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21–949PS 2006

THE FUTURE OF NASA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 28, 2005

Serial No. 109–19

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

KEN CALVERT, California

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington

MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana

JOHN J.H. ‘‘JOE’’ SCHWARZ, Michigan

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

VACANCY

VACANCY

BART GORDON, Tennessee

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

BRAD SHERMAN, California

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

JIM MATHESON, Utah

JIM COSTA, California

AL GREEN, Texas

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas

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C O N T E N T S

June 28, 2005

Page

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 9

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10

Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................ 10

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14

Statement of Representative Ken Calvert, Chairman, Subcommittee on Space

and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ....... 15

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 16

Statement of Representative Mark Udall, Ranking Member, Subcommittee

on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ..................................................................................................................... 17

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 17

Prepared Statement of Representative Ralph M. Hall, Member, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 18

Prepared Statement of Representative Curt Weldon, Member, Committee on

Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................. 19

Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 20

Prepared Statement of Representative Russ Carnahan, Member, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 20

Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................ 20

Prepared Statement by Representative Al Green, Member, Committee on

Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................. 22

Witness:

The Honorable Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 23

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 24

Discussion

Timetable for Information ................................................................................... 34

Budget Firewalls .................................................................................................. 36

Returning to Flight .............................................................................................. 39

The Centrifuge ..................................................................................................... 39

Financial Management ........................................................................................ 39

Aeronautics ........................................................................................................... 40

Hubble Space Telescope ....................................................................................... 41

The Iran Nonproliferation Act ............................................................................ 42

Center Workforce ................................................................................................. 46

FFRDC .................................................................................................................. 48

Safety and Risk .................................................................................................... 48

Voyager and CEV ................................................................................................. 49

Page

IV

Life Science Research .......................................................................................... 50

Space Grant Programs ......................................................................................... 50

Lessons Learned From the International Space Station .................................. 56

Workforce .............................................................................................................. 57

Manned Space Flight vs. Unmanned Space Flight ........................................... 58

Debris Hazards ..................................................................................................... 60

The Value of Humans on the Moon .................................................................... 60

Strategic Decision-making ................................................................................... 60

The Role of HBCs ................................................................................................. 60

Launch Vehicle Determination ........................................................................... 61

U.S. Preeminence in Space .................................................................................. 63

Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

The Honorable Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and

Space Administration .......................................................................................... 66

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record

Review of President’s FY 2006 Budget, Statement by Michael D. Griffin,

NASA Administrator ............................................................................................ 78

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THE FUTURE OF NASA

TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE,

WASHINGTON, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L.

Boehlert [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.

2

3

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The Future of NASA

TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 2005

10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M. 2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose:

On Tuesday, June 28, 2005 at 10:00 a.m., the Committee on Science will hold a

hearing on the future of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA). NASA Administrator Michael D. Griffin will be the sole witness. The hearing will examine Administrator Griffin’s guiding philosophy and plans for NASA’s

programs in human space flight, space science, Earth science, and aeronautics, as

well as plans for the Agency’s workforce, organization, and infrastructure. The hearing will set the stage for the Committee’s action the following day on the NASA authorization bill.

Overarching Questions:

1. What are Administrator Griffin’s priorities and how does he plan to maintain

a balanced portfolio of science, aeronautics, and exploration programs?

2. What is the status of NASA’s plans to define the final configuration of and

research agenda for the International Space Station? What is the status of

NASA’s plans for returning the Space Shuttle to flight and for retiring it at

the end of the decade?

3. What is the status of NASA’s plans to define the Vision for Space Exploration, including accelerating the Crew Exploration Vehicle and selecting

launch vehicles?

4. How does Administrator Griffin intend to ensure the Agency has the appropriate size and skill mix in its workforce, as well as the facilities and infrastructure necessary to support the Agency’s goals?

Overview:

Dr. Michael D. Griffin was sworn in as NASA’s 11th Administrator on April 14th.

Administrator Griffin takes the reins of the Agency at a crucial time, when NASA

faces significant issues in nearly every facet of the Agency’s operations. Since taking

office, Administrator Griffin has moved swiftly to begin tackling critical issues in

many key areas. He has been personally involved in reviewing plans for returning

the Shuttle to flight later this year. He has directed a team to undertake a study,

to be completed in July, to define the final configuration of the Space Station, its

research agenda, and to develop plans to continue Space Station following the retirement of the Shuttle, which he has stated will be in 2010. He has directed another team to undertake a study, to be completed in July as well, to better define

plans for NASA’s exploration program, including accelerating the Crew Exploration

Vehicle (CEV) to minimize the gap after the Shuttle is retired in 2010 and defining

the launch vehicle options for missions back to the Moon. Griffin has also made several significant organizational and personnel changes, including removing many key

managers at headquarters and realigning the reporting structure for NASA’s field

centers so they report directly to him.

Looking forward, Administrator Griffin will have many critical decisions to make

over the next year. He will need to install a new management team to replace those

leaving their posts, and key decisions will be made as to what the focus and responsibilities of the various field centers will be and what facilities at those field centers

are necessary to implement the Agency’s goals. So far, Griffin has indicated a strong

preference for giving the field centers more responsibility to manage programs and

rebuild the expertise resident within the government.

Over the next year, Administrator Griffin will have many programmatic and technical issues to address. He will have to decide, once the Shuttle has flown a couple

of times, whether the Agency should move forward with a Hubble servicing mission.

Griffin will have to decide whether to recommend a Shuttle-derived launch vehicle

4

or use existing rockets for heavy lift missions to the Moon, a recommendation to be

made jointly by the Administrator and the Secretary of Defense. He will also have

to decide how to pay for increased costs on several programs, such as the recent cost

increase on the Webb telescope, while maintaining a balanced portfolio of exploration, science, and aeronautics programs.

On the policy side, NASA and the Administration are still working out proposed

legislative changes to the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA), which currently prohibits

the U.S. from purchasing or bartering for Soyuz capsules and Progress vehicles for

the Space Station. Without a legislative proposal, it’s difficult to know whether Congress would approve the change in law, but if the current law is not amended, the

U.S. would not be able to have a permanent presence on the Space Station, at least

not until the CEV was available. NASA is reportedly developing plans on how they

would proceed with the station if the law is not changed, should that situation arise.

Issues:

Shuttle Return-to-Flight

Administrator Griffin’s first priority has been to review NASA’s progress in preparing the Space Shuttle for return-to-flight. He has personally participated in several technical reviews in preparation for the launch. Shortly after becoming Administrator, he postponed a planned Shuttle launch in May because of technical concerns with the Shuttle’s External Tank and to provide additional time to complete

some of the analysis. The launch is now scheduled for July 13th.

The Stafford-Covey Return-to-Flight Task Group, created to oversee NASA’s implementation of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s (CAIB) return-to-flight

recommendations, has approved all but three of the CAIB’s 15 return-to-flight recommendations. The three remaining items relate to developing an adequate tile repair capability, completing an analysis of potential sources of debris that could harm

the Shuttle, and hardening the Shuttle against potential debris damage. The Stafford-Covey panel is scheduled to hold its final meeting on Monday, June 27th and

will then provide NASA with its final results and recommendations.

Griffin will ultimately make the final decision on whether the Shuttle is ready

to launch. The launch window extends from July 13th through to July 31st. The

next launch window occurs in September.

Planning for Human Space Flight: Shuttle Transition and CEV Acceleration

Administrator Griffin has indicated that he will take a different approach in developing the missions to return astronauts to the Moon. He has created a new Office

of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) and charged it with developing two

critical plans for NASA’s human space flight programs: one to examine options for

how to configure the Space Station to conduct the research NASA must do to enable

human exploration in deeper space, to minimize the number of Shuttle flights necessary to finish putting the station together, and to ensure the Shuttle can retire

by the end of 2010.

The second planning effort involves developing the strategy for how to return astronauts to the Moon and possibly to Mars, including how to accelerate the development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle to minimize the gap between the retirement

of the Shuttle and the first flight of the CEV, when the U.S. will not have its own

capability of putting an astronaut into space. Both studies will be completed this

summer in time to aid key Agency and Congressional decisions.

Administrator Griffin has set a goal to accelerate the Crew Exploration Vehicle

(CEV) so it is ready as close to 2010 as possible to minimize any gap. Griffin has

also directed that the CEV be designed to fly to the Space Station, a requirement

that had not been set previously. NASA recently awarded contracts to two industry

teams to begin preliminary design work for the CEV. Later this year, NASA is expected to release updated specifications and plans for accelerating the CEV. A key

decision will be the selection of the launch vehicle for the CEV program.

Webb Telescope Cost Increase

Recently NASA announced that the cost of the James Webb Space Telescope, one

of NASA’s highest priority space science programs, was expected to increase by approximately $1 billion to a total of $4.5 billion. Under current plans, the mission

is scheduled to be launched in 2011. NASA has convened a science panel and an

engineering panel to review the mission, focusing on options to control costs and

perhaps scale back the program. The panels’ reports and recommendations are due

to be completed later this summer. Any increases in cost will likely have to be borne

by the science program. Both NASA and the scientific community will face tough

choices as the options for dealing with Webb telescope become clear and a decision

on whether NASA should conduct a Hubble servicing mission nears.

5

Workforce and Institutional Issues

The reduction in aeronautics funding proposed in the fiscal year 2006 budget request would require the elimination of 1,100 civil service jobs at NASA centers, although NASA has also said that there will not be any layoffs in 2006. In addition,

NASA officials insist that there are no plans to close any NASA centers. Also, the

retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010 will require NASA to address the size and

skill mix of a significant segment of the workforce at some centers. Work on the

CEV and other elements of the mission to the Moon will significantly help offset

the loss of Shuttle work, but some jobs and skills may still need to be eliminated.

NASA may be able to help affected employees take advantage of training, retraining, and job placement programs to help the transition.

How to ‘‘right size’’ NASA, its facilities, and its workforce, and ensure NASA has

the necessary skill mix, are among the issues Griffin and Congress will have to face.

Iran Nonproliferation Act Limits Use of the Space Station

NASA faces a legal hurdle, the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA), that could affect

utilization of the Space Station after April 2006. The U.S. is totally dependent on

Russian Soyuz capsules for crew rescue, and without access to Soyuz capsules,

Americans will not be able to stay on Space Station for long duration missions. U.S.

astronauts will still be able to visit the Space Station using the Shuttle and will

be able to continue construction of the station, but the Shuttle is not capable of remaining docked to the Space Station long enough to provide a crew rescue capability. NASA policy prevents astronauts from being aboard the Space Station if

there is no rescue capability. Russia is currently providing capsules under an agreement that was grandfathered into the INA. However, Russia fulfills its obligation

under that agreement in April 2006 and will no longer provide capsules or other

services without payment.

The INA prohibits the U.S. from purchasing or bartering for services from Russia

in connection with the International Space Station unless the President certifies

that the Russians are not proliferating nuclear or certain missile technologies to

Iran—a certification the President is highly unlikely to make. NASA has no known

alternative plans for providing a crew rescue capability beyond buying such services

from the Russians, until the CEV is available.

The matter is currently the subject of an interagency review, and the Administration is expected to send up a legislative proposal to amend the INA as early as next

month. However, it is unclear how Congress would react to such a proposal with

Iran being such a focus of attention in foreign policy. The International Relations

Committee shares jurisdiction with the Science Committee over the INA, so any legislative effort would involve both committees. If Congress fails to amend the INA,

the U.S. would not be able to use the Soyuz as a rescue vehicle or to use Russian

Soyuz and Progress vehicles to ferry astronauts and cargo, respectively, to and from

the Space Station. NASA has begun the process of developing contingency plans for

the Space Station in the event that an exception in INA is not made for whatever

reason. Without access to Soyuz, U.S. astronauts could be there as long as the Shuttle is docked, and thus could continue to utilize the station as long as the Shuttle

is flying, but only on short-term visits. After the Shuttle is retired they would not

be able to be there at all until the Crew Exploration Vehicle is available.

The Future of the Hubble Space Telescope

Two days after the President’s speech announcing the Vision for Space Exploration in January of 2004, NASA announced that it would not use the Shuttle to

conduct further servicing missions to the Hubble Space Telescope. Then-Administrator Sean O’Keefe cited Shuttle safety concerns as the primary reason for his decision. Widespread criticism led NASA to explore the possibility of a robotic servicing

mission. A December 2004 report from the National Research Council, however, concluded that a robotic servicing mission was not likely to succeed in the time available. In the fiscal year 2006 request, NASA requested funds only for a de-orbit mission (to ensure that Hubble re-enters from orbit without posing danger to populated

areas).

During his April 2005 confirmation hearing, however, Administrator Griffin

pledged to revisit the decision after the Shuttle returns to flight and its risks are

better understood following the post-Columbia modifications. He also directed NASA

engineers to resume planning for a Shuttle servicing mission so they could move forward expeditiously if needed. Work on more advanced space telescopes, such as the

Space Interferometry Mission and the Terrestrial Planet Finder, is being deferred

in order to preserve the option to service Hubble and provide for its safe de-orbit.

6

Aeronautics Research, Wind Tunnels and Workforce

Over the last decade, funding for NASA’s aeronautics budget has declined by more

than 50 percent, to about $900 million. For fiscal year 2006, NASA proposes a relatively small decrease ($54 million, or about six percent) in aeronautics research

and development compared to 2005. The proposed five-year budget projection for

aeronautics contemplates substantial funding reductions (20 percent) for aeronautics

research, together with significant cutbacks in its civil service and contractor

workforces. Civil service personnel and infrastructure costs account for much of the

aeronautics budget, largely because of the expenses involved in the operation and

maintenance of NASA’s 31 wind tunnels. Specifically, the aeronautics program receives only six percent of NASA’s total budget, yet it employs more than 20 percent

of the entire NASA workforce and is responsible for 40 percent of all of NASA’s infrastructure costs.

NASA commissioned a study last year from RAND, which concluded that NASA

should continue to operate 29 of its 31 wind tunnels. RAND estimated the annual

operating cost of all 31 tunnels to be $125–$130 million. RAND argued that while

some of the tunnels were not well used now, they offered capabilities that could be

needed in the future and that would be hard to replicate if the tunnels were shut

down. RAND also argued that while some questions that once needed to be solved

with wind tunnels could now be answered through computer simulation, many critical questions still required wind tunnels. It also said that wind tunnel data were

sometimes needed to develop computer simulation software.

The Committee held a hearing on aeronautics earlier this year and the House appropriations bill restores the cuts to the fiscal year 2006 budget. In addition, the

appropriations bill includes a legislative provision directing the Administration to

develop a national aeronautics policy to guide NASA’s aeronautics research program.

Balancing Science and Exploration

The President’s Vision for Space Exploration provides the human space flight program with a clear set of goals to guide its programs. Many applaud the Administration for providing clear direction for the human space flight program, but it has also

made others nervous, particularly in the science community, that the Vision will require a disproportionate amount of NASA’s funding and that valuable science programs will suffer.

In the past, Congress has a played an important role in ensuring that a balance

exists between science and human space activities. However last year, because of

the uncertainty surrounding the implementation of the Vision and the unknown

costs of the return-to-flight costs for the Shuttle, Congress provided an unprecedented level of authority to transfer funding between appropriations accounts. The

effect of this authority was to remove the ‘‘wall’’ between science and human space

activities.

Administrator Griffin has stated that the Vision is not intended to undermine

other core functions of the Agency, such as aeronautics, space science, and Earth

science, but it is not yet clear how NASA will maintain a balance between science

and human space activities within its projected budget.

Organizational and Personnel Changes

Administrator Griffin has moved quickly in making key personnel and organizational changes. First, he announced that the directors for each of NASA’s field centers would report directly to him, instead of through the Associate Administrators.

Next, he informed three of the four Associate Administrators (human space flight,

science, and exploration) of his intent to reassign them to other positions within the

Agency. The fourth Associate Administrator (for aeronautics) has decided to step

down. Additional personnel changes are expected over the next several months as

Griffin begins to install his own management team. An important issue is how

quickly he will be able to fill key slots to completely staff his management team.

FY 2005 Operating Plan Update

On May 11, Administrator Griffin submitted an updated Operating Plan for fiscal

year 2005. The plan provides the first complete picture of how NASA is prioritizing

its funding for 2005. The plan fully funds the $762 million increase above the appropriated amount for 2005 for returning the Shuttle to flight and provides the full

$291 million appropriated to begin planning for a Hubble servicing mission, as well

as re-programs over $500 million in cost increases for several programs, most notably to cover costs for the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, scheduled for launch this

August, and the New Horizons mission to Pluto set to launch in January 2006. The

plan also fully funds Congressionally-directed items, as adjusted for the rescission.

7

Administrator Griffin has said that his overarching philosophy in finding offsets

is to eliminate lower-priority programs rather than reducing all programs in the

face of budget difficulties. To do so, he must set clear priorities within the budget

that has been allocated. To pay for the increases included the Operating Plan NASA

is considering a two-year delay in the Mars Science Laboratory to 2011. To pay for

the 2005 costs to prepare for a possible Hubble servicing mission, NASA will defer

work on several advanced space telescopes, such as the Space Interferometry Mission (SIM) and the Terrestrial Planet Finder. NASA is also reviewing plans for its

nuclear systems program, Project Prometheus. NASA has indefinitely deferred the

Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO) and will focus on higher priority and more nearterm needs for nuclear power, such as for use as a power source on the Moon’s surface. A summary of NASA’s Operating Plan changes is in the Appendix.

8

9

Chairman BOEHLERT. The Committee will come to order.

It is a great honor and pleasure to welcome Dr. Michael Griffin

this morning in his first appearance before this committee as

NASA Administrator. Dr. Griffin appeared before us many times as

a private citizen, and he has long served this committee as a trusted advisor. The announcement of his nomination was greeted in

these precincts with something close to glee, and we have not been

disappointed.

Mike has taken on his duties with gusto and with candor. In fact,

it would be easy to paint Mike as a Don Quixote-like figure, lost

in his books. Mike does not realize that idealism has dimmed, and

he suits up and wanders about NASA, righting old wrongs, questioning old varieties, and rescuing programs in distress.

But there is an essential difference between Administrator Griffin and the man of La Mancha. The errors Dr. Griffin is battling

are real, and the results are consequential rather than comic.

Indeed, much is riding on Dr. Griffin’s tenure at NASA. Each

and every NASA program is facing fundamental questions. What

will the CEV look like, and what will we do on the Moon? What

kind of aeronautics research will NASA pursue and at what facilities? Will NASA continue to have a robust Earth science program?

What is the future of the Hubble and Webb telescopes? What will

be done about the Iran Nonproliferation Act?

And those are just a few of the basic issues. In fact, more than

two years after the President announced his Vision for Space Exploration, NASA can barely give a definitive answer to a single

question about its programs. That is not, believe it or not, criticism

of NASA. The Agency is rethinking its activities, and the answers

will take time. Moreover, Administrator Griffin wisely sent some of

his teams working on the answers back to the drawing board. But

it is important to remember that we are pretty much flying blind

right now. We expect to have the first answers about the human

space flight program some time in July. And NASA will have to answer the most fundamental question about its current manned programs this week, when it determines whether to return the Shuttle

to flight. As yesterday’s Stafford Covey deliberations indicated, that

is a close question. And I am ready to abide by any decision Administrator Griffin makes.

But even as NASA wrestles with these thorny issues, congress

needs to move ahead with authorizing legislation. The bill that

Chairman Calvert and I introduced yesterday provides a framework for moving forward, ensuring that Congress has the information it needs to make more detailed policy calls in the years ahead.

I look forward to working with all of the members of this committee as we move the bill forward to enactment over the next several months.

There are two matters on which the bill is crystal clear: first,

that we should move ahead with returning to the Moon by 2020;

and second, that human space flight programs cannot become the

sole mission of the Agency. Figuring out how to balance those goals

will be no easy task, but it is essential. Part of the answer is ensuring that the Shuttle is indeed retired no later than 2010. But it will

take more than that to ensure that NASA continues to have vibrant and productive aeronautics, Earth science, and space science

10

programs, programs that are not evaluated in terms of the vision

but on their own terms for their own contributions.

I look forward to working with Administrator Griffin, who also

wants to see a balanced and multi-mission NASA. And so I look

forward to hearing from the Administrator on his latest thoughts

this morning. If things don’t go well, he can just write us off as one

more windmill he has to tilt with today.

Thank you.

Mr. Gordon.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT

It is a great honor and pleasure to welcome Mike Griffin this morning in his first

appearance before this committee as NASA Administrator. Dr. Griffin appeared before us many times as a private citizen and he has long served this committee as

a trusted advisor. The announcement of his nomination was greeted in these precincts with something close to glee.

And we have not been disappointed. Mike has taken on his duties with gusto and

with candor. In fact, it would be easy to paint Mike as a Don Quixote-like figure:

lost in his books, Mike does not realize that idealism has dimmed, and he suits up

and wanders about NASA, righting old wrongs, questioning old verities and rescuing

programs in distress.

But there’s an essential difference between Administrator Griffin and the Man of

LaMancha: the errors Mike is battling are real, and the results are consequential

rather than comic.

Indeed, much is riding on Mike’s tenure at NASA. Each and every NASA program

is facing fundamental questions: what will the CEV look like and what will we do

on the Moon? What kind of aeronautics research will NASA pursue and at what facilities? Will NASA continue to have a robust Earth science program? What is the

future of the Hubble and Webb telescopes? What will be done about the Iran NonProliferation Act?

And those are just a few of the basic issues. In fact, more than two years after

the President announced his Vision for Space Exploration, NASA can barely give a

definitive answer to a single question about its programs.

That is not, believe it or not, a criticism of NASA. The Agency is rethinking its

activities, and the answers will take time. Moreover, Administrator Griffin, wisely,

sent some of the teams working on the answers back to the drawing board. But it’s

important to remember that we are pretty much ‘‘flying blind’’ right now. We expect

to have the first answers about the human space flight program some time in July.

And NASA will have to answer the most fundamental question about its current

manned programs this week, when it determines whether to return the Shuttle to

flight. As yesterday’s Stafford-Covey deliberations indicated, that is a close question,

and I am ready to abide by any decision Administrator Griffin makes.

But even as NASA wrestles with these thorny issues, Congress needs to move

ahead with authorizing legislation. The bill that Chairman Calvert and I introduced

yesterday provides a framework for moving forward, ensuring that Congress has the

information it needs to make more detailed policy calls in the years ahead. I look

forward to working with all the Members of this committee as we move the bill forward to enactment over the next several months.

There are two matters on which the bill is crystal clear. First, that we should

move ahead with returning to the Moon by 2020, and second that human space

flight programs cannot become the sole mission of the Agency.

Figuring out how to balance those goals will be no easy task, but it is essential.

Part of the answer is ensuring that the Shuttle is indeed retired no later than 2010.

But it will take more than that to ensure that NASA continues to have vibrant

and productive aeronautics, Earth science and space science programs—programs

that are not evaluated in terms of the Vision, but on their own terms, for their own

contributions. I look forward to working with Administrator Griffin, who also wants

to see a balanced and multi-mission NASA.

And so I look forward to hearing Administrator Griffin’s latest thoughts this

morning. If things don’t go well, he can just write us off as one more windmill he

had to tilt with today.

Thank you.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11

I want to welcome not only Dr. Griffin, but also our audience

today. I think the number of folks that are here indicate the significance of this hearing, and I am sure there are many more that are

watching elsewhere. So welcome everyone. And as usual, I want everyone to know that I concur with my Chairman and his statement, and we are on board in most ways—and in sync in our direction for NASA.

Dr. Griffin, you have come to the job of Administrator with impressive technical credentials and a wealth of experience. I want to

wish you well. I look forward to working with you to ensure that

the United States maintains a strong and robust civil space and

aeronautics program.

I count myself among the supporters of the Exploration Initiative. I believe that the long-term goals for human space flight program proposed by the President makes sense. At the same time, I

must say that I am concerned about where NASA is headed and

about the large number of unanswered questions that remain almost 18 months after the President announced his Exploration Initiative.

And let me elaborate for a minute on some of those unanswered

questions. For example, what is the overall architecture for achieving the President’s exploration goals? That is, where are we going,

how are we going to get there, what are we going to do when we

get there, how long will it take, and how much will it cost?

Last year, we were told that there was a rigorous process underway involving 11 concept exploration and refinement teams from

industry and academia working with NASA to answer these questions. Now we are being told that the process is no longer relevant.

Instead, a small internal NASA team has been tasked with coming

up with an exploration architecture by some time in July.

Another set of questions. What is the Crew Exploration Vehicle

going to do? How are we going to acquire it? And what will it cost?

Last year, we were told that there was a rigorous process to develop a ‘‘System of Systems’’ concept for the CEV and associated

launch vehicles, incorporating a ‘‘spiral development’’ acquisition

approach.

Now we are being told that the planned CEV acquisition approach is no longer relevant and that a new approach is being

taken in order to accelerate the CEV, but there is no way of knowing, at this point, how much it will cost to accomplish the accelerated program.

What is the International Space Station going to be used for, and

what is it going to look like? Last year, we were told that the International Space Station research program was being restructured to

more closely align it with the Exploration Initiative and that Congress would be given the restructured plan last fall.

Now we are being told that the entire ISS program content is

once again being restructured and that it will be later this summer

before we will know what those plans are. And we hear that our

international partners are very concerned about the impact on

their plans from NASA’s restructuring.

And what is the priority of the nuclear power and propulsion system in the President’s Exploration Initiative? For the last several

years, we were told that the most appropriate demonstration of the

12

Project Prometheus space nuclear technology would be the scientific probe to Jupiter’s moons, called the JIMO mission.

Now we are being told that the JIMO mission is essentially dead,

that Project Prometheus is being restructured, and that the main

Project Prometheus activity at present appears to be transferring

money from NASA to DOE’s Office of Naval Reactors.

Last year, we were told that it was important to undertake the

whole series of exploration systems research and technology development projects at a cost of more than $700 million in fiscal year

2005 alone.

Now we are being told that the funding for many of those proposed projects has been put on hold. Now I could go on, but I hope

my point is clear. Almost 18 months after the President announced

his Exploration Initiative, basic questions are still unanswered,

and much of what Congress was told last year is no longer valid.

Yet in the absence of needed information, Congress is being

asked to support the exact funding levels for exploration proposed

in the fiscal year 2006 NASA budget request, almost $3.2 billion,

and to cut other non-exploration programs in order to free up funds

for the initiative.

That is, we are being asked to make a ‘‘trust me’’ vote on NASA’s

funding requests, and I might add that is what the previous Administrator not only asked but demanded and received, and you see

where we are.

Dr. Griffin, you have only been on the job for about two months,

and you cannot be held accountable for anything that had gone on

at the Agency prior to your arrival. At the same time, given all of

the changes you have made to the exploration program since you

became NASA Administrator, it would seem that you have concluded that none, or rather not all of more than $2 billion allocated

for NASA’s exploration system program since January 2004, has

been wisely spent. And that is troubling, because even $100 million of that exploration system’s funding could make a significant difference in the

health of NASA’s aeronautics program or NASA’s Earth science

program.

Yet the reality is that under the President’s plan, those other

programs may increasingly become bill payers for the Exploration

Initiative in coming years, and the healthy balance that should

exist between all of NASA’s core missions will be lost. That is certainly going to be the case if NASA continues cutting NASA’s—or

if the Administration continues cutting NASA’s out-year funding

profile in the upcoming fiscal year 2007 request as it did in the fiscal year 2006 request, while at the same time attempting to hold

on to the President’s milestones for his Exploration Initiative.

Unfortunately, the results of that approach are already evident.

Some 2,500 current NASA employees are at risk of losing their

jobs. Scientific missions are being canceled, deferred, or cut, and

NASA’s aeronautics approach—or program is on a path of becoming ‘‘irrelevant’’ in the words of one of the recent witnesses before

this committee.

In addition to being a waste of human capital and infrastructure

built up at NASA over the last forty years, I believe such actions

will make it increasingly difficult to sustain support for NASA’s

13

budget in coming years as the Agency’s focus is narrowed and the

overall fiscal situation facing the Nation becomes worse. I hope we

can avoid such an outcome, but I think it will require a course of

correction within NASA and the White House if that is to succeed.

Now, Mr. Griffin, what does all of this mean? Let me tell you.

You remember very well a few years ago when we had a number

of votes at a time when we had a tough—we had world-record

budget deficits, we had a lot of needs here on Earth, and the question was: ‘‘Should we continue with the International Space Station?’’ And after a number of votes, by only one vote did the Space

Station succeed.

Now what I am afraid that we are going to see is, at a time when

we have even worse deficits, even more needs on Earth, we are

going to see a series of attempts to take money out of Mission to

Mars and put it here on Earth. And as we do this, and it is not

going to be tomorrow, it is going to be in the next three or four

years, during that same period of time, I am afraid that we are

going to see a cannibalization of other programs in NASA. We are

going to see a lot of long-term employees with expertise and core

missions within the centers to be lost.

And so the situation then could very well be, at this point, and

whatever it might be in three or four years, we have those same

kind of votes. The—we decide that money, rather than going to

Mars, ought to be placed in schools or veterans or something else

on Earth, while at the same time, we have already undermined our

existing programs. Well, then do we say, ‘‘Well, NASA now is not

relevant in even more ways, and there are even more cuts.’’ That

is my concern.

And so I also have a suggestion. And let me tell you what my

suggestion is. I am taking a little more time than I normally do,

maybe going back to some previous times, because you haven’t

been to see me yet, and so I want to have—take this opportunity

to let you know.

Here is what I think that we need to do.

If we are planning on going to Mars in the year 2030, or I guess

it is 2035 or beyond, then rather than 30 years, it might be 31

years. I don’t think we are any worse off, and we might save a lot

of money. What I would hope you would do is go forward with

those things we know that need to be done. We have got to returnto-flight. We have got to get this Crew Exploration Vehicle going.

We need to go ahead and look for the—a heavy payload type of lift.

We have got to do those things, but let us slow down in terms of

restructuring NASA until we—until you answer those questions

that are out there. Let us take this year to try to find out what

are those programs outside the exploration mission that really are

important. Let us have some priorities there. Let us be sure that

we are not going to have this start-stop approach any longer. I

think we will save money. I think it would be the best thing for

NASA, and I hope that you will give that some consideration.

And thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. I guess I am

reclaiming lots of time that I yielded early in the past.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]

14

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE BART GORDON

Good morning. I want to join the Chairman in welcoming Dr. Griffin to today’s

hearing.

Although Dr. Griffin has testified before this committee on previous occasions,

this will be the first time we will have a chance to hear from him in his capacity

as NASA Administrator.

Dr. Griffin, you come to the job of Administrator with impressive technical credentials and a wealth of experience. I want to wish you well, and I look forward to

working with you to ensure that the United States maintains a strong and robust

civil space and aeronautics program.

I count myself among the supporters of the exploration initiative—I believe that

the long-term goals for the human space flight program proposed by the President

make sense. At the same time, I must say that I am concerned about where NASA

is headed, and about the large number of unanswered questions that remain almost

18 months after the President announced his exploration initiative.

Let me elaborate for a minute on some of those unanswered questions. For example, what is the overall architecture for achieving the President’s exploration goals—

that is, where are we going, how are we going to get there, what will we do when

we get there, and how long will it take and how much will it cost?

Last year, we were told that there was a rigorous process underway involving 11

Concept Exploration and Refinement teams from industry and academia working

with NASA to answer those questions. Now we are being told that that process is

no longer relevant—instead, a small internal NASA team has been tasked with coming up with an exploration architecture by sometime in July.

Another set of questions: What is the Crew Exploration Vehicle going to do, how

are we going to acquire it, and what will it cost? Last year, we were told that there

was a rigorous process to develop a ‘‘System of Systems’’ concept for the CEV and

associated launch vehicles, incorporating a ‘‘spiral development’’ acquisition approach.

Now we are being told that the planned CEV acquisition approach is no longer

relevant, and that a new approach is being taken in order to accelerate the CEV—

but that there ‘‘is no way to know’’ at this point how much it will cost to accomplish

that accelerated program.

What is the International Space Station going to be used for, and what is it going

to look like? Last year, we were told that the International Space Station research

program was being restructured to more closely align it with the exploration initiative—and that Congress would be given that restructured plan last fall.

Now we are being told that the entire ISS program content is once again being

restructured, and that it will be later this summer before we know what the new

plans are. And we hear that our International Partners are very concerned about

the impact on their plans of NASA’s latest restructuring.

What is the priority of nuclear power and propulsion systems in the President’s

exploration initiative? For the last several years, we were told that the most appropriate demonstration of Project Prometheus’s space nuclear technologies would be

a scientific probe to Jupiter’s moons, the so-called JIMO mission.

Now we are being told that the JIMO mission is essentially dead, that Project

Prometheus is being restructured, and that the main Project Prometheus activity

at present appears to be transferring money from NASA to DOE’s Office of Naval

Reactors.

Last year, we were told that it was important to undertake a whole series of Exploration Systems Research and Technology development projects at cost of more

than $700 million in FY 2005 alone.

Now we are being told that the funding for many of those proposed projects has

been put on hold. I could go on, but I hope my point is clear. Almost 18 months

after the President announced his exploration initiative, basic questions are still unanswered. And much of what Congress was told last year is no longer valid.

Yet in the absence of needed information, Congress is still being asked to support

the exact funding levels for exploration proposed in the FY 2006 NASA budget request—almost $3.2 billion—and to cut other non-exploration programs in order to

free up funds for the initiative.

That is, we are being asked to make a ‘‘faith-based’’ vote on NASA’s funding request.

Dr. Griffin, you have only been on the job for about two months, and you cannot

be held accountable for anything that had gone on at the Agency prior to your arrival. At the same time, given all the changes you have made to the Exploration

program since you became NASA Administrator, it would seem that you have conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:38 May 19, 2006 Jkt 021949 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\062805\21949 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
15

cluded that not all of the more than $2 billion allocated for NASA’s Exploration Systems program since January 2004 has been wisely spent.

That’s troubling, because even a $100 million of that Exploration Systems funding

could make a significant difference to the health of NASA’s aeronautics program or

NASA’s Earth science program.

Yet, the reality is that under the President’s plan, those other programs may increasingly become bill payers for the exploration initiative in coming years and the

healthy balance that should exist between all of NASA’s core missions will be lost.

That is certainly going to be the case if the Administration continues cutting

NASA’s out year funding profile in the upcoming FY 2007 budget request as it did

in the FY 2006 request while at the same time attempting to hold on to the President’s milestones for his exploration initiative.

Unfortunately, the results of that approach are already evident: Some 2,500 current NASA employees are at risk of losing their jobs; scientific missions are being

canceled, deferred, or cut; and NASA’s aeronautics program is on a path to becoming ‘‘irrelevant,’’ in the words of one of the recent witnesses before this committee.

In addition to being a waste of the human capital and infrastructure built up at

NASA over the last 40 years, I believe such actions will make it increasingly difficult to sustain support for NASA’s budget in coming years as the Agency’s focus

is narrowed and the overall fiscal situation facing the Nation worsens. I hope we

can avoid such an outcome, but I think it may require a course correction within

NASA and the White House if we are to succeed.

Well, we have a lot to talk about today. I again want to welcome you to this morning’s hearing, Dr. Griffin, and I look forward to your testimony.

Chairman BOEHLERT. The spirit of cooperation.

The Chair is pleased to recognize the distinguished Chairman of

the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Mr. Calvert of California.

Mr. CALVERT. And in the spirit of brevity, Mr. Chairman, I will

be very brief.

Today, we welcome NASA’s 11th Administrator, Dr. Mike Griffin,

and his first appearance before this committee. Tomorrow, we will

mark up the first NASA authorization bill in a number of years in

the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, which I am certainly

happy to Chair. And I am very hopeful that we will be able to get

this bill through the House of Representatives before the August

work period where we can go into conference with the United

States Senate.

Dr. Griffin, you are certainly a breath of fresh air for NASA, and

we are really looking forward, as you can tell, to working with you

to build a better and stronger NASA together.

As you know, we are beginning a second space age, as I like to

put it. The first space age was born in the Cold War. The second

space age will feature space exploration while achieving synergy

with commercial, civil, national security space programs. Doctor,

you are in a place to lead us in the second space age, and we will

work together to build a better NASA.

For NASA to develop an overall grand strategy, we must have

a strategy for NASA’s aeronautics research and technology as well

as a multi-year plan for NASA’s science programs that parallel

NASA’s vision for space exploration. Once we have well defined

mission strategies, NASA will be able to move forward more effectively and efficiently in its core areas.

As you know, I plan on visiting all of the NASA centers in this

Congress, and so far I have visited Kennedy Space Center. I plan

to be at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory on July 3 to observe the climax of Deep Impact program as it collides with a comet, and for

16

the first time, we will have a good look inside a comet. This will

be an exciting evening.

At each of these centers, I have been impressed with the enthusiasm, dedication, and the technical skills of the workforce. I spoke

with a number of workers who were preparing the Space Shuttle

for return-to-flight, processing components of International Space

Station, conducting life science research, and testing experimental

vehicles. This NASA community is comprised of a talented workforce with skills that America cannot afford to lose.

I believe that Mike Griffin is the right person to lead this talented workforce in a direction to benefit our nation and to enhance

our competitiveness globally. Administrator Griffin said in a speech

last week, ‘‘My feet are firmly grounded in reality, but I am also

grounded in the idea that we need to change some of the definition

of reality.’’

I look forward to working with you as we change the definition

of reality and work into this second space age, and I certainly welcome your testimony today.

And I yield back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Calvert follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN KEN CALVERT

Today, we welcome NASA’s 11th Administrator, Dr. Michael Griffin, in his first

official appearance as Administrator before the House Science Committee. Tomorrow, we will mark up the first NASA Authorization in a number of years in the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, which I chair. I am very hopeful that we will

be able to get our bill through the House of Representatives before our August district work period.

Dr. Griffin is a breath of fresh air for NASA and we are really looking forward

to working with him as we build a better and stronger NASA together. We are beginning a ‘‘Second Space Age.’’ The first space age was born of the Cold War. This

Second Space Age will feature space exploration while achieving synergy with the

commercial, civil and national security space programs. Dr. Griffin is now in place

to lead us in this Second Space Age as we work together to make a better NASA.

For NASA to develop an overall grand strategy, we must have a multi-year plan

for NASA’s aeronautics research and technology as well as a multi-year plan for

NASA’s science programs that parallel NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration. Once

we have well-defined missions and strategies, NASA will be able to move forward

more effectively and efficiently in all its core areas.

I plan to visit all the NASA centers this Congress and so far, have visited the

Kennedy Space Center and Dryden Flight Research Center. I plan to visit the Jet

Propulsion Laboratory on July 3, to observe the climax of the Deep Impact program

as it collides with a comet and we have our first look inside a comet. At each of

these centers, I have been impressed with the enthusiasm, dedication and technical

skills of the workforce. I spoke with a number of the workers who are preparing

the Space Shuttle for the Return-to-Flight, processing components of the International Space Station, conducting life-science research, and testing experimental

vehicles. This NASA community is comprised of a talented workforce with skills

that America cannot afford to lose.

I believe that Mike Griffin is the right person to lead this talented workforce in

a direction to benefit our nation and to enhance our competitiveness globally. As Administrator Griffin said in a speech last week, ‘‘my feet are firmly grounded in reality, but I am also grounded in the idea that we need to change some of the definition of reality.’’

I look forward to working with Administrator Griffin as we change the definition

of reality and move into this Second Space Age.

I welcome Dr. Griffin to testify today.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Calvert. And

thank you for the leadership you are providing in the Subcommittee during a very important time for the Agency.

Mr. Udall.

17

Mr. UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Dr. Griffin.

I am going to hopefully—put myself in the same spirit as my

chairman, Mr. Calvert, and be brief.

If I could, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask for unanimous consent to include my entire statement in the record.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Without objection.

Mr. UDALL. Dr. Griffin, I think it may be a bit of a clich ́ e, but

I think it is worth saying that NASA is at a crossroads, and this

is the focus that we want to have at this hearing is how we balance

all of these competing interests. The President has given us a new

long-term vision for human space flight. I support that vision, but

I am not sure how all of these aspirations, as I just said, fit into

the budget that has been provided to NASA.

Congressman Calvert, Congressman Gordon, and Congressman

Boehlert talked about the aeronautic side of NASA. I have concerns

based on what we have heard recently from non-government witnesses, and looking at the President’s budget, I think those concerns are worth considering. That is one of the reasons I introduced, along with a group of bipartisan supporters, H.R. 2358, the

Aeronautics R&D Revitalization Act, which I would like to see incorporated into the NASA reauthorization.

The concerns I have also heard from the fundamental biology

and microgravity research communities, as well as from commercial organizations, and about what we are going to do in the areas

of Earth and space science, I think, are worth hearing. And I look

forward to your testimony today in that regard.

As I close, I do want to thank you for your willingness to start

preparing for a Shuttle servicing mission to the Hubble space telescope, contingent, of course, on a successful return-to-flight of the

Space Shuttle. It is one of the most significant space laboratories

ever launched, and I believe we should continue to utilize it to its

fullest capacities as long as it remains productive.

So again, Doctor, it is a tremendous opportunity to have you

here. Thank you for your service. And I look forward to hearing

your testimony and engaging further with you in the question and

answer period.

Mr. Chairman, I would yield back any time I have remaining.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Udall follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE MARK UDALL

Good morning and welcome, Dr. Griffin. I look forward to working with you in

the months ahead, and I wish you all the best as you shoulder your new responsibilities.

While it can sound like a bit of a cliche ́ to say that NASA is at a crossroads, I

think it nonetheless is an accurate description of the current situation.

The President has given NASA a new long-term vision for its human space flight

program—one that I support. At the same time, it’s not at all clear that the President’s aspirations fit the budget that has been provided to NASA.

And one result of that mismatch is that the highly productive balance that has

existed between NASA’s space science, Earth science, aeronautics, and human space

flight activities is at risk of being seriously damaged.

The evidence of the stresses on NASA’s non-exploration programs is all around

us.

At a recent hearing before the Space Subcommittee, there was unanimity among

all of the non-government witnesses that NASA’s aeronautics programs have been

18

negatively impacted by the budget cuts of recent years and that the President’s proposed five-year budget for aeronautics will significantly worsen the situation.

That is one of the reasons I and a bipartisan group of co-sponsors introduced H.R.

2358, the Aeronautics R&D Revitalization Act, which I would like to see incorporated into the NASA Authorization.

The situation facing NASA’s Earth-Sun Systems program is no better. The

Science Committee heard compelling testimony from a panel of respected experts

that bluntly concluded that the Nation’s Earth observations program is at risk. And

we have heard about productive missions being threatened with termination due to

budgetary shortfalls.

In addition, although we have not yet had a Space Station oversight hearing, I

and my staff have been hearing from the fundamental biology and micro-gravity research community, as well as from commercial organizations.

Their message is the same.

For more than 15 years, NASA has been telling them that there would be a place

for their research on the ISS. Now however, it appears that the budgetary demands

of the exploration initiative are going to cause NASA to break those long-standing

commitments.

While all of this has been going on, the unfortunate fact is that 18 months after

the President first announced his exploration initiative, specifics on NASA’s plans

are still hard to come by. That concerns me, especially given the fact that the specifics we do have from NASA concern cuts to NASA’s non-exploration programs.

I hope that Dr. Griffin will be able to shed some light on what NASA’s plans are

for both exploration and for NASA’s other core missions, as well as for its workforce.

We will need that information if we are to do our oversight jobs properly, and I

think enough time has passed for us to be justified in asking for specifics.

Finally, before I close, I would just like to express my appreciation to Dr. Griffin

for his willingness to start preparing for a Shuttle mission to service the Hubble

space telescope, contingent of course on a successful return-to-flight of the Space

Shuttle.

As you know, Hubble is one of the most significant space observatories ever

launched, and I believe that we should continue to utilize it to its fullest as long

as it remains scientifically productive.

Mr. Chairman, today’s hearing is an important one for this committee, and I look

forward to hearing from our witness. Thank you.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

How is that for a warm welcome?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Very interesting.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE RALPH M. HALL

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on the future of NASA. On the

eve of the Subcommittee markup of the NASA Authorization bill, it is useful to hear

what the Administrator of the space agency thinks about the future of the organization.

Dr. Griffin, I would like to congratulate you on your new position as the 11th Administrator of NASA. You have a challenging task ahead, but I know that you are

more than capable of leading this agency into a bright and exciting future. I am

already pleased with the direction you have been going since taking the position on

April 14.

When President Bush announced the new Vision for Space Exploration in January

2004, I was excited to see that NASA had a new direction and focus for the future.

Our ventures into space not only keep America at the forefront of exploration and

innovation, but they also are vital to our economy and our national security. This

new Vision sets America on a course toward the Moon and Mars, and we should

embrace this dream and work to make it a reality.

The money that we put into NASA grows exponentially when we consider the scientific and technological spin-offs that space exploration provides. Experiments conducted on the Space Shuttle and International Space Station expand health research and move us toward cures for some of our most threatening diseases. Microgravity experiments in the 1990s led to advances in antibiotics to fight infections.

These experiments also unlocked secrets to protein growth that produced medicines

to treat patients who have suffered from strokes and to prepare them for open-heart

surgery. Americans suffering from osteoporosis also benefit from bone-density experiments conducted on the International Space Station in microgravity environments. These tests accelerated the clinical trials of a drug that is expected to be

19

on the market soon. From the development of MRI technology to microchips, the scientific partnerships between NASA and American universities and companies ensure our nation’s viability, increase our nation’s competitiveness, and help drive our

economy.

A few weeks ago, I had the opportunity to meet with the astronauts who will be

returning to flight next month on the Shuttle. Returning the Shuttle to flight is the

first step toward meeting the goals of the Vision, and it helps America fulfill its

promise to our international partners to complete the International Space Station.

I know that NASA has made progress toward making the Shuttle as safe as possible, and I am pleased that the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) approves of many of the changes the Agency has made.

Retiring the Shuttle in 2010 and moving to a newer, safer vehicle is a welcome

goal. As contractors develop the new Crew Exploration Vehicle for human space

flight, we need to make sure that a viable crew escape system for our astronauts

is incorporated into the design of the spacecraft. As we implement the new space

vision, I will work to ensure that NASA fulfills this priority and minimizes the risks

for our brave men and women who fly our space missions. Our hopes and dreams

ride with them, and we must do all we can, at whatever cost is necessary, to ensure

their safety.

Dr. Griffin, thank you again for coming to Capitol Hill today to tell us of your

plans for NASA. I look forward to working with you and your staff to reach these

goals together and move America toward its destiny in space.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weldon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE CURT WELDON

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and Administrator Griffin, I appreciate the

opportunity to submit my testimony for the record.

First, I would like to officially congratulate Administrator Griffin on his new position and thank him for taking the time to come to Capitol Hill and address the

Committee’s questions and concerns. I look forward to working with him to create

a stronger more viable NASA.

I also look forward to the Shuttle’s possible Return-to-Flight later this month. I

trust the Administrator’s experience and expertise will enable him to make the right

decisions about the safety of the Shuttle’s launch while taking into account the recommendations set forth by the Stafford Covey Return-to-Flight Task Group (SCTG).

I do support NASA’s desire to further explore space and recognize the immeasurable value in learning more about our solar system, but I would be remiss if I

did not voice my concerns over the projected costs of the President’s Vision for Space

Exploration. I am concerned that too much of our precious resources and funding

will be diverted away from other NASA programs in favor of space exploration.

As a senior Member of this committee, over the past several years, I have witnessed the decrease and now elimination of funds for rotorcraft research. As an aggressive supporter of rotorcraft funding and research, I am greatly concerned that

this important program is being neglected. NASA has cut aeronautics research by

half between 1998 and 2003 and requested zero dollars for its rotorcraft research

programs for FY03–FY06.

I am truly concerned about what will happen to the U.S. Aeronautic industry if

the Federal Government continues to ignore rotorcraft funding. As you know, the

U.S. aerospace industries are highly reliant on technologies enabled by NASA research. Aerospace business markets today make it difficult for companies to invest

huge sums in high-risk, long-term R&D activities. The consequences of insufficient

research and development investment are already being felt. There is a direct relationship between the viability of federal aeronautics R&D conducted by NASA, the

future of the U.S. aeronautics and transportation industry, and economic growth.

I fear that our country’s neglect of rotorcraft could pave the way for other nations

to surpass the United States in development of a technology with the potential to

change the way we travel. To this end, I have established the Center for Rotorcraft

Innovation (CRI), which will provide a single, coordinated, national focus within industry and academia for cooperation with the government on rotorcraft. CRI will

focus on emerging and unmet national needs in rotorcraft operations and technology, and will function as a venue where the public and private sectors can work

together for the sake of the American rotorcraft industry.

In my opinion, the establishment of future rotorcraft technology, systems and infrastructure is also critical to promote national security, and emergency response.

The war in Iraq clearly demonstrates how precious helicopter assets are to AmeriVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:38 May 19, 2006 Jkt 021949 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\062805\21949 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
20

cans in harms way for the purpose of emergency evacuation, combat and logistical

support.

So in closing, I would just like to again reiterate my disappointment that this important program has consistently suffered major funding cuts. I ask that the Administrator provide me with information on his vision for the future or Aeronautics

funding, specifically Rotorcraft within NASA. In the meantime, I will continue to

use my position as a senior member of this committee and Vice-Chairman of the

Armed Services and Homeland Security Committees to advocate and fight for increased federal rotorcraft and aeronautics dollars. Thank you for you time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE JERRY F. COSTELLO

Good morning. I want to thank Administrator Griffin for appearing before our

committee to discuss the FY06 Budget for NASA. Today’s hearing serves as an opportunity for oversight of certain departmental programs. My colleagues on the

Science Committee and I have been calling for the Administration to establish a vision for the space program even before the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy. Last

year, when the President announced his space exploration initiative, I was pleased

we were setting long-term goals for our nation’s human space flight program. However, a year later many of NASA’s plans and organizational arrangements for implementing the initiative are in flux. I am concerned that NASA is proceeding aggressively on the implementation of the President’s exploration initiative and is making

fundamental changes in its priorities without providing Congress with more specifics as we consider the FY06 budget request for NASA. While the Administration

continues to bolster this initiative and state it is affordable under the budgetary

plan developed by NASA, NASA’s track record on the credibility of its cost estimates

over the last several years is at best mixed. The President’s proposal will have a

high price tag and it should not come at the cost of our commitment to our children,

our veterans, our seniors, and our other important domestic priorities. We currently

have over a half-trillion dollar deficit and the case is going to have to be made to

this committee and the American people why this proposal should be supported in

the face of that deficit.

In last year’s FY05 Omnibus, the appropriators gave NASA a great deal of latitude to determine the allocation of the funds appropriated to it, with the understanding that the appropriations committees would review that allocation as part

of the standard Operation Plan process. I realize it is too early to draw definitive

conclusions about NASA’s performance on the exploration initiative because most of

its efforts over the last year have been focused on developing requirements and

‘‘roadmaps’’ and restructuring its organization. Yet, the all of these efforts are still

unclear at this point. Since Administrator Griffin has indicated that he intends to

significantly reshape NASA’s human exploration-related program and has suspended or terminated many of the exploration-related planning activities that were

underway when he became Administrator, I am concerned NASA’s commitment to

building the Agency’s core foundation of aeronautics and aerospace research and development as well as its missions of exploration are overlooked.

I welcome the Administrator and look forward to his testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carnahan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE RUSS CARNAHAN

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, thank you for hosting this hearing, and

Mr. Griffin, thank you for joining us today to discuss the future of NASA. I am very

interested in hearing your testimony.

Many on this committee have been paying attention to NASA’s budgetary decisions and what these choices mean for the long-term direction of the Agency. In particular, I look forward to hearing your perspective on how or if NASA will be able

to balance the President’s space exploration agenda with the Agency’s traditional

multi-mission approach.

We are pleased to have you with us for the first time and I look forward to this

morning’s hearing.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Gordon,

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I want to thank you for organizing this important hearing to discuss The Future

of NASA. I want to welcome Dr. Griffin, the new NASA Administrator and thank

him for coming before this committee this morning. NASA faces a watershed moment after having endured a tremendous tragedy in the Columbia disaster and now

trying to map its future with a return to the Moon and manned exploration of Mars.

Unfortunately, while I wholeheartedly support the work of NASA, I am deeply

concerned that the President’s budget does not meet all the needs for future space

exploration as we move forward in this new century. A lack of necessary budget authority makes the job for a new Administrator much more difficult and brings in

to question the true vision for NASA. As I have stated before, this Administration

has made many bad budgetary choices, which continue to push us further into a

huge deficits and mounting debt during the last four years. In addition, the President has proposed a highly questionable plan for Social Security along with an uncertain military future in Iraq that in conjunction with proposed $1.6 trillion tax

cuts will result in less funds being available for vital agencies such as NASA.

I have been supportive of President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration because

I firmly believe that the investment we make today in science and exploration will

pay large dividends in the future. Similarly, I do not want to put a cap on the frontiers of our discovery, NASA should aim high and continue to push our nation at

the forefront of space exploration. However, I find it hard to be more supportive of

the President’s plan, when I have no real specifics as to what this plan will entail.

Large missions of this sort require detailed planning and as a Members of Congress

we deserve to know how exactly the President’s plan proposes to accomplish its objectives so that we can set out the proper resources and provide the necessary oversight. In addition, the President stated that the fundamental goal of his directive

for the Nation’s space exploration program is ‘‘. . .to advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through a robust space exploration program.’’ I could

not agree more with that statement; unfortunately, this President’s own budget does

not meet the demands of his ambitious agenda. One year after the Administration

laid out a five-year funding plan for NASA that was intended to demonstrate the

affordability and sustainability of the exploration initiative, the Administration submitted a budget proposal for 2006 that would reduce that funding plan by $2.5 billion over the next four years. For example, in 2006, the Administration is seeking

$546 million less than it said would be needed for NASA in 2006 in the five-year

funding plan that accompanied last year’s request. In fact 75 percent of the $2.5 billion shortfall will fall to NASA’s science and aeronautics programs. This kind of

under-funding for vital programs is unacceptable. Again, it is even more alarming

because the President has not provided a detailed plan as to how he intends to accomplish his space exploration agenda; certainly draining money from the budget

will not help that cause. I hope Administrator Griffin will be able to shed some light

on the vision of NASA with the current budget shortfalls.

My greatest concern at this point is that we may not allocate enough money or

resources to ensure the safety of all NASA astronauts and crew. After the Columbia

disaster, safety must be our highest priority and it is worrisome that there is not

a noticeable increase in funding to address all safety concerns. Presently, NASA is

working towards a resumption of Space Shuttle flights, with the date for such a

launch in uncertainty at this point. However, once NASA returns the Shuttle to

flight status, it is then supposed to begin the task of figuring out how to retire the

Space Shuttle fleet in 2010 while continuing to fly the Shuttle safely up to the very

last flight. I am concerned that pressure to retire the Shuttle by a fixed date to free

up resources for other activities, coupled with the need to fly up to 28 Shuttle flights

to assemble the Space Station, could—if not handled properly—lead to the types of

schedule and budgetary pressures that were cited by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) as contributing to the Columbia accident. I hope this concern

is paramount at NASA as we move forward in the future.

As Members of this committee know, I have always been a strong advocate for

NASA. My criticism of the President’s budget and its relation to the vision for NASA

is intended only to strengthen our efforts to move forward as we always have in

the area of space exploration and discovery. NASA posses an exciting opportunity

to charter a new path that can lead to untold discoveries. As always I look forward

to working with the good men and women of NASA as we push the boundaries of

our world once again.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE AL GREEN

Chairman Boehlert and our Ranking Member, Mr. Gordon, I appreciate the opportunity that you have provided us to speak to the newly appointed Administrator of

NASA, Dr. Michael Griffin. First and foremost, Administrator Griffin, let me extend

my congratulations.

As a Member of the Science Committee, I have had the distinct pleasure of following NASA’s progress as it has moved towards its Return-to-Flight mission scheduled in mid to late July. I have also followed NASA while it has re-defined itself

behind President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration. Let me reiterate my support

for NASA.

With Johnson Space Center only moments away from the 9th Congressional District of Texas, I must admit that NASA is an entity near and dear to the interest

of my district. I remember the ebullience that our nation felt when Neil Armstrong

walked on the Moon in 1969. Our young people need to witness similar achievements that will drive them into advanced careers in science, engineering, and math,

and I truly believe that the Vision for Space Exploration will be one giant step towards that goal.

I am however concerned with such a focused approach because NASA has successfully accomplished a broad mission including aeronautics, Earth science, and additional space research programs that do not revolve around this Vision for Space Exploration. I must say I am cautious about NASA’s return-to-flight because of the inherent risks to our brave astronauts. As we eagerly await the return-to-flight mission, I am seeking the assurance that NASA has done everything in its power to

ensure the safety of its crews. The Vision for Space Exploration is a superior ambition, however we cannot afford another devastating accident that leads to setbacks

and losses of life.

Now that you have had two months in your position as Administrator, I look forward to hearing your vision for NASA. More specifically, I would like to learn how

you intend to balance and restructure NASA in a way that continues all of its important missions and accomplishes an aggressive research and exploration agenda

that makes the safety of our astronauts a top priority.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Administrator, as both Mr. Gordon

and I noted in our opening statements, many fundamental questions facing NASA remain to be answered. Let me go through a list

of pending items that we reviewed at the February hearing with

then Acting Administrator Gregory. For each of these, I would like

you to tell me and the Committee when we will get the answer to

the question. You may have mentioned some of these in your testimony, but I would like to go through the list, nonetheless, to create

a single place in the record we can all go back to to measure our

progress.

The research—can you tell me when you are going to have the

research agenda for the International Space Station and its proposed final configuration?

Wait. Make a statement first.

Dr. GRIFFIN. No, sir. I wanted to take your questions. You

were——

Chairman BOEHLERT. Are you sure? I——

Dr. GRIFFIN. No, that is fine, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. All right. Fine.

Can I repeat that? I will go through the list.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Please do.

Chairman BOEHLERT. The first one, you have got that, right?

The—when do you plan to have the research agenda for the International Space Station and its proposed final configuration? I will

do them one by one and let you respond.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Okay. Oh, I am sorry.

We are reworking the research agenda of the Space Station, as

has been pointed out. We are looking at—the question is difficult

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to answer, because, in part, it ties up with how much research on

the Station do we want to do while we are trying to build and finish developing it.

As was pointed out in your earlier statement, or someone’s earlier statement, we must retire the Shuttle by 2010. We must, as

soon as possible thereafter, deploy the CEV, the Crew Exploration

Vehicle, which will replace the Shuttle and which will be our

means of ferrying astronauts back and forth. And so, to some extent, the research that we would do on the Space Station, if we

were otherwise unconstrained, must take a back seat to getting the

necessary systems online to allow us to develop and utilize the Station.

I can’t specifically give you an answer as to when we will have

the research agenda for the Station fully defined.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Can you hint?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Yes. Yes, sir, I can hint.

I made a couple of notes on this. We are trying to rebalance the

portfolio. The high-priority areas are going to be space radiation

health and shielding, advanced environmental control and monitoring, advanced EVA activities and the support of those, human

health encounter measures, life support systems, medical care for

exploration, and human factors, medical research with human subjects and microgravity validation of the environmental control and

life support systems.

We expect to refine those as a result of the Shuttle and Station

Configuration Options Team examination that is underway today.

Within the next few weeks, we will be briefing, discussing configuration options within the Administration, and then, in short order,

with you here on Capitol Hill, with this committee and with others.

Our uncertainty today—so I—so in a briefer answer to your question, I would say later this summer. Later this summer.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Later this summer.

Dr. GRIFFIN. The situation that we find ourselves in that results

in this lack of full definition is that, as we sit here today, the one

thing we are certain of is that we cannot fly 28 Shuttle flights to

assemble the Station and still retire the Shuttle by 2010. There are

not 28 flights available in our manifesting sequence, if we wish to

retire by 2010. Therefore, what we are looking at is a redefined

program of Shuttle flights that we can execute with a high degree

of confidence over the next five years. And that necessarily results

in replanning the research agenda.

Chairman BOEHLERT. You know, I was so anxious to get to these

questions, we all are, that I neglected to give you the opportunity

for an opening statement. We want to welcome you with open arms

before this committee and give you the chance to share with us

some of your thoughts before we proceed with the questions.

So the Floor is yours, Mr. Administrator.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, thank you, Chairman Boehlert. I am—I will

just make a few brief remarks, and then I believe I will enter into

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the record this statement as well as the more—longer, more formal

statement.

I do want to thank you for inviting me to appear before you. As

both you and Ranking Member Gordon have pointed out, I have

been here many times before as a private citizen. I have forged, I

think, excellent working relationships with this committee, and I

certainly hope that that won’t change in testifying before you in a

new capacity as NASA Administrator.

And we do have many challenges to overcome. We need to work

closely with this committee and the entire Congress to carry out

the President’s vision for exploration and our other programs. You

have many—you have raised many questions. I have made significant changes in the last 2c months that I and my staff believe are

necessary to get us on the right track. And I look forward to answering as many of the questions that Ranking Member Gordon

and yourself have raised today as I possibly can.

So with that introduction, let me enter, if I might, this oral statement into the record. Your staff and you can pursue it at your leisure, and with your permission, then, we can move directly to your

questions, which I will try to answer as——

Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, without objection, so ordered. Your

entire statement will be made part of the permanent record for our

perusal, quite frankly, close examination.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Griffin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to

appear today to discuss NASA’s plans for the future as represented in the President’s FY 2006 budget request for NASA.

On January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush announced the Vision for Space

Exploration. The President’s directive gave NASA clear objectives as well as a new

and historic focus. The fundamental goal of this directive for the Nation’s space exploration program is ‘‘. . .to advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests

through a robust space exploration program.’’ In issuing this directive, the President

committed the Nation to a journey of exploring the solar system and beyond, returning humans to the Moon, and sending robots and ultimately humans to Mars and

other destinations. He challenged us to establish new and innovative programs to

enhance our understanding of the planets, to ask new questions, and to answer

questions as old as humankind. NASA embraced this directive and began a longterm transformation to enable us to achieve this goal.

In June 2004, the President’s Commission on Implementation of the United States

Space Exploration Policy, led by E. C. ‘‘Pete’’ Aldridge, Jr. (the Aldridge Commission), reported its findings and recommendations to the President. The Aldridge

Commission emphasized the crucial role that technological innovation, national and

international partnerships, and organizational transformation must play if we are

to implement the President’s vision for an affordable and sustainable space exploration program. NASA is committed to making the necessary transformation to

achieve the Vision for Space Exploration.

On December 21, 2004, the President signed a new national policy directive that

establishes guidelines and implementation actions for United States space transportation programs and activities to ensure the Nation’s continued ability to access and

use space for national and homeland security, and civil, scientific, and commercial

purposes. NASA will play a significant role in implementing this directive, fostering

and enabling the development of space transportation capabilities for human space

exploration beyond low-Earth orbit with the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), consistent with the goals of the Vision for Space Exploration.

The President demonstrated his commitment to the Vision for Space Exploration

by making it a priority in his FY 2005 budget request, and Congress responded positively by providing funding for NASA at the level requested by the President. The

President has reaffirmed his commitment to the Vision by again making it a priority

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in his FY 2006 budget request in a very challenging budget environment. The

$16.46 billion requested for NASA reflects an increase of 2.4 percent over FY 2005.

While today’s hearing concerns the President’s FY 2006 budget request for NASA,

I must also use this opportunity to update the Committee regarding the difficult

choices that need to be made in executing NASA’s FY 2005 budget, and my guiding

philosophy in dealing with these challenges.

A detailed FY 2005 Operating Plan update was recently provided to all of the

Committees in Congress which oversee NASA. With this FY 2005 Operating Plan

update, NASA is fully funding—within our FY 2005 budget—the $762 million increase for returning the Space Shuttle safely to flight, consistent with the recommendations from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), over $400

million in Congressionally-directed items, $291 million for Hubble servicing, and

over $500 million in necessary programmatic cost increases, notably to cover cost

growth in several space science missions, including the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, scheduled to be launched this August, and the New Horizons mission to Pluto

set to launch in early January 2006.

Identifying offsets needed to fund these items has created some difficult choices

for the Agency. Given a choice, I generally favor eliminating lower-priority programs

rather than reducing all programs in the face of budget difficulties, because this allows for the more efficient execution of the programs which remain. Thus, we must

set clear priorities to remain within the budget which has been allocated.

Allow me to be as clear as possible on what the impact of these costs means to

other programs. The Agency has adopted a ‘‘go-as-you-can-pay’’ approach toward

space exploration. Several NASA missions and activities will need to be deferred or

accomplished in other ways in order to ensure adequate funding for the priorities

of the President and the Congress in FY 2005. NASA cannot do everything that we,

and our many stakeholders, would like to accomplish. Several missions will have to

be delayed, deferred, or canceled in order to pay for the missions where the priorities were set by the President and Congress. We have tried to be sensitive to the

priorities of the affected research communities, and have listened carefully to their

input. For example, we seek to impart a new balance among planetary science,

Earth science, solar physics, and astronomy within the overall science program by

revisiting our Mars exploration program strategy and mission sequence and the

schedule for advanced space telescopes such as the Space Interferometry Mission

(SIM) and Terrestrial Planet Finder (TPF).

NASA Priorities

Over the past year, NASA has made great strides in implementing the Vision for

Space Exploration and meeting other national priorities:

• Shuttle Return-to-Flight—We are making final preparations for the Space

Shuttle return-to-flight planned for mid-July.

• International Space Station—The ISS began its fifth year of continuous

human presence on-orbit.

• Exploring Our Solar System and the Universe—The Mars rovers, Spirit and

Opportunity, have exceeded all expectations and made unprecedented discoveries; the Cassini/Huygens mission is providing stunning views of Saturn and

Titan; the Genesis mission, despite its hard landing, has returned primordial

samples from space; new missions have been launched to Mercury and to

comets; and amazing discoveries continue with Hubble, Chandra, and Spitzer.

• Laying the Groundwork for the Future—We awarded initial contracts in preparation for a major milestone in 2008 with the mapping of the Moon in unprecedented detail by the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO).

• Aeronautics—We are continuing to execute a portfolio of focused, results-oriented technology demonstrations of next-generation aircraft along with aviation safety, security, and airspace systems. NASA, with its industry partners,

recently demonstrated the feasibility of significantly reducing the sonic boom

from supersonic aircraft, and, last November, NASA’s hypersonic X–43A demonstrated that an air-breathing engine can fly at nearly 10 times the speed

of sound.

• Earth Science—We have completed deployment of the Earth Observing System and are supporting investments in the Global Change Science and Technology Program and the next generation Earth observing satellites for numerous applications, including improved weather forecasts, earthquake prediction, resource management, and other hazard warnings.

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NASA’s Proposed FY 2006 Authorization Bill

On June 17, 2005, NASA transmitted its proposed FY 2006 Authorization Bill to

the Congress. I look forward to working closely with the House Science Committee

and Senate Commerce Committee this year to enact this important legislation.

Through NASA’s proposed FY 2006 Authorization Bill we are requesting a set of

critical tools and authorities to implement the Vision for Space Exploration con- sistent with the recommendations of the Aldridge Commission. The provisions requested are an integral complement of critical tools and authorities that will better

equip NASA to address the challenges we face in implementation of the Vision for

Space Exploration.

As the United States implements the Vision for Space Exploration, the Administration recognizes the value of effective cooperation with Russia to further our space

exploration goals. At the same time, it is essential that we appropriately maintain

U.S. nonproliferation policy and objectives in our relationship with Russia. Such a

balanced approach must include the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (INA), which

contains certain restrictions that complicate cooperation with Russia on the International Space Station (ISS), and will also have an adverse impact on cooperation

with Russia on our future space exploration efforts related to human space flight.

Over the last several months, NASA has been participating in an interagency coordination process related to INA in an effort to develop a solution to this issue that

would provide NASA with needed flexibility while still meeting our nation’s nonproliferation objectives. The interagency group has proposed a legislative solution in

the form of an amendment to the INA, which sustains the Act’s nonproliferation

core, while allowing for continued NASA–Russian cooperation on the ISS and

human space flight endeavors.

It is expected that this approach will be delivered to Congress in the very near

future. To that end, the Administration looks forward to working with Congress to

ensure that the Vision for Space Exploration is able to succeed while remaining fully

consistent with broader U.S. national security and nonproliferation goals.

In the Authorization bill, we are also requesting authority to award prizes

through Centennial Challenges. With this authority the Agency will award prizes

to stimulate innovation in basic, advanced, and applied research; technology development; and, through prototype demonstrations that have the potential for application for the aeronautics and space activities of NASA. Instead of soliciting proposals

for a contract or grant, Centennial Challenges will identify a challenge, the prize

amount to be awarded for achieving that challenge, and a set of rules by which

teams will compete for that prize. Centennial Challenges will help NASA meet technology challenges while encouraging creativity and innovation in the private sector,

particularly in exploration.

NASA is placing a new emphasis on building an agile workforce, with the right

mix of permanent civil servants, other-than-permanent civil servants, and contractors. As a result, we are seeking a set of critical workforce management tools needed

as the Agency engages in a major transformation and restructures itself to achieve

21st Century goals. Specifically, the Agency is seeking the authority to re-hire annuitants without a salary offset to accommodate short-term emergency or critical program needs; the ability to offset the expense of short-term health care coverage for

employees who are involuntarily separated from the Agency and request extended

coverage (as currently authorized by law); provide incentives for permanent employees who voluntarily convert to a time-limited appointment to minimize the need for

other, less desirable workforce reshaping actions; and provide additional hiring flexibilities under collaborative research activities to further enhance our partnerships.

Furthermore, NASA seeks the ability to realign real property assets with Agency

missions by expanding the current enhanced-use lease authority beyond the current

two center pilot projects, and allowing NASA to retain the proceeds from the sale

of real and personal property.

Lastly, the proposed legislation requests intellectual property, financial management, and administrative improvements to support NASA’s mission.

Affordability and Sustainability

In his February 2nd State of the Union Address, the President underscored the

need to restrain spending in order to sustain our economic prosperity. As part of

this restraint, it is important that total discretionary and non-security spending be

held to levels proposed in the FY 2006 Budget. The budget savings and reforms in

the Budget are important components of achieving the President’s goal of cutting

the budget deficit in half by 2009, and we urge the Congress to support these reforms. The FY 2006 Budget includes more than 150 reductions, reforms, and terminations in non-defense discretionary programs, of which three affect NASA programs. The Agency wants to work with the Congress to achieve these savings.

27

To achieve the Vision for Space Exploration, NASA is proceeding, as directed by

the President, to plan and implement a sustainable and affordable, integrated

robotic and human exploration program, structured with measurable milestones,

and executed on the basis of available resources, accumulated experience, and technology readiness. Last year, we provided a long-range roadmap through 2020 to outline this program:

• The Space Shuttle will be retired by 2010. Prior to its retirement, it will be

utilized primarily for the assembly of the ISS. Our top priority will be to

make each flight safer than the last one.

• The new CEV and its associated launch system will transport crews on exploration missions, and will also be capable of ferrying astronauts to and from

the Space Station. The CEV will be developed in the latter part of this decade

and deployed operationally as soon as possible. The CEV will conduct missions in Earth orbit, including missions to the ISS, but its primary mission

will be to support exploration of the Moon and other destinations.

• Robotic missions will continue to increase our understanding of our home

planet and will continue the exploration of the solar system, traveling to the

Moon and Mars in anticipation of later human visits, as well as to other destinations such as Mercury, Saturn, Pluto, asteroids, and comets. Observatories will be deployed to search for Earth-like planets and habitable environments around distant stars, and to explore the universe to understand its

origin, structure, evolution, and destiny. The President’s Budget requests increased funding for these areas over the coming years, with Science investments growing from 33 percent to 38 percent of the Agency’s total budget.

• Human explorers will return to the Moon, possibly as early as 2015—with the

CEV as the first core element of a new exploration architecture. Major development of the other elements in the exploration architecture will commence

later this decade and will accelerate upon the retirement of the Space Shuttle.

These exploration elements will include launch vehicles, in-space transfer systems, lunar landers, and surface habitation systems. Critical research and

technology investment decisions will be guided by the development requirements of these elements.

These human and robotic explorers will enable our exploration and scientific

plans. A recent report released on February 3, 2005, by the National Research

Council, entitled Science in NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration, states, ‘‘Exploration done properly is a form of science. Both robotic spacecraft and human space

flight should be used to fulfill scientific roles in NASA’s mission to explore.’’ To that

end, NASA has initiated an Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS), which

will provide the analytical support for a number of key near-term decisions for

NASA, the White House, and Congress. The ESAS is a 90-day study that is examining many of the larger questions associated with the Vision for Space Exploration.

Some of the topics the ESAS is reviewing include the requirements for returning

to the Moon and extending human exploration to Mars, as well as possibilities for

accelerating the development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). This team is

expected to complete its work in July and we will keep Congressional Committees

informed as this study effort progresses.

This study effort will focus on four primary areas:

• Complete assessment of the top-level CEV requirements and plans to enable

the CEV to provide crew transport to the ISS and to accelerate the development of the CEV and crew launch system.

• Definition of top-level requirements and configurations for crew and cargo

launch systems to support the lunar and Mars exploration programs.

• Development of a reference lunar exploration architecture concept to support

sustained human and robotic Lunar exploration operations.

• Identification of key technologies required to enable and significantly enhance

these reference exploration systems, and a re-prioritization of near-term and

far-term technology investments.

NASA is also currently examining alternative configurations for the Space Station

that meet the goals of the Vision and the needs of our international partners, while

maintaining safety as our highest priority. In May 2005, we initiated the Shuttle/

Station Configuration Options Team (SSCOT). This team is conducting a 60-day

study of the configuration options for the ISS and assessing the related number of

flights needed by the Space Shuttle before it retires no later than the year 2010.

The scope of the Shuttle/Station Configuration Options Team study spans ISS asVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:38 May 19, 2006 Jkt 021949 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\062805\21949 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
28

sembly, operations, and use and considers such factors as international partner commitments, research utilization, cost, and ISS sustainability. This team is expected

to complete its work in June, with those results integrated into the ongoing Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS).

NASA Priorities in the FY 2006 Budget Request

The President’s FY 2006 budget request for NASA reaffirms the funding strategy

outlined above. NASA’s FY 2006 request endeavors to provide a balanced portfolio

of programs to meet the needs of our national priorities in aeronautics and civil

space. It maintains focus on key priorities, milestones, and schedules for the Vision

introduced in the FY 2005 budget.

To support the Administration’s goal of reducing the deficit, NASA’s budget was

reduced $0.5 billion in FY 2006 below the level planned in the 2005 budget for FY

2006. In addition, returning the Shuttle safely to flight will cost $0.4 billion more

in FY 2006 than previously estimated. To address these and other items, we proposed a budget that provided $0.4 billion (11 percent) less for Exploration Systems

than previously planned for, $0.3 billion (five percent) less in Science, $0.1 billion

(11 percent) less in Aeronautics, and $0.2 billion (four percent) more in Space Operations. These changes were not easy, but in the end, we made the decisions to protect the priorities outlined above.

Science

The FY 2006 budget request of $5.5 billion for the Science Mission Directorate

will support 55 missions in orbit, 26 in development, and 34 in design phase. By

2010, the Science budget will increase by 23 percent over current levels.

The FY 2006 budget includes $858 million for Mars and Lunar robotic exploration. The Mars rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, have far exceeded all goals with

their unprecedented discoveries and longevity. Last year, the rovers found definitive

evidence of an ancient body of water on the Red Planet, and they continue to gather

data more than a year after their successful landing. We recently awarded contracts

for six instruments to be flown on the 2008 LRO that promises unprecedented mapping of the Moon’s surface. The 2008 LRO will be the first step in revolutionizing

our understanding of the Moon, in much the same way that our Mars missions have

transformed our understanding of Mars. As mentioned earlier, to simplify the management chain-of-command among mission directorates, our FY 2005 Operating

Plan update transfers management responsibility for the Lunar Exploration program, including LRO, to the ESMD. This will help to maximize the exploration and

science benefits of this important program.

The budget also includes $218 million to maintain competitive efforts for the Explorer Program, $56 million for the Beyond Einstein program to study the universe,

$234 million for studying the Sun in the Living With a Star program, and $136 million for competitive opportunities in the Earth System Science Pathfinder program.

With our international partners, we also continue to add to the constellation of

Earth-observing satellites that monitor our planet while extending our reach and

presence further into the solar system. NASA launched Aura to look back at Earth

and give us a better picture of our atmosphere and changing climate, and the entire

Earth Observing System continues to return trillions of bytes of information about

our dynamic Earth. In the future, NASA plans to develop a ‘‘sensor-web’’ to provide

timely, on-demand data and analysis to users who can enable practical benefits for

scientific research, national policy-making, economic growth, natural hazard mitigation, and the exploration of other planets in this solar system and beyond.

NASA will continue to expand its exploration reach with an armada of existing

and new space observatories operating in many different wavelengths and looking

at different parts of our exotic universe. The three ‘‘Great Observatories’’—Hubble,

Spitzer, and Chandra—will continue to bring wondrous images to our eyes and exciting new scientific discoveries. Missions such as Kepler will provide a new understanding and knowledge of the planets orbiting stars far from our solar system.

This budget also includes $372 million to continue developing the James Webb

Space Telescope for a 2011 launch and provides $93 million in development funds

for the Hubble Space Telescope. This investment in the Hubble, together with the

synergistic use of the other two Great Observatories, and combined with the greatly

increased capability of ground-based assets and the emergent science of optical

interferometry, will ensure many years of new scientific discoveries.

NASA’s decision in January 2004 not to service the Hubble Space Telescope was

a very difficult one, given the Hubble’s record of spectacular successes. That decision

was made at a time when significant uncertainty remained regarding the technical

solutions and risks associated with return-to-flight. After the two successful Space

Shuttle flights needed to achieve our return-to-flight objectives, NASA will have

29

learned a great deal more regarding the risks and operations of the vehicle than

was known when the previous decision was made. I am committed to reassessing

this earlier decision after return-to-flight, based on the relative risks to the Space

Shuttle as well as the costs and benefits to our nation’s astronomy program. As a

result, we are continuing our efforts to preserve the option for a Shuttle servicing

mission for Hubble. Consistent with this ongoing activity, NASA’s FY 2005 Operating Plan update has fully funded the $291 million identified in the Conference Report accompanying the FY 2005 Consolidated Appropriations bill and has consolidated the funding and management responsibility within the Science Mission Directorate. NASA will use the balance of the FY 2005 funds to maintain options for HST

servicing and de-orbit. NASA has also begun the analysis of how a de-orbit module

for the Hubble Space Telescope could be added to the manifest of such a Space

Shuttle servicing mission. I will make a decision regarding a Shuttle servicing mission for Hubble following the success of the first two Return-to-Flight missions. In

the interim, the Agency will keep all stakeholders apprised as this work progresses.

NASA remains committed to a world-class, affordable program of space-based astronomy.

Preparing for Exploration

The FY 2006 budget request of $3.2 billion for the ESMD includes $753 million

for continuing development of the CEV, the vehicle that will serve as the core element for future exploration beyond Earth orbit. The CEV promises safer travel for

astronauts into space, continuing U.S. human access to space after retirement of the

Shuttle. The CEV will first conduct missions in Earth orbit, but its primary mission

will be to support exploration of the Moon and other destinations. Our earlier plans

called for operational deployment of the CEV not later than 2014. However, we are

now seeking programmatic alternatives to allow development of the CEV to be completed as soon as possible. Acceleration of the CEV program will be accomplished

by down-selecting to a single contractor sooner than originally planned, and by deferring other elements of the Exploration Systems Research and Technology plan

not required for the CEV or for the early phases of human return to the Moon.

The first CEV missions to Earth orbit will include docking with the ISS. NASA’s

Exploration Systems Mission Directorate will be responsible for developing and acquiring both crew and cargo services to support the International Space Station, and

funds have been transferred to that Directorate. We plan to leverage our nation’s

commercial space industry to meet NASA’s needs for ISS cargo logistics and potentially crew support.

Going forward, the Agency will need a launch system for the CEV, one which does

not at present exist. Two possibilities exist by which we might obtain such a vehicle.

The first is to develop a launch system derived from Shuttle components, specifically

the SRB with a new upper stage. The second option is to upgrade the proposed

heavy-lift versions of EELV with a new upper stage. As NASA Administrator, I

must be a responsible steward of our funds, and a key aspect of the Agency’s analysis of alternatives will be to capitalize on existing technical and workforce assets

in a cost-effective and efficient way. NASA’s goal is to develop a CEV capable of operating safely soon after the retirement of the Space Shuttle.

The FY 2006 budget request included $919 million (a 27 percent increase) for Exploration Systems Research and Technology (ESR&T) that will enable designs for

sustainable exploration; though, as mentioned, elements of that program will now

be deferred to accelerated the CEV. Other ESR&T elements include $34 million for

a revamped technology transfer program and $34 million for the Centennial Challenges prize program. The Agency continues to seek the support of the Congress for

authorization to enable larger prize awards.

This budget also includes $320 million for a restructured Prometheus Nuclear

Systems and Technology Theme for space-qualified nuclear systems. The technology

and capabilities being developed by the Prometheus Nuclear Systems and Technology Theme are critical for enabling the power and propulsion needs of the Vision

for Space Exploration. As part of the Agency’s effort to define an Exploration Systems Architecture, NASA will examine alternative nuclear systems, including surface nuclear power, nuclear thermal, and nuclear electric systems. NASA will restructure Prometheus for space-qualified nuclear systems to support human and

robotic missions with clear priorities focused on near-term needs. We expect to make

program decisions to focus our nuclear technology efforts on our highest priorities

for near-term applications as part of the Exploration Architecture study, to be completed this summer. In addition, the FY 2006 budget request provides $806 million

for Human Systems Research and Technology, which has been restructured so that

its programs are now linked directly to exploration requirements for human missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond.

30

Aeronautics Research

NASA’s FY 2006 request for the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate is $852

million, a significant portion of the government’s overall investment in aeronautics

research. To make the most of this investment, NASA’s technical expertise and facilities for aeronautics research are becoming more focused and results-oriented.

NASA’s current aeronautics research is focused on enhancing the public good. NASA

is also working to maintain a strong basic aeronautics research program and to establish a series of far-reaching objectives, each of which, if enabled, could significantly transform civil aeronautics. The results from the basic research, technology

development, and demonstrations achieved by NASA’s Aeronautics efforts will be

transitioned for use by both Government and industry. The President’s FY 2006 request increased the vital research of the Aeronautics program in Aviation Safety

and Security and in Airspace Systems. These two priority programs are fully funded

to ensure timely results critical to meeting national goals. NASA works closely and

constructively with other Executive Branch agencies to enhance our nation’s aeronautics capability. In this vein, NASA, along with the Departments of Defense,

Homeland Security, Commerce, and Transportation, is a principal member of the

interagency Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), which was chartered

by the Century of Aviation Revitalization Act to oversee research and technology efforts for the Next Generation Air Transportation System. NASA is working closely

with industry consortia and other government agencies to develop advanced aircraft

demonstrations, such as those that would expand the capabilities of high-altitude,

long-endurance, unmanned aerial vehicles, which could have numerous commercial,

scientific, and homeland security applications.

At this time, NASA is also working with other U.S. Government departments and

agencies and industry to assess its facilities for aeronautics research. NASA will

need to consider the possibility of closing some under-utilized aeronautics facilities,

while modernizing some others to become state-of-the-art facilities.

As we move forward, a broader national dialog on aeronautics R&D goals may be

appropriate as we enter the second century of aviation. These discussions should include a range of stakeholders and customers, including the Congress. This process

could lead to a national consensus for aeronautics R&D goals.

Education

NASA’s FY 2006 budget request includes $167 million for the Office of Education

to support programs in science, technology, engineering, and math education. NASA

will establish clear goals, metrics, and monitoring capabilities for its education initiatives in the coming months to ensure that these funds will achieve the greatest

benefit.

Space Shuttle and International Space Station

The FY 2006 budget request of $6.8 billion for the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD) reflects the first step in the Vision for Space Exploration: returning the Space Shuttle safely to flight and resuming flight operations. Going forward,

all SOMD expenditures will be consistent with the retirement of the Space Shuttle

by 2010, while maintaining operational safety of flight throughout the program. The

FY 2006 budget includes $4.5 billion for the Space Shuttle program. The budget also

provides $1.9 billion for the ISS. NASA currently is examining configurations for the

Space Station that meet the goals of the Vision for Space Exploration and needs of

our international partners, while requiring as few Shuttle flights as possible to complete assembly.

A key element in the future of the ISS program is the purchase of alternate cargo

transportation services to supplement the Space Shuttle, and the development of

new crew transportation capabilities to replace Shuttle when it retires. Because the

ESMD has the mission to develop and acquire such crew and cargo capabilities for

the ISS and beyond, I have transferred management responsibility for the activities

and budget of ISS Cargo/Crew Services to ESMD from SOMD, as stated in the May

update to NASA’s FY 2005 Operating Plan. The budget request before the Congress

provides $160 million for these services in 2006.

As a top Return-to-Flight (RTF) priority, NASA has made dozens of changes to

the External Tank (ET) design to reduce both foam and ice debris from shedding

during ascent. These changes include an improved bipod design that now excludes

using foam and a new design for the area around the liquid oxygen feed line bellows. Each of these changes incorporates electric heaters to eliminate an unacceptable debris risk to the Orbiter caused by ice buildup on the ET. The new designs

are presently installed on the ET for Discovery’s flight (STS–114) and will be included on all those to be used in the future.

31

We have also made more than 100 major modifications and upgrades to Discovery

and its supporting systems, including new cabling and wiring for sensors placed in

the wing leading edge of each wing, a digital camera for monitoring any debris impacting the underside of the Orbiter, and a boom extension for the Shuttle’s robotic

arm that will enable us to inspect nearly all the outside areas of the Orbiter’s Thermal Protection System after achieving orbit. Additionally, technicians at KSC have

installed the redesigned Forward Reaction Control System Carrier Panels and the

Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Nose Cap. Technicians have also installed 88 new sensors in the leading edge of each wing, of which 66 will measure acceleration and

impact data and 22 will measure temperature profiles during Discovery’s ascent to

orbit. These data will be down-linked to the ground to be used as a cue for pointing

to areas in the thermal protection system needing further inspection by the boom

mounted sensor system. These are just several of the extensive changes we have

made to the hardware to mitigate the effects of debris shedding from the External

Tank. Discovery and its propulsion elements are now at the launch pad undergoing

the final tests and checks required prior to launch, currently scheduled to occur not

earlier than July 13, 2005.

Transforming NASA

The CAIB was clear in its assessment that the lack of open communication on

technical and programmatic matters was as much a cause of the loss of Columbia

as the shedding of the foam. We have understood and embraced this assessment,

and are absolutely and completely committed to creating an environment of openness and free-flowing communication by continuing to assess our leadership practices.

For the last three decades, NASA and the Nation’s human space flight program

have been focused on the development and operation of the Space Shuttle and the

Space Station. In its final report, the CAIB was very forthright in its judgment that

these goals are too limited to justify the expense, difficulty, and danger inherent in

human space flight, given the limitations of today’s technology. The CAIB was

equally forthright in calling for a national consensus in the establishment of a program having broader strategic goals. The Vision for Space Exploration proposed by

the President is that program, and NASA has embraced this new direction. But to

effect these changes, NASA must engage in a major transformation—taking the capabilities we have throughout the Agency and restructuring them to achieve these

21st Century goals. This is an enormous challenge, but we have begun to transform

our entire organization to foster these changes and to enhance a positive, missiondriven culture.

• Embracing Competition—NASA is embracing competition as a way to elicit

the best from NASA’s Centers, industry, and academia. The Agency is using

competitive processes to encourage more cost-effective, innovative solutions to

the scientific and technical challenges presented by the Vision. Over the past

year, competitive selections in exploration have demonstrated increased collaboration between NASA’s Centers and industry and academia. The engine

of competition is the primary force behind the American economy, the greatest the world has ever known, and we plan to make greater use of this engine

than has been the case at NASA in the past. NASA plans to pursue appropriate partnerships with the entrepreneurial and commercial space sector to

the maximum practical extent.

• The Role of the Centers—While competitive processes are crucial to maintaining NASA at the ‘‘cutting edge’’ of science and technology, we must acknowledge that the NASA Centers and other federal research and development laboratories exist, and have existed for decades, precisely because industrial

competition does not serve to accomplish all of our national goals. In order

to accomplish the national goals set forth by the President and Congress,

NASA must set realistic priorities within limited resources. NASA Centers

will have an important role in definition of the architecture and requirements

for exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, and for the systems engineering and

integration functions used in building the systems of that architecture. We

will continue to assess the skill-mix that we require, the number of people

we require, their location, and how we are organizing ourselves to fulfill our

obligations to the President and Congress. To begin to create some of the

workforce flexibility necessary for the future, NASA has offered voluntary

separation incentives (buyouts) to employees in positions identified with excess competencies. To the extent that NASA’s workforce needs revitalization,

NASA is proposing legislative initiatives to the Congress as part of the Agency’s draft FY 2006 Authorization Bill. Congress’s enactment of the NASA

32

Flexibility Act of 2004 is also helping the Agency toward that end, and additional authorities will provide even more aid in managing the Agency’s workforce.

• Improved Decision-making—NASA recently transformed its organizational reporting in order to provide more integrated decision-making. NASA field Center Directors now report directly to the Administrator, and I am drafting a

position description for a new Associate Administrator who will manage the

internal activities of the Agency. The Office of Education reports directly to

the Director of Strategic Communications, who is also in charge of Public Affairs, External Relations, and Legislative Affairs, in order to provide a more

integrated picture of what NASA is doing and can do for its stakeholders and

public. NASA’s new Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation has been created in order to provide analyses and assessments for strategic planning and

budgeting decisions, independent cost estimates, evaluation of projects at

major milestones, and feedback from the Centers on their capabilities and

work climate. This is to ensure that the acquisition strategies, if done as

planned, are executable, have exit and entrance criteria, contain clear approval milestones, and involve independent reviews.

• Improving Financial Management—For the past two years, NASA has received a disclaimer of audit opinion on its annual financial statements due

largely to two issues—financial system conversion, and accounting for property, plant and equipment, and materials and supplies. In FY 2003, NASA

converted the 10 separate NASA Center accounting systems and the associated 120 subsidiary systems, along with over 12 years of historical financial

data, into a single integrated agency-wide core accounting system. Problems

associated with this conversion have been greater than expected and are taking longer than expected to correct. I regard improvement of NASA’s financial

management as one of my priorities.

• Capital Asset Management—The management of NASA’s capital assets, valued at $37.6 billion (83 percent of NASA’s assets on the balance sheet), is a

significant challenge for the Agency. Historically, the management systems to

provide proper valuation and tracking of assets have not been sufficient to

meet the rigors of review without significant compensating controls and manual effort. Another challenge we are facing is that the costs of many facilities

that could be deemed ‘‘national assets’’ were being born as direct charges to

our projects causing an unequal competitive base among our field centers.

Through the Integrated Asset Management (IAM) project we are steadily creating the proper controls to provide tracking and valuation needed to account

for the many types of assets that exist within NASA. Realistically, the successful completion of the IAM project will take time. We are validating the

requirements for asset management methods to ensure they comply with

audit requirements while we simultaneously update existing tracking systems

to modern platforms. For our ‘‘national assets’’ we plan to create a new funding structure aimed at ensuring the Centers have a chance to compete on an

equal footing. Placing the national asset funding in a separate, carefully managed account will help create a level playing field and encourage broad scale

use. A great deal of attention is being placed on asset management to ensure

that the new methods and systems we devise provide a robust and enduring

solution to the challenges the Agency has faced in resolving this significant

issue.

The Nation’s Future in Exploration and Discovery

The aftermath of the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 1,

2003, brought us to a watershed moment in the American civil space program.

Choices had to be made. The President has put forth a choice, a strategic vision for

the space program. That vision has been enunciated with exceptional clarity, and

has been subjected to considerable public debate for over a year. While differences

of opinion exist, the President’s proposal has attained broad strategic acceptance. As

a nation, we can clearly afford well-executed vigorous programs in robotic and

human space exploration, Earth science, and aeronautics research.

For America to continue to be preeminent among nations, it is necessary for us

to be the preeminent space-faring nation. It is equally true that great nations need

allies and partners in this journey. That is what the Vision for Space Exploration

is about.

As President George W. Bush said, ‘‘We choose to explore space because doing so

improves our lives and lifts our national spirit. So let us continue the journey.’’

33

34

Dr. GRIFFIN. Thank you.

DISCUSSION

TIMETABLE FOR INFORMATION

Chairman BOEHLERT. Let me continue on with my series of questions on when.

When do you expect that we will have some report on the number of flights the Space Shuttle will make before its retirement, the

purpose of those flights, and the expected date of the final flight?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Again, sir, later this summer.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Later this summer we are going to be in

the August recess, so——

Dr. GRIFFIN. No. Okay, we will be discussing—we are examining—as I sit here, a team of bright and dedicated engineers with

substantial experience in the business and on Space Station, in

particular, are looking at all of the available options by which we

might complete the assembly of the Space Station consistent with

our obligations to our partners and our research agenda while remaining within the requirement to retire the Shuttle by 2010. I

just mentioned that there will not be available 28 flights, and so

we must work with less, and we must make some determination

as to what amount of work is left over for the new system to complete.

We will be—we are close to the end of that exercise. During the

month of July, we will be discussing those alternatives within the

Administration, and as soon as we can do so, with your committee

and other Members of Congress.

Chairman BOEHLERT. So is it fair to say the September time

frame would be a——

Dr. GRIFFIN. Absolutely not later than that, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. All right. Thank you very much.

And when might we have a description of the means, other than

the Space Shuttle, that might be used to ferry crew and cargo to

the International Space Station?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Again, in that same time frame, because that depends upon the results of a parallel study on exploration systems

architecture, and I think you know that the President has required

that the so-called Crew Exploration Vehicle, which will provide the

fundamental building block for returning astronauts to the Moon,

must also be capable of ferrying astronauts to and from the Space

Station. And so again, later this summer——

Chairman BOEHLERT. That same time frame for a description of

the launch vehicle for a CEV?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Absolutely, yes, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. All right. And now this one is a sticky

wicket, but the plan for the operation of the International Space

Station in the event that the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 is

not amended.

Dr. GRIFFIN. That will take longer. If—we are in—for the Administration, we are planning to seek recommendations for that act to

allow us to utilize the Station together with our Russian partners.

If that act is not amended, then, at present, the only plan we really

have for utilizing the Space Station would be while the Space ShutVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:38 May 19, 2006 Jkt 021949 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL05\062805\21949 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
35

tle is docked at the Station. At times other than that, after 2006,

the United States would not be able to keep astronauts——

Chairman BOEHLERT. April 2006 you are saying?

Dr. GRIFFIN. April 2006. That is correct, sir. So if the act is not

amended and NASA would not be able to have U.S. astronauts on

board the Station, other than when the Shuttle is there.

Chairman BOEHLERT. And the Shuttle can be there a couple of

weeks?

Dr. GRIFFIN. A couple of weeks.

Chairman BOEHLERT. All right. A description of any heavy-lift

vehicle the Administration intends to develop, the intended uses of

that vehicle, and whether the decision to develop that vehicle has

undergone, or is undergoing, an interagency review.

Dr. GRIFFIN. All of the architecture that we intend to put forward

this summer will undergo interagency review. That is an unequivocal statement. For heavy-lift vehicles capable of returning us to the

Moon, I have made no secret of the fact that I believe a Shuttlederived architecture wherein we retire the orbiter and utilize the

remaining elements of the Shuttle structure, the engines, the

tanks, the rocket boosters, will provide us a 100 metric ton class

payload capability. And the—but from where we are today, that is

the shortest path to such a capability.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Of the intended purpose of lunar missions

and the architecture for those missions?

Dr. GRIFFIN. And sir, later this summer, certainly not later than

September. That is a study that is ongoing. And I realize—I fully

respect Mr. Gordon’s remarks, and yours, that it has been now almost 18 months since the President’s announcement of the vision

for exploration and that it might well be said that we owe you, and

have owed you for some time, those plans and those architectures.

I do take responsibility for that.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, it is an agency in transition. We understand that.

Dr. GRIFFIN. It is in transition, and we do not believe that the

problem needs to be as complicated as some have said, and we

are—we have been working since I arrived, and we are working

today in order to be able to provide you with those top-level plans,

architectures, approaches, and budgets later this summer.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, one of your great skills is your ability

to take complicated matters and provide some simplification, and

we are looking forward to that.

How about the project goals for Project Prometheus?

Dr. GRIFFIN. I have—if I have an ability to simplify things, it is

because I must to remain within my own limitations, but thank

you.

Project Prometheus is extremely important. The utilization of nuclear power in space for electric power and propulsion has no

stronger advocates than I, and I know that this committee knows

that, because I have said that in prior testimony. However, in a

world of limited resources, as I looked at our program going forward, I could not justify placing as the first goal of Project Prometheus, the development of a nuclear electric propulsion system

to send a scientific mission to Europa. There are—that mission was

at $11 billion and counting for cost estimates before we got off the

36

drawing board, and I, in the face of competing priorities, simply

could not endorse that. Moreover, the nearest term need that we

have for nuclear capability in space will be surface power on the

Moon in the middle or toward the end of the next decade.

So to the extent that we wish to devote resources to exploring

Europa, and I do, and we will be submitting such a program, I

chose not to link the exploration of Europa with the development

of nuclear electric propulsion to do so. And to the extent that I believe in the importance of nuclear power and propulsion in space,

and I do, I have chosen to devote our early resources to the development of lunar power—sorry, surface power for lunar missions.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Let me, before turning to Mr. Gordon,

whose indulgence I appreciate, but these are really consensus questions.

Dr. GRIFFIN. I understand, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. And we are all searching.

The final thing is when might we expect a plan for managing the

cost overruns for the James Webb Space Telescope?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Again, sir, I was apprised of those potential cost

overruns last month. Within 48 hours of having been so apprised,

we, at NASA, chartered a special team to review those costs with

the action to reduce them where possible or where they are real,

to recognize them and to replan the rest of the program around

them. The James Webb Space Telescope is the centerpiece of our

astronomy program going forward, no question about it, but we

need to make sure that we have an executable program with realistic dates. When we have that information, again, not later than

the end of this summer, I will bring it to this committee.

Chairman BOEHLERT. It is very apparent that you have a lot of

busy days ahead, and we don’t expect you to wave a magic wand

and perform miracles, but I hope you can appreciate the desire on

the part of this committee, on both sides, to get answers to some

of these basic questions that guide us as we go forward with charting the course for the future of NASA.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Sir, I could not more fully understand and appreciate the need to do that. And I—we are with you in this search

for answers. And as rapidly as we can provide responsive and reasonably complete answers, this committee will have them.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

Mr. Gordon.

BUDGET FIREWALLS

Mr. GORDON. First of all, let me say, Mr. Chairman, thank you

for getting those questions on the record. I think it is important for

us to, in our mission of oversight, and quite frankly, I say that we

haven’t done as good a job of oversight as we should have in the

past, because we haven’t gotten those kinds of answers. And I

think, Dr. Griffin, your suggestion of September is realistic and

reasonable. You have got a lot to review. But I will also point out,

that is only a few days before the beginning of the fiscal year,

which is again why I would suggest that there not be major redefining of NASA and of some of the goals there until you have a

chance to get through this. So I would hope that you keep that in

mind.

37

And let me move forward with my questions.

Dr. Griffin, in my opening statement, I mentioned a number of

changes that have been made to NASA’s exploration program since

you arrived. I did that not to question your decisions but to make

the point that a lot is in flux within NASA’s exploration program.

And a lot of what Congress and the industry was told last year is

no longer relevant. Unfortunately, NASA has a history of such

changes. The Space Station program seemed to change almost

every year since its initiation in the mid-1980s, and I understand

you are now considering restructuring it again. In 1994, NASA announced its single stage to orbit launch vehicle program with much

fanfare. A few years later, the program was canceled before the X–

33 test vehicle even flew.

Then NASA announced that it was instead going to initiate the

space launch vehicle within the goals of developing a next-generation reusable launch vehicle and other advanced technologies. A

few years later, NASA canceled the space launch initiative and said

that its new plan was to build an Orbital Space Plane. Well, the

Orbital Space Plane program last year was also canceled.

Then last year, NASA announced its plan to develop a Crew Exploration Vehicle, using a spiral development approach. This program apparently, the CEV program, is being restructured and the

acquisition approach changed. And many other changes are apparently being made to the exploration program. That may be the best

thing to do, and I think it probably is, Dr. Griffin, but given

NASA’s record, it is hard to take that on faith.

So, Dr. Griffin, you are not going to have a lot of room to maneuver when it comes to the budgets, which you will likely see over

the next few years. So how do you plan to ensure that your exploration program is not subject to the same errant changes that we

have seen from NASA in the past? In other words, what are you

going to do differently? And also, do you feel that it is necessary

to set up firewalls? Or what are you going to do in these tough

budget times to stop poaching into other areas of NASA’s budget?

Or do you think that is necessary? And is it inevitable that will

happen?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Let me answer the last question first, sir, if I might.

I don’t believe that we are allowing the manned space flight program to poach onto other areas. I have committed, often and publicly, that I intend to, want to, and will protect NASA’s science program from the demands of human space flight, and frankly, vice

versa. If the James Webb Space Telescope overruns, it is the problem of the astronomy folks, not the Shuttle folks. They have their

own problems.

Mr. GORDON. Do you see setting up firewalls or what, other than

just good faith? And how do you intend to try to do that?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, I don’t think, sir, that we need legal firewalls,

because the preservation of flexibility, in the event of an emergency, is always important, as, for example, in recovering returning

to flight from Columbia, we—NASA did not receive a supplemental

as we did in the Challenger—the aftermath of the Challenger disaster. And so, if we were to return-to-flight, there was no alternative but to reprogram funds. And this committee, and others,

were very helpful in allowing us to do that.

38

So I think the avoidance of——

Mr. GORDON. There was a process——

Dr. GRIFFIN. Pardon, sir?

Mr. GORDON. There was a process there——

Dr. GRIFFIN. There was.

Mr. GORDON.—that allowed you to meet those emergencies.

Dr. GRIFFIN. And I would use that process again. So I would

rather avoid legal restrictions on flexibility, and I would rather rely

on working with this committee to establish the correctness and

the utility of the decisions that are being made. You mentioned

that you didn’t want to appear to be questioning my decisions. On

the contrary, sir, I think you should. If I make decisions that cannot stand up to the light of day, I think they should be questioned.

Mr. GORDON. Well, we may do that in September once we hear

them.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Yes, sir.

You asked what we will be doing different.

First of all, I hope never again to let the words ‘‘spiral development’’ cross my lips. That is an approach to acquisition for large

systems, very relevant to DOD acquisition requirements, but I have

not seen the relevance to NASA, and I have preferred a much more

direct approach, and that is what we will be recommending and implementing.

What else will be different? I hope that you will see, as we bring

it forward, a very straightforward plan to replace the Shuttle and

a very straightforward architecture for lunar return. That, on the

face of it, will seem to you that if we are to do these things that

the approach being recommended is a logical, clean, simple,

straightforward approach.

We—you mentioned, sir, in your opening remarks, the—postponing the arrival date at Mars in order that we can do the proper

things now, and I agree. The money that is being spent that is

being tagged with exploration initiative funding in these early

years is really, almost entirely, for the completion of the Space Station and for the development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle. That

is what is being done with the money that is being provided. And

in fact, we need all of it that we can get in order that we not have,

in my view, a strategically undesirable gap between the retirement

of the Shuttle and brining online the CEV.

I don’t think it is too soon to undertake the redefinition of what

we are doing in NASA that you have mentioned. I don’t think we

need a year to take a deep breath, because in the course of that

year, we would be spending a lot of money. There are many things,

which were on the table when I walked in the door at NASA, that

needed to be reexamined, and I felt, honestly, sir, that the soonest

that we could do that and stop spending money in directions that

we felt were unprofitable and unpalatable, the soonest that I could

do that would be none too soon.

We have submitted to this Congress the—a revised operating

plan for 2005. We will be putting forward a budget amendment for

fiscal year 2006 to reflect some of these changes in priorities.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

Mr. Calvert.

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

39

RETURNING TO FLIGHT

Obviously, the hot topic on the news today is returning to flight.

And last evening, there was a report that indicated there were

some problems but that they anticipate returning to flight soon. I

just thought we would ask your current assessment of the plans to

return the Shuttle to flight. And do you still anticipate that we will

be able to do that launch on July 13?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Let me start with the end.

Yes, sir. We have several days of slack available between today

and launch on July 13. We look like we are in pretty good shape

there. We have a flight readiness review, the formal flight readiness review, tomorrow and Thursday, which I will be attending. In

fact, I will be leaving this evening for Kennedy Space Center. I

have participated in every technical review that was appropriate

for me to do since coming on board as Administrator. And I believe

I have acquired a pretty good picture of where we are with respect

to the technical requirements to return-to-flight. I have been tremendously impressed with the work that the team has done in executing those improvements, and I think, based on what I know

now, we are ready to go. The flight readiness review for the next

couple of days will either uncover an exception to that statement

or will endorse it. And we will all see.

Mr. CALVERT. That is good to hear.

THE CENTRIFUGE

One of the questions that you answered indicated an obvious situation that we are not going to be able to fly the 28 Shuttle missions that were anticipated to finish the International Space Station to some degree that some folks would like to happen. I was

wondering, with regard to the Centrifuge, when do you see the future of that, and are we going to be able to move forward with

human exploration without performing that research that the Centrifuge was to provide? Or is there another way to get that Centrifuge up there?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, the—in the fullness of time, there is always

a way to get anything up there. The Centrifuge accommodation

module was—is being considered as to whether or not it should be

flown, given the focus of Station research on the effects on the

human organism of microgravity. Centrifuge can’t, of course, accommodate a human. It can accommodate tissue or small animals

for fundamental, cellular-based, life science research. That sort of

research at the cellular level is not directly applicable and would

not be for many years to problems of flying humans on voyages

back to the Moon or Mars. And so in that sense of reorienting the

Station’s mission to focus on human exploration rather than fundamental life science research, the Centrifuge accommodation module

is in——[inaudible].

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Mr. CALVERT. One other question I have that—I know that you

have only been there a couple of months, but as you know, for the

last three of the four years, NASA has been unable to produce

auditable financial statements. Auditors have highlighted a numVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:38 May 19, 2006 Jkt 021949 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL05\062805\21949 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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ber of weaknesses with NASA’s financial statements, as you know.

So what is your assessment, so far, of this situation, and what do

you have in mind to fix it?

Dr. GRIFFIN. The situation is deplorable. It is unacceptable that

NASA cannot meet the standards for financial acumen to which it

holds its contractors. We—I was apprised of this during my

preconfirmation visits here on the Hill and scarcely a week has

gone by that I have not been reminded of it. We have provided additional personnel and additional budgetary resources to address

the issue. We have, in fact, invited leading financial management

experts from other federal agencies to review our plans and have

incorporated their suggestions. I have empowered the CFO to execute these plans and take actions that should produce a long-term

financial health of the Agency.

We are trying to—we have three core priorities that we are trying to achieve. The first exercise is to generate a clean opinion from

our auditors, just to simply know where all our money is and have

our auditors agree that we do. With regard to developing our budget, we want to resolve issues of how we control our funding distribution, how we should standardize our financial data structure,

and how we are going to standardize our budget formulation process. And finally, we need to standardize our management reporting

methodology and financial management metric. We—our major

challenges are to reconcile the fund balance with treasury accounts,

to provide an auditable evaluation of our property plant and equipment and environmental liabilities, and to improve our financial

data integrity and compliance with the Federal Accounting Standards board and OMB and Treasury requirements.

We know the challenge in front of us. We are getting the best

external and internal help that we can to execute it. I take it very

seriously.

Mr. CALVERT. Thank you, Doctor, and I look forward to working

with the Chairman to have, maybe, a hearing about this later on

and be more specific on this problem.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Yes, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

Mr. Udall.

Mr. UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Griffin, if we could, I would like to focus on the aeronautics

side to the equation and also ask you a couple of questions about

Hubble.

AERONAUTICS

As I mentioned in my opening statement, there has been a

steady drumbeat of task force reports and testimony that make a

compelling case that NASA’s aeronautics program is at serious

risk. The five-year funding trend contained in the President’s 2006

budget, I think, could render the aeronautics side of the equation

irrelevant. Could you just comment, as the NASA Administrator,

on what you are planning to do, if anything, to reverse that decline?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, the President’s budget for aeronautics is what

it is. And what I am committed to do is utilizing that budget in

the most effective way possible. I absolutely believe in the imporVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:38 May 19, 2006 Jkt 021949 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL05\062805\21949 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tance of aeronautics for NASA and for this nation, and I understand that we have stakeholders in industry, in DOD, with the

FAA, and even internally within NASA, all of whom to which the

aeronautics program is of first rank.

I think we need to focus our efforts going forward more than they

have been. I think NASA does its best when our aeronautics programs are focused around key technical demonstrations, which are

of a groundbreaking nature. We have had much in the aeronautics

community, which is of a business-as-usual, keep-funding, keepprograms-alive nature, and I am looking to restructure. I have

been, in fact, one of the voices, noting that the last time the Nation

had a strategic plan in aeronautics, it was issued by the Office of

Science and Technology Policy, and the date it carried was 1982.

I have the report. I am in full support of this committee’s and the

House’s recommendation that we have a new aeronautics strategy.

Mr. UDALL. Do I hear you say, then, that you more aggressively

promote the aeronautics side of the NASA mission?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Within the context of the President’s budget, I absolutely will. I am a strong supporter of our aeronautics program. I

think we need to be looking at what we can do with almost $1 billion in funding rather than complaining constantly that it isn’t

enough.

Mr. UDALL. But if I could, I would ask you, and I think you

would have a lot of support on the Committee, to push for additional funding. I think the flat-line trend puts us further behind

the eight ball, and it is my opinion that the results, the economic

return, on the aeronautic side, is equal to that of the space side.

Could we count on you to push for—within the context of your responsibilities, additional funding, at least to keep pace with inflation?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Sir, my first priority will be to effectively—to utilize

effectively the money that we are given. I will be working with this

committee and other executive agencies to do that.

Mr. UDALL. Let me turn—and I think this conversation will continue, if I might conclude in that way——

Dr. GRIFFIN. Sure.

Mr. UDALL.—because I do think the aeronautics side is crucial

across the whole series of fronts.

HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE

Let us turn to Hubble. Again, I want to thank you for your willingness to revisit the Hubble policy. I know you have asked a team

out at Goddard to start planning for such a mission. Could you talk

about what they are doing? And then would you talk about your

comment that after the first two successful return-to-flight missions, and I am going to presume, as we all do here, that these are

going to be successful return-to-flight missions, what are the criteria you are going to use to decide whether to proceed with the

Hubble servicing mission?

Dr. GRIFFIN. There are some detailed test objectives to be accomplished on these flights that have to do—that do affect our ability

to execute Hubble Servicing Mission 4, SM–4, as it is known. They

have to do with available crew time for EVA, other EVA guidelines,

use of the manipulator arm for tile inspections. What we do with

42

regard to those procedures, they need to be worked out before we

can fully commit—before I could responsibly commit to you that we

should undertake the servicing mission. What I have said in prior

testimony and in public remarks is that by this fall, when we have

completed those two missions, we will know those answers. And if

those answers are favorable, then I will recommend that we execute Hubble Servicing Mission 4 with the Shuttle and restore the

Hubble to health and to a stable orbit for, you know, the next half

dozen years or more.

Mr. UDALL. Doctor, do you have any cost estimates on the

Hubble servicing mission and any sense of how much might be

funded by the science account in the fiscal year 2006?

Dr. GRIFFIN. I don’t have those estimates currently, no, I am

sorry. We can provide those to you for the record. I have also not

looked at, yet, the structure of what that mission might consist.

Much of the cost depends on the assumptions that go into the mission, and we have not flown—all of the missions we have flown of

that vein beforehand, of course, were prior to the loss of Columbia,

and we need to think through how we would intend to do this mission.

Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Let me ask you, Mr. Administrator, and come closer to the microphone, because we are anxious to hear what you have to say.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Oh, I am sorry.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Is it still the operative plan within NASA,

as you undergo this strategic review in your workforce, that there

will be no layoffs, at least until 2007, if then?

Dr. GRIFFIN. I believe that is where we are at present.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Okay. Thank you very much.

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And I would like to welcome the new Administrator. Thank you

very much.

THE IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT

Let me note that our Chairman compared you to the man from

La Mancha, which I found very disturbing, Mr. Chairman. In fact,

after considering that of the four top NASA executives, that all four

of them are leaving, will be gone shortly, I think that we should

compare you more to Conan the Barbarian rather than the man

from La Mancha. So—but we—but our governor in California has

already secured himself that designation. So we will be searching

for an appropriate title that will exemplify your Administration.

Let me note that you have started very, very well. And you have

been bold. You have been making decisions. You have been setting

up a process in order to make the decisions that can’t be made

now. And you can count on all of us here on both sides of the aisle

to be working with you.

A little disagreement with my—with the Ranking Member. I

would suggest that you actually take as much money from the

Mars part of the program and spend it on meeting the current

challenges. Spending money too soon in such a long-term project as

going to Mars, spending money would be wasteful rather than trying to meet the challenges we have now and then using new techVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:38 May 19, 2006 Jkt 021949 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL05\062805\21949 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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nology in the years ahead, rather than trying to develop technology

today for something that may not be applicable because of changes

in the future.

I would like to specifically talk to you right now about, and get

your reaction to, something that I see as your ultimate short-term

challenge, and you mentioned it in terms of the Shuttle and the

Space Station. And the greatest impediment to you, which I can

see, of actually meeting that challenge of making sure that the

Space Station project is finished and reaches its potential, and plus

our—that we know about in terms of the limitations of the Shuttle.

And I guess what I am talking about is the Iran Nonproliferation

Act. And let me note, Mr. Chairman, that I was very deeply involved in the wording of the Iran Nonproliferation Act in dealing

with this particular challenge that we face right here. And I will

say that it was a worthy effort at the time to make sure that we

pressured the Russians not to participate in the developing of a nuclear facility in Iran. That strategy has, however, not worked.

Clearly, it has not worked. Unfortunately when the Nonproliferation Act was put into place in the year 2000, both during the Clinton Administration and during this Administration, what needed to

happen was some type of an overture to the Russians that would

give them an alternative. Neither Administration did its job in the

past, and now you, after two months as being leader of NASA, are

faced with this very serious time period when we have to make decisions and we have to move forward and decisions have to be

made.

And so you aren’t to blame. I would put the blame on the Clinton

Administration as well as the Bush Administration for not doing

this, but now we have got this decision to make.

Do you believe, and you have background with—but we know

that the Defense Department has been able to work with the Russians all along, even with the Nonproliferation Act. Do you believe

that we should now shift into more of a policy with NASA that is

more like what you have in the Department of Defense and just realize that the Nonproliferation Act is not working and Space Station has got to be completed?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, yes, sir, broadly speaking, I do support that.

And as I said earlier, the Administration is just releasing, I, in

fact, signed today jointly with Secretary of State Rice, a letter to

this committee requesting that we do amend the act. It is worthy

of note that it is, today, possible for the Defense Department,

through its contractors, to buy Russian engines for Defense Department purposes, but if we would seek to use one of those engines

to support the International Space Station program, it would not

be possible under the act, and—as it exists today, and that is an

interesting——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, you need not be burdened with things

that were so weighty, let us say, as the Nonproliferation Act, which

was not, as I say, followed through on. It was not handled correctly

by those who preceded you, as well as the rest of the Administrations, both the Clinton and Bush Administrations. Is there any

other way out that you see?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Other than an amendment of the Act, no, sir. As I

pointed out earlier, the only approach that we can take would be

44

to cease buying Progress and Soyuz services from Russia and to restrict our astronaut time on the Space Station to periods when the

Shuttle is present.

I would also point out that while, you know, we have alliances

and differences with Russia, that among the best things to have

come from our space program over the last 15 years is the space

cooperation that we have enjoyed with Russia. And if the act is not

amended, that will come to a halt in April of 2006.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, it was a worthy goal. We tried, Mr.

Chairman, to make sure that we used all of the leverage we had,

including space cooperation with the Russians to try to get them

out of this nuclear power plant down in Iran. It did not work.

There is no reason for us not to be realistic, and I applaud you and

the Administration now for being realistic, although I think the Administration shares a great deal of blame for bringing us to this

point.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, sir, none of us like this position. And the fact

is that for the next several years, as the Space Station development

and its partnership go forward, the United States is in the position

where we cannot effectively utilize the Space Station without our

Russian partners. This strategic dependence, in a critical area, is

why I have spoken up so strongly since coming into this new position for narrowing the gap between Shuttle retirement and Crew

Exploration Vehicle deployment. That is why I have subordinated

other important priorities within NASA to that priority, because I

believe—I absolutely believe that it is strategically essential that

the United States have its own access to space, dependent upon no

other nation.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you. And without objection, the letter to the Chair and the Committee, signed by Secretary Rice and

you, Mr. Administrator, will be put in the record at this juncture.

[The information follows:]

45

46

Chairman BOEHLERT. In effect, it says that within the Administration, a proposed amendment is still being vetted, and we can anticipate something in the short-term. So thank you.

Dr. GRIFFIN. I think the details of the wording, that is correct,

but with the broad principle that we need an amendment. I believe

that is accepted.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Honda.

Mr. HONDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome, Mr. Griffin. It is good seeing you again.

Dr. GRIFFIN. It is good to see you, sir.

CENTER WORKFORCE

Mr. HONDA. A lot of the questions I wanted to ask were asked

already. And I think your responses were clear and very forthright,

and I appreciate that.

And I look forward to September where we get more information

from you in terms of what the timeline on the calendar is going to

look like for our programs.

47

The previous Administrator had set up the budget in such a way

that it appeared that our different centers would be operating as

if they were R&D outsourced agencies. And I heard you say that—

and I read that you had said that you are changing the direction

and trying to retain the core competence of those engineers and scientists that we have at these centers so that they can do what we

do best and what NASA’s mission has been set out in—originally.

Understanding that and seeing that and looking at the proposed

budget for NASA for 2006, what is it in the budget that you see

right now that needs to be revisited or looked at in terms of policy

refinement in our budget for authorization so that you can move

forward with the mission that you laid out and that you see that

needs to be done in the near future? Not only the mission, but also

in terms of how we are going to be able to maintain the staffing

that we currently have without compromising our core competencies and the direction that you would like to take NASA.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Yes, sir. I feel like I am becoming repetitive with

this answer, but we have yet another team of senior folks within

NASA——

Mr. HONDA. I remember that. Yeah.

Dr. GRIFFIN.—who are looking at exactly the question you raised

of how do we need to restructure our fiscal year 2006 plans in

order to preserve core competencies within the NASA centers.

Those results, also, will be available within the next few weeks. In

fact, we must have them within that time in order to present—prevent other undesirable actions.

Philosophically, there are—there is probably no one you will have

before you who is a stronger supporter of the broad principles of

competition and industrial capability than I. I have run businesses,

which had to make money. I have been an entrepreneur.

But all of that said, federal research centers and laboratories are

not operating businesses. They don’t exist for that purpose. They

exist to make investments on behalf of the American people that

it has been determined by the Congress are necessary to be made.

And they don’t operate, and should not operate, on the principles

of short-term gain or next quarter profitability. So we will not be

running our NASA federal centers as if they were our outsourced

laboratories for R&D. We will be making strategic assignments of

missions—mission areas and work to those centers in order to preserve the core competencies that we feel we have to have going forward to execute NASA’s science missions, the vision for exploration, and aeronautics.

They won’t be, necessarily, the exact same missions that we had

been performing in the past or even are performing today. During

my round of center visits, including to Ames and other aeronautic

centers, I have pointed out that in fairness, the research centers,

as opposed to the mission and flight operation centers, the research

centers should be on the cutting edge of change. They should be on

the very edge of the frontier of what it means to be doing research

and development for space and aeronautics. Just as today we no

longer have manufacturers who produce slide rules, today we may

well not need every wind tunnel that exists within NASA. But the

role of research within NASA, to keep this Nation on the cutting

48

edge of space and aeronautics technology development, cannot be

denied, and it is uniquely NASA’s, and I support it totally.

FFRDC

Mr. HONDA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. If I may, a quick question.

Then have you reached any conclusions about the recommendation to convert centers to alternative structures, such as the

FFRDC?

Dr. GRIFFIN. I have worked at NASA centers, and I have worked

at FFRDCs. Both are excellent investments, in my opinion, of federal tax dollars. I do not fundamentally see any gain to be achieved

by having NASA convert federal centers to FFRDCs, and the doing

of so—such—so doing would, in fact, create pension and retirement

system liabilities that I don’t believe this Congress is prepared to

take on in the current budget environment.

Mr. HONDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And just as a personal

comment, this program and these projects have been in such turmoil in the last few years that a lot of these—being repeated, and

if we are talking about Don Quixote de La Mancha, he had more

than one or two windmills he had to hit, and sometimes it looked

like the same ones. And I think that people’s lives and people’s

projects that are affected sometimes require repetition for the—to

replace the kinds of sentiments that had been growing for these

past few years, and I, for myself, do appreciate your leadership.

Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. HONDA. Thank you.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Dr. Ehlers.

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SAFETY AND RISK

Let me first say, Mr. Administrator, how pleased I am that you

are in this position. NASA is at a very crucial juncture, and you

are the type of person and have the right background to solve the

multitude of problems that we have been talking about this morning, and I appreciate your willingness to take on this almost impossible task.

I would like to join my colleagues who have expressed their support for the Hubble servicing mission. I won’t go into a lot of details

on that, but I would simply point out we have done it several times

before with far less safety concerns than we are facing right now,

and we completed the missions safely.

I worry, frankly, and this is not just relating to the Hubble repair mission, that we have become so safety conscious after the Columbia accident that we may be needlessly eliminating our space

exploration efforts. We have to recognize, as American people, you

cannot guarantee absolute safety, but I think at this point, you are

certainly very close to exceeding the safety standards that every

American has when they enter their automobile and drive through

traffic in this country. They don’t stay at home because there might

be an accident. And similarly, I don’t think you should stay on the

ground, or your astronauts should stay on the ground, because

there might be an accident. They recognize full well, and I have

49

discussed this with them the risks involved. They understood that

full well when they became test pilots, the many who have served

in that capacity. And I suspect we are going in a direction where

we are trying to make our spacecrafts safer than the test aircrafts

that they flew in the past. So I just—I am just urging some common sense and not an atmosphere of fear that I think has pervaded

a lot of—that has infected a lot of people since the Columbia accident.

I certainly hope you are able to do the Hubble repair mission

and, of course, do it as safely as possible, but not be Earth-bound

by it by fear of what might happen.

VOYAGER AND CEV

The second point I would like to make is Voyager I, which I

think has reached a very crucial juncture in its voyage. And I understand that there is some talk of terminating that particular mission. You, of course, can’t terminate Voyager I. It is still going to

be out there transmitting the data, but that, for financial reasons,

we are not going to continue recording the data. I, once again,

would plead with you to keep that effort going. It seems foolish to

wait all of these years for it to reach the—and then somebody pull

the plug. So I hope—and I would be happy to work with you and

I am willing to try to help you identify other things that could be

cut instead. But I plead with you to keep Voyager I going. And—

I shouldn’t say that. It is going to keep going, but keep collecting

data, and even if we may have to slow down the analysis for financial reasons, at least collect it and let future generations of scientists have that information.

My final point is I think the highest priority you have, other

than these two aspects, is development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle. And I think when you mentioned earlier the need for research, that is clearly an area where we need, I think, some very

new ideas, some very basic, fundamental research, to try to come

up with new approaches, particularly if we are hoping to travel to

Mars some time in the future. We have to develop better propulsion systems. And the CEV is a golden opportunity to really look

at some new ideas that have developed since the Shuttle was developed. And so I wish you well in that. And I really think you were

correct when you say it is a very high priority. I think it has to

be your highest priority, other than the various satellites that are

out there now.

I would appreciate any comments or reaction you might have to

any of these points.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Sir, with regard to to the preservation of operating

satellites, we are—we have heard the voice of the community and

the Congress in this topic. We are doing a fresh, top-down review

on what satellites will be kept in operation and which ones will

not. And I assure you that I also think it is rather dumb to be

turning off Voyagers I and II. Nonetheless, you will hear our final

answers on that a little bit later this year.

With regard to the priority of the CEV, in my view, it is right

behind—it is my number two priority, after flying the Shuttle safely in the remaining years of its operation. So I support your remarks.

50

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you.

LIFE SCIENCE RESEARCH

Administrator Griffin, I am pleased to see you here. A couple of

years ago, the investigation into the Shuttle disaster concluded

that one of the problems was that NASA had contracted out too

much expertise, that there was not the nucleus of expertise inhouse at NASA, that they needed to be at each other’s elbows to

do the job that they needed to do. I asked Sean O’Keefe if he embraced that finding, since it did appear to be contrary to deviate

from the Administration’s orthodoxy about contracting out, and I

never got an answer, although, when he got through not answering, the light was red. So I am very pleased to have heard you embrace that idea that we do need to maintain that nucleus of expertise within NASA and that you will push for that in future budgets.

I do have a couple of questions about other programs. You did

say earlier that you thought that there was not an immediate need

for life science research into longer-term human travel into space,

because we aren’t going to do it right away. But what is going to

be the effect of a break in research in that? If we don’t have continuous research, how easy is it going to be to pick back up after having essentially stopped the life science and the biomedical research

that we had been doing and need to do at some point before we do

longer-term space travel?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, sir, in response to that question, I believe the

answer is fairly obvious to any of us who have ever been grad students in our lives. Most of the kind of research, fundamental research that we talk about is done in universities or in programs

where universities are part. And it will, if we are not able to fund

all of the work in fundamental life science, the researchers who

were doing it will go elsewhere to other occupations, other research

endeavors that are being funded, and we will have to put the program back together later.

Mr. MILLER. Okay.

Dr. GRIFFIN. That is just a fact. But I cannot responsibly

prioritize microbiology and fundamental life science research higher than the need for the United States to have strategic—its own

strategic access to space.

Mr. MILLER. Well, I am not happy with that answer, but it was

an answer.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Yes, sir. And I am sorry, I am not happy with it either, but I don’t know what else to do.

SPACE GRANT PROGRAMS

Mr. MILLER. One additional question about this space grant program. It is hard not to look at NASA’s request and Congress’s appropriations and not come to the conclusion that Congress values

the space grants program more highly than NASA does. I think

Congress, in fiscal year 2003, appropriated $24,100,000 for the

51

space grant program. The request the next year from NASA was

$19,100,000, and it kind of goes on every year. What is your take

on the space grant program? Do you support that program? Do you

think it is important in providing the kind of flow of expertise that

we need? Is there something we ought to be doing instead of the

space grant program?

Dr. GRIFFIN. I would have to take that question for the record,

sir. I am actually not familiar with the program, and in the two

and one-half months I have been on board, have not had the opportunity to become so. So we will take a look at it, and I will get you

a responsive answer, but it will have to be for the record.

Mr. MILLER. Okay. Thank you.

INFORMATION FOR THE RECORD

The National Space Grant College and Fellowship Program (Space Grant) continues to be a critical component in our education portfolio, particularly with regard

to addressing workforce needs of both NASA and the national aerospace industry.

Our experience is that the Space Grant program also has been very effective in developing a national network of affiliated organizations, now comprised of over 550

colleges and universities, 80 industry affiliates, 40 government affiliates, and 180

non-profit and other educational organizations. This network is a critical strategic

element for preserving and cultivating our future workforce expertise in disciplines

needed for future space exploration.

The focus of NASA education is best presented in terms of its three major strategic outcomes: (1) Strengthening NASA’s and the Nation’s future science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) workforce; (2) Attracting and retaining students in STEM disciplines through a progression of educational opportunities

for students, teachers and faculty; and (3) Engaging Americans in NASA’s mission

through partnerships and alliances.

The Space Grant Program has and is expected to continue to assist NASA in

achieving these outcomes in several ways:

• Student Pipeline: Program fellowships and scholarships support an average

of 2,200 students each year of which 21 percent are under-represented minorities and 43 percent are women; the research component involves over

5,000 students each year; and, the higher education component involves over

20,000 students each year.

• Faculty Competitiveness: The research infrastructure building effort contributes to the development of faculty through the travel grants, seed research

grants, release time, and research collaborations with NASA Centers and industry.

• Pre-service Education: The pre-college efforts focus on enhancing the knowledge of students and teachers through teacher preparation and development,

curriculum development informed by NASA content, and dissemination activities.

• Student Research: The fellowships and scholarships emphasize student internships and research experiences and mentoring components, with consortia

reporting an average of 1,500 collaborative efforts each year with NASA Centers and with industry.

• Under-represented and Under-served Participation: 20 percent of the over 550

academic affiliate organizations are minority-serving institutions. Additionally, over 20 percent of the Space Grant fellowships and scholarships are

awarded to under-represented minorities.

• Elementary and Secondary Participation: The pre-college component places

an emphasis on teacher preparation and development. Each consortium is directed to align pre-college components with the state’s STEM standards and

existing state systemic reform efforts.

• Informal Education: The public service component emphasizes promoting an

understanding of STEM disciplines through the dissemination of NASA content (materials and information), and the stimulation of an interest in STEM

disciplines and the NASA mission through public service activities.

We look forward to sustaining this program with a focus on alignment to NASA

strategic education outcomes in the areas of workforce, pipeline, and public benefit.

52

With our increased emphasis on partnerships and alliance, we value the many now

long-standing affiliations, which have developed through Space Grant over the last

18 years and look to build on those relationships.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Hall.

Mr. HALL. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is not necessary that I be happy. It is probably not possible

when I hear all of these suggestions that we are going to have 28

or 38 missions by 2030, or even talk about our new vehicle by 2010.

I think about George Burns, at the age of 100, saying he didn’t buy

green bananas. So I don’t think it is going to happen really quick,

but I am glad to see you with your hand on the throttle. And we—

a lot of us are very happy to see him reach down into the maze

of men and women that could be considered for this to see you

come up with it. I am not sure you are going to make it, but I am

pretty sure that I am going to be trying to help you and support

you.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. HALL. And Congressman Rohrabacher referred to you as the

man from La Mancha. I guess the areas that you are battling are

real, however. We know they are, and the results are consequential, rather than comical. You have a lot of work to do and some

very difficult things to change. I just—you have—you know, for one

thing, the trip to Mars, you are faced with the Will Rogers lookalikes throughout this country who say they are less interested in

going to Mars than they are of being able to make a trip to the grocery store. And that is a pretty—thing that most people can relate

to, but the hard and cold facts are we need to go to Mars. We have

to go to Mars for a lot of reasons. And this group—these—we—it

is obvious that we are aware of those reasons and are pretty supportive of them.

We know that NASA wrestles with all of these thorny issues,

that we have got to move ahead with authorizing legislation to

keep you going. And the bill that Chairman Calvert and I introduced just yesterday, I think, provides a framework for moving forward and ensuring that Congress has the information it needs to

make a more detailed policy because in years ahead you are going

to have to make and be having to lead.

I think that on safety—this hasn’t been talked about very much

here today, but I know it is on everyone’s mind. We—as you know,

we had $15 million set aside. We had requested that and had been

set aside to study for the future safety of the astronauts themselves, and I understand that you all have handled that and that

you—that either under the previous Administration, or your Administration, have been working for safety with full plating with

the hulls of some of the birds we have and space suits and other

survival equipment, that that has been wrapped into that and

going in the future planning that I have asked you about so many

times. So you know pretty well, and because it is still a fragile mission, you know the reason I am asking them, and you know the

question I am going to ask, and you can just answer it without me

asking it, but to make it a little easier for you, I would like to get

it on record. This is your first appearance here, official appearance

here, as the Administrator. You have been here many times before,

but you know I am concerned, as we all are, about crew safety, and

53

I know that you have down-selected the Crew Exploration Vehicle

to two contractor teams, is that correct?

Dr. GRIFFIN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. HALL. And in their proposals, did they address crew safety

as an issue? And if so, how? And if not, will this be included in future iterations of these contracts themselves?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Oh, crew safety has been addressed, and as we go

forward to a further down-select early next year to a single contractor to build the CEV, we will absolutely make certain that crew

safety is a top priority.

Mr. HALL. But you are underway, and you are of record, and you

are giving leadership in that thrust?

Dr. GRIFFIN. In every possible way that I can, sir.

Mr. HALL. Because wouldn’t you hate to be Administrator, and

would we hate to be Members of Congress, if we had another tragedy and we weren’t already traveling that road to get that type of

operative procedure for our future astronauts?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Sir, we are endeavoring with our plans and designs

for the new Crew Exploration Vehicle to make it as safe as we can,

as simple as we can, and have it as soon as we can.

Mr. HALL. Until 2010, and then have the module in that bird

that would be an escape vehicle.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, we would hope there would be an escape system for launch aborts and things like that. Yes, there will be.

Mr. HALL. I thank you. And I thank you for what you have done.

And I thank you for the way you are doing it. And I admire you

for the way you are doing it.

I yield back my time.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentleman yields back four seconds.

Mr. Green.

Mr. HALL. Well, let me finish then.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Mr. Green.

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I also thank you, as well as the Ranking Member, for this

opportunity to visit with our outstanding head of our space program.

I will tell you, sir, that as you sit there alone, that table looks

very large. Normally, we have several people there at the table, but

it appears to me that you are up to the task, and I compliment you.

I would like to segue from Congressman Hall’s comments about

crew safety to another area of crew safety. It is my understanding

that the Columbia Accident Investigation Board gave us 15 recommendations that were to be adhered to, or should be adhered to

before we return to space flight. I understand that 12 of the 15

have been met, but we have three that are outstanding. Those

three include the debris issue, which was a key issue with reference to the demise of Columbia, repair tools, and repair techniques. Mr. Bill Parsons has said that the space—return to space

right now bears an acceptable risk. And my question has to do with

this term ‘‘acceptable risk’’, given that we still have the debris

issue, we still have the repair tools and repair techniques, and we

are looking at a launch window of possibly early July, July 13

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through July 31. Will you please comment on the term ‘‘acceptable

risk’’?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Yes, sir. I believe that Mr. Parsons was commenting

on the acceptable risk of returning the Shuttle to flight in terms

of the corrections and improvements that have been made after the

loss of Columbia to address the causes of that loss. Now I have—

as I said earlier, I have participated in every significant technical

review that has been held on this topic since I was nominated to

this office.

Let me give you my assessment, if I might.

We have—and our independent advisors from outside have

agreed, we have tremendously reduced—we believe that we have

tremendously reduced the amount of debris, which is shed, or will

be shed, by the external tank on this next Shuttle mission, as compared to all prior Shuttle missions. Now we believe that. This is

a test flight. These next two flights are test flights. It needs to be

fully understood that they carry the risk of test flights, because we

cannot—we simply do not have the capability to assess the efficacy

of our improvement without returning to flight. But we believe it

is much improved.

So when we say ‘‘acceptable risk’’, we mean that the risk of an

accident due to debris, which was the approximate cause of the

Shuttle Columbia loss, has been reduced to a level that is consistent with other risks associated with the Shuttle space flight

system. And there are many.

Mr. GREEN. Just as a quick follow-up, will we have repair tools

and repair techniques available to us prior to the next launch?

Dr. GRIFFIN. No, sir, we will not. We—those three recommendations in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s report were,

of course, well intended and serve as admirable goals. The ideal

state would be to have no debris coming from the tank. We have

not been able to achieve that. The ideal state would be to have repair tools and repair techniques, which could deal with a flaw in

the tile, the Shuttle’s entry heat system, heat protection system

once we are on orbit. We don’t know how to do that. We have spent

quite a lot of money on it. Some have estimated hundreds of millions of dollars trying to comply with that recommendation. We

don’t know how to do it. So at this point, we must say that we have

reduced the level of risk due to debris damage to an acceptable

level, in Mr. Parsons’ words the other day, or we must say that we

don’t want to fly the Shuttle again because we do not have a better

technical approach to dealing with it than the one we have put forward.

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance

of my time.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you. You are generous: two seconds.

Mr. Administrator, when you say ‘‘debris,’’ are we talking foam

now or foam and ice?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Broadly speaking, foam and ice. If you wish to make

it more specific, then I—everything that I have learned in the past

two and one-half months causes me to believe that we have reduced the risk of damage from foam debris to a negligible level.

Okay. That will not be a factor. And again, we cannot back that

assertion up without a test flight, but we are going into the flight

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of STS–114 with the belief that foam debris risk is not a significant

factor.

Chairman BOEHLERT. What about the risk of ice?

Dr. GRIFFIN. We have greatly reduced the risk of damage by falling ice, in particular by putting a feedline—a heater on the locks,

forward locks feedline bellows. There are other spots on the external tank and its propulsion system where ice can accumulate and

from which it can be liberated and strike the orbiter. We believe

that risk is minimal. Well, we believe it is well less than one in

100 based on our analyses, but it is not zero. And——

Chairman BOEHLERT. But it would lead you to conclude the acceptable risk?

Dr. GRIFFIN. The—we have concluded that it is an acceptable

risk in comparison to other risks, which we assume when we fly

the Shuttle.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Administrator.

Mr. Sodrel.

Mr. SODREL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Administrator Griffin, for being here this morning.

I know there are various kinds of risks to astronauts. One certainly is trauma, which the question has been asked here. The

other is longer-term. I have got an e-mail here I would like to read

to you from a constituent in my District and ask your comment.

It says in order to ensure the safe return of astronauts from exploration missions, we must have effective countermeasures and an

autonomous support system. This requires an aggressive basic and

applied research program in flight aboard the International Space

Station and on the ground. It is particularly compelling because the

countermeasures that are available today will not adequately protect our astronauts. In fact, I understand the longest—that the astronauts that spent the longest time in orbit experienced both muscle deterioration and loss of bone density. But anyway, it says, in

short, that we must maintain orbital science and grant research

and apply them directly to exploration missions. I wonder if it had

had any significant impacts on space life scientists has been the denying of funding of proposed research that received high acclaim

and peer review. We scientists believe the values and principles encompassed within peer review. The process needs to be upheld by

all research agencies, including NASA.

So I guess first, my first question is how much weight is given

to peer review? And the second part is what are we doing with regard to protecting the astronauts long-term?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, with regard to the role of peer review in selecting science experiments, it remains unchanged within NASA

and absolutely follows the guidelines that your constituent is suggesting. However, the purpose of peer review is to determine which

experiments, in comparison to other suggestions, are worth doing

and ultimately to help us with prioritizing our overall research

agenda. But there will always be more good ideas that could be

suggested for funding and would pass the peer review process than

we have the budget to support. And so at some point, there must

be a cut-line established below which we simply can’t afford to fund

those priorities.

56

Now that does not make them without a value, but it does mean

that we don’t have the money to support them. We must choose.

We must choose whether minimizing a strategically significant gap

in space access to the United States is more important or less important than doing the kind of research of which, you know, your

constituent speaks.

I have been very clear in my choice that the most important priority facing us, as we conduct our program of human space flight,

is to fly the Shuttle safely. The next most important thing is to

bring online its replacement. It, in my view, serves no purpose to

conduct even very high quality research into human space life

sciences unless we are flying humans. And if we have a long and

strategically significant gap in such human space flights, I think

we have got the priority order in the wrong way. But with all due

respect to your constituent, I do understand the priority choices,

which must be made, and I have made mine.

Mr. SODREL. So you feel like we are doing enough to protect the

astronauts in the long-term, as well as the short-term?

Dr. GRIFFIN. I believe we must eventually do more to protect astronauts in the long-term, but at present, we are not conducting

long-term flights.

Mr. SODREL. Thank you.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Ms. Johnson.

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE

STATION

I apologize for being late. I had an engagement I couldn’t change,

and I might have missed a great deal of your testimony, but welcome, and I read about your beginning. And I would like to—well,

over the years, I have touted the space program as being one of the

most successful research programs in our history with both treatment and commercial items.

What did we learn from the International Space Station?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, ma’am, that is a very broad question. We have

learned much from the International Space Station so far and have

a significant amount to go. Some specific things that we have

learned, I have often said that one of the best benefits of the program has been the enduring quality of the international partnership which has developed. We have learned to work with other nations in space and to find ways to resolve differences and make the

program work. We have learned a tremendous amount about assembling and integrating large structures in space and sustaining

them for years at a time, frankly, through some pretty severe difficulties following the loss of Columbia. It is the goal of this Administration, it is my goal, to put us on the path to a lunar return and

the establishment of a lunar outpost and missions to Mars. We will

not be able to execute those missions without learning how to sustain operations in space for months and years at a time, and a

place where we can learn to do that is the Space Station.

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WORKFORCE

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you. A year ago, as we were listening to

testimony, one of the urgent things was making sure that we had

the talent in-house, the numbers available to do the work. Have—

and I noticed you have gotten rid of a lot of people. Have you

brought new ones on?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Ma’am, we haven’t gotten rid of a lot of people. I

am not sure we have gotten rid of anyone. I have reassigned some

senior managers from existing roles in the Agency, or will be reassigning them, to other roles within the Agency, if they choose to accept those roles. I am in the process of assembling a management

team that I feel I can most efficaciously work with as we go forward, as I think you would expect of any senior manager. We are

looking very closely across the Agency at how we preserve the core

competencies that we need within the government.

Ms. JOHNSON. You have ended your associations primarily with

private industry as well as universities, and most especially with

universities. I thought we were attempting to attract and prepare

staff for the future. What was the rationale for that? I know you

said you want to do it in-house, but I am just trying to——

Dr. GRIFFIN. Ma’am, we have not ended our associations with

universities and private industry by any stretch of the imagination.

Eighty percent, or more, of NASA’s budget is outsourced and will

continue to be so.

Ms. JOHNSON. Okay. I am reading the wrong material.

When you go to—what—I understand that the—in getting to

Mars, it is going to be a journey, so it is going to probably take a

while. What do we need to do before you start to go to—other than

raise a lot of money, what—you are going to use what you have

learned from the International Space Station. What else do we

need to do, and what are we looking for?

Dr. GRIFFIN. We need to develop a replacement for the Shuttle,

which is capable of flying to the Moon and later on to Mars. We

need to develop—to redevelop a heavy-lift launch vehicle, something in the 100 metric ton class. We need to gain broad operational experience going to and living on the Moon for significant

periods of time before it would be wise, in my opinion, to take the

step to Mars. We need to develop space nuclear power and propulsion systems in order that we can go to Mars and remain there in

effective ways.

Ms. JOHNSON. Do you feel——

Dr. GRIFFIN. Those are the broad categories of things that I think

are important.

Ms. JOHNSON. Okay. Do you feel that you have now—or you have

your eye on the appropriate skills to bring in-house for that?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Yes, ma’am, I do. I think NASA has most of the

critical skills it needs to acquire and maintain in order to execute

this mission, and where we don’t have them, we know what to do

to get them.

Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. Good luck, and I will try to be of support.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Thank you.

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Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you.

Mr. McCaul.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MANNED SPACE FLIGHT VS. UNMANNED SPACE FLIGHT

Dr. Griffin, it is an honor to have you here today. You certainly

have a challenge in front of you that I agree with the Committee.

You are doing a great job getting started, and I wish you well.

I have about 15,000 NASA employees and contractors on the

Houston end of my District. I have been through the Johnson

Space Center. It is very impressive. Most of the questions have already been asked, but I do want to ask a more fundamental question, and that is I support the President and his vision, space exploration to the Moon and Mars and beyond. But there are those

critics who say that we shouldn’t take the risk and that we should

do that with unmanned vehicles. And I was hoping that you could

possibly articulate or advocate why it is important for us to engage

and have manned space flights to the Moon and Mars and beyond

as opposed to unmanned space flights.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, sir, I think both are important, and I have

spent significant portions of my career in both pursuits. But let me

answer your question as to why I believe it is important.

I believe that if the United States is to be the world’s preeminent

nation going forward in the 21st century and the centuries beyond,

that it must be preeminent in space, exactly as was the case centuries ago when small island nations or other small nations, such

as Britain, Portugal, had dominant roles in the global structure of

their day because of their maritime preeminence.

Space is—mastery of the art of space flight, both human and

robotic, is the most important thing that America can do to assure

that we will always be a great nation, in my opinion. When one

looks at that, there are broad regimes of activity. There are activities that we undertake today in low-Earth orbit, both human and

robotic, and they are very significant.

Beyond low-Earth orbit, the next places that we can go are the

Moon, Mars, and the near-Earth asteroids. If we don’t go there,

eventually other nations will, and eventually may not be too long.

I have pointed out in other testimony that since we last flew our

own people in space on our own machines, two other nations have

done so. I do not find that acceptable. Space will be explored and

exploited by humans. The question is which humans from where

and what language will they speak. It is my goal that Americans

will be always among them.

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank you for your eloquent testimony.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Ms. Jackson Lee.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Welcome, Dr. Griffin. It is a pleasure to engage you, and I thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for

this very crucial hearing. I hope we will have an opportunity, as

I might imagine you would like, for members to engage on a regular basis. I, frankly, believe that we have to be a team if we are

going to be successful.

I consider the astronauts brave and patriotic Americans willing

to risk their lives on behalf of American excellence and at the direcVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:38 May 19, 2006 Jkt 021949 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL05\062805\21949 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
59

tions of the Commander in Chief. I don’t believe one astronaut

would tell you that they are not willing to accept this mission or

any other mission. And that is why I believe it is crucial for the

executive, in this instance, you, but even more crucial for this body,

which is considered part of the people’s house, closest to the people

of the United States, to be diligent, technically and philosophically,

on this question of space exploration. Now I happen to be a very

strong supporter of human space exploration, including the mission

to the Moon. But at the same time, my neighbors are astronauts.

My neighbors are the Johnson Space Center. My neighbor was Ron

McNair, who attended church in my Congressional District, and his

wife, a friend, and still a very zealous and wonderful supporter of

NASA’s mission.

So I pointedly ask a number of questions that you have already

asked and answered, and I have reviewed your testimony, and I,

too, apologize for being at another meeting. But I do want to probe

more extensively your very forthright recognition that we don’t

have the tools or the techniques that we would totally like to have

as it relates to space debris, and I think space debris is anything.

It is the foam, or as I understand, any amount of debris that you

encounter in going into space. Can you calculate—this question

has—might be considered asked and answered, but I think we need

to hear it more times than not, where you place this risk, this acceptable risk, as compared to the advantages or the importance of

space exploration. Might you also give us the vision of the NASA

Administration and the President of the extent of human involvement in the space exportation in the mission to the Moon and the

presence of humans on the Moon, the advantage of their presence

on the Moon? I am trying to give you a series of questions so that

you can answer them.

The other point that I want to acknowledge, and I think I understand this, I want to applaud the bringing in-house of technical and

planning and strategic decisions for NASA, meaning that you are

looking for the world’s best scientists, the Nation’s best scientists

in dealing with decisions in-house, and I think that is absolutely

imperative. One of the questions—one of what I glean from the

Gehman Administration is the line of command. Who was telling

whom to do what? Can you tell me, is that where you are trying

to go to make sure that strategic decisions, whether it is on safety

or otherwise, are within the bounds of NASA? And if you are going

that direction, I am with you.

Let me conclude in this direction.

I hope that you will join us and encourage this committee to hold

a full, extensive hearing on the question of safety. And I am going

to ask you. I would like you to just answer that yes or no in your

answers, of the importance of this committee having oversight,

being an investigatory mold to be helpful on the question of safety,

safety on human space shuttle, but safety as well in the International Space Station, which I think is extremely important as a

scientific tool for what it has done for America.

And lastly, this question of training in-house. I hope that we can

work together on our Hispanic-serving and historically black colleges. I would like to work with NASA on direct programs generating physicists, chemists, biologists, and others that can be diVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:38 May 19, 2006 Jkt 021949 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL05\062805\21949 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
60

rected toward your institution who happen to be from the minority

community.

And I thank you for your presence, and I hope you can summarize my questions.

Dr. GRIFFIN. I will try. Thank you.

DEBRIS HAZARDS

With regard to debris hazards and being all encompassing with—

in our definition of debris whether it is on ascent or while we are

on orbit, yes, you are right. Orbital debris might—what we call

MMOD for micrometeroid and orbital debris hazard, is one of the

more significant hazards to space flight in the Shuttle. And when

I spoke earlier of reducing our ascent debris hazard down to a level

consistent with other risks, this was one of the other risks. Going

forward, in order to make space flight as safe as possible, the best

thing we can do is to continue with the protocols we are already

implementing regarding minimizing—absolutely minimizing the

generation of new orbital debris. And then the other factor is in the

replacement vehicle for the Shuttle, the CEV, we must have a design which is, as much as possible, robust in the face of orbital debris, and that is a significant concern that I have.

THE VALUE OF HUMANS ON THE MOON

Now humans on the Moon I think is quite significant. I have

never heard it put better than Norm Augustine in his report in

1990 where he pointed out that an instrumented payload on the

top of Mount Everest simply did not have the same value as

Tenzing and Hillary ascending that mountain. Others have tried to

come up with similar approaches, but I think Mr. Augustine put

it best. The value of humans on the Moon is the value that we

bring anywhere we go. The ability to make broad judgments, to

make big picture assessments, to decide what details are important

and what ones are not important so that we can deploy our robotic

assistance on the proper tasks.

STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING

With regard to our strategic decision-making in NASA, yes, we

are refining our—in fact, our—what we call our strategic management handbook, as I speak, trying to simplify our chain of command and make our decision processes more transparent and more

specific.

If you decide to hold a hearing on safety of space flight, whether

Shuttle or International Space Station, you may count on me to be

a strong supporter of that hearing, and I look forward to working

with you on it.

THE ROLE OF HBCS

Regarding the development of in-house capability for our scientific and engineering staff, I welcome, with open arms, efforts to

engage Hispanic or historically black colleges and universities, as

I do all of our colleges and universities. We are, as a nation, facing

a crisis, clear and documented in our ability to entice young people

61

to embark on careers—on technical careers: science, mathematics,

engineering, all branches of those. Our—in many cases, in our

graduate institutions, foreign enrollment surpasses domestic enrollment, and the problem is that they go back home. They don’t stay

here. We need to address this. I have—I could not more strongly

support that.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

Mr. Feeney.

Mr. FEENEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

LAUNCH VEHICLE DETERMINATION

And Dr. Griffin, I want to join the chorus of the members of the

Committee to welcome and congratulate you to the Administration

head at NASA. I have been very impressed by your background,

been very impressed by the fact that you hit the ground running.

Even though you came from the outside, you had in your mind a

very visionary way of taking a complete inventory of NASA’s resources and capabilities and opportunities and challenges long before you were appointed by President Bush. And I have been,

frankly, amazed at how quickly, dispensing with any need for onthe-job training, you have stepped forward. You have reorganized

both personnel and mission. You have made some very critical, decisive judgments that are going to be criticized by a lot of us. But

you have done so with a sort of confidence and the level of expertise and background that gives me confidence that we are exactly

doing what we need to be doing. And there are going to be 535 visions for NASA in Congress. And the fact of the matter is, we are

going to have to rely on you to bring those together on behalf of

the people of the United States. And I have complete confidence in

your ability to do that job.

I was especially delighted to hear you say that priorities one and

two for your term involve human space flight, because, while there

are lots of priorities in science, microbiology for example, as mentioned earlier, all of these are important, but prioritizing is the job

that you have to do and the budgetary folks have to do. And the

truth of the matter is, there are a lot of places that can do research. There are a lot of universities. There are a lot of foundations. There are a lot of private sector folks, but there is only one

place that can move Americans into low, middle, and high-Earth

orbit and to explore the solar system, and for now, that is the Federal Government.

I join Dana Rohrabacher and others in hoping that, with respect

to low-Earth orbit, NASA gets out of the business pretty quickly.

We have commercial-viable options that can do that. But for now,

return to the International Space Station by the Shuttle and then,

number two, the CEV are clearly, in my view, the most important

priorities, and you have got them right. And I congratulate you.

With respect to the new CEV, and by the way I want to thank

you for trying to find a way to shorten the window. The original

proposal talked about a window from 2010 to 2014 where we would

have no capability as a Nation to send humans into space. And you

determined what that CEV ought to look like, and you have to select the type of vehicles for launch. The CEV is an important thing

to design, as Ralph Hall talks about, in a safe way, the heavy-lift

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obligation for, not just people, but equipment, the supplies needed

to go to the Moon and potentially to Mars someday, the ability to

go back and forth to the Shuttle. For reasons of safety, reliability,

scheduled costs, the development of the Shuttle-derived vehicles, I

think, had some real opportunities, and you have expressed a clear

preference for those Shuttle-derived launch vehicles.

On the other hand, back in December, you had the President’s

space transportation policy, which had a presumption, as I understand it, in favor of the use of the evolved expendable launch vehicles. I wonder if you could tell us how those presumptions, yours

versus the transportation policy organization, how you expect them

to be resolved, who you expect to be involved in the decision-making, what sort of considerations ought to be a factor into that, and

also, what sort of capabilities we want the CEV to have that may

combine the usage, ultimately, of both the EELV and the Shuttlederived opportunities.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, sir.

Let me answer the last question first, I think.

We have, within NASA, looked extensively at all of the means

that we might bring to bare for the two major—or I would say the

three major categories of things that we launch. And those three

categories are science missions, which go on expendable launch vehicles, and then we will be requiring a Shuttle replacement, the

CEV and its associated launch system. And then finally to go to the

Moon, as I have indicated before, we need capability in the 100

metric ton class.

I am, of course, aware of the space transportation policy that you

mentioned. The—I don’t believe that that transportation policy creates a presumption of the use of one system or another. What it

requires NASA and the DOD to do is to coordinate on their requirements in an effort to achieve the most efficacious——

Mr. FEENEY. If I may interrupt.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. FEENEY. DOD has a presumption here at a minimum, don’t

they?

Dr. GRIFFIN. I have not yet had an opportunity—I have spoken

with General Lord, head of U.S. Space Command, and General

Lord was quite clear that he understands and agrees with my stated preference of—for NASA to pursue a Shuttle-derived solution.

He would like us to launch our expendable vehicle traffic on DOD

systems as much as possible, and with that, we concur. NASA has

no desire to spend extra money developing systems that already

exist. But where systems don’t exist, then we need to look at the

lowest cost and highest reliability, safest path forward, and that is

what we are doing.

Chairman BOEHLERT. The Chair would like to recognize the ever

patient Dr. Schwarz.

Here is the situation on the Floor. We have a series of votes, and

they are eight minutes and 46 seconds to go. Dr. Schwarz, you will

get your two cents in, and——

Mr. SCHWARZ. How about 46 seconds worth?

Chairman BOEHLERT. All right. Go to it.

63

U.S. PREEMINENCE IN SPACE

Mr. SCHWARZ. Okay. This is a—just lob a softball up there, but

I think people would like to know, as we talk about other nations

and consortia who have programs, perhaps not as ambitious as

ours to go to a Jovian moon, but other programs, what are the

other countries and other consortia who you would consider our

competition in these enterprises, because I think that is not commonly known, and people should know who the competition is out

there and why we, perhaps, if not have fallen behind, have fallen

back from our previous lead?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Yes, sir. We—the United States has partners in its

space endeavors, and it has competitors. And in many cases, just

as in industry, the partners and competitors are the same people.

We ally or we compete on different ventures, according to what we

perceive our needs to be. Our chief competitors for preeminence in

space are Russia, the European Space Agency, the Chinese, who

are coming along quite nicely, and the Indian Space Agency is

making strong initiatives. We partner with any and all of those nations in various venues, and I expect that to continue in the future.

But we also compete with them. And it is, again, my goal to see

to it that America is always in the lead in that competition. That

matters greatly to me.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Thank you, Dr. Griffin.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you. And Mr. Administrator, we

want to help you achieve that goal. Let me say, in your maiden appearance before this committee as Administrator, you have appeared many, many times before and have been an invaluable resource to us, quite successful. I appreciate the candor of your responses to the many questions. I appreciate your trying to give us

some guidance as to when we might expect further answers to specific questions. I think it has been a very productive hearing. I

hope you share that view. We are partners in this endeavor. We

want to make it work.

Dr. GRIFFIN. I do share that view, sir. If I could just have one

more moment.

We need your help. We do need to work together. We need the

help of this committee and this Congress in carrying out our mission. We need your help with an authorization request and with relief on the Iran Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, pardon me. We cannot be successful without you, and we know that.

So thank you for having me here today.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Of the cynic society, I just want to tell you,

we are from the Congress. We are here to help.

This meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

(65)

Appendix 1:

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon

Q1. Do you intend to pursue competitive procurements for all of the required elements of the exploration program, or are you planning to use sole-source agreements or other non-competitive means for some of the elements? If the latter,

which elements will not be competitively procured?

A1. We anticipate full and open competition on all the elements of the exploration

program except where competition may not be safe or feasible. In those cases, we

will utilize sole-source agreements as necessary. Final decisions will be part of formal Acquisition Strategy Meetings.

Currently, the only sole-source procurement we are planning involves those parts

of the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) that are derived from existing Shuttle hardware.

Also, we plan to use in-house capabilities extensively to develop technologies for the

Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and lunar sortie missions.

Competitions are currently planned for the CEV, the CLV Upper Stage, and crew

and cargo services to and from the International Space Station. The CEV currently

has two contractors in phase 1 of a two-phase program with a competitive down select scheduled for spring 2006.

It should be noted that the Acquisition Strategy for the Constellation Program is

still a work-in-progress and details could change, but this reflects our current baseline.

Q2. What exploration capabilities do you intend to develop in-house at NASA, and

which ones do you plan to have industry develop? How did you go about making

those decisions?

A2. NASA considers many factors when determining which tasks will be retained

in the Agency and which will be performed by contractors. These factors include

criticality to fulfilling the Vision, available Agency workforce, existing talent pools,

future developments in the marketplace, and budget and schedule concerns. The capabilities that we will keep ‘‘in-house’’ are those that are considered core NASA capabilities, such as Systems Engineering and Integration and many technology capabilities as well. For example, the Liquid Oxygen, Liquid Methane engine will be developed primarily at NASA Centers, with NASA’s Glenn research center leading the

activity. This will be done to invigorate the technology capabilities at our NASA Research Centers and to utilize our civil service work force.

We will go to industry for many other capabilities. Goods and services provided

by industry will be competitively procured. For example, NASA will work in partnership with a contractor team to develop new space suit capabilities for the CEV

and lunar exploration vehicles.

Q3. Under what circumstances, if any, do you envision using U.S. funds to pay nonU.S. companies or organizations for exploration-related technologies, products,

or services instead of by means of no-exchange-of-funds cooperative agreements

with non-U.S. space agencies?

A3. NASA will pursue opportunities to cooperate with its international partners, as

the President directed us to do in the Vision for Space Exploration. We plan to purchase transportation services from our partners in support of the International

Space Station if commercial capabilities are not available when needed. We are

seeking international cooperation on the lunar robotic precursor missions and potentially with lunar surface systems such as rovers, habitats, and power, systems but

no firm plans or agreements are yet in place.

Under the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations, it is possible that foreign firms

with unique capabilities could compete and win some NASA-sponsored contracts and

grants for exploration-related activities. In such cases, NASA would first explore

whether the proposed activities could be accomplished on a cooperative no-exchange

of funds basis with NASA’s foreign government counterpart as an alternative to

funding a foreign firm.

Q4. You have talked about accelerating the Crew Exploration Vehicle [CEV] and its

launch vehicle, as well as starting development of a heavy lift booster to launch

cargo. How do you plan to reconcile those desires with the realities of the exploration program’s current five-year budget plan? Are you prepared to defer work

on other parts of the exploration initiative to accelerate the CEV and heavy lift

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booster? If so, what activities would you defer? Or would you get the money from

somewhere else? And if so, where?

A4. The Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) team has identified our architecture for the development of the CEV, the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV), and initial lunar landing sorties. To meet the challenge of accelerating the CEV and all

of its associated systems, and to provide adequate resources for this priority,

ESMD’s technology programs were carefully assessed as part of the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). ESMD can currently afford this acceleration, with

no new funding sources from outside the Directorate. This can be accomplished by

shifting funds from lower-priority or longer-term technology needs, including a total

of $785 million in FY 2006, including $292 million reflected in the FY 2006 budget

amendment and $493 million identified as a result of actions taken in the FY 2005

Operating Plan September update. We have been able to shift funding from Research and Technology projects that were more focused on future capabilities that

are not required for near-term objectives. For example, closed loop life support systems funded by ESMD have been deferred in the near term, because they are not

required by the early lunar sortie missions. As we begin to focus on long-duration

lunar outposts, funding for closed-loop life support systems and other essential technology will be increased at the appropriate time to support those missions.

Q5. NASA recently decided to phase out the involvement of the consultant Behavior

Sciences Technology (BST) after just 16 months of what was expected to be a

three-year campaign. BST was brought in as a result of the findings in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report that focused on the role that

the NASA culture played in creating the environment that contributed to the

Shuttle accident.

• Why has the contract been canceled?

• Do you believe that no more work is needed to improve the NASA culture? If

so, why?

A5. The BST effort was reviewed by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation

in cooperation with the Office of Institutions and Management. Working in collaboration, those offices defined the refocused effort that is being implemented after consultation with the Office of the Administrator. We feel NASA has benefited from the

activities involved in this effort. After significant experience with the BST contract

and dedicated work at several field centers, we decided to place internal focus on

those parts of the BST culture change effort, which offered the most significant benefits while curtailing other aspects.

While we did find many aspects of the BST activities to be beneficial, there was

never an expectation that culture could be fixed like a machine. Attention to safety

and strong internal communications is an on-going, continuous effort. NASA is dedicated to pursue this effort in the most efficient and effective manner possible. Similarly, there are many different ways we can improve our ability to consider alternative views and make effective, informed decisions. With our Strategic Management Handbook, we are setting up a streamlined set of Councils that will facilitate

informed decisions by senior leaders. The leaders and members of the councils will

be responsible and accountable for those decisions. With the new Office of Program

Analysis and Evaluation, NASA is ensuring that there are internal checks and balances built into the decision-making process.

Q6. You have stated your firm intention to terminate the Space Shuttle program in

2010.

Q6a. How do you respond to the concern that setting such a strict deadline creates

the same kind of schedule pressure that the Columbia Accident Investigation

Board (CAIB) identified as a contributing factor to the Shuttle accident?

A6a. NASA will not be driven by schedule pressure to fly the Shuttle when it is

not ready to fly, even if that means fewer flights prior to retirement.

Q6b. Two alternatives to a hard deadline are (1) to firmly define how many Shuttle

launches are needed and then operate the Shuttle until those launches are completed—however long that might be; or (2) to operate the Shuttle until a replacement means of crew transport has been developed. What do you see as the

pros and cons of each of these approaches?

A6b. NASA conducted a study to re-evaluate the Space Shuttle mission plans for

completion of the International Space Station in light of the February 2004 Vision

for Space Exploration, in particular, the number of Shuttle flights required by FY

2010. The Station-Shuttle analysis has become the basis for the number of remainVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:38 May 19, 2006 Jkt 021949 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\062805\21949 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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ing flights to be planned for the Shuttle program. Shuttle costs exceed $4 billion

per year to operate, and retiring the Shuttle is a key source of funds for developing

exploration systems. Extending Shuttle operations for a finite or indefinite period

would correspondingly defer exploration goals, given current resource constraints.

The Vision for Space Exploration calls for the Space Shuttle to be retired by 2010

with its primary focus being to complete assembly of the International Space Station. NASA has developed a proposed plan to execute this mission and meet our

international partner obligations using eighteen Space Shuttle flights over the next

five years.

NASA is also pursuing alternative means of crew and cargo access to the International Space Station in the post-Shuttle era, including soliciting crew and cargo

services from potential commercial providers. In addition, our international partners

have, or are developing, a number of vehicles to provide crew and cargo access to

the International Space Station, including the Russian Soyuz (crew) and Progress

(cargo), the European Space Agency’s Automated Transfer Vehicle (cargo), and the

Japanese H–2 Transfer Vehicle (cargo). The Crew Exploration vehicle will also be

capable of servicing the International Space Station.

Q7. How many flights of the Space Shuttle were budgeted for in the five-year budgetary plan (FY 2006–2010) for the Space Shuttle that was submitted as part of

the FY 2006 NASA budget request? How was the Space Shuttle five-year budget

estimate arrived at?

A7. There was a great deal of uncertainty associated with the outyears of the FY

2006 budget request for Shuttle. NASA was still working toward Return-to-Flight,

and had not yet addressed all issues raised by the Columbia Accident Investigation

Board (CAIB). In addition, NASA had not yet determined how many times the Shuttle was going to fly before its retirement in 2010. The President’s FY 2006 Budget

request stated, ‘‘NASA is examining configurations for the Space Station that meet

the needs of both the new space exploration vision and our international partners

using as few Shuttle flights as possible.’’ The five-year budget estimate was an estimate, based on the Shuttle budget in the FY 2005 budget request.

Questions submitted by Representative Mark Udall

Q1. You have said that you plan to revisit the possibility of a Shuttle mission to

service Hubble because after the Shuttle completes two successful Shuttle returnto-flight missions, the Shuttle will then be ‘‘essentially a new vehicle.’’ If that is

so, it sounds as though no extensive ‘‘recertification’’ of the Shuttle [as called for

by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board] would be required if the decision

was made to fly the Shuttle for a year or so past the proposed 2010 retirement

date. Is that an accurate assessment? If not, what would still need to be recertified?

A1. All the Criticality 1 systems and subsystems on the Space Shuttle have been

assessed against the 2010 retirement date and found to be within their hardware

certification limits. Certification assessments for certain lower criticality hardware

will continue through 2006. Consistent with the policy direction given in the Vision

for Space Exploration, the Space Shuttle program has not assessed any certification

activity that may be required to continue flying past 2010.

Q2. NASA plans to place some of its Earth observing sensors on spacecraft built by

other agencies instead of building its own satellites. For example, NASA plans

to put Landsat-type sensors on the first NOAA–DOD NPOESS satellite instead

of launching a dedicated Landsat spacecraft.

Q2a. What is the status of the NPOESS program? How easy is it going to be to add

Landsat sensors to the first NPOESS?

A2a. NASA is a partner in the NPOESS program. The NPOESS development is

governed by the NPOESS Executive Committee (ExCom) which has members from

the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense and NASA. Official

NPOESS Program status should be obtained from the host agency for NPOESS; the

Department of Commerce.

The complexities of manifesting a Landsat-like sensor on the NPOESS have been

analyzed in coordination with NASA, the NPOESS IPO and the NPOESS prime contractor, Northrop Grumman Space Technology. Analysis indicates that accommodating a Landsat-like sensor on the NPOESS spacecraft would entail significant

technical challenges.

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Q2b. To what extent are you concerned that the government may be following a

strategy of ‘‘putting all your eggs in one basket’’ with respect to Earth observations research and operations?

A2b. We have a diversified approach to Earth observations, research, and applications. We have other partnerships for measurements not destined for NPOESS. We

are pursuing a four-partner approach for ocean altimetry among NASA, CNES,

NOAA, and EUMETSAT with the intent that the research agencies (NASA, CNES)

will build the ocean surface topography mission, NOAA and EUMETSAT (the operational agencies) will operate it, and then NOAA and EUMETSAT will continue

ocean altimetry measurements via inclusion in their future operational satellite systems.

Reducing risk to long-term data continuity is the principal reason for seeking to

acquire selected Earth observations through NPOESS. The NPOESS Preparatory

Project (NPP), built by the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) with instruments

provided by GSFC and the IPO, will serve as both a risk reduction for the NPOESS

project and also provide climate data. NPOESS is the next generation series of polar

weather satellites, whose continuous operation is secured via multiple copies and

flight-ready or on-orbit spares. NASA research satellites, on the other hand, because

they are research missions, tend to be one-of-a-kind, with limited or no on-orbit redundancy or stand-by copies on the ground. The idea is to migrate measurements

that have proven their value in NASA research missions to NPOESS operational

systems so their continuity is assured. The challenge is in this transition phase

where the operational system taking on the key measurements is itself a new system. NPOESS is a ‘block change’ upgrade of the NOAA-operated, NASA-built POES

series that have comprised the civilian polar-orbiting weather satellite system for

many years. NASA is staying in the Earth observation business, continuing its role

of creating new Earth observation technologies and research.

Q2c. What if NPOESS runs into cost or technical problems—has NOAA committed

to you that it will keep the Landsat sensors on NPOESS no matter what?

A2c. The NPOESS management structure is governed by the NPOESS Executive

Committee (ExCom) which has members from the Department of Commerce, the

Department of Defense and NASA. The manifest of a Landsat-like sensor on the

NPOESS platform and the resulting NPOESS implementation strategies and contingencies will be governed by the NPOESS Executive Committee.

Q3. The American Geophysical Union (AGU) released a statement in May that concluded that NASA’s Earth and space science programs are ‘‘at risk.’’ The statement said, ‘‘There are indications that Earth and space sciences have become

a lower priority at NASA’’ and that NASA’s FY 2006 budget plan reduces

science research by $1.2 billion over the next five years relative to the previous

plan. Is the AGU correct in its assessment? What is your response to the statement?

A3. While the FY 2006 President’s budget shows a smaller rate of increase in the

budget for NASA’s Science Mission Directorate, these programs are still growing significantly. The overall NASA science programs budget runout shows a 24 percent

increase from FY 2006 through FY 2010, at which science will grow from 33 percent

to approximately 38 percent of the NASA budget, enabling the Science Missions Directorate to continue to support 55 operational missions, 26 missions in development, and 34 in formulation.

Q4. On page 2 of your testimony, you state that NASA ‘‘has adopted a ‘go-as-youcan-pay’ approach toward space exploration.’’ The 1990 Augustine Commission

used the same phrase to describe its approach to human exploration beyond low

Earth orbit, but it meant something very different from what NASA’s current approach seems to be. The Augustine Commission defined science as NASA’s highest priority and stated that human exploration beyond low Earth orbit [or ‘‘Mission from Planet Earth’’ as they termed it] should only be funded after the other

core missions of the Agency such as space and Earth science were adequately

funded, and that the pace of the human exploration initiative should be determined by how much extra funding was made available. Do you agree with the

Augustine Commission’s definition of ‘‘go-as-you-can-pay’’? If not, how would you

define it and why shouldn’t NASA follow the approach recommended by the Augustine Commission?

A4. While NASA strives to stay within budget and ensure adequate support for

Earth and space science, as called for by the Augustine Commission, NASA’s mission has changed since 1990. On January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush anVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:38 May 19, 2006 Jkt 021949 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\062805\21949 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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nounced the Vision for Space Exploration. This bold initiative places a renewed emphasis on human exploration of the solar system while continuing to ensure a balanced portfolio of scientific research. Implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration will be enabled by scientific discovery and will enable new compelling scientific opportunities. In addition, the Vision offers an opportunity to stimulate

mathematics, science and engineering in America’s grade, undergraduate and graduate studies programs.

Q5. NASA officials indicated to us earlier this year that substantial job cuts were

assumed in the budget projections contained in your FY 2006 budget. Specifically, we were told that the number of budgeted civil service full time equivalents (FTEs) will drop by almost 2,500 over the next year and a half.

• Do you still anticipate that level of personnel cuts?

• If so, what are the details of those cuts by Center and by discipline?

• If not, what is your current best estimate, and why has it changed?

A5. The NASA workforce has been impacted by significant budget reductions in our

aeronautics programs, cancellation of programs, and investment changes to the research and technology portfolio of the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. We

have taken specific actions to try to alleviate this problem. For example, starting

in November 2004, NASA implemented employee buyouts to rebalance the workforce and in January 2005 established hiring guidelines to emphasize filling vacancies from within the Agency. We are also making significant changes that will help

ensure that NASA’s Centers have a productive future. Contractors will continue to

play a key role, but we need to ensure that the Federal Government maintains the

in-house intellectual core capacity to sustain NASA’s exploration, science and aeronautics missions. Our goal is to ensure that NASA Centers are productive contributors to the Agency’s agenda and that we have the people and tools necessary to accomplish the long-term goals of space exploration. With that in mind, we will be

making changes at Headquarters as well.

In September, NASA initiated an Institutional Requirements Review (IRR) the

scope of which includes corporate G&A, corporate service pools, and all Headquarters-based operations. Our goals are to keep corporately funded requirements

within overall corporate budget guidelines, reduce the total workforce at Headquarters commensurate with its appropriate role and overall size of the Agency, and

consolidate required personnel at the Headquarters building. We aim to (1) gain

operational efficiencies; (2) align ourselves to a management model that has Headquarters in charge of architecture, strategy, policy, compliance, and general management with field Centers executing programs and projects; and (3) set an example

for the rest of the Agency of the willingness of Headquarters to make hard decisions

that benefit NASA in the long run.

Assuming we can achieve additional buyouts in the next few months and redirect

some of our in-house capacity to performing core activities related to exploration,

science, and aeronautics missions, NASA has approximately 950 civil servants in

the field without program coverage in FY 2006.

We will continue to address this problem and structure the workforce to ensure

the success of the exploration vision, as well as NASA’s other missions in science,

aeronautics, education, space operations and exploration. However, changes to our

skill mix and, therefore, the workforce will be required.

The NASA Office of Human Capital continues to work with center management

on the workforce strategies. We will continue to identify center work assignments

71

based on our strategic planning for the exploration systems. We are in the planning

stages of offering a final buyout program to employees.

If we are unable to cover all of the NASA civil service positions, NASA is planning

to conduct a Reduction in Force (RIF). Our Office of Human Capital is working with

human resource offices at the centers to ensure readiness for a RIF, should it become necessary. However, a RIF is a last resort, and we will exhaust all other reasonable possibilities before undertaking such an action.

With changes to NASA’s mission, it is important that we manage our workforce

issues to ensure that we have the right skill mix to successfully execute the vision

for space exploration and maintain the important work in other areas such as our

aeronautics, space operations and science portfolios. We will have an integrated,

Agency-wide approach to human capital management.

Questions submitted by Representative Brian Baird

Q1. Last year, the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) issued contracts

to firms from the Explorations Systems Research and Technology and Human

Systems Research and Technology programs. In April, NASA announced it was

‘‘indefinitely deferring’’ the expected Broad Agency Announcement for these two

programs. The Agency promised ‘‘additional insight into our revised plans.’’

A1. The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate did issue contracts last year for

Exploration Systems Research and Technology but none for Human Systems Research and Technology. The Broad Agency Announcement planned for 2005 was

canceled in anticipation of the change in direction being outlined by new Administrator Michael Griffin.

Q1a. In issuing these contracts, NASA was hoping to attract interest from non-traditional sources. In many cases, these are smaller firms that have a harder time

with uncertainty in funding and planning than the usual government sources.

Does NASA intend to honor the contracts that it has already signed?

A1a. The Exploration Systems Research and Technology projects have been realigned to support the Exploration Systems Architecture Study’s (ESAS) recommended requirements including accelerated development of the new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), the Crew Launch vehicle (CLV) and the lunar lander. This

realignment has resulted in a focused and phased, requirements driven Research

and Technology program in which some projects are curtailed, some modified or delayed, and some added. On going projects are streamlined to deliver technology capabilities when needed to meet the accelerated development schedules for the CEV,

launch systems and lunar lander. In FY 2005, 80 tasks and activities are being discontinued since they do not directly support ESAS architecture or schedule requirements. NASA, however, is continuing to investigate innovative procurements for

commercial resupply of crew and cargo to the ISS and encouraging other innovative

approaches (Centennial Challenges) to assist our exploration objectives.

Q1b. What steps is the Agency taking for the disposition of these contracts?

A1b. The first step was to notify Congress via the FY 2005 Operating Plan September update, which included the modifications. The next step is to provide affected contractors with termination notices following consideration by the Committees of the Operating Plan. NASA will also provide the contractors with two months

of FY 2006 funding for closeout costs. Additional closeout costs will be negotiated

on a case-by-case basis.

Q1c. What is your timetable for the disposition of those contracts?

A1c. Notification of effected contractors is projected by late-October.

Q1d. When are we likely to know NASA’s intentions to resume procurements in these

programs?

A1d. ESMD does not anticipate any new Broad Agency Announcements in these

programs. Our future research will be directed, with the intention of focusing our

efforts and funding on near term technologies designed to accelerate the development of the crew exploration vehicle and lunar sortie missions. Much of this directed research will be at NASA Centers. Industry and universities will provide capabilities and expertise that is not resident at the NASA Centers.

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Questions submitted by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee

Q1. Dr. Griffin, as a long-time supporter of NASA, my greatest priority at this point

is safety. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board led by Admiral Gehman

was able to determine the cause of the accident and was a solid first step in establishing new safety procedures for future space exploration missions. Since

last year, I have called for such a commission to be formed to investigate safety

aboard the International Space Station. Will you support the formation of such

a commission?

A1. I share your passion for conducting NASA’s space and aeronautics missions

safely and let me assure you that we do not take for granted the health or safety

of our astronauts and pilots who are needed to help us explore humankind’s remaining frontiers. After the investigation of the Columbia accident, our stakeholders

challenged us to address each recommendation provided by the Columbia Accident

Report. You may be familiar with the extensive planning undertaken by the Shuttle

program to address its cited deficiencies since the overwhelming share of public

scrutiny was focused on the Shuttle’s return-to-flight. Much less apparent, but nonetheless just as important, were the lessons that NASA wove into the fiber of many

other programs across all our centers. The International Space Station drafted its

own implementation plan for supporting the continuation of flight of the ISS entitled, NASA’s Implementation Plan for International Space Station Continuing

Flight. This document, available at http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/

110883main¥Station¥CFT¥Rev2.pdf, demonstrates NASA’s commitment to the application of lessons learned from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations and observations in support of safe continuing flight of the International Space Station.

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) is my source of expert consultation

on safety matters as well as a representative of our external stakeholders. In order

to assure that ASAP is satisfied with the approaches we are taking to ensure safety;

we have methodically provided its members with copies of the plan at each step of

its iteration. NASA briefed the ASAP about the plan during its development. Consistent with your request for a review of safety aboard the ISS, I have asked Vice

Admiral Joe Dyer, Chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), to review the ISS plan again independently, and to verify that this important program

has properly implemented the CAIB findings into its own planning. As you know,

the ASAP is an independent group of industry and non-NASA government leaders

and safety experts that advises me Administrator on safety matters with an emphasis on human space flight. Congress originally chartered this panel after the Apollo

fire, and the panel has been effective over the years in helping NASA focus on safety related design, operational and cultural issues. I have asked Admiral Dyer to

complete his review by the end of the calendar year, and I look forward to sharing

the results of his study with you and your staff.

Q2. I am especially concerned to learn that the Stafford-Covey Return-to-Flight Task

Group, the independent oversight panel chartered by NASA to certify that the

15 safety recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board are

met, has stated that three of these recommendations remain incomplete in advance of a proposed July launch. Will you delay the launch to make certain that

the problems faced by Columbia have been completely resolved?

A2. NASA’s Return-to-Flight process has been guided by the fifteen Return-toFlight recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and the

Space Shuttle program’s own internally generated ‘‘raise the bar’’ actions. NASA’s

implementation of the Board’s Return-to-Flight recommendations has been independently assessed by the Return-to-Flight Task Group. NASA’s overall Return-toFlight progress has been documented in the periodically updated Implementation

Plan for Space Shuttle Return-to-Flight and Beyond.

On August 17, 2005, the Return-to-Flight Task Group released its Final Report.

In it, the Task Group unanimously closed out all but three of the Board’s Returnto-Flight recommendations. The Task Group could not reach consensus on whether

NASA’s actions fully met the intent of three of the Board’s most challenging recommendations: External Tank Thermal Protection System Modifications (3.2–1), Orbiter Hardening and Impact Tolerance (3.3–2) and Thermal Protection System OnOrbit Inspection and Repair (6.4–1). The Task group noted NASA had made substantial progress relative to these recommendations, and emphasized that, ‘‘The

ability to fully comply with all of the [Board’s] recommendations does not imply that

the Space Shuttle is unsafe.’’ The first two Return-to-Flight missions, STS–114 and

STS–121, will provide the data and flight experience needed to address the remainVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:38 May 19, 2006 Jkt 021949 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\062805\21949 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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ing open issues in these recommendations. This work will be documented in future

updates to the Implementation Plan.

NASA made the decision to proceed with the launch of STS–114 on July 26, 2005

based on Return-to-Flight Task Group’s assessment, the totality of improvements

made to the Space Shuttle system during Return-to-Flight, and the vetting of all

these improvements through a rigorous and multi-layered engineering review process.Post-flight analysis of STS–114 indicated that, except for one event, the thermal

protection system on the External Tank performed within expected parameters.

Most of the small foam shedding events that were observed with the upgraded imagery and sensor capabilities developed during Return-to-Flight posed little or no

threat to the Orbiter. The one event of concern was the loss of an approximately

one-pound piece of foam from the area of the External Tank’s liquid hydrogen protuberance air load (PAL) ramp. NASA commissioned two teams (one lead by the Space

Shuttle propulsion manager, the other an independent ‘‘Tiger Team’’ reporting directly to the Associate Administrator for Space Operations) to analyze these foam

loss events and recommend any forward work that would have to be done prior to

the launch of the next mission, STS–121.

As of September 2005, NASA is reviewing flight opportunities for future missions

given the effects of Hurricane Katrina (which caused extensive damage to the area

around the External Tank manufacturing facility near New Orleans) on ongoing

foam loss troubleshooting and normal processing activities. NASA is targeting the

May 2006 launch window as the next opportunity to launch STS–121.

Q3. It has come to my attention that the NASA Education Office has been merged

into the Strategic Communication Office. How will this affect NASA’s education

program? Furthermore, how will this affect NASA’s assistance and work with

minority serving institutions?

A3. As directed by the NASA Administrator, the Office of Education is now part of

the Strategic Communications component at NASA Headquarters. Under the direction of the Chief of Strategic Communications, the Office of External Relations, the

Office of Legislative Affairs, the Office of Public Affairs, and the Office of Education

are now working more closely than ever regarding our regular and ongoing communications with our stakeholder communities. This ensures that more timely and consistent information is provided to the distinct stakeholder communities serviced by

each office. Specifically, the Office of Education, its functions, and all programs previously in place remain intact. Program operations under the Chief of Strategic

Communications will have no adverse affect on NASA’s assistance to and work with

the minority serving institutions (MSIs). NASA’s education programs will continue

to provide opportunities for MSI faculty and students to participate in the Agency’s

research and education programs.

Q4. NASA officials indicated to us earlier this year that substantial job cuts were

assumed in the budget projections contained in your FY 2006 budget. Specifically, we were told that the number of budgeted civil service full time equivalents (FTEs) will drop by almost 2,500 over the next year and a half.

• Do you still anticipate that level of personnel cuts?

• If so, what are the details of those cuts by Center and by discipline?

• If not, what is your current best estimate, and why has it changed?

A4. The NASA workforce has been impacted by significant budget reductions in our

aeronautics programs, cancellation of programs, and investment changes to the research and technology portfolio of the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. We

have taken specific actions to try to alleviate this problem. For example, starting

in November 2004, NASA implemented employee buyouts to rebalance the workforce and in January 2005 established hiring guidelines to emphasize filling vacancies from within the Agency. We are also making significant changes that will help

ensure that NASA’s Centers have a productive future. Contractors will continue to

play a key role, but we need to ensure that the Federal Government maintains the

in-house intellectual core capacity to sustain NASA’s exploration, science and aeronautics missions. Our goal is to ensure that NASA Centers are productive contributors to the Agency’s agenda and that we have the people and tools necessary to accomplish the long-term goals of space exploration. With that in mind, we will be

making changes at Headquarters as well.

In September, NASA initiated an Institutional Requirements Review (IRR) the

scope of which includes corporate G&A, corporate service pools, and all Headquarters-based operations. Our goals are to keep corporately funded requirements

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quarters commensurate with its appropriate role and overall size of the Agency, and

consolidate required personnel at the Headquarters building. We aim to (1) gain

operational efficiencies; (2) align ourselves to a management model that has Headquarters in charge of architecture, strategy, policy, compliance, and general management with field Centers executing programs and projects; and (3) set an example

for the rest of the Agency of the willingness of Headquarters to make hard decisions

that benefit NASA in the long run.

Assuming we can achieve additional buyouts in the next few months and redirect

some of our in-house capacity to performing core activities related to exploration,

science, and aeronautics missions, NASA has approximately 950 civil servants in

the field without program coverage in FY 2006.

We will continue to address this problem and structure the workforce to ensure

the success of the exploration vision, as well as NASA’s other missions in science,

aeronautics, education, space operations and exploration. However, changes to our

skill mix and, therefore, the workforce will be required.

The NASA Office of Human Capital continues to work with center management

on the workforce strategies. We will continue to identify center work assignments

based on our strategic planning for the exploration systems. We are in the planning

stages of offering a final buyout program to employees.

If we are unable to cover all of the NASA civil service positions, NASA is planning

to conduct a Reduction in Force (RIF). Our Office of Human Capital is working with

human resource offices at the centers to ensure readiness for a RIF, should it become necessary. However, a RIF is a last resort, and we will exhaust all other reasonable possibilities before undertaking such an action.

With changes to NASA’s mission, it is important that we manage our workforce

issues to ensure that we have the right skill mix to successfully execute the vision

for space exploration and maintain the important work in other areas such as our

aeronautics, space operations and science portfolios. We will have an integrated,

Agency-wide approach to human capital management.

Q5. When do you expect the first humans to set foot on Mars? What is that estimate

based on, and can that be done within a NASA budget that is flat or at best

keeping pace with inflation? If so, how?

A5. When the President unveiled the Vision for Space Exploration on January 14,

2004, he announced a plan to extend human presence across the solar system and

beyond. NASA’s exploration architecture lays out our plans for developing launch,

transportation, landing and habitation systems that will enable a return to the

Moon by 2018, followed by sustained human presence on the Moon while preparing

for later Mars missions. This architecture will be affordable and will institute a ‘‘go

as you can afford to pay’’ budget approach. We’re not far enough along in the planning to say exactly when the first human flight to Mars will be, however we will

already have much of the architecture, including the heavy lift vehicle, a versatile

crew capsule and propulsion systems, needed to get there. In addition, experience

from missions to the Moon will lay the groundwork for using Martian resources. A

lunar outpost, just three days away from Earth, will provide us with the needed

practice of ‘‘living off the land’’ that will be required for the longer missions to Mars.

Question submitted by Representative Michael E. Sodrel

Q1. Administrator Griffin, in your answer to my question as to whether or not NASA

was doing enough to ensure astronaut health in long-term missions, you stated

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that NASA will need to do more in the future, but NASA was not endeavoring

to have long-term human flight at this time. Shortly after answering my question, you referenced the Administration’s goal of visiting Mars. If I am not mistaken, flight to Mars will take years just to traverse the distance. While I can

understand why many resources will be committed to developing a vehicle capable of distance flight, I would hope engineering plans would also seek to alleviate or mitigate physical stress on the human flight crew. When placed in zero

gravity for extended periods, tremendous physical changes take place in the

human body such as accelerated skeletal aging, muscle atrophy and inexplicable

biochemical signaling disturbances that lead to anemia and immune dysfunction in crew. Vigorous life science research will be necessary to assist engineers

in solving such problems involved in long-term human flight. Would you agree

that maintaining a life science program at NASA is essential to obtaining stated

goals of NASA and the President?

A1. Four types of missions are currently planned for NASA: 1) Long duration, up

to six months in Low Earth Orbit; 2) short duration, 9–14 day missions to the Moon

starting in 2018; 3) longer duration stays (up to six months) on the Lunar surface,

and 4) a long duration mission to Mars later in the century. Physiological changes

develop in astronauts in microgravity and become more profound on extended duration missions.

Current research is directed toward the validation of countermeasures protecting

human health on the International Space Station (ISS). Medical standards for addressing the affects of space flight are being developed, as are prototypes of medical

care. Also critical, environmental health and radiation protection research is being

conducted on ISS and in the Brookhaven National Laboratory facility. Significant

resources are directed toward developing life support technology and autonomous

medical care without which longer missions such as Mars will not be possible.

NASA Life Sciences has provided significant contributions to our understanding

of the physiological changes and human adaptation to microgravity. ISS continues

to provide invaluable data on the exposure of humans to microgravity and the time

course of these changes, information which is also needed for Mars. The National

Space Biomedical Research Institute has been created to address space physiology,

psychosocial issues, and medicine, and to link with the Johnson Space Center and

other members of the Space Life Sciences community to address these issues. Obviously, NASA will also continue to rely on the contributions of the National Institutes of Health research in relevant areas.

(77)

Appendix 2:

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

78

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN

Review of President’s FY 2006 Budget

Thank you, Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Gordon and Members of the

Committee for inviting me to appear before you for today’s hearing. You have invited me to appear before your committee as a private citizen on several past occasions to discuss our nation’s space program. Today, I’m testifying before you in a

much different capacity—as NASA Administrator. When I previously appeared before you, I would use phrases such ‘‘they (meaning NASA) should do X or Y.’’ I now

need another choice of pronouns. We at NASA have a lot of work to do. We have

many challenges to overcome. We need to work closely with this committee and the

entire Congress in carrying out the many challenges before us, and we will need

your help in this great endeavor.

In your invitation, you asked me to address my guiding philosophy and plans for

setting priorities for NASA’s programs in human space flight, space science, Earth

science, and aeronautics, as well as its workforce and infrastructure. That’s a tall

order for a five minute summary, so this might take a little longer.

The Science Committee has already received testimony this year from NASA’s

Deputy Administrator, Fred Gregory, concerning NASA’s FY 2006 budget request,

you’ve held focused hearings on NASA’s aeronautics R&D and Earth science programs, and few weeks ago your committee held the first-ever Congressional hearing

with a live feed from astronaut John Phillips onboard the International Space Station. I will try to focus my testimony today on my guiding philosophy and priorities,

and will update the Committee on where we are and where we are going. It has

been a busy time for me personally as well as for the entire NASA team. We have

a lot of work ahead of us.

In presenting the Vision for Space Exploration last year, the President defined a

focus for our nation’s space program in a journey of exploration that will be carried

out over the next several decades. In heading down this path, the first steps we take

are critically important, and decisions need to be made in a timely manner.

The first step is to return the Space Shuttle to flight, and to fly each mission

thereafter as safely as possible. This is my top priority as NASA Administrator.

Last week I participated in an engineering review of the risk to the Shuttle due to

foam and ice debris, which we believe to have been greatly mitigated since the loss

of Columbia. I met with the Stafford-Covey Return-To-Flight Task Group this morning to hear the concerns of the panel members. Given the level of complexity of the

issues involved, we need their point of view. We need these complex issues to be

discussed openly and accurately.

Tonight, I leave for Kennedy Space Center for the Flight Readiness Review of the

STS–114 mission with the Space Shuttle Discovery commanded by USAF Colonel

Eileen Collins. At this review, the NASA team will determine if we’re ready to fly

when the next launch window opens in mid-July. I look forward to a healthy, open

dialogue about Space Shuttle safety issues and NASA’s ability to return the Space

Shuttle to flight. Members of the Science Committee are invited to Kennedy Space

Center for this launch, but let me caution everyone involved that the entire NASA

Space Shuttle team has a lot of hard work to do, and many things can happen between now and the date of launch.

Following a safe return-to-flight, we will turn our sights to the construction of the

International Space Station and, after its completion, the retirement of the Space

Shuttle by 2010. To this end, a team of experts within NASA are investigating a

range of realistic ISS configuration and Shuttle manifest options before we retire

the Shuttle in 2010. I met again with the team earlier this morning, and I hope

to present NASA’s proposed plan for the ISS configuration and Shuttle manifest to

you and our international partners later this summer. Let me emphasize to everyone that this is a proposal that requires further discussion. I visited with many of

our partners a few weeks ago during the Paris Air Show. We shared with each other

our thoughts on the International Space Station and other areas of cooperation in

space exploration. I look forward to continuing an open dialogue with our international partners on how best to use the Space Station as a testbed for future space

exploration activities, and how to realize tangible benefits from the fruits of this research.

Even as a testbed, the Space Station will not answer all of the questions that

need to be answered before we begin to explore the Moon and Mars. However, if

a problem occurs on the Space Station, the crew is only a few hours away from a

safe return to Earth, while they will be three days away when on the Moon, and

many months away from home during the long journey to Mars.

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The loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia has made us acutely aware that one of

the major impediments in fully utilizing the Space Station’s capabilities is that we

need a more robust logistics capability for crew and cargo than the United States

or our international partners have readily available or on the drawing board. For

this reason, we plan to leverage our nation’s commercial space industry to meet

NASA’s needs for ISS cargo logistics and possibly crew support. I spoke in some

depth on this topic at last week’s Space Transportation Association breakfast about

my guiding philosophy in dealing constructively with the emerging commercial

space industry. I want to thank Congressmen Hall and Calvert for taking part in

that event.

To meet the need for crew rescue support for the Space Station, NASA will require the help of this committee in helping to resolve certain restrictions placed on

cooperation with Russia in the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. This Administration recognizes the value of effective cooperation with our international partners on

the Space Station. At the same time, we must appropriately respect and maintain

our nation’s nonproliferation objectives. Over the last several months, NASA has

participated in an interagency coordination process and is proposing a legislative solution in the form of an amendment to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 that

would provide NASA with the necessary flexibility while maintaining our nation’s

nonproliferation objectives.

If a solution is not found, we believe that U.S. astronauts will need to cease maintaining permanent presence aboard the Space Station in April 2006, in accordance

with previous agreements between NASA and Russia concerning crew rescue support for the ISS using the Russian Soyuz vehicle. We do not believe this situation

was the intent of Congress back in 2000, but this is the consequence we are facing

today. I also should note that NASA did not plan to rely so extensively on the Russian Space Agency in carrying out the Space Station program, but this is the situation in which we find ourselves today. The Administration expects to deliver this

proposed legislative solution to the Congress in the very near future. We will need

this committee’s help in dealing with these restrictions.

In the future, I believe that we need to ensure that the United States does not

find our space program so heavily reliant on others. Toward this end, NASA must

accelerate the development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle, which will be capable

of ferrying our astronauts to and from the Space Station, and of conducting voyages

to the Moon and Mars. We have a team of some of the best engineers and managers

drawn from across the Agency looking at ways to accelerate the development of the

Crew Exploration Vehicle, and we hope to soon share with the Congress our plans

for the overall space exploration architecture, the CEV, and the transportation system needed to launch it.

Another major initiative underway concerns how we as an Agency consisting of

ten field centers plan to organize our workforce and facilities to carry out our exploration, aeronautics, and science missions. Having visited all of the NASA centers

within the past few weeks, I firmly believe that more authority should be delegated

to program managers at these centers, while NASA headquarters should focus on

policy, budget, and program executive functions. Frankly, NASA headquarters staffing has grown too large over the last several years.

Another of the things I realized during my tour of NASA’s field centers is that

some outdated facilities need to be modernized, closed, or mothballed. We will conduct a study, across the Agency, to determine which facilities belong in which category. This analysis of our assets will require close coordination with our DOD,

FAA, and industry stakeholders.

NASA is facing difficult choices in balancing the needs of the Agency’s civil servant workforce with the missions the Agency conducts on behalf of the Nation along

with the budget available. We have not yet decided whether any involuntary layoffs

of NASA’s civil servants will be needed in the future, beyond those already announced at Langley Research Center due to an A–76 competition. Thus, we are conducting an assessment of the Agency in organizing the work to be done and workforce needs. I plan to have interim answers in the coming weeks, but this will be

a difficult problem for the next several years. As a team, we are trying to be sensitive in balancing the needs of the workforce, NASA’s mission requirements, and

our budget constraints. I hope to keep NASA’s workforce and the Congress informed

as much as humanly possible.

However, I need to be straightforward with all concerned. NASA cannot afford everything on its plate today. We must set clear priorities and remain within the

budget NASA has been allocated. We are taking a ‘‘go-as-you-can-afford-to-pay’’ approach toward space exploration, but at several field centers, NASA has a gross mismatch between the work to be done, the size of the civil service workforce, and the

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one as much as possible, but difficult decisions will be required, and these decisions

must be made in a timely manner.

Another set of major, upcoming decisions that we at NASA need to address concern how best to manage several space astronomy missions under development.

Congress has been clear in its priorities for the Agency. NASA is making plans for

a servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope, but we need to complete two successful Shuttle test flights before we can assess the relative risks of another Shuttle

mission to the Hubble. This assessment should be completed this fall. At the same

time, we are conducting an assessment of significant cost growth purported for the

James Webb Space Telescope, a high priority mission under development within

NASA’s astronomy portfolio. I have called for a special review of the program to report back in late July. In the meantime, we have decided that NASA will accept

the European Space Agency’s offer to launch the Webb Space Telescope spacecraft

on an Ariane V rocket as their contribution to the overall mission.

However, the problems facing both of these space telescopes jeopardize the budgets for other advanced astronomy and space physics missions currently under formulation. Again, NASA simply cannot afford everything on its plate.

Another priority is the acceleration of the Crew Exploration Vehicle. In order to

accelerate development of the CEV and its associated launch vehicle, while keeping

within NASA’s budget guidelines, NASA will need to defer the development of some

other space exploration-related technologies, ISS research, and space nuclear systems that are only needed after the CEV comes on-line in the post-2010 timeframe.

Within the Science Mission Directorate, NASA is seeking a better balance in how

priorities are set between Earth and space science missions. NASA has a robust

science agenda—with 55 missions in orbit, 26 missions in development—including

the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter to map the Moon’s surface in great detail—and

34 missions in the design phase. However, due to cost growth and the extended life

on several missions, NASA will need to defer some missions.

One of those missions which we hope to extend is the Tropical Rainfall Measuring

Mission (or TRMM), a research satellite which has exceeded our expectations in

being used operationally with hurricane forecasts. NASA is working closely with

NOAA, the Japanese Government, and others in the interagency process to determine the legal liabilities and safety measures necessary in extending this mission.

NASA and NOAA need to continue to work closely together, especially in

transitioning NASA-developed sensors, research, and other capabilities to operations. Likewise, NASA also needs NOAA’s operational sensors to enable further

Earth Science research.

In aeronautics research, NASA needs to focus its technical expertise and facilities

on results-oriented programs for our nation. The Administration supports the call

for the development of a national aeronautics policy in H.R. 2862, the FY 2006 appropriation bill for NASA that recently passed the House of Representatives. NASA

must work closely with a broad range of stakeholders and customers, including the

Congress, Defense Department, and FAA in developing this national aeronautics

policy. But again, I need to be straightforward with you. This policy needs to set

clear, realistic priorities to focus NASA’s limited resources, and not simply be a

laundry list of unrelated projects.

To conclude, I would like to note that next week our nation will celebrate our

Independence Day, a day of fireworks and celebration. That same day, NASA satellite operators working on the Deep Impact mission will be hard at work trying to

create their own fireworks display, 80 million miles from Earth, by smashing a

small spacecraft into the comet Temple 1 at 23,000 miles per hour to discover what’s

inside. It’s a difficult mission. . .even for rocket scientists.

The men and women of NASA appreciate the risks our nation is willing to make

for the noble purpose of exploration and science. Meriwether Lewis observed in his

journal two hundred years ago on July 4th, 1805: ‘‘We all believe that we are now

about to enter on the most perilous and difficult part of our voyage, yet I see no

one repining; all appear ready to meet those difficulties which wait us with resolution and becoming fortitude.’’