In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 22-1360, 22-1761 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

LATONYA R. FOXX, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. 

No. 18-cr-00080-JD-JEM-3 — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED OCTOBER 24, 2023 — DECIDED MARCH 21, 2024 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, WOOD and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. On July 18, 2018, a grand jury 

charged LaTonya Foxx, Yvonna Lee, and Tanisha Bledsoe 

with engaging in a scheme to defraud by filing hundreds of

fraudulent tax returns. Foxx entered a blind guilty plea to one 

count of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and was sentenced 

to 18 months’ imprisonment, one year of supervised release, 

and $1,261,903 in restitution. She now appeals the restitution 

order. 
2 Nos. 22-1360, 22-1761 

According to the indictment, “the purpose of the scheme 

was to: (1) file hundreds of fraudulent federal tax returns that 

generated improper refunds for clients who paid fees ranging 

from $400 to $3,000; and (2) to file fraudulent federal tax returns for the defendants, generating improper refunds.” Dist. 

Ct. Doc. 1 at 3–4. The indictment described the scheme in detail. As part of the scheme, Foxx, Lee, and Bledsoe would recruit clients, promising them maximum tax refunds, and 

would obtain the clients’ personal information including 

names, dates of birth, social security numbers, and dependent

and income information. Bledsoe and Foxx then used the information they collected from their own clients, as well as the 

information provided by Lee to Bledsoe and Foxx pertaining 

to Lee’s clients, to electronically file federal tax returns with 

the IRS on behalf of those clients. Furthermore, the indictment 

detailed that the fabricated information on the tax returns included, but was not limited to, claiming that very young children attended college to claim the American Opportunity Tax 

Credit (“AOTC”), creating fake Form W-2s, listing false itemized deductions on Schedule A, and listing false profits and 

losses on Schedule C, all in order to obtain inflated tax refunds. To conceal their fraudulent behavior, Bledsoe and Foxx 

filed those fraudulent federal returns as “self-prepared” returns, rather than disclosing that they were paid to prepare 

them. For their services, Lee, Bledsoe, and Foxx required a tax 

preparation fee from their clients, ranging between $400 and 

$3,000. They also included false information on their own federal returns, thereby obtaining inflated returns for themselves. 

Count 3, to which Foxx pled guilty, set forth one use of the 

wires “[i]n executing the scheme to defraud,” specifically that 

Lee sent a text to Bledsoe from Indiana to Chicago that she 
Nos. 22-1360, 22-1761 3

had initially received from Foxx, which contained the personally identifying information relating to a resident of Indiana. 

Id. at 6. 

Federal courts have no inherent power to award restitution. United States v. Berkowitz, 732 F.3d 850, 853 (7th Cir. 

2013). Any such power, must come from a statute. Id. The 

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA), 18 

U.S.C. § 3663A, authorizes district courts to impose restitution 

for wire fraud offenses. United States v. Westerfield, 714 F.3d 

480, 489 (7th Cir. 2013). Where, as here, the offense of conviction involves a scheme to defraud, restitution is required under the MVRA for “any person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). “Restitution is 

‘limited to the actual losses caused by the specific conduct underlying the offense, and, like the loss amount, the government must establish that by a preponderance of the evidence.’” United States v. Meza, 983 F.3d 908, 918 (7th Cir. 2020), 

quoting United States v. Orillo, 733 F.3d 241, 244 (7th Cir. 2013). 

The offense comprehended by the wire fraud statute is not 

limited to the specific conduct set forth in the count to which 

Foxx pled guilty, but rather encompasses the entire scheme to 

defraud, such that restitution for the victims of the overall 

scheme is required. Id.; United States v. Locke, 643 F.3d 235, 247 

(7th Cir. 2011). Under the MVRA, Foxx therefore could be ordered to pay restitution for all the losses she caused during 

the scheme, and not just those relating to the specific wire 

transactions to which she pled guilty. “When calculating a defendant’s restitution amount, district courts should ‘adequately demarcate the scheme’ by explaining the scheme’s 
4 Nos. 22-1360, 22-1761 

scope,” which “necessarily requires the district court to explain how the defendant is responsible for the amount of restitution ordered.” United States v. Dridi, 952 F.3d 893, 901 (7th 

Cir. 2020), quoting United States v. Smith, 218 F.3d 777, 784 (7th 

Cir. 2000). 

In the district court, Foxx argued that the restitution 

amount should only be $653,189, because she was unaware of 

fraudulent returns that Lee prepared through co-defendant 

Bledsoe, and because the IRS might have recouped some of 

the improper tax returns. She does not pursue those arguments on appeal, and instead asserts that the district court 

failed to adequately demarcate the scheme and make specific 

findings that the losses included in restitution derived from 

the same scheme for which she was convicted. Ordinarily, we 

review a challenge to a district court’s restitution amount for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. White, 883 F.3d 983, 992 

(7th Cir. 2018). As Foxx concedes, however, she failed to raise 

the challenge below, and therefore we review the challenge 

only for plain error. Id. Under that standard of review, “we 

ask whether the defendant has shown that the error was obvious, affects substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings.” 

United States v. Beltran-Leon, 9 F.4th 485, 499 (7th Cir. 2021); 

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). The record reveals that Foxx cannot demonstrate plain error here.

Foxx argues that the district court failed to adequately demarcate the scheme in that the court did not explain how the 

restitution amount represented financial harm caused by the 

wire fraud scheme involving Foxx and co-defendants Lee and 

Bledsoe. Foxx specifically questioned how the guilty plea to 

the wire fraud sceme charged in Count 3 of the indictment 
Nos. 22-1360, 22-1761 5

included the “’relevant conduct’ of her separate fraudulent 

tax filing wire fraud scheme for tax years 2013 through 2015, 

wherein she prepared false federal tax returns falsely claiming entitlement to the American Opportunity Tax Credit, an 

education credit.” Defendant-Appellant Brief at 12–13. Essentially, Foxx would characterize some of her false federal return filings as part of a separate scheme from other such filings directly involving Lee or Bledsoe.

The only question, then, is whether the district court adequately set forth findings as to the scope of the scheme so as 

to support the restitution award. We are cognizant that the 

district court cannot necessarily be faulted for the failure to 

expand upon an issue never raised. Accordingly, “[t]he lack 

of a finding is not necessarily fatal, but the lack of evidentiary 

support that would have supported a finding is.” White, 883 

F.3d at 992; Berkowitz, 732 F.3d at 854 (“The district court did 

not engage in a lengthy discussion of the restitution order, but 

it was not required to do so, especially when [the defendant] 

did not raise any specific objections to the restitution calculation at the time of sentencing.”); United States v. Fennell, 925 

F.3d 358, 362 (7th Cir. 2019). Such evidentiary support can be 

found in the district court’s own findings, but also in other 

sources in the record including a defendant’s declaration in 

support of the plea, admissions at the plea hearing, and uncontested findings in the presentence investigative report 

(PSR). White, 883 F.3d at 989; Berkowitz, 732 F.3d at 853. Moreover, we have held that a district court need not engage in a 

repetitive discussion, and where a court makes a finding as to 

a unitary scheme in an earlier “relevant conduct” discussion, 

the court does not commit plain error in awarding restitution 

based on that single scheme. Westerfield, 714 F.3d at 489. 
6 Nos. 22-1360, 22-1761 

Here, no fatal deficiency exists because the record provides evidentiary support for a scheme encompassing all of 

the fraudulent federal returns filed by Foxx during that time 

period including, specifically, returns falsely claiming the 

AOTC education credit. Moreover, the record does not contain support for characterizing some of those false returns as 

part of a separate scheme. Whether clients were referred by 

Lee or obtained by Foxx herself, the scheme to defraud involved the same victim (the IRS), the same conduct (the filing 

of tax returns claiming credits to which the claimant was not 

entitled), and the same time period (2014-2016, involving 

claims for the 2013-2015 tax years). 

As Foxx acknowledges in her brief, Count 3 to which she 

pled guilty incorporated as an element the scheme to defraud

set forth in the indictment. The indictment related that

scheme to defraud in detail, providing that Foxx used the information obtained from her own clients, as well as information provided to her by Lee pertaining to Lee’s clients, to 

file false tax returns with the IRS. The indictment further provided that the fabricated information on the tax returns included, but was not limited to, claiming that very young children attended college in order to falsely obtain the AOTC education credit. In her Plea Declaration, Foxx admitted to a 

scheme to defraud consistent with that language in the indictment. She acknowledged filing false returns for her own clients as well as for clients referred to her by Lee, all to engage 

in a scheme to defraud the United States by means of false 

representations. She further admitted in that Plea Declaration 

that for both her own clients and those referred by Lee, the

fraudulent claims on the tax returns included falsely claiming 

the AOTC education credit. Furthermore, the PSR set forth 

the dates of the scheme to defraud, and Foxx did not object to 
Nos. 22-1360, 22-1761 7

those facts; indeed, Foxx confirmed conduct as part of the 

scheme that spanned those dates in the Plea Declaration. Finally, in her challenge to the restitution amount in the district 

court, Foxx raised no objection to the inclusion of all of the 

fraudulent return conduct as part of one scheme—assuming 

that all of the fraudulent returns that she submitted during 

that time period should be considered and arguing only that 

some of the amounts had been recovered and therefore 

should not be counted. 

Evidence in the record, therefore, supports the court’s determination that all of the false returns filed by Foxx during 

that time period were part of the same scheme to defraud, and 

the court ordered restitution only as to returns attributable to 

Foxx. Therefore, there was no legal error in assessing restitution that can be considered “obvious under the law.” United 

States v. Burns, 843 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2016); Henderson v. 

United States, 568 U.S. 266, 278 (2013) (“The Rule’s requirement that an error be ‘plain’ means that lower court decisions 

that are questionable but not plainly wrong (at the time of trial 

or at the time of appeal) fall outside the Rule’s scope.”) And 

the inclusion of false returns beyond the specific conduct in 

Count 3 is unquestionably appropriate. As we have made 

clear, the offense covered by the mail or wire fraud statutes is 

the scheme to defraud, not merely the mail or wire use that 

occurs in the course of that scheme, and restitution for the entire scheme is required by the MVRA. United States v. Belk, 435 

F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 2006); Locke, 643 F.3d at 247. 

In conclusion, the description of the scheme in the record 

points to one unitary scheme, and Foxx assumed as much in 

her own objection to restitution, which proposed an amount 

that would still include the fraudulent returns as one unitary 
8 Nos. 22-1360, 22-1761 

scheme. That is enough to conclude that the district court did 

not commit an error that was “plain” in treating the conduct 

as part of one scheme, particularly given that all of the conduct took place over the same time period, with the same victim, and for the same goal of obtaining fraudulent tax refunds. 

Accordingly, the decision of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.