Filed 12/8/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROBERT OTTO CARTER, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D082219

 (Super. Ct. No. BAF1501107)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, 

Randall S. Stamen, Judge. Reversed and remanded.

Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, 

Melissa A. Mandel, Warren J. Williams and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Robert Carter, Jr. appeals the denial of his request for a full 

resentencing under recently enacted Penal Code section 1172.75.1 Although 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 

noted.
2

the trial court recalled Carter for resentencing under section 1172.75 and 

struck his one-year prior prison term from his sentence, the court declined to 

conduct a full resentencing under the new law. The court found that it did 

not have the authority to do so because Carter was originally sentenced 

pursuant to a plea agreement. Carter contends that this was in error. We 

agree that section 1172.75 required the trial court to conduct a full 

resentencing, and that the People are not entitled to withdraw their assent to 

the plea bargain if the trial court further reduces Carter’s sentence on 

resentencing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the trial court

for a full resentencing. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In November 2015, the People filed a complaint alleging that Carter 

committed two counts of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and one 

count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)), specifically, a 

machete. The People further alleged that Carter served a prior prison term 

(§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and was convicted of a strike prior (§§ 667, subds. (c) and

(e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). 

In April 2016, the complaint was amended to add a second count of 

assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)) and a great bodily injury 

allegation (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). At that time, Carter pled guilty to both 

counts of assault with a deadly weapon and admitted the great bodily injury 

allegation, the prison prior, and the strike prior. The parties stipulated to a 

12-year sentence under the plea agreement, calculated as follows: for the first 

count of assault with a deadly weapon, the middle term of three years, 

doubled to six years due to the strike prior; for the second count of assault 

with a deadly weapon, one-third the middle term of three years (one year), 

doubled to two years due to the strike prior, run consecutively; for the great 
3

bodily injury enhancement, an additional and consecutive term of three 

years; and for the prison-prior enhancement, an additional and consecutive 

term of one year. In May 2016, the trial court accepted and imposed the 

stipulated sentence. 

In October 2022, the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation referred Carter’s case to the trial court for recall and 

resentencing under newly enacted section 1172.75, subdivision (b). The 

People filed an opposition to resentencing under section 1172.75, arguing 

that although the court had to strike the one-year prison prior from Carter’s 

sentence, it had no discretion to conduct a full resentencing because there 

had been a stipulated sentence per the parties’ plea agreement. Carter filed 

a response to the People’s opposition, arguing that a full resentencing was 

mandatory under section 1172.75 and the court was required to apply all new 

sentencing laws that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion. 

Carter also filed a motion to strike his strike prior (People v. Superior Court 

(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497), which the People opposed. 

In March 2023, after holding a hearing, the trial court issued a written

resentencing order. The court concluded that Carter’s prison prior under 

section 667.5, subdivision (b) was invalid and ordered it stricken. The court 

acknowledged that Carter “ha[d] taken advantage of the rehabilitative 

aspects of incarceration, earning several certificates of completion and letters 

of appreciation,” and stated that if Carter’s “conviction and sentencing were 

not the product of an accepted plea bargain, the court could take [his] 

achievements into account at a full resentencing hearing.” However, the 

court agreed with the People that it did not have the authority to modify the 

negotiated sentence beyond striking the prison prior. The court found that to 

do so where the “defendant’s sentence was the product of a plea bargain 
4

would divest the People of the benefit of their bargain.” For the same reason, 

the court concluded it did not have the authority to strike Carter’s strike

prior, and it therefore denied his Romero motion. 

At the resentencing hearing, the court ordered Carter’s prison prior 

stricken, stated that all other terms of his sentence would remain intact, and 

sentenced him to 11 years in state prison. 

Carter timely filed a notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

The parties agree that the trial court properly struck Carter’s prison 

prior from his sentence. The only issues before us are (1) whether the court 

erred in finding that it did not have discretion under section 1172.75 to fully 

resentence Carter because his sentence was imposed pursuant to a plea 

agreement, and (2) if so, whether the prosecution may withdraw its assent to 

the plea bargain if the trial court further reduces Carter’s sentence on 

resentencing. 

A. Governing Law

Before January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b) required trial 

courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each true finding on an 

allegation the defendant had served a prior prison term and had not 

remained free of custody for at least five years. (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 

Cal.App.5th 375, 379–380 (Burgess).) Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill 

No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 136) amended section 667.5 by 

limiting the enhancement to only prior prison terms served for sexually 

violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) Enhancements based on prior 

prison terms served for other offenses became legally invalid. (Burgess, at 

pp. 379–380.)
5

In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg.

Sess.) (Senate Bill 483), which, among other things, made the changes 

implemented by Senate Bill 136 retroactive. (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 380.) Senate Bill 483 added former section 1171.1, later renumbered as 

section 1172.75 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12), to the Penal Code.2 (Stats. 2021, 

ch. 728, §§ 1, 3.) Penal Code section 1172.75 provides that “[a]ny sentence 

enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to 

subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a 

prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of 

Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.” (Pen. 

Code, § 1172.75, subd. (a).) It further provides that if a currently 

incarcerated defendant is serving a sentence that includes such a legally 

invalid enhancement, “the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the 

defendant.” (Id., subd. (c).) 

The statute provides specific instructions for the resentencing under 

section 1172.75. (See People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399

(Monroe).) First, the resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence than the 

one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed 

enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. Resentencing 

pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer sentence than the one 

originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) Second, the trial court “shall 

2 Senate Bill 483 also added section 1171, later renumbered as section 

1172.7 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 11), which made the changes previously 

implemented by Senate Bill No. 180 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 180)

retroactive as well. Senate Bill 180 amended Health and Safety Code section

11370.2 to invalidate most three-year drug-prior sentence enhancements

imposed before January 1, 2018. (Stats. 2017, ch. 677, § 1; see also Pen.

Code, § 1172.7, subd. (a).)
6

apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other 

changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to 

eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” 

(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) Third, the court “may consider postconviction 

factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of 

rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects 

whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have 

reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects 

that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that 

continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75, 

subd. (d)(3).) Fourth, “[u]nless the court originally imposed the upper term, 

the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there 

are circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of 

imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have been 

stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable 

doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1172.75, subd. 

(d)(4).) Finally, the court “shall appoint counsel” for the resentencing. 

(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(5).)

The Legislature declared in an uncodified statement of intent in Senate 

Bill 483 “that in order to ensure equal justice and address systemic racial 

bias in sentencing, it is the intent of the Legislature to retroactively apply 

Senate Bill 180 of the 2017–18 Regular Session and Senate Bill 136 of the 

2019–20 Regular Session to all persons currently serving a term of 

incarceration in jail or prison for these repealed sentence enhancements. It is 

the intent of the Legislature that any changes to a sentence as a result of the 

act that added this section shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to 

rescind a plea agreement.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.)
7

B. Standard of Review

We review issues of statutory construction de novo. (People v. 

Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1123.) Our fundamental task in 

interpreting a statute is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to 

effectuate its purpose. (Ibid.) We begin with the text of the statute and give

the words their usual meaning while construing them in light of the statutory 

framework as a whole. (Ibid.) If the statutory language is unambiguous, 

then its plain meaning controls. (Ibid.) If the language “permits more than 

one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the 

statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy. [Citation.] The wider 

historical circumstances of a law’s enactment may assist in ascertaining 

legislative intent, supplying context for otherwise ambiguous language.” 

(People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 976 (Prudholme), internal 

quotation marks omitted.)

“In considering the purpose of legislation, statements of the intent of 

the enacting body contained in a preamble, while not conclusive, are entitled 

to consideration.” (People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1280.) Although 

such uncodified statements do not confer power, they “properly may be 

utilized as an aid in construing a statute.” (Ibid.) The Legislature’s 

statement of intent in Senate Bill 483 is found within the preamble, or what 

the Supreme Court has also referred to as a “ ‘plus section’ ”—“a provision of 

a bill that is not intended to be a substantive part of the code section or 

general law that the bill enacts, but to express the Legislature’s view on some 

aspect of the operation or effect of the bill.” (People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 

846, 858, fn. 13 (Allen).) 
8

C. Analysis

Carter argues that simply striking the one-year enhancement imposed 

under the repealed portion of former section 667.5, subdivision (b) deprives 

him of his right to full resentencing under the changes in the law that 

resulted from the enactment of Senate Bill 483. According to Carter, the 

language of section 1172.75 and Senate Bill 483 demonstrate the 

Legislature’s intent to apply the full-resentencing provisions of section 

1172.75 to all sentences, whether stipulated or not. We agree.

We turn first to the language of the statute itself. Section 1172.75

provides that “[i]f the court determines that [a defendant’s] current judgment 

includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall 

the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c), italics 

added.) The statute also provides that, when resentencing, the “court shall

apply . . . any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for 

judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote 

uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2), italics added.) “By its 

plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the 

trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.” (Monroe, supra, 85 

Cal.App.5th at p. 402; see also People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

[when a sentence is subject to recall, “the resentencing court has jurisdiction 

to modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion subjected to 

the recall”].) Nothing in section 1172.75 indicates that sentences resulting 

from a plea agreement are exempt from its provisions. 

The People concede that the plain language of section 1172.75 

“appear[s] to give trial courts the authority to fully resentence” without 

making any exception for plea bargains or stipulated sentences. Yet the 

People contend that “where a defendant received a stipulated sentence, a 
9

scenario not mentioned in the statute, these provisions conflict with section 

1192.5” and “section 1192.5 controls.” 

We disagree. Section 1192.5 provides that upon acceptance of a plea

agreement by the parties and approval by the court, “the court may not

proceed as to the plea other than as specified in the plea.” (§ 1192.5, subd. 

(b), italics added.) Although the court may “withdraw its approval in the 

light of further consideration of the matter” (§ 1192.5, subds. (c)–(d)), “longstanding law limits the court’s unilateral authority to strike an enhancement 

yet maintain other provisions of the plea bargain” (People v. Stamps (2020) 9 

Cal.5th 685, 701 (Stamps)). Thus, where a defendant has received a 

stipulated sentence and a new ameliorative law creates a retroactive right to 

be resentenced, it “create[s] a statutory ambiguity with section 1192.5”

regarding “how the law should be applied retroactively to existing plea 

agreements.” (Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 973–974.)

The Supreme Court recently resolved similar ambiguities in Stamps

and Prudholme, two cases that “involved the intersection of this statutory 

scheme of plea bargaining and the retroactivity rule” of In re Estrada (1965) 

63 Cal.2d 740. (Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In Stamps, the 

defendant pled guilty, and the parties agreed to a nine-year stipulated

sentence, which included a mandatory five-year enhancement for a prior 

serious felony conviction. (§ 667, subd. (a); see Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 

p. 693.) While that case was on appeal, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 

No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1393) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013), 

which “removed provisions that prohibited a trial court from striking a 

serious felony enhancement in furtherance of justice under section 1385.” 

(Stamps, at p. 700.) The defendant argued that Senate Bill 1393 applied 

retroactively to his plea bargain, and his case must therefore be remanded to 
10

permit the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to strike the 

enhancement from his stipulated sentence. (Id. at p. 698.) The Supreme 

Court explained that “to justify a remand for the court to consider striking 

his serious felony enhancement while maintaining the remainder of his 

bargain, defendant must establish not only that Senate Bill 1393 applies 

retroactively, but that, in enacting that provision, the Legislature intended to 

overturn long-standing law that a court cannot unilaterally modify an 

agreed-upon term by striking portions of it under section 1385.” (Id. at 

p. 701.) 

After analyzing the bill’s legislative history, the Stamps court was “not 

persuaded that the Legislature intended” such a result. (Stamps, supra, 9 

Cal.5th at p. 701.) The court found that although the “Legislature may have 

intended to modify the sentencing scheme, . . . the legislative history [of 

Senate Bill 1393] does not demonstrate any intent to overturn existing law 

regarding a court’s lack of authority to unilaterally modify a plea agreement. 

Indeed, none of the legislative history materials mention plea agreements at 

all.” (Stamps, at p. 702.) 

The court distinguished the language at issue in Stamps from that in

its earlier decision in Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984 (Harris), 

which considered the effect of Proposition 47 on convictions, including those 

resulting from plea agreements. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 702–703.) 

Proposition 47 reduced certain nonviolent crimes from felonies to 

misdemeanors and created a resentencing petition procedure applicable to 

those “ ‘serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea. . . .’ ” 

(Stamps, at pp. 702–703, quoting Harris, at p. 991; see also § 1170.18, subd. 

(a).) Harris rejected the People’s claim that they should be permitted to 

withdraw from a plea agreement where the defendant successfully petitioned
11

for resentencing under Proposition 47, explaining that “[b]y expressly 

mentioning convictions by plea, Proposition 47 contemplated relief to all 

eligible defendants.” (Harris, at pp. 991–993.) Indeed, the “resentencing 

process that Proposition 47 established would often prove meaningless if the 

prosecution could respond to a successful resentencing petition by 

withdrawing from an underlying plea agreement and reinstating the original 

charges filed against the petitioner.” (Id. at p. 992.)

The Stamps court, on the other hand, concluded that “[n]othing in the 

language and legislative history of Senate Bill 1393 suggests an intent to 

modify section 1192.5’s mandate that ‘the court may not proceed as to the 

plea other than as specified in the plea’ without the consent of the parties. . . . 

That Senate Bill 1393 is silent regarding pleas and provides no express 

mechanism for relief undercuts any suggestion that the Legislature intended 

to create special rules for plea cases involving serious felony enhancements.” 

(Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 704.) Accordingly, the court determined that 

the proper remedy for Stamps was a limited remand of his case to allow him 

to seek relief under Senate Bill 1393 with the understanding that, should the 

trial court exercise its discretion to strike the serious felony enhancement, 

the People would be entitled to withdraw from the plea agreement. (Id. at 

pp. 707–708.)

The court considered a different statute in Prudholme. There, the 

defendant’s appeal was pending when the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 

No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1950). (See Stats. 2020, 

ch. 328, § 2, amending Pen. Code, § 1203.1; Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 

p. 964.) The defendant argued that the new law applied retroactively and 

required his probation term to be reduced to two years but that the terms of 

his plea agreement should otherwise remain in place. (Prudholme, at p. 964.) 
12

The Supreme Court again analyzed the bill’s language, its legislative history, 

and its intersection with section 1192.5 to determine the remedy for 

retroactive application of the bill in plea bargain cases. (Id. at pp. 975–977.)

The court agreed with the defendant that “employing the Stamps procedure 

and allowing the prosecution to withdraw from the plea agreement would 

appear contrary to the purposes underlying the new law,” which included

reducing the length of probation to increase probationary effectiveness and 

reducing the likelihood of incarceration for minor probation violations. (Id. at 

p. 977.) But like Senate Bill 1393 in Stamps, Assembly Bill 1950 “made no 

mention of the legislative intent regarding an application to pleas,” and the 

“level of clarity” present in Harris therefore did not exist in Prudholme. (Id. 

at pp. 973, 975.) The court was thus required to analyze the legislative 

history of Assembly Bill 1950 to determine the Legislature’s intent. The 

court determined that “the Legislature intended that its new limitations on 

the maximum term of probation in amended section 1203.1 should be applied 

to existing, nonfinal plea agreements while otherwise maintaining the 

remainder of the bargain.” (Id. at p. 979.) The court therefore concluded that 

the proper remedy was to modify the judgment to reflect the new

probationary term of two years. (Ibid.)

Here, unlike in Stamps and Prudholme, there is no question as to the 

retroactivity of Senate Bill 483. By its terms, the bill applies exclusively to 

sentence enhancements imposed before January 1, 2020 (§ 1172.75, subd. 

(a)), and the Legislature specified in its statement of intent “that in order to 

ensure equal justice and address systemic racial bias in sentencing, it is the 

intent of the Legislature to retroactively apply Senate Bill 180 of the 2017–18 

Regular Session and Senate Bill 136 of the 2019–20 Regular Session to all 
13

persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for these 

repealed sentence enhancements” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1). 

As in Stamps and Prudholme, however, the application of section 

1172.75 to plea bargain cases creates a statutory ambiguity when considered 

in conjunction with section 1192.5, and the parties disagree as to the

Legislature’s intent in passing Senate Bill 483.3 Carter argues that the 

Legislature intended to allow all eligible defendants to be resentenced under 

section 1172.75 regardless of whether their previous sentence resulted from a 

plea agreement. The People contend that the Legislature did not intend for 

the full-resentencing provisions of section 1172.75 to apply to stipulated 

sentences. They argue that although the Legislature expressed its intention

for trial courts to strike invalid prison-prior enhancements from stipulated 

sentences resulting from plea agreements, it expressed no such intention to 

alter the remainder of the plea agreements. Alternatively, the People argue 

that if Carter is entitled to full resentencing, and the trial court reduces the 

sentence beyond just striking the prison prior, they are entitled to withdraw 

their assent to the plea agreement and presumably reinstate the original 

charges against Carter. 

The First District Court of Appeal, Division One recently addressed 

this issue. (People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562 (Coddington).) 

In Coddington, the defendant contended that section 1172.75 entitled him to 

full resentencing to seek further reductions of his sentence, which was 

imposed pursuant to a plea agreement, beyond just striking the one-year 

3 The parties rely on Senate Bill 483’s legislative history but neither has

requested judicial notice of any legislative materials. On our own motion, we 

take judicial notice of the legislative history materials cited in this opinion 

under Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (c) and 459. (See Gananian v. 

Wagstaffe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1541, fn. 9.)
14

prison-prior enhancement. (Id. at p. 567.) The appellate court agreed with 

the defendant on this point, concluding that he was permitted to seek further 

sentencing relief on remand “since the statute requires . . . the trial court to 

apply ‘ “any other changes in law that reduce sentences.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 568, 

quoting Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.)

However, the court relied on Stamps to further conclude that although 

Coddington must be provided the opportunity to seek a full resentencing 

under section 1172.75, he would do so with the understanding “that if the 

court on remand indicates it is inclined to further reduce Coddington’s 

sentence, the prosecution may withdraw its assent to the plea agreement.” 

(Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 565.) The Coddington court 

determined that “[a]lthough the Legislature clearly intended that the 

striking of a sentencing enhancement for a prior prison term would not 

provide a basis for rescinding a plea agreement, this intent cannot be 

understood to govern other possible sentence reductions merely because they 

happen to occur during the same resentencing.” (Ibid.) The court reviewed

the legislative history and concluded that certain legislative “statements 

indicate a clear intent to ‘overturn long-standing law that a court cannot 

unilaterally modify an agreed-upon term.’ ” (Id. at p. 572, quoting Stamps, 

supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 701.) According to the Coddington court, however, 

those legislative statements “were limited to the context of prison priors.” 

(Ibid.)

We agree with the Coddington court that a defendant eligible for 

removal of a prison prior under section 1172.75 must be provided an 

opportunity for full resentencing to argue for further relief under any other 

ameliorative changes in law that reduce sentences, regardless of whether 

their sentence resulted from a plea agreement. (Coddington, supra, 96 
15

Cal.App.5th at p. 568; Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 402; § 1172.75, 

subd. (d)(2).) Where we part ways with Coddington, however, is on the 

question of whether the prosecution is then entitled to withdraw from the 

parties’ plea agreement should the trial court choose to exercise its discretion 

in further reducing the defendant’s sentence beyond merely striking the oneyear prison-prior enhancement. We conclude that the answer is no.

The Coddington court observed, as we have, that when the Legislature 

enacted Senate Bill 483, “it specifically declared in an uncodified section that 

it was ‘the intent of the Legislature that any changes to a sentence as a result 

of the act that added this section shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court 

to rescind a plea agreement.’ ” (Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 570, 

quoting Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1; see also Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 

pp. 702–704 [entering a plea agreement does not insulate the parties from a 

law the legislature expressly intends to apply to them].) The court then 

stated: “The trial court here followed Senate Bill No. 483’s clear directive in 

striking the prison prior but otherwise leaving intact the plea agreement.” 

(Coddington, at p. 570.) 

But the court did not explain where it found this “clear directive,” and 

we do not see it. The statement of legislative intent in Senate Bill 483 does 

not differentiate between a sentence reduced by removal of the prison-prior 

enhancement and a sentence reduced due to other resentencing decisions 

made by the trial court. Instead, it broadly refers to “any changes” to the 

sentence resulting under the new law and then states that those changes do 

not give the prosecution a right to withdraw from a plea agreement. (Stats. 

2021, ch. 728, § 1.) Nor does the statutory language or legislative history 

make such a distinction. In fact, the statute does not even allow a court to 

merely strike a legally invalid prison-prior enhancement. Instead, section
16

1172.75 is structured solely as a resentencing law—the only relief it

authorizes is for the court to “recall the sentence and resentence the 

defendant” under current sentencing laws if the judgment includes a nowinvalid prison-prior enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) We will not infer an 

intent not expressed in the Legislature’s language. (See Cornette v. 

Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 73–74 [“A court may not 

rewrite a statute, either by inserting or omitting language, to make it 

conform to a presumed intent that is not expressed.”].)

In our view, the Legislature’s clear directive is that any reduction of the 

defendant’s sentence on resentencing shall not be a basis for the prosecutor 

or the court to withdraw from a plea agreement. The Legislature expressly 

stated that “any changes to a sentence as a result of the act that added this 

section shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea 

agreement.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1, italics added.) The all-inclusive phrase 

“any changes to a sentence as a result of the act” (ibid.) can only be 

understood to include changes resulting from the law’s resentencing 

provision, which provides for full resentencing and states that it “shall result 

in a lesser sentence” unless it would endanger public safety and “shall not 

result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75, 

subd. (d)(1).) 

The language at issue here is closer to that in Harris, which expressly 

mentioned plea agreements, than to the provision and legislative history 

materials in Stamps or Prudholme, which did not. The Supreme Court 

concluded in Harris that “[b]y expressly mentioning convictions by plea, 

Proposition 47 contemplated relief to all eligible defendants.” (Harris, supra, 

1 Cal.5th at pp. 991–993.) The same is true here. The statement of intent in 

the “plus section” of Senate Bill 483, which expressed the Legislature’s view 
17

on the effect of the bill (see Allen, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 858, fn. 13),

expressly mentions plea agreements and prohibits both the court and the 

prosecution from rescinding the plea agreement based on any change to the 

sentence resulting from the law. And as in Harris, the “resentencing process” 

established by section 1172.75 “would often prove meaningless if the 

prosecution could respond to a successful resentencing petition by 

withdrawing from an underlying plea agreement and reinstating the original 

charges filed against the petitioner.” (Harris, at p. 992.)

Additional legislative history materials are consistent with our 

interpretation of the Legislature’s intent here. The Assembly Committee on 

Public Safety’s analysis of Senate Bill 483 emphasized the bill author’s 

statement “that long prison and jail sentences have no positive impact on 

public safety, but are demonstrably injurious to families and communities—

particularly Black, Latino, and Native Americans in the United States and in 

California.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021–

2022 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 2021, p. 3.)4 It also included a section titled “Effect 

on Guilty Pleas,” which expressly stated that the “legislative intent [is] that 

its provision for retroactive application and resentencing applies to guilty plea 

cases. This would include those in which there may have been a negotiated 

disposition.” (Id. at p. 4, italics added.) The report went on to quote the 

Supreme Court’s holding in Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 66, 71, 73

that “plea agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the 

4 The Senate Committee on Public Safety’s report further explained that 

those released after incarceration “face significant barriers to finding jobs 

and housing. Family members of incarcerated people struggle with crushing 

debt from court costs, visitation and telephone fees, and diminished income. 

The longer the sentence, the more severe these problems tend to be, and the 

tougher it is for societal reintegration.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on 

Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 27, 2021, p. 3, italics added.)
18

state to amend the law”; the fact that “parties enter into a plea agreement 

thus does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that 

the Legislature has intended to apply to them”; and it therefore follows “that 

requiring the parties’ compliance with changes in the law made retroactive to 

them does not violate the terms of the plea agreement.” (Assem. Com. on 

Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 2021, 

p. 4.) The Committee’s report also confirmed the “Legislative intent that any 

changes to a sentence as a result of these provisions is not a basis for a 

prosecutor or a court to rescind a plea agreement.” (Id. at p. 2.) Like the 

uncodified statement, this language did not distinguish between the removal 

of prison priors and other potential sentence reductions. 

Several other legislative committee reports on Senate Bill 483 also

noted the Legislature’s intent to prohibit rescission of a plea agreement based 

on any change in sentence resulting from the law. (See Senate Third Reading 

on Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 1, 2021, p. 2 

[the bill “[s]tates Legislative intent that any changes to a sentence as a result 

of these provisions is not a basis for a prosecutor or a court to rescind a plea 

agreement.”]; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Rep. on Sen. Bill 

No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 1, 2021, p. 4 [same].) 

The Coddington court did not mention these committee reports, but it 

cited to the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for Senate Bill 483 as stating “that 

the legislation would declare prison priors ‘to be legally invalid’ and would 

state the intent of the Legislature to prohibit the rescission of a plea 

agreement based on eliminating them.” (Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th 

at pp. 571–572, italics added.) But the actual language of the Legislative 

Counsel’s Digest is broader than what Coddington suggested. Consistent 

with the bill’s uncodified statement of intent and the legislative committee 
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reports, it explained: “The bill would state the intent of the Legislature to 

prohibit a prosecutor or court from rescinding a plea agreement based on a 

change in sentence as a result of this measure.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. 

Bill 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2021, ch. 728.) The Legislative 

Counsel’s Digest also specifically mentioned the bill’s resentencing provisions 

and its requirement “that the resentencing result in a lesser sentence, unless 

the court finds that a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” (Ibid.) 

We therefore conclude that the legislative history of Senate Bill 483 supports 

our view of a broader legislative intent.5

We disagree with Coddington that this result is equivalent to finding 

that the provisions of section 1172.75 “overrule Stamps as to the resentencing 

of all enhancements of all defendants who accepted a prison prior under a 

plea deal.” (Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 571.) This is not a 

matter of “overruling” Stamps. Stamps involved a different statute, with 

different statutory language and legislative history. As Stamps itself made 

clear, the question of how an ameliorative statute applies to plea-bargained 

sentences is one of legislative intent. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 701–

5 The People also argue that the deletion of language from a prior version 

of Senate Bill 483 declaring the affected enhancements to be legally invalid 

“regardless of whether the sentence was imposed after trial or open or 

negotiated plea” demonstrates the Legislature rejected such a provision. 

(Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), as amended July 7, 2021 and 

July 15, 2021.) The deletion of this language does not support the People’s 

position for two reasons. First, the final version of the bill still includes 

language explicitly referencing plea agreements. The Legislature may have 

simply found this additional language to be unnecessary because the rest of 

the bill already made clear that the statute applies to guilty pleas. Second, 

the People concede that Carter’s prison prior enhancement is legally invalid 

under section 1172.75 even though (1) it was imposed after a guilty plea, and 

(2) the statute as enacted did not include the deleted language. Thus, the 

People’s reliance on the prior version of Senate Bill 483 does not assist them.
20

702.) Stamps had nothing to say about the legislative intent behind section 

1172.75.

The People also argue that even assuming the Legislature intended to 

apply the full-resentencing provisions of section 1172.75 to stipulated 

sentences, effectuating that intent violates the federal and state contracts 

clauses. We conclude that the People do not have standing to assert such a 

violation.

The United States and California Constitutions’ contracts clauses

“prohibit states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts.”

(People v. Gipson (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1068, citing U.S. Const., 

art. I, § 10, cl. 1 & Cal. Const., art. I, § 9 [rejecting defendant’s contracts 

clause challenge to plea agreement].) However, these prohibitions “do not 

prevent the legislature from changing the contractual rights of its political 

subdivisions acting in a governmental capacity,” because “there can be no 

impairment of contracts upon a voluntary relinquishment by the state of any 

contractual rights it may have acquired.” (County of Alameda v. Janssen

(1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 284 (Janssen).) It is thus a “well-established rule that 

subordinate political entities, as ‘creatures’ of the state, may not challenge 

state action as violating the entities’ rights” under the contracts clause. 

(Star-Kist Foods v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1, 6 (Star-Kist 

Foods); see also Cox Cable San Diego, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1987) 188 

Cal.App.3d 952, 966–967 (Cox Cable) [because city was political subdivision 

of the State and acting in its governmental capacity, it had no standing to 

claim contract impairment “in opposition to acts of the State Legislature”].)

This well-established rule applies here. A county district attorney acts 

as an agent of the State of California when prosecuting crimes. (People v. 

The North River Ins. Co. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 797, 806; see also § 684 [“A 
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criminal action is prosecuted in the name of the people of the State of 

California, as a party . . . .”].) Thus, a plea bargain such as the one between 

Carter and the People is essentially a contract entered into by the district 

attorney on behalf of the state. (See People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 

1355, 1360 [“like the parties to a private contract, the state and the 

defendant are bound by the [plea] agreement as between themselves”].) It 

follows that when the People enter into a contract on behalf of the state, they 

cannot later assert that the state has unconstitutionally passed a law 

impairing that contract. (See Janssen, supra, 16 Cal.2d at p. 284.) As a 

representative of the state acting in its governmental capacity, the district 

attorney therefore “has no standing to raise the defense of impairment of 

contract[.]” (Cox Cable, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 967; see also Star-Kist 

Foods, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 6.)

In sum, we determine that, in enacting Senate Bill 483, the Legislature 

intended that the full resentencing procedure in section 1172.75 should be 

applied to all sentences, including stipulated sentences imposed as part of a 

plea bargain, and that the prosecution may not withdraw from the plea 

bargain if the court imposes a lower sentence on resentencing. The trial 

court therefore erred in refusing to resentence Carter beyond striking his 

one-year prison prior.
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DISPOSITION

The order is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

DO, J.