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[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 5491 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 5491

To mobilize United States strategic, economic, and diplomatic tools to 
confront the challenges posed by the People's Republic of China and to 
set a positive agenda for United States economic and diplomatic efforts 
                    abroad, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           December 11, 2024

  Mr. Cardin introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To mobilize United States strategic, economic, and diplomatic tools to 
confront the challenges posed by the People's Republic of China and to 
set a positive agenda for United States economic and diplomatic efforts 
                    abroad, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Realizing Economic 
and Strategic Objectives while Leading with Values and Engagement Act 
of 2024'' or the ``RESOLVE Act of 2024''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Consultation and engagement with Congress.
               TITLE I--INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE

           Subtitle A--Combatting the PRC's Economic Coercion

Sec. 101. Definitions.
                PART I--Economic Coercion Determinations

Sec. 105. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 106. Targeted country determination.
Sec. 107. Sunset.
                           PART II--Response

Sec. 111. Economic defense response teams.
Sec. 112. Economic Defense Response Fund.
Sec. 113. Existing authorities that may be used to respond to economic 
                            coercion.
Sec. 114. Sunset.
                          PART III--Resilience

Sec. 115. Office of the Chief Economist.
Sec. 116. Economic support to allies and partners.
             PART IV--Coordination With Allies and Partners

Sec. 119. Coordination with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
                            Development members on engagement from the 
                            People's Republic of China.
                         PART V--Implementation

Sec. 121. Report on strategy and implementation.
                         PART VI--Other Matters

Sec. 124. Developing economic tools to deter aggression against Taiwan.
Sec. 125. Intellectual property violators list.
Sec. 126. Report on subsidies provided by the Government of the 
                            People's Republic of China.
        Subtitle B--Economic Engagement With Allies and Partners

      PART I--Investing in Economic Engagement in the Global South

Sec. 131. Investing in talent in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, 
                            sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.
Sec. 132. Enhancing United States-Africa trade and investment for 
                            prosperity.
Sec. 133. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in 
                            Africa.
Sec. 134. Support for Bangladesh democracy and labor rights programs.
Sec. 135. Support for anti-corruption programs and other programs to 
                            address impunity and justice in Sri Lanka.
           PART II--Aligning With Partners on Economic Tools

Sec. 141. Assistance to advance foreign investment screening of United 
                            States allies and partners to protect 
                            national interests.
Sec. 142. Assistance to counter corrupt practices in foreign countries.
Sec. 143. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners.
Sec. 144. Pilot program to audit barriers to commerce in developing 
                            partner countries.
Sec. 145. Strategy for promoting supply chain diversification.
Sec. 146. Authorization to assist United States companies with global 
                            supply chain diversification and 
                            management.
Sec. 147. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting private 
                            sector finance.
   PART III--Countering Efforts to Undermine International Economic 
                             Organizations

Sec. 151. International Monetary Fund new arrangements to borrow.
Sec. 152. Participation of Taiwan in Inter-American Development Bank.
Sec. 153. Increased United States cooperation with Asia-Pacific 
                            Economic Cooperation.
Sec. 154. Opposition of the United States to an increase in the weight 
                            of the Chinese renminbi in the Special 
                            Drawing Rights basket of the International 
                            Monetary Fund.
        Subtitle C--Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

Sec. 161. Department of State Infrastructure Coordination Task Force.
Sec. 162. Authorization of Partnership for Global Infrastructure and 
                            Investment.
Sec. 163. Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network.
Sec. 164. Strategic Ports Initiative.
Sec. 165. Next-generation shipping.
Sec. 166. Global Strategic Infrastructure Investment Fund.
Sec. 167. Modifications of requirements to become a Millennium 
                            Challenge Corporation candidate country.
Sec. 168. Africa energy security and diversification.
Sec. 169. Enhancing resilient critical infrastructure in the Pacific 
                            Islands.
Sec. 170. Oceania Restoration and Hazards Removal Program.
Sec. 171. Coordination with other Federal agencies and cooperation and 
                            participation of nongovernmental entities.
Sec. 172. Findings related to the People's Republic of China's 
                            industrial pollution.
Sec. 173. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the Belt 
                            and Road Initiative and Global Development 
                            Initiative.
Sec. 174. International cooperation to secure critical mineral supply 
                            chains.
            Subtitle D--Digital Technology and Connectivity

Sec. 176. Office of the Special Envoy For Critical and Emerging 
                            Technology.
Sec. 177. Realigning the Regional Technology Officer Program.
Sec. 178. Annual semiconductor industry monitoring report on the 
                            People's Republic of China.
Sec. 179. Combatting AI-enabled disinformation.
Sec. 179A. International collaboration on research and development.
Sec. 179B. Oversight of the United States-European Union Trade and 
                            Technology Council.
Sec. 179C. Digital connectivity in the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 179D. Cyber and digital security cooperation with respect to 
                            developing countries.
              Subtitle E--Countering PRC Malign Influence

Sec. 181. Sense of Congress distinguishing the PRC Government from the 
                            Chinese people.
Sec. 182. Authorization of appropriations for countering the People's 
                            Republic of China Influence Fund.
Sec. 183. Global Engagement Center.
Sec. 184. Amendment to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act 
                            of 1961.
Sec. 185. Countering malign information operations in the Americas.
Sec. 186. Global Peace Operations Initiative.
Sec. 187. Expansion of sanctions under the Fentanyl Sanctions Act.
Sec. 188. Imposition of sanctions with respect to agencies or 
                            instrumentalities of foreign states.
Sec. 189. Imposition of sanctions with respect to military and 
                            intelligence facilities of the People's 
                            Republic of China in Cuba.
Sec. 190. Strategic stability dialogue and arms control.
Sec. 191. Track 1.5 dialogues with the People's Republic of China on 
                            nuclear matters.
Sec. 192. Oversight of life sciences dual use research of concern.
        Subtitle F--Strengthening United States Public Diplomacy

Sec. 196. Authorization of appropriations to promote United States 
                            education, exchange, cultural, and the 
                            Fulbright-Hays Program.
Sec. 197. Public diplomacy training.
Sec. 198. Public diplomacy efforts.
Sec. 199. Supporting independent media and countering foreign 
                            information operations.
Sec. 199A. Support for local media.
   TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES, PARTNERSHIPS, AND INTERNATIONAL 
                             ORGANIZATIONS

              Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

 PART I--Promoting United States Leadership on Matters Related to the 
                              Indo-Pacific

Sec. 201. Sense of Congress condemning the PRC's support for Russia's 
                            war on Ukraine.
Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners 
                            in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 203. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the Quad.
Sec. 204. Statement of policy on enhancing United States-Taiwan 
                            partnership.
Sec. 205. Expanding expertise on Taiwan matters.
Sec. 206. United States-South Korea alliance.
Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on United States-Japan-Republic of Korea 
                            cooperation.
Sec. 208. Sense of Congress on the need for the Senate to give its 
                            advice and consent to the ratification of 
                            the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
                            the Sea.
Sec. 209. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in 
                            international waterways and airspace of the 
                            Indo-Pacific and on artificial land 
                            features in the South China Sea.
Sec. 209A. Sense of Congress regarding universal implementation of 
                            United Nations sanctions on North Korea.
Sec. 209B. Establishing a Senior Official for the Compacts of Free 
                            Association at the Department of State.
      PART II--Enhancing Diplomatic Engagement in the Global South

Sec. 211. Enhancement of diplomatic support and economic engagement 
                            with Pacific Island countries.
Sec. 212. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 213. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 214. Strengthening diplomatic efforts in Africa.
Sec. 215. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the 
                            Caribbean regarding accountability, human 
                            rights, and the risks of pervasive 
                            surveillance technologies.
                Subtitle B--International Organizations

Sec. 221. Safeguarding the integrity of the United Nations system.
Sec. 222. United States membership in United Nations specialized 
                            agencies and related organizations.
Sec. 223. Establishment of Office on Multilateral Strategy and 
                            Personnel.
Sec. 224. Authorization of appropriations to promote United States 
                            citizen employment at the United Nations 
                            and international organizations.
Sec. 225. United States leadership and representation in standards-
                            setting bodies.
    Subtitle C--South China and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2024

Sec. 231. Short title.
Sec. 232. Sanctions with respect to PRC persons responsible for the 
                            PRC's activities in the South China Sea and 
                            the East China Sea.
Sec. 233. Sense of Congress regarding portrayals of the South China Sea 
                            or the East China Sea as part of China.
Sec. 234. Sense of Congress on 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration's 
                            tribunal ruling on arbitration case between 
                            Philippines and People's Republic of China.
                   TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

    Subtitle A--Promoting Human Rights in People's Republic of China

PART I--Promoting Human Rights for Citizens of the People's Republic of 
             China and for United States Citizens in China

Sec. 301. Protecting human rights in the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 302. Report on corrupt activities of senior officials of 
                            Government of the People's Republic of 
                            China.
Sec. 303. China exit bans.
                 PART II--Matters Related to Hong Kong

Sec. 305. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy, 
                            human rights, and civilian security in Hong 
                            Kong.
Sec. 306. Development and deployment of internet freedom and 
                            circumvention tools for the people of Hong 
                            Kong.
                 PART III--Matters Related to Xinjiang

Sec. 311. Sense of Congress on treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic 
                            minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
                            autonomous region.
Sec. 312. Sense of Congress calling on organization of Islamic 
                            cooperation members to take action on 
                            atrocities in Xinjiang.
Sec. 313. Reauthorization of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act.
Sec. 314. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape, 
                            coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or 
                            involuntary contraceptive implantation in 
                            the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region.
                   PART IV--Matters Related to Tibet

Sec. 317. Policy with respect to Tibet.
Sec. 318. United States policy and international engagement on the or 
                            reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and 
                            religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.
              Subtitle B--Promoting Human Rights Globally

Sec. 321. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council 
                            that commit human rights abuses.
Sec. 322. Protecting human rights defenders at the United Nations and 
                            other multilateral bodies.
Sec. 323. Inclusion of surveillance technology abuse in human rights 
                            report.
Sec. 324. Strengthening public reporting on corruption.
Sec. 325. Authorization of funding for public reporting on corruption 
                            and corrupt practices.
    TITLE IV--MODERNIZING THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO MEET THE CHINA 
                               CHALLENGE

Sec. 401. Establishing an Assistant Secretary of State for Indo-Pacific 
                            Affairs.
Sec. 402. Enhancing strategic competition at the Department of State.
Sec. 403. Department of State professional development and rotational 
                            program related to strategic competition.
Sec. 404. Refocusing international security efforts for strategic 
                            competition.
                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 501. Savings provisions.
Sec. 502. Rule of Construction on Maintaining One China Policy.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
        ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (2) Joint declaration.--The term ``Joint Declaration'' 
        means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United 
        Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of 
        Hong Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.
            (3) PRC.--The term ``PRC'' means the People's Republic of 
        China.
            (4) Strategic infrastructure.--The term ``strategic 
        infrastructure'' means infrastructure where a primary driver of 
        United States national interest in such infrastructure is--
                    (A) to advance United States national security or 
                economic security interest or those of the country in 
                which the infrastructure is located; or
                    (B) to deny the People's Republic of China of 
                ownership or control over such infrastructure.

SEC. 3. CONSULTATION AND ENGAGEMENT WITH CONGRESS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the strategic competition between the United States and 
        the PRC will require the United States to marshal sustained and 
        political will to protect its vital interests, promote its 
        values, and advance its economic and national security 
        objectives for decades to come; and
            (2) sustained prioritization of the challenge posed by the 
        PRC requires the participation of the whole United States 
        Government, including--
                    (A) the President to lead and direct the entire 
                executive branch to treat the PRC as the greatest 
                geopolitical and economic challenge for United States 
                foreign policy;
                    (B) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and
                    (C) frequent, sustained, and meaningful 
                collaboration and consultation between the executive 
                branch and Congress.
    (b) Engagement With Congress.--Consistent with section 15(b) of the 
State Department Basic Authorities Act (22 U.S.C. 2680(b)), the 
Department of State shall keep the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives fully and currently informed with respect to all 
activities and responsibilities carried out in relation to the 
provisions of this Act, including by regularly consulting with the 
appropriate committees of Congress in the development and 
implementation of each of the strategies called for by the provisions 
of this Act.

               TITLE I--INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE

           Subtitle A--Combatting the PRC's Economic Coercion

SEC. 101. DEFINITIONS.

    In this subtitle:
            (1) PRC economic coercion.--The term ``PRC economic 
        coercion'' means actions, practices, or threats by the People's 
        Republic of China (PRC) to unreasonably restrict, obstruct, or 
        manipulate commerce or economic relations with, foreign aid to, 
        debt of, or investment in, any United States ally or partner in 
        a capricious, pretextual, or non-transparent manner for the 
        purpose of threatening or causing economic harm to the United 
        States allies or partners for the purpose of influencing, 
        constraining or limiting such countries decision-making.
            (2) Target country.--The term ``targeted country'' is a 
        country or entity determined by the Secretary to have been the 
        subject of unusually adverse or acute PRC economic coercion.
            (3) Targeted good or service.--The term ``targeted good or 
        service'' is a good or service subject to export or import by a 
        targeted country that is significantly or adversely affected by 
        PRC economic coercion.

                PART I--ECONOMIC COERCION DETERMINATIONS

SEC. 105. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the PRC is increasingly using economic coercion to 
        pressure, punish, and influence the United States and United 
        States allies and partners;
            (2) economic coercion causes economic harm to United States 
        allies and partners, threatens their economic security and 
        attempts to constrain their ability to undertake sovereign 
        political actions;
            (3) economic coercion is often characterized by--
                    (A) arbitrary, abusive, or discriminatory actions 
                that seek to interfere with sovereign actions, or 
                violate international rules;
                    (B) capricious, pretextual, or non-transparent 
                actions taken without due process afforded; or
                    (C) intimidation or threats of punitive actions;
            (4) existing mechanisms for trade dispute resolution and 
        international arbitration may not apply to claims related to 
        economic coercion, and are often inadequate for responding to 
        economic coercion in a timely and effective manner as the PRC 
        exploits plausible lengthy resolution processes to evade 
        accountability;
            (5) the United States should provide meaningful economic 
        and political support to foreign partners at their request and 
        consistent with United States interests, when they are the 
        target of PRC economic coercion that causes significant 
        economic and political harm;
            (6) responding to economic coercion will be most effective 
        when the United States provides relief to affected foreign 
        partners in coordination with allies and like-minded countries; 
        and
            (7) such coordination will further demonstrate broad 
        resolve against economic coercion.

SEC. 106. TARGETED COUNTRY DETERMINATION.

    (a) Secretary of State Determination.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State may determine that 
        a country is a targeted country and may exercise the 
        authorities described in section 111(b) and 112 with respect to 
        that country.
            (2) Delegation and consultation with cabinet members.--To 
        inform any determination under paragraph (1) or exercise of 
        authority described in section 111(b) and 112, the Secretary 
        may delegate the authorities under this section to an 
        appropriate Senate-confirmed official at the Department of 
        State, who should consult with other Federal agencies, as 
        appropriate.
            (3) Notification and transmittal to congress.--In making 
        any determination, the Secretary shall notify the appropriate 
        committees of Congress not later than 10 days before issuing a 
        determination under paragraph (1) or exercising authorities 
        described in section 111(b) and submit such determination and a 
        justification to the appropriate committees of Congress in an 
        unclassified form, which may include a classified annex.
    (b) Expiration and Extension of Determination.--
            (1) Expiration of initial determination.--Any determination 
        made by the Secretary under subsection (a) shall expire 180 
        days after the date of such determination, unless the 
        Department submits a notification to the appropriate committees 
        of Congress pursuant to paragraph (2) that PRC economic 
        coercion against the targeted country is ongoing and requires 
        an additional response.
            (2) Extension of determination; congressional 
        notification.--
                    (A) In general.--The Department may extend any 
                determination under subsection (a) for a period of one 
                year by submitting a congressional notification to the 
                appropriate committees of Congress for their review not 
                later than 30 days in advance of an extension taking 
                effect.
                    (B) Elements.--Any notifications submitted to the 
                appropriate committees of Congress pursuant to 
                subparagraph (A) shall include--
                            (i) a description of the status of the PRC 
                        economic coercion that led to the initial 
                        determination made under subsection (a);
                            (ii) an assessment of the targeted 
                        country's political and economic vulnerability 
                        to such PRC economic coercion;
                            (iii) a description of the exercise of the 
                        authorities and activities described in section 
                        111(b) or section 112 to date;
                            (iv) a plan for the continued exercise of 
                        authorities under section 111(b) or section 
                        112;
                            (v) a description of the actions taken by 
                        the PRC against a targeted country in response 
                        to support provided to the targeted country by 
                        the United States or United States allies and 
                        partners;
                            (vi) coordination conducted with and 
                        support provided by United States allies and 
                        partners to assist the targeted country; and
                            (vii) a justification for why an extension 
                        is in the national interests of the United 
                        States.
                    (C) Classification.--A notification under this 
                subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form but 
                may include a classified annex.
            (3) Revocation.--The Secretary may at any time revoke a 
        determination made under subsection (a) or the extension of 
        such determination made under paragraph (2).

SEC. 107. SUNSET.

    The authorities under this part shall expire 8 years after the date 
of the enactment of this Act.

                           PART II--RESPONSE

SEC. 111. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall establish, in 
coordination with other relevant Federal departments and agencies as 
appropriate, a program for the creation of economic defense response 
teams that can provide rapid, targeted technical assistance and high-
level diplomatic support to the targeted country. Such assistance and 
support may include the following activities:
            (1) Developing and implementing bilateral or multilateral 
        contingency plans to lessen the political and economic impact 
        of PRC economic coercion, including by surging technical 
        assistance, diplomatic support and economic assistance, as 
        needed, to the targeted country.
            (2) Encouraging senior Department of State officials to 
        engage with United States allies and partners, the United 
        States private sector and other relevant interlocutors in 
        support of the targeted country, as appropriate.
            (3) In coordination with the targeted country, developing 
        plans and strategies for reducing vulnerabilities and improving 
        resilience.
            (4) Deploying positive public messaging campaigns to 
        reinforce the policy independence and resilience of the 
        targeted country and to condemn PRC economic coercion.
    (b) Activation of Response Teams.--Activation of an economic 
defense response team to support a targeted country may involve the 
following elements and others as the circumstances require:
            (1) Identification and designation of relevant personnel to 
        the task force, including economists, data analysts, trade 
        experts, legal experts and foreign policy and foreign 
        assistance personnel within the United States Government with 
        expertise relevant to the activities described in subsection 
        (a).
            (2) Negotiation of memoranda of understanding or 
        contracting mechanisms, where appropriate, with other Federal 
        departments and agencies and the United States private sector, 
        as needed, to ensure access to the technical assistance 
        identified under subsection (a)(1) and expertise identified 
        under paragraph (1).
            (3) Clear direction to United States diplomatic missions on 
        the rapid and effective activation of such teams, and the 
        establishment of appropriate liaison relationships, as 
        appropriate, with local public and private sector officials and 
        entities.

SEC. 112. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE FUND.

    (a) In General.--There is hereby established an ``Economic Defense 
Response Fund'' within the Department of State (in this section 
referred to as the ``Fund'') to provide support, including the 
provision of assistance or the provision of loans to facilitate the 
purchase or redirection of targeted goods, in particular goods of a 
strategic, time-sensitive, or perishable nature, in the targeted 
country.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated not less than $25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 
through 2029 for the establishment and operation of the Fund. The Fund 
shall be solely administered by the Secretary of State or the 
Secretary's designee, in consultation with the heads of other 
Departments and agencies, as appropriate.
    (c) Use of Loans.--The Economic Defense Response Fund may be used 
to support loan programs to underwrite purchases by third parties to 
redirect targeted goods or services.

SEC. 113. EXISTING AUTHORITIES THAT MAY BE USED TO RESPOND TO ECONOMIC 
              COERCION.

    The Secretary of State should use the following authorities to 
respond to economic coercion against a targeted country, as 
appropriate:
            (1) Requesting appropriations for foreign aid to the 
        targeted country.
            (2) Requesting the necessary authority and appropriations 
        for sovereign loan guarantees to the targeted country.
            (3) The waiver of policy requirements (other than policy 
        requirements mandated by an Act of Congress) to facilitate the 
        provision of financing to the targeted country.
            (4) Requesting appropriations for loan loss reserves to 
        facilitate the provision of financing to support United States 
        exports to the targeted country.
            (5) Providing technical assistance and legal expertise to 
        support a targeted country's response to and redress of an act 
        or acts of PRC economic coercion.
            (6) Other authorities that could benefit the targeted 
        country and that require coordination and consultation with the 
        relevant Federal departments and agencies.

SEC. 114. SUNSET.

    The authorities under this part shall expire 8 years after the date 
of the enactment of this Act.

                          PART III--RESILIENCE

SEC. 115. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST.

    (a) In General.--There is established at the Department of State an 
Office of the Chief Economist.
    (b) Duties.--The Office will be led by the Chief Economist of the 
Department of State, at the Senior Executive Service or equivalent 
level, and shall be responsible for--
            (1) conducting economic research, collecting and analyzing 
        data, and preparing reports and assessments and policy 
        recommendations to senior Department leadership on 
        international economic trends, opportunities, and challenges 
        and unanticipated global developments with economic impacts; 
        and
            (2) providing economic analysis to inform policy making, 
        including related to--
                    (A) international trade and trade policy;
                    (B) international macroeconomics and finance;
                    (C) economic development;
                    (D) competition and industrial strategy;
                    (E) economic sanctions development and 
                implementation, and sanctions evasion; and
                    (F) capacity building;
            (3) coordinating with allies and partners, other relevant 
        agencies, departments, and stakeholders on international 
        economic matters;
            (4) identifying countries vulnerable to PRC economic 
        coercion, and analyzing commodities, products, services, and 
        other economic linkages of each such country that may be 
        vulnerable targets for PRC economic coercion, including 
        examining risk factors such as--
                    (A) perishability;
                    (B) strategic or political value, or to regional or 
                global supply chains;
                    (C) proportion of the total export value for the 
                exporting country of the product being exported to a 
                country engaged in economic coercion;
                    (D) potential exposure of the product to arbitrary 
                or excessive regulatory, phytosanitary, or other safety 
                or inspection requirements; and
                    (E) reliance of a country on the import of such 
                commodities, product, or services; and
            (5) analyzing and monitoring economic linkages to identify 
        goods and commodities with respect to which United States 
        allies and partners may be vulnerable to economic coercion that 
        is informed by--
                    (A) current market data;
                    (B) information, including United States 
                intelligence, on economic coercion strategies;
                    (C) relevant data from before, during and after 
                past instances of economic coercion; and
                    (D) any other relevant information needed to 
                support economic analysis and policy recommendations, 
                including access to information technology systems 
                which integrate and synthesize economic and related 
                data.
    (c) Personnel.--In addition to a qualified professional Chief 
Economist, the Secretary of State is authorized to employ sufficient 
full-time equivalent individuals to fully execute the Office of the 
Chief Economist, including--
            (1) a Deputy Chief Economist, who must be a qualified 
        professional economist;
            (2) at least four qualified professional economists at the 
        GS-15 level;
            (3) a Chief Data Officer;
            (4) a Chief of Staff;
            (5) research economists;
            (6) career members of the foreign service, including 
        program support staff; and
            (7) temporary staff, including fellows.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for 
the Office for personnel costs, project and data services, and limited 
travel funds.

SEC. 116. ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO ALLIES AND PARTNERS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Undersecretary of State for Economic Growth, 
Energy, and the Environment, using the economic analysis as described 
in section 115, shall coordinate with other relevant Federal 
departments and agencies, as appropriate, to develop and implement a 
strategy to provide proactive support to partners and allies at risk of 
becoming target countries for PRC economic coercion. Such support may 
include the following activities:
            (1) Data and information sharing on economic risks and 
        vulnerabilities, including specific sectors.
            (2) Technical support to establish proactive action plan 
        and contingency plans to reduce the partner country's 
        vulnerability to coercive economic practices and limit the 
        damage of economic coercion.
            (3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral contingency 
        plans for responding to the threat or use of PRC economic 
        coercion.
            (4) Providing technical assistance to partner countries in 
        screening foreign sovereign investment in physical and digital 
        infrastructure, and foreign investment in other strategic 
        sectors that may increase the partner country's vulnerability 
        to PRC economic coercion.
            (5) Funding non-governmental entities to support public 
        conferences and reports on the use of economic coercion and 
        options for response efforts.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--Of the $25,000,000 authorized 
in section 112(b), $5,000,000 may be allocated to the Bureau of 
Economic and Business Affairs to resource, staff, and implement the 
strategy in subsection (a).

             PART IV--COORDINATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS

SEC. 119. COORDINATION WITH ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
              DEVELOPMENT MEMBERS ON ENGAGEMENT FROM THE PEOPLE'S 
              REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    The Secretary of State shall coordinate with willing Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development member countries--
            (1) to study the effects of coercive economic practices 
        associated with the PRC, such as those through the Belt and 
        Road Initiative, the Digital Silk Road, and the Global 
        Development Initiative, which may include the extent to which 
        such practices--
                    (A) are predatory or usurious;
                    (B) are inconsistent with internally accepted 
                banking and accounting practices;
                    (C) result in low quality infrastructure that does 
                not meet international standards;
                    (D) incorporate conditions intended to limit 
                transparency, including lending with conditional 
                restrictions on debt reporting, inconsistent with the 
                borrower's obligations to the International Monetary 
                Fund; and
                    (E) provide the PRC with undue influence over the 
                borrower in the event of the borrower's default;
            (2) to create a shared set of metrics to enable evaluation 
        of whether the PRC is engaging in the practices referred to in 
        paragraph (1) on particular initiatives or projects, and 
        promote transparency with respect to those actions, including a 
        joint analysis of--
                    (A) the PRC's distortive economic practices, such 
                as subsidies provided by the PRC as it pertains to 
                state-owned enterprises and other forms of market-
                distorting state intervention in the PRC's economy; and
                    (B) the potential negative global spillovers from 
                such practices;
            (3) to establish--
                    (A) a program or plan of action for future 
                dialogues on the PRC's unfair economic practices; and
                    (B) a clear understanding of common concerns and 
                priorities among member countries with respect to such 
                practices; and
            (4) to issue joint informational reports that contain the 
        results of the data gathering efforts described in this 
        section.

                         PART V--IMPLEMENTATION

SEC. 121. REPORT ON STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION.

    (a) Strategy and Implementation.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit 
        to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on 
        activities under this subtitle.
            (2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include the following elements:
                    (A) A description of the establishment of the 
                program authorized by section 111(a) describing the 
                development of the program, the major elements of the 
                program, the personnel and institutions involved, and 
                specifics on how the program incorporates the elements 
                described in section 111(a).
                    (B) A description of the development and 
                implementation of the strategy described in section 
                116, including--
                            (i) the development and use of data and 
                        analytical tools by the Office of the Chief 
                        Economist in assessing potential interventions 
                        that could be pursued to address identified 
                        vulnerabilities to economic coercion in advance 
                        of such coercion or in preparation for such 
                        coercion;
                            (ii) a strategy for public engagement 
                        before, during and after instances of economic 
                        coercion to build resilience, domestic and 
                        international support to counter such coercion; 
                        and
                            (iii) how the Secretary of State will work 
                        with interagency stakeholders to implement the 
                        strategy required under section 116, and the 
                        potential contributions of other Federal 
                        departments and agencies to programs, 
                        initiatives, and activities that complement the 
                        Economic Defense Response Fund authorized in 
                        section 112.
    (b) Economic Defense Response Team Reports.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
        activation of an economic defense response team pursuant to 
        section 111(b), and annually thereafter for so long as such 
        team is active, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
        appropriate committees of Congress a report describing the 
        operations of the team with respect to the targeted country and 
        an assessment of its effectiveness in countering the negative 
        impact to the targeted country of PRC economic coercion.
            (2) Classification.--the report required under paragraph 
        (1) shall be unclassified but may include a classified annex.

                         PART VI--OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 124. DEVELOPING ECONOMIC TOOLS TO DETER AGGRESSION AGAINST TAIWAN.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States must be prepared to take immediate action to sanction any 
military or non-military entities owned, controlled, or acting at the 
direction of the Government of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party 
that are supporting actions by the Government of the PRC or the Chinese 
Communist Party to--
            (1) overthrow or dismantle the governing institutions in 
        Taiwan;
            (2) occupy any territory controlled or administered by 
        Taiwan; or
            (3) take significant action against Taiwan, or territory 
        controlled or administered by Taiwan, including conducting a 
        naval blockade, seizing Taiwan's outlying islands, or 
        perpetrating a significant cyberattack on Taiwan.
    (b) Task Force.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Office of the Sanctions Coordinator of the 
Department of State and the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the 
Department of the Treasury shall establish an interagency task force to 
identify military or non-military entities that could be sanctioned 
immediately following any action taken by the PRC that demonstrates an 
attempt to achieve or has the significant effect of achieving the 
physical or political control of Taiwan, including by--
            (1) overthrowing or dismantling the governing institutions 
        in Taiwan;
            (2) occupying any territory controlled or administered by 
        Taiwan as of the date of the enactment of this Act; or
            (3) taking significant action against Taiwan, or territory 
        controlled or administered by Taiwan, including--
                    (A) the creation of a naval blockade of Taiwan;
                    (B) the seizure of the outlying islands of Taiwan; 
                or
                    (C) the initiation of a significant cyberattack 
                that threatens civilian or military infrastructure of 
                Taiwan.
    (c) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days following the establishment 
of the task force required under subsection (b), the task force shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a strategy for 
identifying targets that--
            (1) assesses how existing sanctions programs could be used 
        following any action taken by the PRC that demonstrates an 
        attempt to achieve, or has the significant effect of achieving, 
        the physical or political control of Taiwan as described in 
        subsection (b);
            (2) develops or proposes, as appropriate, new sanctions 
        authorities that might be required to impose sanctions on 
        targets identified under this section;
            (3) analyzes the potential economic consequences to the 
        United States, and to allies and partners of the United States, 
        of various types of such sanctions and to assess measures that 
        could be taken to mitigate such consequences, including through 
        the use of licenses, exemptions, carve-outs, and other 
        approaches;
            (4) includes coordination with allies and partners to--
                    (A) leverage sanctions and other economic tools to 
                deter or respond to aggression against Taiwan;
                    (B) identify and resolve potential impediments to 
                coordinating sanctions-related efforts; and
                    (C) identify industries, sectors, or goods and 
                services where the United States and allies and 
                partners can take coordinated action through sanctions, 
                or other economic tools that will have a significant 
                negative impact on the economy of the PRC;
            (5) assesses the resource gaps and needs at the Department 
        of State and the Department of the Treasury, and other Federal 
        departments and agencies, as appropriate, to most effectively 
        use sanctions and other economic tools to respond to the threat 
        posed by the PRC;
            (6) recommends how best to target sanctions and other 
        economic tools against individuals, entities, and economic 
        sectors in the PRC, taking into account the role of such 
        targets in supporting Government of the PRC or Chinese 
        Communist Party policies and activities that pose a threat to 
        the national security or foreign policy interests of the United 
        States, the negative economic implications for the PRC, 
        including its ability to achieve its objectives with respect to 
        Taiwan, and the potential impact of such sanctions on the 
        stability of the global financial system, including with regard 
        to--
                    (A) state-owned enterprises;
                    (B) government officials;
                    (C) financial institutions associated with the 
                government; and
                    (D) PRC companies not formally designated by the 
                Government of the PRC as state-owned enterprises;
            (7) identifies any foreign military or non-military 
        entities that would likely be used by the PRC in any action 
        taken that demonstrates an attempt to achieve any, or has the 
        significant effect of achieving, the physical or political 
        control of Taiwan, as described in subsection (b), including 
        entities in--
                    (A) shipping;
                    (B) logistics;
                    (C) energy, including oil and gas;
                    (D) aviation;
                    (E) ground transportation; and
                    (F) technology;
            (8) describes policies, to be applied in the event of any 
        PRC coercive action, including an invasion by the PRC that 
        fringes upon the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan by 
        preventing access to international waterways, airspace, or 
        telecommunications networks, to--
                    (A) restrict the access of the People's Liberation 
                Army to oil, natural gas, munitions, and other supplies 
                needed to conduct military operations against Taiwan, 
                United States facilities in the Indo-Pacific and Indian 
                Oceans, and allies and partners of the United States in 
                the region;
                    (B) diminish the capacity of the industrial base of 
                the PRC to manufacture and deliver defense articles to 
                replace those lost in operations of the People's 
                Liberation Army against Taiwan, the United States, and 
                allies and partners of the United States; and
                    (C) inhibit the ability of the PRC to evade United 
                States and multilateral sanctions through third 
                parties, including through secondary sanctions; and
            (9) identifies tactics used by the Government of the PRC to 
        influence the public in the United States and Taiwan through 
        propaganda and disinformation campaigns, including such 
        campaigns focused on delegitimizing Taiwan or legitimizing a 
        forceful action by the PRC against Taiwan.
    (d) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        submission of the strategy required under subsection (c), the 
        President shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
        Congress a report on potential sources of leverage against the 
        PRC and recommendations to reduce United States 
        vulnerabilities. The report shall--
                    (A) identify goods and services from the United 
                States that are relied on by the PRC such that reliance 
                presents a strategic opportunity and source of leverage 
                against the PRC, including during a conflict;
                    (B) identify procurement practices of the United 
                States Government, and critical sectors within the 
                United States economy, that are reliant on trade with 
                the PRC and other inputs from the PRC (including drugs 
                and active pharmaceutical ingredients, critical 
                minerals, and metallurgical inputs) such that those 
                sectors present a strategic vulnerability and source of 
                leverage that the Chinese Communist Party or the PRC 
                could exploit, including during a conflict; and
                    (C) includes recommendations to Congress on steps 
                that can be taken to reduce the sources of leverage 
                described in subparagraph (B), including through--
                            (i) provision of economic incentives and 
                        making other trade and contracting reforms to 
                        support United States industry in critical 
                        sectors and to indigenize production of 
                        critical resources; and
                            (ii) policies to facilitate ``near- or 
                        friend-shoring'', or otherwise developing 
                        strategies to facilitate that process with 
                        allies and partners of the United States, in 
                        other sectors for which domestic reshoring 
                        would prove infeasible for any reason.
            (2) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
        be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a 
        classified annex.

SEC. 125. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter 
for 8 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of 
other Federal departments and agencies as the President determines 
appropriate, shall create a list (referred to in this section as the 
``intellectual property violators list'') that identifies--
            (1) all state-owned enterprises incorporated in the PRC 
        that have benefitted from--
                    (A) a significant act or series of acts of 
                intellectual property theft that caused significant 
                harm to an economic sector of the United States or a 
                company, partnership or entity incorporated or 
                organized in the United States or group or association 
                of such entities; or
                    (B) an act or government policy of involuntary or 
                coerced technology transfer of intellectual property 
                owned by an entity identified company incorporated in 
                the United States; and
            (2) any foreign person with operational control of an 
        entity described in paragraph (1), including senior corporate 
        officers and principal shareholders of the entity.
    (b) Rules for Identification.--To determine whether there is a 
credible basis for determining that an entity should be included on the 
intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the departments and agencies specified in subsection 
(a) shall consider--
            (1) any final adjudication by a court of competent 
        authority in the United States that the entity has violated 
        relevant United States laws intended to protect intellectual 
        property rights; or
            (2) substantial and credible information received from any 
        entity described in subsection (c) or other interested persons.
    (c) Consultation.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the departments and agencies specified in 
subsection (a), may consult, as necessary and appropriate, with--
            (1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
            (2) entities in the private sector, including trade 
        associations;
            (3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise; 
        and
            (4) allies and partners of the United States.
    (d) Reports.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 8 years, 
        the Secretary of State shall publish in the Federal Register a 
        report that--
                    (A) lists the entities identified pursuant to 
                subsection (a)(1) and the corporate officers of such 
                entities identified pursuant to subsection (a)(2);
                    (B) describes the circumstances surrounding acts or 
                policies described in subsection (a)(1), including any 
                role of the Government of the PRC;
                    (C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the 
                economic advantage derived by the entities identified 
                pursuant to subsection (a)(1); and
                    (D) assesses whether each entity described in 
                subsection (a)(1) is using or has used stolen 
                intellectual property in commercial activity within the 
                sovereign jurisdiction of the United States.
            (2) Classified report.--Concurrent with publication of the 
        reports required under paragraph (1), the Secretary of State 
        shall submit to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate 
        and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of 
        Representatives a classified version of the report that 
        includes greater detail and intelligence about the information 
        specified in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of paragraph (1).
    (e) Requirement To Protect Confidential Business Information.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State and the head of any 
        other Federal agency involved in the production of the 
        intellectual property violators list shall protect from 
        disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a private 
        sector party and marked as confidential business information, 
        unless the party submitting the information--
                    (A) had notice, at the time of submission, that 
                such information would be disclosed by the Secretary;
                    (B) subsequently consents to the disclosure of such 
                information; or
                    (C) is an entity listed on the intellectual 
                property violators list.
            (2) Inclusion in classified version of report.--If 
        confidential business information is provided by a private 
        sector party in connection with the production of the 
        intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State 
        shall include such information in the classified version of the 
        report under subsection (d)(2).
            (3) Treatment as trade secrets.--Proprietary information 
        submitted by a private sector party (except an entity listed on 
        the intellectual property violators list) under this section--
                    (A) shall be considered to be trade secrets and 
                commercial or financial information exempt under 
                subsection (b)(4) of section 552 of title 5, United 
                States Code, from being made available to the public 
                under subsection (a) of that section; and
                    (B) shall be exempt from disclosure without the 
                express approval of the party.

SEC. 126. REPORT ON SUBSIDIES PROVIDED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
              PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 10 years, the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade 
Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a report that identifies--
            (1) patterns of direct and indirect subsidies provided by 
        the central, provincial, or local governments of the PRC to 
        state-owned enterprises and private entities under the 
        direction or control of the Government of the PRC operating in 
        economic sectors deemed by the Government of the PRC to be 
        strategic sectors, including by identifying such sectors in 
        major policy initiatives or by inclusion in the Chinese 
        Communist Party's five-year plans;
            (2) discriminatory, non-market treatment favoring state-
        owned and private enterprises in the PRC and disadvantaging 
        foreign market participants;
            (3) any impacts that the activities outlined in paragraphs 
        (1) and (2) have on United States national security and 
        economic competitiveness; and
            (4) any coordination with foreign allies and partners to 
        address the impacts of the activities outlined in paragraphs 
        (1) and (2).
    (b) Elements of Report.--In compiling the report under subsection 
(a), the Secretary of State shall consider--
            (1) regulatory and other policies enacted or promoted by 
        the central government of the PRC that--
                    (A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in the PRC 
                that disadvantage foreign market participants;
                    (B) shield centrally administered, state-owned 
                enterprises from competition; or
                    (C) otherwise suppress market-based competition;
            (2) financial subsidies, including subsidized loans or 
        below-market lending terms, from or promoted by the central, 
        provincial, or local governments of the PRC or state-owned 
        enterprises in the PRC that materially benefit enterprises in 
        the PRC over foreign market participants in contravention of 
        generally accepted market principles;
            (3) any subsidy that meets the definition of subsidy under 
        article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
        Measures referred to in section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round 
        Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12));
            (4) any impacts that the activities outlined in paragraphs 
        (1), (2), and (3) have on United States national security and 
        economic competitiveness; and
            (5) any coordination with foreign allies and partners to 
        address the impacts of the activities outlined in paragraphs 
        (1), (2), and (3).
    (c) Form of Report.--Each report required by subsection (a) may be 
submitted in classified form.
    (d) Consultation.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the United 
States Trade Representative, may, as necessary and appropriate, consult 
with--
            (1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
            (2) the private sector; and
            (3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.

        Subtitle B--Economic Engagement With Allies and Partners

      PART I--INVESTING IN ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

SEC. 131. INVESTING IN TALENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC ISLANDS, 
              SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, AND LATIN AMERICA.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Latin america and the caribbean.--In this section, the 
        term ``Latin America and the Caribbean'' does not include Cuba, 
        Nicaragua, or Venezuela.
            (2) Pacific islands.--The term ``Pacific Islands'' means 
        the nations of Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, 
        Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, 
        Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
            (3) Southeast asia.--The term ``Southeast Asia'' means the 
        nations of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
        Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
        Vietnam, and Timor-Leste.
            (4) Sub-saharan africa.--The term ``sub-Saharan Africa'' 
        means a country or successor political entity defined in 
        section 107 of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (19 
        U.S.C. 3706).
    (b) Establishment of Centers of Excellence.--The Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development and, as appropriate, the heads of 
other relevant Federal departments and agencies, is authorized to enter 
into public-private partnerships and establish centers of excellence 
located in countries in Southeast Asia, Pacific Islands, sub-Saharan 
Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean to build and enhance the 
technical capacity of officials, emerging leaders, and other qualified 
persons from countries in those regions.
    (c) Priority Areas for Technical Assistance and Capacity 
Building.--The centers of excellence established under subsection (b) 
shall provide technical assistance and capacity building in areas, such 
as the following:
            (1) Domestic resource mobilization.
            (2) Regulatory management.
            (3) Procurement processes, including tendering, bidding, 
        and contract negotiation.
            (4) Budget management and oversight.
            (5) Management of key economic sectors, including energy, 
        digital economy, and infrastructure.
            (6) Project appraisal.
            (7) Sovereign financial management.
    (d) Terms and Conditions.--The program authorized under this 
section shall--
            (1) leverage existing United States programs and activities 
        in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
        and Latin America, which may include assistance provided 
        under--
                    (A) future leaders initiatives, such as the Young 
                Southeast Asia Leaders Initiative and the Young Pacific 
                Leaders Program;
                    (B) the United States Agency for International 
                Development's American Schools and Hospitals Abroad 
                (USAID/AHSA) initiative;
                    (C) the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 
                7701 et seq.);
                    (D) U.S.-Support for Economic Growth in Asia (US-
                SEGA);
                    (E) programs related to the Asia-Pacific Economic 
                Community (APEC);
                    (F) the Young African Leaders Initiative;
                    (G) the Young Leaders of the Americas Initiative; 
                and
                    (H) other relevant education or scholarship 
                programs;
            (2) be supported by instructors that--
                    (A)(i) currently serve in relevant areas of the 
                United States Government with a rank of not less than 
                14 on the GS scale; or
                    (ii) possess at least ten years of experience 
                relevant to the areas of instruction identified in 
                subsection (c);
                    (B) meet high professional standards within their 
                fields; and
                    (C)(i) are contracted by any center of excellence 
                established pursuant to subsection (b); or
                    (ii) are deployed or detailed directly from a 
                Federal Government agency;
            (3) seek to attract participants who--
                    (A)(i) are currently senior or mid-career officials 
                in key technical ministries of participating countries 
                in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, sub-Saharan 
                Africa, or Latin America and the Caribbean;
                    (ii) have demonstrated leadership potential and 
                direct responsibility for crafting or implementing 
                policies relevant to the areas of instruction described 
                under subsection (c); or
                    (iii) demonstrate an intent to return to government 
                service after completing the program outlined in this 
                section; or
                    (B) are currently employed in utilities, publicly 
                or privately owned companies, or other non-government 
                entities with responsibility for implementing policy 
                and regulation or supporting government functions in 
                the areas of instruction described under subsection 
                (c); and
            (4) require financial or in-kind contributions from 
        participating governments, commensurate with the gross domestic 
        product of the countries.
    (e) Authorization To Enter Agreements and Non-Binding 
Instruments.--To fulfill the terms and conditions specified by 
subsection (d), the Secretary of State is authorized to enter 
agreements and non-binding instruments with participating governments 
to determine what financial or in-kind contributions will be made by 
the United States and what financial or in-kind contributions will be 
made by the participating government with respect to the activities 
described in this section.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $45,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to 
carry out this section.

SEC. 132. ENHANCING UNITED STATES-AFRICA TRADE AND INVESTMENT FOR 
              PROSPERITY.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
increase United States investment in Africa and to promote and 
facilitate trade between the United States and Africa, focused on key 
countries and sectors, that supports mutual economic growth and 
development outcomes, long-term development of markets, and the 
strategic interests of the United States.
    (b) Office To Coordinate Policy.--
            (1) Establishment.--The President shall establish an 
        office, to be known as the ``Prosper Africa Office,'' and 
        assign it to a bureau within the United States Agency for 
        International Development to coordinate the activities of the 
        United States Government related to increasing trade and 
        investment between the United States and Africa, which should 
        include representation from relevant agencies as designated by 
        the President.
            (2) Duties.--The office established pursuant to paragraph 
        (1) shall--
                    (A) identify priority countries or sectors as 
                appropriate for United States foreign investment in 
                countries in Africa and sectors and countries that 
                support United States economic growth and promotes 
                trade based on the analysis required under subsection 
                (c);
                    (B) coordinate activities and implementing 
                mechanisms, including at United States embassies in 
                Africa, to carry out the policy set forth in subsection 
                (a), including by--
                            (i) providing program support and guidance 
                        to implement the policy in subsection (a);
                            (ii) providing information and analysis to 
                        United States companies and investors in 
                        countries and sectors identified in 
                        subparagraph (A); and
                            (iii) serving, as needed, as an information 
                        clearinghouse for the United States Government 
                        for businesses, investors, and civic 
                        organizations, and others in the United States 
                        seeking information related to investing in 
                        Africa, and connecting them with teams at 
                        United States embassies overseas; and
                    (C) identify barriers to trade and investment in 
                priority countries and sectors, and identify concrete 
                actions to address them, including strengthening 
                programs and activities aimed at improving the enabling 
                environment in those countries.
            (3) Organization.--
                    (A) In general.--The office established under 
                paragraph (1) shall be led by an Executive Director who 
                shall be designated by the Administrator of the United 
                States Agency for International Development, and who 
                shall--
                            (i) coordinate interagency efforts related 
                        to paragraph (2);
                            (ii) identify, not later than 90 days after 
                        the release of the analysis required under 
                        subsection (c), a list of priority countries 
                        for the purposes of carrying out this section;
                            (iii) plan, coordinate, and oversee the 
                        policies, activities, and programs of United 
                        States Government agencies, in the United 
                        States and in overseas missions, involved in 
                        promoting or facilitating trade and investment 
                        activities between the United States and Africa 
                        and development and coordination of relevant 
                        activities meant to improve the enabling 
                        environment;
                            (iv) identify and provide information about 
                        investment opportunities, market information, 
                        and United States Government programs to 
                        support trade and investment activities in 
                        priority countries and sectors identified 
                        pursuant to paragraph (2)(A); and
                            (v) not less than 4 times per year, convene 
                        a committee consisting of the directors from 
                        each agency designated under subparagraph (B) 
                        to provide strategic guidance and coordination 
                        for the policy, programs, and activities of the 
                        office.
                    (B) Designation of agencies.--The President shall 
                designate Federal departments and agencies to 
                participate in support of the policy set forth in 
                subsection (a), and direct the head of each designated 
                agency to--
                            (i) designate an employee to serve as a 
                        focal point for the agency's respective 
                        activities related to subsection (a), who shall 
                        coordinate the relevant activities of the 
                        agency and liaise with the Executive Director 
                        designated pursuant to subparagraph (A); and
                            (ii) designate an employee to serve at 
                        United States embassies in priority countries 
                        identified pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A).
            (4) Staffing.--In order to carry out this section--
                    (A) the Executive Director shall have the 
                authority, as appropriate, to hire employees and 
                contractors in a manner that is consistent with 
                existing hiring authorities of USAID to support the 
                execution of efforts described in paragraph (3)(A), and 
                shall be supported, as appropriate, by staff detailed 
                from any Federal department or agency designated 
                pursuant to paragraph (3)(B); and
                    (B) the Chief of Mission in relevant Sub-Saharan 
                and North Africa countries--
                            (i) shall take an active and direct 
                        leadership role in promoting, supporting, and 
                        facilitating activities pursuant to this 
                        section;
                            (ii) shall designate a Foreign Service 
                        Officer, Foreign Commercial Service Officer, or 
                        other direct hire person under Chief of Mission 
                        authority to lead an interagency team to 
                        support activities pursuant to this section, 
                        who shall--
                                    (I) conduct assessments of market 
                                conditions and business operating 
                                environments;
                                    (II) identify investment 
                                opportunities;
                                    (III) foster relationships and 
                                communications between United States 
                                investors and businesses and African 
                                businesses and individuals within their 
                                country of responsibility; and
                                    (IV) carry out other duties as 
                                necessary; and
                            (iii) is authorized to hire locally 
                        employed staff with relevant experience to 
                        support the activities of the office 
                        established pursuant to this subsection.
    (c) Market and Sector Analysis.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and every 4 years thereafter until 
        2031, the Executive Director shall commission and publish a 
        study every 4 years of the investment environment in Africa 
        that incorporates the following elements:
                    (A) An analysis of which markets are the most 
                promising for private investment.
                    (B) An analysis of African markets that identifies 
                which industries and sectors United States firms have 
                an advantage in comparison to other sources of foreign 
                direct investment.
                    (C) An analysis of perceived and actual barriers to 
                United States private investment, including--
                            (i) significant legal and regulatory 
                        constraints to foreign investment and business 
                        operating environments;
                            (ii) reputational risks;
                            (iii) investor information gaps; and
                            (iv) access to and affordability of 
                        capital, labor markets, currency volatility, 
                        and infrastructure.
            (2) Authority.--To produce the study required under 
        paragraph (1), the Executive Director is authorized to engage 
        the services of a qualified United States private sector 
        consultant or subject matter expert.
            (3) Submission and publication.--The Administrator of the 
        United States Agency for International Development shall submit 
        each study required under paragraph (1) to the appropriate 
        committees of Congress and shall make the study publicly 
        available.
            (4) Determination of priority countries.--The Executive 
        Director shall determine the priority countries and sectors for 
        purposes of subsection (b)(2)(A)(i) based on the findings of 
        the report required under this subsection.
    (d) Small and Medium Enterprises.--The office shall, to the extent 
practicable, promote and facilitate investments in small and medium 
enterprises, including by establishing and supporting relationships 
between United States Government institutions, philanthropic 
institutions, and private lenders to mobilize blended finance for small 
and medium enterprises in Africa.
    (e) Support for Diaspora Investment.--The office shall seek to 
support and facilitate investments in Africa by United States citizens 
and residents who identify as members of the African diaspora.
    (f) President's Advisory Council on Africa Diaspora Engagement in 
the United States.--
            (1) In general.--The Executive Director shall consult with 
        the President's Advisory Council on African Diaspora Engagement 
        in the United States (referred to in this subsection as the 
        ``Council'') established by Executive Order 14089 on issues 
        relating to increasing, developing, and sustaining investments 
        in Africa by United States members of the African diaspora.
            (2) Membership.--The Executive Director shall consult with 
        the Chairman and Ranking Member of the appropriate committees 
        of Congress in developing recommendations to the President of 
        not less than 3 persons for appointment to the Council who have 
        significant relevant experience in the fields of trade, private 
        investment, economics, international development, or other 
        relevant fields.
            (3) Duties.--The Council shall publish an annual report on 
        investment in Africa by United States members of the African 
        diaspora and barriers to increased investment by the diaspora.
            (4) Diaspora business forums.--The Executive Director shall 
        organize public meetings throughout the United States with 
        members of the African diaspora community that--
                    (A) provide a forum for communication, education, 
                and information about investment opportunities; and
                    (B) as appropriate, may be coordinated with local 
                civic, community, and business organizations.
    (g) Business-Enabling Environment.--The Executive Director, in 
coordination with the respective Chiefs of Mission at designated United 
States embassies, shall seek to strengthen the business-enabling 
environment in Africa by--
            (1) identifying barriers to United States investment on a 
        country-by-country basis;
            (2) identifying existing development and technical 
        assistance programs that can serve to eliminate the barriers 
        identified under paragraph (1);
            (3) ensuring Country Development Cooperation Strategies and 
        Regional Development Cooperation Strategies incorporate 
        programs and activities focused on addressing specific barriers 
        to private sector investment identified under paragraph (1); 
        and
            (4) providing policy advice and technical assistance to 
        select African countries to develop and improve regulatory and 
        legal structures, taxation and customs regimes, policy 
        frameworks, and other relevant structures and practices to 
        improve the operating environments for businesses and eliminate 
        other barriers to competition.

SEC. 133. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN 
              AFRICA.

    The Comptroller General of the United States shall--
            (1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign Commercial 
        Service Officers and Department of State Economic Officers at 
        United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; and
            (2) develop and submit to the appropriate committees of 
        Congress an assessment of whether human resource capacity in 
        such embassies is adequate to meet the goals of the various 
        trade and economic programs and initiatives in Africa, 
        including the African Growth and Opportunity Act (19 U.S.C. 
        3701 et seq.) and Prosper Africa.

SEC. 134. SUPPORT FOR BANGLADESH DEMOCRACY AND LABOR RIGHTS PROGRAMS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State is authorized to provide 
assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act to support and develop 
programs in Bangladesh that promote or expand--
            (1) freedom of expression, including in the media, by--
                    (A) supporting media personnel who are victims of 
                arbitrary arrests and legal harassment about educating 
                them about their rights and resources under Bangladeshi 
                law; and
                    (B) education and training for media personnel on 
                how to promote democratic values in a restrictive 
                environment;
            (2) access to labor rights, including--
                    (A) strengthened legal and policy frameworks to 
                protect workers seeking redress for gender-based 
                violence; and
                    (B) strengthened legal and policy frameworks for 
                migrant workers; and
            (3) improved working conditions, including in Bangladesh's 
        Ready Made Garment (RMG) sector.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2027 for 
the Secretary of State to carry out this section, which upon 
appropriation shall remain available until expended.

SEC. 135. SUPPORT FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMS AND OTHER PROGRAMS TO 
              ADDRESS IMPUNITY AND JUSTICE IN SRI LANKA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) democracy, respect for human rights, justice and 
        reconciliation, and economic prosperity in Sri Lanka are 
        critical for the Sri Lankan people and to safeguard United 
        States interests in the Indo-Pacific;
            (2) numerous factors contributed to Sri Lanka's economic 
        crisis, including government corruption, financial 
        mismanagement, and disproportionate military expenditures at 
        the expense of other public policy priorities; and
            (3) despite being a recipient of 16 International Monetary 
        Fund loans, the Government of Sri Lanka has failed to address 
        their governance and economic issues given their predatory 
        lending, inability to tackle corruption, government impunity 
        for atrocities and justice for victims of atrocities, and other 
        abuses of human rights.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to--
            (1) support the peaceful, democratic, and economic 
        aspirations of the people of Sri Lanka; and
            (2) call on the Government of Sri Lanka to address the 
        recommendations of the International Monetary Fund of the need 
        to address corruption and to hold officials accountable for 
        past behaviors in order to address the dire governance and 
        economic concerns in Sri Lanka.
    (c) Authorization.--The Secretary of State is authorized to provide 
assistance to support and develop programs in Sri Lanka to address 
public sector corruption, support accountability for those responsible 
for atrocities, and promote justice for victims of atrocities.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2027 for 
the Secretary of State to carry out this section, which shall remain 
available until expended.

           PART II--ALIGNING WITH PARTNERS ON ECONOMIC TOOLS

SEC. 141. ASSISTANCE TO ADVANCE FOREIGN INVESTMENT SCREENING OF UNITED 
              STATES ALLIES AND PARTNERS TO PROTECT NATIONAL INTERESTS.

    (a) Technical Assistance to Foreign Partners.--The Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and, as 
appropriate, the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as the 
President determines appropriate, shall offer to provide technical 
assistance to the governments of countries that are allies and partners 
of the United States in establishing or improving legislative and 
regulatory frameworks to screen foreign investment for national 
security risks that are, to the extent possible, similar to the 
frameworks set forth in section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 
1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565).
    (b) Engagement With Foreign Partners.--In carrying out subsection 
(a), the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the 
Treasury and, as appropriate, the heads of other Federal departments 
and agencies, shall actively encourage the government of each country 
that is an ally or partner of the United States--
            (1) to establish transparent protocols for screening 
        foreign investment that protect the national security interests 
        of such country; and
            (2) to make decisions on the basis of the potential 
        national security risk of such investments.
    (c) Diplomatic Engagement.--In providing the technical assistance 
described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall--
            (1) consult closely with the intended recipient of such 
        assistance to reach a mutual understanding regarding the scope 
        and nature of the country's particular national security needs 
        with respect to investment screening and the appropriate 
        response to meet those needs, and take all reasonable care to 
        ensure any screening process is transparent and national 
        security-focused;
            (2) encourage governments of countries receiving technical 
        assistance to establish or improve the regulatory and 
        legislative frameworks to screen foreign investment as 
        described in subsection (b) to meet the security identified 
        pursuant to paragraph (1); and
            (3) prioritize the conduct of diplomatic engagement with 
        government officials, including legislators, from countries 
        whose cooperation in foreign investment screening is deemed by 
        the Secretary to be critical to the interests of the United 
        States.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of State for fiscal year 2025 
$10,000,000 to carry out this section, which may be administered either 
by the Department of State or the United States Agency for 
International Development.

SEC. 142. ASSISTANCE TO COUNTER CORRUPT PRACTICES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

    The Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other 
Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall offer to provide 
technical assistance to help establish and implement regulatory and 
legislative frameworks to combat the bribery of foreign public 
officials consistent with the principles of the Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, adopted by the Negotiating Conference of the Council of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development on November 
21, 1997, to the government of any country--
            (1) that is an ally or partner of the United States;
            (2) that has demonstrated a will to responsibly combat 
        corrupt practices in such country; and
            (3) for which technical assistance will likely achieve 
        measurable results within five years.

SEC. 143. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
heads of other participating Federal agencies, shall establish and 
develop a program to facilitate and encourage regular dialogues between 
United States Government regulatory and technical agencies and their 
counterpart organizations in allied and partner countries, both 
bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institutions and 
organizations--
            (1) to promote best practices in regulatory formation and 
        implementation;
            (2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory outcomes 
        based on scientific, technical, and other relevant principles;
            (3) to seek better harmonization and alignment of 
        regulations and regulatory practices;
            (4) to build consensus around industry and technical 
        standards in emerging sectors that will drive future global 
        economic growth and commerce; and
            (5) to promote United States standards regarding 
        environmental, labor, and other relevant protections in 
        regulatory formation and implementation, in keeping with the 
        values of free, open, and democratic societies, including the 
        rule of law.
    (b) Prioritization of Activities.--In facilitating expert exchanges 
under subsection (a), the Secretary shall prioritize--
            (1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with countries 
        where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, 
        or communication and dialogue between technical agencies is 
        achievable and best advances the economic and national security 
        interests of the United States;
            (2) multilateral coordination and collaboration where 
        greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, or 
        dialogue on other relevant regulatory matters is achievable and 
        best advances the economic and national security interests of 
        the United States, including with the members of--
                    (A) the European Union;
                    (B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation;
                    (C) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
                (ASEAN);
                    (D) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
                Development (OECD);
                    (E) the Pacific Alliance; and
                    (F) multilateral development banks; and
            (3) regulatory practices and standards-setting bodies 
        focused on key economic sectors and emerging technologies.
    (c) Participation by Nongovernmental Entities.--With regard to the 
program described in subsection (a), the Secretary of State may 
facilitate, including through the use of amounts authorized for such 
purposes pursuant to subsection (d), the participation of relevant 
organizations and individuals with relevant expertise, as appropriate 
and to the extent that such participation advances the goals of such 
program.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $2,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to 
carry out this section.

SEC. 144. PILOT PROGRAM TO AUDIT BARRIERS TO COMMERCE IN DEVELOPING 
              PARTNER COUNTRIES.

    (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with 
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, shall establish a pilot program--
            (1) to identify and evaluate barriers to commerce in 
        developing countries that are allies and partners of the United 
        States; and
            (2) to provide assistance to promote economic development 
        and commerce to those countries.
    (b) Purposes.--Under the pilot program established under subsection 
(a), the Secretary shall, in partnership with the countries selected 
under subsection (c)(1)--
            (1) identify barriers in those countries to enhancing 
        international commerce with the goal of setting priorities for 
        the efficient use of United States trade-related assistance;
            (2) focus United States trade-related assistance on 
        building self-sustaining institutional capacity for expanding 
        commerce with those countries, consistent with their 
        international obligations and commitments; and
            (3) further the national interests of the United States 
        by--
                    (A) expanding prosperity through the elimination of 
                foreign barriers to commercial exchange;
                    (B) assisting such countries to identify and reduce 
                barriers through the provision of foreign assistance to 
                increase--
                            (i) international commerce; and
                            (ii) foreign investment;
                    (C) assisting each such country in undertaking 
                reforms that will promote economic development, and 
                promote conditions favorable for business and 
                commercial development and job growth in the country; 
                and
                    (D) assisting private sector entities in those 
                countries to engage in reform efforts and enhance 
                productive global supply chain partnerships with the 
                United States and allies and partners of the United 
                States.
    (c) Selection of Countries.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary shall select countries for 
        participation in the pilot program established under subsection 
        (a) from among countries--
                    (A) that are developing countries and allies and 
                partners of the United States;
                    (B) the governments of which have clearly 
                demonstrated a willingness to make appropriate legal, 
                policy, and regulatory reforms that are proven to 
                stimulate economic growth and job creation, consistent 
                with international trade rules and practices; and
                    (C) that meet such additional criteria as may be 
                established by the Secretary, in consultation with, as 
                appropriate, the Administrator of the United States 
                Agency for International Development and any other 
                agency.
            (2) Considerations for additional criteria.--In 
        establishing additional criteria under paragraph (1)(C), the 
        Secretary and the Administrator shall--
                    (A) identify and address structural weaknesses, 
                systemic flaws, or other impediments within countries 
                that may be considered for participation in the pilot 
                program under subsection (a) that impact the 
                effectiveness of United States assistance to and make 
                recommendations for addressing those weaknesses, flaws, 
                and impediments;
                    (B) set priorities for commercial development 
                assistance building to focus resources on countries 
                where the provision of such assistance can deliver the 
                best value in identifying and eliminating barriers to 
                trade and investment, including by fostering adherence 
                to international trade obligations;
                    (C) developing appropriate performance measures and 
                establishing annual targets to monitor and assess 
                progress toward those targets, including measures to be 
                used to terminate the provision of assistance 
                determined to be ineffective; and
                    (D) ensure representation from across multiple 
                geographic regions.
            (3) Number and deadline for selections.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 270 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 
                thereafter for 3 years, the Secretary, with the 
                concurrence of the Administrator, shall select 
                countries under paragraph (1) for participation in the 
                pilot program under subsection (a).
                    (B) Number.--The Secretary shall select for 
                participation in the pilot program under subsection 
                (a)--
                            (i) not fewer than 5 countries during the 
                        one-year period beginning on the date of the 
                        enactment of this Act; and
                            (ii) not fewer than 15 countries during the 
                        5-year period beginning on such date of 
                        enactment.
            (4) Prioritization based on recommendations from chiefs of 
        mission.--In selecting countries under paragraph (1) for 
        participation in the pilot program under subsection (a), the 
        Secretary shall prioritize--
                    (A) countries recommended by chiefs of mission and 
                other agencies present at the missions, such as the 
                United States Agency for International Development--
                            (i) that will be able to substantially 
                        benefit from expanded commercial development 
                        assistance; and
                            (ii) the governments of which have 
                        demonstrated the political will to effectively 
                        and sustainably implement such assistance; or
                    (B) groups of countries, including groups of 
                geographically contiguous countries, including as 
                recommended by chiefs of mission, that meet the 
                criteria under subparagraph (A) and as a result of 
                expanded United States commercial development 
                assistance, will contribute to greater intra-regional 
                commerce or regional economic integration.
    (d) Plans of Action.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary, in consultation with the 
        Administrator, as appropriate, shall lead in engaging relevant 
        officials of each country selected under subsection (c)(1) to 
        participate in the pilot program under subsection (a) with 
        respect to the development of a plan of action to identify and 
        evaluate barriers to economic and commercial development that 
        then informs United States assistance.
            (2) Analysis required.--The development of a plan of action 
        under paragraph (1) shall include a comprehensive analysis of 
        relevant legal, policy, and regulatory constraints to economic 
        and job growth in that country.
            (3) Elements.--A plan of action developed under paragraph 
        (1) for a country shall include the following:
                    (A) Priorities for reform agreed to by the 
                government of that country and the United States.
                    (B) Clearly defined policy responses, including 
                regulatory and legal reforms, as necessary, to achieve 
                improvement in the business and commercial environment 
                in the country.
                    (C) Identification of the anticipated costs to 
                establish and implement the plan.
                    (D) Identification of appropriate sequencing and 
                phasing of implementation of the plan to create 
                cumulative benefits, as appropriate.
                    (E) Identification of best practices and standards.
                    (F) Considerations with respect to how to make the 
                policy reform investments under the plan long-lasting.
                    (G) Appropriate consultation with affected 
                stakeholders in that country and in the United States.
    (e) Termination.--The pilot program established under subsection 
(a) shall terminate on the date that is 8 years after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.

SEC. 145. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION.

    (a) Strategy.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as determined by the 
Secretary, shall develop, implement, and submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a strategy to increase supply chain resiliency 
and security by promoting and strengthening efforts to incentivize the 
relocation of supply chains from the PRC.
    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall--
            (1) be informed by consultations with the governments of 
        allies and partners of the United States;
            (2) provide a description of how supply chain 
        diversification can be pursued in a complementary fashion to 
        strengthen the national interests of the United States;
            (3) include an assessment of--
                    (A) the status and effectiveness of current efforts 
                by governments, multilateral development banks, and the 
                private sector to attract investment by private 
                entities who are seeking to diversify from reliance on 
                the PRC;
                    (B) major challenges hindering those efforts; and
                    (C) how the United States can strengthen the 
                effectiveness of those efforts;
            (4) identify United States allies and partners with 
        comparative advantages for sourcing and manufacturing critical 
        goods and countries with the greatest opportunities and 
        alignment with United States values;
            (5) identify how activities by the United States Agency for 
        International Development, the United States Trade and 
        Development Administration, and the United States International 
        Development Finance Corporation can effectively be leveraged to 
        strengthen and promote supply chain diversification, including 
        nearshoring to Latin America and the Caribbean as appropriate;
            (6) advance diplomatic initiatives to secure specific 
        national commitments by governments in Latin America and the 
        Caribbean to undertake efforts to create favorable conditions 
        for nearshoring in the region, including commitments--
                    (A) to develop formalized national strategies to 
                attract United States investment;
                    (B) to address corruption and rule of law concerns;
                    (C) to modernize digital and physical 
                infrastructure;
                    (D) to lower trade barriers;
                    (E) to improve ease of doing business; and
                    (F) to finance and incentivize nearshoring 
                initiatives;
            (7) advance diplomatic initiatives towards mutual 
        recognition of standards and regulations, expedite customs 
        operations, and facilitate economic integration and the World 
        Trade Organization Trade Facilitation Agreement; and
            (8) develop and implement programs to finance, incentivize, 
        or otherwise promote supply chain diversification in accordance 
        with the assessments and identifications made pursuant to 
        paragraphs (3), (4), and (5), including, at minimum, programs--
                    (A) to develop physical and digital infrastructure;
                    (B) to promote transparency in procurement 
                processes;
                    (C) to provide technical assistance in implementing 
                national nearshoring strategies;
                    (D) to mobilize private investment; and
                    (E) to secure commitments by private sector 
                entities to relocate supply chains from the PRC.
    (c) Coordination With Multilateral Development Banks.--In 
implementing the strategy required under subsection (a), the Secretary 
of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as 
determined by the Secretary, should, as appropriate, coordinate with 
the United States Executive Director to the World Bank Group and the 
United States executive directors to regional development banks.

SEC. 146. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COMPANIES WITH GLOBAL 
              SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.

    (a) Authorization To Contract Services.--The Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish 
a program to facilitate contracting by the Department of State for the 
professional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee-for-
service basis, to assist interested United States persons, including 
business entities, with supply chain management issues related to the 
PRC, including--
            (1) exiting from the market of the PRC or relocating 
        certain production facilities to locations outside the PRC;
            (2) diversifying sources of inputs and other efforts to 
        diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC;
            (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in 
        the course of activities described in paragraphs (1) and (2); 
        and
            (4) identifying alternative markets for production or 
        sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market 
        intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners 
        as appropriate, and other services.
    (b) Chief of Mission Oversight.--An individual hired to perform 
services described in subsection (a) shall--
            (1) be under the authority of the United States chief of 
        mission in the country in which the individual is hired, in 
        accordance with existing United States laws;
            (2) coordinate with officers of the Department of State and 
        the Department of Commerce; and
            (3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant 
        local partners in other countries as needed to provide those 
        services.
    (c) Prioritization of Micro-, Small-, and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises.--In carrying out the program authorized under subsection 
(a), the Secretary shall prioritize the provision of services described 
in that subsection to assist micro-, small-, and medium-sized 
enterprises with supply chain management issues described in that 
subsection.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of State $15,000,000 for each of fiscal 
years 2025 through 2029 for the purposes of carrying out this section.
    (e) Prohibition on Access to Assistance by the PRC.--
            (1) In general.--None of the funds appropriated pursuant to 
        the authorization of appropriations under subsection (d) may be 
        provided to an entity--
                    (A) under the foreign ownership, control, or 
                influence of the Government of the PRC or the Chinese 
                Communist Party;
                    (B) determined to have beneficial ownership from 
                foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction, 
                direction, or influence of the PRC; or
                    (C) that, at the time any of such funds would be 
                provided, has a contract in effect, or has had a 
                contract in effect in the preceding year, with--
                            (i) the Government of the PRC;
                            (ii) the Chinese Communist Party;
                            (iii) the Chinese military;
                            (iv) an entity majority-owned, majority-
                        controlled, or majority-financed by the 
                        Government of the PRC, the Chinese Communist 
                        Party, or the Chinese military; or
                            (v) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of 
                        an entity specified in any of clauses (i) 
                        through (iv).
            (2) Foreign ownership, control, or influence defined.--In 
        this subsection, the term ``foreign ownership, control, or 
        influence'' has the meaning given that term in the National 
        Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22-M), 
        or a successor document, part 117 of title 32, Code of Federal 
        Regulations (or a successor regulation).

SEC. 147. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON PROMOTING PRIVATE 
              SECTOR FINANCE.

    (a) In General.--The President should work with transatlantic 
partners to enhance coordination that fosters private sector-led 
development and provides market-based alternatives to state-directed 
financing in emerging markets, particularly as related to the PRC's 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initiative 
(GDI), including by supporting efforts, including--
            (1) the 2023 MOU between the Development Finance 
        Corporation and the European Investment Bank;
            (2) the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and 
        Asia;
            (3) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Initiative 
        Investment Fund;
            (4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged 
        $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and emphasizes 
        transparency standards;
            (5) the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and 
        Investment; and
            (6) cooperation with multilateral development banks and 
        international financial institutions, including the World Bank, 
        International Finance Corporation, Asian Development Bank, 
        Inter-American Development Bank, and other regional 
        multilateral development banks.
    (b) Cooperation at the United Nations.--The United States should 
coordinate efforts with the European Union and European countries to 
address the Government of the PRC's use of the United Nations to 
advance and legitimize BRI as a global good, including the 
proliferation of memoranda of understanding between the PRC and United 
Nations funds and programs on BRI implementation.
    (c) Standards.--The United States and the European Union should 
coordinate and develop a strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation 
with the OECD and the Paris Club to provide alternatives to BRI 
projects for the development of critical infrastructure, including by 
enabling developing countries to negotiate more favorable terms that 
meet international performance and transparency standards.

   PART III--COUNTERING EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
                             ORGANIZATIONS

SEC. 151. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND NEW ARRANGEMENTS TO BORROW.

    Section 17(a)(6) of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 U.S.C. 
286e-2(a)(6)) is amended by striking ``December 31, 2025'' and 
inserting ``December 31, 2030''.

SEC. 152. PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States fully supports Taiwan's participation 
        in, and contribution to, international organizations and 
        underscores the importance of the relationship between Taiwan 
        and the United States;
            (2) diversifying the Inter-American Development Bank's 
        donor base and increasing ally engagement in the Western 
        Hemisphere reinforces United States national interests;
            (3) Taiwan's significant contribution to the development 
        and economies of Latin America and the Caribbean demonstrate 
        that Taiwan's membership in the Inter-American Development Bank 
        as a non-borrowing member would benefit the Bank and the entire 
        Latin American and Caribbean region; and
            (4) non-borrowing membership in the Inter-American 
        Development Bank would allow Taiwan to substantially leverage 
        and channel the immense resources Taiwan already provides to 
        Latin America and the Caribbean to reach a larger number of 
        beneficiaries.
    (b) Plan for the Participation of Taiwan in the Inter-American 
Development Bank.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of the Treasury, as appropriate, is authorized--
            (1) to initiate a United States plan to endorse non-
        borrowing membership in the Inter-American Development Bank for 
        Taiwan, including by advancing amendments, as necessary, to the 
        Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, 
        done at Washington April 8, 1959 (10 UST 3029); and
            (2) to instruct the United States Governor of the Bank to 
        work with the Board of Governors of the Bank to admit Taiwan as 
        a non-borrowing member of the Bank, including by advancing 
        amendments, as necessary, to that Agreement.

SEC. 153. INCREASED UNITED STATES COOPERATION WITH ASIA-PACIFIC 
              ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

    The Secretary of State should pursue the following objectives at 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum:
            (1) Improving efficiency in supply chains, particularly 
        semiconductor supply chains.
            (2) Encouraging continued public-private dialogues with 
        policymakers and promoting a common set of technology 
        standards.
            (3) Promoting the development and use of policy 
        recommendations for governments--
                    (A) to adopt clean energy standards; and
                    (B) to support research and development of clean 
                energy, both renewable and non-renewable.
            (4) Advancing cooperation that reduces barriers to cross-
        border investment and creates opportunities for United States 
        small- and medium-sized enterprises to access APEC emerging and 
        growing markets.
            (5) Improving cybersecurity in the Asia-Pacific region and 
        developing tools for governments to combat cyber threats, 
        including ransomware, disinformation, and cyber hacks.
            (6) Increasing coordination in prohibiting and preventing 
        the facilitation of trade in goods produced using forced labor.
            (7) Confronting issues such as intellectual property theft 
        and counterfeit goods.
            (8) Enhancing sufficient and sustainable food security by 
        promoting the development of advanced agricultural technologies 
        and farming practices.
            (9) Expanding the economic opportunities for women to fully 
        and meaningfully engage in a business environment that promotes 
        women's economic participation.

SEC. 154. OPPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES TO AN INCREASE IN THE WEIGHT 
              OF THE CHINESE RENMINBI IN THE SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS 
              BASKET OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the 
United States Governor of, and the United States Executive Director at, 
the International Monetary Fund (in this section referred to as the 
``Fund'') to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any 
increase in the weight of the Chinese renminbi in the basket of 
currencies used to determine the value of Special Drawing Rights, 
unless the Secretary of the Treasury has submitted to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services 
of the House of Representatives a written report that includes an 
assessment that--
            (1) in the 12 months preceding submission of the report--
                    (A) the PRC does not appear, based on publicly 
                available data, to have been in violation of its 
                obligations under Article VIII of the Articles of 
                Agreement of the Fund;
                    (B) the Secretary of the Treasury has not 
                determined under section 3004 of the Omnibus Trade and 
                Competitiveness Act of 1988 (22 U.S.C. 5304) that the 
                PRC has manipulated the rate of exchange between its 
                currency and the United States dollar for purposes of 
                preventing effective balance of payments adjustments or 
                gaining unfair competitive advantage in international 
                trade; and
                    (C) the President, through the Secretary of the 
                Treasury, has not taken an action against the PRC 
                pursuant to section 701 of the Trade Facilitation and 
                Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (19 U.S.C. 4421) for 
                failing to adopt appropriate policies following 
                enhanced bilateral engagement conducted pursuant to 
                that section;
            (2) the renminbi is freely usable (within the meaning of 
        Article XXX(f) of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund); and
            (3) the PRC provides financing assurances and debt 
        treatments consistent with debt sustainability analyses of the 
        Fund for countries participating in the Common Framework for 
        Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative 
        (commonly known as the ``Common Framework'') and debt 
        treatments outside the Common Framework.
    (b) Waiver.--The Secretary of the Treasury may waive any of the 
conditions described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) 
upon certifying to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives 
that such a waiver is in the national interest of the United States.
    (c) Sunset.--Subsection (a) shall have no force or effect on or 
after the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.

        Subtitle C--Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

SEC. 161. DEPARTMENT OF STATE INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION TASK FORCE.

    (a) Establishment.--There is established at the Department of State 
a task force, to be known as the ``Infrastructure Coordination Task 
Force'', which shall be led by an appropriate Senate-confirmed official 
at the Department of State. If the leader of the Task Force is not the 
Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and the 
Environment, then the leader of the task force shall coordinate with 
such Under Secretary on matters related to the task force.
    (b) Duties.--The Infrastructure Coordination Task Force shall--
            (1) coordinate international infrastructure policies and 
        projects supported by the United States Government, with 
        participation by the relevant Federal departments and agencies;
            (2) engage international partners such as the Group of 
        Seven (G7), multilateral development banks, international 
        financial institutions, the United States private sector, 
        multinational corporations and banks, nongovernmental 
        organizations, and other partners in industrialized countries;
            (3) advance United States objectives through initiatives 
        such as the Blue Dot Network, Infrastructure Transaction 
        Assistance Network, the Transaction Advisory Fund, and the 
        Strategic Ports Initiative; and
            (4) produce strategic guidance that identifies 
        international infrastructure projects.

SEC. 162. AUTHORIZATION OF PARTNERSHIP FOR GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
              INVESTMENT.

    (a) Establishment.--There shall be an office at the Department of 
State to support the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and 
Investment, or a successor entity (hereafter, ``the Office''). The 
Office shall be led by a ``Coordinator for Global Infrastructure and 
Investment'' (hereafter, ``the Coordinator'') who shall be an official 
serving in a position to which the individual was appointed by the 
President, with the advice and consent of the United States Senate.
    (b) Authority.--The Coordinator shall have the authority to convene 
the interagency on matters relating to its policy remit. The Office is 
authorized to deploy United States public and private sector capital 
and expertise for the purpose of mobilizing foreign public and private 
sector capital and expertise--
            (1) to help identify and meet the strategic infrastructure 
        needs of countries that are allies and partners of the United 
        States; and
            (2) to provide allies and partners of the United States 
        with mutually beneficial strategic infrastructure investment 
        solutions that are alternatives to exploitative, coercive, or 
        harmful foreign infrastructure investments.
    (c) Prioritization.--In evaluating proposals for strategic 
infrastructure projects funded through the Partnership for Global 
Infrastructure and Investment, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with other departments and agencies as appropriate, should prioritize--
            (1) projects that have the highest strategic value to the 
        United States; and
            (2) projects related to--
                    (A) strategic transport infrastructure, including 
                ports, airports, intermodal transfer facilities, 
                railroads, and highways;
                    (B) energy infrastructure, technology, and supply 
                chains, critical minerals, and related areas that align 
                with the energy needs of partner countries and with the 
                objective of maximizing such countries' energy access, 
                energy security, energy transition and modernization, 
                and resilience needs.
                    (C) secure information and communications 
                technology systems, networks, and infrastructure to 
                strengthen the potential for economic growth and 
                promote an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure 
                Internet; and
                    (D) global health security, including through 
                infrastructure projects that increase the availability, 
                accessibility, and affordability of health care in 
                partner countries.
    (d) Standards.--In carrying out the purposes described in 
subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall adhere to standards for 
sustainable, transparent, and quality infrastructure investment and 
ensure interventions include opportunities to advance economic growth 
priorities in relevant sectors in the partner country and support good 
governance and the rule of law.
    (e) Projects in High-Income Countries.--Support provided by the 
United States under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and 
Investment shall not be provided in countries with high-income 
economies (as those terms are defined by the World Bank) unless the 
Secretary certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that 
such support--
            (1) is necessary to attempt to preempt or counter efforts 
        by a strategic competitor of the United States to secure 
        significant political or economic leverage or acquire national 
        security-sensitive technologies or infrastructure in a country 
        that is an ally or partner of the United States; and
            (2) includes cost-sharing arrangements with partner 
        countries to ensure effective burden-sharing and long-term 
        sustainability, including through the involvement of private 
        sector investments.
    (f) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period 
        of two years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
        Administrator for the United States Agency for International 
        Development and the heads of other Federal departments and 
        agencies, as appropriate, shall submit a report to the 
        appropriate committees of Congress that--
                    (A) identifies all current infrastructure projects 
                supported by the Partnership for Global Infrastructure 
                and Investment;
                    (B) describes how the Partnership for Global 
                Infrastructure and Investment supported each project;
                    (C) explains the rationale of the United States and 
                partner country interests served by the United States 
                providing support to such projects, including as it 
                relates to the priorities described in subsection (c);
                    (D) describes how the Partnership for Global 
                Infrastructure and Investment cooperates with other 
                entities in the United States Government that support 
                infrastructure, including de-confliction of efforts; 
                and
                    (E) to the extent possible, describes the estimated 
                timeline for completion of the projects supported by 
                the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and 
                Investment.
            (2) Form of report.--The report required under paragraph 
        (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
        classified annex.

SEC. 163. INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSACTION AND ASSISTANCE NETWORK.

    (a) Authority.--There is established an initiative, to be known as 
the ``Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network'', under which 
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Development and the heads of 
other relevant Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall carry out 
programs to advance the development of sustainable, transparent, and 
quality infrastructure globally in countries that are eligible for 
foreign assistance, by--
            (1) strengthening the capacities of United States allies 
        and partners to improve infrastructure project evaluation 
        processes, regulatory and procurement environments, and 
        infrastructure project preparation;
            (2) providing transaction advisory services and project 
        preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure; 
        and
            (3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance 
        for the development of infrastructure, including infrastructure 
        that utilizes United States-manufactured goods and services, 
        and catalyzing investment led by the private sector.
    (b) Transaction Advisory Fund.--As part of the Infrastructure 
Transaction and Assistance Network described under subsection (a), the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Development, and in 
consultation, as appropriate, with other Federal departments and 
agencies, shall provide support, including through the Transaction 
Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost the capacity of 
partner countries globally to evaluate contracts in line with 
international standards, including through providing services such as--
            (1) legal services, including with the objectives of--
                    (A) minimizing opportunities for corrupt practices; 
                and
                    (B) ensuring agreements are transparent, clear, and 
                enforceable;
            (2) project preparation and feasibility studies;
            (3) debt sustainability analyses;
            (4) bid or proposal evaluation; and
            (5) other services relevant to advancing the development of 
        sustainable, transparent, and quality infrastructure.
    (c) Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure Fund.--
            (1) In general.--As part of the ``Infrastructure 
        Transaction and Assistance Network'' described under subsection 
        (a), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, 
        including through the Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure 
        Fund, for technical assistance, project preparation, 
        development, and execution, and other infrastructure project 
        support in the countries of the Indo-Pacific region.
            (2) Joint infrastructure projects.--Funds authorized for 
        the Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used 
        in coordination with the Department of Defense, the 
        International Development Finance Corporation, the Export-
        Import Bank of the United States, the United States Trade and 
        Development Agency, like-minded donor partners, and 
        multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support joint 
        infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (3) Strategic infrastructure projects.--Funds authorized 
        for the Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be 
        used to support strategic infrastructure projects.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029, $50,000,000 
for the Transaction Advisory Fund and $100,000,000 for the Indo-Pacific 
Strategic Infrastructure Fund.

SEC. 164. STRATEGIC PORTS INITIATIVE.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, the Chief Executive Officer of United States International 
Development Finance Corporation, the Trade and Development Agency, and 
other relevant Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall 
carry out a program entitled the ``Strategic Ports Initiative'' for the 
following purposes:
            (1) To provide training and technical assistance to partner 
        country officials and institutions, and others, as appropriate, 
        responsible for building, managing, and securing seaports, 
        airports, and related infrastructure abroad.
            (2) To identify ports and airports vulnerable to ownership 
        or other forms of control by strategic competitors, including 
        the PRC, and make recommendations for United States Government 
        action.
            (3) To contribute to United States Government diplomatic 
        engagements and other efforts with partner countries and 
        economies, and relevant and trusted private sector entities 
        with respect to ownership or control of seaports and airports 
        by strategic competitors, including the PRC.
            (4) To generate priority countries and projects for United 
        States assistance and investment, including through 
        coordination with the Infrastructure Coordination Task Force 
        established pursuant to section 161.
            (5) To ensure that all Department of State initiatives, 
        activities, and funding related to seaports and airports align 
        with the national security interests of the United States and 
        account for the vulnerabilities, technical constraints, and 
        other national security implications of seaport and airport 
        infrastructure to construction, ownership, operation, or other 
        forms of direct and indirect control by strategic competitors, 
        including the PRC.
            (6) To ensure, to the greatest extent practicable, that 
        projects supported by the United States use local labor and 
        professional capacities, in contrast to infrastructure projects 
        carried out by the PRC.
            (7) To assist in identifying and promoting alternatives for 
        port logistics data management systems currently offered by 
        strategic competitors, including the PRC.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029, $6,000,000 to 
carry out the purposes of the Strategic Ports Initiative.

SEC. 165. NEXT-GENERATION SHIPPING.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State is authorized to carry out 
the following activities to support the development of next-generation 
shipping corridors or green shipping corridors:
            (1) Conduct analysis to determine United States priorities 
        for cooperation with partner countries on next-generation 
        shipping corridors or green shipping corridors.
            (2) Support research and development initiatives and 
        technical assistance, as appropriate, in the following areas:
                    (A) Next-generation port design, engineering, and 
                architecture.
                    (B) Hydrogen fuel production and hydrogen fuel 
                storage and utilization capacities at ports.
                    (C) Commercial-scale high-speed electric vehicle 
                trucking fleet charging infrastructure.
                    (D) Logistics and shipping corridor planning.
                    (E) Hydrogen pipelines.
                    (F) Liquid hydrogen power vessels, and other next-
                generation marine propulsion systems, design and 
                manufacturing, including both new vessels and retrofit 
                and refurbishment of existing vessels.
            (3) Support private sector investment in next-generation 
        shipping infrastructure in partner countries with strong or 
        emerging commercial ties with the United States that--
                    (A) are strategically or centrally located markets 
                in international commerce; or
                    (B) face growing or concerning financial 
                entanglements with malign foreign governments.
    (b) Parameters.--In carrying out activities authorized under 
subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall ensure that all activities 
align with the national security interests of the United States and the 
purposes of the Strategic Ports Initiative authorized pursuant to 
section 164.
    (c) International Maritime Organization.--The United States shall 
use its voice, vote, and influence in the International Maritime 
Organization to-
            (1) counter any attempts by the PRC or other strategic 
        competitors to advance or advocate for policies, regulations, 
        or technical standards that unfairly benefit particular 
        countries and their domestic industries and products to the 
        detriment of free and fair markets;
            (2) advocate for the adoption of next-generation shipping 
        industry technologies and infrastructure standards, policies, 
        regulations and cooperation initiatives that advance United 
        States national and economic security interests;
            (3) participate in the International Maritime 
        Organization's global technical cooperation projects to support 
        growing the capacity of parties to develop and modernize global 
        shipping industries technologies and infrastructure; and
            (4) represent the interests of United States stakeholders 
        impacted by International Maritime Organization initiatives.
    (d) Limitation.--Prior to providing funding for activities to 
support the establishment and development of next-generation shipping 
corridors or green shipping corridors, the Department of State shall 
obtain commitments from participating countries in the following areas:
            (1) Prohibiting exclusivity or preferences for specific 
        international shipping routes, including exclusive access for 
        specific vessels, fleets, or maritime shipping companies of the 
        PRC.
            (2) Preventing the sale, lease, or operational control of 
        port operations, or any subsidiary operations, including 
        security, communications and information technology, or energy 
        suppliers to entities owned or controlled by the PRC.
            (3) Prohibiting the use of, or contracts with 
        communications, survey, and logistics management providers 
        owned or controlled by the PRC.
            (4) Maintaining transparent and accountable security 
        operations that are not contracted to entities owned or 
        controlled by the PRC.
            (5) Ensuring that ports do not serve as ports of call for 
        PRC military or research vessels.
            (6) Ensuring that ports are operated in a transparent and 
        accountable manner, consistent with domestic and applicable 
        international law.
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $120,000,000 over the next three fiscal years to carry out 
activities under this section.

SEC. 166. GLOBAL STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT FUND.

    (a) Strategic Infrastructure Investment Fund.--
            (1) Establishment.--There is established in the Treasury of 
        the United States a fund to be known as the ``Global Strategic 
        Infrastructure Fund'' (in this section referred to as the 
        ``Fund'') for the Secretary of State to provide for assistance, 
        including through contributions for strategic infrastructure 
        projects globally as authorized under this section.
            (2) Appropriations.--In addition to amounts otherwise 
        available for such purposes, there is appropriated to the Fund 
        established in subsection (a)(1), out of amounts in the 
        Treasury not otherwise appropriated--
                    (A) for fiscal year 2025, $400,000,000, to remain 
                available until expended;
                    (B) for fiscal year 2026, $400,000,000, to remain 
                available until expended;
                    (C) for fiscal year 2027, $400,000,000, to remain 
                available until expended;
                    (D) for fiscal year 2028, $400,000,000, to remain 
                available until expended; and
                    (E) for fiscal year 2029, $400,000,000, to remain 
                available until expended.
            (3) Transfer authority.--Amounts in the Fund shall be 
        transferred and merged with accounts within the Department of 
        State, the United States Agency for International Development, 
        the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the United States 
        International Development Finance Corporation, the Millennium 
        Challenge Corporation, and the United States Trade and 
        Development Agency, as appropriate, to be used for such 
        purposes.
            (4) Consultation.--The Secretary of State shall consult 
        with the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
        International Development on the allocations of the Fund.
            (5) Loans and loan guarantees.--Amounts transferred from 
        the Fund to the Export-Import Bank and the United States 
        International Development Finance Corporation, among other 
        purposes, may be made available for the costs of direct loans 
        and loan guarantees, including the cost of modifying such loans 
        and loan guarantees, as defined in section 502 of the 
        Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 661a).
    (b) Prioritization.--In evaluating proposals for strategic 
infrastructure projects funded pursuant to subsection (a), the 
Secretary of State shall prioritize--
            (1) projects that have the highest strategic value to the 
        United States; and
            (2) projects related to--
                    (A) strategic transport infrastructure, including 
                ports, airports, railroads, and highways;
                    (B) energy infrastructure, technology, and supply 
                chains, critical minerals, and related areas that align 
                with the officially conveyed energy needs of partner 
                countries and with the objective of maximizing such 
                countries' energy access, energy security, energy 
                transition, and resilience needs;
                    (C) secure information and communications 
                technology networks and infrastructure to strengthen 
                the potential for economic growth and to promote an 
                open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet; and
                    (D) global health security, including through 
                infrastructure projects that increase the availability, 
                accessibility, and affordability of health care in 
                partner countries.
    (c) Standards.--In evaluating proposals for strategic 
infrastructure projects funded pursuant to subsection (a), the 
Secretary of State shall adhere to standards for sustainable, 
transparent, and quality infrastructure investment and ensure projects 
include opportunities to advance economic growth priorities in the 
partner country and support good governance and the rule of law.
    (d) Projects in High Income Countries.--Support provided under the 
Fund shall not be provided in countries with high-income economies (as 
those terms are defined by the World Bank) unless the President 
certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such 
support--
            (1) is necessary to preempt or counter efforts by a 
        strategic competitor of the United States to secure significant 
        political or economic leverage or acquire national security-
        sensitive technologies or infrastructure in a country that is 
        an ally or partner of the United States; and
            (2) includes cost-sharing arrangements with partner 
        countries to ensure effective burden-sharing and long-term 
        sustainability.

SEC. 167. MODIFICATIONS OF REQUIREMENTS TO BECOME A MILLENNIUM 
              CHALLENGE CORPORATION CANDIDATE COUNTRY.

    (a) Candidate Country Qualifications.--Section 606 of the 
Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7705) is amended to read as 
follows:

``SEC. 606. CANDIDATE COUNTRIES.

    ``(a) In General.--A country shall be a candidate country for 
purposes of eligibility to receive assistance under section 605 if--
            ``(1) the per capita income of the country in a fiscal year 
        is equal to or less than the World Bank threshold for 
        initiating the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
        Development graduation process for the fiscal year; and
            ``(2) subject to subsection (b), the country is not 
        ineligible to receive United States economic assistance under 
        part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et 
        seq.) by reason of the application of any provision of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or any other provision of law.
    ``(b) Rule of Construction.--For the purposes of determining 
whether a country is eligible, pursuant to subsection (a)(2), to 
receive assistance under section 605, the exercise by the President, 
the Secretary of State, or any other officer or employee of the United 
States Government of any waiver or suspension of any provision of law 
referred to in subsection (a)(2), and notification to the appropriate 
congressional committees in accordance with such provision of law, 
shall be construed as satisfying the requirements under subsection (a).
    ``(c) Determination by the Board.--The Board shall determine 
whether a country is a candidate country for purposes of this 
section.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--
            (1) Amendment to report identifying candidate countries.--
        Section 608(a)(1) of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 
        U.S.C. 7707(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``section 
        606(a)(1)(B)'' and inserting ``section 606(a)(2)''.
            (2) Amendment to millennium challenge compact authority.--
        Section 609(b)(2) of such Act ( 22 U.S.C. 7708(b)(2)) is 
        amended--
                    (A) by amending the paragraph heading to read as 
                follows: ``Country contributions''; and
                    (B) by striking ``with respect to a lower middle 
                income country described in section 606(b),''.
            (3) Amendment to authorization to provide assistance for 
        candidate countries.--Section 616(b)(1) of such Act ( 22 U.S.C. 
        7715(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``subsection (a) or (b) of 
        section 606'' and inserting ``section 606(a)''.
    (c) Modification to Factors in Determining Eligibility.--Section 
607(c)(2) of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 
7706(c)(2)) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by 
striking ``consider'' and inserting ``prioritize need and impact by 
considering''.

SEC. 168. AFRICA ENERGY SECURITY AND DIVERSIFICATION.

    Section 3 of the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-121; 
22 U.S.C. 2293 note) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (8), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
        semicolon;
            (2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting a semicolon; and
            (3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following new 
        paragraphs:
            ``(10) advance United States foreign policy and development 
        goals by assisting African countries to reduce their dependence 
        on countries that use energy dependence for political 
        influence, such as the Russian Federation or the People's 
        Republic of China, which have used energy and financial 
        resources to influence other countries;
            ``(11) promote the energy security and domestic energy 
        resource mobilization of allies and partners of the United 
        States in Africa by--
                    ``(A) encouraging the development of accessible, 
                transparent, and competitive energy markets that 
                provide diversified sources and reliable and affordable 
                power, including civil nuclear energy;
                    ``(B) promoting domestic energy resource 
                mobilization, advancing regulatory reforms in the 
                energy sector, and supporting grid modernization and 
                energy storage deployment efforts; and
                    ``(C) facilitating the efforts of partner countries 
                to meet their goals and commitments related to energy 
                resource production and consumption;
            ``(12) encourage United States public and private sector 
        investment in African energy infrastructure projects to bridge 
        the gap between energy security requirements and commercial 
        demand in a way that is consistent with the region's capacity 
        and the goals and commitments of partner countries; and
            ``(13) help facilitate the trade and cooperation on energy 
        production, advance energy technology development and 
        deployment, and provide technical assistance to build 
        capacities on regulatory improvements and greater expertise on 
        global markets in a way that benefits the energy security of 
        allies and partners of the United States, including in 
        Africa.''.

SEC. 169. ENHANCING RESILIENT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE PACIFIC 
              ISLANDS.

    (a) Program.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State, in coordination 
        with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and 
        agencies, as appropriate, shall develop and implement a 
        strategy for the expansion, improvement, and protection of 
        resilient critical infrastructure in the Pacific Islands.
            (2) Elements.--The strategy and related programming under 
        paragraph (1) shall--
                    (A) consider the--
                            (i) current and forecasted gaps in 
                        functionality of, and threats to, critical 
                        infrastructure in the Pacific Islands, 
                        including--
                                    (I) for disaster preparedness and 
                                response, transport connectivity, 
                                operability of health systems, 
                                information and communications 
                                technology, food security, coastal zone 
                                management, marine and water resource 
                                management, and energy security and 
                                access to electricity; and
                                    (II) to the extent practicable, the 
                                rates, severity and drivers of 
                                deterioration, structural deficiencies, 
                                and most pressing threats to public 
                                safety from aging, at-risk, and failing 
                                infrastructure;
                            (ii) United States national security risks 
                        posed by weak, outdated, at-risk, and failing 
                        critical infrastructure in the Pacific Islands, 
                        with particular consideration for the 
                        interconnectedness of supply chains, 
                        interconnected transportation networks, 
                        technology, communications, and financial 
                        systems; and
                            (iii) the policy-enabling environment for 
                        public and private sector investment in 
                        critical infrastructure in the Pacific Islands, 
                        including through local resource mobilization, 
                        early stage project preparation, development 
                        finance, and foreign direct investment;
                    (B) seek to enhance the ability of Pacific 
                Islanders, including governments at the national and 
                local levels, civil society leaders, and private sector 
                partners, to attract and effectively manage public and 
                private investment in critical infrastructure while 
                resisting predatory lending and resource extraction 
                deals by malign actors;
                    (C) identify priorities for critical infrastructure 
                improvement, reinforcement, re-engineering, or 
                replacement based on the significance of such 
                infrastructure to ensuring public health, safety, and 
                economic growth;
                    (D) support investment and improvement in natural 
                resource management and conservation;
                    (E) include recommendations for policy and 
                governance reforms in the Pacific Islands, as necessary 
                and appropriate, to strengthen critical infrastructure 
                resilience; and
                    (F) support trainings and information sharing, 
                technology exchanges, reverse trade missions, and pilot 
                projects that provide Pacific Islanders with access to 
                proven, cost-effective solutions for mitigating the 
                risks associated with critical infrastructure 
                vulnerabilities and related interdependencies.
    (b) Coordination.--The program developed under this section should 
be coordinated with like-minded allies, partners, and regional and 
international organizations to encourage alignment of efforts and to 
avoid duplicative investments and programming.
    (c) Disaster Preparedness.--The Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development, in consultation with the relevant 
Federal departments and agencies with technical and practical 
expertise, shall work with Pacific Island countries to--
            (1) provide technical assistance, education, and training, 
        including through grants and cooperative agreements for 
        qualified United States and local nongovernmental 
        organizations, to enhance early warning systems, emergency 
        management and preparedness procedures, and post-disaster 
        relief and recovery; and
            (2) enhance coordination of existing disaster mitigation 
        and response plans in the Pacific Islands region, including by 
        United States allies and partners in the region.
    (d) International Financial Institutions.--The Secretary of the 
Treasury shall direct the representatives of the United States to the 
World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian 
Development Bank to use the voice and vote of the United States to 
support sustainable, resilient, and high quality infrastructure 
projects in the Pacific Islands.

SEC. 170. OCEANIA RESTORATION AND HAZARDS REMOVAL PROGRAM.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall establish an Oceania 
Restoration and Hazards Removal Program (in this section referred to as 
the ``Program'').
    (b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Program is--
            (1) to coordinate with the countries of Oceania--
                    (A) to support survey and clearance operations of 
                buried and abandoned bombs, mortars, artillery shells, 
                and unexploded ordnance from battlefields of World War 
                II; and
                    (B) to identify, isolate, and where appropriate, 
                mitigate environmental risks associated with submerged 
                maritime vessels that pose a threat to public health or 
                marine resources because of the presence of oil, fuel, 
                corrosive metals, or other toxins; and
            (2) to build the national capacity of the countries of 
        Oceania to identify, isolate, and mitigate risks related to 
        explosive ordnance hazards, submerged maritime vessels, or 
        related hazardous marine debris through survey and disposal 
        training, funding to relevant nongovernmental organizations, 
        and support to regional cooperation initiatives with countries 
        that are allies and partners of the United States, including 
        Australia, France, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, 
        and the United Kingdom.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Secretary of State $1,000,000 for each of fiscal 
years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section.

SEC. 171. COORDINATION WITH OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES AND COOPERATION AND 
              PARTICIPATION OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES.

    The Federal officials responsible for carrying out policies and 
actions under sections 168 and 169 should, as appropriate--
            (1) coordinate with existing programs and efforts of 
        relevant agencies of the United States Government, including 
        with regard to the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the 
        Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau;
            (2) seek the cooperation and participation of United States 
        private sector, United States nongovernmental organizations, 
        and United States institutions of higher education; and
            (3) work with civil society organizations and other 
        relevant stakeholders in Pacific Island countries, as 
        appropriate.

SEC. 172. FINDINGS RELATED TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S 
              INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) State-owned enterprises of the PRC are subject to the 
        direction of both the state and the Chinese Communist Party 
        (CCP), and the CCP strives to increase their influence over the 
        global economy by pursuing predatory and exploitative trade, 
        economic, and industrial practices designed to out-compete the 
        United States and other market economies.
            (2) The PRC's control of key components of critical global 
        supply chains, including critical minerals, semiconductors, 
        batteries, solar panels, and pharmaceuticals, as outlined in 
        the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's February 
        2023 ``Annual Threat Assessment'', represents a direct threat 
        to United States national security and harms global economic 
        competition.
            (3) The CCP's industrial strategy, as articulated in the 
        Made in China 2025 plan, aims to dominate global manufacturing 
        in crucial energy technologies, including advanced materials, 
        batteries, and power equipment.
            (4) The PRC, by far the world's largest polluter, accounts 
        for approximately \1/3\ of global carbon dioxide 
        (CO<INF>2</INF>) emissions according to the International 
        Energy Administration and subsidizes its industries, 
        manufacturers, and exports by neither implementing nor 
        enforcing adequate environmental or labor protection standards.
            (5) The PRC's industrial sectors like agriculture, mining, 
        automotive production, and computer and electronics 
        manufacturing emit 3 times more carbon dioxide as compared to 
        the United States' same industrial sectors, and nearly 2 times 
        more carbon dioxide than the global average of the production 
        of comparable goods in other foreign countries, according to 
        industry tracking data from the International Energy Agency.
            (6) The CCP seeks to utilize the Belt and Road Initiative 
        (BRI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI) to increase 
        the dependence of low-income and lower-middle income countries 
        in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas on the PRC at the 
        expense of trapping such countries in long-term, high-
        polluting, debt-ridden, low-quality infrastructure projects 
        that undermine developing countries' efforts to sustainably 
        grow and industrialize their economies to maximize benefits and 
        participation for their citizenry, while increasing global 
        pollution.
            (7) The United States--
                    (A) has adopted many environmental protections, 
                including the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.), 
                the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1251 
                et seq.), the Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. 
                2601 et seq.), and more than 15 other major 
                environmental protection laws that--
                            (i) add costs to the production of goods in 
                        order to secure the benefits of environmental 
                        protection and conservation efforts; and
                            (ii) serve to meaningfully decrease 
                        greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide 
                        (CO<INF>2</INF>), methane (CH<INF>4</INF>), 
                        nitrous oxide (N<INF>2</INF>O), sulfur 
                        hexafluoride (SF<INF>6</INF>), 
                        hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons 
                        (PFCs), and other fluorinated greenhouse gases;
                    (B) is the world's largest consumer market and its 
                economy is highly integrated into the world; and
                    (C) bears responsibility to ensure that the United 
                States market does not incentivize forum shopping for 
                the production of goods to jurisdictions with low 
                environmental standards to obtain a competitive cost 
                advantage while undermining efforts to address 
                transnational environmental and resource challenges as 
                well as global public health.
            (8) Any realistic pathway to substantially reduce global 
        carbon emissions will require the PRC to be held accountable 
        for its role as the world's largest polluter.

SEC. 173. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES TO THE BELT 
              AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE.

    (a) In General.--The President should seek opportunities to partner 
with multilateral development finance institutions to develop financing 
tools based on shared development finance criteria and mechanisms to 
support investments in developing countries that--
            (1) support low carbon economic development; and
            (2) promote resiliency and adaptation to environmental 
        changes.
    (b) Partnership.--The Chief Executive Officer of the United States 
International Development Finance Corporation should seek to partner 
with other multilateral development finance institutions and 
development finance institutions to leverage the respective available 
funds to support low carbon economic development, which may include 
nuclear energy projects, environmental adaptation, and resilience 
activities in developing countries.
    (c) Joint Cooperation on Infrastructure Projects.--
            (1) Joint support.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary 
        of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
        International Development, and other relevant agency heads may 
        co-finance, or provide joint support for, infrastructure 
        projects that advance the development of the United States 
        overseas and provide viable alternatives to projects that would 
        otherwise be included within the PRC's Belt and Initiative and 
        Global Development Initiative.
            (2) Conditions.--Co-financing agreements and arrangements 
        authorized pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be approved 
        unless--
                    (A) the projects to be financed--
                            (i) promote the public good; and
                            (ii) will have substantially lower 
                        environmental impact than the proposed Belt and 
                        Road Initiative and Global Development 
                        Initiative alternative; and
                    (B) the appropriate committees of Congress are 
                notified not later than 15 days in advance of entering 
                into such co-financing arrangements.

SEC. 174. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO SECURE CRITICAL MINERAL SUPPLY 
              CHAINS.

    (a) Statement of Policy on Critical Mineral Supply Chains.--It is 
the policy of the United States--
            (1) to collaborate with allies and partners of the United 
        States to build secure and resilient critical minerals supply 
        chains, including in the mining, processing, and valuation of 
        critical minerals, as well as with respect to advanced 
        manufacturing that includes critical minerals;
            (2) to prioritize the development and production of 
        critical minerals domestically, both to supply domestic needs 
        and for export to allies and partners that participate in 
        secure and resilient supply chains for critical minerals;
            (3) to reduce or eliminate reliance and dependence on 
        critical mineral supply chains controlled by the PRC, the 
        Russian Federation, Iran, or any other adversary of the United 
        States;
            (4) to work with allies and partners on enhancing 
        evaluation capability and technology in trusted countries that 
        produce critical minerals to avoid the export of mined and 
        processed critical minerals to adversaries of the United 
        States;
            (5) to identify and implement market-based incentives for 
        the purposes of facilitating the creation and maintenance of 
        secure and resilient critical mineral supply chains in 
        collaboration with allies and partners;
            (6) to prioritize securing critical mineral supply chains 
        in United States foreign policy, including through the use of 
        economic tools to invest responsibly in projects in partner 
        countries in a manner that both benefits local populations and 
        bolsters the supply of critical minerals to the United States 
        and allies and partners of the United States; and
            (7) that collaboration with allies and partners to build 
        secure and resilient critical mineral supply chains shall not 
        replace United States efforts to increase domestic development 
        and production of critical minerals.
    (b) International Negotiations Relating to Protecting Critical 
Mineral Supply Chains.--
            (1) In general.--The President is authorized to negotiate 
        an agreement with international partners for the purposes of 
        establishing a coalition--
                    (A) to facilitate--
                            (i) the mining, processing, and supply of 
                        critical minerals; and
                            (ii) advanced manufacturing that includes 
                        critical minerals; and
                    (B) to secure an adequate supply of critical 
                minerals and relevant products, manufacturing inputs, 
                and components that are heavily dependent on critical 
                mineral resources for the United States and other 
                members of the coalition (in this subsection referred 
                to as ``member countries'').
            (2) Negotiating objectives.--The overall objectives for 
        negotiating an agreement described in paragraph (1) should be--
                    (A) to establish mechanisms for member countries to 
                build secure and resilient supply chains for critical 
                minerals, including in--
                            (i) the mining, refinement, processing, and 
                        valuation of critical minerals; and
                            (ii) advanced manufacturing of products, 
                        components, and materials that are dependent on 
                        critical minerals;
                    (B) to improve economies of scale and joint 
                cooperation with international partners in securing 
                access and means of production throughout the supply 
                chains of critical minerals and manufacturing processes 
                dependent on critical minerals;
                    (C) to establish mechanisms, with appropriate 
                market-based disciplines, that provide and maintain 
                opportunities among member countries for creating 
                industry economies of scale to attract joint investment 
                among those countries, including--
                            (i) cooperation on joint projects, 
                        including cost-sharing on building appropriate 
                        infrastructure to access deposits of critical 
                        minerals; and
                            (ii) creation or enhancement of national 
                        and international programs to support the 
                        development of robust industries by providing 
                        appropriate sector-specific incentives, such as 
                        political risk and other insurance 
                        opportunities, financing, and other support, 
                        for--
                                    (I) mining and processing critical 
                                minerals;
                                    (II) manufacturing of products, 
                                components, and materials that are 
                                dependent on critical minerals and are 
                                essential to consumer technology 
                                products or have important national 
                                security implications; and
                                    (III) associated transportation 
                                needs that are tailored to the 
                                handling, movement, and logistics 
                                management of critical minerals and 
                                products, components, and materials 
                                that are dependent on critical 
                                minerals;
                    (D) to establish market-based rules for member 
                countries regarding adoption of qualifying tax and 
                other incentives to stimulate investment, as balanced 
                by market-based disciplines to ensure a fair playing 
                field among those countries;
                    (E) to establish recommended best practices to 
                protect--
                            (i) labor rights;
                            (ii) the natural environment and ecosystems 
                        near critical mineral industrial sites; and
                            (iii) safety of communities near critical 
                        mineral industrial activities;
                    (F) to advance economic growth in developing 
                countries with critical mineral reserves, including for 
                the benefit of the citizens of those countries;
                    (G) to establish rules allowing for the 
                establishment of a consortium that is resourced and 
                empowered to bid and compete in acquiring and securing 
                potential deposits of critical minerals in countries 
                that are not members of the coalition described in 
                paragraph (1) (in this subsection referred to as 
                ``nonmember countries'');
                    (H) to establish a mechanism for joint resource 
                mapping with procedures for equitable sharing of 
                information on potential deposits of critical minerals 
                not less frequently than annually;
                    (I) to establish appropriate mechanisms for the 
                recognition and enforcement by a member country of 
                judgments relating to environmental and related harms 
                caused by mining operations within such member country 
                in contravention of that country's laws; and
                    (J) to improve supply chain security among member 
                countries by providing for national treatment 
                investment protections among those countries that are 
                equal to, or better than, the standards in the United 
                States model bilateral investment treaty.
    (c) Minerals Security Partnership Authorization.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State, acting through the 
        Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the 
        Environment, is authorized to lead United States participation 
        in the ``Minerals Security Partnership'', for the following 
        purposes:
                    (A) To identify and support investment and advocate 
                for commercial critical mineral mining, processing, and 
                refining projects that enable robust and secure 
                critical mineral supply chains, in consultation with 
                other Federal agencies, as appropriate.
                    (B) To coordinate with relevant regional bureaus to 
                develop regional diplomatic engagement strategies 
                related to critical minerals projects and to identify 
                projects that are priorities.
                    (C) To coordinate with United States missions 
                abroad on projects, programs, and investments that 
                enable robust and secure critical mineral supply 
                chains.
                    (D) To coordinate with current and prospective 
                members of the Minerals Security Partnership.
                    (E) To establish a mechanism for information-
                sharing with members of the Minerals Security 
                Partnership.
                    (F) To establish policies and procedures, and if 
                necessary, to provide funding to facilitate cooperation 
                on joint projects with members of the Minerals Security 
                Partnership and the Mineral Security Forum, including 
                those related to cost-sharing agreements, political 
                risk insurance, financing, equity investments, and 
                other support, in coordination with other Federal 
                agencies, as appropriate.
                    (G) If an agreement described in subsection (b) is 
                entered into, to support the establishment of the 
                coalition described in that subsection.
            (2) Database.--As part of the Minerals Security 
        Partnership, the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary, 
        is authorized to establish and maintain a database of critical 
        mineral projects for the purpose of providing high quality and 
        up-to-date information to the private sector in order to spur 
        greater investment, increase the resilience of global critical 
        minerals supply chains, and boost United States supply.
            (3) Qualifications for personnel.--With respect to staffing 
        personnel to carry out the Minerals Security Partnership, the 
        Secretary shall prioritize individuals with the following 
        qualifications:
                    (A) Substantive knowledge and experience in issues 
                related to critical minerals supply chain and their 
                application to strategic industries, including in the 
                defense, energy, and technology sectors.
                    (B) Substantive knowledge and experience in large-
                scale multi-donor project financing and related 
                technical and diplomatic arrangements, international 
                coalition-building, and project management.
                    (C) Substantive knowledge and experience in trade 
                and foreign policy, defense-industrial base policy, or 
                national security-sensitive supply chain issues.
            (4) Private sector coordination.--The Secretary of State 
        shall ensure close coordination between the Department of 
        State, the private sector, and relevant civil society groups on 
        the implementation of this subsection.
            (5) Project selection.--
                    (A) In general.--The United States, through its 
                participation in the Minerals Security Partnership, 
                shall prioritize projects that advance the national and 
                economic security interests of the United States and 
                allies and partners of the United States.
                    (B) Criteria requirements.--The United States 
                should advocate for the Minerals Security Partnership 
                to use environmental, social, or governance standards, 
                including as criteria for project selection, that are 
                consistent with United States law or international 
                agreements approved by Congress.
    (d) United States Membership in the International Nickel Study 
Group.--
            (1) United states membership.--The President is authorized 
        to accept the Terms of Reference of and maintain membership of 
        the United States in the International Nickel Study Group 
        (INSG).
            (2) Payments of assessed contributions.--For fiscal year 
        2024 and thereafter, the United States assessed contributions 
        to the INSG may be paid from funds appropriated for 
        ``Contributions to International Organizations''.
    (e) Critical Mineral Defined.--In this section, the term ``critical 
mineral''--
            (1) has the meaning given the term in section 7002 of the 
        Energy Act of 2020 (30 U.S.C. 1606); and
            (2) includes any other mineral or mineral material 
        determined by the Secretary of State--
                    (A) to be essential to the economic or national 
                security of the United States; and
                    (B) to have a supply chain vulnerable to 
                disruption.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of State $75,000,000 for fiscal year 
2025 to enhance critical mineral supply chain security, including to 
implement this section.

            Subtitle D--Digital Technology and Connectivity

SEC. 176. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY FOR CRITICAL AND EMERGING 
              TECHNOLOGY.

    (a) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish an Office of the 
Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology (referred to in this 
section as the ``Office''), which may be located within the Bureau for 
Cyberspace and Digital Policy.
    (b) Leadership.--
            (1) Special envoy.--The Office shall be headed by a Special 
        Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology, who shall--
                    (A) be appointed by the President, by and with the 
                advice and consent of the Senate;
                    (B) have the rank and status of ambassador; and
                    (C) report to the Ambassador-at-Large for 
                Cyberspace and Digital Policy.
    (c) Membership.--The Office may include representatives or expert 
detailees from other key Federal agencies or research and technology-
focused fellowship programs, as determined by the Special Envoy for 
Critical and Emerging Technology and with the consent of the 
Ambassador-at-Large for Cyberspace and Digital Policy, in coordination 
with relevant Department stakeholders and appropriate senior officials 
of the Department of State and such agencies.
    (d) Purposes.--The purposes of the Office are to assist the 
Secretary of State in the coordination of Department and interagency 
action in support of the functions described in subsection (e).
    (e) Critical and Emerging Functions.--The Secretary of State 
shall--
            (1) establish, in coordination with relevant bureaus, 
        offices and other Federal agencies, an interagency security 
        review process for proposals regarding United States 
        Government-funded international collaboration on certain 
        critical and emerging technologies and associated research;
            (2) establish and coordinate an interagency strategy to 
        facilitate international cooperation with United States allies 
        and partners regarding the development, use, and deployment of 
        certain critical and emerging technologies and associated 
        standards and safeguards for research security, intellectual 
        property protection, and illicit knowledge transfer;
            (3) facilitate technology partnerships with countries and 
        relevant political and economic unions that are committed to--
                    (A) the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
                including freedom of speech, and expression;
                    (B) the safe and responsible development and use of 
                certain critical and emerging technologies and the 
                establishment of related norms and standards, including 
                for research security and the protection of sensitive 
                data and technology;
                    (C) a secure internet architecture governed by a 
                multi-stakeholder model instead of centralized 
                government control;
                    (D) robust international cooperation to promote 
                open and interoperable technological products and 
                services that are necessary to freedom, innovation, 
                transparency, and privacy; and
                    (E) strengthening multilateral coordination on 
                certain critical and emerging technologies, as defined 
                in subsection (f), in coordination with relevant 
                Department stakeholders and bureaus, including through 
                diplomatic initiatives, information sharing, and other 
                activities, to defend the principles described in 
                subparagraphs (A) through (D) against efforts by state 
                and non-state actors to undermine them;
            (4) support efforts to harmonize critical and emerging 
        technology governance regimes with partners, coordinating on 
        basic and pre-competitive research and development initiatives, 
        and collaborating to pursue such opportunities in certain 
        critical and emerging technologies;
            (5) coordinate with other technology partners on export 
        control policies for certain critical and emerging 
        technologies, as defined in subsection (g), including 
        countering illicit knowledge and data transfer related to 
        certain critical and emerging technologies research and use;
            (6) conduct or support diplomatic engagement, in 
        coordination with other relevant Department stakeholders and 
        bureaus, offices, and relevant Federal departments and 
        agencies, with allies and partners to develop standards and 
        coordinate policies designed to counter illicit knowledge and 
        data transfer in academia related to certain critical and 
        emerging technology research;
            (7) coordinate with allies, partners, and other relevant 
        Federal agencies, with the concurrence of other relevant 
        Department stakeholders and bureaus, to prevent the 
        exploitation of research partnerships related to certain 
        critical and emerging technologies;
            (8) share information regarding the threat posed by the 
        transfer of certain critical and emerging technologies to 
        authoritarian governments, including the People's Republic of 
        China and the Russian Federation, and the ways in which 
        autocratic regimes are utilizing technology to erode individual 
        freedoms and other foundations of open, democratic societies; 
        and
            (9) collaborate with private companies, trade associations, 
        and think tanks to realize the purposes described in paragraphs 
        (1) through (8), in coordination with relevant Department 
        stakeholders and bureaus.
    (f) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the 
Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence 
and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees an unclassified 
report, with a classified index, if necessary, regarding--
            (1) the activities of the Office related to paragraphs (1) 
        through (9) of subsection (e), including any cooperative 
        initiatives and partnerships pursued with United States allies 
        and partners, and the results of such activities, initiatives, 
        and partnerships;
            (2) the activities of the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Russian 
        Federation in sectors related to certain critical and emerging 
        technologies and the threats they pose to the United States; 
        and
            (3) an inventory of all international research and 
        development programs for certain critical and emerging 
        technologies funded by the Department or USAID that include 
        participation by institutions or organizations that are 
        affiliated with, or receive support from, the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China or the Government of the Russian 
        Federation.
    (g) Critical and Emerging Technologies.--In this section, the term 
``certain critical and emerging technologies'' means technologies 
determined by the Secretary from the critical and emerging technologies 
list published by the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) at 
the Office of Science and Technology Policy, as amended by subsequent 
updates to the list issued by the NSTC.

SEC. 177. REALIGNING THE REGIONAL TECHNOLOGY OFFICER PROGRAM.

    Section 9508(a)(1) of the Department of State Authorizations Act of 
2022 (division I of Public Law 117-263; 22 U.S.C. 10305(a)(1)) is 
amended by inserting ``, and shall be administered by the Bureau for 
Cyberspace and Digital Policy'' before the period at the end.

SEC. 178. ANNUAL SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY MONITORING REPORT ON THE 
              PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Report Required.--Not later than May 1, 2025, and annually 
thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with 
the heads other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the 
advanced semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of the PRC.
    (b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
include--
            (1) the domestic semiconductor manufacturing capabilities 
        of the PRC;
            (2) year-by-year technological development efforts by the 
        PRC in the fields of advanced semiconductor manufacturing and 
        artificial intelligence chipmaking, including relevant 
        government plans and initiatives;
            (3) engagement between the PRC and other foreign countries 
        with respect to advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment 
        capabilities;
            (4) an analysis of the impact of United States and allied 
        and partner export controls on covered items related to the 
        development of advanced semiconductor manufacturing in the PRC; 
        and
            (5) an assessment of whether such export controls remain 
        effective in curbing the development of advanced semiconductor 
        manufacturing equipment capabilities in the PRC and 
        recommendations for enhancing effectiveness of such controls.
    (c) Form.--
            (1) In general.--The report required by subsection (a) 
        shall be submitted in unclassified form and shall include a 
        classified annex, providing additional details and supporting 
        intelligence, as available.
            (2) Public availability.--The unclassified portion or a 
        synopsis of the report required under subsection (a) shall be 
        made available on a publicly accessible internet website of the 
        Federal Government.

SEC. 179. COMBATTING AI-ENABLED DISINFORMATION.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the rapid development of publicly available, affordable 
        generative artificial intelligence (AI) technology, including 
        the use of large language models (LLM) to fuel natural language 
        processing applications, has the potential to fundamentally 
        alter the nature of disinformation and propaganda campaigns by 
        enabling finely tailored, auto-generated disinformation 
        swiftly, in any language, at scale, and at low-costs;
            (2) academia and private industry, including social media 
        platforms, play a critical role in establishing safeguards for 
        powerful, publicly available tools for producing AI-generated 
        content, and it is in the United States national security 
        interest to ensure that these technologies are not misused by 
        foreign malign actors to enhance influence operations abroad;
            (3) the ability to identify, track, and label original 
        text, audio, and visual content is becoming increasingly vital 
        to United States national interests as sophisticated AI-
        generated content creation becomes increasingly available to 
        the public at low costs;
            (4) coalitions such as the content authenticity initiative 
        (CAI) and the coalition for content provenance and authority 
        (C2PA) play important roles in establishing open industry 
        standards for content authenticity and digital content 
        provenance; and
            (5) the Department, as the lead agency for United States 
        foreign affairs, including public diplomacy, should work within 
        the interagency process to develop a common approach to United 
        States international engagement on issues related to AI-enabled 
        disinformation.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--it shall be the policy of the United 
States--
            (1) to share knowledge with allies and partners of 
        instances when foreign state and non-state actors have 
        leveraged generative AI to augment disinformation campaigns or 
        propaganda;
            (2) to work with private industry and academia, as 
        appropriate, to mitigate the risks associated with public 
        research on generative AI technologies; and
            (3) to support efforts in developing digital content 
        provenance detection techniques and technologies in line with 
        United States national security interests.
    (c) Establishment of Countering AI-Enabled Disinformation Task 
Force.--
            (1) Establishment.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 
        establish within the Department a Countering AI-Enabled 
        Disinformation Task Force (referred to in this section as the 
        ``Task Force'') to--
                    (A) identify potential responses to the growing 
                threat of AI-enabled disinformation and its use by 
                foreign state and non-state actors to augment influence 
                operations and disinformation campaigns;
                    (B) work closely with private industry and academia 
                to identify and coordinate efforts in developing 
                digital content provenance detection techniques and 
                technologies;
                    (C) develop the department's internal coordination 
                across regional and functional bureaus on the issue of 
                AI-enabled disinformation;
                    (D) develop a unified approach to international 
                coordination on--
                            (i) establishing standards around digital 
                        content provenance techniques and technologies, 
                        specifically as it relates to countering AI-
                        enabled disinformation campaign; and
                            (ii) assessing the potential for 
                        establishing frameworks around the 
                        proliferation of tools that facilitate AI-
                        enabled disinformation; and
                    (E) identify any additional tools or resources 
                necessary to enhance the Department's ability to--
                            (i) detect AI-enabled foreign 
                        disinformation and propaganda;
                            (ii) rapidly produce original counter-
                        messaging to address AI-enabled disinformation 
                        campaigns;
                            (iii) expand digital literacy programming 
                        abroad to include education on how media 
                        consumers in recipient countries can identify 
                        and inoculate themselves from synthetically 
                        produced media; and
                            (iv) coordinate and collaborate with other 
                        governments, international organizations, civil 
                        society, the private sector, and others, as 
                        necessary.
            (2) Membership.--The Task Force shall be comprised of a 
        representative from relevant offices, as determined by the 
        Secretary, which may include--
                    (A) the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy;
                    (B) the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and 
                Public Affairs;
                    (C) the Global Engagement Center;
                    (D) the Center for Analytics of the Office of 
                Management Strategy and Solutions;
                    (E) appropriate offices and Bureaus at the United 
                States Agency for International Development; and
                    (F) any other officials or offices the Secretary 
                determines appropriate.
    (d) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Artificial intelligence.--The term ``artificial 
        intelligence'' has the meaning given that term in section 
        238(g) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232; 10 U.S.C. 4001 note).
            (2) Digital content provenance.--The term ``digital content 
        provenance'' means the verifiable chronology of the origin and 
        history of a piece of digital content, such as an image, video, 
        audio recording, or electronic document.

SEC. 179A. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Innovation in artificial intelligence and other 
        emerging technology domains has become increasingly global. 
        According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
        Development, worldwide spending on research and development 
        more than tripled between 2000 and 2020. The United States 
        accounted for almost 70 percent of such spending in 1960, but 
        less than \1/3\ \\ in 2018.
            (2) Many allies and partners of the United States are 
        technological powers in their own right, with robust research 
        and development activities and world-leading capabilities in 
        fields such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, 
        robotics, and biotechnology.
            (3) Adversaries of the United States, including the PRC, 
        the Russian Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, also 
        emphasize technology and innovation in their geopolitical 
        strategies. In particular, the Chinese Communist Party believes 
        innovation is essential to its continued rule and is investing 
        heavily in research and development as part of a strategy to 
        ``leapfrog'' the United States into global leadership.
            (4) The United States and its allies and partners 
        collectively control a much larger share of research and 
        development activity than the PRC. Together, the United States 
        and six like-minded countries, namely, Japan, Germany, the 
        Republic of Korea, India, France, and the United Kingdom, 
        account for more than \1/2\ of global spending on research and 
        development, while the PRC accounts for approximately \1/4\.
            (5) The National Science Board's ``Vision 2030'' report, 
        issued in May 2020, states, ``Staying at the frontiers of 
        discovery requires leaning into internationalism, particularly 
        given the nation's falling share of global knowledge 
        production, paired with the rising importance and impact of 
        international collaboration and knowledge- and technology-
        intensive industries.''.
            (6) Previously, in 2008, the National Science Board 
        reported, ``The U.S. Government could play a more effective 
        role in supporting international S&E (science and engineering) 
        partnerships by developing a coherent international S&E 
        strategy to coordinate the activities and objectives of the 
        various Federal agencies that play a role in such partnerships. 
        . . . No single U.S. agency is responsible for coordinating or 
        supporting international S&E partnerships, and few U.S. 
        agencies that do S&E work have explicit missions in 
        international relations.''.
            (7) Numerous Federal departments and offices administer 
        joint research and development activities with international 
        partners, including the Office of International Science and 
        Engineering within the National Science Foundation, the 
        Division of International Relations within the National 
        Institutes of Health, and the Office of International Science & 
        Technology Cooperation within the Department of Energy.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) international collaboration on research and development 
        is critical to maintaining United States leadership in 
        artificial intelligence and other critical technologies;
            (2) Federal initiatives related to international 
        collaboration on research and development should--
                    (A) be consistently and adequately funded;
                    (B) be coordinated across agencies to increase 
                impact, minimize undue duplication, and ensure 
                alignment with policies and strategic objectives of the 
                United States; and
                    (C) incorporate national security safeguards, 
                including vetting processes, to protect against 
                exploitation by strategic competitors of the United 
                States;
            (3) implement data privacy regimes, including with respect 
        to data sharing agreements between the United States and its 
        partners;
            (4) the United States should work expeditiously with its 
        allies and partners to resolve issues related to data privacy; 
        and
            (5) the United States, and Federal departments and agencies 
        must adopt rigorous safeguards and countermeasures to protect 
        research institutions, key science and technological research 
        data, and national security-sensitive knowledge from efforts by 
        United States adversaries to gain access to such information, 
        including by exploiting international research collaboration.

SEC. 179B. OVERSIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN UNION TRADE AND 
              TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL.

    (a) In General.--Not later than December 1, 2024, and annually 
thereafter for a period of 3 years, the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of Commerce, and the United States Trade Representative shall 
jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on 
the United States-European Union Trade and Technology Council (TTC), 
including a description of--
            (1) the goals of the Council, its achievements to date, and 
        opportunities for cooperation in key areas;
            (2) a status update on deliverables of the TTC, 
        particularly those itemized in public statements and fact 
        sheets published by the United States Government;
            (3) the expected impact of the progress made on each 
        deliverable on growing two-way trade, achieving mutual 
        recognition of relevant regulatory standards, and increasing 
        the ease of doing business, including quantitative assessments;
            (4) the expected impact of deliverables on national 
        security, including technology security;
            (5) a description of any trade or technology topics that 
        the United States has sought to incorporate into the TTC;
            (6) a description of engagements during the reporting 
        period with the private sector on issues addressed in the TTC, 
        and the results of those engagements; and
            (7) other relevant updates with respect to the work of the 
        TTC's working groups.
    (b) First Report.--The first report submitted pursuant to 
subsection (a) shall cover progress from the first TTC ministerial on 
September 29, 2021, through June 1, 2024.
    (c) Subsequent Reports.--All subsequent reports submitted shall 
cover the previous year.
    (d) Form of Report.--The reports required under this section shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 179C. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State and the Administrator for 
the United States Agency for International Development, in coordination 
with other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall develop and 
implement a digital connectivity initiative specific to Pacific Island 
countries.
    (b) Elements and Conduct of Pacific Islands Digital Connectivity 
Initiative.--The initiative developed pursuant to subsection (a) 
shall--
            (1) include an assessment of opportunities to coordinate 
        with regional allies, including through the United States-Japan 
        Global Digital Connectivity Partnership and the United States-
        Japan-Australia Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership;
            (2) identify and address country-driven digital 
        transformation priorities;
            (3) conduct an assessment of the digital ecosystem of 
        Pacific Island countries, such as through the United States 
        Agency for International Development's (USAID) Digital 
        Ecosystem Country Assessments, to identify opportunities and 
        risks;
            (4) seek to develop human and institutional capacity and 
        infrastructure to catalyze private sector investments in 
        Pacific Island countries' digital ecosystem;
            (5) assist in the development of digital policy and 
        regulatory schemes in Pacific Island countries, including 
        information and communications technology (ICT) regulations and 
        procurement best practices and relevant reforms;
            (6) advance digital platforms and solutions for the 
        delivery of public services and enhance digital skills and 
        literacy;
            (7) seek to expand access to open, interoperable, reliable, 
        and secure internet for Pacific Island communities;
            (8) identify roles that digital technologies can play in 
        addressing important challenges for Pacific Island countries, 
        including the environment, sustainable fishing, readiness, 
        including in response to tsunami warnings;
            (9) identify ways to support women-owned enterprises in the 
        digital ecosystem of Pacific Island countries;
            (10) seek to expand the availability of and access to 
        secure and reliable subsea cable systems;
            (11) regularly assess opportunities for which United States 
        businesses, or those of other like-minded partners, would be 
        competitive;
            (12) promote exports of United States ICT goods and 
        services to advance a secure ICT supply chain and increase 
        United States company market share in Pacific Island digital 
        markets;
            (13) support the development and expand availability of 
        telehealth services for Pacific Island country communities; and
            (14) build digital connectivity among educational 
        institutions within the region as well as with educational 
        institutions in the United States.
    (c) Pacific Island Countries Defined.--In this section, the term 
``Pacific Island countries'' means the Cook Islands, the Republic of 
Fiji, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, 
the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Nauru, Niue, the 
Republic of Palau, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the 
Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon Islands, the Kingdom of Tonga, 
Tuvalu, and the Republic of Vanuatu.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $3,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to 
carry out this section.

SEC. 179D. CYBER AND DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO 
              DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

    (a) Interagency Working Group To Counter PRC Cyber and Digital 
Security Activities in Developing Countries.--The Secretary of State 
shall establish an interagency Working Group, which shall include the 
National Cyber Director and representatives from the Department of 
State, the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, the United States Agency for International 
Development, and such other agencies of the United States Government as 
the Secretary considers appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber and 
digital security activities in developing countries, which could 
coordinate, as appropriate, with other related interagency mechanisms.
    (b) Duties.--The Working Group established pursuant to this section 
shall develop and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
set of recommendations for--
            (1) bolstering the capacity of governments in governments 
        in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean to ensure the 
        integrity of their data networks and critical infrastructure, 
        where applicable;
            (2) providing alternatives to Huawei and other untrusted 
        vendors of cyber and digital security technology; and
            (3) an action plan for United States embassies to assist 
        host-country governments with respect to protecting their vital 
        digital networks and infrastructure from the PRC.

              Subtitle E--Countering PRC Malign Influence

SEC. 181. SENSE OF CONGRESS DISTINGUISHING THE PRC GOVERNMENT FROM THE 
              CHINESE PEOPLE.

    (a) Findings.--Since the establishment of the People's Republic of 
China in 1949, the Chinese people have attempted to highlight the 
abuses of the Communist Party of China, including in 1989 with the 
Tiananmen Square protests and resulting massacre, and most recently 
through mass demonstrations in November 2022, known as the ``White 
Paper Movement'' to protest censorship and the harsh zero-COVID policy, 
but the efforts of the Chinese people have consistently been met with 
brutal suppression by CCP authorities and further efforts to monitors, 
control, and politically indoctrinate Chinese citizens.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the challenges and threats posed by the PRC stem 
        primarily from the actions and behavior of the CCP and the PRC 
        government, not the people of China or people of Chinese 
        descent;
            (2) the United States Government should seek to support the 
        aspirations of the Chinese people, and other peoples suffering 
        in oppressive, authoritarian regimes, by promoting human rights 
        and supporting their ability to express their own opinions and 
        views about their government;
            (3) the United States is a diverse nation, and the strength 
        and vibrancy of the United States is enhanced by the diverse 
        ethnic backgrounds and tolerance of its citizens, including 
        Asian Americans and people of Chinese descent; and
            (4) the United States Government and governments around the 
        world must actively oppose racism and intolerance in all forms, 
        and use all available and appropriate tools to combat the 
        spread of anti-Asian racism and discrimination.

SEC. 182. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUNTERING THE PEOPLE'S 
              REPUBLIC OF CHINA INFLUENCE FUND.

    (a) Countering the People's Republic of China Influence Fund.--
There is authorized to be appropriated $600,000,000 for each of fiscal 
years 2025 through 2029 for the Countering the People's Republic of 
China Influence Fund to counter PRC malign influence. Amounts 
appropriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain 
available until expended and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise 
authorized to be appropriated to counter such influence.
    (b) Policy Guidance, Coordination, and Approval.--
            (1) Coordinator.--The Secretary of State shall designate an 
        existing senior official as the Coordinator for the Countering 
        the People's Republic of China Influence Fund (in this section 
        referred to as ``Coordinator'') to provide policy guidance, 
        coordination within the Department and the interagency as 
        appropriate, and recommendations for the obligation of funds 
        authorized pursuant to subsection (a).
            (2) Duties.--The Coordinator designated pursuant to 
        paragraph (1) shall be responsible for--
                    (A) on an annual basis, the identification of 
                specific strategic priorities for using the funds 
                authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a), 
                such as geographic areas of focus or functional 
                categories of programming that funds are to be 
                concentrated within, consistent with the national 
                interests of the United States and the purposes of this 
                section;
                    (B) the coordination and approval of all 
                programming conducted using the funds authorized to be 
                appropriated under subsection (a), based on an 
                assessment that such programming directly counters PRC 
                malign influence, including specific activities or 
                policies advanced by such influence, pursuant to the 
                strategic objectives of the United States;
                    (C) ensuring that all programming approved bears a 
                sufficiently direct nexus to countering PRC malign 
                influence and adheres to the requirements outlined in 
                subsection (d);
                    (D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and 
                evaluation of the effectiveness of all programming 
                conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated 
                under subsection (a) to ensure that it advances United 
                States interests and degrades the ability of the 
                Government of the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party 
                (CCP), or entities acting on their behalf, to advance 
                the activities described in subsection (c); and
                    (E) ensuring, to the maximum extent practicable, 
                that all approved programming under subsection (a) is 
                carried out in coordination with other Federal 
                activities to counter the malign influence and 
                activities of the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or 
                entities acting on their behalf.
            (3) Assistant coordinator.--The Administrator of the United 
        States Agency for International Development shall designate an 
        official with direct responsibility for policy with respect to 
        the PRC to assist the Coordinator designated pursuant to 
        paragraph (1), particularly with respect to such assistance 
        handled by the United States Agency for International 
        Development.
    (c) PRC Malign Influence Defined.--In this section, the term ``PRC 
malign influence'' means influence of the Government of the PRC and the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or entities acting on their behalf 
globally that--
            (1) undermines a free and open international order;
            (2) advances an alternative, repressive international order 
        that bolsters the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party's 
        hegemonic ambitions and is characterized by coercion and 
        dependency;
            (3) undermines the national security, territorial 
        integrity, or sovereignty of the United States or other 
        countries; or
            (4) undermines the political and economic security of the 
        United States or other countries, including by promoting 
        corruption or elite capture, and advancing coercive economic 
        practices.
    (d) Activities To Counter PRC Malign Influence.--In this section, 
countering malign influence through the use of funds authorized to be 
appropriated by subsection (a) include efforts--
            (1) to promote transparency and accountability, and reduce 
        corruption, including in governance structures targeted by the 
        malign influence of the Government of the PRC or the CCP;
            (2) to support civil society and independent media to raise 
        awareness of and increase transparency regarding the negative 
        impact of activities and initiatives of the Government of the 
        PRC and the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, including 
        the Belt and Road Initiative and other initiatives that lack 
        transparency, fail to meet international standards, and are 
        associated with coercive economic practices;
            (3) to counter transnational criminal networks that 
        benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of the 
        Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their 
        behalf;
            (4) to encourage economic development structures that help 
        protect against predatory lending schemes, including support 
        for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, such as 
        digital economy, energy, and infrastructure;
            (5) to counter activities that provide undue influence to 
        the security forces of the PRC;
            (6) to expose foreign influence operations and propaganda 
        of the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on 
        their behalf;
            (7) to counter efforts by the Government of the PRC, the 
        CCP, or entities acting on their behalf to legitimize or 
        promote authoritarian ideology and governance models, including 
        its model of a state-dominated cyber and digital ecosystem;
            (8) to counter efforts by the Government of the PRC, the 
        CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, to silence, 
        intimidate, or exact reprisal against individuals outside of 
        their sovereign borders, including members of diaspora 
        populations such as political opponents, repressed religious or 
        spiritual practitioners, marginalized ethnic community members, 
        civil society activists, human rights defenders, researchers, 
        and journalists;
            (9) to provide alternatives to problematic PRC technology 
        offerings, which could provide the Government of the PRC undue 
        access to or influence over global data flows or sensitive 
        information, and compete with problematic PRC efforts to 
        leverage or make gains in the development of advanced and 
        emerging technologies;
            (10) to counter PRC activities that directly enable 
        critical supply chain monopolization or other monopolistic 
        practices;
            (11) to counter aggressive PRC efforts to make inroads into 
        the nuclear energy sectors of countries to the detriment of 
        United States national security, strategic, and 
        nonproliferation interests; and
            (12) to counter efforts by the Government of the PRC, the 
        CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, to undermine the 
        democratic processes and institutions of United States allies 
        and partners.

SEC. 183. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.

    (a) Extension.--Section 1287(j) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended 
by striking ``the date that is 8 years after the date of the 
enactment'' and inserting ``the date that is 13 years after the date of 
the enactment''.
    (b) Amendments.--Section 1287 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``foreign state and 
        foreign non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts,'' and 
        inserting ``foreign state and non-state influence operations'';
            (2) in subsection (b)--
                    (A) in paragraph (3)--
                            (i) by striking ``propaganda and 
                        disinformation,'' and inserting ``foreign 
                        influence operations''; and
                            (ii) inserting ``, including by working 
                        directly with United States embassies and 
                        consulates'' before the period at the end;
                    (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``refute foreign 
                propaganda and disinformation,'' and inserting 
                ``counter foreign influence operations''; and
                    (C) in paragraph (8)--
                            (i) by striking ``propaganda and 
                        disinformation,'' and inserting ``foreign 
                        influence operations,''; and
                            (ii) by striking ``propaganda and 
                        disinformation is'' and inserting ``foreign 
                        influence operations are''.
    (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
Secretary of State should empower the Global Engagement Center to 
expand its coordinating capacity, including through the exchange of 
liaison officers with Federal departments and agencies that manage 
aspects of identifying and countering foreign influence operations.
    (d) Complementing United States Embassy Operations.--In carrying 
out its mandate as outlined in section 1287 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, the Global Engagement Center 
should ensure its efforts complement United States Embassy operations 
where applicable, including--
            (1) working with key posts to equip and support officers 
        tasked with countering foreign influence operations;
            (2) supporting posts in developing country-specific 
        programs to counter foreign influence operations; and
            (3) working with regional bureaus to ensure effective 
        coordination and mutual visibility and input into regional 
        strategies and activities related to foreign influence 
        operations.
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2025 for the Global 
Engagement Center to counter foreign state and non-state influence 
operations.

SEC. 184. AMENDMENT TO THE MUTUAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE ACT 
              OF 1961.

    Section 108A(a)(1) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange 
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2458a) is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; and'' and 
        inserting a semicolon;
            (2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the semicolon and 
        inserting ``and,''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(D) which is not an exchange with the People's 
                Republic of China, unless the Secretary of State has 
                determined and certified to the appropriate committees 
                of Congress that participation by Federal employees in 
                the exchange is in the national security interest of 
                the United States.''.

SEC. 185. COUNTERING MALIGN INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN THE AMERICAS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) foreign influence operations pose serious threats to 
        national sovereignty, democratic governance and human rights;
            (2) foreign influence operations in Latin America and the 
        Caribbean--
                    (A) have been carried out by the Maduro regime and 
                other foreign state actors, including the PRC, the 
                Republic of Cuba, the Russian Federation, and the 
                Islamic Republic of Iran; and
                    (B) have undermined United States national 
                interests, including by--
                            (i) undermining democratic electoral 
                        processes;
                            (ii) exacerbating political polarization; 
                        and
                            (iii) spreading false narratives contrary 
                        to the interests of the United States and its 
                        allies; and
            (3) the United States Government should ensure sufficient 
        attention and resources are allocated to efforts to protect 
        independent media spaces, strengthen transparency of links 
        between local media ecosystems and foreign actors, and counter 
        Spanish-language and other non-English language foreign 
        influence operations in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
        including through Global Engagement Center research, grants, 
        and programs.
    (b) Strategy.--The Secretary of State shall develop and implement a 
strategy for protecting independent media spaces and countering the 
creation and amplification of foreign state and nonstate influence 
operations in Latin America and the Caribbean and to identify 
initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean to counter efforts by 
the Governments of the PRC and the Russian Federation to undermine 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and democratic processes and 
institutions in the region.
    (c) Multilateral Diplomacy.--The Secretary of State should convene 
summits, forums, and multi-stakeholder initiatives to address global 
threats to independent media ecosystems and develop solutions to the 
challenges posed by foreign influence operations, which could include--
            (1) a ``Latin America and Caribbean Tech Challenge'' that 
        is--
                    (A) sponsored by the Global Engagement Center; and
                    (B) aimed at advancing the development of 
                innovative solutions to counter disinformation and 
                propaganda across Latin America and the Caribbean; and
            (2) a high-level, multi-stakeholder summit convened by the 
        Secretary of State in Latin America and the Caribbean that 
        seeks to--
                    (A) strengthen information sharing and other 
                cooperation among regional governments, independent 
                media, academia, tech companies, and civil society 
                organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean for 
                purposes of developing joint solutions to counter 
                disinformation;
                    (B) counter efforts by the PRC and Russia to 
                undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
                democratic processes and institutions of United States 
                allies and partners; and
                    (C) promote efforts to protect the sustainability 
                of independent media and freedom of the press.

SEC. 186. GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE.

    Section 552 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348a) 
is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(e) Restriction Related to People's Republic of China.--None of 
the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to 
carry out this chapter, including for the Global Peace Operations 
Initiative of the United States Department of State, may be used to 
train or support foreign military forces in peacekeeping training 
exercises by the Government of the People's Republic of China or the 
People's Liberation Army unless, by not later than October 1 of each 
year, the Secretary of State certifies to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives that such training or support is important to 
the national security interests of the United States.''.

SEC. 187. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS UNDER THE FENTANYL SANCTIONS ACT.

    Section 7212 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 2312) is 
amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a 
        semicolon;
            (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting a semicolon; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
            ``(3) the President determines has knowingly engaged in, on 
        or after the date of enactment of this paragraph, a significant 
        activity or financial transaction that has materially 
        contributed to, foreign opioid trafficking; or
            ``(4) the President determines--
                    ``(A) has received any property or interest in 
                property that the foreign person knows--
                            ``(i) constitutes or is derived from the 
                        proceeds of an activity or transaction 
                        described in paragraph (3); or
                            ``(ii) was used or intended to be used to 
                        commit or to facilitate such an activity or 
                        transaction;
                    ``(B) has knowingly provided significant financial, 
                material, or technological support for, including 
                through the provision of goods or services in support 
                of--
                            ``(i) any activity or transaction described 
                        in paragraph (3); or
                            ``(ii) any foreign person described in 
                        paragraph (3);
                    ``(C) is or has been owned, controlled, or directed 
                by, or has knowingly acted or purported to act for or 
                on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any foreign 
                person described in paragraph (3) or subparagraph (A) 
                or (B).''.

SEC. 188. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO AGENCIES OR 
              INSTRUMENTALITIES OF FOREIGN STATES.

    The President shall--
            (1) impose one or more of the sanctions described in 
        section 7213 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 2313) 
        with respect to each agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
        state (as defined in section 1603(b) of title 28, United States 
        Code) that the President determines--
                    (A) has engaged in, on or after the date of 
                enactment of this section, a significant activity or 
                transaction that has materially contributed to opioid 
                trafficking; or
                    (B) has provided, or attempted to provide, 
                financial, material, or technological support for, 
                including through the provision of goods or services in 
                support of, any activity or transaction described in 
                subparagraph (A); or
            (2) impose the sanction described in subsection (a)(6) of 
        such section 7213 on each foreign person that the President 
        determines--
                    (A) is a senior official of an agency or 
                instrumentality of a foreign state described in 
                paragraph (1); or
                    (B) that the President determines is or has been 
                owned, controlled, or directed by, or has knowingly 
                acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly 
                or indirectly, an agency or instrumentality of a 
                foreign state described in paragraph (1).

SEC. 189. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY AND 
              INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
              IN CUBA.

    (a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions described 
in subsection (b) with respect to any foreign person that the President 
determines has engaged in, after the date of enactment of this Act, a 
significant transaction or transactions, or any significant dealings 
with, or, after the date of enactment of this Act, has provided 
significant material support to or for a military or intelligence 
facility of the PRC in Cuba.
    (b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
subsection with respect to a foreign person are the following:
            (1) Asset blocking.--The exercise of all powers granted to 
        the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers 
        Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block 
        and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in 
        property of the foreign person if such property and interests 
        in property are in the United States, come within the United 
        States, or are or come within the possession or control of a 
        United States person.
            (2) Exclusion from the united states and revocation of visa 
        or other documentation.--In the case of a foreign person who is 
        an alien, denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the United 
        States of, the alien, and revocation in accordance with section 
        221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
        1201(i)), of any visa or other documentation of the alien.
    (c) Implementation; Penalties.--
            (1) Implementation.--The President shall exercise 
        authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the 
        International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 
        1704) to carry out this section.
            (2) Penalties.--A person that knowingly violates, attempts 
        to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of 
        subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued 
        to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties 
        set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the 
        International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to 
        the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act 
        described in subsection (a) of that section.
    (d) Exceptions.--
            (1) Importation of goods.--
                    (A) In general.--The authorities and requirements 
                to impose sanctions authorized under this section shall 
                not include the authority or a requirement to impose 
                sanctions on the importation of goods.
                    (B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term 
                ``good'' means any article, natural or manmade 
                substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, 
                including inspection and test equipment, and excluding 
                technical data.
            (2) Compliance with united nations headquarters 
        agreement.--Sanctions under subsection (b)(2) shall not apply 
        to an alien if admitting the alien into the United States is 
        necessary to permit the United States to comply with the 
        Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, 
        signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force 
        November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United 
        States, or other applicable international obligations.
    (e) National Security Waiver.--The President may waive the 
imposition of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign 
person on a case-by-case basis if the President submits to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a determination that the waiver is 
in the national interests of the United States.
    (f) Termination of Sanctions.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, this section shall terminate on the date that is 30 days after 
the date on which the President determines and certifies to the 
appropriate committees of Congress (and Congress has not enacted 
legislation disapproving the determination within that 30-day period) 
that all military or intelligence facilities of the PRC in Cuba have 
been closed.
    (g) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Alien.--The term ``alien'' has the meaning given that 
        term in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
        U.S.C. 1101).
            (2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a 
        person that is not a United States person.
            (3) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or 
        entity.
            (4) United states person.--The term ``United States 
        person'' means--
                    (A) an individual who is a United States citizen or 
                an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to 
                the United States;
                    (B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
                United States or any jurisdiction within the United 
                States, including a foreign branch of such an entity; 
                or
                    (C) any person in the United States.

SEC. 190. STRATEGIC STABILITY DIALOGUE AND ARMS CONTROL.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States and the PRC have both made 
        commitments to advancing strategic security through enforceable 
        arms control and non-proliferation agreements as states parties 
        to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done 
        at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.
            (2) The United States has long taken tangible steps to seek 
        effective, verifiable, and enforceable arms control and non-
        proliferation agreements that support United States and allied 
        security by--
                    (A) controlling the spread of nuclear materials and 
                technology;
                    (B) placing limits on the production, stockpiling, 
                and deployment of nuclear weapons;
                    (C) decreasing the risk of misperception and 
                miscalculation; and
                    (D) avoiding the destabilizing effects of nuclear 
                arms competition.
            (3) The PRC's current nuclear expansion, part of a massive 
        modernization of the PLA that is expected to be completed by 
        2035, combined with the PLA's aggressive actions, has 
        increasingly destabilized the Indo-Pacific region.
            (4) The long-planned United States nuclear modernization 
        program will not increase the United States nuclear weapons 
        stockpile, predates China's conventional military and nuclear 
        expansion, and is not an arms race against China.
            (5) The United States extended nuclear deterrence--
                    (A) provides critical strategic security around the 
                world;
                    (B) is an essential element of United States 
                military alliances; and
                    (C) serves a vital non-proliferation function.
            (6) The United States has, on numerous occasions, called on 
        the PRC to participate in strategic arms control negotiations, 
        and has sought to engage the PRC in a strategic stability 
        dialogue, but the PRC has so far declined. Such negotiations 
        and dialogue would benefit the entire world by developing 
        guardrails to ensure that competition does not veer into 
        conflict.
            (7) Provocations such as the ``balloon incident'' in 2023 
        and the inability of United States officials to reach PRC 
        counterparts via deconfliction lines underscore the need for 
        further engagement on risk reduction, including through near-
        term dialogue and eventual arms control negotiations.
            (8) The Governments of Japan, the United Kingdom, Poland, 
        Slovenia, Denmark, Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the 
        Netherlands, Romania, Austria, Montenegro, Ukraine, Slovakia, 
        Spain, North Macedonia, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Croatia, 
        and Albania, as well as the Deputy Secretary General of the 
        North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have all encouraged the PRC 
        to join arms control discussions.
    (b) Report on the Future of United States-PRC Interactions on 
Nuclear and Strategic Issues.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 
        Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress 
        a report that outlines the strategy and objectives in engaging 
        the Government of the PRC on nuclear and strategic issues, 
        which shall include--
                    (A) areas of potential dialogue between the 
                Governments of the United States and the PRC, including 
                the interplay of ballistic, hypersonic glide, and 
                cruise missiles, conventional forces, nuclear, space, 
                artificial intelligence and cyberspace issues, as well 
                as other new strategic domains, which could reduce the 
                likelihood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were 
                to occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in 
                the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) the types of strategic military capabilities of 
                the PRC that the United States Government is most 
                interested in limiting;
                    (C) an assessment of whether additional crisis 
                consultation mechanisms should be developed to avoid, 
                manage, or control inadvertent nuclear, conventional, 
                and unconventional military escalation between the 
                United States and the PRC;
                    (D) the personnel and expertise required to 
                effectively engage the PRC in strategic stability and 
                arms control dialogues; and
                    (E) opportunities and methods to encourage 
                transparency and predictability from the PRC with 
                regard to the growth and purpose of its nuclear and 
                related strategic forces.
            (2) Form of report.--The report required under paragraph 
        (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
        classified annex.

SEC. 191. TRACK 1.5 DIALOGUES WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON 
              NUCLEAR MATTERS.

    Not later than 15 days before any United States Government official 
participates in a Track 1.5 dialogue on nuclear policy with any 
institution under the direct control of the PRC or the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Ministry of Defense, or the People's Liberation Army of the PRC, the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
in the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of 
Representatives a notification of such United States official 
participation and a justification for such participation, including 
how--
            (1) the Track 1.5 dialogue supports official talks between 
        the United States and the Peoples Republic of China on arms 
        control, crisis stability, or other dialogues related to 
        nuclear policy; and
            (2) United States Government official participation in the 
        Track 1.5 dialogue directly supports the national security 
        interests of the United States.

SEC. 192. OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Biological weapons convention.--The term ``Biological 
        Weapons Convention'' means the Convention on the Prohibition of 
        the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
        and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Washington, 
        London, and Moscow, April 10, 1972.
            (2) Life sciences dual use research of concern.--The term 
        ``life sciences dual use research of concern'' means life 
        sciences research that--
                    (A) involves the Peoples Republic of China; and
                    (B) based on current understanding can be 
                reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, 
                information, products, or technologies that could be 
                misapplied to do harm with no, or only minor, 
                modification to pose a significant threat with 
                potential consequences to public health and safety, 
                agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the 
                environment, materiel, or national security.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States 
to--
            (1) conduct rigorous scrutiny of, and regularly review, 
        collaboration on international biological, bacteriological, 
        virological, and other relevant research that could be 
        weaponized or could reasonably be considered life sciences 
        dual-use research of concern, and incorporate national security 
        and nonproliferation considerations and country-specific 
        conditions into decisions regarding such collaboration;
            (2) ensure that, in the search for solutions to pressing 
        global health challenges, United States Government support for 
        public health research and other actions does not advance the 
        capabilities of the PRC in the area of life sciences dual use 
        research of concern or inadvertently contribute to the 
        proliferation of biological weapons technologies; and
            (3) declassify, to the maximum extent possible, all 
        intelligence relevant to the PRC's compliance or lack of 
        compliance with its obligations under the Biological Weapons 
        Convention (BWC), and other national security concerns 
        regarding PRC biological, bacteriological, virological, and 
        other relevant research that could be weaponized or could 
        reasonably be considered life sciences dual use research of 
        concern that may be outside the scope of the BWC.
    (c) Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern.--
            (1) Secretary of state.--The Secretary of State shall--
                    (A) ensure robust and consistent Department of 
                State participation in interagency processes and review 
                mechanisms related to oversight of life sciences dual-
                use research of concern;
                    (B) participate in interagency working groups and 
                task forces related to vetting United States Government 
                funding related to international cooperation in 
                nonproliferation, life sciences, high containment 
                laboratories, and infectious diseases, to develop 
                policies and processes for post-award oversight of 
                grants and funding for life sciences dual use research 
                of concern, including as aligned with current laws and 
                regulations and for grants or funding from other 
                Federal departments and agencies, in order to keep 
                apprised of any national security or foreign policy 
                concerns that may arise with respect to an 
                international project or a project involving a foreign 
                partner, funded by another Federal department or 
                agency;
                    (C) conduct periodic reviews of the adequacy of 
                consultative mechanisms with other Federal Departments 
                and agencies with respect to oversight of life sciences 
                dual use research of concern, especially consultative 
                mechanisms mandated in United States law, and identify 
                recommendations for improving such consultative 
                mechanisms;
                    (D) direct Chiefs of Mission to ensure Country Team 
                Assessments are submitted to the Department of State 
                and the head of the Federal department or agency 
                proposing to sponsor a program or collaboration to 
                assess whether such program or collaboration involves 
                life sciences dual use research of concern, and ensure 
                that such Assessments are integrated into relevant 
                interagency processes; and
                    (E) direct Chiefs of Mission to increase embassy 
                reporting on life sciences dual use research of 
                concern, biosecurity hazards trends in the development 
                of synthetic biology and biotechnology, and other 
                related matters.
            (2) Administrator of the united states agency for 
        international development.--The Administrator of the United 
        States Agency for International Development shall report to and 
        consult with the Department of State on any proposed programs, 
        projects, initiatives, or funding for life sciences dual use 
        research of concern.
    (d) United Nations Agencies, Programs, and Funds.--
            (1) Requirement.--The Permanent Representative of the 
        United States to the United Nations should use the voice, vote, 
        and influence of the United States at the United Nations to 
        block representatives from any country listed in paragraph 2 
        from serving in leadership positions within any United Nations 
        organ, fund, program, or related specialized agency with 
        responsibility for global health security (including animal 
        health), biosecurity, atomic, biological or chemical weapons, 
        or food security and agricultural development.
            (2) List of countries specified.--The countries described 
        in paragraph (1) are--
                    (A) the People's Republic of China;
                    (B) the Russian Federation;
                    (C) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
                    (D) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
                    (E) the Assad Regime of Syria; and
                    (F) any other country specified in the report 
                required by section 403(a) of the Arms Control and 
                Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a)) in the relevant 
                calendar year.
            (3) Sunset.--This section shall terminate on the date that 
        is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

        Subtitle F--Strengthening United States Public Diplomacy

SEC. 196. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS TO PROMOTE UNITED STATES 
              EDUCATION, EXCHANGE, CULTURAL, AND THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS 
              PROGRAM.

    There is authorized to be appropriated, for each year of the 5-year 
period beginning on October 1, 2025, $20,000,000, to promote education, 
training, research, and foreign language skills through the Fulbright-
Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual 
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).

SEC. 197. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TRAINING.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the PRC has invested heavily in public diplomacy 
        efforts that promote positive narratives of the PRC while 
        obfuscating the nefarious actions of the government against its 
        own people, its use of threats and coercive diplomacy to demand 
        deference from other countries, its use of United Front Work 
        Department, affiliated organizations, and other tools and 
        tactics to conduct malign influence operations and undermine 
        democratic values in other countries, and its anti-competitive 
        economic practices;
            (2) these include huge state-sponsored investments into 
        media outlets throughout the world, advancement of censorship, 
        and the establishment of cultural centers; and
            (3) the United States must respond with investment, 
        training, and personnel to effectively counter these public 
        diplomacy efforts.
    (b) Hiring.--The Secretary of State should prioritize increasing 
recruitment, hiring of, and the placement of public diplomacy officers 
for the purposes of strategic competition.
    (c) Training.--The Secretary of State shall require all Foreign 
Service Officers to regularly complete public diplomacy training 
courses through the Foreign Service Institute or other Department-
approved professional development training in public diplomacy, 
including preparing them to--
            (1) counter foreign malign influence, especially the 
        effective use by the PRC, Russia, and other relevant countries 
        of tools to influence and manipulate foreign audiences, present 
        narratives favorable to their regimes, undermine democratic 
        values and fundamental freedoms, and obfuscate harmful or 
        coercive policies and practices;
            (2) understand foreign media landscapes to understand how 
        United States public diplomacy efforts can be most effective; 
        and
            (3) partner with local organizations focused on countering 
        malign foreign influence, including through disinformation, 
        public influence campaigns, and other means.
    (d) Developing Department-Wide Guidance.--The Under Secretary for 
Public Diplomacy shall, in consultation with United States missions 
abroad, develop Department-wide guidance for public diplomacy officers 
and senior officers at posts to enable them to better counter foreign 
malign influence, as described in subsection (c).
    (e) Form of Guidance.--The guidance required under subsection (d) 
may take the form of--
            (1) regularly updated cables;
            (2) a handbook for the development of public diplomacy 
        efforts at post to counter foreign malign influence; and
            (3) other forms of guidance as determined appropriate by 
        the Under Secretary.

SEC. 198. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Peoples' Republic of China, Russia, and other 
        strategic competitors vastly overshadow the United States in 
        efforts to shape global public opinion in favor of their own 
        narrow political, commercial, and economic interests, including 
        through promoting disinformation and propaganda as well as 
        investing in exchange programs, scholarships, cultural 
        diplomacy, and other programs;
            (2) the United States must utilize its full spectrum of 
        public diplomacy tools to promote United States interests and 
        security as well as combat Russian and PRC disinformation; and
            (3) the Department of State should ensure that adequate 
        resources are available for posts to generate locally tailored 
        public diplomacy programming that advances United States 
        national security objectives.
    (b) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a strategy to modernize and increase 
the operational and programming capacity of American Spaces, American 
Corners, and American Centers throughout the world, including on--
            (1) leveraging public private partnerships;
            (2) options for United States Government stipends or 
        additional pay to augment the current salaries of local staff 
        at partner organizations hosting American Spaces to locally 
        employed staff of American Spaces and American Corners; and
            (3) opportunities for United States businesses and 
        nongovernmental organizations to better utilize American Spaces 
        in alignment with overall United States Government priorities.

SEC. 199. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUNTERING FOREIGN 
              INFORMATION OPERATIONS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds that the PRC is increasing its 
spending on public diplomacy, including influence campaigns, 
advertising, and investments into state-sponsored media publications 
outside of the PRC. This includes, for example, more than 
$10,000,000,000 in foreign direct investment in communications 
infrastructure, platforms, and properties, as well as bringing 
journalists to the PRC for training programs.
    (b) The United States Agency for Global Media.--The United States 
Agency for Global Media (USAGM) and affiliate Federal and non-Federal 
entities shall, consistent with the other executive branch undertakings 
in this Act led by the President or the Secretary of State, and in 
accordance with the highest standards of journalism, undertake the 
following actions to support independent journalism, counter foreign 
malign influence, and combat surveillance in countries where the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and other malign actors are promoting 
foreign information operations, propaganda, and manipulated media 
markets:
            (1) Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of America (VOA) shall 
        expand coverage and digital programming in China for all China 
        services and other affiliate language broadcasting services.
            (2) All USAGM operating entities shall seek to increase 
        coverage on CCP influence in their coverage regions, including 
        RFA in Asia, RFE/RL in Central Asia, MBN in the Middle East, 
        Office of Cuba Broadcasting in Cuba, and Voice America 
        globally.
            (3) Radio Free Asia (RFA) shall expand its Mandarin-
        language Asia Fact Check Lab to expose and analyze false 
        narratives on social media by pro-Beijing influencers and 
        content creators.
            (4) Voice of America shall continue the bilingual Asia Fact 
        Check Lab, established in 2022, and expand on the Jiehuang 
        Pindao initiative to continue identifying and exposing PRC 
        information operations.
            (5) Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc. (MBN) shall 
        expand coverage of the PRC's influence in the Middle East and 
        North Africa, a topic that is void on indigenous media in the 
        region.
            (6) USAGM shall expand existing training and partnership 
        programs that promote journalistic standards, investigative 
        reporting, cybersecurity, and digital analytics to help expose 
        and counter false CCP narratives.
            (7) The Open Technology Fund shall continue its work to 
        support applied research, and the development and deployment of 
        tools and technologies to circumvent censorship and 
        surveillance by the CCP, both inside the PRC as well as abroad 
        where the PRC has exported these technologies.
            (8) Voice of America shall continue its mission of 
        providing accurate, objective, and comprehensive news as well 
        as presenting the policies of the United States clearly and 
        effectively.
            (9) The Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) shall continue 
        its work promoting freedom and democracy by providing the 
        people of Cuba with objective news and information, including 
        exposing and reporting on Chinese disinformation and malign 
        influence for its Cuban and Latin American audiences.
            (10) RFE/RL shall establish an investigative unit dedicated 
        to working across Central Asia to develop multimedia responses 
        to local information operation efforts by the CCP and other 
        malign actors.
            (11) All USAGM operating units may establish or further 
        develop investigative units.
            (12) The networks and grantees of the United States Agency 
        for Global Media shall continue their mission of providing 
        credible and timely news coverage, including on the PRC's 
        malign behavior and activities across the world.
    (c) Authorizations of Appropriations.--
            (1) USAGM.--There is authorized to be appropriated, for 
        each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for the United States 
        Agency for Global Media, $1,500,000.
            (2) Media support.--There is authorized to be appropriated, 
        for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029, $250,000,000 for 
        ongoing and new programs to support local media, build 
        independent media, combat PRC information operations inside and 
        outside of China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, 
        and monitor and evaluate these programs. Such funds shall be 
        directed to--
                    (A) RFA to expand--
                            (i) its China language services (including 
                        Mandarin, Cantonese, Uyghur, and Tibetan);
                            (ii) its coverage in Southeast Asia and the 
                        Pacific Islands to counter the Chinese 
                        Communist Party's propaganda;
                            (iii) its Global Mandarin digital brand 
                        WHYNOT/Wainao, which engages Chinese-speaking 
                        populations both inside China and around the 
                        world;
                            (iv) its investigative unit, which probes 
                        PRC influence and relevant issues including 
                        transnational repression and cross-border crime 
                        in Asia, the Pacific, and globally; and
                            (v) its Asia Fact Check Lab, which counters 
                        and analyzes PRC disinformation and malign 
                        influence in the information space.
                    (B) RFE/RL to increase Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, 
                Turkmen, and Uzbek language services;
                    (C) the Open Technology Fund for censorship 
                circumvention and privacy enhancing technologies which 
                contribute to--
                            (i) enabling Chinese citizens to safely 
                        access independent news and information; and
                            (ii) countering Chinese information control 
                        technologies in authoritarian countries where 
                        they are being exported and adopted;
                    (D) MBN to increase coverage of China's influence 
                in the region through its award-winning investigative 
                reporting, including expansion of its digital series 
                ``Did it Really Happen?'' to counter false narratives 
                being spread by the PRC through social media;
                    (E) OCB to increase efforts to expose and counter 
                China's active propaganda and disinformation machine 
                within Cuba, including expanded fact-checking, 
                journalistic training, and investments in technology; 
                and
                    (F) Voice of America to expand--
                            (i) its coverage addressing China's malign 
                        influences within China and across Africa, 
                        Latin America, Asia, and Eurasia;
                            (ii) direct reporting in key regions, 
                        including Taiwan and the Pacific Islands, 
                        including establishing a Mongolian Service; and
                            (iii) Open-Source Intelligence journalism, 
                        to leverage data mining capabilities to uncover 
                        insights into China's domestic developments and 
                        its global activities.
    (d) Report to Congress.--Not later than one year after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, USAGM shall submit to Congress a report on 
the audience size and partnerships developed in furtherance of its 
efforts to counter CCP's malign influence.

SEC. 199A. SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, acting through the Under 
Secretary for Public Diplomacy, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and in coordination with the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, shall support civil society and foreign media 
organizations in the implementation of programs to train foreign media 
personnel on investigative techniques, provide journalist protection, 
improve media literacy among the school-aged and general populations, 
boost access to accurate and reliable news and information generally, 
as well as other media-related activities in order to ensure public 
accountability related to the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global 
Development Initiative, the PRC's use of and export of surveillance and 
other technologies, and other influence operations abroad direct or 
directly supported by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of 
the PRC.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of State, for each of fiscal years 2025 
through 2029, $100,000,000 in support of the activities outlined in 
subsection (a), including for ongoing and new programs in support of 
press freedom, training, media literacy, and protection of journalists.

   TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES, PARTNERSHIPS, AND INTERNATIONAL 
                             ORGANIZATIONS

              Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

 PART I--PROMOTING UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE 
                              INDO-PACIFIC

SEC. 201. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING THE PRC'S SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA'S 
              WAR ON UKRAINE.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the PRC and the Russian Federation are strengthening 
        their relationship to advance their mutual interests, including 
        in creating divisions between the United States and its allies 
        and partners;
            (2) the PRC is supporting Russia's unprovoked, full-scale, 
        and brutal invasion of Ukraine, including through increasing 
        trade with Russia by 30 percent in 2022, and another 26.3 
        percent in 2023, purchasing 2,140,000 barrels of Russian crude 
        oil per day in 2023 under embargo by the transatlantic 
        alliance, selling high-precision machinery, electronics, base 
        metals, textiles and apparel, vehicles, ships, aircraft to 
        Russia, abetting sanctions evasion in countries on Russia's 
        borders, and amplifying Russian propaganda and false 
        information;
            (3) the PRC has explored providing weapons and ammunition 
        to the Russian Federation in order to support that country's 
        unlawful, imperialist war of aggression against Ukraine;
            (4) the Government of the PRC is not taking sufficient 
        action to prevent PRC-based companies from exporting lethal 
        equipment to the Russian Federation, as revealed by the 
        credible evidence that PRC companies and entities have--
                    (A) shipped unmanned aerial vehicles to Russia that 
                were designated on customs forms as being ``for use in 
                the special military operation.'';
                    (B) supplied Iran with drone parts that were later 
                used by Russian forces in Ukraine;
                    (C) sent ``Tiger'' armored personnel carriers to 
                Chechen forces, raising the possibility that these 
                vehicles being could be deployed to Ukraine;
                    (D) shipped tens of thousands of kilograms of 
                smokeless gunpowder to a munitions factory in Russia;
                    (E) provided Russia with optical parts used in 
                tanks and armored vehicles;
                    (F) provided nitrocellulose used in gunpowder; and
                    (G) allowed the shipment of dual use engines for 
                missiles and drones to Russia;
            (5) because of the PRC's ongoing support for Russia's war 
        against Ukraine, the United States has sanctioned numerous PRC 
        and Hong Kong-based entities;
            (6) the PRC's support for Russia's war against Ukraine 
        threatens European stability and security, including that of 
        those countries that the United States is committed to defend 
        under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty;
            (7) the United States, the European Union, and European 
        countries must continue and increase implementation of 
        sanctions and other appropriate economic tools against PRC 
        firms supporting the Russian Federation's war against Ukraine, 
        including those supporting Russian paramilitary organizations;
            (8) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) 2022 
        Strategic Concept correctly recognizes the need to prepare for, 
        and respond to, the threats posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic 
        security, including threats derived from its relationship with 
        the Russian Federation and its efforts to divide United States 
        and European allies;
            (9) NATO members must work to implement and build on steps 
        identified in NATO's Strategic Concept, including building 
        greater NATO expertise on the PRC and its military and 
        intelligence apparatuses, using NATO summits as an opportunity 
        to check progress and update priorities, and making any needed 
        adjustments to NATO's operational plans to account for the 
        ownership or involvement of PRC state-owned enterprises and 
        other entities in space, key seaports, communications nodes, 
        and airports;
            (10) the Government of the PRC has been clear about its 
        desire to be included in diplomatic discussions about ending 
        Russia's war in Ukraine, including through the February 2023 
        publication of a 12-point position paper on the ``political 
        settlement of the Ukraine crisis'' and the appointment of a 
        Special Envoy for Eurasian Affairs;
            (11) the Government of the PRC has done nothing to deliver 
        tangible outcomes on the elements of its position paper beyond 
        symbolic actions;
            (12) although the PRC's position paper calls for the full 
        implementation of the July 2022 United Nations-brokered Black 
        Sea Grain Initiative as a means to maintain global food 
        security, and despite Xi Jinping's emphasis on food security 
        for his own country, the Government of the PRC did nothing to 
        pressure the Russian Federation to return to the deal, which it 
        abrogated in July 2023;
            (13) President Joseph R. Biden rightly dismissed the PRC's 
        ``peace plan'' (referring to the 12-point position paper) as 
        something that would not help ``anyone other than Russia,'' as 
        he stated in February 2023;
            (14) the United States should remain wary of PRC engagement 
        in Ukraine and instead focus its efforts on strengthening the 
        coalition of like-minded partners in support of Ukraine's full 
        sovereignty and territorial integrity;
            (15) given the PRC's significant support for Russia, Xi 
        Jinping and the Government of the PRC should not be viewed as 
        impartial brokers that will bring this war to an end on terms 
        that will be positive for Ukraine, its independence, and the 
        security of Europe;
            (16) although Russia and the PRC have disagreements, both 
        countries assess that their partnership is critical to 
        countering the United States;
            (17) PRC diplomatic involvement in Ukraine would lead to 
        greater PRC involvement in European security issues, while also 
        presenting the PRC as a responsible party to the international 
        community;
            (18) it is of vital importance that the United States and 
        Europe remain united in confronting the security and economic 
        risks posed by a significant PRC role in diplomatic efforts to 
        end Russia's war in Ukraine, executing policies that account 
        for greater Sino-Russian alignment, and working together 
        closely on planning ahead for reconstruction of Ukraine;
            (19) as earlier PRC investments in Ukraine targeted 
        strategic sectors, any post-war PRC investments in Ukraine 
        would give the PRC access to valuable military technology and 
        know-how, as Ukraine inherited roughly one-third of the Soviet 
        Union's defense-industrial base and 15 percent of Soviet 
        military research and development facilities, and during its 
        war against Russia, has made great strides in the development 
        of certain defense items; and
            (20) given the PRC's documented track record on corruption, 
        a role for the PRC in Ukraine's reconstruction would likely 
        undercut extensive ongoing United States and European efforts 
        to align Ukrainian governance and anti-corruption standards 
        with those of Western institutions, as well as the European 
        Union's (EU) progress in helping Ukraine adhere to the 
        standards required for its eventual entry into the EU.

SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS 
              IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States alliances in the Indo-Pacific provide 
        a unique strategic advantage to the United States and are among 
        the United States' most vital relationships, enabling the 
        United States Government to advance its vital national 
        interests, defend its territory, expand its economy through 
        international trade and commerce, establish enduring 
        cooperation among like-minded countries, prevent the domination 
        of the Indo-Pacific by a hostile power or powers, and ensure 
        the region's sea, skies, and other shared domains remain free 
        and open and are lawfully governed;
            (2) the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
        Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are critical allies in 
        advancing a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region and 
        tackling challenges with unity of purpose, and have a strong 
        record of collaboration on shared interests in areas such as 
        defense and security, economic prosperity, infrastructure 
        connectivity, and fundamental freedoms;
            (3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in 
        the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Indonesia, 
        Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, Taiwan, and Vietnam as well 
        as regional architecture such as the Quad, the Association of 
        Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic 
        Cooperation (APEC), which are essential to further shared 
        interests;
            (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region 
        demands consistent United States and allied commitment to 
        strengthening and advancing our alliances so that they are 
        postured to meet key challenges, and will require sustained 
        political will, concrete partnerships, economic, commercial, 
        and technological cooperation, consistent and tangible 
        commitments, high-level and extensive consultations on matters 
        of mutual interest, mutual and shared cooperation in the 
        acquisition of key capabilities important to allied defenses, 
        and unified mutual support in the face of political, economic, 
        or military coercion;
            (5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships 
        and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken 
        collective ability to advance shared interests;
            (6) the United States must work with allies to prioritize 
        human rights, good governance, and anti-corruption throughout 
        the Indo-Pacific region;
            (7) the Indo-Pacific region is vulnerable to natural shocks 
        and stresses, making humanitarian and disaster relief, 
        stewardship of natural resources, and food and water security 
        important areas of cooperation between the United States and 
        partner countries; and
            (8) the United States should continue to engage and deepen 
        cooperation with allies and partners of the United States in 
        the Indo-Pacific region, in the areas of--
                    (A) disaster risk reduction, including efforts to 
                enhance effective forecasting, reduce vulnerability, 
                and build resilience to natural shocks and stresses;
                    (B) disaster response and early recovery;
                    (C) humanitarian assistance and food security;
                    (D) sustainable uses of forest and water resources 
                with the goal of promoting economic security while 
                preserving biodiversity and access to safe drinking 
                water; and
                    (E) fisheries and marine resource conservation.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States--
            (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security 
        cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, the 
        Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, 
        including, as appropriate, through diplomatic engagement, 
        regional development, energy security and development, 
        scientific and health partnerships, educational and cultural 
        exchanges, missile defense, intelligence-sharing, space, cyber, 
        and other diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;
            (2) to uphold United States multilateral and bilateral 
        treaty obligations, including--
                    (A) defending Australia under article IV of the 
                Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security 
                Treaty (ANZUS);
                    (B) defending Japan, including territories under 
                the administration of Japan, under article V of the 
                Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the 
                United States of America and Japan;
                    (C) defending the Republic of Korea under article 
                III of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United 
                States and the Republic of Korea;
                    (D) defending the Philippines under Article IV of 
                the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and 
                the Republic of the Philippines; and
                    (E) defending Thailand under Article IV of the 1954 
                Manila Pact and the Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962;
            (3) to strengthen and deepen the United States regional and 
        multilateral partnerships, including with ASEAN, and to support 
        ASEAN centrality in the region;
            (4) to cooperate with Australia, Japan, the Republic of 
        Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand to promote human rights 
        bilaterally and multilaterally, including through regional 
        fora;
            (5) to support the continued development and implementation 
        of an enhanced trilateral security partnership between 
        Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States under the 
        auspices of ``AUKUS''; and
            (6) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and 
        security cooperation with regional partners, such as India, 
        Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
        Vietnam.

SEC. 203. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH THE QUAD.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States should continue to reaffirm its 
        commitment to quadrilateral cooperation among Australia, India, 
        Japan, and the United States (the ``Quad'') to enhance and 
        implement a shared vision to meet shared regional challenges 
        and to promote a free, open, inclusive and resilient Indo-
        Pacific that is characterized by democracy, rule of law, and 
        market-based economic growth, and is free from undue influence 
        and coercion;
            (2) the United States should seek to expand collaboration 
        with Quad partners to bring concrete benefits to the Indo-
        Pacific region, including benefits with respect to the rule of 
        law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution 
        of disputes, democratic values, economic prosperity and 
        security, infrastructure development, energy access and 
        security, technological advancement, territorial integrity, 
        peace and prosperity, and democratic resilience;
            (3) the United States should seek to expand avenues of 
        cooperation with the Quad, including more coordinated policies 
        related to such shared interests as protecting cyberspace and 
        advancing maritime security;
            (4) the cooperation under the Indo-Pacific Partnership for 
        Maritime Domain Awareness, announced at the fourth Quad leaders 
        meeting on May 24, 2022, will contribute to the region's shared 
        maritime domain awareness picture, which is a critical 
        component to achieving peace, stability, and prosperity in the 
        maritime domain;
            (5) Quad commitments to address shared challenges in new 
        areas such as resilience in the Pacific Islands region, space, 
        cyberspace, and critical and emerging technologies, and to 
        continue to work to address pandemic preparedness, to provide 
        quality infrastructure investment, humanitarian assistance, and 
        disaster relief, and to enhance people-to-people ties, 
        including through the announcement of a Quad Fellowship in 
        September 2021, further advance the important cooperation among 
        Quad nations that is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region;
            (6) the United States and other Quad nations, including 
        through partnerships with multilateral development banks, 
        should work together to finance and otherwise cooperate on 
        development and infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific 
        region that are sustainable and offer a viable alternative to 
        the investments of the PRC in that region under the Belt and 
        Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative; and
            (7) in consultation with other Quad countries, the 
        President should continue to prioritize clear, concrete 
        deliverables related to Quad priorities, particularly for 
        leader-level working groups, to increase the Quad's operational 
        effectiveness and strategic value by demonstrating that the 
        Quad can deliver tangible results while remaining agile enough 
        to adjust as needs and conditions change.

SEC. 204. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ENHANCING UNITED STATES-TAIWAN 
              PARTNERSHIP.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the United 
        States Indo-Pacific strategy;
            (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy as 
        key elements for the continued peace and stability of the 
        greater Indo-Pacific region, and a vital national security 
        interest of the United States;
            (3) to secure United States interests and preserve the 
        ability of the people of Taiwan to determine their own future, 
        and to strenuously oppose any action by the PRC to use force to 
        change the status quo of Taiwan;
            (4) to strengthen cooperation with the military of Taiwan 
        under the framework of the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-
        8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances, with 
        consideration of the ongoing military buildup in the PRC and 
        the military balance in the Taiwan Strait, and to transfer 
        defense articles to Taiwan to enhance its capabilities, 
        including to advance its ability to contribute to denying the 
        PRC coercion and potential invasion;
            (5) to support Taiwan's implementation of its asymmetric 
        defense strategy;
            (6) to encourage Taiwan to continue increasing its defense 
        spending and undertaking defense reforms that enable the full 
        resourcing and effectiveness of its defense strategy;
            (7) to support Taiwan's vibrant democracy and free and fair 
        elections, and promote dignity and respect for the 
        democratically elected leaders of Taiwan, who represent more 
        than 23,000,000 people, by using the full range of diplomatic 
        and other appropriate tools available to promote Taiwan's 
        international space;
            (8) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's meaningful 
        participation in the United Nations and its specialized 
        agencies, the World Health Assembly, the International Criminal 
        Police Organization, and other international bodies as 
        appropriate;
            (9) to advocate for information sharing with Taiwan in the 
        International Agency for Research on Cancer;
            (10) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United 
        States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners;
            (11) to enhance bilateral trade, including through new 
        agreements and the United States-Taiwan 21st Century Trade 
        Initiative;
            (12) to include Taiwan as a partner in the Indo-Pacific 
        Economic Framework;
            (13) to actively engage in negotiations in pursuance of a 
        bilateral free trade agreement and tax agreement to avoid 
        double taxation and promote trade and investment;
            (14) to expand bilateral economic and technological 
        cooperation, including improving supply chain security;
            (15) to support United States educational and exchange 
        programs with Taiwan, including by promoting the study of 
        Chinese language, culture, history, and politics in Taiwan;
            (16) to expand people-to-people exchanges between the 
        United States and Taiwan;
            (17) to ensure that distinctions in practice regarding 
        United States relations with Taiwan are consistent with the 
        longstanding, comprehensive, strategic, and values-based 
        relationship the United States shares with Taiwan, and 
        contribute to the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues; 
        and
            (18) to further enhance United States relations with Taiwan 
        by forming a robust partnership that--
                    (A) meets current geopolitical challenges;
                    (B) fully accounts for Taiwan's democratic status; 
                and
                    (C) remains faithful to United States principles 
                and values, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act 
                and the Six Assurances.

SEC. 205. EXPANDING EXPERTISE ON TAIWAN MATTERS.

    (a) Permanent Personnel Realignment.--Not later than the end of 
fiscal year 2024, the Secretary of State shall realign up to twelve 
full-time equivalent personnel to the American Institute in Taiwan.
    (b) Additional Personnel.--
            (1) American institute in taiwan.--The American Institute 
        in Taiwan should increase staffing by not less than four 
        additional full-time equivalent personnel at the American 
        Institute in Taiwan in Washington.
            (2) Office of taiwan coordination.--There is authorized to 
        be appropriated $800,000 for four additional full-time 
        equivalent personnel at the Office of Taiwan Coordination at 
        the Department of State.
    (c) Notification.--Not later than 30 days after the Secretary of 
State carries out the requirement in subsection (a), the Secretary 
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a notification 
that includes a description of the role of each realigned full-time 
equivalent personnel and how such realignment addresses gaps in the 
American Institute in Taiwan's ability to advance United States 
interests with respect to Taiwan.

SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-SOUTH KOREA ALLIANCE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) On October 1, 1953, the United States and the Republic 
        of Korea signed the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United 
        States and the Republic of Korea.
            (2) First agreed to in 1991, the ``Agreement between the 
        United States of America and the Republic of Korea Concerning 
        Special Measures Relating to Article V of the Agreement under 
        Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United 
        States of America and the Republic of Korea Regarding 
        Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed 
        Forces in the Republic of Korea'' (referred to in this section 
        as the ``SMA''), established the sharing of non-personnel 
        stationing costs associated with the presence of United States 
        forces in the Republic of Korea.
            (3) After eight rounds of consultations, the United States 
        and the Republic of Korea reached consensus on ad ref texts for 
        a renewed SMA on October 3, 2024.
            (4) The renewed SMA and the accompanying Implementing 
        Arrangement for the Special Measures Agreement (``SMA IA'') 
        were signed in Seoul, South Korea, on November 4, 2024, 
        becoming the 12th iteration of the SMA.
            (5) Under the renewed SMA and consistent with United States 
        objectives, the United States and the Republic of Korea agreed 
        to a topline 8.3 percent increase in the contribution from the 
        Republic of South Korea as compared to the calendar year 2025 
        contribution.
            (6) The renewed SMA meets additional United States priority 
        objectives, including maintaining the United States position of 
        protecting the authority of the United States Forces Korea 
        (USFK) Commander to allocate funds within and between the three 
        cost categories in accordance with operational and mission 
        requirements.
            (7) The renewed SMA and IA entered into force on November 
        29, 2024, following notification in writing by the United 
        States and the Republic of South Korea that their respective 
        domestic procedures necessary for the agreement's entry into 
        force had been completed.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
uphold and reinforce the United States alliance with the Republic of 
Korea, including by--
            (1) maintaining the presence of approximately 28,500 
        members of the United States Armed Forces deployed to the 
        Republic of Korea;
            (2) affirming the United States extended deterrence 
        commitment using the full range of United States defense 
        capabilities, consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty Between 
        the United States and the Republic of Korea, signed at 
        Washington, October 1, 1953, in support of the shared objective 
        of a peaceful and stable Korean Peninsula; and
            (3) upholding the renewed SMA agreement reached and signed 
        on November 4, 2024, between the United States and the Republic 
        of Korea.

SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES-JAPAN-REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
              COOPERATION.

    It is the sense of Congress that it is in the national interest of 
the United States--
            (1) to support Japan and the Republic in Korea (ROK) in 
        building on the steps taken to address major issues in their 
        bilateral relations, including the ROK's plan to resolve a 
        World War II forced labor dispute announced in March 2023 and 
        follow-on bilateral leaders summit;
            (2) to encourage Japan and the ROK to increase engagement 
        in security cooperation on a bilateral and trilateral basis 
        with the United States;
            (3) to emphasize the shared threats that Japan and the ROK 
        face as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
        accelerates its provocative missile tests with a tempo and 
        diversity of missiles that suggests it is simulating wartime 
        use to signal to United States allies that it can control 
        escalation in a conflict;
            (4) to prioritize the exchange of information among the 
        three militaries, particularly in the area of theater missile 
        defense;
            (5) to encourage Japan and the ROK to resolve their 
        history-related disputes with mutually acceptable and durable 
        solutions that allow cooperation to continue without 
        interruption;
            (6) to encourage and facilitate Japan and the ROK deepening 
        cooperation on cyber defense, including through the NATO 
        Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), which 
        Japan joined in 2018 and the ROK joined in 2022;
            (7) to participate in trilateral inter-parliamentary 
        exchanges with Japan and the ROK, including through efforts 
        like the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission Thomas S. Foley 
        Legislative Exchange program; and
            (8) to promote trilateral development and humanitarian 
        assistance cooperation to collectively enhance the stability, 
        security, and democratic norms of partner countries through an 
        affirmative and sovereign development model.

SEC. 208. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED FOR THE SENATE TO GIVE ITS 
              ADVICE AND CONSENT TO THE RATIFICATION OF THE UNITED 
              NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA.

     It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) it is in the national interest for the United States to 
        become a formal signatory of the United Nations Convention on 
        the law of the Sea (UNCLOS), done at Montego Bay December 10, 
        1982;
            (2) the United States Senate should promptly give its 
        advice and consent to the ratification of the UNCLOS; and
            (3) joining the UNCLOS should remain a top priority for the 
        United States, the importance of which was most recently 
        underscored by the strategic challenges the United States faces 
        in the Indo-Pacific, the Arctic, and the Black Sea regions.

SEC. 209. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS IN 
              INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC 
              AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress--
            (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of 
        force by the PRC to impede operations or freedom of overflight 
        in international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to 
        alter the status quo, or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific 
        region;
            (2) urges the Government of the PRC to refrain from 
        implementing the declared East China Sea Air Defense 
        Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, 
        and to refrain from taking similar provocative actions 
        elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration 
        decision is final and legally binding on both the Philippines 
        and the PRC and that the PRC's claims to offshore resources 
        across most of the South China Sea are unlawful; and
            (4) urge the PRC to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of 
        Arbitration ruling, despite the PRC's obligations as a state 
        party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to--
            (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and 
        partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including longstanding 
        United States policy regarding Article IV of the United States-
        Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, and restate its position 
        that the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands fall within the 
        scope of Article V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense 
        Treaty;
            (2) oppose claims that impinge on lawful use of the sea, or 
        the airspace above it, and oppose the militarization of new and 
        reclaimed land features in the South China Sea;
            (3) continue certain policies with respect to the PRC's 
        claims in the South China Sea, namely--
                    (A) that the PRC claims in the South China Sea, 
                including claims to offshore resources across most of 
                the South China Sea, are unlawful;
                    (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime 
                claim vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas that the 
                Permanent Court of Arbitration found to be in the 
                Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its 
                continental shelf;
                    (C) to reject any claim by the PRC to waters beyond 
                a 12-nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands 
                it claims in the Spratly Islands; and
                    (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial or 
                maritime claim to James Shoal;
            (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in 
        destabilizing activities, including occupation or efforts to 
        unlawfully assert administration over areas subject to disputed 
        claims;
            (5) encourage disputes to be managed without intimidation, 
        coercion, or force;
            (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in 
        accordance with international law;
            (7) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime 
        claims, including claims to territorial waters or territorial 
        seas, must be derived from land features and otherwise comport 
        with international law;
            (8) oppose the imposition of unilateral fishing regulations 
        covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations 
        which have raised tensions in the region;
            (9) support a Code of Conduct only if that Code of Conduct 
        reflects the interests of Southeast Asian claimant states and 
        does not serve as a vehicle for the PRC to advance its unlawful 
        maritime claims and keep the United States out of the Indo-
        Pacific region;
            (10) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules 
        and guidelines, including the International Regulations for 
        Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 
        (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation 
        between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other 
        countries, including the PRC;
            (11) support the development of regional institutions and 
        bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense 
        Minister's Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded 
        ASEAN Maritime Forum, to increase practical cooperation in the 
        region and reinforce the role of international law;
            (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other 
        countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and 
        capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States 
        Government to explore the development of appropriate 
        multilateral mechanisms for a ``common operating picture'' in 
        the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would 
        serve to help countries protect their sovereignty in a manner 
        consistent with international law and deter risky and dangerous 
        activities;
            (13) oppose actions by any country to prevent another 
        country from lawfully exercising its sovereign rights related 
        to the resources of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and 
        continental shelf by making claims to those areas in the South 
        China Sea that are not consistent with international law; and
            (14) assure the continuity of operations by the United 
        States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate, 
        operations in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm 
        the principle of freedom of operations in international waters 
        and airspace in accordance with established principles and 
        practices of international law.

SEC. 209A. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNIVERSAL IMPLEMENTATION OF 
              UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress--
            (1) condemns Russia's March 2024 veto of, and the PRC's 
        abstention on, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
        renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts tasked with 
        monitoring United Nations sanctions against the Democratic 
        People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as irresponsible and 
        dangerous actions that undermine international efforts to 
        counter the threat posed by the DPRK's unlawful nuclear and 
        ballistic missile program;
            (2) despite the expiration of the mandate of the Panel of 
        Experts, remains committed to working with relevant United 
        Nations agencies, members of the Security Council, and all 
        United Nations Member States, to uphold the United Nations 
        sanctions regime against the DPRK's unlawful nuclear and 
        ballistic missile program, and to advance the global 
        nonproliferation regime; and
            (3) supports the establishment of new multilateral 
        mechanisms to monitor United Nations Member State 
        implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions 
        targeting the DPRK to shine a light on Member States who are 
        evading sanctions and abetting the DPRK regime's unlawful 
        weapons program.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
sustain economic pressure on the Government of the DPRK until the 
regime undertakes actions toward complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
denuclearization, including by--
            (1) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to implement 
        and enforce existing United Nations sanctions with regard to 
        the DPRK and its nuclear and missile programs;
            (2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and in 
        accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, to 
        end the practice of hosting DPRK citizens as guest workers, 
        recognizing that such workers are demonstrated to constitute an 
        illicit source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nuclear 
        ambitions;
            (3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to pursue 
        rigorous interdiction of shipments to and from the DPRK, 
        including ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United 
        Nations Security Council resolutions;
            (4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities--
                    (A) to cease business activities with United 
                Nations-designated entities and their affiliates in the 
                DPRK; and
                    (B) to expel from the PRC individuals who enable 
                the DPRK to acquire materials for its nuclear and 
                ballistic missile programs;
            (5) working with likeminded partners, think tanks, research 
        organizations, and civil society to develop and implement 
        alternative, independent mechanisms to monitor United Nations 
        Member State adherence to United Nations sanctions targeting 
        the unlawful DPRK weapons program and publicly shine a light on 
        Member States that evade and violate those sanctions; and
            (6) implementing and enforcing United Nations Security 
        Council resolutions with respect to the DPRK and United States 
        sanctions, including those pursuant to the North Korea 
        Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-
        122), the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions 
        Act (Public Law 115-44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear 
        Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI of Public Law 
        116-92), and relevant United States executive orders.

SEC. 209B. ESTABLISHING A SENIOR OFFICIAL FOR THE COMPACTS OF FREE 
              ASSOCIATION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary shall designate a senior official at 
the Department of State responsible for administering the Compacts of 
Free Association at the Department of State (in this section referred 
to as the ``Senior Official''). The Senior Official shall report to the 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
    (b) Duties.--The Senior Official shall--
            (1) be responsible for the conduct of United States foreign 
        policy with respect to the countries affiliated with the United 
        States Government under the Compacts of Free Association (in 
        this section referred to as the ``Compacts''), namely the 
        freely associated states of--
                    (A) the Republic of Palau;
                    (B) the Marshall Islands; and
                    (C) the Federated States of Micronesia;
            (2) assist the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
        and Pacific Affairs in providing overall direction, 
        coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities 
        of the United States Government in these countries, including 
        ensuring the timely transfer of assistance and provision of 
        benefits through the United States Department of the Interior, 
        as laid out in the Compacts;
            (3) oversee and evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of 
        United States policy with respect to these countries as well as 
        of the plans, programs, resources, and performance for 
        implementing that policy, including programs and other 
        activities implemented by the Department of the Interior;
            (4) directly supervise the policy and operations of the 
        Compacts and provide guidance to relevant United States 
        missions within the Indo-Pacific region;
            (5) ensure the provision of an adequate, regular flow of 
        information to posts abroad on United States Government 
        policies, policy deliberations, and diplomatic exchanges in 
        Washington, DC; and
            (6) ensure the continuity of implementation of commitments 
        and Compact obligations and benefits, consistent with United 
        States national interests in the Indo-Pacific region.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $250,000 to support the Senior Official in the conduct and 
discharge of the duties described in subsection (b).

      PART II--ENHANCING DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

SEC. 211. ENHANCEMENT OF DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT 
              WITH PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES.

    (a) Authority.--The Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
Commerce are authorized to hire Locally Employed Staff in Pacific 
Island countries for the purpose of providing increased diplomatic 
support and promoting increased economic and commercial engagement 
between the United States and Pacific Island countries.
    (b) Availability of Funds.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
to the Department of State and the Department of Commerce for fiscal 
year 2025, not more than $10,000,000 to each agency to carry out the 
purposes of this section.
    (c) Exception for American Samoa.--The Secretary of State may, as 
appropriate, treat the territory of American Samoa as a foreign country 
for purposes of carrying out this section.

SEC. 212. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the 
Department of State $12,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 
2029 for the International Military Education and Training Program for 
Latin America and the Caribbean.
    (b) Modernization.--The Secretary of State shall take steps to 
modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding pursuant to 
subsection (a) to ensure that such programs are rigorous, substantive, 
and the preeminent choice for international military education and 
training for Latin American and Caribbean partners.
    (c) Required Elements.--The programs referred to in subsection (a) 
shall--
            (1) provide training and capacity-building opportunities to 
        Latin American and Caribbean security services;
            (2) provide practical skills and frameworks for--
                    (A) improving the functioning and organization of 
                security services in Latin America and the Caribbean;
                    (B) creating a better understanding of the United 
                States and its values; and
                    (C) using technology for maximum strategic impact 
                and effective operations; and
            (3) promote and ensure that security services in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority and 
        operate in compliance with international human rights law and 
        international humanitarian law.
    (d) Limitation.--Security assistance under this section is subject 
to the limitations of section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).

SEC. 213. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Young African Leaders Initiative, launched in 2010, 
        is a signature effort to invest in the next generation of 
        African leaders;
            (2) Africa is a continent of strategic importance and it is 
        vital for the United States to support strong and enduring 
        partnerships with the next generation of African leaders;
            (3) the United States Government should prioritize 
        investments to build the capacity of emerging young African 
        leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, including through efforts to--
                    (A) enhance leadership skills;
                    (B) encourage entrepreneurship;
                    (C) strengthen public administration and the role 
                of civil society;
                    (D) enhance peace and security in their respective 
                countries of origin and across Africa; and
                    (E) connect young African leaders continentally and 
                globally across the private, civic, and public sectors;
            (4) youth in Africa have a positive impact on efforts to 
        foster economic growth, improve public sector transparency and 
        governance, and counter extremism, and should be an area of 
        focus for United States outreach on the African continent; and
            (5) the Secretary of State should increase the number of 
        fellows from Africa participating in the Mandela Washington 
        Fellowship above the estimated 700 fellows who participated 
        during fiscal year 2021.
    (b) Young African Leaders Initiative.--
            (1) In general.--There is established the Young African 
        Leaders Initiative, (``YALI'').
            (2) Purpose.--YALI shall seek to build the capacity of 
        young African leaders in sub-Saharan Africa in the areas of 
        business and entrepreneurship, civic leadership, or public 
        administration, including through efforts to--
                    (A) support young African leaders by offering 
                professional development, training, and networking 
                opportunities, particularly in the areas of leadership, 
                innovation, civic engagement, elections, human rights, 
                entrepreneurship, good governance, peace and security, 
                and public administration;
                    (B) provide increased training to young African 
                leaders to promote economic growth, strengthen ties 
                between United States and African businesses, build 
                resilience to predatory lending practices, and improve 
                capacity in strategic sectors, including critical 
                minerals extraction, technology and media; and
                    (C) identify additional ways to connect all YALI 
                alumni to United States public and private resources 
                and institutions.
            (3) Fellowships.--
                    (A) In general.--YALI shall support the 
                participation in the United States in the Mandela 
                Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders of 
                fellows from Africa who--
                            (i) are between 25 and 35 years of age;
                            (ii) have demonstrated strong capabilities 
                        in entrepreneurship, innovation, public 
                        service, and leadership; and
                            (iii) have had a positive impact in their 
                        communities, organizations, or institutions.
                    (B) Oversight.--The fellowships described in 
                paragraph (1) shall be overseen by the Secretary of 
                State through the Bureau of Education and Cultural 
                Affairs.
                    (C) Eligibility.--The Secretary of State shall 
                establish and publish--
                            (i) eligibility criteria for participation 
                        as a fellow under paragraph (1); and
                            (ii) criteria for determining which 
                        eligible applicants will be selected.
            (4) Reciprocal exchanges.--Subject to the approval of the 
        Secretary of State, United States citizens may--
                    (A) engage in reciprocal exchanges with alumni of 
                the fellowship described in paragraph (3); and
                    (B) collaborate on projects with such fellowship 
                alumni.
            (5) Yali regional leadership centers and networks.--The 
        Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
        Development shall establish not fewer than 4 regional 
        leadership centers in sub-Saharan Africa to offer in-person and 
        online training throughout the year on business and 
        entrepreneurship, civic leadership, and public management to 
        young African leaders between 18 and 35 years of age who have 
        demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, 
        innovation, public service and leadership, and peace-building 
        and conflict resolution, and who have had a positive impact in 
        their communities, organizations, or institutions.
            (6) Activities.--
                    (A) United states-based activities.--The Secretary 
                of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant 
                Federal departments and agencies, shall oversee all 
                United States-based activities carried out under YALI, 
                including--
                            (i) the participation of Mandela Washington 
                        Fellows in a six-week Leadership Institute at a 
                        United States educational institution in 
                        business, civic engagement, or public 
                        management, including academic sessions, site 
                        visits, professional networking opportunities, 
                        leadership training, community service, and 
                        organized cultural activities; and
                            (ii) the participation by Mandela 
                        Washington Fellows in an annual Mandela 
                        Washington Fellowship Summit, to provide such 
                        Fellows the opportunity to meet with United 
                        States leaders from the private, public, and 
                        non-profit sectors.
                    (B) Africa-based activities.--The Administrator for 
                the United States Agency for International Development, 
                in coordination with the Secretary of State and the 
                heads of other relevant Federal departments and 
                agencies, should continue to oversee and support YALI 
                activities in sub-Saharan Africa, including--
                            (i) continued leadership training and other 
                        professional development opportunities for 
                        Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African 
                        Leaders alumni upon their return to their home 
                        countries, including online courses, training, 
                        and access to funding;
                            (ii) training for young African leaders at 
                        regional leadership centers established in 
                        accordance with paragraph (5), and through 
                        online and in-person courses offered by such 
                        centers; and
                            (iii) opportunities for networking and 
                        engagement with--
                                    (I) alumni of the Mandela 
                                Washington Fellowship for Young African 
                                Leaders;
                                    (II) alumni of programs at regional 
                                leadership centers established in 
                                accordance with paragraph (5);
                                    (III) United States and like-minded 
                                diplomatic missions, business leaders, 
                                the diaspora, and others as 
                                appropriate; and
                                    (IV) where practicable and 
                                appropriate, other United States-funded 
                                regional leadership programs, including 
                                the Young Southeast Asian Leaders 
                                Initiative (YSEALI), the Young Leaders 
                                of the Americas Initiative (YLAI), the 
                                Young Pacific Leaders (YPL), and the 
                                Young Transatlantic Innovation Leaders 
                                Initiative (YTILI), and through 
                                Department of State programs such as 
                                the Community Engagement Exchange 
                                Program and other initiatives.
                    (C) Implementation.--To carry out this subsection, 
                the Secretary of State and the Administrator for the 
                United States Agency for International Development, in 
                coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal 
                departments and agencies, shall seek to partner with 
                the private sector to pursue public-private 
                partnerships, leverage private sector expertise, expand 
                networking opportunities, and identify funding 
                opportunities as well as fellowship and employment 
                opportunities for YALI.

SEC. 214. STRENGTHENING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN AFRICA.

    (a) Bolstering United States Diplomatic Presence in Africa.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit 
        to the appropriate committees of Congress a plan to strengthen 
        United States diplomatic presence in Africa, including to 
        ensure that United States embassies in Africa have sufficient 
        personnel to focus on the activities, policies, and investments 
        of the PRC.
            (2) Elements.--The plan required under subsection (a) shall 
        include the following elements:
                    (A) A review of the incentives available for United 
                States diplomatic personnel who serve in posts in 
                Africa, which includes proposals to provide additional 
                incentives for hard-to-fill posts in Africa, including 
                those that leverage relevant talent in the Department, 
                including talent within the civil service, and which 
                addresses requirements for promotions and onward 
                assignment for the Foreign Service.
                    (B) An identification of--
                            (i) the number and average duration over 
                        the last 5 years of vacancies in the political 
                        and economic sections of United States 
                        embassies relative to the full-time equivalent 
                        positions allocated for the economic and 
                        political sections in such embassies; and
                            (ii) the number of Foreign Service Officers 
                        who are working in ``stretch'' positions in the 
                        political and economic sections of United 
                        States embassies in Africa and a list of 
                        proposals to reduce those vacancies and stretch 
                        positions.
                    (C) An assessment of whether United States 
                embassies in Africa have adequate staff to implement 
                initiatives such as Prosper Africa and those emanating 
                from the African Leaders Summit and a proposal to 
                better meet the staffing needs to implement those and 
                other high-priority initiatives.
    (b) Africa Heads of State Summit.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and biennially thereafter, the 
        President shall convene a United States-Africa Leaders Summit 
        (in this subsection referred to as the ``Summit'') in order to 
        establish stronger bilateral and multilateral diplomatic, 
        economic, security, and cultural ties between the United States 
        and African countries.
            (2) Participation.--Each Summit convened pursuant to this 
        subsection shall have participation, including in meetings with 
        United States officials, from--
                    (A) leaders of civilian-led governments of African 
                countries in good standing with the African Union, each 
                of which the President has determined--
                            (i) has held a credible election associated 
                        with the current head of government or state; 
                        or
                            (ii) is the head of a transitional 
                        government, is implementing a roadmap to hold 
                        credible elections, and is unaffiliated with 
                        actions that were related to an 
                        unconstitutional change of administration; and
                    (B) civil society from each of the African 
                countries represented at the Summit.
            (3) Unit to plan and implement.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary of State shall 
                establish a dedicated unit within the Bureau of African 
                Affairs of the Department of State to coordinate, plan, 
                and implement the Summit on a biennial basis, which 
                should include robust interagency consultation and may 
                include, on a temporary basis, personnel seconded from 
                the United States Agency for International Development 
                and other Federal agencies as appropriate, and which 
                shall be led by an individual who has previously been 
                appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
                    (B) Planning efforts.--The unit established under 
                this paragraph shall--
                            (i) use lessons learned from the 2022 
                        African Leaders Summit and subsequent Summits 
                        to inform planning of future Summits;
                            (ii) lead interagency efforts to provide 
                        guidance to United States embassies in African 
                        countries related to planning each Summit and 
                        engagement with governments and civil society 
                        in advance of each Summit;
                            (iii) lead efforts to implement commitments 
                        made at previous Summits; and
                            (iv) consult regularly with the appropriate 
                        committees of Congress on the planning in 
                        advance of, and follow-up for, each Summit.

SEC. 215. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
              CARIBBEAN REGARDING ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
              RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Government of the PRC is exporting its model for 
        internal security and state control of society through advanced 
        technology and artificial intelligence; and
            (2) the inclusion of communication networks and 
        communications supply chains with equipment and services from 
        companies with close ties to or that are susceptible to 
        pressure from the Government of the PRC or security services 
        without reliable legal checks on governmental powers can lead 
        to breaches of citizens' private information, increased 
        censorship, violations or abuses of human rights, and 
        harassment of political opponents.
    (b) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Chief Executive Officer of the 
United States Agency for Global Media, working through the Open 
Technology Fund, and the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, shall expand and prioritize 
efforts to provide anti-censorship and anti-surveillance technology and 
services to journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean, in order to 
enhance their ability to safely access or share digital news and 
information.
    (c) Support for Civil Society.--The Secretary of State, through the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
and in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency 
for International Development, shall work with civil society partners 
to--
            (1) support and promote programs that support internet 
        freedom and the free flow of information online in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean;
            (2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reliable 
        access to internet in Latin America and the Caribbean;
            (3) provide integrated support to civil society for digital 
        safety and related technology programs in Latin America and the 
        Caribbean;
            (4) train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques necessary 
        to ensure public accountability and prevent government 
        overreach in the digital sphere;
            (5) assist independent media outlets and journalists in 
        Latin America and the Caribbean to build their own capacity and 
        develop high-impact, in-depth news reports covering governance 
        and human rights topics;
            (6) provide training for journalists and civil society 
        leaders on investigative techniques necessary to improve 
        transparency and accountability in government and the private 
        sector;
            (7) provide training on investigative reporting of 
        incidents of corruption, unfair trade, and coercive and anti-
        competitive business and commercial practices perpetrated by 
        the PRC, including the role of the Government of the PRC in 
        such practices;
            (8) assist civil society organizations to strengthen their 
        capacity to monitor the activities described in paragraph (7); 
        and
            (9) identify local organizations to support the activities 
        to be carried out under this subsection.

                Subtitle B--International Organizations

SEC. 221. SAFEGUARDING THE INTEGRITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress that--
            (1) the United Nations system is critical to advancing 
        peace and security, human rights, and development;
            (2) the United States benefits from opportunities at the 
        United Nations to engage in multilateral diplomacy to advance 
        its own interests and to work with other members of the 
        international community to address complex and shared 
        challenges; and
            (3) the United States therefore has an interest in 
        safeguarding the integrity the United Nations System.
    (b) Prioritizing the United Nations System.--The Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the United States Ambassador to the United 
Nations as appropriate, shall prioritize and instruct the senior 
leadership of the United States Mission to the United Nations and other 
United States Missions to the United Nations to--
            (1) promote United States participation in the United 
        Nations System, and that of United States allies and partners 
        who are committed to upholding the integrity of the United 
        Nations;
            (2) ensure that United Nations employees are held 
        accountable to their obligation to uphold the United Nations 
        charter, rules, and regulations;
            (3) hold United States citizens and lawful permanent 
        residents serving within the United Nations accountable for 
        conduct, or conspiring or attempting to engage in conduct, 
        outside of the United States that would constitute a crime if 
        the conduct had occurred within the United States;
            (4) monitor and counter undue influence, especially by 
        authoritarian governments, within the United Nations System;
            (5) promote meaningful participation and inclusion of 
        Taiwan throughout the United Nations System and its affiliated 
        agencies and bodies; and
            (6) advance other priorities deemed relevant by the 
        Secretary of State and the United States Representative to the 
        United Nations to safeguard the integrity of the United Nations 
        System.

SEC. 222. UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN UNITED NATIONS SPECIALIZED 
              AGENCIES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Congress and the executive branch share responsibility 
        for the foreign relations of the United States pursuant to 
        Article I and Article II of the Constitution of the United 
        States.
            (2) While the executive branch has a unique role in 
        speaking for the United States with other governments, it is 
        not unconstrained under United States law in doing so.
            (3) The Senate has a constitutional role in the treaty-
        making process, and when the Senate expressly imposes 
        limitations or requirements that the executive branch must 
        satisfy before withdrawing from or terminating a treaty 
        relationship, the executive branch must adhere to those 
        limitations or requirements.
            (4) The Senate has provided advice and consent to 
        ratification of various agreements for the United States to 
        join United Nations bodies, and Congress has authorized United 
        States participation in other United Nations bodies where 
        treaty ratification was not required, including the World 
        Health Organization.
            (5) Congress therefore has a clear role--consistent with 
        its constitutional responsibilities in foreign affairs, advice, 
        and consent to ratification of treaties, and the making of 
        Federal law--in whether and how the United States participates 
        in the United Nations, including whether it seeks to withdraw 
        from such participation.
            (6) Robust United States engagement in international 
        organizations, including the World Health Organization, is 
        critical in countering efforts by the PRC to bolster its 
        influence around the world.
    (b) Withdrawal From World Health Organization.--Section 4 of the 
Joint Resolution entitled, ``Providing for membership by the United 
States in the World Health Organization and authorizing an 
appropriation therefor,'' approved June 14, 1948 (22 U.S.C. 290c), is 
amended by inserting before the period at the end the following ``: 
Provided further, That not less than 180 days before providing notice 
to withdraw the United States from the World Health Organization, the 
President and Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives a notification that such withdrawal is 
in the national interests of the United States''.
    (c) Withdrawal From Other Specialized Agencies or Related 
Organizations of the United Nations.--Not less than 180 days before 
taking formal action to initiate the United States withdrawal from a 
United Nations specialized agency or related organization, the 
President and Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives a notification that such withdrawal is 
in the national interests of the United States.

SEC. 223. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE ON MULTILATERAL STRATEGY AND 
              PERSONNEL.

    There is established within the Bureau of International 
Organizations of the Department of State an Office on Multilateral 
Strategy and Personnel (MSP) with the following responsibilities:
            (1) Developing, coordinating, and maintaining a whole-of-
        government strategy to strengthen United States engagement and 
        leadership with multilateral institutions and international 
        organizations, to include managing efforts to counter third-
        countries seeking to undermine the integrity of the United 
        Nations.
            (2) Coordinating whole-of-government efforts related to the 
        United Nations Junior Professional Officer (JPO) program, 
        including--
                    (A) recruiting qualified individuals who represent 
                the rich diversity of the United States to apply for 
                United States-sponsored JPO positions;
                    (B) collecting and collating information about 
                United States-sponsored JPOs from across the United 
                States Government;
                    (C) establishing and providing orientation and 
                other training materials with United States agencies 
                sponsoring JPOs;
                    (D) maintaining regular contact with current and 
                former United States-sponsored JPOs, including 
                providing career and professional advice to United 
                States-sponsored JPOs;
                    (E) making, informing, and advising on strategic 
                decisions, including about the location and duration of 
                United States-sponsored JPO positions to strengthen 
                United States national security interests and the 
                competitive advantage of United States-sponsored JPOs 
                for future employment; and
                    (F) sponsoring events, including representational 
                events as appropriate, to support United States-
                sponsored JPOs.
            (3) Coordinating and overseeing a whole-of-government 
        United States strategy and efforts in relation to promoting 
        qualified United States candidates for elected or appointed 
        senior positions at multilateral institutions and international 
        organizations, including--
                    (A) creating a whole-of-government strategy that 
                identifies and prioritizes upcoming openings of 
                leadership positions at multilateral institutions and 
                international organizations;
                    (B) developing and executing processes to identify 
                and recruit qualified candidates to apply or run for 
                these offices;
                    (C) consulting across the Department and 
                interagency as they implement selection processes; and
                    (D) creating and implementing a strategy to obtain 
                the support necessary for United States candidates for 
                priority leadership positions including--
                            (i) liaising and coordinating with 
                        international partners to promote United States 
                        candidates; and
                            (ii) working with embassies to engage 
                        officials and other entities needed to support 
                        relevant United States candidates.
            (4) Promoting detail and transfer opportunities for 
        qualified United States personnel to multilateral organizations 
        including by--
                    (A) liaising with multilateral institutions to 
                promote and identify detail and transfer opportunities;
                    (B) developing and maintaining a database of detail 
                and transfer opportunities to multilateral 
                organizations;
                    (C) promoting these detail and transfer 
                opportunities within the United States Government and 
                making the database available to those eligible for 
                details and transfers; and
                    (D) facilitating any relevant orientation, 
                trainings, or materials for detailees and transferees, 
                including debriefing detailees and transferees upon 
                their return to the United States Government.
            (5) Promoting internship and volunteer opportunities at 
        multilateral institutions and international organizations and 
        coordinating orientation and career development opportunities, 
        as relevant.
            (6) Promoting and entering into partnership arrangements 
        with multilateral institutions and international organizations 
        to encourage United States nationals participation in such 
        organizations.

SEC. 224. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS TO PROMOTE UNITED STATES 
              CITIZEN EMPLOYMENT AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
              INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) In General.--The President should direct United States 
departments and agencies to, in coordination with the Secretary of 
State--
            (1) fund and recruit Junior Professional Officers for 
        positions at the United Nations and related specialized and 
        technical organizations; and
            (2) facilitate secondments, details, and transfers to 
        agencies and specialized and technical bodies of the United 
        Nations.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated an additional $50,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 
through 2031 for the Secretary of State to support Junior Professional 
Officers, details, transfers, volunteers, and interns that advance 
United States interests at multilateral institutions and international 
organizations, including to recruit, train, and host events related to 
such positions, and to promote United States citizen candidates for 
employment and leadership positions at multilateral institutions and 
international organizations.

SEC. 225. UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AND REPRESENTATION IN STANDARDS-
              SETTING BODIES.

    (a) Enhancing Representation and Leadership of United States at 
International Standards-Setting Bodies.--The President shall--
            (1) establish an interagency working group to provide 
        assistance and technical expertise to enhance the 
        representation and leadership of the United States at 
        international bodies that set standards for equipment, systems, 
        software, and virtually defined networks that support 5th and 
        future generation mobile telecommunications systems and 
        infrastructure, such as the International Telecommunication 
        Union and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project; and
            (2) work with allies, partners, and the private sector to 
        increase productive engagement with respect to the standards 
        described in paragraph (1).
    (b) Interagency Working Group.--The interagency working group 
described in subsection (a) shall--
            (1) be chaired by the Secretary of Commerce or a designee 
        of the Secretary at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level or 
        above;
            (2) be vice-chaired by the Secretary of State or a designee 
        of the Secretary at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level or 
        above to focus on cooperation with allies and partners with 
        respect to international standards-setting bodies; and
            (3) consist of the head (or designee) of each Federal 
        department or agency the President determines appropriate.

    Subtitle C--South China and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2024

SEC. 231. SHORT TITLE.

    This part may be cited as the ``South China Sea and East China Sea 
Sanctions Act of 2024''.

SEC. 232. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PRC PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
              PRC'S ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE EAST 
              CHINA SEA.

    (a) Initial Imposition of Sanctions.--On and after the date that is 
120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President may 
impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any 
PRC person, including any senior official of the Government of the PRC, 
that the President determines--
            (1) is responsible for or significantly contributes to 
        large-scale reclamation, construction, militarization, or 
        ongoing supply of outposts in disputed areas of the South China 
        Sea;
            (2) is responsible for or significantly contributes to, or 
        has engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions, including the 
        use of coercion, to inhibit another country from protecting its 
        sovereign rights to access offshore resources in the South 
        China Sea, including in such country's exclusive economic zone, 
        consistent with such country's rights and obligations under 
        international law;
            (3) is responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in, 
        directly or indirectly, actions that significantly threaten the 
        peace, security, or stability of disputed areas of the South 
        China Sea or areas of the East China Sea administered by Japan 
        or the Republic of Korea, including through the use of vessels 
        and aircraft by the PRC to occupy or conduct extensive research 
        or drilling activity in those areas;
            (4) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided 
        financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or 
        services to, or in support of, any person subject to sanctions 
        pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), or (3); or
            (5) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on 
        behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person subject to 
        sanctions pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
    (b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions that may be imposed with 
respect to a person described in subsection (a) are the following:
            (1) Blocking of property.--The President may, in accordance 
        with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
        1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all 
        property and interests in property of the person if such 
        property and interests in property are in the United States, 
        come within the United States, or are or come within the 
        possession or control of a United States person.
            (2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
                    (A) Visas, admission, or parole.--In the case of an 
                alien, the alien may be--
                            (i) inadmissible to the United States;
                            (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other 
                        documentation to enter the United States; and
                            (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted 
                        or paroled into the United States or to receive 
                        any other benefit under the Immigration and 
                        Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
                    (B) Current visas revoked.--
                            (i) In general.--An alien described in 
                        subparagraph (A) may be subject to revocation 
                        of any visa or other entry documentation 
                        regardless of when the visa or other entry 
                        documentation is or was issued.
                            (ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under 
                        clause (i) may--
                                    (I) take effect immediately in 
                                accordance with section 221(i) of the 
                                Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
                                U.S.C. 1201(i)); and
                                    (II) cancel any other valid visa or 
                                entry documentation that is in the 
                                alien's possession.
            (3) Exclusion of corporate officers.--The President may 
        direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, and the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United 
        States, any alien that the President determines is a corporate 
        officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a controlling 
        interest in, the person.
            (4) Export sanction.--The President may order the United 
        States Government not to issue any specific license and not to 
        grant any other specific permission or authority to export any 
        goods or technology to the person under--
                    (A) the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 
                U.S.C. 4801 et seq.); or
                    (B) any other statute that requires the prior 
                review and approval of the United States Government as 
                a condition for the export or reexport of goods or 
                services.
            (5) Inclusion on entity list.--The President may include 
        the entity on the entity list maintained by the Bureau of 
        Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce and set 
        forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the Export 
        Administration Regulations, for activities contrary to the 
        national security or foreign policy interests of the United 
        States.
            (6) Ban on investment in equity or debt of sanctioned 
        person.--The President may, pursuant to such regulations or 
        guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit any United 
        States person from investing in or purchasing equity or debt 
        instruments of the person.
            (7) Banking transactions.--The President may, pursuant to 
        such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any 
        transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions 
        or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent 
        that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction 
        of the United States and involve any interest of the person.
            (8) Correspondent and payable-through accounts.--In the 
        case of a foreign financial institution, the President may 
        prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions 
        on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent 
        account or a payable-through account by the foreign financial 
        institution.
    (c) Implementation; Penalties.--
            (1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all 
        authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the 
        International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 
        1704) to carry out this section.
            (2) Penalties.--The penalties provided for in subsections 
        (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency 
        Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person 
        that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or 
        causes a violation of regulations prescribed under subsection 
        (b)(1) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person 
        that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of 
        such section 206.
    (d) Exceptions.--
            (1) Inapplicability of national emergency requirement.--The 
        requirements of section 202 of the International Emergency 
        Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply for 
        purposes of subsection (b)(1).
            (2) Exception for intelligence, law enforcement, and 
        national security activities.--Sanctions under this section 
        shall not apply to any authorized intelligence, law 
        enforcement, or national security activities of the United 
        States.
            (3) Compliance with international agreements.--Paragraphs 
        (2) and (3) of subsection (b) shall not apply if admission of 
        an alien to the United States is necessary to permit the United 
        States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters 
        of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success, June 26, 1947, 
        and entered into force, November 21, 1947, between the United 
        Nations and the United States and other international 
        obligations of the United States.
            (4) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
                    (A) In general.--The authority or a requirement to 
                impose sanctions under this section shall not include 
                the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on 
                the importation of goods.
                    (B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term 
                ``good'' means any article, natural or manmade 
                substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, 
                including inspection and test equipment, and excluding 
                technical data.
    (e) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Account; correspondent account; payable-through 
        account.--The terms ``account'', ``correspondent account'', and 
        ``payable-through account'' have the meanings given those terms 
        in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.
            (2) Alien.--The term ``alien'' has the meaning given that 
        term in section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
        (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)).
            (3) PRC person.--The term ``PRC person'' means--
                    (A) an individual who is a citizen or national of 
                the PRC; or
                    (B) an entity organized under the laws of the PRC 
                or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the 
                Government of the PRC.
            (4) Financial institution.--The term ``financial 
        institution'' means a financial institution specified in 
        subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), 
        (K), (M), (N), (P), (R), (T), (Y), or (Z) of section 5312(a)(2) 
        of title 31, United States Code.
            (5) Foreign financial institution.--The term ``foreign 
        financial institution'' has the meaning given that term in 
        section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or 
        any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).
            (6) Person.--The term ``person'' means any individual or 
        entity.
            (7) United states person.--The term ``United States 
        person'' means--
                    (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully 
                admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
                    (B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
                United States or of any jurisdiction within the United 
                States, including a foreign branch of such an entity; 
                or
                    (C) any person in the United States.

SEC. 233. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING PORTRAYALS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
              OR THE EAST CHINA SEA AS PART OF CHINA.

    It is the sense of Congress that the Government Publishing Office 
should not publish any map, document, record, electronic resource, or 
other paper of the United States (other than materials relating to 
hearings held by committees of Congress or internal work product of a 
Federal agency) portraying or otherwise indicating that it is the 
position of the United States that any part of the territory or 
airspace in the South China Sea that is disputed among two or more 
parties, or of the territory or airspace of areas administered by Japan 
or the Republic of Korea, including in the East China Sea, is part of 
the territory or airspace of the PRC.

SEC. 234. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON 2016 PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION'S 
              TRIBUNAL RULING ON ARBITRATION CASE BETWEEN PHILIPPINES 
              AND PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Finding.--Congress finds that on July 12, 2016, a tribunal of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration found in the arbitration case 
between the Philippines and the PRC under the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea that the PRC's claims, including those to 
offshore resources and ``historic rights'', were unlawful, and that the 
tribunal's ruling is final and legally binding on both parties.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States and the international community 
        should reject the unlawful claims of the PRC within the 
        exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf of the 
        Philippines, as well as the maritime claims of the PRC beyond a 
        12-nautical-mile territorial sea from the islands it claims in 
        the South China Sea;
            (2) the provocative behavior of the PRC, including coercing 
        other countries with claims in the South China Sea and 
        preventing those countries from accessing offshore resources, 
        undermines peace and stability in the South China Sea;
            (3) the international community should--
                    (A) support the ruling described in subsection (a) 
                in compliance with international law; and
                    (B) take all necessary steps to support the rules-
                based international order in the South China Sea; and
            (4) all claimants in the South China Sea should--
                    (A) refrain from engaging in destabilizing 
                activities, including illegal occupation or efforts to 
                unlawfully assert control over disputed claims;
                    (B) ensure that disputes are managed without 
                intimidation, coercion, or force;
                    (C) clarify or adjust claims in accordance with 
                international law; and
                    (D) uphold the principle that territorial and 
                maritime claims, including over territorial waters or 
                territorial seas, must be derived from land features 
                and otherwise comport with international law.

                   TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

    Subtitle A--Promoting Human Rights in People's Republic of China

PART I--PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS FOR CITIZENS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
             CHINA AND FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN CHINA

SEC. 301. PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary shall carry out programs, including 
through nongovernmental organizations, that prioritize the protection 
and advancement of the freedoms of association, assembly, religion, and 
expression for, democracy and human rights activists, women, and ethnic 
and religious minorities in the PRC.
    (b) Consultation Requirement.--In carrying out this section, the 
Assistant Secretary of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall consult 
with the appropriate committees of Congress regarding--
            (1) strengthening the capacity of the organizations 
        referred to in subsection (a);
            (2) protecting members of the groups referred to in 
        subsection (a) who have been targeted for arrest, harassment, 
        forced sterilizations, coercive abortions, forced labor, 
        intimidation, or subject to transnational repression, including 
        members residing outside of the PRC; and
            (3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest possible 
        audiences within the PRC about United States Government efforts 
        to protect freedom of association, expression, assembly, and 
        the rights of women and ethnic and religious minorities.

SEC. 302. REPORT ON CORRUPT ACTIVITIES OF SENIOR OFFICIALS OF 
              GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Annual Report Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through 
        2028, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
        Secretary of the Treasury and any other relevant United States 
        Government official, shall submit to the appropriate committees 
        of Congress a report identifying those senior PRC officials who 
        are responsible for, or complicit in, or who have directly or 
        indirectly engaged in, significant corruption.
            (2) Elements.--
                    (A) In general.--The report required under 
                paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:
                            (i) A general description of the corrupt 
                        sources of wealth of senior PRC officials.
                            (ii) A description of corruption, including 
                        activities taking place outside of China, 
                        engaged in by senior PRC officials.
                            (iii) A description of any gaps in the 
                        ability of the intelligence community to 
                        collect information described in clauses (i) 
                        and (ii).
                            (iv) The names of other individuals and 
                        entities who facilitate or benefit from 
                        significant corruption by senior PRC officials, 
                        both inside and outside of the PRC.
                    (B) Scope of reports.--The first report submitted 
                under paragraph (1) shall include comprehensive 
                information on the matters described in subparagraph 
                (A). Each succeeding report submitted under paragraph 
                (1) may consist of an update or supplement to the 
                preceding report submitted under that paragraph.
            (3) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall 
        include an unclassified executive summary of the elements 
        described in clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (2)(A), and may 
        include a classified annex.
            (4) Assessment of applicability of sanctions.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after 
                submission of each report required by paragraph (1), 
                the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
                Secretary of the Treasury, as appropriate, shall--
                            (i) evaluate whether any foreign person 
                        identified under this section may meet the 
                        criteria for the potential imposition of 
                        sanctions under existing sanctions authorities, 
                        including--
                                    (I) the Global Magnitsky Human 
                                Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 
                                10101 et seq.); and
                                    (II) section 7031(c) of the 
                                Department of State, Foreign 
                                Operations, and Related Programs 
                                Appropriations Act, 2023 (division K of 
                                Public Law 117-328; 8 U.S.C. 1182 
                                note); and
                            (ii) submit to the appropriate committees 
                        of Congress a report, in writing, setting forth 
                        the results of that assessment.
                    (B) Form.--The report required by subparagraph 
                (A)(ii) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
                may include a classified annex.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should undertake every effort and pursue every opportunity to 
expose the corruption and related practices of senior PRC officials, 
including General Secretary of the Communist Party and President Xi 
Jinping.
    (c) Corruption Defined.--In this section the term ``corruption'' 
includes, among other activities--
            (1) the misappropriation of state assets;
            (2) the expropriation of private assets for personal gain;
            (3) abuse of an official position related to government 
        contracts or the extraction of natural resources; and
            (4) bribery.

SEC. 303. CHINA EXIT BANS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall collect and analyze 
available information on the application of exit bans by the PRC, 
including trends with respect to the application of such exit bans to 
United States nationals. Such data shall be--
            (1) used to update of travel warnings as appropriate, and 
        in disseminating such information to relevant State and local 
        authorities, with a special emphasis on domestic jurisdictions 
        with large numbers of at-risk populations;
            (2) shared, as appropriate, with allies and partner nations 
        about potential risks and vulnerabilities their citizens may 
        face in traveling to the PRC;
            (3) used to inform United States actions to hold the PRC 
        accountable for these actions; and
            (4) submitted to the appropriate committees of Congress.
    (b) Exit Ban Defined.--In this section the term ``exit ban'' means 
a restriction imposed by the Government of the PRC that prevents 
foreign nationals, including United States nationals, including legal 
permanent residents of the United States, from leaving the PRC without 
a fair and transparent legal cause or recourse for the impacted party.

                 PART II--MATTERS RELATED TO HONG KONG

SEC. 305. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY, 
              HUMAN RIGHTS, AND CIVILIAN SECURITY IN HONG KONG.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2025 for the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State to 
promote democracy, human rights, and civilian security in Hong Kong.
    (b) Administration.--The Secretary of State shall designate an 
office within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to 
administer and coordinate the provision of the funds described in 
subsection (a) within the Department of State and across the United 
States Government.

SEC. 306. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET FREEDOM AND 
              CIRCUMVENTION TOOLS FOR THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The PRC has repeatedly violated its obligations under 
        the Joint Declaration by suppressing the basic rights and 
        freedoms of Hong Kongers.
            (2) On June 30, 2020, the National People's Congress passed 
        a ``National Security Law'' that further erodes Hong Kong's 
        autonomy and enables authorities to suppress dissent.
            (3) The PRC continues to utilize the National Security Law 
        to undermine the fundamental rights of the people of Hong Kong 
        through suppression of the freedom of speech, assembly, 
        religion, and the press.
            (4) Article 9 of the National Security Law authorizes 
        unprecedented regulation and supervision of internet activity 
        in Hong Kong, including expanded police powers to force 
        internet service providers to censor content, hand over user 
        information, and block access to platforms.
            (5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong Broadband Network 
        blocked public access to HK Chronicles, a website promoting 
        pro-democracy viewpoints, under the authorities of the National 
        Security Law.
            (6) On February 12, 2021, internet service providers 
        blocked Hong Kong users' access to the Taiwan Transitional 
        Justice Commission website in Hong Kong.
            (7) Major tech companies, including Facebook, Twitter, 
        WhatsApp, and Google have stopped reviewing requests for user 
        data from Hong Kong authorities.
            (8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy activists in 
        Hong Kong were arrested and charged under the National Security 
        Law on the charge of ``conspiracy to commit subversion''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should--
            (1) support the ability of the people of Hong Kong to 
        maintain their freedom to access information online; and
            (2) focus on investments in technologies that facilitate 
        the unhindered exchange of information in Hong Kong in advance 
        of any future efforts by the Chinese Communist Party--
                    (A) to suppress internet access;
                    (B) to increase online censorship; or
                    (C) to inhibit online communication and content-
                sharing by the people of Hong Kong.
    (c) Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish a 
        Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program in the Bureau of Democracy, 
        Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State which shall 
        include a working group dedicated to developing a strategy to 
        bolster internet resiliency and online access in Hong Kong (in 
        this subsection, the ``Program''). The working group shall 
        consist of--
                    (A) the Under Secretary of State for Civilian 
                Security, Democracy, and Human Rights;
                    (B) the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
                and Pacific Affairs;
                    (C) the Chief Executive Officer of the United 
                States Agency for Global Media;
                    (D) the President of the Open Technology Fund;
                    (E) the Administrator of the United States Agency 
                for International Development; and
                    (F) the Ambassador-at-large for Cyberspace and 
                Digital Policy;
            (2) Independence.--During the period beginning on the date 
        of the enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 2027, 
        the Program shall be carried out independent from internet 
        freedom programs focused on the rest of the PRC.
            (3) Consolidation of department of state program.--
        Beginning on October 1, 2026, the Secretary of State may--
                    (A) consolidate the Program with the mainland China 
                initiatives in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
                and Labor; or
                    (B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance 
                with paragraph (2).
    (d) Support for Internet Freedom Technology Programs.--
            (1) Grants authorized.--The Secretary of State, working 
        with the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
        International Development and the President of the Open 
        Technology fund as appropriate, are authorized to award grants 
        and contracts to private organizations to support and develop 
        programs in Hong Kong that promote or expand--
                    (A) open, interoperable, reliable, and secure 
                internet; and
                    (B) the online exercise of human rights and 
                fundamental freedoms of individual citizens, activists, 
                human rights defenders, independent journalists, civil 
                society organizations, and marginalized populations in 
                Hong Kong.
            (2) Goals.--The goals of the programs developed with grants 
        authorized under paragraph (1) should be--
                    (A) to support unrestricted access to the internet 
                in Hong Kong;
                    (B) to increase the availability of internet 
                freedom tools in Hong Kong;
                    (C) to scale up the distribution of such 
                technologies and tools throughout Hong Kong;
                    (D) to prioritize the development of tools, 
                components, code, and technologies that are fully open-
                source, to the extent practicable;
                    (E) to conduct research on repressive tactics that 
                undermine internet freedom in Hong Kong;
                    (F) to ensure information on digital safety is 
                available to human rights defenders, independent 
                journalists, civil society organizations, and 
                marginalized populations in Hong Kong; and
                    (G) to engage private industry, including e-
                commerce firms and social networking companies, on the 
                importance of preserving unrestricted internet access 
                in Hong Kong.
            (3) Grant recipients.--Grants authorized under this 
        subsection shall be distributed to multiple vendors and 
        suppliers through an open, fair, competitive, and evidence-
        based decision process--
                    (A) to diversify the technical base; and
                    (B) to reduce the risk of misuse by bad actors.
            (4) Security audits.--New technologies developed using 
        grants authorized under this subsection shall undergo 
        comprehensive security audits to ensure that such technologies 
        are secure and have not been compromised in a manner 
        detrimental to the interests of the United States or to 
        individuals or organizations benefitting from programs 
        supported by these funds.
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--
            (1) Open technology fund.--There is authorized to be 
        appropriated to the Open Technology Fund $2,000,000 for each of 
        fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section. This 
        funding is in addition to the funds authorized for the Open 
        Technology Fund pursuant to section 309A of United States 
        International Broadcasting Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6208a).
            (2) Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor.--In 
        addition to the funds authorized to be made available pursuant 
        to paragraph (1), there is authorized to be appropriated to the 
        Office of Internet Freedom Programs in the Bureau of Democracy, 
        Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State $2,000,000 
        for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this 
        section.

                 PART III--MATTERS RELATED TO XINJIANG

SEC. 311. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TREATMENT OF UYGHURS AND OTHER ETHNIC 
              MINORITIES IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Uyghurs are one of several predominantly Muslim Turkic 
        groups living in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 
        in the northwest of the PRC.
            (2) Following Uyghur demonstrations and unrest in 2009 and 
        clashes with government security personnel and other violent 
        incidents in subsequent years, PRC leaders began a campaign of 
        large-scale atrocities in the XUAR including arrests and 
        extreme security measures, under the pretext of combatting 
        alleged terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism.
            (3) In May 2014, the PRC launched its ``Strike Hard Against 
        Violent Extremism'' campaign, which resulted in additional 
        human rights violations against minorities in the XUAR under 
        the pretext of fighting terrorism.
            (4) In August 2016, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo 
        member Chen Quanguo, former Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Party 
        Secretary, known for overseeing intensifying security 
        operations and human rights abuses in the TAR, was appointed as 
        Party Secretary of the XUAR.
            (5) Beginning in 2017, XUAR authorities sought to forcibly 
        ``assimilate'' Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities into Chinese 
        society through a policy of cultural erasure known as 
        ``Sinicization''.
            (6) Since 2018, credible reporting, including from the BBC, 
        France24, and the New York Times, has shown that the Government 
        of the PRC has built mass internment camps in the XUAR, which 
        it calls ``vocational training'' centers, and detained Uyghurs 
        and other groups in them and other facilities.
            (7) Since 2015, XUAR authorities have arbitrarily detained 
        an estimated 1,500,000 Uyghurs--12.5 percent of the XUAR's 
        official Uyghur population of 12,000,000--and a smaller number 
        of other ethnic minorities in the ``vocational training'' 
        centers and other detention and pre-detention facilities.
            (8) In 2017, the XUAR accounted for less than two percent 
        of the PRC's total population but 21 percent of all arrests in 
        China.
            (9) The Atlantic, Radio Free Asia, and other sources have 
        revealed that detainees are forced to renounce many of their 
        Islamic beliefs and customs and repudiate Uyghur culture, 
        language, and identity.
            (10) Investigations by Human Rights Watch and other human 
        rights organizations have documented how detainees are subject 
        to political indoctrination, forced labor, crowded and 
        unsanitary conditions, involuntary biometric data collection, 
        both medical neglect and intrusive medical interventions, food 
        and water deprivation, beatings, sexual violence, and torture.
            (11) Research by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
        suggests that, since late 2019, many detainees have been placed 
        in higher security facilities and convicted of formal crimes.
            (12) Human Rights Watch has reported that the PRC uses data 
        collection programs, including facial recognition technology, 
        to surveil Uyghurs in the XUAR and to identify individuals whom 
        authorities may detain.
            (13) PRC authorities have placed countless children whose 
        parents are detained or in exile in state-run institutions and 
        boarding schools without the consent of their parents.
            (14) New York Times reporting revealed that numerous local 
        PRC officials who did not agree with the policies carried out 
        in XUAR have been fired and imprisoned.
            (15) Associated Press reporting documented widespread and 
        systemic efforts by PRC authorities to force Uyghur women to 
        take contraceptives or to subject them to sterilization or 
        abortion, threatening to detain those who do not comply.
            (16) PRC authorities prohibit family members and advocates 
        inside and outside China from having regular communications 
        with relatives and friends imprisoned in the XUAR, such as 
        journalist and entrepreneur Ekpar Asat.
            (17) PRC authorities have imposed pervasive restrictions on 
        the peaceful practice of Islam in the XUAR, to the extent that 
        Human Rights Watch asserts the PRC ``has effectively outlawed 
        the practice of Islam''.
            (18) Individuals who are not detained in camps have been 
        forced to attend political indoctrination sessions, subjected 
        to movement restrictions, mass surveillance systems, 
        involuntary biometric data collection, and other human rights 
        abuses.
            (19) International media, nongovernmental organizations, 
        scholars, families, and survivors have reported on the systemic 
        nature of many of these abuses.
            (20) On June 26, 2020, a group of 50 independent United 
        Nations experts jointly expressed alarm over China's 
        deteriorating human rights record, including its repression in 
        Xinjiang, and called on the international community ``to act 
        collectively and decisively to ensure China respects human 
        rights and abides by its international obligations''.
            (21) On October 6, 2020, 39 United Nations member countries 
        issued a public statement condemning human rights violations by 
        PRC authorities and calling on the PRC to allow the United 
        Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights unfettered access to 
        Xinjiang.
            (22) United States Congress passed the Uyghur Human Rights 
        Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145).
            (23) United States Congress passed the Global Magnitsky 
        Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of 
        Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note), which has been used 
        to sanction PRC officials and entities for their activities in 
        the XUAR.
            (24) United States Congress passed the Uyghur Forced Labor 
        Prevention Act (Public Law 117-78.)
            (25) The United States Government has implemented 
        additional targeted restrictions on trade with Xinjiang and 
        imposed visa and economic sanctions on PRC officials and 
        entities for their activities in the XUAR.
            (26) The United States Government has documented human 
        rights abuses and violations of individual freedoms in the 
        XUAR, including in the 2019 Department of State Report on 
        International Religious Freedom.
            (27) On January 19, 2021, then-Secretary of State Michael 
        Pompeo ``determined that the PRC, under the direction and 
        control of the CCP, has committed crimes against humanity, 
        genocide against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other 
        ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang'' and that 
        these crimes are ongoing.
            (28) On January 19, 2021, during his confirmation hearing, 
        Secretary of State Antony Blinken testified that ``forcing men, 
        women, and children into concentration camps, trying to in 
        effect reeducate them to be adherents to the Chinese Communist 
        Party--all of that speaks to an effort to commit genocide''.
            (29) On January 19, 2021, Secretary of the Treasury Janet 
        L. Yellen, during her confirmation hearing, publicly stated 
        that China is guilty of ``horrendous human rights abuses''.
            (30) On January 27, 2021, in response to a question from 
        the press regarding the Uyghurs, Secretary Blinken stated that 
        his ``judgement remains that genocide was committed against the 
        Uyghurs''.
            (31) On March 10, 2021, in response to a question on 
        Xinjiang during his testimony before the Committee on Foreign 
        Affairs of the House of Representatives, Secretary Blinken 
        reiterated, ``We've been clear, and I've been clear, that I see 
        it as genocide, other egregious abuses of human rights, and 
        we'll continue to make that clear.''
            (32) The 2020 Department of State Country Reports on Human 
        Rights Practices: China states that ``[g]enocide and crimes 
        against humanity occurred during the year against the 
        predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious 
        minority groups in Xinjiang''.
            (33) United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
        Michelle Bachelet traveled to China in May 2022 and during this 
        mission visited the XUAR, but the PRC did not provide her with 
        the unfettered and unmonitored access that would have been 
        needed to make a fulsome assessment of the conditions and 
        experiences of those most affected by the PRCs repressive 
        policies.
            (34) On August 31, 2022, the United Nations Office of the 
        High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) issued its 
        ``Assessment of the Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang 
        Uyghur Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China'' and in 
        this report noted that the human rights abuses being committed 
        against the Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim groups in 
        the XUAR ``may constitute international crimes, in particular 
        crimes against humanity''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the atrocities, including genocide, committed by the 
        PRC against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim Turkic 
        groups in Xinjiang, including forced labor, sexual violence, 
        the internment of over 1,000,000 individuals, and other 
        horrific abuses must be condemned;
            (2) the President, the Secretary of State, and the United 
        States Ambassador to the United Nations should speak publicly 
        about the ongoing atrocities in the XUAR, including in formal 
        speeches at the United Nations and other international fora;
            (3) the President, the Secretary of State, and the United 
        States Ambassador to the United Nations should appeal to the 
        United Nations Secretary-General to take a more proactive and 
        public stance on the situation in the XUAR, including by 
        supporting calls for an investigation and accountability for 
        individuals and entities responsible for abuses against the 
        people of the XUAR;
            (4) the United States should continue to use targeted 
        sanctions and all diplomatic tools, including the Uyghur Human 
        Rights Policy Act and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, 
        available to promote accountability for those responsible for 
        the atrocities in Xinjiang;
            (5) United States agencies engaged with China on trade, 
        climate, defense, or other bilateral issues should include 
        human rights abuses in the XUAR as a consideration in 
        developing United States policy;
            (6) the United States supports Radio Free Asia Uyghur, the 
        only Uyghur-language news service in the world independent of 
        PRC government influence;
            (7) United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
        Bachelet's visit to China in May 2022 may have inadvertently 
        lent credence to the PRC's narrative that its actions in the 
        XUAR were part of a legitimate counter-terrorism operation 
        given the PRC;
            (8) in any future visits to China senior United Nations 
        officials, and in particular the United Nations High 
        Commissioner for Human Rights, should insist on unfettered and 
        unmonitored access, including to XUAR; and
            (9) the Secretary of State, working with the United States 
        Ambassador to the United Nations, and the United States 
        Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice should outline 
        a strategy to work with international partners to promote 
        justice for the PRC's crimes in the XUAR and investigate the 
        atrocity crimes and other human rights abuses that have taken 
        place in the XUAR, collect, preserve, and analyze this 
        evidence, so that it can be used by a future competent court to 
        adjudicate these cases.

SEC. 312. SENSE OF CONGRESS CALLING ON ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC 
              COOPERATION MEMBERS TO TAKE ACTION ON ATROCITIES IN 
              XINJIANG.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States is committed to the right to freedom 
        of religion or belief and the principle that all persons should 
        be free to practice or not practice the religion or belief of 
        their choice without fear of persecution;
            (2) the international community plays an important role 
        elevating awareness when countries are discriminating against, 
        persecuting, or committing atrocities, including genocide, or 
        other abuses against persons based on their religion or 
        ethnicity;
            (3) countries that are home to significant populations of 
        religious communities being persecuted and abused elsewhere are 
        uniquely positioned to take a leadership role in exerting 
        diplomatic pressure and promoting accountability with respect 
        to such abuses; and
            (4) the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and its 
        member states should, as ``The Collective Voice of the Muslim 
        World'', which ``endeavors to safeguard and protect the 
        interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting 
        international peace and harmony among various people of the 
        world,'' be the leading global voice in--
                    (A) advocating, including with respect to Uyghurs 
                and other ethnic and religious minorities in the PRC, 
                for Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
                Rights, which provides, ``Everyone has the right to 
                freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
                shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 
                belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually 
                or in community with others and in public or private to 
                manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, 
                practice, and teaching.'';
                    (B) seeking to raise awareness about the plight of 
                the Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities 
                in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and elsewhere 
                in the PRC;
                    (C) calling on the PRC to stop committing 
                atrocities, including genocide, against Muslims and 
                other religious and ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang 
                Uyghur Autonomous Region and elsewhere in the PRC;
                    (D) taking action to support justice for Uyghurs 
                and other ethnic and religious minorities in the 
                Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and elsewhere in the 
                PRC; and
                    (E) safeguarding against the refoulement of Uyghurs 
                and other ethnic and religious minorities back to the 
                PRC.

SEC. 313. REAUTHORIZATION OF THE UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY ACT.

     Section 6(h) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public 
Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended by striking ``5 years 
after'' and inserting ``10 years after''.

SEC. 314. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SYSTEMATIC RAPE, 
              COERCIVE ABORTION, FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY 
              CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR 
              AUTONOMOUS REGION.

    (a) In General.--Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy 
Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (G); 
        and
            (2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following new 
        subparagraph:
                    ``(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced 
                sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive 
                implantation policies and practices.''.
    (b) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendment made by 
subsection (a)--
            (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; 
        and
            (2) applies with respect to each report required by section 
        6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted 
        after such date of enactment.

                   PART IV--MATTERS RELATED TO TIBET

SEC. 317. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET.

    (a) Rank of United States Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues.--
            (1) In general.--Section 621 of the Tibetan Policy Act of 
        2002 (subtitle B of title VI of Public Law 107-228; 22 U.S.C. 
        6901 note) is amended--
                    (A) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), and (d), 
                as subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively; and
                    (B) by inserting after subsection (a) the following 
                new subsection:
    ``(b) Rank.--The Special Coordinator shall either be appointed by 
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, or shall be 
an individual holding the rank of Under Secretary of State or 
higher.''.
            (2) Conforming amendment.--Section 616(e)(2) of the Tibetan 
        Policy Act of 2002 is amended by striking ``section 621(d)'' 
        and inserting ``section 621(e)''.
    (b) Tibet Unit at United States Embassy in Beijing.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish a 
        Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the United States 
        Embassy in Beijing, People's Republic of China.
            (2) Operation.--The Tibet Unit established under paragraph 
        (1) shall operate until such time as the PRC permits--
                    (A) the United States Consulate General in Chengdu, 
                People's Republic of China, to reopen; or
                    (B) a United States Consulate General in Lhasa, 
                Tibet, to open.
            (3) Staff.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary should assign not 
                fewer than 2 United States direct-hire personnel to the 
                Tibet Unit established under paragraph (1).
                    (B) Language training.--The Secretary shall make 
                Tibetan language training available to the personnel 
                assigned under subparagraph (A), consistent with the 
                Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (subtitle B of title VI of 
                Public Law 107-228; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note).

SEC. 318. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT ON THE OR 
              REINCARNATION OF THE DALAI LAMA AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF 
              TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.

    (a) Reaffirmation of Policy.--It is the policy of the United 
States, as provided under section 342(b) of division FF of the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Public Law 116-260), that any 
``interference by the Government of the PRC or any other government in 
the process of recognizing a successor or reincarnation of the 14th 
Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas would represent a clear abuse of 
the right to religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists and the Tibetan 
people''.
    (b) International Efforts To Protect Religious Freedom of Tibetan 
Buddhists.--The Secretary of State should engage with United States 
allies and partners--
            (1) to support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders' sole 
        religious authority to identify and install the 15th Dalai 
        Lama;
            (2) to oppose claims by the Government of the PRC that the 
        PRC has the authority to decide for Tibetan Buddhists the 15th 
        Dalai Lama; and
            (3) to reject interference by the Government of the PRC in 
        the religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.

              Subtitle B--Promoting Human Rights Globally

SEC. 321. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 
              THAT COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

    The President shall direct the Permanent Representative of the 
United States to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States to--
            (1) reform the process for suspending rights of membership 
        in the United Nations Human Rights Council for states that 
        commit gross and systematic violations of human rights, 
        including--
                    (A) ensuring information detailing the member 
                country's human rights record is publicly available 
                before a vote on suspension of the rights of 
                membership; and
                    (B) making the vote of each country on the 
                suspension of rights of membership from the United 
                Nations Human Rights Council publicly available;
            (2) reform the rules on electing members to the United 
        Nations Human Rights Council to seek to ensure United Nations 
        members that have committed gross and systematic violations of 
        human rights are not elected to the Human Rights Council; and
            (3) oppose the election to the Human Rights Council of any 
        United Nations member--
                    (A) currently assessed to engage in a consistent 
                pattern of gross violations of human rights pursuant to 
                section 116 or section 502B of the Foreign Assistance 
                Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n, 2304);
                    (B) currently designated as a state sponsor of 
                terrorism;
                    (C) currently designated as a Tier 3 country under 
                the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 
                U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);
                    (D) the government of which is identified on the 
                list published by the Secretary of State pursuant to 
                section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 
                2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c-1(b)) as a government that 
                recruits and uses child soldiers; or
                    (E) the government of which the United States 
                determines to have committed genocide, crimes against 
                humanity, war crimes, or ethnic cleansing.

SEC. 322. PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
              OTHER MULTILATERAL BODIES.

    The Secretary of State and the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations shall use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations and other 
multilateral bodies--
            (1) to oppose efforts by the PRC and other authoritarian 
        actors to prevent the full participation of civil society 
        actors, including human rights defenders, and block the 
        accreditation of non-governmental organizations at the United 
        Nations and other multilateral bodies;
            (2) to ensure that the United Nations bolsters the 
        protection and safe participation of civil society actors who 
        are subject to transnational repression, state-sponsored 
        harassment, and reprisals by the PRC and other governments;
            (3) to increase monitoring and reporting to identify and 
        track reprisals against human rights defenders, who engage with 
        the United Nations and other multilateral bodies;
            (4) to oppose efforts by the PRC and other authoritarian 
        actors to sponsor the participation of government-organized 
        nongovernmental organizations in the Committee on Non-
        Governmental Organizations of United Nations Economic and 
        Social Council, which organizations are used as instruments of 
        the state, including to repress participation and debate by 
        legitimate civil society actors;
            (5) to support the use of targeted sanctions, censure of 
        member states, and all diplomatic tools, including working with 
        other foreign governments, available to hold accountable 
        persons that engage in reprisals against human rights 
        defenders; and
            (6) to oppose efforts by the PRC to reduce funding for 
        human rights monitoring and civilian protection posts within 
        Security Council approved United Nations peacekeeping missions.

SEC. 323. INCLUSION OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY ABUSE IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
              REPORT.

    The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) is 
amended--
            (1) in section 116 (22 U.S.C. 2151n), by adding at the end 
        the following new subsection:
    ``(h) Surveillance Technology.--
            ``(1) In general.--The report required under subsection (d) 
        shall to the extent feasible include a description of the use 
        of foreign commercial spyware by the government of each country 
        in which there are systematic acts of political repression, to 
        conduct surveillance, including passive or active monitoring, 
        against activists, journalists, opposition politicians, or 
        other individuals for the purposes of suppressing dissent or 
        intimidating critics.
            ``(2) Defined term.--In this subsection, the term `foreign 
        commercial spyware' means the term referred to in section 6318 
        of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for 
        Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263).''; and
            (2) in section 502B (22 U.S.C. 2304)--
                    (A) by redesignating the second subsection 
                designated subsection (i) as subsection (j); and
                    (B) by adding at the end the following new 
                subsection:
    ``(k) Surveillance Technology.--
            ``(1) In general.--The report required under subsection (b) 
        shall to the extent feasible include a description of the use 
        of foreign commercial spyware by the government of each country 
        in which there are systematic acts of political repression, to 
        conduct surveillance, including passive or active monitoring, 
        against activists, journalists, opposition politicians, or 
        other individuals for the purposes of suppressing dissent or 
        intimidating critics.
            ``(2) Defined term.--In this subsection, the term `foreign 
        commercial spyware' means the term referred to in section 6318 
        of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for 
        Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263).''.

SEC. 324. STRENGTHENING PUBLIC REPORTING ON CORRUPTION.

     It is the sense of the Congress that--
            (1) the PRC and its representatives are engaged in 
        corruption across the globe, targeting public sector officials 
        with the goal of inducing them to make official decisions that 
        suit the interests of the PRC in exchange for personal 
        financial gain;
            (2) people across the globe do not want leaders who make 
        deals to enrich themselves and their families in exchange for 
        their country's natural resources or agreeing to take on 
        onerous national debts and loans, which the nation will be 
        forced to pay back; and
            (3) uncovering and bringing to light evidence of this sort 
        of corruption serves the objective of empowering people 
        everywhere to bring such practices to end.

SEC. 325. AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDING FOR PUBLIC REPORTING ON CORRUPTION 
              AND CORRUPT PRACTICES.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall support and 
strengthen media and civil society initiatives to uncover and report on 
evidence of corruption, with a goal of bringing to light the corrupt 
practices of the PRC and its representatives in every region, and the 
local leaders who are accepting these payments.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated an additional $3,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 
through 2029 for the Secretary of State to carry out this section.

    TITLE IV--MODERNIZING THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO MEET THE CHINA 
                               CHALLENGE

SEC. 401. ESTABLISHING AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDO-PACIFIC 
              AFFAIRS.

    (a) Repeal.--Section 122 of the Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (22 U.S.C. 2652b) is repealed.
    (b) Authorization.--The Secretary of State is authorized to 
establish a Bureau for Indo-Pacific Affairs, to be headed by an 
Assistant Secretary for Indo-Pacific Affairs appointed by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The 
Assistant Secretary shall report to the Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs.
    (c) Duties.--The Assistant Secretary for Indo-Pacific Affairs 
shall--
            (1) be responsible for overseeing and coordinating 
        diplomatic efforts related to the Indo-Pacific region, and to 
        advance United States interests, promote regional stability, 
        and foster economic growth and development through diplomatic 
        engagement, public affairs, policy coordination, and strategic 
        partnerships within the Indo-Pacific region;
            (2) advance United States interests with respect to the 
        PRC, especially by advancing a policy of strategic competition 
        to contend with the threats and challenges posed by the PRC to 
        the United States, its allies, and other partners in the Indo-
        Pacific region;
            (3) assist the Secretary of State in providing overall 
        direction and coordination of interdepartmental activities of 
        the United States Government in the countries within the Indo-
        Pacific region, including directing United States policies for 
        Indo-Pacific countries, directing and overseeing the 
        effectiveness of the applicable strategies, plans, programs, 
        resources, and performance for implementing that policy, and 
        monitoring for and indications of developing crises and 
        initiating appropriate action in a timely manner;
            (4) provide active direction to chiefs of mission (COMs) in 
        carrying out their official duty to implement U.S. foreign 
        policy and lead their missions effectively, and facilitate 
        supported needed by COMs at their missions;
            (5) directly supervise the policy and operations of the 
        bureau and provide overall guidance to the United States 
        missions within the region;
            (6) direct and oversee the provision of an adequate, 
        regular flow of information to posts abroad on United States 
        Government policies, policy deliberations, and diplomatic 
        exchanges, especially on matters that may result in 
        negotiations, initiatives, policy actions, or other official 
        representations of Department policy abroad; and
            (7) other responsibilities, as determined by the Secretary, 
        related to the advancement of United States foreign policy and 
        national security in the Indo-Pacific.
    (d) Realignment.--The Secretary of State is authorized to realign 
bureaus and offices within the Department of State to implement this 
provision.
    (e) Definitions.--The terms ``Indo-Pacific'' and ``Indo-Pacific 
region'' mean the following 39 countries and their surrounding 
waterways: Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, the 
People's Republic of China, Cook Islands, Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Nauru, Nepal, New 
Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, 
Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. The terms also include Taiwan and 
its surrounding waterway.

SEC. 402. ENHANCING STRATEGIC COMPETITION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the 
        PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, development, 
        military, informational, and technological realms that 
        maximizes the United States strengths and increases the costs 
        for the PRC of harming United States interests and the values 
        of United States allies and partners;
            (2) to lead a free, open, and secure international system 
        characterized by freedom from coercion, rule of law, open 
        markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commitment 
        to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, 
        and good and transparent governance;
            (3) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and 
        partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and Europe, by 
        pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative 
        initiatives that advance shared interests and values and 
        bolster the confidence of partner countries that the United 
        States is and will remain a strong, committed, and constant 
        partner;
            (4) to encourage and collaborate with United States allies 
        and partners in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency 
        to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests and values, 
        free from coercion and external pressure;
            (5) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy 
        competition in United States-China economic relations by--
                    (A) advancing policies that harden the United 
                States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or 
                trading practices and the coercion of United States 
                businesses; and
                    (B) tightening United States laws and regulations 
                as necessary to prevent the PRC's attempts to harm 
                United States economic competitiveness;
            (6) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth 
        in emerging markets around the world, including through the use 
        of United States Government tools that--
                    (A) support greater private sector investment and 
                advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded 
                in the rule of law;
                    (B) promote open markets;
                    (C) establish clear policy and regulatory 
                frameworks;
                    (D) improve the management of key economic sectors;
                    (E) combat corruption; and
                    (F) foster and support greater collaboration with 
                and among partner countries and the United States 
                private sector to develop secure and sustainable 
                infrastructure;
            (7) to lead in the advancement of international rules and 
        norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and 
        integrated markets;
            (8) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of 
        United States companies and businesses in partner countries 
        that seek fair competition;
            (9) to ensure that the United States leads in the 
        innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-
        generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum 
        information science, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by--
                    (A) providing necessary investment and concrete 
                incentives for the private sector and the United States 
                Government to accelerate development of such 
                technologies;
                    (B) modernizing export controls and investment 
                screening regimes and associated policies and 
                regulations;
                    (C) enhancing United States leadership in technical 
                standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing 
                norms regarding the use of emerging critical 
                technologies;
                    (D) reducing United States barriers and increasing 
                incentives for collaboration with allies and partners 
                on the research and co-development of critical 
                technologies;
                    (E) collaborating with allies and partners to 
                protect critical technologies by--
                            (i) crafting multilateral export control 
                        measures;
                            (ii) building capacity for defense 
                        technology security;
                            (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in supply 
                        chains; and
                            (iv) ensuring diversification; and
                    (F) designing major defense capabilities for export 
                to allies and partners;
            (10) to collaborate with advanced democracies and other 
        willing partners to promote ideals and principles that--
                    (A) advance a free and open international order;
                    (B) strengthen democratic institutions;
                    (C) protect and promote human rights; and
                    (D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;
            (11) to develop comprehensive and holistic strategies and 
        policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns;
            (12) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United 
        Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral 
        organizations and defend the integrity of these organizations 
        against co-optation by illiberal and authoritarian nations;
            (13) to prioritize the defense of fundamental freedoms and 
        human rights in the United States relationship with the PRC;
            (14) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral 
        organizations, leveraging their significant and growing 
        capabilities to build a network of like-minded states that 
        sustains and strengthens a free and open order and addresses 
        regional and global challenges to hold the Government of the 
        PRC accountable for--
                    (A) violations and abuses of human rights;
                    (B) restrictions on religious practices; and
                    (C) undermining and abrogating treaties, other 
                international agreements, and other international norms 
                related to human rights;
            (15) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, repression, and 
        other malign behavior to attain unfair economic advantages and 
        to pressure other nations to defer to its political and 
        strategic objectives;
            (16) to maintain United States access to the Western 
        Pacific, including by--
                    (A) increasing United States forward-deployed 
                forces in the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) modernizing the United States military through 
                investments in existing and new platforms, emerging 
                technologies, critical in-theater force structure and 
                enabling capabilities, joint operational concepts, and 
                a diverse, operationally resilient and politically 
                sustainable posture; and
                    (C) operating and conducting exercises with allies 
                and partners--
                            (i) to mitigate the Peoples Liberation 
                        Army's ability to project power and establish 
                        contested zones within the First and Second 
                        Island Chains;
                            (ii) to diminish the ability of the 
                        People's Liberation Army to coerce its 
                        neighbors;
                            (iii) to maintain open sea and air lanes, 
                        particularly in the Taiwan Strait, the East 
                        China Sea, and the South China Sea; and
                            (iv) to project power from the United 
                        States and its allies and partners to 
                        demonstrate the ability to conduct contested 
                        logistics;
            (17) to deter the PRC from--
                    (A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, including by 
                developing more combat-credible forces that are 
                integrated with allies and partners in contact, blunt, 
                and surge layers and able to defeat any PRC theory of 
                victory in the First or Second Island Chains of the 
                Western Pacific and beyond, as called for in the 2018 
                National Defense Strategy;
                    (B) using grey-zone tactics below the level of 
                armed conflict; or
                    (C) initiating armed conflict;
            (18) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military 
        communication and improve de-escalation procedures to de-
        conflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict, 
        including through high-level visits and recurrent exchanges 
        between civilian and military officials and other measures, in 
        alignment with United States interests; and
            (19) to cooperate with the PRC if interests align, 
        including through bilateral or multilateral means and at the 
        United Nations, as appropriate.
    (b) Establishing and Expanding the Regional China Officer 
Program.--
            (1) In general.--There is authorized to be established at 
        the Department of State a Regional China Officer (RCO) program 
        to support regional posts and officers with reporting, 
        information, and policy tools, and to enhance expertise related 
        to strategic competition with the PRC.
            (2) Authorization.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
        $2,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to the 
        Department of State to expand the RCO program, including for--
                    (A) the placement of Regional China Officers at 
                United States missions to the United Nations and United 
                Nations affiliated organizations;
                    (B) the placement of additional Regional China 
                Officers in Africa;
                    (C) the hiring of locally employed staff to support 
                Regional China Officers serving abroad; and
                    (D) the establishment of full-time equivalent 
                positions to assist in managing and facilitating the 
                RCO program.
            (3) Program funds.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
        $50,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for each 
        Regional China Officer to support programs and public diplomacy 
        activities of the Regional China Officer.
    (c) Sense of Congress on Data-Driven Policy Making.--It is the 
sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Office for China Coordination should employ at 
        least one full-time equivalent Data Officer, who shall not be 
        dual-hatted, focused on strategic competition with the PRC; and
            (2) the Department should, to the extent possible within 
        existing authorities, prioritize access for the Office for 
        China Coordination to databases, commercial software, and other 
        data to support policy-making related to strategic competition 
        with the PRC.

SEC. 403. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND ROTATIONAL 
              PROGRAM RELATED TO STRATEGIC COMPETITION.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary shall promote policies that enable 
greater opportunities for the Department of State workforce to acquire 
skills, education, training, and work experience relevant to strategic 
competition with the PRC and to promote the increased effectiveness of 
the workforce.
    (b) Professional Development.--The Secretary shall, to the extent 
possible and consistent with existing authorities, expand educational 
and professional development opportunities for the workforce of the 
Department related to strategic competition with the PRC.
    (c) Rotational Program.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary shall, consistent with 
        existing authorities and in order to improve the Department's 
        coordination with other Federal departments and agencies with a 
        significant role in the economic, technological, defense, 
        public diplomacy, information, intelligence, and law 
        enforcement aspects of United States competition with the PRC, 
        establish an interagency rotational program at the Department.
            (2) Skills and experience objectives.--The rotational 
        program shall facilitate rotations for Department personnel to 
        other relevant Federal departments and agencies to acquire 
        skills and experience related to--
                    (A) PRC malign influence operations, including 
                activities and polices designed to subvert or undermine 
                open societies, repress fundamental freedoms in other 
                countries, engage in information operations, shape 
                narratives favorable to the Chinese Communist Party, or 
                suppress narratives unfavorable to it, and otherwise 
                use coercive, covert, or corrupt methods to exert 
                improper influence on governments, private sector, 
                civil society, universities and other academic 
                institutions, State and local legislators, and other 
                relevant actors in the United States and abroad;
                    (B) economic tools relevant to national security, 
                including sanctions, export controls, and investment 
                screening;
                    (C) trade and investment in partner countries;
                    (D) commercial diplomacy and advocacy for United 
                States businesses in emerging markets;
                    (E) energy security;
                    (F) security cooperation;
                    (G) cyber and technology;
                    (H) space;
                    (I) critical minerals and other strategic sectors 
                where the PRC is dominant;
                    (J) supply chain security and cooperation;
                    (K) development and foreign assistance, including 
                executing high-standard infrastructure development, 
                especially in the transport, energy, and digital 
                sectors;
                    (L) development finance; and
                    (M) other issue areas that the Secretary determines 
                necessary for the Department workforce to develop for 
                the purposes of strategic competition with the PRC.
            (3) Program design, monitoring, and evaluation.--
                    (A) Rotations and secondments.--In designing the 
                rotational program required under this subsection, the 
                Secretary may, if appropriate and consistent with 
                existing authorities, include rotations or secondments 
                for Department personnel to international 
                organizations, private sector entities, or to the 
                governments agencies of United States partners and 
                allies.
                    (B) Data tracking.--The Secretary shall collect and 
                analyze data related to the rotational program required 
                under this subsection, including to track the--
                            (i) number of personnel who participate;
                            (ii) the duration of the rotations;
                            (iii) the grade and job series and sending 
                        bureau or office;
                            (iv) the receiving department or agency, 
                        bureau, and office;
                            (v) information as to whether the rotation 
                        was reciprocal between the sending and 
                        receiving bureau or offices;
                            (vi) information regarding whether a 
                        backfill was acquired, and if so, through what 
                        mechanism; and
                            (vii) any other information that the 
                        Secretary deems necessary to inform adjustments 
                        to program design to meet the objectives 
                        described in subsection (a).

SEC. 404. REFOCUSING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY EFFORTS FOR STRATEGIC 
              COMPETITION.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the size of the United States diplomatic corps and 
        Department of State civil service personnel must be sufficient 
        to meet the current and emerging security challenges of the 
        21st century, particularly those posed by the PRC and Russia;
            (2) an increased focus on the PRC in the international 
        security sphere is necessary to achieve Department of State 
        objectives in strategic affairs and nonproliferation;
            (3) this effort must be implemented with a focus on 
        increasing the number of Foreign Service Officers and civil 
        servants at the Department of State to--
                    (A) ensure the Department is resourced at 
                sufficient levels to ensure that diplomatic tools 
                remain central to the implementation of a long-term 
                competitive strategy with the PRC; and
                    (B) coordinate with allies and partners efforts to 
                improve the security of United States and allied 
                interests in the face of the PRC's military 
                modernization and expansion;
            (4) emerging technologies such as cyber, artificial 
        intelligence, quantum technologies, space, hypersonic missiles, 
        fractional orbit bombardment system and advances in missile 
        defense systems will increasingly impact the strategic balance 
        between the United States and its great power adversaries; and
            (5) strategic threats will be increasingly addressed 
        through risk reduction measures such as the promotion of 
        international norms in multilateral forums, increasing 
        communication and fostering predictability with adversaries, 
        and close cooperation and security integration with allies and 
        partners.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States--
            (1) to ensure Department of State funding levels for 
        international security reflect the importance and significance 
        of the Indo-Pacific region to the political, economic, and 
        security interests of the United States; and
            (2) to increase funding and the proportion of personnel 
        dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective to the 
        Department of State's International Security budget.
    (c) Action Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the 
appropriate committees of Congress an action plan with the following 
elements:
            (1) Identification of requirements to advance United States 
        international security objectives in the Indo-Pacific and the 
        personnel and budgetary resources needed to meet them, assuming 
        an unconstrained resource environment.
            (2) Identification of offices responsible for managing 
        bilateral and multilateral arms control, nonproliferation, and 
        disarmament agreements that are expired, are expiring, or that 
        have not been implemented since calendar year 2021 with the 
        objective of revising their mission to focus on competitive 
        strategies and risk reduction initiatives in the Indo-Pacific 
        region.
            (3) A plan to increase the size of the Department's 
        international security budget.
            (4) Budgeting dedicated to the Indo-Pacific, including the 
        reallocation of personnel and resources, with a focus on the 
        threat posed by PRC military modernization and expansion.
            (5) A plan to increase the number of positions in bureaus 
        that report to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and 
        International Security and overseas missions with 
        responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a 
        description of increases and a description of how such 
        increases in personnel will advance United States objectives in 
        the Indo-Pacific region.
            (6) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that the 
        Department will meet in implementing the action plan.
            (7) A description of any barriers to implementing the 
        action plan.
    (d) Updates to Action Plan.--Not later than 180 days after 
submitting the action plan required under subsection (c), and every 180 
days thereafter for 2 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress an update on the implementation of 
the action plan, including supporting data and a detailed assessment of 
benchmarks reached.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 501. SAVINGS PROVISIONS.

    (a) Consultation and Notification Required.--The obligation of any 
funds authorized to be appropriated by the provisions of this Act shall 
be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent with section 634A 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular 
notification procedures of--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Qualifying Non-Binding Instruments.--Any nonbinding instrument 
related to the provisions of this Act shall be considered a qualifying 
non-binding instrument for purposes of section 112b of title 1, United 
States Code.

SEC. 502. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION ON MAINTAINING ONE CHINA POLICY.

    Nothing in this Act may be construed as a change to the one China 
policy of the United States, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations 
Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), the three United States-People's Republic 
of China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.
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