1 Th e H on ora ble Jo hn F. Ke en an , Unit ed

St ate s D ist

ric t Ju dg e f

or t he So uth ern

Di str ict of Ne w 1 2 York, sitti ng by designati on. 1 06- 3147- cv Ja c o b so n v . H e a lthc a re F in a n c ia l S e rv ic e s, In c . 1 2 UNITED STATE S COURT OF AP PEALS 3 FO R T HE SE CO ND CI RC UI T 4

____________________________________ 5 6 August Term, 2007 7 8 (Argued: November 19, 2007 Decided: February 14, 2008 ) 9 10 Do ck et N o. 06 -31 47 -cv 11

____________________________________ 12 13 GERSHO N JACOB SON, 14 on behalf of himself and all others similarl y situate d, 15 Plaintif f-Appellant , 16 17 v. 18 19 HEALTH CARE FINA NCIAL SER

VICES, INC., 20 De fen da nt- Ap pe lle e . 21

____________________________________

Before: WA LKER and CA LABRES I, Ci rcu it J ud ges , and KEENAN , District Judge

. 1 22 23

____________________________________

Ap pe al f rom a d eci sio n of

th e Unit ed

St ate s D istric t C ourt f

or t he Ea ste rn D ist

ric t of Ne w 24 25 York (Glasser, J. ), gr antin g s um m ary jud gm ent to De fe nd ant-A pp ell ee o n P lai nti ff

-App ell ant’s 26 claims under the Fa irDe bt Co ll ection Prac tices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. , and awarding 27 att orn ey s’ f

ees to D ef

en dant- Ap pe lle e. 28 Affirm ed in part, r eversed in pa rt, vacat ed, and remanded. 29 L AW RENCE K ATZ , Katz & Klei nm an , Un ion da le, 30 N.Y., for Plainti ff-Appell ant . B RI AN M I LLE R (D avid J . Gold, on thebr ief ), N ew 31 32 York, N.Y., for De fen da nt- Ap pe lle e . 33

___________________________________2 1 CALAB RESI, Circuit Judge : 2 Plaintiff-AppellantGershon Jacobson (“ Jacob so n” ) appe als from a June 6, 2006 decision 3 of Ju dg e I. Le o G las ser , which (1) grante d s um m ary jud gm ent to De fe nd ant-A pp ell ee H eal thc are 4 Fi nanc ial Se rvi ces (“H FS ”) o n J aco bs on ’s c lai m s und er t he Fa ir D eb t C oll ect ion

Practices Ac t, 5 15 U. S.C. § 1692 et seq. (“ F D C P A ” o r “ th e A c t” ), an d (2 ) o rd e re d

J a c o b s o nto p aya tt orn ey s’ 6 fees and costs to HFS. Ja co bs on v. He alt hc are F in. Se rvs , Inc

. , 434 F. Supp. 2d 133 (E.D.N.Y. 7 20 06 ). J aco bs on

ap pe als bo th d ete rm inatio ns . 8 W e af

fi rm the dis tri ct c ourt i n p art, rever se i t in part, an d v acate i ts j ud gm ent, b oth as t o 9 the merits of Jacobson’s cl aim, and as to the award of costs and a ttorneys’ fee s. We r emand the 10 case to the distri ct court for furthe r proceedi ngs consiste nt with this opinion. 11 B ACKG ROUND 12 13 HFS is a “debt coll ector” wit hin the meaning of the FDCPA. S e e 15 U. S. C. § 1 69 2a (6)

. 14 It s ent a l ett er t o J aco bs on , d em anding pa ym ent of a d eb t of $4 92 .0 0 o we d b y J aco bs on to a thi rd 15 party. The let ter, date d July 13, 2004, stat ed:

THIS ACCO UNT HAS BEEN ASSIGNE D TO OU R OFFICE 16 17 FOR CO LLECTION.

IF YOU R PAYMENT OR NOTICE OF D ISPUTE IS NOT 18 19 RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE W ITHIN 30 DAYS, W E SHALL 20 RECOMMEND FURTHE R ACTIONBE TAKEN AGAINST 21 YOU TO COLLEC T THIS OUTS TANDINGBALAN CE.

NO TE : T HA T W E H AV E T HE RI GH T T O REP OR T T HI S 22 23 DEBT TO THE A PPROPRIATE CRED IT BUREAUW HICH 24 MIG HT HA VE A N EG AT IV E IMP AC T O N Y OU R C RE DI T 25 RATING. MAKE YOUR CHECK

OR MONEYORDER 26 PAYAB LE TO HEA LTHCARE FINANCIAL SERVICES.1 Jacobson has not, t o date, sought cl ass cert ification. 2 3 1 Pursuant to HFS’s obli gations underthe Act, this text was imm ediatel y followed by a “validat ion 2 no tic e”: PLEASE READ BEL OW 3 THIS COMMUNICA TION IS AN AT TEMPT TO CO LLECT A 4 5 DEBT AN D ANY INF ORMATION O BTAINED W ILL BE 6 USED FO R THAT P URPOSE

.

IN CO MPLIANCE W ITH TH E PR OVISIONS OF PARAGR APH 7 8 809 OF THE C ONSUMER CREDIT PR OTECTIONACT, 9 AMENDMENT S, YOU A RE HERE BY NOTIFIED OF THE 10 FOLLOW ING:

UNLESS Y OU NOT IFY THIS OFFICE W ITHIN 30 DAYS 11 12 AFTER RECEIVING TH IS NOTICE THA T YOU DISP UTE 13 THE VALIDITY OF T HIS DE BT O R A NY P ORTION 14 TH EREO F, TH IS OF FI CE W IL L A SS UM E T HI S D EB T I S 15 VALID.

IF YOU NO TIFY THIS OFFICE IN W RITING W ITHIN 30 16 17 DAYS FR OM RECEIVING THIS NOTICE, TH IS OFFICE W ILL 18 OBT AI N VERIFICAT ION OF THE DEBT OR OBTAIN A 19 COPY O F A JUDGE MENT AND MA IL YOU A C OPY OF 20 SUCH JUD GEMENT OR VERIFICATION

. IF YOU REQ UEST F ROM THIS OFFICE IN W RITING, 21 22 W IT HIN 3 0 D AY S A FT ER RE CEIV IN G T HI S N OT IC E, TH IS 23 OFFICE W ILL PROVIDE Y OU W IT H THE NA ME AND 24 ADDRE SS OF ORIGINAL CREDITOR, IF D IFFERENT FROM 25 THE CUR RENT CREDITOR. 26 Co nte nd ingthat H FS ha d v iol ate d th e F DC PAby“d ive st[ ing ] t he co ns um er o f h is r ights 27 to dispute t he debt for thir ty days a ft err ecei pt of the collec tion let ter,” Jac obson filed a 28 complaint on July 30, 2004. He p urp ort ed to b rin g a natio nw ide c las s ac tio n o n b eh alf of him sel f 29 and all ot he r co ns umers who had rec eived similar comm unications from

HFS. Plaintiff did not

2 30 allege any a ctual los s, but sought st atutory damages and att orneys’ fees.1 Neither par ty objects to the district court’s decision to convert HFS ’s Rule 12 motion to a motion 3 2 fo r summ ary

jud gm ent. 4 1 Rather than ans wer the complaint, HFS moved fori ts di smissal, and in the al ternati ve 2 ask ed

fo r summ ary

jud gm ent. C on clu din g th at t he le tte r di d n ot v iol ate the statut e, the dis tri ct 3 court grant ed summ ary judgment to HFS. Ja cobson , 4 34 F. Su pp . 2 d at 13 9-4 1. Mo reo ve r, 4 finding that pla intiff’s acti on was brought “in badfa it h an d for the purpose of harass ment,” 15 5 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), the cour t awar de d at torneys’ fees and cost s to defendant. Jacobson , 434 6 F. Supp. 2d. at 141. This appeal foll owed. 7 D I S CUS S I ON 8 I. Th e Me rit s 9 10 Summary judgm ent is appr opri at e where t he moving party shows that ther e is “no 11 genuine is su e as t o any material fact and tha t the movant is entit led to judgment as a matter of 12 law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The facts relev an t to thi s appeal ar e undisputed, and we r eview de 3 13 novo the distr ict court ’s holding t ha t the colle ction let ter did notviolate t he FDCPA. Se e R us sel l 14 v. Equifax A.R.S. , 74 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1996). 15 In passi ng the FDCPA in 1977, legisl ators note d “abundant evide nce of the use of 16 abusive, decept ive, and unfaird eb t co ll ect ion practi ces.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a). Finding exi sting 17 laws inadequat e to a ddre ss t he probl em, C ongress act ed with the ai m of eliminating abusive 18 pra ctices in t

he de bt c oll ect ion

ind us try , and

als o s ou ght to en sure t

hat “t ho se d eb t co lle cto rs 19 who refrain from using abusive debt c oll ection pra ctices a re not competitivel y disadvantage d.” 20 Id. § 1692(e). These pur poses i nfo rm the FDCPA’s many provisions. Among other things, the 21 Act regulat es and rest ricts t he acquisit ion of information about debtors. Id. §§ 169 2b , 1 69 2c . It 22 further prohibits conduct whose natural consequence is to “harass, oppress, or abu se an y p ers on1 Our ca ses rec ognize the de bt c oll ect or’ s ri ght to de m an d p aym ent, e ve n w ith in t he thi rty -day 4 2 period, unless the c ustomer submits a notice of disput e. Se e, e .g , S av ino v. Co mp ute r C

red it , Inc

. , 3 164 F.3d 81, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1998). This right has now been m ade explicit in the statutory text by 4 the 2006 Amendm ents to t he FDCPA. Se e Financial Ser vices Regulat ory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. 5 L. No. 109-351, § 802(c), 120 Stat. 1966, 2006- 07 (2006) (ins ert in g in 1 5 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) the 6 fo llo wi ng text: “ C o ll e c ti on act ivi tie s an d c om

m un icatio ns that do no t ot

he rw ise vio lat e th is t itl e m ay 7 continue duri ng the 30-day per iod referred t o in subsecti on (a) unles s the consumer has not ified the 8 de bt co lle c to r i nw ri ti n g th a t t h e d e b t, o r anyp o rt io no f th e d e b t, is d is p ute d

o r t h a t t h e c o ns um er 9 requests t he name and address of the origina l credit or.”). 5 1 in c onne cti on

wi th t he co lle cti on

of a d eb t.” Id. § 1692d. And i t bars t he us e o f “ any f

als e, 2 deceptive, ormisleading represe ntation ormeans in connection with the collect io n of any debt,” 3 id. § 1692e, whil e p ros cri bin g “ un fa ir o r un co ns cio na ble m ean s to co lle ct o r attem pt t o c oll ect 4 any d eb t.” Id. § 1692f. 5 As a response to “ the recurring proble m of debt colle ctors dunnin g th e wr on g person or 6 att em

pti ng to c oll ect

de bts wh ich

the co ns um er h as a lre ad y paid,” S. Rep. N o. 95 -38 2, at 4 7 (1977), as rep rin ted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A .N. 1695, 1699, the FDCPA gives the consumer the right 8 to d isp ute a d eb t cl aim ed bya d eb t co lle cto r, and

to seek ve rific ati on

of the va lid ityof

the de bt. 9 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). If the consumer notifie s the de bt collec tor in writ ing, “within t he thirt y10 day period” afforded by the Act , that she di sputes the de bt or an y po rt io n of t he debt, the debt 11 co lle cto r m

us t “c eas e co lle cti on .” Id. Th e d eb t co lle cto r m ayres um e collect ion act ivi tie s o nly 12 when it has obtai ned ve ri fi ca ti on of the debt, a nd has mailed a copy of the verificat ion to the 13 co ns um er. Id. Th e th irty-d aywi nd owis n ot a “gra ce pe rio d” ; in

the ab sen ce o f a

dis pute n oti ce, 14 the deb t collect or is all owed to demand immediate payment and to continue coll ection act ivity. 4 15 By

th e sam e tok en , ho we ve r, “[ t] he f ail ure o f a co ns um er to dis pute the v ali dit y of a d ebt unde r 16 [§ 1692g] may n ot b e co nstrued by any court as an admission of liabilit y.” 15 U.S.C. § 17 16 92 g(c ).6 1 Si gn if

icantl y, the FD CP A d oe s n ot a ssum e th at t he re cip ient of a co lle cti on

letter is 2 aw are of he r r ig h t t o re qu ir e v e ri f ic a ti o no f th e d e b t. In s te a d , th e A c t r e qu ir e s th e d e b t c o ll ect or, 3 as the part y in the bett er positi on to know the law, to in for m the consum er of that ri ght. Section 4 16 92 g(a ) or de rs the de bt c oll ector to s en d a wr itt enno tic e, wi thi n f ive days of

its ini tia l

co mm un ic a ti o nw it

hth e c o n s um e r, s tati n g the am o un t o f th e d e b t an d

th e n a m e o f

th e c re d it o r t o 5 6 wh om

the debt i s o we d, 15 U. S. C. §§ 16 92 g(a )(1 ) & ( 2). Th is v ali datio n n oti ce m us t f urt he r 7 inc lud e “a

statem ent th at unless the con sum er, wi thi n th irty d ay s af ter rec eip t of

the no tic e, 8 disputes t he validit y of the debt, or any port ion thereof, the de bt wi ll be assumed to be valid by 9 th e d e b t c o ll e c to r. ” Id. § 1692g(a)(3) . The notice must incorpora te “a sta tement that if the 10 consumer notifies the d eb t coll ector in wri ting within t he thirt y-day period t hat the debt , or any 11 po rti on

the reo f, is d isp ute d, the de bt c oll ect or w ill ob tai n v eri fi cat ion of the de bt. ” Id. § 16 92 g(a )(4 ). F inally, t

he no tic e m

us t co nta in “ a st ate m ent th at, up on the co ns um er’ s written 12 13 re qu es t w it hi n t he th ir ty -d ay pe ri od , t he de btco ll ec to r w il l p ro vi de th e c on su mer wi th th e n ame 14 an d a dd

res s o f t he ori gin al c red ito r, i f d if fe rent f rom the curre nt c red ito r.” Id. § 1 69 2g (a) (5)

. 15 In this Ci rcu it, the qu est ion of wh eth er a

co mm un icatio n c om

pli es w iththe FD CP A i s 16 de ter

m ine d f rom the pe rsp ect ive of

the “le ast

so ph ist icated

co ns um er. ” Clomon v. Jack son , 988 17 F. 2d

13 14 , 1 31 8 (2 d C ir. 19 93 ). T he purpo se o f t he lea st- so ph ist icated-c on sum er s tan dard, he re 18 as in o th era reas of consumer law, is to ensur e that the statute protects the gulli ble as well a s the 19 shrewd. Id. at 1318 . B ut i n a pp lyi ng thi s st an dard, we be ar i n m ind the Ac t’s “d

ua l pu rpo se” : in 20 ad dit ion

to p rot ect ingco ns um ers ag ain st d ece pti ve de bt c oll ect ion pra cti ces , th e o bje cti ve tes t 21 we apply protect s debt coll ectors fr om u nreasonable construct ions of their communications. Id. 22 at 1 32 0. Ev enin “ cra ft inga n orm that pr ote cts the na ive an d th e cr ed ulo us ,” we have “caref

ull y 23 pre ser

ve d the conc ep t of

rea so na ble ne ss. ” Id. at 1 31 9. Ac co rdi ng ly, the FD CP A d oe s n ot a id1 In Ru sse ll , we rejected a form ulation of the overshadowing / contradic tion test which would have 5 2 req

uir ed the plainti ff

to s ho w that th e co ntr ad ict ion is “ thr eat en ing .” Se e R us sel l , 74 F.3d at 35 3 (refusing to follow Sm ith v. Fi n. Co lle cti on Agen cies, 770 F. Supp. 232, 237 (D. Del. 1991)). 1 Th is am en dm ent to ok ef fe ct o n O cto be r 13 , 2 00 6, too lat e to ap ply to t his cas e. But, i n anyev ent, 6 2 the ne w t ex t co nf

irm s, rathe r th analt ers , th e law o f t his Ci rcu it. 7 1 plainti ffs whose claims are based on “bi zarre oridiosyncra tic int erpreta tions of collec tion 2 no tic es. ” Id . at 1320. 3 In t

his cas e, Jac ob so n c oncedes th at t he lan gu ag e o f t

he va lid ati on

no tic e, stand ingalo ne , 4 would sati sfy HF S’s obligat ions under § 1692g(a ). But that i s not the end of the matter, for HFS 5 ha s th e ob li gati on, not just t o convey the information, but to conve y it clea rly. Ru sse ll , 7 4 F .3d 6 at 35. Applying the l east-sophi sticat ed-consumer standard, we have he ld r ep eat edly that adebt 7 co lle cto r vi olates § 1 69 2g (a) , e ve n if the co lle cto r in clu de s an acc urate v ali datio n notice, if that 8 no tic e is ov ers ha do we d o r co ntr ad ict ed byoth er l an gu ag e in com m un icatio ns to t

he de bto r. Se e, 9 e. g. , S

av ino v. Co mp ute r C

red it, Inc

. , 1 64 F. 3d

81 , 8 5 (2 d C ir. 19 98 ); Ru sse ll , 74 F.3d at 34. 10 A n oti ce o ve rsh ad ow s o r co ntr ad ict s th e v ali datio n n oti ce “ if it w ou ld m ake the lea st 11 so ph ist icated

co ns um er unc ert ain

as t o h er r ights.” Ru sse ll , 74 F. 3d at 3 5. W e h av e sa id t

hat 5 12 thi s ju dic ial glo ss o n th e o rig ina l te xt o f t he statut e ac co rds wi th t

he Act’ s ov erarch ingpurpo se 13 of de ter

rin g de cep tiv e co nd

uc t, an d en sures th at “p urp ort ed c om pli an ce wi th the f

orm of the 14 statut e [ is] no t . . . g ive n s an cti on at the expe ns e o f t

he substance of

the Ac t.” Id . And

Co ng res s 15 has now codified our approa ch by adding the following s entence to t he statut e: “Any colle ction 16 activit ies and comm unica ti on dur in g the 30-day per iod may not overshadow or be inconsi stent 17 with the disc losure of the consumer’s ri ght to di sp ute the debtor requestthe name and address of 18 the ori gin al c red ito r.” 15 U. S. C. § 1 69 2g (b) (as a men de d b y th e F inanc ial Se rvi ces Re gu lat ory 6 19 Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 802(c), 120 Stat. 1966, 2006-07 ( 2006)).1 Jacobson brought t he present a ction les s than thre e weeks after rec eiving the l etter i n question. 7 8 1 In the e ve nt of a tr an sg res sio n, th e FD CP A pro vid es fo r e nf orc em ent b y the Fed era l 2 Trade Comm ission and by ot her administrati ve agencies. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 l . B ut it also grants a 3 private r ight of action t o a consumer who receives a comm unicatio n th at violates the Act. Id. § 4 1692k. In additi on to compensatory damages, id. § 1 69 2k (a) (1) , th e A ct em po we rs d istric t 5 courts to a ward “additi onal damages” of up to $1,000 per consumer, id. . § 1692k(a) (2 )( A), and 6 mandates the award of at to rn ey s’ fe es to successful pl aintiffs. Id. § 1 69 2k (a) (3) . In ord er t o 7 prevail, i t is not nec essary for a pla intiff to show that she he rself was confused by the 8 comm

un icatio n s he rec eiv ed ; it is s uf fi cie nt f or a pla int if f t o d em on str ate that th e le ast 9 sophistic ated consumer would be confused. In this way, the FDCPA enli st s th e efforts of 10 so ph isticated consum ers lik e Ja co bs on as “ pri vate atto rne ys ge ne ral ” to aid the ir l ess 7 11 so ph ist icated

co unter parts , who are un lik ely

the mselves to bri ng su it und er the Ac t, b ut who are 12 assumed by the Act to benefit from the deterrenteffect of civil acti ons brought by other s. 13 Jac ob so n asser ts that th e v ali datio n n oti ce w as o ve rsh ad ow ed or c ontra dic ted , in

thr ee 14 different ways, by the second pa ragraph of the le tter. Thatparagraph r eads as follows: “I f your 15 paym ent or

no tic e o f d isp ute is n ot r ece ive d in thi s o ff ice wi thi n 3 0 d ay s, we sh all rec omm end 16 fu

rth er a cti on

be tak enag ain st y ou

to c oll ect

thi s o uts tan din g b alanc e. ” W e ad dre ss i n tu rn e ach 17 of

his thr ee c ontentio ns . 189

A. The Right to Dispute the Debt Before Payment 1 2 Plaintiff contends firs t that t he lette r might lead the l ea st s ophistica ted consumer to be 3 un ce rt ain whether she had anyri ght t o dis pute the d eb t at a ll be fo re payin g it. If th at were the 4 case, the le tter would vi olate § 1692g(a ) under the wel l-established la w of this Court. Like the 5 distri ct court, however , we find no violation of the Act on t his score. 6 As no ted

ab ov e, a debt coll ect or i s, as a ge ne ral m att er, entit led

to d em an d im

m ed iat e 7 payment of a debt, and to th re at en fu rt her acti on in the eventof non-payment. Our cases have 8 rec og niz ed , h ow ev er, that su chde m an ds m aycau se c on fu sion about the rig ht t o d isp ute , and wi ll 9 sometim es, i n th atwa y, l ea d debt colle ctors to run afoul of the Act. In Russell v. Equif ax , for 10 example, a debt co ll ect ion agency senta lette r captione d as an “imm ediate col lection not ice,” 11 tel lin g th e co ns um er “if y ou do no t di sp ute thi s cl aim (se e re ve rse sid e) and

wi shto p ayit w ith in 12 the next 10 days we wil l not post t his c ol le cti on to your file.” 74 F.3d at32. On the reverse side 13 of

the letter , th ere was a vali datio n n oti ce a ccu rat ely statin g th e n ature o f t

he rec ipi ent’s rig ht t o 14 disput e the debt. Id . T we nty days lat er, the de bt c oll ect or s ent an oth er l ett er, de m an ding 15 “p ayment in fu ll w ith in 5 days .” Id . at 33. We found that both comm unications violated t he 16 FD CP A. Whil e th e co lle cto r w as t echnically with in i ts r ights t o d em an d p aym ent, t he lea st 17 so ph ist icated

co ns um er w ou ld b e le ft un cer tai n whe the r sh e h ad

the op tio n to dis pute th e d eb t, 18 and to withhold payment while dis puting it. Id

. 19 W e elabo rated on our approach to thi s kind of claim in Sa vin o v . C om pu ter Cred it, Inc

. , 2 0 16 4 F

. 3 d

a t 8 5 -8 6

. T h e re , th e f

ro n t o f th e le tt e r s tate d

th a t t h e c re d it o r “ in s is ts o nim m e d iat e 21 paym ent or

a v ali d re aso n f

or your fa ilure t o m ak e p aym ent.” Id. at 8 4. At the bo tto m , th e le tte r 22 also ref

erred to a n “IMPORTANT N OTICE ON B ACK,” where the information required by § 23 1692g(a) could be found. Id. Th e Savino court held thatthe notice violated t he FDCPA. B y10 1 de m an din g im

m ed iat e p ayment on

the fr ont, and

on ly i nf orm ingthe de bto r of

his rig ht t o d isp ute 2 on the ba ck , th e n oti ce, we co nc lud ed , w ou ld l eav e th e le ast so ph ist icated

co nsum er uncert ain

as 3 to her ri ght to disput e the debt. Id at 85-86. 4 Jacobson clai ms that “the actual holding of Savino is th at anim m ed iat e de m and for 5 paym ent v iol ate s the A ct ev enwhe n it is pre sented w ithan alt ern ati ve .” App ell ant’s Br. at 11. 6 W e d isa gre e; the Savino pane l stres sed that “a req ue st f or i mm ed iat e p aym ent d[ oe s] no t, 7 stand ingalo ne , v iol ate the FD CP A. ” Savino , 1 64 F. 3d at 8 5-8 6. Ind eed , th e Savino court went 8 further and provi ded examples of “transiti on al l an guage” designed t o call at tention t o a 9 va lid ati on

n oti ce, whic h wo uld

s til l a llo w a de bt co lle cto r t o de m an d imm ed iat e paym ent w hil e 10 co mpl yi ng with t he Act. Id. at 86. That the de bt collec tor in Savino it sel f vio lat ed th e Act by 11 req

uir ingimm ed iat e p aym ent “w ith out a ls o explaining t hat its de mand did not override the 12 co ns um er’ s ri ghts und er S ect ion [1 69 2g ] t o s eek

va lidation of the de bt, ” id. (em ph asi s ad de d), in 13 no way supports Jacobs on’s extre me position. 14 Th e le tter sent by HF S t o J aco bs on , th ou ghit d em an de d p aym ent, a de qu ate ly e xp lai ne d 15 that the r eci pie nt h ad the rig ht t o s eek

ve rif icatio n o f t

he de bt. It p res ented

Jac ob so n w ithtwo 1 6 a lt e rn a te w ay s o f av o id in g “ f

urt h e r a c ti o n ” : e it

h e r p ayth e d e b t “ w it

h in 3 0 d ay s , ” o r su

bm it a 17 no tic e o f d isp ute , “ wi thi n 3 0 d ay s.” This ri ght to see k v ali datio n o f t he de bt w as f

urt he r 18 explained, noton the bac k of th e demand letter , but on its face, bel ow the initi al stat ement, and 19 in cl ear term s. In t he se c irc um stanc es, ev enthe lea st s op his tic ate d d eb tor wo uld un de rst an d th at 20 sh e h ad

the op tio n to submit a

no tic e o f d isp ute , rathe r th anpay th e cl aim ed sum . W e th ere fo re 21 af

fi rm the dis tri ct c ourt’ s d eci sio n to rej ect Jac ob so n’s fi rst

arg um ent. 22 B. Th e T hir

ty- Day P eri od : S tar

tin g D ate 2311 1 Pl aintif

f n ex t ar gu es t

hat th e le tte r’s statem ent th at f urt he r ac tio n w ou ld b e take n unle ss 2 paym ent or

a n oti ce o f d isp ute wa s su bm itt ed “within 30 days” c ast s d ou bt o n th e st art ingdate 3 for the t hi rt y- day per iod. A recipie nt, Jacobson ass erts, would be unce rtain as to whether the 4 thirty- day period for submitting a not ice began on the date of the let ter (Jul y 13 , 2004), or 5 ins tea d s tar

ted on the date J aco bs on

rec eiv ed it, wh ich , th e p art ies ag ree , w as s om e d ay s later . If 6 that were so, t he le tter would vi olate the statute , for the latt er date i s the corr ect one under t he 7 Act. Section 1692g(a )(3) re quires the validati on n ot ic e to sta te that t he debtor may dispute the 8 de bt “w ithin thirty days after rece ipt of t heno tic e ” (e m

ph asi s ad de d). W e ag ree wi th t he dis tri ct 9 co urt , h ow ev er, that on the fa cts of

this case, ev enthe lea st s op his tic ate d c on sum er w ou ld 10 understand t hat the thi rty-day per iod began only when the not ice was rece ived. 11 The first case J acobson c ites in s upport of his second ar gument, Ca va lle ro v. La w O ffi ce 12 of Shapiro & Kreisman , 933 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), is not on point . The validati on 13 notice in t ha t ca se sta ted explic itly tha t the debt would be assumed valid unless the recipie nt 14 dis puted the deb t “w ith in t hir ty ( 30 ) days fro m t

heda te o f th is n oti ce .” Id. at 1 15 1 (e m ph asi s 15 ad de d). Th e distric t co urt qu ite rig htl y f

ound a v iol ati on

of the statut e, fo r th e n oti ce e xp res sly 16 st ate d the wrong star ting date. Id. at 1 15 4. He re, b y co ntr ast , the c ontes ted s tat ement says 17 sim

ply that paym ent or

a n oti ce m

ust be s ub m itt ed

“w ith in 3 0 d ay s, ” w ith out sp eci fy ingwh en 18 the period s tarts running. 19 Whil e th e le tte r is , th ere fo re, pe rha ps am biguo us as t o when th e th irty-d aype rio d b eg ins , 20 the valida tion notic e clari fies any possible ambiguity. It c ontains a cl ear and accur ate stat ement 21 of

the starti ng date, inf

orm ingJac ob so n that he has “ 30 days fr om rec eiv ingthi s n oti ce” to 22 su

bm it the no tic e o f d isp ute. I n th is r esp ect , th e d eb t co lle cto r’s statem ents – tak entog eth er – 23 resemble t ho se c on side red by this Courtin McS tay v. I.C . S ystem , Inc

. , 3 08 F. 3d

18 8 (2 d C ir.12 1 2002), where we r ej ec ted a similar cl aim of overshadowing. In McStay , th e le tte r threaten ed 2 fu rth er a cti on

if the recipient had not p aid the de bt “ af

ter 30 days .” Id. at 189. The front of the 3 McStay lettercontained no r eference to the debtor’s r ight to dis pu te t he debt , but direct ed the 4 reader’ s intenti on to “important information” on th e re ve rs e si de. There, the debt or would find 5 an explanation of her rights, which com ported with § 1692g(a). On these f acts, the C ou rt fou nd 6 that “anyco nf

us ion cre ate d b y th e am

biguit y o n th e f

ront of the letter dissipate s whe n re ad

in 7 co nju

nc tio n w iththe lan gu age on the ba ck .” Id. at 1 91 . W e ag ree d w iththe dis tri ct c ourt i n 8 McStay that “the lea st sophisticated co ns um er [ wa s] no t li ab le t o c on clu de that th e th irty-d ay 9 pe rio d c om

m en ced on the date the

. . . le tte r was written as o pp os ed

to r ece ive d. ” McStay v. I .C. 10 Sy

s. , In c. , 174 F. Supp. 2d 42, 46-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 11 The same reasoning app li es t o this case . The validati on notice adequa tely cle ars up any 12 ambiguity created by t he lette r as to the starti ng date for the thi rty- da y pe ri od

. Indeed, McStay 13 wa s a c los er c ase . T he re, the clarif yin g lang uage was o n th e b ack of the no tic e; h ere , it

is j us t 14 tw o in ch es f

urt he r do wn

on the sam e p ag e as the arguably am big uo us ori gin al s tat em ent. 15 Ac co rdingly, we f ind that ev enthe lea st s op his tic ate d c on sum er, rea din g th e d oc um ent in its 16 entir ety , wo uld

und ers tan d that t

he th irty-d ayd isp ute p eri od s tar ted ru nn ingf rom the day she 17 received t he lette r, ratherthan from the date the let ter was writ ten. We th ere fore affirm the 18 dis tri ct c ourt’ s d eci sio n to rej ect Jac ob so n’s sec on d argum ent. 1913

C. Th e T hir

ty D ayPe rio d: E nd

Date 1 2 Jacobson’s t hird content ion is thatthe lett er “ falsel y states t hat the only way for the 3 co ns um er t o avo id f urt he r co lle cti on s is thr ou ghfu ll p aym ent or a disp ute be ingrec eiv ed wi thi n 4 thi rtydays, whe n in fa ct a ll the co ns um er n eed [d o] is send his dispute within the t hirty days

. ” 5 Appellant’s Br. at 10 (em ph asi s ad de d). HFS’s le tte r expli cit ly r eq uir es e ith er p aym ent, o r a 6 no tic e o f d isp ute , to be “ rec eiv ed in [ HF S’s ] off ice ” w ith in t

hir ty d ay s, if the recip ient w ants t o 7 avo id “f

urt he r a cti on ” (em

ph asi s ad de d). Th ou ghJ aco bs on ’s co un sel m ad e thi s arg um ent t o the 8 distri ct court, J udge Glasser di d not address i t. 9 The two courts we have found thathave consider ed this is sue have reso lv edi t in favor of 10 the co ns um er, ho ldi ng that th e d eb t co lle cto r m us t gi ve the rec ipi ent notice that sh e h as t hir ty 11 days to ma il

the dispute notice. The Seventh Cir cuit rea ched that conc lusion in Chauncey v. JDR 12 Re co ver

y C or p ., 11 8 F .3 d 5 16 (7t

h C ir. 19 97 ), whe re the co lle cti on lette r stated

that paym ent ha d 13 to b e re cei ve d w ith in t he thi rty -day p eri od , “ thu s re qu iri ng pla int iff to m ail the paym ent pr ior to 14 the thi rti eth

day to co m

ply .” Id. at 5 19

. O n that b asi s, th at Ci rcu it fo un d that t he lette r violat ed 15 the FDCPA: It is cl e ar t h a t M r. C h aun c e yh a d

th e f u ll th ir ty d ay s to s e n d

his 16 17 notificati on to defendant. Not hi ng in Sect ion 1692g requir es, and 18 we have f ound no oth er c ourt d eci sio n whic h h as r eq uir ed , th at the 19 de bt c oll ect or m us t rec eive notice of the dis pute within t hirty days 20 as d efe nd an t insist s. . . . If we were to hold thatthe valida tion 21 req ue st m us t be rec eiv ed

by the thir tieth da y, we would be 22 rewriti ng Section 1692g, which we are not entit led to do. 23 Id. a t 5 1 9

. M o re r e c e n tl y , Ju d g e W e in s te in , s itti n g i nth e s a m e d is tr ic t in wh ic hth is cas e w as 24 filed, followed Ch au nc ey . Swift v. Maxi mus, Inc ., No. 04-cv-216 (JBW ), 2 00 4 W L 1 57 66 18 , at 25 *3 -4 ( E. D. N. Y. Ju ly 15, 20 04 ) (“ [T ]h e n oti ce s tat es t hat paym ent m

us t be rec eiv ed

within the 26 thirty da y limit. Even the least -sophisti cated consumer would calcul ate th at payment m ust be14 1 m ail ed

in a dv an ce of

a d ead lin e in ord er to be re cei ve d byth at de ad lin e. ”). In Chaunc eyand 2 Sw ift , th e d eb t collecto rs d id n ot e xp lic itl y m iss tat e th e p eri od fo r su bm itt inga d isp ute no tic e. 3 Th eir

co mm un icatio ns , h ow ev er, ov ers ha do we d th at p eri od byde m an din g th at payment be 4 rec eiv ed

wi thi n th irty d ay s. The case b ef ore us is e ve n c lea

rer . H ere , th e le tte r st ate s d ire ctl y 5 that any no tic e o

f di sp ute m us t be rec eiv ed

wi thi n th irty d ay s. 6 Bo th t

he Ch au nc eycourt a ndJ ud ge Weinstei n readily a ssumed that § 1692g gives the 7 consumer thirty days t o mail the dispute noti ce. That questi on, h owe ve r, i s an open one i n our 8 Court, and must be addressed expressly, for the answer i s not obvi ous. Read in isola tion, the t ext 9 of the statut e is inc on clu siv e. Se cti on 16 92 g(b), wh ich

pro vid es t

he su bs tantiv e ri ght to see k 10 verificati on of the debt, stat es simply t ha t th e debt colle ctor must cease coll ection “[i]f the 11 co ns um er no tif

ies the de bt c oll ect or i n writing wi thi n th e th irty-d aype rio d d esc rib ed in 12 subsection ( a) of this sect ion” (emphasis added). S imilarly, § 1692g( a)(4) r equires “astatement 13 that if

the co ns um er no tif

ies the de btcollect or in writi ng within the t hirty-da y period thatthe 14 de bt, or anypo rti on the reo f, is disputed, the de bt c oll ect or w ill ob tai n v eri fi cat ion of the de bt” 15 (emphasis added). And one might read this l anguage eithe r way. 16 The consumer, having done all in he r power to submit the notice, can be said t o notify the 17 de bt c oll ect or “ wi thi n th e th irty d aype rio d” if s he p lac es the d isp ute n oti ce i n th e m ail bo x b ef ore 18 thirty da ys have passed. Alt ernative ly, one could say t hat a consumer has not noti fied the debt 19 coll ect or until th e wr itt enn oti ce arr ive s at the d eb t c oll ect or’ s ad dre ss. Fo r s im ilar reasons, § 20 1692g(a)(3) is ambiguous; it order s debt coll ectors t o include “a s tatement that unle ss the 21 co ns umer, within thirty days after recei pt of the notice, dis pu tes th e va lid ityo f the d eb t . . . the 22 debt will be a ssumed to be valid by the debtcollect or” (emphasis added). Looking s olel y to the 23 tex t, w e coul d say that a c on sum er “ dis putes ” th e v ali dit y o f t he de bt t he m om ent sh e m ail s a15 1 no tic e. But w e co uld als o c on clu de , in ste ad , th at a co ns um er d oe s n ot d isp ute a d eb t w ith in 2 thi rtydays un les s th e co lle cto r re cei ve s th e n oti ce b ef ore thi rtydays expir e. 3 Th e A ct’ s le gis lat ive his tor y, m ore ov er, sh ed s n o d ire ct l ight on the meanin g o f t

he tex t. 4 See S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 4, 8 (1977), as rep rin ted in 1 9 7 7 U

. S

. C

. C

. A

. N

. 1 6 9 5 , 1 6 9 9 , 1 7 0 2 (“ If 5 the co ns um er d isp ute s th e v ali dit y o f the de bt w ith in 3 0 d ay s, the de bt c oll ect or m us t ce ase 6 collect ion until he se nd s the consumer verification. . . . I f a consumer disputes a debt withi n 30 7 days, the debt c ollectormust stop collecti on until ver ification i s sent to t he consumer.”). 8 Un de r th e ci rcum stanc es, we m us t ex am ine the un de rly ingpurp os es o f t he statut e to 9 discern i ts meaning. W e must, in the classi c word s of th e headnote to acelebrat ed nineteent h10 century Engli sh torts c as e, look t o the “mischief” the statute was designed t o address. Go rri s v. 11 Sc ott , (1874) 9 L.R. Exch. 125, 125. Doing so leads us t o conclude thatthe F DCP A gives the 12 consumer thirty days to mail the notice. Though it also protects the interes ts of law-abiding debt 1 3 co lle c to rs , th e A c t i s p ri m ari ly ac o n s um e r p ro te c ti o ns tatu te , an d w e h a v e c o n s is te n tl y 14 interpr eted the st atute with t hat co ng res sional obje ct in mind. Se e, e. g. , R us sel l , 74 F.3d at 33- 15 34 ; Clomon , 988 F.2d at 1318-20. 16 Th e ai m

of § 1 69 2g is t o p rov ide a p eri od fo r th e re cip ient of

a collection letter

to 17 consider heroptions. Itis also t o make the ri gh ts a nd obligati ons of a potential ly hapless de btor 18 as p ell uc id a s p os sib le. Gi ve n th ese goals, we cann ot a do pt a co ns tru cti on

of the Ac t th at w ou ld 19 no t on ly s ho rte n th e d eb tor ’s p eri od of ref lec tio n, but al so leave that de bto r un cer tai n as to jus t 20 when – given the vagar ies of the mails – she must, to be safe, send out a not ice of dispute. 21 Fo r th ese rea so ns , w e f ind that th e b ett er r ead ingof § 1 69 2g su

pp ort s Jacob so n’s thi rd 22 arg um ent. A cco rdi ng ly, we ag ree wi th t he Se ve nth C irc uit

an d w ithJu dg e W ein ste in, an d h old 23 that th e re cip ient of a d eb t co lle cti on

letter co ve red bythe FD CP A v ali dly invokes the r ight to1 Jacobson has not c ross-moved for summary judgm ent. Given our reading of the statute and of the 8 2 letterJacobs on rec eived, it would appearthatsumm ary judgment would be availabl e to him, absent 3 po ssi ble d ef

en ses th at have n ot be en , but w ou ld no t i n the o rdi nary co urs e be , bro ug ht to our 4 att entio n. In anyev ent, w e le av e al l th at t o th e d ist ric t co urt on rem an d. In t

his res pe ct, w e als o n ote 5 that Jacobs on seeks statutory d ama ge s an d attorneys ’ fees. The award of costs and fees t o a 6 su cce ssf

ul p lai nti ff

app ear s to be mand ato ry. 15 U.S .C . § 16 92 k(a )(3 ). But the award of statut ory 7 damages is in the discretion of the distr ict court , id. § 1 69 2k (a) (2) (A ), whic h m ay , w ith out do ub t, 8 co ns ide r whe the r th e v iol ati on wa s m an if

est , or whe the r, as here , it co uld be est ab lis he d on ly a ft er 9 a not uncomplicated exer cise in st atutory cons tructi on. See id. § 16 92 k(b ) (“ [T ]h e co urt sh all 10 consider . . . t he extent t o which [the defendant’s] noncompliance was intent ional.”). 16 1 have the debt ve rified wh en ev ershe ma ils a n oti ce o f d isp ute within thir ty days of re ceiving a 2 co mm

un icatio n f

rom the de bt c oll ect or. It f

oll ows that the letter

in t he cas e b ef

ore us vio lat es 3 the FD CP A, be cau se i t co ntr ad ict s Ja co bs on ’s r ight s und er § 16 92 g. By req uir ingthe no tic e to 4 be rec eiv ed by the de bt c oll ect or w ith in t hir ty d ay s, the letter

sh ort en s th e p eri od

durin g whic h 5 the reci pient may seek verificat ion of the debt. We t he re for e reverse the distr ict court ’s decisi on 6 to grant summary judgm ent to HFS. 8 7 8 II. At tor ne ys ’ F ees an d C os ts 9 10 The FDC PA pro vid es f

or f ee- sh if tin g a s a m att er o f c ou

rse to successful plai ntiffs, 15 11 U. S. C. § 1 69 2k (a) (3) , b ut a lso giv es t he dis tri ct c ourt the power to aw ard fe es ag ain st abusive 12 pla int if

fs : “O n a fi nd ingbythe co urt

that an act ion un de r th is s ect ion

wa s b rou ght in

bad f aith 13 an d f

or t he purpo se of haras sm ent, t he co urt m ayaw ard

to t he de fe nd ant attor

ne y’s fe es 14 rea so na

ble in r elatio n to the wo rk expended and co sts .” Id . Judge Glasser made such a finding 15 in this ca se, and awarded at torneys’ fees a nd costs to HFS. Jacobson , 434 F. Supp. 2d at 141. 16 This Court has not ye t had an occasi on to determine the st andard of review fordecisions 17 to awarda tt or ne ys ’ fees under the FDCPA. W e generall y review decis ions to award ordeny 18 att orneys’ fees for abuse of disc retion. Ke rin v. U. S. Po sta l Se rv. , 2 1 8 F

. 3 d 1 85 , 1 88 (2d

Ci r.17 1 20 00 ). M ore ov er, oth er c irc uit co urt s h ear ingap pe als fr om aw ard s ag ain st p laintiffs under § 2 1692k(a)(3) have u se d th at s tandard. See, e.g., Horkey v. J.V.D.B. & Assocs., I nc ., 333 F.3d 769, 3 77 4 (7 th C ir. 20 03 ); Perry v. Stewart Ti tle Co. , 756 F.2d 1197, 1211 (5th Cir. 1985). We adopt 4 that ap pro ach , and ho ld t hat we r eview fo r ab us e o f d isc ret ion a d ist ric t co urt ’s d eci sio n to aw ard 5 att orn ey s’ f

ees to a de fe nd ant pu

rsu ant to the FDCPA. Do ingso , w e f ind that th e d istric t co urt ’s 6 de ter

m inatio n th at J acobson broug ht t his act ion “in ba d f aith and fo r th e p urp os e o f h ara ssm ent” 7 cannot stand. Se e K eri n , 2 18 F.3d at 188 (a dis tri ct c ourt a bu ses its dis cre tio n if

it r eli es o n “ an 8 err on eo us vie w o f t he lawor o n a

cle arl y e rro ne ou s as ses sm ent of the ev ide nc e” (inter

na l 9 quotation marks and cit ation omitted)). 10 In justi fying the award, Judge Glass er reli ed on Jacobson’s a cknowledgment t ha t the 11 un de rly ingde bt w as v ali d, an d h is a dm iss ion that he did

no t f eel “h ara sse d, thr eat en ed or m isl ed 12 bythe letter .” 43 4 F . S up p. 2d at 1 41 . T he se f

act s ar e ir

rel ev ant to the qu est ion

of wh eth er 13 Jac ob so n b rou ght th e action “in ba d fa ithan d f or t he purpo se o f h ara ssm ent,” an d it wa s le ga lly 14 erroneous for the distr ic t court t o base its c onclusion on the m. A s explained above, by providing 15 for statutory damages and attorneys fees for succes sful plainti ffs, the FDCPApermits and 16 encourages parti es who have su ff ere d n o lo ss t o b rin g c ivi l ac tio ns fo r st atutor y v iol ati on s. 17 Jacobson’s subj ective r eaction t o the lett er, there fore, is neithe r here nor t here. 18 Th e d istric t co urt also bas ed its aw ard

on the co nc lus ion

that Ja co bs on

“k ne w that hi s 19 cla im

wa s m eri tle ss. ” Id. S in c e w e h a v e f o un d th a t J a c o b s o n ’s th ir d

argum e n t w a s in

fa ct 20 meritorious, this basis for grant ing costs and fees was ne cessari ly erroneous

. 21 Accordingly, we vacat e the award of costs a nd attorneys ’ fees to HFS. 22 23 2418 C ONCL US I ON 1
W e AF FI RM the distr ict courtin part and REVER SE it in par t, and VACAT E its 2 3 judgment, both on the merits of Jacobson’s c la im, a nda s to the award of att orneys’ fees and 4 co sts to H FS . T he cas e is REMAND ED for further proceedi ngs consiste nt with this opinion.