IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1853

Filed October 2, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

RICHARD EUGENE NOLL,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Stuart Werling, 

Judge.

Richard Eugene Noll appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled 

substance. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED

WITH DIRECTIONS.

Katherine Sears of Clark and Sears Law, PLLC, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Richard Eugene Noll appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled 

substance, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as 

a result of a traffic stop. Upon our review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and 

remand with directions.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On May 3, 2022, Noll was driving to his cousin Julie’s home. Muscatine 

County Sheriff’s Office Deputy Jacob Walker followed him. Walker later testified 

that he thought the driver was impaired because in his experience, most impaired 

drivers “have been late evening into early morning hours.” He stated that the truck

was driving ten miles per hour under the posted speed limit “along the center line” 

and “weaving within its lane.” Walker also observed an issue with the rear license 

plate light, testifying the light “was too reflective” and obscured part of the plate. It 

was not until Noll slowed down to turn into his cousin’s driveway that Walker was 

able to read the plate number. Walker initiated a traffic stop, activating his squad 

car lights, and parked behind Noll’s truck in Julie’s driveway.

When Walker approached the vehicle, he testified that he “detected an odor 

of marijuana that was coming from inside the vehicle.” He also noticed an open 

container of beer in one of the cup holders. When questioned, Noll denied smoking 

marijuana or drinking. Throughout their interactions, Noll was compliant albeit 

“argumentative.” Walker asked Noll to exit the vehicle and patted him down. When 

this yielded no results, Walker then searched the vehicle, which also did not reveal 

anything, although Walker testified he “did detect the odor of marijuana 

throughout.” Walker then searched Noll’s person and discovered two small, clear 
3

baggies containing methamphetamine. Walker arrested Noll. While transporting 

Noll to Muscatine County Jail, Walker testified that he thought Noll was impaired 

because Noll “continued muttering to himself in the back seat.”

At the jail, Walker put Noll through a series of field sobriety tests, which

ended with mixed results. Noll passed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test but 

failed both the walk-and-turn and one-leg-stand tests. Walker invoked implied 

consent and obtained a urine sample from Noll, which tested positive for 

amphetamine.

Noll was ultimately charged with possession of a controlled substance, third 

offense, and operating while intoxicated, second offense. He moved to suppress 

the methamphetamine, field sobriety test results, and urine sample test results, 

citing several constitutional violations. After a hearing, the court denied his motion, 

finding there were reasonable grounds for the traffic stop. Noll moved to enlarge, 

requesting the court to consider the other alleged constitutional violations. The 

court filed a supplemental order, resolving additional issues. Noll moved again, 

asking the court to consider his search-incident-to-lawful-arrest argument. The 

court denied his second motion to enlarge.

The parties stipulated to a trial by the minutes and admission of certain 

exhibits. The court found Noll guilty of possession of a controlled substance but 

dismissed the operating-while-intoxicated charge. Noll appeals his conviction, 

citing the denial of his motion to suppress on multiple grounds.

II. Review.

We review suppression rulings for constitutional issues de novo. State v. 

Fogg, 936 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Iowa 2019). “We examine the whole record and make 
4

an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (cleaned up) 

(citation omitted). While not binding, we do “give considerable deference to the 

trial court’s findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses.” State v. Tyler, 

830 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Iowa 2013) (citation omitted).

III. Discussion.

Both the United States and Iowa Constitutions protect individuals from 

unreasonable intrusion and “seizure” by law enforcement. See U.S. Const. 

amend. IV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 8; State v. Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 522 

(Iowa 2004). Noll contends that his constitutional rights were violated and the 

evidence obtained as a result of such violations should have been suppressed at 

trial. See State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002) (“Evidence obtained 

in violation of these provisions is inadmissible, regardless of its relevancy or 

probative value.”). We consider each of his claims in turn.1

A. Lawful Initiation of the Traffic Stop.

Noll first argues that the initiation of the traffic stop was itself illegal because 

he had a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in Julie’s driveway and that Walker 

committed a trespass and “gathered evidence by exploiting his unlicensed physical 

intrusion on to the private driveway.”2 But this is not the correct standard; Noll is 

1 While Noll also claims Walker “unconstitutionally extended the length of time” of 

the stop, we do not reach the merits of this issue because we remand on other 

grounds.

2

In making this contention, Noll relies on a city code that requires drivers to obtain 

consent prior to parking on private property. But such argument was not made 

below and is therefore not preserved for our review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 

641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review 

that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before 

we will decide them on appeal.”).
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conflating his traffic-stop claim with that of evidence collection or searches of 

private property, and he is attempting to subvert Walker’s authority to detain him. 

See State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763, 772 (Iowa 2001) (noting that we do not 

“reward[] the evasion of lawful police authority by allowing suspects who make it 

to [a protected place] steps ahead of law enforcement officers to claim sanctuary”). 

Instead, Iowa courts have treated traffic stops more akin to that of a Terry stop. 

See Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 642 (applying a “Terry” stop analysis under Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). We similarly do so now.

In denying the motion to suppress, the court found that Noll obstructed his 

license plate in violation of Iowa Code section 321.37(3) (2022),

3 which provided 

sufficient basis for the traffic stop. While “[a] traffic stop is unquestionably a seizure 

under the Fourth Amendment,” see Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 292, such stops do not 

require probable cause. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 642 (“The evidence justifying the 

stop need not rise to the level of probable cause.”). In initiating the stop, the officer 

was detaining Noll “for investigatory purposes” and was allowed to make such a 

stop “based on a reasonable suspicion that a criminal act has occurred or is 

occurring.” Id. at 641. “Whether reasonable suspicion exists for an investigatory 

stop must be determined in light of the totality of the circumstances confronting a 

police officer, including all information available to the officer at the time the 

decision to stop is made.” Id. at 642. Based on the record before us, we find there 

is beyond reasonable suspicion that Noll committed a minor traffic violation. See 

3 The State also cites section 321.388 (requiring a “rear lamp” to illuminate the 

registration plate “and render it clearly legible”) and Noll’s alleged impairment as 

additional justifications. Because we find the traffic stop initiation was justified, we 

need not consider these arguments.
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Iowa Code § 805.8A(2)(f), (3)(l) (designating a violation of section 321.37 as a 

minor traffic offense). “[W]hen a peace officer observes a violation of our traffic 

laws, however minor, the officer has probable cause to stop a motorist.” Tyler, 

830 N.W.2d at 293 (citation omitted). Noll’s claim that “the State offered no 

evidence supporting” a violation of section 321.37(3) is incorrect. Walker testified 

that he observed that “an open light bulb” was covering part of the plate, and he 

was unable to read the characters until he “was nearly on the rear bumper.” The 

court found Walker’s testimony highly credible, stating “his visual clarity would be 

far in excess of the clarity of the video presented,” and we give deference to such 

credibility determinations. See id. Accordingly, we find that the initiation of the 

traffic stop was supported by not only reasonable suspicion but even probable 

case. We therefore decline to suppress evidence based on this issue.

B. Lawfulness of Search of the Defendant’s Person.

During the traffic stop, Walker conducted a full search of Noll’s person.4

But, as we alluded to in our earlier discussion of the procedural history, the district 

court never ruled on this issue.

Among other arguments, Noll’s motion to suppress in the district court urged 

suppression of the methamphetamine discovered on the full search of his person 

as unconstitutional. The State responded to the issue in its resistance, under a 

heading titled “Search of Defendant’s Person.” And the issue was litigated at the 

4 Walker also patted down Noll’s outer clothing just before searching the vehicle. 

While Noll contends this encounter was in violation of his constitutional rights, we 

do not consider the merits of the “pat down” because it did not result in any 

discovered contraband and there is no evidence to suppress stemming from the 

pat down.
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suppression hearing. In a post-hearing supplemental filing, Noll again urged 

suppression of the methamphetamine, under the heading: “Unlawful Search of 

Richard Noll’s Person.”

Despite this briefing, the district court’s initial order on the motion to 

suppress only addressed the propriety of the traffic stop and the search of the 

vehicle. Noll filed a “request for expanded and additional rulings,” requesting the 

court address the other issues he raised, including but not limited to the 

“warrantless search of [his] person.” The court entered a supplemental ruling 

addressing some of the claims. This ruling referred to the “pat down” search, and 

erroneously suggested this is how the methamphetamine was found. But the 

ruling never addressed the full search of Noll’s person.

Noll filed a second “request for expanded and additional rulings,” expressly 

reiterating that the pat-down search did not reveal incriminating evidence and the 

court “did not address the subsequent full-blown search of Noll’s person.” The 

court denied this motion with no explanation beyond: “DENIED.”

Under our case law, Noll preserved error on this issue by filing the motion 

to expand and informing the court it had failed to resolve his claim. See Meier, 

641 N.W.2d at 539 (allowing a party to preserve error through postruling motions 

“when the district court fails to resolve an issue” (citation omitted)). So we are left 

in the unusual situation where error was preserved but we have no ruling to review. 

See Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 863 (Iowa 2012) (finding “a motion 

raising the court’s failure to decide a purely legal issue” still preserves error).

While we can sometimes rule on a suppression issue without the benefit of 

an underlying ruling so long as we have a developed record, we are reluctant to 
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do so here for a few reasons. First, we lack fact findings directly relevant to 

deciding whether the search was conducted incident to arrest, and there is 

competing evidence or interpretations of the evidence regarding when the arrest 

began. As an appellate court, we are not fact-finders, and we rely on the trial 

courts’ role as fact-finder even in cases that include video evidence. See State v. 

Davis, No. 23-0794, 2024 WL 4039570, at *9 n.5 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2024)

(citing Eric J. Magnuson & Samuel A. Thumma, “Same As It Ever Was”: Why 

Audio-Video Recordings In and of Trial Court Proceedings Should not Change the 

Standard of Appellate Review, 24 J. App. Prac. & Proc. 213, 215 (2024)). Second, 

there is at least one implicit credibility finding in the district court’s ruling on the 

other issues (crediting the deputy’s testimony that Noll’s vehicle smelled of 

marijuana as a basis for one or more searches) such that we are hesitant to find 

facts on a cold record when the district court has already made choices about the 

believability of certain witnesses. And third, the lawfulness of the search of Noll’s 

person is a mixed question of law and fact turning in part on when the arrest 

began—not a pure question of law amenable to correction without the benefit of 

an underlying ruling. These reasons all counsel in favor of a remand rather than 

us deciding the question for the first time on a cold record.

Because we lack a ruling or the necessary fact-findings to evaluate the 

lawfulness of the search of Noll’s person leading to the discovery of 

methamphetamine, we reverse and remand to the district court with directions to 

promptly decide that issue by written ruling containing fact-findings sufficient to 

permit appellate review. Cf. State v. Hillery, 956 N.W.2d 492, 501 (Iowa 2021)

(reversing and remanding with directions for a new suppression hearing on 
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additional issues when the appellate court lacked fact findings necessary to decide 

the issues); State v. Sefcik, No 02-1801, 2004 WL 149958, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. 

Jan. 28, 2004) (similar, with directions on what issues to address and emphasizing 

the importance of fact findings and credibility determinations). The ruling must 

include analysis of whether the search of Noll’s person was lawful as a search 

incident to arrest. The district court may determine whether it wishes to rule on the 

existing pleadings, hold a reported hearing with oral argument, or invite additional 

clarification from the parties.

IV. Disposition.

We affirm the district court’s ruling on the validity of the traffic stop but 

reverse and remand with directions to decide the lawfulness of the search of Noll’s 

person leading to the discovery of methamphetamine as outlined in this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH 

DIRECTIONS.