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S. Hrg. 109–399

RECOVERING FROM HURRICANE KATRINA:

THE NEXT PHASE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 14, 2005

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

THOMAS R. ELDRIDGE, Senior Counsel 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

MICHAEL ALEXANDER, Minority Professional Staff Member 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 3

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 5

Senator Levin with attachments ..................................................................... 6

Senator Coleman .............................................................................................. 18

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 20

Senator Domenici ............................................................................................. 21

Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................................... 23

Senator Coburn ................................................................................................. 25

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 27

Senator Chafee ................................................................................................. 28

Senator Dayton ................................................................................................. 29

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 30

Prepared statement: 

Senator Warner ................................................................................................ 69

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2005

Hon. Pete Wilson, Former Governor, California ................................................... 32

Hon. Patricia A. Owens, Former Mayor, Grand Forks, North Dakota ............... 35

Hon. Marc H. Morial, President and CEO, National Urban League, Former 

Mayor of New Orleans ......................................................................................... 40

Iain B. Logan, Operations Liaison, International Federation of Red Cross 

and Red Crescent Societies ................................................................................. 43

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Logan, Iain B.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 43

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 108

Morial, Hon. Marc H.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 40

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 104

Owens, Hon. Patricia A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 35

Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................... 77

Wilson, Hon. Pete: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 32

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 71

APPENDIX

Jim Haynie, President, National Association for Amateur Radio (ARRL), prepared statement ................................................................................................... 111

International Bottled Water Association (IBWA), prepared statement .............. 114

(1)

RECOVERING FROM HURRICANE KATRINA: 

THE NEXT PHASE 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2005

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Voinovich, Coleman, Coburn, Chafee, 

Domenici, Warner, Lieberman, Levin, Akaka, Carper, Dayton, Lautenberg, and Pryor. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. 

Today the Committee begins an inquiry into the Hurricane 

Katrina disaster. I would like to thank my colleagues and our witnesses, and particularly my Ranking Member, Senator Lieberman, 

for their prompt cooperation on a matter of such urgency. 

In the months ahead, this Committee intends to conduct a thorough, deliberate, and fair review of the preparation for and response to this devastating hurricane—at all levels of government. 

We will ask the hard questions about the adequacy of planning 

efforts for this long-predicted natural disaster. We will explore the 

coordination among local, State, and Federal emergency management officials before and after the hurricane’s landfall. And we will 

critically examine the legal structures and authorities that define 

who is in charge of assets that must be brought to bear in such a 

catastrophic event. 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, America has 

worked hard and invested billions of dollars to create an emergency 

preparedness and response structure that would bring together 

local, State and Federal authorities into one cohesive and effective 

unit. In its first major test since September 11, however, this structure failed to meet our expectations. 

At this point, we would have expected a sharp, crisp response to 

this terrible tragedy. Instead, we witnessed a sluggish initial response that was characterized by a confusing lack of unity of command, a lack of coordination among different levels of government, 

and a lack of communication—sometimes even an inability to communicate at all—among government entities, first responders, utilities, health care providers, and other emergency workers. 

2

Some have said that these problems have been caused by the 

Federal Government’s post-September 11 focus on terrorism. Our 

Committee will look at that issue, but I will tell you at the outset 

that I really doubt that is the problem. Much of our preparations 

for a terrorist attack are equally applicable whether the cause of 

the incident is a natural disaster, fire, or accident. 

For example, if the levees in New Orleans had been breached by 

a terrorist attack instead of a hurricane, we would still be faced 

with very similar evacuation, rescue, and recovery challenges. 

Another issue that we will examine is whether FEMA should be 

part of the Department of Homeland Security. Again, I will say at 

the outset that my inclination is that it should be part of DHS. 

Whether it is a terrorist attack or a natural disaster, FEMA plays 

a key role in the response. 

DHS includes offices that support preparedness at the State and 

local level as well as Federal agencies like the Coast Guard that 

play critical roles in planning and response. Including FEMA as 

part of DHS should promote better coordination with these agencies. 

Another question that is being debated is whether or not an outside commission should be formed to investigate Katrina. The answer to that question really has no bearing on our work here. Regardless of whether an outside commission is established, it is essential that Congress conduct an aggressive inquiry. We would be 

remiss if we ignored our clear responsibility to conduct oversight to 

identify why the preparation and initial response were so woefully 

inadequate. We must identify problems so that we can change the 

laws and institute reforms that only Congress has the power to implement. 

The purpose of our work here is not simply to place blame. Such 

an inquiry would be unproductive and misguided. Without a single 

human error, Katrina still would have been a natural disaster on 

an order of magnitude rarely seen on earth. But our inquiry must 

lay bare the painful evidence of human errors that added to the 

suffering. We must learn the lessons from Katrina, so we can better protect our people the next time a disaster strikes. 

In conducting this inquiry we are determined not to divert resources from the recovery efforts that are still at a critical stage. 

Ensuring that Federal, State, local, and private emergency efforts 

have the resources and the leadership needed must remain our 

first priority and our highest obligation. 

In that spirit, this first hearing will focus on how we can best 

assist the victims of Katrina, the 450,000 families that require 

long-term housing, the newly unemployed, the shuttered small 

businesses, the overwhelmed school systems, and the obliterated 

communities. 

We have with us here today witnesses who have led with distinction when faced with natural disasters. We will seek their advice 

on what we can do now, right now, to assist and comfort the victims of Katrina, to stabilize the economy of the Gulf Coast, and to 

plan for the reconstruction. 

Let me close with a word of thanks. Despite the failures and 

shortfalls of the response, there have been many more acts of courage and compassion. Many first responders and medical providers, 

3

the Coast Guard, the National Guard, active duty troops, private 

citizens, and, yes, FEMA employees have worked heroically and 

tirelessly. Neighbors have reached out to neighbors. 

One incredible fact that I learned last week from the Coast 

Guard briefing of this Committee, 70 percent of the Coast Guard 

employees based in the Gulf Coast who were heroically rescuing 

tens of thousands of people over the past 2 weeks, had lost their 

own homes in Hurricane Katrina. Yet they carried on and they did 

their job helping others. 

And throughout our Nation, Americans have done what they always do in times of crisis: They have opened their hearts, their 

wallets, and even their homes. Katrina has raised serious and troubling questions about how our governments respond to catastrophic 

events, questions that we will answer over the course of this investigation. But Katrina has also shown, once again, that the spirit 

and character of the American people give our Nation a resiliency 

to recover from any catastrophe. 

Senator Lieberman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman, for 

that excellent opening statement. 

The fact is that fate has given this Committee a very important 

responsibility. I suppose I would say fate and the Senate Rules 

have given this Committee a very important responsibility to investigate the conduct of the Federal Government, also to look at the 

State and local governments, in preparation for and in response to 

Hurricane Katrina. 

And what is required now clearly in the national interest is an 

independent-minded, open-minded, nonpartisan, no-holds-barred 

investigation to see what worked and what did not work, what we 

have to be grateful for and what we ought to be angry and 

unsatisfied with in the governmental response. I know that our 

leaders are still negotiating here in the Senate and in the House 

the exact contours of that debate, but the fact is, one way or the 

other, this Committee, as you have said, has a responsibility to proceed because we are the Committee with oversight responsibility 

over the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and we will proceed. 

I am confident that under your leadership we will proceed in exactly the nonpartisan, independent manner that the seriousness of 

this hurricane and what it revealed about government’s incapacity, 

at least in this case, to respond to protect the American people in 

crisis. 

When I express my confidence in you and this Committee it is 

the result of experience, not just faith. We will do it because we 

have done it, and we will do it the right way because I am proud 

to say we have as a Committee done it the right way, most recently 

in the response to the 9/11 Commission Report, when we had a 

very thorough debate of the legislation in this Committee before we 

reported to the Senate. We had 2 days of amendments and discussion and debate. Not a single one of those votes on those amendments broke on partisan lines, and that is exactly the spirit here 

in another hour of national urgency that is required of us, and I 

4

have no doubt that we will, as a Committee under your leadership, 

meet that test. 

This morning’s hearing gives us an opportunity to begin to look 

at what we can do to aid the people of New Orleans and the rest 

of the Gulf Coast with their recovery in the aftermath of the destruction wrought by Hurricane Katrina. This, too, is a critical part 

of our oversight responsibility. This hearing is about today and tomorrow, not about yesterday. 

Our staff investigation of the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina has begun, and when we are ready we will go in 

whatever the forum is to public hearings. This is not about that. 

This is about the future, and this is a moment when we hope to 

step in early to ensure that the Federal Government and the State 

and local governments together get the recovery and building process right, better than they got the preparation and response process. 

This is an opportunity to hear from experts, and we have some 

experienced ones before us, and to begin to lay down some markers 

on what should be done now and in the days ahead to help put 

these communities back on their feet. 

It is also an opportunity to begin to consider how we can make sure that we spend the more than $60 billion already rapidly approved by Congress—with billions and billions more likely on the 

way—wisely and efficiently, and that we will do together. 

Hurricane Katrina’s path of destruction has caused, obviously, a 

loss of life and property beyond any experience in a single natural 

disaster event in our lifetimes. The personal and human toll from 

this storm on those directly affected has been immense, but it has 

also taken a toll on the millions and millions of other Americans 

who watched the hurricane and its aftermath with increasing 

shock, grief, then anger, and then I would say embarrassment, embarrassment at the government’s failure to adequately protect its 

citizens affected by this hurricane, and embarrassment at the reality exposed by the hurricane, which was the other America of the 

poor who were left behind when the evacuations began postKatrina and are left behind every day in cities and towns throughout our country. 

The American people did not like what they saw, and I think 

that is part of why they individually and in groups have responded 

with such generosity to help those who have been hurt. This is a 

moment of tragedy, but it is a moment of opportunity if we handle 

it well and right and strongly, to pull our country together, to help 

these people and this region recover, and in a larger sense, to deal 

with the lack of opportunity of all those who are left behind every 

day in our country. 

For me, as we focus today on what is happening now, it is a real 

opportunity to begin to restore the confidence so many people in 

our country have lost in our government as they watched the response to this hurricane, by showing that we can get the rescue, 

recovery, and rebuilding right, and that the government will play 

a critical, constructive leadership role in that. 

I want to thank our witnesses, Governor Wilson, Mayor Owens, 

Mayor Morial, and Mr. Logan, for being here today. They bring extraordinary experience to the table before us that can help us do 

5

exactly what we want to do, and that is what Senator Collins hopes 

that this Committee will be able to help. 

I say, finally, this country has a history, and it mirrors our national values and attitude, which is like individuals, communities, 

and organizations in life, everybody is knocked down at some point, 

or stumbles down at some point. The test is whether and how we 

get up, and I think we are ready to prove what we are made of 

again as a people, and we are again ready to prove, and committed 

to prove, that our government is prepared to be as competent as 

the American people have a right to expect that we will be. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. Chairman Collins, thank you for holding this 

hearing today. I applaud your initiative and leadership in considering the next stage of the recovery effort. Hurricane Katrina may 

be the largest natural disaster that this country has ever experienced. The recovery effort will be monumental, and I am pleased 

that you brought such an experienced panel before the Committee 

to assist us as we proceed. 

It is great to have a former governor and two former mayors on 

the panel, and a distinguished guest from the International Red 

Cross. I must say, as a former mayor, governor, and county commissioner, the rubber meets the road when we have disasters on 

the city, county, and State level. 

I would first like to take this moment to extend my deepest sympathies to the victims and loved ones of this unprecedented disaster. I know all of our prayers and thoughts go out to those individuals. 

And, Madam Chairman, you would be interested to know that we 

worked with the Ethics Committee to create a Senate Katrina 

Fund as part of the Combined Charities Campaign. We are going 

to be urging all Senators and all members of our staff to contribute 

to this fund so that we can show our concern for our brothers and 

sisters who are suffering in that part of the country. 

I would also like to recognize the dedication of those who have 

offered tireless assistance to the victims of Katrina. To date 50,000 

people have been rescued, 208,000 are housed in shelters around 

the country, and countless families have relocated out of State. It 

is amazing, the calls that all of us are getting from our constituents 

that say, ‘‘I would like to take a family and take them in.’’ It is just 

unbelievable, the outpouring that we are having in this country to 

help those that need help. 

There has been much criticism of the relief effort, but I applaud 

the over 80,000 Federal personnel on the ground responding, including 22,000 active duty personnel, 1,900 reservists, almost 9,000 

FEMA workers, 4,000 Coast Guard, and approximately 51,000 National Guard personnel. I also want to thank the 1,500 personnel 

from Ohio, 300 of which responded on Thursday night at the Super 

Dome, and hundreds more who are still on the streets of New Orleans and throughout Mississippi who are doing search and rescue 

and logistics. I am very proud of them, and I think we owe a debt 

6

of sacrifice to those individuals who were there and the families 

that are supporting them. 

Katrina’s impact is unfathomable, and an entire region was irrevocably affected. I cannot conceive of a perfect evacuation or mitigation effort for circumstances of this magnitude. I know that we 

will all have questions about the timely response to this catastrophe, and in due time we will work to make sure these questions 

are answered. 

However, our responders have a job to do on the Gulf Coast and 

our objective should be to offer assistance and to speed recovery 

and respond to the needs of those impacted. We must provide them 

with the best information we can about whether or not they will 

have jobs and homes to return to so they can make very important 

decisions about what they are going to do with the rest of their 

lives. 

In addition to the recovery and rebuilding, we must take this opportunity to improve our capability to respond. Secretary Chertoff 

has made many recommendations for reforming the Department. 

Prior to Katrina, Secretary Chertoff said that FEMA should be removed from the Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate 

and made directly answerable to the Secretary of the Department. 

I look forward to hearing more about this proposal. 

In closing, I look forward to working with my colleagues to ensure that we conduct a measured and deliberate examination of the 

aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 

Madam Chairman and Ranking Member, Senator Collins and 

Senator Lieberman, I am glad that you said that it is the responsibility of this Committee and its Members to determine what went 

right and what went wrong on the Gulf Coast. I think we have to 

be very careful in circumstances like this when we decide whether 

or not to implement an independent group or commission to do the 

work. It is our responsibility. 

I will never forget, when I ran for mayor I said, ‘‘We are going 

to get into the bowels of the City of Cleveland,’’ and when I ran 

for governor, ‘‘We are going to get into the bowels of State Government.’’ Well, we are going to get into the bowels of the Department 

of Homeland Security and make sure that the next time around it 

will be able to get the job done that we expect it to do. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Levin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Madam Chairman, thank you, and thanks to Senator Lieberman, for convening the hearing and for your leadership 

in the investigation, which is essential, into the events surrounding 

Katrina. 

I am glad that our first hearing is focused on the needs of the 

people who survived Katrina. Private generosity has been overwhelming, but it cannot meet most of the needs caused by the 

Katrina disaster. We need housing, both temporary and permanent, for as many as half a million individuals, health care, environmental clean-up, oil refinery reconstruction, removal of debris, 

road and bridge repair, and so forth. 

We have a special responsibility on this Committee in addition 

to oversight, reviewing the events and the failures surrounding the 

7

Katrina disaster. We must oversee the ongoing Federal spending 

which is already $62 billion. We have jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, and Federal procurement 

issues in general. So we have the authority specifically to oversee 

the laws that govern the spending of Federal money, including the 

Competition in Contracting Act. 

If contracts are being given to favorites instead of to people who 

are the most qualified and the most efficient; if we do not have a 

process to make sure that Federal funds are spent properly—in 

other words, without active ongoing oversight by this Committee, 

public support for the Katrina recovery effort will erode and deepen 

the distrust of the Federal Government, which is already plenty 

deep given the Federal failures following the catastrophe of 

Katrina. 

So that is a responsibility that I know we are going to add to the 

other responsibilities that we are undertaking. 

We have an opportunity later this morning to act in one area 

where we know we have an urgent need and where we have failed 

to provide the resources to local and State governments. That has 

to do with the ability of first responders to communicate with one 

another. Interoperable communications is listed by just about every 

mayor I have talked to, every county commissioner I have talked 

to, and about every governor I have talked to. Interoperable communications is either at the top of the list or high on the list. 

And yet, the U.S. Conference of Mayors found in a 2004 report 

that 88 percent of the cities surveyed do not have interoperable 

communications capabilities with the Department of Homeland Security agencies, including FEMA. In addition, 83 percent of the cities surveyed reported that they have interoperability communications problems with the Justice Department, including the FBI and 

other parts of the Justice Department. Seventy-five percent of the 

cities surveyed by the U.S. Conference of Mayors reported that 

they have not received any Federal funds for interoperable communications. 

We are going to vote in a few minutes on an amendment of Senator Stabenow, which would provide the first part, a down payment 

of the $15 billion needed to provide interoperable communications. 

It is an amendment that would provide $5 billion of that $15 billion, which is so essential. So we can act as a Congress in a way 

we have not acted so far, to provide dedicated, focused funding for 

interoperable communications. 

Madam Chairman, there is a number of questions that I have set 

forth, including some, it seems to me, inadequate questions that 

have been even asked so far, relative to notice that was given by 

the FEMA Director, yes, on Monday night on television, to our 

leaders about the flooding that was taking place, and yet 24 hours 

later our leaders did not apparently have knowledge of the fact 

that we had this massive flooding in New Orleans. I lay out these 

questions in my opening statement. I would ask that the opening 

statement be made part of the record at this time. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Levin with attachments follows:]

8

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

In the wake of the greatest natural disaster to strike our nation, our topmost priority must continue to be to help the hundreds of thousands of persons injured and 

displaced by Hurricane Katrina. I am glad that our Committee’s first hearing on the 

Katrina disaster is focused on their needs. 

If there is a bright spot in this crisis, it has been the generosity of the millions 

of Americans who are opening their hearts and homes to help. The generous contributions of aid and comfort to hurricane victims all across the country is America 

at its best. In Michigan, people have welcomed with open arms several hundred individuals and families into urgently prepared shelters, and are working hard for 

their recovery. I saw the outpouring of support from my constituents when the first 

group arrived at the Air National Guard Base in Battle Creek last Sunday. 

Private generosity cannot meet most of the needs caused by the Katrina disaster. 

We need housing, both temporary and permanent, for as many as 450,000 individuals. Health care. Environmental cleanup. Oil refinery reconstruction. Removal of 

debris. Road and bridge repair. Changes to make sure social security checks and 

veterans benefits can be received. New funding for interoperable communications 

equipment not only for Gulf region but throughout the United States. Congress has already appropriated $62 billion, with more to come. While other 

committees in Congress can address specific needs related to housing, health, and 

other Katrina-related problems, our Committee can and should contribute to at least 

two essential tasks: Spending oversight and accountability. 

First, oversight of ongoing Federal spending. With our jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA), and Federal procurement issues, our Committee has the authority needed 

to undertake an intensive oversight effort to help ensure that DHS and FEMA are 

responsible stewards of the billions of taxpayer dollars that are going to be paid out. 

Questions are already flying about no-bid contracts for huge sums of money going 

to favored contractors or contractors with questionable track records. Active Congressional oversight is essential to ensuring responsible spending and vigilance 

against waste, fraud, and abuse. 

Without active ongoing oversight, public support for the Katrina recovery effort 

will erode. I am glad to learn that the DHS Inspector General has set up special 

teams to monitor and audit Katrina-related spending, but that task is no huge that 

it may be necessary to establish a special Inspector General with that sole responsibility. GAO also has a role to play in overseeing this spending, and we should call 

upon its expertise. In addition, we need to find out why FEMA is using no-bid instead of competitively bid contracts, why these contracts are so massive in scope, 

and how contractors were selected. As our Chairman will vividly remember, it was 

this Committee that authored the Competition in Contracting Act, and it is fitting 

and of critical importance that we help oversee Katrina spending to protect taxpayers. 

Second, it is beyond dispute that emergency planning and response failures took 

place both before and immediately after Katrina hit. Our Chairman and Ranking 

Minority Member have set a course for this Committee to identify, analyze, and understand those failures, and insist on accountability for them. Without understanding and accountability for poor performance, there is no incentive or ability to 

improve. By finding out what went wrong, we can strengthen our preparedness for 

future disasters, whether natural or caused by terrorist attack. 

I am particularly interested in finding answers to questions about the Federal 

Government’s immediate response to the hurricane and how to prevent similar 

types of problems in the next disaster, including the following:

• Why was there a massive communication failure during Katrina, and what 

can be done to prevent this problem in the future? One of the key problems 

exposed by the September 11 attack was our lack of interoperable communications equipment, yet 4 years later, we seem no better off. In fact, a June 

2004 U.S. Conference of Mayors report found that 88 percent of the cities surveyed still do not have interoperable communications capabilities.

• Why did it take so long for the department of Defense to join the hurricane 

relief effort? I don’t believe there is a problem with the law in this area, but 

we need to make sure. And why did Navy commanders in Pensacola, Florida 

restrain their helicopter pilots from providing search and rescue services to 

people in dire need?

• Did evacuation plans exist for people with special needs, such as the elderly, 

the sick, the disabled, and those without cars or the resources to leave town? 

If so, why were these plans so poorly executed?

9

• At the Superdome, 200 National Guard troops guarded the perimeter of the 

facility but apparently thought they had no authority to provide security for 

the thousands of persons inside the dome. Why was security so poorly 

planned and executed, and why did it take so long to evacuate the persons 

to a safe location?

• When tens of thousands of individuals began gathering at the Convention 

Center, no government agency took the steps necessary to recognize the 

emerging problems for the people stranded there and provide them with security, food, and water. Why did it take so long to get water, food and security 

to the convention center?

• Last Saturday, a newspaper article stated, ‘‘In Louisiana and Mississippi, civilian and military leaders said the response to the hurricane was delayed by 

the absence of the Mississippi National Guard’s 155th Infantry Brigade and 

Louisiana’s 256th Infantry Brigade, each with thousands of troops in Iraq.’’ 

The National Guard has since reported that, on the day of the hurricane, it 

had only about 34 percent of the equipment it should have had, due to deployments to Iraq. To what extent was our domestic preparedness hurt by the extensive deployment of National Guard troops and assets in Iraq?

• It is critical that we understand why the Federal response was so slow during 

the first 2 days after the hurricane hit. Levees were breached and broke when 

the hurricane hit on Monday morning, August 29. The resulting flooding was 

widely reported on television throughout the day on Monday. According to a 

report in the New Orleans papers, Army Corps of Engineers New Orleans 

project manager Al Naomi said that reports of the flooding and breaches were 

transmitted to Federal and State officials: ‘‘It was disseminated. It went to 

our [Office of Emergency Preparedness] in Baton rouge, to the State, FEMA, 

the Corps. The people in the field knew it.’’

On Monday night, the former FEMA director, Michael Brown, announced on 

television, on MSNBC, that New Orleans was flooding, and that he had told 

the President of this. He said: ‘‘I’m just beginning to receive reports from my 

folks in the field of literally tens of square miles of homes inundated with 

water up to the roofs. I mean I’ve already told the President tonight that we 

can anticipate a housing need of at least in the tens of thousands.’’

About an hour later that evening, Mr. Brown told CNN: ‘‘And I think what 

we see is, sure, New Orleans dodged the bullet, in the sense that the catastrophic disaster we thought would occur downtown, moved slightly to the 

east, 30 or 40 miles. But what that meant is that we now have literally 

neighborhood after neighborhood that is totally engulfed in water.’’

Despite this information, DHS Secretary Chertoff, Secretary of Defense 

Rumsfeld, and General Myers have said that they did not learn of the levee 

breaks and severe flooding until late Tuesday morning or afternoon. They 

said that, after reading the newspapers on Tuesday morning, they still 

thought that New Orleans had ‘‘dodged the bullet.’’

I would like to know why some of the most senior people responsible for 

emergency response and preparedness were either misinformed or uninformed about the actual conditions in New Orleans for so long.

Presumably if they had learned of the dire situation 24 hours earlier, on 

Monday afternoon instead of Tuesday afternoon, more would and could have 

been done. Instead, critical response time was lost. We need to find out how 

this communications break down happened—who knew what, when they 

knew it, and what they did with the information. This analysis is critical to 

preventing a similar communications break down in the next disaster.

Again, I would like to commend Senators Collins and Lieberman for beginning 

this inquiry into the Federal response to the hurricane. This important task goes 

to the heart of American security.

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Senator LEVIN. I thank the Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Coleman. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR COLEMAN 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Chairman Collins, for your expeditious and conscientious way that you have brought this hearing 

about. The Nation is full of questions and waits for answers, and 

we begin to meet that urgent need today. 

I also want to express my appreciation for the foresight of the 

Chairman and the Ranking Member to focus on the road ahead 

today before we collectively look back, and we will collectively look 

back, and we need to get answers of what went wrong, but it is 

important to look to the future. 

Some may say that a storm of this magnitude so overwhelmed 

our expectations that it destroyed our ability to respond. Others 

will say that all things are basically manageable and that this was 

primarily a failure of systems of government in which people, regular people, depend on for protection. I think each is partially right 

and each is partially wrong, and I second the words of my colleague, the former mayor and governor, that we need to get to the 

bowels of Homeland Security and figure out what was not done, 

talk to folks at the local level and State level, understand what was 

beyond the scope of government, and pull all of that together. 

I served as Mayor of St. Paul, and in that capacity I had the opportunity to travel, and see close hand, the disaster that occurred 

in Grand Forks, North Dakota, and the tremendous leadership of 

Mayor Owens to respond to that disaster. It is great to have you 

here. That flood and subsequent destruction ravaged an area that 

was already hard hit by economic hardship. 

I recall meeting with a local official in East Grand Forks, right 

across the river, and I asked him for the total financial assistance 

the area would need to receive. He said to me, ‘‘A few million dollars less than Kevin Garnett just received in his new NBA contract.’’ I think an event like this brings all questions of values into 

sharp focus, and I think that is important. 

An observation, first of all, I think we all heard the statement 

‘‘every crisis is an opportunity in disguise.’’ For those who lost their 

lives, their homes and everything, this tragedy wears no mask, and 

we need to confront the painful reality of what has happened to 

them and deal with that. But for the rest of us, Hurricane Katrina 

is an opportunity to learn lessons that may spare another community of a similar fate. 

I also am looking forward to the prospect of a brighter future. 

When I was mayor my mantra was ‘‘Hope and confidence yield investment.’’ Hope comes from government doing its business right; 

a sense of confidence comes from people believing that there are 

those who are going to be there when they need them. Hope comes 

from a brighter vision for the future. 

I do believe that we have to take advantage of this time to build 

that brighter future, not just rebuild what was. There are 400 

schools that have been destroyed. Do we rewire them in 20th Century technology, or do we do 21st Century technology? Part of my 

questions will be, how do we, at the Federal level, help bring to the 

table some of the ideas of urban planning and vision that are out 

19

there but do not override local concern and direction? Somehow we 

have to bring that together. This is a moment of opportunity. We 

can bring hope to the people of the Gulf Coast. We should be doing 

that, not alone by ourselves, but working in partnership. So I hope 

that we get there. 

We will have time to look back, and we will look back, but let 

us take advantage of this time to look forward and to make sure 

that we are building that future of greater hope and greater confidence and ultimately greater investment in the communities that 

have been so ravaged. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Coleman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

Hurricane Katrina will likely be noted as the most horrific and costly natural disaster in our Nation’s history. I urge my colleagues to not lose sight of this fact as 

we begin, what I trust will be, an exhaustive investigation into the Federal, State, 

and local response to this unprecedented disaster. Moreover, I appreciate the foresight of Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman to begin this oversight process 

by looking forward, before looking back. Our first priority must be to quickly aid 

the victims that are eagerly awaiting our assistance, rather than immediately beginning a process of recriminations. 

I am confident we—the Senate, the government, and the Nation—will learn many 

important lessons in the months to come. However, our focus should now be on the 

massive recovery and re-building process ahead. Restoration is not only critical for 

the displaced citizens of New Orleans, but for the morale of all Americans. In the 

wake of the devastation that ravaged New Orleans, we now have a unique opportunity to not only rebuild, but also to revitalize New Orleans by utilizing the most 

innovative technology and infrastructure available in the process. However, I am 

concerned that without the presence of strong leadership and planning, the citizens, 

the schools, and the business community will have no direction. 

Yesterday, I along with several of my colleagues in the Senate, who also were 

former mayors and governors, sent a letter to President Bush urging the creation 

of a New Orleans Rebuilding Commission. We envision a high level, independent 

panel of experts, appointed by the President, to restore and redesign the city of New 

Orleans. 

The Commission will address the environmental, social, and cultural elements of 

the city as it develops a comprehensive urban re-design plan. A coordinated solution 

brought forth by many parties who understand the multiculturalism, geography and 

history of the city will ensure that while the face of the city may change, its soul 

will remain intact. 

I would be remiss if I did not mention that while we do not want this investigation to interfere with recovery efforts, we urgently need an accounting of lessons 

learned at all levels of government—Federal, State, and local. Our response plans 

failed. Our communication infrastructure failed. We believed that these problems 

were solved after the brutal attacks of September 11. Unfortunately, much work remains to ensure a fluid response to the next disaster—whether natural or manmade. We were provided advance notice of the likely devastation to be wrought by 

Hurricane Katrina and our response failed. Terrorists will provide no such warning. 

It is imperative that we ensure specific and demonstrable plans are available for 

all levels of government and for all types of disasters. Not only do we need plans—

we need to test them regularly to ensure an adequate response becoming of the U.S. 

Government. I look forward to actively participating in this investigation. 

Finally, we need to do all we can to assist the victims of this disaster. We will 

learn many important lessons from this unprecedented disaster and our plans will 

be improved. Yet, for the next few months our thoughts and prayers need to be with 

the victims of this tragedy throughout Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana. 

Thank you, Chairman Collins.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Akaka. 

20

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman and 

Ranking Member Lieberman. I wish to compliment both of you for 

once again taking the lead on an issue so critical to this Nation, 

the response to Hurricane Katrina. 

I also want to welcome our distinguished panel, representing 

State, county, and national organizations, to this Committee hearing. 

The devastation to the Gulf Coast region—what can I say—is 

staggering. To the millions of Americans affected by this catastrophe, I extend my prayers for those who have lost their lives and 

for those who are in mourning and those who are suffering. 

We have the difficult task of making sure that those in need and 

those who seek to provide relief are served well by their government. This national emergency is a humanitarian crisis of enormous dimension. The world has witnessed tens of thousands of 

Americans lacking the basic necessities of food, water, shelter, safety, and medicine. Sadly, when Katrina’s victims needed the Federal 

Government most, there was a crisis of leadership. I am not pointing fingers or assigning blame, but I know that many Americans 

are angry and are seeking accountability. 

I have received hundreds of letters from my own constituents 

from Hawaii. Hawaii is also threatened by hurricanes and has been 

badly battered in the past by them. It is the hurricane season now 

in Hawaii. My constituents want to know what their leaders did 

wrong and what they did right. They want to know how the government can do better. They want to be assured that if Hawaii is 

hit again that they will be helped. All Americans want this assurance. 

Since September 11, 2001, the Congress has given considerable 

attention to making Americans more safe. Yet there were disturbing similarities between Hurricane Katrina and September 11, 

similarities in what was known beforehand and how the government responded to pending dangers. 

On September 11, we found that the President and other senior 

leaders received intelligence and law enforcement reports about imminent threats to Americans. In the case of Katrina, the National 

Weather Service tracked the hurricane for a week across the Atlantic and through the Gulf of Mexico, and the Administrator of 

NOAA rightly stated, ‘‘This storm was reported as widely as any 

I have ever seen.’’ Moreover, there were numerous studies and 

news reports about the dangers this strong hurricane would pose 

to the levees. 

In the 4 years since September 11, we should have done a better 

job in preparing to protect Americans. This unprecedented disaster 

is not only a test of our Nation’s character, but it is also an opportunity to improve. We need to examine our national priorities and 

give greater attention to the needs of Americans, and even think 

of evaluating the structure of DHS and its response capacity, and 

to search for ways to do better. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I welcome our witnesses and look 

forward to their testimony. 

Madam Chairman, I have a longer statement that I request to 

be made part of the record. 

21

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Thank you, Madam Chairman and Ranking Member Lieberman. 

I wish to compliment both of you for once again taking the lead on an issue so 

critical to this nation—the response to Hurricane Katrina. 

The devastation to the Gulf Coast region is staggering. To the millions of Americans affected by this catastrophe, I extend my prayers for those who have lost their 

lives and to those who are in mourning. We have the difficult task of making sure 

that those in need, and those who seek to provide relief are served well by their 

government. 

Over 90,000 square miles have been impacted by Hurricane Katrina—an area as 

large as Great Britain. We know that hundreds of thousands of Americans have lost 

their homes and worldly possessions. Loved ones and strangers alike have opened 

their homes and hearts to those who have been forced to seek refuge. Much of New 

Orleans was submerged under flood waters that have since become a polluted, toxic 

swamp, endangering the health and lives of storm survivors and their brave rescuers—a major U.S. city of a half-million people rendered uninhabitable. Entire 

communities in Mississippi and Alabama have been wiped out. 

This national emergency—which was televised worldwide—is a humanitarian crisis of enormous dimension. The world has witnessed tens of thousands of Americans 

lacking the basic necessities of food, water, shelter, safety, and medicine. 

Sadly, when Katrina’s victims needed the Federal Government most, there was 

a crisis of leadership. On Friday, September 2, 4 days after the battered levees 

broke, victims in major shelters reported not seeing a single Federal official. Organizations like the Red Cross and the Salvation Army, along with private citizens and 

businesses sought to rescue and bring relief to the Gulf residents. 

I am not pointing fingers or assigning blame. But I know that many Americans 

are angry and are seeking accountability. I have received hundreds of letters from 

my own constituents. Hawaii is also threatened by hurricanes and has been badly 

battered in the past by them. It is the Hurricane season now. My constituents want 

to know what their leaders did wrong and what they did right. They want to know 

how their government can do better. They want to be assured that if Hawaii is hit 

again that there will be help. All Americans want that assurance. 

Since September 11, 2001, the Congress has given considerable attention to making Americans more safe. Yet there are disturbing similarities between Hurricane 

Katrina and September 11. Similarities in what was known beforehand and how the 

government reacted to pending dangers. 

On September 11, we found that the President and other senior leaders received 

intelligence and law enforcement reports about imminent threats to Americans. In 

the case of Katrina, the National Weather Service tracked the hurricane for a week 

across the Atlantic and through the Gulf of Mexico, and the Administrator of the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration rightly stated ‘‘this storm was reported as widely as any I have ever seen.’’ Moreover, there were numerous studies 

and news reports about the dangers that a hurricane of this magnitude would pose 

to the levees. 

In the 4 years since September 11, we should have done a better job in prepared 

to protect Americans. 

This unprecedented disaster is a test of our Nation’s character. It is also an opportunity to improve. 

We need to re-examine our national priorities and give greater attention to the 

needs of Americans and to search for ways to do better. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I welcome our witnesses and look forward to their 

testimony.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Domenici. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR DOMENICI 

Senator DOMENICI. First, Madam Chairman, I want to say to 

both of you that I believe it is imperative that you proceed as you 

have started today. 

A couple of statements that have been made here, I think, deserve being repeated. Senator Lieberman, you have approached 

this, in my opinion, in terms of looking at what went wrong, as a 

22

Senator should, not as a partisan Senator. You have said this Committee should find out what went right and what went wrong. Inherent in that statement is that you think that there is sufficient 

competence in Congress for a congressional committee, structured 

as we structure committees, to do this. 

As a long-time Senator, I just cannot believe what I am hearing 

these days. We have a problem like this, and it is instantly stated 

by some that Congress cannot answer this question, that it has to 

have some special outside committee. I would assume implicit in 

that statement is a belief that we would play politics, that we 

would not appropriately set responsibilities in things achieved and 

actions that failed. I do not believe we need an outside committee 

every time there is a problem in this country. We ought to investigate such problems, whether it is this Committee or whether our 

leadership establishes another committee, but it should be a congressional investigation by a committee with the same kind of virtues and the same kind of liabilities that standing congressional 

committees have. 

So I thank you for that. I do not know that you expected it to 

be interpreted as I have, but I nonetheless believe it is imperative 

that it be stated. You are not asking that another committee be appointed, and I do not think you would be upset if the leadership 

appointed a congressional committee and you were on it, which you 

probably would be. Some of us would not be on it, and maybe some 

would be upset, but not every Senator is on this Committee either, 

so some are going to be upset anyway. Everyone wants to hold 

their own hearings, but that cannot be. Enough of that issue. 

[Laughter.] 

Second, let me say one Senator suggested that we ought to quickly fund an amendment on the floor that asks for telephone interoperable communications. I am not sure we should do that. Why 

am I not sure? Because I do not know what kind of plan we have 

for the recovery of the area. That might not be the most important 

thing we have to do. We ought to find out what rehabilitation we 

are going to do, and then start to fund that rehabilitation, with the 

exception of those things that are absolutely imperative and must 

be done immediately. To do otherwise, as it appears we are headed, 

leads me to the conclusion that we are on a road to failure in the 

way we are doing things. 

Mr. Governor, my friend, you know what is going to happen. The 

people in charge are not going to have enough time to do their 

work because every committee up here is going to have them up 

here testifying as to what we can do for you. They are not going 

to have enough time to figure out what they ought to do for the 

area. 

So I am going to repeat here what I have said a number of times. 

The President of the United States should appoint a lead person 

as coordinator and set up a coordinating office, and do it quickly 

with the consent of the governors and mayors so it runs in deference to them, not contrary to them. The sooner the better, I repeat. 

Now, Madam Chairman, I know that does not sit well with some 

because some think they should be doing that, and that is fine. I 

wish the President could understand what I am saying because I 

23

think he is not embarrassing himself by doing it, he is not admitting defeat by doing it, rather he is setting a management structure in place. 

Last, how many Americans and how many Senators know that 

there exists within Homeland Security an institute, a modeling institute, called the National Infrastructure Simulation Analysis 

Center, NISAC. Perhaps you do, Madam Chairman? 

It is a center that has plugged into it information whereby you 

determine what areas in the country and what events in the country could bring the largest disasters. They already predict which 

one is the worst. It is the earthquake of San Francisco. And it says, 

if that happens, here is the damage. Now, do you want to prepare 

for it or do you want to wait until it happens, or is it too unlikely 

to happen that you should not prepare for it? I do not know. But 

nobody has studied that. 

It said the second worst one, believe it or not, was this one. It 

was there. They modeled it out and said this is what will happen. 

They have No. 3, they have No. 4. I believe they have the first 20. 

Should we do something about that? I would say you bet. The 

President and Congress should say, ‘‘What are they? Are they accurate?’’ If they are, be honest. I submit some of them you cannot prepare for because they are so big, and while we are talking about 

who failed here, I submit that what really happened is that Mother 

Nature decided that we were going to get the most devastating 

storm that could ever hit America. And most of the damage we 

could not avoid. We can talk about who was 1 day late, 24 hours 

late, 36 hours late, but the truth of the matter is that Katrina was 

so gigantic and the aftermath of that event is so big that 1 or 2 

days of preparatin and knowing who planned what and who did not 

is not going to solve the major problem that the Good Lord, if you 

believe in God, just put on this area something you could not fix. 

It happened and then we have to try to fix it. 

I hope that people do not think that 1 day, 2 days here or there 

would have avoided the devastation that exists because of Katrina 

because it could not have. And I hope that comes out, too, when 

Katrina response is evaluated. 

I took too much time, but I really believe what I have said was 

not intended to say anything about this Committee. I think you 

have done a terrific job and you should have primary responsibility. 

If Congress is going to do it, you should have prime responsibility. 

I thank you for the time. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR LAUTENBERG 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for convening this hearing. I have a longer statement which I would ask 

unanimous consent be included in the record. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. One of the things that strikes me is, as we 

watched events unfold there, the bravery and the courage of the 

people who served in the rescue mission. The Coast Guard touched 

everybody’s heart when you saw those baskets drop down virtually 

from the sky and pick people off rooftops. It was an incredible deed 

of courage. The winds were blowing, the sea was stormy, and it 

24

was repeated by other departments of government. One of the 

things that comes out, as I review events, is that this constant refrain that we hear about shrinking the size of government, getting 

it down to so small that we can drown it in the bathtub, where 

would we have been without government’s intervention in this even 

though there is plenty of fault to go around? 

So I think we have to rethink the philosophy that pervades our 

society and say government is not evil. We do not do everything 

right, but we do a lot of things that are essential, and I am particularly pleased that we are going to have this review. I am mindful 

of where we are when I look at a story in today’s Washington Post,

in which Tom Kean, respected former governor from the State of 

New Jersey—and Pete Wilson, I know that you know Tom Kean, 

having served with him, and by the way, Governor Wilson and I 

were in the class of 1982, and it hardly seems that long ago because neither of us has aged in that period of time. [Laughter.] 

The fact of the matter is that unless we take the lessons from 

history—it has been said by Santiama the poet—we are doomed to 

repeat them. So we cannot simply say stop the blame game and let 

us turn to the future. The fact is that unless we really understand 

what took place, then we are operating without full thought. 

And Tom Kean issued a statement today in which he said that 

Congress has been delinquent, not his word exactly, but he said 

that—you know he headed the 9/11 panel, and we all in this Committee think a pretty good job was done there. He said that the 

bungled response to Katrina lay bare how unprepared the Nation 

remains for a catastrophic event, whether it is another terrorist 

strike or a natural disaster. 

Senator Domenici said something that was absolutely right. 

When something of this magnitude happens, you cannot prepare 

perfectly for all the eventualities, but we at least ought to have 

plans that do not include cronyism or preferred contractors or 

things of that nature or people who do not have experience being 

assigned tasks that they never had any idea about how to handle. 

While I commend the leadership of the Committee for starting 

this debate, it is obviously going to be a long, at times I think, 

painful debate, but we should not run or hide anything that was 

there in the past because those lessons, though painful, are critical 

to how we plan for the future. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG 

Thank you Madam Chairman for convening this hearing. 

Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst disasters to strike our nation. It was an 

act of nature, compounded by a failure of leadership on the part of our Federal Government. 

We all want to put the mistakes of the last few weeks behind us, so we can get 

on with the daunting task ahead. 

But we can’t ignore the mistakes of the last 2 weeks. We need to learn from them. 

If we fail to heed the lessons of the past, we will jeopardize our success in the future. 

And the mission before us now is too important for us to fail. So we must take 

an unflinching look at why our government failed the people of the Gulf coast in 

their hour of need. We must also make sure that help is reaching those who need 

it. We have appropriated $62 billion to address the needs of Katrina’s victims, and 

begin rebuilding their communities. 

25

Most of that money will be administered by FEMA. To ensure that those dollars 

are spent wisely, this Committee must be certain that FEMA is being managed in 

a professional and competent manner. 

There is no place for cronyism in FEMA. By the same token, this unprecedented 

event must not be used as an excuse to dole out sweetheart contracts for politically 

connected companies. 

Imagine my surprise when the Halliburton corporation received the first contract in the aftermath of Katrina! The Shaw Group has also received a contract for $100 

million dollars. That company is represented by Joe Allbaugh, a former FEMA director. Mr. Allbaugh came to FEMA with a great deal of experience running political 

campaigns. 

Mr. Allbaugh brought along his college roommate, Michael Brown, who eventually 

took Allbaugh’s job at FEMA. Mr. Brown’s lack of relevant experience may have cost 

lives and hampered rescue efforts. 

According to a Washington Post poll published this week, a majority of the American people are concerned that the government isn’t doing enough to prevent fraud 

and corruption in the rush to award billions of dollars in contracts. 

We need to bolster the confidence of the American people, and ensure that our 

resources go to those who really need help and are not wasted. Thank you Madam 

Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Coburn. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR COBURN 

Senator COBURN. Madam Chairman, thank you, and I apologize 

to our panelists. I am on the Judiciary Committee and have left 

that because of the importance of this, and I will have to leave this 

hearing shortly—I have a statement I would like introduced into 

the record if I may. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

Senator COBURN. I would like to make two quick points. I have 

a short-lived history of politics, but the one thing I appreciate on 

the leadership of this Committee is the nonpartisan nature under 

which Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins conduct this Committee. If there is anything that is hurting our country most it is 

the divisiveness of the politicians that use partisanship as a tool 

with which to make political gains rather than to solve problems. 

Senator Lautenberg mentioned laying the blame. The problem is 

not laying the blame. The problem is fixing the problem. What is 

the problem? How do we fix it? The blame will be evident in the 

facts rather than the pointing of fingers, and it is my hope that 

this Committee can model through its leadership a behavior that 

examples to everybody else in Congress. 

My friend, Senator Voinovich, yesterday in our steering committee or our caucus, made the point that we have a committee to 

look at Homeland Security and FEMA. It is this one. I do not believe we need another committee. I trust the Members of this Committee to do an open, honest, frank appraisal of what went wrong, 

how we fix it, how we make the adjustments. 

The third point I would make is what history teaches us about 

sacrifice. President Roosevelt expanded Federal authority a great 

deal in the face of the Great Depression, but what everybody else 

does not realize is that during World War II he cut discretionary 

spending by 20 percent. What everybody else does not realize is 

that President Truman cut it 28 percent during the Korean War. 

We are in the midst of a war. We have the biggest national tragedy 

that we have ever faced in our country. 

I just got an e-mail. The State of Montana has offered to return 

all Federal earmarks to the Federal Government in the face of the 

26

tragedies and financial difficulties in which we find ourselves. They 

are leading by example. We need to do that. The American people 

have already done it in the opening of their hearts in how they 

have responded to this tragedy. It behooves us to live up, as Members of Congress, to the examples set before us by the common citizens of our country, and if we cannot do that, and if this is nothing 

but a partisan battle to fix this problem, then I believe the country 

needs a new set of leaders, leaders who can look past partisanship 

to solve the very grave, difficult, and real problems that we face. 

As I said on the floor, and I will finish, we have two national 

tragedies, this one that occurred along the Gulf Coast, but the financial tragedy that is in front of us as a Nation that will impact 

the way of life and the opportunity for the generations that follow 

us. We can do no less than leave them the same heritage that was 

left for us, which is one of sacrifice to create opportunity for the 

future. 

I thank you, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Coburn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I appreciate you holding this hearing, and I especially appreciate the leadership shown by you and the Ranking Member in focusing 

this hearing, as the title says, on where we go from here in response to Hurricane 

Katrina. 

There has been too much attention paid to the political finger-pointing in the 

wake of this disaster, and not enough attention paid to the generosity and hard 

work put into the recovery or how we are going to finance the massive costs of our 

relief efforts. 

I also appreciate our panelists who are here today. You each have a unique and 

valuable perspective on this problem, and I look forward to reviewing your testimony. 

I do have to apologize in advance. As the only member of both this committee and 

the Judiciary Committee, I may be required to leave to tend to the confirmation 

hearing of Judge John Roberts. 

I spoke on the floor about this last week, but I would like to reiterate to my colleagues my strong belief that we need to keep in mind the sacrifices made by past 

generations when paying for disaster relief. 

Many remember President Franklin Roosevelt for his expansion of Federal authority and power in the face of the Great Depression. Less well known is the fiscal 

courage he showed in response to the disaster of Pearl Harbor. Following that tragedy, President Roosevelt realized the need for our country to rearrange its priorities. 

Between 1942 and 1944, he cut nondefense spending by 20 percent. Among those 

programs he cut were his own pet programs, the Civilian Conservation Corps, the 

National Youth Administration and the Work Projects Administration—three programs which represented one-eighth of the Federal budget. 

Faced with the outbreak of the Korean War, President Harry Truman cut nondefense spending by 28 percent. Again,when faced with a crisis which required a 

significant financial commitment, the leadership of the United States made the 

tough choice and made the necessary cuts in spending. 

Both of these presidents realized the need for fiscal restraint in a time of crisis 

and made the tough choices which benefited Americans in the long term. It wasn’t 

the easiest thing to do for that generation of Americans, but it served to the benefit 

of future generations. Yet many seem uninterested in learning from these examples 

in order to provide a better future for our own children and grandchildren. Throughout our country, Americans are making sacrifices to assist those effected by this disaster, yet there is no sacrifice on the part of Congress. 

It means our grandchildren are going to have a far lower standard of living as 

we try to continue to load this debt on them. That is not opportunity. That is not 

a heritage I want to be involved with. I want to follow the heritage of our forefathers and the great generation of World War II where sacrifice was made. 

With the current Katrina aid included our deficit will be $670 billion this year. 

That is the real deficit. That comes to over $2,000 per man, woman, and child in 

this country this year alone. We will borrow internationally this year $1.4 trillion. 

27

How many years do you think the international financial community will continue 

to allow us to borrow that money without some cost coming home? 

The President, in his budget proposal this year, recommended 99 programs to be 

eliminated that did not meet an assessment rating program that was developed by 

OMB. That program was many times agreed to by many people in this body. That 

was $8.8 billion. There is not the courage coming from the Executive Branch To 

offer those, to say we are not going to spend another $8.8 billion of our grandchildren’s money. 

Last year, 2004, the Federal Government overpaid $41.5 billion for things it 

bought or handed out. That would nearly pay for our initial Katrina funding, if we 

would eliminate that. We can eliminate it. We choose not to do the oversight that 

is necessary to find the problems to make up more efficient, to accomplish the very 

goals to create the opportunity in the future for the next generation. 

With all of this financial mismanagement, it is obvious that the money we direct 

to aid those along the Gulf Coast impacted by Katrina should be closely monitored. 

We need a controller for this money under the Office of the President to make sure 

it is spent properly. I am going to offer that legislation today to make sure it is 

spent right. The President has authorized in good will an inspector general increase 

to look at it, but they won’t be controlling the money. What they do is see how it 

is spent after the fact. We need somebody in charge of spending before it is spent 

to make sure it is a priority before it goes down there, as we should be doing here. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

It is especially good to be able to welcome a former governor and 

colleague, Pete Wilson. Thank you so much for joining us. And to 

our other witnesses, welcome. Nice of you to come. 

Hurricane Katrina was in all likelihood the worst natural disaster that I have ever witnessed, and that may be true for others 

here today as well. Hundreds, some say thousands, have died, a lot 

of people are homeless as we know, large swaths of the States of 

Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana are in ruins, and parts of the 

city of New Orleans today are still under water. 

Having said all of that, I have been inspired by the outpouring 

of support and compassion from individuals all over the country. At 

the same time, like many Americans, I have been shocked and outraged by at least some aspects of our response to the storm. 

During my 8 years as governor, some of which I shared with Pete 

Wilson and others with Governor Voinovich, but during my 8 years 

as Governor of Delaware, my State lived through a number of 

weather emergencies, everything from ice storms to blizzards to 

floods to hurricanes. In fact, someone suggested at the end of my 

time as governor, he said, ‘‘Were you the Governor when we had 

the snowstorm of the century?’’ I said, ‘‘Yes.’’ He said, ‘‘Were you 

the Governor when we had the ice storm of the century?’’ I said, 

‘‘Yes.’’ He said, ‘‘Were you the Governor when we had the flood of 

the century?’’ I said, ‘‘Yes.’’ He said, ‘‘Were you the Governor when 

we had the hurricane of the century?’’ I said, ‘‘Yes.’’ He said, ‘‘Do 

you know what I think?’’ I said, ‘‘No.’’ He said, ‘‘I think you’re bad 

luck.’’ [Laughter.] 

Whether I am bad luck or not, we worked through all that stuff, 

and I know we certainly never suffered anything as tragic as what 

they have gone through on the Gulf Coast, but whenever we needed help from FEMA on my watch, we got it. They came early, and 

they stayed late. They worked hard. They sent real good people, 

and they were wonderful partners with all of us, and our first reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:23 May 31, 2006 Jkt 024244 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\24244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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sponders and our Guard and local folks back in Delaware. I think 

it is pretty clear to anyone with access to their televisions over the 

last couple of weeks that that kind of response, at least in the days 

immediately after Katrina struck, was not what we saw at the Gulf 

Coast. 

There has been a lot of talk recently about the blame game. I 

think I just heard Tom Coburn mentioning it, and I am sure others 

did in their statements. I think instead of pointing fingers, it is 

time for our Nation’s leaders—and that certainly includes us—

starting right here with our Committee, my colleagues, to start 

playing what I call the responsibility game, the accountability 

game, and to figure out what we did right, what we did wrong, and 

what we need to do to make sure we are better prepared to respond 

to the next disaster, be it a hurricane, be it an earthquake or some 

kind of terrorist attack. 

I think it was Abraham Lincoln who once said the role of government is to do for the people what the people cannot reasonably do 

for themselves. Four years after September 11th, however, it is 

clear to me that we still do not have our act together when it comes 

to responding to national emergencies. At a time when Americans 

still live under the threat of a terrorist attack, we must do better, 

and we can. That is why I hope this Committee will continue the 

work we have begun with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the reorganization of our Intelligence Committee 

by examining and addressing the failures at all levels of government that have contributed to the disaster in the Gulf Coast region. 

Because we still have people on the ground in the Gulf Coast and 

in emergency shelters across the country in desperate need of assistance in the aftermath of Katrina, we need to learn more about 

what needs to be done in the coming days and weeks and months, 

maybe even years, to help those communities affected by Katrina 

to recover as best they can. 

I am pleased that we have before us this panel today, which fortunately or unfortunately has a considerable amount of experience 

in recovering from natural disasters, to help us guide the way. 

Again, we thank you. We look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Chafee. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR CHAFEE 

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator Collins and Senator 

Lieberman for holding this hearing, and I look forward to the testimony of the distinguished panel. 

Governor Wilson, in your testimony you say that California 

emerged from your fires, droughts, landslides, and earthquakes 

stronger than before. 

And, Mayor Owens, you say that Grand Forks has come back 

bigger, better, and stronger than before the April 1997 floods. 

So I am sure that is all our goal, to see the Gulf Coast come back 

stronger than before, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Dayton. 

29

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR DAYTON 

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

It has now been over 2 weeks since the levees protecting New 

Orleans from the rains of Hurricane Katrina have failed, and almost a week since the Senate Majority Leader announced that this 

Committee would investigate those and other failures. 

Since that time the Federal officials responsible for the Administration’s actions and inactions to the hurricane have been unwilling 

to appear before us in a public session. They pretend they are too 

busy 24 hours a day, 7 days and nights a week to do so. Madam 

Chairman, obviously, none of us on this Committee want to disrupt 

the disaster relief efforts in Louisiana or Mississippi. They are already disrupted enough without us. But those Federal officials 

have enough time to appear on the Sunday talk shows, more often 

than not from here in Washington. 

Eight days ago, 10 Federal agency heads, all of them Cabinet 

Secretaries, briefed Senators for over an hour here in Washington 

behind closed doors. There was nothing, nothing that they said that 

could not and should not have been said in a public setting. 

Six days ago the heads of operations for FEMA and for the Coast 

Guard briefed Members of this Committee behind closed doors. 

Today we finally have our first public hearing on this greatest 

natural calamity ever to inflict our country, and the responsible 

Administration officials—if that is not an oxymoron—are still hiding behind closed doors. 

President Bush said yesterday that he wants to know what went 

right and what went wrong. So do we. So do the American people. 

However, as my mother taught me, actions speak louder than 

words. While the Administration professes to want the answers to 

tough questions, they will not face those questions in public before 

us on this Committee. 

While the Republican Senate leadership professes to want this 

Committee to investigate the failures and the successes of the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina, they will not permit us to do 

so in public. 

Madam Chairman, I have the utmost respect for you and for the 

Ranking Member, and I know that you have done your utmost to 

begin the public inquiry, which is this Committee’s responsibility. 

It is a responsibility that is ours, as Senator Voinovich said, under 

the Senate’s organizing resolution, and it is not dependent upon 

the majority leader’s beneficence or the White House’s concurrence. 

I have the utmost respect for today’s distinguished panel, outstanding public servants who answered this Committee’s call to 

share their previous experiences with us. None of them, however, 

hold positions of public responsibility for Hurricane Katrina, and 

none of the people who hold positions of public responsibility for 

Hurricane Katrina are yet willing to appear before this Committee, 

and thus, in public, before the families and friends of those who 

lost their lives, before those who lost their homes, their businesses, 

their jobs, their communities, or before the rest of America, who 

have the right, as we have the responsibility on this Committee, to 

get answers about what happened, what did not happen, and why. 

Until those Federal officials who are responsible appear in public 

before this Committee, then anything else here today or otherwise, 

30

I regret to say, Madam Chairman—but I must say—anything else 

is part of the Administration’s cover up, and any attempt to delay 

the public investigation of this Committee into Hurricane Katrina 

is an obstruction of justice. Any attempt to bypass this Committee 

by some select subcommittee, as being proposed, is unacceptable, 

and any acquiescence by this Committee to their doing so would be 

unconscionable. 

This is our responsibility. This is our authority. So let us get on 

with it. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Pryor. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Let me first start 

by thanking the Chairman and the Ranking Member for their leadership on this and a variety of other issues. 

I do hope that this Committee hearing we are having in this 

Committee today is the first of many that we will have on this subject. For those of you who may be new to the Committee, out in 

the audience or watching at home perhaps, Senators Collins and 

Lieberman have really led by example. I have been working with 

them for 3 years, and time and time again they have shown strong 

bipartisan leadership. In fact the intelligence rewrite that we did 

last year proves that this Committee can be a very non-political 

venue and that we can do great things in this Committee if we are 

allowed to do so. So it is my belief that regardless of outside political pressure, it is this same Committee that ought to pursue oversight responsibilities on the government’s slow rescue and response 

effort in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 

If the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

for some reason is not allowed to do its job, which I believe is correct under the Senate Rules, but if we are not allowed to do that, 

I think that the families of the Gulf Coast and the rest of the Nation really have a right, and they really deserve to get, a thorough 

review of the mistakes that occurred in a setting where politics will 

not play a role. I believe very adamantly that part of this investigation and legislation that follows really should begin with looking at 

the chain of command and the bureaucratic breakdowns that we 

saw in the aftermath of Katrina. 

I think a lot of us look at some of the problems and sometimes 

forget to mention some of the bright spots. I think there were a lot 

of bright spots, most notably three that I want to mention. One is 

the Coast Guard. I think the Coast Guard was absolutely excellent. 

By all accounts, everything I have heard, they have just been fantastic. Second is the National Guard. They really once again came 

to the rescue. And also just everyday citizens of this country have 

really been great. They have been very generous. They have just 

been amazing in how they responded to this. 

But back to Homeland Security and FEMA and other Federal 

agencies. When we set up the Department of Homeland Security, 

we were hoping for a smooth and immediate rescue and recovery 

when major national tragedies happen. That did not occur in the 

aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. I must say I am very concerned 

and very dismayed, given the government’s response, and I think 

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31

cane Katrina really shows a weakness in our emergency preparedness, and that weakness is of great concern to me and all my Senate colleagues, and also to all Americans. 

So as we go through these hearings, I look forward to—as my colleague from Ohio said—getting down in the bowels of Homeland 

Security and FEMA and really doing the nuts and bolts oversight 

work that the Senate should do and this Committee should do. 

Madam Chairman and Senator Lieberman, thank you very much 

for your leadership. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I want to thank our panel for having such patience in sitting 

through more than an hour of opening statements. I think it shows 

how much the Members of this Committee care about this important issue. 

Unfortunately, as former Senator Wilson will appreciate, a vote 

has just been called. What I would like to propose to do is to briefly 

introduce this panel, then recess for about 12 minutes, and then we 

will resume with your statements immediately upon our return 

from the vote. 

We have a very distinguished panel of witnesses. Governor Pete 

Wilson has devoted more than 30 years to public service. During 

his first term as Governor of California, he was confronted with an 

astonishing array of declared disasters. I believe I read 22 declared 

disasters in your first term, one of which was the Northridge 

Earthquake of 1994, which killed more than 50 people, displaced 

22,000 people, and leveled numerous buildings and critical highways in the region. It also caused an estimated $44 billion worth 

of damage. Following this tragedy, Governor Wilson directed State 

response efforts for which he has been lauded. He truly, having 

gone through all those disasters, is one of our Nation’s premiere 

disaster and recovery experts. 

Mayor Patricia Owens has served local government in Grand 

Forks, North Dakota, for nearly 30 years. She was mayor when one 

of the worst floods in her region’s history engulfed 80 percent of the 

city. She oversaw the evacuation of most of her 50,000 residents. 

I was telling the mayor earlier that I was struck by the phrase 

that she used, and it was a great example of communication, when 

she advised people to bring their pets, pills, and pillows, and I 

think we have seen in New Orleans that if that advice had been 

given to people, we would have had a better evacuation. And I appreciate your coming up with that communications effort. 

Mayor Owens then oversaw the recovery efforts in Grand Forks, 

including an extensive urban planning effort that led to the movement of homes and businesses away from the floodplain areas. So 

we look forward to hearing from you as well. 

Mayor Marc Morial was Mayor of New Orleans from 1994 to 

2002. He is currently President of the National Urban League, he 

has had many years of public service, and he brings to this hearing 

a special understanding and deep concern of the needs of Katrina’s 

survivors. We look forward to hearing his advice on how we can 

best help the Gulf Coast recover. 

Iain Logan is the Operations Liaison for the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Mr. Logan 

was the Chief Coordinating Officer for the International FederaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:23 May 31, 2006 Jkt 024244 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\24244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
32

1The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson appears in the Appendix on page 71. 

tion, on the ground for 4 months after the tsunami disaster killed 

an estimated 150,000 people and displaced more than a million 

more. He also played a similar role in responding to the devastating earthquake in Iran a year earlier. He has also worked in 

many other international disasters, including Hurricane Mitch, 

which caused such suffering in seven Central American countries. 

We are very pleased to have all of you here, and I thank you for 

your patience as we now take a brief recess. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. 

Governor Wilson, again we welcome you, and we are going to 

start with your testimony. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. PETE WILSON,1 FORMER 

GOVERNOR, CALIFORNIA 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Senator Collins. Thank you for convening this hearing. I thank the Members for attending. In the interest of time—you have my prepared statement—let me try to 

highlight some of the things that I think are of essential value. 

Before I do, I would make this general statement. As daunting 

as it seems, recovery from Katrina is not just possible, it is essential. It is essential to the well being of the Nation. New Orleans 

and the rest of the Gulf are simply too important not to take that 

very strongly into account, and I think our job in both the public 

and the private sector must be basically to dispense with business 

as usual and procedures that will delay and impede recovery, and 

instead, in both the public and the private sector, we must devise 

practical incentives to accelerate the return to health of this vital 

region. The good news is that it has been done in other places. It 

can and must be done in response to Katrina. 

Now, specifically, as you pointed out, I had the doubtful experience like the rest of this panel, of having more experience than we 

would like to have in this area. You mentioned 22 major natural 

disasters. That is true. I will not make the statement about this 

disaster, Katrina, which I think dwarfs all others in American history. I will not make the well-intended but perhaps unfortunate 

statement made by one of my predecessors as he was reviewing 

recessing flood damage in Northern California. The former Governor Pat Brown said, ‘‘This is the worst disaster since my election.’’ [Laughter.] 

I share his concern, but in any case, we had too many to choose 

from. I am going to leave to Mayor Owens the experience of dealing 

with floods. We had floods in California. We had one in January 

1997 that she recalls. It resulted in eight deaths, evacuation of 

120,000 people, relocation of 55,000 people to over 100 shelters, 

damage or destruction of 30,000 residences and 2,000 businesses. 

Total damage estimate about $2 billion. 

As serious as that was, it was by no means the worst of the 

things that we faced. The largest, of course, as you pointed out, 

was the Northridge Earthquake, which up until the time of Andrew 

was the costliest disaster in U.S. history. 

33

Let me point out some of the things that can be done that we 

did do trying to speed recovery. We first of all had excellent response from FEMA. We had it in the first Bush Administration, 

and we had it in the Clinton Administration. Yes, there are always 

things that can be done better and faster, but the response was 

really very good, and the coordination was excellent, some would 

say because we had had so much practice working together with 

those 22 natural disasters. 

But in the case of the Northridge quake, our first job was to 

make certain that people were safe. And then we went about slashing the red tape and trying to set aside rules that imposed delays 

to which there was no real purpose. We had to take care of people 

who had no food, no homes, no jobs, and I underscore the ‘‘no jobs’’ 

because that is a very important consideration. 

As with so many other disasters faced in my State, and as with 

Katrina, the National Guard was our extraordinary first line of response, often supplementing the efforts of people who had as their 

official duty a response. There were over 23,000 Guard members 

mobilized to protect public safety, to distribute food and water, set 

up tents as emergency shelters for thousands of victims. By the 

way, in the case of a major quake, I think that it is common to find 

that people are unwilling to go into structures because they are 

afraid of the after shock. So we had that experience. The Red 

Cross, the Salvation Army had shelters that were not at capacity, 

but we used tents for people who simply could not bring themselves 

to go back in. 

We recruited and deployed some 4,200 State workers to help out 

with processing claims of various kinds, working with Federal disaster centers that we set up with FEMA. In order to cut the long 

waits, we used these 4,200 State workers, working in any number 

of areas where they could be helpful to recovery, outside their 

agencies and well outside their job descriptions, and in fact, we 

made the FEMA Disaster Assistance Centers into a one-stop center 

for both Federal, and State, and local assistance. We had people 

working side by side. We even had insurance agents in there handling claims. 

We were trying to rebuild very quickly, and I do want to spend 

some time on that. Someone mentioned—I think Senator Levin—

interoperability of communications. Something that you may want 

to look at is the interoperability of equipment. When we had the 

Oakland fire, the terrific coordination and cooperation that exists 

under long-existing mutual assistance pacts was frustrated by the 

fact that when fire departments from other parts of the State, 

other communities, came to help Oakland with a fire that consumed some 3,000 homes, they were frustrated to discover that 

their equipment would not fit the hydrants in Oakland. 

When we were trying to cut red tape, we did it in a variety of 

ways. I should tell you the key to all of this was the existence in 

the State Government Code of Emergency Powers, explicit powers 

and explicit authority conferred upon the governor in time of emergency, to suspend the operation, not only of regulation, but statute, 

and I did that with alacrity. 

We suspended several trucking rules, some of which prohibited 

nighttime deliveries of food products. We suspended overtime rules 

34

for those employers whose workers were having a terrible time getting to work with the bridges down on I–10 because they needed 

to have flexibility of schedule to come during normal and abnormal 

times. 

We had my Secretary of Health and Welfare armed with the ability to go to hospitals and to other structures that we needed to convert to hospitals on a temporary basis, with whatever waivers were 

required for that purpose. 

We waived fees to speed the reinstallation of mobile homes. We 

expedited the permitting of reconstruction by waiving many of the 

procedural requirements and put staff from State and local permitting agencies into a single location. 

We waived the waiting period for unemployment benefits to get 

aid to those who needed it immediately. 

We eliminated all the paperwork requirements for getting a portable classroom and thereby made 230 units available through a 

simple phone call from districts in need. 

We issued, I think importantly, bridge loans and loan guarantees 

from State resources to help small business owners get back on 

their feet until the Federal assistance, which took a time, could arrive. 

So in these and many other areas we dealt with a situation that 

it deserved. We decided that there was just no time for business 

as usual. Most notable, I think, was the fact that when we were 

seeking to repair the freeway bridges, the overpasses on I–10 that 

had been reduced to rubble in a matter of seconds, we said to those 

contractors bidding on the repair work: ‘‘We want to know not only 

when you will finish the job and how much, but we want you to 

agree that you will submit to one more condition, and the condition 

is very simply that for every day that you are late in terms of your 

promised date of completion, you will incur a penalty of $200,000 

per day. For every day that you are early, you will earn a bonus 

of $200,000 per day.’’

The winning bidder I think made more on the bonus than on the 

bid. We had been told initially that it would require 2 years and 

2 months to restore those bridges, an intolerable situation for an 

artery that was central, the busiest freeway in the world and central to the functioning of our economy. It did not take 2 years and 

2 months. It took 66 days. 

The other thing that I would urge the Committee to look at with 

specific regard to New Orleans and the levees, I am told—and I am 

not an engineer—that there is an engineering solution even in that 

alluvial soil without bedrock. It is very expensive. It seems inevitable to me that we are going to have to do as public agencies what 

we have done in the past in other parts of the country to deal with 

flood damage, but in this instance, it seems to me that the private 

sector, who may very well benefit from the rebuilding of New Orleans, has an opportunity, and what we ought to do is say, ‘‘We will 

share the burden and use something that many Members of this 

Committee are familiar with—there are former mayors and governors sitting there, most of whom are familiar with tax increment 

financing, the use of bonds for land assembly to redevelop blighted 

areas.’’ I do not think anyone can argue about the blight in New 

Orleans. 

35

1The prepared statement of Ms. Owens with attachments appears in the Appendix on page 

77. 

What I think we ought to do is extend that mechanism to include 

not just land assembly in the ruined sections of the city that will 

need to be rebuilt, but that we ought to include fronting the costs, 

the expensive costs of constructing these new super levees by the 

use of that kind of tax increment bond, because as we rebuild in 

New Orleans, as new properties are added, it adds dramatically to 

the tax base, it builds that tax increment, and over time will create 

the fund that is required to redeem those bonds. It is a very simple, and I think ingenious, idea that someone had for redevelopment of blighted areas many years ago. It is a proven technique. 

We should simply permit the funding to go to the construction of 

the levees and whatever else is necessary to secure the investment 

that otherwise I do not think will come. 

If we are going to give potential investors the confidence to invest and to rebuild New Orleans, then it begins with their having 

confidence that the next time a Category 4 storm approaches, that 

the levees will not go down. 

There are other things that I could say. Let me conclude simply 

by saying this—I see I am over my time—again, I emphasize economic development as an essential requirement and something 

that has to have the earliest possible attention. That is what was 

behind our rebuilding of the I–10, not just driver convenience. It 

was costing $600,000 per day, by conservative estimate, in economic dislocation. 

The Mayor of Los Angeles made it his priority. Dick Riordan was 

bent upon bringing jobs to his community and rebuilding confidence. That kind of can-do attitude, I think, is essential as well 

as the bipartisan or nonpartisan cooperation between all levels of 

government, and a sharing of the responsibility between the public 

and the private sectors. 

Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much, governor, for your excellent testimony. I know all of us are going to have questions to 

follow up on it. 

Mayor Owens. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. PATRICIA A. OWENS,1 FORMER 

MAYOR, GRAND FORKS, NORTH DAKOTA 

Ms. OWENS. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Lieberman, 

and Members of the Committee, I feel honored that you would ask 

me to be here today to testify on how we recovered and how I feel 

that we, as a Nation, can help the Gulf Coast with their comeback. 

Grand Forks, North Dakota, in 1997, experienced eight of the 

worst snowstorms it ever had. It was almost 100 inches of snow 

over about a 5-month period, and we were very well prepared for 

a 49-foot flood. By the time April 1 came, we were all exhausted 

from battling keeping the roads open and keeping the cities going 

and so forth, so we were pretty run down. April 1 we had a huge 

ice storm that stifled the whole State, and the next day we had a 

14-inch snowfall. By Monday it was thawing and the ice jams were 

forming. 

36

We were in emergency mode, and that Wednesday I had a meeting with some of the people that were in the lower areas of the city. 

About 2,000 people appeared, and I had to stand up and say, ‘‘You 

need to evacuate because we do not know what is coming.’’ The 

Weather Service had said 49 feet. They had no other way of knowing because it was coming so fast. 

By that Friday I was called back to the emergency center to 

evacuate the city. I had gone home for just a couple hours to get 

some rest. I remember as a political figure what you think is—(I 

had worked for the city for 33 years for four mayors before I ran 

for mayor)—my goodness, they are looking at me here, and I am 

going to have to evacuate 50,000 people. I mean I knew every nook 

and cranny of that city, but this was just surreal. So I turned 

around and I saw the Coast Guard there, and I thought, yes, 

Grand Forks is flat. I know this is serious. [Laughter.] 

So my mind went from one thing to another, and I know elected 

people go through this because it is so unreal. And they said, ‘‘We 

have people on the levees and they are starting to breach.’’ My first 

comment was, ‘‘Get them off of there and get these people evacuated.’’

We started evacuating in the middle of the night. We sent people 

through the neighborhoods. The Coast Guard was there, the National Guard, our police and fire departments with bullhorns. We 

had our civil defense sirens, which was really a plus in an emergency for people to take note. 

We got all 50,000 of those people out of the city prior to the waters inundating about 90 percent of our city. We even had to move 

our emergency center. 

I think one of the main things was we had the FEMA people in 

about 2 weeks before with the representatives from Minnesota and 

North Dakota, and led a delegation to show them what we had 

done and what we figured was going to happen. 

Across the river was a city of about 9,000 people, too, and the 

bridges were out. I did talk to the Mayor of Winnipeg, Manitoba, 

Canada, and we decided our main goal was to tell them to take 

their pets, their pills, and their pillows because we knew they were 

going to be gone for a while. My first goal was to take care of the 

people first, and I said, ‘‘We are going to save all lives at all costs.’’ 

I got on TV as a front line figure because I think they trusted me 

since I had worked for government so long. I needed to encourage 

people. The majority of them left. 

We had to find a strategy to recover. We were out at the University of North Dakota. We had a huge group of people, thousands 

of people in a hangar at the Grand Forks Air Force Base, so we 

had to figure some strategy to keep in touch with these people. I 

stayed on TV constantly so they would be updated. I think the two 

critical elements present during a response is establishing and 

maintaining emergency disaster information for the public, and 

also as you are recovering. It is never enough. I mean no matter 

how much we did, you still get critical comments. It is because people are so busy they just cannot watch everything or they do not 

have the communication. And then the interactive communication 

among the city, county, State, and Federal agencies is so important. 

37

One of the things we decided to do is build for the future and 

do it better. As long as we were investing the money, we were 

going to do what was right for years to come, not just put what we 

had in place. 

One of the best things we had was nonpartisanship. We had our 

congressional delegation. The two Senators and our Congressmen 

were wonderful. They were right beside me. I mean I followed them 

and they followed me. Our governor was there also. The governor 

was Republican. Our people in Washington were Democrats. They 

worked as a team, and they worked with us. I still believe in emergencies you can have a plan, but that plan is not going to always 

address everything. We updated ours all the time because we had 

floods. That plan will never be something that you can follow to the 

top degree; however, it will assist you. 

I think there is not a plan or a book written that is going to take 

people through a disaster like the Gulf Coast went through. I mean 

it is just tragic. I think the one thing that they had there with the 

first responders was dealing with the human part of the disaster, 

with the looting and the shootings and the things that were going 

on that endangered the lives of the people in their city, but also 

the first responders. It is very difficult to go into a city when that 

is happening. 

I believe the less finger pointing that is done and the more we 

move ahead, the quicker those people are going to recover. We had 

places, too, that were not right, and mistakes were made, but we 

just moved on. I made it a point that we just would try to do it 

better and just move on and keep going. 

I think one of the things that I did that worked really well was 

I put together a group of technical people to help—because I did 

not have all the technical abilities, even having worked for the city 

for so many years. I put a group of people together of my top department heads. It was my Director of Public Works, who would 

deal with the infrastructure and getting it back online, and then 

also our future flood protection, which I think is something you 

need to do right away or people will not come back to the city. The 

businesses will not want to come; the people will not want to come 

back. You have to address that early on. 

So we did address that and we did get a $350 million levee system in Grand Forks. 

The next thing I did was put the next community development 

director in place. We were fighting in Washington for a $500 million disaster aid bill, and we worked very hard with our Senators 

and Congressmen to get that. It finally went through, and we were 

allotted $171 million of that to kind of jump start recovery in our 

city. 

We needed accountability on that money. I put my city auditor 

in place for accountability on all the monies. That is one of the 

things where they will hit brick walls. Every bit of money you get, 

you have to have accountability, and there is always conflict over 

how it is distributed and what you do with it. 

Grand Forks recovered well, but we recovered well because everyone worked together. I think government with a city starts right 

at the local level and goes up to State and Federal, and we were 

a team. We worked together from the very beginning. We had a 

38

one-stop shop again. Our City Hall was gone, so we were even in 

that one-stop shop where they had the FEMA Headquarters. All 

the agencies were there. We met daily for 31⁄2 years in the mornings, and at the beginning it was all the emergency response people. We met maybe two times a day so we could touch base to see 

where the critical needs were, and critical needs, of course, were 

getting people back into some type of housing. We did build 200 

homes, congressional homes, with monies that we got from HUD, 

and sold them with incentive so people would locate back in an 

area that was dry. 

We had to move back from the river quite a ways, so we had the 

buy-out program. I am sure the buy-out program is going to cause 

a lot of conflict also. That is a difficult thing to do. There are those 

who will do it voluntarily, and there are those who will not want 

to do it. 

I guess you learn one thing when you are an elected official during a disaster, I do not think anybody can imagine what the people 

go through. We are there suffering with them, but I do not think 

anybody can imagine what the elected people also are going 

through. It is exhausting. It is a daily—I mean you have no rest 

for the whole time that you are working during your term. It is just 

totally exhausting. You are inundated, and you have to be very 

strong to get through it because you will take criticism. 

But like I said, the first thing was we took care of the people. 

We got housing. We got trailers in there. We addressed the jobs. 

I appointed a group of citizen people and broke them off into about 

13 different areas. Local bankers worked with some of the citizens 

to get the jobs online. We had money and checks coming in in my 

name, so we had to form some type of bank set aside—I believe we 

did it through the Bank of North Dakota—and have a small group 

to monitor so people could submit applications. What we did with 

that money mostly was start a day care because once you were getting your jobs up, you had no day cares. 

Another thing that I think when you have a disaster, the first 

thing I did was close all the bars. We had a dry town. [Laughter.] 

The psychological effects are horrible because people are tired, 

they are exhausted, they turn to alcohol and drugs. There is more 

abuse. There are suicides. That is a huge issue that has to be addressed. The children need help, too, with that type of thing. 

I could talk for hours on what we went through and the good 

things that we could do. I am an employee of FEMA, by the way. 

I was hired on by FEMA as an Ambassador of Hope and a consultant with Region 8 after my term was ended. I did go several times 

with FEMA to the disaster areas when I was mayor. Congresswoman Eva Clayton had invited me to North Carolina, so I went 

there, and joined in a rally, and went to Rocky Mount, Princeville, 

and Greenville, and did what my job was, to inspire people and 

give them hope. That is what I tried to do in my city because I did 

have my technical people to work. Our people in Washington were 

wonderful. I lobbied for months. I felt like I lived here most of the 

time. They were wonderful. We just had to present our story, and 

we did get the help we needed as the monies were available. 

Examples of what happens to people, elected people, I mean most 

of the time you are voted out of office, which I was, too. I had won 

39

by 77 percent of the vote. I lost by 300 votes. Most of the time this 

happens to elected people, and James Lee Witt had warned me of 

this. There was a North Carolina Mayor, after I gave a talk in 

North Carolina, who came up to me, and he had tears running 

down his face. What I do best is inspire people. I inspire them so 

that they can do it. There is nothing that you cannot accomplish 

if you work together and just keep going and have faith in God, 

too, and faith in yourself and the people around you. That is what 

I kept saying, keep the faith. 

But this mayor came up to me, and he said, ‘‘You know, Mayor, 

I lost my election, too,’’ and I said, ‘‘What was the reason for 

yours?’’ He said, ‘‘You know, after flooding of Grand Forks and East 

Grand Forks, Minnesota, I sent a truckload of goods, and that is 

what they used against me, was my inability to help here, but I 

sent goods to a community that was hurting.’’ I told him, ‘‘You 

know what, you will have a special place there, and you did your 

job.’’ I said, ‘‘That is remarkable. You just keep your head high. 

You did what was needed at the time.’’ And I said, ‘‘That is the 

only way you can be a good politician.’’

So personal strain. You have to be strong to do the regulations 

that need to be done. We put regulations aside for building also so 

that people could come forth. We had to deal with the gouging, contractors coming in that were not legitimate. You need a City Attorney who does not budge. You need a strong City Attorney working 

with the Attorney General. They have to be the top-notch person—

and that man was by my side. 

I do have to say, about 3 days after it started, I knew he would 

be one of my top people, and we disagreed on something. So I very 

politely just leaned over the desk and took him by the tie—and I 

am small—— [Laughter.] 

And said, ‘‘We have to work together for 31⁄2 years to get this 

going.’’ I do not think we ever had another word after that. [Laughter.] 

Anyhow, I think one of the things that the Gulf Coast has, it has 

wonderful people working in a nonpartisan manner, and there is 

nothing more enlightening to me as a person who lives in the 

United States than to see people come together to help the people 

who are hurting. I personally know from experience, I have the 

greatest confidence that this group is going to work to bring New 

Orleans back, and it will be bigger, better, and stronger. And the 

people there need to know that, too. We cannot point fingers. We 

need to move on. We can do things better. We can go back and see 

the challenges that they had in getting people out. 

I have also had the experience of two of the hurricanes in Florida 

because I am retired and living in Florida now. I know what just 

the tail end of it can do, and I think of what happened there. So 

I have had flooding. I have been involved—in fact, FEMA called me 

to go to work the hurricanes again. Well, I cannot because of health 

reasons. They called me last year, and before I had my suitcase 

packed, I could not even go because the next hurricane was there. 

So I was struggling with my own family to keep things upright. 

Again, I just say, all you have to do is keep the faith. You can 

do it. And bad things happen, and we do not know for what reason. 

40

1The prepared statement of Mr. Morial appears in the Appendix on page 104. 

We had a bad flood. They had a catastrophic event, and we all need 

to be there for them as everybody was there for us. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much. Thank you for your 

excellent testimony. 

Mayor Morial, we are pleased to have you here, too. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. MARC H. MORIAL,1 PRESIDENT AND 

CEO, NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, AND FORMER MAYOR OF 

NEW ORLEANS 

Mr. MORIAL. Thank you very much. Madam Chairman, Senator 

Lieberman, and Members of the Committee, I want to thank all of 

you for giving us a chance to come down here and talk to you 

today. I am here as the President of the National Urban League, 

but also, very importantly, as the former Mayor of New Orleans, 

and one who loves New Orleans, its people, its culture, its history, 

and its very essence. 

So I come here shocked and angry, and this is how I have felt 

over the last several weeks, hurt, betrayed, befuddled, and bewildered. But I come today to say now is the time for competence and 

compassion. And the Nation, the voluntary agencies, the people of 

this Nation have expressed a great deal of compassion and generosity for the people who are victims and survivors of Katrina, 

who are from New Orleans and all over; I want to remind everyone, Southeastern Louisiana, Southern Mississippi, parts of Southern Alabama. 

I come today to also say that I agree that it is not the time for 

gamesmanship, salesmanship, or brinkmanship, but it is time to 

thoughtfully, as this Committee in all of its opening statements has 

suggested, plan about what the best next steps are. 

So I want to lay out for you some of my thinking about next 

steps under the umbrella of what I call the ‘‘Katrina Victims Bill 

of Rights,’’ because in all of this, in this tragedy, the most important thing is that we have one million displaced Americans, internally displaced Americans. They are not refugees. They are our 

own citizens. They are our neighbors. They are our voters. They are 

your constituents. They are, if you will, they are black, they are 

white, they are hispanic, they are Asian, they are rich, they are 

middle class, they are working class, and they are poor. And while 

the poorest of poor suffered the most and their candid images are 

what we saw, Katrina was an equal opportunity destroyer that affected the lives, in a dramatic way, of so many Americans. 

I believe as we think about this we should look at how this Nation responded, how this Congress responded, how the President 

responded in the aftermath of September 11, as the standard, the 

gold standard, if you will, to help guide our thinking and our discussion. This is why I believe that this Congress should create a 

victims compensation fund. 

In the aftermath of September 11, within 2 weeks after that 

tragic event, the Congress created a victims compensation fund, 

which in the end paid out some $7 billion to many thousands of victims, those who were survivors of those who were killed, those who 

were injured, and those who suffered economic losses. The comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:23 May 31, 2006 Jkt 024244 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\24244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
41

pensation fund functioned in an orderly and appropriate way and 

gave due respect to the fact that people’s lives were significantly 

disrupted by that tragedy. 

Second, I believe that in this, as I visited Houston, and as I fielded calls from all over the country, as our affiliate offices have received scores of people coming and looking for help, people have 

been dislodged from their jobs. They have been dislodged from their 

businesses. They have been dislodged from their bank accounts. 

They have been dislodged from the social structures and clubs and 

organizations that are a part of their quality of life. But most importantly, they have been dislodged from their jobs. 

So I believe that Congress must look very carefully at an appropriate way to provide unemployment assistance to every worker for 

an appropriate extended period because if not, it will be in Houston 

and Dallas, in Austin, in Little Rock, in Memphis, in Washington, 

in Boston, in all of the communities where displaced Americans 

have gone that will have to bear the burden of people in those communities with no money, with no job, with no house, with nowhere 

to go. It will be local and State Government that will have to bear 

that very significant burden. So Congress, as it thinks going forward, I would urge should think about an appropriate way to give 

unemployment assistance and assistance to people in connecting to 

new jobs, assistance to people in connecting with both temporary 

and permanent housing. 

The hard, painful reality is that no one can say with any degree 

of accuracy when it is that people will be able to return to New Orleans or to St. Bernard Parish, or Plaquemins Parish, or Slidell, or 

Gulfport, Biloxi, Waveland, or Bay St. Louis. No one can say with 

any accuracy. Our leaders should not hold out false hope until the 

rescue and recovery efforts have had an opportunity to quickly, I 

hope, move forward. 

Third, the displaced citizens who are now in all of these communities, displaced by Hurricane Katrina, must continue to have full 

voting rights in their States. This is not meant to politicize the discussion, but meant to say that they must have a voice in the rebuilding of the communities from which they have been displaced. 

In this regard, the idea of one million displaced Americans, we are 

in uncharted territory at least certainly in the last 100 years. But 

this is an area that I hope Congress will give some attention to. 

When it comes to the rebuilding, certainly the Federal Government must commit to a Gulf-wide rebuilding effort that meaningfully includes the residents of the Gulf Coast region, but also challenges us to put together an unprecedented and comprehensive 

public/private Federal, State, and local coalition to orchestrate, to 

design, to plan this rebuilding. If not, partisanship, regional conflict, class, and racial conflict will dominate this rebuilding process. 

As various people begin to articulate their singular vision for the 

rebuilding, there must be a collective vision. New Orleans is not a 

gated community. New Orleans’ essence is as a diverse multi-cultural, a place that has given the world and the Nation great music 

and food and great people. 

So I believe that Gulf-wide rebuilding effort is going to require 

the hands-on involvement of many, but require a broad coalition, 

a broad partnership to think about all of the suggestions that have 

42

been made about red tape and tax increment financing and all of 

these very important ideas, but this is unprecedented. We have 

never had to rebuild an entire city or an entire region. 

Also I would add—Senator Domenici suggested this, and there 

have been some other suggestions. The rebuilding has to be a 

building for the future that respects the history. Somehow in this 

perhaps there needs to be a czar, a super secretary, a coordinator, 

some person with direct access to the President, who has credibility 

with all of you and the public at large, a single point where the 

buck will stop, to coordinate the rebuilding of the lives of the people and also the rebuilding of the Gulf Coast Region. 

Finally, I would suggest this. I think, yes, it is certainly appropriate that Congress conducts its own investigation of what happened because that is your job and that is your responsibility. But 

I do think that the September 11 experience demonstrated that 

there is a role for an independent commission. This issue of disaster preparedness and disaster response, I think as all of us up 

here learned or know, is tough, sophisticated science, tough and sophisticated science, and the best minds and experts need to be utilized in looking at what went right, what went wrong, and how to 

improve it fast, quick, and in a hurry. I suggest that due consideration be given to some sort of independent September 11 style commission to work in conjunction with the appropriate investigatory 

activities of this Committee, the House, and the Congress. 

Finally, FEMA has come under great fire. I had an opportunity 

when I was mayor to work with James Lee Whitt, and the relationship and the experience were positive. It seems to me at the very 

least that one of the things that Congress can do is look at writing 

into the FEMA authorizing statute the minimum qualifications for 

the Director and the top-level officials. 

Disaster preparedness is a science, it is a profession, it is professional. It is not something that simply because someone is smart, 

a good manager, a good communicator can do. It requires experience, it requires training, and the top Federal official ought to at 

least meet some minimum standards with respect to disaster preparedness and response. 

As I close I want to say that I had the opportunity to visit Houston, the Astrodome, the George Brown Convention Center, and the 

Reliant Arena with former Presidents Clinton and Bush, with the 

governor, with the mayor, with the county executive down in 

Texas. What Houston has done is remarkable. The generosity, the 

arms, the attitude, the cooperation, is a model for the Nation. It 

is uncomfortable for people to live on a cot, sharing a bedroom with 

10,000 people, but Houston has done an excellent job. I think it 

bears a look by all communities in this Nation because what they 

simply did when the need was there was to pull the trigger on their 

own emergency response plan. I think their generosity reflects the 

attitude and the spirit of so many Americans, and I thank them for 

that. 

And my final word is, what is needed is for this Committee and 

for the Congress to be an advocate for the survivors and the victims. That is what is needed. I fear that when this story drifts from 

being a lead story on the evening news, from the front page of the 

national press, that the people are going to be forgotten. This situaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:23 May 31, 2006 Jkt 024244 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\24244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
43

1The prepared statement of Mr. Logan appears in the Appendix on page 108. 

tion needs public advocacy. It needs the Congress of the United 

States to be victims. What happened to New Orleans and the Gulf 

Coast could happen to San Francisco. It could happen to Miami or 

Charleston or coastal North Carolina. It could happen to Houston. 

It could happen to San Diego or Los Angeles. And as I grew up in 

New Orleans, and as I served as mayor, people said, ‘‘This is what 

will happen when the big one comes.’’

One of the reasons why many people may not have evacuated is 

there were those who could not, and there were those who said 

that Chicken Little is saying the sky is going to fall in one more 

time, and I have heard this for so long. This unprecedented event, 

this epic biblical event that has displaced so many of our citizens 

and shocked our conscience could happen to another community 

again. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, mayor, for your very thoughtful 

testimony. 

Mr. Logan, thank you for being here. 

TESTIMONY OF IAIN B. LOGAN,1 OPERATIONS LIAISON, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES 

Mr. LOGAN. Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, I have some 

testimony that I would like to ask to be included in the document 

of record. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

Mr. LOGAN. I will make a short statement and then highlight a 

few points in my testimony that would perhaps stimulate some 

questions. 

The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 

Societies, first of all, would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to give testimony at this hearing. More importantly, on 

behalf of the President and the Secretary General of our institution, we would like to convey on behalf of the 181 Red Cross/Red 

Crescent Societies around the world our condolences and our 

thoughts for the people of the United States, but more specifically, 

for those that are affected in the South. 

The Red Cross and the Red Crescent movement represents a collective humanitarian force. It is dedicated to assisting people in the 

recovery of those impacted by both natural and manmade disasters 

by mobilizing the power of humanity, which is our mission statement. 

Unfortunately, we are only too familiar with the scenes that we 

have seen in the last few weeks. The Indian Ocean tsunami, the 

earthquakes in Bam and Gujarat, Hurricane Ivan, so many more. 

Although members of the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement 

share a common mission, the nature of each disaster can vary depending on the economic situation of the government and the agencies that are responding, the overarching needs of the public and 

the capacity of the national society of that country. In the United 

States, my colleagues behind me from the American Red Cross focused their disaster relief on meeting people’s immediate and emergency disaster needs. And today the American Red Cross faces the 

44

largest relief operation in its history, and it is both an honor, and 

indeed a duty, that 156 Red Cross people from 80 national societies 

around the world, including myself, have been asked by the American Red Cross to support them in that enormous task. 

But as the waters of the flood recede, there is a need to rebuild 

lives, property, and above all, hope. It is with that challenge in 

mind that we would like to share with you some of the experiences 

that we have had from an international context because as I have 

been listening to my colleagues here, it is very clear that there are 

some overarching issues which transcend boundaries. 

Humanitarian actors may be greater in number, the economies 

in which they work stronger, but the principles of a sustainable recovery remain the same wherever it is. What is next? That is the 

question that you are asking yourselves right now. There is a feeling amongst the public, amongst some governments that a disaster 

is an event. It is on the TV. For those of us that work in this business, it is not an event, it is a part of a continuum, and the ability 

to be able to deal with a disaster has got to do with awareness of 

the full continuum, the preparation, the mitigation, the response, 

the planning that goes afterward because sure as this one came, 

there will be another. 

So recovery for us around the world starts during the response. 

We learned during the tsunami that within weeks of the response 

we had to start to evaluate what were going to be the recovery 

strategies from some 11 different countries with very different 

types of economies and populations. 

For the Red Cross movement, a major part of that recovery is 

based on the fact that we are a volunteer organization. Those volunteers that you see for the American Red Cross and other agencies are critical, not only in the response phase, but in the recovery 

for many months later on. It will require the participation of many 

different kinds of actors, and it really does not matter. My observation is that whether you are a farmer in Ethiopia following a 

drought, a fisherman in Sri Lanka, a waiter in New Orleans, or a 

doctor in Iran, the most critical thing is that people need to get up 

and feel that there is hope. They have to go back to their livelihoods. They have to start working. 

It never ceases to amaze me that following the most disastrous 

of events, the spirit of the human being to stand up and start to 

do something. You see it daily. Equally well, there will always be 

those who are paralyzed with shock, and your recovery has to take 

account to mobilize the strength of those who have the resilience, 

and to be ready to support those who are so traumatized that they 

need additional help. 

There also is spontaneous recovery. From the very beginning 

there will be organizations, institutions, individual towns and villages who will automatically start to take care of themselves. This 

cannot be held back. It needs to be built into the planning. People 

wish to take charge of their own lives. 

Recovery has to be inclusive. I have recently moved to New York 

City, and I am amazed, listening to the debate on the reconstruction of the World Trade Center. It could be absolutely duplicated 

from some of the comments that I heard in the city of Bam, Iran, 

in terms of the citizens there at the 2,500-year-old world heritage 

45

site, who demanded, in spite of the fact that their government is 

very different from here, that they be a part of how that city would 

be rebuilt. At that moment in time those people are exactly the 

same. 

Recovery must be sustainable. The community in which we work 

very dramatically, it is absolutely unacceptable that following a 

huge disaster such as the tsunami that we would stand back and 

allow a recovery that would not improve the lives of the people who 

are affected, that in fact, you reinforce the very risks that they 

were facing. 

There is enormous pressure at this moment in time to do something and do something quick, and very clearly you have to start 

to do something. In a disaster decisions may be flawed. You can fix 

them. No decision and inertia is the worst thing that can happen. 

At the same time you have to think about the planning. In the tsunami there is some criticism that we are not doing enough, we are 

not doing it quick enough. But in Sri Lanka and in Indonesia and 

in the Maldives, they recognize that there is an opportunity to 

build back better, and that requires greater thought. Greater 

thought may take more time, but in the long run, that extra time 

may be valuable. How do you balance those two needs, to move but 

to think? 

Very clearly we have examples around the world, in Turkey, in 

Gujarat, that many of the casualties may well have been as a result of standards, building construction that had not been monitored. Yet again, the person that I remember talking to in Papua, 

New Guinea, had no desire to be provided with a modern house. 

They wanted a home that was traditional for them, and our challenge was how do you build a better home of that kind? I have seen 

people who have relocated from New Orleans who have ended up 

in Alaska. Some of them will stay. This will be a huge new opportunity for them. But since I am a Canadian, when winter comes, 

they may wish to go back to New Orleans. [Laughter.] 

Some of them would rather go back, as we found in Venezuela, 

when they were offered opportunities of going to new farms up the 

Orinoco Valley, that they would rather come back and live on the 

very dangerous slopes that they had left just before. How do you 

plan to meet both those eventualities? 

Finally, a few words on coordination. It is a culture. It is not 

something that you talk about today and forget about tomorrow. It 

must be built into not only your responding authorities, but to the 

very communities themselves. The International Red Cross, for example, every year since Mitch, which was not our greatest moment, 

we run a workshop in which our American Red Cross, the British 

Red Cross, USAD/OFDA, the United Nations, the European Union, 

all come together every year to remind ourselves what are we actually doing there? We track these hurricanes. Hurricanes, we know 

they are coming. We do not know what directions they may go. We 

do not know what force they will end up. But we can predict with 

great accuracy the number of hurricanes we will have every year 

in the Caribbean. It will be humanitarian malpractice not to take 

that into account and to make plans that build up a culture of preparedness and awareness. 

46

Finally, relocating displaced populations, a very sensitive task in 

which the voice of the people must be listened to. Forced resettlement is not acceptable in any country anywhere in the world. 

Finally a few comments from our special representative who is 

now working with former President Clinton, who is doing exactly 

the same thing in terms of recovery. Whether Katrina was the 

United States’ tsunami is debatable. What is true for both and is 

in most disasters, the endless grief of those who lost loved ones, the 

courage of the rescue and relief workers, and the selfless generosity 

of strangers who opened their doors and gave of themselves. 

All those devastated, be they Iraqi, Indonesian, American, have 

the same need for dignity, community, privacy, and above all, the 

belief that a better life awaits them and that you will be with them 

in the long term. 

When I left Bandar Aceh after the tsunami, a young Indonesian 

teacher said to me, ‘‘Don’t say goodbye. If we thought you weren’t 

coming back, we could never let you go.’’ And it was only afterwards when I realized that she was quoting Winnie the Pooh. We 

live in a small world. 

Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Logan, for your exceptionally 

moving testimony. 

I would like to start by asking each of you a general question. 

Now that the initial rescue stage is largely complete, we face an 

enormous task. We have some 90,000 square miles that were affected by this hurricane. We have 450,000 families that are going 

to be in need of long-term shelter. We have considerable unemployment, businesses that are shut down. We obviously have an overwhelming number of needs that we need to meet. If you were giving advice to the emergency management officials, whether it is 

Federal, State, or local level, what should be the top priority right 

now? What would it be? What should we be doing right now? 

We will start with Governor Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Senator, I think that an interesting focal point 

would be the comment that several members of the panel have 

picked up on made by Senator Domenici, where he said that it is 

necessary to have one person who is given the responsibility and 

the authority to make decisions when we are talking about recovery and the urgency of that need. That, I think, is at the Federal 

level and at the State level, the most important thing. 

If I could leave the Committee with one abiding thought, it is one 

that relates to Federal responsibility, but really to the State responsibility that I had, and I do not know whether Governor Blanco, Governor Barbour, or Governor Riley have the same authority 

that I had that was conferred upon me and other California governors by the State Government Code. If not, they should not hesitate for a moment to demand it from their legislatures. If they do 

not have it, they should convene a special session of the legislature 

to get it. 

But they really need the authority to do the kinds of things that 

we have been discussing this morning, to grant the waivers, which 

in the normal course of business may make great good sense as 

safeguards of one kind of another, but which in the urgency of recovery requires someone who is invested with authority commensuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:23 May 31, 2006 Jkt 024244 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\24244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
47

rate with his or her good common sense to get rid of requirements 

that simply waste time, and time, as you heard from all the panelists, is of the essence. 

When you are talking about rebuilding infrastructure, when you 

are talking about rebuilding an economy, there has to be the kind 

of authority that allows you to do what I was able to do. Those governors should have it. Someone at the Federal level should have it. 

And as was pointed out, when you are talking about Federal agencies, you are talking about a multiplicity of agencies, each with different enabling legislation, each with different regulatory requirements derivative from their enabling legislation. 

This Committee would do well, I think, to make it its responsibility to look at all of those different agencies, all of those different 

enabling acts and regulations, and give someone the authority to 

waive them in time of crisis, which is what you are facing after—

not only after Katrina, but after every major natural disaster. I 

think Mr. Logan’s comment was poignant and prophetic, tragically, 

that we know that there is going to be a next one. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mayor Owens. 

Ms. OWENS. I agree 100 percent with Mr. Wilson that there 

needs to be one point in whatever you do so that it does not tie 

it up because they need to be able to move through. They cannot 

be tied up in the politics or the rhetoric of what is happening. 

Another thing that I know that they are going to be faced with, 

from experience, is they are going to have to clean up that area. 

We had so many deaths and so many people who had illnesses 

afterward from respiratory diseases, every kind you could imagine. 

Before people move back in there, they really need to make sure 

that they have that clean so that they do not—they can avoid other 

possibilities of people dying from the after effects of the disaster—

because it is contaminated. That was serious in our city. 

Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mayor Morial. 

Mr. MORIAL. I will echo the idea of a czar or a coordinator, but 

I want to really emphasize, in terms of next most immediate steps, 

is to focus on the displaced people. If the energy becomes, ‘‘Let us 

orchestrate the rebuilding,’’ which could in fact take time, then the 

unemployment, social, educational problems, sense of alienation 

and abandonment of people who are displaced will in fact be accelerated and exacerbated. That means—and I would say that the disaster response system that has been typical in the United States, 

that I am familiar with, contemplates that people would be displaced for a limited period of time, be able to go back to their 

homes, or if there was any permanent displacement or long-term 

displacement, it would be a few people or small number. 

Here we have a large number of people. So are the systems in 

place? Are the resources in place? Is the coordination in place for 

those displaced citizens? That would be the No. 1 priority. 

Second, with respect to the rebuilding, there needs to be, either 

placed under a czar, a commission of prominent citizens, a task 

force, a group, the ability to be able to get the alignment correct, 

as the mayor said, to clean up and deal with environmental and 

health hazards first before the town is opened. 

48

Third, to coordinate what the State’s role, the Fed’s role, the 

State’s money, the Fed’s money, the city’s role, the city’s money, is 

going to be in this massive rebuilding effort. If not, we are going 

to have a situation—and New York has struggled with breaking 

ground on the rebuilding of two buildings 4 years later. Great 

plans, lot of discussion, but still controversy on what is going to be 

at the site of the World Trade Center. Here we have an entire set 

of communities. 

So I would offer those thoughts, but to put people and their 

needs first as the most immediate objective. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Logan. 

Mr. LOGAN. I think in terms of my observations for the United 

States and the role that the Red Cross would have on that, the 

American Red Cross are the people that you would need to talk to 

about in terms of their very specific activities and recommendations. However, it is very clear, and I would concur that the question of the continuation of a coordination mechanism, based on the 

relationships and the successes, because there will be and you have 

already identified successes in coordination. That coordination has 

to look to the long term, and it cannot be a separate series of processes. They have to link to the very foundations. 

The fact that you have got such a widely dispersed population, 

as Mr. Morial has said, means that you are going to have to throw 

that net very wide, and that means there must be a common message that people can buy into. That population that have been displaced, who will come back, have to feel that there is a clear motivation for them to return, that things will be better. 

And building better of course is not just simply building a better 

school, it is building more hope. The amazing thing—and I think 

the opportunity for that coordination is that in the worst disasters 

that I had been involved in, it has in fact broken the cycle of poverty. It has given people opportunities, and I think that linking all 

of those social elements along with the very dry but essential elements of the technical rebuilding is critical and the more successful 

initiatives that I have seen on recovery. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thanks to this panel. You have been extraordinarily helpful, I 

must say both programmatically, and if I can put it this way, therapeutically. I think programmatically you have given us a series of 

recommendations from your own considerable experience that, 

Madam Chairman, we may want to consider passing on to the appropriate administrative agencies of our government, or even insofar as it is relevant, turning it into legislation. 

I say ‘‘therapeutically’’ because the end point of all that you have 

had to say, based on your experience and attitude, is hopeful, that 

not only can you rebuild from a disaster, you can rebuild—what 

was your phrase, Mayor Owens? Bigger, better, stronger——

Ms. OWENS. Bigger, better, stronger. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I like it. So thank you for that. 

I want to pick up on Senator Collins’ question and the answer 

that Governor Wilson, you gave, and others did, too, which is about 

the need for a new structure here. We all saw that one of the problems apparently—and we will know it better when we proceed with 

49

our investigation—in the preparation and response to the Hurricane Katrina was some troubles in the relationship between the 

different levels of our government. It seems to me that as we begin 

to contemplate, not just the recovery but the rebuilding, which 

would be the largest rebuilding in our Nation’s history, we have 

also to think about three levels of government and how we put 

them together. 

I take it under the existing national response plan, FEMA gets 

the responsibility to oversee rebuilding and recovery from the Federal Government point of view. I think we are all seeing that something larger is necessary here, and I wonder if you have any ideas 

on how we can do that, of how we can put the three levels of government together. Some have recommended a public authority, a 

kind of private/public new entity that will oversee the reconstruction of the communities that have been devastated. 

Governor Wilson, you are a great place to start because you have 

had experience at the local, State, and Federal levels of our government. 

Mr. WILSON. Senator Lieberman, I think the answer is that you 

need to coordinate all three, and you are not going to have the 

same solution each time. It does need to be tailor-made. I think a 

fundamental principle is to allow the local initiative to have maximum exercise. There will be limits imposed by law, some imposed 

simply by circumstance, but I must tell you that I have great confidence in New Orleans. I have a great affection for the city and 

a great admiration. I travel there frequently these days because I 

am privileged to serve as a trustee of the National D–Day Museum, 

which is located in New Orleans, in fact has become the major 

tourist attraction there. 

It is in New Orleans because New Orleans acted after 50 years, 

when no one else in the country did, to recognize a responsibility 

to build that museum as a memorial to the most important event 

of the last century and to the people who teach succeeding generations of Americans that freedom is not free, that it has to be repurchased by the courage and the sacrifice of people willing to fight 

and die for it. 

Congress—and I thank you for it—has officially recognized that 

contribution by recognizing the museum as America’s official World 

War II museum. The people who built that—and it is still a building, and we have an ambitious campaign under way—the people 

who took the initiative are extraordinary. 

The business and civic leaders in Mayor Morial’s city grabbed the 

ball when no one else had, and I have confidence that their pride 

in their city and their determination to complete that task is the 

kind of thing that will allow New Orleans, given time and the adequate tools, one of which we have discussed today—and I put it at 

greater length in an op-ed in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal—I 

think they can be expected to rebuild it bigger, better, and stronger, to use Mayor Owens’ phrase. I think to the extent that you have 

got people who are self-starters like that, what you want to do is 

look at how you can enable them. I would say that the role for Federal and State Governments is to be as great an enabler as possible 

to those at the local level. 

50

Senator LIEBERMAN. I will share briefly a story with you. I heard 

from a friend from New Orleans yesterday that when order began 

to collapse in New Orleans, there was just a slight bit of looting 

that went on at the gift shop at the D–Day Museum. Somebody 

there ran out, and the National Guard came rapidly to take position around the museum to protect it for all the present and past 

associations with it. 

My time is rapidly going, but I wonder if anybody else has a 

thought about the structure—the most obvious thing is to create a 

so-called czar, but is there a different kind of structure here that 

integrates the different levels of government? Mayor Morial. 

Mr. MORIAL. Senator Lieberman, your question is intriguing because it certainly provokes the thinking that you could have a 

super enterprise or empowerment zone that would be managed by 

some sort of special public authority or some sort of special public 

agency that would have representatives of both the State, the Federal, and the local government on it that would be sort of a coordinating conduit for the rebuilding that would be tailor-made because 

the challenge for FEMA is FEMA has ongoing responsibilities for 

other disasters. Hurricane Ophelia is there. Snow emergencies and 

weather emergencies that arise during the winter, another hurricane season, tornadoes, all of the myriad of natural disasters, and 

this is critical. But they have got to also keep their eye on the continuing ball of other natural disasters, which is why your thinking 

that a specialized public authority might be a good idea. 

I think the most important thing is that it not be seen as some 

sort of Federal usurpation. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Correct. 

Mr. MORIAL. That it be a true partnership. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mayor Owens, you want to add a word 

quickly? 

Ms. OWENS. I agree with you, but I think also I agree with you. 

Government starts at the local level. You have got to be that person who works with Washington. You have to work with your 

State, get your governor on board. 

Now, FEMA in our case—and I know this applies because I went 

to Virginia for a week when they had the hurricanes 2 years ago 

to tame some tempers that were—people were under a lot of duress. And FEMA, actually after they are dispatched, they are accountable to the State. The State tells them what they want. They 

tell them how much ice they want to come in, what they should be 

doing. So a lot of times I think people do not understand that the 

State also gives them the authority when they are there to do 

whatever they are going to do, and that is what they did not understand in Virginia. It worked a lot better when they started doing 

that. 

To put an agency together, I think, is very simple because when 

you have a disaster the first thing that you should do is get your 

local, State, and Federal Governments right on board. And this was 

just such extenuating circumstances. I do not know, in another 

case like this, if it could be better or not. They get on the ground 

as quickly as they can, but yet they are small compared to the 

amount of disasters that are happening. 

51

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you for your answers. I must say it 

was a question I asked without having an answer to it. I think we 

are all struggling for the right answer here. You were very helpful. 

I do want to say real quickly—something that was said earlier—

I heard from a friend from New Orleans, who is a business leader—this fellow said a certain number of people will come back to 

New Orleans no matter what, a certain number of people will not 

come back no matter what, but there is a large group in the middle 

who need the confidence and the hope to come back, and the number one thing that will bring them back is reconstruction of the levees up to Category 5. 

Mr. WILSON. Madam Chairman and Members, forgive me. You 

see me poised to take flight because I have less than 2 hours to 

get to Dulles, and I have to be back in Los Angeles by 6 o’clock. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much for being here, Governor Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Been a privilege and a pleasure. 

Chairman COLLINS. We very much appreciate it. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I am going to call on Senator Voinovich. Unfortunately we do 

have two votes on right now, and I am going to go vote and rush 

back. If anyone is here after Senator Voinovich finishes, feel free 

to pose your questions, even if there is nobody officially chairing. 

You can be temporarily the Chair, and I will return. Thank you for 

your patience. 

Senator VOINOVICH [presiding]. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

The real issue here is what is this Committee going to do? Hearing 

from these excellent witnesses, it seems to me that the focus of this 

Committee should not be on what happened but on what we are 

going to do to deal with some of the things that have been talked 

about. Mayor Morial has talked about dealing with—where are the 

people? How are they going to be? Where are they living? What 

about the medical care? Do they have jobs? And so forth. 

The next issue is, what are they going to do to rebuild the city? 

As Mayor Owens has pointed out, we need to collaborate and cooperate. We should bring together people who know a lot about 

FEMA and disaster recovery to work with the Administration. 

In the future, I look forward to hearing about two best practices 

out there. Additionally, I look forward to hearing from the Administration and asking them questions about what their plans for response and recovery are. But right now, we have to take care of 

the people, and we have to give them good information. 

Mayor Morial, the question I would ask you pertains to the issue 

of information. We know that some people are going to leave, some 

are in limbo, and some definitely will come back. But I really think 

that people have to be informed. I understand that we cannot provide them with information immediately, but do you not believe 

that the sooner we can give them the facts about what is going to 

happen, the better off everyone is going to be? 

Mr. MORIAL. I agree, and I think one of the mistakes along the 

way in this has been, is just the communication has been very disjointed. You are right, people need a place to go to get accurate information. My concern is what I call false hope, news reports that 

52

this section of the city is open, but that section is not open. The 

minute any section is open people are going to seek to return because they want to go examine their homes. They want to go examine the whereabouts, particularly those who evacuated beforehand, 

which is about 75 to 80 percent. But communication is key. I do 

not know if it has to be multi-faceted, an official website, perhaps 

with official communications that would come from a czar or FEMA 

or jointly. 

There is a lot of—and it is prompted—I know this because I get 

a lot of phone calls from people who said, ‘‘I heard this on the radio 

but I read that in the paper. What is true? What in fact is the 

case? Is the city going to be drained in 8 weeks, or is it going to 

be drained in 12 weeks? And then when will I be able to return? 

How about my insurance claim? How about my automobile insurance claim? Do I have to pay my mortgage? Do I have to pay my 

bank loans? If I write a check is it going to bounce? Where can I 

get information about my basic human existence short term while 

thinking about what I need to do long term?’’

So communication is important. Where the buck stops on that at 

this point is a question that needs an answer. Someone has got to 

say ‘‘I have got the responsibility for communicating, and I am 

going to communicate daily.’’ And when that person talks, it is not 

that a local official is going to say one thing, and then in the afternoon a State official is going to say something else, and then a Federal official the following morning is going to say, ‘‘No, no, no, that 

is not the case. Where did you get that information from?’’

That is very important at this stage. I think the media that has 

covered this, as many have expressed to me privately a desire to 

report accurate information, but they do not know what the centralized departure point is for that information. 

Senator VOINOVICH. We had a wonderful briefing last week 

where many of the Cabinet Secretaries spoke about what they are 

doing in response to Katrina. I was quite impressed with the waivers they are talking about giving. I wish that everybody in America 

had a chance to be there to hear the lengths to which the Federal 

Government is going in response to this disaster. The challenge is 

how do we get good information and adequate coordination? What 

has happened is, for instance, we thought we would have 1,000 

people in Ohio. It was not until just prior to the planned arrival 

that the plans to send evacuees to Ohio were cancelled. But 200 

families have come to Ohio unassisted by DHS. The Federal Government is trying to provide these individuals with an ID number 

so that they know who they are and how they can provide them 

with the best information. I know one of the things you are talking 

about is moving people out of the area even though they want to 

come back. 

I had the EPA Director in yesterday. He said that the water is 

just horrible, and they are really concerned about the conditions. 

Mayor, you just brought that up, you had to go back and make sure 

that the areas were sanitized so that if people came back, they 

would not be exposed to hazardous substances. My question is—do 

the people know this? We must get the information out. 

I have dealt with FEMA as governor of a State. In my experience, they come in and they help, we get the program in place, and 

53

we tell everybody what they are entitled to, but ultimately FEMA 

leaves, and the State and local governments take over. Is that not 

what happens? 

Ms. OWENS. Right. They stayed with us until their job was done, 

which was quite a long time because that was the only disaster at 

that time. But the staff continually goes down. They can be there 

2 or 3 months. In this case I would say they will be there—unless 

we have others—I would say they have a 1- to 2-year battle there. 

Senator VOINOVICH. The question I have is in terms of recovery. 

Ms. OWENS. But they are there to help because——

Senator VOINOVICH. But the fact is, what they are doing is they 

are helping you access Federal programs and other programs that 

are available. Correct? 

Ms. OWENS. Right. 

Senator VOINOVICH. IT, the Department of Labor, unemployment, and all those other things. 

Ms. OWENS. Right. They are just wonderful to lead the people 

through that. I mean they have people in their organization that 

will help lead them through that. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Recovery, rebuilding homes, and that type of 

thing. Again, what we need is information. Who ran that in your 

town? 

Ms. OWENS. Who ran the information part? 

Senator VOINOVICH. No. Who ran the actual operation? You talked about—what you got, $500 million and an advance of $100 

million. 

Ms. OWENS. Right. That is why I just appointed three tri-chairs 

and a five-member flood response committee out of our city council, 

and myself. 

Senator VOINOVICH. And you ran the response? 

Ms. OWENS. City Council and those three tri-chairs with the help 

of others—they were the main, and I was the voice that spoke in 

front. 

Senator VOINOVICH. How about your State Government? Were 

they at the table or did they just access programs they had? 

Ms. OWENS. Everyone was working, but they were not always—

they were at the table at the beginning until we had things lined 

up. They always had a representative there. In fact, the governor 

appointed one of the retired National Guard as the lead for the 

State. So that person was at that table all the time. 

Senator VOINOVICH. How about the Federal Government, who 

was at the table? 

Ms. OWENS. Federal Government, honestly, every time I turned 

around one of the three would come in if there was anything urgent or anything detrimental. They were with us all the way. I 

mean we would talk daily. We would get in on phone conversations. 

I mean they were there, all of them were together. That is what 

I was saying was so unique because we discussed almost daily, for 

over 2 years, even longer than that, as things progressed. At the 

beginning it was more, and then we would kind of siphon down. 

But they were always there. 

But it was our five-member flood response committee out of council. We had 14 council people, so you can imagine that is not easy. 

And then the three tri-chairs with the different things they were 

54

working with because somebody has to lead the infrastructure and 

dealing with the new flood control, which I said is No. 1 to me, to 

get the people some hope that when they go back it is not still vulnerable. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So one of the first things that you think we 

should do in New Orleans is to decide whether or not we are going 

to rebuild the levees, to get that information out, and to give people 

an idea of how long it will take in order to get that done. People 

must know that they are going to be taken care of or many will 

never come back. 

Mr. MORIAL. Right. The levee system, and also not much has 

been said about the drainage system, which the levee breaks which 

occurred, occurred on levees that protected the city from manmade 

drainage canals, not natural bodies of water, and those drainage 

canals take water from below the streets of the city into the lake. 

So when the levees break, it has the effect of the lake water reversing back into the canals into the city. So the levee system and New 

Orleans will realize, the drainage which is a subsurface water system, to know that it is operational, the pumps are working, there 

is a system of redundancy, will give people some confidence that 

there are better protections from a Category 4 or 5 engulfing the 

city in the future. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I have just been informed that there is no 

time left on the vote, and I am hoping that they will keep it open. 

The Chairman of the Committee will be coming back, but I am not 

sure whether any of the other Members will, so please stick around 

for a little while. 

This is one of the best panels that I have questioned since I have 

been a member of the Senate. I thank you so much for being here, 

and I suspect that the Chairman and the Ranking Member will be 

back in touch with you for more of your ideas. I am going to recommend that we get the best ideas and find out what the Administration is doing and see if it meets the benchmarks that some of 

you have established in your respective communities. 

And Mr. Logan, it is incredible to hear what the Red Cross has 

done and what your experience has been in some of the areas that 

you have come back and rebuilt. Thank you very much for being 

here today. 

Mr. LOGAN. Thank you. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I will say that the Committee is recessed 

until the Chairman returns. 

[Recess.] 

Senator LIEBERMAN [presiding]. Folks, since I am here I will be 

happy to take advantage of your collective wisdom, and as soon as 

any other Member comes back, I will be happy to yield to that person. I thank you again. 

Some of you referred to an aspect of this that is very real and 

human, but we do not always talk about it and figure out how to 

deal with it governmentally. And that is the psychological impact 

of going through something like this. 

I keep referring to friends I have in New Orleans. I love the city. 

I was thinking, mayor, as we talk about it, that New Orleans, of 

course, is a tourist town. And in part that means that it is one of 

the cities that I bet you most Americans feel really good about, feel 

55

like they have some part of themselves there. But also, in all the 

ways that you said, for what it has contributed particularly to 

American culture, it is a part of America. 

But anyway, just to ask the question from what you have been 

through, there are people walking around, both those who went 

through the worst parts of this, losing somebody, losing a family 

member or friend, or going through the awful conditions of the Superdome and the convention center, or frankly, I have talked to 

some friends who said that they feel lucky, their families have 

enough money, they evacuated, and ended up in a hotel in Baton 

Rouge or Memphis. But the house is gone. They do not know where 

the law office or business is or what the future is. You have all 

gone through that in different ways. 

What, if anything, can government do to be responsive to that 

particular dimension of this? Because if people are truly wounded, 

it is going to be hard psychologically. It is going to be hard to have 

the kind of recovery that we want. 

Mr. MORIAL. The others may be able to add, but I think it is a 

subject for the experts. I think that the Committee should publicly, 

privately, the staff talk to experts who confront this sort of massive 

trauma, and to a great extent massive grief. I know I fought back 

tears the first week to 10 days, particularly when I watched television. I know that friends and family members have called me, 

sobbing, in tears, going back and forth from thanking the good 

Lord that they are living, but lamenting the fact that they have 

lost much. 

The other component of it that I think could be addressed is family separation. There are people who cannot find their family members. Family reunification, and sometimes it is just a case of information, but if you cannot find your family member, you think they 

may be one of the deceased. You do not really know because people 

were separated at evacuation, and a family is in New Orleans, like 

it is in so many communities, it is an extended family. It is several 

generations who might not necessarily share a home but lived in 

the same neighborhood. One may have gone to Memphis, one may 

have gone to Houston, one may have found their way to Austin. 

You do not know. So family unification is certainly something. But 

I think on the overall question the only thing I would add, I do not 

feel competent or qualified to address that except to say it is massive grief and massive trauma. 

As I sit here, you fear that the phone will ring and someone you 

knew very well was in the deceased category. I know I learned 

from a man I talked to in Houston about the neighborhood that I 

grew up in, where the water was to the ceilings, and I said, ‘‘Well, 

did you think people got stuck?’’ He said, ‘‘I know people got stuck.’’ 

He says, ‘‘I am lucky. I had a second floor on my house, so I was 

able to await rescue.’’

It is something I appreciate you and the Committee’s concern for, 

but I think it is a subject that the public health experts and the 

mental health experts ought to be tasked with helping the country 

deal with. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Logan, you have been through this. 

Senator Collins asked a question about the emotional consequences 

to individuals, communities, as a result of this. We see it from 

56

those who went through the worst of it, and some, as I mentioned, 

as you said to me, had enough money in the bank, they are not 

worried about their future in one sense. They evacuated. But their 

lives have been altered. Their homes are gone. Their offices are 

gone. 

So I ask if there is a government role in this and how important 

is it? Mr. Logan. 

Mr. LOGAN. I think there is an interesting dynamic that certainly 

I have observed, and I have even been part of it myself, I suppose, 

in other disasters. What is going through your population right 

now is a stress that is primarily adrenalin driven, get out of the 

city, get away. We talk to people, there is even a certain excitement 

about it. There is grieving, but the whole thing is a pivotal moment 

in their lives, and it is very much adrenalin driven. 

This is not the same as losing a family member, where it is you 

and your family. The grieving process will go ahead. What is really 

special about what is happening like this? It is the stress that 

comes later, and it is the stress of sometimes impotence against a 

bureaucracy. The normal things go beyond the disaster. It is getting your life straightened out. It is sorting out your mortgage payments. It is do you put the kids in one school? 

And this is what is happening in Indonesia right now. What our 

psychological teams are finding is that the level of psychological 

stress actually increases but in a different form after the disaster 

has gone. As the adrenalin goes out, you are faced with the numbing problem of not having your surrounding community, not having 

your family, not knowing what to do. 

I watched one of your psychologists on television talking to a 

lady who is in a wheelchair. She had spent her whole life—she was 

70-years-old—in New Orleans. She was in Montana or somewhere, 

and she said, ‘‘I don’t know whether to be so grateful for these people from the American Red Cross and the government who are 

helping me, or to commit suicide, because I don’t know what to do. 

I’ve got no friends. I’ve got nothing.’’

So I think that the authorities in government have to look at the 

psychological impact of this as a long-term thing. One of the benefits that we have had in the tsunami operations, for the first time 

ever we have been able in the international humanitarian to have 

funds that will allow us to put in programs which normally we can 

only run for a few months, for programs that can be run for several 

years, and I think that is a challenge that is faced. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mayor, do you have any reaction to my 

question based on what the folks in Grand Forks experienced? 

Ms. OWENS. Yes. We put together—you do not realize when you 

are starting with this that you are going to have all that, but even 

at the very beginning I would have calls that—well, for instance, 

this man was in his home. He had a gun. Neighbors called. He was 

going to shoot himself. Well, that is when I discovered also what 

we were going to go through psychologically. In fact, I almost 

adopted, through the whole time I was in, a young boy who had 

lost his grandfather, and he could not recover. So his dad asked me 

to help him, so I just took this kid—it is a smaller city—but I took 

him, and I did whatever I could to help him. 

57

But the main thing, FEMA does have people that line that all 

up for these cities and so forth. When that happened, all I did is—

(I was in the same building). I went and got them. They went out 

there, and we had several like that. They do have a division of 

their FEMA people that work with that. By the time they were 

gone, we had lined up through our local United Health Services a 

group of our top psychologists, psychiatrists, agencies like the 

Northeast Human Service Center, that type of thing, and they had 

already gotten together, and we just actually sent to them. 

Another thing that happens is your own people, the city staff, 

and county staff who are working, become psychologically burned 

out, and that is something you really have to watch for because it 

can be very detrimental to the recovery of your city. We had much 

of that. Eventually we hired on a person from the Minneapolis 

area, and at least we had somebody to send them to and also a 

local psychiatrist. We had an employee assistance program, and it 

lasted a long time. In fact, there is still some of that, 8 years later, 

those that really still need the help. 

Psychological is going to be one of the biggest problems because 

they are hurting. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Senator Collins. 

Chairman COLLINS [presiding]. I almost said, thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. That is really scary. [Laughter.] 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is very kind of you. You have been 

very generous in working together, but I do know I am the Ranking Member. [Laughter.] 

Chairman COLLINS. Mayor Owens, I was struck by the fact that 

you had a fairly sizable city, 50,000 people, that you had to evacuate. And I assume that means that temporarily you had to house 

them as well. One of the major challenges we face with Katrina is 

we are going to have to provide long-term housing for some 450,000 

families in addition to many more who have short-term housing 

needs. What did you do for housing? 

Ms. OWENS. Of course, like I said, I do not like our title, but we 

were the largest disaster per capita ever in the Nation until this 

one. And we evacuated the largest American city. I mean I look at 

the area now, and it is similar, but it is so much smaller. 

The only thing is, when our people left, they went to 49 of the 

50 States, and many of them had to—I mean they could not come 

back because the homes were gone. There were homes destroyed, 

homes wet. What we did is we brought in the trailers. We had 400 

trailers on our side of the river, and I do not know, 200 to 300 trailers on the other side of the river in East Grand Forks. And they 

lived in those for 18 months, a lot of them, until we could get some 

housing stock rebuilt. 

We formed a group with Grand Forks Homes, Inc., which is a 

private investing company in our city, and Fannie Mae, and 

worked to build—and private financial institutions—to build 200 

homes so people would start coming back. If we saw that we were 

having more problems, that things were not getting cleaned up, we 

were going to do more. That is controversial, too. It was not at the 

beginning. But then when things started getting better, the realtors were not happy. But we got in the middle of that. You have 

to do this or you are going to lose your people. But housing that 

58

many people, I said, ‘‘As I look at it, I do not know, I think the 

people across the United States are just going to have to each help 

some of these people.’’

The thing that I could not get (and I know I would not do it), 

but I know they have to, is they take you out of a shelter, put you 

on a plane and you do not know where you are going to land. That 

just got me. I do not think I could do it. 

Chairman COLLINS. That actually is a great segue to the question I had for Mr. Logan. I was struck when you mentioned the fact 

that you cannot force people to live where they do not want to live. 

And FEMA officials have told me that one of the very big challenges that they are facing is helping displaced families to come to 

grips with the fact that they are not going to be able to go home 

any time soon. 

We have also seen—for example, there is a former closed military 

base in Northern Maine, where I am from, which could accommodate some 200 people. I am shocked to learn from FEMA officials 

that people from the South are not that eager to go to Northern 

Maine and live there for a period of time. [Laughter.] 

I am sure they would love it if we could get them there, but in 

all seriousness, how do we deal with the housing needs, respecting 

the preference of individuals, and yet accommodating an overwhelming need not just for temporary housing, but for long-term 

housing. 

Mr. LOGAN. I think in the case of the United States, it is very 

different from the ones that I have been involved in where the capacity of this country is so enormous, but I do not think it is immune from that very dilemma. You are right, you cannot—well, 

you can force people to leave, but you have already seen what happens with mandatory evacuations. They are so sensitive that they 

are not practical. There are some countries, perhaps, where the political situation would just simply force people to leave. That is a 

forced evacuation, forced resettlement. And we in the Red Cross 

movement have been faced with the dilemma of what do you do 

when people have to be compelled one way or the other to leave. 

We do not get involved in that. What we do is if you are going 

to move a population, they have humanitarian needs, they have to 

be sheltered, they have to be fed. Clearly what we would try to do 

is advocate for alternative solutions, and this is what we are doing, 

for example, in Indonesia, where there is no way that we can put 

100,000 families into permanent housing tomorrow. In Sri Lanka 

they have never built more than 5,000 houses in a year ever, and 

we have to build it. So you look at various different alternatives, 

and you have to listen to what people are saying. 

Interestingly enough, a number of years ago I was working with 

the American Red Cross on disaster management exercise, and one 

of the tasks that they were asked to look at at the time was, what 

are you going to do if you had to evacuate a major city in the 

United States? And specifically it was to do with shelter because 

traditionally, internationally anyway, the Red Cross movement is 

involved in shelter. It got down to—there are certain parameters. 

You had to be 200 miles from the city because of contamination. 

I think it was a weapons of mass destruction type of scenario. You 

could not use schools and hotels because they would be needed 

59

later. Very quickly, everybody was saying, ‘‘Well, we cannot do this. 

How can you house 200,000 people?’’

And interestingly enough, the international member said, ‘‘Oh, 

yes, we can do it. We do it all the time. You put them into tents.’’ 

And they said, ‘‘Well, you cannot use tents.’’ But ultimately you 

have to use whatever is there, and then you work up. In the tsunami what we are seeing is there will always be someone in a tent 

until it is finished, and there will always be somebody who goes 

first into a new home. If they have to stay in a tent, we have to 

make sure that is the best possible tent that we can get them, and 

they are already beginning to degrade, and then you move them 

up. 

The problem is, if you move them into temporary accommodation, 

in any society in the world that I have been to—and I have been 

to 50 countries now—there is always the worry that if I am the 

first one into a tent will I be the last one to get a permanent 

house? So this requires a lot of communication. It requires a lot of 

transparency, and above all, it requires listening to the people and 

letting them be a part of the solution. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I listened attentively here to all the experiences you have gone 

through, all of you, and no question that what you are stating to 

us will be helpful. 

Mayor Owens, I have been a key proponent of pre-disaster mitigation programs. Do you know if your city at that time benefited 

from any of FEMA’s pre-disaster mitigation programs prior to the 

1997 flood? And if so, how would you assess their effectiveness? 

Ms. OWENS. When the 1997 flood occurred, we were in the process, through our city building enforcement, of trying to work with 

and enforce the 100-year floodplain. And FEMA came in and they 

worked—I have testimony that I have sent in. We had to comply 

with that disaster resistant community plan that they had. They 

have acknowledged to us that we were one of the committees, as 

we were rebuilding, that complied totally with what they wanted 

in place. Before we had started, we were building a flood control 

project that we were halfway through. We had to throw it away because it was not any good. 

We had, in fact, even talked with the Corps of Engineers. We are 

flat, but they were going to build it around us, so we would have 

been like in a bathtub, and New Orleans was one of the ones that 

I knew very well because they would talk to us about it. 

But it came about from the FEMA plan. That was one of the best 

programs they have. I do not think they have it any more, and I 

think it was a wonderful plan. They need to do that because these 

events are going to keep happening time and time again. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for that. I understand that there was 

a mandatory evacuation of Grand Forks, which has a population of 

50,000. Did anyone refuse to be evacuated, and if so, how did you 

handle those refusals? 

Ms. OWENS. I do not know why, but for some reason or another, 

they listened to me, and maybe it is because I had 33 previous 

years with the city and had been front line with four mayors. They 

60

knew me personally, and it is a smaller city, you can know the person personally. 

But we had people going through the city actually with bull 

horns. We had the fire department, the National Guard. We had 

the Coast Guard. We had the police department, and actually, the 

National Guard was already trying to clear out the nursing homes 

and all that were in those low areas. 

They did listen. There were some that did not, unfortunately. A 

group of them that did not were in that building that caught fire 

downtown. They had left the electricity on. They did not tell me, 

but they knew there were some people still housed up there. That 

is what shorted out. So when they went in, they could not get in, 

they could not use fire hydrants. They could not do anything to 

hook up, so the fire department saw those people and got them out. 

There were kids. And, yes, there was even a county commissioner 

and her husband who refused to leave who lived right behind my 

home. We did not force them, but we did remind them that the 

worst cause of death in a flood is electrocution or fire and that we 

would not respond because we did not want to put our first line responders in danger for their inability to take charge of their own 

lives. 

Senator AKAKA. Grand Forks Water Treatment Plant was shut 

down during the 1997 flood. 

Ms. OWENS. Absolutely. 

Senator AKAKA. What was the extent of contamination of your 

city? And based on your experience, what would you recommend in 

terms of handling the cleanup? 

Ms. OWENS. I will tell you, I know everything that had been 

touched by the floodwaters had to be discarded. We had tons and 

tons and tons of garbage. I cannot tell you the extent—I just know 

everything was contaminated. We had animals and things in there, 

too, but we lost no human lives. There was fuel oil, there were 

chemicals that it had picked up. 

One thing that we did is we delegated to the State Health Department and our Health Department officer in the city, and they 

worked with that, with the EPA, and of course, legally with our 

City Attorney. That City Attorney stood out with everything we 

did. 

Chairman COLLINS. Excuse me for interrupting for just a moment, Senator Akaka and Mayor Owens. The second vote, the time 

has expired. I have not voted, so I am going to go vote, but I would 

be happy to turn over the gavel to you, Senator Akaka, so that you 

and Senator Pryor can complete your questions. 

I do, before I run off, just want to thank our witnesses since I 

will not be coming back this time, and to say that the hearing 

record will remain open for 15 days for additional materials. 

But thank you so much for your excellent testimony and for sharing your experiences with us. 

And, Senator Akaka, I am proud to turn the gavel over to you. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MORIAL. Thank you, Senator. And I have to excuse myself 

also to get to another engagement. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

61

Ms. OWENS. Mr. Akaka, I think the thing I would tell you is that 

even with the size of our city with all the technical things, we really turned over and left it to the experts, and they were remarkable, 

with the EPA in cleaning up our city. 

Senator AKAKA [presiding]. Thank you for that. Mayor Owens, I 

understand that the flood caught Northern System’s Power—one of 

the largest power supplies in North Dakota—by surprise. But it 

was still able to implement an emergency shut-down plan. When 

power was re-energized to the city, were any steps taken to minimize the possibility of fire outbreaks, and how do you assess their 

planning and their implementation? 

Ms. OWENS. Well, we had no power for probably a week before. 

With the ice storm the whole region was out, so they had their 

plans well in line because they knew what was coming. But the 

only thing we did is we had our State Electrical Board and our City 

electrical people, enforcement people, before anybody could enter 

any building after the electricity was on, they had to check it 

through thoroughly. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Let me ask one question of Mr. 

Logan, and we will have questions from Senator Pryor. 

Mr. Logan, you were involved in the tsunami relief effort in 

Southeast Asia. As you mentioned in your testimony, many saw the 

disaster also as an opportunity to implement a redevelopment program for the region, and that would raise the standard of living for 

the residents. Yet one of the problems was the Indonesian Government’s slowness in developing and implementing plans. 

Based on your experience, what recommendations would you 

make to city, State, and Federal officials in the States affected by 

Hurricane Katrina as they begin planning for reconstruction and 

redevelopment? 

Mr. LOGAN. I think that is a question that has overarched across 

boundaries, so I do not think I am in a position where as a visitor 

I am suggesting recommendations to yourselves. 

It is true. Forget the additional complication in both Sri Lanka 

and in Indonesia, that these were states in conflict. There was ongoing conflict there. And that the Bandar Aceh province had been 

effectively a closed province for nearly 30 years, which added to the 

complication. Consequently, the Indonesian situation, there is perhaps some understandability that the mindset of the government 

had to turn around to go to a massive redevelopment in a region 

that was actually going in the opposite direction, requires quite a 

change of turn. It is a bit like chaining an aircraft carrier, you will 

get around there eventually, but it is a big circle. 

What became clear, and where I think the lesson is in both Sri 

Lanka and in Indonesia, which are the two biggest ones, but very 

clearly and positively demonstrated in the Maldives, a much smaller country, was that once the decision was made that there was a 

need to look at this beyond simply throwing up a few little houses 

for the fishing communities, that there was in fact not only an opportunity, but in fact an obligation to build better, if you like. In 

the case of both of them, they established a specific focal point that 

would transcend the national, regional, and local authorities without cutting them out, in other words, incorporating them. By the 

62

way, even in Iran, ultimately it was the state and the city who actually took on the lead even there. 

The feeling there was that if we can do this now, we can learn 

from this, and the urging of former President Clinton and his 

group is that this is an opportunity to establish a mechanism that 

does not necessarily have to be large, because many of the communities that I helped respond to are quite limited in capacity, but 

something that is extremely flexible. In other words, it has a 

mindset that between disasters it is there working on preparedness 

and being ready, and this cultural awareness, but that the mechanisms are there for it to rapidly expand to meet whatever the scope 

of the disaster is. 

So I think that those countries that have realized that other disasters will come, and that disasters do in fact give you an opportunity to address risk, to build better both socially, to build better 

both in terms of architectural and building standards. That needs 

to be continued as a mindset between the time when there are no 

disasters. And I think therein lies a lesson that has been learned 

in many countries around the world, the success that it has been 

implemented varies, but certainly we are seeing some real progress 

now in Indonesia after that decision was made, and they got a particularly effective individual, and that is why I am saying I think 

the individual very much will be the person who drives that forward ultimately. 

Senator AKAKA. I will turn the questioning over to Senator Pryor. 

Senator Pryor. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now is our chance. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator AKAKA. It is your time. 

Senator PRYOR. Mayor Owens, let me ask—I am sorry I had to 

step out for those votes—but in your area you had extensive flooding, is that right? 

Ms. OWENS. Yes. 

Senator PRYOR. And an ice storm? 

Ms. OWENS. Well, it started, we had over 100 inches of snow, 

eight snowstorms that just crippled our area all the way from October through to April, so we had been battling with that. We had 

to even acquire the help of the National Guard to keep our roads 

open it was so bad. Our whole State was inundated. 

It was the largest disaster ever per capita in the Nation until 

this event, and we evacuated 50,000 people. We had the ice storm. 

We were sandbagging at that point. We always had some type of 

flood. But then 14 inches of snow the next day, and then right after 

that we had to dig the snow away so we could continue to sandbag 

on the levees. And then it just melted too quickly, and we had the 

Red Lake and the Red River of the north, ice jams, and we just got 

inundated. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. How much water did you have in your 

city? How high was it? 

Ms. OWENS. It was anywhere I think in the lower—well, what we 

call the Lincoln Drive area, they had a levee system in there that 

had been in since the 1950s. That is the first one that breached. 

I am not sure of the extent of it, but it went over the roofs of the 

63

houses. They were just floating. Otherwise, I would say throughout 

our city, anywhere from 4 to 6 feet of water. 

Senator PRYOR. So in other words, when you see pictures of New 

Orleans, that looks like your city? 

Ms. OWENS. I looked up my 10-minute film that I had, and you 

can identify right up to where we lost no people, and then that is 

where my heart just went out to them. 

Senator PRYOR. After the water receded, how long was the water 

there in your city? 

Ms. OWENS. We were probably flooded a couple weeks. 

Senator PRYOR. After the water receded, what percentage of the 

buildings could be saved? 

Ms. OWENS. Well, 90 percent of our city was wet, and I think we 

lost about, without the flood control project, we lost approximately 

1,000 homes on our side of the city, and then East Grand Forks, 

Minnesota, lost almost their whole housing stock. They were totally 

under there in the 8,500 population. 

The majority of the businesses were wet. I would say the majority of them also could be saved. 

Senator PRYOR. But a minority of the houses could be saved? 

Ms. OWENS. Well, we have, let us see, all the ones along the river 

for sure, were gone, 1,000. So 90 percent were wet. I would say we 

lost a lot of our apartments, probably 40, 50 percent of our housing 

stock at that time. 

Senator PRYOR. I am just trying to get a sense of what we can 

anticipate down in New Orleans because I know it is different, but 

there are a lot of similarities to what you went through. 

Let me ask this in terms of the aftermath concerning the housing 

and also the commercial property; who paid to have them cleaned 

up, or maybe demolished and rebuilt? Who paid for that? Was it 

private insurance? Was it the government? How did that work? 

Ms. OWENS. Both. We, first of all, had the $171 million that we 

got out of that $500 million disaster aid bill that Congress passed, 

we used much of that for help for businesses, to get them back on 

board. I mean we did some of that. The SBA a lot, most of it was 

private. They had to get loans. We had a lot of people that are still 

working at 75-years-old because they could not retire. They had to 

invest. But it was a partnership, but a lot of it was private money. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask both of you a question concerning 

population. Arkansas is immediately above Louisiana, and we are 

to the west of Mississippi, so we have a lot of evacuees in our 

State. We do not know exactly how many, tens of thousands, and 

by one estimate, 75,000. Some are in church camps. Some are with 

friends. Some are in hotels. You all know the routine, you have 

seen this before. 

I was on the phone yesterday with a lot of the people who are 

running these camps. We have a lot of civic centers we have converted, but we also have a lot of church camps that are being used. 

That has seemed to work out very well. When I was talking to Arkansans on the phone yesterday who were in those camps and centers, they said that a number of the people they have talked to 

have said, ‘‘Look, we do not have anything to go back to, and if you 

can get us a job here, we will just stay here.’’ Has that been your 

experience? 

64

Ms. OWENS. Yes. We did lose population at that time. I think the 

thing that I would say right now to New Orleans and the Gulf 

Coast is this is going to be a 25-, 30-year project as you move 

along. It is not going to be rebuilt overnight. It is going to take a 

long time. I mean that is just my thinking from what we went 

through because ours is about a 15-year project. But the one thing 

I would say, I think what really pulled the heartstrings in my 

household was you become blind to the poverty level of some of the 

people, and that just broke my heart. If these people go away and 

they can find jobs and stability right now, I think they need to do 

that. Let New Orleans and the Gulf Coast rebuild, and other people will come in, and these people may come back, but they need 

some normalcy in their lives because they cannot go on for as long 

as it is going to take to rebuild. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Logan, is that your experience? 

Mr. LOGAN. I think it is exactly the case in any part of the world 

that I have ever been to. Some will never leave, in spite of the fact 

they are floating down the river. Some will never come back. The 

bigger group will be driven by the need to retain their family connections, to get their kids into school, whatever that may take. 

So consequently some will relocate for a certain period of time 

until they observe that the situation is sufficiently stable for them 

and their families to go back. So you have to make programs for 

the people who will come back immediately, the ones that may 

come back later on. What will your obligations be? This is a difficult one that some authorities can think around the immediate 

transitional needs, but they do not think through the fact that they 

may not necessarily be the ones that are calling the shots 5 years 

from now, and that is why I am saying you have to be ready to welcome them back, not just today or tomorrow, but maybe 5 or 10 

years from now they may want to come back to their home, particularly those who are native to that city. 

And then others will see an opportunity that they never had. We 

are dealing very often with people who are not only moved from 

their city, but actually moved out of their country. They have become refugees. And I think that there are many stories that being 

a refugee, which was a term that was being used early on here, 

which is incorrect, but nonetheless, so many refugees actually become—they broke that cycle and there were opportunities, and I 

believe that there will be opportunities and you will probably find 

some hardy New Orleans people who actually find living in Alaska 

has given them something new. It is a broad spectrum. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. And you touched on one of the reasons I 

asked that is because in our State, we have school districts, we 

have cites, counties, State that are providing services, etc. And just 

as I talk to them over the next several days, several weeks, several 

months, I just need to be ready to share my thoughts on how many 

of their resources they should invest in these folks because kids are 

in schools, they are trying to find jobs, all those issues. I want to 

tell you, I have never been more proud of my State. They have welcomed people with open arms. They have opened their checkbooks, 

opened their personal homes. They have given them cars. I mean 

it has just been amazing to see the generosity of people in ArkanVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:23 May 31, 2006 Jkt 024244 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\24244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
65

sas, and I am sure that is true in other parts of the country as 

well. 

But that is really why I was asking because I just would love to 

be able to advise either our governor or our various local people on 

what to expect, what the future might look like. 

Ms. OWENS. Even in our case now, and I said New Orleans and 

the cities along the Gulf, of course, they have to recoup their economic development, try and get their people back for the tax base. 

But in our city, it can be an opportunity. It sounds terrible because 

there were lives lost, but these people that are at the poverty level, 

some of them might find jobs, a place where their children can go 

to school, a place where they can make a better living. To me, then 

they should take their opportunities, and other people will move in, 

or these people may go back, but it can be an opportunity for people who were living at the poverty level particularly. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask another question on a different line, 

and that is concerning our experience in Arkansas, where a lot of 

these people, when they got off the buses, they were bewildered. 

They did not know what State they were in. In fact, there is one 

case—we do not have to relive all of FEMA’s problems—but one example I heard is that people were loaded on the bus at the Superdome and driven all the way to the Astrodome. It was full. They 

were driven back to New Orleans even though there was no place 

to go back to. Apparently they waited on the parking lot, I heard, 

for 5 hours. I have not verified this, but this is what, anecdotally, 

people have told me. And then they were driven up to Fort Chaffee, 

Arkansas, and I do not know how many hours that would be, but 

anyway, they were processed there, and then they got on a bus to 

go to the camp wherever it may be. So some of these people spent 

a full day, maybe 2 days on the bus, maybe 3 days, I am not quite 

sure. 

And they were very bewildered, I mean literally, when they got 

off the bus, and some of them did not know what State they were 

in. Clearly a lot of these people really felt no real assurance from 

the Federal Government. 

And then I have heard stories where in one of these camps they 

kept saying FEMA will be here in the next few days, and everybody was anticipating FEMA coming. They finally came, and all 

they had was a guy with flyers, with just the toll free number and 

a website, and so there was a big letdown there. 

I guess my question is, based on your experience, is that common, or normally is there a government agency there that actually 

has a better game plan and is actually taking care of people in a 

more deliberative way? 

Ms. OWENS. In our case they were there. I mean we did not have 

that problem. We had people in 49 of the 50 States. I mean they 

just—I do not know if you were here when I said that would be 

the hardest thing that I could do. I would probably be one of the 

ones that would not want to go to get on a plane when I do not 

know where I am going to be on the other end because you have 

lived here all your life. You are just ripping people, but that is 

what they had to do I guess. 

66

But I do not know. It was so large, I do not know if they could 

have—it could have been done better. They had to get them out to 

safety I guess. 

But what we did for our people who were evacuating, even in 

that small city, we had the ability to tune in through TVs. The 

media was wonderful to us. And every place where they had a 

large group of people in these cities, we had a press conference almost daily, so they would know what was going on in their city 

while they were gone. And that worked wonderfully. Like I would 

tune into, well, all across the country they did that for us. 

Senator PRYOR. That is good to know. 

Mr. Logan, do you have any comment on that? 

Mr. LOGAN. Not specifically to your question regarding the 

United States, but I think there is one other statistic that we have 

identified. Whether it would apply here or not, I do not know, but 

I suspect that it might. In almost any displaced population there 

probably is somewhere around about 10 or 15 percent who would 

have to be classified as especially vulnerable. 

Now, in our case it may well be that it is old folks who cannot 

get to food distribution lines. The young guys get there. In Africa 

they are up there and—but very often, that 10 or 15 percent slips 

through because your planning is for the 75, 80, 90 percent, and 

very often these very vulnerable people—maybe it could be handicapped, it could be mentally challenged, it could be single moms, 

of course, is one of the big problems we have in refugee camps 

where it is mostly women and children. 

But what I would say is, is that those people who are involved 

have to give some special attention to identifying where that 10 or 

15 percent might be, because otherwise, they will be the ones who 

will drop down, and they are probably disadvantaged to start with, 

and they will slip right down below the radar. So I think that 

needs to be looked at as well. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask about the Red Cross. Do you guys 

work with FEMA very closely? 

Mr. LOGAN. I really cannot answer on the basis of the American 

Red Cross. I know that of course they have as part of their—they 

are auxiliary to the U.S. Government, and they have a very clear 

mandate, and that they will be working with them right as we 

speak. I know that. The details we would have to ask my American 

Red Cross colleagues at some other time. 

Senator PRYOR. My last question, I promise, Mr. Chairman. One 

thing that you have heard the Committee talk about today is accountability. We have a lot of money that we have appropriated for 

this region of the country, and I am curious about your experience 

in terms of scams and rip-offs. I am a former Attorney General of 

my State, and we used to do consumer protection, and we would 

see those scams and rip-offs of people, fly-by-night contractors and 

things like that, that would get their money up front and you 

would never see them again. So certainly we know that there is 

going to be some of that, we just know that. 

There is also the contracting process. Unfortunately, we have 

done some of this with no big contracts, and I know we will talk 

about that a lot over the coming weeks here in the Congress. But 

what is your experience with the money that goes in to try to help, 

67

and sometimes people try to profiteer or sometimes people try to 

take advantage of desperate situations? Do you have a comment on 

that? 

Mr. LOGAN. It has always been a problem internationally, and I 

suppose never, ever more than in the tsunami, which was the 

greatest sort of giving internationally that we have ever seen, to 

the point at which of the three main areas that former President 

Clinton, in his role as Special Envoy, has identified that require 

specific attention, aside from the tracking and the personal needs, 

and that is accountability. Very clearly—and we are dealing with 

government authorities of 11 different countries in the tsunami and 

in many other ones—is the willingness and the ability to have 

some form of external auditing. In the case of the tsunami, all of 

the governments involved, all of the agencies involved like our own, 

have opened ourselves up to not only vigorous internal auditing 

and tracking and accountability, but also external. 

Clearly the complications of dealing with that amount of money 

on an international basis are very important, very tricky, and undoubtedly we know already from day one that we will be under the 

microscope on the whole question of accountability, just on that. 

And then you multiply that by the number of other disasters that 

we are working at internationally, it has become a core element of 

stewardship for the Red Cross as a movement. 

Ms. OWENS. We had one construction company that was working with an event center we were building at the time, a $70 million 

event center. So they were in the city, and we knew we needed 

somebody immediately to start helping with so many different 

things that needed these people. And the City Council and myself 

agreed to keep them on board because our others were all scattered. 

I was not very popular later because when it came down to 

where you could start with divvying out the jobs to the other people 

coming back for private enterprise, I had them pull back, and I 

mean they did a wonderful job, but it was time to turn it back to 

open, and that is what I did. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

I want to thank our witnesses on this hearing, Recovering from 

Hurricane Katrina: The Next Phase. I want to thank you so much 

for your testimony. It will be helpful to this Committee, this Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 

I, as Chairman, will adjourn this hearing. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:50 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(69)

A P P E N D I X 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER 

When the framework for our nation’s government was first laid out, the goal was 

the creation of a republic with limited Federal powers. The Founding Fathers envisioned a situation where state and local governments maintained the responsibility 

to provide public services and maintain public safety. However, over the past 200 

plus years, the growth of our economies and that of our population have made the 

scale of many issues beyond the capacity of our state and local resources. Fortunately, advances in technology have made it possible for the rapid deployment of 

Federal and pooled state resources in times of tragedy. We have seen this time and 

time again. It is the American spirit to help one’s neighbors in times of need and 

the response to Hurricane Katrina is truly an event that proves that fact. 

The role of the Federal Government has expanded approximately over the years. 

The challenges now are to efficiently utilize the vast array of resources and talents 

that people across this nation are willing to bring to the situation. I applaud Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman for calling today’s hearing and especially appreciate the specific stated purpose. We are here to discuss next steps—to make certain 

that the appropriate resources are brought into use. 

The task ahead is a difficult one. We must appropriately and efficiently allocate 

resources to manage what is likely to be the largest response, recovery, and rebuilding effort in modern American history. We have to focus on coordination among Federal, State, and local agencies. We also have to be certain to consider the indirect 

and long-term effects of decisions that are made. Priority one is saving lives and 

getting those who are displaced from their families, homes, and places of work back 

to a state of normalcy. But we cannot forget the fact that every decision has not 

only short term costs and benefits but also long term ones as well. 

As United States Senators we must remember our duty is not one of project managers who are involved in every detail of the response. True, our responsibility is 

one of oversight—as a Member of this Committee, the Environment and Public 

Works Committee, and as Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, I am receiving daily briefings and updates from numerous Federal agencies working on the response. However, at this point in time our most important role is one of providers. 

As Members of Congress we must make certain that the operational units have 

the resources necessary to do their work. To date, the Congress has provided $62.3 

billion in Emergency Supplemental funds. More will come. We also must work to 

ensure that the law provides decisionmakers the authority to get the job done. Many 

agencies have temporarily suspended certain regulations to speed the effort, from 

weight limitations on roadways, to contracting requirements and certain environmental permits. 

Yesterday, I took the Senate floor to discuss the current efforts by the Department 

of Defense in the response effort. I have spoken with General Blum, who is the 

Commander of the National Guard. He never once flinched when he said we are 

doing the job and we are going to succeed. Our hats are off to the National Guard. 

The Navy deployed 20 ships, including the USS Harry S Truman, an aircraft carrier, and the USNS Comfort, the hospital ship. More than 400 aircraft, including 

373 helicopters and 93 airplanes, are in support of search and rescue, medical evacuation, and logistical supply missions. The amount of humanitarian support provided to the region is astounding. More than 16 million meals-ready-to-eat—the old 

MRE or military meals—44 million liters of water, and more than 175 million 

pounds of ice have been delivered to date. The Army Corps of Engineers has 39 of 

its 137 permanent pumps operating throughout New Orleans, with an additional 46 

military pumps operating at a lower capacity. I wonder though if there are limitations under current law that prevent the Department of Defense from bringing its 

full range of assets to the effort. 

70

I have spoken with many of my colleagues about the framework of laws that have 

served our nation well, especially the Posse Comitatus Act, the Insurrection laws, 

and to what extent we must revisit that doctrine. We must determine if changes 

are needed to meet Federal obligations in facing the uncertainties of the 21st Century, especially the new threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about their experiences and 

specifically what they needed but couldn’t get because of red-tape, regulatory hurdles, or even prohibition by Federal law. again, as Members of Congress, we can 

best help by providing the resources—through appropriations and statute—to best 

serve our local, state, and Federal agencies speed the recovery of the Gulf Coast 

states. 

Surely the task is a daunting one. But we are up to it and are united in our collective desire to help our brothers and sisters get back home.

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