NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

File Name: 17a0201n.06 

No. 16-3320 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

VERNON L. TRASTER, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO 

BEFORE: BATCHELDER, ROGERS, and WHITE, Circuit Judges. 

 ROGERS, Circuit Judge. This employment case arises out of several accusations of 

sexual harassment made against Vernon Traster, a long-time professor of law at Ohio Northern 

University. In the spring of 2012, university officials received complaints from two women at 

the university’s law school—Traster’s student research assistant and a library employee—

alleging that he had sexually harassed them and, in the employee’s case, had assaulted her. The 

university promptly suspended Traster without pay pursuant to the university’s faculty 

handbook, and launched an investigation under its university-wide sexual harassment policy. 

After a faculty committee convened by the university found Traster in violation of that policy, 

his suspension was continued and, soon after, a second faculty committee recommended his 

termination, which the university ultimately approved. 
No. 16-3320, Traster v. Ohio Northern Univ. 

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Traster then brought this suit alleging, among other things, that the university breached 

his employment contract by suspending and terminating him, and that by choosing to suspend 

him without pay it had also discriminated against him based on his age. After granting summary 

judgment to the university on Traster’s age discrimination claim, the district court ordered a 

bifurcated bench trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(M) and 42(b), dividing the procedural 

questions at the core of Traster’s contract claim—which set of university procedures was 

required by the contract—from the substantive issue of whether the correct procedure was 

properly employed. In the event that the court found that Ohio Northern had failed to employ the 

correct procedure, the court would then have moved to a “re-do” of the disciplinary proceedings. 

If, on the other hand, the court determined that Ohio Northern had followed the correct 

procedures, the court would instead allow Traster to “litigate his claim challenging [Ohio 

Northern’s] findings” relating to his termination. 

The case proceeded to a bench trial—corresponding to the first step of the bifurcation 

order—after which the district court issued an opinion ruling in Ohio Northern’s favor on the 

remaining contract issues, including the substantive issue of whether sufficient evidence 

supported Traster’s termination. Traster then sought reconsideration of that judgment, in part on 

the basis that he had not been given the opportunity to litigate the substantive question of 

whether the termination decision was proper under his contract, as had been spelled out in the 

court’s bifurcation order. The district court reaffirmed its original rulings, and Traster now 

appeals. 

After carefully reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, as well as the relevant law, 

we are convinced that the district court correctly resolved the issues presented in this case. 

The district court’s two principal opinions—on summary judgment and on the remaining 
No. 16-3320, Traster v. Ohio Northern Univ. 

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contract claims following the bench trial—accurately and exhaustively lay out the facts and law 

governing the major questions raised in this appeal, and those opinions clearly articulate the 

court’s reasons for ruling as it did. A full written opinion from this court is therefore 

unnecessary. 

Only two further issues need be addressed specifically. First, apart from his challenge on 

the merits of his breach of contract claims, Traster has also objected on appeal to the way the 

district court handled those claims, by deciding the substantive issue of his termination before 

allowing him to brief and argue that issue. Thus, Traster contends, the district court’s departure 

from its bifurcation order—a departure that the district court itself admitted—denied Traster the 

opportunity to litigate his substantive claim before the district court ruled on it, resulting in 

reversible error. But whatever error there was, being harmless, does not justify reversal. Rule 61 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes clear that an error of the kind Traster alleges 

would not warrant setting aside a judgment unless it “affects the substantial rights of the parties; 

otherwise, the error should be considered harmless.” Gandy v. Sullivan County, 24 F.3d 861, 

866 (6th Cir. 1994). There was no such prejudicial effect on Traster’s rights, however, for he 

was provided the opportunity to litigate the substantive claim. It is true that that opportunity 

came only after the court had already ruled on the issue and then only in a motion for 

reconsideration. Nonetheless, in ruling on that motion the court emphasized that it had been 

willing to reconsider its original view of Ohio Northern’s decision to terminate Traster—it had 

“left open the door” for Traster to show the court it had erred. Even after weighing that motion 

and the various exhibits attached to it, however, the court was still unmoved, having found 

Traster’s alleged evidence of bias too “meager” to justify overturning either Ohio Northern’s 

termination decision or the district court’s original opinion upholding it. The latter opinion, as 
No. 16-3320, Traster v. Ohio Northern Univ. 

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the district court explained, was also sound under Ohio law and had adequate support in the 

record. Even if the court may have jumped the gun, then, in reaching the substantive issue of 

Traster’s dismissal, that lapse ultimately did not affect Traster’s ability to make his case that 

Ohio Northern had wrongly dismissed him. Nor, therefore, does it now justify reversal. 

Traster also raises an issue that he claims was “avoided” by the district court: that 

because he was normally paid for nine months of work over a twelve-month period, but received 

pay for only seven of the nine months he actually worked before his suspension, he is now due 

the difference between what he received (7/12th of his salary) and what he was owed (7/9th of 

that salary). But the district court likely did not address that claim for the same reason that this 

court cannot review it now: it appears nowhere in Traster’s complaint. Indeed, Traster himself 

was unable to locate that claim in his complaint during the telephonic hearing on Ohio 

Northern’s summary judgment motion, and in his brief before this court he appears to admit that 

he raised the issue only in response to that motion. We have declined, however, to consider a 

claim raised for the first time in response to a motion for summary judgment, see Bridgeport 

Music, Inc. v. WB Music Corp., 508 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2007), just as we have more 

generally refused to consider a claim not raised in a complaint, see Freightliner of Knoxville, Inc. 

v. DaimlerChrysler Vans, LLC, 484 F.3d 865, 871 n.4 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Clark v. National 

Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)). This final claim, having been 

raised for the first time in response to a motion for summary judgment, is therefore not properly 

before this court. 

The judgment of the district court is accordingly affirmed.