CSI REPORT

xit Years of Reorganizing

for Combat:

A Historical Trend Analysis

COMBAT

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

NO. 14
Combat Studies Institute

Missions

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June

1979 as a department-level activity within the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas. CSI has the following missions:

1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the

doctrinal concerns of the Army and publish the results in a

variety of formats for the Active Army and Reserve Components.

2. Prepare and present instruction in military history at

USACGSC and assist other USACGSC departments in

integrating military history into their instruction.

3. Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command's executive agent for the development and

coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military

history instruction in the TRADOC service school system.

CSI Reports are short-term research papers

prepared in response to official inquiries. They

are based mainly on secondary sources and

provide basic information on the subject under

consideration. The views expressed in a CSI

Report are those of the author and not

necessarily those of the Department of the

Army or the Department of Defense.

I I I I I I I

I , , · I · ,

Il · I I··- I L II LI - -·I I I I - II -- 111 I--
CSI REPORT

NO. 14

Sixty Years of Reorganizing

for Combat:

A Historical Trend Analysis

Combat Studies Institute

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-1352

December 1999
For additional copies of this CSI Report, download this booklet from the CSI website at

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/csi/
Contents

Figures v

Introduction 1

Triangular Infantry Division, 1939 3

Armored Division, 1940-1943 9

Division Reorganization, 1947-1948 14

Pentomic Division, 1955-1963 19

ROAD (Reorganization Objective Army Divisions), 1960-1963 23

11th Air Assault Division (Test), 1963-1965 28

1st Cavalry Division (TRICAP), 1971-1974 33

Division Restructuring Study (DRS), 1975-1979 37

Division 86, 1978-1980 41

High Technology Test Bed (HTTB)/High Technology Light

Division (HTLD)/ High Technology Motorized Division

(HTMD) (9th Infantry Division), 1980-1988 45

7th Infantry Division (Light), 1983-1986 51

Force XXI/EXFOR/Experimental Division, 1993-1997 55

iii 111

Figures

1. Infantry Division, 15 July 1943 8

2. Armored Division, 15 September 1943 13

3. Infantry Division, 7 July 1948 18

4. Pentomic Infantry Division, 1 February 1960 22

5. ROAD Division Base, 1961 27

6. Howze Board-Air Assault Division, 1963 32

7. TRICAP Division 36

8. Division Restructuring Study (DRS) Division (1976) 40

9. Heavy Division, 1 October 1982 44

10. Motorized Division (HTMD), 1984 50

11. Light Division, 1 October 1985 54

12. Force XXI (1995) 60

v
Introduction

Throughout the twentieth century, the U.S. Army has periodically reviewed the structure

and organization of its primary combat unit, the division, to posture itself better to meet

changing requirements. Since 1939, the Army has conducted at least eleven such reviews with

associated testing and validation exercises, the most recent being the reorganization of the

light and heavy divisions in the mid-to-late 1980s. Given the significant changes in the world

political environment since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in the early

1990s, another such review is warranted, if not overdue.

In November 1999, Gen. Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, directed the U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command to undertake just such a comprehensive review. In response,

the TRADOC commander, Gen. John Abrams, began the development of a brigade-sized

force capable of rapid deployment, yet with the staying power of the current heavy force.

Toward that end, the Combined Arms Center tasked the Combat Studies Institute to analyze

four U.S. Army division/brigade restructuring initiatives that took place between the years

1960 to 1994 in an attempt to "determine critical historical insights gained and common

themes from previous Army experiments germane to standing up the Prototype [Initial]

Brigade."

To provide a broader historical context and a wider range of key themes and trends that

may be relevant to the current restructuring efforts, the Combat Studies Institute expanded its

efforts to include several additional restructuring initiatives that have occurred since 1939.

Twelve significant reorganization efforts fall within this period: the Triangular Infantry

Division, 1939; the Armored Division, 1940-43; the Division Reorganization of 1947-48; the

Pentomic Division, 1955-63; the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD),

1960-63; the 11th Air Assault Division (Test), 1963-65; the 1st Cavalry Division (TRICAP),

1971-74; High Technology Motorized Division, 1980-88; the 7th Infantry Division (Light),

1983-86; the Division Restructuring Study (DRS), 1975-79; Division 86, 1978-80; and Force

XXI Experimental Force (EXFOR), 1993-97. The following analysis takes the form of a case

study on each of these efforts. Each case study begins with an overview of the circumstances

that generated the restructuring initiatives in question. The overview is followed by an

analysis of the following focus areas: proposed unit missions; preparatory training; unit field

test methods; testing results; TOE-required resources versus MTOE manning; equipment;

technology issues; impact of conversion on unit readiness; operational/wartime validation;

and other insights gained. The final chapter of this work draws upon the twelve case studies to

illuminate significant common themes in the Army's perennial efforts to improve its

capabilities through reorganization.

1

TRIANGULAR INFANTRY DIVISION, 1939

BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED UNIT MISSIONS: During the Spanish

American War, the U.S. Army implemented ad hoc triangular divisional organizations with

three brigades each of three regiments. Every regiment had three battalions of four companies.

The Field Service Regulation of 1905 formalized this organization. However, a division was

not again employed until 1913 when Secretary of War Henry Stimson assembled an

experimental "Maneuver Division" on the Mexican border.

During World War I, Army planners quickly observed that trench warfare made tactical

maneuver difficult. This new form of warfare emphasized firepower, exacting heavy casualties.

The solution was to form a division large enough to absorb heavy losses and continue combat

operations. Therefore, the Army provisionally organized into square divisions, with two

brigades of two regiments each. The regiment, in turn, had three infantry battalions and a

machine-gun company. These large divisions met the needs of trench warfare in relation to

power, endurance, shock action, and easy passage through lines, but they were relatively

difficult to maneuver and support. At the war's end, the Army retained its square infantry

divisions as a type unit.

In 1920, General John J. Pershing, who had commanded the American Expeditionary

Force in World War I, called for an elastic and mobile three-unit system built to operate in

North America. Mobility was especially important, and although the square division was not

suited to mobile warfare, a divisional-type organization henceforth became the pillar of U.S.

mobilization. However, with no enemy in sight and the nation's adoption of an independent

foreign policy, Congress did not provide the monies to support a relatively large army. In fact,

military budgets shrank consistently until 1935.

Discussion over the shape of the new division finally began in 1929 as part of the

modernization debate and continued for the next ten years. That year, the Assistant Chief of

Staff, G-3, Major General Frank Parker, reported that European countries were creating the

sort of armies that could lead tontcombat unprecedented velocity in war. For instance, Britain

was experimenting with armor, France with motorization, and Germany, handicapped by

treaty restrictions, was dreaming of things to come. All were discarding older, unwieldy

division designs. Since the Army was planning to modernize its equipment by introducing

semiautomatic rifles and light machine guns, General Parker suggested that parts of the 2d

Infantry Division conduct tests to discover the optimum combination for these weapons. The

Chief of Staff, General Charles E. Summerall, agreed to the proposal and extended it to the

entire division. The test was conducted by the Infantry Board. Several proposals emerged for

a triangular division, but the matter lay dormant after 1931 because of the budget cuts brought

about by the Great Depression (see figure 1, page 8).

In 1935, General Malin Craig, the new Army Chief of Staff, ordered a complete review of

organization and tactics, and in 1936, he created the Modernization Board to examine the

3
Army's organization. When assembled, the board concluded that trying to reorganize the

entire Army in the course of a single study was too complex and impractical a task. Instead, it

chose to concentrate its energies on redesigning the infantry division. Part of its rationale was

that the structure of higher commands rested on the infantry division's design. Drawing upon

expertise from the Army school system, the General Staff, and earlier studies of foreign

armies, it endorsed a triangular infantry division design. The board finally delivered its report

to General Craig in 1936. After reviewing it, he decided to test the design in 1937.

In the new formulation, the brigade headquarters and one of the infantry regiments of the

square division disappeared. While the old square division consisted of twenty seven

battalions made up of 108 company-size formations, the new organization had two field

artillery regiments, three regiments of infantry with three infantry battalions each, and was

supported by division engineer, signal, ordnance, quartermaster, medical, and military police

units, with a fire support element at each echelon. The new formation consisted of twelve

battalions with sixty company-size elements.

Several considerations influenced the new organization's design. One of the most

important was the need for improved mobility and increased flexibility. The triangular

division enhanced mobility because it used less road space and could deploy from movement

formation faster than the square division. It was more flexible because it eliminated an

excessive reserve. The three-regiment arrangement, moreover, provided a convenient reserve

for the division commander. In addition, smaller unit size allowed the use of a separate

division as a reserve. Eliminating the brigade-level command allowed for faster transmission

of orders. Another important issue was the need to exploit new technology, weapons, and

firepower. General Craig specifically directed the War Department staff to examine

reorganization and tactical changes that optimized motorization, mechanization, and increased

firepower. Finally, planners designed the division assuming that North America would be the

probable theater of operations.

PREPARATORY UNIT TRAINING: The proposed infantry division design

was tested by elements of the 2d Infantry Division in 1937; other units were drawn from the

Army as a whole. In general, equipment was allocated for the test from the rest of the Army.

The design was refined and tested again by the same division in 1939.

UNIT FIELD TESTS: The field test, the first of its kind, was held in Texas between

September and November 1937. The Provisional Infantry Division (PID) was composed of

troops from the entire Army; the largest portion came from the 2d Infantry Division. It

tested a smaller (than the square division) triangular division design which incorporated

attached antitank and antiaircraft battalions and an observation squadron. The revised

division design was tested in February-August 1939. The 2d Infantry Division was again used

as the test unit in Texas. Designated the Provisional 2d Division, its commander, Major

General Walter Krueger, conducted the tests. The test director, the VIII Corps area

commander, Major General Herbert J. Brees, concurred with some of the commander's

4
recommendations but disagreed with others. The main area of contention was the full extent

of motorization the two men saw as optimal.

TESTING RESULTS: The report of the 1937 test results was written by a special

committee consisting of Major General Fox Connor, then-Colonel George C. Marshall, and

Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair (the PID Chief of Staff). Although Marshall feared that

the committee would appear to be stacked in favor of the smaller division design, its report,

largely written by McNair, identified the same weaknesses critics had discovered. Instead of

assigning the division to a fixed corps as the critics wanted, the committee recommended a

smaller, more powerful division, emphasizing increased firepower, range, and mobility. After

examining the report, the Modernization Board redesigned the division, using the triangular

concept, with three combat teams built around three regiments. In 1938, General Craig

decided to spend most of 1939 evaluating it before determining its fate.

In September 1939, the Modernization Board recommended a new infantry division design

to Marshall (who as a full general had recently been appointed Army Chief of Staff). The

board recommended placing general officers in charge of its infantry and artillery

components, a motorized engineer battalion, and an increased number of trucks for the

quartermaster. The division would be completely motorized. By late 1940, the design had

been modified. The artillery regiments were eliminated and replaced by divisional artillery,

consisting of three battalions of 105-mm cannon and one 75-mm and 155-mm battalion. A

reconnaissance troop was also added.

TOE REQUIRED RESOURCES VERSUS MTOE MANNING AND

EQUIPMENT: When the designs were first tested, no change in total Army strength was

expected. The division had two authorized strengths, a peacetime one of 7,970 officers and

men and a wartime strength of 11,485. After peacetime conscription was instituted in 1940,

the Army would get its required manpower. However, there were equipment shortages as

well as inadequate housing and training facilities for the troops. In one year, the Army

expanded from five understrength divisions to twenty-two divisions. Simultaneously,

American industry was supplying the U.S. military as well as Great Britain.

Since planners assumed the division would be part of a larger force providing combat and

logistical support, the new infantry division was "streamlined"; it had a reduced number of

organic artillery and auxiliary units and no organic armor. After the tests, the division size

was revised upward to 15,514 officers and men. World War II infantry division size

adjustments decreased its size to 14, 253 officers and men because of shipping and manpower

shortages. Lesley McNair, by now a lieutenant general and Chief of Army Ground Forces,

expended special efforts to ensure that, with a minimum of specifically defensive weapons, the

division remained a compact offensive unit streamlined for open warfare and reinforced by

"pooling" common support units at corps and army level.

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES: All the technology issues were concerned with

5
modernization. The Army was grappling with issues raised by mechanization, aviation,

electronics, new weapons, and the tactics to best use new tools, like voice radios, close air

support, self-propelled artillery, tanks, semiautomatic rifles, and light machine guns. The

Army tested a new division that was made more practicable by reliable motorized transport;

light, reliable voice radios; and new infantry weapons that increased the individual soldier's

firepower.

DETRIMENTAL EFFECT UPON UNIT READINESS DURING

CONVERSION: During the interwar period, the Army's divisions gradually declined as

fighting organizations. Budgetary constraints that began in the 1920s effectively destroyed the

possibility of training units as combined arms teams. Constraints included reductions in the

Regular Army's size and an increase in the size of the Air Corps, at the expense of Army

troop strength. Units were inactivated, and the onset of the Great Depression led to some

further budgetary cuts.

General Marshall approved the triangular division reorganization in mid-September 1939,

after the start of war in Europe. He began by ordering the reorganization of the 1st, 2d and

3d Infantry Divisions and the activation of the 5th and 6th Infantry Divisions. Given the state

of the Army at the time, no real loss to preparedness was experienced during the change. The

nation was not at war yet and, therefore, not tested during the conversion period.

Throughout the interwar period, the Army did not have the money to man, equip, and

test divisions. Instead, the planners concentrated on designing a division organization and

developing new concepts for its employment. Assuming the division would be needed to

repel an invader, the planners worked out an appropriate span of control, the number of staff

echelons, the mix of infantry and artillery, reconnaissance, the role of engineers, and

organizing of combat service and support. The triangular division appeared to offer the best

solution to General Marshall's problems because National Guard divisions could easily adopt

it, even though they remained "square" until 1942. Losing a regiment was a thorny political

issue for the National Guard. In 1940, another seventeen divisions were either activated or

inducted into Federal service.

OPERATIONAL/WARTIME VALIDATION: Divisional organization

rapidly adjusted to the demands of World War II. Initially, three factors influenced division

organization: availability of men, shipping space, and the quality of weapons. The latter

proved most influential, forcing the Army to make structural changes for new weapons

systems or eliminating failed weapons systems. During World War II, three other

experimental division types were formed, the light, the alpine, and the motorized divisions.

Their wartime experience confirmed General McNair's suspicions about excessive

specialization. The standard, triangular infantry division was suitable in all of the

environments in which the Army fought. However, in striving for mobility, General McNair

"streamlined" the division too much. As World War II ended, the Army attempted to give

infantry divisions back some of the resources they needed, but this effort came too late to

6
provide much benefit.

INSIGHTS GAINED: The triangular division continued without substantial change

from the end of World War II until 1955. After the war, the Army analyzed the strategy,

tactics, and administration of theater forces. This analysis revealed that "streamlining" had

indeed gone too far. Therefore, the Army implemented several recommended changes to the

infantry division design in 1948-50. The main alteration was to increase firepower and make

organic to the division such units as armor, previously assigned from higher headquarters

during combat.

The 1949 reorganization raised authorized infantry division strength to 18,804 men. A

tank battalion was made organic to the division, and each infantry regiment received an

organic tank company. Antiaircraft artillery, strengthened engineer, military police,

maintenance and quartermaster units, as well as men to provide communications, intelligence,

reconnaissance and administration were also added.

The Army made these adjustments based on combat experience while attempting to adjust

to the increased difficulty of conducting reconnaissance and gathering intelligence on a deeper

and wider battlefield. Initially, the Army assumed the atomic bomb would not substantially

alter the nature of ground combat.

7
Infantry Division, 15 July 1943

1 Includes chaplains.

FIGURE 1

8
ARMORED DIVISION, 1940-1943

PROPOSED UNIT MISSION: The tank first emerged as a weapon of war in

World War I, where it functioned almost exclusively in the infantry-support role. However,

even during that conflict, armor advocates began to suggest that tanks, operating in mass,

would someday constitute the arm of decision. A series of experiments conducted by various

nations between the world wars suggested that large armored forces were indeed viable.

American observers (including the Secretary of War) were particularly aware of the British

Army's tests conducted on Salisbury Plain (1927-37) in which mechanized forces organized in

brigade and division strength conducted a variety of combat missions.

American initiatives during this period included brigade-level tests conducted at Camp

Meade, Fort Eustis, and Fort Knox. Although the Infantry branch claimed proponency for

tanks, the initiative for mechanized experimentation shifted toward Cavalry by the late 1930s,

culminating in the creation of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) by 1938. Ironically, the

incumbent Chief of Cavalry was a dedicated horseman who placed little value on his own

branch's experimental efforts. Not until May 1940 did the Cavalry's mechanized brigade join

up with a brigade of the Infantry's tanks to form a provisional division for testing in

maneuvers.

The German conquest of France in the spring of 1940 triggered the creation of an

American armored arm. In July of that year, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General George

C. Marshall, directed the creation of an Armored Force, which was to be independent of the

other combat arms. Initially, the Armored Force consisted of I Armored Corps and the 1st

and 2d Armored Divisions, which were created out of the existing Infantry and Cavalry tank

and mechanized formations. In keeping with Cavalry's recent dominance of the

mechanization program, the mission of the new armored division was mobility oriented.

Envelopment, exploitation, and other high-maneuver functions constituted the armored

division's perceived battlefield missions.

As constituted in 1940, the armored division reflected its Cavalry parentage. The main

fighting element was an armored brigade containing two regiments of light tanks (for a total

of six battalions), one regiment of medium tanks (two battalions), and a regiment of artillery

(two battalions). An infantry regiment of two battalions, an artillery battalion, a

reconnaissance battalion plus engineers and other support troops occupied a strictly secondary

place within the division structure. The division's wartime TOE strength was 11,200.

PREPARATORY TRAINING: The 1st Armored Division assembled at Fort Knox, and

the 2d Armored Division came together at Fort Benning. Lacking any branch-specific training

materials, the new armored formations borrowed and modified training programs from the

older combat arms until Armored Force headquarters could generate programs of instruction.

The new formations spent the fall and winter of 1940-41 in individual and small-unit training.

The spring of 1941 was dedicated to regiment, brigade, and division-level training. The 2d

9
Armored Division also conducted a series of tests in conjunction with ground-attack aviation.

All training programs aimed toward preparing the armored divisions for corps- and army-level

training to be conducted later that year.

UNIT FIELD TESTS: The U.S. Army conducted a series of maneuvers in the summer

and fall of 1941 that were intended to both train and test. The armored divisions fared very

well in the corps-versus-corps maneuvers conducted during the summer. Utilizing their high

mobility, armored formations repeatedly out-maneuvered their infantry-heavy opponents and

won impressive "victories." During the autumn army-versus-army maneuvers conducted in

Louisiana and the Carolinas, the armored divisions encountered antitank elements that

decimated the attacking armored formations. Thus, it was revealed that the armored division

was over-reliant on light tanks and lacked both the assets and the command structure to

conduct combined-arms combat.

TESTING RESULTS: The Armored Force quickly took to heart the lessons of the

maneuvers. In 1942, a new division organization was approved. The new division structure

included two rather than three armored regimental headquarters, while the infantry regiment

was increased to three battalions. The three artillery battalions were consolidated under a

division artillery headquarters. The brigade headquarters was eliminated, as were certain other

elements. For tactical control of combat elements, the new division structure included two

brigade-level "combat command" headquarters, to which any mix of combat and support

elements could be assigned for specific missions. Signifying a shift in emphasis from mobility

toward fighting power, the new division contained four battalions of medium tanks and only

two battalions of light tanks. Total TOE strength was 14,618, with much of the increase

accounted for by additional combat service support assets.

TOE REQUIRED RESOURCES VERSUS MTOE MANNING AND

EQUIPMENT: At the time of activation, the 1940 armored division had a TOE peacetime

strength of 9,500 and a wartime establishment of 11,200. The Armored Force as a whole

received only 9,500 when established. However, two months after the first two armored

divisions were activated, Congress passed a peacetime Selective Service act which effectively

solved the Army's manpower shortages.

Shortfalls in weapons and equipment were less readily solved. In place of the 3,243 vehicles

that each armored division required, the Armored Force initially acquired a total of less than

1,000. Of the 287 light and 120 medium tanks required for each division, a total of 400 light

and only 18 medium tanks were on hand. By the summer of 1941, most equipment

requirements had been met but often with expedient or improvised equipment. The armored

divisions went through the 1941 maneuvers with "medium" tanks that were actually light

tanks marked with a large "M." Self-propelled artillery not being available, the armored

artillery battalions relied upon truck-drawn field pieces well into 1942.

When a medium tank did become available in large numbers, it was the M-3 model which

10
was itself an improvisation. Not until 1943 did the M-4 Sherman tank displace the last of the

M-3s.

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES: The armored division was a response to technology in

the form of the tank, but the tank did not "drive" the creation of the armored division. The

tank was more than twenty years old when the 1940 armored division was crafted and had

long occupied a comfortable spot in doctrine as an infantry-support weapon. The key

developments precipitating the emergence of the armored division were conceptual, not

technological. However, it is true that a host of supporting technology had to emerge before

armored formations could live up to their potential. Reliable motor transport, self-propelled

artillery, portable radios, and light liaison aircraft were just a few of the technologies that

made the armored division effective.

EFFECT UPON UNIT READINESS DURING CONVERSION: The 1st

and 2d Armored Divisions were both new formations and were not conversions of existing

divisions. Within a year of their activation, these two armored divisions were rated as being

among the Army's most combat-ready. This observation should be taken in context. The

entire Army was in the throes of expansion, and virtually every division underwent major

upheavals in personnel and/or organization. Thus, the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions were

actually the least-unready formations in a turbulent period.

VALIDATION IN BATTLE: The 1942 version of the armored division first saw

battle in Tunisia and suffered a notable defeat in the 1943 battle of Kasserine Pass. Few if any

observers blamed the division structure for that debacle. A further reorganization in 1943

resulted in a leaner, more flexible, division, but this reorganization was driven mainly by an

Army-wide requirement to economize on manpower. It does not appear to have been a direct

result of combat experience. The 1943 armored division did away with all regimental

headquarters (see figure 2, page 13). The division included three battalions of tanks, three of

infantry, and three of artillery. The two combat commands of the 1942 structure were

increased to three. Total manpower decreased from 14,618 to 10,937, with much of the savings

coming from the elimination of headquarters and logistics organizations. Of the sixteen

armored divisions fielded in World War II, fourteen adopted the lean 1943 structure. Two

served throughout the war in a modified version of the heavier 1942 TOE. Both variants were

successful in combat, though both frequently required augmentation in infantry and artillery.

The versatile "combat command" concept has persisted to the present day.

INSIGHTS GAINED: The process of creating and then modifying an American

armored division was not undertaken in a vacuum. With war already raging in Europe, the

U.S. Army had a wealth of combat data upon which to draw in formulating its own doctrines

and force structures. Elements of both British and German armored doctrine can be perceived

in the evolution of the U.S. armored force.

11
Though the 1941 maneuvers were the most important "in-house" trials undertaken, they

were not the ideal testing venue for the new divisions. Aside from testing the armored

divisions, the maneuvers were also intended to serve as capstone unit training exercises, as a

"college" for higher commanders who had not seen corps or army-size formations since 1918,

and as doctrinal tests for other forces, such as airborne and antitank. In short, there were too

many variables in play. The Armored Force was fortunate that it was able to discern the

appropriate lessons from these multifaceted exercises

12
Armored Division, 15 September 1943

FIGURE 2

13
DIVISION REORGANIZATION, 1947-1948

BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED UNIT MISSIONS: After World War

II concluded in Europe, the U.S. European Theater of Operations formed the General Board,

consisting of many committees, to analyze strategy, tactics, and administration of theater

forces. One committee was assigned the task of examining the need for various types of

divisions. It recommended the Army retain only three division types-infantry, armored, and

airborne-concluding that the standard infantry division could accomplish various diverse

missions, making special divisions (light or mountain) unnecessary.

The General Board defined the division as the basis of Army organization. Wartime

experience showed the infantry division's subordinate units deficient in strength and

composition to ensure their ability to conduct independent offensive and defensive operations

with maximum efficiency. The absence of tanks in the infantry division's organization was

especially onerous.

The infantry division committee proposed to increase regimental size, adding soldiers to

provide communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and administration, as well as improved

weapons for cannon and antitank companies. To ensure adequate intelligence and security, the

committee recommended increasing the divisional cavalry troop to a full squadron. In

addition, the committee called for more artillery and organic armor. This initial proposal

increased the size of an infantry division to 20,578 officers and men.

Using the 1943 armored division as a base, the armored division committee added a fourth

105-mm howitzer battalion and an antiaircraft artillery battalion. The committee members

further believed that the combat command organization was weak because it did not have any

units assigned to it. It recommended, therefore, that three regiments replace the combat

commands, each regiment consisting of one tank and two armored rifle battalions. This

increased the strength of the armored division to 19,377 officers and men, doubling the size of

the 1943 armored division.

The Army Staff received these reports and passed them on to the Chief, Army Ground

Forces, General Jacob Devers, late in 1945. Devers refrained from taking any action until

infantry and armored conferences sent their recommendations to him after their meetings the

next spring. In July 1946, he forwarded proposals for new infantry and armored divisions to

the General Staff. These proposals combined the recommendations of the General Board and

the infantry and armored conferences. The new infantry division was similar to those created

late in the war, when manpower caps were lifted. The armored division kept its 1943

configuration but was augmented to correct organizational deficiencies discovered during the

war. Except for the atomic bomb, these new divisions reflected the Army's war experience

and its belief that the nature of ground combat had remained unchanged.

14
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Army Chief of Staff, sent these divisional proposals

to senior officers and the Chief of Staff's Advisory Group. Eisenhower himself thought the

units were too big and that they tried to account for every contingency under every condition,

violating the wartime principles of flexibility and economy of force. In contrast, however, his

two groups of senior officers believed the division did not have too many people or too much

equipment; the proposal augmented the divisions only by those units that had been habitually

associated with them in combat. As finally agreed upon, the new infantry division

organization retained much of the structure of the World War II division. It added two guns

to every artillery battery, provided an organic antiaircraft artillery battalion and a tank

battalion to the division, and furnished one tank company to each of the three infantry

regiments (see figure 3, page 18).

PREPARATORY UNIT TRAINING: The new units were not radical departures

from the older divisional organizations, so there were no problems converting units. The

problem lay with Army training in general.

Training programs in the late 1940s did not receive proper funding because the Army felt

no sense of urgency about the evolving world situation. Because much of the Army was on

occupation duty, training for war was further neglected. Until 1949, basic training lasted only

eight weeks, and graduates usually had to receive much more training when they arrived at

their assigned units. Part of the training problem lay in Army procurement policy. While the

Army bought food, clothing, and medical supplies, it was not able to buy ammunition or

develop new weapons systems, and it had to rely on obsolete or obsolescent equipment.

Shortages of men and supplies combined with inadequate training led to low combat

readiness.

UNIT FIELD TESTS: Because it was not a radical departure from previous designs,

the new design did not require field testing.

TESTING RESULTS: Again, the relatively minor organizational changes were not

deemed to require testing.

TOE REQUIRED RESOURCES VERSUS TOE MANNING AND

EQUIPMENT: In 1948, the new division designs were codified. New tables of

organization and equipment published by the Department of the Army authorized infantry

divisions of 18,804 officers and men. Each new infantry division consisted of three infantry

regiments with three battalions, altogether nine infantry battalions. Each regiment included an

organic tank company, and the division had an independent tank battalion as well as an

antiaircraft artillery battalion. Artillery batteries were increased from four guns to six.

Armored divisions would consist of 15,973 officers and men. The armored division retained

its 1943 command structure of combat commands, with three medium tank battalions, three

armored infantry battalions, and three 105-mm howitzer battalions. However, the reserve

command was made identical to the two existing combat commands, the tank destroyer

15
battalion was replaced by a heavy tank battalion, and an antiaircraft artillery battalion and a

replacement company were added.

The new organizational structure was to be implemented in 1948-49. Of the Army's ten

divisions, only one (the 1st Infantry Division in Germany) attained its full table of

organization strength before 1950. Because of serious shortfalls in equipment, manpower, and

funding, the strengths of the other nine divisions varied between 55 and 80 percent. Each of

their infantry regiments lacked one battalion and the tank company, while the artillery

battalions had only two firing batteries instead of three. Only one company or battery was

filled in the separate tank and antiaircraft artillery battalions. The actual strengths of the

divisions ranged between 12,500 and 13, 650 officers and men. The Army was, for all practical

intents and purposes, hollow.

The skeletonizing of the divisions handicapped a doctrinal system that was designed to

function tactically with three-battalion regiments. In practical terms, a regimental commander

in combat could only use a single battalion in the line if he wished to maintain a reserve, or

he could place both battalions in the line and operate without a reserve. This violated the

Army's tactical doctrine of keeping a reserve to finish off an enemy or repulse a counterattack.

Removing the organic armor from the division also negated one of the primary purposes of

the reorganization.

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES: There were no technology issues per se. The new design

incorporated incremental improvements to weapons and equipment, especially the new

medium tank and more tracked vehicles, without difficulty.

DETRIMENTAL EFFECT UPON UNIT READINESS DURING

CONVERSION: Conversion produced only a small effect on unit readiness, an effect

which paled before the Army's larger manpower, training, and fiscal problems. In 1946, the

Army fielded seventeen divisions, had a strength of 1,891,011 officers and men, and a budget

of $189.6 billion. In 1950 it fielded ten divisions, was 593,167 strong, and was budgeted at

$43.2 billion. Approximately 38 percent of the force was assigned overseas, mostly performing

occupation duty in Europe and Japan.

OPERATIONAL/WARTIME VALIDATION: Although all Army units were

understrength and suffered from training deficiencies, the units in Japan were the first to suffer

the consequences of budget and manning deficiencies when they were committed to the

Korean peninsula to turn back the North Korean invasion in the summer of 1950.

The first unit to deploy to Korea was Task Force Smith, which consisted of elements of

the 24th Infantry Division. The remainder of the division arrived soon after, followed by the

25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division. To bring these units closer to their

wartime strength, the remaining division in Japan, the 7th Infantry Division, was stripped of

troops. In the first two weeks of the war, the 24th Infantry Division was the only major

16
American combat unit in Korea. Operating with its skeletonized structure, this division

suffered a series of defeats before finally rallying with other American and South Korean

forces in the Pusan Perimeter. The causes of this debacle could be traced directly to prewar

policy and preparation. Once the nation fully manned and equipped its divisions in Korea to

the 1948 standard, the divisional design proved more than adequate for the requirements of

the war.

INSIGHTS GAINED: Army doctrine in Field Manual 100-5, Field Service

Regulations, Operations, published in 1949, distilled what the Army had learned in worldwide

combat between 1941 and 1945, as did the 1948 divisional reorganization. Both were based on

the triangular division design that had been developed before and modified during World War

II. The new divisional structures applied the insights expensively obtained through wartime

experience to enhance divisional firepower significantly. However, this new ideal was

unattainable in the postwar political and social climate in the United States. The national

mood of complacency, budget cuts, and recruitment shortfalls meant the new division

organizations could not be fully manned. The lessons of history had been applied in theory,

but political realities precluded their implementation in practice. The disaster of 1950 was the

unfortunate result.

17
Infantry Division, 7 July 1948

FIGURE 3

18
PENTOMIC DIVISION, 1955-1963

BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED UNIT MISSION: In 1954, no U.S.

Army officer would have claimed that the institution had been prepared to conduct ground

warfare in Korea. To the extent that the United States had a coherent defense policy after

World War I, it was to rely on strategic nuclear weapons to deter the sort of conventional

military aggression that had precipitated World Wars I and II. The U.S. Army's mission under

this scenario, prevalent until mid-1950, was to guard the bases and occupy the countries from

which strategic nuclear weapons would be launched. Presumably, this would enhance the

credibility of the nuclear deterrence that would prevent new wars.

The Korean War discredited these essential assumptions. In June 1950, the United States

committed its army to defeat a conventional invasion, and it did so in a place where it had

never planned to fight, the mainland of Asia. Developments subsequent to the North Korean

aggression suggested that ground forces in the next war might have to fight on a nuclear

battlefield. Since the Soviet Union had conducted a controlled nuclear explosion in 1949, it

would likely have deliverable nuclear weapons by 1954. Thus, the United States government

and public opinion, exasperated by the military stalemate from 1951 to 1953, might insist on

using tactical nuclear weapons in the future, rather than bear the burden of another long,

protracted war.

The Pentomic Division was supposed to provide survivability and sustainability on a

nuclear battlefield by increasing the maneuverability of the basic (subdivision) warfighting

units (see figure 4, page 22). The army structured this division for a cellular battlefield of

greater depth and dispersion, the older linear battlefield now being judged far too vulnerable

in the nuclear age. To accomplish this new organization, army planners restructured the old

"triangular" division in place since World War II. This division placed three regular platoons

plus a heavy weapons platoon in each company and three regular companies plus a heavy

weapons company (three maneuver elements and one firepower element) in each battalion.

Building on these essential blocs, three battalions made up a regiment, and three regiments

made up a division. The "Pentomic Division," as outlined by Army Chief of Staff Maxwell D.

Taylor in October 1956, would have five relatively self-contained battle groups, each one

made up of five companies. Being smaller than a regiment but larger than a battalion, a battle

group was supposed to be both agile and strong, the combination necessary to enhance

survivability in the face of nuclear explosions. The total strength of a division would be

reduced from 17,700 soldiers in the typical infantry division (1947) to 14, 000 in the pentomic

force structure. According to division planners, so-called "fox hole strength" would not be

degraded because reductions would come from staffs and combat service support.

PREPARATORY TRAINING: In Germany, Major General James Gavin,

Commander, VII Corps, ran tactical exercises in 1954 testing the concept. The exercises

confirmed the hypothesis that conventional infantry divisions were not ready for a nuclear

battlefield. Gavin concluded that the army must adopt relatively independent battle groups,

"each one capable of sustained combat on its own."

19
UNIT FIELD TESTS: In 1954, the 1st Armored Division at Fort Hood and the 47th

Infantry Division at.Fort Benning also conducted tests. In 1955, at operation Desert Rock VI

(Yucca Flats, Nevada), the Army placed a composite armored force 3,000 meters from a

thirty-kiloton nuclear explosion.

TEST RESULTS: Improved communications capabilities tested at Fort Hood and

Benning seemed to suggest that the division commander would be able to control five, rather

than just the three, units he had once commanded in the field. At Yucca Flats, when neither

vehicles nor soldiers were disabled and where the latter were able to open up weapons fire

within thirty seconds after the blast, the army felt it had preliminary proof that a pentomic

battle group could survive on a nuclear battlefield.

TOE REQUIRED RESOURCES VERSUS MTOE MANNING AND

EQUIPMENT: Initial plans for the Pentomic Division called for five direct-support (107-

mm) mortar batteries for each battle group. When this was found to provide inadequate fire

support, subsequent revisions called for support from five artillery battalions, one 105-mm

and one 155-mm battery. Actual manning varied according to division, but the Army as a

whole could not field as much artillery support as planned. Plans also called for enhanced

airlift to deal with unforeseen emergencies such as Korea; the smaller size of a battle group

(vis-a-vis a regiment) was supposed to be conducive to strategic mobility. The Eisenhower

administration, however, emphasized nuclear deterrence, not flexibility, and therefore was not

willing to build airlift at the expense of the Strategic Air Command.

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES: A major problem in technology was that, all plans to the

contrary, contemporary communications equipment could not offset the size reductions in

staffs and combat service support personnel. Nor could this equipment enable commanders to

handle effectively their enlarged span of control. Division commanders found themselves

swamped by communications with and activities related to sixteen different subordinate units.

At the battle group level, now that battalions ceased to exist, a colonel and his staff had to

coordinate five rifle companies, a mortar battery, a tank company, direct-support artillery,

and a reconnaissance platoon.

IMPACT ON UNIT READINESS: "Every time I think of the ... Pentomic

Division I shudder," said General Paul Freeman, former commander of Continental Army

Command; "Thank God we never had to go to war with it." The Pentomic Division simply

did not have the capacity and capabilities to perform the basic warfighting functions necessary

in combat: that is firepower and communication. Moreover, even if the Pentomic Division

had been able to discharge its primary function, that is, fighting on the tactical nuclear

battlefield, it would not have been able to function on the lower ends of the spectrum of

conflict, primarily against insurgencies.

OPERATIONAL/WARTIME VALIDATION: The division design was never

made operational or tested in combat.

20
INSIGHTS GAINED: As Colonel Henry E. Kelly wrote in Military Review,

"reliance upon words [i.e., concepts and doctrine] which are not backed by practical ability is

extremely dangerous." Whatever theoretical merits the Pentomic Division had, those merits

remained theoretical because the United States, in general, and the Eisenhower administration,

in particular, would not develop and fund the artillery, communications equipment, and

airlift capabilities to put viable Pentomic Divisions in the field.

21
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22
ROAD (REORGANIZATION OBJECTIVE ARMY

DIVISIONS), 1960-1963

BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED UNIT MISSION: The ROAD division

(see figure 5, page 27) was created in an effort to overcome the perceived shortcomings of the

Pentomic divisions that existed in the late 1950s (the main weakness of the Pentomic division

being that it lacked the combat power to cope with an enemy armored force in a conventional

battle). Preliminary division reorganization studies, called MOMAR (Modern Mobile Army),

were conducted in 1959-60 but discarded. On 16 December 1960, Vice Chief of Staff of the

U.S. Army, General Clyde D. Eddleman, ordered the U.S. Continental Army Command

(USCONARC) to carry out a new study of division reorganization. In January 1960,

representatives from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and branch

schools convened at CONARC Headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia, to discuss the issue.

The reorganization study was then developed quickly by Colonel George Sedbury,

Eddleman's protege at CONARC.

In March 1961, CONARC submitted the completed study, called Reorganization Objective

Army Divisions 1965 [ROAD 1965], to Army Chief of Staff George H. Decker. The Chief of

Staff and the President approved ROAD reorganization in May 1961 for immediate

implementation, but this was delayed by the need to respond to immediate international

pressures. ROAD 65 was sent to CGSC and other schools to develop field manuals (FMs) and

tables of organization and equipment (TOEs). In the event, two new divisions were to be

formed on the ROAD pattern, the 1st Armored Division [1AD] and 5th Infantry Division

[5ID], before other divisions were reorganized. The 1AD was activated February 1962 and

ready in August 1962. The 5ID was activated February 1962 and ready in October 1962.

Testing of these divisions as they were established served also to test ROAD organization. The

rest of the Army's divisions were reorganized along ROAD lines from January 1963 to May

1964.

ROAD divisional organization featured a common support base for infantry, mechanized,

and armored divisions. This common base included division headquarters, division artillery,

an engineer battalion, aviation battalion, and other support elements. Each ROAD division

also had three maneuver combat brigade headquarters. To these could be attached the

maneuver battalions, ten for infantry (eight mechanized battalions and two tank battalions)

and mechanized (seven mechanized battalions and three tank battalions), eleven for armored

divisions (five mechanized battalions and six tank battalions). In principle, only the mix of

maneuver battalions differed from division to division. Also, all supply and technical support

elements were gathered under one commander for the first time in the division support

command, and aviation assets were twice those in the old Pentomic divisions. In combat, the

ROAD divisions were task organized: maneuver battalions and other elements were attached

as needed to one of the three combat brigade headquarters. Administratively, each battalion

reported directly to division headquarters. Brigade headquarters served only to direct

maneuver and combat.

23
ROAD divisions were supposed to have the versatility and flexibility necessary to operate

in all environments-against conventional heavy forces in Europe, or against lighter

conventional forces or unconventional/guerrilla threats around the world. The divisions were

configured to function in a nonnuclear environment but could convert to nuclear readiness if

needed. (This was the opposite of the Pentomic division approach.)

PREPARATORY TRAINING AND UNIT FIELD TESTS: Close attention

was paid to training and testing ROAD, especially in the first divisions adopting it, the 1AD

and 5ID. The 1AD was activated at Ft. Hood in February 1962. Preparatory training for 1AD,

which amounted to field testing of the ROAD concept, was conducted from March to August

1962, after which 1AD was judged ready. All phases of training took place at Ft. Hood under

the division's commander, MG Ralph E. Haines, Jr. Training was conducted first for

individuals until they were proficient, then for small units, and finally for large units. In other

words, the division carried out in sequence, between March and August 1962, advanced

individual training (AIT), basic unit training (BUT), advanced unit training (AUT), divisional

and brigade command post exercises, and finally the divisional field training exercises.

Training included live-fire exercises at the platoon level. Field testing of every type of unit was

formally evaluated: tank and mechanized battalions, the military police company, the aviation

battalion, the artillery battalion, the engineering battalion, the signal battalion (and the like),

the combat brigade headquarters, and the division as a whole. Detailed questionnaires for

evaluators of each type of unit were developed in advance by the U.S. Armor School at Ft.

Knox, KY, and submitted to 1AD in June 1962. When evaluation was completed for

subordinate units and for 1AD as a whole, the evaluation report was sent up the command

chain and distributed to CGSC and to each branch school.

TEST RESULTS: In August 1962, Chief of Staff Decker reported to Secretary of the

Army Cyrus Vance that 1AD and 5ID had not experienced any significant difficulties that

indicated need for change in the basic ROAD concept. Decker's report was subsequent to July

reports from the commander of 1AD. The commander of 1AD in July 1962, Major General

Ralph E. Haines, Jr., after several months of testing, concluded that ROAD had better

flexibility than the old Pentomic divisions and was better suited to oppose guerrillas because it

operated twenty cavalry platoons instead of twelve. ROAD, moreover, had better surveillance

capabilities than before because of its doubled aircraft assets. The commander gave high marks

to the new division support command for handling supply and technical support matters

more effectively than in the past. He urged that more vehicles be provided for the artillery

units and that radios with greater range and more frequencies be provided for the division. He

reported that the division was not yet fully equipped, which was not a problem during but

because equipment was shifted from unit to unit as each practiced maneuvers; but, he said, this

would be a problem during AUT, where all units exercised simultaneously. A number of

other problems mentioned in the 1AD July testing report included shortages of armored

personnel carriers, radios, tools, aircraft, and surveillance equipment. What is more, evaluators

of branch specific units concluded that the Military Police (MP) Company needed another

platoon and an organic mess, that artillery battalions needed more vehicles and

communication equipment, and the like. But on the whole, evaluators of 1AD believed that

24
the new ROAD organization was adequate to its missions and more effective than Pentomic

division organization.

TOE REQUIRED RESOURCES VERSUS MTOE MANNING AND

EQUIPMENT: In the July report on 1AD, the commander noted that officers and enlisted

troops were about equal to TOE levels. Warrant officers, especially pilots, were at only 66

percent strength, however. The commander also indicated shortages in certain NCO

specialties, such as mechanics and radio technicians. Haines stated that 1AD had had to send

1,000 troops to Army technical schools for more training and to train a further 1,300 at

schools at Ft. Hood. He urged that military occupational specialty (MOS) needs be better

anticipated and the schools' quotas adjusted.

Chief of Staff Decker in his report to the Secretary of the Army observed that staffing of

the new ROAD divisions required 2 percent more personnel than the old divisions and that

those personnel were not available. At the same time, ROAD organization doubled the

number of some weapons systems, but the Army did not yet have the TOE equipment to

send to the divisions. The result was that the new divisions would be understrength in

personnel and not fully effective until the new equipment arrived. Until then, fixed-wing

aircraft would have to serve in place of helicopters, and infantry battalions in place of

mechanized battalions.

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES: The new ROAD divisions were heavy in technical assets,

both armor and aviation related. Commanders during testing reported shortages of technical

support personnel, aircraft, vehicles, and other equipment. Evaluators frequently focused on

questions of equipment. Usually evaluators' observations took the form of requesting more

equipment, notably armored personnel carriers, radios, tools, aircraft, and surveillance

equipment. In the case of radios, however, the division commander asked that a different

family of equipment be found or developed. He said that battalion-level radios had too limited

a range and too few frequencies. Incompatibility of the radios provided to different units was a

problem. The twelve-channel very-high-frequency (VHF) radio for the division headquarters

was too time consuming to operate to be effective, while its forty-five-foot antenna was too

conspicuous.

IMPACT ON UNIT READINESS: Commentators did not emphasize detrimental

readiness in the ROAD conversion. Note, however, that initial ROAD experimentation and

testing was done with newly formed divisions that had no readiness to lose, that earlier

formed divisions were reorganized only after initial testing was completed, and that general

reorganization was delayed for two years until there was relatively less likelihood of

immediate need for their operational deployment.

OPERATIONAL/WARTIME VALIDATION: ROAD, a variation of the

World War II armored division, was the standard division configuration between 1962 and

1983, when it was replaced by the Army of Excellence model. It was the division with which

the Army went to war in Vietnam.

25
INSIGHTS GAINED: The ROAD reorganization project seems on the whole to

have been carried out effectively. Contributing to this outcome were careful planning,

mobilization of planning resources at branch and staff schools at several points, systematic

testing and evaluation, and an implementation schedule that was timely but not hasty. ROAD

reorganization was facilitated also by an increase in authorized Army strength in 1961-63 of

31,000 troops (from 929,000 to 960,000 authorized). This made possible the formation of the

two new ROAD divisions. Army budgets were also increased from 1961-63 by 12 billion

dollars.

26
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11TH AIR ASSAULT DIVISION (TEST), 1963-1965

BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED UNIT MISSION: After losing its

organic air power to an independent Air Force in 1947 and then losing tactical air support to

strategic bombing tactics, the Army looked for ways to use its aviation assets to increase

mobility and close air support. By the mid-1950s, the Army Aviation School at Fort Rucker

was conducting experiments and improvising the mounting of guns and rockets on helicopters

and devising ways to use them tactically to improve the ratio between manpower and

firepower on the potential nuclear (and, thus, dispersed) battlefield. After his appointment in

1961, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara assigned his staff to review the Army's

aviation needs and requirements. He believed the Army's previous attempts had been too

limited and conservative; therefore, he instructed the senior leadership to examine aviation in

a new light and to be more audacious in using it, writing: "I shall be very disappointed if the

Army's re-examination merely produces logistically oriented recommendations to procure

more of the same, rather than a plan for employment of fresh and perhaps unorthodox

concepts which will give us a significant increase in mobility." In 1962, the Howze Board

recommendations called for the Army to recognize that drastic force structure changes would

be necessary to "accommodate the near revolutionary change in land combat tactics and

doctrine" implied by the extensive use of the helicopter (see figure 6, page 32).

PREPARATORY TRAINING: The 11th Air Assault Division (Test) was formed

on 15 February 1963 as a tactical training and experimental test bed at Fort Benning. The

division commander began by organizing one battalion and picking a few men to form a

brigade staff. Few had any knowledge of helicopters, and the division was so small that it had

to borrow elements from the 2 ID to conduct exercises. At the same time, the 10th Air

Transport Brigade was created around an existing aviation battalion at Fort Benning. Like the

rest of the division, the brigade's aviation assets came from the entire Army.

The test units were under the direct control of U.S. Army Continental Command

(CONARC) for organizational and training purposes. The Combat Developments Command

(CDC) supervised the developing and implementing of the appropriate tests and evaluations.

The test director was the Commanding General (CG), Infantry Center, Fort Benning. The

Test Evaluation and Control Group there established a methodology to evaluate the combat

systems and the ways they interacted with each other. The biggest problem they faced was

deciding what could and should be tested. The test cells began to develop procedures, tactics,

and techniques to use throughout the test cycle. Changes occurred daily, complicating the

need for the testing units to train themselves while testing. There were neither texts nor

standard operating procedures (SOPs) to help the Test and Evaluation Group, just as there

were none for the division executing the test. All had to be created as the division and test bed

grew.

UNIT FIELD TESTS: The first phase, Air Assault I, which began in September 1963,

tested a C2 system that used a flying command post (CP). A helicopter equipped with radios

28
capable of communicating with ground units carried the brigade commander, an artillery

liaison officer, a forward air controller (FAC), and the brigade operations officer. The troops

used included a field battalion and a skeleton brigade headquarters (HQ), which simulated the

brigade and division staffs. The test objective was to develop a sequence of steps necessary to

achieve surprise and massive offensive firepower for an assault. Techniques tested included

assault doctrine, methods of formation flying, the use of aerial artillery to suppress hostile fire

in landing zones, the maintenance of air lines of communication, and ways to control airspace

over a target area.

The second phase, Air Assault II, a division field exercise at Fort Bragg, began in October

1964. It pitted the division, still missing one brigade (simulated for the exercise), against the

82d Airborne Division. It included various controlled maneuvers designed to collect necessary

testing data.

TEST RESULTS: Air Assault I showed that an airmobile brigade land battalion HQ

could handle the required jobs without division teams to integrate firepower and coordinate

air operations. Air Assault II concluded that the division had limitations and strengths. The

former included poor ground mobility, vulnerability to armored attacks, and operational

vulnerability to bad weather and extended operations. The latter included excellence in hightempo operations, long-range capability, and flexibility to fight simultaneously in different

directions and to conduct operations without a reserve, using air mobility to concentrate its

forces at critical points. One surprising test result was the division's capability for resupply by

air. Air Assault II showed that an airmobile brigade could seek out and destroy an enemy over

a wide area. In a low-intensity war, it was thought, the division could control large sectors of

countryside. In a medium-intensity war, it would function as an unparalleled reserve screening

force. The Army planners also believed that the test proved the cost-effectiveness of an

airmobile division. In addition, the test director reported that integrating Army aircraft into

the ground units provided crucial maneuver capability for light mobile forces to close with

and destroy the enemy.

TOE REQUIRED RESOURCES VERSUS MTOE MANNING AND

EQUIPMENT: As originally conceived, air assault divisions would resemble ROAD

divisions and have sufficient aircraft to lift 33 percent of the division's combat elements at

once. The division would have some fixed-wing aircraft, but most would be in an air transport

brigade, a nondivisional unit, to reinforce the division's transport capabilities. The board

suggested that the new division use new, lighter 105-mm howitzers, Little John rockets, and

air-to-ground rockets on helicopters to replace 155-mm howitzers. Infantry would be relieved

of all burdens except those associated with combat. The board estimated the division would

require between 400 and 600 aircraft, but ground vehicle requirements fell from 3,400 to

1,000.

The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was configured differently from the test unit. It had

neither a Little John rocket battalion nor an attack helicopter battalion. The division fielded

an aviation group (a general aviation support company and one assault and two assault

29
aviation battalions). There were 335 division helicopters. The division was authorized 1,500

ground vehicles (half the number of a ROAD division) to move supplies, artillery, antitank

weapons, and help in ground reconnaissance. The airmobile infantry battalion had one

combat support company (reconnaissance, mortar and antitank resources) and three rifle

companies.

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES: These issues revolved around the Army's use of aviation

assets and the Air Force opposition to this use. The Army used this test bed to experiment

with new air assault and air mobility doctrine. It tested new radio equipment, the use of

helicopters to replace other road-bound forms of mobility, as well as new tactical

configurations. New weapons systems and tactical configurations, not new technology per se,

were the issues tested.

IMPACT ON UNIT READINESS: By direct instruction from the Secretary of

Defense, the 1 th Air Assault Division (Test) was specifically formed as a test unit in order to

test the air mobility concept. It did not appear as an active division. As the written material

about testing indicates, it was never at full strength as a division. The closest it came was in an

Air Assault II test, when it consisted of two brigades and simulated its third brigade.

OPERATIONAL/WARTIME VALIDATION: The Vietnam War provided

a laboratory for testing some of the 11th Air Assault Division's ideas and equipment. The

division created and maintained a bond with units deployed to Vietnam by showing interest

in their experiences. Many of the division's soldiers came from Vietnam and returned there to

discuss ideas and techniques with units already deployed. The test itself received an added

mission to form, equip, and train six airmobile companies to send to Vietnam. It also provided

leadership continuity for the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) when it deployed to Vietnam.

After receiving the Army's recommendation to establish an airmobile division, the Secretary

of Defense announced its activation on 28 June 1965. The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

was officially activated on 1 July 1965 and was composed of the 11th Air Assault Division

(Test), the 10th Air Transport Brigade, and elements of the 2d Infantry Division. The new

division was ordered to Vietnam on 28 July 1965. In less than one month, it was organized

and prepared for combat.

INSIGHTS GAINED: The 1 1th Air Assault Division (Test) was important because it

developed methodology for future Army testing and development architecture. The lasting

elements were the techniques, procedures, and organizations created and used to develop force

structure and to test new equipment. The test enabled development of proponency between

the test and evaluation community and the tested unit. It also allowed for greater military and

civilian cooperation at the user level, especially in incorporating new technology into existing

or new organizational structures.

On the other hand, the division's creation isolated and divided the armed forces' senior

leadership. The Secretary of Defense directly intervened in the process to start it and to give

30
support to the aviation insurgents. Without his initial direction and support, they would have

been unable, as they had been in the past, to overcome their opponents in the Army and the

Air Force. The bitter interservice rivalry and bickering that characterized the joint test

continued for another twenty years.

The test provided a valuable leadership continuity lesson because the most knowledgeable

and motivated men directed it at each level. It also provided leadership continuity for the 1st

Cavalry Division (Airmobile) when it deployed to Vietnam. Support at the highest level was

necessary when interservice rivalry threatened the idea of air mobility. These rivalries also

increased costs and bureaucracy. This was evident in the need for follow-on tests. However,

the most enduring results are the Army's existing test and evaluation framework.

31
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32
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (TRICAP), 1971-1974

BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED UNIT MISSION: After seven years in

Vietnam, the Army was beginning to reform itself to face the Soviet threat in Europe and the

eastern Mediterranean and to revitalize its NATO connections. It would take the combat

lessons the Army learned in the various terrains in Vietnam to produce the impetus to create

new force configurations to fight against potential Soviet threats.

Between 1972 and 1974, the Army tested a variation of the ROAD division. Leading up to

the test, the 1st Cavalry Division (TRICAP) was activated at Fort Hood, Texas, on 5 May

1971 (see figure 7, page 36). The TRICAP (triple capability) concept combined an armored

brigade (for its fire power, mobility, and shock action), an airmobile infantry brigade (to serve

as a fixing force with tactical and operational mobility), and an air cavalry combat brigade (for

its combination of aerial firepower with tactical and operational mobility) into a single

division. Army magazine reported, "Technically, we are combining an airborne tankdestroying force with a ground armored force." The concept was designed to apply the latest

technological advances to military techniques and tactical requirements to increase combat

power. It would impose new technology on what was then current doctrine. The idea was to

extend the airmobility experience from Vietnam to the midintensity combat environment

expected in Europe and the Middle East. It was thought that the division would provide a

foundation for the future Army that would be modified by tests scheduled for 1971-72.

PREPARATORY TRAINING: Field testing began in February 1972. The

experimental division was formed from elements of the 1st Armored Division and the 1st

Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The 1st Cavalry Division replaced the 1st Armored Division in

the force structure and became part of I Corps. Meanwhile, the 1st Armored Division was

sent to Europe to replace the deactivated 4th Armored Division. Completion of the TRICAP

division evaluation was supposed to occur in FY 73.

The TRICAP division consisted of 13,500 officers and men organized into an armored

brigade, an airmobile brigade, and an air cavalry combat brigade. The latter consisted of one

squadron of air cavalry (Vietnam organization) and one squadron of new air cavalry, described

as a "mobile and flexible antitank force." Ultimately, it would be equipped with attack

helicopters carrying TOW antitank missiles.

The Department of the Army (DA) established two programs to evaluate the division and

the air cavalry combat brigade. On-site testing was conducted under the Modern Army

Selected Systems Test, Evaluation and Review (MASSTER). The object was to adapt and

apply airmobile experiences from Vietnam to different battlefield environments.

UNIT FIELD TESTS: The Air Cavalry Combat Brigade Test (ACCBT), beginning in

August 1971, tested the air cavalry attack platoon. The ACCBT was designed to evaluate the

use, capabilities, and effectiveness of the platoon under continuous combat operations. The

33
TRICAP program was designed to test the operational effectiveness of various tailored

company teams that were parts of battalion task force organizations and investigate the

employment of air cavalry and attack helicopters with company-sized armor and mechanized

and airmobile elements. The simulated combat environment was a mid-intensity European

war.

The test program was managed by the Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Night

Observation (STANO) Systems Manager. Created by DA on 15 September 1969, it received

managerial responsibility for TRICAP and MASSTER in February 1971. The MASSTER

project director was the Commanding General, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas.

As the STANO test bed, Project MASSTER had Army-wide implications. Initially, the

tests did not include major force design issues related to combat forces, but this changed as the

project embraced the TRICAP concept. The presumed triple capability of a division

containing Armor, Airmobile, and Air Cavalry organizations in mid- to high-intensity

warfare was attractive. TRICAP was superimposed on Project MASSTER from its beginning

to avoid creating another test organization. It remained under CONARC and responded to

DA direction. In August 1972, the department added another agency to the mix, the Combat

Developments Command (CDC). It would coordinate with CONARC and the Army

Materiel Command, establish test objectives, evaluate test results, and make recommendations

directly to the DA.

Many believed the TRICAP test would demonstrate a revolutionary increase in combat

power. They hoped test results would confirm TRICAP as the best combination and size of

combat elements and simultaneously demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of the TRICAP

division as a general-purpose unit. The division was under considerable pressure to remain

combat ready to fulfill its mission to reinforce NATO. The mission to reorganize to deploy

would be accomplished with a roundout reserve brigade in case of an emergency.

TEST RESULTS: The test and evaluations determined the division had distinct

disadvantages when compared to other divisions in attacking and defending. It also pointed

out that the division needed better C3 and support systems to synchronize combined arms

operations involving the Army fielded helicopters, antitank systems, new target-acquisition

systems, and a new generation of armored and mechanized vehicles.

In December 1972, CDC produced an interim recommendation to increase the TRICAP

division's size to 16,000 officers and men. This made it more closely resemble a standard

armored division and reduced its airmobile assets. Other studies suggested the need for more

artillery to support aerial combat operations, while the antitank emphasis in the division was

praised. The testing did not conclusively settle the question of whether the air cavalry combat

brigade performed better in a division or as an independent unit. Forming the independent

6th Cavalry Brigade was the result of a consensus for further study (as the larger test

concluded inconclusively).

34
The 1973 Yom Kippur War jarred the Army into adding more heavy divisions to the force

structure. As the result of a CDC evaluation, the division would be reorganized late in FY 74

with two armored brigades and an air cavalry brigade. In March 1974, the Department of the

Army announced a revision of the force structure for FY 75-80. The 1st Cavalry Division was

reorganized as an armored division, and a separate 6th Air Cavalry Brigade was formed.

TOE REQUIRED RESOURCES VERSUS MTOE MANNING AND

EQUIPMENT: The TRICAP division consisted of 13,500 officers and men organized into

an armored brigade, an airmobile brigade, and an air cavalry combat brigade. On 23

November 1970, the organization was approved by the Army Chief of Staff, General William

C. Westmoreland. Because the Army was unable to retain the 1st Cavalry Division and

remain within the authorized thirteen-division force structure, the redesignation briefly

described above occurred. The Army could not afford to maintain a divisional test unit with

the force reductions enacted in the declining days of the Vietnam War.

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES: No new technology issues were broached in this

experiment; it was simply a matter of providing improvements to what was already available.

The technology issues concerned command, control, and computers and concentrated on

augmenting and improving technology proven effective in Vietnam.

IMPACT ON UNIT READINESS: Given the manpower constraints mentioned

in the previous paragraph, the disassembling and reassembling of the division caused

degradation in unit readiness. Testing the different combinations of equipment and reforming

soldiers from two separate divisions into a single division had a detrimental effect on unit

readiness.

OPERATIONAL/WARTIME VALIDATION: The division design was never

made operational or tested in combat.

INSIGHTS GAINED: The TRICAP Division lacked strong institutional support

and a threat-based requirement necessary to keep it viable. The pressure to subject a unit that

still belonged to the thirteen-division force structure to tests also caused problems. Expecting a

unit to maintain combat readiness and accountability, to operate as a test unit, and to be

prepared to deploy showed a flawed testing plan from the start. The Yom Kippur War

reinforced a decision to add more heavy divisions to the Army and end the test. In many

ways, the insights gained were indirect, such as those that resulted in establishing the

independent 6th Cavalry Brigade.

The TRICAP Division failed but did have an impact on the Army. Overall, however, the

results of the tests were disappointing. The experiment concluded that the TRICAP division

needed more tanks and less airmobile infantry. It lacked the heavy combat power needed to

fight on a NATO battlefield. After the Vietnam War, the Army eschewed forces that could

not support its primary mission of NATO defense.

35
Headquarters and

Headquarters

Company

Armored

Brigade

r Airmobile | | Air Cavalry

Brigade Combat Brigade

I

I Cavalry

idron

II

Mechanized

Infantry

Battalion

FIGURE 7

36

I

K
DIVISION RESTRUCTURING STUDY

(DRS), 1975-1979

BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED UNIT MISSION: In mid-1975,

TRADOC began to analyze the current Army division's suitability to meet the Warsaw Pact

challenge. The planners realized that more was needed than adjusting and adapting the basic

division design. In October 1975, General William E. DePuy, TRADOC Commander, wrote

to General Frederick C. Weyand, Army Chief of Staff, suggesting that the Army base unit

organization on weapon systems and tactics. In March 1976, the Department of the Army

directed the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to undertake a formal

restructuring effort, and on 4 May 1976, General DePuy formed a special Division

Restructuring Study Group under his direct control. He was particularly concerned that force

design reflect the new generation of improved equipment the Army expected to receive in the

early 1980s.

The DRS recognized that the ROAD organization made inefficient use of 1970s weaponry

and voiced concern that ROAD could not handle the weapons programmed for the 1980s (see

figure 8, page 40). Also, the ROAD design could not keep pace with tactical changes emerging

from weapons advances like the antitank missile. The study was supposed to determine the

best size, mixture, and organization of armored and mechanized infantry divisions for the

early 1980s.

Weapons systems and the best mode of employing them would determine force design.

DRS would integrate new weapons to ensure their ideal use when and where they were most

needed. Trends in firepower and personnel employment over the last hundred years were key

to any design. The 1983 mechanized division would have six times the combat power of its

World War II predecessor. Simultaneously, indirect fire techniques and air-delivered

munitions greatly increased the demands on battlefield commanders as they attempted to

integrate all elements of the combined arms battle. Greater troop dispersion required greater

mobility to mass defenders quickly at a threatened breakthrough point. The increasing

complexity of war demanded more combat service and combat service support to supply and

maintain the troops and the new weapons, continuing a trend of increasing the size of the

Army's logistical tail.

Planners identified a number of institutional problems facing contemporary divisions.

Already overburdened company commanders had to integrate fires of the combined arms

team on the battlefield, despite the inexperience of these officers. Artillery was outnumbered

by Soviet guns and insufficient for a modern battle. The engineers' missions were too

diversified and did not focus on mobility and countermobility. Weapons were being added to

existing organizations, even if this meant inefficiently employing men and materiel. The

Army had to switch from traditional organizations that integrated new systems into existing

units to a system that aligned combat and support organizations toward particular weapons

systems.

37
On 16 July 1976, TRADOC briefed General Weyand on the pilot study for a proposed

heavy division. General Weyand endorsed the concept for further discussion, evaluation, and

testing. Many of the ideas were innovative, some controversial, and a number of the

recommendations would eventually be adopted by the Division 86 study. A DA staff critique

favored testing. The reviewers had strong reservations about General Weyand's proposal for a

one-year test in 1977-78. They favored a longer, four-year study and a slower restructuring

pace to allow new weapons to be integrated into the redesigned divisions as the systems

became operational.

PREPARATORY TRAINING: On 24 January 1977, General Bernard W. Rogers,

the new Chief of Staff, approved the original testing concept with the 1st Cavalry Division at

Fort Hood, Texas, as the primary test unit. Fresh from the TRICAP experiment, which ended

in 1974, the division had been reconfigured as an armored division. For this test, one brigade

of the division was selected as the test bed.

UNIT FIELD TESTS: The field tests were undertaken by the brigade at Fort Hood

in 1979. The test director was the m Corps commander. The tests were held under rules

established by General DePuy but occurred after General Donn A. Starry became the

TRADOC commander. But the tests could not use the weapons around which the design was

constructed because, scheduled to enter into service three years later, they were terminated

before they were completed.

TEST RESULTS: Not unexpectedly, the tests, called the Division Restructuring

Evaluation, yielded mixed results. The test director reported that the division was

overmanned and overequipped in many areas. Although this gave commanders resources to

meet every possible contingency or deficiency, the test director thought the personnel and

equipment costs would make the division too expensive to field.

Critics reported the tests, which supported the three-tank platoon, were flawed. Units

improperly trained in the new three-tank tactics exercised against opposing forces that were

poorly trained in obsolete Soviet tactics, under poor control, and operated under improper

conditions to assure the validity of test data. Strong support did emerge for the brigade

organic battalions, integration of combined arms at battalion level and below, single-purpose

maneuver units, and cross attachment at company level, which was thought to be an option

worth retaining. Yet serious doubts remained: the three-tank platoon was too small (a fourtank platoon was superior to either the five- or three-tank variety); the division depended too

much on external combat service support and lacked scouts in its maneuver battalions (it was

believed that scouts were necessary at both battalion and brigade); and the brigade's span of

control was too large. But four firing batteries of eight howitzers each were superior to the

three-by-six structure. Finally, the ROAD TOE updated with weapons available in 1986 was

better and more cost-effective for the offense, but the new DRS TOE was better and more

cost-effective for the defense. In short, features of both the current and the restructured

division warranted inclusion in any new design for a heavy division.

38
TOE REQUIRED RESOURCES VERSUS MTOE MANNING AND

EQUIPMENT: A single brigade was tested, not an entire division. The test director found

it was overmanned and overequipped in many areas.

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES: The technology issues concerned radios, which had

proliferated so much that their use hampered rather than improved communications. Other

issues tied to technology, such as the inadequacy of air defense and the way the bifunctional

staffs filtered information, also emerged.

IMPACT ON UNIT READINESS: Throughout the test period, there was tension

between the division's role as a test bed and its role as a deployable unit. As in the TRICAP

experiment, disassembling and reassembling a brigade of the division caused degradation in

unit readiness.

OPERATIONAL/WARTIME VALIDATION: The division design was never

made operational or tested in combat.

INSIGHTS GAINED: The DRS shared several characteristics with the Active

Defense Doctrine and suffered from the same problems. It reflected General DePuy's drive

and insight and was created by a small group working under his direct supervision. TRADOC

did not staff the force design to its own schools and centers before seeking the Army Chief of

Staff's approval. Consequently, the study did not have the benefit of their wisdom, and they

felt no responsibility for the design. General Starry, who succeeded General DePuy as

TRADOC commander, disagreed with both the study's results and methodology. General

DePuy's desire to field a new force design quickly inspired accelerated and nonstandard

testing, which left many questions unanswered.

Before the tests were concluded, General Starry launched Division 86 to build on the DRS

and its tests. In July 1979, the Department of the Army followed TRADOC's lead and

formally absorbed the Division Restructuring Study into Division 86. The motivation behind

DRS was to organize divisions in line with new, more effective weapons systems and

emerging tactical doctrine. General DePuy's and the DRS planners' overriding concern were

the increased battlefield lethality demonstrated in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. This led them

to emphasize the tactical level. Before they could implement their ideas, however, a new

TRADOC commander with a different focus overtook their study with a more detailed,

organized, and broader-based approach to the poblems of force design for the modern

battlefield.

39
FIGURE 8

40

Q

>

0

Z

OU)

0

oDz

C) a:

U)

CDa>

C)

QD

I

3

m
DIVISION 86, 1978-1980

BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED UNIT MISSION: General DePuy's

successor at TRADOC, General Donn A. Starry, replaced the DRS with a more detailed

approach and sought wider Army approval for the resulting force design before the 1st

Cavalry Division completed the Division Restructuring Evaluation. Based on his experience as

V Corps commander in Europe, he believed the DRS was done too quickly, by too few

people, and with too little analysis. Units conducted tests without proper training, and the

opposition lacked up-to-date knowledge of Soviet tactics; therefore, the test results were

flawed.

General Starry believed the Army should create force designs the same way it created

equipment and doctrine, around a vision of the battlefield. He believed that once the Army

identified the functions it wanted in a unit, it could then study itself as well as the perceived

threat to determine what was needed. This approach purposely eschewed a branch orientation

and was later formally called the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS). Although it

was introduced near the end of Starry's command tour at TRADOC, its approach governed

the Division 86 force design process. Division 86 was so named because 1986 was as far in the

future as the Army's senior leadership could project the Soviet threat (see figure 9, page 44).

Division 86 was the best-orchestrated, elaborate, and thorough division-design effort

conducted. When he announced the new design initiative at the 1978 TRADOC

Commander's Conference, General Starry described it as building on DRS and permitted

doctrine, organization, training, and training literature to focus on new weapons and

equipment. He tasked the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth to coordinate

service school efforts in preparing the Division 86 materiel systems and TOEs. The schools

and centers became proponent agencies, conceptualizing various functions and tasks within

the design.

The fundamental approach began by defining the division's specific tasks and functions,

designing organizations to meet those demands, and combining the units into a coherent

whole. School and center task forces fleshed out potential unit organizations, which CAC

analyzed in various division combinations. Periodic general officer meetings provided input,

guidance, recommendations, and approval to the actions by task forces and CAC, while

sorting out unresolved conflicts among the designers. To counter the Soviet threat in Central

Europe, the force designers concentrated on the heavy division.

PREPARATORY TRAINING: No unit was designated as a test bed.

UNIT FIELD TESTS: None.

TEST RESULTS: None.

41
TOE REQUIRED RESOURCES VERSUS MTOE MANNING AND

EQUIPMENT: The heavy division was designed to have flexibility, mobility, strength,

and resiliency to withstand and defeat the echeloned attack of Warsaw Pact armies.

Superficially, it resembled the ROAD design. It consisted of a 19,855-man division (armor), with a division headquarters, headquarters company (HHC), three brigade headquarters, combat maneuver elements, a division support command, a reconnaissance squadron, division

artillery, and other support and combat service support companies and battalions. However, it

differed significantly from ROAD.

A fourth brigade-sized headquarters and an air cavalry attack brigade (ACAB) united all

divisional aviation. Tank and mechanized battalions had a new organization. The former were

organized with an HHC and four tank companies. Each company consisted of three tank

platoons, each with three tanks. The latter had an HHC, a TOW antitank company, and four

companies of three platoons of three squads each. Division artillery had increased firepower: three 155-mm battalions with three batteries of eight guns each, one battalion of 16 eight-inch howitzers, and nine general-support rocket system launchers (MLRS). The reconnaissance

squadron was smaller and had a more limited mission, and the engineer battalion was more

mobile, with consolidated armored vehicle launched bridges (AVLBs). The air defense

battalion consolidated all the division's Stinger antiaircraft missiles, while the Division

Support Command (DISCOM) placed critical battlefield support functions in three battalions

to provide direct support to maneuver brigades.

The plans for Division 86 used more than forty major weapons or new pieces of

equipment that had not been procured yet. Some were still in the developmental stages. The

solution proposed by DA was to adopt the concept but continue with interim organizations using obsolete equipment until the new materiel became available.

On 1 August 1980, Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer approved implementation of the newly designed heavy division. The armor division of six armor

battalions and four mechanized battalions would be 19,966 men strong, the mechanized

division of five armor and five mechanized battalions would be 20,250-men strong.

The Army faced a personnel shortfall in fielding Division 86. TRADOC estimated that it

would require 836,000 soldiers to field Army 86, but Congress authorized only 780,000 for

the foreseeable future. Because of this manpower problem and difficulties experienced in

funding and procuring new equipment, modernizing the heavy divisions was delayed for ten

years.

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES: There were no technology issues to address per se. The

planned division would not exploit any technological breakthroughs. The new equipment was

to be improved versions of what already existed.

IMPACT ON UNIT READINESS: None. There was no test unit.

42
OPERATIONAL/WARTIME VALIDATION: The division design was never

made operational or tested in combat.

INSIGHTS GAINED: Several reasons were advanced for developing Division 86.

First was the need to provide units to support new equipment, increase the leader-to-led ratio,

and adapt to the anticipated rapid pace of future combat.

Division 86 was also shaped by the probable area of conflict. The Army moved away from

its traditional, generic, flexible division design to meet a specific foe in a specific area.

Doctrine was another consideration. This was probably the first time that an emerging

doctrine played a major role in a force design effort. AirLand Battle doctrine was not officially

endorsed until after Division 86 was approved, but General Starry began developing the

division to match his doctrinal ideas. The new doctrine developed concurrently with the

design effort, and each theoretically nurtured the other. His doctrinal concepts and vision of

future Army doctrine provided the impetus for the new heavy-division design. Doctrine

joined demands for modernization, leader-to-led ratios, and the expected theater of battle as

factors prompting the design of a new heavy division.

General Starry recently observed that the final Division 86 design was the result of many

compromises and did not resemble the original concept. He commented that although

nothing tangible came from DRS, the Division 86 studies were built on its foundation. The

Yom Kippur War demonstrated that the battlefield had radically increased in size, tempo, and

lethality. With the larger battlefield and increasing tempo, the Army had to begin thinking at

the operational level.

He stated that, conceptually, the Division 86 organization was established correctly, but

that internal Army politics forced compromises and, in the end, produced a larger rather than

smaller division. From his experience, he concluded that Army managers lost sight of the

reorganization's original purpose, and that doctrine should outweigh internal politics and

policy. In the end, Division 86 was not light enough to deploy and not heavy enough to fight

heavy forces in open terrain. Attempting to meet both requirements prevented the design

from succeeding. However, the Infantry Division 86 design was the basis for the Army's later

search for a viable light division.

43
Heavy Division, 1 October 1982

TANK BN F MECHINF.BN

522 eaI I j 876 eaI

" -Xb 

-~ --- - - X~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

---- --- ---

MOE Variation 1-6 tank, 4 mechanized infantry battalions (M113) 18,954.

Variation 2-5 tank, 5 mechanized infantry battalions Ml 13) 19,302

Variation 3-6 tank, 4 mechanized infantry battalions (BFVS) 19,040.

Variation 4-5 tank, 5 mechanized infantry battalions (BFVS) 19,407.

Variation 5-6 tank, 4 mechanized infantry battalions (BFVS) 20,459.

mm1 Support battalions vary in the number of armor and mechanized

infantry forward support teams: 2 armor and 1 infantry, 377; 2 armor

and 2 infantry, 402; and 1 armor and 2 infantry, 363.

FIGURE 9

44
HIGH TECHNOLOGY TEST BED (HTTB)/HIGH

TECHNOLOGY LIGHT DIVISION (HTLD)/HIGH

TECHNOLOGY MOTORIZED DIVISION (HTMD)

(9TH INFANTRY DIVISION), 1980-1988

BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED UNIT MISSION: While stationed in

Europe in the mid-1970s, General Edward C. Meyer became convinced that light infantry was

necessary to fight in forested and urban areas. He believed the Army needed powerful, mobile

units that could be rapidly deployed throughout the world, win a victory, and then return to

their home stations; in other words, the Army needed conventional light infantry to balance

its conventional force structure.

In 1979, an Islamic Revolution overthrew the Shah of Iran and began a protracted hostage

crisis that paralyzed the Carter administration. That same year, the Soviet Union invaded

Afghanistan. Despite these threats, the United States did not deploy forces to Southwest Asia.

The Army had concentrated too much attention on heavy forces and the potential Soviet

threat in Central Europe. What is more, the Air Force and the Navy indicated they were

unwilling to fight for appropriations to build the transportation resources to enable the Army

to deploy overseas in the future. The Army Chief of Staff was faced with the possibility that

the United States might need to go to war, and that the Army would not be able to deploy

easily.

In June 1980, General Meyer as Army Chief of Staff, directed the establishment of a High

Technology Test Bed to work with the 9th Infantry Division. The two organizations would

develop, evaluate, and implement concepts and initiatives related to operations, organization,

doctrine, and technology. They would enhance the division's command and control,

firepower, tactical mobility, survivability, and flexibility. General Meyer wanted to create a

High Technology Light Division. An October 1980 memorandum of understanding (MOU)

between Forces Command (FORSCOM), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and

the Development and Readiness Command DARCOM) governed this effort.

Meyer wanted to build a force capable of deploying to Southwest Asia on C-141 aircraft

(C-5s were explicitly excluded). He shared many of the senior leadership's frustrations with a

procurement process that took between six and ten years to field new technologies, by which

time they were obsolete. He sought to use high technology to reduce the need for a heavy

division's heavy equipment. With the test bed, he departed from usual Army practice by

having the 9th Infantry Division design, test, and field itself, receiving support only from

concept, materiel, and training developers in TRADOC and DARCOM. He wanted to design

a unit to fight primarily in the Middle East, and secondarily as a part of NATO.

General John A. Wickham, Jr., General Meyer's successor, shifted focus to create the

Army of Excellence Light Division. The 9th Infantry Division became the High Technology

45
Motorized Division, to avoid confusion with the new Army of Excellence Light Division. By

the late 1980s, force reductions cut one brigade from the division, compromising the

experiment's integrity.

PREPARATORY TRAINING: FORSCOM commanded the 9th Infantry Division

through I Corps, also based at Fort Lewis, Washington. General Meyer directed that the

division commander become the HTTB test director and further directed TRADOC to

establish a test group at Fort Lewis. The chief of the test group would also serve as the deputy

test director. (The test director was responsible to TRADOC for the HTTB, and TRADOC

also supplied his deputy.) TRADOC developed the outline test plans; analyzed operational

and organizational concepts, doctrine, and test results; and provided periodic, independent

evaluations of the test effort to the Department of the Army (DA). Meanwhile, the test

director had direct access to both DA and the Army Chief of Staff. Later, the HTTB became

the Army Development and Employment Agency (ADEA), a field operating agency for the

deputy chief of staff for operations. This gave it broader Army-wide concerns but lowered its

visibility to the DA staff.

Initially, TRADOC believed the division would test the Infantry Division 86 design,

while the division thought it had a mandate that included this design as a baseline. General

Meyer gave directions supporting the division's position. TRADOC was conscious it had

limited funds for testing and, therefore, wanted to exclude everything already tested. The

HTLD believed it had to explore all possible improvements, even those that had not

previously worked.

UNIT FIELD TESTS: The testing process tried to do many things. For one, it would

test a radically new division configuration. At the same time, the Army Chief of Staff made

plain to the test director, who was the division commander, that he did not have any

obligation to test any part of the configuration that did not make sense. The Chief of Staff

agreed that the division commander was incrementally converting the division into a new

force.

There were numerous difficulties, especially related to funding and equipment. By May

1983, however, the basic division design neared completion and was ready for testing,

evaluation, and fielding. Meanwhile, the new Army Chief of Staff, General John A. Wickham,

wished to concentrate the Army's energies on other projects. That same year, 1983, he

initiated the Army of Excellence study, which contained another type of light division.

Therefore, the HTLD lost its high priority and resources, but its planners adapted themselves

to this new environment, and the next year, General Wickham approved the HTMD design

(see figure 10, page 50).

Over the next four years, the design was adjusted and tested, and by 1988, it had evolved

into a unit that could fill the gap between the Army of Excellence heavy and light

divisions-a unit capable of being airlifted anywhere in the world and prepared to fight

enemy armored forces with great mobility and agility upon arrival.

46
TEST RESULTS: General Meyer chartered the division to design, test, and field the

high-technology division itself. The test bed worked with private industry, identifying

existing items that could be purchased easily. The HTLD was concept (rather than

technology) driven, a departure from previous Army efforts. To test concepts, the division

used surrogate equipment until private industry could provide for its needs. The division also

used innovative testing methods to allow for qualitative judgments because statistical analysis

could not model some aspects of the battlefield synergy. This opened the test bed to criticism

by those in the Army with a vested interest in trend-line analysis and other old testing

methods.

The emphasis was changed from testing highly technical equipment to developing

innovative organizational and operational concepts. FORSCOM wanted the 9th Infantry

Division as a currently deployable asset and maintained a steady pressure on it to sacrifice

design issues on the altar of readiness. The test community usually tested equipment, not

issues, and when faced with surrogate equipment, wanted to test it. When the division wanted

to use an NTC rotation to test its high-technology 3d Brigade, FORSCOM refused; testing

and evaluation was not part of the National Training Center (NTC) training mission.

The test focus shifted when General Wickham succeeded General Meyer. The change was

accompanied by a shift away from the HTLD to the light division in the Army of Excellence.

The test community opposed the 9th Infantry Division's test methodology because it tested

equipment, not concepts, and wanted to continue that way even when the equipment was not

available. The division also could not fill the roles assigned to it by the concept; it was hollow

in fact, if not on paper. The TRADOC schools did not have the supporting doctrine or

manuals for a motorized division, and there were no prepared Army Training Evaluation

Program (ARTEP). As the schools shifted their focus to the Army of Excellence, they did not

support the 9th Infantry Division's need for new TOEs and leadership development. Constant

tension also existed with FORSCOM over the conflicts between the test function and the

need to have the division perform as an integral part of the force structure. Unit readiness

became an enemy of test and experimentation.

TOE REQUIRED RESOURCES VERSUS MTOE MANNING AND

EQUIPMENT: The new division initially consisted of 13,000 personnel as opposed to

10,500 soldiers in a light division. Between 1984 and 1988, the division's organization shifted

from a light configuration to a motorized one. In 1988, the motorized division had three

maneuver brigades composed of nine maneuver battalions: five heavy combined arms

battalions (CAB [Hi), two light combined arms battalions (CAB [L]) and two light attack

battalions (LAB). The air attack cavalry brigade (CB [AA]) was designed and employed as a

fourth maneuver brigade. It consisted of one attack helicopter battalion, an air cavalry

squadron, and a combat support aviation battalion. Division artillery consisted of three direct

support battalions of 155-mm howitzers and a general support battalion of multiple launch

rocket systems and 105-mm howitzers.

The CAB (H) had two antiarmor companies and a motorized infantry company. The

47
CAB (L) had two motorized infantry companies and an antiarmor company. Both had

common headquarters and combat support companies. The LAB was configured similarly but

had three companies armed with high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV)

that carried tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided weapons (TOW II) or the Mark 19

40-mm grenade machine gun.

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES: The Army was only able to field prototypes of some key

pieces of the high-technology equipment. In other cases, it could not even field prototypes of

certain equipment, like the fast attack vehicle (FAV), the armored gun system (AGS), the

maneuver control system (MCS), and the position reporting system (PRS). These failures

hamstrung the division's development.

IMPACT ON UNIT READINESS: Throughout the test period, there was tension

between the 9th Infantry Division's role as a test bed and its role as a deployable unit. If it was

to fulfill its promise as a test bed, it needed a period when it would be excused from

participating in contingency operations.

OPERATIONAL/WARTIME VALIDATION: The division design was never

made operational or tested in combat.

INSIGHTS GAINED: Most writers agree that the HTTBs biggest problem was its

cost, compared to the benefits it offered the Army's senior leadership. They balked at one

more prototype division in a resource-constrained environment. Many believed the division,

as it existed in 1983-86, was too heavy to be deployed as a light division and too light to

successfully engage heavy forces. Part of the problem was that surrogate equipment became

standard during its interim phase. As the 9th Infantry Division was integrated into different

war plans, it was clear it did not fit the needs of the warfighting commanders in chief

(CINCs). The HTLD was designed to fight in the deserts of Southwest Asia. Between 1983

and 1986, that area of the world receded as a major concern. Further, in 1987, Congress cut

the military budget, which meant force reductions. The division lost an active component

brigade. It was replaced with a heavy reserve roundout brigade. By then, it was clear the

experiment had reached a dead end. In December 1988, one of its remaining active brigades

was converted from a combined arms brigade to a heavy brigade.

The Army did gain insights from the HTTB and the 9th Infantry Division experiment.

New command post concepts showed the Army new command and control possibilities. The

division pioneered the use of pallet loading to shorten time in transit. It clearly demonstrated

the need for a positional navigation system. In addition, the 9th Infantry Division worked out

and demonstrated the tenets of AirLand Battle, which had a clear effect on the Army of

Excellence.

Critical pieces of equipment needed to realize the division concept were never available.

The FAVs it wanted were neither authorized nor funded by Congress, and the AGS was never

successfully developed. The substitutes, moreover, did not provide the capabilities envisioned

48
by the original concepts.

The testing methodology proved itself to some, but not to others. Optimists were excited

by the effort's promise, while pessimists concentrated on the unit's deficiencies as a deployable

asset. In addition, throughout the test period, there was a tension between the 9th Infantry

Division's role as a test bed and its role as a deployable unit. If it was to fulfill its promise as a

test bed, it needed a period when it would be excused from participating in contingency

operations.

The HTLD was an attempt to create a solution tailored to fit a particular niche in national

defense needs. It took shape when the major threat was the Soviet Union. It was hard to

convince an Army interested in a unit that was larger, bigger, and heavier that it needed a unit

that was smaller, lighter, and faster.

Since the HTLD was eclipsed by the light division, American industry gained the

capability to produce tailored products. Today, the Army supply system is not as dependent

on identical equipment because the logistics system can use information technology to identify

requirements and ship the needed parts to the right units.

The HTTB violated every tenet for successful experimentation, but its greatest failing was

its inability to establish an Army-wide consensus to enable it to succeed. Because the effort

was personally tied to an Army Chief of Staff, the effort collapsed when General Meyer

retired. Because of its innovative testing methodology, the HTTB concept was seen as

invalidated. These failures doomed the test bed.

49
MOTORIZED DIVISION (HTMD) 1984

Iy

Headquarters andtoried

Headquarters Btrigd Company Brigade

Air Defense Headquarters Artillery Battalion Conpany

Combat Comined Arms

Engineer Battalion

Battalion(Heavy)

Military

Battalion Combined Arms Battafio- ~ Attack Battalion

(Ught)

Signal

BattalionAttack

Battalion

r

--, XX

;OM

FIGURE 10

50

I I

a
7TH INFANTRY DIVISION (LIGHT), 1983-1986

BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED UNIT MISSION: By 1983, the Army

was again concerned about force-structure.Global commitments meant preparing for the

possibility of a mid- to high-intensity threat from the Soviet Union, as well as preparing for

contingency operations that would involve low-intensity conflict or terrorism. However, the

nation's ability to project its military power was limited by airlift and sealift resources and by

high unit deployment profiles (most units needed many air and sea sorties to completely

deploy all their soldiers and equipment). In short, it took too long to get the available forces

to the potential battlefield.

Another of the governing forces behind the Army of Excellence program was the Army's

hollowness. It was unable to staff units at full strength. Congressionally imposed manpower

ceilings meant that division and nondivisional units divided limited manpower resources.

The Army needed a division to perform contingency missions at short notice. But the light

division was probably the most controversial division design since the Pentomic division.

Some of the Army's senior commanders questioned the need for a light division in Korea and

Europe, while others argued that no corps-level support base had been created to support the

proposed, austerely manned light division.

In June 1983, General John A. Wickham, Jr., became Army Chief of Staff. He ordered

Training and Doctrine command (TRADOC) to design a 10,000-men light infantry division

(LID) deployable in 500 C-141 sorties (see figure 11, page 54). He conceived this division as the

centerpiece of a complete redesign of the force structure called the Army of Excellence. The

Combined Arms Center briefed the new force design to the Army Commanders' Conference

in October 1983. On 18 January 1984, President Reagan approved the Army's new light

infantry division. On 1 February 1984, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh announced the

conversion of the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California, into a light infantry division.

Before its conversion, the 7th Infantry Division was a heavy infantry division, with a strength

of 18,300 officers and men, including its reserve component roundout brigade.

PREPARATORY TRAINING: TRADOC and FORSCOM conducted the

division's joint certification from January 1985 through 1986 at Fort Hunter Liggett,

California. According to a TRADOC and Forces command (FORSCOM) MOU, the

Commander, I Corps, served as the certification director, and the division's commander was

his deputy. The division used Exercise Celtic Cross IV for final certification. TRADOC

schools and centers developed manuals, ARTEPs, and MTOEs for the new organization.

General Wickham, meanwhile, directed the LID's design, certification, and fielding. He

used the Army Commanders' Conferences to build a consensus among the senior leadership

on concept and force design. He directed TRADOC to design the LID, which meant that

command would also develop leadership training, force design, and documentation as needed

for the division. General Wickham established a LID General Officer Steering Committee

51
for the division. General Wickham established a LID General Officer Steering Committee

(GOSC) to review the effort's progress and to keep attention focused on the desired result.

The LID GOSC included representatives from the Army major commands, the Military

Personnel Center, and the Concepts Analysis Agency. A general officer from the Deputy

Chief of Staff for Operations office chaired the committee. Major General Leonard Wishart,

Deputy Commander, Combined Arms Center for Combat Developments (CAC-CD), and his

staff traveled to all the CINCs and senior Army commanders to brief them on the LID design.

FORSCOM had jurisdiction over the 7th Infantry Division and played a critical role in the

certification process.

CAC, with its branch proponents, developed the force structure before the concept's

employment. Others at CAC, besides force designers, also worked on the concept. Because

the branch schools and centers participated in the design effort and in preparing leader

development and unit training materials, they were committed to its success.

UNIT FIELD TESTS: Unit certification began in January 1985 and lasted through

1986. Certification took place primarily at Fort Hunter Liggett, California. A memorandum

of agreement (MOA) between TRADOC and FORSCOM designated the I Corps commander

as certification director and the commander of the division as his deputy. The division used

the Celtic Cross IV exercise for final certification. TRADOC centers and schools developed

manuals, ARTEPs, and MTOEs for the new organization.

TEST RESULTS: In certifying and fielding the LID, the Army relied on alreadyavailable technology. Though there were problems with some of the equipment, this approach

allowed the division to be fielded in a relatively short time.

The LID proceeded quickly from idea to fielded unit. Its existence served as part of

NATO's deterrent defense and provided a deployable contingency force for use outside

Europe. After certification, the division consisted of 10,483 officers and men and could deploy

in 550 C-141 sorties.

TOE REQUIRED RESOURCES VERSUS MTOE MANNING AND

EQUIPMENT: Planners at Combined Arms Combat Development Agency (CACDA)

created an organization specifically designed to carry out contingency missions that did not

involve heavy combat. To this end, the division was given only enough support systems to

operate in a low-intensity environment for forty-eight hours without external support.

Designers reduced logistics, fire support, antitank, and survivability assets. Whenever possible,

they replaced organic capabilities with cadre personnel organized to accept corps

augmentation quickly. The final design (10,500 soldiers) was an extremely lean, foot-mobile

division.

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES: In certifying and fielding the LID, the Army relied on

already available technology. Though there were minor problems with the number and

placement of some of the radio equipment, this approach allowed the division to be fielded in

52
IMPACT ON UNIT READINESS: The division was converted from a heavy

division to a light division, losing 45 per cent of its personnel strength. It was reequipped

based on alternatives that capitalized on the high-technology light division (HTLD)

capabilities whenever possible. The new configuration was characterized by a high combat to

combat service support ratio, common organizational vehicles and equipment, as well as an

ability to receive and integrate augmentation forces and support rapidly. This necessitated

retraining the division and had an adverse impact on readiness.

OPERATIONAL/WARTIME VALIDATION: The LID was a controversial

design. Units were fielded within a year after the studies were completed. It gave the Army a

viable force while expanding its operational possibilities. It was used in Panama during

Operation Just Cause and in Saudi Arabia-Kuwait for the Gulf War, Operation Desert

Shield/Desert Storm.

INSIGHTS GAINED: Different sectors of the Army criticized aspects of the LID.

Some noted it was too light to face heavy forces, others that it lacked tactical mobility, while

still others said it emphasized combat power at the expense of support units. All the criticism

was not consistent. However, there was an ongoing concern about the LID's relationship with

the Reserve forces. Several members of the Army's senior leadership questioned whether the

roundout brigades that had been part of infantry divisions could maintain the required combat

readiness to be part of the LID. This division had to be deployable as part of a contingency

force, which meant any Reserve formation associated with it had to be equally deployable. In

light of this, the Army decided to replace the roundout units with active units.

When he created the Light Infantry Division, General Wickham established TRADOC as

the "Architect of the Future" and charged it to design the change and market it to the Army.

The effort relied on a common leadership culture and a widespread concern about hollowness

and deployability. The Army Chief of Staff established TRADOC (CAC in particular) as the

proponent for change. CAC then served as the honest broker between the branch proponents

in the effort to establish a workable and acceptable force structure. General Wickham worked

to build a consensus and involved other agencies in this process, including the Army

Commanders' Conference, the LID GOSC, TRADOC, and FORSCOM. The speed with

which fielding occurred ensured leadership continuity. Because several critical actors in the

7th Infantry Division (Light) force design and fielding process rose to senior leadership

positions in the Army, they, too, provided critical leadership continuity. The Army of

Excellence and the Light Infantry Division efforts had the Army Chief of Staff's active and

visible support. The LID certification process was also credible to the Army as a whole. The

force structure and equipment changes that came from certification gave the process even

greater credibility.

In the last years of the Cold War, the change to a Light Infantry Division was a success. It

gave the Army a contingency capability, while it added to the deterrence of conflict in

Europe.

53
00

S0

0o

e,

0

eI

;*>r*

c:

*_3 'e

FIGURE 11

54
FORCE XXI/EXFOR/EXPERIMENTAL DIVISION,

1993-1997

BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED UNIT MISSION: After the victory in

the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet empire, the Army temporarily stopped exploring

doctrine and force design changes. Army Chief of Staff, General Carl E. Vuono, concluded

that there was no need to change for the sake of change. However, the focus on various

combatants without superpower status and the diverse missions to which ground forces were

committed combined with the extraordinary growth of information technology to create a

different world for the post-Cold War Army and its Chief of Staff, General Gordon R.

Sullivan. These factors compelled the Army to reexamine its doctrine and force design.

On 22 January 1993, General Sullivan endorsed the concept of "digitizing" the divisions,

i.e., linking combat elements with sophisticated computers, enabling units to share situational

awareness, and allowing commanders to make rapid, accurate tactical decisions. Eventually,

General Sullivan became convinced that the shape of the new force could not be resolved by

debate. General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

Commander, was convinced earlier and persuaded Sullivan that the path to change lay in

experimentation. By 1994, most of the Army's senior leadership accepted this idea.

General Sullivan formally initiated FORCE XXI, a term describing this redesign process,

on 8 March 1994. TRADOC and its new commander, General William W. Hartzog, were an

important part of the process (see figure 12, page 60). The effort would be centered on

redesigning the heavy division. After a briefing from planners, General Hartzog

recommended to General Dennis J. Reimer, General Sullivan's successor as the Army Chief of

Staff, that a hybrid heavy division design was the best option for further study and

experimentation.

PREPARATORY TRAINING: One of the Experimental Force's (EXFOR) most

difficult tasks was synchronizing the training plan, the force modernization plan, the applique

(a prototype set of hardware and software providing common computer links in a combat

brigade) plan, and the experimental plan. Training could not begin until the force

modernization and applique plans were completed. The experiment could not begin until the

unit was trained. The compressed schedule (force modernization and applique, March 1995 to

31 May 1996, training, 1 June 1996 to February 1997) left little room for missteps.

Eventually, members of the division would say, "We don't know what we don't know."

Two critical areas dealt with were planning for and implementing a division redesign for the

experimenting, developing, and implementing of new C2 structures for combat. Uncertainty

remained high, but the division trudged toward the experiment.

For the first seven months of 1996, the 4ID's 1st Brigade was transformed and manipulated

by various experts, specialists, contractors, and consultants. Even when ready for training, the

55
brigade was still closely scrutinized by the Army's leadership and subject to stresses placed on

no other brigade. Two complex processes occurred: (1) building fundamental tactical skills and

(2) integrating the immature Tactical Internet (TI) into combat training operations. The TI,

available in August 1996, showed great promise but provided little hope to a commander who

would use it in combat training nine months later. The technology was fragile, leaving the

commander to integrate it into his tactics and his soldiers to exploit its every advantage and

accommodate its disadvantages.

The unit also had to train for a National Training Center (NTC) rotation. Building

proficient tactical units is difficult when junior leaders are new and inexperienced. The U.S.

Army Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) reported that three-quarters of the brigade's

platoon leaders and sergeants were new to their positions. Guided only by experienced

platoon sergeants and company commanders, they would learn tactical skills but without

external criticism. It would be difficult for everyone if the new leaders had to master combat

fundamentals and digital equipment simultaneously. The latter was unfamiliar to everyone,

and contractors were still working on the TI. In addition, there were outside experts taking

notes, and often, general officers or distinguished civilians were watching every move.

Because basic tactical training and learning the TI competed for time, a training schedule

was developed to isolate them. Ideally, units through battalion level would train in the field to

learn tactical fundamentals. Then, they would receive digital equipment and conduct

individual new equipment training (NET); take the equipment to the field and train as

platoons, companies, and a task force (TF), overlaying the digital systems onto a trained unit;

and, finally, execute the Advanced Warfighting Exercise (AWE).

The soldiers received the digital equipment and conducted NET before receiving

fundamental tactical training. Meanwhile, the brigade staff designed a plan to integrate the

equipment and move to the field to learn how to fight. The plan incorrectly assumed training

would begin by 1 June 1996.

The battle drills focused on making the digital equipment work, and platoon training

results were mixed. The equipment's potential was obvious, but there was a great difference

between potential and actual performance. The immaturity of the new technology affected all

areas. A platoon had marginal ability to conduct digital operations, and technologically, the TI

made little progress when company training began. The percentage of tactical vehicles

displayed on applique computer screens did not increase. However, this low percentage filled

company screens with friendly icons, making it appear that the TI improved greatly.

However, even lackluster TI performance was useful to a higher headquarters. As the

technology improved, the issue of fundamental tactical skills came to the fore. Fragile

technology was issued to uncertain soldiers. As the soldiers gained experience and the

technicians improved the systems, a standard of "just-good-enough" developed.

The brigade commander and staff understood a tactical environment that reflected

Clausewitz's description of a war in which "three-quarters of the factors on which action...

is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. In such an environment, a

56
sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for, a skilled intelligence to scent out the

truth." Thus, the men were trained to expect hints of truth and to build their estimates on

them. Although the TI reported intermittently or incompletely, it gave them more concrete

facts than they had previously imagined receiving.

UNIT FIELD TESTS: The Army planned to test the design in a series of AWEs. The

2 AD, later redesignated the 4ID at Fort Hood, was designated the EXFOR. The test's

culmination would be a brigade-sized field test at the NTC and a division AWE at Fort Hood.

To help coordinate implementation and track progress on mastering the technological

challenges, an Experimental Force Coordination Cell (ECC) was established at Fort Hood.

TEST RESULTS: OPTEC implied that the experiment could have yielded more

concrete insights if the unit had been better prepared in both combat fundamentals and fully

functioning digitization and then trained in how to exploit the combination. Early in the

process, time was scheduled to train on combat fundamentals. This was dropped when it

became obvious that the technological challenges of a TI would not be met on time.

Additionally, waiting for fully functioning digitization before proceeding with the experiment

would have meant a delay until the next century. The concepts espoused were sound

projections of technological capabilities, but expecting the technical architecture to be built in

less than a year may have been expecting too much. That any system was produced, no matter

how fragile, was astounding.

The OPTEC observation correctly identified the two elements of the TF XXI AWE that

constrained its success. The technologists produced the materiel as quickly as possible. Given

the circumstances, it is hard to imagine the applique, or the TI, could have been more mature

than it was in March 1997. It is fair to ask if more time could have been found, more time to

train the brigade in fundamental combat skills.

If the technology matured as rapidly as possible, there were two other ways to provide

more training time. First, delay the AWE. Three facts made this unattractive: (1) all the

interested constituencies-Congress, retired military officers, senior military leaders, and

allies-closely followed the experiment's progress since it began. They were patient, but their

patience was limited; (2) the brigade commander and his staff believed the troops could not

maintain the hectic pace beyond March 1997; and (3) General Reimer wanted to use the TF

XXI AWE results in his 1997 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission. Waiting

until March compressed this schedule, but waiting longer would have made it impossible.

The only other way to gain more training time would have been to allow piecemeal

training, i.e., some elements would train, while the equipment of others was modified.

Coordinating a plan like this was beyond the authority and capability of the brigade

commander and his staff. It would have required platoon and company training with prepositioned tactical vehicles reserved solely for the EXFOR. Fort Hood's other division, the

1st Cavalry Division, would have been excluded from these training areas, degrading its own

readiness. The II Corps commander, whose primary responsibility was the readiness of his

57
corps and its divisions, would have vigorously protested. Probably, the unity of effort,

characterized by the TRADOC and Forces Command (FORSCOM) commanders' close

coordination through the ECC would have been strained. This option was not possible in the

confusing, coordinated command structure.

The TF XXI AWE's qualified success does not detract from its achievements. Without a

highly visible, large-scale experiment scheduled for March 1997, a TI, however fragile and

immature, would not have been created in 1996. If the experiment had been conducted at Fort

Hood instead of the NTC, it would have been viewed as a formality, reaffirming the Army

senior leadership's vision. If the experiment had not proceeded, debate about digitization's

effectiveness and its impact would have remained abstract. The analytical models supporting

Force XXI and the debate over digitization were made better because of the test.

TOE REQUIRED RESOURCES VERSUS MTOE MANNING AND

EQUIPMENT: The FORCE XXI interim division design was slightly smaller than the

Army of Excellence division, totaling 15,820 people. Modifications included increased fire

support to shape battle space, expanded reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities, greater

consolidation of logistics support functions, and additional infantry.

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES: Technology issues were rampant. They included the

creation of applique systems and a tactical internet, but these were only two of the more than

seventy- five systems that were tested. All of the equipment was fragile and in the prototype

stage. The problems with this new, untested equipment and the concomitant reduction in

training time led to the relatively lackluster results in the TF XXI AWE at the NTC.

IMPACT ON UNIT READINESS: Designating the 2AD, reflagged as the 4ID, as

a test division had an adverse impact on its combat readiness. Although only the 1st Brigade

was involved in the NTC AWE, the division's other units were involved in helping the

brigade prepare for it. The problems associated with integrating experimental equipment into

the brigade and training new and inexperienced soldiers and leaders highlighted the problems

inherent in all experimental units. In addition, if III Corps' training resources were wholly

devoted to the EXFOR, the readiness of the other division at Fort Hood, the 1st Cavalry

Division, would have been degraded. The III Corps commander would have dissented

vigorously.

OPERATIONAL/WARTIME VALIDATION: The unit has not yet been used

in actual operations.

INSIGHTS GAINED: The EXFOR affected the Army's culture by changing the

terms of the digitization debate. Almost every part of the experiment challenged principles of

Cold War Army culture. Experimentation did not answer all the questions, but it showed the

practicality of some of the ideas. It also raised unexpected questions and insights.

In Division XXI, brigades can move farther apart because they can see each other

58
"virtually." An enemy attempting to exploit a gap between them can be discovered and

destroyed in many ways. This was validated in the division AWE. However, dispersion's

negative aspects were also clearly defined.

The speed of ground movement is an important limitation. The division could detect

opportunity and crisis early, but if the commander decided to integrate ground forces into his

response, he was limited by their movement time. In many cases, the commander did not

maintain a ground reserve. Given the distance it must travel to exploit a situation, such a

reserve would have had negligible influence. Additionally, even with the increased logistical

knowledge, the supplies still had to be delivered, and they, too, were limited by the speed of

ground transportation. These considerations limit the commander's freedom of action. As the

Army considers the 21st century force, it must either increase ground speed or permanently

accept this limitation.

In dispersing maneuver forces, Force XXI operations increased the value of its intelligence

gathering and fire assets. These high-value assets (HVAs) were vulnerable to ground attack by

small and light forces. With maneuver forces farther away, HVAs found themselves under

constant threat of enemy attack. This forced brigade commanders to use combat forces in a

security role. As the nature of the division becomes better defined, this tension between HVA,

security, and combat maneuver forces will be an important issue.

59
H~ ~ ~ I= ~ .0-0

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CONCLUSIONS

Over the past sixty years, the Army has undertaken a major reorganization of its division

structure on twelve separate occasions. Each reorganization was unique. Objectives, methods,

and degrees of success varied from one to another. And yet, some common threads can be

discerned. The following conclusions are framed in terms of the nine issues discussed under

each of the preceding case studies.

PROPOSED UNIT MISSION: Each of the reorganizations studied was

undertaken to address a specific need perceived by the Army. These reorganization objectives

can be roughly grouped as follows:

* Reorganization to meet a specific threat.

· Reorganization to utilize or accommodate new technology.

* Reorganization to accommodate austerity in one or more areas.

These studies suggest that the most successful reorganization is the one that is designed to

meet a specific opponent on a known battlefield. The ROAD and Division 86 initiatives,

which fall under this heading, had fewer.unknowns to confront than did many of the others.

They also enjoyed a wider level of acceptance within the Army than most of the other

reorganizations.

Technology-driven reorganizations, such as the 11th Air Assault Division and Force

XXI/EXFOR, are inherently more speculative in nature as regards enemy and theater. They

are also likely to lie outside of the Army's institutional "comfort zone."

Reorganizations that are intended to address austerity, be it shrinking manpower pools or

lack of strategic transport, run the grave risk of creating a structure that is deployable but not

"fightable." Since 1943, for example, the problems of inadequate combat power and

sustainability have plagued every effort to design a "light" division, even when the

reorganization procedures themselves went smoothly.

PREPARATORY TRAINING: In testing a new organizational concept, it is

essential that the concept and not the inherent fitness of the test unit functions as the factor

that determines the test outcome.

Two alternatives exist for selecting the test unit:

* Convert an existing formation to the new structure.

* Assemble a new formation for test purposes.

The preceding case studies suggest that the best course of action is to utilize an existing

formation that is already proficient in fundamental skills. This practice is the more efficient in

terms of time, has less impact upon the rest of the Army, and helps assure that the results of

61
the test are valid. The smooth conversion of the 7th Infantry Division from "heavy" to "light"

configuration is an example.

If a new formation is to be assembled for test purposes, extra time should be allowed for

the test unit to train, either before the test or concurrently with the test process. The 11th Air

Assault Division and the EXFOR both provide examples of the difficulties that will be

encountered if such time is not provided. The World War II armored division and the ROAD

reorganizations allowed for systematic, progressive training within the test units.

UNIT FIELD TESTS: The actual conduct of field tests has taken several different

forms. Variations found within the case studies include:

* Test unit assembled, trained, and tested concurrently.

* New concepts and new technologies tested concurrently.

Tests planned and administered by recognized proponent agencies.

* Test formations planned and administered by its own test program.

In considering the issues to be tested, it is clear that an essential aspect of a successful test

program is to controle number the erof variables that may influence the outcome. Although a

hastily created formation, the 11th Air Assault Division, utilized carefully controlled

maneuvers designed to address specific issues. The World War II armored division and the

HTTB provide negative examples: surrogate equipment, experimental doctrine, and leadership

all affected test outcomes simultaneously, obscuring the lessons to be derived.

As to the actual administration of the testing program, the HTTB again serves as a

negative example. The test unit formulated and conducted its own test program, leading

inevitably to questions of credibility. In contrast, EXFOR utilized established test agencies,

such as NTC, lending instant credibility to test results.

TEST RESULTS: The testing of new organizational concepts produced three different

results in the case studies examined above:

* The reorganization needed fine-tuning.

* The reorganization needed major modifications.

* The new concept showed potential not yet realized.

The ROAD reorganization is a good example of the "fine-tuning" result. In this case,

however, it should be understood that the "reorganization" was essentially a return to an

earlier structure. The ROAD division was the lineal descendent of the 1943 armored division

that the Army's senior leadership knew from their service in World War II.

The Pentomic division serves as an example of a test that indicated a need for major

62
modifications. It displayed numerous deficiencies that were never adequately addressed, and

the concept ultimately failed. By contrast, the 11th Air Assault Division survived, despite the

fact that its deficiencies could not be corrected immediately.

EXFOR exemplifies the third possible outcome. Although test results were superficially

unimpressive, Army leaders recognized that the technology involved was still in its infancy

and that the experiment was far from over.

TOE REQUIRED RESOURCES VERSUS MTOE MANNING AND

EQUIPMENT: Rarely, if ever, is the Army able to resource fully a new organizational

concept. Two alternative situations have suggested themselves:

· Tests indicated the need for more assets.

* The test organization were intentionally "lean," actually reducing the assets required.

Every case study except one involved a call for more assets in the reorganized unit. In

times of Army growth, not surprisingly, the new requirements can often be met (ROAD

division). More commonly, the provision of new assets is incremental and prolonged, as in the

case of Division 86. All too often, the Army proceeds with reorganization "on the cheap,"

expecting units to do more with less. TRICAP suffered a different fate. The post-Vietnam

drawdown led to the abandonment of the reorganization and the elimination of the test unit.

The division reorganization of 1947-48 was the least well-resourced of them all.

The triangular division and the 7th Infantry Division underwent an intentionally "lean"

reorganization. History, however, suggests a cautionary note. Attempts to streamline and

lighten the divisional structure usually involve the shifting of assets to other echelons and in

the creation of a division that needs to be reinforced again before it can fight effectively.

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES: Technology influences reorganization in two ways:

· Technology pushes reorganization.

· Reorganization creates a demand for new technology.

The Pentomic Division was a hastily conceived initiative pushed by new technology

(atomic weaponry) but without a clear doctrine for its battlefield employment. EXFOR was

also pushed by technology, but in this case the Army refrained from embarking upon

wholesale immediate reorganization because the technology itself was still evolving.

The advent of airmobility illustrates both points. Obviously, technology triggered the

whole airmobility issue. In addition, the 1 1th Air Assault Division experiment also spelled out

the need for new technology and provided a sound basis for its eventual acquisition.

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The triangular division, the World War II armored division, and the Division 86

experiences optimized the technology factor. This reorganization was founded upon a clearly

perceived doctrine that induced the development and acquisition of new technology. This

example also reflects the fact that technologically induced change is usually incremental, not

revolutionary.

IMPACT ON UNIT READINESS: Obviously, the act of reorganization

temporarily reduces a formation's readiness to go to war. Less obvious is the impact upon the

Army's overall readiness when a formation is designated as a test unit. Two alternatives exist:

· The reorganizing formation is relieved of any deployment responsibility.

* The reorganizing formation is considered to be deployable.

To put it succinctly, reorganization and deployability are incompatible. This is

particularly true for a test formation, such as the 1st Cavalry Division, which struggled to stay

deployable throughout the TRICAP test. The worst-case example in this regard is the

Pentomic Division, which may well have been nonviable, even after its adoption.

VALIDATION IN BATTLE: Typically, the U.S. Army has time to test and modify

division structures before committing them to combat. In World War II, several years elapsed

between the outbreak of hostilities and the deployment of divisions in the theaters of

operations. The experience of other belligerents shaped the development of doctrine and force

structure. Similarly, lessons learned from the on-going Vietnam conflict helped guide the 11th

Air Assault Division initiative. Thus, new divisional organizations have benefited from

combat experience without having to endure the combat.

No American division organization has ever blatantly failed in combat, but all have

undergone modifications after commitment to battle. These modifications generally involve

adding rather than removing assets. This pattern suggests that designers of division structures

tend to underestimate the demands of combat. Battle punishes "lean" divisions that are too

austere.

INSIGHTS GAINED: In conclusion, the following insights can be gleaned from the

case studies examined:

* Reorganization imposed from above, in the absence of Army-wide support, will fail with

the departure of its author and proponent.

* Turf battles among agencies and contests between "progressive" and "reactionary" factions

are destructive and long-lived.

* The most successful reorganizations involve consensus building and co-opting of senior

leadership early in the reorganization process.

* The Army benefits from the existence of permanent testing agencies and facilities, as

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opposed to reinventing the wheel with each reorganization.

The HTTB, initiated by one Chief of Staff of the Army who chose not to work through

established channels, never won acceptance in the Army at large. When that Chief retired,

there was no proponent to continue the effort.

Under different circumstances, questions over proponency can escalate into institutionally

divisive turf battles. The development of an armored division languished for a decade because

no combat arm claimed proponency. The 11th Air Assault Division experiment, as part of a

larger debate over airmobility, divided the Army into warring camps and invoked the

hostility of the Air Force. While such contention may at times be the inevitable price of

progress, institutional feuds clearly should be avoided whenever possible.

It is obviously preferable to generate agreement over fundamental issues before

reorganization is attempted. An excellent example of consensus building is that of the 7th

Infantry Division's transition to "light" configuration. Another is the ROAD division. In

both, the Army as a whole recognized the need for change, and many agencies participated in

the conceptualization and testing processes.

Finally, it can be noted that every reorganization initiative since 1975, with one exception,

has met with success (if one considers the DRS program to be subsumed under Division 86).

The exception is HTTB. It is no coincidence that HTTB is the one initiative that was

undertaken outside of the framework for creating doctrine that was established after the

Vietnam War. TRADOC, NTC, and other existing agencies all have obvious and important

roles to play in future reorganization efforts.

Three recommendations can be derived from this historical examination of Army

reorganization efforts. First, have a clear and valid reason, based upon doctrine and battlefield

realities, for reorganizing. Second, give an explicit sense of direction to the testing agency and

to the Army at large so that the goal of reorganization is commonly understood. Third, set

specific concrete goals for the testing agencies, and assure that the evaluation process is a valid

test of the reorganization concept, not a rubber stamp. Following these procedures will help

assure that the reorganization process succeeds both institutionally and on the battlefields of

the future.

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