NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JUSTIN M., Appellant,

v.

APRIL M., T.M., N.M., D.M., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0523

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS518028

The Honorable Arthur T. Anderson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli, Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Robert D. Rosanelli

Counsel for Appellant

April M., Mesa

Appellee
JUSTIN M. v. APRIL M., et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James P. Beene delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop

joined.

B E E N E, Judge:

¶1 Justin M. (“Father”) appeals an order terminating his parental 

rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father is the biological parent of T.M., N.M., and D.M. 

(“Children”). In 2010, Father married April M. (“Mother”), and soon after, 

they had two children, T.M. and N.M. In 2013, Father was arrested for 

domestic violence after assaulting Mother. Father was sentenced to one 

year incarceration for charges stemming from the event. Following his 

release, Father and Mother had another child together, D.M.

¶3 In 2015, Father was convicted of burglary and sentenced to 

seven years’ incarceration. During Father’s incarceration, he tested positive 

for drugs on multiple occasions. Following Father’s positive drug tests, 

Mother filed for divorce, which was finalized in September 2016. Mother 

obtained sole legal decision-making authority regarding the Children and

Father’s parenting time with the Children was at Mother’s discretion.

¶4 On June 1, 2016, Mother filed a petition to terminate Father’s 

parental rights on several grounds, including the length of incarceration for 

a felony conviction that would deprive the Children of a normal home for 

a period of years.1 Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B)(4) (2017).2

 

1 We need only address one of the statutory grounds for termination

found by the superior court. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 282, ¶ 9 

(2005) (only one statutory ground necessary to satisfy § 8-533).

2 Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite a statute’s 

current version.
JUSTIN M. v. APRIL M., et al.

Decision of the Court

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¶5 After a contested termination hearing, the superior court 

found by clear and convincing evidence that Father’s conviction and 

incarceration for seven years was a valid basis for termination, and found 

by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in the Children’s best 

interests to terminate Father’s parental rights. Father timely appealed the 

termination. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12–120.21(A)(1) 

(2017) and 8–235(A) (2017).

DISCUSSION

¶6 The fundamental right to parent one’s child is not absolute. 

Kent K., at 284, ¶ 24. The superior court may terminate parental rights if it 

finds, “by clear and convincing evidence, at least one of the statutory 

grounds set out in section 8–533,”and by a preponderance of the evidence 

that termination is in the best interest of the child. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't 

of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248–49, ¶ 12 (2000). We review an order 

terminating parental rights for an abuse of discretion and will not reverse 

unless “there is no reasonable evidence to support” the order. Mary Lou C. 

v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004).

Father’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to A.R.S. § 

8-533(B)(4) because his term of imprisonment was of such length that the 

Children would be deprived of a normal home for a period of years. There 

is no “bright line” defining how long a sentence must be to deprive a child 

of a normal home for a “period of years,” and each case must be determined 

based on its “particular facts.” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251, ¶ 29. The 

superior court may look to all relevant factors, including:

(1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship 

existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which 

the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured 

during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the 

relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that 

incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the 

length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to 

provide a normal home life, and (6) the effect of the 

deprivation of a parental presence on the child at issue.

Id. at 251-52, ¶ 29.
JUSTIN M. v. APRIL M., et al.

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¶7 Father was incarcerated in 2015, and the earliest date he could 

be released is December 2020. Because of Father’s domestic violence and 

burglary convictions, he has been incarcerated for the majority of the 

Children’s lives.

¶8 Due to Father’s continued drug use, the superior court found 

that Father was not willing to take steps necessary to maintain a healthy 

relationship with the Children. We defer to a trial court’s findings because 

it is “in the best position to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of the 

parties, observe the parties, and make appropriate factual findings.” In re 

Pima Cty. Dependency Action No. 93511, 154 Ariz. 543, 546 (App. 1987). We 

find no error in the superior court’s finding that clear and convincing 

evidence demonstrates a valid basis for termination under § 8-533(B)(4).

¶9 The superior court also determined by a preponderance of the 

evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s 

best interests. “[I]n a private proceeding to sever parental rights, just as in 

state-initiated proceedings, a juvenile court may conclude that a proposed 

adoption benefits the child and supports a finding that severance is in the 

child’s best interests.” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 2, ¶ 1 (2016). 

In considering a child's best interests, the superior court is tasked with 

balancing “the unfit parent’s diluted interest against the independent and 

often adverse interests of the child in a safe and stable home life.” Id. at 4, 

¶ 15.

¶10 The superior court found by a preponderance of the evidence

that termination of Father’s parental rights would benefit the Children by 

allowing Mother to care for the Children without Father’s highly disruptive

influence. We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the superior 

court’s finding that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the 

Children’s best interests.
JUSTIN M. v. APRIL M., et al.

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶11 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order terminating 

Father’s parental rights.