SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0393-14T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LATASHA M. BAKER,

Defendant-Appellant.

————————————————

Submitted April 11, 2018 – Decided 

Before Judges Fuentes and Suter.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 12-08-2188.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Jacqueline E. Turner, Assistant Deputy 

Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Jason Magid, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Suter, J.A.D.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

September 24, 2018
2

A-0393-14T3

Defendant Latasha M. Baker appeals the July 14, 2014 judgment of 

conviction following a jury trial, contending the court erred by not instructing 

the jury on the affirmative defense to felony-murder, by not suppressing 

statements she made to the police and by not granting her motion for judgment 

of acquittal. She also challenges her sentence as excessive. We affirm the 

convictions and sentence. 

I

We relate these facts based on the record from defendant's trial. On 

October 14, 2009, Silvia Ramos Morales and her husband Oscar Hernandez were 

about to close their bakery in Woodlynne for the evening when defendant 

entered carrying a baby and asked to buy a slice of cake. She left when they did 

not have what she wanted but returned in a few minutes. Shortly after, three 

men came in. One had a mask and a gun. He followed Hernandez as he ran into 

the kitchen, fatally shooting Hernandez in the chest. The other men, who 

blocked the entrance, told two prospective customers not to enter. Sensing 

something was wrong, they alerted a police officer. The customers in the store 

were robbed. They told the police the men were armed. The robbers attempted 

but were not able to open the cash register, and left the bakery when the police 

arrived. 
3

A-0393-14T3

Defendant and her baby were in the bakery throughout this. Just after the 

incident, defendant told the police that a Hispanic man in a red jacket, who she 

did not recognize, "snatched" her cell phone. The next day, October 15, 2009, 

the police traced defendant's cell phone signal to her apartment, which was 

located on the same block as the bakery. After she consented to a search of the 

apartment for the phone, the officers found the cell phone under her couch. 

The police interviewed defendant that day for three hours at the 

prosecutor's office and her statement was recorded. Defendant's explanation to 

the police about how the cell phone was in her apartment varied, but all the 

explanations indicated the robbers had to know her. She claimed the phone was 

returned to her by the robbers as a favor because she was a single mother, or to 

prevent her from calling the police. She speculated that she was being framed 

and that a neighbor was involved in the robbery. Further, she claimed it could 

have been her neighbor's sister's boyfriend. Defendant also claimed she spoke 

to her brother, Rashawn Carter, twice that day around the time she entered the 

bakery. Following her interview, the police took her home. 

On October 22, 2009, defendant agreed to be interviewed again at the 

prosecutor's office. This interview was for ten hours. By this time, the police 

had reviewed surveillance video from the bakery that showed defendant leaving 
4

A-0393-14T3

the bakery and returning, a fact she had not mentioned to the police during the 

October 15, 2009 interview. She explained to the police that she left to go to 

another store. However, the officers pointed out that the store was in the 

opposite direction from her movements depicted on the videotape. 

Defendant's phone records showed she made eighteen calls to her brother 

Rashawn Carter, just before and after the robbery occurred, not one or two calls 

as she said in her pervious interview. Historical cell site analysis revealed that 

both defendant's and her brother's phones were located near the bakery at that 

time. Defendant claimed that her sister must have used her phone.

The police asked defendant to take a lie detector test. She declined to do 

so saying "I don't know, I don’t know, I don’t think I should take it. If . . .

they think I'm the suspect then . . . I should wait until I get a lawyer or 

something." The interview continued after that. The police did not administer 

Miranda1 warnings before taking either statement. 

Other evidence about the robbery was presented at trial. Eddie Ball, the 

father of one of defendant's children, identified Rashawn Carter from a 

videotape of the robbery; Carter was wearing Ball's distinctive red jacket that he 

had left at defendant's apartment. The customers, who were turned away when 

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5

A-0393-14T3

the robbery was in progress, also identified Rashawn Carter as one of the men 

at the bakery. Michael Streater testified that in November 2009, he and William 

Cooper were cellmates, and Cooper told him that he shot someone at the bakery.

The victim's wife testified about her identification of the man who shot her 

husband. The police arrested Rashawn Carter and William Cooper as they were 

hiding in a pantry closet at defendant's sister's house.

Following defendant's indictment, she filed a motion to suppress her 

October 15, 2009 and October 22, 2009 statements. The motion judge denied

the suppression of the October 15, 2009 statement, but granted in part the 

suppression of the October 22, 2009 statement. With respect to the October 15 

statement, the court found: 

[t]he totality of the circumstances, including the 

duration, location, time, nature of the questions, 

language employed in the interrogations, the conduct of 

the police, the status of the interrogators, status of the 

suspect, and all the other relevant factors, including her

experience, her history, her knowledge, her 

expressions, her background, indicate that on balance 

that was clearly not a custodial interrogation. And . . . 

objectively, looking at the totality of the circumstances, 

a reasonable person in the defendant's position would 

have concluded that . . . [t]here was no significant 

deprivation of her freedom.

However, the court did not have the same "comfort level" with the October 

22, 2009 statement. The court found the October 22 interview was lengthy and 
6

A-0393-14T3

that the tone of the interview changed over time. The record shows defendant 

stated, "if they think I'm the suspect then . . . I should wait until I get a lawyer 

or something," meaning if she were a suspect then she wanted counsel. The 

interrogating police officers accused defendant of protecting someone. They

asked defendant whether she wanted to go home. The court found:

that Miranda . . . applies . . . in light of the tone, in light 

of the nature of her response . . . , and in light of what 

went on thereafter, . . . [a]nd her concerns and her 

perception of her status and the nature of the 

interrogation from that point on militate in favor of the 

defense and constitute invocation of Miranda and 

should be excluded under Miranda. 

The court suppressed the part of defendant's statement that was tainted by these 

interrogation tactics. 

The jury convicted defendant of first-degree felony-murder, N.J.S.A. 

2C:11-3(a)(3); second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15; second-degree 

conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; and fourth-degree hindering 

apprehension or prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4). After merging the 

relevant charges, the judge sentenced defendant on the felony-murder count to 

a term of forty-five years imprisonment, subject to an eighty-five percent period 

of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, five 
7

A-0393-14T3

years of parole supervision and a consecutive term of eighteen months for 

hindering apprehension. 

II

On appeal, defendant raises the following issues:

POINT I

THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT CHARGING 

THE JURY WITH THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 

TO FELONY MURDER, AS PROVIDED BY N.J.S.A. 

2C:11-3a(3)(a)-(d). (Not Raised Below)

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 

MS. BAKER WAS NOT IN CUSTODY AT THE 

TIME SHE WAS BEING INTERROGATED BY THE 

POLICE. U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV; N.J. Const. Art. 

I, para. 10. 

POINT III

THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING THE 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF 

ACQUITTAL ON THE CONSPIRACY COUNT AS 

THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF AN AGREEMENT 

PUT BEFORE THE JURY

POINT IV

THE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE. 
8

A-0393-14T3

A

In argument Point I, defendant contends that the trial court should have 

charged the jury with the affirmative defense to felony-murder. See N.J.S.A. 

2C:11-3(a)(3)(a)-(d). We review this issue under the standard of plain error, 

meaning an error "clearly capable of producing an unjust result," because it was 

not previously raised to the trial court. See R. 2:10-2. 

The Criminal Code provides an affirmative defense to felony murder 

where a defendant is not the only participant in the underlying crime and the 

defendant:

(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way 

solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the 

commission thereof; and

(b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any 

instrument, article or substance readily capable of 

causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort 

not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding 

persons; and

(c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other 

participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, 

article or substance; and

(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other 

participant intended to engage in conduct likely to 

result in death or serious physical injury.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)(a)-(d).]
9

A-0393-14T3

Defendant argues the trial court should have given the affirmative defense 

charge because she was acquitted of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and 

she did not know the other participants were armed. However, at trial, defendant 

contended she was not a participant in the robbery at all. The affirmative 

defense charge was not consistent with her defense strategy because it was a 

defense based on actions she claimed she did not do. Thus, it was not plain error 

for the trial court to charge felony murder without the affirmative defense when 

to do so was not consistent with defendant's defense strategy. See State v. 

Daniels, 224 N.J. 168, 184 (2016).

B

Defendant contends the trial court should have suppressed her October 15, 

2009 statement and all of her October 22, 2009 statement to the police.

2

Defendant argues the police had a strong suspicion by October 15 that she was 

involved in the robbery. According to defendant, their aggressive questioning 

after her cellphone was found in her apartment revealed they viewed her as a 

suspect. Then, on October 22, 2009, she was confronted with her cell phone 

records and the police asked her to take a lie detector test. Although the motion 

judge suppressed a portion of the October 22 statement she contends all of her 

 

2 Defendant acknowledges she was not in custody when she gave her first 

statement to the police on October 14, 2009, and did not seek its suppression. 
10 A-0393-14T3

statements "were an integral part of the State's case" and should have been 

suppressed. We disagree.

"An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal 

case must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision, 

provided that those findings are 'supported by sufficient credible evidence in the 

record.'" State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 426 (2017) (citing State v. Scriven, 226 

N.J. 20, 40 (2016)). We do so "because those findings 'are substantially 

influenced by [an] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 

"feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" State v. Gamble, 218 

N.J. 412, 424-25 (2014) (alterations in original) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 

146, 161 (1964)). We owe no deference, however, to conclusions of law made 

by trial courts in suppression decisions, which we instead review de novo. State 

v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015) (citing State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 327 

(2013)).

Custodial interrogation means "questioning initiated by law enforcement 

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 

freedom of action in any significant way." State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 265-

66 (2015) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). In determining whether a 

custodial interrogation has occurred, a court must examine all circumstances 
11 A-0393-14T3

surrounding the interrogation. State v. O'Loughlin, 270 N.J. Super. 472, 477 

(App. Div. 1994). "The critical determinant of custody is whether there has been 

a significant deprivation of the suspect's freedom of action based on the 

objective circumstances . . . ." Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 266-67 (quoting State v. 

P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103 (1997)). The inquiry is "'how a reasonable [person] in 

the suspect's position would have understood his situation.'" Id. at 267 (quoting 

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)). The State must also prove a

defendant's statement was freely and voluntarily given. State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 

368, 383 (2014).

We discern no error by the motion judge. The question is not as defendant

has posed it, whether the statements were an integral part of the State's case, but 

whether she reasonably believed she was not free to leave. The motion judge 

carefully analyzed each statement under the factors described in State v. Brown,

352 N.J. Super. 338, 352 (App. Div. 2002). We agree based on his analysis that 

defendant's October 15, 2009 statement was not the result of a custodial 

interrogation. Defendant was only asked at that time to explain how the stolen 

cell phone was returned to her house. By the time she was questioned on 

October 22, 2009, however, the police had more information from the cell phone 

records and the surveillance video and asked her about inconsistencies from her 
12 A-0393-14T3

prior statements. The fact that the interview is conducted at the prosecutor's

office did not make this a custodial interrogation. See State v. Micheliche, 220 

N.J. Super. 532, 536 (App. Div. 1987) (questioning in a police station does not 

necessarily establish custody). The fact that the police may have a suspicion 

that she was involved in the crime does not convert the interview to a custodial 

interrogation. See State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 406 (2009).

Here, the motion judge's order was based on the change in the tone of the 

interview toward defendant when she declined to take a lie detector test,

expressing she wanted a lawyer if she were a suspect. We agree with the motion 

judge that a reasonable person could have concluded she was not free to leave

at that point. 

C

Defendant contends the trial judge erred by denying her motion for 

acquittal under Rule 3:18-1 on the conspiracy count, arguing there was no 

evidence of a conspiracy. Our standard of review is whether there was sufficient 

evidence to warrant a conviction. R. 3:18-1. See State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 

458-59 (1967) (providing that the issue is whether there is sufficient evidence 

for a reasonable jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt "giving the State 

the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences 
13 A-0393-14T3

which reasonably could be drawn therefrom."). The essential requirement of a 

conspiracy is an agreement with another person to engage in conduct that is a 

crime or an attempt to do so or to agree to aid another with planning or 

commission of a crime or attempt to do so. N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1)-(2); See In re 

State ex rel. A.D., 212 N.J. 200, 222 (2012).

Here, there was sufficient credible evidence that defendant was part of the 

plan to commit robbery. She was in communication with the robbers before and 

after it, appeared to act as a look out, misled the police about the return of her 

cell phone and then about the identity of the robbers. This was sufficient to deny 

the motion for acquittal. 

D

Finally, Defendant argues her forty-five year sentence for felony murder 

and consecutive eighteen-month term for hindering is excessive because she did 

not have a weapon or know that the other participants were armed. We reject 

defendant's contention that her sentence was excessive. Our review of a 

sentencing determination is limited. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984). 

We review a judge's sentencing decision under an abuse of discretion standard. 

Id. at 363-64. We must determine whether: 

(1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the 

aggravating and mitigating factors found by the 
14 A-0393-14T3

sentencing court were not based upon competent and 

credible evidence in the record; or (3) 'the application 

of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the 

sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the 

judicial conscience.' 

[State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Roth, 95 N.J. at 364-65).]

Here, the court found aggravating factors: N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) the risk 

of re-offense; (6) the extent of defendant's prior criminal record and the 

seriousness of the offenses; and (9) the need to deter. It placed significant 

weight on factor three because of defendant's "consistent life of crime since the 

age of 19" and her failed opportunities for rehabilitation. It placed moderate 

weight on factor six considering that none of her prior offenses involved 

violence. The court placed significant weight on factor nine, the need to deter. 

The court found no mitigating factors. Defendant contends the court 

should have considered defendant's children in mitigation. The court found "she 

put her own selfish interests before those of her one-year-old child, who was 

running around the store as the three armed robbers burst into the store." The 

court considered her prior criminal record. There was nothing erroneous about 

the court's analysis nor did the sentence shocks one's conscience, given the 

nature of the offenses. The sentence was within the sentencing guidelines. We 

thus discern no abuse of discretion.
15 A-0393-14T3

Affirmed.