At the time MUR 7889 (SIG SAUER) concluded, certain 

information was redacted from my Statement of Reasons 

because a related case was still pending. That matter, MUR 

8011 (Daniel Defense), has now closed and been made public. 

I have therefore updated my Statement of Reasons in this 

matter, and I attach it hereto.

C OMMISSIONER ELLEN L. WEINTRAUB

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

MUR788900089
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

UPDATED STATEMENT OF REASONS 

OF COMMISSIONER ELLEN L. WEINTRAUB 

In this matter, the Commission unanimously agreed that one respondent, SIG SAUER, 

Inc. (“SIG SAUER”), violated the law by making a contribution as a federal contractor to an 

independent expenditure-only political committee (aka “super PAC”). The Commission divided, 

however, on whether to enforce the law against another federal contractor gun manufacturer for 

making an unlawful contribution and against the super PAC for knowingly soliciting those 

unlawful contributions.1 Our nonpartisan Office of General Counsel (“OGC”) recommended 

finding reason to believe against these additional respondents, and I supported those 

recommendations. My Republican colleagues, however, did not vote to move forward on these 

straightforward violations.

My colleagues’ statement in this matter attempts to justify their failure to pursue OGC’s

recommendations on two grounds: (1) They claim we had no reason to investigate the super 

PAC,

2 and (2) that OGC’s recommendations with respect to the second federal contractor gun 

manufacturer were beyond its authority.

3

I strongly disagree on both counts, and I write to 

explain why. 

* * *

The Complaint in this matter alleged that SIG SAUER, a firearms manufacturer that 

contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security, violated 

1 See Certification, MUR 7889 (SIG SAUER, Inc., et al.) (Dec. 19, 2022); Certification, MUR 7889 (SIG SAUER, 

Inc., et al.) (Jan. 14, 2022).

2 Stmt. of Reasons of Vice Chairman Sean J. Cooksey & Comm’rs Allen Dickerson & James E. “Trey” Trainor, III

(“Republican Statement”) at 3, MUR 7889 (SIG SAUER, Inc., et al.) (Jan. 20, 2023).

3

Id. at 5.

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matter of

SIG SAUER, Inc., et al.

)

)

)

)

)

 

MUR 7889

 

MUR788900090
MUR 7889 (SIG SAUER, Inc., et al.)

Updated Statement of Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub

Page 2 of 8

the federal-contractor prohibition of the Federal Election Campaign Act (the “Act”), by making a 

$100,000 contribution to Gun Owners Action Fund (“GOAF”), a super PAC. SIG SAUER is the 

fourth-largest manufacturer of firearms in the U.S. and has been paid $178,913,000 by the U.S. 

government pursuant to 1,622 contracts for firearms and related products since 1989.4 The 

Commission found reason to believe that SIG SAUER made an unlawful contribution to GOAF. 

That contribution came about after Marty and Cindy Daniel, co-owners of a different gun 

manufacturer, Daniel Defense, sent an email on behalf of GOAF on December 29, 2020 to SIG 

SAUER and other unknown recipients soliciting contributions to the super PAC.

5

Ms. Daniel serves as Daniel Defense’s chief operating officer; Mr. Daniel serves as its 

chief executive officer. The company is a privately held limited liability company located in 

Georgia. Daniel Defense contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security and has been awarded 195 federal contracts as a vendor and subvendor since 

2003 with a total value of $24.7 million.6

In addition, Daniel Defense itself made an unlawful $100,000 contribution to GOAF on 

January 6, 2021. The Republican commissioners blocked the Commission from moving forward 

with OGC’s recommendation to pursue this violation in this matter. 

The Daniels sent the email solicitation on behalf of GOAF, which registered with the 

Commission on December 10, 2020 and was founded by Chris Cox, who worked for the 

National Rifle Association for 25 years and led its lobbying and political efforts until June 2019.

7

During the 2020 election, GOAF was active in the Georgia Senate runoff elections, reporting 

$1,951,302 in independent expenditures supporting and opposing candidates in the two Georgia 

runoffs. From December 11, 2021 to February 22, 2021, GOAF received a total of nine large 

contributions, from just six different sources, totaling $2,212,765.8 Of the six contributors, two 

were the government contractors at issue here: SIG SAUER and Daniel Defense.

4 First Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. at 3, MUR 7889 (SIG SAUER, Inc., et al.) (Nov. 16, 2021). Among SIG SAUER’s more 

recent government contracts are a well-publicized $580 million contract awarded in January 2017 to supply the U.S. 

Army with a new service pistol and a $77 million contract awarded in November 2020 to supply the U.S Army with 

rifle scopes. Id. 

5 SIG SAUER Resp., Attach. A. The email solicitation is written in the first-person plural in reference to the authors

and GOAF, indicating that Marty and Cindy Daniel may have been working with or on behalf of GOAF when they

sent the solicitation to SIG SAUER. Id. (using the pronouns “we,” “us,” and “our” throughout to refer to Marty 

Daniel, Cindy Daniel, and GOAF).

6 First Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. at 3. The email identified GOAF as a “SuperPAC created to support candidates and 

officials who will protect and promote the 2nd Amendment” and explained that its “mission is to help re-elect 

Senators David Perdue and Kelley Loeffler in the Georgia Senate Runoffs.” Id. 

7

Id.

8

Id. at 6.

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Updated Statement of Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub

Page 3 of 8

In addition to the email solicitation the Daniels sent on GOAF’s behalf, Daniel Defense 

stated that GOAF directly solicited Daniel Defense to make a contribution. The Commission did 

not move forward in this matter on the unlawful solicitation by GOAF or on the unlawful 

contribution by Daniel Defense. 

In the First General Counsel’s Report circulated to the Commission, OGC recommended 

finding reason to believe SIG SAUER made an unlawful contribution to GOAF.

9

In that report, 

OGC also noted that it planned to notify Daniel Defense as an additional respondent for making 

a similar unlawful contribution.10 Daniel Defense’s contribution was not alleged in the 

Complaint; OGC became aware of the potential federal contractor contribution in the normal 

course of analyzing the Complaint and the Response.

Following its review of this matter’s documents and Commission filings, OGC in its 

Second General Counsel’s Report recommended finding reason to believe Daniel Defense made 

an unlawful contribution to GOAF and that GOAF knowingly solicited unlawful contributions 

from federal contractors SIG SAUER and Daniel Defense. Accordingly, OGC recommended that 

the Commission authorize an investigation.11

I agreed with OGC’s recommendations on these violations of the law. The Republican 

commissioners did not. In their Statement of Reasons, the Republican commissioners first claim, 

incorrectly, that OGC had no evidence that GOAF knowingly solicited a federal contractor. 12

They then claim, incorrectly, that OGC engaged in an ultra vires – that is, unauthorized –

investigation of Daniel Defense. That second claim constitutes an unwarranted and unfair 

impugning of the integrity of the Commission’s professional legal staff.13

9

Id. at 8.

10 Id. at 13.

11 Sec. Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. at 16, MUR 7889 (SIG SAUER, Inc., et al.) (the narrow investigation would “seek to 

obtain facts to conclusively determine whether or not GOAF, through its principals, employees, or agents, knew that 

SIG and Daniel Defense were government contractors when it solicited the contributions, were aware of facts that 

would lead reasonable person to conclude that there was a substantial probability that they were government 

contractors, or were aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to inquire whether they were government 

contractors.”). 

12 Republican Statement at 3. 

13 The Republican commissioners make one additional claim in a footnote in their Statement of Reasons that merits 

a response. Despite voting to find that SIG SAUER made an unlawful contribution, they note that while “SIG 

SAUER did not raise any constitutional objection to the statute’s enforcement,” they “continue to harbor doubts 

about the constitutionality of the federal-contractor prohibition as applied to IEOPC contributions.” Stmt. of 

Reasons of Vice Chairman Sean J. Cooksey & Comm’rs Allen Dickerson & James E. “Trey” Trainor, III at 2 n.9, 

MUR 7889 (SIG SAUER, Inc., et al.) (Jan. 20, 2023) (citing Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Dickerson and 

Commissioners Cooksey and Trainor at 6 (Oct. 13, 2021), MUR 7180 (GEO Corrections Holdings, Inc.)). 

This agency sits in the Executive Branch, the branch of government charged with faithful execution of the law. The 

Legislative Branch has enacted a law that a federal contractor may not make contributions to political committees. 

52 U.S.C. § 30119(a); 11 C.F.R. § 115.2. Super PACs are political committees. Thus, since at least 2011, following 

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Updated Statement of Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub

Page 4 of 8

ON WHETHER GOAF KNOWINGLY SOLICITED A FEDERAL CONTRACTOR

The Act prohibits federal government contractors from making political contributions and 

prohibits anyone from knowingly soliciting such a contribution.14 As my colleagues point out, 

the adverb – knowingly – is a component of the offense.

15

But this word does not mean what they think it means. Throughout their discussion of the 

issue, they slip in another word when defining it – “actual”16 – that is simply not in the statute.

This rewriting and constricting of the statute is unaccompanied by any supporting legal authority. 

Moreover, it flies in the face of the Supreme Court’s decision in Intel v. Sulyma (2020).17

There are basically two types of knowledge under the law: stuff you do know, and stuff you 

really should know, that is, “actual knowledge” and “constructive knowledge,” respectively. In 

Intel, the Supreme Court gave a pithy explanation of what it means when a statute specifies 

“actual knowledge” and when it does not. Congress required “actual knowledge” in 

the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Under ERISA, no action may 

be commenced against a fiduciary after “three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff 

had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.”

18

The Intel court defined “actual knowledge” strictly as “[d]irect and clear knowledge, as 

distinguished from constructive knowledge.”19 And, the Court held, “The qualifier ‘actual’ 

creates that distinction.”20 It continued: “The addition of ‘actual’ in [ERISA] signals that the 

the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC and the D.C. Circuit decision in SpeechNow.org v. 

FEC, the Commission has consistently construed the government contractor prohibition to apply to contributions to 

super PACs. See, e.g., MUR 6403 (Alaskans Standing Together) (Nov. 10, 2011). And the Judicial Branch hasn’t 

told us otherwise. Unless and until it does, we must apply the law as Congress wrote it. 

14 52 U.S.C. § 30119(a). (“It shall be unlawful for any person... (2) knowingly to solicit any such contribution [from 

a federal contractor].”

15 See Republican Statement at 3. 

16 See id. at 3 (“we could find reason to believe only if GOAF acted with actual knowledge of SIG SAUER’s 

contractor status”) (emphasis added); at 4 (“Under this standard, it is apparent from the record that OGC lacked any 

information – beyond speculation and conjecture – that any agent of GOAF had actual knowledge of SIG SAUER’s 

status as a federal contractor. At the outset, GOAF unequivocally denied that it had actual knowledge of any 

contributor’s federal-contractor status” and “Weighed against explicit denials, that is simply insufficient to support 

reason to believe that these parties solicited SIG SAUER while having actual knowledge of SIG SAUER’s federal 

contract”) (emphasis added). 

17 Intel v. Sulyma, 140 S.Ct. 768, 772 (2020).

18 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2) (emphasis added).

19 Intel v. Sulyma, 140 S.Ct. at 776, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1043 (11th ed. 2019).

20 Id. 

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Updated Statement of Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub

Page 5 of 8

plaintiff’s knowledge must be more than ‘potential, possible, virtual, conceivable, theoretical, 

hypothetical, or nominal.’”21

Here, in this matter, in the relevant section of the Federal Election Campaign Act, the 

word “actual” does not exist. And according to the Supreme Court, it is the actual use of the 

word “actual” that creates the limitation to “actual knowledge.” Its absence signals that the law

encompasses both actual and constructive knowledge.

OGC, in analyzing GOAF’s knowledge of Daniel Defense’s federal-contractor status, 

used a perfectly reasonable definition of “knowing” found in federal campaign-finance law that 

is fully in accordance with the Supreme Court’s Intel decision. The definition is found in the 

regulation that prohibits any person from knowingly soliciting, accepting, or receiving a 

contribution or donation from a foreign national.22 As defined there, the term “knowingly”

means a person must:

(i) Have actual knowledge that the source of the funds solicited, accepted or 

received is a foreign national;

(ii) Be aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that there is a 

substantial probability that the source of the funds solicited, accepted or 

received is a foreign national; or

(iii) Be aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to inquire whether the 

source of the funds solicited, accepted or received is a foreign national, but the 

person failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry.23

As it happens, Congress did write a qualifier multiple times into the Act when it wanted 

to require an enhanced knowledge threshold: the “knowing and willful” standard.24 “Knowing 

and willful” violations of the Act – that is, the Respondent “acted voluntarily and was aware that 

his conduct was unlawful”25 – subject violators to criminal penalties and increased civil 

penalties.

21 Id. And even when a statute does require actual knowledge, the Intel court held, “actual knowledge can be proved 

through ‘inference from circumstantial evidence.’” 140 S.Ct. at 779, citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 

114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).

22 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(g).

23 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(a).

24 See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(5)(B); § 30109(a)(5)(C); § 30109(a)(11); § 30109(a)(12)(B); § 30109(d)(1)(A); § 

30109(d)(1)(B); § 30109(d)(1)(C); § 30109(d)(1)(D); § 30124(a)(2); § 30124(b)(2).

25 This standard does not require knowledge of the specific statute or regulation that the respondent allegedly 

violated; it is sufficient to demonstrate that a respondent “acted voluntarily and was aware that his conduct was 

unlawful.” U.S. v. Danielczyk, 917 F. Supp. 2d 573, 579 (E.D. Va. 2013), quoting Bryan v. U.S., 524 U.S. 184, 195 

(1998) (holding that the government needs to show only that the defendant acted with knowledge that conduct was 

unlawful, not knowledge of the specific statutory provision violated, to establish a willful violation). And even then, 

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Updated Statement of Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub

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There’s good reason for Congress to have drawn these distinctions in the Act. A 

“knowing” standard that did not take into account what a person reasonably should have known 

could be defeated simply by a respondent denying to the Commission that they know something, 

regardless of how unreasonable or unlikely that purported lack of knowledge might be. Indeed, 

we see this playing out in this very matter, where the Republican commissioners ignored 

substantial evidence suggesting that GOAF may well have known that Daniel Defense was a 

federal contractor26 and instead accepted its “explicit denials” – that is, an asserted denial from 

GOAF’s counsel, unsupported by personal knowledge, affidavits, or any other evidence – as 

dispositive.27 In the face of contrary, albeit circumstantial, evidence, an unsworn denial should 

not foreclose a targeted investigation.28

ON WHETHER OGC’S ACTIONS WERE AUTHORIZED

The Act authorizes the Commission to find “reason to believe that a person has 

committed . . . a violation” of the Act “on the basis of information ascertained in the normal 

course of carrying out its supervisory responsibilities.”29 OGC informed the Commission in the 

First General Counsel’s Report that the allegations against Daniel Defense arose “in the normal 

course of analyzing the Complaint.”30

such awareness may be shown through circumstantial evidence from which the respondent’s unlawful intent may be 

reasonably inferred, including, for example, an “elaborate scheme for disguising” unlawful acts. Cf. U.S. v. Hopkins,

916 F.2d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 1990), quoting U.S. v. Bordelon, 871 F.2d 491, 494 (5th Cir. 1989). Hopkins involved a 

conduit contributions scheme, and the issue before the Fifth Circuit concerned the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the defendants’ convictions for conspiracy and false statements under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1001; id. at 

214-15. “It has long been recognized that ‘efforts at concealment [may] be reasonably explainable only in terms of 

motivation to evade’ lawful obligations.” Id. at 214, quoting Ingram v. U.S., 360 U.S. 672, 679 (1959).

26 See First Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. at 9-13; Second Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. at 12-18, MURs 7889 and 8011 (Gun Owners 

Action Fund, et al.) (Nov. 28, 2022). While actual knowledge is not the statutory standard, under either an actual or 

constructive knowledge standard, there was sufficient information before the Commission to support a reason to 

believe finding. The Commission’s standard for a reason to believe finding in an enforcement matter is when “a 

complaint credibly alleges that a significant violation may have occurred, but further investigation is required to 

determine whether a violation in fact occurred and, if so, its exact scope.” Federal Election Commission, Statement 

of Policy Regarding Commission Action in Matters at the Initial Stage in the Enforcement Process, 72 Fed. Reg. 

12545 (Mar. 16, 2007). 

27 Republican Statement at 4.

28 For an example of why the Commission should not always take even sworn declarations as dispositive, see First 

Gen. Counsel’s Rpt., MUR 6718 (Ensign) (Jan. 18, 2013), found at

https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/6718/13044332371.pdf. 

29 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2) (emphasis added); see Guidebook for Complainants and Respondents on the FEC 

Enforcement Process, May 2012, found at http://www.fec.gov/em/respondent_guide.pdf; see also Statement of

Policy Regarding Commission Action in Matters at the Initial Stage in the Enforcement Process, 72 Fed. Reg. 12545 

(March 16, 2007). See also Stmt. of Reasons of Chair Ellen L. Weintraub & Comm’rs Cynthia L. Bauerly & Steven 

T. Walther at 1, MUR 6623 (Bennett).

30 First Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. at 13.

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Updated Statement of Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub

Page 7 of 8

The Republican commissioners take issue with what OGC considers to be “the normal 

course”: “OGC did not limit itself to the allegations and the facts presented and instead, while 

preparing its First General Counsel’s Report, broadened the matter’s scope beyond the 

Complaint.”31 They put a dark spin on our lawyers’ perfectly reasonable due diligence: “OGC 

made the unilateral decision to engage in an investigation of GOAF’s other contributors, to 

check their federal-contractor status, and to name one as an additional Respondent in the matter. 

All of this was done without Commission authorization and outside of established Commission 

procedures.”32 The “established Commission procedures” upon which Republican 

commissioners base their accusations are found in Section II(C) of Commission Directive 6: “No 

non-routine reviews of reports or other documents shall be conducted by Commission staff 

members without specific prior approval of the Commission.”33

This broadside omits key facts and context. There is no reasonable way to characterize 

OGC’s efforts as a “unilateral decision to engage in an investigation.” In the course of preparing 

its recommendations to the Commission, OGC routinely takes into account information received 

from Respondents and reviews publicly available information, particularly information that the 

Act requires the Commission to collect and make public.34 The Response to the Complaint 

brought the Daniels to OGC’s attention by attaching their email that solicited the illegal 

contribution from SIG SAUER. It is unremarkable that OGC checked publicly available sources 

to find out who the Daniels were; it would have been a glaring omission from the First General 

Counsel’s Report had OGC not bothered to find out who they were.35 Any reasonable attorney 

would have checked whether a firm with “Defense” in its name was, in fact, a federal defense 

contractor; Daniel Defense’s website confirms that indeed it is.36 Daniel Defense in its response 

itself argued that GOAF should have known Daniel Defense was a government contractor, a fact

that “can readily be ascertained through an elementary Google search” and “should be obvious 

from its very name.”37 Finally, Daniel Defense’s contribution to GOAF is disclosed in the 

Commission’s publicly available databases. The activities undertaken by OGC in analyzing this 

matter were routine and consistent with established Commission practices for ensuring that when 

the Commission votes, it is on an informed basis. 

31 Republican Statement at 2.

32 Id. at 5. 

33 See FEC Directive 6, Handling of Internally Generated Matters (April 21, 1978), found at 

https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/directive_06.pdf.

34 See OGC Enforcement Manual (June 2013) at 10-11, found at https://www.fec.gov/resources/aboutfec/commissioners/weintraub/ogc_docs/generalcounsel%27smemorandumdatedjune262013.pdf. 

35 First Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. at 4, n. 7; see also https://www.linkedin.com/in/cindy-daniel-07439027/. 

36 See Daniel DNA, https://danieldefense.com/daniel-dna (“But we also support the military and law enforcement 

communities that protect our freedoms with top-tier firearms and accessories designed to get the job done and them 

home safe.”) 

37 Daniel Defense Response at 1-2.

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Updated Statement of Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub

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Moreover, it simply is not standard practice for the Commission to “authorize” OGC to 

determine who the respondents in a matter are. OGC reads the Complaint, reads the Response, 

researches the facts and law relevant to the matter, and writes its report to the Commission. All 

along, OGC looks at what it knows to determine who the relevant Respondents are. This is 

“established Commission procedure.”38

The Republican commissioners characterize OGC’s actions as ultra vires,

39 Latin for 

“beyond one’s legal power or authority”. Government attorneys, in particular the attorneys I 

have been privileged to serve with at the FEC, are acutely aware of the power governments 

wield; staying within their authority is a cornerstone of their role. An accusation of ultra vires

action calls into question lawyers’ professionalism and ethics. And it is absolutely uncalled for 

here. OGC acted appropriately and professionally at each step of the way in this matter, and 

consistently with established Commission practice. I dissent in the strongest terms from any 

claim to the contrary.

40

Ultimately, while the Commission’s conciliation with SIG SAUER was appropriate 

based on the record and addresses the unlawful contribution, I agreed with OGC that we should 

have done more. I voted to find reason to believe Daniel Defense and GOAF violated the law

and to authorize a narrow investigation.

41 The facts and the law demanded that we pursue OGC’s 

recommendations in this matter, and the Commission should have done so. 

March 10, 2023 __________________________

Ellen L. Weintraub

 Commissioner

38 In arguing that OGC’s actions were improper here, the Republican commissioners mischaracterize Nader v. FEC,

823 F. Supp. 2d 53, 67 (D.D.C. 2011) when they write that “Federal courts have observed that the Commission does 

not have legal authority to name whomever it likes as a respondent to a complaint—the statute does not provide that 

discretion.” Republican Statement at 6. The Nader court put a floor, not a ceiling, on the Commission’s discretion to 

name Respondents – every Respondent named in a complaint must be notified, no exceptions. But the court did not 

bar the Commission from adding Respondents as appropriate in the course of working a matter.

39

 Id. at 1, 3, 5, 7.

40 Ironically, no one – not the respondents, and not even my colleagues – contests that Daniel Defense is a 

government contractor and made an illegal contribution. On the very same day they voted to block enforcement of 

OGC’s recommendations regarding Daniel Defense in this MUR, MUR 7889, the Republican commissioners voted 

with the rest of the Commission in MUR 8011 to find reason to believe that Daniel Defense did indeed make a 

prohibited government contractor contribution. And while it is gratifying that the Commission was finally able to 

address that violation, that result was not foreordained. Had the Commission not received a separate complaint, this 

obvious violation that was squarely in front of the Commission in this matter would have gone unredressed. Nothing 

in the Act requires us to put blinders on when making enforcement decisions. 

41 Certification, MUR 7889 (SIG SAUER, Inc., et al.) (Dec. 19, 2022).

MUR788900097