CSI Report No. 11 

Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943 

Colonel David 81. Glantz 

Director of Research 

Soviet Army Studies Office 

Combined Arms Center 

Combat Studies Institute 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

September 1986 

90.CSJ-02936 
Introduction 

In his classic work, On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote, "AS we shall 

show, defense is a stronger farm of fighting than attack."1 A generation 

of nineteenth century officers, nurtured on the study of the experiences of 

NapolGon and conditioned by the wars of German unification, had little 

reason to accept that view. The offensive spirit swept through European 

armies and manifested itself in the regulations, plans, and mentality of 

those armies. It also blinded all but a few perceptive observers to the 

carnage of the American Civil War, the Boer War, and the Russo-Japanese War, 

all of which suggested that Clausewitz" dictum was perhaps correct. The 

catastrophe of World War I vindicated Clausewitz and grotesquely mocked 

those who placed such high hopes in the utility of the offensive. 

Post-World War I armies understood well the power of twentieth century 

technology when harnessed to serve the military. Postwar military views, in 

general, echoed national political aims. Those nations wedded to 

maintenance of the political status quo sought to draw upon technology to 

strengthen military defenses and to deter those who would alter the 

political condition by use of offensive military power. Conversely, those 

nations, shackled by the political settlements of World War 1 or compelled 

by ideology to seek change , sought to exploit new technologies in order to 

restore the viability of the offensive to the modern battlefield. Thus the 

Germans worked surreptitiously on developing blitzkrieg concepts, and the 

Soviets fixed their attention on achieving deep battle (glubokiy boy). 

The events of 1939, 1940, and 1941 in Poland, France, and Russia 

respectively again challenged Clausewitz' claim of the superiority of the 

defense and prompted armies worldwide to frantically field large armored 

forces and develop doctrines for their use. While blitzkrieg concepts ruled 

supreme, it fell to that nation victimized most by those concepts to develop 

techniques to counter the German juggernaut. The Soviets had to temper a 

generation of offensive tradition in order to marshal forces and develop 

techniques to counter blitzkrieg. In essence, the Soviet struggle for 

survival against blitzkrieg proved also to be a partial test of Clausewitz' 

dictum. In July 1943, after arduous months of developing defensive 

techniques, often at a high cost in terms of men and material, the Soviets 

met blitzkrieg head-on and proved that defense against it was feasible. The 

titanic, grinding Kursk operation validated, in part, Clausewitz' views. 

But it also demonstrated that careful study of force organization and 

employment and application of the fruits of that study can produce either 

offensive or defensive victory. While on the surface the events of Kursk 

seemed to validate Clausewitz' view, it is often forgotten that, at Kursk, 

the Soviets integrated the concept of counteroffensive into their grand 

defensive designs. Thus the defense itself was meaningless unless viewed 

against the backdrop of the renewed offensive efforts and vice versa. What 

Kursk did prove was that strategic, operational, and tactical defenses could 

counter blitzkrieg. 
Soviet Tactical Defense Prior to Kursk 

Soviet victory on the Eastern Front was a product first and foremost of 

the Soviet defensive effort. Only successful defense could pave the way for 

offensive victory. Moreover, the development of strategic and operational 

defenses depended directly on the Soviet ability to stop German offensive 

action at the tactical level. Soviet development of effective tactical 

defenses was a long and diffieult process. It involved ehanging the 

offensive mind-set of Soviet officers. It also entailed the training of a 

generation of officers capable of ably controlling forces at the tactical 

level and the fielding of equipment of the type and in the numbers necessary 

to conduct successful combined arms defense. Development of tactical 

defense concepts involved a process of education that began in June 1941 and 

continued throughout the war. The fruits of that education were apparent at 

Kursk. 

The Soviet fixation on offensive forces, concepts, and techniques in the 

late 1920s and 1930s eclipsed similar work on defense at the strategic, 

operational, and tactical level. Soviet brainpower and resources focused on 

the creation of shock armies, mechanized forces, and airborne forces; all 

those elements critical to achieving strategic offensive success through the 

conduct of deep operations and deep battle. By the Soviets" own admission, 

this fixation on the offensive caused them to pay too little attention to 

strategic (front), operational (army), and tactical (corps and division) 

level defensive operations s a deficiency vividly evident in 1941. 

The 1936 Field Regulation demonstrated the Red Army's attitude toward 

defense.2 Devoting only about twenty pages of a 300-page document to 

defense, the Soviets described it as a temporary phenomenon designed to 

economize force, gain time, hold critical areas, or disrupt an advancing 

enemy, pending a resumption of the all important offense.* The tendency to 

view the defense as a temporary (and unpleasant) phenomenon forestalled 

Soviet development of a broad defensive doctrine that addressed such 

essential questions as requisite strength and integration of numbers and 

types of weapons necessary to forestall or parry enemy offensive action. 

The general neglect of defensive training was exacerbated by the ill effects 

of the military purges on the level of competence within all levels of 

command. 

Within the context of army-level defensive operations, tactical defense 

in the 1930s involved the organization of covering and shock groups within 

rifle corps and rifle divisions (see figure l).** The covering group, 

consisting of two-thirds of the force, absorbed the energy of enemy 

*By contrast, almost one-half of the 1944 Regulation focused on 

defensive techniques. 

**An army defended a sector of 80-100 kilometers. 

-l- 
I 

Figure 1. Rifle Division Combat Formation-Defense, 1930 

offensive blows, while the shock group (the remaining one-third of the 

force) launched counterattacks. One-ninth of the force made up a small 

reserve.3 The tactical defense zone consisted of an engineer-chemical 

obstacle belt 12 kilometers deep, a combat security belt 1 to 2 kilometers 

from the forward edge of the main defensive belt, a main defensive belt 

6 kilometers deep, and a rear defensive belt 12 to 15 kilometers deep. 

Within the main defensive belt, a rifle division defended in an 8- to 

12-kilometer sector and a regiment on a 3- to !i-kilometer front, each in 

cS1/5139A/2046A -2- 
two-echelon formation. Individual battalions within the regiments formed 

the basic defensive region, normally 1.5 to 2.5 kilometers wide and 1.5 to 

2 kilometers deep, but, on occasion, in sectors as wide as 5 kilometers, By 

1940, it had already become clear that new weaponry had improved the 

capability of attacking forces, thus the Soviets reduced the division 

defensive sector to 6 to 10 kilometers. Prewar views on antitank defense 

mandated the fielding of six to nine antitank guns (a number that proved 

woefully inadequate in the face of German Army assaults in June 1941) on a 

front of 1 kilometer integrated into defensive positions to a depth of ,, 3 kilometers.4 

The general neglect of defensive techniques combined with other problems 

to cause the disasters of June 1941. After the outbreak of war, Soviet 

tactics suffered from the same general malaise as strategy and operational 

art. Understrength rifle divisions (T,OOO-6,000 men) and rifle brigades 

(4,500 men) defended in extended sectors (14-20 kilometers) and were forced 

to deploy in single-echelon defensive formation with a depth of only 3 to 

5 kilometers (see figure 2 and table l>.* Small reserves provided little 

capability for sustained counterattacking, and infantry support artillery 

groups were weak. 

The single-echelon formation was dictated by the limited forces 

available and wide defensive zones. This resulted in inadequate tactical 

densities of .5 battalions and three guns and mortars per kilometer of 

front.5 Division defenses were subdivided into battalion defensive 

regians and company strongpoints that were often noncontiguous and not 

linked together by interlocking fire. Few of the gaps were covered by fire. 

In the almost complete absence of antitank defense, engineer obstacles, or 

trenches, enemy forces could and did penetrate through those gaps into the 

depth of the defense, thus disrupting the command and control of the 

division as a whole and its parent rifle corps or army.** 

*Rifle brigades were light divisions , consisting of three rifle 

battalions, an artillery battalion, two mortar battalions, and an antitank 

battalion. The Soviets created these units in lieu of new rifle divisions 

on the assumption that they would be easier than the full rifle division for 

inexperienced Soviet officers to command and control. 

**In late summer 1941, the Soviets truncated the size of armies and 

abolished the rifle corps as a level of command. 

CSI/5139A/2046A -3- 
TRNk 

REtEwz 

. I-.-.-. n f “i3r-h 

- 

Figure 2. Rifle Division Combat Formation-Defense, 1941 

-4- 
Table 1. Strength of Soviet Units, 1941 and 1943 

JULY 1941 RIFLE DIVISION 1943 RIFLE DIVISION 

3 Rifle Regiments (4 x 76mm) 

c4 x 45n.d 

1 Artillery Regiment (16 x 76mm) 

(8xl22mm) 

2 Sapper Battalions 

1 Reconnaissance Company 

1 Supply Company 

strength: 10,859 men 

36 field guns 

7% mortars 

18 AT guns 

3 Rifle Regiments 4 x '76mm) 

16 x 45m) (12 in GRR) 

1 Artillery Regiment (20 x 76mm) 

(12 x 122m) 

1 Antitank Battalion (12 x 45mm) 

1 Sapper Battalion 

1 Signal Company 

1 Reconnaissance Company 

1 Supply Company 

strength: 9,380 men (10,670 in GRD) 

44 field guns 

160 mortars 

48 AT guns 

1941 RIFLE REGIEENT 1943 RIFLE REGIlviENT 

3 Rifle Battalions 

1 Automatic Weapons Company 

(added in July) 

1 Antitank Battery (4 x 45mm) 

1 Artillery Battery (4 x '761~) 

1 Mortar Battery 

3 

1 

Rifle Battalions 

Automatic Weapons Compan (2 in GRRs 5; 

Antitank Rifle Company 

Antitank Battery (6 x 45mm) 

Artillery Battery (4 x 76mm) 

Mortar Battery (4 x 12ommr 

1941 RIFLE BATTALION 1943 RIFLE BATTALION 

3 Rifle Companies 

1 Machine Gun Company 

1 Mortar Battery 

1 Antitank Platoon 

3 Rifle Companies 

1 Machine Gun Company (2 in GRB) 

1 Antitank Rifle Company 

(16 rifles) 

1 Nortar Battery (82mm) 

1 Antitank Battery (45mm) 

1 Antitank Platoon (45m) (GRB) 

source : P. A. Kurochkin, ed., Obshchevoiskovaya armiya v nastuplenii 

(The Combined Arms Army in the Offense.) (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1966) 

CSI/5139A/2046A -5- 

__-- -._~-. -.--___ --- -. 
Limited quantities of artillery denied rifle forces adequate artillery 

support, and awkward use of tanks further inhibited the integrity of the 

defense. Tank regiments and battalions were supposed to hold separate 

positions or lines, provide direct fire support for infantry, and conduct 

counterattacks against penetrating enemy units. In practice, however, 

Soviet commanders subdivided tank regiments and battalions into small groups 

and counterattacked from march formation without proper reconnaissance or 

use of maneuver.6 This, plus minimal artillery or air cover for operating 

armored forces, resulted in heavy tank losses. 

By late 1941, battlefield experience slowly produced improvements in 

Soviet tactical defenses. In October, rifle divisions still operated in 

wide sectors of up to twenty-four kilometers, Densities of infantry fire 

were low, thus defensive capabilities were weak. In November, however, as 

Red Army strength grew and the Soviets began relearning the art of 

concentration, divisions narrowed their defensive sectors and formed in 

either one or two echelons of regiments. The single-echelon formation 

brought maximum firepower to bear on the forward area, but it also denied 

the commander the ability to reinforce his defenses, shift laterally to meet 

threats, or launch counterattacks.7 Improvements in engineer preparation 

of defenses began occurring in late 1941. Separate rifle trenches were 

united by other trenches running along the front and by communication 

trenches running to the rear, at first within company strongpoints and then 

within battalion defensive regions. This allowed concealment of gaps and 

flanks, the integration of antitank and antiaircraft artillery into the 

defense, and greater ability to maneuver defensive forces. A clearly 

distinguishable first defensive position resulted. 

Increases in manpower and weaponry continued to improve Soviet tactical 

defenses in 1942 (see figures 3-6). Rifle divisions more frequently created 

second echelons and began forming tank, antitank reserves, and stronger 

artillery groups. Rifle regiments and rifle divisions created battalion 

defensive regions in their second echelons that would soon evolve into the 

second and third defensive positions of the main defensive belt. Separate 

rifle foxholes were united by trenches along the front, at first between 

platoons and then between company and battalion regions. Consequently, 

tactical densities improved to one battalion and twenty guns and mortars per 

kilometer of front by the end of the first period of war (November 1942), 

and antitank defenses achieved densities of two to five guns per 

kilometer.8 Antitank defenses also improved with the creation of networks 

of antitank strongpoints and the use of mobile engineer reserves to create 

antitank obstacles during combat. 

CSI/5139A/2046A -6- 
3 

Y 

\ - 

Figure 3. Rifle Division Combat Formation-Defense, 1942 

-7- 
Figure 4. Combat Formation Anditank Defense-Rifle Division 

Stalingrad, 1942 
Figure 5. Combat Formation, 181st Rifle Division-Defense 

Stalingrad Operation 

-9- 

go-N-02936 

- 
.*-,. -.a 

.., ..- 

Figure 6. Battalion Defensive Region, Stalingrad 

-lO- 
However, full use of defensive enginneer preparations and the maturation 

of antitank defense would not occur until 1943, when experience combined 

with increased quantities of equipment to produce the prerequisites for such 

defenses. Throughout the winter of 1942-1943, division defenses remained 

shallow (one defensive belt) and weak in antitank means, thus producing 

conditions conducive to such Soviet defeats as occurred in the Donbas in 

February and March 1943 (see figure 7). 

Figure 7. Rifle Division Combat Pormation-Defense 

Winter 1942-1943 

CSI/5139A/2046A -ll- 
Tactical Defenses in the Summer of 1943 

By the summer of 1943, Soviet tactical defenses had evolved from their 

noncontigpous nature to a dense, deeply echeloned trench defense system, 

providing greater protection for infantry and a more secure environment for 

maneuver of forces and fire support weaponry along the front and in the 

depth of the defense (see figure 8). The width af defensive sectors 

Figure 8. Rifle Corps/Division Combat Formation-Defense 

Summer-Fall 1943 

CSI/5139A/2046A -12- 
decreased, and the depth of the defense increased. A rifle corps normally 

deployed with two rifle divisions in the first tactical defense belt and one 

rifle division in the second belt. Rifle divisions defended in one or two 

echelons of regiments, and rifle regiments in two echelons of battalions 

supported by artillery groups, antitank strongpoints and regions, artillery 

antitank reserves, and mobile obstacle detachments. A first-echelon rifle 

division in a main defense sector normally defended on a front of eight to 

fifteen kilometers, to a depth of five to six kilometers. On secondary 

directions, rifle divisions defended sectors twenty-five kilometers wide.9 

Antitank defenses matured as the Soviets increasingly integrated 

antitank strongpoints and regions throughout the entire depth of the 

defense. Separate tank brigades, tank regiments, and self-propelled gun 

regiments, attached to the rifle division and kept in reserve, delivered 

counterattacks or reinforced first-echelon rifle regiments by deploying as 

mobile or fixed firing points. Defense, in general, became more durable and 

mobile in terms of bath rifle units and supporting fires. Above all, 

integration of all types of units and weapons was more thorough than 

before. Greater force availablity permitted even army- and front-scale 

counterattacks in support of defending forces. 

By the summer of 1943, the rifle corps provided the nucleus of an army‘s 

tactical defense (the rifle corps command link was reestablished beginning 

in late 1942) (see figure 9). Whereas rifle divisions had formed the 

tactical defense zone in the Noscow and Stalingrad operations, at Kursk the 

rifle corps performed that function. As a rule the rifle corps at Kursk 

deployed in two echelons, with two rifle divisions in the first echelon and 

one in the second echelon. So arrayed, the corps defended to a depth of 

fifteen to twenty kilometers (three to four times the depth of division 

defenses at Stalingrad), The corps had no support units. In addition to 

the rifle divisions, the rifle corps fielded only an antitank reserve, a 

tank reserve* and a mobile obstacle detachment. 

The rifle divisions within the rifle corps normally deployed in two 

echelons of rifle regiments, with a combined arms and an antitank reserve 

(see table 1 and figures 10, lli.10 In addition, divisions formed 

infantry support artillery groups, a long-range artillery group of two to 

three artillery battalions, and a mobile obstacle detachment consisting of a 

sapper company equipped with mines. Some divisions also had tank reserves. 

For antitank defense, the division farmed nine to twelve antitank 

strongpoints and antitank regions throughout the depth of its combat 

formation, which, likewise, increased to from five to eight kilometers. 'The 

division's defensive sector correspondingly shrunk to a width of six to nine 

kilometers, increasing tactical densities to .? to 1.3 rifle battalions, 18 

to 30 guns and mortars, and 2 to 4 tanks per kilometer of front.11 

CSI/5139h/2046A -13- 
Figure 9. Combat Formation 25th Guards Rifle Corps, 7th Guards Army, July 1943 
Figure 10. Combat Formation 78th Guards Rifle Division, July 3.943 

-15- 
I 

--- - “‘1 

Figure 11. Combat Formation 52d Guards Rifle Division 

Kursk, July 1943 

CSI/5139A/2046A -14- 
Soviet tactical defenses at Kursk included a series of defensive 

positions and belts occupied by rifle companies, battalions, regiments, 

divisions, and corps that were linked together by engineer measures and tied 

in with the supporting fires of antitank and antiaircraft artillery; and 

tactically employed armored battalions, regiments, and brigades, backed up 

by infantry and armored operational reserves. 

Engineer measures which glued the entire defensive structure together 

had been mandated by April 1943 Instructions on the Construction of Field 

Defenses issued by the General Staff on the basis of analysis of war 

experiences. l* The instructions required the creation of battalion 

defensive regions, linked together by elaborate trench systems and laced 

with antitank defenses, as the basis for each defensive belt. 

The tactical defense zone contained two defensive belts.13 The first 

(main) defensive belt consisted of three defensive positions, cutoff 

positions (switch lines), and artillery firing positions occupied by the 

rifle corps' first-echelon rifle division. The battalion defensive region 

(2 kilometers frontage and 1.5 to 2 kilometers depth) provided the basis for 

the three defensive positions. In turn, the battalion region was subdivided 

into company and platoon strongpoints. 

The first defensive position, designated to engage the enemy in front of 

the defenses and to absorb the first enemy blows, 

engineer preparation (see figure 12). 

involved the most thorough 

It consisted of two to three trench 

lines and communication trenches, interspersed with engineer obstacles, and 

was occupi.ed by the two first-echelon rifle battalions of first-echelon 

rifle regiments. Infantry and heavy weapons in the second and third 

trenches, located 150 to 250 meters and 1 to 1.5 kilometers from the first 

trench respectively, provided covering fires for trenches to their front and 

gave depth to the battalion defensive region. 

The second-echelon rifle battalion of the first-echelon rifle regiment 

occupied the second defensive position that consisted of one or two 

trenches, two to three kilometers from the forward edge of the battlefield. 

Deployed in company strongpoints or in battalion defensive regions, troops 

of the second defensive position covered those in the first pasition, 

contained supporting artillery and tanks, and provided a base from which to 

launch lacal counterattacks. Second-echelon rifle regiments of 

first-echelon rifle divisions manned the third defensive position that was 

composed of one or two trenches, four to six kilometers from the forward 

edge of the battlefield. The division reserve formed in the third defensive 

position or nearby. The third position, although less fortified than the 

first two, provided a basis for new defense lines against penetrating enemy 

forces, contained additional fire support, and provided a region from which 

to launch counterattacks. Cutoff positions, normally running diagonally or 

perpendicularly ta the front, consisted of one or two trenches and served as 

interior defensive lines or routes for redeployment of forces between 

sectors. They also covered the flanks of defending units and threatened the 

flanks of penetrating enemy units. 

CSI/5139A/2046A -17- 
Figure 12. 151st Rifle Regiment, 8th Rifle Division Defensive Position 

29 June 1943 

CSI/5139A/2046A -18- 
The second defensive belt, less well prepared by the engineers than the 

first, was located ten to fifteen kilometers from the first belt. The 

second-echelon rifle divisions of the rifle corps occupied the second 

defensive belt and had the mission of preventing enemy units that penetrated 

the first belt from advancing into the operational rear of the defense. In 

addition, the second defensive belt covered the maneuver into combat of 

forces from the rear and provided another base from which to launch 

counterattacks. The depth of the second defensive belt forced the enemy, 

after overcoming the first belt, to regroup its foroes and disperse its 

artillery prior to engaging the defenders of the second defensive belt. 

The elaborate trench system provided increased security to rifle forces, 

improved the durability of the defense, and provided for freer maneuver of 

forces during combat. Engineer preparation of the battlefield also 

inhibited movement of the enemy, in particular the armored units. Antitank 

obstacles reinforced the natural barriers available, and liberal use of 

mines further threatened enemy personnel and tanks alike. h July 1943 

Stavka order prescribed the laying of mines to the depth of the defense 

integrated with defensive fires of the infantry and artillery, with emphasis 

on main attack avenues into defensive positions,14 Specifically, the 

order required that mines be employed in groups of over 100 mines sown six 

to ten meters apart in unequal rows. The rows themselves were to be fifteen 

to forty meters apart but not parallel. Accordingly, the minefields at 

Kursk achieved densities of 1,700 antipersonnel mines and 1,500 antitank 

mines per kilometer of front.* The highest density of mines was forward of 

and within the first defensive position. Thus at Kursk, each battalion 

defensive region of the 25th Guards Rifle Corps (of 7th Guards Army) had an 

average 1.6 kilometers of barbed wire covering its position, and 1,000 

antitank mines emplaced per kilometer of their defensive frontage. On 

15th Army's 81st Rifle Division's front, the 1,000 emplaced antitank mines 

accounted for the destruction or disabling of seventeen of forty enemy tanks 

which took part in the initial German assault.15 

Artillery of all types and calibers provided resilience to the defense 

and produced the necessary attrition in enemy forces. Prior to Kursk, an 

absence of large quantities of artillery, together with Soviet lack of skill 

in properly integrating artillery into defenses and employing it when under 

assault, contributed to German success in penetrating Soviet defenses. by 

July 1943, new regulations, derived from the analysis of war experiences, 

and the improved skill of Soviet commanders produced more effective use of 

artillery. 

*Pour times that of Moscow, and two to five times the amount used at 

Stalingrad. 

cs1/5139h/2046A -19- 
Indirect artillery fire, under control of unit commanders at each 

echelon, was coordinated with the operations of infantry and armor. Rifle 

corps commanders designated artillery missions and the location of corps and 

division antitank regions. The rifle division commander organized the fires 

of divisional weapons covering the areas immediately forward of the forward 

defense, the depth of the division's defenses, the division's flanks, and in 

the gaps between units. Regimental commanders controlled regimental 

artillery support group fires and directed battalion fires covering the gaps 

in regimental defenses. Battalion commanders coordinated the fires of 

organic artillery and that of subordinate rifle companies. In addition, 

divisional artillery participated in the artillery preparation or the 

counterpreparation fired under army control.l6 

Effective use of antitank artillery was critical for a successful 

defense against blitzkrieg tactics. Before July 1943, Soviet antitank fire 

had taken a toll of enemy armor but had never halted a major offensive 

spearheaded by massed armored units. The Soviets used the experiences 

gathered from numerous failures to create a thorough antitank defense at 

Kursk and thereafter. The antitank defense was based on the use of deeply 

echeloned antitank forces integrated into every level of command (see 

figures 13-15). The majority of antitank units and weapons performed an 

active role in the defense by occupying antitank regions or strongpoints 

scattered throughout the defense and massed on likely tank approaches into 

the defense. Other large antitank forces, supplemented by mobile obstacle 

detachments, served as antitank reserves at every level of eommand.l7* 

*Usually antitank reserves were made up of the following: 

At rifle regiment level--two to three antitank guns, up to a platoon 

of antitank rifles, and an automatic weapons platoon 

At rifle division level--a battery or battalion of antitank guns 

At rifle corps level --an antitank regiment 

Mobile obstacle detachments were composed of: 

At rifle regiment level-- a sapper squad with mines 

At rifle division level--two sapper platoons with mines 

At rifle corps level-- one sapper company with 500 to 700 antitank 

mines 

CSI/5139h/2046k -2o- 
Figure 13. Combat Formation--Antitank Defense--Rifle Division 

Kursk, July 1943 

-21- 
Figure 14. Antitank Defense, 375th Rifle Division, July 1943 

CSI/5139A/2046A -22- 
Ifigure 15. Combat Formation--124Lst Rifle Regiment, 375th Rifle Division 

Kursk, 5 July 1943 

Antitank strongpoints (ATSPS) and antitank regions (ATE&) integrated 

antitank fire and the fire of infantry and artillery cloaked within the 

protection of engineer defenses. The ATSPs were formed in company defensive 

regions and combined their fires with those of rifle company heavy weapons 

and antitank rifles. An ATSP normally consisted of four to six antitank 

guns, six to nine antitank rifles, two to three heavy machine guns, and 

three to four light machine guns. Troops with automatic weapons and sappers with antitank mines supported the antitank gunners of each strongpoint. 

First-echelon rifle regiments on main attack axes formed three to four 

ATSPs, while divisions contained from nine to twelve ATSPs. In certain 

vulnerable regions or where geographically feasible, Soviet commanders 

CSI/5139A/2046A -23- 
combined the forces of two to three ATSPs into a larger and more durable 

ATR.18 In the depth of the defense, rifle divisions and rifle corps 

created independent ATRs, usually formed around the nucleus of artillery 

battalions. Virtually all artillery, whether howitzer, gun, rocket, or 

antiaircraft, participated in antitank defense. In addition, tanks and 

self-propelled guns in dug-in positions further strengthened the antitank 

defense. Tanks and self-propelled guns, assigned to first-echelon rifle 

battalions and rifle regiments in company and battalion strength 

respectively, integrated their fires with the infantry. In addition, 

separate tank brigades and tank and self-propelled artillery regiments 

cooperated in counterattacks by second-echelon rifle divisions or larger 

armored formations. 

Measures for the effective command and control of so large a force 

improved by the time of Kursk. Commanders worked out all coordination 

measures "on the ground'" with subordinates and carefully discussed the 

variants in the defensive plan. Command posts of rifle forces and 

supporting artillery units were collocated to facilitate coordination and 

control of fires. Each rifle corps and division established a main command 

post, a reserve command post, and two observation points, and regiments 

established one command post and observation point, from which to control 

operations.19 

The two years of defensive combat that the Soviet commanders and troops 

experienced at the hands of the Wehrmacht had had major effects on Soviet 

force organization and tactical techniques. In the July 1943 battle at 

Kursk, the German High Command tested Soviet forces to determine how well 

they had mastered defensive combat, the results of which would settle once 

and for all the fate of German fortunes on the Eastern Front. 

Strategic and Operational Context 

Hindsight has conditioned the contemporary observer to accept the 

results of the Kursk operation casually, as if they were predestined. The 

consensus after Kursk was that the German plan had been a disaster simply 

waiting to occur. That judgment belies the actual situation. Objectively, 

German Operation Citadel was to be the fifth annual demonstration of the 

power of blitzkrieg, a demonstration that, since September 1939, had 

occurred annually in the late spring or summer. Every previous operation of 

such strategic scale had reaped immediate victory, although in 1941 Germany 

had not achieved the ultimate goal of the operation and, in 1942, had 

stretched the operation to its disastrous climax at Stalingrad. If not all 

of the annual exercises had resulted in strategic success, they all had 

achieved remarkable operational success in their early and intermediate 

stages. And who could question the absolute tactical successes the Germans 

CSI/5139A/2046A -24- 
had achieved early in each operation? Who could possibly have imagined 

stopping blitzkrieg in its early stages? In 1943, only the Soviets harbored 

such a hope, yet their own doubts forced them to make immense defensive 

preparations around Kursk. They were about to attempt something they had 

never before achieved--namely, stop a German strategic offensive before it 

had achieved tactical or operational success. 

Tactical operations at Kursk were the by-product of months of strategic 

and operational planning by both sides. On 18 June 1943, after months of 

debating alternative strategies and reconstructing and reequipping his 

armored forces, Hitler at last approved the final form of Operation 

Citadel.20 The offensive, to be launehed jointly by Army Groups Center 

and South against the northern and southern faces of the Kursk bulge, would 

seek to destroy Soviet forces massed in that bulge, grind up Soviet 

operatianal reserves, and perhaps restore the strategic initiative to German 

hands. German forces would rely upon blitzkieg tactics and the fielding of 

technologically advanced equipment (the new Panther and Tiger tanks and 

Ferdinand assault guns) to provide victory to the numerically smaller German 

force, just as had been the case in earlier operations. 

The German operational plan involved the nearly simultaneous strikes of 

two large panzer forces against narrow sectors of the Soviet front north and 

south of Kursk.21 The forces designated to strike the dual blows would 

slash through Soviet defenses, unite near Kursk, and fan out to obliterate 

Soviet troops and weapons in the bulge. In the north, the 9th Army's 

XXXXVII Panzer Corps (2d, 6th, 9th Panzer Divisions, 20th Panzergrenadier 

Division, 6th Infantry Division) would spearhead the attack by advancing 

south along the rail and highway line to-Kursk in order to link up with-the 

4th Panzer Army forces advancing from the south. The XXXXVI Panzer Corps 

(7th, 31st, 102d, 258th Infantry Divisions, von Manteufel Group) would cover 

the XXXXVII Panzer Corps' right flank, and the XXXXI Army Corps (86th, 292d 

Infantry Divisions, 18th Panzer Division) would cover the assault force's 

left flank. The 4th and 12th Panzer Divisions and the 10th Panzergrenadier 

Division would be available to reinforce the attack that would be led by 

task-organized, battalion-size detachments of Tiger tanks and Ferdinand 

self-propelled guns. Their task was to gnaw through the Soviet defenses and 

free the armored divisions to operate in the Soviet operational rear. The 

heavy armor detachments would precede the advance of medium and light tanks 

and motorized infantry that would complete the destruction of the Soviet 

defenses and conduct the exploitation. In total, over 1,200 tanks and 

self-propelled guns would strike the Soviet positions on a front of less 

than thirty kilometers.* 

*About 900 tanks and assault guns were in units immediately available 

for combat. 

CSI/5139A/2046A -25- 
In the south, the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf would strike 

north and northeast from positions west and south of Belgorod to smash 

Soviet defenses and link up with 9th Army forces near Kursk. The 4th Panzer 

Army would deliver its main attack with XXXXVIII Panzer Corps (3d, 

11th Panzer Divisions, Gross Deutschland Panzergrenadier Division, 167th and 

332d Infantry Divisions, Panther Brigade Decker) and II SS Panzer Corps 

(SS Panzer Divisions Das Reich, Totenkopf, and Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler) 

advancing abreast north and northeast from positions west of Belgorod. On 

the 4th Panzer Army's right flank, Army Detachment Kempf would smash Soviet 

defenses west of Belgorod and push III Panzer Corps (168th Infantry 

Division, 6th, 7th, 19th Panzer Divisions) either northeast in cooperation 

with II SS Panzer Corps or eastward toward Korocha. The combined force of 

the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf's 1,500 tanks and assault guns 

would complete destruction of Soviet forces south of Kursk. 

To receive this German assault* the Soviet Stavka massed the bulk of two 

fronts (Central and Voronezh) in the Kursk bulgrThe Central Front 

arrayed its forces in single echelon along a 300-kilometer front north of 

Kursk with 60th, 63d, 70th, 13th, and 48th Armies abreast, backed up by 

2d Tank Army and two separate tank corps (see map 1). Each combined arms 

army occupied three defensive belts, with its rifle corps employed in single 

echelon on secondary approaches and in two echelons on main attack axes 

(13th Army).* The Voronezh Front deployed four rifle armies (38th, 40th, 

6th Guards, 7th Guards) in first echelon backed up by 69th Army, 1st Tank 

Army, two separate tank corps , and a separate rifle corps (see map 2). 

Armies occupied the first three defensive belts with a single echelon of 

rifle corps. Both the Central and Voronezh Fronts created two additional 

front defensive belts to the rear of the three army defensive belts. ll?e 

two fronts deployed a total of about 3,300 tanks and self-propelled guns. 

The Soviets employed their tank units to support rifle units (tank 

battalions, regiments, and brigades) and to function as operational reserves 

(tank corps and armies). 

Backing up the Central and Voronezh Fronts was the strategic reserve, 

the Steppe Front. Consisting of five combined arms armies (27th, 4th 

Guards, 5th Guards, 53d, 47th), one tank army (5th Guards}, three tank 

corps, three mechanized corps, and three cavalry corps, the Steppe Front, 

with its over 1,600 tanks, would ensure that no German operational 

penetration would occur and would provide strength for planned Soviet 

counterattacks. 

"Rifle corps defended the first two belts, and army defended the third 

belt. 

@SI/5139A/2046A -26- 
. -r7- 
csI/5139A/2046h -28- 
In fact, Soviet planners integrated two planned counterstrokes into 

their strategic defensive plans. The first would occur against German 

forces in the Ore1 salient north of Kursk while the German offensive was 

still in progress. The second would strike German forces south of Kursk 

once the German advance in that region had stalled. Such offensive planning 

was indicative of the Soviet belief that they could finally defeat a German 

blitzkrieg operation. Clearly, however, Soviet hopes depended upon their 

ability to blunt or seriously weaken the German advance at the tactical 

level. 

At 0330, 5 July, undeterred by a massive Soviet counterpreparation fired 

hours before and by a knowledge of certain Soviet awareness of their plans, 

German artillery opened fire. About an hour later, the Germans commenced 

massive armored assaults on Soviet positions north and south of Kursk (see 

maps 3-6). In the north the German assault struck Lieutenant General N. P. 

Pukhov's 13th Amy deployed in a forty-kilometer sector astride the rail 

line to Kursk.23 For seven days, German armored forces and infantry 

plowed forward through Fukhov's first-echelon rifle corps, By the end of 

the second day, the Germans had smashed those corps' lead divisions and, by 

the end of the third day, had driven into the defensive belt occupied by 

Fukhov's corps' second-echelon divisions deployed between Kashara and Ponyri 

Station. In a welter of combat, Fukhov committed first his infantry suppart 

tank and self-propelled gun regiments and brigades, then his second-echelon 

rifle corps. The front released to his control the tank corps of 2d Tank 

Army, and by 7 July, the three corps of that army advanced into the teeth of 

the German assault. Viciaus fighting raged as the Germans threw in fresh 

forces, first toward Ponyri and then Ol'khovatka, in desperate attempts to 

slice through the dense mass of infantry supported by a profusion of 

self-propelled artillery, antitank guns, tanks, and sapper units incessantly 

sowing new minefields. On 12 July, at a depth of from two to twelve 

kilometers into the Central Front's defense, the German advance expired from 

sheer exhaustion just as Soviet guns echoed from the north announcing the 

commencement of the planned Soviet counteroffensive against German positions 

around Orel. In the course of seven days, at tremendous cost in lives and 

material on both sides, the Soviets had denied the Germans their vital 

tactical penetration in the north. Blitzkrieg had failed in the 

debris-strewn ground around Ponyri and on the gentle slopes rising south of 

Teploye. Within two days, the tide of battle rippled back toward the north. 

In the south, the 4th Panzer Army's armored fists struck Lieutenant 

General I, M. Chistyakov's 6th Guards Army deployed northwest of Belgorod, 

while Army Detachment Kempf thrust into Lieutenant General M. S. Shumilov's 

7th Guards Army east of Belgorod (see map 7).24 The massed tanks of 

XXXXVIII Panzer Corps and II SS Panzer Corps cut deeply into Chistyakov's 

front despite Soviet employment of antitank reinforcements and by the end of 

the first day, at considerable cost, penetrated Chistgakov"s lead rifle 

division positions. Late in the day, the front released, to combat, 

CSI/5160A/2046A -29- 
CSI/ 5139h/2046A -3& 
C31/5139.4/2046h -31- 


-34- 
1st Tank Army and its reserve rifle carps in order to stop the 4th Panzer 

Army"s alarming progress. Southwest of Belgarod, the III Panzer Carps, held 

up by fierce Soviet resistance east of Belgarad, swung its spearhead 

southward and cut into Shumilov's first echelon divisions near Razumnaye. 

In the ensuing seven days of combat, the 4th Panzer Army penetrated the 

Soviet tactical defenses along the road north to Oboyan and entered the 

Soviet operational rear. By 11 July, with the road to Obayan again blocked 

by Soviet defenses, the 4th Panzer Army's armored spearhead swung northeast 

toward Prokhoravka, where it ran into deployed Soviet operational reserves 

in the form of Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov's reinforced 5th Guards 

Tank Army. The resulting titanic tank battle around Prakhoravka broke the 

back of the German assault and ended hopes far German operational and 

strategic victory. To the southeast, the III Panzer Carps faught its way 

through Soviet tactical defenses into the operational open before the 

Prokharavka battle rendered its advance superfluous. By 13 July, the battle 

ebbed as the German command slowly withdrew its battered forces southward to 

new defense positions close to where German farces had jumped off over a 

week earlier. 

In the south, the German advance did penetrate Soviet tactical defenses 

in two sectors, but as a result it so weakened its offensive power that it 

could not deal with Soviet operational reserves, The tactical defenses of 

Soviet rifle divisions and supporting artillery, which on the surface seemed 

futile, in reality sapped from German armored farces the vigor which they so 

desperately needed at the decisive battle with Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army. 

At Kursk, German armor had to fight its way thraugh forces that it 

previously had simply swept aside. By 12 July, at Prokharovka, the effects 

af this combat became apparent. 

Tactical Defense of a Rifle Division 

A close view of the defensive combat that took place in several of those 

rifle division sectors illustrates the role the Saviet infantryman, 

artilleryman, and tanker played in the momentous decision reached at tiursk. 

The Soviet 7th Guards Army's 25th Guards Rifle Corps manned defenses in 

an eighteen-kilometer sector east of Belgarad, along the eastern bank of the 

Northern Donets River, facing the assault positions of the German III Panzer 

Corps (see map 8). The Soviet corps commander, Major General G. B. 

Safiulin, employed two rifle divisions in first echelon and one in second 

echelon, thus giving a depth af twenty kilometers to his defenses. The 

81st Guards Rifle Division, reinforced by a tank regiment, defended east of 

Belgorod opposite a small German bridgehead at Mikhailavka. The 78th Guards 

Rifle Division deployed southward along the Northern Donets River in a 

twelve-kilameter sector centered an the town of Razumnaye. To the rear, the 

73d Guards Rifle Division occupied carps' second-echelon defenses on the 

higher ground east of Krutoy Lag. 

CSI/5160A/2046h -35- 
f 

CSI/5139A/2046A 

Map 8. Situation 1900, 4 July 1943. 

. 

0 

-3G- 
The 7,854-man 78th Guards Rifle Division consisted of the 223d, 225th, 

and 228th Guards Rifle Regiments, the 158th Guards Artillery Regiment, the 

81st Separate Antitank Battalion, and other support units, and was 

reinforced by a battalion of the 671st Artillery Regiment and the Army's 

4th Antitank Rifle Battalion. Each of the division's regiments had three 

rifle battalions of three rifle companies apiece. The division commander 

deployed his forces in two echelons within the main defensive belt, weighted 

to the right flank with two regiments occupying first-echelon defenses along 

the east bank of the Northern Donets River, and his second-echelon regiment 

in positions to the rear around Generalovka and Krutoy Log.25 The 

division's right flank regiment (228th Guards) deployed in the narrower 

five-kilometer, right-flank sector north of Razumnoye, with two battalions 

in the first defensive position and the third battalion in the second 

defensive position, supported by an artillery battalion of the 152d Guards 

Artillery Regiment. Reinforced by two antitank rifle companies and two 

batteries of antitank guns, the 228th Guards Rifle Regiment's mission was to 

prevent an enemy penetration toward Generalovka and to hold on to its 

positions. Each battalion defended a front of 2 to 2.5 kilometers, and the 

regiment formed an antitank region at and north of Razumnoye to cover the 

boundary, with the regiment on its left flank. 

The 225th Guards Rifle Regiment, on the 228th Guards Rifle Regiment's 

left, defended in a sector of seven kilometers , with two rifle battalions 

along the Northern Donets River and a third battalion covering Krutoy Log. 

Supported by one company of antitank rifles, the regiment's battalions 

defended sectors 3.5 kilometers wide and created an antitank strongpoint at 

the junction of its two first-echelon rifle battalions. 

The 78th Guards Rifle Division's second-echelon 22311 Guards Rifle 

Regiment (less one battalion) occupied defenses extending from Generalovka 

to Krutoy Log to repel penetrating enemy forces and launch counterattacks. 

The regiment formed an antitank region on its left flank south of Krutoy 

Log. One battalion of the 223d Regiment (1st Battalion), supported by a 

reinforced battery of the 81st Tank Destroyer Battalion, was in division 

reserve near Dan Urozhaye, and one battery of antitank guns constituted the 

division"s antitank reserve deployed east of Razumnoye. Division forward 

battalions and companies, supported by division sappers, prepared necessary 

trenches and barbed wire obstacles. They also prepared all population 

centers in the first defensive belt for all-around defense. 

Artillery firing positions of the regimental artillery support groups 

were located three to five kilometers from the forward edge of the defense, 

and artillery fire was under the centralized control of the division. The 

antitank strongpoints each consisted of five to seven antitank guns and a 

company of infantry. Thus the division's weakest defenses were on the left 

flank, where the Soviets felt the Razumnoye River would impede German 

offensive operations. On the right flank, the high concentration of 

fortified villages and weaponry provided for a stronger defense. 

CSI/516OA/2046A -37- 
At 0410, 5 July, after a forty-minute artillery and air preparation, 

German farces of Army Detachment Kempf's III Panzer Corps thrust across the 

Northern Donets River into the 78th Guards Rifle Division's defensive sector 

(see map 9)*26 The 19th Panzer Division struck division positions from 

Dalni Peski to Dorogobuzhino, while the 7th Panzer Division advanced from 

Solomino towards Razumnoye and Krutoy Log--a combined assault force of 

almost 300 tanks. To the north, the 168th Infantry Division, supported by 

6th Panzer Division tanks, sought to break out of the Nikhailovka bridgehead 

against the 81st Guards Rifle Division under a hail of Soviet artillery fire 

that hampered bridging efforts, caused the assault to abort, and forced the 

6th Panzer Division to shift its offensive efforts southward. 

The combined assault of the 19th and '7th Panzer Divisions hit the 

boundary between the 78th Guards Rifle Division‘s 228th and 225th Regiments 

and crushed the forward company's defensive positions covering the eastern 

bank of the Northern Donets River. At a cost of thirty disabled tanks, the 

19th Panzer Division and the 7th 'Panzer Division overran Soviet positions 

from Dorogobuzhino to Mizhny Cl'shanets and pushed forward north and south 

of Razumnoye. The 19th Panzer Division's 27th Panzer Regiment crushed the 

positions held by the 3d Battalion, 228th Rifle Regiment, and pushed into 

the second defensive position of the 2d Battalion before being halted, in 

the evening, by heavy Soviet antitank fire from the antitank region at 

Razumnoye. Meanwhile, the 7th Panzer Division's spearhead of over 100 tanks 

overran the positions of 2d Battalion, 225th Rifle Regiment, destroyed the 

battalion's antitank strongpoint, and pushed against the regimentIs 

3d Battalion positions south of Razumnoye. The 3d Battalion repulsed the 

initial German attacks, but German fire then concentrated on the battalion's 

1st Machine Gun Company, and by 1800, German forces smashed through the 

battalion's defenses and advanced toward the Krutoy Log defensive positions 

of 3d Battalion, 223d Rifle Regiment.27 

To slow down the onslaught, the 25th Rifle Corps commander ordered the 

443d and 477th Guards Mortar Artillery Battalions to move from their 

positions supporting the 81st Guards Rifle Division and occupy new positions 

east of Krutoy Log in order to fire in support of the 78th Guards Rifle 

Division.* At 2200, from their new positions, the two battalions delivered 

massed katyusha fire on German tanks and infantry advancing on Krutoy Log, 

temporarily halting the 7th Panzer Division's advance. Again at 0200, 

6 July, the 443d Guards Nortar Battalion broke up an assembly of German 

armor near Krutoy Log.28 

*Soviet guards mortar units were equipped with multiple rocket 

launchers, the famous katyushas. 

CSI/5160A/2046A -3% 
.-r-m -- 1.1 I, 

--d 

flep 9. Eiituation 1900, 5 July 1943. 

csI/51~9A/2046A -39- 
By the evening of 5 July, the 78th Guards Rifle Division's defenses were 

shattered in three sectors. The 228th Rifle RegimentIs 1st Battaiion 

defenses held firm near Dalni Peski, and the 2d Baitalion and remnants of 

the 3d Battalion contained the 19th Panzer Division's spearhead just south 

of Dalni Peski and east of the rail line. However, the 225th Rifle 

Regiment's right flank was torn apart. The remnants of the 2d Battalion 

were threatened with encirclement at Razumnoye, and the 3d Battalion 

desperately held on to its second-echelon positions around Krutoy Log. The 

regiment's 1st Battalion, with several companies encircled and destroyed, 

was pushed back from its river defenses. It thea joined the right flank of 

the neighboring 72d Guards Rifle Division in a stubborn withdrawal toward 

Gremyachiy. 

On the evening of 5-6 July, the 25th Rifle Carps commander ordered his 

second-echelon 73d Guards Rifle Division to reiniorce the 78th Guards Rifle 

Division with one rifle regiment and to hold on to positions at and to the 

rear of Krutoy Log. The commitment of the e~rps' second echelon meant that 

the 7th Panzer Division‘s advance now had to deal with the 78th Guards Rifle 

Division's remnants and the fresh 7'3d Guards Rifie Division. The latter was 

reinforced by a battery of 85-mm guns and the 14ji;th Self-Propelled 

Artillery Regiment that was equipped with 122-mm and some 152-mm guns. 

Moreover, the Voronezh Front commander ordered a larger assembly of forces 

in order to deal with the deteriorating situation in the 25th Guards Rifle 

Corps' sector. He shifted control of the 111th and 27Qth Rifle Divisions 

from the 69th Army to the 7th Guards Army; and control of the 94th and 

92d Guards Rifle Divisions from the 35th Guards Rifle Corps to the 

7th Guards Army.29 All four divisions moved forward to back up the 

73d Guards Rifle Division, defending on the road to Korocha. 

General Shumilov also created a shock-group, containing the 3lst Tank 

Destroyer Brigade, 167th Tank Regiment, 1438th Self-Propelled Artillery 

Regiment, 262d Gun Artillery Regiment, 309th and 47th Guards Mortar 

Regiments, and 329th Engi.neer Battalion, and ordered the group to support 

the 73d Guards Rifle Division, thus further complicating the 7th Panzer 

Division's task. 

Meanwhile on 6 July, the 78th Guards Rifle Division continued to play 

out its role of absorbing the initial shock of the German advance (see 

map 10). After a short artillery preparation, t&e 19th Panzer Division 

resumed its assaults on Dalni Peski and the 228th Rifle Regiment's positions 

north of Razumnoye, while the 7th Panzer Division struck Soviet defenses 

east of Razumnoye and at Krutoy Log. The 6th Panher Division, having 

deployed south from Belgorod in search of suitable crossing sites over the 

Northern Donets River, by mid-morning crossed the river and advanced into 

the interval between the 19th and 7th Panzer Divisions. Its commitment to 

combat increased the tank onslaught through the 7bth Guards Rifle Division's 

positions to over 400 tanks. 

CSI/5160A/2046A -4o- 
Itap 10. Situation 1900, 6 July 1943. 

-41- 

%I-N-U2936 
By 1200, 6 July, the 1'3th Panzer Division's 27th Panzer Regiment had 

fought its way to Generalovka, where the 2d Battalion, 223d Rifle Regiment, 

halted its progress. Meanwhile, remnants of the 228th Rifle Regiment 

abandoned Dalni Peski, left one battalion in new defensive positions, and 

using woods and ravines to cover their movement, swung two battalions into 

new positions north of Generalovka facing south, and tied into 81st Guards 

Rifle Division‘s left flank opposing the 19th Panzer's 7% Panzer Grenadier 

Regiment (see map 111.30 The German advance destroyed most of the 

remaining Soviet force in Razumnoye and forced the remnants of the 223d and 

225th Rifle Regiments into encirclement at Krutoy Log. As the 6th and 

7th Panzer Divisions swept on toward the 73d Guards Rifle Division's 

positions northwest of Krutoy Log, the two encircled Soviet regiments 

received orders to break aut during darkness before German infantry arrived 

to seal off their escape. Late on the night of 6-7 July, the regiment's 

remnants finally reached new defensive lines formed by the 72d Guards Rifle 

Division near Gremyachiy. 

On the afternoon of 6 July, after having dealt with the 78th Guards 

Rifle Division's defenses, the 6th and 7th Panzer Divisions engaged in heavy 

combat with the 73d Guards Rifle Division northwest of Krutoy Log (see 

map 121.31 The 7th Panzer Division dented, but did not break, the Soviet 

defenses and lost heavily in the contest.* At 14Op, on the 7th Panzer's 

left flank, the 6th Panzer Division, with 100 tanks, assaulted and overran 

the 209th Guards Rifle Regiment's positions on the 73d Guards Rifle 

Division's right flank and advanced into the depth of the Soviet defenses 

(see map 13). The 7th Panzer Division soon ended its attacks on the 

73d Guards Rifle Division's defenses and moved the bulk of its forces in the 

wake of the 6th Panzer Division's advance northward. 

By the evening of 7 July, the 78th Guards Rifle Division had fulfilled 

its role in the battle of Kursk--the necessary but unpleasant role of shock 

absorber for the German assault. The division absorbed the full force of 

two attacking German panzer divisions and shattered under the blow, but only 

after two days of heavy combat that exacted a toll, in time and lives, from 

the two German units and provided the 7th Guards Army with the time 

necessary to bring new units to bear on the German advance. In a narrow 

sense, the defense failed, although the Soviets claimed the division 

disabled about fifty German tanks. In a larger sense, operating as an 

integral part of the 25th Guards Rifle Corps' defensive plan, the 

78th Guards Rifle Division's defense was a greater success. The combined 

efforts of the more successful 81st Guards Rifle Division and the 73d Guards 

Rifle Division accounted for roughly a quarter of the German tank strength 

(100 of 400)) slowed the German advance, and ulitmately created conditions 

which prevented the timely linkup of the III Panzer Corps with the II SS 

Panzer Corps in the Prokhorovka area. 

*An estimated fourteen tanks lost on 6 July, and another twenty-five on 

7 July. 

CSI/5160A/2046A -42- 
Map 11. Defensive Maneuver 78th Guards Rifle Division, 6 Jul.y 1543. 

-43- 
w I 

Map 12. Defensive Combat 73d Guards Rifle Division, 6 July 1943. 

CSI/5139A/2046A -44- 
, 

f 

CSI/5139A/2046A 

Map 13. Situation 1900, 7 July 1943. 

-45- 
The 78th Guards Rifle Division paid a severe price in the operation, 

with casualties probably amounting to as much as 40 percent of its initial 

force of over 7,000 men. (33-1 ree weeks later, after some reinforcement, the 

division strength stood at almost 6,000 men.132 

Tactical Defense of a Rifle Corps 

While the 25th Guards Rifle Corps was unable to contain the German 

tactical penetration southeast of Belgorod, the 29th Rifle Corps of 

13th Army conducted a costly, yet more successful, tactical defense against 

units of the German 9th Army. The 29th Rifle Corps manned the 

fifteen-kilometer-deep 13th Army tactical defensive zone in a sector 

nineteen kilometers wide, extending from Probuzhdeniye eastward to just east 

of the rail line to Kursk, a sector that the German XXXXVII and XXXXI Panzer 

Corps would attack (see map 31.33 The corps' first-echelon 15th and 

81st Rifle Divisions deployed in the first defensive belt, five to six 

kilometers deep, while the 307th Rifle Division deployed in the second 

defensive belt on the right of the 6th Guards Rifle Division, 17th Guards 

Rifle Corps. Both defensive belts were fully prepared with trenches and 

engineer obstacles and further backed up by an army defensive belt, twelve 

to fifteen kilometers to the rear, that was occupied by the 70th and 

75th Guards Rifle Divisions of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps. 

Colonel V. M. Dzhandzhgava's 15th Rifle Division on the left flank in 

the 29th Rifle Corps' first echelon defended the first two defensive 

positions in a sector of nine kilometers, with its 47th Rifle Regiment on 

the left and the 676th Rifle Regiment on the right. The 321st Rifle 

Regiment, in second echelon, occupied a third defensive position seven 

kilometers wide and four to five kilometers to the rear of the first 

position. The division training battalion was in reserve, and fourteen 

antitank strongpoints were scattered throughout the division's defensive 

area. 

On the 15th Rifle Division's right flank, the 81st Rifle Division 

defended a ten-kilometer sector with its 467th Rifle Regiment on the left 

and the 410th Rifle Regiment on the right in front of Waloarkhangel'sk 

Station. The 519th Rifle Regiment was in division's second echelon. Ten 

kilometers to the rear, the 307th Rifle Division defended the second 

defensive belt with the 1019th Rifle Regiment on the left, the 1021st Rifle 

Regiment on the right, and the 10233 Rifle Regiment.in assembly areas to the 

rear. Both the 15th and 307th Rifle Divisions earmarked their divisional 

training battalions as the reserve. 

Both first-echelon divisions created antitank reserves from the division 

antitank battalions and designated sapper platoons equipped with mines as 

mobile obstacle detachments that they positioned near likely tank avenues of 

approach. To the rear of the 307th Rifle Division's positions, the 

-46- 
129th Tank Brigade, 27th Heavy Tank Regiment, and 1442d Self-Propelled 

Artillery Regiment took up positions from which they could deploy forward 

and provide support in any sector that required it.* 

At 0430, 5 July, the Germans began a sixty-minute artillery preparation 

by approximately 100 batteries against the 13th Army's positions. Five 

minutes later, Soviet forces responded with a counterpreparation of their 

own. Simultaneously, more than 200 German aircraft pounded Soviet defensive 

positions. One hour later, assault elements of the XXXXI Panzer Corps 

(292d and 86th Infantry Divisions), supported by 18th Panzer Division tanks, 

struck the Bkst Rifle Division's positions and the right flank defenses of 

the 15th Rifle Division. The bulk of XXXXVII Panzer Corps' assault units 

from the 6th Infantry Division and the 20th Panzergrenadier Division, 

supported by the 2d and 9th Panzer Divisions, struck the remainder of the 

15th Rifle Division's sector. 

The asault elements of the 86th and 292d Infantry Divisions first 

engaged the security forces of the 410th Rifle Regiment (one reinforced 

rifle battalion). After disabling or destroying two medium and four heavy 

tanks, the Soviet battalion was submerged under the onrushing German armor. 

Remnants of the battalion made their way back to regimental positions where, 

by now, heavy battle raged. By noon, German assault columns penetrated 

between the 410th and 467th Rifle Regiments. Soviet divisional artillery 

fire stripped the accompanying infantry from the tanks and destroyed ten of 

the tanks. Overall, according to Soviet claims, fifty German tanks and 

self-propelled guns were destroyed or disabled in the intense fighting by 

the evening of 5 July.34 

By 1600, German columns had penetrated west of Kaloarkhangel'sk Station 

to the villages of Ochki and Nikol'skoye 1, had encircled the first-echelon 

battalions of the 467th Rifle Regiment , and had thrust into the regiment's 

second defensive position. Simultaneously, German forces penetrated into 

the gap between the 15th and 29th Rifle Corps. The commander of the 

81st Rifle Division, Major General A. B. Barinov, at first ordered his 

second-echelon 519th Rifle Regiment to launch counterattacks and restore the 

defense. In light of the growing intensity of the German attack, however, 

Barinov reconsidered and'instead ordered, his 467th Rifle Regiment to 

withdraw to new defensive positions under cover of the 519th Rifle 

Regiment's fires and direct fires from the 9th Artillery Brigade. 

*In addition, the 5d Artillery Division supported the 29th Rifle Corps, 

and each division formed a division artillery group from attached artillery 

units. 

CSI/5160A/2046A -47- 
Meanwhile, the German 282d Infantry Division assault groups penetrated the 

division's defenses west of Shirokoye Boloto, only to be repulsed by direct 

fire from the 208th Howitzer Artillery Regiment that destroyed eighteen 

German tanks. While the beleaguered 81st Rifle Division regrouped around 

the 519th Rifle Regiment's defensive positions, the 13th Army commander 

dispatched the 27th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment (twenty-three tanks), the 

129th Separate Tank Brigade (forty-eight tanks), and the 1442d 

Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (sixteen SU-122s) to its assistance. As 

the reinforcements approached, fifty German tanks, supported by infantry, 

drove the 430th Rifle Regiment to the rear and occupied part of the 

division's third defensive positions. At 1900, the Soviet tank and 

self-propelled gun reserves counterattacked with the 410th Rifle Regiment's 

remnants, destroyed six German tanks, and restored the 81st Rifle Division's 

front north of Ponyri Station, which was now anchored on the 519th Rifle 

Regiment's positions.35 

Heavy combat also raged in the 15th Rifle Division's sector. German 

forces of the 20th Panzergrenadier and 6th Infantry Divisions, with armor 

support, attacked two hours after the assault units of the XXXXI Panzer 

Corps. After an artillery preparation at 0800, 100 tanks and self-propelled 

guns in groups of ten to fifteen, supported by infantry, smashed into 

Lieutenant Colonel I. I. Kartashev's 47th Rifle Regiment's positions defending Yasnaya Polyana. The heavy bombardment had knocked out two-thirds 

of Kartashev's gun and antitank positions. This "seriously weakened the 

defense of the regiment and reduced the morale of its persomel.q’36 At 

0830, sixty German tanks and infantry struck the 47th Rifle Regiment's left 

flank battalion, whose communications had already been knocked out by the 

artillery barrage. With its command and control paralyzed, the battalion 

melted away, thus exposing the left flank of the 15th Rifle Division. The 

adjacent battalion held its positions until German armor swept into its rear 

and encircled it. Lacking communication with regimental headquarters, the 

battalion commander ordered his companies to withdraw through the German 

armored screen toward Prodolyan'. 

By 1000, it was clear to the 13th Army commander, General Pukhov, that 

the main (and most successful) German attack was in the 15th Rifle 

Division's sector. Consequently, he shifted the bulk of the 16th Air Army 

support to that sector. Meanwhile, the 676th Rifle Regiment's first-echelon 

battalions were increasingly isolated but holding out against German attacks 

from Arkhangel'skoye (see map 14). The 81st Rifle Division on the 676th 

Rifle Regiment's right flank had been pushed back toward Ponyri Station. On 

the 676th's left, the 45th Rifle Regiment had been pushed to the rear in 

disarray. At 1100, the 676th Regiment's commander, LTC N. N. Onopriyenko, 

organized his three battalions for all-around defense and waited for the 

inevitable German onslaught. 

CSI/516QA/2046A -48- 
lb 4 0 1 Km I 

Map 14. Situation 0800-1400, 5 July 1943. 

-49- 

_.---- 
The German assaults began at 1400 by a regiment of infantry attacking 

from the north and fifty tanks and supporting infantry advancing from the 

east (see map 15). Contracting its lines into a four-square-kilometer area, 

the regiment held out, while the 13th Army commander struggled to restore 

the situation in the 15th Rifle Division's sector. While German forces 

occupied Prodolyan' and pushed remnants of the 47th Rifle Regiment toward 

Saborovka, General Pukhov raced reinforcements to the scene. He moved the 

237th Tank, 1441st and 1541st Self-Propelled Artillery Regiments, two mobile 

obstacle detachments, and all available artillery forward in order to 

stiffen withdrawing 47th Rifle Regiment forces. North of Saborovka, the 

hastily assembled tank and artillery task force struck lead German elements 

and, at heavy cost to themselves, halted the Germans, destroying eleven 

German tanks and three guns. Meanwhile, the 676th Rifle Regiment continued 

to hold its position and prevented a broader German advance. After 

nightfall at 2130, the 676th Rifle Regiment's battalions finally withdrew 

and occupied new positions near Snovo amidst the second defensive belt 

positions of the 6th Guards Rifle Division (see map 16). 

Thus by nightfall on 5 July, German forces of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps 

had penetrated the 29th Rifle Corps' main defense belt in the 15th Rifle 

Division's sector, and the XXXXI Panzer Corps had forced the 81st Rifle 

Division back to its third defensive position north of Ponyri Station, all 

of this at a cost to the Germans of approximately 110 tanks and 

self-propelled guns. That evening General Pukhov formed his forces and 

reinforcements from front for a counterattack on the morning of 6 July. The 

16th and 19th Tank Corps of 2d Tank Army and the 17th Guards Rifle Corps, 

with its subordinate 15th, 14&h, and 74th Rifle Divisions, supported by 

three tank and self-propelled artillery regiments, would conduct the 

counterattack on a front from Saborovka to Snavo.T?* The counterattack, 

launched at 0400, 6 July, after a ten-minute artillery preparation, ran into 

the teeth af the German assault and petered out after a one- to 

two-kilometer gain.* As the front temporarily stabilized, the 81st and 

307th Rifle Divisions of the 29th Rifle Corps and their supparting armor had 

to fend for themselves in their defenses north of Ponyri. 

*The 15th Rifle Division had been reassembled in the rear after its 

retreat on 5 July. 

**On the evening of 6 July, the 2d Tank Army's 3d Tank Corps also moved 

into the Ponyri area. Subsequently, its tanks also served in an 

infantry-support role. 

CSI/516OA/2046A -5o- 
Nap 15. Situation 1400-18Cl0, 5 July 1986. 

-5x- 

_--- -~ 
Map 16. Situation 1800, 5 July 1943--C&00, 6 July 1943. 

-52- 
On the morning of 6 July, the 815t Rifle Division launched its own 

unsuccessful local counterattacks while, to its rear, the 307th Rifle 

Division and the 6th Guards Rifle Division solidified their defenses for the 

expected renewed German attacks. By 1200, the 81st Rifle Division had run 

into German armored assault groups ; and, supported by the 9th Howitzer and 

23d Guards Mortar Brigade, the division slowly withdrew to its starting 

positions under heavy German fire, By day's end, the Germans had committed 

the 9th Panzer Division against the 81st Rifle Division's left flank and had 

driven it back toward Ponyri Station, The 81st Rifle Division, by day's 

end, was exhausted. Consequently, the 29th Rifle Corps commander ordered it 

to withdraw through the 307th Rifle Division's positions covering Ponyri 

Station. Having lost 2,518 men of its orignial strength of about 8,000, the 

81st Rifle Division finally withdrew to reassembly areas having accounted 

for about seventy destroyed or disabled German tanks in two days of brutal 

fighting.38 Now it was left to the 307th Rifle Division to defend what 

remained of the 29th Rifle Corps' tactical defenses. 

On the night of 6-7 July, the 13th Army commander reinforced the 

307th Rifle Division with the 129th Tank Brigade, 1442d Self-Propelled 

Artillery Regiment, 540th Light Artillery Regiment, and the army mobile 

obstacle detachment. Pukhov also provided, to the 307th, the fires of the 

11th Mortar Brigade, the 22d Guards Mortar Brigade, and the bulk of the 

5th Artillery Penetration Division. In addition, he dispatched the 

1st Guards Engineer Brigade and 13th Army's antitank reserve, the sixty guns 

of the 13th Tank Destroyer Artillery Brigade. The 380-gun support for the 

307th Rifle Division was the largest amount of artillery put at the disposal 

of a single rifle division on the defense in the entire war in the 

east.39 To provide further security for this sector, the Central Front 

commander positioned the 2d Tank Destroyer Artillery Brigade in firing 

positions west of Ponyri Station. 

At daybreak on 7 July, Major General M. A. Yenshin's 307th Rifle 

Division was prepared for combat (see map 17). In first echelon on the 

left, its 1019th Rifle Regiment covered the approaches to Ponyri Station and 

Pervaya Maya, and on the right, the 1021st Rifle Regiment defended the 

approaches to hill 257.1 and Nikol'skoye 2. The 1023d Rifle Regiment in 

second echelon, near and east of Ponyri, cooperated with the 129th Tank 

Brigade and the corps' mobile obstacle detachment. The 27th Heavy Tank 

Brigade and the division antitank reserve, backed up by the division reserve 

of two rifle companies and the division mobile obstacle detachment, deployed 

to the rear of the 1019th Rifle Regiment behind hill 256.9. 

Against this force, the German XXXXI Panzer Corps prepared an assault 

force of about 200 tanks (see map 18). At 0630, after a short artillery and 

air preparation, two regiments of the 292d Infantry Division, with 100 tanks 

and self-propelled guns of the 18th Panzer Division, advanced from hill 

240.9 toward Ponyri Station on the 1019th Rifle Regiment's left flank. The 

Soviets opened up with volleys of katyusha rocket fire, followed by air 

attacks by bombers and shturmovik attack aircraft. Flame throwers and 

CSI/5160A/2046A -53- 
Map 17. Situation 0600, 7 July 1943. 

-54- 

A 224.a 

.I 
Nap 18. Situation, 7 July 1943. 

CSI/5139A/2046A -55- 

L 

-- 
exploding minefields, laid overnight by sappers, accounted for twenty-two 

disabled German tanks. For four hours, the assaults continued as the 

1019th Rifle Regiment repelled four separate German attempts to smash 

through their positions. 

By mid-morning the German 86th Infantry Division and the 78th Assault 

Division joined the fray, and heavy combat churned from Ponyri Station to 

Pe rvaya Maya, slowly grinding down the strength of the 307th Rifle 

Division's first echelon. At 1130, German tanks and infantry finally 

penetrated Soviet defenses and seized hill 257.1, east of Psrvaya Naya on 

the 102lst Rifle Regiment's left flank. From the reverse slope of the hill, 

the 1021st Regiment's left flank battalion and the 837th Artillery 

Regiment's guns, firing directly at German tanks, destroyed twenty-three 

tanks and halted the German assault. Shortly thereafter, the 1021st Rifle 

Regiment commander committed his second-echelon rifle battalion to regain 

the hill. No sooner had it done so* than German forces struck the defensive 

positions of the 1019 Rifle Regiment at Ponyri Station from two sides. As 

the assault troops pushed the 1019th Rifle Regiment back, General Yenshin 

dispatched two battalions of his second-echelon 1023d Rifle Regiment and 

tanks of the 129th Tank Brigade to counterattack and restore the situation. 

In five hours of fighting, Ponyri Station changed hands repeatedly, but the 

Germans still held stubbornly to its northern outskirts. 

Heavy German air attacks on Soviet positions at Ponyri and further west 

at Cl'khovatka were met by equally heavy antiaircraft fire from the 

25th Antiaircraft Artillery Division. By nightfall, after renewed assaults 

by two regiments and sixty tanks, the Germans finally took the northern and 

central part of Ponyri. German losses were heavy, as were those of the 

1019th Rifle Regiment and supporting 540th Light Artillery Regiment that 

accounted for four heavy tanks before being forced to withdraw from its 

positions. Small groups of German assault troops infiltrated further south 

through gaps in the 1019th Rifle Regiment's lines, as the two battalions of 

the 1023d Rifle Regiment tried in vain to seal the gaps. Battle raged 

throughout the night, illuminated by the burning buildings of Ponyri. 

The following day, although the focus of the German assault shifted 

westward toward Ol'khovatka (where the Germans committed the 4th Panzer 

Division}, the situation remained critical at Ponyri Station. Soviet 

defenses stiffened a bit overnight, as the 6th Guards Rifle Division of 

17th Guards Rifle Corps, on the 307th Rifle Division's left, turned over 

part of its sector to corps1 second-echelon divisions (70th and 75th Guards) 

and shifted its strength to the right toward Ponyri 1. Just before 

daybreak, General Pukhov concentrated all of his attentions on the 

Ol'khovatka and Ponyri Station sectors, and he ordered the 307th Rifle 

Division to attack at dawn to retake the statian. As reinforcements for the 

division, he dispatched the 5lst Tank Brigade and his antitank reserve to 

cooperate with the, by now depleted, 129th Tank Brigade. Moreover, Pukhov 

CSI/51bCA/2046A -56- 
released the 18th Guards Rifle Corps' 4th Guards Airborne Division to the 

29th Rifle Corps' control, and it occupied positions two kilometers to the 

rear of the 307th Rifle Division's defensive positions. By daybreak, the 

49th Separate Battalion of Armored Trains rolled north along the rail line 

from Kursk to firing positions just south of Ponyri Station (see map 19). 

With these reinforcements in place, the 307th Rifle Division's 1019th 

and 1023d Rifle Regiments, supported by the 51st and 129th Tank Brigades, 

the 27th Tank Regiment , and a profusion of artillery, began their 

counterattacks in mid-morning but could not dislodge German forces from 

Ponyri Station. By 1300, the repeated Soviet attacks had driven German 

forces from the southern portion of the station and had retaken the 

water-supply point. Throughout the afternoon, the division held on to the 

water-supply point in the face of repeated German assaults. At 1800, a 

fresh German attack retook the water-supply point, but again Soviet 

counterattacks, covered by fire from the 567th and 1180th Tank Destroyer 

Regiments, halted the German advance. After nightfall, the seesaw battle 

continued as the 1019th Rifle Regiment's battalions again seized the 

water-supply point, 

On the night of 8-9 July, General Pukhov sent further reinforcements to 

assist the 307th Rifle Divisions (see map 20). The 18th Guards Rifle Corps' 

3d Guards Rifle Division moved toward the sound of the guns to alleviate a 

situation that had deteriorated as dawn broke on 9 July. German assaults, 

early on 9 July, *‘surrounded the Ponyri defenders with a squall of 

fire."40 By 0930, heavy German attacks again swept over Ponyri, and by 

1800, all three battalions of the 1023d Rifle Regiment were surrounded in 

the central part of the village around the railroad station. At 1900, the 

4th Guards Airborne Division attacked along the railroad in an attempt to 

break the encirclement. After several hours of fighting, the division's 

troops reached Ponyri Station and the southern edge of Pervaya Maya. 

At first light on 10 July, the 307th and 4th Guards Airborne Division 

resumed their assaults against concentrated German tank, artillery, mortar, 

and small arms fire, and ran into new assaults by German forces who, by now, 

were reinforced by the 10th Paneergrenadier'Division (see map 21). The 

German assaults forced the 12th and 15th Guards Airborne Regiments to fall 

back and pinned the 9th Guards Airborne Regiment and 307th Rifle Division 

remnants in Ponyri Station. Six hours of heavy fighting raged before the 

German assault again ebbed. Finally, on the evening of lo-11 July, General 

Pukhov ordered the exhausted remnants of the 307th Rifle Division to turn 

over their positions to the 3d and 4th Guards Airborne Divisions and 

withdraw to the rear. Although German attacks rippled across adjacent 

sectors, it was clear, by the evening of 11 July, that the German 9th Army"s 

hopes for victory in the Soviet 13th Army's sector were dashed. On the 

morning of 12 July, the Germans sowed defensive minefields and withdrew 

their shattered armored units to the rear. 

CSI/516CA/2046A -57- 

- 
Flap 19. Situation, 8 July 1943. 

cS1/5139A/2046A -58- 
Map 2Q. Situation, 9 July 1943. 

-59- 
Map 21. Situation, 10 July 1943. 

-6O- 
For four days, the 357th Rifle Division had struggled, first alone and 

then reinforced, to hold onto the 29th Rifle Corps' second defensive belt. 

It had done so at tremendous cost but had also inflicted major damage on its 

German opponents.* Its stand at Ponyri Station symbolized, in microcosm, 

the Soviet defensive effort north of Kursk. 

Conclusions 

The Soviet strategic and operational effort at Kursk was noteworthy. 

For the first time in the war, the Soviets showed marked restraint in 

strategic planning and chose to conduct a strategic defensive operation to 

wear down German forces and prepare the way for a renewed broad front 

strategic offensive. To that end, the Soviets conducted a strategic 

regrouping and concentrated immense forces in the Kursk area, backed up by a 

strong strategic reserve. Moreover, they incorporated a strategic 

counteroffensive into their strategic defensive planning. Certainly, the 

Soviets had numerical superiority strategically, as well as operationally 

and tactically. But this was not a new phenomenon. At Kursk, however, the 

Soviets magnified that superiority by their concentration of forces in one 

strategic sector. Soviet superiority in equipment, at least in numbers, was 

greater than in the past and important for the outcome of the strategic 

operation. It attested to growing Soviet production efforts that wholly 

harnessed the economy to war production. The technological edge in 

equipment went to the Germans, and they banked upon that technology, 

combined with greater German experience and military proficiency, to produce 

victory. Events at Kursk demonstrated the risks involved in placing too 

much faith in partially tested new weapons systems, 

Operatianally, the Soviets demonstrated increased maturity at Kursk. 

Their operational force structure was better developed than in the past, 

with tank, artillery, and support organizations better suited to the 

achievement of operational ends.** Their operational formations were 

deeper, more flexible, and capable of more sustained operations than in the 

past. And the experiences of Soviet commanders demonstrated an increased 

capability for planning and conducting combat at the operational level. In 

particular, the Soviet use of echelonment and functional operational 

groupings (like the mobile group) gave a new resilience to Soviet 

operational efforts. 

"German casualties at and around Ponyri Station were estimated at 10,700 

killed or wounded% and 220 tanks and self-propelled guns and 71 guns/mortars 

destroyed. 

**For example, the tank army and artillery penetration divisions. 

CSI/5160A/2046A -61- 
However, it was in the tactical arena that Soviet forces had to make the 

greatest progress if they were to reverse the trends of the past and avoid 

tactical disasters that, in turn , could produce operational defeat. That 

progress was apparent at Kursk. It was clear that the tactical proficiency 

of the Soviet soldier and lower-ranking officer often lagged behind that of 

his German counterpart--in part because of high manpower attrition and 

inadequate time for training. However, those who had survived learned, and 

a generation of more tactically competent company, battalion, and regimental 

commanders emerged at Kursk. In part, that competence resulted from the 

systematic collection, analysis, and dissemination of war experiences 

conducted under the auspices of the General Staff." Soviet theoreticians 

studied the faults of previous tactical operations, drafted orders and 

regulations to correct those faults , and disseminated explanations of those 

faults through the lower echelons of command. The operational pause of 

March-July 1943 provided additional time necessary for Soviet commanders to 

absorb and to apply those lessons learned. 

At Kursk, tactical defense was defense in depth. Concentration of 

forces permitted the establishment of multiple tactical defensive belts and 

multiple tactical defensive positions within those belts. The new rifle 

corps organization permitted the extensive echelonment of battalions, 

regiments, and divisions. Whereas, in the past, German forces had to 

penetrate the defenses of two regiments and perhaps a second-echelon 

division to overcome the tactical defenses, at Kursk they were faced with 

penetrating the defensive positions of three divisions, each arrayed in 

two-echelon formation, before reaching the operational rear. In addition, 

Soviet concentration measures constricted defensive sectors to further 

increase the density of the defense in terms of battalions, tanks, guns, and 

mortars per kilometer of front. 

Extensive emplayment of engineer resources permitted erection of 

increasingly elaborate fortifications and obstacles that further improved 

the durability and survivability of the defense. The use of mobile engineer 

forces to install a wide range of new obstacles resulted in greater 

flexibility in the defense during combat.41 

At Kursk, tactical defense was combined arms defense. Increased 

production of armaments of all types and calibers and the integratian of 

those weapons into every level of command increased the firepower of the 

defense. Improved coordination procedures resulted in tactical interlocking 

of fires that made penetrating the defense an even more deadly process. In 

particular, the Soviets created specialized weapons units to satisfy 

specific tactical functions (such as mobile obstacle detachments, artillery 

grows, antitank reserves). Most important, the Soviets created functional 

*In accordance with a General Staff Directive of November 1942. 

CSI/5160A/2046A -62- 
combined arms groupings to conduct the critical function of antitank 

defense, The antitank strongpoints and regions integrated infantry, 

artillery, and sometimes tank fire, and placed that fire on the moat likely 

armored approaches into the defenses. The greater numbers of these antitank 

"fortresses0 arrayed in depth increased the quality and lethality of the 

defense (see map 22). Even when a rifle division defense was crushed, it 

generally took longer than in previous years and exacted a higher cost from 

the attackers. For example, the German XXXXVIII Panzer Corps penetrated the 

defenses of the 67th and 52d Guards Rifle Divisions in just over one day. 

However, the antitank support made attacking German units pay a high price 

in lost armored vehicles (see map 23).42 Likewise, the 78th Guards Rifle 

Division's defense delayed the German III Panzer Corps for two critical days 

east of Belgorod. 

At Kursk, tactical defense integrated armored forces to a higher degree 

than before, thus providing an even greater risk to advancing infantry. 

Most rifle divisions defending on main attack axes had tank and 

self-propelled artillery battalions, regiments, or even brigades in 

support. They integrated armor into the antitank strongpoints and regions 

and into the battalion and regimental positions. Other armored elements 

constituted tank reserves at rifle-division and rifle-corps levels, which 

cooperated with second-echelon rifle regiments or rifle divisions in 

launching incessant counterattacks. In especially threatened sectors, 

larger operational armored units (tank corps and even tank armies) dug in to 

reinforce tactical defenses.* 

At Kursk, tactical defense was more active defense. The Soviets had 

urged increased activity (aktivnost") by forces at all levels in previous 

orders and regulations. Aktivnost' meant increased tenacity and flexibility 

at all levels--an unwillingness to give up when threatened, bypassed, or 

encircled--and a doggedness that gave a defense an additional intangible 

quality of strength. Such was the case at Kursk. German accounts 

repeatedly noted the tenaciousness of defenders and the resulting high cost 

paid by German units trying to overcome the defenses. A veteran of the 

6th Panzer Division noted that Soviet individual soldiers and small units 

continued to fight even when pentrated and bypassed. They struck like packs 

of dogs and nipped at the Germans incessantly from the flanks and the 

rear.43 The combined efforts of hundreds of such men and units wore down 

the spirit and combat capability of even the best German unit. 

*This was not recommended in Soviet regulations, It perhaps was 

indicative of the lack of faith of the High Command and fronts in the 

ability of commanders to control these relatively new operational units 

effectively in maneuver warfare. 

@SI&160A/2046A -63- 
-64- 
Map 23. Antitank Defense--52d Guards Rifle Division, 5 July 1943. 

-65- 
Thus at Kursk, tactical defense was more successful against a major 

German offensive effort than it had been at any time earlier in the war. 

The deeply echeloned infantry in well-constructed defenses that were laced 

with antitank weapons , supported by an improving array of armor and 

artillery, and backed up by operational and strategic reserves, exacted an 

awful toll on attacking German units. In some regions, the defense broke 

(as in the Belgorod sector), and in some places it bent (as on the Korocha 

axis), but in many places it stood and held (at Ponyri). But in all places 

it wore down German forces to such an extent that, when necessary, 

operational and strategic reserves could restore the situation. 

When the week of combat around Kursk had ended, the perceived 

infallibility of blitzkrieg was destroyed, along with the future hopes of 

the German Army for victory or even stalemate in the east. From July 1943, 

it was the German Army that would have to learn the lessons of successful 

defense if it was to survive. Kursk thus restored the credibility of 

Clausewitz' dictum on defense that events of the previous five years had 

cast into disrepute. 

Careful reading of Clausewitz' concept of defense is revealing. He 

stated: 

The defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger 

than the offensive . . . it should be used only so long as 

weakness compels, and be abandoned as soon as we are 

strong enough to pursue a positive object. When one has 

used defensive measures successfully, a more favorable 

balance of strength is usually created; thus the natural 

course in war is to begin defensively and end by 

attacking.44 

In July 1943, 'the Soviets followed Clausewitz" prescription. Kursk made 

clear that a well-planned, articulate defense, using carefully structured 

forces, could deal effectively with the most potent and proven of offensive 

concepts. Moreover, it could provide a suitable prelude to the conduct of 

successful offensive operations as it did in the late summer and autumn of 

194.3, if not 1944 and 1945 in general. 

Kursk stands like an object lesson to those who would stand in awe and 

fear of current offensive threats. Kursk announced to the world that for 

every offensive theory, there is a suitable defensive one available to those 

who devote the requisite thought necessary to develop it. 

CSI/5160A/2046A -66- 
NOTES 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michael Howard 

and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 84. 

Vremennyy polevoy ustav RKKA, 1936 (temporary E'ield Regulation of the 

Red Voenizdat, 1937) translated by U.S. Army War 

College, 1937. 

A. A. Strokov, ed. Istoriya voennogo iskusstva (a history of military 

art) (Maskva: Voenizdat, 1966), 321. 

Vremennyy polevoy ustav, 120-121; L. Kozlov, "Sovershenstvovaniye 

protivatankovoi oborony strelkovykh soedinenii'" (The perfection of the 

antitank defense of rifle formations) Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, 

March 1971, 32. 

Strokov, 391. 

N. Kh. Bagramyan, ed. Istoriya voin i voennogo iskusstva (a history of 

war and military art) (Moskva: Voenizdat, 19?0), 153. 

I. Sazonov, "Razvitiye takticheskoy oborony v Velikoy Otechestvennoy 

vainer' (The d evelopment of the tactical defense in the Great Patriotic 

War) VIZh, September 1968, 16. The 1942 tactical field regulation of 

the Red Army incorporated lessons learned in 1941 and early 1942. It 

abolished the older concept of shock groups and holding groups, 

recognized defensive operation as "a normal part of modern warfare," 

and required that defense be stubborn, active, antitank in nature, and 

deep. However, the Soviets could not meet all of those conditions 

until mid-1943. The 1944 Field Regulation answered the needs described 

in the 1942 regulation and was even more specific in describing how 

defenses should function. 

I!. Ko!zlovP, "Sovershenstvovaniye . . .,ll 33. 

Strokov, 429; Sazanov, 21-23. 

A. Razhenov, "Razvitiye taktiki oboronitel'nogo boya po opytu Kurskoi 

bitvy" (The development of the tactics of defensive battle from the 

experience of the Kursk battle) VIZh, June 1983, 34. 

Ibid., 36. 

Saeanov, 22. 

-67- 
13. Bazhanov, 36-38; variations discussed in A. I. Radzievsky, ed., Taktika 

v boevykh primerakh (diviziya) (Tactics by combat example (division)) (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1976), 184-185. 

14. 

15. 

16. 

Sazanov, 23-24. 

Ibid., 24. 

Bazhenov, 40; for details see K. S. Kolganov, Razvitiye taktiki 

sovetskoi armii v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny (1941-1945 gg). 

(The development of Soviet Army tactics in the years of the Great 

Patriotic War (1941-1945)) (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1958), 352-57. 

Kolganov provides statistics as well on virtually every category of 

defensive combat. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

L. Kozlov, 38-40. 

Ibid. 

Bazhenov, 41-42. 

For Hitler's order mandating Operation "Citadel" and the German 

planning process, see Kriegstagebuch der OK@ 1940-1945, Vol. III, 1425; 

E. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berl- in: ~. The ~_._ German ___~__ Defeat - __ __ _ -__ Ian the ---- --- - East 

(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United 

States Army, 1968). 124-25. 

21. "The Zitadelle Offensive" MS #T-26 Historical Division Headquarters, 

United States Army, Europe, Foreign Military Studies Branch Appendix, 

T;o. 4; 3. Engelmann, Zitadelle: Die Grosste Panzerschlacht im &ten), 

1943 (Citadel: The greatest tank battle in the east, 1943) (Friedberg, 

FRG, Podzun-Fallas-Verlag), 55-60. 

22. G. A. Koltunov, B. G. Solov'yev, Kurskaya bitva (The Kursk Battle) 

(Noskva: Voenizdat, 1970), 48-56. 

23. The best general descriptions of combat at Kursk from the Soviet 

perspective are found in Koltunov, 101-80; Kurskaya bitva (The Kursk 

Battle) (Voronezh: Tsentral'no-Chernozemnoye Khizhnoye Izdatel'stvo, 

1982), John Erickson, The Road to Berlin (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 

Press, 1983), 87-112, and unit histories of those Soviet armies which 

took part in the operations. 

24. See also "Breakthrough of a Panzer Corps through deeply echeloned 

Russian defenses during the battle of Kursk in July 1943'" MS #D-258 

Headquarters, European Command, Office of the Chief Historian. 

25. Radzievsky, Taktika w . \I (diviziya), 200-202. 

CSI/5115A/2046h -68- 
26, 

27. 

28. 

29. 

30. 

31. 

32. 

33. 

34. 

35. 

36. 

37* 

3%. 

39. 

40. 

A. I. Radzievsky, ed., Taktika v boevykh primerakh (polk) (Tactics by 

combat example (regiment)) (Moskva: Vseniedat, 1974), 255-56; 

Koltunov, 141-42; A. Krukl, Das Hannoversche Regiment 73: Geschichte 

das Panzer- Grenadier Regiments 73 (The Hannovarian Regiment 73: The 

history of Panzer Grenadier Regiment 73) (Hannover: 

Regimentskamaradshaft, undated), 290-304. 

Koltunov, 142. 

P. B. Bragunsky, N. S, Popel'nitsky, M. 6. Usenkov, Taktika artillerii 

v boevykh primerakh (podrazdeleniya i chasti) (Tactics of artillery in 

combat examples (subunits and units)) (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1977), 

185-86. 

V. Nazarov 'Xuzhestvo i masterstvo v aboroner' (Courage and skill in the 

defense} VIZh, 47-52, details the combat of 73d Guards Rifle Division. 

Radzievsky, Taktika . l . Polk, 255-56. 

Nazarov, 49-52; Kaltunov, 150-51. 

"Kurskaya bitva v tsifrakh"' (The Kursk battle in figures) VIZh 

July 1968, 79-81. 

M. A. Kozlov, ed. V plameni srazhenii: boevoi put' 13-i armii (ln the 

flames of battle: the combat path of 13th Army) (Moskva: Voenizdat, 

1973), 90-W; Kolganov, 281, 294; A. A. Radzievsky, ed., Armeiskiye 

operatsii (Army operations) (Hoskva: Voenizdat, 1977) 184-88; 

Moltunov, 107-10 all cover aspects of the 29th Rifle Corps'defense. 

M. M. Kozlovs 101. 

Ibid., 102-3. 

Ibid., 104. For the 676th Rifle Regiment defense, see Bazhenov, 42. 

Koltunov, 115-16. For 2d Tank Army‘s role at Kursk, see F. I. 

Vysotskii, et al, Gvardeiskaya tankovaya (Guards Tank) (Moskva: 

Voenizdat, 1963) 29-42. 

M. M. Kozlov, 110-12. 

Ibid., 113-14. See also M. A. Yenshin "Na oborone Ponyrei'" (At the 

defense of Fonyri) Kurskaya bitva, 238-45. Yenshin commanded the 

307th Rifle Division at Kursk. 

M. M. Kozlov, 120; for the airborne division's involvement, see D. S. 

Sukhorukhov, Sovetskiye vozdushno-desantnye (Soviet airborne troops) 

(Moskva: Voenizdat, 1980), 186-88. 
41. See details of the engineer preparations of the defense in A. D. 

Tsirlin, et al, Inzhenernye voiska v boyakh za sovetskuyu rodinu 

(Engineer forces in battles for the Soviet fatherland} (Moskva: 

Voenizdat, 1970) 153-76. According to Tsirlin, there were 6,000 mines 

on 13th Army's front which accounted for 98 destroyed German tanks on 

the first day of battle. On 6 July, the eight mobile obstacle 

detachments of 13th Army sowed 9,000 additional mines which cost the 

Germans 88 tanks and self-propelled guns on the second day of battle. 

The following day, 8,000 new mines accounted for 93 tanks more. In 

all, throughout the battle sappers laid 35,000 antitank and 4,000 

antipersonnel mines which destroyed or disabled 420 German tanks and 

assault guns. In the German 4th Panzer Army's and Army Detachment 

Kempf's areas, mines took a toll of 355 German tanks and 30 assault 

guns. 

42. For the 67th Guards Rifle Division's actions, see G. Kovtunov llNa 

Ognennoi duge" (0 n an arc of fire) VIZh, July 1981, 57-63. The best 

description of artillery fire support at Kursk and the work of antitank 

regions is in K. P. Kazakov, Vsegda s pekhotoi vsegda s tankami (Always 

with the infantry, Always with the tanks) (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1969), 

129-62. 

43. From a conversation with retired Oberst Helmut Ritgen, who was a 

company officer of the 6th Panzer Division during the fighting at Kursk. 

44. Carl von Clausewitz, 358. 

9Q-CSl-02936-1000-17 Apr 90 

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