The Honorable Mark R. Kravitz, of the United States District Court *

for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.

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08-6182-cr

United States v. Owad

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1,

2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON

ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan

United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of

New York, on the 3 day of February, two thousand and ten. rd

Present: RICHARD C. WESLEY,

GERARD E. LYNCH

Circuit Judges,

MARK R. KRAVITZ,

District Judge.

*

________________________________________________

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

- v. - (08-6182-cr)

CHRISTINE OWAD,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________________________ 

Appearing for Appellant: ARZA FELDMAN, Feldman and

Feldman, Uniondale, New York.

Appearing for Appellee: PAUL D. SILVER and JOSHUA

VINCIGUERRA, Assistant United

States Attorneys, for Andrew T.

Baxter, United States Attorney
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for the Northern District of New

York, Albany, New York.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of New York (McAvoy, J.).

1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

2 AND DECREED that the judgment of the United States District

3 Court for the Southern District of New York be AFFIRMED.

4 On October 17, 2007, Defendant-Appellant Christine Owad

5 entered a plea of guilty for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641.

6 On December 8, 2008, Owad was sentenced to a fifteen-month

7 term of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of

8 supervised release. Owad now challenges the special

9 conditions imposed as terms of her supervised release and

10 the district court’s order that she pay restitution for her

11 crimes. Specifically, Appellant argues that the district

12 court erred in requiring that she participate in a mental

13 health program and in the computer restriction and

14 monitoring program, and that the district court failed to

15 adequately consider her financial circumstances and the

16 mandatory factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2) in

17 imposing its restitution order. We presume the parties’

18 familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural

19 history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 
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1 When, as in this case, the Appellant failed to

2 challenge the imposition of a condition of supervised

3 release before the district court, this Court reviews the

4 propriety of the conditions for plain error. United States

5 v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 2008). We have,

6 however, “[o]n occasion, . . . reviewed unobjected to

7 sentencing errors without rigorous application of plain

8 error standards.” United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122,

9 125 (2d Cir. 2002). We have held that relaxation of the

10 plain error standard was warranted when “the challenged

11 condition of supervised release was not recommended in the

12 PSR.” Id. Even under a relaxed plain error standard of

13 review, we conclude that the district court did not commit

14 error — plain or otherwise — in imposing the challenged

15 special conditions of supervised release or in setting the

16 schedule for Appellant’s payment of restitution.

17 District courts have “broad discretion to tailor

18 conditions of supervised release.” United States v. Gill,

19 523 F.3d 107, 108 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). In order to

20 fall within this broad discretion, a condition of supervised

21 release must involve “no greater deprivation of liberty than

22 is reasonably necessary to implement the statutory purposes
4

1 of sentencing,” id. at 109 (internal quotation marks and

2 citation omitted), must be “consistent with pertinent

3 Sentencing Commission policy statements, id., and must be

4 “reasonably related to the factors set forth in section[s]

5 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D).” 18 U.S.C.

6 § 3583(d)(1).

7 A district court is permitted to “require as a special

8 condition of [supervised release] that a defendant

9 participate in a mental health program ‘[i]f the court has

10 reason to believe that the defendant is in need of

11 psychological or psychiatric treatment.’” United States v.

12 Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam)

13 quoting U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(d)(5)). The condition requiring

14 that Owad participate in a mental health program was

15 reasonably related to her “history and characteristics.” 18

16 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).

17 Imposition of the special condition requiring that

18 Appellant participate in the computer restriction and

19 monitoring program was not error. We have held that

20 “[r]estrictions on Internet use may serve several sentencing

21 objectives, chiefly therapy and rehabilitation, as well as

22 the welfare of the community (by keeping the offender away
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1 from an instrumentality of his [or her] offenses).” United

2 States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 281 (2d Cir. 2006). Here,

3 the district court stopped short of imposing an outright ban

4 on Appellant’s use of computers and the Internet. Cf. id.

5 at 282. The special condition is reasonably related to “the

6 nature and circumstances of the offense,” the need to

7 “afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” and the

8 need to “protect the public from further crimes of the

9 defendant.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), and

10 (a)(2)(C).

11 The district court properly ordered that restitution

12 was due and payable immediately and set a schedule for

13 Appellant to make the required payments. Under a

14 deferential standard of review, see United States v. Amato,

15 540 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2008), we find the district

16 court’s order proper. In imposing a restitution order, the

17 district court is not required to “explicitly recite that

18 she had considered the mandatory factors.” United States v.

19 Nucci, 364 F.3d 419, 421 (2d Cir. 2004). There is nothing

20 in the record that indicates that the district court failed

21 to consider the appropriate factors in requiring Owad to

22 adhere to the payment schedule it devised in connection with
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1 its restitution order. See United States v. Fiore, 381 F.3d

2 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2004). To the contrary, the court’s

3 statements that it based the restitution amount on Owad’s

4 “overall financial resources and assets,” and that it

5 declined to require a fine based upon “the restitution order

6 and [Owad’s] financial situation,” are sufficient for us to

7 find that it considered the relevant factors. See United

8 States v. Mortimor, 52 F.3d 429, 436 (2d Cir. 1995). We

9 therefore affirm.

10 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s remaining arguments

11 and finds them to be without merit. Accordingly, the

12 judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.

13

14 For the Court

15 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

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