FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

STATEMENT OF REASONS OF COMMISSIONER ELLEN L. WEINTRAUB

This matter involved an alleged multimillion-dollar contribution-in-the-name-of-another 

scheme designed to conceal the identity of specific donors who sought to use federal political 

committees to evade state disclosure requirements. The scheme funneled funds to two federal 

super PACs with an understanding that the federal super PACs involved would use the funds to 

support Eric Greitens in his 2016 campaign for Missouri governor.

1

The scheme was clearly designed to avoid the transparency federal law requires. Donors

allegedly made over $6 million in contributions through two 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations, 

American Policy Coalition and Freedom Frontier, to two super PACs, SEALs for Truth (“SFT”) 

and LG PAC.

2 Since contributing directly to the super PACs would have led to disclosing the 

names of the donors, impermissibly using the nonprofit organizations as conduits allowed the 

names of the donors to be withheld from public disclosure. The record shows two primary 

transactions by the nonprofit organizations: $2 million provided to SFT and a series of nine 

contributions to LG PAC totaling $4.395 million.3 The FEC’s nonpartisan Office of General 

Counsel (“OGC”) convincingly argued that the nonprofit organizations were not the true sources 

of the contributions.4

1 Eric Greitens is currently a candidate for a Missouri U.S. Senate seat. See FEC Form 2, 202108139466260269.pdf 

(fec.gov).

2 Suppl. to First Gen. Counsel’s Rept., at 1, MUR 7422 (Greitens for Missouri, et al.) (May 12, 2020). 

3 First Gen. Counsel’s Rept., at 22, MUR 7422 (Greitens for Missouri, et al.) (Nov. 22, 2019).

4 See id. at 14, 18.

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matter of

Greitens for Missouri, et al.

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 MUR 7422

 

 

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MUR 7422 (Greitens for Missouri, et al.)

Statement of Reasons

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After reviewing the detailed record,5 OGC recommended finding reason to believe that 

contributions in the name of another were made, received, and that such contributions were 

improperly reported. I agreed with the recommendations.6 As OGC pointed out, the respondents 

elected to use federal super PACs to advance this scheme, which meant that they were required to 

report according to the rules applicable to federal super PACs.7 Having funneled the money 

through two 501(c)(4) organizations and two federal political committees, apparently to avoid state 

disclosure requirements, respondents’ argument that they should not have had to disclose the true 

source of the federal contributions because they were really trying to influence a state election 

rings hollow.

The Commission’s core mission is to promote disclosure to ensure an informed electorate

and deter and detect illegal activity. Testimony collected by the Missouri State House of 

Representatives Special Investigative Committee on Oversight suggested that the goal of the 

scheme was to hide the identities of the true donors, in part because their donations may have been 

illegal under state and federal law.8 Some of these contributions may have violated the Federal 

Election Campaign Act’s foreign national political spending ban,

9

a violation the Commission 

purports to prioritize. But because we could not muster a fourth vote, the names of the true donors 

and the existence of any other potential violations will remain hidden from public view.

OGC sought to further investigate the allegations, attempting to establish the true sources

of funds provided as part of the two primary transactions, as well as the relevant parties’ knowledge 

at the time regarding the identities of the true contributors.

10 OGC already had substantial 

information from the state legislative and Missouri Ethics Commission investigations. It was wellpositioned to timely determine the true source of the funds.

5 The available record before the Commission was atypically comprehensive for this stage of the proceedings. The 

record includes the factual allegations contained in the Complaint, a state investigation conducted by the Missouri 

House of Representatives Special Investigative Committee on Oversight, and the findings of a Joint Stipulation of 

Facts and a Consent Order setting forth uncontested facts and violations of Missouri law by Greitens for Missouri, 

the campaign committee of former governor Greitens. 

6 So too did one of my former Republican colleagues. The motion to adopt OGC’s recommendations failed on an 

unusual 3-0 vote, with one commissioner abstaining (at a time when only four Commissioners were serving). See 

Certification ⁋ 4, MUR 7422 (Greitens for Missouri, et al.) (June 25, 2020).

7 First Gen. Counsel’s Rept., at 15 (“SFT’s federal registration and its reported receipt of a $2 million federal 

contribution from APC appear to have allowed it to avoid registering as a state political committee and reporting the 

APC donation under Missouri law, but, by the same token, SFT opted into the Act’s federal regulatory regime, 

under which the funds it received and reported as federal contributions are treated as such.”) (emphasis added).

8 See id., footnotes 21 and 22 and accompanying text.

9 52 U.S.C. § 30121.

10 First Gen. Counsel’s Rept., at 22.

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Statement of Reasons

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Two of my colleagues wrote statements laying out their reasons for not moving forward in 

this matter.11 Their explanations of why we should not enforce the law notably lack any discussion 

of the merits of the matter.

One Commissioner argues that the Commission should have dismissed the Complaint in 

an exercise of its prosecutorial discretion because he had “doubts as to whether there would have 

been sufficient time left to complete OGC’s proposed investigation,” and due to the agency’s 

enforcement backlog, investigating this matter might not be the “best use of agency resources.”12

I emphatically disagree. At the time the first votes on this matter took place, a full eleven months 

remained before the earliest date that any conduct covered by the statute of limitations would have 

expired and nearly sixteen months remained before the five-year statute of limitations would have 

touched our ability to pursue monetary penalties on all the violations alleged.

13 Not only did this 

colleague effectively shorten the limitations period by well over a year, he ignored the 

Commission’s well-established equitable remedies, which are particularly important in a matter 

where the true identity of contributors has been misreported. 

Another colleague asserts his intent to abstain from casting substantive votes on matters 

that remain before the Commission but where previous substantive votes have already occurred.14

Unsurprisingly, he cites no statutory authority (or any authority at all) for that practice. There is 

none. The Commission frequently holds multiple substantive votes on matters, which can occur 

over multiple meeting days, including matters in which my colleague has participated and joined 

in successful efforts to find consensus.

15 And it was a curious choice to emphasize this argument 

in this matter in which he did indeed cast a substantive vote long after previous substantive votes 

had already occurred.

16 I disagreed with the substance of his vote, but he was 100% within his 

rights to cast it. A case remains open until it is closed by a successful motion to do so (which 

typically requires four votes), and motions remain in order until that happens. 

My colleague approvingly quotes this statement by a former Commissioner: “Congress 

established the FEC to prevent single-party control, with every significant decision requiring 

bipartisan approval.”17 Here, we are in agreement. Dismissing a case is a significant decision and

11 Stmt. of Reasons of Chairman Dickerson, MUR 7422 (Greitens for Missouri, et al.) (May 13, 2022); Stmt. of 

Reasons of Chairman Trainor, MUR 7422 (Greitens for Missouri, et al.) (Aug. 28, 2020).

12 Stmt. of Reasons of Chairman Trainor at 5, MUR 7422 (Greitens for Missouri, et al.) (Aug. 28, 2020). 

13 Compare Certification ⁋ 4, MUR 7422 (Greitens for Missouri, et al.) (June 25, 2020) with First Gen. Counsel’s 

Rept., at 1 (calculating the expiration of the statute of limitations as, “June 1, 2021 (earliest) – October 5, 2021 

(latest).”). See 28 U.S.C. § 2462.

14 Stmt. of Reasons of Chairman Dickerson at 1, MUR 7422 (Greitens for Missouri, et al.) (May 13, 2022). 

15 See, e.g., Certification ⁋⁋ 1, 2, MUR 7613 (Zekelman Industries, Inc., et al.) (July 15, 2021), Certification ⁋ 1, 

MUR 7613 (Zekelman Industries, Inc., et al.) (July 29, 2021).

16 See Certification, MUR 7422 (Greitens for Missouri, et al.) (Jan. 14, 2021).

17 Stmt. of Reasons of Chairman Dickerson at 3 n. 15 (citing Resignation Letter of Comm’r Caroline C. Hunter 

(June 26, 2020)).

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Statement of Reasons

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does not happen by virtue of a partisan 3-3 vote on a motion that fails. There are no magical or 

automatic dismissals.

Time after time, my colleagues claim we should not use our resources to pursue 

investigations. But this agency was created to “follow the money” and is charged with enforcing 

the law. The comprehensive record before the Commission demonstrating a multimillion-dollar 

contribution-in-the-name-of-another scheme is exactly the sort of matter for which Congress 

appropriates funds to the FEC to enable us to investigate.

The allegations in this matter were credible, with a factual record well-developed by

thorough investigations by both a state legislative committee and a state ethics commission. Our 

lawyers had plenty of time to build on the record of those investigations and enforce the law in 

this matter. We should have authorized them to do so.

__________________________

July 8, 2022 Ellen L. Weintraub

Commissioner

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