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COMBAT

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

83-CSI-2578
CSI REPORTS are short-term research papers prepared in response to official inquiries.

REPORTS are based mainly on secondary sources and provide basic information on

the subject under consideration. The views expressed in a CSI REPORT are those of

the author and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department

of Defense.

COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE

Mission

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a separate, department-level activity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for the purpose of accomplishing the following missions:

1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the current doctrinal concerns

of the Army and publish and distribute the results of such research in a variety

of formats to the Active Army and Reserve components.

2. Prepare and present instruction in military history at CGSC and assist other CGSC

departments in integrating applicable military history materials into their resident

and nonresident instruction.

3. Act as the TRADOC proponent for the development and coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military history instruction in the TRADOC service

school system.

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No. 10

Night Combat Operations

by

Major Andrew N. Morris

Combat Studies Institute

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

A Historical Perspective Prepared for

the Concepts Developments Activity, Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

23 August 1985

2 5 FEB 1993

, I-* I 1 t -e\ r P till^' "
THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

LIBRARY

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

Call Number

CGSC Label 13

1 Jan 85 Edition of 11 Dec 72 is obsolete.

A.> ... y . ....
Introduction

The U.S. Army has always recognized that combat operations of any nature

(offensive or defensive) will usually continue curing the hours of

darkness. Not since the Civil War and Indian Wars has the luxury of

discontinuing actons at sunset and picking up again at sunrise been

available, and even these conflicts provide numerous instances of movement

and preparation of positions at night. Yet, despite the historical record,

the U.S. Army has always emphasized aaylight operations and has frequently

forfeited the night to the enemy. Sometimes this has been done

deliberately,l but more often it has been a result of a massive American

preponderance in indirect fires, total air superiority, and being untrained

and uncomfortable with night operations. The firepower superiority made day

operations preferable for American units, who could force the enemy to keep

his head down while the attacking units closed on his positions. When one

attack failed in the face of enemy firepower, the typical American solution

has been to back off and pound the enemy with indirect fires, then try

again. With large numbers of nonprofessional soldiers, units consisting of

large numbers of new replacements, inexperienced junior officers and iN0s, a

lack of night training, control problems in daylight, and firepower

superiority, these techniques were deemed necessary and, oy and large,

effective.

This relationship between daylight operations and fire superiority is

not unique to the U.S. Army. The offensive operations of the German Army in

the early years of World War II show a similar pattern. When the Wehrmacht

had control of the skies and artillery superiority, they used daylight

almost exclusively for their attacks. Only as they came unoer attack by

increasingly superior air and artillery did they turn to night, making most

attacks, movements, and resupply actions after dark when facing American and

British forces in the west. 2

Initially, the Soviets were also forced by their combat inferiority and

desperate defensive posture to turn to night operations. 3 They learned

their lessons so well that even when they had gained air and fire

superiority over their German enemy, they still continued to use night to

protect attacking forces from the still not inconsiderable German fires.

The Japanese always made extensive use of night combat against their

western foes, intially with great success. As American and British forces

became familiar with their tactics, however, these night actions became less

and less successful. That night was not the only time the Japanese used for

attacks is shown by their actions against the Chinese. Possessing air and

artillery superiority, they made use of the daylight ano forced the Chinese

to use the cover of darkness. So successful were they at teaching the

Chinese to use the night that the Chinese Communists were to become masters

at night attacks, a skill they later demonstrated against American forces in

Korea numerous times. But because the Japanese did not possess this

superiority versus their American and British enemies, they turned to the

cover of darkness to hide their movements and attacks.
As the U.S. Army prepares to fight potential enemies around the worla,

across the scale of conflict intensity, it has to come to grips with

operations after dark; it must recognize the fact that many potential

adversaries will possess equal or greater firepower than the committed

American forces, especially in any European conflict. We will be forced to

use the dark properly, or we may very well fail. If day operations are

denied because of enemy fire superiority, then most likely the typically

American solution to maintaining control in a night attack--the "illuminated

night attack"--will also fail. All that is left will be a choice between

true night operations or defeat. Additionally, in any low or medium

intensity conflict where we retain our accustomed fire superiority, one

enemy will undoubtedly turn to the night for his movements and attacks. If

American forces are to stop these acts, the cover of the night has to be

denied to the enemy. U.S. forces must be able to operate more proficiently

than their foes to deny them the advantages of the dark. With that in mind,

this study proposes to look at six examples of night combat. They are

selected from World War II and Korea and depict a-typical cross section of

good and bad experiences by American units of varying competency. The fifth

example is an exception to the others in that it is both a British action,

and dates from the First World War. However, it so clearly demonstrates

what can be done that it deserves inclusion in any study of night combat.

The focus of this paper is at the level of battalion or higher; the

study looks at three types of combat actions: attacks, defenses, and

raids. The most common night action is probably the reconnaissance, out as

the American experience (unlike the Soviets)4 aoes not include

reconnaissance actions by larger units, they will not be addressed.

Repeatedly throughout a study of night operations, certain key

influences surface:

Leadership

Training

Planning

Surprise

These are self-evident and, with the possible exception of surprise, are as

true for daylight operations as for those at night. Superior firepower can

compensate for a lack of surprise in a daylight action; it usually can not

make up for a loss of surprise at night. The first three elements are the

factors which build cohesive units and provide success in combat.

Leadership is undoubtedly the single most critical element in the

success or failure of night operations. This is no surprise, as it is

likewise decisive in every other endeavor a military force undertakes.

However, it becomes even more important at night. According to the Chief of

the G3 Training Section of Headquarters, Fifth U.S. Army, in Italy during

2
1943, "the nature of night operations are such that they become a series of

small unit operations, dependent largely for success on the ability of

leadership at the small unit (squad) level. "b Two regimental commanders

quoted in the same report felt that the critical level was the platoon.0

Similar importance can be traced to the highest leadership levels. World

War II examples include Major General Terry Allen, commander of the 1st

Infantry Division in North Africa and Sicily and the 104th Infantry Division

in Western Europe, two divisions renowned for their successful use of night

attacks, and Field Marshall Sir Bernard Montgomery, who attacked with his

entire 8th Army at El Alamein at night.

Training stems directly from leadership. When the leaders of a combat

unit realize the critical necessity of operations after dark, they will

usually train their soldiers to conduct those operations. When the

leadership, for whatever reason (lack of time, opportunity or desire), fails

to train for operations at night, their units will have to acquire

experience the hard way, under fire, which is always less satisfactory and

causes unnecessary casualties. Training for night involves more than just

changing the hours on the training schedule to do more of the same after

dark. Proper night training begins with an understanding of the human

differences, physiologically and mentally, between day and night. Soldiers

must learn and master new techniques, from off center vision and conserving

visual purple 7 to the use of night observation devices. They have to

realize that their minds will play tricks on them as they become more

fatigued and recognize what these tricks are and how to overcome them. Most

important, each soldier must learn to maintain contact with the other

members of his unit, whether moving or stationary. When contact is lost,

control is gone, and the advantage passes to the enemy. All these skills

are acquired through training.

The third key factor is planning. Military history abounds with

examples of improperly planned night operations, especially attacks, that

failed for lack of detailed planning by the leaders. The most successful

examples of night attacks are those in which the leaders had adequate time

to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of their objectives and develop

detailed, but simple, plans. The importance of this was noted by an Army

Ground Force observer in 1945. Speaking about the advance from southern

France to meet the forces advancing from Normandy, it was reported that

"This period (D+24 to D+35)...was characterized by numerous night attacks

and advances without prior reconnaissance and with distance objectives.

Such violations of Field Service Regulations were foredoomec to failure."8

The key to success in night operations is to control one's own forces

while forcing the enemy to lose control. Control derives from the first

three key elements. At night, the psychological factors of increased

isolation and lack of knowledge about what is going on,9 combined with

deficiencies in any of these key elements, leads to defeat.

3
OFFENSIVE EXAMPLES

General: The success of an attack at night depends on many factors, of

which one of the most important is surprise. Surprise frequently allows an

otherwise doomed attack to succeed because it denies the enemy the control

over his soldiers necessary to victory. It also allows attacking units to

get close to the enemy's positions without taking excessive casualties. In

open areas, darkness substitutes for cover and concealment.

Besides surprise, another reason

continue to pressure the enemy after

Discrete night attacks, in which the

of darkness, are rare in Western mill

turn out to be raids. Night attacks

continuation of a daylight offensive

exploitation of the success achieved

for night attacks is a desire to

a successful daylight assault.

attack begins and ends during the hours

itary history. Such operations usually

are often ordered as part of a

action, or are followed by a daylight

by the night attack.

4
Example 1: 1st Battalion: 415th Infantry, 104th Infantry Division,

at-tacKing the fortified town of Merken, Germany, 11-13 December 1944.

General Situation: The 104th Infantry had been forcing its way to the

fortified west bank of the Roer River as part of VII Corps' attack towaras

Cologne, which began on 16 November 1944 (Map 1). This advance had been

characterized by frequent night attacks to take aavantage of surprise and to

allow attacking units to get closer to the well-fortified German positions

without taking debilitating casualties. by 9 December the division had two

regiments forward, the 415th on the right and the 414th on the left, ana was

closing on- the Roer River. The final objective for the 415th Infantry was

the fortified town of Merken. The original division plan was to seize tne

town of Pier, then advance on Merken. This, however, was impossible as the

attack on Pier by the 414th Infantry stalled on the edge of the town for

over two days. Merken was believed to be held by a battalion of the Uerman

3d Parachute Division supported by tanks and/or self-propelled 8nilm

guns.l0 Because of the flat open ground, containing a minefield of

unknown size, that had to be crossed to reach the objective, the American

forces decided to attack at night.

Special Situation: The mission was given to the 1st Battalion, which had

been in reserve for several days ana was relatively well rested and at full

strength. Merken itself was composed of approximately 100 stone or brick

houses surrounded by open, slightly rolling ground. There were extensive

entrenchments on the west of the town. A minefield had been reported by the

9th Infantry Division on the right of the 415th Infantry, but reconnaissance

patrols had failed to find any trace of it. The high ground around

Lucherberg allowed excellent observation of the objective, and the delay

incurred waiting for the capture of Pier gave the attacking force ample

opportunity to conduct a detailed reconnaissance, which included aerial

photographs. Based on these observations, the plan was to seize Vilvenicn,

a small village of 10 buildings and establish a roadblock there to protect

the battalion's rear from the enemy in Pier, then attack MerKen from the

flank down the Pier-Merken road. The attack would be made by a reinforced

platoon of "A" Company on Vilvenich, with "8" and "C" Companies assaulting

Merken itself. The order of march was "a" Company, Battalion Headquarters,

"C" Company, the platoon of "A" Company. Crossing the Line of Ueparture

(LD), which was hela by the 3d battalion, the attacKing force would proceed

to the outskirts of Merken on two sequential compass azimuths. The

artillery fire support plan was "unique and inspiring." ll Based on

experience and the large amounts of American artillery fires deliverea even

during relatively quiet periods, the commander decided to use his artillery

to force the defenders out of their preparea defense positions and to seek

shelter in basements. In order to accomplish this, four field artillery

battalions, the Regimental Cannon Company, unit mortars, and a platoon of

155mm self-propelled guns were used. All these units would establish a fire

lane of parallel barrages 400 yards to each flank of the battalion's route

commencing H-hour, with frequent concentrations on known enemy positions.

5
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At set intervals, white phosphorus would be fired for the battalion to guide

on along both legs of its route (Map 2). Tnese types of fires were

apparently common enough that the 1st Battalion commander believed

(correctly) that they would not compromise his chances of achieving surprise.

The Operation: The 1st Battalion crossed the LU at 0430 on 11

December. it The wire laying teams were unable to keep up with the fast

moving infantry, but radio communications were substituted ana proved

reliable. Although prepared to follow a preset compass azimuth, the white

phosphorus shells gave everyone a target to march towards, ana the compasses

were not needed. when the pace counter announced the point wnere a change

in azimuth was to be made (Map 2), artillery fires were shifted to cover tne

second leg, and the column moved to the eage of ierKen where "6" and "C1

Companies deployed for their attack. The artillery continued to fire on the

objectives until they were seized by the infantry, then snifted west to

block reinforcement/retreat routes. Fires were controlled by the oattalion

commander using radio to talk to his Fire Support Officer in Lucherberg.

By 0700 nineteen buildings had been seized and 65 prisoners had been

captured with no resistance. Following a short pause to reoryanize, the

battalion continued its attack in daylight (assisted by tanks in the

afternoon), methodically clearing each house, moving only through holes

blown through the walls and avoiding the streets. By 1700, over half the

town and 166 German prisoners were in American hands. The following day the

remainder of the town was cleared and all enemy forces were captured,

killed, or forced back across the Roer River.

The platoon from "A" Company had simultaneously overrun an enemy outpost

outside Vilvenich. During a brief reorganization it was discovered that

seventeen men, to include both medics and an attached machine gun, were

missing. Despite this, the village was immediately assaulted, six of its

ten buildings were seized, and 78 Germans were captured in their beas

without a shot being fired. The remainder of "A" Company was eventually

committed and the rest of the village was captured by 1700, with a total of

87 enemy prisoners.

The last element in this night attack concerns the missing "A" Company

personnel, one rifle squad and a machine gun squad. They had broken contact

from the remainder of the platoon when a squad leader paused to help a man

who fell into a water filled ditch. Everyone behind him also stopped, and

thus lost sight of the platoon. Heading for a burning building in what was

believed to be Vilvenich, they attempted to rejoin their platoon. To their

surprise, after capturing eighteen sleeping Germans, they realized they were

in Pier. They withdrew after dark and later guided "G" Company, 2d

Battalion, 414th Infantry, along their route. This company captured in a

few hours the town where all previous direct attacks by the 414th Infantry

had been repulsed for three days.

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Summary: This battalion crossed 3,200 yards of open ground, captured a

well-fortified position guarded by strong enemy forces, ana suffered a total

of one killed, 27 wounded and two missing. In the course of this action it

inflicted over one hundred casualties, captured 186 prisoners, and destroyed

four anti-tank guns, two self-propelled guns, and fifteen machine guns. 13

The attack was also directly responsible for the subsequent capture of Pier

and Schophoven.l 4 This success was due to surprise, which in turn leu to

a loss of control by the German leaders. Once control was lost oy the

defenders, they were essentially helpless against the well organized and led

American units.

Analysis: This attack would seem to violate many of the recognized

principles of night attacks, i.e., use of radio and massive artillery fires

that would presumably alert the enemy; yet it achieved complete surprise,

which enabled it to achieve all objectives with minimal cost. The attack,

however, was successful not just because it was conducted at night ana

achieved surprise. Success is also attributable-to the planning,

leadership, and training of the American forces. Ample time was available

to plan and brief all key personnel. This included a thorough

reconnaissance of the route and objectives. A simple plan was developed and

thoroughly disseminated, with redundancy in critical elements (i.e., both

compass azimuth and white phosphorus shells to guide the moving units). The

objective was limited to seizing a foothold in the town, not trying to seize

the entire village at night. Thus, the soldiers coula focus initially on

one or two buildings for their squad or platoon. "The troops knew they were

going and exactly where they were to be at daylight."l1 The direction of

the attack, coming from the northwest (towards Pier and vilvenicn), was

obviously not expected. The defenders presumably expected to receive prior

warning of any U.S. movement from the defenders of those two villages. When

it failed, the defense failed. That the Germans had elements (i.e.,

outposts) out to provide early warning of an attack from the south or west

was shown by an incident wherein the Ammunition and Pioneer (Support)

platoon leader with a carrying party bringing ammunition to the companies in

Merken was captured about mid-day on the 12th by five Germans as he

attempted to go from Lucherberg to Merken along the most direct route.

Blocked by U.S. artillery fire (adjusted by forward observers who watched

the whole affair) from going to Pier as his captors wished, the platoon

leader convinced the German party to go instead to Vilvenich. Nsot realizing

that Vilvenich was in American hands, the Germans marches their prisoners

into the waiting arms of "A" Company, who quickly disarmed them. This was

obviously an enemy outpost that completely failed to provide any early

warning. Had the defenders in the towns been at any level of security

(one-third or fifty percent awake) this attack would not have been so easy.

Of interest is that Lieutenant Arbogast's platoon ("A" Company) overran an

outpost in front of Vilvenich, then captured its garrison asleep. Every

unit must provide for its own security.

7
Another of the principal reasons for this success was that the

defender's positions were easily detected from botn the air and ground.

Camouflage was apparently nonexistent. This allowea the attacking forces to

maneuver in such a way as to avoid the majority of enemy defenses while

simultaneously suppressing any defenders with smoke and air burst artillery

to such an extent that most Germans were captured in cellars.

Finally, the battalion commander understood his enemy. He was able to

use large amounts of artillery to cover the sounds of movement and protect

his flanks because the Germans were accustomed to heavy American inairect

fires and spent most of their time in basements in an attempt to avoid

casualties. To have not fired artillery would nave broken the expected

pattern of American activity and would have cost surprise. Likewise, the

use of radio to control artillery was not unknown, and its substitution for

wire communications to control the supporting fires did not compromise the

attack.

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Example 2: Regimental attack by the 47th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division, near E1 Guettar, Tunisia, 28-29 March 1943.

General Situation: The 9th Infantry Division, a part of II Corps, was

directed to atzack on 28 March 1943 in order to seize the hill mass known as

the Djebel Berda, a rough, tangled series of barren hills that overlooked

and controlled the El Guettar-Gabes road (Map 3). This road led directly

into the rear of Axis forces who were defending Tunisia against American and

British forces attacking from the west and the British 8th Army coming up

from the south. The purpose of the attack was primarily to distract and tie

down German and Italian forces and prevent them from reinforcing the units

facing the 8th Army. The final objective for the 9th Infantry Division ana

II Corps was Gabes. The corps' attack was to be conducted in three phases.

In phase one, the 1st Infantry and 9th Infantry Divisions were to seize the

pass between the Djebel el Mcheltat (Hill 482) and Djebel el Kheroua (Hill

369); in phase two, they were to take a subsequent pass through El Hafay.

Finally in phase three, they were to pass the lst-Armored Division through

to the western flank of the enemy's so-called "Chott Position," a defensive

line to be occupied once he was forced out of the well-fortified "Mareth

Line" by the 8th Army. This was the first division sized attack for the 9th

Division. It had participated in the initial amphibious landing at Safi in

Morocco, and combat operations against the French garrison of Morocco, but

this was the first combat operation against German and Italian forces. The

division had acquitted itself well to this point, but had little experience

in operating after dark. Most pre-invasion training had been devoted to

amphibious operations, and little had been attempted in the way of night

operations prior to being committed in the II Corps sector.lb

The enemy facing the 9th Infantry Division was composed of Italian

veterans of the Centauro Division, in part led by German officers and NCO's,

and the 10th Motorcycle Battalion, with German units on the high ground

north of the E1 Guettar-Gabes road. 17 These veterans haa been in their

defenses long enough to have blasted positions into the solid rock that was

nearly impervious to most incoming fire.

Specific Situation: The objective for the 47th Infantry was Hill 369, the

eastern extremity of the larger hill mass known as the Djebel el Kheroua.

The regiment had come by rail and truck from their positions in Morocco to

occupy positions around Kasserine Pass on 2 and 3 March. They were

subsequently moved to Gafsa and E1 Guettar on 25-26 March, where they

relieved elements of the 1st Infantry Division. The maps issued were found

to be inadquate, and prior to attacking, there was time for reconnaissance

only by battalion commanders. 18 The terrain consisted of flat open

plains, followed by very steep, barren hills connected by sharp, twisting

ridges. Trails were rare. Vegetation was nonexistent. The position was

described as "a natural fortress capable of being defended by minimum forces

for an indefinite period."19 The problem for the commanders was

compounded by the fact that after they had conducted their planning,

9
division headquarters issued a change which modified the plan. The change

came out too late to allow necessary adaptations and preparations by all

units involved. The new plan called for the 47th Infantry to attack with

two battalions (first and second) moving up parallel ridges to seize the

division objective, Hill 369 (part of the Djebel el Kheroua). The 3d

Battalion was to follow the 1st in reserve, with the 1st Battalion 39th

Infantry (Division reserve) following on order (Map 4).

The Operation: The planned attack miscarried almost as soon as it began.

The 1st infantry Division units previously occupying the positions had told

the 47th Infantry that the enemy in the Division area consisted of no more

than one battalion and two or three batteries of artillery. As noted

earlier, this was incorrect. Furthermore, the general lack of

reconnaissance and detailed preparation by the leaders guaranteed that what

little information was available about the enemy and terrain was not known

by all the soldiers. Objectives and routes were unclear. Despite these

problems, the regiment moved out in the attack at-0330 on the 28th of March,

with battalions in column.

1st and 3d Battalions were to advance along the Djebel el Kheroua to

Hill 369. The commanders misidentified a smaller ridge lying between them

and the objective, the Draa Saada el Hamra ridge leading to Hill 290 for

their objective, and captured the majority of it. They did not succeed in

capturing Hill 290 or Hill 369 due to the intense machine gun and artillery

fire delivered by an unsurprised enemy. Not only was the enemy well dug in

on the objectives, but he also occupied unthreatened observation posts on

Hill 772 on the flank of the moving battalions.

2d Battalion was to move along the Djebel el Lettouchi. They were

detected about 0535 and pinned down by enemy fire in the confused ground

south of the rest of the regiment. During the next 36 hours, during which

they were out of touch with any higher command, the battalion lost as

prisoners most of "E" company, its battalion commander, S2, communications

officer, the commander, and 30 men of the "G" company, the commander,

executive officer and five men of "F" company, and the commander of "H"

company. What was left of the battalion had to pull back, reorganize, and

(eventually) reestablish contact with regiment. The 1st Battalion, 39th

Infantry, got lost trying to follow the 47th Regiment and wound up

accomplishing nothing. Some of its units were eventually formed into a

provisional battalion with what was left of the 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry,

and attempted to accomplish the original mission, but to no avail.

This same pattern of ineptitude in night operations in the 9th Division

continued the following night. The 47th Infantry was to attack from its

positions on the Draa Saada el Hamra towards Hill 369. The 2d Battalion,

39th Infantry was to move around Hill 290 and attack Hill 369 from the

north. This plan also foundered on the twin obstacles of poor planning and

inadequate reconnaissance. The 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, moved too close

10
I
to Hill 290, mounted in trucks, and was demoralized and took severe

casualties from the fires of the defenders on Hill 290. The last stragglers

were unable to return to their initial assembly areas until the following

night, having spent the day pinned down by intense direct and indirect enemy

fire. The attacks by the 47th Infantry were never launched.

The enemy positions were finally taken on 7 April, due more to 8th Army

successes along the Mareth Line and the Chott Position than to the attacks

of II Corps. On 8 April elements of 1st Armored Division linked up with the

8th Army and this phase of the battle for Tunisia was over.

Summary: In eleven days of intense fighting the 47th Infantry lost 733

casualties. Of these, 24220 were prisoners (33 % of casualties), lost to

the enemy mostly on the first night. The Regiment did not succeed in taking

its initial objective until ten days after it began its attack, and then

primarily because the enemy withdrew as a result of events elsewhere.

Analysis: Nearly everything that could go wrong with a night operation went

wrong in this example. The leaders had made no special effort to prepare or

train their soldiers for large-scale night operations. They were thus

unprepared for this action, and this, coupled with inexperience, proved

their undoing. In contrast to the first example, where adequate time

allowed detailed planning, proper fire plans, and reconnaissance by all

leaders, the 47th Infantry was receiving changes to the 9th Division's plans

with no time to react. Maps were poor, though other II Corps units had

better maps that showed the terrain accurately.21 Fire planning was not

arranged to cover the sounds of movement, nor was it properly employed to

neutralize enemy observers and suppress enemy fires. Reconnaissance was

faulty and hurried and combined with the poor maps to lead units astray, or

leave them totally lost. Enemy positions were not pinpointed, with the

result that moving units virtually stumbled into contact with a fully alert

and prepared enemy who used his fires to stop all American attacks. A

subsequent analysis by the 9th Division determined that the best way to have

accomplished this mission would have been to have seized Hill 772, the

observation post directly on the south flank of the moving units, then

attack to the east down the three ridges (Draa Saada el Hamra, Djebel el

Kheroua, and Diebel Lettouche) to seize Hills 290, 369, and 361

respectively. 2 This would have lessened the enemy's observation of U.S.

units and negated the effectiveness of most of his prepared positions, since

they were oriented towards the open plain. Even so, the attacking forces

failed to gain surprise, and subsequently, their commanders lost control of

their own units rather than forcing the enemy to lose control. The result

was a bloody repulse followed by extremely costly uphill battles against a

well-prepared foe.

11
DEFENSE EXAMPLES

General: The firepower available to American units in its wars this century

has usually left its enemies in a position where they haa to use night

attacks to succeed. Daylight attacks were usually suicidal against American

troops with their normal supporting fires in any type of a coherent

defensive position. As a result, night defense by American units against

attacking enemies has been more the rule than the exception against the

Germans, the Japanese, the North Koreans and their Chinese communist allies,

and most recently, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. These attacks

usually failed when the American units occupied positions with proper

security and redundant communications. When American units failed to ensure

these preconditions for success, the enemy frequently succeeded. These

elements are a direct reflection, once again, of the elements of leadership,

training, and planning. A knowledge of the enemy and his probable tactics

is also a key element in success. In the successful defense example which

follows, the tactics of the Japanese attackers were well understood, ana the

defense triumphed. In the ensuing unsuccessful example, the Chinese were an

unknown factor, and the defense paid the cost of ignoring the three key

elements, even though the tactics in use had been successful against the

North Korean units up to that point.
Example 3: The 32d Infantry Regiment, 7th Division, defending Shoestring

Ridge, Leyte, the Philippines, 23-28 November 1944.

General Situation: U.S. forces returned to the Philippines on 20 October

1944, landing on the island of Leyte as a preliminary move to establish air

bases that could support further invasions, especially of Luzon. By mid-November the majority of the east side of the island, where the most

desirable land and the majority of the population lived, was in American

hands. The 32d Infantry, minus its 1st Battalion, led the way towards the

last Japanese stronghold at Ormoc, in northwestern Leyte. The 1st Battalion

was left guarding installations in the corps rear. The 32a Infantry, lea by

the 2d Battalion, started crossing to the west side of Leyte on 30 October

1944 (Map 5). The Japanese dispatched a reinforced company to delay any

American movement north, pending the arrival of substantial reinforcements

from Luzon, but lost most of it to an ambush by E Company, 32d Infantry.

The 32d then moved slowly forward, held back by requirements to guard a long

supply route and rebuild numerous destroyed bridges. It was also traveling

over very poor roads, which washed out almost daily. Finally, the Army Commander, General Krueger, did not want to put it out on a limb while he

was waiting for reinforcements to allow him to release the entire 7th

Infantry Division. As a result the 32d Infantry stopped along the Palanas

River near Damulaan and established defensive positions along what came to

be called Shoestring Ridge.23 Across the river to the north the Japanese

26th Division, just arrived from Luzon, also assembled, with the mission of

stopping any American advance.

Specific Situation: The 32d Infantry initially occupied Shoestring Ridge

with its 2d Battalion, reinforced with two companies of Philippine

guerrillas ("F" & "G", 94th Philippine Infantry). The 3d Battalion occupied

positions farther south, with the 2d Battalion, 184 Infantry, even further

south. This last unit was attached to the 32d Infantry, but the division

commander kept it from being used without his permission. The reason for

this lengthy deployment was primarily to prevent the Japanese from

surrounding and isolating the forward units by moving either inland, or by

sea. Both were a possibility. This left a rather inadequate force to

defend the forward positions, even when reinforced by Batteries "A" & "B",

49th Field Artillery (105mm), and Battery "B", Ilth 155mm Marine Gun

Battalion, for a total of 14 artillery pieces in the vicinity of Damulaan.

The artillery units were placed close to the 2d Battalion because of

anticipated offensive operations, and because it consolidated the defense on

the best ground. The defenses were concentrated (two companies "F" and "G")

along the flat ground, astride the road and along the adjacent ridge where

it dominated the artillery and CP's on the low ground. Further inland "E"

Company and the guerrillas were spread out on the ridge in platoon

positions. "F" and "G" Companies were thinly spread across 1,500 yards of

open, marshy ground. They established fighting positions of dirt and

sandbags every 75 yards, with minefields to the front. "E" Company was

essentially in outposts. (Map 6)

13
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About 1830 on November 23, the expected Japanese assault began with

artillery that put smoke on "A" Battery, 49th Artillery. The next 40 rounds

were mixed HE and smoke, but their impact was so scattered it was impossible

to determine what their target was. Counterbattery fire silenced the

Japanese artillery temporarily, but at 2000 heavy mortar and artillery

barrages fell on the entire front of the 2d Battalion. Wire communication

between battalion and regimental headquarters at Baybay was cut early in the'

attack, and radio also failed. Though radio contact was eventually reestablished by a relay through 3d Battalion, regimental headquarters remained out of contact for much of the night.

Utilizing covering mortar and machine gun fire, and by making excellent

use of the ground, two Japanese companies were able, starting about 2100, to

penetrate "E" Company's line on the ridge and force it to withdraw. "G"

Company reoriented its two right squads to protect its flank and held in

place against probes and small attacks.

After daylight, the 2d Battalion retook the ground it had lost the

previous night, forcing a strong enemy force back to the north. By nightfall most of the ground had been regained, and a defensive perimeter

was established as shown on Map 6. By the evening of 24 November the 2d

Battalion, now reinforced by both "L" and "K" Companies of the 3d Battalion

("L" had arrived late the previous day) was ready to withstand another

attack. Artillery and small arms ammunition had been replaced by herculean

efforts on the part of the service troops, who succeeded in building up stockpiles of 1,400 105mm howitzer and 1,600 81mm mortar rounds by dark.

The 1st Battalion 184th Infantry was also attached to the 32d Infantry, but

had to be moved across the central mountains. It also had a requirement to

have division permission before it could be committed.

The Japanese had completed massing their forces and regarded this night

as the time for annihilating the American position. They attacked Companies "G," "K" and "L" with the entire 13th Independent Infantry Regiment following a thirty minute artillery and mortar barrage. Combat patrols simultaneously attacked "F" and "G" Companies from the north, but were

easily repulsed. The assaulting forces were heard massing in front of the American positions, enabling the defending fire support units to deliver

maximum fires. Artillery and mortar final protective fires wreaked havoc on

the attacking enemy, the artillery disrupting command elements and reserves

and preventing the assault units from moving to the rear, while the mortar

shells "fell like rain and inflicted great casualties"24 on the

attackers. At this critical point the 2d Battalion commander put his

Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon (i.e., Support Platoon) and an engineer squad into previously prepared positions next to "G" Company, which allowed them

to repel all assaults relatively easily.

14
The Japanese attacked "L" Company's right platoon with mortars and the

fire of at least twelve stationary machine guns, plus more with the

attacking infantry. Utilizing all available weapons, "L" defeated this

attempt with heavy losses to the attacking forces.

"K" Company was operating at about 50% strength, and the platoon

guarding the draw between "L" and "K" companies had only 19 men. The

Japanese succeeded in placing machine gun fire on all sides of this platoon,

which prevented it from moving, then started closing to bayonet range. At

this desperate moment, a Marine .50 caliber.machine gunner from the

supporting -lth 155mm Gun Battalion managed to silence the two guns

delivering flanking fire on the platoon; he then proceeded to knock out most

of the machine guns in the Japanese base of fire. This allowed the platoon

to withdraw to an alternate position it had previously prepared.

The Japanese then attacked the center of "K" Company across open corn

fields. They took so many casualties that they never attacked in that area

again. 2 5

As these assaults were bogging down in front of "K" Company, a new

attack against the right flank of "L" Company was being prepared. Three

separate attempts were made to move down the ravine, but all were stopped by

artillery fire adjusted by an infantry lieutenant in an outpost 50 yards in

front of "L" Company's barbed wire. Unable to even close with the

American's on this flank, the Japanese then tried the left flank of "L"

Company, but were stopped by 60mm mortars and two 37mm antitank guns firing

cannister.

The U.S. artillery was as'busy as the infantry. besides firing nearly

every round that had been stockpiled, it was subjected to an intense

Japanese artillery barrage that broke all wire communications and oisablea

all four guns in "B" Battery, 49th Artillery. Radio communications with the

infantry fortunately survived, and by cannibalization "B" Battery got one

gun operating by sunrise. At one point about 25 enemy managed to infiltrate

to within 50 yards of the regimental CP's perimeter with two machine guns,

but were driven off by the defenders, principally medics.

During daylight on the 25th all American companies put patrols out 2,000

yards to keep the enemy from getting too close during the day, and

reinforced, resupplied, and dug even deeper. Company "I" moved into the

draw between "K" and "L" companies, and the 3d Battalion commander resumed

control of his now reunited battalion. The "I" Company positions were in a

rice paddy, so were prepared but only occupied at night, the day being used

to dry the soldiers out. Japanese artillery fire fell sporadically, but

prompt counterbattery fire prevented it from becoming more than a nuisance.

All CP's were moved because their location was known to the enemy.

Headquarters and "B" Battery of the 57th Field Artillery moved into

positions near Damulaan. That night approximately a battalion of Japanese

attacked "G," "E" and "I" companies, but were easily repulsed. One group of

nine Japanese did manage to crawl down the Bucan River to the vicinity of

15
"B" Battery, 49th Artillery, where they succeeded in putting one gun out of

action before they were all killed by the defending artillerymen.

During the day on the 26th, the 32d Infantry again rested, changed

automatic weapon positions, and replenished ammunition supplies. "B"

Company, 184th Infantry, occupied positions on the right flank (Map 7), and

"B" Battery was merged with "A" Battery, 49th Artillery. That night, at

2100 the Japanese came back again. Elements of all three regiments of the

enemy's 26th Division were now involved (11th, 12th, and 13th Independent

Infantry regiments). This night was considered the most desperate of

al.26

At 2100 an intense artillery and mortar barrage fell on "G" Company and

"A" Battery. Up to 50 machine guns provided supporting fires as one

battalion of Japanese attacked "G" Company and another hit between "E" and

"L" companies. Another force estimated at battalion strength was held in

reserve to exploit any penetration. The attack on "G" Company continued to

close despite intense American fire and the attackers moving into their own

artillery fire. Just as it appeared that the pinned down American soldiers

were about to be overrun, the Japanese withdrew, apparently because of their

casualties, allowing the U.S. commanders the opportunity to reorganize. As

all the platoon leaders in the area under attack had become casualties, a

heavy machine gun section sergeant took command and prepared the position

for the next attack, which was not long in coming.

This second attack was as strong as the first, however this time the

enemy did not withdraw, but tried to infiltrate after they had beehr

stopped. The most serious fighting occurred in and around a bamboo thicket

in front of the center platoon of "G" Company. One gauge of the intensity

of this combat is shown by the fact that at one point the 81mm mortar

platoon of "H" Company fired 650 rounds in five minutes. The action

continued for about an hour, after which it died down as the Japanese

finally pulled back.

One curious, and potentially fatal incident occurred on the left flank

of "G" Company as the battle raged. Not actually engaged because of the

terrain, these troops were very aware of what was happening on their right.

A three man outpost was about 75 yards to the front, and hearing the battle

moving towards them and the enemy forming to their front, one man was sent

back to request permission to withdraw. When permission was received, he

shouted the order to the outpost from about 50 yards behind it. The left

platoon and two squads of the center platoon of "G" Company joined the

outpost as it withdrew, and within 45 minutes both platoons and a section of

heavy machine guns were on the road headed south. "There was no thought in

their minds that the withdrawal was not authorized."27 The executive

officer of "H" Company met them after they had gone about 250 yards and sent

them back. The left platoon regained its position, but the two squads of

the right platoon found their positions occupied by about 200 Japanese with

20 machine guns. The regimental commander, Colonel Finn, contained them by

16
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moving a reserve platoon from "I" Company up behind "E" Company, facing north, and bending the flanks of "G" and "F" Companies so as to present no

flank to the enemy. Fortunately the enemy failed to realize what had

happened and never advanced out of the bamboo thicket.

Pressure continued against "E," "L" and "I" companies all night, though

never as heavy as that against "G" Company. No ground was yielded as the

Americans used effective supporting and organic fires to kill over 400 enemy.

By 0515 on the 27th of November the Americans were preparing to evict

the Japanese from their bamboo thicket in "G" Company's sector. Available

was the 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, which attacked at 0855. Stopped initially by heavy Japanese fire, a total of three attacks were launched,

each preceeded by increasingly intensive artillery and mortar fires. The

last assault cleared out the enemy at 1600, revealing 109 enemy killed and

29 machine guns in the position vacated by "G" Company the night before.

Other than this counterattack, the daylight hours were devoted to

reestablishing and reinforcing positions. The 1st Battalion, 184 Infantry,

was added to the perimeter. That night minor attempts at infiltration were

made by the Japanese, but these were easily stopped. On the 28th, the 32d

Infantry was relieved by the 184th Infantry and moved to the rear to rest

and refit.

Summary: The 32d Infantry suffered just over one hundred casualties during

this series of actions. In the process, they inflicted 1,400 dead and an

unknown but large number of wounded on the Japanese 26th Division.

Analysis: This is a classic example of intelligent defense holding up

against a numerically superior enemy with good support, who made excellent

use of the ground. Despite the successful efforts of the Japanese to

concentrate large forces against small sections of the defensive perimeter,

the defense was never broken. The defenders used the terrain to their best

advantage and combined-the ground with artificial obstacles and well

coordinated supporting fires to decimate the enemy. Outposts and alert

soldiers prevented the Japanese from ever gaining surprise, and without

surprise the well supported and coordinated assaults were doomed.

Communications were never a problem thanks to the use of both radio and wire

and a determination not to lose contact. Units were placed where they could

support each other with overlapping fires and a continuous foxhole line, and

thanks to extensive digging, were relatively immune to the enemy's artillery

and mortar fire. Finally, despite problems resupplying the defense, there

was never a crippling shortage of any type of ammunition. On the contrary,

enough ammunition was available that Colonel Finn, Regimental Commander,

commented about arms getting tired from throwing so many grenades, and

specifically credited one 6Onm mortar in "L" Company with developing a

technique to get 18 rounds in the air before the first hit the ground, then

resetting and firing an illumination round to observe the results. 28 The

result was a conclusive success for the well-trained, well-led U.S. troops.

17
Example 4: 9th Infantry Regiment, 2a Infantry Division, defending along the

Chongchon River, North Korea, 25-26 November 1950.

General Situation: The U.S. Eighth Army had been attacking into North Korea

following the successful breakouts from the Pusan Perimeter and the landing

at Inchon in September 1950. The North Korean Army had quickly become

demoralized as it retreated north, and by late October only scattered

guerrilla bands faced the U.S. troops. By 26 October General Walker, Eighth

Army commander, knew the Chinese Communists (CCF) had decided to intervene

and had begun to concentrate his divisions along the line of the Chongchon

River.29 There had been some contact with CCF units, ana he wished to

reassemble his scattered divisions before continuing his drive towards the

Yalu River. The U.S. units were composed mostly of recent draftees who had

little combat experience and who expected the war to end shortly. This

belief had been especially reinforced by General MacArthur's Thanksgiving

message which told the soldiers to expect the war to end by Christmas. The

lack of experienced leadership and combat veterans, together with the

impending end to the conflict, caused discipline to be lax. To use "S"

Company, 9th Infantry, as an example, on 25 November 1950, as it moved out

in an attack, the company fielded 129 men. There were only 12 helmets in

the company, as the cold weather made pile caps desirable, and they could

not be worn comfortably under a helmet. Two bayonets were carried (by new

replacements), and there was less than one grenade per man. Weaponry

consisted of a mix of Ml rifles, carbines, Browning Automatic Weapons

(BARs), light machine guns, and 60mm mortars. Some infantrymen carried as

few as 16 to 30 rounds. One-half had no entrenching tools. An average of

only 400 rounds per machine gun was available. Radios were carried, but

usually didn't work because of the distance between units, or because of

intervening mountains that blocked radio transmissions.30 The ostensible

reason given for this lack of equipment was that the precipitous terrain

required a minimum load.31 In reality it was because the soldiers did not

believe they needed to carry any more, despite advice to the contrary from

older soldiers, and because the leaders were unable or unwilling to enforce

discipline.

Specific Situation: On November 25th, the 9th Infantry moved forward to

continue the attack along the Chongchon River. "B" Company led the attack

to take Hill 219 (OBJ 16) (Map 8). Against unexpectedly stiff opposition

(they had faced only small guerrilla bands of 6-10 men during the recent

advance), the company managed to seize about two-thirds of the hill before

dark, the men settling into a defensive posture wherever they happened to be

as day ended. The other companies moved to occupy the positions shown.

There was no coherent defensive plan at any level above company, nor was

canmunications ensured between all units. In "K" Company,32 for example,

the terrain prohibited radio contact, and a wire team sent out by the 3d

Battalion headquarters ran out of wire when only two-thirds of the way to

the company, whereupon the wire team leader simply returned to his

headquarters. No one took any further positive steps to gain

communications. It was in these precarious circumstances that the regiment

was attacked after dark by CCF units of divisional strength.

18
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The Operation: The CCF attack began on "3" Company, which had been engaged

all day. It was pressured all night, though never in particularly great

strength. By sunrise the enemy attacks had gradually pushed the company

back from its extended positions and eventually forced it off Hill 219.

When daylight on the 26th ended the action, "B" Company completed its

withdrawal and broke contact with the Chinese. Of its 129 men, it could

muster 34 who were able to fight.

The next contact occurred with "K" Company. It had seized its

designated objective (35) late in the afternoon. The commander decided to

forgo local reconnaissance patrols and to occupy immediately ana start

preparing defensive positions with his understrength company. As noted

above, there was neither radio nor wire communications to nigher

headquarters, so the ccmpany fought this night on its own, with no help,

unable even to tell its higher headquarters when it was assailed. The

platoons were deployed with 2d and 3d on low ground, facing a dry creek, and

1st on the high ground to their rear. A three man- outpost with a lignt

machine gun was positioned to watch the stream bed on the extreme western

flank of the position. About 1900 the outpost saw enemy soldiers start to

go by. The only American on the outpost (the other two were Korean soldiers

assigned to the company), refrained from firing because he was afraid that

if he fired he would alert the enemy to his unit's location, and as he

realized he was viewing at least a regiment, he was afraid they would

destroy the company. However, other soldiers, initially in the 2d Platoon,

opened fire. At this, the two rear CCF companies left their column and

attacked "K" Company. After careful scouting to locate the actual American

positions, the CCF forces attacked from three directions and, after severe

fighting at close range, forced the remnants of "K" Company to withdraw to

the north, the only open direction.

The CCF regiment continued its advance down the stream bed towards "L"

Company. Although the commanders of both "L" and "K" companies had been

told they were in supporting range of each other, neither made any effort to

determine where the other was, or to coordinate their defenses and

supporting fires. In fact, they were over 2,500 yards apart, with a large

hill between them that precluded radio communications.

Having dropped off two companies to deal the "K" Company, the CCF

regiment proceeded to attack "L" with two more companies. One significant

CCF feature of the attack on "K" Company was the use of bugles and whistles

by the scouting elements who determined the U.S. troop's exact positions

before attacking. These signals allowed the CCF leaders to relay sufficient

information to each other without radio or wire to coordinate their attack.

This scouting was unnecessary at "L" Company as its commander had authorized

squad warming fires that perfectly outlined its positions to the approaching

Chinese. These fires were still burning even after the company was

attacked, as no immediate efforts were taken to put them out. The company

19
initially held its position well, but when its commander was wounded and the

word went out that he was hit, the heart went out of the company ana it

began a gradual, unorganized withdrawal that the remaining officers and

NCO's were powerless to stop.

The remainder of the CCF regiment continued on down the stream bed until

reaching the main valley of the Chongchon River. Here it overran the 1st

Battalion's Command Post, almost capturing the commander and his staff, ana

its adjacent Aid Station. The Chinese then established a blocking position astride the main highway. Shortly thereafter, another Chinese regiment

attacked one of the two artillery positions of the 2d Uivision, a relatively flat position along the Chongchon River next to a hill (329) known as the

Chinaman's Hat. Wading the river in seven company columns simultaneously, they were within 75 yards of the defending artillery and infantry before

being sighted.33 They caught the 61st Artillery totally by surprise and

the gunners panicked and fled, some heading for higher ground, most running through "8" Company, 23d Infantry, a few of whose-soldiers joined the

flight. Most of the infantry stayed in their positions, however, and

stopped, then threw the enemy out of the area with a counterattack. This

fight eventually cost the CCF over 400 dead and 111 prisoners.

Meanwhile, Colonel Sloane, 9th Infantry commander, was still unaware

that his unit was in any difficulty and had even loaned his attached tank

company (3-72d Armor) to the 23d Infantry for its counterattack. He began to realize the extent of his own problems when the 1st Battalion commander

and his staff straggled into his headquarters about 0300. He still Knew

nothing about the fate of "K" or "L" companies.

The 2d Battalion had "F," "G," and "H" companies grouped together on ubJ

26 (Map 8). "E" Company was on OBJ 15. The battalion commander was with

"E" Company. He became concerned when a patrol he had dispatched just prior

to dark had failed to find "K" Company. He knew nothing about the location

or status of 1st and 3d battalions, but felt something was happening and was

alarmed. Tne Chinese attacked "E" Company about midnight and forced it off

its hill. It immediately counterattacked and recaptured its position.

"G" Company was the last unit attacked. Its turn came about 0630, when

a company-sized force approached down a streambed in a column. They were in

full view of the defenders and were quickly destroyed by small arms fire and

a tank led counterattack.

The remainder of the regiment was untouched through the night. As the

commanders determined the status of their units during the 26th, it was

evident that the main strength left was in the 2d Battalion, concentrated

near OBJ 26. The regimental commander shifted boundaries and positions and

consolidated his companies for the expected attacks that night. Since most

of this movement had to be conducted under enemy fire, it took most of the

20
aay. By nightfall the regiment had reassembled about two miles south of its previous positions. The Chinese formed on the old U.S. locations to stage their attacks the 26th (Map 9).

The CCF started by breaking through the 23d Infantry's positions on the

east side of the Chongchon River. They were able, about 2100, to capture the Regimental CP and force both 1st and 2d battalions to withdraw about 600

yards. This prompted Colonel Sloane to order his 2d Battalion to attack

south into the 23d Infantry's sector to preclude an attack from the newly vacated American positions. Just as the battalion began to move, it was hit from the north. CCF forces had infiltrated to within 40 yaras of the defensive position (no outposts) of "G" and "F" companies. Attacking initially a platoon of "E" Company attached to "G" Company, the Chinese used

mortars to knock out the two machine guns which were holding up their advance, then overran the platoon and the neighboring platoon (1st Platoon, "G" Company). (Map 10) They quickly set up their own machine guns and

opened fire on the positions held by 2a and 3d platoons. Simultaneously 3d Platoon was attacked across its front and moved, according to plan, back to join 2d Platoon. Soon another Chinese machine gun occupied their old

position and made further defense impossible. Permission was obtained to withdraw, and the company moved down the hill, crossing the river using tanks and half tracks, or wading. Those who got wet were immediate

casualties in the +10 degree cold and required immediate evacuation to

warming facilities in the division rear. The rest of "G" Company joined what was left of "F" Company, which had been attacked at the same time, ana rejoined American lines in the perimeter of the 23d Infantry.34

Summary: By sunrise on the 27th the CCF were on the advance everywhere. They Iad forced the 9th Infantry back, inflicting severe losses, and had

gained the initiative that they were to keep until January 1951, when they were forced to halt to resupply.

Analysis: This operation shows the dangers involved in poorly disciplined soldiers encountering the enemy under conditions of the latter's choosing. The 9th Infantry was a typical American unit at this stage of the war. It

had come, poorly trained and understrength, from the U.S. to play a key role in the defense of the Pusan Perimeter. It fought its way up through Korea

to its positions on the Chongchon River, but forgot most of the lessons it

learned as its men perceived the war to be nearing an end.3 5 Their defeat

was caused by poor communications, little coordination between companies or with their headquarters, inadequate local security, and soldiers and leaders

who did not know how to use the terrain properly to organize a defense, and

were not equipped to sustain a defense. The men lacked the ammunition and

personal equipment necessary to hold a defensive position. There were

multiple documented instances of weapons failing because of the cold, of

counterattacks and defenses failing because the soldiers ran out of bullets

and grenades, and of soldiers abandoning or destroying their weapons either

21
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because the enemy was close or because the weapons wouldn't work. These

weapons were frequently turned against the Americans shortly thereafter.

The major lesson is that, no matter what the enemy situation has been, the

leaders must set and enforce high standards. They must ensure that the

proper equipment is carried and is in condition to be used. Each position

where a unit may spend any time must be properly sited and prepared for

defense. Finally, all ranks have to understand that communications remains

decisive. With proper communication, these units could have received the

fire support that might have precluded the necessity of withdrawing at all,

despite their unpreparedness. With proper communications flanking units

could have tied their defenses together so that isolated companies could not

be attacked and overwhelmed in detail. With good personal communication,

the trust and confidence so essential to cohesion could have been

maintained, preventing many withdrawals and unnecessary casualties.

22
RAID EXAMPLES

General: The last type of night operation that deserves consideration is

the Raid. Raids are offensive operations designed to harass, hurt, and

demoralize the enemy, without the requirement to seize and hold ground--"the

raiding force always withdraws after it accomplishes its mission."3 6

Typically raids are carried out by forces smaller than a battalion, however,

numerous instances can be found of units up to brigade size conducting

raiding operations. The first example falls in this category. It is also

the only non-U.S. example used in this stucy.

23
Example 5: Raid by the 29th Brigade, 10th (Irish) Division, British Army,

on the El 8urj-Ghurabeh Ridge, Palestine, 12-13 August 1918.

General Situation: British forces based in Egypt had been fighting Turkish

forces in Palestine since 1914. This campaign, though peripheral to the

main theaters in Europe, was of special significance to the British as any

Turkish success endangered the Suez Canal and traffic witn the Indian ana

Pacific Ocean areas. The fighting had been mostly inconclusive; however,

the assignment of General Sir Edmund Allenby as Commanoer in Chief in June

1917 breathed new air into operations. His early plans for a general

offensive to complete the capture of Palestine in Marcn 1918 were stymied oy

German successes in France that caused most of his British units to be

withdrawn from his command and rushed to help stem the German advances in

the west. They were replaced by inexperienced Indian Army units, some of

which had only recently been formed.37 The purpose of operations before

the resumption of a general offensive was therefore to train these new

replacements, to give them experience, to build their self-confidence, ana

to acclimatize them to the terrain and weather of the area. The largest in

a continuing series of raids was by the 29th Brigade of the 10th (Irish)

Division of the XX British Corps. There was another goal besides testing

and training the new troops: it was to reinforce the enemy commander's

belief that the main British attack would come up the road going beside the

objective (Map 11), whereas the XX Corps commander's actual scheme of

maneuver was to attack on the flanks and envelop the concentrated Turkish

defenders opposite his center. In line with this goal, two other brigades,

the 179th and the 181st of the 60th Division, simultaneously carried out

raids east of the Nablus Road. The cumulative effect of these night

operations was to make the enemy, both the Turks and their German advisors,

believe that a major attack had been beaten off, to reinforce their belief

that the main attack would be in the center, and to raise the morale and

effectiveness of the new British units while lowering the Turks to the point

that whole units were deserting.38

Specific Situation: The objective of the raid was a steep-sided ridge

approximately 4,500 yards long, lying 2,000 yards from the British lines

across a deep wadi, or ravine. The defenders, here the 33d Regiment of the

11th Division, about 800 strong, occupied one of the few continuous

defensive positions the Turks had in this theater, elsewhere being forced to

use relatively separated strong points. His defense included 36 machine

guns and barbed wire. The 33d was one of the best Turkish formations on the

front, having few deserters. The general outline of the raid was provided

by the corps commander, General Sir Philip Chetwode, with the specifics and

training provided by 10th Division. Since the desired goal was "An

unmistakable and inspiriting success,"39 the 29th Brigade was pullea out

of the line and provided three weeks of special training. The enemies

defenses were thoroughly reconnoitered and reproduced as closely as

possible on a hill, 20 miles behind British lines, which closely resembled

24
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the objective. This was then attacked repeatedly starting in daylight, with

further night rehearsals, until every soldier was completely familiar with

his role. A plaster model was made of the actual objective for further

familiarization. Training included wire cutting and crossing on special

ladders designed for this operation. Further reconnaissance patrols

determined locations of Turkish headquarters and preplanned artillery

fires. On the night of 12 August 1918, the attack was launched.

The Operation: The plan called for two Indian battalions, the 54th Sikhs

and the 1/0l1st Grenadiers to cross the wadi and seize the opposite ends of

the ridge. They would each be followed by two companies from the only

British battalion in the brigade, the 1st Leinster, who would then turn

inward and fight their way towards each other. Ideally, they would meet in

the center of the objective, but a withdrawal time of 2400 was established

whether the objective was overrun or not. The other Indian battalion in the

brigade was assigned to guard prisoners, carry wounded, and cover the

withdrawal as necessary.

At 2155, the units having moved single file from their defensive

positions across steep, rocky hillsides to the assault position, a twenty

minute preparation was fired. The deployment is of interest in that white

tape, splashes of lime, and boards painted with luminous paint were implaced

by patrols to mark the lines of advance. The night and time were chosen so

that a moon would aid the advance, but the actual attack would start in

total darkness. Special felt soles were fastened to the bottoms of the

boots to muffle movement, and bundles of dried grass were used as necessary

to further quiet any sounds. As a further precaution, a large caliber

artillery round was fired on the Turk's flank positions every 15 seconds to

cover any unavoidable noises. Any suspicion this might have raiseo in the

defenders minds was anticipated by commencing these fires several days prior

to the raid. Finally, the time required to move to the attack positions was

actually determined by patrols moving along the routes followed, prior to

the raid.

Once the artillery preparation was complete, the Indian battalions

captured their objectives on the flanks as scheduled. The two companies of

1st Leinsters on each flank followed a moving barrage towards the center,

which those on the right reached before withdrawal time. The two companies

on the left, with more difficult ground and stiff close-quarters fighting to

overcome, failed to reach their final objective, but turned back at the

designated time for the return. The attack by soldiers well rehearsed for

this operation was a total success, coming as it did from the flank and rear

as the Turks fired wildly to the front. The withdrawal was completed

uneventfully. Bonfires were provided to give the returning troops a goal to

guide on, and relays of stretcher bearers moved the wounded to the rear.

Final evidence of the thought that went into the planning for this operation

is provided by the fact that a shellproof shelter was constructed in an

25
abandoned village between the lines to protect any wounded who were not

behind friendly lines by dawn, and a deception plan of phony gun flashes and

flares to attract Turkish fires was initiated during the withdrawal.

Summary: At a cost of 107 casualties, the 29th Brigade accomplished every

mission given it. 239 Turks were captured, along with 14 machine guns and

10 mules. Enemy killed and wounded were estimated at 450. The morale of

the Indian troops and the confidence established between them and their

leaders was firmed. Five weeks later these same units assaulted the shaken

defenders in a great offensive that ended Turkish domination over Palestine

forever.

Analysis: This is a classic example of a night operation planned in depth,

rehearsed properly, and achieving total success. Although it violated the

principle of simplicity, it did so after sufficient training and preparation

to allow the rather complex plan to succeed. From the beginning one of the

goals of the operation was to foster trust and faith within new units. This

was, in essence, a graduation exercise in a cohesion building program. The

leaders made no demands the troops were unprepared to give thanks to

foresight and common sense. The exercise demonstrated the essential

elements of successful night operations: leadership, planning, and training.

26
MAP 12

RAIO B( L : RANC-ER .BATT8LON

12 I Z I 11
Example 6: 1st Ranger Battalion raiding an Italian defensive perimeter at

Sened Station, Tunisia, 11-12-13 February 1943.

General Situation: The situation for American forces in central Tunisia was

somewhat desperate in early February 1943. The advance into Tunis and the

rear of Field Marshal Romnel's Afrika Korps had been stalled by strong

German and Italian forces under General von Arnin. The 1st Ranger Battalion

under Lieutenant Colonel William O. Darby was assigned to the U.S. II Corps

to accomplish several diverse missions. The first was to find out

information about the disposition and strength of Axis forces in central

Tunisia. The second was to create the impression that strong U.S. forces

were present in central Tunisia, although in fact many of these units were

being moved to block German thrusts from Tunis and 6izerte to the north.

These dual missions were to be accomplished by fast moving nignt actions to

simulate large troop strengths and to capture prisoners to confirm or

identify the Axis units present in the area. The Ranger Battalion was

uniquely qualified for those actions. For the previous two months it had

trained extensively in night operations in anticipation of this

eventuality. To this end three raids were proposed by Lieutenant Colonel

Darby, of which the first, against an enemy outpost near Sened Station, was

the only one to actually be accomplished before events altered plans.

Specific Situation: Following a reconnaissance by the battalion commander,

hisexecutive officer, and the three company commanders who would be

involved, the plans for the Sened Station raid were tentatively finalized

and orders issued. The objective was a cluster of five small hills occupied

by an Italian unit of company size, acting as an outpost in front of the

principle defensive positions around Sened Station. (Map 12) At least four

47-mm anti-tank guns and twelve machine guns armed the veteran Afrika Korps

soldiers who were well dug in. After a thorough briefing, the battalion

departed by blacked out truck at 2300 on 11 February from their bivouac at

Gafsa to a Free French outpost where they began their foot movement. They

were traveling light, only one canteen, one c-ration, one shelter half, and

ammunition was carried by each man.

The Operation: Departing the outpost at approximately 0400 on 12

February,4U the 200-man force moved quickly across eight miles of flat

desert and barren rugged mountains under daylight enemy observation and

artillery fire to a camouflaged bivouac about six miles from the Italian

outpost. There the raiders were dispersed into hiding places among the

rocks below a saddle where an outpost was established to watch the enemy

position through the day. Based on this observation and a closer

reconnaissance by Lieutenant Colonel Darby, plans were finalized for the

attack that night. The force moved after dark to a position on the edge of

the plain leading to the enemy and waited for the moon to set, which it did

at midnight. As soon as the darkness was complete, the rangers moved out in

column to close with their objective. The three companies deployed

27
silently, using a system of red and green pinpointed flashlights to indicate

un-it locations to each other in the dark and to assist the assault line in

maintaining its alignment.

Since all key leaders had conducted a thorough visual reconnaissance of

the objective from their daylight bivouac, everyone was aware of their

particular platoon and company boundaries and objectives (Map 13). Moving

slowly and silently, the raiders were actually able to reach the Italian

position in the center, while the flank companies were about 30 to 50 yards

from the enemies initial positions before they were discovered.42

Crawling under the excited and aimless fire of the surprised defenders, the

assaulting units were able to overrun the entire position, destroy all

weapons, and capture 11 enemy soldiers. 4 3 The assault was completed in

twenty minutes, followed by a quick reorganization, at which time it was

determined that the force would be split. A fast group of the unwounded in

each company moved out under the control of the battalion executive

officer. They were able to cross the twelve miles to the French outpost in

the two hours before the waiting trucks would have to depart without them as

dawn approached. The slow group, composed of the wounded and prisoners,

with escorts was able to reach the French outpost an hour after daybreak,

where it remained until dark. The most seriously wounded and their

protecting section hid in the mountains until jeeps could be dispatched to

evacuate them, about 1130. That night another darkened convoy brought these

rangers back to Gafsa.

Summary: The number of enemy casualties varies with the source, but

amounted to about 85 dead, 25 wounded, and 11 prisoners out of an estimated

130 defenders. Ranger casualties amounted to one killed, one seriously

wounded, and 14 walking wounded. Most of the casualties were from grenades

thrown indiscriminately by the few Italian soldiers who were awake when the

attack began, or who managed to wake up in enough time to participate in the

defense. The rangers were known among the Italians after this affair as

"Black Death"44 and their reputation preceded them in subsequent

conflicts, making otherwise difficult missions easier as the defending

Italians learned who they were facing.

Analysis: In the Ranger's own after-action discussion, they determined that

"(1) control, (2) contact, (3) confidence, and (4) invisibility" were the

vital elements in the success of a night raid. "Troops trained to maintain

contact on the darkest night in all types of terrain will keep together

during an operation, and with contact control is simple. Confidence in

themselves as individual fighters and in their unit as an unbeatable

fighting teams is instilled in combat soldiers by long hours of training and

maneuvers more difficult than any situation in actual battle. Invisibility

to both the eyes and ears of the enemy is the key to surprise, which

demoralizes the enemy and leads to panic in his ranks." 45 It goes without

saying that none of this is possible without strong positive leadership,

which shines out in every account of this operation.

28
M1AP 1'3

RA D O 7EC TIVE

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CONCLUSION

This study has shown that the U.S. Army has not always been a master of

the art of fighting at night. It has not had to be because it has entered

its wars this century with a superiority in supporting fires (to include

airpower) that could substitute for efficiency at night. Operations in the

dark (especially offensive ones) are risky, and the penalty for failure is

frequently found to be greater in terms of casualties then daylight operations. This is due to the fact that control is more difficult, and

units are more likely to break into fragments and lose their combat power at

night. As a hasty substitute for true night proficiency, the U.S. Army has

tended to substitute technology, in the form of searchlights or artillery

illumination, to turn the night into day and allow it to move back to a

combat environment more familiar, however fleeting the light might be.

This is not to say that there have not been numerous exceptions. But,

they have all been units with strong leaders who understood the risks and

advantages of night combat, and who trained their soldiers to minimize the

risks and optimize the advantages. The 104th Infantry division is one of

the most outstanding examples of a unit using the night to best advantage.

It entered combat on 23 October 1944 and fought nearly continuously until

the end of the war in Europe. During this period it launched 45 separate

major attacks, eleven at night. It also continued the attack 28 times,

eleven of these being after dark. This is less than 30% of all its major

actions, yet this unit had an enviable reputation for night attacks. The

key point is that it was just as capable of daylight operations and used

that skill to become expert at operating in the dark. Further, the

commanders knew when to use a night attack, and when not to use one.

Another division that early established a reputation for night expertise

was the 45th Infantry Division. In his review of the Sicilian Campaign, the

division commander said:

This Division employed night attacks to the fullest

extent possible. They were universally successful. It

was found that whenever the enemy could be kept on the

move continually, they were unable to execute demolitions

to the fullest extent and emplace mines. It is believed

that whenever the enemy employs inferior forces in delaying

action a continuous pressure must be exerted. Without

question the employment of successive night attacks reduced

casualties of this Division to a considerable extent. In

many cases the Axis forces had very well prepared positions

which if attacked during daytime would have caused

considerable delay. It is recommended that troops be

trained to operate at night at least 50% of the time, and

this method of warfare will obtain dividends commensurate

with the effort expended... 4 6

29
Enemies of the United States and other armies facing similar problems (i.e., the Soviets) have always turned to the cover of darkness to give

them, if not an advantage, at least a more equal chance against superior firepower. As we look at potential enemies in the world--who range from the

Warsaw Pact, who could deprive us of the use of daylight by achieving air

superiority and a simultaneous advantage in artillery, to potential low

intensity conflicts where the enemy will once again have to use the night

because of our firepower superiority--it becomes more evident that night

operations will be one major key to success. The U.S. Army must be prepred to match or better its enemy's ability. One way will be through technology,

but this is- still a fragile support, with dangerous consequences for those

who are overly reliant, especially in a high- or mid-intensity conflict

where supply lines and the flow of repair parts are subject to

interruption. The U.S. Army must train and retain the ability to steal the

night from the enemy.

The ingredients for success at night were given in the introduction.

The most important of these is unquestionably leadership. To succeed in

night operations the senior leadership must be aware of the risks and

benefits inherent in them. They must know when to attack at night, and when

it is inappropriate. They have to enforce noise and light discipline not

only in the front line infantry, but also in the brigade and division rear

areas. The junior leadership must be confident in their own ability as well

after dark as they are in the daylight, a skill that comes from training.

Even the best combat leaders cannot succeed with soldiers who are

unaccustomed to the dark and who lack confidence in themselves and their

leaders. The cure for this is training, a commodity in short supply in a

combat unit that has been in battle for any extended period. As

replacements enter combat units the experience and confidence levels go down, and without a major break in combat to retrain, any unit will become

less proficient, especially at complicated actions such as night fighting.

The best U.S. night fighting units have been those that had extended periods

to train at night. The 1st Ranger Battalion is an example of an American

unit that truly became a master at night operations. Most units do not have

the time and opportunity available to Lieutenant Colonel Darby. When you

reach the other extreme, you have units like the 9th Infantry (Example 4) or

the 47th Infantry (Example 2) with no training and no ability. The World

War II commander of the 2d Battalion, 179th Infantry, said in his comments

about training:

30
There should be much greater amount of night training

of all kinds. Particularly training in night attack

problems, and preparation and organization of position at

night. Unit commanders and leaders must learn to be able

to maintain control over their organizations at night in

widely dispersed positions. Proficiency in the

organization and plans for alert and assembly for action

at night are of great importance. Commanders must organize

and teach their men to avoid firing on each other in the

darkness. That has happened several times over here.

Units must be trained in the technique and tactics of

limited objective attacks at night. We actually had one

limited objective attack operation involving an advance

of 9 miles. This distance was unusual, of course, but

we carried it through well because we had had good prior

training. I would say the greatest difficulty in night

attack is reorganizing in the darkness. I would stress

this as the most important part of training for night

action. In all operational night exercises, harp on

reforming and reorganization after an attack or other

action. ..47

Unfortunately, too often in current training only lip service is paid to

the necessity of night operations. As Vietnam combat experience becomes

less prevalent in the American army, the lessons learned in previous wars

becomes of increasing importance. This means that commanders have to give

serious attention to learning the lessons of past night combat and realize

that, as Major Gorman Smith stated, "An examination of both the theory and

the experience of night attacks discloses that by far the largest single

factor in the division's ability to attack at night is the state of training

of its small units--company, platoon, and squad. The better trained these

units are the less they are hampered by the difficulties of control

encountered at night and the more readily they can exploit the advantage of

night concealment."48

Planning is the third leg of successful night combat. U.S. Army

doctrine calls for night attacks to be shallow in depth, against

well-defined objectives. As noted in the examples of night attacks, this

doctrine has an excellent basis in experience. Time must be available for

the leaders to reconnoiter their objective, plan their scheme of maneuver,

and develop fire-support plans. Where time is not available, planning

suffers, and inevitably, the execution of the mission suffers. Only

well-trained units can overcome inadequate planning.

Likewise, the plan must be kept simple. Complicated plans allow more

room for Clauswitz's friction, or "Murphy's Law" to interfere with success.

The 1st Ranger Battalion's plan at Sened Station is an outstanding example

of simplicity.

31
Finally, if all these critical elements are met, the result will be a

unit that can achieve surprise vis-a-vis its foes. To quote Smith again,

"...it is the surprise which darkness helps achieve, and not the darkness

itself which is so large an element of the favorable...shift (in combat

power) in favor of the attacker. This surprise usually comes from being

able to approach close to the enemy position unobserved, especially if his

security measures are lax." 4 9 As noted before, surprise leads to the

enemy losing control of his forces and, in rapid succession, to his defeat.

The U.S. Army can either learn the lesson, pay the cost ana train, or accept

a self-imposed disadvantage at night. Unfortunately, the next war may not

allow the luxury of recovering and relearning these lessons the hard way.

32
EN0NOTES

1. "Prior to the Leyte and Luzon Campaigns, night operations (in the

Pacific Theater of Operations) became practically non-existent because in

the dense jungle growth on little known islands, together with the

unprecedented lack of maps of any value, night operations, large or small,

not only availed nothing of value but resulted in senseless expenditure of

trained personnel. On the other hand, the Japanese policy of uncoordinated

night attacks by small units against organized positions offered continuous

opportunities for the annihilation of such units at little cost to

ourselves. Since the Japanese persisted in this policy, our forces

abandoned normal night operations for all practical purposes ana adopted the

policy of waiting for the enemy to expend himself against us." U.S. War

Department, United States Army Forces in the Far East, "Night Operations in

Pacific Ocean Areas," USAFFE Report Number 279, May 1945, p. 1.

2. This conclusion is supported by the comments of the Germans themselves,

who indicated that night came to be regarded as their ally. "During the two

world wars, night and other periods of poor visibility, such as fog and

snowstorms or rainstorms, gradually came to be considered the ideal time for

action. Interference from the air reduced fighting and paralyzed movements

in daylight hours, with the result that the space between the front and the

most remote corner of the rear areas was often empty and deserted. During the hours of darkness combat and movements resumed with new intensity. After a while the German soldier considered this mole-like existence as

normal, but the conclusions that should have been drawn from theseundeniable facts in setting up training schedules were completely inadequate." U.S. Department of the Army, Night Combat, Department of the

Army Pamphlet Number 20-236 (Washington: June 1953), p. 1.

3. See MAJ Claude R. Sasso, "Soviet Night Operations in World War II,"

Leavenworth Paper Number 6, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command ana

General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.

4. Ibid.

5. U.S. War Department, Army Ground Forces, "Board Report A-114, MTO,"

Headquarters Army Ground Forces, 3 December 1943, p. 5.

6. Ibid.

7. The eye has six major components. Three of these, the cornea, lens, and

iris control the amount of light which enter the eye, and focus it on the

retina, which receives the light in its rod and cone cells and converts it

to a signal which is collected at the optic disk, then sent along the optic

nerve to the brain. The cone cells are used principally for high intensity

light, such as daylight. Rod cells are used for low intensity light. Cones

are found exclusively at the center of focus of the lens, the fovea. The

-33-
peripheral retina farthest from the fovea is almost purely rod cells. At

night the rod cells, which receive only shades of gray, produce a chemical

called rhodopsin, or visual purple, which enables them to receive low light levels. Cone cells are incapaoie of producing visual purple, and are

therefore blind at low light intensities. The loss of these cells at the

focus point of the eye means that the eye must scan, or look to the side of

objects in order for them to be seen. This is called off-center vision.

Any white light brighter than a full moon immediately destroys the visual

purple, which requires 15 to 30 minutes to regenerate itself. Conserving

visual purple by closing one or both eyes or wearing red filtered goggles

when exposed to a bright light is necessary to avoid temporary blindness.

8. U.S. War Department, Army Ground Forces, "Extracts from Observer's

Reports," Headquarters Army Ground Forces, 17 February 1945, p. 3.

9. MAJ Gorman C. Smith, "Division Night Attack Doctrine," MMAS thesis, U.S.

Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 19b4,

p. 53.

10. CPT Royce L. Eaves, "The Operations of the 1st Battalion, 415th

Infantry in the Attack on Merken," personal experience of the 81mm Mortar

Platoon Leader, staff paper for the Advanced Infantry Officers Class,

1949-50 - on microfilm, AGO Microfilm, Item No. 3540, Reel 3101, Infantry

School, Staff Department, Fort Benning, Georgia.

11. Ibid, p. 7.

12. Ibid, p. 8. There is some question as to the actual LD time. Leo A.

Hoegh and Howard T. Doyle in their book "Timberwolf Tracks, The History of

the 104th Infantry Division, 1942-45," Infantry Journal Press, Washington,

1947, say LD time was 0400. I tend to believe Eaves' account as it is by a

participant, and his knowledge of other events is detailed and in agreement

with other sources.

13. Hoegh and Doyle, "Timberwolf Tracks," pp. 183-4.

14. Charles B. MacDonald, "The Siegfried Line Campaign," Office of the Chief

of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1963, p. 584.

15. Eaves, Operations of the 1st Battalion, p. 18.

16. David E. Gillespie, editor, "History of the 47th Infantry Regiment," no

publication location listed, but dated 1946 while the regiment was in

Germany, no page numbers.

17. George F. Howe, "Northwest Africa: Seizing the Iniative in the West,"

Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington,

DC, 1957, pp. 565-6.

-34-
18. Gillespie, "History of the 47th Infantry Regiment," Section on E1

Guettar.

19. Howe, "Northwest Africa," p. 567.

20. Ibid, p. 568.

21. Ibid, p. 567.

22. 9th Infantry Division AAR, 26 Mar-8 Apr 43, datea 25 Aug 43, Annex b

(Terrain Study).

23. COL John M. Finn, "Shoestring Ridge," Infantry Journal, September and

October 1945. This information derives from Volume LVII, number 3

(September), p. 47. It was called Snoestring Ridge because of the supply

situation, not because of any peculiarity of the terrain.

24. Ibid, p. 51.

25. Ibid, p. 52.

26. Finn, "Shoestring Ridge," Volume LVII, number 5, p. 50.

27. 32d Infantry Operations Report, Leyte, p. 22, as quoted in M. Hamlin

Cannon, "Leyte: The Return to the Philippines," Office of the Chief of

Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1954, p. 262.

28. Finn, "Shoestring Ridge," Volume LVII, number 5, pp. 51-52.

29. Eighth Army operated in the western part of Korea ana consisted of the

1st Cavalry Division, 2d Infantry Division, 24th Infantry Division, 25th

Infantry Division, and the ROK II Corps, operating on the right of the U.S.

units. The U.S. X Corps, with the 1st Marine Division and elements of the

7th Infantry Division were operating along the eastern portion of Korea, but

were not subordinate to Eighth Army.

30. S.L.A. Marshall, "The River and the Gauntlet," William Morrow & Company,

New York, 1953, pp. 19-20.

31. T. R. Fehrenbach, "This Kind of War," The Macmillan Company, New York,

1963, p. 305.

32. An infantry regiment in 1950 consisted of nine rifle companies and three

weapons companies lettered sequentially "A" through "L". They were grouped

in three battalions, so that 1st Battalion was rifle companies "A", "B", and

"C", with weapon Company "D", and a headquarters company. 2a Battalion had

"E" through "H", and 3d Battalion, "I" through "L". There was also a
headquarters and a service company (M). Due to a shortage of American

soldiers, a proportion of the rifle strength of each company were Korean

soldiers known as KATUSA's.

33. The flat area was on the flood plain and barely large enougn to hold the

two artillery battalions (61st and 503d), and the regimental headquarters

and 1st Battalion of the 23d Infantry. The position included six M4 tanKs

of the 23d Tank Company, attached to the 23d Regiment.

34. The 2d Battalion mustered 28 officers and 750 men on 25 November. 8y

28 November it was only able to assemble nine officers and 250 men.

35. Fehrenbach, "This Kind of War," pp. 304-308.

36. FM 100-5, "Operations," Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington,

DC, 20 August 1982, p. 93.

37. Field Marshal Earl Wavell, "Soldiers and Soldiering," Jonathan Cape,

London, 1954, p. 166.

38. CPT Cyril Falls, "Military Operations Egypt and Palestine," part of the

official "History of the Great War," His Majesty's Stationary Office,

London, 1930, pp. 426-429.

39. Wavell, "Soldiers and Soldiering," p. 167.

40. CPT Leilyn M. Young, "Rangers in a Night Operation," Mlilitary-Review,

July 1944, Volume XXIV, Number 4, p. 64.

41. James A. Altieri, "The Spearheaders," 8obbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 196U,

p. 206.

42. Young, "Rangers in a Night Operation," p. 67.

43. COL William 0. Darby, with William H. Baumer, "We Led the Way," Presidio

Press, San Rafael, California, 1980, p. 58.

44. Darby and Baumer, "We Led the Way," p. 58.

45. Young, "Rangers in a Night Operation," p. 69.

46. Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, Training Memorandum Number 50, "Lessons From the Sicilian Campaign," 20 November

1943, p. 13.

47. Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, (G-3

Training Section, "Training Notes From the Sicilian Campaign,"

25 October 1943, p. 12.
48. Smith,

original.

"Division Night Attack Doctrine," pp. 149-150, emphasis in the

49. Ibid, p. 110.