FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

1050 FIRST STREET, N.E.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matter of ) 

) MURs7207, 7268, 7274, 7623

Russian Federation, et al. ) 

) 

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF REASONS OF VICE CHAIR ALLEN

DICKERSON

Few events in recent memory have received the level of sustained attention

accorded to the Russian Federation’s involvement in the 2016 presidential election.

This has included a full investigation by a special counsel of the Department of

Justice1 and a five-volume bipartisan review by the Senate Intelligence Committee.2

The results of these inquiries have included extensive reports, federal indictments,

exhaustive press coverage, and even, indirectly, the impeachment of a president.3

Against this backdrop, the Federal Election Commission has been asked to

play its modest role in supervising the raising and spending of “contributions” and

“expenditures” under the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA” or “the Act”).4

1 Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, “Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In

The 2016 Presidential Election,” U.S. Department of Justice, March 2019.

2 Select Committee on Intelligence, “Russian Active Measures Campaigns And Interference In The

2016 U.S. Election...Vols. I-V,” United States Senate, Nov. 2020 (“Senate Intelligence Comm. Rep.”).

3 H.R. 755 at 1-2, “Articles of Impeachment Against Donald John Trump,” 116th Cong., 1st Sess., Dec.

18, 2019 (“Article I: Abuse of Power...These actions were consistent with President Trump’s previous

invitations of foreign interference in United States elections”).

4 Supp. Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Dickerson and Comm’r Trainor at 1-2, MURs

7821/7827/7868 (“Twitter, Inc.”), Sept. 13, 2021 (“Accordingly, our authority is limited both the by Act

itself, which denies us a roving commission to police elections and limits our jurisdiction to

‘contributions’ and ‘expenditures,’ and by nearly a half century of accumulated judicial decisions

narrowing that legislative grant”).

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As a preliminary matter, we can add little to the public record concerning these

events. The Commission lacks the resources, access, and expertise to meaningfully

supplement the work already taken at the highest levels of government. This should

be immediately apparent to anyone with even a passing knowledge of this agency.

But the proof is in our Office of General Counsel’s (“OGC”) report itself.5 We have

undertaken no original research – the entirety of our efforts have been derivative of

the Special Counsel’s investigation and the Senate’s public conclusions.6

Nevertheless, as has been noted before, “there is a tendency to recast political

disputes as campaign finance violations and enlist the Commission as a party to

larger conflicts.”7 Citizens who are quite properly outraged by the efforts of a foreign

state to divide and weaken our polity will look for options. One is to file a complaint

with this agency.8

And we received several complaints alleging that the Russian Federation,

through hacking operations, social media activity, the purchasing of online

advertisements, and direct or indirect coordination between Russian agents and the

Donald Trump for President campaign committee and a then-unknown

Congressional candidate, violated FECA’s prohibitions on foreign contributions and

expenditures.

As one might expect, the merits of these allegations varied.9 But, as explained

below, I am persuaded that there is reason to believe the Russian Federation violated

the Act. I also voted to find reason to believe that a then-unknown Congressional

candidate solicited opposition research from a known foreign national, Guccifer 2.0,

a Russian intelligence agent that publicly claimed to be a Romanian citizen.10

5 See First Gen’l Counsel’s Report, MUR 7207/7268/7274/7623 (Russian Fed’n, et al.) (“FGCR”), Feb.

23, 2021.

6 Id. This is hardly OGC’s fault. It reflects our institutional capabilities, not our attorneys’ diligence.

7 Supp. Statement of Reasons of Vice Chair Dickerson and Comm’r Trainor at 2, MURs 7821/7827/7868

(“Twitter, Inc.”), Sept. 13, 2021.

8 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1) (“Any person who believes a violation of this Act...has occurred may file a 

complaint with the Commission”) (emphasis supplied).

9 This Statement addresses only the subset of these allegations concerning action by foreign entities.

10 Certification at 3-4, MURs 7207/7268/7274/7623, Apr. 22, 2021.

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The IRA was a Russian corporation that was formed sometime around the year 

2013.21 It operated as a quasi-governmental entity “at the direction of the Kremlin”

and conducted what it self-described as “information warfare against the United

States of America.”22 The IRA reportedly “received its funding from Yevgeny 

Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch and ‘close Putin ally with ties to Russian intelligence;’

Prigozhin also controlled other companies that had Russian government contracts.”23

It is unclear how much the IRA spent on operations to influence the 2016 U.S.

election; however, there is information suggesting that, by July 2016, “‘more than

eighty’ IRA employees were specifically tasked with U.S.-related operations.”24

“During the 2016 election, IRA employees operated accounts on U.S. social

media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram,

masquerading as U.S. citizens or grassroots organizations.”25 “According to

information released by these platforms, the IRA operated approximately 3,800

accounts on Twitter, 470 on Facebook, and 170 on Instagram.”26

As a small part of these activities, the IRA used some of its fake accounts to

distribute paid advertisements over the internet.27 Often these advertisements 

provided a simple description of a phony organization, “apparently for the purpose of

attracting additional followers.”28 A small number of the IRA’s paid advertisements

referenced the 2016 election or candidates.29 In total, the IRA purchased around 1,000 

ads, spending approximately $70,000 on paid social media advertisements during the 

2016 election cycle.30

21 Id. at 9.

22 Id (citing Senate Intelligence Comm. Rep. Vol. II at 32).

23 Id. (citing Superseding Indictment ¶ 10(d), United States v. Internet Research Agency, et al., 1:18-cr00032 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2019) (“IRA Indictment”)).

24 Id. at 10 (citing IRA Indictment ¶ 10(c)).

25 Id. at 10 (citations omitted).

26 Id. at 12.

27 Id. at 13.

28 Id. 

29 Id. at 14.

30 Id. at 13.

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or more candidate(s), “reject the incumbent,” or . . . campaign slogan(s) or

individual word(s), which in context can have no other reasonable meaning

than to urge the election or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidates,

such as posters, . . . advertisements, etc. which say “Nixon’s the One,”. . . or

“Mondale!”; or

(b) When taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events, such

as the proximity to the election, could only be interpreted by a reasonable

person as containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one or more clearly

identified candidate(s) because (1) The electoral portion of the communication

is unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of only one meaning; and (2)

Reasonable minds could not differ as to whether it encourages actions to elect

or defeat one or more clearly identified candidate(s) or encourages some other

kind of action.43

Here, the IRA purchased over 1,000 advertisements totaling approximately

$70,000, but the publicly-available evidence suggests that only approximately $3,000

worth of those advertisements contained express advocacy.44 Those advertisements

use language such as “vote Republican” and “vote Trump” – unambiguously

advocating the election or defeat of clearly identified candidates – and therefore,

violate 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(c).45

The remaining $67,000 worth of advertisements do not contain any express

advocacy. However, OGC argues that the lack of express advocacy in these

communications did not bar enforcement because “the Russian Federation did not act

to advance an issue relevant to U.S. voters but instead to surreptitiously influence

the election to advance its own interests and generally erode faith in the U.S.

democratic process.”46 But this reading goes against the Supreme Court’s explicit

decision to limit our jurisdiction over independent expenditures to those which

expressly advocate an electoral outcome.47

43 FGCR at 51-52 (quoting 11 C.F.R. § 100.22).

44 Id. at 54-55.

45 See 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(a).

46 FGCR at 60-61.

47 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44, id. at n.52. While the 2002 amendments to FECA gave us jurisdiction to

regulate “electioneering communications,” 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3), which need not constitute express

advocacy, McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 191-192 (2003), the definition of

“electioneering communication” extends only to large broadcast communications over radio or

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I understand the temptation to stretch our authority to reach troubling, or even 

outrageous, conduct that has some connection to federal elections. That temptation

is inherent in our name; “Federal Election Commission” implies powers far in excess

of those actually granted to us by Congress. But there is simply no legal basis for

applying a different meaning of “independent expenditure” for purposes of the foreign

national prohibition. And to take OGC’s invitation and expand the meaning of

“independent expenditure” to reach any communication with the subjective intention

of “surreptitiously influencing” elections or “undermining confidence” in our electoral 

processes would pose insurmountable constitutional difficulties—especially for

American speakers, who would bear the brunt of our overreach. We have been

explicitly cautioned not to adopt such “intents and effects tests” in doing our work.48

In short, Russia’s non-express-advocacy communications were the heart of its

illicit activities and have been the focus of other government entities enforcing

different statutes against a different constitutional backdrop. But they do not fall

within our limited jurisdiction under the FECA.

While the Russian Federation itself did not make any payments for the express

advocacy advertisements at issue in this matter, it is nonetheless responsible for the

payments made by the IRA.49 According to the publicly-available evidence derived

from other investigations, although the IRA is a non-governmental entity, Russian

President Vladimir Putin directed the Russian influence campaign and the Russian

Federation reportedly acted through the IRA to execute a portion of it.50 “The U.S.

Intelligence Community labeled the IRA a ‘quasi-government’ actor and described

Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the financier of the IRA, as ‘a close Putin ally with ties to Russian

intelligence.’”51 The Senate Intelligence Committee reiterated that Prigozhin’s “close

ties to high-level Russian government officials including President Vladimir Putin,

point to significant Kremlin support, authorization, and direction of the IRA’s

operations and goals.”52 Furthermore, “[t]he State Department has identified both 

television. As far as the Commission is aware, the Russian state did not, directly or through the IRA,

fund electioneering communications during the 2016 election.

48 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (controlling opinion of

Roberts, C.J.).

49 See 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1).

50 FGCR at 50.

51 Id. (citation omitted).

52 Id. (quoting Senate Intelligence Comm. Rep. Vol. II at 5).

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