FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NARANJIBHAI PATEL and RAMILABEN 

PATEL, No. 08-56567

Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No.

v.  2:05-cv-01571-

CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

DSF-AJW

a municipal corporation, OPINION

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 6, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed July 17, 2012

Before: Harry Pregerson, Richard R. Clifton, and

Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Clifton;

Dissent by Judge Pregerson

8193
COUNSEL

Frank A. Weiser, Los Angeles, California, for appellants

Naranjibhai Patel and Ramilaben Patel.

PATEL v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 8195
Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Laurie Rittenberg,

Assistant City Attorney, Todd Leung (argued), Deputy City

Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for appellee City of Los

Angeles.

OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs Naranjibhai Patel and Ramilaben Patel are owners and operators of motels in Los Angeles. They challenge

the constitutionality of Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC)

§ 41.49, which requires operators of hotels in the City to

maintain certain guest registry information and to make that

information available to police officers on request. Appellants

contend that LAMC § 41.49 is facially unconstitutional under

the Fourth Amendment because it authorizes unreasonable

invasions of their private business records without a warrant

or pursuant to any recognized warrant exception. Following a

bench trial on stipulated evidence, the district court held that

the ordinance was reasonable and granted judgment in favor

of the City, concluding that the hotel operators did not establish that they had a privacy interest in the guest registry information.

A facial challenge is “the most difficult challenge to mount

successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of

circumstances exist under which the Act would be valid.”

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); see Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party,

552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (“i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications”). That the ordinance might

operate unconstitutionally under some circumstances is not

enough to render it invalid against a facial challenge. The

Patels have not satisfied that high standard. As a result, this

facial challenge to the ordinance fails. We affirm.

8196 PATEL v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
I. Background

The facts of this case are simple and undisputed. The only

exhibit introduced at the bench trial was the text of LAMC

§ 41.49. The parties stipulated that the Patels have been and

continue to be subjected to searches and seizures of their

motel registration records by the police, pursuant to the ordinance, without consent or a warrant. The parties also stipulated that the only issue at trial was the facial constitutionality

of LAMC § 41.49.

The ordinance defines “hotel” broadly to cover hotels,

motels, inns, rooming houses, and other establishments offering space for overnight accommodations for rent for a period

of less than 30 days. It requires that every operator of a hotel

record certain information concerning its guests, including

name and address; total number of guests; make, type and

license number of the guest’s vehicle if parked on hotel premises; date and time of arrival; scheduled date of departure;

room number; rate charged and collected; method of payment;

and the name of the hotel employee who checked the guest in.

The record may be kept in electronic, ink, or typewritten

form. LAMC § 41.49(2). The ordinance requires that the

record be kept on the hotel premises in the guest reception

area or in an adjacent office for at least 90 days after the last

entry. It provides specific requirements for the form of the

guest register and requires that it must be printable if maintained electronically. LAMC § 41.49(3).

With regard to the authority of the police to require that the

registration records be made available, the ordinance provides

that:

The record . . . shall be made available to any officers of the Los Angeles Police Department for

inspection. Whenever possible, the inspection shall

be conducted at a time and in a manner that miniPATEL v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 8197
mizes any interference with the operation of the

business.

LAMC § 41.49(3)(a).

Based on the stipulated record, the district court entered

judgment in favor of the City. The Patels timely appealed.

II. Discussion

We review interpretations of and constitutional challenges

to regulations de novo. Mapes v. United States, 15 F.3d 138,

140 (9th Cir. 1994). A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo as well. Hapner v. Tidwell, 621

F.3d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 2010).

[1] The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Not all

intrusions violate the Fourth Amendment — only “unreasonable” ones do. As the Supreme Court has observed, “ ‘reasonableness is still the ultimate standard’ under the Fourth

Amendment.” Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 71 (1992)

(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387

U.S. 523, 539 (1967)).

[2] The Fourth Amendment applies “when government

officers violate a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’ ” United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 950 (2012). In

addition, the Fourth Amendment embodies “a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons,

houses, papers, and effects’) [the Fourth Amendment] enumerates.” Id.1

 The “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has

1

In Jones, the Court held that attachment of a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device to a vehicle and subsequent use of that device

to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets was a search within

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. That decision was filed after this

case was submitted to our court. We requested and obtained from the parties supplemental briefing on the impact of that decision. 

8198 PATEL v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.” Id. at 952. We will discuss both in turn.

A. Reasonable expectation of privacy

Most applications of the Fourth Amendment focus on an

individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (“in order to claim the

protection of the Fourth Amendment, a [person] must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the

place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable”). The

expectation of privacy must be “one which society accepts as

objectively reasonable.” United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d

1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2006).

[3] The information covered by the Los Angeles ordinance

principally concerns hotel guests. The information does not,

on its face, appear confidential or “private” from the perspective of the hotel operator.

[4] We have already held that hotel guests do not have a

reasonable expectation of privacy in guest registry information once they have provided it to the hotel operator. United

States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). We

noted that the information at issue in that case, the guest’s

name and room number, was not “highly personal information.” Id. We also noted that once the guest has voluntarily

revealed factual information to the hotel in the process of

checking in, he can no longer claim a reasonable expectation

of privacy in that information, citing United States v. Miller,

425 U.S. 435, 441-43 (1976) (holding that a bank customer

did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records

maintained by the bank). Cormier, 220 F.3d at 1108.

[5] The Patels presented no evidence to support their contention that hotel owners and operators, including themselves,

have their own expectation of privacy in the information contained in guest registers. It may be true, as they allege, that the

PATEL v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 8199
information could be used by the hotel operators for other

purposes, but that does not mean hotel owners have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the registers. Just because information can be used by a business does not mean that the

business owner desires to keep the information private, or that

society would accept such a desire as objectively reasonable.

Here, there is no evidence that all hotel owners affected by the

regulation even consider the information to be private, let

alone that any such expectation is reasonable.

Moreover, the Patels have presented no evidence that hotel

owners customarily maintain guest registers in a manner that

would support a claim of privacy. As Miller and Cormier recognized, once information is revealed to others it is unlikely

that a reasonable expectation of privacy can be established.

An old-fashioned guest register may take the form of a book

located on the counter in the guest reception area, a form that

would appear to satisfy the ordinance. But it is unlikely society would recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in

information kept in a manner so easily accessible by anyone

entering the hotel. 

[6] To be clear, we do not hold that a hotel owner or operator can never have a reasonable expectation of privacy in

guest register information. To this end, we reject the argument

of the City that hotel owners can never have a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the guest registries simply because

the regulation informs them that the police can inspect the

registries on request. An individual’s otherwise reasonable

expectation of privacy cannot be so easily stripped away

merely by the adoption of a regulation authorizing searches of

an item or location. To hold otherwise would allow the government to conduct warrantless searches just by announcing

that it can. See United States v. Consol. Coal Co., 560 F.2d

214, 217 (6th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other

grounds, 436 U.S. 942 (1978), judgment reinstated, 579 F.2d

1011 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1069 (1979)

(“Even where a statute requires records to be maintained and

8200 PATEL v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
authorizes on-premises inspection of them in the normal

course, no precedent sanctions direct access to the records

without demand in the absence of a search warrant.”); see

also McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990, 995 (6th Cir.

1988) (“[T]he concept of ‘required records’ is not synonymous with the absence of a privacy interest.”); Brock, 834

F.2d 994, 996 (11th Cir. 1987) (concluding business had a

privacy interest in records OSHA required it to keep and

make available for inspection).

A customer list, for example, may be entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment, like other business records

and premises. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,

312 (1978) (discussing historical background of Fourth

Amendment and noting that “[a]gainst this background, it is

untenable that the ban on warrantless searches was not

intended to shield places of business”); United States v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699 (1987) (“An owner or operator of a

business thus has an expectation of privacy in commercial

property, which society is prepared to consider reasonable”).

Businesses may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in

their information contained in their records. See G.M. Leasing

Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352 (1977) (seizure of

corporate books and records implicated company’s privacy

interest); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967)

(Fourth Amendment applies to government’s “perusal of

financial books and records”).

[7] But the Patels have provided no evidence or other basis

for us to conclude that they have an objectively reasonable

expectation of privacy in the information covered by this ordinance, let alone that all hotel operators do. They cannot meet

the standard for a successful facial challenge because they

cannot “establish that no set of circumstances exist under

which the Act would be valid.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.

B. The common-law trespassory test

The Patels argue that they may have a valid claim even if

they lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the informaPATEL v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 8201
tion at issue because the Fourth Amendment protects interests

in addition to privacy. That is true, as confirmed by the

Court’s recent decision in Jones.

But “reasonableness” remains the “ultimate standard”

under the Fourth Amendment. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 71. Jones

did not change that. Jones did not discuss the “reasonableness” standard in applying what it described as the “commonlaw trespassory test” because, as the Court specifically held,

the government had “forfeited” the argument that the attachment and use of the GPS device was reasonable by failing to

make that argument to the court of appeals. 132 S.Ct. at 954.

[8] The Fourth Amendment explicitly protects “papers.”

The guest register covered by the city ordinance is a protected

paper. But the intrusion imposed by the ordinance is limited.

The Patels make no claim that they have been or will be physically dispossessed of any property. No “seizure” of property

is inherent under the ordinance, nor is it to be expected. The

ordinance is concerned with obtaining access to information

and provides several options as to the form in which the hotel

operator keeps the information. Nothing in the ordinance provides that the hotel operator cannot keep the information

available for its own use at the same time that a police officer

may be inspecting it. If it is kept electronically or if duplicate

records are maintained, both the hotel operator and the police

officer may be able to have access to the information at the

same time. The ordinance also specifically provides that any

inspection “shall be conducted at a time and in a manner that

minimizes any interference with the operation of the business.” LAMC § 41.49(3)(a).

Nor does the inspection authorized by the ordinance require

a physical invasion of the hotel operator’s private premises.

The ordinance requires that the register information be maintained in the guest reception or guest check-in area or in an

office adjacent to that area. The reception area is by nature

public, not private. As the records may be kept and made

8202 PATEL v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
available for inspection there, the ordinance does not require

intrusion into any private space.

[9] The Patels have failed to demonstrate that the limited

intrusion authorized under the ordinance is unreasonable in

their own particular circumstances, let alone in terms that

would support a facial challenge to the ordinance.

C. Plaintiffs’ additional arguments

The Patels make additional arguments that we conclude are

not persuasive.

[10] The Patels contend that the Supreme Court established certain requirements that must be satisfied for a system

of warrantless inspections to be permitted under the Fourth

Amendment, citing United States v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691

(1987). They argue that the Los Angeles ordinance at issue

here does not satisfy those requirements, most importantly

because the motel industry is not a “closely regulated” industry.2

It is certainly true that the Court has recognized that the operator of commercial premises in a “closely regulated” industry

has a reduced expectation of privacy, such that warrantless

inspection of those premises may be accepted as reasonable

under the Fourth Amendment when a similar inspection of

different premises would not be permitted. See id. at 702. But

that assumes that there is a privacy interest protected by the

Fourth Amendment in the first place. Because the Patels have

failed to establish that they have a reasonable expectation of

privacy in the information covered by the ordinance, there is

no need to justify the examination of the guest register as a

warrantless administrative search under Burger.

2The district court agreed with the Patels on that point, concluding that

the City failed to establish that hotels and motels were closely regulated

for the purpose of qualifying for that exception for warrantless administrative searches. Because we resolve the case on another ground, we do not

reach that issue. 

PATEL v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 8203
The Patels also cite our decision in Tucson Woman’s Clinic

v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 539-42 (9th Cir. 2004), as directly on

point in support of their claim. It is not. That case dealt with

regulation of abortion clinics. In that context we noted that

“the expectation of privacy is heightened, given the fact that

the clinic provides a service grounded in a fundamental constitutional liberty, and that all provision of medical services in

private physicians’ offices carries with it a high expectation

of privacy for both physician and patient.” Id. at 550. The

Patels have not established a reasonable expectation of privacy in the first place.

III. Conclusion

[11] The Patels have not established that all hotel owners

have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their guest registers, or even that they themselves do. Nor have they demonstrated that the inspection of guest registers authorized by the

ordinance is an unreasonable intrusion. As a result, we conclude that LAMC § 41.49 is not facially unconstitutional. 

AFFIRMED.

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that warrantless

searches by police “ ‘are per se unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established

and well-delineated exceptions.’ ” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.

332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,

357 (1967)); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390

(1978) (“[I]t is a cardinal principle that ‘searches conducted

outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge

or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established

8204 PATEL v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
and well-delineated exceptions.’ ”) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at

357). Today, the majority overlooks this well-established rule.

The majority upholds an ordinance that violates the Fourth

Amendment on its face. Los Angeles Municipal Code Section

41.49 authorizes the Los Angeles Police Department to search

hotel business records without a warrant. To pass constitutional muster, a warrantless search of a business, like any warrantless search, must be based on a “specifically established

and well-delineated exception[ ]” to the Fourth Amendment’s

warrant requirement. Gant, 556 U.S. at 338 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436

U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (noting that the Fourth Amendment’s

warrant requirement applies to “places of business”). What is

the “specifically established and well-delineated exception[ ]”

put forth by the majority? There is none. Instead, the majority

simply declares that the searches at issue are reasonable. Maj.

Op. at 8202-03. 

The majority concedes that the ordinance authorizes a

“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See

Maj. Op. at 8202 (“The Fourth Amendment explicitly protects

‘papers.’ The guest register covered by the city ordinance is

a protected paper.”). The majority further concedes that the

ordinance authorizes these searches to occur without a warrant. Maj. Op. at 8197. 

Thus it is clear that, to comply with the Fourth Amendment, the ordinance must fall within a “specifically established and well-delineated exception[ ]” to the warrant

requirement. Gant, 556 U.S. at 338 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Yet the majority does not offer any exception.1

1

I agree with the district court that the exception to the warrant requirement for “closely regulated” industries does not apply. See New York v.

Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700-02 (1987) (describing exception to the warrant

requirement for “closely regulated” industries). The city has not offered

any evidence that hotels in Los Angeles have been subjected to intense

PATEL v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 8205
The majority opinion conflicts with long-standing and wellestablished Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Accordingly, I

dissent.

regulatory scrutiny. The city cites a handful of state and local laws to

establish that hotels are “closely regulated,” but most of the laws cited by

the city are laws of general applicability, and do not establish that hotels

are a closely regulated industry. See Rush v. Obledo, 756 F.2d 713, 722

(9th Cir. 1985). 

8206 PATEL v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES