58444 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 191 / Tuesday, October 3, 2006 / Notices 

STATUS: Public and Closed. 

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: 

Week of October 2, 2006 

Thursday, October 5, 2006 

12:55 p.m.—Affirmation Session (Public 

Meeting) (Tentative) a. Entergy 

Nuclear Operations, Inc., (Pilgrim 

Nuclear Power Station), 

Massachusetts Attorney General’s 

Petition for Backfit Order 

(Tentative). 

Week of October 9, 2006—Tentative 

There are no meetings scheduled for 

the Week of October 9, 2006. 

Week of October 16, 2006—Tentative 

Monday, October 16, 2006 

9:30 a.m—Briefing on Status of New 

Reactor Issues—Combined 

Operating Licenses (COLS) 

(morning session). 

1:30 p.m.—Briefing on Status of New 

Reactor Issues—Combined 

Operating Licenses (COLS) 

(afternoon session) (Public 

Meetings) (Contact: Dave Matthews, 

301–415–1199). 

These meetings will be webcast live at 

the Web address—http://www.nrc.gov. 

Friday, October 20, 2006 

2:30 p.m.—Meeting with Advisory 

Committee on Reactor Safeguards 

(ACRS) (Public Meeting) (Contact: 

John Larkins, 301–415–7360). 

This meeting will be webcast live at 

the Web address—http://www.nrc.gov. 

Week of October 23, 2006—Tentative 

Tuesday, October 24, 2006 

9:30 a.m.—Briefing on Transshipment 

and Domestic Shipment Security of 

Radioactive Material Quantities of 

Concern (RAMQC) (Closed—Ex. 3) 

(morning session). 

1:30 p.m.—Briefing on Transshipment 

and Domestic Shipment Security of 

Radioactive Material Quantities of 

Concern (RAMQC) (Closed—Ex. 3 & 

9) (afternoon session). 

Wednesday, October 25, 2006 

9:30 a.m.—Briefing on 

Institutionalization and Integration 

of Agency Lessons Learned (Public 

Meeting) (Contact: John Lamb, 301–

415–1727). 

This meeting will be webcast live at 

the Web address—http://www.nrc.gov. 

1:30 p.m.—Briefing on Resolution of 

GSI–191, Assessment of Beris 

Accumulation on PWR Sump 

Performance (Public Meeting) 

(Contact: Michael L. Scott, 301–

415–0565). 

This meeting will be webcast live at 

the Web address—http://www.nrc.gov. 

Week of October 30, 2006—Tentative 

There are no meetings scheduled for 

the Week of October 30, 2006. 

Week of November 6, 2006—Tentative 

Wednesday, November 8, 2006 

9:30 a.m.—Briefing on Digital 

Instrumentation and Control (Public 

Meeting) (Contact: Paul Rebstock, 

301–415–3295). 

This meeting will be webcast live at 

the Web address—http://www.nrc.gov. 

Thursday, November 9, 2006 

9:30 a.m.—Briefing on draft Final 

Rule—Part 52 (Early Site permits/ 

Standard Design Certification/ 

Combined Licenses) (Public 

Meeting) (Contact: Dave Matthews, 

301–6415–1199). 

This meeting will be webcast live at 

the Web address—http://www.nrc.gov. 

* * * * * 

*The schedule for Commission 

meetings is subject to change on short 

notice. To verity the status of meetings 

call (recording)—(301) 415–1292. 

Contact person for more information: 

Michelle Schroll, (301) 415–1662. 

* * * * * 

The NRC Commission Meeting 

Schedule can be found on the Internet 

at: http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/ 

policy-making/schedule.html. 

* * * * * 

The NRC provides reasonable 

accommodation to individuals with 

disabilities where appropriate. If you 

need a reasonable accommodation to 

participate in these public meetings, or 

need this meeting notice or the 

transcript of other information from the 

public meetings in another format (e.g., 

braille, large print), please notify the 

NRC’s Disability Program Coordinator, 

Deborah Chan, at 301–415–7041, TDD: 

301–415–2100, or by e-mail at 

DLC@nrc.gov. Determinations on 

requests for reasonable accommodation 

will be made on a case-by-case basis. 

* * * * * 

This notice is distributed by mail to 

several hundred subscribers; if you no 

longer wish to receive it, or would like 

to be added to the distribution, please 

contact the Office of the Secretary, 

Washington, DC 20555 (301–415–1969). 

In addition, distribution of this meeting 

notice over the Internet system is 

available. If you are interested in 

receiving this Commission meeting 

schedule electronically, please send an 

electronic message to dkw@nrc.gov. 

Dated: September 28, 2006. 

R. Michelle Schroll, 

Office of the Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 06–8470 Filed 9–29–06; 9:48 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Notice of Availability of Model 

Application Concerning Technical 

Specification Improvement To Modify 

Requirements Regarding the Addition 

of LCO 3.0.9 on the Unavailability of 

Barriers Using the Consolidated Line 

Item Improvement Process 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of availability. 

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that 

the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has prepared a 

model safety evaluation (SE) and model 

application relating to the modification 

of requirements regarding the impact of 

unavailable barriers, not explicitly 

addressed in technical specifications, 

but required for operability of supported 

systems in technical specifications (TS). 

The NRC staff has also prepared a model 

no-significant-hazards-consideration 

(NSHC) determination relating to this 

matter. The purpose of these models is 

to permit the NRC to efficiently process 

amendments that propose to add an 

LCO 3.0.9 that provides a delay time for 

entering a supported system TS when 

the inoperability is due solely to an 

unavailable barrier, if risk is assessed 

and managed. Licensees of nuclear 

power reactors to which the models 

apply could then request amendments 

utilizing the model application, as 

generically approved by this notice, and 

confirming the applicability of the SE 

and NSHC determination to their 

reactors. 

DATES: The NRC staff issued a Federal 

Register notice (71 FR 32145, June 2, 

2006) which provided a Model Safety 

Evaluation (SE) and model application 

relating to modification of requirements 

regarding the addition to the TS of LCO 

3.0.9 the impact of unavailable barriers; 

similarly the NRC staff herein provides 

a Model Application, including a 

revised Model Safety Evaluation. The 

NRC staff can most efficiently consider 

applications based upon the Model 

Application, which references the 

Model Safety Evaluation, if the 

application is submitted within one year 

of this Federal Register notice. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: T. R. 

Tjader, Mail Stop: O–12H4, Division of 

Inspection and Regional Support, Office 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 191 / Tuesday, October 3, 2006 / Notices 58445 

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, telephone 

301–415–1187. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

Regulatory Issue Summary 2000–06, 

‘‘Consolidated Line Item Improvement 

Process for Adopting Standard 

Technical Specification Changes for 

Power Reactors,’’ was issued on March 

20, 2000. The consolidated line item 

improvement process (CLIIP) is 

intended to improve the efficiency of 

NRC licensing processes by processing 

proposed changes to the standard 

technical specifications (STS) in a 

manner that supports subsequent 

license amendment applications. The 

CLIIP includes an opportunity for the 

public to comment on proposed changes 

to the STS following a preliminary 

assessment by the NRC staff and finding 

that the change will likely be offered for 

adoption by licensees. The CLIIP directs 

the NRC staff to evaluate any comments 

received for a proposed change to the 

STS and to either reconsider the change 

or to proceed with announcing the 

availability of the change for proposed 

adoption by licensees. Those licensees 

opting to apply for the subject change to 

technical specifications are responsible 

for reviewing the staff’s evaluation, 

referencing the applicable technical 

justifications, and providing any 

necessary plant-specific information. 

Each amendment application made in 

response to the notice of availability 

will be processed and noticed in 

accordance with applicable rules and 

NRC procedures. 

This notice involves the addition of 

LCO 3.0.9 to the TS which provides a 

delay time for entering a supported 

system TS when the inoperability is due 

solely to an unavailable barrier, if risk 

is assessed and managed. This change 

was proposed for incorporation into the 

standard technical specifications by the 

owners groups participants in the 

Technical Specification Task Force 

(TSTF) and is designated TSTF–427, 

Revision 2 (Rev 2). TSTF–427, Rev 2, 

can be viewed on the NRC’s Web page 

at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/ 

operating/licensing/techspecs.html. 

Applicability 

This proposal to modify technical 

specification requirements by the 

addition of LCO 3.0.9, as proposed in 

TSTF–427, Rev 2, is applicable to all 

licensees. 

To efficiently process the incoming 

license amendment applications, the 

staff requests that each licensee 

applying for the changes proposed in 

TSTF–427, Rev 2, to use the CLIIP. The 

CLIIP does not prevent licensees from 

requesting an alternative approach or 

proposing the changes without the 

requested Bases and Bases control 

program. Variations from the approach 

recommended in this notice may require 

additional review by the NRC staff, and 

may increase the time and resources 

needed for the review. Significant 

variations from the approach, or 

inclusion of additional changes to the 

license, will result in staff rejection of 

the submittal. Instead, licensees desiring 

significant variations and/or additional 

changes should submit a LAR that does 

not request to adopt TSTF–427, Rev 2, 

under CLIIP. 

Public Notices 

The staff issued a Federal Register 

notice (71 FR 32145, June 2, 2006) that 

requested public comment on the NRC’s 

pending action to approve modification 

of TS requirements regarding the impact 

of unavailable barriers on supported 

systems in TS. In particular, following 

an assessment and draft safety 

evaluation by the NRC staff, the staff 

sought public comment on proposed 

changes to the STS, designated as 

TSTF–427. The TSTF–427 Revision 2 

can be viewed on the NRC’s Web page 

at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/ 

operating/licensing/techspecs.html. 

TSTF–427 Revision 2 may be examined, 

and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC’s 

Public Document Room, located at One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike 

(first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 

Publicly available records are accessible 

electronically from the ADAMS Public 

Library component on the NRC Web 

site, (the Electronic Reading Room) at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. 

In response to the notice soliciting 

comments from interested members of 

the public about modifying the TS 

requirements regarding the impact of 

unavailable barriers on supported 

systems in TS, the staff received one set 

of comments (from the TSTF Owners 

Groups, representing licensees). The 

specific comments are provided and 

discussed below: 

General Comments and Comments on 

the Notice for Comment 

1. Comment: Throughout the notice, 

reference is made to TSTF–427, 

Revision 1. Revision 2 of TSTF–427 was 

submitted to the NRC on May 3, 2006 

(NRC accession number ML061240055). 

The document should be revised to 

reference Revision 2 instead of Revision 

1. 

Response: This notice of availability 

correctly references TSTF–427, Revision 

2, which includes the addition of a 

discussion of barriers significant to 

Large Early Release (i.e., containment 

bypass events) and external events, 

consistent with the implementation 

guidance in NEI 04–08. TSTF–427, 

Revision 2, was provided on the Web 

site for review and comment. 

2. Comment: In the notice under 

‘‘Applicability’’, the last two sentences 

state, ‘‘Significant variations from the 

approach, or inclusion of additional 

changes to the license, will result in 

staff rejection of the submittal. Instead, 

licensees desiring significant variations 

and/or additional changes should 

submit a LAR that does not claim to 

adopt TSTF–427, Rev 1’’. Should a 

licensee submit an application that 

requests adoption of TSTF–427 but 

includes significant variations or 

additional changes, it would facilitate 

the NRC’s review for the licensee to 

acknowledge that the change is based on 

TSTF–427 so that the NRC may use the 

model Safety Evaluation to the extent 

possible. We recommend revising the 

last sentence to state, ‘‘Instead, licensees 

desiring significant variations and/or 

additional changes should submit a LAR 

that does not request to adopt TSTF–

427, Rev 2. under the Consolidate Line 

Item Improvement Process’’. 

Response: The staff agrees and the 

change in wording has been made. 

3. Comment: The notice generally 

uses the term ‘‘barrier’’ but uses the 

term ‘‘hazard barrier’’ or ‘‘hazard 

barriers’’ nine times. TSTF–427 and the 

associated implementation guidance, 

NEI–04–08, use the term ‘‘barriers’’. We 

recommend that the document be 

revised to use the word ‘‘barrier’’

throughout instead of the phrase 

‘‘hazard barrier’’ so that the Traveler, 

the implementation guidance, the model 

Safety Evaluation, the model 

application, and the notice are 

consistent. 

Response: The staff agrees and the 

change in wording has been made for 

consistency. 

Comments on the Model Safety 

Evaluation 

1. Comment: Section 1.0, first 

paragraph, first sentence—The notice 

states that the NEI Risk-Informed 

Technical Specification Task Force 

(RITSTF) submitted TSTF–427, 

Revision 1. That is incorrect. TSTF–427 

(including the most recent version, 

Revision 2) was submitted by the 

Technical Specifications Task Force 

(TSTF), not the NEI RITSTF. Note that 

all Travelers are submitted by the TSTF, 

even if the Traveler is risk-informed and 

developed with the NEI Risk Informed 

Technical Specification Task Force. 


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58446 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 191 / Tuesday, October 3, 2006 / Notices 

Response: The staff agrees to this 

clarification and the change in wording 

has been made. 

2. Comment: Section 1.0—The quote 

of the proposed LCO 3.0.9, first 

sentence, contains an extra word not in 

TSTF–427, Revision 2. It states, ‘‘* * * 

any affected supported system * * *’’

The word ‘‘affected’’ does not appear in 

TSTF–427 and should be removed. This 

same misquote appears in the last 

sentence of Section 1. 

Response: The staff agrees and the 

wording correction has been made. 

3. Comment: Section 2.0, first 

sentence, contains a typographical error. 

‘‘TX’’ should be ‘‘TS’’. Note that this 

wording is correct on the NRC’s Web 

site as ML061460020, but not in the 

published notice. 

Response: The staff agrees and the 

typographical correction has been made. 

4. Comment: Section 2.0, second 

paragraph, first sentence—the definition 

of barriers is not consistent with TSTF–

427, Revision 2. Specifically, the notice 

states, ‘‘mechanical devices’’, which 

was deleted from TSTF–427, Revision 2. 

Response: The staff agrees and the 

term ‘‘mechanical devices’’ has been 

replaced with the term ‘‘installed 

structures or components’’, to be 

consistent with TSTF–427, Revision 2. 

5. Comment: Section 3.0, first 

paragraph, fourth sentence—The date 

given for NEI 04–08 is incorrect. The 

correct date is March 2006, not 

November 2005. Note that Section 7.0, 

‘‘References’’, provides the correct date. 

Response: The date given for NEI 04–

08 is corrected. 

6. Comment: Section 3.0, second 

paragraph, first sentence—There is a 

wording error. The sentence should 

state, ‘‘* * * can be assessed using the 

same approach * * *’’ instead of 

‘‘during the same approach’’. Note that 

this wording is correct on the NRC’s 

Web site as ML061460020, but not in 

the published notice. 

Response: The staff agrees and the 

wording correction has been made. 

7. Comment: Section 3.0, numbered 

item 2—The last sentence is missing the 

verb. It should read, ‘‘The objective is to 

ensure that * * *’’ Note that this 

wording is correct on the NRC’s Web 

site as ML061460020, but not in the 

published notice. 

Response: The staff agrees and the 

wording correction has been made. 

8. Comment: Section 3.0, sixth 

paragraph, second sentence—There is a 

typographical error. The sentence states, 

‘‘* * * barriers that are n not able to 

perform * * *’’ The extraneous ‘‘n’’

should be deleted. Note that this 

wording is correct on the NRC’s Web 

site as ML061460020, but not in the 

published notice. 

Response: The staff agrees and the 

typographical error has been corrected. 

9. Comment: Section 3.0, third 

paragraph from end, last sentence—This 

sentence references Section 3.3. The 

correct reference is Section 3.1.3. 

Response: The staff agrees and the 

correction has been made. 

10. Comment: Section 3.1.1, last 

paragraph before Table 2—NUMARC 

93–01 is misquoted. The notice states, 

‘‘* * * configuration that is associated 

with a CDF higher than 1E–03 should 

not be entered voluntarily’’. However, 

NUMARC 93–01, Section 11.3.7.2, 

states, ‘‘* * * CDF in excess of 10–3/ 

year should be carefully considered 

before voluntarily entering such 

conditions. If such conditions are 

entered, it should be for very short 

periods of time and only with a clear 

detailed understanding of which events 

cause the risk level’’. The notice 

wording should be revised. Note that 

Table 2 in the notice correctly describes 

the NUMARC 93–01 guidance. 

Response: The staff agrees. To be 

consistent with NUMARC 93–01, the 

word ‘‘normally’’ has been added so that 

the phrase reads: ‘‘* * * should not 

normally be entered voluntarily’’. 

11. Comment: Section 3.1.1, Table 2—

The table uses the undefined term 

‘‘RCDF’’. This term should be defined. 

Response: The staff agrees. The term 

has been defined. 

12. Comment: Section 3.1.2, third 

paragraph—The following phrase is 

confusing, ‘‘* * * unplanned failures or 

discovered conditions may result in the 

unavailability of at least one train or 

subsystem for a particular initiating 

event’’. A clear statement of the intent 

is in Section 1.0, which states, ‘‘* * * 

if the required OPERABLE train or 

subsystem becomes inoperable while 

this specification is in use, it must be 

restored to OPERABLE status within 24 

hours or * * *’’ The inoperability of the 

train that has the affected barrier is not 

the purpose of the 24-hour allowance—

it is the inoperability of the opposite 

train. This phrase should be revised to 

be consistent with Section 1.0. 

Response: The staff agrees and the 

change in wording has been made for 

consistency. 

13. Comment: Section 3.1.2, third 

paragraph—The notice states, ‘‘Such 

conditions may result during 

application of LCO 3.0.9 from 

equipment failure on the operable train, 

or discovery of degraded barriers’’. The 

statement is technically correct but the 

last phrase is misleading. The 24-hour 

allowance is only used when the 

redundant train required to be operable 

by LCO 3.0.9 is found to be inoperable 

due to equipment failure or the failure 

of a barrier that protects the train from 

the same initiating event as the 

unavailable barrier on the first train. We 

recommend revising the sentence by 

replacing the last phrase with ‘‘* * * or 

discovery of a degraded barrier that 

protect all trains of a TS system from the 

same initiating event’’. 

Response: The staff agrees, and the 

wording has been revised for 

clarification. 

14. Comment: Section 3.1.3, second 

paragraph, first sentence—This sentence 

is incorrect when it states, ‘‘The 

implementation guidance for LCO 3.0.9 

(Reference 2) requires that the risk 

determination for an unavailable barrier 

be performed per the ICCDP calculation 

as described in Section 3.1 * * *’’ The 

implementation guidance clearly states 

in Section 6.2, Step 7, first paragraph, 

‘‘(The user is not limited by the example 

used in the TSTF–427 technical 

justification)’’. Furthermore, Appendix 

A of the implementation guidance 

provides an example of a risk 

assessment program for barriers using a 

site-specific on-line risk tool. The 

example uses the ICCDP equation only 

to calculate the allowed time, Tc. This 

sentence in the notice should be revised 

to state, ‘‘The risk determination of an 

unavailable barrier is to be performed 

using the plant-specific configuration’’. 

Response: The staff agrees, and the 

wording has been revised for 

clarification. 

15. Comment: Section 3.1.3, third 

paragraph, second sentence—This 

sentence has a grammar error. It should 

state, ‘‘The numerical guidance 

identified in Table 2 is applicable to 

* * * ‘‘not’’ are applicable to’’. 

Response: The staff agrees and the 

correction has been made. 

16. Comment: Section 3.1.3, next to 

the last paragraph, last sentence—The 

sentence is not correct. The CLIIP states, 

‘‘* * * LERF, then the methodology 

requires a calculation for ICLERP 

similar to the calculations performed for 

ICCDP, described in Section 3.1, or the 

applicability of LCO 3.0.9 must be 

limited to that one barrier’’. This is 

inconsistent with TSTF–427, Section 4, 

and NEI 04–08, Section 6.2, Step 7.c, 

which states, ‘‘However, if the barrier 

protects a system that is significant to 

mitigation of containment bypass 

events, such as interfacing systems 

LOCA or steam generator tube rupture, 

assess the LERF impact using a 

qualitative, quantitative, or blended 

approach, * * *. If a quantitative 

assessment of the LERF impact cannot 

be made, the use of LCO 3.0.9 at a given 

time should be limited to a single 


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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 191 / Tuesday, October 3, 2006 / Notices 58447 

barrier protecting a system that is 

significant to mitigation of containment 

bypass events’’. The notice should be 

revised to be consistent with the 

Traveler and the implementation 

guidance document. 

Response: The staff agrees, and the 

wording has been revised for 

clarification. 

17. Comment: Section 3.2, Item 3, first 

paragraph, last sentence—This is an 

incomplete sentence. We recommend 

revising it to state ‘‘Unnecessary plant 

shutdowns may occur due to discovery 

of * * *’’

Response: The staff agrees to this 

clarification and change in wording has 

been made. 

18. Comment: Section 3.2, next to the 

last paragraph, stipulation item 1—

Reference to NEI 04–08 should be 

eliminated. Commitment to NEI 04–08 

is discussed in the next paragraph. Note 

that the commitments in the Model 

Application do not reference NEI 04–08 

in the first commitment. 

Response: The staff does not agree 

that a change is necessary. The purpose 

of item 1 is to identify both required 

commitments, and the purpose of item 

2 is to address necessary related 

revisions to procedures. 

19. Comment: Section 3.2, last 

paragraph, stipulation item 2—The 

paragraph states, ‘‘Licensee procedures 

must be revised to ensure that the risk 

assessment and management process 

described in NEI 04–08 is used 

whenever a barrier is considered 

unavailable * * *’’ NEI 04–08 is not the 

only acceptable methodology that may 

be used to perform the risk assessment 

required by LCO 3.0.9. As stated in 

Section 6.0 of NEI 04–08, the document 

‘‘* * * describes considerations for risk 

assessment and management relative to 

the use of LCO 3.0.9’’. The document 

discusses acceptable methods of 

assessment in Section 6.1 and the 

general process for risk assessments in 

Section 6.2. We recommend revising the 

paragraph to state, ‘‘Licensee procedures 

must be revised to ensure that the 

guidance on the assessment and 

management of risk in NEI 04–08 is 

used whenever a barrier is considered 

unavailable’’. The same change should 

be made to commitment 2 in Section 

3.2, ‘‘Verification and Commitments’’, 

and in Enclosure 4 in the published 

Model Application. 

Response: The staff agrees and the 

change in wording has been made for 

consistency. 

20. Comment: Section 7.0, Reference 

1—Revise Reference 1 to refer to 

Revision 2 of TSTF–427, dated May 3, 

2006. 

Response: The staff agrees and the 

correction has been made. 

21. Comment: Section 7.0, Reference 

7—For consistency, Reference 7 should 

list the May 2000 issuance date of 

Regulatory Guide 1.182. 

Response: The staff agrees and the 

change in wording has been made for 

consistency. 

Comments on the Proposed NoSignificant-Hazards-Consideration 

Determination 

1. Comment: Last paragraph—The 

notice states, ‘‘Based upon the reasoning 

presented above and the previous 

discussion of the amendment request, 

the requested change does not involve a 

no-significant-hazards consideration’’. 

The use of the double negative is 

confusing. We recommend revising the 

sentence to state, ‘‘Based upon the 

reasoning presented above and the 

previous discussion of the amendment 

request, the requested change presents 

no significant hazards considerations 

under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 

50.92(c)’’. 

Response: The staff agrees and this 

clarifying change has been made. 

Comments on the Model Application 

1. Comment: Enclosure 3, ‘‘Revised 

Technical Specification Pages’’, should 

be shown as optional. Many licensees 

do not provide retyped technical 

specification pages in their license 

amendment requests. 

Response: The staff does not agree 

that this proposed change is necessary. 

Submission of revised technical 

specification pages clearly identify the 

changes requested and enhance the 

staff’s ability to conduct an efficient 

review, consistent with purpose of 

changes made in accordance with the 

Consolidated Line Item Improvement 

Process. 

2. Comment: We recommend adding 

the Technical Specifications Branch 

Chief to the cc: list on the model 

application as has been done in other 

CLIIP model applications. 

Response: The staff agrees and the 

change has been made. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day 

of September 2006. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Timothy J. Kobetz, 

Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, 

Division of Inspection and Regional Support, 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. 

Model Safety Evaluation, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Office of 

Nuclear Reactor Regulation, 

Consolidated Line Item Improvement, 

Technical Specification Task Force 

(TSTF) Change TSTF–427; The 

Addition of Limiting Condition for 

Operation (LCO) 3.0.9 on the 

Unavailability of Barriers 

1.0 Introduction 

On May 3, 2006, the industry owners 

group Technical Specifications Task 

Force (TSTF) submitted a proposed 

change, TSTF–427, Revision 2, to the 

standard technical specifications (STS) 

(NUREGs 1430–1434) on behalf of the 

industry (TSTF–427, Revisions 0 and 1 

were prior draft iterations). TSTF–427, 

Revision 2, is a proposal to add an STS 

Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 

3.0.9, allowing a delay time for entering 

a supported system technical 

specification (TS), when the 

inoperability is due solely to an 

unavailable barrier, if risk is assessed 

and managed. The postulated initiating 

events which may require a functional 

barrier are limited to those with low 

frequencies of occurrence, and the 

overall TS system safety function would 

still be available for the majority of 

anticipated challenges. 

This proposal is one of the industry’s 

initiatives being developed under the 

risk-informed TS program. These 

initiatives are intended to maintain or 

improve safety through the 

incorporation of risk assessment and 

management techniques in TS, while 

reducing unnecessary burden and 

making TS requirements consistent with 

the Commission’s other risk-informed 

regulatory requirements. 

The proposed change adds a new 

limiting condition of operation, LCO 

3.0.9, to the TS. LCO 3.0.9 allows 

licensees to delay declaring an LCO not 

met for equipment supported by barriers 

unable to perform their associated 

support function, when risk is assessed 

and managed. This new LCO 3.0.9 

states: 

‘‘When one or more required barriers 

are unable to perform their related 

support function(s), any supported 

system LCO(s) are not required to be 

declared not met solely for this reason 

for up to 30 days provided that at least 

one train or subsystem of the supported 

system is OPERABLE and supported by 

barriers capable of providing their 

related support function(s), and risk is 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
58448 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 191 / Tuesday, October 3, 2006 / Notices 

assessed and managed. This 

specification may be concurrently 

applied to more than one train or 

subsystem of a multiple train or 

subsystem supported system provided 

at least one train or subsystem of the 

supported system is OPERABLE and the 

barriers supporting each of these trains 

or subsystems provide their related 

support function(s) for different 

categories of initiating events. 

[BWR only: For the purposes of this 

specification, the [High Pressure 

Coolant Injection/High Pressure Core 

Spray] system, the [Reactor Core 

Isolation Cooling] system, and the 

[Automatic Depressurization System] 

are considered independent subsystems 

of a single system.] 

If the required OPERABLE train or 

subsystem becomes inoperable while 

this specification is in use, it must be 

restored to OPERABLE status within 24 

hours or the provisions of this 

specification cannot be applied to the 

trains or subsystems supported by the 

barriers that cannot perform their 

related support function(s). 

At the end of the specified period, the 

required barriers must be able to 

perform their related support 

function(s), or the supported system 

LCO(s) shall be declared not met.’’

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation 

In 10 CFR 50.36, the Commission 

established its regulatory requirements 

related to the content of TS. Pursuant to 

10 CFR 50.36, TS are required to 

include items in the following five 

specific categories related to station 

operation: (1) Safety limits, limiting 

safety system settings, and limiting 

control settings; (2) limiting conditions 

for operation (LCOs); (3) surveillance 

requirements (SRs); (4) design features; 

and (5) administrative controls. The rule 

does not specify the particular 

requirements to be included in a plant’s 

TS. As stated in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i), 

the ‘‘Limiting conditions for operation 

are the lowest functional capability or 

performance levels of equipment 

required for safe operation of the 

facility. When a limiting condition for 

operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, 

the licensee shall shut down the reactor 

or follow any remedial action permitted 

by the technical specification * * *.’’

TS Section 3.0, on ‘‘LCO and SR 

Applicability,’’ provides details or 

ground rules for complying with the 

LCOs. 

Barriers are doors, walls, floor plugs, 

curbs, hatches, installed structures or 

components, or other devices, not 

explicitly described in TS that support 

the performance of the functions of 

systems described in the TS. For 

purposes of this TS, the term ‘‘barrier’’

refers to one or more devices which 

protect one train of a safety system from 

a given initiating event. A ‘‘degraded 

barrier’’ refers to a barrier that has been 

found to be degraded and must be 

repaired, or to a barrier that is 

purposefully removed or reconfigured to 

facilitate maintenance activities. As 

stated in NEI 04–08, LCO 3.0.9 

specifically does not apply to fire 

barriers, snubbers, barriers which 

support ventilation systems or non-TS 

systems, or barriers which support TS 

systems where the unavailability of the 

barrier does not render the supported 

system inoperable. 

Some TS required systems may 

require one or more functional barriers 

in order to perform their intended 

function(s) for certain initiating events 

for which the barriers provide some 

protective support function. For 

example, there are barriers to protect 

systems from the effects of internal 

flooding, such as floor plugs and 

retaining walls, and barriers are used to 

protect equipment from steam 

impingement in case of high energy line 

breaks. Barriers are also used to protect 

systems against missiles, either 

internally generated, or generated by 

external events. 

Barriers are not explicitly described in 

the TS, but are required to be capable 

of performing their required support 

function by the definition of 

OPERABILITY for the supported system 

which is described in the TS. Therefore, 

under the current STS, the supported 

system must be declared inoperable 

when the related barrier(s) are 

unavailable. However, the magnitude of 

plant risk associated with the barrier 

which cannot perform its related 

support function is much less than the 

risk associated with direct 

unavailability of the supported system, 

since barriers are only required for 

specific, low frequency initiating events. 

Some potential undesirable 

consequences of the current TS 

requirements include: 

1. When maintenance activities on the 

supported TS system require removal 

and restoration of barriers, the time 

available to complete maintenance and 

perform system restoration and testing 

is reduced by the time spent 

maneuvering the barriers within the 

time constraints of the supported system 

LCO; 

2. Restoration of barriers following 

maintenance may be given a high 

priority due to time restraints of the 

existing supported system LCO, when 

other activities may have a greater risk 

impact and should therefore be given 

priority; and 

3. Unnecessary plant shutdowns may 

occur due to discovery of degraded 

barriers which require more time than 

provided by the existing supported 

system LCO to complete repairs and 

restoration of the barrier. 

To improve the treatment of 

unavailable barriers and enhance safety, 

the TSTF proposed a risk-informed TS 

change that introduces a delay time 

before entering the actions for the 

supported equipment, when one or 

more barriers are found to be degraded, 

or are removed or reconfigured to 

support maintenance activities, if risk is 

assessed and managed. Such a delay 

time will provide needed flexibility in 

the performance of maintenance and at 

the same time will enhance overall 

plant safety by: 

1. Performing system maintenance 

and restoration activities, including 

post-maintenance testing, within the 

existing TS LCO time, and allowing 

barrier removal and restoration to be 

performed outside of the TS LCO, 

providing more time for the safe 

conduct of maintenance and testing 

activities on the supported TS system; 

2. Requiring barrier removal and 

restoration activities to be assessed and 

prioritized based on actual plant risk 

impacts; and 

3. Avoiding unnecessary unscheduled 

plant shutdowns and thus minimizing 

plant transition and realignment risks. 

3.0 Technical Evaluation 

The industry submitted TSTF–427, 

Revision 2 (Reference 2), ‘‘Allowance 

for Non Technical Specification Barrier 

Degradation on Supported System 

OPERABILITY’’ in support of the 

proposed TS change. This submittal 

documents a risk-informed analysis of 

the proposed TS change. Probabilistic 

risk assessment (PRA) methods are 

used, in combination with deterministic 

and defense-in-depth arguments, to 

identify and justify delay times for 

entering the actions for the supported 

equipment associated with unavailable 

barriers at nuclear power plants. The 

industry also submitted implementation 

guidance NEI 04–08, March 2006 

(Reference 2). This submittal provides 

detailed guidance on assessing and 

managing risk associated with 

unavailable barriers. This is in 

accordance with guidance provided in 

Regulatory Guides (RGs) 1.174 

(Reference 3) and 1.177 (Reference 4). 

The risk impact associated with the 

proposed delay times for entering the 

TS actions for the supported equipment 

can be assessed using the same 

approach as for allowed completion 


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time (CT) extensions. Therefore, the risk 

assessment was performed following the 

three-tiered approach recommended in 

RG 1.177 for evaluating proposed 

extensions in currently allowed CTs: 

1. The first tier involves the 

assessment of the change in plant risk 

due to the proposed TS change. Such 

risk change is expressed (1) by the 

change in the average yearly core 

damage frequency (DCDF) and the 

average yearly large early release 

frequency (DLERF) and (2) by the 

incremental conditional core damage 

probability (ICCDP) and the incremental 

conditional large early release 

probability (ICLERP). The assessed 

DCDF and DLERF values are compared 

to acceptance guidelines, consistent 

with the Commission’s Safety Goal 

Policy Statement as documented in RG 

1.174, so that the plant’s average 

baseline risk is maintained within a 

minimal range. The assessed ICCDP and 

ICLERP values are compared to 

acceptance guidelines in RG 1.177, 

which provide assurance that the plant 

risk does not increase unacceptably 

during the period the equipment is 

taken out of service. 

2. The second tier involves the 

identification of potentially high-risk 

configurations that could exist if 

equipment in addition to that associated 

with the change were to be taken out of 

service simultaneously, or other risksignificant operational factors such as 

concurrent equipment testing were also 

involved. The objective is to ensure that 

appropriate restrictions are in place to 

avoid any potential high-risk 

configurations. 

3. The third tier involves the 

establishment of an overall 

configuration risk management program 

(CRMP) to ensure that potentially risksignificant configurations resulting from 

maintenance and other operational 

activities are identified. The objective of 

the CRMP is to manage configurationspecific risk by appropriate scheduling 

of plant activities and/or appropriate 

compensatory measures. 

A simplified risk assessment was 

performed to justify the proposed 

addition of LCO 3.0.9 to the TS. This 

approach was necessitated by (1) the 

general nature of the proposed TS 

change (i.e., it applies to all plants and 

is associated with an undetermined 

number of barriers that are not able to 

perform their function), and (2) the lack 

of detailed modeling in most plantspecific PRAs which do not include 

passive structures such as barriers. 

The simplified risk assessment 

considers three different parameters: 

1. The length of time the affected 

barrier is unavailable, 

2. The initiating event frequency for 

which the affected barrier is designed to 

mitigate, and 

3. The importance to CDF (or LERF) 

of the TS equipment (train, subsystem, 

or component) for which the affected 

barrier is designed to protect, measured 

by the risk achievement worth of the 

equipment. 

The ICCDP can be calculated based on 

the following equation: 

ICCDP T IE

IE

RAW CDF CDF C i

T

= × j base base





 



 × × ( ) −  

 8766

Where: 

• Tc is the time the barrier is unavailable 

(hours) 

• Tc/8766 is therefore the fraction of the year 

during which the barrier is unavailable, 

• IEi/IET is the ratio of the initiating event 

frequency for which the affected barrier 

is designed to mitigate, IEi, and the total 

initiating event frequency, IET, 

• RAWj is the risk achievement worth of the 

component(s) for which the barrier 

provides protection, and 

• CDFbase is the baseline core damage 

frequency (per year). 

ICLERP also may be similarly 

determined, using baseline LERF and 

RAW values with respect to LERF. It is 

assumed that the magnitude of the LERF 

risk resulting from the barrier’s inability 

to perform its related support function 

would be generally at least one order of 

magnitude less than the corresponding 

CDF risk. Containment bypass 

scenarios, which are typically the 

significant contributors to LERF, would 

not be uniquely affected by application 

of LCO 3.0.9, and initiating events 

which would be significant LERF 

contributors, such as steam generator 

tube rupture and interfacing systems 

LOCA, are not typically associated with 

barriers within the scope of LCO 3.0.9. 

Therefore, the assumption regarding 

LERF risk is reasonable and acceptable 

for the generic risk evaluation, provided 

that LERF risk impacts are considered 

on a plant-specific basis for unavailable 

barriers, as described in section 3.1.3. 

The relevant initiating events (i.e., 

events for which barriers subject to LCO 

3.0.9 provide protection) are: 

• Internal and external floods, 

• High energy line breaks, 

• Feedwater line breaks, 

• Loss of coolant accident (small, 

medium, and large), 

• Tornados and high winds, and 

• Turbine missiles. 

Generic frequencies for most of these 

initiating events were obtained from 

NUREG/CR–5750 (Reference 5). For 

external floods, turbine missiles, and 

tornados, other industry source 

documents were referenced. The most 

limiting (highest frequency) initiating 

event was obtained for a high energy 

line break from NUREG/CR–5750, with 

a frequency of 9.1E–3 per year. The risk 

assessment is therefore based on this 

limiting frequency, and the proposed 

methodology to apply LCO 3.0.9 is 

similarly restricted to barriers protecting 

against initiating events whose total 

frequency is no more than 9.1E–3 per 

year. 

3.1 Risk Assessment Results and 

Insights 

The results and insights from the 

implementation of the three-tiered 

approach of RG 1.177 to support the 

proposed addition of LCO 3.0.9 to the 

TS are summarized and evaluated in the 

following Sections 3.1.1 to 3.1.3. 

3.1.1 Risk Impact 

The bounding risk assessment 

approach, described in Section 3.0, was 

developed for a range of plant baseline 

CDF values and for a range of protected 

component RAW values. The maximum 

allowable 30-day outage time was used. 

The results are summarized in Table 1. 

TABLE 1.—RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS FOR A POSTULATED 30-DAY

BARRIER OUTAGE

RAW ICCDP ICLERP 

Baseline CDF = 1E–6 per year 

2 ............................... 7.5E–10 7.5E–11 

10 ............................. 6.7E–09 6.7E–10 

50 ............................. 3.7E–08 3.7E–09 

100 ........................... 7.4E–08 7.4E–09 

Baseline CDF = 1E–5 per year 

2 ............................... 7.5E–09 7.5E–10 

10 ............................. 6.7E–08 6.7E–09 

50 ............................. 3.7E–07 3.7E–08 

100 ........................... 7.4E–07 7.4E–08 


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TABLE 1.—RISK ASSESSMENT RESULTS FOR A POSTULATED 30-DAY

BARRIER OUTAGE—Continued 

RAW ICCDP ICLERP 

Baseline CDF = 1E–4 per year 

2 ............................... 7.5E–08 7.5E–09 

10 ............................. 6.7E–07 6.7E–08 

50 ............................. 3.7E–06 3.7E–07 

100 ........................... 7.4E–06 7.4E–07 

The above results represent a sensitivity 

analysis covering the expected range of 

plant baseline CDF values and 

component RAW values. The most 

limiting configurations involving very 

high risk components (RAW > 10) 

would not be anticipated to occur for 

most planned maintenance activities. 

The calculations conservatively 

assume the most limiting (highest 

frequency) initiating event and the 

longest allowable outage time (30 days). 

Occurrence of the initiating event 

during unavailability of the barrier is 

conservatively assumed to directly fail 

the protected equipment; no credit is 

taken for event-specific circumstances 

which may result in the equipment 

remaining functional even with the 

barrier unavailable. (For example, a 

barrier required to protect equipment 

from steam impingement for high 

energy line breaks may only be required 

for breaks occurring in specific locations 

and orientations relative to the 

protected equipment, and only for large 

size breaks.) No credit is taken for 

avoided risk identified in Section 2. 

The risk assessment results of Table 1 

were compared to guidance provided in 

the revised Section 11 of NUMARC 93–

01, Revision 2 (Reference 6), endorsed 

by RG 1.182 (Reference 7), for 

implementing the requirements of 

paragraph (a)(4) of the Maintenance 

Rule, 10 CFR 50.65. Such guidance is 

summarized in Table 2. Guidance 

regarding the acceptability of 

conditional risk increase in terms of 

CDF for a planned configuration is 

provided. This guidance states that a 

specific configuration that is associated 

with a CDF higher than 1E–3 per year 

should not normally be entered 

voluntarily. The staff notes that the 

higher risk configurations documented 

in Table 1 would exceed this guidance, 

and would therefore not be permitted to 

be entered voluntarily. For example, 

with a baseline CDF of 1E–4 per year, 

a component with a RAW greater than 

10 would exceed the 1E–3 per year 

criteria. Therefore, the sensitivity 

analyses presented in Table 1 are 

understood to include higher risk 

configurations which would not be 

permitted under the guidance of 

Reference 6. 

TABLE 2.—GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING 10 CFR 50.65(A)(4) 

DRCDF Guidance 

Greater than 1E–3/year ............................................................................ Configuration should not normally be entered voluntarily. 

ICCDP Guidance ICLERP 

Greater 1E–5 ................................... Configuration should not normally be entered voluntarily ..................... Greater than than 1E–6. 

1E–6 to 1E–5 .................................. Assess non-quantifiable factors. Establish risk management actions .. 1E–7 to 1E–6. 

Less than 1E–6 ............................... Normal work controls ............................................................................. Less than 1E–7. 

Guidance regarding the acceptability 

of ICCDP and ICLERP values for a 

specific planned configuration and the 

establishment of risk management 

actions is also provided in NUMARC 

93–01. This guidance, as shown in 

Table 2, states that a specific plant 

configuration that is associated with 

ICCDP and ICLERP values below 1E–6 

and 1E–7, respectively, is considered to 

require ‘‘normal work controls’’. Table 1 

shows that for the majority of barrier 

outage configurations the conservatively 

assessed ICCDP and ICLERP values are 

within the limits for what is 

recommended as the threshold for the 

‘‘normal work controls’’ region. 

As stated in the implementation 

guidance for LCO 3.0.9 (Reference 2), 

plants are required to commit to the 

guidance of NUMARC 93–01 Section 11, 

and therefore the above limits would be 

applicable. Plant configurations 

including out of service barriers may 

therefore be entered voluntarily if 

supported by the results of the risk 

assessment required by 10 CFR 

50.65(a)(4), and by LCO 3.0.9. 

RG 1.177 (Ref. 4) provides guidance of 

5E–7 ICDP and 5E–8 ILERP as the limit 

for a TS allowed outage time. As shown 

in Table 1, the guidance is met for the 

typically anticipated configurations, 

unless either the baseline CDF for the 

plant approaches 1E–4 per year or the 

RAW of the protected components is 

well above 10. Such configurations may 

exceed the criteria described in Ref. 6 

(Table 2) and would not be voluntarily 

entered. Such configurations are not 

expected to be frequently encountered, 

and may be addressed on a case-by-case 

plant-specific basis by limiting the 

allowed outage time and by 

implementing plant-specific risk 

management actions, as per the 

implementing guidance (Reference 2). 

RG 1.174 (Ref. 3) provides guidance of 

1E–5 per year DCDF and 1E–6 per year 

DLERF. The ICCDP calculations 

demonstrated that each individual 30- 

day barrier outage is anticipated to be 

low risk. Although there is no explicit 

limit on the number of times per year 

that LCO 3.0.9 may be applied, even 

assuming barrier outages occurred 

continuously over the entire year, the 

risk incurred would still be anticipated 

to be below the limits of the guidance. 

The staff finds that the risk 

assessment results support the proposed 

addition of LCO 3.0.9 to the TS. The risk 

increases associated with this TS change 

will be insignificant based on guidance 

provided in RGs 1.174 and 1.177 and 

within the range of risks associated with 

normal maintenance activities. 

3.1.2 Identification of High-Risk 

Configurations 

The second tier of the three-tiered 

approach recommended in RG 1.177 

involves the identification of potentially 

high-risk configurations that could exist 

if equipment, in addition to that 

associated with the TS change, were to 

be taken out of service simultaneously. 

Insights from the risk assessments, in 

conjunction with important 

assumptions made in the analysis and 

defense-in-depth considerations, were 

used to identify such configurations. To 

avoid these potentially high-risk 

configurations, specific restrictions to 

the implementation of the proposed TS 

changes were identified. 

When LCO 3.0.9 is applied, at least 

one train or subsystem is required to be 

operable with required barriers in place, 

such that this train or subsystem would 

be available to provide mitigation of the 

initiating event. LCO 3.0.9 may be 

applied to multiple trains of the same 

system only for barriers which provide 

protection for different initiating events, 

such that at least one train or subsystem 


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is available to provide mitigation of the 

initiating event. The use of LCO 3.0.9 

for barriers which protect all trains or 

subsystems from a particular initiating 

event is not permitted. Therefore, 

potentially high-risk configurations 

involving a loss of function required for 

mitigation of a particular initiating 

event are avoided by the restrictions 

imposed on applicability of LCO 3.0.9. 

LCO 3.0.9 also addresses potential 

emergent conditions where unplanned 

failures or discovered conditions may 

result in the unavailability of a required 

train or subsystem for a particular 

initiating event. Such conditions may 

result during application of LCO 3.0.9 

from equipment failure on the operable 

train, such that all trains of a TS system 

are not protected from the same 

initiating event. In such cases, a 24-hour 

allowed time is provided to restore the 

conditions to permit continued 

operation with unavailable barriers, 

after which the applicability of LCO 

3.0.9 ends, and the supported system 

LCO becomes effective. This allowed 

time is provided so that emergent 

conditions with low risk consequences 

may be effectively managed, rather than 

requiring immediate exit of LCO 3.0.9 

and the potential for an unplanned 

plant shutdown. 

A limit of 30 days is applied to the 

LCO 3.0.9 allowed outage time for each 

barrier, after which the barrier must be 

restored to an available status, or the 

supported system TS must be applied. 

This 30-day backstop applies regardless 

of the risk level calculated, and provides 

assurance that installed plant barriers 

will be maintained available over long 

periods of time, and that the application 

of LCO 3.0.9 will not result in long term 

degradation of plant barriers. 

The staff finds that the restrictions on 

the applicability of LCO 3.0.9 assuring 

that one safety train remains available to 

mitigate the initiating event, along with 

the 30-day limit applicable to each 

barrier, assure that potentially high-risk 

configurations are avoided in 

accordance with the guidance provided 

in RGs 1.174 and 1.177. 

3.1.3 Configuration Risk Management 

The third tier of the three-tiered 

approach recommended in RG 1.177 

involves the establishment of an overall 

configuration risk management program 

(CRMP) to ensure that potentially risksignificant configurations resulting from 

maintenance and other operational 

activities are identified. The objective of 

the CRMP is to manage configurationspecific risk by appropriate scheduling 

of plant activities and/or appropriate 

compensatory measures. This objective 

is met by licensee programs to comply 

with the requirements of paragraph 

(a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 

50.65) to assess and manage risk 

resulting from maintenance activities, 

and by LCO 3.0.9 requiring risk 

assessments and management using 

(a)(4) processes if no maintenance is in 

progress. These programs can support 

licensee decision making regarding the 

appropriate actions to manage risk 

whenever a risk-informed TS is entered. 

The implementation guidance for 

LCO 3.0.9 (Reference 2) requires that the 

allowed outage time determination for 

an unavailable barrier be performed 

using the plant-specific configuration. 

Further, the risk determinations are to 

be updated whenever emergent 

conditions occur. These requirements 

assure that the configuration-specific 

risk associated with unavailable barriers 

is assessed and managed prior to entry 

into LCO 3.0.9 and during its 

applicability as conditions change. 

These evaluations for the unavailable 

barrier are performed as part of the 

assessment of plant risk required by 10 

CFR 50.65(a)(4). The numerical 

guidance identified in Table 2 is 

applicable to implementation of LCO 

3.0.9, using the results of the 

configuration-specific risk assessment 

which addresses the risk impact of the 

unavailable barrier along with all other 

out of service components and plant 

alignments. 

Risk management actions are required 

to be considered when the calculated 

risk exceeds specific thresholds per 

NUMARC 93–01 Section 11, as 

identified in Table 2. Additional 

guidance on risk management actions 

are provided in the implementation 

guidance for LCO 3.0.9. 

The allowed outage time for a barrier 

is calculated based on an ICCDP limit of 

1E–6. This is the NUMARC 93–01 

Section 11 guidance for applicability of 

normal work controls, and is 

conservatively lower than the guidance 

of 1E–5 for voluntary maintenance 

activities. The use of 1E–6 will result in 

conservatively short allowed outage 

times for barriers compared to allowed 

times for other maintenance activities. 

If the scope of the PRA model used to 

support the plant-specific CRMP does 

not include the initiating event for 

which a barrier provides protection, 

then LCO 3.0.9 applicability is limited 

to one barrier on a single train. Multiple 

barriers for such initiating events may 

not be unavailable under LCO 3.0.9, and 

in such situations the LCO(s) associated 

with the protected components would 

be applicable. Applicability of LCO 

3.0.9 to the single barrier for an 

initiating event that is not modeled in 

the plant PRA is acceptable based on the 

generic risk analysis provided by TSTF–

427, as described in Section 3.1. 

Assessment of the LERF risk impact 

on an unavailable barrier is required to 

be performed in accordance with 

NUMARC 93–01 Section 11. If an 

unavailable barrier provides protection 

to equipment which is relevant to the 

containment function, or which protects 

equipment from the effects of an 

initiating event which is a contributor to 

LERF, then applicability of LCO 3.0.9 

must be limited to that one barrier 

unless a quantified assessment of LERF 

is performed. 

The staff finds that the risk 

evaluations necessary to support the 

applicability of LCO 3.0.9 appropriately 

consider the risk from unavailable 

barriers in an integrated manner based 

on the overall plant configuration. 

Therefore, potentially high-risk 

configurations can be identified and 

managed in accordance with the 

guidance provided in RGs 1.174 and 

1.177. 

3.2 Summary and Conclusions 

The unavailability of barriers which 

protect TS required components from 

the effects of specific initiating events is 

typically a low risk configuration which 

should not require that the protected 

components be immediately declared 

inoperable. The current TS require that 

when such barriers are unavailable, the 

protected component LCO is 

immediately entered. Some potential 

undesirable consequences of the current 

TS requirements include: 

1. When maintenance activities on the 

supported TS system requires removal 

and restoration of barriers, the time 

available to complete maintenance and 

perform system restoration and testing 

is reduced by the time spent 

maneuvering the barriers within the 

time constraints of the supported system 

LCO; 

2. Restoration of barriers following 

maintenance must be given a high 

priority due to time restraints of the 

existing supported system LCO, when 

other more risk important activities may 

have a greater risk impact and should 

therefore be given priority; and 

3. Unnecessary plant shutdowns may 

occur due to discovery of degraded 

barriers which may require more than 

the existing supported system LCO time 

to complete repairs and restoration. 

To remove the overly restrictive 

requirements in the treatment of 

barriers, licensees are proposing a riskinformed TS change which introduces a 

delay time before entering the actions 

for the supported equipment when one 

or more barriers are found degraded or 

removed to facilitate planned 


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maintenance activities. Such a delay 

time will provide needed flexibility in 

the performance of maintenance during 

power operation and at the same time 

will enhance overall plant safety by (1) 

performing system maintenance and 

restoration activities, including postmaintenance testing, within the existing 

TS LCO time, and allowing barrier 

removal and restoration to be performed 

outside of the TS LCO, providing more 

time for the safe conduct of 

maintenance and testing activities on 

the supported system; (2) requiring 

barrier removal and restoration 

activities to be assessed and prioritized 

based on actual plant risk impacts; and 

(3) avoiding unnecessary unscheduled 

plant shutdowns, thus minimizing plant 

transition and realignment risks. 

The risk impact of the proposed TS 

changes was assessed following the 

three-tiered approach recommended in 

RG 1.177. A simplified bounding risk 

assessment was performed to justify the 

proposed TS changes. This bounding 

assessment was selected due to the lack 

of detailed plant-specific risk models for 

most plants which do not include 

failure modes of passive structures such 

as barriers. The impact from the 

addition of the proposed LCO 3.0.9 to 

the TS on defense-in-depth was also 

evaluated in conjunction with the risk 

assessment results. 

Based on this integrated evaluation, 

the staff concludes that the proposed 

addition of LCO 3.0.9 to the TS would 

lead to insignificant risk increases as 

stipulated by RG 1.177 and depicted on 

Table 1 above. This conclusion is true 

without taking any credit for the 

removal of potential undesirable 

consequences associated with the 

current conservative treatment of 

barriers. Therefore, the proposed change 

provides adequate protection of public 

health and safety and is acceptable 

provided the conditions set forth below 

are satisfied. 

Consistent with the staff’s approval 

and inherent in the implementation of 

TSTF–427, licensees interested in 

implementing LCO 3.0.9 must, as 

applicable, operate in accordance with 

the following stipulations: 

1. The licensee must commit to the 

guidance of NUMARC 93–01, Section 11 

(Reference 6) and to NEI 04–08 

(Reference 2); and 

2. Licensee procedures must be 

revised to ensure that the guidance on 

the risk assessment and management 

process described in NEI 04–08 is used 

whenever a barrier is considered 

unavailable and the requirements of 

LCO 3.0.9 are to be applied. This must 

be done in accordance with an overall 

CRMP to ensure that potentially risksignificant configurations resulting from 

maintenance and other operational 

activities are identified and avoided. 

4.0 State Consultation 

In accordance with the Commission’s 

regulations, the [ ] State official was 

notified of the proposed issuance of the 

amendment. The State official had [(1) 

no comments or (2) the following 

comments—with subsequent 

disposition by the staff]. 

5.0 Environmental Consideration 

The amendment changes a 

requirement with respect to the 

installation or use of a facility 

component located within the restricted 

area as defined in 10 CFR part 20 and 

change surveillance requirements. The 

NRC staff has determined that the 

amendment involves no significant 

increase in the amounts and no 

significant change in the types of any 

effluents that may be released offsite, 

and that there is no significant increase 

in individual or cumulative 

occupational radiation exposure. The 

Commission has previously issued a 

proposed finding that the amendment 

involves no-significant-hazards 

considerations, and there has been no 

public comment on the finding [FR]. 

Accordingly, the amendment meets the 

eligibility criteria for categorical 

exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 

51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), 

no environmental impact statement or 

environmental assessment need be 

prepared in connection with the 

issuance of the amendment. 

6.0 Conclusion 

The Commission has concluded, on 

the basis of the considerations discussed 

above, that (1) there is reasonable 

assurance that the health and safety of 

the public will not be endangered by 

operation in the proposed manner, (2) 

such activities will be conducted in 

compliance with the Commission’s 

regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 

amendments will not be inimical to the 

common defense and security or to the 

health and safety of the public. 

7.0 References 

1. TSTF–427, Revision 2, ‘‘Allowance 

for Non Technical Specification Barrier 

Degradation on Supported System 

OPERABILITY’’, May 3, 2006. 

2. NEI 04–08, ‘‘Allowance for Non 

Technical Specification Barrier 

Degradation on Supported System 

OPERABILITY (TSTF–427) Industry 

Implementation Guidance’’, March 

2006. 

3. Regulatory Guide 1.174, ‘‘An 

Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk 

Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions 

on Plant-Specific Changes to the 

Licensing Basis’’, USNRC, August 1998. 

4. Regulatory Guide 1.177, ‘‘An 

Approach for Plant-Specific, RiskInformed Decisionmaking: Technical 

Specifications’’, USNRC, August 1998. 

5. ‘‘Rates of Initiating Events at U.S. 

Nuclear Power Plants’’, NUREG/CR–

5750, Idaho National Engineering and 

Environmental Laboratory, February 

1999. 

6. Nuclear Energy Institute, ‘‘Industry 

Guideline for Monitoring the 

Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear 

Power Plants’’, NUMARC 93–01, 

Revision 2, Section 11. 

7. ‘‘Assessing and Managing Risk 

Before Maintenance Activities at 

Nuclear Power Plants’’, Regulatory 

Guide 1.182, May 2000. 

Proposed No-Significant-HazardsConsideration Determination 

Description of Amendment Request: A 

change is proposed to the standard 

technical specifications (STS) (NUREGs 

1430 through 1434) and plant-specific 

technical specifications (TS), to allow a 

delay time for entering a supported 

system technical specification (TS) 

when the inoperability is due solely to 

an unavailable barrier, if risk is assessed 

and managed consistent with the 

program in place for complying with the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). LCO 

3.0.9 will be added to individual TS 

providing this allowance. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an 

analysis of the issue of no significant 

hazards consideration is presented 

below: 

Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not 

Involve a Significant Increase in the 

Probability or Consequences of an Accident 

Previously Evaluated 

The proposed change allows a delay time 

for entering a supported system technical 

specification (TS) when the inoperability is 

due solely to an unavailable barrier if risk is 

assessed and managed. The postulated 

initiating events which may require a 

functional barrier are limited to those with 

low frequencies of occurrence, and the 

overall TS system safety function would still 

be available for the majority of anticipated 

challenges. Therefore, the probability of an 

accident previously evaluated is not 

significantly increased, if at all. The 

consequences of an accident while relying on 

the allowance provided by proposed LCO 

3.0.9 are no different than the consequences 

of an accident while relying on the TS 

required actions in effect without the 

allowance provided by proposed LCO 3.0.9. 

Therefore, the consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated are not significantly 

affected by this change. The addition of a 

requirement to assess and manage the risk 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 191 / Tuesday, October 3, 2006 / Notices 58453 

introduced by this change will further 

minimize possible concerns. Therefore, this 

change does not involve a significant 

increase in the probability or consequences 

of an accident previously evaluated. 

Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not 

Create the Possibility of a New or Different 

Kind of Accident from any Previously 

Evaluated 

The proposed change does not involve a 

physical alteration of the plant (no new or 

different type of equipment will be installed). 

Allowing delay times for entering supported 

system TS when inoperability is due solely 

to an unavailable barrier, if risk is assessed 

and managed, will not introduce new failure 

modes or effects and will not, in the absence 

of other unrelated failures, lead to an 

accident whose consequences exceed the 

consequences of accidents previously 

evaluated. The addition of a requirement to 

assess and manage the risk introduced by this 

change will further minimize possible 

concerns. Thus, this change does not create 

the possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from an accident previously 

evaluated. 

Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not 

Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin 

of Safety 

The proposed change allows a delay time 

for entering a supported system TS when the 

inoperability is due solely to an unavailable 

barrier, if risk is assessed and managed. The 

postulated initiating events which may 

require a functional barrier are limited to 

those with low frequencies of occurrence, 

and the overall TS system safety function 

would still be available for the majority of 

anticipated challenges. The risk impact of the 

proposed TS changes was assessed following 

the three-tiered approach recommended in 

RG 1.177. A bounding risk assessment was 

performed to justify the proposed TS 

changes. This application of LCO 3.0.9 is 

predicated upon the licensee’s performance 

of a risk assessment and the management of 

plant risk. The net change to the margin of 

safety is insignificant as indicated by the 

anticipated low levels of associated risk 

(ICCDP and ICLERP) as shown in Table 1 of 

Section 3.1.1 in the Safety Evaluation. 

Therefore, this change does not involve a 

significant reduction in a margin of safety. 

Based upon the reasoning presented 

above and the previous discussion of 

the amendment request, the requested 

change presents no-significant-hazards 

considerations per 10 CFR 50.92(c). 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this lday of 

llll. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Timothy J. Kobetz, 

Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, 

Division of Inspection and Regional Support, 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. 

THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLE OF AN 

APPLICATION WAS PREPARED BY 

THE NRC STAFF TO FACILITATE USE 

OF THE CONSOLIDATED LINE ITEM 

IMPROVEMENT PROCESS (CLIIP). 

THE MODEL PROVIDES THE 

EXPECTED LEVEL OF DETAIL AND 

CONTENT FOR AN APPLICATION TO 

REVISE TECHNICAL 

SPECIFICATIONS REGARDING THE 

ADDITION OF LCO 3.0.9 ON THE 

UNAVAILABILITY OF BARRIERS 

USING CLIIP. LICENSEES REMAIN 

RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT 

THEIR ACTUAL APPLICATION 

FULFILLS THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE 

REQUIREMENTS AS WELL AS 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION REGULATIONS. 

lllllllllllllllllll

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Document Control Desk 

Washington, D.C. 20555 

SUBJECT: 

PLANT NAME 

DOCKET NO. 50—APPLICATION 

FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 

CHANGE TO ADD LCO 3.0.9 ON 

THE UNAVAILABILITY OF 

BARRIERS USING THE 

CONSOLIDATED LINE ITEM 

IMPROVEMENT PROCESS 

Gentleman: 

In accordance with the provisions of 

10 CFR 50.90 [LICENSEE] is submitting 

a request for an amendment to the 

technical specifications (TS) for [PLANT 

NAME, UNIT NOS.]. 

The proposed amendment would 

modify TS requirements for unavailable 

barriers by adding LCO 3.0.9. 

Attachment 1 provides a description 

of the proposed change, the requested 

confirmation of applicability, and plantspecific verifications. Attachment 2 

provides the existing TS pages marked 

up to show the proposed change. 

Attachment 3 provides revised (clean) 

TS pages. Attachment 4 provides a 

summary of the regulatory commitments 

made in this submittal. 

[LICENSEE] requests approval of the 

proposed License Amendment by 

[DATE], with the amendment being 

implemented [BY DATE OR WITHIN X 

DAYS]. 

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a 

copy of this application, with 

attachments, is being provided to the 

designated [STATE] Official. 

I declare under penalty of perjury 

under the laws of the United States of 

America that I am authorized by 

[LICENSEE] to make this request and 

that the foregoing is true and correct. 

(Note that request may be notarized in 

lieu of using this oath or affirmation 

statement). 

If you should have any questions 

regarding this submittal, please contact 

[NAME, TELEPHONE NUMBER] 

Sincerely, 

Signature 

[Name, Title] 

Attachments: 

1. Description and Assessment 

2. Proposed Technical Specification 

Changes 

3. Revised Technical Specification Pages 

4. Regulatory Commitments 

5. Proposed Technical Specification Bases 

Changes 

cc: NRC Project Manager 

NRC Regional Office 

NRC Resident Inspector 

NRC Technical Specifications Branch Chief 

State Contact 

Description and Assessment 

1.0 DESCRIPTION 

The proposed amendment would 

modify technical specifications (TS) 

requirements for unavailable barriers by 

adding LCO 3.0.9. 

The changes are consistent with 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

approved Industry/Technical 

Specification Task Force (TSTF) STS 

change TSTF–427 Revision 2. The 

availability of this TS improvement was 

published in the Federal Register on 

[DATE llll FR llll] as part of 

the consolidated line item improvement 

process (CLIIP). 

2.0 ASSESSMENT 

2.1 Applicability of Published Safety 

Evaluation 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed the safety 

evaluation dated [DATE] as part of the 

CLIIP. This review included a review of 

the NRC staff’s evaluation, as well as the 

supporting information provided to 

support TSTF–427. [LICENSEE] has 

concluded that the justifications 

presented in the TSTF proposal and the 

safety evaluation prepared by the NRC 

staff are applicable to [PLANT, UNIT 

NOS.] and justify this amendment for 

the incorporation of the changes to the 

[PLANT] TS. 

2.2 Optional Changes and Variations 

[LICENSEE] is not proposing any 

variations or deviations from the TS 

changes described in the TSTF–427 

Revision 2 or the NRC staff’s model 

safety evaluation dated [DATE]. 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
58454 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 191 / Tuesday, October 3, 2006 / Notices 

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS 

3.1 No Significant Hazards 

Consideration Determination 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed the 

proposed no significant hazards 

consideration determination (NSHCD) 

published in the Federal Register as 

part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has 

concluded that the proposed NSHCD 

presented in the Federal Register notice 

is applicable to [PLANT] and is hereby 

incorporated by reference to satisfy the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a). 

3.2 Verification and Commitments 

As discussed in the notice of 

availability published in the Federal 

Register on [DATE] for this TS 

improvement, plant-specific 

verifications were performed as follows: 

1. [LICENSEE] commits to the 

guidance of NUMARC 93–01 Section 11, 

which provides guidance and details on 

the assessment and management of risk 

during maintenance. 

2. [LICENSEE] will revise procedures 

to ensure that the risk assessment and 

management process described in NEI 

04–08 is used whenever a barrier is 

considered unavailable and the 

requirements of LCO 3.0.9 are to be 

applied, in accordance with an overall 

CRMP to ensure that potentially risksignificant configurations resulting from 

maintenance and other operational 

activities are identified and avoided. 

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed the 

environmental evaluation included in 

the model safety evaluation dated 

[DATE] as part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] 

has concluded that the staff’s findings 

presented in that evaluation are 

applicable to [PLANT] and the 

evaluation is hereby incorporated by 

reference for this application. 

* In conjunction with the proposed 

change, technical specifications (TS) 

requirements for a Bases Control 

Program, consistent with the TS Bases 

Control Program described in Section 

5.5 of the applicable vendor’s standard 

TS (STS), shall be incorporated into the 

licensee’s TS, if not already in the TS. 

LIST OF REGULATORY 

COMMITMENTS 

The following table identifies those 

actions committed to by [LICENSEE] in 

this document. Any other statements in 

this submittal are provided for 

information purposes and are not 

considered to be regulatory 

commitments. Please direct questions 

regarding these commitments to 

[CONTACT NAME]. 

REGULATORY 

COMMITMENTS 

DUE DATE/ 

EVENT 

[LICENSEE] commits to the 

guidance of NUMARC 93–

01, Revision 2, Section 11, 

which provides guidance 

and details on the assessment and management of 

risk during maintenance. 

[Ongoing or 

implement 

with amendment] 

[LICENSEE] commits to the 

guidance of NEI 04–08, 

‘‘Allowance for Non Technical Specification Barrier 

Degradation on Supported 

System OPERABILITY 

(TSTF–427) Industry Implementation Guidance,’’

March 2006. 

[Implement 

with amendment, when 

barrier(s) 

are unavailable] 

* In conjunction with the proposed 

change, technical specifications (TS) 

requirements for a Bases Control 

Program, consistent with the TS Bases 

Control Program described in Section 

5.5 of the applicable vendor’s standard 

TS (STS), shall be incorporated into the 

licensee’s TS, if not already in the TS. 

[FR Doc. 06–8427 Filed 10–2–06; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

PEACE CORPS 

Information Collection Request Under 

OMB Review 

AGENCY: Peace Corps. 

ACTION: Notice of public use form 

review request of the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB)—OMB 

Control #0420–0513. 

SUMMARY: The Associate Director for 

Management invites comments on 

Reinstatement, with change, of a 

previously approved collection for 

which approval has expired to OMB 

Control # 0420–0513, an information 

collection request as required pursuant 

to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1981 

(44 U.S.C., Chapter 35). This notice 

announces that Peace Corps has 

submitted to the Office of Management 

and Budget a request to approve 

Reinstatement, with change, of a 

previously approved collection for 

which approval has expired for PC 

Form-2042 (rev. 07/2006), 

Correspondence Match Enrollment 

Form. Peace Corps invites comments on 

whether the proposed collection of 

information is necessary for proper 

performance of the functions of the 

Peace Corps and the Paul D. Coverdell 

World Wise Schools’ Correspondence 

Match program, including whether the 

information will have practical use; the 

accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the 

burden of the proposed collection of 

information, including the validity of 

the information to be collected; and, 

ways to minimize the burden of the 

collection of information on those who 

are to respond, including through the 

use of automated collection techniques, 

when appropriate, and other forms of 

information technology. 

DATES: Comments must be submitted on 

or before December 4, 2006. 

ADDRESSES: Comments should be 

mailed to Peace Corps, Office of 

Domestic Programs, Sally Caldwell, 

Director of World Wise Schools, 1111 

20th Street, NW., Washington, DC 

20526. Ms. Caldwell can be contacted 

by telephone at (202) 692–1425 or 800–

424–8580, ext. 1425 or e-mail at 

scaldwell@peacecorps.gov. E-mail 

comments must be made in text and not 

in attachments. 

Information Collection Abstract 

OMB Control Number: 0420–0513. 

Title: Correspondence Match 

Enrollment Form. 

Need for and Use of the Information: 

The Peace Corps and Paul D. Coverdell 

World Wise Schools need this 

information to officially enroll 

educators in the Correspondence Match 

program. The information collected is 

used to make suitable matches between 

the educators and currently serving 

Peace Corps Volunteers. 

Type of Review: Emergency—

Reinstatement, with change, of a 

previously approved collection for 

which approval has expired. 

Respondents: Educators interested in 

promoting global education in the 

classroom. 

Respondents Obligation to Reply: 

Voluntary. 

Burden on the Public: 

a. Annual reporting burden: 1667 

hours. 

b. Annual record keeping burden: 250 

hours. 

c. Estimated average burden per 

response: 10 minutes. 

d. Frequency of response: Annually. 

e. Estimated number of likely 

respondents: 10,000. 

f. Estimated cost to respondents/ 

Agency: 0/$8,900. 

This notice is issued in Washington, DC on 

September 28, 2006. 

Wilbert Bryant, 

Associate Director for Management. 

[FR Doc. 06–8459 Filed 10–2–06; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6051–01–M 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES