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### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 32 4- CV J eff SILL , Appellant
v . L orina Weave r WHI TE f/k/a L or ina Sill , Appellee Fr om the County

Court at L aw, Kenda ll Count y , Texas Tr ia l Co ur

t N o. 07 -1 73 CCL Honora ble Bill R. Palmer, J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: April 15, 2009 AFF I RMED This appea l involves the enfor ceme nt of a for eig n divorce decr ee. O n appea l, Jeff Sill argues that enfor ceme nt of the decr ee is ba rre d by collater al estoppel. We disag ree and af firm the judg ment of the tr ia l c ourt
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- 2- B ACKG ROUND On Novembe r 9, 2001, J eff Sill and L orina Weave r White were divorce d by a Judgment for Di sso lut ion

of Marr ia g e and

Mar it al S ettle me nt A g re e me nt s ig ne d b y an I lli no is d istri c t c ourt
. Pur su ant t o th e a g re e d ma ri ta l se ttl e me nt, Sill wa s r e qu ir e d to pa y Whit e $5 00 pe r m on th i n maintenanc e until he died, she rema rried or co-ha

bitated with a

nother, or his obligations under the
a g re e me nt w e re pa id i n f ull . T he a g re e me nt a lso pr ov ide d th a t ti tle to Wh ite ’s car woul d b e in Whit e’s name, but that Sill was re quired to make pay ments on the vehicle until paid in full. F ur the r, a t th e tim e of

the ir div or c e , Si ll a

nd Wea ve r o wned (1) a

ho me in C ibo lo, Te xas, wh ic h w a s b ou g ht i n 2 00 1 f or $1 50 ,0 00 and

ha d a mo rt g a g e ba lanc e of $1 19 ,0 00 ; ( 2) a

ho me in Boe rne, Te x as, which w as boug ht in 1999 for $94,000 and had a mor tga g e bala

nce of $83,000; and (3) 3.4 a cre s of vac ant land in B erg heim, Texas, which was boug ht in 1999 for $35,000 and had a
mor tg a g e ba lanc e of

$2 5, 00 0. Ti tle to t

he Cib olo ho me wa s h e ld i n b oth Sill ’s and

Whit e ’s name s. Title to the Boe rne home, howeve r, was held s olely in Whi te’s name , and title to the Be rg heim land
wa s h e ld s ole ly

in S ill ’s name . Purs ua

nt t o the a g re e d se ttl e me nt, Sill wa s re qu ir e d to c on ve y a ll h is ri g ht, tit le , a

nd int e re st i n th e Cib olo ho me to Whit e , a nd he wa s “ re sp on sib le fo r t

he mor tg a g e un til said mortg ag e is paid in full.” Upon Si l l ’s p aym en t in full of all obligations under the agree d settlement, Whit e ag ree d to c onvey her rig ht, titl e, and inter est to the Boe rne home to Sil l. Sil l was

“ so le ly re sp on sib le for any and al l mo rt g a g e pa y me nts , r e a l e state ta xes, a sse ssm e nts , util iti e s, ins ur anc e pr e miums a

nd any and a ll o the r expe ns e s inc ide nta l or re late d” to t he B oe rn e ho me . T he se ob lig a tio ns we re re ite rate d in the “ de bt an d li a bil iti e s” se c tio n o f t

he de c re e , w he re Sill and

Whit e acknow ledg ed their ma

rital debts and Sill ag ree d t o b e s o l el y responsible for

the mortg ag e on the Cibolo hom e; the mortg ag e on the B oerne hom e; t h e mortgag e on the B erg heim land; the lien of04

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- 3- a pp ro xima te ly

$3 3, 50 0 o n Wh ite ’s c ar; the lie n o f $ 21 ,2 54 on his c ar; sp e c if

ie d c re dit c ard de bts ; and business debts. I n e xch ang e fo r S ill makin g mor tg a g e and c ar pa

y me nts un til pa id in fu ll, he re c e ive d “ a s h is
s o le an d s e p ar a te p r o p e rty , f

r e e an d c le ar o f an y r igh t, ti tl e , an d inte r e s t h e ld o r c la im e d b y [Wh it e ]” Capital Restorations, L L C, d/b/a Newport Construction Service s, a construc tion service a cquire d by Sill and Whit e duri ngthe ir

marr ia g e . A nd , in

e xch ang e fo r S ill re c e ivi ng the b us ine ss a s h is s ole proper ty , he agree d to the following “sec urity ” provision: The Husba

nd repr esents and w arr ants that he is able to make the pay ments on all of the above debts bec ause of the transf

er of the busines s an d al l o f the assets in the business to him. I f, for any rea son, he fails to pay any of the a bove debts, he ag ree s that h i s i n t er est in the Boe rne, Te x as, home a nd the B erg heim, Texas, vaca nt land shall be aw arde d to the Wife as her sole and sepa

rate p roperty

and cle ar of

any interest of the Husband. Ne ith e r S ill no r Wh ite a

pp e a le d th is a g re e d I lli no is j ud g me nt. Almost seven months later, on May 29, 2002, Whit e filed a

motion in t he I llinois district court, see king e nforc ement of the secur ity provision in the decr ee. According to Whi te, Sill had failed to c omply

with the decr ee. Thus, she asked the trial court to enf orce the sec urity

provision and
awa rd her Sill ’s intere st in the Boer ne home a

nd Be rg heim land. On Fe bruar

y 25, 2003, the I llinois trial court sig ned an or der f inding th at Sill had violated the dec ree without lega l cause or justification and holding Sill in contempt of cour t. Howeve r, the trial court ref

used to e nforc e the secur ity provision a nd denied Whit e’s reque st f or the de eds to the Boe rne home and B erg heim land. Acc ording to the trial court, “ enforce m en t would result in a fo rf e iture wh e re the pe na lty

is unr e late d to the dama g e s. ” I ns te a d, the tr ia l c ourt or de re d th a t Sil l could “pur g e” himself of contempt by

doing the following acts withi n twenty -one da y s or be
re m an d edt o t h e c u s t o dy

o f t h e D u P age C o u n t y

S h er i ff u n t i l h i s co mp l i an ce wa s fo rt h co m i n g:04

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- 4- (a) Pay unto [ Whit e] th e sum of four thousand five hundr ed dollars ($4,500) f

or non -complianc e with maintenanc e provisions of the J udg ment from May

2002 throug h Fe bruar

y 2003. (b ) T e nd e r a

du ly e xec ute d a

nd re c or da ble de e d tr ans ferri ng his inte r e s t i n2 0 9 Wi n te r

F r o s t, Ci b o lo , T e xa s , to [Wh it e ]. (c) Pay unto [Whit e] the sum of twelve thousand se ven hundre d nine do lla rs and nin e ty -f ive sc e nts ($ 12 ,7 09 .9 5) fo r n on -c omp lia nc e wi th t h e pr o v i s i o n s i n t h e J u d gm en t re qu i ri n g [ S i l l ] t o p ay t h e m o rt gage incident to the 209 W inter Frost, Cibolo, Texas, rea l estate; said sum repr esentingeleve n (11) monthly pay ments missed at one thousand one hundre d fifty -five dollar s and for ty -five c ents ($1,155.45). (d ) P ay un to [Wh ite ] the su m of

se ve n th ou sa

nd thr e e hund

re d f if ty dollars and forty -two cents ($7350.42) for non-c ompliance with the provisions of the J udg ment requiring[S ill] to pay mo nth ly o b li g a tions incid e nt t o [Wh it e ]’s Tahoe automobile; said sum repr esentingeleve n (11) monthly

pay ments missed at six hundred sixty eig ht dollars and twenty -two ce nts ($668.22). (e) Remove [W hite]’s name from a ll of [S i l l ] ’s business rec ords including A BC Supply

obligation and Ba

nk One oblig ation. Sill pa id t he amou nt l ist e d a bo ve to Wh ite so that he c ou ld p ur g e him se lf of c on te mpt
. M ea n wh i l e, af

t er W h i t e ha d fi l ed t h e mo t i o n t o en fo rc e bu t b ef o re t h e t ri al co u rt ’s h ea ri n g,
on July 2, 20 02 , Si ll f

ile d in I lli no is d istri c t c ourt

a pe tit ion purs ua nt t o s e c tio n 1 -1 40 1 o f t

he I lli no is Code of Civil P roce dure. Sec tion 1-1401 allows a par ty to seek re lief fr om final judg ments if filed within two y ear s after

entry of the judg ment. See735 I LL . C OMP . S TAT . ANN . 5/2-1401 (West 2009) (abolishing bills of review a nd allowing party

to seek post-judg ment relief if filed within two y ear s afte r entry

of judg ment). In Sill ’s petition for post-judg ment re l i ef, he argued that the mar ital settlement ag ree ment so overwhe lmingly favor ed White as to be u n consciona ble. The tria l court denied the pe tition. On appeal, Sill arg ued that the t rial court erre d in failing to find the settlement ag ree ment unconsciona

ble. Sil l v . S

ill , No. 02-03-0301, slip op. at 1 (I ll. App. Ct. Feb. 20, 2004). The04

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- 5- I llinois appellate court disag ree d and af firmed the tr ial court, ex plaining that beca use t he law f

avors the pe a c e fu l se ttl e me nt o f mari ta l dis pute s, if a pa rt y se e ks to v a c a te a

se ttl e me nt i nc or

po rate d into a dissolution judgment, all pre sumptions favor the validity of the settlement. Id. a t 4. Ac c or din g to the appe llate cour

t, as the par

ty challeng ing the settlement, Sill had to over co m e t his strong presumption that the ag ree ment wa s v alid and prove that it was unconsciona ble. Id. a t 5. Sill , ho we ve r, “ int

ro du c e d v ir

tua lly no e vid e nc e a

bo ut h owthe a g re e me nt w a s ma de and ve ry little evidenc e about the par

ties’ financ ial circ umstances r esulting f rom it.” Id. Thus, the appe llate cour t aff irmed the trial c ourt. Id. at 9. On J u n e 1 3 , 2 0 0 7 , W h i t e f i l edi nKe n d al l C o u n t y , T ex as , a “ M o t i o nt o E n fo rc e F o re i gn Dec ree ,” alleg ing that Sil l had fa iled to comply with the I llinois divorce decr ee be cause he had not paid the mortg ag e on the Cibolo home u n t i l the mortg ag e debt wa s paid in full. Whi te aske d the county court to apply

the dec ree ’s sec urity

provision and or d er S i l l to sign ove r the de ed on the B e rghe im l and

to h e r. Whit e a lle g e d th at bo th the Cib olo and B oe rn e ho me s h a d b e e n lo st t o fore closure be cause Sill had fa iled to make pay m en t s . Fu rt her, White alleg ed that Sill was in the pr oc e ss o f s e lli ngthe B e rghe im l and to a thi rd pa rt y . T hu s, Whit e a lso fi le d a no tic e of lis pe nd e ns . On Marc h 7, 2008, the t rial court held an e videntiary hear ing on White’s motion to enforc e. At the hea

ring , Sill testified t hat he could not reme mber whether he had made any pay ments since the 2003 contempt hea

ring , but rec o gn i z ed t h at it had “bee n awhile since [W hite] had gotten a ny
mon e y ” fr om h im. Sill a dmi tte d th a t he ha d f a ile d to pa

y in fu ll the mor

tg a g e on the Cib olo ho me
and that he ha d fa ile d to pay in fu ll the pa y me nts on Whit e ’s c ar. Whit e a lso te sti fi e d. Ac c or din g to Whit e, af ter the 2003 c ontempt hear ing, she rec eived $24,000, more or less, from S ill, but that after that date, she never

rec eived a

ny more money . Whit e testified that be cause the Cibolo home had04

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- 6- been c lose to fore closure, he r parents purcha sed t he home. And, because Si ll had failed to make ca r pay ments o nh e r

T ah o e , th e T ah o e w a s r e p o s s e s s e d
. A f te r h e ar in g th e e v id e n c e , th e tr ia l c o urt g rante d Whit e’s motion and orde red Sill to sig n a spec ial war ranty deed c onveying a ll his right, title, and intere st in the Ber g heim land to Whit e. Sill a pp e a ls. D I S CUS S I ON I n his sole issue, Sil l argues that White’s claim i s barr ed by collater al estoppel. Both parties ag ree that I llinois law applies under the Full Fa ith a nd Credit Clause of the Constit ution. Both parties also ag ree that under I llinois law, the a pplication of collate ral e stoppel is gove rned by the following three elements: (1) the i ssue decided i n a prior adjudication is identical to the one prese nted in the suit in question; (2) ther e wa s a final judg ment on the merits in the prior adjudication; and (3) the party ag ainst whom estoppel is asserted w as a pa rty or in privity

with a par

ty to the prior adjudication. Gu mm a v . W hite , 833 N.E.2d 834, 843 (I ll. 2005). Sill argues that “[i] t is bey ond dispute that [W hite] sought to enforc e the ‘ secur ity ’ provision in I llinois in 2003 and soug ht the ident i ca l re l i ef” in the ca se. Ac cordingto Sil l, beca use the “B erg heim proper

ty was de nied by

the I llinois trial court in F ebrua ry of 2003,” White is now prec luded from se ekingtransfe r of the B erg heim proper ty . We disag ree . First, the issue de cided in the pr ior motion to enfor ce was di ffe rent from the one presented in the underlying motion to enfor ce. White testified that S ill had not paid any amounts since the 2003 contempt orde r, that he ha d allo we d t h e C i b o l o home to be in dang er of fore closure, that he had allowed the B oerne home to be for eclose d, that he had a llowed White’s Tahoe to be re possessed, and that he wa s attempting to sell the B erg heim land. Thus, af ter S ill committed new violations of the04

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- 7- decr ee by failing to make pay

ments, allowing the t wo hom es t o be los t to fore closure, a nd attempting to sell the Be rg heim land, W hite was free to ask another court to apply the sec urity

provision as the issue decide d in Whi te’s prior motion to enfor ce w as diffe rent fr om the one pre sented he re. Second, the I llinois trial court’s contempt order was not a f

inal adjudication of whether the
se c ur ity pr ov isi on

is e nf or c e a ble . A ft e r t

he div or c e de c re e wa s e nte re d, ne ith e r S ill no r Wh ite appea led. White then f

iled a post-judgme nt motion to e nforc e, asking that the trial cour t transfe r the B e rghe im pr op e rt

y to he r un de r the se c ur ity pr ov isi on . Th e tr ia l c ourt de nie d that r e qu e st, be c a us e the trial cour

t felt that Whit e had not pr oven that the value of the pr operty was re lated to the amount not paid by

Sill : “[E] nforc ement would re sult in a forfe iture wh er e t h e p enalty is unrelated to the dama g e s. ” Th a t is , th e tr ia l c ourt de c lin e d to a

pp ly the se c ur ity

pr ov isi on

a t th a t ti me . Ins te a d, it fo u n d S i l l i nco n t em p tan d

o rd er edh i mt o p ay

t h e am o u n t o we d t o W h i t e. T h e t ri al co u rt ’s ru l i n g, howeve r, wa s not a final adjudication on the ap p l i ca b i l i t y of the sec urity

provision. Se e In re J’Am erica B. , 806 N.E.2d 292, 301 (I ll. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that doctrines of res judicata and
c oll a te ra l e sto pp e l di d n ot a pp ly be c a us e the tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on a t th e fi tne ss h e ari ngwa s n ot a final judg ment on the merits). Whil e White’s motion to enfor ce and the trial court’s ruling there on did not relate to a final adjudication of the en fo rce ability of the sec urity

provision, Sil l’s post-judgme nt motion for relief fro m t h e d ecree , allowed unde r I llinois law and f iled in J uly

2002, did relate to the finality of the
secur ity provision. I n that motion for post-judgme nt relief, Sill argued that the se curity provision was unconsciona

ble. The tria l court disag ree d and re fused to g rant Sill relief fr om the d i v o rc e dec ree , ho ldi ngthat Sil l h ad no t pr ov e n th a t th e se c ur ity pr ov isi on

wa s unc on sc ion a

ble . T he I lli no is appellate court a ffirme d, holding that Sill had not met his burden to prove unc onscionability
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- 8- Be cause Whit e’s motion to enforc e wa s not barre d by collater al estoppel, we aff irm the judgme nt of the trial cour t.

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice