J-S13020-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARTIN ROUSE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1392 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 12, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No: CP-51-CR-0012569-2015

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARTIN ROUSE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1393 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 12, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No: CP-51-CR-0012570-2015

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARTIN ROUSE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1394 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 12, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No: CP-51-CR-0012571-2015
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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARTIN ROUSE 

Appellant

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:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1395 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 12, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No: CP-51-CR-0012572-2015

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARTIN ROUSE 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1396 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 12, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No: CP-51-CR-0012573-2015

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MAY 12, 2023

Martin Rouse (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing his petition 

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We 

affirm.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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CASE HISTORY

Between November 2009 and March 2013, Appellant and two coconspirators, Curtis Smith (Smith) and Dennis Holloman (Holloman),

committed a series of armed robberies and burglaries in Philadelphia.

On May 23, 2014, Philadelphia police arrested Appellant and 

charged him with numerous offenses at docket numbers CP-51-

CR-0012569-2015 (Docket 12569), CP-51-CR-0012570-2015 

(Docket 12570), CP-51-CR-0012571-2015 (Docket 12571), CP51-CR-0012572-2015 (Docket 12572), and CP-51-CR-0012573-

2015 (Docket 12573). On December 11, 2017, the trial court 

granted the Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate Appellant’s

cases.

The charges against Appellant and Holloman proceeded to a week 

and a half-long joint jury trial commencing March 5, 2018. Smith

testified as a Commonwealth witness, but denied remembering 

anything about the statement he gave police or his guilty pleas. 

Holloman testified in his defense, disavowing the statements he 

gave to police because, he maintained, the statements were made 

under duress and the police detectives’ coercion. Appellant did 

not testify, but presented one exhibit. On March 14, 2018, the 

jury found Appellant guilty of numerous offenses.

Commonwealth v. Rouse, 237 A.3d 493 (Pa. Super. May 28, 2020)

(unpublished memorandum at *1) (footnotes omitted).

The jury convicted Appellant of three counts of theft by unlawful taking 

(Dockets 12570, 12572, 12573); two counts of robbery (Dockets 12569, 

12571), conspiracy to commit robbery (Dockets 12572, 12573), receiving 

stolen property (Dockets 12569, 12571), and conspiracy to commit receiving 

stolen property (Dockets 12569, 12571); and one count of burglary (Docket 

12570), conspiracy to commit burglary (Docket 12570), and firearms not to 

be carried without a license (Docket 12573).
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Appellant timely appealed, and this Court affirmed his convictions. 

However, we remanded for resentencing because the probationary sentences 

for theft by unlawful taking should have merged with the robbery sentences. 

Id. at 6-7.

On February 22, 2021, the trial court resentenced Appellant to an 

aggregate 8 — 16 years of incarceration. Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition 

on March 1, 2021. Counsel entered his appearance for Appellant and filed an 

amended petition on October 13, 2021. The Commonwealth filed a motion to 

dismiss the petition without a hearing. The PCRA court, after “reviewing the 

petitions, the Commonwealth’s motion, and all relevant matters of record ...

determined that Appellant’s claims were meritless, did not raise any issue of 

material fact, and did not warrant an evidentiary hearing.” PCRA Court 

Opinion, 8/1/22, at 5. On April 7, 2022, the PCRA court issued notice of intent 

to dismiss the petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The PCRA court 

dismissed the petition on May 12, 2022. Appellant timely filed notices of 

appeal at each docket. This Court consolidated the cases sua sponte.

ISSUES

Appellant timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. He

presents the following issues for review:

I. Whether the Court erred in denying the Appellant’s PCRA 

petition without an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in the 

Amended PCRA petition?

II. Whether Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion 

to reconsider sentence?
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III. Whether Appellant is entitled to a new trial based on newly 

discovered evidence?

IV. Whether Appellant’s conviction should be reversed due to a 

change in the law regarding hearsay being admitted at the 

preliminary hearing?

V. Whether Appellant’s conviction should be reversed due to a 

change in the law regarding Appellant's Rule 600 motion? 

Appellant’s Brief at 8.

In his first issue, Appellant argues the PCRA court erroneously dismissed 

his petition without conducting a hearing. Appellant’s Brief at 17-19. 

Appellant claims he was entitled to a hearing to prove facts which “most 

certainly, if proven true, would entitle the Appellant to relief.” Id. at 17. 

Notably, Appellant does not identify the facts or develop this claim beyond his 

conclusory statement. See id. at 17-19.

In his second issue, Appellant argues his trial counsel “was ineffective 

for failing to [file] a post sentencing motion to reconsider sentence.” Id. at 

20. Appellant claims the error caused the Superior Court to find waiver, and 

“deprived Appellant of arguing the harsh sentence he received.” Id. at 17.

In his third issue, Appellant argues he is entitled to relief due to 

“evidence regarding misconduct of police officers ....” Id. Appellant states 

that his current counsel “received a Notice from the District Attorney’s Office 

disclosing that two police officers who were originally involved in Appellant’s 

investigation had been identified as officers who may have engaged in 

misconduct.” Id. at 22 (emphasis added). Appellant contends: “Multiple 
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police officers and detectives gave testimony inconsistent with prior records 

and other witness’ testimony. Therefore, the fact that there were officers 

involved in Appellant’s investigation who have officially been punished for 

making false statements, disclosing classified information, and threatening 

violence on people of color, is crucial information to Appellant's defense.” Id.

at 23.

In his fourth and fifth issues, Appellant asserts he is entitled to relief 

because of changes in the law regarding 1) hearsay evidence admitted at

preliminary hearings; and 2) Rule 600 motions. Appellant does not address 

retroactivity. Regarding hearsay, Appellant cites Commonwealth v. 

McClelland, 233 A.3d 717 (Pa. 2020) (holding hearsay evidence alone is not 

sufficient to establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing). However, 

Appellant fails to expand on his claim that McClelland “conflicts with the 

assessment made by the court at the Preliminary Hearing” in 2015. Id. at 

25. As to Rule 600, Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 

600 (Pa. 2021) (holding trial court may invoke “judicial delay” to deny a 

defendant’s Rule 600 motion only after the Commonwealth has demonstrated 

it complied with due diligence requirements throughout the case). Although 

Appellant recites case law, id. at 25-27, his argument is based on his general 

assertion that “the Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence.” Id. at 28.

In response to Appellant’s arguments, the Commonwealth counters that 

the PCRA court properly dismissed Appellant’s petition given the “various 
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undeveloped allegations regarding ineffective assistance of trial counsel, afterdiscovered evidence, speedy trial, and hearsay at the preliminary hearing.” 

Commonwealth Brief at 5 (stating Appellant’s “claims are meritless for the 

reasons explained in the PCRA court’s opinion.”).

APPELLATE REVIEW

We review the denial of PCRA relief “to determine whether the ruling of 

the PCRA court is supported by the record and free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Wharton, 263 A.3d 561, 567 (Pa. 2021) (citation 

omitted). We have explained:

There is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on 

a PCRA petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the 

record that no genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing 

is not necessary. To obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to 

dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that 

he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor, 

would have entitled him to relief, or that that court otherwise 

abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truthdetermining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or 

innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant 

to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim 

is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic 

basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors 

and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that 

the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

* * *
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Boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis 

and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to 

prove that counsel was ineffective.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citations omitted). It is well-settled that counsel cannot be deemed 

ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Commonwealth v.

Poplawski, 852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

Instantly, the record and law support the PCRA court’s dismissal of 

Appellant’s petition.

PCRA COURT OPINION

Like the Commonwealth, we conclude the PCRA court “aptly explains in 

its thorough opinion” why Appellant’s issues do not merit relief. 

Commonwealth Brief at 5. The Honorable Timika R. Lane, who sat as both 

the trial court and PCRA court in this case, observed that “the facts of this 

case are troubling.” PCRA Court Opinion, 8/1/22, at 9. Judge Lane capably 

addressed Appellant’s issues before concluding that the record and law reveal 

“no harmful, prejudicial, or reversible errors[.]” Id. at 17. Having also 

reviewed the record and law, we likewise conclude that the PCRA court opinion 

properly disposes of Appellant’s issues. Therefore, we adopt the PCRA court’s 

August 1, 2022 opinion in affirming the denial of post-conviction relief.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/12/2023
0060_Opinion