United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 20-2417

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Gemma Edith Rosales-Reyes; Alexa Abigail Barbosa-Rosales; Fabian Emanuel 

Rosales-Reyes

 Petitioners 

v.

Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States

 Respondent1

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Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

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Submitted: April 15, 2021

Filed: August 4, 2021

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Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Gemma Edith Rosales-Reyes (Petitioner) and her two minor children, Alexa 

Abigail Barbosa-Rosales and Fabian Emanuel Rosales-Reyes (collectively, 

Dependent Petitioners), natives and citizens of Mexico, petition this Court for review 

1

Respondent Garland is automatically substituted for his predecessor pursuant 

to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2). 
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of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an order of the 

Immigration Judge (IJ) denying their claims for asylum and withholding of removal

under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture (CAT). We deny the petitions.2

I. 

On April 9, 2015, Petitioner sought admission at the San Ysidro, California 

port of entry. In an interview with United States Customs and Border Protection 

agents, Petitioner explained that she was afraid to return to Mexico. She was charged 

with being removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as an alien who, at 

the time of application for admission, was not in possession of valid entry 

documents;

3 she and her two minor children were issued separate Notices to Appear; 

2

Currently before this Court are petitions arising from case numbers 208-594-

176 (Petitioner’s petition), 208-594-177 (Alexa Abigail Barbosa-Rosales’s petition), 

and 208-594-178 (Fabian Emanuel Rosales-Reyes’s petition). The BIA declined to 

address Dependent Petitioners’ individual applications because they did not 

meaningfully challenge the IJ’s denial of those applications. We similarly treat as 

waived Dependent Petitioners’ individual challenges to the IJ’s denial of their 

applications and the BIA’s affirmance of that denial. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Sessions, 

902 F.3d 764, 770 (8th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “‘[i]f a petitioner fails to raise a 

particular issue when he appeals to the [BIA],’ the petitioner has not exhausted his 

administrative remedies with respect to that issue.” (citation omitted)). 

Consequently, we address Dependent Petitioners’ requests for relief only to the 

extent that they relate to their status as derivative petitioners of their mother’s 

petition. 

3

Petitioners argue that the IJ erred as a matter of law because while the IJ 

accepted Petitioner’s pleadings at the December 28, 2015 hearing and found her to 

be removable, Dependent Petitioners did not set forth any pleadings and the IJ, 

expressly reserving his ruling on removability as to Dependent Petitioners, never 

made a finding as to the Dependent Petitioners’ removability. However, Petitioners 

did not appeal this to the BIA, and as explained supra note 2, we address Dependent 

Petitioners’ requests for relief only insofar as they derive from Petitioner’s request.
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and all three were paroled. Petitioner and her children each filed applications for 

asylum and withholding of removal under the INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A), 

1231(b)(3)(A), and relief under the CAT, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208(16)(c), 1208.18, within 

a year of entering the United States. Petitioner also named Dependent Petitioners as 

derivatives of her application. After admitting the factual allegations against her and 

conceding the charges contained in her Notice to Appear on December 28, 2015, 

Petitioner appeared before an IJ on June 6, 2018, for a merits hearing. Petitioner 

was the sole witness at this hearing, and because the IJ deemed her testimony 

credible,4 we rely on that testimony for this factual recitation. See, e.g., Ngengwe 

v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1031 (8th Cir. 2008). 

While living in El Llano del Higo, a town within the municipality of Villa 

Purificación, and when walking to a store with her one-year-old son, Petitioner was 

pulled into a van by a group of men who placed a covering over her head. While 

her face was covered, the men pressed a live electrical wire against her one-year-old 

son’s hand. The men then made statements revealing their familiarity with 

Petitioner’s personal information, such as the names of her children and relatives 

and the fact that she worked at a local restaurant, before instructing her that she was 

to sell drugs for the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (the Cartel) from that

restaurant. They held Petitioner and her son for 24 hours without access to food, 

water, or a bathroom before giving Petitioner drugs to distribute, which she accepted 

but later disposed of. Once released, Petitioner did not report this encounter to the 

police because she believed that the police chief of Villa Purificación was a close 

friend of the Cartel’s leader, Ruben Oseguera Cervantes (or “El Mencho”) and 

worked with the Cartel. Instead, Petitioner traveled to Tijuana, Mexico, with her 

children before seeking admission at San Ysidro, California. Petitioner’s parents, 

fearful of living in El Llano del Higo after their daughter’s encounter, moved to 

4

The IJ noted two discrepancies in Petitioner’s testimony: first, how long the 

men held her and her son captive, and second, when her uncle was killed. The IJ 

nevertheless found Petitioner to be credible, explaining that it would not make an 

adverse credibility finding on those discrepancies alone.
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another area of Mexico, but Petitioner’s uncle, who moved into Petitioner’s house 

after she fled, was killed; bloodstains and shell casings found in the house suggested 

that Petitioner’s uncle was shot there and then moved to a second location, where 

his body was later discovered. Petitioner did not present any evidence indicating 

that the police investigated her uncle’s death, but the record does include his death 

certificate, which shows that he was killed by firearm projectiles. 

At the hearing, Petitioner testified that she had suffered persecution, or 

alternatively torture, at the Cartel’s behest because of her membership in a particular 

social group defined as “Mexican mothers who refuse to work for the Cartel.”5

 

Petitioner explained that the Cartel’s power, which is prominent in 21 of the 31 

Mexican states, coupled with the corruption present in many of the country’s police 

forces, would allow the Cartel to identify and harm her and her children should they 

be removed to Mexico. 

The IJ ultimately denied Petitioner’s and Dependent Petitioners’ applications 

for asylum and withholding of removal, treating Petitioner’s arguments as 

Dependent Petitioners’ arguments and finding that Petitioner failed to show she was

harmed because of her membership in a particular social group or her political 

opinion. Further, the IJ denied CAT relief, explaining that although the Cartel wields 

significant power in Mexico, the Mexican government does not consent or acquiesce 

to and is not willfully blind to the Cartel’s violence. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s 

and Dependent Petitioners’ appeal, affirming the IJ’s decision. Petitioner and 

Dependent Petitioners now petition this Court for review.

II. 

Petitioner challenges the BIA’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and 

protection under the CAT. “Only the BIA order is subject to our review, including 

5

Petitioner also testified that her refusal to distribute drugs on the Cartel’s 

behalf constituted a political opinion for which she was persecuted, but she waived 

this claim by not appealing it to the BIA and this Court. 
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the IJ’s findings and reasoning to the extent they were expressly adopted by the 

BIA.” Ngengwe, 543 F.3d at 1032 (citation omitted). “When[, as here,] the [BIA] 

adopts the IJ’s findings of fact but adds its own reasoning, we review the agency’s 

fact-finding in both decisions for substantial evidence.” Fuentes v. Barr, 969 F.3d 

865, 870 (8th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citation omitted). “We review the BIA’s legal 

determinations de novo and employ the deferential ‘substantial evidence’ standard 

when reviewing the BIA’s factual determinations.” Galloso v. Barr, 954 F.3d 1189, 

1191 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we will affirm the BIA’s 

factual findings “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude 

to the contrary.” Etchu-Njang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 577, 580 (8th Cir. 2005) 

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). We address each of Petitioner’s arguments in 

turn, ultimately concluding that the BIA did not err.

A.

Petitioner argues that the Cartel persecuted her because of her “membership 

in a particular social group,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), namely “Mexican mothers 

who refuse to work for the Cartel.” The INA bestows discretionary authority on the 

Attorney General to grant asylum to refugees. See id. § 1158(b)(1). A “refugee,” 

as defined by § 1101(a)(42)(A), is: 

any person who is outside any country of such person’s 

nationality . . . who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 

unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country 

because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account 

of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 

or political opinion.

This “discretionary judgment whether to grant relief under the asylum provisions 

‘shall be conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of 

discretion.’” Etchu-Njang, 403 F.3d at 580 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D)). “An 

applicant for asylum may prove eligibility by establishing past persecution on 

account of one of the statutorily enumerated grounds, and if the applicant shows past 
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persecution, he or she will be presumed to have a well-founded fear of future 

persecution.” Fuentes, 969 F.3d at 871 (citation omitted). “Under the [BIA]’s 

analysis, whether an asserted group qualifies as a ‘particular social group’ turns on 

whether the group is ‘(1) composed of members who share a common immutable 

characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the 

society in question.’” Fuentes, 969 F.3d at 871 (citation omitted). Whether 

Petitioner’s proposed group constitutes a “particular social group” is a legal question 

which we review de novo, see Ngengwe, 543 F.3d at 1033 (reviewing the BIA’s 

finding that the petitioner’s proposed social group did not constitute a “particular 

social group” de novo), but we review the BIA’s underlying factual findings for 

substantial evidence, see Fuentes, 969 F.3d at 870. 

Although we review the determination de novo, we lend deference to the 

BIA’s reasonable interpretation of “particular social group.” De Guevara v. Barr, 

919 F.3d 538, 540 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). “As to the social group’s 

particularity, it must ‘be “defined by characteristics that provide a clear benchmark 

for determining who falls within the group.”’” Fuentes, 969 F.3d at 871 (citations 

omitted). “Whether a given particular social group is perceived as distinct by the 

society of which it is part depends on evidence that the society makes meaningful 

distinctions based on the common immutable characteristics defining the group.” Id. 

(citation omitted). “Persecutory conduct aimed at a social group cannot alone define 

the group, which much exist independently of the persecution.” De Guevara, 919 

F.3d at 540. 

Here, the BIA, like the IJ, found that Petitioner’s proposed social group lacked 

the requisite particularity and social distinction because the evidence demonstrated 

that the Cartel victimizes any person who opposes it and not that the Cartel 

specifically targets Mexican mothers who oppose it. Although the record makes 

clear that the Cartel seized an opportunity to recruit a Mexican mother, who was 

vulnerable while walking alone with her one-year-old son, to distribute drugs for it, 

the record also shows that the Cartel indiscriminately victimizes anyone capable of 

furthering its operations. Petitioner submitted substantial evidence that in recent 
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years the Cartel has dominated much of Mexico and that, in the states where the 

Cartel is present, violence is also present. Even if we assume that being a Mexican 

mother creates a “clear benchmark” of who is or is not within the social group—i.e., 

that particularity exists—Petitioner still presents no evidence that this group is 

“perceived as distinct by the society of which it is a part” and that “society makes 

meaningful distinctions based on the common immutable characteristics defining 

the group.” See Fuentes, 969 F.3d at 871. Perhaps the only commonality shared by 

Mexican mothers who refuse the Cartel’s demands is that those mothers will face 

violence for their opposition. However, this is insufficient to meet the statutorily 

enumerated ground. See De Guevara, 919 F.3d at 540 (persecutory conduct aimed 

at a group cannot alone define that group). 

While we are cognizant of the inherent danger of living alongside the Cartel 

and sympathize with Petitioner’s experience, we find that Petitioner’s proposed 

social group, i.e., “Mexican mothers who refuse to work for the Cartel,” is not 

sufficiently particularized or socially distinct. See Fuentes, 969 F.3d at 871. 

Additionally, insofar as Petitioner relies on her uncle’s death as evidence of 

persecution, we have previously explained that such evidence is insufficient. See

Cano v. Barr, 956 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (8th Cir. 2020) (finding that evidence of 

isolated violence against a family member cannot establish persecution sufficient for 

asylum because a “pattern of persecution tied to the petitioner” is required) (citation 

omitted). Therefore, we find that the BIA did not err in denying Petitioner’s asylum 

application. 

B. 

Petitioner also challenges the BIA’s denial of withholding of removal. Our 

analysis of the BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s application for withholding of removal

mirrors that of Petitioner’s asylum claim. As with an application for asylum, to 

achieve withholding of removal under the INA, an applicant must show that she will 

“face persecution upon repatriation on account of one of the five protected grounds, 

including membership in a social group.” Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 753 
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(8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)). Petitioner again 

relies on her status as a “Mexican mother who refuses to work for the Cartel.” Here, 

because Petitioner was unable to demonstrate eligibility for asylum, it follows that 

she is also unable to demonstrate eligibility for withholding of removal. Ultimately, 

we discern no error in the BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s application for withholding 

of removal. 

C. 

Petitioner finally argues that the BIA erred in denying CAT relief by failing 

to adequately consider Petitioner’s submitted evidence, namely the country 

condition reports which allegedly show that Petitioner will be tortured with the 

acquiescence of low-level public officials like police officers upon her removal. “To 

qualify for relief under the CAT, an alien must show ‘that it is more likely than not 

that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.’” 

Malonga v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 546, 554-55 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.16(c)(2)). Torture is defined, in part, as “any act by which severe pain or 

suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person.” 8 

C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). The alien must also “show that the torture would be ‘at the 

instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official acting in an 

official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity.’” Bautista-Bautista 

v. Garland, No. 20-1534, 2021 WL 2793224, at *3 (8th Cir. July 6, 2021) (quoting 

8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1)). “A government does not acquiesce in the torture of its 

citizens merely because it is aware of torture but powerless to stop it, but it does 

cross the line into acquiescence when it shows willful blindness to the torture of 

citizens by third parties.” Moallin v. Barr, 980 F.3d 1207, 1210 (8th Cir. 2020) 

(citation omitted). Finally, where it is possible for a petitioner to relocate upon 

removal to avoid torture, CAT relief is inappropriate. See Bautista-Bautista, 2021 

WL 2793224, at *3; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208(b)(1)(i)(B). 

 In Bautista-Bautista, we found that CAT relief was inappropriate because the 

petitioner could safely relocate upon removal. Here we similarly find persuasive the 
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fact that Petitioner can safely relocate, joining her parents in a Mexican state free 

from the Cartel’s control. Ultimately, we conclude that the BIA’s determinations 

are supported by substantial evidence and affirm the BIA’s denial of CAT relief. 

See Galloso, 954 F.3d at 1191.

III. 

 

Finding no error, we deny the petitions for review.

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