No. 3

UNIT RECONSTITUTION - A HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE

by Dr. 'Edward J. Drea

U.S. XAmy

Combat Studies Institute

Command and General Staff College

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE PREP.ARED FOR THE COMBINED ARMS

RESEARCH ACTIVITY OPERATIONS (CAORA).

1 December 1983
Pre face f.

This CSI Report responds to a CAORA requirement for historical data to 2D7/

use in an ongoing CAORA study of the reconstitution of units. CAORA members ^

focused on several questions. These were: - --'

a) What criteria might a commander use to withdraw a unit from combat

operations; what criteria constitute grounds for the commander to recommend

a unit be withdrawn from combat?

b) Mow does the distribution of casualties within a particular unit

affect unit reconstitution?

c) What is the logistical system's response to personnel or equipment

losses much above anticipated levels--the reaction -to "surge" casualties

when reconstituting units? CAORA also requested a comparative historical

background of unit reconstitution in the 20th century be included in CSI's

final report.

Within these zuidelines, the following -methodology is employed. The

definitions-reconstitution, regeneration, sustaining- support 4 replacement,

reorganization, redistributed, resupply--are used in the context related in

Chapter 4, of CAORA's "Current Reconstitution Concept," and' are attached asappendix 1. This study proceeds from the general description of the unit

reconstitution system used in the two world wars to the particular

reconstitution of the 28th Infantry Division during and after the Schmidt,

Germany operation of November 1944. There is also a brief description of

Israeli Armv reconstitution procedures on the Sinai front in the 1973

Mid-Mast War, and the U.S. Army's experience in Vietnam.

The historical examples from World War I and World War II illustrate the

orocess of unit reconstitution and provide clues about general criteria

which may be useful in identifying units in need of reconstitution. A brief

overview of the British, French, German, and American schemes for unit

reconstitution in that those conflicts provides a comparative historical

basis. The French experience in World War I is most instructive because the

French high command regenerated an entire army after the 1917 military

mutinies. In -the World War II and Israeli examples, unit reconstitution for

armored forces receives attention.

The detailed examination of' the reconstitution of the 28th Division at

Schmidt has three parts; part one--synthesis of the operation with emphasis

on reconstition; part two--criteria for reconstitution; part

three--regeneration of the 28th Division. CSI devised a list of indicators

of unit reconstitution based on CSI's analysis of historical data and the

examination of factors affecting combat efficiency as previously developed

by other organizat:ions, such as Operational Research Organization (ORO) and

BDM Corporation. The CSI list incorporated or amended existing criteria for

n'WPrC1221 J/NOV81

- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1'
unit reconstitution according to CSI's historical perspective on the study

requirements.

The empirical evidence of a division withdrawn from combat because of

"extremely heavy personnel and equipment losses" 1 was, in turn applied to"

these criteria. The resulting application of a specific historical instance

of the total process of maintaining a combat effective force to the list of

indicators offers a touchstone for reconstitution models in terms of what

was done and what was left undone.

Caveats, like television announcer disclaimers, seem obligatory in this

type of study. Throughout this report, the historical cases selected

depended upon the availability of source material at CGSC. Other nations,

most notablv the US.S.R., were not included because of a lack of open data

or security classification considerations. The critical aspect of this

research is to ascertain criteria that commander might employ to withdraw -a

unit from combat. The records of the 28th Division available at CGSC are

the most detailed of any division history concerning personnel

replacements. Moreover the experience of the division at Schmidt met the

CAORA requirement for "surge" losses, so CSI analyzed the 28th-s historical

experience in the light of unit reconstitution. .

The available historical evidence indicates that such guidelines for

reconstituti.on tend to be situational thus -difficult to reduce solely- to

quantitative measurement. Furthermore the historical record is incomplete,

particularly in the consistency of statistical data.2 Human factors in

warfare necessarily impose. such pitfalls, and the criteria this study

provides should be considered with those cautions in mind.

3WPC1221 j/NOV83 2
Unit Reconstitution--The Historical Perspective of World War I

Like all the major belligerents of World War I, the British

Pxped i ti onar Force (BEF) anticipated a short, victorious war, and

consecuently little thought was given to the-- notion of- unit -reconstitution.

Bv 1915, >owever, events of the opening months of the war had demonstrated

that a prolonged battle of attrition lay ahead. It became apparent also

that troops in the front line trenches or dug-outs could not be left there

indefinitely, if only because their health would rapidly deteriorate. In

short, a unit reconstitution system evolved of necessity.

'A BEF infantry brigade (two regiments of four battalions each) would

normally spend two weeks in the trenches and reserve billets and then a week

in rest camps. An infantry battalion would spend between four to eight days

on duty in the trenches and then rotate back to billets just behind the

front lines for rest. During a "quiet" time, an infantry battalion might

expect to lose 30 battle casualties and an equal number' to illness each

mon th. I

World War-I billets were usually abandoned farms and buildings, lacked

eomestic comforts, and within range of the enemy artillery. 2 ...The- troops,

however, did have limited protection from the elements and were spared the

"filth and squalor" of the trench proper.3 Later in the' war more- fixed"

shelters-tents, wooden huts, and the Nissen hut--provided shelter. While

in billets, troops were on alert and could be recalled to the trenches as

the situtation dictated. Additional fatigue duties included repairing roads

or support trenches in their sector. Before a battalion left the trenches

for a rest area, it was required to 'submit a detailed training program to be

undertaken during the rest period.4 - The first stop on its way to rest

areas was the bath house and delousing station. Washed and cleaned the men

continued to the rest camps where they followed a strict routine; reveille

at 0600; roll call at 0700; weapons cleaned before breakfast at 0800; arms

inspection and drill until 1200. After lunch team sports occupied the men

until 1600 at which time those not on duty were left to themselves until

lights out at 2130.5 Replacement packets from regimental depots joined

the units in rest camps and were integrated into the unit before it returned

to combat. In the camps the men were provided hot water, fresh shirts and

underclothing, enjoyed mail and sundries along with band concerts and

movies. The YMCA or Re& Cross operated store sold basic amenities such as

soap, tobacco, ect. YMCA huts had a lunch counter and a large hall with

tables and chairs for letter writing and reading. After February 1915 each

battalion provided its own canteen.

The length of time a unit spent in the line varied due to operational

considerations. Between December 1914 and August 1916 for instance, one'

British colonel spent 2?1 days in trenches or billets and 183 days in rest

camps or safe places. Another officer's diary for 1916 showed he spent 101

days in trenches, 120 davs in reserve, 73 days rest, 10 hospitalized, and 17

on leave. His battalion made sixteen tours of varying length (1 to 13 days)

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

3
in the trenches. 6 A comparison with U.S. Army units, which adopted a

similar system, reveals that the U.S. 1st Infantry Division spent 213 days

of its 501 days in France in the line; the 2d Division, 139 of 383; and the

26th Division, 205 of 303.7 .- . .

Major offensives and their anticipated surge casualties presented new

problems in terms of unit reconstitution. The original practice had been

that the battalion specialists--signallers, bandsmen, cooks, sanitary men,

transport, clerks, and pioneers--would provide the permanent core of the

unit and were responsible to pass on unit traditions to replacements.

Furthermore, before the Somme Offensive of 1 July 1916, the high command

ordered all infantry battalions to leave ten per cent of their fighting

strength: with the rear echelon transport to constitute the nucleus for

rebuilding battalions mauled in combat. 8 This became the standard

practice for the rest of the war.

The first day on the Somme, the BEF suffered 60,000 casualties, a surge

beyond their most pessimistic predictions. Records indicate that the

survivors of the battered rifle battalions were led to rest areas where

normal procedures were followed with inspections and fatigue-- duty. The

purpose of these actions was to keep the survivors from dwelling on the

enormity of the calamity which had befallen their units. Where units_--had

completed an operation, commanders from division level and above personally

visited the men in the battalions. If successful, congratulations --were- in

order, if not commanders told their men that their unit's gallant efforts

contributed to success elsewhere on the battle field. 9 While these

depleted units were reorganized with depot replacements, fresh battalions

continued the offensive through November 1916.

The Germans used a system of unit reconstitution similar to the British

and French except that the Germans tended to leave their divisions in the

line for more extended periods of time because they had fewer troops and

thus had to use them in combat for longer periods.

During the same Somme Operation in 1916, a typical German division had

about one-third of its strength in deep dugouts on the front line; another

third in supports (billets) within 1,000 to 2,500 yards of the front line

trenches; and the other third in villages four to six miles in the

rear. 10 The BEF's preliminary bombardment hurled nearly 2.7 million

shells on a German 'frontage of 11 miles in one week but did not inflict

proportionately severe casualties. The German defenders, however, became

exhausted both by the endless tasks of keeping open dug-cut entrances and

the difficulty in obtaining food. This was due to the constant shelling

that disrupted German communications and inflicted numerous casualties on

ration parties carrying resupply forward to men in the the front line

trenches. Men went without food for two or three day periods. Throughout

the shelling the Germans did maintain their standard six-day inter-battalion

reliefs but only with great difficulty. 1 1 German losses in fighting for

3WPC 1221 J/NOV 83
the first trench along the Somme were enormous, 400,000 in the five month

campaign. This resulted in doctrinal changes which, in part, were responses

to unit reconstitution.

By 1917 the German Supreme Command (O.EI.L.) reserve divisions were

billeted behind the line divisions they supported. The purpose of these

reserve units was not relief or rotation of the advance division on a

one-to-one exchange basis. They were instead essential elements of the

battle, not a reserve waiting to be called. 12 They operated as combat

units under the orders of the front line division commander and represented

his unit reconstitution to sustain his front l1ne division in combat

operations.

In the French Army system, a rifle battalion normally-spent a week to

ten days in the trenches followed by relief to rest or reserve billets well

behind the trench lines. Troops were supposed to receive furloughs' of seven

davs for every four months of service, but these were subject to

cancellation due to impending operations. Of all the belligerents on the

Western Front, the French infantrymen probably had the poorest combat

support system. French medical support twas notoriously -- inefficient;

so-called rest areas were often destroyed villages without- sanitary or

messing facilities where the infantryman was left to his .own devices 1. 3 ..

Indicative of the lack of organized rest facilities ,was that men often had

to sleep two to a bed until the reforms of 19-17. 1 4

In 1917 the French Army mutinied. There were many reasons, among them

appalling living conditions, staggering battlefield casualties (more than

3 million by 1917), and destroyed visions of final victory based on the

futile 1917 offensive. Mutiny was a shock, but 4t should not have been a

surprise. A series of indicators pointed to the need to rest and

reconstitute the battered French infantry. Among the more noticeable was an

increase in desertions-from 509 in 1914 to nearly 9,000 in 1916, to an

annual rate of 30,000 in 1917. There was a significant loss of small unit

leaders, by 1915 half of the French military academy classes had been killed

or invalided. Sustained casualties and, on 21 April 1917, surge casualties

of perhaps as many as 90,000 in a single day combined to break the French

Army. Perhaps as important were the false hopes raised about victory.

According to General Henri Petain, who regenerated the French Army after the

mutinies, "Nothing is more dangerous than to raise the hopes of the troops

when the war can prevent them from being carried out." 15

While no complete open record of the extent of the mutinies exists, they

were so widespread that one historian estimated that only two of 109 French

infantry divisions were completely reliable.1 6 The Army was in danger of

disintegration.

The regeneration commenced with the inevitable change in command as

General Petain replaced the now disgraced General Robert Nivelle. Petain

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

5
The commanding general of the Services of Supply (SOS) was responsible

for the reception, classification, and training of replacements. His

control ended at the regulating stations where army, corps, and division

commanders assumed responsibility for the replacements until the

replacements reached their front line units. The regulating officer acted

under General Headquarters (GHQ) instructions and established priorities for

the transportation of men and supplies to the forward units.2 0

Regulating officers forwarded this information about personnel

replacements to the divisions receiving the men. Division representatives

would meet the replacements at the railheads (in theory one railhead per

division) and forward the new men to the proper subunits of the division.

Replacements for units actually engaged with the enemy usually were held

back until the division rotated out of the front line and back to the billet

or rest areas.21

The original theory of replacement divisions collapsed under the

staggering weight of unanticipated personnel casualties. One measure of the

desperate need for infantrymen was that of the 58 combat divisions the

United States' shipped to France, 16 were either- converted to replacement

depot units or service troops, stripped of all' men except cadre, andI

designated as replacements for the combat divisions.22 Nevertheless, _the

flow. of replacements was insufficient. In 17 days of almost continuous

combat in June 1918 near Cnateau-Thierry, .for instance, the 2d Infantry

Division suffered combat losses of 99 officers and .4,301 men. The .divis-ion

received 34 officers and 2,706 men as replacements, but these new men were

only partially trained and completely unknown to the division's officers and

NCOs.

Because replacement divisions had been stripped of combat troops, by

July 1918 there were only two depot divisions, the 41st and 83d, available

to handle replacements for all U.S. troops in France, a task beyond their

means. As an ad hoc measure, GHQ established seven corps' replacement

battalions between June and September 1918. Their responsibilities included

receipt and forwarding of men discharged from hospitals, receipt of casuals

enroute to units; establishment of a reserve supply of replacements for

combat units; and completion of training for replacements who were not ready

to enter combat.23 By August 1918, the shortage of infantry replacements

was still serious. In an effort to get still more combat troops to the

theater, the Army sent divisions below strength and in need of manpower

directly from the U.S. to France. The result was more untrained and

ill-equipped American troops and that only exacerbated the problem.

Replacements ultimately came from active combat divisions that the AEF.

stripped of manpower for that purpose. In September 1918, the AEF used men

from the 84th and 86th divisions for replacements, leaving only a cadre of

two officers and 25 men for each infantry and machine gun company in those

respective divisions. Despite such measures, the combat divisions were

about 120,000 men short, including 95,000 infantry. The AEF reduced

authorized divisional strengths by 4,000, but the demand for replacements

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

7
explained to the troops his strategy of firepower and not manpower to

achieve success in limited offensives. Furthermore ?etain published and

distributed throughout the Zone of the Armies a broadside titled- "Why We Are

Fighting", a technique echoed thirty-four years later in Korea by

General Matthew 3. Ridgway's "Why Are We Here4?---What- Are We- Fighting For?"

directive to his Eighth Army troops 17 As ?etain personally addressed

each division, his staff combed the Western Front searching for loyal units

which could be expected to continue to fight the Germans. The French

reauested the BEF attack the Germans thereby relieving German pressure on

their dangerously weakened lines and provide the French breathing time to

reconstitute or regenerate their units. The British complied with the

French request.

For the infantrvman PRetain's headquarters adopted more liberal leave

oolicies, increasing the number of men eligible-for -leave to 25 or

50 per cent in large units taken to the rear for reconstitution. 18 To

make leave meaningful, Petain instituted reforms to give the troops on leave

';s^ rudimentary comforts. The: French provided truck transportation from

rest areas to railroad stations, soldiers' restaurants, barbershops,

washrooms, medical service and bunking facilities for the soldier on leave.

Thev reorganized medical services. Improved food -was given -to the--troops

and new awards and decorations issued. A new routine developed in the rest

areas. During the first four days out of the line, the. troops -were --left

completely alone--to talk out their experiences among themselves or whatever'

thev wished to do pursuant to the requirement.s of military -discipline.

After that a training cycle began ,with short periods of drill and

instructions which gradually lengthened as the days passed. The French

disnovered that a division required 15 days to recover its morale after

heavy losses, but if left in a rest camp more than 30 days the men became

irritable. On the darker side, to insure the reassertion of military

discipline, Petain authorized his complete backing to "those /junior

officers/ who display vigor and energy in the suppression" of mutiny. 19

These procedures may appear elementary, but no one had ever considered them

before, especially t.he radical notion of telling the French infantryman his

role in the war. Such techniques of unit regeneration will reappear in

every conflict.

The American World War I,Experience

A U.S. Army division in World War I had 28,105 men, almost double the

size of a French or German division. American commanders believed the

larger division would be able to conduct sustained combat operations because

it could suffer heavy losses and still continue to fight. Each brigade

commander would control two regiments, one forward and one in reserve. As

the forward regiment suffered losses, the reserve regiment could leapfrog

forward to continue the offensive. As originally envisioned, each corps had

two reolacement divisions which were intended to receive, train, and forward

replacements after they arrived overseas.

3WPC 1221 j/NOV8?. 8
was so great that a packet of men sent from the United States in July under

the automatic replacement draft had a total of only two weeks training

before their departure. 24

Supplies, Equipment, and Manpower

From September 1917, shipments of supplies to the American Expeditionary

Force (AEF) were based on an automatic supply system. The G-1 of the

Services of Suoply in France eliminated items locally available, and then

consolidated all requests into a priority cable to the War Department in

Washington. Throughout the war, personnel replacements received priority

over supplies and equipment. This practice resulted in the constant

shortages of weapons, and materiel.

At the lower levels, the static trench warfare made unit reconstitution

a "logisticians dream" because regular supply lines and schedules could be

established, depots or forward railheads organized on a semi-permaznent

basis, and requirements calculated in fairly accurate terms.25

The AEF developed a system of base, intermediate, and advanced s5torage

and divided the responsibilitv for supply into three phases;- procurement,

care and- storage, and transportation. The latter was responsible -for

unloading troops and freight at ports and for transporting them by rail - to

stations, depots, and regulating stations.2 6 The number of service troops

was supposed to be about 25 per cent (330 thousand of 1.33 million) of t-he

army's strength, but that figure was never achieved, The chronic shortage

of infantrymen necessitated the reassignment of men working in SOS to combat

units.27 7Ths action, however, depleted further the already understrength

service troops. The AEF went full circle in September 1918, when due to the

imbalance between infantrymen and SOS personnel, the AEF broke up five

combat div sions so that the men could be used as either replacements or for

logistical duties.28

The AEF divided supplies into four categories. Class 1 comprised all

items of daily automatic supply (rations, fuel, fodder) and was based on

reported troop strength and the number of animals in an organization (the

smaller British division in 1916 had 5,000 horses). The division G3-1

supplied the necessary information to army G-4 who in turn notified the

regulating officer at least once a week.29

Company commanders submitted requisitions for Class 2 supplies, mainly

clothing and bedding. Regimental commanders consolidated and approved the

requisitions and forwarded them through division G-1 directly to an advance

depot. Requisitions for Class 3 items, equipment, including weapons, were.

handled like Class 2 except that the division supply officer and army dumps

and parks tried to fill such requisitions before going to an advance depot

for the remainder. Class 4 supplies, including ammunition, were handled in

the same way, except that those sent to depots had to pass through the G-4

at GHQ.

3WPC1221 J/OV83

8
Once SOS earmarked supplies and personnel replacements for the forward

units, regulating stations handled the shipment. A regulating station was

normally a large railroad yard where cars from depots and other rear

installations were received, sorted, and made into strings of cars for each

division, called rames. A daily supply -train carried rations, mail,

replacement troops, and supplies from -the regulating station to the

divisional railhead. Ideally each division had its own railhead, but often

a railhead had to be shared among divisions. The railhead ,was normally

located near the division dump but this practice varied depending on the

operational situtation and terrain. From distant railheads, the d vision

used truck convoys to bring supplies and replacements forward.

The 4th Infantry Division's example illustrates how the replacement

system functioned. Afte. moving to its assigned rest area in August 1918,

division subunits sent personnel requLsitions to the-'adjutant's office for

consolidating and forwarding to army headquarters-. Representatives of. the

division met the assigned replacements at the divisional railhead and

escorted them to the divisional replacement depot. Officers subsequently

distributed the replacements within the division, apparently according to

unit need.

As for the front line units, convoys of 14 trucks, loaded according- to

unit. to reduce confusion, took supplies forward at night. Mule drawn owagons

carried rations to kitchen areas. Troops in billets could receive hot food,

and even troops on the. firing line -could enjoy hot food carried forward in

marmite cans. Front line troops kept emergency rations in gas proof

containers because gas attacks frequently rendered food supplies useless.

Ordnance resupply was ordinarily accomplished at the division mobile

ordnance repair shops where troops turned in weapons for repair or

replacement. Clothing came forward with rations, although issue was

normally delayed until troops rotated to a rest area for a bath and

delousing. Unit reconstitution was a continual process of personnel

rotation and resupply. By 1918 it had reached a highly developed state

sufficient so long as the war remained static. The system, however, could

barely cope with the great September-November offensive of the AEF.

During offensive operations, the premium was on light railroads to haul

supplies forward to the advancing troops because the men could not maintain

roads in the shell cratered morass of no man's land. Sixty men required 10

hours to build a quarter-mile of plank road 4 meters wide whereas 135 men

could lay as much as 3 miles of light railroad track in 5 hours.30 For

major offensives, the AEF established ar. army general depot or each service

established several forward dumps or depots.* Engineers followed the

*For the Meuse Argone Offensive, 24 ammunition depots, 12 ordnance, 9

quartermaster, 9 gasoline and oil, 8 water points, 7 chemical warfare, plus

depots for medical, motor, tank, signal supplies, and 34 evacuation

hospitals were established. See, Huston, p. 382.

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

9
advance constructing a rail line from the dunaps to the forward positions.

Naturally the battlefield conditions and shell cratered terrain made

resupply to advancing infantry units extremely difficult. There were no

roads for-ward of the original front line, so engineer -and labor battalions

used muscle, gravel, and sandbags to keep tracks open. They did much of

this work after dark in order to keep roads 'open from the trenches to the

rear areas so that vital supplies could flow forward and casualties move

back to rear area hospitals.

Chaos ensued as everyone t o use the few trafficable routes between

the front and rear. Battlefield evacuation of wounded was a special

problem. Each division had a sanitary train with a field hospital section

and ambulance section consisting of 12 mule drawn ambulances and 36 motor

vehicles. These not only proved wholly insufficient -for offensive

operations, but also clogged resupply routes as they competed for : the same

routes as the trucks carrying supplies forward to the advancing troops. :- -

Ammunition was the priority item, so infantrymen often went hungry after

they ate their two days of field rations. In offensive operations, troops

relied on emergency rations packed 25 to a galvanized box. which---requir-ed no

cooking. Unfortunately the nature of World War I combat formations

increasing tendency toward dispersal made the dis.tribution of emergencyrations nearly impossible. Field kitchens could not keep pace with the -20

mile advance during the six week Meuse-Argone- Offensive, so infantrym-en went

without hot food for weeks.31 * ... .

In the wake of the advance, salvage parties used trucks and wagons from

the divisional ammunition train to police the battlefield. The reclamation

of the discarded or damaged materiel was in itself a major contribution to

resupply. After a four day engagement in July 1918, a detail of 600

replacements collected nearly. 300 truckloads of equipment to be turned over

to a salvage squad at a railhead.32

In summation, while the concept of unit reconstitution was undreamed of

in 1914, by 1918 all major participants could reconstite vast armies in the

field, particularly in static situations. The reconstitution system as it

existed in late 1918, however, could support large scale offensives like

that in the Meuse Argonne only with great difficulty. The 120,000 American

casualties suffered in the six-week Meuse Argonne Campaign, taxed the

personnel replacement and supply systems to the breaking point, rendering

them impotent for near term future offensive operations.

3WPC1 221 j/NOV83

10
World War II Equioment Replacement: The German Case

A single military commander, the 'Chief of Army Equipment and Commander

of the Replacement Army, was in charge of all army activities inside. Germany

with one exception.* iHe was subordinate to the commander-in-chief, but

other-wise enjoyed a free 'hand in directing induction, training of troops,

procurement, storage and distribution of military supplies, and other

services required to support the Field Army which conducted operations.

The link between the Replacement and Field armies was the Quartermaster

General on the Army General Staff. He provided supplies to the Field Army

while requisitioning their needs from the Zone of the Interior, i.e.,

Germany. The Quartermaster General's responsibilities did not include

equipping new formations, reequipping badly mauled divisions, supplying

tanks, armored vehicles, and signal equipment, or building fortifications.

The Replacement Army or Todt Organization handled these efforts.1 .

Despite the experience of World War I the Germans did not establish

elaborate rear-area installations at the start of World War II, because they

olanned for short blitzkreig campaigns, and expected to live off-the- land in

their conquered territories. Trained technicians accompanied the Field Army

to exploit the conquered nations' economic systems for Germany's benef-it. .

The general rule that the German Army- followed was that -each_ unit

collected supplies from the next- higher unit.. Below division level,

companies, platoons, sections, or individuals organic to the unit performed

service functions, except for the motor maintenance troops in the infantry

division who were assigned to regiment and battalion. Administrative troops

supplied rations, forage, clothing, personnel, equipment and supplies.

Ordnance troops supplied and repaired weapons and ammunition as well as

certain types of equipment. Supply troops provided transportation--either

horse or motor--and the labor detachments to distribute supplies. Motor

maintenance troops supplied and repaired vehicles, with the exception of

tanks. Special tank recovery units and workshops were located in armored

units or at higher levels to facilitate tank repair and maintenance.

The reconstitution process for German armored units offers an insight

into their methods.2 Upon induction into the army, recruits were assigned

to specific units of the Replacement Army. Those assigned to armor joined a

tank training company where they underwent 12 weeks of training (later

reduced to 8). After completion of training, the replacements went forward

as a unit to their respective armored division.

As for equipment, initially the Germans planned for. a centralized systemof tank reconstitution with only minor repairs made in the field. Seriously

*The exception was the Army Personnel Office which controlled officer

personnel.

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

11
damaged tanks would be returned to the factory of origin in Germany for

refit. This system was effective in Germany's opening, short campaigns

against Poland, Norway, the Low Countries, and France. In North Africa,

however, and later in Russia, the centralized system was no longer practical

as campa4igns lenghtened and transportation over the great distances between

support bases and the operational areas made the centralized system

prohibative. As a result the Germans augmented the strength of maintenance

units attached to the armored div sions.

?ach tank company had a maintenance detachment which made on-the-spot

repairs of disabled tanks. If field repairs required more than 12 hours,

the detachment arranged for the armored regiment's maintenance company's

recovery platoon to evacuate the tank. Recovery teams removed disabled

tanks from the bat t lefield to co ction oints rotectd rom enemy

observation and fire. Depending on the extent of damage, crews would send

the tanks from the collecting point to either field repair shops or the

nearest railhead for transport to Germany.

The tank maintenance company, organic to a tank regiment, ran the field

repair shops and set a 14 day limit to complete repairs.. Usually it had a

10 to 40 tank capacity. Aside from its maintenance- and repair- missions, the

tank maintenance company was responsible for the welfare of tank .crews who

accompanied their disabled tanks to the field repair shop. Until 1943

maintenance companies housed and fed crews -awaiting repairs and- personnel

replacements. Then the armored reg-iments organized casual companies whose

commander took the responsibility for the well being, training, and security

of crews awaiting repairs of their tanks as well as new replacements. While

the crew went to the casual company to await repairs, the tank driver

remained with the vehicle to check the status of the work. Upon repair and

matching with crews, tanks returned to their units in groups of 4 to 8 tanks

commanded by an officer.

In the event of surge casualties or tank losses, the Germans attached

tank maintenance and tank recovery companies to army group or army

headquarters as needed to support the armored forces otherwise lacking

sufficient personnel to keep the reconstitution pace abreast of surge losses.

At the start of an attack, maintenance detachments advanced behind the

second echelon of the attacking force together with vehicles of the recovery

platoon. Field repair shops were close to the front line, the maximum

distance not to exceed 70 kilometers. This was due to excessive wear and

tear on prime movers and disabled vehicles that were moved over great

distances. During advances and pursuits, recovery detachments brought only

those tanks disabled within a 15 kilometer radlus of the repair site to theoperating site of tank maintenance companies. Otherwise, the recovery teams

took tanks disabled along the axis of attack to predesignated contingency

collection points along the route. After the armored units broke off their

attack, normally at dusk, maintenance crews reassembled to pool their

3WPC 1221 j/NOV 83

12
resources until the attack ,as resumed the following day. These crews

determined which of the disabled tanks could be repaired and made available

to continue the attack.

No tank was abandoned, unless completely destroyed. Otherwise recovery

was mandatory, even though the tank might be used only for

cannibalization.* Shortages of spare parts often led to cannibalization,

especially of tanks marked for return to Germany. Each Army Group

maintained its stock of tank spare parts and established advance dumps at

army level. The tank maintenance companies requisitioned and drew spare

parts for their regiments from either dump or depot where stock levels were

replenished automatically. A lack of spare parts plagued the Germans,

Particularly because they found most repairs involved exchanging worn for

new parts while less than 30 per cent of damaged tanks required welding or

time consuming labor.

In the defense, the Germans trained combat troops to remove disabled

equipment from the battlefield. If they could not accomplish that mission,

recovery crews from the maintenance companies moved in after dark to remove

damaged or disabled vehicles and tanks. In .. retrograde- movements,

maintenance crews evacuated by rail tanks not capable of repair in a short

time.

*German tankers did not trust depot maintenance and preferred to either

deadline tanks in field repair depots for 3 to 4 weeks or canibalize them

for spare parts.

3WPC 221 J/NOV83

13
The British Exoerience in North Africa

Originally the British sent new or repaired tanks to a Tank Delivery

Regiment (TDR) for inspection and stocking and thence forward on

transporters to a Tank Delivery Squadron (TDS).3 Tanks repaired at corps

echelon went to TDS for service and matching with crews who had returned

from battle, TDR and TDS both lacked sufficiently experienced personnel to

inspect and check the tanks properly. Tanks and crews dispatched forward

from TDS travelled independently. This inadequate control of replacement

tanks and mix-and-match crews (veteran crew members mixed with replacement

crews or crews from different regiments) added to the confusion. By early

1942 the North African tank fighting had also shown the British that

replacement tanks and crews in an armored unit, if they even existed, were

consumed within the first day of a battle,

Based on past experience and the need for more- effective reconstitution

procedures, a number of changes appeared in the British system. First crews

coming out of battle with a disabled tank were never sent beyond the TDS

where each armored battalion stationed an officer to care for the welfare of

his unit's crews. The unit maintenance section- made minor-tank repairs

while the crew remained with their tanks in the battalion trains area* For

recair within 24 hours, crews accompanied their tanks to brigade workshops.

The Tank Delivery Troop (TDT) handled the tank at brigade; checked and

serviced it; and drew supplies. from the co-located quartermaster- battalion

for the tank. Crewmembers checked the supplies and TDT officers told crew

members when to move forward as well as check points and radio call signs

along their route. With the reinstitution of control on the movement of

replacement tanks, the armored brigade S-4 knew when repaired or new tanks

were arriving. Crews reported to the S-4 who in turn directed the crews to

regiment or battalion.

Transporters carried more seriously damaged tanks to corps workshops.

After repair an Advanced Inspection Unit would recheck the condition of

field repairs and send the tank to TDS for resupply and re-equipping. Crews

of seriously damaged tanks reported to a Corps Personnel Camp (CC),

co-located with the TDS. The CPC provided an administrative staff, tents,

cooking facilities, and transportation for the crews. Within the CC, each

armored division administered and organized its own area. HQ, CPC

coordinated the divisional areas with the officer-in-charge who was the

assistant corps G-1.

The C?C cared for replacements and men in transit. It offered them a

central canteen and recreation tent, a mobile bath unit, and a central

distribution point for stores and supplies. They concentrated all these

resources near the CPC to insure the proper care for a crew coming from

battle as the initial phase. of reconstitution. Officers from their own

battalion met the crewmen. The crews received a hot bath, new clothes, new

equioment, excellent food, and had recreation facilities. The purpose was

to give them a respite from combat that they required.

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

14
The turn around procedure was equally simple, although the distances of

fronts in North Africa created special problems. When a tank left a

workshop, TDS notified corps and obtained from corps a priority for

delivery. TDS then informed the appropriate divisional camp officer who

decided, based on orders from his divisional headquarters, - which tank

regiment the repaired tank would join. -That determined, a crew from the

same regiment at C?C reported to TDS to pick up their tank and deliver it to

its original unit.

3WPC1221 !J/NOV83

15
World War II Personnel Replacement: The German System

Germany began World War II with 106 divisions averaging 15,626 men. By

December 19'3 the figure had reached 278 divisions averaging 10,453 men, and

by Aoril 19I 5, 260 with 9,985. 4 The German high command decided 'on this

zradual mobilization to avoid the mistakes of 1914 when the almost overnight

mobilization of manpower seriously disrupted the economic life of the

country. ' The Replacement Army procured and trained recruits. Personnel

for field units came from specified units of the Replacement Army and those,

in turn, came only from the home recruiting stations.6 The twenty

military districts in Germany each contained numerous affiliated divisions.

Each regiment at the - front left a rear echelon training replacement

battalion (a decot battalion) at its home base. The replacement battalion

would receive and train recruits then forward them to the parent regiment as

a unit.7

Replacements always travelled in 1units, 1,000 man 'strong "marching

battalions" (Marschbattalione) that were armed and equipped for combat

operations if the need arose. An officer from the parent unit met the

Marsch battalion and led it to the unit whereupon the marching battalion was

dissolved . The men went to a divisional field replacement ba'talion'; each

of whose three companies was linked to one of the division's- three

regiments. Officers and NCOs - from the line -regiments trained- -thereolacements assigned to their unit. In addition to having veterans teach

the newcomers, it gave the veterans a temporary respite from the -front

line. After training was completed; the replacements, as a unit, reported

to their regiment at the front. 8

There were no fixed rules for rotation of combat units. Following the

earlv brief campaigns, divisions underwent Refreshment--a three week long

exercise involving logistic and administrative preparations. Existing units

reconstituted, received refresher training, merged their replacements, and

obtained issues of new equipment to replace lost or worn items.9 As the

war lengthened, such refreshment became more infrequent. Instead of the

entire division undergoing refreshment simultaneously, it became an

interdivisional system in which regiments of the division rotated from the

front line for varying periods of time and went to Recovery Homes for

reconstitution. The company commander could also grant leave, and the

Germans gave preference to the front line troops who had the longer periods

of active service. The longer the active service, the more frequent the

oeriod of leave--one leave for the first 12 months, one in 9 for the second,

and one in 6 for the third. 1 0

The American System:

Little prior planning for U.S. Army personnel replacements seems to have

occurred. Only on 29 January 1942 did a War Department memo from the

Executive Officer, G-1 to the Planning Officer, G-1 War Department General

3WPC1221 J/NOV83

16
Staff acknowledge that, "Some thought should be given to the subject of

establishing a rapid and direct method of supplying officers and enlisted

loss replacements to our overseas forces." 11 It was not until December

1943, however, that a tabulation of battle--casualties - identified which

combat arms would need replacements the most. Based on the North Africa

campaign, infantry accounted for over 61- per cent of battlefield casualties,

field artillery 6.7 per cent, and others 32.3 per cent. The War Department

had assumed responsibility to maintain the replacement pool in each overseas

command at the required numerical and categorical strength. But there was

no evidence that any thought had been given in the early planning stages to

the overall administration of the replacement pools. 12 Tne underlying

philosophy seemed to be that men, like equipment, were interchangable parts

of a vast fighting machine.

The basic strategic decision to create a small number of combat

divisions (90 total with 89 seeing combat) meant that replacements received

individual, not unit training because the Army lacked sufficient divisions

to withdraw any from combat for training purposes. A division stayed in or

near the front line until the campaign ended.. Individual replacements

joined the division wherever it was when they- reporte.d-- for -- duty.

Furthermore the policy of keeping the combat divisions up to.-strength by a

steady stream of replacements made unit rotation . impossible. --andunnecessary. No passes, for example, were granted in the ETO until 1

October 1944. Rest and recreation centers for corps and divisionis -did -not

receive attention until mid October of the same year. Even then -the

division itself had to sponsor a rest area for its men and received little

support from corps or army in the projects. Rest centers within corps had

very limited capacities, 800 men in VIII Corps, 600 in V Corps, 2,4C00 in

VII Corps, and 600 in III Corps. Unit commanders designated men as

individuals to go to rest centers, while the majority of the unit remained

on the line or in reserve just behind the line.

A regiment of a division or an individual battalion might be two or

three miles behind the front for rest and reconstitution, but the main force

of the division ,was on the line engaged in combat. U.S. divisions remained

in the line much longer than either our allies or enemies. In February 1944

General Devers wrote to General McNair from the Mediterrain Theater, ^Itt has

been demonstrated here that the division should not be left in the line any

longer than 30 or 40 days in an active theater. If you do this as has been

done in this theater, everybody gets tired, then they get careless and there

are tremendous sick rates and casualty rates." 13

A form of "combat exhaustion" affected veterans who had been in

continuous action. After about four months of combat these men developedthe very symptoms described by General Devers--unreliability, loss of

interest, decreased efficiency and carelessness. 14 Postwar studies

conducted by military officers revealed that the average combat infantryman

was unfit for duty after 200 to 240 aggregate combat days. Any man in

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

17
combat that long and still uninjured who displayed signs of "combat

exhaustion" would require at least six months treatment to make him useful

for a noncombat assignment. 15 In short, even if by some chance he

survived the rigors of combat, he could never be reconstituted or

regenerated for combat if left in the line that long.

In the Italian Campaign, the British estimated that their riflemen would

last 400 combat days because they rotated their infantrymen out of the line

at the end of 12 days or less for a rest of 4 days. In contrast,. the

American soldier in Italy usually stayed on the line without relief for 20

to 30 days, frequently for 30 to 40 days, and occasionally 80 days. A

costwar U.S. Army board recommended that there should be some system to

rotate men out of the line for short periods of time for rest. Frequent

relief for short periods was creferrable to less frequent rel ef for longer

oeriods.1- Third Army in the ETO believed that additional planning should

have been given to the matter of rest centers for troops coming out of the

line. Camps developed ad hoc by the combat units, but a more systematic

approach to provide adequate facilities for rest and recreation would have

allowed more to have been done for the combat soldier. Third Army admitted,

though, that sufficient personnel to allow rotation within.. the .units

normally were not available. 17 -

Rotation for the U.S. soldier in World War II closely resembled the

oattern his father was familar with from- World War I. Army studies

emphasized that the frontline fighter wanted fundamentals--a bath, haircut,

clean clothes, and withdrawal from the range of normal enemy artillery

fire-to relieve the tension that accompanies close contact with the enemy.

This included the privilege to sleep in a bed, to write a letter in relative

comfort, and to eat a properly prepared meal.18 All of these functions

could have been organized at rest centers.

In fact the system did not work that way. Higher headquarters shuffled

a division in need of reconstitution or regeneration to a relatively

inactive sector of the front. Even in a quiet sector the Americans still

engaged the enemy. The 28th Division, for example, in October 1944 had been

in a "quiet sector" undergoing reconstitution after heavy fighting in August

and September. That October the division reported suffering 993 battle

casualties--28 officers and 965 enlisted men--including 106 killed. 19 The

danger of a quiet sector is evident.

If combat veterans faced these types of problems, replacements faced an

entirely different set intitally. The infantry most needed replacements.

Infantry losses throughout the war exceeded projections and the consequent

shortage of manpower affected unit performance. Put differently, overall.

infantry comprised 68.5 per cent of the division's manpower, but suffered

94 7 oer cent of all divisional casualties.20 The losses were naturally

heaviest in the lettered line companies which, because of the replacement

shortage, normally fought understrength.21

3WPC1221j/NOV83

18
A rifle battalion could expect to suffer heavy losses intitally, then at

a more gradual loss rate. In Fifth Army (Italy) a rifle battalion could

expect to lose from battle and non-battle casualties about 25 per cent

strength after 30 days-; 40 per cent after 50 - days; 60 per cent after 100

days; 90 per cent after 200 days, and be virtually destroyed after 300

combat days (10 combat days = 17 calendar days).22 During the Schmidt

offensive between 2 and 18 November, the 28th Division requisitioned ten

times the infantry replacements as all other branches (4,458 infantry against 420 others).23 Infantry losses in the 9th and 28th divisions

during late October and early November 1944 were so great that V Corps' 41st

Replacement Battalion exhausted its supply, of infantry replacements in the

last week of November. Henceforth the only replacements available to the

28th Division were men returning to duty after hospitalization. 24

Faced with replacing such personal losses, American divisions did not

have a special organization to absorb and retrain newly arr.ived recruits and

replacements were expected to pick up experience from veterans.25

Unfortunately the lack of preparation for combat resulted in numerous cases

of combat exhaustion among the replacements just before they actually

entered the fighting or during their first five- days in the-line.- Such

cases were particularly high among infantry replacements who had not been

thoroughly trained or indoctrinated into the unit's tradition.25 ..

Moreover it was difficult for infantry replacements to blend into their

new units. Veterans resented and distrusted replacement line officers. NCO

replacements blocked veterans' promotion opportunities with the unit.

Replacements were unknown and unproven and thus considered unreliable

entities. During the gruelling fighting in Normandy, for example, the

commanding general of the beleagured 4th Infantry Division refused to accept

400 replacements because they lacked proper infantry skills or were not

thoroughly trained.27 This was a recurrent problem with U.S. Army

replacements. At Schmidt the 112th Infantry Regiment, which suffered the

most battle casualties (1549) of any regiment during the fighting, refused

to accept a group of 250 replacements for similar reasons. One factor

responsible for this condition was "the apparent lack of importance attached

to personnel matters by commanders and staffs in virtually every echelon of

the Army, particularly the highest echelons".28 The U.S. Army created and

perpetuated a personnel replacement system that accentuated deficiencies of

new soldiers introduced to combat.

After basic training in the United States, the U.S. Army replacement was

given 10-12 days leave and then reported to the Replacement Depot at the

embarkation ports. As individuals they were then shipped overseas to a

theater depot. ETO replacements landed at Le Harve, location- of the 15thb

Replacement Depot. About one-third of all replacements moved directly from

the beach to waiting trains while the remainder stayed in the depot area for

6 to 36 hours waiting for their trains.29

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

19
The Transportation Corps authorized the 15th Replacement Depot one train

per day. Troops usually rode in boxcars to the forward areas. The train

mixt proceed to an Army depot where the replacements received up to five

weeks refresher training If combat units urgently needed replacements,

however, the trains went directly to forward depots and- from -there to combat

divisions. At the divisions, the division chief of staff, or his

representative apportioned the individual replacements in groups or batches

among the regiments. It was quite possible for a replacement to join his

unit and be killed in action before his commanding officer or NCOs learned

his name. If the replacement Joined a unit occupying a quiet sector, he

discovered that the time he spent in the replacement pipeline had rusted his

combat skills and caused the deterioration of his physical condition.

Riding in boxcars the men lacked exercise. Food was also poor and it was

not until November 1944 that an attempt was made to serve the replacements

hot meals during their journey. Before that the men_ subsisted on K or C

rations. Thus originated the stereotype of an untrained, physically unfit

reolacement being dumped on a combat unit.

All armored force replacements went to the 9th Depot at Fontainebleau.

They moved from the communication zone to their vehicles at the vehicular

pool, division service park, or an immediate. point ---in -- unusual

circumstances .X In practice, there was difficulty matching- the flow of

oersonnel and vehicles. Communications Zone and service troops- went--to -the19th Depot at Etemps. The bulk of replacements, 62 per cent, were

infantrymen, and thev went to one of two "immediate stockage depots,"-- each

serving two armies. The stockage depot had two forward depots--one for each

army suDported-and each forward depot had one forward battalion per corps

supnorted. The battalions provided replacements to the combat divisions.

The normal procedure was for the individual replacement or groups of

individual replacements to report to the subsistence depots from which the

line units drew supplies so that the replacements might ride on the trucks

hauling rations to the front.31

Infantrymen were the key personnel ingredient in unit reconstitution.

Yet the U.S. Army belatedly recognized that it had mishandled the personnel

replacement problem. "There seems to be no objection to introducing

reolacements into the line in very small numbers," a postwar study observed,

"but our World War II practice of introducing masses of replacements was

indeed shortsighted, inhuman, and in the long run grossly wasteful of

manpower. "32

Reconstitution of Equipment:

In the U.S. Army case, Army Service Forces (ASF) organized the

procurement and production of supplies in the United States and shipped themto overseas theaters. Once delivered to an overseas port, theater

commanders assumed the responsibility for supplying and servicing the troops

within the areas of their command.33 Army doctrine in 1942 called for the

3WC 1221 J/NOV83

20
creation in major theaters of a" Communications Zone as the region that

connected the fighting army with the sources of supply. The communications

zone contained supply, evacuation facilities, repair shops, and other

service facilities. It was, in fact, similar to the system the U.S. Army

employed during World War I. The major difference in World War II was that

no two theaters operated alike. As in World War I, neither did an entirely

satisfactory system of supply evolve in any theater.34

The U.S. Army's campaign in Northwest Europe from 5 June 1944 to 7 May

!q45 alternated between periods of hea~vy fighting but relatively little

movement and fast moving pursuits with relatively little fighting. From the

invasion at Normandy until Operation Cobra beginning on 25 July, the Allied

lodgment on the continent was restricted in area. Resupply was relatively

uncomplicated, except for the capricious channel weather which disrupted

resuoplv operations on 19 June. Desoite that storm, operations progressed

slower than anticipated, so materiel resupply was not a .serious problem.

Personnel reolacements, however, as early as July had become a significant

oroblem, about which more will be mentioned later.

Battlefield recovery of damaged mechanized vehicles was generally good

to excellent during a normal rate of advance, but- during the _rapid pursuit

from earlv August to early September it proved inadequate, because units

lacked the organic capability to recover battle damaged or inoperative

vehicles and unit commanders felt their responsibilities for .recoverv and

salvage should be shifted to other service or supply organizations at such

times .T3

Fuel, ammunition, personnel shortages and stiffening German resistance

brought the Allied pursuit to a halt in early September. Both sides

reconstituted their forces for the border battles along the German frontier,

the Seigfried Line campaign. The Battle of Schmidt occurred during that

campaign.

By that time personnel replacements were in short supply, and at the end

of October nearly 73 per cent of Allied supplies on the continent were still

stored in the Normandy area.3 Not until the Allies rebuilt the French

railroad system did resupply improve. Still the Allies lack of a suitable

oort facilities hindered resupply. The Transportation Corps moved supplies

from the comnunications zone in Normandy to the fighting units by means of

108 Quartermaster Truck companies, that by December 1944 had 9,500

vehicles. 37

The assault divisions at Normandy landed 25 per cent overstrength in

oersonnel, in effect providing themselves with replacements until the

automatic replacement and requistion system went into effect on 18 June. A

similiar system had been used during the Allied breakout from Anzio.38

Bv the end of July 1944, three Ordnance group headquarters existed, the

51st, 71st, and 72d. The 71st took over the ammunition battalions and

'WPC 1221 J/NOV83

21
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T w a UX

V VA= . 1 4 m JMWAL AMM3, M303=

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ma4mlool-0 MSULS ?V=V=

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Fwrxz 11-2.en-onnel and vehicle replacc=ent Row chart for armored uaiu.

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I
supervised all army ammunition operations, including Ammunition Supply

Points (ASP) and army depots. The 72d assumed operations in the main army

area and commanded the four battalions that ran the main shop and depots

where inspection and refitting occurred.39 (See Flow Chart, following

pate *7

Behind each corps there were two battalions, a forward battalion to do

Id echelon maintenance and operate a collecting point; the other to do 4th

echelon maintenance and act as a support battalion for heavy tank

maintenance and operate a forward depot. 4 0 The forward ordnance battalion

was responsible for recovery and evacuation of ordnance materiel within the

corps. In mid-July an- evacuation company was formed to bring back heavy

materiel from collecting points, move supplies between the main shop and

forward depot or to line units, and, if required, help the forward

col lee tins companies. . - .

Division and army established collecting points manned by qualified

personnel to classify items for evacuation to higher echelon, immediate

repair, or not repairable.. 1 When required repairs could not be made at

the units, the unit exchanged the item prior to -evacuation, as available.

t.S. Army infantry divisions had no organic heavy-ordnance equipment, but

the medium tank battalion and tank destroyer battalion attached to infantry

divisions were only very reluctantly, if ever, released.* First U. S. Army

resorted to the conversion of four ordnance evacuation companies into

ordnance collecting companies by reducing the number of tank transporters

needed for longer hauls, and increasing the general purpose vehicles,

winches and tow-trucks. These units recovered abandoned or unservicable

ecuioment from the battlefield when the using arms lacked the capabilities

to do so. The ordnance collecting companies then delivered the damaged

equipment to forward collecting points or to maintenance companies.4 2

ASPs normally held the minimum ammunition necessary to support

anticipated operations. Corps stocked 2 and 1/2 days' units of fire and

recommended the number of rounds for an ASP to maintain. Army restocked

ASPs based on corps" reports, and corps ammunition officers kept army

advised of expected "surge" demands. In addition, salvaged or damaged U.S.

ammunition was returned by collecting companies to ASPs for recycling.

Each armv in 12th Army Group (1st, 3rd and 9th armies) had established

a regulating station to receive requisitions for all classes of supply from

the armies and forwarding these to the Communications Zone. A regulating

station in World War I: was a traffic control agency to insure orderly and

*According to the pooling concept attached units were provided

specialized equipment as needed for a particular operation after which, in

theory, the assets reverted to a central pool. Experience did not bear out

the theory.

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

22
systematic movements into and out of the combat zone.43 The regulating

station officer received, passed on, and enforced priorities for the

movement of supplies. Normally the regulating station was a railhead so the

regulating stations also had to conduct reconnaissance for new railheads and

their oreparation as the -armies- moved across France. - From: the regulating

stations, supplies moved forward by rail or truck to corps depots, thence to

truckheads and ultimately to the forward troops.44

In the static conditions of World War I, railheads had been the

significant resupply points. In the mobile warfare following the Allied

breakout from Normandy and oursuit of the Germans across France, truckheads

and mobile ASPs appeared. A truckhead was the term for a forward

distributing point. Designated forward truckheads served each corps,

usually at locations the corps quartermaster designated, but never less than

ten miles from the front lines.4 5 To support the-breakZout, 2d Armored

Division assembled 84 trucks--25 carrying gasoline, 57 ammunition, and 1

with diesel and 50 weight oil. Key supply personnel and control and supply

vehicles joined the mobile truckhead.4 During the pursuit across France,

First Army' displaced its Class I truckheads once every four days in a

leapfrog fashion by platoons. -

To overcome the difficulties of extended supply lines, in- August 1944,

First Armyv used six medium automotive maintenance companies to create- twelve

truck hospitals. These were located about 20 miles apart on the main axis

of communication and had a wrecker point half way between hospitals.3 A

olatoon operated each station and maintained road patrols ten miles on

either side of the station to locate disabled trucks. About 40 per cent of

the work was second echelon, the remainder third, with some fourth class.

After the Allies broke the Seigfried line and advanced into Germany,- First

Army established a tank relay station at Giessen, Germany in the spring of

1045 to service replacement tanks being sent forward. Messing and shelter

for '00 men a day were available.4 7

A mobile AS? supported VII Corps during the pursuit. Corps attached a

Ouartermaster Truck Battalion with five companies and 225 trucks to the 71st

Ordnance Group. The Truck Battalion established a two echelon ASP. The

forwarrd echelon issued ammunition directly to combat units from its 125

trucks, sometimes at artillery gun or tank positions, and sent its empty

trucks and requests to rear echelon about twenty miles farther back. The

rear echelon filled the request and sent convoys back to an ammunition depot

100 miles to the rear. In eleven days from 14-25 August, the mobile ASP

handled 13,156 tons of ammunition--6,615 received and 6,541 issued.48

The slower moving inLfantry divisions each had an organic quartermaster

comoanv that had three truck platoons and a service platoon with 16 two and

*The 12th Army Group's size varied from one to four armies during the

campaign, but usually was two armies, the 1st and 3rd.

3WPC, 1 22 ?1j/NO 83

23
one-half ton trucks each. The divfsion's service company had principally

auto mechanics and mess personnel. These organic trucks normally supplied

infantrv divisions. The Cuartermaster Company drew Class I and II supplies

dailv at an army truckhead and distributed them to the vehicles of the

combat units at a divisional distribution point.4 - The service platoon of

the Cuartermaster company transferred supplies from divisional trucks to

those of combat units.

Line infantry companies depended for normal resupply on the arrival of

jeers and trailers each evening, enemy and terrain permitting. Resupply was

accomDlished under the cover of darkness with rations, water, radio

batteries, and dry socks going forward to the line troops. A resupply of

amunition ,was likely to accompany the quartermaster resupply, although the

hattalion aunition and pioneer platoon maintained an ammunition

distributing Doint where a detail could be sent to pick -up ammunition as

needed. All armies customarily reinforced the infantry division's Ordnance

light maintenance company with an Ordnance medium mainten-ance company that

was transferred from army to army as divisions shifted.50 Personnel

replacements, if urgently needed to replace losses, could expect to go

forward to their new units with the resupply teams; otherwise they joined

the unit when it rotated out of line. When possible hot meals-were sent -up

in marmite cans and platoons and squads would go back successively for their

meals. During heavy fighting the men subsisted on daily distributions -of K

or 10 in 1 rations. If the jeeps could not get close enough to front l-ineoositions, headquarters' platoons and reserve companies would hand carry -the

vttal supplies forward.5 1

Reconstitution in armored divisions was somewhat easier because trucks

could meet tanks and off-load supplies at p-redesignated points. In static

periods the 2d Armored Division accomplished reconstitution, in this case

29 November to 15 December', as follows.52 The division commander

continually rotated his front line units to afford maximum time for rest,

maintenance, and general rehabilitation of equipment. Units not occupying

the division's forward positions received replacement equipment and

conducted training. Advanced training inc luded demonstrations of

tank-infantry tactics with co-ordinated artillery , ai, and tank destroyer

support. Training focused on anticipated operations so during this period

the men of the 2d Armored Division practiced driving landing vehicles (LVTs)

and treadway bridge construction in preparation for the Rhine River crossing.

Through 15 December the division carried out replacement and repair of

casualty tanks and salvage of equipment. This work was vital because losses

throughout the campaign ran higher than planners anticipated so constant

shortages of equipment and men plagued First Army. Every day in the ETO the

U.S. Armv lost 1,200 small arms, 1,300 bayonets, and 5,000 tires. Every

month 700 mortars, 375 medium and light tanks, 900 2 1/2 tons, 15,000 jeeps,

100 cannon and 150 tubes had to be replaced. 53

I3WC1221 j/NOV83
ORDNANCE SERVICE, COMMUNICATIONS ZONE, EUROPEAN THEATER

Period Covered: 6 June 1944 to 28 February 1945

Summary of Statistical Reports showing the number of weeks, out of a

total period of 39 weeks, in which various critical major.items were below

authorized T/E plus reserve levels.

MAJOR ITEMS WEEEKS REPORTED SHORT

Combat Vehicles

Medium Tanks 39

Light Tanks 4

Armored Cars 39

Half Tracks 39

Small Arms, Mortars etc

Mortar, 60-m .26

Mortar, 81-Ia - - 17

Gun, Mach., Cal. .30 Flex 12,

Rifle, Auto., Cal. .30 (BAR) 8

Gun, Submachine, Cal. .45 12

Rifle, Cal. .30 Ml 4

Launcher, Rocket, Anti-Tank 12

Binoculars, All Models 35

Compass 17

Watches, Pocket & Wrist 35

General Purpose Vehicles

Trucks, one and one half ton & under 35

Trucks, two and one half ton & over 39

Trailers, one fourth 'ton & one ton 12

Artillery Weapons

Anti-Tank Motor Carriages 31

Field Artillery Motor Carriages 26

Anti-Aircraft Artillery, Multi Gun,

Motor Carriages 17

Towed Medium Field Artillery 21

*Heavy Field Artillery 9

*-Extracted from G-4 Periodic Reports, 12 US Army Group.

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

25
To meet the resupply difficulties in October 1944 First U.S. Army

directed that armored divisions turn in all medium tanks in excess of 200,

although the Table of Equipment authorized 236 per division. 54

Furthermore replacement tanks would be issued only after the number-on hand

dropped below 200. On 15 Octobe-, the 2d Armored had 211 medium tanks

available despite losses of 120 medium tanks since June 19a44. They had to

return the excess 11 tarks to First Army which consolidated all turned-in

equipment in the main army vehicle and artillery park. There ordnance

maintenance companies processed the turned-in equipment, repaired equipment,

and newly arriving major items of equipment. In this manner, First Army

created a pool of vehicles and tanks.

Replacement crews for armored divisions theoretically had their flow

coordinated writh that of replacement vehicles. According- to the manual,

replacements moved fr-m the communications zone replacement center to the

vehicular pool, division service park, or an intermediate point in

exceptional circumstances.55 First Army, however, reported difficulty in

matching the flow of armored crew replacements with armored vehicles and

recommended that crew be requistioned as individuals.56

Operational needs for tanks were always high and in November 1944 a

revised system of tank resupply went into effect. .The 522d Ordnance HeavyMaintenance Tank Company began work in Nancy, France and operated as- a

provisional base tank repair shop.

3WPC1221J /NOV83

26
ORO-T-117 Fire Damage and Repairability

TABLE XIX

REAIRABIL(TY OF TANK CASTJALTIES-ALL THEATERS

(Sampling)

NUMBER PERCENT NUMBER NON- PERCENT NONSample REAIRABLE REPA.RABLE REPAIRABLE REPAIRABLZ

TOTALS BY THEATER -- -

US: Italy-Gunfire 32 9 28'. 1 23 - 71.9

Mine 24 16 66.7 8 33.3

Mortar 1 0 0.0 1 100.0

Hollow chg. 3 2 56.7 1 33.3

ETO - Gunfire 722 337 46,7. 385 . - 53.3

Mine 210 159 75.7 51 24.3

Mortar 7 7 100.0 0 - 0.0

Hollow chg. 152 105 69.1 47 - 30.9

UK: N. Africa-Gunfire 242 129 113

Mine 48 31 64.6 17

Italy-Gunfire 94 51 54.3 43 45.7

Mine 42 30 71.4 12 28.6

Mortar 2 1 50.0 1 50.0

Hollow chg. 10 7 70.0 3 30.0

TOTALS BY COUNTRY

US: GTunfire 754 346 45.9 408 54.1

Mine 234 175 74.8 59 25.2

Mortar 8 7 87.5 1 12.5

Hollow chg. 155 107 69.0 48 31.0

U': Gunfire

Mine

Mortar

Hollow chg.

3WPC 1221 J/NOV83

528

208

8

45

304

171

7

35

57.6

82.2

87.5

77.8

224

37

1

10

42.4

17.8

12.5

22.2

27
GRAND TOTALS BY CAUSE

Gunfire 1282 650 50.7 632 49.3

Mine 442 346 78.3 96 21.7

Mortar 16 14 87.5 2 12.5

Hollow chg. 200 142 71.0 58 29.0

3WPC1221 J/NOV83

28
The company repaired and serviced all tanks brought there and forwarded them

to the army pool. When a using unit turned in a tank for repair, they

received a tally which authorized them to pick up a newly repaired tank frcm

the pool. By such methods, tactical units --could -be kept aat authorized

strength with scarcely any loss of time .57 The tank crew, however, faced

the burden of breaking in an unfamilar tank, learning its mechanical

idiosyncracies, and a nagging sense that perhaps something had been left

undone.

To support a tank attack, two recovery squads and two wrecker squads

positioned themselves close to the tank assembly area. Heavy transportation

squads stayed 2 or 3 miles to the rear. The recovery units attempted no

repair work and instead removed all recovered material to a corps collecting

point. As with the Germans and 3ritish, recovery operations" began at night

to avoid enemy fie.58

Medium Tank First Army Medium- Tank" ..- -Medium Tanks

T/E Strength Authori- Operative.- Lost

zation Daily Average

AUG 1944

SEPT 1944

OCT 19424

NOV 1944

DEC 1944

JAN 1945

- TOTAL 1358

-TOTAL 1184

- TOTAL 1454

-TOTAL 1054

- TOTAL 1730

- TOTAL 1400

I of FEB 1945 TOTAL 1064

1358

1138

1362

931

1588

1368

1064

1282

1026

1201

846

1320

1210

942

GRAND TOTAL LOSS FOR PERIOD AUGUST 1944 TO FEBRUARY 1945

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

29

223

139

132

133

398

184

1251
Reclamation of battlefield equipment was a major factor in sustaining

units in combat. The three armies of. 12th Army Group each had three salvage

collecting companies and three salvage repair companies, one per corps and

one for army. The collecting company maintained 3 or "-4- man details- at Army

Class I supply points of the supported corps. They received salvage

evacuated by unit ration vehicles, sorted the salvage, and sent it to

salvage centers.59 Small arms shortages were quite severe, and during

October 1944 Third Army emphasized battlefield recovery of small arms.

Third Army instructed all units to turn in excess weaponry, and held unit

commanders responsible for unauthorized weapons retained by men in their

command. Ccmpany commanders designated recovery squads within each company

to collect and turn in all abandoned small arms. Ordnance personnel made

periodic visits to all aid stations, hospitals, collection points, and

cemeteries to collect weapcns.60 Their results were irresslv',e.

On Back Order 6 OCT

Sub-machine gun

30 Cal. machine-gun

Binoculars

Compass

Tanks (medium)

1200

800

4250

366

40

On Back Order end OCT

None (700 on hand)

90

2. 2446 - - -

190

10 .

Anti-tank platoon personnel policed the battlefield behind the advancing

infantry troops. The equipment they recovered was used to replenish unit

stockage, with all surplus going to salvage. Units used their for-4ard

medical installations to salvage miscellaneous organizational equipment from

casualties, especially binoculars and watches which were difficult items to

replace. 61

3WPC1221 j/NOV8S3

30
Part III

The 28th Infantry -Division at Schmidt

At Schmidt, Germany, -the 28th Infantry- Division -su-ffered very heavy

casualties in a short period of time, and for that reason CSI selected it as

an excellent example to illustrate the reconstitution process for a

particular unit. From 2 through 9 November 1944, the 28th Infantry Division

fought a major offensive action at Schmidt, After 9 November, the division

did conduct local attacks until 14 November, but it was incapable of further

sustained combat operations. Higher headquarters withdrew it from the

fighting. The division -entered the operation with 13,932 effectives, and on

13 November listed 13,447 effectives despite 5,028 cumulative losses (3,637

battle, 1,391 non-battle) suffered from 2 November to that date. 1 The

overwhelming majority of casualties occurred in the rifle battalions among

infantrymen. A 1944 infantry division had roughly 6,000 riflemen, so that

between 2 and 7 November the 28th Division lost nearly all its infantry

fighting strength.

The 28th Infantry Division attacked Schmidt on 2 November as -its 109th

Infantry Regiment assaulted German positions in wooded terrain Fo the-north

in the direction of Huertgen; its 110th Infantry also attacked over wooded

terrain to the south; the 112th Infantry pushed west out of the woods -and'

across the Kall River into a narrow salient between the 109th and 1 10th

regiments and seized Schmidt on 3 November. '110th Neither the 109th nor 

made much progress. On 4 November German counterattacks drove the 3d

Battalion, 112th Infantry, from Schmidt to Kommerscheidt. Meanwhile, the 2d

Battalion, 112th Infantry occupied 'Vossenack Ridge, protecting its sister

battalions' northern flank. (See map next page)

Under heavy and sustained German artillery fire, the 2d Battalion

vacated its positions on 6 November. The next day remnants of the 1st and

3d battalions withdrew from Komerscheidt, and on 8 November the division

commander ordered the entire 112th Infantry to withdraw back across the Kall

River for reconstitution. After the withdrawal and subsequent unit roll

calls, the magnitude of the regiment's losses became clear to divisional

headquarters. Forty-six officers and 829 enlisted casualties (including 434

missing in action) - were reported for the single day of 10 November. 2, In

fact almost all of the casualties reported on 10 November had occurred

earlier in the fighting near Schmidt. Battalions of the 112th Infantry were

reduced to company size formations and the unit was incapable of further

operations. Despite divisional orders that brought the regiment up to

strength through personnel replacements, the 112th was ,unable to carry out

an attack scheduled for 10 November. The 1st Battalion, 109th Infantry

attacked instead, but with only partial success and additional casualties.

By that time, the 109th's other two battalions were restricted to patrolling

actions. The 110th Infantry to the south tried until 12 November to

*An infantry regiment had 3,118 officers and enlisted' members.

3WPC1221 j/NOV83
dislodge German defenders, but its companies were so depleted and its

attacks such feeble, piecemeal efforts that virtually no change in the lines

was effected.3 The official unit report asserted that the division's

morale was "excellent" after the fighting, 4. but a pos-twar study maintained

that as of 14 November 1944, "the 28th Division was reported destroyed as a

fighting machine."

From this overview of the Schmidt operation, a detailed examination of

reconstitution procedures to sustain the 28th Division in combat at Schmidt

follows. The purpose is to demonstrate how reconstitution worked at the

division level in an actual operation that involved "surge" casualties. A

detailed look at the engagement will also help identify criteria that a

commander might recognize as indicating that a unit requires

reconstitution. Those factors from the Schmidt experience will be applied

to the criteria developed for reconstitution in the second part of this

narrative. Part three describes the methods used to regenerate the 28th

Division from its combat ineffective state.

?art I-Operations at Schmidt ..

On 1 November 1944 the 28th Infantry Division was rested -after nearly a

month in a relatively inactive sector, and was almost at full- s-trengthbeing 7 officers and 18 enlisted men understrength. The division had been

in combat three plus months and had seen heavy fighting in France in August

191a and at the Seigfried Line in September 1944-. Cumulative casualties to

1 November were 8,775, including 6,130 battle losses.6

On I November there were 825 officers and 13,107 enlisted men available

for duty. In addition, for the attack on Schmidt the division had been

substantially reinforced by the 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion (728 officers

and men) and the 707th Tank Battalion (718 officers and men). The division

also received 47 weasels (M 29 Cargo Carriers) in recognition of the rugged

terrain in which resupply would have to be conducted. Eight battalions and

a separate battery of V and VII corps artillery were available, and six

battalions of VI7 Corps artillery would participate in the preparatory

fires. The IX Tactical Air Command would provide close air support to

isolate the battlefield. Such lavish support was available because the 28th

Division was the only division attacking the Germans along a 27 mile front

and, for several days, the division's engagement was the only offensive

action taking place on the entire 170 mile western front.7

First Army's general offensive to clear German forces remaining west of

the Rhine was to commence on 5 November. It was hooed that. the 28th

Division's attack, scheduled to begin on 1 November; would divert German

reserves and thus open the way for the main thrust.s In fact bad weather

orecluded air support and forced postponement of the First Army's attack

until 10 November, or the first good weather day thereafter. The original

diversionary intent of the Schmidt operation was lost.

1WPC1221 j/NOV83

32
The 28th Division's tactical plan for divergent series of attacks was a

deviation from standard doctrine. It was necessary because of the lack of

troops for the operation and the .necessity to perform three initial

missions--defend the north flank, clear the south flank, and seize

Schmidt.9 At the small unit levels, however, --the commander's intent was

either not clear or not properly explained. When the 3d Battalion, 112th

Infantrv entered Schmidt on 3 November there was confusion over whether they

should pursue the retreating Germans or consolidate their positions. A

rifleman from Company L, 3d Battalion remembered that there was "a lot of

indecision about what we were supposed to do--stay or push on." 10 By the

time orders reached them to consolidate, darkness had settled so it was too

late to site fighting positions or post sentries. Consequently the tired

men spent that night in the buildings of Schmidt.

Schmidt fell easily into American hands, but the subsequent intensity of

the battle was beyond the expectations of the men. Three factors--

misinformation about the enemy situation, rough terrain, and bad

weather-accounted in large measure for the failure of expectations to match

reality. Corps and division G-2 and G-3 officers told the men that IX

Tactical Air- Force would isolate the battlefield and prevent German

reinforcements from reaching to Schmidt area. The G-2 told unit- commanders

that they would be "fighting a grabbag formation of German infantry." 11

This. was untrue, but irrelevant.- In the rugged, forested terrain, even

crab-bag packets of determined German defenders could stop the advance of

much larger units .

The men moved into the dank, dense Heurtgen Forest on 26 October 1944 to

relieve the 9th Infantry Division and to prepare for their attack on

Schmidt. The 9th Division suffered 4,500 casualties in the Heurtgen Forest

from 5 through 11 October.12 Conducting the relief, men of the 28th

Division saw in the gloomy thick forestation and undergrowth the litter of

the debris of battle; emergency ration containers, artillery shattered

trees, loose mines along muddy roads and trails. The troops they relieved

showed the signs of desperate fighting--crushing fatigue, nervousness, and a

dirty and unshaven appearance.13 The men of the 9th Division were

exhausted; so tired that, according to one account, men coming out of the

line could not even lift their feet to step over corpses of members of their

own units. Instead they stepped on the corpse's face and continued their

trudge to the rear. Battalion commanders were reduced to near "gibbering

idiots" and became completely apathetic. 14

Nor was this impression limited to sympathetic observers. First Army

acknowledged that the "perpetual gloom of the forest destroyed morale." 15

The configuration of the terrain which had sharply defined, roller-coasterlike ridges, valleys, and gorges compounded the "stupifying effects offighti=n in the woods. n 16 In such terrain, units found it nearly

impossible to maintain contact; squads got lost and the area was conducive

to German ambushes. The Americans, moreover, could not employ direct fire

artillery, a fire support technique to which they had become accustomed.

3WPC1221 J/NOVS3

33
Untrained for operations in wooded areas, the 28th Division's 109th and

110th _Infantry fought man and nature. A captured German appraisal of the

American troops noted, "In combat in wooded areas the American has shown

himself completely unf it."17 One historian,---himself a - former -infantry

comDany commander in the European Theater of Operations (ETO), wondered if

the forest fostered a psychological malaise affecting commander and soldier

alike. 18

The hindering wooded terrain impeded resupply efforts. Engineers had to

work around the clock to keep the few roads intersecting the woods

trafficable. Resupply to front line units was also difficult, particularly

for the 112th Infantry across the Kall River. Only a single bridge spanned

the Kall and only an unimproved track ran from the resupply point to that

bridge. This dirt trail was too narrow to support sustained heavy vehicle

and tank traffic, although engineers and maintenance personnel did manage to

get several tanks and tank destroyers across the Kall. The weasel tracked

cargo carriers proved most effective, but even their supply runs at night

would take 3 to 4 hours for a 4 mile trip to resupply the 112th. In

addition to the rugged terrain, the weather conspired to turn roads into

muddy bogs. , . ....-..

Immediately p-receeding and throughout the Schmidt operation, theweather

was cold, damp, misty, and generally uncomfortable, although not quite

freezing. Before the operation, from 15 to 20 October, the 28th Division

lived in the rain. A 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry informal history recalled

that rain on 17 October "dampened the spirits of the entire company. " 19

As S.L.A. Marshall wrote, "moral 'values change with every shift of the

weather. Rain and heavy skies are as greatly depressing to the will of

fighting troops as they are impeding to the mechanics of movement."^20

There had been so much rain that the ground woas saturated and water

staved on the surface. Beyond the psychologically depressing atmosphere,

the foul weather and supply shortages combined to swell the sick-call

lists. The 28th Division was short 9,000 pairs of artic overshoes, and the

overshoes would not be issued until 14 November, after the unit had been

withdrawn from the Schmidt fighting. Consequently the number of cases of

immersion foot (trench foot) was "tremendous. Besides that, the men

had been living in foxholes and tents for the days preceeding their attack:.

The bone chilling dampness of the wet ground and constant exposure to the

raw German autumn had left many men with respiratory diseases ranging from

head colds to' walking pneumonia or even more incapacitating ailments. In

many instances, sick men were attacking in weather that could only worsen

their already weakened physical condition.

At the operational level, the wet weather hindered resupply efforts,

close air support, and artillery observation. The weather stayed dismal

throughout the battle.

3WPC1221 /NOV83

34
On 28 October, the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry saw its first sunrise in

40 days, but on 30 October grey, misty skies returned. The next day it

rained forcing postponement of the 28th's attack because IX Tactical Air

Force would not fly support. On 2 November, the- day the attack commenced,

it was cold and misty, not quite raining. Mist and low clouds precluded

close air support. Tne next day's weather was similar, with temperatures

hovering near freezing and heavy mists hanging on wooded draws. By this

time the infantrymen were engaged in close combat and, with the exception of

the two battalions of the 112th Infantry whose men were sheltering in

buildings in Schmidt, the infantry was at the complete mercy of the

elements. The nature of small-unit combat exacerbated the effects of

weather.

The infantrymen at Schmidt carried one blanket and their -overcoats in a

horseshoe roll on their packs. But the infantryman invariably tried to

lighten his load, particularly when being shot at, and discarded everything

he could possibly do without. This resulted in a huge waste of clothing and

equipment. It seems to have depended on the individual infantry unit on how

effective it was on collecting surplus equipment from troops upon their

entry to combat. Surplus equipment would then be stored and-returned to

survivors after the battle. Normally anti-tank personnel-- policed the

battlefield behind the front line elements and recovered equipment which -was--

in turn used to replenish unit stockage, with all surplus going -to

storage.22 At Schmidt the terrain and the tactical situation of" the -112th

Infantry in a narrow salient precluded effective battlefield policing. Thus

after one or two days of fighting, many men of the 28th Division no longer

had overcoats or blankets to keep themselves warm, those items having been

lost or abandoned during the heat of the action.

By 3 November a mist threatening to turn to drizzle settled over a

morass of mud that mired supply vehicles and stuck to the boots of the

infantrymen thereby increasing their physical labor and exertion. No close

air support was available. Artillery observers could not see marking smoke

and had difficulty adjusting fire. The following day the weather improved

and air support was available after 1200 hours. Later in the day the

weather again closed in and caused cancellation of planned airstrikes. The

best weather for air support during the entire operation was on 5 November,

but the next day adverse weather returned and air was unavailable until 1200

hours. On 7 November a cold winter rain fell in the morning and low clouds

on 8 November precluded support. On 9 November the weather turned worse, a

cold rain changing to snow after daylight with increasing snowfall

throughout the day. Adverse weather plagued the entire operation,

restricting fire support, resupply, and sapping the strength and health of

the infantrymen fighting the battle.

Furthermore the restricted visibility allowed German reinforcements to

reach Schmidt unimpeded by U.S. tactical aircraft. In addition, U.S.

artillery could not locate and thus neutralize the German artillery which

dominated the battelfield with disasterous results for the Americans.

3'WPC1 221J/NOV83

35
On U November the German 116th Panzer Regiment counterattacked the

Americans holding Schmidt. American infantry fired bazooka rounds and

watched helplessly as the rounds bounced off the thick-hulled German tanks.

Tnstead of meeting ragtag infantry formations, the 28th Division found

itself engaging German combined arms counterattacks. The absence ofanticipated air support and ineffectual artillery support and the lack of

faith in their organic anti-tank weapons demoralized the 112th Infantry.

The intensity of the battle exceeded the expectations of the veterans of

the 28th Division. One said that fighting in the Normandy breakout was bad,

but nothing like Schmidt. 23 The 109th and 110th Infantry regiments faced

the special problems of fighting in woods--sundered formations, poor command

and control, confusion, and the ability of small pockets of determined

Germans to inflict heavy casualties and disrupt American _attacks. Across

the Kall River, the 112th Infantry was in Schmidt on an otherwise open

plain. They were simultaneously exposed to German gunners. on the plain and

isolated from their sister regiments.

Only three American tanks had been able to cross the Kall River by

I November, the remainder either suffering mechanical breakdown-or unable to

move on the narrow, congested Kall Trail. American armor then could not

provide support against the German counterattack on the mornilng- of

4 November. Neither could airpower, because a requested airstrike failed to

arrive on time. - - -

Meanwhile the Germans shelled the exposed American salient in Schmidt

from three sides with artillery and mortars. German tanks added their

direct cannon fire to the bombardment. The Americans in Schmidt lost

telephone contact with the 2d Battalion on Vossenack ridge and with the the

Id Battalion Command Post which was located on the road between Schmidt and

Kommerscheidt.24

Following a 30 minute artillery bombardment, German tanks led

infantrymen in a counterattack against the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry

holding Schmidt. Company K, 3d Battalion broke and fled under the German

attack. A bazooka team and six supporting riflemen climbed out of their

foxholes and ran toward other members of the company yelling that tanks were

coming. According to one survivor, "the platoon seemed to disintegrate,"

and riflemen streamed into the woods southwest of Schmidt.25

Company I was ordered to pull back and cover the gap opened by K's rout,

but Comoany I's men instead fled to Komerscheidt, then held by the 1st

lattalion, 112th Infantry about one mile northeast of Schmidt. Rumors and

confusion about the battalion commander deserting -his men filled the

panic-stricken men.26

At Kommerscheidt the 1st Battalion halted the fleeing mob running at

them by ohysical force and drawn pistols. They finally rounded up about 200

men of the 3d Battalion to augment the defenses at Kommerscheidt. The

3WPC1221J/NOV 83

36
Germans continued their counterattack, but the American defenders received

fire sunoort from the 229th Field Artillery Battalion, the three tanks that

had managed to cross the tall, and some air support. This additional

firepower enabled the Kommerscheidt defenders to regenerate the men from the

l Battalion by reorganizing the unit.27. ---The commander- of -the 1st

Battalion shifted the depleted units of the 3d Battalion to support the

1st Battalion and form a composite unit. In a matter of hours, then, men

had panicked, fled, and returned to fight off a German counterattack. As

for the men who fled into the woods, about 30 stragglers made it back to

their unit. The rest were killed or captured, 133 prisoners being taken by

the Germans on 8 November.

Within Kommerscheidt the commander of the 1st Battalion reorganized the

1st and Id battalions into two defensive sectors. He commanded one sector

and a captain, the Company I commander, led the other. 8 - The men held

against German counterattacks until the morning of 7 November when they too

were driven from Kommerscheidt. -' -

Meanwhile on Vossenack Ridge, the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry had been

under heavy and sustained German artillery fire. By 5 November the

cumulative effect of the constant pounding had shattered men's-- nerves.

Soldiers had to be ordered to eat; many cried- like children, and the

battalion commander sat in a basement with his head in his 'hands-- -Jusbefore dar'- on 5 November, artillery killed six men in a line of two-man

foxholes. Th..e rest of their shaken company pulled back into the town- of

Vossenack, leaving a 100 yard gap in the defenses. Officers ordered t'he

reluctant men back into their foxholes. The men went but soon returned,

crving, to the imagined safety of the town's buildings.29

The next morning there was no dawn shelling,. only small arms fire.

About thirty minutes later, however, German artillery fire began falling on

the battalion's positions. Company G broke and fled, followed pell mell by

the other line comoanies and the reserve. Men pushed and shoved each other,

threw awav their equipment, and abandoned their wounded. From this terror

stricken mob, only 70 .men could be mustered for combat. The rest hid in

woods or tried to recross Kall River. It is doubtful that the Germans even

attacked the 2d Battalion that morning. The strain of battle had become too

great, and the men fled.30

Tanks and tank destroyers had crossed the Kall River on 3 November, but

in limited numbers so the American infantrymen felt let down by their own

armor. The defenders at Kommerscheidt would desert their forward foxholes

unless they saw American armor up front supporting them. Americans were

skittish without their tank support.31 The 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry

insisted that they lacked "adequate tank and anti-tank support." Thisoerception persisted despite the loss of 16 or 24 tank destroyers of the

893d Tank Destroyer Battalion and 31 of 50 M-4 tanks of the 707th Tank

~attalion. 32

'WPC 1221 j/NOV 83

37
Artillery support was not altogether satisfactory due to its inability

to neutralize the deadly German artillery. Division artillery alone fired

over ^6,000 rounds in support from 1 through 6 November and nearly 50,000

rounds from 7 through 16 November.33 These .-fir-es did-- help break-up German

counterattacks. On 4 November they suppqrted the forces in Ko=erscheidt

with at least '62 rounds and helped to repulse that German

counterattack.34 Air support was generally unsatisfactory, mainly because

foul weather prohibited its effective employment. Those times when air

support was available, most men agreed it was effective supporte

Resupply: Equipment and ?ersonnel Replacements:

The 28th Division's established its division supply agencies and

division clearing station at Roetgen, about 10 miles -straight line distance

east of Schmidt. (See map following page) Military police directed

resupply convoys from Roetgen south through Lamersdorf thence northwest' to

Richelskaul and Germeter, the latter about three miles northeast of Schmidt

on the entrance to the Kall Trail.35 The rugged terrain made resupply for

any of the infantry regiments difficult, but especially for the 112th

fighting in Schmidt. The division commander ordered the engineers- to keep

the single road open to one-way traffic, but five- disabled tanks and four

disabled tank destroyers along - the narrow trail -negated much- of this

effort. The engineers used bulldozers and explosives in attempts to improve

the trail, but wet weather coupled with the heavy vehicles driving- on the

roadwav virtually crumbled it. '

Members of Company A, 707th Maintenance Battalion worked three hours to

recair a thrown track of a tank broken down on the narrow trail. The tank

then lurched forward a few yards and again threw a track. The maintenance

men were Derhaps overly concerned about the heavy equipment and were

reluctant to abandon the equipment or destroy it. Consequently resupply

convoys had to work their way gingerly around the disabled hulks.30

Resupply vehicles operated at night to avoid enemy observation and

fire. The 707th Tank Battalion's 'supply convoys consisted of 3 weasels, 1

jeep, and 1 2&1/2 ton truck to carry rations, ammunition, gasoline, and

water to the tanks and their crews. It took them about three to four hours

to cover the two miles. The resupply convoy stopped near Company K's

positions and hand carried supplies from their vehicles to the tankers.37

Infantry resupply relied on three weasels and continued until 6 November

despite German artillery fire and ambushes laid by German infiltrators. The

first resupply vehicles reached Kommerscheidt at 0430 on 4 November.

Even so Company L, 3d Battalion had nothing to eat -on 4 November and did'

not receive any food until 5 November, a lapse of 34 hours.38 Probably

the least an infantryman can expect is to be fed. If that need is not

fulfilled, he becomes convinced that the unit has lost all interest because

it no longer even tries to supply the basics. It is no accident that

pictures of World War II infantrymen show gaunt, bodies and tired faces.

3WPC 1?21 j/NOV83

38
Most infantrymen suffered radical loss of weight. They were starving by

expending more calories than they were taking' in through rations. Field

rations were sufficient to sustain the enormous energy requirements of a

rifleman in combat, but soldiers in combat might- not receive their rations

regularly or refused to eat such rations.

At a pace of less than a mile-an-hour, the resupply columns set out in

darkness for Kommerscheidt. Two enlisted men of the 3d Battalion, 112th

nnfantry operated the only forward ammunition dump. located near Vossenack,

for five days.39 When the resupply vehicle arrived at the dump, these two

men loaded the trucks or weasels and sent them forward to the troops. After

0300 on 6 November, however, no resupply reached the 112th Infantry until

the surrvivors withdrew across the Kall on 8 November.,a

Space on resupply vehicles wms never wasted. After distributing rations

and ammunition, units used the now empty vehicles to evacuate their wounded

to the forward medical detachments. These detachments had followed behind

the attacking infantry and established field aid stations. From these

stations medics went forward to aid the infantrymen. At- the forward aid

station doctors checked casualties and classified -them for return .. to duty

after treatment or evacuation to the division clearing station at Roeten.

Wrom 2 through 14 November, 3 officers and 127 men- were returned "to dutyafter brief hospitalizaticn. After the 28th Division began reconstitution,

from 15 to 22 November, they received another 4 officers and 213 men

returned to duty. 14 Finally salvage teams visited the forward medical

installations to gather miscellaneous organizational equipment from

casualties.

Personnel Replacements and Reconstitution:

Casualties: 'While casualty figures should provide the best guide for a

commander about the status of his forces, accurate casualty figures are

normally unavailable until several days after the fact, if ever. At Schmidt

the 28th Division lacked information about events at foxhole level that

exacerbated this natural lag in reporting. Furthermore, one commander

deliberately supplied misleading information to division in order to conceal

the extent of his regiment's reverses.42 The following is the official

report of casualties and requistions for replacements by day for the 28th

Division during the Schmidt fighting.43

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

39
t -IIII

L . \ ,,V,_ J ,.:2..~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~f -::-&g _X ~:;,

2,,, ~ ~,,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

4~~:,~ V;.~ ~~~~-',_'44D~~~~~~~~~~~~ I

' . .," ~' 72'"~""2 , .~4,, 'e, LI..' ,,,..~~~~~~~~~~~ "~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

l o

1? . 't ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

· ¢<t~~~~~t+-..._ ~ ~;~~~~~~ v.~~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~ ~~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

W%~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...- 4:,-.-,.--.,.lJJ~ Z~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

N~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~:~ ... .;':. '

4 W~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.. ."..'2:

U-4# 4.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,: cc-Z:

1~~~~~~~~~1 ?" '': .- --.- ~~7-~.,. ,--.,.--~:.~ v.~~-....:i,,![!::~;,_~ ,:4 4-:-~~ -. '.:

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~V 0.40,,. -,

.3 Al 4,~~~~~~ IN~~~~~~~~~~

. . .. l ~"""", .~,,~'~"' ~" _~ !~2 :~ '~-'.

-'..,,*_,..~.~_'~'~-."~.,..,. '-' '-_. :4,'~ -:~.~,%. .O ~l.:;.~a 

~ _ . / .~"'5~'~ '~'"-.~, ~.~ ~~-. '. '~F ..'.-;. '.,',,._.:~'~~,',.~::~:,~.~,:-:../'-~-- :,-ISO~ ~%-~~~~ /~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~07 ~ I ~,' ._~+~'-.K~/'""l:~F~f~.;.,~ ' ;.. SJ~.':,..?-,~,,.':&',"..":.:~'t~-5:::;-'~i~~'~':~::;,. ;*

411 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~1,'

'

~~ ' 'Q ''~~

ix,. z;:~33.;~- ~ -. r'- &.~'-% F~/~?.:~:¢!.',:..'?-.~:;';i.e.j.!~'~V ~)-_./ %'-/1 ' ~%~:'-"-.M ) ~"~,,._~ >.,-"~., ''~.~,:%~.:-.!,:.-?'.: ~:":.:.,~' ., .!.'"V

-i -Z , - - . - , - .,6 j , "'I -, ,, I Z.. :  --- Y., ; , 6" -, I..

I .1 -. -4 !:I -,-.; ') -,' ,- . " 4 .1 " VI ;. I .1 '. , , I ') "I'* 1 .- I- 2
BAT!'LZ NON-BATTT.E RE LACEIENITS EFFECTIVE" STRENGTH

CAS3ALTIES

OFF /Em

29/699 (48)

18/72(52)

10/371(22)

11/344 (63)

5/37(1/14)

11/204(3/45)

0(0/14)

745/12536

754/12271

754/12368

-757'/12690.

761'/12679

768/12840

770/12784

12 NOV 11/160 6/90

6/210 3/111

?/98

1/0 medical

0/2 engineer

150 infantry

0/5 engineer

0/9 medical

300 infantry

2/8 artillery

0/8 medical

0/4 engineer

3/225 infantry

1/15 engineer

0/2 medical

100 infantry

1/1 artillery

1/63 medical

0/15 engineer

0/50 tank

destroyers

0/6 AAA

l4/60 armor

0

0 --

From 2 through 26 November, the 28th Division reported 248 officers and

.,452 men lost as battle casualties, although most of these losses were

suffered between 2 and 14 November. To 18 November, the division received

4,878 replacements, overwhelmingly infantry specialities (4,458 of the

total). The division .was able to replace its heavy ersonnel losses but

the influx of replacements was so great that the individual regments of the

division were no longer combat effective.

The infusion of 68 officers and 2,177 enlisted replacements during the

heaviest fighting between 2 and 10 November could not reconstitute the

fighting strength of the division. The unit suffered too many casualties in

too brief a time, and the division commander did not know the extent of

losses within his command. The reasons were the inevitable lag in casualty

reoorting from line units; the falsification of casualty reports apparently

to impress higher headquarters; surge casualties overloading the division's

administrative reporting system which could not keep an accurate account of

losses; and the division commander's seeming inability to recogize the toll

the fighting exacted from his men.

When replacements arrived, the division chief of staff instructed the

division G-t to distribute them to the regiments. The regimental S-1 in

turn apportioned the replacements received at regiment to battalion where

battalion officers assigned them to specific companies and platoons. At

3WPC1221 j/NOV83 41

1t3 NOV

14 NOV

1; NOtO

16 NOV

17 NOV

18 NOV

3/24

0/13

4/27

0/18

6/64

1/25

1/59

1/55

DAY IIIEQUEST I70us
BATTLE NON-BATTLE

CASUALTIES

OFF./EM

12/288 1/59

10/238 1/53

16/253 2/61

13/185 0/75

18/352 5/142

REPLACEMENTS EFFECTIVE STRENGTH

0(/7)*

14/358(0)

o(0/10)

0(0/11)

-5/308(3/25)

A special reauisition was submitted for

12/333 3/98 1/296(0/17)

-- 821/1.2760

814/12828

798/12523

786/12280

771-/12108

2 0-6s and 5 0-5s,

758/11965

REEQUISTIONS

1-0/300- infantry

0/10 artillery

0/4 engineer

5 medical

0/300 infantry

0/3 artillery

1/3 engineer

0/300 infantry

1/4 artillery

0/11 armor

25 medical

1/0

quartermaster

0/11 armor

25/300 infantry

1/13 artillery

-1/8 engineer

25 medical

257350- infantry

0/3 cavalry

3/25 medical

infantry.

15/350 infantry

1/13 artillery

10/310 1/81 38/691(0/48)

After a headcount ordered by division, it

and 673 enlisted men were missing. This

the following day's report.

787/12314

was estimated that

was to be reported

10/450 infantry

2/6 artillery

0/1 engineer

34 officers

to Army in

BATTLE ]

CAASUALTIES

OFF/EM

20/86

NON-BATTLE REPLACEINTS

1/105

46/829 9/91

9/112 5/165

1/87(28)

9/437(35)

11/431(59)

EFFECTIVE STRENGTH REQUISTIONS

770/12241

0/10 artillery

0/16 medical

724/11805

2/3 artillery

0/2 medical

730/12080

1/4 artillery

22/373 infantry

60/400 infantry

0/250 infantry

-Returned-to unit from medical system in addition to replacements,

?WPC1221j/NOV83

DAY

2 NOV

3 NOV

4 NOV

6 NOV

7 NOV

8 NOV

DAY

9 NOV

10 NOV

11 NOV
the regimental level, the reconstitution of personnel involved the following

process .

On 3 November, General Cota committed his reserve battalion of the 110th

Infantry, thus expending the 28th Division's only reserve very early in the

operation. That same day division received-14 officers and 358 enlisted

replacements, but they included 14 officers and 147 men who had been

attached to the division for training in the regimental rear echelon. As

the attack began, V Corps authorized their use as replacements. According

to the G-1 Journal, 150 infantrymen each were sent to the 109th and 110th

Infantrv regiments respectively.

No more replacements arrived until 6 November when 315 (5 officers/308-

men) reported. G-1 recorded sending 315 replacements to units, probably the

109th and 110th Infantry regiments. Replacement figUfres and- distribution

for 7 through 9 November reveal that for the first time division

headquarters grasped the severe losses suffered by the 112th Infantry.

On 7 November, G-1 planned to send 200 replacements to the 109th

Infantry and 90 to the 3d Battalion, 11Oth Infantry, then-holding the Kall

Crossing.** The Chief of Staff then instructed that -all the_ replacements

report to the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry the following day. On_ 8

November, an additional 38 officer and 691 enlisted replacements arrived.

Division headquarters pooled and distributed these replacements and those

received the previous day, 247 to the 109th; 225 to the 110th; and "475 to

the 1 ?th. The same day General Cota had ordered the 112th Infantry to

withdraw across the Kall and begin reconstitution. At that time, to

determine actual personnel casualties, division ordered the units to make

head counts of their members.

*These fizures are derived from the 28th Division G-1 Journal and File,

but thev do not match exactly the daily replacement figures recorded in the

28th Division's unit h.story. I have placed the unit history figures in

parenthesis following the G-t's figures on disposition of replacements.

**This included 18 men returned to duty.

tWPC1221 /NOV8?
.As of 8 November

ist Battalion,* 112th Infantry (Fought at Kcmmerscheidt 3-8 November)

HQ & HQ Co 3/63

Company A 2/67

B 0/60

tt C 2/112

tt D 2/50

TOTAL 9/352- (By 9 November stragglers made the total 9/357)

3d Battalion, 112th Infantry (Driven from Schmidt, 4 November; fought at

Kcmmerscheidt 4-8 November)

HQ & HQ Co 4/49

I Company 1/73

K " 1/-42

L " 2/42 -

M " 3/68

TOTAL 9/274 (By 9 November stragglers made the total 11/274)

These units did not, however, receive replacements because the division

commander wanted the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry brought up to authorized

strength so that it could spearhead an attack on 10 November. But the

commanding officer, 112th Infantry, called the division G-1 on 8 November

and refused' to accept 250 of these replacements because they lacked proper

infantry training. Furthermore, when the 2d Battalion received its alerting

order to lead the attack north against Huertgen on the morning of

10 November, its commander reported to the division G-3 that the battalion,

"while up to strength, could not be considered more than 20 per cent

effective for combat., 515 replacements having been placed in the battalion

the day previous. n 44 Division then placed the battalion in reserve to

hold Voasenack and ordered the 1st Battalion, 109th Infantry to make the

attack instead.

The division commander found it difficult even to know the exact status

of his line units. On 9 November at 1430 the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry,

for example, reported its personnel strength, but the division G-1 believed

the reported figure was too high and ordered a recount. Two and one-half

hours, the battalion returned an amended report.

*A rifle battalion consisted of 35 officers and 836 men at strength. A

rifle company had 6 officers and 187 men at strength.

3WPC1221J/NOV83
Id Battalion, 110th Infantry

Original Amended With Replacements HQ & HO Co 8/118 18/18 8/118

I Company 3/145 2/103 4/148 (2/45) - n 4/40 1/50 - /170 '(3/120

L n 2/97 1/109 5/174 (4/65)

M " 5/120 5/110 6/117 (1/7)

Thus the 3d Battalion could provide accurate figures only for its

Headquarters Company personnel, but not its lettered companies. In

addition, the unit received 237 replacements to go with the 372 soldiers

left in the line companies, or slightly over 50 per cent replacements in the

line units. Even these manpower drafts alone could not reconstitute the

unit as a fighting force. When the 110th Infantry resumed its attacks, the

?3 Battalion remained as regimental reserve. The tst and- 2d Battalions

carried the bulk of the fighting, but by 14 November they too were exhausted.

On the night of 12 November, the regimental executive officer visited

the 1st-Battalion and determined that the morale, physical condition, and

mental state of the men was low, with the companies reduced to sub-platoon strength. The battalion was badly disorganized,- so- the next mornhihg the

regiment attempted to reconstitute the battalion-.- Casualties had been- so

severe that it was impossible to reform companies or even platoons. -Insteadregiment organized various defense groups commanded by an officer or NCO.

Despite the organization of fighting teams its first tactical movement

caused the reorganized battalion to disintegrate. Its companies were so

deoleted and its attacks such "feeble, piecemeal efforts" that all failed,

vet resulted in another 616 casualties. The assistant division commander

visited the 110th's lines on 13 November and personally observed the

"depressing situation." He promptly cancelled all offensive action by the

regiment. Altogether the regiment suffered 1,549 battle casualties and

another 544 non-battle losses. 4 5

That experience seems to invalidate the official conclusions about the

efficiency of the replacement system at Schmidt.

"The oresent policy in this theater of assigning replacements to units

in combat is found to be sound and, until such times as casualties in

infantry battalions go over 20 per cent in a very short period of time, it

is believed that the units can continue in combat with but a very little, if

any, drop in efficiency. Even with casualties going over 50 per cent in

some battalions, the policy of immediate replacement of casualties prevents the necessity of the complete reorganization of the unit."4 6

Desoite an immediate replacement of losses at ' Schmidt, the 112th

Infantry was rendered combat ineffective from 8 November; the 110th's 3d

Battalion from 9 November. Other battalions of the division had to carry

tWPC1221J/NQV8?

44
Appendai- A

.JMA{PLE OF Dt-MTION OF CkSUA HIZS

IN AN -L{FA.XRY DWISION

(2mt Division, Schmidt Ca.cpaig., 1-14 Noverber 1944)

On 14 Ncvembe' Lhte 2Sth Division wz.s :ripcted des"oyed ds a flght.Lmg

Tf3UlE, Al .

* D1TIIBLT1ON CE CASI.UAL7-E. IN AN A'NFANRt1Y DIViSlON

iI £1rective 5irVeh ai Stan, o[ Ekgagrirmo, 01,24C Nowicr

Uaiws L~ 4 .

A *c1meats - 1a,117Xs 21,392

Teota 1l530 936. 16,266

2., CUala~ihaea~tt (rzde14 YomBt.34 1e), 2 to 13 Novzmba.;adiuivw

* I Div &a Anch=Lx.

-~ ~~~c ¶l ofTotl C. eudile. S~tiegrt a. of O124fK

Orpyit Uomit.. E04 0 Total in D iv &as Aztcmzrn

id Rfst (a) 4321 205 4s6 93.19 77.2

Ov Arty (4 Da) 67 7 74 1.52 .4

RWy C a's 43 1 .91 .27

StI Co 1 7

Ocrd 1 1.)

He* T." 10 io .49 .15

Q% C. 22 2

R~~ad 1 11

Sqbtot4 c~44 214 4&'

?aok.D~eatlr oye Dos 78 4 1.65 .49

AAn os 2 .14 .04

T.~kfl no 4 t02 2.10 * 6.

STbas ot4 I7 10 1'29

Tstal 463.1 224 "27 10.3.00 2.35

ORO-T-289

* 0 9 i * :·4 a' A .,a fr

39

* I f . - .
TAtLE Al (continue) .

3. Rep.lacemcnts «a4 citeurnccs bry Day o U'ttle

.a . _ .M 0 E4 0

* ~ ' . .. · 3' 342 -

* 4 10. * *- I

S - U ' 1

6 33 a 13

7 313 1 17. 2

* I 9 .. 38

9 IlS

10 472 9 10 2

.. * 11- 90 11 S

1 7S47 29 2

- 13 124 I8 7'

Tdl 37:2 115 56 4

2...t prcfCnet Iof ;vd;a casualtles repilace

31.73 percntc of AttacheIat asullies replacea
the attacks which resulted in more casualties for no appreciable gains and

ultimately wrecked the division.

A vague area concerning replacements is howw untested. men replace key

leaders. It is deceptively simple to identify key leaders by rank, but

should one regard the loss of a new 2d Lieutenant as significantly as the

loss of a veteran rifleman? Clark's study concluded that proportionately

higher losses among officers than enlisted troops "are not characteristic"

of the breakup of infantry battalions."4 7

At Kommerscheidt and at Vossenach company and battalion officers stemed

panic stricken troops in rout on two occasions and forced them back into the

firing line. During the same engagement, however, the division's G-1

requistioned two 0-6s and five 0-5s, infantry, as _replacement officers,

i.e., two regimental and five battalion commanders. 'The commander of the 2d

Battalion, 112th Infantry was evacuated for combat exhaustion; thatof- the

3d Battalion, 112th for minor wounds and combat exhaustion. The three other

battalion commanders were wounded in action. The 3d Battalion, 110th

Infantry lost its battalion commander, S-2, S-3, and Executive officer.

Losses among company and platoon officers were equally severe in-all -units.

Moreover, during the German counterattack on 7 November that -finallydrove the 1st and 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry from Kommerscheidt, the

regimental commander left his beleagured troops because -of a

misunderstanding. The colonel believed rumors that his relief was

imminent. A message from division headquarters seemed to confirm his

suspicions so he left Kommerscheidt to report to division. General Cota had

sent no such message, and when the colonel, now wounded, showed up at

division headquarters, Cota thought that he had deserted his men under

fire.* The strain was so great that Cota fainted..48 It should be

recalled, however, that General Cota was a highly regarded commander, one of

the better division commanders in Europe, and well thought of by his

troops. The physical and mental strain of six months of combat (Cota had

landed at Normandy on 6 June) appear to have taken their toll on his health

and decision-making ability. Yet in December the 28th Division under Cota

would perform well in the Battle of the Bulge.

Later that day Cota requested V Corps permission to withdraw the 28th

Division from combat. V Corps relayed the tacit approval of First Army, but

warned that the army commander was "extremely disappointed" with the 28th

Division's showing. On 8 November at a conference at division headquarters.

General Hodges, First Army commander, drew Cota aside and remarked that the

28th Division headquarters appeared to have no precise knowledge of the

location of its units and was doing nothing to obtain the information. 9

This was probably a valid criticism, but even the units themselves had no

idea of their location in the thick woods.

*in fact a message had been sent to the colonel by mistake.

3'PC1 221 j/NOV83

45
Not only did division lack a knowledge of the precise location of its

units and their personnel losses, it also seemed to have little

understanding of the nature of the fighting. The influence of terrain on

the troops has been discussed. Beyond that the men were sick even before

entering combat. The. enormous fatigue produced by infantry ccmbat further

dulled their senses. At Schmidt on 3 November the men were too tired to dig

foxholes. They were constantly exposed to the elements, the cold rain and

bone chilling mists. Men without blankets or overcoats huddled in rain

filled foxholes trying to keep out the cold. They had no overshoes, yet had

to stay in the water logged positions. German artillery and small arms fire

was so intense that men of the 112th Infantry could not leave their

foxholes. They were forced to dispose of their excrement in K-ration boxes,

pieces of paper, or handkerchiefs.50 Such conditions naturally affected

morale and unit cohesion. By 7 November the troops at Kcmmerschiedt were so

tired that they could not even hear artillery shells landing close to them.

They had reached the stage of fatigue that made their actions mechanical;

the fatigue that produces, according to S.L.A. Marshall,- an automatism of

the mind which destroys physical response. Their courage was killed and

their intellects fell asleep.51 For those reasons, as much as for

personnel losses, the 112th Infantry could not be reconstituted as a

fighting unit during the Schmidt operation. Morale had vanishedt r-eplaced

by apathy. The division staff deceived itself with the journal entry for 30

November that the combat efficiency, although reduced -in.- strength,

particularly of unit officers and NCOs, is rated excellent.52 .The

division had been destroyed and was even then undergoing regeneration. -

Criteria for Withdrawal of a Unit From Combat

As Applied to the 28th Infantry Division at Schmidt

Criteria Used for Unit Reconstitution

CSI derived of the reconstitution criteria applied to the 28th Division

from previous analytical studies by ORO, BDM, CAORA53 and CSI's historical

evaluation of combat data and evidence. These factors must be considered as

interrelated situational variables when employed as guidelines for

commanders. As Sun Tzu wrote, "And as water has no constant form, there are

in war no constant conditions." Perhaps the single variable most apparent

to the commander is the condition of his troops.

1. The condition of troops at the beginning of the engagement: This

criterion is probably the most easily recognizable. Its subsections would

include a) months the division has been in combat; b) the length of rest

period or service in a quiet sector just prior to the engagement; c) nature

of the most recent combat experience; d) actual unit strength; e) the

number of replacements in the unit. All of this factual data about the 28th

Division was available. Subset 1. b) is deceptive because even in a quiet

sector the unit had lost nearly 1,000 men in one month or over 30 a day to

all causes.

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

46
2. Terain: The commander should appraise the terrain not only for its

tactical advantages and disadvantages and availability of line of

communication for resupply, but also should consider the pyschological

effects the terrain will exert on his troops. Clearly the Huertgen Forest

exerted a deleterious influence on the men. Jungle fighting seems to impose

similar demands as would desert and mountain operations.

3. Weather: S.L.A. Marshall commented on the effect of weather on the

fighting troops. Excessive rain and clouds do exert psychological

influences as does excessive heat and sun. A common cliche is that a

oarticular location i3 no where to fight a war, but usually the fighting men

have no say in where they will fight. If commanders expect their men to be

adaptable, they should understand that adaptibility has a price tag in terms

of unit effectiveness. Weather and terrain also cause most non-battle

casualties, esecialvl illness and disease. At Schmidt the men were

ohvsicallv rundown before the operation began and the weather never =imroved

enough to afford them the opportunity to recover their health. These facts

should have been knomrn to the commander, but if they were, he ignored or

slighted them. So besides the effect on operations, one must consider

weather as a morale factor or casualty producer.

4. Expectations of the Troops Enterin Baattle: Combat rarely, if ever,

fits preconceived notions. Even veteran troops meet unexpected

circumstances. This variable relates to what Clark' termed "Imperative of

Mission", but is more encompassing. Clark defined her term to. mean the

"degree of urgency of the mission assigned to a unit may be assumed - to

influence its determination to carry out the order."54 Obviously, to

continue her analogy, a unit ordered to stand to the death has a different

perspective than one ordered to fight a delaying action. In short, the

significance of the mission should be clear to all the men. At Schmidt this

was not the case. In fact, First Army seems to have had no clear idea what

to do about Schmidt. An imperative was lacking.

The men of the line companies knew that "two divisions had been shot up"

in the woods before, ."but this time things would be different," but little

more. 5 While some might argue that this is all the men needed to know,

soldiers with a thorough knowledge of the comsander's plans and intentions

fight better because they understand their minor role in the major operation.

The men met unexoectedlv strong German resistance. The appearance of

previously unidentified counter attacking German armor proved expecially

demoralizing because staff officers assured the men that no German armor was

available. The shock hardly inspired confidence in the command or raised

morale. Instead of an Important mission imperative, Schmidt took on the

look of an ill-planned, ill-thought out operation *with no meaningfulobh ective.

3WPC1221 ,/NOV83

47
5. The Intensity of Cmba Combat mmnders should be aware of how their men

oerceive the particular combat engagement. if they insist it is the most

difficult fighting of a campaign, reconstitution may be required. Veterans

thought the Schmidt fighting was the hardest they endured, worse than

Normandv which, for the 28th Division, had been a bloody introduction to

their trade.

The intensity of the Schmidt battle was beyond the troops' expectations. German artillery fire especially punished the Americans

almost incessantly. German tanks and infantry pressed home counterattacks

with fanatic resolution. As a consequence, morale flagged, confidence

waned, and the enemy acquired superhuman qualities. Those intangibles added

to heay casualties or sickness caused units to fall apart.

~. Loss of 'Ke Leaders: One might expect the division commander to know

his key battalion and regimental leaders, but it is impossible, or nearly

so, that he would have such imtimate knowledge of leadership at the company, platoon, and squad level. As a generalization, at Schmidt from division

through platoon there seems to have been a failure of leadership. This may have been because otherwise brave and competent commanders had been

overworked both psychologically and physically during previois¶ ooerations

and could no longer function to - acceptable standards. Terrain also

prevented leaders from commanding. Units became so fragmented in the- woods

that accurate status reports were impossible to obtain. Even General Cota

collapsed in the heat of battle. Signs of physical and nervous strain among battalion and regimental commanders may be symptoms of the need for

reconstitution within their units.. Unfortunately at the lower levels of

command it is almost impossible to determine who were the real key leaders

barring an exhaustive study of unit morning reports and oral interviews.

Identification of such men remains a problem. After Schmidt, for example,

one draft of replacements contained scores of NCOs. Veterans of Schmidt

resented their presence feeling either cheated out of rightful promotions or

that the newcomers could not fill the veteran's boots. Thus the lack of

confidence in leadership started at the lowest level.

7. Physical Condition of the Men and Equioment: A unit's ability to

reconstitute depends in great measure on the physical condition of the men.

The constant tension of combat, lack of sleep, and exposure to natural

elements produced a acumulative burden of fatigue. Daily basics, such as

eating, seemed to require more energy and determination than the fatigued soldier possessed. This crushing fatigue appeared in the form of

negligence, lax discipline, or indifference to orders and rendered units

combat ineffec tive.

The equipment the men carried at Schmidt was in good condition, although much of it, especially small arms, was lost by the 112th nl'antry. Salvage and recovery teams recovered disabled and damaged armor vehicles after the

battle or when the front pushed forward a few weeks later. U.S. equipment,

tanks and artillery particularly, did not measure up to the German

3WPC1221 /NOV83

48
counterparts. U.S. infantrymen considered the bazooka worthless, a feeling

confirmed when the weapon could not stop German tanks.

8. Casualties: This should be the most accurate indicator of the need for

unit reconstitution. Unfortunately the lag or confusion in casualty

reporting often skews the report as a yardstick .to measure a unit.

Deliberate falsification of casualty reporting might also occur. Still

these reports probably remain the best single determinent of the need for

reconstitution. One should, however, consult Clark's study for a more

detailed appraisal of casualty rates on unit performance.

9. Suport Exsected and Received: The commander should never promise his

troops more support than may be available. Dashing the troops high

expectations is one of the surest ways to destroy a-unit' -confidence and

morale. At Schmidt' the 28th Division never received the support higher

headquarters promised, yet it is a tribute to the men that -they continued: to

fight as long as they did despite broken promises. If changes in expected

support develop, as they probably will, the commander should insure that the

men understand why someone failed to deliver on their behalf. To ignore a

lack of promised support and not communicate with the -fighting men only

convinces them that no one knows, no one cares, and they have been left to

redeem other's mistakes with their sacrifice. .

10. Isolation: The dispersion of the fighting men to offset the increased

volume of small arms fire characterizes modern combat. Densely packed ranks

advancing against a foe would be suicidal. But those archaic formations

provided a sense of belonging to a unit that the modern soldier lacks

because he certainly cannot see more than his predecessors, and in fact he

sees less. An 18th Century infantryman could see his opponents, march in

ranks with his comrades, deliver a volume of fire on command-in short

despite the danger have a regulated and even orderly view of the battle.

Tactical dispersion presents not only a command and control problem, but

also an individual one. The soldier's lack of information and awarness of

events swirling around him heightens his sense of isolation.

At Schmidt the battalions that broke and ran were those that had

advanced the farthest and consequently became the most exposed to German

counterattacks and isolation. Communications within those battalions and

within their companies and platoons was done mainly by runners, electronic

means having failed. The isolation prevented the commander frcn gaining an

accurate and timely appreciation of the course of the battle. Lacking such

data, he was unable to reconstitute the unit.

11. Intangibles: Morale, esoirit, _unit pride; unit cohesion: Motivations.

to fight and sustain morale in combat remain nebulous qualities, elusive to

define and, in many cases, even identify. A commander has to know his

troops and be sensitive to their needs in order to detect the initially

subtle shifts in morale that may ultimately undermine his authority and

destroy the unit.

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

49
The Regeneration of the 28th Division

Regeneration began for the shattered 1st and 3d battalions, 112th

Infantrv, even while their sister regiments continued to carry the fighting

to the Germans. Company L, 3d Battalion, had :withdrawn across the Kall as

ordered on 8 November with a mere 11 men. After their withdrawal the

survivors received pup tents for shelter. This marked the first time in six

days thev had not slept in the open.56 The men also received three hot

meals a day. The division band "supplied music for consolation," and, for

the first few days, the division left the men to themselves to sort out

their exDerience at Schmidt. Then, gradually, personnel replacements joined

the survivors. 3y 13 November, 140 replacements were present for duty. It

was, in effect, a brand new line company, whose members formed their

expectations of battle from listening to the few survivors of the original

companv talk about Schmidt.

On 8 November, the division assembled the survivors of Company .K, -3d

Rattalion, in the divisional kitchen area, three miles southeast of

Roetgen. Two officers and 31 men were present, leaving about 110 men as

unaccounted. A few stragglers from the unit drifted in the next few days

suffering from exhaustion, exposure, or frostbite. All the men 'receive

first aid and issues of new clothing. Fifty-six "replacements- reported to

the company on 8 November, but the next day the division transferredthose

replacements to the 2d Battalion, 112th.

Left to themselves, several men built a log cabin capable of sleeping

twenty. The American Red Cross supplied beer for a party, and division

cooks served the men's favorite breakfasts. On 10 November General Cota

visited the men and that afternoon addressed them. In a time honored

fashion he praised their efforts at Schmidt and told them that he was proud

to have them in his command. Later the division band gave a concert and the

ARC supplied coffee and doughnuts. Forty more replacements arrived.

On 11 November the division erected a pyramidal tent for use as a

recreation hall, writing room, and mail tent. Not until 12 November did

reorganization begin. The 1st Platoon was reorganized with replacements.

Generally the men relaxed and received hot meals. That evening 90 more

reolacements arrived bringing the strength of the company up to 187 men.

The next day 2d, 3d, and 4th platoons underwent reorganization. Then the

battalion ordnance sergeant distributed new automatic rifles, pistols,

machine guns, and bazookas to the company. These weapons came from ordnance

dumos for most the battalion's weapons lay abandoned in German held

territory west of the Kall.

To reinvigorate a military unit's mentality, the kitchen started 3erving

the men in rotation by platoons. This would be the regimen they would

follow in combat. The company commander reasserted military order and

discipline when he reestablished platoon areas and subdivided these into

?WPC 1221 j/N0V83

50
scuads. The basic celleur components of the fighting company were now

reconstituted. Physical and psychological needs were also addressed.

The men improved their living quarters, --saely out -of range- of -the

German guns. They also turned in requisitions to cover unit or individual

shortages. of supplies. The division scheduled the company for showers on

14 November, but a movement order forced cancellation. The men did receive

arctlc overshoes that day. The entire division moved to the

Luxembourg-German border. This relatively inactive sector of the western

front had oreviously been used for orientation of new divisions and

recuperation of old. Once at their new sector of the front, division issued

passes for Paris to veterans. Field kitchens served hot meals daily and

twentv men per company per day went to division rear for showers. Church

services helped to heal the wounds of Schmidt, as did casses to the newly

established division rest center.

During reconstitution the division remained on the front line, although

in a quiet sector. The men received training behind their lines as they rotated platoons on line following the formula of two platoons forward, one

hack. In early December platoons conducted assault training,- -- earned

patrolling techniques, and gradually became acclimated to life in a combat

theater's front line..

The 110th Infantry patrolled the sector to keep the enemy oast of the

Our River. They continued training and rehabilitation until the end" of

November. On 24 November the regiment received a new commander. In early December the unit moved closer -to the river in order to conduct a

battalion-size raid across the river to seize German prisoners. The men

regarded the raid as a success, and it was a means of restoring the

veteran's confidence in their fighting abilities and introducing the

replacements to offensive combat operations.

In a similar manner, the 112th Infantry organized assault groups to

destroy three German pillboxes. A platoon from each battalion formed one

assault team and on 2 December attacked. One platoon could not find its

objective; another destroyed its; and the third slightly damaged the German

fortification. The purpose was to restore confidence, not to destroy

Germans. The regiment continued extensive training from 15 November to

15 December. During that time, replacement officers brought the unit's

authorized officer complement up to strength.

The 28th Infantry Division still was being reconstituted when the major

German counteroffensive--the campaign known as the Battle of the Bulge--hit

the division head-on. It speaks to the success of the reconstitution

measures that the division, shattered and combat ineffective a month

earlier, fought a determined defensive action despite being outnumbered,

outgunned, and surprised by the German thrust.

3WPC1221j/NOV83

51
1o73 Mideast War-The Reconsftitution Process in the Israeli Army

The Israeli Army consists of three elements; a small professional cadre

of officers and NCO specialists; a large number of conscripts; and a trained

civilian reserve expected to mobilize with -72 hours of -notification.1 In

Octoher 1973, there were 11,500 regular army officers and men; about 50,000

conscripts in various stages of training; and 275,000 army reservists,

although about 35 percent of these reseritsts were women who were used for

non-combat duties. 2 Israeli reservists, however, joined their own

operational units upon mobilization instead of forming a manpower pool from

which the standing army drew reinforcements. Some units were manned

entirely by reservists while others were manned by reservists and

regulars.3 This section will examine unit reconstitution procedures in

Israeli armored divisions during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

Israeli armored divisions had three armord brigades of three armored

battalions each, a headquarters company per battalion, plus organic

artillery and service units for supply and maintenance. The divisional

trains were a support element of the division and provided logistical

support to all organic and attached divisional tro-op units; Their- functions

encompassed supply, repair, ancillary transportation, medical. services, and

the evacuation of personnel and equipment.4 According to one authority,

the Israelis had three armored brigades available in the Sinai, about 280

tanks and 50 self-propelled guns. 5

Logistics support employed a "push" system adopted from the U.S. Army's

system. That means that instead of combat units asking for resupply,

arranging a meeting point, and waiting until the supply convoys arrive, the

various classes of supply are continually sent forward along the unit's axis

of advance. Combat units therefore do not have to wait for resupply

requests to be filled which would retard their rate of advance. 6 Area

command depots stocked divisional logistic units. The divisional units, in

turn, formed convoys to "push" resupply forward to brigades. Brigades then

formed still smaller convoys to carry resupply to combat units.7

The success of Israeli arms .in the 1967 War extended Israeli borders to

the banks of the Suez Canal. While the Sinai Pennisula might serve as a

military buffer against a future Egyptian attack, its possession also meant

that the Israelis had to extend and reorganize their logistic services to

onerate over lengthy lines of communication. They also had to increase

stockpiles to support forces in the field. The Israelis accomplished this

task, but their underlying assumptions about the next war were that it would

be of short duration and not involve intense fighting. 8 Consequently when

heavy fighting necessitated large numbers of replacement vehicles and spare

parts, these items for tanks and vehicles at mobilization parks were not

3WPC1221 J/NOV83

52
"Yaya" ."Yossi" "Ivan"

Paratroop Paat roop Reconnaisance

Battalion 8altin at Battalion

I I I .. - . I t I~~~~

SHARON DIVISION

Maj. Gen. (Res.) Aride "Arik" Sharon

Col. Yaacov "Jackie" Even,

Second in Command

I----------

TANK BRIGADE

Dan Shomron

Avraham

Ran Attached. 22 Oct.

L-

.Aua-ahed 15 Oct.: Attached IS Oct.

MATT PARATROOP BRIGADE UZZI PARATROOP BRIGADE

Col. Danny ,Matt Col. Uui Ya'iri

! ~ ___

ALBERT/KALMAN DIVISION

Maj. Gen. Avraham "Albert" Mvandler

(killed in action 13 October)

Maj. Gen. Kalman Magen

| (promoted to succo.d)

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fullv ready and many weapons were still in the preservative greases. Fuel

and ammunition supplies were low as was the supply of spare parts. Coupled

with the distance to the Sinai front, these deficiencies complicated initial

Israeli reconstitution of units fighting against the Egyptains.

The war began at 1400 on 6 October 1973, when Egyptain and Syrian forces

attacked the Israelis on two fronts. On the Sinai Front, initial Egyptian

attacks either overran or isolated Israeli strongpoints along the Suez

Canal, the so-called Bar Lev Line. The Israelis reacted by counterattacking

these Egyptin penetrations, Major General Avraham Adan's armored division

olayed a major role in these operations.

tWhen war erupted, Adan was rorming his armored division. One armored

brigade had already deployed to the Sinai on 5 October, and two reserve

brigades began to move to the Sinai at 2200 on 6 October, twelve hours after

mobilization. 9

The Egyptians repulsed the initial Israeli armored counterattacks and

inflicted heavy casualties. By 0400 on 7 October, Southern Command, which

controlled the Israeli units operating in the Sinai, could count only 110

operational tanks. This meant as many as 170 tanks were unoperational or

mechanical losses. These setbacks were doubly-discouraging to Israeli

morale because in previous wars the Israelis, 'with 'relatively ew

casualties, had quickly vanquished their forces.

A major reason for the heavy tank losses was that unsupported Israeli

armored units had attacked prepared Egyptain positions. In Adan's division,

one armored battalion virtually ceased to exist after losing 19 to 21

tanks. An armored brigade counted 17 tanks from 44 assigned *

Nevertheless, according to Israeli doctrine units could never be

redistributed. No matter how badly hit, units had to continue to function

and fight. Survivors of mauled units had to maintain operational

resoonsibility. Adan therefore assigned the survivors of the hardest hit

tank battalion the task of recovering tanks and personnel casualties. He

also reduced their sector of responsibility, moved them a little to the

rear, but kept them on alert.

The commander of this battered armored battalion split his 30 survivors

into three sub-units to evacuate wounded; to remove weapons and

communications equipment from disabled tanks, and to secure the area. By

noon on 9 October they had accomplished these tasks and the commander moved

a further 30 kilometers east (to the rear) where he obtained fuel and

ammunition. Me also reassembled his force and regenerated it by

reorganizing his unit with sub-units that had been stationed near the canal

*One battalion from the brigade had been diverted elsewhere which

accounts, in part, for the initial low figure of 44 tanks.

~. C1221 J/NOV83

53
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during the early fighting. Although he had lost 13 tanks to enemy action, o

to mechanical failure, and suffered 10 killed and 18 wounded, by evening of

Q October he had reassembled a orce o-f 13 Centurion and 7 Patton tanks.

The brigade's remaining vehicles and crew -- members reorganized at the

Ma'adim-Haziait road junction where they -refueled and took on ammunition.

The brigade commander collected the surviving crew members from abandoned

tanks, helped them gather some equipment, spoke personally to them to boost

their morale, and then sent them further to the rear to serve as

reinforcements when more tanks were repaired and capable of re-entering the

fi;h t.

Two circumstances allowed the Israeli's to regenerate their hard hit

armored brigades. First, the 4gyptians did not press their advance, being

content to secure the various canal crossing points. _Second, the Israeli's

controlled the air above the battlefield which permitted their long, slow,

congested supply convoys and personnel replacements to move forward without

significant interference from hostile air interdiction.

In fighting on 8 October, the Israeli's lost-about 70 tanks, including

40 severely damaged with 25 left behind in enemy controlled territory. From

that evening, Israeli reconstitution procedures followed a general pattern

of disengagement at evening and -replenishment and regeneration during the

night. After the bitter fighting of 8 October, Adan estimated that Egyptian

night attacks were most unlikely because the enemy also needed time- to

reorganize. A reserve reconnaissance unit provided a security patrol and

screen along Adan's south flank, the Hazizit Road, while farther north his

three armored brigades withdrew about five kilometers along the three

lateral roads paralleling Hazizit Road. Along those lateral roads the

brigades met the divisional trains which had positioned themselves at

pre-selected night bivouacs to awa'it the brigades. Some tanks had been

repaired by their crews, and others were towed from the battle zone.

Helicopters or vehicles evacuated personnel casualties. Division and

brigade headquarters' logistics officers and the division supporting

logistic units not only had to plan and coordinate the flow of supplies, but

also had to lead supply columns under fire and exhibit what Adan termed

"follow-me" leadership.

Reconstitution usually began around 1745, shortly before dusk, when

units disengaged. The location of the night bivouacs depended on the

operational situation, but normally they were ready to accept the brigades

bt 2200 or 2300 hours. Maintenance crews would replenish and repair tanks.

Commanders reassigned manpower, reorganized units and sub-units, assigned

new commanders to replace casualties. Staff planners. incorporated lessonsdrawn from the day's fighting into planning the next day's battle.

The difficult and protracted fighting exacted a physical toll on the

men. Fatigue manifested itself in negligence and lax night discipline in

the bivouac areas, Adan "acted vigorously" to reimpose night discipline

3WC1221j/NOV83

54
because he regarded any letdown in standards as a warning sypmtom of combat

exhaustion. Exhaustion did cause a slackening of standards after four days

of fighting, but the only "solution"- was to speed up the stocking process so

crews might catch a few hours rest.

Furthermore, by the fourth day of fighting, Adan realized that the men

needed a general picture 'of the overall military situation that transcended

their own immediate battle zone. He instituted nightly broadcasts over the

division radio nets in the form of a news bulletin in order to tell his

soldiers what was happening on other fronts. By 10 October the division

established a "checkpoint" or straggler line on the Spontani Road. This

"checkpoint," located -2-3 miles behind the front, served as a supply point

for fuel and ammunition, a forward medical element, and a point for ordnance

men to repair tanks. There Israeli officers halted withdrawing tanks, and

inspected them to determine their problem. If necessary- they evacuated

wounded, and, if possible, combined crews from two damaged tanks, put them

in a repaired tank, gave them a "pep" talk, and sent them back to battle.

Maintenance crews repaired malfunctioning tanks on the spot. If not

possible, the crews were given another tanks so that they could get back to

the battle. - Israeli ordnance units' retrieval and repair of battle-damaged

tanks by was an important source of the Israeli rieconstitution - and--buildup

of tanks prior to crossing their Suez Canal.

Ordnance teams attached to the battalions did spot repairs, and first

and second echelon maintenance near Artillery Road. Fifteen kilometers to

their rear, on Ma'adem and Spontain roads, forward companies of divisional

ordnance units were deployed for. third echelon repairs. Further to the

rear, around Romani, the base company did fourth echelon repair. Ordnance

teams also patrolled roads, much like the U.S. Army in northwestern Europe

in World War II, to locate and extricate tanks, repair them, and push them

to the front. The Israelis' used inoperative tanks, say those with turret

malfunctions, to tow tanks stuck in heavy sand dunes. Nearly every Israeli

tank was hit during the war, but ordnance crews repaired most during the

course of the fighting. Ultimately the IDF wrote off about 400 tanks and 25

artillery pieces as totally lost.

Reconstitution continued, especially during lulls from 12 October

through 14 October and as a flow of reinforcements augented the process.

The evening before the canal crossing, Adan also addressed all his brigades

to explain the Israeli Army's plan and why it was vital that each soldier do

his utmost.

Personnel casualties exerted a conservative effect on Israeli

operations. The Israelis lost 2,222 killed on both fronts, 5,596 wounded,

and 301 prisoners. These severe losses affected morale. Commanders

considered and reconsidered tactics in terms of how many casualties would

result. "Charge ahead carefully" became the watchword.

3WPC1221j/NOV83

55'
With the cease fire on 25 October, Adan faced another problem. Unsure

of whether or not the cease flire would hold, he had to train new tank teams

to replace the heavy losses among tankers, roughly half the Israeli

casualties being suffered in the armored corps. To insure security, he

assigned each veteran tank crew a new crew. which they would train on the

soot. Thus his division could maintain a high level of alert while the

training of replacement crews continued apace.

One important "Lesson" from the 1973 Israeli experience is the need to

keeo troops informed of events beyond their own limited perspective. From

Petain in World War I through Ridgway in Korea to Adan on the Suez,

successful commanders understood that they must provide t heir troops the

"Tig picture" and the role of the troops in it. If the soldier believes he

is part of a greater, successful operation, he may continue-to fight despite

suffering and hardship. The Israelis also made use of the time available to

them to refit and replenish units. They had an efficient system for- the

recovery of damaged equipment and were able to repair and field again

damaged vehicles and tanks. They had efficient (or pre-planned) reassembly

areas where combat units could be replenished.

Adan's criteria for reconstitution of his fighting units appear to have

been losses of equipment and personnel casualties, .consumption- of- supplies,

especially ammunition and fuel, and his ability to recognie symptoms -

fatigue among his men. The- most evident symptom of fatigue was -the

soldier's negligence or carelessness.

3WPC1?21 j/NOV83

56
U.S. Army Vietnam-Unit Reconstitution

In Vietnam the U.S. Army continued its policy of replacing individuals

not units. Due to the nature of the fighting and enemy tactics--few set

piece, sustained battles--units requiring reconxstitution- could be- moved to

relatively safer areas without excessive security problems. Division base

areas or base camps served as the center of the personnel reconstitution

effort. After arrival in country individuals reported to their respective

units. At division or independent base areas, individual replacements

received combat training of varying duration depending on the unit

involved. After this training, the division sent individuals to battalions

which in turn passed -them to companies for integration into platoons and

squads.

Overall division and even battalion strength- was - quite high, but

personnel shortages were concentrated in the rifle companies, a phenomenon

reminiscent of U.S. Army line companies during World Wae II.10 After the

Tet Offensive of 1968 the number of replacements available to units dropped

due the overall losses throughout Vietnam. Many rifle companies had a

"paddy strength" (actual number of riflemen present for duty on the

battlefield) 20 to 30 percent below that authorized, even though Army policy

called for divisions to be kept at 102 percent. s-trength. The 9th -Infantry

Division's, "paddy strength" figures were:

Authorized Rifle Company 164

Assigned 157 4% replacements not properly assigned.

Present for Duty 141 10% diversions to higher headquarters

or leave, TDY.

Paddy strength 120 15% sick call, physical profiles, guard

duty, diversions to cover unit

overheads.

Furthermore the Army's 12 month tour-of-duty policy created a problem

for any replacement program. Rotation boosted morale, but it also weakened

units that had to send experienced men home. During the initial Vietnam

build-up, the U.S. Army tapped Strategic Army Forces to meet Vietnam

personnel requirements.

U.S. Army logistic channels in Vietnam underwent several changes during

the war. In September 1965 the 1st Logistical Command assumed common item

support for all U.S. Army Forces in South Vietnam. Originally two major

base depots--Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay--supported five support commands--Vung

Tau, Can The, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang. Base depots had a 45 day

stockage and support commands 15 days. By late 1967 the 1st Lcgistical

Command controlled U.S. Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam and operated four

area support commands--Saigon (Long Binh) III and IV Corps, Cam Rhan Bay

Southern II Corps, Qui Nhon Northern II Corps, and Da Nang I Corps. Support

commands drew their supplies from the Zone of Interior and distributed the

supplies to divisions or to non-divisional units. 1 1

3WPC1221j/NOV83

57
Normally the support command would convoy supplies by truck to the

division base camp. There the division would use organic assets to

distribute the supplies with the division's area of operations. Assets

might include trucks, helicopters, or jeeps. -Logisatical. Support Activity

provided resupply for non-divisional elements. These were normally

provisional activities located in a fixed base camp to provide direct and

general supply, maintenance, and 3ervice support to non-divisional elements

lacking their own organic logistical support.

Foarard Support Activities (FSA) were also provisional, but deployed in

the vicinity of a base to provide direct supply, maintenance, and service

support. Often the FSA's assets came from divisional trains of the

supported unit. After the operation, the FSA withdrew from the area and its

assets and personnel returned to their parent units.3

The U.S. Ary's experience in Vietnam probably does not readily -lend

itself to current reconstitution questions, with the possible exception of

the Tet 1968 offensive. Otherwise enemy tactics were characterized by

hit-and-run actions and a refusal to stand and fight except on prepared

ground of their choosing. Even in engagements where the: Nor-th Vigtnamese

fought, contact was broken after two or three days leaving each side more or

less free to reconstitute itself in a relatively secure. area either a

division base camp or a sanctuary- across a neutral border,

U.S. Army reconstitution procedures at the small-unit level in Vietnam

varied according to the time a unit deployed or the operational situation as

the following examples illustrate. A rifle company from the 1st Cavalry

Division operating in the Binh Dinh highlands in February 1966 had about 125

officers and men (of the 140 authorized) in the field. The company met

strong resistance from North Vietnamese regulars and lost about 60 men in a

single day's fighting. One platoon counted only three men, the platoon

leader, the radio operator, and one rifleman. Nevertheless this company

continued to operate for the next two days.

Both sides broke tontact at night at which time the Americans carried

their wounded and most of the dead, whom they could reach safely, to a

central location within the company perimeter. The company commander

redistributed the three survivors froc the mauled platoon into another rifle

platoon which had also suffered casualties. The surviving platoon leader

took command of the reorganized unit.

The next morning helicopters brought ammunition and other resupply items

and evacuated the wounded and dead. The company policed the battlefield for

other American dead, searched for North Vietnamese stragglers, and fought

North Vietnamese rearguard elements. They collected abandoned equipment and

carried it to an open area to load on helicopters for transport back to the

unit's base.

3WPC1221 j/NOV83
Helicopters also airlifted the surv.ivors of the company back to their

base at An Khe where replacements reported to the unit for the next week.

Field units normally sent a status report to the battalion and the battalion

used these reports as the basis of personnel requisitions. The 1st Sergeant

divided the replacements in the company rear and had arleady assigned them

to the platoons when they returned to the base.

A second instance involving the same company occurred in May 1966 when

North Vietnamese regulars overran a 22 man mortar platoon. 2 Sixteen

Americans were killed and six wounded in the attack. The remainder of the

company, who had not been involved in the fighting, deployed that night for

a company-size ambush mission, naturally, without a mortar platoon.

The next day a new mortar platoon joined the company in the field. The

Battalion S-1 at An .Khe assembled soldiers with a mortar MOS (11C) from

among division replacements, convalescents, and returning wounded, and

formed them into a platoon commanded by the former platoon sergeant (who had

been hospitalized and not on the original mission) and sent the regenerated

platoon back to combat.

Another officer in a separate infantry brigade served as a rifle company

commander and, later, as a battalion S-4 in 1967-68. Personnel. replacements

for his rifle company in the field did not present a problem because combat

operations did not produce "surge" casualties. The highest losses suffered

might total ten men in a single day. The company commander informed--the

battalion S-3 of the losses. Normally battalion already knew about the

losses because of monitering command radio nets and being involved in the

evacuation process. This was because the company's access to battalion

forward was by means of the battalion command radio net.

The company's rear was co-located with battalion rear and its Executive

Officer would contact the company First Sergeant in the field, usually

during resupply of the unit. At that time the First Sergeant would provide

exact details of the casualty to the Executive Officer who, in turn, would

send requisition for replacements to the battalion S-1. When replacements

arrived at the battalion, officers apportioned them to the company most in

need of replacements. The battalion staff also identified NCOs and officers

entering the battalion replacement system for key positions.

?WPC1221 j/NOV83

59
A rifle company normally operated at strengths between 105-115 men in

the field. Battalion policy was that no more than 7-10 men could be in the

company rear at the same time. This -included the executive officer, supply

personnel, clerks, and so on. Because of the mass rotation policies, at one

time company strength fell to 58 men.1 The com-pany requested' replacements

for the rotated men and many were transferred to the unit from the 101st

Airborne Division (the unit was OPCON to the 101st). While awaiting these

replacements, the seperate brigade held the same area of operations, but did

not actively pursue offensive operations.

Battalion rotated rifle companies to a forward fire base to provide

security and receive replacements and new equipment. This practice was

similiar to battalion relefs in World War I and II, Scmetmes replacements

would just be dropped off to the company in the tield. The new personnel

did mostly in-country orientation and tried to survite urtil they became

experienced. This practice was also similar to. the U.S. Army personnel

replacement procedures in World War II.

Due to the nature of the fighting, the brigade lost few major items of

equipment. Losses were usually taken care of by dropping the item from the

property book as a combat loss or by doing a-.report of survey oh thie

individual responsible for the item of equipment. --In the case of personnel

casualties, the unit kept their weapons and equipment when the casuaity -was'

evaciated. If the company was to be in the field for extended periods, or

if conditions warranted, they would evacuate casualties' equipment,

including weapons, on the medical evacuation helicopters. The company

executive officer. at battalion rear-would go to the evacuation hospital and

reclaim the equipment. Despite command directives to keep the equipment in

the field, the company normally evacuated it in order to avoid carrying the

additional weight.

Resupply reached units in the field an average of every three days or,

if necessary, daily. Helicopters carried most resupply and included food,

ammunition, special items like clothing, boots, maps, and personal items

(mail and packages). Helicopters flew hot meals out for the evening meal as

often as possible.

Unit laundry was done weekly. A resupply helicopter tossed out several

bags of fatigues and everyone helped himself to the clean uniforms. The men

collected the dirty uniforms and recalled the helicopters to pick up the

laundry. The battalion S-4 consolidated the laundry by company and sent it

for cleaning.

1The brigade originally had deployed to Vietnam for 6 months TDY. The

brigade was taken off TDY status and placed in a permanent in-country

status. Soldiers were offered the choice of returning to the U.S. or

remaining in Vietnam. Most officers and NCOs stayed; most E-5s and below

went home.

3WPC1221 /NOV83

60
All personnel carried a basic load of small arms ammunition (14 magazines

loaded and 14 additional boxes of M16 ammunition). As in previous wars,

machine gunners, assistant gunners, and designated riflemen carried a basic

load of machine gun ammunition that varied with the operation. Emergency

resupply of Class V7 (ammunition) was accomplished by predetermined (based on S-4 estimates) loads of a cross-section of required

rifle company ammunition. This was positioned on the helicopter resupply

pad at battalion rear. The company cmmander would notify the battalion S-3

forward who, in turn, would notiffy battalion rear S-a. A backup admin-log

net was available, but usually forward companies could not transmit to the

battalion rear. Also the battalion rear rarely monitored the net, but had

responsibility to pass the infornation to the helicopter crews. Class V

supplies were drawn from the battalion Class V point which was co-located

with battalion rear. Other classes of supply came from the brigades'

organic battalion support command. There was also a -great deal of

"scrounging" to obtain items in otherwise short supply.

3WTC1221 j/NOV83

61
Summary:

Personnel: The analysis of the selected historical examples in this report

suggests certain patterns in American Army behavior concerning unit

reconstitution in wartime. The American practice in- both world wars and

Vietnam has been based on the premise that men and machines are

interchangable and can be replaced as individual spare parts without

affecting the overall performance of a vast war machine,. ven with the

wartime experience of Allies readily available, the US Army in both

conflicts consistently underestimated both the numbers and types of combat

personnel replacements required to reconstitute combat units. Replacement

crisises in both wars -resulted and, had either conflict dragged on a few

more months, could have seriously affected combat operations. Similar

experiences with replacement and individual rotation policies in Korea and

Vietnam indicate no significant change in Army policy. n an attempt to

equalize the burden of fighting, the Army seems to have sacrified .the

consistency and stability that are the hallmarks of unit tradition, esprit,

and cohesion. It is difficult to see how the infusion of masses of

individuals into a complex interpersonal unit where very survival requires

cooperation, confidence in other members, and- teamwork can- produce a quality

fighting organization

qcuioment: The US Army tapped the greatest industrial base on earth during -

both world wars. In World War II, production seems to have been adequate,

but distribution to the theaters inadequate. There were several reasons;

overly conservative projection of loss rates, poor battlefield salvage and

reclamation policies and because no two theaters operated their logistics

system in the same manner, In short, no thought had been given to fighting

a multi-theater war. Similarly in Korea and Vietnam little thought appears

to had been given to fighting limited wars and supplying armies from a

peacetime-oriented industrial base.

During World War II unit equipment reconstitution systems evolved as the

belligerents learned the lessons from the theaters of war, especially in the

case of tank recovery and repair. Ad hoc measures and improvisation were

necessary because long range logistical planners had underestimated the

amount of resupply combat units neede. Each belligerent began World War II

with a logistics system based on the previous war's experience, but the

multi-theater warfare of 1939-1945 forced changes in procedures. As in

World War I, efficient and sustained resupply was possible only after the

Allies had rebuilt the railroad and port infrastructure of northwest

Europe. Until that time supplies accumulated in Normandy and it required

enormous effort to push them forward to the fighting troops. POL and

ammunition shortages reached critical proportions.

Regeneration: The techniques of regeneration display a remarkable

consistency that cuts across national armies and periods of warfare.

Commanders moved a badly mauled unit rearward and left to itself for a few

days with only minimum military discipline and training imposed. High

3WPC1221 j/NOVS83
ranking officers visited with and comended survivors on their successes or

explained how their sacrifice resulted in great victories elsewhere. The

key was to reassure the survivors that they had done their best, were still

considered in good standing as a unit, and that they still had a future role

to play in the ultimate victory. Only after" meeting these conditions, could

replacements be fed into the unit, training gradually reintroduced, and the

unit shaped into a more organized military formation. Usually rest in a

quiet sector or a rest zone followed, but this period could not be overlong

or the troops would stagnate from inaction and lose precious combat skills.

Regenerated units normally conducted low risk combat assignments designed to

restore their self conrfi dence and acclimate them again to the danger of

combat. Once combat operations re-commenced, the units gradually recovered

their aggressiveness as well as their conf'idence in the high command. At

that point a unit was reconstituted and prepared for any type of operation.

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

63
Footnotes

Preface

1. U.S. Army, V Corps, "After Action Report," November 1944, p. 1.

2. See, for instance, the discussion of the value and relevance of

historical data sources to operational analysis in Robert McQuie, et

al., Multivariate Analysis of Combat (Planning Research Corporation;

July, 196 ), PRC R-t43 pp t 1t The authors present an accurate

brief on the limitations of the historical record base available for

analysis.

Unit Reconstitution-Historical Perspective of World War I

1. Martin Middlebrook, First Day on the Somme (New York: W.W. Norton &

Company, 1972), p. 1 6 .

2. Michael Houlihan, World War I Trench Warfare (London; Ward Lock

Limited, 1975), p. 117.

t. John Ellis, Eve-deep in Hell (New York-: Pantheon Books, 1976), p. 142.

U. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Cited in Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers

in Battle (Boston: Xluwer-NiJhoff Publishing, 1982), p. 126.

7. U.S. Army, American Expeditionary Force, 1917-1920, Divisional

History Charts (July 1920?), Tabs 1, 2, and 8.

8. Middlebrook, p. 17.

9. Ibid., p. 75.

10. G.C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West

(London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1939), pp. 173-174.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 185.

13. Richard M. Watt, Dare Call It Treason (New York: Simon and Schuster,

1963), p. 222.

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

64
14. Houlihan, p. 158.

15. Cited in Watt, p. 229.

16. Houlihan, p.

17. Matthew 3. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Doubleday and Company,

1967), Appendix 4, pp. 257-258.

18. Watt, p. 220.

19. Ibid., p. 235.

20. LTC Leonard L. Lerwill, The ?ersonnel Reolacement System in the United

States ArLy (Washington: Department of the Ar my, 195 4 Department of

the Army Phamphlet No. 20-211, p. 207. .

?1. Ibid., p. 207.

22. Russell F. Weigley, History o the Unitd States Arm (New York:

MacMillian Publishing Company, 1967), p. 438.-

23. Lerwill, p. 203.

24. Ibid., p. 227.

25. James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logiftics 1775-1953

(Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), p. 356.

26. Ibid., pp. 357-359.

27. James A. Huston, "Toward Greater Flexibility: Rotation of Combat and

Service Units," Review (November-December, 1964), p. 118.

?8. Ibid., p. 119.

29. This and following paragraphs are adapted from Huston, Sinews, pp.

373-377.

30. Ibid., p. 378-379.

?1. Ibid., p. 383.

32. Ibid., p. 379.

3WPC1221 /NOV83

65
World War II Equipment and Personnel Replacement

1. This information is digested from, LTC Joseph I. Coffey, "Supply and

Services in the German Army," Quartermaster Review (March-April. 1948),

pp. 44-447 and 108-112 and LTC Joseph . Coffey, "Supply and Services

in the German Field Army," Quartermaster Review (Seotember-Octber,

1948), pp. 54-58 and 125-126. -

2. This information is digested from U.S. Department of the Army,

Historical Study: German Tank Maintenance in World War II

(Washington: Department of the Army, 1954) Department of the Army

Pamphlet No. 20-202, pp. 1-44.

3. This information is digested from Colonel Michael R,. Lubbock, British

Army, "Replacement of Tanks and Personnel in Battle," Military Review

(November 1923), pp. 50-54.

4. Martin Van Creveld, Fighting Power: German Military Performance

1914- 1945 (C & L Associates, December 19 07), p. 4.

5. W. Victor Madej, German Army Order of .Battle 1939-1945, Vol. 1

(Allentown, PA: Game Marketing Company, 198f), p. 49..- .

5. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p. 50.

8. Van Creveld, p. 88-89

9. Ibid., p. 103.

10. Ibid., p. 122.

11. U.S. Army, Department of the Army, Relacementstem World Wide World

War II (Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army

mimeo., 1947) Book 2, Section 1. p. 1. Hereafter this study, which has

six separate books will be cited as RS, Book , Section

12. RS, Book 3, Section 1, p. 1.

13. RS, Book 4, Section 1, p. 3.

14. United States Forces European Theater, Report of the General Board

United States Forces European Theater--Combat Fati ue--Medical Section

(Study No. 91), (1945?), pp. 1-2.

15. U.S. Army, Headquarters Army Ground Forces, Stu of Army Ground

Forces Casualties, HQ Army Ground Forces, Plans Section, 25 September

1946, p, 3 and RS, Book 5, Section 19, p. 2.

3WPC1221j/NOV83

66
16. RS, Book 5, Section 23, p. 5, p. 9 and Section 19, p. 2.

17. U.S. Army, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, G-1 Section, After Action

Report of the G-1 Section 1945, p. 15.

18. RS, Book 5, Section 23, p. 2.

19. Headquarters 28th Infantry Division, "Unit Report No. 4 From 010001

October to 312400 October 1944," (14 November 1944), p. 3.

20. Study AGF Casualties, p. 7.

21. Ibid., 6. The lettered companies of infantry battalions normally were

below authorized strength while headquarters, service, and supporting

units were overstrength. AGF concluded that there was- an "apparently

irresistible tendency (perhaps there is a real need) to fatten

headquarters units while the front-line riflemen performs the most

hazardous duty with fewer comrades than the law anticipated.

Interviews with infantry combat commanders show that rifle companies

seldom fight at more than two-thirds strength." Ibid. As an example,

the same study cites one infantry division .in Europe -on 2-0 -January

1945 whose regimental headquarters and headquarters companies averaged

145 per cent of authorized -enlisted strength while the rifle cmpanies

averaged 65 percent.

22. Ibid;

23. Headquarters 28th Infantry Division, "Unit Report No, 5. From 010001

November to 312400 November 1944,F" (6 December 1944), passim.

24. "V Corps After Action," November 1944, p. 7.

25. Van Creveld, pp. 86-87.

26. General Board,.Combat Fatigue, pp. 1-2.

27. RS, Book 5, Section 24, p. 23

28. RS, Book 1, p. 7.

29. Army PAM, 20-211, p. 453.

30. War Department, Field Manual 100-10 Field Service Regulations

Administration) Washington, D.C. War Department, November, 1943),

PP. 133-134.

31. Army PAM, p. 454. The corps replacement battalions theoretically

stocked four companies of 1,200 replacements total, but figures as

high as 7,000 or 2,500 for a two month period from mid-June to

3WPC1221J/NOV83

67
mid-August 1944 were known. In those cases additional equipment was

loaned to replacement battalions by the corps they supported. Normal

requisitions for supplies went to Replacement System Headquarters for

consolidation and for-arding to Headquarters, SOS. However the

replacement battalions were well forward. so replacements would not

have far to go to their units and thus hundreds of miles from SOS

supply depots. Army depots lacked transportation to make supply runs

to the replacements battalions, but had to take up the supply function

regardless. For example, rifles were allocated to armies in the

theater, not SOS. Army, however, could only requisition rifles based

on authorized strength-which did not include the flow of

replacements. M-1 rifles, therefore, were not available without

"cutting corners" despite the fact that Army wanted all combat troops

equioped with M-ls. RS., Book 5, Section, 24, p. 25.

22. RS, Book 5, Annex 23, p. 2 Comments.

Reconstitution of Equipment

I,. U.S. Army, U.S. Army Service Forces, Logistics in World War II: Final

ReDort of The Army Service Forces, (1 July 1947), p. 158.

71. Ibid., p. 247.

? . Major T.S. Oliver, "Ordnance Recovery and Evacuation Requirements for

a Field Army," CGSC, 1947, Annex 1 Appendix C.

3?. Logistics in World War !I, p. 161.

37. Ibid., p. 102.

38. RS, 5, Section 24, p. 19 and Army Ground Forces Board Report, "Lessons

Learned in Combat, 7-8 November 1942--September 1944," Headquarters

34th Infantrv Division (September 1944), p. 92.

39. Lida Mayo, U.S. Army in World War II: The Technical Services: The

Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront (Washington:

Office of the Chief of Military History, 1968), p. 255.

40. Ihid., p. 269.

1l. LTC Frank R. Skelly, "Mobile Maintenance and Reclamation Units," USA

Command and Staff College, 22 May 1947, pp. 21-22..

42. The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, The

Employment of Ordnance Staff sections Ordnance Combat Service Units

and' Ordnance Service Units in the European Campaig (Study No. 101),

pp. 0-10.

I!?PC1221j/NOV83

68
43. Ruppenthal, p. 497.

44. War Department Field Manual FM 100-10 Field Service ulatons

Administration (Washington, D.C.: War Department) 15 November 1943,

P. 39.

45. William F. Ross and Charles F. Rcmanus, U.S. Army in World War XI:

The Technical Services The Quartermaster Cors erations in the

War Against Germany (IWashington: Off'ice of the Chief o.. Military

History 1965), p. 464.

46. U.S. Army, Headquarters 2d Armored Division t"G-4 History European

Theater of Operations," (14 November 1945), p. 7.

47. The General Board, United States Forces, European Tneater, Operation

of Ordnance Roadside Service Stations (Study No. 97), -pp. 1-2.

48. Mayo, pp. 270-271.

49. Ross and Rcmanus, pp. 471-472.

50. Board Study No. 10.

51. Huston, Sinews, pp. 533-534.

52. U.S. Army, Headquarters 2d Armored Division, "After Action Report,

December 1944 ," and U.S. Army, Headquarters 2d Armored Division, G-4

History."

53. Roland G. Ruppenthal, United States Army in World War II: The

European Theater of Operations Logistical Support of the Armies in Two

Volumes: Volume II Seotember 1944-May 1945 (Washington: Office of

the Chief of Military History, 1959), p. 236.

54. Second Armored Division "G-4 History," p. 21.

55. FM 100-10, pp. 132-134.

56. U.S. Army, Headquarters First Army, Combat Operations Data First Army

Europe 1944-1945 (18 November 1946), p. 118.

57. U.S. Army, Headquarters Third Army, After Action Report, Ordnance

Section, Headquarters Third Army n.d., p. 15.

58. The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, Requirement

for Ordnance Recovery mpany, (Study No. 95), 4 February 1946,

pp. 2-3.

59. See Skelly, Annex 5 to Appendix J, p. 66.

3WPC1221J/NOV83

69
60. Third Army Aft.er Action Report, Ordnance Seation, t. 13.

61. Skelly, p. 35.

Part IV Schmidt and the 28th Infantry Division

1. The statistics in this section are based on 28th Infantry Division's

"Unit Report No. 5" covering the period November 1944 when the

division fought at Schmidt. Regimental records, however, record 5,450

casualties (3660 battle and 1,790 non-battle).

2. Ibid., p. 14 .

?. Charles 3. .MacDonald and Sidney T. Mathews, United States Arm- in_

World War II: Soecial Studies: Three Battles: Arnav lle Altuzzo

and Schmidt Washington: Office of the chief of Military History,

1952), p. 413. Hereafter cited as Schmidt.

4. "Unit Report, No. 5," p. 6.

5. Dorothy Kneeland Clark, "Casualties as a Measure of the Loss of Combat

Effectiveness of an Infantry Battalion," Operations Resea.ch ----- ffice,

The Johns Hopkins University, Technical Memorandum ORO-T-289

(August 1954), Appendix A, p. 39.

6. "Unit Report No. 4, p. 2. MacDonald, Schmidt, p. 255, and the

cumulative figures from Memorandum to G-1 Daily Sumamry attached to

Headquarters 28th Infantry Division G-1 Journal 01 Nov 44 30 Nov 44

Germany.

7. Charles 3. MacDonald, U.S. Army in World War II: EurFoean Theater of

Operations: The Seified Line Campai (Washington: Office of the

Chief of Military History, 1963), p. 346 and Clark, p. 31.

8. Seigfried LineCaain, pp. 390-391.

*9. MacDonald, Schmidt, p. 254.

10. Headquarters, Third Battalion, 112th Infantry, "3d Battalion, 112th

Infantry History," n.d. n.p. Company L account for period 3-6 November.

11. MacDonald, Schmidt, p. 255 and "Unit Report No. 5, p. 29, "The local

battlefield was to be isolated by air action."

12. Charles B. MacDonald, The Battle of the Huertgen Forest

(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1963), p. 86.

3WPC1221 j/NOV83

70
13. MacDonald, Seigried Line, p. 255.

14. Robert Ingersoll, Too Secret (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946),

pp. 240-241. Also cited in John Ellis,-The Sharp End: The- '-ghtin

Man in World War II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980), p. 239.

15. U.S. Army First United States Army, Report of Ortins 1 gu 1944

22 February 1945 n.d., p. 165.

16. MacDonald, Huerten, p. 111.

17. Cited in FirstU.S. Arm Reoort of Operations, p. 166.

18. MacDonald, Huertgen, p. 107.

19. "3d Battalion, 112th Infantry History.n" Company K account: for

17 October 1944.

20. S.L.A, Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in

Future War (rpt. Glouster, Mass: Peter Smith,. 1978), p.--13.- --

21. 28th Division "Unit Report No. 5," p. 28.

22. Skelley, "Mobile Maintenance," pp. 34--35.

23. "History, 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry," Summary for 5-7 November.

24. U.S. Army Service Forces, Technical Intelligence Report, "Poor Staff

Leadership," dated 7 August 1945, p. 3. This is a highly critical

account of the 112th Infantry staff officers and unit commanders by an

American officer serving with the 86th Chemical Mortar Battalion at

Schmidt. He was in Schmidt during the height of the fighting.

25. "History 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry," Company L account for

3-5 November.

26. MacDonald, Huertgen Forest, p. 104-105. Also see "Poor Staff

Leadership," p. 5.

?7, MacDonald, Schmidt, pp. 308-309. "3d Battalion, 112th Infantry

History," Company L account for 3-6 November, Company K for 4

November.

28. MacDonald, Schmidt, p. 327.

29. MacDonald, Huert Forest, p. 113.

30. Ibid., pp. 113-115.

3WPC1221J/NOV83

71
31. MacDonald, Schmidt, p. 349.

32. Ibid., p. 415.

33. U.S. Army, Headquarters 28th Infantry Division, 1After Action Report"

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 28th Division Artillery 010001

Nov to 302400 Nov 1944 (4 December 1944), p. 6.

34. MacDcnald, Schmidt, p. 307.

35. See Ibid., passim for details on supply and engineer activities along

the Kall trail.

36. Ibid., p. 311.

37. Ibid.

38. "3d Battalion, 112th Infantry History," Company L account for

3-6 November.

39. Ibid., Headquarters Company account 4-7 November.

40. MacDonald, Schmidt, pp. 368-369.

41. Extracted from "Unit Report No. 5," pp. 7-25.

42. MacDonald, Huerten Forest, p. 107.

43. As noted in 28th Infantry Division G-1 Journal and "Unit Report No. 5".

44. 28th Infantry Division G-1 Journal and tUnit Report No. 5," p. 12.

45. MacDonald, Schmidt, p. 413. U.S. Army, 110th Infantry Regiment,

History of the 110th .Infantry Regiment of the 28th Division United

States Army World War II 1941-1945 (Atlanta: Albert Love Enterprises,

1945), pp. 4546.

"6. "Unit Report No. 5," p. 27.

47. Clark, "Casualties," p, 3, 25, 26, and 35.

48. MacDonald, Huert Forest, p. 118.

1'9. MacDonald, Sei fried Line, p. 369.

50. MacDonald, Schmidt, p.

51. Marshall, pp. 173-4.

3WPC1221 J/NOV83

72
52. "UJnit Report No. 5," p. 6

53. In order Clark, ORO-T-289, pp. 29-35; .. DM- Corporation, ed., 3-DM inal

Retort New AoProaches to Reconstitution in 'High Intensity Confio-t I on

the Modern Battlefield (14 March 1980); and Elizabeth W. Etheridge and

Michael R. Anderson, "Criteria for Reconstitution of Forces", Studies

and Analysis Directorate, Combined Arms Studies and Analysis USACACDA

(September 1981).

51. Clark, p. 31.

5.t "3d Battalion, 112th Infantry History," Headquarters Company account

for 31 October 1944.

:6. This account is based on Ibid., accounts for the period 8 November

19t4 to 2 December 1944.

.WP'C1221j/NOV83

73
Endnotes 1973 War

1. Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Ar.m- (-New York: Harper &

Row, 1975), p. 77.

2. Edgar O'Ballance, No Victor No Vancuished: The Yom Kiour War (San

Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), p. 53.

3. Luttwak, p. 77.

4, Avraham Adan, On the Banks of the Suez (San Rafael, CA: Presidio

Press, 1980), p. 152. Each armored battalion usually had three

com.anies, but occassionally a fourth company appears as in Adan's

division.

5. O'Ballance, p. 53.

6. Luttwak, p. 175.

7. Ibid.

8. O'Ballance, p. 87.

9. The following is derived from Adan's book.

Vietnam

10. Julian J. Ewell and Ira A. Hunt, Department of the Army: Vietnam

Studies: Sharpening the Combat Ed e _ The Use of Analysis _to

Reinforce MilitarJuement (Washington, D.C., 1974).

11. Joseph M. Heiser, Deartment of the Arry: Vietnam Studies: Logistic

Supoort (Washington, D.C., 1974),

12. Details of this engagement may be found in Albert N. Garland, ed.,

Infantrv in Vietnam (Fort Benning, GA: Infantry Magazine, 1967),

pp- 5-- and S .L.A. Marshall, Battles in the Monsoon (New York:

William Morrow and Co., 1967), pp 11413.. -

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Appendix

CURRENT RECONSTITUTION CONCEPT

(Definitions provided by CAORA Concept Paper dated. June 1983)

DEFINITION OF TERMS. The development of the current reconstitution

concept is dependent upon an understanding of several terms. These terms

include the following:

a. Reconstitution-The total process of keeping the force supplied with

various supply classes, services and replacement personnel and equipment to

maintain the desired level of combat effectiveness.

b. Reaeneration-Includes those replacement, - reor-anization, and

redistribu ton actions necessary to restore attrited units that are no

longer combat effective to the desired level of combat effectiveness.

c. Sustainin Su__ ort-Includes those resupply and service actions that

are constantly in progress to maintain a unit at a desired level of combat

effectiveness. These actions include replenishment of all classes -of--supply

and the transportation required to accomplish resupply, essential

maintenance, recovery and evacuation of nonoperational equipment, -medical

treatment and evacuation, individual personnel replacement, and services

required to sustain the unit.

d. Replacement-The introduction of personnel and equipment assets into

attrited units with the aim of raising such units to a designated strength

level. The personnel and equipment assets may be introduced into the

attrited unit individually, by fully manned weapon or equipment items, in

other small increments, or as whole sub-units (squads, platoons, etc.).

e. Reorganization-Those organizational actions taken within an attrited

unit to restore its combat effectiveness. Reorganization consists of such

measures as shifting equipment and personnel between sub-units to better

balance their combat capabilities, the matching of surviving weapon systems

with surviving crews to enable their continued employment, the formation of

composite units (Joining two attrited sub-units to form a single

full-strength or over-strength combat effective sub-unit), and similar

internal shifting of unit resources.

f. Redistribution-When a unit has been rendered combat ineffective and

when resource constraints, the' operational situation or other factors

preclude, or make impractical the restoration of that unit's combat

effectiveness, the unit's remaining assets may be redistributed among other

attrited formations. These assets may be assigned as personnel and

equipment replacements or employed in other ways as specified by the higher

commander. While such a unit would continue to exist "on the books," its

personnel and equipment resources would be assigned to other formations.

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g. ResuplyAttrited units must be sustained and resupplied through the

combat service support system with emphasis put on reestablishing unit basic

loads of ammunition, topping off tuel tanks and providing other critical

supply items required for conducting future combat operations.

h. Services-The services functions of combat service support, as they performed by and for the Army in the field, are termed field services. They include: laundry, bath, clothing renovation, baky, extile renovation,

selvage, decontamination, graves registration, post exchange sales,

provisions general labor, and provisions of water.

i. Combat Effectiveness-The unit's ability to carry out a given mission

is termed "combat effectiveness". There are many factors that contribute to

a unit's capability to carry out combat operations. Thes-e include such

identifiable elements as weapons strength and technical specification, (lethality, range, accuracy, etc.), personnel strength, logistic resources

and assets (transport and maintenance capabilities, supply item

availability, and the system capabilities of other equipment on hand in the

unit. There are unquantifiable factors which include unit training, leadership, morale, motivation and the debilitating influence_ heavy

attrition and battlefield stress may have on combat effectiveness.

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Glossary

Army Service Forces--one of the three major subdivisions of the Army; it

provides general administration, transportation, supply, evacuation, and

other services to meet the requirements of the Army. In World War I it

was known as Services of Supply.

class I supplies, -- supplies, such as rations and forage, that are consumed

at an approximately uniform daily rate under all conditions, and that

are issued automatically without requisitions to Army Units. Abbrev:

C1 I Sup.

class II supplies, -- supplies, such as clothing weapons, and vehicles, for

which allowances are fixed by Tables of Allowances and Tables of Basic

Allowances.

class III supplies, -- supplies, such as fuels and .lubricants for all purposes

except aviation, including gasoline for all vehicles, Diesel oil, fuel

oil, and coal.

class III (A)- supplies, -- aviation fuels and lubricants.

class IV supplies, -- supplies and equipment for which allowances are not

prescribed, or which require special measures -of control and .a are not

otherwise classified. Normally such supplies include fortification

materials, construction materials, aircraft, and articles of- similar

nature.

class IV (E) supplies, -- complete airplanes, airplane equipment, and all

spare parts and supplies required to maintain a complete airplane in

commission.

class V supplies, -- ammunition, pyrotechnics, antitank mines, and chemical

warfare agents.

1st echelon maintenance -- servicing or repairs that can be done by an

operator, driver, or crew.

2nd echelon maintenance -- service or maintenance that is beyond the scope of

the operating personnel, but which can be done by the maintenance

section of the unit that uses the equipment.

3rd echelon maintenance -- maintenance, repairs, and unit replacement beyond

the scope of the troops using the material and equipment, which can be

performed by mobile maintenance organizations.

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4th echelon maintenance--general overhaul and reclamation of equipment, units, and parts, involving the ue of heavy tools and the services of

general and technical mechanics.

5th echelon maintenance--maintenance of equipment by personnel of maintenance

and supply units located at fixed installations in the rear areas. This

included the reclamation or complete reconditioning of materiel, the

limited manufacture of parts and equipment, and" the supplying of

equipment to lower echelons.

regulating station--a traffic control agency located on a line of

ccaunication near the rear of the combat zone to maintain quick,

smooth, regular movement of troops and materiel to and from parts of the

area controlled.

services of supply--see army service forces.

theater of operations--cmbat area, including the area necessary for the

administration and supply connected with military operations.

zone of interior--that part of national territory in a theater of war not

included in the theater of operations. The zone of the interior is

organized to furnish manpower and munitions to the armed forces.,o

3WPC1221J/NOV83

78
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