UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4341

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ALLEN DAVID HOLLAND,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Anderson. J. Michelle Childs, District Judge. (8:12-cr-00481-JMC-1)

Argued: May 10, 2018 Decided: June 14, 2018

Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Jonathan McKey Milling, MILLING LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. Everett Eugene McMillian, OFFICE OF THE UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Beth 

Drake, United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, Alan Lance Crick, Assistant 

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, 

South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

In this appeal, Allen David Holland challenges the district court’s imposition of 

his revocation sentence. Applying a plain error standard of review, we conclude that: (1) 

the district court did not plainly err in determining that criminal domestic violence under 

South Carolina law qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S. Sentencing Guideline 

(U.S.S.G.) § 4B1.2(a); and (2) the district court adequately explained its reasons for 

imposing a 51-month sentence. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

I.

In 2013, Holland pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846, and was sentenced to serve a term of 80 months’ 

imprisonment followed by 10 years of supervised release.1

 While on supervised release, 

Holland failed a drug screening test. Five days later, Holland was arrested for seconddegree criminal domestic violence in violation of South Carolina Code § 16-25-20(A), 

(C), after he drove his vehicle into a car driven by his pregnant girlfriend. Based on these 

two offenses, the probation officer filed a motion to revoke Holland’s supervised release. 

Holland was arrested and, after an initial hearing, was released on bond. 

About one month later, Holland was arrested for a third-degree offense of criminal 

domestic violence under South Carolina Code § 16-25-20(A), (D), after physically 

 1 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the district court later reduced Holland’s 

sentence to a term of 50 months’ imprisonment. 
3

assaulting his girlfriend. In the probation officer’s violation report, he classified 

Holland’s arrest for second-degree criminal domestic violence as a “Grade A” violation, 

and third-degree criminal domestic violence and use of illegal drugs as “Grade C” 

violations. In accordance with these classifications, the probation officer recommended a 

guidelines range of between 51 and 63 months in prison. After holding an evidentiary 

hearing, the district court concluded that Holland committed the violations as alleged, 

accepted the probation officer’s recommendation, and imposed a sentence of 51 months’ 

imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. Holland now appeals. 

II.

“A district court has broad, though not unlimited, discretion in fashioning a 

sentence upon revocation of a defendant’s term of supervised release.” United States v. 

Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 206 (4th Cir. 2017); see United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 

546-47 (4th Cir. 2010). In reviewing a revocation sentence, we initially consider whether 

the sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable.2

 United States v. Wynn, 786 

 2 If we conclude that the revocation sentence is unreasonable, we further must 

consider whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. United States v. Wynn, 786 F.3d 

339, 341 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 

2006)). Our review of supervised release revocation sentences “follow[s] generally the 

procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our review of original 

sentences, . . . with some necessary modifications to take into account the unique nature 

of supervised release revocation sentences.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39 (citation 

omitted).
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F.3d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 

2006)). 

Holland’s arguments focus exclusively on allegations of procedural error. See 

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining that issues on 

appeal presented only claims of procedural reasonableness and therefore court did not 

address substantive reasonableness). He contends that the district court committed 

procedural error by failing to calculate properly his guidelines range, and by failing to 

explain adequately the sentence imposed. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007) (describing procedural reasonableness issues). Because Holland did not raise 

these arguments before the district court, and did not otherwise request a specific 

sentence that was rejected by the court, we review the issues presented for plain error. 

United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013) (reviewing for plain error when 

defendant failed to object to court’s explanation of his revocation sentence); Lynn, 592 

F.3d at 577-79 (explaining that to preserve procedural error argument defendant must 

argue for sentence lower than the one imposed). 

Under the plain error standard, Holland must establish that: (1) there was error; (2) 

the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial rights. United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Further, any error that occurred must “seriously [have] 

affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Mindful of these principles, we turn to consider each 

of Holland’s arguments.
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A.

Holland first argues that the district court erred in calculating his sentencing 

guidelines range. According to Holland, the South Carolina offense of criminal domestic 

violence does not qualify as a “Grade A” violation under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1), because 

the offense is not a “crime of violence” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). 

Holland contends that the district court erroneously considered Holland’s actual conduct 

underlying the arrest for second-degree criminal domestic violence, rather than

conducting a categorical analysis of the elements of that offense. Holland maintains that

under the categorical approach, the offense of criminal domestic violence in any assigned 

degree does not qualify as a crime of violence. Holland therefore argues that the offense 

of criminal domestic violence qualifies only as a “Grade B” violation, which would have 

resulted in a lower guidelines range and sentence. 

We disagree with Holland’s position. Employing a categorical analysis, we hold 

that the court did not plainly err in concluding that the offense of criminal domestic 

violence qualifies as a “crime of violence.”3

 

 3 Because we review this question for plain error, we need not address directly 

whether the district court properly considered Holland’s actual conduct underlying his 

arrest for criminal domestic violence, under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1 cmt. n.1, an issue on which 

our sister circuits are not in accord. Compare United States v. Golden, 843 F.3d 1162, 

1166-67 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting use of categorical approach in analyzing supervised 

release violation sentences), United States v. Carter, 730 F.3d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2013) 

(same), and United States v. Cawley, 48 F.3d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1995) (considering actual 

conduct underlying crime), with United States v. Willis, 795 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(holding that the categorical approach should apply to determine whether a person’s 

conduct during supervised release constitutes a Grade A violation). 
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A supervised release violation is classified as a “Grade A” violation if, among 

other factors not relevant here, the violation qualifies as the commission of “a crime of 

violence.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1) & cmt. n.2 (referring to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)). Under 

the categorical approach, to constitute a “crime of violence,” the South Carolina offense 

of criminal domestic violence necessarily must have “as an element the use, attempted 

use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” (the force clause).4

 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1); see United States v. Gardner, 823 F.3d 793, 803 (4th Cir. 2016) 

(applying categorical approach with respect to force clause contained in 18 U.S.C. § 

924(e)(2)(B)(i)). 

In making this assessment, we review the elements of the offense and “the 

minimum conduct necessary for a violation” as defined by state law. Gardner, 823 F.3d 

at 803 (citation omitted). An individual commits the offense of criminal domestic 

violence under South Carolina law when he (1) causes, offers, or attempts to cause 

physical harm to a household member (2) with the apparent present ability to create a fear 

of imminent peril. State v. Golston, 732 S.E.2d 175, 178 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012) (citing 

S.C. Code § 16-25-20(A) (the criminal domestic violence statute)). 

 4 To qualify as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), the crime also 

must be punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. This condition is 

satisfied here, because second-degree criminal domestic violence is punishable by a term 

of imprisonment of up to three years. See S.C. Code § 16-25-20(C). We also observe 

that under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), a crime also could qualify as a “crime of violence” if it 

constituted one of the enumerated offenses listed in subsection (2). However, we need 

not address that subsection in this case.
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We previously have held in an unpublished opinion that all means of committing 

the South Carolina offense of criminal domestic violence, namely, causing, offering, or 

attempting to cause physical harm to the victim, as described in the criminal domestic 

violence statute, necessarily fell within the force clause. United States v. Chisolm, 579 F. 

App’x 187, 194-96 (4th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (addressing whether the offense of 

criminal domestic violence, as a lesser included offense of criminal domestic violence of 

a high and aggravated nature, qualifies as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 

§ 4B1.2(a)(1)). Focusing on the least culpable means of committing the offense of 

criminal domestic violence of “offering” to cause harm, we explained that under South 

Carolina jurisprudence, an offer of harm coupled with the present ability to inflict fear of 

imminent peril, qualifies as a “threatened use of force” under the force clause of U.S.S.G. 

§ 4B1.2(a)(1). Id. at 194-95. 

We further explained that our conclusion was supported by several decisions in 

other circuits, namely, that an offer to cause harm, as described in the South Carolina 

criminal domestic violence statute, qualifies as a threat in the context of the force clause. 

Id. (collecting cases). Recently, in two other unpublished opinions, we reaffirmed our 

holding in Chisolm that the offense of criminal domestic violence qualifies as a “crime of 

violence.” United States v. Lewis, 719 F. App’x 210, 219-20 (4th Cir. 2018) 

(unpublished) (addressing identical force clause under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)); United States v. Young, 702 F. App’x 113, 115-16 (4th Cir. 

2017) (unpublished) (addressing the force clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)). 
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Although our holdings in Chisolm, Lewis, and Young are not precedential, no other 

binding decision from the Supreme Court or this Circuit has addressed whether the South 

Carolina offense of criminal domestic violence qualifies as a crime of violence under 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Accordingly, the district court’s conclusion that the South Carolina 

offense of criminal domestic violence qualifies as a crime of violence could not constitute 

error that is plain under the standard of review that we apply in this case. See United 

States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 516 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that error is “plain” or 

“obvious” when settled law establishes that an error has occurred). 

We therefore conclude that the district court did not plainly err in categorizing 

Holland’s arrest for second-degree criminal domestic violence as a “Grade A” violation 

that qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the guidelines. Thus, the district court did 

not commit procedural error in calculating Holland’s sentencing guidelines range on this 

basis. 

B.

Holland also argues that the district court committed procedural error in imposing 

his revocation sentence by failing to articulate adequately the reasons for selecting a 51-

month sentence. We disagree.

In explaining its reasons for imposing a revocation sentence, a district court need 

not provide the same level of detail or specificity required for an initial post-conviction 

sentence. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007). Instead, the court 

need only provide a statement of reasons that permits this Court to “effectively review the 

reasonableness of the sentence.” Id.; see Slappy, 872 F.3d at 210. In determining the 
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appropriate sentence, a sentencing court should consider the defendant’s breach of trust, 

the seriousness of the underlying violation, and the defendant’s criminal history, as well 

as the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).5

 See Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207. Under the 

deferential standard of review applicable to revocation sentences, coupled with our 

review for plain error in this case, Holland bears a heavy burden to show that the district 

court’s explanation for a within-range revocation sentence was insufficient. Thompson, 

595 F.3d at 547. 

Here, although the district court’s comments in explaining the revocation sentence 

were not extremely detailed, the court’s explanation was sufficient to reveal its basis for 

the particular sentence chosen. Before imposing the revocation sentence, the district 

court analyzed Holland’s criminal history and explained that the severity of Holland’s 

Category VI criminal history constituted the primary concern for the court. The court 

also emphasized that Holland’s domestic violence offenses “jeopardized the safety of” 

his child and served as an example of Holland’s pattern of violent conduct. Finally, the 

district court specifically referenced its consideration of relevant policy and statutory

factors, observing that imposition of a 51-month sentence, which was at the low-end of 

the guidelines range, was “fair, equitable, [and] not greater than necessary to achieve the 

sentencing factors.” Therefore, we hold that the district court adequately addressed its 

 5 The policy statements regarding revocation sentences appear in the U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7A(3)(b).
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reasons for imposing Holland’s revocation sentence, and did not commit procedural error 

in this regard. 

III.

For these reasons, we hold that Holland’s revocation sentence is not unreasonable, 

and we affirm the district court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED