In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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Nos. 03-3244, 03-3260, 03-3431 & 03-3432

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL D. BONTY and

CHARLES E. HALL,

Defendants-Appellants.

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Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 02 CR 30116—Michael J. Reagan, Judge.

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ARGUED JUNE 3, 2004—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 7, 2004

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Before BAUER, RIPPLE and MANION, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Michael Bonty and Charles Hall

appeal their convictions for the interstate transportation of

a minor with the intent to commit aggravated sexual

assault under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Appellants challenge the propriety of evidentiary rulings made

during trial and argue that there was insufficient evidence

to convict. We disagree and affirm the convictions.

The events giving rise to Bonty’s and Hall’s convictions

occurred on September 27, 2002, when the men, both in
2 Nos. 03-3244, 03-3260, 03-3431 & 03-3432

their thirties, decided to try to pick up teen-age girls at a

shopping mall in St. Louis, Missouri. “Jane Doe 1” and

“Jane Doe 2” were the unfortunate subjects of this plan;

they were thirteen and fifteen years old, respectively. At the

shopping mall Bonty impressed the girls by telling them

that he was a record producer and a friend of popular rap

musicians. Bonty and Hall then invited the girls to cruise

Lindburgh Boulevard—a popular past time for teenagers in

the area. The girls accepted the invitation and the group

left the mall together in Bonty’s car. At that point they

picked up “John Doe,” a friend of the girls, age fifteen.

While they were driving, Bonty suggested they smoke marijuana together; everyone agreed. Bonty purchased marijuana

and then drove them across the Mississippi River into Illinois

to his home in East St. Louis. The group gathered in Bonty’s

living room where they listened to music and smoked the

marijuana. During the course of the night on several occasions Bonty asked Jane Doe 1 to have sex with him, she

refused each time. Bonty also asked Jane Doe 2 to have sex

with him; she also refused. Finally Bonty became angry and

tried to forcefully drag Jane Doe 1 into his bedroom; she

successfully resisted him. Bonty then locked the front door

to the house, securing it with a padlock and set the house

alarm. When Bonty attempted to drag Jane Doe 1 into the

bedroom she began crying and vomiting. Bonty went

downstairs and returned with something wrapped in a

towel, which he put to John Doe’s head and told Jane Doe

1 that he would shoot John Doe if she didn’t go in his

bedroom. Jane Doe 1 still refused to go, instead she grabbed

onto Jane Doe 2. Bonty struck Jane Doe 2 so that the girls

were separated and dragged Jane Doe 1 into his bedroom

where he raped her repeatedly over the next three hours.

During that time Hall turned up the stereo so that Jane

Doe 2 and John Doe could not hear what was going on in

the bedroom. After the assault Bonty and Hall ushered the

children out of the house and into Bonty’s car. John Doe
Nos. 03-3244, 03-3260, 03-3431 & 03-3432 3

looked over his shoulder on the way out and saw Bonty and

Hall give each other high-fives, shake hands and laugh.

Bonty drove the victims back to their homes in Missouri

around 4:00 a.m.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Bonty argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he undertook interstate travel

with the intent of committing aggravated sexual assault.

Hall appeals his conviction for aiding and abetting Bonty,

also claiming insufficiency of evidence. We consider the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government and

will overturn the conviction only “if the record contains no

evidence on which a rational jury could have returned a

guilty verdict.” United States v. O’Hara, 301 F.3d 563, 569

(7th Cir. 2002). 

Defendants’ convictions were pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 2423(a). At the close of the trial, the jury was instructed

as to the elements of Section 2423(a):

First: That the defendant did knowingly transport

in interstate commerce, Jane Doe 1, from the

State of Missouri to the State of Illinois; 

Second: That the defendant did so with the intent that

Jane Doe 1 engage in sexual activity for which

a person can be charged with a criminal offense, namely: aggravated criminal sexual

assault under Illinois law, as charged in the

superseding indictment; and

Third: That Jane Doe 1 was under the age of eighteen years at the time.

Bonty concedes that he transported Jane Doe 1 across

state lines; he also concedes that he sexually assaulted Jane

Doe 1 later that night; what he contests is the notion that
4 Nos. 03-3244, 03-3260, 03-3431 & 03-3432

at the moment he was crossing into Illinois with Jane Doe

1 he did so with the intent to commit the aggravated sexual

assault. Bonty argues that when he was transporting Jane

Doe 1 he only intended to have consensual sex with her and

that it wasn’t until after the thirteen-year-old unexpectedly

declined his sexual advances that it occurred to him to use

force—at which point they were already in Illinois. 

Bonty’s optimistic scenario of the events is not wholly

implausible, and perhaps some jury somewhere might have

arrived at this conclusion. Bonty didn’t get that jury. Instead, Bonty’s jury reached the conclusion that, based on

the evidence, he intended to commit rape that night. We do

not believe this finding was irrational. 

 The government presented evidence demonstrating that

the men picked up the girls at the shopping mall, transported

them into Illinois and ultimately committed aggravated sexual

assault. In the process the government presented evidence

of Bonty’s intent. The government showed the temporal

proximity of the trip across State lines and the assault—

occurring within a few hours of each other. The government

also demonstrated that once the men took the victims to

East St. Louis, they told them they could not leave the

house on foot because the neighborhood was too dangerous,

effectively trapping them there. The government presented

evidence that during the evening, prior to the rape, Bonty

repeatedly told the girls they might as well agree to have

sex with him voluntarily because, “somebody is going to get

fucked tonight.” Finally, the government presented evidence

that Bonty and Hall celebrated the assault after it happened. It is apparent that the men contemplated that the

sex might not be consensual and that force would be

necessary.

 This Circuit has recognized that a defendant may have

more than one purpose in the interstate transportation of

a minor. United States v. Vang, 128 F.3d 1065, 1069-72 (7th

Cir. 1997). It takes little stretch of the imagination to con-
Nos. 03-3244, 03-3260, 03-3431 & 03-3432 5

clude that, in transporting Jane Doe 1 across State lines,

Bonty intended to have sex with her that night either (1)

with her consent or (2) by force. The government need only

prove that a “significant” or “compelling” purpose of the trip—

not the dominant purpose—was to commit aggravated assault.

Id. at 1072. The evidence presented was sufficient to support this scenario. 

Hall makes an additional argument that there is insufficient evidence to support the charge that he aided and

abetted Bonty. A person aides and abets if he, “knowingly

participated in the transaction”; mere presence at the time

of the crime is not enough to support a conviction. United

States v. Coleman, 179 F.3d 1056, 1061 (7th Cir. 1999). At

trial the government presented evidence showing that Hall

accompanied Bonty to the mall, participated in the cruising

and pot smoking, threatened the children to get them to

remain in the house, turned up the stereo to cover the

sounds of the assault, and celebrated with Bonty after the

fact. Hall argues that the witnesses providing this information were not credible (a determination left to the jury) and

that the remainder of the evidence shows only that he

helped Bonty after the fact. Hall fails to convince us that no

rational jury could consider this evidence—viewed in a light

most favorable to the government—and conclude that he

was guilty of aiding and abetting Bonty.

Evidentiary Challenges

Hall challenges two evidentiary rulings made during trial.

We review evidentiary rulings by the trial judge for abuse

of discretion; further, even if error is found, we will not

reverse a verdict if the error was harmless. United States v.

Garcia, 986 F.2d 1135, 1139 (7th Cir. 1993). 

Hall first challenges the exclusion of a statement made by

Bonty in which Bonty told FBI Special Agent John Jimenez

that Hall had nothing to do with the events of September
6 Nos. 03-3244, 03-3260, 03-3431 & 03-3432

27. Hall believes this statement should have come in as an

exception to hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence

804(b)(3) as a “statement against interest.” A statement

against interest is admissible if: (1) the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial; (2) the statement is against the

declarant’s penal interest; and (3) corroborating circumstances exist that bolster the statement’s trustworthiness.

United States v. Shukri, 207 F.3d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 2000).

The district court found that Hall could not meet the

second part of this test; we agree. A statement is against

penal interest if it subjects the declarant to criminal liability. United States v. Butler, 71 F.3d 243, 253 (7th Cir.

1995). Bonty’s statement—that Hall had nothing to do with

the events of September 27—did not tend to implicate

Bonty and was not against Bonty’s penal interest. See, e.g.,

Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600 (1994)

(finding that non-inculpatory statements are not admissible

even if made within a broader context of a generally

inculpatory narrative). Hall believes we should evaluate the

statement in the context of Bonty’s entire interview; this

does not strengthen Hall’s argument. At the time Bonty

made the statement he continued to deny that he sexually

assaulted Jane Doe 1. It is simply not enough that during

the interview Bonty admitted to some facts—that he had

picked up the girls at the shopping mall and taken them to

his home—that “possibly could” lead to criminal liability; to

be inculpatory he must admit to criminal behavior. Butler,

71 F.3d at 253 (“Dixon, though placing himself in the room

where the guns were found, did not admit to anything

remotely criminal”). Similarly, Hall would seek refuge in

the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Paguio,

where that court held a father’s statement that his son had

nothing to do with making false statements on a loan

application was admissible. 114 F.3d 928, 932-33 (9th Cir.

1997). The case is clearly distinguishable; the Ninth Circuit

allowed in the father’s statement because the inculpatory
Nos. 03-3244, 03-3260, 03-3431 & 03-3432 7

and exculpatory portions of his statement were “not practically separable,”—the father was taking sole responsibility

for the crime—here Bonty simply made no inculpatory

statement. Id. at 934.

Hall also challenges the admission of testimony regarding

his sexual advances toward Jane Doe 2. He believes that

this testimony should have been excluded under Federal

Rule of Evidence 403 as not probative of any fact in issue

and unduly prejudicial. Specifically, Hall argues that,

because he is a thirty-one-year-old black man, his propositioning a fifteen-year-old white girl inflamed the jury.

Further, he believes that making sexual advances toward

Jane Doe 2 was not probative of whether he aided and

abetted Bonty. The government argues that the statements

were relevant to demonstrate Hall’s intent to participate in

Bonty’s scheme; at trial there was an issue as to whether Hall

knew that the purpose of picking up the girls at the mall

was to later engage in a sexual encounter. The government

further argued that any prejudicial effect of the testimony

was lessened because the testimony only came in once (it

was not repeated) and the jury was instructed not to “be

influenced by any person’s race, color, religion, national

ancestry, or sex.” We find the testimony was relevant and

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding

that, on balance, its probative value outweighed the

prejudicial effect. 

AFFIRMED.
8 Nos. 03-3244, 03-3260, 03-3431 & 03-3432

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—9-7-04