CSI REPORT

No. 4

NOTES ON MILITARY ELITE UNITS

by LTC Gary L. Bounds

COMBAT

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

90-3780
CSI REPORTS are short-term research papers prepared in response to official inquiries.

REPORTS are based mainly on secondary sources and provide basic information on

the subject under consideration. The views expressed in a CSI REPORT are those of

the author and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department

of Defense.

COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE

Missions

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a departmentlevel activity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CSI has the following missions:

1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns of the

Army and publish the results in a variety of formats for the Active Army and

Reserve Components.

2. Prepare arid present instruction in military history at USACGSC and assist other

USACGSC departments in integrating military history into their instruction.

3. Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's executive agent for the

development and coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military

history instruction in the TRADOC service school system.
No. 4

NOTES ON MILITARY ELITE UNITS

by LTC Gary L. Bounds

Combat Studies Institute

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Prepared in response to TRADOC Chief of Staff

request (16 March 1984)

90-3780
CONTENTS

Preface ii

Historical Examples of Types of Elite Units 1

General Characteristics of Elite Units 1

Why Do People Join 2

Other Factors/Considerations . 2

Historical Examples . 3

Vignette

1. World War 1 3

2. World War II 3

3. 1st Special Service Force. . 4

4. The American Volunteer Group (AVG) "Flying Tigers11 .. . 4

5. U.S. Airborne (World War II and Postwar) 4

6. French Airborne 5

Summary

Sources
PREFACE

The attached notes were prepared by the Combat Studies Institute in

response to a request by TRADOC Chief of Staff, MG Robert Forman, to assist

in formulating ideas on elite forces using a historical perspective, CSI

staff members discussed the paper with MG Forman at a working luncheon

during his visit to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College on 16

March 1984. Present at the luncheon were the Deputy Commandant of the

College, MG Dave Palmer, and four historians from the Combat Studies

Institute.

Most of the material in the "Notes" come from Roger Beaumont's Military

Elites and Eliot Cohen's Commandos and Politicians. These two works address

elite units in general. Many other works on elite units address specific

operations of elite forces; some of these works appear under sources. This

is not a comprehensive study of elite forces and only represents an overview

prepared in response to MG Forman's request.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF TYPES OF ELITE UNITS

Types*

Ceremonial

Combat Proven

Praetorian (Bodyguard)

Ethnic

Political-Idealogical

Romanticist/Atavistic

Technological/Proto-Cybernetic

Nihilistic

Func t i on a1/Ob j ec t ive

Examples

Philadelphia Black Horse Troop

The Iron Brigade

The Early SS

Gurkhas

International Brigade

1st Special Service Force

79th Armored Division

Spanish Foreign Legion

Aviators

List spans the 20th century and was taken from page 3 of Beaumont's

book. Also some of the roles shifted after initial growth; the SS, for

example, acquired a combat proven role.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ELITE FORCES"

Lightly equipped.

Staffed by volunteers.

Distinctive uniforms or insignia.

Relatively free of ordinary administration.

Relatively free of ordinary discipline.

Will not accept nonvolunteers.

Created as "child of the storm.11

Special access to resources.

More military but also more political.

Highly mobile.

Hit-and-run raider role.

High physical and mental standards.

Rapidly formed synthetic traditions.

Entrance by "rite of passage."

Usually receive high level of media coverage.

Disdain for outsiders.

Small unit or individual actions.

Immunity from orthodox control.

Serve a political purpose.

Success breed proliferation.

May or may not apply to all of the historical examples above,

-1-
WHY DO PEOPLE JOIN

Enhanced sense of importance and achievement.

Additional pay.

Additional privileges.

Additional food allocations.

Excitement of participation in extra-legal type atmosphere above that of

the average soldier (i.e., kill by stealth, attack unaware).

Romantic image.

OTHER FACTORS/CONSIDERATIONS

Specialized elite unit requirements rob parent organizations of

leadership, and a "leadership drain'1 results. Privates in elite units

often could have been sergeants or lieutenants in conventional units.

Elite units usually have official recognition of elite status before

being assembled.

Elite units often trade youthful daring for time (fire brigade role) in

an attempt to make up for deficiencies in hardware or personnel.

Elite units often mirror successful enemy or friendly units of the past.

The decision to create elite forces has often been impulsive or intuitive.

Often the challenge for which the elite force was created disappears by

the time the units are ready for action.

Elite units are often misused because the need has vanished or the

conditions have changed.

Elite units serve in a laboratory role to test new concepts, weapons, and

organizations.

When elite units are too large as in the case of French Paratroopers and

the Waffin SS, they usurp conventional unit missions.

Placing elite units in intense battle situations creates a "selectiondestruction11

 cycle that usually results in diminishing numbers of

available high quality volunteers and in eventual disbanding of the force.

Resentment is often the reason for disbanding elite units. (Bradley and

Montgomery, for example, both shared a disdain for special units.)

-2-
Because elite forces are often created during a state of retreat, defeat,

or frustration, they can be symptomatic of leadership under pressure.

Elite units serve as "visual spice'1 for a political show of force, such

as mass airborne drops in the 1950s Cold War Era.

Volunteer casualties do not create the political feedback of conscripts.

Elite forces often have political origins, such as Churchill's British

Commandos, Kennedy's U.S. Army Special Forces, and Dayan's Israeli

Defense Force Airborne.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

Vignette 1: World War I

During World War I, the stalemate of trench warfare created conditions

of intense frustration because of high casualties, seemingly endless

artillery fire, and no sense of accomplishment. The stalemate forced a turn

to elite units, which required aggressive, reliable, and intelligent

personnel to carry out the operations. Examples were the German Storm

Troopers of the 1917-18 offensive, the Italian Arditi and Alpini, the

British and French tank units, and German U-Boats. The Storm Trooper

volunteers came from the urban middle class, and many had university

backgrounds. Training emphasized knives, handgrenades, entrenching tools,

and other individual weapons. The Arditi wore black shirts and distinctive

headgear and had a nihilistic motto, "who cares?11

Vignette 2: World War II

From December 1941 through November 1942, the United States experienced

a period of frustration from -not being able to respond to the German threat

with large-scale operations. As a result, the first Ranger Companies were

formed in England by MG Lucian Truscott. This action was approved by U.S.

Army Chief of Staff GEN George C. Marshall. The units formed, trained with

the British, and participated in a limited role in the Dieppe raid. After a

number of successful limited operations, they were used as a spearhead force

at Cisterna during the Anzio Beachhead expansion. In this conventional

role, all but six members of a 767-man forces were killed or captured. The

remaining numbers were either transferred to the 1st Special Service Force

or sent home to train new units.

-3-
Vignette 3: 1st Special Service Force

This Canadian-American unit was created to take part in a raid designed

to destroy Norwayfs industrial capability. The Canadians were high quality

volunteers, but the U.S. "volunteers" came, for the most part, from various

jails and detention facilities. Thus, the unit required restaffing, before

training. Political considerations kept the unit from being committed to

the Norway mission. The unit, however, still received airborne, mountain,

and Arctic training. Later, the unit was committed to the Italian campaign

and then to southern France. After suffering substantial casualties, it was

disbanded in December 1944. This unit enjoyed direct communication with

Ottawa and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Vignette 4: The American Volunteer Group (AVG) "Flying Tigers."

This elite group was chose from already elite pilot volunteers and

further screened training and combat. Characterized by courage and skill

and operating with deficient equipment, the unit had a strong visual image

(tiger's mouth on the radiator scoop) and made dramatic press copy.

Personnel for this illegal (by U.S. law) volunteer force were recruited by

representatives of the Chinese government during visits to U.S. Army and

Navy bases. Already carefully screened on medical grounds, trained and

ready to fight, they were offered lucrative one-year contracts and

dispatched to China under U.S. Navy escort in June 1941. The AVG, with its

excellent combat record, proved that properly screened, well qualified,

relatively highly paid elite forces could produce outstanding results: 299

confirmed Japanese aircraft downed plus 253 probable destroyed at a cost of

12 AVG planes lost in the air and 61 on the ground. These results occurred

in spite of disciplinary problems, including a virtual mutiny, during the

AVG's short existence.

Vignette 5: U.S. Airborne (World War II and Postwar)

During the reorganization of 1942, GEN McNair expressed concern over

the growing number of "specialized" units and suggested breaking up airborne

divisions, keeping parachutists separate, and making the rest into light

divisions. This plan was unacceptable to European Theater planners, and an

Airborne Center was established to develop doctrine and conduct training.

Airborne successes were uneven, and many times the rapid advance of ground

forces overran airborne objectives. Beaumont stated that Bradley

intentionally allowed objectives to be overrun so lift aircraft could be

used for supply runs to ground troops. In many instances, Allied airborne's

greatest contribution was in the diversion of enemy forces and materiel to

cope with real or perceived threats to the rear area. As is true with many

elite forces, practice ran ahead of doctrine in the airborne.

-4-
Actual use of Allied airborne forces varied: to overrun airfields in

North Africa, to seize key points in Sicily, to support beachhead operations

in Salerno, to flank cover and diversion on D-Day, and as a supplement to

the assault in southern France. During Operation Market, they served an

airborne role and later a more conventional role during the Rhine

crossings. The greatest misuse of airborne occurred when they operated for

long periods as conventional forces, a role they could not fulfill without

considerable attachments.

U.S. airborne soldiers in World War II were young, flat-stomached,

physically fit, and agile. These men received increased pay, special

insignia, and distinctive uniforms. That image continued as the young

airborne warriors of World War II (Gavin, Taylor, and Ridgeway) became

prominent postwar leaders. As the Cold War era unfolded, the elite airborne

units became America1s first-line reaction force for deployment

contingencies, such as in Lebanon in 1958 and in the Dominican Republic in

1965. After 1950, American maintained peacetime conscription, and the

Airborne became more of an elitist institution when all lieutenants

commissioned in the Regular Army were required to take such training. This

qualification served to distinguish between groups of officers as well as

enlisted men.

Vignette 6: French Airborne

Late in developing during World War II, the French airborne came into

its own during the postwar years. The classic example of the misuse of

French airborne occurred at Dienbienphu in 1954. The Viet Minh, with the

help of artillery supplied by the Chinese, besieged the French camp and

eventually won the battle. Dienbienphu as since been compared to Arnhem,

reflecting many of the same characteristics of elite force misuse: vague

concept, confused command, lack of surprise, poor communications, resupply

failure, operation at edge of the resupply aircraft range, weak

intelligence, and poor choice of terrain. These factors all combined to

defeat both the British elite forces at Arnhem and the French forces at

Dienbienphu.

Summary

The following comments appear relevant based on the sources consulted.

Casualty rates for elite forces are usually higher than for conventional

units in both peace and war. For example, the 10th Mountain Division

suffered five times more casualties than conventional forces and the

heaviest wartime casualties in the Italian Campaign based on relative time

-5-
in combat. The creation of wartime elite forces has not come so much from

need as from a desire to cope with frustration brought on by defeat,

pressure, personnel shortages, or economic and materiel shortfalls. From a

historical perspective, wartime elite units were "children of the storm,11

created in response to a specific challenge, and they often spent too long

in the preparation process and, after initial use, were attrited through

malassignment and misuse. This process usually led to disbanding after a

period of time.

Elite units cause "leadership drains*" Many of the highly motivated

enlistees of these units could have gone on to higher rank in conventional

units. In a sense, promotion would be stifled if it were not for the high

number of leader casualties in elite units. These high casualty losses

create what Beaumont calls a "selection-destruction" cycle that leads to

depletion of assets (highly motivated, high quality personnel) that are not

readily replaceable. Not only does this leadership drain create shortages

for future replenishment of elite forces, but it also makes high quality

leadership less available for conventional units that must carry the bulk of

the fighting load.

It also appears that, during wartime, elite units are often misused and

create numerous intra-organizational problems. Special considerations

detract from overall force productivity.

During peacetime, elite units seem to be somewhat better received by

the Army as a whole. One of the primary roles for elite forces is to serve

as "visual spice" to political initiatives. Their use in this role was and

is a good way to demonstrate force presence and technological advances.

Casualties, except for training accidents, are not a major drain during

peacetime. The "leadership drain" still exists to the detriment of

conventional units when an elite force is too large. Many critics felt that

elite forces should be assigned restricted missions, that operations should

be small-scale, and that units should remain below brigade size in order to

preclude their use as regular infantry. Elite forces serve a real purpose

but must be considered in the context of the total force structure.

Beaumont questioned whether elite forces were worth the cost and whether

their past effectiveness had enhanced the overall force structure. These

questions still need answers.

-6-
SOURCES

Beaumont, Roger A. Military Elites, New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1974.

Burton, Hal, The Ski Troops. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971.

Cohen, Eliot A. Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern

Democracies. Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard

University, 1978.

Edwards, Roger. German Airborne Troops. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and

Co., 1974.

Gavin, James M. Airborne Warfare. Washington: Infantry Journal Press,

1947.

Geraghty, Tony. This is the SAS. New York: Arco Publishing Co., 1983.

King, Michael J. nRanger Operations." Leavenworth Paper. Fort

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and

General Staff College, forthcoming.

Lucas, James. Alpine Elite. New York: Jane's Publishing, 1980.

McMichael, Scott R. Light Infantry Forces, CSI Historical Bibliography

no. 2 and accompanying chart. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies

Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984.

Mrazek, James E, The Fall of Eban Emal. Washington: Luce, 1971.

Sajer, Guy. The Forgotten Soldier. New York: Harper and Row Publishers,

1971.

90-3780-CGSC-1000-29 June 90 ~7 ~