Filed 5/1/20 Certified for Publication 5/22/20 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KENNY INKWON LEE,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B297928

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA079332)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed. 

Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and David W. Williams, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________
2

Defendant and appellant Kenny InKwon Lee appeals from 

the trial court’s denial of his petition under Penal Code1

section 1170.95. That statutory section permits defendants 

convicted of murder under the felony murder rule or natural and 

probable consequences doctrine to petition for resentencing based 

on changes to the Penal Code enacted under Senate Bill No. 1437 

(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015). 

Our opinion from Lee’s original appeal in 1996 indicates he 

was not convicted under either of these two theories, but instead 

was convicted under the provocative act doctrine. Provocative act 

murder requires proof of malice, which distinguishes it from 

felony murder and natural and probable consequences murder. 

Lee therefore is not entitled to resentencing under section 

1170.95.

Accordingly, we affirm. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

We quote the summary of the facts in our 1996 opinion 

(1996 opinion) addressing Lee’s appeal from his conviction. 

(People v. Lee (May 28, 1996, B088132 [nonpub. opn.])2 

“Three men arrived at a shopping center in a red sports car. 

While the driver (Chul Woong Choi) waited in the car, Lee and 

Joo Hyung Woo got out and went into a video store. Outside, a 

suspicious security guard (Agustin Nolasco) started to write down 

 

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

2 We granted Lee’s request to take judicial notice of our 

1996 opinion. Apart from that opinion, the record before us 

does not contain any of the trial or appellate record pertaining to 

Lee’s original conviction.
3

the sports car’s license number. Inside, Lee and Woo pointed 

guns at the video store’s two employees, dragged them to the

back of the store, beat them, and took their money and personal 

belongings. Lee and Woo then ransacked the store and took 

money from the cash register.” (People v. Lee, supra, B088132, 

at p. *2.)

“Impatient, Choi (who was also carrying a gun) got out of 

the sports car, tried to open the door to the video store, and yelled 

to Lee and Woo, ‘Hey, let’s go.’ As Lee and Woo ran out of the 

store, Nolasco (the guard) stepped out of his car and yelled (in 

English), ‘What’s going on?’ In response, Lee and Choi

pointed their guns at Nolasco and Nolasco, in turn, ducked down 

behind his open car door and grabbed his gun from his car. Lee 

and Woo got into the sports car and when Nolasco raised his head 

to see what was going on, Choi (then halfway into the driver’s 

seat of the sports car) fired a shot at Nolasco. Nolasco shot back 

twice, hitting Choi. Lee (who was sitting next to Choi) stepped on 

the accelerator and, while shooting at Nolasco, drove slowly out of

the parking lot.” (People v. Lee, supra, B088132, at p. *2.)

“Nolasco ran into the video store, made sure everyone was 

all right, then went back outside where he found Choi’s dead 

body face down on the ground where he had been dumped by Lee 

and Woo.” (People v. Lee, supra, B088132, at p. *3.)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Trial, conviction, and appeal

Lee and Woo “both were charged with Choi’s murder, three 

counts of robbery, the attempted murder of Nolasco, and a variety 

of firearm enhancements.” (People v. Lee, supra, B088132, 

at p. *3.) Woo was granted immunity to testify against Lee, 
4

although he ultimately was not called as a witness. (Ibid.) After 

a jury trial, Lee was convicted of first degree murder, attempted 

murder, two counts of robbery, and one count of receiving stolen 

property, with enhancements. (Id. at pp. *2–*3.) 

Lee’s conviction for murder was based on the “provocative 

act” doctrine. (People v. Lee, supra, B088132, at p. *3.) 

Appealing from that conviction, Lee argued there was insufficient 

evidence to show that Lee committed a provocative act that was 

the proximate cause of Choi’s death. (Ibid.) Lee argued the 

evidence instead showed that it was Choi pointing his gun at 

Nolasco that led to Nolasco shooting Choi. (Id. at p. *4.) 

We rejected this argument, concluding that Nolasco’s

testimony at trial made clear that it was both Lee’s and Choi’s 

pointing their guns at Nolasco that caused him to reach for his 

own gun and shoot back, killing Choi. (People v. Lee, supra, 

B088132, at p. *5.) Thus, there was sufficient evidence that Lee’s 

conduct was a “substantial factor in causing the shooting, and 

the fact that Choi’s own conduct was also a contributing factor 

does not relieve Lee of criminal responsibility for this killing.” 

(Ibid.)

We further held that the jury was properly instructed “that 

a murder ‘which occurs during the commission or attempt to 

commit the crime of robbery, when there was in the mind of the 

perpetrators of such crime the specific intent to commit robbery, 

is murder of the first degree,’ ” citing former section 189. (People 

v. Lee, supra, B088132, at p. *6.) Lee argued that “because the 

felony-murder rule does not apply to provocative-act killings for 

the purpose of proving malice aforethought, the felony-murder 

rule ought not to have anything to do with determining the 

degree of a provocative-act murder.” (Id. at pp. *6–*7.) We held 
5

that Lee’s argument was contrary to established law under 

People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal.2d 690, 705 (Gilbert), reversed on 

other grounds by Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.S. 263. 

After rejecting Lee’s other claims of error, we affirmed the 

judgment. (People v. Lee, supra, B088132, at pp. *7–*8.)

2. Petition for resentencing

In February 2019, Lee filed a petition for resentencing 

pursuant to section 1170.95. Lee checked boxes on the petition 

form indicating that he was convicted of first or second degree 

murder under the felony murder rule or the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine, and could not now be convicted of murder 

because of changes to sections 188 and 189 effective January 1, 

2019. As to his specific conviction, Lee checked the box indicating 

he was convicted for first degree felony murder; he did not check 

the box indicating a conviction for second degree murder under 

the natural and probable consequences or second degree felony 

murder doctrines. 

The trial court denied the petition without Lee present or 

represented by counsel. The trial court found that Lee’s jury was 

instructed on provocative act murder, conviction for which 

requires a finding of “at least implied malice.” The trial court 

further found that Lee’s jury was instructed that it could not 

convict Lee of attempted murder unless he had express malice.3 

 

3 The record before us does not contain the jury 

instructions for Lee’s trial, and our 1996 opinion does not discuss 

any instructions for attempted murder. The trial court may have 

reviewed additional documents not in our current appellate 

record. Because our 1996 opinion provides sufficient information 

to resolve this appeal, any discrepancy between what the 
6

The trial court concluded that in regard to Lee’s murder 

conviction, “defendant had implied malice,” and therefore was 

ineligible for relief under section 1170.95. 

Lee timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

Lee argues his petition stated a prima facie basis for relief 

under section 1170.95, and the trial court erred in concluding 

otherwise. We disagree. We begin with a discussion of 

Senate Bill No. 1437, the legislation enacting section 1170.95. 

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) 

A. Senate Bill No. 1437

As a general matter, a defendant may not be convicted of 

murder absent proof that he or she unlawfully killed a human 

being “with malice aforethought,” either express or implied. 

(§§ 187, subd. (a), 188, subd. (a).) Prior to the enactment of 

Senate Bill No. 1437, however, both the felony murder rule and 

the natural and probable consequences doctrine provided theories 

under which a defendant could be found guilty of murder without 

proof of malice. 

Under the felony murder rule, a defendant could be 

convicted of murder “ ‘ “when the defendant or an accomplice 

kill[ed] someone during the commission, or attempted 

commission, of an inherently dangerous felony . . . .” ’ ” (People v. 

Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 942 (Powell).) “ ‘ “If the felony is 

 

trial court reviewed and what is before us on appeal is 

immaterial.
7

listed in section 189, the murder is of the first degree;[4] if not, 

the murder is of the second degree.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Prior to the 

enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, “[f]elony-murder liability d[id] 

not require an intent to kill, or even implied malice, but merely 

an intent to commit the underlying felony.” (People v. Gonzalez

(2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 654 (Gonzalez).)

Similarly, under the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine, “a person who knowingly aided and abetted a crime, the 

natural and probable consequence of which was murder or 

attempted murder, could be convicted of not only the target crime 

but also of the resulting murder or attempted murder. 

[Citations.] ‘This was true irrespective of whether the defendant 

harbored malice aforethought. Liability was imposed “ ‘for the 

criminal harms [the defendant] . . . naturally, probably, and 

foreseeably put in motion.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Munoz (2019) 

39 Cal.App.5th 738, 749, review granted on other grounds 

Nov. 26, 2019, S258234.) The natural and probable consequences 

doctrine “is not an implied malice theory; the mens rea of the 

aider and abettor with respect to the [murder or attempted 

murder], actual or imputed, is irrelevant.” (People v. Lopez

(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1102 (Lopez), review granted on 

other grounds Nov. 13, 2019, S258175.)

The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 “to amend 

the felony murder rule and the natural and probable 

 

4 Section 189, subdivision (a), reads, in relevant part, “All 

murder . . . that is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to 

perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, 

kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable under 

Section 206, 286, 287, 288, or 289, or former Section 288a, . . . is 

murder of the first degree.”
8

consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder,” such that “[a] 

person’s culpability for murder must be premised upon that 

person’s own actions and subjective mens rea.” (Stats. 2018, 

ch. 1015, § 1(f), (g).) 

The bill significantly limited the felony murder rule by 

adding subdivision (e) to section 189. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.) 

That subdivision provides that “[a] participant in the 

perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in 

subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if 

one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual 

killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the 

intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, 

solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the 

commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was 

a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with 

reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) 

of Section 190.2.”

5

Senate Bill No. 1437 also eliminated liability for murder 

under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Lopez, 

supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 1092.) It did so by amending 

section 188, which now provides, “Except as stated in 

subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, 

a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice 

shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her 

participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); Stats. 2018, 

 

5 “Subdivision (e) does not apply to a defendant when the 

victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the course of the 

peace officer’s duties, where the defendant knew or reasonably 

should have known that the victim was a peace officer engaged in 

the performance of the peace officer’s duties.” (§ 189, subd. (f).)
9

ch. 1015, § 2; see Lopez, at pp. 1102–1103.) In short, after the 

enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, a defendant cannot be 

convicted of murder absent a showing of malice, with the 

exception of felony murder as limited by section 189, 

subdivision (e). (See Lopez, at p. 1102.)

B. Section 1170.95

Section 1170.95 permits “[a] person convicted of felony 

murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences 

theory” to petition the trial court for resentencing if, among other 

things, “[t]he petitioner could not be convicted of first or second 

degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189” effected 

under Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).) After 

confirming that the petition contains the statutorily required 

information, “[t]he [trial] court shall review the petition and 

determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that 

the petitioner falls within the provisions of this section.” (Id., 

subd. (c); see id., subd. (b)(2) [court may deny petition without 

prejudice if statutorily required information is missing from 

petition].) If the trial court determines the petitioner has made 

an adequate prima facie showing, the court must appoint counsel 

for the petitioner and conduct further proceedings as set forth in 

the statute. (§ 1170.95, subds. (c)–(e); People v. Verdugo (2020) 

44 Cal.App.5th 320, 332–333 (Verdugo), review granted Mar. 18, 

2020, S260493; People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1140 

(Lewis), review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260598.) 

This division and others have held that in determining 

whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing for 

purposes of section 1170.95, the trial court may review the record 

of conviction, including the opinion from the petitioner’s original 

appeal from his or her conviction. (Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th 
10

at pp. 1137–1138; accord, Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 

329–330, 333; see People v. Cornelius (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 54, 

57–58 [affirming denial of section 1170.95 petition when “the 

verdict, the trial transcript and the prior appeal” indicated 

petitioner could not make a prima facie showing for relief]

(Cornelius), review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260410.) 

We acknowledge that the Supreme Court has granted 

review in Lewis to decide (1) whether the trial court properly may 

consider the record of conviction when ruling on a petitioner’s 

prima facie showing under section 1170.95, and (2) when in the 

process outlined under that section the right to appointed counsel 

arises. (See Lewis, supra, S260598.) The Supreme Court also 

has granted review in Verdugo and Cornelius, deferring further 

action pending disposition of the issues in Lewis. (See Verdugo, 

supra, S260493; Cornelius, supra, S260410.)

Lee, however, gives us no reason not to follow Lewis. Lee 

does not cite or discuss Lewis, Verdugo, or Cornelius in his 

appellate briefing, although the Attorney General invoked those 

cases in the respondent’s brief. Lee himself requested we take 

judicial notice of our 1996 opinion, which he cites in his briefing, 

thus acknowledging that the record of conviction properly may be 

considered when evaluating the adequacy of his prima facie 

showing. Lee quotes section 1170.95’s requirement that the trial 

court appoint counsel, but makes no argument as to whether that 

appointment must occur before the trial court assesses the 

petitioner’s prima facie showing. Pending further guidance from 

the Supreme Court, therefore, we apply our holding in Lewis. 
11

C. Lee is not eligible for resentencing under section 

1170.95 for provocative act murder

Having laid out the applicable legal principles underlying 

section 1170.95, we review Lee’s record of conviction—in this case 

our 1996 opinion—to determine if the trial court correctly 

concluded that Lee is ineligible for relief under section 1170.95.

We hold that the trial court reached the correct conclusion. 

Lee was not convicted of murder under either a felony murder or 

natural and probable consequences theory, but under the 

provocative act doctrine, which permits a defendant to be “held 

liable for the killing of an accomplice by a third party.” (People v. 

Mejia (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 602 (Mejia).)

“The provocative act doctrine is to be distinguished from 

the felony-murder rule.” (Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 654.) 

The felony murder rule applies to killings “committed in the 

perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate” certain crimes. (§ 189, 

subd. (a).) “When a killing is not committed by [the defendant] or 

by his accomplice but by his victim,” however, “malice 

aforethought is not attributable to the [defendant], for the killing 

is not committed by him in the perpetration or attempt to 

perpetrate” the underlying felony. (People v. Washington (1965) 

62 Cal.2d 777, 781 (Washington).) Thus, the felony murder rule 

cannot support a murder conviction when an accomplice is killed 

by a third party rather than by the defendant or another 

accomplice. (Gonzalez, at pp. 654–655; accord, Washington, 

at p. 781.)

Under such circumstances, the defendant may nonetheless 

be convicted of murder under the provocative act doctrine. 

“[W]hen the perpetrator of a crime maliciously commits an act 

that is likely to result in death, and the victim kills in reasonable 
12

response to that act, the perpetrator is guilty of murder. 

[Citations.] ‘In such a case, the killing is attributable, not merely 

to the commission of a felony, but to the intentional act of the 

defendant or his accomplice committed with conscious disregard 

for life.’ ” (Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 655.) “The classic 

provocative act scenario occurs when a perpetrator of the 

underlying crime instigates a gun battle, usually by firing first, 

and a police officer, or victim of the underlying crime, responds 

with privileged lethal force by returning fire and kills the 

perpetrator’s accomplice . . . .” (Mejia, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 602–603.)

Unlike felony murder or murder under the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine, “[a] murder conviction under the 

provocative act doctrine . . . requires proof that the defendant 

personally harbored the mental state of malice, and either the 

defendant or an accomplice intentionally committed a provocative 

act that proximately caused” the death of another accomplice.6 

(Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 655; see Mejia, supra, 

211 Cal.App.4th at p. 603 [“With respect to the mental element of 

provocative act murder, a defendant cannot be vicariously liable; 

he must personally possess the requisite mental state of malice 

aforethought when he either causes the death through his 

provocative act or aids and abets in the underlying crime the 

 

6 The provocative act doctrine does not apply when the sole 

provocateur is the deceased accomplice. (People v. Hunter (2017) 

15 Cal.App.5th 163, 171; see Mejia, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 603 [provocative act must be performed by defendant or a 

surviving accomplice].) 
13

provocateur who causes the death,” italics omitted].)7 The malice 

requirement for provocative act murder was well established in 

1996 when we affirmed Lee’s conviction. (See, e.g., People v. Mai

(1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 117, 124 [“an element of the provocative 

act doctrine is implied malice”], disapproved of on other grounds 

by People v. Nguyen (2000) 24 Cal.4th 756, 757; see also Gilbert, 

supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 703–704 [defendant’s murder conviction 

based on police officer’s killing of accomplice required proof of 

malice].)

Lee therefore cannot show that he “could not be convicted 

of first or second degree murder because of changes to 

Section 188 or 189” as required for relief under section 1170.95, 

subdivision (a)(3). Section 188, as amended, establishes that “in 

order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act 

with malice aforethought.” Because Lee was convicted of 

provocative act murder, the jury necessarily found he acted with 

malice aforethought. Section 189, as amended, changed the 

felony murder rule, but Lee was not convicted under that rule. 

 

7 Mejia notes that provocative act murder has both a 

physical and a mental element. (Mejia, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 603.) As discussed, the mental element is malice 

aforethought. (Ibid.) The physical element is the provocative act 

itself, defined in Mejia as “an act, the natural and probable 

consequence of which is the use of deadly forced by a third party.” 

(Ibid.) Although there is no vicarious liability as to the mental 

element, the defendant may be vicariously liable for the physical 

element: “[A] participant in the underlying crime who does not 

actually commit a provocative act himself may nevertheless be 

vicariously liable for the killing caused by his provocateur 

accomplice based upon having aided and abetted commission of 

the underlying crime.” (Ibid.)
14

Although not entirely clear, Lee appears to dispute that he 

was convicted under the provocative act doctrine. He claims that 

our 1996 opinion establishes that he “did not initiate a gun 

battle,” and it was Choi’s shooting at the security guard that led 

to Choi’s death. Lee claims he was instead convicted “as an aider 

an[d] abettor based on Choi’s action during their mutual 

participation in a felony listed in section 189.” 

Lee misreads our 1996 opinion, which expressly stated he 

was convicted under the provocative act doctrine, and that it 

was both Choi’s and Lee’s conduct that caused Nolasco to fire 

his weapon and kill Choi. (People v. Lee, supra, B088132, 

at pp. *3–*5.) There is no indication that he was convicted under 

a felony murder theory, nor could he have been given that 

Choi was killed by a third party, Nolasco, not by Lee or the 

other accomplice, Woo. (See Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th 

at pp. 654–655.)

To the extent our 1996 opinion discussed the felony murder 

rule and section 189, it was in the context of Supreme Court 

authority holding that, although the felony murder rule does not 

provide a basis to convict a defendant of murder when a third 

party kills the defendant’s accomplice, section 189 nonetheless is 

relevant in determining whether a provocative act murder is in 

the first or second degree. (People v. Lee, supra, B088132, at 

pp. *6–*7; see Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 705 [“even though 

malice aforethought may not be implied under section 189 to 

make a killing murder unless the defendant or his accomplice 

commits the killing in the perpetration of an inherently 

dangerous felony [citations], when a murder is otherwise 

established, section 189 may be invoked to determine its 

degree”].) 
15

Applying the above quoted rule from Gilbert, we rejected 

Lee’s challenge to a jury instruction “that a murder ‘which occurs 

during the commission or attempt to commit the crime of robbery, 

when there was in the mind of the perpetrators of such crime the 

specific intent to commit robbery, is murder of the first degree.’ ” 

(People v. Lee, supra, B088132, at pp. *6–*7.) Our discussion of 

the felony murder rule in this context does not establish that Lee 

was convicted of felony murder, as would be required under 

section 1170.95, and Lee does not argue otherwise. Nor does Lee 

argue that Senate Bill No. 1437 impacts the rule from Gilbert.

8

Lee argues that “[p]rovocative act murder as charged in the 

instant case is a combination of felony murder and natural and 

probable consequence murder.” In support, Lee quotes People v. 

Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653 (Concha), in which our Supreme 

Court stated, “where the defendant perpetrates an inherently 

dangerous felony, the victim’s self-defensive killing is a natural 

and probable response.” (Id. at p. 661.) 

The Supreme Court made this statement in the context of 

explaining that a conviction for provocative act murder requires 

proof of proximate causation. (See Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th 

at p. 661 [“the defendant is liable only for those unlawful killings 

proximately caused by the acts of the defendant or his 

accomplice”].) There is no indication in Concha that the Supreme 

Court intended to suggest that provocative act murder was a 

subset of either felony murder or natural and probable 

consequences murder. Nor could it be, given that provocative act 

murder requires proof of malice, unlike the felony murder rule or 

 

8 Neither the current viability of the rule from Gilbert nor 

the correctness of our application of that rule in our 1996 opinion 

is at issue in this appeal, and we express no opinion as to either.
16

natural and probable consequences doctrine as they existed 

before Senate Bill No. 1437. 

Indeed, Concha itself recognized the malice requirement for 

provocative act murder: “[A] defendant is liable for murder when 

the actus reus and mens rea elements of murder are satisfied. 

The defendant or an accomplice must proximately cause an 

unlawful death, and the defendant must personally act with 

malice. Once liability for murder is established in a provocative 

act murder case or in any other murder case, the degree of 

murder liability is determined by examining the defendant’s 

personal mens rea and applying section 189.” (Concha, supra, 

47 Cal.4th at p. 663, italics added.)

Lee argues that his conduct and mental state did not 

satisfy the elements under section 189, subdivision (e) that 

would make him culpable for murder, nor did we consider 

those elements in our 1996 opinion. Because section 189, 

subdivision (e) applies only to felony murder, and Lee was not 

convicted of felony murder, this argument fails.
17

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

JOHNSON, J.

WEINGART J.*

 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.
Filed 5/22/20

CERFIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KENNY INKWON LEE,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B297928

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA079332)

 CERTIFICATION AND ORDER

 FOR PUBLICATION

 [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed May 1, 2020, 

was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good 

cause it now appears that the opinion should be published in the 

Official Reports and it is so ordered.

There is no change in the judgment.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

____________________________________________________________

BENDIX, Acting P. J. JOHNSON, J. WEINGART, J.*

 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.