UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

TOZZI, CAMPANELLA, and CELTNIEKS 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Sergeant SHAWN F. HUDSON 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20140428 

Headquarters, 82d Airborne Division 

Deidra J. Fleming, Military Judge (arraignment) 

Tara A. Osborn, Military Judge (trial) 

Colonel John N. Ohlweiler, Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial) 

Lieutenant Colonel Susan K. McConnell, Acting Staff Judge Advocate (post-trial) 

For Appellant: Major Andres Vazquez, Jr., JA; Captain John L. Schriver, JA. 

For Appellee: Major Daniel D. Derner, JA. 

18 August 2015 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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TOZZI, Senior Judge: 

 A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of three specifications of failure to go to his appointed place 

of duty, two specifications of absence without leave, and two specifications of 

wrongful use of cocaine in violation of Articles 86 and 112a Uniform Code of 

Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 886, 912a (2012) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The military 

judge sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for five months, 

and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening authority approved the badconduct discharge, confinement for 120 days, and reduction to the grade of E-1. 

Appellant received sixty-seven days of sentence credit. 

 This case is before us for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant 

raises no allegations of error. Appellant personally submitted one matter pursuant to 

United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982) wherein he asks this court to 

provide appropriate relief to remedy the dilatory post-trial processing of his case. 
HUDSON—ARMY 20140428 

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We agree that relief is appropriate in this case and grant thirty days confinement 

credit. 

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

The convening authority took action 353 days after the sentence was 

adjudged, 344 of which are attributable to the government. The record in this case 

consists of two volumes, and the trial transcript is 156 pages. Although we find no 

due process violation in the post-trial processing of appellant’s case, we must still 

review the appropriateness of the sentence in light of the unjustified dilatory posttrial processing. UCMJ art. 66(c); United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219, 224 

(C.A.A.F. 2002) (“[Pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ, service courts are] required to 

determine what findings and sentence ‘should be approved,’ based on all the facts 

and circumstances reflected in the record, including the unexplained and 

unreasonable post-trial delay.”). See generally United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 

353, 362-63 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Ney, 68 M.J. 613, 617 (Army Ct. 

Crim. App. 2010); United States v. Collazo, 53 M.J. 721, 727 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 

2000). 

It took 239 days to serve the record of trial on appellant’s defense counsel in 

this case. It took sixty-four days for the military judge to authenticate the record of 

trial. The government provided an explanation in its post-trial submissions for this 

delay, citing a backlog of cases and short staffing of court reporters. As annotated 

on the authentication page, the military judge was on temporary duty away from Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina, for a significant period of time after receipt of the record of 

trial for review and authentication. Despite this explanation, the delay between 

announcement of sentence and action could “adversely affect the public’s perception 

of the fairness and integrity of military justice system . . . .” Ney, 68 M.J. at 617. 

Thus, we find that relief is appropriate under the facts of this case. 

 

CONCLUSION 

Upon consideration of the entire record, the findings of guilty are 

AFFIRMED. Given the dilatory post-trial processing, however, we affirm only so 

much of the sentence as provides for a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for three 

months, and reduction to the grade of E-1. All rights, privileges, and property, of 

which appellant has been deprived by virtue of this decision setting aside portions of 

the sentence are ordered restored. See UCMJ arts. 58b(c), and 75(a). 

Judge CAMPANELLA and Judge CELTNIEKS concur. 
HUDSON—ARMY 20140428 

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FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: