IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

March 21, 2017 Session

KRISTIE LINLEY SIBLEY v. COREY D. SIBLEY

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County

No. MC CC CV DN 14-0012 John H. Gasaway, III, Judge

No. M2015-01795-COA-R3-CV

This is a divorce case. Wife was granted a divorce due to Husband’s inappropriate 

marital conduct. The trial court then made a division of the parties’ marital property and 

debt, which included an award to Wife of the marital residence and the equity therein. 

The court further awarded Wife $1,100 per month for 36 months in rehabilitative alimony 

and $3,000 in attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. Husband appeals the trial court’s 

awards of the marital residence and alimony to Wife. Wife seeks attorney’s fees for 

defending this appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and 

remand for further proceedings. Specifically, we affirm the trial court’s award of the 

marital residence to Wife, and we vacate and remand for additional findings on the issues 

of alimony and attorney’s fees. We deny Wife’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed in 

part, Vacated in part, and Remanded

BRANDON O. GIBSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN 

STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., joined.

Mark Robert Olson and Taylor Robinson Dahl, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, 

Corey D. Sibley.

Timothy T. Ishii, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Kristie Linley Sibley.

OPINION

 

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Kristie Linley Sibley (“Wife”) and Corey D. Sibley (“Husband”) married on April 

24, 1998. No children were born of the marriage. Husband is a 100% disabled combatwounded veteran. He was discharged from the military in 2005. In 2008, Husband was 

05/25/2017
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convicted of theft of government property and sentenced to probation and ordered to pay 

approximately $17,000 in restitution. Husband admits Wife stood by his side throughout 

this ordeal and that the restitution was paid back during the parties’ marriage. Wife has 

both a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree and worked at a community college for 

several years during the marriage. After Husband’s conviction, Husband and Wife began 

a catering business together. According to Wife, Husband began to leave the marital 

residence for periods of time beginning in 2013. Husband eventually became 

disillusioned with the parties’ catering business and simply quit and went to Arizona and 

then Miami. Wife was left to handle the business’ debts and dissatisfied customers. 

On January 3, 2014, Wife filed a complaint for legal separation, which alleged 

irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. In her complaint, Wife 

requested that the court make an equitable distribution of the parties’ property and award 

her alimony, both temporary and permanent, as well as attorney’s fees. Husband filed an 

answer to wife’s complaint and a counter-complaint for divorce on February 18, 2014. In 

response to Wife’s complaint, Husband admitted that the parties had irreconcilable 

differences but denied that he was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct. Husband’s 

counter-complaint sought a divorce from Wife based on grounds of irreconcilable 

differences and alleged that Wife was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct. Husband 

prayed that the court make an equitable division of the parties’ real and personal 

property, make an apportionment of the parties’ joint debt, require each party to pay their 

own individual debts, and award Husband attorney’s fees. Wife responded by denying 

that she was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct. 

During the pendency of the separation and divorce proceedings, Wife filed a 

motion asserting that Husband removed her as his designated caregiver with the Veterans 

Administration (“VA”), which cancelled her health insurance through the VA and caused 

her to incur substantial medical bills. Wife requested that the court reinstate her health 

insurance and award her temporary spousal support. Husband opposed Wife’s motion. 

After a hearing, the trial court held that it did not have jurisdiction to reinstate Wife’s 

health care benefits but ordered Husband to continue paying expenses related to the 

marital residence and pay Wife $500 per month in temporary spousal support. Wife then 

filed a motion alleging that Husband cancelled her homeowners and automobile 

insurance policies. She requested the court to order Husband to reinstate these insurance 

policies and pay her monthly health insurance premium. This motion was also brought 

before the court for a hearing, and the court granted Wife’s motion requiring Husband to 

continue paying for the homeowners and automobile insurance and to pay Wife an 

additional $84.81 per month for her health insurance premium.

The trial on Wife’s complaint for legal separation and Husband’s countercomplaint for divorce took place on July 27, 2015. The trial court heard argument from 
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counsel for both parties, testimony from Husband, Wife, and Husband’s new caregiver, 

and admitted items into evidence. At the close of proof, the trial court requested that the 

attorneys for both parties submit proposed rulings for its review, and the court took the 

matter under advisement. The court entered a final decree of divorce on August, 31, 

2015 (“Final Decree”). During the hearing on July 27, 2015, the court declared the 

parties divorced; however, in the Final Decree, the court determined it proper to award a 

divorce to Wife, stating as follows:

Initially [Wife] requested a legal separation, however, after the proof, she 

made an oral motion to amend, and there was no objection by [Husband] as 

he was already requesting a divorce. The Court finds that [Husband] 

admitted his infidelity, and was forced to contact [Wife] to inform her that 

she might have a disease due to his infidelity. Therefore, [Wife] is granted 

a divorce due to the inappropriate marital conduct of [Husband]. 

The court then went on to divide the marital estate, with the parties’ primary assets 

being the marital residence and a few vehicles. The court awarded Wife the marital 

residence, including the equity therein, and gave each party the personal property in their 

possession, including their respective automobiles. The remainder of the distribution of 

marital assets related to the apportionment of debt. The marital residence was 

encumbered with delinquent property taxes although Husband testified that he should 

qualify for tax relief available to veterans. To that end, the court ordered Husband to 

complete the tax forms necessary to dispose of the property’s delinquent taxes and held 

that Wife would be responsible for any property taxes accruing on and after August 1, 

2015. There were also debts related to the parties’ catering business venture. Wife 

testified that a credit card she held in her name was used for the parties’ business, and 

that the card had a balance of around $12,000. The court ordered Husband and Wife 

were equally responsible for the payment of that debt. The court ordered Husband to pay 

any additional debts associated with the business, including any debts owed to the State 

of Tennessee and the Better Business Bureau. The court further ordered that Wife would 

be responsible for paying the balance of her student loans, which she testified was around 

$100,000. Finally, the court addressed Wife’s request for spousal support. Wife 

requested an award of $1,800 per month for 7 years. The court summarily ordered 

Husband to pay Wife $1,100 per month in rehabilitative alimony for 36 months and 

$3,000 in attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. 

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Husband presents the following issues for review on appeal, which we have restated: 

1. Whether the trial court erred in awarding the marital residence and 
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the equity therein to Wife? 

2. Whether the trial court erred in awarding rehabilitative alimony and 

alimony in solido to Wife?

Wife requests that we award her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

This case was tried by the trial court without a jury. We therefore review the trial 

court’s findings of fact de novo with a presumption of correctness unless the evidence 

preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. App. 13(d); Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 

685, 692 (Tenn. 2013). Also, because the trial court has the opportunity to observe the 

demeanor of the witnesses and hear the in-court testimony, we afford considerable 

deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations and the weight given to oral 

testimony. Andrews v. Andrews, 344 S.W.3d 321, 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). We 

review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. 

Hyneman v. Hyneman, 152 S.W.3d 549, 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

A. Award of Marital Home

Husband first contends that the trial court committed reversible error by granting 

the marital residence and its equity entirely to Wife. This Court has set forth the 

following principles with regard to a trial court’s division of marital property:

A division of marital property is not rendered inequitable simply because it 

is not precisely equal, or because each party did not receive a share of 

every piece of marital property. The fairness of the trial court’s approach 

is inevitably reflected in its results. 

The approach to dividing a martial estate should not be mechanical, 

but rather should entail carefully weighing the relevant factors in Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) in light of the evidence that the parties have

presented. Trial courts have broad discretion in fashioning an equitable 

division of marital property, and appellate courts must accord great weight 

to a trial court’s division of marital property. Accordingly, it is not our 

role to tweak the manner in which the trial court has divided the marital 

property. Rather, our role is to determine whether the trial court applied 

the correct legal standards, whether the manner in which the trial court 

weighed the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) is consistent with 

logic and reason, and whether the trial court’s division of marital property 
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is equitable. 

The division of the marital estate includes both the division of 

marital property and the allocation of the marital debt. Trial courts have 

not completely divided a marital estate until they have allocated both the 

marital property and the marital debt. Thus, an examination of the manner 

in which a trial court divided the marital property must take into 

consideration how the trial court allocated the marital debt.

Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (internal citations omitted). 

To that end, we must not simply review the award of the home in a vacuum. Rather, we 

review the trial court’s entire division of the marital assets and liabilities to determine the 

propriety of awarding the marital residence to Wife. 

In the case at hand, the parties did not have a substantial amount of marital 

property. As a whole, the parties’ debt appears to have exceeded the value of their assets.

The parties agreed at mediation that they would retain their respective vehicles, and the 

trial court awarded the marital residence to Wife, which was encumbered with a 

mortgage.1 However, the trial court was also tasked with distributing the parties’ debt. 

The court ordered that the parties equally split a credit card balance with debt associated 

with the parties’ business. Husband was ordered to pay any additional debts associated 

with the business. Wife was ordered to pay her student loans, which she estimated to be 

around $100,000. 

Although it is not clear whether the court’s division of assets and debt was exactly 

equal to each party, the goal is an equitable distribution of property, not equal. See Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1). We conclude that the trial court’s distribution of marital 

property was not an abuse of discretion. We affirm the trial court’s award of the marital 

residence to Wife.

B. Award of Spousal Support

We now turn to Husband’s assertion that the trial court erred in awarding 

rehabilitative alimony and alimony in solido to Wife. The Tennessee Supreme Court has 

articulated a deferential standard of review applicable to a trial court’s decision on 

matters of alimony:

For well over a century, Tennessee law has recognized that trial courts 

should be accorded wide discretion in determining matters of spousal 

 

1At trial, the parties testified that equity in the home was just under $50,000. 
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support. . . . This well-established principle still holds true today, with this 

Court repeatedly and recently observing that trial courts have broad 

discretion to determine whether spousal support is needed and, if so, the 

nature, amount and duration of the award. . . . 

Equally well-established is the proposition that a trial court’s 

decision regarding spousal support is factually driven and involves the 

careful balancing of many factors. 

Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105-06 (Tenn. 2011) (footnote and 

internal citations omitted). 

Husband asserts that the trial court’s order awarding alimony contains insufficient 

findings of fact as to Wife’s need in order to affirm the award on appeal. The entirety of 

the trial court’s discussion of its award of alimony is as follows:

[Wife] is requesting alimony for 7 years. The Court awards [Wife] the sum 

of $1,100 per month as rehabilitative alimony for thirty-six (36) months 

beginning August 1, 2015. [ ] [Husband] shall insure his life and name 

[Wife] as the beneficiary in the amount of alimony awarded to [Wife] and 

said amount shall continue until the alimony is paid in full. [ ] [Wife] is 

awarded the sum of $3,000.00 as alimony in solido for a portion of her 

attorney’s fees. These sums are to be paid to [Wife’s] attorney within 

ninety (90) days of the entry of the Final Decree. At the 90 day period, if 

the attorney’s fees are not paid in full, the award shall accrue interest at a 

statutory rate of 10% per annum.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121(i) sets forth a non-exhaustive list of factors 

for a court to consider when determining whether an award of alimony is appropriate, 

and, if so, the nature, amount, term, and manner of payment of said alimony, including:

(1) The relative earning capacity, obligations, needs, and financial 

resources of each party, including income from pension, profit sharing or 

retirement plans and all other sources;

(2) The relative education and training of each party, the ability and 

opportunity of each party to secure such education and training, and the 

necessity of a party to secure further education and training to improve such 

party’s earnings capacity to a reasonable level;

(3) The duration of the marriage;
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(4) The age and mental condition of each party;

(5) The physical condition of each party, including, but not limited to, 

physical disability or incapacity due to a chronic debilitating disease;

(6) The extent to which it would be undesirable for a party to seek 

employment outside the home, because such party will be custodian of a 

minor child of the marriage;

(7) The separate assets of each party, both real and personal, tangible and 

intangible;

(8) The provisions made with regard to the marital property, as defined in § 

36-4-121;

(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;

(10) The extent to which each party has made such tangible and intangible 

contributions to the marriage as monetary and homemaker contributions, 

and tangible and intangible contributions by a party to the education, 

training or increased earning power of the other party;

(11) The relative fault of the parties, in cases where the court, in its 

discretion, deems it appropriate to do so; and

(12) Such other factors, including the tax consequences to each party, as are 

necessary to consider the equities between the parties.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i). Our supreme court held that “a trial court must consider 

all relevant factors in § 36-5-101(d)(1) to determine whether an economically 

disadvantaged spouse can be rehabilitated.” Robertson v. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d 337, 343 

(Tenn. 2002). Also, Wife’s award of attorney’s fees constitute an award of alimony in 

solido, and this Court has held that “a trial court considering a request for attorney’s fees 

must consider the factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121(i), with the 

most important factors being the need of the economically disadvantaged spouse and the 

ability of the obligor spouse to pay.” Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483, 501 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2009). 

Such an analysis is lacking in this case. The trial court did not explain how or why 

it reached its decision on the issues of alimony or attorney’s fees. Perhaps most 
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importantly, the Final Decree lacks any discussion of Wife’s need or Husband’s ability to 

pay either the rehabilitative alimony or the attorney’s fees, nor was there a determination 

that Wife had the need to be or was capable of being rehabilitated. We therefore cannot 

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, we vacate the trial 

court’s order as it pertains to the awards of rehabilitative alimony and attorney’s fees as 

alimony in solido and remand for entry of an order addressing these issues in compliance 

with Rule 52.01. See Parrish v. Parrish, No. W2013-00316-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL

3203352, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2013) (discussing the need for specific findings 

under Rule 52.01 to explain an award of alimony); Hudson v. Hudson, No. 02A01-9412-

CH-00282, 1996 WL 165293, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 1996) (remanding for 

appropriate findings regarding a spouse’s ability to pay some or all of the other spouse’s 

insurance costs as alimony); Kathryne B.F. v. Michael B., No. W2013-01757-COA-R3-

CV, 2014 WL 992110, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2014) (remanding for specific 

findings concerning the trial court’s reasons for denying a request for attorney’s fees).

C. Attorney’s Fees on Appeal

The determination of whether to award attorney’s fees on appeal is within the sole 

discretion of the appellate court. Moses v. Moses, E2008-00257-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 

838105, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2009) (citing Archer v. Archer, 907 S.W.2d 412, 

419 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)). Considering the lack of factual findings in the trial court, 

we must decline to award Wife her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.2

 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court with respect to 

the award of the marital residence to Wife, and we vacate and remand for additional 

findings on the issues of alimony and attorney’s fees. We deny Wife’s request for 

attorney’s fees on appeal. Costs of this appeal are taxed one-half to Wife, and one-half to 

Husband, and his surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________ 

BRANDON O. GIBSON, JUDGE

 

2Our holding on attorney’s fees on appeal does not preclude a request for such fees in the future, if 

necessary.