Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on National Security, Veterans Affairs,

and International Relations, Committee

on Government Reform, House of

Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

November 2001 MILITARY AIRCRAFT

Services Need

Strategies to Reduce

Cannibalizations

GAO-02-86
Page i GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

Cannibalizations Are Extensive, but Full Magnitude Is Unknown 4

Cannibalizations Have Many Negative Effects 12

Services Cannibalize for Many Reasons 19

Strategies to Reduce Cannibalizations Vary Among Services 22

Conclusions 26

Recommendations for Executive Action 27

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 30

Appendix II Cannibalization Data for the Navy and Marine

Corps 32

Appendix III Cannibalization Data for the Air Force 34

Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense 35

Tables

Table 1: Cannibalization Rate, Active Inventory, and Average

Age of Navy/Marine Corps Aircraft Reporting

Cannibalization Hours in Fiscal Year 2000 32

Table 2: Cannibalization Rates, Active Inventory, and Average

Age of Air Force Aircraft Reporting Cannibalization

Hours in Fiscal Year 2000 34

Figures

Figure 1: Total Air Force and Navy Cannibalizations Reported

 in Fiscal Years 1996-2000 4

Figure 2: Total Navy Cannibalizations Reported in Fiscal Years

 1996-2000 5

Contents
Page ii GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

Figure 3: Navy Aircraft Reporting the Highest Number of

 Cannibalizations in Fiscal Year 2000 7

Figure 4: Navy Aircraft With the Highest Cannibalization Rates

 for Fiscal Year 2000 8

Figure 5: Total Air Force Cannibalizations Reported in Fiscal

 Years 1996-2000 9

Figure 6: Air Force Aircraft Reporting the Highest Number of

Cannibalizations in Fiscal Year 2000 10

Figure 7: Air Force Aircraft With the Highest Cannibalization

 Rates in Fiscal Year 2000 11

Figure 8: Repairs Require Two Steps—Cannibalizations, Four 13

Figure 9: Total Reported Cannibalization Personnel Hours,

 Fiscal Years 1996-2000 14

Figure 10: Personnel Hours Navy Reported Spending on

 Cannibalizations of Six Aircraft 15

Figure 11: Personnel Hours That the Air Force Reported Spending

 on Cannibalizations of Five Aircraft 16

Figure 12: Cannibalized Navy FA-18 Aircraft 18
Page 1 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

November 21, 2001

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

 Veterans Affairs, and International Relations

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In January 2001, we reported on the major performance and accountability

challenges facing the Department of Defense and identified inventory

management as a high-risk area because the Department continues to

maintain levels of inventory that are too high, and its management systems

and procedures are ineffective.1

 We warned that if this condition persists,

the Department may not have key items, including spare aircraft parts,

available when needed. This would impair aircraft and other equipment

readiness. To compensate for shortfalls in logistics, all the military

services—Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps—have resorted to

cannibalization. The Department defines cannibalization as removing

serviceable parts from one piece of equipment and installing them in

another.

Because of your concern that heavy use of cannibalization may increase

both aviation maintenance costs and workloads, you asked us to examine

the practice in the services. Accordingly, we determined (1) the extent to

which the Army, the Navy2

, and the Air Force depend on cannibalizations

to maintain aircraft; (2) the effects of cannibalizations; and (3) the reasons

for cannibalizations. In addition, we assessed the sufficiency of the actions

the Department of Defense and the services are taking to reduce the

practice. We participated with the services in a hearing before your

Subcommittee on May 22, 2001. This report expands on the information

provided in that testimony and provides recommendations. More

information on the scope and methodology of our report is in appendix I.

 1

 See Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management Challenges and

Program Risks: Department of Defense (GAO-01-244, Jan. 2001).

2

 The Navy’s data used in this report include data for both Navy and Marine Corps aircraft,

and Navy policies are applicable to the Marines.

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

All the military services use cannibalization extensively as a routine

aircraft maintenance practice. In fiscal years 1996 through 2000, the Navy

and the Air Force reported about 850,000 cannibalizations, requiring about

5.3 million additional maintenance hours. Aircraft that the services depend

on to accomplish their missions had relatively high cannibalization rates.

The numbers, however, are incomplete because the Navy’s data are

reportedly understated by as much as 50 percent, the Air Force underreports cannibalizations, and the Army does not collect servicewide

figures. As a result, neither the Department of Defense nor the services

know the overall magnitude of the practice.

Cannibalizations have several adverse impacts. They increase maintenance

costs by increasing mechanics’ workloads, they affect morale and

personnel retention, and they sometimes take expensive aircraft out of

service for long periods of time. Cannibalizations can also create

additional mechanical problems. The effects on workloads seem the most

serious: over half of all aircraft maintenance personnel report working

more than 50 hours a week, and some report working 70 hours or more. A

Navy study noted that the additional work generated by cannibalizations

adversely affects morale and lowers reenlistment rates. At the recent

hearings before your Subcommittee, Air Force and Army officials also

acknowledged that cannibalizations may have an adverse impact on

morale and retention. However, because the services do not track how

much time they spend on cannibalizations, they cannot assess all of the

consequences.

The services have many reasons for cannibalizing aircraft and strong

incentives for continuing to do so. However, with the exception of the

Navy, they do not consistently track the specific reasons for

cannibalizations. As a result, much of the information on causes is

anecdotal. In the broadest sense, cannibalizations are done because of

pressures to meet readiness and operational needs and because of

shortcomings in the supply system. When parts are not available to repair

a malfunctioning aircraft, and the aircraft is needed to fly a mission, the

cannibalization of another aircraft for parts is often seen as the answer. A

Navy study also found that cannibalizations are sometimes done because

mechanics are not trained well enough to diagnose problems or because

testing equipment is either not available or not working. In these cases,

parts are swapped from one aircraft to another until the problem is solved.

Although the services have undertaken some initiatives to address

logistics shortfalls, few specific strategies have been developed to reduce

cannibalizations and the associated maintenance hours. A number of

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

service working groups have been asked to address cannibalizations, but

they have had very limited success in determining how to reduce them.

Because they view cannibalizations as a symptom of spare parts shortages,

the services have not closely analyzed other possible causes or made

concerted efforts to measure the full extent of the practice. As a result,

neither the Department of Defense nor the services can accurately identify

possible alternatives or their costs, specific improvements or changes that

are needed, or the effects of cannibalizations on morale and retention.

We are making recommendations aimed at establishing standardized,

comprehensive, and reliable cannibalization data collection procedures

and at developing strategies to reduce the amount of time spent on

cannibalizations. In comments on a draft of this report, the Department of

Defense acknowledged that cannibalization is a serious issue and

generally agreed with our recommendations. In accordance with the

quarterly reporting requirements of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (2001 Defense Authorization Act),3

the Department is reviewing the services’ submissions to ensure that the

necessary information concerning cannibalization is collected. The

Department has also initiated an in-depth assessment of the

cannibalization processes, including data collection and reporting

procedures. The Department believes this assessment will provide a basis

for the better reporting of cannibalization information and reducing

cannibalization rates.

Army, Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps policies allow or support the use

of cannibalization to meet urgent or mission critical requirements.

However, the services’ maintenance policies state that such actions should

be minimized, used only after certain conditions have been met, or used

only as a last resort because their use tends to adversely affect morale and

to aggravate the very same supply problems that they are meant to

overcome. Navy policy specifically states that cannibalizations violate

personnel utilization policies because they double the documentation and

personnel hours needed to remove and install parts and components: two

parts must be removed—from two aircraft—and two must be installed,

instead of one. Although Army policy limits cannibalization to whenever a

needed item is not available through the supply system, it allows

 3

 P.L. 106-398, sec. 371.

Background
Page 4 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

commanders at installation levels and below to use their discretion as to

whether and how much to cannibalize.

In fiscal years 1996-2000, Air Force and Navy units reported a total of

about 850,000 cannibalizations, and reported annual figures ranging

between 154,000 and 176,000. (See fig. 1.)

The numbers remained relatively stable in fiscal years 1996-99 and

dropped slightly in fiscal year 2000, when the two services reported about

154,000 cannibalizations. The Air Force and the Navy, however, do not

report all cannibalizations, and how much the Army uses cannibalizations

is not known because it requires that only very selected cannibalizations

be reported. As a result, total Servicewide figures may be considerably

higher than those officially reported.

Figure 1: Total Air Force and Navy Cannibalizations Reported in Fiscal Years

1996-2000

Source: Air Force and Navy data.

Relatively few aircraft types accounted for a large proportion of the

cannibalizations in the Navy and Air Force. We found that selected aircraft

that the services depend on to accomplish their missions had relatively

Cannibalizations Are

Extensive, but Full

Magnitude Is

Unknown
Page 5 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

high cannibalization rates. Some of these aircraft experienced a significant

increase in the number of cannibalizations from fiscal year 1996 through

fiscal year 2000.

During the 5-year period under study (fiscal years 1996-2000), the Navy

reported approximately 468,000 cannibalizations, or on average, about

94,000 a year. (See fig. 2.) However, according to recent studies, the actual

number of cannibalizations may be much higher. In fiscal year 1998, a

Navy group noted that as many as half of all Navy cannibalizations may go

unreported. In April 2000, the Navy Inspector General also confirmed that

cannibalizations were being consistently underreported and that

commanders were concerned that cannibalization was becoming an

accepted maintenance practice.4

Figure 2: Total Navy Cannibalizations Reported in Fiscal Years 1996-2000

Source: Navy data.

 4

 See Final Report of Naval Aviation Spares and Readiness, Naval Inspector General (Apr.

28, 2000).

Navy
Page 6 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

In fiscal year 2000, the Navy reported carrying out cannibalizations on 63

different aircraft types. (See app. II.) Five of these aircraft types—FA-18C,

P-3C, S-3B, EA-6B, and E-2C—accounted for about 35,000 of the service’s

84,000 reported cannibalizations, or 42 percent of the total for that year.

(See fig. 3.) These five aircraft types accounted for 958 aircraft, or 26

percent of the total inventory for which cannibalizations were reported in

fiscal year 2000. (See app. II.) The FA-18C is naval aviation’s principal

strike fighter for both the Navy and Marine Corps. The P-3C provides the

Navy with antisurface warfare, command communication, battle group

support, littoral surveillance, and aerial mining. The EA-6B is an allweather electronic attack aircraft that operates from aircraft carriers and

land bases and is the only Department of Defense aircraft that can

electronically jam enemy antiaircraft radar.
Page 7 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

Figure 3: Navy Aircraft Reporting the Highest Number of Cannibalizations in Fiscal Year 2000

Source: Navy data.

The Navy measures cannibalization rates as the number of

cannibalizations per 100 flying hours. In the 5-year period, the Navy’s

average cannibalization rate ranged from a high of 9.6 in fiscal year 1997 to

a low of 8.8 in fiscal year 2000. In spite of the drop in the servicewide

average rate, four aircraft types (S-3B, FA-18E, FA-18B, F-14D) had more

than twice the average cannibalization rate in fiscal year 2000, and two

others (E-2C and EA-6B) had almost twice the average rate. (See fig. 4.)
Page 8 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

Figure 4: Navy Aircraft With the Highest Cannibalization Rates for Fiscal Year 2000

Source: Navy.

In fiscal years 1996-2000, the Air Force reported about 376,000

cannibalizations, or on average, about 75,000 a year. (See fig. 5.) However,

as with the Navy, these numbers may also be low. In a 1998 review, the Air

Force Audit Agency noted that maintenance technicians did not always

report cannibalizations.5

 Unlike the Navy Inspector General, the Air Force

Audit Agency did not attempt to quantify the extent of underreporting. But

the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics, at the

hearing earlier this year, contended that Air Force information systems,

while not perfect, do allow reasonably good insight into cannibalizations.

 5

 See Report of Audit on Maintenance Analysis Program, Air Force Audit Agency (July 31,

1998).

Air Force
Page 9 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

Figure 5: Total Air Force Cannibalizations Reported in Fiscal Years 1996-2000

Source: Air Force data.

Of the 28 Air Force aircraft types that reported cannibalizations in fiscal

year 2000, 4 accounted for about 60 percent of the service’s total. These

included three fighter aircraft (F-16C, F-15C, and F-15E) and the B-1B

bomber. (See fig. 6.) The active inventory represented by these four

aircraft types included 1,743 aircraft or 42 percent of the total inventory of

aircraft for which cannibalizations were reported in fiscal year 2000. (See

app. III.) Several other aircraft types, including the A-10A, OA-10A, F-15B,

E-3C, and F-117A, reported a 100-percent increase in cannibalizations over

the 5-year period from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 2000.
Page 10 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

Figure 6: Air Force Aircraft Reporting the Highest Number of Cannibalizations in Fiscal Year 2000

Source: Air Force data.

Unlike the Navy, the Air Force measures cannibalization rates in terms of

cannibalizations per 100 aircraft sorties (one takeoff and one landing

comprise one sortie). The Air Force’s average cannibalization rate during

the 5-year period ranged from a low of 10.6 in fiscal year 1996 to a high of

12.7 in fiscal year 1997. However, in fiscal year 2000, the cannibalization

rates of the B-52H, C-5B, C-5A, and B-1B were all well over twice the

average rate of 11.6. The rates for these four aircraft ranged from 30 to 85

cannibalizations per 100 sorties. The rates of the F-15C and F-15E were

almost twice the average at 22 and 23, respectively. (See fig. 7.)
Page 11 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

Figure 7: Air Force Aircraft With the Highest Cannibalization Rates in Fiscal Year

2000

Source: Air Force data.

We were unable to include Army data in our analysis because, unlike the

Navy and the Air Force, the Army does not track cannibalization

servicewide and does not require subordinate commands to do so. Unit

commanders are allowed to report cannibalizations but do not do so

consistently, and the data are not aggregated at the service level. The Army

requires only that cannibalizations be reported for selected components;

these make up less than 4 percent of all aviation repair parts.

According to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, although the

Army’s reporting systems do not completely track all cannibalizations,

there is evidence that cannibalization rates are higher than desired and

that commanders are using them more than is desired to meet readiness

and mission requirements.6

 Several Army headquarters officials we spoke

 6

 Statement by Lt. General Charles S. Mahan, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, U.S.

Army, before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform,

Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, May 22,

2001.

Army
Page 12 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

with agreed that cannibalizations should be tracked to provide an overall

picture of how much cannibalization is used to compensate for parts

shortage or availability. However, the officials also said that they will not

be able to fully track cannibalizations until a new information system is in

place and that such a system will not become operational until 2003 or

later.

Cannibalizations are done to meet operational and readiness needs, but

they come at a high cost. Cannibalizations have increased the workload of

maintenance personnel by millions of hours since fiscal year 1996—costly

time that could have been spent more productively. Evidence shows that

increasing the workload of maintenance personnel also has a negative

effect on morale. Cannibalizations also take expensive aircraft out of

service, sometimes for long periods of time, and can create additional

mechanical problems. Nevertheless, it is difficult to gauge the precise

effects of cannibalizations because the services do not know how many

are performed, the specific reasons for performing them, or how much

time and money are spent on them.

Cannibalizations increase the workload of maintenance personnel because

they take at least twice as long as normal repairs. (See fig. 8.) Thus, a

direct cost of cannibalizations is the additional personnel hours required

to remove and reinstall a part. In the process, personnel must also check

or repair other parts disturbed by the cannibalization.

Cannibalizations Have

Many Negative

Effects

Cannibalizations Increase

Workloads
Page 13 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

Figure 8: Repairs Require Two Steps—Cannibalizations, Four

Since fiscal year 1996, the Navy and the Air Force have reported spending

about 5.3 million maintenance hours on cannibalizations—the equivalent

of more than 500 aviation maintenance personnel working full-time for 5

years. (See fig. 9.) In fiscal year 2000, the Navy reported spending about

441,000 personnel hours on cannibalizations at the squadron level, while

the Air Force reported about 510,000 hours. According to one official,

units do not have the resources to meet this increased requirement, so

maintenance personnel must work harder and longer, even though they

are not paid for overtime. If these people leave the military because of

work and pay conditions, the services incur additional recruiting,

retention, and training costs to replace them.
Page 14 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

Figure 9: Total Reported Cannibalization Personnel Hours, Fiscal Years 1996-2000

Source: Navy and Air Force data.

Predictably, aircraft with the highest number of cannibalizations also

accounted for a large share of maintenance hours spent on

cannibalizations. For example, the Navy’s FA-18A, FA-18C, S-3B, P-3C, E2C, and EA-6B consumed about 45 percent of the total reported

cannibalization hours in fiscal year 2000. (See fig. 10.) Navy data show that

in fiscal years 1996-2000, about 648,000 hours were spent on

cannibalizations of the FA-18, and about 152,000 hours on the EA-6B.
Page 15 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

Figure 10: Personnel Hours Navy Reported Spending on Cannibalizations of Six Aircraft

Source: Navy data.

In fiscal year 2000, the Air Force’s KC-135R, F-15C, F-15E, F-16C, and B-1B

accounted for about 332,000 personnel hours associated with

cannibalizations, while the F-16C accounted for about 114,000 of the total.

These five aircraft accounted for about 65 percent of the total

cannibalization hours reported by the Air Force during the fiscal year. (See

fig. 11.)
Page 16 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

Figure 11: Personnel Hours That the Air Force Reported Spending on Cannibalizations of Five Aircraft

Source: Air Force data.

Evidence suggests that cannibalizations have a negative effect on morale

because they are sometimes seen as routinely making unrealistic demands

on maintenance personnel. Cannibalizations may have to be performed at

any time, day or night, and very quickly in order to meet operational

commitments. In such cases, personnel must continue working until the

job is done (without additional pay). Cannibalizations increase the

maintenance personnel hours required for specific repairs, thus increasing

the overall workload. For example, in fiscal year 2000, the Air Force

reported that cannibalizations added 510,000 maintenance hours to the

Potential Effects on

Morale
Page 17 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

overall workload, or about 7.2 additional hours per cannibalization action.

For the same period, the Navy reported that cannibalizations added

approximately 441,000 maintenance hours, or about 5.2 additional hours

per cannibalization. To the extent that cannibalizations contribute to

extensive overtime, they may also have an adverse effect on morale and

retention, thus adding to recruiting and training costs.

In April 2000, the Naval Inspector General reported that cannibalization is

counterproductive and has a “huge” impact on morale. Our analysis of the

data collected during our 1999 survey of active duty personnel showed

that a significant portion of aviation maintenance personnel reported

working more than 50 hours a week and that some reported working 70

hours. In August 1999, we reported that the majority of the factors that

personnel cited as sources of dissatisfaction and reasons for leaving the

military were work-related, such as lack of parts and materials to

successfully complete daily job requirements.7

 At the recent hearing, Air

Force and Army officials acknowledged that cannibalizations may have an

adverse impact on morale and retention. But because they do not track all

the maintenance hours they spend on cannibalizations, the services cannot

assess all of the consequences.

One example we found of how cannibalizations may become the source of

waste or frustration was that of a major EA-6B component. This

component, which was part of the aircraft’s jamming mechanism, was

removed from or reinstalled on four different aircraft, for a total of 16

times in 6 days. In another case, an Air Force C-5 was missing 136 parts, 47

of which had been used to make another cannibalized aircraft operational.

Aircraft that are missing parts due to cannibalizations may remain

grounded for long periods of time. These aircraft are not available for

operations, thus denying the military the use of valuable assets. Air Force

and Navy guidance states that, to the maximum extent possible,

cannibalized aircraft should not remain grounded for more than 30

consecutive days. Yet we observed numerous cases in which aircraft were

grounded for much longer periods. One wing we visited provided us a

daily aircraft status report showing that 6 out of 28 aircraft downed for

parts had not flown for 37 days or more. One of these aircraft had not

 7

 See Military Personnel: Perspectives of Surveyed Service Members in Retention Critical

Specialties (GAO/NSIAD-99-197BR, Aug. 16, 1999).

Expensive Assets

Unusable
Page 18 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

flown for more than 300 days and, according to the Maintenance and

Material Control Officer, was missing 111 parts. As a result, the Navy had

been unable to use this multi-million-dollar asset for almost a year. The

officer estimated that it would take more than 1,000 maintenance hours to

return the aircraft to flying status.

In another example, four cannibalized FA-18 aircraft were missing so

many parts that they were referred to as the “wind chimes.” (See fig. 12.)

According to Navy officials, the number of days that these aircraft had not

flown ranged from 903 to 1,756 days. They were finally transported to a

Navy depot in July 2000. As of May 2001, one of them, which had been

missing over 400 parts, had been funded for reassembly, while the

remaining three were in storage awaiting funding approval. The depot

estimated that the costs to reassembly the one aircraft would total about

$568,000, assuming that the squadron that owns the aircraft supplies all

the missing and failed parts. The depot’s costs could increase if the

squadron is not able to provide the parts.

Figure 12: Cannibalized Navy FA-18 Aircraft

Source: Navy.

In another case, a Navy squadron within 30 days of a major exercise

reported that 6 of its 13 assigned aircraft had not flown for 30 or more

days—2 aircraft could not fly because the wing directed that parts be given

to other squadrons. A Navy training squadron we visited had 20 of its 29

aircraft down for parts or maintenance—6 due to cannibalizations. In

fiscal year 2000, the same squadron reported an average of 113

cannibalizations a month.
Page 19 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

In order to remove a component, mechanics often have to remove other

parts or components as well. This increases the risk of collateral damage

to the aircraft and other components. For example, Air Force personnel

stated that the removal of a cockpit gauge also requires the removal of its

wiring harness. This operation, if repeated several times, causes excessive

wear on the wiring and ultimately requires the wiring to be replaced as

well. The other services also provided anecdotal evidence indicating that

cannibalizations do indeed increase the possibility of damage to parts

because they involve two aircraft rather than one and are often performed

under very rushed conditions. Furthermore, cannibalizations do not

replace a broken part with a new one, but with a used one. According to

one study, cannibalizations do not restore a component to its full

projected life expectancy but rather increase the chance that the

component will break down prematurely.8

The services have many reasons for cannibalizing aircraft and strong

incentives for continuing to do so. They are operating with chronic spare

parts shortages, high operational tempo, and aging aircraft. The

combination of these factors, along with intense readiness requirements,

creates an environment that encourages cannibalization.

With the exception of the Navy, the services do not record the reasons for

specific cannibalization actions. This lack of information makes it difficult

to develop strategies to reduce cannibalizations. Without such

information, it is impossible to know, for example, whether specific

cannibalizations are done because a part is not available in the supply

system, because a part is in the supply system but not where it is needed,

or for reasons that have nothing to do with the supply system. At least one

study has suggested that as many as half of all Navy cannibalizations are

not caused by supply system problems.

Service officials believe that the spare parts shortage is the main reason

for cannibalizations, and they claim that they must cannibalize if parts are

not available in the right place at the right time. In previous reports, we

addressed some of the reasons for these shortages, such as unexpectedly

 8

 See Daniel C. Worra, “Analysis of Aircraft Maintenance Cannibalization With Respect to

Aging Aircraft Within the EA-6B Community,” Ph.D. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,

Monterey, Calif., Dec. 2000.

Potential for Mechanical

Side Effects

Services Cannibalize

for Many Reasons

Supply System Problems
Page 20 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

high demand, production or repair delays, and higher-than-expected

failure rates of components.

During an overhaul, Army mechanics found a cracked gear in a Chinook

(CH-47) helicopter transmission. Because this created safety concerns, the

entire fleet was grounded in August 1999 until the gears could be replaced.

The ensuing demand exacerbated an ongoing shortage because there were

not enough transmissions on hand to meet the average monthly demand.

As of March 2001, 75 transmissions were still on back order.9

We previously reported that some Air Force parts were unavailable

because they did not last as long as expected. Thus, the parts in stock

were exhausted before the Air Force could restock them. For example, a

skid detector for the C-5 aircraft had a 50-percent increase in failures, and

all spare parts were used before the item could be ordered or restocked.10

We also reported that some Navy parts were not available because of

delivery delays by the contractor. The repairs of two types of EA-6B

antennas were delayed because the contractor completely halted repair

work from December 1999 to about March 2000 because of a company

merger. One of these antennas later had problems passing quality

inspections, exacerbating the shortage.11

The Comptroller General recently testified that for years, the Department

of Defense has had equipment readiness problems because of a lack of key

spare parts. He also said that the lack of spare parts was a major

contributor to lower-than-expected mission-capable rates.12 In a recent

report to Congress, the Department of Defense identified aviation

readiness as one of its major problems and expressed concern about parts

shortages and maintenance issues.13 Yet despite these shortages, we found

 9

 See Army Inventory: Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and Maintenance

Effectiveness (GAO-01-772, July 31, 2001).

10 See Air Force Inventory: Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and Maintenance

Effectiveness (GAO-01-587, June 27, 2001)

11 See Navy Inventory: Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and Maintenance

Effectiveness (GAO-01-771, July 31, 2001).

12 See Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Departments of Defense, State,

and Veterans Affairs (GAO-01-492T, Mar. 7, 2001).

13 See Department of Defense Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, JanuaryFebruary 2001.
Page 21 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

that Defense could not document whether the $1.1 billion that the

Congress provided as part of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations

Act for Fiscal Year 1999 specifically for spare parts was actually used for

this purpose.14

Readiness and operational demands put heavy pressure on the supply

system to provide parts immediately and to wherever they may be needed.

The goal of logistics and maintenance operations is to produce missionready aircraft by using approved maintenance practices—including the

controlled use of cannibalization. Maintenance personnel told us,

however, that they will do whatever is necessary to keep readiness ratings

high, even if this means routinely cannibalizing aircraft and having

personnel work overtime to do so.

The services also will sometimes cannibalize aircraft when it is faster to do

so than to wait for a part to be delivered from across base or town. A Navy

study group estimated that these cannibalizations may account for as

many as half of all Navy cannibalizations.

Overall, the services believe that cannibalizations allow them to better

perform their operational missions. Information is not available to

determine to what extent cannibalizations contribute positively to

readiness. But two Army studies concluded that readiness would be

significantly degraded if cannibalizations were not performed.

The Department of Defense has stated that as aircraft age, they tend to

break down more often, take longer to inspect and maintain, and are

therefore less available for training and operations.15 According to figures

by the Congressional Budget Office, the average age of all the services’

aircraft increased from fiscal years 1980 to 2000.16 The average age of Navy

aircraft rose from 11 to over 16 years, that of Air Force aircraft climbed

from 13 to over 20 years, and that of the Army’s helicopter fleet grew from

10.2 to 17.6 years.

 14 See Defense Inventory: Information on the Use of Spare Parts Funding Is Lacking

(GAO-01-472, June 11, 2001).

15 See Tactical Aircraft: Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce Average Age of Aircraft

(GAO-01-163, Feb. 9, 2001).

16 See CBO Paper: The Effects of Aging on the Costs of Operating and Maintaining

Military Equipment (Aug. 2001).

Readiness and Operational

Demands

Aging Aircraft
Page 22 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

With aging aircraft, obsolescence can be a particularly serious problem.

Original manufacturers may no longer make parts, forcing a new

manufacturer to produce the item. This can result in long delays in filling

orders and to increased cannibalizations. Army and Defense Logistics

Agency officials informed us that the age of the Apache, Blackhawk, and

Chinook helicopters is a contributing factor in these aircrafts’ parts

shortages. The Army Materiel Command Commander said in 1999 that the

Army expects to maintain an upgraded model of the almost 40-year-old

Chinook, for another 30 years. He added that the age of these aircraft

increases parts consumption and makes cannibalization necessary.17

Similarly, the Navy had problems finding a firm to manufacture F-14

transmitters and found itself with a shortage of parts. It had not procured

the transmitter for 10 years. Potential contractors were reluctant to make

the part. One contractor willing to do so could not produce the

transmitters on schedule. Consequently, unfilled demands for the

transmitter affected the aircraft’s capability to perform its missions.18

The Navy Inspector General has cited three other reasons for

cannibalizations that are related more to maintenance deficiencies than to

parts shortages: (1) lack of experience and insufficiently trained

maintenance personnel, (2) outdated maintenance manuals, and (3) lack

of testing equipment.19 In other words, cannibalizations are sometimes

done to diagnose a problem or to identify which component is not working

properly. By removing a suspect part and replacing it with one that is

known to be working, a mechanic can identify where a problem lies, even

without testing equipment or proper training.

During the recent hearing, service officials acknowledged that

cannibalization is not a preferred maintenance practice and that, in some

cases, their cannibalization rates are higher than desired. In general, each

noted its commitment to reduce cannibalizations and believes that its

efforts to improve overall logistics support should achieve this result.

Although maintenance policies for each of the services state that

 17 See GAO-01-772.

18 See GAO-01-771.

19 See Final Report of Naval Aviation Spares and Readiness, Naval Inspector General

(Apr. 28, 2000).

Other Reasons

Strategies to Reduce

Cannibalizations Vary

Among Services
Page 23 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

cannibalizations should be minimized or used sparingly because of their

adverse affects on workloads and morale, we found that, with the

exception of the Navy, the services have few specific strategies in place to

address cannibalizations servicewide. Until the services develop strategies

directed specifically at reducing the maintenance hours associated with

cannibalizations, we believe this inefficient practice will remain a routine

part of aircraft maintenance.

The Department of Defense is working with new reporting requirements

for cannibalizations, but it has not placed the right level of emphasis on

the problem and has not analyzed the full extent of the human capital

costs and effects of cannibalizations. The 2001 Defense Authorization Act

requires that the Department, on a quarterly basis, measure the extent to

which each service uses cannibalizations. Consequently, each service was

directed to report by May 15, 2001, to the Deputy Under Secretary of

Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness (1) the cannibalization

metric applicable to each weapon system or end item reported in the

Department of Defense Status of Resources and Training System and (2)

the maximum acceptable level for each metric and the rationale for

establishing that level. Within 15 calendar days of the end of each quarter,

the services are also to report to the Deputy Under Secretary (1) the data

for one year’s cannibalization (the last completed quarter and the prior

three quarters), by weapon system or end item, and (2) narrative

comments whenever an unfavorable trend for any system is identified and

at least whenever the maximum acceptable level is exceeded for three

consecutive quarters. The Department of Defense is currently working

with each of the services to finalize the reporting requirements. Aside from

that, however, it has done little to address the issue Department-wide.

According to the recent testimony by its officials, the Air Force has

implemented a multifaceted strategy of increased funding for spares,

initiated a new policy, and developed organizational initiatives to reduce

cannibalization rates. Beginning in fiscal year 2000, depot-repairable spare

parts were funded at 100 percent of stated requirements. The Air Force

also implemented a new policy permitting base supply offices to stock any

consumable part that prevents an aircraft from being mission capable. It is

also monitoring how long individual aircraft are in nonfly status if they

have been used as the source of cannibalized parts. Aircraft that exceed

the major command limit—usually 30 to 45 days—are monitored to ensure

prompt return to flying status. Finally, the Air Force has begun a campaign

Department of Defense

Air Force
Page 24 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

to identify all the obstacles to providing adequate spare part supplies. The

analysis is to be completed by the fall of 2001.

The Air Force is also undertaking an initiative to minimize

cannibalizations at bases in Langley, Virginia, and Elmendorf, Alaska. The

bases have instituted a “consolidated” cannibalization program, referred to

as the Cannibalization Dock Program. The program centralizes

cannibalization management, whereby each of the squadrons in the wing

provides a “donor” aircraft and a cadre of maintenance personnel on a

rotating basis. The program is designed to ensure that as few aircraft as

possible are cannibalized and that the cannibalized parts are better

controlled. While these efforts are localized, they have reduced the

number of cannibalized aircraft and the amount of time that aircraft

remain cannibalized, minimized the number of personnel performing

cannibalizations, and improved quality control over the process.

The Director of the Fleet Readiness Division, Office of the Chief of Naval

Operations, testified in May 2001 that the Navy and the Marine Corps have

initiated a number of actions to reduce cannibalizations. These include

increased funding for spare parts, increased operation and maintenance

funding for the flying-hour program, and specific targeted efforts to

improve the reliability of aircraft and reduce failures. The Director also

cited new programs aimed at identifying and tracking the components that

are cannibalized the most and at improving them.

In March 1998, the Navy established an Aviation Maintenance-Supply

Readiness Study Group to recommend specific actions to reduce aviation

maintenance and supply costs and increase readiness. The Study Group

included cannibalizations in its study and recommended that

cannibalizations and their causes be more closely tracked so that the

reasons could be more precisely identified. As a result, the Navy initiated

actions to better identify the specific causes of cannibalizations and

increase the visibility of items that are being cannibalized extensively.

Beginning in June 2001, the Navy implemented a requirement that more

specific reasons for each cannibalization be reported. Although the Navy

already required some reporting of the specific causes for

cannibalizations, the new requirement increased the number of reportable

reason codes. For example, maintenance personnel are now required to

report whether a cannibalization was done (1) for troubleshooting, (2)

because it was directed by higher authority, (3) because the part was not

available in the required time frame to meet a flight schedule, (4) because

the repair part was carried locally but was not on hand, (5) because the

Navy/Marine Corps
Page 25 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

repair part was not carried in the local supply system, (6) because the

consumable part was not carried or not in stock, or (7) because of a lack

of storage space or testing equipment. A Web site has also been

established to better highlight the items frequently cannibalized and to

provide an avenue for maintenance personnel, program managers, and

inventory control personnel to comment on problems and track progress

in resolving issues. In addition, a new reporting system is being

implemented which, according to Navy officials, should improve reporting

accuracy.

On July 31, 2001, the Navy convened a conference to address

cannibalization issues. The conference was attended by senior leaders

from various organizations, including the Defense Logistics Agency, the

Naval Air Systems Command, the Naval Supply Systems Command,

Marine Corps headquarters, and the Naval Inventory Control Point. Also

attending were representatives from Naval Air Forces Atlantic and Pacific

Fleets, the Center for Naval Analysis, and subordinate commands.

Working groups were established to develop actions to reduce

cannibalizations, including updating cannibalization guidance, determining

appropriate disincentives for cannibalizations, improving the positioning

of stock, and identifying more meaningful ways of measuring the extent of

cannibalizations and the amount of maintenance hours spent on them.

In September 1999, the Army commissioned a study to assess the status of

cannibalization and to determine the need for implementing better

controls over the process. The study, completed in 2000, found a strong

appreciation among unit maintenance officers that cannibalization causes

as many problems as it solves—doubling the man-hours dedicated to a

single maintenance effort. However, it concluded that cannibalization was

a good tool for commanders and that there appeared to be adequate

command involvement to prevent abuse. The study recommended that the

Army develop a data-collection system that would identify all

cannibalization actions, thereby improving data analysis with regard to

cannibalizations.

The study cited a controlled experiment conducted by the Army in 1987 to

determine the effects of cannibalizations on the readiness rates of similar

helicopter units. When the units were forced to stop cannibalizations,

readiness rates dropped more than 25 percent, then returned to previous

levels when cannibalizations resumed. Although the Army did not repeat

the experiment, the 2000 study cited the experiment to conclude that

Army
Page 26 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

operational readiness would suffer if units were not allowed to

cannibalize.

In testimony before your subcommittee on May 22, 2001, the Army Deputy

Chief of Staff for Logistics noted that the full extent to which

cannibalization is used is unknown, as the current information system

used in maintenance and supply has only a limited capability to capture

aircraft data. However, recognizing the need to gain greater visibility over

cannibalizations, the Army is planning to initiate several actions. It is

updating its information system to more effectively capture data on

cannibalizations from existing aviation readiness reports. It is developing a

new logistics automation system that should be able to track

cannibalizations, but the system is not expected to become available until

the second quarter of fiscal year 2003. In addition, it is investing heavily in

a repair parts/spares recapitalization program, working to improve the

reliability of its repair parts, and undertaking a series of improvements in

its logistics system to increase the availability of spare parts at both the

retail and wholesale levels. It is also undertaking a program to extend the

service life of its helicopters and to replace parts most likely to fail.

Cannibalization is a serious problem with many negative effects. While it is

unlikely that the practice may be completely eliminated, we believe there

are opportunities to reduce it. The services are not recording all

cannibalizations, the specific reasons for them, or how much time or

money they spend on them. Although the Air Force and the Navy have

systems in place to measure the number of cannibalizations, the data may

not be sufficiently accurate. The Army’s current information system does

not allow for the reporting of servicewide data on cannibalizations. As a

result, neither the Department of Defense nor the services can accurately

determine (1) which cannibalizations are necessary and what alternatives,

if any, are available to reduce the number of those that are not; (2) what

specific improvements or changes need to be implemented to effectively

limit the adverse effects of cannibalizations; and (3) to what extent

reducing the workload associated with cannibalizations would increase

personnel morale and retention rates. Having standardized data on

cannibalizations should help managers make sound economic decisions

concerning the relative costs of alternatives, such as changing the

stockage levels or storage locations for specific parts.

We believe that the new requirement to report the use of cannibalizations

as part of the current readiness reporting system outlined in the 2001

Defense Authorization Act will be beneficial. However, we believe that the

Conclusions
Page 27 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

new reporting requirement established by the Department in response to

this Act could be improved by including the amount of time spent on

cannibalizations. In our opinion, it is the amount of maintenance

personnel time spent on cannibalizations—not only the number of

cannibalizations—that contributes the most to morale and retention

problems and to higher maintenance costs.

Because they view cannibalization as a symptom of supply problems, the

services are relying on improvements in the logistics system to reduce the

practice. We agree that improvements in the supply system should help

reduce cannibalizations, but we believe that actions aimed specifically at

reducing the maintenance hours expended on cannibalizations are also

needed. Although the services have taken some initiatives to address

cannibalizations, and although we believe these initiatives are steps in the

right direction, the magnitude of the problem and the many reasons for

cannibalization call for a more coordinated approach that involves both

the Department and the services. Because cannibalization is a problem

whose causes are not service-specific and whose effects cut across all

areas of Defense, the Department must provide the services with guidance

and leadership in tackling the issue.

To permit the Department of Defense and the services to more accurately

determine the extent of cannibalizations, we recommend that the

Secretary of Defense direct the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to

establish standardized, comprehensive, and reliable cannibalization datacollection procedures and systems for cannibalizations. The procedures

should require the accurate documentation of the number of

cannibalizations, the associated maintenance hours, and the specific

reasons for the cannibalizations. They should also require the services to

identify any adverse effects of cannibalizations on maintenance costs and

personnel.

The 2001 Defense Authorization Act requires the Department of Defense to

measure, on a quarterly basis, the extent of cannibalizations. We

recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the services to measure

and report the number of maintenance hours associated with

cannibalizations.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the services to

develop strategies to reduce the number of maintenance hours spent on

cannibalization, ensure that cannibalized aircraft do not remain grounded

for long periods of time, and reduce the adverse effects of cannibalizations

Recommendations for

Executive Action
Page 28 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

on maintenance costs and personnel. At a minimum, the strategies should

include criteria to determine (1) which cannibalizations are appropriate,

(2) cannibalization- reduction goals, and (3) the actions to be taken to

meet those goals. The services must assign responsibility for ensuring that

goals are being met and allocate resources for this purpose.

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense

concurred with the intent of all our recommendations and commented

that cannibalization is a serious issue. The Department indicated, however,

that cannibalization accounts for a “negligible percentage” of total

maintenance hours. We believe that that the 5.3 million maintenance hours

spent by the Navy and the Air Force on cannibalizations in fiscal years

1996-2000–the equivalent of more than 500 aviation personnel working fulltime for 5 years—is significant, especially considering that, as our report

points out, the Navy’s data are probably understated by as much as 50

percent, the Air Force underreports cannibalizations, and the Army does

not collect servicewide figures. In addition, virtually all Navy and Air

Force aircraft types reported cannibalization actions for fiscal year 2000.

Several of these aircraft experienced cannibalization rates from about 2 to

over 7 times the service average. These data suggest that the services may

benefit most by focusing their attention on specific aircraft types where

cannibalization problems are the most severe.

The Department does not agree that cannibalization is a pervasive problem

throughout the military. While the Department indicated that a few

weapons systems are showing cannibalization rates higher than desired,

overall cannibalizations are declining—for example, the levels for fiscal

year 2000 are the lowest in 4 years. Even so, as our report indicates, the

Navy and the Air Force still reported spending almost 1 million personnel

hours cannibalizing aircraft that year. And senior service officials, who

testified before your subcommittee on May 22, 2001, acknowledged that

cannibalization rates are too high and need to be reduced.

The Department concurred with our recommendation to establish

standardized, comprehensive, and reliable cannibalization data collection

procedures. According to the Department, an in-depth assessment of the

impact of cannibalization has already been initiated. The Department said

that the assessment will identify the causes and effects of cannibalizations

and will recommend improvements. The Department said this assessment

will provide a basis for potential modifications to logistics management

policies and strategies.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 29 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

With regard to our recommendation that the number of maintenance

hours associated with cannibalizations be included in the Quarterly

Readiness Report to the Congress, the Department said the

recommendation was “redundant” because existing legislation already

requires that this be done. However, our review of the latest readiness

report (for the quarter ending June 2001) revealed that while

cannibalization rates were being reported by weapon system, the

associated maintenance hours were not. We believe that the hours spent

on cannibalizations, not the number of cannibalizations, are the most

important indicator of the negative impact of the practice on maintenance

personnel and that this information should be included in the readiness

reports. Although the Department has not made the number of personnel

hours spent on cannibalizations part of its reporting requirement, it did

state that it is reviewing the data submitted by the services to ensure that

all necessary information is collected.

We performed our work from July 2000 through November 2001 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Our

scope and methodology are provided as appendix I.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its

issuance. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretaries

of Defense, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Army; the Commandant, U.S.

Marine Corps; the Director, Defense Logistics Agency; and the Director,

Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies available to other

interested parties upon request. If you or your staff have any questions

about the report, please contact me at (202) 512-5140.

Key contributors to this assignment were William Meredith, Harry Taylor,

Hugh Brady, Douglas Mills, Janine Cantin, and Stefano Petrucci.

Sincerely yours,

Neal P. Curtin

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 30 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

We performed our review at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, service

headquarters, aviation commands, and other locations as appropriate. To

identify Department of Defense and service policies and practices

regarding cannibalization, we interviewed Office of the Secretary of

Defense and service headquarters and aviation command personnel

responsible for aircraft maintenance policies and oversight, reviewed

applicable regulations and other guidance concerning the practice, and

analyzed statistical data regarding cannibalization rates. We held

discussions concerning the pros and cons of cannibalization, its impact on

readiness, the alternatives and their relative costs, and any efforts on the

part of the Department of Defense to address the issue. We obtained

statistics concerning cannibalizations from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal

2000, identified weapons systems most dependent on the practice to

maintain readiness, and documented the reasons for dependence. We did

not independently verify the number of cannibalizations, associated

maintenance hours, or cannibalization rates provided by the individual

services. We also visited aircraft maintenance units to discuss the use of

cannibalizations and tracking processes. We discussed the impact of

cannibalizations on personnel and other readiness issues, the time

involved, the processes used to decide when cannibalizations should be

used, and alternatives.

To determine the extent to which the services depend on cannibalizations,

we requested that the services provide statistics for fiscal years 1996—

2000 covering the total reported cannibalization actions, rates, and

associated maintenance hours broken out by weapon system. With the

exception of the Army, these data were provided by Navy and Air Force

headquarters organizations; the Navy’s data included Marine Corps figures.

The Navy’s and Marine Corps’ data on cannibalizations were obtained

from the Navy’s Aviation Maintenance and Material Management

Information System (AV-3M), and the Aircraft Inventory Readiness

Reporting System (AIRRS) maintained at the Naval Air Systems Command

located at the Patuxent River Naval Air Station, Maryland. The Air Force’s

data were obtained from the Reliability and Maintainability Information

System (REMIS) and provided to us by Headquarters U.S. Air Force. Since

the Army does not collect data on servicewide cannibalizations, we

discussed the extent that the Army cannibalizes aircraft with officials at

the Army’s Aviation and Missile Command in Huntsville, Alabama; U.S.

Army Forces Command, Ft. McPherson, Georgia; and the Army’s 101st

Airborne Division at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky. Although they provided us

with some limited statistics regarding the number of cannibalizations, we

did not include them in our report because the data were not comparable

to those provided by the other services.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 31 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

To determine the effects of and reasons for cannibalization, we discussed

the issues with maintenance and supply personnel and obtained studies

and documentation during visits to various military headquarters and

aviation activities, including the Commander, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic,

Norfolk, Virginia, and Pacific, San Diego, California; headquarters and

selected squadrons of Strike Fighter Wing U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets,

located at Oceana Naval Air Station, Virginia Beach, Virginia, and at

Lemoore Naval Air Station, California, respectively; and Commander,

Electronic Attack Wing Pacific and selected squadrons at Whidbey Island

Naval Air Station, Washington. For the Air Force, we held discussions with

and obtained available documentation from officials at the Headquarters,

Air Combat Command, 1st Tactical Fighter Wing and selected fighter

squadrons at Langley Air Force Base, Hampton, Virginia; Air Mobility

Command Headquarters, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois; and the 436th

Airlift Wing at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware. We also held discussions

with and obtained documentation from officials at the Army’s Aviation and

Missile Command, U.S. Army Forces Command, and Headquarters 101st

Airborne Division, 101st Aviation Brigade, and the 159th Aviation Brigade

at Ft. Campbell. We also discussed and obtained documentation on the

effect of cannibalization on personnel with officials at Marine Corps

Headquarters, II Marine Air Wing and various squadrons at Marine Corps

Air Station, Cherry Point, Havelock, North Carolina, and at New River

Marine Corps Air Station, Jacksonville, North Carolina.

To identify the actions that the Department of Defense and the services

are taking to reduce cannibalizations, we held discussions with the

responsible offices within each service and the Department of Defense,

analyzed regulations and guidance, and reviewed studies and other

documentation. We focused our work concerning this objective at the

following headquarters locations: Department of Defense’s Office of the

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness,

the Naval Air Systems Command located at the Patuxent River Naval Air

Station, the Air Force Headquarters Logistics Directorate, the Air Combat

and Mobility Commands, Department of the Army Headquarters, U.S.

Army Forces Command, and the Army Aviation and Missile Command. In

addition, we attended a Navy Conference addressing cannibalization

issues. We also obtained and analyzed testimony by the Director, Fleet

Readiness Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy; the

Deputy Chief of Staff/Installations and Logistics, U.S. Air Force; and the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, U.S. Army, provided at the May 22,

2001, hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans

Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government

Reform, on cannibalization of military aircraft parts.
Appendix II: Cannibalization Data for the

Navy and Marine Corps

Page 32 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

Table 1: Cannibalization Rate, Active Inventory, and Average Age of Navy/Marine

Corps Aircraft Reporting Cannibalization Hours in Fiscal Year 2000

Type/ model/

series

Cannibalizations

per 100 fly/hrs.

(FY 2000)

Active inventory

(Mar. 2000)

Average age in

years (Mar. 2001)

F-14D 32.8 46 14

FA-18B 27.7 31 17

FA-18E 21.5 26 2

S-3B 18.2 111 25

EA-6B 16.7 123 19

E-2C 16.2 73 9

F-14A 14.3 87 21

SH-3H 13.6 17 36

MH-53E 13.5 43 11

CH-46D 12.7 26 34

TAV-8B 12.0 18 12

AH-1W 11.3 194 11

FA-18C 11.2 407 9

YSH-60F 11.0 1 0

F-14B 10.8 71 15

FA-18A 9.7 225 15

SH-60F 9.7 75 10

P-3C 9.2 244 24

AV-8B 8.2 153 8

FA-18D 8.2 142 9

CH-53E 7.5 165 13

CH-60S 7.0 3 0

UH-60A 7.0 1 16

UH-1N 6.9 103 26

HH-1N 6.5 35 28

KC-130F 6.0 35 39

CH-46E 5.7 229 33

SH-60B 5.2 158 12

UH-3H 5.2 53 37

EP-3E 5.0 11 31

CH-53D 4.9 56 31

HH-60H 4.4 39 8

UH-46D 4.4 11 35

C-2A 4.0 38 14

FA-18F 4.0 28 1

KC-130R 4.0 14 24

SH-2G 4.0 14 13

TA-4J 4.0 19 32

HH-46D 3.8 42 36

Appendix II: Cannibalization Data for the

Navy and Marine Corps
Appendix II: Cannibalization Data for the

Navy and Marine Corps

Page 33 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

Type/ model/

series

Cannibalizations

per 100 fly/hrs.

(FY 2000)

Active inventory

(Mar. 2000)

Average age in

years (Mar. 2001)

F-5E 3.0 32 16

KC-130T 3.0 28 12

T-2C 3.0 110 29

T-38A 3.0 10 13

TH-57C 3.0 84 18

TH-6B 3.0 6 10

C-130T 2.0 20 7

T-45A 2.0 74 6

T-45C 2.0 50 2

VH-3A 2.0 2 39

C-130H a0 N/A

C-20D a 2 14

C-20G a 5 7

C-9B a 17 25

DC-9 a11 14

E-6A a4 10

E-6B a12 11

F-5F a 4 21

OH-58C a 4 4

P-3B a28 33

TE-2C a2 13

UP-3A a4 38

UP-3B a0 N/A

VP-3A a5 39

Legend:

N/A = not applicable

a

Reported rate more than zero but less than one cannibalization per 100 flying hours.
Appendix III: Cannibalization Data for the Air

Force

Page 34 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

Table 2: Cannibalization Rates, Active Inventory, and Average Age of Air Force

Aircraft Reporting Cannibalization Hours in Fiscal Year 2000

Aircraft model/

series

Cannibalizations

per 100 sorties

(FY 2000)

Active inventory

(Mar. 2001)

Average age in

years (Mar. 2001)

B-1B 85.4 93 14

C-5A 54.6 74 30

C-5B 42.2 50 13

B-52H 30.2 94 39

F-15E 22.8 217 10

F-15C 22.0 346 18

E-3C 17.6 9 18

E-3B 17.1 23 23

C-130J 16.7 12 1

C-141C 13.6 63 35

OA-10A 10.7 118 20

C-5C 10.5 2 31

KC-135R 10.3 356 39

F-16C 9.5 1,087 11

C-141B 9.3 61 34

KC-135T 9.3 54 41

A-10A 8.3 249 20

KC-135E 7.8 132 42

F-15A 7.0 102 23

F-15B 6.9 20 24

F-15D 6.8 54 18

C-130E 5.5 223 36

C-130H 4.4 286 14

F-16A 3.8 84 18

F-16D 3.6 182 11

C-17A 3.4 73 4

F-16B 3.0 41 19

F-117A 1.7 52 10

Appendix III: Cannibalization Data for the Air

Force
Appendix IV: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 35 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft

Appendix IV: Comments From the

Department of Defense
Appendix IV: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 36 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft
Appendix IV: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 37 GAO-02-86 Military Aircraft (350087)

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