U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

La Posada Hotel Fire

McAllen, Texas

USFA-TR-001/February 1987

Homeland

Security

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

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during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

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For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the Administration’s Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

La Posada Hotel Fire

McAllen, Texas

Investigated by: Jeffrey M. Shapiro, P.E.

This is Report 001 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-88-C-2277 to the United

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Homeland

Security

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

Homeland

Security

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Codes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Exits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Interior Finishes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Fire Protection Systems and Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Fire Department. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT FACTORS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Building Construction and Contents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Fire Protection Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Human Behavior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Smoke Detectors are Critical for Life Safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Fire Officer Decision to Make Evacuation the Priority Lessened Risk of Greater Losses. . . . . . . . 5

Improper/Inadequate Building Features Helped Spread Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Lack of Awareness of Fire Safety Rules Caused the Fire and Prevented Early 

Extinguishment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Supplemental Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Appendix A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

1. Texas Fire Incident Reporting System Incident Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2. McAllen Fire Department Dispatcher’s Incident Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

3. Floor Plan Indicating First Floor Layout and Damage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

4. Site Plan Indicating Fire Department Deployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

5. Narrative Reports of Fire Department Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

6. Recommendations and Requirements for Reconstruction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

1

LA POSADA HOTEL FIRE

McAllen, Texas – February 25, 1987

Investigated by: Jeffrey M. Shapiro, P.E.

Local Contacts: Chief Butch Derr

F.M. Honore Castro

Lt. Richard Loza

City of McAllen Fire Department

101 South Bicentennial

McAllen, Texas 78501

(512) 631-3301

OVERVIEW

On February 25, 1987, the successful operation of a smoke detector provided the early warning that 

mitigated a potential multiple death fire in the La Posada Hotel in McAllen, Texas. Though the fire 

caused approximately 150,000 dollars in damages, 155-160 occupants were evacuated with only 

one serious injury. The fire was caused by smoking in bed and sent heavy smoke throughout most 

of the hotel. Key negative factors in the fire included the lack of self-closing doors between guest 

rooms and corridors, open stairwells, and the lack of sprinklers and fire alarms systems. Key positive 

factors included smoke detectors in each room, light fire loading, fire resistive construction, and an 

unusually high proportion of occupants familiar with the hotel.

BACKGROUND

The La Posada Hotel is a designated historic structure registered with the State of Texas. The original 

structure was built in 1918. In 1973, the building was struck by lightning which caused a major fire 

that destroyed the original structure with the exception of some exterior walls. The rebuilt building 

is three stories tall with 164 guest rooms plus meeting facilities. (See Figure 1.)

Codes

McAllen currently uses both the Southern Standard Building Code and the full set of National Fire Codes. 

Based upon the timeframe for construction provided by fire department sources, the building probably 

was constructed to the 1973 Southern Standard Building Code. Additionally, National Fire Protection 

Association (NFPA) 101, Life Safety Code, may have been applied. Though NFPA 101 contains provisions 

for safety in existing buildings, no retroactive enforcement program had been established.
2

Construction

The building was completely reconstructed using non-combustible, fire resistive construction. The 

structural frame consists of concrete double-tee floor assemblies and masonry block walls. The 

overall fire protection classification appears to be Type II, fire resistive. All guest rooms are separated 

from other guest rooms, corridors, and public areas by at least one-hour fire resistive construction 

with the exception of corridor doors.

Corridor doors to guest rooms are panel-style wood doors, non-rated, and without closing devices. 

These doors are hung in solid wood frames.

Exits

Exiting from the guest rooms was through interior corridors or through an operable window in 

each room. (See Figures 2 and 3.) The building has four interior exit stairways, all of which are 

unenclosed or inadequately enclosed, based upon the criteria for new and existing hotels contained 

in NFPA 101, Life Safety Code. (See Figures 4 and 5.)

Interior Finishes

All interior wall surfaces are painted. Floors in guest rooms and guest room access corridors are 

carpeted. (See Figure 6.)

Fire Protection Systems and Equipment

The only fire protection equipment in the hotel consisted of 2 1⁄2 gallon pressurized water fire extinguishers, 1 1⁄2 inch occupant use hose cabinets supplied by domestic water only, and battery-powered 

single station smoke detectors in guest rooms and storage areas. The smoke detectors are General 

Electric SMK-6/M1. They were located above the ceiling in the return air plenum for the room. 

(See Figure 7.) This location is not the recommended location according to NFPA 72E, standard on 

automatic fire detectors.

Fire Department

McAllen Fire Department operates six fire stations will 111 personnel. The department operates six 

engines, one truck, one rescue, and a crash-fire-rescue vehicle.

THE FIRE

The fire originated in Room 123 in the north wing of the hotel. That wing contained 22 guest 

rooms and two storage rooms on the first floor.

According to the room occupant’s statement to fire investigators, he returned to the hotel at approximately 11:00 p.m., under the influence of alcohol and lied down on the bed to watch television 

while smoking. He fell asleep and the cigarette ignited a small area of bedding. The smoke detector 

alarmed at approximately 1:00 a.m.

At the time of the fire only two hotel staff members, a night auditor and a janitor, were on duty. 

Having heard the smoke alarm from the front desk, which was located approximately 50 feet down 
USFA-TR-001/February 1987 3

the corridor from Room 123, the two staff members went into the corridor and determined that the 

alarm was in Room 123. They then went back to the desk and called that room. The occupant said 

everything was OK, and no further action was taken.

Approximately 15 minutes later, the occupant called the front desk to advise that there had been a 

fire and that there was some damage. He requested that a staff member come assess the damage so 

that he could make restitution. The night auditor advised that the hotel would handle the matter in 

the morning when the occupant checked out.

The occupant then removed the mattress from the box spring and placed the mattress vertically 

against the wall adjacent to the bed, leaning it against the window curtains. He then opened the 

window to remove the smoke odor unknowingly providing a fresh air source to the mattress which 

was still smoldering. The occupant then went back to sleep on the box spring.

Sometime after 4 a.m., the occupant was again awakened by the smoke detector and discovered 

flames involving the mattress and spreading to the curtains. He went outside the room leaving the 

door open behind him, went to the front desk, and advised the auditor to call the fire department. 

He went back to the room with the janitor and a 2 1⁄2 gallon pressurized water fire extinguisher. At 

this point, flames were rolling off the ceiling. The janitor first used the extinguisher with no success. 

The occupant then took the extinguisher and crawled into the room to attempt extinguishment. The 

extinguisher expired, and the occupant backed out leaving the door open behind him. (See Figures 

8 and 9.)

The fire began to extend out the doorway into the corridor. (See Figure 10.) The janitor went to the 

second and third floors and began awakening guests. Many guests came into the corridors to check 

the commotion. Fire was continuing to extend towards the front desk on the first floor level, and 

smoke was spreading throughout the corridors in the north, east, and west wings of the hotel on all 

three floors. On upper floors, smoke was particularly heavy in the north and east wings having traveled primarily up the open “grand” stairway in the lobby. Glass stairway doors separating the other 

stairways from the first floor corridor remained in-place for between five and ten minutes before 

failing. The hotel’s assistant management was on the premises and was notified of the fire immediately after the fire department was called. She left her room and attempted egress through an interior 

stairway. Upon opening the glass door to the first floor corridor, she was exposed to heavy smoke. 

Smoke spread was so rapid that by the time she was able to return to the second floor, it too was 

smoke-filled, and she was forced to break a window with a chair to escape to an outside balcony.

The fire department received its first notification of the fire by telephone from the night auditor at 

4:13 a.m. The first dispatch was made sending a first alarm assignment at 4:13 with the first units 

arriving on the scene at 4:14. Initial dispatch consisted of two engines, one truck, one rescue units, 

and one deputy chief, a total of 11 personnel. The first unit arriving noted fire in the lobby, corridor, and the room of origin. As yet, many occupants were still unaware of the fire. Others were 

evacuating through smoky corridors or awaiting rescue at windows. Given the number of occupants 

at windows requiring rescue, the initial fire department operations were geared to ground ladder 

rescues. Actual firefighting was limited to one handline placed into service at the room of origin 

through the exterior window by a single firefighter. Later, a second handline was placed in service 

from the interior. Though the fire was extinguished relatively quickly, the size of the structure, the 

number of occupants, and the extent of smoke spread necessitated fire department operations escalating to a third-alarm.
4 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Of the 164 guest rooms available for rental at the time of the fire, 125 were occupied. The estimated 

total number of occupants in the building at the time of the fire was 155-160. According to fire 

department reports, approximately 15 people were rescued by ground and aerial ladders, and the 

remainder escaped on their own or were escorted out through smoky halls and interior stairway 

exits by fire department personnel.

The only serious injury reported was that of a woman who was sitting on a window ledge on the third 

floor calling for help when the fire department arrived, and either jumped or fell. Fire damage was 

limited to the room of origin, approximately fifty feet of corridor space in either direction, and a small 

area at the front desk. Smoke damage was considerable throughout the north, east, and west wings.

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT FACTORS

Building Construction and Contents

The combination of a light fire loading and non-combustible, fire resistive building construction 

helped limit the fire damage to the room of origin and the corridor in the immediate vicinity. 

Combustible contents in the room of origin were limited to a wood desk, two wood chairs with 

small seat and/or back pads, a wood dresser, a television with stand, drapes, and a bed. (See Figure 

3.) The mattress consisted of 30 percent urethane foam, 40 percent blended cotton felt, and 30 

percent sisal. (See Figure 11.) It was apparently purchased only three years ago which would 

indicate compliance with Federal smolder resistance standards. However, the testing for compliance 

with Federal standards does not contemplate a vertical mattress placed against combustible curtains 

next to an open window. The bedding, furniture upholstery, and window curtains were unlabeled 

and probably ignited easily. The only combustible materials in the corridor were the carpeting and 

decorative wood beams on the non-combustible ceiling. The lack of rated self-closing doors to guest 

rooms allowed smoke and fire to escape into the corridor from the room of origin, and the lack of 

stairway enclosures allowed smoke to spread to the upper floors.

Fire Protection Equipment

A key factor in the successful evacuation of occupants was the early warning provided by the smoke 

detector in the room of origin. Had the fire been full extinguished when first detected, a major 

fire incident would not have occurred; however, the early detection of the rekindle was ultimately 

responsible for the escape of the room occupant, the early notification of the fire department, and the 

evacuation of guests. Texas passed a law in 1983 which required all hotels, motels, and apartments 

to provide smoke detectors to protect sleeping areas.

The fire department did experience some trouble evacuating the building due to the lack of a fire 

alarm system. Many guests were unaware that there was a fire until fire department personnel 

knocked on the doors to evacuate them. Some actually refused to leave until ordered to do so by 

police.

The lack of sprinklers and fire alarm systems placed additional demands on the fire department to 

rescue occupants. The fire department was able to gain control of the situation due to prompt notification and fast response times. Had sprinklers been present in the hotel’s guest rooms, it appears 

that the fire might well have been controlled by one sprinkler head.
USFA-TR-001/February 1987 5

Human Behavior

Unlike the transient nature of occupants in a typical hotel, the La Posada was occupied almost entirely 

by guests who were somewhat familiar with the hotel. Eighty-five percent of the guests were with 

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and had been in the hotel for one and a half weeks at 

the time of the fire. Of the other 15 percent, many were seasonal guests who had been residing in 

the hotel for an extended period. Occupant familiarity is thought to have contributed to the large 

number of guests who were able to evacuate on their own, and probably eased the anxiety of those 

evacuated by the fire department in smoky conditions.

LESSONS LEARNED

The La Posada fire demonstrated once again the value of smoke detectors in providing early, life-saving warning of fire. A working detector and the quick response of the fire department, coupled with 

their tactical decision to focus staffing on safely evacuating the occupants, were the main, positive 

lessons drawn from this fire. These points are discussed below:

Smoke Detectors are Critical for Life Safety

Not once, but twice, the smoke detector in Room 123 alerted the occupant to a developing emergency. Unwise actions by the occupant and lack of a suitable response by the hotel’s night employees 

after the first warning led to a rekindling of the mattress and the need for the second sounding of the 

detector. Given some of the other conditions present, e.g., lack of an alarm system, unenclosed/inadequately enclosed stairways, and the late hour the fire occurred (guests were sleeping and unaware), 

the losses in all likelihood would have far exceeded the one injury and 150,000 dollars damage had 

it not been for the presence of a working detector.

Ironically, the detector was not properly located. It had been installed (as had the other guest room 

detectors) in the return air plenum, rather than on the ceiling of the room. Moreover, the detector 

was a battery-operated type, not hard-wired to the electrical system as is preferred for this type of 

occupancy.

Fire Officer Decision to Make Evacuation the Priority Lessened Risk 

of Greater Losses

The decision to assign ten or eleven of the personnel on the first-arriving units to alert and evacuate occupants probably averted additional civilian casualties. Since there was no alarm system in 

the building, firefighters had to go door-to-door, a time consuming job, before sleeping occupants 

could be awakened and helped to safety. The rapid spread of smoke escalated the danger, and more 

casualties might have occurred had the occupants not been warned to get out. As more units arrived, 

another 25 firefighters became available to rescue and evacuate people. Eight firefighters from one 

of the three mutual aid companies that responded also were assigned rescue duties.

In retrospect, it would have been a good idea for firefighters to have gotten master keys at the outset 

so they could have alerted guests more quickly and avoided kicking in the guest room doors. (Keys 

were obtained after awhile.) Nevertheless, firefighters otherwise showed awareness of proper procedures, e.g., they propped open doors of rooms, already evacuated, established a check-point, oversaw 

the return to rooms and occupants’ removal of their belongings, etc.
6

What lessons can be learned about areas for improvement? Most of the problems centered around 

certain building features and human behaviors that contributed to the start and spread of the fire. 

There are a number of key factors under both headings that should be examined.

Improper/Inadequate Building Features Helped Spread Fire

Once again, we see the impact that building features can have either in containing or aiding the 

spread of fire and smoke. Among the more serious problems were:

•	 Guest room doors did not have automatic closures and were constructed of wood. The door 

to the room of origin was left open.

•	 Stairways leading to the second and third levels were not enclosed or were inadequately 

enclosed. Smoke spread through them.

•	 There was no central fire alarm system. Occupants had to be alerted by firefighters going 

door-to-door.

•	 There were no automatic sprinklers. Fortunately, fire-resistive construction and low fire load 

in the corridor helped check the spread of flames.

•	 A few rooms on the first floor had burglar bars installed over the exterior windows. However, 

the fire department stated that the bars were easily removed and did not hamper rescue. 

Obviously, burglar bars are an impediment to emergency egress and, when installed, should 

have a clearly identified emergency egress release which occupants can use in an emergency. 

Such release devices are required by current codes.

Lack of Awareness of Fire Safety Rules Caused the Fire and Prevented 

Early Extinguishment

Human carelessness caused the La Posada fire. The occupant of Room 123 broke one of the cardinal 

rules in fire safety – not to smoke in bed. Other mistakes were also made:

•	 The occupant opened the window near where he placed the smoldering mattress.

•	 Night shift employees, after having the first detector warning, accepted the guest’s reassurance that nothing was wrong. Even when the occupant called 15 minutes later to report 

minor fire damage, they failed to check out the situation further.

•	 The occupant left his room door open when he went to advise front desk personnel of the 

rekindled fire. After he and the janitor attempted to extinguish the fire, they left the room 

with the door hanging open.

These human behavior factors were, in large measure, responsible for the fire. Fire safe behaviors 

would have prevented the fire in the first place.
USFA-TR-001/February 1987 7

Conclusion

The combination of early warning, limited combustible contents, occupant familiarity, and fast fire 

department action in evacuation were the prime factors which contributed to the successful outcome of the fire. The addition of a sprinkler system, a fire alarm system, rated self-closing doors, 

and enclosed stairwells could have helped to reduce losses and the risk to the occupants. All of these 

recommendations are included in the requirements or request of the McAllen Fire Department for 

reconstruction of the hotel.

Further, losses and risk may have been reduced if a fire safety plan had been developed. A proper 

hotel fire safety plan, if provided, would likely have included training which instructed the staff to 

have called the fire department immediately upon an indication of a potential fire. In addition, such 

a plan would likely have contained provisions to prohibit a guest from returning to a fire area to fight 

a fire and provisions for evacuation of guests in a fire emergency.

Supplemental Information

Hotel Owner: Huntington Hotel Corporation

100 Crescent Court, 17th Floor

Dallas, Texas 75201

(214) 954-1700

Contact: Scott Lynch (should have information on interior 

finishes, furnishings, and appointments used in hotel.)

On-Site Hotel Representative: Martha Estes

Assistant Manager

La Posada Hotel

100 North Main Street

McAllen, Texas 78501

(512) 686-5411

Construction plans available through: Turner and Morales Architect, McAllen, Texas
8

Figure 1. La Posada Hotel (view of the east end main entrance).

Figure 2. Typical interior corridor.
USFA-TR-001/February 1987 9

Figure 3. Guest room identical to room of original. Note exterior 

window and contents.

Figure 4. Main entry foyer. The front door is to the right. The 

wall in the rear of the picture was erected after the fire to separate 

the damaged area. During the fire, smoke traveled past the front 

desk (visible in the lower portion of the wall behind the telephone 

operator) and up the “grand” stairway to the upper floor corridors.
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Figure 5. Typical open stairway (view 

from a second floor corridor).

Figure 6. Carpeting in interior corridor and guest room. Also note 

wood panel door without door closer.
USFA-TR-001/February 1987 11

Figure 7. Battery powered smoke detector in adjacent room. All 

detectors were located in return air plenum above filters and grilles 

in ceiling.

Figure 8. Room of origin. Mattress was standing up against wall 

with window.
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Figure 9. Room of origin.

Figure 10. View from the front desk into the corridor towards the 

room of origin. Note the descending smoke mark level on wall 

towards the area of origin.
USFA-TR-001/February 1987 13

Figure 11. Mattress identification tag.

15

Appendix A

1. Texas Fire Incident Reporting System Incident Report

2. McAllen Fire Department Dispatcher’s Incident Report

3. Floor Plan Indicating First Floor Layout and Damage

4. Site Plan Indicating Fire Department Deployment

5. Narrative Reports of Fire Department Personnel

6. Recommendations and Requirements for Reconstruction
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-001/February 1987 17
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-001/February 1987 19
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-001/February 1987 21
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-001/February 1987 23
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-001/February 1987 25
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
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28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
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30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-001/February 1987 31
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series