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S. Hrg. 109–359

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY:

SECOND STAGE REVIEW

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 14, 2005

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

KATHLEEN L. KRANINGER, Professional Staff Member 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

HOLLY A. IDELSON, Minority Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 3

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 4

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 5

Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................................... 5

Senator Domenici ............................................................................................. 6

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 8

Senator Coburn ................................................................................................. 20

Senator Coleman .............................................................................................. 23

Senator Dayton ................................................................................................. 29

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 32

WITNESS 

THURSDAY, JULY 14, 2005

Hon. Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 39

Questions and responses for the Record ......................................................... 55

APPENDIX

Memorandum from Shawn Reese, Analyst in American National Government, 

Government and Finance Division, Congressional Research Service, sent 

to Honorable Susan Collins, dated July 12, 2005 .............................................. 72

Letter dated July 14, 2005, sent to Honorable Frank Lautenberg from Daniel 

P. Mulhollan, Director, Congressional Research Service .................................. 75

Memorandum from Shawn Reese, Analyst in American National Government, 

Government and Finance Division, Congressional Research Service, sent 

to Honorable Frank Lautenberg, dated July 8, 2005 ........................................ 76

(1)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: 

SECOND STAGE REVIEW 

THURSDAY, JULY 14, 2005

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:33 p.m., in room 

SD–562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Lieberman, Voinovich, Coleman, 

Coburn, Domenici, Warner, Levin, Akaka, Carper, Dayton, Lautenberg, and Pryor. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. 

Good afternoon. This afternoon the Committee will examine the 

results and recommendations of the Second Stage Review of the 

Department of Homeland Security conducted by Secretary Chertoff. 

I applaud the Secretary and his team for a thorough analysis of the 

Department’s organization, strengths, and weaknesses. 

We meet in the aftermath of a grim reminder of why this review 

is so significant. The terrorist attacks last week in London remind 

us that the enemy we face has an unlimited capacity for cruelty. 

They remind us that terrorists can be blocked again and again, yet 

they need carry out only one successful plot to cause death and destruction. And the attacks remind us that we must strive for success every single time. 

I know we all extend our deepest condolences to the people of 

Great Britain. I also know that these attacks only strengthen their 

resolve and our commitment to stand with them against those who 

would destroy our way of life. 

The Department of Homeland Security was created to help us respond to the enormous challenges we face. Our Nation was attacked by a new enemy in a new way, and we responded with a 

massive and innovative effort to better protect our Nation against 

the threats of the 21st Century. 

This Committee, which crafted the legislation creating the Department of Homeland Security and which has confirmed two generations of its top officials, works closely with the Department to 

continually improve our Nation’s homeland security posture. We 

have always viewed our role not as critics of the Department but 

as partners in a common cause. Whether the issue is the security 

of our cargo ports or our chemical facilities, equipping and training 

2

of our first responders, or improving counterterrorism intelligence 

and information sharing, we have worked with the Department not 

just to identify problems, but also to forge solutions. 

This Second Stage Review comes, appropriately enough, as the 

second generation of Department leaders takes over from the commendable start of its predecessors. As Secretary Chertoff said in 

previous testimony shortly after he announced this review, the Department ‘‘was created to do more than simply erect a large tent 

under which a lot of different organizations would be collected.’’

The Secretary’s announcement yesterday outlined a strong direction for the Department, one of better integration, risk-based planning, and dynamism. The proposals put forth in his review do not 

construct additional partitions within that big tent but, rather, 

seek to remove those that are counterproductive to the comprehensive approach that homeland security requires. It is about accomplishing goals and objectives, not about preserving the status quo. 

Within this overall theme, of course, there are a great many specifics that we will discuss today and over the coming months, particularly where implementing legislation is required. We will also 

address several organizational proposals, such as the merger of Infrastructure Protection, Domestic Preparedness, and other entities 

into a new Directorate of Preparedness, and the establishment of 

a much needed Policy and Planning Office to develop coherent 

strategies and comprehensive policy guidance at the very highest 

levels of the Department. 

The Secretary has also proposed the creation of a Chief Intelligence Officer responsible for both internal and external coordination. I am particularly interested in this proposal, as just 3 months 

ago Senator Lieberman and I urged the Secretary to assess the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate and 

its relationship with the intelligence community, State, local, and 

tribal governments, and the private sector. 

As with so many aspects of homeland security, the collection, 

analysis, and dissemination of critical intelligence require not just 

a Federal strategy but a national strategy that recognizes the contributions of intelligence not only across the Federal Government 

but from our State and local partners as well. I believe that 

strengthening the Department’s intelligence efforts and giving its 

chief a direct line of communication with the Secretary would help 

begin to resuscitate what appears to be a rather moribund and underutilized part of the Department. 

I hope that the efforts of the Second Stage Review lead to further 

functional integration. As Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson and I 

discussed during his nomination process, the Department-wide 

management functions, particularly in procurement, information 

systems, and finance, must be integrated with and support the Department’s missions. And I know that the Secretary’s reorganization plan recognizes and addresses those critical management 

issues. 

Secretary Chertoff’s predecessor, Tom Ridge, often described the 

creation of the Department of Homeland Security as the greatest 

IPO in history, a merger of unprecedented size and complexity. The 

organizational challenges are extensive, and DHS will need to continue to evolve. I commend the Secretary for his leadership on this 

3

crucial matter. I look forward to hearing from him today in more 

detail about his findings and his specific plans and recommendations. 

Senator Lieberman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Secretary 

Chertoff, welcome back to the Committee. Thank you for appearing 

today to discuss the top-to-bottom departmental review you commissioned when you were confirmed as Secretary 5 months ago. 

The Department has made our country safer than it was before, 

but I think we all would agree that it is not yet as safe as we need 

it to be, and the Department was ready, it seems to me, for a second chapter step back to look at where we have been and see how 

we can carry out our responsibilities better. 

It appears to me that you have done a thorough, honest, constructive job here that will help you, as the head of the Department 

with primary responsibility for the protection of the American people at home, to not only fulfill your responsibility but to fully take 

advantage of the opportunity you have to guide the Department 

into the critical second stage of its post-September 11 development. 

I want you to know that I was encouraged by several parts of 

your recommendations as I took a first look at them, and I know 

we will discuss them in more detail today. First was the emphasis 

on strategic policy planning. Highlighted in oversight hearings of 

the Department that the Committee held earlier in the year, the 

establishment of an Under Secretary for Policy is very important 

and hopefully will lead to a clear setting of priorities, which has 

not been as much the case as we would have wanted up until now. 

Intelligence is a critical function of the Department. We focused 

on that in the legislation creating the Department, and I would say 

although a number of significant improvements have been made 

across the intelligence community, particularly when we passed the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act last year, I do 

not think that the Department’s Office of Information Analysis has 

to date received the support that it needs. Therefore, I take the 

separation out of that office and the creation of a Chief Intelligence 

Officer as a step in the right direction. I certainly hope it is, and 

I look forward to discussing with you your ideas for supporting the 

intelligence activities of the Department and improving the coordination among the various intelligence agencies within DHS and the 

intelligence support that is received. 

Also, the proposal for a Chief Medical Officer makes a lot of 

sense to me. It is something that I have been interested in myself. 

In legislation I proposed earlier this year, BioShield II, we called 

for the creation of an Assistant Secretary for Medical Readiness 

and Response, and it seems to me—I hope—that the Chief Medical 

Officer that you are talking about creating will fulfill that role. And 

this is to coordinate and galvanize preparedness for one of the 

nightmares of the age of terrorism, and that is a biological terrorist 

attack. 

I do have questions about some of the other reorganization proposals. I want to hear more about the rationale for separating 

FEMA from the Department’s preparedness programs and for 

4

eliminating the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security. 

And I must say just generally, as I heard your remarks yesterday, 

I was concerned about the extent to which you feel limited by the 

limitation of financial resources, and I will bring to you the experience that I have had as a member of the Senate Armed Services 

Committee. We always say to the people at the Pentagon, ‘‘Don’t 

let your decisions be budget-driven. We are talking about the security of the United States of America.’’ And I would say the same 

to you as you go forward. 

In that regard, as you may know, there has been a lot of controversy today about some statements you made yesterday, and I 

want to ask you in your opening statement if you could respond to 

them. And this is on questions that you were asked yesterday 

about mass transit protection, and you were quoted in an Associated Press story this morning as saying that—basically you are 

contrasting aviation security with mass transit, and you say, ‘‘By 

contrast, mass transit systems are largely owned and operated by 

State and local authorities.’’ And then you seem to be saying that 

the Federal Government must focus on attacks that could produce 

the most casualties. The quote is, ‘‘The truth of the matter is a 

fully loaded airplane with jet fuel, a commercial airliner, has the 

capacity to kill 3,000 people. A bomb in a subway car may kill 30 

people. When you start to think about your priorities, you are going 

to think about making sure you don’t have a catastrophic thing 

first.’’ I am reading from the AP story this morning. ‘‘Asked if this 

meant communities should be ready to provide the bulk of the protection for local transit systems, Chertoff said, ‘Yep.’ ’’

This has alarmed a lot of us who have mass transit going 

through our States. A lot of people who ride mass transit are already worried about security because they are not closed systems. 

And, inevitably, I think this has to be, at least in part, a national 

responsibility. 

So I use that as an example to just say that in all the structural 

changes you are making, which generally to me seem to be heading 

in the right direction, we also need you to not let your decisions, 

which are life-and-death decisions, be budget-driven. 

I thank the Chair. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. 

We are expecting to begin roll call votes, a series of them, shortly 

after 3 o’clock. So I would ask my colleagues to keep their opening 

remarks extremely short, and if you could even bring yourself to 

submit them for the record, that would be even better. 

Senator Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I applaud 

your leadership and the expediency for calling this hearing one day 

after Secretary Chertoff released the Department of Homeland Security Second Stage Management Review. I am anxious to hear 

what he has to say today. 

I ask that the rest of my statement be inserted in the record so 

we can move on to hear the Secretary. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you so much. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]

5

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I applaud your leadership and expediency for calling this hearing one day after Secretary Chertoff released the Department of Homeland Security’s second stage management review. 

Secretary Chertoff, you have one of the most challenging jobs in the Federal Government. Therefore, I would like to thank you again for your service to our Nation 

and for your willingness to relinquish a lifetime appointment to the third circuit 

court of appeals in order to serve as Secretary of the Department. 

Mr. Secretary, you face great challenges. In addition to securing our homeland 

from terrorists, the Department is forging a unified corporate identity for 180,000 

employees from 22 disparate Federal agencies. This monumental effort is to important that the Government Accountability Office included implementing and transforming the Department of Homeland Security on their high-risk list of programs 

especially susceptible to mismanagement. 

As Chairman of the Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee, I am 

interested in ensuring that the Department continues to improve its operations. In 

fact, Mr. Secretary, just this morning, I held a hearing on the security of the National Capital Region, an area I encourage you to closely examine. In addition, I 

have been monitoring the Department’s implementation of the human resource 

management system known as MaxHR. 

Given the Department’s significant management challenges, I believe that we 

should be conducting more oversight and directing more resources to management 

issues. This includes better coordination between DHS’s authorizing and appropriating committees in Congress, which in turn will lead to better oversight of the 

Department. 

In closing, I commend Secretary Chertoff for initiating this comprehensive review 

of the Department’s operations. I look forward to his testimony and stand ready to 

help him implement his recommendations. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Akaka. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I want 

to add my welcome to the Secretary and say thank you for being 

here. I will not have an opening statement, but let me say that we 

have just received the Secretary’s proposal on reorganization of the 

Department of Homeland Security, and I just want to say that at 

first glance some of the Secretary’s recommendations look good. 

But I would like to take the time to try to understand how they 

impact our security. 

So I look forward to the Secretary’s statement and also possibly 

future hearings by this Committee as we explore how to best proceed. Thank you very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I do have a statement, Madam Chairman, 

and I will try to make it brief. But this is a rare opportunity for 

us to meet with the Secretary and to explain to the public how we 

see things to make certain that we are not rushing past a chance 

to learn more about what is taking place at Homeland Security. 

And I particularly want to thank Secretary Chertoff for being here. 

Yesterday he unveiled proposals to make the Department of Homeland Security more effective, and we respect that greatly. 

But while Secretary Chertoff was announcing these steps yesterday, the Senate acted contradictorily to his goal of protecting our 

homeland from terrorist attack. The Senate voted to reduce the 

amount of homeland security grant money that will go out based 

6

1The letter referenced by Senator Lautenberg appears in the Appendix on page 75. 

2The CRS report dated July 8, 2005, appears in the Appendix on page 76. 

on highest risk. And in the real world, that means that we are 

thwarting Secretary Chertoff’s desire to protect our country to the 

best of his ability. And I will only continue to say loudly and clearly 

that the only basis for allocating homeland security resources as 

the 9/11 Commission requested is to distribute to the area of highest risk. If we knew of an imminent anthrax attack targeting Detroit, we would not send 40 percent of the limited vaccine to California. So why should we do that with our national security grants? 

Nearly 1 year ago, DHS put out an Orange Alert on three jurisdictions: New York City, Washington, DC, and northern New Jersey. People in our area are justifiably worried, but we assured 

them that the government would be doing all it can to keep their 

communities safe. One of those targets was a building in Newark, 

New Jersey. But if this happens again, I am not sure what we can 

tell them. Tell them that the money is in Kansas someplace? We 

have to live up to our responsibility. 

The Administration has been very clear about what they want. 

They want to put the money where the risk is. Last summer, the 

risk was within sight of my New Jersey office. Our intelligence 

services gathered data showing that terrorists have studied the 

Prudential office building. That is how you measure risk, analysis 

and intelligence, not a simple formula. 

Secretary Chertoff wrote a letter to all the Senators yesterday in 

which he says providing enough flexibility to distribute over 90 percent of grant funds on the basis of risk, so that confirms your view. 

And there seemed to be a question about whether or not figures 

that CRS developed were accurate or not. And I ask unanimous 

consent that a letter from Daniel Mulhollan, the Director of CRS, 

be included in the record.1

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. This is dated July 14. He said, 

‘‘We have reviewed the calculations that underlay the data presented in the memorandum’’—to me 2—‘‘dated July 8 and have confirmed their accuracy.’’ So we are not making any mistakes about 

the mathematics included in this. 

And I was hoping that the London attacks would finally wake up 

the Senate to this reality. Unfortunately, I was wrong. And I look 

forward to hearing the testimony of our distinguished Secretary. 

Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Domenici. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOMENICI 

Senator DOMENICI. I regret that I cannot just say nothing, but 

I will be very brief. 

Chairman COLLINS. Please proceed. 

Senator DOMENICI. First, Mr. Secretary, I hope that you will 

have confidence in what you are doing in spite of the difficulties 

of organizing because everybody should know that you have either 

the privilege or are the victim, whichever, of having to organize a 

reorganization that is the largest in 50 years. And when you consider how big we are, and you have that big of a reorganization, 

7

it is hard to put it together. And I think it will require more than 

one reorganization effort. So keep the faith. 

Second, I was going to ask about the border, but it has become 

so prevalent these last few days on the floor and in your commitments that you are going to talk about it. You cannot do enough, 

but the border is organizable, with your Commissioner who is in 

charge, who is excellent—we spoke to him at length. If his game 

plan is your game plan, you ought to promote it. It is terrific. It 

will get us there. It will control the border within the next 4 or 5 

years without putting the United States military on the border. 

Last, a little tiny thing that I think is a big thing, and that is: 

Since September 11 the flow of foreign students to our universities 

has turned from a river to a trickle. There may be some around 

that say, ‘‘Great. What do we need them for?’’ But, frankly, that is 

abysmal for America, not only because they should be coming here 

to get educated, but because the best way to influence countries, 

including countries like China, is to have 20,000 to 30,000 of their 

students here going to our great universities and then having them 

go home. And the trickle has to be reconverted to a river. We have 

to turn it back into a flow. You have from time to time spoken 

about your ideas regarding students coming to America. If you do 

not address it today, I will seek your position. And if we need legislation, I will be glad to pursue it. I think it is very important, subtle but dramatic. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Domenici follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOMENICI 

Madam Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing to discuss the Department 

of Homeland Security’s second stage review. Thank you also, Secretary Chertoff, for 

discussing your departmental review with us. 

Your Department is young, but it is tasked with the difficult job of securing our 

Nation. Your Department also represents the largest reorganization of governmental 

departments in more than 50 years, so I understand that there are some areas we 

can address to improve our security. I look forward to working with you throughout 

the second stage review process to determine what our homeland security needs are, 

and how we can best address those needs. There are a few specific areas that I am 

eager to hear about today. 

First, I would like to learn about your thoughts on the coordination of the Department’s research initiatives, which I hope will be a focus as you coordinate DHS activities. I believe DHS must collaborate its research and development efforts within 

the Department and with universities and national labs. For example, in my home 

State of New Mexico, the Department of Homeland Security works with Sandia and 

Los Alamos National Laboratories at the National Infrastructure Simulation and 

Analysis Center to understand the consequences of disruptions to our Nation’s infrastructure. The Department must continue to work with worthwhile partners like 

this. 

Second, I look forward to hearing more about your plan to strengthen the border 

and improve the immigration process. This is an issue of critical importance to my 

State and other States on the southern and northern borders. I agree with you that 

we can provide more security by adequately staffing our borders with immigration 

and border experts and investing in new technologies like Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. 

I am also anxious to learn more about your efforts to improve border infrastructure because 1986 was the last time we launched a major effort to upgrade the infrastructure at our land ports of entry. That last effort, which occurred almost 15 

years before September 11, 2001, was headed by former Senator DeConcini and myself, and I believe the time for further improvements to our border infrastructure 

is now. 

Similarly, I am eager to hear more about your thoughts on an industry-wide temporary worker program and eased restrictions for immigrants seeking to study in 

8

1The prepared statement of Secretary Chertoff appears in the Appendix on page 39. 

the United States. Prior to 2001, the United States was a preferred place for foreign 

students to obtain post-graduate degrees. Students came to the United States to 

study, but they stayed here to work. Thus, our country was obtaining many of the 

most brilliant minds not only from within our borders, but from across the world. 

Unfortunately, that has changed because of the restrictions and limitations put on 

student visas post-September 11. Now, many of the leaders of the next generation 

choose to attend school in places like Great Britain, where they have easier access 

to universities. 

Lastly, I am interested in your thoughts on our Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers. I am pleased to see that FLETC will maintain its autonomy and will 

report directly to Deputy Secretary Jackson under your proposed Department reorganization. Additionally, because New Mexico is home to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center where our Border Patrol Agents, Federal Air Marshals, Federal Flight Deck Officers, and other Federal agents train, I am eager to hear about 

your review of the agency. 

I know that your review has covered many other areas as well, and I look forward 

to discussing each of those topics with you as well, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Pryor. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I just want to 

thank you, and the Ranking Member, for your leadership. Secretary Chertoff, good to have you here in the Committee today. 

Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much. Senator Dayton. 

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I look forward 

to hearing from the distinguished Secretary, so I will pass. Thank 

you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. You 

may proceed with your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL CHERTOFF,1 SECRETARY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Thank you, Chairman Collins and Senator 

Lieberman. I will ask that my full statement be made part of the 

record. 

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I will just try to briefly cover some points 

and then open myself up to questions. 

First of all, I do want to give you my sincere and deep gratitude 

for the counsel and advice that you, Madam Chairman, and Senator Lieberman and the rest of the Committee have given me in 

discussions about this Department over the period of time since 

even before I became the Secretary and up to the present time. We 

have had an opportunity to talk about a number of the ideas here, 

and a number of the ideas, frankly, are plagiarized from suggestions and proposals that have been offered by this Committee, and 

I invoke every means of paying tribute to your good suggestions. 

But I think maybe the most eloquent is that we have adopted a lot 

of them in the reorganization as well. So we have paid a lot of close 

attention to what this Committee is doing. 

Let me outline briefly, kind of give an overview of what we have 

tried to do here, and then I want to respond a little bit to Senator 

Lieberman’s point in his opening statement. 

9

Neither my speech yesterday nor my testimony today is a complete review of everything that we need to do and are doing. We 

have had some previous testimony here about, for example, chemical site security. I did not feel the need to repeat that again yesterday. We are working very hard on that issue because we do recognize that there is a lot of concern about making sure that chemical 

sites do not become weapons in place. But some things which I 

think we had not talked about seemed appropriate to talk about 

yesterday: Preparedness, making sure that we have focused on preparedness for our greatest risks, and that includes biological, nuclear, chemical, things of that sort; transportation, including mass 

transportation, making sure we have better systems that move people and goods into the country and around the country, and taking 

account of the nature of the systems themselves, to be able to bring 

modern technology into play, and also to make sure we are being 

interoperable, that when we set up various trusted traveler programs and screening programs, we build them in a way so that 

they work together, and so that eventually, instead of having four 

or five separate trusted traveler cards, people can have one, and 

that can do the duty for all the different kinds of screening that 

we need to do. 

This kind of thinking smart not only promotes security, but it 

promotes privacy and it promotes efficiency. 

Borders and immigration, obviously a huge issue. Senator 

Domenici, I can tell you that the discussion that the Commissioner 

had with you reflects the way this Department is approaching the 

border, which is an integrated approach that is looking to take and 

coordinate new technology, infrastructure, and people in a way that 

makes them work together. Also, it does something we sometimes 

don’t do in government, which is take a strategic look at the whole 

picture. Because the issue of dealing with illegal migration is not 

just apprehension, but it is also, when we apprehend people, do we 

detain them? If we detain them, how quickly can we remove them? 

And all of these pieces work together. 

I can tell you, sometimes we make a mistake when we flood a 

lot of resources to one piece of the system and we do not take account of the fact that it is going to bottleneck another piece of the 

system. And what we are doing now is we are going to have a program manager who is going to build an entire system and make 

sure that all the pieces are properly scaled so that we actually increase efficiency. 

Likewise, too, I am delighted to point out, Senator Domenici, in 

terms of the foreign students, as I announced yesterday, Secretary 

Rice and I are working on an agenda that we hope to announce 

shortly that will expedite and make it easier and more welcoming 

for those who want to come to the country to visit and study in a 

positive way to come here. There is no question part of the struggle 

against terrorism is the struggle of ideas, and we want to embed 

our ideas overseas. And that is one of the reasons why we want to 

be welcoming and not forbidding. 

Information sharing is a key element, and the Chief Intelligence 

Officer that we envision is going to have the ability and the authority to fuse the intelligence that is generated by the over 10 components in our Department that currently have some intelligence 

10

responsibilities, and to do it with a view to having strategic intelligence that fulfills the unique mission that I think Congress envisioned for this Department, which is not merely playing ‘‘catch the 

terrorist,’’ but is talking about how to help our State, local, and private partners protect their infrastructure, prepare themselves for 

any eventuality, and prevent acts of terrorism on State and local 

levels. 

Finally, I would be remiss and I would have been remiss had I 

not mentioned organization as a critical part of what we are trying 

to do. That is why I mentioned it yesterday, and that means not 

only procurement policy—and we talked about this. I sat down 

with the Inspector General very soon after I arrived and said, ‘‘I 

want to get your ideas about how to make procurement work with 

efficiency and integrity,’’ but also having human capital to properly 

move forward where you have MAX HR. One of the things I am 

trying to do is not only move that forward and implement it in a 

way that is reassuring and accessible to the employees of the Department, but also build a culture in the Department where people 

learn that we are working as a team. And that involves doing 

things, for example, as encouraging career paths where people can 

move among different components so that they get a sense that we 

are part of a larger Department. 

To do all these things, I have outlined a series of organizational 

changes which I won’t go into in detail in my opening statement, 

but which I think will give us the tools to make sure when we look 

at our missions in terms of our policy, our intelligence, and our operations, we look with a single pair of eyes that operate in 

synchronicity and that allow us to look across the entire Department and drive the agenda and accomplish the mission without regard to the individual component stovepipes. 

Let me just take a moment to respond to Senator Lieberman’s 

observations about mass transit. 

I have obviously been closely involved in our response to what 

happened in London and in dealing with the whole issue of how we 

are preparing ourselves with respect to transportation, in general. 

As I think I said during my confirmation hearings, I believe we 

need to make sure that we are paying as much attention to our 

non-aviation transportation as we pay to our aviation transportation. But I also have tried to emphasize that these are different 

systems. They work differently. Their ownership is configured differently. And, therefore, although they each require the same degree of attention, the particular way in which we pay attention 

may be a little bit different. Aviation is, for example, a closed system. People enter and depart in a relatively fixed number of points. 

Once you are on the airplane, you are on the airplane. And so our 

configuration in terms of security is one that is guided and molded 

by the existing nature of the system. We don’t want to break the 

system. 

We all know we could not import that system into the New York 

subway system. I have ridden the New York subways. I have ridden the Washington subways. To have magnetometers would be to 

destroy the system itself. So we have to think about how do we 

make that system work with security and with efficiency? 

11

And in that regard, one of the things I wanted to be careful to 

emphasize—and perhaps I am not always as careful as I want to 

be—is that we have to look at the whole range of threats. Obviously, even a bombing that kills 30 people or 40 people is a very 

serious matter. But a biological incident in a subway or a chemical 

incident in a subway which could have the capability of killing 

many, many more people and, in fact, rendering the subway unusable for a substantial period of time would be a matter of significantly worse consequence. 

It’s part of the nature of my job to make sure that as we go about 

doing things in terms of our priorities, we take account of the 

structural differences of the systems we deal with, the differences 

in consequence. I think that is the essence of risk management. 

But I do want to emphasize so there is no mistake about it, that 

as we speak—and frankly, you know, before London we were working very hard focusing on the rail system, and particularly upon 

those vulnerabilities that people on this Committee have talked 

about, including concerns about the movement of hazardous chemicals on our rail system, concerns about the possibility, as I say, of 

chemicals or biological things on the system, and also, obviously, 

working on new technologies to detect explosives and to allow us 

to give greater safety to those who use the transportation system. 

So that is my kind of overview, and I hope I have clarified any 

misconceptions, and I look forward to answering questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

During the last 3 years, the Department has invested a great 

deal of resources, time, and attention in improving our Nation’s 

preparedness and ability to respond to a terrorist attack, and that 

is obviously a very important part of the mission of the Department. Less attention, however, has been given to the intelligence 

role of the Department. As Senator Lieberman, who is the chief author of the Department’s legislation, can attest, Congress intended 

the Department of Homeland Security to play the role of integrating a lot of the terrorism-related information reporting and 

analysis. And that really has not happened. The Department’s role 

has been minimal in the intelligence community, and yet its component agencies, like the Coast Guard and the Border Patrol, critically need access to information and intelligence reporting. 

I had always thought, when the Terrorist Threat Integration 

Center was created, that it would be placed within the Department. But as I said, the Department has really never fulfilled its 

role. Under your new plan, what do you see as the role of the Department within the broader intelligence community at the Federal 

level and in working with our partners at the State and local level? 

Relatedly, what role does the new Chief Intelligence Officer play 

within the Department? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Like you, Chairman Collins, I am passionate about intelligence as the key to doing our job properly. The 

best way to avoid a problem is to detect it in advance. 

We have within the Department over 10 individual components 

that do intelligence. A lot of it is tactical intelligence. For example, 

Customs and Border Protection needs to know about new types of 

phony passports, and that is appropriately done at the level of Customs and Border Protection. 

12

But there is a strategic component to that as well. As people 

come across the border, as they are intercepted and we question 

them, sometimes they are turned away. Sometimes we find phony 

documents. If you stand back and connect all those dots, you sometimes get very interesting pictures that are not necessarily known 

to those who are within the individual offices or even within the 

individual component. 

We have done some things, for example, on an ad hoc basis 

where we have pulled Coast Guard intelligence together with Customs and Border Protection and ICE, and we have actually been 

able to put a team together to assemble a much wider picture of 

a particular intelligence threat than we could have done in each 

component on its own. And then we have taken that to the wider 

community and sat with the FBI and with the DNI and the NCTC, 

and we have plugged that into what they are doing in a coordinated way. 

So we have begun this process even before the organization—by 

doing it manually in the sense that I will call up the head of the 

components and bring these people and let’s sit down, let’s fuse 

this together. The lesson there is that we need to do it institutionally, not just when the Secretary intervenes personally. And that 

is what we are really trying to build here. The Chief Intelligence 

Officer will have the authority and the obligation to pull intelligence from all the components inside and make sure it is fused 

and integrated from a Department perspective. 

The second piece is we need to make sure that we then become 

better participants in the intelligence community as a whole. By 

having more to contribute, first of all, we will have, frankly, a more 

vigorous place at the table. But I have also made it clear and I am 

going to continue to make it clear that our intelligence officer, our 

Chief Intelligence Officer has a unique role to play in the community. We are not simply chasing terrorists. We are looking at this 

information trying to understand how does it affect our border operations, how does it affect our Coast Guard operations, because we 

do adjust these based on the intelligence. And then how do we 

work with our State and local partners and our private sector partners in passing this on and helping them make use of it. So that 

is a big part of what that job is going to be. 

Let me conclude by saying that one of the things I announced 

yesterday was that I had spoken to a number of governors and 

homeland security advisers in the States about their desire to have 

fusion centers. We are inviting them all to come meet with me and 

the top leadership to see how we can network those fusion centers, 

which are another form of intelligence gathering and distribution 

mechanisms in order to get them all linked together. 

So that is an overly long-winded response to your question. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Secretary, I want to turn very quickly to 

a recommendation that you did not embrace. As you know, we have 

heard testimony before this Committee from the Rand Corporation 

and others recommending a merger of CBP and ICE, and I have 

asked the Department’s Inspector General to analyze that and report back to us. 

It appears to me that you are going in exactly the opposite direction by moving CBP and ICE out from under a common DirecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:33 May 12, 2006 Jkt 023159 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\23159.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
13

torate, the Border and Transportation Security (BTS) directorate, 

and having them report to you directly. If anything, you are further 

separating the entities. We know that a lot of law enforcement officials believe that it would be better instead to bring them together. 

Could you give us your thoughts on why you decided to recommend abolishing BTS, separating them further rather than 

merging them? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I took this question very seriously, and I 

actually met with the Inspector General to get a sense at least of 

what he was finding. I also spent time talking to people in the field 

about it. And, I also have the ability to rely on my own experience 

doing law enforcement work and as a prosecutor dealing with different agencies. 

It was a difficult question. I understand the arguments in favor 

of it. We begin with the fact that a merger like that would in itself 

impose substantial costs. So I asked myself, What are the problems 

we are trying to cure here and is there a way to cure them in a 

less drastic approach? 

I think one problem is a financial problem that had to do with 

the original merger, and we are, I think, close to getting that cured 

with additional funding and additional management controls in 

ICE. I don’t think I would recommend merging the two organizations to correct a management problem in one. I think we just 

ought to correct the management problem. 

The second question is, How do you get them to work together 

operationally? And I think there has been a problem there. Some 

of it may be cultural, some of it may be a legacy of what was left 

over from the original merger. I asked myself the question, Is this 

a case where we have two agencies that are chasing the same type 

of activity? Usually when you find that, there is a good argument 

for combining them. But here, actually, although there is some 

overlap, there is actually a fairly distinct center of gravity to each 

organization. 

FAMS, for example, which we have indicated we are going to 

move back to TSA, really has nothing to do with these two organizations in terms of their main missions. But much of what ICE 

does in detention and removal and investigation is functionally different to a large degree from Customs and Border Protection. 

So I guess I concluded that merging them would simply—they 

would still have to have different functions. They would simply 

have deputy assistant secretaries instead of assistant secretaries. 

What seemed to be important was to get them to operationally 

work together, but to do it with the other components as well, with 

Coast Guard, for example, and even with Infrastructure Protection. 

And that is where having an operations and a planning and policy 

shop Department-wide, I think, supplies the answer. 

When we sat down to talk about a border security strategy, what 

we needed to do was to build a plan that was comprehensive, that 

took us from the beginning of the process through to the end, and 

that spanned, among other things, the role of CBP, ICE, and the 

Coast Guard. Putting together a tool that allows us to do that, 

which is what we have recommended, I think will address the 

problems that have been identified. 

14

Now, as I say, I spent time thinking about it. I understand reasonable minds can disagree. I think that at this point I am confident that our solution has a very good prospect of succeeding, and 

I look forward to talking about it more with you in the future. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Chertoff, let me come back to the 

question I asked you about the comments you made yesterday. 

First let me clarify because I have been asked, and by coincidence, 

many of us were in a classified briefing with you yesterday. I would 

never quote from that. I want to make clear this is a quote from 

apparently a meeting you had yesterday with the Associated Press

reporters and editors. I want to read it to you because on the face 

of the story, if you have not seen it, it is very unsettling coming 

a week after the London attacks. It must be particularly unsettling 

to the 14 million Americans who ride rail and transit. 

We know, as you said in your initial response, in your opening 

statement, that these are not closed systems, so they are harder to 

protect than aviation, for instance. But there seems to be a suggestion here that there is not a Federal responsibility to protect local 

and State rail and transit systems. And to me that goes to the 

heart of what the Department is about. The Department is dealing 

with a national threat of terrorism and does not base its protective 

actions on whether a Federal Government regulation dominates in 

one area or another. I will just read it to you briefly. This is an 

AP story today, Lara Jakes Jordan, Associated Press writer. ‘‘ ‘The 

Federal Government can provide only limited help to States and 

local governments to protect transit systems from terror attacks, 

and local officials must be largely responsible for the cost of improved subway, train, and bus security,’ Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said Thursday, one week after the bombings in London’s subway and bus system. Chertoff said the U.S. 

Government is bound to financially support the security of the Nation’s commercial airlines in part because the aviation system is almost exclusively a Federal responsibility. By contrast, he said, U.S. 

mass transit systems are largely owned and operated by State and 

local authorities. He also said the Federal Government must focus 

on attacks that could produce the most casualties. ‘The truth of the 

matter is a fully loaded airplane with jet fuel, a commercial airliner, has the capacity to kill 3,000 people,’ Chertoff told AP reporters and editors. ‘A bomb in a subway car may kill 30 people. When 

you start to think about your priorities, you are going to think 

about making sure you don’t have a catastrophic thing first.’ Asked 

if this meant communities should be ready to provide the bulk of 

the protection for local transit systems, Chertoff said, ‘Yep.’ ’’

So I want to give you a chance to respond to that because I 

think—I repeat, I gather you have already been challenged to 

apologize by one of my colleagues on the floor of the Senate. This 

will create an uproar, and you happen to be here, so I think it is 

important for you to clarify how you see the Department’s responsibility with regard to the safety of rail and transit systems in our 

country. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We have an equal responsibility to protect 

Americans across the board in every respect. The way in which we 

protect differs depending on the nature of what we are talking 

15

about. And I think, the point I was trying to make—and, again, 

perhaps not with perfect precision—was we have to deal with the 

differences in the system as we talk about the way in which we 

interact with the system. 

My point was the aviation system is essentially a closed system. 

We can govern people who enter and who have access to it. We can 

do it in a way that, because of the timing of aviation, allows us to 

put up portals and things of that sort. And, frankly, there is almost 

nobody positioned to put the boots on the ground, so to speak, other 

than what we do. I mean, there are not large numbers of local authorities that will provide screeners. So in terms of a manpowerintensive approach to screening in the aviation area, we do have 

a large Federal presence. 

As someone who has ridden subways and trains all my life, most 

of the boots on the ground are local. They are local police and they 

are local transit police and local transit authorities. So a lot of the 

actual folks who do the work and a lot of the kind of manual dayto-day stuff is held by local governments and some by private, for 

example, bus lines and things of that sort. 

So our responsibility is the same, but our way of interacting is 

going to be different. The help that we can give transit authorities, 

for example, may come in a different form than what we do with 

respect to airlines. No one is suggesting, I think, that we take Federal police and put them on subways. What we want is the ability 

to use our technology to do the kinds of things we are now doing, 

for example, here in Washington, and in other places like Boston 

and New York, to have better detection equipment, use of synchronized video cameras with, for example, chemical and biological 

sensors so we can get better efficiency and more efficiency with respect to the way in which we protect our subway and transit passengers. 

So it is not a question of not having responsibility across the 

board. It is a recognition of the fact that different sectors of our 

economy are configured differently, and we have to be partners 

with everybody, and we have to recognize those differences in the 

way we apply our partnership. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. I wanted to give you the opportunity to 

clarify, and I think you have. Let me state what you know, which 

is, there is an enormous Federal investment, which we are debating right now, in the mass transit systems themselves, leave aside 

the security question. We are debating that in the transportation 

legislation, so there is a big Federal involvement there. But I agree, 

we are not talking in the case of mass rail and transit systems of 

Federal police, for instance. They are going to require Federal financial support and technological support. And I just want to give 

you the opportunity to clarify that you believe that there is a Federal responsibility, specifically through the Department of Homeland Security, in assisting rail and transit systems around America 

and protecting the security of the 14 million people who ride them 

every day. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Absolutely, and we do that, and we will 

continue to do that. My point is that we will do it in partnership 

with those systems. We are not going to come in and take the system over. 

16

Senator LIEBERMAN. Understood. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We are going to do it with them and, in 

fact, that is what we have been doing. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I think we need to reiterate the fact, Mr. Secretary, that you 

have 180,000 people from 22 separate agencies trying to come together. The Government Accountability Office has said that the 

way the Department is coming together is on the high-risk list, and 

I would hope that during your tenure one of the goals you have is 

to get it off the high-risk list. 

I was there when Senator Gregg gave his opening remarks on 

the Homeland Security Appropriations bill, and he showed us four 

feet of reports, many of them critical, that have been done on your 

Department during the last couple of years. I would hope that perhaps 2 years from now there will be fewer critical reports of the 

Department. 

How many committees in Congress do you have to report to? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Boy, that is tough. I am sure, obviously, we 

have two authorizing committees, two appropriations subcommittees. I would say in the Senate, I think we interact with at least 

two, if not three additional committees, and I think in the House 

probably the same. So I think we have, I would venture to say, 

somewhere on the order of eight to ten committees probably with 

some degree of jurisdiction. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Madam Chairman, the issue of oversight is 

important, and the 9/11 Commission was very critical of us in this 

regard. I remember Jim Woolsey, the Director of the CIA, said that 

when Congress was in session 185 days, he made 205 trips here 

to Congress. I would like you to discuss just how often you have 

been here because the more time you are here, the less time you 

have to run your Department. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I can say—and I say this with mixed 

emotion—that I think next week some Department representative 

will have attended the 100th hearing on Capitol Hill since the beginning of the year. So that is a milestone of some sort. 

Senator VOINOVICH. As you know, I am very interested in human 

capital, and I applaud you for your MAX HR program. I would like 

you to share with the Committee what would happen if the cut 

that has been made in the House of $96 million, from your proposed $146 million management account, became law, what impact 

that would have on your ability to get the job done. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think, Senator, it would have a very serious impact. As it is, I believe based on the cuts in the 2005 budget, 

we extended the period of time for phasing into MAX HR from 2 

years to 3 years. I think we are in jeopardy if we don’t adequately 

fund this to have the worst of all worlds, which is to have a pending change of significance but no ability to move it forward, which 

creates a great deal of tension among the employees and a great 

deal of uncertainty. So I would strongly encourage full funding to 

allow us to move forward. 

17

Senator VOINOVICH. In other words, without full funding, you are 

not going to be able to implement the human capital and other 

management things that Congress has asked you do. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We will not be able to do it in a reasonable 

or timely fashion. 

Senator VOINOVICH. As a Governor, I dealt with FEMA, and from 

my perspective it is the agency with the most expertise in working 

with State and local governments to prepare for, respond to, and 

recover from events. Many stakeholders consider that FEMA’s role 

was diminished after it was incorporated into DHS. Under your 

Second Stage Review, it appears that the FEMA Director would not 

report to the Under Secretary for Preparedness. 

Secretary Chertoff, with the Division of Preparedness and Response, how will FEMA’s all hazards mission be coordinated with 

the roles and responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Preparedness? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. The Under Secretary for Preparedness, 

Senator, is going to have to—let me actually begin by saying FEMA 

does a terrific job and has done a terrific job. What we have tried 

to do is make sure FEMA is focused on the mission that it is obligated to do and that it does well. 

Now, preparedness really covers the gamut. It covers prevention 

as well as protection as well as response and recovery. The expertise that will be drawn upon by the Preparedness Directorate will 

be clearly expertise residing in FEMA, also expertise that comes 

out of the Coast Guard and out of some of our other operating arms 

as well, including, for example, Secret Service, which does a very 

good job in developing the kind of planning you need for preparedness. 

So the idea here is not to decouple the skills of FEMA from Preparedness. It is to allow FEMA to pursue its core mission as a direct report to the Secretary and then look to the Preparedness Directorate to draw on FEMA’s skill set and the other skill sets in 

equal measure in order to make sure it is covering the entire 

gamut of preparedness from prevention through response and recovery. 

Senator VOINOVICH. We had a hearing this morning on National 

Capital Region security coordination. You have a Mr. Lockwood in 

your Department, and I must say that I was impressed with his 

testimony. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I asked him how many people he had working for him, and he explained it to me. The gentleman who represented the State of Maryland said that Mr. Lockwood does not 

have the people necessary to get the job done. I would appreciate 

your looking into that situation. 

I am very concerned that so often we—the Congress—ask the Executive Branch to do a mission, and we do not give them the resources to get the job done. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I agree with that. I think they have done 

a fine job, and I think, in fact, it was in working with that office 

and the Mayor of Washington and the Governors of Virginia and 

Maryland in the most recent period of time after London last week, 

18

I saw what a fine job they do. And I will certainly make sure that 

they are adequately supported. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Secretary Chertoff, I am sure you will agree with me that financial accountability is critical to the success of the mission of DHS. 

That is why I wish to bring to your attention the Administration’s 

noncompliance with legislation. I, along with Representative Platts 

and former Senator Fitzgerald, successfully passed legislation that 

brings the Department under the Chief Financial Officers Act. Our 

bill, which became law on October 16, 2004, requires the President 

to appoint a Chief Financial Officer for the Department no later 

than 180 days after enactment. As with all CFOs, the DHS CFO 

is to report directly to the Secretary. However, your Second Stage 

Review neglects the position. I would be interested in knowing, 

first, the status of the nomination of a CFO as required by the Department of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act of 

2004; and, two, given the direct reporting requirement under law, 

where will the DHS CFO be placed in the proposed reorganization? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, I don’t know that we have identified 

the person to hold that position yet. We currently have a person 

on an acting basis who is holding the position. It is important—obviously, there is a legal obligation of a direct report, and I can tell 

you that I probably work more closely with the acting CFO now 

than I do with many people in the Department. I think it is important, though, that still remain well coordinated with our overall 

management function. 

As I say, I envision complying with the law, but making sure 

that our CFO and his very important function, first of all, has authority and coordination over the entirety of the Department, 

which I think is critical in terms of making sure the financial system works together, and that it is closely configured with the other 

management elements of the Department, which include procurement, human capital, and things of that sort. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Secretary, this morning, the Subcommittee 

on Oversight of Government Management, chaired by Senator 

Voinovich, held a hearing at my request on security in the National 

Capital Region. We discussed how important the DHS Office of National Capital Region Coordination, ONCRC, is to the success of 

the NCR. Under your proposal, the Director of ONCRC would report to the Under Secretary of Preparedness instead of to you, the 

Secretary, as is current policy. 

My question to you—and this has been touched on already—is: 

What rationale led you to create another layer of bureaucracy between yourself and the National Capital Region? And, two, what 

steps do you intend to take to ensure sufficient full-time employees 

rather than detailees are available to staff this critical function? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, again, there are numerous direct reports to the Secretary, and what we have tried to do is look at the 

actual work flow and pattern within the Department and configure 

people who do a lot of work closely together in a manner that gets 

them close together in the organization chart. 

19

The National Capital Office, which has really the function of preparedness for the capital, does something that needs to be very 

closely linked with preparedness in general. For example, a lot of 

the work that we want to do under our proposed Chief Medical Officer is going to have direct effect on the capital because we have 

suffered an anthrax attack here. 

I want to make sure they are working together. In fact, what this 

does is it enhances the ability of the National Capital Office to participate in our preparedness planning, and including the biopreparedness planning, using the perspective that he has, drawing 

from the unique challenges that you face in this particular city 

given the fact that it is the seat of government. 

So I actually do not view it as diminishing the role of that office, 

but actually as enhancing its ability to touch and influence many 

of the preparedness functions that we need to use that will be of 

direct significance to protecting the capital of the country. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Secretary, you have mentioned the need to 

enhance and speed up baggage inspections, and you call for more 

research on sophisticated detection equipment. I have a suggestion 

that is budget neutral. To help solve this problem, I urge you to 

improve TSA screener rights and protections. As an example, the 

checked bags at Dulles International Airport are placed on conveyors where they are taken to the basement for inspection. Bags 

are physically lifted off the conveyor belts, placed on screening machines, and then again lifted off and loaded on baggage carts. If a 

conveyor belt breaks down, which happens often at Dulles because 

several airlines ignore weight limits and the machinery is overstressed, the bags are physically moved by TSA baggage screeners 

many yards to a working screening machine. 

This example clearly demonstrates why employee input on working conditions and new technologies is important because employees know firsthand the impact technology will have on their ability 

or inability, as the case may be, to do their jobs. 

However, without the rights and protections granted to the other 

DHS employees, TSA employees may hesitate to disclose problems 

that directly affect the efficiency and security of our transportation 

systems as well as costs, since TSA employees have high rates of 

workers’ compensation claims due to the physical nature of their 

jobs. 

I believe granting TSA screeners full whistleblower protections, 

including appeal rights to the Merit System Protection Board, will 

improve our screening capability. And I ask you, what is your view 

on whistleblower protections for TSA employees? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, first of all, I do not think that anybody needs to hesitate about suggesting improvements in the 

screening system. In fact, I believe that when we do procurements, 

and particularly when we design requests for proposal, we need to 

do that by up front going to the operators and making sure we understand the operational conditions and constraints. It makes no 

sense, as you point out, to build equipment that in real life does 

not work because the people who operate it—it does not work in 

the real-world environment. 

20

So we are going to be encouraging participation by people with 

operational experience in the process of designing and procuring 

our systems going forward. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator Akaka. Senator Coburn. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN 

Senator COBURN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony. A couple of things. 

First of all, to follow up on CFO. I do not know if you are aware, 

but the Federal Financial Management Subcommittee has been 

looking at this, and I can tell you in terms of the President’s management agenda, a qualified and vibrant and active CFO is a must 

for you to meet that, plus the PART assessments, plus IPIA, which 

is the Improper Payments Act, plus all the other acts from GIPRA 

on up, so I would just encourage you to get that settled because 

that is going to help us help you. 

The second thing, under your six imperatives that you outlined, 

the second one dealt with borders and immigration. You mentioned 

strengthening border security, interior enforcement, and reforming 

immigration processes. I note that the third was reforming immigration processes, and I understand that works with it, but I want 

to make sure you understand that the consensus in the country, 

even though we have to have some immigration reform, is to secure 

our borders, northern and southern, and it is important for me, for 

this President and the people who work for him in positions such 

as you, to let the American people know what we are actually doing 

and what is the priority. Is it to change immigration policies, or is 

it to secure the border? 

I understand that they all are interdependent, but which is the 

greatest priority? 

I would also bring forth to you the fact that we had some questions of Mr. Aguilar in some of our oversight hearings, one of which 

is I asked him specifically to get to me exactly what they needed, 

his Department, to secure the border. I want to tell you, what he 

sent us could have come from a second grader in terms of being 

vague, noncommittal. In other words, he sent us some information 

but did not send us any information. I think that is inappropriate, 

first. Second is we really do need to see assessments. You see the 

amendments on the Senate floor about increasing border patrol? 

That is a reflection of the tension that is in the country, and I 

would just ask for you to comment on what we are doing on our 

borders. Do we have the money? Do we have the personnel? Do we 

have the training capabilities to secure the border first in conjunction with our immigration reform? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I am acutely aware of how troubled people 

are, and justifiably, about the situation at the border. I think I said 

in my speech that flagrant violation of our borders not only undermines our security, but it really flouts the rule of law, and of course 

it imposes a particular burden on the border communities. 

I do not know when you got the information from Chief Aguilar, 

but I can tell you what we are doing. We are, as I said earlier, looking at this whole picture as a total system because the tendency—

I can say, going back to my years when I was a prosecutor, a line 

21

prosecutor in the Federal Government—sometimes is to flood a lot 

of resources to a piece of the system in a way that breaks the system. 

This is about border patrol agents in part, but only in part. You 

have to be able to deploy them effectively. That means you have 

to have surveillance technology, it has to be integrated, in command and control, with the boots on the ground. You have to have 

changes in infrastructure so people can move more quickly. And 

then you have to do some other things. You have to have, for other 

than Mexicans—you cannot simply deport to Mexico—you have to 

have beds. But then when you look at beds, you have to ask yourself this question, how long does somebody occupy a bed? It now 

takes an average of about 40 days to get a person back to their 

home country. If we can cut that, we have effectively doubled the 

beds. 

You understand the point. I think we have now mapped out this 

system in its entirety. I think we now know all the moving pieces. 

I will tell you I personally spent a fair amount of time, including 

some weekend time, on this. We are now finding a program manager, and we need to build a very specific set of plans that will now 

do things like, say, OK, for every X number of border patrol or X 

number of OTMs, how quickly do we have to move them out of 

their beds? What do we need to do that? Where does that mean we 

flow the funding? 

You are exactly right to expect that we do that. One of the main 

reasons I am arguing for a policy and a planning directorate is to 

give us the people who can take these policies and now really, literally grind out the instructions very specifically about how we get 

there. I am convinced we can do it. We are working on it now. We 

are looking to start immediately on the detension and removal 

issue. It is not going to happen overnight, but we are also looking 

to do a system-wide procurement for a suite of technology and infrastructure and people that will be integrated and will get us to 

where we need to go in a way that does not create a bottleneck. 

Senator COBURN. Let me just follow up. We also had a June 7 

hearing on the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Technology and 

Homeland Security. Mr. Aguilar discussed the expedited removal 

process for OTMs on our southern border. I was impressed by what 

we have heard so far. Currently that is being done in 2 of 20 sectors, both on the southern and northern border. Senator Kyl asked 

him for a time frame when we could expect this to expand from 2 

to 20, and Senator Kyl’s actual words were, ‘‘Are we talking about 

a matter of months, or what are we talking about?’’ And Mr. 

Aguilar’s quote was, ‘‘I would feel comfortable with that if DHS approves everything else, yes, sir.’’

So what does it take to approve that so that we get that type of 

process going in all 20 sectors? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I have approved it, I think, for a couple 

more sectors since then. The limiting factor, Senator, is beds. An 

expedited removal for a non-Mexican means you have to arrange 

to send them back to their homeland. 

Senator COBURN. I understand. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Now we need beds, but let me just give you 

one other little example of a small thing we could do that would 

22

make it better. Right now sometimes we wait, I think, for a period 

of days perhaps for a consular officer from a local country to appear 

and talk to the person before we can move him out. If we put in 

video conferencing and we get them to do it in a matter of hours, 

we can cut bed time. 

So Chief Aguilar was right. We are talking about rolling this out. 

We are talking about a matter of months to scale this up. But we 

need to make sure that when we scale it up on expedited removal, 

we have fully scaled up all the rest of the process. 

Senator COBURN. And you feel confident that is moving along? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Yes. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, those of us who come from urban area States are 

extremely concerned with the commentary made about transit systems and the Federal role in helping fund security for those systems. Now, many of these systems are interstate systems. We have 

Amtrak. Is Amtrack considered part of a national responsibility or 

does that, too, get divided up somehow in terms of supplying security funds? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think Amtrak police are Federal employees. I mean, as I say, I have ridden the same systems that we are 

talking about for many years. I do not think anybody suggested we 

make the New York City Transit Police Federal police, or the New 

Jersey Transit Police Federal police. The hiring, the payment, and 

the managing of those police will continue to remain, as I understand it, in the State and local hands. 

What we can do is we can add value in areas like technology and 

things of that sort, and we can give some financial help. But I 

guess, again, the way the ownership and the operation of those systems works is different in every different context. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. It is a clouded definition, and we are going 

to need Federal help in many of these operations. We just do not 

have the means in the States to take care of it on our own. 

Mr. Secretary, we took an action here yesterday that runs contrary to the statement that you make that you would oppose any 

amendment that does not allow 90 percent of the funding to be 

based on higher risk. Now, yesterday we voted within the Senate 

to decrease the funding that goes to the high-risk area by $138 million, confirmed by CRS. Does that represent an impairment for 

your operation in any way? Is it too small a sum to be concerned 

about? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I thought I was about as clear as you could 

possibly be in the letter, and I am sure I am better in letters than 

I am sometimes when I speak off the cuff. I mean obviously the 

closer we move to a totally risk-based system, the more ability we 

have to manage our resources in an effective way. Again, riskbased means looking at consequence, vulnerability, and threat. And 

as I tried to make clear, you cannot necessarily tell—maybe some 

people think they can—I cannot necessarily tell you which States, 

‘‘win or lose under that formula.’’ What I can tell you is that a riskbased formula that lets us use our resources in a way that is drivVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:33 May 12, 2006 Jkt 023159 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\23159.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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en by our analysis of risk as opposed to predetermined categories 

is what we favor. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Are you familiar with the statement made 

about the most dangerous 2-mile stretch in the country as an invitation for a terrorist attack; you are familiar with that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We have talked about this, I know we have, 

yes. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Do you believe that is true? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I cannot tell you what the most dangerous 

2-mile stretch is. I can tell you we look in a very disciplined way 

at all the infrastructure and the way infrastructure is built around 

each other, and we are very mindful of what reflects the highest 

dangers based not only on obviously the location of the population, 

but also the relationship with the infrastructure that can have cascading effects on things that are very far distant. 

I think again, I mean what we advocate is, and what I advocated 

in the letter is, a funding mechanism that allows us to use some 

of the tools we have developed, and some of them are quite sophisticated, in analyzing threat vulnerability and consequence of all different kinds of infrastructure in different parts of the country and 

then let us allocate the money on that basis. Again, bearing in 

mind what I said, a lot of the infrastructure is in private hands, 

and so that means the private sector has to bear its fair share of 

the responsibility, as do our other partners. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. It is suggested in a review of chemical 

hazards in the country, that fairly significant damage could result 

from an attack on any one of these. One of the most threatened 

place to the largest number of people is a chemical facility in Carney, New Jersey, which is part of the New York/New Jersey region, 

and it is estimated that as many as 12 million people could perish 

if an accident or a raid took place there. Do you have any reason 

to challenge these estimates? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I cannot say that I have heard of 12 million 

based on a single chemical plant. I can tell you what we do, and 

what we are continuing to do, is look at chemical plants, for example, and I think we have grouped them into tiers in terms of the 

threat that they would pose to particular parts of the country or 

numbers of people. It depends a lot on the nature of the chemical, 

the location of the plant, and how it is configured relative to other 

parts of a particular community, and I certainly do not want to announce publicly what the most dangerous ones are, but that is the 

model we are going to look at, as to the extent we have the ability 

to apply our resources in a risk-based way, and that is the kind of 

modeling we will use and go forward on. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Coleman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, just to follow up on Senator Lautenberg’s comments, the whole idea of risk assessment is not an exact science. 

It is not a mathematical calculation that will allow you to rank 

order of most risk. There is a whole range of factors that enter into 

that, including the part that we do not understand, which is what 

24

is in the mind of the terrorist, soft targets, hard targets. Minnesota 

has a nuclear power plant on the Mississippi River, so it is not a 

matter of the number of people that could be affected. You could 

affect commerce, one of the major flows of agricultural commerce 

in the United States, if that was the target, or the Mall of America, 

which is in a suburb outside of Minneapolis-St. Paul, but has 30 

or 35 million visitors a year and is a symbol. 

As we go about doing what we do in the Senate, I mean those 

of us who represent States with large cities but not of the size of 

New York or Los Angeles, risk is throughout this country. Do you 

think that is a fair statement? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I do, and I think, something here, Senator, 

I wanted to point out because it did not get as much attention in 

the speech as I thought it might, when we talked about the bio, 

having a chief medical officer and making preparedness for biological threats, putting it in the top rank of things, I was careful to 

talk about threats to animals and to our food supply. I mean that 

is something which people do not talk about perhaps that much 

here in this part of the country, but we all eat. I think we are all 

familiar with the impact, for example, that foot and mouth disease 

can have on our agriculture, and just look at what happens with 

one cow. So that is an example of something that I do put as high 

risk. 

Again, every risk we deal with differently does not mean we are 

going to have Federal cattle police sitting on the farms, but it does 

mean that when we think about preparedness, that is the kind of 

thing that I do want to put a lot of emphasis on. 

Senator COLEMAN. I would note that I did not make a formal 

statement, but in my formal remarks I wanted to say I was encouraged by the focus you have provided with a chief medical officer 

and the impact that has on food safety which is a huge issue. 

But let me just talk about the issue of preventing terrorists from 

acquiring and detonating nuclear weapons. Clearly, it is a major 

concern. I think I recall in the presidential debate that this was 

one of the issues both candidates said, ‘‘this is the most important 

issue that we are facing.’’

There are two areas I just want to probe, the first being radiation portal monitors. I know that you are committed to getting 

those employed. I believe that we are, almost 4 years after September 11, I think we have one seaport has complete installation 

of RPMs. Can you tell me what your vision is and when you think 

we can get that done? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think we have RPMs at a number of 

ports, land and sea. I think there may be a couple that have been 

100 percent done. Others are not 100 percent. We want to continue 

that process, but the President’s budget requests money for a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, which would get us to the next 

level. We want to make sure we are working on the next level of 

detection equipment as well. 

Senator COLEMAN. And that is the other area that I wanted to 

say that I am encouraged by the creation of a Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office. 

My question is concerning the ability of that office to coordinate 

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rity, Defense, State, and Energy. Can you tell me a little bit about 

what steps that you will take to ensure that DNDO will be fully 

coordinating its activity with those branches of government that 

are outside DHS? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Sure. And one of the reasons I wanted to 

make a direct report was to give it the stature to attract people in 

the office that would not just be DHS people, but would be senior 

people from the Department of Energy and the interested departments. I have spoken to Secretary Bodman about this. We are both 

very committed to making this work. I know the President is personally interested in this as well. I think we all know this is a 

unique threat, and that is not to say that it is a threat that is imminent, but it is a threat that if it ever comes to fruition would be 

of a character unlike anything we have ever seen. 

So there is a very high level of commitment to making this thing 

work, and if we can get the adequate funding—we are already 

working on it—we are going to continue to move in a very brisk 

fashion. 

Senator COLEMAN. And I do want to applaud you. I think it is 

a bold step, and I think it is critically important. 

Let me just ask about the soft side of Homeland Security, but 

one that has a lot of impact on people’s lives. The requirement that 

is being instituted now for passports, travel between the United 

States, Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean. In northern Minnesota and 

I presume in northern Maine and maybe some other places, people 

have a lot of commerce that goes back and forth, and they do not 

have a lot of options for commerce. What they have is important, 

and that you want to maintain it. They travel back and forth. They 

do not keep their passport in their back pocket. It is about 97 

bucks for a passport. If you have a family of five and you want to 

go fishing, all of a sudden you—you do not, by the way, have the 

passport operations in those areas. If you look at a map of where 

the offices are, they are not in the areas very directly impacted, in 

those northern regions. 

So I am concerned about the impact on ordinary citizens. It is 

that kind of balance between securing our borders, which the Senator from Oklahoma talked about, but also doing it in a way that 

does not unduly burden average Americans going about living their 

lives, and particularly those areas that it is a real economic impact, 

is a real quality of life impact. Are you considering other ways to 

address this other than the passport requirement? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We are, Senator, and I think we made clear 

at the very beginning we were looking and anticipated alternatives 

to passports. Obviously, a passport would be sufficient. And by the 

way, I do not think this requirement would come into effect under 

the law which Congress passed as part of, I believe, the Intelligence Reform Act for a few years. We have a few years to stage 

into this. 

But the idea is to identify other forms of secure identification 

that would suffice for purposes of doing this, and that is again why 

I am driving the point of having interoperable systems of cards and 

verification of documents so that you could use a wallet-size card 

that would do a number of different things for you, and it may be 

that under the—as we develop our regulations under the REAL ID 

26

Act, it may be that we can move to the point that even driver’s licenses will be able to satisfy the requirements of the statute. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Coleman follows:

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

I would like to begin by commending your foresight and strong leadership in reexamining the structure and priorities of the Department of Homeland Security. 

The terrorist attacks in London last week reminded us that we are still engaged 

in a Global War on Terrorism. These attacks underscore the importance of this review and remind us that our enemies continue to seek to harm us and therefore, 

we must continually work to strengthen the security of our homeland. Both DHS 

and the Senate must collaboratively ensure DHS is adequately structured, financed, 

and focused to protect our homeland. I personally look forward to working with you 

and DHS to pass the legislation needed to implement the reforms you have outlined. 

I am privileged to Chair the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and, as 

you know, we have closely followed supply chain security—specifically the implementation of the Container Security Initiative, or CSI, and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C–TPAT. As we discussed with Commissioner Bonner 

at our May 26 hearing, entitled ‘‘The Container Security Initiative and Customs 

Trade Partnership Against Terrorism: Securing the Global Supply Chain or Trojan 

Horse?’’ these programs are promising concepts, yet require considerable changes to 

transition into sustainable initiatives. Commissioner Bonner and CBP have begun 

to implement some positive changes, yet much work remains. To follow-up on our 

May hearing and assess these changes as well as the impact on the private sector, 

PSI will hold another hearing on this issue in the fall. 

I am encouraged by the launch of the Secure Freight Initiative and hope to hear 

you expand upon this during your testimony today. I also hope, Mr. Secretary, that 

DHS will continue to work closely with my Subcommittee on programs and initiatives to strengthen our supply chain security. And as I have said previously, instead 

of security becoming a cost of doing business, it must become a way of doing business. 

My Subcommittee is also closely following programs designed to confront the 

threat of nuclear terrorism. The threat of terrorist acquiring and detonating a nuclear weapon in the Untied States is real and we need to prioritize programs to prevent terrorists from obtaining material as well as programs to detect these materials abroad and domestically. It is simply unacceptable that today, almost 4 years 

after September 11, only one seaport has actually completed the installation of Radiation Portal Monitors, or RPMs. I am encouraged to hear that you have publicly 

indicated that the deployment of RPMs will be completed and urge that this becomes a top priority of DHS. Installing these portals must be a priority and this 

job must be completed. 

Also, as you may know, I am a strong supporter of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and believe that under the direction of Vayl Oxford, this is the right and 

necessary concept for a coordinated and focused response to the threat of nuclear 

terrorism. No reform is more important in preventing a nuclear attack than eliminating the diffuse and disparate programs within DHS and across other Departments. I urge your personal involvement as DNSO seeks to enhance the coordination of the various Departments engaged in this issue. 

Just like Chairman Collins, as a representative and a resident of a border State, 

border security is an issue of personal interest and importance to my constituents. 

We need to implement strong and sensible policies to secure our border, yet need 

to be mindful of the millions of Americans who travel freely across this border on 

a daily basis. As you all know, I have expressed concern over the far-reaching and 

perhaps, unintended consequences of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. I 

hope that together we can find an acceptable solution that ensures security without 

infringing upon the lives of millions of my fellow residents along the Northern Border. 

To that end, I would also like to note that my Subcommittee will continue to follow border security issues closely and focus on programs that facilitate trade, process people, and deport individuals that are here illegally. Strengthening these initiatives will ensure that all our borders are more secure. Finally, I am very excited 

that the legislation championed by Senators Collins and Lieberman—and which I 

co-sposnored—was recently passed by the Senate and will lead to the fair distribution of homeland security grants. 

27

I want to thank you for addressing the grant problem between Minneapolis and 

St. Paul and also thank you in advance for taking the time to visit my good friend, 

Mayor Kelly in St. Paul next week. I look forward to your testimony today, and look 

forward to continuing to work with you as a Member of this Committee, as a Subcommittee chairman, and as a concerned citizen who wants to make our country 

more secure.

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Pryor. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Secretary Chertoff, let me ask if I may something that Senator 

Coleman referred to a few moments ago and you followed up on 

about the food supply and agriculture generally. 

What is your assessment of the risk of an attack to agriculture, 

what we call that agroterrorism? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I do not know that I can give you a number. I think the general issue of biological attacks on human health 

and animal health and food, it is an area that we need to be concerned about. We know historically that terrorists have looked at 

biological and chemical weapons, and I think it is not hard to see 

how that might be applied in an agricultural setting, as well as in 

a human setting. 

Now, the principal point in our general governmental preparedness process for dealing with these issues is the Department of Agriculture, and they own the expertise. But our responsibility as 

those who essentially have to look at the total architecture of our 

preparedness is to make sure that we are working with the Department of Agriculture, that we have a good set of plans, a good set 

of preparedness for what to do in the case of an attack like this. 

Obviously, part of this is keeping these agents out of the country 

in the first place. But we also know that there are naturally occurring things like foot and mouth disease in the world, so there is 

a fair amount of learning and understanding about how to deal 

with that, and we just need to make sure we have a good set of 

plans and resources in place in case something like that should 

happen. 

Senator PRYOR. You mentioned a good set of plans and good preparedness. Do you feel like the Department is there? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think we have done a lot, but I think by 

indicating my desire to consolidate preparedness and make it accountable in one place, that I feel we need to polish up what we 

have, and we need to make sure that to the extent there are issues 

that you have to debate about how you deal with these things, that 

we get those debates done in advance and make some decisions 

about what the appropriate course of action is before, God forbid, 

we face an actual crisis. 

Senator PRYOR. So in other words, you are saying agroterrorism 

is real? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think we have to treat the danger of a biological attack or a chemical attack on our agricultural system as 

a priority concern. 

Senator PRYOR. Also would you include as part of that, using agriculture chemicals in an attack, like the Oklahoma City bombing? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. That is a somewhat different category of 

issues. I mean the question of explosives—and we know that fertilizer can be used as an explosive——

28

Senator PRYOR. Right. I just mean they are much more available 

in agricultural areas. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think that is true, although I must tell 

you there are a disturbing number of household chemicals that can 

be used to make powerful explosives. So that is a species of a larger problem that I would consider a little bit separate from the biological problem. 

Senator PRYOR. I may want to follow up with you on that separately at some point and talk about that in more detail. 

Do you think that agriculture security will be considered a high 

enough risk to be part of the risk-based funding? I mean are we 

there on that? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. It is clearly a high risk in terms of our priority. Again, I guess I want to come back to the original point I 

made to Senator Lieberman. I cannot equate priority necessarily 

with the amount of money that is spent. There are going to be 

many things that are very high priority in which the infrastructure, frankly, is in private hands, and I am not going to say that 

the Federal Government is going to pay private people to protect 

what they own. We will use other ways to encourage the private 

sector to do what it has to do. 

So I can tell you that agroterrorism is a very high priority. How 

that plays out in terms of funding depends on the particular characteristics of that sector of the economy and the way that business 

model works. 

Senator PRYOR. Great. And tell me about the chief medical officer. How do you envision that working? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Again, we do not own—the expertise in 

human health is principally HHS. The expertise in animal health 

is principally Agriculture, and that is before we even get to all the 

State officials who have a tremendous amount of expertise in this 

area. I do not see DHS as competing to seize control of the expertise. 

What we do have the obligation to do is to look at the total picture, make sure that we turn to the departments with the expertise, and ascertain that they have a plan in place, that it is properly integrated with everything else we are doing in terms of preventing and protecting against an attack and responding if we have 

an attack. Making sure, if there is uncertainty about that plan, 

that we get that resolved and we have certainty, and ultimately 

owning the responsibility for coordinating a response with these experts in the various departments across the board. And that is 

what is really laid out in the National Response Plan which the 

President has issued. 

Senator PRYOR. I am curious about your new organizational paradigm there that you are trying to set up. Do I understand correctly that Border and Transportation Security is merging into Preparedness? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. No. What is going to happen, we are going 

to take the—Border and Transportation Security did three things. 

It was responsible for policy planning and was responsible for operations, but only with respect to some of the components of the Department. It covered, for example, Customs and Border Protection, 

29

TSA, and ICE. It does not cover Coast Guard, for example, or other 

functions. 

What we are doing, essentially we are building on a good idea. 

We are taking the good idea of that planning function, but we are 

making it part of a department-wide directorate that is going to 

have the ability to plan for all of the components, not just some of 

the components. We are going to take—Border and Transportation 

Security had an operational capability, but with respect to a few 

components. We are going to take that and create an office that can 

be operational coordinator for all of the components. Once we do 

that, we have effectively taken the functions of the BTS, and we 

have made them more nimble and made them more wide spanning 

across the entire breadth of the Department. At that point we really do not need another layer to stand between some of the components and the Secretary. We have taken out the functions, we have 

distributed them across the board, and I think we can actually flatten the organization. 

Senator PRYOR. So if I can summarize, this sounds to me like it 

is an example of the Department being up and running for a couple 

years, learning some lessons about how some things work and 

some things do not, and you are trying to streamline and make 

things more efficient. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. That is exactly right. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Dayton. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAYTON 

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for taking on these many enormous 

burdens. We have had two instances in the last 13 months with a 

small private plane, originally unidentified, at least not communicating its identification to Capitol Police, and evacuations, and I 

think both of them have demonstrated different gaps in communications. The first, as I recall, the FAA was aware the plane did 

not have an operating transponder and under its own regulations 

should not have been permitted, but it was, and they knew that. 

They did not communicate that. There was an open line established, I guess, among different agencies to communicate post-September 11. That was not staffed so the information was not shared. 

More recently, the evacuation, I believe, showed a lack of communication between the Federal and the City of Washington, DC, and 

as we learned this morning at a hearing that Senator Voinovich 

chaired, a subcommittee, was instructive because they had representatives from the States of Virginia, Maryland, and then Washington, DC, and then the Federal agency. And the complexity of 

these intergovernmental entities and relationships means, it seems, 

that there have to be these multiple communications, which in an 

emergency situation, seems the more complexity you have, the 

more likelihood that something is not going to function properly. 

Is your agency responsible? Is there an overriding responsibility 

that someone has to protect the Capitol and to make decisions that 

become necessary if that kind of a situation occurs again? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I guess we have responsibility for managing 

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ners. To the extent, of course, that F–16s go up, as they do when 

we have these incidents, those F–16s obviously are part of the Department of Defense and operate within the authority of the Department of Defense. 

What we did in the wake of—there frankly have been many incidents with small planes. Very few of them get to the point of getting reported. And they are by and large innocent. People either 

get mixed up or sometimes they are trying to avoid weather. What 

we did after a recent incident was we sat down with the city and 

with everybody else. We have an operations center in which both 

States and the City of Washington, DC, are represented and have 

people present who can listen real time to the discussion over the 

airways when planes are coming in. 

We decided that as a back-up it made sense for the District of 

Columbia to have somebody present in our Transportation Security 

Administration Operations Center, which is a second center, and 

have that person again able to listen live. And then I think there 

is also some additional steps the District has taken to tap into 

some of our preexisting warning communication systems——

Senator DAYTON. Excuse me. My concern is that in both of those 

instances, although people were evacuated—I give the Capitol Police, I mean they were heroic to stand their ground and get people 

out—but if either of those planes had been a hijacked terrorist 

plane, it would have crashed in the Capitol well before hundreds 

of people would have been evacuated. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Well, actually—let me try to address it this 

way. Of course the time frame within which you know that a plane 

is coming is very short. We get hundreds and hundreds of planes 

that within a certain number of miles do raise our interest. I can 

tell you first of all that I do not think there is any doubt that had 

it been necessary, the Air Force would have had the capability to 

remove any threat, any airborne threat. 

But that raises a second question, which is to caution that evacuation is not always the right step in the face of an attack. A small 

plane—and I know this is being looked at now—does not necessarily have the capability of doing to a strong building what people envision, let us say in the case of what happened on September 

11. On the other hand, a small plane carrying a chemical or biological agent would actually do more damage if people go out in the 

street than if people shelter in place. 

And if there is one message I can leave to the country at large 

on this issue of preparedness is, our intuitions about the right reaction in the face of a threat like an airplane, which is often to run, 

sometimes turns out not to be right. Sometimes we are better off 

sheltering in place. That is why one of the things we encourage 

people to do is, as part of preparedness, is to think through and 

understand—we want businesses to do this, too, and government 

agencies—to understand that sometimes the right advice is do not 

run out of the building, stay where you are, maybe go down to a 

basement, and that is actually safer. 

So we have spent a lot of time on this. I am confident we have 

the situation well in hand, and we continue to monitor it and train 

on it. 

31

Senator DAYTON. Along those lines, how does opening National 

Airport to general aviation improve our homeland security? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. What it does is it is the recognition of the 

fact that where we have sufficient systems in place to protect ourselves, we ought to consider lightening the burdens and restrictions 

as well as making them heavier. 

Senator DAYTON. We have no security at the terminals I have 

gone to that charter planes, no screening, nothing. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. Actually, when the regulation becomes effective—and I think that should happen within a very short period 

of time, a matter of days—it will not allow general aviation to come 

in. It will require general aviation that comes in to be previously 

identified, required TSA screening at the place in which the general aviation departs from. It requires certain other security measures that are in place, precisely to avoid the situation you are concerned about. 

Senator DAYTON. If the greatest burden placed on somebody is to 

have to land at Dulles and drive in, as I have done several times 

for that reason, I mean, it seems to me that is a very small burden 

on anyone, and with these planes you say it has happened a number of times without having an evacuation, it just seems to me having that many more planes and pilots with different degrees of 

knowledge about the procedures and all, you are begging for more 

incidents related to the Capitol. I do not get it. I think it is one 

of those burdens that can be justified. 

I am sorry my time is limited. I am sorry to cut you off. But let 

me ask something else. Last night Senator Akaka offered an 

amendment to increase the funding for the first responders program, including the UASI and the like, and we were told by the 

chairman of the Senate Budget Committee on the floor, he said, 

‘‘The simple fact is that you cannot disregard the fact that there 

is $7 billion in the pipeline for first responders, $3 billion from the 

year 2004, $4 billion from 2005 that has not been spent.’’ Is there 

$7 billion in the pipeline because we would surely love to direct 

some of that pipeline to Minnesota. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think the figure I have in my mind on 

State homeland security funding and Urban Security Initiative 

Funding in the last several years, I think, is a total of $8.6 billion. 

That is over a period of years. That is in various parts of the pipeline. Some of it has been spent, some of it has been obligated, some 

of it is going to be awarded in grant programs that we currently 

have under way. 

So again, often figures get sliced in different ways, and I am 

never quite sure——

Senator DAYTON. But never in the Senate. 

Secretary CHERTOFF [continuing]. How they are being sliced, but 

I can tell you that I think the figure I have for the last several 

years has been $8.6 billion. 

Senator DAYTON. Madam Chairman, I will direct a question, if 

I may, and ask for a written response that really details that because I think if that was a misstatement on the Senate floor, it 

should be corrected. If it is accurate, I would like to know why 

there is $7 billion that has not been distributed and why areas of 

Minnesota were zeroed out in funding, and I will follow up on that. 

32

Finally, I noted with interest your comments in your prepared 

testimony, Mr. Secretary, about FEMA. We have had a couple of 

experiences in Minnesota with flooding disasters. In 1997, the Red 

River flooded and Grand Forks, East Grand Forks, and the lake 

were seriously damaged. From all accounts, FEMA was outstanding there and responsive, minimum of red tape. When the city 

of Roseau in Northwestern Minnesota flooded in 2002, it was not 

the same efficiency of response. I was up there myself a couple of 

times in the immediate aftermath, and the FEMA individuals came 

in from, I believe it was Washington State, but they were right on 

the spot. They could not have been more wanting to be forthcoming. 

But they were trying to explain these programs to beleaguered 

men and women who lost their homes, lost their businesses, lost 

their farms, whatever, and you had to have an advanced degree in 

computer science to track these different programs and intricacies 

and everything else. And then they had to apply, and then they got 

turned down, and then they did not know they had to appeal. I 

mean we could have made it a lot easier, and without just throwing 

money at people, they needed some oversight. This is a time when 

people are down and out, they are in despair, and if ever government needed to undo a lot of the bureaucratic red tape and just be 

able to be forthcoming in a reasonable way would just improve, I 

think, not only the quality of the service but just the attitude that 

those people have toward their own government in a time of critical 

need. 

So I would urge you to bring to us, as soon as you can, any suggestions or whatever you need from us, to untie the hands of these 

people and simplify these programs or assistance, and authorize 

the people on the spot to do a job, empowering them to approve 

these awards and get the money in the hands of these people. 

Thank you. I am finished. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. I just want to make sure Senator 

Carper has time for his questions because the vote has started. 

Senator DAYTON. He said I could have his time. 

Chairman COLLINS. And you did. [Laughter.] 

Senator DAYTON. He does not remember that. 

Senator CARPER. I would like to insert my prepared statement at 

this time. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Carper follows:]

OPENING PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding this important hearing on Secretary 

Chertoff’s plans to refocus and reorganize the Department of Homeland Security. 

I supported the creation of the Department of Homeland Security as a Member 

of this Committee 3 years ago now because I believed it would enable Federal agencies to do better, and more efficiently, prevent, prepare for, and respond to disasters 

and terrorists attacks. Since the Department came into being, I think we’ve had 

some successes. There are certainly areas, however, that need improvement. 

We established the Department of Homeland Security to reduce the vulnerability 

of the Untied States to terrorism. The bombings in London last week and in Madrid 

last year, however, demonstrate the very real threat to our own transit and rail systems. 

But to date, the Department of Homeland Security, to my knowledge, has not set 

out a review of the threats to and vulnerabilities in our surface transportation system. Nor has the Department provided standard guidance to our Nation’s transit 

and rail operators as to how they should protect their riders. 

33

We need the Department of Homeland Security to work proactively to establish 

standards and help build the infrastructure necessary to prevent and prepare for 

future attacks. They can’t respond only to the specific type of attack we suffered on 

September 11. But the Department has failed, in my view, to tackle rail and transit 

security needs the way they’ve tackled aviation security. 

In the Department’s defense, Congress hasn’t put the same focus on rail and transit security as we have on aviation security either, and this is something we need 

to change. The Senate unanimously passed legislation last year to establish a transit and rail security program. However, the House did not act on it before the end 

of the session and neither body has done anything since. 

While we’ve stood by, the FBI has warned us on more than one occasion that al 

Qaeda may be directly targeting U.S. passenger trains and that their operatives 

may try to destroy key rail bridges and sections of track to cause derailments. Following the successful attacks in London and Madrid, it’s likely that al Qaeda and 

other like-minded groups will target rail and transit systems in the United States. 

We need to provide our transit agencies and Amtrak with the guidance and support 

they need. We can’t afford to wait for a London- or Madrid-style attack to occur on 

our shores before taking action. 

Further, many municipalities—including the District of Columbia—are concerned 

about the movement of hazmat by rail and by truck through their cities. Because 

the lack of Federal guidance regarding who must be informed about hazmat movement through sensitive areas, cities and States are moving ahead with their own 

rules and often fighting this out in the courts. The experts at the Department of 

Homeland Security need to analyze this issue and provide us with some guidance 

so that we can provide a consistent, safe standard regarding the movement of hazardous materials across our country. 

In closing, I’d note, Madam Chairman, that Secretary Chertoff mentioned in his 

speech yesterday announcing the results of his second stage review the need to 

tighten transportation security—including rail and transit security. I look forward 

to hearing some details this afternoon about what he might have in mind in this 

area because it’s vitally important that we hit the ground running in the wake of 

the London bombings and work together to do what needs to be done to prevent 

loss of life here at home.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Secretary, welcome. Thanks for joining us 

again today. It is good to see you as always. 

I know this question came up earlier, and I was unable to be 

here when it was raised. But I believe you may have testified before a committee in the House either today or yesterday. I was 

asked by a reporter to respond to something that she thought that 

you had said. The tenor of her question, the thrust of her question 

was: Secretary Chertoff suggested before the House yesterday or 

today that the States really should assume the responsibility for 

underwriting the cost of terrorist protection, or protection against 

terrorist attacks on inter-city passenger rail and on commuter rail 

services. I do not know if she was goading me or what, but she was 

trying to get me to kind of lash out at you. And my first response 

was, I find that hard to believe that he would have said that. So 

I think it has probably come up here earlier, but I just wanted to 

hear it with my own ears what you said. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. It did come up earlier, Senator, and it is 

fascinating to watch the velocity of misunderstanding as it increases over time. While I may not have been crystal clear, what 

I said to the reporter—it was not in a hearing, but what I said to 

the reporter is this: We deal with different systems—we obviously 

have a Federal responsibility for protecting everybody in the country. We deal with the mechanics of different systems, and so the 

way in which we carry out that protective responsibility differs in 

different systems. The aviation system is one in which it is a closed 

34

system, and basically Federal authority is the only government authority that operates in the area of air travel. 

When it comes to, for example, subways—and here I am speaking from my own personal experience riding subways—a lot of the 

boots on the ground are local boots on the ground. There are transit police, local police, and conductors. 

Although we have, for example, screeners at the airport that are 

federally employed, I do not think anybody would suggest we 

should federally employ all subway, transit police, or subway conductors. 

The way in which we work with protecting our transit systems 

is to work in partnership with State and local authorities. And the 

boots on the ground largely are owned by those State and local authorities, they are not Federal police. 

What we do bring to the process is we give assistance, we have 

technological assistance, we have intelligence. I have talked at 

some length here about some of the detection equipment and detection systems we have worked with the States and locals to put into 

place, as well as worked with, which we are continuing to be doing. 

And of course we have made aid available through various transit 

programs, as well as through the President’s budget, which contemplates $600 million in targeted infrastructure protection that is 

available for transit systems. 

We talked earlier about the State Homeland Security grants and the Urban Security Initiative grants. That is $8.6 billion, and that 

money is certainly—transit protection is eligible for that kind of assistance. 

So we play a major role working with our partners in protecting 

our rail and bus systems. But the way in which that role is played, 

of course, is different in that partnership setting than it is, for example, in a setting, in an aviation setting where it is a different 

kind of a system. 

Senator CARPER. I am told that if you add up all the people that 

ride subways and buses and trains, and you look at the amount of 

money that we are spending as a Nation to protect them from terrorist attacks, it works out to about 12 cents per rider. I am told 

that if we look at the amount of money that we spend on those of 

us who ride airplanes around the country and around the world, 

that we spend as a Nation about $7.50 dollars per rider. I do not 

know if those numbers are correct, but if they are, we are spending 

roughly 50 times more for a rider on an aircraft than we are on 

those who may be on a train or on a subway. 

I appreciate the need for a partnership, but I have a concern. 

There are a lot of other expenses and needs that State and local 

governments are trying to meet with the Federal grants that they 

get, and to load onto that a major expectation for them to help protect inter-city passenger rail and transit, I think is unwise, and I 

am encouraged by what I hear you say, but I want to have a 

chance to think about it a bit more. 

Let me just come back to funding for this current fiscal year. My 

recollection was in the appropriations bill for Homeland Security in 

fiscal year 2005 that we included about $150 million to look to the 

needs of transit security in particular. I do not know that there is 

any money there for inter-city passenger rail, but about $150 milVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:33 May 12, 2006 Jkt 023159 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\23159.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
35

lion. And I am told that we spent precious little of that money during the course of this fiscal year. I do not know if that is true. 

Maybe you can clarify that for me if it is. But if it is true, if we 

spent none or little of the $150 million. I am also told the Administration did not ask anything specifically for 2006. I think we have 

about $100 million in the bill now on the Floor, probably going to 

adopt an amendment to add to that. But my question is, what is 

the Department doing to facilitate moving that money out to where 

it might be put to best use? 

Secretary CHERTOFF. We retooled our process of analyzing how 

we were spending this year in order to be somewhat more rigorous 

and disciplined in terms of how to get the money out, and I think 

the real money, some of the real money that was stopped is now 

in the process of being moved out. 

I have to say, I think, I read an article in the paper in the last 

couple days where the head of the New York Metropolitan Transit 

Authority said he had a lot of money he had not spent yet. And 

they were asking him why, and he said: ‘‘Because I do not really 

know what to spend it on. I am waiting to see what kind of technology is the best technology to use.’’

This is very important to protect transportation, but it is important to protect it in the right way and not to waste the money, and 

I can guarantee you, if we waste the money I am going to be reading stories in a year about how we wasted money on gyms and 

stuff like that, which I know from going back a couple years. 

Senator CARPER. It is hard to waste money when we are not 

spending it. I do not think anyone is going to accuse you of wasting 

money in providing for transit security. 

Secretary CHERTOFF. I think what we are doing is we are spending it, but I think we have a program now to make sure it is being 

spent wisely, and of course, again, when I hear the head of transit 

authority say, well, he is not sure he wants to spend his money yet 

because he does not know what to spend it on, that does put a little 

kind of cautionary flag up. 

I do want to say that we are doing a lot of stuff in rail. We are 

doing a lot of stuff with respect to, for example, chemical and biological detection equipment, integrated systems with video and 

with detectors which we now have in Boston and in New York and 

in Washington. We have Biowatch centers in 32 cities in the country. We are accelerating development of that. That is focused on a 

very significant threat in the subway system, which is the threat 

not just of a bomb which could kill—it would be bad enough to kill 

a few dozen people, but imagine a biological agent put in a subway 

system that killed thousands of people and made the system unusable for a period of months. 

So I want to make sure that we are focused on putting our considerable resources that we are putting into transportation security, again, in a disciplined and prioritized way. 

Finally, let me say, in this year’s budget, we basically combined 

a number of programs, and actually our targeted infrastructure 

protection program requested $600 million, which would put in the 

area of rail and other similar things more money than would have 

been available to all of those things individually based on the prior 

year’s spending. 

36

1The CRS report dated July 12, 2005, appears in the Appendix on page 72. 

So we have actually put considerable additional money into this, 

and I want to remind the public that in addition, we have large 

general grant programs for homeland security which are fully 

available for transportation. So we should not view transportation 

as limited to a few hundred million. We have literally made billions 

of dollars available to States and localities in various programs 

over the years that have been used to spend on enhancing transportation facilities. 

Senator CARPER. My time has expired. Let me just say, if the 

folks in New York or somewhere else do not know how to spend 

some of these dollars, I am sure there are folks in other States, including my own, and probably some other States that are represented here on this panel, that could figure out how to do it. 

I would urge you to consider, your Department to consider putting out guidelines to help New York or anybody who is having a 

hard time figuring it out. 

Last, we do not have time to do this here. If I did, I would ask 

you just to share with us, what do they do in London? What systems do they have on the ground in place that enable them to track 

down so quickly the perpetrators of the crimes that were committed and killed all those people? 

Chairman COLLINS. Cameras. 

Senator CARPER. That is what I hear. But we do not have time 

for that today, but it was amazing what they accomplished in a 

very short period of time in figuring out who did this, who perpetrated those crimes, and tracking down the perpetrators, identifying them. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. 

Mr. Secretary, we do have a vote on. You are in luck because 

that means this hearing has to conclude. 

I want to make two very quick points in closing. The first is that 

as I review your plan, I see that you intend to make some truly 

fundamental changes to the Department without requesting legislation. Your list of legislative changes is very narrow, and I think 

you are pushing the boundaries on that. I hope you will work with 

the Committee so that we can draft a more comprehensive reauthorization bill. I think many of the changes you are proposing 

really should be done by law and not just administratively. So that 

is an issue we will be pursuing with you. 

Second, I cannot let the record go uncorrected in response to the 

comments from the Senator from New Jersey about the CollinsLieberman Homeland Security Grant Amendment, which was 

adopted by the Senate overwhelmingly yesterday, with more than 

70 votes, 71 as a matter of fact. 

I want to make two points. First, the Collins-Lieberman Amendment doubles the amount of money that would be allocated based 

on a risk assessment as compared to current law. In fact, the latest 

Congressional Research Service report, which I will put into the 

record, says that nearly 80 percent of the funding would be allocated based on a risk assessment.1

Second—and this is a very important point—the Secretary of 

Homeland Security will have unprecedented authority to allocate 

37

funds. We asked the Congressional Research Service to see if they 

could find any other grant program in excess of a billion dollars 

where a Secretary was given such unfettered discretion, and they 

could not. Colleagues on both sides of the aisle have expressed concerns that we in the Congress are giving you too much authority 

to allocate these funds as you see fit. 

So in fact, we have moved a long ways toward the position that 

you have advocated, despite the concerns of the Senator from New 

Jersey. I hope your future public statements on this will reflect 

these key points as well. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. May I just say that in this, as in so much 

else, the Chairman speaks for the Ranking Member. [Laughter.] 

I do want to say it struck me, as we were all focused on London, 

that it bears mentioning that from all that we know now, the plot 

to attack rail and transit in London was put together in Leeds, a 

smaller town, and it follows the pattern of the September 11 attacks here, and it shows the important role of local law enforcers 

in stopping such plots, not to mention the fact that agroterrorism, 

obviously, would be carried out in rural areas as well. So we are 

together on this. Thank you very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. The hearing record will remain 

open for 15 days. I am sure many of the Members will have additional questions for the record as well as other materials to submit. 

Thank you very much for appearing today. We look forward to 

working closely with you. 

Chairman COLLINS. This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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