Slip Op. 07-25



## UNI TED STATES COU

RT OF INTERNATIO

NAL TRADE

__________________________________________ : AGRO DUTCH I

NDUSTRI ES L I MI TED, : : Plaintiff, : : v. : : UN I TE D ST AT ES, : Before: M USGRA VE, Jud ge : Def endant, : Court. No. 02-00499 : and : : COAL I TI ON F OR FAI R PR ESERVED : MUSHROOM TRADE, : : Def endant- I nterve nor. : __________________________________________: OP IN ION AN D O RD ER [P laintiff ar g ued that ag ency ’s antidumping duty deter minations were not pr oper in that: (1) the ag ency ’s use of partial fac ts a vailable and adver se infere nces for c erta in transac tions was in error ; (2) that ag ency ’s determination of pl aintiff’s constructed value was in err or; and (3) that ag ency ’s adjustment of plaintiff’s imputed cr edit expenses wa s i n er ro r. The c ourt found: (1) a g ency ’s rea soning a s to use of par

tial f acts available and adver se infere nces was not clear and re manded that matter for

further consideration; (2) ag enc y ’s deter minations as to plaintiff’s constructe d value calc ulation was prope r; and (3) ag ency ’s deter mination a s to pla intiff’s imputed cre dit ex penses wa s proper .] Dated: F ebrua ry 16, 2007 Garve y Schube rt Barer

( Lizbeth R. Lev inson , John C. Kalitka , and Ro na ld M . W isla ) for the plaintiff. Robert D. Mc Callum , Assistant Attorney Gene ral, Civil Divisi on, United States Depa rtment o f Jus tice, JeanneDavidson , Ac t i n g Di re ct o r, C o m m er ci al L i t i gat i o nBr an ch , C i v i l Di v i s i o n , Uni ted States Depa

rtment of Just ice ( Stefan Shaibani , and De lfa Cas til lo ); I nternation al Of fi ce of Chief Counsel for I mport Administration, United St ates De partment of Comm erc e ( W ill iam G. Is as i ), of c ouns e l, f or the de fe nd ant.Court No. 02-00499 Pag e 2

Plaintiff also alleg es that Commerce issued improper liquidatio n i nstructions. As 1 this matter is being rema

nded, the c ourt does not re ach this issue at this time. Col lie r, Sh an no n, Sc ott

, P LLC ( Adam H. Gordon and Michae l J. Coursey ) f or the de fe nd a ntintervenor

. Be fore the cour

t is plainti ff Ag ro Dutch Industries, L imited’s (“plaintiff,” “Ag ro Dutch,” or “re spondent”) motion for judgment on the age ncy rec ord. P laintiff cha lleng es aspe cts of the United States Depa

rtment of Commerce ’s (“ defe ndant,” “ Commerce , ” o r “D epar tment”) de terminations

ma de fo r t

he Se c on d A dmi nis tr a tiv e Re vie w o f t he antidu mp ingdu ty

or de r c ov e ri ngc e rt a in prese rved mushrooms from I ndia. See Certain Preser ved Mushrooms F rom I ndia: Final Results of An tid ump ing Duty Ad

min

. Re vie w, 67 F e d. Re g . 4 6, 17 2 ( I TAJuly 12 , 2 00 2) (“ F ina l Re su lts ” ); see id. at 1 4 , 1 73 (adopting rea soning of the I ssues and De cision Memo. for [the] Final Results of the Antidumping Duty

Admin. Review on Certa in Preserve d Mushroom [s ic] from I ndia - Fe bruar y 1, 2000, throug h J anuar

y 31, 2001, Pub. R. Doc. 154 (“De cision Memo”)) . By its mot ion plaintiff

ra ise s th re e ma in i ssu e s: ( 1) that th e us e of pa rt ia l fa c ts av a ila

ble and a dv e rs e inf

e re nc e s f or c e rt a in of plaintiff’s sa les was improper; (2) that the methodology used to deter

mine plaintiff’s construc ted value wa s in err or; and (3) that the ca lculation of plaintiff’s imputed c redit expenses wa s in error

. 1 Jurisdi ction and Standard of Review The c ourt has jurisdiction over this matter pur suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2000) . The c ourt must uphold C ommerce ’s determinations unless they are “unsupported by

substantial evidence on the re cord, or

otherwise not in ac corda nce w ith the law .

. . .” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (b)( 1)(B ) (2000)

. Sub sta nti a l e vid e nc e is “ mor e tha n a me re sc int ill a , it

me ans su c h re le va

nt e vid e nc e a s a

re a so na ble mind might acc ept as a dequate to support a conc lusion.” Matsushita Ele c. Indus. Co. v. UnitedCourt No. 02-00499 Pag e 3

States , 7 5 0 F. 2 d

9 2 7 , 9 3 3 (F ed

. C i r. 1 9 8 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Consolidat ed Edison Co. v. NLRB , 305 U.S. 197, 2 2 9 (1 9 3 8 ), and Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB , 3 4 0 U

. S. 4 7 4 , 4 7 7 ( 1 9 5 1 ) )

. T h is s ta n d ard require s “something less than the we ight of the evidenc e, and the possibili ty o f d ra wing two inconsistent conclusions from the e vidence does not preve nt an a d mi n is trative a g ency ’s finding from being supported by

substantial evidence .” Id. (q u o t i n g Consolo v. F ed. Mar. Comm’n , 383 U.S. 607, 619–20 (1966))

. Howeve r, substantial e vidence supporting an ag ency deter mination must be base d on the whole r ecor d, and a revie wing court must take into a ccount not only that which supports the ag ency ’s conc lusion, but also “whateve r in the record fairly detra cts from it s weig ht.” Mele x USA, Inc. v. United States , 1 9 C I T 1 1 3 0 , 1 1 3 2 , 8 9 9 F. S u p p . 6 3 2 , 6 3 5 (1 9 9 5 ) ( ci t i n g Un iv e rsa l Ca me ra , 340 U.S. at 488). Backg ro und Commerce published a

notice in the F ederal R egister a lerting interested pa rties that they could re q u es t an administrative r eview of the antidumping duty

order cover ing the subject

merc handise for

the per iod of re v i ew of F ebrua ry 2000 throug h J anuar

y 2001 (“POR”)

. See Antidumping or Counter

vailing D uty

Orde r, F inding, or

S u s p en d ed I nvestig ation; Opp’y to Req. Ad min . Re vie w, 66 F e d. Re g . 1 0, 26 9, 10 ,2 69 (I TAF e b. 14 , 2 00 1) . Pl a int if f r e qu e ste d r e vie w o f i ts antidumping duty

marg in, Comm erc e initiated a r eview the reof , and C o m m er ce se nt plaintiff an antidumping que stionnaire. See le tte r f ro m la w f ir m of Ma natt, Phe lps & Phi lli ps L L P ( “ MPP” ) t o Commerce of

2/26/01, Pub. R. Doc. 3; I nitiation of Anti dumping and Countervailing Duty Admin. Reviews and Re qs. for Revocations in Part, 66 Fe d. Reg

. 16,037, 16,038 (I TA Mar. 22, 2001); letter from Commerce to MPP of 3/30/01, Pub. R. Doc. 9, Attach. (“ Questionnaire ”).Court No. 02-00499 Pag e 4

This document is a printout of all the data enter ed for plaintiff’s sales. I t can be found 2 a s p arto f t h e S e c t i o nC R e s p o n s e i m m e d i a t e l y po st Appendix C -3b. Plaintiff timely

submitt ed re sponses to the Questionnaire

. See letter fr om MPP to Comm erc e of 5/7/01, Conf. R. Doc. 3, Attach. ( “Section A Response ”); letter from MPP to C ommerce of 5/25/01, Conf

. R. Doc. 7, Attac h. (“Sec tion C R esponse” ). In its responses, plaintiff a nswere d various questions a

bout its sales and sales proce sses. Of rele vance to this discussi o n , p l ai ntiff

aver red that eac h of its sales wer e individually neg otiated, and indicated that once terms wer e ag ree d to, they wer e firm. See Section A Resp. at 10 (“We ne g otiate produc t, price a nd quantity

with our customer via the telephone. Once we a g ree to terms, the price and quantity do not chang e. . . . Our pa y me nt t e rm s are 90 da

y s a ft e r s hip me nt. ” ); id . at 11; id . at 12 (“ Both our c ustomer and we [si c]

are bound to the order price reg ardle ss of t he chang e in marke t price s that occur betwee n [t he] order date and sh ipm e nt d ate .” ); id . ( “ Al l of our s a le s are ma de a s de sc ri be d

. . . a bo ve ” ); se e als o Section C Resp. at C-12 (“All of our sales ar e made [wit h] pay m en t t er m s o f 90 day s after bill of lading date . . . . We have rec orded a ‘3’ in this field [(“PAYTERMU”)] to indicate this pay ment term.”) ; Section C Resp., App. (“Sale s Databa se”) (showing a “ 3 ” en t er ed in t he PAYTERMU fie ld for 2

ever y transac tion). Plainti ff further stated that, for all of i ts transac tions, it invoiced its customers

sever al day s after

the date of shi pment, and considered the date of invoice to be the date of sale

. See S ect io n A Re sp . at 10 (“ We i nv oic e our c us tom e r w ith in a fe w d ay s a ft e r s hip me nt. ” ); id . at 12 (“[W] e invoice our

customer a

pproxi mately

two to five day s after

shipment. There are no circ umstances under which we would deviate from this prac tice.”) ; Section C Resp. at C-10 (“TheCourt No. 02-00499 Pag e 5

For clar ity , the cour

t will refer

to the date of

sale/invoice a s the date of sale. 3 date of sa le is o ur

date of inv oic e .” ); Sa le s D ata ba se a t “ SAL I NT U” c olumn ( sh ow inga ll 3 transac tions have an e ntere d date of sale). Finally , plaintiff s tated that it did “not have a w ritten sales contra ct with [i ts] customers.” Section A Resp. at 11. After an initial reviewof the Responses, Commerc e re quested a dditional information from plaintiff. See le tte r f

ro m Co mme rc e to M PP of 8/9 /01 , Pu

b. R. D oc . 8 0, Atta c h. (“ Au g us t 9 Questionnaire ”). B y

this questionnaire, Commerce specifically reque sted that plaintiff cla rify wh e the r t he re e xiste d “ any

sa le s a g re e me nt or con tr act . . . b e tw e e n A g ro Dutc h a nd it U .S.

c us tom e rs ,” and

“ wh e the r o r n ot A g ro Dutc h a nd its U. S. c us tom e rs have any lon g -t e rm

or mul tipurcha se contra cts or ag ree ments.” Id . at 1. I n re s p o n s e, p l aint iff stated that it did not have “ any binding c ontrac ts or ag ree ments with a ny U.S. customers duringthe POR. The quantities and pric es

o f al l s al es ar e subject to cha ng e until the date of

shipment.” L etter f

rom MPP t o Commerce of 8/30/01, Conf. R. Doc. 20, Attach. (“ Aug ust 30 Response”) at 1. After revie wing plaintiff’s re sponses, the Coalition for Fa ir Preser ved Mushroom Tra de (“Coalition” or “ intervenor ”) r aised que stions about certai n i n fo rmation containe d there in. Specifica lly , the Coalition noted t hat, whil e plainti ff ha d stated in its Section A and C Responses that all of its sales had ter

ms that require d pay

ment ninety

day s after

invoicing, some of plaintiff’s transac tions had “neg ative credit periods”—me aning that the enter ed pay ment date f

or a tra nsaction predated the ente red sale date for that transac tion (“NCP Transa ctions”). See letter fr om law firm of Collier, Shannon, Scott, PL L C (“CSS”) t o Commerce of 1/30/02, Conf. R. Doc. 30 ( “Coalition’s Com me nts ” ) at 5; se e als o Sales Data base at obss. 79, 201, 209 (showing transac tions with ente redCourt No. 02-00499 Pag e 6

Customer A is identified in Conf. R. Doc. 34 at 2. 4 pay ment dates that pre date e ntere d sales date s). The Coalition s p eculated that these va lues might have be en ente red in error as plaintiff had nowher e indi cate d in any of its responses that it had made “pre pay ment” s al es . Coalition’s Com ments at 6. I n response , plaintiff stated that the e ntere d pay ment dates for the NC P Transa ctions wer e, in fac t, corr ect. See le tte r fr om l aw f ir m of Ar no ld & Porte r (“ AP”) to Commerce of 2/11/02, Conf. R. D oc. 34 (“Reply to Comments”) at 2. Plaintiff stated that the data re flec ted “c ash advanc es” from one of its U.S. customers (“ Customer A” ) that 4 “we re pa id in anticipation of future shipments for which the c ustomer, produc t and price wer e not deter mined at the time of the a dvance ” (“ The Ar rang ement”)

. Id

. Commerce the n published the preliminary results of its review

. See Certain Prese rved Mushrooms from I ndia: Prelim. Results of Anti dumping Duty Admin. Review, 67 Fed. Reg . 10,371 (I TA Mar. 7, 2002) (“Pre liminary Results”). For the preliminary calc ulation of p l ai n t i ff’s

anti dumpi ngmarg in, Com me rc e de te rm ine d th a t it cou ld not us e the data re la te d to the NC P Tr ans a c tio ns . Co mme rc e e xpla ine d th a t th is w a s so be c a us e : ( 1) pla int if

f’ s r e sp on se s in

the Re ply to C omment s “ su g g e st[] th a t A g ro Dutc h ma y have a lon g -t e rm

c on tr a c t or

sa le s a g re e me nt w ith [Cus tom e r A ], y e t A g ro Dutc h cla ims that it ha d n o b ind ingc on tr a c ts o r a g re e me nts wi th a ny U. S. customers duringthe POR,” id . at 10,374 (c iting Aug . 30 Resp. at 1); and (2 ) “Ag ro Dutch’ s repor ting of pre- pay ments appea

rs inconsistent with its ea

rlier state ment that all of its U.S. sales are sold with pay

ment terms of 90 day s afte r the bill of la ding date.” Id . ( c iti ngSe c tio n C R e sp . at C12 ). Com me rc e c on c lud e d tha t it wo uld us e fa c ts a

va ila ble —a nd no t th e e nte re d d a ta

fo r t he NC P Transa ctions—to calculate plaintiff’s pr eli minary antidumping mar g in beca use plaintiff’sCourt No. 02-00499 Pag e 7

“desc ription of its sales to this custom er r equire s further explanation as to the exi stence of any sales ag ree ment with this cust o m er , the appr opriate date of sale , and the r eleva nt pay ment terms.” Id

. (c iti ng19 U.S. C. § 16 77 e (a )) . Co mme rc e fu rt he r d e te rm ine d th a t it

wa s n e c e ssa

ry to u se a dv e rs e inf e re nc e s wh e n se le c tin g a mon g the fa c ts a va ila ble be c a us e pla int if

f ha d “ no t c oo pe rate d to the be st of its ability

to comply

with the Depa

rtment’s re quests in the q u estionnaire a nd supplemental questionnaire to supply

full information of its pay ment terms and copies of a ny sales ag ree ments.” Id . (citing 1 9 U. S .C. § 1677e(b)) . As a re sult of these dete rminations, Comm erc e ca lculated plaintiff’s pre l i m i n ar y an t i dumping duty marg in to be 1.54 perc ent. Id . at 10,376. I n calc ulating pla int if f’ s p re lim ina

ry anti dumpi ngdu ty

marg in, no iss ue s w e re rai sed as to t he data re la te d to pla i n t i f f ’ s o t h e r s a l e s t o C u s t o m e r A ( “ t h e P O R T r a n s a c t i o n s ” ) an d C o m m e r c e i n c l u d e d t h a t da ta in c a lc ulatin g pla int if

f’ s p re lim ina

ry anti dumpi ngmarg in. F ina lly , Com me rc e state d that it wo uld “provide Ag ro Dutch w ith the opportunity to pro v ide furthe r information on this topic afte r the issuance of

the pre liminary

results for c onsideration in the fina l results.” Id . at 10,374. After the Prelimina

r y Re s ults were published, Commerc e sent plaintiff a nother supplementa l questionnaire. See letter fr om Comm ere to AP of 3/7/02, P u b

. R

. Doc. 129, Attac h. (“Ma rch 7 Questionnaire ”). Commerc e re quested that plaintiff:

Ex plain in det ai l the sales and pa y ment terms for tr ansac tions inv olv ingpa

y me nt a dv anc e s, a s id e nti fi e d o n p a g e 2 o f the [Re ply to Comments] . I n particula

r:

a . S pec if y wh e the r o r n ot anyty

pe of w ritten sales ag ree ment or contra ct exis ts w ith r eg ard to [ Customer A]. I f so, provide the document(s)

. Ex plain why the a g re e me nts we re no t pr ov ide d e arl ie r i n r e sponse to the Depa rtment’s questionnaire and supplementa l questionnaire.Court No. 02-00499 Pag e 8
b. Ex plain the appa

rent c ontradiction between the descr iption of pay

ment terms to [C ustomer A] in the [R eply to Comm ents], and the statement at pag e C-12 of the [Section C Response] that all of Ag ro Dutch’ s U

. S

. s a l e s ar e m a d e w i t h p aym e n tt e r m s o f 9 0 d ays afte r the bill of lading date. Id

. at 1 (empha sis in orig inal). Plaintiff timely responde d to this supplemental questionnaire. See l e t t e r f r o m A P t o C o m m e r c e o f 3 / 2 6 / 0 2 , C o n f

. R

. D o c . 4 7 , A t t a c h

. ( “ M ar c h 2 6 R e s p o n s e ” )

. In response to Commerc e’s question to “ [e] x plain in de tail the sales and pay ment t er m s , ” p laintiff stated that [Cus tom e r A ] is bot h a c us tom e r o f A DI Land

a sa le s a g e nt. That is it both purchases ADI L mushrooms f or its own acc ount, and a lso se rv e s a s a sal e s a g e nt f or AD I Lsa le s to oth e r c us tom e rs . [C ustome r A] ea rns a c ommissi on from ADI Lfor c erta in sales for wh ic h it a c ts a s an a g e nt. [C ustomer A] asked us to produce a produc t for shipment duri ngthe POI that we we re no t the n pro du c ing— A -1 mus hr oo ms, which ar e Gr ade A mushrooms that are sliced 3/8” [sic] t hick rather than the standa

rd 3/16” [sic] t hick. We understand that [ Customer A se lls thi s p ro du c t to a U.S

. buy e r]. AD I Lwa s c on c e rn e d th a t if it beg an produc ing this produc t, and [Cus tomer A] were to canc el an order , ADI Lwould not be able to r esell this customiz ed produc t . . . . To satis fy thi s c on c e rn , a

nd pr ov ide a ssu

ra nc e that it wo uld c omp le te all purcha ses, [Cus tomer A] provided advance pay ment deposits

. . . , in e ff e c t a s se c ur ity

fo r f utu re sa le s o f a

ne w p ro du c t. T h er e i s n o w ri t t en agr ee m en t , o n l y an o ra l u n d er s t an d i n g. Mo re ov e r, the a dv anc e s w e re pr ov ide d w ith ou t r e g ard to d e fi nit e future sa les. I ndeed the whole idea of the a dvance was to provide a form of secur ity ag ainst future orders. There was no corre sponding c on te mpo ra

ne ou s a g re e me nt t o s hip sp e c if ic qu ant iti e s to sp e c if

ic c us tom e rs a t sp e c if

ic pr ic e s. As we be g an s h i p ping A -1 mushrooms, and they wer e acc epted by

the ultimate customer, [Cus t o m er A] s oug ht the quick re tur n of its a dv anc e pa

y me nts
. We a g re e d to c redit th e depo sit sCourt No. 02-00499 Pag e 9

a g a i n s ts a l e s o f

o t h e r p r o d u c t s a s w e l l a s A

- 1 m u s h r o o m s . In a dd iti on , w e a g re e d to c re dit the a dv anc e pa

y me nts a g a ins t sa le s to oth e r c us tom e rs wh o w ou ld a g re e to p ay the inv oiced

a mou nts to [Cus tom e r A ] rathe r t

han to us. T his e na

ble d [Cu sto me r A ] to rec over its adva

nce pa y ments ear lier. The invoice s at issue note that the sale was made ag ainst advanc e pay ment, and wher e [Cust omer A] wa s not the c us tom e r, it is sh ow n a s th e c on sig ne e . F or the se sa le s, [C ustomer A] collected pa y ment from the ultimate customer

. Id

. a t 1– 2 ( c itatio n o mit te d) ; see id. a t E x . 5 ( s a mp l e i n v o i c e l i s t i n g C u s t o m e r A a s c o n s i g n e e )

. In response to Commerc e’s question as to w hether there was or w as not a “ written sales a g ree ment or contra ct” be tween pla intiff an d C u s t o mer A, pla intiff stated that “[n]o written sales ag ree ment or contra ct betwe en ADI Land any customer, including [C ustomer A] of any ty pe wa s in effe ct during the POR or reg ardingsales m ade during the POR.” Id. at 2. Fina lly , in response to Commerc e’s question that plaintiff “explain the appar ent contra diction” of its claim that all of its sales we re ma de wi th n ine ty -d ay

pa y me nt te rm s and the data on the re c or d sh ow ing that no t a ll s a le s w e re ma de in this manner, plaintiff state d that

ADI L ’s standar d pay

ment terms ar e 90 day s after bill of lading date, and the se te rm s a

pp lie d to a ll cus to mer s d ur ingthe POR . With r e s p e c tt o t h e a d v an c e p ay m e n t s m a d e b y

[C u s t o m e r

A ], o b v i o u s ly t h e c u s t o m e r p a i d i n a d v an c e an d t h u s d i d n o t h a v e 9 0 d ay s t o p ay. F or tho se sa le s to wh ic h th e a dv anc e pa y me nts we re a

pp lie d, it w ou ld have be en more acc urate to state that t h e t er m s of pay ment wer e pay ment in advanc e. Id . T he re a ft e r, Com me rc e pu bli sh e d th e F ina l Re su lts

. F or the F ina l Re su lts , Com me rc e c on tin ue d to fi nd that the us e of

fa c ts a va ila ble and a dv e rs e infere nces w as wa

rra nted for the NCP Tr ansac tions. See Dec ision Memo at 7–10 (“Comment 2”). Un lik e the Pr e lim ina

ry Re su lts , h ow e ve r, fo r t

he F ina l Re su lts Com me rc e fo un d that the us e of fa c ts available and adve rse infe renc es wa s warr anted f or all of plaintiff’s sa les to Custom er A —includingCourt No. 02-00499 Pag e 10

the POR Transac tions. Se e id . at 8– 9; se e als o Ag ro Dutch F inal Results Marg in Calc u l at i on Prog ram L og and Output, Conf. R. Doc. 54 at ll. 335–340 (stating that the “ [f] ollowing pr og raming to apply AFArate to all sales to [Customer A], pe r discussion in Dec ision Memo, Comment 2 . . . .” (empha sis a dded))

. I n Comment 2, Commerce e x plained why use of f acts available wa s warr anted fo r a ll o f t he se tr ans a c tio ns : [D] espite specific reque sts f rom the De partment to Ag ro Dutch in the instant r eview to pr ovide documentation and information conc erning thi s sp e c if

ic sa le s c ha

nn e l, A g ro Dutc h f

a ile d to pr ov ide thi s information until the post-preliminary results Marc h 26, 2002, su bmi ssi on . In th is r e vie w, Ag ro D ut ch fir st r e po rt e d th a t a ll o f i ts U.S. sales ar e sold with pay ment terms of 90 da

y s af t er t h e bil l of lading date ( see May

25, 20 0 1 , S ec t ion C questionnaire re sponse at pag e C-12). I t also asser

ted t hat i t had no binding contrac ts or sales a g re e me nts wi th any U. S. cu sto me rs duri ngthe POR ( see Aug ust 30, 20 01 , s up ple me nta l qu e sti on na ir e re sp on se a t pa g e 1[) ]. N ow he re in the May 7, 2001, Section A re sponse discussion on sales proc ess or any other response does Ag ro Dutch ref er to advanc e pay

ment sales circ umstances involving [C ustomer A]. No t u n til the Depar tment so ug ht c lari fi c a tio n o f A g ro Dutc h’ s r e po rt e d p ay me nts , s ho rt ly be fo re the du e date of

the pr e li mi na

ry re su lts , d id A g ro Dutc h f ir st me nti on the se unus ua l sa le s c ir c ums tanc e s ( see Fe b ru ary 11, 2002, response at pag e 2). O nly afte r the preliminary results of this review and another supplemental questionnaire did Ag ro Dutch pr ovide any details about s ales to the c ustomer in question in the Marc h 26, 2002, submissi o n (i n full, ten months after the Depa rtment first re quested Ag ro Dutch’ s sales information in it s initi al questionnaire ). Howeve r, t his belated e x planation ra ises more que stions than it answers. A g ro Dutch’ s Marc h 26, 2002, explanation indicates that the c us tom e r p ro vid e d a

g re a t de a l of

mon e y to A g ro Dutc h me re ly as a de posit ag ainst future or ders f or which no w ritten ag ree ment or contra ct was r equire d, nor any g uara ntees on p ri cing . To adva nce such a larg e amount of m oney without any further leg al commitment or s e c u r it y r e f le c ts anu n u s u a l b u s in e s s a g r e e me n t t h at r e quires further explanation. I f no sales a g ree ment or contra ct exist s bey ond an “or al under standing ” ( see t h e M ar ch 1 6 , 2 0 0 2 , s u b m i s s i o nat p age 1), then such a deal implies either a g reat deal of trust on the pa rt ofCourt No. 02-00499 Pag e 11 the customer, or

that the customer ha s some other for m of relationship t o Ag ro Dutch. No t only is the a pp ro pr ia te date of

sa le and pa y me nt d a te in qu e s ti o n , b u t a ls o o th e r k e y s a le s is s u e s , s u c h a s th e r o le o f the customer a s a sales a

nd pay ment age n t , the re lationship of the c us tom e r t o A g ro Dutc h, and e ve n th e pr ice bas is f

or the sa le s ( i.e. , Ag ro Dutch’ s price to the c ustomer in question, or price that the other cu s to me r s p a id th is c u s to me r , a s n o te d a t p a g e 1 o f th e Mar ch 26, 2002, response ). The pe titio n er s s u gg ested in their c ase br ief that sales throug h this customer may be conside red more appropriately as constructe d export price sales, rather than EP sales. W hile the re cord inf or ma tio n d oe s no t su

pp or t thi s c on c lus ion , we c ann ot e nti re ly ru le out this poss ibilit y , g iven the questions that re main ab o u t t h is sales c ha nn e l. T he re is a gr e a t de a l mo re to b e le arn e d a bo ut t he se sa le s, but no further

opportunity

in this proceedingto obtain the information be c a us e Ag ro Dutc h fa ile d to pro vid e thi s sal e s inf or ma tio n unti l late in the proce eding . Be cause Ag ro Dutch w ithheld information reque ste d b y th e D e p artm e n t r e late d

to th e s e s a le s . . . , w e h a ve deter mined that fac ts available is wa rra nted in this inst ance . Comment 2 at 8–9 (c iting 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a )(2) (A)) . Fur thermore , Commerce de termined that the use of a dverse infere nces w as wa rra nted for a ll of plaintiff’s transa ctions with Cust omer A. Commerce e x plained that

the Department’s lac k of full knowledg e about the sa les involving thi s c us tom e r, a s w e ll a s th os e sa le s w here the c us tom e r a c te d a s a pay ment ag ent, stems dir ectly from Ag ro Dutch’s lack of cooper ation in p ro vid ing sp e c if

ic a lly re qu e ste d in fo rm a tio n in thi s r e vie w. Th is inf or ma tio n w a s ma int a ine d in Ag ro Dutc h’ s re c or ds and wa s w ith in its c on tr ol, bu t A g ro Dut c h f a ile d to pr ov ide the inf

or ma tio n in its qu e sti on na ir e res po ns e . T hu s, Ag ro Dutc h h a s n ot c oo pe rate d w ith re sp ect to p ro vid ingthi s in fo rm a tio n a nd an a dv e rs e inf

e re nc e is w ar r an te d in a p p ly in g f a c ts a v a il a

b le f o r th e s a le s ma d e to the customer in question . . . . Id . at 9 (c iti ng 19 U. S.C. § 167 7e (b ))

. Us ing fa c ts av a ila ble a nd a dv e rs e inf

e re nc e s f or bo th t he NC PCourt No. 02-00499 Pag e 12

and POR Transa ctions, Commerce calculated pl aintiff’s final antidumping duty marg in to be 27.80 pe rc e nt. Discussion I Th e c ourt fi rs t e xami ne s p la int if f’ s c on te nti on

that Co mme rc e ’s us e of

pa rt ia l f a c ts a va ila ble and adve rse infe re n ces was not proper . Commerce ma y use fa cts ava ilable in calc ulating a n

anti dumpi ngdu ty

marg in. Th e statut e pr ov ide s, in r e le va nt p art : (a) I n g ener al. I f– . . . (2) a n interested pa

rty or any other pe rson– (A) w ithholds i nformation th at has be en re quested by the administering authority

. . . under this title, . . . the a dmi nis te ri nga

uth or ity

. . . s ha ll, su

bje c t to se c tion 78 2(d) , u se the fa cts otherwise available in rea ching the applicable deter mination under this title. 19 U. S.C. § 1 67 7e (a )( 2) (A ) ( 20 00 ). Se c tio n 7 82 (d ) ( 19 U. S.C. § 1 67 7m( d) ) p ro vid e s:

I f the a dminist eringauthority . . . deter

mines that a re sponse to a reque s t fo r i nformation under this ti tle does not comply with the reques t , t he administeringauthority . . . shall promptly

inform the person submitting the r esponse of the nature of the de ficienc y and shall, to the ext ent pra cticable, provide that pe rson with an op po rt un ity to r e medy or ex pla in t

he de fi c ie nc y

in l ig ht o f t

he tim e limit s established for

the completion of investigat i ons or re views un de r t his tit le

. I f t

hat pe rs on

su bmi ts f ur the r i nf or ma tio n in re sp on se to such defic iency

and either

– (1) t h e administering authority . . . finds that such response is not satisfactory , or (2) such response is not submitted within the a pp lic a ble tim e lim its ,Court No. 02-00499 Pag e 13 then the administering authorit y . . . may , subject to subsection (e ), dis re g ard a ll o r p art

of the or ig ina l and

su bs e qu e nt r e sp on se s. 19 U. S.C. § 1 67 7m( d) (2 00 0) . Se c tio n 7 82 (e ) ( 19 U. S.C. § 1 67 7m( e )) pr ov ide s:

I n r e a c hin g a

de te rm inatio n . . . the a dmi nis te ri nga uth or ity

. . . s ha ll not decline to conside r i nformation that is submitt ed by an intere sted party and is nec essar

y to the determination but does not meet a ll the applicable require ments established by the administering authority or the Commiss ion, if– (1) the inf

ormation is submit ted by the dea dline established for

its submi ssion, (2) the inf ormation ca

n be ver ified, (3) the inf ormation is not so incomplete that it cannot se rv e a s a

re lia ble ba sis fo r r each ingthe a pp lic a ble deter mination, (4) the inter ested pa

rty has demonstrated t hat it acted to t h e b est of its ability

in providing the information and m ee t ing the require ments established by the adm inistering a

uthority . . . with respec t to the information, and (5) the inf

ormation ca n be used w ithout undue dif fi c ult ie s. 19 U. S.C. § 1 67 7m( e ). He re , th e c ourt un de rs tand s th a t th e re are thr e e di st in ct com po ne nts to Com me rc e ’s fa c ts a

va ila ble and a dv e rs e inf

e re nc e s d e te rm inatio ns : T he A rran ge me nt, Th e NC P Transa ctions, and t he POR Transa ctions. The diffic ulty in review ing Commerc e’s de terminations with respec t to these distinct factua l situations i s that it is not entirely clea r how Commerc e ar

rived at its conclusions. Nucor Corp. v. United States , 414 F.3d 1331, 1339 (F ed. Cir. 2005) (“ Where a n ag ency has not made a

particula r deter mination ex plicitly , the ag ency ’s ruling nonetheless may be

s u s t ai n edas l o n g as ‘t h e p at h o f t h e a g e n cy m ay b e r ea s o n ab l y

d i s ce rn ed

. ’” (c i t i n g CeramicaCourt No. 02-00499 Pag e 14

Regiomontana, S.A. v. U

nited States , 8 10 F .2 d 1 13 7, 11 39 (F e d. Cir . 1 98 7) )) ; Hynix Se miconductor Inc. v . United States , 3 0 C I T _ _ , _ _ , 4 2 5 F. S u

p p . 2 d 1 2 8 7 , 1 3 0 7 (2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Bowman Transp., Inc. v . Ark.-B est

Freight Sys., Inc

. , 4 19 U. S. 2 81 , 2 86 (1 97 4) ). He re , th e c ourt c ann ot u ph old Commerce’ s determinations with reg ard to the use of par tial fac ts available and adve rse infe renc es fo r s e ve ra l r e a so ns . First, Commerce ’s re asoning as to the use of fac ts available a

nd adver se infere nces f

or The Ar ra ng e me nt c ann ot b e “ re a so na bly dis c e rn e d. ” F or

e xamp le , T he Ar

ra ng e me nt i s v ari ou sly char acte rized as beingfor “ cash a dvance s” or “sec urity for future sales” or “adva nce pa y ments.” See Reply to Comm ents at 2; M ar ch 2 6 Response at 1–2; Preliminary Results at 10,374. The prope r char acte rization of The Arr ang em en two u l d s ee m v i t al t o C o m m er ce ’s d et er m i n at i o n , b u tC o mmerce

nev er full y

re so lve s th is i mpo rt ant i ssu e or e xpla ins wh y

su c h r e so lut ion

is unn e c e ssa

ry to i ts de te rm inatio n. F ur

the rm or e , Com me rc e ’s de te rm inatio n a s to T he Ar ra ng e me nt i s n ot c le ar b e c a

us e the ana ly ses for The Ar

rang ement, the NCP Tra

nsactions and the POR Tra nsactions ar e intertwine d. For instance, Commerce seems to find that, bec ause the use of f acts available mig ht be war rante d fo r T he Ar

ra ng e me nt, tha

t—i n a nd of i ts e lf —is su ff ic ie nt r e a so n to fi nd

the us e of

fa c ts a va ila ble

was wa rra nted for the NCP and POR Transac tions. See Dec ision Memo at 8–9. This cannot be, howeve r, bec ause the NCP and POR transac t i ons, while possibly related in some way

to The Arra ng ement, ar e distinct fac tual situations that require se parate ana ly ses. While the court appre ciates that Comm erc e has pr ovided some ana ly sis of t h i s co m p lex s ituation, due to that complexit y , a cle ar a

nd distinct recitat i o n of Commerce ’s re asoning is nece ssary to fac ilitate theCourt No. 02-00499 Pag e 15

Th e fa c t tha t Co mme rc e ’s ana ly sis c ann ot b e “ re a so na bly dis c e rn e d” is r e fl e c te d in 5 the pa rt ie s’ su bmi ssi on s, wh ic h d o n ot p ro vid e sep arat e ana ly se s f or Th e Ar ra ng e me nt, the NC P Transa ctions, or the POR T ra nsactions. Se e ge ne ra lly Pl.’s Resp. at 9–16, Def.’ s Resp. at 10–19. I ndeed, only intervenor mentions the NC P and P OR Transa ctions—and then only in passing. See I nterve nor’s Resp. at 29, 30.

To put it a slightly

differ ent way : “but for” t h e ap p ar ent ra ndom assignme nt of the 6 pay ments for the N CP Transactions to Customer A, i t seems bey ond doubt that those transa ctions wo uld have ha d e nt ere d p ay

me nt d a te s th a t c on fo rm e d to pla int if f’ s Se c tio n Aand

C Re sp on se s. Wer e that th e c a se , it wou ld be lo g ic a l th a t Co mme rc e wo uld have us e d th a t data

to c a lc ulate plaintiff’s antidumping duty marg in. pr op e r r e vie w o f C omm e rc e ’s de te rm inatio n a s to Th e Ar ra ng e me nt. 5 Second, C ommerce ’s reasoning as t o the use of f acts available a

nd adver se infer ence s for the NC P Tr ans a c tio ns c ann ot b e “ re a so nably di sc e rn e d. ” A r e vie w o f t he re c or d s ho ws that th e on ly

rea s o np ro v i d edfo r u s i n g fa ct s av ai l ab l e f o r t h e N C P T ra n s ac t i o n s wa s t h at p l ai n t i ff “w i t h h el d” sale s and pay ment data. See Com me nt 2 a t 9 (c iti ng 19 U. S.C. § 1 67 7e (a )( 2) (A )) . T he data c on ta ine d in plaintiff’s re sponses, howeve r, see ms to contradict this conclusion. Specific ally , plaintiff did enter a sale date for every one of its transac tions—including the NCP Transa ctions—and those value s do not seem a

berr ational. See Sales Databa se at SAL EI NTU column. Thus, it is not c lear how plaintiff “withheld” this i nformation. Fur thermore , while the re cord se ems to show that there are unexpected data p o in ts in th e PA Y D A T E U f ie ld f o r th e N CP T r an s a c ti o n s , it a ls o a p p e ar s th a t th e a mo unt of money “assig ned” to Customer A f or these tr ansac tions is not nece ssaril y ab er ra t i o n al, in that the pay ment amounts for similar transa ctions seem equiva lent. Com pa re Sales Data

base obs. 78 with obs. 79 (same me r c h an d is e /b u y e r )

. T h is b e in g s o , it is n o t c le ar

h o w th e s e tr an s a c ti o n s d if fer fundame ntally

from those that Commerc e wa s able to use to c alculate plaintiff’s antidumping marg i n . I ndeed, Commerc e nowhe re e x plains in detail—with refe renc e to its statutory

6Court No. 02-00499 Pag e 16

mand a te —h owthi s d a ta

is “ mis sin g ” su c h th a t th e cou rt can now c on c lud e tha t th e us e of

fa c ts available and adve rse infe renc es was proper for the N CP Transactions. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677m(d), (e ); Nippon Steel Corp. v

. United States , 3 37 F .3 d 1 37 3, 13 82 –8 3 ( F e d. Cir . 2 00 3) (d isc us sin g us e of fa cts ava ilable and a dverse infere nces)

. Finally , Commerce’ s rea soning a s to the use of fa ct ava ilable and a dverse infere nces f or the POR Tr ans a c tio ns c ann ot be “ re a so na bly dis c e rn e d. ” Ag a in, the on ly re a so n g ive n f or re so rt ingto fac ts available for the POR Tra nsactions is that plaintiff “withheld” sale a nd pay ment date data for them. See Com me nt 2 a t 9 ( cit in g 19 U .S. C. § 16 77 e (a )( 2) (A )) . A s w iththe NC P Tr ans a c tio ns , howev er , p l ai ntiff did enter sales date s for e ach of

these tra nsactions. See Sales Data base at SAL EI NTU c olumn. Further

more, plaintiff e ntere d pay ment dates for these transactions that appe ar to c onform to pla intiff’s Sections A and C Responses. See id. a t PA YD AT EUc olumn. I nd e e d, it is entirely unclea r how this data is “missing,” as C ommerce was a ble to use it to calculate plaintiff’s preliminary antidumping duty marg in. See Preliminary Results, 67 Fe d. Reg . at 10,374. Ther efor e, the cour t is unable to conclude that Commerce’ s use of fa cts available and adver se infere nces for the POR Transac tions was proper

. See 19 U. S.C. §§ 16 77 m( d) , ( e ); Nippon , 337 F.3d at 1382–83. For the above rea sons, the court c annot find that Commerce ’s deter mination that use of pa rt ia l f a c ts a va ila ble and a dv e rs e inf

e re nc e s w a s w arr ante d f or The Arran ge me nt, the NC P Tr ans a c tio ns , or

the POR Tr ans a c tio ns wa s p ro pe r. On re mand , Co mme rc e sh a ll p ro vid e se pa rate

ana ly se s f or Th e Ar ra ng e me nt, the NC P Tr ans a c tio ns , a nd the POR Tr ans a c tio ns and

c le arl y state ho w e a c h o f i ts d e te rm inatio ns are in a c c or da nc e wi th i ts s ta tut or

y man dat e and c ite to s pe c if ic

rec ord evide nce in support ther eof.Court No. 02-00499 Pag e 17

II Plaintiff ne x t c ontends that Commerce’ s deter mination a s to c onstructed value was not prop er . Plaintiff raises two a rg uments in this reg ard: (1) that Commerce’ s selection of pla intiff’s profit rate from the immediate ly prec eding revie w was not in ac corda nce w ith law; an d (2) that Commerce did not prope rly apply the s tatutory profit ca p. The c ourt turns to eac h contention in turn. A For the Fina l Results, C ommerce deter mined that it was nec essar y to use construc ted value to calculate plaintiff’s a

ntidumping duty

m ar gi n . See Dec ision Memo at 3–6 (“Comment 1”). Commerce de termined that wa s so beca use plaintiff ha d neither home -marke t nor third-country sales during the period of r eview upon w hich to base nor mal value. See Com me nt 1 a t 3 ( c iti ng19 U. S.C. § 1677b(a) (4)) . Thus, Commerce looke d to othe r source s to derive a profit rate and se lling expenses for c onstructed va lue. See id . ( c iti ng19 U. S.C. § 1 67 7b (e )) . Sp e c if ic a lly , Co mme rc e ha d to deter mine constructe d value in accor dance with one of the thre e statutory alternatives provided by 19 U. S.C. § 1 67 7b (e )( 2) (B ). Th e statut e pr ov ide s, in r e le va nt p art : (e) Constructed value . For purposes of this title, the construct ed v al u e of imported merc handise shall be a

n amount equal to the sum of- - . . . (2 ) ( A) the a c tua l amou nts inc ur re d a nd real iz e d b y

the sp e c if

ic exporter or produc er . . . , or (B ) i f a c tua l data

are no t ava ila

ble wi th r e sp e c t to the a mou nts descr ibed in subpara g raph ( A), then-

- (i) the a ctual amounts incurr ed and r ealized by the specific exporter or produc er be ing e x amined in the investigation or review

for s elling, g ener al, and adm i n i s t ra t i v e e x p en s es , an d fo r p ro fi t s , i nconnec tion with the production and sa le, for c on s umption in t heCourt No. 02-00499 Pag e 18

No par ty disag ree s with Comm erc e’s se lection of Alter native 3. 7 fo re ig n c ountr y , o f m e rc ha

nd ise th at is in the same g ener al categ ory

of product s as the subjec t merc handise, (i i) the we ig hte d ave ra g e of the a ctual a mou

nts i n curred and r ealized by

exporters or produc ers that are subject to the investig ation or re view (othe r than the exporter or pr oducer

descr ibed in clause (i)) f or selling, g ener al, and administrative e x penses, a nd for profits, in connec tion with the production and sale of a for eig n like product, in the ordinary course of trade , for c onsumption i n the fore ign c ountry , or (i i i ) t h e a m o u n t s i n cu rr edan d re al i z edfo r s e l l i n g, g e ne ra l, and a dmi nis tr a tiv e e xpe ns e s, and fo r p ro fi ts, based on a

ny other re asonable method, except that the amount allowed f

or profit may

not exceed the amount normally rea liz ed by

exporters or prod u cer s (other than the exporter or

produce r desc ribed in cla use (i)) in connec tion with the sale, fo r co n sumption i n the f o r e i g n c o u n t r

y , o f m e r c h an d i s e t h a t i s i n t h e sa me g ener al categ ory

of pr oducts as the subjec t merc handise . . . . 19 U.S.C

. § 1677b(e) (2000). Due to issues related to the possible r evelation of proprieta ry data, Commerce determined that it could not use t he first two statutory alternatives and, so, turned to the third (“Alter

native 3”)

. Commerce note d that, when it had use d Alternative 3 in the past, it weig hed

7 various factors to select the prope r data

. See Comment 1 at 4 (citing Notice of F inal Deter mination of Sales at L es s T h an Fa i r Value: Pure Mag nesium from I sr., 66 Fe d. Reg . 49,349 (I TA Sep. 27, 2001)). Commerc e explained that

in Magnesium from Israe l , wher e the Department also applied Alternative 3 in determining the profit rate, t he Department sele cted t h e m o s tap p ro p ri at e p r o f i tra t e b as edo ns ev er al fa ct o rs , i n cl u d i n g: (1 ) t he si mi lari ty

of the po te nti a l surr og a te c omp anie s’ bu sin e ssCourt No. 02-00499 Pag e 19

operations and products to the responde nt’s; (2) the e x tent to which the financ i al d ata of the surrog ate c ompany ref lects sales in the United States as we ll as the home marke t; and (3) the co n temporane ity

of the surr og ate data to the per iod of investigation or re vie w. I n th at pro c e e din g , th e De pa rtme nt s e le c te d a

pr of it r a te derive d from the 2000 f

inancial data of an I srae li company that was fo un d to have the mos t si mil ar p ro du c tio n p ro c e ss to the re sp on de nt. The other financ ial data available in that investigation was from 1999 and less conte mporane ous with the period of inve stigation. Id. Using this test, C ommerce deter mined that it would use plaintiff’s ow n data f or the c onstructed value c alculation. Id. I n support, Commerce stated that

[a]p ply ingthe same c ri te ri a

to thi s re vie w do e s no t c ha ng e our p ro fi t rate selec tion [ from the Pre liminary Results] . The use of

the responde nt’s own data obviously best satisfies t h e first fa ctor. The Ag ro Dutch . .

. ra t e[ ] also [ is] based on sa les to the compar ison mark et and not on U.S. sales. As for contempora

neity , the third fac tor, we note that the profit rate experience from t h e 1 998--2000 revie w period ref

lects the time per iod immediately prior to the instant revie w. Ther e is no in formation on the r ecor d to sugg est that the profit rate ex perie nce from t hat period is so differ ent from the instant period to re nder those pr ofit rates distortive. More over, the specific ity

of Ag ro Dutch’ s . . . own financ ial d at a outweig hs the c on te mpo ra

ne ity of Hi ma ly a ’s fi na

nc ia l data in s e le c tin g the mos t app r o p r iate p r o f

it r a te s . We d is a g r e e w it h th e p e ti ti o n e r s th at the Hi ma lya PO R r a te c anb e a v e r a g e d w it h A g r o D u tc h ’ s . . . 1 9 9 8

-- 2000 profit rate without the po ssibili ty of disclosingHimaly a’s p r o p r ie ta r y in f o r mati o nto A g r o D u tc h

. . . . F u rth e r , a v e r a g ing Himaly a’s POR data with eac h of the other responde nts’ own 1998-- 2000 data does not nece ssarily make the r esulting a

vera g e rate a more appropr iate rate
. There is no information on the re cord to indicate that the diffe renc e betwe en the r espondent’s 1998- -2000 data and Himaly a’s POR rate is due to contemporaneity rathe r than diff

ere nces in b us ine ss o pe ratio ns and pr od uc ts. Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff contends that Commerce’ s selection of pla intiff’s own data was not prope r. Spe c if ic a lly , p la int if

f a rgue s tha t, wh e n usin g Al te rn a tiv e 3, Com me rc e is c on str a ine d to us e ho meCourt No. 02-00499 Pag e 20

marke t data whe re suc h data is ava ilable. See Pl.’s Mem. at 19 (citing I ssues and De cision Memo. for the 1999–2000 A ntidumping Admin. Review: F resh Salmon from C h ile, (Aug . 6, 2001)). P l ai n t i ff ar gu es t h at t h i s “p re fe re n c e ” i s s h o wn b y t h e p h ra s e “ fo r c o n s u mp t i o ni nt h e f o re i gn country ” appe aringin eac h of the thre e re levant subsec tions. Id. a t 19 ; see 1 9 U

. S. C. §§ 16 77 b( 2) (B )( i) –( iii ). Pla int if f c la ims that, r a the r t

ha n u sin g the se le c te d d a ta , Co mme rc e “ sh ou ld have us e d home mark e t pro fi t fr om t he fi rs t pe ri od

of re vie w, no t th ir d c ounty

pr of it f ro m th e fi rs t period of r eview . . . .” Id. at 21. The c ourt does not ag ree that the statute conta ins such a “pre fer ence ” or that Comm erc e wa s require d to use home marke t profit data whe n using Alternative 3. This is so because this Court has vis ite d th is is su e and fo un d th a t A lte rn a tiv e 3 d oe s n ot c on ta in a g e ne ra l “ pr e fe re nc e ” fo r h ome marke t data. See G eum Poong Corp. v

. Un i t ed States , 25 CI T 1089, 1093, 163 F. Supp. 2d 669, 675–76 (2001). In Geum P oong , the Court considere d whether Commerce, using Alternative 3, wa s limit ed to using available home marke t se lling expense data—a s opposed to a vailable third country selling e x pense data. Id

. The Court found that Commerc e wa s not so constrained, stating that the phrase “for

consumption in the foreig n country” applied only t o t h e “p rofit ca p” languag e of Alternative 3, and not the entire subsection. See id. at 1093, 163 F. Supp

. 2 d at 6 7 5

. T h e C ourt

c on tin ued th at “Com me rc e pr op e rl y c a lc ulate d s e lli nge xpe ns e s a c c or din g to ‘ any re a so na ble method’ without limitation as to whether the underly ing data had be en der ived from home ma rket or non-home ma

rket sale s.” Id. at 1094–95, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 677. He re, Commerc e, using Alter n at i v e 3, was fac ed with a c ompara ble situation, in that it is selecting betwee n home marke t profit rates and third countr y profit rates. Be cause Alternative 3 does not evince a “pr efe renc e” f orCourt No. 02-00499 Pag e 21

Th e c omp anie s’ pr od

uc ts i nc lud e d d

ri e d a nd pr oc e sse d f

ru its , s pic e s, ve g e ta

ble 8 products, cha

rcoa l, and soft drinks. Pl.’s Mem. at 22. ho me mark e t data

(e ve n th ou g h s uc h d a ta

mig ht exis t) Com me rc e wa s f re e to u se “ any

re a so na ble method” to deter

mine plaintiff’s construc ted value. Id . I ndeed, Commerc e provide d an explanation as to why it was using this data

as opposed to other , available , home-mar ket data. Thus, the cour

t finds that Commerce’ s determination to us e plainti ff’ s own t hird country profit data for plaintiff’ s constructe d value c alculation wa s proper . B For the Fina l R es u l t s Commerce a pplied the statutory

“prof it cap” w hen ca lculating plaintiff’s antidumping duty marg in. To deter mine the profit ca

p Commerce c onsidered inf ormation from seve ral sources: (1) data from another responde nt in the instant investigation; (2) data from two responde nts from the immediately prec eding administrative review; and (3) data from the per iod of revie w for sever al food c ompanies that did not produce the subject mer chandise

. See Com me nt 1 at 6

. After

consideringthese va

rious source s, Commerce se lected the profit rates of the thre e 8

m u s h ro o m produce rs/exporters to determine the profit ca p. Id

. I ns u

p p o r t o f it s d e te r mi n a tion Commerce e x plained that

the three prese rved mushroom ex porter/pr oducer profit rates meet the statut or y re qu ir e me nt b e cause the rate s r e fl e c t th e pr of it n or ma lly rea liz ed b y ex p orters or

produce rs in connec tion with the sale, for consumption in I ndia of prese rved mushrooms, w hich, as the subject merc handise, fa ll within t he definition of t he same g ener al categ ory of produc ts as the subject mer chandise

. The statute does not specify the contempor aneity

of the data, and we consi der the information fr om t he imm e d i a te ly pr iorre vie w t o b e su ff ic ie ntl y contempora

neous for this purpose beca

use t here is no information on t h e r e c o r d t o t h e c o n t r ar

y ( i.e. , no rea son to believe the pr ofit rates a re signific antly

differ ent in this P OR than the last).Court No. 02-00499 Pag e 22

We a r e n o t u s in g th e p r o f it r a te s d e r iv e d

f r o m t h e [n o n -subject me rc ha nd ise pro du c ingc omp anie s’ ] fi na nc ia l st a te me nts in deter mining the pr ofit cap beca use their data is le ss r eleva nt tha n that of the re viewed c ompanies. . . . Id. Using th i s d ata, Com merc e “c ompare d the 1998-2000 prof it rate[] for Ag ro Dutch . . . to the profit ca p. [This rate did not] exceede d the profit ca p ( i.e. , th e hig he st p ro fit rat e am on g tho se included in the profi t ca p d et ermination) under Alternative 3.” Id . at 6 (c iting Constructed V alue Profit Rate Cap Comparison, Conf. R. Doc. 52). Pla int if f a rgue s th a t Co mme rc e imp ro pe rl y a pp lie d the pr of

it c a p. Pla int if

f c on te nd s th a t it was improper

for Commerc e to selec t “the hig hest individual profit rate achie ved by produce rs of subject mu s h ro o m s o n s al es in I ndia during the past two per iods of revie w.” Pl.’s Mem. at 22 (empha sis removed). Plaintiff c ontinues that “such an ap p ro ac h is inconsistent with t he statute’s

r e qu i r e m e n tt h a tt h e D e p art m e n tu s e a s t h e p r o f i tc a p t h e a m o u n t ‘ n o r

m a l l y r e a l i z e d

. ’ S t a t e d

s i mp l y, the hig hest individual profit rate is not the amount ‘normally rea liz ed.’” Pl.’s Mem. at 22. Plainti ff argues that, i nstead, Com merc e shoul d have use d profit data that it placed on the r ecor d “for other I ndian food products compa nies,” a s this data closely

corr esponded w ith the fiscal y ear of the pe riod of review. Pl.’s Mem. at 22. Plaintiff states that “[t] hese f ood proce ssing c ompanies all produc e proce ssed food produc ts . . . .” Id

. I n e sse nc e , p la int if

f ra ise s two iss ue s. Th e fi rs t is wh e the r C omm e rc e ha d th e dis c re tio n to selec t from amongthe var ious data on t h e re cord f or the prof

it cap; the sec ond is whether, a fter selec ting that data, Commerce proper ly used that information to de termine a profit cap. A s to the fi rs t is su e , a s p re vio us ly

dis c us se d, wh e n us ing Al te rn a tiv e 3 Co mme rc e may us e “ any re a so na ble method” in or der to de termine c onstructed va lue. See 19 U. S.C. 16 77 b( e )( 2) (i ii) ; Geum P oong , 25Court No. 02-00499 Pag e 23

CI T at 1093, 163 F . Supp. 2d at 675–76. The only limit ation place d on Commerce’ s determination of c on str uc te d v a lue is that, u

nle ss u nu su a l c ir c ums tanc e s w arr ant, it must a pp ly a pr of it c a p th a t is based on home market sa les. See 19 U. S.C. 16 77 b( e )( 2) (i ii) ; Geum P oong , at 1093, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 675. Here, the court cannot say , g iven that Commerce may use “a ny rea sonable method,” that it was improper f

or Commerce to rejec t home marke t data that it considere d “less re levant” in f avor of ot her data. Indeed, pla intiff makes no a rg ument to the contra

ry . See Pl.’s Mem. at 16–21; Pl .’s Reply at 6–7. As to t h e s econd issue—whether Commerce pr operly

used the data it selecte d for deter mining the pr ofit rate—pla intiff argues that Commerce should have used a profit ca p that was

an ave rag e of a

vailable r ates. See P l

. ’s M em . at 2 3 (c i t i n g Floral Trade Council v. United States , 41 F. Supp. 2d 319, 332 (1999); Ma gnesium from I sr., 66 Fe d. Reg . 49,349 (Comment 8)); Pl.’s Reply at 7 (“ Even if the Court [sic] uses the profit rate s of [the] three mushroom companies rather t h an t h e p ro fi t ra t es o f t h e fo u r fr u i t an d v ege t ab l e co mp an i es , t h e De p ar tm en t s h o u l d u s e t h e a v er age

ra t es fr o m t h e c o mp an i es s el ec t ed , n o tt h e hi gh es t ra t e. ”)

. Aga i n , t h er e i s n o t h i n g i nt h e l an gu age of the statute that r equire s Commerce to avera g e rates when d et er m i n i n g the profit ca p under Al t ernative 3. See 19 U. S.C. § 1 67 7b (e )( 2) (i ii) ; c om pa re id. with 19 U. S.C. § 1 67 7b (e )( 2) (i i) (providing that constructe d value be based on “ the weig hted ave rag e of the actua l amounts incurre d and re alized by

exporters or producers .

. . .”). I ndeed, one of plaintiff’s cited sources unde rmines its posit ion that it is C o m m er ce’ s “normal pr actice ” to ave rag e rates. See Mag nesium from I sr., Comment 8 (stating t h at “t h e Department ha s on the rec ord the fina ncial stateme nts of three

surr og a te c omp anie s from which to select a reasonable CV profit rate or to calcul a t e an averageCourt No. 02-00499 Pag e 24

The Que stionnaire instructions provide guidance as to the mea ning of the term 9 “imputed expenses.” See Qu e sti on na ir e a t I -9 (“ I mpute d e xpe ns e s g e ne ra lly are op po rt

un ity c os ts (rather than a ctual costs) that are not refle cted in the f inancial r ecor d s o f t h e co mpany being i n v e s t i g a t e d , b u tw h i c h m u s tb e e s t i m a t e d an d r e p o rt e d f o r p u r p o s e s o f a nan t i d

u mp i n g i n qu i r

y. Common ex amples of imputed expenses include c redit expenses and inve ntory car rying c osts.”). pr ofi t ra te if more than one surrog ate’ s data is equally rea sonable.” (empha sis added)) . This being

so , th e c ourt c ann ot say that it wa s im pr op e r f or Com me rc e to s e le c t—i n th is i ns tanc e —th e “ hig he st” profit rate for the profit ca p. III F ina lly , f or the F ina l R esu lts, Co mme rc e re vis e d p la int if f’ s im pu te d c re dit

e xpe ns e data beca use plaintiff de ducted commissions fr om this amount. Commerce e x plained that it was prope r to do so beca

use, [i]n a c c or da

nc e wi th De pa

rtme nt pr a c tic e , we no rm a lly imp ute c re dit ba se d o n th e g ro ss p ri c e le ss a ny pr ic e a dju stm e nts g ra

nte d at th e tim e of inv oic ing . A s c omm iss ion s a re no t c on sid e re d p ri c e a dju stm e nts for pur poses of c alculatingimputed cre dit, and there are no other ad j u s t ments to price at the time of invoicing , we r eca lculated Ag ro Dutch’s imput ed credit expense base d on the g ross price without any de du c tio ns . Comment 1 at 2

. Plaintiff a rg ues that Commerce’ s calc ulation of its imput ed cr edit expenses was 9 not in accor dance with law. Plaintiff contends—in full—that

the Departme nt w ro ng ly c a lc ulate d A g ro Dutc h’ s im pu te d c re dit expense based on the g ross sales va lue, rather than on the g ross sales value less commissions paid to third pa rties. Credit expenses ar e the costs of financ ing acc ounts rec eivables. The Depa rtment’s inclusion of commission in calculating imputed cre dit ignore s t h e fact that co m m issions are not paid by Ag ro Dutch until it rece ives pay ment from its customer. I n other words, Ag ro Dutch f inance s only

its net sa le s p ro c e e ds , n ot c omm iss ion s. As a re su lt, the De pa

rtme nt s ho uld have de ducted c ommissi ons prior to ca lculating the cr edit expense.Court No. 02-00499 Pag e 25

Pl. ’s Me m. at 23 –2 4. De fe nd ant re sp on ds that Com me rc e ’s a dju stm e nt to pla int if f’ s imp ute d c re dit expenses was prope r bec ause it wa s “[c]onsi stent with its s tandar d methodology ,” and that Com me rc e inc lu des thi s e xpe ns e in t he anti dumpi ngc a lc ulatio n “ to e sti ma te the op po rt un ity c os t of mon e y inc ur re d b y a c omp any fr om t he tim e . . . me rc ha

nd ise is s hip pe d f

ro m th e se lle r’ s f

a c ili ty until the seller re ceive s pay ment for the g oods.” Def.’s R esp. at 32 (citations om itted). I nterve nor responds by

prese nting two r easons why Commerce’ s s h o u l d be found pr oper. F irst, intervenor argues that, bec ause pla intiff failed to ra ise this issue at the administrative level, it is pre vented f rom doing so now due to the doctrine of exhaustion of administ rative r emedies. See I nterve nor’s Resp. at 47; 28 U.S.C.§ 2637(d) (stating that the cour t “shal l , where appr opriate, r equire the exhaustion of a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me die s. ” ); JCM, L td. v. United States , 2 1 0 F

. 3 d 1 3 5 7 , 1 3 5 9 ( F e d

. C i r . 1 9 9 9 ) ( “ In the anti dumpi ngc on te xt, Co ng re ss h a s p re sc ri be d a c le ar, step -b y -s te p p ro c e ss f or a c la ima nt t o follow, and the f

ailure to do so pre cludes it from obtain i ng revie w of that issue in the Court of I n t ern at i o n al T ra d e. ” ( ci t i n g Sandvik Steel Co. v. United States , 164 F.3d 596, 599–600 ( Fe d. Cir. 19 98 ); National

Corn Growers Ass’n v. Bake r , 840 F.2d 1547, 1555–57 ( Fe d. Cir. 1988))). Sec ond, in a n a rgume nt t hat pa ra lle ls d e fe nd ant’ s, int e rv e no r c on te nd s th a t pl a int if f’ s p os iti on

la c ks me ri t beca use “[i] mputed cre dit mea sures the value of the g ood sold f rom the time it is shipped from the seller to the time the buy er makes pay ment. I mputed cre dit is based on the g ross price of the g ood betwee n the buy er a

nd seller.” I nterve nor’s Resp. at 50. De fe n d an tan d

i n t e r v e n o r ’ s p o i n t s ar e w e l l t a k e n . In d e e d , p l a i n t i f f

— b e y o n d m e r e l y al l egi n g, in its m oving b r ie f, that Commerce ’s deter mination was not proper

—cites neither

statute, regulation,

nor ca se law in support of its positi on. See Pl. ’s Me m. at 23 –2 4. F ur the rm or e , p la int if

f, in i ts r e plyCourt No. 02-00499 Pag e 26

brief, in no wa

y challeng es either defe ndant’s or intervenor ’s arguments that Commerce w as using its “standard me thodology ,” or inter venor’ s argument that this iss ue should have been r aised at the administrative level. Id

. As plaintiff neither presse s its own arg ument nor take s issue with those of de fe nd ant a

nd int e rv e no r, the c ourt

c onsid e rs pla int if

f t o h a ve a

ba nd on e d it s p os iti on

a s to Co mm e r c e ’ s a d

ju s tm e n t o f

it s im p u te d c r e d it e xp e n s e s an d

f in d s th a t C o mm e r c e ’ s d e te r mi n a ti on in this reg ard pr oper. Conclu sion F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , the c ourt re mand s thi s ma tte r so that Com me rc e may re -v isi t it s deter mination that the use of partial fac ts available a nd adver se infer ence s was wa rra nted as to The Arra ng ement, the NCP Transa ctions, and the POR Transa ctions. Commerce shall file t he re sults of this remand wi t h i n s i x t y day s of the date of this opinion; all parties may submit comments to t he

re mand re su lts wi thi n 3 0 d ay s o f f ili ng ; and a ll p art ie s ma

y fi le re sp on se s to any

su c h c omm e nts with i n 10 day s after

the submission t here of. As to the other issues addre ssed in this opini on, the

c ourt fi nd s th a t Com me rc e ’s de te rm inatio ns are su pp or te d b y su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e and

oth e rw ise in

acc ordanc e with law. SO ORDERED /s/ R. Kenton Musgra ve R

. Ke n t o nM u s gra v e, J u d ge Dated: Fe bruar

y 16, 2007 New Y ork, Ne w York