J-S46039-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BARBARA ROGERS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3048 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 10, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0002045-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 23, 2021

Barbara Rogers (“Rogers”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered following her conviction of third-degree murder.

1

 We affirm.

In the early morning hours of July 15, 2017, Rogers and her boyfriend, 

Stephen Mineo (“Mineo”), were in the studio apartment they shared together 

in Coolbaugh Township, Monroe County, when Rogers placed Mineo’s handgun 

against Mineo’s forehead and shot him once, killing Mineo. Twenty minutes 

after the shooting, Rogers called 911. Corporal Steven Mertz (“Cpl. Mertz”) 

and Detective Corporal Lucas Bray (“Detective Bray”) of the Pocono Mountain 

Regional Police Department (“PMRPD”) responded to the shooting. They 

subsequently transported Rogers to police headquarters for questioning.

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c).
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During her interviews, Rogers was advised several times of her rights 

under Miranda,

2 and Rogers executed several written waivers of her Miranda

rights. During the interviews with Detective Bray and Detective John Bohrman 

(“Detective Bohrman”), Rogers disclosed that she had been in the United 

States Army for eight years before being discharged for medical reasons; she 

suffered from bi-polar disorder, but was not currently on her medication; and 

she owned a handgun, for which she had a permit, and which she stored in 

the apartment. Further, Rogers disclosed that she and Mineo were members 

of a religious cult. Rogers stated that she and Mineo had recently become 

upset with the leader of the cult, who believed that Rogers was actually a 

reptile. Rogers’s and Mineo’s issues with the cult had caused tension in their 

relationship. Rogers also stated that she killed Mineo because Mineo wanted 

her to kill him, and that she was under a large amount of stress due to the 

issues with the cult.

Rogers was charged with criminal homicide in connection with the 

shooting. On February 26, 2018, Rogers filed a pre-trial Motion to suppress 

her statements to police, which the trial court denied following a hearing. 

Rogers proceeded to a jury trial, which took place from March 27-29, 2019. 

At trial, the jury acquitted Rogers of first-degree murder, and convicted her 

of third-degree murder.

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2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Following the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”), 

the trial court sentenced Rogers to fifteen to forty years in prison. Rogers 

filed timely post-sentence Motions, in which she requested reconsideration of 

sentence, and requested a new trial on four grounds: (1) the verdict was 

against the weight of the evidence; (2) the trial court improperly refused to 

charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter; (3) the trial court improperly 

ruled that Rogers could not offer a defense of diminished capacity without also

admitting criminal liability; and (4) the trial court improperly denied her pretrial Motion to suppress. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Rogers’s 

post-sentence Motions. Rogers filed a timely Notice of Appeal, and a courtordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on 

appeal.3, 4

Rogers raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion and commit reversible 

error when the [trial] court did not allow the charge of involuntary 

manslaughter to go to the jury[,] because involuntary 

manslaughter is a lesser[-]included offense of murder, and 

because the evidence would support an involuntary manslaughter 

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3 Rogers purports to appeal from the trial court’s denial of her post-sentence 

Motions. However, “[i]n a criminal action, appeal properly lies from the 

judgment of sentence made final by the denial of post-sentence motions.” 

Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001) 

(en banc) (citation omitted). We have corrected the caption accordingly.

4 By Order dated June 17, 2020, this Court dismissed Rogers’s appeal for 

failure to file an appellate brief. Rogers filed a Petition to reinstate the appeal, 

and on July 13, 2020, this Court issued an Order reinstating Rogers’s appeal.
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verdict whenever it would support a murder or involuntary 

manslaughter verdict?

2. Did the [trial] [c]ourt abuse its discretion and commit reversible 

error by not suppressing [Rogers’s] statements from the scene 

and at [PMRPD] where, because of her mental state, she was not 

in a position psychologically and emotionally to provide a reliable 

and trustworthy statement and understand the waiver of 

Miranda?

3. Did the [trial] [c]ourt abuse its discretion and commit reversible 

error [by imposing] a sentence that was unduly harsh and [by 

failing] to properly consider the mitigating factors of her military 

service and her bi-polar disability?

4. Did the [trial] [c]ourt abuse its discretion and commit reversible 

error by not setting aside the verdict of [c]riminal [h]omicide-

[m]urder in the third [d]egree because it was against the 

sufficiency of the evidence?

5. Did the [trial] [c]ourt abuse its discretion and commit reversible 

error by not setting aside the verdict of [c]riminal [h]omicide-

[m]urder in the third [d]egree because it was against the weight 

of the evidence?

Brief for Appellant at 5 (renumbered).

Rogers first argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant her 

request for a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter.

5

 Id. at 10. Rogers 

claims that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on involuntary 

manslaughter “basically shut out the defensive strategy of [Rogers],” as 

Rogers had cross-examined witnesses under a theory that Rogers had 

accidentally shot Mineo. Id. Rogers asserts that such an instruction was 

appropriate, as she had failed to perceive the risk that shooting Mineo would 

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5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a).
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have caused, and because the shooting was an “unlawful act that happened 

in a reckless manor [sic].” Id. at 13-14.

In reviewing a challenge to the trial court’s refusal to give a 

specific jury instruction, it is the function of this Court to 

determine whether the record supports the trial court’s decision. 

In examining the propriety of the instructions a trial court presents 

to a jury, our scope of review is to determine whether the trial 

court committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law 

which controlled the outcome of the case. A jury charge will be 

deemed erroneous only if the charge as a whole is inadequate, not 

clear or has a tendency to mislead or confuse, rather than clarify, 

a material issue. A charge is considered adequate unless the jury 

was palpably misled by what the trial judge said or there is an 

omission which is tantamount to fundamental error.

Consequently, the trial court has wide discretion in fashioning jury 

instructions. The trial court is not required to give every charge 

that is requested by the parties and its refusal to give a requested 

charge does not require reversal unless the [a]ppellant was 

prejudiced by that refusal.

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 904 A.2d 964, 970 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal 

citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

Pursuant to Section 2504 of the Crimes Code, involuntary manslaughter 

involves “the doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner 

or the doing of a lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner.” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a). “[I]n a murder prosecution, an involuntary 

manslaughter charge shall be given only when requested, where the offense 

has been made an issue in the case and the trial evidence reasonably would 

support such a verdict.” Commonwealth v. Banks, 677 A.2d 335, 343 (Pa. 

Super. 1996).

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this issue as follows:
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The facts in evidence at trial ... do not reasonably support a finding 

of involuntary manslaughter. [Rogers] confessed to firing the 

fatal shot, telling Detectives Bohrman and Bray that she knew the 

gun was loaded, she intentionally pulled the trigger, she knew a 

bullet would come out, and she knew [Mineo] wanted to die. 

Further, the evidence, from [Rogers]’s own demonstration, 

showed that [Rogers] was standing over [Mineo] in an isosceles 

shooting stance with the gun aimed at a downward angle at the 

forehead of [Mineo,] who was sitting cross-legged on the floor. 

This evidence[,] together with the evidence relating to how the 

gun was fired and the gunshot wound itself does not align with an 

accidental death or gross negligence on the part of [Rogers] as 

required for an involuntary manslaughter charge. Specifically, 

Corporal [Joseph] Gober [(“Corporal Gober”), a firearms examiner 

with the Pennsylvania State Police,] testified that the gun would 

not have fired unless the shooter’s finger was fully on the trigger 

because of the safety bar on the trigger. This means that the 

trigger would not go to the rear, allowing the gun to fire, if it was 

pushed on from the sides or other indirect pressure was applied. 

Furthermore, the trigger requires approximately 7.2 pounds of 

pressure be applied for the gun to be fired. There was no evidence 

presented that tended to show [Mineo]’s death was the result of 

an accident caused by [Rogers], and there was no evidence 

presented that tended to show [Rogers] acted with recklessness 

or with gross negligence in causing the death of [Mineo]. Thus, 

th[e trial c]ourt did not err in refusing to charge the jury on 

involuntary manslaughter as a potential verdict.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/20/19, at 6-7 (citations to record omitted).

We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not to 

provide the jury with involuntary manslaughter instructions, as the record 

does not reflect that the evidence presented at trial would have reasonably 

supported such a verdict. See Banks, supra. Accordingly, we can grant 

Rogers no relief on this claim.

In her second issue, Rogers argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying her Motion to suppress the statements Rogers made to 
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police on the night of the shooting. Brief for Appellant at 15-24. Rogers 

claims that she was highly emotional and lacked proper sleep during the 

hours-long interviews with police, and she and Mineo had been drinking for 

hours prior to the shooting. Id. at 16. Though Rogers concedes that she 

signed a waiver of her Miranda rights, she argues that such waiver was not 

“free and unconstrained,” as her emotional distress from the shooting and 

other circumstances rendered her incapable of overcoming the coercion placed 

upon her by police. Id. at 16-20. Finally, Rogers claims that “[n]o one in 

[her] mental and emotional state could have formed the requisite mindset 

required to overcome the coercive nature of an in-custody interrogation and 

voluntarily make a statement to police.” Id. at 24.

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial 

court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining 

whether the factual findings are supported by the record and 

whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.

[W]e may consider only the evidence of the 

prosecution and so much of the evidence for the 

defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. Where the record 

supports the findings of the suppression court, we are 

bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court 

erred in reaching its legal conclusions based upon the 

facts.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 26-27 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en 

banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “It is within the 

suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of 
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witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” Commonwealth v. 

Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Furthermore,

[w]hen determining the validity of a Miranda waiver, we employ 

a two-step inquiry. We first ask whether the waiver was voluntary 

in the sense of being the result of an intentional choice on the part 

of a defendant who was not subject to undue government 

pressure. If we conclude the waiver was voluntary, we then ask 

if the defendant was aware of the nature of the choice that he 

made by giving up his Miranda rights, i.e., whether it was 

knowing and intelligent.

Commonwealth v. Knox, 219 A.3d 186, 193-94 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal 

citations omitted).

Regarding its denial of Rogers’s suppression Motion, the trial court 

stated the following:

Detective Bohrman read [Rogers] her Miranda warnings upon 

arrival at PMRPD, [Rogers] indicated that she understood her 

rights, and [Rogers] executed a written waiver of the same prior 

to questioning at 5:00 a[.]m[.] [Rogers] had not previously 

disclosed her bipolar disorder diagnosis to law enforcement, nor 

did she make any such disclosure to Detective Bohrman when she 

waived her Miranda rights. [Rogers] revealed her mental health 

diagnosis two hours later when asked why she had been 

discharged from military service. When asked if she took 

medication for her bipolar disorder on a regular basis, [Rogers] 

responded that she did take medication, but that she sometimes 

skips a few days. There was no further discussion of [Rogers]’s 

mental health diagnosis during the interrogation.

At the hearing on [Rogers]’s Motion, Detective Bohrman 

testified credibly regarding [Rogers]’s bipolar disorder...[.] Other 

information gleaned from [Rogers] during her interview with 

Detectives Bohrman and Bray prior to arrest was that [Rogers] 

had eaten dinner and imbibed two alcoholic beverages between 

8:00 and 11:00 p[.]m[.] on July 14, 2017, that [Rogers] did not 

have a history of drug use, that [Rogers] was not currently under 
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the influence of drugs or alcohol, that [Rogers] graduated from 

high school, and that [Rogers] had been a member of the United 

States Army for eight years. At the hearing on [Rogers]’s Motion, 

Detective Bohrman testified credibly regarding [Rogers]’s alleged 

intoxication...[.]

After being informed that [Rogers] was under arrest, 

Detective Bohrman read [Rogers] her Miranda warnings a second 

time, [Rogers] indicated that she understood those rights, and she 

executed a second waiver of the same. When asked if she wanted 

to continue talking, [Rogers] indicated that she no longer wished 

to speak to Detective Bohrman. However, after [Rogers] was 

advised of the next steps in the process and was told that 

Detective Bohrman would be sitting at his desk if she would like 

to tell him anything, [Rogers] made additional incriminating 

statements to Detective Bohrman and later Detective Bray.

Overall, [Rogers] was detained for approximately seven[-

]and[-]a[-]half hours. During that time [Rogers] was provided 

water, offered additional beverages and food, and utilized the 

restroom a number of times. In total, accounting for breaks, 

[Rogers] was interviewed for a total of 166 minutes, just over 

two[-]and[-]three-fourths hours.

* * *

[] We find that, given the totality of the circumstances, each 

Miranda waiver executed by [Rogers] on July 15, 2017[,] was 

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. The record before 

us is devoid of any evidence of police coercion, intimidation, or 

deception in the form of promises [or] threats at any time during 

the interrogation. [Rogers] was detained for seven[-]and[-]a[-

]half hours, during which she was questioned for two[-]and[-

]three-fourths hours, provided water, utilized the restroom, and 

took several breaks. There is no evidence to suggest that the 

conditions of the interrogation room were out of the ordinary. 

Detectives Bray and Bohrman conducted a question and answer 

style interrogation, and maintained a respectful tenor and attitude 

throughout the interrogation. While [Rogers]’s bipolar disorder 

diagnosis is a factor for consideration, there is no evidence that 

her mental illness impacted Detective Bray or Bohrman’s conduct, 

or that her mental illness [a]ffected [Rogers]’s ability to 

understand the nature of her rights or the consequences of her 

decision to abandon them. Additionally, there was no evidence to 

suggest that [Rogers] was under the influence of drugs or alcohol 
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at the time she executed her waivers. As such, both prongs of 

the Miranda waiver test are satisfied, and the Commonwealth has

proven by a preponderance of the evidence that [Rogers]’s 

Miranda waivers were voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly 

made.

As to [Rogers]’s second argument, that regardless of the 

voluntariness of her Miranda waiver, given her bipolar disorder, 

the circumstances of the interrogation were so coercive that any 

statements she made were inherently involuntary, [w]e disagree. 

Having already discussed the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the entirety of the interrogation, we rely on that 

discussion above. As there is no evidence to suggest that 

Detectives Bray or Bohrman conducted themselves in a coercive, 

threatening, or otherwise intimidating manner, and that [Rogers] 

understood her rights, was afforded several opportunities to 

invoke those rights, and voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly 

waived same on two separate occasions, [Rogers]’s argument is 

without merit. As such, the circumstances surrounding [Rogers]’s 

interrogation were not so coercive that her July 15, 2017[,] 

statements were involuntary.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/16/18, at 7-12 (citations to record omitted).

We will not disturb the trial court’s credibility determinations. See 

Clemens, supra. The record supports the suppression court’s determination 

that Rogers’s knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her Miranda

rights. See Knox, supra. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying 

Rogers’s suppression Motion. See Williams, supra.

In her third issue, Rogers argues that her sentence of fifteen to forty 

years in prison was excessive, as the trial court did not give sufficient 

consideration to Rogers’s military service, and her diagnosis for bi-polar 

disorder. Brief for Appellant at 25. While Rogers acknowledges that she was 

sentenced within the standard range, Rogers claims that she lacked the 
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capacity to appreciate her actions because of her alcohol consumption, her bipolar disorder, and the nature of her relationship with Mineo. Id. at 25-26. 

Had the trial court properly weighed these mitigating factors, Rogers asserts, 

it should have imposed a lesser sentence. Id. at 26.

Rogers challenges the discretionary aspects of her sentence, from which 

there is no automatic right to appeal. See Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 

1058, 1064 (Pa. Super. 2011). An appellant challenging the discretionary 

aspects of sentence must first invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a 

four-part test to determine

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether [a]ppellant 

preserved his issue; (3) whether [a]ppellant’s brief includes a 

concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of 

appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and 

(4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question 

that the sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code.

Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz, 64 A.3d 722, 725 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citations omitted).

Here, Rogers filed a timely Notice of Appeal, and preserved the issue in 

her post-sentence Motion. Additionally, while Rogers’s brief does not contain 

a separate Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement, the Commonwealth has not objected 

to this omission. See Commonwealth v. Kiesel, 854 A.2d 530, 533 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (stating that this Court may ignore the omission of a 2119(f) 

statement and determine whether the appellant has raised a substantial 

question, as long as the Commonwealth does not object to the omission). 

Finally, Rogers’s argument that the trial court fashioned an excessive 
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sentence, and failed to consider mitigating factors, raises a substantial 

question. See Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (holding that “an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an 

assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a 

substantial question.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we will address the 

merits of her issue.

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

When imposing a sentence, a court is required to consider 

the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of 

the defendant. In considering these factors, the court should refer 

to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal 

characteristics and potential for rehabilitation. It must be 

demonstrated that the court considered the statutory factors 

enunciated for determination of sentencing alternatives, and the 

sentencing guidelines. Additionally, the court must impose a 

sentence which is consistent with the protection of the public, the 

gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the 

victim and the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the 

defendant.

Commonwealth v. McClendon, 589 A.2d 706, 712 (Pa. Super. 1991) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9721(b). Further, “where a sentence is within the standard range of the 
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guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. 

Super. 2010). Moreover, “where the trial court is informed by a pre-sentence 

report, it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing 

factors and considerations, and that where the court has been so informed, 

its discretion should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 

A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, the record reflects that the trial court considered the “unusual” 

circumstances of the offense, including Mineo and Rogers’s involvement with 

a cult, the nature of their relationship, and the parties’ use of alcohol and other 

substances on the night of the shooting. See N.T., 6/10/19, at 20-26. The 

record reflects that the trial court also considered Rogers’s military service 

and mental health history, and her rehabilitative needs, as well as her 

statement at sentencing and her general character. See id. at 21-23. 

Further, the trial court considered the Sentencing Guidelines, Rogers’s prior 

criminal history and rehabilitative needs, the seriousness of her crimes, and 

the protection of the public. Id. at 23-25. Thus, the trial court properly 

considered all the statutory factors prior to sentencing Rogers. See 

McClendon, supra.

Additionally, because the trial court had the benefit of a PSI, which the 

trial court expressly stated that it had reviewed, see N.T., 6/10/19, at 25 

(wherein the trial court states that it had read through the “very 
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comprehensive” PSI), it is presumed that the trial court was aware of relevant 

information related to Rogers’s character, and weighed those considerations 

along with any mitigating factors. See Downing, 990 A.2d at 794; see also 

Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(stating that “[t]he sentencing judge can satisfy the requirement that reasons 

for imposing sentence be placed on the record by indicating that he or she has 

been informed by the [PSI]; thus properly considering and weighing all 

relevant factors.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a standard range sentence, and 

Rogers’s discretionary sentencing challenge fails.

In her fourth issue, Rogers argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

support her conviction of third-degree murder. Brief for Appellant at 30-32. 

Rogers asserts that she lacked the requisite intent to kill Mineo; reasonable 

doubt existed as to the circumstances surrounding the shooting; and her 

unfamiliarity with the mechanisms of the handgun resulted in the handgun 

firing. Id.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 
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circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by 

means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying 

the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all 

evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] 

of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none 

of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 790 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

The Crimes Code defines third-degree murder as any killing with malice 

that is not first- or second-degree murder. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2502(c); see also Commonwealth v. Baskerville, 681 A.2d 195, 199-

200 (Pa. Super. 1996).

Malice consists of a “wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, 

cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of 

social duty, although a particular person may not intended to be 

injured....” Malice may be found where the defendant consciously 

disregarded an unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions 

might cause serious bodily injury.

Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 582 (Pa. Super. 2001) 

(citation and brackets omitted). “[M]alice can be inferred from the use of a 

deadly weapon upon a vital part of the victim’s body.” Commonwealth v. 

Thomas, 54 A.3d 332, 335-36 (Pa. 2012).

The trial court, in its Opinion, addressed the merits of Rogers’s 

sufficiency claim as follows:

[Rogers] fired the shot that killed [] Mineo. Indeed, she 

confessed, in detail to [D]etectives [] Bray and [] Bohrman of the 

P[MRPD]. Additionally, [Rogers] demonstrated to the detectives 

exactly how she was standing over Mineo while holding the gun to 
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Mineo’s head. The evidence also showed that [Rogers] was the 

only other person in the room with Mineo at the time of the 

shooting.

Furthermore, evidence presented by the Commonwealth 

directly contradicted [Rogers]’s claim that Mineo placed the gun 

in her hand and forced her to pull the trigger by violently pulling 

the barrel of the gun toward himself. First, the Commonwealth 

presented evidence that the gun was placed down on its left side, 

rather than being dropped by the shooter. Mineo’s body was 

completely undisturbed after the shooting, which indicated that 

[Rogers] did not try to revive or check on Mineo or otherwise make 

contact with his body after the gun went off. Evidence also 

showed that Mineo had toxic levels of mitragynine in his system 

together with a BAC of .150%, which would have rendered him 

impaired. Moreover, Mineo was sitting on the floor in a relaxed 

pose with his right leg crossed over his left leg. The fatal shot was 

located in the center of Mineo’s forehead and there were clear 

signs of a close contact gunshot, including burns and bruising 

around the entrance wound, indicating the muzzle of the gun was 

lightly pressed against Mineo’s head at a downward trajectory. 

Lastly, Corporal Gober testified that if a tight or heavy pressure is

applied to the muzzle area of the gun used in this case, the gun 

can be knocked out of battery, which is a safety feature that can 

prevent it from firing.

Finally, the Commonwealth presented circumstantial 

evidence to show [Rogers]’s intent to commit [t]hird[-d]egree 

[m]urder—i.e.[,] malice. Evidence was presented at trial that 

showed [Rogers] and Mineo had a tumultuous relationship in the 

weeks leading up to the shooting. Indeed, the evidence showed 

that [Rogers] and Mineo were part of a “religious” group, led by 

Sherry Shriner. There was evidence that this group was, in fact, 

more like a cult and that Shriner had immense control over the 

majority of her devotees, including Mineo. Approximately [two] 

months before the shooting, Shriner began attacking [Rogers] 

online, claiming that [Rogers] was one of the group’s enemies 

(specifically, a “reptile”) and insinuating that Mineo should no 

longer be in a relationship with [Rogers]. In addition to this 

ongoing confrontation, the Commonwealth presented evidence 

that Mineo was financially dependent on [Rogers], and that Mineo 

suspected [that Rogers] was cheating.
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The above evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth, established beyond a reasonable doubt, 

albeit circumstantially, that [Rogers] was holding the gun to 

Mineo’s forehead and pulled the trigger, committing murder. The 

Commonwealth presented evidence that [Rogers] was the only 

person in the home at the time of the fatal shooting. The 

Commonwealth also presented evidence that Mineo suffered from 

a contact gunshot wound to the middle of his forehead and that 

his sitting posture and the gun’s placement after the shooting 

belied any type of self-inflicted gunshot wound or a sequence of 

events that involved Mineo’s hands on the gun when it was fired. 

Accordingly, evidence shows that [Rogers] used a deadly 

weapon—a gun—on a vital part of Mineo’s body—his head. As we 

instructed the jury, this act alone can be used by the finder of fact 

to infer malice. In addition to this permissible inference of malice, 

the Commonwealth also presented evidence to show that intent 

in that [Rogers] and Mineo’s relationship had become increasingly 

contentious due to accusations about [Rogers] from Mineo’s 

“religious leader” and Mineo’s financial dependence on [Rogers]. 

Finally, and in accordance with the physical evidence at the scene, 

[Rogers] herself admitted to shooting Mineo and demonstrated a 

shooting stance that would have resulted in the same type of 

wound that killed Mineo.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/19, at 3-6 (citations to record omitted).

We agree with the sound analysis of the trial court, and adopt its 

analysis herein. See id. Accordingly, Rogers is not entitled to relief on this 

claim. See Smith, supra.

In her fifth issue, Rogers argues that the verdict was against the weight 

of the evidence. Brief for Appellant at 27-29. Rogers claims that she lacked 

the requisite intent to kill Mineo, and that her inconsistent statements to police 

were due to the “tunnel vision” she was experiencing after just having 

witnessed Mineo’s death. Id. at 27. According to Rogers, she did not believe 

that the handgun would fire because her experience with revolvers provided 
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her with an inaccurate impression of the trigger pressure necessary to fire the 

handgun. Id. at 28. Further, Rogers points to the possibility that Mineo’s 

hands were on top of the handgun as it fired. Id. In light of the above factors, 

Rogers asserts that the verdict shocks the conscience. Id. at 28-29.

The law pertaining to weight of the evidence claims is wellsettled. The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the 

finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new 

trial is not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony 

and must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the 

credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to 

determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so 

clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal 

weight with all the facts is to deny justice. On appeal, our purview 

is extremely limited and is confined to whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in finding that the jury verdict did not shock 

its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a weight claim consists 

of a review of the trial court's exercise of discretion, not a review 

of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

The trial court ably addressed Rogers’s weight of the evidence claim as 

follows:

In this case, there was never any question whether [Rogers] fired 

the fatal shot. [Rogers] placed the call to 911 and stated to the 

dispatcher that she shot [Mineo] in the head and also told the 

responding officer, [Cpl.] Mertz, that [Mineo] placed the gun to 

his own head, then she pulled the trigger and [Mineo] collapsed 

onto the floor. Later, during an interview with [Detective] Bray 

and [Detective] Bohrman from the P[MRPD], [Rogers] confessed 

to the murder in very specific detail. Additionally, [Rogers] 

demonstrated to the detectives exactly how she was standing over 

[Mineo] while holding the gun to [Mineo]’s head. The evidence 
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also showed that [Rogers] was the only other person in the room 

with [Mineo] at the time of the shooting.

Furthermore, at trial, the Commonwealth presented 

evidence from the crime scene that showed the following: [t]he 

gun was placed down on its left side, rather than being dropped 

by the shooter. [Mineo]’s body was completely undisturbed after 

the shooting, which indicated that [Rogers] did not try to revive 

or even check on [Mineo]. Evidence also showed that [Mineo] had 

toxic levels of mitragynine in his system together with a BAC of 

.150%, which would have rendered him impaired. [Rogers]’s 

claim that [Mineo] placed the gun in her hand and forced her to 

pull the trigger by violently pulling the barrel of the gun toward 

himself is also belied by the way [Mineo] was sitting at the time 

of the fatal shot. Specifically, [Mineo] was sitting on the floor in 

a relaxed pose with his right leg crossed over his left leg. The 

fatal shot was located in the center of [Mineo]’s forehead and 

there were clear signs of a close contact gunshot, including burns 

and bruising around the entrance wound, indicating the muzzle of 

the gun was lightly pressed against [Mineo]’s head at a downward 

trajectory. Further, Corporal Gober testified that if a tight or 

heavy pressure is applied to the muzzle area of the gun used in 

this case, the gun can be knocked out of battery, which is a safety 

feature that can prevent it from firing.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/20/19, at 4-5 (citations to record omitted).

Our review of the record confirms that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it concluded that the jury’s verdict was not against the weight 

of the evidence. See Gonzalez, supra. Discerning no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court, this claim fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/23/2021