IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs July 26, 2005

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MICHAEL N. SMITH

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Coffee County

No. 33,410F Gerald L. Ewell, Sr., Judge

No. M2005-00173-CCA-R3-CD - Filed September 23, 2005

The trial court found the defendant, Michael N. Smith, guilty of possession of a controlled substance

with intent to sell or deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the defendant argues

that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of an

investigatory stop. Following our review, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J.C. MCLIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GARY R. WADE, P.J., and DAVID H.

WELLES, J., joined.

Cynthia M. Fort (on appeal), and Glen R. Funk (at trial), Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant,

Michael N. Smith.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Assistant Attorney General; C.

Michael Layne, District Attorney General; and Kenneth J. Shelton, Assistant District Attorney

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts and Procedural History

At the suppression hearing, Highway Patrol Officer Rhett Campbell, testified that he was

patrolling the westbound lane of Interstate 24 in Coffee County when he observed the defendant’s

vehicle also heading westbound. As Officer Campbell pulled up beside the defendant’s vehicle and

passed it, he noticed that the window tint on the driver’s-side windows appeared darker than allowed

by statute. Officer Campbell also perceived that the window tint on the front windshield was

excessive because it extended beyond the manufacturer’s factory installed shade band. After
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Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-9-107(a)(1) states that windows of vehicles operated on public roads in Tennessee must

have a visible light transmittance of at least thirty-five percent, and with the exception of the manufacturer’s standard

installed shade band, the windshield must have a light transmittance of at least seventy percent. 

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observing the window tinting, Officer Campbell stopped the defendant’s vehicle because he suspected

the window tint violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-107(a)(1).

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Officer Campbell testified that upon approaching the vehicle, he told the defendant that he

pulled him over because he thought his “window tint was too dark.” After checking the defendant’s

driver’s license and registration, Officer Campbell noticed a prescription pill bottle in the ashtray and

inquired whetherit belonged to the defendant. The conversation quickly turned to drugs; whereupon,

the defendant admitted that he had used marijuana a few hours earlier and had drug paraphernalia in

his possession. According to Officer Campbell, the defendant consented to a search of his vehicle

when Officer Campbell told the defendant that he would be lenient if the paraphernalia was all the

defendant had in his possession. At this time, the defendant acted strangely by shaking his head and

saying, “No. I’m not going home.” The defendant’s response made Officer Campbell extremely

nervous so he took the defendant’s keys and placed them on the roof of the vehicle for his safety, then

asked the defendant to be truthful with him. In response, the defendant admitted that he had

approximately ten pounds of marijuana in the toolbox and bed of his vehicle. Hearing this, Officer

Campbell advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, placed the defendant under arrest, and then

searched the vehicle. In searching the defendant’s vehicle, Officer Campbell uncovered what turned

out to be over nineteen pounds of marijuana.

On cross-examination, Officer Campbell admitted that he did not have his “tint card” with him

on the day he stopped the defendant. Officer Campbell stated that he did not realize his tint card was

missing until after he had stopped the defendant. Officer Campbell reiterated that after he approached

the vehicle the topic of conversation quickly went from window tint to drugs.

The defendant testified that Officer Campbell told him the reason his vehicle was stopped was

because the window tint appeared too dark but that was the extent of the conversation. The defendant

stated that the tint on his vehicle was installed by a reputable business; therefore, he did not believe

that his window tint was illegal. According to the defendant, when Officer Campbell questioned him

about the prescription bottle, he told the officer it was a prescription for penicillin. Further, the

defendant acknowledged that he told Officer Campbell that he had recently smoked marijuana and

produced drug paraphernalia when asked if he had “any other drugs in the vehicle.” The defendant

denied dropping his head and making the statement “I’m not going home.”

The defendant stated that Officer Campbell told him “he had the right to search the vehicle

after that point.” Although the defendant recalled that Officer Campbell told him to be honest and

asked whether he had any other controlled substances in the car, the defendant stated that he did not

remember Officer Campbell ever saying, “If this is all that is in here, you are going home.” The

defendant admitted that before he was placed under arrest, he told Officer Campbell that he had about

ten pounds of marijuana in his truck, but he was just taking it to be delivered somewhere.
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Timothy Turner, the owner of Extreme Auto Trim, testified that he installed the window tint

on the defendant’s truck. Turner recalled that he installed a “medium tint,” darkened at thirty-five

percent on the side windows of the defendant’s truck. Turner could not recall if he installed tint on

the front windshield of the defendant’s truck. Turner also testified that he had been in the window

tinting business for twenty-two years and was very familiar with Tennessee laws regarding window

tint. As Turner explained, tint film comes in designated percentages and every vehicle that leaves his

shop is always below the legal limit. Turner acknowledged that weather conditions and the size of

the windshield could give the appearance that the tint is too dark or too low.

Following the suppression hearing, the trial court found that Officer Campbell had probable

cause to stop the defendant’s vehicle to determine whether the tint exceeded the lawful level of

intensity on the side windows or the lawful width at the top of the windshield. Subsequently, the

defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver and

possession of drug paraphernalia and was ordered to serve a total effective sentence of two years.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence

of marijuana and drug paraphernalia found in his vehicle after he was stopped because of his window

tint. Specifically, the defendant asserts that the investigatory stop was unreasonable because Officer

Campbell did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle for having illegally

tinted windows. The defendant contends that the stop was pretextual because Officer Campbell could

not have reasonably believed a tint offense occurred and never attempted to investigate this offense

once he stopped the vehicle.

When reviewing the trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, this Court conducts a de

novo review of the trial court’s conclusions of law and application of law to facts. See State v.

Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001). However, the trial court’s findings of fact are presumed

correct unless the evidence contained in the record preponderates against them. See State v. Daniel,

12 S.W.3d 420, 423 (Tenn. 2000). “Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value

of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as

the trier of fact.” State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting State v. Odom, 928

S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)). Moreover, the prevailing party is entitled to the strongest legitimate

view of the evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that

evidence. State v. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d 515, 521 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861,

864 (Tenn. 1998).

Both the state and federal constitutions protect individuals from unreasonable searches and

seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7. Therefore, a search or seizure

conducted without a warrant is presumed unreasonable and any evidence discovered subject to

suppression. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Bridges, 963

S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tenn. 1997). However, the evidence will not be suppressed if the State proves that
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the warrantless search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions

to the warrant requirement. State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000). 

One of these narrow exceptions occurs when a law enforcement officer stops an automobile

based on probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Whren v. United States, 517

U.S. 806, 810 (1996); State v. Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Tenn. 1997). If the officer has

probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, any seizure will be upheld even if the

stop is a pretext for the officer’s subjective motivations in making the stop. See Whren, 517 U.S. at

813-15; Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d at 734-35. Another such exception occurs when a law enforcement

officer initiates an investigatory stop based upon specific and articulable facts that the defendant has

either committed a criminal offense or is about to commit a criminal offense. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

1, 21 (1968); Binette, 33 S.W.3d at 218. This narrow exception has been extended to the

investigatory stop of vehicles. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975); State

v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992). In evaluating whether the law enforcement officer

had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop, this Court must consider the totality of the

circumstances, which includes the personal observations and rational inferences and deductions of

the trained law enforcement officer making the stop. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; Watkins, 827 S.W.2d

at 294. Objective standards apply, rather than the subjective beliefs of the officer making the stop.

State v. Norword, 938 S .W.2d 23, 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Our review of the record indicates that Officer Campbell possessed reasonable suspicion to

suspect that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Tennessee Code Annotated section

55-9-107(a)(1) states: 

It is unlawful for any person to operate, upon a public highway, street

or road, any motor vehicle registered in this state, in which any

window . . . has been altered, treated or replaced by the affixing,

application or installation of any material which: 

(A) Has a visible light transmittance of less than thirty-five percent

(35%); or 

(B) With the exception of the manufacturer’s standard installed shade

band, reduces the visible light transmittance in the windshield below

seventy percent (70%).

The statute expressly authorizes a “police officer of this state to detain a motor vehicle being operated

on the public roads, streets or highways of this state when such officer has a reasonable belief that the

motor vehicle is in violation of subdivision (a)(1), for the purpose of conducting a field comparison

test.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-9-107(c). Here, Officer Campbell’s testimony indicates that he stopped

the defendant’s vehicle based upon his observations that the darkly tinted windows of the defendant’s

vehicle violated a Tennessee statute. Although Officer Campbell did not realize that he did not have

his “tint card” with him until he stopped the defendant, he issued the defendant a verbal warning

about his tinted windows. In addition, Timothy Turner testified that he installed a thirty-five percent
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tint on the side windows of the defendant’s vehicle, which is the darkest tint allowed by law.

According to Turner, certain weather conditions may cause the tint to appear darker than it actually

is, and, depending on windshield size, a band of tint may appear to extend past the permissible factory

installed band. Therefore, based upon the totality of the circumstances, it is our view that the officer’s

stop was not pretextual but based on reasonable suspicion that the defendant violated legal window

tint limits. 

Although not directly addressed in the defendant’s brief, we also note that Officer Campbell’s

investigatory stop did not exceed its scope. A police officer’s actions after conducting an

investigatory stop must reasonably relate to the circumstances which justified the stop in the first

place. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. The detention “must be temporary and last no longer than is

necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).

Moreover, the officer should employ the least intrusive meansreasonably available to investigate his

or her suspicions in a short period of time. Id. In determining the reasonableness of the detention,

the proper inquiry is whether during the detention, the officer diligently pursued a means of

investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel his or her suspicions quickly. United States v.

Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). “If the time, manner or scope of the investigation exceeds the

proper parameters,” a constitutionally permissible stop may be transformed into impermissible stop.

State v. Troxell, 78 S.W.3d 866, 871 (Tenn. 2002). However, if the officer develops a reasonable

suspicion that the occupant is engaged in other criminal activity during a valid stop, further detention

is justified. State v. Branden Haney and Lawrence Davis, No. E2002-00559-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL

22169708, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Sept. 19, 2003). 

Again, the record reflects that after initiating a stop in order to determine if the window tint

on the defendant’s vehicle was illegal, Officer Campbell noticed a prescription pill bottle in plain

view, which led him to ask the defendant questions regarding drugs. During the conversation, the

defendant admitted that he had recently smoked marijuana and voluntarily produced drug

paraphernalia he was carrying. The officer was then justified in detaining the driver for the time

reasonably necessary to determine whether the defendant had “any other drugs in the vehicle.” As

the conversation continued, the defendant admitted he had approximately ten pounds of marijuana

in his truck, which gave the officer probable cause to search the defendant’s truck. Where an officer

has probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband and the mobility of the vehicle is an

exigent circumstance, the vehicle may be searched or seized without a warrant. See Carroll v. United

States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-56 (1925); State v. Leveye, 796 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tenn. 1990). 

In addition, Officer Campbell’s testimony established that the defendant consented to a search

of his vehicle. The trial court’s finding that a search is consensual will not be overturned unless the

evidence preponderates against the ruling. Brady v. State, 584 S.W.2d 245, 252 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1979). The trial judge accredited Officer Campbell’s testimony by overruling the defendant’s motion

to suppress, and no facts are present that indicate the defendant’s consent was not voluntary. The

defendant’s consent furthersupports our decision that Officer Campbell’s continued detention of the

defendant and search of his vehicle was lawful. 

III. Conclusion
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For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to

suppress. We therefore affirm the decision of the trial court, denying the defendant’s motion to

suppress. 

___________________________________ 

 J.C. McLIN, JUDGE