J-S48042-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

MARCUS T. SANTOS, 

 Appellant No. 44 MDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order December 12, 2013 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County 

Criminal Division at No.: CP-22-CR-0003262-2009 

BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*

 

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 08, 2014 

Appellant, Marcus T. Santos, appeals pro se from the order denying his 

petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the fines imposed in his 

judgment of sentence as excessive. We affirm. 

 On March 9, 2010, Appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of 

possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance and one count of 

criminal use of a communication facility. The trial court accepted the 

negotiated guilty plea and imposed an aggregate term of incarceration of not 

less than ten nor more than twenty years plus fines and costs totaling 

$110,250.00. Appellant did not file a direct appeal. 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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 On March 10, 2011, Appellant timely filed a pro se petition pursuant to 

the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. The 

PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a motion to withdraw after 

concluding that Appellant’s PCRA claims were without merit. On August 12, 

2011, the PCRA court granted the motion to withdraw and issued notice of 

its intent to dismiss the petition pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 907(1). Appellant did not respond, and the PCRA court dismissed 

his petition on September 6, 2011. Appellant did not appeal the dismissal. 

 On November 6, 2013, Appellant filed a pro se petition for writ of 

habeas corpus, contending that the fines imposed in his sentence were 

excessive. The court denied the petition on December 12, 2013, and 

Appellant timely appealed.1

Appellant raises one question for our review: “[Whether t]he fine

imposed by the court were [sic] constitutionally excessive and violated the 

Eighth Amendment[?]” (Appellant’s Brief, at 4).

Preliminarily, we observe that Appellant’s claim should have been 

treated as a PCRA petition. The PCRA provides that it “shall be the sole 

means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law 

and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this 

____________________________________________ 

1

Pursuant to the court’s order, Appellant filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on 

January 29, 2014. The court entered its Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 4, 

2014. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 
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subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis.” 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. The PCRA offers “the procedural context within which 

constitutional rights connected with habeas corpus remedies may be 

exercised.” Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 570 n.4 (Pa. 1999); 

see also Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013), 

appeal denied, 2014 Pa. Lexis 296 (Pa. filed Jan. 29, 2014) (“Issues that are 

cognizable under the PCRA must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and 

cannot be raised in a habeas corpus petition.”) (citation omitted).

Here, Appellant challenges his fines as unconstitutionally excessive, a 

claim cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i) 

(providing, inter alia, eligibility for relief where the “sentence resulted from 

. . . [a] violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the 

Constitution or laws of the United States . . .”); Taylor, supra at 466. 

Thus, the trial court should have addressed his claim pursuant to the PCRA. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542; Lantzy, supra at 570 n.4. Nonetheless, “we may 

affirm the trial court’s decision on any basis.” Commonwealth v. 

McCulligan, 905 A.2d 983, 988 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 918 A.2d 

743 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted).

 Our standard of review is well-settled: 

 When reviewing the propriety of an order granting or 

denying PCRA relief, this Court is limited to determining whether 

the evidence of record supports the determination of the PCRA 

court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. Great 

deference is granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and these 

findings will not be disturbed unless they have no support in the 

certified record. 
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Commonwealth v. Rachak, 62 A.3d 389, 391 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal 

denied, 67 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted). 

We begin our review by addressing the timeliness of Appellant’s 

petition. See Taylor, supra at 466. The time limits imposed by the PCRA 

are jurisdictional and must be strictly construed. See Commonwealth v. 

Fahy, 959 A.2d 312, 315 (Pa. 2008). “Where a petitioner fails to satisfy the 

timeliness requirements of the PCRA, the PCRA court and this Court have no 

jurisdiction to review the petition by fashioning an equitable exception to 

timeliness.” Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283, 1285 (Pa. Super. 

2013), appeal denied, 91 A.3d 162 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). 

 A PCRA petition “shall be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment [of sentence] becomes final[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 

Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has jurisdiction to hear 

an untimely PCRA petition. Statutory time restrictions are 

mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and may not be altered 

or disregarded to reach the merits of the claims raised in the 

petition. . . . 

 The three statutory exceptions to the timeliness provisions 

in the PCRA allow for very limited circumstances under which the 

late filing of a petition will be excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(1). To invoke an exception, a petition must allege and 

the petitioner must prove: 

(i) the failure to raise a claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation 

of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United 

States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or 
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(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period 

provided in this section and has been held by that court to 

apply retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). The PCRA specifically 

provides that a petitioner raising one of the statutory exceptions 

to the timeliness requirements must affirmatively plead and 

prove the exception. Id. The statutory exceptions to the 

timeliness requirements of the PCRA are also subject to a 

separate time limitation and must be asserted within sixty (60) 

days of the date the claim could have been first presented. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). As such, when a PCRA [petition] is not 

filed within one year of the expiration of direct review, or not 

eligible for one of the exceptions, or entitled to one of the 

exceptions, but not filed within 60 days of the date that the 

claim could have been first brought, the trial court has no power 

to address the substantive merits of a petitioner’s PCRA claims. 

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Pa. Super. 2007), 

appeal denied, 951 A.2d 1163 (Pa. 2008) (footnote, quotation marks and 

case citations omitted). Thus, when a petition is filed outside the one-year 

time limitation, “our review focuses on whether Appellant has pled and 

proven that one of the three limited exceptions to the timeliness 

requirements of the PCRA apply.” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 824 A.2d 

331, 335 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 839 A.2d 352 (Pa. 2003). 

Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on April 8, 2010, 

when his time to appeal his sentence to this Court expired. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Hence, in order to comply with 

the filing requirements of the PCRA, Appellant’s petition had to be filed by 

April 8, 2011. Because the underlying petition was filed on November 6, 

2013, it is facially untimely and the court lacked jurisdiction to review it 
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unless Appellant pleaded and proved one of the statutory exceptions to the 

time bar under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 

Appellant neither pleads nor proves any exceptions to the time bar, 

simply arguing that “[d]uring the negotiated plea agreement it was stated 

that the mandatory would not be sought in this case[]” but that he 

nonetheless received “excessive” fines as a part of his sentence. 

(Appellant’s Brief, at 6). Appellant has failed to demonstrate that any 

exception to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA applies.2

 See Wilson, 

supra at 335; see also Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237, 243 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (finding Eighth Amendment challenge to imposition of fines in 

collateral petition waived). Accordingly, the court did not err or abuse its 

discretion in denying Appellant’s petition when it was patently untimely, and 

we are without jurisdiction to address the merits of his claim.3

 See Fahy, 

supra at 315; Taylor, supra at 1038. 

 Order affirmed. 

____________________________________________ 

2

 We further observe that, even if Appellant had properly asserted an 

exception to the time bar, his petition challenging the events of his 

sentencing on March 9, 2010 was filed well after sixty days of the date the 

claim could have been presented, and would therefore be untimely in this 

respect as well. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). 

3

 Moreover, after Appellant is paroled, he may not be committed to prison 

for failure to pay his fines unless it appears after a hearing that he is 

financially able to do so. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 706(A). 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/8/2014