1 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matters of ) 

 ) MURs 7324, 7332, 7364 

Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. and ) & 7366 

Bradley T. Crate in his official capacity as treasurer; ) 

Donald J. Trump; American Media, Inc.; ) 

David J. Pecker; Dylan Howard; ) 

Michael D. Cohen; Timothy Jost ) 

 

STATEMENT OF REASONS OF VICE CHAIR ALLEN DICKERSON AND

COMMISSIONERS SEAN J. COOKSEY AND JAMES E. “TREY” TRAINOR, III

The Complaints in these four matters allege that the Respondents violated the Federal 

Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended (the “Act”), through a series of payments American 

Media, Inc. (“AMI”) made to purchase the exclusive rights to certain news stories. Specifically, 

they claim that two of AMI’s corporate officers worked with representatives of the Trump 

campaign to purchase and suppress certain negative stories about then-candidate Donald J. Trump

for the purpose of influencing the 2016 election. 

Looking to the evidence and the likelihood of success, we voted to proceed with only a 

limited enforcement action against certain Respondents. This decision was driven by two 

important factors: the applicable statute of limitations and the disparate levels of evidence against 

each Respondent. As explained below, rather than sinking significant resources into a likely 

fruitless investigation, or pursuing a case that was outside the statute of limitations or soon would 

be, we voted to dismiss the weakest allegations and to focus on the strongest case for enforcement. 

I. Factual Background 

The allegations in these Complaints center around the 2016 presidential campaign and two 

contracts AMI entered into for the purchase of limited life story rights. Specifically, the 

Complaints in MURs 7324, 7332, and 7366 alleged that AMI, through its corporate officers David 

J. Pecker and Dylan Howard, negotiated an agreement with Karen McDougal to purchase rights 

to her story of an alleged personal relationship with Trump, purportedly in an effort to influence 

the 2016 election.1 Additionally, the Complaints in MURs 7364 and 7366 averred that AMI 

1 See Complaint at 4–10 (Feb. 20, 2018), MUR 7324 (Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., et al.); Complaint 

at 3–4 (Feb. 27, 2018), MUR 7332 (Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., et al.); Complaint at 3–7 (April 17, 2018), 

MUR 7366 (Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., et al.).

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similarly negotiated a payment to Dino Sajudin, a former doorman at Trump Tower in New York 

City, to prevent publication of a rumor regarding Trump’s alleged personal affairs, also for the 

purpose of influencing the 2016 election.2

The Commission received the four Complaints between February and April 2018, but it 

would be some time before the Commission could consider the allegations. First, the Office of 

General Counsel took significant time and resources to evaluate the allegations and prepare a First 

General Counsel’s Report. Indeed, the Report was not circulated to Commissioners’ offices until 

December 4, 2020.3 This was due in part to the Commission’s decision to await the outcome of 

other publicly known investigations, but was also because of OGC’s choice to look beyond the 

complaints themselves and conduct extensive outside research into news reports, published books, 

and social media posts. 

During this same period, the Commission lacked a quorum for significant stretches of time 

and was unable to deliberate or vote on pending matters.4 The Commission regained its quorum 

in December 2020, and it voted on the matters for the first time in executive session in March 

2021.5 These delays, once again, left the Commission with limited options for handling these 

matters. 

II. Legal Analysis 

The allegations in these Complaints can be most comprehensibly divided between those 

relating to Dino Sajudin and those relating to Karen McDougal. For each set of allegations, we 

voted to dismiss against all or some Respondents for distinct but related reasons. 

A. Dino Sajudin Allegations 

We voted to dismiss all allegations relating to AMI’s reported agreement with Dino Sajudin 

for a simple reason: the statute of limitations had lapsed and barred enforcement against any 

violation. The alleged agreement was formed in November 2015 and amended in December 2015.6

But the applicable statute of limitations for any campaign-finance violation is five years.7 As a 

2 See Complaint at 4–8 (April 12, 2018), MUR 7364 (Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., et al.); Complaint 

at 6–7 (April 17, 2018), MUR 7366 (Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., et al.).

3 First General Counsel’s Report (December 4, 2020), MURs 7324, 7332, 7364, and 7366 (Donald J. Trump 

for President, Inc., et al.). 

4 See Statement of Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub On the Senate’s Votes to Restore the Federal Election 

Commission to Full Strength (Dec. 9, 2020), available at https://www.fec.gov/resources/cmscontent/documents/2020-12-Quorum-Restoration-Statement.pdf. 

5 Id. 

6 First General Counsel’s Report at 22 (December 4, 2020), MURs 7324, 7332, 7364, and 7366 (Donald J. 

Trump for President, Inc., et al.). 

7 18 U.S.C. § 2462.

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result, when the Commission first considered the merits of these allegations in March 2021, all of 

the relevant conduct fell outside the limitations period, and the Commission could not press any 

enforcement case based on this conduct.8 The only appropriate disposition, then, was to dismiss 

these allegations as time-barred.

B. Karen McDougal Allegations 

Though not entirely time-barred like the Sajudin allegations, the Complaints’ allegations 

related to Karen McDougal faced similar and likely insurmountable problems with pursuing 

enforcement—with one exception. 

While it did not bar enforcement entirely, the impending statute of limitations severely 

limited the likelihood of a successful investigation. The bulk of the relevant conduct relating to 

McDougal took place in August 2016, when AMI purchased the rights to McDougal’s story for 

$150,000.9 This meant that the Commission had merely five months to complete a lengthy and 

complicated investigation to establish what happened, who was involved, who knew or said what, 

and when. The Commission would then need to bring the matter through probable-cause 

proceedings, and if unable to settle the matter, would need to file an enforcement action in federal 

court. Completing this entire investigative process to support an enforcement suit on such a 

truncated timeline would be uncertain to say the least.

10

The Commission’s likelihood of success was dimmed further by the lack of credible or 

admissible evidence available at the initial stage of enforcement. Despite months wasted 

conducting outside research—combing through dozens of media reports, articles, and published 

books not contained in the record before the Commission—large swaths of evidence collected and 

cited in the First General Counsel’s Report were unreliable.11 Much of it was based on secondhand knowledge, unsourced or anonymous claims, unreliable accounts, and assertions that fail to 

meet acceptable standards for evidentiary trustworthiness, even at the initial stage of enforcement.

8 See Supplemental Statement of Reasons of Commissioner Sean J. Cooksey at 2–3 (April 29, 2021), MURs 

6917 and 6929 (Scott Walker et al.) and MURs 6955 and 6983 (John R. Kasich et al.) (discussing, among other things, 

the bar on enforcement actions seeking penalties outside of the statute of limitations). 

9 First General Counsel’s Report at 14 (December 4, 2020), MURs 7324, 7332, 7364, and 7366 (Donald J. 

Trump for President, Inc., et al.). 

10 See Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Allen Dickerson and Commissioners Sean J. Cooksey and James E. 

“Trey” Trainor, III at 2 n.7 (May 10, 2021), MURs 7265 and 7266 (Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., et al.). 

11 See, e.g., Statement of Reasons of Vice Chairman Donald F. McGahn and Commissioner Caroline C. Hunter 

at 11 n.33 (July 25, 2013), MUR 6540 (Rick Santorum for President, et al.) (“[T]he Commission has already 

determined that news articles standing alone are insufficiently reliable to support a reason to believe finding.”); 

Statement of Reasons of Vice Chairman Matthew S. Petersen and Commissioners Caroline C. Hunter and Donald F. 

McGahn at 5–6 n.20 (May 1, 2009), MURs 5977 and 6005 (American Leadership Project, et al.) (“[A]dherence to the 

Commission’s regulations regarding sources of information contained in complaints cautions against accepting as true 

the statements of anonymous sources.”).

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In order to build a persuasive case, then, the news reports accepted at face value by the 

First General Counsel’s Report would need to be investigated and proved with more rigorous 

forms of evidence. This would have consumed significant Commission resources.12 Indeed, there 

have been occasions where the Commission has opened similar investigations predicated on 

unverified news reports, and ultimately wasted enormous amounts of time and money only to 

discover that the press accounts were wrong.13 Facing this shaky evidence, the long odds of 

success, a dwindling limitations period, and the difficult choices of efficiently allocating our 

limited agency resources, we voted to dismiss the allegations related to Karen McDougal under 

Heckler v. Chaney14 against most Respondents. 

As to the allegations related to AMI and its officers, the evidence available at the initial 

stage of enforcement was much stronger. As part of its own investigation, the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office for the Southern District of New York entered into a non-prosecution agreement (“NPA”) 

with AMI concerning the McDougal payments.

15 The NPA set out the facts and circumstances 

surrounding the McDougal contract, which included AMI’s admissions that its “principal purpose 

in entering into the agreement was to suppress [McDougal’s] story so as to prevent it from 

influencing the election” and that “[a]t no time during the negotiation for or acquisition of 

[McDougal’s] story did AMI intend to publish the story or disseminate information about it 

publicly.”16 

As a sworn statement admitting the elements of a campaign-finance violation, the NPA 

obviated the need for further investigation.17 The NPA was direct, reliable evidence that 

empowered the Commission to pursue enforcement within the remaining statute of limitations. We 

therefore voted to find reason to believe that AMI and David J. Pecker knowingly and willfully 

violated 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) by making and consenting to prohibited corporate in-kind 

12 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce ... is 

a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion ... [and] often involves a complicated balancing of 

a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation 

has occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to 

succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, ...”). 

13 See Second General Counsel’s Report at 24 (Jan. 13, 2021), MUR 7271 (Democratic National Committee, 

et al.) (concluding, after a one and a half years of investigation, that a complaint based entirely on news reports could 

not be substantiated to support a finding of probable cause). 

14 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 

15 U.S. Department of Justice Letter (September 20, 2018), available at https://www.justice.gov/usaosdny/press-release/file/1119501/download (last visited June 21, 2021) (“AMI Non-Prosecution Agreement”). 

16 AMI Non-Prosecution Agreement, Ex. A ¶ 5. 

17 The Non-Prosecution Agreement with the Department of Justice that AMI signed through its representatives 

in September 2018 is credible and direct evidence of a civil violation. See AMI Non-Prosecution Agreement at 2. As 

the statement of a party-opponent, it falls outside the definition of hearsay and would be admissible as evidence in a 

civil proceeding against AMI but would not be against other Respondents. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2); accord United 

States v. Morgan, 376 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2004) (sworn statements from prior bankruptcy filing held admissible, 

among other reasons, as a statement of a party opponent).

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contributions with regard to payments related to Karen McDougal.18 We conciliated with AMI on 

this violation, and AMI ultimately agreed to pay a substantial fine.

19

III. Conclusion 

These matters, yet again, presented the current Commission with no good options. As has 

been the case for other matters coming out of our enforcement backlog, the Commission has been 

left with matters previously abated or undeveloped, with little time left on the statute of limitations, 

and with much work remaining.20 In choosing how to allocate the Commission’s limited 

enforcement resources, we opted against pursuing the long odds of a successful enforcement in 

these matters and, with a noted exception, instead voted to dismiss as an exercise of prosecutorial 

discretion. 

______________________________ June 28, 2021 

Allen Dickerson Date

Vice Chair

_________________________________ June 28, 2021 

Sean J. Cooksey Date

Commissioner

_________________________________ June 28, 2021 

James E. “Trey” Trainor, III Date

Commissioner 

18 Certification (March 17, 2021), MURs 7324, 7332, 7364, and 7366 (Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., et 

al.). 

19 Conciliation Agreement (May 18, 2021), MURs 7324, 7332, 7366 (Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., et 

al.) (imposing a civil penalty against AMI of $187,500). 

20 See Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Allen Dickerson and Commissioners Sean J. Cooksey and James E. 

“Trey” Trainor, III at 2–3 (May 10, 2021), MURs 7265 and 7266 (Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., et al.). 

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