## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

In re A.L. , 2012 IL App (2d) 110992

Appellate Court Caption In re A.L
., B.C., and E.C., Minors (T he People of the State of I llinois
, Petitioner-Appellee , v. L asay sha L ., Respondent-Appe llant).

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-11-0992

Filed May 3, 2012

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The trial court’s adjudication of respondent’s children as negle cted and the order plac i n g t h e children with the Depa rtment of Children and Family Service s based on the finding that responde nt was dispositi onally unfi t wer e aff

irmed, notwithstanding responde nt’s contentions that the adjudi ca t i o n of neg lect was based only on her stipulation without an inquiry into the fac t u al b asi s and that the dispositi onal order was not founded on a valid order of neg lect, since the trial court ’s interest in whether the children wer e neg lected war rante d expeditin g t he adjudicat o ry hear ing, responde nt’s pare ntal rig hts wer e not being terminated, she w a s a f

f o r d ed a full evidentiar

y hear ing at the dispositi onal stag e, the trial court expressly stated that the finding s of neg lect wer e based on the stip ulation, the finding s based on one fathe r’s drug abuse problem we re not ag ainst the m anife st weig ht of the e vidence and we re not cure d by his su bsequent death of an overdose
, and the trial court proper ly proce eded to a

dispositi onal hea

ring

.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of W i n n eb ag o County
, Nos. 11-JA-123, 11-JA-124, 11-J A-125; the Hon. Ma ry L inn Gree n, J udg e, pre siding.J udg ment Affir med.

Counsel on Appea l R o b er t F. May
, of L aw Offic es of Robert D. L owe, of Rockford, fo r appellant.

J oseph P

. Br

uscato, S tate’s Attorney
, of R ockfor d (L awr ence M. Ba uer and Victoria E. J ozef, both of State’s Attorney s Appe llate Prosecutor’ s Offic e, of c ounsel), for

the People.

Panel J USTI CE HUTCHI NSON delivere d the judgme nt of t h e court, with opinion.
J ustice Hudson conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.
J ustice B irkett dissented, with opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 In 2011, the State filed neg lect petitions on behalf of A.L
., B.C., and E.C. (collec tively
, the minors). There afte r, responde nt, L asay sha L
., stipulated to an amende d count of neg lect in eac h petition, and the State dismiss ed the rema ining counts in the petit ions. Pursuant to responde nt’s fac tual stipul at i o n , t h e trial court adjudicate d the minors neg lected, and the
matter proce eded to a dispositi onal hear ing. After that hear ing, during which evidenc e was prese nted, the tria l c o u

r t f o u n d r e spondent dispositi onally unfit and order ed guardia nship and custody of the mi n o rs with the Depa rtment of Children and Family Service s (the Department). Respondent appea ls, contending that: (1) the trial court’s adjudication of
neg lect, based only on her stipulation, violated her right to due proce ss and was ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e; and (2) the trial court’s subsequent dispositi onal order was improper a

bsent a va lid finding of ne g lect. We af firm.

¶ 2 I . Ba ckg round ¶ 3 Only the fac ts rele vant for the purposes of this appea l will be set forth below. Respondent is the biologica l mother of the minors. Respondent was marrie d to Bill L
., A.L .’s biologica l fathe r and E.C.’s and B.C.’s stepfathe r. Bil l L

. was dece ased when the State filed its petitions. Br ian C. is the biologica l fathe r of E.C. and B.C., but he was never marrie d to responde nt and is not a party to this litigation. When the petitions wer e filed, responde nt was residingwith the minors in Tennessee

. ¶ 4 On April 18, 2011, the State filed its neg lect petitions, which wer e substantively simil ar

-2-with respe ct to eac h minor. Count I alleg ed that responde nt left the minors in the car e of Bill

L
., placing them at ri s k of harm. Count I I alleg ed that drug s and drug para pherna lia wer e found in the home and wer e easily acc essible to the minors. Count I I I alleg ed that the minors

wer e subject to an injurious environment beca use responde nt had a substance abuse problem
t hat prevented her from properly pare nting, placing the m inors at risk of harm. During t h e initial hear ing, the trial court a ppointed counsel and admonished respondent reg arding her rig hts and the State’s burden of proof. Specifica lly
, the trial court admonished responde nt that the State bore the burde n to prove the alleg ations by a prepondera nce of the evidenc e. The trial court further advised responde nt that the minors could be made war ds of the court if the State met its burden and the trial court conclude d that making the minors war ds of the
court wa s in the best interests of the minors. ¶ 5 During a pretria l confe renc e on J uly 22, 2011, the trial court was advised that responde nt had rece ntly moved t o Tenne ssee with the m inors and that, on J ul y 7
, 2 011, the t rial court judge in a related family court proce eding g ave temporar y phy sical custody of B.C. and E.C.
to Sandra F., their pater

nal g randmother

. The trial court in this case conducte d a hear ing later that day
, with responde nt and her attorney prese nt. The gua rd i an ad litem from the related family court proce eding appea red and advised the trial court that she prepa red a repor

t. The trial court acknow ledg ed that it “re ceive d [the repor t] ” and “re viewed it.” The State argued that responde nt’s remova l of the minors f rom I llinois to T ennesse e was “inappr opriate.” In support, the State noted that there was a police repor t indicating that responde nt was char g ed with driving under the influence in 2009. The State raised oth er conce rns, including that drug s and drugpara

pherna lia wer e found in the home , and stated that it would defer to the
guardia n ad litem in the family court proce eding to e x press her conce rns. The State argued that the minors should be returne d to I llinois

. Respondent’s counsel objected to the minors b eing returne d to I llinois and advised the trial court that responde nt had a residenc e in Tenne ssee. ¶ 6 Subsequent l y , t h e t ri al co u rt as k ed the guardia n ad litem from the family court proce eding to comment on whether the minors should be returne d from Tenne s s ee

. T he
guardia n ad litem advised the trial court that she had “done quite a bit of investiga tion on this

case ” and that “[t] here are sever al incidents.” The guardia n ad litem informed the trial court of a police repor

t indicating that responde nt had pulled a knife on Bill L

. She also noted that Bill L

. “died of a massive drug overdose
, which is what I believe instigate d this proce eding .” T h e guardia

n ad litem further advised that, in November 2010, responde nt picked up the minors from school while she wa s al l egedly intox icated and threatened to harm the supervisors at the afte r-sc hool prog ram. Respondent had to be restra ined during the incident and was arr ested for resisting arr est. T h ereafte r, responde nt’s counsel and the trial court asked the guardia

n ad lit em a s er i es of questions, including whether she had met with responde nt or the minors. T he guardia n ad litem responde d that she spoke with the minors and responde nt by phone but was unable to meet with th e m i n o rs

. Finally
, the trial court asked responde nt who was car ing for the minors in Tenne ssee. Respondent replied that her fianc é was car ing for the minors so she could attend the proce eding and that her landlord in Tenne ssee wa s also helpingcar e for them. ¶ 7 At that point in the proce eding s, the State moved for a shelter- car e hear i ng

. The State

-3-argued that it was nece ssary for the trial court to consider the evidenc e, which would include

the repor t and testimony

from the guardia

n ad litem from the family court proce eding

. The State argued “[o] bviously
, [t he parties] are stating their positions, but all of the positions are proff ers and setups of what we think the evidenc e will show.” The trial court g ra n t ed the State’s motion for a shelter- car e hear ing. Af t er a s h ort rec ess, the trial court acc epted an ag ree ment betwee n the parties that responde nt would bring the minors back from Tenne ssee and that the minors would reside with San d y L
., A.L .’s pater nal g randmother
, during the pendenc y of the proc eeding s. ¶ 8 On Au gu s t 10, 2011, the State amende d count I of eac h petition. A.L .’s petiti o n wa s amende d to al leg e that Bill L

. had a substance abuse problem that impaired his pare nting, placing the minor at risk. E.C. and B.C. ’s p et i t i o ns wer e simil arly amende d. At a hear ing held on that day
, responde nt fac tually stipulated to the amende d count I of eac h petition and, pursuant to an agree ment, the State dismiss ed the rema ining counts of the petitions. During the hea ring
, responde nt’s attorney advised the trial court that he was “on the same pag e as the State.” The trial court then f ound the minors neg lected, stating:
“Pursuant to the ag ree ment rec ited by the State, ag ree d to by the parties, the [t rial court] adjudicate s the minors to be neg lected pursuant to [respondent’s] ** * stipulation to [a] mended [c]ount 1 of the [petit ions] .” The trial court’s written order s provided that the minors wer e adjudicate d neg lected pursuant to the “fa ctual stipulation by mother to [c] ount 1 as amende d.” ¶ 9 The matt er p ro ce ed ed to a dispositi onal hear ing on August 16, 2011, and both parties

wer e aff orded the opportunity to submit evidenc e. The rec ord ref lects that responde nt argued
at that hear ing that i t wa s i n the minors’ best interests that guardia nship and custody

rema ined with her. At the conclusion of the hear ing, the trial court fo u n d re s pondent dispositi onally unfit a

n d o r d e r ed guardia

nship and custody with the Depa rtment. Respondent timely appea ls.

¶ 10 I I . Analy sis ¶ 11 A. Due Proc ess and F inding of Neg lect ¶ 12 Respondent prese nts the first issue on appea l as “[w]hether there was sufficie nt f actua l evidenc e and due proce ss to uphold [respondent’s] stipulation and the trial court’s adjudication of neg lect as to the [m inors] on August 10, 2011.” Wit h respe ct to due proce ss, responde nt arg

ues that her stipulation was not made knowing ly and voluntarily
, beca use the trial court did not inquire as to the fac tual basis of that stipu l at i o n b ef o re acc epting it. Respondent furthe r ar gues that the trial c ourt’s findingof neg lect was ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evide nce be cause Bill L . was de cea sed whe n the State filed the pe titions

. ¶ 13 T h e J u v en i l e C ourt Act of 1987 (the Act) provides a step-by -step fr am ew o rk fo r deter mining whether a minor shall be remove d from his or her pa rents and made a war d of
t h e state. 705 I L CS 405/1-1 to 7-1 (West 2010). Following a temporar y custody hear ing
p u rsuant to section 2-10 of t he Act (705 I L CS 405/2-10 (West 2010)), the trial court must make a finding of abuse, neg lect, or depende nce befor e it conducts an ad j u dication of

war dship. Section 2-3(1) (b) of the Act define s a “neg lected minor” to include any minor

-4-under 18 y ear s of ag e whose environment is injurious to his or her welfa re. 705 I L CS 405/2- 3(1)( b) (West 2010). Whil e our supreme court has noted t h at the term “injurious environment” is an “amor phous conce pt that cannot be define d with particula rity ,” it
g ener ally includes “the brea ch of a pare nt’s duty to ensure a ‘saf e and nurturing shelter’ for his or her children.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) In re Arthur H.
, 212 I ll. 2d 441, 463 (2004) (quoting In re N.B.
, 191 I ll. 2d 338, 346 (2000))

. Section 2-21(1) of the Act provides that, if the cour

t finds that the minor is abused, neg lected, or depende nt: “[ T]he court shall then deter mine and put in writing the fac tual basis supportin g t h at deter mination, a

nd specify
, to the extent possible, the acts or omissions or both of eac h
pare nt, guardia

n, or leg al custodian that form the basis of the court’s finding s.” 705 I L CS 405/2-21(1) ( West 2010).
Be caus e of the “fa ct-drive n nature ” of neg lect and injurious environmenta l ruling s, a revie wingcourt will r ever se a finding of neg lect only if it is aga inst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. In re N.B.
, 191 I ll. 2d at 346. A ru l i n g i s aga i n st the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e only if the opposite conclusion is clea rly evident; and g iven the d el i cac y and difficulty of child custody

deter minations, the discretion vested with the trial cour t is even
g reater than in an ordinary appea l applying the manifest-w eig ht-of-the -evide nce standard of revie w. In re R.S. , 382 I ll. App. 3d 453, 459-60 (2008). ¶ 14 In addition, the United States Supreme Court and I llinois courts have rec og nized pa rents’ liberty interest in raising their children. Troxel v. Gr a n vi lle
, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); In re M.H.
, 196 I ll. 2d 356, 362 (2001). The Troxel Court, afte r di scussing extensive prec edent, opined t hat “it cannot now be doubted that the [ d ] u e [ p ] roce ss [c] lause of the [ f]ourteenth [a] mendment protec ts the fundame ntal right of p ar en t s t o make decisions conce rning the

car e, custo d y , and control of t heir children.” Troxel
, 530 U.S. at 66. Acc ording ly
, beca use

a termination proce eding seeks to end the pare nt’s fundame ntal liberty interest, the
proce dures involved must meet the requisites of the due proce ss clause

. In re M.H.
, 196 I ll. 2d at 363 (citing Santosky v. Kramer
, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982))

. The t h ree fac tors to be considere d in deter

mining what due proce ss require s are (1) the private interest aff ecte d by the officia l action; (2) the risk of an err oneous deprivation of the interest throug h the
proce dures used, and the probable value of addit i o n al o r subs titute proce dural safeguards; and (3) the g overnm en t ’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitut e safe guards would en t ai l

. In re M.H.
, 196 I ll. 2d at 363 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). ¶ 15 Guided by these principles, we first addre ss responde nt’s arg ument that she was de nied due proce ss. T his a

rgument require s us to de termine whether due proce ss r equire d the trial
court to ensur e the e x istence of a fa ctual basis befor e acc epting responde nt’s stipulation to

an alleg ation of neg lect. Respondent r elies primar ily on our supreme court’s decision in In

re M.H.
, 196 I ll. 2d 356. In that case , t h e S t at e filed a petition for termination of pare ntal rig hts with respe ct to the responde nt’s two children who, there afte r, wer e remove d from the responde nt’s custody

. Id. at 358. After the minors wer e adjudicate d neg lected, the State filed

a supplemental petition for ter mination of the responde nt’s pare ntal rig hts, alleg ing in pa rt that the responde nt failed to make rea sonable prog ress toward the return of the minors to her within 12 months afte r the adjudication of neg lect. Id. at 358-59. During the termination

-5-hear ing, the State informed the trial court that the responde nt would admit that she failed to

make rea sonable progress toward the return of the min o rs

. T h e trial court asked the responde nt whether she understood her right to have the State prove by clea r and convincing evidenc e that she was unfit, and it asked the responde nt if she wanted a mom ent t o confer with her attorney befor e making her admission. Id. at 359-60. After the responde nt’s verba l
ag ree ment, the trial court acc epted her admission of unfitness. Id. at 36 0

. Fo l l o wing an addi t i o n al hear ing, the trial court found that it was in the minors’ best interests that the responde nt’s pare ntal rig hts be terminated. Id. ¶ 16 On ap p ea l
, the appellate court vacated the order terminating the responde nt’s pare ntal rig hts, and the supre me cour t affir med. Id. at 368. Relying on Mathews
, 424 U.S. 319, our supreme court noted that the interest of pare ntal car e of a child is f undamental and will not be ter minated lightly

. In re M

.H. , 196 I ll. 2d at 365. There fore , befor e a c hild can be ma de

a war d of the court, the State must prove abuse, neg lect, or depende nce by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e; and befor e a court can adjudicate a pare nt unfit and terminate pare ntal rig hts, the State must prove by clea r and convincing evidenc e t hat the pare nt is unfit. Id. The
supreme court noted that, beca use an admission of neg lect must be knowing and voluntary
, an admission of unfitness must also be knowing and voluntary

. Id. at 366. The supreme court conclude d that there must be a fac tual basis for an admission of unfitness, beca use it “allows the par ent to hear

the State desc ribe the a lleg ed fa cts relating to fitness a nd g ive the par ent an opportunity

to challeng e or corr ect any fac ts that a re disputed.” Id. at 367. The supr eme court emphasized that, without a fac tual basis, there is a dang er that the pare nt unde rstands the S tate’s alleg ations but does not rea liz e that his or her c onduct does not fit within those alleg ations. Id. There fore
, if a pare nt is not fully informed of the fac tual basis underly ing the State’s alleg ations, there exis ts an incre ased chanc e that pare ntal rig hts w ill be err oneously
t er m i n at ed beca

use of an ill-advised admission of unfitness. Id. As a result, the supreme court held that due proce ss re q u i re d the trial court to deter mine whether a fac tual basis exis ted for the responde nt’s admission of unfitness. Id. at 368. ¶ 17 Subsequently
, the I lli n o i s Ap p el l at e Court, Fifth District, considere d whether abuse neede d to be established at a termination hearing when at the adjudicator y stag e the pare nts admitted to the State’s al l ega t i o n s of neg lect and abuse. In re A.A.
, 324 I ll. App. 3d 227 (2001). In distinguishing In re M.H.
, the Fifth District initially noted that In re M.H. involved the pare nt a dmitti ngto the alleg ations of a petition to terminate pare ntal rig hts a nd that the trial court acc epted the admission without hear ing any fac tual basis for the admission. Id. at 237. Conversely
, in the matter befor e it, the pare nts wer e provided with a full and complete evidentiar y hear ing befor e their pare ntal rig hts wer e ultimately terminated

. Id. The court considere d the three due proce ss fac tors outlined by the Mathews Court and conclude d that, alt h o u gh t h e interest in the case befor e it–the pare nts’ car e, custody
, and control of their children–w as the same as in In re M.H.
, the risk of an err oneous deprivation of that interest was “ not quite the same.” Id. at 239. Specific ally , the cour t stated: “The risk of an err oneous temporar y deprivation of this right, however , is not quite
t h e same as the risk involved in a permanent termination proce eding like the one in In

re M.H. Afte r t h e i n itial, adjudicator y stag e of the proce eding s, the pare nts have

numerous opportunities over a leng thy period of t i m e to reg ain the custody of their

-6-children. In contra st, afte r the order terminating pare ntal rig hts is filed, the pare nts’ only

avenue of redr ess is wi t h t h e co urts of revie w. Be cause the risk of an err oneous deprivation involves a much g reater loss with much less ability to corr ect any err ors, the proof require d at the two stag es of t h e proce eding s is also differ ent. At the initial, adju d i ca t o ry stag e, the State must prove the right to remove the children from the
pare nts’ custody by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. At the termination stag e, the State
must prove the pare nts to be unfit by clea r a nd convincing evidenc e. The differ ence in the level of proof *** is rele vant *** beca use i f an ad

j u d ication is proper with only a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, then a lower level o f p ro o f, by way of a pare ntal admission toge ther with the fac ts of rec ord demonstrating the fac tual basis for the initial

re m o v al
, is sufficie nt to protec t the pare nts’ due proce ss rig hts at that stag e of the
proce eding s. Since the risk of an err oneous deprivation is lower at the adjudicator y stag e than at the ter

mination stage , there is no due proce ss rig ht to any additional proce dural safe guards *** a

bove those a lrea dy

in place he rein.” Id. at 239-40. The court conclude d that, beca use t he proof nece ssary for an ad j u d i cation is less than t hat

nece ssary for a termination, the State’s fiscal and administrative interests i n reduc ing the
costs of those proce eding s are more important at the initial stag e than at the final termination stag e. Id. at 240. Thus, the pare nts’ admission at the adjudicator y stag e that one of the minors

wa s s ex u ally abused, combined with the additional evidenc e prese nted at the termination stag e, was sufficie nt and did not violate their rig ht to due proce ss. Id. The court conclude d:
“To require more at this e arly stag e of the proce eding s would not add any protec tion to the pri m ary interest at the first stag e–the welfa re of the children. The number of adjudicator

y hear ings in our state’s more populous counties would far exceed the number of t ermination proce eding s, and there is an overwhelming g overnme nt interest in expediting these adjudicator y proce eding s to ‘ac t in a just and s p ee dy manner to deter mine the best interests of the mi n o r, including providing for the safe ty of the minor.’ ” Id. (quoting705 I L CS 405/ 2-14(a ) (West 1998)). ¶ 18 The Fifth District’s rea soning in In re A.A. is persua sive. The purpose of an adjudicatory hear ing pursuant to se ction 2-21(1) of the Act is to de termine whether the minor is a bused,
neg lected, or depende nt. In r e A rthur H.
, 212 I ll. 2d at 466. As our supreme noted, “[ i] t is only after the [t rial court] has adjudicate d the child neg lected that the statute direc ts the court to consider the actions of the pa rents.” ( Emphasis in origina l.) Id. ; see also In re J.W

. , 386 I ll. App. 3d 847, 855 (2008) (noting that a trial court’s finding under se ction 2-21 does not adjudicate a pare nt “ guilty ”). There fore
, we ag ree with the court in In re A.A. that the State has a c ompelling inter est in expediti ngthe first-stage adjudicator y hearing so a s to act in a speedy and just manner to deter mine the best interests of the minors. In re A.A.
, 324 I ll. App. 3d at 240. ¶ 19 E q ually important, as the court in In re A.A. also emphasized, the risk of re s p o n d en t being deprive d of her fundame ntal interest in the car e, custody
, and control of the minors is
not the same at the initial adjudicator y stag e as it is at the dispositi onal phase. See id. at 239- 40. Her e, the rec ord ref

lects that the fac tual alleg ations responde nt stipulated to wer e clea rly
set forth in the petitions. Respondent was aff orded a full evidentia ry hear ing at the dispositi onal stag e. She had the opportunity at that later stag e to corr ect any err ors that might

-7-have occur red during the ear lier stag e in the proce eding s. See id. at 239. Conversely
, at the
perma nent termination stag e at issue in In re M.H.
, the responde nt’s only rec ourse was with the courts o f re v i ew. In re M.H.
, 196 I ll. 2d at 358-59. As did our colleagues in the Fifth District, we c onsider this distinction s ignif icant. ¶ 20 Our determ i n at i o n is consistent with the Four th District’s rec ent holding in In re C.J.
, 2011 I L App (4th) 110476. In In re C.J.
, the State filed a petition alleg ing that the minor was abused in that the responde nt and the minor’s biolo gi ca l fathe r inflicted, or allowed to be inflicted, phy sical injury
, resulting in five fra cture d ribs. Id. ¶ 4. The following day
, the trial
court condu ct ed a shelter- car e hearing, during which it considere d a shelter- car e repor t prepa red by the Department showing that t he mi nor was admitted to the hos pital with two fra cture d ribs, among other injuries. Id. ¶¶ 6-12. Considering the shelter- car e repor t, and also the re spondent’s stipulation that probable cause exis ted t o believe that the minor had be en ab u s ed and that an im mediate necessity exis ted t o place the m inor in shelter care
, the t ri al court g ave te mporary

custody of the minor to the De partment. Id. ¶ 12. ¶ 21 After the State filed a supplemental petition, the trial co u rt conducte d an adjudicatory hear ing. The t ri al co urt advised the parties that the responde nt was g oing to make an admission of abuse a

nd that if the trial cour

t found a fa ctual basis, alongwith a “ ‘ fre e and voluntary admission, then [t he trial cour t ] wa s go ing to rec eive documentation from [t he State] *** to try to deter

mine what acts or omissions of the pare nts *** form the basis of the [c] ourt’s finding s.’ ” Id. ¶ 15. The trial court advised that the matter would, at that point, be

rec essed so the trial court could revie w the submitt ed materia ls, including police repor ts and medical rec ords. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. On ce t h e proce eding s resumed, the trial court would hear
argument and deter

mine, to the extent possible, what acts by the pare nts formed the basis of the finding of abuse. Id. There af t er, the State provided a fac tual basis, which included the minor’s medical examination while hospitaliz ed, the curricula vitae of attending phy sicians, and the responde nt’s police interview, among other materia ls. Id. ¶ 16. Howeve r, beca use the trial court ha d y et to revie w the exhibit s proffe red by the State, it relied on the she lter-c are repor t to find that a fac tual basis exis ted for the responde nt’s admission that the minor was abused. Id. ¶ 17. ¶ 22 On appea l, the revie wing court initially reje cted the responde nt’s argument that she did
not knowing ly and voluntarily admit that the minor was abused. In reje cting the responde nt’s
argument that In re M

.H. controlled the matter bef ore it, the re viewingcourt stated:
“We reje ct responde nt’s contention that M.H. stands for the proposition that the State
must provide a fac tual basis prior to a responde nt’s admi s s i o n that a child is abused,
neg lected, or depend en t at an adjudicator y hear ing. Instead–a s we have noted– M.H. stands for the proposition that ‘due proce ss require s a [trial] court to deter mine whether

a fac tual basis exis ts for an ad m i s sion of pare ntal unfitness before it acce pts the admission .’ ” (Emphase s omitted a nd in origina l.) Id. ¶ 30 (quoting In re M.H.
, 196 I ll. 2d at 368). Relying on In re A.A.
, 324 I ll. App. 3d at 239-40, the revie wing court conclude d that, beca use the re spondent ac knowledg ed that she unde rstood the alleg ation in the State’s petition and

was not promised any

thing in return for her admission, the trial court proper ly acc epted the

-8-shelter- car e repor t as the fac tual basis for the responde nt’s admi s s i o n t h at the minor was abused. C.J. , 2011 I LApp (4th) 110476, ¶ 32. ¶ 23 Subsequently
, the revie wing court in In re C.J. considere d the sufficie ncy of the fac tual basis that the State prese nted to support the responde nt’s admission. By way of compar ison, the revie wing court outlined the fac tual-basis require ments pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 402(c) (ef

f. J uly 1, 1 9 9 7 ), wh ich provides, “The court shall not enter final judgme nt on a plea of guil t y without first deter mining that there is a fac tual basis for the plea.” In re C.J.
, 2011 I L App (4th) 110476, ¶¶ 50-51. The re viewingcourt ex plained that “ ‘[t] he factual basis for a guilty plea will g ener ally

consist of an e x press a dmission by the defe ndant that he committed the acts alleg ed in the indictment or a rec ital to the court of the evidenc e that supports alleg ations in the indictment.’ ” Id. ¶ 53 (qu o t i n g P eople v. W hite
, 2011 I L 109616, ¶ 17). After summarizing Rule 402(c) ’s require ments, the revie wing court stated: “[A] fac tual-basis require ment that s up p o rt s an admission that the child is abused,
neg lected, or depende nt can be no m ore bur densome for the State than that re quired in

a cr iminal context , wher e a de fenda nt’s persona l liberty

may be at r isk.” Id. ¶ 54. The revie wing court conclude d that the trial court had a sufficie nt fac tual basis to acc ept the responde nt’s admission. Id. ¶ 57. The revie wing court emphasized that, simil ar to a criminal
proce eding
, the fac tual-basis require ment is satisf ied if evidenc e exis ts any wher e in the

rec ord from which the trial court coul d re as o n ab ly conclude that the minor was abused,
neg lected, or dependent

. See id. ¶ 56 (citing People v. Bassette
, 391 I ll. App. 3d 453, 457 (2009) (noting that a fac tual basis to support a guilty plea is satisfied if the rec ord contains evidenc e from which the trial court could rea sonably conclude that the defe ndant committed the cr ime with the requisite intent, if any )). ¶ 24 Whil e we are mindful of the Four th District’s compar ison to Rule 402(c)
, we do not find that rule analog ously applicable to an admission under section 2-21(1) of the Act. The plain languag e of Rule 402(c) ex p re s s l y p rovides that it applies t o a final judgme nt on a plea of
guilty

. I ll. S. Ct. R. 402(c) (ef f. J uly 1, 1997). As noted above, section 2-21(1) instructs the trial court at the adjudicator y hear ing to deter

mine whether the child is abused, neg lected, or depende nt, not whether the pare nts are guilty of some conduct. See In re Arthur H.
, 212 I ll. 2d at 466-67 (citing 705 I L CS 405/2-21(1) (West 2000)); In re J.W

. , 386 I ll. App. 3d at 855. We maintain that, in this case , so long as the responde nt’s stipulation did not violate her rig ht
to due proce ss, and the trial court specifie d that it found the minors neg lected pursuant to responde nt’s stipulation t o count I of the amended pe titions , the trial court had a suf ficient fac tual basis to acc ept that stipulation. As p re v i o u s l y discussed, beca use this case is distinguishable from In re M.H.
, we do not be lieve that due proce ss r equire d the trial court to elicit a fa ctual basis bef ore a cce pting r espondent’s stipulation. ¶ 25 In any event, like the trial court in In re C.J.
, the trial court here could have relied on any evidenc e in the rec ord allowing it to rea sonably conclude that the minors wer e neg lected. At the J uly 22, 2011, hear ing, the guardia n ad litem from the family court proce eding stated that she had prepa

red a repor

t for the trial court, and the trial court acknow ledg ed that it revie wed that repor t. The guardia

n ad litem further stated that she did “quite a bit of investigation” in

-9-this case and informed the trial court of her con ce rn s rega rding the welfa

re of the minors, including Bill L .’s drug overdose

. There afte r, in moving for a shelter- car e hear ing, the State advised the trial court that the parties’ various positions with respe ct to returning the minors
to I llinois fr o m Tenne ssee wer e proff ers for what the evidenc e at a shelter- car e hear ing would demonstrate. Respondent and her attorney wer e prese nt at the J uly 22, 2011, hear ing and ag ree d to forg o the shelter- car e evidentiar y hear ing on the basis that responde nt w ould
return t he minors to I llinois

. The trial court could have also proper ly relied on the
repr esentations and re p o rt from the guardia n ad litem as a fac tual basis for responde nt’s stipulation t hat the minors wer e neg lected. See In re C.J. , 2011 I L App (4th) 110476, ¶ 56 (citing Bassette , 391 I ll. App. 3d at 457). ¶ 26 The dissent maintains that the trial cour t failed to “per form its statutory duty as to the stipulation.” Infra ¶ 46. The dissent emphasizes that the purpose of the fac tu al -b as is require ment pursuant to se ction 2-21(1) is to give the parties notice of the rea sons f orming th e b as i s for remova l and to prese rve that rea soning for appellate revie w. Infra ¶ 46. The dissent further

states that “whatever

due proce ss ma

y require , section 2-21( 2) re quires that the fac tual basis contemplated by section 2-21(1) be provided in whole befor e the court may proce ed to a dispositional hear ing.” Infra ¶ 51. ¶ 27 Initially
, we note that the dissent does not claim that the trial court’s rea son for its finding of neg lect, Bill L .’s drug use, is not in the rec ord or was not adequat el y prese rved for appellate revie w. Instead, the dissent appea rs to focus on whether the parties, and specific ally responde nt, had notice of Bill L .’s drug use when the trial court made its finding of neg lect. ¶ 28 More important, by focusing on strict compliance rathe r than a re v i ew o f the entire
proce eding s, the dissent advocates that statutory formality should trump substance. S ee Townshi p of Jubilee v. State , 2011 I L 111447, ¶ 35 (“[I ]t is axiom atic that in matters of statutory construction, we cannot allow formality to trump substance wher e the result would be contra ry to the purposes for which the statute was enac ted ***.”). As our supreme court has stated, “The purpose of the Act is to secur e car e and guidance for minors and to serve the ‘saf ety and moral, emotional, mental and phy sical welfare ’ of minors and the best i n t er est of the community .” In re Madison H.
, 215 I ll. 2d 364, 373 (2005) (quoting 705 I L CS 405/1- 2(1) (West 2002)). Toward that end, “T he Ac t is to be ‘liberally construed’ to car

ry out its stated purpose and policy .” Id. at 374 (quoting705 I L CS 405/ 1-2(4) (West 2002)). ¶ 29 Her e, as note d above, the transcr ipt from the July 22, 2011, hear ing, which re spondent attended with he r attorne y , clea rly ref lects that the State based its ne g lect petitions, in part,

on Bill L .’s drug use and that the parties wer e awa re of that b asis. During the hearing, the trial court enter

tained argument from the parties conce rning the best interests of the minors and considere d the testimony and re port from the guardia n ad litem in a re lated family law
proce eding

. That guardia

n ad litem noted that Bill L

. died of a drug overdose

. Respondent’s attorney asked the guardia n ad litem from the family proce eding about her interac tion with the minors. To reve rse now–when the rec ord unequivoca lly demonstrates that the parties and the trial cour t wer e awa re of the fac tual basis for the State’s petition, and thus for responde nt’s stipulation–m ere ly beca use the trial court did not specific ally rec ite that fac tual basis would contravene the underlying purpose of the Act. There fore
, beca use the Act must be liberally construed to car ry out its stated purpose ( id. ), we co n cl u d e that the trial court

-10-compl ied with sections 2-21(1) and (2) of the Act when it found the minors neg lected

pursuant to re spondent’s stipulation. ¶ 30 The dissent further cites In re Johnson
, 102 I ll. App. 3d 1005 (1981). We do not find that

case applicable here

. In Johnson
, the court held that the appellant’ s admission was not made knowing ly and voluntarily beca use “[t] he rec ord *** is *** devoid o f any indication that appellant understood the conseque nces of his a dmission.” Id. at 1013. The court noted that the trial court did not specify to the appellant the conseque nces of his admission, and neither did the as s i s t an t public defe nder, who repr esente d the appellant when he enter ed his

a d mi s s io n

. I d

. Si gn ificantly
, in Johnson
, the attorney appointed to repr esent the appellant w a s not prese nt at the hear ing when the appellant enter ed his admission, and the assistant public defe nder the trial court appointed to repr esent him at that hear ing als o repr esente d the mother. Id. at 1009. ¶ 31 Jo h n s o n ’s u n i q u e ci rcumstances do not exis t here

. As the dissent acknowl ed ges , responde nt was admonished at the onset of the proce eding s. She was repr esente d by counsel both at the J uly 22, 2011, hear ing and at the hear ing when she stipulated to an alleg ation of
neg lect. At the latter hear ing, and befor e her stipulation, her attorney advised the trial court that he wa s “on the same pag e as the State.” ¶ 32 In sum, we conclude that responde nt’s rig ht to due proce ss was not violated when at the adjudicator

y stag e the trial court acc epted her stipulation of neg lect without inquiring as to the fac tual basis. The State has a com pelling interest in expediting adjudicator y hear ings beca use those hear ings are conce rned solely with whether minors are abused, neg lected, or dependent an d d o not adjudicate pare nts “guilty ” of any thing. In addition, the risk that responde nt w ould be deprive d of her f undamental inter est in the car e, custody
, and control of t he m i n o rs at the adjudicatory stag e is not the s ame as the risk at a termination hear ing,

as in In re M.H. Subsequent to the adjudicator y stag e, responde nt was aff orded a fu l l evidentiar y hear i n g at t he dis positional stag e and had an opportunity to corr ect any err ors. We further conclude that the trial court complied with section 2-21(1)
, beca use it expressly

s t ated that its finding s of neg lect wer e based on responde nt’s stipulation, and t h e re co rd ref lects that the trial court hear d arguments, and the parties wer e awa re, of the State’s fac tual basis for its ne g lect petitions. How ever , we caution trial courts that the be tter pra ctice is to either elicit a fac tual basis or summarize on the rec ord a fac tual basis fro m the exis ting

rec ord whe n acc eptinga stipulation of abuse, ne g lect, or de pendenc y from a r espondent. ¶ 33 We next consider respondent’ s contention t hat t he trial court ’s ad j u dication of neg lect

was ag ainst the manifest we ight of the evidenc e. Respondent a rgues that the only fac ts she stipulated to wer e that the minors wer e neg lect ed beca use Bill L

. had a substance abuse problem, im p airing his pare nting abilities. Acc ording to responde nt, beca use Bill L

. was dece ased when the State filed its petitions, the trial court’s finding of neg lect was ag ainst the manifest we ight of

the evidenc e. ¶ 34 Respondent’s argu m ent is unavailing

. The term “neg lect” g ener ally means “fa ilure to exercise the car e that circ umstances justly demand.” (Interna l quotation mar ks omitted.) In

re C.R.
, 191 I ll. 2d 338, 346 (2000). Our supreme co u rt has emphasized that the term “neg lect” has a fluid meaning that embra ces willful as well as unintentional disreg ard of

-11-duty
, and its meaning can vary depending on the circ umstances. In re Arthur H.
, 212 I ll. 2d

at 463. In addition, the term “injurious environment” is broad but is g ener ally understood to include the brea ch of a pare nt’s duty to e nsure a safe and nurturing shelter for the children. Id. Finally
, our leg islature has clea rly stated that the purpose of an adjudicator y hear ing is to deter mine whether

an alleg ation that a minor is neg lected is supporte d by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, and the s t at u t e makes no mention of the trial court deter mining the party responsible for the child’s neg lect or assessing proportionate blame. Id. at 465 (quoting 705 I L CS 405/ 1-3(1) (West 2000)). ¶ 35 In the curr ent matter, the tr ial court’s deter mination that the minors wer e neg lected, ba sed

on responde nt’s stipulation to the alleg ation in count I of the amended p eti tions, was not ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. The amende d petition alleg ed that Bill L
., A.L .’s fathe r and B. C

. ’s an d E.C.’s stepfathe r, had a substance abuse problem that impaired his
pare nting a

bility and plac ed the minors at r isk of harm. I llinois revie wingcourts have held th at a fi nding of neg lect is proper even if only one pare nt is responsible for cre ating an injurious environment due to substance abuse. See In re Chyna B.
, 331 I ll. App. 3d 591, 593- 96 (2002). ¶ 36 Moreove r, that Bill L

. was dece ased did not r ender the alleg ed neg lect cure d. As noted, the purpose of an adjudicator y hear ing is to deter

mine whether an alleg ation that a minor is
neg lected is supported by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, not to assig n blame to the pare nts ( In re Arthur H.
, 21 2 I l l

. 2 d at 465), and the trial court is vested with wide discretion in deter mining whether a minor is neg lected (see In re R. S

. , 3 8 2 I ll. App. 3d at 459-60 (empha siz ing the “wide” discretion a trial court has due to the “delicacy and difficulty ” of child custody deter

minations)). Her e, responde nt could h av e s t ipulated that Bill L

. had a substa n ce abuse problem, but submitt ed additional evidenc e at the adjudicator y stag e to demonstrate that the neg lect was cure d as a result of Bill L .’s death. Instead, responde nt stipulated that Bill L

. had a substance abuse problem that impaired his pare nting and place d the m inors at risk of harm and she did not submit any additional evidenc e. As a re sult, the only evidenc e before the trial court at the ad j u d i ca t ory stag e was responde nt’s stipulation. Given the wide discretion aff orded to the trial court, it could have conclude d that the risk of harm was still prese nt after Bill L

. died. Cf. In re R.W

. , 401 I ll. App. 3d 1100, 1107 (2010) (ruling that the trial court’s finding of an injurious environment resulting from unclea n living conditions was ag ains t the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e beca use the living conditions

wer e clea ned befor e the neg lect petitions wer e filed). There fore
, beca use cases i n v olving alleg ations of neg lect are sui generis and must be decid ed o n the basis of their unique circ umstances (see In re Arthur H.
, 212 I ll. 2d at 463), combined with a defe rential standard of revie w and the evidenc e befor e the trial court at the adjudicator y hearing, we conclude that th e t ri al court’s finding of neg lect was not ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e. In

rea ching our deter

mination, we ag ain emphasiz e t hat the rec ord clea rly ref lects that respond en t h ad an opportunity at the dispositi onal stag e of the proce eding s to submit evidenc e demonstrating that, beca use Bil l L

. wa s dece ased, it was in the minors’ best interests that they

not be made w ards of

the cour t or adjudicated neg lected.

-12-¶ 37 B. Jurisdiction for Dispositional S tag e

¶ 38 Respondent’s second contenti o n on appea l is that the trial court lacke d jurisdiction to
proce ed to the dispositi onal h ear ing and enter a dispositi onal order
, beca use there was insufficient evidenc e to support the trial court’s adjudication of neg lect. Be cause we alre ady conclude d that the trial court’s adjudication of neg lect did not violate responde nt’s rig ht to due proce ss and was not ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e, the trial court proper ly
proce eded to a d i s positional hear ing, as provided in section 2-21(2) of the Act. 705 I L CS 405/2-21(2) ( West 2010).

¶ 39 I I I . Conclusion ¶ 40 For the af

o re m en t i o n ed re as o n s , we aff irm the judgme nts of the circ uit court of Winnebag o County

.

¶ 41 Affir

med.

¶ 42 J USTI CE BI RKETT, dissenting: ¶ 43 I respe ctfully disagree with the majority that responde nt’s stipulation supported the trial court’s deter

mination of neg lect. L ike the majority
, I distinguish betwee n the proce dural and substantive sufficie ncy of the stipulation. Unlike
, th e ma jor ity
, howeve r, I find the stipulation neither pr ocedur ally

nor substantively

adequate. ¶ 44 Count Iof the petitions orig inally alleg ed that the minors’ environme nt “is injurious to [t heir] welfa

re in that [A.L .] was left in the car e of [hi s] dece ased fathe r [Bill L .], placing the minor[s ] at risk of harm.” At the adjudicator y hear ing, the State moved to amend count I to alleg e that the minors’ “envir onment is injurious to [their] w elfa re in that *** [Bill L .] had

a substance abuse problem that impaired his a bility to pa

rent[,] placing the minor[s ] at risk

o f h ar m

. ” Following the amendment, the State announce d that responde nt “would be

1 fac tually stipulating to the Amended Count, and the State would move to dismiss Counts 2 and 3 on their motion, with the understanding that service s could be deter mined and pare nts would cooper ate with service s based on the dismiss ed counts.” The State then immediately addre ssed the issue of the scheduling of the dispositi onal hearing. After a leng thy discussion, the parties and the court ag ree d o n a d at e. The court then rec og nized that it had not y et formally acc epted the stipulation:
“We ar e not done yet.
P u rs u ant to the ag ree ment rec ited by the State, ag ree d to by the parties, th e C o u rt adjudicate s the minors to be neg lected pur suant to [respondent’s] factual stipulation to Amended Count 1 of the Petition, Petitions

. The other counts of the Petitions
, Counts 2 and 3, ar e her eby

dismiss ed on motion of the State.”

I have quot ed one of the pet it ion s. Am end ed cou nt I is word ed dif fe re ntl y i n a l l thr ee 1 pet it ion s, b ut the vari at ion s a re sl ight a nd d o no t a ff ect th e s ubs ta nce of

th e a ll egati on.

-13-¶ 45 The co u rt ’s writ ten order enter ed the same day rec ited that the court was finding the

m i n ors neg lected pursuant to the “fa ctual stipulation by [respondent] as to Cou n t 1 as amende d.” ¶ 46 The c ourt failed, I submit, t o perf

orm its statutory duty as to the stipulation. Section 2- 21(1) of the Act pr ovides in releva nt part: “I f the court finds that the minor is abused, ne g lected, or depende nt, the court shall then deter

mine and put in writing t h e fac tual basis supporting the deter mination, and specify
, to the extent possible, the acts or omissions or both of eac h pare nt, guardia n, or leg al custodi an that form the basis of t he court’s finding s. That fi n d i n g shall appea r i n the orde r of the c ourt.” 705 I L CS 405/ 2-21 (West 2010). Whil e the f

actua l basis need not be in wr iting ( Madison H. , 215 I ll. 2d at 374-75), the tria l court’s finding s, whether oral or written, must fulfill the purpose of section 2-21(1) ’s fac tualbasis require ment, which is “to give the parties notice of the re asons formingthe basis for the removal of t he child and to pr eser

ve this re asoningfor a

ppellate r eview. E x plicit oral finding s stated during a dispositional hearingadvise the pa rties of the ba sis f

or the remova l of the minor and,

once transcr ibed, provide an equal opportunity to r eview the validity of the finding s on appea l as well as wr itten findings c ontained in an or der.” Id. ¶ 47 Although M.H.
, discussed at leng th by the majority
, dealt with a stipulation to unf itness, the supreme court’s c omments ill uminate the requirements of section 2-21( 1) as we ll. The responde nt in M.H. argued that a stipulation to unfitness is not valid unless the trial court deter mines that a fac tual basis exis ts for the stipulation. There is no statutory require ment of

a fac tual basis for a stipulation to unfitness; the responde nt in M.H. argued instead that due
proce ss mandates a fac tual basis. The sup re m e court considere d section 2-21, g overning finding s of negle ct, as a guide in deter mining the require ments of due proce ss in regard to finding s of unfitness:
“A fac tual-bas i s requirement ensure s that the State has a basis for its alleg ation of unfitness. In addition, a fac tual-basis require ment makes cer tain th a t a p a r e nt’ s admission of unfitness is knowing an d v o l u n t ary

. I llinois courts have held that in a neg lect
proce eding
, pursuant to [sec t i o n 2-21], circ uit courts must state in writing the fac tual basis supporting the deter minat i on that a minor is abused, neg lected, or depende nt. [C itation.] The purp o se of this statutory require ment is to set forth the g rounds for termination of pare ntal rig hts if no rea sonable eff orts wer e made by the pare nt to corr ect the g rounds in the orig inal adjudication of the child. [C itation.] This require ment puts the
pare nt on notice as to what is require d of her in the future as to reha bilitation or prog ress to be made with reg ards to her children. I t is clea r that if suffic i en t fa ct s must be
prese nted to a

nd found by the court in determiningabuse, ne g lect, or depende nce, then a fa ctual-ba sis presentation must be re quired for a findingof unfitness as w ell.
I llinois courts have also held that admissions unde r the J uvenile Court A ct must be voluntarily and intelligently made. [C itations.] *** [F]or a pare nt’s admission to be valid in an adjudicator

y phase of a neg lect proce eding it must be intelligently and voluntarily made. [C itation.] This knowing an d v o l untary require ment protec ts a pare nt from

-14-admitting to neg lect or abuse when their cond u ct d o es not fall within the State’s alleg ations. Clearly
, if an admission of neg lect must b e knowing and voluntary
, then an admission of unfitness must also be knowing and voluntary

. The fac tual basis allows the pare nt to hear the State descr ibe the all ege d fac ts relating to fitness and g ives the pare nt an opportunity to challeng e or c orre ct any fac ts that are disputed. Wit hout a factual basis, ‘there is a dang er that a pare nt may understand the State’s alleg ed g rounds of unfitness but may not rea liz e that his or her conduct does not fall within those all ega t ions.’ [C itation.] Thu s , i f a pare nt is not fully informed of the fac tual basis underly ing the State’s alleg ations, the risk is incre ased that h er pare ntal rig hts will be err oneously terminated beca

use of an ill-advised admission of unfitness.” M.H.
, 196 I ll. 2d at 365-67. ¶ 48 I n t h e fo re go i n g, the supreme court rea soned that, if a fac tual basis is require d for a stipulation to neg lect, it must also be require d for a stipulation to unfitness. The majority and I disag ree as to whethe r t he proce dural protec tions that M.H. imposed for unfitness stipulations apply equally t o n eglect stipulations. The majority believes that M.H. is “distinguishable ” beca

use a finding of unfitn es s ca rries g reater finality than a finding of
neg lect. Supra ¶ 24. There fore
, rea sons the majority
, the “due proce ss” conce rns articula ted by the cour t in M.H. do not require the trial court “to elicit a fa ctual basis beforeacc epting responde nt’s stipulation” to neg lect. (Empha sis added.) Supra ¶ 24. ¶ 49 I do not agree that M.H. is distingui s h ab l e. T h e m aj o rity err s in construing M.H. as requiring a due proce ss analy sis for deter mining whether the trial court must “ inquire as to the fac tual basis of [a neg lect] stipulation befor e acc epting it.” Supra ¶ 12. To interpre t M.H. 2 in this way

is to inver

t its analy sis. M.H. never

rec og nized the criteria

for a neg lect finding to be a cr eatur e of c onstitut ional law. Rather , it was the cr iteria for an unfitness stipulation that M.H. rec og nized as proce eding from the constitutional n o rm s , and the court derive d those criter ia by first co n s i d er i ng an analog ous statutory require ment, namely
, section 2- 21(1), which g overns neg lect deter minations at the adjudicator y stag e. The court conclude d,

as quoted above, “that if sufficie nt fac ts mu s t b e prese nted to and found by the court in deter mining abuse, neg lect, or depende nc e , th e n a f a c tu a l- b a sis prese ntation must be require d for a findi ng of unfitness as well.” M.H.
, 196 I ll. 2d at 366. I cannot read this but to imply that the same protec tions must be aff orded at the termination stag e as at t he adjudicator y stag e. The majority
, howeve r, thinks differ ent l y , and holds that a trial court may acc ept a stipulation to neg lect without “inquiring as to the fac tual basis” but may n o t o m i t this preliminary step in the case of a stipulation to unfitness. Supra ¶ 32. As the majority does not elabor ate, the rea der is left to surmise what differ ence the majority sees betwee n “inquiring

as to the fac tual basis” for a deter mination of neg lec t (t h e m aj o rity ’s own phrase ) and “dete rmin[i ng ] *** the fac tual basis” (s ec t i o n 2 -21(1) ’s phrase ). Whil e I cannot conce ive what the majority has in mind, I am convince d that it is draw ing a line wher e none is permitted. There is no indication in M.H. that the court was imposing stricter standards at the

T he m aj ori ty al te rna ti vely fr ames the is sue as whet her the tr ia l cou rt m ust “el ic it ” a fa ct ual 2 bas is bef ore ac cep ti ng the st ipu la ti on. Supr a ¶ 24.

-15-termination stag e than at the adjudicator y stag e. The majority

believes that the termination stag e car ries g reater finality than the adjudicator y stag e, but the M.H. court never intimated such a be lief–nor wa s it a nece ssary premise for i ts conclusion t hat a fac tual basis must be established for an unfitness stipulation. M.H. ’s holding require d nothing other than a belief that the termination stag e is as proce durally important as the adjudicator y stag e and, hence
, that if a fac tual basis is require d for a neg lect stipulation, it must be require d for an unfitness stipulation. Thus, the protec tions t h at the supreme court descr ibed as g overning the termination stag e, e.g. , that the pare nt must be “fully informed of the fac tual basis underlying the State’s alleg ations” (

M.H. , 196 I ll. 2d at 367), apply equally to the adjudicator

y stag e. ¶ 50 The majority finds in A.A. further support for disparate treatment of neg lect and unfitness stipulations. I n the conc luding pa ragraph of

its analy sis, the court in A.A. wrote: “T h er efor e, we hold that a sufficie nt fac tual basis for the adjudication [of neg lect]

was prese nted to the court by way of the pare nts’ admission at the adjudicator y hear ing and the additional evide nce presented at the termination hearing

. The due proce ss rig hts of the pare nts here in wer e not violated by this proce dure.” (Emphasis added.) A.A.
, 324 I ll. App. 3d at 240. ¶ 51 The A.A. court did not mention section 2-21(1)
, but applied due proce ss principles alone

. Perhaps, unlike here
, the respondents did not invoke s ection 2-21(1). I ex press no opinion

on whether the procedure in A.A. satisfied due proce s s re quirements; m y conce rn rather is that A.A. could be err oneously interpre ted to speak as to what section 2-21(1) require s. I t is clea r to me that, whateve r section 2-21(1) require s in terms of a fa ct u al b as i s (a topic I addre ss below), this require ment cannot be satisf i ed partly at the adjudicator y stag e and partly at t he termination stag e–a proce ss the court in A.A. approve d as con sistent with due
proce ss require ments. Rather, the fac tual-basis require ment of section 2-21(1) is a prer equisite to further proce eding s. Section 2-21(2) of the Act (705 I L CS 405/2-21(2) (West 2010)) pr ovides:
“I f, pursuant to subsection (1) of this Section, the court deter mines and puts in writing the fac tual basis supporting the deter mination that the minor is either abused or neg lected

or depende nt, the court shall then se t a time not later than 30 day s afte r the entry of the finding for a d i s p o sitional hear ing *** to be conducted *** at which hear ing the court shall deter

mine whether it is consistent with the health, safe ty and b es t i ntere sts of t he minor and the public that he be made a wa rd of the c ourt.”
“A finding of abuse, neg lect or depende nce is jurisdictional, without [which] the trial court lacks jurisdiction to proce ed to an adjudication of war dship.” (I nterna l quotation marks omitted.) Arthur H.
, 212 I ll. 2d at 464. Thus, whateve r due proce ss might require
, section 2- 21(2) r equire s that the fac tual basis contemplated by section 2-21(1) be provided in whole befor e the court may proce ed to a dispositi onal hear ing. A.A. ’s holding, which was based on due proce ss principles alone, ca n n o t be extended to section 2-21. The majority makes ref ere nce to r espondent’s oppor tunity at the dispositional hearingto corre ct any err ors that

occur red in the taking of the stipulation to neg lect. Supra ¶ 19. A dispositi onal hea ri ng cannot retroac tively cure a section 2-21(1) problem, as c ompliance with that section i s the jurisdictional threshold to the dispositi onal stag e.

-16-¶ 52 The fo re go i n g shows that the m ajority err s by rea ding into M.H. a dis tinction between

the fac tual-basis require ments for neg lect and unfitness s t i pulations–a distinction that the

rea der can at best g ather is betwee n “inquiring as to the fac tual basis” (the majority ’s phrase ) and “de termin[ing] *** the factua l basis” (sec tion 2-21(1)’s phr ase)

. ¶ 53 Inow turn to the crux of this appea l, which is what sec tion 2-21(1) itself re quires for a fac tual basis. Section 2-21(1) ’s require ment that the court “dete rmine *** the fac tual basis supporting the deter

mination” is phrase d simil arly to Rule 402(c)
, which states: “The court shall not enter final judgme nt on a plea of guilty wi t h o u t fi rs t deter mining that there is a fac tual basis for the plea.” I ll. S. Ct. R. 402(c) (e ff. J uly 1, 1997). Given this linguistic aff inity
, C.J. was justified in using Rule 402(c) to guide its interpre tation of section 2-21(1)

. “Words having well-de fined common l aw m eanings are interpre ted to have the same meaning s when used in statutes dealing with simil ar subject matter.” People v. Sergey
, 137 I ll. App. 3d 971, 975 (1985). Case law on Rule 402(c) is abundant, while case law on section 2-21(1) is sparse. ¶ 54 The majority denies t h at a gu i l ty plea is “ana logous” to a deter mination of neg lect, beca use “[t] he plain languag e of Rule 402(c) expressly provides that i t ap p l i es to final judgm en t on a plea of guilty ,” while “sec tion 2-21(1) instructs the trial court at the adjudicator

y hear ing to deter

mine whether the child is abused, neg lected, or depende nt, not whether the pare nts are guilty of some conduct.” Supra ¶ 24. The majority simply conflates the substantive and pr ocedur al re quisites for a finding of neg lect. There is no question that abuse, neg lect, and depende ncy under the Act are leg ally distinct from crimes. Yet while the fac tual bases for guilty pleas and neg lect deter minations may have differ ent substantive
content (owing to differen t substantive standards)
, they might have simil ar proce dural requisites. It is the procedur al kinship alone that intere sted C.J. , and now inter ests me. ¶ 55 I first point out one important proce dural differ ence betwee n Rule 402(c) and section 2- 2 1(1). Doing so also highlig hts that the majority appea rs not to find Rule 402(c ) as disanalog ous as it claims. The majority asser ts that the trial court “could have relied on any evidenc e in t he record a llowing it to rea sonably conclude that the minors wer e neg lected.” Supra ¶ 25. This asser

tion is, in fac t, a principle rec og nized in the case law on Rule 402(c)
, and it reve als t h at t h e m ajority is at least ambivalent about the rule’s pertinenc e. What constitutes a fac tual basis under Rule 402(c) has been explained numerous times in the case law. The followingis a repr esentative statement:
“The fac tual basis for a guilty plea g ener ally consists of either an express admission by the acc used that he committed the acts alleg ed in the indictment or a rec ital of evidenc e to the court which supports the alleg ations in the indictment. [C itations.] Rule 402( c) is satisfi ed, howeve r, if there is a basis anywhere in the record up to the entry of the final judgment from which the

judge could reasonably reach the conclusion that the defendant actually comm itted the acts with the intent ( if any) required to constitute the offense to which he is pleading guilty

. [C itations.] ” (Emphasis added.) P eo p le v. Vinson
, 287 I ll. App. 3d 819, 821 (1997). ¶ 56 The majority
, applying the italicized languag e, holds that a fac tual basis for the neg lect stipulation in this case co u l d h ave been found in the repor t that the guardia

n ad litem

-17-g ener ated for the J uly 22, 2011, pretria l confe renc e as well as i n t h e guardia n’s numerous ref ere nces at that hear ing to past misconduct by responde nt. I cannot ag ree

. The majority is

corr ect that my conce rn is the “notice” to responde nt. Supra ¶ 27. As I rea d M.H.
, the fac tualbasis requirem en t i n section 2-21(1) serve s a distinct notice function in addition to an evidentiar y function. As the court explained, “[the] require ment puts the pare nt on notice as to what is require d of her in the future as to reh ab i l itation or prog ress to be made with
reg ards to her children.” M.H.
, 196 I ll. 2d at 366. The court went on to descr ibe the purpose that the fac tual-basis require ment serve s with respe ct to an unfitness stipulation. As I noted above, supra ¶ 49, the comments by the M.H. court apply equally to neg lect deter minations and in fac t are not substantively differ ent from what the court had said about n egl ec t deter minations. Reg arding an unfitness stipulation, the court said that the p ar ent must be “fully informed of the fac tual basis underlying the State’s alleg ations.” M.H.
, 196 I ll. 2d at 367. Thus, even if a neg lect deter mination is objectively

g rounded in the rec ord, it will not be valid unless the parent i s fully informed of the record support for the alleg ed facts t hat, if true, would support the d et ermination. I f the court in M.H. believed that a fac tual-basis require ment wer e simply a matter of whether a stipulation to neg lect is objectively g rounded, then the court would have been satisfied if there wer e case worke r repor ts or other documents somewher e in the rec ord to corr oborate the State’s alleg ations. Instead, the court’s

overa rching conce rn was the notice provided to the pare nt, which t h e co u rt held must be “full[ ] .” Id. ¶ 57 Her e, when the stipula t i o n wa s t en d er ed
, n ei t h er the State, nor the trial court, nor responde nt’s attorney identified for responde nt the so urce s or materia ls that the majority now claims support the neg lect deter mination. Indeed, there wer e simply no ref ere n ce s t o any exis ting or anticipated evidentiary support for the neg lect determination. The S tate si mply stated that responde nt would stipulate to the alleg ations in count I of the amende d petitions. Certainly
, the alleg ations contained some fac tual specific ity
, b ut th is w a s in s ufficie nt by itself since responde nt w as not inf ormed “of the fac tual basis underlying the State’s alleg ations” (empha sis added) ( id .). ¶ 58 I t is telling that the majority acc uses me of insisti ng on strict compliance with section 2- 2 1(1), for this sug g ests that the majority rec og nizes that the approa ch I urg e i s t h e o n e actua lly dictated by the plain text of the statute. The majority
, howeve r, believes that to insist

on strict compliance with section 2-21(1) is to elevate proce dural exactitude over the purpose of the Act, which is the protec tion of minors. The majority cites Madison H. ’s observation that the Act itself states that it is to be “ ‘libera lly construed.’ ” Madison H.
, 215 I ll. 2d at 374 (quoting 7 0 5 I L CS 405/1-2(4) (West 2002)). Madison H. undermines, not supports, the majority ’s i nsistence on liberal construction here

. Whil e Madison H. held t hat i t would be unduly formalistic to insist on a particular vehicle ( written as oppose d to oral deliver y ) for the finding s that constitute the fac tual basis require d b y s ec t ion 2-21(1)
, the court did not intimate that there was any flexibi lity as to what the fac tual basis itself must acc omplish, that is, to notify the pare nt “of the reasons forming the basis for remova l of the child and to prese rve this rea soning for appellate review

. ” Id

. The majority believes that its liberal interpre tation of section 2-21(1) is appropr iate g iven the State’s “compe lling interest in expediting adjudicator

y hear ings,” which “ar e conce rned solely wi th whether minors are

-18-abused, neg lected, or depe ndent and do not adjudicate par ents ‘guilty ’ of any thing.” Supra ¶ 32. The majority also notes that a neg lect deter mination does not car

ry t h e same decisivene ss or finality as a termination ruling

. Supra ¶ 32. The majority ’s appar ent source for these statements is A.A.
, but, as I explained above ( supra ¶¶ 50-51), A.A. addre ssed what du e p ro ce s s require s, not what section 2-21(1) require s. As I also explained (supra ¶ 4 9 ), M.H. provides no justification for believing that section 2-21(1) requ i re s l ess of a fac tual basis for a neg lect stipulation than due proce ss require s for an unfitness stipulation. Rather, the court in M.H. took se ction 2-21(1) as a model for what due proce ss ought to require for an unfitness stipulation. ¶ 59 The m aj o ri t y ’s d i s t inction not only lacks a sound basis in case law but also fails as a matter of policy

. At the adjudicator y stag e, “[t] he issue *** is whether the minor is neg lected, not whether

one or both of the minor’s pare nts a re responsible for the neg lect.” In re A.W

. , 231 I ll. 2d 92, 103 (2008). The fac t that a neg lect finding need not char g e the pare nt with any kind of wrongdoing does not diminis h i t s signific ance

. Whether or not the neglec t finding is personalized to the pare nt, it will lead to an int ensely persona l proce ss. I t is a process i n which the pare nt is continually place d on the defe nsive and fac es a heavy burden in proving herse lf fit to have the child returne d–even though she might not have been responsible for the condition that le d to the remova l of the child. See In re D.D

. , 309 I ll. App. 3d 581, 589 (2000) (the responde nt was incar cer ated when his child was born and rema ined so when the child was adjudicate d neg lected and remove d from the mother’s custody on the g round that he was born with co ca i n e i n h is sy stem). The majority has inverted the signific ance of a negl ec t fi nding. Such a finding has no less impact beca use it beg ins rathe r than ends the
proce ss unde r the Act; rathe r, it ha s monumental impact because it beg ins a proce ss that is heavily weig hted ag ainst the pare nt. As I noted above ( supra ¶ 49), I cannot deter mine what the majority believes must be prese nted in the way of a fac tual basis at the adjudicator y stag e. The majority say s only what is not ne cessa ry , namely
, for the trial court to “inquir[e] as to” ( supra ¶ 32) or “elicit” ( supra ¶ 24) the fact u al basis–but even here the majority does not elabor ate. Fr om the majority ’s wholesale endorse ment ofA.A. ’s holding, which is essentially that the fac tual basis for a neg lect deter mination may be develope d piece meal throug hout the
proce eding s under the Act, I fea r that today ’s opinion will be taken to justify pro forma and perf unctory adjudications contra ry to the supreme court’s dictates in M.H. and disreg arding the rig hts of pare nts. ¶ 60 Returning to my Rule 402(c) analogy , I sug g est that M.H. does not permit courts to apply
to neg lect deter

minations the fail-sa fe rule in Rule 402(c) jurisprudenc e that allows a g uilty plea to be g rounded in any basis in the rec ord reg ardle ss of whether the defe ndant is apprised of that basi s

. W i t h t he fail-sa fe rule eliminated from consideration, the rema ining way s a fac tual basis for a plea of guilty may be established include “(1) * ** having the defendant
state what he did; (2) *** having the prosec utor summarize the testimony expected to have b ee n introduced at trial; (3) *** having the fac ts stated by witnesses; [and] (4 ) b y examination of a prese ntence repor t” ( People v. Ginder
, 26 I ll. App. 3d 295, 299 (1975))

. See also People v. W

hite
, 2011 I L 109616, ¶ 17 (“The fac tual basis for a guilty plea g ener ally will consist of an express admission by the defendant that he commit ted t he acts alleg ed in the indictment o r a rec ital to the court of the evidenc e that supports the alleg ations in the

-19-indictment.”). Nothing analog ou s to a ny o f th e s e s c e n a

r io s occur red here

. Respondent neither made persona l admissions on the re co rd n o r was direc ted to any evidenc e, exis ting or anticipated, supporting the State’s alleg ations. Re as o n ing by analogy with Rule 402(c)
, I conclu d e t hat the fac tual-basis require ment of section 2-21(1) was not satisfied. Consequently
, I agree with responde nt that the trial court lacke d au thority to proce ed to a dispositi onal hea

ring

. ¶ 61 Respondent’s second argument on proce dural sufficie ncy is that her neg lect stipulation

was not knowing and voluntary beca use the trial court failed to inform her of the proce dural
conseque nces of the stipulation. She cites only one case , Johnson
, 102 I ll. App. 3d 1005. Johnson applies the principle, which the majority does not question, that a neg lect stipulation “must be intelligently and voluntarily made; that is, it must be appar ent from the rec ord that the party making the admission was awa re of the conseque nces of his admission. ” Id. at 1012. In Johnson
, the rec ord was “complete ly devoid of any indication that [t he responde nt] understood the conseque nces of his admission [t o neg lect].” Id. at 1013. Ap p ar entl y , the responde nt in Johnson rec eived no admonitions at any point in the proce ss. Her e, by contra st, at responde nt’s May 18, 2011, initial appea ranc e, the trial court descr ibed the various stag es of proce eding s under t h e Act and advised responde nt that a neg lect finding could lead ultimately to termination of her pare ntal rig hts. Respondent, howeve r, did not stipulate to neg lect until August 10, 2011, y et was g iven n o fr es h admonitions. Despite the fac tual differ ence s betwee n this case and Jo h n s on , I cannot ag ree that the rec ord ref lects that responde nt was aw are of the proc edura l conseque nces of her stipulation to neg lect. ¶ 62 The majority also rea ches the issue of the substantive sufficie ncy of the stipulation. F rom

a strict proce dural standpoint, the lack of a fac tual basis prec ludes this court from addre ssing substantive sufficie ncy even in the alternative, as, contra ry to M.H.
, no support was adduce d for the neg lect alleg ati o n , an d o n e can only speculate as to what support could have been provided. I point out only my puzz lement at the majority ’s claim that the de termination of
neg lect must stand beca use responde n t failed to adduce “additional evidenc e at the adjudicator

y stag e to demonstrate that the neg lect wa s cure d as a r esult of Bill L .’s dea th.” Supra ¶ 36. The majority claims that, such evidenc e b ei n g ab s ent, it was within the trial court’s discretion to “conc lu d e[ ] that the risk of harm was sti ll prese nt afte r Bill L

. died.” Supra ¶ 36. Ag ain, count I of eac h petition alleg ed that there was an injurious e nvironment in that “[Bill L .] had a substance abuse problem that impaired his ability to pare nt[ ,] placing the minor[s ] at risk of harm.” Thus, the only harm that count I associate d with Bill L .’s drug problem was harm from Bill L

. himself. Bill L
., howeve r, could not have outlasted himself; wh en he died he cea sed to pare nt badly beca use he cea sed to pare nt altog ether

. This was obvious; no “additional evidenc e” w as nee ded. ¶ 63 The majority tacitly distinguishes R.W

. , but in that case , un l i ke here, there was at least a possi bility that the conditi ons–a clutt ere d y ard and house–that were alleg ed to constitute
neg lect could rec ur. Though the responde nt in R.W

. had clea ned up the mess befor e the
neg lect petition was filed, she had the capa bility of reve rting to her former lifestyle. Despite this and the fac t that the m ess had been a rec urring problem, t he appellate court dismiss ed

as “spec ulative” any “fe ar of rela pse.” R.W

. , 401 I ll. App. 3d at 1107. Her e, it would be more proper ly superstition than speculation to enter tain the possibili ty that Bill L

. could continue

-20-post mortem to prese nt a risk of harm throug h poor pare nting. The majority defe rs to the trial

court but cannot even venture to guess what specific “risk of harm” persist ed af t er Bill L

. died. Even if the trial court could have proper ly depar ted from the languag e of the petitions and considere d wh e th e r respondent herself prese nted a continuing risk of harm, no fac ts wer e adduce d in connec tion with the stipulation t o sug g est that she was a potential source of dang er. Respondent was apprised of no fac ts showing
, for instance, that she knew or should

3 have known of Bill L .’s drug problem and there by displayed poor judgme nt that might enable further injurious situations. Cf. 705 I L CS 405/2-3(1)( a) (West 2010) (“a minor shall not be considere d neg lected for the sole rea son that the m inor’s parent or pare nts or ot h er p er son

or persons responsible for the minor’s welfa re h av e left the minor in the car e of an adult relative for any period of time, who the pare nt or pare nts or other person responsible for the minor’s welfa

re know is both a mentally capa ble adult relative and phy sically capa ble adult relative, as define d by this Act”)

. I conclude that the stipulation was substantively insufficient. ¶ 64 For

the fore g oing r easons, I

would reve rse a

nd rema nd for a new a djudicatory

hear ing.

Nota bly, cou nt I I I
, whic h al le ged tha t re spo nde nt her sel f had a dru g pro ble m , was dis m is sed 3 by the Sta te when th e s ti pul at ion was pr ese nte d.

-21-