## In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02

- 23

- 00491

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 78th District Court

Wichita County, Texas

Trial Court No. DC78

- CV2021

- 0707

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Wallach, JJ. 

### S TATE 

### F ARM 

### L LOYDS



### , Appellant

V



### .

J OHN 

### H ILMI 

### , Appellee

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth2 MEMORANDUM OPINION

According to Appellee John Hilmi, lightning caused almost $ 200,000 of

personal property damage at his home , “frying” hundreds of items

— from his family’s

toothbrushes to their hoverboards and Apple watches. But h is homeowner’s

insurance provider

—

Appellant State Farm Lloyds

— was not convinced . A fter paying

Hilmi for repairs to his real property, it grew skeptical of his lightning claim and

refused to pay for his family’s personal property. A jury sided with Hilmi , awarding

compensation for his personal property damage along with bad faith and statutory

damages for State Farm’s mismanagement o f Hilmi’s insurance claim.

State Farm now contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to support

the verdict . It argues that expert testimony was required to establish lightning as the

cause of Hilmi ’ s extensive personal property damage , and because Hilmi provided no

such testimony

, his contract claim fails

— and with it, the remainder of the judgment.

Because we agree that expert testimony was required to establish the causal link

between the lightning strike and much of Hilmi’ s personal property damage , and

because that issue is dispositive , we will reverse and remand for a new trial

.

I. Background

In 2018, State Farm insured the Hilmi family’s Wichita Falls home from

,

among other things, “ accidental direct physical loss to [certain personal]

property

. . . caused by

. . . lightning .”3

A. Storm and Damage

A storm hit Wichita Falls in late June 2018 while the Hilmi family was out of

town. 1 A friend was house

- sitting for the Hilmis

, and she later recalled waking up

during the night to feel the house shake and to see a “bright light

. ” T he following

morning, the home’s air conditioning was not working, at least one refrigerator was

not working, the basement had flooded, and there was extensive damage to the

Hilmis’ trees and landscaping

. The house sitter later testified that she believed the

property had been struck by lightning.

After the Hilmi family return ed home, they reached the same conclusion. 2

T hey observed “scorch[] marks” on the grass, pool

, and home exterior ; all the koi fish

in the ir pond were dead ; many of the electrical outlets were “blacked[ ]out”; and there

were “charred and burned” electrical wires

. More important to this appeal, though,

was the Hilmis’ discovery that many of the ir personal electronic devices no longer

worked.

1 The record reflects differ ent dates for the storm at different points in the

claims process

. T he date of loss was initially identified as July 6

, and it continued to

be so identified until after the present lawsuit was filed

. But at trial, the Hilmis put on

evidence that the storm had occurred on June 24 or 25 and that they returned home

on July 2

.

2 The house sitter recalled that she spent the night at the Hilmis’ home on June

24, and Mrs. Hilmi testified that the family arrived home on July 2.4

Mr. and Mrs. Hilmi later explained that numerous devices had been left

plugged in while they were gone and that those devices would not turn on when the

family returned

. In fact, according to the Hilmis, e ven devices that they had taken

with them on vacation ( such as their Apple watches ) stopped working after being

placed on charging stations at their lightning

- damaged house

.

B. State Farm Payment ( and Lack Thereof )

The Hilmis contacted State Farm to report the lightning damage, and when

State Farm’s representative s visited the property, the representatives acknowledged

that the damage was consistent with a lightning strike

. The Hilmis thus proceeded

with repairs to their real property , fixtures, and landscaping , but those repairs turned

out to be significant and continued for more than a year.

Meanwhile

, Mrs. Hilmi collected the family’s non

- working personal electronic

devices in a list

, and she submitted the list to State Farm for payment

. B ut by the time

State Farm confirmed receipt of the Hilmis’ list in October 2019 3

— more than a year

after the storm

— the insurance company had already paid more than $700,000 to

repair or replace other aspects of the Hilmis’ home, and it had grown skeptical of the

legitimacy of the Hilmis’ overall claim. So

, rather than compensating the Hilmis for

3 The parties disputed whether Mrs. Hilmi had provided or attempted to

provide a hard copy of her list to State Farm’s adjuster before October 2019

. Regardless, the documentation reflected that State Farm electronically received the list

of damaged personal property in October 2019.5

the ir list of damaged pe rsonal property, State Farm hired counsel and demanded that

the Hilmis submit to examination s under oath

. 4 Th e Hilmis responded by hiring

counsel themselves , and litigation ensued.

C. Litigation

The Hilmis sued State Farm for breach ing the insurance contract by failing to

pay for their list of damaged personal property items, 5 and they alleged extra

contractual claims related to that failure to pay , including violations of the Texas

Insurance Code, see Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § § 54 1 .003, .051, .061, 542.056 , and breaches

of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. The parties presented the

case to a jury in a lengthy trial

.

One of the central disputes at trial was whether the Hilmis’ home had been

struck by lightning at all

. State Farm denied that it had , and it presented expert

testimony showing that there had not been any lightning strikes within a half

- mile

radius of the Hilmis’ land on or around the alleged date of the storm

. 6 This irked the

4 An examination under oath was contemplated under one of the policy

provisions but had not previously been requested in the Hilmis’ case.

5 The Hilmis also alleged that State Farm had failed to pay for their additional

living expenses

, such as food and rent

.

6 State Farm’s expert explained that the United States has “a network of

antennas

. . . called the National Lightning Protection Network” that “can triangulate

in on a lightning event and place a location for it” within “a tenth of a mile.” The

expert ran reports using this data and found no lightning events at the Hilmis’

property on the date of the storm or in the weeks around the loss date

. He testified6

Hilmis, who insisted that State Farm had acknowledged the lightning strike for the

first year of their claim and had questioned the strike’s existence only after the parties

became embroiled in litigation

. 7

Nonetheless, to prove that the strike had occurred, the Hilmis offered

testimony from their house sitter

, descriptions of the various scorch marks on their

property

, testimony regarding the damage done to their electrical wiring and devices,

and similar evidence. Mr. Hilmi identified a split tree on the property as the perceived

that, a month before the date of loss

, “[t]here was a strike .7 miles away from the

house” and a few days before

, there was a strike 3.8 miles from the residence

. G iven

these distances and the magnitude s of the strikes, he opined that neither strike could

have caused damage to the Hilmis’ house.

7 State Farm’s claim

- related file documented its initial confirmation that a storm

had occurred on the date of loss and that lightning had been probable on that date,

although th o se confirmations were based on the original date of loss: July 6

. See supra

note 1.

Regardless, although the Hilmis ’ presentation to the jury emphasized State

Farm’s flip

- flopping, the Hilmis did not plead any estoppel

- related theories, nor do

they advance any such theories on appeal. See Ulico Cas. Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n

, 262

S.W.3d 773, 7 82 (Tex. 2008) (clarifying that “there is no ‘right’ of noncoverage that is

subject to being waived by the insurer, even by assumption of the insured’s defense

with knowledge of facts indicating noncoverage and without obtaining a valid

reservation of rights or non

- waiver agreement”); Wash. Nat ’l Ins. Co. v. Craddock

, 109

S.W.2d 165, 166 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1937) (noting that while “an insurance company

may, by its conduct, waive a forfeiture,” such conduct “will not have the effect to

broaden out such contract so as to cover additional objects of insurance or causes of

loss”); Rice v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.

, 324 S.W.3d 660, 668 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2010

,

no pet. ) (recognizing that “the supreme court in Ulico held that waiver and estoppel

cannot be used to rewrite an insurance policy and expand coverage”).7

site of the lightning strike

, 8 but Mr s. Hilmi speculated that

, despite

“everybody

. . . talking about the one [strike]

. . . that [the house sitter] saw,” there

were “scorch marks all over

, ” so she believed “ there [had been] multiple lightning

strikes ” that hit not only the tree but also the flowerbeds, pool, driveway, and home

exterior

.

The parties’ dispute over the existence of the lightning strike(s) formed the

backdrop for t he causation question at issue in this appeal, i.e. whether the alleged

strike (s) caused damage to all of the Hilmis’ listed items of personal property

. The

Hilmis presented their list of personal property items to the jury in a spreadsheet with

an estimate of each item’s value

, showing a total of $189,538.76 in damaged goods

. 9

8 Mr. Hilmi testified that, based on the burnt foliage and marks on a split tree,

he believed that the lightning had struck that area. Similarly, a State Farm

representative testified that, when he first visited the Hilmis’ property, Mr. Hilmi took

him to the location of the alleged lightning strike : an area where there was “dead

vegetation” and a damaged tree. And a nother individual

— a Best Buy employee who

help ed Mrs. Hilmi estimate the replacement cost for some of the family’s

electronics

— testified that he saw “evidence of a lightning strike” on a tree near the

pool, about 75 yards away from the main house.

9 T he Hilmis also sought to recover additional living expenses that they had

incurred due to their loss of use of their home

. A t trial, they included their fast

- food

bills in the same spreadsheet as their damaged personal property ; t he spreadsheet ’s

$189,538.76 total thus included both the fast

- food bills and the personal property

items. Nonetheless, when presenting the spreadsheet to the jury, the Hilmis argued

that the $189,538.76 reflected the value of their damaged personal propert y. And

although the jury found that the Hilmis were not entitled to recover any additional

living expenses under the terms of the insurance policy

, it awarded the requested

$189,538.76 for damaged personal property

. Regardless, the parties do not discuss

this issue on appeal

, and we need not address it given our disposition of the case

.8

The spreadsheet listed many standard home electronics

— e.g., ceiling fans

, lamps, and

a washer and dryer

— but it went far beyond that as well. It included everything from

the previously mentioned hoverboards to an elliptical machine, insect traps

(presumably electric), wireless headphones, heated blankets, numerous Wii games and

accessories

, a water

- dispenser filter

, an “Xbox Live Gold: 12 Month Membership,” a

golf cart, external hard drives, a portable tripod, television streaming sticks, and

several “$100 Fortnite In

- Game Currency Card[s]

. ”

The Hilmis did not walk through the ir spreadsheeted list item

- by

- item

, nor did

they offer expert testimony that identified lightning as the cause of any given item’s

damage

. To the contrary , both Mr. and Mrs. Hilmi confirmed that no one with

electrical or lightning expertise had examined the spreadsheeted items ; t hey testified

that State Farm’s adjuster had not required them to have the personal electronic

devices tested so they had not done so and had thrown the items away

. 10 But the

Hilmis explained that all of the electronic devices listed on their spreadsheet had

stopped working after the strike and that some of them had shown signs of

“charr[ing]” or “melt[ing],” so

—given the broader context of lightning

- related

10 As with the dispute over the lightning strike’s existence, the Hilmis

emphasized the perceived unfairness of State Farm changing its tune by demanding

evidence that lightning had caused the personal property damages. Again, though, the

Hilmis did not plead any estoppel

- related theories, nor do they advance any such

theories on appeal. See supra note 7.9

damage to the Hilmis’ land

— the family had concluded that lightning had “fried” the

devices

.

State Farm

, meanwhile, offered expert testimony that lightning could not have

caused all of the personal property damage alleged

, both as a general matter and as to

the specific items listed in the Hilmis’ spreadsheet

. Derek Geer

, a forensic engineer

with expertise in electrical engineering “and specifically

. . . [in] lightning cases

, ”

explained how lightning seeks a “path to ground” and why even a direct lightning

strike on the Hilmis’ home would not have been “an unlimited event” that damaged

every plugged

- in electronic device

. 11 He also discussed individual items on the Hilmis’

spreadsheet

, such as the Hewlett Packard laptops and printers

, the Apple watches, 12

and the piano keyboar d

, and h e explained how many of th o se devices had built

- in

surge

- protect

ion mechanisms

. He opined that the nature of th e se and other listed

items’ electrical components would have prevented the type and scope of damage that

the Hilmis alleged had occurred

.

11 Geer clarified that, while a direct lightning strike could cause a power surge

with the “[p]otential[]” to damage some items in a house, “[i]t’s not going to damage

everything in the house.”

12 When asked whether a device such as an Apple watch could be damaged after

the fact by a previous lightning strike

, Geer testified that “there’s no scientific basis

that [he] c[ould] come up with that would explain that phenomena.” He explained

that, even when lightning strikes, “it flows and it’s gone”

— “there’s no phenomena of

electricity’s scooting around in the house or staying in the house.”10

D. Verdict

T he jury did not believe State Farm’s expert . I nstead, it found that State Farm

had breached the insurance contract by failing to pay the Hilmis $189,538.76

— the

amount shown in their spreadsheet

— for their list of lightning

- damaged personal

property . The jury further found that State Farm had violated the other extra

contractual duties that the Hilmis asserted

, and it awarded the Hilmis bad faith and

statutory damages for those violations along with attorney’s fees

. The trial court

entered judgment on the verdict.

II. Discussion

In State Farm’s dispositive appellate issue, 13 it argues that expert testimony was

required for the Hilmis to prove that lightning was the cause of their personal

property damage , and because there was no such expert testimony offered, the

evidence was legally insufficient to support the Hilmis’ contract claim.

A

. Standard of Review

In an insurance coverage case , the insured has the burden of establishing

coverage under the terms of the policy. Gilbert Tex. Const., L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s

London , 327 S.W.3d 118, 124 (Tex. 2010). Here, the policy provided for State Farm’s

13 The Hilmis criticize State Farm’s appellate briefing and argue that many of

State Farm’s arguments are “convoluted,” improperly multifarious

, or otherwise

inadequately briefed

. We disagree; State Farm’s brief reflects a professional, thorough

presentation of the issues and is more than sufficient to “acquaint the court with the

issues

. . . [and] enable the court to decide the case.” See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1, 38.9.11

insurance of “direct physical loss to [certain personal] property

. . . caused

by

. . . lightning.”

To determine whether there is legally sufficient evidence that the Hilmis’

personal property damage was “caused by

. . . lightning,” we consider evidence

favorable to the finding if a reasonable juror could, disregard contrary evidence unless

a reasonable juror could not, and indulge every reasonable inference in support of the

finding. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas , 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of

Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)

. The evidence is legally insufficient

to support a finding of causation if the evidence offered to prove it is no more than a

mere scintilla or if the rules of law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to

the only evidence offered to prove causation

. See Gunn v. McCoy , 554 S.W.3d 645, 658

(Tex. 2018).

“ Proof other than expert testimony will constitute some evidence of

causation ”

—

i.e., enough to withstand a legal sufficiency challenge

— “only when a

layperson’s general experience and common understanding would enable the

layperson to determine from the evidence, with reasonable probability, the causal

relationship between the event and the condition.” Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez , 206

S.W.3d 572, 583 (Tex. 2006) ; see Jelinek v. Casas , 328 S.W.3d 526, 533 (Tex. 2010)

. But

if the causal link or resulting cond ition involves matters beyond a layperson’s

common understanding, then e xpert testimony is required. See Tex. R. Evid. 702

(providing for expert testimony by a witness “qualified as an expert by knowledge,12

skill, experience, training, or education” when the expert’s “scientific, technical, or

other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue”); Guevara v. Ferrer , 247 S.W.3d 662, 668 (Tex. 2007)

(recognizing in personal injury context that “non

- expert evidence alone is sufficient to

support a finding of causation in limited circumstances where both the occurrence

and conditions complained of are such that the general experience and common sense

of laypersons are sufficient to evaluate the conditions and whether they were probably

caused by the occurrence”) ; see also Mack Trucks , 206 S.W.3d at 583 ; Alexander v. Turtur

& Assocs

. , Inc. , 146 S.W.3d 113, 119

– 20 (Tex. 2004)

.

The necessity of expert testimony is a question of law subject to de novo

review. Mack Trucks

, 206 S.W.3d at 583 ; FFE Transp. Servs

. , Inc. v. Fulgham , 154

S.W.3d 84, 89

– 90 (Tex. 2004)

.

B. Expert Testimony Required

According to State Farm, even though the jury implicitly found that lightning

struck the Hilmis’ land, it was beyond a layperson’s common understanding to discern

whether lightning had caused the damage to all of the Hilmis’ spreadsheeted items of

personal property

. The Hilmis, however, argue that a layperson did not need an

expert to tell him what common sense dictate d : that lightning could damage

electronic s

.

We agree with the Hilmis that a lay juror ’s common experience allow s him to

understand lightning ’s ability to cause a power surge that damage s a plugged

- in13

electronic device

. And we agree with the Hilmis that this common experience

— taken

together with lay evidence that a given electronic device operated without issue

immediately before the lightning strike , was plugged in at the time of the strike, and

stopped working immediately after the strike

— is sufficient to “establish[] a sequence

of events which provide s a strong, logically traceable connection between the event

and the condition.” Guevara , 247 S.W.3d at 667 (holding that lay evidence is sufficient

to prove causal link between car accident and “basic physical conditions which (1) are

within the common knowledge and experience of laypersons, (2) did not exist before

the accident, (3) appeared after and close in time to the accident, and (4) are within

the common knowledge and experience of laypersons, caused by automobile

accidents”) ; see Jelinek , 328 S.W.3d at 533 (explaining that “[w]hen lay testimony is

credited as evidence of causation, it usually highlights a connection between two

events that is apparent to a casual observer”); U.S. Fire Ins. v. Lynd Co. , 399 S.W.3d

206, 218 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2012, pet s . denied) (op. on reh’g) (concluding that

“a lay witness is competent to state based on personal observation and common sense

whether hail fell on a particular location on a particular date, and to make a logical

connection between the hail event and the property damage existing after the storm”)

.

Some of the Hilmis ’ damaged personal property items fit this bill.

But for other personal property items on the Hilmis’ spreadsheet , the family

r elied on a more complex theory of causation. The Hilmis claimed that when the

lightning strike(s) hit their property, the resulting power surge damaged not just a14

single plugged

- in electronic device but all or most plugged

- in devices throughout their

hom e

, that it travel ed through many of those devices to damage the devices ’

attachments (e.g., Wii accessories and external hard drives), and that it continue d to

linger in the home so as to damage items that were plugged in days later (e.g., Apple

watches). A n ordinary layperson lacks sufficien t familiarity with lightning’s electrical

current and effects to determine how

— or whether

— the lightning strike(s) that hit the

Hilmis’ land could or did produce such extensive, multi

- layered damage

. See Gharda

USA, Inc. v. Control Sols., Inc. , 464 S.W.3d 338, 348 (Tex. 2015) (holding that expert

causation testimony was required because “[t]he plaintiffs ’ causation theory in th[e]

case [wa]s complex”) ; Guevara , 247 S.W.3d at 669

– 70 (holding that lay testimony was

sufficient to show that car accident had caused decedent’s “immediate post

- accident

condition which resulted in his being transported to [and examined in] an emergency

roo m” but that expert testimony was required to establish that the accident had

caused all of the decedent’s subsequent medical treatment s

— which included multiple

surgeries, three confinements in health care facilities, and numerous prescriptions and

laboratory procedures over the course of several months ); River City Drywall, LLC v.

Hanlon , No. 03

- 17

- 00482

- CV, 2018 WL 4087715, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Austin Aug. 28,

2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that expert causation testimony was required to

establish whet her improper application of drywall texture caused peeling

- paint

problem)

. Indeed, while the jury was free to disregard State Farm’s expert testimony

,15

the very nature of that testimony demonstrated the complexities of the Hilmis’

causation theory

.

Even Mr. Hilmi acknowledged that he lacked sufficient expertise to determine

the lightning strike’s effects

. H e admitted that

, when it came to the family’s desktop

computers and laptops that would not turn on, the family “just assumed since

everything else was fried that they were too.” And he made similar statements

regarding the family’s Apple watches

, admitting that he “ha[d] no idea” what had

happened to them while speculat ing that it was “[s]omething

. . . going on with the

current in the house.”

Such testimony manifests an honest reflection of a layperson’s limitations.

While the Hilmis could speculate that lightning was to blame for the extensive

personal property damage that they had sustained or discovered in the months after

the storm, such suspicion was legally in sufficient to support the Hilmis’ multi

- layered

causation theory

. See Jelinek , 328 S.W.3d at 533 (cautioning that “[c] are must be taken

to avoid the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, that is, finding an earlier event caused a later

event merely because it occurred first”) ; Santos v. I Lone Star Auto Parts, Ltd. , No. 14

-

11

- 00067

- CV, 2011 WL 6157031, at *2

– 3 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 1,

2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that expert causation testimony was required when

plaintiff’s vehicle caught fire after driving away from defendant’s repair shop) ; Bldg.

Prods

. Plus, Co., L.C. v. TAMKO Bldg. Pro d s

. , Inc. , No. 01

- 12

- 00073

- CV, 2013 WL

5604738, at *12

– 13 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 10, 2013, no pet.) (mem.16

op.) (holding that expert causation testimony was required to establish that decking

boards’ deterioration was caused by manufacturing defect and rejecting plaintiff’s

contention that “perhaps” he had received “‘a bad batch’ of boards” as mere

suspicion)

.

For many

— if not most

— of the Hilmis’ spreadsheeted personal property items

,

then, the causal link between the lightning strike(s) on their land and the damage to

the listed item was a matter beyond common understanding

. E xpert testimony was

required. Cf. Builder Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Taylor , No. 03

- 18

- 00710

- CV, 2020 WL 5608484,

at *7 (Tex. App.

—

Austin Sept. 17, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that expert

causation testimony was required when plaintiff alleged that improperly installed spray

foam insu lation emitted toxic fumes that damaged home) ; Driskill v. Ford Motor Co.

,

269 S.W.3d 199, 204

– 05 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (holding that expert

testimony was required to establish that cruise

- control switch caused fire even though

expert testified that fire originated in relevant portion of engine compartment,

photographs showed melted switch, plaintiffs testified cruise control had stopped

working before fire, and government criteria for switch

- related fires were in evidence).

A nd because it is undisputed that the Hilmis offered no such expert testimony, there

was legally insufficient evidence to support the full amount of breach of contract

damages awarded

. See Gharda USA , 464 S.W.3d at 353 (sustaining no

- evidence

challenge because expert testimony of causation was required, plaintiff’s expert

testimony was unreliable, and “the jury [was prohibited] from inferring causation17

based on circumstantial evidence alone”) ; Guevara , 247 S.W.3d at 669

– 70 (holding

evidence legally insufficient to support finding that car accident caused all medical

expenses when expert causation testimony was required for some but not all

expenses); see also City of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 812 (“When expert testimony is required,

lay evidence supporting liability is legally insufficient.”).

We sustain State Farm’s dispositive first issue.

III. Conclusion

Although we generally render judgment when sustaining a no

- evidence issue

following a trial on the merits, if the absence of expert testimony undermines some

but not all of a plaintiff’s damages, and if the amount of remittitur cannot be

determined from the record, then remand for a new trial is appropriate. See Ford Motor

Co. v. Garcia , 363 S.W.3d 573, 582 (Tex. 2012); Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld,

L.L.P. v. Nat ’

l Dev. & R

sch. Corp. , 299 S.W.3d 106, 123

– 24 (Tex. 2009); Guevara , 247

S.W.3d at 670. Such is the case here. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment

on the Hilmis’ breach of contract claim and remand that claim for a new trial. See

Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(d).

And because the Hilmis’ other claims

— their extra

- contractual claims and

request for attorney’s fees

— hinge on the breach of contract claim, we reverse and

remand those claims as well, mooting the remainder of State Farm’s appellate issues.

See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(d), 47.1; USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca , 545 S.W.3d 479,

489

– 501 (Tex. 2018) (explaining the “rules that govern the relationship between18

contractual and extra

- contractual claims in the insurance context” and discussing

general rules that insured must establish right to receive benefits under policy or

independent injury to recover for bad faith loss of benefits or for related statutory

violations).

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth

Chief Justice

Delivered: October 3, 2024