# D U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OFHEARINGS FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

## FEB 182015 HEARING DOCKET
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, Complainant,

vs. AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND ENGINEERING SERVICES, Respondent. DocketNo. FAA-2013-0291 FAA CaseNo. 2011S0290032

Judge Sullivan

FAA's RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTIONFOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT On January 30, 2015, Respondent served a Motion for Summary Judgment in this case. Respondent begins its Motion by asking the Judge to weigh evidence, ends its Motion by asking the Judge to make credibility determinations, and inbetween asks the Judge to reach conclusions about aircraft maintenance relying exclusively and extensively on the personal opinions of an individual who does not even hold a mechanic certificate. Respondent's motion is wholly withoutmerit, and shouldbe denied. I. Becker Is NotA Mechanic, AndNot AnExpert OnAircraft Maintenance Of particular note in examining everything asserted by Respondent in its brief is that (when it relies on any evidence at all) it extensively and exclusively relies on the deposition testimony ofJohn Becker for opinions as to subjects such as the nature and cause ofdamage to
an aircraft, whether damage affects the airworthiness ofan aircraft, how a mechanic can tell ifa flying door is misrigged, and how to change the tire on a B727. As a result, it is important to emphasize that Becker is not a mechanic and is not competent to offer opinions on aviation

Imaintenance. Exhibit B at 9. He has never perfonned maintenance on an aircraft, nor could he legally do so. This ignorance is best exemplified by his explanation ofhow the tubular bearing
on the right-hand flying door ofN287SC might have fallen out during a tire change because the mechanic used a short cut. See Respondent's Motion at 20-21. Not only is Becker's explanation based on a game oftelephone

- literally that he knows a guy who knows a guy who says that
some other guys might change tires in some incorrect way - but the supposed "short cut" described by Becker would in reality be much more time-consuming than the proper way of changing the tire. See Exhibit JJ ,-r 36. The particular issues with Becker's testimony, and the particularplaces where Respondentrelies on it, will be discussed inmore detail below. However, it is worth noting up front that Respondent's entire Motion is founded on the opinions of an individual who simply is not competent to provide expert testimony on the subject matter ofthis
case. Additionally, the Judge recently denied the FAA's motion to exclude Becker serving as
an expert witness 1 on the basis that Becker was only identified as an expert witness in order to rebut the testimony of FAA expert witness Michael Christensen and the Judge had granted Respondent's motion to exclude Christensen's testimony. Accordingly, the undersigned can only presume that the Judge will not consider any "expert" opinion from Becker, inasmuch as it wouldbe outside the identified scope ofBecker's "expert"testimony (that scopebeingpurelythe rebuttal ofChristensen's expert opinions). II. CircumstantialNature ofthe Evidence As Respondent notes, in this case - as in almost every maintenance case ever brought by the FAA

- the FAA must rely on circumstantial evidence that a Respondent improperly

1 Themotion was based only on the late disclosure ofBeckeras an "expert" witness, and neither the motion nor ruling onthat motionrelated to Becker's lackofqualification to serve as an expert.
2performed maintenance because FAA inspectors are not typically present when a particular maintenance action was being performed? See Respondent's Motion at 2, 8-11. As such, it is puzzling that Respondent spends so much time reminding the Judge that the FAA inspectors in this case only inspected the aircraft 2-93 months after Respondent performed maintenance

- when, as even the cases Respondent cites emphasize

- this state of affairs is routine. See Respondent's Motion at 8-11. The effect ofthe passage oftime is, when at issue, a question ofexpert testimony. Ifthe effect ofthe passage oftime is one that is both material and subject to genuine dispute, then this would be an issue for hearing. Indeed, the primary case that the Respondent relies on, Florida Propeller, is a case that went to hearing and where the FAA lost only because it had failed to actuallypresent an expert onthe causes ofthe condition ofthe aircraft. Respondent's suggestion that this question might supportjudgmentin its favor is baseless. However, at this point in this case the effects ofthe passage oftime present neither a genuine nor a material dispute, because Respondent has so far presented no evidence to rebut the

2In those situations where an FAAinspectoris actuallypresent when a certificateholder is improperlyperforming maintenance, the inspector would generallypoint outthe impropermaintenance to the certificate holder, ensuring that the certificate holder correctedthe problems before approving the workfor returnto service, and thus preventing any violation from occurring in the first place. 3 For the duration ofthis case, Respondent has characterizedthe gap betweenthe maintenance andthe May2010 inspections as being from 2-9 months. See Respondent's Motionat 10 n.5. Indeed, whenInspectorLipinski sent Respondentthe letter ofinvestigation about this case using the dates ofJuly 31, 2009 and September 29, 2009 as the maintenance dates for N899AAandN898AA, Respondent's response to that letter ofinvestigation soughtto correct the inspector as to the dates, noting that the aircraft were not approvedfor return to servicebyRespondentuntil August 26, 2009 and October24, 2009. Compare Exhibit GG with ExhibitHH. The distinction betweenthetwo sets ofdates is that onthe earlier date Respondent signedoffon the individual maintenance taskcard, while itwas onthe later date that Respondent approvedthe aircraft for return to service. Respondent, wishingto make the amountof timebetweenthe maintenance and the May2010 inspections seems as long as possible, has nowdecidedfor the first to use the earlier ofthe two dates as a reference point, insistingthat "2 to 1 0" months ofaircraft operationshad passed since the maintenance. See Respondent's Motion at 3, 13-14. This semantic gamesmanship is pointless- the aircraft was not operatinguntil afterRespondent had approved it for return to service, and the temporal distance betweenthe two dates represents time thatthe aircraft was sitting at Respondent's facility, nottime during which it was conducting operations inthe supposedly "hostile environment" of"the slipstream." It is unclear why Respondent wouldknowinglyrepresent to the courtthatN898AAand N899AAwere "operated" for 8 or 10 months after maintenance, seeRespondent's Motion at 13-14, whenRespondentis well aware that the aircraft werenot operating duting the first month, see ExhibitHH at 1. 3FAA's proffered testimony. Respondent has presented no evidence to rebut the repeated contemporaneous documentation by its own personnel that Respondent had improperly installed the landing gear and flying doors. Respondent provides no explanation for why the time elapsed since its maintenance actions would affect the determinations made bythe FAA inspectors (and CCIA and Respondent's ownpersonnel at the time). See Respondent's Motion at 10. Respondent presents no explanation, much less evidence, of how the damage observed and documented could be "wear and tear," rather than the result ofimproper installation. Respondent asserts that it is necessary to see the aircraft with the flying doors closed to determine whether they were properly rigged, but this assertion is simply wrong - and Respondent supports it only with the statement ofBecker, who is not a mechanic and is not qualified to offer such an expert opinion. See Respondent's Motion at 10. Respondent asserts that Becker "personally inspected" each of the aircraft in May 2010, but fails to mention that Beckerhas no recollection ofthe condition of the aircraft at that time. Compare Respondent's Motion at 17 with Exhibit B at 76. Respondent notes that Becker has personal knowledge ofthe "AMES investigation" into the discrepancies with the aircraft, but fails to mention that the investigation in question concluded that Respondent had performed improper maintenance on all three aircraft. Compare Respondent's Motion at 10-11 with Exhibit HH. The sole source of Becker's opinions is his review of Respondent's maintenance records, yet Respondent relies on his testimony is disregarding its
own maintenance records as inaccurate. Compare Exhibit B at 76 with Respondent's Motion at 17. Given Respondent's lack ofevidence or explanation on this subject,judgmentin favor of the FAA would be appropriate at this time. Even if Respondent later presents admissible

4evidence onthe subject, that could do no more than create an issue ofmaterial fact. Respondent's Motion on this point should be denied. III. The Missing Tubular Bearing on N287SC In its motion, Respondent acknowledges that when N287SC was inspected less than a month after Respondent approved it for return to service, there was a missing tubular bearing in the right-hand flying door assembly. Respondent does not dispute that this tubularbearing was a component that needed to be installed as part of its installation of the flying doors. Rather, Respondent asserts that the bearing must have been missing due to a tire change that occurred three days after Respondent installed the main landing gear. Respondent's Motion at 20-21. This argument fails for several reasons, most notably because Respondent's argument is based on a misunderstanding of what part of the aircraft was missing

- the improper procedure that Respondent speculates may have occurred would have no effect whatsoever on the tubular bearing. As evidence in support ofthis belief, Respondent cites to Becker's deposition testimony. See Respondent's Motion at 20-21. However, there are several severe issues with this. First, Becker's testimony is not as forceful as Respondent makes it out to be

- Respondent cites Becker's testimony in support ofits contention that the tubular bearing "likely" fell out due to the tire change, when Becker only asserted that it "could have happened" and that it was a "possibility." Compare Respondent's Motion at 20 with Exhibit KK4 at 47, 124. When Becker expresses "confidence" that Respondent installed the bearing was, this was based not on any knowledge of the situation, but rather was based on his belief that CCIA would have

4 Excerpts from Becker's deposition were included as ExhibitB to the FAA'sMotion for Summary Judgment. This Response refers to portions ofBecker's deposition that were not included among those excerpts. For the convenience ofthe Court, Exhibit KK attached to this Response contains anycitedportion ofBecker's deposition transcript, whether it was contained in Exhibit B or not. 5"immediately" detected a problem ifthe bearing was missing. Exhibit KK at 126. However, this beliefis baseless. As Respondent notes, the tire change in question took place three days after Respondent had reinstalled the flying door (on March 25, 2010). See Respondent's Motion at 20. But the vibration incident did not occur until April 16, 2010. If the missing tubular bearing would have immediately caused a problem if Respondent left it out on March 22, 2010, then likewise it would have immediately caused a problem ifit somehow fell offofthe airplane on March25, 2010. But there was no incident until April16, 2010. Since even Respondent agrees that the tubular bearing was missing by no later than March 25, 2010, the fact that there was no vibration incident until April 16, 2010, conclusively demonstrates the inaccuracy of Becker's beliefthatthe missingbearing would immediately cause aproblem. Second, Becker's testimony in this regard is meaningless. As discussed above, Becker is not a mechanic and is not qualified to present opinions on the subject. Becker's beliefthat it is "possible" for the tubular bearing to fall out because ofa tire change is because Becker talked to Mike Ebert, who had talked to Mark Summers (or some other unknown mechanic), who indicated that some other mechanics sometimes "remove the bolt that contains the tubular bearing and hold up the flying door out ofthe way as they change the wheel." Exhibit KK at 124-25. As Becker notes, this procedure is not one that is listed in the AMM, and there is a warning in the AMM that mechanics should not remove the actuation rod attachment bolt because lifting the flying door up too high may damage a hinge cover. Exhibit KK at 124-25. Respondent asserts that the mechanic on March 25, 2010 must have taken this "short cut." Respondent's Motion at 20. However, the procedure Becker describes would actually be more difficult and time-consuming than the proper procedure. Exhibit JJ

**~** 36 No mechanic would

6take a "shortcut" that was more work than the proper procedure. Additionally, as discussed below, Becker does not evenunderstand which component ofthe aircraft is at issue. Third, and most significantly, the improper procedure that Becker describes doesn't have anything to do with the tubularbearing that was missing. The properprocedure for changing the tire is to remove two bolts that run through the actuating rod for this exact purpose, shift the flying door up a few inches, and thenput the two bolts back in. Exhibit JJ '1[36; see also Exhibits LL, MM. Thebolt that Becker was referring to
- the actuation rod attachment bolt

- can be seen in AMM 32-12-11. Exhibit D, Page 403, Figure 401 Sheet 1. As can be seen in the central image, the actuation rod attachment bolt goes through a "hollowpin," with both running through the actuation rod and the door fitting. Exhibit D, Page 403, Figure 401 Sheet I; Exhibit C, Page 402, 

### 'If AL(7), (8), (9); see Exhibit JJ '1[37. And as Becker says, there is a warning in the AMM that a mechanic changing a wheel should not remove that attachment bolt. See Exhibit LL. However, the missing tubular bearing was not the hollow pin that is used as part of the attachment of the actuation rod to the flying door. The missing tubular bearing was from the fitting where the actuationrod attaches to the landinggear (specificallyto the drag strut). Exhibit AA; Exhibit BB at 1. This tubular bearing can be seen in AMM 32-11-00, Page 404, which highlights the actuation rod drag strut attachment. Exhibit C, Page 404, Figure 401; see also Exhibit C, Page 422, 

### 'If AL(10), (11); Exhibit JJ '1[38. In order for the tubularbearing to somehow fall off, it would require detaching the actuation rod entirely from the landing gear. Even removing and replacing the wing door itselfdoes not require detaching the actuation rod from the landing gear. See generally Exhibit D. The improper procedure for a tire change that Becker described

- removing the actuation rod attachment bolt

- has nothing to do with the tubular bearingthat was missing from N287SC.

7Fourth, Respondent relies on a statement by Becker that "the mechanic that performed the work specifically said in his statement, I recall putting the tubular bearing back in." Respondent's Motion at 20; Exhibit KK at 125. However, this statement by Becker must be read in the context of Becker's statement at deposition that, when Respondent investigated these matters, none of the mechanics had independent recollections of the original work, but were simply relying on their maintenance sign-offs. Exhibit 

### rae at 40-41. The mechanic's purported statement that he recalled putting the tubular bearing back on the aircraft is simply a statement that he has reviewed his maintenance sign-off, that the procedure signed offrequired putting the bearing back in, and therefore he must have put the bearing back in. The renders the proffered statement almost meaningless, as it is undisputed that Respondent signed offthe work as being completed. Additionally, even ifthe mechanic had some personal recollection ofhaving installed the tubular bearing, that recollection is demonstrably false, as there is no other way that the tubular bearing could be missing on April 16, 2010 other than it not having been installed on March 22, 2010. Respondent was required to install the tubular bearing on N287SC when it removed and replaced the main landing gear on that aircraft. Less than a month later, that tubularbearing was directly observedbyCCIApersonnel as missing from the aircraft, and it was determined that this
was because Respondent had failed to install the bearing in the first place. Respondent's argument that it probably fell offduring atire change is nonsensical and without any evidentiary foundation. Indeed, given that it is undisputed that the tubular bearing was missing, and given that Respondent's alternative explanation is demonstrably nonsensical, judgment against Respondent on this point is appropriate. Not only should Respondent's Motion on this point be denied, butjudgment should be grantedin favor ofthe FAA.

8IV. Shims Respondent argues that thereis no evidence ofmissing and misplaced shimmingwashers. See Respondent's Motion at 22-24. This assertion, as with most in Respondent's Motion, is (when it is based on anything) based only on the personal opinions of Becker based on his review ofthe corrective maintenance actions taken by Respondent, and simply ignores the other evidence in the case. Regardless, Respondent's own maintenance documents reflect several instances ofimproperly configured shims. Inspector Lipinski personally observed improperly configured shimming washers. Exhibit I at I. CCIA documented improper rigging inits discrepancynotices to Respondent with regards to N898AA and N287SC, and Respondent did not dispute this finding. Exhibits U, V, EE. CCIA documented improper hardware stackups in its response to the FAA. Exhibit Gat 2. Respondent referred the FAA to these documents when it responded to the FAA. While Respondent asserts that the case against it must be dismissed ifits own maintenance documents do not specifically reference missing and misplaced shimming washers, see Respondent's Motion at 19, this is not the case. While explicit references in the Respondent's own documentation can, and do, conclusively demonstrate that it improperly installed the main landing gear, the fact that Respondent did not write down a particular discrepancy with shimming washers does not somehow negate the personal observations that they were not properly configured. Further, even when Respondent's own maintenance records explicitly document improper configuration ofthe shimming washers, Respondent seeks to convince the Judge that this should be ignored. Respondent's Motion at 22. OnN899AA, Respondent explicitlywrote up all four main flying door hinges as having improper hardware stack ups (improperly configured

9shimming washers). ExhibitNat 2-7. For all four hinges, the proscribed corrective action was to
remove and replace the hardware in question. Exhibit N at 2-7. For all four hinges, the maintenance documents reflect that the flying door was removed and that the hardware was "verified." Exhibit N at 2-7. Respondent (supported again only by Becker's personal opinion) take this to mean that there were no problems with the stack up, contrary to the initial write-up. See Respondent's Motion at 22. However, the maintenance documents say no such thing. If a mechanic, upon performing the work, had determined that the original discrepancy was in error, then the mechanic's write-up would reflect this. This can be seen most easily several times inthe e-mail between CCIA and Becker, where several maintenance discrepancies were noted as being found to be invalid, but no mention was made ofthese discrepancies. See Exhibit N at 5

**~~5-6,** 8-9. Each of the four non-routine cards at issue was generated on May 28, 2010, when the aircraft arrived at Respondent's facility. Exhibit N at 2-4, 6. The aircraft doors were then removed entirely to enable Respondent to work on the aircraft from May28, 2010 through May 31, 2010. See Exhibit N. As part ofthat initial removal, all ofthe shimming washers that were installed on the hinges would have beenremoved. Exhibit D

**~** 3(e). When the flying doors were put back onthe aircraft several days later, new shimming washers were used in accordance with the service bulletin reference in the maintenance documents. Exhibit N at 2-4, 6 (calling for the washers to be replaced). There is nothing in the maintenance write-ups to indicate that Respondent performed some sort ofadditional inspection ofthe original shimming washers after they had been uninstalled but before they were discarded (indeed, it is unclear how Respondent could have conducted such an inspection after the hinge assembly had been disassembled to
remove the flying doors). Rather, the verification, listed after the removal and before the reinstallation, would be a verification ofwhich washers complied with the provisions ofthe cited

10service bulletin, and which needed to be discarded. Becker's personal opinion as to what he wishes the mechanic meant to say does not negate what the inspector actually did write down based onhis direct observations. There were also additional problems with shimming washers that Respondent does not appear to recognize in its review of the documents. For example, on N899AA, Respondent documents that the gear fittings on the left- and right-hand flying doors were both loose and needed new hardware. Exhibit N at 8-11. Like the forward and aft flying door hinges, the gear fitting requires the use of shimming washers to keep the fitting tight enough. Exhibit C at 404 (diagram of gear fitting), 422(AL)(10(c) (directing the use shimming washers to limit a gap). Both of the gear fittings on N899AA were loose, indicating that they had not been properly shimmed, and the maintenance records for those repairs both specifically reference reshimming the fitting. Exhibit Nat 8-11; Exhibit JJ -,r-,r 22, 27. But Respondent does not even address this in its Motion. Respondent asks that the Judge grantjudgment in its favor on the question of whether there were any improperly installed shimming washers. However, Respondent's own maintenance documents reflect multiple instances of improperly installed shimming washers, and the totality of Respondent's evidence on this point consists of Becker suggesting that Respondent's inspector's own maintenance write-ups were inaccurate. Not only should Respondent's Motion on this point be denied, butjudgment should be granted in favor ofthe FAA. V. Hydraulic Lines and Clamps In its Motion, Respondent acknowledges that there are references in the record to improperly placed clamps. See Respondent's Motion at 24. Respondent acknowledges that there

11were problems with the placement ofthe clamps but asserts (again, based solely on Becker's testimony5) that it was not responsible for these improper placements. There is no genuine issue ofmaterial fact on this issue

- but, contrary to Respondent's belief, the facts demonstrate that Respondent improperlyperfonned two ofthe installations. There were two problems with hydraulic lines and clamps reflected in the corrective actions taken by Respondent in May 2010. First, on N899AA, Respondent wrote up a discrepancy for chafing on the left-hand flying door caused by incorrectly positioned hydraulic line clamps, which was addressed by repositioning those swivel clamps. Exhibit N at I, 13-14. Second, on N898AA, Respondent wrote up a discrepancy for the swivel clamps on the left-hand main landing gear being installed incorrectly, which was also addressed by repositioning the clamps. Exhibit T at 26. Respondent's own documentation reflects that these clamps were improperly positioned when they were installed. Respondent's sole argument on this point is that it was a vendor who had done the actual work ofpositioning these clamps, not the Respondent. See Respondent's Motion at 24. Unfortunately for the Respondent, regardless ofwhether or not some other vender did some amount of preliminary work on these components, it was the Respondent who performed this maintenance. For both ofthese landing gear and flying doors (as with all six at issue in this case), the Respondent signed offhaving completed a removal and replacement ofthe main landing gear in accordance with AMM 32-ll-00, including having performed Required Inspection Item (RII) inspections. Exhibit G at 1 (approving left-hand MLG of N899AA for return to service after

5 Respondent has notproduced an airworthiness release or other approval for return to servicebythe vendor that Respondent asserts actually did the work onthe hydraulic lines and clamps. However, evenifthere was aprior airworthiness release, this would not change the fact that Respondentperformedthe installation, including the placement ofthe hydraulic lines and clamps.
12replacement in accordance with 32-11-00); Exhibit R at I (approving left-hand MLG of N898AA for return to service after replacement in accordance with 32-11-00). Because AMM 32-11-00 includes the arrangement and installation ofthe hydraulic lines and clamps, including the installation ofthe trunnion swivel, hydraulic lines, and clamps in accordance with a diagram in 32-11-00, Respondent thereforeperformedthe installation ofthehydraulic lines and clamps. AMM 32-11-00 section covers the placement ofhydraulic lines and clamps in two places. First, the manual instructs the mechanic to prepare the landing gear assembly for installation, that assembly including hydraulic lines and clamps. Exhibit C at 416

**~** S(A). Second, the manual instructs the mechanic to install the trunnion swivel complete with hydraulic lines, as shown in Figure 404. Exhibit C at 407 (Figure 404), 422

**~** 5(AH). Figure 404 depicts the trunnion swivel, the hydraulic lines, and clamping for those lines. See Exhibit C at 407. Because it was Respondent signed off on the maintenance and approved the newly-installed landing gear and flying doors for return to service, it was Respondent who performed the maintenance. This is true whether Respondent directly did the work regarding the hydraulic lines and clamps or whether Respondent relied on another vendor for that work. Regardless ofwhether some other vendor did some preliminary build-up, it was Respondent who performed the complete installation, including the preparation and installation of the hydraulic line clamps. And, as Respondent's own documentation shows, that installationwas improperlyperformed. Respondent's Motion, based on the incorrectbeliefthat (because another vendor was also involved6) it did not perform maintenance that it signed offis mistaken. Respondent performed, signed off, and approved for return to service these landing gear and flying doors as having completed a replacement pursuant to AMM 32-11-00, and that manual section includes the

6Respondent has onlypresentedBecker's testimonythat Respondentrelied ona vendorto performthe work
13properrouting and clamping ofthe hydraulic lines. Respondent's Motion on this point is not only due to bedenied, butjudgment shouldbe granted infavor ofthe FAA. VI. "Wear and Tear" Respondent asserts that the extensive damage observed to the components ofthe flying door assemblies and adjacent structures is wear and tear. However, Respondent fails to present any evidence to support the conclusion that this damage was "wear and tear," or even could be "wear and tear." As an initial matter, it shouldbenoted that- contraryto Respondent's assertion- it is not the case that "there can be no denying that flying doors, representing large structures that are raised and lowered in the slipstream, operate in a hostile environment and are subject to significant wear and tear." See Respondent's Motion at 3. Respondent provides no factual support whatsoever for any aspect ofthis contention. Onthe contrary, a flying door- ifproperly installed and rigged- is apart ofthe aircraft that almost never develops issues between C checks (whenthe door will beremoved, reinstalled, andre-rigged). Exhibit JJ

**~** 14. Rather, for the notion that the damage to the aircraft was "wear and tear," Respondent relies exclusively on the opinions ofBecker

- who is not a mechanic

- and in particular on the Becker's interpretation of maintenance records. See Respondent's Motion at 19, 22-24. Respondent cannot rely on the documents themselves because they contain repeated explicit references to improperly installed components, as well as repeated references to cracked and gouged components. Instead, Becker simply asserts, without explanation or expertise, that the damage was "wear and tear." And Respondent cannot rely on the personal observations of Becker- while Respondent seeks to buttress Becker's testimonyby asserting that he was present
on "a daily basis" when the aircraft were returned to the AMES facility, see Respondent's

14Motion at 17, Respondent fails to mention that Becker does not have any actual recollection of the condition ofthe aircraft at thattime: Q: And what, if anything, do you remember observing about the condition of those aircraft? A:
... I do recall that myinspectors were asked to inspect the flying doors and the areas with a fine tooth comb. They wanted us to write up every nick, every minor flaw

.... Q: Sure. Do you have any personal recollection ofwhat, if any, nicks or flaws were on these aircraft? A: Um,no. Exhibit B at 76. This is especially noteworthy when Becker is used to support the notion that
some ofAMES's own maintenance entries are inaccurate. See Respondent's Motion at 17.It is unclear what basis Becker could have for concluding that the documents are inaccurate when he has no independent recollection ofthe status ofthe aircraft and is relying solely on those same documents. Respondent's assertion that the damage at issue (described in detail in the FAA's Motion for Summary Judgment) was "wear and tear" makes little sense. The entire purpose ofrigging the flying doors is that, when properly rigged, the flying doors and associated structures have ample clearance between them, and components like the hinges are not put into unduly forceful contact. But the damage at issue in this case specifically included multiple instances ofdamage caused when these components were scraping and binding against each other. This is very distinct from "wear and tear"- which is why a trained mechanic, such as Inspector Lipinski, who looks at the aircraft can tell the difference between the two. As Inspector Lipinski noted at his deposition, there was very minor wear and tear on the aircraft

- out that the damage at issue in

15this case is not wear and tear. See Exhibit NN at 49-50; see also Exhibit JJ

**~~** 14, 24, 27, 30, 33, 42. It is also why, contrary to Becker's belief, see Respondent's Motion at 16-17, it is not always necessary to perform a gear swing to determine that a flying door is out ofrig. When the flying door and associated structures are exhibiting damage from the components scraping and binding against each other, it canbedetermined thatthe dooris out ofrig. Exhibit JJ

**~** 15. In sum, the damage to the aircraft from flying door and associated structures scraping and binding is not consistent with wear and tear, but is rather exactly the sort ofdamage one might expect when the flying door is improperly rigged. Respondent provides no explanation for its contention that the damage is just wear and tear, and no meaningful evidence. Respondent's Motion onthis point is not only due to be denied, butjudgment should be granted in favor ofthe FAA. VII. Applicability ofMaintenance Concepts BeyondAMM 32-11-00 and 32-12-11/501 In its Motion, Respondent argues that Inspector Lipinski erred in asserting that Respondent should have taken into account AMM section 32-12-11/401 and following pages. See Respondent's Motion at 4, 24-28. Respondent is incorrect in asserting that its personnel should conduct maintenance in ignorance of any information outside the four comers of a particularAMM section. Respondent's argument raises the question ofto what extent a mechanic or repair station is responsible for awareness ofmaintenance documents and concepts beyond the four comers of the AMM section it cites in its sign off. In performing maintenance, is a repair station expected to know the manufacturer's standard practices provisions? Is it expected to have knowledge of advisory circulars on acceptable maintenance techniques, or know industry standards on how

16maintenance tasks are to beperformed? When performing maintenance on a larger assemblythat includes removal and reinstallation ofmany sub-components, is it expected to have knowledge ofthe information in the parts catalog, or the more detailed diagrams, routing information, and installation instructions in other parts ofthe AMM? Does it matter when the work being signed offbythe repair stationis a Required Inspection Item (RII)? Respondent asserts that- at least as to some ofthese questions -itis under no obligation to have knowledge of or take into account these other documents and concepts, including the detailed diagram in AMM 32-12-11/401 showing the proper configuration of the shimming washers for the forward and aft flying door hinges. See Respondent's Motion at 4, 24-28. As Respondent notes, it is undisputed that AMM 32-12-11/401 is not explicitly called out in AMM 32-11-00. But the fact that a document is not explicitly called out in AMM 32-11-00 does not
mean that a mechanic is under no obligation to be aware ofthe contents ofthat documents. The B727 AMM presumes that a mechanic either knows the full manual, or knows when to go look for more detailed information. See Exhibit JJ

**~** 12. The procedure for reinstalling the landing gear and flying doors contains multiple instructions that, in a vacuum, lack detail on how to perform the action in question. The manual instructs the mechanic to install the flap track fairing, but doesn't explain how to do that. Exhibit C, Page 422,

**~** AK. The instructions say to hang the door, but don't explain how to hang the door or how to support the door before the hinges and actuation rod have been attached. Exhibit C, Page 422,

**~** AL(3). The instructions call for the mechanic to tighten bolts and install cotter pins, without saying howtight the bolts need to be or where exactly the cotter pins go. Exhibit C, Page 422,

**~~** AL(5)(9). Much ofthis information is inAMM43-12-11/401. Similarly, when AMM 32-11-00 instructs the mechanic to insert washers

onthe forward hinges ofthe flying doors to provide clearance between the lugs ofthe aft hinges,

17it does not say exactly where those washers should go or how much clearance is necessary. Exhibit C, Page 422,

**~** AL(2). It is by looking at the diagrams in AMM 32-12-11/401 that the mechanic can learn the particulars ofwhere the washers (and cotter pins) are to be located. See Exhibit D. By contrast, Respondent provides no evidentiary support for the notion that a mechanic

can properlyperform maintenance while remaining willfully ignorant ofthe full contents ofthe AMM heis using. Respondent's motion onthis point is due to be denied. VIII. Respondent's Claims ofInspector Bias Although it has no bearing in a snmmaryjudgment motion, Respondent again reiterates its baseless allegations ofbias against Aviation Safety Inspector Lipinski. Respondent's Motion at 5, 28-30. Respondent's claim that the FAA's case should be dismissed based on allegations of bias is frivolous

- this exactly the sort ofcredibility determination that a court cannot make on summaryjudgment. Further, Respondent has only been able to identify one supposed effect of this supposedbias- and, as discussed below, Respondent's own manager inadvertently admitted that the supposed exaggeration by Inspector Lipinski was actually an appropriate statement. Finally, as exemplified by the FAA's Motion for Summary Judgment, a finding ofviolation is supported against the Respondent even if the evidence considered consists solely of the documentation createdby Respondent and CCIA. As an initial matter, Respondent's motion on this point is inappropriate. The court does not evaluate credibility in snmmary judgment proceedings. Steven Baicker-McKee, et.al, Federal Civil Rules Handbook, 1125 (West Publishing 2012). Even ifthe Respondent had laid out a convincing case that the Inspector was biased, and that this has some sort ofeffect on the
case - which it has not - a motion for summary judgment is not the place for credibility

18determinations. Indeed, Respondent asks the court to make a double credibility determination

- to credit its management officials over Inspector Lipinski when the two disagree about Inspector Lipinski's statements, and thenbased on that credibility determination make abroader credibility determination about the supposed bias of Inspector Lipinski. Respondent asks the Judge to do this even though Inspector Lipinski has no reason whatsoever to present false information, but Respondent faces tens ofthousands ofdollars in direct penalties and the possibility ofhaving the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) rescind Respondent's authorization to approve aircraft components for returnto service under EASAregulations. It should also be noted that the supposed bias asserted by Respondent is hardly demonstrated by the allegations it makes. Respondent's allegations come in two parts. First, that the Inspector was "biased" in favor ofanother repair station. See Respondent's Motion at 28-29. It appears that the Inspector, the other members of the certificate management team, and everyone at CCIA shared this opinion

- the other repair station had extensive experience with B727 aircraft, Respondent had no experience with them, and the move was made only because Respondent and CCIA shared a corporate parent. See Respondent's Motion at 28, Exhibit JJ

**~** 9; Exhibit 00 at 88 (D'Arcy deposition). An FAA maintenance inspector holding opinions about the skill and safety level ofvarious certificate holders is hardly noteworthy

- indeed, it would

seem quite noteworthyifan inspectormanaged to avoid forming any opinions. See Exhibit JJ

**~** 9 Regardless, Inspector Lipinski did not "steer" CCIA towards any particular maintenance provider. See Exhibit JJ

**~** 9. Second, Respondent references two meeting ofthe Capital managers and the certificate management team. See Respondent's Motion at 29. At one ofthese meetings, Inspector Lipinski allegedly made a number "intemperate remarks" about how he was going to "war" with

19Respondent and would "take no prisoners" and that the "shit is going to start." Respondent's Motion at 29. What Respondent does not mention in its Motion is that this meeting took place in March 2012, when the Notice ofProposed Civil Penalty in this case had been issued in August 2011 7 See Respondent's Motion Exhibit 15. As a general matter, the possibility that an FAA inspector lost his temper during a meeting is a vast distance away from the inspector bringing false charges against a Respondent. More particularly, it is unclear how a statement in March of 2012 that the Inspector was going to "war" and that "shit is going to start" could possibly be referring to a case that the Inspector had completed a year before, was already in the undersigned's office, and wouldhave already gone through coordination withFAA headquarters. See FAA Order 2150.3B, Chapter 6

**~** 3(b)(3) (requiring coordination with headquarters for all civil penalties over $100,000, such as the one against CCIA). Nor is it clear how Inspector Lipinski could offer a quidpro quo about how the FAA would handle a "potential" enforcement action against CCIA when the only existing enforcement action against CCIA had already been referred to legal, and there were no future enforcement actions initiated against CCIA. See Exhibit JJ

**~** 9. Further, it is unclear what the supposed effect of Inspector Lipinski's supposed bias is supposed to be. Respondent's only allegation in this regard concerns a claim that Inspector Lipinski is exaggerating the damage he observed on the aircraft. See Respondent's Motion at 16 n.7, 21-22. However, with one exception, Respondent has failed to identify what the supposed exaggerations were. See Respondent's Motion at 16 n.7. And that one supposed exaggeration
was in fact an accurate statement, as Beckerinadvertently admitted at his deposition.

7 The undersigned's office received the companion case against CCIA inMarch 2011, a year priorto the meetings discussedbyRespondent.
20That one particular "exaggeration" is the condition ofthe anti-skid conduit on the righthand main landing gear on N287SC. See Respondent's Motion at 21. Inspector Lipinski described the conduit as "crushed," while Respondent believes that it is better described as "pinched." ExhibitKK at 55. Althoughthis appears to be a rather superficial semantic distinction to base a charge ofbias on, Respondent asserts that the word "crushed" was improper because it "would suggest" that the wires inside the conduit were damaged. See Respondent's Motion at 21 n.11. However, at his deposition, Becker testified that the word "crushed" would have the "connotation" that the conduit was beyond use. Exhibit KK at 56. But the conduit in question here was beyond use and, as Becker admitted later in his deposition, did have to be replaced. Exhibit KK at 99, 149; see also Exhibit DD at 6 (Respondent's maintenance write-up that "conduit found unserviceable & needs replaced"). So, even according to Becker's own description ofwhat it would mean for the conduit to be crushed, the conduit was crushed

- it could notbeused, andhad to bereplaced. Finally, even if it was somehow appropriate for the court to make credibility determinations on summaryjudgment, and even ifRespondent had actually presented evidence of bias on the part of Inspector Lipinski, that would not mean that any sort ofjudgment in Respondent's favor would be appropriate. Respondent asserts that the case against it should be dismissed simplybecause ofthe Inspector's supposedbias. However, Respondent does not
- and cannot

- provide any citation to any principle oflaw that would require or even permit such a result. As an initial matter, the Respondent appears to have difficulty distinguishingbetween "the FAA" and "Inspector Lipinski." See generally Respondent's Motion. Similarly, Respondent fails to acknowledge any source of evidence against it but Inspector Lipinski

- even though the observations of another FAA Inspector, CCIA mechanics, Respondent's mechanics, and

21numerous documents all implicate Respondent in this case. Even if it was appropriate for the Court to make a credibility determination against Inspector Linpinski, and even if it was appropriate to make that determination on summaryjudgment, the other evidence in the case - including Respondent's own documentation

- demonstrates that Respondent improperly performedthe insallations. Respondent's Motion on this point is inappropriate, and due to be denied. IX. Other FactualMatters In addition to the lengthier topics addressed above, Respondent's Motion includes a pair ofadditional factual misrepresentations that are worth correcting. First, Respondent claims that "[f]rom the outset" it responded to the FAA's Letter of Investigation by asserting that "whatever discrepancies were identified

... were the product of 'normal wear and tear' and not evidence of the failure to properly rig the flying doors." Respondent's Motion at 2. This assertion is false. As discussed in detail in the FAA's Motion, Respondent originally agreed, in writing, that it had improperly installed the flying doors. See Exhibit HH. Respondent only changed its mind later, at some point after it had received the Notice ofProposed Civil Penalty. Second, Respondent asserts that the damage observed on the aircraft here was "minor" and therefore had no relation to airworthiness. Respondent's Motion at 16. As an initial matter, this topic does not warrant extensive discussion because it is immaterial

- whether the damage observed was sufficient to render the aircraft unairworthy is not at issue in this case because the FAA has not charged Respondent with operating an unairworthy aircraft8 Substantively, Respondent's connection between "minor" and airworthiness here is inapt. Respondent correctly

8 The aircraft were in anunairworthy condition, but allegations regarding operating an aircraft in an unairworthy condition were properlybrought against the air carrier, not the repair station.
22notes that, during his deposition, Becker asserted that some ofits repairs were minor and did not affect airworthiness. See Exhibit KK. at I02. However, Becker (perhaps not adequately understanding the concept ofairworthiness) contradicted that contention in the deposition when he specifically identified several repairs that performed byRespondent that, even in his opinion,
were necessary and required. See Exhibit KK. at 99 (anti-skid conduit had to be replaced), 100 (nut plate had to be replaced), 101 (new hinge covers had to be installed), 115-17 (gimbals needed to be repaired), 118/130 (damaged angle needed to be replaced), 135 (bushings were beyond limits), 143 (gouges had to be repaired), 146 (incorrectly positioned clamps had to be moved), 148 (cracked fairing stiffenerhad to berepaired). Respondent's ownmaintenance writeups include several explicit references to the status of components being "beyond limits." See Exhibit Nat 17; Exhibit Tat 1-7, 43. Indeed, even though Becker asserted that a "blend and treat" was a "minor" repair that did not affect airworthiness, Exhibit KK at I02, he later indicated that damage warranting a "blend and treat" was something that had to berepaired once detected, 

### id. at 101. But if damage to an aircraft means that component has to be repaired or replaced under the AMM or applicable maintenance program, this means that the aircraft is unairworthy if that maintenance action is not taken. See In re Whitley; FAA Order 2009-4. Accordingly, while the issue ofwhether the aircraft were unairworthy by reason ofthe various maintenance problems observed in May 2010 is immaterial, Respondent's assertion that the aircraft were airworthyis mistaken, and is directly contradictedbyits ownwitness's testimony. Conclusion As discussed above, Respondent's Motion for SummaryJudgment is baseless. It asks the judge to make credibility determinations and weigh competing evidence and reach conclusions that are not only incorrect substantively, but inappropriate procedurally. And almost all ofthe

23competing evidence it does present consists of the un-expert personal opm10ns of a nonmechanic on issues of aviation maintenance. On the contrary, the actual evidence in the case demonstrates thatjudgment in favor ofthe FAA is appropriate on many ofthe points raised by Respondent- Respondent failed to install the tubular bearing on the right-hand side ofN287SC, Respondent failed to properly shim the hinges or gear fittings on N899AA, Respondent performed the maintenance that included the improperly installed hydraulic line clamps on N898AA and N899AA, and the improper installations resulted in damage to the aircraft that cannotbe dismissed as "normal wear and tear."

WHEREFORE, the FAA requests that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment be denied and, as laid out in the FAA's Motion for SummaryJudgment, thatjudgmentbe granted to the FAA.

.



## ~~ Respectfully submitted this

# 17 dayofFebruary, 2015.



# ~- CHRISTOPHERR. STEVENSON Attorney Office ofthe Regional Counsel

24CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certifY that the foregoing Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment was sent: original and one copy via Federal Express to: Federal Aviation Administration 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20591 Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 Wilbur Wright Building- Suite 2Wl000

one copyviaFederal Express (with attachments) andfacsimile (without attachments) to: The Honorable J.E. Sullivan Administrative LawJudge Office ofHearings, M-20 U.S. Department ofTransportation 1200 NewJersey Avenue, SE (Ell-310) Washington, DC 20590 facsimile: (202) 366-7536 Robert P. Silverberg, Esq. 1101 30th Street, NW, Suite 120 Washington, D.C. 20007 Facsimile: (202) 944-3306



# ~~~s

Program Analyst Office ofthe Regional Counsel 

## _fEB 17 Dated

25U;S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

## FEB l82015 

# D

.HEAHING DOCKET

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, Complainant,

vs. AIRBORNE MAINTENA-NCE AND ENGINEERING SERVICES, Respondent. DocketNo. F AA-2013-0291 FAACaseNo. 2011S0290032
Judge Sullivan

DECLARATION OF FRANKLIPINSKI COMES NOWthe Declarant, FrankLipinski, and states as follows: 1. I am overthe age of18 and Iunderstand the obligations ofan oath. 2. I am c1mently employed withthe FederalAviationAdministration as anAir Carrier Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI) atthe Orlando Certificate Management Office (CMO), currently on long-term detail to the Flight Standards Air CarrierMaintenanceDivision, Cargo Focus Team. 3. Ihave served at the FederalAviationAdministration as anAviation Safety Inspector (Airworthiness) since 2000. As anAviation Safety Inspector, and then as aPrincipal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), I was trainedto evaluate, and routinely do evaluate, whether maintenance was performedin accordance withmaintenance programs andmanuals; and whether it was performed in accordance withthe Federal AviationRegulations. In additionmy private sector experience with the

### B-727, whichis discussedbelow, as part ofmy duties atthe FAA I attended amulti-weekfactory service training course at the Boeing facility inLong Beach. 4 .I served inthe United States Marine Corps andNavy from 1970through 1988. While in the Navy, I served as an AircraftMaintenance Technician SeniorChief, CrewChief, Plane Captain, Flight Crew Plane Captain, Quality Assurance Inspector (All Systems), Quality Assurance Representative (All Systems), Quality Assurance Department Chief, Maintenance Control Manager/Chief, FlightEngineer, FlightEngineer CheckAirman/Standards Evaluator, Flight Loadmaster, andRadio Operator.**~** GOVERNMENT 

# i .!!'l:!.IBIT 

### i 

## -J,) ! ! I

. ' 1 i-- ----------------------------------

5. In 1988 !received aMechanic Certificate withAirframe and Powerplantratings, and a FlightEngineer certificate, bothbased on my !11-ilitaryexperience. In I990 Ireceived aPilot certificate. From 1988 through 1991, Iworkedat AmericanAirFreight, Laredo Air, and American Jet Center, serving variously as amechanic, flight engineer, maintenance supervisor, inspection supervisor, andmaintenance instructor. This included working withB-727 aircraft. In 1992 and 1993 Iworked as the chiefflight engineer, DirectorofMaintenance, and General Managerfor Alcai:rAirTransport. Afterthat Iworkedfrom 1994through 1998 as a flight engineer, maintenance inspector, and maintenance supervisorfor Trans AirLinkAirlines. This again includedworking onB-727 aircraft. I also worked as amaintenancetechnician maintenance supervisor at SpiritAirlines beforejoiningthe FAA. 6. Iwas the reporting inspectorfor this EIRandfor the related case against Capital Cargo International Airlines (Capital). Iwas also thePMI for Capital during for yearsbefore this violation occurred andremained PMIuntil Capital shut down. In reachingthe opinions offered in this declaration, Ihave considered all documents containedin the EIR, mypersonal observations ofthe aircraft, my conversations with employees andmanagers at Capital and AMES, and additional documents providedbyAMES during discovery. The documents Ihave reviewed include the maintenancepackages for the original work done by AMES, the re-work done by· AMES, documents onthe vibrationincidentinApril of20I0, aircraftlogbookpages, portions of theB-727 AircraftMaintenanceManual (AMM), and letters and e-mails betweenthe FAA, AMES, and Capital. My

**Suppos~d** "Bias" 7. My statements and opinions inthis case arebased onmy observations and experiencein aircraft maintenance. Ihave no "bias" againstAirborneMaintenance and Engineering Services (AMES), although Ihave formed opinions aboutthembased on interactions withthem and Capital, and my investigations inthis and othercases, and intheperformance ofmy duties as PMIfor Capital (such as determining whetherto approve an additionto Capital's operations specifications to permitthe use ofAMES as amaintenanceprovider). 8.

-My statements inthe EIR, bothinmyinspector's statement and in SectionB, were honest and accurateto the best ofmyknowledge andunderstanding atthetimethose statements were made. My statements about mypersonal observations ofthe conditionofthe aircraftwhenI inspected them inMay of2010 arenotexaggerated. · 9. Ihave reviewedthe accusations ofbias made againstme by AMES in its motion for summaryjudgment, the pages ofJeffBecker'sdepositionthat are mentioned inthat part ofthe motion, _andthe declarations that are mentioned in thatpart ofthe motion. Again, I am notbiased againstAMES. It says in the motionthat Icomplained aboutCapital beingforcedto use the services ofAMES after Capital was boughtbyparentcompanyAirTransportation ServicesGroup (ATSG) and AMES was created out ofthe Airborne Express (ABX) maintenance department. Onthe contrary, Capitalpersonnelcomplainedtome thatthey were goingto be requiredto use the services ofAMES because ATSGhadtoldthemto. Itis statedinthe motion that Iusedthe "derogatoryterm" of"mother ship" whenreferring to ATSG. AlthoughI do not recall the particularincidentthatBeckermentions, Ihave used thatterm torefer to ATSG. Iused

2thatterm because it was howpersonnel at Capital frequently referredto ATSG. AMES says in its motionthat I "went so far as to say" thatI "preferred CCIAusethe services of'anotherrepair station (Flight Star), andthat I attemptedto steer Capital to that otherrepair station. Personnel at Capital made itvery clearto metltat they preferredthe services ofFlight Star, whichwas the repair station Capital hadpreviously beenusing and continuedto use for sometasks. Iwas, and am, ofthe opinionthatusing Flight Star, whichhad extensiveB-727 experience (AMES had none), would have resulted in fewermaintenance issues for Capital. Inthe contextofCapital's repeated issues with AMES and Capital personnel repeatedly complainingto me aboutthe quality ofthework from AMES, we wouldhave discussed the quality ofCapital's other maintenance options. However, Inever attemptedto "steer'' Capital into using one repair station or another. Itis stated intl1e motion and declarations that during aMarch 2012 meeting Ireferred to AMES as "evil,"that Iwas going to "war" against AMES, thatI would "take no prisoners," thatthe "shitis going to start," and that itwas my goal to have AMES'scertificate SUSpended. This meetingtookplace months afterthis case andthe relatedcase agaiost Capital had been completed and sentto theRegion. Ikoow that Idid not saythatmy goal was to have AMES's certificate suspended. Ido notrecallmakingthe other statements. One ofthe declarations I reviewed saidthat I said during aMarch 2012meetingthat itwould beneftt Capital io a "potential" enforcementca!le ifthey dropped AMES. This is nottrue. ImproperInstallation of Main Landing GearandFlyingDoors 10. Iremain ofthe opioionthatAMES iolproperly installed the landing gear and flying doors. onN287SC,N898AA, andN899AA. Mypersonal observations ofthe aircraft in May 2010 included direct observationofimproperly placed shimming washers and damagetothe flying doors, flap track fairings, and other components thatwas causedby improperriggiog. The Capital and AMES maintenance records, plus my conversations witll Capital andAMES managers, andwritten statements to me from Capital and AMES, all confirmedthatthe landiog gear and flying doors had notbeenproperly installed. 11. Installing tile main landing gearand flying doors requires the use ofshims intile flyiog door hinges and otherfittings. Placementofthese shiols, especiallythe shims intile priolary forward and aft hinges for each flyiog door, is calledriggiog. These shiols make surethat the flying door is held tightly intile properposition, with enough clearance betweenitand other components, and so thatwhenthe landiog gearretractthe surface ofthe flying door is evenwith the surface ofthe wing. The actuationrodthatcloses the flying door ispowerful and strong enoughthatthe flying doorwillclose regardless ofwhetherthe dooris properlypositioned. If the door is notproperlyrigged, this will resulted in stress andthendamage to the components of the flying door assembly, the flying door itself, and associated structures. 12. I am aware that AMES claims that it did nothaveto koow oruse the informationio AMM 32-12-11/401. AMES is rightthatAMM 32-11-00 does not explicitly call outAMM 32- 12-1111. But, as Iexplained atmy deposition, this is not how the B-727 AMM is designed. The B-727 AMM requires the mechanic to have koowledge ofthemanual system generally. For example, I discussed earlierthe procedure for changing amainlanding gear wheel. The procedure for changingthe wheeltells the mechanic to removetwo bolts and raise the wing door to servicing position. Itdoes nottellthe mechanic wherethe bolts are, what they looklike, what

3the servicing position is, or aboutthe redwarning paintthat shows the mechanicthatthe dooris extendedto the proper servicing positionto insertthe bolt. This information is found elsewhere inthe AMM. The instructions for configuring the hinges whenreinstalling the flying doors, in AL(9), instructthe mechanic to tighten anut to standardtorque, but do nottell the mechanic whatthe standardtorque is. That same instructiontells themechanic to install acotterpin, but does nottell himwhere to install it. The sectionthatcontainsthe diagram onexactlywherethe cotterpin goes is AMM 32-12-111401. The same is true ofthe proper configuration ofthe shimming washers for thosehinges. AMM 32-11-00 does not say exactly whatthe configuration is supposedtobe, but that diagram canbe found inAMM 32-12-11/401. A mechanic using the B-727 AMM needs training onwhere elseinthe manualto lookfor the details ofsome tasks, or at least thetraining to recognize when he needs additional information so he canfigure outwhere it is. 13. As stated above, it is my opinionthat AMES, inperformingmaintenance on aB-727, neededto be aware ofthe manual system generally, notjustthe individual section itwas performing. However, none ofmy opinions inthis declaration as to whether AMES properly performed the main landing gear and flying door installations depends on whether AMES followed the diagran1s inAMM 32-12-11/401. While my own observations ofthe shims onthe tln·ee aircraft infuis case showed that those shims were not arranged as specifiedinAMM 32-12- 1!!40I, ignoring fuis does not change whetherAMES properlyperformedfue maintenance. As discussedbelow, each ofthemainlanding gear/flying door installations oneach offue aircraft was performedimproperly evenwithout considering AMM 32-12-11/40I. · 14. Ihave been informedthatAMES asserts thatthecause offuedamage to the aircraft thatI observed inMay 2010, andthatwas documentedby Capital andAMES, was "wear andtear." The damage was notnormal wear andtear. As I said during my deposition, fuere was a small amount o[wearand tear onthese aircraft, but the damage Iwas referringto inmyinspector's statement and infue EIRwas notwear andtear. Normalwear and tear for fuese components might be paint deterioration, worn orpossiblytornrubber seals, agedlubrication, affixed dirt, or · the presence ofmetallic dust inthehinges from the frequentmovement. The type ofdamage I observed could notbenormal wear and tear. My observations ofother Capital B-727 aircraft duringfue May 2010 inspections, including some thathadbeen flying muchlonger sincetheir mostrecent C checks, did notreveal the sort ofdamage I observed onthese three aircraft. When the installation and rigging ofthe landing gear and flying doors is properlyperformed, this sort ofdamage will aln10stnever occurpriorto the nextC check (whenthe doors will be removed, reinstalled, andrigged again). 15. Ihave beeninformedthatAMES and Mr. Beckerclaimthatit is impossible to knowif the B-727 flying doors are improperly riggedwifuoutperforming a gear swing. They are wrong. Agear swing is requrredto definitely determine that aflying door is properly rigged. However, it can be possible to tell that aflying door is outofrig. Inthis case, pails ofall three aircraft were damagedwhere fue doors, hinges, flap track fairings, and othercomponents hadbeenscraping, rubbing, orbinding against each other. Whenthe door is properly rigged, these components do not scrape, rub, and bind against each other. So by looking atthe damage yon cantellthatthe door is notproperlyrigged.

4---------------------- ----------------cc

16. Performingmaintenance for Capital, AMES wasrequired to follow Capiial's maintenance program. ThatprogramrequiredthatAMES followthe B-727 AMlv!. N899AA 17. AMES approvedN899AA for returnto service inAugust 2009 after removing and replacingbothmainlanding gears. According to Capital, the aircraftwas used on784 flights betweenthatreturnto service andwhenwe inspectedthe aircraft inMayof2010. 18. The damage and otherproblems noted onthe right-handflYing door and associated components duringthe May 2010 inspection, as documentedwhen Capital worked onthe aircraft inToledo, and as documented when AMES performedthere-work onthe aircraft included:

• The flap trackfairing was damaged bythe forward hinge cover upperhinge pin, which hadmigratedout ofthe hinge; • Theflap trackfairing was also damagedfrom rubbing attheforward hinge cover; • Thewrongpin was installedinthe hinge cover midhinge; • A hinge loop on the forward hinge cover was cracked and neededto be replaced; • The afthinge coverhadto be replaced; • The aft angle onthe fairing was damage and neededto be replaced; • The shimmingwasher configuration onbothhinges was incorrect; • There was excessive play (looseness) in the gearfitting. 19. The conditionofthe flying door and associated components inMayof2010 demonstrates thatthe right-handmainlanding gear and flying doorwerenotproperlyinstalledbyAMES in August of2009. 20. AMES wasrequiredto properly install and secure the hinge covers, including the hinge pins, butthey didnot, as specifically noted in Capital's documentation. 21. AMESwasrequiredto properly configurethe shimming washers ontheforward and aft hinges, butthey did not, as specificallynotedintheirownre-workdocuments. 22. AMES was requiredto shimthe gear fitting, but did not, as reflected inthe needto reshimthe gearfitting because itwas loose. 23. The other damage to the flap track fairing and excessivewear ona hinge cover also shows thatthe doors were notproperlyrigged, because these components wererubbingagainst other components whenthey shouldnothavebeen. 24. The discrepancies discussed above are not consistent withnormal wear and tear. 25. The damage and otherproblems noted onthe left-hand flying door and associated components during theMay 2010 inspection, when Capitalworked on the aircraft in Toledo, and when AMES performedthere-work onthe aircraft included:



### 5**----------------~-------------··-·------------------**

• The shimming washer configurationonbothhinges wasincorrect; • There was excessive play (looseness) inthe gear fitting; • The forward hinge cover bracketneededto bereplaced dueto excessive wear; • Therewas damage tothe flying doorwhere the door was chafing onimproperly positionedhydraulic line clamps, whichwas addressed byrepositioning thehose swivel clamps. 26. AMES wasrequiredtoproperlyroute and clamp the hydraulic lines, butdid not, as specificallynotedintheir ownre-work documents. I am aware that AMES has statedthatthe initial build-up for themainlanding gear assembly was performedbyanothervendor. This does notchangemy conclusion. Accordingto their ownmaintenance documents, AMESperformed theentire removal andreplacement ofmainlanding gear, specificallyincluding section5 (Installation ofMain Landing Gear). This sectionbegins withaninstructionto "prepare a main landing gear assembly for installation,"and specifically statesthatthis includes hydrauliclines andclamps. Laterinthe process, themechanic is instructedto install a trunion swivel complete withhydraulic lines. AMES specifically signed offhaving completedthese steps, andthen (as requiredbyCapital'smaintenance program) signed offhavingperformed aninspectionto ensure thatthe workwas performedproperly. Even ifanothervendor didtheinitialbuild-up, AMES performedthemaintenancebecause AMES signed offhavingperformedthemaintenance, and then approved the installationfor returnto service.

·27. AMES wasrequired toproperly configurethe shimmingwashers onthe forward and aft hinges, butthey didnot, as specificallynoted intheir ownre-work documents. AMES was requiredto properly shimthe gearfitting, butdidnot, as reflectedinthe replacehardware damaged fromthe gearfitting beingtoo loose. These, andthe excessivewearthat required replacement ofthe forward hinge bracket, arenotconsistentwithnormal wear andtear. N898AA 28. AMES approvedN898AAfor returnto service inAugust 2009afterremoving and replacingbothmainlanding gears. According toCapital, the_aircraftwas used on 628 flights betweenthatretoro to service andwhen weinspectedthe aircraft inMay of2010. 29. The damage and otherproblems notedontheright-hand flying door and associated components duringtheMay 2010 inspection, as documentedwhenCapitalworked onthe aircraft inToledo, and as documented whenAMES performedthe re-work onthe aircraft included:

• The flying doorhad gougedthe skinofthe \ving; • The skin oftheflying door was cracked at a hinge fitting; • Theforward hinge neededtobereplaced because it hadcracked; • The afthingeneededto bereplacedbecause itwas loose; • Manyhingebushings showedexcessive wear andhadtobereplaced; • Therewas suchexcessive wear ona flap trackfairing attachplate thatitwas chafed through.

630. These discrepancies, especiallythe damage to the wing, flying door, and hinges, demonstratethattheright-hand mainlanding gear and flyingdoorwere notproperlyinstalled. The damagerecorded is not consistentwithnormal wear and tear. 31. Thedamage and otherproblemsnoted on the left-hand flying door and associated · components duringthe May 2010 inspection, as documentedwhen Capitalworked onthe aircraft in Toledo, and as documentedwhenAMES performedthere-work onthe aircraft included:

• Therewere gouges inthe flying door at an attachbracket and atthe stopbracket; • The forwardhingewas cracked; • Hingebushingshad to bereplacedbecausethey were wornbeyondlimits; • Anaft hinge coverpinhad migrated out ofthehinge and a hinge lobe was cracked; • There was a crackedbushinginthe gear fitting; • Theaft internal stiffener inthefairing was crackedtwice; • Therewas a crackinthe flap track fairing's forward attach plate; • The swivel clamps forthehydraulic lines were incorrectly positioned; • Even afterrepairs, the door couldnotbeadjusted intorig andneeded to bereplaced. 32. AMES wasrequiredto properlyroute andclamp thehydraulic lines, butdidnot, as specifically notedintheir ownre-workdocuments. As discussed above, AMES signedoffthis work as being completed and approved the aircraftfor returnto service. Preparingthe assembly for installation andinstalling the trimion swivel complete withhydraulic lines is specifically called for inthe landing gearinstallationprocess (AMM 32-11-00,page422). AMES is responsible for whethetthe maintenance itperformed and singed offwas done propedy. 33. The other discrepancies also demonstratethat the left-handmainlanding gear andflying doorwere not properly installed. Notonly werethere gouges and cracks,butthe door itselfhad beenbentby the actuator repeatedly closing the door when itwas out ofrig. Thisis whythe flying door couldnotbe adjustedbackinto rig afterthe other damage was repaired, andwhythe doorhadto bereplaced. The damagerecordedis notconsistent withnormal wear andtear. N287SC 34. AMES approvedN287SC forreturnto service inMarch2010 afterremoving and replacing bothmainlanding gears. Inspectionafter a vibrationincident onApril 16, 2010 found thatthetubular bearing was missing fromwhere the wing door actuationrod connectedwiththe drag strut ontheright -handmain landing gear. 35. No relevant maintenance wasperfo!'med onthe aircraftbetweenMarch22, 2010 and April16, 2010. The onlyreasonwhythistubularbearing wouldbemissingis afailure to install itinthefirst place. 36. I havebeeninformed that AMES andMr. Becker claimthatthe missing tubularbearing on N287SC wasprobablythe result ofa tire change. This is wrong. I havereviewedMr. Becker's depositions whereMr. Becker claims that somepeople when changingthetire will "removethatboltthat contains thetubularbearing andholdup theflying dooroutoftheway as


### 7they change the wheel." I have beentoldthatAMES describes this as a "shortcut." No mechanic wouldchange a tire inthe waydescribed by

### Mr. Becker. Itis not a shortcut. TheB-727 flying door actuationrod has apair ofboltsthat are specifically designed for changingthewheel- you removethetwo bolts, the actuationrod extends afew inches, andthen youput one ofthose two boltsbackin, which supports the flying doorwhile the wheel isbeing changed. Theinstructions for doingthis work are listedinAMM 32-45-01 pages 401-404 (Main GearWheelsRemoval/Installation), andthe diagram showingthe actuationrod andboltpositions isinAMM 32-12-00 (Main Gear Doors- Description and Removal). Thisprocedure couldnotpossibly have any effectonthetubular bearing, whichis part ofthe attachmentfitting wherethe actuation rodattaches to the landing gear, which canbe seen inAMM 32-11-00 page403 Detail A. 37. Inhis deposition, 

### Mr. Beckerrefers to moving the flying door outofthe wayofthe wheel changebyremoving therod actuation attachmentbolt. This bolt attaches the actuationrodto the wing door. The attachmentboltslides into ahollowpin. This hollowpincanbeseeninFigure 401 ofAMM 32-12-11 page403. Theprocedure suggestedbyMr. Beckerwouldrequire the mechanicto entirelydetachthe actuationrodfromtheflying door. Therewouldbenobuilt-in wayto supportthe flying door. Thephysicalprocess ofremoving andreinstalling the actuation rod attachmentboltis more difficult thanprocess for removing the correctbolts. A mechanic improperlyperformingtheprocedureinthatwaywouldhave madehis life muchmore difficult. I havenever seen orheard ofa mechanic changing a B-727 wheel that way. 38. Whether ornota mechanic wouldchange awheel intheway described by

### Mr. Becker, the hollowpinthat goes aroundthe actuationrod attachmentbolt was not what was missing on N287SC. As previouslydiscussed, whatwas missing onN287SC wasthetubularbearingth!ltis pa1t ofthefitting where the actuationrod connects tothe drag strut. Changing a wheel by removingthe attachmentboltcouldnot affectthe tubularbearing. I have never seenorheard ofa mechanic changing a wheel by detaching the actuationrodfromthelanding gear. 39. Accordingto Capital, the aircraft was usedon 172flights betweenthat returnto service andwhenwe inspectedthe aircraft in, Mayof2010. 40. The damage and otherproblemsnoted onthe left-hand flying door and associated components duringthe May 2010 inspection, as documentedwhenCapitalworked ontheaircraft inToledo, and.as documentedwhenAMES performedthe re-work ontheaircraftincluded:

• Thehinge coverpins for both the forward and afthinge covers were improperlyinstalled; • There was damagetothe flap trackfairing attheforward hinge opening; • The door was in a discrepant condition, which was addressedbyplacing multiple bushings (exact quantity unknown). 41. AMES was requiredto properlyinstall and securethehinge covers, includingthehinge pins, butthey didnot, as specificallynotedin AMES'sre-work documentation. 42. These discrepancies, especiallythe damage to the flap track fairing, demonstratethatthe right-hand mainlanding gear and flying door werenotproperlyinstalled. The damagerecorded is notconsistent withnormal wear andtear.



### 843. TheBoeingAMM, whichwas requiredto be followed under Capital'smaintenance program, requiredthatAMES properlyroute and clamphydraulic lines, properlyinstallhinge covers (includingthehingepins), install all required components (includingthe tubularbearing), properly shimthe hinges and gear fittings, and in general rigthe door so thatproper clearances betweencomponents wouldprevent damage to the aircraft fromrubbing, scraping, andbinding. EachtimethatAMES did notproperlyinstall a componentitwas failing to follow theAMMand failing to follow Capital'smaintenance program. These improperrepairs also meantthatthe aircraftwere notrestored totheir original orproperly alteredcondition.
Further declarant sayeth naught. I, FrankLipinski, declare this/JJ/dayofFebruary, 2015, underpenalty ofperjurythat the ove statements are true and correct. 

# ::u

# <iii

. j



### 9

## In The Matter Of: 

## AirborneMaintenance andEngineeringServices

JeffreyBecker October29, 2014

LegalRealtimeReporting 622 E. 

## CentralBlvd

Orlando, FL 32801

Original File 102914 Beckerfinal.txt 

### J\'Hn-U-Script® withWord Index GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT



# ..t<\<1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 

### 10 11 

### 12 13 14 15 or the "C" Check at an earlier date or are you asking what they MR. STEVENSON: At this time right now, I am asking about the original reinstallation. MR. SILVERBERG: That's not the 30(b)6 question and you know that. BY MR. STEVENSON: Q. Okay. That's

-- as to each of the three aircraft, the identity of any individuals currently or formerly employed by AMES who have personal knowledge of the original reinstallation of the MLG and flying doors by AMES. MR. SILVERBERG: Asked and answered. MR. STEVENSON: Okay. So

-- MR. SILVERBERG: We've been through that. 16 BY MR. STEVENSON: 17 

### Q. So you don't. These people have no personal 18 knowledge. They are or the extent of their personal 19 knowledge to be able to say, well, I signed that off. 20 This is the process that I followed. 40

21 MR. SILVERBERG: That's your question. That's 22 the form of your question. Go ahead. Continue. 23 A. I can go ahead and answer by stating that we 24 performed an investigation when this first came to our 25 attention. Any technicians and inspectors that had taken

### 1 part in any of these installations

-- and I don't 2 remember specifically, but I do recall that the answers 3 were exactly as Bob referenced. They reviewed the 4 maintenance manual, they reviewed the nonroutine sign 5 offs and there was no additional information they 6 provided other than that at the time we did the 7 

### investigations. 8 

### BY MR. STEVENSON: 9 

### Q. Okay. And is that still true today that they 10 would not be able to provide any additional information? 11 I don't know why it would've changed, but I have to ask. 12 A. We have not talked to them since the initial 13 investigation. Q. Okay. And is that

-- just for clarity of the record, I had been asking you about just 899AA. Is this also true of the original reinstallation, sorry, of the main landing gear replacement on N898AA, in or about October of 2009? 

### 41

14 15 16 17 

### 18 19 20 A. Yeah. My recollection is that we, like I said,
we initiated an investigation. I don't recall if it was 21 tail number specific. I know it was specifically about 22 the subject of the rigging of the doors because that's 23 what the issue was at hand, yes. But without looking at 24 our discrepancy notice files or the corrective action 25 report files, I can't answer specific tail numbers or1 2 

### A. Q. 

### No. They are just repositioning it. Okay. And are they repositioning it

-- may I 3 presume that you're saying they repositioned it further 4 than they would just by opening the landing gear? 5 A. Correct. 6 

### Q. And it is AMES' belief that it's possible that 7 the bushing could've fallen out during that procedure? 8 MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. Asked and 9 answered. Go ahead and answer. A. 

### Correct. BY MR. STEVENSON: 47

10 11 

### 12 13 

### Q. There are some -- with respect to this component, there are references to a bushing or a tubular 14 bearing. Are you aware of any difference between those 15 16 

### or are they referring to the same thing? A. I've seen it listed different ways in the 

### AMM 17 depending on where you look. I've seen it stated as a 18 tubular bearing or tubular bushing. 19 Q. Okay. But those would be references to the 20 same component? 21 22 

### A. Q. Right. You're aware that CCIA told the FAA that the 23 missing bushing was the result of AMES' actions in 24 reinstalling the landing gear in March of 2010? 25 MR. SILVERBERG: Objection as to the form of1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 

### 10 11 

### 12 55 of these photographs are from the right wheel well or are they from both landing gear? A. Yeah. I guess I don't recall specifically, but I do know we spent a lot of time in the right-hand wheel well of 287. Frank was showing us the issues and basically, the statement was, hey, these are the types of issues that he sees on the other airplanes. Q. Okay. So we've talked about the conduit. At the time in May of 2005 when you were in Toledo, was this conduit properly routed? A. 

### Q. No. Okay. Now, some emphasis, I think would be 13 

### fair to say, has been placed by AMES on Inspector 14 

### Lipinski's description of this conduit as being quote, 15 "crushed". Would you agree that that's important to 16 

### AMES? 17 

### A. I believe it's just a terminology that 

### 18 misrepresents actually what we're seeing here. 19 

### Q. Okay. And if I understand correctly, the 20 terminology that AMES has used is that the conduit was 21 pinched? A. Pinched. That's what the write up was. That's what's in the documentation. 22 23 24 

### Q. And to you, what's the difference between, in 25 this context, between pinched and crushed?1 

### 2 3 

### 4 5 6 

### 7 8 

### A. 

### memory. Again, you know

-- and I'm talking from my It's based on the way that Mr. Lipinski phrased it in the EIR. I'm trying to remember exactly where the word crushed came from and I believe it's in the EIR. think it misrepresents those people that are not knowledgeable. Crushed, to me, has a connotation of that it
was beyond use. That it wasn't doing its job. That it 9 was -- it created an airworthiness issue, which I



### 10 Mr. Lipinski is completely incorrect in that assessment. 11 

### Q. Okay. So one of the things that you mentioned 12 would be if the conduit couldn't be

-- sorry. That the 13 word crushed would imply that the conduit couldn't be 14 used. Right. 56

15 16 

### A. 

### Q. Okay. So when Inspector Lipinski says that the 17 conduit is crushed, do you think that that's just a 18 question of degree from pinched or do you think it's 19 completely out there? 20 A. I believe it's completely out there. This 21 aircraft had no history. That's an antiskid conduit, so 22 there's wires running through the conduit from the 23 antiskid sensors in the wheel. This airplane had no 24 

### history of antiskid issues. So you would believe that 25 there would be logbook write ups and issues regarding1 

### off. So this is another certificated agency had signed 2 off on this door before we got it. 3 And number two is, we were under the direction 4 of Charles Working. He said replace the door, so we 5 replaced the door. 6 

### Q. I understand. So that was -- that's an 7 entirely new door being put on? 8 

### 9 A. 

### Q. Correct. Okay. And if I understand correctly, you did 10 not feel that that would've been necessary. 11 12 

### A. 

### It says replace door with customer supplied door. This was a customer request. I have no knowledge 99



### 13 of why he wanted us to replace that door, but he asked us 14 to do it so we did it. 15 16 

### Q. A. 

### Sure. It also says to check bushing and hardware for 17 condition and wear. And it says specifically that we 18 checked those bushings for condition. It doesn't say 19 that we would replace them. It just says we checked 20 them. Of course, it has the pinched wiring conduit. 21 

### Yes, I agree that once this was found, this 22 should have been replaced so, yes, that was done. That 23 was item number 3. 24 Item number 4, remove and replace left-hand 25 

### flying door, forward roller assembly. It says we

### 124
1 Q. I'm sorry, just for clarity, was that a yes or 2 a no? You said mm-hmm and I'm just trying to
-- 3 

### 4 5 6 

### A. Yes. Yes. My contention is, is that there's a possibility. There was another maintenance event. Ben Bucks' statement in one of the letters was that there
were no other maintenance events and I'm just stating 7 it's incorrect. There's a possibility that that could've 8 happened. 9 

### Q. Sure. Based on, you know, your knowledge and 10 experience, do you know how likely that would be? 11 MR. SILVERBERG: Objection. But go ahead. 12 13 

### 14 15 16 17 

### 18 19 20 

### A. Where my frame of reference comes from is my discussions with Mike Ebert, who was then the director of line maintenance for AMES. When the tubular bearing came up missing as part of the investigation, I talked to Mike and I said, okay. So what's, you know, what's the line maintenance version of what goes on? You know, how does that work? And he said that he had had conversations with somebody in Capital Cargo I don't know who. It may have been 21 Mark Summers, it may have been some other line 22 maintenance folks from Capital Cargo, but that at times, 23 the line maintenance people will remove that bolt that 24 contains the tubular bearing and hold up the flying door 25 out of the way as they change the wheel.

### 125 1 That procedure is not in the Capital Cargo 2 procedures for changing the wheel. And in the Boeing 3 procedures for changing the wheel, it has that note that 4 specifically says, hey, you'll damage the hinge cover if 5 you remove the link that way. Because you're holding up 6 the door, it's not steady. 7 So that's where my, again, that's where my 8 frame of reference is coming from. That there was an 9 10 

### 11 12 13 14 

### 15 16 17 

### opportunity for that tubular bearing to be missing. That coupled with when we did our investigation, the mechanic that performed the work specifically said in his statement, I recall putting the tubular bearing back in. Q. Sure. So if I understand correctly, for the tubular bearing to have come out while the mechanic was changing the tire, that mechanic would have to have been doing that maintenance action in a way that the Boeing AMM specifically tells him not to do because it might 18 damage these hinge covers? 19 A. Yeah. All I recall is it has a note specific 20 that says, if you do not use this other procedure, that 21 hinge cover damage can occur. And as we found, almost 22 every single one of the airplanes that came in had some 23 form of hinge cover damage. 24 Q. Do you think that it is more likely that the 25 bushing was left out when the MLG was installed at AMES

### 1 or more likely that this mechanic violated the AMM and 2 lifted that door such that the bushing fell out? 3 A. I think as I stated in my response to the Ben 126

4 Buck, we did not have any proof or even any inkling that 5 that bushing or that tubular bearing was missing. And 6 not only did we have a statement from the technician that 7 says he specifically recalls putting the bearing back in, 8 but again, the doors were swung. They met all the fair 9 conditions. We can only assume that if you're gonna go 10 ahead and do a function check to make sure that all the 11 procedures followed, that that door, there would've been 12 issues or problems with that door if that tubular bearing 13 was missing when it left the AMES facility. 14 So all I could say is, I am fairly confident 15 that AMES left that tubular bearing in. Also that 16 airplane flew and we got an e-mail from Randy Buol, the 17 vice-president of Capital Cargo said the airplane flew 18 perfect. No problems noted after the gear changes. You 19 would think that if that tubular bearing missing had 20 caused vibration, that you would've felt it immediately. 21 Again, you know, putting, stringing all those 22 conclusions together, I find it hard to believe that AMES 23 left out that tubular bearing. And that's why I stated 24 it in the, in the CAR that I responded to Ben Buck, that, 25 you know, we're here to help as much as we can, which is

### 100 

### 1 replaced it. Other than that, you know, I can't comment. 2 It doesn't say what the condition was. But again, you 3 

### 4 know, I have to state we're under Mr. Working's orders. It didn't say try to repair it. It didn't say lube it. 5 He told us to replace it. So it was a customer request. 6 

### 7 8 

### 9 10 11 

### 12 13 14 15 16 

### 17 18 19 20 

### We replaced it. Q. Sure. A. Item number 5. It says panel on inboard side of inboard flap track fairing has three bad nut plates. I'm not sure what was wrong with the nut plates, but we replaced the nut plates. This was inside the inboard flap track fairing. From my recollection of the landing gear change procedures and everything else, it does not ask us to inspect that fairing. So again, I'm not sure where the three bad nut plates were. If they found them and they were stripped, then obviously, they need to change them, but again, that's normal line maintenance,
wear and tear type repairs. Stop strip missing, right landing gear. Right landing gear wing door forward hinge door metal stop 21 strip missing. Again, this is where Capital Cargo signed 22 off on it, you know, a month prior. We replaced the 23 strip. Again, these are the type of things that you 24 would find in just a typical line environment type stuff. 25 

### Q. Do you know if that strip was something that101
1 

### needed to be replaced or 2 A. I mean, it's a stop strip. So, you know, my 3 recollection is, yeah, it's a wear strip. It's something 4 that a stop stops against. So it became dislodged. 5 

### Item number 10, 

### left-hand main landing gear 6 

### wing door forward and aft hinge cover, hinge pins 7 improperly installed. This is on the left-hand side. 8 

### These hinge pins are part of a hinge pin cover assembly. 9 It's part of the landing gear change procedures. 

### My 10 

### recollection is we don't do anything with these hinge 11 

### pins. So again, I have no comment about what they mean 12 

### by improperly installed or whether AMES, you know, had 13 

### done that. Because as far as I know, there was no work 14 done on these hinge covers when it was in the

-- when 287 15 

### was in our facility in March. 16 

### Q. Do you know if that was something that needed 17 

### to be done? 18 19 

### A. I'm the description. yeah. I'm sorry, I'm just looking at Improperly installed. It doesn't tell 20 me if they were loose or exactly what was going on. 21 

### Q. Okay. 22 A. But then again, it was in operation for two 23 months after it left our facility. So if a line mechanic 24 found a loose hinge pin and did something, we wouldn't 25 have known about it.102
1 2 3 

### 4 5 

### Item Number 9, left-hand inboard flap fairing has slight damage in forward main landing gear wing door hinge at, I'm sorry, at forward main landing gear wing door hinge opening. Blended. It was a blend and treat.

6 

### 7 8 

### Q. Do you know whether or not that was something that would've been needed to be done in accordance with the 

### AMM or the MIP? A. 

### This says we requested engineering to evaluate 9 

### it. 10 11 

### 12 

### yeah.

### A. No, MR. SILVERBERG: If you know. Yeah. I mean, no. I'm thinking. I don't

--

I don't know. I don't know if it again, 13 just based on the, you know, this could've been something 14 as minor as chips on paint or, you know, something, but 15 bottom line, it was blended. So based on my knowledge of 16 what defines an airworthy or unairworthy condition, 17 blending is a minor repair. A minor repair, by 18 definition, doesn't impact airworthiness. 19 Item number 8, again, another hinge opening, 20 blended damage. It was a blend and treat repair. So 21 

### again, minor. And that's all the items in Exhibit M. 22 23 

### BY MR. STEVENSON: Q. Okay. So would it be fair to say that, setting 24 aside the pinched conduit, your opinion would be that 25 almost all of that work was not something that was

### 115 1 you have the partial work accomplished for item 11? 2 3 4 

### A. 

### Yes. Q. 

### One of the entries in the discrepancy it says for entry number one it says, as written, door removed 5 FOM. What would a technician mean when he says FOM? 6 7 8 9 

### A. To facilitate maintenance. maintenance. All right. Facilitation of
Q. 

### A. 

### So in order to check the hardware stack, he had 10 to remove the door. 11 

### 12 13 

### 14 

### 15 16 

### 17 18 

### Q. 

### Sure. Proceed. A. Item number 7, 

### left-hand main flying door has excessive play at gear gitting. They really meant fitting, misspelled fitting. And they checked and replaced hardware. Now, it says in the corrective action, installed gimbal hardware as required per 32-11. The gimbal, when they refer to the gimbal fitting, it is the 19 end of the actuation rod. This is the fitting where the 20 tubular bearing is. So, again, this airplane was in 21 service for nine months. They found some play and so 22 

### 23 24 

### 25 they fixed it. 

### Q. Now, as I review this, since, ultimately the question we ask is necessary or unnecessary. When I look at this, it says that they installed the gimbal hardware

### 116
1 

### as required per the 727 AMM. So do you agree with this 2 write up that that is something that they needed to 3 replace? 4 

### A. Yes. If you find excessive play in that 5 fitting, yes, you should go ahead and you should 6 definitely, yeah, you should go ahead and repair it. 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 

### 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 

### 22 

### 23 

### Q. Okay. A. Yeah. And, yeah, I mean, I keep restating from AMES' position, you know, it left our facility nine months prior. Q. I understand that. A. Okay. MR. SILVERBERG: And you'll hear that as often
as necessary. A. And then item number 8 is same write up for the right-hand side. BY MR. STEVENSON: Q. Then that's the same write up as the gimbal and had play and needed to be replaced? A. Right. Okay. Q. A. Item number 12, aft angle on right wing fairing at FWA flying door cutout is damaged. I'm not 24 immediately sure what FWA means. Removed and replaced 25 angle.

### 117 1 So again, as part of their cursory inspection, 2 they found an angle damage and they replaced it. I can't 3 determine whether that was something that would've or 4 should have been caught. It may have been they covered 5 the angle with this right-hand fairing. I just

-- I 6 don't know. 7 

### Q. Sure. Now, when you're saying you're not sure 8 if that's something that should have been caught, do you 9 mean that at the time it was originally installed? 10 

### 11 A. Right. AMES' work scope, I mean, the instructions going back to changing the gear, from my 12 recollection, there's nothing in changing the gear that 13 has to do anything with the right wing fairing. And so, 14 yeah, I guess what I'm saying is I'm not familiar with 15 this aft angle. I'm not sure where it's located. 16 Q. 

### Okay. So do you -- would you know, based on 17 this write up, whether or not as of May 2010, it was 18 necessary to replace the angle as was done here? 19 A. Yeah. And again, we did a very detailed 20 inspection of all these areas. And like I said, with 21 Charles Working and my inspectors, or the supervisor, and 22 so, yeah, I'm just

-- I'm just stating, I'm not sure 23 exactly where this is. When they refer to a fairing, it 24 may have been inside the fairing. Again, they were doing 25 inspections over and above what had been done prior.

### 118 1 Q. Well, I understand that, but are you -- would 2 you be able to say based on this write up, whether or not 3 that as of May 2010 when they did find this**d~age** 4 A. Mm-hmm. 5 

### Q.

-- it was necessary to go ahead and replace 6 that? 7 A. Oh, absolutely. Any time you find**d~age** 

### on an 8 airplane, yes, you write it up and you repair it, you 9 replace it. 10 11 12 13 Q. A. 

### Q. A. Okay. Item 13 we had already talked about. Sure. Item 14, this is the left-hand and right-hand 14 main landing gear gimbal fitting do not have cotter pins. 15 Needs torque checked and safetied. 16 This is interesting in that Mr. Lipinski brings 17 it up in the EIR. Mr. Buck misquotes it in his LOI 18 response. This is an in situ finding. This is the 19 inspector

-- I talked to the inspector, Mr. Dave Hopper, 20 and he recalls this issue. They were getting an okay to 21 swing the gear. He was doing a general visual of the 22 installation. And he found that they had forgot to put 23 24 

### cotter pins on the end of these bolts. So they wouldn't install them. So the airplane never flew without the 25 cotter pins, which is

-- which again, Mr. Buck

### 130 1 Q. But you indicated that that damage having been 2 found by AMES, that was something that needed to be 3 replaced. 4 A. Right. 5 6 

### Q. So I'd like you to think about things in those terms as well. Not just is this something that we 7 would've done during the replace, but at the point in 8 time when AMES and its mechanics and repairmen were 9 looking at this aircraft in May of 2010, is this 10 something that actually requires a maintenance action as 11 compared to our customer told us to do it so we're just 12 going to do it. 13 A. Okay. I understand. 14 15 

### 16 17 

### 18 

### MR. SILVERBERG: When you address each one, call out the item number so the record is clear. THE WITNESS: Okay. MR. SILVERBERG: Thank you. 

### A. Yeah. This is item number l. Right-hand main 19 gear door reported for discrepant conditions. 20 21 22 23 24 25 

### MR. SILVERBERG: Right. A. Suspect worn bushings. MR. SILVERBERG: One second. Okay. So this is not in the order that was produced. Did you reorder these? MR. STEVENSON: It shouldn't be.

### 135 1 done this work, was it necessary work? If this 2 right-hand main gear wing door, if it was fairing and had 3 no issues during Capital Cargo's operation, yeah, these 4 worn bushings, just because we replaced them, doesn't 5 mean they were worn out of any limits. 6 Now, in the partial work accomplished, they go 7 through very specific limits that they evaluated on each 8 one of these bushings and they determined that they were 9 going to replace them. 10 Q. Now, if I understand correctly, as you said, 11 they go through the specific limits on a good number of 12 bushings and on some of them, they actually did note that 13 the wear was out of limits. So would replacing those 14 bushings then be something that was necessary to do? 15 A. Oh, yeah. I mean, just like any other write 16 up, once you find a write up that's out of limits, you're 17 compelled to go ahead and replace them. But the 18 nonroutine, itself, wouldn't have been written unless 19 there was issues with the operation of the door to begin 20 with. So they wouldn't have gotten down to this level of 21 inspection unless there was actual operation issues with 22 the door. 23 number 2. 24 25 

### A. This was the same write up. I'm on item

MR. SILVERBERG: Okay. Item number 2, the same write up for the

### 143 Actually, the next item number 18, they found two missing screws. Item number 15, three gouges. Now, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 

### 10 these three gouges were of a -- these three gouges necessitated a repair, so they performed the sheet metal repair for these three gouges. But again, three gouges, you know, could've been

-- the damage could've been caused by a number of items, a number of issues. It doesn't state here in the nonroutine where the gouges were. It is in the flying door. So by definition, a sheet metal repair to a flying door is a non-pressurized 11 area, so it's not an airworthy issue. This issue is a 12 minor repair. 13 Left main landing gear flying door inboard 14 lower, again, a fastener missing, so they replaced the 15 fastener. 16 

### Q. Which number is this? 17 18 19 

### A. Q. 

### A. I'm sorry, number 17. Okay. They replaced the rivet. 20 Item number 16, skin gouged. And it was a 21 blend and treat repair. 22 Item number 19 is written up as a tool mark on 23 inner surface of main landing gear flying door between 24 nonroutines 0015's gouges and the upper hinge. 25 Let me see here. This is written up by one of

### 146 Q. Okay. So during the original landing gear 1 

### 2 3 

### 4 5 6 

### 7 8 

### 9 

### installation, you wouldn't have done anything with the clamps, but then you did do something with the clamps at this point in time?

10 11 

### 12 A. Again, it was due to the fact that the level of the inspection that we were doing when the airplanes came in in May. Q. You mean, was this something that having been detected in May, was that something that needed to be fixed? A. Oh, yeah, absolutely. Right. Item number 25, left wing forward flying door 13 fitting has cracked bushing and it gives a part number. 14 And they removed and replaced the bushing. 15 Quite frankly, I don't recognize the bushing 16 part number. I'm sorry, in the partial work 17 accomplished, it states that it is the forward hinge 18 aircraft side bushing and it references the service 19 bulletin for replacement, so it must have been one of the 20 bushings inside the hinge fitting. You would not have 21 seen this from the outside, so this is something they 22 found after they removed the door. And they replaced the 23 

### bushing. Left wing fairing and forward flying door hinge 24 needs removed to facilitate maintenance. 25 MR. SILVERBERG: This is number148 

### 1 would've removed the door and then they would've found 2 this condition after they removed the door. It wouldn't 3 have been visible unless you dropped the door. 4 Item number 28, left wing forward fairing, aft 5 internal stiffeners cracked in two places. Actually, 6 

### 7 8 

### this was referenced in another nonroutine. So this is after they removed the fairing. It was an internal stiffener and they would not have seen this stiffener 9 until they removed the fairing. And then they repaired 10 it in accordance with SRM. Again, that's something you 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 

### 22 23 24 25 

### would not have seen and it would not be part of the AMM procedures for changing a gear. Q. But that was something that once detected, needed to be replaced? 

### A. Correct. Item number 29, left wing forward fairing, inboard attach plate is cracked, so they replaced the attach plate. Again, this is an internal part of the fairing, so we wouldn't have seen this item unless we removed it. Item number 30, right wing forward fairing inboard attached plate is chafed through on the right-hand side. The same attach plate as in the left-side had to be replaced. Again, you wouldn't have
seen it unless you removed the fairing. Item 33, left-hand main landing gear flying1 

### door requires replacement. Cannot adjust. So this 2 refers

-- this is the nonroutine referred to when that 3 other nonroutine said that the left-hand door failed, 4 this provides the procedures for changing that door. 5 And again, rightfully so, this nonroutine was 6 

### initiated on May 31st. So, yes, well after they 7 performed the gear swings. 149

8 

### Item number 32, remove and

-- remove right-hand 9 

### main landing gear antiskid conduit for transfer to 287. 10 So they robbed the antiskid conduit to send it off to 287 11 and then they replaced it. 12 MR. SILVERBERG: Robbed in the technical
sense. A. Yeah. Cannibalized, took it off of one airplane so it could be installed on another. MR. SILVERBERG: I wanted to make sure Rita didn't assume we're a bunch of thieves. A. And then, yeah, Exhibit 

### Q includes a copy of the RFTS. I'm sorry. And RFTS means request for 13 14 15 16 

### 17 18 19 20 technical service. It's a memo document that comes from 21 heavy maintenance to engineering, requesting assistance. 22 BY MR. STEVENSON: 23 24 

### Q. A. Okay. So, yeah, these are a number of the items and 25 the nonroutines are referenced.

### MAINTENANCE MANUAL MAIN GEAR WHEELS- REMOVAL/INSTAlLATION 1. General A. Matching of tires on dual wheels is necessary so that each tire will have the same contact area with the ground and carry an equal share of the Load. Whenever possible, install tires having equal pressure and inflated diameters within 1/2 inch. Tires with diameters that differ more than 3/4 inch must not be used in pairs. Position Larger diameter wheel assemblies on inboard side of gear. EA 2. Equipment and Materials A. Wheel Change Dolly- Commercially available B. Main Landing Gear Wheel Retaining Nut Wrench

- 3ME65-72761 C. Airplane Jack for Main Gear D. Torque Wrench E. Grease (1) Aeroshell 5 (preferred) (AMM 20-60-02) (2) MIL-G-81322 (alternate) (AMM 20-60-02) F. Dow Corning- 200 fluid or No. 10 machine oil (AMM 20-60-02) G. Axle Thread Protector

- F72880-3 or F72913-3 3. Main Gear Wheel Removal A. Set parking brake to hold brake disks aligned for when the wheel is installed. NOTE: If brake disks misalign when brake pressure is off, it will be necessary to align brake disks before installing wheel. B. Jack main gear until wheel clears and deflate tire (AMM Chapter 7, Jacking). YOU MUST NOT REMOVE THE TWO WHEELS AT THE SAME TIME. IF THE AIRPLANE ACCIDENTALLY FALLS OFF THE JACK, INJURIES TO PERSONS AND DAMAGE TO THE AIRPLANE CAN OCCUR. (1) If tire cannot be deflated, back off valve stem slowly while applying a slight pressure on the valve stem during removal

. 

# ••• EXCESSIVE TWISTING FORCE CAN CAUSE SEPARATION OF VALVE CORE PARTS. STAY OUT OF VALVE PATH DURING REMOVAL OR INJURY MAY RESULT. C. Remove hubcap bolts (Fig. 201) and hubcap. D. Remove axle nut Lockbolt. E. Remove axle nut using special wrench. F. Remove washer and outer bearing. G. To remove outboard wheels, remove two bolts through wing door actuating rod, raise wing door to servicing position and replace one bolt. 

# I CAUTION DO NOT REMOVE ACTUATION ROD ATTACHMENT BOLT AND RAISE DOOR ABOVE NORMAL SERVICE POSITION AS HINGE COVER MAY BE DAMAGED. H. Install axle thread protector. EFFECTIVITY------------, D6-23043 ANS ALL
BOEING PROPRIETARY- Copyright (C)- Unpublished Work- See t 

# 32-45-01 GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT 

# LL 401 25/09I. J. K. 

### MAINTENANCE MANUAL Position wheel change dolly, raise wheel, and remove.. Mark the reason for the tire removal on the tire to aid the inspectors when they examine the tire. Make sure that inner main wheel bearing and dust seal remain in wheel. NOTE: On airplanes using wheels equipped with metal felt-type dust seal, inner main wheel bearing and dust seal are retained in wheel with a retainer ring. On airplanes using wheels equipped with metal rubber-type dust seal, inner main wheel bearing and dust seal are not retained with a retainer ring. 4. Main Gear Wheel Installation NOTE: Main landing gear may have one of two types of dust seals supplied with the wheels. One type consists of a metal felt-type seal used with a wiper ring and a retaining ring. The other type consists of a metal rubber-type seal used without a wiper ring and retaining ring. A. On airplanes using wheels equipped with metal felt-type dust seal, make sure that dust seal and inner bearing are held in place in wheel by a retainer ring and that antirotation tab on dust seal ring is in notch in wheel hub. B. On airplanes using wheels equipped with metal rubber-type dust seal, make sure that dust seal and inner bearing are positioned properly in wheel. Installation instructions are imprinted on side of seal: THIS SIDE TOWARD BEARING. NOTE: Make sure that installation. felt-type dust machine oil or for 15 minutes bearing has been packed with grease before wheel On airplanes using wheels equipped with metal seal, make sure that felt has been soaked in light Dow Corning 200 fluid for 5 minutes and let drain prior to installation. C. Check and align brake disks if necessary (Fig. 401). D. Position wheel assembly on dolly and slide into position on brake and inner bearing. NOTE: Whenever possible, install tires having equal pressure and inflated diameters within 1/2 inch. Position larger diameter wheel assemblies on inboard side of gear. E. Install outer bearing and align washer tab with keyway on axle. Hand pack bearing with grease before installation. F. Lubricate threads with grease and install the axle nut. While rotating the wheel, tighten axle nut to 360-420 pound-feet. Stop the wheel. Loosen the axle nut to almost zero torque. While rotating the wheel, tighten the axle nut to 100 pound-feet minimum and, if necessary, continue to tighten the axle nut so that the lockbolt hole aligns. G. Install axle nut lockbolt and tighten 25 to 35 pound-inches.

EFFECTIVITY·------------, 

# 32-45-01 D6-23043 ANS ALL
BOEING PROPRIETARY- Copyright (C)- Unpublished Work- See title page for details. Page 402 Jul 25/13OUTER BEARING 

### MAINTENANCE MANUAL

Main Gear Wheel Installation Figure 401 EFFECTIVITY'------------, 06-23043 ANS ALL AXLE BRAKE MOUNTING FLANGE



# 32-45-01 Page 403 Apr 01/05 BOEING PROPRIETARY- Copyright (C)- Unpublished Work- See title page for details.

### MAINTENANCE MANUAL H. Make sure that antiskid drive coupling and transducer drive shaft are not bent. 

# 1· CAllTION

# cl MAKE SURE THAT ANTISKID DRIVE COUPLING AND TRANSDUCER DRIVE SHAFT ARE NOT BENT. ABENT DRIVE SHAFT WILL RESULT IN INTERMITTENT ANTISKID RELEASES DURING OPERATION. I. Make sure that antiskid drive spider mates with antiskid drive coupling. J. Position hubcap, install hubcap bolts and lockwire, applying standard torque as follows: (1) 20 to 25 pound-inches for NAS1103 bolts used with NAS679A3W nuts. (2) 30 to 35 pound-inches for NAS1303-7 bolts used with BACN10GW3 nuts. (3) 35 ±3.5 pound-inches for NAS1303 bolts used with helicoil inserts. K. Remove temporary bolt from wing door actuating rod as installed in step 3.G and install the two wing door actuating rod bolts to return wing door to normal position. L. Prior to letdown, inflate the tire to the proper pressure (AMM 12-15-31). M. Lower gear and remove jack.

EFFECTIVITY'-------------, ANS ALL D6-23043 

# 32-45-01 Page 404 Jul 25/09 BOEING PROPRIETARY- Copyright (C) -Unpublished Work- See title page for details.

### MAINTENANCE MANUAL MAIN GEAR DOORS

- DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION 1. General A. The main gear doors close over the wheel well opening when the landing gear is retracted or extended by the normal hydraulic system (Fig. 1). Wheel well doors are normally operated by hydraulic power. Wing doors, operated by mechanical linkage from the landing gear, close over the shock strut aperture only when the gear is retracted (fig. 2). A safety bar mechanism is provided to completely open the wheel well doors when the gear is lowered by manual extension, or should the power operating system of the doors malfunction. A ground release mechanism permits the doors to be opened for access to each wheel well when the airplane is serviced. Wheel well doors are closed by hydraulic actuation only. An airtight seal runs around the edge of the doors. 2. Main Gear Doors A. The main gear doors consist of inner and outer alclad skins with internal ribs and stiffeners. The doors are in two parts. An inner door hinged to the keel beam and an outer door hinged to the outer edge of the inner door. The door actuator and actuation beam are connected to a large bracket on the inner door. The outboard end of the actuator pivots in the actuator beam which in turn is connected to the structure by a swinging link and an adjustable rod. Linkage for the manual release is carried on the forward inner edge of the inner door. The linkage picks up the release mechanism on the keel beam. The outer door is raised by its hinges when the inner door closes. At each end of the outer door a radius rod is installed between the outboard edge of the door and act to raise the outer end into position as the door closes (Fig. 1). A bracket mounted on the aft end of the inner door near the hinge line provides an attachment for the gear sequence valve control rod. 3. Wing Doors A. The wing doors are built up from a front and rear spar, with ribs, stiffeners, and an inner and an outer skin. Each door carries an end plate (Fig. 2). The front and rear spars project beyond the upper end of the door where the ends of the spars are machined to provide hinges. The doors are hinged to the inboard flap inner rail. An actuator rod is attached to a support fitting mounted on the door center rib. The opposite end of the actuator rod is attached to the shock strut. B. The door end of the actuator rod can be extended to hold the wing door out from the gear to provide access for wheel and brake removal. A red stripe on the actuator rod insert shows when the rod is extended (fig. 3).

EFFECTIVITY------------, D6-23043 ANS ALL 

# I GOVERNMENT ; EXHIBIT 

# 1AV!M 32-12-00 Page 1 Jul 25/09 BOEING PROPRIETARY- Copyright (C)- Unpublished Work- See title page for details.

### MAINTENANCE MANUAL

DOOR ACTUATING ROD HOLE FOR SECOND BOLT WHEN ROD IS IN NORMAL POSITION

ACTUATING ROO INSERT RED STRIPE WING DOOR ACTUATING ROD (SERVICE POSITION)

_Ai"-- DOOR IN SERVICING POSITION LOCK ROLLER

Main Gear Wing Door Servicing Position Figure 3 EFFECTIVITY'------------, 

# 32-12-00 D6-23043 ANS ALL

BOEING PROPRIETARY- Copyright (C) -Unpublished Work- See title page for details. Page 4 Apr 01/05BEFORE THE US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS

WASHINGTON, DC 

# COPY

In the matter of: Docket No. FAA-2013-0291 FAA Case No. 2011S0290032 AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND) ENGINEERING SERVICES, ) ) Administrative Law Judge Respondent ) J.E. Sullivan )

FRANK LIPINSKI

Deposition of FRANK LIPINSKI taken on behalf of Airborne Maintenance and Engineering Services, at the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southern Region, 1701 Columbia Avenue, College Park, Georgia, commencing on December 18, 2014, at 9:25 a.m. before Jennifer L. Pope, Certified Court Reporter and Registered Professional Reporter. 1



### LYON REPORTING, INC. GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT CERTIFIED COURT REPORTERS 

# NN

P.O. BOX 81124, ATLANTA, GA 30366**770/4~8-5500** 800/767·2030 FAK 770/458·127749
1 explain the condition of the aircraft. I understand 2 that. 3 

### A. Okay. 4 Q. But we have a concept of wear and tear that 5 you've now -- 

### A. Of course. 7 Q. Okay. But you didn't mention it in 8 Section B. You took no account of that; correct? 9 Your conclusions are not based on concepts of wear 10 and tear? 11 MR. STEVENSON: Objection. That was a 12 compound question, and I'm confused by it. 13 BY MR. SILVERBERG: 14 Q. Let me ask you: Is wear and tear discussed 15 at all in Section B? 16 

### A. No. 17 Q. It is not. Why not? You've acknowledged 18 to me it is a factor. 19 A. It is a factor on aircraft. It was not a 20 factor in these, and the damage incurred. It's not 21 wear and tear. 22 Q. You're not saying there was no wear and 23 tear, are you, with respect to any of these three 24 aircraft? 25 A. I'm-- no. Of course, there's wear and LYON REPORTING, INC.1 tear. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Q. 

### A. Q. With respect to all three aircraft? All 16 they had on their ops specs. I'm talking about these three aircraft. They're the only ones we're talking about today, sir.A. I know, but this wear and tear was not associated with the damage, absolutely not. Q. Okay. There was some degree of wear and 10 tear, but your position is that it doesn't fully 11 explain the condition of the flying doors as you saw 12 it? 13 14 15 16 17 18 

### 19 A. On a scale of one to ten, one being the least and ten being the most, the wear and tear
-- 

### Q. The most what? 

### A. The worst wear and tear, one to ten. These were at one or less wear and tear. not from wear and tear. The damage was


### Q. How do you determine these are a one on 20 your scale? 21 22 A. I just gave you a scale.
a hypothetic scale like tire wear. That's all, just There's a scale. 23 Q. But it's not a formal scale? 

### 24 A. No. I'm just 2 5

# L

__ Q_.
__ Y_o_u
__

'_r_e_t
__

r_y_i_n_g_t_o_l_·l
__

l_u_s_t_r

__

a_t_e_a
__ P_o_l_·n_t_? ______ _ LYON REPORTING, INC. 

### 50

## In TheMatter Of: AirborneMaitenance andEngineeringServices

RichardD 'Arcy October 28, 2014

LegalRealtimeReporting 622 East CentralBoulevard Orlando, Florida 32801 Phone: 407.440.3822

Fax: 407.895.4483

Original File 102814_DARCY.TXT 

### lVHn-U-Script® withWord

### Index GOVERNMENT EXlilBIT



# OQ1 2 3 

### Q. A. Q. 

### Richard D'Arcy 

### Okay. Flightstar had violations, also. Repairs

-- heavy repair stations are not 4 necessarily violation free, right? 5 6 

### A. 

### Q. No. Okay. So was there a qualitative 7 difference between Flightstar and AMES? 8 A. Flightstar had been 30 to 35 years 9 experience with the 727 aircraft. 10 Q. 

### So did that

-- 11 A. Not necessarily the facility as a whole, 12 but the personnel working there. Most of the personnel 13 at the time working at Flightstar worked on some of the 14 first 727s built when Eastern Airlines got them. And a 15 lot of Flightstar•s personnel were formed with Eastern 16 Airlines. And they had a -- they had a vast experience 17 in the 727s. So there was a large experience pool in 18 Flightstar. 87

19 Q. In terms of the authority of Flightstar and 20 the authority with AMES with respect to main landing 21 gear changes, was it identical? 22 

### 23 24 25 A. 

### Q. A. 

### Q. I'm sorry, when you say authority? Repair station ratings? Oh, sure. Yes. It was identical? Legal Realtime Reporting