S. Hrg. 109–382

CHEMICAL FACILITY SECURITY: WHAT IS THE

APPROPRIATE FEDERAL ROLE?

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 13 AND 27, 2005

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(

CHEMICAL FACILITY SECURITY: WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE FEDERAL ROLE?

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WASHINGTON : 

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23–157 PDF 2006

S. Hrg. 109–382

CHEMICAL FACILITY SECURITY: WHAT IS THE

APPROPRIATE FEDERAL ROLE?

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 13 AND 27, 2005

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ALLISON J. BOYD, Counsel 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

HOLLY A. IDELSON, Minority Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1, 49

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 3, 50

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 4, 59

Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................................... 6, 52

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 7, 62

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 2005

Martin J. Durbin, Managing Director, Security and Operations, American 

Chemistry Council ................................................................................................ 8

Matthew Barmasse, Environmental, Health, Safety, and Quality Director, 

ISOCHEM, Inc., on behalf of the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association ...................................................................................................... 12

Bob Slaughter, President, National Petrochemical and Refiners Association .... 15

Gerald V. Poje, Ph.D., Former Board Member, U.S. Chemical Safety and 

Hazard Investigation Board ................................................................................ 29

Glenn Erwin, Project Director, Triangle of Prevention Program, United Steelworkers International Union ............................................................................... 33

Carol L. Andress, Economic Development Specialist, Environmental Defense .. 36

WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 2005

Rear Admiral Craig E. Bone, Director of Port Security, Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection Directorate, U.S. Coast Guard ................ 53

Beth Turner, Director, Global Operations Security, E.I. duPont de Nemours 

and Co., Inc., Wilmington, Delaware .................................................................. 64

Jim Schellhorn, Director of Environmental Health and Safety, Terra Industries, Inc., on behalf of the Fertilizer Institute .................................................. 67

John P. Chamberlain, Security Manager, Asset Protection Services, Corporate 

Security, Shell Oil Company, on behalf of the Shell Oil Company and 

the American Petroleum Institute ...................................................................... 70

Chief Robert A. Full, Fire Marshal/Emergency Management Coordinator, Allegheny County (PA) Department of Emergency Services ................................ 74

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Andress, Carol L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 36

Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................... 209

Barmasse, Matthew: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 102

Bone, Rear Admiral Craig E.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 53

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 233

Chamberlain, John P.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 70

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 264

Durbin, Martin J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 91

Page

IV

Erwin, Glenn: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 33

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 144

Full, Chief Robert A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 74

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 272

Poje, Gerald V., Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 29

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 130

Schellhorn, Jim: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 67

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 253

Slaughter, Bob: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 15

Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................... 119

Turner, Beth: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 64

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 238

APPENDIX 

Survey entitled ‘‘PACE International Union Survey: Workplace Incident Prevention and Response Since 9/11’’, October 2004, by Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union (PACE), submitted by Mr. Erwin ............................................................................................ 150

‘‘Security Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries, Second Edition,’’ October 2004, American Petroleum 

Institute, NPRA, submitted by Mr. Chamberlain ............................................. 277

‘‘Security Guidelines for the Petroleum Industry,’’ American Petroleum Institute, April 2005, submitted by Mr. Chamberlain .............................................. 428

Paul Orum, Working Group on Community Right-to-Know, July 2004, report 

entitled ‘‘Unnecessary Dangers: Emergency Chemical Release Hazards at 

Power Plants,’’ submitted for the record ............................................................ 482

Jon P. DeVine, Jr., Senior Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, 

prepared statement, with an attachment entitled ‘‘Critical Infrastructure 

Security Series, New Strategies to Protect America: Securing our Nation’s 

Chemical Facilities,’’ by Dr. Linda Greer ........................................................... 522

Meghan Purvis, Environmental Health Advocate, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, prepared statement with attachments entitled ‘‘Needless 

Risk, Oil Refineries and Hazard Reduction,’’ August 2005, U.S. PIRG Education Fund, and ‘‘Survey of Chemical Industry Hazard Reduction to Protect Public Safety, 2002 Survey Summary’’ ....................................................... 549

The National Association of Chemical Distributors, prepared statement .......... 587

Agricultural Retailers Association, submitted by Richard Gupton, ARA Director of Legislative Policy and Counsel, prepared statement with attachments 

entitled ‘‘Guidelines to Help Ensure a Secure Agribusiness,’’ and ‘‘Agricultural Retailers Association: Security Vulnerability Assessment Workshop’’ .. 595

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CHEMICAL FACILITY SECURITY: WHAT IS THE 

APPROPRIATE FEDERAL ROLE? 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 2005

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room 

562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Lieberman, Voinovich, Lautenberg, 

and Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. Good 

morning. 

Today marks the third in this Committee’s series of hearings on 

the issue of chemical security. At our first hearing, we heard from 

experts about the potentially catastrophic impact of a successful 

terrorist attack on a chemical facility and about how vulnerable 

many chemical sites are. 

At the second hearing, the Department of Homeland Security 

and the Environmental Protection Agency testified that current 

laws are not sufficient, and the Administration pledged to work 

with this Committee in developing appropriate legislation. 

At today’s hearing, we will hear from a variety of witnesses who 

have a longstanding interest in the safety and security of chemical 

sites. 

Let me take just a moment to describe the chemical industry. By 

economics alone, it is impressive. The total value of chemical shipments in the United States approaches half-a-trillion dollars annually. The chemical industry represents our largest export sector, 

with exports totaling $91.4 billion in 2003. More than 900,000 people work directly in the American chemical industry, with an additional 700,000 supplier jobs and millions more in indirect jobs. 

Perhaps even more significant than the economic impact is the 

impact of chemicals on our daily lives. Chemicals are necessary for 

more than 70,000 products that help make life in our country what 

it is today and that have helped us to achieve the greatest standard of living the world has ever seen. 

How many people have enough food to eat because fertilizers and 

other agricultural chemicals have helped to make America the 

breadbasket of the world? How many Americans would die of cholera and other diseases if we did not have chemicals to treat our 

2

water supply? How many children’s lives are saved each year by 

the chemical compounds that make up prescription medicines? 

Where would we be without computers and other consumer electronics, which are not possible without chemicals? 

It is an unfortunate fact of life that many things in this world 

that have the greatest capacity for good also have the greatest capacity to cause harm. Chemicals fall in that category. While of immense benefit to society, chemicals can also cause tremendous 

damage. 

Since the first large-scale use of chemical weapons in World War 

I, chemicals have been the most used weapon of mass destruction 

by both governments and terrorists. As we learned in chilling detail 

in this Committee’s first hearing, even necessary and legitimate 

chemicals have an immense capacity to cause death and destruction. 

It is a further fact of life that we often fail to appreciate the significance of a threat until a catastrophe occurs. For example, many 

of our most important chemical safety measures were not established until after the tragic deaths of thousands following a chemical accident in Bhopal, India. The Chemical Safety Board, as well 

as the EPA’s Risk Management Plan program, were both established in response to Bhopal. 

Many companies have recognized the need for stronger security 

and have already taken strong steps to improve security at their 

chemical sites. Many in the industry have subscribed to well-regarded voluntary programs such as the Responsible Care® program. I applaud these efforts and strongly encourage the continuation of voluntary actions to improve security. 

Unfortunately, as the Department of Homeland Security testified 

at our earlier hearing, not all companies abide by such codes of 

conduct. I look forward to hearing from our first panel of industry 

representatives today about their views on the need for mandatory 

measures to complement the voluntary efforts. 

Our second panel consists of representatives from environmental, 

labor, and public advocacy groups. Environmental groups and other 

public advocates have long sought to increase public recognition of 

the risks inherent in operating large chemical facilities, particularly near large population centers. Similarly, labor representatives 

have long pushed for greater worker safety at chemical plants. 

Given that the chemical industry presents both tremendous benefits as well as immense risks, it is critical that any legislation 

strike a carefully thought out balance. Terrorists seek to use our 

infrastructure and assets to cause maximum disruption to our society and harm to our economy. In our search for a solution to the 

threats that we face, we must be careful not to accomplish the terrorists’ objectives for them by harming our economy. 

I look forward to hearing from industry, labor, and environmental groups in today’s hearing. Their different views and perspectives will be most helpful to this Committee as we continue our 

work on this critical issue. 

Senator Lieberman. 

3

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Chairman Collins. As 

you have noted, this is the third in a series of hearings that our 

Committee has held on chemical site security. Since there are not 

many subjects that get three hearings before the Committee in 3 

months, it should be very clear that the Chairman and I and the 

Members of the Committee consider chemical security to be a particularly urgent challenge for our Nation and for this Committee. 

This hearing, as we all know, comes just 1 week after terrorists 

in London demonstrated yet again their intention and capacity to 

attack and kill innocent civilians, to find and exploit weaknesses in 

our homeland defenses. And even though the most recent incident 

was an attack on a mass transit system, it was a very loud and 

painful warning that we need to continue to be alert, to be vigilant, 

to identify and close vulnerabilities in our own country. 

By any measure, the chemical industry today is one of the sectors in American life that is most vulnerable to terrorist attack. At 

our first hearing, we heard compelling testimony about the potential risk posed by chemical sites across the Nation. We were told 

that chemical facilities represent potential weapons of mass destruction. If released through accident or terrorist attack, the 

chemicals stored or manufactured in these plants could kill thousands of people in surrounding communities. 

At our second hearing, the Department of Homeland Security 

agreed that chemical facilities posed a serious risk from terrorist 

attack. While describing some significant initiatives taken by the 

chemical industry itself, the Department conceded that these voluntary measures are not enough. Rather, the Department said we 

need new legislation to ensure that all facilities that use or store 

significant amounts of hazardous chemicals, and therefore pose a 

terrorism risk, are subject to minimum security standards. I agree. 

Today, we will hear from representatives of the chemical industry and other stakeholders, that is, those who work at chemical 

sites and also environmental and safety advocates who work on 

issues relating to the operation of chemical facilities. These witnesses really can help us on this Committee answer some of the 

most difficult questions that we will need to answer as we attempt 

to draft responsive and sensible legislation. 

For example, one of our witnesses today, the American Chemistry Council, developed a security code for its members after September 11. I would like to learn more about what this code requires, what are its strengths and weaknesses, and how it might 

inform any Federal mandates, statutory mandates, for chemical facilities. 

Another important question that I have relates to local preparedness and response. While some chemical facilities have clearly tried 

to improve security on their premises themselves, they also rely on 

local officials to secure the area outside their gates and respond in 

the event of an accident or an attack. Based on testimony at our 

earlier hearings and on interviews by our Committee staff, I am 

concerned that State and local officials will need more resources 

than they now have to carry out those responsibilities, and I hope 

today we can get some clarity about what is the best division of 

labor between the chemical industry and public authorities and 

4

what needs to be done by whom to ensure effective security and response capability. 

Third, I am also concerned that there may be many citizens who 

live near chemical facilities who haven’t been adequately prepared 

and informed about what to do if there is an accident or an attack 

at a chemical facility, and so I hope our witnesses can help us to 

decide how we can improve public readiness here. 

And finally, and perhaps most difficult, we have to resolve critical questions about how to define and regulate the word ‘‘security.’’ 

Some have argued that any legislation should be limited to physical security measures, such as gates, surveillance cameras, and access controls. Others say that these types of measures will never 

stop a determined terrorist and that we must instead figure out 

how to reduce potential damage from these sites. Some have said 

that this will and should require that the chemical industry look 

into alternative substances or technologies to reduce the amount of 

harmful chemicals it employs or configure them in ways that minimize the risk of hazardous release. 

I know that there is great disagreement about whether these 

issues, all of them, should be addressed in chemical security legislation, but there should be no disagreement, and I don’t believe 

there is, about the need to make our chemical industry and processes as safe as possible, indeed, safer than they are today, and the 

question is how to best get there. 

A final word, Madam Chairman. Although the Administration is 

not testifying today, I am sure that they are listening, and so I 

want to reiterate my request made at our last hearing that the Administration and the relevant departments take a real leadership 

role in crafting chemical security legislation. I know you and I are 

prepared and eager to work with them. We need the benefit of the 

Administration’s work on this issue and its recommendations on 

legislation it believes is needed, and we need that as soon as possible. Thank you very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding 

this series of hearings on chemical facility security. I compliment 

your diligence in examining the issue. I look forward to a bipartisan legislative effort to ensure that our Nation’s chemical sector 

is secure from the threat of terrorist attack. 

The chemical industry is a critical component of our Nation’s infrastructure. It is massive, impacting every facet of our daily life. 

The scope and complexity of the chemical industry warrants careful 

consideration of any new security initiatives. 

During the first hearing of this Committee on April 27, we heard 

alarming statistics that warned of a devastating loss of life in the 

event of a terrorist attack against a major chemical facility. Senator Lieberman, in your opening remarks, you made reference to 

the threat that is there. 

In the hearing on June 15, we heard from the Environmental 

Protection Agency and the Department of Homeland Security regarding the safeguards that have already been implemented indusVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:59 May 18, 2006 Jkt 023157 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\23157.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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try-wide. I think we must recognize that there has been a lot of legislation addressing safety at chemical facilities. 

I recently hosted a round table discussion in Cincinnati and included local officials, law enforcement, and emergency response 

personnel. I was informed of the Community ‘‘Right-to-Know’’ laws, 

which require companies to disclose what is inside their facilities, 

assess the potential risk, and develop a response plan. So there has 

been a lot of work on the local level and by the industry that we 

should take into consideration when we pursue this legislation. 

Today, we are going to hear differing views on how the Federal 

Government should best secure the chemical industry. I look forward to learning the perspectives of each party as we begin to debate the Federal role in securing this vital sector. 

Though the risk of terrorism is serious, as last week’s horrific attacks on London’s transportation sector demonstrate, I must reiterate my belief that the Federal Government cannot protect 

against every potential threat that we can possibly conceive of in 

this country. Doing so would bankrupt the Nation. I would like to 

state publicly that one of the stated goals of the terrorists, the people who have announced that they would like to do us harm, is 

that they want to hurt our economy. We should learn the lessons 

of the Cold War. The Soviet Union bankrupted themselves trying 

to protect against whatever the United States might do to them. 

So as we address the issue of chemical facility security, I think 

as a Nation, we need to take into consideration just how we are 

going to handle this. We must be wary of throwing money at this 

issue. Further, if we require that the industry incur the cost of enhanced security, it will have a horrific impact on the economy. I 

would like to emphasize the importance of a balanced approach between self-regulation by industry and more proactive Federal action. 

Industry leaders like the American Chemistry Council and the 

National Petrochemical Association should be commended for 

building a strong foundation for chemical safety. It is my hope that 

the significant safety measures developed by industry will be incorporated into legislation and built upon. Likewise, we should carefully evaluate the laws already on the books and seek to enhance 

those relevant to chemical security. 

As we further explore the issue, I would like to iterate four 

points. First, efforts to enhance the security of our facilities should 

be sharply focused on prevention, protection, and consequence management of potential terrorist attacks. 

Second, Federal action to address chemical facility vulnerabilities 

must not be burdened with extraneous issues. 

Third, critical information must be protected from unnecessary 

public disclosure, providing it only to responsible government authorities that need to have access to such information. 

And fourth, Federal action should be based on risk and vulnerability. In other words, security considerations should be based on 

factors such as potential for adverse economic impact and serious 

loss of life. A one-size-fits-all approach will not work for chemical 

security. 

Finally, Federal legislation should adhere to a comprehensive 

cost-benefit analysis so as not to place industry at a competitive 

6

disadvantage. As my colleagues may know, the chemical industry 

is experiencing economic hardship as a result of natural gas costs. 

In fact, we have gone from a Nation that exported chemical products to a Nation that is now importing chemical products because 

of the high cost of natural gas. The industry is already under economic stress. 

I think we ought to take all these things into consideration when 

we are putting this legislation together. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for convening this hearing, yet another on chemical security. As I look at 

the witness table, I just left a Durbin and now we face another 

Durbin. Welcome. Part of the family, right? 

Mr. DURBIN. Indeed. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. But we know you are objective and we 

welcome you. [Laughter.] 

My concern about the security of chemical plants dates back to 

the late 1990s, when I introduced the first bill in Congress to deal 

with the problem. And while the industry has made substantial investments in trying to improve the safety around these plants, 

more obviously needs to be done. 

Now, 2005, we are well past the time to start acting to confront 

the terrible risks that have not diminished, but rather have increased since September 11, and I commend Chairman Collins for 

calling this hearing. 

In view of the devastating attack in London last weekend, it is 

clear that we can’t let down our guard. But as the 9/11 Commission 

cautioned, we must not focus so much on the last attack that we 

fail to continue to develop our own strategy. 

Since September 11, we have focused on the security of our aviation system. But the London attacks remind us that there are 

many other potential targets in our country, particularly chemical 

facilities. With over 15,000 chemical plants, storage facilities in the 

country, we have quite an array of facilities that under attack, 

could be devastating. More than half of these are located in areas 

where an attack could claim thousands or even millions of lives. 

In my State, New Jersey, we lost 700 of our friends, neighbors, 

and loved ones on September 11. We all hope that we can prevent 

something like that from ever happening again. But as horrible as 

the attacks on September 11 were, most of the victims were adults, 

but this wouldn’t necessarily be the case in an attack on a chemical 

plant, since an incident there could kill or injure thousands of innocent children at home or school. The Congressional Research Service has calculated that more than 8,000 schools or hospitals are 

near a chemical facility. 

Now, according to EPA, the largest zone of vulnerability to widespread death and destruction is in South Carney, New Jersey. You 

know that New Jersey has an industrial past, and we welcome the 

jobs and the industry in our State. But in this particular area, it 

is believed that an attack on this chemical facility could kill as 

7

many as 12 million people. It is a densely populated area, the New 

York-New Jersey region. 

The threat is clear and our response deserves some acceleration. 

New Jersey has some 1,600 chemical facilities within our State borders. Not a single one of these facilities is legally required to take 

any of the risk-reduction steps identified by experts at our hearing 

a few months ago. 

Ignoring the threat of a chemical plant attack won’t make it go 

away. So I urge my colleagues on this Committee, who I know are 

very committed to the issue, to try to move forward from this hearing toward a legislative remedy. I am not sure that we can legislate 

everything that we want. Senator Voinovich was correct. I mean, 

we can’t disrupt an industry that provides so much good, keep it 

from operating efficiently or at costs way beyond their capacity. 

But we do have to protect our citizens where we can, and I thank 

all the witnesses who are with us and look forward to hearing their 

views. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Madam Chairman, and to our witnesses, welcome. We are glad that you are here today. 

I was sitting here listening to Senator Lautenberg talk about all 

the chemical plants that they have in New Jersey. At one time, 

Delaware was known, among other things, as the chemical capital 

of the world, with companies like DuPont, Hercules both headquartered there with a number of facilities there, as well. I don’t 

think we ever had 1,500. You may have bragging rights there. 

We are known for a number of other things. We are also known 

as the First State, the State that started the Nation, as well as the 

Nation’s summer capital, home of tax-free shopping, Small Wonder. 

I expect we could go around the Committee here and ask for each 

of us to tell what our States are known for or famous for, and we 

could all do that. And we may not be the chemical capital of the 

world, but we have a great deal of interest in the security of the 

chemical plants that we do have. 

In Delaware, we have a bit of a reputation for being able to get 

things done, for being able to work across the aisle, for using common sense. It is one of those rare States where actually Democrats 

kind of like Republicans and vice versa. It reminds me a little bit 

of this Committee. This Committee has a reputation for getting 

things done, and with the leadership of Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman, we do work well across the aisle. I am told they 

like each other, and frankly, we like them, too. 

This is an issue whose time has come. There are other Committees that have sought to deal with this without a great deal of success. The ball has been punted, if you will, in our direction, and 

we are on the receiving end, and I am pleased to see that we are 

going to receive that ball and take the kickoff and run with it, and 

I look forward to providing some of that upfield blocking and 

maybe a lateral from time to time, and let us see if we can’t get 

this ball in the end zone and provide, whether it happens to be the 

chemical capital of the world in Delaware or our neighbors to the 

East, a little greater security not only for the folks who are really 

8

1The prepared statement of Mr. Durbin appears in the Appendix on page 91. 

living around those plants, but also those who are working there, 

too. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. 

Our first panel of witnesses represents some of the largest chemical industry associations. Our first witness will be Martin Durbin, 

the Managing Director of Security and Operations and the Senior 

Director for Federal Relations at the American Chemistry Council. 

ACC member companies are responsible for approximately 90 percent of basic industrial chemical production in the United States. 

We welcome you, Mr. Durbin. 

I would also like to welcome Matthew Barmasse, Director of Environmental, Health, Safety, and Quality at ISOCHEM, Incorporated. Today, however, he is here representing the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association. He has more than 25 

years of experience in the chemical industry and will provide this 

Committee with the perspective of how a smaller company like 

ISOCHEM has improved security. 

Last, I would like to welcome Bob Slaughter, the President of the 

National Petrochemical and Refiners Association. The NPRA has 

more than 450 member companies, including virtually all the refiners and petrochemical manufacturers in the United States. So we 

welcome you, as well. 

Mr. Durbin, we are going to begin with you. 

TESTIMONY OF MARTIN J. DURBIN,1 MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

SECURITY AND OPERATIONS, AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL 

Mr. DURBIN. Madam Chairman, Senators, good morning. My 

name is Marty Durbin, and as the Managing Director for Security 

and Operations at the American Chemistry Council, I appreciate 

the opportunity to provide testimony on behalf of ACC. 

Allow me to directly address the question posed by this hearing: 

‘‘What is the appropriate Federal role for chemical facility security?’’ On behalf of ACC, I am here this morning to repeat and continue the call we have made for more than 21⁄2 years, and that is 

the need for legislation to set mandatory national standards for security at chemical facilities and provide the necessary regulatory 

authority to the Department of Homeland Security to ensure this 

critical part of our national infrastructure is protected. 

ACC represents more than 130 of the leading companies in the 

U.S. chemical manufacturing sector, and as noted, we are responsible for nearly 90 percent of basic industrial chemical production 

and are an essential part of our Nation’s critical infrastructure. As 

many of you have noted, the products of chemistry are critical in 

many aspects of our lives, from cleaning our drinking water to supporting agriculture and spurring medical innovations to prevent 

and treat disease. 

In my brief remarks, I would like to highlight the following. 

First, the leadership role that ACC members have taken to further 

ensure the safety and security of their products, their facilities, the 

supply chain, and the communities in which they operate, an inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:59 May 18, 2006 Jkt 023157 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\23157.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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vestment to date of more than $2 billion in security since September 11. 

Second, the great strides we believe have been made by the Federal Government and our industry, cooperatively, to secure the 

chemical sector. 

Third, the real need for Federal legislation to provide nationwide 

assurances that all portions of the industry take the same aggressive actions that ACC members and others are taking. 

And finally, our views on the important and often misunderstood 

subject of inherent safety. 

Security isn’t new to our members, but the tragedies of September 11, 2001, brought swift and decisive action from the industry leaders of our association. Without waiting for government direction, ACC quickly issued site and transportation security guidelines in October and November of that year, after which ACC’s 

Board of Directors launched an aggressive effort to develop a new, 

Responsible Care® Security Code. Implementation of Responsible 

Care®, which is ACC’s signature program of continuous improvement in environmental, health, safety, and now security performance, is mandatory for our members. 

The Responsible Care® Security Code and ACC member security 

enhancements have been widely and uniformly acknowledged by 

government and security experts. State and local governments 

have used the code as a model for their own regulation of chemical 

facility security, and the U.S. Coast Guard, which regulates security for nearly 240 chemical facilities under the Maritime Transportation Security Act, recognized our Security Code as an alternative 

security program for ACC members. 

The Security Code itself required each of our member companies 

to take the following four steps broadly. First, they had to prioritize 

every facility by risk. 

Second, they had to assess the vulnerabilities using methodologies that were developed by Sandia National Laboratories and the 

Center for Chemical Process Safety, which is a program of the 

American Institute of Chemical Engineers. 

Third, they then had to implement security enhancements commensurate with the risks that were identified by those assessments 

and taking into account inherently safer approaches, engineering, 

and administrative controls and other security prevention and mitigation measures. 

And finally, they had to verify the implementation of those physical security measures using third parties that are credible in the 

local community, such as first responders and law enforcement officials. All ACC member company facilities have completed their vulnerability assessments, implemented security enhancements, and 

to date nearly all have had those enhancements verified. 

The ACC Security Code also covers transportation and cyber security. It allows our members to extend the reach of the code 

throughout the physical and virtual value chain. Separate guidance 

documents were developed to assist members in implementing the 

code with those companies who transport our products, including 

rail, truck, and barge. 

Specific to cyber, our members lead an industry-wide cyber security program that has developed guidance documents and a broad 

10

practices standards and technology initiative. We believe our members provide a model to other industries with similar automated 

systems. Some of our members’ cutting edge facilities, in fact, have 

hosted visits by staff from DHS and this Committee, and we have 

received very positive reports. 

All of the guidance materials I have mentioned addressing site, 

transportation, and cyber security, as well as the code itself, are 

publicly available through our website so they can have the broadest possible effect beyond our membership. 

Now, turning to our partnership with the Federal Government, 

the Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 7 specifically names DHS as the lead or sector-specific agency for the chemical sector. To achieve the infrastructure protection objectives of 

that directive, ACC and its members have worked in close partnership with DHS over the past years, facilitated site visits to our 

member facilities, and participated in their Buffer Zone Protection 

Program that provides support and resources to local governments. 

We created, fund, and maintain the Chemical Sector Information 

Sharing and Analysis Center, a two-way 24/7 communications tool 

between DHS and the chemical sector, which we operate as a public service through our CHEMTREC program in cooperation with 

DHS. 

We participate regularly in exercises and drills at all levels, from 

facility-based emergency preparedness and response drills to the 

recent national level TopOff 3 exercises. 

We also facilitated development of the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council, a group of 16 leading trade associations that coordinates communication between DHS and our sector for purposes of 

infrastructure protection. In fact, all three organizations represented on this panel are members of that Council. 

Along with others in the sector, we are working with DHS to develop tools and methods to help intelligently allocate protective resources on a risk basis. That is not to say everything is working 

perfectly in our relationship with DHS, but we are all learning together, and we have made great strides to improve the partnership 

between our sector and the agency, and we have established a constructive relationship that will allow for even better things as we 

move forward. 

So why is Federal legislation necessary? Despite all the progress 

that has been made to date, there is no way to assure that all 

chemical facilities that need to be protected are taking the same 

kinds of aggressive steps that ACC members have taken to protect 

this critical sector. No doubt, many non-ACC members have also 

taken appropriate steps, and they should be commended. But as 

highlighted by DHS Assistant Secretary Stephan at last month’s 

hearing, there are high-risk facilities that have not. 

ACC has led the effort to ensure that all chemical facilities are 

secured against the threat of terrorism. We have worked continuously with Congress and the Administration for enactment of national security legislation that will first establish national standards for security of chemical facilities. We agree with DHS that 

those standards should be risk-based, reasonable, clear, and equitable, and that they be performance-oriented in a way that will 

provide flexibility to facilities. 

11

Second, require those identified facilities to conduct vulnerability 

assessments and implement security plans. 

Third, provide oversight, inspection, and enforcement authority 

to DHS. 

Fourth, protect sensitive security information. 

And finally, recognize responsible voluntary efforts. Naturally, 

we believe that any Federal legislation should enable DHS to give 

credit to ACC members for their substantial actions and investments to implement the Responsible Care® Security Code. As witnesses at your April hearing concurred, ACC members deserve a 

level playing field and a common set of expectations. But let me be 

clear. We are not asking for an exemption from the law, only that 

DHS be allowed to recognize our members’ significant actions just 

as the Coast Guard has already done. 

Without Federal action on this vital topic, State legislatures will 

fill the void. Both Maryland and New York have already enacted 

chemical facility security laws. And while ACC was able to support 

both of those statutes, we strongly believe that a national program, 

not an incomplete patchwork of potentially conflicting State efforts, 

is necessary. 

Finally, Madam Chairman and Senators, in the debate over 

chemical security, no issue has proven more controversial than the 

role of inherent safety. Because of ACC members’ deep investment 

in this issue, I want to spend the balance of my time explaining 

our views and why we feel so strongly about them. 

In a nutshell, inherent safety means designing a process to minimize hazards in the first place rather than managing and controlling them with protective equipment or procedures. This concept 

was invented by the chemical engineering profession and our industry has long embraced it. Under the Responsible Care® initiative, inherent safety is a key element in the design and modification of facilities and job tasks. Our members continually conduct 

process hazard analyses of our facilities, and those analyses can 

lead us to change processes, modify procedures, or substitute materials to reduce and manage risks. And, as I noted earlier, the Responsible Care® Security Code mandates that our members take 

inherently safer approaches into account in assessing possible security measures. 

I cannot overemphasize, however, that inherently safer chemical 

processing requires considering all the risks potentially associated 

with a process. Inherent safety typically involves making very challenging judgments to ensure that risks are not unwittingly shifted 

or substituted and that overall risks are reduced. 

Many inherently safer approaches involve trading one risk 

against the potential of another. 

For example, advocates of inherent safety frequently speak of reducing onsite inventories or reducing or eliminating storage of hazardous materials. While that may be appropriate, reducing inventories at a facility may also increase the number of truck shipments through a neighborhood. Similarly, replacing a low-temperature, low-pressure process that uses a toxic chemical with a process 

that uses a less-toxic chemical but operates at a higher temperature and pressure may increase the potential hazard to workers. 

12

1The prepared statement of Mr. Barmasse appears in the Appendix on page 102. 

The challenge of trying to oversee inherent safety decisions is 

compounded by the complexity of chemical industry processes. 

Chemical companies make tens of thousands of products, and there 

are no standard processes for making them. To expect effective regulatory oversight in this area is unrealistic, at least without great 

difficulty, expense, and delay. In fact, in the Clean Air Act Risk 

Management Program rulemaking, EPA concluded that requiring 

and reviewing multiple process options at each regulated plant 

would not lead to greater advances in process safety. 

Members and witnesses at April’s hearing agreed on the importance of this legislation, and in Senator Voinovich’s words at the 

time, any legislation must be sharply focused on security and not 

burdened with extraneous issues. We firmly believe that judgments 

about inherent safety are fundamentally process safety decisions 

that must ultimately be left to the process safety professionals. So 

mandating IST, we believe, should not be part of any security-focused legislation. 

In closing, I just want to say that it has been nearly 4 years 

since September 11, and now is the time to act. So we welcome this 

hearing, and we are committed to continuing to work with this 

Committee and others to see that legislation is enacted in this session of Congress. 

Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much. Mr. Barmasse. 

TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW BARMASSE,1 ENVIRONMENTAL, 

HEALTH, SAFETY, AND QUALITY DIRECTOR, ISOCHEM, INC., 

ON BEHALF OF THE SYNTHETIC ORGANIC CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION 

Mr. BARMASSE. Madam Chairman, Members of the Committee, 

my name is Matt Barmasse. I am the Director of Environmental, 

Health, Safety, and Quality for ISOCHEM, which is a small chemical manufacturer located in Western New York. My company 

mainly produces phosgene and phosgene derivatives, serving very 

diverse customers and markets, from pharmaceuticals to photographic products. 

I am appearing today on behalf of the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, also known as SOCMA. I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you about the appropriate Federal role in chemical site security. SOCMA is the leading trade association representing specialty and batch chemical producers, 

most of which are small companies. As a condition of membership 

to SOCMA, chemical companies must subscribe to Responsible 

Care® and its security code. 

I will focus my remarks today on the nature of specialty chemicals and batch manufacturing, our relationship with DHS, EPA’s 

Risk Management Program, and our perspective on Inherently 

Safer Technology. 

Specialty chemicals are essential ingredients and building blocks 

for other products and perform very specific functions based largely 

on their molecular structures, which give them unique physical and 

chemical properties. Without these substances, nylon would not be 

13

strong enough to use for seat belts, medicine would revert back to 

what it was in the 1800s, and our Armed Forces would not have 

the modern equipment and supplies necessary to defend our country. 

Because of their complex chemistries and narrowly focused applications, specialty chemicals are typically produced in small quantities, batch by batch. Most batch producers change products frequently, often on customer demand and short notice. This leads to 

frequent changes in the risk profile of the site. In many cases, 

batch producers are located in nondescript industrial or office parks 

with most of the processing equipment either indoors or out of 

view, making them difficult to recognize as chemical facilities. 

Does this mean that my company and other SOCMA members 

feel that we should do nothing about security? Absolutely not. 

ISOCHEM conducted a security vulnerability analysis and accordingly enhanced its security policies and procedures. We spent over 

$750,000 to upgrade our physical and cyber security since September 11. And again, we are a small company. 

I do believe, however, that a one-size-fits-all approach to security 

is neither appropriate nor feasible. Instead, SOCMA and its members support a tiered, risk-based approach. 

SOCMA has established a strong working relationship with the 

Department of Homeland Security. DHS officials have met with 

SOCMA and its members on many occasions. SOCMA staff and 

member company experts are routinely consulted by DHS on technical issues and participate on DHS work groups, such as the team 

developing RAMCAP. SOCMA is a founding member of the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council, which also works closely with 

DHS. 

DHS has also visited our site, providing valuable insight and 

constructive suggestions to enhance security. ISOCHEM has also 

been involved in our area Buffer Zone Protection Program, enabling 

our region to receive direct DHS funding for security upgrades. We 

are also participating in a RAMCAP pilot project which will be conducted over the summer. In addition, DHS is working with other 

Federal, State, and local agencies, trade groups, and individual 

companies to secure America’s chemical facilities. 

The Committee should be aware of other important efforts currently underway. State and local authorities are often in the best 

position to help secure our Nation’s infrastructure, and there are 

many ongoing efforts to augment chemical site security. At the 

community level, we all have a mutual interest in mind. None of 

us want our communities to be attacked by terrorism. 

In earlier hearings before this Committee, some have suggested 

that a number of RMP facilities are unwilling or unable to secure 

their facilities. While there may be some outliers, which are primarily small-scale chemical users rather than manufacturers, I am 

not easily convinced that they are very attractive terrorist targets. 

Simply put, the figures often cited by the press, 15,000 chemical facilities that put thousands or even millions of people at risk, are 

just not an accurate depiction of reality. 

In fact, the RMP database, especially the worst-case scenarios, 

were never designed to be realistic. EPA and DHS officials have 

made this point repeatedly, and this has just been reaffirmed by 

14

the Congressional Research Service. Yet I repeatedly see RMP data 

used to scare people into thinking that the chemical industry is 

putting our communities at significant risk. This is both irresponsible and inaccurate. It is unfair to the chemical industry, DHS, 

and the local authorities with whom we work closely. 

An important consideration missing from RMP methods include 

the safety systems in place at our facilities, our outstanding emergency response capabilities, residential and industrial building 

codes, and the realities of how hazardous materials behave when 

released, which will explain why we don’t see Bhopal-like incidents 

occurring here in the United States. 

That is not to say RMP data cannot be useful. While we believe 

that most facilities falling under the RMP program are not attractive terrorist targets, the list does provide a reasonable universe of 

sites to begin screening and prioritizing according to risk. 

Inherently Safer Technology (IST) is probably the most misunderstood and controversial aspect of chemical site security. IST 

is a philosophy, it is not a technique, and it is certainly not a panacea for securing America’s chemical facilities. Many non-scientists 

have been led to believe that the only way to achieve inherent safety is by substituting for the hazardous materials used in chemical 

manufacturing and processing. Application of IST, however, is 

bound by the laws of physics and nature. Physical laws place restrictions on what can and cannot be done when trying to make a 

chemical. In chemistry, reactive substances must be used to form 

new molecules and many reactive chemicals are, by their very nature, hazardous. 

Where hazardous chemicals are used, they are highly regulated 

by EPA and OSHA and appropriately managed by chemists in universities, government, and industry. The fact of the matter is that 

scientists cannot produce the materials that make our standard of 

living possible without using very specific chemicals. 

Making medicine is a good example. Phosgene is a key building 

block for an important starting material in a pharmaceutical application. The structure of phosgene allows for transfer of atoms that 

is clean, meaning that it does not allow side reactions to occur that 

would contaminate the compound with potentially toxic byproducts. 

Using phosgene helps secure the safety of medicines used to treat 

diseases, such as MS. 

Another important factor is the potential for transferring risk 

from one area to another. For example, if the amount of a chemical 

stored onsite is reduced, the only way to maintain production 

schedule is to increase the number of shipments to the site, which 

increases the transportation and transfers the risk. 

The very nature of hazardous chemicals provides important economic incentives for companies to use the safest and least hazardous chemicals possible, including reduced accidents, cheaper 

transportation and disposal costs, cheaper insurance rates, fewer 

government regulatory requirements, and avoidance of facility 

down time. 

With all these incentives in place, the question becomes why do 

chemical companies still use hazardous materials? The simple fact 

is that the law of physics and nature are much larger drivers than 

anything else. No Federal program mandating IST will change the 

15

1The prepared statement of Mr. Slaughter with attachments appears in the Appendix on page 

119. 

science of chemistry. Instead, such a program would result in nothing more than a burdensome paperwork exercise forced on companies just to justify their scientific methods and decisions while 

doing nothing at all to enhance security. 

As noted earlier, chemical sites are extremely diverse as are the 

chemistries that take place within our facilities. Because of this, a 

one-size-fits-all approach to security of chemical facilities with prescriptive standards just will not work, nor will attempting to mandate Inherently Safer Technologies. 

SOCMA and its members support a tiered risk-based approach to 

security that begins with a mechanism to screen and prioritize 

sites and concentrates further work on areas with the greatest degree of risk. Any Federal oversight of security in a chemical sector 

needs to account for the significant voluntary efforts already undertaken. It should also use performance-based fundamentals that 

provide the flexibility needed to implement effective site-specific 

programs. 

Key elements of such a program include a clear definition of covered entities and any exceptions; recognition of past efforts and voluntary programs that are substantially equivalent to DHS requirements; flexibility in achieving compliance; compliance assistance 

for small companies; risk screening for prioritization across covered 

facilities; DHS approved security vulnerability assessments for 

higher-priority sites; Federal preemptive authority for DHS; retention of security plans containing critical infrastructure information 

with availability to DHS upon request; and finally, recognition of 

efforts by the regulated community under other security programs. 

Madam Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for 

your consideration of SOCMA’s perspective of these important 

issues, and I am happy to answer any questions you have about my 

testimony. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Slaughter. 

TESTIMONY OF BOB SLAUGHTER,1 PRESIDENT, NATIONAL 

PETROCHEMICAL AND REFINERS ASSOCIATION 

Mr. SLAUGHTER. Thank you very much. Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, and other Members of the Committee, my name 

is Bob Slaughter. I am President of the National Petrochemical and 

Refiners Association. 

NPRA’s member companies constitute an extremely broad representation across two industries, the petrochemical industry and 

the refining industry, as well as their suppliers and vendors. On 

behalf of our members, I do want to begin by thanking you for the 

opportunity to appear today and for holding this important hearing, as well as for the very balanced and fair opening statements. 

We would like to offer the following summary of our complete 

testimony. Maintaining the security of our facilities has always 

been a priority at refineries and petrochemical plants. It is job one. 

It simply has to be that way. Our industries have long operated 

globally, often in unstable regions where security is an integral 

part of providing for the world’s energy and petrochemical needs. 

16

After the occurrence of the tragic events of September 11, those 

industries realized, as did everyone else, that additional threats 

had to be taken into account to secure the critical assets that we 

own. Our members began implementing additional and far-reaching measures to address these new threats, and you have asked 

what are some of those steps. 

We developed, along with our sister association, the American 

Petroleum Institute, a peer-reviewed Security Vulnerability Assessment methodology especially attuned to the needs of refining and 

petrochemical industries. The Department of Homeland Security 

has endorsed this methodology and, in fact, uses it in instances to 

train its own people. 

Under that methodology, you analyze a facility to determine the 

vulnerabilities. You identify potential threats. You identify potential security vulnerabilities. You determine the risk by measuring 

the likelihood of an attack and the consequences, and you recommend appropriate incident mitigation and countermeasures. You 

identify the appropriate security measures and incorporate them in 

a security plan addressing the SVA findings, which is then implemented. 

Our members have conducted security vulnerability assessments 

pursuant to these plans, and they have prepared and implemented 

facility security plans in response to the findings. In 2004, the SVA 

methodology was extended to transportation-related activities, including pipelines, rail, and truck transportation. 

We developed an extremely close working relationship, as well, 

with key Federal agencies, as well as State and local law enforcement officials, to obtain and exchange critical information. We are 

actively partnering with DHS on many important security initiatives, including the development of the Risk Assessment Methodology for Critical Asset Protection, or RAMCAP, the Homeland Security Information Network, HSIN, and the Buffer Zone Protection 

Plan, among others. Other groups that we work with include the 

FBI, the Department of Transportation, DOE, the Department of 

Defense, the CIA, the Government Accountability Office, and, of 

course, the Department of Homeland Security and its various components, particularly the U.S. Secret Service, Transportation Security Agency, and Coast Guard. 

We have held joint training exercises simulating terrorist attacks 

on numerous occasions with both Federal and State officials. We 

have developed training programs involving Federal and State Government officials. We have shared best security-related practices 

among large and small companies that constitute our diverse membership at NPRA meetings and conferences. We have held five national security conferences involving large numbers of companies in 

both industries since 2001. Again, they have shared best practices, 

they have heard from experts, they know what the state of the art 

is when it comes to security practices. 

Our members, like others, have complied with the 2002 Maritime 

Transportation Security Act. The Coast Guard has jurisdiction over 

a majority of the 150 refineries and 200 petrochemical manufacturing facilities in the United States. SVAs and plans have been 

submitted to the Coast Guard. They have been reviewed and approved. Companies have designated Facility Security Officers to 

17

oversee implementation. Quarterly drills are required to test the 

elements of these plans. 

Companies themselves have taken strong new security measures. 

They have reconfigured sites. They have set critical assets back 

from perimeters and installed electric intrusion detection systems, 

implemented card access controls using biometric technology. They 

have acquired enhanced security community systems, shared security response plans with local law enforcement and appropriate 

Federal agencies. They have conducted drills and exercises to test 

security and response plans, and hired additional security personnel. There is an even more complete list of this, which in itself 

is still partial, in the filed testimony. 

You have asked for NPRA’s position on legislation. We do not oppose reasonable chemical security legislation and regulation. However, the existing system, we believe, is working well and care 

must be taken to do no harm to current efforts in fashioning your 

ultimate product. Although we have not advocated legislation, we 

realize this Committee and DHS have both announced support for 

new regulatory authority, and in response, we have developed some 

principles that we hope the Committee will consider and adopt in 

Federal legislation, and we look forward to working with you on 

that. 

Our principles are, you need to be prudent in fashioning what 

could amount to a significant additional and costly mandate on 

America’s scarce refining and petrochemical facilities. There has 

been a lot said about how scarce our refining facilities are in the 

United States. We have not built a new refinery in the United 

States since 1976. So security needs to be maintained at these facilities, but we have to have an eye toward the impact on their survivability and the maintenance of these facilities in the United 

States. 

The same with petrochemicals. As Senator Voinovich pointed out, 

the petrochemical industry has been under intense pressure on 

natural gas prices in recent years, so no one wants to compromise 

security, but requirements need to be reasonable. These are scarce 

assets and necessary to national security. 

We hope you will try to maintain the close and highly productive 

relationship that currently exists between the Department of 

Homeland Security, other Federal, State, and local governmental 

bodies, and the refining and petrochemical industries. That relationship is largely responsible for the success of security programs 

in those industries thus far. We are concerned about the impact of 

new legislation on this productive relationship. The dynamics of 

the relationship could be affected and the current level of information sharing could be diminished and that would not be productive, 

and we hope you will keep that in mind as you fashion your legislative product. 

We hope that you will use MTSA as the model for any new security legislation. It has clear performance-based requirements. Essentially here, we are talking about support for a tiered approach 

based on risk. We favor reliance on Security Vulnerability Assessments and responsive facility security plans with exercises, documentation, reporting procedures, and audits, protection, above all, 

for sensitive security information. 

18

We think there should be self-assessment and auditing. We have 

had good experience with Coast Guard jurisdiction. We would assume that you would set up a Department of Homeland Security 

jurisdiction for facilities not subject to Coast Guard jurisdiction. We 

think that a facility that currently is partially covered by the Coast 

Guard should be able to opt in its whole facility if it chooses. We 

hope you will preempt other Federal and State programs so there 

aren’t a lot of overlapping requirements that will make it difficult 

to comply and understand what the rules are. 

We hope you will credit companies for security programs already 

implemented by companies. We have not developed and marketed 

a proprietary NPRA program for our members. We have tried to let 

them know what the state of the art is. We have some of the largest meetings in the world in the petrochemical and the refining industry, and we have invited folks to come in and talk about their 

programs, including ACC, so that our members will know what is 

available. We let them make their own choice. 

We hope you will help companies with background checks, to define the criteria for denying access to facilities, and hopefully allow 

companies to access and utilize government resources and databases in making employment decisions. 

Again, we hope you will require DHS to develop a tiered riskbased approach to regulate chemicals and facilities. 

We were very much encouraged by the DHS statement before 

this Committee and others that they are developing core principles 

based on risk, reasonable, clear, equitable and enforceable security 

standards, ones that recognize investments and the progress that 

companies have made so far. We are committed to continuing that 

progress however we go forward. 

So just to conclude, I want to underscore again that refiners and 

petrochemical manufacturers take very seriously the responsibility 

to maintain and strengthen security at facilities. We urge the Committee to fully consider the impact of legislation on existing programs and practices. Please use MTSA as the template for developing new chemical security requirements and embrace and support the core principles outlined by DHS at this Committee’s June 

15 hearing. 

I am happy to answer any questions the Committee may have on 

our testimony. I want to thank you again for offering us the opportunity to be here today. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Durbin, you testified that compliance with the Responsible 

Care® Security Code is mandatory for ACC members. First, could 

you explain to us how ACC monitors compliance with the code, and 

second, what would your suggestions be for compliance measures 

to be included in the legislation that we will be drafting? 

Mr. DURBIN. Senator, for the Responsible Care® program overall 

and the Security Code, we have set the guidelines for the companies to follow within the code and they self-assess. And in the case 

of the Security Code, they actually had to report to a third party 

that they had completed the steps that I outlined. And again, if 

they had not done that, they had not met those guidelines within 

the code, then we have a governance process that would first try 

19

to bring them into compliance, and if not, make clear that they are 

no longer eligible for membership. 

With regard to compliance within legislation, again, I think, 

clearly, we have stated very clearly that there should be clear oversight, inspection, and enforcement authority for DHS. All that we 

asked, just as the other witnesses have, as well, is that we give 

DHS the ability to look at work that has been done through programs such as those that have been cited and determine whether 

or not they are essentially equivalent to those regulatory programs, 

and if so, let us not force companies to duplicate efforts that they 

have already made. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Slaughter, in your written testimony 

and again this morning, you have cited the Maritime Transportation Security Act as a model that this Committee could use in 

drafting chemical security legislation. Under that law, the Coast 

Guard has the authority to shut down a facility if the Coast Guard 

determines that the facility has not established sufficient security 

measures. In fact, the law prohibits a facility from operating unless 

it has submitted and is in compliance with a security plan approved by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Would you support 

giving the Department of Homeland Security similar authority to 

shut down chemical facilities that the Secretary determines have 

not taken the necessary steps or security measures that the Department deems necessary? 

Mr. SLAUGHTER. Obviously, any regulatory entity, Madam Chairman, has got to have ultimate authority to enforce its requirements. I think you have to hope that any regulatory authority will 

use wisely whatever authority they are given, and I don’t believe 

that anyone in the industry would be disinclined to grant that as 

the ultimate authority to the Coast Guard under MTSA. But again, 

one would hope there would be a number of steps and the good 

working relationship has been set up with the Coast Guard and 

DHS, but that is probably one aspect of that regulation, yes. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Barmasse, more than 3 years ago, the 

CIA first alerted us to the possibility of an al Qaeda attack on 

chemical facilities, and since that time, many experts both inside 

and outside of government have warned the industry that you are 

a potential target. That is different, however, from knowing the 

specifics, from knowing that there is a specific plant that is at risk 

or a specific plot against a particular sector. 

I am curious about the flow of communication and information 

sharing between the Department and smaller companies like yours. 

I suspect that the Department has a very close communication and 

working relationship with the ACC and with larger industry players. But could you tell us how a threat that would involve plants 

that are smaller, like yours, would be conveyed and assess for us 

the extent of communication and information sharing between the 

Department and the smaller manufacturers? 

Mr. BARMASSE. We have been very pleased with the flow of information from DHS and through the chemical sector, ISAC, which 

anybody can participate in to get that type of information on chemical site security. We signed up for that. We get notices and information on potential threats. And the Department of Homeland Security and their different offices within the Department have been 

20

very forthcoming with information and sharing information. They 

visited our site. They have assessed our security procedures that 

are in place. They provided valuable information on how to assess 

threats, and we have found that the information flow from them 

through the chemical sector, ISAC, has been very good, which all 

small chemical companies would be available to. So it has been a 

very good relationship to date and the information has flowed very 

well. 

Chairman COLLINS. That is good to hear. 

Mr. Durbin, one of the issues raised by witnesses at our previous 

hearings is that while 80 percent of the industry is complying with 

voluntary codes and has taken sometimes very expensive measures 

to improve security, there is a smaller percentage, possibly as 

much as 20 percent, according to the Department, that has not implemented the kinds of security measures that your members have 

embraced. 

Are there competitive issues at play here? What I am thinking 

of is that a company that makes the investments, and they may 

well be expensive investments, to improve security may be put at 

a competitive disadvantage compared to a counterpart that does 

not make those investments. 

Mr. DURBIN. Certainly. I think it is clear that we have—just speaking for ACC members, we can point to more than $2 billion 

worth of investment in security. That doesn’t count what my counterpart organizations here at the table have also invested there. 

But while that is certainly a consideration, and something that I 

think from our members’ standpoint, yes, we would like to see the 

playing field leveled and ensure that as we do move forward, we 

are not forced to make duplicative investments, the fact of the matter is our primary drive here is that you have a critical sector, critical part of this national infrastructure that has to be protected, 

and we have to have those nationwide assurances that the entire 

sector is acting in ways that it should. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Madam Chairman, may I make a request 

that questions be answered by the witnesses in writing? I have to 

go to another hearing. 

Chairman COLLINS. Certainly. The hearing record will remain 

open for 15 days. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Thanks to the 

witnesses for their testimony this morning. 

Let me ask this question. Despite some of the significant steps 

that the industry has taken, which you have testified to today, 

there have been media reports relatively recent that suggest an unacceptable level of access to some chemical facilities with dangerous materials. Most recently, the New York Times reported that 

the stretch of Northern New Jersey between the Newark Airport 

and Port Elizabeth, which has more than a dozen chemical plants 

and a lot of other potential targets—storage tanks, refineries, and 

pipelines—was very accessible to trucks. Apparently, you could 

drive within 100 feet of storage tanks. A Times reporter and photographer, and I quote here from the story, ‘‘found the plant only 

loosely guarded as they drove back and forth for 5 minutes, snapping photos.’’ 

21

This experience echoed previous incidences, which I am sure you 

are familiar with, including one highlighted on ‘‘60 Minutes’’ where 

reporters easily gained access to a chemical facility near Pittsburgh, which contained very toxic and explosive chemicals. 

Given the work that the industry has done, how do you explain 

these incidences and what do they say to us about what more 

should be done? Mr. Durbin, do you want to start? 

Mr. DURBIN. Sure. In the instances that were cited with ‘‘60 Minutes,’’ if there is access to a facility, and certainly getting to the 

more sensitive areas of a facility, frankly, that is unacceptable, and 

I think that is why you have to have programs that are focused on 

making sure those things won’t happen and why we as an organization have been calling for national legislation to make sure that 

we do have those kinds of standards set in place. 

It is difficult to comment on other stories without knowing more 

details, but not all security preparations are obvious or visible. So 

I am reluctant to get into specifics on any one——

Senator LIEBERMAN. No, I understand——

Mr. DURBIN [Continuing]. And you are talking about public roadways and what have you. But in general, again, I think that this 

just points out why there needs to be a nationwide set of standards 

to be sure that all those facilities that ought to be taking these 

kinds of actions are doing so. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that answer. Mr. Barmasse. 

Mr. BARMASSE. And again, I am not familiar with the specifics 

of those, but we are also supportive of legislation that is reasonable 

and flexible for the risks associated with facilities. A facility like 

ours takes quite a few steps to make sure that our facility is adequately secured. We have gone through a lot of the risk assessments and worked with DHS to help identify those threats. And I 

think many of the small companies are doing similar-type things. 

So we would be very supportive of legislation that does provide 

those types of security. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Slaughter. 

Mr. SLAUGHTER. Senator Lieberman, we work very closely 

through our NPRA Security Committee with our members, who go 

from the largest to the smallest of companies. I can tell you from 

what I have seen personally and what I have heard is that they 

are extremely sensitive to problems such as were discussed in this 

particular article, which I also have read. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. SLAUGHTER. And we certainly have sent a very strong message, and they have heard it and they have heard it from others, 

that this is unacceptable behavior. So it is difficult to determine—

the company names I have seen are people who are not our members, but sometimes you don’t see them. But this is behavior which 

seems to be very different from what we are seeing in our members 

who are watching to see if anyone takes pictures of the facility or 

anything. So it is difficult to determine who the outliers are. All of 

us are united here in efforts to get the information about best practices out and to see that they are enforced. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. I appreciate the answers. I think you 

draw the same conclusion I do, which is that these stories, genVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:59 May 18, 2006 Jkt 023157 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\23157.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
22

erally speaking, speak to the need for national standards and for 

legislation. 

Mr. Durbin, let me ask you this. After September 11, I know that 

your organization added a security requirement to the Responsible 

Care® Security Code that requires facilities, and I applaud this, to 

conduct a vulnerability assessment and then prepare and implement a security plan. There is third-party verification of plan implementation. However, the third-party review consists of verifying 

that the chemical facility took the steps outlined in the security 

plan, but it doesn’t conduct an independent assessment of whether 

the plan is adequate to the threat. 

Is there a need for a truly independent assessment of the sufficiency of the security measures taken in our Nation’s chemical facilities? 

Mr. DURBIN. You are absolutely correct, Senator, in your explanation of the verification process, and that is how it was set out 

when the code was developed. At that time, the overall program 

was moving from one of a separate set of codes to what is now the 

Responsible Care® Management System. So we put the code in 

place and the verification piece that you described in place in the 

interim. 

Now, as we move forward, we are moving to RCMS, modeled on 

ISO 14,000, where there actually will be third-party certifications 

and audits of companies that will encompass everything they have 

done in the environmental, health, safety, and security area. So 

moving forward, there will be those independent third-party auditors coming in to certify that they have taken appropriate actions. 

Having said that, we were also working toward trying to get a 

government role that would help to assure that the actions taken 

were indeed up to the measure on whatever the national standards 

are that would be set. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. My time is up. Thank you for that answer. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I have been thinking about this from a perspective of a former governor and former mayor, and I am wondering how you get all of this done? Specifically, what percentage 

of the industry is covered by MTSA? 

Mr. SLAUGHTER. For refining, it is over half of the refining facilities and probably over half of the petrochemical facilities, as well, 

Senator Voinovich. They tend to be located close to coasts and large 

navigable waterways. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. How much different is the MTSA regulations as to the Responsible Care® Security Code? How similar are 

they? 

Mr. DURBIN. Actually, Senator, they are very close. In fact, as I 

noted, the Coast Guard was given the authority to look at programs like Responsible Care® and determine whether or not they 

were substantially equivalent. We worked with them over about a 

6- to 9-month period to walk through their regulations and our program, and at the end, the Coast Guard was willing to declare that 

the Responsible Care® Security Code was an alternative security 

plan for complying with MTSA. They did require each facility to 

provide some additional information on what they will do when we 

23

raise the alert levels in the port, but overall, our companies did not 

have to go back and redo vulnerability assessments——

Senator VOINOVICH. So from the Committee’s point of view, if we 

looked at your Responsible Care® Security Code and looked at the 

MTSA regulations, that could give us a nice picture of what we 

should be doing in terms of regulation. Now, does the Coast Guard 

verify that MTSA is being carried out? 

Mr. SLAUGHTER. Yes, Senator. 

Mr. DURBIN. Yes, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH. From your perspective, is it pretty conscientious? 

Mr. DURBIN. It is extremely conscientious. It is one of the, frankly, rare times that our members say that a Federal agency is extremely conscientious, and also, they have a very good relationship 

with that group. 

Senator VOINOVICH. How do your recommendations differ from 

one another? If you read the testimony, you are almost all in sync 

about what you think the legislation should look like. You all agree 

that there should be national legislation. So how much different, in 

terms of your consensus of the legislation, is it from what the Department of Homeland Security has suggested as the kind of legislation that needs to be implemented? Is there a wide discrepancy? 

I have asked my staff to look at that, but from your perspective, 

how far off are you? 

Mr. DURBIN. Again, just responding to what we have heard so 

far, what Assistant Secretary Stephan laid out in his testimony 

and from discussions with them, so from the broad context, I think 

we are very supportive of the approach that they are taking on 

this. Again, nothing specific to respond to yet, but very supportive 

of the structure they have laid out. 

Senator VOINOVICH. It would be interesting to get from DHS 

their opinion about what the industry folks are recommending in 

terms of the legislation. 

The other issue, then, is the bureaucracy. I understand that the 

Coast Guard is responsible for the facilities or navigable water. 

What bureauacy do you suggest should monitor the rest of the facilities? 

Mr. SLAUGHTER. That is correct, and we suggested DHS outside 

of the Coast Guard. 

Senator VOINOVICH. It appears that the Coast Guard is a good 

role model for them to follow. 

Mr. SLAUGHTER. Right. 

Senator VOINOVICH. The other issue, of course, is Inherently 

Safer Technologies. The concept that reduction or elimination of 

particular chemicals or alternative approaches will lessen the 

threat. What is your opinion on I.S.T? 

Mr. SLAUGHTER. I would say we have concerns about an IST requirement, Senator Voinovich, because a lot of—there are great incentives to go to Inherently Safer Technologies if they are effective 

and practical today. But if you get into a situation where it is mandated and you get into an extensive review process as to why didn’t 

you do A, B, C, and D instead of what you are doing, this whole 

program may be very difficult to implement and be very problemVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:59 May 18, 2006 Jkt 023157 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\23157.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
24

atic for everyone and just be a papermaking exercise, as the 

SOCMA testimony pointed out. 

Mr. DURBIN. I would echo those comments. I think the Inherently Safer Technology is clearly something that our member companies, this industry really drives toward, but it does not lend itself 

to a regulatory approach. 

I believe one of the Senators in your opening statements talked 

about the dichotomy between those who just want physical and 

those who say you have to have this approach. I don’t think it is 

that stark of a contrast here. If you are doing a meaningful vulnerability assessment that has a meaningful methodology behind it, 

that is going to point you in that direction toward process changes 

as well as other ways of managing risk. 

For example, the GAO report responding to Senator Byrd that 

was provided in March, they visited ten ACC member company facilities. Seven of those facilities noted that they made process 

changes as part of their security enhancements. 

Senator VOINOVICH. My time is up. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks very much. 

I have a couple of questions. One, I find it helpful with a panel 

like this where there is a fair amount of consensus, before you 

wrap up, just to come back again and tell us where you think the 

consensus lies among the three of you. A follow-up question is 

going to be, where do you disagree? 

And then I think I am going to ask you to sum it up by saying, 

again, the purpose of this hearing was what is the appropriate Federal role, and I am going to ask you to sum up again and say this 

is what we believe, each of you, this is what we believe the appropriate Federal role is. 

So if you could, Mr. Durbin——

Mr. DURBIN. Sure. At the risk of speaking for my colleagues——

Senator CARPER. Where is the consensus, what are the differences, what is the appropriate Federal role? 

Mr. DURBIN. The consensus I am hearing here this morning is 

that the Federal role that is put in place needs to be a risk-based 

tiered approach that will set national standards to ensure that everyone in the chemical sector that has been identified is taking the 

appropriate steps. But again, it needs to be a risk-based program 

that is reasonable, clear and measured, and provides some flexibility, and also recognizes the efforts that have already taken place 

within the industry. 

Mr. BARMASSE. And I agree with that, and I would like to add 

a few things to that——

Senator CARPER. Go right ahead. 

Mr. BARMASSE [continuing]. Especially for the smaller facilities 

and smaller chemical companies that may not have the expertise 

of the larger companies. I think Small Business assistance or compliance assistance is going to be a very important component of 

anything that is drafted, and so I believe that is the extent of my 

additional comment. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Mr. Slaughter. 

Mr. SLAUGHTER. We also would agree that it is very important 

that everything rely on a tiered, risk-based approach, which is 

25

what DHS apparently is talking about. I suspect where there may 

be a little bit of disagreement is that, I think the impression is left 

sometimes that industry has not focused on this issue and done a 

great deal of work. We have. 

I would say at the same time there are competitive issues here. 

I think we need to have a flexible program that fits requirements 

to facilities and responds to the risk and threats at that particular 

facility. If large companies can make certain investments but they 

go beyond what is necessary to secure facilities that may be owned 

by someone with less capital, we don’t want to lose facilities in the 

petrochemical and refining business unnecessarily. So rather than 

force everyone to do what the largest companies in the world are 

doing, we need to focus, as I think the MTSA does, on what does 

a facility really need to do rather than going beyond in any case. 

If there are competitive concerns, as the Chairman mentioned and 

questioned earlier, they run both ways, and I think a reasonable 

program will take care of both elements of competitive concerns. 

And as I said before, we have not been advocates of Federal legislation. We have focused on working with our members to help 

them do everything they can do at their facilities. But given the position of the Committee, the position of DHS, we want to work with 

you to fashion reasonable requirements and look forward to working with you in that. And I agree with you, there is a substantial 

consensus at the table with just small differences and concerns. 

Senator CARPER. Does anyone else want to mention differences, 

where you might differ? 

[No response.] 

OK. I will come back again to the issue of the appropriate Federal role with a specific focus on this Committee, if you will. Any 

closing thoughts? 

Mr. DURBIN. Again, just to restate, the ACC believes there needs 

to be a Federal role. We believe DHS should play that role in coordinating the efforts of the Federal Government to protect this 

critical sector. They have worked very diligently with our sector. 

You have heard all three organizations talk about the good working 

relationship there, and I think that is absolutely the case. 

Allow them to take that expertise that they have built over at 

the agency and that relationship and really put together and build 

a meaningful program that will also take advantage of not only the 

existing actions of the industry itself, but the existing actions of 

various Federal agencies that we all deal with on a day-to-day 

basis, not just EPA. We are talking about DEA and the Department of Commerce and Department of State, OSHA and what have 

you. Those are all the things that need to be coordinated. 

Mr. BARMASSE. I would like to add that I have a legitimate concern that, being in New York State, there is New York State security legislation drafted, and if there are vast differences between 

Federal and State legislative activities, it could conceivably require 

us to spend a lot more time, effort, and money to comply with two 

totally different types of programs, and we would be supportive of 

Federal preemptive authority over the State programs so you don’t 

have to do two totally different things. 

Senator CARPER. Any last comment, Mr. Slaughter? 

26

Mr. SLAUGHTER. Well, Senator Carper, I just say that the real 

trick in doing this will be not to harm the existing relationship that 

exists with DHS and industry. Particularly with DHS, the information flow is very good right now. There is a lot of understanding 

and it grows all the time—between the industries and DHS. If they 

become a regulator, you don’t want to do too much harm to that 

relationship. The nature of it will change somewhat, but you want 

that information flow to be maintained and not to set up a purely 

adversarial relationship. 

Senator CARPER. All right. One more real quick one. There are 

many times when safety and security actions mesh together well. 

There are some instances when security priorities have conflicted 

with safety. Are you aware of any times when we have had a conflict between the security priorities and the safety priorities? 

Mr. DURBIN. One example that sticks out, more on the transportation side, was the use of placards for hazardous materials as they 

are being transported. The question raised is does that make it a 

target, or do you need to maintain that as the useful tool that it 

is for first responders and others that need that information in the 

event of an accident? 

Our association very clearly agreed that placards should stay because they do play an important role for first responders, and the 

first responder community themselves said, until we come up with 

a better way of doing this, those need to stay on there. So that is 

the only kind of obvious conflict, but DHS clearly stepped in and 

resolved that, as well, and said they are staying on. We are not 

going to try to change that at this time. 

Senator CARPER. Anybody else? 

Mr. BARMASSE. The only thing I would add to that is that the 

protection of the information may be a conflict. The security-sensitive information and people’s right to know what is going on at 

these facilities is a very important consideration. I think that information, it is very important that it is protected, kept within the 

chemical facilities and possibly with only DHS so that this information isn’t publicly available beyond that and might pose another 

threat to the chemical facilities. 

Senator CARPER. Gentlemen, thanks very much. Madam Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I want to give my colleagues the opportunity for one last question each to this panel before we go on to the second one. I understand from your testimony that each of you would oppose including 

in legislation a requirement involving Inherently Safer Technology, 

and Mr. Durbin, you have cited the complexity of the chemical 

processes. In addition, others have cited to me a fear of litigation 

resulting from the requirements. 

But let me ask you a broader question. Do you think that the Department of Homeland Security should have any authority to regulate chemical processes, chemical use, or chemical storage? Mr. 

Durbin. 

Mr. DURBIN. I believe that with regard to chemical processes, 

use, and storage, there are existing regulations in place. Our companies have to perform process hazard analyses as part of the PSM 

rule at OSHA and with RMP and——

27

Chairman COLLINS. If I could interject, just for a second. Those 

programs are not aimed at security. Those programs are aimed at 

enhancing worker safety or environmental health and safety. So 

they have a different justification. They may, in fact, help safety 

and security, but that is a different issue. 

Mr. DURBIN. That is correct, but that is why it is important that 

you have a meaningful vulnerability assessment that would be required that would essentially point you toward and encourage the 

use of different technologies or things that you could put in place 

to change not only your process, but perhaps the way you distribute it and the way that your plan is configured. We have countless examples where our member companies have done just that to 

address security issues. 

Chairman COLLINS. But should the Department be able to require a process change if the vulnerability study indicates that this 

is an issue for a particular facility? 

Mr. DURBIN. I think I could only answer that by saying we would 

have strong concerns about the agency making those types of decisions, as to what process should or shouldn’t be used or what material should or shouldn’t be used. I think we should use that authority to really drive companies toward finding those solutions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Barmasse, same question for you. Should the Department 

have any authority in this area? 

Mr. BARMASSE. I think the Department’s expertise is going to be 

in the area of security and not chemistry, and it is going to be very 

difficult for security experts to have the expertise to understand 

how to regulate what goes on in a process. Chemists and scientists 

spend a tremendous amount of time trying to understand their 

process, and they develop these processes in the safest manner 

they can. And security experts would have a difficult time understanding the intricacies and the complexities of a chemical process 

and be able to make any meaningful suggestions or recommendations on that. So I think it is outside the realm of their area of expertise. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Slaughter, what about a requirement that companies have to 

consider Inherently Safer Technology, which is different from having the Department mandate specific chemical processes? 

Mr. SLAUGHTER. My answer, I am sorry, is somewhat hackneyed, 

is that the devil is in the details on that one because—the devil is 

in the details because the question is, how is that written? What 

is reviewable? I mean, you can end up in the exact same place just 

with that type of requirement as you can actually giving them authority to mandate changes in processes. 

I agree that the SVA methodology and process will lead to information about potential problems and a dialogue with the regulator. 

But I think we would have significant concerns about either type 

of provision being included in the legislation. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Thanks again to 

the witnesses. 

My question goes to the interaction of the chemical industry with 

local governments, and I would just ask each of you to respond 

28

briefly. Mr. Durbin, first, if you might, I am interested in knowing 

whether the Responsible Care® Security Code includes a requirement to conduct drills and exercises or interact in any way with 

first responders and local communities. 

Mr. DURBIN. Absolutely. In fact, it was one of the founding principles within Responsible Care®, the original Care Code, was the 

community awareness and emergency response. Frankly, that is 

one of the good stories here, is that after September 11, this is an 

area where we didn’t have to start from scratch. Our member companies generally had very well established and good relationships 

with first responders in their communities. In fact, in many cases, 

you will find that the first responders work at our facilities. The 

volunteer firemen—some of our security directors happen to be the 

deputy sheriff of the county or the fire chief of the neighboring 

community. So there is a very robust relationship that already existed there and drills that have been taking place all along. So this 

was just one more way of focusing our effort. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Barmasse and Mr. Slaughter, do you 

believe that the chemical facilities should have a role or a requirement to play in ensuring that the surrounding communities which 

they might impact have a well-functioning local emergency planning committee, and just briefly, because our time is going, what 

is your sense of the current relationship generally between the 

chemical facilities that you are involved with and the local surrounding communities? 

Mr. BARMASSE. I would be happy to respond to that, and I would 

like to say that it is not just large companies that do those types 

of things. It is small companies, also. We work very actively with 

local emergency planning committees. Previously, it was always on 

response to chemical accidents, but now, we have even worked with 

them and broadened the local law enforcement to provide security 

and vulnerability assessments from a security perspective. 

The Buffer Zone Protection Program brought in State, local, and 

county law enforcement agencies to perform buffer zone protection 

analysis. We have had drills and we have had meetings with our 

local and county emergency planning committees that discuss just 

response to terrorism activities. 

So I believe that the integration has already occurred in a lot of 

cases, and not just at the larger LEPC levels. It is happening with 

smaller companies and at the smaller level. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good. Mr. Slaughter. 

Mr. SLAUGHTER. I would agree that is the case with large to 

small companies across our membership in both industries, Senator, and I would also say that the State and local law enforcement 

personnel plus also first responders have been active participants 

in all the exercises that we have been doing for several years with 

Federal and State agencies on terrorist-related events. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I thank the three of you. 

I think, Madam Chairman, that the testimony of this panel has 

been significant. I, at least, have not heard up until today this kind 

of clarity of statement that, while some progress has been made 

voluntarily and in other ways, that the status quo with regard to 

chemical security of facilities in America today is no longer acceptable, that there is a larger necessary and appropriate Federal role. 

29

1The prepared statement of Dr. Poje appears in the Appendix on page 130. 

Now, obviously the question is, what is that role, and there are 

going to be a lot of disagreements about that. But most encouraging from your testimony today, I think we are all at the same 

table. The Administration is. Obviously, we are. And I presume 

that the representatives of the stakeholders on the next panel are. 

Under your leadership, Madam Chairman, I am more encouraged 

after hearing this panel that we are going to get something done 

in this critical area in this session of Congress. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. I, too, want to thank this panel 

for excellent and very constructive testimony. We look forward to 

continuing to work closely with you. Thank you. 

I would now like to call up our second panel of witnesses today. 

Our first witness on the second panel is Dr. Gerald Poje. Dr. Poje 

is a toxicologist by training and has years of experience dealing 

with safety issues in the chemical industry. Dr. Poje recently completed his second term on the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, where he earned the distinction of the longestserving member of that Board. He currently is serving on the National Academies of Science Expert Committee assessing the 

vulnerabilities of the Nation’s chemical infrastructure. 

Our second witness on this panel will be Glenn Erwin, the 

Project Director of the Triangle of Prevention, or TOP Program, 

and the Catastrophic Accident Investigator for the United Steelworkers. Mr. Erwin has more than 30 years of experience in the 

petrochemical industry and in particular with health and safety 

issues. The Steelworkers Union recently merged with PACE, the 

largest chemical workers’ union in the United States, and we welcome you, as well. 

And finally, we will hear from Carol Andress, who is an Economic Development Specialist for the environmental organization 

known as Environmental Defense. She has led Environmental Defense’s work to foster pollution prevention and improve the public’s 

awareness of chemicals in the environment, and we thank you for 

coming today, as well. 

We are going to start with Dr. Poje. 

TESTIMONY OF GERALD V. POJE, PH.D.,1 FORMER BOARD 

MEMBER, U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD 

Dr. POJE. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Senator Lieberman, 

for the opportunity to testify before this Committee on strengthening the chemical sector’s security. 

With its history of catastrophic releases, the chemical sector has 

had too many unintentional incidents of public terror to leave unregulated the potential for intentional terror. As last Thursday’s 

events in London and yesterday’s blast at a Spanish power station 

tell us, terrorism, maybe home grown, is becoming an all too frightening global specter. 

My written testimony focuses on a number of issues. However, 

my oral testimony today, I hope, will convey my passion and urgency for preventing these chemical disasters. 

30

While America’s worst chemical disaster occurred in Texas City 

in 1947, my wake-up call came more than 20 years ago when I was 

a young toxicology professor. I vividly remember the world’s worst 

chemical disaster. It began as a violent runaway reaction within a 

methyl isocyanate (MIC) storage tank in December 1984 at the 

Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India. After about 1,500 

pounds of water entered an MIC tank, possibly caused by a routine 

line washing procedure, an exothermic reaction ensued. Excessively 

heated and pressurized gases burst through a rupture disk and 

opened a pressure relief valve, allowing approximately 50,000 

pounds of MIC and reactants to be released through an elevated 

scrubber vent system. 

The cooling gas formed a dense, low-lying cloud in that early 

morning and slowly and quietly drifted through the adjacent housing and much of the central city. MIC is highly reactive, irritating, 

and a toxic gas that is soluble in the aqueous fluid membranes 

around eyes and lungs. Victims awoke gasping for painful breaths 

and stumbled bleary-eyed into the streets with no indication of 

which direction to seek relief. Immediate fatalities were estimated 

at 3,000, with an accumulation of almost 20,000 disaster-related 

deaths in subsequent years. Injuries estimates range from 200,000 

to 500,000. Casualties overwhelmed the city’s four hospitals and 

several clinics that supplied only a total of 1,800 hospital beds and 

300 doctors. Now, how many American communities could triage 

such an event? 

What made Union Carbide such a tool of mass destruction in 

Bhopal? Well, I think the root causes lie in the systemic problems 

at the facility and within the community. 

Lack of awareness and knowledge of the hazards—MIC was produced and utilized as a high-volume intermediate chemical, and yet 

its hazards under specific process conditions were not well understood by the workers, or the management, or the emergency responders. 

Deficient hazard assessments—the hazards associated with contamination of the MIC in the storage tanks and their operations 

under high temperatures and pressures were poorly assessed and, 

therefore, abnormal situations were not managed. 

Inadequate operating procedures—procedures were just insufficient, poorly written, understood, and executed. 

Insufficient staffing and preparedness for the abnormal situation—managing staff at that facility were relatively new, unfamiliar with its processes. Employee responsibilities were not clearly 

established. Staffing had been downsized and staff turnover was 

high. 

Failure to maintain the essential design and safety equipment—

major changes had occurred without them being assessed for their 

safety impact. A refrigeration unit was shut down and the refrigeration material drained. The flare tower had been shut off for 

maintenance and was inoperable. The scrubber system, which had 

the ability to detoxify smaller amounts of MIC, also was turned off 

at the time of the event. 

Inadequate investigations and failure to implement audit recommendations—prior deadly incidents that caused fatalities, injuries, and evacuations and smaller releases at the facility were not 

31

fully investigated and their root and contributing causes not established. 

The equipment mechanical integrity was not maintained. Valves, 

pipes, and other pieces of equipment were corroded and leaking 

and unable to contain the material. 

And there was inadequate emergency planning and response. 

The community was not even alerted to the disaster that was impending in their midst. 

And there was lack of public oversight and authority. The government of India did not have rules, regulations, and authorities 

to conduct the appropriate management of such facilities. 

You might think that this incident was long ago and far away 

and off topic. However, the CSB observed every one of these deficiencies in our investigations during my tenure, and who among us 

could not imagine a terrorist scenario being successful at such an 

operation and location? In fact, a consultant to the company speculated that the real cause was sabotage. 

Let us look at a tale of two countries. While most Americans remember the events of September 11, few recall the major chemical 

catastrophe that occurred just 10 days later. On September 21, a 

huge explosion tore through the AZF fertilizer factory in Toulouse, 

France. Nearly 400 tons of ammonium nitrate detonated with a 

force equivalent to 3.4 on the Richter scale. AZF is owned by 

Atofina, the chemicals unit of TotalFinaElf, one of the world’s largest petrochemical and petroleum producers. 

The blast created a crater 50 meters in diameter and 10 meters 

deep. Windows shattered in buildings throughout the city’s center 

three kilometers away. Thirty people were killed, 10,000 injured, 

and a further 14,000 sought treatment for acute post-traumatic 

stress. Over 500 homes were rendered uninhabitable and 27,000 

others were damaged. Alarm systems failed, telephone lines were 

severed, frustrating public communications of safety messages. 

Nearby businesses collapsed and others had long-term business 

interruptions. 

Thousands of tons of liquified ammonium, ammonium nitrate, 

and solid fertilizers and other chemicals at nearby businesses 

prompted additional concerns about possible domino effects. Because so many windows and building structures were damaged, 

sheltering in place would have been impossible if toxic chemicals 

were released. 

The event greatly exceeded the consequences of the scenarios 

that have been used for planning emergency response. More than 

1,500 firemen, special emergency personnel, and 950 policemen responded to the event, yet the early responders arrived on scene 

lacking exposure assessment equipment and personal protective 

equipment to cope with the toxic cloud. 

The facility had been inspected several times in 3 years by local 

authorities, but not for the inadequacies of the ammonium nitrate 

fertilizer management in a warehouse of that facility, a warehouse 

mostly operated by the subcontracting workers and not by the 

management itself. 

The Toulouse disaster, as many others have, and you already 

know, prompted nationwide debate about acceptable risks in communities. The French legislature extensively reviewed policies and 

32

practices and new legislation has focused on strengthening safety 

management systems of technological risk, including enhanced 

worker training and roles in risk prevention, improved safety management coordination and roles for contract workers, expanded 

public information about the risks and involvement in prevention, 

and better land use planning and siting around these high-risk facilities. 

Now, with 20/20 hindsight, could we imagine what would have 

happened if that event occurred in the United States on September 

21, 2001? The same corporation had a facility in Michigan that just 

2 months earlier had sent 2,000 people into an evacuation mode 

and killed three in using a chemical called methyl mercaptan. 

If there is a silver lining in this cloud of terrorism, it is, I believe, 

the urgent motivation to reign in the risks posed by the chemical 

sector. I urge the Committee to see the development and maintenance of competent management systems for safety as essential 

underpinnings to enhanced security. These have to go together. We 

need to have U.S. policies that will force the marriage between 

these two domains such that we are not Balkanizing security into 

a Homeland Security Department that is completely ignorant of all 

of the essential security features that have to be part of a security 

paradigm. 

I give you five—or six recommendations to consider. One, ensure 

that whoever has responsibility monitors the scope of the chemical 

sector problem. We know that we have 9,000 incidents occurring 

annually in just 15 States in this country. We don’t have a nationwide surveillance system to tell us how many chemical events are 

occurring in America. 

I ask that you also establish a Department of Homeland Security 

responsibility that promotes effective coordination with other 

agencies. If these agencies are only on bended knee to Homeland 

Security about security issues and there is no interdigitation of security’s work with these other agencies functions, we will lose a 

golden opportunity for strengthening our whole system of safety 

and security. 

Set requirements for a security management system. We heard 

on the previous panel the importance of the words ‘‘management 

systems.’’ I believe that those are the critical underpinnings for us 

being able to have a much more effective approach. One where effectiveness is observed, in my particular unique safety portion of 

the world, by looking at exceptions. Yes, I know about good coordination between agencies. I know about good work of trade associations. But I have had to look at the safety exceptions, when good 

practice and oversight don’t work. We have to make more abundant 

use of such features of the safety landscape of the chemical sector 

and force the study of the exceptions, the exceptions that are causing evacuations and injuries in communities right now and are 

showing us where those relationships aren’t working. I think we 

have to keep a high focus on that. 

I also believe that the ultimate solutions for security and safety 

will be found in reducing the volumes and the toxicity of the hazardous chemicals. We need to have a better way of making an attack on that problem. 

33

1The prepared statement of Mr. Erwin with an attachment appears in the Appendix on page 

144. 2The survey entitled ‘‘PACE International Union Survey: Workplace Incident Prevention and 

Response Since 9/11’’, October 2004, by Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers 

International Union (PACE) appears in the Appendix on page 150. 

And finally, we need to employ effective training approaches. An 

absolute critical step to improving security at the chemical plants 

is going to be to properly train the workers who respond to the disruptions. We have some good models, and I think they need to be 

built upon for enhancing security. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I would be happy 

to answer any questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Your testimony is a powerful reminder of why we are committed to passing legislation. 

Mr. Erwin. 

TESTIMONY OF GLENN ERWIN,1 PROJECT DIRECTOR, TRIANGLE OF PREVENTION PROGRAM, UNITED STEELWORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION 

Mr. ERWIN. I would like to thank you, Chairman Collins and 

Senator Lieberman and the rest of the Committee. I would also like 

to thank the staff. Too often, the ones that do the work never get 

the recognition, so I would like to thank the staff. 

As Dr. Poje said in his remarks, he said he wanted to share with 

you his passion for this concept here. He reminded me of an 86-

year-old cowboy friend I have in Texas that always said, ‘‘Whatever 

you do, you do with all your heart, mind, and soul.’’ So I guess you 

have my mind in the written agenda that I gave you, or the written 

comments. Like Dr. Poje, I would like to share my heart and soul. 

I promise you I won’t sing. I am not Aretha Franklin. [Laughter.] 

But I would like to talk about some things that are very near 

and dear to me. Just as recently as March 23, 2005, I lost a very 

good friend in an explosion in Texas City, one of the most wonderful, Godly men I had ever met. As a matter of fact, the last Christmas that I saw him, he was gathering up a pickup load of toys to 

take to the Texas State Penitentiary in Huntsville, Texas, to make 

sure that none of the children there had a Christmas without toys. 

He was killed in that explosion. Now, I know we are here to talk 

about intentional acts of sabotage, but whether it is an intentional 

act or an accidental act, his life was cut short and our community 

has really lost a wonderful person. 

Now, I believe that we, in the oil and petrochemical industry, oil 

refineries and chemical, I believe that we will be a target. It is not 

‘‘if’’ but ‘‘when.’’ I am certain it is going to happen. I think one of 

the reasons for it is we are too easy, very easy to gain access. 

We did a survey.2 We have distributed that. We have also submitted that for your review. But only 3 percent of our people think 

that we have done an excellent job in preparing to prevent an intentional act of sabotage. So, we are too easy. 

There is such a large vulnerability. There is such a potential on 

what they can do if they get access into certain chemical plants, 

and our industry is just too important. If we disrupt the flow of energy, the flow of gasoline, the flow of chemicals, as everybody said 

before, we are going to really impact our country. 

34

Now, I want you to think layers of protection, and that is what 

we need to do, is we need to look at protection, some way to protect 

from this worst possible thing happening. And I guess I would ask 

you to visualize, I couldn’t think of anything better, but maybe an 

onion. Let us make it a 10–15 layered onion that was developed by 

Texas A&M—— [Laughter.] 

It goes great with barbecue and will give you something to pick 

on Senator Hutchison about, about somebody talking about onions 

from her State. 

But anyway, I want you to visualize an onion and just kind of 

take the outer skin of it. The outer skin of it, the first layer is our 

security. It is the fence line. It is to keep the unauthorized people 

from being there, the gates to control the flow of who goes in and 

out in normal admission, and also to train and equip our guards. 

That is our first layer. That is the one that we need first to put 

in place, but it is not there yet. 

I just stood at the front gate of a major multi-national oil company the other day right at lunch time, and I watched the flow 

through the front gate of one car going in after another, and I 

watched a pickup truck, and I will use this one for an example. 

There were two people in it, and they drove up to the gate, and 

they showed their badge, and they went right on through. Well, sitting in the back of that truck was five or six buckets, closed-top 

five-gallon containers, and I looked at the guy that was next to me, 

and I said, ‘‘What is in the buckets?’’ And he said, ‘‘I don’t have 

any idea.’’ And I said, ‘‘Well, does the guard?’’ And he said, ‘‘No.’’ 

I said, ‘‘Why won’t he check them?’’ He said, if he did, nobody 

would get back from lunch, and he would be in trouble for holding 

up the flow of traffic. 

So I think that we are vulnerable there. I don’t think we have 

control of our main gates yet. So that is the first layer. 

The second layer of security is inside the plant. Once you are inside the plant, there are different areas. But our security is set up 

for perimeter. Our security is not set up for everything within it. 

We treat a kerosene tank, the accessibility to a kerosene tank, the 

same as we do to a hydrofluoric acid tank. In fact, the same plant, 

as we drove by, and we drove on a road, not 100 feet, maybe 150 

feet from a hydrofluoric tank that contained probably 800,000 

pounds of hydrofluoric acid. 

That didn’t bother me as much as to see 50 or 100 people with 

a flurry of activity going on around that. And I said, ‘‘Is that tank 

empty?’’ And he said, ‘‘Oh, no, that tank is full.’’ They had heavy 

equipment operating within 20 to 25 feet of a line, the suction line 

to that tank. Now, had they have hit that, whether intentionally 

or unintentionally, knocked that suction line loose from that tank, 

I asked our guide, I said, what would have been the effect, and he 

said it would have been catastrophic. And I said, ‘‘Well, how bad?’’ 

I said, ‘‘Thousands?’’ And he said, ‘‘More like 10,000, maybe 

100,000 if the wind direction is right,’’ if that happened. 

So that is the second layer. There needs to be added precaution 

once inside and not treat everything just the same. 

Let us peel another layer. Let us go now to substitution, and we 

have talked—they have used some fancy words for it. I am not 

going to use that, but let us get rid of some hazards. 

35

Just like the HF tank, it is used for an alkylation process that 

you can also use sulfuric acid for. Now, why does one company use 

one method that doesn’t have the potential and another company 

use the other one? I can’t answer that. There are lots of other examples of how we can eliminate, how we can substitute, how we 

can change. I guess economics is one reason, but if you start looking at the human toll if something happened to a sulfuric tank 

versus a hydrofluoric tank, there would be a tremendous incentive 

to try to move to the others. 

Now, some companies may not want to hear that I feel, and our 

institution feels, that there should be some mandatory look at what 

you handle. Whether you use the HF, sulfuric, chlorine, or bleach, 

I think somebody has to do it, and it is not just economics. It 

should be based on the vulnerability. 

Now, you may not get that law passed, but I will tell you the second best thing. Pass a law where the plant manager or the CEO 

has to live in that plant, and I will tell you what, they would look 

at it just a little different. You know what the dirty little underbelly is? It is that most of the people that manage our facilities 

don’t even live in the same town. They move further away. 

Let us peel another layer—reduction. Reduce the hazard. Look, 

there are things that we can do, and it has got to be mandatory 

to look at trying to reduce the hazard. My old cowboy friend would 

say, if you are going to raise cattle, you have to have a bull, but 

he doesn’t have to have horns. Look at doing something to try to 

reduce the hazard in the materials that we work with. 

We can store it in smaller amounts. They say you have to truck 

more in that way. If you use 1,000 pounds a year, I don’t care if 

you store 100,000, that is what you have to use to get in and out. 

I don’t see the math. So I think we need to look at trying to reduce 

it. 

Let me peel another layer. Next is to minimize what we have 

other than just the amount in a tank. We had an 800,000-gallon, 

or pound tank of hydrofluoric acid. Wouldn’t it be less hazardous 

to have four 200,000 if you have to do it? There are just some 

things like that that make common sense to me that I understand 

why we don’t do it, the things that we have to look at. 

Now, I want to emphasize that there are a couple hazards in the 

plant we have to look at. One of them is explosives. The other one 

is toxics. Nine-eleven was explosives, but Bhopal was toxic. 

Now, I have a friend that drives a truck, and he drives a 

hydrofluoric acid truck—methyl mercaptan. He drives a methyl 

mercaptan truck. And I was talking to him and I said, ‘‘well, what 

would happen—what are you doing to prevent somebody from 

using your truck as a weapon of mass destruction? What is to prevent somebody from hijacking it?’’ He said, ‘‘Well, I have a Global 

Positioner Satellite on top of my truck.’’ And I said, ‘‘Have you got 

one on the tank?’’ He said, ‘‘No.’’ And I said, ‘‘Well, all they have 

to do is just to waylay you and take the tank, isn’t it?’’

Let me visualize, can you imagine what a tank of methyl 

mercaptan could do if they drove it into the right area and somebody knocked the belly cap off that thing and just released all the 

contents of that highly-toxic material at the right place, at the 

right time? It would be devastating. We need to put the positioning 

36

1The prepared statement of Ms. Andress with attachments appears in the Appendix on page 

209. 

satellites on the trailer, not just the truck. We need to see where 

the actual shipment is going. 

Now, look, I lost a friend, I said, to that explosion. I have had 

other people that have been hurt in fires. I have walked into Ben 

Taub Hospital and walked into the burns institute. There were four 

people in there and I was trying to find my friend, and I couldn’t 

tell the four people apart. I couldn’t even identify him. His own 

mother didn’t even know which one he was. 

The incidental act and the intentional act still have the same effect, but if we can prevent the intentional and really prepare ourselves to prevent for those along at the same time that we are looking for the intentional acts, I think we are going to gain so much 

more. 

Let me give you a personal example. I am running out of time, 

but I will tell you what—on Halloween night, 1987, it was Friday 

night in Texas. We had a football game. And on Friday night in 

Texas, what is the most important thing that goes on? I have two 

kids, a 17- and 15-year-old that were already down at the stadium, 

and I was preparing to go, and as I was sitting there, I came across 

the eyewitness news that we had a leak in town, shelter in place, 

stay off your phones and behave yourself. Don’t get out of the 

house. There I sat, with two kids at the football field. They told 

over the TV where the spill was occurring. It was occurring at a 

Marathon facility. Well, I could just draw a beeline from my house 

to there and right in the middle of it was where that stadium was. 

I know what it would be like if the leak that occurred was a contractor dropped and hit the vapor line of that tank. Now, had he 

hit the liquid line of that tank, it would have killed both my kids. 

Both of them were exposed, but it was minor because the vapors 

were coming up, not the liquid being left off. 

Look, the hazards are out there, the potential in our communities. We have to do some things. We have to look at layer protection. We have to work together. We have done our survey. We said 

there is more that can be done. Our members say that there is 

more that can be done. It is not just me sitting here. It is 125 sites 

that were surveyed. It says we are not ready enough. They are not 

involving the people. We have not involved the actual workers to 

the extent that we can. 

Now, we support legislation. I am out of time and I am going to 

shut this off, but we support it. It is in my written comments. We 

can do better. I think we can do better. And I appreciate your effort 

for convening this and attempting to try to make our workplaces 

and our communities safer. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much. Ms. Andress. 

TESTIMONY OF CAROL L. ANDRESS,1 ECONOMIC 

DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE 

Ms. ANDRESS. Good morning, and thank you for the opportunity 

to testify today. I represent Environmental Defense, a national environmental group where I work on pollution prevention issues. I 

37

will summarize my written statement, but I ask that my full statement and the attachments be entered into the record. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

Ms. ANDRESS. On the issue of chemical security, I want to describe an example that I believe is illustrative of the challenges 

and the opportunities before you. It is about an actual chemical 

plant in Baltimore, Maryland, that was subject to three separate 

but overlapping security programs. It was covered by ACC’s Responsible Care® Security Code, and, in fact, the facility had already 

passed the company’s mandatory third-party verification process. 

The facility was also covered by the Maritime Transportation Security Act because it is located on a navigable waterway. The Coast 

Guard approved the security plan that the facility developed under 

ACC’s voluntary program. The facility is also covered by a Baltimore ordinance on mandatory security plans. Despite these requirements, a reporter was able to enter the facility, enter an unguarded gate, reach two fully loaded chlorine tank cars, and then 

leave without ever being challenged. 

This is not an isolated example. Investigative reporters have documented lacks and inadequate security at many facilities storing 

and using extremely dangerous substances. An enterprising reporter, or more troubling, a determined terrorist could likely gain 

access to most if not all of the several thousand facilities that use 

or store large quantities of dangerous substances. This includes 

about 2,800 facilities, all of which have 10,000 people or more living within a projected danger zone. These very high-risk facilities 

are located in almost every State. 

So the problem is significant, pervasive, and yet unaddressed. 

This is why your commitment to a strong chemical security program is so important. 

I want to return to the example of the plant in Baltimore. What 

lessons can we learn from this? First and most importantly is that 

a sole reliance on a strategy of guards, gates, and guns is simply 

inadequate and bound to fail. Physical security alone cannot prevent a determined terrorist. 

Second, current security programs which, frankly, are largely 

voluntary, are not effective. This suggests that the accountability 

mechanisms in the existing laws are not enough. 

So what should we do? The most effective and economical way 

to achieve security is to design the products and processes that reduce the use of these extremely dangerous chemicals. Reducing the 

source of the problem, the chemicals and processes, makes a facility less attractive as a terrorist target. It cuts the needs and costs 

of security measures. And it minimizes the likelihood of a major 

chemical accident. This is classic pollution prevention. But more 

importantly, this is how you get real, lasting, cost-effective security. 

My written statement provides examples of some high-hazard industries that have eliminated or significantly reduced their vulnerabilities to terrorist attack. This includes refineries, power plants, 

sewage treatment, and water treatment facilities. 

The challenge then is not how many guards, gates, and guns are 

needed but how to foster more widespread risk reduction. Several 

State laws and one local law provide a road map for how to achieve 

that risk reduction. These include New Jersey’s Toxic Catastrophe 

38

Prevention Act, Massachusetts’s Toxic Use Reduction Act, California’s Accidental Release Prevention Act, and Contra Costa County’s 

Industrial Safety Ordinance. These laws are aimed at spurring facilities to cut their use of certain toxic chemicals and the results 

are impressive. 

At the start of New Jersey’s program, 575 facilities reported having chlorine tanks on site. Now that number is 26. Contra Costa 

County, California, experienced a 36 percent reduction in acutely 

hazardous substances between 1990 and 1994. 

Lessons from these programs suggest three key principles for a 

Federal chemical security program. First, Congress should mandate the most effective, most efficient, and safest option. This 

means establishing requirements that all facilities conduct a thorough evaluation of ways to switch to safer chemicals or processes, 

reduce the amount of dangerous chemicals used, or reduce the 

amount stored onsite. When those options are practicable, the facility should be required to implement them. High-risk facilities, especially, should be expected to make significant investments in reducing the quantity and nature of the hazardous chemicals onsite. 

I realize not every facility will be able to eliminate or significantly reduce the hazards. When a facility finds that there is no 

safer option that is technologically feasible, or where the alternatives are prohibitively expensive, particularly when compared to 

the potential damages, or when the available alternatives would 

create an equal or greater hazard to public health or the environment, then they should provide a justification for why an alternative approach is not practicable. 

Safety cannot be voluntary. The issue is too important and the 

market mechanisms are simply inadequate. Facilities that are facing daily questions about operational efficiency and financial performance have little interest in dealing with catastrophic hazards 

that seem remote. For that reason, Congress needs to mandate that 

a reasonable process be put in place for getting safer approaches 

in place. The complexity of the industry should not be an obstacle 

to action. 

A second key principle is accountability. I trust that most facilities will make a good faith effort to implement safer approaches. 

However, this is far too important to rely solely on good intentions. 

Facility owners and operators must be accountable to Federal authorities and the public for reducing hazards. I believe accountability measures should include government oversight and intervention, especially when facilities do not perform; public disclosure 

of the reasons why they were unable to implement alternative approaches; and linking public funding with safer operations. 

This is especially applicable at sewage and water treatment 

plants that receive substantial public money and yet continue to 

use chlorine gas in populated areas. It frankly makes no sense to 

me to have taxpayer money going to basically pre-position a deadly 

and unnecessary chemical in a populated area and then spend 

Homeland Security money to try to protect the chemical. Taxpayer 

money should not be spent at facilities that pose an unnecessary 

risk to the American public. 

The third principle is that Federal legislation should avoid creating loopholes for voluntary programs. We commend ACC’s, 

39

SOCMA’s, and MPRA’s early efforts to protect their facilities. But 

as we have seen with many news reports, voluntary programs 

alone are wholly inadequate. Creating special conditions for facilities that participate in these voluntary programs will undermine 

your efforts to safeguard facilities. Allowing facilities to follow their 

own standards has not been deemed acceptable for airports or nuclear plants and should not be acceptable for chemical plants. 

We agree that companies should not have to reinvent work done 

previously. Congress should allow them to submit prior documents 

with supplements, as needed. For example, vulnerability assessments done by drinking water facilities under the Bioterrorism Act 

should be considered as part of meeting their obligations under a 

chemical security program. 

However, it is particularly important that work done as part of 

a voluntary industry program be strictly scrutinized. It is one thing 

to recognize the security efforts performed under Federal statutes. 

However, it is completely unacceptable to rubber stamp voluntary 

measures that have not been evaluated or enforced by a Federal 

agency. 

My written statement elaborates on some additional issues to include in chemical security legislation, including requiring buffer 

zones and simulating community evacuation drills with the community and coordinated by local emergency responders. 

Efforts to protect Americans from terrorist attacks are often costly and complicated. Instances when protection of the public can be 

achieved in a cost-effective manner should be aggressively pursued. 

That some of these options have side benefits, such as eliminating 

the potential for chemical accidents, makes them all the more appealing, and I do not consider these to be extraneous issues. Safety 

and security cannot be separated. 

Congress should insist that facilities take all reasonable steps to 

reduce risks of catastrophic chemical release. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for your testimony. 

Each of you has argued for mandating a reduction in the use of 

dangerous chemicals or the substitution of less-hazardous chemicals wherever possible. But if we draft legislation so that it is truly 

risk-based, so that the level of regulation is ratcheted up depending 

on the hazards at a particular facility, wouldn’t the companies have 

an inherent incentive to use less-dangerous chemicals or smaller 

amounts of hazardous chemicals in order to get into a lower-risk 

category with fewer regulations imposed upon them? Dr. Poje. 

Dr. POJE. Actually, Senator, that is a very good point. The earlier 

mentioning of the Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act in New Jersey, 

I think, has given us quite a few examples to look at for how a regulatory regimen over time has caused the mobilization of the industry to change its pattern and practice of the use of chemicals. 

A certain portion of chlorine-using facilities, particularly in the 

water and wastewater treatment arena, have migrated out of chlorine gas usage for biocidal treatment, and that has come in part 

because of a higher degree of oversight and a ranking of high 

hazardness for that particular chemical in that regulatory regimen. 

Now, to be fair to the previous panel, there is enormous complexity in the diversity of processes being used throughout the 

chemical producing and using sector. However, I think it is abunVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:59 May 18, 2006 Jkt 023157 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\23157.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
40

dantly clear to me that there are some processes whose moment 

has come for inherently safer approaches and we need to be able 

to challenge the usage of those chemicals in ways that embrace 

clear alternatives available. I think Ms. Andress has given us a 

pretty clear example with chlorine in the water-treatment industry. 

Do we taxpayers want to pay both for the development of a 

wastewater treatment facility using the most highly hazardous 

form of biocidal treatment and then a second payment for using 

Homeland Security protection measures to be imposed over that? 

I think that is just foolish, and we clearly don’t have the resources 

to perpetuate such a poorly thought out system. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Erwin, wouldn’t there be an inherent incentive for companies to change to less-hazardous processes if we 

draft the legislation so there is a different level of regulation depending on the risks involved? 

Mr. ERWIN. That might be very true. The more hazardous it is, 

the larger the problem. It is a very complex issue. There are some 

things that are hazardous they can’t get rid of. And a lot of the 

companies have done a lot of work, and I don’t want to sound like 

they haven’t because they have done a lot of work to try to substitute, when they can reduce. But not everybody has. 

There are some forward-thinking companies. There are some 

companies that are very responsible. And then there are some that 

are not. There are some that keep the books right and some that 

don’t. We know that for a fact, too, and it is the same thing here. 

But you are right. That may be true. 

Chairman COLLINS. Ms. Andress. 

Ms. ANDRESS. Well, I think implicit in that kind of risk-tiering 

approach is that safer approaches are, frankly, the best option. And 

so from that standpoint, I find that appealing. I think, however, I 

am concerned that it would leave—it potentially leaves some fairly 

high-risk facilities to simply adopt a physical security approach and 

that, I don’t think, is enough, to just rely on physical security. 

Chairman COLLINS. Dr. Poje. 

Dr. POJE. If I could just make one additional comment on that. 

My experience for 7 years has been to look at safety tragedies in 

the chemical sector, so I have a very myopic view of seeing where 

failures occur. Having said that, though, I also see that is the place 

where Phoenix-like, we can rise up out of the ashes to do a much 

better job. 

Bhopal changed policies in the United States to be more aggressive. There was a chemical facility in the State of Texas right after 

the terrible Bhopal tragedy in India, a DuPont facility, that within 

an 8-month period switched dramatically out of methyl isocyanate 

usage. It actually had plans already developed. Now, the acceleration of the implementation of those plans took the terrible Bhopal 

tragedy to make it happen. 

The Chemical Safety Board under my tenure conducted 33 investigations. Only less than 10 percent of those investigations involved 

chemical processes covered under the RMP system. Now, in one 

way of thinking, RMP is an appropriate approach for risk ranking 

systems, the conceptual basis of what is worst, highest toxicity, 

highest amounts. Those are all very rational designs that we have 

to employ. 

41

But there is one other piece of the equation to consider. What 

happens when failure tells us there are other management processes that are having terrible problems. In fact, every one of those 

9,000 incidents that I mentioned occurring in those 15 States is an 

enormous red flag to everybody—a red flag to those who want to 

do harm that we have management problems here and harm can 

be had in this fashion. If we don’t embed the responsibility within 

DHS to have to hold them up for an example and examine them 

in a detailed way, we are going to lose the advantage of those disasters to strengthen the whole of the system of safety and security. 

And I would argue if there is a pattern within these safety incidents that identifies particular chemicals and processes having the 

most frequent problems, we had better figure out solutions for 

them quickly. And, there should be governmental resources, if 

there isn’t private sector resources, to help make that happen. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Erwin, before I turn to Senator Lautenberg, I am very interested in the results of the study that you were 

involved with. It prompts in my mind a question about whether the 

Department of Homeland Security involves the workers, goes to the 

head of the local union if there is one, when it does an assessment 

of the security of a chemical plant. Do you happen to know? DHS 

has pointed to these site visits that it has undertaken. Do you happen to know whether workers, union representatives, are interviewed by DHS officials when they do these site visits? 

Mr. ERWIN. We are not party to when they come in like we are 

when OSHA comes in or when the CSB comes in, and we are not 

included in the conversations, to my knowledge. I don’t know of 

any union leaders or employee representatives that have been included in this area. I think it is nonexistent. 

Chairman COLLINS. That is very helpful and something I will follow up with the Department on, because I think, judging from your 

testimony and experience, that they could learn a lot from talking 

to the employees of these facilities. 

Let me ask just one other related question. Has the Steelworkers 

Union or PACE shared its survey with the Department of Homeland Security, do you know? 

Mr. ERWIN. Well, we have copies here. I would be glad to give 

them a copy. But what we did when we prepared the report, we 

shared this with the governmental agency that we were working 

with, the National Institute of Environmental Health Scientists. 

Now, it is our understanding that they have shared that in the report with other agencies with whom they are working, and I guess 

they work with DHS, too. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you 

all for your testimony. I am sorry that I wasn’t here, Madam 

Chairman, when the first panel was still up because I was struck 

by some things that were said, and one of them related to Mr. 

Barmasse’s testimony about IST. 

You talked, Ms. Andress, about how much use has been reduced 

of chlorine, and we know that here in this district, the wastewater 

treatment had enormous reductions in threat as a result of transfer 

from chlorine to another material that appeared to be substantially 

42

safer. I don’t like to ask questions that Mr. Barmasse could have 

answered, but I am compelled by the structure to ask you. 

I think in Mr. Barmasse’s testimony for SOCMA, he made the 

point that Inherently Safer Technology is probably the most misunderstood and controversial aspect of chemical site security. While 

it seems self-explanatory, the term as used in chemical and engineering may be misleading to non-scientists. It is an approach to 

chemical processing that considers procedures, equipment, and the 

use of hazardous substances. 

Don’t we have data that refutes the fact that IST can be seriously employed with a lot less expense or risk than the other massive changes that have to be made? Are we out of reliable changes 

of one material for another that can make us safer? 

Ms. ANDRESS. I am not sure I understand the question. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, the question is whether or not we 

have exhausted the opportunity to make substitutions of materials. 

Dr. Poje may want to say something about that. Have we run the 

gamut on substitutable materials? 

Ms. ANDRESS. Well, you are correct in that we have—there is 

quite a bit of knowledge and expertise out there, and, in fact, there 

is quite a bit of knowledge about these issues at the various State 

institutions in New Jersey, Massachusetts, and elsewhere. So there 

probably—I don’t think we have exhausted it. I think there is still 

ground to be tilled. I think from my standpoint, the most important 

point is that we haven’t exhausted the adoption of the safer chemicals. There still are several wastewater treatment plants using 

chlorine gas in heavily urban areas. That is simply outrageous. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Would that transfer be relatively transparent with regard to costs? Dr. Poje, do you have any knowledge 

about this? 

Dr. POJE. Yes. I think as I said earlier and I think as the first 

panel reflected, there is a great complexity to certain aspects of the 

chemical industry. But we have already heard from two panelists 

here about the use of hydrofluoric acid in alkylation within the oil 

refining industry for which there are two alternatives. One, 

hydrofluoric acid, has a much higher risk than the other sulfuric 

acid. In the chlorination and alternative biocidal treatment of 

water and wastewater, there are also clear examples. 

In other chemical process areas, it takes specific research and 

analysis to make processes inherently safer. Now, within the chemical industry, there are some that are leaders in doing this R&D 

work, and it gives them the competitive advantage of new materials. In fact, the greatness of our chemical industry comes in large 

measure by very innovative chemistry and R&D to help get a competitive advantage in the global market over those who are producing things in a less efficient way. 

The term that has grown of art recently is green chemistry. That 

is the most vibrant aspect of the chemical industry’s development 

and the chemical sciences development. How do we optimize across 

12 different principles for making a better chemical science that 

will be of advantage to us for our lives and lifestyles in the future? 

There are aggressive programs in universities all over this country 

and across the globe to promote that end. 

43

One of the Green Chemistry principles is to design things so that 

they are inherently safer and so that we prevent chemical accidents. I would argue in the post-September 11 world, also to prevent terroristic disasters. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Dr. Poje, you heard the testimony of our 

first panel, and yet it is clear that you believe that improvements 

in chemical safety and security beyond the industry’s Responsible 

Care® program are needed. How do you draw those conclusions because I think they are quite different from the idea we heard earlier. 

Dr. POJE. I certainly draw those conclusions from my more intimate experience, having studied the pattern of safety tragedies 

that occur when chemicals aren’t appropriately managed. And 

when you see after the incident that safer alternatives could have 

been available, you are forced to ask the question, what are the 

barriers that prevented people from either knowing about those alternative approaches or for economically employing them? 

Clearly, there are two different worlds that we have to be concerned about. Greenfields development, in which we should have 

the best and most cutting-edge technologies applied as we develop 

new facilities. Then there is the brownfields, the facilities that already have tanks and concrete and ‘‘hardened’’ facilities for which 

making changes is going to have to come out of someone’s capital 

budget. 

And I think that is where the artfulness of business decisionmaking is coming into this debate. How much can you mandate of 

that to existing facilities before you wind up mandating those facilities to leave the country and go offshore. We have to be concerned 

about that. I think we do need this domestic industry and its jobs 

and its opportunities here in the United States. But how do we 

avoid expanding the risks that we see? 

Last April, I had the terrible experience of having to lead a team 

from the Chemical Safety Board to a place in Dalton, Georgia, that 

was a SOCMA member that for the first time had been using a 

chemical called allyl alcohol. And while the investigation is still ongoing at the Chemical Safety Board, rudimentary aspects of safety 

and emergency response just were not operational in that fairly 

sizeable community of Dalton, Georgia. 

When that chemical was being used for the first time, there were 

poor plans on how to deal with abnormal situations. The reaction 

got out of control and it bubbled out of the reactor. There was no 

secondary containment available. A bucket, a small plastic bucket, 

was being used to capture what was coming out of this reactor, and 

that poor containment allowed toxic gas to emanate into the surrounding community. 

Emergency responders turned out to deal with it. Police went 

door to door. Police without any kind of protective equipment went 

gasping into this cloud of toxic allyl alcohol, trying to get community members out of harm’s way. There was no awareness within 

this community about those hazards. 

In fact, I was quite shocked. When I gave a press briefing the 

next day after I had arrived and announced to people what chemicals were involved, they didn’t already know that information at 

that time. They didn’t know it at the hospital. They didn’t know 

44

it in the broad community. You shouldn’t wait for somebody from 

Washington to come and investigate and find out what people 

might have been exposed to. You need to know that at the hospital. 

Those 154 people went to the hospital on a cold mountain Georgia evening to be stripped naked, hosed down before they were allowed to go in and be examined for any possible impact. But if the 

medical system did not know what they were exposed to, how 

would you possibly be able to deal with the hazards that those people had? 

So we here have a reason to start asking more serious questions 

about who is using chemicals, when they are using them, how they 

are using them, and make sure that we are adhering to even the 

minimal standards that currently operate for risk management and 

process safety management. There are a whole bunch of chemicals 

that are outside of the RMP system, and the Chemical Safety 

Board has had to investigate numbers that are not currently covered by Federal safety standards. 

I would not want Homeland Security to think that somehow it 

can pull out of another agency the named list of chemicals, talk to 

the industry and thereby say that these are the only ones we are 

going to worry about, and consequently blindly miss other risks 

that are around us. And those risks, the ones that I see, have seen, 

are ones that announce themselves through mismanagement as releases into communities. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Madam Chairman, if I might, just another 

question. 

Chairman COLLINS. Certainly. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. It was said by Mr. Barmasse in the first 

panel that, in response to a memo to Congressman Markey of Massachusetts, the population potentially affected under an EPA worst 

case scenario release is calculated in a circle around the facility. It 

is unlikely that this entire population would be affected by any single chemical release even if it is a worst case accident. So this challenging to the data that are being used to describe the threat. 

All three of you have had occasion to look at these. Would you 

agree that the figures that are used are under suspicion in terms 

of their accuracy? 

Ms. ANDRESS. Well, he is correct when he says that everybody 

within the vulnerability zone would not be affected in the event of 

a release. The idea is there is a circle drawn around the facility. 

It shows where the potential could be. But on any given day, an 

incident is only going—depending on prevailing wind conditions, it 

is only going to move in one direction or another. But it does get 

to this issue of how do we determine what are the risky facilities, 

and I am aware that, for example, the Department of Homeland 

Security has its own system for evaluating risk. 

At Environmental Defense, we recognize we need to prioritize. 

We are not talking about a rigorous government oversight of rural 

facilities that have minimal, if any, offsite consequences. We do believe that every facility that poses an offsite risk needs to evaluate 

safer options, but where we need to focus government resources is 

on the high-risk facilities. 

But I do think the EPA numbers are useful in that they are 

transparent. We know how those numbers got arrived at, whereas 

45

the DHS numbers, it is largely a secret methodology, and it is predictable, and we think both the public and the agencies need—and 

the companies need that kind of clear basis for knowing what the 

priorities are. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, the ‘‘Right-to-Know’’ law that I 

helped coauthor in Federal statute derived from a similar law that 

was developed in New Jersey. The thing that triggered the Rightto-Know law in New Jersey was when the firemen approaching a 

chemical fire had their protective gear virtually melt in front of 

them. What happened is there was an incredible amount of participation by industry on a voluntary basis to reduce the emissions 

and to identify these hazardous chemical facilities that were located in lots of places in New Jersey. So it was a good start. 

But as we look now, there wasn’t an interest then by some terror 

group that was looking for a way to really do us a lot of damage, 

and so there are things that we can do on a voluntary basis, but 

there are also things that we have to do. 

Mr. ERWIN. Can I comment on this issue right here? 

Chairman COLLINS. Absolutely. 

Mr. ERWIN. Any institution is just like a body. The head of it is 

the only one that gets to dream. The ones down in the rest of the 

body live in reality. [Laughter.] 

Having said that, the worst case scenario, we only look at single 

worst case scenarios, and if we are going to deal with terrorists, 

don’t you believe that they are smart enough to hit more than one? 

So when we look at a worst case scenario, we are not dealing with 

a single incident. We are going to look at multiple things. I mean, 

if I was going to do it, I would knock the HF tank, I would hit your 

power supply, I would also do some other things all at one time, 

and I am not a terrorist, so I don’t think like that. But just imagine 

what they could do when they hit a lot. 

So I think we need to go back and reassess what our worst case 

is now in the light of terrorism because I think it has changed. I 

don’t think that our worst case that we looked at now is truly our 

worst case. I think we need to go back and do a reassessment on 

that. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you 

to the witness table. 

Chairman COLLINS. You are welcome. 

I just have a couple of final questions for this panel. One of the 

most important tasks that this Committee will face will be to define in legislation the universe of chemical facilities that DHS 

should be regulating for security. Do you have any advice for the 

Committee on how we should define the universe? Dr. Poje. 

Dr. POJE. Yes. I think it is clear that the usage of chemicals is 

widespread in our society. One could go to an individual consumer 

who goes to a Home Depot and picks up a can of pesticide for use 

on their lawn and that person is handling a chemical. Could we 

possibly reach down and touch such persons for the way that they 

are securely and safely managing it? You can’t do that. So there 

has to be a scale that moves in some direction toward those that 

are using the highest and the worst chemicals. 

I think there has been an awful lot of work done in this country 

in the chemical safety arena to examine and reexamine that quesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:59 May 18, 2006 Jkt 023157 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\23157.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
46

tion. I think we can build off of that platform to define what are 

the highest risks in a measurable fashion above the next tier. The 

Risk Management Planning program obviously establishes three 

different tiers of program responsiveness for dealing with that kind 

of work. I think that should be examined and looked at, and I 

would hope you would get the assistance that you called for from 

Homeland Security and from OSHA and EPA and those who have 

had that kind of responsibility to work together to come up with 

such a proposal. 

Again, my written statement, though, asks also that we be prepared for the exceptions. Do not put the blinders up that says that 

listed chemicals in regulated amounts are the only thing we worry 

about. Force yourself and DHS to have to confront the annual reality of chemical releases and cross compare. Are the chemical incident events reflective of the reality that we have chosen for our 

regulatory programs? 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Erwin, do you have any advice for us on 

the scope of our legislation? 

Mr. ERWIN. I think the scope of your legislation should be based 

on potential, the potential risk, the potential vulnerability, the 

amount of who could be harmed, and if you based it on that, it 

would be very inclusive. 

Chairman COLLINS. Ms. Andress. 

Ms. ANDRESS. Well, I would start with the Risk Management 

Program. It is, as I mentioned earlier, a transparent system. We 

know how those numbers are derived at. They are imperfect on 

both sides. As the industry panel noted, they may exaggerate the 

risks in some respects, but then in others, as Mr. Erwin noted, they 

don’t take into account, what if all of the inventory were to be released at one time. But I actually think maybe that makes them 

the best option because they are kind of in the middle. 

And then in terms of—I know there have been proposals, for example, to say that all facilities above a certain vulnerability should 

do X, Y, and Z, and I think that is—we recognize again the need 

to prioritize, and there are a number of facilities in the Risk Management Program that don’t need heavy regulation and oversight. 

But as I said earlier, I think everybody needs to have—all facilities 

in the program that pose a potential risk to communities and workers nearby need to do an evaluation of the safer alternatives. And 

then you focus government resources on the high-risk facilities. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Yes, Mr. Erwin? 

Mr. ERWIN. Because I have never been here before, I may not understand the procedure, but do I have to ask to have my written 

comments and the survey added into the record? 

Chairman COLLINS. All of the statements, surveys, and anything 

else that you wish to submit will be included in the record. 

Mr. ERWIN. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Just one final question, Dr. Poje. In response 

to an earlier question, you made a statement along the lines that 

we need to be able to challenge the chemicals and chemical processes employed by chemical facilities. This raises a question that 

I posed to the first panel. 

You have already testified that you would support imposing some 

sort of IST requirements directly on facilities. But could you also 

47

support an alternative approach whereby we would not impose 

those requirements across the board, but give DHS the explicit authority to require changes if specific vulnerability studies for particular sites indicated a problem that could be addressed that way? 

Dr. POJE. Certainly, I would, if I understand you correctly, I 

would see the advantage of having a Federal entity have some 

oversight in this area, particularly if it could identify common problems across the country and for which there should be some mandated inherently safer approaches. However, I would also have to 

say, my experience on the Chemical Safety Board is that the 

knowledge as to where a particular process could best change oftentimes is dependent upon the best process engineering competency within that facility itself or within that corporation. 

I don’t think that we are going to be able to guarantee that any 

Federal agency is going to become the best repository for that intimate process information. The agency should be the coordinator, 

convener, collaborator for drawing that information into a public 

arena so that more of the public would be able to see what are the 

opportunities. And thereby, more of the facilities that might not 

have access to getting to a professional American Institute of 

Chemical Engineering meeting would find out what inherently 

safer techniques are being used through the services provided by 

a Federal entity required to make sure that information gets out 

to the public. And I think it would also help this Committee do an 

effective job of oversight on whether we are making the progress 

as rapidly as we could. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. I want to thank all of our witnesses today for truly excellent testimony that will be very valuable to this Committee as we undertake the Herculean task of 

weighing all these arguments and drafting legislation. 

We will be having a final hearing in this series of four hearings 

focusing on chemical security. That hearing is tentatively scheduled for July 27. 

Again, I want to thank you all. We look forward to working closely with you. 

The hearing record will remain open for 15 days for the submission of any additional questions for our witnesses as well as other 

materials. 

This hearing is now adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(49)

CHEMICAL FACILITY SECURITY: WHAT IS THE 

APPROPRIATE FEDERAL ROLE? 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 2005

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Voinovich, Lieberman, Carper, and 

Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. 

Good morning. Today, the Committee is holding its fourth and 

final hearing on the security of our Nation’s chemical industry 

against terrorist attack. The goal of these hearings has been to 

help this Committee develop comprehensive, bipartisan legislation 

to address what is clearly one of our Nation’s greatest homeland 

security vulnerabilities. 

Throughout this series of hearings, we have learned that the 

United States is home to an astonishing number of facilities that 

manufacture, use, or store chemicals for legitimate purposes that 

could cause devastation if turned against us as weapons. 

The Environmental Protection Agency has listed some 15,000 

chemical facilities that produce, use, or store large quantities of 

hazardous chemicals. The Department of Homeland Security uses 

a different methodology and has identified 3,400 facilities that 

could potentially affect more than 1,000 people if attacked and 

nearly 300 chemical facilities where a toxic release could potentially affect at least 50,000 people. 

We have heard expert testimony regarding recent chemical accidents in our country that have also resulted in injury and death. 

We have learned that the chemical industry is enormous, diverse, 

and vital to the American economy. The U.S. chemical manufacturing industry approaches half a trillion dollars annually in sales. 

The chemical industry represents our largest export sector, with 

exports totaling $91.4 billion in 2003. More than 900,000 people 

work directly in the U.S. chemical industry, which supports an additional 700,000 supplier jobs and millions more indirectly. 

From national defense and high-tech to agriculture and health 

care, the chemical industry produces more than 70,000 products 

that improve the well-being of the American people. And these 

50

hearings have reminded us that the terrorist enemy we face has a 

clear strategy of turning the tools of free and productive societies 

into weapons. They did it on September 11, 2001. They did it in 

Madrid last year. And they have done it in London, not once but 

twice this month. Given the chance, they will surely do so again. 

Currently, the Federal Government’s regulation of the security of 

chemical facilities is limited. The Department of Homeland Security’s representative and many other witnesses have testified that 

new legislation is required to strengthen the security of chemical 

sites. The Department points out that approximately 20 percent of 

the overall chemical industry sector that it believes to be at high 

risk does not subscribe to voluntary industry security standards. 

While I applaud those many companies that have taken voluntary 

measures, an unacceptable number have not. Moreover, given the 

severity of the threat, I believe that it is a mistake to rely on voluntary measures alone. 

To date, we have heard from witnesses representing industry, 

labor and environmental associations, as well as chemical safety 

professionals, homeland security experts, and the Department of 

Homeland Security and the Environmental Protection Agency. 

Today, we will hear from company security chiefs who will describe 

the day-to-day challenges of securing these sites. A local emergency 

manager with decades of experience in responding to chemical incidents will also testify. And we will begin our hearing today by 

hearing from the U.S. Coast Guard, which is responsible for implementing the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. 

Throughout these hearings, the results-based cooperative approach of MTSA has been described as a security success story. 

Maritime commerce is no less diverse or vital to our economy than 

is our chemical industry, and the security issues are no less challenging. 

I will be very interested to hear the Coast Guard’s views on the 

extent to which MTSA could be used as the template for the chemical security legislation we will begin drafting next month. 

I look forward to hearing from all of our expert witnesses today. 

Senator Lieberman, welcome. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. This is, as 

you have said, the fourth—and I believe the last for now—in a series of hearings that the Committee has held on chemical security. 

I think this series has really served to inform us of the vulnerabilities we face as well as the various responses that we can take 

together to strengthen our defenses against a potential terrorist attack or a chemical accident. I hope it is clear that Chairman Collins and I and the Members of this Committee consider securing 

our most exposed chemical storage and manufacturing sites a top 

priority for this Committee and, indeed, for our country. 

I am heartened that we have agreement with the Administration 

and a large portion of the chemical industry itself that legislation 

is necessary. The fact is that the recent news from Sharm elSheikh and London reminds us again that the war of Islamist terrorists against us is continuing and it is global; that terrorists will 

exploit weaknesses in our homeland defenses wherever they find 

51

them; and that they aim to kill as many innocent men, women, and 

children as possible to spread fear and panic throughout our countries to bring about the political changes that they desire. 

By any measure, the chemical industry today is one sector where 

a successful attack could have catastrophic consequences for our 

people and our country, and that is why we must and will continue 

to work with haste to do everything we possibly can to prevent 

such an attack. 

At our first hearing in April, we learned of the potential risk 

posed by thousands of chemical sites across the Nation. One witness described chemical facilities as potential weapons of mass destruction. At our second hearing, in June, the Department of 

Homeland Security testified that voluntary safety measures taken 

by the chemical industry, commendable as they were, were not 

enough and that the Administration supports legislation to secure 

the most hazardous facilities by imposing minimum security standards. 

Earlier this month, industry representatives told us that legislation was, in fact, needed in their opinion to establish Federal security standards. The largest chemical trade associations—which is to 

say the American Chemistry Council, the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, and the National Petroleum and 

Refiners Association—all agreed that Federal standards would improve security, although they opposed Federal mandates requiring 

companies to implement the so-called inherently safer technologies. 

Today, we are going to hear from a variety of stakeholders, both 

public and private. Some of our witnesses will argue that Federal 

controls should be limited to—and have argued, in fact, that Federal controls should be limited to standards for physical security 

measures such as gates and surveillance cameras. But I must say 

that I am impressed by the arguments of most of the security experts that we have heard that physical measures alone will not 

stop a determined terrorist attack. Knowing that, I believe we must 

look long and hard and thoughtfully at what can be done to reduce 

the inherent hazards at chemical sites by finding alternative substances or technologies to reduce the risks or configure plants in 

ways that minimize the possibility of a hazardous release. In other 

words, how can we ensure that the chemical companies are doing 

all they can to achieve better safety and security through such 

measures? 

I am also concerned that too many local preparedness and response teams may not be able to respond effectively to an attack 

on a chemical plant, and I believe that State and local officials, 

who are also the first preventers, need more resources than they 

now have if they are expected to protect the areas just outside a 

chemical facility’s fence, as now seems to be the case. 

And, finally, I want to be sure that the people who live near 

chemical facilities have been informed and prepared about what to 

do if there is a breach at a chemical facility. Today, in too many 

places, I conclude that is not the case, leaving the public uninformed and unnecessarily at risk. 

I know that there are still disagreements about details, and they 

are not insignificant disagreements. But I must say, as we come to 

this fourth hearing, I am very encouraged that we all are walking 

52

along the same road, which will lead us to an agreement that will 

make our chemical plants safer and that will guarantee that they 

pose as few risks as possible to the American people. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Madam Chairman, are we going to be permitted to make opening statements? 

Chairman COLLINS. As the staff had informed all Members, we 

just did opening statements at the first day of this series of hearings. But if you and Senator Voinovich——

Senator LAUTENBERG. I just think this subject is such an important one, and in particular, the area I come from is highly vulnerable to terrible destruction if an attack is placed against any of the 

chemical facilities, and I don’t want to upset the routine, but I 

would hope, Madam Chairman——

Chairman COLLINS. Senator, if you would like to make a few 

comments, that is certainly fine with me. We do have a number of 

witnesses this morning, so I would ask that they be brief. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Sure. 

Chairman COLLINS. I will call on Senator Voinovich and offer 

him the same courtesy, if he would like to make any comments. 

Senator VOINOVICH. The only comment I would like to make is 

I have been working on this subject for about 4 years. 

Chairman COLLINS. You are very knowledgeable. 

Senator VOINOVICH. In that amount of time, the issue was before 

the Environment and Public Works Committee, and now it is over 

at Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. I am really 

pleased that you and our Ranking Member have taken it upon 

yourselves to have these extensive hearings on this issue. I hope 

that as a result of them we can come up with some legislation that 

is fair. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. You have worked long 

and hard on this issue, and we are very fortunate to have your expertise to help guide us as we draft legislation jointly on this issue. 

So thank you for your participation. 

Senator Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I won’t extend the courtesy, Madam Chairman, but I would hope that in the future there is an opportunity 

to lay out a point of view. And I, too, started on this a long time 

ago. As a matter of fact, before I took my sabbatical, I had proposed a chemical hazards structure so that we could identify these 

things. But I look forward to the hearing, and I commend you, 

Madam Chairman, for having held these hearings. But the change 

in procedure is one that I would hope would change. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lautenberg, we will discuss that further after the hearing, but the procedure was made very clear. 

Our first witness today is Admiral Craig Bone of the U.S. Coast 

Guard. Admiral Bone is the Coast Guard’s Director of Port Security 

and brings to this job more than 28 years of service to our country. 

It is noteworthy that he was the Deputy Commander of ActivitiesNew York on September 11 and later served as the Commanding 

Officer and Captain of the Port Activities-New York, where he laid 

53

1The prepared statement of Admiral Bone appears in the Appendix on page 233. 

the groundwork with the maritime industry for the implementation 

of MTSA. We look forward to hearing his testimony. 

Admiral Bone, thank you for being with us, and you may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL CRAIG E. BONE,1 DIRECTOR 

OF PORT SECURITY, MARINE SAFETY, SECURITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DIRECTORATE, U.S. COAST 

GUARD 

Admiral BONE. Good morning, Madam Chairman, Senator 

Lieberman, and distinguished Members of the Committee. I am 

Rear Admiral Craig Bone, Director of Port Security in the Coast 

Guard’s Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection Directorate. Today, I intend to discuss the Coast Guard’s role to secure chemical facilities on the waterways of the United States. 

A terrorist incident against a facility in our marine transportation system could have a disastrous impact on public safety, our 

Nation’s economy, and international trade. Such an incident, if it 

were to occur in a strategic port, could also threaten our military 

mobilization capabilities. Clearly, the security of the chemical sector is vital and important to the protection of the public from harm. 

Of more than 3,000 facility security plans that the Coast Guard 

has reviewed and approved under the Maritime Transportation Security Act, commonly known as MTSA, we have approved 300 for 

chemical facilities. This represents about 2 percent of the approximate 15,000 chemical facilities in the United States that use or 

store chemicals. The Coast Guard also approved an alternative security program for the American Chemistry Council. An alternative 

security program is an option afforded to facility operators under 

MTSA. Instead of creating their own facility plan, operators of facilities required to meet Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, 

Parts 101 through 106, may meet an alternative security program 

that has been approved by the Coast Guard. Approximately 50 

chemical facility operators have chosen to use the American Chemistry Council’s alternative security program rather than create 

their own individual plans. 

The Coast Guard has completed compliance inspections of all facilities that currently have facility security plans or the alternative 

security program to verify that they are operating within their respective plans. Since the July 1, 2004, implementation date for 

MTSA, the Coast Guard has taken control actions, which include 

restrictions to or suspension of operations, against 45 facilities. 

Three of those facilities were from the chemical industry. 

The Coast Guard’s work in implementing MTSA for waterfront 

facilities has been a collaborative effort with other Federal, State, 

and local agencies as well as the private industry partners. We 

have worked in conjunction with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate within the Department of 

Homeland Security to ensure that all MTSA plans are consistent 

with their buffer zone protection plans. 

The Area Maritime Security Committees, led by the local Coast 

Guard Captain of the Port, have identified their port’s specific 

54

vulnerabilities and created a plan to address those vulnerabilities. 

The Area Maritime Security Committees, which include representatives from the oil and chemical sector, developed the Area Maritime Security Plans to address the risks specific to their ports. 

These area plans focus on critical port operations and infrastructure, which include regulated chemical facilities under MTSA as 

well as those facilities merely located in close proximity to the navigable waterways but do not engage in marine transfer operations. 

Such facilities would not be regulated under MTSA. These plans 

address how local, State, and Federal resources will be deployed to 

prevent terrorist attacks and protect critical infrastructure in our 

ports, waterways, and coastal areas. 

We have developed a security matrix under Operation Neptune 

Shield, which is our internal plan to identify highest-risk threats 

and conduct operations which prevent and protect the public, facilities, and vessels from a terrorist attack. The matrix establishes a 

protocol of risk awareness and surveillance to include vessel traffic, 

air patrols, cutter presence, security zones, vessel escorts, security 

boardings of vessels, and positive control measures used to mitigate 

the vulnerabilities inherent in the ports, waterways, and maritime 

domain. 

We continue to address highest-risk maritime operations. As 

such, we have contracted for a special assessment of inland barges 

which carry certain dangerous cargos, evaluating their 

vulnerabilities and identifying the blast consequence analysis. 

The Coast Guard will continue to perform facility security plan 

compliance examinations and spot checks on waterfront facilities 

that are regulated under Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, 

Part 105, including facilities identified as chemical, production, and 

storage operations. Those facilities will continue to be held to a 

standard commensurate with the vulnerabilities of the facility, the 

threat to the facility, and the consequences of a successful attack. 

Since September 11, the Coast Guard has worked closely with 

Federal, State, and local agencies and members of the chemical industry to enhance the security of the chemical sector and the marine transportation system. We have established a robust strategy 

to enhance public safety from potential threats to chemical facilities located in the maritime region. We have conducted vulnerability assessments, implemented comprehensive security plans, 

and worked again with the Federal, State, and local agencies and 

industry to exercise those plans against realistic scenarios. 

The MTSA has provided the foundation piece for chemical facility 

security in our ports. Our work is far from complete. We will build 

upon this foundation using a program of regular training and exercises, an annual review of plans. 

The Coast Guard, in concert with the other Federal agencies, 

State and local authorities, and partners in industry will continue 

to refine the tools and analysis that aid senior leaders and first responders alike in their ability to protect, prevent, and rapidly respond to maritime transportation security incidents. We want to 

minimize the damage in such an incident and aid in recovery operations. 

I thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will be pleased 

to answer any questions at the appropriate time. 

55

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much, Admiral. I very much 

appreciate your testimony and the expertise that you bring. 

Many of our witnesses, including representatives of the Department of Homeland Security, have indicated that the framework 

under the Maritime Transportation Security Act might be one that 

we could use in drafting a chemical security bill. So I would like 

to ask you more questions about the specifics of the implementation of the MTSA. 

First of all, how does the Coast Guard verify and enforce compliance with MTSA regulations? 

Admiral BONE. Well, first off, the plans have to be approved in 

accordance with the regulations, so that is the starting point, which 

we have already completed. But then there is annual compliance 

examinations. We have already, again, examined each facility, and 

our inspectors go out with a checklist that includes the performance dimensions required of the facility to deal with their particular risk environment. In other words, not every facility is exactly the same; each facility has different types of chemicals, has 

different vulnerabilities. So facilities conducted—we confirmed that 

the facilities, in fact, conducted their actual facility risk assessment 

or their vulnerability assessment and then have put into place the 

actions necessary to protect that facility. And, again, the checklist 

includes such things as access controls, training of individuals, 

looking at realistic scenarios for threats to that facility or attempts 

to basically threaten that facility and cause a transportation security incident. 

Again, we do not look at everything that could happen. We look 

at those things that would have significant consequences if it was, 

in fact—if someone entered improperly or took actions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Let me pick upon a point that you made that 

not all facilities are the same. This is a point that the chemical industry representatives have made to us repeatedly, that they are 

not in favor of a one-size-fits-all regulatory scheme, and they have 

pointed to the performance-based regulations of MTSA as a possible model. 

Could you explain for us the differences between performancebased and prescriptive regulations and how you have implemented 

a performance-based framework? 

Admiral BONE. An example might be someone could prescribe 20-

foot-size fences plus perimeter guards outside that have to be located 20 feet or 100 feet from the facility to address incoming traffic. That may be one standard in one highly populated area or high 

risk, particular high risk, but what if the facility, for example, you 

are worried about the cargo that is there being taken, or being 

used, which is a byproduct on the facility, versus the product being 

the target itself to cause it to explode or blow up at the location. 

You may be able to do that in a different way in a different location, say if you are in a rural area on the inland rivers versus if 

you are sitting, as Senator Lautenberg mentioned, in New Jersey, 

in the port of New Jersey. 

The requirements, however, that are in place are access control. 

Establish effective access control that will not allow someone who 

is not properly identified and is not supposed to be there to do business from entering your facility. There are multiple ways of doing 

56

that, both within your facility but also with the help of State and 

local agencies. In other words, you may hire additional security 

contractors and maybe people within your own. You may actually 

have the local authorities assisting you in establishing those access 

controls. 

Chairman COLLINS. The focus is on the goal, not how to reach 

the goal. 

Admiral BONE. Yes. 

Chairman COLLINS. Under MTSA, the Coast Guard has the authority, I am told, to shut down a facility that is not in compliance 

with MTSA regulations. Has this actually happened? Has the 

Coast Guard shut down facilities for noncompliance? 

Admiral BONE. Yes. Again, since July 2004, there have been 32 

cases where we have actually shut down a facility, these facilities—

not all of them chemical. When we are talking about MTSA, three 

of which were chemical facilities. But the majority of those, the 

very beginning when the program started up, some of them had not 

submitted their Federal security plans and as such they were not 

allowed to continue to operate until they had submitted them early 

in the process. 

Chairman COLLINS. Do you think that authority is important for 

us to give the Department of Homeland Security? 

Admiral BONE. Yes. If you have a significant violation of security 

such as access, illegal access or breach of the facility, and there are 

not proper procedures in place, then you have compromised that security, safety, and the well-being of the public, and I think that it 

is imperative. 

Chairman COLLINS. Does the Coast Guard have authority under 

the MTSA to mandate changes in the storage of chemicals at facilities if you deem the security plan to be inadequate? 

Admiral BONE. Well, we start off with an adequate security plan, 

so if they decided to move something to a different location, then 

we would—the Captain of the Port has the authority to seek an 

amendment to their security plan or actually require a modification 

of, again, their protective measures or their performance, or it may 

be a determination that they make to move it in order to continue 

operations. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Admiral, thanks very much for your extremely helpful testimony. 

Some of the experts in this area that I have talked to and we have 

heard from have said, given the thousands of chemical facilities in 

this country, that they worry whether the Department of Homeland Security has the kind of infrastructure or capacity to adequately monitor and oversee implementation of security measures 

in this sector. In contrast, I have heard that one reason why the 

Coast Guard has been able to effectively implement the provisions 

of MTSA is because the agency does have an existing infrastructure at the ports, obviously, where the Captains of the Ports are 

clearly in charge of ensuring that security is improved in their 

areas of jurisdiction. The Coast Guard also received substantial additional resources to implement MTSA. 

I wanted to ask you to reflect a little bit on the existing DHS infrastructure, as you understand it, and also how the Coast Guard 

57

determined how much in the way of additional resources it needed 

to adequately oversee implementation of MTSA. 

Admiral BONE. Well, first off, as you stated, we were fortunate 

because we already had experience working in the safety and environmental arenas with these facilities and, in fact, had area committees similar to the area security committee, both for environmental and port safety operations, two separate committees. 

However, we did not have the additional bodies, as you have 

said, in order to do that and actually called up people on Title 10 

in order to do that until the Administration and the Senators and 

Congressmen provided the additional resources for us, which in 

turn was about $101 million and approximately 800 people to carry 

this out. 

Now, when we look at what differential, what do we have to put 

in place in order to establish and actually execute the plans and 

the review of the plans and approval of the plans is separate from 

the execution of the compliance. But, again, part of the regulatory 

process, which we follow, includes looking at those alternatives, 

looking at the approach in order to do this and identifying what is 

required in order to execute it. So it is a very deliberate process, 

identifying—and if you are going to be having requirements that 

are annual, quarterly, semi-annually, that will drive your resource 

requirements as well. 

Additionally, we look at what we are currently doing in security 

and what our controls were already able to capture. And the fact 

that we are monitoring these from a safety standpoint as well as 

security, our visits are more frequent to these facilities in any 

event. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. As you probably know, Robert Stephan, the 

Acting Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, came before the Committee, and he is the one who 

said on behalf of the DHS that voluntary measures were no longer 

enough and that the Department was working on legislation. I 

wanted to know whether the Coast Guard is currently involved in 

those efforts within DHS to try to flesh out proposals for broader 

chemical security safety legislation. 

Admiral BONE. We are not involved in security regulation drafting, but we have, in fact, been working closely with IAIP on looking 

at comprehensive chemical reviews of facilities, of chemical facilities, and that process. We have also been involved with them in 

looking at the liquefied natural gas facilities and comprehensive security assessments of those to follow the current assessments that 

have already been conducted. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So beyond your answers to my first question, what lessons have you learned from implementing MTSA that 

could be important for Congress to keep in mind as we consider 

legislation to broaden the requirements for chemical safety in the 

country? 

Admiral BONE. First, I think, is that you have an industry that 

is a mature industry and that is a risk-based industry that has 

been engaged in safety and environmental protection and actually 

understands risk probably better than any other group, if they are 

professional in what they undertake. Risk management is not a 

new thing. The threat vectors may be different for this group. So 

58

it is key that you engage, as we do, actually, in almost all of our 

rulemakings, with the industry component as you go forward and 

you continue that process because they have expertise that you 

should use. 

The other is that you have to have compliance. I think that it 

is not just—there has to be a mandated set of requirements. A voluntary system, as we learned in our environment and in our safety 

system, for those that are already respectable and the best companies, they are not just going to meet what you have, they are going 

to exceed it. And that is true also in the security arena. And we 

learned that also with MTSA. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. But they are not all the best companies, are 

they? In other words, the best companies will exceed the minimum 

that we set, but others need that minimum. 

Admiral BONE. But we can learn a lot from those companies that 

set those examples, that have been doing it—actually, many of 

them, this is not a tremendous change to their way of doing business because identification and access control and worrying about 

threats, even internal individuals doing harm to their facilities because they have certain dangerous cargos that, in fact, are such 

high risk, many of them actually have gone down this, what I will 

call a decision tree process to make sure the critical links in the 

chain are removed so that something cannot happen. 

I mean, when I think back on my career, I have worked with this 

industry in the past to try to prevent catastrophic incidents from 

a safety arena. Actually, in our experience with MTSA, they, in 

fact, were one of the leaders in this along with the passenger vessel, cruise ship industry, who were already involved with security 

operations. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Any other lessons? 

Admiral BONE. I think you need to make sure you exercise your 

plans. I think that if you do not have exercises, if it is not drilled, 

people are not trained to do this. And if you do not have exercises 

that involve not just the people in the facilities themselves, but the 

vessel that may be located there, the emergency response—I heard 

mention that one of the emergency response agencies, the local authorities that are quite often the people that are providing that 

layer of defense for the security of this facility, if they are not built 

into it, it would be a big mistake to not include them in the drills 

and exercises, particularly the exercises, because that is where you 

find out your gaps. You put the framework together, which is what 

MTSA does. It puts the security framework together, hardens the 

targets, and allows for the entities to engage. Then the question is: 

How do you buy down the risk in that system? How do you collectively use that? In my experience, things have changed drastically 

from just response. In today’s environment, if you have an incident, 

you not only are responding to that incident, but at the same time 

you are heightening security in and around the facilities. 

So some of the same people that were engaged before in responding and controlling traffic now may also be tapped to go provide increased security. So you may build a plan, but until you actually 

exercise it, you will not find all your communications. You will not 

really clearly know your true resource requirements. And you may 

59

find some things that you have more than enough of and other 

things that you need. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Admiral. My time is up. You have 

been very helpful. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. Again, Madam Chairman, thank you for 

these hearings. 

In the previous hearings, we have learned of the vulnerabilities 

of this sector and the need to adequately secure it from the threat 

of terrorist attacks. We have also begun to understand the patchwork of safety and security measures, both public and private, that 

begin to address both the safety and the security of the chemical 

industry in the absence of a comprehensive Federal approach to 

chemical security. 

Before I ask my questions, I would like to express my thoughts, 

Madam Chairman, on this issue. Risk is inherent in business. 

While it is possible to manage risk and mitigate its impact, elimination of risk is impossible. Unfortunately, we continue to see the 

brutal nature of terrorism, and we know that the possibility of a 

terrorist attack is very real. That threat must be addressed by enhanced security. 

That said, I want to reiterate my belief that the Federal Government cannot protect itself against every single threat, and I think 

that is what Osama bin Laden would like to see us try to do because in the process of doing so, we will bankrupt this country. 

Therefore, I want to emphasize the importance of a balanced approach between self-regulation by industry and more proactive Federal action. Admiral Bone, I have been very much impressed with 

your testimony here today. It seems to me that the MTSA-approach 

to chemical facility security could be the benchmark for the way we 

go about handling this. You have come up with your standards; if 

necessary, the industry has come up with their alternative security 

system. You have approved it. You supervised it. I am very impressed with the way you are doing things. Madam Chairman, if 

we are thinking about who is going to run the show after we pass 

the legislation, it seems to me that maybe we ought to suggest to 

Michael Chertoff that the person should be Admiral Bone. [Laughter.] 

Admiral BONE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator VOINOVICH. One of the things that I would like to know 

is who takes care of the facilities that you do not oversee? I understand that you are responsible for facilities or navigable water 

ways; but who takes care of the portion that is not in your jurisdiction? 

Admiral BONE. Well, maybe I need to clarify something. Actually, 

this was different than the regulation that applied to transfer operations under environmental or safety in that it actually takes you 

to the gate. So if the facility is, in fact, a single structure or a single perimeter, then we do, in fact, when it comes to security and 

access control, have authority under MTSA to regulate that facility. 

However, if portions of a facility owned by the same company are 

located, as you say, on another location, for example, if one comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:59 May 18, 2006 Jkt 023157 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\23157.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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pany has this plot and area and then there is another one that is 

completely separate and has separate access controls, separate 

processing, not a transfer of cargos that has a maritime nexus to 

it, then you are right, those facilities would be inland facilities and 

would not have a maritime nexus. 

The key is we need some type, from water, either—for MTSA, we 

need from water access for transportation of goods. But from the 

Port and Waterway Security Act, we have authority over a facility 

if it is adjacent to the waterway and it presents a risk or a threat. 

In those cases, MTSA does not apply, but if there is a threat vector 

directed, say, at the chemical sector, we can, in fact, impose requirements on that facility regarding access controls and assist in 

that with our own assets, and that is working with the State and 

local. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So we could look at the proximity or the 

nexus of facilities with that water facility perhaps, to look at who 

would handle those that are not in your jurisdiction. 

Admiral BONE. What I would tell you is that each plan identifies 

the exact perimeter and the layout of that facility, so that it is 

clear if it is a MTSA facility or not. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. But what I am saying is that for the facilities that are not subject to MTSA, what entity oversees them? 

Admiral BONE. Right now I don’t know anyone that is actually 

applying any standards along these lines other than the States 

themselves or the local communities that may have input particular requirements or safety requirements, and then did it under 

the guise of safety and protection of the public. 

Senator VOINOVICH. What do you think about using MTSA and 

the alternative security system as a prototype for expanding the 

method to a nationwide chemical security effort. 

Admiral BONE. I think it is a good model and it is a good framework, and I do not see why it would not work. I think that you 

have to look at the organizational constructs. You create an area 

maritime security committee and things like that, you may need to 

look at some other organizational construct further inland just because of the nature of the relationship or the entities and how DHS 

could best manage. 

Senator VOINOVICH. And you are confident that the MTSA regulations and the alternative security system that the industry has 

come up with, in terms of regulations, gets the job done in terms 

of securing these facilities? 

Admiral BONE. Yes, it has definitely improved the security of the 

facilities. Again, I want to make sure it is clear that this is a systemic approach. The hardening and the protective actions by the 

industry of the facilities is one piece of securing that facility from 

a terrorist event. It has to be layered, no different than from a vessel that is coming to the facility. When we look at our work overseas, if you are looking at a terrorist with intent to do harm——

Senator VOINOVICH. But what I am really interested in is that 

in terms of the regulations, that they get the job done. Do you feel 

comfortable that we do not have to come back and add another 50 

pages of regulations. Do you feel that the regulations you have get 

the job done? 

Admiral BONE. Right, I believe so. 

61

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Admiral, you know that I have great respect and I would say friendship with the Coast Guard and so 

much appreciate how you get things done, typically with ever reduced resources to do it but more assignments. That is really an 

anomaly, I must tell you. But you carry on in a form that makes 

us all proud. 

When you do an assessment of risk, do you do risk assessments 

throughout the ports that you have jurisdiction over or are involved 

in? 

Admiral BONE. Yes, sir. We have completed 55 risk assessments 

of what we believe to be the 55 most critical economic and military 

strategic ports in the United States. We have completed those. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So when you do a risk assessment, you try 

to measure the damage that might occur if an attack takes place, 

and that deals with things like volatility of material. How about 

the density of population nearby? Does that figure into it? 

Admiral BONE. We look at the threat vector, we multiple that by 

the vulnerability, and then by the consequence. And part of that 

consequence could be public safety. It could also be the economic 

harm. If you are looking at a port, if you are looking at a facility, 

then a facility—again, you will use the same assessment only if it 

is a microcosm of the port. But we looked at the combined port system and the vulnerabilities of that system, not just of an entity. 

And we also had threat assessments that were conducted as well 

so that you have some validity of what that threat—what is the 

true risk that you are trying to address. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Do you have a file, a list, a database that 

lists the most vulnerable and a scale that defines where all of these 

places stand in terms of one risk in one place compared to the 

other sites? 

Admiral BONE. Yes, Senator. We have, in fact, identified that——

Senator LAUTENBERG. Are you familiar with the——

Admiral BONE [CONTINUING]. For ports. And then we work with 

DHS to look at critical infrastructure and critical assets. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So when you look at the port of New York, 

Newark, Elizabeth, you are, I assume, familiar with the identification of the 2-mile stretch from Newark Liberty Airport to the harbor. And that is described as the most vulnerable, most damagesusceptible place in the country. 

Admiral BONE. I would hope it is not the most vulnerable now 

along the waterfront. But I would say that does present a very high 

risk. It is a high-risk environment that you have to have countermeasures for. I agree. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So you support applying resources based 

on risk assessments? 

Admiral BONE. Yes, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Because we do that on the maritime side, 

the port security side. And that is different than our grant programs that we have otherwise. And you know that Secretary 

Chertoff, the Administration, and the Chairmen of the 9/11 Commission all suggest focus on the risk and that is how we should distribute our resources. That is quite logical. 

62

What is the difference between a risk-based security decision and 

threat-based? Is there a difference or is that just terminology? 

Admiral BONE. It sounds to me like terminology. I think that 

risk includes the threat vector as well as the vulnerability or the 

probability of the event and the consequence when you say riskbased. If you say threat-based, then usually that is 

counterterrorism direct, meaning here is the threat, I go after the 

threat. I know exactly where it is, I counter the threat. So that 

may be the differential. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Admiral, I thank you for your service and 

the Coast Guard. 

Madam Chairman, I would ask that the record be kept open because I have to go, and I have other questions. I will not be able 

to hear the other panelists. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Admiral, welcome. 

I love your name. [Laughter.] 

I have to slip out, in just a minute, and go to the Capitol to participate in an event with one of our colleagues, Blanche Lincoln, 

and some others, on a matter. As a result, I cannot ask you but 

maybe one question. I am going to miss the beginning of the testimonies from the panelists who follow, and I want to especially welcome Beth Turner from DuPont, and I look forward to hopefully returning to ask some questions. 

My staff was good enough to prepare some real good questions, 

and my colleagues have asked them all. So I am just going to ask 

you one. 

Let’s say you are sitting on this side of the table, and we are sitting out there, and you are thinking about what do I do now. The 

hearing is over, time to craft the legislation and to introduce a bill. 

What would it look like? 

Admiral BONE. I think that it would start with the end in mind, 

meaning, again, what is the risk, the loss that is unacceptable. And 

I would frame it around that. 

We framed MTSA around a transportation security incident that 

looked at significant loss of life or direct impact on the transportation—significant impact on the transportation system as the 

baseline. You have to decide that, I think, again, inland for those 

facilities. Then I would craft legislation very similar to the protective measures when it comes to industry’s responsibility to execute 

security around their facilities. And I think that you may have 

some nuances in that maybe trucks go to one location where we 

have fleeting barges in a location, maybe trucks or railroad—trains 

have places that they may come together different than we do for 

barges. But I think you are going to have to look at the nuances 

between the transportation systems and the storage systems and 

develop it from there. 

But I think the framework is in place, and I think it is something, too, that we have seen that industry and a portion of the 

States and the local enforcement entities understand. So why 

63

would you want to create something that is so new or so different 

than now if I am over here on this side of the street I work this 

way, if I am on this side of the street, I have to do something completely different. 

Senator CARPER. That sounds like pretty good advice. Thank you. 

Thanks for your service as well and being with us today. 

Admiral BONE. Thank you, sir. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Thank you very much, Admiral. I think now we will be consulting with you as we begin to draft the legislation over the August recess, and I hope we can call upon you for advice. 

Admiral BONE. Yes. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I would now like to call forward our second panel, which consists 

of three security chiefs from different parts of the chemical sector 

as well as a local emergency manager. Our first witness will be 

Beth Turner. Ms. Turner is the Director of Global Operations Security for DuPont and is responsible for the security of DuPont’s operating assets around the world. Ms. Turner led the American Chemistry Council team that developed the original Responsible Care®

Security Code, about which we have heard so much, and the team 

also reassessed the code in 2004. She is currently serving as Chairman of the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council. Welcome. 

Our second witness is Jim Schellhorn, the Director of Environmental Health and Safety for Terra Industries. Mr. Schellhorn is 

responsible for security for Terra’s North American operations. In 

addition to providing testimony about his own experience with security for Terra’s fertilizer facilities, he will be representing the 

views of the Fertilizer Institute, and we thank you for being here 

today. 

Third, we will hear from John Chamberlain, who is the Corporate Security Manager for Shell Oil Company. Mr. Chamberlain 

has years of experience working with Shell’s refineries, chemical 

plants, and distribution terminals, as well as more than 30 years 

of law enforcement experience. He also serves as the Vice Chairman of the Security Committee for the American Petroleum Institute and will be representing both API and Shell today. 

And last, but certainly not least, we will hear from Chief Robert 

Full, who is the Fire Marshall and Emergency Management Coordinator for Allegheny County in Pennsylvania, an area that encompasses the city of Pittsburgh. Chief Full has more than three decades’ experience with hazardous materials and chemical safety. He 

has been a volunteer firefighter for 34 years and the county’s emergency manager for the past 7 years. He chairs or has chaired the 

local emergency planning committee for the last 6 years. 

I would also note that he has had firsthand experience with terrorism. On September 11, when Flight 93 crashed in Somerset 

County, Chief Full was part of the team that responded to that 

tragedy. Chief Full, we welcome you as well. 

Ms. Turner, we will start with you. Thank you. 

64

1The prepared statement of Ms. Turner appears in the Appendix on page 238. 

TESTIMONY OF BETH TURNER,1 DIRECTOR, GLOBAL OPERATIONS SECURITY, E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND CO., INC., 

WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 

Ms. TURNER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman and Senator Lieberman. Distinguished Members of the Committee, it is my 

pleasure to be here with you today. My name is Beth Turner, and 

as the Chairman indicated, I am Director of Global Operations Security for DuPont. In that responsibility and that role, I have responsibility for the security of our operating assets around the 

world, and the Chairman has indicated some of the other roles that 

I have so I will not repeat those. But it is a pleasure to be here, 

and thank you for the opportunity. 

My testimony will first address the actions that DuPont has 

taken to protect our employees, our communities, and our facilities, 

so first I will cover that; second, our views regarding the critical 

security legislation that we are here to discuss; and third, some 

brief comments on our activities and working with industry programs. 

For over 200 years, DuPont has focused on safety. The founders 

of our company established an uncompromising commitment to 

safety when we opened our first gunpowder operation in Delaware, 

and that safety commitment continues today. Our focus on safety 

is driven by what we, in DuPont, know as our core value commitment to our employees and the communities in which we operate. 

So, in that context, the world-changing events of September 11, 

2001, compelled us to view security in a different light. Quickly 

after the 2001 attacks, senior corporate leadership made security 

a high priority by integrating it into the company’s safety core 

value, and this sent a very strong and powerful message across the 

company about the importance of security. The bottom line of that 

change is hardening and heightening of security at our facilities 

across the company. We assessed over 500 locations worldwide, and 

we used a risk-based approach to sort these facilities into categories, and we called the highest category Category 1 facilities. A 

security leader was designated at each of these locations to become 

a focal point for security. These site security leaders have worked 

tirelessly since the events of 2001, and it is their outstanding work 

that I am so pleased to recognize today to this Committee. 

These security professionals partnered with process safety professionals in our company and conducted security vulnerability assessments of our Category 1 facilities, looking at equipment, staffing, 

procedures, the practices we have in place, and our preparedness. 

We accelerated the timing for the overall vulnerability assessment 

process and completed our upgrades and our verification of all Category 1 sites 9 to 12 months ahead of the American Chemistry 

Council deadline for that work. 

While I cannot speak publicly about specific measures that we 

took, I can describe in general terms the types of upgrades that we 

have implemented at our U.S. Category 1 facilities so you get an 

idea of the kinds of things we have done. 

Equipment upgrades include fencing, motorized gates, turnstiles, 

signage, access control systems, video surveillance, additional lightVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:59 May 18, 2006 Jkt 023157 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\23157.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
65

ing, fence-associated electronic intrusion detection systems and 

alarm monitoring, crash gates, and barricades. We have since implemented a special maintenance program to ensure that this new 

equipment remains functional and reliable, and we have another 

round of upgrades currently underway. 

Other measures that we implemented include increased patrols 

of site perimeters, significant reductions in traffic coming on site, 

more stringent identification checks, and increased inspections of 

rail cars, vehicles, and other trucks and other vehicles on site. 

In addition, our entire workforce is very alert to suspicious activities, and I will talk more about that in just a few minutes. 

Security officer staffing has been significantly increased. These 

officers received additional training, and they are continually retrained. 

Strong process safety management is a key part of our DuPont 

safety culture, and it is a very important means to protect our employees and our contractors. Process safety analyses are performed 

to identify ongoing improvements, and they consistently include inherently safer evaluations. 

We require extensive criminal background checks for all employees upon hiring and all contractors that seek access to a DuPont 

U.S. site. 

We have long-standing relationships with local law enforcement 

and emergency planners, and these relationships have been reinforced. Together, we train, we drill, we exercise, we work together 

on investigation of suspicious activities. We are active in local 

emergency planning committees and mutual aid groups and, in 

fact, we offer our own DuPont transportation emergency response 

teams to assist other companies in transportation incidents. 

We work with a range of trade associations and Federal Government agencies such as DHS, the Coast Guard, the FBI, and the 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and we have found government to be 

a very willing and helpful partner in our efforts to secure our sites. 

When the national threat level is elevated, security measures are 

immediately reassessed by headquarters and by individual sites, 

even if there is no connection to the chemical industry or DuPont. 

Additional measures that we might implement are determined 

based on the specific threat environment at the time. Each DuPont 

Category 1 site has carefully planned for security actions that 

might be required in extreme circumstances, and we have an automated crisis notification system that can contact all of these sites 

within 10 minutes or less. 

Perhaps the most powerful security measure activated since September 11 is the involvement of our employees and our contractors. 

They have been trained to be alert and to report anything unusual, 

and believe me, they do. 

In summary, DuPont and our employees have done a lot, and our 

security enhancements are continuing. We recognize that an effective security program is a journey. It requires constant vigilance 

and continual improvement, and we are committed to that. 

So now I would like to turn to the Federal legislation. While 

many security measures have been implemented voluntarily, we 

believe that there is an important role in government to ensure 

that all chemical sites are taking appropriate action. Accordingly, 

66

DuPont supports meaningful and effective legislation and believes 

that ten important elements should be addressed, and I now will 

go through those briefly. 

First, we believe the legislation must have a clear security focus 

so that we get the job done in a timely and effective manner. 

Second, legislation should be risk-based so that government and 

the private sector resources can focus where they can provide the 

greatest benefit. 

Third, we believe that regulatory authority for the chemical sector should reside with DHS. DHS and the sector are already working together and also DHS regulates portions of our sector through 

the Maritime Transportation Security Act, as has been discussed. 

Fourth, we believe that chemical security legislation should be 

guided by a clear Federal program rather than a patchwork of 

State and local programs. 

Fifth, it is important to recognize the different yet complementary roles for government and the private sector in security matters. The private sector can and should take reasonable steps to secure its facilities against threats, but it is the role of government 

to defend the Nation’s infrastructure. 

Sixth, flexibility is important. Our sector is very diverse. In DuPont alone, we operate thousands of chemical processes, employing 

a wide range of raw materials in both rural and urban locations. 

Chemical security legislation should be risk-based and allow DHS 

to tailor its regulations with the diversity of the sector in mind. 

Seventh, is the Maritime Transportation Security Act. It has 

proven, in my opinion, to be a very effective security regulation for 

DuPont facilities, and I suggest that it be a model for regulating 

the highest-priority facilities. 

Eighth, the work already done under programs such as Responsible Care® and the Maritime Transportation Security Act has materially enhanced security, and these prior efforts must be credited. 

Ninth is the protection of sensitive security information, and protection of that information is critical. We must obtain strong protection for information that we need to ensure does not get into the 

hands of the wrong people. 

The final issue is inherent safety, commonly referred to as inherently safer technology, or IST. As the Committee knows, IST is a 

process safety matter, and we believe that it should stay with the 

safety arena and not be mandated in the chemical security context. 

DuPont believes that inherently safer technology is a mainstream 

component of process safety and that it has an important role to 

play in security. And inherently safer has not only been an integral 

part of our process safety system for many decades. In addition, it 

is now part of the security vulnerability assessment process that 

we all ran and the teams that conducted those assessments included both security and safety professionals at the table, the safety professionals being the ones that understand IST. 

Each chemical process is complex and unique, a complex array 

of piping and pressure vessels, tanks, pumps, valves, raw materials, and operating conditions at a variety of temperatures and 

pressures. So given the complex and unique nature of each process, 

safety evaluations do require special expertise and consideration of 

a wide range of possibilities for inherently safer operation. ThereVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:59 May 18, 2006 Jkt 023157 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\23157.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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1The prepared statement of Mr. Schellhorn with an attachment appears in the Appendix on 

page 253. 

fore, companies must have the flexibility to assess and decide upon 

options. 

I was also asked to comment on the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council in my role as Chair of the group. I am pleased to 

report that the council is strong, and after only one year of existence has tackled a number of substantive issues. I can speak further about the council during the question-and-answer session. 

In closing, Madam Chairman, I want to thank you and the Members of the Committee for allowing me to share what DuPont has 

done to build a strong security system and process in place in our 

operations. We have very successfully integrated security, engagement, and responsibility into our culture, and we know there is 

more to do. We take this responsibility very seriously, Madam 

Chairman, and we appreciate the trust and the confidence that has 

been placed in us by the public and government. Therefore, we are 

taking the necessary actions to appropriately harden and heighten 

security across the company. 

Our corporate leadership is very committed to continually 

strengthening security. Security and safety of our operations are 

critical to our employees and neighbors and, in fact, are essential 

to the future of the company. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. We appreciate the important work of this Committee, and we have enjoyed 

working with you to date and hope we can do that in the future. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Schellhorn. 

TESTIMONY OF JIM SCHELLHORN,1 DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY, TERRA INDUSTRIES, INC., ON 

BEHALF OF THE FERTILIZER INSTITUTE 

Mr. SCHELLHORN. Thank you. Madam Chairman and Members of 

the Committee, I am Jim Schellhorn. I am the Director of Environmental Health and Safety for Terra Industries and am responsible 

for security for Terra’s North American operations. I am here today 

to testify on behalf of The Fertilizer Institute. TFI is the leading 

voice of the Nation’s fertilizer industry, representing the public policy, communication, and statistical needs of manufacturers, producers, retailers, and transporters of fertilizer. I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today. 

Terra is headquartered in Sioux City, Iowa. We are a leading 

international producer of nitrogen fertilizers. Our primary products 

are anhydrous ammonia, ammonium nitrate, urea, and urea ammonium nitrate solution. Our facilities operate 24 hours a day, 7 days 

a week, and Terra employs approximately 1,200 people in North 

America and the United Kingdom. We are proud of the vital role 

the fertilizer industry plays in modern agriculture. 

Fertilizer is essential to food production. Without the contribution of our fertilizers to crop production, roughly one-third of the 

world’s population would be without food. Because food production 

depletes soil nutrient supplies, farmers rely on fertilizers to keep 

the soil productive. With the help of commercial fertilizer, North 

68

American farmers are able to produce the most abundant and affordable food in the world. 

The fertilizer industry is very diverse. Companies such as Terra 

produce and sell fertilizer into the retail distribution system, which 

in turn sells it to farmer customers. Most of our production and 

storage facilities, like many others in the industry, are located in 

rural communities. For instance, Terra’s Verdigris plant, where I 

work, is located in a rural area of northeast Oklahoma near the 

Tulsa port of Catoosa. Because we produce and store anhydrous 

ammonia and because our operations include a waterfront facility, 

the Verdigris plant is subject to many Federal safety, security, and 

environmental regulations, including OSHA’s process safety management standard, the U.S. Coast Guard’s facilities security regulations under the Maritime Transportation Security Act, or MTSA, 

and EPA’s risk management program requirements. Companywide, in the United States, Terra has five locations subject to 

MTSA and nine locations subject to PSM and RMP requirements. 

Shortly after the events of September 11, TFI formed a security 

task force, of which Terra is a member. In September 2002, TFI’s 

security task force developed and the board of directors adopted an 

industry Security Code of Management Practices designed to help 

the fertilizer industry secure the manufacture and transport of its 

products. 

The voluntary code calls on the industry to use methodologies developed by the Center for Chemical Process Safety, the Synthetic 

Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, or an equivalent 

methodology when conducting security vulnerability assessments, 

or SVAs, and when making security-related improvements. 

The code establishes benchmarks for conducting SVAs and implementing security measures, for conducting employee training and 

drills, for communicating with law enforcement, conducting audits, 

and verifying physical site security measures through a third 

party, and the code provides timelines for these activities by ranking facilities at high, medium, and low risk levels. 

I would like to take a moment and discuss specific measures 

Terra has taken and continues to undertake to secure our facilities 

and the products we produce. 

After TFI developed the security code, we immediately began to 

conduct security vulnerability assessments and audits at all of our 

facilities. We used both outside law enforcement experts and internal resources to identify vulnerabilities, implement countermeasures, and develop security plans. The process we utilized 

ranked both our facilities and the vulnerabilities we identified 

based upon risk. Using those rankings, we began to address the 

highest risks first. 

Since September 11, Terra has installed many physical security 

improvements, including additional lighting, fences, physical barricades, and video monitors at strategic locations. All gates are 

locked when unattended, and facility access is tightly controlled by 

security or Terra employees 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. All of 

our product carriers and drivers are pre-approved. All deliveries to 

our facilities are checked at the gate prior to authorizing access. 

And criminal background checks are required for all contractors 

and all Terra employees. 

69

We have also recently implemented a system to ensure delivery 

receipts for all truck shipments of ammonium nitrate from Terraowned facilities. All of our facilities now have active security plans, 

and our waterfront facilities are in compliance with the Coast 

Guard facility security regulations. 

Terra Industries and other members of TFI have undertaken tremendous efforts to ensure that criminals intent on harming our 

country cannot purchase and misuse fertilizer products. For example, after the tragedy in Oklahoma City in 1995, the fertilizer industry partnered with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 

and Explosives in outreach programs called ‘‘Be Aware for America’’ and ‘‘Be Secure for America,’’ which were aimed at protecting 

our products and our places of business. 

After the terrorist attack on September 11, the fertilizer industry 

launched ‘‘America’s Security Begins with You,’’ a new program, 

which has been endorsed by ATF, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Association of American Plant Food Control Officials, who regulate fertilizer at the State level. The campaign urges 

that security plans be developed and implemented, records of sales 

be maintained, and that law enforcement be alerted to any suspicious activity. 

These programs have primarily focused on ammonium nitrate, 

the fertilizer used in the Oklahoma City bombing. Recognizing the 

changing nature of the Nation’s security, Senators Cochran, Pryor, 

Roberts, and Chambliss recently introduced the Secure Handling of 

Ammonium Nitrate Act of 2005. The bill directs the Department of 

Homeland Security to promulgate regulations requiring all facilities that handle ammonium fertilizer to register at the State level 

and maintain records for all purchases of ammonium nitrate. The 

fertilizer industry’s support of the Senate legislation—and parallel 

legislation introduced in the House—takes the industry’s voluntary 

programs to the next level through the creation of a uniform Federal set of rules for sellers and purchasers of ammonium nitrate. 

We believe that chemical facilities will most effectively address 

security when given the flexibility to use measures that will address the risks specific to each facility. Quite simply, we at Terra 

and others in the industry have not employed a one-size-fits-all approach at our facilities, and we believe that legislation requiring us 

to do so would be counterproductive. 

Equally important, Congress must recognize the security measures already taken and facilities covered under other Federal regulations, such as the Coast Guard’s facility security requirements, to 

avoid duplicate regulations. 

There has also been considerable debate over whether Congress 

should mandate the use of inherently safer technologies, or IST. 

IST is not a security measure. It is a safety concept that has been 

misapplied by some groups in a way that we fear could lead to the 

ban or restricted use of basic nitrogen fertilizers. For instance, if 

anhydrous ammonia manufacture was banned in the United States 

as a result of an IST mandate, there would be no nitrogen fertilizer 

manufacturing in the United States because ammonia is the basic 

feedstock for all other nitrogen fertilizer. U.S. farmers would have 

to rely on imported fertilizer to grow their crops, and indirectly, the 

70

1The prepared statement of Mr. Chamberlain appears in the Appendix on page 264. 

American public would have to rely on foreign fertilizer for their 

food supply. 

Terra and the fertilizer industry are not opposed to evaluating 

process safety of our operations and considering potential safety 

improvements. On the contrary, process hazard analyses and risk 

assessments we have conducted as part of our PSM and RMP programs and the security vulnerability assessments we have performed include consideration of ways to minimize hazards. However, this type of hazard assessment can only work when applied 

by a site owner’s engineers and safety professionals who truly understand the facility’s operations. 

Madam Chairman and Members of the Committee, American 

farmers, fertilizer producers, and retailers are committed to security. We have demonstrated that commitment through the significant number of voluntary security steps we have taken and will 

continue to take. Without question, we very much want to help 

Congress in its endeavors to shield this country from acts of terrorism. We support Department of Homeland Security Secretary 

Chertoff’s efforts to evaluate the Nation’s vulnerabilities and 

prioritize the Federal Government’s response based on risk assessment. 

As the Federal Government proposes its suggestions for chemical 

facility security legislation, we recommend such proposals be based 

on reasonable, clear, and equitable performance standards. TFI and 

its members believe that to be effective, fair, realistic, and feasible 

to implement, the legislation must: Provide for the varying levels 

of risk posed by different kinds of chemical facilities; recognize the 

security measures our industry has already taken and complement 

Federal regulations with which we already comply; and reject attempts to mandate inherently safer technology. 

Furthermore, we urge that the Federal regulations preempt any 

such action by State or local governments. Layering Federal regulation upon a patchwork of State regulations is, at best, inefficient 

and, at its worst, an impediment to efficient compliance. 

I thank you for the opportunity to testify and look forward to answering any questions you might have. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN P. CHAMBERLAIN,1 SECURITY MANAGER, ASSET PROTECTION SERVICES, CORPORATE SECURITY, SHELL OIL COMPANY, ON BEHALF OF SHELL OIL COMPANY AND THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE 

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Chairman Collins, Ranking Member Lieberman and Members of the Committee, my name is John Chamberlain. I am a Manager with Corporate Security for Shell Oil Company. I also serve as the Vice Chairman of the Security Committee 

for the American Petroleum Institute. I have many years of experience working with Shell’s energy operations, and also 30 years of 

law enforcement experience. 

I am pleased to appear before you today to testify on the issue 

of chemical security, representing both Shell Oil and the American 

Petroleum Institute, API. 

71

1The document entitled ‘‘Security Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum 

and Petrochemical Industries, Second Edition,’’ October 2004, American Petroleum Institute, 

NPRA, submitted by Mr. Chamberlain appears in the Appendix on page 277. 

The U.S. oil and natural gas industry is committed to protecting 

the reliable supply network of fuels and products to keep our economy growing. Our industry has long operated globally, and often in 

unstable regions overseas, where security is an integral part of providing for the world’s energy needs. 

After September 11, 2001, the industry partnered with Federal, 

State, and local authorities to reevaluate and strengthen our domestic security. Within months of the attack, the industry developed security measures for all segments of the oil and gas network, 

including pipelines, refineries, terminals, and others. 

One reason I believe the industry was able to move so quickly 

is that we have high caliber security professionals with both military and law enforcement backgrounds on our staff. These former 

FBI, Secret Service, and Delta Force personnel are experts in physical security, and they are employed protecting our industry’s assets. A large number of security personnel in the oil and gas industry, including myself, have security clearances necessary for classified briefings we have with the Federal intelligence community, 

and that is important. 

I want to speak briefly about two areas: one, the numerous broad 

actions to address security in the energy sector that we support, including industry actions, Federal security laws, and public/private 

sector partnerships; and two, I want to talk about specific proposals that we think would be counterproductive to security. 

Although it is rarely reported on, the oil and natural gas industry, in partnership with government agencies, has taken quite 

thorough and painstaking actions to improve security. We have operated under new Federal security law, Federal security partnerships, industrial practices, and enhanced intelligence sharing 

networks, and we support these ongoing efforts. Little has been 

communicated about the actions that Congress, industry, government agencies, State and local first responders have taken. Examples of these actions are—what we heard today—the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act, the TSA background check requirements under the PATRIOT Act, and the Department of Transportation’s security requirements for hazardous materials, all security 

laws that we operate under and support. 

The industry collectively created industry-wide methods to address two stages of security, first finding the weaknesses and then 

protecting them. First API and the National Petrochemical Refiners Association produced the methodology for SVA or Security Vulnerability Assessment. This is a method for managers to identify 

security vulnerabilities in the wide range of oil and natural gas operations. This SVA methodology is sophisticated. It is a risk-based 

tool used to identify the security hazards, threats and vulnerabilities. We co-wrote this with the Department of Energy’s security personnel, and DHS today is using this methodology to train 

their field inspectors. 

I would like to submit a copy of this document for the record.1

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection, Mr. Chamberlain. Thank 

you. 

72

1 ‘‘Security Guidelines for the Petroleum Industry,’’ American Petroleum Institute, April 2005, 

submitted by Mr. Chamberlain appears in the Appendix on page 428. 

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. In addition, this security tool is accepted by 

the American Chemistry Council’s Responsible Care Code and is an 

example of the government-recognized industry practices that are 

now in operation in this business. 

API and Federal security personnel next completed the Security 

Guidelines for the Petroleum Industry. This booklet instructs operators and plant managers in how to protect facilities and respond 

to changes in the threat level. The third edition was completed earlier this summer. These are working methods and countermeasures 

the oil sector uses to protect all segments of industries, and I would 

like to also submit this after testimony.1

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection, Mr. Chamberlain. Thank 

you. 

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Some legislators may be tempted to treat security as a concern to be addressed with proscriptive inflexible regulations. This would result in a one-size-fits-all approach that provides a roadmap for terrorists in my opinion. We ask that you recognize that a terrorist, unlike a pollutant or physical workplace environment, is clever, deliberate, and has the ability to adapt 

against a checklist of arbitrary rules. This is one reason we value 

our close professional partnership with government, industries, and 

the intelligence community. 

Let me give you an example of a more risk-based approach. Like 

other integrated oil companies, Shell and other API members have 

joined with the Department of Homeland Security in developing a 

common system for comparing security risks across the Nation’s 

very critical infrastructure. The system is called Risk Assessment 

and Management of Critical Asset protection and has the acronym 

of RAMCAP. It will give Congress and the Executive Branch, 

through the Department of Homeland Security, the tools they need 

to make decisions and allocate resources for security. We support 

the risk-based concept being adopted in the RAMCAP program. 

Overall, we hope that you would avoid provisions that would be 

counterproductive to the gains that we have made in security since 

September 11. There are specific proposals that we have concern 

would be disruptive to our industrial security operations. Although 

we are in the energy business, some proposals to address the security of chemical sites could affect the energy industry, as well as 

agricultural, water treatment, food, dairy processing, and other 

small businesses. These U.S. industries and farms are essential for 

our national security and economic vitality and are not traditionally thought of as chemical industry facilities. 

Concerning inherently safer technology, we strongly oppose any 

environmental mandates for inherently safer technology pursued 

under the guise of security. It would be counterproductive to protecting our infrastructure. Security law covering companies should 

be risk-based and not seek to legislate out the elimination of all 

risk, which quite frankly is impossible. Private farms and company 

facilities that need to use dangerous substances intensify their security plans based on the risk level. 

73

Infrastructure security laws already passed by Congress, such as 

the Maritime Transportation Security Act, the Bioterrorism Act, require vulnerability assessments and security plans for private facilities and vessels, but they do not create a new requirement for 

IST. In fact, no other security law requires IST and that is for good 

reason. 

First, creating an inherently safer technology requirement for 

farms and businesses and others in the name of national security 

could actually increase risk. For example, in reducing volumes of 

hazardous chemicals stored at a facility, you may reduce the on-site 

risk, but consequently you could increase the transportation risk 

where the material has to be transported by rail, truck, or barge 

traffic to the site that used to keep it on site, and this could potentially increase risk to the overall system. 

Under new IST authority, a government order for a change to 

materials or processes could very well result in accidental or intentional harm and create a new liability for complying with the law. 

Process safety concepts are already incorporated under existing 

Federal health and safety requirements. They are both in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Process Safety Management Program and the EPA’s Risk Management Program. 

American farms and companies will continue to comply with Federal and State and local requirements as they are today. Farms 

and company facilities, through self-interest, consider the safest, 

most innovative and cost-effective technology as they do business. 

New government mandates for IST could require bureaucrats without expertise and courts to determine the best technology of businesses. Creating a new security IST authority will allow government micro-management in mandating substitutions for all processes and substances, and this would greatly inhibit and limit operational flexibility and innovation. 

I want to mention information protection, too. It has been mentioned earlier. But in addition to FOIA exemption, I believe information protection is extremely important in anything to do with security legislation. I would like to see additional protections made 

to prevent the leak of vulnerability information which could provide a roadmap to terrorists or other criminals. Any information 

developed in regard to this security legislation should be protected 

from civil discovery. 

I want to mention, too, MTSA. We have heard a lot about it already. Should the Committee conclude that new legislation is needed, we would suggest that it not apply to facilities already covered 

under the existing MTSA legislation. We would also suggest that 

sites that contain areas only partially covered by MTSA have the 

option for the entire facility to be covered by MTSA instead of a 

new law, something the Senator questioned the Admiral about earlier. We would support that as it would avoid conflicting regulations in a single facility, to have part of it under MTSA and part 

of it under some other requirement when you have a common management for the site. 

Examining the MTSA security law, I would like to highlight a 

few characteristics for your consideration. In implementing a broad 

new security law, the Coast Guard has overall done a successful job 

without impeding the commerce it protects. This is a credit to the 

74

1The prepared statement of Mr. Full appears in the Appendix on page 272. 

Coast Guard century-long experience in protecting onshore and offshore commerce, as well as the existing relationships of local stakeholders and the respective captains of the port. Without this security expertise and these relationships with private sector operations, the MTSA would not have been able to be successful. Many 

agencies do not have the security expertise of the Coast Guard and 

should not have responsibility for counterterrorism. 

Like the MTSA, other Federal security laws have protected and 

strengthened our infrastructure, instead of having a Federal bureaucracy attempt to redraw or micromanage how private operators function. In other words, we believe that a security rule or law 

has to be a risk-based philosophy. The required security protections 

need to meet the risk under which the facility is operating. 

In conclusion, oil and natural gas operations are safer now and 

more secure as a result of the public/private partnerships and numerous new Federal security requirements. We urge the Committee to carefully consider the effect any new Federal law would 

have upon existing security laws, industry practices, and the partnerships that have been developed with government thus far. 

The oil and gas industry is committed to protecting the reliable 

supply, supply network of fuels and products to keep our economy 

growing, and whether or not new security legislation is passed, we 

are going to continue to work with the government to consistently 

reevaluate and improve security of U.S. oil and gas operations. 

I thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Chief Full, welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF CHIEF ROBERT A. FULL,1 FIRE MARSHAL/

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COORDINATOR, ALLEGHENY 

COUNTY (PA) DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY SERVICES 

Mr. FULL. Good morning, Chairman Collins and Senators. It is 

a distinct honor and privilege to be invited here to testify on behalf 

of chemical facility security today and its impact to the local and 

county level of government. My County Chief Executive, Dan 

Onorato, extends his appreciation for this opportunity as well. 

I speak this morning as a 30-year first responder as a firefighter, 

paramedic, and a hazardous materials technician, as both a career 

professional and a volunteer firefighter from Allegheny County in 

Southwestern Pennsylvania. I serve as my county’s local Emergency Management Coordinator, and also the local Emergency 

Planning Committee Chairperson. I also have had the privilege to 

serve as the chairman of one of our Regional Counterterrorism 

Task Forces in Pennsylvania, representing 13 counties, a population of 3.1 million people, which would also include the city of 

Pittsburgh. 

Allegheny County in Pennsylvania has the city of Pittsburgh as 

its county seat and is famous for Three Rivers, steel making, research centers, world class medical systems, education institutions 

such as the University of Pittsburgh, Duquesne, and Carnegie Mellon, major transportation systems, and the Pittsburgh Steelers and 

Pirates. The county covers some 730 square miles with a popuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:59 May 18, 2006 Jkt 023157 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\23157.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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lation of 1.3 million residents, and most unusual, with 130 separate 

local municipalities. 

This morning as I awoke early to fly here, I took a shower and 

made my coffee with crystal clean and safe water. My clothes have 

synthetics in them. The breakfast fruits that I enjoyed were free 

from bacteria and were hearty from the vine. The fuel in both my 

car and the airplane I flew in worked extremely well today. As I 

look around here I see so much of the positives and the need for 

a strong and safe chemical industry. It has been said and reinforced that one of the main reasons the United States enjoys the 

highest standard of living is through the use of our chemicals in 

all aspects of our daily lives. 

On behalf of those that I represent, the first responder community and local government, we could not agree more in the need to 

support and protect our chemical industry. I am humbled to be 

with such fine representatives of the chemical industry. I know 

personally firsthand the representatives from these various organizations have done an outstanding job in working with us at times 

at the local level to provide us training and resources so we can 

better serve the public. 

As a first responder, paramount to the success of doing your job 

is to be able to protect lives and property during emergencies. An 

individual comes into public safety as a first responder and he/she 

is primarily trained to deal with the aftermath of an incident which 

was caused by perhaps an accident, an act of God, or an intentional 

act. 

Every day in this country the men and women of our public safety departments, police, fire, emergency medical services, 911, demonstrate great courage and conviction to be the best they can be. 

These folks plan, train, exercise, and respond to any emergency no 

matter what the case. No matter how good a public safety organization is, there will be times that their training, skills, knowledge, 

capabilities will be overwhelmed, or they may not have the expertise to deal effectively with the situation. 

To minimize this scenario, having a strong emergency plan and 

relationships with pertinent persons in advance pays dividends 

each day at the local level across America. It is cliche ́, but it is not 

the time or place to exchange business cards during the time of an 

emergency. 

I would like to focus now on chemical safety. In 1986, the Federal Government enacted the SARA Title III, Emergency Planning 

and Community Right to Know Act. The overall success of this law 

cannot be overstated and can be measured in my county and 

throughout the country by the reduction in chemical spill emergencies, better informed employees and responders during emergencies, Federal, State, and local government input and coordination, and so much more. 

In my career I have had an opportunity to specialize in hazardous materials response emergencies. I was the first city of Pittsburgh Hazardous Materials Chief and served in that capacity for 

13 years, and today I oversee five hazardous materials teams in my 

county, and I have logged in excess of 2,000 responses to hazardous 

material emergencies. 

76

I have come to see firsthand the potential life-threatening situations that are involved when chemicals are accidentally or intentionally released from their containers and processes. The chemicals and materials are found in fixed facilities during production, 

transfer, storage, and along with the transportation to and from 

market via highway, railroad, water, air, and pipeline. Responding 

to chemical spills requires quick informed decisionmaking along 

with specialized tools and equipment. Incidents of vapor clouds, 

running liquid spills, unidentified products, and fires severely complicate local response actions, many times to the point that a community may not be able to react fast enough to save its residents. 

Transportation accidents involving chemicals provide even a greater challenge as they move in and out of our neighborhoods, by our 

schools, homes, and places of business. 

The SARA Title III law targeting fixed chemical facilities, followed by similar legislation in my Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 

has directly contributed to saving lives, property, and the environment. The SARA law has allowed us to be proactive through planning, training, and networking versus reacting and always responding to the unknown and not knowing the players when you 

get there. The Federal Government has served us all well with this 

law, but we need to update some of the provisions to meet the 

needs of today. 

I believe we all knew it would come some day or another, and 

never did any of us expect it to come in a manner so coordinated 

with such devastating results as it did on September 11. It did, and 

we should have learned from it and should not forget. I was always 

told by my father that mistakes and accidents can and will happen. 

Most importantly you learn and work to make sure that you do not 

make the same mistake twice. We may have missed it the first 

time to a degree, but let us do everything to prevent it from happening a second time. The next time when it comes, we are told 

by the top security minds in our government, it may be greater in 

magnitude with even more loss of life and property, utilizing weapons of mass destruction, involving chemicals, biological, nuclear, radioactive materials, and explosive devices. We need to get and be 

ready now. 

At the local government and first responder levels we are concerned that our residents believe that we can protect them effectively against the threat of WMD and chemical releases from a terrorist act, which could easily be one of our own chemical facilities 

in our neighborhoods. 

Our men and women on the front lines in our communities have 

been working hard in getting some of the special training and have 

begun to reap the benefit of some of the generous homeland funding that has been provided by this Congress and the President by 

putting new specialized equipment in the hands of first responders 

and local governments and extra training. The sharing of intelligence between the levels of government has not been better. However, we are not where we need to be as of yet and have a long 

way to go, but we are better off today than we were yesterday. 

Terrorism threat assessments and uniform strategies that deal 

with them are a common requirement and a need at all levels of 

government. In looking at all the potential hazards and threats to 

77

our communities, chemical facilities and their transportation rise 

with just a few others to the very top. It is not that we do not know 

what is in the plant or what is being transported in most cases. We 

do, through the impact of the Federal and State laws. But we do 

not know for sure what safety and security measures are in place 

to keep something or someone from getting to them. Can the bad 

guys use them against us? The fact is that there are some chemicals and materials, if released from their containers for whatever 

reason or by a terrorist, that can greatly cause injury and death 

to our unprotected public. We have to make sure that we do everything in our collective powers to make sure that we understand 

and make chemical facilities and their transportation safe. 

Madam Chairman and Members of this Committee, today you 

are hearing from some of the most notable and responsible chemical companies in our country. I have had the opportunity to work 

with these folks and their people in safety and response personnel. 

The communities are top notch, well trained. They have excellent 

plans. They are in good financial condition and have in most cases 

good security systems. 

Unfortunately, that is not the case around the country for many 

of us at the local level. There are so many other companies that 

are in our neighborhoods that are less fortunate that really concern 

us and pose a unique risk. These companies will not do anything 

unless there is some force of law to cause them to do it. 

The American Chemistry Council has done a good job in stepping 

up to the plate with providing a voluntary program with materials 

and training on chemical plant security. A problem exists that it 

is voluntary, and second, not all companies belong to the Council, 

especially in my county. 

Today we have an opportunity to be proactive versus reactive. 

Chemical plant safety and transportation is an issue that needs to 

be and should be addressed on a national level to ensure uniformity, and not at the State level, even though my State government has a fabulous State law that was enacted utilizing the SARA 

law and additional legislation from the Federal Government as a 

template. 

I do not have a political or legislative expertise on whether or not 

a new law or tweaking an old one is the best way to go. I leave 

that, and the people that I represent, we leave that to you. 

I was around in the 1980s when there was a great outcry from 

the chemical industry about how the SARA Title III law was unnecessary and that the industry voluntary program for planning 

and response was more than adequate. The law almost was not enacted. It took a real wake-up call. It took several thousands of folks 

to die in Bhopal, India, coupled with an incident in West Virginia 

that was just on the brink of catastrophe to raise enough concern 

that our Congress enacted the law. 

Today we hear some of the same in different forms, or you have 

heard some of the same perhaps from other folks testifying before 

you in the past. Security, trade secrets, plans, products, we have 

heard it all before. What if it gets out, etc.? Together we can work 

it out. 

The local governments and the people that are going to be responding to these incidents need to be a part of the process and be 

78

part of the solution because we are the ones on the front lines who 

are going to be out there responding when that emergency comes 

in, no matter what. We speak to international terrorism, but we 

know that we have grown some phenomenal terrorists at home as 

well. That is not to say that even a domestic terrorism event cannot be superseded by somebody who is mentally deranged, whether 

he is an employee of the company or not. 

I do not know of many trade secrets that have been given up or 

critical information that has been given out. If so, then that information and those folks that made that available inappropriately 

should be held accountable and sanctions for doing so should be applied. 

LEPCs have been a great tool to ensure effective planning and 

community safety. We can have experienced security people look 

over the plans as necessary. I do not advocate LEPCs as a policing 

agency by any stretch of the imagination for security. We can utilize the JTTFs, which are in place around the country. We have 

great relationships with U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security, and our local law enforcement, but I do advocate 

that we cannot appreciate or effectively plan for incidents within 

our jurisdictions without the full benefit of all aspects of the hazards, the risks, and the vulnerabilities that we face. 

The public is counting on us. I know my residents are counting 

on me and the 10,000 first responders in my county. Shame on all 

of us if we wait until it is too late. We can do something now, and 

we should move forward. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Chief. I think your local Chamber of Commerce ought to give you a special award for getting in 

all of the advantages of the county in which you live, and some beyond them as well. 

At the end of your testimony you talked about an issue that we 

are going to have to deal with as we draft legislation, and that has 

to do with information sharing and the protection of sensitive security information. Under MTSA, the vulnerability assessments and 

security plans for individual facilities are maintained by the Captain of the Port, and a copy is also kept at the Coast Guard headquarters in Washington, DC. Do you believe that local law enforcement ought to also have access to or a copy of the vulnerability assessment? Where do we draw the line? 

I will tell you that one chemical company told me that the Coast 

Guard actually lost its security plan. And I have great respect and 

admiration for the Coast Guard, but it seems to me if we are concerned about information that that was not a good indicator. But 

who should have access? Where should these vulnerability assessments, which obviously contain very sensitive information, and security plans be kept and who should have access to them? 

Mr. FULL. Well, clearly, we have heard today, Senator, that there 

is an outstanding program that goes on where the Coast Guard 

does deal with the maritime issues of chemical plant security. I believe that those files, they are kept with the Captain of the Port, 

is just that, they are kept with the Captain of the Port right now. 

I would argue the fact that a good bit of that information that 

has probably been developed has been developed without any local 

input or any knowledge of the local responders that may be inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:59 May 18, 2006 Jkt 023157 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\23157.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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volved with that in concert with local law enforcement or anybody 

that is familiar with security aspects from anywhere other than the 

maritime folks. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Chamberlain, what is your answer to 

that? What is your advice to the Committee on how can we strike 

the right balance between ensuring the security of this very sensitive information, and yet making sure that if someone like Chief 

Full, who is going to be called upon to respond, understands what 

security issues or vulnerabilities may exist at a plant? 

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. The facility security plan goes into tremendous amount of detail on single-point sources that could shut down 

your facility, basically your Achilles heel, and that is what you are 

going to identify and then protect against. Those types of things I 

think need to be kept classified, as they are today. 

We work closely, and our facilities, wherever we operate, have 

close relationships with local first responder groups. We usually 

have various law enforcement and safety committees that we are 

active on, so we are not trying to surprise anybody in the types of 

issues that they may need to be responding to. The response is 

typically going to be after the fact, after something has occurred. 

Part of the plan is to try to prevent something from occurring. I 

think what you have under MTSA is a very workable approach. It 

has worked so far so well. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Schellhorn, should chemical facilities 

maintain vulnerability assessments and security plans on their site 

or on file with the Department of Homeland Security in Washington? What are your views on this as we are drafting legislation? 

Mr. SCHELLHORN. They certainly should maintain a copy of the 

vulnerability assessment on site, and we do that now under MTSA, 

and a copy of that vulnerability assessment and plan, I would 

think, would be submitted to the regulatory authority, like we do 

now under MTSA. I do not think a copy should be submitted to the 

local fire department or emergency management authority. My personal opinion is you want to limit the distribution of those plans 

and vulnerability assessments. 

However, what we have done is we invite the local authorities, 

the local emergency management agency, the LEPC chairman, the 

local law enforcement authorities to our facility. We share the details of our security plan and our vulnerability assessment with 

those individuals at our site so that they are familiar with what 

we are doing and familiar with the details of our security program. 

Chairman COLLINS. Ms. Turner, what is the right balance here 

from your perspective? How do we ensure that this very sensitive 

information does not fall into the wrong hands, and yet make sure 

that first responder groups or those who would be called upon to 

act in the event of a terrorist attack on a chemical facility or an 

accidental spill do have the information they need? What is your 

advice to us? 

Ms. TURNER. I think it is extremely important that the first responders have access to the information they need in order to know 

what to expect from the hazards that they are going to be responding to, and that information is freely shared today so that our first 

responders know the hazards they could encounter, what kind of 

80

equipment they need to have with them, and that is very important 

to keep that information there so they can access that. 

We might think about that information as different than the 

vulnerabilities that are associated with getting into a chemical facility, as you just said, whether it is accidental or intentional, the 

nature of the chemical information is what you need, different than 

the vulnerability and separate from the vulnerability of the facility 

from a security standpoint. 

Now, on that latter information we do, as was just said, we keep 

our vulnerability assessments on site, and then we vet the person 

who wants information, and we are pretty free with showing it to 

people that have a need-to-know basis, and I think that is the right 

thing to do. But it is very sensitive information that we want to 

be certain is properly secured, and in fact, that is why in my testimony I indicated that beyond MTSA we do need a framework for 

protecting that vulnerability information. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I would like to pursue your line of questioning. 

Chief Full, you are the Emergency Management Coordinator, Allegheny County; is that right? 

Mr. FULL. Yes, Senator. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Do you have a list somewhere in your office 

of the chemical facilities that you have in Allegheny County? 

Mr. FULL. Yes, sir, we do. In Allegheny County we have 235 

chemical facilities which are required under the SARA law to have 

emergency plans and have reported the amount of chemicals and 

so forth within the facilities. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Have the chemical facilities in the county for 

the most part done their threat assessment? 

Mr. FULL. We believe that the majority of them, but there are 

some of them that are on the threshold of reporting now through 

the process of even some of the outreach of the SARA Title III law 

and the reporting and so forth. We find that there is more and 

more chemical companies that are reducing their amount of stored 

materials, putting them in the transportation stream, and falling 

out of the need for them to report. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Is it mandatory that a fertilizer company 

share with you their vulnerability? 

Mr. FULL. No, sir, not whatsoever. That is why the suggestion 

is——

Senator VOINOVICH. Do you think it should be mandatory? 

Mr. FULL. I believe that we can go into exactly—the Federal Government address in the SARA Title III law—first off, again, our experience has been we have held close trade secrets. We are familiar 

with that. We are certainly not going to give up the ship here. We 

are just as interested as the corporate chemical facilities to make 

sure that it does not get into the wrong hands, but at the same 

time we believe also that we are responsible and in the law it already addressed that fire and local fire folks can get the fire information, medical——

Senator VOINOVICH. How about the ‘‘Right-to-Know’’ laws? Has 

there been pretty good compliance with those? 

Mr. FULL. Yes. 

81

Senator VOINOVICH. So to clarify, your fire department has on 

file what chemicals are on the premises. 

Mr. FULL. Right. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So with the ‘‘Right-to-Know’’ law, the community has access to knowing what is on file there, correct? 

Mr. FULL. There is nothing on security though, sir. There is 

nothing of them to share it with us at all other than——

Senator VOINOVICH. But the fact is that you would not want 

them to share that information with, say, the community. You 

would like a provision that provides the necessary information to 

those that will be responding, and that allows you to have a good 

idea of the vulnerabilities, so that you have a better idea of how 

you would coordinate with them to respond if something happened. 

Mr. FULL. That is what we are asking for right now, right. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chamberlain, how do you feel about 

that, and Mr. Schellhorn and Ms. Turner, how do you feel about 

that? 

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I would like to make a distinction between responding to an emergency—which certainly the Chief and the first 

responders do—an emergency has usually already occurred, and 

the security plans, the security vulnerability assessment, and the 

facility security plan also address prevention, what you are doing 

to prevent an emergency. There are no chemicals or products on 

site that our first responders do not know are there. We are not 

trying to hide anything at all. It is merely the sensitivity of giving 

somebody a roadmap on how to shut you down or how to do damage that you want to carefully control. 

And certainly, I think, MTSA does that today. I would encourage 

any future legislation would have that sensitivity in there. We 

want people to know what they are going to be coming into if they 

are coming out to assist with an emergency. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I would be interested to get your best 

thoughts on how you would get that done. 

Mr. Schellhorn—fertilizers—how much more has your product 

gone up because of natural gas costs? [Laughter.] 

Thank you for being in business. 

Mr. SCHELLHORN. It has not gone up as much as the natural gas 

price has gone up, I assure you. 

I would like to add something if I may to what Mr. Chamberlain 

just said. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Sure. 

Mr. SCHELLHORN. Additionally, communicating with neighbors 

about what to do in the event that there is a release is extremely 

important, and Senator Lieberman touched on this in his opening 

statement. It is very important that neighbors know what to do, 

that they know when there is an incident, they know how they are 

going to learn if there is an incident, and then they know what to 

do to protect themselves, and the fertilizer industry has been very 

involved in that kind of community outreach program, as I know 

others in the chemical industry have been. Community awareness 

and emergency response programs have addressed that. 

I have brought some information. I spoke to some of the staff 

about this earlier. We have an outreach program that has been in 

place for more than 10 years, where we visited with our neighbors 

82

to talk about shelter-in-place programs, and we have telephone notification systems that call our neighbors within a very short period 

of time if we have an accident. I know DuPont has that system in 

place, and so do many of the other chemical plants. I would like 

to share this with the Committee if I may. That is a very important 

part. These programs are coordinated with LEPCs and the local 

fire departments. So that is also, I think, an important part of this 

whole effort. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Can I just ask one more question? 

Chairman COLLINS. Absolutely. 

Senator VOINOVICH. You represent the Fertilizer Institute. 

Mr. SCHELLHORN. Yes, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Does the Fertilizer Institute also belong to 

the American Chemistry Council? 

Mr. SCHELLHORN. No, sir. We are not a member of the American 

Chemistry Council. 

Senator VOINOVICH. How about API companies, are you part of 

the American Chemistry Council or do you have a separate——

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. No. API is a separate manufacturing group. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So when we talk about 150 companies that 

are in the American Chemistry Council that are working with the 

Coast Guard, that does not include any oil companies? 

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. No, that is not correct. Shell is a member of 

the American Chemistry Council. When you asked if API was a 

member, those are two——

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. But that is what I meant. 

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Yes, my company is a member——

Senator VOINOVICH. They belong to API and they belong to the 

American Chemistry Council? 

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Yes. 

Senator VOINOVICH. And you are part of the 150 companies that 

are in that organization? 

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Yes. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Schellhorn, my last question is regarding Senator Cochran’s legislation, ‘‘Secure Handling of Ammonium 

Nitrate.’’ How does what you are requiring in that legislation differ 

from what is in MTSA or what is being done by ACC? 

Mr. SCHELLHORN. Yes, sir. The Cochran bill is specific to ammonium nitrate manufacturing, distribution, and retail sales of ammonium nitrate specifically. It is a registration. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So, when considering legislation, we ought to 

be aware of the differences through the industry. 

Mr. SCHELLHORN. Yes, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Carper, you did miss excellent testimony from Ms. Turner, but I know you made a great effort to get back here in order 

to ask questions, and I am pleased to call upon you. 

Senator CARPER. I apologize for leaving. Senators Lincoln, 

Lieberman, and myself, and a few others have just unveiled legislation to address the issue of children having access to pornography 

on the Internet, to create almost like a step that some would have 

to go through to register their age, to be able to identify their age, 

so that if you are under the age of 18 you cannot get on; to impose 

83

a 25 percent tax on the profits for the Internet, and to use those 

monies to develop new technologies to help keep kids clear of that 

kind of temptation. I apologize. It is an important issue. Not to say 

that this is not important as well, but that is why I have been 

away. 

Thank you all for coming in. I especially wanted to welcome Beth 

Turner to our hearing today, and if I may I would just like to ask 

the first question of you, Beth. 

We are proud of DuPont and we are proud of DuPont’s reputation as a good steward of the environment, and my wife who 

worked there for 28 years, just retired last summer, and in a number of her jobs she was in charge of safety with the people in her 

workforce around her. She not only was that way at work, she was 

that way at home. I tell the story about how we would go on family 

vacations or be staying at a hotel, and get the kids to bed in their 

room, and we were getting ready for bed. My wife was probably one 

of the few—I do not know what other spouses talk about just before 

they go to sleep, but my wife is going through, out loud, just making out the escape routes from the hotel. Which door do we go out? 

Which direction do we go? Which stairs do we go down? So it was 

a company that puts a whole lot of emphasis on safety, and we are 

proud of them and respectful for that. 

I would ask of Ms. Turner, if I could, could you describe DuPont’s 

experience with the Maritime—and you may have addressed this, 

and if you have I apologize—but with the Maritime Transportation 

Security Act, and how you and DuPont believe that law can inform 

our Committee’s work in a broader chemical facility security bill? 

Specifically I would like to hear how DuPont implemented the requirements and about your ongoing compliance assurance. 

Ms. TURNER. Good morning, Senator Carper, it is nice to see you. 

Senator CARPER. My pleasure. 

Ms. TURNER. I only spoke briefly about the Maritime Transportation Security Act. In my comments I indicated that the regulations have very effectively secured our sites and that we would 

view them as a model for security and higher priority sites. 

In terms of how we approach the regulation, we identified our facilities that are impacted. There are some very specific criteria in 

the regulations about facilities that have wharves on navigable 

bodies of water and that unload certain dangerous goods. So I went 

through that analysis of which facilities fell into that classification. 

And there are a number of very clear requirements on what you 

have to do once you are in, one of which is identify an individual 

who is a formal facility security officer, and put them through some 

very specific training. So our approach was to identify the facilities 

and then take them through the whole process as a group. 

So we centralized, did our training. Much of what we had done 

for the Responsible Care® Security Code in terms of our vulnerability assessments, the things we had done for DuPont all fed into 

that very nicely so we were able to integrate it all, which is an important thing, so that the sites could see an integrated effort, and 

not, ‘‘I have to do this for responsible care and that for MTSA, and 

have to do this for corporate headquarters.’’ So we made sure it all 

fits together. 

84

On the ground with the Captain of the Port and their staff we 

have had a tremendous working relationship. I am very impressed 

at how grass roots oriented the Coast Guard is in deploying itself 

to work with sites. They do not let us get lax. They may show up 

at 2 a.m. in the morning when we least expect it, or run a boat 

down the channel and see if our cameras can pick it up. Our impacted sites have really tried to incent our security officers to see 

the Coast Guard before they think we can see them. So we have 

given out prizes and awards for sort of detecting the Coast Guard, 

and it has generated a lot of energy. 

We have been successfully inspected by the Coast Guard at all 

of our regulated facilities. 

Senator CARPER. I think in your testimony you described how 

DuPont categorized its sites. I think you may have just alluded to 

it. Category 1 sites, I am told, are your highest priority group. 

Ms. TURNER. That is right. 

Senator CARPER. Category 2 sites have no potential for off-site 

release or theft of materials. Is that correct? 

Ms. TURNER. Yes, that is correct. 

Senator CARPER. Many folks have advocated—I think even here 

today—for a risk-based tiered approach to regulating facilities. Let 

me just ask what criteria and what methods did DuPont use in categorizing your sites and your facilities? Do you think that the categorization that DuPont used is a sufficient approach, or do you 

think some additional steps or categories might be appropriate as 

we try to develop a risk-based tiered approach? 

Ms. TURNER. I think that the categorization was absolutely critical. I find that—and let us not talk for a minute about whether 

you have two categories or four or however many. The fact that you 

can spread facilities out over certain categories is absolutely critical 

deploying resources. I treat and work with and defend and protect 

a Category 1 site very differently than I do a Category 2 site because the potential consequence is so very different. 

From my standpoint I think that we have to have—and I think 

we have all been in agreement—that risk-based approach is very 

necessary here. I might just mention why we had a Category 1 or 

2. It is really an internal thing. The American Chemistry Council 

had four tiers. The first three would have been equivalent to our 

Category 1, and the only difference was a 6-month delay that you 

could spread out. So the Tier 1 had to be done first, then Tier 2 

6 months later, Tier 3 6 months later, and then Tier 4 after that. 

I simply made an internal decision that I wanted to treat everything as Tier 1. 

So we identified all of our facilities, and we also tried to make 

it simple by saying it does not matter whether a facility is an RMP 

facility or not. If it can create an off-site consequence, then I put 

it in Category 1. And then we just took those Category 1s, again, 

just like we did MTSA, right through the process as a group. And 

for our company—and I am only speaking for our company—that 

created some efficiencies. For other companies, obviously having 

more tiers was a helpful thing and you could spread the effort out. 

Senator CARPER. My time has expired. I appreciate those responses, and again your presence here. 

Ms. TURNER. Thank you. 

85

Senator CARPER. How did these guys do? Did they do a pretty 

good job in their testimony? 

Ms. TURNER. They did great. 

Senator CARPER. I wish I could ask them a few questions, but I 

am afraid time does not allow. Thank you again for joining us and 

for your valued input. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Ms. Turner, I want to follow up on the issue that Senator Carper 

just raised. I do believe that we need a tiered approach. The security for a local fertilizer dealer may not be the same level that is 

needed for a large chemical plant on that two-mile stretch in New 

Jersey that Senator Lautenberg has referred to. One of our challenges is defining the scope of the chemical industry for regulation 

by the legislation that we are drafting. Each of the three of you, 

each of your respective companies has chemical facilities listed 

under the EPA RMP program, and you just were referring to that. 

Each of you also have facilities that are covered under the Maritime Transportation Security Act and are regulated for security by 

the Coast Guard. 

Of your companies’ chemical facilities that are not covered by the 

MTSA regulations, how would you identify which ones you think 

should be covered under a new chemical facility security regime? 

In other words, I am trying to pick up where Senator Carper left 

off, on his categorization. As we do this tiered approach, there are 

going to be some facilities, perhaps a local potato farm in Northern 

Maine, that should not come under the law at all. There may be 

others that need some coverage but at a lower level, etc. How 

should we define the scope of facilities that should be covered? Ms. 

Turner. 

Ms. TURNER. Thank you. Speaking from DuPont’s standpoint, the 

criteria that I used was the ability to create consequence off site. 

I think that is a very important discriminator, and I would recommend that as a consideration for the Committee. It is in our 

self-interest as a company not to create off-site consequence. We 

want the safest communities. We want our employees to be safe, 

and so the whole concept that we want to be able to contain our 

chemicals in the vessels where they belong, and focus on those facilities that have the potential to go beyond our fence line is the 

internal criteria I have used. 

My view is that it does not matter how far the off-site consequence goes. If it goes off site then it needs to be in the highest 

priority category, and that is the approach DuPont has used. 

Chairman COLLINS. That is helpful. Mr. Schellhorn. 

Mr. SCHELLHORN. I agree with what Ms. Turner has said. One 

thing that I would add, however, is the four categories of risk is 

pretty helpful for dividing that group of facilities into highest, medium, and lowest risk facilities based on the significance of the offsite impact. I certainly understand why DuPont did what they did 

and just grouped everything that had off-site impact into Tier 1. 

But when you are looking at a universe of all facilities, breaking 

it down into Tier 1, 2, 3, and 4 is, I think, helpful because that 

helps to focus attention on the very highest risk facilities, and then 

down from there. 

86

That criteria is established criteria. American Chemistry Council 

has a methodology for doing that. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Chamberlain. 

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Yes. Let me just mention all of our major 

chemical facilities do happen to fall under MTSA, but if there were 

other—and then I also wanted to just make sure that the Chairman and the other Senators realize that a number of chemical facilities are co-located on sites with refineries. In my case, my two 

biggest chemical facilities share a property with a refinery that you 

would not know where one stops and the other begins. So the colocated chemical facilities are another aspect that you need to have 

in the planning and mapping of future issues that you deal with. 

Certainly off-site consequences is something that should be considered in trying to determine the severity. You also need to look 

at what is off site? If the closest population is 15 miles away and 

you are surrounded by a sugar cane farm, the consequence of an 

off-site release is not the same as if you are in a major metropolitan area with neighbors living on your fence line. So you have to 

look at the entire picture, look at the vulnerabilities that you have 

and the consequences of a worst-case scenario. 

Chairman COLLINS. Chief Full, do you have any thoughts on this 

issue? 

Mr. FULL. Senator, what is interesting to me here right now is 

the fact that we receive in our emergency management agency, 

emergency plans from companies that are just eloquently put together by consultants and so forth. We will get plans that are 100 

pages thick. They will answer all kinds of questions in there about 

the vulnerabilities to the community and different things like this. 

Then we will find some other companies, that they will send us a 

three- or four-page report as well. Many of those folks, especially 

the ones that come from the biggest companies, have never consulted with us at the local level. 

There is a disconnect right now between what we hear right now 

from the table here, and what goes on at the local level at times. 

How can folks really sit and say what is going on there without 

consulting with the local folks to see what vulnerabilities there are 

out there before the plans are done, and quite frankly, that is more 

the exception than the rule. 

We come upon plans. We review the plans. It will say if people 

are injured here, they are going to go to XYZ Hospital. You tell the 

hospital that this particular chemical company has identified their 

hospital to take the injured, and they say, we do not know anything about it. They never talked to us about it. 

I mean, my crusade here today on behalf of the folks at the local 

level on that is, again, just to ensure that whatever comes about—

and we certainly need chemical plant and transportation security—

additional security. In whatever form it comes from, we do have to 

have a strong input in coordination with us at the local level. 

We are going to be there to handle the aftermath, and all too 

often it is sort of like they say, well, we will call the first responders and they will come. But frankly, we need to be involved in preventing too. We do not want to have to respond to these things because we know that going in that we are going to have very little 

or no impact, positive impact, and we are going to lose a lot of our 

87

folks as well as a lot of residents if we are not involved. We should 

know what the risks are, and so forth. I think there can be a happy 

balance between sensitive information and Achilles heel scenarios 

and so forth along those lines, but clearly we need to be involved, 

and we see all too often that we are not. 

Chairman COLLINS. Ms. Turner, I am going to ask you my final 

question of the day. It has to do with, perhaps, the most controversial issue that we will have to wrestle with in this bill, and that 

is the inherently safer technology issue. It is clear from the four 

hearings that I have chaired that some people want this bill to be 

a hazards reduction bill. There are others who want this bill to be 

strictly limited to the physical security of chemical plants. 

You have testified this morning that DuPont believes that inherently safer technology and chemicals are mainstream components 

of process safety and have a role to play as companies evaluate security. But you have also said that DuPont does not believe that 

inherent safety could or should be mandated by regulation, and you 

have called that unworkable. Similarly, and I think it was Mr. 

Schellhorn who pointed out that inherently safer technology is a 

safety process, it is not a security measure. 

Is there a middle ground here? What I am wondering is whether 

it makes sense in our legislation to require companies to evaluate 

inherently safer technology as they do their safety plans, but in 

their vulnerability assessments, but not have the Federal Government mandate specific processes or get involved in second guessing, 

if you will, the safety processes used in the plants. It seems to me 

that it does make sense for companies to be required to look at 

whether safer chemicals or processes could be used to help make 

their plants less vulnerable to an attack. What are your thoughts 

on this? 

Ms. TURNER. First, let me speak briefly about what is behind the 

testimony in terms of those things. We are saying IST has a role 

in security, but we are saying do not mandate it in security regulation, and in some respects that could appear to be sort of a contradiction. 

I think that when we look back over the history of inherently 

safer technologies, at least in our company, we have been pursuing 

this for 40 years through—first the safety systems are engineering 

designs for our plants. We have very mature infrastructure for 

managing process safety management, inherently safer technology. 

We also have two codes of Responsible Care®, the process safety 

code and the security code that focus on inherently safer. 

Then the Sandia methodology for conducting vulnerability assessments, which is a site that just because it is the one that we 

chose has a very structured approach for going through inherently 

safer from the very first step of the methodology when you form 

your team, characterize your facility. You have both process safety 

experts and security experts at the table because they bring separate expertise. So in the greater context we have these drivers for 

inherently safer in a very mature safety system that has IST embedded in it. 

In my view, the place where we do not have something complementary is in the pure security side of the house, and that is 

88

why we recommend the passage of legislation so that we then can 

essentially bolt or marry these two together. 

Now, in terms of how do we feel about what you said at the end 

about some view of requiring consideration, I think that my response is it depends on what is in the language. We would like 

very much to work with you if the Committee decides to go in that 

direction, using a phrase, the devil is in the details. 

I think the thought I want to leave with you is—I will speak 

broadly—responsible chemical companies have many incentives for 

a look at inherently safer. A big one is keeping our facility safe, 

keeping our employees safe, keeping our employees’ families safe. 

We cannot run a company if we are not doing that. But the other 

driver is, as you said at the last hearing, the incentive to a chemical company to pull its risk down through any tool is there both 

because it is good business and because it helps us bring down the 

risk category in the face of regulation and other drivers. 

Chairman COLLINS. Your points are very well taken, and DuPont, of course, is renowned for its commitment to safety. It is difficult for me to imagine that the Department of Homeland Security 

could teach DuPont anything about the process of inherently safer 

technology. We might, however, be able to help you improve your 

security in general I would hope. But that is not going to be true 

of every chemical facility. I am thinking of the ones that Chief Full 

has talked about in his county, not all of whom are members of the 

American Chemistry Council or comply with the Responsible Care®

Security Code or even have the sophistication perhaps of a DuPont. 

Then we get into the dilemma of what if the Department of 

Homeland Security, in reviewing a plant, perhaps doing an audit 

of its vulnerability assessment, and comes across improper storage 

of chemicals, where there clearly is an increased security risk because of a lack of a secondary containment, for example, or some 

other measure. So should the Department, in such a case, be able 

to step in and mandate an improvement in the storage of the 

chemicals as the price of approving the security plant? How do we 

draw the lines here? 

Ms. TURNER. I think that is going to require some analysis of the 

roles of the different regulatory agencies that are at play in the 

chemical industry. Right now I would not see Department of Homeland Security as having the kind of expertise to look at how a tank 

is built. That does not mean we could not embed it there, and I am 

not so sure that would not divert DHS from the security mission 

they need. It is possible to build it there, but I think the better approach might be to look at what resides in OSHA and what resides 

in EPA for driving the safety part that has been in place before 

September 11 ever came. 

So it is certainly unacceptable if a chemical company is doing 

something that is blatantly unsafe, and somewhere in the regulatory regime we need to have an agency that has the capability 

to enforce its regulations. I am just not sure in my mind that is 

going to be a great focus for the security piece, which we need to 

stand up very quickly in a very thoughtful manner. 

So it is a very important issue, and I appreciate how hard the 

Committee is working to figure out where the right place is on that 

issue, and we want to work with you on it. It is very important. 

89

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. I very much look forward to 

working with all of you. We are going to use the August recess to 

draft what I hope will be a comprehensive, effective, bipartisan, 

and reasonable bill on chemical security. We do not have that 

many of those around here that meet all of those criteria, and that 

is why we have spent so much time on this issue. This is our fourth 

hearing. There are not very many issues that Congress debates 

that have this many hearings and this kind of consideration, but 

I think this is enormously complex and enormously important. I 

really appreciate all of you sharing your expertise today. 

I also want to thank the Committee staff, which has worked very 

hard to put together this series of hearings. You noticed that they 

all groaned when I said we would be spending the August recess 

drafting the bill. [Laughter.] 

But I am very committed to introducing a bill in September, and 

we are going to try to adhere to that timeline. 

This hearing record will remain open for 15 days for the submission of additional questions and other materials. I thank you all for 

your cooperation and advice to the Committee. 

This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(91)

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Æ


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