NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JUAN V., Appellant, 

 

v.

 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, 

J.V., E.V., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0113

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

Nos. JD16257

 JD18172

The Honorable Lisa Daniel Flores, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

John L. Popilek, PC, Scottsdale

By John L. Popilek

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Mesa

By Amanda L. Adams

Counsel for Appellee DCS
JUAN V. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jon W. Thompson and Chief Judge Michael J. Brown joined. 

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 Juan V. ("Father") appeals from the superior court's order 

terminating his parental rights to his two daughters. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and a woman not a party to this appeal are the parents 

of two daughters, one born in 2014 and the other in 2015. Both girls were 

born substance-abused and were taken into custody of the Department of 

Child Safety ("DCS") soon after their births.

¶3 Father, 30 years old at the time of the severance trial, first 

began using marijuana at the age of nine or ten. He testified he used 

marijuana every other day until he stopped using in 2012. He pled guilty 

to possession of marijuana in 2012 and was placed on two years' probation. 

In 2014, he pled guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia and was placed 

on two years' probation, to run concurrently with his initial probation term. 

After DCS took custody of his older daughter, DCS offered Father various 

services, including substance-abuse assessment and treatment through 

TERROS, random drug testing through TASC, psychiatric and 

psychological evaluations, parent-aide services and supervised visits. 

Father substantially failed to participate in services. Most significantly, 

during the first six months of 2015, he provided only 10 of 25 mandatory 

drug tests. During that time, three times he tested positive for opiates, 

which he attributed to having taken pain-killers he borrowed from a friend. 

Because of his failure to participate in drug testing, TERROS closed out 

referrals for him in November 2014 and April 2015. Father also failed to 

attend three scheduled psychological evaluations.

¶4 After the younger daughter was born in August 2015, DCS 

continued to try to provide substance-abuse and drug-testing services to 

Father. Father did not engage in the services, causing TERROS to close out 

his third referral; TASC also closed his referral.

¶5 After a trial in February 2016, the superior court issued an 

order terminating Father's rights to both children on grounds of substance 
JUAN V. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

abuse and nine months' time in care. We have jurisdiction of Father's timely

appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, Arizona 

Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 8-235(A) (2016), 12-2101 (2016) and 

Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 103A.

1

DISCUSSION

¶6 The right to custody of one's child is fundamental but not 

absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11-12 

(2000). The superior court may terminate a parent-child relationship upon 

clear and convincing evidence of at least one of the statutory grounds set 

out in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) (2016). Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 12.

Additionally, the court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination is in the child's best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 

284, ¶ 22 (2005). We review a termination order for an abuse of discretion. 

Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). 

Because the superior court is in the best position to "weigh the evidence, 

observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and make 

appropriate findings," we will accept its findings of fact unless no 

reasonable evidence supports them. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 

203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002).

¶7 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), the court may terminate the 

rights of a parent who is "unable to discharge parental responsibilities 

because of . . . a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled 

substances or alcohol and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 

condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period."

¶8 Father argues he has not used marijuana since 2012, and that 

the superior court mistakenly understood him to say that at the time of trial, 

he used marijuana every day. He also argues that the only times he tested 

positive for drugs during the dependency and severance proceedings were 

the occasions on which he took a friend's pain-killers. Notwithstanding 

Father's arguments, reasonable evidence supported the superior court's 

finding that he has a history of chronic drug abuse and that it would 

continue for a prolonged period. Father repeatedly disregarded 

opportunities to resolve his drug issues. His contention that he no longer 

uses drugs is belied by the fact that he missed more random drug tests than 

he took during these proceedings and, as noted, he abused a friend's 

prescription drugs. Furthermore, at trial, Father denied he had a drug 

 

1 Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite a statute's 

current version.
JUAN V. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

problem and minimized the effects his drug use had on his family. Based 

on Father's record, the case manager testified Father had not remedied his 

drug use, his drug abuse would continue for a prolonged indeterminate 

period and that in the meantime, absent termination, his children would be 

at risk.

¶9 Under the circumstances, Father's failure to demonstrate that 

he could and had abstained from drug use, combined with the evidence 

recounted above, supports the court's finding of the statutory ground for 

severance based on clear and convincing evidence. See Raymond F. v. Ariz. 

Dep't of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 29 (App. 2010). Because we affirm 

the court's termination order based on chronic drug abuse, we need not 

consider its order of termination based on time in care.

CONCLUSION

¶10 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the superior court's 

order terminating Father's rights to his two daughters.