, means the 

authority of the Commission to permit 

licensees or certificate holders, or the 

designated security personnel of the 

licensee or certificate holder, to transfer, 

receive, possess, transport, import, or 

use one (1) or more category of standard 

and enhanced weapons, as defined in 

§ 73.2, notwithstanding any local, State, 

or certain Federal firearms laws 

(including regulations). 

(2) Enhanced weapons authority, as 

provided in section 161A of the AEA, 

means the authority of the Commission 

to permit licensees or certificate 

holders, or the designated security 

personnel of the licensee or certificate 

holder, to transfer, receive, possess, 

transport, import, and use one (1) or 

more category of enhanced weapons, as 

defined in § 73.2, notwithstanding any 

local, State, or certain Federal firearms 

laws (including regulations). 

(3) Prior to receiving NRC approval of 

enhanced-weapons authority, the 

licensee or certificate holder must have 

applied for and received NRC approval 

for preemption authority, in accordance 

with this section or under Commission 

orders. 

(4) Prior to granting either authority, 

the NRC must determine that the 

proposed use of this authority is 

necessary in the discharge of official 

duties by security personnel engaged in 

protecting—

(i) Facilities owned or operated by a 

licensee or certificate holder and 

designated by the Commission under 

paragraph (c) of this section, or 

(ii) Radioactive material or other 

property that is owned or possessed by 

a licensee or certificate holder, or that 

is being transported to or from an NRCregulated facility. Before granting such 

approval, the Commission must 

determined that the radioactive material 

or other property is of significance to 

the common defense and security or 

public health and safety and has 

designated such radioactive material or 

other property under paragraph (c) of 

this section. 

(c) Applicability. (1) The following 

classes of licensees or certificate holders 

may apply for stand-alone preemption 

authority—

(i) Power reactor facilities; and 

(ii) Facilities authorized to possess a 

formula quantity or greater of strategic 

special nuclear material with security 

plans subject to §§ 73.20, 73.45, and 

73.46. 

(2) The following classes of licensees 

or certificate holders may apply for 

combined enhanced-weapons authority 

and preemption authority—

(i) Power reactor facilities; and 

(ii) Facilities authorized to possess a 

formula quantity or greater of strategic 

special nuclear material with security 

plans subject to §§ 73.20, 73.45, and 

73.46. 

(3) With respect to the possession and 

use of firearms by all other NRC 

licensees or certificate holders, the 

Commission’s requirements in effect 

before [effective date of final rule] 

remain applicable, except to the extent 

those requirements are modified by 

Commission order or regulations 

applicable to such licensees and 

certificate holders. 

(d) Application for preemption 

authority. (1) Licensees and certificate 

holders listed in paragraph (c) of this 

section may apply to the NRC for the 

preemption authority described in 

paragraph (b)(1) of this section. 

Licensees and certificate holders 

seeking such authority shall submit an 

application to the NRC in writing, in 

accordance with § 73.4, and indicate 

that the licensee or certificate holder is 

requesting preemption authority under 

section 161A of the AEA. 

(2) Licensees and certificate holders 

who have applied for preemption 

authority under this section may begin 

firearms background checks under 

§ 73.18 for their armed security 

personnel. 

(3) Licensees and certificate holders 

who have applied for preemption 

authority under this section and who 

have satisfactorily completed firearms 

background checks for a sufficient 

number of security personnel (to 

implement their security plan while 

meeting security personnel fatigue 

requirements of this chapter or 

Commission order) shall notify the NRC, 

in accordance with § 73.4, of their 

readiness to receive NRC approval of 

preemption authority and implement all 

the provisions of § 73.18. 

(4) Based upon the licensee’s or 

certificate holder’s readiness 

notification and any discussions with 

the licensee or certificate holder, the 

NRC will document in writing to the 

licensee or certificate holder that the 

Commission has approved or 

disapproved the licensee’s or certificate 

holder’s application for preemption 

authority. 

(e) Application for enhanced-weapons 

authority. (1) Licensees and certificate 

holders listed in paragraph (c)(2) of this 

section may apply to the NRC for 

enhanced-weapons authority described 

in paragraph (a)(2) of this section. 

Licensees and certificate holders 

applying for enhanced-weapons 

authority shall have also applied for 

preemption authority. Licensees and 

certificate holders may make these 

applications concurrently. 

(2) Licensees and certificate holders 

seeking enhanced-weapons authority 

shall submit an application to the NRC, 

in accordance with § 73.4, indicating 

that the licensee or certificate holder is 

requesting enhanced-weapons authority 

under section 161A of the AEA. 

Licensees and certificate holders shall 

also include with their application—


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(i) The additional information 

required by paragraph (f) of this section; 

(ii) The date they applied to the NRC 

for preemption authority (if not 

concurrent with the application for 

enhanced weapons authority); and 

(iii) If applicable, the date when the 

licensee or certificate holder received 

NRC approval of their application for 

preemption authority under this section 

or by Commission order. 

(3) The NRC will document in writing 

to the licensee or certificate holder that 

the Commission has approved or 

disapproved the licensee’s or certificate 

holder’s application for enhancedweapons authority. The NRC must 

approve, or have previously approved, a 

licensee’s or certificate holder’s 

application for preemption authority 

under paragraph (d) of this section, or 

via Commission order, to approve the 

application for enhanced weapons 

authority. 

(4) Licensees and certificate holders 

who have applied to the NRC for and 

received enhanced-weapons authority 

shall then apply to the U.S. Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

Explosives (ATF) for a federal firearms 

license (FFL) and also register under the 

National Firearms Act (NFA) in 

accordance with ATF’s regulations 

under 27 CFR parts 478 and 479 to 

obtain the enhanced weapons. Licensees 

and certificate holders shall include a 

copy of the NRC’s written approval with 

their NFA registration application. 

(f) Application for enhanced-weapons 

authority additional information. (1) 

Licensees and certificate holders 

applying to the Commission for 

enhanced-weapons authority under 

paragraph (e) of this section shall also 

submit to the NRC for prior review and 

written approval new, or revised, 

physical security plans, security 

personnel training and qualification 

plans, safeguards contingency plans, 

and safety assessments incorporating 

the use of the specific enhanced 

weapons the licensee or certificate 

holder intends to use. These plans and 

assessments must be specific to the 

facility, radioactive material, or other 

property being protected. 

(2) In addition to other requirements 

set forth in this part, these plans and 

assessments must—

(i) For the physical security plan, 

identify the specific types or models, 

calibers, and numbers of enhanced 

weapons to be used; 

(ii) For the training and qualification 

plan, address the training and 

qualification requirements to use these 

specific enhanced weapons; and 

(iii) For the safeguards contingency 

plan, address how these enhanced and 

any standard weapons will be employed 

by the licensee’s or certificate holder’s 

security personnel in meeting the NRCrequired protective strategy, including 

tactical approaches and maneuvers. 

(iv) For the safety assessment—

(A) Assess any potential safety impact 

on the facility, radioactive material, or 

other property from the use of these 

enhanced weapons; 

(B) Assess any potential safety impact 

on public or private facilities, public or 

private property, or on members of the 

public in areas outside of the site 

boundary from the use of these 

enhanced weapons; and 

(C) Assess any potential safety impact 

on public or private facilities, public or 

private property, or on members of the 

public from the use of these enhanced 

weapons at training facilities intended 

for proficiency demonstration and 

qualification purposes. 

(3) The licensee’s or certificate 

holder’s training and qualification plan 

on possessing, storing, maintaining, 

qualifying on, and using enhanced 

weapons must include information from 

applicable firearms standards developed 

by nationally-recognized firearms 

organizations or standard setting bodies 

or standards developed by Federal 

agencies, such as: The U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security’s Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center, the U.S. 

Department of Energy’s National 

Training Center, and the U.S. 

Department of Defense. 

(4) Licensees or certificate holders 

shall submit any new or revised plans 

and assessments for prior NRC review 

and written approval notwithstanding 

the provisions of §§ 50.54(p), 70.32(e), 

and 76.60 of this chapter which 

otherwise permit a license or certificate 

holder to make changes to such plans 

‘‘that would not decrease their 

effectiveness’’ without prior NRC 

review. 

(g) Completion of training and 

qualification prior to use of enhanced 

weapons. Licensees and certificate 

holders who have applied for and 

received enhanced-weapons authority 

under paragraph (e) of this section shall 

ensure security personnel complete 

required firearms training and 

qualification in accordance with the 

licensee’s or certificate holder’s NRCapproved training and qualification 

plan. Such training must be completed 

prior to security personnel’s use of 

enhanced weapons to protect NRCdesignated facilities, radioactive 

material, or other property and must be 

documented in accordance with the 

requirements of the licensee’s or 

certificate holder’s training and 

qualification plan. 

(h) Use of enhanced weapons. 

Requirements regarding the use of 

enhanced weapons by security 

personnel in the performance of their 

official duties are contained in §§ 73.46 

and 73.55 and in appendices B and C of 

this part, as applicable. 

(i) [Reserved]. 

(j) Notification of adverse ATF 

findings or notices. NRC licensees and 

certificate holders with an ATF federal 

firearms license (FFL) and/or enhanced 

weapons shall notify the NRC, in 

accordance with § 73.4, of instances 

involving any adverse ATF findings or 

ATF notices related to their FFL or such 

weapons. 

12. Section 73.55 is revised to read as 

follows: 

§ 73.55 Requirements for physical 

protection of licensed activities in nuclear 

power reactors against radiological 

sabotage. 

(a) Introduction. (1) By [date—180 

days—after the effective date of the final 

rule published in the Federal Register], 

each nuclear power reactor licensee, 

licensed under 10 CFR part 50, shall 

incorporate the revised requirements of 

this section through amendments to its 

Commission-approved Physical Security 

Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, 

and Safeguards Contingency Plan, 

referred to collectively as ‘‘approved 

security plans,’’ and shall submit the 

amended security plans to the 

Commission for review and approval. 

(2) The amended security plans must 

be submitted as specified in § 50.4 of 

this chapter and must describe how the 

revised requirements of this section will 

be implemented by the licensee, to 

include a proposed implementation 

schedule. 

(3) The licensee shall implement the 

existing approved security plans and 

associated Commission orders until 

Commission approval of the amended 

security plans, unless otherwise 

authorized by the Commission. 

(4) The licensee is responsible for 

maintaining the onsite physical 

protection program in accordance with 

Commission regulations and related 

Commission-directed orders through the 

implementation of the approved 

security plans and site implementing 

procedures. 

(5) Applicants for an operating license 

under the provisions of part 50 of this 

chapter, or holders of a combined 

license under the provisions of part 52 

of this chapter, shall satisfy the 

requirements of this section before the 

receipt of special nuclear material in the 

form of fuel assemblies. 

(6) For licenses issued after [effective 

date of the final rule], licensees shall 


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design construct, and equip the central 

alarm station and secondary alarm 

station to equivalent standards. 

(i) Licensees shall apply the 

requirements for the central alarm 

station listed in paragraphs (e)(6)(v), 

(e)(7)(iii), and (i)(8)(ii) of this section to 

the secondary alarm station as well as 

the central alarm station. 

(ii) Licensees shall comply with the 

requirements of paragraph (i)(4) of this 

section such that both alarm stations are 

provided with equivalent capabilities 

for detection, assessment, monitoring, 

observation, surveillance, and 

communications. 

(b) General performance objective and 

requirements. (1) The licensee shall 

establish and maintain a physical 

protection program, to include a 

security organization which will have as 

its objective to provide high assurance 

that activities involving special nuclear 

material are not inimical to the common 

defense and security and do not 

constitute an unreasonable risk to the 

public health and safety. 

(2) The physical protection program 

must be designed to detect, assess, 

intercept, challenge, delay, and 

neutralize threats up to and including 

the design basis threat of radiological 

sabotage as stated in § 73.1(a), at all 

times. 

(3) The licensee physical protection 

program must be designed and 

implemented to satisfy the requirements 

of this section and ensure that no single 

act, as bounded by the design basis 

threat, can disable the personnel, 

equipment, or systems necessary to 

prevent significant core damage and 

spent fuel sabotage. 

(4) The physical protection program 

must include diverse and redundant 

equipment, systems, technology, 

programs, supporting processes, and 

implementing procedures. 

(5) Upon the request of an authorized 

representative of the Commission, the 

licensee shall demonstrate the ability to 

meet Commission requirements through 

the implementation of the physical 

protection program, including the 

ability of armed and unarmed personnel 

to perform assigned duties and 

responsibilities required by the 

approved security plans and licensee 

procedures. 

(6) The licensee shall establish and 

maintain a written performance 

evaluation program in accordance with 

appendix B and appendix C to this part, 

to demonstrate and assess the 

effectiveness of armed responders and 

armed security officers to perform their 

assigned duties and responsibilities to 

protect target sets described in 

paragraph (f) of this section and 

appendix C to this part, through 

implementation of the licensee 

protective strategy. 

(7) The licensee shall establish, 

maintain, and follow an access 

authorization program in accordance 

with § 73.56. 

(i) In addition to the access 

authorization program required above, 

and the fitness-for-duty program 

required in part 26 of this chapter, each 

licensee shall develop, implement, and 

maintain an insider mitigation program. 

(ii) The insider mitigation program 

must be designed to oversee and 

monitor the initial and continuing 

trustworthiness and reliability of 

individuals granted or retaining 

unescorted access authorization to a 

protected or vital area and implement 

defense-in-depth methodologies to 

minimize the potential for an insider to 

adversely affect, either directly or 

indirectly, the licensee capability to 

prevent significant core damage or spent 

fuel sabotage. 

(8) The licensee shall ensure that its 

corrective action program assures that 

failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, 

deviations, defective equipment and 

nonconformances in security program 

components, functions, or personnel are 

promptly identified and corrected. 

Measures shall ensure that the cause of 

any of these conditions is determined 

and that corrective action is taken to 

preclude repetition. 

(c) Security plans. (1) Licensee 

security plans. Licensee security plans 

must implement Commission 

requirements and must describe: 

(i) How the physical protection 

program will prevent significant core 

damage and spent fuel sabotage through 

the establishment and maintenance of a 

security organization, the use of security 

equipment and technology, the training 

and qualification of security personnel, 

and the implementation of 

predetermined response plans and 

strategies; and 

(ii) Site-specific conditions that affect 

implementation of Commission 

requirements. 

(2) Protection of security plans. The 

licensee shall protect the approved 

security plans and other related 

safeguards information against 

unauthorized disclosure in accordance 

with the requirements of § 73.21. 

(3) Physical security plan. (i) The 

licensee shall establish, maintain, and 

implement a Commission-approved 

physical security plan that describes 

how the performance objective and 

requirements set forth in this section 

will be implemented. 

(ii) The physical security plan must 

describe the facility location and layout, 

the security organization and structure, 

duties and responsibilities of personnel, 

defense-in-depth implementation that 

describes components, equipment and 

technology used. 

(4) Training and qualification plan. (i) 

The licensee shall establish, maintain, 

and follow a Commission-approved 

training and qualification plan, that 

describes how the criteria set forth in 

appendix B ‘‘General Criteria for 

Security Personnel,’’ to this part will be 

implemented. 

(ii) The training and qualification 

plan must describe the process by 

which armed and unarmed security 

personnel, watchpersons, and other 

members of the security organization 

will be selected, trained, equipped, 

tested, qualified, and re-qualified to 

ensure that these individuals possess 

and maintain the knowledge, skills, and 

abilities required to carry out their 

assigned duties and responsibilities 

effectively. 

(5) Safeguards contingency plan. (i) 

The licensee shall establish, maintain, 

and implement a Commission-approved 

safeguards contingency plan that 

describes how the criteria set forth in 

section II of appendix C, ‘‘Licensee 

Safeguards Contingency Plans,’’ to this 

part will be implemented. 

(ii) The safeguards contingency plan 

must describe predetermined actions, 

plans, and strategies designed to 

intercept, challenge, delay, and 

neutralize threats up to and including 

the design basis threat of radiological 

sabotage. 

(6) Implementing procedures. (i) The 

licensee shall establish, maintain, and 

implement written procedures that 

document the structure of the security 

organization, detail the specific duties 

and responsibilities of each position, 

and implement Commission 

requirements through the approved 

security plans. 

(ii) Implementing procedures need 

not be submitted to the Commission for 

prior approval, but are subject to 

inspection by the Commission. 

(iii) Implementing procedures must 

detail the specific actions to be taken 

and decisions to be made by each 

position of the security organization to 

implement the approved security plans. 

(iv) The licensee shall: 

(A) Develop, maintain, enforce, 

review, and revise security 

implementing procedures. 

(B) Provide a process for the written 

approval of implementing procedures 

and revisions by the individual with 

overall responsibility for the security 

functions. 

(C) Ensure that changes made to 

implementing procedures do not 


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decrease the effectiveness of any 

procedure to implement and satisfy 

Commission requirements. 

(7) Plan revisions. The licensee shall 

revise approved security plans as 

necessary to ensure the effective 

implementation of Commission 

regulations and the licensee’s protective 

strategy. Commission approval of 

revisions made pursuant to this 

paragraph is not required, provided that 

revisions meet the requirements of 

§ 50.54(p) of this chapter. Changes that 

are beyond the scope allowed per 

§ 50.54(p) of this chapter shall be 

submitted as required by §§ 50.90 of this 

chapter or § 73.5. 

(d) Security organization. (1) The 

licensee shall establish and maintain a 

security organization designed, staffed, 

trained, and equipped to provide early 

detection, assessment, and response to 

unauthorized activities within any area 

of the facility. 

(2) The security organization must 

include: 

(i) A management system that 

provides oversight of the onsite physical 

protection program. 

(ii) At least one member, onsite and 

available at all times, who has the 

authority to direct the activities of the 

security organization and who is 

assigned no other duties that would 

interfere with this individual’s ability to 

perform these duties in accordance with 

the approved security plans and 

licensee protective strategy. 

(3) The licensee may not permit any 

individual to act as a member of the 

security organization unless the 

individual has been trained, equipped, 

and qualified to perform assigned duties 

and responsibilities in accordance with 

the requirements of appendix B to part 

73 and the Commission-approved 

training and qualification plan. 

(4) The licensee may not assign an 

individual to any position involving 

detection, assessment, or response to 

unauthorized activities unless that 

individual has satisfied the 

requirements of § 73.56. 

(5) If a contracted security force is 

used to implement the onsite physical 

protection program, the licensee’s 

written agreement with the contractor 

must be retained by the licensee as a 

record for the duration of the contract 

and must clearly state the following 

conditions: 

(i) The licensee is responsible to the 

Commission for maintaining the 

physical protection program in 

accordance with Commission orders, 

Commission regulations, and the 

approved security plans. 

(ii) The Commission may inspect, 

copy, retain, and remove all reports and 

documents required to be kept by 

Commission regulations, orders, or 

applicable license conditions whether 

the reports and documents are kept by 

the licensee or the contractor. 

(iii) An individual may not be 

assigned to any position involving 

detection, assessment, or response to 

unauthorized activities unless that 

individual has satisfied the 

requirements of § 73.56. 

(iv) An individual may not be 

assigned duties and responsibilities 

required to implement the approved 

security plans or licensee protective 

strategy unless that individual has been 

properly trained, equipped, and 

qualified to perform their assigned 

duties and responsibilities in 

accordance with appendix B to part 73 

and the Commission-approved training 

and qualification plan. 

(v) Upon the request of an authorized 

representative of the Commission, the 

contractor security employees shall 

demonstrate the ability to perform their 

assigned duties and responsibilities 

effectively. 

(vi) Any license for possession and 

ownership of enhanced weapons will 

reside with the licensee. 

(e) Physical barriers. Based upon the 

licensee’s protective strategy, analyses, 

and site conditions that affect the use 

and placement of physical barriers, the 

licensee shall install and maintain 

physical barriers that are designed and 

constructed as necessary to deter, delay, 

and prevent the introduction of 

unauthorized personnel, vehicles, or 

materials into areas for which access 

must be controlled or restricted. 

(1) The licensee shall describe in the 

approved security plans, the design, 

construction, and function of physical 

barriers and barrier systems used and 

shall ensure that each barrier and barrier 

system is designed and constructed to 

satisfy the stated function of the barrier 

and barrier system. 

(2) The licensee shall retain in 

accordance with § 73.70, all analyses, 

comparisons, and descriptions of the 

physical barriers and barrier systems 

used to satisfy the requirements of this 

section, and shall protect these records 

as safeguards information in accordance 

with the requirements of § 73.21. 

(3) Physical barriers must: 

(i) Clearly delineate the boundaries of 

the area(s) for which the physical barrier 

provides protection or a function, such 

as protected and vital area boundaries 

and stand-off distance. 

(ii) Be designed and constructed to 

protect against the design basis threat 

commensurate to the required function 

of each barrier and in support of the 

licensee protective strategy. 

(iii) Provide visual deterrence, delay, 

and support access control measures. 

(iv) Support effective implementation 

of the licensee’s protective strategy. 

(4) Owner controlled area. The 

licensee shall establish and maintain 

physical barriers in the owner 

controlled area to deter, delay, or 

prevent unauthorized access, facilitate 

the early detection of unauthorized 

activities, and control approach routes 

to the facility. 

(5) Isolation zone. (i) An isolation 

zone must be maintained in outdoor 

areas adjacent to the protected area 

perimeter barrier. The isolation zone 

shall be: 

(A) Designed and of sufficient size to 

permit unobstructed observation and 

assessment of activities on either side of 

the protected area barrier. 

(B) Equipped with intrusion detection 

equipment capable of detecting both 

attempted and actual penetration of the 

protected area perimeter barrier and 

assessment equipment capable of 

facilitating timely evaluation of the 

detected unauthorized activities before 

completed penetration of the protected 

area perimeter barrier. 

(ii) Assessment equipment in the 

isolation zone must provide real-time 

and play-back/recorded video images in 

a manner that allows timely evaluation 

of the detected unauthorized activities 

before and after each alarm 

annunciation. 

(iii) Parking facilities, storage areas, or 

other obstructions that could provide 

concealment or otherwise interfere with 

the licensee’s capability to meet the 

requirements of paragraphs (e)(5)(i)(A) 

and (B) of this section, must be located 

outside of the isolation zone. 

(6) Protected area. (i) The protected 

area perimeter must be protected by 

physical barriers designed and 

constructed to meet Commission 

requirements and all penetrations 

through this barrier must be secured in 

a manner that prevents or delays, and 

detects the exploitation of any 

penetration. 

(ii) The protected area perimeter 

physical barriers must be separated from 

any other barrier designated as a vital 

area physical barrier, unless otherwise 

identified in the approved physical 

security plan. 

(iii) All emergency exits in the 

protected area must be secured by 

locking devices that allow exit only and 

alarmed. 

(iv) Where building walls, roofs, or 

penetrations comprise a portion of the 

protected area perimeter barrier, an 

isolation zone is not necessary, 

provided that the detection, assessment, 

observation, monitoring, and 


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surveillance requirements of this section 

are met, appropriately designed and 

constructed barriers are installed, and 

the area is described in the approved 

security plans. 

(v) The reactor control room, the 

central alarm station, and the location 

within which the last access control 

function for access to the protected area 

is performed, must be bullet-resisting. 

(vi) All exterior areas within the 

protected area must be periodically 

checked to detect and deter 

unauthorized activities, personnel, 

vehicles, and materials. 

(7) Vital areas. (i) Vital equipment 

must be located only within vital areas, 

which in turn must be located within 

protected areas so that access to vital 

equipment requires passage through at 

least two physical barriers designed and 

constructed to perform the required 

function, except as otherwise approved 

by the Commission in accordance with 

paragraph (f)(3) of this section. 

(ii) More than one vital area may be 

located within a single protected area. 

(iii) The reactor control room, the 

spent fuel pool, secondary power 

supply systems for intrusion detection 

and assessment equipment, nonportable communications equipment, 

and the central alarm station, must be 

provided protection equivalent to vital 

equipment located within a vital area. 

(iv) Vital equipment that is 

undergoing maintenance or is out of 

service, or any other change to site 

conditions that could adversely affect 

plant safety or security, must be 

identified in accordance with § 73.58, 

and adjustments must be made to the 

site protective strategy, site procedures, 

and approved security plans, as 

necessary. 

(v) The licensee shall protect all vital 

areas, vital area access portals, and vital 

area emergency exits with intrusion 

detection equipment and locking 

devices. Emergency exit locking devices 

shall be designed to permit exit only. 

(vi) Unoccupied vital areas must be 

locked. 

(8) Vehicle barrier system. The 

licensee must: 

(i) Prevent unauthorized vehicle 

access or proximity to any area from 

which any vehicle, its personnel, or its 

contents could disable the personnel, 

equipment, or systems necessary to 

meet the performance objective and 

requirements described in paragraph (b) 

of this section. 

(ii) Limit and control all vehicle 

approach routes. 

(iii) Design and install a vehicle 

barrier system, to include passive and 

active barriers, at a stand-off distance 

adequate to protect personnel, 

equipment, and systems against the 

design basis threat. 

(iv) Deter, detect, delay, or prevent 

vehicle use as a means of transporting 

unauthorized personnel or materials to 

gain unauthorized access beyond a 

vehicle barrier system, gain proximity to 

a protected area or vital area, or 

otherwise penetrate the protected area 

perimeter. 

(v) Periodically check the operation of 

active vehicle barriers and provide a 

secondary power source or a means of 

mechanical or manual operation, in the 

event of a power failure to ensure that 

the active barrier can be placed in the 

denial position within the time line 

required to prevent unauthorized 

vehicle access beyond the required 

standoff distance. 

(vi) Provide surveillance and 

observation of vehicle barriers and 

barrier systems to detect unauthorized 

activities and to ensure the integrity of 

each vehicle barrier and barrier system. 

(9) Waterways. (i) The licensee shall 

control waterway approach routes or 

proximity to any area from which a 

waterborne vehicle, its personnel, or its 

contents could disable the personnel, 

equipment, or systems necessary to 

meet the performance objective and 

requirements described in paragraph (b) 

of this section. 

(ii) The licensee shall delineate areas 

from which a waterborne vehicle must 

be restricted and install waterborne 

vehicle control measures, where 

applicable. 

(iii) The licensee shall monitor 

waterway approaches and adjacent areas 

to ensure early detection, assessment, 

and response to unauthorized activity or 

proximity, and to ensure the integrity of 

installed waterborne vehicle control 

measures. 

(iv) Where necessary to meet the 

requirements of this section, licensees 

shall coordinate with local, State, and 

Federal agencies having jurisdiction 

over waterway approaches. 

(10) Unattended openings in any 

barrier established to meet the 

requirements of this section that are 620 

cm2 (96.1 in2) or greater in total area and 

have a smallest dimension of 15 m (5.9 

in) or greater, must be secured and 

monitored at a frequency that would 

prevent exploitation of the opening 

consistent with the intended function of 

each barrier. 

(f) Target sets. (1) The licensee shall 

document in site procedures the process 

used to develop and identify target sets, 

to include analyses and methodologies 

used to determine and group the target 

set equipment or elements. 

(2) The licensee shall consider the 

effects that cyber attacks may have upon 

individual equipment or elements of 

each target set or grouping. 

(3) Target set equipment or elements 

that are not contained within a 

protected or vital area must be explicitly 

identified in the approved security 

plans and protective measures for such 

equipment or elements must be 

addressed by the licensee’s protective 

strategy in accordance with appendix C 

to this part. 

(4) The licensee shall implement a 

program for the oversight of plant 

equipment and systems documented as 

part of the licensee protective strategy to 

ensure that changes to the configuration 

of the identified equipment and systems 

do not compromise the licensee’s 

capability to prevent significant core 

damage and spent fuel sabotage. 

(g) Access control. (1) The licensee 

shall: 

(i) Control all points of personnel, 

vehicle, and material access into any 

area, or beyond any physical barrier or 

barrier system, established to meet the 

requirements of this section. 

(ii) Control all points of personnel and 

vehicle access into vital areas in 

accordance with access authorization 

lists. 

(iii) During non-emergency 

conditions, limit unescorted access to 

the protected area and vital areas to only 

those individuals who require 

unescorted access to perform assigned 

duties and responsibilities. 

(iv) Monitor and ensure the integrity 

of access control systems. 

(v) Provide supervision and control 

over the badging process to prevent 

unauthorized bypass of access control 

equipment located at or outside of the 

protected area. 

(vi) Isolate the individual responsible 

for the last access control function 

(controlling admission to the protected 

area) within a bullet-resisting structure 

to assure the ability to respond or to 

summon assistance in response to 

unauthorized activities. 

(vii) In response to specific threat and 

security information, implement a twoperson (line-of-sight) rule for all 

personnel in vital areas so that no one 

individual is permitted unescorted 

access to vital areas. Under these 

conditions, the licensee shall implement 

measures to verify that the two person 

rule has been met when a vital area is 

accessed. 

(2) In accordance with the approved 

security plans and before granting 

unescorted access through an access 

control point, the licensee shall: 

(i) Confirm the identity of individuals. 

(ii) Verify the authorization for access 

of individuals, vehicles, and materials. 


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(iii) Search individuals, vehicles, 

packages, deliveries, and materials in 

accordance with paragraph (h) of this 

section. 

(iv) Confirm, in accordance with 

industry shared lists and databases, that 

individuals have not been denied access 

to another power reactor facility. 

(3) Access control points must be: 

(i) Equipped with locking devices, 

intrusion detection equipment, and 

monitoring, observation, and 

surveillance equipment, as appropriate. 

(ii) Located outside or concurrent 

with, the physical barrier system 

through which it controls access. 

(4) Emergency conditions. (i) The 

licensee shall design the access control 

system to accommodate the potential 

need for rapid ingress or egress of 

authorized individuals during 

emergency conditions or situations that 

could lead to emergency conditions. 

(ii) Under emergency conditions, the 

licensee shall implement procedures to 

ensure that: 

(A) Authorized emergency personnel 

are provided prompt access to affected 

areas and equipment. 

(B) Attempted or actual unauthorized 

entry to vital equipment is detected. 

(C) The capability to prevent 

significant core damage and spent fuel 

sabotage is maintained. 

(iii) The licensee shall ensure that 

restrictions for site access and egress 

during emergency conditions are 

coordinated with responses by offsite 

emergency support agencies identified 

in the site emergency plans. 

(5) Vehicles. (i) The licensee shall 

exercise control over all vehicles while 

inside the protected area and vital areas 

to ensure they are used only by 

authorized persons and for authorized 

purposes. 

(ii) Vehicles inside the protected area 

or vital areas must be operated by an 

individual authorized unescorted access 

to the area, or must be escorted by an 

individual trained, qualified, and 

equipped to perform vehicle escort 

duties, while inside the area. 

(iii) Vehicles inside the protected area 

must be limited to plant functions or 

emergencies, and must be disabled 

when not in use. 

(iv) Vehicles transporting hazardous 

materials inside the protected area must 

be escorted by an armed member of the 

security organization. 

(6) Access control devices. (i) 

Identification badges. The licensee shall 

implement a numbered photo 

identification badge/key-card system for 

all individuals authorized unescorted 

access to the protected area and vital 

areas. 

(A) Identification badges may be 

removed from the protected area only 

when measures are in place to confirm 

the true identity and authorization for 

unescorted access of the badge holder 

before allowing unescorted access to the 

protected area. 

(B) Except where operational safety 

concerns require otherwise, 

identification badges must be clearly 

displayed by all individuals while 

inside the protected area and vital areas. 

(C) The licensee shall maintain a 

record, to include the name and areas to 

which unescorted access is granted, of 

all individuals to whom photo 

identification badge/key-cards have 

been issued. 

(ii) Keys, locks, combinations, and 

passwords. All keys, locks, 

combinations, passwords, and related 

access control devices used to control 

access to protected areas, vital areas, 

security systems, and safeguards 

information must be controlled and 

accounted for to reduce the probability 

of compromise. The licensee shall: 

(A) Issue access control devices only 

to individuals who require unescorted 

access to perform official duties and 

responsibilities. 

(B) Maintain a record, to include 

name and affiliation, of all individuals 

to whom access control devices have 

been issued, and implement a process to 

account for access control devices at 

least annually. 

(C) Implement compensatory 

measures upon discovery or suspicion 

that any access control device may have 

been compromised. Compensatory 

measures must remain in effect until the 

compromise is corrected. 

(D) Retrieve, change, rotate, 

deactivate, or otherwise disable access 

control devices that have been, or may 

have been compromised. 

(E) Retrieve, change, rotate, 

deactivate, or otherwise disable all 

access control devices issued to 

individuals who no longer require 

unescorted access to the areas for which 

the devices were designed. 

(7) Visitors. (i) The licensee may 

permit escorted access to the protected 

area to individuals who do not have 

unescorted access authorization in 

accordance with the requirements of 

§ 73.56 and part 26 of this chapter. The 

licensee shall: 

(A) Implement procedures for 

processing, escorting, and controlling 

visitors. 

(B) Confirm the identity of each 

visitor through physical presentation of 

a recognized identification card issued 

by a local, State, or Federal Government 

agency that includes a photo or contains 

physical characteristics of the 

individual requesting escorted access. 

(C) Maintain a visitor control register 

in which all visitors shall register their 

name, date, time, purpose of visit, 

employment affiliation, citizenship, and 

name of the individual to be visited 

before being escorted into any protected 

or vital area. 

(D) Issue a visitor badge to all visitors 

that clearly indicates that an escort is 

required. 

(E) Escort all visitors, at all times, 

while inside the protected area and vital 

areas. 

(ii) Individuals not employed by the 

licensee but who require frequent and 

extended unescorted access to the 

protected area and vital areas shall 

satisfy the access authorization 

requirements of § 73.56 and part 26 of 

this chapter and shall be issued a nonemployee photo identification badge 

that is easily distinguished from other 

identification badges before being 

allowed unescorted access to the 

protected area. Non-employee photo 

identification badges must indicate: 

(A) Non-employee, no escort required. 

(B) Areas to which access is 

authorized. 

(C) The period for which access is 

authorized. 

(D) The individual’s employer. 

(E) A means to determine the 

individual’s emergency plan assembly 

area. 

(8) Escorts. The licensee shall ensure 

that all escorts are trained in accordance 

with appendix B to this part, the 

approved training and qualification 

plan, and licensee policies and 

procedures. 

(i) Escorts shall be authorized 

unescorted access to all areas in which 

they will perform escort duties. 

(ii) Individuals assigned to escort 

visitors shall be provided a means of 

timely communication with both alarm 

stations in a manner that ensures the 

ability to summon assistance when 

needed. 

(iii) Individuals assigned to vehicle 

escort duties shall be provided a means 

of continuous communication with both 

alarm stations to ensure the ability to 

summon assistance when needed. 

(iv) Escorts shall be knowledgeable of 

those activities that are authorized to be 

performed within the areas for which 

they are assigned to perform escort 

duties and must also be knowledgeable 

of those activities that are authorized to 

be performed by any individual for 

which the escort is assigned 

responsibility. 

(v) Visitor to escort ratios shall be 

limited to 10 to 1 in the protected area 

and 5 to 1 in vital areas, provided that 

the necessary observation and control 

requirements of this section can be 


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maintained by the assigned escort over 

all visitor activities. 

(h) Search programs. (1) At each 

designated access control point into the 

owner controlled area and protected 

area, the licensee shall search 

individuals, vehicles, packages, 

deliveries, and materials in accordance 

with the requirements of this section 

and the approved security plans, before 

granting access. 

(i) The objective of the search program 

must be to deter, detect, and prevent the 

introduction of unauthorized firearms, 

explosives, incendiary devices, or other 

unauthorized materials and devices into 

designated areas in which the 

unauthorized items could be used to 

disable personnel, equipment, and 

systems necessary to meet the 

performance objective and requirements 

of paragraph (b) of this section. 

(ii) The search requirements for 

unauthorized firearms, explosives, 

incendiary devices, or other 

unauthorized materials and devices 

must be accomplished through the use 

of equipment capable of detecting these 

unauthorized items and through visual 

and hands-on physical searches, as 

needed to ensure all items are identified 

before granting access. 

(iii) Only trained and qualified 

members of the security organization, 

and other trained and qualified 

personnel designated by the licensee, 

shall perform search activities or be 

assigned duties and responsibilities 

required to satisfy observation 

requirements for the search activities. 

(2) The licensee shall establish and 

implement written search procedures 

for all access control points before 

granting access to any individual, 

vehicle, package, delivery, or material. 

(i) Search procedures must ensure 

that items possessed by an individual, 

or contained within a vehicle or 

package, must be clearly identified as 

not being a prohibited item before 

granting access beyond the access 

control point for which the search is 

conducted. 

(ii) The licensee shall visually and 

physically hand search all individuals, 

vehicles, and packages containing items 

that cannot be or are not clearly 

identified by search equipment. 

(3) Whenever search equipment is out 

of service or is not operating 

satisfactorily, trained and qualified 

members of the security organization 

shall conduct a hands-on physical 

search of all individuals, vehicles, 

packages, deliveries, and materials that 

would otherwise have been subject to 

equipment searches. 

(4) When an attempt to introduce 

unauthorized items has occurred or is 

suspected, the licensee shall implement 

actions to ensure that the suspect 

individuals, vehicles, packages, 

deliveries, and materials are denied 

access and shall perform a visual and 

hands-on physical search to determine 

the absence or existence of a threat. 

(5) Vehicle search procedures must be 

performed by at least two (2) properly 

trained and equipped security 

personnel, at least one of whom is 

positioned to observe the search process 

and provide a timely response to 

unauthorized activities if necessary. 

(6) Vehicle areas to be searched must 

include, but are not limited to, the cab, 

engine compartment, undercarriage, and 

cargo area. 

(7) Vehicle search checkpoints must 

be equipped with video surveillance 

equipment that must be monitored by 

an individual capable of initiating and 

directing a timely response to 

unauthorized activity. 

(8) Exceptions to the search 

requirements of this section must be 

submitted to the Commission for prior 

review and approval and must be 

identified in the approved security 

plans. 

(i) Vehicles and items that may be 

excepted from the search requirements 

of this section must be escorted by an 

armed individual who is trained and 

equipped to observe offloading and 

perform search activities at the final 

destination within the protected area. 

(ii) To the extent practicable, items 

excepted from search must be off loaded 

only at specified receiving areas that are 

not adjacent to a vital area. 

(iii) The excepted items must be 

searched at the receiving area and 

opened at the final destination by an 

individual familiar with the items. 

(i) Detection and assessment systems. 

(1) The licensee shall establish and 

maintain an intrusion detection and 

assessment system that must provide, at 

all times, the capability for early 

detection and assessment of 

unauthorized persons and activities. 

(2) Intrusion detection equipment 

must annunciate, and video assessment 

equipment images shall display, 

concurrently in at least two 

continuously staffed onsite alarm 

stations, at least one of which must be 

protected in accordance with the 

requirements of paragraphs (e)(6)(v), 

(e)(7)(iii), and (i)(8)(ii) of this section. 

(3) The licensee’s intrusion detection 

system must be designed to ensure that 

both alarm station operators: 

(i) Are concurrently notified of the 

alarm annunciation. 

(ii) Are capable of making a timely 

assessment of the cause of each alarm 

annunciation. 

(iii) Possess the capability to initiate 

a timely response in accordance with 

the approved security plans, licensee 

protective strategy, and implementing 

procedures. 

(4) Both alarm stations must be 

equipped with equivalent capabilities 

for detection and communication, and 

must be equipped with functionally 

equivalent assessment, monitoring, 

observation, and surveillance 

capabilities to support the effective 

implementation of the approved 

security plans and the licensee 

protective strategy in the event that 

either alarm station is disabled. 

(i) The licensee shall ensure that a 

single act cannot remove the capability 

of both alarm stations to detect and 

assess unauthorized activities, respond 

to an alarm, summon offsite assistance, 

implement the protective strategy, 

provide command and control, or 

otherwise prevent significant core 

damage and spent fuel sabotage. 

(ii) The alarm station functions in 

paragraph (i)(4) of this section must 

remain operable from an uninterruptible 

backup power supply in the event of the 

loss of normal power. 

(5) Detection. Detection capabilities 

must be provided by security 

organization personnel and intrusion 

detection equipment, and shall be 

defined in implementing procedures. 

Intrusion detection equipment must be 

capable of operating as intended under 

the conditions encountered at the 

facility. 

(6) Assessment. Assessment 

capabilities must be provided by 

security organization personnel and 

video assessment equipment, and shall 

be described in implementing 

procedures. Video assessment 

equipment must be capable of operating 

as intended under the conditions 

encountered at the facility and must 

provide video images from which 

accurate and timely assessments can be 

made in response to an alarm 

annunciation or other notification of 

unauthorized activity. 

(7) The licensee intrusion detection 

and assessment system must: 

(i) Ensure that the duties and 

responsibilities assigned to personnel, 

the use of equipment, and the 

implementation of procedures provides 

the detection and assessment 

capabilities necessary to meet the 

requirements of paragraph (b) of this 

section. 

(ii) Ensure that annunciation of an 

alarm indicates the type and location of 

the alarm. 

(iii) Ensure that alarm devices, to 

include transmission lines to 


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annunciators, are tamper indicating and 

self-checking. 

(iv) Provide visual and audible alarm 

annunciation and concurrent video 

assessment capability to both alarm 

stations in a manner that ensures timely 

recognition, acknowledgment and 

response by each alarm station operator 

in accordance with written response 

procedures. 

(v) Provide an automatic indication 

when the alarm system or a component 

of the alarm system fails, or when the 

system is operating on the backup 

power supply. 

(vi) Maintain a record of all alarm 

annunciations, the cause of each alarm, 

and the disposition of each alarm. 

(8) Alarm stations. (i) Both alarm 

stations must be continuously staffed by 

at least one trained and qualified 

member of the security organization. 

(ii) The interior of the central alarm 

station must not be visible from the 

perimeter of the protected area. 

(iii) The licensee may not permit any 

activities to be performed within either 

alarm station that would interfere with 

an alarm station operator’s ability to 

effectively execute assigned detection, 

assessment, surveillance, and 

communication duties and 

responsibilities. 

(iv) The licensee shall assess and 

respond to all alarms and other 

indications of unauthorized activities in 

accordance with the approved security 

plans and implementing procedures. 

(v) The licensee’s implementing 

procedures must ensure that both alarm 

station operators are knowledgeable of 

all alarm annunciations, assessments, 

and final disposition of all alarms, to 

include but not limited to a prohibition 

from changing the status of a detection 

point or deactivating a locking or access 

control device at a protected or vital 

area portal, without the knowledge and 

concurrence of the other alarm station 

operator. 

(9) Surveillance, observation, and 

monitoring. (i) The physical protection 

program must include the capability for 

surveillance, observation, and 

monitoring in a manner that provides 

early detection and assessment of 

unauthorized activities. 

(ii) The licensee shall provide 

continual surveillance, observation, and 

monitoring of all areas identified in the 

approved security plans as requiring 

surveillance, observation, and 

monitoring to ensure early detection of 

unauthorized activities and to ensure 

the integrity of physical barriers or other 

components of the physical protection 

program. 

(A) Continual surveillance, 

observation, and monitoring 

responsibilities must be performed by 

security personnel during routine 

patrols or by other trained and equipped 

personnel designated as a component of 

the protective strategy. 

(B) Surveillance, observation, and 

monitoring requirements may be 

accomplished by direct observation or 

video technology. 

(iii) The licensee shall provide 

random patrols of all accessible areas 

containing target set equipment. 

(A) Armed security patrols shall 

periodically check designated areas and 

shall inspect vital area entrances, 

portals, and external barriers. 

(B) Physical barriers must be 

inspected at random intervals to 

identify tampering and degradation. 

(C) Security personnel shall be trained 

to recognize indications of tampering as 

necessary to perform assigned duties 

and responsibilities as they relate to 

safety and security systems and 

equipment. 

(iv) Unattended openings that are not 

monitored by intrusion detection 

equipment must be observed by security 

personnel at a frequency that would 

prevent exploitation of that opening. 

(v) Upon detection of unauthorized 

activities, tampering, or other threats, 

the licensee shall initiate actions 

consistent with the approved security 

plans, the licensee protective strategy, 

and implementing procedures. 

(10) Video technology. (i) The licensee 

shall maintain in operable condition all 

video technology used to satisfy the 

monitoring, observation, surveillance, 

and assessment requirements of this 

section. 

(ii) Video technology must be: 

(A) Displayed concurrently at both 

alarm stations. 

(B) Designed to provide concurrent 

observation, monitoring, and 

surveillance of designated areas from 

which an alarm annunciation or a 

notification of unauthorized activity is 

received. 

(C) Capable of providing a timely 

visual display from which positive 

recognition and assessment of the 

detected activity can be made and a 

timely response initiated. 

(D) Used to supplement and limit the 

exposure of security personnel to 

possible attack. 

(iii) The licensee shall implement 

controls for personnel assigned to 

monitor video technology to ensure that 

assigned personnel maintain the level of 

alertness required to effectively perform 

the assigned duties and responsibilities. 

(11) Illumination. (i) The licensee 

shall ensure that all areas of the facility, 

to include appropriate portions of the 

owner controlled area, are provided 

with illumination necessary to satisfy 

the requirements of this section. 

(ii) The licensee shall provide a 

minimum illumination level of 0.2 

footcandle measured horizontally at 

ground level, in the isolation zones and 

all exterior areas within the protected 

area, or may augment the facility 

illumination system, to include patrols, 

responders, and video technology, with 

low-light technology capable of meeting 

the detection, assessment, surveillance, 

observation, monitoring, and response 

requirements of this section. 

(iii) The licensee shall describe in the 

approved security plans how the 

lighting requirements of this section are 

met and, if used, the type(s) and 

application of low-light technology 

used. 

(j) Communication requirements. (1) 

The licensee shall establish and 

maintain, continuous communication 

capability with onsite and offsite 

resources to ensure effective command 

and control during both normal and 

emergency situations. 

(2) Individuals assigned to each alarm 

station shall be capable of calling for 

assistance in accordance with the 

approved security plans, licensee 

integrated response plan, and licensee 

procedures. 

(3) Each on-duty security officer, 

watchperson, vehicle escort, and armed 

response force member shall be capable 

of maintaining continuous 

communication with an individual in 

each alarm station. 

(4) The following continuous 

communication capabilities must 

terminate in both alarm stations 

required by this section: 

(i) Conventional telephone service. 

(ii) Radio or microwave transmitted 

two-way voice communication, either 

directly or through an intermediary. 

(iii) A system for communication with 

all control rooms, on-duty operations 

personnel, escorts, local, State, and 

Federal law enforcement agencies, and 

all other personnel necessary to 

coordinate both onsite and offsite 

responses. 

(5) Non-portable communications 

equipment must remain operable from 

independent power sources in the event 

of the loss of normal power. 

(6) The licensee shall identify site 

areas where communication could be 

interrupted or can not be maintained 

and shall establish alternative 

communication measures for these areas 

in implementing procedures. 

(k) Response requirements. (1) 

Personnel and equipment. 

(i) The licensee shall establish and 

maintain, at all times, the minimum 

number of properly trained and 


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equipped personnel required to 

intercept, challenge, delay, and 

neutralize threats up to and including 

the design basis threat of radiological 

sabotage as defined in § 73.1, to prevent 

significant core damage and spent fuel 

sabotage. 

(ii) The licensee shall provide and 

maintain firearms, ammunition, and 

equipment capable of performing 

functions commensurate to the needs of 

each armed member of the security 

organization to carry out their assigned 

duties and responsibilities in 

accordance with the approved security 

plans, the licensee protective strategy, 

implementing procedures, and the site 

specific conditions under which the 

firearms, ammunition, and equipment 

will be used. 

(iii) The licensee shall describe in the 

approved security plans, all firearms 

and equipment to be possessed by and 

readily available to, armed personnel to 

implement the protective strategy and 

carry out all assigned duties and 

responsibilities. This description must 

include the general distribution and 

assignment of firearms, ammunition, 

body armor, and other equipment used. 

(iv) The licensee shall ensure that all 

firearms, ammunition, and equipment 

required by the protective strategy are in 

sufficient supply, are in working 

condition, and are readily available for 

use in accordance with the licensee 

protective strategy and predetermined 

time lines. 

(v) The licensee shall ensure that all 

armed members of the security 

organization are trained in the proper 

use and maintenance of assigned 

weapons and equipment in accordance 

with appendix B to part 73. 

(2) The licensee shall instruct each 

armed response person to prevent or 

impede attempted acts of theft or 

radiological sabotage by using force 

sufficient to counter the force directed 

at that person, including the use of 

deadly force, when the armed response 

person has a reasonable belief that the 

use of deadly force is necessary in selfdefense or in the defense of others, or 

any other circumstances as authorized 

by applicable State law. 

(3) The licensee shall provide an 

armed response team consisting of both 

armed responders and armed security 

officers to carry out response duties, 

within predetermined time lines. 

(i) Armed responders. (A) The 

licensee shall determine the minimum 

number of armed responders necessary 

to protect against the design basis threat 

described in § 73.1(a), subject to 

Commission approval, and shall 

document this number in the approved 

security plans. 

(B) Armed responders shall be 

available at all times inside the 

protected area and may not be assigned 

any other duties or responsibilities that 

could interfere with assigned response 

duties. 

(ii) Armed security officers. (A) 

Armed security officers designated to 

strengthen response capabilities shall be 

onsite and available at all times to carry 

out assigned response duties. 

(B) The minimum number of armed 

security officers must be documented in 

the approved security plans. 

(iii) The licensee shall ensure that 

training and qualification requirements 

accurately reflect the duties and 

responsibilities to be performed. 

(iv) The licensee shall ensure that all 

firearms, ammunition, and equipment 

needed for completing the actions 

described in the approved security 

plans and licensee protective strategy 

are readily available and in working 

condition. 

(4) The licensee shall describe in the 

approved security plans, procedures for 

responding to an unplanned incident 

that reduces the number of available 

armed response team members below 

the minimum number documented by 

the licensee in the approved security 

plans. 

(5) Licensees shall develop, maintain, 

and implement a written protective 

strategy in accordance with the 

requirements of this section and 

appendix C to this part. 

(6) The licensee shall ensure that all 

personnel authorized unescorted access 

to the protected area are trained and 

understand their roles and 

responsibilities during security 

incidents, to include hostage and duress 

situations. 

(7) Upon receipt of an alarm or other 

indication of threat, the licensee shall: 

(i) Determine the existence of a threat 

in accordance with assessment 

procedures. 

(ii) Identify the level of threat present 

through the use of assessment 

methodologies and procedures. 

(iii) Determine the response necessary 

to intercept, challenge, delay, and 

neutralize the threat in accordance with 

the requirements of appendix C to part 

73, the Commission-approved 

safeguards contingency plan, and the 

licensee response strategy. 

(iv) Notify offsite support agencies 

such as local law enforcement, in 

accordance with site procedures. 

(8) The licensee shall document and 

maintain current agreements with local, 

State, and Federal law enforcement 

agencies, to include estimated response 

times and capabilities. 

(l) Facilities using mixed-oxide 

(MOX) fuel assemblies. In addition to 

the requirements described in this 

section for protection against 

radiological sabotage, operating 

commercial nuclear power reactors 

licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52 

and using special nuclear material in 

the form of MOX fuel assemblies shall 

protect unirradiated MOX fuel 

assemblies against theft or diversion. 

(1) Licensees shall protect the 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies 

against theft or diversion in accordance 

with the requirements of this section 

and the approved security plans. 

(2) Commercial nuclear power 

reactors using MOX fuel assemblies are 

exempt from the requirements of 

§§ 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46 for the 

physical protection of unirradiated 

MOX fuel assemblies. 

(3) Administrative controls. (i) The 

licensee shall describe in the approved 

security plans, the operational and 

administrative controls to be 

implemented for the receipt, inspection, 

movement, storage, and protection of 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies. 

(ii) The licensee shall implement the 

use of tamper-indicating devices for 

unirradiated MOX fuel assembly 

transport and shall verify their use and 

integrity before receipt. 

(iii) Upon delivery of unirradiated 

MOX fuel assemblies, the licensee shall: 

(A) Inspect unirradiated MOX fuel 

assemblies for damage. 

(B) Search unirradiated MOX fuel 

assemblies for unauthorized materials. 

(iv) The licensee may conduct the 

required inspection and search 

functions simultaneously. 

(v) The licensee shall ensure the 

proper placement and control of 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies as 

follows: 

(A) At least one armed security 

officer, in addition to the armed 

response team required by paragraphs 

(h)(4) and (h)(5) of appendix C to part 

73, shall be present during the receipt 

and inspection of unirradiated MOX 

fuel assemblies. 

(B) The licensee shall store 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies only 

within a spent fuel pool, located within 

a vital area, so that access to the 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies 

requires passage through at least three 

physical barriers. 

(vi) The licensee shall implement a 

material control and accountability 

program for the unirradiated MOX fuel 

assemblies that includes a 

predetermined and documented storage 

location for each unirradiated MOX fuel 

assembly. 


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(vii) Records that identify the storage 

locations of unirradiated MOX fuel 

assemblies are considered safeguards 

information and must be protected and 

stored in accordance with § 73.21. 

(4) Physical controls. (i) The licensee 

shall lock or disable all equipment and 

power supplies to equipment required 

for the movement and handling of 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies. 

(ii) The licensee shall implement a 

two-person line-of-sight rule whenever 

control systems or equipment required 

for the movement or handling of 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies must 

be accessed. 

(iii) The licensee shall conduct 

random patrols of areas containing 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies to 

ensure the integrity of barriers and 

locks, deter unauthorized activities, and 

to identify indications of tampering. 

(iv) Locks, keys, and any other access 

control device used to secure equipment 

and power sources required for the 

movement of unirradiated MOX fuel 

assemblies or openings to areas 

containing unirradiated MOX fuel 

assemblies must be controlled by the 

security organization. 

(v) Removal of locks used to secure 

equipment and power sources required 

for the movement of unirradiated MOX 

fuel assemblies or openings to areas 

containing unirradiated MOX fuel 

assemblies must require approval by 

both the on-duty security shift 

supervisor and the operations shift 

manager. 

(A) At least one armed security officer 

shall be present to observe activities 

involving the movement of unirradiated 

MOX fuel assemblies before the removal 

of the locks and providing power to 

equipment required for the movement 

or handling of unirradiated MOX fuel 

assemblies. 

(B) At least one armed security officer 

shall be present at all times until power 

is removed from equipment and locks 

are secured. 

(C) Security officers shall be trained 

and knowledgeable of authorized and 

unauthorized activities involving 

unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies. 

(5) At least one armed security officer 

shall be present and shall maintain 

constant surveillance of unirradiated 

MOX fuel assemblies when the 

assemblies are not located in the spent 

fuel pool or reactor. 

(6) The licensee shall maintain at all 

times the capability to detect, assess, 

intercept, challenge, delay, and 

neutralize threats to unirradiated MOX 

fuel assemblies in accordance with the 

requirements of this section. 

(m) Digital computer and 

communication networks. (1) The 

licensee shall implement a cybersecurity program that provides high 

assurance that computer systems, which 

if compromised would likely adversely 

impact safety, security, and emergency 

preparedness, are protected from cyber 

attacks. 

(i) The licensee shall describe the 

cyber-security program requirements in 

the approved security plans. 

(ii) The licensee shall incorporate the 

cyber-security program into the onsite 

physical protection program. 

(iii) The cyber-security program must 

be designed to detect and prevent cyber 

attacks on protected computer systems. 

(2) Cyber-security assessment. The 

licensee shall implement a cybersecurity assessment program to 

systematically assess and manage cyber 

risks. 

(3) Policies, requirements, and 

procedures. (i) The licensee shall apply 

cyber-security requirements and 

policies that identify management 

expectations and requirements for the 

protection of computer systems. 

(ii) The licensee shall develop and 

maintain implementing procedures to 

ensure cyber-security requirements and 

policies are implemented effectively. 

(4) Incident response and recovery. (i) 

The licensee shall implement a cybersecurity incident response and recovery 

plan to minimize the adverse impact of 

a cyber-security incident on safety, 

security, or emergency preparedness 

systems. 

(ii) The cyber-security incident 

response and recovery plan must be 

described in the integrated response 

plan required by appendix C to this 

part. 

(iii) The cyber-security incident 

response and recovery plan must ensure 

the capability to respond to cybersecurity incidents, minimize loss and 

destruction, mitigate and correct the 

weaknesses that were exploited, and 

restore systems and/or equipment 

affected by a cyber-security incident. 

(5) Protective strategies. The licensee 

shall implement defense-in-depth 

protective strategies to protect computer 

systems from cyber attacks, detecting, 

isolating, and neutralizing unauthorized 

activities in a timely manner. 

(6) Configuration and control 

management program. The licensee 

shall implement a configuration and 

control management program, to 

include cyber risk analysis, to ensure 

that modifications to computer system 

designs, access control measures, 

configuration, operational integrity, and 

management process do not adversely 

impact facility safety, security, and 

emergency preparedness systems before 

implementation of those modifications. 

(7) Cyber-security awareness and 

training. (i) The licensee shall 

implement a cyber-security awareness 

and training program. 

(ii) The cyber-security awareness and 

training program must ensure that 

appropriate plant personnel, including 

contractors, are aware of cyber-security 

requirements and that they receive the 

training required to effectively perform 

their assigned duties and 

responsibilities. 

(n) Security program reviews and 

audits. 

(1) The licensee shall review the 

physical protection program at intervals 

not to exceed 12 months, or 

(i) As necessary based upon 

assessments or other performance 

indicators. 

(ii) Within 12 months after a change 

occurs in personnel, procedures, 

equipment, or facilities that potentially 

could adversely affect security. 

(2) As a minimum, each element of 

the onsite physical protection program 

must be reviewed at least every twentyfour (24) months. 

(i) The onsite physical protection 

program review must be documented 

and performed by individuals 

independent of those personnel 

responsible for program management 

and any individual who has direct 

responsibility for implementing the 

onsite physical protection program. 

(ii) Onsite physical protection 

program reviews and audits must 

include, but not be limited to, an 

evaluation of the effectiveness of the 

approved security plans, implementing 

procedures, response commitments by 

local, State, and Federal law 

enforcement authorities, cyber-security 

programs, safety/security interface, and 

the testing, maintenance, and 

calibration program. 

(3) The licensee shall periodically 

review the approved security plans, the 

integrated response plan, the licensee 

protective strategy, and licensee 

implementing procedures to evaluate 

their effectiveness and potential impact 

on plant and personnel safety. 

(4) The licensee shall periodically 

evaluate the cyber-security program for 

effectiveness and shall update the cybersecurity program as needed to ensure 

protection against changes to internal 

and external threats. 

(5) The licensee shall conduct 

quarterly drills and annual force-onforce exercises in accordance with 

appendix C to part 73 and the licensee 

performance evaluation program. 

(6) The results and recommendations 

of the onsite physical protection 

program reviews and audits, 

management’s findings regarding 


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program effectiveness, and any actions 

taken as a result of recommendations 

from prior program reviews, must be 

documented in a report to the licensee’s 

plant manager and to corporate 

management at least one level higher 

than that having responsibility for dayto-day plant operation. 

(7) Findings from onsite physical 

protection program reviews, audits, and 

assessments must be entered into the 

site corrective action program and 

protected as safeguards information, if 

applicable. 

(8) The licensee shall make changes to 

the approved security plans and 

implementing procedures as a result of 

findings from security program reviews, 

audits, and assessments, where 

necessary to ensure the effective 

implementation of Commission 

regulations and the licensee protective 

strategy. 

(9) Unless otherwise specified by the 

Commission, onsite physical protection 

program reviews, audits, and 

assessments may be conducted up to 

thirty days prior to, but no later than 

thirty days after the scheduled date 

without adverse impact upon the next 

scheduled annual audit date. 

(o) Maintenance, testing, and 

calibration. (1) The licensee shall: 

(i) Implement a maintenance, testing 

and calibration program to ensure that 

security systems and equipment are 

tested for operability and performance 

at predetermined intervals, are 

maintained in operable condition, and 

are capable of performing their intended 

function when needed. 

(ii) Describe the maintenance, testing 

and calibration program in the approved 

physical security plan. Implementing 

procedures must specify operational 

and technical details required to 

perform maintenance, testing, and 

calibration activities to include, but not 

limited to, purpose of activity, actions to 

be taken, acceptance criteria, the 

intervals or frequency at which the 

activity will be performed, and 

compensatory actions required. 

(iii) Document problems, failures, 

deficiencies, and other findings, to 

include the cause of each, and enter 

each into the site corrective action 

program. The licensee shall protect this 

information as safeguards information, 

if applicable. 

(iv) Implement compensatory 

measures in a timely manner to ensure 

that the effectiveness of the onsite 

physical protection program is not 

reduced by failure or degraded 

operation of security-related 

components or equipment. 

(2) Each intrusion alarm must be 

tested for operability at the beginning 

and end of any period that it is used for 

security, or if the period of continuous 

use exceeds seven (7) days, the 

intrusion alarm must be tested at least 

once every seven (7) days. 

(3) Intrusion detection and access 

control equipment must be performance 

tested in accordance with the approved 

security plans. 

(4) Equipment required for 

communications onsite must be tested 

for operability not less frequently than 

once at the beginning of each security 

personnel work shift. 

(5) Communication systems between 

the alarm stations and each control 

room, and between the alarm stations 

and offsite support agencies, to include 

back-up communication equipment, 

must be tested for operability at least 

once each day. 

(6) Search equipment must be tested 

for operability at least once each day 

and tested for performance at least once 

during each seven (7) day period and 

before being placed back in service after 

each repair or inoperative state. 

(7) All intrusion detection equipment, 

communication equipment, physical 

barriers, and other security-related 

devices or equipment, to include backup power supplies must be maintained 

in operable condition. 

(8) A program for testing or verifying 

the operability of devices or equipment 

located in hazardous areas must be 

specified in the approved security plans 

and must define alternate measures to 

be taken to ensure the timely 

completion of testing or maintenance 

when the hazardous condition or 

radiation restrictions are no longer 

applicable. 

(p) Compensatory measures. (1) The 

licensee shall identify measures and 

criteria needed to compensate for the 

loss or reduced performance of 

personnel, equipment, systems, and 

components, that are required to meet 

the requirements of this section. 

(2) Compensatory measures must be 

designed and implemented to provide a 

level of protection that is equivalent to 

the protection that was provided by the 

degraded or inoperable personnel, 

equipment, system, or components. 

(3) Compensatory measures must be 

implemented within specific time lines 

necessary to meet the requirements 

stated in paragraph (b) of this section 

and described in the approved security 

plans. 

(q) Suspension of safeguards 

measures. (1) The licensee may suspend 

implementation of affected 

requirements of this section under the 

following conditions: 

(i) In accordance with §§ 50.54(x) and 

50.54(y) of this chapter, the licensee 

may suspend any safeguards measures 

pursuant to this section in an emergency 

when this action is immediately needed 

to protect the public health and safety 

and no action consistent with license 

conditions and technical specifications 

that can provide adequate or equivalent 

protection is immediately apparent. 

This suspension of safeguards measures 

must be approved as a minimum by a 

licensed senior operator prior to taking 

this action. 

(ii) During severe weather when the 

suspension is immediately needed to 

protect personnel whose assigned duties 

and responsibilities in meeting the 

requirements of this section would 

otherwise constitute a life threatening 

situation and no action consistent with 

the requirements of this section that can 

provide equivalent protection is 

immediately apparent. Suspension of 

safeguards due to severe weather must 

be initiated by the security supervisor 

and approved by a licensed senior 

operator prior to taking this action. 

(2) Suspended security measures must 

be reimplemented as soon as conditions 

permit. 

(3) The suspension of safeguards 

measures must be reported and 

documented in accordance with the 

provisions of § 73.71. 

(4) Reports made under § 50.72 of this 

chapter need not be duplicated under 

§ 73.71. 

(r) Records. (1) The Commission may 

inspect, copy, retain, and remove copies 

of all records required to be kept by 

Commission regulations, orders, or 

license conditions whether the records 

are kept by the licensee or a contractor. 

(2) The licensee shall maintain all 

records required to be kept by 

Commission regulations, orders, or 

license conditions, as a record until the 

Commission terminates the license for 

which the records were developed and 

shall maintain superseded portions of 

these records for at least three (3) years 

after the record is superseded, unless 

otherwise specified by the Commission. 

(s) Safety/security interface. In 

accordance with the requirements of 

§ 73.58, the licensee shall develop and 

implement a process to inform and 

coordinate safety and security activities 

to ensure that these activities do not 

adversely affect the capabilities of the 

security organization to satisfy the 

requirements of this section, or overall 

plant safety. 

(t) Alternative measures. (1) The 

Commission may authorize an applicant 

or licensee to provide a measure for 

protection against radiological sabotage 

other than one required by this section 

if the applicant or licensee demonstrates 

that: 


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(i) The measure meets the same 

performance objective and requirements 

as specified in paragraph (b) of this 

section and 

(ii) The proposed alternative measure 

provides protection against radiological 

sabotage or theft of unirradiated MOX 

fuel assemblies, equivalent to that 

which would be provided by the 

specific requirement for which it would 

substitute. 

(2) The licensee shall submit each 

proposed alternative measure to the 

Commission for review and approval in 

accordance with §§ 50.4 and 50.90 of 

this chapter before implementation. 

(3) The licensee shall submit a 

technical basis for each proposed 

alternative measure, to include any 

analysis or assessment conducted in 

support of a determination that the 

proposed alternative measure provides a 

level of protection that is at least equal 

to that which would otherwise be 

provided by the specific requirement of 

this section. 

(4) Alternative vehicle barrier 

systems. In the case of alterative vehicle 

barrier systems required by § 73.55(e)(8), 

the licensee shall demonstrate that: 

(i) The alternative measure provides 

substantial protection against a vehicle 

bomb, and 

(ii) Based on comparison of the costs 

of the alternative measures to the costs 

of meeting the Commission’s 

requirements using the essential 

elements of 10 CFR 50.109, the costs of 

fully meeting the Commission’s 

requirements are not justified by the 

protection that would be provided. 

13. Section 73.56 is revised to read as 

follows: 

§ 73.56 Personnel access authorization 

requirements for nuclear power plants. 

(a) Introduction. (1) By [date—180 

days—after the effective date of the final 

rule published in the Federal Register], 

each nuclear power reactor licensee, 

licensed under 10 CFR part 50, shall 

incorporate the revised requirements of 

this section through amendments to its 

Commission-approved access 

authorization program and shall submit 

the amended program to the 

Commission for review and approval. 

(2) The amended program must be 

submitted as specified in § 50.4 and 

must describe how the revised 

requirements of this section will be 

implemented by the licensee, to include 

a proposed implementation schedule. 

(3) The licensee shall implement the 

existing approved access authorization 

program and associated Commission 

orders until Commission approval of the 

amended program, unless otherwise 

authorized by the Commission. 

(4) The licensee is responsible to the 

Commission for maintaining the 

authorization program in accordance 

with Commission regulations and 

related Commission-directed orders 

through the implementation of the 

approved program and site 

implementing procedures. 

(5) Applicants for an operating license 

under the provisions of part 50 of this 

chapter, or holders of a combined 

license under the provisions of part 52 

of this chapter, shall satisfy the 

requirements of this section upon 

receipt of an operating license or upon 

notice of the Commission’s finding 

under § 52.103(g) of this chapter. 

(6) Contractors and vendors (C/Vs) 

who implement authorization programs 

or program elements shall develop, 

implement, and maintain authorization 

programs or program elements that meet 

the requirements of this section, to the 

extent that the licensees and applicants 

specified in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(5) 

of this section rely upon those C/V 

authorization programs or program 

elements to meet the requirements of 

this section. In any case, only a licensee 

or applicant shall grant or permit an 

individual to maintain unescorted 

access to nuclear power plant protected 

and vital areas. 

(b) Individuals who are subject to an 

authorization program. (1) The 

following individuals shall be subject to 

an authorization program: 

(i) Any individual to whom a licensee 

or applicant grants unescorted access to 

nuclear power plant protected and vital 

areas. 

(ii) Any individual whose assigned 

duties and responsibilities permit the 

individual to take actions by electronic 

means, either onsite or remotely, that 

could adversely impact a licensees or 

applicants operational safety, security, 

or emergency response capabilities; and 

(iii) Any individual who has 

responsibilities for implementing a 

licensee’s or applicant’s protective 

strategy, including, but not limited to, 

armed security force officers, alarm 

station operators, and tactical response 

team leaders; and 

(iv) The licensee’s, applicant’s, or 

C/V’s reviewing official. 

(2) At the licensee’s, applicant’s, or 

C/V’s discretion, other individuals who 

are designated in access authorization 

program procedures may be subject to 

an authorization program that meets the 

requirements of this section. 

(c) General performance objective. 

Access authorization programs must 

provide high assurance that the 

individuals who are specified in 

paragraph (b)(1) of this section, and, if 

applicable, (b)(2) of this section are 

trustworthy and reliable, such that they 

do not constitute an unreasonable risk 

to public health and safety or the 

common defense and security, 

including the potential to commit 

radiological sabotage. 

(d) Background investigation. In order 

to grant unescorted access authorization 

to an individual, the licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs specified in 

paragraph (a) of this section shall ensure 

that the individual has been subject to 

a background investigation. The 

background investigation must include, 

but is not limited to, the following 

elements: 

(1) Informed consent. The licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs specified in 

paragraph (a) of this section may not 

initiate any element of a background 

investigation without the knowledge 

and written consent of the subject 

individual. Licensees, applicants, and 

C/Vs shall inform the individual of his 

or her right to review information 

collected to assure its accuracy and 

provide the individual with an 

opportunity to correct any inaccurate or 

incomplete information that is 

developed by licensees, applicants, and 

C/Vs about the individual. 

(i) The subject individual may 

withdraw his or her consent at any time. 

The licensee, applicant, or C/V to whom 

the individual has applied for 

unescorted access authorization shall 

inform the individual that—

(A) Withdrawal of his or her consent 

will withdraw the individual’s current 

application for access authorization 

under the licensee’s, applicant’s, or 

C/V’s authorization program; and 

(B) Other licensees, applicants, and 

C/Vs will have access to information 

documenting the withdrawal through 

the information-sharing mechanism 

required under paragraph (o)(6) of this 

section. 

(ii) If an individual withdraws his or 

her consent, the licensees, applicants, 

and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of 

this section may not initiate any 

elements of the background 

investigation that were not in progress 

at the time the individual withdrew his 

or her consent, but shall complete any 

background investigation elements that 

are in progress at the time consent is 

withdrawn. In the information-sharing 

mechanism required under paragraph 

(o)(6) of this section, the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V shall record the 

individual’s application for unescorted 

access authorization; his or her 

withdrawal of consent for the 

background investigation; the reason 

given by the individual for the 

withdrawal, if any; and any pertinent 

information collected from the 


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background investigation elements that 

were completed. 

(iii) The licensees, applicants, and 

C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this 

section shall inform, in writing, any 

individual who is applying for 

unescorted access authorization that the 

following actions related to providing 

and sharing the personal information 

under this section are sufficient cause 

for denial or unfavorable termination of 

unescorted access authorization: 

(A) Refusal to provide written consent 

for the background investigation; 

(B) Refusal to provide or the 

falsification of any personal history 

information required under this section, 

including the failure to report any 

previous denial or unfavorable 

termination of unescorted access 

authorization; 

(C) Refusal to provide written consent 

for the sharing of personal information 

with other licensees, applicants, or C/Vs 

required under paragraph (d)(4)(v) of 

this section; and 

(D) Failure to report any arrests or 

formal actions specified in paragraph (g) 

of this section. 

(2) Personal history disclosure. (i) Any 

individual who is applying for 

unescorted access authorization shall 

disclose the personal history 

information that is required by the 

licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s 

authorization program and any 

information that may be necessary for 

the reviewing official to make a 

determination of the individual’s 

trustworthiness and reliability. 

(ii) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

may not require an individual to 

disclose an administrative withdrawal 

of unescorted access authorization 

under the requirements of paragraphs 

(g), (h)(7), or (i)(1)(v) of this section, if 

the individual’s unescorted access 

authorization was not subsequently 

denied or terminated unfavorably by a 

licensee, applicant, or C/V. 

(3) Verification of true identity. 

Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall 

verify the true identity of an individual 

who is applying for unescorted access 

authorization in order to ensure that the 

applicant is the person that he or she 

has claimed to be. At a minimum, 

licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall 

validate the social security number that 

the individual has provided, and, in the 

case of foreign nationals, the alien 

registration number that the individual 

provides. In addition, licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs shall also 

determine whether the results of the 

fingerprinting required under § 73.21 

confirm the individual’s claimed 

identity, if such results are available. 

(4) Employment history evaluation. 

Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall 

ensure that an employment history 

evaluation has been completed, by 

questioning the individual’s present and 

former employers, and by determining 

the activities of individuals while 

unemployed. 

(i) For the claimed employment 

period, the employment history 

evaluation must ascertain the reason for 

termination, eligibility for rehire, and 

other information that could reflect on 

the individual’s trustworthiness and 

reliability. 

(ii) If the claimed employment was 

military service, the licensee, applicant, 

or C/V who is conducting the 

employment history evaluation shall 

request a characterization of service, 

reason for separation, and any 

disciplinary actions that could affect a 

trustworthiness and reliability 

determination. 

(iii) Periods of self-employment or 

unemployment may be verified by any 

reasonable method. If education is 

claimed in lieu of employment, the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V shall request 

information that could reflect on the 

individual’s trustworthiness and 

reliability and, at a minimum, verify 

that the individual was actively 

participating in the educational process 

during the claimed period. 

(iv) If a company, previous employer, 

or educational institution to whom the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V has directed 

a request for information refuses to 

provide information or indicates an 

inability or unwillingness to provide 

information within 3 business days of 

the request, the licensee, applicant, or 

C/V shall document this refusal, 

inability, or unwillingness in the 

licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s record 

of the investigation, and obtain a 

confirmation of employment or 

educational enrollment and attendance 

from at least one alternate source, with 

questions answered to the best of the 

alternate source’s ability. This alternate 

source may not have been previously 

used by the licensee, applicant, or C/V 

to obtain information about the 

individual’s character and reputation. If 

the licensee, applicant, or C/V uses an 

alternate source because employment 

information is not forthcoming within 3 

business days of the request, the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V need not 

delay granting unescorted access 

authorization to wait for any employer 

response, but shall evaluate and 

document the response if it is received. 

(v) When any licensee, applicant, or 

C/V specified in paragraph (a) of this 

section is legitimately seeking the 

information required for an unescorted 

access authorization decision under this 

section and has obtained a signed 

release from the subject individual 

authorizing the disclosure of such 

information, a licensee, applicant, or 

C/V who is subject to this section shall 

disclose whether the subject 

individual’s unescorted access 

authorization was denied or terminated 

unfavorably. The licensee, applicant, or 

C/V who receives the request for 

information shall make available the 

information upon which the denial or 

unfavorable termination of unescorted 

access authorization was based. 

(vi) In conducting an employment 

history evaluation, the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V may obtain 

information and documents by 

electronic means, including, but not 

limited to, telephone, facsimile, or email. The licensee, applicant, or C/V 

shall make a record of the contents of 

the telephone call and shall retain that 

record, and any documents or files 

obtained electronically, in accordance 

with paragraph (o) of this section. 

(5) Credit history evaluation. The 

licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

specified in paragraph (a) of this section 

shall ensure that the full credit history 

of any individual who is applying for 

unescorted access authorization has 

been evaluated. A full credit history 

evaluation must include, but would not 

be limited to, an inquiry to detect 

potential fraud or misuse of social 

security numbers or other financial 

identifiers, and a review and evaluation 

of all of the information that is provided 

by a national credit-reporting agency 

about the individual’s credit history. 

(6) Character and reputation. The 

licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

specified in paragraph (a) of this section 

shall ascertain the character and 

reputation of an individual who has 

applied for unescorted access 

authorization by conducting reference 

checks. Reference checks may not be 

conducted with any person who is 

known to be a close member of the 

individual’s family, including but not 

limited to, the individual’s spouse, 

parents, siblings, or children, or any 

individual who resides in the 

individual’s permanent household. The 

reference checks must focus on the 

individual’s reputation for 

trustworthiness and reliability. 

(7) Criminal history review. The 

licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s 

reviewing official shall evaluate the 

entire criminal history record of an 

individual who is applying for 

unescorted access authorization to assist 

in determining whether the individual 

has a record of criminal activity that 

may adversely impact his or her 


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trustworthiness and reliability. The 

criminal history record must be 

obtained in accordance with the 

requirements of § 73.57. 

(e) Psychological assessment. In order 

to assist in determining an individual’s 

trustworthiness and reliability, the 

licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

specified in paragraph (a) of this section 

shall ensure that a psychological 

assessment has been completed of the 

individual who is applying for 

unescorted access authorization. The 

psychological assessment must be 

designed to evaluate the possible 

adverse impact of any noted 

psychological characteristics on the 

individual’s trustworthiness and 

reliability. 

(1) A licensed clinical psychologist or 

psychiatrist shall conduct the 

psychological assessment. 

(2) The psychological assessment 

must be conducted in accordance with 

the applicable ethical principles for 

conducting such assessments 

established by the American 

Psychological Association or American 

Psychiatric Association. 

(3) At a minimum, the psychological 

assessment must include the 

administration and interpretation of a 

standardized, objective, professionally 

accepted psychological test that 

provides information to identify 

indications of disturbances in 

personality or psychopathology that 

may have implications for an 

individual’s trustworthiness and 

reliability. Predetermined thresholds 

must be applied in interpreting the 

results of the psychological test, to 

determine whether an individual shall 

be interviewed by a psychiatrist or 

licensed clinical psychologist under 

paragraph (e)(4)(i) of this section. 

(4) The psychological assessment 

must include a clinical interview—

(i) If an individual’s scores on the 

psychological test in paragraph (e)(3) of 

this section identify indications of 

disturbances in personality or 

psychopathology that may have 

implications for an individual’s 

trustworthiness and reliability; or 

(ii) If the licensee’s or applicant’s 

Physical Security Plan requires a 

clinical interview based on job 

assignments. 

(5) If, in the course of conducting the 

psychological assessment, the licensed 

clinical psychologist or psychiatrist 

identifies indications of, or information 

related to, a medical condition that 

could adversely impact the individual’s 

fitness for duty or trustworthiness and 

reliability, the psychologist or 

psychiatrist shall inform the reviewing 

official, who shall ensure that an 

appropriate evaluation of the possible 

medical condition is conducted under 

the requirements of part 26 of this 

chapter. 

(f) Behavioral observation. Access 

authorization programs must include a 

behavioral observation element that is 

designed to detect behaviors or 

activities that may constitute an 

unreasonable risk to the health and 

safety of the public and common 

defense and security, including a 

potential threat to commit radiological 

sabotage. 

(1) The licensees, applicants, and 

C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this 

section shall ensure that the individuals 

specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this 

section and, if applicable, (b)(2) of this 

section are subject to behavioral 

observation. 

(2) The individuals specified in 

paragraph (b)(1) and, if applicable, (b)(2) 

of this section shall observe the 

behavior of other individuals. The 

licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

specified in paragraph (a) of this section 

shall ensure that individuals who are 

subject to this section also successfully 

complete behavioral observation 

training. 

(i) Behavioral observation training 

must be completed before the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V grants an initial 

unescorted access authorization, as 

defined in paragraph (h)(5) of this 

section, and must be current before the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V grants an 

unescorted access authorization update, 

as defined in paragraph (h)(6) of this 

section, or an unescorted access 

authorization reinstatement, as defined 

in paragraph (h)(7) of this section; 

(ii) Individuals shall complete 

refresher training on a nominal 12- 

month frequency, or more frequently 

where the need is indicated. Individuals 

may take and pass a comprehensive 

examination that meets the 

requirements of paragraph (f)(2)(iii) of 

this section in lieu of completing annual 

refresher training; 

(iii) Individuals shall demonstrate the 

successful completion of behavioral 

observation training by passing a 

comprehensive examination that 

addresses the knowledge and abilities 

necessary to detect behavior or activities 

that have the potential to constitute an 

unreasonable risk to the health and 

safety of the public and common 

defense and security, including a 

potential threat to commit radiological 

sabotage. Remedial training and retesting are required for individuals who 

fail to satisfactorily complete the 

examination. 

(iv) Initial and refresher training may 

be delivered using a variety of media 

(including, but not limited to, classroom 

lectures, required reading, video, or 

computer-based training systems). The 

licensee, applicant, or C/V shall monitor 

the completion of training. 

(3) Individuals who are subject to an 

authorization program under this 

section shall report to the reviewing 

official any concerns arising from 

behavioral observation, including, but 

not limited to, concerns related to any 

questionable behavior patterns or 

activities of others. 

(g) Arrest reporting. Any individual 

who has applied for or is maintaining 

unescorted access authorization under 

this section shall promptly report to the 

reviewing official any formal action(s) 

taken by a law enforcement authority or 

court of law to which the individual has 

been subject, including an arrest, an 

indictment, the filing of charges, or a 

conviction. On the day that the report is 

received, the reviewing official shall 

evaluate the circumstances related to 

the formal action(s) and determine 

whether to grant, maintain, 

administratively withdraw, deny, or 

unfavorably terminate the individual’s 

unescorted access authorization. 

(h) Granting unescorted access 

authorization. The licensees, applicants, 

and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of 

this section shall implement the 

requirements of this paragraph for 

granting initial unescorted access 

authorization, updated unescorted 

access authorization, and reinstatement 

of unescorted access authorization. 

(1) Accepting unescorted access 

authorization from other authorization 

programs. Licensees, applicants, and 

C/Vs who are seeking to grant 

unescorted access authorization to an 

individual who is subject to another 

authorization program that complies 

with this section may rely on the 

program elements completed by the 

transferring authorization program to 

satisfy the requirements of this section. 

An individual may maintain his or her 

unescorted access authorization if he or 

she continues to be subject to either the 

receiving licensee’s, applicant’s, or 

C/V’s authorization program or the 

transferring licensee’s, applicant’s, or 

C/V’s authorization program, or a 

combination of elements from both 

programs that collectively satisfy the 

requirements of this section. The 

receiving authorization program shall 

ensure that the program elements 

maintained by the transferring program 

remain current. 

(2) Information sharing. To meet the 

requirements of this section, licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs may rely upon the 

information that other licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs who are subject to 


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this section have gathered about 

individuals who have previously 

applied for unescorted access 

authorization and developed about 

individuals during periods in which the 

individuals maintained unescorted 

access authorization. 

(3) Requirements applicable to all 

unescorted access authorization 

categories. Before granting unescorted 

access authorization to individuals in 

any category, including individuals 

whose unescorted access authorization 

has been interrupted for a period of 30 

or fewer days, the licensee, applicant, or 

C/V shall ensure that—

(i) The individual’s written consent to 

conduct a background investigation, if 

necessary, has been obtained and the 

individual’s true identity has been 

verified, in accordance with paragraphs 

(d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section, 

respectively; 

(ii) A credit history evaluation or reevaluation has been completed in 

accordance with the requirements of 

paragraphs (d)(5) or (i)(1)(v) of this 

section, as applicable; 

(iii) The individual’s character and 

reputation have been ascertained, in 

accordance with paragraph (d)(6) of this 

section; 

(iv) The individual’s criminal history 

record has been obtained and reviewed 

or updated, in accordance with 

paragraphs (d)(7) and (i)(1)(v) of this 

section, as applicable; 

(v) A psychological assessment or 

reassessment of the individual has been 

completed in accordance with the 

requirements of paragraphs (e) or 

(i)(1)(v) of this section, as applicable; 

(vi) The individual has successfully 

completed the initial or refresher, as 

applicable, behavioral observation 

training that is required under 

paragraph (f) of this section; and 

(vii) The individual has been 

informed, in writing, of his or her arrestreporting responsibilities under 

paragraph (g) of this section. 

(4) Interruptions in unescorted access 

authorization. For individuals who have 

previously held unescorted access 

authorization under this section but 

whose unescorted access authorization 

has since been terminated under 

favorable conditions, the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V shall implement the 

requirements in this paragraph for 

initial unescorted access authorization 

in paragraph (h)(5) of this section, 

updated unescorted access 

authorization in paragraph (h)(6) of this 

section, or reinstatement of unescorted 

access authorization in paragraph (h)(7) 

of this section, based upon the total 

number of days that the individual’s 

unescorted access authorization has 

been interrupted, to include the day 

after the individual’s last period of 

unescorted access authorization was 

terminated and the intervening days 

until the day upon which the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V grants unescorted 

access authorization to the individual. If 

potentially disqualifying information is 

disclosed or discovered about an 

individual, licensees, applicants, and 

C/V’s shall take additional actions, as 

specified in the licensee’s or applicant’s 

physical security plan, in order to grant 

or maintain the individual’s unescorted 

access authorization. 

(5) Initial unescorted access 

authorization. Before granting 

unescorted access authorization to an 

individual who has never held 

unescorted access authorization under 

this section or whose unescorted access 

authorization has been interrupted for a 

period of 3 years or more and whose last 

period of unescorted access 

authorization was terminated under 

favorable conditions, the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V shall ensure that an 

employment history evaluation has been 

completed in accordance with 

paragraph (d)(4) of this section. The 

period of the employment history that 

the individual shall disclose, and the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V shall 

evaluate, must be the past 3 years or 

since the individual’s eighteenth 

birthday, whichever is shorter. For the 

1-year period immediately preceding 

the date upon which the individual 

applies for unescorted access 

authorization, the licensee, applicant, or 

C/V shall ensure that the employment 

history evaluation is conducted with 

every employer, regardless of the length 

of employment. For the remaining 2- 

year period, the licensee, applicant, or 

C/V shall ensure that the employment 

history evaluation is conducted with the 

employer by whom the individual 

claims to have been employed the 

longest within each calendar month, if 

the individual claims employment 

during the given calendar month. 

(6) Updated unescorted access 

authorization. Before granting 

unescorted access authorization to an 

individual whose unescorted access 

authorization has been interrupted for 

more than 365 days but fewer than 3 

years and whose last period of 

unescorted access authorization was 

terminated under favorable conditions, 

the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall 

ensure that an employment history 

evaluation has been completed in 

accordance with paragraph (d)(4) of this 

section. The period of the employment 

history that the individual shall 

disclose, and the licensee, applicant, or 

C/V shall evaluate, must be the period 

since unescorted access authorization 

was last terminated, up to and including 

the day the applicant applies for 

updated unescorted access 

authorization. For the 1-year period 

immediately preceding the date upon 

which the individual applies for 

updated unescorted access 

authorization, the licensee, applicant, or 

C/V shall ensure that the employment 

history evaluation is conducted with 

every employer, regardless of the length 

of employment. For the remaining 

period since unescorted access 

authorization was last terminated, the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V shall ensure 

that the employment history evaluation 

is conducted with the employer by 

whom the individual claims to have 

been employed the longest within each 

calendar month, if the individual claims 

employment during the given calendar 

month. 

(7) Reinstatement of unescorted 

access authorization (31 to 365 days). In 

order to grant authorization to an 

individual whose unescorted access 

authorization has been interrupted for a 

period of more than 30 days but no 

more than 365 days and whose last 

period of unescorted access 

authorization was terminated under 

favorable conditions, the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V shall ensure that an 

employment history evaluation has been 

completed in accordance with the 

requirements of paragraph (d)(4) of this 

section within 5 business days of 

reinstating unescorted access 

authorization. The period of the 

employment history that the individual 

shall disclose, and the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V shall evaluate, must be 

the period since the individual’s 

unescorted access authorization was 

terminated, up to and including the day 

the applicant applies for reinstatement 

of unescorted access authorization. The 

licensee, applicant, or C/V shall ensure 

that the employment history evaluation 

has been conducted with the employer 

by whom the individual claims to have 

been employed the longest within the 

calendar month, if the individual claims 

employment during a given calendar 

month. If the employment history 

evaluation is not completed within 5 

business days due to circumstances that 

are outside of the licensee’s, applicant’s, 

or C/V’s control and the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V is not aware of any 

potentially disqualifying information 

regarding the individual within the past 

5 years, the licensee, applicant, or C/V 

may maintain the individual’s 

unescorted access authorization for an 

additional 5 business days. If the 

employment history evaluation is not 


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62864 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

completed within 10 business days of 

reinstating unescorted access 

authorization, the licensee, applicant, or 

C/V shall administratively withdraw the 

individual’s unescorted access 

authorization until the employment 

history evaluation is completed. 

(8) Determination basis. The 

licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s 

reviewing official shall determine 

whether to grant, deny, unfavorably 

terminate, or maintain or amend an 

individual’s unescorted access 

authorization status, based on an 

evaluation of all pertinent information 

that has been gathered about the 

individual as a result of any application 

for unescorted access authorization or 

developed during or following in any 

period during which the individual 

maintained unescorted access 

authorization. The licensee’s, 

applicant’s, or C/V’s reviewing official 

may not determine whether to grant 

unescorted access authorization to an 

individual or maintain an individual’s 

unescorted access authorization until all 

of the required information has been 

provided to the reviewing official and 

he or she determines that the 

accumulated information supports a 

positive finding of trustworthiness and 

reliability. 

(9) Unescorted access for NRCcertified personnel. The licensees and 

applicants specified in paragraph (a) of 

this section shall grant unescorted 

access to all individuals who have been 

certified by the NRC as suitable for such 

access including, but not limited to, 

contractors to the NRC and NRC 

employees. 

(10) Access prohibited. Licensees and 

applicants may not permit an 

individual, who is identified as having 

an access-denied status in the 

information-sharing mechanism 

required under paragraph (o)(6) of this 

section, or has an access authorization 

status other than favorably terminated, 

to enter any nuclear power plant 

protected area or vital area, under escort 

or otherwise, or take actions by 

electronic means that could impact the 

licensee’s operational safety, security, or 

emergency response capabilities, under 

supervision or otherwise, except if, 

upon evaluation, the reviewing official 

determines that such access is 

warranted. Licensees and applicants 

shall develop reinstatement review 

procedures for assessing individuals 

who have been in an access-denied 

status. 

(i) Maintaining access authorization. 

(1) Individuals may maintain 

unescorted access authorization under 

the following conditions: 

(i) The individual remains subject to 

a behavioral observation program that 

complies with the requirements of 

paragraph (f) of this section; 

(ii) The individual successfully 

completes behavioral observation 

refresher training or testing on the 

nominal 12-month frequency required 

in (f)(2)(ii) of this section; 

(iii) The individual complies with the 

licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s 

authorization program policies and 

procedures to which he or she is 

subject, including the arrest-reporting 

responsibility specified in paragraph (g) 

of this section; 

(iv) The individual is subject to a 

supervisory interview at a nominal 12- 

month frequency, conducted in 

accordance with the requirements of the 

licensee’s or applicant’s Physical 

Security Plan; and 

(v) The licensee, applicant, or C/V 

determines that the individual 

continues to be trustworthy and reliable. 

This determination must be made as 

follows: 

(A) The licensee, applicant, or C/V 

shall complete a criminal history 

update, credit history re-evaluation, and 

psychological re-assessment of the 

individual within 5 years of the date on 

which these elements were last 

completed, or more frequently, based on 

job assignment; 

(B) The reviewing official shall 

complete an evaluation of the 

information obtained from the criminal 

history update, credit history reevaluation, psychological re-assessment, 

and the supervisory interview required 

under paragraph (i)(1)(iv) of this section 

within 30 calendar days of initiating any 

one of these elements; 

(C) The results of the criminal history 

update, credit history re-evaluation, 

psychological re-assessment, and the 

supervisory interview required under 

paragraph (i)(1)(iv) of this section must 

support a positive determination of the 

individual’s continued trustworthiness 

and reliability; and 

(D) If the criminal history update, 

credit history re-evaluation, 

psychological re-assessment, and 

supervisory review have not been 

completed and the information 

evaluated by the reviewing official 

within 5 years of the initial completion 

of these elements or the most recent 

update, re-evaluation, and re-assessment 

under this paragraph, or within the time 

period specified in the licensee’s or 

applicant’s Physical Security Plans, the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V shall 

administratively withdraw the 

individual’s unescorted access 

authorization until these requirements 

have been met. 

(2) If an individual who has 

unescorted access authorization is not 

subject to an authorization program that 

meets the requirements of this part for 

more than 30 continuous days, then the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V shall 

terminate the individual’s unescorted 

access authorization and the individual 

shall meet the requirements in this 

section, as applicable, to regain 

unescorted access authorization. 

(j) Access to vital areas. Each licensee 

and applicant who is subject to this 

section shall establish, implement, and 

maintain a list of individuals who are 

authorized to have unescorted access to 

specific nuclear power plant vital areas 

to assist in limiting access to those vital 

areas during non-emergency conditions. 

The list must include only those 

individuals who require access to those 

specific vital areas in order to perform 

their duties and responsibilities. The list 

must be approved by a cognizant 

licensee or applicant manager, or 

supervisor who is responsible for 

directing the work activities of the 

individual who is granted unescorted 

access to each vital area, and updated 

and re-approved no less frequently than 

every 31 days. 

(k) Trustworthiness and reliability of 

background screeners and authorization 

program personnel. Licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs shall ensure that 

any individuals who collect, process, or 

have access to personal information that 

is used to make unescorted access 

authorization determinations under this 

section have been determined to be 

trustworthy and reliable. 

(1) Background screeners. Licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs who rely on 

individuals who are not directly under 

their control to collect and process 

information that will be used by a 

reviewing official to make unescorted 

access authorization determinations 

shall ensure that a background check of 

such individuals has been completed 

and determines that such individuals 

are trustworthy and reliable. At a 

minimum, the following checks are 

required: 

(i) Verification of the individual’s 

identity; 

(ii) A local criminal history review 

and evaluation from the State of the 

individual’s permanent residence; 

(iii) A credit history review and 

evaluation; 

(iv) An employment history review 

and evaluation for the past 3 years; and 

(v) An evaluation of character and 

reputation. 

(2) Authorization program personnel. 

Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall 

ensure that any individual who 

evaluates personal information for the 


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purpose of processing applications for 

unescorted access authorization 

including, but not limited to a clinical 

psychologist or psychiatrist who 

conducts psychological assessments 

under paragraph (e) of this section; has 

access to the files, records, and personal 

information associated with individuals 

who have applied for unescorted access 

authorization; or is responsible for 

managing any databases that contain 

such files, records, and personal 

information has been determined to be 

trustworthy and reliable, as follows: 

(i) The individual is subject to an 

authorization program that meets 

requirements of this section; or 

(ii) The licensee, applicant, or C/V 

determines that the individual is 

trustworthy and reliable based upon an 

evaluation that meets the requirements 

of paragraphs (d)(1) through (d)(5) and 

(e) of this section and a local criminal 

history review and evaluation from the 

State of the individual’s permanent 

residence. 

(l) Review procedures. Each licensee, 

applicant, and C/V who is 

implementing an authorization program 

under this section shall include a 

procedure for the review, at the request 

of the affected individual, of a denial or 

unfavorable termination of unescorted 

access authorization. The procedure 

must require that the individual is 

informed of the grounds for the denial 

or unfavorable termination and allow 

the individual an opportunity to 

provide additional relevant information, 

and provide an opportunity for an 

objective review of the information on 

which the denial or unfavorable 

termination of unescorted access 

authorization was based. The procedure 

may be an impartial and independent 

internal management review. Licensees 

and applicants may not grant or permit 

the individual to maintain unescorted 

access authorization during the review 

process. 

(m) Protection of information. Each 

licensee, applicant, or C/V who is 

subject to this section who collects 

personal information about an 

individual for the purpose of complying 

with this section, shall establish and 

maintain a system of files and 

procedures to protect the personal 

information. 

(1) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

shall obtain a signed consent from the 

subject individual that authorizes the 

disclosure of the personal information 

collected and maintained under this 

section before disclosing the personal 

information, except for disclosures to 

the following individuals: 

(i) The subject individual or his or her 

representative, when the individual has 

designated the representative in writing 

for specified unescorted access 

authorization matters; 

(ii) NRC representatives; 

(iii) Appropriate law enforcement 

officials under court order; 

(iv) A licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s 

representatives who have a need to have 

access to the information in performing 

assigned duties, including 

determinations of trustworthiness and 

reliability, and audits of authorization 

programs; 

(v) The presiding officer in a judicial 

or administrative proceeding that is 

initiated by the subject individual; 

(vi) Persons deciding matters under 

the review procedures in paragraph (k) 

of this section; and 

(vii) Other persons pursuant to court 

order. 

(2) Personal information that is 

collected under this section must be 

disclosed to other licensees, applicants, 

and C/Vs, or their authorized 

representatives, who are seeking the 

information for unescorted access 

authorization determinations under this 

section and who have obtained a signed 

release from the subject individual. 

(3) Upon receipt of a written request 

by the subject individual or his or her 

designated representative, the licensee, 

applicant, or C/V possessing such 

records shall promptly provide copies of 

all records pertaining to a denial or 

unfavorable termination of the 

individual’s unescorted access 

authorization. 

(4) A licensee’s, applicant’s, or C/V’s 

contracts with any individual or 

organization who collects and maintains 

personal information that is relevant to 

an unescorted access authorization 

determination must require that such 

records be held in confidence, except as 

provided in paragraphs (m)(1) through 

(m)(3) of this section. 

(5) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

who collect and maintain personal 

information under this section, and any 

individual or organization who collects 

and maintains personal information on 

behalf of a licensee, applicant, or C/V, 

shall establish, implement, and 

maintain a system and procedures for 

the secure storage and handling of the 

personal information collected. 

(6) This paragraph does not authorize 

the licensee, applicant, or C/V to 

withhold evidence of criminal conduct 

from law enforcement officials. 

(n) Audits and corrective action. Each 

licensee and applicant who is subject to 

this section shall be responsible for the 

continuing effectiveness of the 

authorization program, including 

authorization program elements that are 

provided by C/Vs, and the authorization 

programs of any C/Vs that are accepted 

by the licensee and applicant. Each 

licensee, applicant, and C/V who is 

subject to this section shall ensure that 

authorization programs and program 

elements are audited to confirm 

compliance with the requirements of 

this section and that comprehensive 

actions are taken to correct any nonconformance that is identified. 

(1) Each licensee, applicant, and C/V 

who is subject to this section shall 

ensure that their entire authorization 

program is audited as needed, but no 

less frequently than nominally every 24 

months. Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

are responsible for determining the 

appropriate frequency, scope, and depth 

of additional auditing activities within 

the nominal 24-month period based on 

the review of program performance 

indicators, such as the frequency, 

nature, and severity of discovered 

problems, personnel or procedural 

changes, and previous audit findings. 

(2) Authorization program services 

that are provided to a licensee, or 

applicant, by C/V personnel who are off 

site or are not under the direct daily 

supervision or observation of the 

licensee’s or applicant’s personnel must 

be audited on a nominal 12-month 

frequency. In addition, any 

authorization program services that are 

provided to C/Vs by subcontractor 

personnel who are off site or are not 

under the direct daily supervision or 

observation of the C/V’s personnel must 

be audited on a nominal 12-month 

frequency. 

(3) Licensees’ and applicants’

contracts with C/Vs must reserve the 

right to audit the C/V and the C/V’s 

subcontractors providing authorization 

program services at any time, including 

at unannounced times, as well as to 

review all information and 

documentation that is reasonably 

relevant to the performance of the 

program. 

(4) Licensees’ and applicants’

contracts with C/Vs, and a C/V’s 

contracts with subcontractors, must also 

require that the licensee or applicant 

shall be provided with, or permitted 

access to, copies of any documents and 

take away any documents that may be 

needed to assure that the C/V and its 

subcontractors are performing their 

functions properly and that staff and 

procedures meet applicable 

requirements. 

(5) Audits must focus on the 

effectiveness of the authorization 

program or program element(s), as 

appropriate. At least one member of the 

audit team shall be a person who is 

knowledgeable of and practiced with 

meeting authorization program 


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performance objectives and 

requirements. The individuals 

performing the audit of the 

authorization program or program 

element(s) shall be independent from 

both the subject authorization program’s 

management and from personnel who 

are directly responsible for 

implementing the authorization 

program(s) being audited. 

(6) The result of the audits, along with 

any recommendations, must be 

documented and reported to senior 

corporate and site management. Each 

audit report must identify conditions 

that are adverse to the proper 

performance of the authorization 

program, the cause of the condition(s), 

and, when appropriate, recommended 

corrective actions, and corrective 

actions taken. The licensee, applicant, 

or C/V shall review the audit findings 

and take any additional corrective 

actions, to include re-auditing of the 

deficient areas where indicated, to 

preclude, within reason, repetition of 

the condition. The resolution of the 

audit findings and corrective actions 

must be documented. 

(7) Licensees and applicants may 

jointly conduct audits, or may accept 

audits of C/Vs that were conducted by 

other licensees and applicants who are 

subject to this section, if the audit 

addresses the services obtained from the 

C/V by each of the sharing licensees and 

applicants. C/Vs may jointly conduct 

audits, or may accept audits of its 

subcontractors that were conducted by 

other licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

who are subject to this section, if the 

audit addresses the services obtained 

from the subcontractor by each of the 

sharing licensees, applicants, and C/Vs. 

(i) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

shall review audit records and reports to 

identify any areas that were not covered 

by the shared or accepted audit and 

ensure that authorization program 

elements and services upon which the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V relies are 

audited, if the program elements and 

services were not addressed in the 

shared audit. 

(ii) Sharing licensees and applicants 

need not re-audit the same C/V for the 

same period of time. Sharing C/Vs need 

not re-audit the same subcontractor for 

the same period of time. 

(iii) Each sharing licensee, applicant, 

and C/V shall maintain a copy of the 

shared audit, including findings, 

recommendations, and corrective 

actions. 

(o) Records. Each licensee, applicant, 

and C/V who is subject to this section 

shall maintain the records that are 

required by the regulations in this 

section for the period specified by the 

appropriate regulation. If a retention 

period is not otherwise specified, these 

records must be retained until the 

Commission terminates the facility’s 

license, certificate, or other regulatory 

approval. 

(1) All records may be stored and 

archived electronically, provided that 

the method used to create the electronic 

records meets the following criteria: 

(i) Provides an accurate representation 

of the original records; 

(ii) Prevents unauthorized access to 

the records; 

(iii) Prevents the alteration of any 

archived information and/or data once it 

has been committed to storage; and 

(iv) Permits easy retrieval and recreation of the original records. 

(2) Each licensee, applicant, and C/V 

who is subject to this section shall 

retain the following records for at least 

5 years after the licensee, applicant, or 

C/V terminates or denies an individual’s 

unescorted access authorization or until 

the completion of all related legal 

proceedings, whichever is later: 

(i) Records of the information that 

must be collected under paragraphs (d) 

and (e) of this section that results in the 

granting of unescorted access 

authorization; 

(ii) Records pertaining to denial or 

unfavorable termination of unescorted 

access authorization and related 

management actions; and 

(iii) Documentation of the granting 

and termination of unescorted access 

authorization. 

(3) Each licensee, applicant, and C/V 

who is subject to this section shall 

retain the following records for at least 

3 years or until the completion of all 

related legal proceedings, whichever is 

later: 

(i) Records of behavioral observation 

training conducted under paragraph 

(f)(2) of this section; and 

(ii) Records of audits, audit findings, 

and corrective actions taken under 

paragraph (n) of this section. 

(4) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

shall retain written agreements for the 

provision of services under this section 

for the life of the agreement or until 

completion of all legal proceedings 

related to a denial or unfavorable 

termination of unescorted access 

authorization that involved those 

services, whichever is later. 

(5) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

shall retain records of the background 

checks, and psychological assessments 

of authorization program personnel, 

conducted under paragraphs (d) and (e) 

of this section, for the length of the 

individual’s employment by or 

contractual relationship with the 

licensee, applicant, or C/V, or until the 

completion of any legal proceedings 

relating to the actions of such 

authorization program personnel, 

whichever is later. 

(6) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs 

shall ensure that the information about 

individuals who have applied for 

unescorted access authorization, which 

is specified in the licensee’s or 

applicant’s Physical Security Plan, is 

recorded and retained in an 

information-sharing mechanism that is 

established and administered by the 

licensees, applicants, and C/Vs who are 

subject to his section. Licensees, 

applicants, and C/Vs shall ensure that 

only correct and complete information 

is included in the information-sharing 

mechanism. If, for any reason, the 

shared information used for determining 

an individual’s trustworthiness and 

reliability changes or new information is 

developed about the individual, 

licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall 

correct or augment the shared 

information contained in the 

information-sharing mechanism. If the 

changed or developed information has 

implications for adversely affecting an 

individual’s trustworthiness and 

reliability, the licensee, applicant, or C/ 

V who has discovered the incorrect 

information, or develops new 

information, shall inform the reviewing 

official of any authorization program 

under which the individual is 

maintaining unescorted access 

authorization of the updated 

information on the day of discovery. 

The reviewing official shall evaluate the 

information and take appropriate 

actions, which may include denial or 

unfavorable termination of the 

individual’s unescorted access 

authorization. If, for any reason, the 

information-sharing mechanism is 

unavailable and a notification of 

changes or updated information is 

required, licensees, applicants, and C/ 

Vs shall take manual actions to ensure 

that the information is shared, and 

update the records in the informationsharing mechanism as soon as 

reasonably possible. Records 

maintained in the database must be 

available for NRC review. 

(7) If a licensee, applicant, or C/V 

administratively withdraws an 

individual’s unescorted access 

authorization under the requirements of 

this section, the licensee, applicant, or 

C/V may not record the administrative 

action to withdraw the individual’s 

unescorted access authorization as an 

unfavorable termination and may not 

disclose it in response to a suitable 

inquiry conducted under the provisions 

of part 26 of this chapter, a background 

investigation conducted under the 


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3Commercial (secure and non-secure) telephone 

numbers of the NRC Operations Center are specified 

in appendix A of this part. 

4Notifications to the NRC for the declaration of 

an emergency class shall be performed in 

accordance with § 50.72 of this chapter. 

provisions of this section, or any other 

inquiry or investigation. Immediately 

upon favorable completion of the 

background investigation element that 

caused the administrative withdrawal, 

the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall 

ensure that any matter that could link 

the individual to the temporary 

administrative action is eliminated from 

the subject individual’s access 

authorization or personnel record and 

other records, except if a review of the 

information obtained or developed 

causes the reviewing official to 

unfavorably terminate the individual’s 

unescorted access. 

14. Section 73.58 is added to read as 

follows: 

§ 73.58 Safety/security interface 

requirements for nuclear power reactors. 

Each operating nuclear power reactor 

licensee with a license issued under 

part 50 or 52 of this chapter shall 

comply with the requirements of this 

section. 

(a)(1) The licensee shall assess and 

manage the potential for adverse affects 

on safety and security, including the site 

emergency plan, before implementing 

changes to plant configurations, facility 

conditions, or security. 

(2) The scope of changes to be 

assessed and managed must include 

planned and emergent activities (such 

as, but not limited to, physical 

modifications, procedural changes, 

changes to operator actions or security 

assignments, maintenance activities, 

system reconfiguration, access 

modification or restrictions, and 

changes to the security plan and its 

implementation). 

(b) Where potential adverse 

interactions are identified, the licensee 

shall communicate them to appropriate 

licensee personnel and take 

compensatory and/or mitigative actions 

to maintain safety and security under 

applicable Commission regulations, 

requirements, and license conditions. 

15. In § 73.70, paragraph (c) is revised 

to read as follows: 

§ 73.70 Records. 

* * * * * 

(c) A register of visitors, vendors, and 

other individuals not employed by the 

licensee under §§ 73.46(d)(13), 

73.55(g)(7)(ii), or 73.60. The licensee 

shall retain this register as a record, 

available for inspection, for three (3) 

years after the last entry is made in the 

register. 

* * * * * 

16. Section 73.71 is revised to read as 

follows: 

§ 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events. 

(a) Each licensee subject to the 

provisions of § 73.55 shall notify the 

NRC Operations Center,3 as soon as 

possible but not later than 15 minutes 

after discovery of an imminent or actual 

safeguards threat against the facility and 

other safeguards events described in 

paragraph I of appendix G to this part.4

(1) When making a report under 

paragraph (a) of this section, the 

licensee shall: 

(i) Identify the facility name; and 

(ii) Briefly describe the nature of the 

threat or event, including: 

(A) Type of threat or event (e.g., 

armed assault, vehicle bomb, credible 

bomb threat, etc.); and 

(B) Threat or event status (i.e., 

imminent, in progress, or neutralized). 

(2) Notifications must be made 

according to paragraph (e) of this 

section, as applicable. 

(b) Each licensee subject to the 

provisions of §§ 73.25, 73.26, 73.27(c), 

73.37, 73.67(e), or 73.67(g) shall notify 

the NRC Operations Center within one 

hour after discovery of the loss of any 

shipment of special nuclear material 

(SNM) or spent nuclear fuel, and within 

one hour after recovery of or accounting 

for the lost shipment. Notifications must 

be made according to paragraph (e) of 

this section, as applicable. 

(c) Each licensee subject to the 

provisions of §§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 

73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or 73.67 shall notify 

the NRC Operations Center within one 

hour after discovery of the safeguards 

events described in paragraph II of 

appendix G to this part. Notifications 

must be made according to paragraph (e) 

of this section, as applicable. 

(d) Each licensee subject to the 

provisions of § 73.55 shall notify the 

NRC Operations Center, as soon as 

possible but not later than four (4) hours 

after discovery of the safeguards events 

described in paragraph III of appendix 

G to this part. Notifications must be 

made according to paragraph (e) of this 

section, as applicable. 

(e) The licensee shall make the 

telephonic notifications required by 

paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of this 

section to the NRC Operations Center 

via the Emergency Notification System, 

or other dedicated telephonic system 

that may be designated by the 

Commission, if the licensee has access 

to that system. 

(1) If the Emergency Notification 

System or other designated telephonic 

system is inoperative or unavailable, 

licensees shall make the required 

notification via commercial telephonic 

service or any other methods that will 

ensure that a report is received by the 

NRC Operations Center within the 

timeliness requirements of paragraphs 

(a), (b), (c), and (d) of this section, as 

applicable. 

(2) The exception of § 73.21(g)(3) for 

emergency or extraordinary conditions 

applies to all telephonic reports 

required by this section. 

(3) For events reported under 

paragraph (a) of this section, the 

licensee may be requested by the NRC 

to maintain an open, continuous 

communication channel with the NRC 

Operations Center, once the licensee has 

completed other required notifications 

under this section, § 50.72 of this 

chapter, or appendix E of part 50 of this 

chapter and any immediate actions to 

stabilize the plant. When established, 

the continuous communications 

channel shall be staffed by a 

knowledgeable individual in the 

licensee’s security or operations 

organizations (e.g., a security 

supervisor, an alarm station operator, 

operations personnel, etc.) from a 

location deemed appropriate by the 

licensee. The continuous 

communications channel may be 

established via the Emergency 

Notification System or dedicated 

telephonic system that may be 

designated by the Commission, if the 

licensee has access to these systems, or 

a commercial telephonic system. 

(4) For events reported under 

paragraphs (b) or (c) of this section, the 

licensee shall maintain an open, 

continuous communication channel 

with the NRC Operations Center upon 

request from the NRC. 

(5) For events reported under 

paragraph (d) of this section, the 

licensee is not required to maintain an 

open, continuous communication 

channel with the NRC Operations 

Center. 

(f) Each licensee subject to the 

provisions of §§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 

73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or each licensee 

possessing SSNM and subject to the 

provisions of § 73.67(d) shall maintain a 

current safeguards event log. 

(1) The licensee shall record the 

safeguards events described in 

paragraph IV of appendix G of this part 

within 24 hours of discovery. 

(2) The licensee shall retain the log of 

events recorded under this section as a 

record for three (3) years after the last 

entry is made in each log or until 

termination of the license. 

(g) Written reports. (1) Each licensee 

making an initial telephonic notification 


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under paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this 

section shall also submit a written 

report to the NRC within a 60 day 

period by an appropriate method listed 

in § 73.4. 

(2) Licenses are not required to submit 

a written report following a telephonic 

notification made under paragraph (d) 

of this section. 

(3) Each licensee shall submit to the 

Commission written reports that are of 

a quality that will permit legible 

reproduction and processing. 

(4) Licensees subject to § 50.73 of this 

chapter shall prepare the written report 

on NRC Form 366. 

(5) Licensees not subject to § 50.73 of 

this chapter shall prepare the written 

report in letter format. 

(6) In addition to the addressees 

specified in § 73.4, the licensee shall 

also provide one copy of the written 

report addressed to the Director, Office 

of Nuclear Security and Incident 

Response. 

(7) The report must include sufficient 

information for NRC analysis and 

evaluation. 

(8) Significant supplemental 

information which becomes available 

after the initial telephonic notification 

to the NRC Operations Center or after 

the submission of the written report 

must be telephonically reported to the 

NRC Operations Center under paragraph 

(e) of this section and also submitted in 

a revised written report (with the 

revisions indicated) as required under 

paragraph (g)(6) of this section. 

(9) Errors discovered in a written 

report must be corrected in a revised 

report with revisions indicated. 

(10) The revised report must replace 

the previous report; the update must be 

complete and not be limited to only 

supplementary or revised information. 

(11) Each licensee shall maintain a 

copy of the written report of an event 

submitted under this section as a record 

for a period of three (3) years from the 

date of the report. 

(h) Duplicate reports are not required 

for events that are also reportable in 

accordance with §§ 50.72 and 50.73 of 

this chapter. 

17. In appendix B to part 73, a new 

section VI is added to the table of 

contents, the introduction text is revised 

by adding a new paragraph between the 

first and second undesignated 

paragraphs, and section VI is added to 

read as follows: 

Appendix B to Part 73—General 

Criteria for Security Personnel 

Table of Contents 

* * * * * 

VI. Nuclear Power Reactor Training and 

Qualification Plan 

A. General Requirements and Introduction 

B. Employment Suitability and Qualification 

C. Duty Training 

D. Duty Qualification and Requalification 

E. Weapons Training 

F. Weapons Qualification and Requalification 

Program 

G. Weapons, Personnel Equipment, and 

Maintenance 

H. Records 

I. Audits and Reviews 

J. Definitions 

Introduction 

* * * * * 

Applicants and power reactor licensees 

subject to the requirements of § 73.55 shall 

comply only with the requirements in section 

VI of this appendix. All other licensees, 

applicants, or certificate holders shall 

comply only with Sections I through V of this 

appendix . 

* * * * * 

VI. Nuclear Power Reactor Training and 

Qualification Plan 

A. General Requirements and Introduction 

1. The licensee shall ensure that all 

individuals who are assigned duties and 

responsibilities required to prevent 

significant core damage and spent fuel 

sabotage, implement the Commissionapproved security plans, licensee response 

strategy, and implementing procedures, meet 

minimum training and qualification 

requirements to ensure each individual 

possesses the knowledge, skills, and abilities 

required to effectively perform the assigned 

duties and responsibilities. 

2. To ensure that those individuals who are 

assigned to perform duties and 

responsibilities required for the 

implementation of the Commission-approved 

security plans, licensee response strategy, 

and implementing procedures are properly 

suited, trained, equipped, and qualified to 

perform their assigned duties and 

responsibilities, the Commission has 

developed minimum training and 

qualification requirements that must be 

implemented through a Commissionapproved training and qualification plan. 

3. The licensee shall establish, maintain, 

and follow a Commission-approved training 

and qualification plan, describing how the 

minimum training and qualification 

requirements set forth in this appendix will 

be met, to include the processes by which all 

members of the security organization, will be 

selected, trained, equipped, tested, and 

qualified. 

4. Each individual assigned to perform 

security program duties and responsibilities 

required to effectively implement the 

Commission-approved security plans, 

licensee protective strategy, and the licensee 

implementing procedures, shall demonstrate 

the knowledge, skills, and abilities required 

to effectively perform the assigned duties and 

responsibilities before the individual is 

assigned the duty or responsibility. 

5. The licensee shall ensure that the 

training and qualification program simulates, 

as closely as practicable, the specific 

conditions under which the individual shall 

be required to perform assigned duties and 

responsibilities. 

6. The licensee may not allow any 

individual to perform any security function, 

assume any security duties or 

responsibilities, or return to security duty, 

until that individual satisfies the training and 

qualification requirements of this appendix 

and the Commission-approved training and 

qualification plan, unless specifically 

authorized by the Commission. 

7. Annual requirements must be scheduled 

at a nominal twelve (12) month periodicity. 

Annual requirements may be completed up 

to three (3) months before or three (3) months 

after the scheduled date. However, the next 

annual training must be scheduled twelve 

(12) months from the previously scheduled 

date rather than the date the training was 

actually completed. 

B. Employment Suitability and Qualification 

1. Suitability. 

a. Before employment, or assignment to the 

security organization, an individual shall: 

(1) Possess a high school diploma or pass 

an equivalent performance examination 

designed to measure basic mathematical, 

language, and reasoning skills, abilities, and 

knowledge required to perform security 

duties and responsibilities; 

(2) Have attained the age of 21 for an armed 

capacity or the age of 18 for an unarmed 

capacity; and 

(3) An unarmed individual assigned to the 

security organization may not have any 

felony convictions that reflect on the 

individual’s reliability. 

b. The qualification of each individual to 

perform assigned duties and responsibilities 

must be documented by a qualified training 

instructor and attested to by a security 

supervisor. 

2. Physical qualifications. 

a. General physical qualifications. 

(1) Individuals whose duties and 

responsibilities are directly associated with 

the effective implementation of the 

Commission-approved security plans, 

licensee protective strategy, and 

implementing procedures, may not have any 

physical conditions that would adversely 

affect their performance. 

(2) Armed and unarmed members of the 

security organization shall be subject to a 

physical examination designed to measure 

the individual’s physical ability to perform 

assigned duties and responsibilities as 

identified in the Commission-approved 

security plans, licensee protective strategy, 

and implementing procedures. 

(3) This physical examination must be 

administered by a licensed health 

professional with final determination being 

made by a licensed physician to verify the 

individual’s physical capability to perform 

assigned duties and responsibilities. 

(4) The licensee shall ensure that both 

armed and unarmed members of the security 

organization who are assigned security duties 

and responsibilities identified in the 

Commission-approved security plans, the 

licensee protective strategy, and 

implementing procedures, meet the following 

minimum physical requirements, as required 

to effectively perform their assigned duties. 


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b. Vision. 

(1) For each individual, distant visual 

acuity in each eye shall be correctable to 20/ 

30 (Snellen or equivalent) in the better eye 

and 20/40 in the other eye with eyeglasses or 

contact lenses. 

(2) Near visual acuity, corrected or 

uncorrected, shall be at least 20/40 in the 

better eye. 

(3) Field of vision must be at least 70 

degrees horizontal meridian in each eye. 

(4) The ability to distinguish red, green, 

and yellow colors is required. 

(5) Loss of vision in one eye is 

disqualifying. 

(6) Glaucoma is disqualifying, unless 

controlled by acceptable medical or surgical 

means, provided that medications used for 

controlling glaucoma do not cause 

undesirable side effects which adversely 

affect the individual’s ability to perform 

assigned security job duties, and provided 

the visual acuity and field of vision 

requirements stated previously are met. 

(7) On-the-job evaluation must be used for 

individuals who exhibit a mild color vision 

defect. 

(8) If uncorrected distance vision is not at 

least 20/40 in the better eye, the individual 

shall carry an extra pair of corrective lenses 

in the event that the primaries are damaged. 

Corrective eyeglasses must be of the safety 

glass type. 

(9) The use of corrective eyeglasses or 

contact lenses may not interfere with an 

individual’s ability to effectively perform 

assigned duties and responsibilities during 

normal or emergency conditions. 

c. Hearing. 

(1) Individuals may not have hearing loss 

in the better ear greater than 30 decibels 

average at 500 Hz, 1,000 Hz, and 2,000 Hz 

with no level greater that 40 decibels at any 

one frequency. 

(2) A hearing aid is acceptable provided 

suitable testing procedures demonstrate 

auditory acuity equivalent to the hearing 

requirement. 

(3) The use of a hearing aid may not 

decrease the effective performance of the 

individual’s assigned security job duties 

during normal or emergency operations. 

d. Existing medical conditions. 

(1) Individuals may not have an 

established medical history or medical 

diagnosis of existing medical conditions 

which could interfere with or prevent the 

individual from effectively performing 

assigned duties and responsibilities. 

(2) If a medical condition exists, the 

individual shall provide medical evidence 

that the condition can be controlled with 

medical treatment in a manner which does 

not adversely affect the individual’s fitnessfor-duty, mental alertness, physical 

condition, or capability to otherwise 

effectively perform assigned duties and 

responsibilities. 

e. Addiction. Individuals may not have any 

established medical history or medical 

diagnosis of habitual alcoholism or drug 

addiction, or, where this type of condition 

has existed, the individual shall provide 

certified documentation of having completed 

a rehabilitation program which would give a 

reasonable degree of confidence that the 

individual would be capable of effectively 

performing assigned duties and 

responsibilities. 

f. Other physical requirements. An 

individual who has been incapacitated due to 

a serious illness, injury, disease, or operation, 

which could interfere with the effective 

performance of assigned duties and 

responsibilities shall, before resumption of 

assigned duties and responsibilities, provide 

medical evidence of recovery and ability to 

perform these duties and responsibilities. 

3. Psychological qualifications. 

a. Armed and unarmed members of the 

security organization shall demonstrate the 

ability to apply good judgment, mental 

alertness, the capability to implement 

instructions and assigned tasks, and possess 

the acuity of senses and ability of expression 

sufficient to permit accurate communication 

by written, spoken, audible, visible, or other 

signals required by assigned duties and 

responsibilities. 

b. A licensed clinical psychologist, 

psychiatrist, or physician trained in part to 

identify emotional instability shall determine 

whether armed members of the security 

organization and alarm station operators in 

addition to meeting the requirement stated in 

paragraph a. of this section, have no 

emotional instability that would interfere 

with the effective performance of assigned 

duties and responsibilities. 

c. A person professionally trained to 

identify emotional instability shall determine 

whether unarmed members of the security 

organization in addition to meeting the 

requirement stated in paragraph a. of this 

section, have no emotional instability that 

would interfere with the effective 

performance of assigned duties and 

responsibilities. 

4. Medical examinations and physical 

fitness qualifications. 

a. Armed members of the security 

organization shall be subject to a medical 

examination by a licensed physician, to 

determine the individual’s fitness to 

participate in physical fitness tests. The 

licensee shall obtain and retain a written 

certification from the licensed physician that 

no medical conditions were disclosed by the 

medical examination that would preclude the 

individual’s ability to participate in the 

physical fitness tests or meet the physical 

fitness attributes or objectives associated 

with assigned duties. 

b. Before assignment, armed members of 

the security organization shall demonstrate 

physical fitness for assigned duties and 

responsibilities by performing a practical 

physical fitness test. 

(1) The physical fitness test must consider 

physical conditions such as strenuous 

activity, physical exertion, levels of stress, 

and exposure to the elements as they pertain 

to each individual’s assigned security job 

duties for both normal and emergency 

operations and must simulate site specific 

conditions under which the individual will 

be required to perform assigned duties and 

responsibilities. 

(2) The licensee shall describe the physical 

fitness test in the Commission-approved 

training and qualification plan. 

(3) The physical fitness test must include 

physical attributes and performance 

objectives which demonstrate the strength, 

endurance, and agility, consistent with 

assigned duties in the Commission-approved 

security plans, licensee protective strategy, 

and implementing procedures during normal 

and emergency conditions. 

(4) The physical fitness qualification of 

each armed member of the security 

organization must be documented by a 

qualified training instructor and attested to 

by a security supervisor. 

5. Physical requalification. 

a. At least annually, armed and unarmed 

members of the security organization shall be 

required to demonstrate the capability to 

meet the physical requirements of this 

appendix and the licensee training and 

qualification plan. 

b. The physical requalification of each 

armed and unarmed member of the security 

organization must be documented by a 

qualified training instructor and attested to 

by a security supervisor. 

C. Duty Training 

1. Duty training and qualification 

requirements. All personnel who are 

assigned to perform any security-related duty 

or responsibility, shall be trained and 

qualified to perform assigned duties and 

responsibilities to ensure that each 

individual possesses the minimum 

knowledge, skills, and abilities required to 

effectively carry out those assigned duties 

and responsibilities. 

a. The areas of knowledge, skills, and 

abilities that are required to perform assigned 

duties and responsibilities must be identified 

in the licensee’s Commission-approved 

training and qualification plan. 

b. Each individual who is assigned duties 

and responsibilities identified in the 

Commission-approved security plans, 

licensee protective strategy, and 

implementing procedures shall, before 

assignment: 

(1) Be trained to perform assigned duties 

and responsibilities in accordance with the 

requirements of this appendix and the 

Commission-approved training and 

qualification plan. 

(2) meet the minimum qualification 

requirements of this appendix and the 

Commission-approved training and 

qualification plan. 

(3) be trained and qualified in the use of 

all equipment or devices required to 

effectively perform all assigned duties and 

responsibilities. 

2. On-the-job training. 

a. The licensee training and qualification 

program must include on-the-job training 

performance standards and criteria to ensure 

that each individual demonstrates the 

requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities 

needed to effectively carry-out assigned 

duties and responsibilities in accordance 

with the Commission-approved security 

plans, licensee protective strategy, and 

implementing procedures, before the 

individual is assigned the duty or 

responsibility. 

b. In addition to meeting the requirement 

stated in paragraph C.2.a., before assignment, 

individuals assigned duties and 

responsibilities to implement the Safeguards 


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Contingency Plan shall complete a minimum 

of 40 hours of on-the-job training to 

demonstrate their ability to effectively apply 

the knowledge, skills, and abilities required 

to effectively perform assigned duties and 

responsibilities in accordance with the 

approved security plans, licensee protective 

strategy, and implementing procedures. Onthe-job training must be documented by a 

qualified training instructor and attested to 

by a security supervisor. 

c. On-the-job training for contingency 

activities and drills must include, but is not 

limited to, hands-on application of 

knowledge, skills, and abilities related to: 

(1) Response team duties. 

(2) Use of force. 

(3) Tactical movement. 

(4) Cover and concealment. 

(5) Defensive-positions. 

(6) Fields-of-fire. 

(7) Re-deployment. 

(8) Communications (primary and 

alternate). 

(9) Use of assigned equipment. 

(10) Target sets. 

(11) Table top drills. 

(12) Command and control duties. 

3. Tactical response team drills and 

exercises. 

a. Licensees shall demonstrate response 

capabilities through a performance 

evaluation program as described in appendix 

C to this part. 

b. The licensee shall conduct drills and 

exercises in accordance with Commissionapproved security plans, licensee protective 

strategy, and implementing procedures. 

(1) Drills and exercises must be designed 

to challenge participants in a manner which 

requires each participant to demonstrate 

requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities. 

(2) Tabletop exercises may be used to 

supplement drills and exercises to 

accomplish desired training goals and 

objectives. 

D. Duty Qualification and Requalification 

1. Qualification demonstration. 

a. Armed and unarmed members of the 

security organization shall demonstrate the 

required knowledge, skills, and abilities to 

carry out assigned duties and responsibilities 

as stated in the Commission-approved 

security plans, licensee protective strategy, 

and implementing procedures. 

b. This demonstration must include an 

annual written exam and hands-on 

performance demonstration. 

(1) Written Exam. The written exams must 

include those elements listed in the 

Commission-approved training and 

qualification plan and shall require a 

minimum score of 80 percent to demonstrate 

an acceptable understanding of assigned 

duties and responsibilities, to include the 

recognition of potential tampering involving 

both safety and security equipment and 

systems. 

(2) Hands-on Performance Demonstration. 

Armed and unarmed members of the security 

organization shall demonstrate hands-on 

performance for assigned duties and 

responsibilities by performing a practical 

hands-on demonstration for required tasks. 

The hands-on demonstration must ensure 

that theory and associated learning objectives 

for each required task are considered and 

each individual demonstrates the knowledge, 

skills, and abilities required to effectively 

perform the task. 

c. Upon request by an authorized 

representative of the Commission, any 

individual assigned to perform any securityrelated duty or responsibility shall 

demonstrate the required knowledge, skills, 

and abilities for each assigned duty and 

responsibility, as stated in the Commissionapproved security plans, licensee protective 

strategy, or implementing procedures. 

2. Requalification. 

a. Armed and unarmed members of the 

security organization shall be requalified at 

least annually in accordance with the 

requirements of this appendix and the 

Commission-approved training and 

qualification plan. 

b. The results of requalification must be 

documented by a qualified training instructor 

and attested by a security supervisor. 

E. Weapons Training 

1. General firearms training. 

a. Armed members of the security 

organization shall be trained and qualified in 

accordance with the requirements of this 

appendix and the Commission-approved 

training and qualification plan. 

b. Firearms instructors. 

(1) Each armed member of the security 

organization shall be trained and qualified by 

a certified firearms instructor for the use and 

maintenance of each assigned weapon to 

include but not limited to, qualification 

scores, assembly, disassembly, cleaning, 

storage, handling, clearing, loading, 

unloading, and reloading, for each assigned 

weapon. 

(2) Firearms instructors shall be certified 

from a nationally or State recognized entity. 

(3) Certification must specify the weapon 

or weapon type(s) for which the instructor is 

qualified to teach. 

(4) Firearms instructors shall be recertified 

in accordance with the standards recognized 

by the certifying national or State entity, but 

in no case shall re-certification exceed three 

(3) years. 

c. Annual firearms familiarization. The 

licensee shall conduct annual firearms 

familiarization training in accordance with 

the Commission-approved training and 

qualification plan. 

d. The Commission-approved training and 

qualification plan shall include, but is not 

limited to, the following areas: 

(1) Mechanical assembly, disassembly, 

range penetration capability of weapon, and 

bull’s-eye firing. 

(2) Weapons cleaning and storage. 

(3) Combat firing, day and night. 

(4) Safe weapons handling. 

(5) Clearing, loading, unloading, and 

reloading. 

(6) When to draw and point a weapon. 

(7) Rapid fire techniques. 

(8) Closed quarter firing. 

(9) Stress firing. 

(10) Zeroing assigned weapon(s) (sight and 

sight/scope adjustments). 

(11) Target engagement. 

(12) Weapon malfunctions. 

(13) Cover and concealment. 

(14) Weapon transition between strong 

(primary) and weak (support) hands. 

(15) Weapon familiarization. 

e. The licensee shall ensure that each 

armed member of the security organization is 

instructed on the use of deadly force as 

authorized by applicable State law. 

f. Armed members of the security 

organization shall participate in weapons 

range activities on a nominal four (4) month 

periodicity. Performance may be conducted 

up to five (5) weeks before to five (5) weeks 

after the scheduled date. The next scheduled 

date must be four (4) months from the 

originally scheduled date. 

F. Weapons Qualification and 

Requalification Program 

1. General weapons qualification 

requirements. 

a. Qualification firing must be 

accomplished in accordance with 

Commission requirements and the 

Commission-approved training and 

qualification plan for assigned weapons. 

b. The results of weapons qualification and 

requalification must be documented and 

retained as a record. 

c. Each individual shall be re-qualified at 

least annually. 

2. Alternate weapons qualification. Upon 

written request by the licensee, the 

Commission may authorize an applicant or 

licensee to provide firearms qualification 

programs other than those listed in this 

appendix if the applicant or licensee 

demonstrates that the alternative firearm 

qualification program satisfies Commission 

requirements. Written requests must provide 

regarding the proposed firearms qualification 

programs and describe how the proposed 

alternative satisfies Commission 

requirements. 

3. Tactical weapons qualification. The 

licensee Training and Qualification Plan 

must describe the firearms used, the firearms 

qualification program, and other tactical 

training required to implement the 

Commission-approved security plans, 

licensee protective strategy, and 

implementing procedures. Licensee 

developed qualification and re-qualification 

courses for each firearm must describe the 

performance criteria needed, to include the 

site specific conditions (such as lighting, 

elevation, fields-of-fire) under which 

assigned personnel shall be required to carryout their assigned duties. 

4. Firearms qualification courses. The 

licensee shall conduct the following 

qualification courses for weapons used: 

a. Annual daylight qualification course. 

Qualifying score must be an accumulated 

total of 70 percent with handgun and 

shotgun, and 80 percent with semi-automatic 

rifle and/or enhanced weapons, of the 

maximum obtainable target score. 

b. Annual night fire qualification course. 

Qualifying score must be an accumulated 

total of 70 percent with handgun and 

shotgun, and 80 percent with semi-automatic 

rifle and/or enhanced weapons of the 

maximum obtainable target score. 

c. Annual tactical qualification course. 

Qualifying score must be an accumulated 


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total of 80 percent of the maximum 

obtainable score. 

5. Courses of fire. 

a. Handgun. 

(1) Armed members of the security 

organization, assigned duties and 

responsibilities involving the use of a 

revolver or semiautomatic pistol shall qualify 

in accordance with standards and scores 

established by a law enforcement course, or 

an equivalent nationally recognized course. 

(2) Qualifying scores must be an 

accumulated total of 70 percent of the 

maximum obtainable target score. 

b. Semiautomatic rifle. 

(1) Armed members of the security 

organization, assigned duties and 

responsibilities involving the use of a 

semiautomatic rifle shall qualify in 

accordance with the standards and scores 

established by a law enforcement course, or 

an equivalent nationally recognized course. 

(2) Qualifying scores must be an 

accumulated total of 80 percent of the 

maximum obtainable score. 

c. Shotgun. 

(1) Armed members of the security 

organization, assigned duties and 

responsibilities involving the use of a 

shotgun shall qualify in accordance with 

standards and scores established by a law 

enforcement course, or an equivalent 

nationally recognized course. 

(2) Qualifying scores must be an 

accumulated total of 70 percent of the 

maximum obtainable target score. 

d. Enhanced weapons. 

(1) Armed members of the security 

organization, assigned duties and 

responsibilities involving the use of any 

weapon or weapons not described above, 

shall qualify in accordance with applicable 

standards and scores established by a law 

enforcement course or an equivalent 

nationally recognized course for these 

weapons. 

(2) Qualifying scores must be an 

accumulated total of 80 percent of the 

maximum obtainable score. 

6. Requalification. 

a. Armed members of the security 

organization shall be re-qualified for each 

assigned weapon at least annually in 

accordance with Commission requirements 

and the Commission-approved training and 

qualification plan. 

b. Firearms requalification must be 

conducted using the courses of fire outlined 

in Paragraph 5 of this section. 

G. Weapons, Personal Equipment, and 

Maintenance 

1. Weapons. 

a. The licensee shall provide armed 

personnel with weapons that are capable of 

performing the function stated in the 

Commission-approved security plans, 

licensee protective strategy, and 

implementing procedures. 

2. Personal equipment. 

a. The licensee shall ensure that each 

individual is equipped or has ready access to 

all personal equipment or devices required 

for the effective implementation of the 

Commission-approved security plans, 

licensee protective strategy, and 

implementing procedures. 

b. The licensee shall provide armed 

security personnel, at a minimum, but is not 

limited to, the following. 

(1) Gas mask, full face. 

(2) Body armor (bullet-resistant vest). 

(3) Ammunition/equipment belt. 

(4) Duress alarms. 

(5) Two-way portable radios (handi-talkie) 

2 channels minimum, 1 operating and 1 

emergency. 

c. Based upon the licensee protective 

strategy and the specific duties and 

responsibilities assigned to each individual, 

the licensee should provide, but is not 

limited to, the following. 

(1) Flashlights and batteries. 

(2) Baton or other non-lethal weapons. 

(3) Handcuffs. 

(4) Binoculars. 

(5) Night vision aids (e.g., goggles, weapons 

sights). 

(6) Hand-fired illumination flares or 

equivalent. 

(7) Tear gas or other non-lethal gas. 

3. Maintenance. 

a. Firearms maintenance program. Each 

licensee shall implement a firearms 

maintenance and accountability program in 

accordance with the Commission regulations 

and the Commission-approved training and 

qualification plan. The program must 

include: 

(1) Semiannual test firing for accuracy and 

functionality. 

(2) Firearms maintenance procedures that 

include cleaning schedules and cleaning 

requirements. 

(3) Program activity documentation. 

(4) Control and Accountability (Weapons 

and ammunition). 

(5) Firearm storage requirements. 

(6) Armorer certification. 

H. Records 

1. The licensee shall retain all reports, 

records, or other documentation required by 

this appendix in accordance with the 

requirements of § 73.55(r). 

2. The licensee shall retain each 

individual’s initial qualification record for 

three (3) years after termination of the 

individual’s employment and shall retain 

each re-qualification record for three (3) years 

after it is superceded. 

3. The licensee shall document data and 

test results from each individual’s suitability, 

physical, and psychological qualification and 

shall retain this documentation as a record 

for three years from the date of obtaining and 

recording these results. 

I. Audits and Reviews 

The licensee shall review the Commissionapproved training and qualification plan in 

accordance with the requirements of 

§ 73.55(n). 

J. Definitions 

Terms defined in parts 50, 70, and 73 of 

this chapter have the same meaning when 

used in this appendix. 

18. In appendix C to part 73, a 

heading for Section I and a new 

introductory paragraph are added after 

the ‘‘Introduction’’ section and before 

the heading ‘‘Contents of the Plan,’’ and 

a new Section II is added at the end of 

the appendix to read as follows: 

Appendix C to Part 73—Licensee 

Safeguards Contingency Plans 

Section I: Safeguards contingency plans. 

Introduction. 

Licensee, applicants, and certificate 

holders, with the exception of those who are 

subject to the requirements of § 73.55 shall 

comply with the requirements of this section 

of this appendix. 

Section II: Nuclear power plant safeguards 

contingency plans. 

(a) Introduction. 

The safeguards contingency plan must 

describe how the criteria set forth in this 

appendix will be satisfied through 

implementation and must provide specific 

goals, objectives and general guidance to 

licensee personnel to facilitate the initiation 

and completion of predetermined and 

exercised responses to threats, up to and 

including the design basis threat described in 

§ 73.1(a)(1). 

Contents of the plan. 

(b) Each safeguards contingency plan must 

include the following twelve (12) categories 

of information: 

(1) Background. 

(2) Generic Planning Base. 

(3) Licensee Planning Base. 

(4) Responsibility Matrix. 

(5) Primary Security Functions. 

(6) Response Capabilities. 

(7) Protective Strategy. 

(8) Integrated Response Plan. 

(9) Threat Warning System. 

(10) Performance Evaluation Program. 

(11) Audits and Reviews. 

(12) Implementing Procedures. 

(c) Background. 

(1) Consistent with the design basis threat 

specified in § 73.1(a)(1), licensees shall 

identify and describe the perceived dangers, 

threats, and incidents against which the 

safeguards contingency plan is designed to 

protect. 

(2) Licensees shall describe the general 

goals and operational concepts underlying 

implementation of the approved safeguards 

contingency plan, to include, but not limited 

to the following: 

(i) The types of incidents covered. 

(ii) The specific goals and objectives to be 

accomplished. 

(iii) The different elements of the onsite 

physical protection program that are used to 

provide at all times the capability to detect, 

assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and 

neutralize threats up to and including the 

design basis threat relative to the perceived 

dangers and incidents described in the 

Commission-approved safeguards 

contingency plan. 

(iv) How the onsite response effort is 

organized and coordinated to ensure that 

licensees capability to prevent significant 

core damage and spent fuel sabotage is 

maintained throughout each type of incident 

covered. 

(v) How the onsite response effort is 

integrated to include specific procedures, 

guidance, and strategies to maintain or 

restore core cooling, containment, and spent 

fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing 


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62872 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

or readily available resources (equipment and 

personnel) that can be effectively 

implemented under the circumstances 

associated with loss of large areas of the plant 

due to explosions or fires. 

(vi) A list of terms and their definitions 

used in describing operational and technical 

aspects of the approved safeguards 

contingency plan. 

(d) Generic planning base. 

(1) Licensees shall define the criteria for 

initiation and termination of responses to 

threats to include the specific decisions, 

actions, and supporting information needed 

to respond to each type of incident covered 

by the approved safeguards contingency 

plan. 

(2) Licensees shall ensure early detection 

of unauthorized activities and shall respond 

to all alarms or other indications of a threat 

condition such as, tampering, bomb threats, 

unauthorized barrier penetration (vehicle or 

personnel), missing or unaccounted for 

nuclear material, escalating civil 

disturbances, imminent threat notification, or 

other threat warnings. 

(3) The safeguards contingency plan must: 

(i) Identify the types of events that signal 

the beginning or initiation of a safeguards 

contingency event. 

(ii) Provide predetermined and structured 

responses to each type of postulated event. 

(iii) Define specific goals and objectives for 

response to each postulated event. 

(iv) Identify the predetermined decisions 

and actions which are required to satisfy the 

written goals and objectives for each 

postulated event. 

(v) Identify the data, criteria, procedures, 

mechanisms and logistical support necessary 

to implement the predetermined decisions 

and actions. 

(vi) Identify the individuals, groups, or 

organizational entities responsible for each 

predetermined decision and action. 

(vii) Define the command-and-control 

structure required to coordinate each 

individual, group, or organizational entity 

carrying out predetermined actions. 

(viii) Describe how effectiveness will be 

measured and demonstrated to include the 

effectiveness of the capability to detect, 

assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and 

neutralize threats up to and including the 

design basis threat. 

(e) Licensee planning base. 

Licensees shall describe the site-specific 

factors affecting contingency planning and 

shall develop plans for actions to be taken in 

response to postulated threats. The following 

topics must be addressed: 

(1) Organizational Structure. The 

safeguards contingency plan must describe 

the organization’s chain of command and 

delegation of authority during safeguards 

contingencies, to include a description of 

how command-and-control functions will be 

coordinated and maintained. 

(2) Physical layout. 

(i) The safeguards contingency plan must 

include a site description, to include maps 

and drawings, of the physical structures and 

their locations. 

(A) Site Description. The site description 

must address the site location in relation to 

nearby towns, transportation routes (e.g., rail, 

water, air, roads), pipelines, hazardous 

material facilities, onsite independent spent 

fuel storage installations, and pertinent 

environmental features that may have an 

effect upon coordination of response 

operations. 

(B) Approaches. Particular emphasis must 

be placed on main and alternate entry routes 

for law-enforcement or other offsite support 

agencies and the location of control points 

for marshaling and coordinating response 

activities. 

(ii) Licensees with co-located Independent 

Spent Fuel Storage Installations shall 

describe response procedures for both the 

operating reactor and the Independent Spent 

Fuel Storage Installation to include how 

onsite and offsite responders will be 

coordinated and used for incidents occurring 

outside the protected area. 

(3) Safeguards Systems Hardware. The 

safeguards contingency plan must contain a 

description of the physical security and 

material accounting system hardware that 

influence how the licensee will respond to an 

event. 

(4) Law enforcement assistance. 

(i) The safeguards contingency plan must 

contain a listing of available local, State, and 

Federal law enforcement agencies and a 

general description of response capabilities, 

to include number of personnel, types of 

weapons, and estimated response time lines. 

(ii) The safeguards contingency plan must 

contain a discussion of working agreements 

with offsite law enforcement agencies to 

include criteria for response, command and 

control protocols, and communication 

procedures. 

(5) Policy constraints and assumptions. 

The safeguards contingency plan must 

contain a discussion of State laws, local 

ordinances, and company policies and 

practices that govern licensee response to 

incidents and must include, but is not 

limited to, the following. 

(i) Use of deadly force. 

(ii) Recall of off-duty employees. 

(iii) Site jurisdictional boundaries. 

(iv) Use of enhanced weapons, if 

applicable. 

(6) Administrative and logistical 

considerations. The safeguards contingency 

plan must contain a description of licensee 

practices which influence how the licensee 

responds to a threat to include, but not 

limited to, a description of the procedures 

that will be used for ensuring that all 

equipment needed to effect a successful 

response will be readily accessible, in good 

working order, and in sufficient supply to 

provide redundancy in case of equipment 

failure. 

(f) Responsibility matrix. 

(1) The safeguards contingency plan must 

describe the organizational entities that are 

responsible for each decision and action 

associated with responses to threats. 

(i) For each identified initiating event, a 

tabulation must be made for each response 

depicting the assignment of responsibilities 

for all decisions and actions to be taken. 

(ii) The tabulations described in the 

responsibility matrix must provide an overall 

description of response actions and 

interrelationships. 

(2) Licensees shall ensure that duties and 

responsibilities required by the approved 

safeguards contingency plan do not conflict 

with or prevent the execution of other site 

emergency plans. 

(3) Licensees shall identify and discuss 

potential areas of conflict between site plans 

in the integrated response plan required by 

Section II(b)(8) of this appendix. 

(4) Licensees shall address safety/security 

interface issues in accordance with the 

requirements of § 73.58 to ensure activities 

by the security organization, maintenance, 

operations, and other onsite entities are 

coordinated in a manner that precludes 

conflict during both normal and emergency 

conditions. 

(g) Primary security functions. 

(1) Licensees shall establish and maintain 

at all times, the capability to detect, assess, 

and respond to all threats to the facility up 

to and including the design basis threat. 

(2) To facilitate initial response to a threat, 

licensees shall ensure the capability to 

observe all areas of the facility in a manner 

that ensures early detection of unauthorized 

activities and limits exposure of responding 

personnel to possible attack. 

(3) Licensees shall generally describe how 

the primary security functions are integrated 

to provide defense-in-depth and are 

maintained despite the loss of any single 

element of the onsite physical protection 

program. 

(4) Licensees description must begin with 

physical protection measures implemented 

in the outermost facility perimeter, and must 

move inward through those measures 

implemented to protect vital and target set 

equipment. 

(h) Response capabilities. 

(1) Licensees shall establish and maintain 

at all times the capability to intercept, 

challenge, delay, and neutralize threats up to 

and including the design basis threat. 

(2) Licensees shall identify the personnel, 

equipment, and resources necessary to 

perform the actions required to prevent 

significant core damage and spent fuel 

sabotage in response to postulated events. 

(3) Licensees shall ensure that 

predetermined actions can be completed 

under the postulated conditions. 

(4) Licensees shall provide at all times an 

armed response team comprised of trained 

and qualified personnel who possess the 

knowledge, skills, abilities, and equipment 

required to implement the Commissionapproved safeguards contingency plan and 

site protective strategy. The plan must 

include a description of the armed response 

team including the following: 

(i) The authorized minimum number of 

armed responders, available at all times 

inside the protected area. 

(ii) The authorized minimum number of 

armed security officers, available onsite at all 

times. 

(5) The total number of armed responders 

and armed security officers must be 

documented in the approved security plans 

and documented as a component of the 

protective strategy. 

(6) Licensees shall ensure that individuals 

assigned duties and responsibilities to 

implement the Safeguards Contingency Plan 


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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 62873 

are trained and qualified in accordance with 

appendix B of this part and the Commissionapproved security plans. 

(i) Protective strategy. 

(1) Licensees shall develop, maintain, and 

implement a written protective strategy that 

describes the deployment of the armed 

response team relative to the general goals, 

operational concepts, performance objectives, 

and specific actions to be accomplished by 

each individual in response to postulated 

events. 

(2) The protective strategy must: 

(i) Be designed to prevent significant core 

damage and spent fuel sabotage through the 

coordinated implementation of specific 

actions and strategies required to intercept, 

challenge, delay, and neutralize threats up to 

and including the design basis threat of 

radiological sabotage. 

(ii) Describe and consider site specific 

conditions, to include but not limited to, 

facility layout, the location of target set 

equipment and elements, target set 

equipment that is in maintenance or out of 

service, and the potential effects that 

unauthorized electronic access to safety and 

security systems may have on the protective 

strategy capability to prevent significant core 

damage and spent fuel sabotage. 

(iii) Identify predetermined actions and 

time lines for the deployment of armed 

personnel. 

(iv) Provide bullet resisting protected 

positions with appropriate fields of fire. 

(v) Limit exposure of security personnel to 

possible attack. 

(3) Licensees shall provide a command and 

control structure, to include response by offsite law enforcement agencies, which ensures 

that decisions and actions are coordinated 

and communicated in a timely manner and 

that facilitates response in accordance with 

the integrated response plan. 

(j) Integrated Response Plan. 

(1) Licensees shall document, maintain, 

and implement an Integrated Response Plan 

which must identify, describe, and 

coordinate actions to be taken by licensee 

personnel and offsite agencies during a 

contingency event or other emergency 

situation. 

(2) The Integrated Response Plan must: 

(i) Be designed to integrate and coordinate 

all actions to be taken in response to an 

emergency event in a manner that will ensure 

that each site plan and procedure can be 

successfully implemented without conflict 

from other plans and procedures. 

(ii) Include specific procedures, guidance, 

and strategies to maintain or restore core 

cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool 

cooling capabilities using existing or readily 

available resources (equipment and 

personnel) that can be effectively 

implemented under the circumstances 

associated with loss of large areas of the plant 

due to explosions or fires. 

(iii) Ensure that onsite staffing levels, 

facilities, and equipment required for 

response to any identified event, are readily 

available and capable of fulfilling their 

intended purpose. 

(iv) Provide emergency action levels to 

ensure that threats result in at least a 

notification of unusual event and implement 

procedures for the assignment of a 

predetermined classification to specific 

events. 

(v) Include specific procedures, guidance, 

and strategies describing cyber incident 

response and recovery. 

(3) Licensees shall: 

(i) Reconfirm on a annual basis, liaison 

with local, State, and Federal law 

enforcement agencies, established in 

accordance with § 73.55(k)(8), to include 

communication protocols, command and 

control structure, marshaling locations, 

estimated response times, and anticipated 

response capabilities and specialized 

equipment. 

(ii) Provide required training to include 

simulator training for the operations response 

to security events (e.g., loss of ultimate heat 

sink) for nuclear power reactor personnel in 

accordance with site procedures to ensure 

the operational readiness of personnel 

commensurate with assigned duties and 

responsibilities. 

(iii) Periodically train personnel in 

accordance with site procedures to respond 

to a hostage or duress situation. 

(iv) Determine the possible effects that 

nearby hazardous material facilities may 

have upon site response plans and modify 

response plans, procedures, and equipment 

as necessary. 

(v) Ensure that identified actions are 

achievable under postulated conditions. 

(k) Threat warning system. 

(1) Licensees shall implement a ‘‘Threat 

warning system’’ which identifies specific 

graduated protective measures and actions to 

be taken to increase licensee preparedness 

against a heightened or imminent threat of 

attack. 

(2) Licensees shall ensure that the specific 

protective measures and actions identified 

for each threat level are consistent with the 

Commission-approved safeguards 

contingency plan, and other site security, and 

emergency plans and procedures. 

(3) Upon notification by an authorized 

representative of the Commission, licensees 

shall implement the specific protective 

measures assigned to the threat level 

indicated by the Commission representative. 

(l) Performance Evaluation Program. 

(1) Licensees shall document and maintain 

a Performance Evaluation Program that 

describes how the licensee will demonstrate 

and assess the effectiveness of the onsite 

physical protection program to prevent 

significant core damage and spent fuel 

sabotage, and to include the capability of 

armed personnel to carry out their assigned 

duties and responsibilities. 

(2) The Performance Evaluation Program 

must include procedures for the conduct of 

quarterly drills and annual force-on-force 

exercises that are designed to demonstrate 

the effectiveness of the licensee’s capability 

to detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay, 

and neutralize a simulated threat. 

(i) The scope of drills conducted for 

training purposes must be determined by the 

licensee as needed, and can be limited to 

specific portions of the site protective 

strategy. 

(ii) Drills, exercises, and other training 

must be conducted under conditions that 

simulate as closely as practical the site 

specific conditions under which each 

member will, or may be, required to perform 

assigned duties and responsibilities. 

(iii) Licensees shall document each 

performance evaluation to include, but not 

limited to, scenarios, participants, and 

critiques. 

(iv) Each drill and exercise must include a 

documented post exercise critique in which 

participants identify failures, deficiencies, or 

other findings in performance, plans, 

equipment, or strategies. 

(v) Licensees shall enter all findings, 

deficiencies, and failures identified by each 

performance evaluation into the corrective 

action program to ensure that timely 

corrections are made to the onsite physical 

protection program and necessary changes 

are made to the approved security plans, 

licensee protective strategy, and 

implementing procedures. 

(vi) Licensees shall protect all findings, 

deficiencies, and failures relative to the 

effectiveness of the onsite physical protection 

program in accordance with the requirements 

of § 73.21. 

(3) For the purpose of drills and exercises, 

licensees shall: 

(i) Use no more than the number of armed 

personnel specified in the approved security 

plans to demonstrate effectiveness. 

(ii) Minimize the number and effects of 

artificialities associated with drills and 

exercises. 

(iii) Implement the use of systems or 

methodologies that simulate the realities of 

armed engagement through visual and 

audible means, and reflects the capabilities of 

armed personnel to neutralize a target 

through the use of firearms during drills and 

exercises. 

(iv) Ensure that each scenario used is 

capable of challenging the ability of armed 

personnel to perform assigned duties and 

implement required elements of the 

protective strategy. 

(4) The Performance Evaluation Program 

must be designed to ensure that: 

(i) Each member of each shift who is 

assigned duties and responsibilities required 

to implement the approved safeguards 

contingency plan and licensee protective 

strategy participates in at least one (1) drill 

on a quarterly basis and one (1) force on force 

exercise on an annual basis. 

(ii) The mock adversary force replicates, as 

closely as possible, adversary characteristics 

and capabilities in the design basis threat 

described in § 73.1(a)(1), and is capable of 

exploiting and challenging the licensee 

protective strategy, personnel, command and 

control, and implementing procedures. 

(iii) Protective strategies are evaluated and 

challenged through tabletop demonstrations. 

(iv) Drill and exercise controllers are 

trained and qualified to ensure each 

controller has the requisite knowledge and 

experience to control and evaluate exercises. 

(v) Drills and exercises are conducted 

safely in accordance with site safety plans. 

(5) Members of the mock adversary force 

used for NRC observed exercises shall be 

independent of both the security program 

management and personnel who have direct 

responsibility for implementation of the 


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62874 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules 

1Commercial (secure and non-secure) telephone 

numbers of the NRC Operations Center are specified 

in appendix A of this part. 

security program, including contractors, to 

avoid the possibility for a conflict-of-interest. 

(6) Scenarios. 

(i) Licensees shall develop and document 

multiple scenarios for use in conducting 

quarterly drills and annual force-on-force 

exercises. 

(ii) Licensee scenarios must be designed to 

test and challenge any component or 

combination of components, of the onsite 

physical protection program and protective 

strategy. 

(iii) Each scenario must use a unique target 

set or target sets, and varying combinations 

of adversary equipment, strategies, and 

tactics, to ensure that the combination of all 

scenarios challenges every component of the 

onsite physical protection program and 

protective strategy to include, but not limited 

to, equipment, implementing procedures, 

and personnel. 

(iv) Licensees shall ensure that scenarios 

used for required drills and exercises are not 

repeated within any twelve (12) month 

period for drills and three (3) years for 

exercises. 

(m) Records, audits, and reviews. 

(1) Licensees shall review and audit the 

Commission-approved safeguards 

contingency plan in accordance with the 

requirements § 73.55(n) of this part. 

(2) The licensee shall make necessary 

adjustments to the Commission-approved 

safeguards contingency plan to ensure 

successful implementation of Commission 

regulations and the site protective strategy. 

(3) The safeguards contingency plan review 

must include an audit of implementing 

procedures and practices, the site protective 

strategy, and response agreements made by 

local, State, and Federal law enforcement 

authorities. 

(4) Licensees shall retain all reports, 

records, or other documentation required by 

this appendix in accordance with the 

requirements of § 73.55(r). 

(n) Implementing procedures. 

(1) Licensees shall establish and maintain 

written implementing procedures that 

provide specific guidance and operating 

details that identify the actions to be taken 

and decisions to be made by each member of 

the security organization who is assigned 

duties and responsibilities required for the 

effective implementation of the Commissionapproved security plans and the site 

protective strategy. 

(2) Licensees shall ensure that 

implementing procedures accurately reflect 

the information contained in the 

Responsibility Matrix required by this 

appendix, the Commission-approved security 

plans, the Integrated Response Plan, and 

other site plans. 

(3) Implementing procedures need not be 

submitted to the Commission for approval, 

but are subject to inspection. 

19. 10 CFR part 73, appendix G, is 

revised to read as follows: 

Appendix G to Part 73—Reportable 

Safeguards Events 

Under the provisions of § 73.71(a), (d), and 

(f) of this part, licensees subject to the 

provisions of § 73.55 of this part shall report 

or record, as appropriate, the following 

safeguards events under paragraphs I, II, III, 

and IV of this appendix. Under the 

provisions of § 73.71(b), (c), and (f) of this 

part, licensees subject to the provisions of 

§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.60, and 73.67 of 

this part shall report or record, as 

appropriate, the following safeguards events 

under paragraphs II and IV of this appendix. 

Licensees shall make such reports to the 

Commission under the provisions of § 73.71 

of this part. 

I. Events to be reported as soon as possible, 

but no later than 15 minutes after discovery, 

followed by a written report within sixty (60) 

days. 

(a) The initiation of a security response 

consistent with a licensee’s physical security 

plan, safeguards contingency plan, or 

defensive strategy based on actual or 

imminent threat against a nuclear power 

plant. 

(b) The licensee is not required to report 

security responses initiated as a result of 

information communicated to the licensee by 

the Commission, such as the threat warning 

system addressed in appendix C to this part. 

II. Events to be reported within one (1) 

hour of discovery, followed by a written 

report within sixty (60) days. 

(a) Any event in which there is reason to 

believe that a person has committed or 

caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or 

has made a threat to commit or cause: 

(1) A theft or unlawful diversion of special 

nuclear material; or 

(2) Significant physical damage to any 

NRC-licensed power reactor or facility 

possessing strategic special nuclear material 

or to carrier equipment transporting nuclear 

fuel or spent nuclear fuel, or to the nuclear 

fuel or spent nuclear fuel facility which is 

possessed by a carrier; or 

(3) Interruption of normal operation of any 

NRC licensed nuclear power reactor through 

the unauthorized use of or tampering with its 

components, or controls including the 

security system. 

(b) An actual or attempted entry of an 

unauthorized person into any area or 

transport for which the licensee is required 

by Commission regulations to control access. 

(c) Any failure, degradation, or the 

discovered vulnerability in a safeguard 

system that could allow unauthorized or 

undetected access to any area or transport for 

which the licensee is required by 

Commission regulations to control access and 

for which compensatory measures have not 

been employed. 

(d) The actual or attempted introduction of 

contraband into any area or transport for 

which the licensee is required by 

Commission regulations to control access. 

III. Events to be reported within four (4) 

hours of discovery. No written followup 

report is required. 

(a) Any other information received by the 

licensee of suspicious surveillance activities 

or attempts at access, including: 

(1) Any security-related incident involving 

suspicious activity that may be indicative of 

potential pre-operational surveillance, 

reconnaissance, or intelligence-gathering 

activities directed against the facility. Such 

activity may include, but is not limited to, 

attempted surveillance or reconnaissance 

activity, elicitation of information from 

security or other site personnel relating to the 

security or safe operation of the plant, or 

challenges to security systems (e.g., failure to 

stop for security checkpoints, possible tests 

of security response and security screening 

equipment, or suspicious entry of watercraft 

into posted off-limits areas). 

(2) Any security-related incident involving 

suspicious aircraft overflight activity. 

Commercial or military aircraft activity 

considered routine by the licensee is not 

required to be reported. 

(3) Incidents resulting in the notification of 

local, State or national law enforcement, or 

law enforcement response to the site not 

included in paragraphs I or II of this 

appendix; 

(b) The unauthorized use of or tampering 

with the components or controls, including 

the security system, of nuclear power 

reactors. 

(c) Follow-up communications regarding 

events reported under paragraph III of this 

appendix will be completed through the NRC 

threat assessment process via the NRC 

Operations Center.1

IV. Events to be recorded within 24 hours 

of discovery in the safeguards event log. 

(a) Any failure, degradation, or discovered 

vulnerability in a safeguards system that 

could have allowed unauthorized or 

undetected access to any area or transport in 

which the licensee is required by 

Commission regulations to control access had 

compensatory measures not been established. 

(b) Any other threatened, attempted, or 

committed act not previously defined in this 

appendix with the potential for reducing the 

effectiveness of the physical protection 

program below that described in a licensee 

physical security or safeguards contingency 

plan, or the actual condition of such 

reduction in effectiveness. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day 

of October 2006. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook, 

Secretary of the Commission. 

[FR Doc. 06–8678 Filed 10–25–06; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 


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