Filed 5/28/15 Jangozian v. Farmers Ins. CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

VARTAN V. JANGOZIAN et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant and Respondent. B247864
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC447829)

SIMON POGOSSIAN et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.
MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent. B250426
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC447829)

APPEALS from judgments and orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. William F. Highberger, Judge. B247864 (Jan gozian plaintiffs) affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions; B250426 (Pogossian plaintiffs) affirmed.2 Gary Rand & Suzanne E. Rand-Lewis a nd Suzanne E. Rand-Lewis for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Tharpe & Howell, Christopher S. Maile, St ephanie Forman and Eric B. Kunkel for Defendants and Respondents.

_________________________________

Plaintiffs in each of the consolidated appeals alleged that smoke and ash from a wildfire damaged their homes. Each set of plaintiffs submitted a claim for damage under their homeowners insurance polic y. Plaintiffs were dissatisfied with their respective insurer’s handling of their cl aims and filed the separate underlying actions, which were
consolidated in the trial court. In the Ja ngozian case, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insu rer, and in the Pogossian case, the court granted the insurer’s motion for discovery-related term inating sanctions. Each set of plaintiffs appealed, and we consolidated the appeals.
THE JANGOZIANS’ CASE
BACKGROUND On December 17, 2010, plaintiffs Vartan and Anna Oleva Jangozian sued Farmers Insurance Group and respondent Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers) on several theories after Farmers partially denied plai ntiffs’ claim for smoke and ash damage to plaintiffs’ house in Glendale resulting from the Station Fire. The operative second amended complaint asserted th e following causes of action against Farmers: breach of contract; breach of implied covenant of good fa ith and fair dealing; violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200; intenti onal infliction of emotional distress; fraud;
and violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Co de section 51 (Unruh Act). In allegations incorporated in every cause of action, plaintiffs allege in the second amended complaint that the Station Fire “b roke out” on August 26 , 2009, and “raged
uncontained for more th an a month.” Plaintiffs further alleged that the fire “blanketed
foothill communities in a thick cloud of ash and left many homes inundated with smoke and ash.” They averred that their own h ouse “was inundated w ith smoke and ash from3 that fire, which caused damage to both the exteri or and interior of Plaintiffs’ premises.” Plaintiffs alleged that their home “sustained covered direct physical losses” “on or about August 26, 2009.” Plaintiffs also alleged that they “noticedsoot and ash as well as an odor that began to permeate the house and its furnishings” “[s]ubsequent to the Station Wildfire which raged for approximately 6 weeks.”
Plaintiffs did not submit a claim under their homeowners in surance policy until February 18 or 19, 2010. Pl aintiffs alleged they “did no t realize the damage sustained
from the smoke and ash was covered under their homeowners insu rance policy” until they “spoke with some of th eir neighbors several months later, who had submitted similar
claims to their homeowners insurance companies and were paid for their damages.” Farmers’s employee Kenneth Holker (H olker) inspected plaintiffs’ house on March 12, 2010, with the assi stance of Forensic Analytic al Consulting Services, Inc. (FACS), which took samples from plaintiffs’ house. Plaintiffs alleged the inspection and sampling were inadequate and fraudulent, in that Farmers and FACS had already decided that they would deny the claim based on “a list of attorneys and insureds whose claims they had predetermined were ‘s uspect’ and would not pay.” Mo re specifically, plaintiffs
averred that Holker “had numerous similar claims, also from insured’s [ sic ] of Armenian ethnicity that he and [FACS] had already denied . He knew that he was going to reject the claim without evaluating it.” On March 17, 2010, Farmer s, through Holker, sent pl aintiffs a letter notifying them that additional time would be required. The letter stated in pertinent part: “To properly investigate and evaluate your claim, I will need additional time to make a final determination. The reason(s) for the additional time needed is for the completion and review of expert hygienist report. [¶] In compliance with the California Fair Claims Settlement Practices Regulation 2695.7(c), I will be contacting you within the next 30 days to advise you of the status of my investigati on and evaluation of your claim.” The letter then informed plai ntiffs of the limitations period: “California law and regulations require that we provide you wi th written notice of any limitation period upon which we may rely to deny a claim. [¶ ] Please refer to paragraph 12 in the Section I –4 Conditions part of your policy, which states: [¶] 12. Suit Against Us . We may not be
sued unless there has been fu ll compliance with all the terms and conditions of this policy. Suit on or arising out of this policy must be brought within one year after the loss occurs.” Finally, the letter info rmed plaintiffs of how to c ontact the state Department of Insurance if they believed “all or part of your claim has been wrongfully denied.” On April 13, 2010, Farmer s, through Holker, sent pl aintiffs a letter partially denying and partially granting their claim. Enclosed with the letter were a copy of FACS’s report and a check in the amount of $2,151.31, which plain tiffs accepted. The letter stated in pertinent part: “This corres pondence will provide you with the results of Fire Insurance Exchange’s investigation a nd evaluation regarding the above-referenced claim. . . . [¶] Enclosed please find a copy of the report prepared by Forensic Analytical. As you will recall, Fire Insu rance Exchange reta ined Forensic Analytical to provide expert technical assistance in the investiga tion and evaluation of the alleged damages to the subject property. Specifica lly, Forensic Analytical cond ucted sampling at the subject property to determine the extent of soot and ash contamination, if any, and had the samples sent to an independent lab for analysis. [¶] As more fully set forth in the report, Forensic Analytical determined there were in sufficient levels of smoke, ash and/or soot related to the August 2009 w ildfires to require any remediation for the personal property of the residence. However, Forensic Anal ytical recommends the shutters/blinds and window sills and tracks be wiped down, the ex terior surfaces be power washed and attic insulation be replaced and attic cleaned due to sufficient levels of smoke, ash, and/or soot. As the entirety of the report is signi ficant, we suggest you read it carefully for
additional informati on and explanation.” The April 13, 2010 letter then set forth a table listing separate columns for “Building” and “Contents.” In the “Building” column, the table listed $3,181.49 as the “Estimate for Damages,” deductions for “Rec overable Depreciation” and “Deductible,” and an “Actual Cash Value Payment” of $2,1 51.31. All entries in the “Contents” column were zeros. The paragraph following the table stated, “You may have the repairs made by an independent contractor of their [ sic ] choice. If for any reason the contractor5 indicates the Replacement Cost estimat e is incorrect, please call me before the work begins. If you do not ca ll me before the work is started, this could affect your ability to obtain any additio nal payments.” The April 13, 2010 letter con tinued, “Based on the forego ing, we regret to inform you that Fire Insurance Exchange must par tially deny the present claim for smoke, ash and/or soot damage.” The letter then info rmed plaintiffs how to contact the state Department of Insurance if they believed “the decision in this matter is incorrect,” and
advised them of the statute of limitations: “The policy of insurance applying to the present claim contains the following condition, as authorized under Insurance Code §2071: [¶] Please refer to pa ragraph 12 in the Section I – Co nditions part of your policy, which states: [¶] 12. Suit Against Us . We may not be sued unless there has been full compliance with all the terms a nd conditions of this policy. Suit on or arising out of this policy must be brought within one year after the loss occurs. [¶] By law, the time spent by the insurer investigating and processing th e claim does not count toward the one-year period within which a lawsuit regarding the loss must be commenced.” The letter also advised plaintiffs, “If you are in possession of any add itional or different factual information that you believe wo uld affect this decision, plea se notify us immediately.” The letter noted Farmers was not waiving any terms or conditions of the policy or any defenses it had or might have.
Plaintiffs sent Farmers a letter date d June 1, 2010, ex pressing “concern and unhappiness regarding Apr 13/2010 report . . . es timate and forensic analytical expert and
their results.” The letter stated plaintiffs had hired their ow n experts, whose reports were enclosed, and demanded payment of $24,166. 14, the amount of an estimate by Patterson Construction (Patterson). The accompanying report by Safeguard Envirogroup, Inc. (Safeguard) reflected that its employees observed “light to moderate levels of darkcolored particulates” in the inte rior of the house at “[p]oint s of entry” such as windows and doors and in the garage. They also observe d such particulates on exterior “finishes” and around points of entry. Laboratory testing of samples collected by Safeguard “revealed evidence indicating the presence of fire byproduct particulates on all surfaces6 sampled in the areas investigated.” Safeguard recommended “specialty cleaning” of the following specified locations: “ Interior [¶] 1) Clean the point s of entry (i.e. interior windowsills and frames, window tracks, shu tters, dressings and blinds, slider tracks, perimeter door thresholds, affected baseboards and proximate floor areas). [¶] a) Use HEPA vacuuming and damp meth ods, such as wiping with a damp disposal cloth with detergent and water mix. [¶] Exterior [¶] . . . [¶] 1) Pr essure wash/scrub/disinfect all exterior surfaces including walls, walks, drives , decks, siding, exterior features, window and deck screens, etc.” Safe guard also suggested “indoor me chanical air filtration” until ash and soot on the ground were absorbed. On June 14, 2010, Farmers, through Holker, sent plain tiffs a letter providing “the results of Fire Insurance Exchange’s re-evalua tion of the above-referenced claim” in light of plaintiffs’ letter, the Safeguard report, and the estimate of plaintiffs’ contractor. Farmers observed, “According to the testing performed by Safeguard Envirogroup, Inc. compared to that done by Forensic Analy tical, the damages are the same with the exception of the attic cleaning and insula tion replacement reco mmended by Forensic Analytical. Accordingly, no further payment is owed.” The letter continued, “We are denying the damages as subm itted by Patterson Construction in the estimate provided as they are not supported by the findings of a cer tified hygienist and are in conflict with the findings of Forensic Analytical and Safeguar d Envirogroup, Inc. . . . The claim result based on and including the hygienist reports from Forensic Analytical was provided in our correspondence of April 13, 2010 at which time we closed our file.” The June 14, 2010 letter also reiterat ed the advisements to plaintiffs about contacting the Department of Insurance, the on e-year limitations period, and tolling. It then noted, “As the cl aim is now closed, any and all to lling of the one-year period ceases
as of the date of this letter.” On September 23, 2010, counsel for plai ntiffs, Gary Rand, sent Farmers, FACS, and plaintiffs’ insurance agent a letter asserting they had viol ated a number of provisions of Civil Code section 1770 and demanding a remedy within 30 days. The letter listed the insurance policy number, claim number, an d “Date of Loss: August 30, 2009.”7 Farmers, through Holker, responded to pl aintiffs’ counsel in writing on October 2, 2010, stating, “We have completed a thorough investigation and have advised your client of the results in our letter dated April 13, 2 010 and again in respon se to the hygienist report provided for review on June 14, 2010.” The letter reiterated the limitations period, enclosed copies of the April 13, 2010 and June 14, 2010 letters and FACS’s report, and asked counsel to provide plaintiffs with copi es of the enclosures “as soon as possible.”
Farmers’s answer to the second ame nded complaint asserted a number of affirmative defenses, including the one-year limitations period. Farmers moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication of issues with respect to each cause of action on the sole gr ound that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court gran ted summary judgment in favor of Farmers.
The court concluded that there was no triabl e issue of fact that “the insureds had an awareness of alleged covered loss by the end of August 2009 . . . . Perhaps the loss was aggravated thereafter, but that does no t change the salient fact that by their admissions and allegations they were aware of a loss no later than Augu st 30, 2009.” The
court further concluded the statute of limitatio ns was not tolled between the dates of April 13, 2010 (when Farmers sent its letter partia lly denying and partiall y granting plaintiffs’ claim) and June 1, 2010 (whe n plaintiffs wrote to Farmers and enclosed their expert’s report and contractor’s estimate). Thus, the tria l court calculated that plaintiffs filed their original complaint 407 days after the August 30, 2009 inception of loss date, and action on the policy was time-barred. The appeal be fore us depends largely on whether this
conclusion was correct. Finally, the court concluded that every cau se of action that plaintiffs asserted against Farmers arose out of pl aintiffs’ rights under the insurance contract, and thus the one-year statute of limitations barred plaintiffs’ other causes of action despite their labels. The appeal also turns on whether the trial court erred in this finding. Farmers filed a memorandum of costs, s eeking a total of $14,843.03. Plaintiffs moved to strike or tax costs, which the trial court denied. Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal.8 DISCUSSION 1. Propriety of granting defend ant’s summary judgment motion a. Pertinent principles governing summary judgment motions A party moving for summary judgment bear s the burden of persuasion that there is
no triable issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to ju dgment as a matter of law. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A triable issue of
material fact exists if the evidence would allow a reasonab le trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of th e party opposing the motion. ( Ibid. ) The moving party also bears the initial burden of pr oducing evidence to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable i ssue of material fact. ( Ibid. ) A defendant moving for summa ry judgment must show, with respect to each of the plaintiff’s causes of action, that either one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) 1 Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove
the existence of a triable issue of material fa ct regarding the element or defense addressed by the defendant’s motion. ( Ibid. ) “If the moving defendant argues that it has a complete defense to the plaintiff’s cause of action, th e defendant has the initia l burden to show that undisputed facts support each element of the affirmative defense. Once it does so, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show an issue of fact concerning at least one element of the defense.” ( Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 858.) A plaintiff opposing a de fendant’s motion for summary judgment “may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set fo rth the specific facts showing that a triable
issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a de fense thereto.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) We review a trial court’s entry of summary judgment de novo. ( Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400(2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767.)

1 Undesignated statutory references pert ain to the Code of Civil Procedure.9 b. Principles pertinent to app lication of the limitations period Insurance Code section 2071, subdivision (a) provides th e standard fire insurance form and includes the following provision: “No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy shall have been complied with, and un less commenced within 12 months next after inception of the loss.” Inception or occurrence of the loss is “determined by reference to reasonable discovery of the loss and [does] not necessari ly turn on the occurrence of the physical event causing the loss.” ( Prudential-LMI Com. Insurance v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 686 ( Prudential-LMI ).) “The insured’s suit on the policy will be deemed timely if it is filed within one year after ‘inception of the lo ss,’ defined as that point in time when appreciable damage occurs and is or should be known to th e insured, such that
a reasonable insured would be aware that hi s notification duty under the policy has been triggered. To take advantage of the benef its of a delayed discovery rule, however, the insured is required to be diligen t in the face of discovered fact s. The more substantial or
unusual the nature of the dama ge discovered by the insured (e .g., the greater its deviation from what a reasonable person would consider normal wear and tear), the greater the insured’s duty to notify hi s insurer of the loss prom ptly and diligently.” ( Id. at pp. 686– 687.) “Once any damage becomes reasonably appa rent the time begins to run, even if the full extent of the damage is unknown. ‘The inception of the loss oc curs when the insured
should have known that appreciable damage had occurred, not when the homeowner learned the true extent of the damage.’ [Citation.]” ( Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Tr uck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1086 ( Doheny Park ).) An insured’s belated discovery of potential cove rage is irrelevant to the inception of loss date. ( Abari v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1988) 205 Cal. App.3d 530, 535 ( Abari ).) The limitations period is tolled from th e time the insured gi ves notice of the damage to the insurer until the insurer formally denies coverage. ( Prudential-LMI
, supra , 51 Cal.3d at p. 693.) “This has been co nstrued to mean ‘unequivocal’ denial in10 writing.” ( Migliore v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 592, 604 ( Migliore ).) “The reason for the tolling rule is to avoi d penalizing the insured for the time consumed by the insurer investigating the claim, while preserving the ‘“central idea of the limitation provision [that] an insured w ill have only 12 months to ins titute suit.”’ [Citation.]” ( Marselis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 122, 125 .) There is no requirement, however, that the insurer take “firm, unmovable positions” ( Liberty Transport, Inc. v. Harry W. Gorst Co. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 417, 429) or use particular “magic” words,
even the word “deny” ( Migliore , at p. 605) to achieve the requisite unconditional denial. “Claims arising out of the contractual re lationship are subject to the contractual limitations period contained in the insurance policy.” ( Lawrence v. Western Mutual Ins.
Co. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 565, 575.) “[A] n action seeking dama ges recoverable under the policy for a risk insured un der the policy is merely a ‘tra nsparent attempt to recover on the policy. ’ [Citing Abari
, supra , 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 536.] As such, it is subject to the policy’s statute of limitations.” ( Jang v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1301.) This includes a “b ad faith cause of acti on based on failure to pay benefits” and any othe r claim, such as intentional inf liction of emotional distress, that is “merely a theoretical restat ement of the same claim.” ( Prieto v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1188, 1196 ( Prieto ).) Where “the essence” of a cause of action “is an attempt to recover ‘[d ]amages for failure to provide benefits under subject contract of insurance,’” it is “ ‘fundamentally a claim on the policy.’” ( Magnolia Square Homeowners Assn. v. Safeco Ins. Co. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1049, 1063 [limitations period applied to “bad faith, breach of fiduciary duties and breach of statutory duties” causes of action].) An insurer may waive, i.e., intentionally relinquish its right to rely upon, the expiration of a limitations provision. ( Singh v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 135, 144 ( Singh ).) Alternatively, “an insurer may be estopped to assert a policy provision limiting the time to sue where it has caused th e insured to delay filing suit until after the expiration of the time period.” ( Doheny Park
, supra , 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1090.) Conduct leading to application of the estoppel doctrine includes “lead[ing] its insured to11 believe that an amicable adjustment of the claim will be made, thus delaying the insured’s suit” ( Prudential-LMI
, supra , 51 Cal.3d at p. 690), fa iling “to notify a claimant of any applicable time limits that might apply to the claim” ( Doheny Park , at p. 1091), and incorrectly representing that the cost of repairing the damage was less than the deductible ( Vu v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1142, 1152). c. The trial court properly granted summary adjudication with respect to all but the seventh cause of action, and th us erred in granting summary judgment (1) Inception of loss date In conformity with Insurance Code section 2071, plaintiffs’ homeowners insurance policy provided that any “[s]uit on or arising out of this policy must be brought within one year afte r the loss occurs.”
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court e rred by concluding there was no triable issue of material fact regarding the inception of lo ss date. Based upon our de novo review of the parties’ separate statements of fact a nd the evidentiary support cited therein, we
conclude that there was no triable issue of material fact regardin g the inception of loss date. Plaintiffs’ admissions in their pleadings and depositions estab lish that by the end of August 2009, plaintiffs knew that smoke a nd ash from the wildfire had entered their home and caused appreciable damage.
Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint alleges that the wildfire began August 26, 2009, and that plaintiffs’ house “was inundate d with smoke and ash from that fire, which caused damage to both th e exterior and interior of Plainti ffs’ premises.” The first (breach of contract) and second (breach of implied covenant) causes of action in plaintiffs’ second amended complaint allege, “[O]n or a bout August 26, 2009, Plaintiffs’ residence [premises] sustained covered di rect physical losses as stated above in Plaintiffs’ factual allegations.” These allegations are incorporated in all remaining causes of action. These allegations constitute judicial admissions by which plaintiffs are bound. “‘“A defendant moving for summary judgment may rely on the allegations contained in the plaintiff’s complaint, which constitute judicial admissions . As such they are conclusive concessions12 of the truth of a matter and have the effect of removing it from the issues.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The admissions may not be cont radicted in opposing summary judgment.” ( Mark Tanner Construction, Inc. v. HUB Internat. Ins. Services, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 574, 586–587.) In addition, Anna Jangozia n admitted in her deposition th at she smelled or felt the smoke from the fire in the air and experien ced difficulty breathing “one or two days after” “the first day.” She further tes tified that the ashes were falling “just like snowflakes” outside the house, and the ash entered the house when anyone op ened the
door or walked in from outside. She first sa w the ash inside her house in close temporal proximity to when she firs t saw it outside the house. Defense counsel asked Vartan Jangozia n at his deposition to describe the conditions at his home “[d]uring the time thatthe fire was burning.” Mr. Jangozian replied, “I can just say a few days after the fire, our whole backyard had—was covered with ashes, thick ashes, on—there were ashes on the cars. And we needed to use brush to
collect it or to clean it. [¶] And there was a stinging sens ation in our eyes because of the smoke. And then also we had a problem br eathing.” Defense counsel asked if they experienced the difficulty breathing and stinging eyes inside the house. Mr. Jangozian replied, “Well, of course, it is very clear wh en you open the door and close the door, you go in and out, the same smoke comes to the ho use but, of course, not to the same degree
as it is outside.”

Through plaintiffs’ admissions in their second amended complaint and depositions, Farmers established that plainti ffs knew on or, at the latest, within a few days after August 26, 2009, that smoke and ash from the wildfire had entered their home and caused appreciable damage. Although plain tiffs may not have known at that time the full extent of the damage that would ultimat ely accumulate, the entr y of these materials was unusual, and the evidence clearly establ ished that plaintiffs knew the smoke and ash were from the wildfire, not the “normal wear and tear” caused by dust and air pollution. Plaintiffs’ deposition testimony regarding their respiratory difficulties further established that plaintiffs either knew or should have known that the materi als deposited in their13 home by the wildfire’s smoke and ash posed the health hazard they alleged in their second amended complaint.

Against this showing, plaintiffs princi pally offered several excuses that were
neither valid nor sufficient to raise a triable is sue of material fact regarding the inception of loss date. Plaintiffs argued, and their decl arations stated, that Farmers did not tell them about the one-year limitations period, no one told them th e “suit against us” provision applied to either plaintiff, and that the “su it against us” provision does not contain the words “‘you’” or “‘insured.’” Farmers specifically and rep eatedly advised plaintiffs of the limitations provision in letters sent dir ectly to Vartan Jangozian on March 17, April 13, and June 14, 2010. The “S uit Against Us” provision is in the Conditions section of the policy Farmers issued to plaintiffs. The “Agreement” section of the policy states, “you will . . . comply with all policy conditions,” and the policy defines “you” as including the spouse of named insured. Th us, the provision applie d to both the named insured, Vartan Jangozian, a nd his spouse, Anna Jangozian. Plaintiffs also attempted to create a triable issue of material fact regarding the inception of loss date by arguing that Farmers did not communicate in writing with Anna Jangozian, and Vartan Jangoz ian requires assistance with English. Neither point is
sufficient to create a triabl e issue of fact regarding the inception of loss date. Furthermore, although Vartan Jangozian asserts in his declaration that he “needed assistance with writings in En glish,” we observe that his declaration, which is under penalty of perjury, is in English, and is unaccompanie d by any certificate from an
Armenian translator.

The only evidence relevant to the inception of loss date asserted by plaintiffs in opposition to Farmers’s summa ry judgment motion was a portion of Anna Jangozian’s declaration stating, “The smoke and ash repeat edly came into our hom e. It began weeks after the fire started, and c ontinued to occur each time it was windy. When all of our cleaning could not get out th e ash, sootiness, and odo r, we made a claim under our insurance policy.” A party, however, cannot crea te an issue of fact by a declaration that14 contradicts his or her prior discovery responses. ( Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 500, fn. 12.)

Admissions made in discovery are accorded great weight because they are deemed to have a “very high credibility value.” ( D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 22; Whitmire v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1087.) Accordingly, “[i]n determining whether any tria ble issue of material fact exists, the trial court may, in its discretion, give great we ight to admissions made in deposition and disregard contradictory and self-servi ng affidavits of the party.” ( Preach v. Monter
Rainbow (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1451.) Thus Anna Jangozian’s attempt in her declaration to contradict the operative comp laint and her depositi on testimony is entitled to no weight and is insufficient to cr eate a triable issue of material fact. Plaintiffs argue that their “loss wa s progressive.” The portion of Anna Jangozian’s declaration quoted above would su pport a finding that damage to plaintiffs’ home was exacerbated “each time it was windy,” bu t this is immaterial to determining the inception of loss date, and theref ore insufficient to create a tr iable issue of material fact regarding that date. The pertinent point is the inception , not completion, of loss, and the
Prudential-LMI standard quoted above applies to pr ogressive losses. The time began to run when any damage became re asonably apparent, not when plaintiffs learned the full extent of the damage. ( Doheny Park
, supra , 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086.) Thus, while the “progressive” nature of the damage may ha ve made it harder to assess the cost of remediation, it did not delay the inception of loss. Finally, we note plaintiffs’ allegation in their second amended complaint that they
did not realize that “their damage was covered under their homeowners insurance policy” until “several months later” when neighbor s told them of receiving payment from their own insurers for similar damage claims. This belated discovery was “without import. ‘It is the occurrence of some . . . cognizable event rather than knowledge of its legal significance that starts the running of the statute of limitations.’” ( Abari
, supra , 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 535.)15 Accordingly, we conclude no triable issue of fact exists as to the date of the inception of loss, which was on or about Augu st 30, 2009. (2) Duration of tolling
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court e rred by concluding that there was no triable issue of material fact regardin g whether Holker’s April 13, 2 010 letter to plaintiffs “was an unequivocal denial of [plaintiffs’] en tire claim” that term inated tolling of the limitations period. Based upon our de novo revi ew of the parties’ separate statements of fact and the evidence cited therein, we conclu de that the trial court was correct. Farmers denied plaintiffs’ claim by means of the Ap ril 13, 2010 letter, ending the tolling period until plaintiffs protested th e denial on June 1, 2010. Accordingly, the one-year limitations period ran 42 days befo re plaintiffs filed this action, which, as detailed below, was fatal to all but one of plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs allege in the second amende d complaint that they submitted a claim under their homeowners policy on or about February 18, 2010. The Holker declaration states that plaintiffs submitted their claim on February 19, 2010. Th is one day difference is inconsequential, because the complaint in this case was e ither timely, or filed 42 days too late. Accordingly, we give plaintiffs the benefit of the extra day and utilize the February 18, 2010 claim submissi on date, as did the trial court. The April 13, 2010 letter began by sta ting, “This corresponde nce will provide you
with the results of Fire Insu rance Exchange’s investigati on and evaluation regarding the above-referenced claim.” It further repor ted that FACS had “determined there were insufficient levels of smoke, ash and/or soot related to the August 2009 wildfires to require any remediation for the personal proper ty of the residence.” In accordance with that statement, the table in the letter clea rly indicated that Farm ers was not recognizing any damage to contents or pa ying any amount for damage to contents. In contrast, the “Building” column in the table listed an estimate for damages, deductions for depreciation and the deductible, and the amount Farmers paid for that damage in a check
enclosed with the letter.16 The letter continued, “Based on the foregoi ng, we regret to inform you that Fire Insurance Exchange mu st partially deny the present claim for smoke, ash and/or soot damage.” The letter then info rmed plaintiffs how to contact the state Department of Insurance if they believed “the decision in this matter is incorrect,” and advised them of the limitations period. Finally, the April 13, 2010 letter advise d plaintiffs, “If you are in possession of any additional or different factua l information that you believe would affect this decision, please notify us immediately.” Vartan Jangozian admitted during his de position that he received and read the letter. He further admitted accepting the Fa rmers’s check enclosed with the letter and using a portion of the funds to have “a crew” clean the house. Anna Jangozian testified at her deposition that when they received the check, “[M]y husband told me that that [ sic ] with that check, there was a letter indicating th at that was their final decision, which, I mean, you can only conclude that they ha d no intentions of doing anything else.” “The interpretation of a written instru ment, even though it involves what might properly be called questions of fact [citation], is essentiall y a judicial function to be exercised according to the generally accept ed canons of interpretation so that the purposes of the instrument may be given effe ct. [Citations.] Extrinsic evidence is ‘admissible to interpret the instrument, but not to give it a meaning to which it is not reasonably susceptible’ [citations], and it is the in strument itself that must be given effect. [Citations.] It is therefore solely a judici al function to interpret a written instrument unless the interpretation turn s upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence.” ( Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865.) The language of the letter itself was suffi cient to constitute an unequivocal denial of plaintiffs’ contents claim, and of their claim regarding damage to the building except for clean up and replacement work specified in the letter and for which Farmers paid plaintiffs. The introductory sentence of the letter stated th at the purpose of the letter was to “provide you with the results of Fire Insurance Exchange’s investigation and evaluation regarding the a bove-referenced claim .” (Italics added.) The terms in that sentence indicate finality and refer to the entire claim. Next, the statement that17 “insufficient levels of levels of smoke, as h and/or soot” were found “to require any remediation for the personal property of the re sidence,” together with the specification of the amount of damages to contents as “$0.00 ” clearly reflected Farmers’s decision that there was no covered damage to the contents of plaintiffs’ home. Similarly, with respect to the building, the specification of FACS ’s recommendations for replacement of attic insulation and cleaning only as to specified ar eas of the home, together with the estimate of “damages” to the building clearly reflec ted Farmers’s decision regarding the limited extent of covered loss to the building. The final paragraph on the first page of the letter, immediately below the table listing the amount that Farmers was paying plai ntiffs for the covered loss to the building, informed plaintiffs they could have any cont ractor perform “the repairs,” and left open the possibility that “[i]f for any reason the contractor indicates the Replacement Cost estimate is incorrect,” Farmer s might agree to make “additional payments” if plaintiffs
contacted Farmers “befor e the work” commenced. Plaintiffs argue that this reference to the potential for “additional payments” rendered the letter something less than an un conditional denial of their claim because it “left the door open” for them “to receive ‘additional payments.’” Although this paragraph addressed the possib ility of additional payment for the cost of remediation for the portion of plaintiffs’ claim that Farmers gr anted, i.e., cleaning of specified areas and replacement of the attic insulatio n, it did not suggest that eith er the portions of plaintiffs’ claim denied by Farmers or the portions granted would remain open for further consideration, except with re spect to the cost of remedi ation for the specifically enumerated “damages” in the portion of the claim that Farmers granted. On the second page of the letter, Farmers st ated it was informing plaintiffs that it “must partially deny the present claim.” Plain tiffs argue that the partial denial means that
the letter was not an unconditional denial. That it was not a complete denial, i.e., Farmers granted the part of plaintiffs’ claim specified on the prior page and denied the remainder, does not mean the denial was conditi onal. “Partial” and “conditional” are not synonyms, and a partial denial is not inherently conditional or equivocal.18 Furthermore, such an interpretation of th e letter would not be reasonable. It would
force insurers to choose betw een complete denial and comp lete acceptance of a claim— even if the claim were only partially me ritorious—just to term inate tolling of the limitations period. Otherwise, every insured could circumvent the limitations period by submitting a claim that was inflat ed, overbroad, or partially fa lse, or that sought payment for loss outside the scope of coverage. Such a practice would negate the purpose of the limitations period, which is “‘“to promote justice by preventing surprises through the
revival of claims that have been allowe d to slumber until evid ence has been lost, memories have faded, and witn esses have disappeared.”’” ( Prudential-LMI
, supra , 51 Cal.3d at p. 684.) “‘“[E]ven if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the peri od of limitation . . . .”’” ( Ibid. ) The next portion of the Apr il 13, 2013 letter advised pl aintiffs how to contact the Department of Insurance if they “believe[d] the decision in this matter [was] incorrect.” (Italics added.) After setting forth the lim itations provision and addressing tolling, the letter advised plaintiffs, “If you are in posse ssion of any additional or different factual information that you believe would affect this decision , please notify us immediately.” (Italics added.) The letter’s references to “the decision in this matter” and “this decision” underscore finality. The second quoted senten ce clearly suggests that, unless plaintiffs provided Farmers with “additional or different factual information” than that already reviewed by Farmers, Farmer s would not further consider plaintiffs’ claim. “The extension of a courtesy, to look at anything else that plaintiffs might have to offer, did not render the denial equivocal.” ( Singh
, supra , 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 143.)
In addition to the letter’s use of word s and phrases affirmatively conveying the finality of Farmers’s decision, it is significant that nothing in the letter suggests that any aspect of plaintiffs’ claim, as to either the contents or the building, was to remain open for further assessment as additional damages, if any, accrued. Nor does any of its language suggest that the letter was merely a tentative or partial evaluation of plaintiffs’
claim or that Farmers was still i nvestigating or consid ering any aspect of plaintiffs’ claim.19 The key fact in Farmer’s separate statement of undisp uted facts pertaining to the duration of the tolling was undi sputed fact No. 17: “On April 13, 2010, based on the totality of FIE’s investigation, including the FACS Inspection Report, Plaintiff(s) were
advised that the Claim was being partially denied.” In attempting to raise a triable issue with respect to this fact, plaintiffs responded: “Defendant never sent a letter to Plaintiff, Anna Jangozian. The letter was sent to Plaintiff, Vartan Jangozian, was not in Armeni an; does not state it contains final results; does not state specifically and clearly any time limit applicable to both Plaintiffs; does not state any calculation of the one year period and indicates that Pl aintiffs should begin repairs. It does not indicate a full, final deci sion or closure of Plai ntiffs’ claim, and in fact, assures Plaintiff that the claim is s till open, and while bei ng processed ‘the time spent . . . processing the claim does not count toward the one year period.’ Defendant’s Exhibit ‘L.’ [A copy of th e second amended complaint.] Although the letter uses the term ‘partially denied,’ it requi res Plaintiffs to read Defe ndant FACS’ ‘expert’ report and does not state what ‘part’ has actually been ‘d enied.’ Plaintiffs did not understand that any part of their claim was denied. Dec. of Vartan Jangozian, ¶ 10; Dec. of Anna Jangozian, ¶10; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit ‘D.’” Paragraph 10 of Vartan Ja ngozian’s declaration stated, “Defendant’s April 13, 2010, letter was not in Armenian; was not addr essed to my wife; did not state my claim was closed; advised me to begin repairs; and disputed damage to our personal belongings.” Paragraph 10 of Anna Jangozian’s declar ation stated, “Defendant’s April 13, 2010, letter was not addressed or sent to me , and was not in Armenian. At no time did Defendant advise me that a one year time limit applied to my claim.”
We conclude that none of this “evidence” creates a triable issue of material fact. The very language of the April 13, 2010 letter belies plaintiffs’ assertion that it “does not state specifically and clearly any time limit applicable to both Pl aintiffs.” To the contrary, the fourth through sixth paragraphs on the second page of the letter expressly20 set forth the one-year limitations period and in form plaintiffs where to find the provision in the policy. Plaintiffs’ similarly misstate the evidence wh en they assert that the April 13, 2010
letter failed to inform them as to what part of their clai m was being denied. The letter states clearly that plaintiffs’ contents clai ms were being denied and reinforces that decision in a table indicating “$0.00” in every box regarding plaintiffs’ “Contents” claim. The letter also describes what portion of plai ntiffs’ claims regarding the “Building” was being granted, to wit, the letter’s description of remediation regarding clean-up to certain designated portions of the building an d replacement of attic insulation.
The fact that the letter was not addresse d separately to Anna Jangozian is not material, or even disputed. The terms of the policy required both the named insured, Vartan Jangozian, and his spouse, Anna Jangozian, to “comply with all policy conditions,” one of which was th e limitations period. Accord ingly, the limitations period applied to both plaintiffs. Pl aintiffs cite no authority requir ing Farmers to specify in its letter that the limitations period applied to A nna Jangozian or to include her name on the
letter. We further observe that plaintiffs’ de clarations submitted in support of their opposition to Farmers’s summary judgment motion stated th at they both lived in the insured property. As far as the record reveals, plainti ffs submitted a single claim for damages to the property fro m the wildfire. They did not submit a claim for loss attributable exclusively to Anna Jangozian. Plaintiffs were in communication with one another about the status of their claim, as illustrated by Anna Jangozian’s deposition testimony regarding Vartan Jangozian’s stat ement upon receiving the check enclosed with the April 13, 2010 letter. Similarly, plaintiffs cite no authority re quiring Farmers to communicate with them in Armenian. We observe again that both their declarations are in English and not accompanied by any certification from an Armenian interpreter.
Plaintiffs also cited to exhibit D in responding to Farmers’s undisputed fact No. 17. Exhibit D is an excerpt from Vartan Jangozian’s deposition, in which he states21 that he read a sentence in the June 14, 2010 letter to mean that he had one year from the
date of that letter within whic h to file the instant case. That sentence reads: “As the claim is now closed, any and all tolling of the one-year period ceas es as of the date of this
letter.” Plaintiffs make the same argument on appeal to argue that the April 13, 2010 letter was not an unequivocal denial. We conclude that this interpretation of the June 14, 2010 letter is not reasonable, and takes the quoted sentence entirely out of the context of the remaining language in the June 14, 2010 letter. The June 14, 2010 le tter states, “The claim result based on and including the hygienist reports from Fore nsic Analytical wa s provided in our correspondence of April 13, 2010 at which time we closed our file .” (Italics added.) The sentence immediately preceding the sentence discussed in the Vartan Jangozian deposition states that “the time spent by th e insurer investigating and processing the claim does not count toward the one-year pe riod within which a la wsuit regarding the
loss must be commenced.” Cl early, the reference to cessation of “tolling” in the next sentence references the period during which Farmers was, as stated in the same letter, “re-evaluat[ing]” plaintiffs’ claim after it wa s closed on April 13, 2010 and plaintiffs
submitted new information in thei r June 1, 2010 letter. As se t forth above, an insured’s submission of additional evidence, even at the insurer’s invitation, does not render a previous denial equivocal. ( Singh
, supra , 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 145 [“[B]eginning a new period of equitable tolling based merely on a request for reconsideration would be anomalous. By the simple expedient of making many requests for reconsideration, claimants could extend the one-yea r statute at will with successive periods of tolling.”].) On appeal, plaintiffs also argue that Farmers “had not cond ucted any examination
under oath” and “there was no statement th at their investigation was complete.” Plaintiffs cite no authority th at either is required for a denial to be unequivocal. An insurer need not use particular words or phras es to provide an unequivocal denial of an insured’s claim. ( Migliore
, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 605.) Si milarly, plaintiffs cite no authority supporting their argum ent in the trial court that Farmers failed to “state any calculation of the one year period” in its April 13, 2010 letter.22 For all of these reasons, we conclude th at there was no triable issue of material fact regarding the trial court’s and our interp retation of the April 13, 2010 letter as an unequivocal denial terminating the tolling peri od. The parties, however, have agreed that the limitations period was tolled from June 1, 2010, to June 14, 2010, while Farmers was addressing Jangozian’s June 1, 2010 lette r. We thus have no occasion to rule on whether that additional tolling was required by the case law, and accept the parties’ agreement. As the trial court set forth in its orde r granting summary ju dgment, the relevant periods for purposes of applying the one- year limitations statute and contractual provision were as follows: 172 days of the limitations pe riod elapsed from the inception of loss on August 30, 2009, until plaintiffs filed their claim on February 18, 2010; 49 days of the limitations peri od ran between April 13, 2010 , and June 1, 2010; and 186 days of the limitations period ran from June 14, 2010, until plaintiffs filed this case on December 17, 2010. Th e complaint was therefore filed 407 days after the inception of loss date, that is, 42 days late. Accordingly, all claims “on or ar ising out of” the policy
are time-barred. (3) The one-year limitations peri od barred all but plaintiffs’ Unruh
Act causes of action (a) Plaintiffs’ nonstatutory causes of action
Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for breach of contract, i.e., the insurance policy, is barred by the limitations period because it is un deniably a claim on, a nd arising out of the policy. Plaintiffs conceded in the trial cour t and in their opening brief on appeal, and we agree, that their second cause of action for bad faith would be similarly barred. Farmers asserted below and on appeal that all of plaintiffs’ other causes of action
are barred for the same reason because in th ese claims, plaintiffs are seeking policy benefits and the claims are merely a redux of plaintiffs’ bad faith claim. Plaintiffs provided no counter argument in their reply as to their nonstatutory causes of action, which are for fraud and inte ntional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs’ reply addresses only plaintiffs’ st atutory causes of action in their third and23 seventh causes of action. Ha ving been given no argument to the contrary and because we independently agree that plaintiffs’ nonstatuto ry causes of action are in essence, claims under the policy, we conclude that the tria l court did not err in summarily adjudicating plaintiffs’ nonstatutory causes of action in favor of Farmers. (b) Plaintiffs’ statutory causes of action Plaintiffs allege in their seventh cause of action violations of the Unruh Act; that cause of action also incorporated all preceding allegations. In particular, plaintiffs allege violations of Civil Code sections 51, 51 .5, and 51.7, in that Farmers “failed to completely, accurately, properly and timely adjust plaintiffs claim, failed to undertake any reasonable claims process, claims hand ling and the evaluation of plaintiffs’ losses and damages,” “engaged in acts and conduct of careless and reckless disregard whereby they failed to honor their contracts and covera ges as represented; failed to acknowledge their obligations and pay for plaintiff’s losses and damages; engaged in an incomplete, discriminatory, biased and in accurate delay and ev aluation of plainti ff’s benefits for losses and damages; failed to determine the exis tence and/or extent and nature of all of plaintiff’s losses and damages; further faile d to acknowledge Defe ndant’s obligation to pay for plaintiff’s losses and damages; based in part on the fact that plaintiffs are of
Armenian descent . . . .” Plaintiffs further allege that “Defe ndants have admitted th at they used and disseminated a list of attorneys and others whom the[y] reported as having presented suspect claims, those individu als in the majority were of Armenian descent with [A]rmenian surnames. Defendant s have admitted that they fla gged these claims not to be paid.” Civil Code section 51, subdivision (b) prov ides in pertinent part that all persons are entitled to “full and equal . . . services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever” irrespective of national origin. Civil Code section 51.5, subdivision (a) prohibits in part a business from discriminati ng in refusing “to buy from, contract with,24 sell to, or trade with any person” on the account of national origin. 2 Civil Code section 51.7, subdivision (a) pr ovides in part that all pers ons are entitled to be free from intimidation based on national origin. An essential element of plaintiffs’ claims under sections 51, 51.5, and 51.7 is that national origin was a “substantia l motivating reason” for the deni al of services, refusal to transact business, or intimidation. (CACI No s. 3060, 3061, 3063, a nd 3064.) The statute
of limitations for claims under the Unruh Act is either two or three years, depending respectively on whether the statutory liability “devolved from the common law” or “did not exist at common law.” (Rylaarsdam et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Statutes of Limitations (The Rutter Group 2015) ¶¶ 4: 620 to 4:646, pp. 4-74 to 4-76.) In moving for summary adjudication of pl aintiffs’ Unruh Act claims, Farmers did not address whether the two- or three-year st atute of limitations applied to plaintiffs’ Unruh Act claims. Nor did Farmers attempt to demonstrate that discrimination against Armenians was not a “substantial motivating reas on” for the partial denial of plaintiffs’ claims arising out of the St ation Fire. Farmers merely recited facts regarding the expiration of the one-year limitations period in the policy and under the Insurance Code, apparently assuming that the Unruh Act cl aims were no different from plaintiffs’
contractual claims. Apparently Farmers viewed plaintiffs ’ allegations of discrimination against Armenians as just another variation on thei r bad faith theme. To extend the musical metaphor, the Unruh Act is not just a variati on on the same melody. It is a different melody. It is precisely the alleged discrimi natory motivation for the denial of part of plaintiffs’ insurance claim that makes plaintiffs’ Unru h Act claims different from plaintiffs’ insurance policy based claims, or put differently, these claims do not arise simply out of the insurance contract.

2 Civil Code sections 51 and 51.5 ar e intended “to prohibit businesses from engaging in unreasonable, arbitrary or invidious discrimination.” ( Pizarro v. Lamb’s Players Theatre (2006) 135 Cal.A pp.4th 1171, 1174.)25 Nowhere does Farmer recognize this distin ction in its separate statement of facts, which merely repeats the history of the co rrespondence between the parties and the oneyear limitations period in th e policy and under the Insurance Code. Farmers never addressed in its motion for summary adjudica tion the above allegati ons of predetermined
denials of claims based at leas t in part on an insured’s Arme nian surname. For all these reasons, Farmers failed to meet its initial bur den in moving for summary adjudication of plaintiffs’ Unruh Act claims in their seventh cause of action, and the trial court erred in granting Farmers’s motion as to that cause of action. Plaintiffs’ third cause of action, for vi olation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, incorporated all preceding al legations, which included the breach of contract and breach of implie d covenant causes of action, but not the Unruh Act claims. Plaintiffs alleged in their third cause of ac tion, “Defendants’ acts as specifically stated herein, constitute unfair business practices which are illegal under California Business & Professions Code Section 17200 (which pr ohibits unfair competition, which includes unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business acts or practices and unfair, deceptive or untrue acts).” Plaintiffs further alleged, “As a proxi mate result of Defendants’ course of unfair and deceptive conduct Plaintiffs have been injure d as previously alleged. Plaintiffs seek all relief allowed pursuant to statute.”
Business and Professions Code section 17 200 defines unfair competition to “mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudul ent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertis ing and any act proh ibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Bu siness and Professions Code.” Although theoretically plaintiffs could have premised their unfair competition claim upon the Unruh Act violations, they did no t allege so here. In deciding a summary adjudication motion, the trial court, as ar e we, was bound by the four corners of the operative pleading. ( Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258 [the operative complaint “limits th e issues to be addressed at the motion for summary judgment”].)26 In Abari
, supra , 205 Cal.App.3d at page 536, th e court concluded an “unfair practices” claim was “a tran sparent attempt to recover on the policy ,” and was thus subject to the contractual limita tions period. Given that plai ntiffs failed to incorporate their Unruh Act allegations, plaintiffs’ unf air business practices cause of action was nothing more than an attemp t to recover money under the policy for partial denial of plaintiffs’ claim, and it is thus time-barred. In sum, the trial court correctly summar ily adjudicated all but plaintiffs’ seventh
cause of action. As to that cause of acti on, the trial court erre d in granting Farmers’s summary adjudication motion, and thus, in granting summary judgment. (4) Waiver and estoppel to assert limitations period Plaintiffs argue that Farmers waived and is estopped from relying upon the limitations period because it “failed to clearl y and unequivocally assert an applicable time limit to [plaintiffs] in April, or on any date thereaft er,” and never communicated with Anna Jangozian. As previous ly addressed in this opinion, these arguments do not create a triable issue of material fact on the theory of either waiver or estoppel. Farmers consistently asserted the limitations period and plaintiffs proffe red no facts supporting estoppel. Because we reverse the entry of su mmary judgment with respect to the Jangozians, we need not address their cont ention that the trial court erred by denying
their motion to tax costs.
THE POGOSSIANS’ CASE
BACKGROUND On October 20, 2010, Simon and Gegouie Pogossian filed their original complaint, seeking damages against Mid-Century Insura nce Company (Mid-Centu ry) and others on several theories following denial of their insurance claim for ash and smoke damage to
their Sherman Oaks home from the Station Fire. After plaintiffs made a claim under their homeowners policy, Mid-Century engaged hygienist Clark Seif Clark, Inc., to evaluate the damage to plaintiffs’ home. Clark Seif Clark recommended that certain parts of the home be cleaned, and Mid-Century obtained an estimate for the work that was less than27 the plaintiffs’ deductible. Accordingly, Mid- Century denied the claim. Plaintiffs, like the Jangozians, hired Safeguard and Patters on to evaluate the damage and cost of remediation, and submitted their reports to Mid-Century, which stood by its denial. The operative first amended complaint asserted the fo llowing causes of action against Mid-Century: breach of contract; br each of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200; intentional infliction of emotional distress; fraud; ne gligent misrepresentation; concealment; and
violation of Civil Code section 51.5 et seq. Ultimately, as addressed later in this opi nion, the trial court granted Mid-Century’s motion for terminating sanctions for failure repeatedly to comply with the court’s discovery orders, and entered judgment against plaintiffs.
DISCUSSION 1. Propriety of overruling de murrer to Mid-Century’s answer to first amended complaint Mid-Century served and filed its answ er to the first amended complaint on September 30, 2011. Plaintiffs filed a demurre r to that answer on October 12, 2011. The
trial court heard the demurrer on November 17, 2011, and overruled it, noting it was untimely because the demurrer was served and f iled more than 10 da ys after Mid-Century
served its answer.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by overruling their demurrer because Mid-Century pleaded insufficient facts to support their affirmative defenses.
A demurrer to an answer must be filed w ithin 10 days after service of the answer. (§ 430.40, subd. (b).) Plai ntiffs’ demurrer to Mid-Century’s answer was filed on a Wednesday, 12 days after service of the answe r, with at most a one-d ay extension due to a holiday. The trial court did not err by overruling plaintiffs’ untimely demurrer. 2. Propriety of denying motion for protective order re discovery In August of 2011, Mid- Century served several type s of written discovery on plaintiffs, including 142 special interrogato ries to Simon Pogossian and 126 special interrogatories to Gegouie Pogossian. The sp ecial interrogatories were accompanied by28 declarations of an attorney representing Mid-Century that stated that the number of interrogatories propounded was “warra nted under section 2030.050 of the Code of Civil
Procedure because there are extensive factual and legal issues presented by the Complaint, on file herein, and the instant set of specially pr epared interrogatories are the most expedient method of obtaining the necessary information to en able the propounding party to conduct an adequate investigation into the claims presented herein.” The declarations also stated, “Non e of the interrogatories in th is set is being propounded for any improper purpose, such as to harass the party, or attorney for the party, to whom it is directed, or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” Plaintiffs filed a motion for a protectiv e order with respect to the special interrogatories and requests for admissions and production of doc uments. Mid-Century opposed the motion on several grounds, incl uding that (1) plaintiffs had not made an attempt to meet and confer regarding any of the discovery other than the special interrogatories, and with respec t to the special interrogatori es, their ultimatum that the interrogatories be withdrawn did not constitute a reasonable and good faith attempt to meet and confer; (2) the bulk of the special interrogatori es was four-part contention interrogatories; and (3) the number of specia l interrogatories was justified by the length of the operative complaint, th e number of causes of action, and the complex and unusual nature of plaintiffs’ claims in the action. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion in its entirety on two grounds: plaintiffs had made inadequate efforts to meet and conf er, and “[t]he discovery at issue is valid contention discovery, propounded as the interre lated use of Requests For Admissions and Special Interrogatories. Their length flows fro m the complexity of the pleading at issue and the number of claims and parties. Legal contentions are a valid subject of contention interrogatories.” The court further noted th e case had been assigned to the Complex Civil Litigation Program along with other Station Fire cases. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the tria l court abused its discretion with respect to the special interrogatories only. Plaintiffs argue that Mid-Century “failed to justify the number of interrogatories serv ed in its Opposition to Appe llants’ motion,” and the trial29 court “simply rubber stamped the discovery” and “did not consider the merits of this one case, but simply viewed it as complex by virtue of its in clusion in the Complex Civil Litigation Program.” a. Pertinent legal principles Section 2030.030, subdiv ision (a)(1) permits a party to propound 35 special interrogatories relevant to the subject matter of the pending action. “Subject to the right of the responding party to seek a protective order under Section 2030.090, any party who attaches a supporting declaration as descri bed in Section 2030.050 may propound a greater number of specially prepared interro gatories to another party if this greater
number is warranted because of any of the following: [¶] (1) The complexity or the quantity of the existing and poten tial issues in the particular case. [¶] (2) The financial burden on a party entailed in conducting the di scovery by oral deposition. [¶] (3) The expedience of using this me thod of discovery to provide to the responding party the opportunity to conduct an inquiry, investigation, or search of files or records to supply the information sought.” (§ 2030.040, subd. (a )(1)–(3).) “If the responding party seeks a protective order on the ground that the numbe r of specially prepared interrogatories is unwarranted, the propounding party shall have the burden of justifying the number of these interrogatories.” ( Id. , subd. (b).)
Section 2030.090 allows the would-be re sponding party to move promptly for a protective order regarding inte rrogatories. The motion must be accompanied by “a meet and confer declaration” showing that the mo ving party made a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve the issues out of court. (§§ 2030.090, subd. (a), 2016.040.) “The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other natural pe rson or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (§ 2030.090, subd. (b).) Discovery orders, including orders grantin g or denying a motion for a protective order regarding discovery, are review ed for abuse of discretion. ( Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal. 4th 725, 733; People ex rel. Harris v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552.) “A determination of whether an attempt at30 informal resolution is adequate also involves the exercise of discretion. The level of
effort at informal resolution which satisfi es the ‘reasonable and good faith attempt’ standard depends upon the circum stances. In a larger, more complex discovery context, a greater effort at informal resolution may be warranted. In a simpler, or more narrowly focused case, a more modest effort may suffice . The history of the litigation, the nature of the interaction between counsel, the natu re of the issues, the type and scope of discovery requested, the prospects for success and other similar factors can be relevant. Judges have broad powers and responsib ilities to determine what measures and procedures are appropriate in varying circumstances.” ( Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)
b. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denyin g the motion for a protective order (1) Inadequate meet and confer
Plaintiffs’ sole meet and confer effort before filing their motion for a protective order consisted of a brief letter dated Septem ber 1, 2011, that complained of the number of special interrogatories, characterized the number as “truly oppressive, unreasonable,” and “bad-faith discovery conduct” “not meant to garner information to assist your clients in this matter,” but “simply me ant to harass Plaintiffs.” The letter continued, “I therefore, request that you withdraw the current sets of Special Interrogatories and re-draft and limit same to just what you will need. Absent sa me, we intend to file a Motion for Protective Order. [¶] Please advise no la ter than 4 p.m. tomorrow, September 2, 2011 whether you
will do so.” Mid-Century responded by plaintiffs’ deadline, and explained that “each interrogatory is based on specific contentions made by and/or on behalf of plaintiffs in the Second [ sic ] Amended Complaint. These are cont ention interrogatories and as such are generally separated into groups of four in terrogatories, to wit, a separate interrogatory inquiring whether the responding party is maki ng a contention as to some allegation in the complaint, and if so, to identify the facts, documents, and persons that support the
contention.”31 Mid-Century noted the plaintiffs had a lleged many types of improper conduct, including, “claims handling bias based on Plaintiffs’ ethnicity , improper claims handling,
medical issues for certain individuals created by defendants’ conduct, the proper parties to the insurance contract, [and] represen tations made at the time the policy was procured.” It explained: “If Plainti ffs are no longer making any of the various contentions set forth in the speci ally prepared interrogatories, a simple answer of ‘no’ is required and the three questions that follow would be inapplicab le. However, if Plaintiffs
continue to make these conten tions, then the interrogatories will ‘garner information to assist [our] clients in th is matter’ and defendant is entitled to know what facts, documents, and persons Plaintiffs claim support these various co ntentions.” Plaintiffs did not respond to Mid-Century’s letter. Given plaintiffs’ 102-paragraph first ame nded complaint pleading eight causes of action, with damage allegedly suffered not only by the two named plaintiffs but also by their nonparty mother and son, we cannot conc lude the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that plaintiffs’ c onclusory ultimatum did not c onstitute a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve their issues out of co urt. When writing to Mi d-Century, plaintiffs did not identify any particular interrogatories or groups of interrogatories that they believed were inappropriate, redundant, abusive, or otherwise not meant to “garner
information to assist” Mid-Century in responding to plaintiffs ’ action. Plaintiffs simply labeled the entire sets oppressive a nd unreasonable based upon the number of interrogatories, and demanded that Mid-Cent ury withdraw them. After Mid-Century’s prompt response attempting to explain why it had propounded such a large number of interrogatories, plaintiffs failed to refi ne or further explain their concerns. “A reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution” “requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.” ( Townsend v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431 , 1439.) For all of these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discre tion by concluding plaintiffs were required to make a greater effort at informal resolution.32 (2) Lack of good cause for protective order After reviewing Mid-Century’s special inte rrogatories in light of the first amended complaint, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate good cause for a protective order. Many of the interrogatories propounded to Gegouie Pogossi an were identical to those propounded to Simon Pogossian. For example, interrogatories 1 through 8 were identical for each, as were interrogatories 20 for Simon Pogossian and 9 for Gegouie Pogossian, 48 for Simon Pogossian and 10 for Gegouie Pogossian, 53 through 64 for Simon Pogossian and 11 through 22 for Gegouie Pogossian , 73 through 76 for Simon Po gossian and 25 through 28 for Gegouie Pogossian, 78 th rough 89 for Simon Pogossian and 65 through 75 for Gegouie Pogossian, 92 through 94 for Simon Pogossian and 77 thro ugh 79 for Gegouie Pogossian, 105 through 109 for Simon Pogo ssian and 80 through 84 for Gegouie Pogossian, 114 through 125 for Simon Pogo ssian and 89 through 101 for Gegouie Pogossian, and 126 through 142 for Simon Pogossian and 106 through 122 for Gegouie Pogossian. The burden upon each plaintiff and th eir attorney was thus not as great as the sheer number of special interrogatories might suggest, because th e responses to the identical interrogatories to each plaintiff we re likely to share strong similarities, or, perhaps, be identical. Furthermore, as Mid-Century and the trial court noted, most of the interrogatories were contention interrogatories addressing specific allegations in the lengthy operative complaint and seeking inform ation expressly permitted by the discovery statutes: “An interrogatory may relate to whether another pa rty is making a certain contention, or to the facts, witnesses, and writings on which a contention is based.” (§ 2 030.010, subd. (b).) As the trial court also observed, the number of interrogatories “flows from the complexity of the pleading at issue and the nu mber of claims and parties.” Plaintiffs did not simply allege breach of contract and breach of implied covenant claims based upon Mid-Century’s failure to pa y their claim. They instead named both Mid-Century and Farmers Group Inc. as defe ndants. They alleged that both defendants issued the policy; misrepresent ed their intent to pay covere d losses for ash and soot from33 a wildfire and other matters; concealed their in tent not to pay for covered losses and other matters; inadequately investigated their cl aim; and improperly denied their claim pursuant to “a plan to deny all claims such as Plaintiffs[’],” based upon “a list of attorneys and insureds whose claims they had predetermine d were ‘suspect’ and would not pay” because the at torneys and insureds had “‘foreig n’ surnames, predominantly of Armenian derivation.” Plaintiffs also allege d that residents of their home not named as parties became ill as a result of the soot, ash, and odor that permea ted plaintiffs’ home. They alleged eight causes of action, includin g violations of the Unruh Act and Business
and Professions Code section 17200. Th e number of special interrogatories was proportional to the number a nd complexity of plaintiffs’ theories of Mid-Century’s wrongdoing and the length of the operative pleading. In addition, as Mid-Century asserted, most of the special inte rrogatories to each plaintiff fell into groups of three or four asking whether a specific contention was made, and if so, seeking the facts supporting that co ntention, plus identif ication of supporting witnesses and documents. For example, inte rrogatory No. 57 to Simon Pogossian stated,
“Do YOU contend that the SUBJECT PROPERTY sustained covered direct physical loss on or about August 26, 2009, as alleged in ¶26 of YOUR COMPLAINT?” Interrogatory No. 58 to Simon Pogossian stated, “If YOU contend that the SUBJECT PROPERTY sustained covered direct physical loss on or ab out August 26, 2009, please state all facts upon which YOU base YOUR contention.” In terrogatory No. 59 to Simon Pogossian stated, “If YOU contend that the SUBJEC T PROPERTY sustained covered direct physical loss on or about August 26, 2 009, then IDENTIFY all PERSONS with knowledge of the fact s upon which YOU base YOUR cont ention.” Interrogatory No. 60 to Simon Pogossian stated, ““If YOU conten d that the SUBJECT PROPERTY sustained covered direct physical loss on or abou t August 26, 2009, then IDENTIFY all DOCUMENTS that support YOUR contention.” Thus, the number of topics addressed by the special interrogatories wa s less than the number of interr ogatories, and if plaintiffs did not make a particular cont ention addressed by the first part of each such set of34 interrogatories, they did not ha ve to respond to the other tw o or three interrogatories in the same group seeking supporting facts and identification of witn esses and documents. Plaintiffs argue, as they did in the tria l court, that the sec tion 2030.050 supporting declarations by defense counsel accompanyi ng Mid-Century’s special interrogatories were deficient because they “failed to st ate any reasons why the factors [in section 2030.050] relied upon were app licable to this lawsuit.” The declarations accurately stated that the operative comp laint presented “extensive factual and legal issues.” The trial court’s implicit conclusion that the special interrogatori es were an expedient method of obtaining the information was not arb itrary, capricious, or patently absurd. For all of these reasons, the trial court di d not abuse its discretion in finding that plaintiffs had failed to show go od cause for a protective order. 3. Propriety of granting motions to co mpel responses to special interrogatories and further responses to requests for production In December of 2011 and January of 2 012, Mid-Century file d seven motions to compel responses and further responses to di scovery, and to deem matters admitted, all with requests for monetary sanctions. On March 19, 2012, the tr ial court granted the motions, in whole or in part, and awarded mone tary sanctions against plaintiffs and their attorneys. Only the following three motions are at issu e on appeal: motions to compel Simon Pogossian and Gegouie Pogossian to provide further responses to requests for production of documents, and a motion to compel Gegouie Pogossian to provide responses without objections to the special interrogatories addre ssed in the preceding section of this opinion. a. Motion to compel Gegoui e Pogossian to respond without objections to special interrogatories In its motion seeking responses withou t objections by Gegouie Pogossian to special interrogatories, the declaration of co unsel for Mid-Century and an attached copy of Gegouie Pogossian’s responses established that these responses were neither signed by counsel nor verified by Gegouie Pogossian. Her responses were served on October 3,35 2011, prior to the hear ing on plaintiffs’ motion for a pr otective order, but no additional responses were served after the tria l court denied the protective order. Mid-Century argued that the responses were ineffective because they were not entirely objections, yet were not verified, an d because plaintiffs’ counsel did not sign them. Mid-Century further argued that Ge gouie Pogossian waived all objections by failing to serve effective responses and asked the court to order her to respond without objections. In opposition to the motion, plaintiffs’ a ttorney filed a declaration stating that her assistant had inadvertently uploaded to the CaseHomePage Web site an unsigned, unverified copy of Gegouie Pogossian’s responses. Counsel attached a signed and verified copy of the responses to her declara tion. Plaintiffs argue d that Mid-Century had made an inadequate attempt to meet and confer, and sought sanctions for having to oppose the motion. The trial court granted the motion and ordered Gegouie Pogossian to provide verified responses without obje ctions. Its minute order explai ned: “Unverified responses are no responses unless the response is entirel y objections (which is almost always bad practice). The October 3, 2011 , responses at issue here were unverified when the motion was brought. While advance consultation be fore a motion is brought for lack of verification (or lack of any obj ections or other form of resp onse) is professionally proper, it is not required. (In fact, an effort atadvance notice was pr ovided on December 9, 2011.) The Court on November 1, 2011, deni ed plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order which would have relieved them of the obliga tion to respond to these interrogatories (to which the October 3 version of a purported response had already been supplied) and ordered plaintiffs to respond by December 1, 2011. No fu rther responses, verified or otherwise were provided, and no new objec tions were tendered by counsel by the courtset deadline.”
The court continued: “Plaintiffs’ counsel in response has now pled clerical error by her assistant and belatedly proffered signed and verified versions of the October 3, 2011, response, but no response sp ecific to this Court’s November 1, 2011, order. When36 presented on October 3, 2011, as unsigned obj ections, the objections were not effective. When given a chance to comply with th e Court’s November 1, 2011, order by providing new and complete initial responses on th e extended, court-ordered due date of December 1, 2011, plaintiffs did nothing in re sponse, either to rest ate objections with an attorney signature or to provide adequate responses. The Court has reviewed the October 3, 2011, objections and finds them boiler-plate and without merit and denies the request in the opposition to this motion to accept the untim ely proffer of the attorney signature to the October 3, 2011 [responses] as effective to preserve those responses. [¶] Accordingly, the time to object to these interrogatories has expired without any proper objections having been made, an d plaintiff is now ordered to provide verified responses without objection by March 29, 2012.” Plaintiff Gegouie Pogossian contends that the trial court “abused its discretion in granting the motions [ sic ] to compel further [ sic ] responses to special interrogatories” because it “completely ignored valid case law th at holds objections are proper despite the lack of a verification for any substantiv e responses served with the objections.” (1) Pertinent legal principles Section 2030.250, subdivision (a) provides, “The party to whom the interrogatories are directed shall sign th e response under oath unless the response contains only objections.” Section 2030.250, subdivision (c) requires the attorney for the responding party to “si gn any responses that contain an objection.” Unsworn responses “are tantamount to no responses at all.” ( Zorro Inv. Co. v. Great Pacific Securities Corp. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 907, 914.) Failure to serve a timely re sponse to interrogatories re sults in a waiver of “any objection to the interrogatories, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product.” (§ 2030.290, subd. (a).) Th e propounding party may move for an order compelling responses. ( Id. , subd. (b).) (2) The trial court did not abuse its discretion The sole basis upon which plaintiff cha llenges the trial court’s ruling on the motion to compel responses to the special in terrogatories ignores the court’s actual37 explanation for its ruling. Plaintiff’s October 3, 2011 responses were ineffective not just because they were unverified, but also becaus e they had not been si gned by counsel. The verification was required because plainti ff provided a substantive response to interrogatories 80 through 92. Counsel’s si gnature was required because her responses principally consisted of objecti ons. As the trial court noted, plaintiff had a second chance to serve signed and verified responses after the court established a new deadline when it denied the motion for a protective order, but plaintiff did not take advantage of that opportunity. Under these facts, the court did not abuse its discretion by granting the motion and compelling plaintiff to respond to the interrogatories without objections. b. Motions to compel further re sponses to requests for production Mid-Century’s separate motions to co mpel each plaintiff to provide further responses to its requests for production of do cuments were substantially the same. In pertinent part, the motions argued that mo st of the responses were inadequate and improper because they simply stated objections and the following: “See documents produced in response to Clark Seif Clark In c.’s Request for Identification and Production served September 12, 2011.” Clark Seif Cl ark was represented by a different law firm and, according to the motions, specified di fferent categories of documents in their requests for production. Mid-Century argued that plaintiffs must produce the responsive documents, labeled and organized to correspo nd to the categories Mid-Century requested. In opposition to the motions, plainti ffs argued all nonpriv ileged documents had previously been uploaded to CaseHomePage and served on all parties in response to Clark Seif Clark’s request for identification a nd production. Plainti ffs further argued that defense counsel’s lengthy, detailed letter was an insufficient attempt to meet and confer because “[o]ne letter by defense counsel . . . does not constitute a proper meet and confer.” Plaintiffs also sought sancti ons for having to re spond to the motions. The court granted the motions with respect to each plai ntiff. The court’s minute order explained that the objections asserted to almost all of the requests were “boilerplate.” The court continued: “This is not good-faith compliance with discovery by plaintiffs or their counsel. [¶] Accordingl y, further responses without the assertion of38 these objections are ordered by March 29, 2012, with any associated additional documents not already produced and associat ed privilege log prod uced by the same deadline. The response n eeds to identify by Bates numbe r the documents previously produced which respond to each specific demand or else the originals of the responsive documents need to be produce d for inspection in the form in which they are routinely kept.”
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering them to “identify documents that had previously be en produced by Bates numbers, and specify
which demand each document co rresponded to.” They ar gue they had previously “produced all responsive documents in the ma nner in which they kept them, and even
attached labels to each category of document, i.e. , correspondence, damage s, etc., so that they could be easily identified. None of the documents previously produced by [plaintiffs] were Bates numbere d, thus it was impossible for [plaintiffs] to comply with the Trial Court’s Order to identify said documents by Bates number. The Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered [plaintiffs] to do mo re than the code requires.” (1) Pertinent legal principles Section 2031.210, subdivis ion (a) provides: “The party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the follo wing: [¶] (1) A stat ement that the party will comply with the particular demand for in spection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testi ng, or sampling pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031 .030 and any related activities. [¶] (2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item. [¶] (3 ) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, te sting, or sampling.” Responsive documents are to be produced on the date specified in the demand either as they are kept in the usual course of business or organized and labele d to correspond with the categories in the demand. (§ 2031.280, subds. (a), (b).)39 The demanding party may move for an or der compelling further responses if it considers a statement of compliance with an y demand to be incomplete, an objection in any response to be too general or without mer it, or a representation of inability to comply to be inadequate, incomplete, or evas ive. (§ 2031.310, subd. (a)(1)–(3).) (2) The trial court did not abuse its discretion Plaintiffs’ repeated directions in thei r responses to Mid-Century’s requests for production to “See documents produced in resp onse to Clark Seif Clark Inc’s Request for
Identification and Production se rved September 12, 2011” were neither a statement that plaintiffs would comply with the demand nor a representation that they lack ed the ability to comply with the demand. Moreover, plain tiffs apparently did not produce responsive documents for inspection, copying, etc. as re quired by the requests. They therefore had not properly responded to or complie d with the requests for production. Plaintiffs’ sole argument on appeal i gnores the court’s actual ruling, which permitted plaintiffs to either “identify by Bates number the documents previously produced which respond to each specific demand or else the originals of the responsive documents need to be produce d for inspection in the form in which they are routinely kept.” (Italics added .) The court did not require plaintiffs to identify the responsive documents by Bates stamp numbers, but merely pe rmitted them to do so as an alternative to complying with the request for production as required by section 2031.280, subdivisions (a) and (b). The court did not abuse its discretion by granting plaintiffs a potentially less burdensome alternative. 4. Propriety of trial court’s order granting Mid-Century’s motion for terminating sanctions
a. Conduct after court’s first orde rs compelling responses and further

responses Plaintiffs did not provide Mid-Century with responses or fu rther responses as ordered by the trial court on March 19, 2012. On November 15, 2012, plaintiffs entered into a stipulation with Mid-Century ackn owledging they had not complied with the court’s orders, and agreeing to provide resp onses without objections and in accordance40 with the court’s March 19, 2012 rulings by noon on November 21, 2012, for special interrogatories and form interrogatory No . 17.1, and by the close of business on December 19, 2012, for requests for producti on of documents and form interrogatory No. 50.1. The trial court signed an order reflecting the terms of the stipulation. Plaintiffs provided further responses in late November and early December of 2012, but Mid-Century found th em inadequate. For example, each plaintiff’s responses to request for production lumped numerous cate gories together and continued to refer to documents produced for Clark Seif Clark, vague ly describing the nature of some, e.g., “photos taken by Defendants and CSC.” Mid-Ce ntury attempted to meet and confer with plaintiffs, but plaintiffs did not respond. b. Second round of motions to compel Mid-Century filed motions to compel fu rther responses by each plaintiff to requests for production and special interroga tories and further responses to form interrogatory No. 17.1 by Simon Pogossian, a total of five motions. Plaintiffs opposed the motions, but the court struckthe oppositions to the motions pertaining to the special interrogatories and form inte rrogatory on the ground they we re untimely filed and served. On March 18, 2013, the court granted all fi ve motions, ordered plaintiffs to serve further responses by March 30, 2013, and also to file their supplemental responses with the court. It also imposed monetary sanctions against plaintiffs and their attorney. With respect to the requests for production, th e court noted it had previously expressly overruled plaintiffs’ attorney-client and work product privilege objections, explained that medical records of plaintiff a nd her son and mother “remain re levant to the issues pled and warned plaintiffs “respons ive documents are to be pr oduced or the plaintiff’s damages proof of physical a nd emotional distress damages will be precluded at time of trial.” With respect to the special interrogatories, the tria l court noted plaintiffs had waived their work product and atto rney-client privilege objections. Plaintiffs did not serve or file any further responses, pay the sanctions, or communicate with Mid-Century’s attorneys.41 c. Motion for terminating sanction s for noncompliance with court’s second order compelling further responses On April 5, 2013, Mid-Century filed a mo tion for terminating sa nctions or, in the alternative, for issue or evid entiary sanctions. Plaintiffs filed no opposition to the motion. At the April 30, 2013 hearing on the moti on, plaintiffs’ counsel asserted she was
unaware of the motion until the prior afternoon. She suggested that her assistant may not have docketed and printed the motion, but she had not yet spoken to the assistant. She asked for “at least a few days to make th e appropriate 473 application” based upon surprise, but said that if the court would not allow her that, she would submit on the tentative ruling. Mid-Century’s counsel informed the cour t that on April 5, 2013, the motion had been served by uploading it to CaseHomePage and taping it to the door of plaintiffs’ attorney’s office. The cour t noted that the motion had two proofs of service, with one reflecting personal delivery. Plaintiffs’ a ttorney informed the court that only one assistant was in her office on April 5, 2013, and the office door was locked. The court concluded that the motion was properly served and declined to postpo ne the hearing. It stated, “In inviting argument today, the court is simply trying to sh ow respect in allowing the maximum due process possible. But there should have been written opposition timely.” The court adopted the tent ative ruling and granted the motion.
The court’s minute order set forth the follo wing explanation of the ruling: “The two named plaintiffs filed this case October 20, 2010. In March of 2011, it was first set for trial on February 6, 2012. On November 1, 2011, the Court heard cross-motions by plaintiffs for a protective order limiting discovery and from defendant for a trial
continuance so that n eeded discovery could be obtained ; all of plaintiffs’ motions to avoid providing discovery were denied and the defense motion for a trial continuance was granted with a new trial date of June 4, 2012, set. On January 9, 2012, in response to a request by defendant for a trial continua nce so it could get a ruling on its motion to compel plaintiffs to provide fu rther discovery responses, the trial date of June 4, 2012, was vacated. On November 2, 2012, trial of [plaintiffs’] case was set for March 18,42 2013. At the joint request of the parties by written stipulation that trial date was further continued to April 9, 2013. On February 13, 2013, at a motion hearing on a summary adjudication hearing involving the Jangoz ian co-plaintiffs, the Poggosian’s [ sic ] April 9
trial date was vacated. On Marc h 20, 2013, the current trial date of June 3, 2013 was set. [¶] The above summary shows that this ca se has been pending a long time and that problems with getting responses from plainti ff have been a major reason why the trial has been continued multiple times from its original date, which was over 14 months ago to the current trial date, which is less than five weeks away.”
The court continued: “The instant motion shows (a) that defendant first sought the discovery at issue over 21 months ago, (b ) that defendant obtained a court order on March 19, 2012, to provide further responses , (c) that a follow-up motion to compel adequate responses to the same demands was heard and granted on March 18, 2013, with a compliance date of March 30, 2013, and (d) that nothing has been proffered as of the motion’s filing date (April 5, 2013) as attemp ted compliance with the Court’s order. No opposition had been filed, on time (i.e. by April 17, 2013) or otherwise. A review of the
electronic service records for this case on th e court-approved electronic service provider (CaseHomePage)’s webpage shows no attemp t to serve further responses and no purported service of any Op position to this motion. “The discovery at issue touches on plain tiffs’ claims for damages as well as their basis for asserting that defendants have liab ility. As is obvious by 66 separate topics on which moving party seeks issue sanctions a nd the 41 separate topics on which moving party seeks evidentiary sanctions, the practical effect of granting the ‘alternative’ remedy of issue and/or evidentiary sanctions is to put plaintiffs’ case in the same terminal
condition as would ha ppen if terminating sancti ons were granted straight up, as sought in the motion papers. Mindful of plaintiffs’ continuing failure to attend to their basic duties as litigants, the imminence of the much continued trial date , the failure to provide any account (plausible or otherwise) for the failure to supply the court-or dered discovery and failure to even try to oppose the motion, the Court determin es in the exercise of its discretion that the requested remedy of term inating sanctions is appropriate. Since43 terminating sanctions are being imposed, th e Court sees no need to add monetary
sanctions for the cost of brin ging the motion to the tab. Fi nality of case closure is a sufficient response to the problem presented.”
Plaintiffs did not file a motion se eking relief pursuant to section 473, subdivision (b). The court later en tered judgment against plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs contend the trial court abus ed its discretion by granting terminating sanctions. They argue Mid-Century’s motion was filed after the March 18, 2013 discovery cutoff, the trial court should have granted a short continuance of the motion pursuant to section 473, and the order granti ng terminating sanctions placed Mid-Century “in a far better position than it would have be en had the ‘discovery been provided and
been favorable.’” d. Pertinent legal principles
Section 2023.030 authorizes a range of penalties, incl uding terminating sanctions, for misuse of the discovery process. Misuse s of the discovery process include “[f]ailing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of di scovery”; “[m]aking, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery”; “[m]aking an evasive response to discovery”; and “[d]isobeying a court order to provide discovery.” (§ 2023.010, ¶¶ (d)–(g ).) The trial court may order a terminating sanction for discovery abuse “after considering the totality of the ci rcumstances: [the] conduct of the party to determine if the actions were willful; the detriment to the prop ounding party; and the number of formal and informal attemp ts to obtain the discovery.” ( Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246 ( Lang ).) An order imposing “terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less se vere sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing th e ultimate sanction.” ( Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 262, 279–280.)
The trial court has broad discretion to impose discovery sanctions, including terminating sanctions, and ma y be reversed “‘only for ma nifest abuse exceeding the bounds of reason.’” ( Lang , supra , 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1244.)44 e. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
As recounted herein and in the tr ial court’s minute order, Mid-Century propounded discovery to plaintiffs in August of 2011. Their response s to that discovery led Mid-Century to file motions to compel responses and further re sponses, which led to the trial court’s original orders to provide responses and further responses by March 29, 2012. The court also imposed monetary sancti ons against plaintiffs and their attorney in the amount of $6,500. Plaintiffs disobeyed the court’s order a nd did not provide responses and further responses until late November and early Dece mber 2012. Moreover, their responses did not completely comply w ith the trial court’s prior orders. For example, plaintiffs did not produce the documents responsive to Mid-Century’s requests for production or indicate by Bates stamp numbers which previously prod uced documents were responsive to each request. They instead continued to refer to documents produced for Clark Seif Clark.
Plaintiffs had been ordered to respond to special interroga tories without objections, but continued to assert objections. They also lumped a number of requests and interrogatories together with a single res ponse. Plaintiffs di d not respond to MidCentury’s meet and confer efforts. Upon motions to compel further responses , the trial court ordered plaintiffs to serve further responses by March 30, 2013, and al so file their response s with the court. The court imposed monetary sanctions of $11, 355 against plaintiffs and their attorney and warned plaintiffs of evidence or i ssue sanctions if th ey did not comply.
In disobedience of the trial court’s sec ond order and disregar d of its warnings, plaintiffs failed to serve or file any further responses. They did not oppose the motion for terminating sanctions and at no time, either at the hearing or in a subsequent motion for relief pursuant to section 473, explained th eir failure to serve and file any further discovery responses. Given plaintiffs’ disregard for the trial c ourt’s orders, with respect to both the time of compliance and the contents of the response s, plaintiffs’ repeated failures to meet and confer with Mid-Century, and their failure, when faced with termin ating sanctions, even45 to attempt to justify their disregard of the trial court’s most recent order for further responses, we cannot conclude that the tr ial court abused its discretion by granting
terminations sanctions. As stated in Laguna Auto Body v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 481 (disappr oved on another ground in Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 478, fn. 4): “Here, the jus tification for imposing discovery sanctions was based upon not one, but a multitude of violations . Where, as here, the record is replete with instances of delay and failure to comply with a court order, dismissal may be proper. Moreover, appellants had ample opportunity to present their arguments and excuses to the trial court. Instead, they failed to file opposition to . . . the dismissal motion, leading the trial court and us to presume th ey had no meritorious arguments.” ( Laguna Auto Body
, supra , 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 489.) The trial court was not required to adopt evidence or issue sanctions or again resort to monetary sanctions, which apparent ly had not been succ essful in securing plaintiffs’ compliance with the discovery statutes and trial court’s orders. “‘[T]he question before this court is not whether th e trial court should have imposed a lesser sanction; rather, the question is whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the sanction it chose.’” ( Collisson & Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1620.) Plaintiffs claim that terminating sanc tions were improper because they put MidCentury in a better position than if plaintiffs had responded to discovery. That could be said whenever terminating sanctions are awar ded because terminating sanctions save the prevailing party the burden and expense of a trial. Yet terminating sanctions are expressly authorized by section 2023.0 30, subdivision (d). The case upon which plaintiffs rely, Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 793, expressly recognized that “there is no question that a court is empowered to apply the u ltimate sanction against a litigant who persists in the ou tright refusal to comply with his discovery obligations.”
Plaintiffs did not raise below their c ontention that the mo tion for terminating sanctions violated the discovery cutoff. They thus forfeited this argument on appeal.46 ( Natkin v. California Unempl oyment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 997, 1011.) Finally, we reject plaintiffs’ contention th at the trial court abused its discretion by failing to continue the motion. Plaintiffs ar gue that the motion for terminating sanctions was unsigned and the court allowe d defense counsel to sign it. In the trial court, counsel for plaintiffs argued that a continuance woul d constitute “the same courtesy” the court had shown counsel for Mid-Century. The court responded: “Well, most of th e paperwork was signed. But the notice of
motion and motion with attached memorandum of points and authorities was signed at the end of the memorandum of points and au thorities, but the signature about the third page in from the front of what was the wrap -up of stating the motion per se had not been signed. [¶] The court followed the proced ures contemplated by the Legislature in adopting CCP section 128.7 (a) that provides ‘An unsigned pape r shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.’ [¶] And that’s what Miss Forman did when it was called to her attention yesterday here in court.” Plainti ffs never claimed their failure to oppose the motion was somehow linked to a missing signature. Plaintiffs also argue that the denial of a continuance was an abuse of discretion because taping the motion to the door of he r office was improper personal service. Plaintiffs, however, did not and do not challenge the propriety of the electronic service of the motion. Indeed, they repe atedly served documents electr onically, apparently pursuant to a case management order, and the trial court found that the motion was properly
served. 3 We find no error in that conclusion.

3 The parties routinely served motions and other documents electronically, apparently pursuant to the trial court’s orde r. Plaintiffs’ proofs of service for their motions, demurrers, oppositions, and discover y responses all reflect their use of electronic service and include the following language: “pursuant to the Court’s Electronic Case Management Order, I instituted service of the fore going document(s) . . . on the interested parties by submitt[ing] an el ectronic version of the document(s) via file transfer protocol (FTP) to CaseHomePage through the upload feature at47 Most significant, plaintiffs made neither a written motion for relief under section 473, subdivision (b), nor a sufficient showing to support such relief. In pertinent part, section 473, subdivision (b) provides: “ The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal represen tative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mi stake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application fo r this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made with in a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. . . . Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanie d by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which w ill result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal en tered against his or her client, unless the
court finds that the default or dismissal was notin fact caused by th e attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” Plaintiffs argue on appeal that they were entitled to relief under either the discretionary or mandatory prov isions of the statute. Th e mandatory provision requires “an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to hi s or her mistake, inad vertence, surprise, or neglect,” which plaintiffs’ attorney never prov ided. The discretionary provision requires a showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect and provision of “a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed.” Neither plaintiffs nor their attorney provided a declarati on or testimony establishing that their failure to file an opposition to the motion ste mmed from mistake, inadverten ce, surprise, or excusable neglect. While plaintiffs’ attorney argued that she was surprise d by the motion for

www.casehomepage.com and therefore I have se rved the document(s) in compliance with and as provided for in the Elec tronic Case Management Order.”48 terminating sanctions and suggested without know ing that her staff must be at fault, she provided no evidence on this poi nt. More important, plaintiffs did not make any claim, let alone provide any evidence, demonstrating th at their disobedience to the court’s order
to serve and file further disc overy responses by Ma rch 30, 2013, was caused by mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglec t, excusable or not. Nor did plaintiffs provide a copy of either their outstanding discovery responses or their proposed opposition to the motion for terminating sanctions. Even if plaintiffs did not have time to prepare, file, and serve a
written section 473, subdivision (b) motion with supporting documents in time for the date of the hearing on the mo tion for terminating sanctions, th ey were free to file such a motion thereafter, but did not do so. Finally, we note that plaintiffs cannot demonstrate prejudice from the trial court’s failure to grant a continuance because they ca nnot show they would have prevailed either in making a motion for relief under section 473, subdivision (b) or opposing the motion for terminating sanctions if they were allowed to file written opposition to it. We cannot speculate upon the possible contents of such motion or opposition. For all of these reasons, we conclude th e trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting Mid-Century’s motion for terminating sanctions. 5. Propriety of partially denying plaintiffs’ motion to tax costs Mid-Century filed a memorandum of co sts, seeking a total of $23,110.78, including $11,355 in unpaid sanctions that th e trial court awarded on March 18, 2013, in ruling upon the motions to comp el further discovery responses . Plaintiffs filed a motion to tax costs, seeking to eliminate these sa nctions, numerous filing fees, the costs of videotaping the Pogossians’ depositions and Armenian interpreters for those depositions,
and other costs. In its opposition to the motion to tax co sts, Mid-Century withdrew its claim for certain costs, including the unpaid sanctions, $590 in filing fees , and the cost of service of process on various news agencies. In their reply to Mid- Century’s opposition and at the hearing on the motion, plaintiffs argued that the entire cost memo randum should be struck because counsel had49 verified that the costs claimed were co rrect, yet Mid-Century had admitted in its opposition that certain items we re incorrectly included. Pl aintiffs also argued at the hearing that the filing fees for five motions to compel further resp onses included on the memorandum of costs were improper because t hose fees were included in the sanctions
that the court awarded when it granted those motions. Mid-Century was uncertain
whether the sanctions award included the fili ng fees, but agreed to concede to taxing $200 for the amount of such fees. With re spect to why it included the sanctions on the cost memorandum, Mid-Century explained it had found no case la w “one way or the
other whether or not it could be included in the cost bill. [¶] Our goal was to put all of
the costs that were owed into one judgment.” The trial court explained that sanctions co uld be collected as if the order awarding them were a judgment. It denied plaintiffs ’ motion with respect to deposition-related and service of process costs, but eliminated th e sanctions, $200 in filing fees awarded as sanctions, and $220 in filing fe es for motions or stipulati ons filed jointly by Farmers Group and Mid- Century because the dismissal of Farmers Group included a waiver of costs. The court thus allowed a total of $10,544.22 in costs.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court e rred by denying their motion to tax costs with respect to three categor ies of costs: filing fees for two separate summary adjudication motions and charges pertaining to the videotaping of, and Armenian interpretation for, the Pogossian s’ depositions. They also contend that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to strike th e entire memorandum of costs because it “was patently false,” in that it included filing fe es incurred by Farmer s Group and sanctions that the court had awarded against plaintiffs. a. Filing fee for summar y adjudication motions Mid-Century apparently filed separate motions for summary adjudication of issues. Neither motion is in the appellate reco rd, but the declaration of defense counsel in opposition to the motion to tax costs stated that the “first[m]otion . . . tested only
Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of insurance cont ract,” while the order on the second motion,50 which the court granted, reveals that it addresse d the merits of the intentional infliction of
emotional distress and Unruh Act causes of action. In its tentative ruling on plaintiffs’ mo tion to tax costs, which it adopted after hearing the motion, the court explained, “The Court also agrees with this defendant that the use of multiple motions for summary adjudication was a reasonable and necessary expense and a proper way to litigate the case.” As the trial court noted, filing fees fo r motions are a category of costs expressly
recoverable under section 1033 .5, subdivision (a)(1 ). Section 437c does not prohibit, and in fact expressly contempl ates, multiple summary adjudication motions and separate summary judgment and summa ry adjudication motions. (§ 437c, subd. (f)(2).) Substantial evidence supports the trial cour t’s conclusion that the filing fees for both
motions were recoverable. The two motions apparently were based upon disparate theories and supported by different evidence . The trial court could have reasonably concluded that their separate filing was reas onably necessary to an efficient and concise presentation of these disparate theories of su mmary adjudication. We conclude that the
court did not abuse its discretion. b. Costs of Armenian interpreters and videotaping for the Pogossians’ depositions Attached to Mid-Century’s opposition to the motion to tax costs was an e-mail from plaintiffs’ counsel to Mid-Century’s coun sel stating, in reference to the depositions of the Jangozians and the Pogossians, “Also ag ain they all need an Armenian interpreter and I again request you confirm this.” Th e declaration of counsel for Mid-Century recounts plaintiffs’ late cancellation of the deposition of Simon Pogossian on two occasions and their late notice that no interp reter would be required for the deposition of Gegouie Pogossian, which required Mid-Century to pay the interpreter service a fee of $595 for the first two cancellati ons and $795 for the third. In its tentative ruling on plaintiffs’ mo tion to tax costs, the court explained: “[T]he cost of videographers and Armenian language inte rpreters are legitimate[] and
allowable costs. So too is the cost of last -minute cancellation of an Armenian interpreter51 when the late notice was given by plaintiff (as here). Even if a witne ss is available in the jurisdiction for trial, it is prudent to videotape a deposition so that the jury can observe the demeanor at deposition of the witness, par ticularly if there is any recanting of prior admissions at trial. Likewise, when a witn ess is reasonably perceived to have limited English-language proficiency, the cost of the interpreter is a reasonable and necessary incidental expense to the proper taking of a de position so that the tr anscript and/or video image could be admissible and useful at trial.” As the trial court noted, the costs of “taking . . . necessary depositions” are expressly recoverable under se ction 1033.5, subdivision (a)(3 ). In light of plaintiffs’ demand for interpreters, as refl ected in the e-mail from plain tiffs’ counsel attached to the opposition to the motion to tax costs, plaintiffs’ a ttempt to tax the cost of the Armenian interpreters is not persuasive.
c. Failure to strike en tire cost memorandum Plaintiffs cite no authority for their contention that the trial court abused its discretion, i.e., acted arbitrarily, capriciously , or in a patently absurd manner, by taxing
the unrecoverable costs instead of striki ng the entire cost memorandum. Nor have plaintiffs demonstrated that the trial court’s failure to strike the entire cost memorandum resulted in a manifest miscarriag e of justice. The mere exis tence of a motion to tax costs contemplates that a prevailing party may seek costs that are unrecoverable and the trial court may eliminate unrecoverable costs without striking the entire cost memorandum.52 DISPOSITION With respect to B247864 (Jangozian pl aintiffs), the summary judgment and the order granting summary adjudication of the seventh cause of action are reversed; the order granting summary adjudication of the first through sixth ca uses of action is
affirmed. The matter is remande d for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each party is to bear its own costs on appeal (B247864). With respect to B250426 (Pogossian plaintiffs), the judgment is affirmed. Respondent Mid-Century Insurance Company is awarded its costs on appeal (B250426).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. BENDIX, J. *
We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

JOHNSON, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Cour t, assigned by the Ch ief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.