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99–905PDF 2005

A REVIEW OF SECURITY INITIATIVES AT DOE

NUCLEAR FACILITIES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 18, 2005

Serial No. 109–66

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida 

Vice Chairman 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia 

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING, 

Mississippi, Vice Chairman 

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

STEVE BUYER, Indiana 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho 

SUE MYRICK, North Carolina 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

Ranking Member 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TOM ALLEN, Maine 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

HILDA L. SOLIS, California 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BUD ALBRIGHT, Staff Director 

DAVID CAVICKE, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel 

REID P.F. STUNTZ, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky, Chairman 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING, 

Mississippi 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOE BARTON, Texas, 

(Ex Officio) 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

Ranking Member 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, 

(Ex Officio) 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Testimony of: 

Brian, Danielle, Executive Director on Nuclear Security, Project on Government Oversight ........................................................................................ 104

Brooks, Hon. Linton F., Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration ......................................................................................................... 22

Nanos, G. Pete, Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory ......................... 80

Podonsky, Glenn S., Director, Office of Security and Safety Performance 

Assurance, U.S. Department of Energy ...................................................... 30

(III) 

(1)

A REVIEW OF SECURITY INITIATIVES AT DOE 

NUCLEAR FACILITIES 

FRIDAY, MARCH 18, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room 

2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Whitfield (chairman) presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Whitfield, Walden, Burgess, 

Blackburn, Stupak, and Inslee. 

Staff present: Dwight Cates, majority professional staff member; 

Mark Paoletta, Chief Counsel; Alan Slobodin, majority counsel; 

Lisa Miller, deputy communications director; Chad Grant, legislative clerk; Chris Knauer, minority professional staff member; and 

Voncille Hines, minority research assistant. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Good morning, and I want to welcome everyone 

to this hearing today on the review of security initiatives at DOE 

nuclear facilities. We appreciate your being here. 

The subcommittee will focus on several security matters at the 

Department of Energy’s nuclear weapons laboratories, weapons 

production facilities, storage facilities, and environmental cleanup 

sites. The protection of nuclear facilities and weapons secrets is a 

priority for us and has been the subject of several subcommittee 

hearings over the years. 

The Department has made several significant changes to its security policy in the year since the subcommittee’s May 2004 hearing. For instance, last November, the Department made supplemental revisions to the Design Basis Threat, or DBT, that it had 

previously finalized in May 2003. The supplemental revisions to 

the DBT in October 2004 have significantly upgraded the characteristics of the postulated adversary. Consequently, additional security requirements will be necessary at each site. 

These changes came about in response to extensive interagency 

discussions regarding the potential size and nature of the terrorists 

that may seek to attack a domestic nuclear facility. I welcome 

these additional changes, but I really would like to know how 

quickly each DOE and NNSA site will comply with these extensive 

new requirements. These upgrades will be expensive and they 

could take years to implement. 

In the past, the conventional management response to increased 

security requirements was to hire a larger guard force. I am encouraged that the Department may consider a greater use of availVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 May 02, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\DOCS\99905.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
2

able security technologies that could increase security and reduce 

the cost of security management at each site. 

At our May 2004 hearing, then-Deputy Secretary Kyle E. 

McSlarrow presented the subcommittee with a series of new security initiatives. Several of these proposals have already been completed or are under development, while some initiatives have not 

started. Mr. Glenn Podonsky, Director of Security and Safety Performance Assessment, will present testimony regarding the status 

of these initiatives. 

I am particularly interested in the Department’s efforts to consolidate nuclear materials across the complex, increase the use of 

new security technologies, and enhance protections to classified 

computer information. I would also note that Mr. Podonsky has 

been to my district on several occasions in the past few years to 

review safety matters in Paducah, at the Paducah site, and I welcome him here today. 

Today, we will also hear from Ambassador Linton Brooks, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. Administrator Brooks has the responsibility for the weapons laboratories, including Los Alamos National Laboratory. Ongoing safety 

and security problems at Los Alamos are a serious concern for the 

committee. We have had numerous hearings on security, safety, 

and business management problems at Los Alamos. We hope Administrator Brooks and Lab Director Pete Nanos, who will also testify today, can explain how we can turn the tide on the bad news 

at Los Alamos. 

This is the first of what I hope will be several hearings on the 

status of security at DOE nuclear facilities. Protection of nuclear 

materials within our borders is a critical line of defense against 

terrorists. In the future, I plan to focus on the DOE and NRC’s efforts to secure sealed sources scattered across the country. These 

are radioactive materials found in a range of industrial equipment, 

including medical devices and devices used to gauge oil wells. 

After today’s third panel, we plan to move the hearing to a secure room where we can continue to discuss security matters in 

closed session with Administrator Brooks, Mr. Podonsky and Director Nanos. We look forward to your testimony today and thank you 

once again for being here. 

At this time, Mr. Stupak is recognized for his opening statement. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for having this important hearing. 

Today’s hearing will be yet another glimpse by this committee 

into the myriad of issues surrounding the security status of DOE’s 

weapons complex. I am very pleased to report that considerable 

progress has been made over the past 5 years. I remain concerned 

that a range of issues still requires attention by this committee, the 

Department of Energy, and the National Nuclear Security Administration. These matters, which I intend to delve into in closed session, will be the mainstay of this hearing. 

I look forward to exploring with our witnesses why it is that we 

still haven’t addressed certain known deficiencies at key sites and 

when we can expect some conclusions on these matters. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, there are a number of sites in this 

complex that receive very formidable attention. While I fully agree 

3

that additional progress must be made to ensure that the DOE 

sites meet the new Design Basis Threat requirements, I intend to 

ask our witnesses to explain in detail where gaps remain. 

For example, we will need to clearly articulate a list of top priorities needing attention and then offer a detailed explanation on 

what must occur to bring finality to these matters. Many of the 

problems that we have discussed today are the very same concerns 

that have plagued the complex for nearly a decade. 

So let me pose to both to Mr. Brooks and Mr. Podonsky that you 

both succinctly tell us what is still vulnerable and why, what needs 

to be done to rectify any such vulnerabilities; and provide this committee with key dates on when it will get done. 

During the course of this hearing, I am sure a number of key facilities and their security status will be discussed. I am also expecting that this committee will continue to examine this area and assess the ongoing progress throughout the next 18 months, as you 

have indicated, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I have urged that both of us personally visit a variety of these facilities as soon as possible. I would like to personally visit those sites where considerable progress has been made 

and those sites where there is considerable work going on. I would 

ask that Mr. Brooks work with us to set up such field visits in the 

near future. 

If there is good news in today’s discussion, it is the fact that the 

DOE complex, as compared to other potential targets across the 

United States, have considerably improved and are hardened. Of 

course, more can and should be done, and I will work with all parties to ensure that forward progress is made. 

Nonetheless, as you know, over the course of the past 3 years, 

this committee has worked incredibly hard to address a range of 

other issues related to homeland security, specifically on the nuclear materials proliferation and smuggling fronts. It is my opinion 

that this Congress must be far more aggressive in addressing the 

many roles that DOE, the Department of Homeland Security, and 

NNSA are playing in that arena. 

Specifically, I am interested in all aspects of how these agencies 

are securing the many sources of materials throughout the globe 

and the myriad of issues surrounding the identification and interdiction should such material fall into the wrong hands. 

Mr. Chairman, this committee has already expended considerable time and effort on some of these matters, including spending 

considerable resources examining the roles DOE plays in setting up 

detection technology in foreign ports. In fact, as part of our effort, 

staff from this committee have visited almost 30 ports and border 

crossings to assess what kinds of equipment are being installed domestically to make sure there are no smuggled nuclear materials, 

and to assess what roles the national labs and DOE are playing in 

assisting the Department of Homeland Security in this capacity. It 

is my understanding that we will continue to work in this regard. 

I sincerely believe it is among the most important matters being 

addressed by this committee. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that this committee will continue to examine these matters and that we will 

4

soon hold additional hearings on these topics. I applaud the effort 

and will continue to lend my full support to this effort. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I do have one housekeeping matter I 

would like to discuss. I note that Mr. Nanos from Los Alamos will 

be testifying today. I have a great deal of respect for his work and 

I look forward to his testimony. In particular, I am looking forward 

to hearing about how Los Alamos is progressing since the major 

events of last year. 

Nonetheless, I do have documents that I hope he will be able to 

shed some light on. This is the White Paper which characterizes an 

audit by Mr. Don Brown. I know Mr. Nanos is familiar with this 

audit. Mr. Brown was apparently an auditor at that facility with 

considerable quality assurance, quality control expertise. Mr. 

Brown conducted a series of audits at Los Alamos; and according 

to this document, major issues involving quality control and quality 

assurance were found and may continue to plague the facility. 

This document appears to have been created by an individual 

who, I am guessing, had at least some standing at the Los Alamos 

complex, at least enough to be allowed to do these kind of audits. 

I think we need more information on this matter, Mr. Chairman, 

and I would like to indulge your help in seeking some clarity about 

this audit. 

I would also request that Mr. Nanos provide in writing a pointby-point response to each of the concerns laid out in this document. 

I assume this would not be too burdensome. While this may not be 

directly related to the site security, per se, I nonetheless believe 

that if the matters are true and they involve quality assurance and 

quality control issues, then those could indeed seriously affect how 

this lab is run and, ultimately, impinge upon both safety and security. I am hoping that Mr. Nanos will be able to provide the information to us and resolve this matter quickly. 

Let me finish by again thanking you, Mr. Chairman, for having 

this hearing. I would greatly like to thank our witnesses, Mr. 

Brooks, Mr. Podonsky, who are certainly key players in this arena 

and both have been very supportive of the committee’s work. 

As the new ranking member of the subcommittee, I am indeed 

looking forward to working with you both over the course of this 

Congress. I would also again like to welcome Mr. Nanos from Los 

Alamos. As you know, while we do not always agree with some of 

the decisions made at your facility, I nonetheless look forward to 

working with you and appreciate the hard work you and your colleagues have put forth in the mission of protecting the United 

States and in the efforts of trying to get the facility back on track 

after the events of the last few years. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Ms. Brian from the 

Project on Government Oversight. Ms. Brian’s organization has 

been a continuous source of information about what corrections are 

needed at the DOE complex. As always, we are pleased to be provided with her expertise and that of her organization, and I want 

to thank her for being here. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again and yield back the balance of 

my time. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Stupak. 

5

Without objection, the document that the gentleman referred to 

will be made a part of the record, and we will ask that Mr. Nanos 

respond to those questions as you asked, and we look forward to 

his response on that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

6


99905.001
7


99905.002
8


99905.003
9


99905.004
10


99905.005
11


99905.006
12


99905.007
13


99905.008
14


99905.009
15


99905.010
16


99905.011
17


99905.012
18


99905.013
19


99905.014
20


99905.015
21

Mr. WHITFIELD. At this time, I will recognize Dr. Burgess for his 

opening statement. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling the hearing. I will waive the opening statement. I have one I 

will put in the record, but in the interest of time and hearing from 

the witnesses, I will submit that for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Michael C. Burgess follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you for having this important hearing. 

At this time in American history, our national security has become the most important issue facing our nation. It is critical that we do everything within our power 

to ensure that our nuclear weapons are highly secured and protected. We cannot 

allow our national security to be compromised because of inadequate safeguards 

that are poorly implemented. The recent security incidents at the Los Alamos National Laboratory illustrate that changes must be made to guarantee the safety of 

weapons and top clearance material. 

I share my colleagues’ deep concern with regards to the safety of nuclear sites in 

America and abroad. I look forward to the opportunity to review both the security 

status of nuclear weapon facilities and discuss security initiatives that can be implemented to better ensure that our nation is protected. I also hope that additional insight can be provided regarding the security matters at Los Alamos. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this crucial hearing in which we can address some of these essential concerns regarding nuclear facilities and the security 

of our nation.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you very much. At this time, I recognize 

Mr. Inslee for his opening statement. 

Mr. INSLEE. Thank you. I just wanted to thank the Chair for his 

continued interest in this, because trust of the public is really paramount here, and we have some work to do to get to the level we 

need. Thank you. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. I would also note that all Members will have 30 

days to submit their opening statements for the record. The Chairman of the Energy and Commerce Committee, Mr. Barton, was not 

able to be with us today but did want me to emphasize his interest 

in this subject matter and that he will be submitting his opening 

statement as well. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Joe Barton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BARTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY

AND COMMERCE

I thank the Chairman for holding today’s hearing on security at the Department 

of Energy’s nuclear facilities. 

At the Subcommittee’s DOE security hearing last year, DOE announced several 

important security initiatives. I look forward to testimony from Mr. Podonsky and 

Administrator Brooks on the status of each of these initiatives. I recently wrote to 

the new Secretary, Mr. Bodman, regarding these initiatives. I hope he will support 

them and ensure the Department follows through on all of them. 

I also look forward to testimony from Los Alamos Director Pete Nanos. This past 

year has been another difficult year for the Lab. Last fall, Director Nanos told me 

that the recent stand-down at Los Alamos would cost the taxpayers $100 million. 

I was not convinced this would be the final figure, and DOE now estimates the cost 

of the stand-down at $370 million. 

I supported the stand-down because of the severity of the security and safety 

problems at Los Alamos. However, the necessity for the stand-down and its duration 

are the direct result of recurring mismanagement by the University of California, 

and I believe UC should pay at least some of the stand-down costs. 

The University of California’s repeated mismanagement of security and safety 

matters has been the topic of several oversight hearings. At each hearing, the uniVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 May 02, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\99905.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
22

versity promised to fix the mismanagement, but these promises never seem to get 

implemented. 

I hope Director Nanos can explain a recent audit report that discovered 21 unauthorized sheds built at Los Alamos to store millions of dollars of supplies and equipment that seem to have been accumulated by circumventing normal inventory controls. 

Structures stashed with shiny new gear that is available to vanish without being 

missed—does this sound familiar? It should. The Subcommittee held three hearings 

in the Spring of 2003 that revealed weaknesses and outright fraud in procurement 

and inventory controls at Los Alamos. 

In my opinion, it is just not fair to continue asking the taxpayers to pick up the 

tab for the university’s ineptitude. 

Probably the only real opportunity to begin to solve the problems at Los Alamos 

is to hire a new contractor, and I support DOE’s decision to re-compete the Los Alamos contract. 

I look forward to today’s testimony, I thank the Chairman and I yield back.

Mr. WHITFIELD. At this time, I will recognize the witnesses. Our 

first panel includes, as I have already indicated, the Honorable 

Linton Brooks, who is Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration; and Mr. Glenn Podonsky, who is the Director 

of the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance at the 

United States Department of Energy. 

As you know, it is the custom with our Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee to ask that the witnesses testify under oath, 

and advise you that also have a right to counsel if you wish to do 

that. 

So I would ask both of you, are you willing to testify under oath 

this morning? 

Mr. BROOKS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Do either of you prefer to have counsel with you. 

Mr. BROOKS. No, sir. 

Mr. PODONSKY. No, sir. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Then, if you will rise. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you. You are now sworn in, and at this 

time, I would call on Mr. Brooks for his opening statement. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. LINTON F. BROOKS, ADMINISTRATOR, 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; AND 

GLENN S. PODONSKY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY AND 

SAFETY PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this 

opportunity to discuss this important issue. Before I give my opening statement, I would like to associate myself with the remarks 

of your ranking member. I would very much like to have members 

of this committee visit our facilities. They are large, they are complex, and it is a case where a visit is worth a thousand words. 

I would be happy in the question period to answer questions on 

the broader subject of materials and would also be willing to do 

that at a later date. 

I want to cover three areas, and I am abbreviating, with your 

permission, my formal statement. I want to talk about what we 

have done to improve physical security, to improve classified material security, and to improve Federal supervision of our contractors. 

23

My basic message is simple. While we still need to improve, none 

of the national security assets entrusted to NNSA are at risk, and 

our security program is robust and effective. Physical security has 

been focused on the need to respond to the increased threat that 

you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement. 

In May 2003, the Secretary approved the Design Basis Threat 

that increased the number and sophistication of attackers. We are 

scheduled to meet the Department’s requirements to be fully compliant by the end of fiscal year 2006. In May of last year, we undertook a review of threat intelligence, and we made changes for still 

further enhancements and will meet this new standard by the end 

of fiscal year 2008. 

We will be happy to discuss in closed session the intelligence that 

led us to those changes and what the changes are and the degree 

to which or the difficulty we will or won’t have in meeting them. 

In general, what we have done is, first, increase the number of 

uniformed protective forces and improved their weaponry. We have 

added barriers, we have closed roads, we have increased security 

patrols, we have increased access controls, and we have enhanced 

employee awareness of threats. 

Now, our near-term solutions relied on the application of more 

guards and more guns. Those are costly measures we cannot afford 

to apply indefinitely, so we are also focusing on consolidation of 

special nuclear material, primarily right now within sites, but ultimately, by eliminating material at sites, and on the increased use 

of technology. 

At the Y-12 plant, construction of a Highly Enriched Uranium 

Materials Facility has begun and is scheduled for completion in 

April 2008. That will lead us to consolidate all the special nuclear 

material in an exceptionally secure facility. It will be ultimately 

matched with a processing facility that will be within the same security perimeter and connected by an underground passageway so 

it is an effective single site. In the interim, the site has done some 

innovative efforts to use containers to form de facto forts in order 

to slow the potential path of an attacker. 

At Los Alamos, we have removed nuclear material from five facilities since 2001. We are moving material from Technical Area 18 

to a facility at the Nevada test site. Technical Area 18 will be 

empty of Category I and II special nuclear material by later this 

year. 

At Sandia National Lab we will shut down the Sandia Pulsed Reactor in 2007, and that will end operations with special nuclear 

materials at Sandia. 

Over the longer term, we have charged a congressionally mandated weapons complex review with looking at how we might end 

plutonium operations at Livermore while maintaining their capability to participate in the stockpile stewardship. These findings 

will be available in late April. 

Now, consolidation is important, but it alone is insufficient. 

America’s strength is technology, so we are deploying advanced 

concept armored vehicles, we are deploying remotely operated 

weapons systems, we are beginning integration of smart camera 

systems into security, and we are implementing new vehicle detection systems. In the longer term, we are looking at additional acVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 May 02, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\99905.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
24

tive denial systems, more remotely operated weapons and more advanced detection systems. Finally, we are working with Mr. 

Podonsky’s office to expedite the fielding of technology we had developed in the past but not fully implemented. 

Now, consolidation and technology help, but security will always 

depend on well-trained protective forces. We are going to try to reduce the reliance on protective forces, but we will never eliminate 

it. Most of our protective forces are dedicated and competent but 

we have had problems. 

Three years ago, for example, at Sandia, we had security officers 

sleeping on duty, we had incidents of racial tension, and we had 

an unprofessional attitude. Under our direction, Sandia took major 

steps to improve the leadership. To make sure they were adequate, 

I commissioned a retired Air Force major general to go out and personally observe the steps Sandia was taking. Based on his reports, 

my reports, and those of my observations, I think performance and 

morale at Sandia, in the protective force, are remarkably improved. 

We have also had problems with lost keys. Keys didn’t allow access to classified material or special nuclear material, but their loss 

showed—there were a series of incidents about 2 years ago that 

showed that security procedures needed improvement. Basically, 

we had too many keys. And so we are now in the process of moving 

to a keyless environment. At the Y-12 plant, we have reduced the 

number of keys by 85 percent. 

Finally, working with Mr. Podonsky, we are working toward the 

creation of a true elite paramilitary force among our guards. 

Progress is steady but uneven. For example, Mr. Podonsky discovered substandard performance by the protective force at the Nevada test site last summer. The site manager was sufficiently concerned to turn over routine operation of her site office to her deputy and take personal supervision of the recovery plan. 

Security of nuclear materials has to be matched by security of 

classified information. We have initiated efforts to reduce classified 

holdings at all facilities. Classified information for us is not just 

documents and computer disks but also a large number of classified 

parts. At Y-12, we have moved a million pounds of classified material to long-term secure storage. 

In July of last year, Dr. Nanos, Director of Los Alamos, imposed 

a stand-down on essentially all operations at the lab. He did that 

because of a series of safety and security problems, including an inability to locate two classified computer disks. Three separate investigations have now convinced us that the missing disks never 

existed, but those investigations revealed significant security management problems. In essence, the problem is, it took us several 

months to realize what happened. 

I provided the committee a copy of the report the former Deputy 

Secretary and I prepared, and a copy of the letter outlining the significant fee reduction imposed on the University of California for 

this decision. As a result of these problems, the Department has 

tightened restrictions on accountable classified material throughout 

the complex. We now require these items be maintained in centralized lending libraries with a formal checkout procedure and fulltime trained custodians. 

25

Once again, the key, however, is to reduce the amount of material. Los Alamos, for example, has reduced from over 90,000 pieces 

of accountable removable electronic media to about 23,000. We are 

now in the process, however, of enabling further reductions by 

working toward a so-called ‘‘diskless computing environment,’’ 

where classified computing does not depend on removable hard 

drives, removable Zip drives. 

When I came to this position 3 years ago, I became concerned 

that I did not have enough competent Federal security professionals. In March 2003, I asked retired Admiral Hank Chiles to 

look at our approach to staffing. As a result of his work, we are 

trying to revitalize the Federal security workforce. We are improving formal training and certification of security officials, we are 

about to implement an intern program to recruit for the long term, 

and we are improving training and management. 

Under the structure that I have created, supervision of contractors is carried out by Federal site offices located at each of the 

eight NNSA facilities. Last summer, when the investigation at Los 

Alamos revealed significant security problems, I became concerned 

because the problems came as a surprise to the site office. This was 

in sharp contrast to the safety problems, where the site office had, 

I submit, at least as good an understanding as the laboratory and 

probably better. 

Then, when we had the poor inspection at Nevada, I became concerned because the results were a surprise to the site office. I 

wasn’t concerned that the inspection went poorly—if inspections 

never go poorly, they aren’t tough enough—but I was concerned 

that my people were surprised by the result. 

So I led a team of senior officials to visit each of my sites to look 

in depth at how we were providing our supervisory responsibility. 

I concluded I needed to fix four areas: I needed to fix leadership, 

I needed to fix the numbers and training of our security experts, 

I needed to improve hands-on involvement, and I needed to provide 

more help from headquarters. 

I replaced two of the six senior site security officials. I had previously replaced one other. Some of my site managers had a tendency to think of security as somebody else’s problem; I have corrected that misperception. We are working on improving training 

and qualification, and we are increasing the number of security 

professionals at the site offices. 

I also became concerned with the way we were providing our supervision. In safety, we get out into the facility a lot. In security, 

we have a tendency to review reports. So we are gradually trying 

to move toward a more day-to-day, hands-on approach. 

Finally, my only way to know my site offices were doing well was 

when Mr. Podonsky came every other year with a full-scale inspection. I concluded that I needed more frequent feedback. So I’m establishing an office to assess and validate security performance and 

provide assistance to the site managers as a supplement to what 

Mr. Podonsky does. I believe the steps we have put in place will 

improve our supervision of security, but I won’t know that for a few 

more months. 

Mr. Chairman, we remain committed to maintaining the security 

of the facilities and the materials and the information we guard. 

26

I am as confident of the security of our facilities as at any time in 

my tenure. I am not, however, satisfied. It is essential we continue 

the improvements we have under way. Only by doing so can we ensure long-term security. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Linton F. Brooks follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LINTON F. BROOKS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR

SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to address security at the National Nuclear Security Administration’s nuclear weapons 

research and production facilities. I would like to cover three major areas:

• NNSA’s progress on improving physical security 

• NNSA’s progress on improving the security of classified material 

• NNSA’s progress on improving Federal supervision of contractor security operations. 

It is important to recognize that there are other important security areas such as 

material control and accounting, the management of personal security clearances 

and human reliability, counterintelligence, and cyber security. Mr. Podonsky and I 

would be happy to respond to questions in these areas but because they have not 

been contentious I will not cover them in my statement. 

Let me begin by stating none of the vital national security assets entrusted to the 

NNSA—nuclear weapons, Special Nuclear Material, or classified materials—are at 

risk anywhere within the nuclear weapons complex. Our security program is robust 

and effective. Secretary Bodman has re-affirmed the Department’s commitment to 

the security of the nuclear weapons complex. 

At the same time, there have been significant security problems at some of our 

sites. Later in this statement I will describe what we have been doing to correct 

those problems and where we still have work to do. 

PHYSICAL SECURITY

In the past three and one half years, physical security at NNSA sites has been 

dominated by the need to respond to the increased threat in the aftermath of the 

attacks of September 11, 2001. Prior to 2001 we assumed a relatively limited threat 

of attackers who sought to steal a weapon. For example, we could counter the threat 

by trapping the attackers in a weapons vault so they could not escape. 9/11 taught 

us that larger attacks were possible and that terrorists were willing to die to inflict 

massive damage. We shifted to a strategy of denying the attacker any access to nuclear weapons. In May 2003, based on an Interagency Working Group postulated 

threat, the Secretary approved a Design Basis Threat (DBT)that significantly increased the number of attackers against which we plan. Because the May 2003 DBT 

dramatically increased both the numbers and sophistication of the adversaries, it 

will take until the end of Fiscal Year 2006 for the Department to be fully compliant. 

That effort is on track within NNSA and all our facilities will meet the requirements of the May 2003 Design Basis Threat by the end of FY2006. 

In May, 2004 the Department undertook a review of all available threat intelligence. Mr. Podonsky and I will be happy to discuss the results of that review in 

detail in closed session. As a result of that review, the former Deputy Secretary approved changes to our graded protection strategy for certain types of special nuclear 

materials and a further increase in the size of the attack against which we must 

defend. His decision was codified in an October 2004 revision of the Design Basis 

Threat. Once again, we will be happy to go into details in closed session. The revised threat sets an exceptionally demanding standard and uses very conservative 

planning assumptions. We plan to meet this new standard by the end of FY2008. 

A new round of vulnerability assessments is under way across the complex to determine enhancements required to meet this threat. Sites will submit their implementation plans and resource requirements by the end of July 2005. Once these 

plans have been reviewed, we will be able to formulate the impact of these requirements on security costs, but almost certainly additional resources will be required 

in FY2007 beyond those shown in our budget projections. 

Many will conclude that such an attack is highly unlikely. No matter how low the 

probability, however, the potential consequences demand that we deter our enemies 

and deny them access to nuclear weapons or special nuclear materials. 

27

To deal with this threat we have increased the number of uniformed protective 

forces, added barriers, closed roads, increased security patrols and detection procedures, increased access controls, and enhanced employee awareness of potential 

threat concerns. We were forced by necessity to meet the increase in threat with 

proven near-term solutions that rely on the application of more guards and guns—

costly measures that we cannot afford to apply indefinitely. 

Because of this we are also focusing on consolidation of special nuclear material 

and on increased use of technology. At the Y-12 plant, one of our oldest sites, we 

are implementing a modernization strategy to consolidate special nuclear material 

storage and operations in facilities with designed denial features. Non-SNM operations will be moved outside high security areas to reduce costs. Construction of the 

Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility, which will provide us with more secure storage for SNM, has begun and is scheduled for completion in April 2008. In 

the interim, the site has provided for additional delay through an innovative use 

of large containers to form de facto forts protecting areas of greatest concern. 

At Los Alamos National Laboratory, we have removed critical special nuclear materials from five facilities since 2001 and consolidated those operations within a single technical area. Material from Los Alamos’ Technical Area 18 is currently being 

moved to the Device Assembly Facility on the Nevada Test Site—a facility designed 

for high levels of security in a more defendable area. Prior to the recent Los Alamos 

stand down, we expected TA-18 to be empty by September of this year. (Some of 

the material scheduled to go to Nevada will be stored on an interim basis within 

the protected area of the plutonium production facility.) We are still evaluating 

whether this schedule can be met without compromising safety. Any delay will be 

brief. 

At Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico, shut down of the Sandia Pulsed 

Reactor in 2007 will end operations with special nuclear material at that site. Over 

the longer term, I have charged the Weapons Complex Review Team to look into 

ending all plutonium operations at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 

California, while still maintaining Livermore’s capability to participate in the Stockpile Stewardship program. This team is examining the future of the entire weapons 

complex and will present its findings in late April. 

NNSA has also begun to work with the Department’s Office of Nuclear Energy, 

Office of Science and the Office of Environmental Management to evaluate the use 

of two facilities at the Idaho National Laboratories for interim storage of material 

from throughout the NNSA complex. One of these facilities was built to provide high 

levels of security for reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels; the other is a well-protected 

material storage building. We are in the opening stages of this evaluation and still 

must determine any legal barriers and additional physical security or construction 

requirements, but these facilities may offer exceptional opportunity to consolidate 

materials and components in a location with robust security features in place. 

Consolidation is important, but it alone is insufficient for protecting nuclear materials from terrorists. America’s strength is in technology. To continue the transformation of security in the nuclear weapons complex we must harness the technological prowess of the United States to reduce our reliance on manpower-intensive 

solutions. We have already begun deployment of advanced concept armored vehicles 

and remotely operated weapons systems at Y-12. We are beginning integration of 

smart camera systems into the existing security systems at two facilities. Y-12 will 

also be implementing new vehicle detection and assessment systems and a new access delay system that utilizes activated delay technology that will not damage facilities. 

In the longer term, we are looking at employment of additional active denial systems, remotely operated weapons, and more advanced detection systems that will 

reduce our reliance on manpower and provide earlier detection and attrition of an 

adversary. The Nevada Test Site will serve as a test platform for developing these 

concepts. To ensure the effective use of technology and system design we have established a Safeguards and Security Engineering Team with representatives from each 

of our sites and several of our Federal components to share best practices for physical security and to conduct peer reviews of proposed new security line item construction projects. This Team has already completed reviews of projects at Los Alamos and Y-12. Finally, we are working with Mr. Podonsky’s Office of Safety and Security Performance Assurance to expedite the fielding of technology developed in the 

past but not fully implemented. 

While consolidation and technology help, security will always depend on welltrained protective forces. While most of our protective forces are dedicated and competent, we have had problems. Three years ago, for example, the Sandia protective 

force had significant problems with officers sleeping on duty, incidents of racial tension and a general unprofessional attitude. Under our direction, Sandia took major 

28

steps to improve the leadership and supervision of the force. To ensure those steps 

are adequate, I commissioned a retired Air Force Major General to assist my local 

Site Office in overseeing corrective action. Based on both my personal observation 

and on those of my subordinates, I believe the performance and morale of the 

Sandia protective force is vastly improved. 

Starting two years ago we had significant problems with lost keys at both the Y12 plant and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Although in no case 

could these keys allow access to special nuclear material or classified information, 

we saw their loss as a sign that security procedures needed improvement. In addition to instituting improved procedures, we concluded we had too many keys. I 

therefore established an initiative to move to a ‘‘keyless’’ environment. At Y-12, for 

example, we have reduced the number of security keys by 85 percent and no key 

type security locks are used to protect special nuclear materials. 

Working with Mr. Podonsky’s Office of Safety and Security Performance Assurance, we are working toward creation of a true elite para-military force at all our 

sites. Progress is steady, though uneven. For example, an independent assessment 

by Mr. Podonsky’s office last summer uncovered sub-standard performance by the 

protective force (and other contractor elements) at the Nevada Test Site. The NNSA 

Site Manager turned over the routine operation of the federal Nevada Site Office 

to her Deputy and took personal supervision of the recovery plan. While corrective 

action is well along, I am disturbed by what this incident says about the quality 

of NNSA’s day-to-day supervision of our contractors. I will have more to say on this 

point in a few minutes. 

CLASSIFIED MATERIAL CONTROL

Security of nuclear materials must be matched by security of classified information. To improve our ability to protect such information, we have initiated efforts 

to reduce classified holdings at all facilities by destroying excess classified material 

and moving some holdings to areas where they can be better controlled. At Y-12, 

for example, we have moved over 1 million pounds of classified materials to approved long-term storage containers. Similar efforts are underway at all facilities. 

The Committee is well aware of the problems with classified removable electronic 

media (CREM) at Los Alamos National Laboratory. In July 2004 the Laboratory Director imposed a stand down on essentially all activities because of a series of safety 

and security problems, including an inability to locate two classified computer disks. 

While separate investigations by the University of California, NNSA, and the FBI 

all concluded that the missing disks never existed, they also revealed serious problems with security management at Los Alamos. I would like to provide the Committee for the record a copy of the report prepared by the former Deputy Secretary 

of Energy and myself that outlines the problems in detail. I would also like to submit for the record a copy of a letter outlining the significant reduction in the management fee awarded the University of California for the operation of Los Alamos 

that I imposed as a result of these deficiencies. In addition, the Laboratory took disciplinary action including terminating three individuals, demoting several supervisors and suspending several individuals without pay. 

In addition to correcting the specific performance problems at Los Alamos, the Department has tightened restrictions on accountable CREM. We now require that 

these items be maintained in centralized lending libraries with formal checkout procedures enforced by full time trained custodians. Still, a contributing cause of the 

problem at Los Alamos was that we simply have too much classified material 

throughout NNSA and the rest of DOE. Los Alamos itself, for example, has gone 

from over 90,000 pieces of accountable CREM in January, 2004 to about 23,000 in 

September. To reduce this number further, we need to move to a diskless 

workstation computing environment. When classified information is stored on central servers with no desktop ability to remove such information, we will be able to 

significantly reduce the potential for inadvertent or intentional mishandling of classified information. We are now forming a task force under my supervision to accelerate the shift to diskless computing throughout the entire Department. 

One element of both physical security and classified material control is control of 

access. We are conducting analysis of the current access control infrastructure 

throughout the nuclear weapons complex and examining technologies used by the 

private industry. This analysis will establish a baseline for enhancements to 

ARGUS, an access control and intrusion detection system that has become the 

standard application for NNSA facilities. We have also formed an Integrated Project 

Team for dealing with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12—Policy for a 

Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, which reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 May 02, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\99905.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
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quires ‘‘smart cards’’ for physical and logical access to Federal sites, buildings and 

systems. 

FEDERAL SUPERVISION

I would like now to turn to Federal supervision of security. Congress created 

NNSA in response to security lapses at our national security laboratories. While I 

believe we have had a number of successes in various areas, I am aware that this 

Committee and Congress as a whole will judge us by the degree to which we ensure 

adequate security throughout the weapons complex. 

Shortly after assuming my current position, I became concerned that I did not 

have adequate competent security professionals to carry out my responsibilities. In 

the short term, I sought to deal with this problem by additional recruiting, but to 

ensure the long-term health of the Federal security community, in March 2003 I 

commissioned retired Admiral Hank Chiles to conduct an extensive review. Such a 

review had not been conducted previously. As a result, we are implementing a 

Human Capital Management Program to revitalize the Federal security work force 

that oversees security at our laboratories, plants, and storage facilities. In addition 

to provisions for the formal training and certification of Federal security officials, 

we will soon implement an intern program designed to attract and train the new 

Federal security officers who will provide leadership and guidance to the NNSA of 

the future. 

To provide further focus and clear direction, in June, 2004 I created a new Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security, reporting directly to me on an 

equal footing with the heads of my major programs. This office consolidated all 

NNSA security functions and is headed by a security professional with over 35 years 

of security experience both at Headquarters and in the field, as well as recent experience in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. 

Under the NNSA structure I have established, supervision of contractors in all 

areas—security, safety, and business practices—is carried out by Federal Site Offices located at each of the eight NNSA facilities. Last summer, when investigation 

of the apparently missing disks at Los Alamos began to reveal significant security 

management problems, I became concerned not just by the problems themselves but 

by the fact that they came as a surprise to the security professionals at the Site 

Office. This was in marked contrast to the safety problems at Los Alamos, all of 

which we were aware of in advance. 

My concern heightened when the contractor at Nevada performed poorly on a 

periodic inspection by Mr. Podonsky. I was not as concerned with the actual performance—if no one ever does poorly the tests are too easy—as with the fact that 

the Site Office expected much better performance. As a result of these two incidents 

I personally led a team of senior security officials to the six sites with special nuclear material. At each site I focused on security performance and, in particular, on 

how supervision of the contractor was conducted. The results varied widely. At some 

sites we had impressive supervision, with strong involvement of the Site Manager, 

an active program of surveillance and inspection, and an exceptional understanding 

of the strengths and weaknesses of the contractor performance. At other sites we 

were far poorer. 

Following my review, I concluded that I needed improvements in four areas: leadership failures, inadequate numbers of trained Federal security experts, a lack of 

hands-on involvement, and failure to provide sufficient headquarters supervision. 

We took the following actions to correct these problems:

• Not surprisingly, the most important determinant of our effectiveness was the 

leadership provided by the senior security professional at each site. After consulting with the local federal Site Manager, I replaced two of the six senior security officials (I had previously replaced one other). A second leadership issue 

involved the local Site Managers themselves. Although they were the senior 

Federal official at each site, some had a tendency to leave supervision of security to their subordinates. I have corrected this. 

• As a result of the Chiles Commission I referred to earlier, we were already working on improving training and qualification of our security professionals. In addition, we are just finishing a detailed review of staffing that will result in increases in the numbers of security professionals at most Site offices. 

• A third problem concerned our method of supervising the contractor. In the area 

of safety our experts spend a great deal of time out in the facility observing operations. At the better sites, this is true for security as well, but at some sites 

our security experts spent much of their time reviewing paper rather than conducting hands on observations, except for an annual survey conducted over a 

30

period of less than a month. We are gradually shifting our approach to emphasize continuous surveillance as a supplement to annual surveys. 

• Finally, my only check on the performance of the Site Offices was the inspections 

conducted every other year by the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance. To provide assistance to Site Managers and assurance to me that our 

performance is adequate in between these inspections, I am moving to formally 

establish an Office of Performance Assurance under the Associate Administrator 

for Defense Nuclear Security. The Office will assess and validate security performance across the NNSA and identify opportunities for improvement. It will 

work closely with the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance in 

the conduct and response to annual security surveys and periodic independent 

oversight reviews. I am confident that this new Office will strengthen the capabilities of individual site offices to perform effective supervision of NNSA’s security contractors. 

In parallel with this effort, initially at my request and subsequently at the request of another Committee of Congress, the Office of Security and Performance Assessment conducted a review of NNSA supervision of security. Their conclusions 

validated my own and also indicated the need for greater attention to monitoring 

of corrective actions. I believe we have provided the Committee a copy of that review. I believe the steps we have put in place will dramatically improve our supervision of security at our sites. 

CONCLUSION

NNSA remains fully committed to maintaining the security of the national treasures we guard. I am as confident of the security of our facilities as at any time in 

my tenure. I am not, however, satisfied. It is essential that we continue the security 

improvements we have underway, upgrade the protective forces, and improve Federal supervision. Only by doing so can we discharge our responsibilities, fix our 

problems as they occur, and ensure the long-term security of the nuclear weapons 

complex. 

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your questions.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Brooks. 

At this time, Mr. Podonsky, you are recognized for your opening 

statement. 

TESTIMONY OF GLENN S. PODONSKY 

Mr. PODONSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

subcommittee, for holding this hearing and for the invitation to testify today regarding the status of security at the Department of Energy. 

The story of security at the Department of Energy over the past 

several years is one significantly affected by change, change in the 

global security situation and in the recognized threat we face; 

change in the missions and configurations of our weapons complex; 

and change in how we approach and practice our security responsibilities. 

Today, I will summarize the progress made and the efforts to enhance the security posture of the DOE, and I will also discuss with 

the committee those areas where the efforts have fallen far short 

and require additional work. I have addressed these in some detail 

in my written testimony. 

The DOE has made significant, but not sufficient progress in the 

past 31⁄2 years. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the 

DOE took immediate actions to increase security, as Ambassador 

Brooks just said in his opening statement. We had an elevated security condition imposed; we added additional physical security 

measures, such as increasing protective force posts, enhancing access controls, and erecting barriers to increase standoff for vehicle 

bombs; and we modified some operational procedures. 

31

Follow-on actions included initiating a review of our Design Basis 

Threat, and creating my office to increase the effectiveness of interaction on security matters between headquarters and the field. 

Last May, the DOE initiated a wide-ranging set of security initiatives to address known security problems and to begin transforming our protection systems to meet our future security needs. 

These initiatives are central to the current security enhancement 

efforts and encompass four broad areas. 

Information security initiatives involve efforts to improve our 

cyber security programs by expanding the performance testing and 

improving capabilities and procedures for recognizing, reporting, 

and disseminating and reacting to attacks on our cybersystems, as 

well as moving to a diskless desktop environment for classified 

computing. 

Our security technologies initiatives are aimed at addressing specific problems, such as creating a keyless security environment and 

enhancing our protection programs through other technologies. 

A third set of initiatives addresses our need to consolidate our inventories of special nuclear materials. 

Our final set of initiatives involves improving our security of 

human capital and includes a range of activities to improve recruitment, training for security professionals, as well as the development, as Ambassador Brooks just mentioned, of the elite-level protective force at our more sensitive facilities. 

These initiatives, 15 in all, represent an aggressive agenda to 

transform and enhance our protection programs and meet the requirements of our revised Design Basis Threat and to respond to 

emerging threats. 

The Department is continuing to pursue these initiatives. Some 

have been completed, most are progressing, some significantly 

more slowly than we prefer. DOE must pursue these security initiatives aggressively, especially since we have continued to experience problems with implementation of our protection programs and 

related management systems. 

For example, some local line management feedback and improvement mechanisms, such as Federal security survey programs and 

contractor self-assessment programs, have not been effective 

enough to detect and correct existing protection program deficiencies. This is verified by deficiencies found by our independent 

oversight office at sites such as Hanford, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Y-12, and Nevada test site. 

These problems, which included such things as poor protective 

force performance, deficient nuclear material control and accountability programs, inadequate classified document control, and deficiencies in physical security systems should have been identified 

and corrected by the local management before our independent 

oversight office found them during their inspections. 

On a somewhat wider scale, we have experienced problems in the 

last year or two, as you know, with lock and key control systems 

and with maintaining adequate controls for classified removable of 

electronic media, or CREM, as we have learned to call it. Again, 

in many cases, line management control mechanisms at individual 

sites did not properly detect and correct the conditions. 

32

We can expect that various problems are going to emerge from 

time to time in systems as large and complex as our protection programs. What is important is that we identify those problems as 

they are emerging and correct them before they do us harm. We 

depend on local DOE line management for this timely identification 

and correction. However, the local management, as I have stated, 

has not always been up to the task. 

The most significant security-related changes we face today and 

in the near future are those associated with implementing our current Design Basis Threat. Meeting the elevated requirements of the 

revised DBT will require significant changes in many of our protection systems, and at a significant cost. This effort is going to require the identification, procurement, and integration of new technologies into our protection systems, significant efforts to raise the 

skill levels of some of our protective forces and other security professionals, and a concerted effort to reduce and consolidate our special nuclear material inventories. 

To address the first of these efforts, we currently have a site-assistance visit activity under way that is intended to apply our best 

technological, analytical, and tactical expertise to assist our most 

critical facilities in identifying security technology applications and 

innovative strategies to effectively and efficiently meet the requirements of the DBT. 

We are encouraged by the ideas resulting from these visits, but 

individual sites will have to follow up that effort to finalize the designs and compute the costs of their proposed protection system upgrades. Ultimately, Mr. Chairman, the Department will have to devise ways to integrate new security technologies, new protective 

force weapons, and tactics with operational needs and safety concerns; and we will need to find the funding sources for those enhancements. 

We are upgrading the capabilities currently in the curricula at 

our National Training Center in Albuquerque, which will play a 

central role in elevating the skill levels of our protective force and 

other security professionals, as well as those managers responsible 

for the security and safety program implementation or oversight. 

Consolidating the special nuclear materials to the greatest degree practicable may prove to be the most difficult challenge, because even after we identify consolidation opportunities and address the related programmatic issues, such as construction of storage facilities, funding, and relocation programs, we will be faced 

with Federal, State and local political obstacles to relocating these 

materials that the Department will not be able to solve internally. 

In closing, we believe the Department is, in fact, actively pursuing initiatives that will improve the capabilities of the security 

systems. I am confident that Secretary Bodman and Ambassador 

Brooks are, in fact, committed to continuing these efforts. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, the Department has not always followed 

through on its commitments. However, it is my opinion that it is 

a new day with Secretary Bodman. He has made it clear he will 

not tolerate missed commitments and inadequate management controls, and that the Department will enact innovative and effective 

methods to foster the necessary changes in our security practices 

and cultures to counter the evolving threat. 

33

While this effort is large and is difficult, it is not impossible. 

With support from this committee and others on Capitol Hill, and 

together in cooperation with our stakeholders at every level, we can 

and we will succeed. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Glenn S. Podonsky follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GLENN S. PODONSKY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY AND

SAFETY PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to 

testify today regarding the status of security programs in the Department of Energy. The story of security in DOE over the past several years is one significantly 

affected by change—changes in the global security situation and in the recognized 

threat we face; changes in the missions and configurations of our weapons complex; 

and changes in how we approach and practice our security responsibilities. Today 

I will discuss the progress we have made, amidst those changing conditions, on our 

efforts to enhance our security posture. I will also discuss those areas in which our 

efforts have fallen short and in which additional work is needed, and discuss the 

major security challenges we face over the next few years. 

Let me start by reaffirming what I hope the members of the subcommittee fully 

recognize: the Department understands that we have custody of some of the nation’s 

most vital national security assets, in the form of both information and materials. 

We know that the protection of these assets is vital to our national security, and 

we are committed to protecting them. There is no item more important than security on the agenda of the Department’s senior management. During the past four 

years, former Secretary Abraham and former Deputy Secretary McSlarrow championed the cause of security and actively guided our efforts to improve our protection posture. Secretary Bodman has continued that legacy by strongly affirming his 

commitment to protecting the Department’s vital national security assets, facilities, 

and employees. While we remain convinced that we have in the past, and continue 

to adequately protect our vital national security assets, we have acknowledged all 

along that our efforts have not been flawless. We must continually adapt our security programs to a changing world and to an evolving threat environment, and we 

can and must find ways to further strengthen our security posture. It is with those 

convictions that we have been aggressively pursuing security improvements during 

the past four years. 

SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS SINCE 9/11

The September 11th terrorist attacks made it painfully clear that our long held 

ideas of postulated threats had become all too real. To ensure that we were adequately protecting our assets against this elevated threat, we knew we needed to 

take immediate action. Let me summarize some of the things we have done since 

9/11 to strengthen the Department’s security posture and to contribute to the Nation’s security efforts. 

On September 11th, we imposed an elevated Security Condition, or SECON, and 

instituted a number of other actions to increase physical security measures at our 

facilities, and particularly around our most sensitive targets. These actions, which 

varied from site to site depending upon local needs and characteristics, included: increasing the number of protective force posts and patrols; closing key streets and 

parking areas; and, erecting additional barriers to increase stand-off distances for 

potential vehicle bombs. Because these enhanced security measures had to be implemented immediately, in many cases our line managers were forced to turn to manpower-intensive solutions involving increased protective force activity. We have been 

at a heightened state of alert at varying SECON levels, since 9/11. 

Our protective forces could not bear this level of burden indefinitely so to relieve 

that additional burden and seek cost effective and efficient ways to maintain enhanced security, we turned to technology solutions. We selected the very best security technologies available to deploy at our sites, ranging from explosives detection 

to chemical defense and cyber security. At the same time, we evaluated the human 

factor associated with highest risk environments. Resulting changes in the Departmental Human Reliability Program have improved the measures by which we assess the physical and mental suitability of individuals who occupy our most critical 

positions. 

We reassessed the Design Basis Threat—the planning basis for our protection requirements—in an effort to ensure that our increased security measures were reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 May 02, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\99905.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
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sponsive to our new understanding of the threat. A new Design Basis Threat policy 

was issued in May 2003. Each site developed implementation plans and began efforts to meet the requirements of the new policy. As a consequence of our efforts 

to upgrade security since 9/11, our security spending increased from $883M in 2001 

to $1.44B in our 2006 request. 

The series of Secretarial Security Initiatives announced in May of last year represents the most ambitious and comprehensive of our current security enhancement 

efforts. The initiatives are broad and far ranging, and impact most major elements 

of the Department’s protection programs, including those of the National Nuclear 

Security Administration. The initiatives can be grouped into four broad program 

areas: information security; new security technology solutions; consolidation of materials; and strengthening security human capital expertise. Together, they directly 

or indirectly impact every aspect of our protection programs. These initiatives are 

so central to our current effort that is it worthwhile to briefly describe each one and 

its current implementation status. 

One set of initiatives involves information security. Much of the information we 

possess today, including classified information, is created on computers and stored 

on computer media. Unfortunately, the fast pace of technological development of 

computer hardware and software seems to be equaled by the pace of development 

of methods for adversaries to exploit that hardware and software. If we are to continue to operate effectively, we have to actively protect the confidentiality, integrity, 

and availability of all of the information on our automated systems, and we have 

to be able to do that even while we are under cyber attack. Consequently, we have 

to be on the cutting edge of cyber security and must employ tools, systems, procedures, and configurations. Recognizing the urgency of this imperative and the potential consequences of falling behind in this area, we resolved to do more to ensure 

that our protection systems keep abreast of emerging threats. The three cyber security initiatives are aimed at: increasing testing used to identify (and eliminate) our 

cyber vulnerabilities before an adversary does; enhancing protection and training 

measures within our information security systems; and reducing the exposure of 

classified information stored on computer media. While these initiatives include 

some longer-term developmental activities, most can be implemented in the near 

term. The cumulative effects of these initiatives will significantly enhance our cyber 

protection abilities. A synopsis of each of these three initiatives and our current 

progress in achieving full implementation follows.

• Expand Cyber Security Performance Testing. This initiative expands our independent oversight organization’s cyber security performance testing program for 

both classified and unclassified information systems by: expanding the scope 

and increasing the frequency of unannounced penetration testing; conducting 

continuous scanning of unclassified computer systems to reduce the exposure to 

Internet threats; and expanding testing of classified computer networks to ensure appropriate need-to-know protection boundaries are in place and are effective. 

The institutional structures necessary to implement this initiative have been 

put in place, and expanded testing has already begun. The necessary additional 

personnel, computer systems, and testing tools have been procured and operating procedures and testing protocols have been validated. Expanded unannounced penetration testing and enhanced testing of classified systems has commenced. We are preparing to begin continuous network scanning and penetration testing to reduce Internet exposure, starting with Headquarters and subsequently phasing in additional sites. • Cyber Security Enhancements. This initiative consists of integrated steps intended to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of our information systems by quickly disseminating cyber threat information, expanding intrusion detection systems that rapidly identify cyber attacks, reducing the exposure of our information systems to Internet threats, and improving workforce 

cyber security training. 

DOE’s Chief Information Officer is leading the efforts associated with this initiative. To date, we have: increased inter- and intra-agency sharing of cyber 

threat and vulnerability data; incorporated intrusion detection and prevention 

into our cyber security enterprise architecture; completed independent reviews 

of Headquarters implementation of the Department’s Cyber Security Management Program; upgraded cyber security training programs; and developed a 

methodology to identify inappropriate information on publicly accessible 

websites. This methodology was applied to an initial website cyber security 

analysis. 

• Diskless Desktop Computing. The use of Classified Removable Electronic Media 

(CREM) to store information has been a persistent security challenge, primarily 

35

due to the ubiquity of the media. This initiative seeks to eliminate or greatly 

reduce this challenge by moving, within a five-year period, to diskless 

workstations for classified computing. The National Nuclear Security Administration has been tasked to identify and implement appropriate diskless technologies. Successful technologies will then be implemented Department-wide. 

A ‘‘tiger team’’ completed a review of potential technical and management solutions to this issue. The team identified requirements for providing high-speed 

desktop workstations and proposed a set of standard diskless workstation solutions, cost estimates, and related recommendations. On January 31, the former 

Deputy Secretary directed the formation of a Project Management Office within 

NNSA to manage implementation of this initiative. 

Another set of initiatives involves the development and deployment of new secu- rity technologies. Two of the security initiatives are aimed specifically at enhancing our protection programs through increased use of security technology solutions. 

One is focused on addressing an area that has been associated with several security 

incidents—specifically, replacing lock and key systems in security areas with modern, keyless entry control systems. Although fairly narrow in scope, this initiative 

represents a massive undertaking, given the number of locks and keys currently in 

use at our security areas throughout the complex. The other security technology initiative is a much broader effort aimed at identifying, evaluating, or developing a 

broad range of useful technologies and facilitating deployment at DOE sites. We are 

particularly interested in identifying technologies that can help our protective forces 

better counter the ever-changing threats to our national security assets. Properly 

applied, such technologies can act as force multipliers to assist our protective forces 

by reducing the burden of routine activities, reducing the risk to them in case of 

an attack, and, through enhanced recognition, provide additional response time to 

meet and defeat an attack.

• Keyless Access Control Technology. NNSA is researching and identifying suitable 

technology that will enable the Department to transition, over a five-year period, to a keyless security environment where no single item that provides access to protected assets, can be lost or stolen. 

We are making progress in this area. My office has developed a current technology matrix that provides specific descriptions of keyless systems, their costs, 

and locations where they are currently in use. The NNSA formed a multi-organizational Technology Review Team to analyze these alternatives. Additionally, 

the efforts of the Integrated Project Team which is addressing HSPD-12—the 

Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, which requires ‘‘smart cards’’ for physical and logical access to Federal 

sites, buildings, and systems, will complement these efforts. • Blue Sky Commission. This initiative involves the identification of off-the-shelf security technologies available for rapid deployment and the establishment by 

NNSA of a Blue Sky Commission to evaluate promising emerging technologies 

that the Department can invest in or develop to enhance our future protection 

systems. 

While we are taking action to identify and apply existing technologies to enhance our protection systems, we have not yet taken the formal steps necessary 

to coordinate investment in emerging security technologies. The Technology Development Program, within my organization’s Office of Security, has disseminated information about current off-the-shelf items suitable for integration into 

security systems. Last July we established the Center of Excellence for Technology Deployment at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in Richland, Washington. The Center’s mission is to find technologies with security applications that are deployable today; to assist in implementing pilot programs 

at DOE sites to test those technologies; and to assist in the further deployment 

at other DOE sites of those technologies that prove to be effective and useful. 

Let me emphasize that this Center’s job is not to develop new technologies, but 

rather to seek out new technologies that are available today and to expedite 

their evaluation and, when appropriate, their speedy integration into security 

systems at DOE sites. In an effort to assist sites in choosing appropriate technologies to implement the current Design Basis Threat, we are in the final 

stages of a series of Site Assistance Visits to our facilities possessing Category 

I quantities of special nuclear materials. During these visits, our multi-organizational, multi-discipline teams work with site security personnel to analyze the 

existing and future site-specific protection systems and identify security technologies that could be employed to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of 

those systems. This effort, which I will come back to in my discussion of the 

Design Basis Threat, has been beneficial to the sites. Our progress in enhancing 

36

our efforts to identify and invest in the development of emerging technologies 

has been somewhat slower. Although we anticipated that NNSA would formally 

establish the Blue Sky Commission last October, that action has yet to occur. 

Before I leave this topic, let me mention some of the progress we have made in 

technology deployment. Several technologies have recently been deployed at sites 

throughout the complex to significantly improve their ability to mitigate our Design 

Basis Threat policy. For example, newly developed armored vehicles with advanced 

fighting capabilities are being deployed at two sites. These vehicles will allow protective forces to be forward-deployed and engage adversaries earlier, while relying 

on improved armor to increase their survivability and externally mounted weapons 

and optics to neutralize adversaries. Chemical agent detectors are also being deployed at six locations. These detectors are unique in that they are able to operate 

24 hours a day for extended periods (years), require minimal maintenance, and provide sufficient time for response forces to don protective gear and engage the adversary. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles UAVs are also being deployed to help conduct surveillance of vast areas outside of a large remote site. The UAVs will be equipped 

with sensors that will detect the adversary earlier, and deny them the luxury of 

being able to pre-stage attackers and equipment and initiate an attack at a time 

that is advantageous to them. The UAVs will also be used to improve combat situational awareness should the site come under attack. One of the threats seen almost 

every day in the news is the large vehicle bomb, lending credibility to our need to 

defeat it. A new type of affordable ($300/ft) vehicle barrier has been deployed at one 

site, and is being installed at a second. What makes this barrier unique is its ease 

of installation, and its ability to stop very large vehicles moving at highway speeds. 

We are also in the final stages of deploying remotely operated weapons at one of 

our facilities, before expanding the deployment to other sites. These weapons are a 

formidable barrier for the adversary, particularly when deployed with visual 

obscurants. Not only do we expect them to improve our ability to neutralize adversaries, but they will also improve the survivability of protective forces in fire fights 

and situations where an adversary might use lethal chemicals. Our future plans call 

for assisted targeting to be integrated into these weapons, and we are hopeful that 

this will eventually lead to manpower savings by proving that an operator can control more than one weapon. We believe that the expanded application of security 

technologies, such as those just described, will be critical to the successful mitigation of the evolving and increasingly capable threats we will face in the future. 

A third set of initiatives addresses our need to consolidate our inventories of special nuclear materials. Our successes in consolidating significant quantities of special nuclear materials have typically been limited to facility closure programs, such 

as at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site. While we still need special 

nuclear materials at some sites to accomplish ongoing national security missions, 

both the amount of materials needed and the number of locations where they are 

needed have substantially decreased since the days of the Cold War when our production facilities were building our nuclear deterrent. Protecting these materials is 

among our most difficult security challenges, but it is also one of our most important 

missions, since the consequences of their loss are unacceptable. We can greatly reduce the difficulty, risk, and costs associated with protecting this material if we can 

consolidate that which we cannot safely and properly eliminate. This has become 

an increasingly important consideration with the increased difficulty and costs associated with defending against the elevated threats described in the current Design 

Basis Threat. Since reduction and consolidation of special nuclear materials has perhaps the greatest potential impact on our future protection requirements and programs, we have identified seven separate initiatives related to this subject. These 

initiatives range in scope from developing plans for terminating the use of a reactor 

to altering the configuration of the Department’s weapons complex. This group of 

initiatives addresses the essential challenges we face in our efforts to reduce and 

consolidate our special nuclear materials inventories and to accurately assess the 

threats to these materials,

• Sandia Pulsed Reactor. This initiative involves completion of the Sandia Pulsed 

Reactor’s mission and removal of the special nuclear material (reactor core) 

from Sandia National Laboratories-New Mexico. 

To enhance the reactor core’s physical protection, Sandia has disassembled it 

and placed it in special protected storage until needed to support essential testing. The reactor will be re-assembled and used for a period of approximately one 

year to support testing and to qualify theoretical models and simulation methods that will eliminate future needs for the pulsed reactor. Upon successful 

completion of the test series, the reactor material will be returned to a secure 

storage condition that greatly reduces the security risks and cost. The testing 

37

and modeling work is currently planned to support the cool down and completion of reactor defueling by March 2007. • Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF). This initiative is to expedite the construction of the HEUMF project, which will provide a new state-ofthe-art storage facility for highly enriched uranium now stored at various locations at the Y-12 National Security Complex. Its design will incorporate a robust denial strategy that includes passive design features to address the DOE 

Design Basis Threat Policy. Goals of completing facility construction and readiness activities by April 2008 and relocating existing material from current locations into the new facility by September 2009 will greatly enhance the security 

of highly enriched uranium within the United States and decrease long term 

operating and material safeguarding costs at Y-12. 

The primary facility construction contract was awarded on schedule on August 27, 2004. Construction is currently 9% complete, including site preparation. While construction is approximately two months behind schedule due to 

above normal rainfall and unanticipated soil conditions, it is expected that the 

original schedule will be met. Associated activities, such as storage container assessment and characterization and material movement and reduction of material in current storage areas are underway. • Resolve Materials Criteria for Acceptance at Long-Term Storage Sites. This initiative addresses the need to resolve situations where nuclear materials are being 

stored at sites only because they do not meet the acceptance criteria at longerterm storage sites. Increases in the Department’s Design Basis Threat necessitate creative approaches to maintain strong security for the Department’s special nuclear material assets in a cost-effective manner. 

A Nuclear Material Consolidation Task Team studied the issue of materials 

consolidation with a focus on reducing the number of nuclear facilities that need 

high-level protection and reducing the number of potential terrorist targets. A 

draft report was issued in December 2004. The report identifies and prioritizes 

candidate materials for consolidation using a set of defined criteria which address security impact, schedule, cost, and programmatic use. The report also 

provides recommendations for implementation in both the near, mid, and long 

term. To formally institutionalize this important effort and to cut across programmatic lines, a multi-program senior-level steering group, under the direction of the Secretary’s Senior Policy Advisor for National Security Matters, will 

provide guidance and recommendations to the Secretary on nuclear material 

consolidation issues. • Weapons Complex Review. This initiative involves reviewing the requirements for 

the weapons complex for the next 20 years in light of the size of the stockpile, 

the new Design Basis Threat, and the opportunities for consolidation, with the 

goal in mind of reducing the footprint of the complex to the minimum needed 

to support long-term national security missions. 

The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) chartered a Task Force 

which consists of five members who were briefed by members of the Department 

of Defense, National Security Council and NNSA Program Offices in February. 

The Task Force has visited most of the weapons complex facilities and will complete their tour by mid-April. Once the study is complete and consolidation opportunities are identified, we anticipate that political (e.g., involving moving 

material between states) and programmatic (e.g., construction) barriers will remain to be confronted. 

• Down-blend Large Quantities of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to make it unattractive as a terrorist target. The goal of this initiative is to determine whether, via the early disposition and down-blending of up to 100 metric tons of HEU 

currently stored at the Y-12 National Security Complex, we could strengthen 

the security of existing HEU operations and storage at that facility. 

Review results recommended a course of action to increase the security of remaining HEU and promote the President’s nonproliferation objectives. The review recommended that a substantial quantity of HEU be removed from any 

future use in nuclear warheads. This is in addition to the 174 metric tons of 

HEU declared in 1994 to be in excess of national security needs. The NNSA Administrator endorsed the recommendations of the study and directed coordination with the Departments of Defense and State. 

• Design Basis Threat (DBT) Reexamination. This initiative reexamined the May 

2003 DBT and the supporting intelligence data to ensure currency in relationship to the changing threat. 

Actions on this initiative are complete. The DBT was reexamined, changes 

were recommended, and on October 18, 2004, the Deputy Secretary approved 

DOE Order 470.3, ‘‘Design Basis Threat (DBT) Policy’’ for implementation. In 

38

conjunction with the DBT revision, we revised the Adversary Capabilities List 

to reflect the most current intelligence information regarding the observed and 

postulated capabilities (e.g., weapons, equipment, tactics, etc.) of the adversary. 

Although this initiative is complete, follow-on activities through April 2005 are 

focused on conducting the Site Assistance Visits mentioned previously to provide sites with technology and protective force tactical options to address the 

requirements of the October 2004 DBT Policy. I will discuss the Design Basis 

Threat and its impact on protection strategies and systems in more detail later 

in this testimony. • Removal of Category I/II special nuclear materials (SNM) from TA-18. The object 

of this initiative is to relocate programmatic SNM from Los Alamos National 

Laboratory’s (LANL) Technical Area -18 to the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) 

at the Nevada Test Site. 

Implementation of this initiative is in progress. On March 31, 2004, NNSA 

directed the initial shipment of LANL TA-18 programmatic SNM to the DAF 

ahead of the previously scheduled date of March 2006. Three shipments of programmatic materials were completed as of December 2004. Approximately seven 

shipments are planned for FY2005. NNSA currently projects that approximately 

50% of the TA-18 programmatic SNM will be moved to the DAF by March 2006 

and 90% by the end of fiscal year 2007. Programmatic SNM needed by NNSA 

to maintain mission continuity, especially to support training for Emergency Response, will remain at LANL in other storage locations. 

The final set of initiatives concern our security human capital. Of all the components of our protection systems, the human component is the most critical, and the 

performance of our people will largely determine the success or failure of our protection efforts. When we speak of security personnel in this context we refer to two 

groups of people: the people who develop, implement, maintain, and oversee our security programs; and the protective force personnel who are on the ground 24/7 protecting our assets. The robustness of our protection programs depend largely on the 

abilities and performance of these two groups of people. Three of our security initiatives deal with strengthening our security human capital. They include efforts to implement the recommendations of the Chiles Commission (regarding management of 

security expertise in the NNSA) within the NNSA and possibly throughout the entire Department. In addition, the initiatives also address options for protective force 

configuration and management, with special emphasis on determining the best approach for creating an elite force dedicated to protecting our most critical sites.

• Implement Chiles Report recommendations. The Chiles Report focused on the 

NNSA nuclear weapons complex and recommended several actions to resolve 

impending human capital shortfalls in safeguards and security and related disciplines. Specific recommendations involved: developing and executing a comprehensive human capital management program; improving the training, qualifications, and stature of the workforce; reengaging in national markets to hire 

security professionals; instituting a long-term practice of security staff rotation; 

identifying options for accelerating the security clearance process; improving security information flow; revising the NNSA Safeguards and Security Strategic 

Plan; identifying specific budget support and tracking recommendation 

progress. 

NNSA is actively pursing implementation of this initiative. For example, to 

address human capital management, workforce analysis methodologies and protocols—were—piloted at the Pantex Site Office. Five professional development 

data assessments were completed at the Pantex Site Office, Y-12 Site Office, 

Sandia Site Office, Nevada Site Office and the NNSA Service Center. This same 

assessment is also planned for the Los Alamos Site Office. NNSA is partnering 

with the DOE National Training Center to provide centralized training for safeguards and security professionals to meet qualification standards established 

for each safeguards and security functional area. Additionally, NNSA has developed a web portal to improve security information flow, implemented a process 

for rotating security management positions between headquarters and the field, 

and began recruiting for an Intern Program. • Examine the Applicability of the Chiles Report recommendations to the Department. This initiative calls for an examination of the Chiles Report recommendations—which were addressed to the NNSA—to determine their applicability and 

appropriateness to enhance security human capital and training programs 

throughout the Department. 

The human resource challenges facing the Department were identified previously and analyzed in the context of the President’s Human Capital Management Plan. Efforts have been underway at our National Training Center to promote skills development in identified critical areas through on-going ProfesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 May 02, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\99905.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
39

sional Development Program activities. The first four recommendations of the 

Chiles Report are being implemented through activities at the National Training Center and through the Human Capital Management Plans developed by 

my organization, the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, and 

by the Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and Environment. Concerns regarding the lengthy clearance process are being addressed through ongoing implementation of the approved action plan entitled ‘‘Options for Accelerating the Security Clearance Process in the Department of Energy’’ signed by the former 

Deputy Secretary on January 7, 2005. My organization addressed security communications concerns following the completion of a Communications Study Report last July, and a DOE 25-Year Strategic Security Plan is pending review 

and approval by the Under Secretaries. 

• Review Options for the Protective Force. This initiative directs the examination 

of existing protective force organizational structures (including existing contract 

mechanisms) to determine changes needed to develop an elite protective force. 

The ultimate goal is to transform the protective forces that guard our most critical national security assets into elite units, trained and equipped for advanced 

tactical operations, and comparable in capability to the nation’s elite military 

units. 

Actions on this initiative are complete. This review was completed and a final 

report containing recommendations was provided to Senior DOE Management. 

A joint memorandum from SSA and NNSA was submitted to the former Deputy 

Secretary in January of this year, recommending that those actions that could 

be initiated within the current force structure be approved. The Deputy Secretary directed immediate implementation, which is now ongoing. Follow-on activities continue relative to implementation of the identified options resulting 

from the review. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, we have made significant 

progress in our efforts over the past several years to improve our protection systems. The security initiatives I have just outlined, and the ongoing and planned actions, represent a sizeable effort and significant commitment of resources by the Department aimed at addressing past security concerns and materially enhancing our 

present and future protection postures. Our work to implement many of these initiatives continues, and in some cases will continue for several more years. I believe 

that the progress we have made to date in implementing these far-reaching initiatives, while significant, will pale in comparison to the benefits that will accrue to 

our protection programs when the initiatives are fully realized. 

ONGOING SECURITY CHALLENGES

The job of adequately protecting the Department’s national security assets is an 

immense undertaking. While we are aggressively pursuing actions to address known 

deficiencies and improve the robustness of our protection systems, we recognize that 

we have a lot more to do. 

As evidenced by our need for the security initiatives and other previously described enhancement activities, we continue to experience problems associated with 

both management systems and program implementation. Our independent oversight 

organization has indicated for years that many local line management feedback and 

improvement mechanisms, such as Federal security survey programs and contractor 

self-assessment programs, were not sufficiently comprehensive or adequately performance based to effectively detect and correct all existing protection program deficiencies. This is verified by problems we found at sites such as Hanford, Oak Ridge 

National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories-New Mexico, Y-12, and the Nevada Test Site. These problems, which included such things as poor protective force 

tactical performance, deficient nuclear material control and accountability programs, 

and inadequate classified document controls, should have been identified and corrected by local line management feedback mechanisms before we found them during 

our inspections. I must acknowledge, however, that once we identified problems at 

these sites the local line managers were responsive in taking action to correct them. 

Our Independent Oversight organization similarly reported slow progress in implementing Integrated Safeguards and Security Management processes, and we have 

continued to experience other protection system problems that are directly related 

to inadequate line management oversight, attention, and accountability. 

For example, in the past few years we experienced several highly publicized incidents involving the loss of keys or key cards affording access to buildings or rooms 

within security areas at a few of our facilities. Although there is no indication that 

these losses resulted in compromise of classified information or other security assets, they are disturbing nonetheless. A review of lock and key programs revealed 

40

that management attention to these programs was largely absent. As a result, there 

were too many spare keys, no strict accountability for all keys, and inadequate accountability/security training for lock and key program personnel and key 

custodians. These incidents were among the motivations behind our initiative to 

transition to a keyless security environment at some facilities. 

Another recent problem involved control and accountability of Classified Removable Electronic Media (CREM)—computer floppy disks and such. As I am sure the 

members of the subcommittee are aware, last year the Department discovered that 

we had some deficiencies in our procedures and practices for handling and protecting the classified information contained on CREM. An incident at Los Alamos 

National Laboratory—which subsequent DOE and FBI investigations determined 

did not involve the loss of CREM—raised questions about accountability systems 

and control procedures for handling CREM. Even though our Independent Oversight 

organization had been reporting conditions that could lead to such an incident, local 

line managers in many cases failed to give sufficient attention to this matter. While 

we acknowledged the obvious fact that incidents such as this can occur, we do not 

concede that they must inevitably occur. We simply will not tolerate continued incidents of this nature. In order to ensure that conditions that would allow a similar 

incident to occur do not exist anywhere in the Department, the Department’s senior 

management took a series of aggressive, even unprecedented actions. For the first 

time in the Department’s history they ordered a complete cessation of all classified 

operations involving accountable CREM. Facilities were not allowed to resume those 

operations until they fully complied with a set of restart protocols, whose key aspects included:

• Ensuring and certifying that all employees who handle accountable CREM receive 

training in proper handling procedures and have reviewed information regarding the incidents at Los Alamos. • Conducting a 100% physical inventory of all accountable CREM on hand and reconciling that physical inventory with baseline inventory records. • Implementing strict requirements and procedures for the storage of CREM (pertaining to approved repositories, keeping repositories locked except when removing or replacing CREM, use of security seals on repositories, etc). • Limiting access to each repository containing accountable CREM to one Custodian 

and one Alternate Custodian, and establishing and performance testing formal 

checkout processes for authorized users to obtain accountable CREM from a 

Custodian or Alternate. • Conducting weekly physical inventories of all accountable CREM, and reconciling 

the inventories with accountability records. • Establishing procedures which ensure that accountable CREM is destroyed only 

by approved DOE destruction procedures and which assure that accountable 

CREM is reproduced only if authorized by the specifically appointed Federal authority. • Ensuring that a local CREM validation team independently verifies, using performance testing, the implementation and effectiveness of all restart protocol requirements. 

The former Deputy Secretary, designated by the Secretary, was the only person 

who could authorize a facility to resume operations with accountable CREM, once 

they satisfied the restart protocols. All of our facilities have satisfied the stringent 

requirements and have resumed operations with accountable CREM. 

Following this process, my Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance sent teams of experts to our major facilities to perform additional independent validations, to make sure that that the restart protocol requirements were 

fully and effectively implemented. Various problems were observed during this validation step. For example, the Nevada Site Office/Nevada Test Site needs to establish a centralized accountability system to improve efficiency; Los Alamos required 

a lengthy period to achieve restart of classified operations and the quality of their 

revised procedures still requires validation. 

As evidenced by these unprecedented measures, we are serious about protecting 

our classified information and about ensuring that additional incidents involving the 

protection of CREM do not occur at any of our facilities. While our intended move 

to a diskless desktop classified computing environment will largely eliminate the potential for such incidents, the use of CREM will be common for at least the next 

several years, and we will maintain strict enforcement and oversight of our current 

requirements for handling CREM. 

As a final example of our experiences with insufficient line management attention 

to security programs, let me address the results of our Review of NNSA’s Federal 

Line Management Oversight of Security Operations. Our Office of Independent 

Oversight and Performance Assurance conducted this review at the direction of the 

41

Secretary. Data collection methodologies included reviews of the results of other recent studies that had examined this issue in whole or in part. These included Independent Oversight reports, the Chiles and (draft) Mies Reports, and the reports of 

internal focus groups studying various security-related Departmental management 

challenges. The review identified or confirmed a number of issues that reflect significant weaknesses affecting the performance of line management oversight responsibilities. These include:

• NNSA has insufficient personnel resources and expertise assigned, particularly at 

site offices, to effectively conduct the quantity and quality of oversight activities 

necessary to reliably determine or assure the effectiveness of site safeguards 

and security programs. The general aspects of the shortage of security expertise 

at appropriate locations in NNSA are multi-faceted, involving work force demographics, recruitment efforts, training and education opportunities, career path 

opportunities, and resistance to geographical relocation. The specific problem at 

NNSA site offices, where it currently has the greatest impact on security oversight, is manifested in two ways: in the numbers of security professionals available and in the skill mixes represented by currently assigned personnel. 

• NNSA site office survey programs are not sufficiently effective in assessing the 

adequacy or effectiveness of site safeguards and security programs. Surveys are 

a primary oversight tool available to the site offices. Many survey programs are 

not effectively or reliably achieving their primary goal, which is to accurately 

determine the effectiveness of site safeguards and security programs. 

• NNSA does not consistently apply or enforce appropriate corrective action program requirements on site contractors. DOE has specific requirements for the 

corrective action process that is to be applied to all formal findings assessed 

against safeguards and security programs by Federal oversight activities. NNSA 

oversight responsibilities are an integral part of that process, but in common 

practice, this process is often not fully invoked or enforced by the NNSA site 

offices. 

• NNSA has not effectively taken advantage of the opportunity to use award fees 

and performance incentives to spur intended results in safeguards and security 

program performance. Site offices have generally been ineffective in appropriately emphasizing security through contractor performance incentives and in 

formulating performance indicators that are successful in achieving the intended results. 

These issues have all been identified through internal oversight activities and/or 

through the efforts of independent teams commissioned by NNSA. DOE, including 

NNSA, managers have initiated the following significant actions to address these 

issues and to improve Federal line management oversight of NNSA security operations.

• DOE, including NNSA, is taking steps to address shortages in security manpower 

resources. As part of the security initiatives announced in May 2004, the Secretary of Energy directed NNSA to implement the recommendations contained 

in the Chiles Report, several of which deal with (security-related) human capital 

management. NNSA actions associated with this initiative were discussed 

above. 

• NNSA has initiated actions to address the education and training needs of its 

Federal security workforce, including those specifically applicable to oversight 

responsibilities. NNSA is working closely with SSA’s National Training Center 

to expand the course offerings in the Professional Development Program to encompass identified NNSA needs, including curricula in leadership and management development, incumbent training in safeguards and security technical disciplines, and training and orientation for security interns. In an immediate action to expand the experience level of security professionals, NNSA has implemented a rotation program to afford security professionals in the field the opportunity to work at headquarters and security professionals at headquarters 

the opportunity to work at field sites. At present, two individuals are participating in this program. 

• DOE, including NNSA, is taking positive steps to clarify and strengthen Federal 

oversight responsibilities at various management levels. Draft DOE Policy 

226.1, DOE Oversight, and a corresponding DOE Order are currently in the review process. They are intended to clarify and assign oversight responsibilities, 

including those of headquarters organizations. NNSA is currently implementing 

a Defense Nuclear Security Performance Assessment Program that integrates 

Federal line management oversight activities. In furtherance of this objective, 

NNSA has recently established an Office of Performance Assurance to head this 

effort. 

42

• NNSA has increased its efforts to reorient day-to-day oversight of contractor security operations. Senior managers are involved in an effort to alter the previous 

philosophy of telling the contractor the ultimate goal (what to do) and allowing 

the contractor to decide how to reach the goal (how to do it). While avoiding 

actions that might stifle contractor initiative, NNSA is encouraging site office 

personnel to focus more attention on how contractors are performing security 

operations and to provide more input to contractors regarding preferred methods of operation. 

Our review concluded that while these deficiencies in line management, and their 

underlying conditions, exist and have been adversely affecting NNSA’s ability to exercise adequate line management oversight of security operations, the problems are 

known to NNSA and the Department, including NNSA, has initiated actions to address them. While solutions to these issues are being pursued, some of those solutions—such as increasing the security workforce and implementing necessary training and education programs—will take several years to implement fully, and will 

require the sustained support of DOE, including NNSA, senior managers. 

We also acknowledge that, while protection programs at our sites are generally 

effective overall, potentially significant lapses in protection program implementation 

do sometimes occur at our NNSA sites as well as at sites under the purview of the 

Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and Environment (ESE). For example, at Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory (an ESE site) portions of the protection system lacked 

the defense-in-depth that we require, and the site relies on an agreement with a 

neighboring site for special response team (i.e., offensive combative) capabilities. 

Our most recent Independent Oversight inspection at the Hanford site (ESE) found 

that the protective force needed to improve its tactical training, planning, and skills, 

and that some local human reliability program processes required reexamination. 

Since that inspection, the Hanford site has implemented corrective actions designed 

to correct these deficiencies. 

Our three most recent Independent Oversight inspections at NNSA sites (Sandia 

National Laboratories-New Mexico, Y-12, and Nevada Test Site) identified some 

common implementation problems, including insufficient frequency of large scale 

force-on-force performance testing/exercises and inadequate weapons and equipment 

to fully deal with today’s threat (e.g., armored vehicles, anti-armor weapons, weapons with high rates of fire). Additionally, the Nevada Test Site exhibited deficiencies 

in protective force operations and material control and accountability procedures; 

Sandia exhibited deficiencies in physical security systems and in handling classified 

matter; and Y-12 exhibited significant deficiencies in most major protection program 

elements. Since those deficiencies were identified, line managers have been responsive and the sites have been engaged in corrective actions. Our Independent Oversight organization is currently inspecting Sandia-New Mexico to determine its current protection system status and the progress it has made in addressing deficiencies. It will inspect Y-12 in May and June and the Nevada Test Site in July 

and August of this year. 

When implementation problems such as those described do occur, we do not ignore them. We employ a formal corrective action and validation process to ensure 

that identified problems are fixed, and in cases where a deficiency results in a potential vulnerability, immediate compensatory measures are required. I would also 

like to point out that as we continue to make Department-wide progress on the security initiatives discussed above and in our system upgrades in response to the requirements of our current Design Basis Threat, we expect that our protection programs will become more robust and the historically troublesome protection elements 

(e.g., locks and keys, CREM, training, etc.) will be addressed through these efforts 

(specifically through the application of technologies or other solutions). 

The last security challenge I would like to discuss is perhaps our major challenge—implementing the requirements of our new Design Basis Threat. After a prolonged development process, the Department issued a revised DBT in May of 2003. 

In May of 2004—in response to internal concerns, Congressional concerns regarding 

the robustness of the threat portrayed in the DBT relative to that portrayed in the 

Defense Intelligence Agency’s Postulated Threat, and questions raised by the General Accountability Office—the Secretary directed the NNSA Administrator, the Director of the Office of Intelligence, and me to reexamine the May 2003 DBT and 

its supporting intelligence data to ensure that it was still current in relationship 

to the changing threat. We formed a task team comprised of individuals with the 

expertise necessary to assist in conducting the review, and the results of that effort 

were reported to the Secretary in late August 2004. In October 2004 the former Secretary approved a revised DBT, one which included some significant changes from 

the previous DBT. Since the DBT is classified, I cannot discuss some of its specific 

43

provisions in this open forum, but I will discuss some of its generic attributes and 

comment on some of the differences between the current and previous versions. 

Our DBT policy is intended to provide consistent and appropriate safeguards and 

security system performance specifications that Departmental elements must meet. 

It delineates a graded threat scale based on the sensitivity of the asset being protected and the potential consequences of asset loss. Assets are categorized into one 

of four ‘‘Threat Levels’’ based on the general consequences of their loss or destruction, or the possible impact of their loss or destruction on the health and safety of 

employees, the public, and the environment. The protection requirements for those 

assets are graded in a commensurate manner. Performance-based standards must 

be met to protect Threat Level 1 (most critical), 2, and 3 facilities and assets. Threat 

Level 4 (non-critical) facilities and assets must meet compliance-based standards. 

The most significant changes reflected in the current (October 2004) DBT are:

• The policy now exists as a formal DOE Order. Procedures requiring a formal annual review have been issued. • The policy is more concise, and understandable, and the number of Threat Levels 

applying to various assets and facilities have been combined and simplified. 

Threats associated with improvised nuclear devices and radiological, biological, 

and chemical sabotage have been folded into the Threat Levels. • The terrorist numbers and attributes associated with the threat levels were increased to reflect current intelligence and geopolitical assessments. 

In December 2004 the former Deputy Secretary directed that all DBT implementation plans be revised to ensure that all requirements contained in the October 

2004 DBT are met no later than the end of FY 2008. The NNSA Administrator has 

expressed his full support and intention to develop and execute implementation 

plans on schedule. However, full implementation of the DBT on schedule is a major 

task posing many difficulties. For example:

• At some facilities it will require fundamental departures from institutionalized 

protection strategies, such as shifting from a containment strategy (preventing 

an adversary from escaping with target material) to a denial strategy (preventing an adversary from reaching target material). 

• The postulated impacts of the DBT mandate that the Department consider aggressive material consolidation efforts, which will likely encounter operational, 

programmatic, and political opposition. 

• The adversary numbers and capabilities postulated in the DBT allow the adversary much greater tactical flexibility, causing significant planning and response 

difficulties for current security systems. 

• The appropriate security technology solutions are still being identified and developed. Consequently, developing accurate budget estimates is difficult at this 

time. 

• Sources of funding and alternatives to current operations that will be necessary 

to implement the DBT are still being explored. 

We are fully cognizant of these difficulties and are prepared to deal with them. 

We believe that the current initiatives that will contribute most to our DBT implementation efforts are: increasing the use of security technologies, implementing the 

elite protective force concept at select facilities, and consolidating our special nuclear materials to the greatest practical degree. As mentioned earlier, our Site Assistance Visit effort—now underway and almost complete—is intended to apply our 

best technological, analytical, and tactical expertise to assist our most critical facilities in identifying security technology applications and innovative protective force 

strategies that will enable them to effectively and efficiently meet the requirements 

of the DBT. So far we are encouraged by the progress resulting from these visits. 

Individual sites will have to follow up that effort with detailed vulnerability analyses to finalize the designs and compute the costs of their proposed protection system upgrades. Ultimately, we will have to devise ways to integrate new security 

technologies and new protective force weapons and tactics with operational needs 

and safety concerns. 

CONCLUSION

In closing, we believe the Department of Energy under the leadership of Secretary 

Bodman is, and will continue to, actively pursue initiatives that will improve the 

capabilities of our security systems and procedures, and we have forcefully responded when elements of those systems have not performed according to our expectations. We will continue seek innovative, effective, and efficient methods, as well 

as the resources, to foster the changes in our security programs and practices that 

are necessary to effectively counter the evolving threat. 

Thank you.

44

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Podonsky, thank you very much for your 

opening statement. 

As is the custom with oversight investigations, we will have 10 

minutes of questions for each of the members of the panel, and I 

will start off here. 

Administrator Brooks, since 2000, we have talked about moving 

Category I and Category II nuclear materials out of Technical Area 

18 at Los Alamos and move it out to Nevada. And there have been 

all sorts of delays, but I notice in your testimony this morning that 

you made the comment that you do intend to have Category I and 

II material out of TA 18 by the end of the year. Is that still your 

commitment? 

Mr. BROOKS. That is correct. Before the Los Alamos stand-down, 

we were slated to complete removal by September 30. I now believe, as a result of the delays imposed by the stand-down, that it 

will be mid-November, about a 6-week slip. 

We will have half of the material in Nevada by the end of the 

year. That is actually slightly earlier than we expected. The rest 

of the material will be moved from TA 18 to another location in Los 

Alamos temporarily, and then will be moved to Nevada over the 

next couple of years. So we are—we will have all Category I and 

II material out, middle of November. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. But out of the site in a couple of years. 

Mr. BROOKS. Out of Los Alamos in a couple of years, but out of 

the vulnerable site at TA 18 by November. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. By the end of the year. 

Mr. BROOKS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Okay. Good. 

Now I would like to also review basically the relationship between the respective offices of the two of you gentlemen. Of course, 

Mr. Podonsky, you work for DOE? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. And you are in charge of independent oversight 

at all DOE and NNSA sites. 

Mr. PODONSKY. That’s correct, sir. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. And, Ambassador Brooks, you are in charge of 

NNSA nuclear weapons labs and productionsites, including Los Alamos. 

Mr. BROOKS. Correct. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, we have this memo dated December 2, 

2003, which was signed by former Secretary Abraham, which established the Office of Security and Safety Performance Oversight, 

and I ask unanimous consent to enter this document into the 

record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

45


99905.016
46


99905.017
47


99905.018
48

Mr. WHITFIELD. This memo clearly authorizes Mr. Podonsky’s office to continue the independent oversight of NNSA’s safeguard and 

security, cybersecurity, environment, safety and health, and emergency management programs. 

Now, Mr. Brooks, you indicated in your testimony that you will 

create your own Office of Performance Assurance to conduct security oversight at NNSA sites. Have you created this office with the 

intention of replacing the work of Mr. Podonsky, or what was your 

goal there? 

Mr. BROOKS. No, not at all. And part of the problem I have had 

is finding the right name for this office that doesn’t allow that 

misperception. 

Mr. Podonsky provides independent oversight. He provides it on 

behalf of the Secretary. He also provides it on behalf of me. We 

have an agreement that if I see a need for an outside observation, 

I can call on Mr. Podonsky; and I have done that from time to time. 

But Mr. Podonsky comes in at periodic intervals, and he is the 

verification to the Secretary that we are doing our job. 

I don’t want to replace that. I need that independent oversight. 

What I did 2 years ago was to centralize authority and responsibility in site offices. That authority and responsibility was diffused 

before then. And to emphasize the importance of those site offices, 

I didn’t provide periodic supervision from headquarters. And in two 

areas that was a mistake—nuclear safety, unrelated to the subject 

of this hearing, and security. 

So what I want to do is provide a routine interaction between my 

office that the site manager can call on when they need help and 

that will make sure I know that when Mr. Podonsky comes, I don’t 

have to wait the 2 years till his next visit to make sure that we 

are performing correctly. It is the difference between line supervision, which is my responsibility—and this is a tool to aid me in 

it—and independent oversight, which is Mr. Podonsky’s. But the 

functions are quite separate. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Podonsky, do you agree with Mr. Brooks’ assessment of the situation. 

Mr. PODONSKY. I agree with how he describes it, and I certainly 

hope that it will be enacted that way. 

My experience, Mr. Chairman, is that this Department does a lot 

of checking on itself without much improvement. I have every confidence that what Ambassador Brooks is talking about is reasonable and makes sense. 

If I were in Ambassador Brooks’ position, I would want to know 

how my sites were performing before independent oversight came 

as well. I just want to make sure we don’t fall into the same predicament that we have had in past years, where previous Secretaries 

have created what we call ‘‘checkers checking checkers.’’ That is not 

a good situation, because we get a lot of reports and not a lot of 

action. 

I don’t believe that is the intention, as Ambassador Brooks has 

described the program. 

Mr. BROOKS. And I agree with that completely. One of the advantages Mr. Podonsky has is that we are both going to be in these 

jobs for the next few years, so we will be sure to make sure these 

get off. 

49

Mr. WHITFIELD. I hope that is the case because, as Mr. Podonsky 

just said, we do seem to have a lot of checkers checking checkers, 

and we do need a lot more action. And there certainly seem to have 

been a lot of problems in these programs. 

Mr. Brooks, the University of California stated that the cost of 

the stand-down at Los Alamos was around $160 million. However, 

we have an NNSA memorandum dated February 22, 2005, from 

the NNSA’s chief financial officer in Albuquerque to the Los Alamos site manager, and according to this document, the total programmatic cost of the stand-down is about $367 million. 

I ask unanimous consent to enter this document into the record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

50


99905.019
51


99905.020
52


99905.021
53


99905.022
54


99905.023
55


99905.024
56


99905.025
57


99905.026
58


99905.027
59


99905.028
60

Mr. WHITFIELD. It seems the difference between those two estimates relates to whether we include indirect costs in the estimate. 

Do you think this $367 million estimate from your staff represents the actual cost of the stand-down? 

Mr. BROOKS. It represents an upper limit. 

There are two points of difference, if I may. This gets into a little 

bit about how we account for costs with our contractors. There are 

two differences, and the application of indirect costs is actually the 

smaller. 

Here is what we do: An individual laboratory is working on a 

project, and they keep a record with a little code of what project 

they are working on. We then take that labor cost, add whatever 

other direct costs, materials, and that is the cost, the direct cost of 

the project. We then apply to that the things you need to run a 

lab—the fire department, the salary of the laboratory director—and 

those are indirect costs. 

There are two differences between the laboratory methodology 

and ours. At our direction, the laboratory kept track of the cost of 

the stand-down. But the way it chose to do so was to continue to 

have people charge to their projects and to apply an algorithm that 

estimated the amount of time that was purely stand-down. That is 

not auditable. It is not done with any malicious intent, but it is not 

auditable. What we did is, here is the period of the stand-down; 

here is what they charged to their projects. So that gave us a substantially larger direct labor cost. 

Now, the truth is almost certainly somewhere in the middle. The laboratory assumes about $119 million of direct labor cost, we assume about $200 million direct labor costs, and there is no way to 

allocate between that as to what people would have been doing if 

there had never been a stand-down, because that is not the way 

the records were kept. 

Then the laboratory chooses to say that indirect cost is inappropriate here. We believe that the way we compare cost is using indirect cost. So that is the difference. It is an accounting difference. 

I believe that the assessment of Mr. Martinez, who is my field 

chief financial officer, is correct, but it is conservatively correct. In 

other words, it is an auditable accounting standard assessment of 

what can be documented. The actual-cost money that was spent 

only because of the stand-down is almost certainly less, but because there is no way to determine how much less, we do not accept the laboratory’s—I would call it ‘‘estimate.’’ Dr. Nanos would 

probably not use that same word. 

The real cost of the stand-down, however, is not just monetary; 

it is what has happened to the programs. And we are working very 

hard with the laboratory to minimize that. 

But I stand by that report. That’s a good report. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. That the costs are significant. 

Mr. BROOKS. The costs are significant. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. My time has expired here, but I notice that you 

did reduce the fees to the University of California. Do you feel like 

the University of California should pay some of these costs caused 

by the stand-down? 

Mr. BROOKS. The determination of whether these are allowable 

charges to the government is a formal determination that will be 

61

made by the contracting officer. In the report you referred to, the 

chief field financial officer offers an opinion that the bulk of these 

costs are allowable charges to the government. 

Let me give you an analogy. If we at our lab go build something, 

anything, and it costs more than we expected, the government is 

responsible for that extra cost. We may decide to reduce the fee, 

we may decide to hire somebody else to run the lab, but we cannot 

change the rules of the contract in the middle. This may be an 

analogous situation. 

Our recourse, first, is to reduce the fee, which as you know I 

have done; and second, this is a performance issue which will be 

taken account in the upcoming competition. I believe those are likely to be our recourse. But I want to be very careful not to prejudge 

the independent determination of the contracting officer who is responsible for deciding whether these are allowable costs. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Stupak. 

Mr. STUPAK. If I may pick up right there, stand-down cost is not 

addressed at all in the contracts? 

Mr. BROOKS. No, and that is what makes it more complex. But 

some of the stand-down costs can be regarded as the necessary cost 

of doing business. 

I don’t want to suggest that this is a completely black-and-white 

determination, and I don’t want to suggest we have made a final 

judgment, but I also don’t want to mislead the committee. Two 

independent looks have suggested that under the contract, these 

are probably going to be allowable costs. 

Mr. STUPAK. How do you ever change the culture, then, if the security, the lax security, the quality assurance, then the stand-down 

costs. 

Not only do we have the loss of work being done at the lab, but 

then you also have other costs for the cost of the stand-down. And 

you say, Well, that is part of doing business with the government, 

so the taxpayer has to foot the bill, while the University of California, that oversees this—how do you ever change this culture 

that you have to do things right or there is going to be some responsibility? And in this case, these costs should be borne by the 

university and not the taxpayer. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, first of all, sir, I think you change the culture 

on the ground in the lab. I believe that the very strong actions Dr. 

Nanos took to hold people accountable, including terminations and 

reductions, I think that the time spent in reviewing procedures and 

working on culture, those are going to pay off. In essence, we have spent $300 plus million to make the lab better. Now, if we screw it up and the lab isn’t better as a result of 

this, then that has been an enormous waste of time and energy. 

And we will not know for some period of time. 

In the stand-down, for example, the laboratory uncovered some 

350 issues that had to be corrected before they started. They uncovered another 3,000 issues of long-term improvement that are being 

built into this. If we follow through on that, we will have——

Mr. STUPAK. If you go in looking for 300 and you come out with 

3,000 more, what does that say about the quality of the security 

and the quality assurance and quality control at the lab? It says, 

62

it is pretty ridiculous, to put it mildly; and then these costs are just 

passed back to the taxpayer. 

See, you are going to get 3,000 again when you go back down 

there in the next stand-down, and I hope you don’t have another 

one, if we’re not doing anything; if we’re not holding anyone responsible. I guess that’s the culture I’m looking for. 

Mr. BROOKS. Yes, sir, and I understand. 

Mr. STUPAK. The only one being held responsible is the U.S. taxpayer, because they are paying for all these indirect and direct 

costs. Aren’t we really paying the University of California for their 

expertise so we don’t have these stand-downs and all these costs 

to the taxpayers and so that labs can run. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, we are certainly paying them to manage the 

lab. We are certainly unhappy with their management, which is 

the reason for the significant reduction in fee. The university, as 

you know, operates the laboratory in a way that it neither benefits 

nor pays. That is, the fee it receives is plowed back into the lab 

and it does not go into its general area. 

I believe there’s no question at all that the university understands that it screwed up and that it is actively trying to make 

sure that the problems are really fixed. 

Mr. STUPAK. But from where we sit, this is my tenth year on this 

oversight subcommittee, and I have heard this 10 years now, that 

we think they really understand, they really get it this time. 

At Los Alamos, I have been there. When I said we should go see 

these, I have been there because of the problems there. I go there 

and they have these real strict procedures, and I think Dr. Nanos 

has really tried to put some strict procedures in there, but if the 

overseer, the University of California here, is going to have this relaxed attitude and there is no real cost to them because they can 

just put that cost back off to the taxpayer, I just think we are going 

to be here for another 10 years going over the same thing and 

hearing from you or someone else in your position that I think they 

really understand. I just don’t see it. 

Mr. BROOKS. The one difference, sir, I will submit, is the competition. I think that for the first time, as a result of past problems——

Mr. STUPAK. You bet. 

Mr. BROOKS. We have made a decision, and we are working very 

hard to make sure this is a genuine, not a pro forma, competition; 

and I believe that is having a salutary effect. 

Mr. STUPAK. I hope when you do these competitive bids you put 

in there that if there is a stand-down, you are going to be responsible for part of the stand-down, because we are relying upon your 

expertise so that we don’t have these stand-downs that cause extra 

money. 

You used the analogy, if we are building a project there and the 

project costs more money than what we anticipate, the government 

is responsible for it. Well, we pay to run these labs at a certain 

price. If it is going to cost more because of lack of quality control, 

I don’t think the taxpayer should have to pay that price. I think 

the University of California should, or whatever is managing it. 

In my opening, I mentioned that I wanted to ask each of you 

about some areas that you feel we need to address and address 

63

now. So if you could generally do that—I don’t want you to say 

anything classified; we will have that discussion later. 

But, Mr. Podonsky, what do you think are the three or four most 

important issues we need to address and address them now? Is it 

the classified removal of electronic media? Is it the theft of nuclear 

material? What do you think our top three or four things are, just 

generally? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Generally, Congressman, it is the consolidation of 

nuclear material that needs to be addressed now, and as rapidly 

as possible, as I said in my opening statement. It is the deployment 

of technology. We are in the 21st century, and we are still depending on more guards, gates and guns than technology. And so we 

definitely need to do that. 

As Ambassador Brooks and I also mentioned, we are moving in 

that direction. We are just not moving as quickly as we would prefer to move. 

The improvement of the existing security force, we talk about an 

elite force in former Secretary Abraham’s initiatives; well, we need 

to establish a paramilitary group for our most valuable assets and 

Category I facilities. We need to continue to improve our physical 

security at many of our sites. And all this is rolled up into our 

DBT. 

Last, I would say, Mr. Congressman, that Federal management 

and oversight of the sites needs to be improved. And as you have 

heard, Ambassador Brooks intends to do that at NNSA sites, and 

we need to do that also at the DOE sites. 

Mr. STUPAK. Let me hit two points. You have mentioned consolidation and technology improvements. I was a little concerned when 

you said we’re going to move this stuff out of, was it TA 18 there, 

and it is going to go up to Nevada. Part of it, we are going to take 

it out of the building it is in now and put it in another building; 

and then later on it will get shipped up to Nevada. Why is that 

taking so long? Why don’t you just move it all to Nevada? Why are 

we hopping from spot to spot. 

Mr. PODONSKY. I think that would with better answered by the 

program, which would be Ambassador Brooks. 

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. Because when you say ‘‘consolidation now,’’ 

what do you mean by ‘‘now’’? This year. 

Mr. PODONSKY. In my capacity for the Secretary and for Ambassador Brooks, looking at it independently, I don’t have to worry 

about running the programs, so I can look at it and say, Why aren’t 

we moving the material now? 

Like the Sandia Pulsed Reactor, without getting into classified 

now, sure, we ought to just go ahead and terminate that activity. 

But, clearly, the program has other requirements that I’m not familiar with, and that would have to be Ambassador Brooks’ decision. 

But it seems to me, after a number of years in this agency and 

overseeing it, that we just don’t move rapidly enough, for reasons 

that are not always clear. Some of them are legitimate and some 

of them, separate from Ambassador Brooks, I think are just more 

excuses as to why we don’t do what we should be doing. 

Mr. STUPAK. So TA-18, if I remember correctly, we have been 

talking about moving this for 10 years. 

64

Mr. PODONSKY. That is correct. But, I would also say, and I was 

there in 2000 when it was first brought up with former Secretary 

Richardson. At least now they are doing something about it. Back 

then, it was still just talk. 

Mr. STUPAK. You guys are starting to sound like the EPA. They 

told me the other day: Soon. Government moves slowly but should 

not move that slowly. 

Ambassador Brooks, could you give us a little bit more on why 

this consolidation, why can’t we just give it up to Nevada? 

Mr. BROOKS. A couple of reasons. One is that there is a safety 

reason; that is packing and moving special nuclear material takes 

time. We have a couple of shipments that have already gone; we 

have several shipments that are going. But the problems of Los Alamos were, in my view, much more severe in the safety than in the 

security area. 

And we are not going to do high-hazard operations other than in 

a safe manner. Second, there are programmatic issues. We need—

this material exists in part because of some criticality training that 

we are going to have to ultimately replicate in Nevada. 

We are trying to balance the requirements to get it out of TA18, still maintain the program and do everything safely. And what 

we have come up with is to move out of TA-18 by the end of the 

year to an area where there is already a good deal of material and 

a very robust amount of security—I can talk a little bit more about 

that in the closed session—while continuing to move it as rapidly, 

as safely to Nevada. 

So, even if I could, if I could press a button now and have it all 

in Nevada, probably will not want to do it, I need some of it to continue the criticality experiments that are important for our emergency management. 

So what I am doing is putting it in a safer place in the interim 

until I can get the capability at Nevada. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Dr. Burgess, you are recognized for 10 minutes. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Podonsky, in your testimony, you discussed the importance 

of local Department of Energy site management to identify and correct security problems on their own. However, you also point out 

that local management has not always been up to the task. Los Alamos has had problems with managing their classified data inventories for many years. 

Why do you think that Los Alamos, at the site level, has been 

unable to effectively identify and correct management weaknesses 

before the problems occur? 

Mr. PODONSKY. I do not think that Los Alamos has a corner on 

that market of not being able to identify all of the problems at the 

site. What has traditionally happened, in my experience, in the Department is that the site offices have not always had the depth of 

capability among their Federal staff to go out and do the work that, 

for example, that my independent oversight office does. 

And because of restrictions on the number of people that they 

can afford to have at these sites in the past, I think what we term 

oversight, I think oversight is a misnomer; it is really managing 

65

and directing the M&O contracts is what we need to recognize. And 

there needs to be more of that. 

I cannot give you a specific, Congressman, as to why they did not 

have a more robust management in the direction, but we have confidence, my oversight group now, has confidence in the team that 

Ambassador Brooks has there onsite. We also have confidence, and 

that is not to impugn people who have served in those capacities 

previously, but there are various degrees of talent that the Federal 

Government is able to attract and keep, and I think Ambassador 

Brooks has got some of the best that he can find for the management of that site right now Mr. BURGESS. Ambassador Brooks, is 

the problem primarily one of funding? 

Mr. BROOKS. No. The problem is the things I tried to allude to 

in my statement. Los Alamos is a good example, because, for years, 

we have not developed security as a career progression. We have 

not built the cadre of very, very experienced and knowledgeable security professionals. We have some, but we do not have enough. 

And that is what Admiral Chiles has helped us to see for the long 

term. 

So the people who are doing this at the Los Alamos site office, 

there were not enough of them. There are more now, and they were 

not as experienced as you would like. Second, there was the leadership issue within that group which no longer exists. Third, there 

has been a tendency at many of my site offices, including, I think, 

Los Alamos, to defer to the security people for security and to 

worry about all of the other things the site office had to do. 

And my site managers now understand they cannot do that, that 

security is too important. And, fourth, in my responsibility of supervising the site offices, I did not have as good a mechanism to 

make sure that they were doing their job, and that is the purpose 

of this new office. 

So it was all of the things that I alluded to in my statement; it 

was not an issue of funding. It was an issue of organization. We 

had, before 2002, an extremely—when you look back, there are a 

number of past reports—an extremely fragmented organization in 

the Department of Energy. It was very difficult to tell who is in 

charge. 

And one of the things we have tried to correct is to make it clear 

that I am in charge, and under me, my site manager. You know, 

in all areas, we are still working to make sure that that concept 

is fully understood, but it is clearly the right way to run the complex. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you. Mr. Podonsky, are there examples of 

other sites in the weapons complex where line management has 

been effective in identifying security matters before they emerge? 

Have we done it right in other places? 

Mr. PODONSKY. From our perspective, yes, sir. Pantex is an excellent example. 

Mr. BURGESS. A Texas facility, I might point out Mr. PODONSKY. I do notice that, Congressman, yes. But, and considering the mission that is there, that is also quite heartening to know that they 

have such a strong site management program. 

Mr. BROOKS. If I may, Congressman. It is the same sized program. So that is why it is not primarily a question of resources; it 

66

is a question of leadership and training. And we are trying to use 

those standards at Pantex as a model for the rest of my sites. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, Ambassador Brooks, do you feel that you are 

going to be able to convince Los Alamos and other sites to improve 

line management, attention to security matters, before they become 

further security problems? 

Mr. BROOKS. On the Federal side, I am absolutely convinced. And 

I have no reason to doubt it on the contractor side. There are always going to be problems. I want to make it clear. There are always going to be problems. This is a huge complex enterprise. The 

point is, are the Federal officials responsible for providing the supervision finding those problems in time to make sure that they 

are corrected? And that is what I am—that is what we are going 

to be able to do. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back my 

time. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Inslee, you are recognized for 10 minutes. 

Mr. INSLEE. Thank you. 

Mr. Brooks, I wanted to ask you some questions about the Hanford site. If you can update us on consolidation efforts there and 

plutonium transfer efforts, I would be appreciative. 

Mr. BROOKS. Hanford is not one of my sites, sir. I am going to 

have to take a pass. 

Glenn, are you in a position to address that? We may need to answer that for the record, sir. We have the wrong people at the 

table. 

Mr. PODONSKY. The Hanford site falls under the under secretary 

for ESE. I believe that nomination is up and has not been confirmed yet. So I do not have the information on that. 

Mr. INSLEE. We will talk to some other folks. 

What—I was reading an article about a year ago talking about 

security in a broad context. It was suggesting reference to the GAO 

report that precipitated a lot of our concerns. And the GAO report, 

as I recall it, basically suggested that there needed to be a new bar, 

a new standard, if you will, for security, that an original sort of 

standard was to prevent an intruder from seizing a weapon or plutonium and leaving the site and using it for nefarious purposes 

somewhere else, and that we really needed a system that would 

prevent intrusion and the ability to detonate and utilize in some 

way onsite. 

How would you characterize efforts to meet that standard? Met? 

Unmet? Are there dates you can discuss with us in that regard? 

Mr. BROOKS. Yes, sir. I will be able to say a little bit more about 

this in closed session. But we operationalize that through the socalled design basis threat. And you are absolutelycorrect. Before 

September 11, all of us assumed that the threat was somebody 

coming to steal highly enriched uranium or plutonium to take it 

some place else and use it. And therefore, we could afford to let 

them get to the vault as long as we could kill them on the way out. 

And so if we could contain them, and that was the term we used, 

containment, that was an adequate security standard. 

After 9/11 we realized that there were people who were willing 

to die in order to cause harm to the United States, and it is hard 

to think of something that would have a greater effect than some 

67

kind of nuclear detonation. So we needed to move to a situation 

where we prevented people from ever reaching the material. 

That turns out to be a much more demanding problem. And it 

depends very much on how many people you think you are defending against and what kind of equipment they—we have made two 

judgments, one in May 2003 and then another in October of last 

year, about how many people. 

And that is associated, May 2003, we made a determination, and 

we will be fully compliant with that standard by the end of next 

year. 

The new, more demanding standard that we implemented in October 2004, the Department has established, it is an extremely conservative standard. I will talk about that in the closed session. 

Well, the Department has established the end of 2008. 

The site assistance visits that Mr. Podonsky talked about are 

partly an attempt to figure out how we tailor to each site the best 

way to meet that threat. That may depend on money in the 2007 

budget; that, I cannot quite know where it is yet. So we are on 

schedule and fully funded to meet the threat established in 2003. 

We have a schedule and a plan, but we still do not have enough 

fidelity to know exactly what it will cost for the more robust threat 

established in October of last year. 

Mr. INSLEE. Now, maybe this is an unanswerable question, but 

that just seems to be a time period that just is something I cannot 

accept just sitting here. I do not have to do the hard work like you 

do, but if someone said I wanted to prevent terrorists from coming 

into this hearing room and eliminating some Members of Congress, 

they said we are going to finish the job at the end of 2008, I would 

not find that acceptable. 

I think, look, there has got to be some mechanical ability to 

achieve this goal at an earlier period. Are budgetary problems a 

problem, really, getting this job done before——

Mr. BROOKS. Not all. 

Mr. INSLEE. Let me finish my question. If you can try to characterize to us, if we said that is just not acceptable, to the demands 

of the public, and I do not think it is, what does it take to accelerate completion of that project? 

Mr. BROOKS. A couple of things. First, we have, in some cases, 

put compensatory measures, which are manpower intensive, so 

that you have some confidence, but not enough confidence, before. 

The answer, I think the honest answer, is, I do not know what 

it takes to accelerate 2008, because I do not know what it takes 

to do 2008. We established this standard, and we are now trying 

to gather the information through the site assistance visits. We will 

have inputs from each site this summer, and then we will see, as 

we prepare the 2007 budget, what has to be done. 

At some sites, I believe it will actually be relatively easily. The 

highly enriched uranium material facility at Y-12, for example, was 

designed so that it was less sensitive to the size of the attacking 

force. 

Nevada test site, the assembly facility, was designed so it is less 

sensitive to the size of the attacking force. And so we will be there 

probably relatively easy. 

68

Other places, I think, are going to prove more complex. So I do 

not know. In some cases, I do not think it is money, because, in 

some cases, it takes a certain amount of time to build things. Let’s 

take the Y-12 facility. If you went to Y-12 now, you would see a 

bunch of buildings, and in there are quote vaults. 

But when you dug into it, you would find those vaults are just 

rooms, because they were built in a different era. And they are not 

located where you would locate them if you were going to have a 

quote vault; they are located where it was convenient to build. So 

they are on the outside of buildings closest to the fence. 

Well, you have obviously got to fix that. And the way to fix it is 

to consolidate it into a very highly secure building. We are building 

that building, but it is going to take some years to build it. And 

to a certain limit, you cannot build a building faster by throwing 

more money at it. It takes what it takes. 

Mr. INSLEE. So if somehow you got a Congressional White House 

mandate to accelerate that by 12 months, what would you do? 

Mr. BROOKS. I would buy more guards, and I would do it with 

compensatory measures. It would be inefficient. But, that is sort of 

what we are doing now. We have established a regime where we 

do certain things with very heavy additional protective force, because we do not yet have the material in this secure building. In 

the short term, the only thing you can do is throw people at it. 

In the longer term, you throw design and technology at it, and 

that is the solution we are working toward. And I would welcome 

the chance to explore this in closed session. I do want to stress, the 

design basis threat that we decided to impose on ourselves in October 2004 is an extremely conservative threat, more conservative 

than is being used elsewhere in the Government. 

So I do want to assure you that we have set ourselves a real 

stretch goal in being able to defend against this threat, and it is 

a threat that I believe is unlikely to be mounted, but it is—the consequences are so severe that we have chosen to establish that as 

our standard. 

Mr. INSLEE. Thank you. 

Mr. PODONSKY. Congressman, if I might. 

You should not leave the hearing thinking that the Department 

is not aggressively moving out to the denial strategy. The previous 

design basis threat of 2003, some sites are actually very close to 

completion in a lot of their efforts, and that is a continuation on 

to 2004. As Ambassador Brooks said, the next one is, in fact, a 

stretch. 

But we all share the same concerns. And that is why we have 

these SAVs taking place, so that we can help the sites find the 

strategies, find the technology, and we can get it implemented as 

rapidly as possible. The 2008 date is when everybody has to be 

compliant. That does not mean they wait until September 2008. 

Mr. INSLEE. Got you. Thank you. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. The gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Walden, who 

is vice chairman of this subcommittee, is recognized for 10 minutes. 

Mr. WALDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, 

I think you have heard pretty clearly from my colleagues a great 

frustration at the cost of the standdown, the delay in implementing 

69

some of these requirements and security efforts. I know you have 

been working on it. 

But it just seems to me that, if the University of California was 

hired to do the job and they did not do it and it resulted in a 

standdown that now costs taxpayers maybe upwards of $360 or $20 

or $160 million and, I think I am hearing today, there is no penalty 

that can probably be extracted against them in the existing contract, something is broken. 

And I know—I am sure—I know Chairman Barton feels this 

way, I know I do, that the University of California should have to 

pay something in this process. It is outrageous, when you look at 

the costs that we are absorbing to improve homeland security. And 

we have got a contractor that is supposed to be providing all of 

this, and you all have to step in and shut everything down. 

What do the people do during this multi-month period of the 

standdown? 

Mr. BROOKS. What—first, I do need to correct one thing. While 

it is almost certain that I would have stepped in and shut it down, 

the laboratory director who was the University of California employee is the one who imposed the standdown. And it to his credit 

that he recognized the problem. 

Mr. WALDEN. I understand it was such a mess they had to shut 

it down. The duration, though, is the issue. Why does it take this 

long to figure out the problem? 

Mr. BROOKS. It took the duration, which I believe surprised both 

the laboratory director and me—we thought it would be much closer to half that—was because, as you dig in to trying to do a very, 

very thorough job, we found that the problems within the organization were deeper and wider spread. 

And so we made a decision, which I made, that, having gone this 

way, we were going to do it right, that is, we were going to find 

and fix the problems, because we did not want to go through this 

pain and this cost and not be able to say, we are going to make 

the lab better at the end. 

Mr. WALDEN. I understand that. That is where you identify the 

350 issues, followed by 3,000 issues. But that tells me, as a manager, and I own my own business and have for 19 years, that someone was not watching the store. 

Mr. BROOKS. No question of that, sir. 

Mr. WALDEN. That somebody—okay, so a few people maybe were 

let go or penalized, but the big somebody, the University of California, is not suffering, are they? 

Mr. BROOKS. The university is suffering, I would submit to you, 

in three areas. One is the monetary penalty that I imposed as part 

of——

Mr. WALDEN. The reduction in fees? 

Mr. BROOKS. The reduction in fees. 

Mr. WALDEN. But you testified those come right back to the lab? 

Mr. BROOKS. The university has traditionally taken its fee and 

used it for its own supervisory actions, and then anything that was 

left over has been poured back to the lab. So the university has 

never, in the 60 years that it has run the lab, used the fees for any 

purpose other than the lab. 

Mr. WALDEN. How much was that reduction? 

70

Mr. BROOKS. The reduction was $5 million, sir. There was a $3 

million penalty. The full——

Mr. WALDEN. How much of that was related to the standdown? 

Mr. BROOKS. $3 million was directly related to the standdown 

and was imposed punitively. An additional $2 million was the result of the grade of unsatisfactory in operations. 

Mr. WALDEN. So like 1 percent, 1.5 percent on the loss. What is 

the total fee? 

Mr. BROOKS. The total fee that they would have been eligible for 

was $8.8 million. They ended up at $3 million. 

Mr. WALDEN. Okay. 

Mr. BROOKS. So that is the first area. 

Second, I believe that the university, which takes great pride in 

its reputation, has suffered an intangible but very real punishment. 

And, third, we are doing a competition. And the record, if the university chooses to compete, their record in this, their successes in 

areas and their failures will be part of the competition. 

Mr. WALDEN. Is there not still lacking a final determination on 

the reasonableness of the duration of the standdown in relation to 

its impact on the overall allowability of the costs? 

Mr. BROOKS. Yes, sir. That is what I was trying to make clear 

in response to an earlier question; that is a determination that is 

made by the contracting officer. I have been urged by the chairman 

to be personally involved in that. And I intend to. So there is a determination yet to be made. 

But I do not want to mislead the committee; you are holding a 

report from probably our most knowledgeable individual in the 

field, who has offered an opinion that that determination will find 

that these are allowable costs. And so I did not——

Mr. WALDEN. You do not want to prejudice that? 

Mr. BROOKS. I do not want to prejudice it, but I do not want to 

mislead the committee. 

Mr. WALDEN. That is—I have a list of DOE security initiatives 

that was presented at a hearing before this subcommittee last May. 

I would like to ask unanimous consent that this list be entered into 

the record, Mr. Chairman. I believe the staff has a copy of that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

71


99905.029
72


99905.030
73


99905.031
74


99905.032
75

Mr. WALDEN. The list, last 14 security initiatives, and I understand that Mr. Podonsky has the responsibility to track the 

progress of these initiatives for the Department. And I understand 

from your testimony, sir, that the Department has fallen behind on 

several of these initiatives. Could you just apprise the committee, 

go through this list and identify for us these initiatives that have 

not been implemented and why? 

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WALDEN. The key ones, at least. 

Mr. PODONSKY. My office was given the responsibility to track 

the progress. And that is done monthly. Each of the initiatives 

were assigned to a program office by separate memorandum, either 

from the former Deputy Secretary, Kyle McSlarrow, or from Ambassador Brooks to his organizations. 

And they report that progress—the program offices report the 

progress to us. Specifically, if we divided them up into four categories: information security, new technologies, consolidation of 

material and then strengthening human capital. 

To answer your question specifically, the cyber enhancement is 

lagging. 

Mr. WALDEN. That is No. 2 on this last? 

Mr. PODONSKY. That is No. 2. The diskless desktop computing 

was lagging up until last month. That has been moving out quite 

nicely now. The keyless technology, that is in progress. 

The Blue Sky Commission, that deserves a special note. This is 

something that both Ambassador Brooks and I have a responsibility for. But we both agreed, setting up a commission, while it is 

something that we would like to do long term, it has been difficult 

to find the people to serve on the commission. 

But that did not stop us from looking at existing technologies 

and getting some of theme deployed to the field as we speak right 

now in pilot programs. The other lagging ones——

Mr. BROOKS. The weapons complex review? 

Mr. PODONSKY. The weapons complex review is one that just recently got underway, but it still has a due date or report to the 

Congress of April 2005. 

Mr. WALDEN. Are you going to meet that? 

Mr. BROOKS. Yes, sir, we are going to meet it with a verbal report, with a final written report. We had more trouble than I expected to get the right people on that committee. It is an external 

review. 

Mr. WALDEN. I see. 

Mr. PODONSKY. The other one is the long-term storage. That is 

a complex matter. 

Mr. WALDEN. Which number is that, sir? 

Mr. BROOKS. Eight. 

Mr. WALDEN. Okay. 

Mr. PODONSKY. The problem with that is finding the material at 

different sites that no longer need to use the material at that site, 

and where do you send that material? 

As I said in my opening remarks and in my written testimony, 

that involves more than just the Department of Energy. 

Mr. WALDEN. Would this involve, for example, the universities 

elsewhere around the country that may have little amounts? 

76

Mr. BROOKS. No, sir. There is a program to deal with that. That 

is moving fairly well. 

No, here is the problem here. It is primarily a plutonium problem. We have plutonium that we do not need and we need to get 

rid of. And we do not have a fully identified path to eliminate it. 

Some of it we are going turn into mixed oxide fuel under a separate program. But some of it is not suitable for that. We are barred 

from bringing that plutonium into the State of South Carolina for 

a complex reason that I can get into if you need to. 

So now you are in a situation—without having a technically adequate path out, which we are still developing. So you have a situation where you would like to move material out of where it is to 

consolidate it in a separate place, but you do not have a separate 

place to consolidate it to. 

So we are looking, for example, now, at a facility in Idaho built 

for another purpose. We are looking at whether that could be a 

place to consolidate material pending disposition. 

For highly enriched uranium, it is much easier. You have a place 

to put that at Y-12. There the problem is that the highly enriched 

uranium that is around the complex we are largely using, and it 

is a question of when we can stop. 

But, on plutonium, the issue is finding a place to put this stuff 

until we can figure out its long-term disposition, which is a technically difficult and somewhat emotional issue. 

Mr. WALDEN. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I appreciate the 

work you are doing and your candor today. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mrs. Blackburn, you are recognized for 10 minutes. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to 

our panel for being here. We appreciate this today. 

We talked a lot about Los Alamos. But I have got a question. I 

want to ask you about Crystal River and about the Crystal River 

complex. And I think that probably many of my colleagues were 

really stunned to learn about the problems that occurred there and 

are curious to know whether or not, despite officials saying that 

they followed all of the proper regulations, if the worker 

verification program, which has been used in Florida, was followed 

with this, because the problem there was those who had gained unlawful entry to our country were working in that facility. And I am 

pulling this from a March 12 article that was in the Washington 

Times. 

And what I would like to know is, do the current Department of 

Energy or NRC regulations require that contractors use the worker 

verification program? Because you all talk—have talked extensively 

this morning about increasing training, about the need for human 

capital security, the need to secure materials. But if you do not 

know who it is, if they are using false documentation, if they are 

using a false identity, how do you know who it is that you are allowing access? 

So do you require them to use the worker verification program? 

Mr. BROOKS. I cannot answer with respect to the Nuclear Regulatory Commissionsites, which I believe is the subject of that story. 

For us, because we generally require security clearances, we are in 

a much different world, because we therefore have to—first, we 

77

have to have U.S. Citizens, and second, we have the investigative 

requirements that are associated with a Q clearance. 

So for most of the people at our sites, this does not become an 

issue because of the requirement for U.S. Citizenship. With regard 

to what the NRC does, I will be happy to try to get you an answer 

for the record, ma’am. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. That is okay. That is fine. So what you are 

saying is that the NNSA has safeguards? 

Mr. BROOKS. Yes. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. That would prevent anything from occurring 

like it did at the NRC site? 

Mr. BROOKS. I believe so. I will—but I have not studied the particular occurrence. I will look at that. If that is not right, I will get 

you a corrected answer for the record. But certainly, we have safeguards that ensure that we only have U.S. Citizens who have been 

investigated and granted the proper clearance. That is an extremely important part of our security approach. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Wonderful. Thank you, sir. 

I have another question for you. You have mentioned, when we 

talk about the security initiatives in the new DBT—and this kind 

of goes in with what Mr. Walden was just speaking to you about—

you have talked about having a tracking progress and having routine interactions. But do you have a time line that would implement the security initiatives and the new DBT? I am not seeing a 

document or have not been able to find a document that says this 

is our time line, these are our benchmarks. You alluded to, possibly, that there may be something. 

Mr. BROOKS. We have, for the May 2003 DBT, the end of fiscal 

year 2006, we monitor progress. A couple of my sites are essentially there. For the October 2004 further enhancements, we have 

set ourselves a goal of the end of 2008. We do not have a detailed 

schedule yet, that is what we will be developing this summer as 

a result of the site assistance visit process that Mr. Podonsky was 

describing. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Okay. And GAO has said that you all lack a 

formal program management structure and need to implement 

guidance for directing the work of its contractors. What specific actions are you taking to address that situation? 

Mr. BROOKS. The former deputy secretary required, in response 

partly to that and partly to just general concern, we establish a formal program management structure. It is in its early stages. And 

I think the jury is still out on whether what we have done so far 

is adequate. We are very good at project management. I mean, we 

can point to you some examples where we have not been, but, basically, we have the structure and the procedures and the training 

and the qualification to be good at project management. 

But to manage overall programs, we have in NNSA I think that 

we have about 54 programs, and to look at each of those, we do 

annual reviews by me, we have—the Department has a series of 

milestones under a system called the jewel. But we were also looking at a quarterly snapshot of each program for the deputy secretary to make sure that we are starting to manage programs as 

overall entities and not just focusing on individual projects? 

78

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Are you using the PMA or the PART, the rating tools there? 

Mr. BROOKS. I use PART. The President’s Management Agenda 

was very important to the previous Secretary and the deputy. And 

there is every evidence they will be even more important to the 

current Secretary, who has a very strong management background. 

I use PART. The Department uses PART as required by the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, I have established 

PART as the internal NNSA review tool. So when I go through my 

annual reviews, we do a PART assessment for every program every 

year, even though the Office of Management and Budget will only 

have us assess two or three of them. 

Our initial experience with that was that our internal assessments were rosier than OMB. More recently, we have been coming 

much closer. And what you do is you look at what you said, and 

then when OMB gives you their grade, you look at the comparison 

and what you want to make sure is that your self assessment is 

honest. 

If it is honest, you will come out pretty close to the OMB grade. 

For the last cycle, I came out very close on the four projects. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Well, if you are going through 54 programs a 

year; you are a busy man. 

Mr. BROOKS. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Mr. Podonsky, a couple of questions. The Y-12 

plant in Oak Ridge, which is in Tennessee, my State, the initial 

plans there were for an underground storage facility. And this was 

changed to an above-ground facility. 

So if you will please address why that was changed to an aboveground facility, why DOE approved it and—even though the inspector general said it was going to cost more and be less secure. 

Mr. PODONSKY. I would like to answer that. But since the facility 

is actually owned by Master Brooks, I would suggest that he would 

give you those answers as to why those decisions were made. I can 

only give you a view of how robust we think the plans are. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Okay. 

Mr. BROOKS. There were two competing designs, neither of them 

were actually underground. The water table at Y-12 makes it difficult to do a true underground facility. So there were two competing designs, one which has been referred to as the berm design, 

essentially had an earth cover, and one that did not. 

Those were not the only differences between the designs. I can 

get into a little more detail in closed session. But the design had—

the designs had a number of features that differed. We concluded 

that the so-called bermed design was not likely. First, it was subject to single-point failure. That is, there is a particular vulnerability that if people were able to penetrate, we did not have a good 

back-up. 

And, second, we were concerned that it was very sensitive to assumptions about the size of the attacking force. That is a big deal. 

Because, as we can talk about more in closed session, when I talk 

about changes in the design basis threat, one of those changes is 

how large the attacking force we assume is. So what you would like 

is a facility that does not depend on the intelligence judgment of 

the day about how big the force was. 

79

We, therefore, shifted to the second design. We could have added 

to that a berm. We chose not to. We chose not to because our assessment was that it was adequate, that it would cost another—

I think the estimate is $35 million in design costs and delay construction 2 years to redesign it. 

And it sounds easy to just put dirt over it, but when you put 22 

feet of dirt on top of a building, it turns out that you have to build 

a different building. And that the improvements in security did not 

outweigh the importance of moving forward. 

You know, there are alternate views. The inspector general report, and I can—we had an assessment done, I want to be very precise on what was done, by Sandia, which convinced me that the design we have was adequate. Sandia was not asked to say in a perfect world what they would do. 

And my guess is, they would have wanted some kind of combined 

design. But we concluded that the design we had was adequate—

it was superior to the alternate design for reasons unrelated to the 

amount of earth—and that it was more important to get on with 

building it. That is the judgment we made. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thank you. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you. 

Thank you very much for participating in this panel this morning. We appreciate the testimony of both of you. I would make one 

other comment. 

Ambassador Brooks, when do you anticipate that you will make 

this final determination on the reasonableness of the duration of 

the standdown in relation to its impact on the overall allowability 

of the cost of the contract? 

Mr. BROOKS. I am sorry, sir. I actually do not know the answer 

to that. I will let your staff know and provide it formally for the 

record. But I am not sure of the schedule on which the contracting 

officer is slated to make it. I just suddenly realized on the way over 

here that I did not know the answer to that. I did not have time 

to check. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. We look forward to hearing from you on that. I 

would also ask you unanimous consent to enter into the record a 

letter that we sent to Secretary Bodman just recently on these 14 

initiatives that were initiated by Secretary Abraham in which we 

asked the Secretary to give us an update on all 14 of those initiatives. 

And so I expect that the two of you may be involved in that as 

well. We look forward to your response to that letter as well. 

We are going to reconvene after our next two panels. We have 

two more panels. We have an individual on each panel, but we will 

be reconvening in room 2218 as soon as we finish the other two 

panels. So thank you all. We look forward to seeing you upstairs. 

At this time, I would like to call our next witness Mr. Nanos, 

Peter Nanos, who is the director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. 

And Mr. Nanos, we appreciate your being with us here today. As 

you know, it is the custom of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee to have witnesses testify under oath. 

And I would ask you, do you have any difficulty doing that this 

morning? 

80

Mr. NANOS. No, sir. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Do you wish to have legal counsel with you when 

you testify? 

Mr. NANOS. No, sir. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Then if you will stand, I will swear you in. 

[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Nanos, thank you very much. And you are 

now under oath. And with that, we would welcome you to give your 

opening statement. 

TESTIMONY OF G. PETE NANOS, DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS 

NATIONAL LABORATORY 

Mr. NANOS. Thank you, sir. Chairman Whitfield, ranking member Stupak, and distinguished members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning to update you on the status of security at Los Alamos. 

My name is Dr. Pete Nanos, and I have served as director of the 

Department of Energy’s Los Alamos National Laboratory since 

2003. I came to the laboratory from the Navy where I retired as 

a vice admiral. 

Before I begin, I wanted to thank Chairman Barton and the committee for your support of the improvements that we have made at 

the laboratory. 

Congressman Stupak, I would be happy to respond to any questions you have today regarding audits conducted by one of our contract employees, Dan Brown. We have thoroughly supported his investigation and drafting of his white paper, and have gone through 

a lot of detailed analysis of all of the elements of that white paper. 

Some of the ones, like welding and QA of plutonium fabrication 

and all, I have been personally involved in. And of course, some—

we can even talk about the boundaries in the closed session of 

some of the aspects. Because of his clearance level, he was not in 

some cases able to see the whole operation. But we can go into that 

in detail later. 

I want to emphatically state that the employees of Los Alamos 

National Laboratory are dedicated to the national security mission 

of this great Nation, and they take very seriously their responsibilities to personally safeguard America’s secrets. 

The laboratory conducts important work for the Nation, most notably ensuring the safety and reliability of the Nation’s strategic 

deterrent. Clearly, a component of that mission is the need to safeguard the national security information entrusted to our care. I am 

here today to tell you that I believe we are doing a good job in security, and I want to reaffirm to you our commitment to do even better. 

Los Alamos National Laboratory is a safer, stronger, more secure 

laboratory than when I last addressed this committee. The first 

point I would like to make is that the suspension of lab operations 

in July 2004 was necessary, and the employees who were at fault 

in the security and safety incidents that led to the suspension have 

been held accountable by the laboratory and the University of California. 

My decision to suspend laboratory operations was not easy, and 

I would like to spend some time here explaining what led to the 

81

suspension. At the outset, it is important to note that, during the 

suspension, the laboratory was open and employees were required 

to come to work throughout. No new funds were required during 

this time. We used existing funds. 

I would also like to clarify a little bit on the cost issue. I think 

Ambassador Brooks is entirely right, that the estimate that you referred to him, the higher estimate, was an upper bound, a very conservative upper bound. Our method of bidding costs for our number 

was based on mutual agreement between us and the site manager, 

in other words the NNSA contracting officer. 

And we decided to use an accepted accounting practice of determining those costs based on the manager’s estimates of where people were working, and did not go to the higher cost option of introducing thousands of new accounts and a great amount of administrative cost. And that was a decision we mutually made. 

Also, we, as people started to work on programmatic work again, 

we put their charges on that programmatic work. For example, 

after about a month, approximately two-thirds of our labor costs 

were back on their normal programmatic work. That was recognized under our procedure, was not recognized under the Albuquerque procedure. So there, clearly, is an opportunity to go into 

great detail on this and satisfy you in that regard. 

During this period, employees did productive work, either program work or work related to safety and security in support of our 

mission. Additionally, at no time did we suspend activities that 

were immediately critical to national security and/or the continuity 

of operations, security, and environmental compliance and protection. 

Many of you have heard that two major incidents led to my decision to suspend operations. The July classified removable electronic 

media or CREM incident, which I will describe further below, as 

well as a safety incident just days later where a student’s retina 

was burned by a laser. 

What many people do not know is that these two incidents took 

place against a background of a recent rise in safety and security 

incidents as well as growing correlations showing that our employees who were poor safety performers were also—proved to be poor 

in security and compliance. 

Further, I was concerned that the July CREM incident showed 

clear signs of a behavior problem versus any sort of honest mistake. Confronted in July with back-to-back cases of seeming disregard for basic safety and security rules, I did not have a good feel 

for the safety and security of lab operations, and therefore, I had 

no choice but to suspend all operations at the lab. 

During the suspension of operations and the subsequent restart, 

we learned that there were many good reasons to have taken the 

action we did. In partnership with UC, the DOE and NNSA, we followed a rigorous restart process. As a matter of fact, it was codified 

in great excruciating detail, and conducting that—and the most important thing is that we conducted management self-assessments of 

all of our organizations, that identified more than 3,000 issues, 

ranging from safety compliance issues to permitting violations that 

needed to be addressed, including 340 prestart issues that we felt 

had to be addressed before the activities could restart. 

82

We fixed the 350 prestarts and have created a project to implement and track the remaining fixes and changes. We resumed operations as quickly as possible with 100 percent of our lowest-risk 

operations, which, by the way, represent 89 percent of all lab activities, and as I have previously stated, roughly two-thirds of our 

labor costs were resumed by August 18 and the majority of operations up and running by late September, early October. Some of 

our highest-hazard operations did not resume until February 2005. 

I want to go back now and focus on the July CREM incident for 

a moment. This incident began when employees were unable to locate two barcoded pieces of accountable CREM. As the result of 

independent investigations conducted by the DOE, the FBI and a 

joint scab lab UC investigation, we now know with high confidence 

that the disk never existed and that the incident was the result of 

an unauthorized practice, barcode numbers that were entered into 

our accountability system but never affixed to actual media. 

We had no way of knowing this initially, and we were further led 

astray by two employees who falsified an inventory sheet incorrectly indicating that the disk had actually existed at one point in 

time. 

We concluded that, although human error and improper action 

were the direct cause of the incident, there were additional systemic contributing weaknesses, among them are the sheer size and 

geographic spread of our CREM operations, which included an inventory of accountable CREM that exceeded 80,000 pieces at its 

high point. More than 4,500 employees had daily direct access to 

CREM, and classified operations spread over roughly 40 square 

miles. 

Upon thorough review of the investigation, I made the decision 

to terminate three employees as a result of their involvement in 

the incident. Additionally, four employees received written reprimands and suspension without pay, and I removed the division 

leader from that position and had the individual reassigned to nonsupervisory duties. 

My second point is that Los Alamos has made real lasting 

changes in the way we handle CREM that significantly reduce the 

likelihood of future problems. After meting out discipline, I turned 

our attention to completely revamping the classified control system 

to help prevent a recurrence of this incident. With concurrence of 

the University of California, we acted to remove all media, to move 

all media into secure, centralized libraries, to establish full-time 

CREM custodians, and to fund expanded classified media lists or 

diskless computing. 

The major elements of our efforts include the following: All accountable CREM has been moved from the hundreds of previous locations into one of 20 centralized base libraries. Additionally, we 

established 14 satellite libraries to provide secure storage of media, 

in close proximity to operational work areas. All CREM is under 

the direct ownership of approximately 40 custodians, a 99 percent 

reduction compared to the previous 4,500 employees who had direct 

access to CREM. 

Trained and certified classified library custodians are assigned to 

each library. They are responsible for checking items out and conducting daily transactional inventories to ensure classified media is 

83

positively accounted for at all times. The library custodians are deployed security professionals reporting directly to the security division. 

To ensure the libraries maintain a high level of performance, we 

began no-notice inventory inspections. The laboratory is pushing 

hard on line organizations to destroy unneeded accountable CREM. 

We have destroyed over 7,000 items in the past 2 months, with 

many more entering the destruction pipeline. 

As of March 4, the lab has 20,074 pieces of CREM and expects 

to further reduce this to less than 2,000 by the end of fiscal year 

2006, a 97 percent decrease from our earlier high point. 

With significant funding support from Congress, we are also 

moving to a diskless environment through the expansion of our 

classified computing network. 

My third and final point this morning is that, thanks to significant investments in physical security, the laboratory’s physical site 

remains secure from threats. 

As you know, DOE has recently revised their Design Basis 

Threat, which articulates the adversary force size and capabilities 

that we must be able to defend against. We have been working literally from September 11, 2001, to fundamentally change the security posture for our site. 

An amazing array of upgrades and improvements has been 

made, all for the singular goal of safeguarding the people and security interests under our control. I am particularly proud to point 

out that the most recent DOE inspection of the protective force performance at TA-18 clearly shows that the facility is well defended 

and the nuclear materials housed there are secure. 

The Department has made the decision to relocate the TA-18 

mission and the nuclear materials to Nevada, and we are fully 

committed to making this happen as quickly as possible. Nonetheless, I am confident in our ability to defend the site, and that confidence is reinforced by DOE assessments that tell me we are good 

and getting better. I personally attended, as an observer, the forceon-force exercises last year in this regard. 

In conclusion, I want to emphasize that the investments made at 

Los Alamos during the suspension have created a Los Alamos that 

is stronger, safer and more secure. I cannot sit here today and tell 

you that we will never have another safety or security incident at 

Los Alamos, but what I can guarantee is that the management at 

Los Alamos and the University of California is doing everything 

possible to continue the improvements to both safety and security. 

We will continue to deliver on our commitment to the safety and 

security of this Nation. I promise you that. Again, thank you for 

allowing me the opportunity to address you. And I would be glad 

to answer any questions you may have for me. 

[The prepared statement of G. Pete Nanos follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF G. PETE NANOS, DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL

LABORATORY, U.S. DEARTMENT OF ENERGY

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

discuss the security program at Los Alamos National Laboratory. My name is Dr. 

Pete Nanos and I have served as Director of the Department of Energy’s Los Alamos 

84

National Laboratory since 2003. I came to the Laboratory from the Navy where I 

retired as a Vice Admiral. 

To begin, I want to emphatically state that the employees of Los Alamos National 

Laboratory are dedicated to the national security mission of this great nation and 

they take very seriously their responsibilities to personally safeguard America’s secrets. Our contributions to the safety and security of the American people are significant, and we continue to serve on the front lines of the effort to build and sustain our collective defense. Clearly a component of that mission is the need to safeguard the national security information entrusted to our care. I am here today to 

tell you that I believe we are a better Laboratory today as it relates to security, and 

I want to reaffirm to you our commitment to be even better. 

I have spent considerable time since assuming leadership of the Laboratory evaluating our strengths and weaknesses and working with the University of California 

to improve the overall direction of the Laboratory. As you know, I suspended Laboratory operations last summer. This was not an easy decision. I would like to spend 

some time here explaining what led to the suspension of operations. At the outset, 

it is important to note that during the suspension of operations, the Laboratory was 

open and employees were required to come to work throughout the entire suspension. During this period, employees did productive work related to safety and security, in support of our mission. I will get into additional detail on this later in my 

testimony. 

Let me emphasize that at no time did we suspend activities that were immediately critical to national security and or the continuity of operations, security and 

environmental compliance and protection. 

Many of you are familiar with the two major incidents that led to my decision 

to suspend operations: the July Classified Removable Electronic Media (CREM) incident, which I will describe further below, as well as a safety incident just days later 

where a Lab student’s retina was burned by a laser due to faulty safety practices. 

What many people do not know is that these two incidents alone did not lead to 

my decision. I would like to provide some additional context, and start by noting 

that my decision was made in close consultation with the University of California, 

the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration. Prior 

to these incidents, my management team and I were tracking a recent rise in safety 

and security incidents. In addition, we were noting correlations in performance in 

the areas of safety, security, and compliance. Those employees who performed poorly 

appeared to do so in all of these areas. The other major factor that concerned me 

with the July CREM incident is that it showed clear signs of a behavior problem. 

This was in sharp contrast to earlier incidents where it was clear that for the most 

part good people who were trying to do the right thing had made honest mistakes. 

Given this backdrop, when I was confronted with back-to-back examples of seeming 

disregard for basic safety and security rules, I had serious concerns regarding the 

security and safety of Laboratory operations and therefore, in good conscience, had 

no choice but to suspend all operations at the Laboratory. 

During the suspension of Laboratory operations, and the subsequent restart, we 

learned that there were many good reasons to take the actions we did. In partnership with DOE and NNSA, we followed a rigorous and strategic process, dividing 

the entire Laboratory into risk levels:

• Risk Level 1, the lowest level, which is general office work; 

• Risk Level 2, medium risk, which represents moderate-hazard work such as construction; and 

• Risk Level 3, high risk, which includes our high-hazard programmatic work involving CREM and special nuclear materials (SNM). 

We conducted Management Self Assessments of all of our operations, and all of 

our Level 2 and 3 operations had to present their findings to a Resumption Review 

Board (RRB), which was made up of personnel from the Laboratory, the National 

Nuclear Security Administration’s Los Alamos Site Office, as well as the DOE Office 

of Assessment who observed and assisted in all aspects of the review. For Level 3 

work, an additional internal review was conducted by a Laboratory Readiness Review (LRR) panel, prior to approval by myself, and ultimately resumption. The LRR 

consisted of Laboratory personnel who were from outside of the organization being 

reviewed. The NNSA site office in Los Alamos worked very closely with us on all 

aspects of the restart. We resumed operations as quickly as possible, with 100% of 

our Level 1 work up and running on August 18, 2004, one month after the suspension of operations began, and the majority of operations up and running by late September/early October. Some of our highest-hazard operations did not resume until 

February 2005. It is important to note that 89% of the Laboratory’s activities were 

classified as Risk Level 1. 

85

What we found in our assessments validated our decision to suspend Laboratory 

operations. We identified more than 3,000 issues (ranging from safety compliance 

issues to permitting violations) that need to be addressed, including 350 ‘‘pre-start’’ 

issues that we felt had to be addressed before an activity could restart. We fixed 

the 350 pre-starts and have created an Operational Efficiency Project to implement 

the remaining fixes and changes over the coming years. 

Below, I’d like to spend a few minutes covering the July 2004 incident, and more 

importantly, what we have done to correct the shortcomings that allowed the incident to occur. 

THE ACCOUNTABLE CREM INCIDENT

First, and perhaps most importantly, we know with high confidence that the disks 

never existed. Rather, what we had was an issue of barcode labels entered into our 

accountability system but never affixed to actual media, which was compounded by 

the falsification of an inventory sheet by two employees indicating that the disks 

did exist. This conclusion is supported by independent investigations completed by 

the DOE and the FBI. Given the identification of the most likely cause, we are left 

with the questions—why did it happen and how did we get ourselves into this situation? 

Our analysis of the incident led us to the following conclusions regarding the direct causes:

• The direct cause of this incident was placing unattached barcodes into accountability (an unauthorized practice) without confirming their actual use. Simply 

put, the classified matter custodian issued the barcodes and entered them immediately into the accountability database. Unfortunately, the employee who received the barcodes failed to realize that the barcodes were accountable and 

should be tracked. The employees subsequently destroyed them without reconciling the discrepancy with the custodian. 

• We also missed the opportunity to discover and reconcile the problem in an annual inventory of accountable classified matter conducted in April 2004. This inventory failed to identify the ‘‘missing’’ barcodes because the custodians did not 

properly complete the inventory and subsequently falsified the inventory 

records. In addition, line managers responsible for the operation failed to ensure 

the inventory was properly conducted and subsequently verified that the inventory was complete and accurate, and that all items were accounted for. That 

was clearly not the case. 

In the process of conducting the root cause analysis of the incident we reached 

the conclusion that while human error and improper action were the direct causes, 

there were additional systemic weaknesses that contributed to this incident, and 

that would allow similar incidents to occur again:

• The sheer size and geographic spread of accountable CREM operations increased 

the likelihood of an incident. 

• The inventory of accountable CREM exceeded 80,000 pieces at its high point. 

• There were over 4,500 employees with daily direct access to the media. 

• Our classified operations are widely dispersed, spread over 40 square miles. 

• The transaction volume is large, with daily movement of classified items between organizations within LANL and throughout the DOE Complex. 

• The lack of detailed supporting documents (e.g. checklists and plans) to serve as 

job aids for employees engaged in classified work activities hindered effective 

performance. 

• Custodians responsible for safeguarding and controlling classified items suffered 

from a variety of organizational ailments, including: 

• Lower job status 

• Lack of authority 

• Part-time job for many 

• Lack of training specific to CREM handling and control 

• Lack of support/conflict of interest within their parent organizations 

• The absence of a DOE or LANL standard accountability system increased the potential for classified items to ‘‘drop through the cracks’’ as they moved between 

organizations. In March 2004 this problem was recognized, and with the concurrence of the University of California, the Laboratory is implementing a single 

site-wide accountability system. 

86

THE RESPONSE TO THE ACCOUNTABLE CREM INCIDENT—HOLDING PEOPLE

ACCOUNTABLE

In light of what we learned during our inquiry it was necessary to take very drastic steps, both in terms of holding people accountable for their actions and in changing the classified control program to help prevent a recurrence of the incident. 

In terms of personnel actions, three employees had their employment terminated 

as a result of their involvement in this incident. Four employees received written 

reprimands and suspension without pay, including the Division leader who was also 

removed and reassigned to non-supervisory duties. All seven employees received administrative sanctions in the form of security infractions, which are permanently 

filed in their personnel security records and factor into the DOE’s decision process 

for granting continued access to classified information. The infractions were issued 

for causes including:

• Failure to properly conduct classified media inventories and falsification of 

records; 

• Failure to reconcile accountable CREM with inventory records; and 

• Management failure to provide adequate oversight. 

The NNSA also exercised its right to hold the University accountable for the incident. LANL received an ‘‘unsatisfactory’’ performance rating in the ‘‘operations’’ area 

of the annual performance assessment. As a result, in January, 2005, NNSA withheld 67% of UC management fee, with a penalty assessment of $5.8M out of a possible $8.7M performance fee pool. This represents the largest DOE-directed management fee cut in history. 

THE RESPONSE TO THE ACCOUNTABLE CREM INCIDENT—CHANGING THE CLASSIFIED

CONTROL SYSTEM

It is safe to say that we have learned a great deal from this recent incident. After 

holding people accountable for their actions, we turned our attention to completely 

revamping the classified control system to help prevent a recurrence of this incident. 

With the concurrence of the University of California, LANL acted to move all media 

into secure centralized libraries, to establish full-time custodians and fund expanded 

classified media-less computing. The major elements of our efforts include the following:

• All accountable CREM has been moved into one of 20 centralized ‘‘base’’ libraries. 

Fourteen ‘‘satellite’’ libraries have also been established to provide as-needed secure storage of media in close proximity to operational work areas. These ‘‘satellites’’ are each associated with a ‘‘base’’ library and are under the strict control 

of the ‘‘base’’ library custodians. The new configuration represents a significant 

reduction in the number of CREM storage locations across the Laboratory. 

Where previously CREM was stored in 89 buildings with 733 rooms, the new 

CREM libraries are housed in 29 buildings with 37 rooms. This represents a 

95% reduction in the number of rooms. 

• Each library was put through a rigorous inspection and certification process prior 

to commencing operations. 

• Trained and certified Classified Library Custodians are assigned to each library—

they are responsible for checking items out and conducting daily transactional 

inventories to ensure classified media is positively accounted for at all times. 

• The library custodians are deployed security professionals reporting directly to the 

Security Division. 

• To ensure the libraries maintain a high level of performance we began no-notice 

inventory inspections. 

• To solve the issue of fragmented accounting systems we have begun the procurement of a Lab-wide inventory/accountability system. 

• We are pushing hard on line organizations to destroy unneeded accountable 

CREM, we have destroyed over 7,000 items in the past two months, with many 

more entering the destruction pipeline. As of March 4, 2005, the Laboratory has 

20,074 pieces of CREM. 

• To help further reduce the accountable CREM holdings we are continuing our effort to replace stand-alone classified computers with ‘‘media-less’’ computer networks. 

• LANL is rapidly driving towards the goal of having less than 2,000 pieces of accountable CREM. We believe this number reflects the long-term static inventory 

and once achieved will represent more than a 97% reduction in accountable 

CREM holdings. With continued investments in ‘‘media-less’’ networks, we hope 

to hit this goal by the end of FY06. 

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I believe it also very important to point out that many of the problems we have 

had in the past regarding difficulties with safeguarding classified information can 

be tied to two over-arching issues. The first is the failure to invest in what I would 

term ‘‘engineered’’ solutions. In many cases we have had good employees trying to 

do a difficult job without the benefit of the right tools. The best example is the 

shortage of classified networks that do not rely on high-risk portable CREM—simply 

put, the more we invest in classified networks the more we reduce the likelihood 

of losing control of classified information. It is important to note that technology enhancements alone will not solve the entire problem. Along with engineered solutions 

we are ensuring that strong management oversight is in place to detect problems 

and solve them before they become a crisis. Thanks to funding support from Congress, we are moving to finish our expansion of media-less computing systems. This 

support is paving the way for continued improvements in our security infrastructure 

and will position us to more effectively meet our security challenges. 

The second over-arching issue is that we have not done as much as we could to 

provide our scientists and engineers with the necessary security resources. As with 

any large operation involving highly classified information, the rules and requirements for security can be difficult to understand and implement. We are deploying 

security experts to our line organizations for the sole purpose of helping them to 

continue to build solid security programs. Our security experts are focusing on 

building better security plans, providing real-time training, and wading through the 

security rules to find the right solutions to adapt to our operations. The feedback 

I’m receiving is that this model is a resounding success—we will continue to put a 

great deal of effort into building this partnership and we have high hopes for its 

ability to substantially improve security performance across the Laboratory. 

HOW THESE CHANGES ARE IMPROVING OUR OPERATIONS

While we are continuing to make enhancements to the new model for controlling 

accountable classified media, initial indications reveal that the system is working 

well, with tangible benefits for both improved security control as well as operational 

efficiencies resulting from the economies of scale we are seeing in the library approach. The major benefits include:

• Substantial improvement in daily control and accountability for CREM—it is 

under the direct ownership of approximately 40 custodians. This represents a 

more than 99% reduction from the approximately 4,500 employees who previously had direct access. • Clear requirements and training for handling accountable CREM when it is 

checked-out of the library—a rigorous training process is required before you 

can be assigned as a ‘‘borrower’’ of the media. • Line organization managers and staff are now able to concentrate on their mission—they are still responsible for protecting the media when it is checked out, 

but they do not have to spend countless hours maintaining individual accountability and control systems. 

Apart from the very tangible benefits we are seeing from our efforts to change 

the security model, we are also starting to see the intangible benefits tied to attitudes and perceptions of the workforce. As a result of the incidents we have had 

over the past several years there was a real concern among our employees that the 

task of doing their job safely and securely was getting increasingly difficult, with 

the addition of more and more policies and procedures to follow. With each new set 

of policies and procedures came the perception of increased risk in inadvertently violating the rules. I am particularly proud of the fact that instead of making the job 

even more difficult to do, our response to this most recent incident has actually simplified the work and clarified the responsibilities our workers have in protecting 

classified information. As a result of this simplification our workforce is becoming 

increasingly confident in taking personal responsibility for safety and security—as 

with any human endeavor, personal responsibility is the linchpin of performance. 

I’m confident that we are rebuilding the sense of trust and mutual support that is 

absolutely essential to sustaining our operations and delivering on our national security mission. 

PHYSICAL SECURITY INITIATIVES

Finally, I want to take this opportunity to tell you what we are doing on upgrading the physical security of the Laboratory to deal with the post-9/11 world. As you 

know DOE has recently revised their Design Basis Threat (DBT), which articulates 

the adversary force size and capabilities that we must be able to defend against. 

I will tell you quite honestly that this new DBT represents a significant challenge 

to nuclear sites, but it is a challenge we must meet. We have been working literally 

88

from September 11, 2001, to fundamentally change the security posture for our site. 

An amazing array of upgrades and improvements has been made—all for the singular goal of safeguarding the people and security interests under our control. I am 

particularly proud to point out that the most recent DOE inspection of the protective force performance at TA-18 clearly shows that the facility is well defended and 

the nuclear materials housed there are secured. The Department has made the decision to relocate the TA-18 mission and the nuclear materials to Nevada and we are 

fully committed to making this happen as quickly as possible. 

To address the recently revised DBT we are developing a comprehensive project 

plan designed to guide our long-term strategy for meeting the new challenges. The 

project plan, which is due to NNSA in July of this year, includes new initiatives 

to control access to the site, upgrades in the size and lethality of our protective 

force, consolidation of nuclear operations to achieve economies of scale for our protection operations, and new construction of barriers and alarms at key facilities. I 

am confident in our ability to defend the site, and that confidence is anchored by 

DOE assessments that tell us we are good and getting better. We will continue to 

spare no effort in our quest to ensure the security of Los Alamos and the national 

security mission with which we are charged. 

SUMMARY

As I mentioned in my opening comments, the decision to suspend Laboratory operations was not an easy one. The decision has caused great turmoil within the Laboratory and generated a fair amount of second guessing. From my vantage point the 

suspension of Laboratory operations was absolutely the right thing to do—the pain 

we have experienced is more than offset by the long-term gain we will see from this 

investment. Today we have a solid grasp on safety and security risk areas within 

the Laboratory based on comprehensive risk analyses. As a result, we are better situated to understand the safety and security implications of the work we do. The 

suspension of operations has introduced a formality of operations to an institution 

that desperately needed it. I cannot sit here today and tell you that we will never 

have another safety or security incident at Los Alamos; our operations are too large 

and too complex to ever be able to give you a 100% guarantee. But what I can guarantee is that the management at the Laboratory and the University of California 

is committed to continuing its improvements to both safety and security. We will 

take an outstanding operation and make it even better, and we will continue to deliver on our commitment to the safety and security of this nation, I promise you 

that. 

Again, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to address you and I would be 

glad to answer any questions you may have for me.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you very much, Dr. Nanos. We appreciate 

your testimony. 

And I have with me here some transcripts from three oversight 

and investigative hearings that the Congress—this subcommittee—

conducted back in 2003 regarding procurement and property mismanagement failures at Los Alamos. 

And you can see from the size of these transcripts that this committee spent a lot of time on mismanagement at Los Alamos. And 

I know that you were not hired to be responsible for this program 

by the University of California until 2003, which was sometime 

right after these hearings were conducted. 

But, then, in September 2004, we received a copy of an audit 

that was performed by the equivalent of the inspector general for 

the University of California, regarding lack of procurement and 

property controls at an area called Technical Area Number 16. 

And, specifically, they were talking about the fact that 21 unauthorized sheds were built at Los Alamos and filled with unauthorized materials, supplies and equipment. 

And it went on to say that the University of California overpaid 

on these sheds. These sheds cost the University of California 

$8,255 per shed. The base price was $5,570. So the unauthorized 

89

sheds were built and overpaid by the University of California, 

$56,000. 

Now, I know that these sheds were, my understanding, built 

prior to your arrival. But this became public knowledge only in 

September. And I guess I would have two points to my question 

here. One, there continues to be, seems to be this problem of mismanagement at Los Alamos regarding the University of California. 

Two, this audit performed by your inspector general that found 

these sheds 3 years after they were built, that were unauthorized, 

inflated prices were paid for them, unauthorized materials being 

kept in them, why would it take so long for you all to recognize 

that these were unauthorized and containing unauthorized materials? 

Mr. NANOS. Sir, you were correct, I believe, in pointing out that 

those were sheds that had been previously looked at. When they 

were raised in the audit, in—last year, we went back and immediately looked at the material. And we found out that the material 

was in fact proper material to be used at the site and in the laboratory. 

That—in distinction from previous things that you were made 

aware of, there was no unauthorized material there in the sense 

that that was all legitimate material for use at the laboratory. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. When you say—are we talking about what was 

stored in the sheds? 

Mr. NANOS. In the sheds. Yes, sir. And some of it had been procured at the time of the sheds and some of it had been procured 

subsequently and the sheds were used for storage. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. But you would agree that the sheds themselves, 

at least that process, was not properly conducted? 

Mr. NANOS. Well, the—it was clear that that contract was one 

that had been previously looked at, had a fairly substantial increase in scope, growth and scope over the years. And that was one 

that our current procedures and process preclude from happening 

again. 

No one is authorized to increase the scope or the ceiling on contracts to the extent that that one had in the past. Also, we are reviewing the costs and the close-out process on that contract. We are 

reviewing the charges and deciding to what level we are going to 

dispute it. 

I am almost positive that we will end up disputing these charges 

and putting in a claim against the contractor for overcharges. In 

the normal closeout process of the contract, we, of course, go 

through and audit all of the costs to make sure that they are right 

and proper and we are not being overcharged. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. So you do intend to go back against the contractor for the overcharges on these? 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, sir. We have not yet finished the close-out audit 

on that contract. So that is still an open issue that we will deal 

with. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. You do agree with this audit report, though, that 

shows the irregularities as it pertains to the building of these 

buildings outside of the scope and so forth? 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, sir. Let me just take a minute and tell you what 

we are doing now. You can increase—we had a problem with nonVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 May 02, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\99905.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
90

contract people, nonbuyers making commitments for the laboratory 

with contractors, and making constructive changes to contracts. 

In my first year, I changed our instruction to make it very clear 

that you had to have contract authority in order to make scope 

changes to contracts, formal contract mods, and that could not be 

done casually in the laboratory. 

We also have made it clear that all purchases under these contracts now have to go through authorized buyers and that even an 

authorized buyer cannot bump up the ceiling more than $200,000 

on any large contract without going through a contract official. 

In other words, we did not set that at zero because we did not 

want to be administratively adding burden to everything. Often, 

when we buy things, it is important to get it in a timely manner, 

because we do not want to be building up personnel costs for want 

of a nail. 

But, on the other hand, we do not want people increasing the 

ceiling on contracts without going through our proper contracting 

channels. So we have established a policy that that has to be formally done now. And that will preclude this type of activity from 

occurring in the future. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, there are allegations that there are other 

types of structures out there that may have been built under the 

same circumstances. Do you expect that we will have some other 

revelations as we move along? 

Mr. NANOS. Sir, we have a tremendous number of temporary 

structures and transportables at the laboratory. It is one of the big 

difficulties that I have to face is that I have an awful lot of substandard space that we are trying to move out of. 

And each one of those, though, is cataloged, has a building number, even if it is a trailer. So we are not—and many of our structures go back to the 1950’s. So it is not—I would not say it is a 

modern well-ordered site in general. And we are trying to manage 

our way through that, coalesce, consolidate, get rid of unneeded 

space and reduce the cost of our footprint, our facility footprint. 

And so there are—it is hard to go to Los Alamos and view the 

site and not come away with the feeling that there are a lot of temporary-looking structures. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Chairman Barton recently sent a letter to Ambassador Brooks saying that he thought the University of California should pay a portion of the cost of the standdown. And you 

heard our discussion earlier about the cost figure. 

But, from your perspective with the University of California, do 

you feel like the Department of Energy can legally charge the University of California with a portion of those costs, pursuant to the 

terms of your contract? 

Mr. NANOS. Sir, I do not want to get—I am not qualified to talk 

about the legal issues. I spent 8 years running major contracting 

activities in the DOD. So I do have some experience. 

I feel that all of the work that we did during the period of the 

standdown was work that was authorized under the statement of 

work. And I know there is some parts of the charges that—or the 

costs that we have exposed to our contracting officer that are still 

being looked at in the normal course. 

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In other words, they have not finished their review. But, to my 

knowledge, everything that we did, which was management self-assessments, which is called for under contractor assurance, and, you 

know, identification of deficiencies. And, frankly, correcting deficiencies is all work that we are called upon to do in the normal 

course. 

We just normally do not do it in such a concentrated way. Also, 

other than that work, which was, I think, the main heavy lifting 

of the management self-assessment, the assessment of risks and 

correction of deficiencies, the rest of the work that was going on at 

that time was all our normal programmatic work. 

I am happy to say that the laboratory, I expect that within the 

next month, the laboratory to be back on schedule with their major 

programs. In other words, we have been able to immediately reapply ourselves back to our mainline DOE programs and get back 

on schedule. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. As a result of the standdown, how far was your 

programmatic work delayed or how long? 

Mr. NANOS. The programmatic—I would have to go back and 

look at the exact change in milestones. But if you look at the—

where these milestones—in other words, there were some 

deliverables at the end of the fiscal year that we did not meet, and 

that got continued into the next fiscal year. 

But, we are catching up on those particular areas of production, 

and tests that are required to support major life-extension programs for our systems. The most critical part of the work, which 

was safety, security and assessment of the stockpile for the country, we kept on schedule despite the standdown. 

So we did slip some milestones, and I will give you an example. 

The tests in support of the major life-extension program that were 

delayed are—the experimental set up has been completed. And we 

expect, by the end of the month, to be back on schedule with that 

testing. And that was in an area, that was with a division that 

had—that was the one that had the security problems, and many 

of the compliance problems, and took us the longest to rebuild. So 

I am very proud of their intense effort to get back on schedule and 

meet the national need. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Stupak. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Nanos, it is good to see you again. I think we met when you 

just started at Los Alamos, when we were out there that time for 

the visit. 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. Let me see if I can get this right. You are an employee of UC, University of California? 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, sir, I am. 

Mr. STUPAK. We would hope that when we see you again, it is 

not in a situation where we are talking about another slip up at 

Los Alamos. So we would really like to, I am sure I speak for everybody on the committee, have better dialog with the lab. I know you 

have an office here and things like that. So you have got the University of California. You have got your law firm and DOE, and we 

should really have more interaction and dialog so we can work together more on some of these things. 

92

I know your lab just come up in an announcement the other day 

on that muon—am I saying that right, sir? 

Mr. NANOS. Muon radiography. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. That is stuff that—let us know so we can help work 

together on some of these things. That is what we would like to do 

instead of always being here when things are not going too well for 

you. 

Let me ask you this. Mr. Brown, and I know we mentioned the 

white paper. He has been at Los Alamos for over 18 months and 

had observed the practices and drawn some comparisons based 

upon his 30 years of experience in assessing adequacy of nuclear 

industry practices at various organizations that are under the oversight of DOE and the NRC. So was Mr. Brown a qualified auditor? 

Mr. NANOS. As far as I know, within his experience, he was 

qualified to do the job that we gave him. He was obviously working 

for my Performance Surety Division, and had been assigned to that 

work by the—by the division leader, who I have great confidence 

in by the way. 

So I have—I am confident that, you know, it is the point I am 

making here is that I do not have any issue with Mr. Brown and 

what he did, and we have taken his comments seriously. 

Mr. STUPAK. Have you discussed them with Mr. Brown? 

Mr. NANOS. I have not personally, but I have been involved in 

some of the issues. I can give you an example of one for example. 

Mr. STUPAK. No. 

Mr. NANOS. But the work—in other words, I have not talked to 

him. But his reports have come to me. 

Mr. STUPAK. I guess what I am looking at is, if he wrote his letter on October 22, 2004, has anyone gotten back with Mr. Brown 

and said, hey, you might be mistaken on this weld point? That was 

an issue that you brought up. 

Mr. NANOS. We would—the weld point is a good one. Because 

that one I know a lot about. He was not mistaken. 

Mr. STUPAK. The point I am trying to say, has anyone even gotten back with Mr. Brown? 

Mr. NANOS. That is good. I do not know. I have not personally. 

Mr. STUPAK. See what I mean about the mix up in the dialog. 

I wish someone would have sat down, because when we go into 

closed session, we are going to ask you a little more specific stuff 

in here. But you see, no one gets back with the guy. And then there 

is back and forth with us. And now that is why we need to work 

together on these things, because if he is qualified, obviously, he 

has some concerns, and he still is not satisfied, and no one has gotten back with him. So can you see how the things gets sort of out 

of control? 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, sir. The only part I am short on, is since I did 

not talk to him personally, and nobody reported to me that they 

had talked to him personally, I cannot tell you the degree to which 

he has been gotten back to. But I will get that answer. 

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. He goes on and he says: The University of 

California faces precarious times. Management’s lack of emphasis 

on nuclear quality assurances increases the risk of a clear and 

present danger to employees and to public health. Ineffectual management practices, an air of superiority, complacency to normal nuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 May 02, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\99905.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
93

clear industry practices/procedures combined with serious cultural 

biases equate to an environment fraught with potential for dangerous consequences similar to the Challenger or Chernobyl disasters. 

And, you know, like I say, I have been on this committee for 10 

years. And just looking at Los Alamos’ track record, it is—without 

further dialog between us, it is hard to say who is correct here, Los 

Alamos or Mr. Brown. 

Mr. NANOS. Well, let me make the following comment. I think—

I would probably have a discussion with him about the issue of 

something akin to Challenger or Chernobyl. But, it is clear from 

my observations at the laboratory, that we had to do something 

about our safety and compliance culture. Because of our record in 

Price Anderson violations, because of our record in safety, and because the correlation—and what the security brought to it, was 

that there was a behavorial aspect of people not wanting to go 

along with the rules that we had to deal with. 

So the shutdown was necessary to do that. We are also continuing—to follow the shutdown with something we call operational 

efficiency, which is to take what we learned during the shutdown 

and institutionalize it. And also, I have introduced the Dupont 

STOP program, Safety, Training, Observation Program, which is a 

behavioral-based safety program because of our belief that we have 

to drive this—these kinds of concerns into the culture. 

But, if he says that there is work to be done at the laboratory 

to improve the culture for safety and compliance, I agree with him. 

That is why I said shut the laboratory down. 

Mr. STUPAK. It is that culture, I used the same word earlier 

about the culture there, that we have these repeated problems related to security, trustworthiness and safety that we are very, very 

concerned about. 

You indicate in your opening that you would get back to us. I 

had asked for a detailed point-by-point accounting of Mr. Brown’s 

allegations. And we would really like someone to get that to us and 

bring it back to this committee. Are you committed to do that? 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. As soon as you can? 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. At the same time, why not stick one in the mail to 

Mr. Brown, if that would be appropriate there, or if you want the 

committee will? I just think that he needs to see that there is a 

culture of change. 

I was a little concerned, Mr. Burgess asked about the other plant 

there, nuclear plant, similar size, I think Ambassador Brooks said, 

which seems to run well, better than Los Alamos obviously. 

And Los Alamos has been a lab for a long, long time, probably 

one of the first ones that we had. So I would think the expertise 

in security and all of this would be at Los Alamos, not at a relatively new lab in Texas. 

So it is that culture I think that we are trying to break. And it 

sounds like—I know you have only been there 2 years. You are 

starting to get to it. I was surprised but pleased to see that when 

you started your shutdown, there were 350 prestart issues that you 

identified, and then, once you got in there, you saw about 3,000, 

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I think it was, issues that have to be addressed. So you have got 

a big job ahead of you. 

Let me ask you this. When you do this standdown, does anyone 

from the outside come in to assist, or is this just an internal 

standdown, and these 3,000 things you have identified internally? 

How does that work? Do you bring in outside experts? 

Mr. NANOS. What we did, first, and I have got a copy of it here, 

our restart instructions, in great detail on what we want people to 

look for. We covered everything in terms of safety, security, personnel, leadership, everything. 

Then we convened something we called a Restart Review Board, 

which incorporated some outside consultants, my people, people sitting on it from the NNSA site office. In other words, the other 

thing I want to emphasize, that this was not the lab and UC standing alone, standing up our laboratory, it was a cooperative effort 

with NNSA. So we got all eyes. Then they reviewed all of the documentation for restart for the entire laboratory, for the two highest 

levels, level two and level three. 

And I reviewed all of the documentation on their work, and personally approved the restart in every area. I saw that they had 

done a very good job of bringing, in other words, of striking a balance of risk across the laboratory. In other words, they were 

very——

Mr. STUPAK. You said they did a good job. 

Mr. NANOS. The RRB, the Restart Review Board. They did an extremely good job of assessing risk and striking a balance. In other 

words, I was not taking extreme risks in one part of the lab and 

no risk in another. It was very well done and well documented 

across the laboratory. 

Mr. STUPAK. So if I understand your answer, in this shutdown, 

you bring in people from NNSA? 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. And then outside consultants? 

Mr. NANOS. They were members of this review board. I had some 

outside consultants that I had known in my previous life that I had 

confidence in and were able to——

Mr. STUPAK. As a result of the shutdown and bringing in these 

consultants, let me ask, do you think that would be a fair cost for 

the taxpayers to pay, or is that one that you guys should eat that 

cost of the outside consultants and NNSA? 

Mr. NANOS. It was—the outside consultant in particular is one 

I had brought in to help with the formality of operations in the laboratory before the shutdown. So what I did is I just had him sit 

on this panel as part of his duties. 

Mr. STUPAK. What—what are the challenges you face now specifically as the lab director? You have been there for 2 years. You 

have been through a shutdown. What are your challenges to get it 

so we do not have you come back here in a year or 2 years for another shutdown for some reason? 

Mr. NANOS. Well, I think—it is hard for me. I am not asking for 

any mercy or anything. But the—I think if you look at the examples of similar turnarounds and culture changes in industry in 

other areas, I remember the model I was looking to when I was 

doing change in my last job in the Navy was the IBM model, where 

95

it took them seven areas to reform their corporate culture and organization and change the fundamental focus. 

It is hard to know how long this is going to be. I estimate that 

a change of this magnitude in an organization this size could take 

maybe 5 to 7 years. So I am counting that I am about 2 years into 

at least a 5-year process. So we are hopefully approaching the tipping point and coming down the back side of the mountain. But it 

is—with the variety of operations and having to drive a corporate 

focus, and not a—in other words, the laboratory people used to joke 

that Los Alamos was 19 laboratories combined by a common janitorial service. 

But now, I think the laboratory is working cooperatively as an 

entire institution to work its problems. And I think we have gotten 

to that point of unity and are now, as an organization, as a cohesive organization, starting to work our way through this. And it 

will take a number of years, I think, to get it out to every part of 

the laboratory. 

But I think the change, the pace of change has been very aggressive. And I have to tell you, I am very pleased with where we have 

come in a relatively short time during my tenure. I am very proud 

of what the people have been able to accomplish. 

So I have confidence we are going to get there. Unfortunately, I 

think the record of other organizations and industries say that culture change of this magnitude is a long process. 

Mr. STUPAK. One of the entities we deal with a little bit, and we 

have dealt with in dealing with Los Alamos, is the firm of Covington and Burling, if I said that right. Does the University of California pay them, or is it part of the budget? 

Mr. NANOS. I do not pay them. 

Mr. STUPAK. It does not come out of the lab budget? 

Mr. NANOS. No, sir. I do not. I assume that that is the University 

of California. I have no knowledge of that. 

Mr. STUPAK. Very good. 

Mr. NANOS. They talk to me occasionally, but as far as I know, 

I am not paying for them. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Dr. Burgess, you are recognized for 10 minutes. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Doctor, many of the instances of security mismanagement at Los Alamos over the years, 

including the recent incidents that we are talking about this morning last year, occurred within one specific program, the DX division. Can you explain why this division has had so many ongoing 

security problems? 

Mr. NANOS. Well, it is hard for me to go back before my tenure. 

I can tell you, in the current situation, I made the determination, 

once I found that something had happened, first of all, I want to 

separate the security problems into two bins. 

We had a number of security problems that I take personally—

personal responsibility for as management at the laboratory, because, you know, when you have got somebody in bad lighting conditions doing a destruction, trying to read the small numbers off a 

barcode and transposes a number and gets it wrong, makes a 

human error, I feel that management has failed that individual, 

that we have given them a system to work with that they cannot 

deal with. 

96

What was unique about this case was that it involved behaviors, 

people who knew the rules, who did not follow the rules or who falsified documents and signed off improperly. And I think the key 

point that we made in this particular incident, as I went into it, 

compared to previous ones, is I said, remember I put 19 people on 

administrative leave or investigatory leave at the beginning of this. 

And the statement I made was that, unless I find the answer of 

who did what with this material, these 19 people will never touch 

another piece of classified information at this laboratory again. I 

will never take the risk until I find out what was done and how 

it was done properly. 

I think that would—and we did find people who actually did 

things improperly. We terminated those people. And then we actually took action. I think that that established clearly the laboratory’s standard of personal accountability. 

And, frankly, I think where, the university, it has not been as 

strong about personal accountability for classified information and 

safety and compliance and the environment. And we made that 

clear at this time. 

So I cannot go back and talk about before my term and how that 

was done. But I can tell you that I was dealing with those two 

types of things. And I was trying to do what I needed to do as the 

manager of the laboratory to protect people from simple administrative errors while at the same time hold people that were accountable for malfeasance, accountable for their actions. 

And I think we drew that line successfully in this last incident, 

and hopefully that will drive the culture. 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, of course, the whole purpose of a bar code 

is so that you will not transpose a digit. 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BURGESS. But I will accept that. I guess I am disturbed 

about the comment, human error versus a behavioral problem. I 

mean, a behavioral problem at that level of security clearance, I 

mean, it seems to me it goes beyond just being put on administrative leave or having the security clearance removed. Was there ever 

any thought given to prosecuting the individuals involved? 

Mr. NANOS. We did exercise the full authority that we had in 

that regard, and we, in fact, terminated the employees that were 

involved, not just put them on leave. Once we found the facts and 

the people who actually—in other words, we had a graded approach. Basically people were held accountable for it and disciplined for what they, in fact, did. And those who operated falsely 

were terminated, and those who took shortcuts with the administrative procedures, in other words, accepted a bar code when they 

knew they shouldn’t, were, in fact, suspended without pay. So there 

was discipline and there was—for each infraction based on the 

level of involvement. 

Mr. BURGESS. So you believe it was—that there wasn’t criminal 

intent when you say ‘‘adverse behavior’’ or ‘‘unacceptable behavior.’’ 

Mr. NANOS. Well, when two people say, hey, we’re supposed to 

do the inventory; let’s not do the inventory, let’s sign the document 

and say we did it. 

Mr. BURGESS. I am new here, but that is bothersome to me. We 

are talking about a big deal here, aren’t we? Los Alamos. 

97

Mr. NANOS. Yes, sir; yes, sir. 

Mr. BURGESS. That is where they built the bomb. 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, sir. We, in fact, terminated those people. 

Mr. BURGESS. Mr. Chairman, I would just ask the question is 

termination enough when you have someone whose behavior is that 

aberrant in that type of facility? 

Mr. NANOS. Well, I don’t have—I don’t have police powers. The 

people who were—in other words, the FBI was there with us doing 

the investigation. They are the ones that generally in this case 

would take that to the attorneys. 

Mr. BURGESS. I will accept that. And I thank you for your candor. 

I just have to ask how in the world do you have a laser injury 

of that magnitude in a laboratory? 

Mr. NANOS. It was terrible, frankly, and the person who had that 

laboratory and was operating with that student was terminated because it was egregious. I had—I had docked the pay, or I had adjusted—we had—this was in a division where they had had previous safety difficulties in the previous year because of other safety 

incidents. Both the associate director and the division leader had 

had their pay adjusted downward to send a clear message that I 

expected better performance. And in this particular incident, I fired 

the individual who had control of the laboratory. His immediate supervisor was put on leave without pay. The division leader was removed from that position. I didn’t terminate him because I felt he 

was trying to do the right thing, but he was ineffective. But because of his lack of effectiveness, I removed him from this position. 

And the associate director, who I felt did not spend the proper 

amount of attention on operational matters, I removed. 

Mr. BURGESS. What has been the outcome of that injury? Has 

that person lost his sight? 

Mr. NANOS. That person has—has lost a large percentage—basically it destroyed the center part of her retina, and she has lost the 

center part of her vision and some of her depth perception as a result of that. And that’s a permanent injury. 

Mr. BURGESS. Yes, sir. As far as the—obviously the laboratory 

bore the cost of the medical treatment? 

Mr. NANOS. Yes. And we have continued to follow up with her 

and her family. 

Mr. BURGESS. And presumably some type of compensatory offer? 

Mr. NANOS. I don’t have the detail. I can get the—I don’t know 

the detail information. I just got a recent report on her condition 

from my head physician who had just been up to visit her and the 

family, but I don’t know the final result of compensation that she 

was given. I think we provided basically all the—I believe we provided all the medical care, but I don’t want to get too far into that 

without getting the data for you. 

Mr. BURGESS. Was the expense of the medical care and whatever 

compensation was going to be offered, is that borne by the university or by the taxpayer? 

Mr. NANOS. That is costs under the contract, you know, for the 

care that we provide in that case. Those services that we provide 

under the contract we provide for all injuries. And we had—by the 

way, that is another indicator that we had that things were not 

98

going well. We had a fairly substantial number of injuries last year 

that we had to deal with. But they are treated like all the rest of 

the industrial injuries. 

Mr. BURGESS. I thank you for your candor. 

I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Walden. 

Mr. WALDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I assume you have workers’ comp coverage. 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, we have workers’ comp. 

Mr. WALDEN. Does this fall under that, then? Workplace injury? 

Mr. NANOS. I don’t know—I think we responded immediately. So 

I would have to go back. I don’t want—as I said, I don’t have the 

data sheet in front of me, but I can get that for the record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

99


99905.033
100


99905.034
101

Mr. WALDEN. I don’t envy your task. 

You have how many employees. 

Mr. NANOS. We have about a little over 8,000 University of California employees and probably between 12,000 and 13,000 employees on the Hill. 

Mr. WALDEN. Twenty-one thousand. 

Mr. NANOS. I total of 12,500 to 13,000, including our support contractors. 

Mr. WALDEN. How many management staff out of that? 

Mr. NANOS. Let’s see. 

Mr. WALDEN. Ballpark. 

Mr. NANOS. I would say down to the division level it is probably 

like a number like 60 or 70. 

Mr. WALDEN. Managing 12,000 or 13,000? 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, but we have a lower level of group leader which 

is below that division level. So, actually part of the issue that we 

are addressing is that we have a very—in some areas a very broad 

span of control, which is probably part of the issue that we’re facing. 

Mr. WALDEN. It is the balance between how much middle management do you have and need and the costs of all of that. 

Mr. NANOS. We tend to be on the low side, I believe. 

Mr. WALDEN. I think that is what we are seeing perhaps as a 

problem, in the sense that it strikes me on this issue of accountability on the bar codes, mismatched numbers, or the decision that 

they were just going to falsify the data—given the importance of 

what they deal with, that there is no check and balance. I spent 

5 years on a community bank board, and a teller making 14,000 

a year moving money has got a check and balance. Has to balance 

their till every night, and if you are going in and out of the vault, 

there are certain checks and balances. 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, if you look at the business process, one of the immediate actions I took when I took over 

the laboratory was to go down to the group level and add administrative people that had been taken out—that were the ones that 

were doing some of this administrative checking. There had been 

no much burden put on at least at the group level, the managers, 

that they were unable to manage the science and manage the administrative part at the same time. 

So we have, in fact—and you will see that a lot in my testimony—a lot of what we are doing now is by going to diskless computing, improving the classified network, and, frankly, by shrinking the number of locations for classified material now from hundreds to tens, we are in the process—we are able—we have much 

more resources in terms of being able to conduct inventories and 

do checks and balance. 

Mr. WALDEN. You have less to inventory. 

Mr. NANOS. Less to inventory, and fewer people doing it, and 

much tighter control. In other words, we do transactional inventories on the safe. You are the custodian responsible for the safe. 

I come and draw my electronic media in the morning; I bring it 

back by the end of the day. You know what was in the safe, what 

was withdrawn, what was put back, and so you keep track on a 

102

transactional basis and at periodic intervals do a complete inventory. 

Instead of having hundreds of locations, you now have 20 with 

a staff that is concentrated, that is professional, that has a career 

path doing that. 

Mr. WALDEN. And isn’t that where people would take off from 

lunch and leave it unattended and—or asleep or whatever? I mean, 

wasn’t that where that problem was in the process? 

Mr. NANOS. That wasn’t our lab. We didn’t have guards, for example, that were asleep. But what we did have, we did have people 

who were custodians. In the old system, if you were a scientist, you 

had your own safe with your own classified media in it, and that 

was spread all over the laboratory, and there was a collateral duty 

classified material custodian that would come by every once in a 

while and inventory your safe to make sure that everything was 

okay. 

What we have done now, that has been done away with. You do 

not keep your own classified material anymore. It is in the library. 

When you come to work, you stop by the library, you withdraw it 

if you need to use it that day. And if you do not need to use it, 

it stays in the library, it is not distributed, it is concentrated. 

Mr. WALDEN. Is there—do they have to turn in their media before they are allowed out the door? 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, in some areas you will 

find people walking around with chains around their neck with a 

big orange card on it. It’s called the M-card, or the moron card. It 

is to remind you that you have withdrawn classified material, and 

until that is off, you can’t go home. 

We are taking very direct measures to make sure that people are 

reminded of their responsibilities, and, frankly, if you try to go 

home, and the custodian—the custodian can’t go home until it is 

all back, and if they see you heading for the door, they will say, 

wait a minute. Somebody will go back that night and look for the 

material. 

Mr. WALDEN. Do you feel like you have the buy-in of the rank 

and file, of those 12,000? 

Mr. NANOS. I think that there has been a great deal of consternation at the laboratory. There are people who have felt that what 

we have gone through has not been necessary. It has fallen to me 

to take the message, the collective message of you all and others, 

to the laboratory. They have not been happy. And some, I believe 

a minority in the laboratory, have not been happy with that and 

have been very vocal. 

Mr. WALDEN. What do they say? 

Mr. NANOS. There are people who think that the safety was 

doing just find, and we didn’t need have a shut-down for safety, 

and that, in fact, you know, that this is a burden on science, and 

that our science will suffer. And I don’t believe that, and I think 

the majority of the workers and the scientists at Los Alamos don’t 

believe that. 

But—and I think that moralewise we took the laboratory down 

to a very low level in terms of employee morale. And I think the 

combination of the shut-down and the suspension of operations, 

and the one-two punch of that and the contract competition has 

103

caused a great deal of personal unease on the part of many, many 

employees. 

Mr. WALDEN. So is that resulting in them buying into the improved security? 

Mr. NANOS. I think that the pressure that the laboratory has 

been under with the impending competition and the issues associated with first business and now safety and security has caused the 

kind of disquiet that has allowed me to implement a lot of change, 

probably more rapidly than would otherwise be the case. 

Mr. WALDEN. During the shut-down were you able to identify 

kind of the groups or individuals who just seem really reluctant to 

adopt these increased safety and security improvements? 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, as part of the restart 

process, I asked every supervisor to interview their employees at 

the next level down and to make judgments about the capability 

of the employee, the level of training, and their willingness to supervise or—if they were supervisors—or to conduct operations in 

that way. And if it looked like there was a disconnect, in many 

cases we got employees additional training; in some cases we actually moved employees, changed them to more suitable roles if it appeared that they were not able to conduct business in the way that 

it needed to be done. 

Mr. WALDEN. Of the people that you dismissed, have you kept 

track of what happened to them? Do they reappear somewhere in 

the government? 

Mr. NANOS. I have not personally tracked them. There were a 

mix. There were some very high-level employees and some very 

low-level employees. I do not know—I don’t personally know where 

they have reappeared. They certainly are not working on our staff. 

Mr. WALDEN. Okay. I don’t believe I have any more questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you Mr. Walden. 

That concludes the testimony of Dr. Nanos. We appreciate——

Mr. STUPAK. Could I interrupt for a minute? Could I ask a question or two, if I may? I finished my statement by saying that you 

should at least get ahold of Mr. Brown and mail him a copy, but 

the more I sit here and listen to the testimony here today, I would 

hope that you would call him in and sit down or find a half-hour 

or an hour to go through this. You are telling us that you want to 

make the lab safe. Mr. Brown in his paper is saying he wants to 

make the lab safe. I think the goal is the same. I hope you guys 

can work together and work it out. 

You said you had a dispute or two with one of the things he said, 

but I think it would be in everyone’s best interest. There is no 

doubt in our minds you are trying to do the best you can. So with 

Mr. Brown. And I would hope you would do that. 

The other thing that bothers me a little bit, Mr. Brown is now 

sort of considered a whistleblower, so he comes under the Government Accountability Project protections of whistleblowers. Why 

would Mr. Brown have to turn into a whistleblower if he is your 

auditor and he is trying to bring out deficiencies? It seems to me 

you would not want him to go under whistleblower, but rather 

work with you to help you out. 

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Mr. NANOS. Sir, I don’t consider him a whistleblower. He has selected himself as a whistleblower. We don’t consider them a whistleblower. He is still employed and still doing audits. We have 

taken what he said seriously. We haven’t retaliated against him in 

any way, and he is still a valued employee. 

So he is being cast—I am puzzled by why he is being cast in this 

position of being a whistleblower. Usually when you are a whistleblower, you are a whistleblower because you are either being retaliated against, or people are not taking you seriously. And I don’t 

think that is true—either of those things are true in this case. 

Mr. STUPAK. The Brown letter, the letter at least is on the GAP 

Web site, the Government Accountability Project. That is why I 

called him a whistleblower. Why would his letter be on an act that 

protects whistleblowers if he is not a whistleblower? That is why 

I used the word. 

Mr. NANOS. Maybe he had a fear of that eventually being the 

case. But it is certainly—there is no action on our part that I know 

of. One of the things I did when I took over at the laboratory, if 

you remember, 2 years ago, there were lots of claims of retribution. 

So I have been screening all these things that have come up, anonymous or otherwise, that indicate there is something wrong or 

there is retribution going on, and I run down and investigate every 

last one of those. So we are making sure that the communications 

are as open as possible in the laboratory. 

Mr. STUPAK. I believe in your previous testimony you indicated 

you have an open-door policy if someone wants to go in, a whistleblower or whatever, who has some concerns. 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STUPAK. So I take it from your testimony you will sit down 

with Mr. Brown? 

Mr. NANOS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Dr. Nanos, thank you. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. At this time we will have our third panel, which 

consists of one witness, who is Ms. Danielle Brian, who is Executive Director with the Project on Government Oversight. 

Ms. Brian, we welcome you and look forward to your testimony. 

As you know, it is the custom of the oversight investigation subcommittee that you are able to have an attorney if you want one; 

if you don’t, if you will stand, I would like to swear you in at this 

time. 

Ms. BRIAN. Yes, sir. 

[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Ms. Brian. You are now sworn in, 

and if you would give us your opening statement. 

TESTIMONY OF DANIELLE BRIAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ON 

NUCLEAR SECURITY, THE PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT 

OVERSIGHT 

Ms. BRIAN. Thank you very much for having me to testify, Mr. 

Chairman. Last year we testified that we were cautiously optimistic that then-Secretary Abraham’s initiatives would be implemented. As it turns out, our caution was well placed. The major 

problem is that the former Secretary failed to establish timely 

105

deadlines for their implementation, and, as a result, many of these 

initiatives have now stalled. 

To get back on track, we believe Secretary Bodman needs to set 

strict deadlines and needs to assign trusted staff to constantly follow up on their progress. Security experts’ greatest fear is very distinct. A terrorist could successfully reach its target at one of these 

facilities and, within an extraordinarily short timeframe, use the 

highly enriched uranium to create an improvised nuclear bomb onsite, known as an improvised nuclear device, or an IND. It only 

takes a critical mass of HEU, which is about 100 pounds, to create 

an IND. To put this in perspective, one site alone stores about 400 

metric tons of HEU. 

Why should we care about this? According to the Department of 

Homeland Security, this is exactly what worries them. The detonation of a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb would destroy everything within 

half a mile and contaminate 3,000 square miles of land. The nuclear weapons complex creates these homeland security 

vulnerabilities right here at home. 

By far the most successful Abraham initiative was the reexamination of the Design Basis Threat. Under the new DBT, security 

forces will be required to repel more than three times the number 

of attackers than they were required to protect against prior to 9/

11. But they will not be fully implemented until 2008, which I want 

to remind you is 7 years after 9/11. 

I would just focus comments on the initiatives that we believe require the committee’s immediate intervention for the sake of brevity. With regards to TA 18. As we know, TA 18 is scheduled to be 

deinventoried of weapons-grade nuclear material by the end of September 2005. But currently, LANL is actually pushing to further 

activities at TA 18. And I understand Ambassador Brooks didn’t 

have the opportunity to get briefed yet from the lab because he was 

in England, but these additional experiments are going to postpone 

the move for at least another 6 months. So POGO has been told 

that despite promises from the lab that they will meet the schedule, a choice is going to have to be made. Either these experiments 

will continue and they will not meet the deadline even by the end 

of the year, or they will have to pause in conducting these experiments and be able to move the materials to the Nevada test site 

on schedule. 

With regard to the initiative to review the necessity of retaining 

Lawrence Livermore special nuclear materials, this has really 

stalled completely. I think I know why. Just 1 month prior to Secretary Abraham’s speech, NNSA Director Brooks testified before 

another House committee that he opposed suggestions of 

deinventorying Livermore; and, in fact, the NNSA has proposed 

doubling Livermore’s plutonium. 

I understand from the testimony this morning that this particular initiative was combined with a larger initiative of looking 

in general at consolidation in the complex. But Secretary Abraham, 

in his speech, singled out Livermore as worthy of particular notice, 

and I think it was with very good reason. Roughly 7 million people 

live within a 50-mile radius of the Livermore lab. Many residential 

homes now exist across the street from the lab’s fence line. And 

new townhouses with minivineyards are being built along the edge 

106

of the fence line. These homes sit only 800 yards from the 

superblock which houses the lab’s plutonium. 

If I could direct the Congressmen to the photograph, the first 

photograph at the end of my testimony, which is from Livermore’s 

Web site, you will see that Livermore lab is actually a mile across, 

and so you get a sense then of the distance. These are all houses 

now. 

Many of you live in areas which are getting overdeveloped. I live 

in Loudoun County, which is the fastest-growing area. This is the 

kind of thing that happens. But this is really unique in the complex, what is happening at Livermore, and these are $600,000 

houses within 800 yards of the plutonium. So we are recommending that a particular focus be placed on Livermore and that 

special nuclear materials be removed from there. 

With regards to the highly enriched uranium materials facility at 

Y-12, the Department is currently breaking ground for an aboveground building, as we heard earlier, to store Y-12’s hundreds of 

tons of HEU. But the Department of Energy’s inspector general has 

criticized the design and cost of this new building, concluding it 

will cost more and be less secure than the original plan for the 

bermed, partially underground facility. 

I direct you to my the other two photos that I have provided to 

the Congressmen. The first photo is of the Nevada test site’s device 

assembly facility. This is a bermed design where you see that there 

is only one side that has to be protected; everything else is underground. In comparison, the current design for the facility at Y-12 

has all these sides. You have the roof and the four sides. And actually, with the design, there is more than four sides. 

Now, it was ultimately Sandia’s approval of this design that persuaded the Department of Energy headquarters to give the green 

light for this designed above-ground building, but POGO has 

learned that Sandia never compared this design to an underground 

design. And I understand from the testimony to the Congresswoman from Tennessee, who was asking the questions, there is no 

reason for a 2-year delay if there is a changed decision that maybe 

it should be underground. The government already has the design. 

Originally there was already a design for an underground facility 

at Y-12. It already exists. So we would recommend the committee 

suggest to DOE that they stop, because they have actually broken 

ground for the above-ground facility, and at least have Sandia compare that design to the security of an underground facility. 

Former Secretary Abraham also proposed the down-blending of 

100 additional metric tons of Y-12 surplus HEU. We believe this 

move is essential so that these materials no longer create an unnecessary homeland security vulnerability, and will, very importantly, significantly help in reducing the enormous costs associated 

with protecting these materials at the new Design Basis Threat. 

It appears, though, that DOE does not have the stomach to live 

up to its promises. The U.S. Has only currently down-blended 34 

of the 174 metric tons that have already been declared excess. The 

remaining down-blending is not scheduled for completion until 

2016 or beyond. So we believe that DOE should both dramatically 

speed up the current down-blending schedule and affirm former 

107

Secretary Abraham’s initiative of increasing the amount of HEU 

declared excess by another 100 metric tons. 

With regard to Secretary Abraham’s encouragement of consolidating nuclear materials, I understand that this study is just beginning to get under way 9 months after the initiative was assigned to NNSA. My organization, POGO, is in its final stages of 

preparing a report with recommendations of how to shrink the 

numbers of facilities across the country that house special nuclear 

materials from 13 sites to 7 at a cost savings of nearly $3 billion 

over 3 years. 

In conclusion, I would be remiss if I did not report to the committee that while not a part of former Secretary Abraham’s initiatives, the treatment of whistleblowers throughout the complex remains abysmal, and I have to particularly make the point, given 

Dr. Nanos’ comments, that retaliation really remains the norm and 

not the exception. 

In addition to Dr. Brown, another case in point is that of Tommy 

Hook and Chuck Montano, who have both worked at Los Alamos 

for decades. After the committee’s three hearings on financial fraud 

at Los Alamos, the University of California was telling the public 

that all of those issues were resolved, while at the same time retaliating against these two men who knew otherwise. 

Hook and Montano were responsible for providing audit support 

for UC and uncovering ongoing irregularities and outright misconduct amounting to millions of taxpayer dollars. Their audit reports were withheld from the Department of Energy. Their treatment? Their work was taken away from them, they were given no 

work for 9 months, and are now being handed menial assignments. 

Even the head of the Los Alamos site office tried to intervene on 

behalf of Tommy Hook, only to be rebuffed by an arrogant University of California. 

Under the current system, DOE contractors have no incentive to 

treat whistleblowers well, as all their legal fees are reimbursed by 

the Federal Government. 

In conclusion, the Department of Energy does not need new offices, does not need new commissions, does not need new studies. 

The DOE needs to follow through on its existing commitments. I 

believe the committee should remain apprised of SSA Director 

Podonsky’s important ongoing work, but even with the strongest 

leadership from the Secretary’s office, the only way these initiatives 

will be enacted is with your continued vigilance. DOE’s history has 

shown that without pressure from Congress, and in particular this 

subcommittee, these initiatives will fail. 

And I would just like to draw your attention to one more thing. 

One of my staff people was doing research and found a front page 

New York Times story from 1984 about a hearing in this subcommittee. And if you could indulge me, the first two sentences of 

this article were: ‘‘the government has put into effect a sweeping 

new program to improve the security of Federal facilities where nuclear warheads are designed and made. The program has come 

about because of a new perception of the threat of terrorism and 

because congressional investigations have disclosed serious lapses 

of nuclear security.’’ 

So I don’t think your work is going to end any time soon. 

108

1Wald, Matthew L. ‘‘Suicidal Nuclear Threat Is Seen at Weapon’s Plants,’’ New York Times, 

January 22, 2002. 

[The prepared statement of Danielle Brian follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIELLE BRIAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PROJECT ON

GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT

Thank you for asking me to testify today. The Project On Government Oversight 

(POGO) is an independent government watchdog group. We have been investigating 

and working to improve security at the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Weapons 

Complex for over five years. 

In May 2004, then-Secretary Abraham announced some bold initiatives for improving the security of the entire nuclear weapons complex. Last year we testified 

that former Secretary Abraham’s initiatives were an important step toward addressing the key weaknesses in security in the nuclear weapons complex, and we were 

cautiously optimistic that they would be implemented. As it turns out, our caution 

was well placed. The major problem with the initiatives: The former Secretary failed 

to establish timely deadlines for their implementation and, as a result, many of 

these initiatives have now stalled. To get back on track, DOE Secretary Samuel 

Bodman has several issues he needs to address. First, he needs to set strict deadlines and, because officials throughout the nuclear weapons complex have strongly 

resisted any change, he needs to assign trusted staff to constantly follow up on the 

progress. 

Adding to the current bureaucratic inertia is the belief by those inside the complex that they can just wait out any new directives until the current Secretary has 

moved on, and the status quo can be maintained. The revolving door between the 

Department of Energy and the privately-run weapons labs creates a lack of incentive to change. There is an insular environment in which people coming into the 

DOE, and particularly the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), bring 

with them their biases in favor of the status quo: No one likes to criticize their own 

actions. 

An array of concerns arises when it comes to securing America’s nuclear material. 

But security experts’ greatest fear is very distinct: a terrorist group successfully 

reaches its target at one of the facilities, and within an extraordinarily short time, 

uses the highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to create an improvised nuclear bomb on 

site (known as an Improvised Nuclear Device, or IND). It only takes a critical mass 

of HEU (about one hundred pounds) to create an IND. To put this in perspective, 

one site alone stores about 400 metric tons of HEU. According to Princeton University’s Frank von Hippel, ‘‘a 100-pound mass of uranium dropped on a second 100-

pound mass, from a height of about 6 feet, could produce a blast of 5 to10 kilotons.’’ 1

The blast from the Hiroshima atomic bomb was about 12 kilotons, killing over 

200,000 people. 

Why should we care about this? According to the Department of Homeland Security, this is exactly what worries them—the detonation of a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb 

would destroy everything within half a mile and contaminate 3,000 square miles of 

land. The nuclear weapons complex creates these homeland security vulnerabilities 

right here at home. 

By far, the most successful Abraham initiative was the re-examination of the Design Basis Threat (DBT), or security standards. Under the new DBT, security forces 

will be required to repel more than three times the number of attackers than they 

were required to protect against prior to 9/11. Furthermore, it will be assumed that 

adversaries will be using far more lethal weapons and much larger truck bombs 

than had previously been considered. Yet the new standards will not be fully implemented until 2008—seven years after 9/11. 

While there were very significant improvements to the Design Basis Threat, the 

follow-through on the other initiatives, for the most part, is tepid at best. For the 

sake of brevity, the rest of my testimony will only focus on what we consider the 

most urgent initiatives that need your immediate intervention. 

Some key weapons facilities, including Los Alamos’ TA-18 and Lawrence Livermore National Lab, will not be able to protect against the new threat level no matter how much money is spent. Removing all Special Nuclear Materials from those 

facilities eliminates security vulnerabilities at those facilities while dramatically decreasing security costs. 

109

LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LAB’S (LANL) TA-18

Widely recognized as the most vulnerable site in the nuclear weapons complex, 

TA-18 is scheduled to be de-inventoried of weapons-grade nuclear materials by the 

end of September 2005. It is worth noting that in 2000 then-Secretary Bill Richardson had ordered the facility to be de-inventoried by the end of 2004, but somehow 

Los Alamos was able to ignore him. Currently, LANL is pushing to continue activities at TA-18, further postponing the move at least six months. POGO has been told 

that despite promises from the Lab that they will meet the schedule—this can not 

happen as long as these activities continue to be performed there. In addition, much 

of the material will be stored at the Los Alamos’ Technical Area 55 for an unknown 

period of time. Security costs are beginning to mount, as the delays continue. 

POGO recommends that NNSA honor the former Secretary’s initiative, and halt 

these experiments so that the material can be moved to the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada Test Site on schedule. 

LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LAB

Another of former Secretary Abraham’s May 2004 initiatives was to review the 

necessity of maintaining Livermore’s Special Nuclear Materials. This initiative has 

stalled completely. I think I know why. Just one month prior to Abraham’s speech, 

NNSA Director Linton Brooks testified before the House Government Reform Committee that he opposed suggestions of de-inventorying Livermore, and in fact, the 

NNSA has proposed doubling Livermore’s plutonium to 1,500 kilograms. 

Roughly seven million people live within a 50 mile radius of the Livermore Lab. 

Many residential homes now exist across the street from the Lab’s fence line, and 

new townhouses with mini-vineyards are being built along the edge of the fence 

line. These homes sit only 800 yards from the Superblock, which houses the Lab’s 

plutonium. 

Surprisingly, the protective forces at Livermore are issued less lethal weapons 

than protective forces at other sites that store Special Nuclear Material. 

POGO recommends removing all weapons-grade plutonium and highly-enriched 

uranium from Livermore. If Livermore continues to need some amount of this material for its mission, the required material should be stored at the Device Assembly 

Facility in Nevada, only an hour’s plane ride away. Livermore scientists who need 

to work with the material can travel there to conduct research, something they did 

for years during the nuclear testing program. 

HIGHLY-ENRICHED URANIUM MATERIALS FACILITY (HEUMF) AT Y-12

Until four years ago, while Lockheed Martin still managed Y-12 near Oak Ridge, 

Tennessee, there were plans to build an underground or bermed storage facility. 

Virtually all modern storage facilities are underground, including the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) and KUMSEC at Kirtland Air Force Base. An underground facility would be much harder to penetrate and would serve as a greater deterrent to 

terrorists. U.S. Special Operations Command personnel have told POGO that an 

above-ground facility is a substantially more vulnerable design and that the underground option is the only credible one. Yet the current contractor, BWXT, changed 

the plan to build an underground or bermed facility to that of an above-ground facility. 

The Department is currently breaking ground for the above-ground building 

known as the Highly-Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF) to store the 

plant’s hundreds of tons of HEU. The DOE Inspector General has criticized the design and cost of this new building, concluding that it will cost more and be less secure than the original plan for a bermed (partially underground) facility. 

In 2004, Sandia National Lab was asked by NNSA to evaluate the HEUMF plans. 

It was ultimately Sandia’s approval of this design that persuaded DOE Headquarters to give the green light for the above-ground building. POGO has learned, 

however, that the Sandia study never made a comparison of the HEUMF design to 

an underground or bermed design, explaining in the small print they did not want 

to have to consider an entire redesign for the building. Ironically, it was an earlier 

Sandia study that had recommended using existing designs from two other government-owned underground facilities to solve the Y-12 storage problem. 

There are also plans to build a second building identical to the HEUMF to house 

the manufacturing of weapons parts from HEU. It is a poor security practice to create two targets, and inefficient at best to have two separate buildings between 

which the materials must be transported regularly, creating further risk as well as 

dramatically increasing security costs. 

110

DOE should immediate stop work on the above-ground HEUMF storage facility. 

NNSA should quickly move to construct an underground or bermed facility to store 

both the non-surplus HEU as well as the new modern manufacturing facility. This 

would result in only one double fence line, known as a Perimeter Intrusion Detection Assessment System (PIDAS), for both operations, as well as provide substantially better security against terrorist attack. A modified DAF design could accommodate both functions. 

DOWNBLEND ADDITIONAL HIGHLY-ENRICHED URANIUM

In his May 2004 speech, then-Secretary Abraham proposed the downblending of 

100 additional metric tons (beyond the surplus 174 metric tons) of Y-12’s surplus 

highly-enriched uranium. The disposal of excess HEU is essential so that these materials no longer create an unnecessary homeland security vulnerability. In addition, 

downblending the HEU will significantly help in reducing the enormous costs associated with protecting these materials. 

However, according to DOE officials, the initial program review of HEU stockpiles 

across the complex initiated by former Secretary Abraham was stymied by complaints from the Office of Naval Reactors, a nearly-autonomous arm of the DOE, 

claiming they may need it some day for their reactors. The long-held territorialism 

by Naval Reactors dates back to its origins under Admiral Hyman Rickover, and 

presents a formidable bureaucratic hurdle to the downblending of HEU. Currently 

Y-12 alone stores over 400 metric tons of HEU. 

DOE does not seem to have the stomach to live up to its promises. The United 

States has only downblended 34 of the 174 metric tons already declared excess. The 

remaining downblending it is not scheduled for completion until 2016 or beyond. 

POGO recommends dramatically speeding up the current downblending schedule, 

and affirming former Secretary Abraham’s initiative of increasing the amount of 

HEU declared excess by another 100 metric tons. 

REVIEW COMPLEX FOR CONSOLIDATION OPPORTUNITIES

Former Secretary Abraham also encouraged consolidating nuclear materials: ‘‘Ultimately, I believe we need to both reduce the number of sites with Special Nuclear 

Material to the absolute minimum, consistent with carrying out our missions, and 

to consolidate the material in each of those sites to better safeguard that material.’’ 

He asked NNSA Director Brooks to head up a study of consolidation options. I understand that this study is just beginning to get underway—nine months after the 

initiative was assigned to NNSA. POGO decided not to wait for them. We are in 

the final stages of preparing a report with recommendations of shrinking the number of facilities across the country that house Special Nuclear Materials from thirteen sites to seven, at a cost savings of nearly $3 billion over three years. 

CONCLUSION

I would be remiss if I did not report to the Committee that, while not a part of 

former Secretary Abraham’s initiatives, the treatment of whistleblowers throughout 

the complex remains abysmal. Retaliation remains the norm, not the exception, as 

can be seen in the case of Tommy Hook and Chuck Montano, who have both worked 

at Los Alamos for decades. After the Committee’s three hearings on financial fraud 

at Los Alamos, the University of California was telling the public that all was resolved, while at the same time retaliating against these two men who knew otherwise. Hook and Montano were responsible for providing audit support for UC and 

uncovered ongoing irregularities and outright misconduct amounting to millions of 

taxpayer dollars. Their audit reports were withheld from DOE. Their treatment? 

Their work was taken away from them, they were given no work for nine months, 

and now they are only being handed menial assignments. Even the head of the Los 

Alamos Site Office tried to intervene on Tommy Hook’s behalf, only to be rebuffed 

by an arrogant University of California. Under the current system, DOE contractors 

have NO incentive to treat whistleblowers well—as all their legal fees are reimbursed by the federal government. 

The Department of Energy does not need new offices such as the NNSA’s new Office of Performance Assurance, new commissions, or new studies. The DOE needs 

to follow through on its existing commitments. Safety and Security Performance Assurance Director Glenn Podonsky is keeping tabs on the progress of these initiatives, and is noting where there is no progress at all. His office’s Site Assistance 

Visits are providing new insights into important consolidation opportunities. The 

Committee should remain apprised of this ongoing work. But even with the strongest leadership from the Secretary’s office, the only way these initiatives will be enacted is with your continued vigilance. DOE’s history has shown that without presVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 May 02, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\99905.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
111

sure from Congress and specifically from this subcommittee, these initiatives will 

likely fail.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, thank you, Ms. Brian, for reminding us of 

that. Would you please explain to me the Project on Government 

Oversight? How old is the Project on Government Oversight, and 

how is it funded and so forth? 

Ms. BRIAN. We were created in 1981. At the time we were actually the Project on Military Procurement, working with people inside the Pentagon who were concerned about wasted money as well 

as weapons that were not working adequately. 

We expanded our focus and changed our name in 1990 to the 

Project of Government Oversight. We work with whistleblowers 

and other people inside the system who work with us on an unclassified basis to get us information that needs to get out to improve 

the way the Federal Government operates. 

We take no money from the government, no money from corporations, and no money from unions. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. And you have an expertise in nuclear security, 

I take it? 

Ms. BRIAN. No. Actually, I am a good government person who, 

at this point, has been working on this issue for 5 years, so I feel 

I have developed it over time. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Absolutely. Now, in your testimony you made a 

reference to Mr. Brown. Do you feel like Mr. Brown was retaliated 

against by the University of California? 

Ms. BRIAN. I know my colleagues at the Government Accountability Project, who are working on his case, very strongly feel that 

way. I must say I am not as familiar with the details of his case. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. You also made the comment in here that there 

is an insular environment in which people coming into the DOE 

and particularly the NNSA bring with them their biases in favor 

of the status quo. Now, why do you make a statement like that? 

Ms. BRIAN. Well, if you look at the people who will leave the 

NNSA, you see them showing up at the lab; and then you see the 

people leaving the labs and showing up at NNSA. It is not unique, 

of course. It happens around the government. But I have really 

never seen it as regularly as I have seen it with this particular universe. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. You made the comment also that it is the normal practice that the government will pay legal fees for the contractor in the event of a whistleblower lawsuit; is that correct? 

Ms. BRIAN. It is in the case of the Department of Energy contractors. That is not the case across the government. It is unique to the 

Department of Energy. And there have been some legislative initiatives to change that, which I would encourage further consideration 

and passage. It just creates a terrible incentive. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Right. It is my understanding that in the energy 

bill, which this committee will be taking up soon, that we are going 

to try to change that. 

Ms. BRIAN. I think that would just really change the dynamics 

for whistleblowers. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Right. 

Well, I genuinely appreciate your being with us this morning, 

and we certainly have read your testimony. 

112

At this time I will recognize Mr. Stupak for any questions he 

might have. 

Ms. BRIAN. Thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for testifying. 

Have you seen Mr. Brown’s paper, the 22 pages? 

Ms. BRIAN. I have not, I’m sorry. 

Mr. STUPAK. Do you know him at all, from his work at the labs? 

Ms. BRIAN. I do know we had brief conversation with him. He 

was already working with the Government Accountability Project, 

and I felt he was in good hands. 

All of our organizations are short-staffed. I know he has good 

people working with him, and we have other people we need to 

help. 

Mr. STUPAK. I understand. I have asked the other witnesses, and 

it is fair to ask you, what do you feel are the most important issues 

that we really need to address right now? You mentioned TA 18, 

and that was supposed to be done in 2004, now in 2008, but is that 

the most pressing thing you see? 

Ms. BRIAN. Clearly that was the site we had focused most attention on over the past few years. I think that we are coming to closure on that one. It has taken, as I think someone mentioned, perhaps it was you—it was actually Secretary Abraham that began 

this—I’m sorry, Secretary Richardson, trying to get that place 

closed. 

I think, honestly, the most important thing now is for there to 

be two things. One is the consolidation review. There needs to really be consideration of why there are still 13 sites. Even assuming 

TA 18 closing, and Sandia, and far too long, in our opinion, from 

closing, you still have a number of sites out there that should not 

continue to house these nuclear materials. So shrinking the complex will help to address the extraordinary cost that is being 

caused by the increase in the Design Basis Threat. 

The other part of that that I think is critical is really a move to 

down-blend the HEU. It is stalled, that initiative, again, and that 

will help to reduce the cost to store this. 

Mr. STUPAK. From your testimony, I get the impression that 

whether it is Secretary Richardson or Abraham, they both had 

some good suggestions, but those suggestions went out to the labs 

and just sort of never went anywhere. Is that a fair way of saying 

it? 

Ms. BRIAN. And part of that is what you asked, actually the 

other Congressman asked earlier, which is this revolving door, because you have the people at headquarters who are all coming from 

the labs who don’t want this change. Every lab wants to keep all 

the materials there. Livermore does not want to give up their materials. 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. 

Ms. BRIAN. So unless you have some new ideas and people who 

aren’t beholden to the old system, that is why we are going to keep 

seeing this push back. 

Mr. STUPAK. You said this Congress, this committee, this subcommittee in particular, should keep on this to make sure that reforms take place, whether it is consolidation or TA 18. But more 

113

than this committee, doesn’t that really lie with the Department of 

Energy? Isn’t it their responsibility? 

Ms. BRIAN. Of course it’s their responsibility to provide the leadership. As you see, however, Secretary Abraham laid out, this is 

what I want to have done. I have learned over time that a secretary—it seems extraordinary to say this, but a secretary of a department doesn’t necessarily have the power to make his department do what they do not want to do, and they typically have a 

shorter time in office than Members of Congress. So I think the bureaucracies just wait out the political appointees. 

Mr. STUPAK. We feel that way, too, at times, believe me. 

TA 18. Do you believe that that move could be expedited before 

2008? Do you think that could be done by the end of 2006, at the 

most? 

Ms. BRIAN. Well, the schedule is actually currently for the end 

of fiscal year 2005, and my understanding——

Mr. STUPAK. They are just moving to another building. 

Ms. BRIAN. To TA 55; correct. 

Mr. STUPAK. Then they are to go to Nevada with it. And they are 

shipping things, and you have to handle it. I would think if you are 

shipping from TA 18 to building number 55, and then to Nevada, 

you are shipping it, packaging it and shipping it twice, so you could 

really—I’m just trying to figure out this delay. 

As I said earlier in my statements, it has been 10 years when 

we talk about TA 18. I have been on this committee 10 years. 

Ms. BRIAN. Exactly. I am worried about the plans to keep it at 

building 55 because its feels like it is Los Alamos’ efforts to keep 

it onsite and then hope people will forget about TA 18 and the 

plans to move it, as tends to happen, and then they will be able 

to maintain it there. 

I still don’t understand why all the facilities feel almost an emotional attachment to keeping the materials; that they just can’t 

say, let’s go, let’s move it somewhere where it is more secure. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. I have no further questions. Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Dr. Burgess. 

Mr. BURGESS. I will pass on the questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Walden. 

Mr. WALDEN. I yield, Mr. Chairman, on the questions. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, I’m shocked, no more questions. 

Ms. Brian, thank you so much for your testimony and for taking 

the time to be with us. As I stated earlier, we are going to go in 

a recess now and reconvene in room 2218 for a closed session. 

It is now 1 o’clock, so I think we will reconvene in room 2218 at 

1:15. That will give people about 9 or 10 minutes. With that, we 

stand in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the subcommittee recessed to proceed 

in closed session.]

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