UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O
. 03-1923
LAWRENC E M. T RO PF , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. R

. J A M ES N I C HOL S ON , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(De cided August 24, 2006 )

J am es W . S te war t (non-attorney

prac titioner), Barton F. Stichman , and Nan c yL. F oti , all of Was hin g ton , D .C. , w e re on the br ie f f

or the a pp e lla nt.
Tim S. Mc Cla in , G e ne ra l Co un sel ; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Richard May erick, all of Washington, D.C., we re on the brief f or the a ppellee.
Be fore GREENE, Chief Judge , and LANCE and SCHOEL EN , Judges

. LANCE, Judge : The appe llant, ve tera n L awr ence M. Tropf, appea ls, through counsel, that part of a J uly

1, 2003 , decision of the B oard of Veter ans' Appea ls (B oard) that denied an incre ased disability rating for residuals of a she ll frag ment wound (SFW) of the back inc luding Muscle Group (MG) XX; a compe nsable disability ratingfor a

n SFW of the rig ht upper a rm includingMG I I I ; and a compe nsable disability

rating for residuals of a heale d fra cture of the distal end of the r ight f ibula. Record ( R.) at 1-15. The appellant make s no argument reg ardingthe B oard' s denial of a compensa ble disability

ratingfor the se rvi ce -c o n n ected residuals of a heale d fra cture of the distal end of the rig ht fibula. Acc ording ly , any issues on appea l conce rningthis claim are a bandoned. See Ford v. Gobe r , 10 Vet.App. 531, 535 (1997) (cla ims not argued on appea l a re de emed a

bandoned) ; Bu c k linge r v . B ro wn , 5 Vet.App. 435, 436 (1993). For the re asons that follow, the Court will aff irm the Board decision in part, vacate it in part, and rema nd one matter

for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with this opi nion.2 I. F AC TS The a ppellant serve d on active duty in the U.S. Army

from Apr il 1966 to May 1970. R. at 17. Duringhis service , he sustained SFWs in combat i n Vietnam. Id. There are no definitive

se rv ic e me dic a l r e c or ds ind ic atin gwh e the r h is i nju re d mu sc le s r e ta in s he ll f

ra g me nts

. In M ay 1970, the appe llant filed a c laim for disability compensation for re siduals of a shrapne l injury to the right side of hi s back. R. at 46-47. In J uly 1970, a VA r eg ional office (RO) g rante d service connec tion for an SFW to the bac k with retaine d metallic fra gm en t s and assigned

a 10 % d isa

bil ity ra tin g und e r 3 8 C. F .R. § 4 .1 18 , D ia g no sti c Cod e (D C) 78 04 (2 00 6) (d isa bil ity

c a us e d b y sc ar) . R. at 56. Duri ng a VA e xami natio n in June 19 75 , a n x-r ay sh ow e d s ma ll m e ta lli c fra g ments in the "sof

t tissues" of the ba ck to the right of the midline. R. at 61. In a June 1975 rating decision, the RO continued the 10% disability ratingfor the a

ppellant' s scar . R. at 64. A J anuar y 1983 rating decision confirme d the 10% disability rating for a tender scar under D C 7804. R. at 66. The c laims here on a

ppeal be g an in September 2001. At that time, the appellant sought an incre ased r atingfor r esiduals of the SF W of the back a nd soug ht se rvice connec tion f or re siduals of an S FW of

th e r igh t u

p p e r ar m. R. at 6 8

. A t a

D e c e mb e r

2 0 0 1 V Ae xami n ati o n , th e phy sical examination of the appellant' s rig ht flank revea led a barely visible scar that was " mildly tender on pa lpatio n. " R. at 82

. X- ra

y s o f h is tho ra c ic sp ine sh ow e d th e pr e se nc e of at le a st thr e e sma ll m e ta lli c fore ign bodie s within the "soft tissues" of the right lower thora cic ba ck ar ea. R. at 86-87. Ex amination of the right shoulder re veale d no visible scar or evidenc e of residual shrapne l. T here

wa s n o mu sc le los s, tis su e los s, or mus c le atr op hy . R. at 82. X- ra y s r e ve a le d s e ve ra l sm a ll m e ta lli c fra g ments in the soft tissues surroundingthe rig ht humerus. R. at 83; Supplemental R. at 1. In Fe bruar

y 2002, the P ittsburgh, Pennsy lvania, R O g rante d the appe llant service connec tion for a n SFW of the rig ht uppe r arm and assig ned a 0% disability ratingunder 38 C.F .R. § 4.73, DC 5303 (2006) f

or MG I I I

. R. at 94-99. The RO de nied an incr ease d ratingfor the SF W of the back with retaine d metallic fra g ments. R. at 96-99. That dec ision indi cate d that the appe llant's pr evious 10% disability

ratingfor this condition was assig ned under DC "7804- 5320" ( the DC for sc ars a nd the DC for muscle injury , respe ctively ). R. at 99. The appellant appea led t o the Board. R. at 101. On J uly 1, 2003, the B oard issued the decisio n h er e o n appea l. As to the residuals of the SF W to the a

pp e lla nt' s ba c k, the B oa

rd c on c lud e d that the DC 53 20 c ri te ri a fora 20 % di sability3

ratingwe re n o t m et. R. at 9-12. As to the re siduals of the SFW to the appellant' s arm, the B oard found that the a

ppellant' s curr ent level of disability was not compe nsable. R. at 12. On April 4, 2006, the Court issued an opinion in this case, a ffirmingthe J uly 1, 2003, Boa rd decision in part a

nd vaca ting a nd rema nding one matter for

rea djudication. Tropf v. Nicholson , 20 Vet.App. 45 (2006). On M ay 15, 2006 the S ecr etar y filed a motion for panel r econside ration and for a full-Court decision should panelr econside ration be de nied. The Sec reta ry ' s motion di d not seek a cha ng e in the outcome of

the ca se but only

the elimination of one holdingthat he asse rted wa s
un n ec es s ary

t o th e c o n cl u s i o nre ac h ed b y t h e C o u r t

. T o d ay , th e C o urtwi l l gra n tth e S ec re t ary 's motion for rec onsideration, withdra w its prior opinion, and issue this opinion i n its stead.

II. THE P AR TIES ' A RG UM EN TS The a ppellant ar gues for

reve rsal of the Boa

rd' s decision o n h i s disability rating s for the

re sid ua ls o f h is a

rm and ba c k in

jur ie s. F ir st, he argue s th at th e B oa rd e rr e d a s a

matte r o f l aw i n failingto assign a

separ ate disability

ratingof at lea st 10% for a "mode rate " injury to his back under DC 5320, in addition to t he 10% disability ra t i n g fo r a painf ul scar grante d under D C 7804. Ap pe lla nt' s B ri e f ( B r. ) a

t 12- 15

. He a sse rt s that the RO ' s use of a hy ph e nate d DC to a ssi g n a

sin g le 10 % d isa bil ity ratin gfo r t

wo se pa rate re sid ua ls w a s n ot a

uth or ize d b y

law a nd that he is e nti tle d to two separ ate 10% disability rating s. Id. The a ppellant also ar gues that the B oard e rre d as a matter of law by failing to assig n a 20% ratingunder 38 C.F.R. § 4.56 (2006), DC 5303, for a moderate injury of his a rm. Appellant' s Br . at 15-18. He asser

ts that, beca

use hi s arm inj ury

has re tained metallic f

ragments, he is entitled to a 20 % d isa bil ity ra tingfo r a " mod e rate " mus c le inj ur y , r athe r t ha n th e 0% a ssi g ne d f

or a " sli g ht" injury . Appellant' s Br . at 16-18. He also argues that the B oard is re quired to assig n like evaluations for like injuries a

nd that the Due Proc ess Clause of the Fifth Amendme nt require s the Boa rd to treat the injury to his arm simil arly

to the injury

to his back. Appe llant's B r. at 15-16. Inh i s b ri ef

, th e S ec re t ary

d o es n o td ef

en d th e us e of th e h y

p h en at edDC t o ra t e t h e ap p el l an t 's ba c k injury
. Se c re tary' s Br . at 5. Ho we ve r, he a sse rt s that the matte r sho uld be re mand e d b e c a

us e it is notclea

r that t he Board made the ne cessa ry fac tual finding s. Secre tary ' s Br . at 5-6. Reg arding the appe llant's a

rm injury , he maintains that a r emand is also nec essar y because ther e has be en no4

clea r findingof fa ct that the fra g ments–which have be en desc ribed by the medica l reports a s located in t he " so ft tis su e " –a re in t he musc le a s p ur

po rt e dly re qu ir e d und e r t

he a pp lic a ble re gulatio ns
. Secre tary ' s Br . at 6-7. In h is r e ply

br ie f, the a

pp e lla nt a rgue s th at th e B oa

rd ma de the fa c tua l fi nd ing s n e c e ssa ry to enable the Court to reve rse the Boa rd' s decision on his ba ck injury and that 38 C.F.R. § 4.56(d) doe s
no t e xplic itl y

re qu ir e the fr a g me nts to b e re ta ine d in the mus c le tis su e of

his arm . App e lla

nt' s Re ply Br . at 5-6.

III . A NA LY SIS A. Standard of

Review Both of the appellant' s arguments on appea l require us to review the Boa rd' s interpre tation of re gulations implementing title 38 reg arding those claims considere d by the Boa rd. We revie w the interpre tation of regulations de novo. Hatch v. Principi , 18 Vet.App. 527, 531 (2004). On r eview, if the mea

ning of the re gulation is clear f

rom its langua g e, then that is "the end of the matter." Brown v. Gardner , 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994).

B. 38 C.F .R. § 4.27 and the Appe llant's B ack I njury Al tho ugh th e Se c re tary

c onte sts on ly

the re me dy , a bri e f d isc us sio n o f t he a pp lic a ble regulation is warra

nted bec ause the Court has neve r ana ly zed the porti on of 38 C.F.R. § 4.27 (2006) qu ote d b e low . As to the a pp e lla nt' s b a c k in

jur y , V A' s u se of

hy ph e nate d r atin g s is dir e c te d in 38 C.F .R. § 4 .2 7, wh ic h r e a ds in p e rt ine nt p art :

W ith diseases , p re fe re nc e is t o b e g ive n to the numbe r as signe d to th e dis e a se itself; if the ratingis determined on the ba sis of residual c onditions, t he numb e r a p p r o p r i at e t o th e r e s i d

u a l c o n d i t i o nw i l l b e a d d e d , p r e c e d e d b y a hy phen. Thus, rhe umato i d (a t rophi c) a rthritis rated a s ankylosis of the lumbar spine should be c oded "5002-5289." In this way , the exact source of eac h ratingcan be easily

identified. (empha sis added). On its face , the clear purpose of a hy phenate d ratingis to add information to help descr ibe the orig ins of a sing le disability when t h e d i sability

is not one listed under the e x plicit DC for the g iven condition. Contrary to the plain languag e of the statute and the unsupported interpre tation and

a pp lic atio n b y

the B oa rd (R . at 9) , the u se of th e hy ph e nate d r atin gin t

his c a se wa s n ot s tr ic tlyU p o n t he Se cret ary ' s m o t i o n f o r reco nsi d erat i o n, t he C o urt has rem o ved f rom t hi s revi sed o p i ni o n i t s ho l d i ng 1 t hat hy phena t ed r at i ng s ar e n ot per mi t t ed f or i nj ur i es un der 38 C. F. R

. § 4. 27

. T he C our t ag r ees wi t h t he Secr et ar y t hat t h e h o l d i n g w a s n o t n e c e s s a r y . H o w e v e r , t h e S e c r e t a r y s h o u l d n o t c i t e o u r o p i n i o n h e r e a s e v i d e n c e o f t h e C o u r t 's agr eement wi t h any o f

hi s su bst ant i ve ar gu ment o n t hi s p oi nt sh oul d t he i s s ue be s quar el y pre s ent ed t o i t i n t he f ut ur e. It i s t rue t ha t t he C o urt i s o b l i ga t ed t o d efer to t he S ec retary' s i nterp retati o n of his o w n regu l ati o n w he n it i s am b i gu o us. See Sm i t h v

. Ni chol

s on , 4 5 1 F .3d 1 3 4 4 , 1 3 5 0 (F ed

. C i r. 2 0 0 6 ). H o w ev er, a regu l ati o n i s no t am b i gu o us m ere l y be ca use the S e c re ta ry ta k e s a li tiga tio n p o sitio n tha t co n tra d ic ts th e p la in la n g u a g e o f t h e re g u la tio n . R a the r, a sta tute is am b i guo us o nl y when t he ap p l i cat i o n o f t he o rdinar y m eani ng o f wo rds and rul es o f co nst ruct i o n t o t he p l ai n l anguage o f t h e re g u la tio n fails to a n sw e r th e q u e stio n a t i ssu e
. See , e. g. , Be l l At l

. T e l

. Cos

. v
. FCC , 13 1 F

. 3d 10 44 , 10 47 ( D

. C. C i r. 1 9 9 7 ) (a m b i gu i t y i s a c oncl us i on r eac hed wh en t he ques t i on pre s ent ed i s not an s wer ed "at t he l eve l of l i t er al la n g u a g e " ). I n th is c a se , t h e S e c re ta ry a sse rts th a t t h e m e a n ing o f t h e re g u la tio n is cle a r b e c a u se the se n te n c e p rio r to t he o ne at i ss ue ref

ers t o bo t h " d i seas es and i njuri es. " H o wever, t he Se cret ary o f f ers no supp o rt f

o r hi s ass ert i o n t hat t he su b ject of t hi s p ri o r s ent ence should b e graf t ed onto t he sent ence at i ss ue, whi ch exp l i ci t l y ref ers t o "d i seas es" o n ly. N umer ous au t hor i t i es s t at e t hat wh en a s t at ut e or r egu l at i on om i t s a t er m i n one p l ace t hat i s us ed i n ot her pl ace s , t hat o m issio n sh o u ld b e re g a rd e d a s inte n tio n a l an d giv e n e ff e c t. See Savag e v
. G ob er , 10 V et

. A p p
. 48 8 , 49 6 (19 9 7 ) ( ci t i ng R uss el l o v. Uni t ed St at es , 4 6 4 U .S . 1 6 , 2 3 (1 9 8 3 ) (" ' [W h e re ] C o n g re ss in c lud e s p a rtic u la r la n g u a g e in o n e se c tio n o f a st at ut e b ut om i t s i t i n ano t her s ect i o n of t he same A ct , i t i s general l y presum ed t hat C o ngres s act s i nt ent i o nal l y and p urpo sel y i n t he d i sparat e i ncl usi o n or excl usi o n. ' " ) ( q uo t i ng Uni t e d S t a t e s v
. Wo n g Ki m Bo , 4 7 2 F.2d 72 0 , 72 2 (5t h C i r. 1 9 7 2 ) ( al t erat i o n i n R u sse llo )) ); c f. B r ow n v. G ardner , 5 1 3 U .S . 1 1 5 , 1 1 8 (1 9 9 4 ); D av e np or t v
. Br own , 7 V et

. App. 476, 4 8 4 (1 9 9 5 ). In the a b se n c e o f a u tho rity s u p p o rting a n o p p o site c o n c lus io n , th e S e c re ta ry' s te x tua l a rg u m e n t is su sp e c t.

T o the e x te n t t h a t t h e S e c re ta ry a rg u e s tha t th e re a re o v e r 6 0 ,0 0 0 c a se s w h e re hyp h e n a te d ra ting s a re c u rr e n tly bei n g u s ed t o r at e i n

j u r i es , i t i s a l s o w el l e s t abl i s h ed t h at t h e u n ch al l en g ed h i s t ori ca l pr ac t i ce of t h e Se cr et ar y i s n ot e v id e n c e th a t th e p ra c tice is co rr e c t. See B r ow n v. G ardner , 51 3 U

. S. at 122 ( "' T he l eng t h of r egu l at i ons ' un s cr ut i ni zed and uns crut i ni zab l e exi st ence' [do es] not al o ne .
. . enhance any cl ai m t o d ef erence. " (quo t i ng G ar dn e r v
. Br own , 5 F. 3d 1 4 5 6 , 14 6 3

- 6 4 (Fed

. C i r. 19 9 3 )) ). T he sheer num b er of s uch cases d o es not pro ve t hat even a si ngl e o ne i s co rr ect

. T he Se cr et ar y h as n ot of

f er ed a s i n g l e e x ampl e of wh er e t h e u s e of

a h y ph en at ed r at i n g f

or a n i n j u r y w ou l d a dd i n f

or mat i on r at her t han di s gu i s e e r r or. I n t hi s r ega r d, t he C our t not es t hat many di s eas es ha ve t hei r own s peci f i c di agn ost i c c od e. See , e. g. , 38 C. F. R

. §§ 4

. 71 a, D C 500 2 (r heu mat oi d (a t r op hi c) ar t hr i t i s ) , 4. 12 0, D C 791 3 (di abet es mel l i t us ) , 4. 12 4a, D C 89 1 0

- 1 4 (epi l ep sy ) ( 2 0 0 6 ). I t m akes sense t o ha ve a t o o l that e xp l ai ns ho w such di seas es ar e b ei ng rat ed when t he ex pl i ci t di ag n os t i c code f or t h e con di t i on i s i n ade qu at e. H owe v er , t h e r ema i n der of t h e r at i n g code i s n ot or g an i ze d by inj u ry. R a th e r , it is g e n e ra lly o rg a n iz e d b y b o d y p a rt a n d the li m itatio n s the re o n . W h e re a n inj u ry c a u se s a sp e c ifi c l i mi t at i on t o a pa r t i cu l ar body pa r t , t h er e i s n o appa r en t ne ed f or addi t i on al i n f

or mat i on i f

t h e a ppr opr i at e di ag n os t i c code i s ch ose n. I f

mo r e t han one l i mi t at i on i s pre s ent , t hen t he ap p ro p riat e co ur s e i s t o re cogni ze eac h of t hem an d t hen c o m b ine the two se p a ra te ra ting s. See Es t eban , 6 V et

. A pp
. at 261

. I f a s er vi ce- conne ct ed d i sab i l i t y c au ses an ot her di s abi l i t y t o occur , t he appropri at e c our s e i s t o gr ant s econdar y s er vi ce conne ct i on an d, ag ain, r at e t he di s abi l i t i es se p a ra te ly. Se e L i be r t i ne v
. Br own , 9 V et

. App. 521, 522 ( 1996) ; 38 C. F. R. § 3. 310( a) ( 2006)

. T h e Se cr et ar y doe s n ot o f f er an exam p l e o f

a s ituat i o n where a hy p henat ed rat i ng co d e wo ul d be an ap p rop ri at e vehi cl e m erel y ad d i ng info rm a tio n a b o u t ho w a n inj u ry is b e ing ra te d inste a d o f av o id ing a w a rd ing two se p a ra te ra ting s w h e n two se p a ra te d isa b ili ties a re p re se n t. U l t i mat el y , t h e Cour t r ec og n i ze s t h at i t i s t h e pr er og at i v e of t h e Se cr et ar y t o i mpl eme n t t i t l e 38 of t h e U

. S. Code 5 informational in that the MG XXinjury was not an unusua l res i du al of the sc arr ing but r ather a separ ate disability . In this reg ard, this Court has held that if a n injury or disease manifests with two differ ent disabilities, then two separa te ratings should be a

war ded. Smith v. Nicholson , 19 Vet.App. 63 , 7 5 ( 20 05 ); Es te ba n v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.Ap p
. 259, 261 (1994). He nce, the hy phenate d ratingwas improper he re be cause it was used in violation of prec edent that r equire s two differ ent disabling

c o n d i t i o n s ( a

s c ar an d a mu s c l e i n

j ur y) t o b e r at e d

s e p ar at e l y. See38 C.F.R. § 4.27.

1thr o u g h re g u la tio n . If the S e c re ta ry w e re to a m e n d h is r e g u la tio n s o th a t th e s e n te n c e o n hyp h e n a te d ra ting e x p licitly

ref erred t o bo t h "d i seas es and inj uri es" t hen t here w o ul d b e no is sue f o r t he C o urt t o res o l ve regardi ng t he p l ai n m eani ng o f t h e re g u la tio n . H o w e v e r, the C o u rt re m ind s the S e c re ta ry a fun c tio n ing syste m o f la w s m u st g ive p rim a c y to the p la in l anguage o f

aut ho ri t i es , not t he Se cret ary ' s l i t i gat i o n po si t i o n. W i t ho ut s t and ard wo rd m eani ngs and rul es of co nst ruct i o n, nei t her C o ngres s no r the S e c re ta ry can know ho w t o wri t e aut ho ri t i es i n a way t hat co nveys t hei r i nt ent and no p ract i t i o ner or– m o re i m p o rt ant l y

– vet eran can rel y on a st at ut e o r regul at i o n t o m ean what i t ap p ears t o s ay. I n s uch a real m , cl ai m ant s wo ul d al ways b e at t he m ercy of t he Se cret ary ' s l i t i gat i o n po si t i o n and t here wo ul d be no m eani ngf ul ro l e fo r t he C o urt t o p erfo rm und er the se p ara t i o n o f p o w ers. T his i s no t t he m an ne r i n which t he rule o f l aw o p era t es. 6 We must now address the a ppropriate reme dy

. The appellant argues that the fa cts nec essar y to support separate disability rating s have be en found a nd that the Court sho u l dassig n a 10% disability ratingfor the MGXX injury and continue the 10% disability ratingfor his sca

r. Ap pe lla nt' s B r. at 14 -1 5. Th e Se c re tary c onte nd s that a re mand is ne c e ssa ry forapp rop riate fac tfinding. Sec reta

ry 's Br . at 6-7. We agree with the Secre tary . Whil e the B oard f ound that the qualifications for a 20% disa bility ratingfor MG XX had not been met (R. at 12), a fair r eadingof the B oar d decision indicate s that the Boa rd did not notice or c onsider the implications of the improper hy

phenate d ratingor make a fa ctual findin g on whether the appe llant's MG XX injury qualifies for

a sepa rate 10% disability

rating

. The B oard c oncluded: " In essenc e, ther e is no evidenc e of a moderately sever e disability

. . . . There fore , the Boa rd finds that a rating in ex ce s s o f t he

c ur re ntl y a ssi g ne d 1 0[% ] inj ur

y to M us c le Gr ou

p X X i s n ot w arranted." R. at 12 . F ro m th is statement, the B oard e vidently believed that the appellant' s pree x isting 10% disability rating was for a muscle injury , when in fa ct it was for his scar. We de cline to rea d purposef ul fac tfinding into the Boa rd' s evident conf

usion. Accor dingly , the 1 0 % d i sability ratingfor his sca

r re mains under DC 7804, and the B oard must deter mine whether

a separ ate disability rating is w arr anted under DC 5320 f o r th e M G X Xi n

j ur y. On re mand, the appe llant is fre e to submit additional evidenc e and argument, and the B oard must c onsider any such evidenc e or ar gument submitt ed. See Kay v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 529, 534 (2 00 2) ; Kutscherousky v . W est , 12 Ve t.A

pp . 369 , 372 -7 3 (19 99 ) (p e r curi am or de r) . T he B oa rd sh a ll proce ed expeditiously , in acc ordanc e with 38 U .S.C. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2005) (requiring Secre tary to provide for

"e x peditious treatment" of cla ims remanded by Boa rd or Court). C. 38 C.F.R. § 4.56 and the Appe llant's Arm Injury As to the appellant' s rig ht, upper a rm injury , he ar gues that he is entitled to a hig her r ating "a s a matter of

law" beca

use the B oard misapplied 38 C.F.R. § 4.56 in failingto acknowle dg e the7

reta ined metallic fr ag ments in his mus cle. Appe llant's B r. a t 1 5. In makingthis argument, he

ex pl ici tl y st ate s t hatth e erro r occ urr ed "un der t he fa cts fou ndby th e Board ." Id. We observe that the third enumer ated findingof fa ct in the B oard de cision is: "The [appellant]' s [S FW] of the rig ht up pe r a rm re su lts in no si gnific ant r e sid ua ls a nd is e sse nti a lly

a sy mpt omatic ." R. at 3. Th is

enumer ated f

inding wa s based on the B oard' s findin g, du ri n g a De cembe r 2001 examination, that "the [appellant] hi mself admitted that his rig ht arm pre sented no res t ri ctions and movements and clinical finding s did not demonstrate otherwise." R. at 11. Acc ording ly , the question is whether an
app e llan t w h o h a s r e t a i n e d m e t a l l i c f r a g m e n t s i n th e mu s c l e b u t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a s y mp t o m at ic is entitled to a compensa

ble disability

under the applicable regulation as a matter of law. Th e a pp e lla nt b a se s h is a

rgume nt on the l angua g e of 38 C.F .R. § 4 .5 6, wh ic h r e a ds in pe rt ine nt p art :

(d) Under

diag nostic codes 5301 through 5323, disabiliti es re sulting fr om muscle injuries shall be classified as sl ight, moderate, moderately sever e or se ve re , a s f

oll ow s: (1) Sli gh t di sa bil ity of m us c le

s— (i) Ty peof i nju ry . Si mpl e wo un d o f m us c le without debridement or inf ection. (ii) History and complaint

. Service depar tment rec ord of superf

icial wound wi th b ri e f t

re atme nt a

nd re tur n to d uty . H e a lin gwi th g oo d f

un c tio na l r e su lts

. No ca rdinal si g ns or sy

mptoms of muscle disability as def ined in para g raph (c) of this section. (iii) Objectivefindings

. Min ima l sc ar. No e vid e nc e of fas cia l d efec t, atrophy , or impaired tonus. No impairment of funct i o n or m e ta lli c fragm ents re tained in m uscle tissue. (2) Mo de ra tedis ab ili ty

of m us c le s— (i ) Ty peof i nju ry . Throug h and through or deep pe netrating wound of short trac k from a single shell, small shell or shra pnel fra g ment, without ex plosive eff ect of high ve locity

mis s ile, residuals of debride ment, or prolong ed infe ction. (ii) Hi sto ry an d c om pla int

. Service depar

tment r ecor d or other evidenc e of in-servic e treatment f

or the wound. Record of

consistent complaint on rec ord from first e x amination forwa rd, of one or more of

the ca rdinal sig ns and sy mptoms of muscle disability as def ined in para g raph ( c) of

this section, particula rly lowere d threshold of fa tigue afte r ave rag e use, aff ec t i n gthe pa rt ic ula r f un c tio ns c ontr oll e d b y

the inj ur e d mu sc le s.8 (iii) Ob je c tiv e Fi nd

ing s. Entranc e and (if prese nt) exit scar s, small or linear, indicating short trac k of missil e throug h muscle tissue. Some l o s s o f d eep fasc ia or muscle substance or impairment of muscle tonus a nd loss of power or lower ed thre shold of fatigue whe n compar ed to the sound side. (b o l d fa ce emp h as i s ad d ed ). The essenc e o f t h e ap p el l an t 's ar gum en ti s th atth i s emp h as i z edl an gu age in § 4. 56 (d ) i s a

pe r s e ba r t o r atin ga

musc le in

ju ry a s " sli g ht" (n on c omp e ns a ble un de r 3 8 C. F .R. § 4.73, DC 5303(2006)) where there are reta ined metallic fr ag ments. The Secr etar y responds that it is notclea

r whe ther the f

ragme n t s n o t ed are in the muscle or the surroundingsoft tissue. Secre tary ' s Br . at 6. Both pa rties base their ar guments exclusively o n t he plain languag e of the regulation. Howeve r, eve n though the parties ig nore our prior case law in this area , we a re not fr ee to do so. See Harrison v. Derwinski , 1 Vet.App. 438 ( 1991) (e n banc or der) (notingthat this Court's pub l i shed opinions are binding prec edent and must be re specte d under pr inciple of star e dec isis). The meaning of the languag e at i ssue has pre viously been c onsidered by

this Court i n Ro be rts on v . B ro wn , 5 V e t.A pp . 7 0 ( 19 93 ). Ab se nt som e ba sis fo r c on c lud ingthat Robertson is no longe r valid, we are obligated to apply

it to the ex tent that it controls the outcome of this ca se. Robertson considere d the same regulatory provisions now contained in § 4.56(d) whe n they

wer e pre viously

contained in 38 C.F .R. § 4.56(c) ( 1995). In Robertson , the Court addre ssed the meaningof the provisions in a func tionally identical conte x t when the a ppellant ar gued that–r e g ard le ss o f a c tua l di sa bil ity –h e wa s e nti tle d to a

" mod e ra te ly se ve re " dis a

bil ity ratin g" sim

ply beca use [his] wound included de bridement." 5 Vet.App. at 73. The Court reje cted this interpre tation of the re gulation, he ld that the criter ia mentioned in 38 C.F .R. § 4.56(c) ( 1995) we re me rely "f actor s to be consider ed," and fur ther he ld that no specific f act e stab l i s h ed entitlement to any particula r rating

. Robertson , 5 Ve t.A pp . at 74 . T he Court

c on c lud e d th at " [t]he a dju dic ator mus t c on sid e r a ll the fa ctors set for

th in the r egulations a

nd make de terminations based on the fac ts of the par ticular

case ." Id. On its fa c e , th e a

pp e l l a nt ' s a r gume nt t hat r e ta ine d me ta l f

ra g me nts in t

he mus c le wo uld

e nti tle him to a pa rt ic ula r r atin ga s a

matte r o f law is no t fun c tio na lly dif fe re nt f ro m th e argume nt i n Robertson that th e e xiste nc e of de br ide me nt m and ate s a sp e c if ic rat ingre g ard le ss o f o the r f a c ts. Howeve r, Robertson ' s validity is not bey ond question. Our dec ision in Robertson was ba sed in part9

o n th e th e n - e xt an t h e a d i n g o f § 4

. 5 6 , w h i c h r e a d : " Factors to be considered in the evaluation of disab ilities res i d u a l to healed wou nds involvi ng m uscle groups du e to gunshot or other tr a u m a. " 38 C.F .R. § 4.56 (1995) (italic e mphasis added) . After Robertson w a s d e c id e d , the regulati o n was re org anized; a portion of 38 C.F.R. § 4.72 (1995) was mer g ed into § 4.56; and the fac tors listed in paragraph ( c) w ere moved to the newly cre ated para g raph (d). 62 Fe d.Reg . 30,235- 40 (Jul y 3, 1997). At that time, the S ecr etar y dropped the "f

actor s to be consider ed" languag e fr om the § 4.56 hea ding. T he Secr etar y also added a new para g raph (c) , which is refe rre d to in the revised languag e that wa s moved to para g raph ( d). Id. The ne w p ar agr ap h (c ) st ates: " For VA rating purposes, the car dinal signs a nd sy mptoms of muscle disability are loss of power, w eakne ss, lowere d threshold of fa

tigue , fatigue-pa in, impair m en t o f coordination and uncer tainty of movement." 38 C.F.R. § 4.56(c) . Significa ntly h o weve r, VA' s commentary acc ompanying the reor g anization expli citly states "w e d[o] not intend to pr opose a substantive chang e." 62 Fe d.Reg . at 30,236. Since the re org anization, neither of our published decisions touchingo n § 4.56 has sug g ested that the

c ha ng e is s ub sta

nti ve or that Robertson is no longe r g ood law. See Jones v. Principi , 18 Vet.App. 24 8 ( 20 04 ); Mariano v. Principi , 17 Vet.App. 305 ( 2003). In the a bs e nc e of any ba sis fo r fi nd ingthat Robertson has bee n superc eded, w e must conclude that it re ma ins va lid . In th is r e g ard , w e no te that th e a dd it io n of th e cur re nt p ara g ra

ph(c ) i s consistent with Robertson and the Sec reta ry ' s comment that no substantive cha ng e was int ended. Robertson interpre ted the prior ver sion of the re gulation as cre atingwhat is, in essenc e, a totality -ofthe-c ircumstance s test. Whi le the test was not e x plicit in the pr ior version or in Robertson , the new pa ra g ra ph(c ) m e re ly

ha d th e e ff

e c t of me mor ia lizin gthe pr a c tic e of g ivi ng the c omm on ly de te c ta ble

manif e statio ns of

mus c le dis a

bil ity pr ior ity in e va luatin ga ll the fa c tor s to be c on sid e re d. As we he ld in Robertson and

re a ff ir m he re , 3 8 C. F .R. § 4 .5 6( d) is e sse nti a lly a tot a lity -o f- the -c ir c ums tanc e s te st and no sing le fa ctor is per se controlling

. T hu s co n tra ry

t o th e ap p el l an t 's ar gum en ti n th i s ca s e, b ec au s e n o s i n gl e f ac ti s co n tro l l i n g, Robertson contra dicts his contention that he was entitled to a compensable rating as a matter of law based on r etained me tallic fra g ments in the muscle. Acc ording ly , the Board' s decision to assig n a "s light" (noncompe nsable) r atingfor his ar m injury based upon the uncontested f inding that the appellant is "e ssentially asy mptomatic" was not a misapplication of the r egulation as a matter of law.10

The only other a rgument the appe ll an t asserts to challeng e B oard' s decision as to his arm inj ur y is that th e B oa

rd a c te d unc on sti tut ion a lly in a pp ly ing the mus c le -i nju

ry ratin gc ri te ri a differ ently

to two simil ar injuries. We need not addre ss that argument here . As we a re va catingthe Boa rd' s decision as to the ratingof the muscle injury to appellant' s back a

nd rema nding that matter fo r r e a dju dic atio n, the re is n o f ina l de c isi on

a s to t hat mu sc le inj ur

y and it c ann ot b e sa id at th is t ime that these two muscle i njuries have been tr eate d differ ently

. See Cromer v. Nicholson , 19 Vet.App. 215, 219 (2005) ( indicatingthere is no basis for deciding an is sue t hat i s not supported by a fa ctual predic ate)

.

III . C ON CL USI ON Acc ording ly , the Boa

rd' s decision denying the appellant' s claim for a n incre ased r atingfor residuals of a

n SFW to the back is VACATED and that matter is REMANDED for f urther proce eding s consistent with this opi nion; the decision is otherwise AF FI RMED.

GREENE, Chief Judge , c o n c ur r i n g : I c o n c ur

w i thth e h o l d i n g s i nth i s c a s e
. I w r i t e s e p ar at e l y, ho we ve r, be c a

us e Iwo uld

ho ld a dd iti on a lly

that Mr . Tr op f' s con sti tut ion a l ar gume nt i s w ith out me ri t and should be disposed of acc ording ly

. The Equa l Protection Clause " is essentially a dire ction that all pers on s s im il arl y

si tu ate d s ho ul d b e tr eat ed al ik e." Cleburne v. Cleburne Li ving C tr, Inc ., 47 3 U.S. 43 2, 43 9 (19 85 ). Mr . Tr op f ar gue s that tre atin g his arm and ba c k d isa bil iti e s d if

fe re ntl y in the ratingschedule is a violation of due proc ess; he as s erts that he should be awa rded a compensa ble rating f

or his arm beca u s e i t i s essentially the same injury

as his back injury . That argument is without m erit bec au s e t reating a veter an' s own injuries diffe rently is not unequal treatment of "

persons si mi lar ly

si tu ate d. " Cleburne , su pra (e mph a sis a dd ed) ; Re e v es v . W est , 11 Ve t.A pp . 2 55 (1 99 8) ; Cla rk

e v . B ro wn , 10 Vet.App. 20 ( 1997).