1 Filed 2/26/15 In re R.F. CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re R.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. R.F., Defendant and Appellant. A140700
(Solano County Super. Ct. No. J41554)

I.
INTRODUCTION In this juvenile wardship case, 15-ye ar-old R.F. appeals a dispositional order committing her to an out-of-home placement in a group home. R.F. contends that: (1) her
case should have been transferred to the dependency court; (2) there is insufficient evidence to support findings that she violated probation, and (3) the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering the grou p home placement. We affirm.2 II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS A. Background In August 2012, R.F. was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, 1 after she admitted a misdemeanor commercial burglary in exchange for dismissal of other theft related charges. By that time, then 12-year-old R.F. ha d already accrued eight referra ls to the county probation department and her guardian, great-grandmother Betty, had reported significant behavior problems. The juvenile court placed R.F. in an electronic mon itoring program (EMP) and released her to Betty’s custody. 2 In September 2012, R.F. was charged with two probation violations: (1) failure to comply with EMP; and (2) receiving a school suspension after attempting to take a cell phone from a developmentally di sabled adult special educati on student. R.F. admitted the EMP violation in exchange for dismissal of the other allegation. The juvenile court continued the wardship and probation, ordere d R.F. to attend a counseling program and committed her to juvenile hall for five weekends. In October 2012, R.F. was charged w ith violating probati on by leaving home without her guardian’s permission. Betty report ed that R.F. took he r debit card, withdrew $300, disappeared over night, and returned the following day but disappeared again. R.F. failed to appear at the proba tion violation hearing, and an arrest warrant was issued. Later that month, R.F. was arrested and the district attorney file d a new wardship petition charging her with grand theft. In Novemb er, R.F. admitted the grand theft charge in exchange for dismissal of the probation vi olation allegation. The juvenile court

1 Unless otherwise stated, undesignated st atutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 R.F. had lived with Betty since she was three months old. Her mother, who was unable to care for her children because of s ubstance abuse problems, was murdered when R.F. was six. R.F. reported that she had limited contact with her father who was not a “nice” person and engaged in criminal activities.3 continued the dependency, ordered R.F. to attend “WRAP” counseling, and to spend an additional five weekends in juvenile hall. In December 2012 and January 2013, R.F. was charged with additional probation violations for failing to comply with court- ordered curfew, staying out all night without permission and failing to atte nd school. R.F. admitted so me probation violations in exchange for dismissal of others, and, in Fe bruary 2013, the court escalated services to address R.F.’s mounting pr oblems. In addition to EMP monitoring and curfew restrictions, R.F. was ordered to participate in therapeutic behavioral services, to attend a girls’ group program, and to spend thre e additional weekends in juvenile hall. In May 2013, the district attorney filed a new section 602 petition. According to the probation department report, R.F. cut off her EMP ankle bracel et on May 3, and was arrested for stealing a man’s cell phone on May 5. The probation department also reported significant concern for R. F.’s safety. She left home and stayed out all night; she associated with adults who exploited and took advantage of her; older friends often asked her to steal things for them; she was involve d in a sexual relationship with a 16-year-old male, and at one point, she mi stakenly believed she was preg nant. These problems arose or persisted despite the fact that R.F. was “receiving the most intensive community based
treatment services that Probation and Solano County ha[d] to offer.” On May 29, 2013, the court conducted a contested hearing and sustained the allegation that R.F. received st olen property. On June 12, R.F. was removed from Betty’s custody and placed at a residential progra m called New Foundations. Her commitment
had to be extended after she snuck out of Be tty’s home while on a fu rlough visit. On October 22, R.F. was released from the program and returned to Betty’s care.
B. The November 2013 Probation Violations On November 5, 2013, R.F. was charge d with violating probation by failing to abide by court-ordered curfew. Accordin g to a supplemental probation department report, on November 4, Betty told the probation officer that R.F. left home on October 31
and did not return until November 2. At that point, Betty a nd R.F.’s brother “physically restrained” R.F. to keep her home. The po lice came and spoke to R.F., but the following4 day she left again and did not return home. On November 4, the probation officer
contacted R.F. at her school a nd spoke with her over the tele phone. R.F. stated that she had an argument with Betty on October 31 so she spent the night at a friend’s house.
When she returned home, Betty restrained her and duct -taped her to a chair. After she was “set free,” R.F. returned to her friend’s hom e. R.F. said she did not feel safe at home
but that she did not want to be taken back into custody. A report was filed with child protective services and the probation departme nt requested that R.F. be detained until a decision could be made about how to proceed. At the November 5 violation hearing, R.F. denied the allegation that she violated probation by failing to comply with her curfew order. The juvenile court continued the matter for a contest, and released R.F to Be tty’s custody under the EMP program. Three days later, R.F. was charged with another pr obation violation for failing to abide by her EMP contract. According to the probation de partment report, R.F. did not go to school on November 6. She left home early in th e morning and her whereabouts were unknown
until she returned a few hours later with a frie nd. When the friend refused to leave, Betty called the police who spoke to R.F. about re specting Betty’s home. On November 7,
R.F.’s conditional release officer went to he r school to speak with her. The officer was
informed that R.F. had not been at school since November 4. Be tty told the probation officer she was very concerned about R.F.’s safety and stated that she did not feel she could control her granddaughter. At the November 8 violation hearing, R.F. denied the most recent probation violation allegation and the matte r was continued for a contest. In addition, the juvenile court ordered a referral to the probation depa rtment for preparation of a section 241.1 report addressing whether R.F.’s case should be transferred to the dependency court or remain in the delinquency court. C. The Jurisdiction Hearing On the morning of Decembe r 4, 2013, the court held a jurisdiction hearing to
determine whether R.F.’s case should be transf erred to the dependency court in light of concerns that Betty could no longer properly care for R.F.5 The probation department a nd the department of social services filed an “Agreed Joint Assessment Report” which recommended that “it is in the best interests of the minor and her family to be afforded services solely via the Pr obation Department . . . .” According to the report, the allegations of a buse and/or neglect were not sustainable, and R.F. did not qualify for child welfare services , but she and her family could benefit from services available in the delinquency cour t. Furthermore, th e agencies jointly recommended that R.F. be placed in a gr oup home. That recommendation was based on several factors including R.F.’s history of running away; her noncompliance with court orders; her high risk for reoffense; and the lack of supervision and structure at Betty’s home. In addition, less restrictive efforts to assist R.F. had not been successful. She had already received intensive services and comp leted a placement at the New Foundations program, but only two weeks after her releas e from that program, R. F. admitted that she had contracted a sexually transmitted disease from “a pimp.” The juvenile court followed the joint reco mmendation to maintain R.F.’s case as a delinquency matter, providing this explanati on for its decision: “The summary of the minor’s behavior is such that I have grave co ncerns for the minor’s safety. I think she’s putting her life at risk in the be havior she’s engaging in. . . . [¶] And I just don’t think this is an appropriate case to be handled in the dependency court but rather should remain in the delinquency court because of the signifi cant risk and the greater services, in my opinion, that will be available to helping this minor turn her life around and survive past the age of 20, which is about what I would put her life expectancy at if she continues doing what she is doing. [¶] Her lifestyle, as reflected in this report, is extremely dangerous to her own well-being, so I’m goi ng to keep this matte r in the delinquency
court.” D. The Contested Probation Violation Hearing
On the afternoon of Decemb er 4, 2013, the court conducted a contested hearing on the two probation violation matters. Betty testified that a court-ordered curfew of 4:00 p.m. was also Betty’s rule and
that R.F. violated that rule on Halloween by leaving home that evening and staying out6 all night. Betty’s memory of the events was vague but she re called that some time after R.F. returned, Betty “restrained” her and th en called the police so they could “witness” what she had done and why she did it—because she did not want R.F. to leave again. After the police left, Betty let R.F. go because Betty was tired and needed to rest. A few days later, Betty thought R.F. was gone ag ain and called the police who searched the house and found R.F. in the garage. Betty also recalled an occasion during that time frame when R.F. did not go to school. Betty subsequently l earned that R.F. had gone to “get medical attention,” which upset Betty, who believes that “medical people” should have to notify the parents before treating a child. Nadia Hollomon, R.F.’s probation officer, te stified that she met with R.F. after she
was released from New Foundations to discu ss her obligations and the court orders she was required to follow. They discussed her curfew, which required her to be home by 4:00 p.m. on weekdays and 6:00 p.m. on we ekends. Hollomon also testified that she called R.F. on November 4, 2013, to follow up on Betty’s report that R.F. violated her
curfew. R.F. told Hollomon that she and Betty had an argument after Betty found out that R.F. had contracted a sexually transmitted disease. R.F. left the house and did not return for a few days. Probation officer Phillip McLaughlin te stified that his responsibilities include releasing minors from juvenile hall on home supervision or electronic monitoring. McLaughlin testified that R.F. signed an EM P contract pursuant to which she agreed to
remain at home at all time s except for school or medical, probation and attorney appointments. The contract also contained a provision requiring R.F. to attend school as required by law and school re gulations. On November 7, 2013, McLaughlin went to
R.F.’s school to conduct a school visit but sh e was not there. A school official checked the records and told McLaughlin that R.F. ha d not come to school that day or the day
before. At the conclusion of the hearing, the j uvenile court sustained the allegation that R.F. violated probation by failing to comply with the curfew order and it also conditionally sustained the allegation that sh e violated her EMP contract by failing to7 attend school. However, the court stated that it would reverse the second finding if R.F. produced verification that she missed school in order to attend a medical appointment.
The matter was continued for di sposition and to give R.F. tim e to produce verification of her medical appointment. E. The Contested Disposition Hearing At a December 13, 2013, hearing, R.F. di d not produce evidence of a valid excuse for failing to attend school but she did elic it testimony to support her objection to the probation department’s recommendati on to place her in a group home. Betty testified she thought the group home recommendation was “ludicrous.” She explained that R.F. was her child; she ha d raised her since she was three weeks old; she was as capable as any two pa rents; and she had raised nine children in her 79 years. Betty believed that R.F. needed “mental heal th,” which had never been provided. She agreed to accept help for R.F., but testified that she wanted R. F. to remain in her home. Furthermore, she explained that she did not ha ve a car and it would be difficult for her to visit if R.F. was placed outside the county.
Nadia Hollomon testified there were services that could be provided to R.F. if she remained in Betty’s home, many of which R. F. had received prior to her placement at
New Foundations. Hollomon also confirmed th at both Betty and R.F. had expressed an interest in obtaining those services agai n. However, other considerations led the probation department to recommend a gr oup home placement instead. Almost immediately after R.F. was released from Ne w Foundations she was back in the streets because “[t]he supervision is just not ther e in her home.” Furthermore, a group home could provide R.F. with mental health serv ices which would give her tools for making
better decisions after she was returned to Be tty’s care. Hollomon testified that she had found a placement for R.F. at the “Children’s Home,” a beha vior program in Stockton. The program has six female residents. There is an on-site clinical social worker, weekly meetings with a psychologist, and a psychiat rist who conducts monthly evaluations. The program has an on-site school, includes proac tive social activities fo r self-esteem, and takes the girls on field trips.8 At the conclusion of the disposition hear ing, the court remove d R.F. from Betty’s custody for placement in suita ble foster home or institutio n. The maximum period of confinement was one year six months. R.F. was placed at the Children’s Home of
Stockton on D ecember 23, 2013.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdictional Issues “A child who has been abused or negl ected falls within the juvenile court’s protective jurisdiction under sec tion 300 as a ‘dependent’ child of the court. In contrast, a juvenile court may take juri sdiction over a minor as a ‘ward’ of the court under section 602 when the child engages in criminal behavi or. [Citations.] As a general rule, a child who qualifies as both a dependent and a ward of the juvenile court cannot be both. [Citations.]” ( In re M.V . (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1505.) “In section 241.1 the Legislature has set forth a procedure for handling cases with potential dual jurisdiction. First, the probati on department and the we lfare department of the county must asse ss the minor, pursuant to a jointly develope d written protocol, to
determine ‘which status will serve the best interests of the minor and the protection of society.’ Then the recommendations of both departments must be presented to the juvenile court for its determination of the st atus appropriate for the minor. [Citation.]” ( In re Marcus G . (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1012-1013, fn. omitted.) “We review the juvenile court’s determ ination under section 241.1 for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ‘To s how abuse of discretion, the a ppellant must demonstrate the juvenile court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd
manner that resulted in a misca rriage of justice.’ [Citation.] Throughout our analysis, we will not lightly substitute our decision for that rendered by the juvenile court. Rather, we must indulge all reasonable inferences to s upport the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings where there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citation.]” ( In re M.V ., supra , 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1506-1507.)9 In the present case, R.F. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by refusing to transfer her case to the depende ncy court because its decision was based on a deficient section 241.1 assessment report.
“The assessment of a minor under section 241.1 is statutorily required to include, at a minimum, consideration of the following eight factors: (1) the nature of the referral; (2) the age of the minor; (3) the prior record of the mino r’s parents for child abuse; (4) the prior record of the minor for out-of-control or delinquent behavior; (5) the parents’ cooperation with the minor’s sch ool; (6) the minor’s functioning at school; (7) the nature of the minor’s home environmen t; and (8) the records of other agencies that
have been involved with the minor and his or her family. [Citation.] This statutory mandate has been augmented by [California Rule of Court] rule 5.512, which requires the joint assessment under section 241.1 to be me morialized in a written report. Further—in addition to the eight factors set forth in secti on 241.1 that must be c onsidered in any such joint assessment—rule 5.512 de mands evaluation of four additional items : (1) the history of any physical, sexual, or emotional abuse of the child; (2) any se rvices or community agencies available to assist the child and his or her family ; (3) a statement by any counsel currently representing the minor; and (4) a statement by any court appointed special advocate (CASA) currently appointed for the child. [Citation.]” ( In re M.V ., supra , 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1506.) Here, R.F. argues that her section 241. 1 assessment report failed to adequately address three matters required by the statute and/or court rule: (1) the nature of the referral; (2) the age of the minor; and (3) any services or community agencies available to assist the child and her family . (§ 241.1, subd. (b)(2); California Rules of Court, rule 5.512(d)(10).) However, our review of the detailed and comprehensive 24-page report
confirms that all three of these ma tters were adequately addressed. First, the report provided de tailed information about the na ture of the referral, i.e., the two probation violation alle gations that simultaneously raised concerns about Betty’s ability to care for R.F. It summarized the eviden ce supporting conclusi ons by the social services agency that the neglect/abuse refe rrals would likely not be sustained because10 they were either inconclusive or not supported by sufficien t evidence. Notably, that
evidence included interviews with the involved parties including R.F. who told the social worker that the reason Betty and R.F.’s brot her duct-taped her to a chair was because they were scared and upset that she had co ntracted a sexually transmitted disease “from being out in the streets.” R.F. also acknow ledged that she was not injured by the incident and, indeed, it had no real effect on her at a ll. She denied that she kept running away, taking the position that she was only leaving home without permission. Furthermore,
R.F. insisted that she wanted to return to Betty’s home, and that Betty could adequately
control her and take care of her. The report also addressed the circumstan ces that gave rise to the two probation violation allegations, compiled the subs tantive evidence s upporting the joint recommendation for a group home placement and explained why th at placement would best address R.F.’s needs: “A group ho me placement will allow [R.F.] to address treatment issues in a safe, st ructured living environment. The minor’s psychological, educational, medical a nd behavioral needs will be met while in placement. She will also receive counseling to address her exploitive be haviors, lack of self-esteem, and poor response to parental supervision. It is hopefu l that placement will give the minor tools to assist her in better decision making, an d reunify with her great-grandmother.” Second, the section 241.1 assessment addre ssed the implications of R.F.’s age. For example, the report stat es “Before the Court is a thirteen year old minor who has developed a significant pattern of noncompliance. She has a history of running away from home and engaging in risky behaviors. Her young age and naivety make the minor’s welfare of great concern.” (Original bolded italics.) Third, the section 241.1 assessment summa rized services that had been provided
to R.F. and addressed what se rvices were potentially availabl e to her in the future. As
reflected in our factual summa ry, the agencies were conc erned that R.F. would not qualify for any services if the case was tr ansferred to dependency court. More fundamentally, as just discussed, the recommendation to re tain R.F.’s case in dependency11 court was explicitly tied to the nature of servi ces that would be available to her in a group home placement. R.F. argues that the section 241.1 asse ssment was fatally inadequate because it failed to: (1) mention that R.F. was not rece iving counseling or support services during the two-week period after he r release from New Foundations , and (2) consider whether the absence of those services may have “hel ped create the possibility that R.F. would quickly violate the terms of her probation.” She contends that this information was crucially relevant because if it had been in cluded in the report, the court would have realized that “[a]t most, this entire episode speaks to R.F. ’s deep need for therapy and structured programs and not to a need for increased punishment or discipline.” We reject this argument for several, separate reasons. First, the report as written was neither inaccurate nor misleading; it accurately summarized the services provided to R.F. th roughout the wardship proceeding and never suggested that she was in co unseling during the two weeks after she was released from New Foundations. Second, R.F.’s assertion th at she would not have violated probation if she had had been receiving counseling during that brief period is speculation, not supported by affirmative evidence and argu ably inconsistent with her demonstrated pattern of behavior. Third, R.F.’s characte rization of the choice a court must make under
section 241.1 reflects a fundamental misunde rstanding of the purpose of delinquency proceedings. “Under section 2 02, juvenile proceedings ar e primarily “rehabilitative” ( id.
, subd. (b)), and punishment in the form of “retribution” is disallowed ( id. , subd. (e)).” ( In re Eddie M . (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 507.) Thus, contrary to the premise of R.F.’s claim of error, the decision to keep her case in the delinquency co urt was not motivated by a desire to punish her. In fact, it appears to us that everyone agreed R.F. needed therapy and structured programs, and that the dispositive question before the court was which forum could best provide those services going forward. Taking a different tack, R.F. argues that, regardless of the adequacy of the section 241.1 assessment report, the juvenile court abused its di scretion by failing to explicitly
address the factors that R.F. has identified as dispositive in her case, namely the nature of12 the referral, her tender age, and the services that had not been pr ovided after she was released from New Foundations. First, R.F. fails to identify statutory or case authority requiring a juvenile court to make explicit fi ndings with respect to each or any factor
addressed in a section 241.1 a ssessment. Second, as our fact ual summary reflects, at the jurisdiction hearing in this case, the court provided a detailed and case specific explanation for its ruling, which confirms th at it considered the relevant factors and
reached a reasoned decision that was neither arbitrary nor capricious. In summary, the section 241.1 assessment report was adequate and substantially supports the court’s determination that th e delinquency court was a better forum for addressing R.F.’s increasingl y dangerous behavior. Inde ed, the agencies questioned whether R.F. would even qualify for child depe ndency services. Thus , the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by continuing R.F.’s case as a delinquency matter.
B. The Probation Violations Probation violation proceed ings conducted pursuant to section 777 require a preponderance of the evidence to support the violation. (§ 777; In re Eddie M
., supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 501.) Here, the record shows that both probation viola tions were proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The probation violation fo r violating curfew was esta blished by testimony from Betty and Nadia Hollomon and was not disputed by any evidence. Betty testified that R.F. violated curfew on October 31, 2013 , by leaving her home after returning from school and staying out all night. Nadia Hollomon confirmed that Betty had reported that R.F. went out at night and did not return home. Hollomon also testified that R.F. admitted to her that she left Betty’s home a nd spent more than on e night at a friend’s
house.
The EMP violation was established by testimony from Betty and Phillip McLaughlin. Betty testified that R.F. did not go to school on at least one day after she was released from New Foundations. McLaughlin also testified that R.F. did not go to school on November 7, 2013.13 On appeal, R.F. contends the juvenile court committed reversible error by admitting McLaughlin’s testimony because it was inadmissible hearsay. When her trial counsel raised this objection at the prob ation violation hearing, the court asked McLaughlin how he knew R.F. was not at school . McLaughlin testified that “I went to the attendance office. They chec ked the computers. She was not at school that day or the previous day.” R.F.’s counse l objected again, arguing the county was required to bring in
the custodian of records from the school. Af ter McLaughlin confirmed that he got his
information from a school offi cial, the court overruled R.F .’s objection, stating: “In probation violation hearings, the Court ca n rely on reliable hearsay, and I think
information from a school official relating to whether or not someone is at school is sufficient to overcome the hearsay objection.” The legal premise of the juvenile court’ s ruling was sound. “Although probation violation hearings involve the criminal justic e system, they are not governed by all the procedural safeguards of a criminal trial. [Citations.] Specifically the Sixth Amendment’s right of confront ation does not apply to pr obation violation hearings. [Citation.] A defendant’s right to cross-exam ine and confront witnesses at a violation hearing stems, rather, from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citation.] Those confrontatio n rights, however, are not abso lute . . . .’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Abrams (2007) 158 Cal.Ap p.4th 396, 400.) Juvenile probation revoca tion proceedings are govern ed by section 777 which states that a court “may admit and consider re liable hearsay evidence at the hearing to the
same extent that such evid ence would be admissible in an adult probation revocation hearing, pursuant to the decision in People v. Brown [1989] 215 Cal.App.3d [452] and any other provision of law.” (§ 777, subd. (c).) In People v. Brown, supra , 215 Cal.App.3d 452 ( Brown ), the Court of Appeal rejected a contention that appellant’s due process rights were violated at a probatio n revocation hearing because a police officer was permitted to testify regarding the results of a lab test establishing that evidence seized from the defendant was cocaine. ( Id . at pp. 454-455.) The Brown court held “[a]s long as hearsay testimony bears a substa ntial degree of trustworthiness it may14 legitimately be used at a proba tion revocation proceeding. [C itations.] In general, the court will find hearsay evidence trustwort hy when there are sufficient ‘indicia of reliability.’ [Citation.] Such a determination rests within the discretion of the trial court
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” ( Ibid .)
Section 777 and Brown support the juvenile court’s decision to permit the probation officer to testify that a school o fficial looked at the school attendance records
and then told him that R.F. had not been at school for two days. School officials have a mandatory duty to keep attendance records and an incentive to keep accurate records in order to ensure adequate state funding. (Ed. Code §§ 1244, 41 020, subd. (c), 42127, 44809, subd (b), 46000, 46300.) In light of this indicia of reliability, the court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the hearsay stat ement by a school official was sufficiently trustworthy to be used at the probation violation proceeding. On appeal, R.F. contends the school official’s hearsay statement was not
admissible under Brown or otherwise reliable because it was “testimonial” hearsay, used as substantive proof of the pr obation violation, and thus c ould not be properly admitted absent a showing of good cause for replacin g live testimony about the matter. To support this argument, R.F. relies on People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144 ( Arreola ), and In re
Kentron D . (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1381.)
Arreola
, supra , 7 Cal.4th 1144, was an appe al from an order revoking the defendant’s probation for driving while intoxi cated. At the revocation hearing the trial court admitted evidence of a police officer’s preliminary hearing testimony given in a new criminal case arising out of the same incident without requiring a showing of good cause for not eliciting live testimony from the officer. ( Id . at pp. 1156-1157.) The
Arreola court affirmed the rule that many forms of documentary hearsay evidence are by their nature sufficiently “trust worthy to be relied upon by the trial court in revoking probation.” ( Id . at p. 1156.) However, the court also found that the admission of preliminary hearing testimony in lieu of liv e testimony required a more rigorous showing of good cause.15 The Arreola court explained that “[t]here is an evident distinction between a transcript of former live testimony and the t ype of traditional ‘documentary’ evidence . . . that does not have, as its source, live testimony. [Citation.]” ( Arreola, supra , 7 Cal.4th at p. 1157, italics omitted.) Witness demeanor is usually not a “significant factor” when evaluating the reliability of documentary hearsay where th e purpose of foundational testimony is often simply to authenticate the documentary material, and where the missing witness would likely “be unable to recall from actual memory information relating to the specific contents of the writing and would rely instead upon the record of his or her own action.” ( Id . at p. 1157.) However, there is a “particularly important”
need for confrontation where th e evidence is testimonial “bec ause of the opportunity for observation of the witness’s demeanor.” ( Ibid ) In light this distinction, the Arreola court held that a showing of good cause is require d “before a defendant’s right of confrontation at a probation revocation hearing can be disp ensed with by the admission of a preliminary hearing transcript in lieu of live testimony.” ( Id. at p. 1159.) The good cause require ment articulated in Arreola is a “broad standard” which is met “(1) when the declarant is ‘unavailable’ under the traditional hearsay standard (see Evid. Code, § 240), (2) when the declarant, although not legally unavailable, can be brought to the hearing only through great difficulty or expense, or (3) when the declarant’s presence would pose a risk of ha rm (including, in appropriate circumstances, mental or emotional harm) to th e declarant. [Citation.]” ( Arreola
, supra , 7 Cal.4th at p. 1160.) Furthermore, the ultimate determ ination of admissibility must be made on a case-by-case basis and requires co nsideration of other releva nt circumstances including the purpose for which th e evidence is offered, the signifi cance of the particular evidence,
and whether other admissible evid ence corroborates the hearsay evidence or if it is the only evidence establishing the probation violation. ( Ibid .) This good cause requirement was applied in a juvenile probation matter in Kentron , supra , 101 Cal.App.4th 1381.
Kentron was an appeal from a disposition orde r placing a ward of the juvenile court in a camp community progr am based on findings that he violated several conditions of his probation. (101 Cal.App.4th 1381.) Applying the principles summarized in16 Arreola
, supra , the Kentron court found that the juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting hearsay statements in the probatio n department’s section 777 notice of the alleged violations. ( Id. at pp. 1392-1393.) The secti on 777 notice was an “accusatory pleading” prepared by a prob ation officer for the sole pur pose of instituting a judicial proceeding and the prosecutor did not esta blish any foundation for admitting it as evidence. ( Id . at p. 1393.) Two of the violations alleged in the notice were witnessed by probation officers who were not present in court, and there had been no showing these witnesses were unavailable. The other allege d violations were base d on observations by probation officers who were present in court a nd presumably available to testify, and yet the prosecutor chose not to call them as w itnesses. Under these circumstances, the juvenile court committed reversible error by re lying solely on the hearsay allegations in
the section 777 notice as subs tantive proof that the viol ations were committed. ( Kentron , supra , at pp. 1392-1393.) For several reasons, Arreola and Kentron do not require reversal of the probation
violation order in this case. First, we are not convinced th at McLaughlin’s testimony fits
the definition of testimonial hearsay addressed by these case s. Technically, McLaughlin was repeating a statement made to him by the school official. However, the school official’s statement was itself documentary hearsay, since it was based entirely on the content of official computerized school record s. That official’s demeanor as a witness was not a significant factor in evaluating fo undational testimony relating to the admission records. It appears that the only purpose achieved by ma ndating the appearance of the
school official would be to authenticate doc umentary material whic h the juvenile court could reasonably ha ve concluded was unnecessary in li ght of the indicia of reliability
associated with those records. Second, even if the court erred by perm itting McLaughlin to testify that R.F. did not attend school on November 7, that wa s only one aspect of the probation officer’s testimony. McLaughlin also testified that he went to R.F.’s school on that date and did not find her there. That non-hearsay testim ony reinforced Betty’s testimony that R.F. did not go to school on at least one day during the relevant time period. Thus, there was17 substantial evidence of the EM P violation even without consideration of the reliable hearsay evidence establishing that school records showed R.F. had not been to school in two days. Finally, as discussed above, the record also establishes that R.F. committed a separate probation violation by failing to comply with the cour t’s curfew order. The only ground upon which R.F. challeng es that separate finding is that Betty admitted that, on a different occasion she mistakenly believed th at R.F. had gone out when she was only hiding in the basement. Betty’s testimony about a collateral incident which was not charged as a probation violatio n does not dilute the undisput ed substantial evidence that
R.F. violated her cu rfew on October 31.
C. The Out of Home Placement “A juvenile court’s commitment order may be reversed on appeal only upon a showing the court abused its discretion. [C itation.] ‘ “We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the j uvenile court and will not disturb its findings
when there is substantia l evidence to support th em.” ’ [Citation.]” ( In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1330.) In the present case, the juvenile court made numerous findings to support the outof-home placement, including that (1) prior e fforts to keep R.F. in Betty’s home had failed; (2) the extensive services already prov ided to R.F. did not alter her problematic behavior; (3) R.F. resisted Betty’s efforts to help her because th e streets were more attractive to her than Betty’s home; (4) R.F. repeatedly violated the terms of her probation; and (5) R.F. was engaging in a pa ttern of inappropriate and dangerous sexual behavior. All of these findings are supporte d by substantial evidence and they establish that the juvenile court did not abuse its disc retion by ordering the out of home placement. R.F. contends that “de minimus,” “technical and non-criminal” probation violations do not justify removing a 13-year-o ld from her home. Th is argument fails to address the pertinent facts supporting the juven ile court’s placement decision. R.F.’s two recent probation violations were not isolated occurrences, but part of a pattern of noncompliance. They were also evidence that the court and probation de partment had18 made extensive efforts to rehabilitate R.F. without removing her from her home and that those efforts had failed. Furthermore, when vi ewed in proper context, the fact that R.F. was only 13 years old reinforced the juvenile court’s conclusion that an out of home placement was necessary. R.F.’s immaturity combin ed with her other problems to make her uniquely vulnerable to exploitation an d abuse by people from whom she refused to
disassociate. R.F. ignores substantial evidence that sh e did not utilize servic es afforded to her while in Betty’s care; that sh e needed greater protection th an Betty could provide; and
that the intensive services a fforded at the Children’s Home would increase the likelihood that R.F. could successfully re unify with Betty in the future. Under these circumstances,
the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the out-of-home placement.
IV.
DISPOSITION The juvenile court orders are affirmed.19 _ ____________ ____________ RUVOLO, P. J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ REARDON, J.

_____________ ____________ BOLANOS, J.*

* Judge of the San Francisco City and Co unty Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, sect ion 6 of the California Constitution.