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*********************************************** 
ANGEL VILLAFANE v. COMMISSIONER OF

CORRECTION

(AC 40615)

Keller, Moll and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The self-represented petitioner, who had been convicted of burglary in the

first degree and criminal violation of a protective order, sought a writ

of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective

assistance. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas

petition and, thereafter, denied the petition for certification to appeal,

and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the petitioner’s claim

that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for

certification to appeal with respect to the issue of whether the court

properly denied his motions to appoint habeas counsel was not reviewable: because the petitioner did not include that claim as a potential

ground for appeal in his petition for certification to appeal, he could

not demonstrate that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying

the petition for certification to appeal concerning an issue that was

never before the habeas court when it considered the petition for certification, nor could this court review an exercise of discretion that did

not occur, and because the petitioner adequately preserved this claim

by raising, in both written and oral motions, requests for the appointment

of habeas counsel, which were ultimately denied by the habeas court,

the petitioner’s reliance on the plain error doctrine for review of his

claim was misplaced, and this court, thus, declined to review the claim

under the plain error doctrine; moreover, the petitioner’s claim that the

habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification

to appeal with respect to the issue of whether his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance was not reviewable, the petitioner having failed

to brief the claim adequately.

Argued January 9—officially released June 11, 2019

Procedural History

Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and

tried to the court, Sferrazza, J.; judgment denying the

petition; thereafter, the court denied the petition for

certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to

this court. Appeal dismissed.

Cheryl A. Juniewic, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Nancy L. Walker, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Kevin D. Lawlor, former

state’s attorney, and Angela R. Macchiarulo, senior

assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

KELLER, J. The petitioner, Angel Villafane, appeals

following the denial of his petition for certification to

appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner

claims that the habeas court abused its discretion in

denying his petition for certification to appeal and

improperly (1) denied his motions to appoint habeas

counsel, and (2) rejected his claim that his trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance. We disagree and,

accordingly, dismiss the petitioner’s appeal.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On December

17, 2014, the petitioner pleaded guilty to one count

of burglary in the first degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (2) and one count of criminal

violation of a protective order in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-223. The petitioner also admitted to violating his probation in two instances and violating a

conditional discharge in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-32. According to the factual basis provided by

the state at the petitioner’s plea hearing, the petitioner

forced his way into a house occupied by a woman

with whom he had a previous relationship, where he

proceeded to strike her ‘‘several times in the head, and

then grabbed a knife from the kitchen and attempted

to stab her . . . .’’ The prosecutor indicated that the

woman’s daughter called the police, and, at that time,

the petitioner fled from the residence. After canvassing

the petitioner, the court determined that the pleas had

been ‘‘knowingly and voluntarily made’’ and were supported by a factual basis.

At the petitioner’s sentencing hearing on February

25, 2015, the court imposed a total effective sentence

of eight years incarceration followed by seven years of

special parole. The court terminated the other probations that the petitioner was serving at the time.

On June 29, 2015, the petitioner, who was self-represented at the time, filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that he was

living at the victim’s house on the day on which the

crime was committed. He contended that, because he

lived there, he ‘‘could not be guilty of burglary in the

first degree . . . .’’ Based on this contention, he alleged

that his attorney at the time of the plea hearing, public

defender David Egan, provided ineffective assistance

by recommending that he plead guilty to that crime and

‘‘take [nine] years and [seven] years special parole.’’ Id.

He also contended that Egan never ‘‘did his due diligence to remotely look into fighting’’ his case, nor did

he investigate ‘‘the facts in the case or the witnesses

. . . .’’ Additionally, the petitioner asserted that Egan

and the trial court, Iannotti, J., had violated his sixth

and fourteenth amendment rights because Egan was
ineffective and the trial court had refused to grant his

motion to dismiss Egan as his attorney.

In his return, the respondent, the Commissioner of

Correction, indicated that he was without sufficient

information to admit or deny any of the factual allegations contained in the petitioner’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. As such, the respondent indicated he

would leave the petitioner to his proof.

On July 9, 2015, after the court received the petition

for a writ of habeas corpus, it referred the petitioner

to the Office of the Chief Public Defender for appointment of counsel. On August 17, 2015, Attorney James

Ruane and his law firm, Ruane Attorneys at Law,

entered an appearance on the petitioner’s behalf. On

December 6, 2016, however, the petitioner moved to

dismiss counsel because, in his view, since the time he

was appointed counsel, the petitioner had been ‘‘represented by [three] different attorneys’’ from the firm. He

argued that each of the attorneys had ‘‘done nothing at

all in the petitioner’s case’’ and that his most recent

attorney, Daniel F. Lage, had refused to investigate his

case. The petitioner requested that the habeas court

dismiss Lage and permit him to represent himself, and

that a trial be scheduled for March 20, 2017.

On January 30, 2017, the habeas court, Bright, J.,

heard arguments on the petitioner’s motion to dismiss

counsel. After canvassing the petitioner and cautioning

him about the challenges of self-representation, the

court stated: ‘‘[The petitioner] has thought through this.

He understands the challenges of representing himself,

but he’s been working diligently in preparing his case.

He has a right to represent himself. He says he’s prepared to go to trial. I’m going to grant his motion.’’

On May 9, 2017, fifteen days before the habeas trial

was scheduled to begin, the petitioner filed a written

motion with the habeas court for ‘‘[appointment] of

special counsel.’’ The petitioner indicated in the motion

that he wanted ‘‘special counsel to assist the petitioner

with his habeas case.’’ The court, Sferrazza, J., who

presided over the habeas trial, denied the motion, indicating that the ‘‘petitioner specifically asked to dismiss

appointed counsel and proceed [self-represented].’’

The petitioner’s habeas trial was held on May 24,

2017. At the outset of the proceeding, the petitioner

renewed his request for counsel to assist him in his

representation. He stated: ‘‘Now, being that I got the

private investigator and the expert psychologist to do

the work . . . I need . . . an attorney to be able to

help me represent this because I’m having problems to

understand why am I still being charged with burglary

one when I live at that address and I have all the proof

. . . .’’ The court responded: ‘‘[Y]ou don’t get to pick

and choose who your attorney is when you’re having

an appointed attorney. And the fact that you’re disap-
pointed with the attorney or you hold the attorney in

low regard or the attorney is not presenting the case

the way you would want is not grounds for disqualifying

the attorney and getting a new attorney. And you opted

to represent yourself, and that’s what you’re doing. If

I were to appoint a new attorney now, that would be

like allowing indigents to pick and choose their own

attorney, which is not allowed. So you’ll have to proceed

and do the best you can in representing yourself.’’ The

petitioner did not revisit his request for counsel.

At trial, the self-represented petitioner presented testimony from three witnesses, including himself, and

offered twelve exhibits, nine of which were admitted

into evidence. The respondent presented no evidence.

In a memorandum of decision dated May 26, 2017,

the habeas court denied the petitioner’s petition for a

writ of habeas corpus. The court aptly observed that

the petitioner claimed that trial counsel had rendered

ineffective assistance by (1) failing to conduct adequate

pretrial investigation and preparation, (2) failing to

request that the petitioner undergo a competency examination pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56d, and (3)

failing to advise the petitioner that one cannot burglarize one’s own residence. The court concluded that the

petitioner was unable to prevail on any of these claims.

Soon thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for

certification to appeal; see General Statutes § 52-470

(g); and an application for waiver of fees, costs, and

expenses and appointment of counsel on appeal (fee

waiver application). See General Statutes § 52-259b. He

asserted the following grounds for his proposed appeal:

‘‘(1) I don’t have money I’m flat broke,’’ and ‘‘(2) my

[sixth] and [fourteenth] amendment right[s] are violated. I have evidence to show that my . . . then Attorney Egan was ineffective and also the Milford court

[Iannotti, J.] was bias[ed]. My due process was violated

by the court [and] Attorney Egan.’’ The habeas court

denied the petition for certification to appeal but

granted the fee waiver application and appointed counsel for purposes of the appeal. This appeal followed.

The petitioner claims that the habeas court abused

its discretion in denying his petition for certification to

appeal and improperly (1) denied his motions to appoint

habeas counsel, and (2) rejected his claim that his trial

counsel provided ineffective assistance.

Section 52-470 (g) provides: ‘‘No appeal from the judgment rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding brought

by or on behalf of a person who has been convicted of

a crime in order to obtain such person’s release may

be taken unless the appellant, within ten days after the

case is decided, petitions the judge before whom the

case was tried or, if such judge is unavailable, a judge

of the Superior Court designated by the Chief Court

Administrator, to certify that a question is involved in
the decision which ought to be reviewed by the court

having jurisdiction and the judge so certifies.’’

As our Supreme Court has explained, one of the goals

our legislature intended by enacting this statute was

‘‘to limit the number of appeals filed in criminal cases

and hasten the final conclusion of the criminal justice

process . . . .’’ Iovieno v. Commissioner of Correction, 242 Conn. 689, 699, 699 A.2d 1003 (1997). ‘‘[T]he

legislature intended to discourage frivolous habeas

appeals.’’ Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 616, 646

A.2d 126 (1994). ‘‘[Section] 52-470 (b)1 acts as a limitation on the scope of review, and not the jurisdiction,

of the appellate tribunal.’’ (Footnote added.) Logan v.

Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 744, 750,

9 A.3d 776 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 918, 14 A.3d

333 (2011).

‘‘Faced with a habeas court’s denial of a petition for

certification to appeal, a petitioner can obtain appellate

review of the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus

only by satisfying the two-pronged test enunciated by

our Supreme Court in Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn.

178, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), and adopted in Simms v.

Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 612, 646 A.2d 126 (1994). First,

he must demonstrate that the denial of his petition for

certification constituted an abuse of discretion. . . .

Second, if the petitioner can show an abuse of discretion, he must then prove that the decision of the habeas

court should be reversed on its merits. . . .

‘‘To prove an abuse of discretion, the petitioner must

demonstrate that the [resolution of the underlying claim

involves issues that] are debatable among jurists of

reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to

deserve encouragement to proceed further.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Logan v. Commissioner of

Correction, supra, 125 Conn. App. 750–51.

‘‘In determining whether the habeas court abused

its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for

certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of

the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether

the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous. In other words, we review

the petitioner’s substantive claims for the purpose of

ascertaining whether those claims satisfy one or more

of the three criteria . . . adopted by [our Supreme

Court] for determining the propriety of the habeas

court’s denial of the petition for certification.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Sanders v. Commissioner

of Correction, 169 Conn. App. 813, 821–22, 153 A.3d 8

(2016), cert. denied, 325 Conn. 904,156 A.3d 536 (2017).

I

The petitioner first claims that the habeas court

abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal with respect to the issue of whether
the habeas court properly denied his motions for the

appointment of habeas counsel. The respondent argues,

however, that the petitioner failed to raise this issue as

a ground for appeal either by stating it in his petition for

certification to appeal or in his fee waiver application

on which he expressly relied in his petition for certification to appeal. Thus, the respondent argues that the

petitioner is unable to claim on appeal that the court

abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal on this ground. The petitioner acknowledges that he did not include this ground in his petition

for certification to appeal but alternatively ‘‘seeks to

prevail on his claim pursuant to the plain error doctrine.’’ We address these arguments in turn.

It is well established that a petitioner cannot demonstrate that the habeas court abused its discretion in

denying a petition for certification to appeal if the issue

raised on appeal was never raised before the court at

the time that it considered the petition for certification

to appeal as a ground on which certification should

be granted. See, e.g., Henderson v. Commissioner of

Correction, 181 Conn. App. 778, 792, 189 A.3d 135, cert.

denied, 329 Conn. 911, 186 A.3d 707 (2018); Tutson

v. Commissioner of Correction, 144 Conn. App. 203,

216–17, 72 A.3d 1162, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 928, 78

A.3d 145 (2013); Perry v. Commissioner of Correction,

131 Conn. App. 792, 796–97, 28 A.3d 1015, cert. denied,

303 Conn. 913, 32 A.3d 966 (2011); Mercado v. Commissioner of Correction, 85 Conn. App. 869, 872, 860 A.2d

270 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 908, 870 A.2d

1079 (2005).

Although the petitioner argues in his appellate brief

that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying

his petition for certification to appeal with respect to

the issue of whether the habeas court properly denied

his motions for the appointment of habeas counsel, as

stated previously, the petitioner recognizes that he did

not include that claim as a potential ground for appeal

in his petition for certification to appeal. This omission

is fatal to his claim. As our decisional law makes clear,

‘‘[b]ecause it is impossible to review an exercise of

discretion that did not occur, we are confined to

reviewing only those issues which were brought to the

habeas court’s attention in the petition for certification

to appeal.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 181 Conn. App. 792 (‘‘[A] petitioner cannot demonstrate that the habeas court abused its

discretion in denying a petition for certification to

appeal if the issues that the petitioner later raises on

appeal were never presented to, or decided by, the

habeas court. . . . Under such circumstances, a

review of the petitioner’s claims would amount to an

ambuscade of the [habeas] judge.’’ [Internal quotation

marks omitted.]).
Alternatively, the petitioner attempts to raise an independent claim on which to obtain reversal of the habeas

court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

In particular, he invokes the plain error doctrine pursuant to Practice Book § 60-5. He contends that the habeas

court’s denial of his written and oral motions for the

appointment of counsel is an error so obvious that it

affects the fairness and integrity of, and public confidence in, the judicial proceedings.

The respondent, however, argues that this court

should not consider the petitioner’s claim under the

plain error doctrine because the petitioner has failed

to establish a prerequisite for appellate review—i.e.,

that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying

certification to appeal. In support of his argument urging us not to consider the petitioner’s plain error claim,

the respondent cites to the concurring opinion in Foote

v. Commissioner of Correction, 151 Conn. App. 559,

573–74, 96 A.3d 587 (Keller, J., concurring) (‘‘[e]ngaging

in a plain error analysis of claims never raised in connection with a petition for certification to appeal expands

the scope of review and thwarts the goals that the

legislature sought to achieve by enacting § 52-470 [g]’’),

cert. denied, 314 Conn. 929, 102 A.3d 709 (2014), and

cert. dismissed, 314 Conn. 929, 206 A.3d 764 (2014), and

to this court’s decision in Mercado v. Commissioner

of Correction, supra, 85 Conn. App. 872 (dismissing

appeal from denial of certification to appeal because

petitioner did not raise claim of plain error in petition

for certification to appeal). The respondent argues, inter

alia, that considering the petitioner’s claim of plain error

invites petitioners who have been denied certification

to appeal to circumvent the bounds of limited review

pursuant to § 52-470 (g) simply by couching wholly

unpreserved grounds as plain error. The respondent

correctly acknowledges, however, that in appeals from

the denial of a petition for certification to appeal, this

court previously has considered claims of plain error

that were not included as potential grounds for appeal

in a petition for certification to appeal. See, e.g., Foote

v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 151 Conn. App.

566–69 (in appeal from denial of certification to appeal,

court considered claim of plain error not raised in petition for certification to appeal).

Despite this apparent inconsistency in this court’s

jurisprudence with respect to whether, in an appeal

from the denial of a petition for certification to appeal,

this court may consider a claim of plain error that was

not raised as a ground on which certification should

be granted, we need not attempt to resolve that reviewability issue in the present case. This is because we

conclude that the petitioner’s reliance on the plain error

doctrine is flawed for a more fundamental reason,

namely, the claim was adequately preserved during the

habeas trial. The plain error doctrine is set forth at
Practice Book § 60-5, which provides in relevant part:

‘‘The court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless

it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent

to the trial. The court may in the interests of justice

notice plain error not brought to the attention of the

trial court. . . .’’ The plain error doctrine ‘‘is an extraordinary remedy used by appellate courts to rectify errors

committed at trial that, although unpreserved, are of

such monumental proportion that they threaten to

erode our system of justice and work a serious and

manifest injustice on the aggrieved party. [T]he plain

error doctrine . . . is not . . . a rule of reviewability.

It is a rule of reversibility. That is, it is a doctrine that

this court invokes in order to rectify a trial court ruling

that, although either not properly preserved or never

raised at all in the trial court, nonetheless requires

reversal of the trial court’s judgment, for reasons of

policy. . . . In addition, the plain error doctrine is

reserved for truly extraordinary situations [in which]

the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects

the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in

the judicial proceedings. . . . Plain error is a doctrine

that should be invoked sparingly. . . . Implicit in this

very demanding standard is the notion . . . that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under

review. . . . [Thus, an appellant] cannot prevail under

[the plain error doctrine] . . . unless he demonstrates

that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful

that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in

manifest injustice.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Moore, 293 Conn. 781, 823,

981 A.2d 1030 (2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 954, 130 S.

Ct. 3386, 177 L. Ed. 2d 306 (2010).

In the present case, however, the petitioner did in

fact raise, by written and oral motion, requests for the

appointment of counsel, which were ultimately denied

by the court. Because this claim was raised and ruled

on by the habeas court and, thus, was properly preserved prior to and during the habeas trial, the petitioner’s reliance on the plain error doctrine is misplaced.

Cloaking the claim in plain error garb merely obfuscates

the fact that the claim was raised and decided during

the habeas trial.2

If the petitioner desired appellate

review of the court’s denial of his motions, it was incumbent on him to include that issue as a ground for appeal

in his petition for certification to appeal in order for

the habeas court to rule on it. See General Statutes

§ 52-470 (g). Because he did not do so, we decline to

afford it review. See Tutson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 144 Conn. App. 217.3

II

The petitioner also claims that the habeas court

abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal with respect to the issue of whether
his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The

respondent contends that this court should forgo

reviewing this claim because it is inadequately briefed.

We agree with the respondent.

‘‘Ordinarily, [c]laims are inadequately briefed when

they are merely mentioned and not briefed beyond a

bare assertion. . . . Claims are also inadequately

briefed when they . . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with no mention of relevant authority and

minimal or no citations from the record . . . . As a

general matter, the dispositive question in determining

whether a claim is adequately briefed is whether the

claim is reasonably discernible [from] the record . . . .

We are not required to review issues that have been

improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract

assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an

issue by failure to brief the issue properly.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Artiaco v.

Commissioner of Correction, 180 Conn. App. 243, 248–

49, 182 A.3d 1208, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 931, 184 A.3d

758 (2018).

In the petitioner’s appellate brief, he provides only

bare assertions that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal

with respect to his claim that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance. As we explained previously, ‘‘[i]n

determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for certification,

we necessarily must consider the merits of the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether the habeas

court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s

appeal was frivolous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sanders v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,

169 Conn. App. 821–22. Although the petitioner provides

in his brief a ‘‘merits’’ section titled ‘‘The Habeas Court

Erred in Denying Petitioner’s Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel,’’ it contains no analysis pertaining to his trial counsel’s performance. Instead, he

devotes the section to arguing that the habeas court

should have appointed him habeas counsel.4 Because

his brief provides only conclusory assertions that the

court abused its discretion in denying his petition for

certification to appeal and provided this court with no

analysis of how his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance, we decline to review this claim.

The appeal is dismissed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Pursuant to No. 12-115, § 1, of the 2012 Public Acts, subsection (b) of

§ 52-470 was redesignated as subsection (g).

2

In arguing that it is appropriate for this court to consider the claim under

the plain error doctrine, the petitioner cites to Foote v. Commissioner of

Correction, supra, 151 Conn. App. 566–69. Foote was an appeal brought by

a petitioner from the denial of his petition for certification to appeal. Id.,

560. He challenged the court’s judgment denying certification to appeal on

the ground that the court (1) abused its discretion and (2) committed plain

error by failing to inquire adequately into his request for new habeas counsel.
Id. This court concluded that the petitioner was unable to challenge the

habeas court’s judgment denying certification to appeal on the ground that

the court abused its discretion by failing to inquire adequately into his

request for new habeas counsel because that ground was raised for the first

time on appeal. Id., 565–66. This court, however, then considered whether

the habeas court committed plain error by failing to inquire adequately into

the petitioner’s request for new counsel. Id., 566–69. Ultimately, this court

concluded that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate an error that was

‘‘so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence

in the judicial proceedings.’’ Id., 569.

Although the court in Foote considered the claim of plain error despite

the fact that the claim of plain error was not set forth by the petitioner

as a ground on which certification should be granted in his petition for

certification to appeal, it did not expressly state that the claim was not

preserved at trial or otherwise explain why the claim fell within the ambit

of the plain error doctrine. We conclude that the claim at issue in the present

case, however, was preserved at trial and, thus, is not a claim that falls

within the ambit of the plain error doctrine. The petitioner, who properly

preserved the issue at his habeas trial, nonetheless chose not to present

that issue to the habeas court, by way of his petition for certification to

appeal, in order for the court to certify that the issue ought to be reviewed

by an appellate court of this state. See General Statutes § 52-470 (g). Although

some of our cases have categorized this omission as failing to preserve the

claim for review, a petitioner’s decision not to include an issue in his petition

for certification to appeal that was preserved during the habeas trial itself

is more akin to abandoning the claim.

3 To the extent the petitioner is also claiming that the habeas court plainly

erred in failing, sua sponte, to suspend trial and appoint counsel after certain

testimony was elicited from the petitioner’s expert witness at the habeas

trial, we deem that claim inadequately briefed and, thus, abandoned. See

State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 724, 138 A.3d 868 (2016) (‘‘[a]nalysis, rather

than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an

issue by failure to brief the issue properly’’).

4 To be sure, in this section of his brief, the petitioner argues that he

‘‘was denied the opportunity of representation by counsel in his habeas

proceeding, let alone the opportunity to have effective representation of

counsel in that proceeding. Due to the lack of appointed counsel and the

petitioner’s lack of understanding of the legal system, trial procedures in

particular, the petitioner was unable to prevail at trial.’’ (Emphasis added.)