FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

In the Matter of ) 

) MURs 7340/7609

GREAT AMERICA COMMITTEE, et al. ) 

) 

STATEMENT OF REASONS OF VICE CHAIR ALLEN DICKERSON AND 

COMMISSIONER SEAN J. COOKSEY

Collectively, these two Matters raised seven separate allegations that the 

Respondents violated the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended (“Act” 

or “FECA”).1 Our Office of General Counsel (“OGC”) recommended that we dismiss 

six of those seven allegations, and we voted accordingly for the reasons OGC 

articulated in its First General Counsel’s Report.2 Conversely, OGC recommended 

reason to believe regarding one allegation, that then-President Donald Trump’s 2020

campaign committee violated the Act “by soliciting soft money.”3 

OGC asked us to find reason to believe this violation occurred because the 

Trump committee issued a public statement warning the candidate’s supporters 

against groups that the committee considered to be dishonest and fraudulent. We

voted to dismiss this allegation under our prosecutorial discretion. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

These Matters came before the Commission on two principal complaints. One, 

running 348 pages,4 raised numerous allegations against the Trump committee, the 

then-sitting President and Vice President, the Great America Committee, the 

Republican National Committee (“RNC”), America First Action, Inc., America First 

Policies, Bradley J. Parscale, and Marty Obst. OGC recommended that we dismiss 

1 First Gen’l Counsel’s Report (“FGCR”) at 30, MUR 7340/7609 (Great America Comm.).

2 Id. 

3 Id. 

4 Complaint (MUR 7340).

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those allegations.5 The second complaint raised the soft money allegation OGC 

recommended we pursue,6 a charge later echoed in a supplement to the first 

complaint.7 

That allegation centered on the Trump committee’s statement denouncing 

what it called “dishonest” groups. OGC recommended finding reason to believe that 

this statement violated 52 U.S.C. § 30125(e)(1)(A), which prohibits any “candidate” 

from “solicit[ing]...funds in connection with an election for Federal office, including 

funds for any Federal election activity, unless the funds are subject to the limitations, 

prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act.”8 Put simply, no federal 

candidate may raise so-called “soft money”—donations in excess of the base limits—

for any organization.

The relevant statement, titled “Trump Campaign Statement on Dishonest 

Fundraising Groups,” was released on May 7, 2019 and reads in full:

The following is a statement from the Donald J. Trump for President campaign:

President Trump’s campaign condemns any organization that deceptively uses the 

President’s name, likeness, trademarks, or branding and confuses voters. There is no 

excuse for any group, including ones run by people who claim to be part of our 

‘coalition,’ to suggest they directly support President Trump’s re-election or any other 

candidates, when in fact their actions show they are interested in filling their own 

pockets with money from innocent Americans’ paychecks, and sadly, retirements. We 

encourage the appropriate authorities to investigate all alleged scam groups for 

potential illegal activities.

There are only four fundraising organizations authorized by President Trump or the 

RNC: Donald J. Trump for President, the Republican National Committee, and two 

joint fundraising committees with the RNC, The Trump Make American [sic] Great 

Again Committee (TMAGAC) and Trump Victory. In addition, there is one approved 

outside non-campaign group, America First Action, which is run by allies of the 

President and is a trusted supporter of President Trump’s policies and agendas.

OGC characterized this statement as a solicitation for soft money donations to 

America First Action, and recommended enforcement against the Trump committee. 

We disagreed and voted to dismiss under Heckler v. Chaney.9 

5 FGCR at 30.

6 Complaint (MUR 7609).

7 Supp. Complaint (MUR 7340).

8 52 U.S.C. § 30125(e)(1)(A). 

9 Certification for MURs 7340/7609, at 1-2, Apr. 22, 2021. 

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II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

This vote took place shortly after the Commission had reacquired a quorum

and faced a substantial backlog of hundreds of Matters—many of which were

imperiled by the statute of limitations.10 OGC’s scarce resources had already been 

spent evaluating this matter and determining that most of the allegations merited 

dismissal. And while one of our colleagues has speculated that this Matter may have 

involved “potentially multi-million dollar violations”11 of the Act, OGC recommended 

a penalty, which would be subject to further negotiation, of a mere —a sum 

unlikely to exceed the Commission’s expenses in obtaining it. In these circumstances, 

we concluded the Commission’s scarce resources would be best spent elsewhere.

These prudential concerns were buttressed by the likelihood of a successful 

and costly legal challenge to enforcement on these facts. 

Under the regulations implementing 52 U.S.C. § 30125(e)(1)(A), we have 

defined a solicitation as “an oral or written communication that, construed as 

reasonably understood in the context in which it is made, contains a clear message

asking, requesting, or recommending that another person make a contribution, 

donation, transfer of funds, or otherwise provide anything of value.”12 The regulation 

goes on to note that this “clear message” can be “made...indirectly.”13 We have also 

stated that this standard is an objective test, which “does not turn on the subjective 

interpretations of the speaker or the recipients,”14 yet also “hinges on whether the 

recipient should have reasonably understood that a solicitation was made.”15 This

guidance is hardly a model of clarity. 

Were the speech at issue direct and clear—had the Trump campaign 

committee, for instance, sent out letters to specific individuals asking the recipients 

to each give $100,000 to America First Action and directed them to a webpage to 

make the contribution—this lack of clarity would have been largely immaterial. But 

the speech at issue here was neither direct nor clear: it was a press statement directed 

to no one in particular, bearing none of the hallmarks of a traditional fundraising 

10 See Statement of Comm’r Weintraub on the Senate’s Votes to Restore the Federal Election 

Commission to Full Strength, Dec. 9, 2020.

11 Statement of Reasons of Comm’r Weintraub at 3, MURs 7340/7609, June 11, 2020.

12 11 C.F.R. § 300.2(m) (emphasis supplied).

13 Id. 

14 Statement of Reasons of Comm’rs Hunter and Petersen at 8, MUR 6798 (Vitter), Aug. 30, 2019.

15 Definitions of “Solicit” and “Direct,” 71 Fed. Reg. 13926, 13928, Mar. 20, 2006. 

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solicitation. A reasonable person reading this statement would not have likely 

understood it as a request for contributions. Enforcement against this statement

could have risked opening our regulation, which purports to police “indirect” “clear 

messages,” to a judicial challenge predicated on “the constitutional requirement of 

definiteness.”16 Rather than spend significant resources to litigate these questions, 

all while risking both this enforcement decision and the viability of the underlying 

regulation, we elected to exercise our prosecutorial discretion.

Moreover, public policy considerations militated in favor of exercising our 

discretion. The statement at issue here is perhaps best read as a warning against

groups active during the 2020 election cycle considered, by the Committee, to be

“deceptive[]” fraudsters only “interested in filling their own pockets.” The statement 

went so far as to “encourage the appropriate authorities to investigate all alleged 

scam groups for potential illegal activities.” 

Sadly, despite our repeated requests to Congress, we are not such an 

authority.17 And it would be unwise to suggest that efforts to distinguish fraudulent 

organizations from bona fide political committees might lead to Commission 

enforcement. Such warnings should be encouraged, not chilled. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we voted to dismiss this allegation pursuant to our 

prosecutorial discretion under Heckler v. Chaney.18

_________________________________ _________________________ 

Allen Dickerson Date

Vice Chair

_________________________________ _________________________ 

Sean J. Cooksey Date

Commissioner

16 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) (per curiam). See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 

(1963) (“Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most

precious freedoms”).

17 See 52 U.S.C. § 30124.

18 470 U.S. 821 (1985).

June 25, 2021

June 25, 2021

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