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26–384 2006

TO REVIEW THE RESPONSE BY CHARITIES TO 

HURRICANE KATRINA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 13, 2005 

Serial No. 109–52 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means 

( 

ii 

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

BILL THOMAS, California, Chairman 

E. CLAY SHAW, JR., Florida 

NANCY L. JOHNSON, Connecticut 

WALLY HERGER, California 

JIM MCCRERY, Louisiana 

DAVE CAMP, Michigan 

JIM RAMSTAD, Minnesota 

JIM NUSSLE, Iowa 

SAM JOHNSON, Texas 

PHIL ENGLISH, Pennsylvania 

J.D. HAYWORTH, Arizona 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

KENNY C. HULSHOF, Missouri 

RON LEWIS, Kentucky 

MARK FOLEY, Florida 

KEVIN BRADY, Texas 

THOMAS M. REYNOLDS, New York 

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin 

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

BOB BEAUPREZ, Colorado 

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania 

CHRIS CHOCOLA, Indiana 

DEVIN NUNES, California 

CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York 

FORTNEY PETE STARK, California 

SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JIM MCDERMOTT, Washington 

JOHN LEWIS, Georgia 

RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts 

MICHAEL R. MCNULTY, New York 

WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

XAVIER BECERRA, California 

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas 

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota 

STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, Ohio 

MIKE THOMPSON, California 

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut 

RAHM EMANUEL, Illinois 

ALLISON H. GILES, Chief of Staff 

JANICE MAYS, Minority Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

JIM RAMSTAD, Minnesota, Chairman 

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia 

BOB BEAUPREZ, Colorado 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

E. CLAY SHAW, JR., Florida 

SAM JOHNSON, Texas 

DEVIN NUNES, California 

J.D. HAYWORTH, Arizona 

JOHN LEWIS, Georgia 

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota 

MICHAEL R. MCNULTY, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York 

Pursuant to clause 2(e)(4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, public hearing records 

of the Committee on Ways and Means are also published in electronic form. The printed 

hearing record remains the official version. Because electronic submissions are used to 

prepare both printed and electronic versions of the hearing record, the process of converting 

between various electronic formats may introduce unintentional errors or omissions. Such occurrences are inherent in the current publication process and should diminish as the process 

is further refined. 

iii 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Advisory of December 6, 2005, announcing the hearing ...................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

McCrery, Hon. Jim, a Representative in Congress from the State of Louisiana ..................................................................................................................... 8 

American Red Cross, Joseph C. Becker ................................................................. 27 

Baton Rouge Area Foundation, John G. Davies .................................................... 40 

Salvation Army of America, Major Todd Hawks ................................................... 34 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Managing Director, Education, Workforce and Income Security ................................................ 19 

American Institute of Philanthropy, Daniel Borochoff ......................................... 54 

National Spinal Cord Injury Association, Marcie Roth ........................................ 59 

Resources for Independent Living, Yavonka Archaga .......................................... 68 

Wyatt, Johnny G., City Marshal and Homeland Security Director, Bossier 

City, Louisiana ..................................................................................................... 73 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

American Arts Alliance, statement ........................................................................ 81 

National Council of Nonprofit Associations, Audrey Alvarado, statement ......... 83 

National Fraternal Congress of America, statement ............................................ 85 

Rotary International, Evanston, IL, Christine Neely, statement ........................ 87 

(1) 

TO REVIEW THE RESPONSE BY CHARITIES TO 

HURRICANE KATRINA 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2005 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m., in room 

1100, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Jim Ramstad (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

[The advisory announcing the hearing follows:] 

2 

ADVISORY 

FROM THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: (202) 225–7601 

December 06, 2005 

No. OV–5 

Ramstad Announces Hearing to Review the 

Response by Charities to Hurricane Katrina 

Congressman Jim Ramstad (R–MN), Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of 

the Committee on Ways and Means, today announced that the Subcommittee will 

hold a hearing to review the response by charities to Hurricane Katrina. The hearing will take place on Tuesday, December 13, 2005, in the main Committee 

hearing room, 1100 Longworth House Office Building, beginning at 3:00 p.m. 

In view of the limited time available to hear witnesses, oral testimony at this 

hearing will be from invited witnesses only. Invited witnesses will include Members 

of Congress and witnesses representing the U.S. Government Accountability Office, 

the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and certain other groups involved 

with the response to Hurricane Katrina. 

BACKGROUND: 

Hurricane Katrina caused unprecedented destruction along much of the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, displacing more than one million people and causing over $100 

billion of property damage. Tax-exempt charitable organizations have played a key 

role in the response and recovery efforts by providing food, shelter, and clothing to 

many of the victims of Katrina, as well as counseling, financial assistance, and other 

forms of help. Americans have reportedly given or pledged nearly $2.6 billion in donations to charitable organizations aiding the victims of Hurricane Katrina. 

Due to the scope of the disaster, a multitude of charities have been involved in 

the response to Hurricane Katrina. National organizations, such as the American 

Red Cross and the Salvation Army, have had prominent roles, but local charitable 

organizations ranging from churches to foundations have performed significant responsibilities as well. The hearing will provide an opportunity to review the activities of these organizations, the coordination of their relief efforts, and the lessons 

they have learned from Hurricane Katrina. 

In announcing the hearing, Chairman Ramstad stated, ‘‘We are grateful for the 

charitable organizations that have played such a critical role in responding to Hurricane Katrina. The Subcommittee has a responsibility to examine the lessons learned 

so that charities can improve their efforts to prepare for and respond to disasters 

in the future. We also want to ensure that Americans who have given so generously 

have confidence that their contributions have been and will be used effectively to 

help people in need.’’ 

FOCUS OF THE HEARING: 

The hearing will focus on relief services provided by charitable organizations, and 

will explore areas where service delivery, preparedness, and coordination could be 

improved. 

DETAILS FOR SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS: 

Please Note: Any person(s) and/or organization(s) wishing to submit for the hearing record must follow the appropriate link on the hearing page of the Committee 

website and complete the informational forms. From the Committee homepage, 

3 

http://waysandmeans.house.gov, select ‘‘109th Congress’’ from the menu entitled, ‘‘Hearing Archives’’ (http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Hearings.asp?congress=17). Select the hearing for which you would like to submit, and click on the link entitled, 

‘‘Click here to provide a submission for the record.’’ Once you have followed the online instructions, completing all informational forms and clicking ‘‘submit’’ on the 

final page, an email will be sent to the address which you supply confirming your 

interest in providing a submission for the record. You MUST REPLY to the email 

and ATTACH your submission as a Word or WordPerfect document, in compliance 

with the formatting requirements listed below, by close of business Tuesday, December 27, 2005. Finally, please note that due to the change in House mail policy, the 

U.S. Capitol Police will refuse sealed-package deliveries to all House Office Buildings. For questions, or if you encounter technical problems, please call (202) 225– 

1721. 

FORMATTING REQUIREMENTS: 

The Committee relies on electronic submissions for printing the official hearing record. As always, submissions will be included in the record according to the discretion of the Committee. 

The Committee will not alter the content of your submission, but we reserve the right to format 

it according to our guidelines. Any submission provided to the Committee by a witness, any supplementary materials submitted for the printed record, and any written comments in response 

to a request for written comments must conform to the guidelines listed below. Any submission 

or supplementary item not in compliance with these guidelines will not be printed, but will be 

maintained in the Committee files for review and use by the Committee. 

1. All submissions and supplementary materials must be provided in Word or WordPerfect 

format and MUST NOT exceed a total of 10 pages, including attachments. Witnesses and submitters are advised that the Committee relies on electronic submissions for printing the official 

hearing record. 

2. Copies of whole documents submitted as exhibit material will not be accepted for printing. 

Instead, exhibit material should be referenced and quoted or paraphrased. All exhibit material 

not meeting these specifications will be maintained in the Committee files for review and use 

by the Committee. 

3. All submissions must include a list of all clients, persons, and/or organizations on whose 

behalf the witness appears. A supplemental sheet must accompany each submission listing the 

name, company, address, telephone and fax numbers of each witness. 

Note: All Committee advisories and news releases are available on the World 

Wide Web at http://waysandmeans.house.gov. 

The Committee seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. 

If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202–225–1721 or 202–226– 

3411 TTD/TTY in advance of the event (four business days notice is requested). 

Questions with regard to special accommodation needs in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats) may be directed to the Committee as noted above. 

f 

Chairman RAMSTAD. The hearing will come to order. 

I want to welcome everyone to today’s hearing on the response 

of charities to Hurricane Katrina. 

As we all know, the whole world watched as Hurricane Katrina 

caused unprecedented devastation along the Gulf Coast, displacing 

more than 1 million people, and causing over $100 billion in property damage. This destruction has required a massive response 

from Federal, State, and local governments. 

The Hurricane has also inspired the Nation’s charities to make 

an historic effort. Americans have made this effort possible by giving or pledging over $2.6 billion to help the victims of this terrible 

disaster. Charities have provided critically important assistance, 

ranging from food, shelter and cash assistance to counseling and 

job training. This is the single largest charitable response to a disaster in our Nation’s history. 

4 

This Subcommittee has the responsibility to review the activities 

of charities, to see where things worked, where they didn’t work, 

and where the response can be made more effective. This Subcommittee, as some of you will remember, held a similar review 

after the September 11th attacks, and highlighted areas in which 

charities needed to improve their response to disasters. I hope our 

effort today can lead to further improvements as well. 

Several of the witnesses today will tell extremely inspiring stories. We will hear about volunteers who dropped what they were 

doing so they could help take care of hurricane victims. We will 

hear about churches and synagogues providing shelter and food to 

people who had nothing but the clothes on their backs. 

We will hear about Americans generously donating to the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army and other organizations to provide needed cash assistance to Hurricane victims; as I said earlier, 

$2.6 billion in monetary contributions by the American people. 

Notwithstanding the tremendous humanitarian response, other 

witnesses will describe some significant shortcomings in the charitable response. Today’s hearing will really focus on three main concerns. First, how coordination between charities can be improved. 

In massive disasters like this one, charities both large and small 

get involved in the response. Their collective resources, capabilities 

and efforts obviously must be effectively coordinated. 

Four years ago, this Subcommittee discussed the problem of coordination among charities responding to the September 11th attacks. Hurricane Katrina has unfortunately shown that much work 

still remains. 

The second area of concern we will examine is how all Americans 

can have access to and receive assistance from charitable organizations during disasters. It is important that the Red Cross and other 

charities not forget communities and individuals who are harder to 

reach or who need special attention, minority populations, people 

with disabilities, and low-income people. 

Today we will hear from two witnesses representing people with 

disabilities, which are of major interest to me, and I know other 

Members of the Subcommittee. These two witnesses will describe 

the experiences of individuals with disabilities during the disaster, 

and believe me, some of those experiences are downright shocking. 

We need to hear what the Red Cross and others are planning to 

do to ensure that underserved populations are not forgotten or neglected during the next disaster. We always know, unfortunately, 

there will be the next disaster. 

The third area of concern is that we need to ensure that charitable dollars are not lost to fraud. While disasters bring out the 

best in most people, they also bring out the worst in others. In 

some cases, criminals have pretended to be charities and have stolen money intended for actual charities. In other cases, people pretending to be victims have taken advantage of charities and taken 

money that could have been used to help actual victims. 

The New York Times reported that the Red Cross distributed $32 

million in cash to residents in and around Jackson, Mississippi, 

even though many of them had experienced little or no significant 

property damage. One pawn shop owner in Jackson, Mississippi, 

told the New York Times that many aid recipients cashed relief 

5 

checks at his shop and immediately bought jewelry, guns, DVDs 

and electronics. 

The owner of a Western Union branch in Jackson was quoted as 

saying, ‘‘Surely the Red Cross has to have a better use of funds, 

unless they just have money they are trying to get rid of for some 

reason.’’ 

Stories like this may discourage donors from giving money for relief efforts; therefore, we have to understand what the Red Cross 

and other charities are doing to ensure that their aid is going to 

the people who actually need it. If this hearing helps document 

where charities fell short in serving the hurricane victims, it can 

help ensure these problems do not occur again. If Americans do not 

have confidence that their donations are being used wisely, they 

may not be so generous when the next disaster strikes. 

This morning I am sure many of you noted that the American 

Red Cross announced the resignation of its president, Marsha J. 

Evans. I would like to thank Ms. Evans for her dedication and hard 

work. 

I also, quite frankly, appreciated Ms. Evans’ candid acknowledgment in September that the Red Cross’s responses to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita had been ‘‘uneven,’’ and that these natural disasters ‘‘eclipsed even our direst worst-case scenarios.’’ 

In more recent weeks, I have been encouraged by the Red Cross’s 

public vow to address some of the criticisms by seeking greater diversity within its ranks and establishing partnerships with local 

groups. I believe the coming transition at the American Red Cross 

offers an opportunity for Red Cross management to respond to the 

concerns that have been raised and that will be discussed here 

today. 

At this time, I now recognize my good friend from Georgia, the 

distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Lewis, for his opening statement. 

[The opening statement of Chairman Ramstad follows:] 

Opening Statement of The Honorable Jim Ramstad, Chairman, and a 

Representative in Congress from the State of Minnesota 

Hurricane Katrina caused unprecedented destruction along the Gulf Coast, displacing more than one million people, and causing over $100 billion in property 

damage. This destruction has required a massive response from federal, state, and 

local governments. The hurricane has also inspired the nation’s charities to make 

an historic effort. Americans have made this effort possible by giving or pledging 

over $2.6 billion to help the victims of this disaster. Charities have provided critically important assistance, ranging from food, shelter, and cash assistance, to counseling and job training. 

This is the single largest charitable response to a disaster in our nation’s history. 

This Subcommittee has the responsibility to review the activities of charities to see 

where things worked, where they didn’t work, and where the response can be made 

more effective. This Subcommittee held a similar review after the September 11th 

attacks, and highlighted areas in which charities needed to improve their response 

to disasters. I hope that our efforts today can lead to further improvements. 

Several of the witnesses today will tell an inspiring story. 

They will tell us about volunteers who dropped what they were doing so they 

could help take care of hurricane victims. We will hear about how churches provided 

shelter and food to people who had nothing. We will hear about how Americans’ generous donations allowed the American Red Cross and other organizations to provide 

needed cash assistance to hurricane victims. 

Notwithstanding the tremendous humanitarian response, other witnesses will describe some significant shortcomings in the charitable response. Today’s hearing will 

focus on three main concerns. 

6 

• First, how coordination between charities can be improved. 

In massive disasters like this one, charities, large and small, get involved in the 

response. Their collective resources, capabilities, and efforts must be effectively coordinated. Four years ago, this Subcommittee discussed the problem of coordination 

among charities responding to the September 11th attacks. Hurricane Katrina has 

shown that much work still remains. 

• Second, how all Americans can have access to and receive assistance from charitable groups during disasters. 

The Red Cross and other charities must not forget communities and individuals 

who are harder to reach or who need special attention. Today, we will hear from 

two witnesses representing the disabled community, which is of particular interest 

to me. They will describe the experiences of individuals with disabilities during this 

disaster, and some of those experiences are shocking. We need to hear what the Red 

Cross and others are planning to do to ensure that underserved populations are not 

forgotten or neglected during the next disaster. 

• Third, we need to ensure that charitable dollars are not lost to fraud. While disasters bring out the best in many people, they also bring out the worst in others. In some cases, criminals have pretended to be charities, and stolen money 

intended for real charities. 

In other cases, people pretending to be victims have taken advantage of real charities, and taken money that could have been used to help real victims. The New 

York Times reported that the Red Cross distributed $32 million in cash to residents 

in and around Jackson, Mississippi, even though many of them had not experienced 

significant property damage. 

One pawn shop owner in Jackson, Mississippi, told the Times that many aid recipients cashed relief checks at his shop, and immediately bought jewelry, guns, 

DVDs, and electronics. The owner of a Western Union branch in Jackson was 

quoted as saying: ‘‘Surely the Red Cross has to have a better use of funds. Unless 

they just have money that they are trying to get rid of for some reason.’’ Stories 

like this may discourage donors from giving their money for relief efforts. Therefore, 

we have to understand what the Red Cross and other charities are doing to ensure 

that their aid is going to the people who need it most. 

If this hearing helps document where charities fell short in serving the hurricane 

victims, it can help ensure these problems do not occur again. If Americans do not 

have confidence that their donations are being used wisely, they may not be so generous when the next disaster strikes. 

This morning, the Red Cross announced the resignation of their CEO, Marsha 

Evans. I would like to thank Ms. Evans for her dedication and hard work. I also 

would like to say that this transition offers an opportunity for the Red Cross management to respond to the concerns that have been raised and will be discussed 

today. 

I now recognize the distinguished Ranking Member from Georgia, my good friend, 

Mr. Lewis, for his opening statement. 

f 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

holding this hearing this afternoon. 

More than 2 months ago, Hurricane Katrina tore through the 

gulf region, causing unbelievable destruction. Tens of thousands of 

people were forced to leave their homes. The area suffered over 

$100 billion in property damage. 

Charitable organizations played a critical role in our country’s 

humanitarian response to Hurricane Katrina. Americans helped 

these efforts by giving well over $2.5 billion to charitable organizations for the victims of Hurricane Katrina. The American Red 

Cross described Hurricane Katrina as a disaster of epic proportion, 

in fact, nearly 20 times larger than anything we have ever faced 

before. 

At the peak of the emergency, the Red Cross sheltered close to 

150,000 people in more than 500 facilities. In response to the hurriVerDate Aug 31 2005 00:31 Apr 20, 2006 Jkt 026384 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\26384.XXX 26384
7 

canes, Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, the Red Cross has 

provided 3.42 million overnight stays in more than 1,000 shelters 

nationwide, and given more than 1.2 million families emergency financial assistance. 

In coordination with the Southern Baptist Convention, the Red 

Cross has served over 50 million hot meals and snacks to hurricane 

survivors. The Salvation Army and small churches, often local 

churches, were able to meet many of the needs of hard-to-reach 

communities where the American Red Cross could not. 

When Katrina first hit the region, the Salvation Army was able 

to quickly deliver food, blankets, cleaning kits, and other needed 

supplies to those in most need. Today, the organization has served 

more than 12 million hot meals, sandwiches and snacks to survivors and first responders. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I want to welcome all of the witnesses coming before the Subcommittee today. 

Your organizations’ response to Hurricane Katrina was outstanding 

and unlike anything seen in our country before. There are always 

lessons to be learned to improve our disaster response system for 

the future; I share your interest in learning from past experience. 

In conclusion, America’s charitable response to Hurricane 

Katrina deserves our praise. I want to give each of you my personal 

thank you for all that you did and continue to do. 

[The opening statement of Mr. Lewis follows:] 

Opening Statement of The Honorable John Lewis, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Georgia 

More than two months ago, Hurricane Katrina tore through the Gulf region causing unbelievable destruction. Tens of thousands of people were forced to leave their 

homes. The area suffered over $100 billion in property damage. 

Charitable organizations played a critical role in providing our country’s humanitarian response to Hurricane Katrina. Americans helped these efforts by giving well 

over two and a half billion dollars to charitable organizations for the purpose of aiding the victims of Hurricane Katrina. 

The American Red Cross describes Hurricane Katrina as a disaster of epic proportions—‘‘in fact, nearly 20 times larger than anything we had ever faced before.’’ At 

the peak of the Katrina emergency, the Red Cross sheltered close to 150,000 people 

in more than 500 facilities. In response to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, 

the Red Cross provided 3.42 million overnight stays in more than 1,000 shelters nationwide and gave more that 1.2 million families emergency financial assistance. In 

coordination with the Southern Baptist Convention, the Red Cross served over 50 

million hot meals and snacks to hurricane survivors. 

The Salvation Army and small charities, often local churches, were able to meet 

many of the needs of hard-to-reach communities where the American Red Cross 

could not. When Katrina first hit the region, the Salvation Army was able to quickly 

deliver food, blankets, cleaning kits, and other needed supplies to those in most 

need. To date, the organization has served more than 12 million hot meals, sandwiches and snacks to hurricane survivors and first responders. 

I want to welcome all the witnesses coming before the Subcommittee today. Your 

organizations’ responses to Hurricane Katrina were outstanding and unlike anything seen in our country before. There are always lessons to be learned to improve 

our disaster response system for the future. I share your interest in learning from 

past experience. In conclusion, America’s charitable response to Hurricane Katrina 

deserves our praise. I want to give each of you my personal thank you. 

f 

Chairman RAMSTAD. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member. 

8 

Now, we call the first panel comprising of our colleague from 

Louisiana, a Member of the Committee on Ways and Means and 

Chairman of the Subcommittee on Social Security. 

I want to say before you begin, Jim, that in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, your leadership, your hard work, your dedicated efforts were truly an inspiration to all of us and to all Americans. 

I want to thank you for all that you did to lead us in the direction 

of providing the appropriate relief to people devastated by the 

worst natural disaster in our Nation’s history. 

I look forward to your testimony. Welcome to the Subcommittee. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. JIM MCCRERY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 

Mr. MCCRERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for those 

kind words. 

I want to thank the full Committee of Ways and Means for being 

so responsive in the wake of Katrina initially, and now Rita, in 

moving bills through the Congress, through our Committee, 

through the Congress on unemployment compensation relief, on 

welfare relief, tax relief for individuals who are victims of Katrina; 

and now, we hope this week or next, another tax bill dealing with 

incentives to bring investment, business investment, back to the 

devastated areas. 

I think this hearing today, though, is very important, Mr. Chairman, and I commend you for holding it in an effort to shed light 

on the positive things that were done—as you and Mr. Lewis both 

talked about, indeed there were a lot of very positive deeds performed in the wake of Hurricane Katrina—but also to question and 

highlight problems that were present in dealing with the aftermath 

of those storms. 

Today, I want to take this opportunity to shed light on some of 

those shortcomings as I saw them from my perspective as someone 

on the ground in a part of Louisiana that was not touched by 

Katrina. My district was not touched at all by the storm, but we 

were touched by the tens of thousands of evacuees that came into 

my district seeking shelter. 

So, it is that experience, primarily, that I want to talk about 

today. Before another Committee, I can talk about the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and some other things, 

but today I am going to focus on the sheltering activity and who 

was responsible for that. 

I am concerned, in particular, with the performance of the American Red Cross. Based on my experiences on the ground from 

Katrina and Rita, the American Red Cross was not properly prepared to fulfill its emergency role in our national response plan. 

For over 100 years, beginning with the Congressional Charter of 

1905, the Federal Government has partnered with the American 

Red Cross to provide domestic and international disaster relief. 

The current relationship is outlined in the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security’s National Response Plan, where the American 

Red Cross is named the primary agency responsible for mass care 

after a disaster. This means that the American Red Cross, a NonGovernmental Organization (NGO), is primarily responsible for 

providing emergency medical care, food and shelter to Americans 

9 

in the wake of natural and man-made disasters. After witnessing 

the Red Cross’s struggles during Katrina and Rita, I question 

whether it is prudent for Congress to place such great responsibility in the hands of one organization. 

Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent flooding of New Orleans 

displaced roughly 1 million people from their homes in southeast 

Louisiana. Tens of thousands sought shelter in my district. It was 

clear from the beginning that the Red Cross simply didn’t have the 

sheltering capacity to meet immediate needs. Small independent 

shelters began popping up by the dozens across northwest Louisiana. At the peak, there were over 40 shelters operating in my 

district, and fewer than 10 of those were Red Cross shelters. 

So, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, when you 

read in the paper or you hear statistics like Mr. Lewis cited in his 

opening statement about X number of people being fed and so 

forth, a lot of those statistics come from the Red Cross, and they 

are accurate insofar as the Red Cross is concerned, but there are 

literally tens of thousands, probably hundreds of thousands of people being fed and sheltered that are not accounted for in those figures because the Red Cross does not know about them. 

That is the experience I had, Mr. Chairman. Immediately after 

Katrina, when I was going around my district trying to make sure 

that evacuees from south Louisiana were taken care of, we had a 

number of small shelters—I say ‘‘small,’’ some of them had 300 people in a high school gymnasium; they were not that small—but we 

had a number of shelters like that that popped up out of necessity. 

The large shelters in Shreveport were full, and none were opening at that time. So, these people were coming up from south Louisiana, banging on our doors, saying, ‘‘Help.’’ Those communities, 

rightfully so, opened their doors, created a shelter, and when I or 

the people from those local communities tried to get the Red Cross 

to send them blankets or cots or food, or diapers, they were told, 

sorry, we cannot help you. 

Now, I believe that the Red Cross director in my district was 

being honest. He probably could not help because he either didn’t 

have the provisions, or he didn’t have the transportation for the 

provisions, didn’t have the volunteers, but whose fault is that? In 

my view, it is the fault of the American Red Cross—not my local 

chapter, the national Red Cross—poorly planning or just not planning at all for a disaster of this scope. 

We have known for decades that New Orleans was vulnerable to 

a storm of this sort, that flooding was possible, that hundreds of 

thousands of people would be displaced from their homes. We have, 

since 9/11, I think, anticipated a similar man-made disaster that 

could be caused by a terrorist act. Why were we not better prepared? 

I spoke earlier about FEMA. I think FEMA was woefully unprepared. The Federal Government was woefully unprepared. Our 

State government was woefully unprepared. The local governments 

were unprepared. I think the Red Cross was unprepared, as clearly 

demonstrated. 

So, that is my testimony in a nutshell, Mr. Chairman. I will be 

happy to stay and answer questions that your Committee might 

have. 

10 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McCrery follows:] 

Statement of The Honorable Jim McCrery, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Louisiana 

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues on Ways and Means, I commend you for holding 

this hearing and appreciate the invitation to share my views on the charitable response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For the past three months, my energies 

have been largely devoted to responding to the hurricanes which ravaged the Gulf 

Coast region. As part of that response, I have assisted hurricane evacuees residing 

in my congressional district, as well as my constituents who were directly impacted 

by Rita. National and local charities have played a central role in feeding, housing 

and finding employment for these families. Their contributions to the relief and recovery have been amazing. I am, however, particularly concerned with the performance of the American Red Cross. Based upon my experiences from Katrina and Rita, 

the American Red Cross is not properly prepared to fulfill its emergency role in our 

National Response Plan. 

For over 100 years, and beginning with the Congressional Charter of 1905, the 

Federal Government has partnered with the American Red Cross to provide domestic and international disaster relief. The current relationship is outlined in the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Plan where the American 

Red Cross is named the primary agency responsible for mass care after a disaster. 

This means that the American Red Cross, a non-governmental organization, is primarily responsible for providing emergency medical care, food, and shelter to Americans in the wake of natural and man-made disasters. After witnessing the American 

Red Cross’ struggles during Katrina and Rita, I am not sure it is prudent for Congress to place such great responsibility in the hands of one organization. 

Hurricane Katrina, and the subsequent flooding of New Orleans, displaced roughly one million people from their homes in southeast Louisiana. Tens of thousands 

of evacuees sought shelter in my district. It was clear from the beginning that the 

Red Cross simply did not have the sheltering capacity to meet immediate needs. 

Small independent shelters began popping up by the dozens across northwest Louisiana. At the peak, there were over forty shelters in my district, while fewer than 

ten of those were operated by the Red Cross. Red Cross had serious trouble operating at least three of the larger shelters in my district: Hirsch Coliseum in Shreveport, LA, CenturyTel Center in Bossier City, LA, and the Health and Physical Educational Building at Northwestern State University in Natchitoches, LA. 

Several days after Katrina’s landfall, the American Red Cross asked a network 

of local churches, led by the First Assembly of God, to take over the Red Cross shelter at Hirsch Coliseum in Shreveport, LA. Steve Beyer, an Associate Pastor with 

one of the churches, agreed to manage the shelter until a replacement Red Cross 

manager could be found. No one replaced him. Mr. Beyer operated the Hirsch Coliseum shelter, where 6,200 people came through its doors, with only two Red Cross 

volunteers for the first two weeks. The Red Cross asked church volunteers to wear 

Red Cross shirts, I suppose to give the appearance that Red Cross was operating 

the shelter. 

The CenturyTel Center in Bossier City, LA, opened as an independent shelter one 

week after the storm in response to overwhelming need for additional sheltering capacity. CenturyTel operated on the backs of local government and community organizations while it waited for certification from the American Red Cross. Even after 

the American Red Cross moved in, local charities provided all of the food for seven 

days until Red Cross could secure food. Johnny Wyatt, the City Marshall and Homeland Security Director for Bossier City, LA, helped manage CenturyTel. Mr. Wyatt 

is scheduled to appear in front of the Subcommittee today. His testimony will shed 

light on the challenges of working with the American Red Cross. 

The American Red Cross shelter at Northwestern State University was managed 

by the City of Natchitoches and the Natchitoches Parish Sheriff’s Department in 

conjunction with the University. Dr. Bill Dickens, the shelter’s manager, had one 

Red Cross volunteer to help service the 1,000 evacuees housed each night at the site 

for the first 10 days following the storm. I should note that it took seven days for 

this shelter to receive any of the $60,000 in new bedding that was donated to the 

local Red Cross chapter by General Motors. The bedding sat unused in a Red Cross 

facility seventy miles away in Shreveport, LA, despite the fact that some evacuees 

in Natchitoches were sleeping on the floor. The failure to get these resources to the 

shelter in a timely fashion represents an inexcusable breakdown in communication 

and coordination within the Red Cross. 

While the Red Cross could barely manage its own network of shelters, the organization offered little assistance to struggling independent shelters. Dennis Butcher, 

11 

the Office of Emergency Preparedness Director for Claiborne Parish, was instructed 

by the Red Cross to fend for himself. Mr. Butcher operated an independent shelter 

of 1,200 evacuees for over a month without any assistance from the Red Cross. I 

wish Mr. Butcher’s experience was unique, but the Red Cross also refused requests 

for assistance from the Office of Emergency Preparedness Directors for Claiborne, 

Sabine, Vernon and Webster Parishes. I also spoke with OEP and other officials on 

the Mississippi Gulf Coast who experienced similar treatment from the Red Cross. 

To date, the American Red Cross has attributed its shortcomings in my district 

to their local chapter. The Federal Government named the American National Red 

Cross as its partner in the National Response plan, not the local chapter in my district. If it is not the responsibility of the National Red Cross to step in when a Category 4 hurricane decimates a major metropolitan area and overwhelms one of their 

local chapters, whose responsibility is it? It has been over thirty years since Hurricane Camille decimated the Mississippi Coast, four years since the terrorist attacks 

of 2001, and a little over a year since Florida’s terrible hurricane season. Forecasters have known for decades that New Orleans was one hurricane away from a 

major disaster. The American Red Cross, as the Federal Government’s lead partner 

in mass care, should have been prepared to meet the immediate needs of the victims 

of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The national organization should have been prepared to move sufficient numbers of volunteers and staff to affected areas. Americans rely on the Red Cross in times of crisis, but the Red Cross could not be relied 

on in northwestern Louisiana. 

The American Red Cross’ reputation in Louisiana has been severely damaged. I 

have stopped giving money to the organization, and instead, have directed over 

$450,000 in funds I raised for hurricane relief to the United Way and the Salvation 

Army. The Red Cross, though, continues to enjoy a major advantage in fundraising 

over other charities because of its partnership with the Federal Government. In this 

disaster alone, the Red Cross absorbed over 60% of all charitable donations. I believe it is Congress’ responsibility to reexamine the Federal Government’s relationship with the Red Cross. 

In closing I would like to once again commend this Committee for its willingness 

to examine this important issue. I would also like to thank all the volunteers who 

have invested their time and money into the recovery effort. The Gulf Coast is forever indebted to them for their generosity. 

f 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Well, thank you very much for your very 

compelling testimony. I have just a few questions I would like to 

ask. 

Jim, what kind of response did you get when you brought the 

problems to the attention of the Red Cross Headquarters of the 

American Red Cross? What kind of response did you get when you 

alerted them as to the problems with the shelters? 

Mr. MCCRERY. The national organization expressed some surprise at some of the things I was telling them. So, they were evidently unaware of what was happening on the ground in my district. They did pledge to look into it and to try to identify where 

the problems arose and fix those, and that is why I am here today. 

I hope I am not being unduly tough on the Red Cross, but I think 

we need to talk plainly about the shortcomings of our disaster response; and if the Red Cross is going to be the Federal Government’s primary responder in terms of shelter, than I think we owe 

it to ourselves and we owe it to the Red Cross to point out the 

shortcomings of that effort so that we can be better prepared next 

time. 

The national Red Cross evidently was not well aware of what 

was going on on the ground, at least in my district, and they have 

promised to try to rectify those problems, but the initial response 

was just simply, we didn’t know. 

12 

Chairman RAMSTAD. I notice from your written testimony that 

you asserted the national Red Cross attributed the shortcomings in 

your district to the local chapter. Rather than being an issue of 

lack of control by the national Red Cross vis-a-vis the local chapter, 

you seem to indicate today it is more a lack of planning on national’s part. 

Mr. MCCRERY. That is my perception, that there was not in 

place an adequate plan on the part of the Red Cross to deal with 

sheltering this many people. It overwhelmed them. It overwhelmed 

my local chapter. It overwhelmed the national Red Cross. I understand that. It was a very difficult situation. 

This country has never seen anything like it in our history, but 

after 9/11, I think we all knew that something like this could happen somewhere, and we should have been better prepared. That is 

all I am saying, Mr. Chairman. 

I hope the Federal Government will work with the Red Cross or 

maybe bring in the Salvation Army or other groups to have a 

united effort to make sure these kinds of problems are met in the 

future. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. I want to ask one final question. I touched 

on it in my opening statement, and you certainly have just touched 

on it again; that is Congress’ responsibility to examine the relationship between the Federal Government and the Red Cross, which 

you clearly stated, so that we can avoid problems that happened 

in your district from happening again, from being repeated anywhere else. 

Do you have any suggestions for how we as Members of Congress 

can help improve the response by charitable organizations? 

Mr. MCCRERY. Mr. Chairman, I think that we ought to reexamine the congressional charter that gives the American Red Cross 

the responsibility for the initial sheltering and feeding and so forth 

of victims of national disasters. We ought to examine that relationship, perhaps bring in other organizations, make it an umbrella organization. 

I do not know, but Congress needs to fully examine that and 

make sure that the plan we have in place with some NGOs is the 

best one to meet such a massive need in case we have this kind 

of disaster again. 

Let me hasten to add, Mr. Chairman, that there were lots of volunteers; I do not know how many—hundreds, thousands of volunteers, and the Red Cross and the Salvation Army, the United Way 

and lots of organizations that did heroic jobs. I think my local director of the Red Cross worked 22 straight days with no time off, 

trying to see to the needs of the shelters that they were operating 

in my area. 

So, I certainly want to commend those individuals who volunteered their time, and some who were paid, and went beyond their 

call of duty to perform these heroic acts. They should be commended. 

I think that Congress has to, if not share the blame, at least 

share the responsibility, going forward, to make sure that the organization or organizations that we vest with this responsibility is 

better prepared next time to carry out that responsibility. 

13 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Thank you again for your testimony and 

your outstanding leadership. 

The Chair now recognizes the distinguished Ranking Member for 

questions. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join you in 

thanking Jim for his leadership and his hard work during the unbelievable crisis along the Gulf Coast. 

I have one or two questions. You have some praise and some 

complaints about how things were handled in your district. Could 

you, just for the record—what do you consider to be the best job 

done and the worst job done? 

Mr. MCCRERY. Well, the best job, in my view, Mr. Lewis, was 

done by people who were not in the Red Cross or the Salvation 

Army or any other organization. They were just ordinary people 

who came out of their homes and brought diapers and pillows and 

blankets and food, and stayed at the high school gymnasium or 

wherever, the civic center, in some small town and cooked for the 

people who were there; who gave them rides to the Social Security 

office to make sure they got their checks; just performed daily acts 

of human kindness for people they had not very much in common 

with. 

Believe me, people in north Louisiana don’t share much culturally with people in south Louisiana. They are Cajun, Catholics, 

French speaking in many cases from south Louisiana, and we are 

Protestant rednecks in north Louisiana; it is like two different 

States. Yet these folks in north Louisiana were coming out of their 

homes every day and every night to take care of people that they 

didn’t know and didn’t have much in common with, except that 

they were human beings. That was very inspiring to me. 

The worst thing was just the total lack of planning that was evident in this crisis. It was insufficient. 

Mr. LEWIS. Let me just try to see if I can find out something 

here. I believe the Red Cross is going to testify, maybe later, that 

this was the worst level of human need in the history of the organization. 

You said earlier that the Federal Government was not prepared, 

that the local government, the county, the State was not prepared. 

Were there any charitable organizations prepared for such a level 

of human need, such devastation? 

Mr. MCCRERY. Probably not. 

Mr. LEWIS. Well, is it possible for someone to be prepared? 

Mr. MCCRERY. I think that is a fair question, and it may not 

be possible to be prepared for every single contingency associated 

with a disaster of this scale, but, Mr. Lewis, it is my contention 

that we could have and should have been much better prepared to 

meet the contingencies of this kind of disaster than we were. 

It was not hard to imagine that the numbers of people evacuating south Louisiana, who did, would actually evacuate. This scenario had been on the books for years, as I have said, and we 

should have been better prepared. 

Let me just give you an example, and maybe—and the Red Cross 

is going to testify, and you can ask them about this—and maybe 

they have some sound reason why they could not do this, but in 

my view they should have, from the national office, anticipated a 

14 

huge need for volunteers or for bodies, for human beings, in areas 

north of New Orleans and the Mississippi Gulf Coast. 

They should have prepositioned people in Dallas and Shreveport 

and Jackson, maybe Atlanta, ready to go into whatever areas were 

taking those evacuees from those devastated areas; and they 

weren’t. My local chapter got zero help for quite a while. I think 

that is inexcusable. 

Mr. LEWIS. Well, should there be a greater burden on the National Government than on some charitable organization, whether 

that organization be national, international or local? Rather than 

talk about getting involved in a blame game, I just want to be clear 

here where we are going. 

Mr. MCCRERY. Well, I am merely reporting to you what happened on the ground. 

The Federal Government has already made the decision, through 

the Congress, to enlist the American Red Cross as the NGO that 

is on the front lines, supposed to meet the needs of evacuees and 

shelters and so forth in a disaster. We have made that decision. 

Whether that decision needs to be reconsidered is a question for 

this Congress. I am posing it today. I do not know the answer, Mr. 

Lewis, but it is a question we ought to ask. We ought to examine 

it thoroughly, and if there is a change necessary, we ought to make 

that change. 

If the Red Cross needs help, if they need other organizations, if 

they need the Federal Government, then we ought to examine that 

and get it done. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. The Chair would now recognize the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Beauprez. 

Mr. BEAUPREZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Jim, let me add my thanks to you for your leadership on this, 

and my sympathy to all of the people affected by these horrible 

storms. Even though Colorado is a long ways from the impacted 

area, we took in 4,200 refugees even in far-away Colorado, about 

three out of four of them from your State of Louisiana; and it 

stressed us a little bit. I can only imagine what it must have been 

like for you in your district, Jim. 

You have mentioned in considerable detail what you went 

through, what your local Red Cross chapter went through. We all 

know that Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, were affected by 

Katrina; Rita took its effects on Texas as well. Of course, the 

storms impacted areas even farther than that because of the refugees. 

What is your perception, Jim, of the circumstances, the struggles, 

the way the whole reaction was managed in other areas? Was 

yours unique or was this a pattern that was far too prevalent? 

Mr. MCCRERY. I cannot speak with any authority on whether 

similar problems existed in other localities, except for the Mississippi Gulf Coast, which I did tour and spoke with several public 

officials in the Mississippi Gulf Coast area. There were similar 

complaints, Mr. Beauprez, about the Red Cross and the response 

to sheltering and assisting shelters on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. 

Mr. BEAUPREZ. I am sure you have had some opportunity to 

talk to some other States, Florida comes to mind, that has been hit, 

15 

hit, and hit again it seems. At least it is my perception that however they manage to do it, they seem to respond pretty well. What 

is the difference in Florida? 

Mr. MCCRERY. I have spoken to some of our colleagues from 

Florida, who have also expressed complaints about FEMA, about 

the Red Cross, about other organizations in the aftermath of hurricanes in South Florida. 

If you are asking about the State’s response, I think the State 

of Florida has enough experience that they have learned to be 

ready and to respond admirably on the State level. 

Mr. BEAUPREZ. Well, given that experience, you have pointed 

out clearly that while we didn’t know the when or the degree of the 

devastation, it should have come as a mystery to no one that something like this could happen. After all, we have had other hurricanes, not this large, but we have had others. 

We had 9/11. We certainly witnessed, a bit from afar, but we saw 

the devastation from the tsunami months before your terrible 

event. So, it should have come with some, I guess, anticipation. 

You said that the question as to the prudence of one organization 

having the responsibility within our national response plan, that 

the Red Cross does, is a legitimate question. 

Well, let me ask you directly. In your opinion, Jim, is the thing 

broken so badly it can’t be fixed? What is your perception right 

now? 

Mr. MCCRERY. My belief is that it can be fixed, that it is possible to be better prepared. Will it take a lot of organization and 

a lot of work? Yes, I think it will. I do think it is possible to be 

much better prepared to meet the needs. 

Look, we all have run campaigns, and we know, at least those 

of us who had tough campaigns at one time—and some of us still 

do—we have to organize volunteers, and we have to have them 

ready to get on a bus, if necessary, and go to some other town to 

go door to door and hand out leaflets. That is hard work. It is hard 

to have a ready set of volunteers, at a phone call to pick up and 

go. I know that. It is very difficult. 

However, that is the kind of nitty-gritty work that I think needs 

to be done on a national level; to have people ready at the drop of 

a hat to respond and be there, have bodies on the ground ready to 

help, ready to give some guidance. That is all a lot of people in my 

district wanted. 

They wanted some people there to just direct them. Look, I am 

here, I am ready to help, but tell me how to do it; what do I need 

to do? There was nobody. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from Texas, Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. No questions. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Mr. Linder. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Jim, for all you have done on this issue and all of 

your colleagues. I am sure you are still working on it on the weekends when you get home. 

Is there a competing element between FEMA and the Red Cross? 

Mr. MCCRERY. I don’t know. There shouldn’t be, but I am glad 

you brought that up, because one thing that was prevalent in the 

16 

first, say, 5 days following the storm, is that I would finally get in 

touch with somebody at FEMA, and they would say, ‘‘that is the 

Red Cross’s responsibility.’’ 

I would get in touch with the Red Cross; they would say, ‘‘Oh, 

no, that is FEMA’s responsibility.’’ 

I would call FEMA back, and they would say, Oh, no, I think 

that is the State’s responsibility; call the Emergency Operations 

Center in Baton Rouge. That is the National Guard. 

Everybody was doing this: ‘‘That is somebody else’s responsibility.’’ 

So, clearly in our National Response Plan, we either need to have 

a better plan or we need to have people better familiar with the 

plan so that everybody knows what his responsibility is; and we do 

not get this runaround of, no, that is not us, that is him, them, 

whoever. 

People need to know what their responsibility is and take responsibility and give answers and give direction when the time comes. 

Mr. LINDER. Is there a reason to question whether we would 

have the major planner of shelter and food in a major disaster 

being an NGO that has a pretty huge budget and pays its executive 

director $500,000 a year, and is distant from the government? 

Mr. MCCRERY. I don’t know. That is the question we need to 

examine. 

Congress has made that decision in the past. We have said that 

in this case the American Red Cross is the appropriate organization; we are going to not only vest them with that responsibility, 

we are also going to provide them some assets and some assistance. 

So, I think that needs to be thoroughly examined. 

We cannot ignore this. It is going to happen again somewhere, 

if it is an Earthquake in California, it is a Category 5 in South 

Florida. 

Mr. LINDER. Or a terrorist attack. 

Mr. MCCRERY. Or a terrorist attack where the terrorists dynamite a dam or infiltrate the water system with pollutants, that 

causes people to have to leave in mass numbers. Something is 

going to happen. So, we owe it to ourselves and our constituents 

to make sure that we either take the plan that is on the books and 

make it work or create a new plan. 

Mr. LINDER. If we anticipated a disaster, which we saw coming 

for several days, and were unprepared for that, how could they prepare for a nuclear accident that we didn’t have any idea was coming? 

Mr. MCCRERY. Yes. Well, certainly something like that—where 

a nuclear device explodes that we do not have any notice of, the 

problems are going to be different associated with that, but some 

of them could be similar. You could have people within a certain 

radius of the explosion ordered to get out quickly and to evacuate, 

to go somewhere else, and you could have the same kinds of problems. 

Certainly every situation would be different, but some of them 

would be the same, and we need to be prepared for that. 

Mr. LINDER. My recollection is that after September 11th, huge 

sums of money came into the Red Cross. They made an executive 

17 

decision not to spend it all on September 11th, which I believe the 

board subsequently overturned. 

Mr. MCCRERY. That’s right. 

Mr. LINDER. Do you have any expectation that this is occurring 

in this event? 

Mr. MCCRERY. I do not. I just do not know, but—I think you 

raise a legitimate question, though, which is, should we have one 

organization that is generally recognized as the organization to respond to disasters, and as a consequence of that recognition, have 

the overwhelming majority of private sector donations going to that 

one organization. I think that is a legitimate question. 

The government shares in the responsibility for identifying that 

one organization, I think. So, I think that is a question we need 

to reexamine. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. The gentleman from California, Mr. 

Nunes. 

Mr. NUNES. No questions. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Shaw. 

Mr. SHAW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I, having experienced a lesser disaster, but a disaster, indeed, 

with Wilma down in Florida and having been a lifetime resident 

of Florida, I have seen many, many hurricanes, but I do not think 

I have ever seen, and I do not think one has ever hit our shores 

that has caused the devastation and loss of property—even though 

there have been some with much larger loss of life in Florida, back 

in the early days—as Katrina. 

Looking back on what we have learned, I think it is easy to overlook much of the good that was done, the heroic behavior, the generosity of the American people. All of those organizations have 

done a good job in so many ways, but that does not mean that we 

should not go back. 

I appreciate your testimony as to what went wrong, and those 

are the things that we should be talking about. You won’t read 

about it in the paper unless it is something that went wrong. Nevertheless, we should not be afraid to get in there, roll up our 

sleeves and talk about it. 

I would suggest—and perhaps you hit on this in your testimony, 

but I think FEMA should call together all of these organizations. 

You talk about a ‘‘plan.’’ Well, the plan should be in writing and 

be very, very clear. 

There were many breakdowns. The first breakdown was in individual responsibility. That was a huge breakdown, and particularly 

in Louisiana. Then there was a breakdown in the city, there was 

a breakdown in the Governor’s office in Louisiana. 

Florida was not perfect, but I think that—compared to what 

went on in Louisiana, that we should get an Oscar for the way our 

government operated at the local as well as at the State level with 

Jeb Bush. I think he did a wonderful job. 

Again, I can tell you, the press in Florida talks about what went 

wrong. One area that is a little bit outside of the scope of this hearing, but Mr. Linder brought up the question of FEMA, an area that 

is worrying me, and that is exactly what FEMA does. 

18 

In Florida, I am sure in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, I 

don’t care how rich you are, if you went out and bought a generator, they reimbursed you up to $800. Luckily, most people didn’t 

know that, or I can tell you that it would have been rampant. 

Chain saws, why are we buying people chain saws? We all are anxious to get the trees out of the road and out of our yards, but giving 

individuals—refunding the money for going out and buying themselves a nice new chain saw, I do not think is the responsibility of 

FEMA. 

Now, I know of personal individuals, if you have got medical 

emergencies, something that is really drastic and people cannot afford it, then I think it is proper to buy a generator to put in someone’s personal home. To just simply say, all you have got to do is 

buy one—one of the adjusters for FEMA, going out and looking at 

where the generator was and being sure that it was properly done 

before the adjustment, found it in a five-car garage. Now, I can tell 

you, somebody with a five-car garage should not be getting a free 

generator. 

On the island of Palm Beach, there were several people; there is 

not a home on the island of Palm Beach that is worth less than 

$1 million. That should not happen. As a matter of fact, I do not 

think we should be buying them, period, except in drastic circumstances. 

Did you have the same experience in your area. 

Mr. MCCRERY. Yes. As you said, this is not the proper forum 

to examine FEMA’s responsibilities. 

Mr. SHAW. It is as close as this Committee will get. 

Mr. MCCRERY. Since you asked, though—and I have already 

stated in a general sense that FEMA was unprepared for this—and 

I think the examples that you point out of people abusing FEMA 

abound. That is hard to control because that is human nature, to 

take advantage of a situation, sometimes even in Florida. What 

FEMA can do about that, short of our changing the rules, I don’t 

know. 

Mr. SHAW. Well, I did look at what the law is; and the law allows FEMA to set the regulations as to what they are going to do, 

and I think we need to be a little more restrictive in the statute. 

So, I plan to ask the party of appropriate jurisdiction to look at 

that and tighten up on that, because otherwise, the word has gotten out now; and I can tell you, when Florida gets another hurricane, the best business you can be in is selling generators, because 

you are going to sell jagillions of them. 

It is wrong. It is not the proper use of taxpayer dollars. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Thank you, Mr. Shaw. 

The Chair again thanks you, Chairman McCrery, for your testimony, your leadership and your great effort in this regard. We look 

forward to working with you to remedy some of the problems that 

you point out. 

The Chair will now call the second panel for today’s hearing. If 

you would come forward please, take your seats. First, Cynthia M. 

Fagnoni, Managing Director, Education Workforce and Income Security, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO); Joseph C. 

Becker, Senior Vice President, Preparedness and Response, AmerVerDate Aug 31 2005 00:31 Apr 20, 2006 Jkt 026384 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\26384.XXX 26384
19 

ican Red Cross; Major Todd Hawks, Public Affairs Secretary and 

Associate National Community Relations and Development Secretary, Salvation Army of America; and John G. Davies, President 

and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Baton Rouge Area Foundation. 

Welcome to all four of you witnesses. Thank you for being here 

today. We will begin, please, with Ms. Fagnoni. 

STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA M. FAGNONI, MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

EDUCATION, WORKFORCE AND INCOME SECURITY, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. FAGNONI. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of 

the Subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to share early 

findings from GAO’s ongoing review of charities’ response to the recent Gulf Coast hurricanes. 

Charities have played a major role in responding to national disasters, including the September 11th terrorist attacks, and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. They provided food, water, shelter and 

other assistance to victims in devastated areas. 

Following the recent hurricanes, charities mounted the largest 

disaster response effort in U.S. history. My statement today will 

focus on charities’ progress in incorporating lessons learned following the September 11th attacks and our preliminary observations on how well charities have coordinated following the Gulf 

Coast hurricanes. 

The GAO reported several lessons learned from the 9/11 response 

that could help charities enhance their responses to future disasters. These included making it easier for eligible survivors to get 

the help they need, enhancing coordination among charities and 

with FEMA, educating the public about charities’ roles in disaster 

response, and planning for future events. 

We recommended that FEMA convene a working group of charities to address these lessons learned, which resulted in the creation of the Coordinated Assistance Network (CAN). The CAN involves seven of the largest disaster response charities and is designed to improve coordination and share information electronically 

about aid recipients and services provided. 

In response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita, charities have raised 

more than $2.5 billion in cash donations according to the Center 

on Philanthropy at Indiana University. The American Red Cross 

raised more than half of that total, with other organizations raising 

considerably smaller amounts. 

Disaster relief charities took steps to coordinate services through 

central operations centers, conference calls and electronic databases. For example, in the weeks following Katrina, the Red Cross 

organized a national operations center with FEMA and other national charities to coordinate services on the ground. 

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD), an 

umbrella organization of charities organized daily conference calls 

with Federal officials and more than 40 charities to share information. The CAN activated its case management databases, which enabled more than 40 participating charities to share data on their 

clients and the services they provided. 

The CAN also created and activated a shelter database that included information about the operating status and capacity of 

20 

emergency shelters in the Gulf Coast region. The charity representatives we interviewed reinforced the importance of these efforts, 

but they raised some concerns about the usefulness of these operations and systems. 

For example, charity representatives told us that the national 

VOAD conference calls often included too many participants and 

sometimes participants provided inaccurate information. Some 

charity officials also told us that because the CAN databases were 

still under development, they were not ready for use on such a 

large scale. 

Many volunteers had not received sufficient training on the system, and some of the technological glitches had not been resolved. 

In addition, the databases required Internet access and electricity, 

which is not always available in disaster situations. We also found 

that charities had to balance access to services with safety concerns 

as they responded to the hurricanes. 

The GAO teams visiting the Gulf Coast in October observed that 

the Red Cross didn’t provide relief in certain areas due to policies 

intended to protect the safety of service providers and victims. 

These policies included not establishing shelters in flood-risk areas 

or in structures that are vulnerable to strong winds, even when victims remained in these areas. 

The GAO teams in the field observed that the Salvation Army 

and smaller charitable organizations, often local churches, frequently met victims’ needs in these locations. Smaller charities 

played an important role in responding to this disaster, but some 

concerns were raised about their ability to provide adequate services to victims. 

Some charity representatives told us that many of the smaller organizations had never operated in a disaster and may not have 

completely understood the situation. Some smaller organizations 

tried to establish tent cities to house evacuees, for example, but 

were not prepared to provide the water, sanitation and electricity 

these shelters required. 

In addition, some of the small charities that placed dislocated 

children in temporary homes didn’t keep sufficient records about 

where the children were placed. This made it difficult for families 

to locate their missing children. 

In closing, the devastation of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita has 

challenged charities’ abilities to provide large-scale aid to disaster 

survivors. At the same time, it has provided a critical opportunity 

to assess how the Nation’s charities have incorporated lessons 

learned from responding to 9/11. 

In ongoing work, GAO will continue to examine how well charities coordinated their response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my oral statement. I would be 

happy to answer any questions you or the Subcommittee Members 

may have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Fagnoni follows:] 

Statement of Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Managing Director, Education, 

Workforce and Income Security, U.S. Government Accountability Office 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the role of charitable services in response 

to recent Gulf Coast hurricanes. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused massive deVerDate Aug 31 2005 00:31 Apr 20, 2006 Jkt 026384 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\26384.XXX 26384
21 

1This estimate based on data from the IRS, with modifications by the National Center for 

Charitable Statistics (NCCS) at the Urban Institute. NCCS excluded foreign and governmental 

organizations from the data. 

struction and large-scale disruption of lives in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and 

Texas. In response to this destruction, we have witnessed heroic efforts by public, 

private, and nonprofit organizations and volunteers. My testimony today will 

present some of our observations regarding the performance of charities in response 

to these hurricanes. These natural disasters have placed strengthening the nation’s 

emergency response efforts at the top of the national agenda. Comptroller General 

Walker has stated that GAO will provide support to Congress through analysis and 

evaluation of coordination efforts among federal agencies, and between federal agencies and the state, local, private, and nonprofit sectors. GAO has conducted several 

previous reviews of federal actions following national disasters, including Hurricane 

Andrew in 1992 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, that will be helpful 

in evaluating the nation’s response to recent hurricanes. We plan to conduct all 

Katrina-related work under the Comptroller General’s authority since it is an issue 

of interest to the entire Congress and numerous committees in both houses. 

Charities have addressed many short- and long-term needs of the victims of recent hurricanes in the Gulf Coast region. Their efforts represent the largest disaster 

response effort in United States history by charitable organizations. As charities collect donations to address these needs, questions have been raised about how the 

money will be used and how charitable relief efforts will be coordinated. This testimony will discuss progress to date in incorporating lessons learned from our review 

of charitable coordination following September 11, and preliminary observations 

about the coordination of charities after the recent hurricanes. This testimony is 

based upon published GAO reports; ongoing work; relevant interviews with federal, 

state, and local government officials in states affected by the hurricanes; interviews 

with charitable officials and national experts; and data on total hurricane-related 

donations to charities from Indiana University’s Center on Philanthropy. 

In summary, we learned from our work following the September 11 attacks that 

charities could take steps to make it easier for survivors of disasters to get the help 

they need, improve coordination among charities and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), better educate the public about charities’ roles in disaster 

recovery, and plan for responding to future disasters. Following our report, seven 

charities formed a network to share information electronically about aid recipients 

and services provided, improve coordination, and ease access to aid. The group 

worked in partnership with FEMA to develop a database to share information between agencies. In a little more than 3 months, charities have raised more than $2.5 

billion to assist in hurricane relief and recovery efforts. In addition, charities have 

taken other steps to improve coordination following the Gulf Coast hurricanes. 

Charities shared information through meetings at the American Red Cross headquarters, daily conference calls, and electronic databases that allowed multiple organizations to access information about services provided to hurricane victims. Despite 

these efforts, some charities raised concerns about the usefulness of the conference 

calls and electronic databases for sharing information. For example, some charities 

said that daily conference calls after Katrina included too many organizations and 

did not provide the information they needed. There were also problems with providing charitable services to victims in some hard-to-reach areas. GAO teams in the 

field reported that American Red Cross did not provide relief in certain areas because of safety policies. In areas where the American Red Cross did not operate, 

GAO teams observed that other charities, such as the Salvation Army and smaller 

charities—often local churches—provided relief services. Although smaller organizations provided needed charitable services in the Gulf Coast region, some concerns 

have been raised about their ability to provide adequate services to victims. We will 

be reviewing this issue in more detail over the next several months. GAO is currently engaged in ongoing work on the coordination of charitable efforts in response 

to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and will further examine how effectively charities 

coordinated their responses to recent hurricanes. 

Background 

Charities are organizations established to serve broad public purposes, such as 

the needs of the poor or distressed and other social welfare issues. The Internal Revenue Service reported that for 2002, 501(c)(3) organizations, which include charities, 

had total assets of over $1.7 trillion. In 2004, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 

recognized 820,000 charities, accounting for about 90 percent of 501(c)(3) organizations.1 Charities can include organizations with missions such as helping the poor, 

22 

2For a list of National VOAD members, see appendix 1. 

advancing religion, educating the public, or providing disaster relief services. Although the Federal Government indirectly subsidizes charities through their tax-exempt status and by allowing individuals to deduct charitable contributions from 

their income taxes, the Federal Government has a fairly limited role in monitoring 

charities. States provide the primary oversight of charities through their attorneys 

general and charity offices. 

Charities’ Response to National Disasters 

Charities have historically played a large role in the nation’s response to disasters. For example, after the September 11 attacks, 35 of the nation’s larger charities—including the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army—collected almost 

$2.7 billion to provide food, shelter, mental health services, and other types of aid. 

Charities’ roles in responding to disasters can vary. Some charities, including the 

American Red Cross and the Salvation Army, are equipped to arrive at a disaster 

scene and provide immediate mass care, including food, shelter, and clothing, and 

in some circumstances, emergency financial assistance to affected persons. Other 

charities focus on providing longer-term assistance, such as job training, scholarships, or mental health counseling. In addition, new charities may form after disasters to address specific needs, such as the charities established after the September 

11 attacks to serve survivors of restaurant workers and firefighters. 

National Response Plan 

The U.S. Government’s National Response Plan provides a single, comprehensive 

framework for the federal response to domestic incidents, such as natural disasters 

and terrorist attacks. The plan provides the structure and mechanisms for the coordination of federal support to states and localities. Major cabinet and other federal 

agencies are signatories to the plan, along with the American Red Cross and the 

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (National VOAD), a national 

charity umbrella organization. The American Red Cross and National VOAD are the 

only nongovernmental organizations that signed the plan. In December 2004, the 

Department of Homeland Security released the plan, which was developed at the 

request of President Bush. The plan incorporates and replaces several previous 

plans for disaster management, including the Federal Response Plan, which was 

originally signed in 1992. One of the ways the plan changed the Federal Response 

Plan was by not naming charities active in disaster relief other than the American 

Red Cross, but instead incorporating them under the umbrella organization, National VOAD. 

The plan designates 15 Emergency Support Functions, each identifying a specific 

disaster response need as well as organizations that have key roles in helping meet 

those needs. The sixth Emergency Support Function, the function most relevant to 

charities involved in disaster relief, creates a working group of key federal agencies 

and charitable organizations to address: 

• mass care, including sheltering, feeding, and emergency first aid; 

• housing, both short- and long-term; and 

• human services, such as counseling, processing of benefits, and identifying support for persons with special needs. 

As a direct service provider, the American Red Cross feeds and shelters victims 

of disasters. In addition to fulfilling this role, the American Red Cross is responsible 

for coordinating federal efforts to address mass care, housing, and human services 

under Emergency Support Function 6 with FEMA. The American Red Cross is the 

only charity to serve as a primary agency under any Emergency Support Function. 

The plan gives the American Red Cross responsibility for coordinating federal mass 

care assistance in support of state and local efforts. The American Red Cross also 

has responsibilities under other Emergency Support Functions, such as providing 

counseling services and working with the Federal Government to distribute ice and 

water. FEMA’s responsibilities include convening regular meetings with key agencies and coordinating the transition of service delivery from mass care operations 

to long-term recovery activities, among other responsibilities. 

National VOAD, a membership organization composed of approximately 40 charities that provide services following disasters, is designated as a support agency 

under Emergency Support Function 6, but it does not provide direct services to victims.2 Rather, National VOAD is responsible for sharing information with its member organizations regarding the severity of the disaster, needs identified, and actions taken to address these needs. 

23 

3GAO, September 11: More Effective Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable Organizations’ 

Contributions in Disasters, GAO–03–259 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2002). 

Following September 11, GAO Reported That More Effective Collaboration 

Could Enhance Charities’ Contributions in Disasters 

Following September 11, GAO reported several lessons learned that could help 

charities enhance their response to future disasters.3 These included easing access 

to aid for eligible individuals, enhancing coordination among charities and between 

charities and FEMA, increasing attention to public education, and planning for future events. Further, GAO recommended that FEMA convene a working group to 

encourage charities involved in disaster response to integrate these lessons learned 

from the September 11 attacks. Following our report, seven of the largest disaster 

response charities, in partnership with FEMA, formed the Coordinated Assistance 

Network (CAN) to ease collaboration and facilitate data sharing. While the network 

databases are still largely in a pilot phase, both government and charity representatives have praised the potential of the network’s databases to improve collaboration. 

Lessons Learned from September 11 Could Improve Charities’ Response to Future 

Disasters 

• Easing access to aid for those eligible: We reported that charities could 

help survivors find out what assistance is available and ease their access to that 

aid through a central, easy-to-access clearinghouse of public and private assistance. We also suggested offering eligible survivors a case manager, as was done 

in New York City and in Washington, D.C., following September 11 to help to 

identify gaps in service and provide assistance over the long term. • Enhancing coordination among charities and with FEMA: We also found 

that private and public agencies could improve service delivery by coordinating, 

collaborating, sharing information with each other, and understanding each other’s roles and responsibilities. Collaborative working relationships are critical to 

the success of other strategies to ease access to aid or identify service gaps, such 

as creating a streamlined application process or a database of families of those 

killed and injured. • Increasing attention to public education: After September 11, we reported 

that charities could better educate the public about the disaster recovery services they provide and ensure accountability by more fully informing the public 

about how they are using donations. Charities could improve transparency by 

taking steps when collecting funds to more clearly specify the purposes of the 

funds raised, the different categories of people they plan to assist, the services 

they plan to provide, and how long the charity plans to provide assistance. • Planning for future events: Further, we reported that planning for how charities will respond to future disasters could aid the recovery process for individuals and communities. Although each disaster situation is unique, it could be 

useful for charities to develop an assistance plan to inform the public and guide 

the charities’ fundraising efforts. In addition, state and local emergency preparedness efforts could explicitly address the role of charities and charitable aid 

in future events. 

Charities Formed National Network to Improve Coordination 

GAO recommended that FEMA convene a working group to encourage charities 

involved in disaster response to integrate lessons learned from the September 11 attacks. After our report, FEMA encouraged charities to form a working group to 

share information following disasters, which became the Coordinated Assistance 

Network. The seven charities that formed CAN are the Alliance of Information and 

Referral Services, the American Red Cross, National VOAD, the Salvation Army, 9/ 

11 United Services Group, Safe Horizon, and the United Way of America. The group 

worked in partnership with FEMA to develop a database to share information between agencies. 

The CAN network addressed several of the lessons learned that GAO identified. 

To ease access to aid for those eligible, the network is designed to share client data, 

such as previous addresses, employment information, and FEMA identification numbers, between charities. CAN is intended to ensure that victims need only explain 

their circumstances once, rather than repeatedly to different service providers. To 

enhance coordination among charities and with FEMA, the CAN network is designed to make charities more aware of the services provided by one another and 

identify any gaps or redundancies in services. Last, to plan for future events, the 

CAN network intends to build partnerships or working relationships among disaster 

response charities before disasters strike. While the CAN network databases are 

still largely in pilot phase, both government and charity representatives have 

24 

4This sum is as of November 18, 2005. 

praised the database’s potential to improve collaboration and noted that it functioned well following the disasters, considering that it was not fully developed. 

Preliminary Observations of Charitable Organizations’ Operations Following the Gulf Coast Hurricanes 

Following the hurricanes, charities have raised more than $2.5 billion to assist in 

hurricane relief and recovery efforts. Many of the charities responding to the disaster have taken steps to coordinate with one another and with FEMA and other 

government agencies. For example, charities have shared information through daily 

conference calls and through electronic databases that allowed multiple organizations to access information about services provided to hurricane victims. Some charity representatives we spoke with praised the potential of these systems for sharing 

information, but also raised concerns that using these systems could be difficult at 

times. Charities also experienced problems in providing services to victims in some 

hard-to-reach areas. GAO teams that visited the Gulf Coast region in October 2005 

observed that in areas where the American Red Cross did not operate, other charities, such as the Salvation Army and smaller charities—often local churches—provided relief services. Although smaller organizations helped fill the gaps in charitable services in the Gulf Coast region, some concerns have been raised about their 

ability to provide adequate services to victims. 

Charities Have Raised More than $2.5 Billion Following the Gulf Coast Hurricanes 

Charities have raised more than $2.5 billion in cash donations in response to the 

Gulf Coast hurricanes, according to the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University.4 The center notes that this number is a low estimate, since it does not include 

direct giving to individuals, giving to smaller charities, or in-kind donations. As of 

November 18, the American Red Cross had raised more than $1.5 billion, more than 

half of all dollars raised. The Salvation Army raised the second-highest amount, 

$270 million, about 18 percent of the amount raised by the American Red Cross. 

The Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund and Catholic Charities were the next-largest fund 

raisers, each raising about $100 million. 

Charities Took Steps to Improve Coordination but Experienced Some Challenges 

Charities operating in the Gulf Coast region following the hurricanes coordinated 

services through the convening of major national disaster relief organizations at the 

American Red Cross headquarters, daily conference calls organized by National 

VOAD, and databases established by CAN. The usefulness of the daily conference 

calls, as well as the CAN databases, was questioned by some charity representatives. 

In the weeks following Hurricane Katrina, the American Red Cross organized a 

national operations center with representatives from FEMA and several major national charities, including the Southern Baptist Convention and the Salvation Army, 

at its headquarters in Washington, D.C. Because of the scale of the hurricane disaster and the large response needed, this was the first time the American Red Cross 

coordinated this type of national operations center following a disaster. This working group helped the major charities coordinate services on the ground by allowing 

for face-to-face interaction and ongoing communication, according to charity representatives and FEMA officials. 

To help fulfill its information-sharing role under Emergency Support Function 6, 

National VOAD organized daily conference calls with FEMA and other Federal Government representatives and its member organizations operating in the Gulf Coast 

region. National VOAD also invited nonmember charitable organizations that were 

providing relief to hurricane victims to participate in these calls, which sometimes 

included more than 40 organizations at once. During these calls, both the Federal 

Government and charities were able to provide information and answer questions 

about services provided, needs identified, and the organizations’ abilities to meet 

these needs. Representatives from charitable organizations told us that these calls 

were an effective way to coordinate the delivery of supplies among charities and 

help identify those regions that were most in need of charitable services. 

Charities were also able to share information through CAN databases. Following 

the hurricane disasters, CAN created a Web-based shelter registry that provided information about emergency shelters operating in the Gulf Coast region, including 

their capacity and operating status. CAN also activated the database of victim information, which at the time was being tested in six pilot communities. More than 40 

charities—all of whom must sign CAN participation agreements, including the 

American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and the United Way of America—were 

25 

able to access this database and input information about the services they provided 

to individual clients, according to CAN representatives. Charities could share information about these clients, who were required to sign privacy releases, through the 

Web-based database, thus reducing service duplication and the need for victims to 

give the same information to multiple organizations. 

Although charity representatives we interviewed reinforced the importance of the 

conference calls and the CAN databases, they also raised concerns about the usefulness of these systems. For example, some representatives were concerned the conference calls had too many participants. Because 40 or more charities might be participating in any one call, the calls often ran long or dealt with issues that may not 

have been of interest to the whole group, according to some charity officials. Additionally, charity representatives told us that call participants sometimes provided 

information that turned out to be inaccurate. 

Charity officials we spoke with were supportive of CAN and its mission, but they 

raised several concerns about the usefulness of its databases following the hurricane 

disasters. One concern that we heard from a few charities was that the CAN case 

management system is still in its developmental stages and was therefore not ready 

to be activated on such a large scale. Many volunteers had not received sufficient 

training on the system, and some of the technological glitches had not been completely resolved, according to charity representatives. In addition, representatives 

told us that the shelter database, which was developed soon after the hurricanes 

and had not been previously tested, may not have been ready for widespread use. 

In addition, some officials said that after Katrina there was neither electricity nor 

Internet access in certain locations, and as a result, the CAN databases could not 

always be used. Some officials stated that they needed to collect information in writing at the time of the disaster and then input the data into the system once they 

had Internet access—a task that was time-consuming and diverted resources from 

other needed areas. CAN officials responded that the CAN databases were created 

primarily for long-term recovery efforts, which would take place after electricity and 

Internet access were restored, rather than for short-term relief. 

Charity representatives also told us that daily conference calls and electronic 

databases helped with coordination efforts, but these systems were not as important 

to coordination efforts as pre-existing relationships. Several of the charities we 

spoke with stated that in order for charities to function efficiently following a disaster, they must have some sort of established working relationship with the other 

charities involved in disaster relief efforts. One charity representative told us that 

it is difficult to make introductions in the chaos of a disaster. He stressed that charities that operate in disasters should have memorandums of understanding signed 

before a disaster strikes—a practice used by many charities—so that they can immediately coordinate efforts in a disaster situation. 

Charities Struggled to Balance Access to Services with Concerns Regarding Safety 

of Service Providers and Victims 

GAO teams that visited the Gulf Coast in October 2005 observed that the American Red Cross did not provide relief in certain areas because of safety policies; and 

thus, other charities, such as the Salvation Army and smaller charities, often helped 

to meet the needs of those areas. The American Red Cross told us that with the 

American Society for Civil Engineers and FEMA, it had previously developed policies intended to protect the safety of service providers and victims following a disaster. These policies include not establishing shelters in areas that may become 

flooded during a disaster or in structures that strong winds may compromise. However, victims remained in areas where the American Red Cross would not establish 

shelters. Further, where the American Red Cross was able to establish shelters, the 

needs of victims sometimes exceeded the capacity of the American Red Cross, as this 

represented the largest response effort in American Red Cross history. GAO teams 

in Mississippi observed that the Salvation Army and smaller charities, such as local 

church organizations, filled many of the needs for volunteer services that the American Red Cross did not meet. Additionally, GAO teams estimated that in the Birmingham, Alabama, area, a significant portion of the approximately 7,000 evacuees 

were being cared for and sometimes being housed by local churches and their members. 

Although smaller organizations provided needed charitable services in the Gulf 

Coast region, some concerns have been raised about the organizations’ abilities to 

provide adequate services to victims. Some officials told us that the smaller organizations helped meet important needs, but many of the organizations had never operated in a disaster situation and may not have completely understood the situation. 

For example, officials told us that some of the small charities that placed children 

who were separated from their parents in homes did not retain sufficient informaVerDate Aug 31 2005 00:31 Apr 20, 2006 Jkt 026384 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\26384.XXX 26384
26 

tion about which children were placed where. This made it difficult to locate missing 

children. Other officials told us that some of the smaller organizations that tried to 

establish ‘‘tent cities’’ to house evacuees were not prepared to provide the water, 

sanitation, and electricity these types of shelters require. 

In closing, the devastation of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita once again challenged 

federal, state, and local governments and charitable organizations’ abilities to provide large-scale aid to hundreds of thousands of survivors. It also provided a critical 

opportunity to assess how the nation’s charities have incorporated lessons learned 

from responding to the September 11 tragedy. 

Our report on charitable organizations’ contributions after September 11 identified several lessons learned and made important recommendations for improving 

the delivery of charitable services after disasters. GAO’s ongoing work on the coordination of charitable efforts in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita will examine 

how these recommendations have been implemented and how effectively charities 

coordinated in response to recent hurricanes. Specifically, this upcoming report will 

address questions regarding the amount of money charities have raised to assist 

people affected by the hurricanes and how these funds have been used, how well 

charities are meeting their responsibilities under the National Response Plan, how 

well charities are coordinating their relief efforts, how people affected by the hurricanes have accessed charitable services and relief supplies and the challenges they 

encountered in dealing with charities, and what charities are doing to guard against 

fraud and abuse. This report will be released next year. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any 

questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time. 

Appendix I 

Members of National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster 

Adventist Community Services 

America’s Second Harvest 

American Baptist Men 

American Radio Relay League 

American Red Cross 

Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team 

Catholic Charities USA 

Center for International Disaster Information 

Christian Disaster Response International 

Christian Reformed World Relief Committee 

Church of the Brethren 

Church World Service 

Convoy of Hope 

Disaster Psychiatry Outreach 

Episcopal Relief and Development 

Friends Disaster Service, Inc. 

The Humane Society of the United States 

International Aid 

International Critical Incident Stress Foundation 

International Relief Friendship Foundation 

Lutheran Disaster Response 

Mennonite Disaster Service 

Mercy Medical Airlift 

National Emergency Response Teams 

National Organization for Victim Assistance 

Nazarene Disaster Response 

Northwest Medical Teams International 

The Points of Light Foundation 

Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) 

REACT International, Inc. 

The Salvation Army 

Society of St. Vincent de Paul 

Southern Baptist Convention 

United Church of Christ 

United Jewish Communities 

United Methodist Committee on Relief 

United Way of America 

Volunteers of America 

World Vision 

f 

27 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Thank you for your testimony and for 

making us all accountable. Mr. Becker, please. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH C. BECKER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 

FOR RESPONSE AND PREPAREDNESS, AMERICAN RED CROSS 

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman, my name is Joe Becker, and I head 

Red Cross disaster services. I continue to lead our organization’s 

response to Hurricane Katrina. I am delighted to be here, and I appreciate the opportunity to share with you our work for the survivors of the storm. The core mission of the American Red Cross 

is to provide relief to victims of disasters. We are volunteer-led and 

our services are delivered by volunteers. We do this through a network of 800 chapters throughout the country. We, like others, deal 

with the human side of disaster. To do that we partner with other 

nonprofit groups and organizations, and we partner with every 

level of government—local, State and Federal. Every day we respond to victims of disaster, from as small as a family whose house 

burns to as big as Katrina, and we help with the same needs. 

We shelter, which is to provide a safe place for people to stay 

during a hurricane and in the coming days after until they have 

a place to go. We feed. We feed the people in our shelters, and we 

feed in the community. We work with other nonprofits and faithbased groups in the larger disasters, who come forward to join that 

effort. We provide emergency financial assistance. We do this to 

provide for things like the next set of clothes for people who left 

home with very little. This is usually done now in the form of a 

debit card. We provide mental health counseling, and we connect 

families with loved ones who are missing. So, we shelter, we feed, 

and we provide for immediate emergency financial needs of people. 

For many years, the bar that we had set for hurricanes was Andrew. Then we had the four back-to-back storms last year, the sum 

of which was the largest Red Cross response ever. 

In every way of measuring, Katrina has dwarfed the sum of all 

four storms last year. We said early on in Katrina that the response would be bigger than the Red Cross alone—that it would 

take many Americans to respond. They did. 

We did run the shelters, as was described, about 1,100 in 27 

States and here in the District. We just closed our last Katrina 

shelter a little over a week ago. We closed our last Wilma shelter 

last night. We have fed over 50 million meals and snacks, and we 

are still feeding in the Gulf Coast at about 50,000 meals a day. 

We knew early on that there was a need for our financial assistance on a totally different scale. We didn’t have 73,000 families 

needing financial assistance, like we did last year in the sum of all 

four of those storms; we knew early on that we would have over 

1 million families requiring that assistance. We had to build entirely new ways to do that. 

We had very long lines. We had a lot of busy signals at the call 

centers that we created for the storm, but in a matter of weeks, we 

gave over 1.2 million families an average of about $1,000 per family. 

Last fall’s storms cost our organization about $130 million. We 

project that our response to these storms will cost us over $2 billion, and we continue to raise money to pay those bills. 

28 

About 220,000 Red Crossers have served so far. They slept in 

their trucks, they slept in the shelters, and they did good work. 

They volunteered because they care. 

However, there were things that we could have done better. 

After every major disaster, we conduct a top-to-bottom study 

with a critical eye, and our board is leading this study now. We intend to take the lessons we learned and work to get better. 

In my written testimony, I outlined some of our early areas of 

focus from the study. The response was bigger than the Red Cross. 

So, many organizations joined the effort, many new to the disaster 

work. We have a lot to be proud of, we have a lot to be thankful 

for, and we still have a lot to do. 

Thank you for allowing me to share with you today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Becker follows:] 

Statement of Joseph C. Becker, Senior Vice President, Preparedness and 

Response, American Red Cross 

Chairman Ramstad, Congressman Lewis, and Members of the Committees, thank 

you for providing me the opportunity to provide testimony on behalf of the American 

Red Cross. 

By any measure, this was the most significant level of human need the Red Cross 

has ever faced in its 125-year history, and it was our most challenging operation, 

too. The organization’s capacity to meet the needs of our citizens has never been 

tested in a magnitude such as that presented by Hurricane Katrina. In fact, it was 

nearly 20 times larger than anything we had ever faced before. 

I thank the Committee for holding this hearing today to address the ways the 

nonprofit sector responded to Hurricane Katrina. After each major disaster response 

is concluded, the American Red Cross carefully examines its response retroactively 

to determine what worked well. More importantly, we always try to identify areas 

where we could improve our response and operation in the future. 

There is much to be learned from this disaster—lessons that will help us improve 

our response to future disasters. However, I would like to state up front that given 

the remarkable demands that we faced, the entire nonprofit sector, supported by the 

incredible generosity of the American public, rose to the occasion and provided care 

and comfort to millions of people who had no place to turn. As the person responsible for directing the response on behalf of the Red Cross, I am extremely grateful 

to our sister organizations including the Salvation Army, the United Way, the 

Southern Baptists, Catholic Charities, the NAACP, the American Psychological Association, and myriad other voluntary agencies, large and small. The American public and our corporate donors were an integral element of our response, along with 

the more than 200,000 Red Cross volunteers who have given their time and talent 

so tirelessly. We could not do the work that we perform without all of this support 

and the support of Congress, and it is with my gratitude that I present this testimony before the Committee today. 

About the American Red Cross 

For more than 124 years, the mission of the American Red Cross has been to help 

Americans prevent, prepare for, and respond to emergencies. In 1905, Congress 

chartered the American Red Cross to provide a system of disaster response and to 

mitigate suffering caused by disaster. We continue to meet this mandate today. We 

have a long and proven track record of immediate response to major disasters, both 

natural and man made. In towns and cities across the United States, the American 

Red Cross has responded to more than 72,000 disasters in the past year, ranging 

from residential house fires to the devastating hurricanes that struck the Gulf 

Coast. At the same time, the Red Cross continues to aggressively prepare for the 

possibility of another terrorist attack on American soil, the threat of a pandemic flu 

and, of course, we share the unenviable task faced by all disaster response organizations of standing prepared to respond to novel and unexpected disasters that we 

may have never seen or imagined until the moment they strike. 

Governed by volunteers and supported by community donations, the Red Cross is 

a network of more than 800 chapters, eight regional service areas, and 35 Blood 

Services regions dedicated to saving lives. Comprising more than one million volunteers and more than 30,000 employees, the Red Cross trained nearly 11 million people in lifesaving skills during the past calendar year alone and keeps U.S. military 

29 

families connected worldwide. The Red Cross is the largest supplier of blood and 

blood products to more than 3,000 hospitals across the nation and also assists victims of international disasters and conflicts at locations worldwide. 

The Red Cross provides a unique community-based network to support all-hazard 

preparedness in your districts, to your constituents, each and every day. As an integral member of the first response community with expertise in meeting the human 

needs associated with disasters, we are integrated into state and local government 

agency disaster planning exercises and response efforts. We partner with local, 

state, and federal governments to provide emergency shelter, food, and health and 

mental health services as well as short-term financial assistance to address basic 

human needs. 

In addition, the Red Cross has the unique role of being the only nongovernmental 

organization assigned Primary Agency responsibilities under the National Response 

Plan (NRP). Upon activation of the NRP, the Red Cross serves as the Primary Agency under Emergency Support Function (ESF) #6, Mass Care (provision of food, shelter, emergency first aid, disaster welfare information, and bulk distribution of emergency relief items). The Red Cross also serves as a Support Agency to the Department of Health and Human Services for Public Health and Medical Services (ESF 

#8), providing blood in coordination with the American Association of Blood Banks 

(AABB) Inter-organizational Task Force on Domestic Disasters and Acts of Terrorism, mental health services, and disaster health services. In addition, we have 

undertaken an expanded function under the NRP within external affairs (ESF #15) 

to help disseminate accurate and timely information to those affected during an incident to help better protect themselves. Ultimately, our activities in the NRP focus 

on meeting the human needs associated with disasters. 

Response to Hurricane Katrina 

For the American Red Cross, and for the country, Hurricane Katrina is a watershed moment in our history. Hurricane Katrina produced human needs exceeding 

those presented by all previous natural disasters in this country, including the 

Johnstown Flood in 1882, the San Francisco Earthquake in 1906, the Spanish Flu 

epidemic in 1918, Hurricanes Camille and Andrew, or manmade events such as the 

Oklahoma City Bombings in 1995 and the tragedy of September 11, 2001. The needs 

created by Hurricane Katrina exceeded even those posed by the four back-to-back 

hurricanes last year. Each of these are major incidents that tested the organization 

and served as a benchmark moving forward. Now, Katrina will do the same. 

The moment the levees gave way in New Orleans, we knew that this response 

and recovery operation would test our capacity as an organization. Yet even as the 

waters rose and more people fled, none of us could have envisioned the sheer scale 

of the catastrophe. 

In order for me to put this in perspective, I want to spend just a moment looking 

back on Hurricane Season 2004. The State of Florida was slammed with four backto-back hurricanes. To date, it had been our largest response to a natural disaster. 

We provided 519,000 shelter nights, gave approximately 73,000 families financial 

assistance, and provided close to 16.5 million meals and snacks to victims and emergency workers. In the end, the organization spent roughly $130 million. 

Yet, all this pales in comparison to our response efforts for Katrina and Rita. In 

response to these two storms, the Red Cross has provided 3.42 million overnight 

stays in nearly 1,100 shelters across 27 states and the District of Columbia. We 

have given more than 1.2 million families emergency financial assistance. The Red 

Cross, in coordination with the Southern Baptist Convention, has served more than 

27.4 million hot meals and 25.2 million snacks to hurricane survivors to date. The 

Red Cross will spend in excess of $2 billion in our response to Hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita. 

But while the challenges were immense, and the circumstances were difficult, the 

Red Cross persisted, and continues to persist, because of our tireless volunteers. Almost 220,000 trained Red Cross disaster services workers from all 50 states, the 

District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have given their talents 

and time to respond to those in need because of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This 

may be the largest mobilization of Americans helping each other in our nation’s history. It is because of their selfless work that we have managed to do the work that 

we do. 

Even before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the American Red Cross was preparing for what proved to be the costliest storm in U.S. history. In addition to 

strongly urging coastal residents to take action by developing a family communication plan, making plans to evacuate, and preparing a disaster supply kit, the American Red Cross was also launching our largest mobilization effort in the organization’s 124-year history. 

30 

The American Red Cross mobilized on all fronts and moved before the storm hit. 

Local Red Cross chapters opened shelters for thousands of residents who heeded 

evacuation orders. Thousands of Red Cross staff and volunteers were pre-deployed 

to safe areas, waiting for the storm to pass so they could begin to respond to the 

needs following the threat. In addition, nearly the entire Red Cross fleet of emergency response vehicles (ERVs) was sent to the Gulf Coast before and just after 

landfall. We also pre-positioned mobile kitchens prepared to provide 500,000 meals 

a day, food and supplies, and necessary technology, and we rented 1,000 box trucks 

to feed and deliver supplies in communities. We knew this was going to be big. 

We set up shelters in Louisiana and surrounding states. As those affected were 

evacuated or fled to virtually every state, we mobilized our entire organization and 

extended our services across the nation. From California to Maine, our chapters 

sheltered, fed, counseled, and assisted the tens of thousands of evacuees relocated 

to distant places and worked with local communities to welcome them and meet 

their needs. 

And while we faced a number of challenges, our basic services were solid. As soon 

as the storm passed, we began to set up our feeding kitchens, opened additional 

shelters, and started to increase the services to provide immediate care for the survivors of Hurricane Katrina. With our partners, the Southern Baptists, we served 

300,000 meals on the third day of the response and peaked at 995,000 meals in a 

single day. The largest number of meals we had ever provided in a single day prior 

to this was 280,000, which was in response to the four hurricanes last year. 

Partnerships 

With 824 chapters nationwide, the Red Cross has an infrastructure that allows 

us to respond quickly to disasters. Similar to former House Speaker Tip O’Neill’s 

observation of politics, all disasters are local. It is at the community level that victims are sheltered, fed, provided with mental health counseling, and offered emergency financial assistance. However, even in small-scale disasters such as residential house fires, the American Red Cross does not respond alone. Partnerships are 

tantamount to our meeting our mission, and in chapters across the country, local 

partnerships help to ensure that those in need receive assistance. 

The importance of partnerships in disaster response cannot be overstated. Because of the scale and magnitude of this disaster, the American Red Cross early on 

called on all of its partners to provide assistance to those in need. The response to 

Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma required collaboration at every level of government, and full engagement of the entire charitable sector, the faith community, and 

the American public. 

There has never been a response that has required as much coordination among 

the nonprofit sector. From the start, the Red Cross coordinated efforts with other 

nongovernmental organizations at all levels. At our National Headquarters, a group 

of national service providers worked together for days to plan service delivery strategy. Red Crossers were busy in county and state emergency operations centers 

working with our partner organizations to coordinate response, logistics, resources, 

and staff. And on the ground, our chapters had partnerships in place to ensure that 

the local communities were responding in a collaborative manner. 

We also partnered around fundraising activities. We knew this response was 

going to involve the entire charitable sector, including the faith community. While 

the Red Cross does not provide direct funding to other charities, we wanted to do 

our part to ensure that their messages were received as well. For example, during 

the first week in October, representatives from the Salvation Army and the United 

Way joined us for a day-long donor trip in Gulfport and Biloxi led by our Red Cross 

Chairman, Bonnie McElveen-Hunter. Also participating were representatives from 

several major foundations, some of whom had requested an opportunity to meet 

with our nonprofit partners. 

One of the significant lessons learned is that partnerships are much more effective when formed well in advance of a disaster. Because of the enormity of the crisis 

and speed required in response, it is difficult for organizations new to the response 

environment to be quickly assimilated into county or parish planning and operations 

in the midst of responding to a disaster. The Red Cross has a number of agreements 

in place with other organizations that delineate roles and responsibilities when disaster strikes. During Hurricane Katrina, those partnerships worked and worked 

well. And while we have received some criticism from other NGOs for not coordinating with their organizations after Katrina made landfall, we seek out their partnership going forward. We are grateful for the work that all organizations did to 

respond to the millions of people in need, and that is why we recommended that 

the Federal government provide reimbursement to groups that stepped forward to 

provide sheltering and feeding operations. There is no ownership here—local charVerDate Aug 31 2005 00:31 Apr 20, 2006 Jkt 026384 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\26384.XXX 26384
31 

ities and the faith community performed vital and necessary work during this disaster. 

Diverse Communities 

The American Red Cross historically deals with the most vulnerable citizens in 

our society. Issues of poverty, race, physical and mental disability, and cultural differences are not new to our organization. It is an unfortunate fact that in our society, disasters have the most profound impact on the most vulnerable residents in 

communities. 

In an effort to learn how we can serve more effectively, we have already undergone some evaluation regarding coordination and partnerships, particularly among 

organizations that represent communities of color and the disabled. While we have 

made tremendous efforts to reach out to minority and disabled communities for volunteers, staff, and donors, we are acutely aware that there is much work to be done. 

Congressional Black Caucus Chairman Mel Watt and other Members of the CBC 

were among the first group of lawmakers we met with following Katrina’s landfall. 

We have worked with the Caucus in the past and knew how important they would 

be in keeping vital lines of communication open and guiding us as issues and challenges arose. The weekend following landfall, our President and CEO, Marty Evans, 

and Board of Governors member Gina Adams hosted a trip to Baton Rouge and 

Houston for Members of the Caucus to begin to challenge difficult issues. Our partnership with the CBC proved instrumental in easing tensions and addressing needs, 

and we thank them for their work and leadership through the entire response. We 

are also grateful to Reverend Jesse Jackson for his help in coordinating with the 

faith community. We met with Reverend Jackson, CBC leadership, and leaders in 

the faith community in Memphis to better coordinate efforts. Additionally, Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee was of tremendous help in coordinating sheltering efforts 

in Houston, where an estimated 250,000 hurricane survivors and evacuees were relocated. 

Challenges and Criticisms 

Hurricane Katrina was a disaster of epic proportions and posed unprecedented 

challenges. The affected area compares to the size of Great Britain, devastating the 

lives of among the most vulnerable people in America. Not only were there geographical challenges, there were severe socio-economic challenges. In so many circumstances, we were providing care for those who needed assistance even before 

they were affected by Katrina. 

Although American Red Cross services were available throughout the affected 

area on an enormous scale, we fell short of being universally present everywhere 

there was a need. Nevertheless, we moved as rapidly as possible to provide services 

in those areas that we could not immediately reach or, in some cases, were unaware 

of. 

We knew this was not going to be a traditional response. During traditional responses, the American Red Cross provides direct services, often door-to-door, to disaster victims. Red Crossers are among the first on the scene, providing shelter, 

meals, and helping local victims that cannot be reached by their loved ones. Yet this 

storm, and the response to it, was not traditional. 

Given the number of people in need, our response was geared toward places that 

we knew we could get to immediately and places where we knew people were congregated. It was our goal to reach the greatest number of people with the most possible speed. Throughout this process, Red Crossers endeavored to work with local 

community-based organizations and faith based groups to reach the most people. 

One of the hard truths about Katrina is that our country was not prepared. Of 

equal concern moving forward is that even with the devastation wrought by 

Katrina, a recent report released by Professor Paul C. Light of New York University 

indicates that Americans still do not feel compelled to prepare for disaster. This is 

a vexing challenge for those of us in disaster services. 

While there were many successful partnerships, there were also significant voids 

that needed to be filled. A large number of spontaneous shelters sprang up. Most 

were churches that opened their doors to provide shelter for those in need. Early 

on, we had difficulty learning of and coordinating efforts with these wonderful 

groups. 

There were a number of questions regarding why we did not re-enter the City of 

New Orleans. The American Red Cross of Southeast Louisiana, located in the City 

of New Orleans, heeded the evacuation order called for by local authorities. The 

chapter relocated to the town of Covington, located on the north side of Lake Pontchartrain. Our service delivery in New Orleans differed from that provided to other 

affected areas in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Under the Louisiana State 

32 

Plan, if a Category 3 or higher storm is headed for Louisiana, 23 parishes, including 

Orleans Parish, are to begin an evacuation inland. The inland parishes, in cooperation with state agencies and the American Red Cross, are to shelter evacuees from 

‘‘Risk Area Parishes,’’ as there are no shelter sites that meet hurricane safety criteria within Orleans Parish. In fact, it has been the policy of the Red Cross that 

there are no safe areas south of the I–10/I–12 corridor for a large scale hurricane. 

The Louisiana Plan, which makes no reference to the Red Cross operating shelters 

within the city, enumerates eight distinct shelter types, plus what is described as 

the ‘‘Refuge of Last Resort.’’ The Convention Center and the Superdome served as 

refuges of last resort. Under state plans, these facilities are to open when local authorities terminate an evacuation due to unsafe driving conditions. These facilities 

are not operated by the Red Cross. In practice, after the threat has passed, the Red 

Cross at times staffs shelters of last resort, providing services to people. We do not 

establish shelters in facilities that do not meet our criteria for safety during landfall. 

Consistent with state and local plans, and our practice in previous disasters, we 

were asked by state and federal officials not to enter New Orleans. While we were 

in constant communication with local and state authorities, it was not deemed safe 

for Red Cross personnel to re-enter the city of New Orleans. The Red Cross does 

not place our client evacuees, staff, volunteers, or resources in harm’s way. It is our 

practice to heed evacuation orders and assist those in need of shelter outside of 

high-risk areas. 

Additionally, it was the goal of local and state officials to fully evacuate the city 

of New Orleans after the storm passed. We were instructed by authorities that, in 

addition to issues of safety, if the Red Cross provided services to survivors within 

New Orleans, it would discourage people from heeding evacuation orders. At the direction of public officials, we entered New Orleans in a coordinated fashion to provide services at the earliest possible time. 

This was a difficult scenario for the Red Cross. Eighty percent of our local Red 

Cross staff in the Southeast Louisiana Chapter lost their homes to Katrina, yet 

while they themselves were victims, they desperately wanted to provide support to 

their neighbors in need, and to this day they continue to do so. We are still engaged 

in active operations in the city. 

Another Herculean challenge was getting financial assistance as quickly as possible to an unprecedented number of people who left their homes with little or nothing and in many cases would have no homes to which they could return. As stated 

previously, the largest number of families to which the Red Cross had ever provided 

assistance was approximately 73,000—those served during the four back-to-back 

hurricanes in 2004. By contrast, demographic and census information from the area 

affected by Katrina led us to estimate that more than one million families, most of 

whom were bereft of all of their traditional social support systems, would need financial assistance. 

The challenge of raising enough money to provide assistance to an estimated one 

million families was, frankly, daunting. Initial disaster assessments and demographic information led us to estimate that, with average assistance of about $1,000 

per family, we were facing financial assistance expenses of approximately $1 billion. 

We had to make the difficult determination whether we would—or could—provide 

this magnitude of financial assistance. Red Cross leadership, together with our 

Board of Governors, rapidly decided that the tremendous needs of the evacuees demanded that we act. Soon, it became clear that dollars were going out at a fast rate. 

We had to either suspend our emergency financial assistance or borrow funds. We 

chose to borrow the money—over $300 million—with the confidence that the American public would see our efforts as worthy and support the work we were doing. 

This has proven to be the case. 

The mechanisms for getting the financial assistance to the people who needed it 

without delay posed an additional set of challenges. During traditional responses, 

trained American Red Cross volunteers and staff, conduct disaster damage assessments, meet with survivors to determine their needs and provide assistance accordingly. We often do home visits to confirm damage and determine necessary assistance. This type of detailed assessment would clearly be impossible for many months 

after Katrina and Rita. We had to choose between two options: we could attempt 

to verify damage house by house and thereby delay assistance to those who so urgently needed it, or we could utilize the best information available regarding damaged areas and speed the provision of our assistance. By choosing the latter option, 

we knew that we ran the risk of putting assistance in the hands of potentially unscrupulous individuals not affected by the hurricanes; we concluded that it was a 

reasonable business risk and mitigated the risks as possible. We considered the 

need to help the vast numbers of families in desperate and legitimate need without 

33 

delay. Using satellite images and fly-over photographs, we determined specific ZIP 

codes where the devastation was obvious and began to disburse the maximum assistance to these families based on family size. It was our goal to get money in the 

hands of survivors as quickly as possible. The fact that fraudulent claims for assistance could occur was to be addressed with an aggressive ‘‘no tolerance’’ fraud enforcement policy which we discussed with federal and state law enforcement authorities. 

Another hurdle was the logistics of getting cash into the hands of so many people 

spread across so many states. Methods used in the past would not accommodate the 

unique aspects of this epic disaster. We set up an 800 number and call centers 

around the country and partnered with Western Union to provide immediate cash 

assistance. A critical moment came when we realized that it could take days and 

weeks to bring these systems up to a scale that could accommodate the number of 

families in need of assistance. That left us with another difficult choice: delay assistance to every disaster victim until we had the capacity to effectively serve them all, 

or proceed with the capacity we had, getting funds into the hands of thousands of 

families right away and working diligently to add to those numbers as quickly as 

we could scale up our systems. We chose to help those whom we could without 

delay, while striving to serve all who needed us. We sincerely regret that there were 

long lines and a lot of busy signals, but we believe that we made the right choice. 

In the six weeks following landfall, the Red Cross put over one billion donated dollars into the hands of families who desperately needed it without delay. 

Lessons Learned 

Hurricane Katrina’s raging winds and engulfing waters laid bare some hard 

truths. It is now a question of whether the American Red Cross, others in our sector, governments at all levels, and the American people will confront those truths 

and learn from them. Now, in the cold light of day and with a calmer atmosphere, 

we have a clearer picture of the impact of such an event on our society, the challenges inherent in a disaster of this magnitude, and the scope of need we must address. Over the course of the next several months we will continue our own top-tobottom internal review of our practices and our response to Katrina, and we will 

continue to build upon our lessons learned. However, I want to share with you some 

big-picture items that are front and center. 

First, we need to convene community leaders to expand our reach to respond 

where needed. Despite tremendous efforts by all, the scale of this disaster left our 

response uneven in some places. To ensure more effective efforts in the future will 

require the input and assistance of all organizations locally in communities across 

the nation now. It will require the diligence of all community stakeholders, including nonprofits, faith-based groups, elected officials, diverse organizations, and individuals to partake in a full assessment of community needs to ensure that every 

person in every community will be provided for should we confront a disaster like 

this again. 

Second, preparedness—training, planning, and drilling—must become a way of 

life for every man, woman and child in this country. For communities, particularly 

those prone to disaster, training operations must take place and, particularly when 

there is a need, the government must provide adequate funding to ensure that such 

training and planning operations can be realized. 

Third, we must also dedicate our attention to some larger public policy questions. 

For example, how much should we in the nonprofit sector—and the government— 

invest in our infrastructure to be ready to respond to the next catastrophic event 

when current funds are barely adequate for ongoing needs? How much money 

should we invest on an annual basis in a core capacity that we may not use for 10 

or 15 or 20 years? Systems must be maintained and upgraded over time, and there 

is a cost for contingent capacity that is not used on a day-to-day basis. How much 

of this cost can nonprofits bear? Will donors understand that a return on this kind 

of investment might not be seen for years? Even if they do, how much of this should 

fall on the backs of the American people who support our response efforts? 

Finally, there is the biggest challenge of all: preparedness. If we in America ever 

thought we were prepared to face a major catastrophic event, we were wrong. We 

have been operating under the assumption that what we have done in the past— 

how we respond to smaller disasters—would simply need to be scaled up if we faced 

a larger one. This is simply not the case. 

We need to do a better job engaging our nation’s citizens in preparing for disasters big and small. And this is no small feat. As we look back on Hurricane Katrina, 

I hope that we will do a better job of ensuring that those who live in harm’s way 

of disasters will better prepare their families, individually, for what may come their 

way. We need to focus our attention on all-hazards preparedness. There are simple 

34 

steps that every family can take to be safer and to ensure that if separated from 

their loved ones, they can reconnect. We need to convince every individual and family to make the effort to keep critical documents, medicines, and items they would 

need immediately in an emergency ready, keeping in mind that, unlike Hurricane 

Katrina, disasters often provide no warning at all. The American Red Cross has a 

‘‘Together We Prepare’’ program that calls for families, schools, or businesses to do 

five things: (1) Make a Plan, (2) Build a Kit, (3) Get Trained, (4) Volunteer, and 

(5) Give Blood. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are replete with stories of families trapped in attics 

who survived unimaginably harrowing ordeals because they had water or items on 

hand. But for each success story, there are also cases where families experienced 

trauma and loss. In many instances, the very fate of those separated from loved 

ones was completely unknown. With the existence of a simple emergency communication plan identifying a third party in a remote location for all members to call, 

the needless anxiety of knowing where their loved ones are could have been avoided 

by many who experienced this unspeakable anxiety. Preparedness plans work. 

Conclusion 

I started my presentation today by talking about the tremendous work of the nonprofit sector, our organization, and our staff and volunteers in response to Hurricane Katrina, and I would like to conclude my testimony along those lines as well. 

The devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina was worse than any worst-case scenario the Red Cross, or the Federal government, ever prepared for. How can the Red 

Cross, or any organization, respond successfully on a scale that is at least 20 times 

greater than it ever faced before? 

I think the answer can be found in the compassion, generosity, and commitment 

of the American people. This is the one consistent resource upon which our organization relies, and the one that enables us to rise to the challenge when needed. 

Our mission is to help people—people who find themselves on the receiving end 

of nature’s most indiscriminate and violent furies along with those impacted by the 

cruel and calculated actions of terrorists. Then there are the people who volunteer 

at the more than 800 Red Cross chapters across the country, those who give generously of their time, talents, blood, and money—including the 200,000 volunteers who 

put their own lives on hold for weeks this year to help the victims of the unusually 

severe hurricanes we have endured. There are the American people who time after 

time, disaster after disaster, sacrifice part of their financial security to provide for 

those who have lost their own. 

At the end of the day, the Red Cross and other charitable organizations, together 

with the tireless volunteers and donors who support these organizations, responded 

to the needs of their neighbors in never-before-seen ways. There were challenges, 

and there are voids that need to be filled and problems that need to be fixed. But 

the compassion and humanity shown by Americans around this country to open 

their arms and provide comfort to those in need is unparalleled. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lewis, Members of the Committee, I am proud of the work 

of the American Red Cross—I am proud of the way Americans came to the aid of 

their neighbors in need. And while Katrina will go down as the largest natural disaster to hit our American soil to date, she could not break the will and compassion 

of the American public. 

Thank you again for providing me the opportunity to testify today. I would be 

happy to answer any questions you may have. 

f 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Thank you, Mr. Becker. Major Hawks, 

please. 

STATEMENT OF MAJOR TODD HAWKS, PUBLIC AFFAIRS SECRETARY AND ASSOCIATE NATIONAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT SECRETARY, SALVATION ARMY 

OF AMERICA 

Major HAWKS. Mr. Chairman, the Salvation Army is a part of 

the Universal Christian Church. Our mission, our fundamental 

purpose is to provide aid and comfort without discrimination to 

those in need. Services are delivered by 3,600 uniformed officers, 

35 

132,000 soldiers and adherents, 65,000 employees, and by about 3.5 

million volunteers. 

Our workers have a firsthand knowledge of their individual communities, and they are on site when a disaster strikes. We have a 

decentralized infrastructure that allows us to respond to a disaster 

very quickly and on a large scale. In essence, the Salvation Army 

operations are driven at the local level and communicated upward. 

Indeed, the role of the national headquarters is to support local effort. 

Our disaster response services are a small part of our work. Each 

day of the year we are serving the poor, the hungry and the homeless, and the forgotten, people’s lives who are in profound crisis. 

Our primary objective is to give people hope. 

The Salvation Army has been at the site of every major disaster 

in America for more than a century, and we have developed the following areas of expertise: mass feeding to survivors and emergency 

responders, sheltering survivors while attending to their emergency 

needs, providing social service assistance, both immediate and long 

term. Knowing that no single charitable organization is capable of 

providing the full range of disaster response services, the Salvation 

Army has entered into memorandums of understanding with both 

faith-based and secular organizations, including FEMA and the 

American Red Cross. 

Despite our sizable footprint, established role in responding to 

disasters, and the history of collaborating with other organizations, 

the Salvation Army is not mentioned in the National Response 

Plan. We are concerned about that. Since we are not mentioned in 

the plan, we may be precluded from having access to key local, 

State, and Federal officials. 

In Louisiana, for example, the Army was represented by an 

interagency volunteer and wasn’t permitted to have a liaison officer 

in the State’s Emergency Operation Center. As a result, we had to 

obtain critical information secondhand. In the immediate aftermath 

of Katrina, we were and still are focused on providing life-sustaining commodities. Within hours after the storm had passed, we 

moved 72 mobile feeding units into the affected areas. In some 

areas, we presented the first opportunities for survivors to obtain 

water and food. 

To date, the Army has deployed 178 mobile feeding units and 

served more than 12 million meals and snacks to survivors and 

first responders. We have also distributed more than 150 cleaning 

kits, hygiene kits, and almost 200,000 boxes of groceries. Because 

of the overwhelming need, the Army opened 225 shelters that 

house more than 31,000 people. As always, the Salvation Army provides emotional and spiritual comfort to disaster survivors and 

emergency workers. 

At some point the nature of our services will change from the immediate life-sustaining service to long-term recovery services. The 

Army employs case management to help people get their lives back 

to normal. We sit down with each family and we determine the social services they need. Some of these clients are referred by other 

organizations because they present particularly challenging problems and the Army is well equipped to help the most 

36 

disenfranchised members of our society. At this time we are assisting more than 269,000 people through case management. 

The Salvation Army is also involved in the reconstruction of communities. Typically, we act in partnership with other organizations 

to achieve our reconstruction goals. For example, Biloxi, the Salvation Army is building a volunteer village for reconstruction teams. 

I want to make one final point about disaster services provided 

by the Army. We do not come into a community, help out for a few 

weeks, and then leave. We don’t make exit plans because we live 

in those communities. Our presence is permanent. If Congress is 

inclined to make changes in the Federal Government’s disaster response protocols, then the Salvation Army has identified four items 

for your consideration. 

First, the Salvation Army should be explicitly mentioned in the 

National Response Plan as a support agency. 

Secondly, if the Federal Government is going to rely upon NGOs 

to deliver disaster services, then standardized training is needed, 

especially for new entrants in the disaster services field. All NGOs 

must understand the government’s emergency management systems and the language of those systems. 

Thirdly, people and corporations send unwanted items to disaster 

sites. Their motivation is laudable, but the arrival of unsolicited, in 

kind contributions is problematic. The Federal Government could 

help to channel the generosity of the American people through public education. 

Finally, any government policy that makes it more difficult for 

potential donors to contribute will impact our ability to deliver 

services. Therefore, we ask Congress to make it as easy as possible 

for donors to contribute to charitable organizations. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Major Hawks follows:] 

Statement of Major Todd Hawks, Public Affairs Secretary and Associate 

National Community Relations and Development Secretary, Salvation 

Army of America 

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. 

The Salvation Army 

Mr. Chairman, The Salvation Army is a part of the Universal Christian Church. 

Our mission—our fundamental purpose—is to provide aid and comfort, without discrimination, to those in need. 

We are active across the country. Indeed, the Army has a presence in nearly every 

zipcode in the United States. 

Services are delivered by 3,600 uniformed officers, 132,000 soldiers and adherents, 

65,000 employees, and by the three-and-a-half million Americans who volunteer 

their time, energy, and compassion to those in need. 

More importantly, our people live and work in the communities that they serve. 

This is an important point when discussing The Salvation Army’s disaster response 

activities, and I’d like to elaborate on it for a moment. 

Our officers, staff and volunteers have first-hand knowledge of their individual 

communities and they are on-site when a disaster strikes. Not only does the Army 

have people spread out across the country, we have buildings and equipment in 

those communities too. In short, Mr. Chairman, we have a decentralized infrastructure, and that decentralized infrastructure is the single most important factor in our 

ability to respond to a disaster very quickly and on a large scale. 

Given this organizational structure, it isn’t surprising that The Salvation Army’s 

operations are driven at the local level and communicated upward. We don’t mobiVerDate Aug 31 2005 00:31 Apr 20, 2006 Jkt 026384 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\26384.XXX 26384
37 

lize through directives issued at the National Headquarters. Indeed, the job of the 

National Headquarters is to make resources and contacts available to the local level. 

Despite today’s focus on the Army’s disaster response efforts, it should be noted 

that our disaster response services are a small part of our work. Each and every 

day of the year, we are serving the poor, the hungry, the homeless, the forgotten— 

people whose lives generally are in profound crisis. Our primary objective is to give 

people hope where all may seem lost. Last year, we delivered hope to some 34 million Americans through our core social services that include programs providing 

help to the drug addicted, the homeless, abused women, low income seniors and atrisk youth. Most of this work is performed beyond the spotlight of television cameras. 

Of course, we are also moved, by our faith, to provide for those who have been 

stripped of shelter and sustenance by a disaster. I would stress that these are ancillary services and the numbers bear out that fact. In comparison to the 34 million 

Americans who received help from our core social services programs last year, we 

assisted 4 million disaster victims during that time. 

Role in Disaster Response: The Salvation Army has been at the site of every 

major natural disaster in America for more than a century, and we have developed 

the following areas of expertise in disaster response: 

• Mass feeding to survivors and emergency responders immediately after the disaster has occurred; 

• Sheltering those affected while we tend to their spiritual and emotional needs 

in the immediate aftermath of the disaster; and then, 

• The continuation of social service assistance to ensure that the survivors have 

the means necessary to move back into some semblance of the routine they 

knew before disaster struck. 

As you are well aware, The Salvation Army was not the only charitable organization to respond when Hurricane Katrina struck. This is not an unusual situation; 

there are several charitable organizations, including The Salvation Army, that routinely provide assistance to disaster victims. Each of these organizations is known 

among the disaster response community for having a particular set of skills or assets to bring to bear on a particular disaster. 

Let me be clear on this point: I do not know of any single charitable organization 

that, on its own, is capable of providing the full range of disaster response services 

that are usually required to put communities back on their feet. As a result, charitable organizations routinely coordinate their activities with one another as well as 

with official government emergency management agencies. The Salvation Army, for 

example, has entered into Memorandums of Understanding with both secular and 

faith-based organizations, including FEMA, the American Red Cross, and several 

other groups. 

Role in the National Response Plan: Despite our sizable footprint, established 

role in responding to disasters, and history of collaborating with other organizations, 

The Salvation Army is not mentioned in the National Response Plan. Omitting the 

Army at the national level has implications for disaster response coordination at the 

state and local levels. 

Many states and municipalities have tailored their emergency response plans 

after the National Response Plan, and because the Army was left out of the federal 

plan we now find that we are often without a seat at the table at the state and 

local level during disasters. In Louisiana, for example, the Army wasn’t permitted 

to have a liaison officer in the state’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC). 

As a result, we had to obtain critical information second-hand through Voluntary 

Organizations Active in a Disaster (VOAD)—if we received the information at all. 

This is an untenable situation. In order to deliver our disaster services effectively 

and efficiently, our local partner must always be the emergency management personnel, and that means inclusion in their disaster response plans. 

Another implication of the Army’s lack of a seat in the EOC is that we did not 

have an opportunity to forge relationships with the other organizations present— 

relationships that might have produced a partnership to deliver disaster services 

more efficiently, expeditiously, or on a larger scale. 

With this general portrait of The Salvation Army in mind, I’d like to move on to 

review the specific services we offer in times of disaster. 

Being Prepared 

Some disasters occur without any warning. We prepare for such disasters by educating and training our response personnel. 

38 

First and foremost, we train under the Incident Command System. This is a management system designed specifically to help first responders manage a critical incident. We’ve adopted this system. 

In addition, the Army has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the 

International Critical Incident Stress Foundation, which is the leading trainer for 

first responders in stress management. The Foundation teaches relief workers how 

to help survivors deal with stress and how to manage their own stress while working in a disaster site. 

These two programs are the keystones of our training. 

In addition, The Salvation Army conducts additional disaster response training 

for our own staffs as well as those from other organizations. Earlier this year, for 

example, The Salvation Army conducted a week-long training conference for nonprofit organizations in which 750 people received training to prepare their organizations and communities to respond to a man-made or natural disaster. 

Sometimes we have an opportunity to make additional preparations. Weather 

events such as hurricanes typically give disaster response organizations a few days 

to prepare, and that is just what we do. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, we staged 

personnel and equipment in the states adjacent to the primary strike zone. Specifically, we: 

• Loaded meals on 72 mobile canteens, each capable of providing 5,000 hot meals 

per day, and two 54-foot mobile kitchens, each capable of providing 20,000 hot 

meals per day. We intended to dispatch these mobile feeding units into those 

geographic areas determined by FEMA to be the hardest hit, and to dispatch 

additional units as needed. 

• Mobilized 200 officers, employees, and volunteers to man these mobile kitchens. 

• Prepared to dispatch portable shower units, trucks transformed into 1-stop 

shops called comfort stations, and emergency response command stations for officers to direct the response efforts. 

Delivering Life-Sustaining Commodities 

In the immediate aftermath of Katrina, we were—and still are—focused on providing life-sustaining commodities—namely food and water. To use the language of 

the emergency management community, we were operating in the ‘‘response phase.’’ 

Mass Feeding: We moved our mobile feeding units into New Orleans, Biloxi, 

Gulfport, Mobile and numerous other affected communities within hours after the 

storm had passed. In some areas, we presented the first opportunity for survivors 

to obtain food and water. 

As the scope and scale of the damage became apparent, we deployed additional 

resources to the region: 

• The number of mobile canteens rose from 72 to 178. 

• The number of field kitchens deployed rose from 2 to 11. I should note that 

eight of the nine additional field kitchens belonged to the Southern Baptists and 

that they were deployed under a cooperative MOU between the Army and the 

Southern Baptists. 

Since Katrina struck, The Salvation Army has served more than 5 million hot 

meals and more than 7 million sandwiches and snacks to survivors and first responders. 

We have also distributed more than 150,000 cleaning kits and almost 200,000 

boxes of groceries. 

Shelter: Although sheltering disaster victims is not our primary activity, The Salvation Army does provide shelter for storm victims. At the height of the initial response, the Army was operating 225 shelters which were housing more than 31,000 

people. Since then, many of these people have moved on to temporary quarters. In 

some cases, the Army is helping with rent payments and other shelter-related 

needs. 

Emotional and Spiritual Care: The Salvation Army provides emotional and 

spiritual comfort to disaster victims and emergency workers coping with the stress 

of a disaster. This practices dates from the hurricane that devastated Galveston, 

Texas, a century ago. At the sites of the Oklahoma City bombing and the World 

Trade Center, one of the most critical missions of the Army was counseling firefighters, police, and morgue workers who were struggling with the enormity of the 

tragedies. We are providing this care now, to both those who have remained in the 

Gulf region and to those who have been moved to other communities across the 

country. 

39 

Ultimately Assisting with Long-Term Recovery 

At some point in the process of responding, the nature of our services will change 

from life-sustaining services to recovery services. Typically at this stage—we’re now 

at Day #101—the Army is usually operating in what is known as a ‘‘recovery 

phase.’’ That means we’re helping people put their lives back to normal. 

The Army employs case management to help people get their lives back to normal. 

We sit down with each family to determine what social services they need. Some 

of these clients will have been referred by other organizations because they present 

particularly challenging problems and the Army is well-equipped to help the most 

disenfranchised members of our society. At this time, we’re assisting more than 

269,000 people through case management. 

These social services are the muscle, if you will, that allows the Army to make 

a lasting contribution to impacted communities. 

The Salvation Army is also involved in the reconstruction of communities. We are 

conscious of the need to rebuild a community’s economic infrastructure, so that people can return to work. Typically, we act in partnership with other organizations 

to achieve our reconstruction goals. For example, if there is a need for new housing, 

then the Army might pay for the lumber. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to make one final point about the disaster services provided 

by the Army: we don’t come into a community, help out for a few weeks, and then 

leave. We don’t make exit plans because we live in those communities. Our presence 

is permanent. 

Thoughts and Observations on Katrina Response 

Congress is obviously and rightly concerned about the quality of the preparations 

for and response to Hurricane Katrina. 

From our perspective, the services that were needed by Gulf Coast residents were 

no different than those provided to other victims of earlier hurricanes. The crucial 

differences between the response to Katrina and earlier hurricanes were the geographic scope of the disaster, the scale of the damage, and the multiple types of disasters triggered by a single event. 

Some special circumstances did arise in New Orleans. There, the conditions under 

which we delivered our services were somewhat different from those of other hurricanes in two respects. 

First, there was toxic material present and our relief workers had to take precautions to protect themselves. Moreover, this delayed the movement of personnel 

into the area by a few days. 

The second complication was civil unrest. The Salvation Army will draw a line 

in the sand with respect to service delivery when a situation is simply too dangerous. 

How Congress Can Help 

If Congress is inclined to make changes in the Federal Government’s disaster response protocols, then The Salvation Army has identified four items that we would 

like you to consider. 

National Response Plan 

The Salvation Army should be explicitly mentioned in the National Response Plan 

as a support agency, similar to VOAD. Inclusion in the federal disaster response 

plan would clarify our role to state and local governments and, in our opinion, help 

the Army to more effectively deliver our services. 

Training for NGOs 

If the Federal Government is going to rely upon tax exempt organizations and 

other NGOs to deliver disaster services, then standardized training is needed because all of the NGOs—especially the new entrants in the disaster services field— 

must understand the government’s emergency management systems and the language of those systems. 

We believe that FEMA should take the lead role in providing this training. In 

fact, FEMA already provides some of this training through the National Emergency 

Training Center in Emmitsburg, Maryland. 

Public Education 

Just as there are roles for government and charitable organizations in disaster 

response, there is also a role for people who are moved to help in some way. 

All too frequently, people and corporations will send unwanted items to a disaster 

site. Their motivation is laudable, but the arrival of unsolicited in-kind contributions 

at a disaster site is problematic. Volunteers have to be diverted from feeding and 

40 

directly assisting victims to sort through truckloads of miscellaneous clothes and 

other un-needed items. Further, storage space in a disaster is scarce. 

Likewise, the unexpected arrival of unsolicited and untrained volunteers is also 

problematic. 

I don’t want to sound cold, but the simple truth of the matter is that the best 

response is to send cash and stay out of the disaster zone, particularly when personal safety and health are at risk. 

The Federal Government could help to channel the generosity of the American 

people through public service announcements or by making prominent statements 

to that effect at the time of a disaster. 

Tax Policy 

Donors make it possible for The Salvation Army to respond to a disaster, and they 

play an essential role in the delivery of services to those in need. To date, the Army 

has received $295 million for hurricane relief efforts in the affected areas and to assist the evacuees from coast to coast. 

Obviously, there is a direct correlation between the generosity of donors and the 

extent of the Army’s ability to help people in crisis. 

Consequently, any government policy that makes it more difficult for potential donors to contribute will impact our ability to deliver services. Therefore, we ask that 

Congress make it as easy as possible for donors to contribute to charitable organizations. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony and I look forward to your questions. 

f 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Thank you, Major Hawks. Mr. Davies, 

please. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN G. DAVIES, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, BATON ROUGE AREA FOUNDATION 

Mr. DAVIES. My name is John Davies. I’m the President and 

CEO of the Baton Rouge Area Foundation, a community foundation 

serving the capital region of Louisiana. Because of our size and location and prior activities, the Baton Rouge Area Foundation was 

positioned to be significantly responsive to the challenges brought 

about by the two hurricanes that devastated our State. 

It is important to understand that after the storm Baton Rouge 

became the center of activity regarding both the displaced population from south Louisiana and the reconstruction effort. The 

Foundation was in the midst of the relief effort. As a result, our 

staff arrived at several conclusions about our experience, and we 

would like to present those to you in the hopes that they might be 

instructive. 

The first is that the lack of coordination among large NGOs, local 

charities, local, State, Federal agencies was a huge impediment to 

service delivery. For the first 3 weeks there was no coherent way 

for relief organizations to coordinate their efforts to ensure complete service coverage and effective response. 

Second, within the independent sector, there was a yawning gap 

of communication between the large multinational NGOs and the 

local organizations. Logically, large charities who work on the 

international scene know how each other works and understand 

each other’s role in disaster relief. Local organizations, at least in 

our case, were unfamiliar with disaster practices and were on a 

steep and costly learning curve. There was no significant awareness among local organizations of what the national organizations 

were doing, and vice versa. 

41 

The Red Cross response felt to us like it was a first time event 

for the Red Cross. There was a wide range of competency and experience among Red Cross staff, and that affected the capacity of 

local charities and volunteers to quickly and properly plug into the 

Red Cross system. Further, several professionals from different 

international NGOs commented that the International Red Cross 

protocols and practices were different from those of the national 

Red Cross. This too led to confusion in the early stages of the relief. 

Fourth, there was a clear dichotomy between the two types of 

shelters: The Red Cross shelters, of which there were up to five in 

the greater Baton Rouge area during the storm, and the non-Red 

Cross shelter that grew to 70 in the area. The various designations 

of Red Cross shelters and non defines the lack of communication 

and collaboration between the two groups. The Foundation focused 

on supporting the latter, primarily faith-based organizations in our 

greater community, that had very quickly responded to the human 

crises by opening their churches and buildings to become shelters. 

In our estimation, the faith-based shelters were hugely important 

to our community’s capacity to absorb the volume of displaced people that it did. 

Fifth, the 211 charitable resource phone call line is critical in 

these situations. The Foundation was inundated by generous people from all over the country who wanted to contribute important 

gifts in-kind: the use of private jets, the use of complete fleets of 

trucks, helicopters, offers of free hotel rooms, offers of free housing 

and apartments, et cetera. For the first 2 weeks after the storm, 

there was no effective 211 system. It had been overwhelmed, and 

it took us time, way too much time, to get it up to capacity to handle the volume of calls and to connect the resources from generous 

people to those in need. 

The Foundation hopes that lessons are learned from the experiences of Katrina so that we do not have to relive the scenarios in 

other disasters, and we are grateful to the Subcommittee on Oversight for holding the hearings so that we can gather information 

that may reduce the anguish, pain, and suffering of those who are 

affected by crises in the future. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Davies follows:] 

Statement of John G. Davies, President and Chief Executive Officer, Baton 

Rouge Area Foundation, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 

Ladies and Gentlemen, my name is John Davies and I am the President and CEO 

of the Baton Rouge Area Foundation, a community foundation serving the capital 

region of Louisiana. Louisiana has five community foundations that serve the state. 

The three community foundations that responded most directly to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita, were the Community Foundation of Acadiana in Lafayette, the 

Greater New Orleans Foundation, and us. The Baton Rouge Area Foundation, the 

largest of the community foundations in Louisiana, has approximately 25 full time 

employees and almost $400 million in assets. The Greater New Orleans Foundation 

is the second largest community foundation in the state with approximately $110 

million in assets and seven employees. The other three foundations have less than 

$50 million each in assets and small staffs. 

Because of our size, location, and prior activities, the Baton Rouge Area Foundation was positioned to be significantly responsive to the challenges brought about 

by the two hurricanes that devastated our state. We immediately launched two 

Katrina Funds, one to address the challenges faced by the displaced population from 

south Louisiana living in the greater Baton Rouge area. The second fund, which we 

launched as a proxy for the Greater New Orleans Foundation, was intended to help 

rebuild the civic structures of the greater New Orleans area. We launched the secVerDate Aug 31 2005 00:31 Apr 20, 2006 Jkt 026384 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\26384.XXX 26384
42 

ond fund rather than our colleagues in New Orleans because they were displaced 

themselves. Two of the seven employees of the Greater New Orleans Foundation 

lost everything except for what they wore as they left the city. All of them had to 

seek other housing arrangements, in many cases with difficult logistics. 

It is important to understand that after the storm, Baton Rouge became the center of activity regarding both the displaced population from south Louisiana and the 

reconstruction effort. Most critical civic offices from New Orleans such as the Chamber, the Community Foundation and United Way moved into temporary offices in 

Baton Rouge, and many businesses from that region did the same. Baton Rouge developed as a central meeting site to discuss both the immediate response to victims 

and the longer term reconstruction issues. The Baton Rouge Area Foundation became one of those locations. For several months, we housed the International Rescue Committee, the Governor’s Louisiana Family Recovery Corporation, the Greater 

New Orleans Foundation and Greater New Orleans, Inc. 

The funds that we launched under Foundations For Recovery.org, a website that 

contains significant information about our fundraising success and the disposition 

of the funds that we have raised, has reached almost $27 million from all 50 states, 

the Virgin Islands, and 26 foreign countries. Of that amount over $12 million has 

been contributed to the Hurricane Katrina Displaced Residents Fund and $4.6 has 

been contributed to the Hurricane Katrina New Orleans Recovery Fund. 

Remembering that south Louisiana had evacuated into Baton Rouge and across 

the country, with Baton Rouge serving as the center of activity, the Baton Rouge 

Area Foundation was in the midst of all the relief efforts. We arrived at several conclusions about our experience, and we present those in hopes that they might be 

instructive for future responses to disasters. 

1. The lack of coordination among large Non-Governmental Organizations 

(NGO’s), local charities, local, state and federal agencies was a huge impediment to service delivery. For the first three weeks post-Katrina, there was no 

coherent way for the relief organizations to coordinate their efforts to ensure 

complete service coverage and effective response. 

2. Within the independent sector there was a significant gap of communication 

between the large, multinational NGO’s and local organizations. Logically, 

large charities who work on the international scene know each other and understand each other’s role in disaster relief. Local organizations, at least in our 

case, were unfamiliar with disaster practices and were on a steep and costly 

learning curve. There was no significant awareness among the local organizations of what the national organizations were doing and vice versa. 

3. The Red Cross response, though critical to whatever success we have had in 

responding to the challenges of the displaced residents, felt to us like it was 

a first time event for the Red Cross. There was widely varying degrees of competency and experience among Red Cross staff, and that affected the capacity 

of local charities whose service could have been most helpful to quickly and 

properly plug into the Red Cross system. Further, several professionals from 

different international NGO’s commented that the International Red Cross protocols and practices were different from those of the National Red Cross. This, 

too, led to some confusion in the early stages of the relief effort. 

4. Again, in the area of communications, there was a clear dichotomy between 

two types of shelters: the Red Cross shelters, of which there were up to five 

in the greater Baton Rouge area during the storm, and the non-Red Cross shelters that grew up to seventy in the area. The very designation of Red Cross 

and non-Red Cross shelters defines the lack of communication and collaboration between the two groups. The Foundation focused heavily on supporting 

the faith-based organizations in our greater community who had very quickly 

responded to the human crises by opening their churches and buildings to become shelters. In our estimation, the faith-based shelters were hugely important to our community’s capacity to absorb the volume of displaced people that 

it did. 

5. The 211 charitable services call line is immensely important in these situations. The Foundation was inundated by immensely generous people from all 

over the country who wanted to contribute important gifts in-kind—the use of 

private jets, the use of complete fleets of trucks, helicopters, offers of free hotel 

rooms, offers of free housing and apartments, etcetera. For the first two weeks 

after the storm, there was no effective 211 system. It had been overwhelmed, 

and it took us time—too much time—to get it up to the capacity to handle the 

volume of calls and to connect the resources from generous people to those in 

need. It seems reasonable that communities should focus time and energy on 

43 

ensuring that their 211 system has the capacity to serve them in times of crisis. 

The Baton Rouge Area Foundation made a few correct and important assessments 

early. The day after the storm, we analogized our situation with Banda Aceh and 

not 9/11. That led us to invite the International Rescue Committee to come to Baton 

Rouge for the first domestic deployment in their history. In their first day onsite, 

which was during the first week post-Katrina, they told us that the major issues 

we would face would be the coordination of service resources and the management 

of information. Almost a month later, in chaos, we finally developed systems to deal 

with the coordination of resources—but it took us a precious month. The staff of the 

Baton Rouge Area Foundation hopes that lessons are learned from the experiences 

of Katrina so that we do not relive these scenarios in other disasters. There must 

be better ways to quickly develop systems into which service providers can plug in 

so that their valuable services can be put to work right away. Additionally, there 

must be a centralized communication system that allows both the victims of the crisis and the service providers a reasonably current and reliable status report of relief 

efforts. 

The Foundation is grateful to the Subcommittee on Oversight for holding this 

hearing so that we can gather information that may reduce the anguish, pain and 

suffering of others who are affected by crises in the future. 

f 

Chairman RAMSTAD. I want to thank all four members of this 

panel for your very helpful testimony. I would like to ask of you, 

Mr. Becker, and let me first say I think it is nothing short of miraculous that the Red Cross has already distributed $1.3 billion in financial assistance to Katrina evacuees. Believe me, as a former 

board member of my local American Red Cross chapter in Minnesota, I appreciate all the good work that the Red Cross does, and 

certainly we are not here to point fingers, but to work with you in 

a collaborative way and the other organizations represented on the 

panels here today to do things better and to correct some mistakes 

that have been made. 

Obviously, in a disaster, an epic disaster of these proportions, nobody could totally and accurately make all contingency plans, and 

we understand that. Again, we appreciate your cooperation. We are 

trying to figure out how we can avoid some of the mistakes that 

were made, how we can cut down on waste and fraud like we are 

trying to do as Members of Congress every day with respect to the 

Federal Government. 

I know the Red Cross is under pressure in a disaster like this, 

under immense pressure, to get cash out to people who need it. As 

I said already, you have distributed $1.3 billion in cash. At the 

same time, it is discouraging to donors to read about cases where 

there is fraud or waste, money going to people who really are not 

victimized, who have minimal or little damage. 

I cited in my opening statement the experience in Hinds County, 

Mississippi, in Jackson, Mississippi, which was written up in The 

New York Times, where initially all residents of the county were 

receiving cash assistance. At midcourse, I understand, the Red 

Cross corrected the policy or changed the policy, so that damage assessments were required before the residents of that county could 

receive cash. 

First of all, I understand, in a hurricane like that there are not 

too many insurance adjusters or others around to make those kinds 

of assessments, before getting cash assistance, which is usually imminently needed and desperately needed. 

44 

How is, if at all, the Red Cross changing its policy consistent 

with what happened in Hinds County, Mississippi? 

Mr. BECKER. Our policy has always been that we give financial 

assistance to families who have verified disaster-caused needs, 

major damage or destroyed homes, in essence. Our constant challenge in the earliest days of Katrina was wanting to get that assistance in victims’ hands as quickly as we could, based on what data 

we had. So, initially, we had some counties that we knew were obviously totally destroyed, and then beyond that we waited—we constantly refined that data as our assessment teams were able to. 

We leaned on FEMA’s data with their overhead satellite imagery, 

and what we did was constantly changed the zip codes that we 

knew everybody in those zip codes had damage, then we had other 

zip codes that no, I think we need a home visit here. In a traditional disaster we go street to street, house to house with our volunteers. In a disaster the size of Great Britain, which street do you 

go down first? So, we relied on macro data in those earliest weeks, 

and then as our on-the-ground data assessment came back in, and 

we had that data, particularly in Hinds County, we were able then 

to refine the data and change our zip code list of who we were giving assistance to. 

We felt like we had a system that yes, if you wanted to in some 

ways defraud the system, we might not catch it in the earliest 

days, but when the data was entered we would eventually find out 

who you were, and we have had a large fraud team focused on how 

many people got assistance who double-dipped on us, went to more 

than one place, or how many people defrauded the system. 

I can quantify that for you at this point. Out of the 1.2 million 

or so families that we gave assistance to we have identified about 

4,000 families that we are now going back and working with. So 

far, we have recovered over $1 million from people who have given 

us the money back. We have had wonderful cooperation with the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and with local prosecutors 

who have lowered the dollar threshold that we would prosecute to 

allow us to prosecute people who defrauded the Red Cross and the 

people that gave us the money to give out. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. You mentioned the number of families, 

Mr. Becker. Of the $1.3 billion in cash assistance that has been 

handed out, can you quantify how much in your judgment went to 

fraudulent claims? 

Mr. BECKER. About 4,000 families, at about an average of 

$1,000 per family. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Four thousand families at about $1,000 a 

family. 

Well, again, I thank you, Mr. Becker. 

Mr. Davies, I want to ask you a question, if I may. You made 

quite an indictment in your testimony and in your remarks today. 

You say that for 3 weeks after Hurricane Katrina there was no coherent way for relief organizations to coordinate their efforts. Who 

in your judgment is responsible for this amazing failure? 

Mr. DAVIES. I am not sure. The situation was so overwhelming 

that it would have been terribly difficult. The frustration of this situation is that we had invited the International Rescue Committee 

to come to Baton Rouge, and they deployed for the first time in 

45 

their history within the United States. They normally serve overseas. They worked in Banda Aceh. We invited them to come to 

Baton Rouge precisely because they had done some point relief 

work in Banda Aceh and they understood the whole issue of displaced people and relocation, which we saw coming. When they arrived within 5 days after the storm, the head of their team of 11 

told us in a briefing that the greatest issue we were going to have 

was to coordinate all of the resources that were there to benefit the 

people, and we knew that then, and we still couldn’t get it pulled 

together until 3 weeks later at a fairly large meeting in our office 

where, finally, the State determined to develop a central coordination center called the Family Recovery Corps, and that was intended to be the central place through which services would be provided to the displaced people. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. We all know that FEMA’s inadequate response initially has been well documented. We know also the relationship on the ground. Do the charities key, if I may, key off 

FEMA, and because of FEMA’s inadequate response did this affect 

the response of the charities on the ground? 

Mr. DAVIES. It may have been a contributing factor. I think the 

enormity of the situation, we had so many international groups 

who had come to Louisiana for the first time; we had obviously the 

Red Cross and Salvation Army, we had World Vision, Mercy Corps, 

Save the Children, International Rescue; we had many, many 

groups who had never worked in Louisiana before, didn’t know our 

organizations, didn’t know the structure of our government. They 

also didn’t understand—we didn’t understand them and their roles. 

I think the nature of relief work at this point, at the shelter 

point is chaotic, but the chaos should not have been at the level 

it was. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. I want to ask finally Major Hawks a question. Thank you, Mr. Davies. 

Major Hawks, I was surprised to learn in the context of preparing for this hearing that the Salvation Army is not named in 

the National Response Plan. It was more than a surprise, I was 

shocked. Therefore, the Salvation Army was excluded from bodies 

in which it could have helped coordinate the response to Katrina. 

Has the Salvation Army applied to become a support agency in 

the National Response Plan, or do you see that as being desirous 

and consistent with your goals and your mission? 

Major HAWKS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Salvation Army has expressed an interest in being a support agency, and the reason that 

that is important to the Salvation Army is in part because the 

State as well as the county and the parishes all adopt their local 

emergency management plans using the Federal plan as the model. 

So, if we are not listed, as you have indicated, then often we are 

not included. We are included in the VOAD grouping. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Again, I want to thank you and all of the 

officers, members, volunteers of the Salvation Army for all the good 

that you did with respect to the hurricanes and for all the good you 

do every day in our country. 

The Chair would now recognize the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Lewis. 

46 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to join you in thanking members of the panel, and 

thank the representatives of these organizations and groups for 

doing the necessary work and the good work for so many years. 

Some of us really appreciate, all of us as a people, as a Nation are 

very grateful to you for your work, for your service. I often think, 

what would it be like if we didn’t have organizations like the Red 

Cross, the Salvation Army, local community foundations. 

Just recently in my own city in Atlanta, we had a bad apartment 

fire in the heart of the inner city, and it was the Red Cross that 

responded to help people, and I am sure the Salvation Army no 

doubt was involved also. The Salvation Army in Atlanta has done 

great work for many years in helping with the homeless population 

and meeting the ongoing needs of people. For one, I am very grateful, and I appreciate your great work. 

Ms. Fagnoni, I wish you would expand on the statement in your 

testimony where in areas where the American Red Cross did not 

provide service, the Salvation Army and smaller organizations, 

often local churches, were able to meet many of the charitable 

needs in hard-to-reach communities. 

It just sounds like everyone, everybody was just doing the best 

they could. What happened, it was unbelievable, it was unreal. So, 

could you just expand? Did we learn anything? Did the organizations, did the groups learn anything from 9/11 to plan better? 

Ms. FAGNONI. To answer the last part of your question first, 

Mr. Lewis. 

Mr. LEWIS. Was anything put in place? 

Ms. FAGNONI. Sure. What we see as the most direct response 

to some of the lessons learned that we and others identified from 

9/11 was this effort to have the CAN, which is a web-based system. 

It is designed to help keep track of both people and services. One 

thing that happened after September 11th is that survivors had to 

keep telling their stories over and over again to different organizations. With the CAN once an individual gives information, then 

signs a waiver, then the other charities that participate in the network and have signed a privacy waiver can access the information 

and know something about the individual. This will enable organizations to identify services that have been provided to an individual, so that there are not gaps or duplication of services. 

So, that is probably the most concrete development that has occurred since 9/11. Further, you have asked about gaps in services, 

and I am sure the Red Cross can explain that due to some of their 

policies, they did not place shelters in areas where people happened to still be. In response, particularly in places like Mississippi, local organizations, often churches stepped in. I think the 

Salvation Army will also tell you that due to their roaming approach to service delivery, it may be easier for them to move into 

some areas and fill in where others might not be. 

I think there is still an open question as to the overall coordination, but there is no question that people were trying to fill in 

where they saw a need. The GAO has a broad set of studies going 

on. Today, I am discussing the piece that deals with charities, but 

we are also looking overall at the National Response Plan, how effectively it has been implemented in this situation, and what 

47 

changes, if any, might need to be made. Of course, charities are a 

very important, but very small piece in that whole picture. Even 

within the emergency support function where the Red Cross has a 

lead role, they share the lead with FEMA. So, even in that situation, there is a Federal presence. 

So, yes, I think there were some lessons learned after September 

11th, but clearly, there will be new lessons learned from this situation. The fact is, with Katrina as with other disasters, it is not 

over. Situations are continuing to happen and we will continue to 

monitor and look at how things are going and what improvements 

might be needed. 

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, I notice my time has run out. If I 

could just ask Mr. Becker a question. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Sure. 

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Becker, could you expand on your comments 

about how your sister organizations, the Salvation Army, Southern 

Baptist, Catholic Church, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the American Psychological Association were critical to the success of the Red Cross mission and 

goal? Sort of follow up on your statement about the significant lessons learned. Is the partnership much more effective well in advance of a crisis? 

Mr. BECKER. I think there is a distinction between the Red 

Cross and our primary role in the National Response Plan and the 

Red Cross as a service provider. The role that we take in the National Response Plan has to do with how does the Federal Government resource States. What we do in our National Response Plan 

role is work at FEMA’s resourcing center to receive requests from 

States and process those to the right Federal organization to resource the State. That is what we do as the Emergency Support 

Function (ESF) 6 primary agency. That is a very different assignment than what the Red Cross does as a service provider. What the 

Red Cross does as a service provider is work with the Salvation 

Army, Catholic Charities, many partners to make sure the work 

gets done. 

The quarterback in a disaster is the parish or county emergency 

manager, and what we are doing in the earliest days of a disaster 

is making sure that we are coordinating on a local basis: Where do 

you have a kitchen? Where do we have a kitchen? What church do 

we know of is feeding? The worst thing we could do is set a kitchen 

down right next to a Salvation Army kitchen or next to a church 

kitchen. So, we are trying to coordinate that, and at the county or 

parish level that is where that coordination happens. 

Our role as primary in ESF 6 does not mean that we are responsible for the Red Cross meeting all of the service delivery needs for 

meeting shelter and clothing distribution, welfare inquiry; it is the 

coordinating role in resourcing States and then we work in partnership with other organizations to actually deliver the service. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Mr. Beauprez, please. 

Mr. BEAUPREZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Becker, let’s stay on that point for a little bit. Communications seem to be an enormous problem. We heard in Mr. McCrery’s 

testimony, we have heard it from several of you, that communicaVerDate Aug 31 2005 00:31 Apr 20, 2006 Jkt 026384 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\26384.XXX 26384
48 

tion was extremely difficult, maybe to be polite. Yet, in your testimony, I don’t see much discussion about how we fix that. So, why 

don’t you expand, if you have ideas. You have been through what 

I am guessing you admit was not a stellar performance by the Red 

Cross as well as many other agencies. How do we address that? 

How do we get over it? 

Mr. BECKER. To clarify the question, communication among the 

nonprofits in the response? 

Mr. BEAUPREZ. Communications throughout. I am likening this 

to a battle zone. There is always going to be variables that happen 

in the field of battle. It is critically important that someone take 

charge, someone develops the strategy, and someone passes the orders for execution throughout the ranks. That seems like there 

was—it seems like, from what I understand from the testimony already today, that there was an enormous breakdown in that chain 

of command communication if in fact the chain of command even 

exists. 

Mr. BECKER. There are several aspects to that. I would say the 

first one is, what are the local relationships among all of the nonprofits that can bring value during a disaster? Not just the large 

national organizations, but anybody. The local food pantry, the 

local crisis center, anybody who can bring value. When we formed 

the CAN, it was done by the large national disaster organizations 

and the United Way, but the intent was that we would offer that 

to a community, and it is not just the technology, it is not just entering cases so that we can all see what we have done for the 

Smith family. The better benefit is that we all sit down in that 

community long before a disaster happens to carve out those rules 

a little bit more clearly. 

The way a disaster sequences, in the earliest days of a disaster, 

what we are focused on is the lifesaving needs, the shelter and the 

food. There is a fairly small number of players, if you will, in that, 

the Salvation Army and the American Red Cross, and in a very 

large disaster such as this, the faith community would respond. 

As the disaster runs out, and people start focusing on questions 

like ‘‘where am I going to live’’ and ‘‘how am I going to recover,’’ 

that is where the whole group of nonprofits comes together. We 

have all been in the community long before the disaster hit, and 

we are going to be in the community long after the disaster is off 

the front page of the news. How do we work together to do that? 

If we wait until the middle of a disaster to exchange business cards 

with each other, we are off to a bad start. 

The value of the CAN would be that we sit down ahead of time 

and form those relationships. We as a group had received funding 

to preposition that network in six pilot communities around the 

country, and we had just started to roll that out. We received the 

funding in the spring. We did it based on threats and, interestingly, New Orleans was one of those six pilot communities that we 

chose. So, we were off to a little bit better of a start in the New 

Orleans area. We now have CAN in over 500 communities around 

the country. I think long-term it is not the technology, it is the relationships among the leaders of the nonprofits to carve those roles 

out and clarify those expectations in advance. 

49 

Mr. BEAUPREZ. I accept that, but what confuses me I guess is 

that this seemed to escape everyone before this disaster happened. 

I accept the premise you just laid out, that progress maybe is being 

made, but in the time I have got remaining, I guess I will ask the 

same question in a slightly different manner to you than I asked 

to my colleague, Mr. McCrery. Whether we want to point a finger 

at FEMA, local government, State government, whether we want 

to point a finger at the collection of NGOs, the collective assumption here is we did not do very well and a whole lot of people suffered mightily as a result. 

Thinking of the National Response Plan, is it broken so badly it 

cannot be fixed? If your answer is no, we can fix it, how soon can 

we fix it? 

Mr. BECKER. Our organizational view is that the National Response Plan needs to be seriously reexamined. There are public policy issues in that as well. At its core, with the National Response 

Plan, all it does is outline how the Federal Government is going to 

resource a State, when you really get down to it, and it is predicated on when a county has a disaster or a parish that is bigger 

than it can handle it will turn to the State. When a State has 

something bigger than it can handle, it will turn to the National 

Response Plan structure for that. 

All disasters are local, though. They are all local, and where we 

have to grow, when the parish or county has its disaster plan, we 

craft ahead of time: this is where the Red Cross shelters are going 

to be, these are the other shelters that might open in the community. That is dictated typically in a plan. If the question is asked, 

what if it is bigger than that, the answer on the local level is then 

we turn to the State or we turn to the Feds. 

I think what we need to reexamine on a local level is, no, what 

if it is bigger than that, what are the local resources; bring the 

faith community into that planning process, bring the other nonprofits into the planning process, because the response has to be 

people from the community first. So, yes, the National Response 

Plan needs to be reexamined, but I think that is too easy for us 

at the local level to say, oh, that is the problem. Our organizations 

at the local level need to think about what if it is bigger than we 

can handle? Before we turn to the State, who else in this community can bring value? That needs to happen as well. 

Mr. BEAUPREZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from North Dakota, Mr. Pomeroy. 

Mr. POMEROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In 1997, the City of Grand Forks, a city of about 50,000, suffered 

a catastrophic flood and the city was evacuated, and we were literally years in recovery. That was the worst thing we ever thought 

could happen until Hurricane Katrina and we saw that things can 

get a magnitude worse. We are still very grateful for the roles 

played by both the Red Cross and the Salvation Army, and our own 

emergency response and then recovery periods. 

I am troubled, however, by anecdotal reports that things on the 

ground did not go as one might have hoped or expected. I am wondering about key lessons that have been learned as we try to address these issues. 

50 

In talking about coordination, in Grand Forks we literally built 

a one-stop shop under the auspices—and this is now more than the 

recovery phase—under the auspices of the United Way, who had 

utter coordination between all nonprofits and charities and churches working on the program. Is there some institutional, multi-organizational coordinating entity that you will be further constructing 

and improving in light of what you have learned? 

Mr. Becker and Major Hawks. 

Mr. BECKER. On a Federal level, FEMA has awarded a very significant grant to the national VOAD and the United Methodist 

Committee on Relief (UMCOR), to do the casework for the people 

going forward. While that is being built, and what is typical in a 

disaster, each community or each county forms what generically 

you would call an unmet needs Committee. You see these all over 

Florida from last year’s storms and you are seeing these form in 

the Mississippi Gulf Coast. That would be the local political leaders, the nonprofit leaders, the faith community, business leaders 

coming together to say how are we going to meet the longer term 

needs of these people. That is where CAN was designed to work. 

CAN was designed to, when these people all come together, how do 

they share that data? Various leaders step forward in communities 

to take that convening role. I don’t think that can be dictated by 

a Federal grant. 

Mr. POMEROY. That is the recovery phase, though. I am wondering if we can’t have an entity that is probably located, I don’t 

know, in Washington or somewhere that exists between disasters 

and has very well-established, multi-participants, and so we have 

a coordinating capacity preestablished for something like this. I 

think quite clearly there was coordination on the ground during the 

relief phase of this organization but did not meet what we I think 

expect and hope for. I am wondering if you are building something 

that will make—that will leave us institutionally improved going 

forward. 

Mr. BECKER. I would agree that that would be one of the key 

learnings going forward, not so much for the recovery phase, which 

is what the learning from 9/11 was, how do you deal with the people in the recovery phase; but in the emergency response phase, 

those earliest weeks, we presumed that coordination happens at 

the local level, because the key players, the county emergency manager, I would agree we need that Federal level as well. 

Mr. POMEROY. Major, do you have insights on that? 

Major HAWKS. I think the model that is in place nationally, 

statewide as well as locally, relates to the VOAD structure, where 

all of us as nonprofit organizations are a part of that group. There 

is a national group, there is a State group, there are county groups, 

there are local groups, and I am thinking that those are the groups 

that need to be strengthened now and they need to continue to 

communicate right on up to the time of the disaster and throughout the disaster. 

Now, there are a number of unmet needs groups that have come 

from the Katrina efforts, and they all have different names. Depending on the communities they have all been given different 

names. The Salvation Army, the American Red Cross and other orVerDate Aug 31 2005 00:31 Apr 20, 2006 Jkt 026384 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\26384.XXX 26384
51 

ganizations, faith-based organizations, are all plugged into those 

Committees across the coast and involved in the recovery efforts. 

Mr. POMEROY. I had a Red Cross—I had a volunteer scheduled 

to go down there and work, work with the Red Cross, and I left 

my personal cell phone number to call if she had any problems. She 

didn’t call from down there, but she called literally before she had 

gotten to her apartment or house back in Fargo to tell me of her 

concern relative to lack of oversight management and lack of fundtracking as the client assistance cards were dispersed, and this has 

come up in some of the questions raised here, but I literally had 

a constituent call and tell me that there would be lines in front of 

the table and one individual claiming on behalf of a family in one 

line and, two lines down, there was another individual claiming on 

behalf of the same family, and this North Dakota volunteer said, 

well, there is not much we can do about that. 

Was sufficient information captured at the time of disbursements, so that the FBI investigation in duplication of benefits inappropriately can now have a chance to work? 

Mr. BECKER. Where we had power and infrastructure, that data 

was captured. Where we didn’t have infrastructure and we were 

handing out intake forms and entering the data in a remote location, there was a period of time before that data got put in. That 

was the comment that I made earlier where you might be able to 

in essence double-dip on us, but we would know who you were 

eventually. There is a team, independent of my team, that has 

been working on that since then, and that is what we did quantify 

to be about 4,000 families that stood in line at one table and then 

went to another table or, in some cases, stood in line in a community and then went to another community. 

Mr. POMEROY. This individual was in Baton Rouge. I think you 

had power throughout there, right? 

Mr. BECKER. In Baton Rouge we did, but to also get the assistance out more quickly, we had a lot of organizations and places 

that we turned into intake centers and, actually, in Baton Rouge 

was the centralized data processing facility. What we were balancing there was the speed of getting the assistance to people and 

the data, and if we had to err we were going to err on the side of 

getting the assistance in people’s hands, feeling like if we had to 

we would come back and knock on their door later to talk about 

the fact that they had gotten two checks from the Red Cross. The 

4,000 number might grow, but it is about three-tenths of 1 percent 

fraud, out of 1.2 million cases. That is how many we have so far. 

It might go up a little bit more, but anecdotally, that was keeping 

me up at night, and it was organizationally for us a risk that we 

took, but we agreed to err on the side of speed. This is the immediate emergency assistance before FEMA can get you your big 

check, or this is just to get you that next set of clothes or what you 

immediately need. Getting it 5 weeks later, 10 weeks later doesn’t 

help, and our emphasis was on speed at that point and mitigating 

as best we could the risk along the way. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. The Chair now recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the Subcommittee on Social Security and 

thanks him again for participating again in today’s hearing. 

Mr. MCCRERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. 

52 

Mr. Becker I think hit the nail on the head when he said, this 

is not so much a failure of individuals, it is a failure of lack of appropriate planning, lack of adequate planning. For example, given 

the situation in the Baton Rouge area, which is very similar to ours 

in my congressional district where the Red Cross simply was not 

prepared or able to take care of all of the evacuees who were flooding into our areas. So, we called on the local Office of Emergency 

Preparedness (OEP) directors to call all their friends and their acquaintances, not just churches. You keep using the faith-based. 

Well, yes, a lot of the churches help, but a lot of these people were 

just called on the phone by the OEP director to say, help. What do 

you have that you can bring me? Well, I have a generator or I have 

this or that. Those were people responding. The problem was, there 

was not any planning for that, at least that I could identify. Maybe 

there was on paper somewhere, but the OEP director didn’t seem 

to know it and the Red Cross didn’t know it, and FEMA sure didn’t 

know it. 

So, I think that is right. We have to—and whatever organizations choose to participate, we have to get a comprehensive plan to 

prepare us for these kinds of contingencies in some kind of mass 

disaster. 

For example, I think Red Cross, Salvation Army, United Way, 

the major charitable organizations in every community, every community has some vestige of one or more of those in their communities, in their counties or their parishes; why not get with the 

OEP director in each parish and some representative of the charitable organizations and plan ahead of time. This is the first shelter 

to open in my parish at the local civic center, and it can have up 

to 500 people here. If that is not enough, then we will have spot 

B as a shelter that can handle 50 people. If that is not enough, we 

are going to have to send them north to the next parish, or all the 

way to Shreveport to the Red Cross shelter, which has a thousand 

or 1,200 or 1,500 people in it. There didn’t seem to be a plan in 

place like that and, unfortunately the Red Cross, when asked, 

would just say sorry, we can’t help; we have our own problems. I 

am sure they did, but then you would ask FEMA and FEMA—well, 

you couldn’t even get FEMA, basically. Communications were terrible, Mr. Chairman. You couldn’t get through to Baton Rouge. All 

the lines were blocked. Yes, they had electricity, but they had no 

phones because everything was so busy you couldn’t get through. 

It was just chaos. 

So, somebody, whether it is FEMA or the lead organization in 

the National Response Plan, somebody I think has to sit down with 

these OEP directors who are by and large volunteers themselves; 

they are not paid, they have another job, so they just volunteer in 

their parish or their community, their county to do that. Somebody 

has to take them to lunch, spend a buck, have the FEMA spend 

enough to buy this poor guy a lunch and go over with him just 

basic stuff. If we have a disaster, this is what we got to do. I don’t 

know. There has to be a better way, because people simply were 

not aware of the plan if there was a plan, and the shelters just 

popped up, thank goodness. 

Finally, I got tired of trying to get the Red Cross to help and trying to get FEMA to help, Mr. Chairman, and I and my staff said 

53 

we are going to do this ourselves. We went community by community, enlisting the sheriffs and the mayors and the OEP directors 

and said, we are going to handle this. We are just going to get the 

food, get the—we don’t have any cots, we can’t find any cots, but 

we will get mattresses and sheets and pillows and clothes, and we 

did. We just handled it. There should have been a better plan in 

place. 

So, thank you for your comments, all of you. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Thank you, Mr. McCrery. The Ranking 

Member has just one brief follow-up question of this panel. 

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I want to ask 

Major Hawks, your primary mission in America is a better place 

because of it, is to give people hope where all may seem lost. Now, 

the Red Cross has been criticized some here today. Do you have 

any positive comments you would like to make? I know you have 

done great work in Atlanta. We have about 40,000 people in the 

metropolitan Atlanta area from the affected States. What are you 

doing now to help people that are coming? 

Major HAWKS. You mean with the evacuees across the country? 

Mr. LEWIS. Right. In places like Atlanta or Houston or Dallas 

or some other place? 

Major HAWKS. Right now we are actually in the response and 

the recovery mode. I have never been in a disaster before where we 

spend 4 months in a response mode, where we have our roving canteen all across the Gulf Coast and at the same time in other communities we are doing case management with evacuees trying to 

get people back into homes and back into places with some semblance of normalcy. 

So, in over 30 States, the Salvation Army is working with the 

evacuees from around the country to try to get them back into their 

homes, and, at the same time, in the affected areas we are still 

working in the response phase. 

Mr. LEWIS. Do you consider yourself different from the Red 

Cross? 

Major HAWKS. Well, initially, in the response phase we emphasize providing food. Our roving canteens that I mentioned, the 72 

canteens that were initially staged to come in, they were staged in 

adjacent States, they were staged in the northern parts of the Gulf 

States, and then there were almost 200 more or 200 total brought 

into the area. That is what we do really well during the time of 

response. Those canteens can provide up to 5,000 meals per unit, 

and we have memorandum of understandings with the Southern 

Baptists and other organizations that will just, really just elevate 

our ability to prepare food, but it goes beyond that. As the disaster 

moves forward, so do our services. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Thank you, Mr. Lewis. The Chair would 

again thank all four members on this panel for your testimony. I 

want to thank you for all of the food that your organizations provided with respect to these epic disasters Rita and Katrina. Finally, 

the Chair would thank you for agreeing to work with us in a collaborative way to address the shortcomings. Again, thank you. 

54 

Now, we call the third panel for today’s hearing. Marcie Roth, 

Executive Director of the National Spinal Cord Injury Association; 

Yavonka Archaga, Executive Director, Resources For Independent 

Living (RIL); Daniel Borochoff, President of the American Institute 

of Philanthropy (AIP); and John G. Wyatt, City Marshal and 

Homeland Security Director for Bossier City, Louisiana. 

We can go as we traditionally do from your right to left, the 

Chair’s left to right, so we will begin with you, Mr. Borochoff, 

please. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL BOROCHOFF, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN 

INSTITUTE OF PHILANTHROPY 

Mr. BOROCHOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you to the 

Committee for inviting me here. I also was invited to testify after 

9/11, and there are a lot of lessons that fortunately the charities 

have learned from all of this. 

I am Daniel Borochoff with the AIP and Charitywatch.org, and 

we are a charity watchdog group. Since 1993 we have been America’s most independent watchdog of accountability, financial governance, and promotional practices of charities. Our letter grade 

ratings, A-plus to F, of nonprofit organizations financial performance are published in the Charity Rating Guide & Watchdog Report and are utilized by thousands of conscientious donors across 

the Nation. 

Americans responded quickly and generously with over $2.5 billion of charitable aid for victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

The AIP is pleased to report that the Red Cross has improved its 

fundraising performance in the aftermath of the recent hurricanes. 

Though it does need to be clear about its financial position, it has 

taken to heart the many important lessons after 9/11. 

The Red Cross continues to be a financially efficient organization. It receives an A-minus grade from the AIP. It is able to spend 

90 percent of its total expenses on programs and has a cost of $22 

to raise $100. It is going to be a lot less for the current fiscal year 

period because of all of the hundreds of millions they have raised 

in this disaster. The Red Cross, unlike 9/11, has honored donor intentions by not trying to raise money for one disaster and then 

using it for another disaster or program. Certainly, in this case, 

with the magnitude of the disaster, they cannot be accused of raising too much money, because even $1 billion, when you divide it 

by a million families, it is only $1,000 per family, so it is not a 9/ 

11 situation at all. 

We actually feel that the Red Cross may have gone overboard 

when it declared that it would not use money given for one disaster, to another disaster, for example to help Rita victims with 

Katrina funds. Being in this case that we have so many overlapping victims, and that the areas were devastated within weeks of 

each other, and is the same type of disaster, I don’t feel that the 

American public would mind if the larger amount of money given 

for Katrina, since that got more coverage and that was focused in 

New Orleans, if some of that money was made available to Rita. 

I think the Red Cross is putting themselves in a difficult situation 

there, and it would be a shame if the Red Cross does not have the 

funding to treat similar victims equally. 

55 

The Red Cross did improve its accountability by announcing September 9, only a few weeks after Katrina hit, its $2.2 billion goal 

for providing emergency aid. They were producing daily statistics 

on how many people they were helping, how many meals they 

served. It would be more helpful if they were actually giving cumulative totals, if they would give you how much they were helping 

right at that time, so that people would have an idea of how many 

people currently needed help, and also if they would say how much 

money they were spending, not just the total number of meals or 

shelter stays. 

We talked about the CAN, and AIP is greatly disappointed that 

the charities were not able to get it together to implement a shared 

database. This is something after 9/11 that I had written about. I 

emphasized that we have to have this if we have another major 

disaster, and here we are 4 years later and we still don’t have it. 

It wasn’t functional. It is so important, because the information 

needs to be shared among the charities to prevent double-dipping 

and allow for a more equitable distribution of aid. 

Based on our inquiries at the AIP, some unnamed charities are 

not agreeing to sign on to the planned database. The AIP believes 

that CAN needs to disclose which charities are unwilling or unable 

to participate so that pressure from watchdogs and donors can help 

gain their participation. This is something important. 

Another concern that we have is that the Red Cross is the ultimate brand for charities; it is the Coca-Cola of charities. On September 23, they were able to raise 75 percent of all the money 

raised. This fell back to 65 percent come October 6. The Salvation 

Army had only raised about 18 percent of the total at $295 million. 

When we have a major scale disaster, everybody should not just 

automatically give money to the Red Cross. One of the beautiful 

things about our sector is we have many different groups that can 

help in many different ways, particularly the local community 

groups that were able to get to places and help particular groups, 

the minorities, the Vietnamese and so forth, that were not able to 

receive aid, and we think that the Red Cross should reimburse 

some of these community groups that have incurred costs to help 

people the Red Cross couldn’t get to. So, if we have another disaster and we need community groups to help people, they are going 

to know there is a chance they are going to get some of that money 

back and they will be more willing to put out money to help these 

people. 

I have concerns about the Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund that our 

former Presidents have put together. They are probably the third 

largest fundraiser. They have raised about $110 million. They have 

been very quick at raising money, but slow in deciding what to do 

with it. Not until December 7, over 3 months after Katrina, did it 

apply for tax-exempt status with the Internal Revenue Service 

(IRS) and announce how it will distribute the bulk of the funds. 

They are going to give $40 million to the States. It is not clear exactly how the States, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, are 

going to spend it; $30 million to colleges and then $20 million to 

faith-based partnerships. It is fine if they want to raise money for 

faith-based groups, but they need to tell the public so the public 

56 

knows that is what it is for, because not everybody wants to give 

to faith-based groups. 

Also, they haven’t announced, since December 7th, who is going 

to be on their full governing board. This is something that donors 

need to know before they make a contribution. They need to know 

who is going to be on the board. It is a shame that they wouldn’t 

tell the public that. 

The Red Cross, even outside of a disaster, uses terms to describe 

its Disaster Response Fund. They use terms such as empty, running on fumes, dangerously low. I have a problem with this because it doesn’t reflect the complete financial position of the Red 

Cross. 

Here is a group with $2.2 billion net assets saying they have no 

money in their disaster fund. It doesn’t mean that they don’t have 

any other money available to use toward a disaster. It is not responsible for them to say they have no money for a disaster, because this implies that if there is another disaster they would not 

be prepared for it. 

Fortunately they do have money that is available for the next 

disaster. So, what they need to do and all charities need to do is, 

say what their true financial position is, or how much money they 

have available. It doesn’t matter if it is board-designated, because 

the board can always undesignate it if they have to. 

So, charities should also consider whether such claims undermine our international standing as a strong and powerful nation by 

creating a false appearance of weakness and vulnerability on our 

home front. How are the people in Iraq going to feel if our main 

disaster group in the United States says they don’t have enough 

money to take care of people in an emergency? 

The Red Cross brought up earlier about the three-tenths of a percent of money lost; but the Red Cross has also lost some money 

through workers and volunteers stealing. That is something that 

should be brought up. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. The Chair would, in fairness to the other 

members of the panel, remind the witness of the 5-minute time 

rule, which is a rule of the Subcommittee. So, if you could wrap up. 

Mr. BOROCHOFF. One quick thing. I am calling for all of the 

charities to offer a 6-month report as the Red Cross did after the 

tsunami disaster. Because of the financial reporting rules, it may 

not be until June 15th, 2007, before the Red Cross is required and 

other charities are required to publicly disclose their Katrina 

spending. Also multi-agency evaluations should be produced that 

will help make charities and donors more aware of victims who 

have been neglected or received poor services so more services can 

be directed toward them. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Borochoff follows:] 

Statement of Daniel Borochoff, President, American Institute of 

Philanthropy, Chicago, Illinois 

The American Institute of Philanthropy and Charitywatch.org is a nonprofit charity watchdog and information resource dedicated to helping its members and the 

general public make wise giving decisions. Since 1993 we have been America’s most 

independent watchdog of the accountability, financial, governance and promotional 

practices of charities. Our letter grade (A+ to F) ratings of nonprofit organizations’ 

financial performance as published in the Charity Rating Guide & Watchdog Report 

are utilized by thousands of conscientious donors across the nation. During this reVerDate Aug 31 2005 00:31 Apr 20, 2006 Jkt 026384 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\26384.XXX 26384
57 

cent crisis, the December 2004 Asian tsunami and the September 11th terrorist attack nearly every major U.S. media outlet has covered AIP’s advice, analyses and 

concerns. Americans have responded quickly and generously with over $2.5 billion of charitable aid for victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The American Institute of Philanthropy is pleased to report that the American Red Cross has improved its fundraising performance in the aftermath of the recent hurricanes. Though it needs to 

be clearer about its financial position, it has taken to heart many important lessons 

from 9/11. The Red Cross continues to be a financially efficient organization and receives an ‘‘A¥’’ grade from AIP for spending 91 percent of its total expenses on pro- gram services and having a cost of $22 to raise $100. In contrast to September 11, 

the Red Cross honored donor intentions by not trying to raise money for one disaster and use it for another disaster or other programs. Due to the immensity of 

this disaster, the Red Cross cannot be accused of raising too much money for hurricane victims; even $1 billion, when spread among one million needy families, only 

amounts to $1 thousand per family. 

In AIP’s opinion the Red Cross may even have gone overboard when it declared 

that it would not use towards Rita any money given to help with Katrina. These 

hurricanes had many overlapping victims and areas that were devastated within 

weeks of each other. AIP believes it would be fair and reasonable for the Red Cross 

to spend money for both crises, whether or not it was raised in specific response 

to Katrina or Rita. It is our view that most donors to the Red Cross wish to help 

the recent hurricane victims of the U.S. Gulf Coast, regardless of which hurricane 

struck them. It will be a shame if the Red Cross does not have the funding to treat 

similar victims of each disaster equally. 

The Red Cross also improved its accountability by announcing on September 19th, only a few weeks after Katrina hit, its $2.2 billion goal for providing emergency financial aid and other assistance to one million families. They also have given regular updates of basic statistics on the total number of evacuees to whom they have 

provided services, how much money they have raised, and how much money they 

have spent in total in the most expensive relief effort in its 124-year history. It 

would be even more helpful to donors that want to track the use of their dollars, 

if the Red Cross also regularly accounted for the amount spent on each type of service provided, e.g. meals, overnight shelter stays, mental and health contacts. The 

Red Cross could also do a better job in their updates by reporting how many people 

they are currently sheltering, feeding or offering other services to, in addition to 

how many people that they have helped in total. This information would give donors 

a better understanding of how many people currently are in need of Red Cross assistance. 

Unlike after September 11, 2001 when the Red Cross resisted participating in a 

shared database, in this crisis they took the lead in forming a new database system 

called CAN, or Coordinated Assistance Network. Unfortunately, the part of the 

database that was to track the aid each victim received from the other charities was 

still being tested when Katrina and Rita struck, according to Red Cross officials. 

The database was operational for keeping track of people’s shelter days. 

AIP is greatly disappointed that the charities were not able to implement a 

shared database nearly four years after the experience of 9/11 made its importance 

obvious. Charities need to share information on specific victims to prevent double 

dipping and allow for a more equitable distribution of aid. AIP strongly encourages 

charities to expedite the implementation of a shared database in preparation for the 

next disaster. Based on our inquiries, AIP understands that some unnamed charities are not agreeing to sign on to the planned database. AIP believes that CAN 

needs to disclose which charities are unwilling or unable to participate so that pressure from watchdogs and donors can help gain their participation. 

By September 23, the Red Cross had raised $827 million or about 75% of the total 

raised by all charities for Katrina and Rita aid according to a tally by the Chronicle 

of Philanthropy. In recognition of the need for more of America’s charitable resources to help with this widespread crisis, AIP encouraged donors to also support 

the efforts of many other important charities offering innovative approaches to providing aid. We emphasized that while the Red Cross is the major charity for providing emergency, front-line services in a disaster, other charities are better suited 

to provide intermediate and longer-term assistance to help victims get back on their 

feet. AIP’s message must have gotten out because by October 6, the Red Cross’s contributions of $1.1 billion had fallen to 65% of the $1.7 billion raised by all the charities, according to figures provided by The Chronicle of Philanthropy. 

By the beginning of December, the Salvation Army had raised $295 million, which 

was the second most raised by any group, yet only 18% of the $1.67 billion that the 

Red Cross had raised. Unlike the Red Cross which plans on using over 90% of its 

58 

$2.2 billion Katrina/Rita disaster budget for short-term emergency needs, the Salvation Army estimates using about two-thirds of the disaster money that it has currently raised for longer term needs, possibly through August 2007. The Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund, which may have collected the third most at $110 

million, has been quick at raising money but slow in deciding what to do with it. 

Not until December 7, over three months after Katrina hit the Gulf, did it apply 

for tax-exempt status with the IRS and announce how it will distribute the bulk 

of its donations. The former Presidents’ Fund said that it will give $40 million to 

charitable funds formed by the governors of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, 

$30 million for colleges and schools in the three states, and $20 million for a faithbased partnership, which will decide how to distribute it. It is surprising that it took 

so long to allocate these funds since most went to grantee organizations that are 

serving as intermediaries in deciding which organizations or people will be the final 

recipients of these donations. Also, as of December 7, the former Presidents’ Fund 

has not publicly announced on its Internet site or in its press releases who will 

serve on its full governing board. Donors need to know this to make an informed 

giving decision. 

The hurricanes caused millions of people to flee and resulted in the largest relocation in our nation since the Civil War. It was beneficial that many U.S. based international relief and development charities recognized the need for America to utilize 

as much of our charitable resources as possible to help the evacuees. For many of 

these groups with experience aiding poverty-stricken people after large-scale disasters in Africa, Asia and South America, it was the first time that they had ever provided assistance in a domestic disaster. Some of AIP’s top-rated international charities that have provided assistance to hurricane victims are Samaritan’s Purse, 

AmeriCares, Mercy Corps, World Vision and Oxfam-America. 

Because of the enormous scope of this crisis the Red Cross had difficulty reaching 

some of the far-flung rural areas hit by the hurricanes. Fortunately, many community groups and churches stepped in to provide aid. AIP believes that it would be 

a good idea for the Red Cross to reimburse the documented expenses of these financially stretched aid groups, who do not have the ability to raise large sums of money 

outside of their communities. 

‘‘Empty,’’ ‘‘running on fumes,’’ ‘‘dangerously low’’ are all terms that the Red Cross 

used during its 2004 fiscal year to describe the state of its Disaster Relief Fund. 

These are certainly not the terms that you would expect a nonprofit to be using 

when, according to its fiscal 2004 audited financial statements, it had total net assets of $2.2 billion. The Red Cross does not make clear in disaster fundraising pleas 

its true financial position or the amount of discretionary money it has available to 

spend on disasters. 

An analysis of the Red Cross’ fiscal 2004 audit, the most recent available, shows 

that the Red Cross likely has far more money available for disasters than the 

$709,000 that it reports in its Disaster Relief Fund. The Red Cross reports having 

$1.36 billion in unrestricted net assets, which includes $1.08 billion designated for 

various purposes by its Board of Governors. It is important to understand that 

funds designated by a nonprofit board can be undesignated and made available the 

very next day. The funds that the Red Cross clearly can not apply to the recent Gulf 

disaster are $429 million in permanently restricted funds and $274 million in purpose restricted funds, identified in its 2004 audit. Unlike funds designated by an 

external third party, funds designated by the board as an endowment can be spent 

by a nonprofit. Based on our analysis of the Red Cross’ fiscal 2004 finances, AIP 

estimates that it has over $700 million that it could direct to a future disaster without using any money earmarked by its board for ‘‘biomedical services,’’ ‘‘retirement 

health benefits,’’ ‘‘replacement and improvement of buildings or equipment,’’ and 

‘‘other purposes.’’ 

It would be wrong for the Red Cross as our nation’s most important front-line 

emergency aid organization to suggest to the American public that it has very little 

available to spend for a disaster when it actually has available money outside of 

its disaster fund. It makes the organization appear unprepared to deal with future 

disasters that may occur before more money is raised. Charities should also consider 

whether such claims undermine our international standing as a strong and powerful 

nation by creating a false appearance of weakness or vulnerability on the home 

front. 

As in 9/11 and the Tsunami disasters, scammers jumped on the fundraising bandwagon. Thousands of questionable web sites purporting to raise money for hurricane 

victims were quickly thrown up on the Internet. Some scammers capitalized on the 

public’s zeal to help by calling or emailing potential donors for their credit card information under the guise of fundraising for a legitimate charity. One particularly 

outrageous scam involved a Florida man without a pilot’s license who was arrested 

59 

for allegedly raising $40,000 so that he could purportedly continue airlifting supplies 

and rescuing hurricane victims, according to The Miami Herald. He even bragged 

about fake exploits on the Internet, including how he tipped his plane’s wings in 

a salute to President Bush when he saw Air Force One flying over Louisiana, and 

rescued a 7-month-old child who needed a transplant. 

There have been many arrests and reports of aid recipients who falsely claimed 

to be hurricane victims. This is likely to happen because people fleeing a disaster 

often do not have much in the way of identification or paperwork to demonstrate 

that they are actual victims. The charities are in a difficult position because they 

must balance the need to get aid out quickly to legitimate victims with the responsibility of not wasting charitable resources on fakers or double dippers. Donors should 

realize that in a crisis situation, charities will not be able to stop a lot of people 

with false claims without making the bona fide victims suffer long delays for assistance. Most scammers will not be caught until after a charity has turned over a suspect’s information to a law enforcement agency to research its truthfulness. Unfortunately, by then the money will likely be long gone. 

The recent news media reports of Red Cross workers in California and Texas 

being arrested on charges of stealing money intended for disaster victims is very 

disturbing. Criminals are more likely to target charities, particularly ones operating 

in a disaster or other chaotic situation, if they perceive that the many good-hearted 

and mission-driven people working in these organizations are not focusing enough 

attention on internal controls and other security measures. AIP encourages all nonprofits to be vigilant about safeguarding the public’s donated dollars. 

AIP strongly encourages each disaster charity to issue by spring of 2006, a 6- 

month report of the funds raised and spent and future plans in response to the Gulf 

hurricanes. These reports will enable donors to better monitor the use of their charitable contributions. The American Red Cross is to be commended for issuing such 

a report six months after the December 2004 tsunami. Under current IRS annual 

disclosure rules, charities are not required to submit a tax form until 51⁄2-months 

after the end of their fiscal year and are almost automatically granted two 3-month 

extensions by the IRS. This means that charities with a June 30 fiscal year end, 

such as the Red Cross, may not be required to disclose how much they received and 

spent in response to Katrina until June 15, 2007. 

AIP also encourages charities to participate in multi-agency evaluations, such as 

those conducted by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition for CARE International, 

World Vision International and other disaster aid groups. This will help charities 

improve their planning, coordination and communication. It will also make charities 

and donors more aware of victims that have been neglected or received poor service 

so that more resources can be directed to them. 

f 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Thank you for your testimony. Ms. Roth, 

please. 

STATEMENT OF MARCIE ROTH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

NATIONAL SPINAL CORD INJURY ASSOCIATION 

Ms. ROTH. Good afternoon, Chairman Ramstad, Mr. Lewis, 

Committee Members. Thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today. My name is Marcie Roth, I am the Executive Director and 

CEO of the National Spinal Cord Injury Association, the Nation’s 

oldest and largest civilian organization serving the needs of people 

with spinal cord injuries and diseases. 

In our disaster relief efforts, we have been working on behalf of 

all people with disabilities, estimated at 25 to 30 percent of those 

affected. 

On September 13th, 2001, I first became involved in addressing 

the urgent needs of New Yorkers with disabilities who had survived the terrorist attacks 2 days earlier. I was shocked when I discovered how ill prepared the disaster relief agencies were. In the 

past 4 years I have participated in efforts to better prepare for another emergency. 

60 

On the morning of August 29th, I was asked to help Benilda 

Caixeta, who was quadriplegic. She had been trying to evacuate 

from her New Orleans home for 3 days. Even calls to 911 had been 

fruitless. I stayed on the phone with her for most of the day trying 

to reassure her. Suddenly she told me, with panic in her voice, the 

water is rushing in, and then we were disconnected. I learned 5 

days later that she had been found dead floating next to her wheelchair. 

I am here today to say some other difficult things. After sharing 

some positive stories, I will focus on the most beloved organizations 

of all, the American Red Cross. It is hard to criticize the Red Cross. 

They do many good things, but they have frequently failed to meet 

the needs of people with disabilities while simultaneously diverting 

resources from organizations addressing those unmet needs. 

Not only has this hurt people with disabilities and the organizations that serve them, but it has also added an untold burden on 

taxpayers through costs associated with preventable secondary 

complications. Sadly, the needs of people with disabilities have 

been overlooked by the general public and the media. 

Joe Shapiro, an NPR reporter, was one of the few to report about 

people with disabilities. Thanks to a very generous donation from 

Robert and Ita Klein, who established the Brian McCloskey Hurricane Katrina Survivors with Disabilities Fund, National Spinal 

Cord Injury Association is able to provide some direct assistance. 

The Disability Funders Network is distributing $5,000 grants to 

meet unserved needs, and the Muslim Public Affairs Council 

stepped in to get donated medical equipment and supplies distributed when none of the relief organizations would provide funds for 

this. 

Several of the international wheelchair distribution organizations 

also stepped in. Thanks to the Salvation Army, funds were made 

available to assist some hurricane survivors who had been dumped 

into nursing homes. While everyone else argued about who was responsible, the Salvation Army provided funds to help survivors regain their independence. 

In contrast, many Gulf Coast residents with disabilities were excluded from Red Cross shelters and relief assistance services. Some 

were separated form caregivers and service animals and then sent 

to nursing homes when they couldn’t maintain their independence. 

People with disabilities were forced to remain on buses while everyone else was invited into certain shelters. Then they were driven for sometimes hundreds of miles before being taken in. When 

disability experts showed up at shelters to offer assistance they 

were frequently turned away. 

One Red Cross official told me, we aren’t supposed to help these 

people, the local health departments do that. We cannot hardly 

deal with the intact people. One woman was sent to a special needs 

shelter so overcrowded that she slept in her wheelchair for weeks. 

Ultimately this landed her in a hospital and then a nursing home. 

After waiting all day in line residents of one Red Cross shelter 

were told to travel to another town to register. Without accessible 

transportation though, those with mobility disabilities were unable 

to make the trip. We tried to get experts into the shelters to assist 

people who couldn’t hear announcements over loudspeakers, 

61 

couldn’t read signs and forms, people who needed medication, people who didn’t understand how to get food and water, and people 

who couldn’t stand in line because they had lost their wheelchair 

or couldn’t handle the heat. 

For weeks, one man had to drive to a hospital every time he 

wanted to go to the bathroom because the bathroom at the shelter 

was not wheelchair accessible. Most people told me that they had 

not received any financial assistance from the Red Cross. A few received $360. While thousands are in need of funds to cover basic 

necessities, $66 million in foreign donations were distributed by 

FEMA to nonprofit organizations, but these can only be used to 

hire staff, to train volunteers, and to provide case management. 

We can’t even get to the tables where rebuilding decisions are 

being made by powerful housing nonprofit organizations, and this 

will result in discrimination, limited options and institutionalization. For all of the planning that has gone on, it seems that the 

needs of people with disabilities will remain unmet when the next 

disaster strikes. 

However, with your help, not only can people with disabilities 

begin to trust that their needs will be better met in future disasters, taxpayers, generous donors, and the general public can rest 

assured that we are maximizing limited resources and minimizing 

unnecessary waste. 

Thanks to you, Chairman Ramstad, the needs of people with disabilities and the hope of visionary leadership have not been lost. 

I know you will invite your colleagues to join you in prioritizing the 

needs of hurricane survivors with disabilities as next steps are 

taken. 

In summary, let me recommend that offices on disability need to 

be established within Red Cross, the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, FEMA, and in each of the Federal members of the Interagency Coordinating Council on Emergency Preparedness and People With Disabilities. They must all be staffed by disability experts 

and given authority to act. 

Congress needs to appoint an independent task force to focus on 

the disaster management needs of people with disabilities. Our Office on Disability at the U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services needs more resources and more authority. Please don’t 

compromise the hard won civil rights of people with disabilities so 

easily dismissed in a time of emergency. 

It is in Benilda’s memory and with great appreciation toward 

those who have worked tirelessly over the past 15 weeks in the 

Gulf States, in Washington, in cyberspace, and around the country 

that I close with the following proverb. The best time to plant a 

tree was 20 years ago. The second best time is now. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Roth follows:] 

Statement of Marcie Roth, Executive Director, National Spinal Cord Injury 

Association, Bethesda, Maryland 

Good afternoon, Chairman Ramstad, Ranking Member Lewis, and distinguished 

committee members. Thank you for inviting me to testify on issues regarding the 

response by nonprofit organizations to the needs of Hurricane Katrina survivors. 

My name is Marcie Roth and I am the Executive Director and CEO of the National Spinal Cord Injury Association (NSCIA). NSCIA is the nation’s oldest and 

largest civilian organization serving the needs of people with spinal cord injuries 

and spinal cord diseases since 1948. 

62 

I am here representing NSCIA, but I want to be very clear that in our disaster 

relief efforts we have been working on behalf of ALL people with disabilities, including those with sensory and intellectual disabilities and those with mental illness 

and other psychiatric disabilities. 

And, although we are focusing on efforts to assist Americans with disabilities in 

disasters, we are also wholly committed to working with others who are addressing 

the needs of ALL people with disabilities in disasters in other parts of the world. 

I want to thank my colleagues in the private sector and those representing government, who have given those of us who are experts on the additional needs of people with disabilities before, during and after a disaster the opportunity to work 

alongside you over the past fifteen weeks as we have shared our knowledge, resources and a deep commitment to meeting the critical needs of as many hurricane 

survivors with disabilities as we possibly could. I am grateful to those individuals 

who have joined us around the clock, for many weeks, in a shared commitment to 

do what no one else was doing, despite their legal and moral obligations, to meet 

the additional needs of hurricane survivors with disabilities. 

On September 13, 2001, I first became involved in navigating between the Federal 

systems and the private sector in an effort to address the very urgent disaster related needs of people with disabilities who had survived the terrorist attacks in New 

York City two days earlier. I quickly learned that a lifetime of knowledge of the additional needs of people with disabilities was being called into action as I found myself in the breach, navigating between the very real needs of very real people and 

the limited public and private systems poorly designed to address those needs. 

I was shocked when I discovered how ill prepared the major disaster relief agencies were, and I became actively involved in efforts to assist those relief agencies 

and communities across the U.S. to better plan for the additional needs of people 

with disabilities. In the months and years after those terrible days, I also participated in efforts to assist people with disabilities to prepare for another emergency. 

I saw the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the relocation of 

FEMA and the National Disaster Medical System, and many printed and Internet 

published materials on preparedness for people with disabilities, workshops and 

conferences on the topic, and many other visible signs that indicated to me that 

high level planning for the next national disaster was in good hands. I did my part, 

made recommendations when the needs of people with disabilities were being overlooked and voiced my concerns when it seemed that plans were unrealistic. Even 

when the ideas of disability and disaster experts were being met with a surprising 

amount of resistance and exclusion, I trusted that even though I couldn’t always see 

it, we were ‘‘ready.’’ Just like most Americans, I assumed that the Red Cross and 

the other major relief organizations were building on something far more durable 

than sand when they published guides and booklets and held meetings and workshops on emergency preparedness for people with disabilities. 

And then, in the last week of August, I joined much of America as we watched 

with more than a little alarm as Hurricane Katrina took a bite out of FL and then 

made its way into the Gulf. 

On the morning of August 29th, I received a call that I will never forget and once 

I tell you about it, I hope you will never forget it either. My friend and colleague, 

former appointee to the Social Security Administration, Susan Daniels called me to 

enlist my help because her sister-in-law, Benilda Caixetta, a New Orleans resident 

who was quadriplegic, paralyzed from the shoulders down, had been unsuccessfully 

trying to evacuate to the Superdome for two days. Despite repeated requests to be 

evacuated, in her power wheelchair, which is a vital tool for mobility and independence, the paratransit system that serves the transportation needs of people with disabilities never showed up. Even calls to 911 had been fruitless. She was still in her 

home, she had not been able to evacuate, despite her very best efforts. In my 

naivete ́ I thought a few phone calls to the ‘‘right’’ people would help, and I was sure 

I knew who to call. I was wrong. After many calls to the ‘‘right’’ people, it was clear 

that Benny, was NOT being evacuated. 

I stayed on the phone with Benny for most of the day, assuring her that I was 

doing all I could to make sure help would be coming as soon as possible. She kept 

telling me she had been calling for a ride to the Superdome for three days, but, despite promises, no one came. The very same paratransit system that people with 

disabilities can’t rely on in good weather was what was being relied on in the evacuation. It’s no surprise that it failed. 

I was on the phone with her that afternoon when she told me, with panic in her 

voice, ‘‘the water is rushing in’’ and then her phone went dead. 

We learned five days later that she had been found in her apartment, dead, floating next to her wheelchair. 

63 

Sometimes things like this can’t be prevented. Despite the magnitude of the catastrophe, this was not one of those times. Benilda did not have to drown. 

I am here today to say some other difficult things, and while there are many organizations worth comment, I will focus almost exclusively today on one of the biggest, 

best funded and most beloved nonprofit organizations of all, the American Red 

Cross. It feels almost blasphemous to criticize the Red Cross, almost like criticizing 

one’s own grandparents. But, for hundreds of thousands of people with disabilities, 

the Red Cross has frequently failed to meet the greatest needs while simultaneously 

diverting donations and other resources from small organizations left to address a 

myriad of often complex unmet needs. Not only has this hurt people with disabilities 

and the organizations that serve them, but it has also added an untold burden on 

every taxpayer in this country, through costs associated with preventable secondary 

complications in disaster survivors, unnecessary hospitalization and institutionalization and failure to maximize limited resources to meet needs. 

Over the past 100+ days, while the rest of America and the world watched on TV, 

millions of Gulf region residents desperately tried to survive not only the weather, 

but the many human failures to follow. For 25–30% of those people, the additional 

challenges of disability, poor planning and low expectations made the unimaginable 

crisis much, much more dangerous. 

As the parent of two children with significant disabilities and as the legal guardian for an Iraqi child who was spinal cord injured in an accidental U.S. artillery 

bombing two years ago, I am acutely aware every day of the unmet needs of 56 million Americans with disabilities and hundreds of millions of people with disabilities 

worldwide. I am also acutely aware of just how rare it is that the unmet needs of 

people with disabilities are ever considered by the people who have the most power 

and the best resources to maximize positive outcomes for a minority population that 

encompasses a sizable portion of the general population of the United States. According to the U.S. Census of 2000, people with disabilities represent 19.3 percent 

of the 257.2 million people ages 5 and older in the civilian non-institutionalized population. Another 2.2 million Americans are institutionalized in nursing homes and 

long-term care facilities. And, it is necessary to point out that these are all people 

with disabilities. People don’t go to nursing homes because they are old; they go to 

nursing homes when their community fails to meet their additional needs. 

Some areas of our country have an especially high percentage of people with disabilities. As it happens, the areas most severely impacted by the hurricanes were 

also areas with especially high percentages of people with disabilities living in their 

communities. 

According to the 2000 Census: 

• In Biloxi, Mississippi, 10,700 people (25% of the residents) are classified as people with disabilities. 

• In Mobile, Alabama, 43,000 people (24% of the residents) are people with disabilities. 

• In the New Orleans metropolitan area, 250,000 residents (21.3%) described 

themselves as disabled. 

Because people with disabilities are . . . 

• disproportionately below the poverty line, 

• often less mobile than the general population, 

• disproportionately more dependent on outside assistance, and 

• often misjudged as less capable 

. . . this population felt the impact of Hurricane Katrina quite severely. 

For most of my career, since the 1970’s, I have worked primarily for nonprofit organizations. For most of this time, serving people with disabilities, we have struggled to meet complicated needs with extremely inadequate resources. As the executive director of a nonprofit organization for the last four years, I am sure I have 

often fallen short. Due to the magnitude of need, the shockingly limited resources 

made available to invest in the needs of people with disabilities and the never 

changing bigotry of low expectations regarding the value and contributions of Americans with disabilities, I anticipate that the needs of my constituency will remain 

under-met for the foreseeable future. And, as long as Congress fails to ensure the 

enforcement of laws to educate children with disabilities, fails to address the institutional bias in Medicaid, fails to pass Money Follows the Person, MiCASSA, the 

Christopher Reeve Act and the Family Opportunity Act, fails to fund adequate housing, mental health parity, access to quality health care, equipment and services and 

considers legislation that will limit the human and civil rights of one in five Americans, no real progress will be made in maximizing limited Medicaid, Medicare, priVerDate Aug 31 2005 00:31 Apr 20, 2006 Jkt 026384 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\26384.XXX 26384
64 

vate insurance and other resources. This is both wrong and it is foolish public policy. 

There are many fine examples of nonprofits who have actively sought to meet 

needs by using limited resources that were intended to serve people who are in the 

greatest need even when the weather is fine. Some organizations, like mine have 

been very fortunate to have come to the attention of true heroes who quietly find 

a way to make a real difference. Thanks to a very generous donation from Robert 

and Ita Klein, who recently established the Brian Joseph McCloskey Hurricane 

Katrina Survivors with Disabilities Fund, my organization, the National Spinal 

Cord Injury Association, is able to replace wheelchairs, hospital beds, household 

goods, repair homes, and pay rent and mortgages for as many people with disabilities as our fund will stretch to serve. The Kleins’ company, Safeguard Properties, 

Inc. has been playing a significant role in disaster and housing related services, and 

they wanted to make a generous donation to meet an otherwise entirely unmet 

need. Their recognition of the unmet needs of hurricane survivors with disabilities 

is a shining exception to the fairly bleak picture. Yet another is the Disability 

Funders Network which raised over $100,000 that it is distributing to small nonprofits in $5,000 grants to meet unserved needs. Many disability organizations have 

had to tap their own limited resources to meet the needs of constituents who have 

lost everything. When we were desperate to send replacement equipment like wheelchairs and hospital beds to people who had to have them to preserve their health 

and we couldn’t get the Red Cross or any of the other large relief organizations to 

provide funds for drivers, trucks and insurance, we were very fortunate to find an 

unlikely ally. The Muslim Public Affairs Council stepped in with funding to help 

Portlight Strategies to get trucks full of donated durable medical equipment and 

supplies on the road and into the hands of those who had lost theirs. 

As wonderful as these stories are, with not more than a few exceptions, the needs 

of people with disabilities, and their stories have been almost entirely overlooked 

by the general public. Even house pets have fared far better! I would be remiss if 

I didn’t thank Joe Shapiro, a wonderful reporter with National Public Radio who 

was one of the very, very few to report about people with disabilities. And, another 

shining example of high quality nonprofits would be the formerly all volunteer Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, a part of the crown jewel known as the National 

Disaster Medical Systems. 

Most organizations like mine exist in the shadow of high profile nonprofits like 

the American Red Cross. In the days after the hurricanes, the American Red Cross 

has received a reported $1.68 billion dollars in donations while Gulf Coast residents 

with disabilities have hardly benefited because many were excluded from their shelters and relief assistance services. 

Sadly, we have attempted to help the Red Cross and other disaster relief leaders 

to see that they have been in a key position to address this inequity since 2001, 

but instead, people with disabilities are still turned away from the Red Cross and 

other charity-run shelters. 

As well as the disability community has come together to try to take care of ‘‘our 

own,’’ we have been excluded from the larger relief community, sometimes told that 

we would just be ‘‘in the way’’ and ‘‘make things worse.’’ We were told to leave the 

relief efforts to those who ‘‘know what they are doing.’’ At the same time, we received report after report about the Red Cross shelters turning people with disabilities away or separating them from caregivers and service animals, then sending 

them to nursing homes when they couldn’t maintain their independence. 

We had many reports of people with disabilities arriving on busses from New Orleans and being forced to remain on the bus while everyone else was invited in. 

Then they were driven from shelter to shelter for sometimes hundreds of miles before being taken in. 

When disability experts showed up at the shelters to offer their assistance, they 

were frequently turned away, and we’ve been told that this was because they hadn’t 

completed the ‘‘required training.’’ This was an interesting disconnect from another 

conversation I had. 

When I inquired about the sheltering needs of people with disabilities, once I was 

finally able to reach a National Red Cross Operations official, she told me ‘‘we aren’t 

supposed to help those people, the local health departments do that. We can’t hardly 

deal with the ‘‘intact’’ people (this term is considered highly offensive to people with 

disabilities). Don’t you understand that we’re taking volunteers off the street to run 

these shelters?’’ 

I am told that just last week, a Red Cross official told meeting attendees at an 

AARP meeting that the Red Cross does not serve people with disabilities. I would 

have dismissed that comment entirely as mere gossip if I hadn’t had a similar conversation. 

65 

There are many stories, but a few stand out as especially egregious. 

One woman in Alabama, a college graduate who survived a spinal cord injury 10 

years ago but was living independently until the hurricane struck told me she went 

to the Red Cross shelter as soon as it became clear that her home was about to 

flood, but she was turned away. She was directed to a ‘‘special needs shelter’’ but 

that shelter was so overcrowded with people who all needed additional help that she 

ended up sleeping in her wheelchair for days on end. This caused a serious skin 

condition to develop, landing her in a hospital and then a nursing home. Despite 

the $1.68 billion raised by Red Cross, she never received any assistance from them. 

In one town, also in Alabama, after waiting all day in line for assistance, residents of the Red Cross shelter were told that the only way to register for assistance 

was to leave the Red Cross shelter and travel to another town. But there was no 

accessible transportation offered so those with mobility disabilities were unable to 

seek assistance. 

Jason and his mom, displaced from New Orleans to Dallas, sent us the following 

email three weeks after the hurricane: 

‘‘To Whom It May Concern: 

Presently, Jason (SCI, 11 years post) and I are homeless and living in a 

Salvation Army Shelter due to Hurricane Katrina. We had to leave our 

home, and all of Jason’s medical equipment (i.e. his hospital bed, electric 

wheelchair, hoyer lift, etc.). Since I am in a public place using one of the 

laptops that they have made available to us, I will not be able to write a 

long letter explaining all of our business. But I am writing now because we 

need some financial help. 

Because we don’t live in one of the shelter sites, we are out of the loop of 

things that are going on. We have not been able to secure clothes or any 

basic funding. FEMA is taking a long time to help and we are missing out 

on everything because we’re not able to get around. Jason is using an old 

manual wheelchair and I have to push him everywhere. This has been a 

strain on me also. 

If you can help us, please contact us. Any help we can get would be appreciated. We are desperate, so I’m grasping at any and all past contacts. Normally, I would never find myself in this sort of begging position. But this 

has been anything but normal. People’s lives were totally shattered. Families 

were torn apart. Please help us.’’ 

Jason ended up in the hospital for weeks as a result of the lack of medical equipment and supplies. 

We worked around the clock for weeks to try to get disability experts into the 

shelters to assess the needs of people who couldn’t hear the announcements over 

loudspeakers, or see the signage that directed them to assistance, people who were 

losing critical stability because they didn’t have access to medication to treat their 

mental illness, people whose eyes and kidneys and hearts were being attacked because they didn’t have insulin, people who didn’t understand what they needed to 

do to get food and water because of an intellectual disability and people who 

couldn’t stand in line for seven hours, or even seven minutes because they had lost 

their wheelchair during the evacuation. People housed in alternative settings were 

excluded from the myriad of relief programs at the shelters and unable to gain 

equal access to resources vital to survival and prevention of secondary complications. 

People without their wheelchairs, walkers and canes couldn’t stand in line. In the 

heat, many people were unable to wait for hours to be assisted and so those with 

the direst needs often had the least assistance. 

Some people, who need additional supports to maintain their independence, were 

forced to go to special needs shelters while family, other caregivers and even service 

animals were denied access to offer assistance. Once independence was compromised, people were institutionalized. I am told that many, many of these people 

have still not been located! 

One man in east Texas told us about having to drive from a shelter to the local 

hospital for weeks, every time he had to go to the bathroom because the bathroom 

at the shelter was not wheelchair accessible. 

In a recent report by the National Organization on Disability: ‘‘The most underserved group [in shelters] were those who were deaf or hard of hearing.’’ 

Less than 30% of shelters had access to American Sign Language interpreters. 

80% did not have TTYs. 

60% did not have TVs with open caption capability. 

66 

Only 56% had areas were oral announcements were posted. ‘‘This meant 

that people who are deaf or hard of hearing had no access to the vital flow 

of information.’’ 

(Report on SNAKE Project, Oct. 2005.) 

There are no estimates of the numbers of people with disabilities who were turned 

away from the shelters, those who were sent to nursing homes and institutions and 

those who were able to evacuate to locations other than shelters, sometimes further 

isolating them from the vital services they needed to protect their independence and 

their health. 

Recently, when I asked people how much financial assistance they received from 

the Red Cross, 70% told me they had not received any assistance and of those who 

had, most reported receiving $360. The highest amount received was reported by 

one man who received $680. 

And while thousands remain homeless and in need of financial assistance to cover 

mortgage payments, rent, utilities and basic necessities, just recently, I learned that 

$66,000 in foreign donations have been given by FEMA to the United Methodist 

Committee on Relief (UMCOR) and the National Voluntary Organizations Active in 

Disaster (NVOAD). 

The case management program, promises to ‘‘assist disaster survivors with unmet 

needs’’ but none of the $66M can be used to meet those unmet needs, rather the 

$66M will be used to hire paid staff who will hire volunteers to provide ‘‘case management’’ to 100,000 hurricane survivors. No efforts seem to have been made to 

reach out to disability service provider experts to participate in this project, and in 

fact, the website for the project and the instructions for responding to the RFP are 

not accessible, even though accessibility is required. Even the telephone is a problem for many as it is a New York number and there is no 800 or TTY line. I have 

to wonder if the $66M would have been better allocated to pay rent and child care 

so people can get back to work and get on with their lives instead of meeting with 

more volunteers. And, for people with disabilities, I wonder how skilled volunteers 

will be at navigating complicated systems that regularly confound experts. I have 

to wonder if this plan will decrease or increase unnecessary institutionalization! 

Along with everyone else, I have learned over the past three and a half months 

that for all of the planning that has gone on, people with disabilities are not in good 

hands and without immediate and bold steps, their needs will remain entirely 

unmet just as soon as the next disaster strikes. I wish that generic systems were 

capable of holding the very specific and often complex needs of people with disabilities in the foreground as they make quick and sweeping decisions, but in a country 

that still thinks nursing home placement trumps community based care for people 

with disabilities on a sunny day, it is obvious that we can’t rely on generic decisionmakers to make smart decisions about the needs of people with disabilities in the 

midst of disaster. 

We have learned that just as we can’t expect well-intentioned medical and public 

service personnel to adequately address the complex needs of people with disabilities in day-to-day situations, without a deep and thorough understanding of the tenets of independent living and self-determination or absolute clarity about the 

human and civil rights of people with disabilities, we also can’t expect these dedicated community members to understand the complexities of meeting the additional 

needs of people in the midst of disaster. 

However, with some smart investments, not only can people with disabilities 

begin to trust that their needs will be better met in future disasters, taxpayers, generous donors and the general public can rest assured that we are maximizing limited resources and minimizing unnecessary waste. 

In fact, amidst all of the projections of huge additional costs to meet the real 

needs of our citizenry in a disaster, there is clearly an opportunity for visionary policymakers to SAVE tax dollars while maximizing limited resources, now, who could 

possibly argue against that! Thanks to you Chairman Ramstad, the needs of people 

with disabilities, and the hope of visionary leadership hasn’t been lost. I know you 

will invite your colleagues to join you in prioritizing the needs of hurricane survivors with disabilities as next steps are taken. 

Recommendations to the Red Cross 

1. Issue additional guidance to shelters regarding their legal and ethical obligation to serve people with disabilities. 

2. Establish an Office on Disability, and staff it with disability experts known 

to the disability community as strong leaders with a track record of meeting 

the additional needs of people with disabilities in a disaster. Give that Office 

67 

direct access to the CEO of Red Cross, power and adequate funds, support 

staff and other resources. 

3. The in-take forms used for people coming into shelters must be revised so 

that disability-specific information is collected. 

4. Training and leadership is urgently needed to provide guidance to Red Cross 

employees and volunteers regarding their obligations to serve people with disabilities. 

5. Actively pursue partnerships with disability related organizations. 

6. Every shelter must have at least one volunteer on duty at all times who is 

knowledgeable about identifying individuals with disabilities when they arrive 

at the shelter, helping to identify that individual’s needs and then helping 

with or directing those individuals to appropriate assistance. 

7. People with disabilities must be carefully tracked, and so must their equipment. When they leave a shelter, there must be information kept on file about 

where they were sent. 

8. Nursing homes and institutions must be alternatives of last resort and never 

used for more than temporary shelter for previously independent people, and 

those receiving their supports and services in the community. 

9. In the future, why not put all shelter services in the same building, rather 

than separating people with additional needs from their family and limiting 

natual supports that may mean the difference between dependence and independence. 

10. The American Red Cross needs to increase its capacity to use technology at 

all levels. 

The very same housing crisis that has kept hundreds of thousands of people 

across the U.S. in restrictive living environments is now putting previously independent and self-sufficient disaster survivors in hospitals and nursing homes for 

lack of appropriate housing that allows them to use a bathroom and sleep in a bed. 

We are still working to get to the tables where key decisions are being made about 

temporary and permanent housing. We have been trying to get to those tables with 

powerful housing nonprofit organizations who have access to substantial funds for 

rebuilding. We are trying to talk about universal design, accessibility and 

visitability. We’ve been attempting this since it first became apparent that housing 

would be a critical need. Yet, even today, housing decisions are being made that will 

result in discrimination, further limited options and institutionalization of people 

who could and should be in our communities and in our workforce. 

Additional Requests: 

Please encourage the appropriate Committees in both the House and Senate to 

hold additional oversight hearings on topics within their jurisdiction. For example, 

Medicaid would be an important topic for an oversight hearing. 

Many nonprofit organizations that already operate without adequate resources 

have had to use their limited funds to address the needs of disaster survivors with 

disabilities as well as their usual constituency. Supplemental funds need to be given 

to these groups to support their continued viability to serve our communities now 

and in the future. These organizations, independent living centers, local chapters of 

national organizations, protection and advocacy systems, etc. are at the heart of the 

solution. We know this; let’s make sure we support what IS working. 

PLEASE do not allow ANYONE to convince you to compromise the hard-won civil 

rights of people with disabilities. Our rights remain fragile even today, and these 

rights are easily overlooked or dismissed in a time of emergency. This is illegal but 

if that isn’t enough it’s also costly. Be good stewards of tax and donor dollars! Just 

say no to limiting or violating the civil rights of people with disabilities! 

Hurricane survivors are afraid that the rest of us are getting ‘‘Katrina Fatigue.’’ 

I encourage you to join me in assuring our fellow citizens that while THEY are entitled to Katrina Fatigue, they can count on the rest of us to stay focused and keep 

things moving forward. 

It is in Benilda’s memory and with deep appreciation towards those who have 

worked tirelessly over the past fifteen weeks in the Gulf States, in Washington, in 

cyberspace and around the country that I will close with the following Chinese proverb: 

The best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago. The second best time is now. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. 

f 

68 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Thank you very much, Ms. Roth. We appreciate your testimony. Ms. Archaga. 

STATEMENT OF YAVONKA ARCHAGA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

RESOURCES FOR INDEPENDENT LIVING 

Ms. ARCHAGA. Chairman Ramstad, Ranking Member Lewis, 

and Representative McCrery and all other Members present, thank 

you for giving me the opportunity to testify here today on this vital 

issue. 

Resources for Independent Living is the center that I represent. 

I am the Executive Director. This center has been in operation for 

over 15 years. We provide an array of services to individuals with 

disabilities. 

Those services include the four core services: Information referral, advocacy, peer support and independent living skills training. 

In addition RIL is one of the largest personal care attendant services organizations in the southeast region of Louisiana. 

I will discuss the services we provide outside of our normal scope 

of operation due to the catastrophe and the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. It became so apparent to us days after landfall that 

our center’s services were transformed by the overwhelming unmet 

needs identified by individuals with disabilities. Although the shelters provided housing and food for individuals with disabilities, we 

had to step in and fill in the gaps. 

RIL delivered durable medical equipment and transported consumers to sites where they could receive other social services such 

as food stamps, Social Security disbursements, unemployment information and benefits. In addition we also provided clothing, 

adaptive accessible equipment, food packages, and so forth, to consumers within the shelter. 

Our center identified the immediate needs of the consumers and 

we responded. Our jobs were made more challenging, gentlemen, 

by the lack of accessibility in the shelter. It is disconcerting that 

decades after Section 504 was passed, access to shelters, which in 

many cases are operated by organizations that are recipients of 

Federal funding, remains at best problematic. 

Accessibility is not only defined in the ability to physically get 

into a building, but also by the ability to meet the basic living 

needs of persons with limited mobility in preparation for people 

with disabilities in the event of a disaster. 

According to the National Council on Disability, of the 484,000 

residents in New Orleans before Hurricane Katrina, 23 percent of 

those individuals were people with disabilities. Charities such as 

the Red Cross need to find a way to obtain expertise about the 

needs of persons with disabilities and must develop and implement 

disaster response plans specific to addressing the needs of the disabled community. 

In order to respond in a way that meets the needs of persons 

with disabilities, the Red Cross needs to rethink its operating principles. Increasingly the disabled community operates based on an 

independent living philosophy that promotes maximizing independence and maximizing an individual’s control over their own lives 

and support networks in settings that are as close to fully integrated as possible. 

69 

Furthermore, the Red Cross and other charities needs to embrace 

this element of independent living philosophy. Many persons with 

disability have pets and working dogs, caregivers and assistive 

technology. Charities must develop procedures to provide reasonable accommodations and work with the disability community to 

ensure that volunteers are well versed in these policies. 

Problems in service gaps encountered by people with disabilities 

in shelters operated by charities, including the Red Cross: 

The Red Cross shelters were not equipped with interpreters. 

They were not equipped with materials in alternative formats. 

They did not have durable medical equipment and accessible communication equipment and specifics on dietary needs of consumers. 

Consumers were isolated and not offered services specific to their 

needs. Staff and volunteers did not have the skills, training and 

knowledge to work with the disabled community. The staff and/or 

volunteers did not perform basic needs assessments to determine 

the types of disabilities individuals had to determine if the consumers had adequate medication on hand or to determine if consumers were on a restricted diet. 

Individuals were often denied entry into shelters if they had a 

service animal or significant adaptive equipment or were separated 

from their families and caregivers in the process of obtaining shelter and placed into institutions or recommended to go to institution. 

Problems that my organizations experienced: 

Representative McCrery, I understand what you were going 

through because I was on the ground as well. It was very, very difficult, gentlemen, for us to get in, and then also to respond with 

short notice. Planning is very vital, and we need to be at the table 

with everyone, and we need to know, because the second wave that 

is coming, gentlemen, is the next hurricane season. We have to be 

prepared. We have to be ready. All of us have to be on the same 

page. 

Referrals of consumers by FEMA to our organization: 

It is interesting that our organization was a referral base for 

FEMA, and we took the calls for individuals with disabilities. We 

had a loss of power. Our office was hit from the hurricane as well, 

but we had to do what we had to do to respond to the community. 

We don’t have the resources that an organization like the Salvation 

Army or the Red Cross may have, but we did the best that we 

could do in light of what was needed. 

In conclusion, we know that the Red Cross and other charities 

are operated with the best intentions who want to do the right 

thing. However, substantial reform is needed in the way that these 

agencies deliver their services and operate their shelters to ensure 

that persons with disabilities already caught up in the tragic circumstances of a natural disaster, such as a Hurricane Katrina, 

don’t have the tragedy compounded by avoidable human error in 

the aftermath. 

Persons with disabilities make up nearly one-fifth of the Nation’s 

population, and charities need to be responsive to the needs of 

those who they are charged to serve, beginning with the compliance 

of Section 504. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Archaga follows:] 

70 

Statement of Yavonka Archaga, Executive Director, Resources for 

Independent Living, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 

Introduction 

Chairman Ramstad, Ranking Member Lewis, and all other members present, 

thank you for giving me this opportunity to testify here today on this vital issue. 

Resources for Independent Living, Inc. (RIL) is a Center for Independent Living, 

which has been serving the Greater New Orleans and Baton Rouge areas for over 

15 years. RIL offers an array of quality, consumer-controlled services to individuals 

with disabilities to assist them with living independently. These include the four 

core services of information and referral, advocacy, peer support and independent 

living skills training. In addition, RIL operates one of the largest personal care attendant services in the southeast region of Louisiana. 

Once the devastation of Hurricane Katrina became so apparent within days after 

its landfall, our Center’s services were transformed by the overwhelming unmet 

needs identified by individuals with disabilities. Although the shelters provided 

housing and food for individuals with disabilities, RIL had to fill in the ‘‘gaps.’’ RIL 

delivered durable medical equipment and transported consumers to sites where they 

could receive other social services such as food stamps, SSI disbursements, unemployment information, etc. In addition, RIL provided consumers with clothing, 

adaptive/accessible equipment, food packages, etc. Our Center identified the immediate needs of the consumers and responded. Since addressing gaps in services and 

supports that limit individuals’ ability to live independently and empowering these 

individuals with the resources they required to make informed decisions on matters 

of vital importance, is consistent with the independent living philosophy, we worked 

days and nights, weekdays and weekends to make certain that their needs were met 

to the maximum extent possible. 

Our jobs were made even more challenging by the lack of accessibility in the shelters. It is disconcerting that decades after Section 504 was passed, access at shelters, which are in many cases operated by organizations that are recipients of federal funding, remains, at best problematic. Accessibility is not only defined by the 

ability to physically get into and out of a building, but also by the ability to meet 

the basic living needs of persons with limited mobility—such as having accessible 

restroom and dining facilities. In many cases, shelters were not physically accessible 

to persons with disabilities. And in many more cases the shelters were unable to 

make their programs accessible to persons with disabilities or to meet basic living 

needs of persons with disabilities. Given the demographics that I will point out 

below, these failures reflect a systemic problem, which cries out for change. 

Preparation for People with Disabilities in the Event of a Disaster 

In preparing for disasters, charities such as the Red Cross must consider the special needs of the disabled community as a central part of the planning process. Since 

persons with disabilities make up a large percentage of the population both in my 

region and across the nation, this must be factored into the planning and preparation process, BEFORE the next disaster—rather than after. 

According to the National Council on Disability, of the 484,000 residents of New 

Orleans before Hurricane Katrina, 23.2 percent of the population or 102,122 are 

people with disabilities. This means that there are 102,122 people with disabilities 

5 years of age and older who live in New Orleans. About 10 percent (or 12,000) of 

them are people ages 5 to 20 years old; 61 percent (or 63,000) of them are aged 21 

to 64 years old; and 29 percent (or 27,000) of the people are 65 years of age and 

older. The statistics are as compelling in other parts of the region hit by Katrina 

and Rita. In Biloxi, Mississippi, a city of around 50,000 residents, 26 percent of the 

population has disabilities. This means that there are 10,700 people with disabilities 

5 years of age and older who live in Biloxi. In Mobile, Alabama, a city of 198,915 

people, 24 percent of the residents are people with disabilities. This means that 

there are 43,000 people with disabilities 5 years of age and older who live in Mobile. 

Among the 102,122 people with disabilities living in New Orleans are residents 

who are blind, people who are deaf, people who use wheelchairs, canes, walkers, 

crutches, people with service animals, and people with mental health needs. At least 

half of the people with disabilities in New Orleans who are of working age are not 

employed. Many of the people rely on a variety of government programs such as 

Supplemental Security Income and Medicaid to help them meet their daily service 

and support needs. 

Charities such as the Red Cross need to find a way to obtain expertise about the 

needs of persons with disabilities, and must develop and implement disaster response plans specific to addressing the needs of the disabled community. These 

plans must include individual needs assessments, and identification of resources, 

71 

such as those who are knowledgeable in meeting the needs of the disability community, surrounding the disaster area to ensure a more immediate response to requests being made. Charities must work with federal, state and local emergency 

management officials to ensure that shelters are sited in accessible locations (consistent with the obligations of recipients of federal funding under Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973), have readily available interpreters, are prepared to provide essential communications in alternative formats, and provide accessible transportation, durable medical goods, medical equipment, and accessible communication 

equipment to those who need them. These items are vital to assisting the disabled 

community in responding to a disaster. 

In order to respond in a way that meets the needs of persons with disabilities, 

the Red Cross needs to rethink its operating principles. Increasingly, the disabled 

community operates based on an independent living philosophy that promotes maximizing individuals’ control over their own lives and support networks in settings 

that are as close to fully integrated as possible. A balkanized system of Red Cross 

shelters and ‘‘special needs’’ shelters makes no sense in most cases. Furthermore, 

the Red Cross and other charities need to embrace elements of the independent living philosophy. If they do not have the capacity to assist consumers in locating case 

management and provider agencies, doctors, family members and friends, then they 

need to develop databases of these resources and contract those responsibilities out 

to those who are experienced in the field. 

Finally, many persons with disabilities have pets or working dogs, caregivers or 

assistive technology. Charities must develop procedures to provide reasonable accommodations and work with the disability community to ensure that volunteers 

are well versed in these policies. 

Problems and Service Gaps Encountered by People with Disabilities in 

Shelters Operated by Charities Including the Red Cross 

The Red Cross shelters were not equipped at all with interpreters, materials in 

alternative formats, durable medical equipment, and accessible communication 

equipment or dietary items. Consumers were isolated and not offered services specific to their needs. Staff and volunteers did not have the skills, training and knowledge to work with the disabled community. The staff and/or volunteers did not perform basic needs assessments to determine the types of disabilities individuals had; 

to determine if the consumers had adequate medication on-hand; or to determine 

if the consumer was on a restricted diet. Individuals were often denied entry to shelters if they had service animals or significant adaptive equipment, or were separated from their family or caregivers in the process of obtaining shelter. 

Consumers were ‘‘delivered’’ to the shelters by buses from the affected areas. Once 

the consumers were ‘‘checked in’’ they were informed that they would receive information from social service state agencies. As my staff visited the shelters, they did 

not get to see anyone at the shelters except the staff and volunteers for many days 

after the storm. Once my staff reached the consumers in the shelters, they continuously expressed their frustration regarding the lack of assistance they were receiving and their inability to contact and communicate with state and federal agencies 

designated to assist them. Sometimes persons with disabilities were separated from 

caregivers, loved ones, essential durable medical equipment/assistive technology, 

and/or service animals. Finally, individuals with disabilities were often moved from 

shelters into institutional settings without paperwork noting where they were going, 

and without any way of applying for FEMA assistance or other benefits for which 

they may have been eligible. Even now, CMS only has a vague idea of where persons with disabilities who have been institutionalized in the aftermath of Katrina 

were sent. As a consequence, we still have been unable to locate many of those persons with disabilities who were consumers of our CIL before Hurricane Katrina hit. 

This is inexcusable and should never be repeated again. 

Problems Resources for Independent Living Encountered in Accessing 

Shelters 

Our Center was denied access to the Red Cross shelters. We held a staff meeting 

and decided that it was vital for us to get inside the facilities, thus we set out to 

convince the Red Cross staff that we were social service employees with skills, training and knowledge regarding the disabled community that they lacked. After many 

days of rejection and many days of persistence we were finally allowed inside. Once 

inside we were stunned to see the lack of services being offered to the persons with 

disabilities. We began conducting basic assessments of needs and begin delivering 

goods to the shelters for consumers. 

72 

Ongoing Problems and Need for a New Approach to Emergency Management for Persons with Disabilities by Charities Including the Red Cross 

Although the Red Cross is more visible than they were immediately following the 

storm, many inconsistencies in the service delivery remain. Consumers with disabilities are still waiting for services. Following the storm, the Red Cross would advertise locations but once we would go to the location it would be closed for various 

reasons. Consumers are not clear as to the role of the Red Cross. Consumers expected the Red Cross to make assessments of their need. Once the needs were identified the consumers expected the Red Cross to fulfill their requests. This did not 

occur. Also, the Red Cross needs to break down their mindset of ‘‘separate but equal’’ 

services to persons with disabilities which leads to the division of shelters into 

standard and special needs shelters. The special needs shelters are operated by primarily faith-based local charities, which despite the best of intentions often suffer 

from the same ignorance of the needs of persons with disabilities and the same lack 

of knowledge about the independent living philosophy and resources for persons 

with disabilities in their communities as the Red Cross. Having two sets of shelters, 

neither of which are staffed by people knowledgeable in meeting the needs of persons with disabilities defies common sense and undermines accountability. 

One set of integrated services responsive to the needs of persons with disabilities 

makes far more sense. The Red Cross has sometimes argued that the special needs 

shelters are necessary because they need to focus on mass care. But the reality remains that during Katrina, many people with disabilities wound up in the general 

population shelters because they have invisible disabilities such as diabetes and 

other chronic conditions, mental health considerations, etc. that are not readily 

identifiable. Regardless of the degree of effort by the Red Cross, persons with disabilities will keep winding up in the general needs shelters in future disasters. The 

Red Cross would be well served to adjust to this reality and rethink its service delivery structure accordingly. 

Referral of Consumers by FEMA to Resources for Independent Living 

Our New Orleans location, which hosts our main computer server, was damaged 

by the storm. As a result of the equipment failure, our Baton Rouge office did not 

have data or voice communications for about a month. We communicated through 

our cell phones, a mode of communication, which was severely limited due to storm 

damage to the cell phone towers. Once we got our phone system to work we began 

getting numerous calls from disabled consumers who stated they have been referred 

to our Center by FEMA. 

Centers for independent living do their utmost to assist each individual in need 

in order to remain or become independent in the community. Despite limited resources and the above-mentioned circumstances we remain committed to doing as 

much as we can. 

We did our best to respond to each caller but we are not equipped to service as 

large of a population with as numerous requests as we were getting. Our usual personnel complement and budget were inadequate to the need that was referred in 

our direction and we lacked access to financial resources due to our data communication problems. 

Needless to say, we worked many nights and weekends with limited resources and 

supports. As of today, we are still receiving referrals from FEMA. It is unfortunate 

that we are placed in a position to respond without receiving the funds to adequately perform the tasks expected. The Red Cross and other nonprofits receive 

funding to meet the needs of 100% of the population. Yet we have heard the Red 

Cross state that it is not their responsibility to meet the needs of persons with disabilities—over 23% of the population. Either the Red Cross and other entities need 

to restructure their service delivery in a manner that makes us partners in the process (for example, by contracting with centers for independent living in emergency 

situations) or Congress and FEMA need to explore ways of ensuring that organizations such as ours that are called upon to meet these needs in the aftermath of a 

disaster have funding and resources that match existing needs. 

Conclusion 

We know that the Red Cross and other charities are operated by individuals with 

the best of intentions, who want to do the right thing. However, substantial reform 

is needed in the way that these agencies deliver their services and operate their 

shelters to ensure that persons with disabilities already caught up in the tragic circumstances of a natural disaster such as Hurricane Katrina do not have that tragedy compounded by avoidable human error in the aftermath. Persons with disabilities make up nearly one-fifth of the nation’s population and charities need to be 

73 

responsive to the needs of those whom they are charged to serve—beginning with 

compliance with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. It is vital for charities to get 

to know the major players in the disability community. Charities must develop ongoing relationships with Independent Living Centers, Advocacy Centers, and Social 

Service agencies to assist them in effectively providing services to consumers. Charities need to learn about concepts such as the independent living philosophy and 

consumer control and either integrate these concepts into their own service delivery 

models or contract with those familiar with these models to address the specialized 

needs of persons with disabilities. 

I look forward to answering any questions that you may have. 

f 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Thank you, Ms. Archaga. Mr. Wyatt, 

please. 

STATEMENT OF JOHNNY G. WYATT, CITY MARSHAL AND 

HOMELAND SECURITY DIRECTOR, BOSSIER CITY, LOUISIANA 

Mr. WYATT. I am Johnny Wyatt, Bossier City Marshal. I have 

been marshal for 15 years. I have been Homeland Security Director 

6 months. Of that 6 months, half of it has been under fire. 

I would like to speak to you from my heart. I feel very fortunate 

to sit at this table with great colleagues. I have heard a lot of the 

testimony through the whole Committee today. There are some 

things that I would like to tell you up front I did wrong. 

Everybody kept talking about what went right. Well, it didn’t go 

right all the time. I ran a shelter that had 270,000 square feet. The 

largest contingency at night I had was a little over 1,400. I don’t 

know how many thousands went through the shelter. 

My biggest problem is in preparing to come here and doing interviews with the Red Cross, OEP, the mayor’s staff and everybody 

that was involved in our shelter. Some things came to light that 

I would like to share with you. 

One, I was pretty shocked to believe that the Red Cross informed 

me that the reason it took them 7 days to start feeding the people 

at Centurytel was they were allowing the faith-based community to 

do what they could. 

When I asked the question, are you telling me the idea of Red 

Cross is to let all of the charitable people do the best they can and 

when we exhaust that then you step forward, it was devastating 

to me, which meant when Red Cross closed their last shelter I still 

have people in hotel rooms, I still have all of the people who came 

forward and helped us at the beginning, who have depleted their 

funds now. 

Now, according to statistics, those shelters are closed and those 

needs are not met. I was shocked to know when they told me, oh, 

we could have started feeding them the first day. Really? No one 

was there. We called on the churches, who fed them for 7 days. We 

got cots from Red Cross only to find out that General Motors 

bought them. 

The point I am trying to make is we ran into some logistical 

problems running the shelter. I had never run a shelter. I can tell 

you when I took over the shelter I thought it was the worst assignment I could ever have had. Ten days later, I would have paid anything to be the shelter manager. It was unbelievably a great lesson 

in humility and gratification. 

74 

There were some fallacies. I saw them, like you talked about. I 

had a blind man’s dog taken away from him. I stopped that. Broke 

every Federal rule there ever was. Okay. The man finally gave up 

the dog because the dog was as scared as he was in a room with 

500 people. 

Okay. The Gideons weren’t allowed to bring Bibles in. I stopped 

that. They came in. 

They did not like the idea of us having Catholic services. We did; 

we had mass; we had a Protestant service; we had Alcoholics Anonymous (AA); we had Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings. We did 

what that community needed. We had 1,400 of our neighbors from 

the south, scared, hungry and lonely. That is what we had. 

It was real hard working with these people when you were doing 

everything you could 24/7, and then to find out after the fact that 

things broke down. Now, the truth of the matter is, Congressman 

McCrery—and I know that the Congressman wouldn’t want me 

just bragging on him—but in our area in the northwest corner, all 

of the leaders worked very well together through OEP. We rewrote 

the book. The book had not been revisited since 1998. We threw it 

away. We started fresh. 

The only person we could get to, to get communications statewide 

for us was Congressman McCrery’s office. If it had not been for him 

we would have really been in trouble. Some of the things that bother us, as they were talking about here, is when you have a national 

organization, such as the Red Cross or anyone else, you have got 

to be able to be flexible enough to adapt to the people’s needs, such 

as when the Philadelphia House was stopped from coming in to 

help the HIV patients. That is insane. 

Those type of things we corrected as we found them, but the 

problem is, when you come back and say we had a full triage at 

our place, we had doctors on scene, we could have all kind of medical help. They told me, oh, we could have provided it too. I said, 

why didn’t you provide medical help? Well, you did not need it. In 

fact, when they called and said we have medical help available to 

you, I turned it down. I said, I can’t believe you turned it down. 

They said, yes, you already had that provided. I said so let me see 

if I understand. 

I take away from all of my hospitals and all of my emergency 

rooms and all of my space, and I am doing it, we are handling it, 

and you could have stepped up and relieved some of that? Your answer is, we need to involve the community more. Well, the community was involved. I will have to tell you, we made a lot of mistakes. 

I can tell you I have learned from it. I heard a lot of questions 

asked today, and I am going to close very quickly with this. We are 

in the process of constructing a 50-by-150 foot structure that will 

house 3- to 400 cots, bedding, clothing, water, food, everything necessary for 3 to 5 days, because in Bossier, we know one thing. We 

are not going to get any help for 3 to 5 days. If we don’t own it, 

we don’t get it. 

I bought the first six wheelchairs for Centurytel. Before 

Centurytel closed somebody gave us 50. I only needed 10. So, it is 

a matter of organizing and putting a leader in charge. I believe you 

have to come up with whoever the first person is to step up and 

75 

say I am in charge, right or wrong it all goes through me, and that 

way everybody can coordinate those activities. You know where to 

get the wheelchair. 

The very blind man that was there, I had to mail him his cane 

10 days later. I put him on an airplane to his brother, but I got 

the stick to him for the blind man 10 days late. Now that is crazy. 

I had an autistic child in a room with 500 people sleeping. Do 

you know what that poor child’s sensory overload was? We would 

take her aside into a restroom where she could touch animals and 

feel safe. I had a Down’s Syndrome man that I couldn’t place in a 

nursing home because the caretaking mother who was 75 and his 

brother, which was 4 years older, did not qualify. 

So, we finally found residents. So, what I am saying to you is, 

our pleas here are not to lay blame. Our pleas here are for you to 

take an action, Mr. Chairman, representing our government that 

says, this person is in charge, and we are all going to work with 

this person. If you don’t work with him, there are going to be penalties because we cannot afford to ever have a tragedy like this 

happen again. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wyatt follows:] 

Statement of Johnny G. Wyatt, City Marshal and Homeland Security 

Director, Bossier City, Louisiana 

On Saturday September 3, 2005, at 8:30 a.m., I became the Incident Commander 

for the Centurytel Center Shelter by request of Mayor Lo Walker. 

The Centurytel Center is an oval building similar to the Superdome in New Orleans, LA. The arena will hold some 15,000 seated. During the crisis, our largest 

count revealed that we had just over 1,400 neighbors, children included, from the 

south sleeping in our shelter. 

We initially started providing security check-in, medical triage, shower/restroom, 

clothes, and food. This would be accomplished the first day with the help of the 

First Baptist Church, which provided food, cots and clothes, and Willis Knighton 

Hospital, which provided full triage with medical staff, not the Red Cross or any 

other organization. 

The Office of Emergency Preparedness and the Red Cross were contacted and 

asked for volunteers to help the staff of police officers, firemen, and Deputy Marshals that had taken over all the responsibilities of the shelter until we could be 

approved as a Red Cross shelter. 

Volunteers from the area and local churches immediately started working with 

the firemen to set up cots with bedding, while others opened up the kitchen to start 

preparing and serving food from the local churches. We operated 7 days utilizing 

the food services of the local churches before the Red Cross secured a contract to 

begin supplying food to the neighbors in the shelter. 

Because of the prior working relationships with local Sheriffs, Chiefs of Police, 

Fire Chiefs, Mayors, hospitals and churches, we were able to obtain any and all of 

our needs within the first 72 hours while we were operating on our own. We established communication with Patrick Jackson, Head of the National Guard for the 

local area who was stationed in Baton Rouge, who helped coordinate transfers from 

his area to ours. D.C. Macham, of the Bossier Parish School Board, was called upon 

to start registering children in local schools. McDonald’s, Wal-Mart, Porter’s Cleaners, Bass Pro Shop, and other merchants opened their stores and hearts with donations for every request that we had. 

When the Red Cross finally approved CenturyTel as a shelter, I was placed in 

contact with American Red Cross representatives Mike Cantrell and Jeanne Jennings from California. There were many problems from the very beginning, which 

ranged from volunteers being turned away, to the extreme incident of a volunteer 

who tried to commit suicide in the parking lot. At this point the Red Cross leaders 

were more trouble than the little help they brought us. In many ways I felt as 

though their numerous ‘‘rules’’ kept us from doing the right thing. 

I had to override some of their rules, such as when I learned that they would not 

allow the Gideons into the building to distribute Bibles to those wanting one. I also 

informed the Red Cross that we had a room outside of the arena in which we were 

76 

going to hold both Catholic and Protestant worship services, as well as Alcoholic 

Anonymous meetings, and any other service that I thought might help to serve the 

poor souls that were our neighbors from the south. I also had a confrontation with 

the Red Cross when they took a seeing eye dog away from a blind man in a wheelchair. When I asked why, they informed me they had to have the dog tested by the 

Blind Association. My response was not good, for in the middle of all the chaos in 

trying to house all these people, the idea of not trying to help a blind man was unbelievable (a letter from Mr. Littlejohn, the blind man mentioned above, is also enclosed). 

The inability of the Red Cross to coordinate efforts from other organizations such 

as Adult Protection, New Horizons, The Arc and Evergreen was also a hindrance. 

The Philadelphia Foundation was also turned away when offering to assist with any 

HIV victims. This led to the final confrontation with Jeanne Jennings while I was 

on the phone with Mr. Richard Wright from Congressman McCrery’s office and she 

demanded that I stop and talk to her first. At that point I advised one of my deputies to remove her from the building and if she tried to return to arrest her for remaining after forbidden. Within 24 hours, a Mr. Paul Unger met with me as the 

new Red Cross shelter manager for CenturyTel. He was a joy to work with. What 

I did not know until he had been with me for almost a week was that he was not 

with the Red Cross nationally, but was actually a volunteer from another shelter 

who had been assigned to cleaning restrooms. He approached the shelter management and advised that he had a management background and asked if there was 

some way he could better serve. Paul was told to report to CenturyTel as the Red 

Cross Shelter manager as the prior manager had been asked to leave. 

In addition to the churches and groups mentioned above, another volunteer organization that did outstanding volunteer work here was the Salvation Army. Every 

time I asked for help their response was when and where, never whether they could 

or not. I personally watched Steve, the head of the local Salvation Army, pick up 

a homeless drunk, place him in his car, and take him back to the shelter. The Bossier Relief Fund was established by several church members and local citizens who 

gave money to be used for bus tickets, long distance calls and other items that 

would help connect our visitors with members of their extended families who could 

offer them immediate help. New Horizons worked with the mentally challenged as 

did the Association of the Blind to help those in need. 

As mentioned above, Paul Unger arrived as a volunteer who eventually became 

the Centurytel Shelter manager. Within days of his arrival, Paul had become ‘‘Mr. 

Red Cross’’ and did an outstanding job. I will close with a quote from Mr. Unger. 

‘‘I do not look for praise, I emotionally cannot handle any more. God has blessed 

me with an opportunity to use my skills and help others. It has been the most fulfilling weeks of my life. My workers and guests have also graced me with more compliments and hugs than I could ever count. That part is done. I hope to be able to 

share my experience with others in order to explain what skills are desperately 

needed to make the system work in a time of disaster. Also to allow others to recognize the contributions of the many churches who helped in so many ways. Without 

them, we might as well just drop rations from the sky. They, along with community 

volunteers, administered the Red Cross resources to the people. They turned food 

into meals, they turned shelters into homes, and they provided friendship when 

friends could not be found.’’ 

I am here to answer any questions, and let it be known that my being allowed 

to manage the largest shelter in Bossier City was the greatest lesson in humility 

and gratitude than anyone could be given. I gladly await the opportunity to answer 

any questions. Thank you for your time. 

SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING RESPONSE TIME: 

1. Allow the approval for a new Red Cross site to be less cumbersome. 

2. The ability to supply/increase necessary goods such as, but not limited to, cots, 

bedding, food, water, clothing. While supplies are not always readily available, 

the ability to have sources to call upon within a 250-mile radius would allow 

the necessary supply/replenishment within 24 hours. 

3. Have one person as the go to person for all services for a particular agency. 

This person would require depth of knowledge of all resources available. 

f 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Thank you, Mr. Wyatt. It is obvious to the 

Chair that the good people of Bossier City, Louisiana, are well 

77 

served by their Homeland Security Director. Thank you for your 

very compelling testimony. 

I want to ask a couple of questions. Ms. Roth, I know in working 

with you in other venues, I know as Co-Chair of the bipartisan Disabilities Caucus, for example, we held a hearing on some of these 

problems, and I know you have been involved since September 

11th, since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, you have been 

involved in helping prepare disaster relief agencies meet the needs 

of people with disabilities. 

I think everybody was shocked to hear some of the horror stories 

that happened to people with disabilities who were hurricane victims, who were evacuees. Was the problem the lack of a plan in 

place for charities to meet the needs of people with disabilities, or 

was the plan just not followed? 

Ms. ROTH. I think the problem is very simply lack of leadership 

outside of the disability community and lack of access within the 

disability community. There has been a tremendous amount of 

planning. The disability community has done a wonderful job of 

planning for the disaster-related needs of people with disabilities. 

We have been excluded again and again from the general relief 

agencies. We have been excluded from the opportunity to give our 

expertise, to give our knowledge to those folks. That is why we are 

calling for offices on disability in any place we can. 

As I think you said so eloquently, if somebody steps up and says, 

I am in charge, everybody else darn well better start listening to 

them. Disability experts can take charge. We are happy to take 

charge. We understand other people don’t quite get it, but we need 

to be in a position to be able to step up. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Well, hopefully one of the results of today’s hearing will be to include people with disabilities and your 

organizations, those of you who represent people with disabilities, 

in all of the planning for natural disasters and other emergency situations, because there must be better preparedness and delivery of 

services to the disabled community and you need to be part of that 

planning. I hope all of the organizations, be they nongovernmental 

or governmental, get that message. 

I also want to ask Ms. Archaga a brief question. Thank you as 

well for all that your organization does to provide for people with 

disabilities, to allow them to enjoy the dignity of independent living, which is so essential to all of us. I just want to ask, one of the 

purposes of this hearing, as I said at the outset, was to ensure that 

people with disabilities and other underserved groups are not neglected when the next large disaster strikes. 

What recommendations would you make to charities to ensure 

better preparedness and delivery of services to the disabled? What 

specific recommendations would you make? 

Ms. ARCHAGA. That we definitely have to be at the table, at the 

planning, development, and most importantly implementation. I 

think the crucial part is that we need to be there when the storm 

is named. We need to be at the table directing where individuals 

should go and putting our consumers’ interests at heart as well. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Prior, if I may ask both of you representatives from organizations concerning people with disabilities, had either of your organizations been consulted prior to Katrina or Rita 

78 

as to emergency preparedness for people with disabilities? For example, how essential access to these shelters is, access to the bathrooms within the shelters, and other basic questions that affect so 

directly people with disabilities? Had either of your organizations 

been contacted or consulted? 

Ms. ROTH. My organization has tried to force its way in wherever we can, but we very rarely have been invited. Even now we 

are very rarely invited to the table, almost never invited to the 

table unless we sort of force our way in and say, hey, we have 

something we can offer you. We would like to think that those days 

are coming to an end and we will be invited, welcomed to the table 

right from the start. 

Ms. ARCHAGA. Sir, we were not invited. Most importantly, I 

would like for you guys to understand that when we went to the 

shelters to get in and identified ourselves we were denied access. 

We had to get very creative to get in, because we knew it was vital 

to get in. Once we got in and the volunteers and the staff members 

understood what we were doing, then we were welcomed back continuously. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Did the people at the shelter, the officials 

in charge, have a handle, did they have a directory of people with 

disabilities living in the shelter? 

Ms. ARCHAGA. No, sir. They really did not have much. One of 

the problems that we had was that they did not capture information in the first 2 or 3 weeks. So, when we would go back for our 

consumer, they weren’t there and we did not know where they 

went. So, that is very frustrating for us, because we know what 

their needs were, and we knew that we needed to get to them. So, 

there was no information. We were even told that we cannot come 

in. It is confidential information. We understand confidential information, but we only wanted to get in just to assess their needs and 

to meet their needs. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Well, and this invitation goes to all four 

members of the panel and everybody in this country. If there are 

Federal regulations, and, Mr. Wyatt, you cited and alluded to some 

that were just nonsensical in terms of this disaster situation and 

the problems you encountered. Make us aware of them. Submit 

those, if you will, so that we can address them here in the Congress. 

Mr. Wyatt. 

Mr. WYATT. One thing that was brought up earlier, and I think 

would be a good start is when we started registering people for Red 

Cross, we had no system to do so. We took my probation department’s computer system, and designed it, changed it up, and 

worked, but we could not use that to hand it to anybody to 

download. 

So, we literally printed out thousands of sheets of paper and 

handed it to the Red Cross, who was going to have to redo that in 

another computer. So, in the organizational structuring, following 

a person once they have hit a shelter is critical for their maintenance and supplies. 

One of the things that was fearful for us was when FEMA decided that they were going to give everybody $2,000. When I heard 

that in the first meeting, I had just come off a 24-hour shift and 

79 

I was not in the best of shape, and I just wanted to know who was 

going to buy the spray paint to put a big V on their chest for victim, because if you took 1,000 people and gave each of them $2,000 

in my building it was going to be chaos. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Well, again, thank you, Mr. Wyatt. Again, 

the Chair would just reiterate, we aren’t here as Monday morning 

quarterbacks, more exactly Tuesday afternoon quarterbacks, to 

point fingers. We are here to make sure we identify the problems 

and that we all work together in a collaborative way so that when 

the next disaster strikes we don’t have a recurrence of these problems, they don’t keep resurfacing and victimizing people over and 

over again. 

Certainly any emergency plans or preparedness, any emergency 

preparedness warrants the participation of the National Spinal 

Cord Injury Association on behalf of people with disabilities, warrants the inclusion of RIL, your organization, Ms. Archaga, the National Multiple Sclerosis Society, and the Disabled Veterans, on 

and on with the respective organizations representing people with 

disabilities. 

So, I hope this is the last time you are excluded from planning, 

because the people of America, people with disabilities in this country deserve better. 

The Chair would now recognize the distinguished Ranking Member for questions. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate your very meaningful questions and statement, really. 

I guess I should have asked representatives from the Red Cross 

and the Salvation Army, but the two of you from Louisiana, you 

have been there on the ground. You have been there. You have 

seen it, and I know you have unbelievable stories to tell and you 

have been very moving. 

How was the decision made when a group of people came in and 

people was placed on planes and buses? I have heard people say, 

well, they said we are going someplace. We ended up in Atlanta or 

Minnesota or end up in the State of Washington. Did they put people with disabilities on planes and buses and take them out of their 

State? Do you have any knowledge? How was it done? Did somebody in the Red Cross make that decision, or the Salvation Army? 

How was it made? Some people didn’t know they were going some 

place until they landed, apparently. 

Mr. WYATT. Right. One of the biggest problems we had was we 

would get a call. There would be three buses coming from Lafayette. We would never know when they left, who was on them, what 

care they needed, and when they were going to arrive. After a day 

or two of the frustration of having that, we would stop them when 

they would call and say there is a bus coming, saying stop. Is there 

anyone on that bus with a cell phone? Give them our number so 

we can talk to them to find out what they need in the way of care, 

whether they were ambulatory, did they need to go to special needs 

hospitals, which we had available. 

Usually though, you are absolutely right, Congressmen. They 

would show up unannounced. I got two buses brought to me by the 

Black Panthers, in the middle of the afternoon, that had been 

abandoned, two buses that the bus drivers actually ran away. 

80 

Somebody called Houston, Texas and got some Black Panthers. 

They brought them to us, and they were great neighbors. They 

brought them to us. They helped us get them checked in, and they 

took the buses back to the police department. 

So, we got them from everywhere. There was no coordination of 

that. The best we could hope for is the OEP tried their best to coordinate through Baton Rouge. The problem is, we worked well in 

a region together, but communication-wise, getting a State organization to manage us was not available. 

That is what we were needing. We were needing somebody to 

step up to the leadership role and say we are going to look over 

FEMA. We are going to look over Red Cross. We are going to look 

over Salvation Army, and we are going to guide these things to 

you. We never knew. 

So, we had to keep doctors around the clock, because we did not 

know what was walking in the back door, where it would have 

been a lot better to be able to place them on call and then call them 

back in 30 minutes. You are absolutely right. Great question. 

Ms. ARCHAGA. Congressman Lewis, in regard to our consumers, 

prior to Hurricane Katrina, we went on—post the storm, we went 

on this scavenger hunt, looking for our consumers. We had no idea 

where they were. Once we finally made contact, and our toll free 

number was up and running, they made contact with us. We were 

told that we were sent to Memphis, we were sent to Arkansas, we 

were sent to Alabama. Why? How? I don’t know. We went over to 

the Red Cross shelter. We were at the shelter, and they told us, 

okay, here is a bus. You have to go. Once they left the Superdome, 

this is the shelter that they took them to. It was not a decision. 

They had no idea where they were going. 

They had no idea they were going to be in Denver, they had no 

idea where they were going to be. What we have done, speaking 

of our policies, is continue to serve them. We could not stop serving 

them. So, we continued to serve them in Louisiana, although they 

were in other States, until that transition occurred. So, we never 

stopped our services. 

Ms. ROTH. May I add? I knew that in Chicago there was a very 

surprising situation in which a man with a spinal cord injury arrived at the airport in Chicago. No plans had been made for him. 

Nobody knew he was coming. He was about to be sent to a nursing 

home, when folks at the Center for Independent Living in Chicago, 

Access Living, somebody gave them a heads up about the situation. 

They stepped in. One of the staff members came, picked up the 

guy. He moved into their house, and they were able to save him 

from being placed in a nursing home. There were stories like this 

across the country. 

Also, I want to add in response to the issues about the law, it 

is very important that at the same time that we are having these 

discussions there is a piece of pending legislation that has been introduced several times that would require 90-day notification if 

someone were going to sue under the Americans with Disabilities 

Act (P.L. 101–336). 

It is really important to us to point out that this is a classic example. If people first had to give notice of a need for accessibility, 

90 days would be a horrible burden for anyone. Making sure that 

81 

all accessibility is assured is really the priority in this. Really the 

Americans with Disabilities Act is our most important civil rights 

law that needs to be implemented and enforced. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Thank you, Mr. Lewis. Chairman 

McCrery. 

Mr. MCCRERY. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. I want to 

thank the panel for their testimony. I would second your suggestion that the citizens of Bossier City are indeed well served by Mr. 

Wyatt, both in his official capacity as Marshal and in his voluntary 

capacity as Emergency Preparedness Director. 

Chairman RAMSTAD. Thank you, Mr. McCrery. Thank you to 

all four members of this panel for your very helpful testimony. We 

look forward to working with you and your organizations. The 

Chair also would like to thank the members of the audience for 

your interest and for being here today. 

Seeing no further business before the Subcommittee, the hearing 

is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Submissions for the record follow:] 

Statement of American Arts Alliance, Inc. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, the American Arts 

Alliance is grateful for this opportunity to submit testimony on behalf of our member organizations—American Symphony Orchestra League, Association of Performing Arts Presenters, Dance/USA, OPERA America and Theatre Communications Group—and the audiences they serve. 

The arts play a disproportionately large role in the economy of the areas 

affected by Hurricane Katrina. 

Culture is the second largest industry in Louisiana and tourism is the fifth largest 

employment sector in Mississippi. Arts and culture accounted for 7.6 percent (7.6%) 

of Louisiana’s employment—more than 144,000 jobs across the state, 57,000 of them 

in New Orleans alone. 

As with other sectors of the economy, the destruction of physical property and resources to community cultural and artistic institutions is immense. Tens of thousands of artists, arts administrators, and educators have been dislocated, left without the space or equipment needed to work. Facilities such as theaters, museums, 

galleries, concert halls, and studios are severely damaged or destroyed. Many surviving venues are being used to house evacuees. 

Performing arts organizations are serving the affected communities and 

displaced families. 

Recovery goes beyond providing mere material necessities. Displaced arts educators and artists have been key participants in creating recovery programs especially for displaced children and families. Performing arts organizations in host cities such as Houston have offered free admission to displaced Katrina families. Arts 

organizations whose own venues are unusable have taken the show on the road performing at the shelters and temporary housing. Artists from across the country have 

held benefit performances to raise money for the victims of the hurricane. In a gesture of solidarity, New Yorkers who suffered in 9/11 held a dance benefit, ‘‘Ballet 

to Ballroom’’ in October at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas. All proceeds from the performance and the silent auction that followed it went to the Mayor’s Disaster Relief Fund to benefit displaced persons in Dallas. And arts organizations in communities across the U.S. have offered temporary employment to displaced artists. 

New Orleans Ballet Association 

Among the hundreds of thousands affected by Hurricane Katrina were the students, faculty and staff of the New Orleans Ballet Association (NOBA), an awardwinning community school and Creative Communities site providing free arts instruction to 1,200 inner-city children at three schools and 14 after-school sites. Creative Communities is an arts education, youth development and community building 

82 

strategy that partners community schools of the arts with their local housing authorities to provide youth in public housing communities with high quality, sequential arts instruction. As with much of the rest of New Orleans, NOBA is now faced 

with rebuilding from the ground up. All but two of the schools and after-school centers with which NOBA works were completely flooded. 100% of NOBA’s students 

have been displaced, as have the school’s staff and faculty. 

In November, NOBA held free dance classes at three satellite locations—Lafayette, Baton Rouge, and Metairie. Displaced New Orleans artists taught children displaced by the hurricane and children in the host communities. NOBA also partnered 

with two Baton Rouge based dance companies—Baton Rouge Ballet Theatre and Of 

Moving Colors—to raise money to support local teaching artists and to give them 

performance opportunities. 

In January, NOBA will resume offering free dance classes in Orleans Parish at 

the one New Orleans Recreation Department center that is operating at Tulane University. The free program started in Metairie will continue in the spring. The Creative Communities free dance program in the public housing developments of New 

Orleans is expected to resume summer 2006. 

Southern Rep 

The Southern Rep is a nonprofit professional theatre in New Orleans. The theatre 

was broken into by looters during the storm and the building in which the theatre 

is housed, The Shops at Canal Place, suffered major damage. They estimate that 

25% of their audience has lost their homes. Southern Rep’s office and rehearsal 

space is being used by the Small Business Association’s Disaster Relief Program. 

Southern Rep had to cancel the first four shows of its season but hopes to reopen 

by the end of February. In April, they plan to co-produce THE SUNKEN LIVING 

ROOM, one of the two world-premieres that were scheduled for the year, with New 

Theatre in Miami, Florida. They plan to reopen the theatre in May with a production of KIMBERLY AKIMBO and THE LAST MADAM. They also plan to start offering acting classes again in the summer. All of this will be done with a drastically 

reduced staff of one full-time and two part time employees down from a staff of 50 

before Katrina. 

The Gulf Coast Symphony Orchestra 

Despite the loss of instruments and homes, the musicians and staff of the Gulf 

Coast Symphony Orchestra, located in Biloxi, continue to bring quality music to the 

people of the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The Orchestra’s venue, the Biloxi Saenger Theater is located just one block from the edge of the tidal surge. On November 19th, 

the Orchestra held its first concert since the hurricanes destroyed the entrance to 

the theatre. Displaced musicians and patrons used a back street approach through 

heavily damaged areas to perform in and attend one of the first cultural events to 

occur on the Mississippi Gulf Coast following the hurricanes. Virtually every seat 

in the house was taken as 78 musicians performed, and nearly everyone on both 

sides of the stage lights had been directly affected by the hurricanes; from minor 

damage to completely losing everything. While the Symphony Orchestra plans to 

hold a January performance, it will likely be forced to cancel the remainder of the 

concert season, due to a drastic drop-off in donations. Nevertheless, the Orchestra 

regards itself as an integral part of the recovery and rebuilding effort, providing 

healing for the minds and spirits of musicians and audience members, and is currently hoping to recover in time for the 2006–07 season. 

The Gulf Coast Symphony Youth Orchestra is struggling to find its scattered student musicians and secure undamaged rehearsal space. The Youth Orchestra will 

not be back to full strength for the next few years. 

The Columbia Theatre/FANFARE 

Southeastern Louisiana University’s Columbia Theatre for the Performing Arts is 

located 50 miles from New Orleans in Hammond, Louisiana and was among the 

hundreds of thousands affected on August 29th when Katrina and its damaging 

winds hit. Despite the damage, Columbia Theatre forged ahead with its month-long 

arts festival, FANFARE, in October. Determined to keep its doors open, this theatre 

served as a coping mechanism for the community. Hundreds came to hear the 

music, see the dance and share with each other the sense of community so desperately needed. 

With no phone service or mail and no hotel rooms for the guest artists, the determined Columbia Theatre purchased beds and asked its Board members to buy pillows and blankets. For the entire month of October FANFARE operated a hotel 

within the theatre’s auxiliary spaces, with a men’s dorm downstairs in the conference center and a women’s dorm upstairs in the dance studio. The theatre purchased a bigger hot water heater for its three showers. In addition to making beds, 

83 

doing laundry, preparing food (most caterers were unavailable), FANFARE presented approximately 55 events. Artists who slept backstage included the Harlem 

Gospel Choir (New York City, NY), Toxic Audio (Orlando, FL), Capitol Steps (Washington, DC), Odyssey Dance Theatre (Salt Lake City, UT) and Aquila Theatre Company (New York City, NY). 

Cultural tourism is a major force in these local economies and tourism will 

not rebound until arts and culture rebound. 

A vital performing arts community is necessary for the recovery of the Gulf Coast 

region. Unfortunately, performing arts organizations are not eligible for two forms 

of vital emergency relief. Under current Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) policy, performing arts facilities are not eligible to receive FEMA relief as 

a private nonprofit facility. All nonprofit organizations are not eligible for economic 

injury loans from the Small Business Administration that help with operations 

costs. The U.S. Small Business Administration can make federally subsidized physical disaster loans to nonprofit organizations to repair or replace disaster-damaged 

property not covered by insurance, but economic injury loans appear to be only 

available to for-profits businesses. 

Conclusion 

Performing arts organizations are a vital component of community life, allowing 

citizens to appreciate our nation’s culture and heritage through excellent artistic 

programming. The arts illuminate the human condition, our history, contemporary 

issues and our future. Arts organizations in the Gulf Coast region have a strong 

commitment to serving their communities, and are dedicated to being a part of the 

rebuilding efforts. There is a misconception that federal resources are available for 

the nonprofit performing arts in the hurricane-affected regions. For the nonprofit 

performing arts to return to the Gulf Coast region in a robust way, communities 

will need access to significant, ongoing support from all sectors. 

f 

Statement of Audrey Alvarado, National Council of Nonprofit Associations 

Introduction 

The National Council of Nonprofit Associations (NCNA), the Louisiana Association of Nonprofit Organizations (LANO), and the Mississippi Center for Nonprofits 

(MCN) respectfully submit this testimony to the Subcommittee on Oversight of the 

House Committee on Ways and Means. 

The National Council of Nonprofit Associations (NCNA) is the network of state 

and regional nonprofit associations serving over 22,000 members in 46 states and 

the District of Columbia. NCNA links local organizations to a national audience 

through state associations and helps small- and mid-sized nonprofits: 

• Manage and lead more effectively; 

• Collaborate and exchange solutions; 

• Save money through group buying opportunities; 

• Engage in critical policy issues affecting the sector; and, 

• Achieve greater impact in their communities. 

LANO is a statewide network of over 800 nonprofits, foundations and individuals 

dedicated to improving the nonprofit sector to provide quality services to Louisiana 

citizens. While much of the attention in the hurricane recovery has focused on the 

damage to the state’s physical infrastructure and business enterprises, the damage 

to the infrastructure of private, nonprofit institutions has been at least as great and 

perhaps even more devastating. These institutions care for the poor, enrich cultural 

life, extend educational opportunities, develop communities, and train the unemployed—all functions that are especially critical to the recovery effort that is now 

underway. LANO is working with the Urban Institute to survey all Health and 

Human Service providers in the affected area. The data gathered will provide a 

clearer picture of the status of the nonprofit sector and the needs of the community. 

MCN is the only nonprofit management center in Mississippi that serves over 

6,000 community and faith-based nonprofit agencies. In the past four months, it has 

become clear that the nonprofit and faith-based communities have become the heroes in recovery efforts, continuing to do their mission work despite no electricity, 

food, water or, often, shelter for their own staff and volunteers. In response to 

Katrina’s devastation, MCN has organized meetings, conducted assessments and 

launched a childcare recovery initiative that has led to the opening of a Gulf Coast 

office of the Center. Additionally, MCN is in constant contact with its organizations 

84 

1 44 C.F.R. § 206.221. 

who were most affected by Katrina in order to inform the public, funders, leaders 

and others regarding the state of these groups as their needs change. 

NCNA represents and serves small- and mid-sized nonprofits with budgets of less 

than $1,000,000. These organizations are the face of the nonprofit sector; they make 

up 75 percent of the nation’s nonprofits and are on the front lines of some of the 

nation’s most pressing social problems and solutions. Most recently, small- and midsized nonprofits have been at the forefront of efforts to rebuild the Gulf Coast region 

in the aftermath of Hurricanes Rita and Katrina. Small- and mid-sized nonprofits 

have direct experience with the enormous challenges that communities face after 

hurricanes and have vital information regarding how to address immediate and long 

term needs to improve the quality of life and preparedness in communities across 

our country. However, they are least likely to have adequate resources to meet and 

articulate the needs of their constituents. Their experience and voices are needed 

to ensure that we learn from our most recent experience and prepare for future disasters. 

Nonprofits are an important resource that many families and individuals turn to 

for direct assistance. Nonprofits have stepped up and served local communities and 

helped improve the lives of people in the region. Unfortunately, the existence of 

these organizations is threatened by dwindling budgets, damaged facilities and a 

fleeing workforce. Like the business community, nonprofits need the support 

of the federal government to rebuild and sustain their efforts. 

NCNA, through its state associations in Louisiana and Mississippi, has gathered 

information from nonprofits and identified three legislative actions that would increase nonprofits’ ability to serve and meet the growing demands for services. 

We urge Congress to enact the following legislation. 

• Allow nonprofits a two-year reprieve of the requirement to secure matching 

funds in order to receive local, state, and federal grants. This will provide relief 

to nonprofit organizations that state and local governments currently rely on to 

deliver much-needed services to local communities without requiring the allocation of additional resources. 

• Direct the Small Business Administration (SBA) to revise its regulations to 

allow nonprofits to qualify for economic injury loans, not just physical disaster 

loans. 

• Direct FEMA to revise its directional guidance in order to clarify and expand 

the eligibility of certain private nonprofit organizations for disaster assistance. 

Two-Year Reprieve to Secure Matching Funds. 

Congress can help nonprofits continue to deliver much-needed services to local 

communities without requiring the allocation of additional resources. 

We urge Congress to allow nonprofit organizations a two-year reprieve of 

the requirement to secure matching funds in order to receive local, state, 

and federal grants. 

A reprieve from match-requirements would: 

• Allow nonprofits to continue to receive government grants that have already 

been allocated; 

• Alleviate the burden of fundraising for nonprofits in the disaster areas; 

• Support services in the disaster areas by allowing organizations to focus on 

serving rather than on fundraising; and, 

• Enable the nonprofit sector to maintain a critical portion of its employment 

base. 

Request that FEMA Clarify Eligibility of Private Non-Profit (PNP) Organizations for 

Certain Disaster Assistance. 

The Public Assistance Program, administered by FEMA, provides supplemental 

Federal disaster grant assistance for the repair, replacement, or restoration of disaster-damaged, publicly owned facilities and the facilities of PNP organizations. 

Currently, certain PNP organizations cannot qualify for this assistance, due to 

FEMA’s directional guidance rules. 

We urge Congress to enact legislation that directs FEMA to revise Recovery Division Policy Number: 9521.3 in order to clarify the eligibility of PNP 

organizations for certain disaster assistance and have the rule conform to 

the statutory definition indicated below. 

The formal regulatory definition of a PNP organization and facility used for disaster relief,1 as defined by congressional statute, is less restrictive than the FEMA 

85 

2See 15 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)(2). 3See 13 C.F.R. § 121.105. 

guidance in regards to ‘‘PNP facility eligibility’’ rules. The regulatory definition indicates that: 

• There is no specific exclusion of recreational facilities in the Public Assistance 

Eligibility Rules; • ‘‘Community centers’’ are included in the category of facilities providing essential governmental services; and • Eligible ‘‘public facilities’’ specifically include public buildings used for ‘‘educational, recreational, or cultural’’ purposes. 

Request that the Small Business Administration (SBA) Amend Regulations to Allow 

Nonprofits to Be Eligible for Economic Injury Loans. 

Nonprofit organizations are eligible for some forms of federal disaster relief assistance if they are located in a county declared a Major Disaster Area (within Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi) or in a state that is hosting evacuees from Hurricane Katrina (Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Oklahoma, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia). 

The SBA can make federally subsidized physical disaster loans available to nonprofit organizations to repair or replace disaster-damaged property not covered by 

insurance, including inventory and supplies. Nonprofit organizations, however, are 

not eligible for economic injury loans from the SBA that help with operational costs. 

Under current federal rules, economic injury loans are only available to for-profits. 

We urge Congress to enact legislation that directs the SBA to amend its 

regulations to support the original intent of the statute and allow certain 

charitable organizations to qualify as ‘‘small business concerns’’ for the 

purposes of receiving economic injury disaster loans. 

The limitation to nonprofit eligibility for economic injury loans is due to the SBA 

definition of who may qualify for such loans. The congressional statute governing 

the SBA provides that the SBA may make such loans as it determines necessary 

to any ‘‘small business concern’’ located in an area affected by a disaster if the SBA 

determines that the concern has suffered a substantial economic injury as a result 

of the disaster.2 SBA regulations define a ‘‘small business concern’’ as a business 

entity organized for profit.3 This needlessly restricts some crucial nonprofits from 

qualifying for assistance. 

Summary 

Nonprofit organizations are on the front lines of the battle to help our communities in need. The charitable or nonprofit sector has long been viewed as a significant resource for the social support system in the United States. In partnership 

with government and the private sector, charities have come to fill the gap for needs 

in a wide range of areas. Small- and mid-sized nonprofit organizations in particular 

have the best experience and expertise to provide cost-effective services—and to do 

so locally without multiple layers of bureaucracy. In the wake of Hurricanes Rita 

and Katrina, many charitable organizations are struggling to meet the increased 

needs of the people in the Gulf Coast region, without having the necessary resources 

to do so. NCNA, LANO and MCN urge Congress to suspend the matching requirement for nonprofits to receive grants; clarify FEMA eligibility rules to allow certain 

nonprofits to qualify for aid; and, change SBA rules to allow nonprofits to qualify 

for economic injury loans. These actions will help ensure that nonprofits are able 

to fulfill their missions in partnership with government—and rebuild and sustain 

communities devastated by Hurricanes Rita and Katrina. 

f 

Statement of the National Fraternal Congress of America 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

On behalf of the National Fraternal Congress of America (NFCA) and our 76 

member-societies, representing 10 million fraternalists nationwide, we appreciate 

the opportunity to provide this statement to the Subcommittee’s, as it reviews the 

response of charities to Hurricane Katrina. 

By way of background, the NFCA represents fraternal benefit societies 

(fraternals), which are organized under section 501(c)(8) of the Internal Revenue 

Code. The governing statute requires that fraternals meet two requirements that 

embody the concept of mutual aid. First, fraternals must operate under a lodge system for the exclusive benefit of their members and, second, they must provide for 

86 

the payment of life, sick, accident, or other benefits to their members and their 

beneficiaries. While fraternals are not charities, they nonetheless are structured and 

operated to support national and local charitable activities in communities throughout the country and they always are at the forefront of disaster relief. 

Fraternals are unique organizations with many having been in existence since the 

Civil War. In essence, fraternals use the revenues received from providing insurance 

and other benefits to members to support the lodge system, one of the greatest 

forces for public good in America today, and to support charitable activities. While 

fraternal mutual aid primarily is achieved by providing personal and family financial security to members, fraternals, through the lodge system, support local communities throughout the year and provide special assistance in times of crisis. For example, the lodge system is what made it possible for fraternals to be a first responder to the Hurricane Katrina disaster. 

In effect, each fraternal has an existing, organized network of its members that 

meets regularly to consider and implement community-based projects. This includes 

mobilizing quickly to respond to crises. In 2004, our member-societies expended approximately $400 million on charitable and fraternal projects—excluding special relief efforts—and volunteered more than 91 million hours nationwide. 

When Hurricane Katrina struck, the lodge system went to work without delay. 

Within 24–48 hours of Katrina’s landfall—and before governmental relief efforts 

began—fraternal lodge volunteers were on the ground distributing water and food 

in the affected areas. Within the week, fraternals were providing food, shelter, and 

supplies to care for babies and children of displaced families. A number of fraternals 

in the South, most notably Woodmen of the World, opened up their summer camps 

to displaced families for lodging within a week of the hurricane. By the third week 

of September, fraternal volunteers began supplying cleaning supplies and assisting 

families trying to get back into their homes. Within a month of Hurricane Katrina, fraternals had raised upwards of $16 million that was specifically targeted to hurricane relief, and that amount continues to 

grow. Further, through the lodge system, fraternalists already have devoted hundreds of thousands of volunteer hours in support of ongoing hurricane relief efforts. 

Fraternal benefit societies provided hurricane relief in two ways. First, through 

the lodge system our members directed their own relief operations, building on existing facilities in the affected region or using the lodge system to quickly organize 

relief efforts. For example, the Louisiana Councils of the Knights of Columbus 

served thousands of meals to hurricane evacuees, and organized efforts to deliver 

ice, food, water and other supplies through truck convoys to the affected areas. The 

Modern Woodmen of America collected and delivered books and toys for children 

who were displaced by Katrina and used their regional network of lodges to organize 

the delivery of these items. Members of Thrivent Financial for Lutherans devoted 

thousands of volunteer hours and raised almost $1 million for hurricane relief in 

the weeks immediately following the disaster. 

Fraternals also work with and support existing charitable organizations. One fraternal has pledged $5 million to Habitat for Humanity towards new homebuilding 

for Katrina victims, with another $6 million pledged to directly assist victims in 

their recovery efforts. Another fraternal has been instrumental in contributing funds 

toward rebuilding local churches, schools and general infrastructure. Still other 

fraternals raised funds to assist the American Red Cross in its efforts, including 

funds raised through matching programs in which a fraternal matches funds raised 

by their members at the lodge level. And hundreds of thousands of fraternalists support the activities of organizations such as Habitat for Humanity through personal 

volunteer efforts. 

It is our understanding that one purpose of the hearing is to ‘‘explore areas where 

service delivery, preparedness and coordination could be improved,’’ and we would 

like to offer some observations based on our experience. 

Local presence is extremely important in any significant relief effort. When conditions require that relief be delivered quickly and effectively under difficult circumstances, there is no substitute for having volunteers on the ground and the ability to organize them quickly. Fraternals, by statute, must be organized under the 

lodge system, which means that there is always in place a network of volunteers 

who are prepared and motivated, both to devote their time and personal efforts to 

assist victims of a national disaster, as well the ability to very quickly organize 

fundraising campaigns. Within a day of Hurricane Katrina, fraternals began relief 

efforts. 

Noting the contribution of fraternals to Katrina relief, Senator Rick Santorum (R– 

Pennsylvania) stated in a recent Senate Finance Committee hearing that ‘‘[w]e have 

seen that within 48 hours of Katrina, the nation’s fraternal benefit societies were 

feeding, housing, providing supplies, clothes, toiletries, cash and beds to those in 

87 

1This sentence stands out too much. I would cut it. If that’s not an option, I would try to 

incorporate it into the previous sentence by saying over 32,000 autonomous clubs. 2 I’m afraid that this could be interpreted by a non-Rotary audience as sounding too exclusive. 

I would say that ‘‘the first priority was to provide food and shelter to the victims’’ instead. 3Some people took a lot of flack for using this term. 

need in shelters both in Houston and in New Orleans. During the first week of this 

effort, fraternals already had expended upwards of $14 million on hurricane relief, 

a sum which is expected to increase as those efforts broaden.’’ 

Ten million Americans have chosen to join fraternal benefit societies because they 

believe that giving back to their communities should be a way of life. Our members’ 

response to Hurricane Katrina, as well as to Hurricanes Rita and Wilma, demonstrated once again that fraternals are a unique national resource that provides 

community assistance quickly and effectively. 

We urge the Ways and Means Committee to foster and encourage the growth of 

community-based organizations like fraternals that always will be ready, willing 

and able to lend a helping hand in time of need. Government efforts are critical and 

government, of course, has the greatest resources, but there is no substitute for 

Americans coming together at the local level to help friends and neighbors in time 

of crisis. This is who fraternals are and what they do and have done for almost 150 

years. And with the Congress’ continued support, fraternals will continue their important role for many years to come. 

f 

Statement of Rotary International, Evanston, Illinois 

Rotary is an organization of business and professional leaders united worldwide 

who provide humanitarian service, help build goodwill, and support global peace 

and international understanding. Founded in 1905 in Chicago with four members, 

in 2005 Rotary celebrated its Centennial with over 1.2 million members in over 

32,000 autonomous Rotary clubs in 168 countries.1

Rotary clubs responded immediately to the crisis after the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. The first priority was to provide food and shelter to the victims.2 Rotary clubs and districts (a group of 50–70 clubs) from throughout the affected Gulf 

Coast region sprang into action to collect necessary food and supplies, raise money, 

and provide shelter to evacuees.3

On 31 August, two days after the disaster, Rotary International President CarlWilhelm Stenhammar asked all Rotary clubs in affected areas to share information 

with Rotary headquarters so that Rotary’s global network would know how to best 

support relief efforts. By 1 September, several Rotary members had already contributed funds to local Rotary districts and donated essential goods. 

As evacuees were transported to Texas, Rotary members, particularly from Rotary 

District 5890 in Texas, served as critically needed volunteers to aid victims in Houston’s Astrodome. Rotary club members worked around the clock, dividing coverage 

with 20-people teams for every eight hours. Rotary worked alongside the American 

Red Cross, local police, fire officials, and the Federal Emergency Management Association to provide any assistance that was urgently needed. 

One story of Rotary’s immediate relief efforts includes the rescue of a British exchange student stranded at the University of Southern Mississippi. Rotary club 

members in Ontario, Canada, worked to secure her school transfer to the University 

of Windsor in Ontario, Canada. A Rotary member in Mississippi waited three hours 

in line to buy enough gas to drive the student from her dorm room to the closest 

town with an available flight to Windsor. The student was able to continue her studies with limited interruption to her exchange year. 

Within one month of the disaster, Rotary clubs sent and distributed over 1,400 

‘‘ShelterBoxes’’ to the most critically needed areas of the Gulf Coast. ShelterBox is 

a Rotary grassroots organization that customized its usual emergency boxes for 

Katrina victims to include two ten-person tents, water purification tablets and miscellaneous tools and equipment. The ShelterBoxes have helped accommodate some 

28,000 people with dry shelter and clean water. 

Rotary District 6840, in Louisiana and Mississippi, developed several projects to 

help reconstruct devastated areas, including public libraries, restoration of local 

child care facilities, repair and restoration of flooded homes, cleanup, laundry services, the development of lockable storage units, and the distribution of Christmas 

88 

4 Unnecessary. 

toys and gifts. The district serves as but one example of the work Rotarians have 

been doing to serve the victims 4 of Hurricane Katrina. 

District 6840 also joined with Districts 6820, 6880 and 6200 in Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana to administer over $400,000 in donations received for Hurricane Katrina Relief. These funds are available for anyone in need in the affected 

areas and are not restricted to use by Rotary members. 

To help address the large number of donations offered, Rotary clubs in 12 Southern and Midwestern states, including Louisiana and Mississippi, established the 

Katrina Relief Fund in cooperation with The Rotary Foundation. The fund has 

streamlined the flow of contributions from Rotarians around the world looking to 

assist victims of the Hurricane Katrina disaster. More than $1 million has been contributed through the Katrina Relief Fund in conjunction with The Rotary Foundation. 

The latest update on Rotary’s efforts in the area can be accessed at 

www.rotary.org. 

Æ