Report to Congressional Requesters

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

December 2001 NUCLEAR WASTE

Technical, Schedule,

and Cost

Uncertainties of the

Yucca Mountain

Repository Project

GAO-02-191
Page i GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

It May Be Premature for DOE to Make a Site Recommendation 7

DOE Is Unlikely to Open a Repository in 2010 as Planned 16

Conclusions 22

Recommendations for Executive Action 23

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24

Scope and Methodology 27

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 29

Appendix II Comments From the Department of Energy 31

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 35

GAO Contact 35

Acknowledgments 35

Figure

Figure 1: Comparison of Statutory Site Approval Process With

 DOE’s Projected Schedule 16

Abbreviations

DOE Department of Energy

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

GAO General Accounting Office

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OCRWM Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

USGS U.S. Geological Survey

Contents
Page 1 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

December 21, 2001

The Honorable Harry Reid

Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation,

 Infrastructure, and Nuclear Safety

Committee on Environment and Public Works

United States Senate

The Honorable Shelley Berkley

House of Representatives

As reflected in the administration’s energy policy, there is renewed

interest in expanding nuclear power as a source of electricity. At the same

time, the nation currently does not have a facility to permanently dispose

of the highly radioactive spent (used) fuel from existing commercial

nuclear power plants. In lieu of such a facility, plant owners are currently

holding about 40,000 metric tons of spent fuel in temporary storage at 72

plant sites in 36 states. In addition, the Department of Energy (DOE)

estimates that it has over 100 million gallons of highly radioactive waste

and 2,500 metric tons of spent fuel from the development of nuclear

weapons and from research activities in temporary storage. Because these

wastes contain radioactive elements that remain active for hundreds of

thousands of years, the permanent isolation of the wastes is critical for

safeguarding public health, cleaning up DOE’s nuclear facilities, and

providing a reasonable basis for increasing the number of nuclear power

plants.

As required by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended in 1987,

DOE has been studying one site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, to determine

its suitability for disposing of highly radioactive wastes in a mined

geologic repository. If the Secretary of Energy decides to recommend this

site to the President, the recommendation would begin a statutory process

for the approval or disapproval of the site that will involve the President,

the state of Nevada, and the Congress. In addition, a subsequent

presidential site recommendation would trigger statutory time frames for

action by the state, the Congress, DOE, and the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC). If the site is recommended and approved, DOE must

apply to NRC for a license to construct a repository. If the site is not

recommended and approved for a license application, or if NRC denied a

license to construct a repository, the administration and the Congress

would have to consider other options for the long-term management of

existing and future nuclear wastes.

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

Site investigation activities at Yucca Mountain include studies of the

physical characteristics of the mountain and potential waste containers.

The investigation also includes the development and use of mathematical

models to measure the probability that various combinations of natural

and engineered (man-made) features of a repository could safely contain

wastes for 10,000 years. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has

set health and safety standards for a repository at Yucca Mountain that

require a high probability of safety for at least that period of time. DOE’s

criteria for determining if the site is suitable for a repository and the NRC’s

licensing regulations are consistent with these standards. DOE has

designated the nuclear waste program, including the site investigation, as a

“major” program that is subject to senior management’s attention and to

its agencywide guidelines for managing such programs and projects. The

guidelines require the development of a cost and schedule baseline, a

system for managing changes to the baseline, and independent cost and

schedule reviews. DOE is using a management contractor to carry out the

work on the program. DOE’s management contractor develops and

maintains the baseline, but senior DOE managers must approve significant

changes to cost or schedule estimates. In February 2001, DOE hired

Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC (Bechtel), to manage the program and

required the contractor to reassess the remaining technical work and the

estimated schedule and cost to complete this work.

In 1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

ruled that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act obligated DOE to start disposing

of the spent fuel from commercial nuclear power plants no later than

January 31, 1998. In 1998, because DOE could not meet this deadline, the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held in another case that

plant owners are entitled to damages. One of the major issues in the

determination of damages is the schedule under which DOE will begin

accepting the spent fuel. DOE does not expect to complete the sequence

of site approval, licensing, and construction of enough of the repository

facilities at Yucca Mountain to open it until at least 2010. Courts in these 2

cases and 16 cases brought by other utilities are currently assessing the

amount of damages that DOE owes the plant owners for delaying the

disposal of their wastes by the estimated 12-year delay. Estimates of the

potential damages vary widely, from DOE’s estimate of about $2 billion to

the nuclear industry’s estimate of $50 billion.

Given these circumstances and questions raised about DOE’s investigation

of the Yucca Mountain site, you asked us to determine the extent to which
Page 3 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

• DOE has completed the work necessary to support a site recommendation

for the development of a repository at Yucca Mountain and

• DOE’s goal of opening a repository at Yucca Mountain in 2010 is

reasonable.

Recommending to the President that the Yucca Mountain site is suitable

for a repository is within the discretion of the Secretary of Energy but, for

the reasons noted below, may be premature. Once the President considers

the site qualified for a license application and recommends the site to the

Congress, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires DOE to submit a license

application to NRC within about 5 to 8 months.1

 On the basis of

information we reviewed, DOE will not be able to submit an acceptable

application to NRC2

 within the express statutory time frames for several

years because it will take that long to resolve many technical issues.

Specifically, DOE is currently gathering and analyzing technical

information required to satisfy 293 agreements that it made with NRC.

According to NRC, completing this ongoing technical work is essential for

it to accept a license application from DOE. Some of these agreements, for

example, provide for the additional study of how water would flow

through the repository area to the underlying groundwater and the

durability of waste containers to last for thousands of years. Many of the

technical issues that were the subject of these agreements have also been

of concern to the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, which was

established by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to review the technical and

scientific validity of DOE’s investigation of Yucca Mountain. Bechtel’s

September 2001 detailed reassessment of the work required to submit a

license application, including the 293 agreements with NRC and assuming

expected funding levels, concluded that DOE would be in a position to

submit a license application to NRC in January 2006, or about 4 years from

now. Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and DOE’s siting guidelines,

 1

 If the President makes a recommendation to the Congress, Nevada has 60 days to

disapprove the site. If disapproved, the Congress has 90 days of continuous session to

enact legislation overriding a disapproval. If the Congress overrides the state’s

disapproval, the Secretary is required to submit a license application to NRC within 90 days

after the site recommendation is effective. These time frames provide about 150 to 240

days, or about 5 to 8 months, from the time the President recommends the site until DOE

submits a license application.

2

 The acceptance of a license application is not the same as approving an application. A

decision to approve or disapprove any application would be made by NRC following

extensive review and testing.

Results in Brief
Page 4 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

while a site recommendation and a license application are separate

processes, DOE will need to use essentially the same data for both.

On the basis of the information we reviewed, DOE is unlikely to achieve its

goal of opening a repository at Yucca Mountain by 2010 and currently does

not have a reliable estimate of when, and at what cost, such a repository

can be opened. Since DOE stopped using the cost and schedule baseline to

manage the site investigation in 1997, the repository program’s baseline

has not reflected changes in the program. For example, when the

program’s fiscal year 2000 appropriation was $57.8 million less than

requested, DOE deferred some planned technical work without adjusting

the baseline to reflect this action. As a result, it was not clearly visible

when, and at what cost, the site investigation would be completed and a

license application submitted to NRC. Bechtel, in its September 2001

detailed reassessment, concluded, on the basis of expected program

funding, that DOE could submit the application in January 2006 at a total

cost of $5.5 billion. This date is approximately 4 years later, and the

$5.5 billion figure is about $1.4 billion more than DOE’s projection in 1997.

Using Bechtel’s estimate, sufficient time would not be available for DOE to

obtain a license from NRC and construct enough of the repository to open

it in 2010. Therefore, DOE is exploring alternative approaches to opening a

repository in 2010, such as developing surface facilities for storing waste

at the site until sufficient underground disposal facilities can be

constructed.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Energy fully consider the

timing of the statutory process before he decides when to make a site

recommendation to the President. We are also making recommendations

to DOE to better manage the nuclear waste program and to prepare

estimates of the schedule and costs for opening a repository at Yucca

Mountain that are tied to a new baseline for the program.

DOE disagreed that it may be premature for the Secretary of Energy to

make a site recommendation to the President on the grounds that we did

not understand the statutory and regulatory requirements for a site

recommendation. (See app. II.) We agree that the Secretary has the

discretion to make such a recommendation at this time; however, we

question the prudence and practicality of making such a recommendation

at this time, given the express statutory time frames for a license

application and the significant amount of work remaining to be done for

NRC to accept a license application from DOE. Our conclusion is based

on the relationship between a site recommendation and DOE’s readiness

to submit an acceptable license application to NRC, as set out in law and
Page 5 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

DOE’s siting guidelines. Although we have clarified our discussion of the

statutory and regulatory requirements for site recommendation, approval,

and licensing, we continue to believe that the Secretary of Energy should

consider the timing of this statutory process as he decides when to make a

site recommendation to the President. Therefore, while we have modified

the language, we have not changed the intent of our recommendation on

this matter. (See p. 24 for our evaluation of DOE’s comments.)

Recognizing the critical need to address the issue of nuclear waste

disposal, the Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 to

establish a comprehensive policy and program for the safe, permanent

disposal of commercial spent fuel and other highly radioactive wastes in

one or more mined geologic repositories. In the act, the Congress stated

that federal efforts to devise a permanent solution for disposing of

radioactive waste had been inadequate. The act charged DOE with

(1) establishing criteria for the recommendation of sites for repositories;

(2) “characterizing” (investigating) three sites to determine each site’s

suitability for a repository; (3) recommending one suitable site to the

President who, if he considers the site is qualified for a license application,

submits a recommendation of such site to the Congress; and (4) upon

approval of a recommended site, seeking a license from NRC to construct

and operate a repository at the approved site. The act created the Office

of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management within DOE to manage its

nuclear waste program. When the act was passed, it was expected that a

repository could be operational in 1998. Amendments to the act in 1987

directed DOE to investigate only the Yucca Mountain site. These

amendments also established the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board

(the Board). The Board’s mission is to review the technical and scientific

validity of DOE’s activities associated with investigating the site and

packaging and transporting wastes, and to report its findings and

recommendations to the Congress and DOE at least twice each year. The

act does not require DOE to implement the Board’s recommendations.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act also set out important and complementary

roles for other federal agencies. It required EPA to establish health and

safety standards for the disposal of these wastes in repositories. EPA

issued the standards for the Yucca Mountain site in June 2001.3

 The act

 3

 The Energy Policy Act of 1992 required EPA to establish specific health and safety

standards for a repository at Yucca Mountain.

Background
Page 6 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

also made NRC responsible for licensing and regulating repositories to

ensure their compliance with EPA’s standard. If the Yucca Mountain site is

recommended to the President and approved, upon accepting a license

application from DOE, NRC has, according to the act, 3 to 4 years to

review the application and decide whether to issue a license to construct,

and then to operate, a repository at the site. The act also required that,

before the Secretary of Energy may recommend the site to the President,

he or she must obtain NRC’s preliminary comments on the sufficiency of

DOE’s site investigation for the purpose of a license application. NRC

provided these comments in writing on November 13, 2001. From the

beginning of the formal investigation of Yucca Mountain, therefore, NRC

has been reviewing DOE’s investigation activities, concentrating on the

scientific and technical issues that need to be understood and clarified so

that DOE will have adequate information for a license application. Finally,

the Board’s principal charge is to evaluate the technical and scientific

validity of DOE’s investigation of Yucca Mountain to ensure that the

investigation is technically sound and scientifically credible. The Board

must report to the Congress and the Secretary of Energy at least twice a

year on issues surrounding the site investigation. Each of the Board’s 11

members is appointed by the President from a list of candidates

recommended by the National Academy of Sciences. Board members

serve part-time and are assisted by a permanent staff.

In addition to the investigation of Yucca Mountain, the nuclear waste

program includes preparations for eventually accepting and transporting

spent fuel and other highly radioactive wastes from storage sites. Upon

receipt of wastes at the site, DOE would put the wastes in metal

containers and put the loaded containers in the repository. Both the

natural features of the site and the design and materials of the waste

containers and other engineered components of the repository system

would contribute to restricting the release of radioactive materials from

the repository over the 10,000-year period required by EPA’s health and

safety standards.

If DOE determines that the site is suitable for the development of a

repository, according to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the Secretary may

then recommend the site to the President at least 30 days after notifying

the state of Nevada of the impending recommendation. However, before

the Secretary may recommend the site to the President, the act requires

that he hold local public hearings to inform the residents of the area and

receive their comments on a possible site recommendation. DOE held the

public hearings from May 2001 to December 2001. In addition, according

to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the Secretary must prepare a
Page 7 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

comprehensive statement of the basis for the site’s recommendation that

includes, among other things, the following:

• NRC’s preliminary comments on the sufficiency of the site investigation

for a license application.

• Descriptions of the proposed repository and waste form or packaging and

a discussion of the information obtained from the site investigation.

• An environmental impact statement prepared for the site along with the

comments on the statement by the Department of the Interior, the Council

for Environmental Quality, the EPA, and NRC.

• The views and comments of Nevada’s governor and legislature and the

Secretary’s response to them.

If, after receiving a site recommendation from the Secretary of Energy, the

President considers the Yucca Mountain site qualified for an application

for construction authorization (a license) for a repository, then the

President shall submit a recommendation of the site to the Congress. The

Nuclear Waste Policy Act does not specify a time frame in which the

President must act. However, the President’s recommendation, if made, is

automatically approved after 60 days unless Nevada’s governor and

legislature notify the Congress of their disapproval of the site. In that

event, the site would not be approved unless the Congress enacted, within

90 days of continuous session, legislation overriding the state’s

disapproval. If the site is recommended and approved, the act requires the

Secretary to submit a license application to NRC not later than 90 days

after the effective date of the site’s approval. NRC is required to issue or

deny a license not later than 3 years after receiving a license application,

unless it extends this period by not more than 1 year by reporting its

reasons for doing so to the Secretary and the Congress.

Although within his discretion, it may be premature for the Secretary of

Energy to make a site recommendation in the near future because DOE is

currently not prepared to submit an acceptable license application to NRC

within the statutory limits that would take effect if the President

recommended the site to the Congress within the next several years. DOE

has entered into almost 300 agreements with NRC to gather and/or analyze

additional technical information in preparation for a license application.

DOE is also continuing to address technical issues raised by the Board. In

September 2001, Bechtel completed a detailed reassessment of the plan

for completing the necessary technical work for DOE and proposed

January 2006 as the date when DOE would be ready to submit an

acceptable license application to NRC. DOE has not accepted this estimate

It May Be Premature

for DOE to Make a

Site Recommendation
Page 8 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

because, according to program officials, it would extend the license

application date too far into the future. Instead, DOE is considering

accepting only the planned work for fiscal year 2002 and asking the

contractor to replan the work remaining to be completed after that fiscal

year until the submission of a license application to NRC. Under the

Nuclear Waste Policy Act and DOE’s guidelines, while a site

recommendation and a license application are separate processes, DOE

will need to use essentially the same data for both.4 Also, the act states

that the recommendation that the President would make to the Congress

is that he considers the site qualified for an application to NRC for a

license. The President’s recommendation also triggers an express

statutory time frame that requires DOE to submit a license application to

NRC within about 5 to 8 months. As a result, we believe that DOE should

consider these factors in deciding when to make a site recommendation to

the President. On the basis of the information we reviewed, DOE will not

be able to submit an acceptable application to NRC within the express

statutory time frames for several years because it will take that long to

resolve many technical issues.

Over the last 2 years, staff of DOE and NRC negotiated 293 agreements

covering specific pieces of additional technical work that DOE agreed to

perform as a part of preparing a license application that NRC would

accept. Such agreements address areas of study within the program where

NRC’s staff determined that DOE needs to collect more scientific data

and/or improve its technical assessment of the data. According to NRC’s

tracking system for the 293 agreements, as of November 30, 2001, NRC had

received and is reviewing the information related to 47 of these

agreements and DOE had completed work on another 15 of the

agreements to NRC’s satisfaction. Many of the technical issues that were

the subject of the 293 agreements between DOE and NRC have also been

of concern to the Board since it began reporting on the Yucca Mountain

project in 1990. According to officials from NRC’s waste management

division, these issues generally relate to uncertainties about three aspects

of the long-term performance of the proposed repository: (1) the expected

lifetime of engineered barriers, particularly the waste containers; (2) the

physical properties of the Yucca Mountain site; and (3) the supporting

 4

 See General Guidelines for the Recommendation of Sites for Nuclear Waste

Repositories; Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines (preamble), 66 Fed. Reg. 57298,

57322 (Nov. 14, 2001).

DOE Lacks Information for

a License Application
Page 9 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

information for the mathematical models used to evaluate the

performance of the planned repository at the site.

The uncertainties related to engineered barriers revolve largely around the

longevity of the waste containers that would be used to isolate the wastes.

DOE currently expects that these containers would be constructed with a

nickel-chromium alloy that would isolate the wastes from the environment

for more than 10,000 years. Minimizing uncertainties about the container

materials and the predicted performance of the waste containers over this

long time period is especially critical because DOE’s estimates of the

repository system’s performance depend heavily on the waste containers,

in addition to the natural features of the site, to meet NRC’s licensing

regulations and EPA’s health and safety standards. As part of its

agreements with NRC, DOE will continue its research on the expected rate

of corrosion of the container material and the anticipated effects of

corrosion on the performance of the repository system. In addition, DOE

formed a peer review panel to address uncertainties about how materials

for waste containers would be expected to perform over time in the

repository.5

 A September 2001 interim report by the panel found no

evidence thus far to rule out the use of the proposed container materials

but noted that significant work is needed to substantiate the technical

basis for predicting the stability of these materials. The report also stated

that the uncertainty about the containers’ long-term performance probably

could be reduced substantially through further experiments and analysis.

The uncertainties related to the physical characteristics of the site involve

a wide variety of issues. According to DOE officials, while some of these

issues have been and are continuing to be studied by DOE, remaining

uncertainties include

• the faulting and fracturing of the repository rock over time;

• the flow of water through the heated portion of the repository;

• the flow of water through the saturated and unsaturated zones of the

repository under natural (prerepository) conditions;6

• the stability of the repository under natural conditions, heated conditions,

and conditions involving seismic events;

 5

 The peer review comprised recognized experts from industry and academia.

6

 The saturated zone is that area beneath the repository that is saturated with groundwater.

The unsaturated zone is above the water table.
Page 10 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

• the movement of radioactive material through the repository in the event

of a release of this material;

• the effect of volcanic activity on the repository; and

• the combined effects of heat, water, and chemical processes in and around

the tunnels where the waste containers would be placed.

According to officials in DOE’s repository project office, the amount of

current scientific uncertainty within each of these areas varies. For

example, the flow of water under natural conditions through the area

where the repository would be located is relatively well understood. In

contrast, there is much more current uncertainty about how the

combination of heat, water, and chemical processes caused by the

presence of nuclear waste in the repository would affect the flow of water

through the repository.

The NRC staff’s concerns over the supporting information for the

mathematical models that DOE would use as its primary tool for assessing

the performance of the repository revolved primarily around validating the

models and verifying the information used in the models. Performance

assessment is an analytical method that relies on computers to operate

mathematical models to assess the performance of the repository against

EPA’s health and safety standards, NRC’s licensing regulations, and DOE’s

guidelines for determining if the Yucca Mountain site is suitable for a

repository. DOE uses the data collected during site characterization

activities to model how a repository system, comprising both natural and

engineered features, would perform at the Yucca Mountain site. Some of

DOE’s mathematical models describe the behavior of individual physical

and chemical processes, such as how quickly water might travel from the

surface to the repository. DOE then links the results of these individual

models together into a computer model representing the performance of

the overall repository system. DOE then uses this model, called a

“performance assessment model,” to estimate the release of radioactivity

from a repository under a range of conditions and over thousands of years.

The model also enables DOE to forecast the dose of radiation to

hypothetical persons living in the vicinity of the repository and compare

them with EPA’s health and safety standards. DOE’s agreements with NRC

are centered on validating the models—presenting information to provide

confidence that the models are valid for their intended use—and verifying

the information that has been collected during the site investigation and

used in these models.

In addition to the NRC staff’s concerns about DOE’s models, NRC’s

Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste has raised concerns about the
Page 11 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

adequacy of the performance assessment model that DOE used to support

the information discussed in the technical documents it has issued to

support a site recommendation.7

 In a September 18, 2001, letter to the

chairman of NRC, the committee concluded that the model did not provide

a basis for estimating performance and did not inspire confidence in the

modeling process. The committee’s conclusions were based on its concern

that the modeling

• is guided by an inconsistent set of assumptions, including a mixture of

conservative and nonconservative bounding assumptions, that do not

represent realistic conditions and

• relies on many assumption-based computations and analyses that do not

support or link the assumptions with available evidence.

According to the director of DOE’s repository project office, the additional

work surrounding the 293 agreements with NRC’s staff is an insignificant

addition to the extensive amount of technical work already completed.

Moreover, this official does not expect that completing the additional

technical work will change DOE’s current performance assessment of a

repository at Yucca Mountain. Also, in commenting on a draft of our

report, DOE stated that it has compiled an enormous body of scientific

and technical work over the last 2 decades including some 600 papers

cited in one of the recently published reports. The Department also cited

a substantial body of analytic literature it has published in recent years.8

From NRC’s perspective, however, the agreements provided the basis for

it to give DOE, as required by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, its preliminary

comments on the sufficiency of DOE’s investigation of the Yucca Mountain

site for inclusion in a future license application. In a November 13, 2001,

letter to the Under Secretary of Energy, the Chairman of the NRC

commented that

“[a]lthough significant additional work is needed prior to the submission of a possible

license application, we believe that agreements reached between DOE and NRC staff

 7

 The committee, established by NRC to advise it on nuclear waste regulatory issues,

comprises experts in several disciplines, including risk assessment.

8

 DOE mentioned its Viability Assessment (1998), Preliminary Site Suitability Evaluation

(2001), Supplemental Science and Performance Analyses (2001), Draft Environmental

Impact Statement (1999), and Supplement to the draft EIS (2001).
Page 12 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

regarding the collection of additional information provide the basis for concluding that

development of an acceptable license application is achievable.”

The NRC Chairman’s letter also pointed out that NRC’s Advisory

Committee on Nuclear Waste noted, similar to the NRC staff, that

substantial additional work by DOE is needed prior to its submission of a

license application.

Since its first report to the Congress and Secretary of Energy in 1990, the

Board has consistently raised issues and concerns over DOE’s

understanding of the expected lifetime of the waste containers, the

significance of the uncertainties involved in the modeling of the scientific

data, and the need for an evaluation and comparison of a repository design

having a higher temperature with a design having a lower temperature.

The Board continues to reiterate these concerns in correspondence to

DOE’s director of the nuclear waste program and in its reports to the

Congress and the Secretary of Energy. For example, in an August 2000

letter to the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, House Committee on

Commerce, the Board reported that the technical basis for DOE’s longterm projections of repository performance had “critical weaknesses.” The

Board explained that some of the large uncertainties about the proposed

repository’s performance over thousands of years—including the

estimated corrosion rates of waste containers and predicted behavior of

the geologic system—were greater at the higher temperatures that would

result from DOE’s design of the repository. At a January 2001 public

meeting with DOE, the Board told DOE that to determine whether the

Yucca Mountain site is suitable for use as a repository, DOE must focus its

attention on four priority issues: (1) quantifying the uncertainties in the

models used to estimate the repository’s performance; (2) gaining a

further understanding of the processes related to the corrosion of waste

containers; (3) evaluating and comparing a repository design having a

higher temperature with a design that has a lower temperature; and

(4) developing evidence other than performance assessment modeling to

support the estimates of repository performance.

In October 2001, the Board reported that, despite DOE’s progress in

responding to the Board’s concerns, gaps in data and analyses make

evaluation of DOE’s technical bases on whether to recommend the site

more difficult. The Board provided several examples of these gaps. First,

the Board noted that DOE has not yet completed a comparison, promised

in a May 30, 2001, letter to the Board, between a high-temperature and a

low-temperature repository design. The Board explained that a design

with a lower temperature has the potential to reduce the level of
Page 13 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

uncertainty in DOE’s modeling results. Second, DOE does not appear to

have implemented the Board’s suggestion, made in two previous letters to

DOE, to examine more closely the contribution that each piece of natural

and engineered barriers makes to the repository’s overall performance.

Third, the Board observed that DOE had not presented a clear and

persuasive rationale for going forward with a site recommendation before

resolving the important issue of the potential consequences to the

repository from volcanic activity. Last, the Board asked that, if the

analyses referred to in the letter would not be available before DOE’s

decision on whether to recommend the site to the President, DOE provide

its rationale explaining why the analyses are not important for site

recommendation as well as any plans for subsequently conducting the

work if the site were recommended and approved for repository

development.

Recent reports to DOE by the U.S. Geological Survey and an international

peer review team provide further insights into DOE’s site investigation. An

October 2001 letter from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), which has

long played an active role in the site investigation, stated that the scientific

work performed to date supports a decision to recommend the site for

development as a repository. However, USGS qualified its position by

noting that it was commenting only within the scope of its earth science

expertise and was neutral regarding other information the Secretary might

consider. USGS also pointed out that additional studies need to be

performed even after a site recommendation.

In November 2001 an international peer review panel released an

executive summary of the results of its review of DOE’s performance

assessment modeling for a potential site recommendation. The panel,

which performed the review at DOE’s request, was organized by the

Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development and the International Atomic Energy Agency of the United

Nations. The panel did not comment on the results of DOE’s modeling

efforts but found that DOE’s methodology is soundly based and

implemented in a competent manner. Overall, the panel stated, DOE’s

approach provides an adequate basis for supporting a statement on likely

compliance within the regulatory period of 10,000 years and for a site

recommendation decision. The panel also qualified its findings, however,

by stating that the findings were based on a brief review and not an

in-depth analysis. The panel also called for a number of improvements in

DOE’s approach to performance assessment, including demonstrating an

understanding of the behavior of the overall repository system rather than
Page 14 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

focusing on the numerical results of the assessment, and identifying and

treating all types of uncertainty in the modeling.

As recently as May 2001, DOE projected that it could submit a license

application to NRC in 2003. It now appears, however, that DOE may not

complete all of the additional technical work that it has agreed to do to

prepare an acceptable license application until January 2006. In September

2001, Bechtel completed, at DOE’s direction, a detailed reassessment in an

effort to reestablish a cost and schedule baseline. Bechtel estimated that

DOE could complete the outstanding technical work agreed to with NRC

and submit a license application in January 2006. This estimate was based

on guidance from DOE that, in part, directed the contractor to assume

annual funding for the nuclear waste program of $410 million in fiscal year

2002, $455 million in fiscal year 2003, and $465 million in fiscal year 2004

and thereafter. DOE has not accepted this estimate because, according to

program officials, the estimate would extend the date for submitting a

license application too far into the future. Instead, DOE is now considering

accepting only the fiscal year 2002 portion of Bechtel’s detailed work plan

and requesting Bechtel to prepare another work plan for fiscal year 2003

through submission of a license application.

Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and DOE’s site suitability guidelines,

while the site recommendation and a license application are separate

processes, DOE will need to use essentially the same data for both.

Further, site recommendation and license application are connected by

law with specific timeframes that require DOE to submit a license

application to NRC within about 5 to 8 months once the President

considers the site qualified for a license application and makes a site

recommendation to the Congress.

Under the act, DOE’s site characterization activities are to provide

information necessary to evaluate the Yucca Mountain site’s suitability for

submitting a license application to NRC for placing a repository at the site.

In implementing the act, DOE’s guidelines provide that the site will be

suitable as a waste repository if the site is likely to meet the radiation

protection standards that NRC would use to reach a licensing decision on

the proposed repository. Thus, as stated in the preamble (introduction) to

DOE’s guidelines, DOE expects to use essentially the same data for the

site recommendation and the license application.

In addition, the act specifies that, having received a site recommendation

from the Secretary, the President shall submit a recommendation of the

Essentially the Same

Information Is Needed for

a Site Recommendation

and a License Application
Page 15 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

site to the Congress if the President considers the site qualified for a

license application. Under the process laid out in the Nuclear Waste

Policy Act, once the Secretary makes a site recommendation, there is no

time limit under which the President must act on the Secretary’s

recommendation. However, once the President makes a recommendation

to the Congress that it approve the site, specific statutory time frames are

triggered for the next steps in the process. Figure 1 shows the

approximate statutory time needed between a site recommendation and

submission of a license application and the additional time needed for

DOE to meet the conditions for an acceptable license application. For

illustrative purposes, figure 1 assumes that the Secretary recommends the

site to the President on January 30, 2002 and the President recommends

the site to the Congress 6 months later on July 30, 2002. The figure also

assumes that Nevada disapproves the site but that the Congress overrides

the state’s disapproval. As shown in the figure, Nevada has 60 days to

disapprove the site, and if disapproved, the Congress has 90 days (of

continuous session) in which to enact legislation overriding the state’s

disapproval. If the Congress overrides the state’s disapproval and the site

designation takes effect, the next step is for the Secretary to submit a

license application to NRC within 90 days after the site designation is

effective. On the basis of Bechtel’s latest program reassessment, DOE

would be in a position to submit a license application to NRC in January

2006.

These statutory time frames provide about 150 to 240 days, or about 5 to

8 months, from the time the President makes a recommendation to DOE’s

submittal of a license application. DOE, however, will not be ready to file

an acceptable application with NRC for several years.9

 (See fig. 1.)

Therefore, the Secretary of Energy should consider the timing of this

statutory process as he decides when to make a site recommendation to

the President.

 9

 In the congressional conference report on fiscal year 2002 appropriations for energy and

water development, the conferees stated that they expect DOE to deliver the final site

recommendation report and environmental impact statement to the Congress by Feb. 28,

2002. They recognized that certain scientific and engineering work is directly related to the

site’s recommendation and to resolving technical concerns of NRC and the Board, and that

“such work should not automatically terminate upon submission of the site

recommendation.” H.R.Rep. No. 107-258, at 122 (2001).
Page 16 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

Figure 1: Comparison of Statutory Site Approval Process With DOE’s Projected Schedule

a No prescribed statutory time frame.

b 90 calendar days of continuous session of the Congress.

DOE, in a document that would support a potential site recommendation,

states that it may be able to open a repository at Yucca Mountain in 2010.

This expectation is predicated on the submission of a license application

to NRC in 2003, receipt of the construction authorization in 2006, and

construction of enough surface and underground facilities to begin putting

wastes into the repository in 2010. However, according to Bechtel’s

September 2001 detailed reassessment of the nuclear waste program, in

which it proposed to reestablish a baseline for the program, a more

realistic date for submitting the license application may be January 2006.

Reestablishing the program’s baseline is necessary because DOE stopped

using the baseline to manage the program in March 1997. Since then,

program officials have used revised estimates for the license application

date in various internal and external reports, but none of these changes

were approved as required and the program’s cost and schedule baseline

has never been revised to reflect these changes. As a result, DOE does not

have a baseline estimate of the program’s schedule and cost that is based

on all the work that it expects to complete through the submission of a

license application. Because of uncertainty over when DOE may be able to

open the repository, the Department is exploring alternatives that might

still permit it to begin accepting commercial spent fuel in 2010.

DOE Is Unlikely to

Open a Repository in

2010 as Planned
Page 17 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

In its most recent report on the program’s estimated cost, DOE states that

it expects to submit the application to NRC in 2003.10 This date reflects a

delay in the license application milestone date last approved by DOE in

March 1997 that targeted March 2002 for submitting a license application.

The 2003 date was not formally approved by DOE’s senior managers or

incorporated into the program’s cost and schedule baseline, as required by

the management procedures that were in effect for the program. At least

three extensions for the license application date have been proposed, but

none of the three proposals have been approved as required.

DOE designates some of its programs and projects, such as the nuclear

waste program, to receive special attention from senior DOE managers

because of the complexity or estimated costs of the programs and

projects. DOE’s guidance for managing these designated programs and

projects requires, among other things, that senior managers establish a

baseline for managing the program or project. The baseline describes the

program’s mission—in this case, the safe disposal of highly radioactive

waste in a geologic repository—and the expected technical requirements,

schedule, and cost to complete the program. Procedures for controlling

changes to an approved baseline are designed to ensure that program

managers consider the expected effects of adding, deleting, or modifying

technical work, as well as the effects of unanticipated events, such as

funding shortfalls, on the project’s mission and baseline. In this way,

alternative courses of action can be assessed on the basis of each action’s

potential effect on the baseline. DOE’s procedures for managing the

nuclear waste program require that program managers revise the baseline,

as appropriate, to reflect any significant changes to the program.

After March 1997, according to DOE officials, they did not always follow

these control procedures to account for proposed changes to the

program’s baseline, including the changes proposed to extend the date for

license application. According to these same officials, they stopped

following the control procedures because the Secretary of Energy did not

approve proposed extensions to the license application milestone. As a

result, the official baseline did not accurately reflect the program’s cost

and schedule to complete the remaining work necessary to submit a

license application.

 10 See Analysis of the Total System Life Cycle Cost of the Civilian Radioactive Waste

Management Program (DOE/RW-0533, May 2001).

DOE’s Current License

Application Milestone Date

Is Not Supported by the

Program’s Baseline
Page 18 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

In November 1999, the Yucca Mountain site investigation office proposed

extending the license application milestone date by 10 months, from

March to December 2002, to compensate for a $57.8 million drop in

funding for fiscal year 2000. According to the specific management

procedures that DOE adopted for the nuclear waste program, a proposed

extension in the license application milestone required the approval of

both the Director of the nuclear waste program and the Secretary of

Energy. Neither of these officials approved this proposed change nor was

the baseline revised to reflect this change even though the Director

subsequently began reporting the December 2002 date in quarterly

performance reports to the Deputy Secretary of Energy.

Less than a year later, in September 2000, the site investigation office once

again proposed an extension to the license application milestone to July

2003 because of reduced funding and added technical work. Then, in

February 2001, the site investigation office proposed another extension in

the milestone, to December 2003. As with the November 1999 extension

request, neither the Director of the nuclear waste program nor the

Secretary of Energy approved either of the latter two requests, nor was

either extension date for the license application milestone incorporated

into the baseline for the program. Furthermore, as with the November

1999 proposed change, DOE began to use the unapproved milestone dates

in both internal and external reports and communications. For example,

the Director used the unapproved 2003 date for submitting a license

application twice in congressional testimony in May 2001. Later, in a

September 2001 memorandum to the DOE Under Secretary discussing the

goals of the nuclear waste program through January 2005, the Director

established 2004 as his goal for submitting a license application.

Because senior managers did not approve these proposed changes for

incorporation into the baseline for the program, program managers did not

adjust the program’s cost and schedule baseline. By not accounting for

these and other changes to the program’s technical work, milestone dates,

and estimated costs in the program’s baseline since March 1997, DOE has

not had baseline estimates of all of the technical work that it expected to
Page 19 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

complete through submission of a license application and the estimated

schedule and cost to complete this work.11

When Bechtel was contracted to manage the nuclear waste program, one

of its first assignments was to document the remaining technical work that

had to be completed to support the submission of a license application

and to estimate the time and cost to complete this work. The contractor’s

revised, unofficial baseline for the program shows that it will take until

January 2006 to complete essential technical work and submit an

acceptable license application. DOE also estimated that completing the

remaining technical work would add about $1.4 billion to the cumulative

cost of the program, bringing the total cost of the Yucca Mountain

project’s portion of the nuclear waste program to $5.5 billion.12 As noted

above, DOE has not accepted Bechtel’s proposed new baseline extending

out until January 2006. Instead, DOE is considering accepting, at present,

only that portion of the baseline that Bechtel proposed to complete in

fiscal year 2002.

An extension of the license application date to 2006 would almost

certainly preclude DOE from achieving its long-standing goal of opening a

repository in 2010. According to DOE’s May 2001 report on the program’s

estimated cost, after submitting a license application in 2003, DOE

estimates that it could receive an authorization to construct the repository

in 2006 and complete the construction of enough surface and underground

facilities to open the repository in 2010, or 7 years after submitting the

license application. This 7-year estimate from submittal of the license

application to the initial construction and operation of the repository

assumes that NRC would grant an authorization to construct the facility in

3 years, followed by 4 years of construction. Assuming these same

estimates of time, submitting a license application in January 2006 would

extend the opening date for the repository until about 2013.

 11 In 1998 and 2000, independent cost and schedule reviews of the program were performed

by DOE contractors. On the latter review, the contractor concluded that DOE’s schedule

for licensing, constructing, and opening the repository by 2010 was optimistic by about

2 years and that DOE’s estimate of the total cost of the program over its 100-plus-year

lifetime—$58 billion (2000 dollars)—was understated by about $3 billion.

12 DOE estimated that the program cost $4.1 billion, on the basis of year-of-expenditure

dollars from the program’s inception in 1983 through March 2002. The $5.5 billion estimate

for the license application is based on year-of-expenditure dollars from 1983 through

January 2006.

Extension of License

Application Date Will

Likely Postpone 2010

Repository Goal
Page 20 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

Furthermore, opening the repository in 2013 may be questionable for

several reasons. First, a repository at Yucca Mountain would be a first-ofa-kind facility, meaning that any schedule projections may be optimistic.

DOE has deferred its original target date for opening a repository from

1998 to 2003 to 2010. Second, although the Nuclear Waste Policy Act states

that NRC has 3 years to decide on a construction license, a fourth year

may be added if NRC certifies that it is necessary. Third, the 4-year time

period for construction that DOE’s current schedule allows from the

issuance of a construction authorization to the opening of the repository

may be too short. For example, a contractor hired by DOE to

independently review the estimated costs and schedule for the nuclear

waste program reported that the 4-year construction period was too

optimistic and recommended that the construction phase be extended by a

year-and-a-half.13 Bechtel anticipates a 5-year period of construction

between the receipt of a construction authorization from NRC to the

opening of the repository. Thus, on the bases of a 4-year licensing period

and a 5-year period for initial construction, the repository might not be

ready to open until about 2015 if DOE does not apply for a license until

January 2006.

Finally, these simple projections do not account for any other factors that

could adversely affect this 7- to 9-year schedule for licensing, constructing,

and opening the repository. Annual appropriations for the program in

recent years have been less than $400 million. In contrast, according to

DOE, it needs between $750 million to $1.5 billion in annual appropriations

during most of the 7- to 9-year licensing and construction period in order

to open the repository on that schedule. In its August 2001 report on

alternative means for financing and managing the program, DOE stated

that unless the program’s funding is increased, the budget might become

the “determining factor” whether DOE will be able to accept wastes in

2010.14

 13 See Independent Cost Estimate Review of the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

Program, 2001 Total System Life Cycle Cost (Jan. 2001).

14 See Alternative Means of Financing and Managing the Civilian Radioactive Waste

Management Program (DOE/RW-0546, Aug. 2001).
Page 21 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

Because of the uncertainty of achieving the 2010 goal for opening the

Yucca Mountain repository, DOE is examining alternative approaches that

would permit it to meet the goal. In May 2001, DOE released a report on

potential options for constructing and operating the repository.15 It is also

sponsoring a National Research Council study on possible approaches to

developing a repository in stages over a longer duration.

DOE’s May report evaluates a range of approaches to developing and

operating the repository system and strategies for implementing these

approaches. For example, to reduce the uncertainties of receiving

substantially higher appropriations needed to open the repository as

planned, DOE examined approaches that might permit it to begin

accepting wastes at the repository site in 2010 while spreading out the

construction of repository facilities over a longer time period. The study

recommended developing the repository on a modular basis, separating

the rate of accepting wastes at the repository site from the rate of waste

emplacement in the underground disposal areas by relying on the surface

storage of received wastes until the capacity to move wastes into the

repository has been increased. For example, relatively modest-sized

surface facilities to handle wastes could be expanded later to handle larger

volumes of waste. Such a modular approach, according to the study

results, would permit partial construction and limited waste emplacement

in the repository, at lower than earlier estimated annual costs, in advance

of the more costly construction of the facility as originally planned. Also,

by implementing a modular approach, DOE would be capable of accepting

wastes at the repository earlier than if it constructed the repository

described in documents, such as the Science and Engineering Report that

the Secretary would use to support a site recommendation.

In addition, DOE has contracted with the National Research Council to

provide recommendations on design and operating strategies for

developing a geologic repository in stages, which is to include reviewing

DOE’s modular approach. The Council is addressing such issues as the

• technical, policy, and societal objectives and risks for developing a staged

repository;

 15 See CRWMS Modular Design/Construction and Operation Options Report

(DOE/OCRWM, TDR-CRW-MD-000002, Rev. 03, May 2001).

DOE Is Reviewing

Alternative Ways to Accept

Wastes in 2010
Page 22 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

• effects of developing a staged repository on the safety and security of the

facility and the effects on the cost and public acceptance of such a facility;

and

• strategies for developing a staged system including the design,

construction, operation, and closing of such a facility.

The Council expects to publish interim and final reports on the study in

about March 2002 and December 2002, respectively.

In part, DOE’s desire to meet the 2010 goal is linked to the court decisions

that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as implemented by DOE’s contracts

with owners of commercial spent fuel, obligated DOE to begin accepting

spent fuel from contract holders not later than January 31, 1998, or be held

liable for damages. Courts are currently assessing the amount of damages

that DOE must pay to holders of spent fuel disposal contracts. Estimates

of potential damages for the estimated 12-year delay from 1998 to 2010

range widely from the Department’s estimate of $2 billion to $3 billion to

the nuclear industry’s estimate of at least $50 billion. The damage

estimates are based in part on the expectation that DOE would begin

accepting spent fuel from contract holders in 2010. The actual damages

could be higher or lower, depending on when DOE begins accepting spent

fuel.

In addition to studying the Yucca Mountain site, DOE is taking the other

steps, such as public hearings and obtaining NRC’s sufficiency comments,

that are required for the Secretary to make a site recommendation in the

near future. Making a site recommendation at this time, however, may be

premature. Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and DOE’s siting

guidelines, a site recommendation and a license application will need to be

based on essentially the same data. Furthermore, the act lays out a

process with specific time frames that requires DOE to submit a license

application to NRC within about 5 to 8 months after the President makes a

site recommendation to the Congress. DOE’s contractor estimates that it

will not have all of the additional information that NRC has said will be

needed for an acceptable license application for another 4 years. Waiting

until DOE is closer to submitting a license application for the additional

information would put DOE in a position to be able to submit a license

application that is acceptable to NRC within the time frames set out in the

law, and to be able to better respond to questions and challenges that may

emanate from the statutory review process subsequent to the President’s

recommendation.

Conclusions
Page 23 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

Another benefit of waiting for the additional technical information is that

the repository’s design and development schedule described in the

documents that support a site recommendation may not describe the

facilities that DOE would actually develop. These documents generally

describe surface and underground facilities that DOE would design and

build on a schedule permitting it to open the repository in 2010. This

schedule, however, is unrealistic if one assumes that DOE’s existing

prelicensing and construction time frames continue to be valid. This

uncertainty is compounded by questions about whether DOE can obtain

the increases in annual funding required to meet its schedule. On the other

hand, a compelling incentive exists to open the repository in 2010 because

DOE is liable for damages, in amounts not yet determined by the courts,

for not beginning to accept utilities’ spent fuel by 1998. The damage

amounts will in part be based on when DOE can begin to accept and

deliver spent fuel to the repository. For these reasons, DOE is exploring

alternative approaches to developing a repository, such as initially storing

spent fuel at the repository site before constructing underground disposal

facilities that could still enable it to accept spent fuel by 2010. Thus,

deferring a site recommendation until DOE has substantially completed

the remaining technical work needed for an acceptable license application

would also enable DOE to complete its consideration of alternative

approaches to developing a repository at Yucca Mountain. DOE could then

ensure that the site recommendation is based on the approach that the

Department intends to follow. This would enable DOE to develop the

estimated schedule to design and build the preferred approach and

estimate its cost, including the annual funding requirements, as part of the

information on which to make a site recommendation.

DOE needs to reestablish a baseline for the nuclear waste program that

accounts for all of the outstanding technical work needed to prepare an

acceptable license application and the estimated schedule and cost to

achieve this milestone. In conjunction with reestablishing a baseline for

the program, DOE needs to resume using the baseline as a tool for

managing the program, in accordance with the Department’s policies and

procedures for managing major projects.

To ensure that DOE will be prepared to submit an acceptable license

application within the timeframes set out in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act,

the Secretary of Energy should consider (1) deferring a site

recommendation until it can meet the express statutory time frames that

are triggered by a site recommendation by the President to the Congress

and (2) including the results of DOE’s ongoing technical work for NRC and

Recommendations for

Executive Action
Page 24 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

the results of analyses of alternative approaches to the proposed

repository in the Secretary’s comprehensive statement of the basis for a

site recommendation.

To improve the management of the nuclear waste program and to provide

the Congress and the public with accurate information on the repository

program, we further recommend that the Secretary of Energy

• reestablish the baseline for the nuclear waste program through the

submission of a license application, including incorporating the remaining

technical work required to submit the application and the estimated cost

and schedule to complete this work, and

• follow the Department’s requirements for managing major programs and

projects, including a formal change control procedure.

We provided DOE with a draft of this report for review and comment. DOE

disagreed with our report, contending that we did not understand the

relevant statutory and regulatory requirements related to a site

recommendation. Bechtel, DOE’s management contractor, also provided

us with a letter asserting unspecified factual and legal inaccuracies in our

draft report; however, the company added that it would provide specific

comments through DOE. While it was not clear from DOE’s comments

which ones had come from Bechtel, we are responding to all comments

received on the following pages. According to DOE, our misunderstanding

of the requirements resulted in a contention in the draft report that it is

premature for DOE to make a site recommendation because all the

technical work for license application is not complete. (DOE’s comments

are in app. II.) We agree that the Secretary has the discretion to make such

a recommendation at this time; however, we question the prudence and

practicality of making such a recommendation at this time, given the

express statutory time frames for license application and the significant

amount of work remaining to be done for NRC to accept a license

application from DOE. Our conclusion is based on the relationship

between a site recommendation and DOE’s readiness to submit an

acceptable license application to NRC, as set out in DOE’s siting guidelines

and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The preamble to DOE’s siting

guidelines states that DOE expects to use essentially the same data for a

site recommendation and a license application. Also, the Nuclear Waste

Policy Act states that a presidential site recommendation is to be made if

the President considers the site qualified for a license application and sets

out a time frame that could be as short as 5 to 8 months from a

presidential site recommendation to a license application. This includes

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 25 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

the requirement that the Secretary of Energy submit a license application

not later than 90 days following congressional approval of the site. Thus,

the statutory time frame is decidedly shorter than the 4-year estimate

between site recommendation and license application that was recently

proposed by DOE’s management contractor.

DOE also pointed out the difference between the decision at hand—

determining whether a potential site is licensable—and the licensing by

NRC of a repository facility at the site. The latter decision would come at

the end of a 3- to 4-year licensing proceeding. In contrast, our report

addresses the relationship between a site recommendation and the

submission of the license application.

DOE said that our draft report incorrectly states that DOE’s siting

guidelines require the Secretary, in making a site recommendation, to

determine if the site currently complies with NRC’s licensing requirements

rather than determining if the site is “likely” to meet NRC‘s radiation

protection standards. We agree that the standard in DOE’s guidelines is

“likely” and have added this language to the report. The report accurately

states the relationship between a site recommendation and a license

application under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the siting guidelines.

In addition, DOE stated that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act charges the

Secretary with establishing criteria for determining the suitability of a site

for a repository and that the Department’s standards (siting guidelines) are

the most important legally relevant guidance on the question of whether

the Department is ready to make a site recommendation. Our report, DOE

said, ignores these standards and instead asserts a standard of our own

devising. Contrary to DOE's assertion, we did not evaluate DOE's

performance against a standard we devised. We used the Nuclear Waste

Policy Act and DOE’s standards—that the site is likely to meet NRC's

radiation protection standards—for a site suitability recommendation.

Moreover, a presidential site recommendation triggers statutory time

frames that require DOE to submit a license application to NRC within

about 5 to 8 months. Thus, our conclusion regarding whether DOE should

make a site recommendation relies on both the relationship between the

standards for site recommendation and license application and the

statutory time frames. While recommending to the President that the

Yucca Mountain site is suitable for a repository is within the discretion of

the Secretary of Energy, such a recommendation may be premature

because of the large number of technical issues remaining to be resolved

before an acceptable license application can be filed with NRC.
Page 26 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

DOE also stated that NRC’s licensing process is an iterative and

continuous process; even the license application is not expected to be “set

in concrete.” We agree with DOE’s statement. The important point,

however, is that DOE and NRC have made 293 specific agreements on

technical work that DOE will need to complete and incorporate into a

license application that would be acceptable to NRC. This also assumes

that no new issues surface that would need to be addressed.

DOE said that our draft report emphasized the inventory of issues between

DOE and NRC but completely ignored the technical work that has been

done over the past 2 decades and the technical groups who have said that

DOE’s data are sufficient for a site recommendation. We have added

information to the report recognizing the body of work that DOE has

completed to date and the views of other technical parties mentioned by

DOE. As discussed above, however, the central issue is not whether

technical parties are of the opinion that DOE has enough information for a

site recommendation but the relationship, in statute and regulation,

between the site recommendation and the submission of an acceptable

license application.

DOE also said our report gives short shrift to NRC’s recent “sufficiency

letter” that, according to DOE, memorializes NRC’s conclusion that the

data and analyses existing and under way likely will be sufficient for a

license application. Instead, DOE added, our report over-relies on the

views of an NRC advisory committee. Our characterization of NRC’s

sufficiency comments is accurate. NRC did state that the agreements

between DOE’s and NRC’s staffs regarding the collection of additional

information provide the basis for concluding that the development of an

acceptable license application is achievable; however, NRC conditioned

this comment on DOE’s successful completion of “significant” additional

work prior to a license application. Also, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act

does not refer to work “underway,” but uses the phrase “seem to be

sufficient.” Finally, we included the views of NRC’s advisory committee

because NRC’s letter included these views.

In addition, DOE stated that our report prominently emphasizes the views

of the Board as requiring the Department to accommodate them before a

site determination is made. DOE added that the report does not

emphasize that the substance of the Board’s criticisms is directed to

licensing—not site recommendation. Contrary to DOE’s assertion, we did

not assert that DOE is “required” to accommodate the Board. We

discussed the Board’s continuing concerns as outlined in its October 2001

letter to DOE. In that letter, the Board noted that gaps in data and
Page 27 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

analyses make the evaluation of DOE’s technical bases on whether to

recommend the site—not apply for a license—more difficult. Also, we

gave the Board’s current concerns about DOE’s site characterization work,

as summarized in its October letter, prominent mention in our report

because of the Board’s statutory mission to independently evaluate the

technical and scientific validity of DOE’s investigation of Yucca Mountain.

Finally, DOE said that our statement that delaying a site recommendation

decision will have no effect on the timing of the ultimate opening of a

repository is contrary to all common sense and experience. We have

removed that statement from the report. However, we note that the key

factors that bear on opening a repository currently lie in the licensing

arena. One such factor is the 4 more years of licensing-related work that

Bechtel, in its September 2001 detailed reassessment that proposed a new

cost and schedule baseline, estimates would be needed to submit a license

application that is acceptable to NRC. In addition, other licensing-related

conditions could continue to affect the timetable for developing a

repository. For example, Bechtel characterized its reassessment leading

to the submission of a license application in January 2006 as a high-risk

schedule that does not include any contingency or reserve—in effect, an

optimistic schedule. Also, NRC, in its preliminary comments on the

sufficiency of site characterization, stated that if DOE adopts a

low-temperature repository operating approach, such as described in a

recent technical document, then additional information would be needed

for a potential license application.

Although we have clarified our discussion of the statutory and regulatory

requirements for site recommendation, approval, and licensing, we

continue to believe that the Secretary of Energy should consider the

timing of this statutory process as he decides when to make a site

recommendation to the President. Therefore, while we have modified the

language, we have not changed the intent of our recommendation on this

matter. DOE did not comment on our findings, conclusions, and

recommendations about (1) potential delays on, and alternatives to, its

proposed repository design and (2) its management of the nuclear waste

program.

We performed our review at DOE’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., and

its project office in Las Vegas, Nevada. We also met with officials of NRC

in Rockville, Maryland; the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board in

Clarendon, Virginia; and the state of Nevada’s Agency for Nuclear Projects

in Carson City, Nevada. We conducted our review from April through

Scope and

Methodology
Page 28 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

December 2001 in accordance with generally accepted government

auditing standards. (See app. I for details of our scope and methodology.)

We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy; the Director,

Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will

make copies available upon request. If you or you staff have any questions

about this report, please call me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this

report are listed in appendix III.

(Ms.) Gary L. Jones

Director, Natural Resources

 and Environment
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Page 29 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

Our objectives for this report were to determine whether (1) the

Department of Energy (DOE) has completed the work necessary to

support a site recommendation for the development of a repository at

Yucca Mountain, and (2) DOE’s goal of opening a repository at Yucca

Mountain in 2010 is reasonable.

To determine whether DOE, through its Office of Civilian Radioactive

Waste Management (OCRWM), has completed the work necessary to

support a site recommendation, we discussed with DOE officials the

nature and extent of such work and their relationship to the two

processes. We also discussed technical issues still outstanding with staff

of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, the Board’s Chairman, and

the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Office of Nuclear

Materials Safety and Safeguards. We analyzed the Board’s annual reports

and other correspondence to DOE, and summarized issues of concern

affecting a site recommendation raised by the Board to DOE. We also

reviewed documents obtained from NRC to identify key technical issues

affecting readiness to submit an acceptable license application. We visited

DOE’s Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Office in Las Vegas, Nevada,

and interviewed officials in that office on the Department’s response to the

issues raised by the Board and NRC. We also reviewed project

management documents at OCRWM’s headquarters and at the project

office to identify and characterize how OCRWM’s response to the issues

raised had been incorporated into the project’s work plans and guidance

to the office’s management contractor for the nuclear waste program. We

interviewed officials of Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC, DOE’s management

contractor, and obtained and analyzed documents prepared by the

contractor—such as its September 2001 detailed reassessment of the

nuclear waste program—to determine how ongoing and future project

work would address these issues, and the subsequent effects on the

project schedule and milestones.

To determine whether DOE’s goal of opening a repository at Yucca

Mountain in 2010 was reasonable, we analyzed OCRWM’s reports and

project documents. We interviewed officials in OCRWM’s headquarters

and the project office to determine how total project and program costs

had been captured, estimated, and reported to the Congress and the

public. We summarized the estimated program costs and associated

reasons for the milestones and changes over time. We also determined the

procedures used by DOE to revise its cost and schedule estimates for site

recommendation and license application, and assessed its use of those

procedures.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Page 30 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

Our work was conducted from April through December 2001, in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments From the Department

of Energy

Page 31 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

Appendix II: Comments From the

Department of Energy
Appendix II: Comments From the Department

of Energy

Page 32 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste
Appendix II: Comments From the Department

of Energy

Page 33 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste
Appendix II: Comments From the Department

of Energy

Page 34 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff

Acknowledgments

Page 35 GAO-02-191 Nuclear Waste

Dwayne E. Weigel (202) 512-6876

In addition, Daniel J. Feehan, Robert E. Sanchez, John C. Furutani,

Jonathan S. McMurray, Lindy Coe, Doreen S. Feldman, and Susan W. Irwin

made key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments

(360068)
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