COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Humphreys, O’Br ien and Retired Judge Bumgardne r 

CRYSTAL SANTOS MEMORANDUM OPINION  v. Record No. 0727- 18-3 PER CURIAM OCTOBER 30, 2018 BEDFORD COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF BEDFORD COUNTY James W. Updike, Jr., Judge (Rebecca L. Wetzel; Wetzel an d Washburn, PLLC, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. (Patrick J. Skelley, II, Count y Attorney, on brief), for appe llee. Appellee submitting on brief.
Crystal Santos (mother) is appealing the orders terminating he r parental rights to her child, K.C., and approving the goal of a doption. Mother argues that t he circuit court erre d by denying her motion for a continuance. 1 Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we concl ude that the circuit court did not err. A ccordingly, we affirm the deci sion of the circuit court. BACKGROUND “On appeal, ‘we view the evide nce and all reason able inference s in the light most favorable to the prevailing part y below, in this case the Department.’” Farrell v. Warren Cty.

 Retired Judge Bumgardner took pa rt in the consideration of thi s case by designation pursuant to Code § 17.1-400(D).

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated fo r publication.

1 Mother does not challenge the su fficiency of the evidence to s upport the circuit court’s rulings regarding the terminati on of parental rights and the go al of adoption. Consequently, we will not address those rulings.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 59 Va. App. 375, 386, 719 S.E.2d 329, 334 (2012) (quoting Jenkins v. Winchester Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178, 1180, 409 S. E.2d 16, 18 (1991)). On November 1, 2017, t he Bedford County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the JDR court) entered an orde r terminating mother’s parental rights to K.C. Mother appealed the JDR court’s order to the circuit court. The parties subsequent ly set the matter for trial in the circuit court for March 28, 2018. The B edford County Department of Soc ial Services (the Department) prepared a notice of the hearin g and mailed copies of the notic e to the guardian ad litem and mother’s counsel. On March 28, 2018, the circuit court called the case, and moth er was not present. The Department stated that it was pr epared to have the case heard, even though mother was not present. Mother’s counsel made a motion for a continuance. Mother’s cou nsel stated that mother had wanted to appeal the JDR court’s ruling, but counsel was not su re whether mother had notice of the March 28 hearing. The Department objected to the continuance a nd argued that mother had notice of the court date from the socia l worker. The D epartment also stated that it had tried to serve mother with notice of the hearin g, but mother had moved from he r last known address. 2 The social worker testified that during her telephone conversation with mo ther on Februar y 8, 2018, she informed mother of the March 2 8 court date. Mother did not ind icate whether she would or would not be coming to the hearing. Then , on March 27, 2018, the soc ial worker spoke with the maternal grandmother, who indicated that she did not know where mother w as living or how to contact her. The social worker also testified that K.C. was doing “wonderfu l” in the foster home. K.C. had lived in the same foster hom e since he was five days old. The foster family already had adopted two of his siblings and wanted to adopt K.C.

2 Mother previously told the De partment that she was living with the maternal grandmother. However, the Depar tment presented evidence that m other had been in and out of the maternal grandmother’s house for several weeks before the M arch 28, 2018 hearing.- 3 - The Department informed the circuit court that mother’s parent al rights had been terminated to four of K.C.’s siblings, and K .C. was the “fifth of five sib lings.” The guardian ad litem told the circuit court that mother was me ntally ill. While K.C. was in foster care, mother moved between Virginia, North Carolina, and Ne w Jersey, and had lived in wome n’s shelters and the maternal grandmother’s house. Both the Department and the guardian ad litem asserted that mother had made “no progress” with the Department’s requirements while K.C . was in foster care. In fact, the social worker testified that mot her had not seen K.C. since Jul y 2017. After hearing the evidence and ar gument, the circuit court den ied mother’s motion for a continuance and held that mother had “actual knowledge and noti ce” of the hearing. The circuit court found that K.C. “shouldn’t have to wait around until [mot her] may or may not decide to be a parent.” The circuit court entered orders approving the goal o f adoption and terminating mother’s parental rights to K.C. pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B), (C)(1), (C)(2), and (E)(i). This appeal followed. ANALYSIS Mother argues that the circuit court erred by d enying her moti on for a continuance. She contends that she “was prejudiced because she was unable to par ticipate in any of the hearing that rendered her a legal stranger to her biological child.” “The decision to grant a motion f or a continuance is within th e sound discretion of the circuit court and must be consid ered in view of the circumstanc es unique to each case.” Haugen v. Shenandoah Valley Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 274 Va. 27, 34, 645 S.E.2d 261, 265 (2007). “The circuit court’s ruling on a motion for a continuance will be re jected on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice to the movant.” Id. The circuit court found that mo ther had “actual knowledge and notice” of the hearing. “We give ‘great deference’ to the tria l court’s factual findings an d view the facts in the light most- 4 - favorable to the prevailing par ty below.” Andre ws v. Creacey, 56 Va. App. 606, 6 19, 696 S.E.2d 218, 224 (2010) (quoting Blackso n v. Blackson, 4 0 Va. App. 507, 517, 579 S.E.2 d 704, 709 (2003)). “On appeal, we will not reverse findings of fact ‘unl ess plainly wrong.’” Budnick v. Budnick, 42 Va. App. 823, 834, 595 S.E.2d 50, 55 (2004) (quotin g Gilman v. Gilman, 32 Va. App. 104, 115, 526 S.E.2d 763, 768-69 (2000)). The circuit court held that mother was “something of a transie nt” and had an obligation to notify the parties, including the Department, of her current ad dress. The circuit c ourt found credible the social worker’s testimony that mother was “definitely aware of the hearing” and that the social worker had informed her of the c ourt date. “It is well establi shed that the trier of fact ascertains a witness’ credibility, determin es the weight to be given to thei r testimony, and has discretion to accept or reject any of the witness’ testimony.” Layman v. Lay man, 62 Va. App. 134, 137, 742 S.E.2d 890, 891 (2013) (quoting Street v. Street, 25 Va. App. 3 80, 387, 488 S.E.2d 665, 668 (1997) ( en banc )). Therefore, contrary to mother’s arguments, the circuit court d id not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s motion for a continuance because the evidence supported the circuit court’s factual findings that mother ha d actual notice of the hearing b ut did not appear. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the c ircuit court’s ruling is affir med. Affirmed.