U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Apartment Complex Fire, 

66 Units Destroyed 

Seattle, Washington

USFA-TR-059/September 1991

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by TriData Corporation, 

Arlington, Virginia, its staff and consultants, who are under contract to assist the USFA in carrying 

out the Fire Reports Program.

The USFA greatly appreciates the cooperation and information received from officials of the Seattle 

Fire Department, most particularly Chief Claude Harris, Assistant Chief Steve Bailey and Fire Marshal 

B. L. Hansen.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton 

Avenue, Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the USFA Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Apartment Complex Fire,

66 Units Destroyed

Seattle, Washington

Investigated by: Philip Schaenman

This is Report 059 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-90-C-3338 to the United

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA), the mission 

of the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) is to 

reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. We 

serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, and in partnership with fire protection and emergency 

service communities. With a commitment to 

excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data initiatives.

TAble oF ConTenTS

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE BUILDING COMPLEX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

FIRE ORIGIN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

FIRE DETECTION AND REPORTING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

FIRE SPREAD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

ESCAPE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

FIRE DEPARTMENT DISPATCH AND INITIAL OPERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

SECOND PHASE OF OPERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

LOGISTICS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

INTERAGENCY RELIEF COORDINATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

CASUALTIES AND LOSSES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

FIRE INVESTIGATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Appendix A: Floor Plan Of Apartment Of Fire Origin And Building Elevation Drawings. . . . 17

Appendix B: Site Diagram Showing First-in Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Appendix C: Fire Department Operations Timeline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Appendix D: Units Used at Scene. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Appendix E: Seattle Fire Department Investigator’s Report, ATF Laboratory Report 

and Police Department Incident Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Appendix F: Map of Seattle Showing Station Locations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Appendix G: Description of Delaware Program Utilizing Load Limiter Devices and 

Model Unpaid Customer Notice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Appendix H: Photographs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

1

Apartment Complex Fire, 

66 Units Destroyed

Seattle, Washington

September 21, 1991

Local Contacts: Chief Claude Harris

Assistant Chief Steve Bailey

Seattle Fire Department

301 Second Avenue South

Seattle, Washington 98104

(206) 386-1400

O

An accidental fire started in a first floor unit of the 96-unit Villa Plaza apartment complex in Seattle, 

Washington, and spread to 66 units before it was stopped. Virtually all of the other units received 

some damage, too. The fire started at about 2115 on a Saturday night and spread rapidly due to 

the extensive use of cedar siding, decorative screens and walkway ceilings. It became a five alarm 

fire and required three task forces from neighboring jurisdictions. This was one of Seattle’s largest 

residential fires in 20 years. (See Appendix A for Floor Plans and Building Elevation Drawings and 

Appendix B for Site Diagram.)

There were no fatalities despite the need for several occupants to jump or be dropped two or three 

stories to escape. A combination of Seattle Fire Department rescue efforts and tenants helping each 

other averted injuries.

The availability of three (emergency) ways out from each unit, the absence of interior hallways, and 

the occurrence of the fire while most residents were awake cut the toll of injuries.

The fire could have been prevented if the woman who started it had exercised reasonable care in 

using a candle for light. The fire would not have spread as rapidly if there were fewer wood surfaces 

on the exterior exit walkway and façade or if there had been sprinklers.
2 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

SUMMARY oF KeY ISSUeS

Issues Comments

Fire Origin Careless use of candles by woman whose power was cut off.

Fire Spread Use of combustible cedar siding, walkway ceilings, and 4-story decorative/security screen.

Fire Reporting Estimated 15 minute delay before residents reported the fire. Delay a combination of nonreporting by woman who started it, attempts to fight fire, and assumption that others reported 

it.

Building Fire Protection No sprinklers. Hand-pulled alarm worked but was largely not believed; no automatic alarm to 

fire department. Detectors worked but were a minor factor.

Staffing Levels Three (versus four) person crew on first-in engine delayed start of water attack by eight 

minutes because of need to rescue a woman.

Losses $3.9 Million

Casualties No deaths, eight civilian injuries.

Escape Many people were able to escape from walkways, windows and balconies. Fire department 

rescued eight.

Multiple alarms Fire was in extreme southeast corner of city; it took a considerable time to build up a large 

firefighting force.

Interagency Cooperation Very good.

Incident Command System Worked very well, but short of enough chiefs in early stages.

Citizens in the complex delayed calling the fire department by 15 to 20 minutes after the fire started, 

and many did not believe the building alarm and failed to react due to many prior false alarms at the 

site. First in firefighters found a 40-foot wide swath of flames four stories high.

The Seattle Fire Department made some excellent tactical decisions that saved part of the complex.

Staffing levels on the first three responding units may have affected the level of damage. Also, the fact 

that the fire occurred in the southeast corner of the city far from the center where the mass of firefighting units are concentrated meant that it was difficult to assemble the needed army of firefighters 

quickly, which delayed extinguishment efforts.

Losses were estimated at $3.9 million. One building was totally destroyed and two others were 

heavily damaged and had to be razed; two more were moderately damaged. Thirty-one cars were 

damaged or destroyed. There were eight civilian casualties, two serious, and two firefighter casualties, neither serious.

THe bUIlDInG CoMPleX

The fire occurred in the Villa Plaza apartment complex located at 9111 50th Avenue South in the 

Rainier Beach district in southeast Seattle. The complex was built in 1968 and consisted of five 

4-story, wood-frame buildings in a U-shape configuration. The open end of the U faced north. The 

overall complex measured 200 feet by 234 feet. The common courtyard had a pool and small pool 

building. The lowest story of each building was partly below ground. The square footage of the five 

buildings were:
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 3

Area Sq Ft Damage

Building A 21,000 Moderately damaged

Building B 22,600 Heavily damaged and razed

Building C 26,100 Destroyed

Building D 22,600 Heavily damaged and razed

Building E 21,000 Moderately damaged

Exit Paths – Exterior covered walkways running the length of each building provided access to each 

apartment unit. The walkways connected between buildings. There were five stair towers: one in 

the northeast corner of the complex, one in the northwest corner, and three evenly spaced across 

the south building (C). There were also two passenger elevators on either end of the south wing, 

adjacent to the covered parking areas. A small, short hallway stub led from the walkway to each pair 

of apartments. Most of the apartments also had a balcony facing the interior side of the complex. 

Occupants thus had three potential ways to escape: 1) through their front door down the short 

hallway, then along the exterior walkways in either direction to a staircase; 2) through a bedroom 

window directly to the walkway; and 3) from their rear balcony or rear window.

The ceiling of the exterior walkways on Floors 1-3 was an exposed tongue-and-groove cedar surface 

supported by 4 inch by 8 inch cantilevered wood beams. The walkways consisted of concrete covered by outdoor carpet. Fire doors had been retrofitted at intervals along the walkways.

The exterior facades of the walkways on the fronts of the buildings were 4-story high decorative 

lattices comprised of 2 inch by 6 inch vertical cedar boards approximately on 9-inch centers. (The 

space between the vertical cedar boards was about seven inches.) The lattices had 10-foot widths 

separated by 5-foot brick fascia. These lattices were both for aesthetics and security. The wood had 

been covered with oil-based stain. The wood had dried out in approximately 30 days without rain 

prior to the fire.

In other words, the exit paths on Floors 1-3 were encased in highly combustible wood on three sides.

Construction – The apartment complex was of ordinary wood construction, with no special hazards. 

It had a flat, hot tar roof over dimensional lumber which helped slow the spread of fire on the top 

floor; the roof did not have trusses. The siding was beveled cedar over waterboard (like plasterboard), which helped slow the fire penetration but not the lateral spread. The water- board helped 

save the two north buildings (A and E) from penetration of the exposure.

Windows on the units were single pane glass, which quickly broke in the fire. Interior walls had 

plasterboard, which held up quite well.

Fire Protection Systems – There were no sprinklers in the apartment complex. A manual pull alarm was 

retrofitted in 1981. It was interconnected throughout the 5-building complex, with the added feature of having an alarm bell in every unit. Pulling any alarm handle set off the alarms in the whole 

complex. In the building of origin, there were 10 manual pull stations. An alarm panel was in the 

office adjacent to the main entrance on the east side of the complex.

Every apartment unit also had a battery-operated smoke detector furnished by the owner. It was the 

responsibility of the tenants to maintain them. The detectors were not interconnected. The building 

of origin had 17 rate of rise detectors.
4 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

There were dry standpipes in every stairway, but no hoselines for tenants to use. Fire extinguishers 

were hung in appropriate places as required by code.

Codes – Seattle uses their own modified versions of the Uniform Building Code and the Uniform 

Fire Code. They are called the Seattle Building Code (SBC) and the Seattle Fire Code (SFC). The Villa 

Plaza Apartments were built in 1968, according to the 1956 SBC then in effect. Table 1 contrasts 

the current code requirements to those used in the building. If built in 1991 the complex would 

have had some key safety features that almost certainly would have made a major difference in the 

outcome of the fire: the residential units would have been sprinklered, and the complex would have 

a central station automatic alarm linked to the fire department. The sprinkler operations would have 

caused a signal to be sent to the fire department and led to earlier fire department response. The fire 

damage most likely would have been contained to the apartment of origin if the complex were built 

to current code.

Inspections/Violations – The building complex had had five minor maintenance violations since 1990, 

and they were not thought to matter in the fire. The building was inspected annually, with additional 

cursory reviews every two weeks or so. The fire alarm system was certified annually, and worked.

Occupancy -- At the time of the fire there were approximately 260 people living in the complex, in 96 

units, 18 on the first floor and 26 each on the higher floors.

Social Environment – Most of the residents were from low income households, some on welfare. Many 

were immigrants. The apartment complex had been a known haven for drug dealers and users. 

There had been many police calls to the complex. The apartment complex had a new manager who 

had made good progress in evicting problem tenants and reducing the drug trade, but had not been 

totally successful. 

Table 1 – Seattle Code Requirements for Multi-Family Dwellings

Feature Requirements in 1968 

(Based on 1956 UBC)

Requirements in 1991 

(Based on 1988 UFC & UBC)1

Class 1 Fireman’s Required Required

Standpipe (4”) in stairs

Class II Tenants Not Required Not Required (because of sprinklers)

Standpipe/Hose Cabinet

Automatic Sprinklers — Not Required Required

Residential Type

Automatic Sprinklers — Not Required Not Required (Total) (Residential Units 

Complete Coverage Required)

Fire Alarm Not Required, but Installed in 1981 Required

Central Station/ Automatic Not Required Required

Fire Department Alarm

Max. Allow. Area per 31,500 square feet 31,500 square feet

Building Division Actual: 21,000-26,100

1

The 1988 Model Uniform Fire Code was adopted by Seattle in December 1990, with some modifications.

continued on next page
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 5

Feature Requirements in 1968 

(Based on 1956 UBC)

Requirements in 1991 

(Based on 1988 UFC & UBC)1

Area Separation 2-hr. (Class D) 2-hr. with 1-1/2-hour door

Construction 20 minute – on drawings

Exterior Balcony Construction 3-inch thick wood decking or 2-inch fire Non-combustible or 1-hour construction 

retardant wood with weather protection. or heavy timber

Smoke Detectors Not Required (installed in units retroac- Required in units; Not required elsetively to meet State code) where if sprinklered.

SBC = Seattle Building Code SFC = Seattle Fire Code

Security – The residents had hired a security guard who was going to move in the week after the 

fire. He was to patrol the halls at night, and could have made a difference in both detection and 

evacuation.

FIRe oRIGIn

The fire started about 2115 – 2120 by a candle in the first floor apartment #115 on Saturday, 

September 21, 1991. (See Floor Plan in Appendix A.) The tenant, a 22-year old mother of three 

children under age seven, had had her electricity shut off ten days earlier. She “borrowed” electricity several times from a neighbor using an extension cord, but on the night of the fire the neighbor 

refused and the mother resorted to using a candle for light after coming home with her children to 

a dark apartment.

The candle was placed in a plate on a dresser in her bedroom. As the candle burned down, the 

mother kept the fire going by feeding it with some paper envelopes. When the fire flared up, she 

tried to blow it out, which caused flaming debris to scatter. A piece of flaming paper fell behind the 

dresser and ignited something on the floor – probably clothing or the rug. (Clothes were scattered 

about the floor, and remnants were found by the dresser.)

The tenant tried to extinguish the fire with water unsuccessfully for a period of time, then brought 

her three children out to her car. She called out to people in the parking lot outside her apartment 

that there was a fire and to get some water. At least one man tried to fight the fire with a bucket of 

water. She did not call the fire department. After the fire blew out the bedroom window, she drove 

off in her car, almost out of control. She struck a car in the parking lot several times but continued. 

A search by police and fire officials found her two days later hiding with relatives. She described how 

the fire started to investigators.

FIRe DeTeCTIon AnD RePoRTInG

The apartment where the fire started was dark because of the lack of electricity, which made it relatively easy for people standing in the parking lot, level with the apartment’s window to notice the 

dancing flames as they grew. One eyewitness said she saw the flames low on the floor and then they 

got higher. The onlookers’ concern was reinforced when the tenant fled the apartment, saying there 

was a fire. Her detector was alarming at this time.

A man carried a bucket of water into the apartment of origin and shouted that it was a fire “for real.” 

There was growing commotion from people becoming aware of the fire.
6 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

A 17-year-old boy came out of apartment #216, above the apartment of origin, and saw and heard 

the man shouting. He ran in, had his mother call the fire department and then ran out banging on 

doors and yelling, “Fire, fire for real, get out, get out.”

His mother was the first to call the fire department. It was estimated by the fire department’s reconstruction of 

the timeline of events that this first report occurred about 15-20 minutes after the fire started. Several of the people 

who initially knew about the fire did not call the fire department because they assumed others had 

already called.

The manager of the unit, who happened to live on the third floor almost directly above the apartment of origin, came down to see what the commotion and shouting were about. She started calling 

to people to get out, and then went to the apartment complex office to call the fire department. Her 

call was the second to come in.

The 17-year-old boy proceeded to pull the manual alarm, which set horns off in every unit. About 

this time the window of the bedroom where the fire started blew out, and heavy flames rolled out.

At first, few people responded to the alarms. The apartment complex had had many false alarms in 

the past, and most people thought this was just another one. Even when people believed there was 

a fire, it seemed far enough away from their unit to not be an immediate worry. While some people 

did leave their apartments, many did not until they were directly threatened by smoke or flames. 

There were many close calls of people just getting out or jumping from balconies or windows to 

escape the flames throughout the incident.

The smoke alarm in the apartment of origin was inconsequential. Many other smoke alarms also 

went off; in some cases they helped convince people that there was a real fire – something not usually mentioned as a benefit of detectors.

FIRe SPReAD

Once the fire broke out of the apartment of origin, it spread extremely rapidly – so fast that fire 

officials considered the fire suspicious at first and called in the Federal Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 

(ATF) Bureau to investigate.

The fire occurred at the end of an unusually hot end-of-summer day. The sun had shone all day on 

the south end of the building where the apartment of origin was. The entire preceding month also 

had been unusually dry. The wood was dry.

A light breeze was blowing, which aided the spread of the fire.

The fire coming out of the broken front bedroom window initially impinged on the base of the 

brick decorative fascia that separated segments of the cedar screen running up the face of the balconies. The screen was comprised of vertical 2 by 6’s. It soon ignited and acted as a path for the fire 

to quickly extend vertically up the entire 40-foot face of the screen, and also horizontally across the 

screen. The fire also quickly ignited the cedar siding and cedar underside of the walkway ceilings. 

The fire spread both east and west on the face of the building.

The fire continued to spread throughout the event along the cedar screens, walkway ceilings and the 

siding. Units were ignited primarily by radiation through their windows rather than through the 

walls of neighboring units or through ceilings between units.
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 7

As units became involved in the building of origin, fire spread through them from the front to the 

rear of the building – the pool-side interior of the complex. It spread along the rear (courtyard) side 

as well as the front side. The fire spread from Building C to Buildings B and D.

One tenant (Ms. Hall-Austin) was quoted in the Seattle newspaper as seeing smoke “curling like a 

tornado” when she opened her front door to the short hallway. As she carried her 5-year-old to the 

stairway and ran down, “flames exploded along the wall.” Another tenant expressed disbelief that 

flames could spread that fast. “It just went swoosh,” said Claudette Williams.2

 She then caught a 

5-6-year-old boy who was dropped to her from a second floor balcony.

E

Tenants had choices in their escape routes, and exercised them. One tenant quoted in a Seattle 

newspaper said that when he got to a stairway he found it engulfed in flames. He led his wife to the 

opposite end of the hallway, then went back to ensure his neighbors escaped.

Though the tenants did not believe the fire even existed at first and then did not react quickly, once 

they did decide to move they took care of their children. This was a significant difference from many fatal 

fires where children are left behind. Neighbors helped each other as well as their own families. 

Children were dropped into waiting arms. People assisted each other in climbing down balconies 

or finding alternative escape routes.

FIRe DePARTMenT DISPATCH AnD InITIAl oPeRATIonS

The first call on the fire was received by the police 9-1-1 communications center at 2135. (See 

Appendix C for a complete timeline.) The call was passed to the fire department at 2136. The first 

alarm response was dispatched 2137. It included three engines (Engines 33, 28, 36), two ladders 

(Ladders 12 and 7) and a battalion chief (BC 5). This was the standard response to an apartment 

complex fire in the residential area of the city.

There elapsed five minutes from the first call to 9-1-1 to arrival of the first unit, Engine 33, at 

the scene. The engine pulled up on the east side of the complex at its southeast corner, close to a 

hydrant, as planned. The lieutenant ordered the crew to connect to the hydrant and to lay a manifold 

and a 2-1/2-inch line, which they started to do.

As the lieutenant rounded the southeast corner of the building to get to the south side where the 

flames were, the sight was almost overwhelming: flames extended in a 40-foot wide swath from the 

ground floor over the top of the building. The full extent of the fire was not visible from the front 

(flames were spreading from front to back of the initial units and then out and up the courtyard side 

of the structure).

A woman on the second floor of the east side of Building D (on 50thAvenue South) started to prepare to jump.

The first-in engine company had one officer plus two firefighters. They could not both assist in a 

rescue and continue to lay and advance a line (each a 2-person job). They opted to assist the woman 

in imminent peril, raised a ground ladder and rescued her and her dog. As a result, they were not 

able to get water on the fire until about eight minutes after they arrived. By that time the fire was 

well beyond the control of a single line.

2 Seattle Times, September 23, 1991.
8 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

The next units in were Engine 28 and Ladder 12, arriving together from the station they shared 

about one and a half to two minutes after Engine 33. As they approached the fire and saw a large 

column of smoke, the engine company officer called for an immediate second alarm, which doubled 

the complement on its way to the fire and added the deputy chief and support units.

The ladder truck pulled in behind Engine 33 on the east side. The ladder company officer reported 

that at this time almost the entire outside of Building C was burning – about 150 feet horizontally. 

Neither they nor the engine could drive to the south side of the building because of the way the 

complex was laid out. The structure of the complex was such that cars had to drive through a low 

overhang to get access to the south parking lot – and fire vehicles could not get through. (Had they 

been able to park the vehicle where they would have preferred, it almost surely would have been 

destroyed, since all cars in the area were destroyed.) The ladder company started to raise its aerial 

and take off a ground ladder to meet the burgeoning demand for rescues from all levels and several 

sides of the complex.

Ladder 12 arrived with one officer plus three crew. They were short one person, who had been 

detailed to the engine company in their station (Engine 28) to fill its complement to three.

While the aerial was being raised, the ladder truck temporarily lent a man to assist Engine 33’s lieutenant in resuming actions to get a line into play. However, by this time the ropes and rubber gaskets 

of the manifold that had been dropped on the south of the building by Engine 33 had started to 

smolder from radiant heat, and the line had to be used in a fog pattern to protect the officer and the 

lines while a monitor was set up on the south side. The loaned aerial man went back to his primary 

duty on the aerial as soon as it was raised, leaving the lieutenant on his own with the first line on 

the fire.

Engine 28, the second-in engine company from the first alarm response, pulled in on the west side of 

the complex. They saw heavy smoke coming across the top of the building from the south side, and 

many people climbing down exterior balconies, with four trapped on the top balcony. They were 

able to lay a manifold for two 1-3/4-inch handlines and to initiate rescue operations in parallel.

Engine 28 had been short because their rookie had been detailed to a fire watch for the president of 

South Korea who was in town that day. However, the rookie asked permission to attend the fire and 

arrived with the first arriving aid unit; he was able to immediately assist his engine company, which 

made a material difference in their being able to lay a line while also effecting a rescue. They estimate 

that his fortuitous addition allowed them to put water on the fire several minutes earlier than they 

otherwise would have been able to do. This is thought to have ultimately helped save Building A.

The third-in engine, Engine 36 (an extra manpower unit with five firefighters) and the second ladder 

of the initial response arrived within 10 minutes of the call to 9-1-1, about five minutes after the 

first responding unit.3 By then people were climbing down from balconies, jumping off balconies, 

dropping children from windows, and scrambling to safety on all sides of three buildings. Hundreds 

of people were gathering in the streets to watch.

3 Part of the initial dispatch was a “manpower” squad with one officer and four crew. However, because of short staffing 

citywide, the nearest fully staffed manpower unit was Engine 36, not the closest one to the scene. Dispatching policies 

are under review in light of continuing reduced staffing levels.
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 9

The first-in battalion was headed by an Acting Battalion Chief, (Captain Molly Douce), the highest 

ranking female firefighter in Seattle. She arrived about 5-7 minutes after the first arriving engine 

company and found flames “visible from floors 1-4 and approximately the entire length of the building.” She immediately called for a third alarm and had the third-in company (E-36) lay exposure 

lines into the east exposure building.

SeConD PHASe oF oPeRATIonS

The second alarm dispatch had been for Engines 26 and 27 and Ladder 3.

The streets on the east and west side of the complex were deadends, impeding access and placement 

of the additional vehicles.

Most of the first and second alarm crews were assisting with rescues. Several handlines and monitors 

were deployed. The fire department made at least seven rescues of people in imminent danger and 

assisted many others during the course of the fire.

At 2153 the Acting Deputy Chief (Donald Taylor, Battalion 1) arrived at the scene, about 16 minutes 

after the first units were dispatched. He found the south wing of the complex (Building C) fully 

involved with the fire “raging out of control.” The southwest wing (Building B) was heavily involved, 

and the fire was progressing toward the southeast section, under a southwesterly wind. Ladder 12 

and Ladder 3 were rescuing victims from the east wing. He requested a fourth alarm within a minute after arriving. Engine 36 was positioned on the north side of Building C in the courtyard and 

attempted to stop the fire from spreading to the east building. Another company was designated to 

cover houses across from the south exposure of the complex (and did so successfully).

Within 40 minutes of the first call, the fire was made five alarms, Seattle’s highest category. Units 

continued to be added after this.

It was apparent by this time that it would not be possible to undertake a meaningful attack on the fire 

in the main building, and that the available water and room to attack the fire would be better used 

as a defensive operation to save Buildings A and E, and to salvage as much of Buildings B and D as 

possible. After initially being the focus of the attack, Building C was left to burn.

Interior attacks were made on each floor of Buildings B and D, and from the apartments on the south 

ends of Buildings A and E on every level, and from the exterior with monitors. The battle switched 

to a defensive fight.

The acting chief of the department at the time of the fire, Deputy Chief Steven Bailey4

 arrived at 

about 2155 and took over the Incident Command System (ICS) which had been established by the 

first-in Battalion Chief, and passed to the Acting Deputy Chief (Battalion 1).

The ICS worked well in this incident. As the size of the force and complexity of the operation 

increased, two branch commands were established: Branch A on the south side of the building, and 

Branch B on the north side.

Throughout the incident, couplings and manifolds had to be hosed down to keep them from igniting from radiant heat.

4 Bailey is now Assistant Chief, Operations.
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

The fire department was under great pressure from the media and public during this operation. 

The fire was being televised while the inhabitants watched the fire spread toward new areas of the 

buildings.

The fire department saved almost all of two buildings (A and E) and half of two more (B and D) 

though the latter two were ultimately razed. The fire was brought under control at 0156 on Sunday 

and extinguished except for spot fires at 0357, almost six hours after it started.

LO

The location of the fire caused numerous logistical problems. It was in the southeast corner of the 

city, far from most units. (See Appendix F for map of Seattle station locations.) It took a long time 

to build up the army of firefighters needed to handle the situation. Most cities would face a similar 

problem. Higher fire alarms were called in more rapid succession than was usual to provide adequate 

staffing and relief. But the delay in getting adequate forces on the scene undoubtedly caused some 

apartments to be lost that could have been saved had more manpower been available.

To add manpower, three task forces of five units each were called under mutual aid agreements from 

neighboring jurisdictions on the north, east, and south of Seattle. Two were used at the scene and 

one to fill in for units at the scene.

The total force used at the fire included three-quarters of all Seattle units plus the three task forces. 

(See Appendix D.) The firefighting involved: 20 engine companies, six ladder companies, five battalion chiefs, over 125 firefighters. Counting relief units and returns of second shifts of the same 

unit, there were many more.

In reviewing logistics after the fire it is important to know when each unit had arrived. A number 

of units at this incident did not immediately report in their arrival to dispatchers. In some cases the 

dispatchers had to infer units had arrived from radio traffic. This had no impact on operations on 

this incident but it could have, and it did make the post-mortem analysis more difficult.

The Seattle Police had to call out a tactical response to provide officers to deal with the several hundred people who fled the fire or came to help or to watch. The crowds impeded access of vehicles 

on the narrow, dead-end streets.

InTeRAGenCY RelIeF CooRDInATIon

This fire had the attributes of a small disaster. It left 224 people temporarily homeless, most of 

whom were low income minorities and immigrants. Translators from within and outside the fire 

department were needed to speak in six languages to understand the problems of the fire victims 

and to question them as to whether all had gotten out. The languages needed were Russian, Greek, 

Vietnamese, Spanish, Chinese and Ethiopian.

The agencies involved in the relief effort were the Red Cross, Salvation Army, Seventh Day Adventists, 

Division of Emergency Management (part of the City’s Department of Administrative Service), the 

Department of Human Services, and the State’s Department of Social and Health Services. In addition, a rented team of dogs were used briefly to check the rubble for victims (none were found).

The Red Cross sent a response team to the scene. In the absence of a formal relief coordinator on 

the scene, they became the de facto coordinator. The Red Cross focused on immediate shelter and 

mass feeding. The Seventh Day Adventists focused on providing clothing and, later, furniture. The 
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 11

Salvation Army helped feed firefighters and other emergency workers on the scene. The Department 

of Human Services provided personnel for case work. The Office of Emergency Management, besides 

getting the Red Cross to the scene, helped arrange for cranes to search for victims in the rubble and 

screen meshes needed to sift the rubble for clues as to the origin.

The Red Cross representative said they were overwhelmed at first by the rush of people seeking help, 

many of whom were immigrants. The Red Cross used a local high school as a shelter and base. They 

served over 1,500 free meals. Food vouchers were given to victims to use at a local grocery store. 

Up to three days at local hotels and motels were made available to 120 residents who applied for it. 

About 20 people stayed in the high school gym.

Some people who did not live in the complex turned out to receive emergency benefits. The service 

agencies did only a cursory screening; they were more concerned that the needy were served than 

that a few others snuck in. The resident manager and neighbors were able to help vouch for most 

people seeking help.

The State’s Department of Health and Human Services had a number of special problems to deal 

with. Victims needed a variety of assistance:

•	 Temporary immigration papers

•	 Temporary drivers licenses for those needing them to work

•	 Food stamps and free health care documents for those on welfare

•	 An interim address to which welfare checks could be sent

•	 Tools for people who depended on them for their jobs

•	 Transportation to jobs and relatives

•	 Medication

•	 Dentures

Homeless victims needed long term housing arranged beyond the temporary help provided by the 

Red Cross. About 35 families had been receiving Federal assistance for housing; ironically, they could 

be relocated more quickly than those not on assistance.

CASUAlTIeS AnD loSSeS

Civilian Injuries – Rather incredibly, only eight civilians were injured, two seriously. This is a tribute to 

the fire department and to rescue efforts by residents and neighbors. One woman jumped or slipped 

while trying to climb down from a third story balcony before the fire department arrived in force, 

and one was overcome with smoke. Four people were released after treatment for smoke inhalation. 

There were two other minor injuries.

It took three days to confirm that there were no fatalities. The fire department compiled a list of 

survivors with the help of the building manager. But despite their efforts and pleas on television and 

radio, some of those who fled never returned or notified the authorities. (There were some with 

criminal records, some involved with drugs, and many immigrants among the survivors; not all 

wanted their whereabouts known.) The woman who started the fire was not located until two days 

after the fire; she was living with her sister.
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Firefighter Injuries – Two Seattle firefighters suffered elevated blood pressure from exertion and exposure to heat. These were the only injuries, an excellent record for a fire of this magnitude – but 

there was a close call. Part of a balcony railing collapsed and fell on three firefighters in the interior 

courtyard of the complex, but they were quickly cleared of the debris and continued working. Their 

outfits protected them. This was another win for the new generation of protective clothing, even 

though they are hot to wear. The Seattle Fire Department calls higher alarms more rapidly than a 

decade ago and rotates crews more often to deal with exertion from wearing the new outfits and 

from having smaller crews.

Property Damage – Total direct losses had been estimated at $3.9 million. Of this, $3.5 million was 

losses to the structures, $.12 million was estimated losses to cars and trucks, and $.32 million estimated losses to contents. Out of 96 units 66 were destroyed or razed (though some lasted long 

enough for some personal property to be saved). All of the remaining units received smoke, water, 

or firefighting damage. The surviving units required rehabilitation and were still vacant six weeks 

after the fire.

Thirty-one vehicles in the parking lot on the south side of the buildings were destroyed by radiant 

heat and flaming debris. The cars seemed to explode in flames, though not from gas tank explosions. 

They spread shrapnel and debris as they exploded.

The houses surrounding the apartment complex on the south side sustained minor damage to windows and from smoke. Properties on all other sides were undamaged due to the successful defenses 

of the exposures. All of the surrounding buildings had been evacuated when it was not clear how 

far the fire would spread. The property had been appraised at $3.5 million in 1985 and had $4.3 

million insurance coverage.

FIRe InVeSTIGATIon

Seattle used its entire complement of fire investigators to determine the cause and development of 

this fire (two officers, six fire investigators, plus two police detectives). The Seattle Fire and Police 

Departments teamed to find the tenant who started it. In addition, ATF was immediately called to 

the scene and rapidly responded with a 20-member quick response team that quickly sifted through 

the debris, took samples and arranged for lab tests. (See Appendix E for Seattle Fire Department 

Investigator’s Report, ATF Laboratory Report and Police Department Incident Report.) The ATF tested 

carpet, carpet pads, concrete, a melted plastic jug and charred debris. Based on the testimony of the 

woman who admitted starting the fire, eyewitnesses standing outside her unit at the time of the fire, 

and failure of any tests to turn up accelerants, the fire was determined by the Seattle Fire Department 

to be an accidental fire started by a candle.

LE

1. Local legislators and power utility officials need to have pointed out to them the potential 

fire safety impact of cutting power to low income households.

Many fires such as this one have been started by low income families resorting to open flames 

for light or using stoves, ovens and open flames for heat when their power is cut off.5 Cutting 

5 For another example besides this fire, see Four House Fires That Killed 28 Children, United States Fire Administration 

(report #020), 16825 South Seton Avenue, Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727.
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 13

power also can disable hard-wired detectors and alarm systems. These results of cutting power 

often are not considered by utilities. Local welfare agencies should give assistance for electric 

power as high a priority as shelter. In some communities, the local power company will provide 

a lower current, minimal service to power heat and light but not use washers, dryers, TVs, etc., 

if payments are stopped. (See Appendix G for description of Delaware program utilizing load 

limiter devices and model notice to delinquent account customers.)

2. Public fire education programs need to make special efforts to reach low income families, 

including the hard-to-reach.

It is often difficult to get safety messages to people who have low education, no stable job, drug 

problems, etc. But the effort needs to be made on getting across the basics. If power is cut off, 

the power company should either deliver safety messages to the household involved or alert 

other agencies who may then do so. Misuse of candles, portable heaters, and stoves are common 

problems.

Another path for reaching low income families is through their children in school. Kids can 

be taught the basics of fire safety and the importance of getting out quickly and calling 9-1-1 

immediately – even in preschool or kindergarten.

3. Many people – perhaps most – still need to be taught how fast fire and smoke can move.

Many people in the apartment complex did not think they were in danger even after they knew 

there was a fire because they had no idea how fast flames could travel.

4. People need to be encouraged to report a fire to the fire department unless they are sure 

someone else is doing it.

Part of the reporting delay in this fire came from people not calling the fire department because 

they assumed others had done so.

5. People in apartment complexes need to be advised to tell their children about the seriousness of false alarms. Schools should also preach that kids who cause false alarms are doing 

harm.

People in this fire disregarded the alarms at first because of frequent previous false alarms.

6. Codes requiring sprinklering of multi-family low income dwellings need to be coordinated 

with housing subsidy rules.

If built under current Seattle code, the Villa Plaza apartments would have sprinklers in every unit. 

The fire department would have been called up initiation of sprinkler water flow monitored by a 

central station service. This fire in all likelihood would have been confined to the unit of origin. 

There were no flammable liquids and no unusual fire loading here, yet the fire spread very rapidly. Local fire departments should continue to press for requirements to have all multi-family 

dwellings sprinklered retroactively.

There is a major problem in low income buildings; however, if the apartment complex had 

been required to be upgraded, it may have charged higher rents and might no longer have been 

considered housing suitable for subsidized families! One does not want to have a policy that 

eliminates housing stocks for low income people or only protects the rich.
14 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

7. In addition to sprinklers, and certainly where sprinklers do not exist, passive measures 

should be taken to slow flame spread.

Ironically, the apartment complex did take what they thought was such a measure: the installation of fire doors in the open walkways. But they proved largely ineffective since the fire could 

and did breach them around the open side of the grill, and by burning through the wood ceiling 

of the walkway and the wood siding of the building.

8. Having four-person engine companies instead of three-person engine companies in outlying residential areas can be critically important when they have to operate on their own for 

a time.

It is difficult to say for sure how the first-in engine company would have acted if they would 

have had a four-person crew instead of the three they had, but they would have had at least a 

chance to make a major difference in the outcome. The training chief of Seattle, who was one 

of the ICS branch commanders at the scene, felt that a 2-1/2-inch line applied right after arrival 

could have checked or slowed the spread of flames along the exterior in at least one direction 

and made a material difference.

The first-in three-person engine company started to lay a line, stopped to affect a rescue, then 

continued laying a line. If they had four people they could have done both operations simultaneously. Or, if it had been necessary, they could have made a second rescue.

As a second point of evidence, the second-in engine company was the first to arrive on the west 

side of the complex. They did have a fourth crew member and were able to do both a rescue 

and set up a 2-1/2-inch line for an interior attack simultaneously. This is thought to have helped 

slow the fire enough to ultimately save Building A.

Also, if the first arriving ladder company (L-12) had its full crew of five instead of being one 

short, they might have been able to leave one person with the engine lieutenant to start fighting 

the fire. Consideration should be given to providing companies in remote areas with higher 

staffing levels than companies that can get backup quickly.

9. Firefighters need to be massed quickly for a large residential fire; current deployment and 

staffing need to be rethought.

This fire illustrated the difficulty in getting an adequate number of units to a high-life hazard 

occupancy in a corner of a city. A deployment with more companies located further from the 

Central Business District (CBD), in a way that still allows them to converge quickly toward the 

center but also to be more available to the residential areas, should be considered. An alternative is to send fewer units to fires in the CBD on first response to allow higher staffing levels on 

remote units, in light of the need to send an army in most cases should the first three units not 

suffice.

The number of crew per company, the deployment of companies, the number of units sent on 

first alarms, and the timing and size of second alarms needs to be reconsidered. This has already 

taken place in some cities abroad such as London and is being now debated by the National Fire 

Protection Association’s Urban Forum.

The strategic deployment of most fire departments is largely dictated by a save-the-CBD philosophy driven by business and insurance pressures. That should be rethought in an era of increas-
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 15

ing built-in fire protection in the CBD while the majority of fire deaths occur in residential 

areas.

A full discussion of deployment is beyond the scope of this report, but this fire points up the 

dangers of conventional (traditional) deployments strategies.

10. More chiefs need to be sent in early for the Incident Command System at a significant fire.

The ICS was used almost from the start and kept the fire department command and control 

effective.

Additional battalion chiefs and higher chiefs could have been used earlier in this fire. The 

operation had to accelerate quickly into a full-blown ICS with branches and divisions, and there 

weren’t enough chiefs who came in on the early alarms. Rapid response of chiefs is almost as 

important as line companies when the ICS is used for a large incident.

11. An agency should be designated to coordinate relief efforts at the scene and at a shelter following a major incident.

A relief-oriented version of the Incident Command System – an Incident Relief Command – 

might be worth considering, as an ICS branch headed by an appropriate, local, welfare-oriented 

department.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency and/or State agencies play a coordinating role 

in large incidents involving thousands of victims, but coordination for major local incidents 

involving hundreds should also be considered. In the aftermath of this incident the local Red 

Cross representative in Seattle suggested that the City Human Services be the relief coordinator 

at such incidents, with the Red Cross serving as the “branch” relief coordinator for shelter.

The relief efforts at this incident involved at least six agencies: two city relief agencies, one State 

agency, and three private organizations, in addition to the fire, police, and medical emergency 

services.

The first night was consumed with providing shelter and food, and accounting for Villa Plaza 

residents. The second day saw the start of coordinating other services for victims. These might 

have started earlier if there was immediate coordination.

12. Having multiple ways out of an apartment unit can mean life or death.

Many modern apartment buildings have only one practical way out for people to escape from 

their unit: the front door. If that path is blocked by fire or smoke, they are trapped. In the Villa 

Plaza, occupants had three ways out of their units.

Because every apartment unit had three ways out, and because more people were out of their 

unit they could flee in either direction to a staircase down, or at least get out on a balcony or out 

of a window, all were rescued. Nevertheless, local officials believe that if the fire had started a 

few hours later on that Saturday night, when some people would have been asleep or under the 

influence of alcohol or drugs, there could easily have been many fatalities.

13. A new, side benefit of smoke detectors was noted: verifying the existence of a real fire.

At least some people did not believe the bells ringing from the pull alarm system, but got moving when they heard smoke detectors going off.
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

14. If the buildings had had a truss roof with vents, all five buildings might have been lost.

The fire was slowed by the solid “old fashioned” roof, which was effectively divided into 16-inch 

compartments on its underside. That slowed the fire spread.

15. Consideration should be given to having a second alarm response that is larger than the first 

alarm in residential areas.

Many departments essentially double the first alarm response on a second alarm. Sometimes the 

second alarm is smaller than the first, as in Seattle.

Because of the slow response of second alarm units to many remote residential locations, consideration should be given to having a larger second alarm response to ensure that some get 

there quickly.

Also, rapid moveups in the direction of the incident should be considered for large working fires 

in remote areas as soon as they are confirmed by the first-in unit, to provide faster response on 

higher alarms.

16. Interpreters need to be able to be located quickly for many languages.

There is often an emergency need to speak to victims to determine if anyone is left inside. On 

a somewhat slower timescale, their needs for assistance must be determined. Communities 

should be able to locate translators from within or outside the fire and police departments to 

cope with the languages of new immigrants, as well as established ethnic groups.

17. Fire departments need to remind crews of the importance of reporting in when they arrive 

on the scene.

Whether reporting arrival on the scene is by radio or by electronic button pushing (Automatic 

Vehicle Locators), crews need to be reminded of the need to report in. This information is needed 

by dispatchers, senior officers monitoring the incident, and for post-mortems. Often the crews are 

thinking about what action they will take and may not remember to do this simple act.

18. A security guard would have cut the time of reporting the fire and aided in the evacuation.

Ironically, the residents of the complex had planned to start using a security guard the week after 

the fire occurred. The guard would have been able to report the fire more quickly, serve as an 

authority figure in telling people there was a fire, and assist in the evacuation.

19. Some tactical lessons/questions:

•	 One of the most critical decisions in the fire was taking water off the building of origin

and using the available water to stop the spread in the wing buildings and the spread to the 

northern two buildings.

•	 Pre-connected deluge monitors might have made a difference. It took considerable time to

wrestle the monitors down from the top of the engines to the ground and connect them. 

Low staffing on engine companies made this harder and slower.

•	 The spray from modern nozzles had difficulty penetrating this fire. Solid-bore old-fashioned nozzles or solid stream add-ons to modern spray nozzles were thought to be better 

to reach the base of the fire compared to spray nozzles stopped down to their most solid 

stream. This is an old issue.
17

APPenDIX A

Floor Plan of Apartment of Fire Origin and 

Building Elevation Drawings

FLOOR PLAN OF APARTMENT OF FIRE ORIGIN
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)
19

APPenDIX b

Site Diagram Showing First-in Response
20

APPenDIX C

Fire Department Operations Timeline

September 21, 1991 Event

21:20 – 21:25 Estimated time of fire origin.

21:35:28 First call received by 9-1-1/Seattle Police Communications (from 

Apartment Unit 216).

21:36:20 Fire dispatcher answers the relayed call from 9-1-1.

21:37:10 Dispatcher hits computer keys to dispatch units.

21:37:50 Units dispatched by computer; bells start ringing in stations.

21:38:321 Dispatcher reads units dispatched on the air. (Engines 33-28-36, 

Ladders 12-7, Battalion 5, Aid 14-28, Air 32).

21:40:46 Engine 33 arrives on the scene (first arriving unit).

21:42:05 SECOND ALARM REQUESTED (by Engine 28).

21:42:35 Second alarm dispatched (E27-26, L3, Air 26).

21:44 Ladder 12, Aide 28 arrived on scene. E22 dispatched.

21:47:20 Battalion 5 arrives; establishes 50th Avenue Command.

21:48:35 THIRD ALARM REQUESTED by Battalion 5.

21:49:25 Third alarm dispatched (E30, L11).

21:50 Engine 36 has arrived by this time.

21:51 By now the second alarm units have arrived.

21:52:20 Aide 31 dispatched.

21:53:15 Medic 10, Aide 32 dispatched.

21:53:45 Battalion 1 (Acting Deputy Chief of Operations) arrives and takes 

over command.

21:54:10 FOURTH ALARM REQUESTED by Command.

21:54:54 Fourth alarm dispatched (E6-37, L10).

1Automatic computer entry. The later times were entered by the dispatcher based on direct radio messages or inferences 

from monitoring radio traffic.
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 21

Appendix C (continued)

21:57:20 Engine 32 and Medic 16 dispatched.

21:59:50 Aide 5, Battalion 7 dispatched (Command requested additional 

chief).

22:09:40 Two Expanded Response System (ERS) Units requested (5-person 

engine companies).

22:11:10 E10 dispatched.

22:12:18 E2 dispatched.

22:13:54 FIFTH ALARM REQUESTED by Command.

22:40 East County Task Force ordered.

22:43 South County Task Force ordered.

22:45 Southwest County Task Force ordered.

Note: Arrival of times of second alarms and higher alarm units not recorded.

September 22, 1991

01:50 Fire controlled.

03:51 Tapped fire, working on spot fire.

September 27, 1991

10:58 Last unit leaves the scene.
22

APPenDIX D

Units Used at Scene

(in approximate order of arrival)

Engine Companies

33, 28, 36 First Alarm

27, 26 Second Alarm

22 Added

30 Third Alarm

6, 37 Fourth Alarm

32, 10, 2 Added

29 Fifth Alarm

13, 34, 9, 25, 8, 17, 11, 21, 294, Added

245, 246, 38, 24, 292, 16, 35, 40,

20, 21, 5, 39, 18

Ladder Companies

12, 7 First Alarm

3 Second Alarm

11 Third Alarm

10 Fourth Alarm

4 Fifth Alarm

6, 312, 303 Added

Air Units

32 First Alarm

26 Second Alarm

9 Added

Chiefs

Battalion 5 First Alarm

1 Second Alarm

7 Added

2, 6, 4, Fifth

Assistant Chief,

Fire Chief

Medical Units

Aid 14, 28 First Alarm

Aid 31, 32, 5, Later

Medic 10, 16, 1
23

APPenDIX e

Seattle Fire Department Investigator’s Report, 

ATF Laboratory Report and 

Police Department Incident Report

SEATTLE FIRE DEPARTMENT

FIRE INVESTIGATOR'S SCENE REPORT
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix e (continued)

FIRE INVESTIGATOR'S SCENE REPORT CONT.

On September 21st 1991, a fire of unknown origin destroyed a major

portion of the Villa Plaza Apartments, a 96 unit apartment complex

located at 9111 50th. Avenue South in Seattle. At the time of the

response numerous occupants of the apartment complex were

unaccounted for.

GENERAL:

The Villa Plaza Apartments are located at 50 Avenue South and South

Director Street. This is located in a lower middle socio-economic

neighborhood.

The four story apartment complex is situated in a "U" configuration

with the opening to the north with a common courtyard in the center

of the complex. The fire was reported by occupants and the manager

of the apartment complex at 9:37 PM on September 21. When the fire

was first discovered it was in apartment 115, on the ground floor

of the (south) wing connecting the two wings forming the legs of

the "U". Fire conditions progressed rapidly. First responding

fire companies noted flames extending from the ground floor to over

the roof on the south wing, Initial response was committed to

search and rescue of residents.

One occupant was seriously injured when she jumped/fell from a

third floor balcony while attempting to escape the fire.

'he fire destroyed 64 units located in the south wing and southern

as of the east and west wings.

CONSTRUCTION:

The Villa Plaza Apartments were built in 1968 as a 96 unit

apartment complex. The three primary wings are four story ordinary

wood frame construction with light weight concrete floors and a

flat hot tar roof.

Primary access to individual units is off common semi-enclosed

breezeways. These breezeways are along the exterior perimeter of

the complex on all four floor levels. The 1st. floor breezeway

includes a concrete stem wall approximately five feet in height.

Stair towers are located on the west side of the north west corner

of the west wing, the east side of the north east corner of the

east wing, and three stair towers approximately evenly spaced along

the south wall of the south wing dividing this wing into quarters.
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 25

Appendix e (continued)

FIRE INVESTIGATOR'S SCENE REPORT CONT.

Access to the upper floors was also provided by passenger elevators

on either end of the south wing adjacent to the covered parking

areas. These covered parking areas are off the apex of the

intersecting wings. The complex office is located on the ground

floor in the intersection of the south and east wings.

The complex was serviced with normal electric and water service.

No natural gas or propane service was provided. Electric service

vaults with base mounted transformers were located on the ground

floor in the intersections of the west and south wings. Electrical

service was distributed throughout the complex through BX flexible

cable.

The exterior wall of the breezeways consisted of a five foot wide

brick facia separated by a ten foot wide 2" X 6" vertical

dimensional lumber lattice facade. The facia and lattice are

continuous extending form the stem wall to the roof. The painted

2 X 6 members are perpendicular to the stem wall and are on

approximate nine inch centers.

The breezeway wall of the individual units are painted cedar siding

over ordinary wood frame construction and includes single pane

windows for each unit room adjoining the breezeway. The floor of

the breezeways were finished with indoor/outdoor carpets. Access

to the individual units is by way of alcoves which each service two

units. Units opening onto the common courtyard included patios and

balconies accessed by sliding patio doors.

The south wing is approximately 300 feet long (east to west). The

east and west wings are approximately 200 feet long.

WITNESS REPORTS:

Apartment 116 was occupied by Andre and Coletta Jenkins. Apartment

115 was occupied by Michelle Parker. Apartment 114 is vacant.

Witnesses report that electric service to apartment 115 has been

terminated for approximately twelve days.

Witnesses statements indicate that Ms. Parker arrived at her

apartment at approximately 9:00 PM. Due to no utilities in her

apartment, Ms. Parker attempted to obtain permission to run an

extension cord from apartment 116, which has been a previous

practice. Although home, Jenkins did not respond to Parker when
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix e (continued)

FIRE INVESTIGATOR'S SCENE REPORT CONT.

she knocked on the door. Parker stated that she lit a candle for

light and went to her bedroom (the southeast corner room of her

apartment) to gather some clothing. According to Parker the candle

was on a plate which she placed on a dresser in her bedroom.

Parker stated that she noted that the south wall of her bedroom was

warm to the touch when she looked out her window when she noticed

that she had left her car lights on. According to Parker, when she

returned from taking care of her car lights she discovered flames

coming from under the wall of apartment 114 into her bedroom.

According to witness statements, the smoke detector in apartment

115 sounded for approximately 15 - 20 minutes before anyone took

action. At 9:36 PM the occupant of apartment 216 called "911".

Shortly after this call was placed the local fire alarm system was

manually activated. At 9:38 PM fire units were dispatched and at

9:41 PM the first fire suppression unit arrived at the scene

finding flames on the south side of the south wing extending from

the ground floor to the roof. First arriving fire units were

dedicated to search and rescue operations.

Several witnesses indicated that Ms. Parker attempted to fight the

fire for a period of time before alerting neighbors of the fire and

asking for help.

Prior to the arrival of the fire department, Michelle Parker fled

the scene driving in a reckless manner striking or running several

vehicles off the road.

According to Ms. Parker no flammable liquids are in her apartment.

No witnesses report any threats or hostile comments being made by

Ms. Parker before or after the fire.

SCENE PROCESSING:

Scene examination by the Western Region National Response team and

the Seattle Fire Department began on the afternoon of September 23.

Custody and control of the scene was maintained from the time of

the fire until, and throughout the scene investigation by the

Seattle Police Department. Entrance onto and search of the scene

was conducted under the authority of a King County Superior Court

Criminal Search Warrant.
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 27

Appendix e (continued)

FIRE INVESTIGATOR'S SCENE REPORT CONT.

The South wing of the apartment complex had been completely

destroyed by fire. The general area of most severe damage was

slightly west of the center of the wing. Most or all of the

structural members of apartments 116, 115, 114, 113, and 112 were

totally consumed.

Examination of the electrical service vaults determined that no

fire extended into this area of the building. Apartment units were

individually metered, The meters for units 114 and 115 were

identified by markings on the meter bases as well as by Seattle

City Light employees. These meters were equipped with plastic

boots over the male plugs making it impossible for current flow to

these two units.

Debris was removed from the areas of apartments 113, through 110

with heavy equipment in search of missing and/or unaccounted for

fire victims. Search of this area failed to reveal any victims.

Eventually during the scene investigation , all missing persons were

accounted for by off scene investigators.

Debris of the upper floors over apartments 115 and 114 was removed

by utilization of heavy equipment. Debris from the first and

second floors was layered using hand tools. All debris from

apartments 114 and 115 was removed and the slab was washed.

The surviving ends of the wall studs in apartment 115 were

examined. This examination indicates that fire travel was from the

master bedroom of this unit. The corner base plates of walls

between the master bedroom and the front door of the apartment were

rounded off indicating the direction of fire travel to be from the

master bedroom, Examination of the doubled wall base plates

between units 114 and 115 indicate that fire could not have

extended at floor level between apartments 114 and 115 as was

stated by the occupant.

Excavation of the debris of apartment 115 failed to produce any

electrical or gas appliances in the area of the master bedroom. A

dinner plate was found in the area of the dresser where the

occupant indicated the candle had been placed.

During excavation of the entrance closets a strong odor believed to

be those of a volatile substance were noted and samples were taken

form this area. A concrete sample was also taken in an area of

unusual floor burn inthe living room of the apartment.
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix e (continued)

FIRE INVESTIGATOR'S SCENE REPORT CONT.

Examination of the floor in apartment 114 revealed similar unusual

burn patterns indicating that the burns were the result of mastic

adhesives, carpet, or fall-down. Examination of the contents of

the closet were the suspect samples were obtained indicates that

there was no fire in this room and the flammable/combustible

liquids that may have been in this area did not contribute to the

initial spread of the fire.

SUMMARY:

No electrical service was available to apartments 114 and 115.

Fire did not communicate between apartments 114 and 115 at or near

floor level.

There is no heat source or electrical service in the south walls of

apartments 114 or 115.

No indication of criminal intent has been revealed during the

interview phase of the investigation.

CONCLUSION:

This fire originated in the master bedroom of apartment 115. The

heat source was an open flame and involved the ignition of ordinary

combustible materials.

Without any indications of criminal intent, this fire is being

determined to be accidental in nature.
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 29

Appendix E (continued)

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Forensic Science Laboratory

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS

355 North Wlget Lane

Walnut Creek. CA 94598

510 486-3170

FTS 449-3170

Laboratory, Report

To: Date of Report: October 2, 1991

Special Agent Dane A. Whetsel

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Lab Number: 91S0507K

818 Jackson Federal Building

915 2nd Avenue Reference: 93370914539F

Seattle, WA 98174 Villa Plaza Apartments

Type of Exam: Accelerants

The following evidence was delivered by Forensic Chemist Brad

Cooper on September 27, 1991:

EXHIBITS

1. Gallon metal can containing charred debris

2. Gallon metal can containing charred debris

3. Gallon metal can containing melted plastic jug and liquid

4. Gallon metal can containing charred carpet, pad and wood

5. Gallon metal can containing carpet and pad (comparison)

6. Metal can containing concrete fragments

RESULTS OF EXAMINATION

No flammable or combustible liquids were detected in Exhibits 1, 2,

3, 4, 5 or 6.

Exhibit 3 contained the melted remains of an approximately 1 gallon

plastic jug. The origin of this jug could not be determined at

this time.

DISPOSITION OF EVIDENCE

The evidence will be returned to the Seattle Post of Duty by

Certified Mail.

Bradley D. Cooper

Forensic Chemist REVIEWED BY:

William R. Dietz, Chief

Forensic Section

BDC/rcg

Accredited by The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (continued)

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS

15355 Vantage Parkway West Suite 212

Houston, Texas 77032

September 26, 1991

To: Bill Haverstick

Group Supervisor

Seattle Arson Group

From: Western Region National Response Team

Through: Special Agent in Charge

Seattle District Office

Re: Origin and Cause Investigating

I/N 93370 91 4539 F

On September 23, 1991, the Western Region National Response Team

responded to Seattle, Washington. A fire of unknown origin

destroyed a major portion of the Villa Plaza Apartments, a 96 unit

apartment complex located at 9111 50th. Avenue South in Seattle.

At the time of the response numerous occupants of the apartment

complex were unaccounted for.

GENERAL:

The Villa Plaza Apartments are located at 50 Avenue South and South

Director Street. This is located in a lower middle socio-economic

neighborhood.

The four story apartment complex is situated in a "U" configuration

with the opening to the north with a common courtyard in the center

of the complex. The fire was reported by occupants and the manager

of the apartment complex at 9:37 PM on September 21. When the fire

was first discovered it was in apartment 115, on the ground floor

of the (south) wing connecting the two win s forming the legs of

the "U". Fire conditions progressed rapid ly. First responding

fire companies noted flames extending from the ground floor to over

the roof on the south wing. Initial response was committed to

search and rescue of residents.

One occupant was seriously injured when she jumped/fell from a

third floor balcony while attempting to escape the fire.

The fire destroyed 64 units located in the south wing and southern

ends of the east and west wings.

CONSTRUCTION:

The Villa Plaza Apartments were built in 1968 as a 96 unit

apartment complex. The three primary wings are four ordinary

wood frame construction with light weight concrete floors and a

flat hot tar roof.
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 31

Appendix E (continued)

Primary access to individual units is off common semi-enclosed

breezeways. These breezeways are along the exterior perimeter of

the complex on all four floor levels. The 1st. floor breezeway

includes a concrete stem wall approximately five feet in height.

Stair towers are located on the west side of the north west corner

of the west wing, the east side of the north east corner of the

east wing, and three stair towers approximately evenly spaced along

the south wall of the south wing dividing this wing into quarters.

Access to the upper floors was also provided by passenger elevators

on either end of the south wing a adjacent to the covered parking

areas. These covered parking areas are off the apex of the

intersecting wings. The complex office is located on the ground

floor in the intersection of the south and east wings.

The complex was serviced with normal electric and water service.

No natural gas or propane service was provided. Electric service

vaults with base mounted transformers were located on the ground

floor in the intersections of the west and south wings. Electrical

service was distributed throughout the complex through BX flexible

cable.

The exterior wall of the breezeways consisted of a five foot wide

brick facia separated by a ten foot wide 2" X 6" vertical

dimensional lumber lattice facade. The facia and lattice are

continuous extending form the stem wall to the roof. The painted

2 X 6 members are perpendicular to the stem wall and are on

approximate nine inch centers.

The breezeway wall of the individual units are painted cedar siding

over ordinary wood frame construction and includes single pane

windows for each unit room adjoining the breezeway. The floor of

the breezeways were finished with indoor/outdoor carpets. Access

to the individual units is by way of alcoves which each service two

units. Units opening onto the common courtyard included patios and

balconies accessed by sliding patio doors.

The south wing is approximately 300 feet long (east to west). The

east and west wings are approximately 200 feet long.

WITNESS REPORTS:

Apartment 116 was occupied by Andre and Coletta Jenkins. Apartment

115 was occupied by Michelle Parker. Apartment 114 is vacant.

Witnesses report that electric service to apartment 115 has been

terminated for approximately twelve days.

Witnesses statements indicate that Ms. Parker arrived at her

apartment at approximately 9:00 PM. Due to no utilities in her

apartment, Ms. Parker attempted to obtain permission to run an

extension cord from apartment 116, which has been a previous

practice. Although home, Jenkins did not respond to Parker when

she knocked on the door. Parker stated that she lit a candle for

light and went to her bedroom (the southeast corner room of her

(2)
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix e (continued)

apartment) to gather some clothing. According to Parker the candle

was on a plate which she placed on a dresser in her bedroom.

Parker stated that she noted that the south wall of her bedroom was

warm to the touch when she looked out her window when she noticed

that she had left her car lights on. According to Parker, when she

returned from taking care of her car lights she discovered flames

coming from under t he wall of apartment 114 into her bedroom.

According to witness statements, the smoke detector in apartment

115 sounded for approximately 15 - 20 minutes before anyone took

action. At 9:36 PM the occupant of apartment 216 called "911".

Shortly after this call was placed the local fire alarm system was

manually activated. At 9:38 PM fire units were dispatched and at

9:41 PM the first fire suppression unit arrived at the scene

finding flames on the south side of the south wing extending from

the ground floor to the roof. First arriving fire units were

dedicated to search and rescue operations.

Several witnesses indicated that Ms. Parker attempted to fight the

fire for a period of time before alerting neighbors of the fire and

asking for help.

Prior to the arrival of the fire department, Michelle Parker fled

the scene driving in a reckless manner striking or running several

vehicles off the road.

According to Ms. Parker no flammable liquids are in her apartment.

No witnesses report any threats or hostile comments being made by

Ms. Parker before or after the fire.

SCENE PROCESSING:

Scene-examination by the Western Region National Response team and

the Seattle Fire Department began on the afternoon of September 23.

Custody and control of the scene was maintained from the time of

the fire until and throughout the scene investigation by the

Seattle Police Department. Entrance onto and search of the scene

was conducted under the authority of a King County Superior Court

Criminal Search Warrant.

The South wing of the apartment complex had been completely

destroyed by fire. The general area of most severe damage was

slightly west of the center of the wing. Most or all of the

structural members of apartments 116, 115, 114, 113, and 112 were

totally consumed.

Examination of the electrical service vaults determined that no

fire extended into this area of the building. Apartment units were

individually metered. The meters for units 114 and 115 were

identified by markings on the meter bases as well as by Seattle

City Light employees. These meters were equipped with plastic

boots over the male plugs making it impossible for current flow to

these two units.

(3)
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 33

Appendix e (continued)

Debris was removed from the areas of apartments 113, through 110

with heavy equipment in search of missing and/or unaccounted for

fire victims. Search of this area failed to reveal any victims.

Eventually during the scene investigation, all missing persons were

accounted for by off scene investigators.

Debris of the upper floors over apartments 115 and 114 was removed

by utilization of heavy equipment. Debris from the first and

second floors was layered using hand tools. All debris from

apartments 114 and 115 was removed and the slab was washed.

The surviving ends of the wall studs in apartment 115 were

examined. This examination indicates that fire travel was from the

master bedroom of this unit. The corner base plates of walls

between the master bedroom and the front door of the apartment were

rounded off indicating the direction of fire travel to be from the

master bedroom. Examination of the doubled wall base plates

between units 114 and 115 indicate that fire could not have

extended at floor level between apartments 114 and 115 as was

stated by the occupant.

Excavation of the debris of apartment 115 failed to produce any

electrical or gas appliances in the area of the master bedroom. A

dinner plate was found in the area of the dresser where the

occupant indicated the candle had been placed.

During excavation of the entrance closets a strong odor believed to

be those of a volatile substance were noted and samples were taken

form this area. A concrete sample was also taken in an area of

unusual floor burn in the living room of the apartment.

Examination of the floor in apartment 114 revealed similar unusual

burn patterns indicating that the bums were the result of mastic

adhesives, carpet, or fall-down. Examination of the contents of

the closet were the suspect samples were obtained indicates that

there was no fire in this room and the flammable/combustible

liquids that may have been in this area did not contribute to the

initial spread of the fire.

SUMMARY:

No electrical service was available to apartments 114 and 115.

Fire did not communicate between apartments 114 and 115 at or near

floor level.

There is no heat source or electrical service in the southwalls of

apartments 114 or 115.

No indication of criminal intent has been revealed during the

interview phase of the investigation.

(4)
34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix e (continued)

CONCLUSION:

This fire originated in the master bedroom of apartment 115. The

heat source was an open flame, most likely a candle, and involved

the ignition of ordinary combustible materials.

Without any indications of criminal intent, this fire is being

determined to be accidental in nature.

(5)
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 35

Appendix e (continued)
36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix e (continued)
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 37

Appendix e (continued)
38 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix e (continued)
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 39

Appendix e (continued)
40 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix e (continued)
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 41

Appendix e (continued)

Photo provided by Philip Schaenman

Close-up of the decorative cedar screen on the fronts of the buildings, 

which served a security purpose as well. Fire could race unimpeded up the 

wood 2 x 6’x. The photograph shows the screen as it passes the outdoor 

carpeted floor of the walkway above.
42 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix e (continued)
43

APPenDIX F

Map of Seattle Showing Station Locations
44

APPenDIX G

Description of Delaware Program Utilizing Load Limiter 

Devices and Model Unpaid Customer Notice

DELMARVA Power and Light utilizes a Limiter Adapter service which encourages the payment of 

electric bills that are in arrears, while providing minimally adequate power. This helps prevent the 

use of candles and other open flames.

The following guidelines are used when a customer is past due on a payment.

1. The Ekstrom Service Limiter Adapter is installed by DELMARVA Power and Light when 

the residential account is 2 months past due.

2. The limiter remains for 7 days; if the electric bill is not paid, then the meter is pulled and 

electricity is turned off.

3. The limiter allows 10 Amps, which the company claims is enough for lights and 

refrigerator.

The information provided to the user gives him or her a chance to make arrangements for payments. 

DELMARVA Power is very clear on what appliances can and cannot be used. The concern over open 

flame for lighting is addressed in the handout.

(This information was provided by Edward C. McCormick, Jr., Fire Commissioner, Delaware State 

Fire Prevention Commission.)
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 45

Appendix G (continued)

ELECTRIC SERVICE

LIMITED

READ NOTICE BELOW

 You have not paid your bill despite efforts by us to collect

the bill and to warn you that a shut-off was about to happen.

Normally at this point, we would have disconnected your

electricity.

 Instead, we have placed a load limiter that reduces the

amount of electricity available for your use. Do not turn on

anything until you have read this notice.

 To restore full electric service, you must pay your previous balance plus a restoration charge. Please call your

distnict office to make these arrangements or to have

any questions answered.

 The use of this limiter is temporary. If your bill remains

unpaid, we have the right to remove the limiter and disconnect your electricity after seven (7) days.

HOW THE LOAD LIMITER WORKS

The Load Limiter should allow for enough electricity to operate

a few lights, a heating system motor, and a refrigerator. If more

electricity is used, a circuit breaker at the meter trips and electric power is disconnected.

IF THE CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIPS:

1. Shut off all lights, motors, and appliances.

2. Go outside to the meter and locate the push button(s) on the

bottom of the device holding the meter.

3. For a single button device:

To restore limited service push the button firmly until you

hear it “click” in position.

For a two button device:

Either one or both of these buttons will pop out. To restore

limited service, press the button that popped out back into

the device. If both buttons have popped out. press both of

them. When both buttons stay up in the device, your limited

electric service is back on.

(Do not attempt to tape the button(s) in place. The service

limiter will fail and you will be totally without power. This

action may also damage your motors.)

CAUTION

1. While your electric service is being limited, do not turn on

a toaster or any large electric appliance such as a range, a hot

water heater, a clothes washer/dryer, or a dishwasher. These

appliances will automatically trip the circuit breaker.

2. If you have a large water pump motor, it also must be shut

off while the service limiter is in operation.

3. Always have on hand a flashlight with fresh batteries. For

your safety, never use candles or any other open flame lighting.
46

Appendix H

Photographs

Photo provided by Philip Schaenman

Typical exterior construction, brick facia with 2” x 6” slated security fencing.
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 47

Appendix H (continued)

Photo provided by the Seattle Fire Department

View from the southeast looking northwest.
48 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo provided by the Seattle Fire Department

Overview of south wing looking west.

Appendix H (continued)
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 49 Photo provided by the Seattle Fire Department Easterly view showing stairwell enclosure that remained at the east end of the destroyed complex.

Appendix H (continued)
50 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo provided by the Seattle Fire Department

Aerial view of area of origin (Unit 115).

Appendix H (continued)
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 51 Photo provided by the Seattle Fire Department Slab of room of origin, southeast bedroom.

Appendix H (continued)
52 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix H (continued)

Photo provided by the Seattle Fire Department

Aerial view showing the unit of origin and adjacent unit on east and slab comparisons.
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 53

Appendix H (continued)

Photo provided by Philip Schaenman

South and west sides of Building E. Note that only a small amount of damage was done to this building, 

at its southeast corner.
54 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix H (continued)

Photo provided by Philip Schaenman

Closer view of damage of southeast corner of Building E. The wooden 

platforms jutting out on the right were part of the walkway attached to 

Building D, which was demolished.
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 55

Appendix H (continued)

Photo provided by Philip Schaenman

View of complex from south. Building A is on left, Building E on right. The small central building was a pool 

clubhouse. Buildings B, C and D were demolished and occupied the front (now vacant) space in the 

bottom third of the photograph.
56 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix H (continued)

Photo provided by Philip Schaenman

View of complex from southeast corner, looking northwest. The fire officer in the foreground is standing on the 

building line of what was Building D. The fire officer on the left is standing about where the first line and 

monitor were put into service by the first arriving engine company.
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 57

Appendix H (continued)

Photo provided by Philip Schaenman

South and east sides of Building A. This building was saved by an excellent exposure defense. Note that it was burning 

on both its southwest and southeast corners.
58 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix H (continued)

Photo provided by Philip Schaenman

Close-up of west facade of Building A; its southwest corner was damaged.
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 59

Appendix H (continued)

Photo provided by Philip Schaenman

Detail of southeast corner of Building A.
60 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix H (continued)

Photo provided by Philip Schaenman

Underside of walkway of basement level of Building E. The underside of all walkways on Floors 1-3 were similar and 

made of cedar. This was one of the avenues of flame spread.
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 61

Appendix H (continued)

Photo provided by Philip Schaenman

Close-up of the decorative cedar screen on the fronts of the buildings, 

which served a security purpose as well. Fire could race unimpeded up 

the wood 2 x 6s. The photograph shows the screen as it passes the outdoor 

carpeted floor of the walkway above.
62 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix H (continued)

Photo provided by Philip Schaenman

Top (fourth) floor walkway on western exterior of Building A. 

The ceiling of the fourth level was the only one not of cedar. The window 

shown is a bedroom window like the one that first blew out in the 

apartment of origin.
USFA-TR-059/September 1991 63

Appendix H (continued)

Photo provided by Philip Schaenman

Melted plastic containers behind the swimming pool. Firefighters were 

operating in this area during the initial stages of the attack.