United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-10227

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Emmanuel Alexander Teijeiro, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:19-CR-121-1 

______________________________

Before Duncan and Wilson, Circuit Judges, and Mazzant, District 

Judge.*

Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge: 

Emmanuel Teijeiro pled guilty of possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) & (b)(2). The district court sentenced

him to 168 months in prison and ordered him to pay his victims $46,000 in 

restitution. On appeal, Teijeiro challenges whether he was competent to 

_____________________

* United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by 

designation.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 10, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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enter into the plea agreement and whether the record supported the restitution order. Because neither challenge has merit, we AFFIRM.

I.

In 2019, the Abilene Police Department followed a CyberTip 

regarding possible child pornography associated with Teijeiro’s roommate, 

Aeriel Jaggard. Officers interviewed Teijeiro, Jaggard, and a third roommate, 

all of whom admitted to watching child pornography regularly. Teijeiro in 

particular admitted to viewing child pornography habitually since 2014 and 

confessed, among other things, his attraction to children as young as 

“babies.” Oddly, though, Teijeiro claimed that he intentionally caused his 

own arrest so he could report his suspicions about predatory activity by his 

own father. 

Teijeiro agreed to a polygraph, during which he stated that he 

masturbated weekly to child pornography and described the types of videos 

he had recently viewed. He also admitted to engaging in sexual contact with 

children several times. Upon examining Teijeiro’s cell phone, authorities 

discovered over 2,000 images depicting child sexual abuse and child 

pornography, which included children as young as toddlers and babies. 

Teijeiro was arrested after a federal grand jury indicted him on one 

count of possessing material containing an image of prepubescent child 

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) & (b)(2). Teijeiro 

pled guilty and entered into a plea agreement under which he waived his right 

to “appeal the conviction, sentence, fine and order of restitution or forfeiture 

in an amount to be determined by the district court.” As relevant here, the

waiver contained certain exceptions, including reserving Teijeiro’s 

“right . . . to bring a direct appeal of . . . a sentence exceeding the statutory 

maximum” and hisright “to challenge the voluntariness of [his] plea of guilty 

or th[e] waiver.” However, the agreement confirmed that it was “freely and 

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voluntarily made and [was] not the result of threats, or of promises apart from 

those set forth in this plea agreement.” 

At arraignment, the magistrate judge explained he was going to ask 

Teijeiro questions to “ensure that [he was] thinking clearly and fully 

underst[oo]d what [he was] doing, because pleading guilty to this charge 

[was] obviously a very serious matter.” Teijeiro confirmed that he was not 

currently receiving (nor had received for the past year) medical care for any 

reason, including mental health; that he was not on medication; and that

nothing interfered with his ability to think clearly and understand his guilty 

plea. Counsel on each side acknowledged they had no reason to doubt 

Teijeiro’s competence, and the magistrate judge found him “competent to 

understand these proceedings and to enter a knowing and voluntary plea.” 

Additionally, the magistrate judge asked Teijeiro if he understood that being 

convicted of this charge could possibly deprive him of certain valuable civil 

rights; that he would be put on the sex-offender registry; and that the 

conviction would likely substantially restrict where he could live, work, and 

with whom he could associate. Teijeiro responded, “[y]es, understood” to 

these questions. 

Following this colloquy, the magistrate judge confirmed that Teijeiro

still believed it was in his best interest to plead guilty and that Teijeiro had 

discussed the plea with his attorney. Accordingly, the magistrate judge found 

that Teijeiro was “fully competent and capable of entering an informed 

plea,” and that the plea was knowing and voluntary. The district court 

accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation without objection. 

When compiling the presentence report (“PSR”), a probation officer 

interviewed Teijeiro over the phone. Teijeiro admitted “he [was] guilty of 

this offense,” but also made some erratic statements. For example, he 

reiterated that he “confess[ed] to the possession of illegal research materials 

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for the purpose of reporting a sex offender to a federal judge,” in part to 

“unfreeze [his bank] account,” which allegedly held funds for writing the 

pilot of the television show “Family Guy.” Teijeiro also claimed he had 

“cured” himself in the early 2000s of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, 

depression, panic attacks, and anxiety. While Teijeiro admits these 

statements were not verified by medical records or interviews, he points to 

his receipt of social security disability income due to mental illness, and a 

2007 statement his mother made to police regarding his bipolar disorder.

The PSR also explained that both the Mandatory Victim Restitution 

Act of 1996 and the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim 

Assistance Act of 2018 applied. The court was therefore required to calculate 

the “full amount of the victim’s losses and . . . order restitution in an amount 

that reflect[ed] [Teijeiro’s] relative role in the causal process . . . but which 

[was] no less than $3,000.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(2). The PSR and its 

addendum contained detailed information from professionals regarding the 

victims’ economic losses and future treatment expenses, as well as victim 

impact statements. The addendum recommended that the district court 

order restitution to the eleven victims in amounts ranging from $3,000 to 

$10,000 each, totaling $46,000. 

Teijeiro did not object to any of the PSR’s factual findings and 

acknowledged that the calculated guideline range of 135 to 168 months was 

accurate. Before sentencing, Teijeiro submitted a memorandum asking for a 

within-guidelines sentence of 135 months. The memo declared that Teijeiro

“suffer[ed] from mental health issues, which ha[d] classified him as disabled 

by the Social Security Administration,” and which were either caused or

exacerbated by the physical, emotional, and sexual abuse he suffered as a

child. It also stated that “Mr. Teijeiro has taken responsibility for his 

conduct[,] . . . [and] he is remorseful and realizes the behavior was not just 

illegal but wrong ethically and morally.” 

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At the sentencing hearing, Teijeiro again stated that he felt obligated 

to view child pornography to get another offender off the streets, and so he 

“manufactured a charge” against himself. The court asked counsel for 

Teijeiro and the government whether they knew of “any reason” the court 

could not lawfully impose a sentence; both attorneys said they did not. 

Teijeiro was sentenced to 168 months in prison. Adopting the PSR’s factual 

findings and legal conclusions, the court also ordered Teijeiro to pay $46,000 

in restitution. 

Teijeiro timely appealed, but the attorney appointed to represent him 

moved to withdraw, arguing the appeal was frivolous. Teijeiro filed a pro se

response in which he again made irrational assertions—such as that he 

manufactured the charge and that he spoke to President Obama about his 

money earned from writing the television pilot. We denied the motion to 

withdraw as inadequate, and Teijeiro’s appointed attorney filed an appellate 

brief. 

II.

Teijeiro raisesthree arguments on appeal. First, he argues his plea was 

not knowing and voluntary because he was incompetent. Second, he argues 

the district court erred by failing to order a competency evaluation sua sponte. 

Third, he argues the restitution order was not supported by adequate 

findings. We consider each in turn.

A.

First, competency to plead guilty. The government argues we should 

review this issue for plain error because Teijeiro neither challenged the 

knowing and voluntary nature of his plea in the district court nor sought to 

withdraw his guilty plea. Teijeiro argues for review under a clearly erroneous 

standard, because competency is a mixed question of law and fact. We need 

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not decide which standard is appropriate, because Teijeiro would fail under 

either one. 

At Teijeiro’s rearraignment hearing, the district court had no reason 

to believe his plea was not knowing or voluntary. Teijeiro essentially 

concedes as much in his brief: “It was during the PSR interview[] that 

[Teijeiro] first started exhibiting potential competency issues.” Elsewhere, 

the brief admits that “the evidence of potential incompetency did not come 

to the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s attention until after the guilty plea hearing.” These 

concessions are supported by the record. For example, during rearraignment, 

Teijeiro confirmed to the magistrate judge that he understood the 

consequences of his plea, that he had reviewed the agreement with his 

counsel, and that he was pleading guilty because he was “in fact, guilty, and 

for no other reason.” 

Teijeiro now argues that, given the irrational statements in the PSR, 

one of the attorneys should have moved for a competency evaluation before 

sentencing. This argument is meritless. Teijeiro cites no authority for the 

proposition that erratic statements in a PSR can somehow retroactively 

undermine the defendant’s competency to plead guilty. To the contrary, the 

plain language of the plea agreement and Teijeiro’s testimony have a “strong 

presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); United 

States v. McDaniels, 907 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 2018). Teijeiro has failed to 

overcome that presumption.

Accordingly, the district court did not err in adopting the magistrate

judge’s finding that Teijeiro was competent to plead guilty.

B.

Teijeiro next argues that the district court should have ordered a 

competency hearing sua sponte, given his statements to the probation officer 

during the PSR interview and during the sentencing hearing. 

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We have sometimes reviewed this kind of claimed error for abuse of 

discretion. See United States v. Messervey, 317 F.3d 457, 463 (5th Cir. 2002); 

United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 303 (5th Cir. 1995). We have reviewed for 

plain error, however, when a defendant has failed to make a competency 

objection during the guilty plea hearing and does not seek to withdraw his 

guilty plea. See United States v. Montoya, 838 F. App’x 898, 898 (5th Cir. 

2021) (per curiam); United States v. Villarreal, 405 F. App’x 833, 833 (5th 

Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Because Teijeiro loses under either standard, “we 

decline to decide whether the stricter plain error standard of review is 

applicable.” United States v. Rey, No. 21-40836, 2022 WL 6316459, at *1 (5th 

Cir. Oct. 7, 2022). 

Convicting a legally incompetent defendant offends due process. See 

Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). “A defendant therefore has a 

procedural due process right to a competency hearing if the evidence before 

the district court ‘raises a bona fide doubt as to [the] defendant’s competence 

to stand trial.’” United States v. Barajas, No. 20-10582, 2021 WL 3437979, at 

*1 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2021) (quoting Pate, 383 U.S. at 385) (alteration in 

original)). “A defendant is competent to stand trial if he has the present 

ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 

proceeding[] against him.” United States v. Joseph, 333 F.3d 587, 589 (5th Cir. 

2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original).

To order a competency hearing, a district court must have 

“reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering 

from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the 

extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the 

proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 4241(a). But the existence of “mental or emotional problems or mental 

illness ‘is not dispositive as to . . . competency.’” Barajas, 2021 WL 3437979, 

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at *4 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 709 F.3d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 2013)).

Instead, we consider three factors to detect whether a court reversibly erred

by failing to hold a competency hearing sua sponte: (1) any prior medical 

opinion on competency, (2) the defendant’s demeanor at trial, and (3) any 

history of irrational behavior. See United States v. Messervey, 317 F.3d 457, 463 

(5th Cir. 2002). Here, no factor supports Teijeiro’s argument.

The first factor weighs strongly against Teijeiro. While pointing to the 

irrational statements he made during his arrest, arraignment, and sentencing, 

he nonetheless concedes that “[t]here are no prior medical opinions about 

[his] competency in the record.” See Barajas, 2021 WL 343979, at *4. 

Moreover, receiving Social Security disability benefits is not tantamount to a 

medical declaration of incompetency. See ibid.

The second factor, Teijeiro’s demeanor in court, also cuts against 

him. He acted cordially, took responsibility for his actions, apologized for his 

criminal behavior, and stated he understood the purpose of the hearings. 

Teijeiro counters by pointing to his off-key contention at sentencing—

namely, that he manufactured the charge in order to draw attention to his 

father. This argument is unavailing. In Mitchell, we found no error in not sua 

sponte ordering a competency hearing because, “[d]espite [the defendant’s] 

illogical and rambling statements,” his testimony “illustrated his basic 

awareness and understanding of the proceedings.” 709 F.3d at 441. So too

here.

Finally, the third factor, Teijeiro’s irrational behavior, also fails to 

support him. Yes, Teijeiro made some strange statements about arranging his 

own arrest and writing a television pilot. But these assertions were not so 

irrational to show that the district court abused its discretion by not sua sponte 

addressing Teijeiro’s competency. As discussed, despite his odd assertions, 

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Teijeiro consistently admitted his guilt, affirmed he understood the 

proceedings, and asked for a “fair” punishment. 

In sum, we see no reversible error in the district court’s not holding a

sua sponte competency hearing prior to sentencing Teijeiro.

C.

Lastly, Teijeiro contends the district court erred by ordering 

restitution without first determining his relative role in causing the victims’ 

claimed losses.

As a threshold matter, the government argues we should not reach this 

argument because Teijeiro waived his right to appeal the “order of 

restitution . . . in an amount to be determined by the district court.”1 Teijeiro

counters that, because the district court neglected to analyze how his offense 

proximately caused the victims’ losses under Paroline v. United States, 572 

U.S. 434, 448 (2014), his appeal falls under the waiver’s exception for a 

“sentence exceeding the statutory maximum.” We review de novo whether 

an appeal waiver bars an appeal. United States v. Keele, 755 F.3d 752, 754 (5th 

Cir. 2014).

The government asserts that Teijeiro’s argument is foreclosed by

United States v. Meredith, 52 F.4th 984 (5th Cir. 2022). Meredith concluded

that “the statutory-maximum carveout authorizes an appeal only when the 

district court exceeds ‘the upper limit of punishment that Congress has 

legislatively specified for violations of a statute’—not when the sentencing 

_____________________

1 The government also argues Teijeiro forfeited this argument by failing to 

adequately brief it. We disagree. Teijeiro’s briefing—which includes the standard of 

review, discusses applicable law, and explains how he believes the district court erred—is 

sparse but enough to preserve his argument. See SEC v. Hallam, 42 F.4th 316, 327 (5th Cir. 

2022) (“To be adequate, a brief must ‘address the district court’s analysis and explain how 

it erred.’” (quoting Rollins v. Home Depot, 8 F.4th 393, 397 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021))).

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judge commits any error under the sentencing statute.” Id. at 987 (quoting 

United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2005)). Meredith, however,

addressed 18 U.S.C. § 3663, the general restitution statute authorizing

“restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a 

plea agreement.” Id. at 987 & n.1 (citation omitted).

Teijeiro’s restitution was ordered under a different statute, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2259. We addressed that statute in United States v. Winchel, holding that 

“if a court orders a defendant to pay restitution under § 2259 without 

determining that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the victim’s 

claimed losses, the amount of restitution necessarily exceeds the statutory 

maximum.” 896 F.3d 387, 389 (5th Cir. 2018). The government does not

meaningfully try to distinguish Winchel.

After briefing concluded in this case, we decided United States v. 

Alfred, 60 F.4th 979 (5th Cir. 2023). That case distinguished Winchel on the 

ground that, there, the district court performed the Paroline analysis and the 

appeal merely challenged its outcome. See Alfred, 60 F.4th at 982 (“Because 

it is clear that the district court considered the Paroline factors at sentencing 

and ordered restitution as authorized by § 2259, the statutory-maximum 

exception does not apply.”). That is not the case here: the district court did 

not address Paroline. Winchel therefore controls and we proceed to the 

merits. See United States v. Leal, 933 F.3d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 2019) (finding 

appeal waiver did not bar a Paroline-based appeal even without an exception 

for sentences exceeding the statutory maximum).

On the merits, we review for plain error because Teijeiro did not 

object to the restitution order. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 

(2009). As such, we have discretion to correct an error only if it “(1) was not 

intentionally relinquished or abandoned, (2) was plain, i.e. not subject to 

reasonable dispute, and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial 

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rights.” Leal, 933 F.3d at 431. Even so, we will reverse only if “the error also 

‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.’” Id. at 431–32 (quoting Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 

U.S. 189, 194 (2016)).

Section 2259 provides that “a court [can] order restitution, but only 

to the extent it is shown that the defendant in question proximately caused 

the victim’s losses.” Winchel, 896 F.3d at 389. In Paroline, the Supreme 

Court enumerated certain factors as “rough guideposts” for this inquiry:

[1] the number of past criminal defendants found to have 

contributed to the victim’s general losses;

[2] reasonable predictions of the number of future offenders 

likely to be caught and convicted for crimes contributing to the 

victim’s general losses;

[3] any available and reasonably reliable estimate of the broader 

number of offenders involved (most of whom will, of course, 

never be caught or convicted);

[4] whether the defendant reproduced or distributed images of 

the victim;

[5] whether the defendant had any connection to the initial 

production of the images;

[6] how many images of the victim the defendant possessed;

[7] and other facts relevant to the defendant’s relative causal 

role. 

572 U.S. at 460 (brackets added). The factors, however, “need not be 

converted into a rigid formula,” ibid., and we have since directed district 

courts to use discretion and sound judgment in applying them. Leal, 933 F.3d 

at 432. Moreover, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the analysis may be 

“difficult” when, as is the case here, the defendant is “one of thousands who 

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have possessed and will in the future possess the victim’s images but who has 

no other connection to the victim.” Paroline, 572 U.S. at 449.

We find helpful guidance in our recent opinion in United States v. 

Musgraves, No. 21-10947, 2022 WL 7283887 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2022), which 

addressed an analogous situation.

2 Musgraves affirmed a restitution award 

where the district court relied on detailed victim impact statements. Id. at *1.

The district court ordered restitution in the amounts the victims requested, 

which represented only a small percentage of each of the victim’s 

demonstrated total losses. Ibid. Further, there was no indication that any of 

the victims received duplicative recovery. Ibid.

That is exactly the case here. The district court adopted the PSR, 

which included the estimated total loss of each victim and an addendum with 

victim impact statements demonstrating how offenders like Teijeiro have 

perpetuated the victims’ abuse. The restitution amounts ordered comply 

with the victims’ requested amounts and represent only a small percentage 

of the demonstrated losses.3 Moreover, there is no indication of duplicative 

recovery.4 

_____________________

2 “An unpublished opinion issued after January 1, 1996 is not controlling 

precedent, but may be persuasive authority.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 n.7 (5th 

Cir. 2006) (citing 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4).

3 For example, the largest individual amount, $10,000 for Sierra from the 

Jan_Sock1 Series, represents less than one percent of her estimated total losses. 

4 Accordingly, this case is distinguishable from a case like Winchel. There, we 

vacated a restitution award where the government conceded the first three plain error 

prongs and the district court had ordered an extraordinarily large restitution amount. See

Winchel, 896 F.3d at 389 (explaining that “[w]hen a court orders a defendant to pay nearly 

$1.5 million in restitution without determining whether that amount complies with a basic 

statutory requirement—in this case, § 2259’s proximate causation requirement—the 

fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings are seriously 

undermined”).

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Accordingly, Teijeiro “fails to show that there is a reasonable 

probability that such error resulted in his accountability for damages he did 

not cause or that the district court would have imposed a lower restitution 

amount but for any error.” Musgraves, 2022 WL 7283887, at *1.

***

AFFIRMED.

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