ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 

NO. PD-1014-15

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

OF THE STATE OF TEXAS

SITTING AT AUSTIN, TEXAS

STEVEN GOODE, 

Petitioner,

VS.

THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Respondent

On Petition for Discretionary Review

To the Court of Appeals Fifth

Supreme Judicial District 

Cause No. 05-14-00651-CR

PD-1014-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS 

Transmitted 8/31/2015 6:23:45 PM 

Accepted 9/1/2015 12:46:05 PM 

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK

PETITION SEEKING DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

James W. Huggler

State Bar No. 00795437

100 E. Ferguson, Suite 805

Tyler, Texas 75702

Telephone: 903-593-2400

Facsimile: 903-593-3830

jhugglerlaw@sbcglobal.net

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
i

IDENTITY OF PARTIES

Trial Court Judge: Dennis Jones, Presiding

County Court at Law Number One

Kaufman County, Texas

Appellant/Petitioner: Steven Goode

TDCJ#01929962

Michael Unit

2664 FM 2054

Tennessee Colony, Texas 75886

Appellant’s Nolan White

Trial Counsel: 690 W. Dallas

Canton, Texas 75103

Appellant’s Counsel Russ Henrichs 

on Direct Appeal: PO Box 190983

Dallas, Texas 75219

Appellant’s Counsel James Huggler

on Petition Seeking 100 E. Ferguson, Suite 805

Discretionary Review:Tyler, Texas 75702

Appellee/Respondent: State of Texas

Kaufman County Criminal District Attorney’s

Office

State’s Phillip Williams

Trial Counsel: Shelton Gibbs

Kaufman County District Attorney’s Office

100 W. Mulberry, 2

nd Floor

Kaufman, Texas 75142
ii

State’s Sue Korioth

Appellate Counsel: Erleigh Wiley

Kaufman County District Attorney’s Office

100 W. Mulberry, 2

nd Floor

Kaufman, Texas 75142
3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii 

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

GROUNDS FOR REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

What are the permissible limits to the State offering 

evidence of gang membership when that evidence does not 

further an element of the offense or is simply character 

evidence?

REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

STATEMENT OF FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

A. Reasons for Granting Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

B. Analysis and Application.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

PRAYER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

APPENDIX A - Opinion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Canales v. State, 98 S.W.3d 690, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).. . . . . . 4, 6

Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). . . . . . . . 5

Goode v. State, No. 05-14-00651-CR, Tex. App. – Dallas,

July 1, 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Jackson v. State, 314 S.W.3d 118 (Tex. App. – Houston

[1

st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 6

Medrano v. State, No. AP-75320, 2008 Tex. Crim. App.

Unpub. LEXIS 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

RULES

TEX. R. APP. P. ANN. 9.4 (West 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

TEX. R. APP. P. ANN. 66.3(a) (West 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

TEX. R. APP. P. ANN. 66.3(b) (West 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

TEX. R. APP. P. ANN. 66.3(c) (West 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

TEX. R. EVID. 403. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1

STEVEN GOODE,

PD-1014-15

§ IN THE COURT OF

PETITIONER §

§

VS. § CRIMINAL APPEALS

§

THE STATE OF TEXAS, §

APPELLEE § AUSTIN, TEXAS

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:

Steven Goode, Petitioner and Defendant in the trial court, 

respectfully submits this his Petition for Discretionary Review 

complaining of the ruling and opinion by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Supreme Judicial District, and would show the Court as follows:

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

In the event this Court grants this petition, Petitioner requests the 

Court to grant oral argument herein so that all matters may be clarified 

and any questions presented by the briefs of the parties may be addressed 

in a proper manner.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant was indicted in Kaufman County with the felony offense

of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine. Goode v. State, 

No. 05-14-00651-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 6741 (Tex. App. – Dallas, July

1, 2015). A jury convicted Mr. Goose and the trial court sentenced him to 

thirty years confinement. Notice of appeal was timely filed. The Court of 

Appeals affirmed the trial court’s sentence in an unpublished opinion, and 

this petition follows. The Petition is timely filed on or before August 31,

2015 following proper extensions granted by this Court.

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Fifth Court of Appeals issued an opinion not designated for 

publication in number 05-14-00651-CR on July 1, 2015. No motion for 

rehearing was filed. On August 6, 2015, a Motion to Extend Time to File 

Petition for Discretionary Review was filed. That Motion was granted and 

the time to file a petition for discretionary review was extended until 

August 31, 2015.
3

GROUND FOR REVIEW

What are the permissible limits to the State offering evidence 

of gang membership when that evidence does not further an 

element of the offense or is simply character evidence?

REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW

The decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts with another court of 

appeals decision on the same issue. TEX. R. APP. P. ANN. 66.3(a) (West

2014).

The decision of the Court of Appeals decided an important question 

of state or federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by the 

Court of Criminal Appeals. Tex. R. App. P. Ann. 66.3(b) (West 2014).

The decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts with an applicable 

decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals on an important question of

state law. TEX. R. APP. PROC. ANN. 66.3( c)(West 2014).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Steven Goode was indicted and charged with the offense of 

possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver in an amount
4

between four and two hundred grams. The State’s case rested on the

testimony of informant Carole Blevins, who had the methamphetamine

hidden in the crotch of her pants Goode at 2. The law enforcement officers 

who investigated the case also relied on the fact that Mr. Goode was a

member of a criminal street gang, specifically the Aryan Brotherhood of

Texas. Goode at 3. The trial court found the enhancement paragraph 

true and sentenced Mr. Goode to thirty years confinement. Further

discussion of relevant facts is included below.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. Reasons for Granting Review

The opinion issued in this case conflicts with the opinion from the

First Court of Appeals on the same issue. Jackson v. State, 314 S.W.3d

118 (Tex. App. – Houston [1

st Dist.] 2010, no pet.).

The opinion also conflicts with this Court’s holdings limiting gang 

membership testimony if it provides some relevantlink to the commission

of the offense. Medrano v. State, No. AP-75320, 2008 Tex. Crim. App.

Unpub. LEXIS 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) and Canales v. State, 98

S.W.3d 690, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
5

B. Analysis and Application

Almost the surest way to ensure a conviction is to include an 

allegation that an accused is a member of a criminal street gang. In this 

case, there was a running objection to the evidence that Mr. Goode was a 

member of a gang, and the State relied extensivley on the Aryan 

Brotherhood of Texas, its operating methods, and his involvement with

that group. Goode at 8-9. The jury was left with general information 

about the Aryan Brotherhood of Texas and their structure and operating 

methods, and left to speculate as to Mr. Goode’s involvement.

The Court of Appeals erred in finding this evidence was properly

admitted because the indictment alleged that Mr. Goode was a member

of a criminal street gang. Goode at 10. The allegation however does not

end the inquiry. Jackson 118 S.W.3d at 125. Even relevant evidence can

be excluded. TEX. R. EVID. 403; Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637,

641-42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The Court also erred in determining that 

contraband inside the pants of another person somehow fits the operating

patterns of a street gang and is thus admissible. Goode at 10.

This analysis used below stands in contrast to the Houston court in

Jackson. Jackson involved the admissibility of evidence of prior crimes
6

committed by a criminal street gang without any evidence as to the

defendant’s participation in or knowledge of those offenses. Jackson at

125-26.

The analysis used below also contradicts the requirement that gang 

testimony must have some underlying value to assist the trier of fact.

Canales, 98 S.W.3d at 697.

CONCLUSION

Under all circumstances, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 

trial court’s decision. This court should grant discretionary review, allow 

complete briefing, and, upon such review, reverse the Court of Appeals 

and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration.
7

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays the Court to grant discretionary 

review and, upon such review, to reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals; and for such other and further relief to which he may show 

himself justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ James Huggler 

James W. Huggler

State Bar No. 00795437

100 E. Ferguson, Suite 805

Tyler, Texas 75702

Telephone: 903-593-2400

Facsimile: 903-593-3830

jhugglerlaw@sbcglobal.net

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition 

has been forwarded to the Kaufman County District Attorney’s Office , 

and on the State Prosecuting Attorney through the State of Texas 

Electronic Filing System on this the 31st day of August, 2015 at the 

addresses listed below

/s/ James Huggler 

James W. Huggler

Erleigh Wiley

Sue Korioth

Kaufman County District Attorney’s Office

100 W. Mulberry, 2

nd Floor

Kaufman, Texas 75142

Lisa McMinn

State Prosecuting Attorney

PO Box 12405

Austin, Texas 78711

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this Petition complies with Tex. R. App. P. 9.4, specifically 

using 14 point Century font and contains 1,529 words as counted by 

Corel WordPerfect version x6.

/s/ James Huggler 

James W. Huggler, Jr.
9

NO. PD-1014-15

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

OF THE STATE OF TEXAS SITTING AT

AUSTIN, TEXAS

STEVEN GOODE,

Petitioner

VS.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Respondent

On Petition for Discretionary Review

To the Court of Appeals Fifth

Supreme Judicial District 

Cause No. 05-14-00651-CR

APPENDIX
10

STEVEN MICHAEL GOODE, Appellant 

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

No. 05-14-00651-CR

COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, FIFTH DISTRICT, 

DALLAS

2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 6741

July 1, 2015, Opinion Filed

NOTICE: PLEASE CONSULT THE 

TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE FOR CITATION OF 

UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.

PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] On Appeal 

from the County Court At Law No. 1, 

Kaufman County. Texas Trial Court 

Cause No. 30921CC.

COUNSEL: For Appellants: Russ

Henrichs, Dallas, TX.

For Appellees: Sue Korioth, Erleigh

Norville Wiley, Kaufman, TX.

JUDGES: Before Justices Francis, LangMiers, and Whitehill. Opinion by Justice 

Whitehill.

OPINION BY: BILL WHITEHILL

OPINION

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion by Justice Whitehill

A jury convicted Steven Michael 

Goode of possession with the intent to 

deliver four grams or more but less than

200 grams of methamphetamine. The trial 

court found the enhancement paragraph 

true, found that Goode committed the 

offense as part of a criminal street gang, 

and sentenced Goode to thirty years' 

imprisonment.

In three issues, Goode argues that the: 

(i) trial court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress; (ii) trial court erred in 

admitting gang affiliation evidence during 

the guilt-innocence phase because it was 

impermissible character-conformity 

evidence; and (iii) evidence is insufficient 

to support his conviction. Concluding that 

his arguments lack merit, we affirm the
11

trial court's judgment.

I. Background

Texas State Trooper Devin Gonzalez 

was a member of a task force 

investigating the Aryan Brotherhood of 

T e x a s ( A B T ) a n d A B T ' s 

methamphetamine distribution. In 

connection with the investigation, Goode, 

and another ABT member, Rusty Duke, 

[*2] were under surveillance.

A fellow task force member, Officer 

Steve Lair, told Trooper Gonzalez that 

Goode was en route to pick up some 

methamphetamine at a house Duke used 

as a "Trap House."

1 Duke was later 

observed at the Trap House. Goode's 

truck was also seen there, with a female 

passenger in the front seat. When Goode 

left the Trap House, Gonzalez told 

Trooper Schumann, who was on routine 

traffic patrol, that Goode's truck might be 

carrying narcotics. Gonzalez asked 

Schumann to make a traffic stop if he 

could.

1 Gonzalez explained that a "Trap 

House" is a residence used solely for 

the distribution of narcotics.

Schumann saw Goode's truck going 

east on the highway and followed it. 

Schumann initiated a stop after he saw the 

truck make an unsafe lane change.

Schumann asked Goode and his female 

passenger, Carole Blevins, to get out of

the truck. When Goode consented to a 

search of the truck, Schumann found half 

of a joint in Blevins's cigarette pack. 

Blevins, who was later identified as an 

informant, also had methamphetamine 

hidden in the crotch of her pants. Blevins 

and Goode were both arrested, and Goode 

was charged with possession with intent 

to deliver methamphetamine in an amount 

of [*3] four grams or more but less than

200 grams, enhanced by a prior felony 

conviction.

The trial court denied Goode's motion 

to suppress the drug evidence. Before 

trial, the State amended the indictment to 

include an allegation that Goode 

committed the offense "as a member of a 

criminal street gang." The trial court 

denied Goode's motion to quash the 

amended indictment.

The case was tried to a jury. During 

trial, the State introduced evidence of 

Goode's ABT membership and of ABT's 

structure and operating methods. Defense 

counsel objected that the evidence 

constituted impermissible character 

evidence and was more prejudicial than 

probative. The trial court overruled the 

objections and allowed the defense a 

running objection to that evidence.

The jury found Goode guilty. The trial 

court found the enhancement paragraph 

true, found that Goode committed the 

offense as part of a criminal street gang, 

and sentenced Goode to thirty years' 

imprisonment.
12

II. Analysis

A. Issue No. 1: Did the Trial Court Err 

in Denying the Motion to Suppress?

Goode's first issue argues that the trial 

court erroneously denied his motion to 

suppress because the "stop and detention 

of [his] truck was impermissible and did 

[*4] not provide [the officer] a legitimate 

basis for making the stop and subsequent 

arrest," and because Gonzalez did not 

have "sufficient credible information to 

pass on to Officer Schumann."

We review a trial court's ruling on a 

motion to suppress evidence under a 

bifurcated standard of review. Turrubiate 

v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2013). We give almost total 

deference to the trial court's findings of 

historical fact that are supported by the 

record and its application of the law to 

facts if the resolution of those questions 

turns on an evaluation of credibility and 

demeanor. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d

666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We 

review de novo the trial court's 

application of the law to the facts when 

the issue does not turn on credibility and 

demeanor. Id. The trial court is the 

exclusive trier of fact and judge of the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight 

to be given to their testimony at the 

suppression hearing. State v. Ross, 32

S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a 

motion to suppress, we must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the 

ruling. See State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808,

818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

We first note that Goode's briefing on 

this issue is inadequate. We locate 

Goode's argument that Gonzalez lacked 

"sufficient credible information to pass on 

to Officer Schumann," and could not 

"reliably and justifiably provide [*5] 

information to Officer Schumann to make 

the traffic stop in the first place," in the 

last paragraph under the issue. The 

briefing is fifteen pages long with ten of 

the fifteen pages consisting of direct 

quotes of testimony given at the 

suppression hearing. Over four pages are 

quotes of general case law. As to the 

traffic violation, Goode states that he 

challenged whether a traffic violation was 

committed at the hearing on the motion to 

suppress, and "the points raised by 

defense counsel are re-urged here." 

Because Goode fails to proffer any 

analysis or argument to support this 

argument on appeal, we reject his 

complaint. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); 

McCarthy v. State, 65 S.W.3d 47, 49 n. 2 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

Regardless, an officer may stop and 

detain a person if the officer has 

reasonable suspicion that a traffic 

violation is in progress or has been 

committed. McVickers v. State, 874

S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 

An objectively valid stop is not unlawful 

just because the detaining officer has 

some ulterior motive for making the stop.
13

Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668, 674 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Ordinarily, a 

violation of a traffic law committed in 

view of a police officer is sufficient 

authority for a traffic stop. See Lemmons 

v. State, 133 S.W.3d 751, 756 (Tex. App.--

Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref'd).

In findings of fact and conclusions of 

law, the trial court found that, when he 

stopped the vehicle, Trooper Schumann 

had reasonable suspicion [*6] to believe 

that Goode had violated transportation 

code § 545.053(a). See TEX. TRANSP. 

CODE ANN. § 545.053(a) (West 2011) 

(passing). The court also found, in 

pertinent part, that when he stopped the 

vehicle, Trooper Schumann had 

reasonable suspicion to believe that 

Goode was violating transportation code 

section 547.3215. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE 

ANN. § 547.3215 (West 2011) (reflective 

devices).

Schumann's testimony is consistent 

with the trial court's findings. Schumann 

testified that he followed the truck as it 

traveled east on the highway in the right 

lane. Schumann then saw the truck move 

into the left lane, pass a vehicle that had 

entered the highway, and move back into 

the right lane "before it was safely--

coming clear of the passed vehicle." 

Schumann said that this constituted 

passing unsafely because it did not allow 

sufficient distance between the truck and 

the passed vehicle, which caused the 

driver of the passed vehicle to have to 

slow down or change his driving

behavior. Consequently, Schumann 

initiated a traffic stop. When he did so, he 

also noticed that the truck's third brake 

light was out.

We conclude that although the issue is 

inadequately briefed, the traffic stop was 

based on a reasonable suspicion that 

Goode had committed a traffic violation. 

Therefore, the trial [*7] court did not err 

in denying the motion to suppress.

B. Issue No. 3: Was The Evidence 

Sufficient to Prove that Goode 

Possessed Methamphetamine with the 

Intent to Deliver?

Goode's third issue challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support his 

conviction. Although the stated issue 

mentions both the possession and intent to 

deliver elements, his argument discusses 

only the possession element. According to 

Goode, the evidence does not establish 

that he possessed narcotics at the time of 

his arrest.

When an appellant challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, we review all the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the verdict to 

determine whether any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential 

elements of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Wise v. State, 364

S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 

We consider both direct and 

circumstantial evidence and all reasonable 

inferences that may be drawn from the
14

evidence in making our determination. 

Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). If the evidence is 

conflicting, we "presume that the 

factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor 

of the prosecution and defer to that 

determination." Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903 

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 326, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 

(1979)).

To prove possession, the State must 

show that the accused: (1) exercised care, 

custody, [*8] control, or management 

over the contraband, and (2) knew the 

substance was contraband. TEX. HEALTH & 

SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.002(38),

481.112 (West 2010 & Supp. 2014); 

Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 406 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). To meet this 

standard, the State must show that 

Go o d e 's co nn e c tion with t h e 

methamphetamine was more than 

fortuitous. Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406. 

Control over a controlled substance need 

not be exclusive, but can be jointly 

exercised by more than one person. See 

McGoldrick v. State, 682 S.W.2d 573, 578 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Taylor v. State,

106 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. App.--Dallas

2003, no pet.). If the defendant was not in 

exclusive possession of the controlled 

substance, the State is required to present 

evidence linking him to it. See Taylor,

106 S.W.3d at 830-31. Mere presence at 

the contraband's location is not sufficient 

to establish possession. Evans v. State,

202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006). But presence or proximity, 

combined with other direct or 

circumstantial evidence, may establish 

possession beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Blevins, the informant, was with 

Goode when they were stopped by the 

police. She testified about (i) her prior 

knowledge of ABT member Rusty Duke 

and his methamphetamine business, (ii) 

Goode's statements to her about Duke 

being in that business, (iii) her 

conversations with Goode in which he 

said that they were going to meet Duke 

and pick up methamphetamine for Goode 

to front for Duke, (iv) how she had 

fronted drugs for Duke before, and [*9] 

(v) her telling Goode about Duke's 

methamphetamine operations. Blevins 

was a female ABT "feather wood," which 

is a woman who is married to or the 

girlfriend of an ABT member and is 

loosely affiliated with that organization. 

She testified that, as an ABT feather 

wood, she had no choice but to go along 

on the trip. She also said that on the way 

to Duke's house she and Goode smoked 

part of a joint, which Goode then told her 

to put in her cigarette pack. Half of the 

joint remained there when they were 

pulled over.

Blevins described the trip to Duke's 

Trap Hous e to pi ck up the 

methamphetamine, Goode's meeting with 

Duke right before she and Goode got in 

his white Ford truck, and how he placed 

the drugs on the truck's console as they 

drove off in Goode's truck.
15

Blevins explained that, as the police 

light came on, Goode gave her the 

methamphetamine and said, "you need to 

put this on you." Blevins understood that 

to mean she needed to "crotch it," so she 

put the drugs down her pants. When the 

officer pulled them over, he separated 

them from each other. While the officer 

was talking to Goode, the drugs were 

"down in [Blevins's] pants."

When the officer searched the truck 

and found the joint, Blevins [*10] told 

him it was hers. The officer then asked 

Blevins if she had anything else illegal on 

her. Blevins replied, "No." The officer 

then stated, "I know you have something 

on you." So Blevins retrieved the 

methamphetamine from her pants. When 

she did so, she asked that the officer not 

tell Goode, because he would "kill [her] if 

he found out."

Goode and Blevins were arrested and 

taken to jail, where they remained for a 

few months. During that time, several 

letters were exchanged between them. 

Many of these letters were admitted into 

evidence. In one letter, Goode asked 

Blevins not to be mad at him. Blevins 

understood that to mean his asking her to 

carry the drugs. According to Blevins, at 

that point Goode thought she had told the 

police the drugs were hers. When Goode 

wrote that he would make it up to her, 

Blevins understood that to mean that 

Goode thought she would be taking the 

blame for the methamphetamine.

Blevins testified that Goode was the 

one who set up the deal with Duke. None 

of Goode's letters asked Blevins where 

she had gotten the methamphetamine. 

Blevins also said that the task force would 

not have been aware of the drug 

transaction between Goode and Duke had 

it not been for [*11] her.

Blevins's testimony was sufficient to 

link Goode to the narcotics and to show 

that he exercised care, custody, and 

control and knew that it was contraband. 

Goode acknowledges Blevins's testimony, 

but argues it was not corroborated and 

that Blevins's criminal history "casts 

doubt upon her testimony." As the sole 

judge of Blevins's credibility and the 

weight to be given her testimony, 

however, the jury was free to believe her 

or not. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d

893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

We reject Goode's arguments 

regarding the accomplice witness rule 

(see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 38.14) 

because again, he relies on pages of direct 

quotes of testimony from the trial, cites 

general case law supporting his argument 

and fails to analyze the issue. See TEX. R. 

APP. P. 38.1(i); WorldPeace v. Comm'n 

for Lawyer Discipline, 183 S.W.3d 451,

460 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.]

2005, pet. denied) (holding that failure to 

offer argument, citations to record, or 

citation to authority waives issue on 

appeal). Moreover, had the issue been 

preserved and properly briefed,sufficient
16

evidence was offered to corroborate 

Blevins' testimony by connecting Goode 

to the offense.

For the above reasons, we decide

Goode's third issue against him.

C. Issue No. 2: Was Evidence of 

Goode's Aryan Brotherhood Affiliation 

Admissible In the Guilt-Innocence 

Phase?

Goode's second issue argues that [*12] 

the trial court erred in admitting evidence 

of his gang affiliation during the guiltinnocence phase because the evidence 

was impermissible character-conformity 

evidence, the prejudicial effect of which 

outweighed its probative value. See TEX. 

R. EVID. 403, 404(b). The record contains 

extensive evidence regarding ABT, its 

operating methods, and appellant's 

involvement with that gang. Goode 

unsuccessfully objected to that evidence 

when offered through Officer Lair but 

was granted a running objection. The trial 

court, however, sustained specific 

objections to detailed evidence regarding 

ABT's structure. The admitted ABT 

evidence about which Goode complains 

consists primarily of general information 

regarding ABT's structure and specific 

information regarding the events leading 

to Goode's arrest.

We review a trial court's evidentiary 

rulings under an abuse of discretion 

standard. Torres v. State, 71 S.W.3d 758,

760 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We will not

reverse an evidentiary ruling if the ruling 

is within the zone of reasonable 

disagreement. Id. For the reasons 

discussed below, we conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the gang related evidence 

during the guilt-innocence phase.

We again point out that under this 

issue, Goode's [*13] briefing is eighteen 

pages long. He direct-quotes trial 

testimony and argument for sixteen of the 

eighteen pages. Another page is general, 

direct-quote case law that includes the 

rule 403 balancing factors. We are given 

a summary argument and directed to the 

applicable rule and general law but are 

not provided any analysis or argument to 

support this argument on appeal. We find 

this issue inadequately briefed. See TEX. 

R. APP. P. 38.1(i); McCarthy v. State, 65

S.W.3d 47, 49 n. 2 (Tex. Crim. App.

2001).

Regardless, Rule 404(b) generally 

prohibits "Evidence of other crimes, 

wrongs, or acts . . . to show action in 

conformity therewith." Rule 404(b) 

applies to third-party acts as well as the 

defendant's acts. Castaldo v. State, 78

S.W.3d 345, 348-49 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002).

Rule 404(b), however, provides that 

evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 

may be "admissible for other purposes 

such as proof of motive, opportunity, 

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, or absence ofmistake or accident
17

. . . ." TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). The 

admissibility of evidence offered for these 

purposes will almost always involve a 

balancing under Rule 403's substantial 

prejudice analysis. Castaldo, 78 S.W.3d. 

at 350. And,

The weight of the prejudice 

to the defendant may be 

different if the extraneous acts 

are a third party's rather than 

his own, keeping in mind that 

the prejudice is greater if the 

third party's acts [*14] in 

s ome wa y p r o v e t h e 

defendant's character.

The danger of prejudice to 

the defendant is usually 

highest when evidence of the 

defendant's extraneous acts is 

offered to prove that the 

defendant acted the same way 

in the offense on trial. The 

danger of prejudice may be 

much lower when evidence of 

a third party's extraneous acts 

is offered. If the third party's 

acts are in some way probative 

of the defendant's character as 

well as the third party's, the 

danger of prejudice may be 

somewhere in between.

Id.

We conclude the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in admitting ABT

gang related evidence in the guiltinnocence phase for several reasons.

First, the evidence was relevant 

because the amended indictment alleges 

that Goode committed the offense as a 

member of a criminal street gang and the 

State must prove the indictment's 

allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Moore v. State, 531 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1976); Butler v. State, 429

S.W.2d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). 

Although the trial court denied Goode's 

motion to quash this allegation in the 

indictment, he does not complain about 

the denial of the motion to quash or the 

validity of the allegation in the indictment 

that he was a member of a criminal street 

gang. The evidence regarding ABT's 

origins, structure, and operating methods 

[*15] was directly relevant to prove that 

Goode's participation in the ABT and that 

the ABT was a criminal street gang as 

alleged in the indictment.

Second, the evidence was admissible 

to prove that Goode possessed the 

methamphetamine, which was not found 

on Goode or in Goode's vehicle but was 

in the pants or crotch area of the 

passenger. As discussed above, the truck 

passenger, Blevins, was an informant and 

an ABT feather wood working with a 

Task Force Officer with the Department 

of Homeland Security's National Gang 

Unit, Lair, who was investigating ABT's 

drug sales operations. Blevins was in 

frequent contact with Lair on the day in 

question, was giving Lair a stream of
18

information regarding the events as they 

happened, and was the information source 

leading up to Goode's arrest. She gave 

detailed testimony about the ABT's 

involvement in the transaction, Goode's 

k n o w i n g p o ss e ssi o n o f t h e 

methamphetamine, and his intent to 

deliver the drugs. She also testified that, 

consistent with ABT practices, she was 

included on the trip so that she could 

"crotch" the drugs if Goode got pulled 

over. "Crotching" is an ABT practice of 

having a woman place illegal drugs in her 

pants, because most officers [*16] are 

men and not allowed to search that area. 

Blevins was the source that directly led to 

the arrest.

For these reasons, we conclude that 

evidence regarding the ABT was relevant 

to proving the allegations in the 

indictment, the existence of, and 

appellant's knowing participation in, a 

gang related crime, and Goode's 

possession of the methamphetamine. We 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in admitting the gang 

affiliation evidence in the guilt-innocence 

phase.

We thus decide Goode's second issue 

against him.

III. Conclusion

Having resolved all of Goode's issues 

against him, we affirm the trial court's 

judgment.

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47

/s/ Bill Whitehill 

BILL WHITEHILL 

JUSTICE

JUDGMENT

Based on the Court's opinion of this 

date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered July 1, 2015.