67726 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 219 / Tuesday, November 13, 2012 / Notices 

States, including the State Department 

Basic Authorities Act, as amended (22 

U.S.C. 2651a), Section 5(a) of the Tom 

Lantos Block Burmese Junta’s AntiDemocratic Efforts (JADE) Act of 2008 

(Pub. L. 110–286), Presidential 

Memorandum of August 29, 2012, I 

hereby delegate to the Assistant 

Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 

Affairs, to the extent authorized by law, 

the authority under Section 5(a)(2) to 

waive the visa bans imposed pursuant 

to Section 5(a)(1) of Public Law 110– 

286. 

Any act, executive order, regulation, 

or procedure subject to, or affected by, 

this delegation shall be deemed to be 

such act, executive order, regulation, or 

procedure as amended from time to 

time. 

Notwithstanding this delegation of 

authority, the Secretary, the Deputy 

Secretary, or the Deputy Secretary for 

Management and Resources may at any 

time exercise any authority or function 

delegated by this delegation of 

authority. 

This document shall be published in 

the Federal Register. 

Dated: September 29, 2012. 

Hillary Rodham Clinton, 

Secretary of State. 

[FR Doc. 2012–27547 Filed 11–9–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4710–30–P 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

[Public Notice 8086] 

Department of State: State Department 

Sanctions Information and Guidance 

AGENCY: Department of State. 

ACTION: Policy guidance. 

SUMMARY: The Department of State is 

publishing information and guidance for 

the public addressing the State 

Department’s sanctions authorities, 

including under the Iran Sanctions Act, 

as amended, certain Executive Orders 

related to Iran sanctions, section 106 of 

the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 

Accountability and Divestment Act of 

2010 (CISADA) and certain related 

provisions of law, and certain statutes 

and Executive Orders related to 

terrorism and weapons of mass 

destruction. 

DATES: The Department of State will 

accept comments on the Guidance on 

Iran Sanctions and the Guidance on 

Sensitive Technology until January 12, 

2013. 

ADDRESSES: Interested parties may 

submit comments within 60 days of the 

date of the publication by any email at 

sanctions@state.gov with the subject 

line, ‘‘Sanctions Guidance’’. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

Secretary of State has legal authority to 

make determinations regarding 

sanctions on individuals and entities 

that meet certain criteria in three areas 

that are important to the national 

security, foreign policy, and economy of 

the United States: certain activities 

related to Iran; certain activities related 

to weapons proliferation; and certain 

activities related to global terrorism. 

This notice includes policy guidance 

outlining the State Department’s 

authorities under the Iran Sanctions 

Act, as amended, and related Executive 

Orders (EOs); provides guidelines to 

further describe the technologies that 

may be considered ‘‘sensitive 

technology’’ for purposes of section 106 

of CISADA, as required under section 

412 of the Iran Threat Reduction and 

Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, and 

other related provisions of law; and 

provides information on the State 

Department’s authorities under certain 

other EOs and statutory provisions 

related to terrorism and weapons of 

mass destruction. 

I. Guidance on Iran Sanctions 

Iran Sanctions Act. Section 5(a) of the 

Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA) (Pub. 

L. 104–172) (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as 

amended, including by the 

Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 

Accountability, and Divestment Act of 

2010 (CISADA) (Pub. L. 111–195) (22 

U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), and most recently 

by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 

Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA) (Pub. 

L. 112–158), requires that the President 

impose or waive sanctions on persons, 

and certain affiliated persons, that are 

determined to have knowingly engaged 

in specified activities. The President has 

delegated the responsibility to make 

these determinations to the Secretary of 

State. As such, the Secretary of State is 

required to impose or waive sanctions 

on persons, including certain affiliated 

persons, that the Secretary of State 

determines have: (1) Made certain 

investments in Iran’s energy sector; (2) 

provided to Iran certain goods, services, 

or technology for Iran’s refined 

petroleum sector; (3) provided certain 

refined petroleum products to Iran or 

provided goods, services, technology, 

information, or support for refined 

petroleum imports into Iran; (4) entered 

into certain types of joint ventures 

involving the development of petroleum 

resources outside of Iran; (5) contributed 

to the maintenance or enhancement of 

Iran’s development of petroleum 

resources and refined petroleum 

products; (6) contributed to the 

maintenance or expansion of Iran’s 

production of petrochemical products; 

(7) been connected in certain ways with 

a vessel used to transport crude oil from 

Iran (with certain exceptions made for 

transactions related to the transportation 

of crude oil from Iran to countries that 

the Secretary of State has determined 

qualified for an exception to sanctions 

under section 1245(d)(4)(D) of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law 112–81, as 

amended); or (8) been connected in 

certain ways with a vessel that conceals 

the Iranian origin of the crude oil or 

refined petroleum products. 

There is an exception, outlined in 

section 5(a)(9) of ISA, as amended, to 

sanctions applicable to categories (7) 

and (8) above for persons that provide 

underwriting services or insurance or 

reinsurance if the Secretary of State 

determines that the person has 

exercised due diligence in establishing 

and enforcing official policies, 

procedures, and controls to ensure that 

the person does not provide 

underwriting services or insurance or 

reinsurance for the transportation of 

crude oil or refined petroleum products 

from Iran in a manner for which 

sanctions may be imposed under either 

of those sections. In addition to this 

exception, all persons involved in 

activities in high-risk sectors should 

consider implementing enhanced due 

diligence in order to minimize the risks 

of inadvertently becoming engaged in a 

sanctionable transaction. This could 

include, but is not limited to, 

confirming that transactions in these 

sectors do not involve an entity owned 

or controlled by Iran or that Iran is not 

otherwise connected to any entities in 

the commercial transactions, including 

by reviewing the Office of Foreign 

Assets Control’s Specially Designated 

Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) 

List; searching commercial databases 

and verifying ownership structures of 

unknown companies; and, in the case of 

transportation or insurance of crude oil 

and petroleum products, verifying that 

Iran is not the origin of the cargo. 

Persons with questions on sections 

5(a)(7)–(9) of ISA, as amended, should 

contact the State Department’s Office of 

Sanctions Policy and Implementation in 

the Bureau of Economic and Business 

Affairs at eb-iransanctions@state.gov or 

at: (202) 647–7489. 

Section 5(b) of ISA, as amended, 

requires the Secretary of State to impose 

or waive sanctions on persons, and 

certain affiliated persons, that are 

determined to have: (1) Exported or 

transferred goods, services, technology, 

or other items that would contribute 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 219 / Tuesday, November 13, 2012 / Notices 67727 

materially to Iran’s ability to acquire or 

develop chemical, biological, or nuclear 

weapons, or destabilizing numbers and 

types of advanced conventional 

weapons, or facilitated such activities; 

or (2) entered into a joint venture 

involving Iran and activity relating to 

the mining, production, or 

transportation of uranium. 

In addition to expanding the types of 

sanctionable activities under ISA, the 

TRA added new sanctions that can be 

imposed under ISA. For activities 

commenced on or after August 10, 2012, 

section 6 of ISA, as amended, now 

permits the Secretary to choose from a 

list of 12 possible sanctions; section 5(a) 

requires selection of at least five of these 

sanctions. In addition, new section 

5(a)(8)(B) of ISA, as amended, which 

relates to concealing the Iranian origin 

of crude oil and refined petroleum 

products, authorizes an additional 

sanction: prohibiting a vessel owned, 

operated, or controlled by a person, 

including a controlling beneficial 

owner, with respect to which the 

Secretary of State has imposed 

sanctions, from landing at a port in the 

United States for a period of not more 

than two years after the date on which 

the Secretary of State imposes the 

sanction. If this sanction is chosen by 

the Secretary of State, the Department of 

State would provide the relevant 

information on sanctioned persons and 

vessels to the United States Coast 

Guard’s Office of Commercial Vessel 

Compliance and the Captains of the 

Ports would inform the vessel that it is 

prohibited from entering the United 

States for the prescribed period 

consistent with the Secretary of State’s 

decision under ISA, as amended. 

The other new sanctions, which are 

applicable to all sanctionable activities 

outlined in ISA, as amended, and 

occurring on or after August 10, 2012, 

are: (1) Prohibiting any U.S. person from 

investing in or purchasing significant 

amounts of equity or debt instruments 

of a sanctioned person; (2) denying a 

visa to and excluding from the United 

States any alien determined to be a 

corporate officer or principal of, or a 

shareholder with a controlling interest 

in, a sanctioned person; and (3) 

imposing on the principal executive 

officer or officers of any sanctioned 

person, or on persons performing 

similar functions and with similar 

authorities as such officer or officers, 

any of the sanctions outlined in section 

6(a) of ISA, as amended. 

Potential ISA sanctions that were 

already in place before the enactment of 

TRA include: (1) Denying Export-Import 

Bank financing assistance in connection 

with the export of goods or services to 

the sanctioned person; (2) denying 

issuance of export licensing or other 

authority to export any goods or 

technology to the sanctioned person; (3) 

prohibiting U.S. financial institutions 

from making certain loans or providing 

certain credits to the sanctioned person; 

(4) prohibiting a sanctioned financial 

institution from acting as a primary 

dealer in U.S. government debt 

instruments or serving as a repository of 

U.S. government funds; (5) prohibiting 

U.S. government agencies from 

procuring or entering into contracts for 

the procurement of any goods or 

services from a sanctioned person; (6) 

prohibiting any transactions in foreign 

exchange that are subject to the 

jurisdiction of the United States and in 

which the sanctioned person has any 

interest; (7) prohibiting transfers of 

credit or payments between financial 

institutions or by, through, or to any 

financial institution if the transactions 

are within the jurisdiction of the United 

States and involve any interest of the 

sanctioned person; (8) blocking all 

property and interests in the property of 

the sanctioned person that are within 

the jurisdiction of the United States, and 

providing that such property and 

interests in property may not be 

transferred, paid, or otherwise dealt in; 

and (9) restricting or prohibiting imports 

of goods, technology, or services into 

the United States from the sanctioned 

person. In addition, section 5(b)(3) of 

ISA, as amended, provides for 

additional sanctions relating to the 

transfer of nuclear technology. 

The President initially delegated the 

authorities associated with these 

sanctions to the Secretary of State, in 

consultation with various other 

agencies, in 1996 (see 61 FR 64249 (Dec. 

4, 1996)). Another delegation was issued 

in 2010 when CISADA was enacted (see 

75 FR 67025 (Nov. 1, 2010)), and 

Executive Order 13574 followed on May 

23, 2011 (see 76 FR 30505 (May 25, 

2011)). The most recent Presidential 

delegation memorandum was issued on 

October 9, 2012, to address the changes 

to ISA made by TRA (see 77 FR 62139 

(Oct. 12, 2012)), along with Executive 

Order 13628, issued on October 9, 2012 

(see 77 FR 62139 (Oct. 12, 2012)). This 

most recent Presidential delegation 

memorandum also delegated to the 

Secretary of State the President’s 

authority under section 212 of TRA, 

which draws on ISA authorities, to 

sanction persons that knowingly 

provide underwriting services or 

insurance or reinsurance for the 

National Iranian Oil Company, the 

National Iranian Tanker Company, or a 

successor entity to either company. 

There is authority to not impose 

sanctions under this provision with 

respect to persons exercising due 

diligence in establishing and enforcing 

official policies, procedures, and 

controls to ensure that such insurance is 

not provided. There is also authority, 

under section 312(d) of the TRA, to not 

impose sanctions with respect to 

transactions that are solely for the 

purchase of petroleum or petroleum 

products and for which sanctions may 

be imposed solely as a result of the 

involvement of NIOC or NITC in the 

transactions, where the country 

receiving the petroleum or petroleum 

products has been determined by the 

Secretary of State to qualify for an 

exception to sanctions under section 

1245(d)(4)(D) of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 

(Pub. L. 112–81), as amended. 

For purposes of ISA, ‘‘person’’ means 

a natural person as well as a 

corporation, business association, 

partnership, society, trust, financial 

institution, insurer, underwriter, 

guarantor, and any other business 

organization, any other 

nongovernmental entity, organization, 

or group, and any governmental entity 

operating as a business enterprise, as 

well any successors to any such entities. 

Section 4 of ISA provides for a waiver 

of the application of sanctions 

provisions under certain circumstances. 

Section 4 also provides for the initiation 

of investigations and contains a 

‘‘Special Rule’’ outlining the 

circumstances under which an 

investigation may be terminated or not 

initiated. In deciding whether to invoke 

the Special Rule or take another step to 

mitigate sanctions such as a waiver 

under this section, the State Department 

typically requires a letter providing 

certain assurances and supporting 

documentation. More information 

regarding what is specifically required 

is provided to companies that seek to be 

considered for application of the Special 

Rule. Section 7 of ISA provides 

authority for the Secretary of State to 

issue advisory opinions, when 

specifically requested, with respect to 

whether a proposed activity would 

subject a person to sanctions under ISA. 

Section 9 of ISA, as amended, provides 

for delay of imposition of sanctions or 

waiver in certain circumstances, and 

provides that a sanction imposed under 

section 5 of ISA, as amended, shall 

remain in effect for not less than two 

years or, if the Secretary of State 

determines and certifies to the Congress 

that the sanctioned person is no longer 

engaging in sanctionable activities and 

that the Secretary of State has received 

reliable assurances that such person will 


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not knowingly engage in such activities 

in the future, for not less than one year. 

Questions about implementation of ISA, 

as amended, can be directed to the State 

Department’s Office of Sanctions Policy 

and Implementation in the Bureau of 

Economic and Business Affairs at ebiransanctions@state.gov or at (202) 647– 

7489. A list of entities sanctioned 

pursuant to section 5 of ISA, as 

amended, can be found at 

www.state.gov/iransanctions. 

Executive Order 13590 (issued on 

November 20, 2011). EO 13590 provides 

for sanctions by the Secretary of State 

on persons knowingly engaging in 

activities that could directly and 

significantly contribute to the 

maintenance or enhancement of Iran’s 

ability to develop petroleum resources 

located in Iran, or the maintenance or 

expansion of Iran’s domestic production 

of petrochemical products, and on 

certain affiliated persons. Entities 

involved in transactions in these sectors 

are expected to conduct adequate due 

diligence to confirm that transactions do 

not involve an entity owned or 

controlled by Iran or that Iran is not 

otherwise connected to any entities in 

the commercial transactions. 

For purposes of the Executive Orders 

addressed in this guidance the term 

‘‘person’’ means an individual or entity. 

For purposes of Executive Orders and 

statutes addressed in this guidance, the 

following definitions apply: 

• ‘‘Petroleum’’ (also known as crude 

oil) means a mixture of hydrocarbons 

that exists in liquid phase in natural 

underground reservoirs and remains 

liquid at atmospheric pressure after 

passing through surface separating 

facilities; 

• ‘‘Petroleum products’’ includes 

unfinished oils, liquefied petroleum 

gases, pentanes plus, aviation gasoline, 

motor gasoline, naptha-type jet fuel, 

kerosene-type jet fuel, kerosene, 

distillate fuel oil, residual fuel oil, 

petrochemical feedstocks, special 

naphthas, lubricants, waxes, petroleum 

coke, asphalt, road oil, still gas, and 

miscellaneous products obtained from 

the processing of: crude oil (including 

lease condensate), natural gas, and other 

hydrocarbon compounds. The term does 

not include natural gas, liquefied 

natural gas, biofuels, methanol, and 

other non-petroleum fuels. Since 

enactment of section 1245 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2012 (Pub. L. 112–81), 

questions have been raised about some 

other specific products and whether 

they would fall under this definition. 

The following additional products are 

considered petroleum products for the 

purposes of this guidance: condensates 

(occurring naturally or derived from the 

processing of petroleum or natural gas), 

and liquefied petroleum gases (LPGs) 

including propane and butane. This list, 

however, is not exhaustive and other 

products not on this list that fall under 

the definition above remain potentially 

sanctionable. 

• ‘‘Petrochemical products’’ includes 

any aromatic, olefin, and synthesis gas, 

and any of their derivatives, including 

ethylene, propylene, butadiene, 

benzene, toluene, xylene, ammonia, 

methanol, and urea. Since the issuance 

of E.O. 13590, questions have been 

raised about some other specific 

products and whether they would fall 

under this definition. The following 

additional products are considered 

petrochemical products for the purposes 

of this guidance: butene, ethylhexanol, 

acetic acid, acrylonitrile butadiene 

styrene, alachlor, ammonium nitrate, 

ammonium sulfate, anhydrous 

ammonia, argon, butachlor, C2+, C3+, 

C4 cut, chlorinated paraffin, chlorine, 

chloracetyl chloride, citric acid, 

diammonium phosphate, 

diethanolamine, ethylene glycol, 

diethylene glycol, dioctyl phthalate, 

dodecycle benzene, ethane, ethoxylates, 

ethylbenzene, ethylene dichloride, 

ethylene glycol, ethylene oxide, heavy 

alkyl benzene, high density 

polyethylene, hydrochloric acid, 

isoprene, linear alkyl benzene, linear 

low density polyethylene, low density 

polyethylene, melamine, methyl tertiary 

butyl ether, methylene diphenyl 

diisocyanate, mid density polyethylene, 

monoethanolamine, monoethylene 

glycol, nitric acid, nitrogen, 

orthoxylene, paraxylene, pentene, 

perchlorine, phosphoric acid, phthalic 

anhydride, polybutadiene, polyethylene 

terephthalate, polypropylene, 

polystyrene, polyvinyl chloride, 

propylene, purified terephthalic acid, 

pyrolysis gasoline, raffinate, soda ash, 

sodium bicarbonate, sodium carbonate, 

sodium chloride, sodium hydroxide, 

sodium hypochlorite, styrene, tyrene 

acrylonite copolymer, sulfur, sulfuric 

acid, styrene butadiene, toluene 

diisocyanate, triethanolamine, 

triethylene glycol, and vinyl chloride 

monomer. This list, however, is not 

exhaustive and other products not on 

this list that fall under the definition 

above remain potentially sanctionable. 

‘‘Petrochemical products’’ do not 

include finished products derived from 

these substances, such as pipes, plastic 

bags, tires, and solvents. For purposes of 

this and other E.O.’s and legislation 

outlined in this guidance, an item 

cannot be both a petroleum product and 

a petrochemical product. 

Executive Order 13622 (issued on July 

30, 2012). Section 2 of E.O. 13622 

provides for sanctions by the Secretary 

of State on a person determined to 

knowingly, on or after July 31, engage in 

a significant transaction for the 

purchase or acquisition of petroleum or 

petroleum products from Iran or for the 

purchase or acquisition of 

petrochemical products from Iran, and 

on certain affiliated persons. Entities 

involved in transactions in these sectors 

are expected to conduct adequate due 

diligence to confirm that Iran is not the 

country of origin of the petroleum, 

petroleum products, or petrochemicals. 

Certain exceptions are made for 

transactions for the purchase of 

petroleum or petroleum products where 

the Secretary of State has granted 

exceptions to sanctions under section 

1245(d)(4)(D) of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 

(Pub. L. 112–81), as amended. 

Executive Order 13628 (issued on 

October 9, 2012). Sections 5, 6, and 7 of 

E.O. 13628 authorize the Secretary of 

State to impose certain sanctions in 

sections 5(a) and 6 of ISA that were 

enacted by CISADA for activity 

occurring between July 1, 2010 and 

August 10, 2012. Section 201 of TRA 

amended the effective date of the 

relevant sanctions to August 10, 2012, 

and did not otherwise preserve their 

applicability for activity occurring 

between the enactment dates of CISADA 

(July 1, 2010) and TRA (August 10, 

2012). 

Questions about the State 

Department’s implementation of these 

Executive Orders can be directed to the 

State Department’s Office of Sanctions 

Policy and Implementation in the 

Bureau of Economic and Business 

Affairs at eb-iransanctions@state.gov or 

at (202) 647–7489. 

II. Guidance on the Provision of 

‘‘Sensitive Technology’’ to Iran and 

Syria 

Section 106 of the Comprehensive 

Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 

Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) (Pub. 

L. 111–195) (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.) 

prohibits U.S. government agencies 

from entering into or renewing 

procurement contracts with individuals 

or entities that export ‘‘sensitive 

technology’’ to Iran. Further, sections 

402 and 703 of the Iran Threat 

Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 

of 2012 (TRA) (Pub. L. 112–158) 

mandate the imposition of sanctions on 

persons who are determined to have 

engaged in certain activities, including, 

on or after August 10, 2012, to 

knowingly transfer, or facilitate the 

transfer of ‘‘sensitive technology’’ to 


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Iran or Syria, or provide services with 

respect to ‘‘sensitive technology’’ after 

such technology is transferred to Iran or 

Syria. 

Section 106 of CISADA defines 

‘‘sensitive technology’’ as ‘‘hardware, 

software, telecommunications 

equipment, or any other technology, 

that the President determines is to be 

used specifically—(A) to restrict the free 

flow of unbiased information in Iran; or 

(B) to disrupt, monitor, or otherwise 

restrict speech of the people of Iran.’’ 

Section 703 of TRA defines ‘‘sensitive 

technology’’ in the same way with 

respect to Syria. 

These guidelines, which are required 

under section 412 of TRA, are intended 

to assist individuals and entities so that, 

going forward, they can make 

appropriate decisions with regard to 

business in Iran and Syria and take 

steps to avoid engaging in potentially 

sanctionable transactions under sections 

106 and 105A of CISADA, as amended 

by section 402 of TRA, Executive Order 

13628, and section 703 of TRA due to 

the similarity of the definition of 

‘‘sensitive technology’’ to section 106 of 

CISADA. 

Misuse of Technology in Iran and Syria 

Information and communications 

technology serves to facilitate 

communication, share information, and 

connect users to each other. Over the 

last several years, the world has 

witnessed the important role this 

technology can assume in holding 

repressive regimes accountable, 

assisting people in exercising their 

human rights and protecting emerging 

elements of civil society. However, 

certain information and 

communications technology can also 

provide unprecedented capabilities for 

governments to conduct surveillance on 

users’ communications and movements, 

and to block or disrupt 

communications. 

The people of Iran and Syria use 

telecommunications technology and 

networks to communicate with each 

other and the rest of the world. The 

United States government supports 

efforts to facilitate the free flow of 

information and freedom of expression 

in Iran and Syria and is cognizant of the 

vital importance of providing 

technology that enables the Iranian and 

Syrian people to freely communicate 

with each other and the outside world. 

At the same time, the Iranian and 

Syrian governments have taken steps to 

restrict the free flow of information and 

freedom of expression over their 

networks, to track and monitor the 

communications of their people for the 

purpose of perpetrating human rights 

abuses, or to disrupt networks in 

support of military operations against 

their own people. 

Determining ‘‘Sensitive Technology’’ 

In determining whether a particular 

transaction involves a good or 

technology that may be considered 

‘‘sensitive technology’’ under CISADA 

and TRA, the United States government 

will closely examine transactions that 

could provide significant surveillance, 

censorship, or network disruption 

capabilities to the Iranian or Syrian 

governments as a result of the particular 

end-user, its end-use, or the type of 

technology. 

The United States government 

recognizes that certain geolocation and 

other monitoring capabilities are part of 

the basic functioning of modern 

telecommunications networks. The 

United States government further 

recognizes that online communications 

services commonly track users’ network 

addresses and usage patterns and may 

request additional personal information 

from users. These capabilities generally 

would not be considered ‘‘sensitive 

technology’’ under CISADA and TRA. 

Moreover, ‘‘sensitive technology’’ does 

not generally include technology 

essential for ordinary network 

operation, personal computing or 

private communications that does not 

provide significant surveillance, 

censorship or network disruption 

capabilities, including: Wi-Fi access 

points, network routers, switches and 

mobile phone base stations; cables (fiber 

optic, coaxial and twisted pair); basic 

network performance monitoring tools; 

wireless antennas and other 

architectural elements; mobile phones 

and mass market desktop, laptop and 

tablet computers without external 

monitoring or surveillance capabilities 

such as keyloggers; computer monitors, 

screens, speakers, mice, headphones, 

headsets, and other accessories; 

defensive technologies to protect 

individual computers against malware 

and related security threats (including 

software and definition updates); 

software development tools including 

libraries, integrated development 

environments, hosting services, and 

collaboration platforms; mass market 

document creation, viewing and editing 

tools without special surveillance 

capabilities; censorship-circumvention 

technologies and services; virtual 

private network (VPN) services; antitracking and encryption technologies to 

protect user privacy, if supplied without 

monitoring or surveillance capabilities; 

personal communications technologies 

(including software updates to such 

technologies) such as instant messaging, 

chat, email, social networking, photo 

and movie sharing, web browsing, and 

blogging; web browser plug-ins for 

rendering web content; data and web 

hosting and storage technology without 

monitoring or surveillance capabilities; 

RSS feed production, distribution, and 

reading tools and comparable 

information transmission technologies; 

and other similar equipment that does 

not provide significant surveillance, 

censorship or network disruption 

capabilities. 

When making an assessment of 

whether or not a company, entity, or 

individual is exporting, transferring, 

facilitating the transfer of, or providing 

services that may be considered 

sensitive technology with regard to Iran 

or Syria, the State Department will 

review all available information, 

including through direct 

communication with the entity or 

individual if possible. It will consider, 

among other factors, whether a company 

knew, or should have known, that a 

particular end-user of its technology 

was likely to misuse such technology, or 

that a particular technology has a 

history of being misused in Iran or Syria 

to further human rights abuses. As such, 

individuals or entities engaged in 

transactions with Iran or Syria involving 

telecommunications goods, services or 

technology should conduct rigorous due 

diligence to ‘‘know their customer’’ and 

assess the potential risk that a particular 

technology is likely to be used to 

facilitate human rights abuses, restrict 

the free flow of information, or disrupt, 

monitor, or otherwise restrict speech of 

the people of Iran and Syria. 

For example, individuals or entities 

sanctioned by the U.S. government for 

activities related to human rights abuses 

in Iran and Syria may pose a more 

apparent risk of misusing technology. 

Under these circumstances, any 

hardware, software, or 

telecommunications equipment 

provided to persons sanctioned for 

human rights abuses pose the potential 

to be considered ‘‘sensitive technology’’ 

for the purposes of CISADA and TRA, 

and any type of support provided to 

these individuals or entities may subject 

the provider to sanctions. 

Regardless of the recipient or known 

end-use, specific telecommunications 

technologies such as ‘‘lawful 

interception’’ and ‘‘surreptitious 

listening’’ devices, systems and 

technology for the interception of wire, 

oral or electronic communications or to 

jam or intercept the air interface of 

mobile telecommunications, have the 

potential to be considered ‘‘sensitive 

technology’’ for the purposes of CISADA 

and TRA under some, but not all, 


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circumstances. Similarly, keyword list 

blocking technology that allows persons 

to block the transmission of content 

containing certain words, has the 

potential to be considered ‘‘sensitive 

technology’’ for the purposes of CISADA 

and TRA under some, but not all, 

circumstances. The following is an 

illustrative, but not exclusive, list of 

other technologies and capabilities that 

pose the risk of being misused by the 

Iranian and Syrian governments, and 

that have the potential to be considered 

‘‘sensitive technology’’: 

• Key logging technology/spyware 

Æ Allows persons to record key 

strokes, mouse clicks, data 

processes, or activity on a 

touchscreen without consent of the 

device user 

• Mobile device forensics data 

extraction and analysis technology 

Æ Allows persons to extract and 

analyze data from a mobile phone 

device, even if password protected 

• Nonconsensual remote forensic 

technology 

Æ Allows persons to perform 

undetected collection and analysis 

of data from remote target 

computers 

• Nonconsensual tracking/monitoring 

technology 

Æ Allows persons to cause a mobile or 

networked device to reveal its 

geographic location, operating 

status or application data, without 

consent of the device owner or 

content provider 

• Network disruption technology 

Æ Designed to enable disruption, 

inhibition or degradation of 

networks or sub-parts 

• Infection vectors technology 

Æ Allows persons to install or execute 

malware or perform other attacks 

• Rootkit technology 

Æ Allows persons to defeat or bypass 

security, hide malware, or enable 

privileged access to computer 

process or network resources 

• DNS poisoning technology 

Æ Allows persons to hijack Domain 

Name System (DNS) requests and 

reroute Internet traffic to 

illegitimate Web sites/servers 

• Censorship-enhancement technology 

Æ Designed to allow persons to 

enforce content blocking or to 

fingerprint and/or defeat anticensorship technologies 

This guidance was developed for its 

applicability to current conditions in 

Iran, as called for by section 412 of TRA 

and by section 106 of CISADA, and in 

Syria, due to the similarity of section 

703 of TRA to section 106 of CISADA, 

and should not be considered 

automatically relevant for other contexts 

or conditions. The State Department 

will periodically review these 

guidelines and, if necessary, amend 

them to take into account new 

information and circumstances 

regarding the use of technology in Iran 

and Syria. U.S. entities and individuals 

are generally prohibited from engaging 

in any transaction involving Iran and 

Syria unless such transactions are 

authorized by the Department of the 

Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets 

Control. Foreign entities and 

individuals may also be subject to 

license requirements if their 

transactions involving Iran or Syria also 

involve the United States, such as a 

funds transfer that transits a U.S. bank. 

For transactions involving exports to 

Iran or Syria, U.S. companies should 

also consult with the Department of 

Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and 

Security regarding relevant licensing 

requirements. 

Persons with questions on sensitive 

technology, section 106 of CISADA, or 

TRA should contact the State 

Department’s Office of Sanctions Policy 

and Implementation in the Bureau of 

Economic and Business Affairs at (202) 

647–7489 or emailing 

CISADA106@state.gov. 

Information on Terrorism Designations 

Executive Order 13224 (issued on 

September 23, 2001), as amended by 

Executive Orders 13268, 13284, and 

13372, provides the Secretary of State 

with the authority, in consultation with 

the Secretary of the Treasury, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, and the 

Attorney General, to designate foreign 

persons that the Secretary of State 

determines have committed, or pose a 

significant risk of committing, acts of 

terrorism that threaten the security of 

U.S. nationals or the national security, 

foreign policy or economy of the United 

States. Among other things, this 

designation blocks, with limited 

exceptions, all of the designated 

persons’ property and interests in 

property that are in the United States or 

come within the United States or that 

come within the possession or control of 

U.S. persons. The Secretary of the 

Treasury also may, in consultation with 

the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, and the Attorney 

General, designate individuals and 

entities that are owned or controlled by 

the designated persons; act for or on 

behalf of the designated persons; assist 

in, sponsor, or provide financial, 

material, or technological support for, or 

financial or other services to, or in 

support of, the designated persons; or 

are otherwise associated with the 

designated persons. Section 211 of TRA 

also provides for certain sanctions to be 

imposed under E.O. 13224 in 

connection with provision of vessels, 

insurance, or any other shipping service 

for the transportation of goods to or 

from Iran that could materially 

contribute to the activities of the 

Government of Iran with respect to 

support for acts of international 

terrorism. The list of individuals and 

entities designated by the Secretary of 

State pursuant to E.O. 13224 is available 

at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/ 

des/143210.htm. 

The Secretary of State also has 

authority, pursuant to section 219 of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act, as 

amended (INA) (8 U.S.C. 1189), to 

designate an organization as a foreign 

terrorist organization (FTO) if the 

Secretary of State finds that the 

organization is a foreign organization; 

engages in terrorist activity or terrorism, 

as defined by the relevant statute, or 

retains the capability and intent to 

engage in terrorist activity or terrorism; 

and the terrorist activity or terrorism of 

the organization threatens the security 

of United States nationals or the 

national security of the United States. 

Additional information on the 

designations process and the 

consequences of designation, along with 

a list of organizations designated by the 

Secretary of State pursuant to section 

219 of the INA, is available at http:// 

www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/ 

123085.htm. 

Information on Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Designations 

In Executive Order 12938 (November 

14, 1994), President Clinton declared a 

national emergency with respect to the 

proliferation of nuclear, biological and 

chemical weapons (weapons of mass 

destruction or WMD) and the means of 

delivering them. EO 12938, as amended 

by EO 13094 and EO 13382, provides 

that the Secretary of the Treasury shall 

prohibit the importation into the United 

States of goods, technology, or services 

produced or provided by any foreign 

person the Secretary of State, in 

consultation with the Secretary of the 

Treasury, determines has engaged, or 

attempted to engage, in activities or 

transactions that have materially 

contributed to, or pose a risk of 

materially contributing to, the 

proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction or their means of delivery 

(including missiles capable of delivering 

such weapons), including any efforts to 

manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, 

transport, transfer, or use such items, by 

an person or foreign country of 

proliferation concern. E.O. 12938, as 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with 
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 219 / Tuesday, November 13, 2012 / Notices 67731 

amended, also imposes the following 

measures against such foreign persons: 

no departments or agencies of the 

United States government shall procure 

or enter into any contract for the 

procurement of any goods, technology, 

or services from these persons including 

the termination of existing contracts; 

and no departments or agencies of the 

United States government shall provide 

any assistance to these persons, and 

shall not obligate further funds for such 

purposes. 

The complete list of foreign persons 

on which the Secretary of State has 

determined to impose an import ban 

because of their WMD proliferation 

activities can be found at http:// 

www.state.gov/t/isn/c15233.htm. 

Executive Order 13382 (issued on 

June 28, 2005) provides the Secretary of 

State with the authority, in consultation 

with the Secretary of the Treasury, the 

Attorney General, and other relevant 

agencies, to designate foreign persons 

that the Secretary of State determines to 

have engaged, or attempted to engage, in 

activities or transactions that have 

materially contributed to, or pose a risk 

of materially contributing to, the 

proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction or their means of delivery 

(including missiles capable of delivering 

such weapons), including any efforts to 

manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, 

transport, transfer or use such items, by 

any person or foreign country of 

proliferation concern. Among other 

things, this designation blocks, with 

limited exceptions, all of the designated 

persons’ property and interests in 

property that are in the United States or 

come within the United States or that 

come within the possession or control of 

U.S. persons. The Secretary of the 

Treasury also may, in consultation with 

the Secretary of State, the Attorney 

General, and other relevant agencies, 

designate individuals and entities that: 

(1) Are owned or controlled by a person 

blocked pursuant to the order, including 

a person designated by the Secretary of 

State; (2) act or purport to act for or on 

behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person 

blocked pursuant to the order, including 

a person designated by the Secretary of 

State; or (3) have provided, or attempted 

to provide, financial, material, 

technological or other support for, or 

goods or services in support of, a person 

blocked pursuant to the order, including 

a person designated by the Secretary of 

State. Section 211 of TRA also provides 

for certain sanctions to be imposed 

pursuant to E.O. 13382 in connection 

with the knowing sale, lease, or 

provision of vessels, insurance, or any 

other shipping service for the 

transportation to or from Iran of goods 

that could materially contribute to the 

activities of the Government of Iran with 

respect to the proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction. The list of 

individuals and entities designated by 

the Secretary of State pursuant to E.O. 

13382 is available at http:// 

www.state.gov/t/isn/c22080.htm. 

The Arms Export Control Act and the 

Export Administration Act require the 

imposition of sanctions against any 

foreign person that knowingly transfers 

items on the Missile Technology Control 

Regime (MTCR) Annex that contribute 

to MTCR-class missile programs in nonMTCR adherent countries. Sanctions 

consist of a ban on export licenses and 

U.S. government procurement, and they 

may also include an import ban. The 

sanctions may be waived if it is 

essential to the national security interest 

of the United States, and the sanctions 

need not be imposed if the transfer was 

authorized by the laws of an MTCR 

adherent or if an MTCR adherent has 

taken adequate enforcement action. 

These laws also require imposition of 

sanctions against any foreign person 

that knowingly and materially 

contributes to the efforts of another 

foreign country, project, or entity to use, 

develop, produce, stockpile, or 

otherwise acquire chemical and 

biological weapons. Sanctions consist of 

a ban on U.S. government procurement 

and imports. The sanctions may be 

waived after 12 months if it is important 

to the national security interests of the 

United States, and sanctions need not be 

applied if the government with primary 

jurisdiction over the offender has taken 

effective steps to terminate the 

sanctions-triggering activities. 

Under the Iran-Iraq Arms NonProliferation Act, sanctions are required 

against entities that transfer goods or 

technology so as to contribute 

knowingly and materially to the efforts 

by Iran and Iraq to acquire chemical, 

biological or nuclear weapons or 

destabilizing numbers and types of 

advance conventional weapons, as 

defined in the statute. Sanctions include 

a procurement ban, export prohibition 

on items contained on the United States 

Munitions List, and the authority to 

impose sanctions pursuant to the 

International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act. A waiver is available if it 

is essential to the national security of 

the United States. 

The Iran, North Korea, and Syria 

Nonproliferation Act requires the 

Secretary of State to report to Congress, 

and further gives the Secretary the 

authority to sanction, a foreign entity if 

there is credible information indicating 

that that the entity transferred to or 

acquired from Iran, North Korea, or 

Syria items listed on certain multilateral 

export control regimes or if the entity 

transferred to or acquired from those 

countries goods, services or technology 

not listed in the multilateral export 

regimes but which nevertheless would 

be if they were U.S. goods, services or 

technology prohibited for export to 

those countries because of their 

potential to make a material 

contribution to the development of 

nuclear, biological, or chemical 

weapons, or of ballistic or cruise missile 

systems. Sanctions include those 

provided for under EO 12938 as well as 

an arms export prohibition and a dual 

use export prohibition. 

The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention 

Act of 1994 requires a cutoff of 

government contracts with any U.S. or 

foreign person that contributes 

knowingly and materially, through the 

export of nuclear-related goods or 

technology, to the efforts of any 

individual, group, or nonnuclear 

weapon state to acquire a nuclear 

explosive device or unsafeguarded 

special nuclear material. The sanction 

may be waived after 12 months if 

continued imposition would have a 

serious adverse effect on vital U.S. 

interests, and sanctions need not be 

applied if the government with primary 

jurisdiction over the offender has taken 

effective steps to terminate the 

sanctions-triggering activities. 

William J. Burns, 

Deputy Secretary of State, Department of 

State. 

[FR Doc. 2012–27642 Filed 11–9–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4710–31–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Office of the Secretary 

Notice of Applications for Certificates 

of Public Convenience and Necessity 

and Foreign Air Carrier Permits Filed 

Under Subpart B (Formerly Subpart Q) 

During the Week Ending October 13, 

2012 

The following Applications for 

Certificates of Public Convenience and 

Necessity and Foreign Air Carrier 

Permits were filed under Subpart B 

(formerly Subpart Q) of the Department 

of Transportation’s Procedural 

Regulations (See 14 CFR 301.201 et. 

seq.). The due date for Answers, 

Conforming Applications, or Motions to 

Modify Scope are set forth below for 

each application. Following the Answer 

period DOT may process the application 

by expedited procedures. Such 

procedures may consist of the adoption 

of a show-cause order, a tentative order, 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with