decree. Because the agreement was not subsequently reduced to writing, 

we look to the terms of the agreement entered in open court as reflected in 

the district court minutes. See Grisham v. Grisham, 128 Nev. , 289 

P.3d 230 (2012) (holding that an oral agreement put on court record is 

enforceable); see also Grenz v. Grenz, 78 Nev. 394, 399, 374 P.2d 891, 894 

(1962) (reviewing an agreement entered into the district court minutes.) 

Here, the agreement provided appellant with custodial time on 

each weekend, except the third weekend per month, from Friday after 

school through return to school Monday morning. On appellant's 

noncustodial weekend, appellant would have the children overnight on the 

following Monday. The agreement also provided that the children would 

spend weekdays after school with appellant until they could be picked up 

by respondent after her work day had ended, and that appellant would 

have the children on days when they were out of school if respondent was 

working. Thus, the agreement provided appellant with seven to nine 

overnight stays per month, depending on the number of weekends in a 

given month, as well as daily time when the children were not in school if 

respondent was at work. The district court properly reviewed the actual 

custodial time under Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 216 P.3d 213 (2009), 

and found that appellant's actual timeshare consisted of nine overnight 

visits per month, which is consistent with the agreement. Thus, we 

conclude that the district court properly determined that respondent was 

the primary custodian, as she had custody more than 60 percent of the 

time. Consequently, because we conclude that the district court properly 

calculated the custodial status of the parties and properly determined the 

timeshare when setting the child support order, we reject appellant's 

arguments that the child support order should be reversed. 

2 
Hardesty 

Parraguirre 

Appellant also argues that the district court improperly 

determined that he was willfully unemployed by applying the presumption 

set forth in Minnear v. Minnear, 107 Nev. 495, 814 P.2d 85 (1991), to the 

award of alimony. We disagree. As child support was ordered, the district 

court properly considered appellant's employment status in light of the 

Minnear presumption in setting the child support obligation. Further, 

willful unemployment is a factor for the district court to consider in setting 

alimony. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 86 Nev. 550, 554, 471 P.2d 254,256- 

57 (1970); accord Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 116 Nev. 993, 998, 13 P.3d 415, 

418-19 (2000) (including earning capacity as a factor to consider in 

awarding alimony). We conclude that the district court properly 

considered appellant's employment status for purposes of both alimony 

and child support. Accordingly, We 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.' 

, J. 

'In light of this order, we deny all outstanding requests as moot. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) I947A 

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cc: Hon. Vincent Ochoa, District Judge 

Erik A. Engdahl 

Abigail Helen Engdahl 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

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