Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023 Page 1 of 31

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Denise L. Turner

DTurner Legal LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

Jodi Kathryn Stein

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Demarcus Nance,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

August 3, 2023

Court of Appeals Case No.

22A-CR-2581

Interlocutory Appeal from the 

Marion Superior Court

The Honorable Shatrese M. 

Flowers, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D28-2009-F2-29100

Opinion by Judge Weissmann

Judges Bailey and Brown concur.
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Weissmann, Judge.

[1] After several law enforcement officers tracked a marijuana odor to Demarcus 

Nance’s home, the officers pulled Nance across the threshold of his home, 

forcibly detained him outside, and then entered his home without a warrant. 

Once inside, the officers observed drug paraphernalia and a gun in plain view. 

Only then did they seek a warrant, relying on evidence they had collected

through the warrantless entry.

[2] Nance was charged with dealing in methamphetamine based on the drug 

evidence seized from his home. He moved to suppress that evidence, alleging 

that the officers overstepped federal and state constitutional boundaries. We 

reverse the trial court’s denial of Nance’s motion to suppress, finding that the 

officers had no authority to cross the threshold of Nance’s home without a 

warrant and that the later searches with a warrant were tainted by the earlier 

illegal entries.

Facts

[3] While assisting Marion County Community Corrections officers at the home of 

Nance’s next-door neighbor, Indiana Gun Task Force members Gregory Kessie 

and Sergio De Leon detected the smell of raw and burnt marijuana emanating 

from the area of Nance’s home. After Sergeant Kessie confirmed that some of 

the other four to six officers present also smelled marijuana, one of the officers 

ran a license check on the car parked in front of Nance’s home. The license 
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plate did not match the vehicle and was not registered to either Nance or his 

neighbor.

[4] Sergeant Kessie and Detective De Leon decided to conduct a “knock and talk” 

at Nance’s home. The smell of marijuana strengthened as they approached 

Nance’s home. Detective De Leon knocked on the front door, which consisted 

of a glass storm door and main door behind that. Nance opened the main door 

and then “cracked” open the storm door with his forearm to speak to the 

officers. Tr. Vol. II, p. 70. At that time, the raw marijuana smell from within 

the home became “overwhelming” to the officers. Id. at 71. A smokey odor also 

was evident. 

[5] Detective De Leon began questioning Nance about the vehicle parked in front 

of his home. Based on the marijuana smell, Sergeant Kessie asked Nance to 

step outside. Nance did not respond but looked over his shoulder. The officers 

could hear movement and other noises coming from inside the home. Sergeant 

Kessie opened the storm door fully and grabbed Nance’s left wrist as Nance

stood in the threshold. Nance stiffened and started to struggle, prompting the 

officers to pull him from “the threshold of the doorway” to the outside of the 

house to handcuff him. Id. at 89.

[6] Sergeant Kessie and other uniformed officers who had participated in the 

compliance check next door entered Nance’s home and briefly searched it. 

They saw in plain view a vacuum sealer on the kitchen counter, an AR-style 

rifle just underneath a bed in the front bedroom, a Taurus gun box in another 
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bedroom, and a large hydraulic press in the garage. A raw marijuana odor was 

present throughout the home. The officers found no one else in the home. They 

determined that the noise and movement they had heard earlier came from a 

television and a dog caged in a bedroom near the front door.

[7] Based on the marijuana smell and the items in plain sight, Detective De Leon 

obtained a warrant to search the home. The search revealed loose raw 

marijuana on a game box in the living room, a jar with raw marijuana in a bag 

in a bedroom closet, a kilo mold in the kitchen closet, items used to dilute 

narcotics, two UPS packages containing methamphetamine, and a locked case 

in a closet. After a second search warrant was obtained, the locked case was 

opened, revealing, among other things, 10 pounds of methamphetamine, two 

ounces of marijuana, two grams of cocaine, $23,470 in cash, three cell phones, 

and digital scales. 

[8] The State charged Nance with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine. 

Nance moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the searches of his 

home. He argued that the officers’ detention of him and warrantless search of 

his home were illegal so the officers’ observations during the initial search could 

not support issuance of the two warrants. The trial court denied Nance’s 

multiple motions to suppress, finding the detention and searches lawful under 

both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 

11 of the Indiana Constitution.
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[9] The trial court granted Nance’s request to certify this case for interlocutory 

appeal, and we accepted jurisdiction.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Nance contends the officers’ actions took an unconstitutional turn and violated 

both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution as 

soon as they grabbed him and yanked him out of his home. The officers 

continued on this unconstitutional path, according to Nance, by conducting an 

illegal protective sweep of his home and then seeking warrants based on the 

information they had illegally obtained through that search. Nance argues that 

all the evidence collected by the officers after they detained him was tainted by 

these constitutional violations and should be suppressed.

[11] When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress in an interlocutory appeal, 

our approach likens that in sufficiency of the evidence claims. We deferentially 

review the trial court’s ruling, construing conflicting evidence in the manner 

most favorable to the ruling. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. 2014). 

We “consider any substantial and uncontested evidence favorable to the 

defendant” but do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. Any 

constitutional issues are reviewed de novo. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 

(Ind. 2008).

I. Fourth Amendment

[12] The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
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seizures.” U.S. Const., amend. IV. The parties agree that the officers’ initial 

approach of Nance’s home and initial questioning of him did not implicate the 

Fourth Amendment. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013) (ruling that “a 

police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, 

precisely because that is ‘no more than any private citizen might do’” (quoting 

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011)); Warren v. State, 73 N.E.3d 203, 207 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (ruling that a knock and talk was legitimate police business 

and thus did not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes).

[13] The parties diverge, however, as to the legality of the officers’ actions once 

Sergeant Kessie opened Nance’s door wider and grabbed Nance. We conclude 

that the Fourth Amendment did not authorize Nance’s detention or any of the 

searches of his home that followed.

A. Detention 

[14] Nance contends the officers first overstepped Fourth Amendment boundaries 

when they crossed the threshold of his home to detain him. In response, the 

State first claims the detention occurred without entry into the home. Even if 

the officers did enter the home to accomplish the detention, the State argues 

that they were justified by the strong smell of marijuana to which they were 

exposed when Nance opened his front door. The State essentially contends the 

“knock and talk” turned into an investigatory stop during which Nance’s 

detention was justified. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (ruling that 

police may, without a warrant or probable cause, briefly detain an individual 

for investigatory purposes if, based on specific and articulable facts, the officer 
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has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity “may be afoot”). Finally, the 

State claims that the officers had probable cause to arrest Nance based on the 

smell of marijuana in his home and that exigent circumstances justified their 

entry into Nance’s home to arrest him. 

[15] We find the threshold was crossed. Terry therefore does not apply. We also 

conclude that the State has failed to prove that the marijuana smell flowing 

from Nance’s home, standing alone, created probable cause to arrest Nance or

exigent circumstances that would justify the warrantless entry.

i. Threshold

[16] The record refutes the State’s claim that the officers did not cross the threshold 

of Nance’s home. Sergeant Kessie testified that Nance “cracked the [storm] 

door just a little bit,” remaining behind it. Tr. Vol. II, p. 87. Sergeant Kessie 

then testified that he opened the storm door wider, grabbed Nance, and “pulled 

him out of the threshold of the doorway” before handcuffing Nance and detaining 

him outside. Id. at 89 (emphasis added). Thus, Sergeant Kessie necessarily 

crossed the outer boundary of the home’s threshold to grab Nance and pull him 

from the home.

[17] The State claims that even if the officers crossed the threshold to detain Nance, 

their warrantless entry to accomplish the detention did not run awry of the 

Fourth Amendment. Relying on United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976)

and United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1386-87 (7th Cir. 1991), the State 

argues that a person standing in the threshold of his home is outside, rather 
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than inside, the home for Fourth Amendment purposes. Under this reasoning, 

the person in the threshold has knowingly exposed himself to “public view, 

speech, hearing, and touch” just as if he were standing in a public place, 

according to the State. Appellee’s Br., p. 20 (quoting Santana, 427 U.S. at 42).

[18] But Santana involved a home with an open door through which police with 

probable cause entered to arrest a person, who at first was standing in the 

doorway when police arrived and then retreated into the vestibule. 427 U.S. at 

40. The Santana Court found exigent circumstances justified the entry because 

the officers entered the home “in hot pursuit” of the person for whom they had 

probable cause to arrest. Id. at 42-43. By contrast, Nance was inside his home 

when police arrived and only appeared in the threshold due to the officers’ 

knocking. Nance only “cracked” the outer storm door to talk to the officers, 

and, unlike Santana, no “hot pursuit” was involved.

[19] The State offers no basis for finding that the officers had probable cause to 

arrest Nance when the officers opened the storm door wider and crossed the 

threshold to seize him. Tr. Vol. II, p. 87. Officer De Leon stated that the officers 

merely suspected marijuana was in the home due to the burnt and raw 

marijuana odors. The smell of raw marijuana, as detected here by experienced 

and trained officers, may establish a substantial basis for probable cause for a 

search warrant. Bunnell v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1231, 1236-37 (Ind. 2021). The 

smell of marijuana also may generate probable cause in other contexts. See, e.g., 

Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013) (marijuana smell in a vehicle 

detected by a trained officer may generate probable cause to search at least the 
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vehicle’s passenger compartment); Bell v. State, 13 N.E.3d 543, 546 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2014) (smell of raw or burnt marijuana on a person provides probable 

cause to arrest that person for possession of marijuana).

[20] But the State cites no authority showing that the smell of marijuana not 

emanating from a person is sufficient, by itself, to establish probable cause for a 

warrantless home entry to detain or even arrest him. At most, the officers had: 

(1) reasonable suspicion to believe Nance possessed the marijuana that the 

officers believed was in the home; and (2) probable cause for a warrant to 

search the home. See Bunnell, 172 N.E.3d at 1236-37.

[21] Given these important distinctions—that is, probable cause and hot pursuit in 

Santana versus mere reasonable suspicion and a knock and talk here—Santana

does not require a finding that Nance lost his Fourth Amendment rights by

standing in the threshold of his home after answering the officers’ knocks. See

Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 8 (2013) (per curiam) (treating Santana as mainly 

governing “hot pursuit” of a felon); Cox v. State, 696 N.E.2d 853, 857-58 (Ind. 

1998) (suggesting, but not explicitly deciding, that where the suspect is only at 

the threshold to answer police knocking at the door, Santana does not dictate 

that the threshold is a public place to which Fourth Amendment protections do 

not apply). 

[22] Berkowitz also does not advance the State’s argument. In Berkowitz, the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit approved a slight, warrantless 

entry into a home to complete an arrest announced outside the home when the 
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individual acquiesced and the door was open. 927 F.2d at 1386-87. But, here, 

the State has not established that the officers had probable cause to arrest Nance

or that the officers announced the arrest before entering to accomplish that 

arrest. And most notably, Nance did not acquiesce in any detention, and the 

outer door to his home was only slightly open.

[23] Not only is Berkowitz factually distinct, but it eviscerates the State’s argument

that officers may cross the threshold of a home without consent to accomplish a 

Terry-style detention. The Seventh Circuit ruled:

[I]t would not have violated the Fourth Amendment for [the 

police] to enter Berkowitz’s house after announcing the arrest, 

and remain near his door, to take Berkowitz under their control.

It is a different matter, however, for the police to enter a person’s 

home, without his consent, before announcing their authority to 

arrest. In that case, the arrestee has not forfeited his privacy 

interest in the home; he has not relinquished his right to close the 

door on the unwanted visitors . . . . Payton [v. New York, 445 U.S. 

573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)] holds that police 

may not enter a person’s home without a warrant to arrest him ...

Santana does not require a different result. As far as reasonable 

privacy expectations go, there is a significant difference between 

a person who for no reason voluntarily decides to stand in his 

open doorway, and a person who merely answers a knock on his 

door. The person who answers the knock and stays within the 

house is not voluntarily exposing himself “to public view, speech, 

hearing, and touch as if [he is] standing completely outside [his] 

house.” Santana, 427 U.S. at 42, 96 S.Ct. at 2409. 

Id. at 1387-88. 
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ii. Terry

[24] Given that the officers crossed the threshold of Nance’s home, the State’s 

reliance on Terry also is unhelpful. The Fourth Amendment generally requires 

police to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before entering a home 

for a search or seizure without permission. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 

(2014); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). This is because the 

physical entry of the home is the “chief evil” to which the Fourth Amendment 

is directed. Payton, 445 U.S. at 585 (internal quotations omitted). In other 

words, “the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the 

house” because it places “[t]he home as first among equals.” Id. at 590; Jardines, 

569 U.S. at 6.

[25] Accordingly, warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively 

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. King, 563 U.S. at 459. This 

presumption sometimes may be overcome, however, because “the ultimate 

touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Id. (citing Brigham 

City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). The warrant requirement therefore is 

subject to certain reasonable exceptions where “special needs, beyond the 

normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause 

requirement impracticable.” Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873 (quoting New Jersey v. 

T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)). One 

of these exceptions occurs when police have probable cause to arrest a person 

and exigent circumstances exist. Payton, 445 U.S. at 587-88. When either 

probable cause or exigent circumstances is missing from a non-consensual 
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warrantless home entry, however, the threshold cannot reasonably be crossed 

by police. Id. at 590, 602.

[26] A Terry stop provides no exception to these rules requiring: (1) consent to entry; 

(2) a warrant supported by probable cause; or (3) in the absence of a warrant, a

combination of probable cause and exigent circumstances. Although a warrant 

is never required for a Terry stop, neither is probable cause. A Terry stop is 

authorized based only on reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Given this lesser standard of proof, reasonable suspicion 

may justify an officer’s approach of a home to question its occupants but will 

not justify a warrantless entry into the home. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 

(1987) (“A dwelling-place search, not less than a dwelling-place seizure, 

requires probable cause.”); United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 

1991) (“Reasonable suspicion cannot justify a warrantless search of a house.”).

[27] We agree with Nance that this was a rogue knock and talk, rather than, as the 

State claims, a knock and talk turned investigatory stop authorized by Terry. See 

Hayes v. State, 794 N.E.2d 492, 496-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that a knock 

and talk “pushes the envelope” and may be misused so as to violate the Fourth 

Amendment). Nance had the right to decline to answer the officers’ questions 

during the knock and talk and to refuse to step outside his home. See JeanBaptiste v. State, 71 N.E.3d 406, 408, 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (reversing

conviction for resisting law enforcement because officer seeking to serve civil 

arrest warrant at defendant’s home “was not lawfully engaged in the exercise of 

his duties when he reached across the threshold of [defendant’s] residence 
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without permission or legal justification and grabbed” defendant; defendant had 

refused to comply with the officer’s request to turn around and place his hands 

behind his back), summarily affm’d in relevant part, 82 N.E.3d 878 (Ind. 2017).

[28] This is so because “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be 

free from unreasonable governmental intrusion” stands at the Fourth 

Amendment’s “very core.” Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2021)

(quoting Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1668, 1670 (2018)). As the United States 

Supreme Court explained:

When law enforcement officers who are not armed with a 

warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any private 

citizen might do. And whether the person who knocks on the 

door and requests the opportunity to speak is a police officer or a 

private citizen, the occupant has no obligation to open the door 

or to speak. When the police knock on a door but the occupants 

choose not to respond or to speak, “the investigation will have 

reached a conspicuously low point,” and the occupants “will 

have the kind of warning that even the most elaborate security 

system cannot provide.” And even if an occupant chooses to 

open the door and speak with the officers, the occupant need not 

allow the officers to enter the premises and may refuse to answer 

any questions at any time.

King, 563 U.S. at 469-70 (internal citations omitted). Thus, by opening his door 

to answer a knock, Nance neither abandoned his privacy interest in his home 

nor invited the officers knocking to enter. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1387.
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iii. Probable Cause to Arrest 

[29] The State also contends the Fourth Amendment authorized the officers’ 

crossing of the threshold because they had probable cause to arrest Nance based 

solely on the marijuana smell. As we noted, the Fourth Amendment prohibits 

warrantless arrests in the home absent consent to enter or a combination of 

probable cause to arrest and exigent circumstances. Payton, 445 U.S. at 588-90.

In advancing this claim that probable cause to arrest Nance existed, the State 

relies solely on Bell v. State, 13 N.E.3d 543, 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 

[30] In Bell, this Court found probable cause to arrest the defendant, as well as 

search the defendant incident to that arrest, based on a marijuana smell flowing 

from both the defendant and her vehicle. 13 N.E.3d at 544. Here, there is no 

evidence that the officers detected a marijuana smell on Nance. The State cites 

no authority that would support a finding that the officers had probable cause to 

arrest Nance simply because his home smelled of marijuana. Without probable 

cause to arrest Nance, the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by crossing 

the threshold to detain or even arrest him. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 

(2002) (“As Payton made plain, police officers need either a warrant or probable 

cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry in a home.”);

Payton, 445 U.S. at 590.

iv. Exigent Circumstances

[31] Even if the officers had probable cause to arrest Nance, they lacked the other 

ingredient necessary to justify the first warrantless entry into Nance’s home: 
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exigent circumstances. See id. at 589 (requiring exigent circumstances to justify 

law enforcement’s entry into a home without a warrant or consent). The State 

claims exigent circumstances existed because any marijuana within Nance’s 

home likely would have been removed or disposed of before the officers 

obtained a warrant. The imminent destruction of evidence is a recognized 

exigent circumstance. King, 563 U.S. at 460. The government has the burden to 

establish “exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of 

unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries.” McDermott v. 

State, 877 N.E.2d 467, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[32] We agree with Nance that the State failed to show exigent circumstances. In 

determining whether the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 

requirement applies, courts review the totality of the circumstances to 

determine whether police “faced an emergency that justified acting without a 

warrant.” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013). The State argues an 

emergency existed because Nance looked backward over his shoulder, the 

officers heard noise and shuffling or movement from within the home, and any 

marijuana was easily disposable. We are unpersuaded.

[33] The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement requires 

circumstances presenting a “compelling need for official action and no time to 

secure a warrant.” Id. at 149 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 

(1978)). Whether exigent circumstances exist is “case-specific.” Lange, 141 S. 

Ct. at 2018. In other words, “[w]hether a ‘now or never situation’ actually 

exists—whether an officer has ‘no time to secure a warrant’—depends upon 
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facts on the ground.” Id. (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 391 and McNeely, 569 U.S. 

at 149).

[34] Where, as here, a minor offense and no flight are involved, the kind of 

emergency that can justify a warrantless home entry seldom exists. Lange, 141 

S. Ct. at 2020; see Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(a) (classifying as a Class B 

misdemeanor possession of less than 30 grams of marijuana absent enhancing 

circumstances). The United States Supreme Court has therefore cautioned that 

“application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home 

entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that 

only a minor offense . . . has been committed.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 

740, 753 (1984).

[35] So far, however, the United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed 

whether the smell of marijuana alone can justify a warrantless home entry 

based on concerns that evidence within would be destroyed before a warrant 

could be obtained. In King, the Court sidestepped whether concerns over the 

imminent destruction of evidence justified a warrantless entry into a home from 

which the smell of marijuana was emanating. 563 U.S. at 470-72. Although the 

King Court recognized generally that exigent circumstances could exist in such 

a scenario, the Court remanded to the Kentucky courts for a determination of 

whether they existed under the particular facts of that case. Id. at 472. The 

Kentucky Supreme Court ultimately found the State had proved no exigent 

circumstances. King v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.3d 119, 122-23 (Ky. 2012)

(finding the State, by only producing evidence that the officer heard movements 
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within a home after smelling marijuana emanating from it, did not establish the 

exigent circumstance of imminent destruction of evidence). Similarly, the U.S. 

Supreme Court in Lange recognized that exigent circumstances may justify 

warrantless entry into a home based on a suspected misdemeanant’s flight but

remanded for the exigent circumstances determination. 141 S. Ct. at 2024-25.

[36] But other United States Supreme Court decisions in drug cases are helpful to 

our analysis. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948), the Court found 

that the dissipation of opium fumes resulting from the delay in obtaining a 

search warrant for the hotel room in which the fumes were present—together 

with movement within the hotel room after police announced themselves but 

before the room’s door was opened—was not a sufficient exigency to support 

the officers’ warrantless entry. Although Johnson was decided 75 years ago, it 

remains a stalwart of modern Fourth Amendment analysis. See District of 

Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 n.5 (2018) (relying on Johnson in 

analyzing whether probable cause to arrest existed); Riley, 573 U.S. at 383

(quoting Johnson on question of warrantless search).

[37] In Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754, the Court ruled exigent circumstances—the 

imminent destruction of evidence in the form of declining blood alcohol levels 

in the drunk driving suspect’s body—did not justify a warrantless entry into the 

suspect’s home, given that the suspected crime was merely a civil traffic offense 

in that state. The Court observed that “it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless 

home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment 

when the underlying offense is extremely minor.” Id. at 753. 
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[38] In Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336-37 (2001), the Court determined that 

no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when law enforcement refused to 

allow McArthur, who was first detained outside his home, to re-enter the home 

unless accompanied by an officer while the warrant was sought. The Court 

found exigent circumstances—that McArthur would destroy marijuana 

evidence that his wife had reported seeing in the home minutes earlier and that 

she said belonged to McArthur—justified the warrantless detention. Id. Noting 

that a home search is a greater intrusion than briefly preventing entry to a 

home, the Court declined to address whether possession of marijuana justified a 

warrantless home entry. Id. at 336 (“Temporarily keeping a person from 

entering his home, a consequence whenever police stop a person on the street, 

is considerably less intrusive than police entry into the home itself in order to 

make a warrantless arrest or conduct a search.”). 

[39] Johnson and Welsh point toward a finding of no exigent circumstances here. 

McArthur, which did not involve a warrantless home entry, does little or no 

damage to such a conclusion. But unlike the United States Supreme Court, 

various United States Courts of Appeals have directly addressed the question of 

exigent circumstances in the context of a warrantless home entry based on a 

marijuana smell. The results have been mixed.

[40] For instance, the Seventh Circuit has ruled that the smell of burning marijuana 

outside a home, without more, does not create an exigency permitting a 

warrantless entry into a home. White v. Stanley, 745 F.3d 237, 241 (7th Cir. 

2014). The Tenth Circuit found that “if marijuana possession is the only crime 
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for which the officers in this case had probable cause, the exigency exception 

for destruction of evidence should not apply because marijuana possession is 

not a serious crime.” United States v. Mongold, 528 Fed.Appx. 944, 950 (10th Cir. 

2013). 

[41] The Third Circuit found that the imminent destruction of evidence justified a 

warrantless entry into an apartment when a marijuana smell was in the 

building’s hallway and increased when the apartment door was opened. United 

States v. McMillion, 472 Fed.Appx. 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2012). But one of the 

important factors in McMillion was the defendant’s admission to smoking 

marijuana. Id. (“It was thus reasonable for the officers to suspect that there was 

ongoing drug activity, and, particularly in light of McMillion’s admission to 

smoking marijuana, it was also reasonable for the officers to conclude that 

contraband was being destroyed and would continue to be destroyed or 

removed if they did not act immediately.”). 

[42] And in United States v. Grissett, the Fourth Circuit found the imminent 

destruction of evidence justified a warrantless intrusion into a hotel room 

occupied by three people when officers smelled a marijuana odor coming from 

the room. 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir. 1991) (“Since the police had identified 

themselves before smelling the marijuana, an officer could reasonably conclude 

that the occupants of the room would attempt to dispose of the evidence before 

the police could return with a warrant.”); see United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 

597, 600 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (“For Fourth Amendment purposes, a hotel room 
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is treated essentially the same, if not exactly the same, as a home.”) (citing 

Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964)).

[43] Like our federal counterparts, this Court also has considered exigent 

circumstances in the context of a warrantless home entry based on the smell of 

marijuana. In Ware v. State, 782 N.E.2d 478, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), we 

rejected the State’s claim that exigent circumstances—specifically, the imminent 

destruction of evidence—authorized an officer’s warrantless entry into an 

apartment from which a marijuana smell was emanating. We reasoned:

Officer Carpenter did not hear Ware yell to anyone inside the 

apartment that the police were there. In fact, when Ware opened 

the door, Officer Carpenter did not see anyone else inside the 

apartment or any drugs in plain view. Additionally, Ware 

cooperated with Officer Carpenter the entire time and returned to 

the door with his identification after his initial encounter with 

Officer Carpenter. Although Ware was gone for approximately 

three minutes before returning with his identification, during that 

time period Officer Carpenter did not hear Ware running through 

the apartment; rather, he just heard Ware “walking around.” 

Furthermore, Officer Carpenter did not hear any toilets flushing 

or anything else indicative of the destruction of the marijuana.

Id. 

[44] Here, unlike the police in Ware, the officers’ initial entry into Nance’s home 

was to detain Nance for purposes of an investigation based on reasonable 

suspicion of criminal conduct, not because the officers had probable cause to 

believe Nance had committed a crime. Officer Kessie specifically testified that 

when he pulled Nance from the doorway, “[Nance] was not under arrest. He 
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was detained for further investigation.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 89. The officers suspected 

someone in the home had either smoked marijuana or possessed it or both, but 

they did not know who. The officers never testified that the marijuana smell 

came from Nance individually, and they never asked Nance whether anyone 

else was in the home.

[45] Given these particular facts, and with the guidance of Ware, we conclude the 

State failed to prove that the Fourth Amendment authorized the officers’ initial 

warrantless entry into Nance’s home to detain him. Given that the officers only 

had reasonable suspicion that Nance might possess marijuana and no exigent 

circumstances existed, their breach of the threshold of his home violated the 

Fourth Amendment.

B. Protective Sweep

[46] Nance argues the officers’ second warrantless entry into his home also violated 

the Fourth Amendment because it stemmed from his illegal detention by the 

officers. Classifying this second entry as a protective sweep, the State asserts 

that the entry and search was justified by Nance’s “arrest” and the need to 

prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. We conclude that the State 

proved no valid exception to the warrant requirement justifying this second 

warrantless entry into Nance’s home.

i. No “Protective Sweep”

[47] The State improperly classifies the officers’ second entry into Nance’s home as 

a “protective sweep.” In Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990), the United 
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States Supreme Court ruled that incident to an arrest, police may, as a 

precautionary measure and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, 

conduct a brief search of areas immediately adjoining the place of arrest from 

which an attack could be immediately launched. 

[48] The State repeats its claim that the officers had probable cause to arrest Nance 

for possession of marijuana. Under the State’s reasoning, the officers’ failure to 

arrest Nance is irrelevant because the officers had authority to do so. We have 

already rejected the State’s assertion that the officers had probable cause for 

Nance’s arrest before they entered his home. Because Buie defined a protective 

sweep as incident to arrest and the State has failed to establish any arrest (or 

even a right to arrest), the officers’ second entry into the home cannot be

justified as a “protective sweep.”

ii. Probable Cause and Exigent Circumstances 

[49] Although the officers lacked probable cause to believe that Nance possessed 

marijuana, they arguably did have probable cause to believe Nance’s home 

contained evidence of criminal conduct. See Bunnell, 172 N.E.3d at 1235; see

Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13 (finding the “presence of odors” may establish probable 

cause for a search warrant if two conditions are met: (1) the issuing judicial 

officer “finds the affiant qualified to know the odor;” and (2) the odor “is one 

sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance”). 

[50] But as we noted earlier, probable cause alone is not enough to justify a 

warrantless search of a home. It must be joined with exigent circumstances to 
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dispense with the warrant requirement. Cudworth v. State, 818 N.E.2d 133, 137-

38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Therefore, if we ignore for purposes of this analysis 

any impact from the first warrantless entry, the legality of the second 

warrantless entry rests on the existence of exigent circumstances. See id.

[51] We have already rejected the State’s claim that the imminent destruction of 

evidence justified the officers’ initial warrantless entry. That analysis equally 

applies to this second entry, given that the circumstances facing the officers had 

not changed in the short time between the officers’ detention of Nance and their 

search of the home. The State has therefore failed to establish that imminent 

destruction of evidence justified their second warrantless entry. For all of these 

reasons, we conclude that the second warrantless entry, like the first, violated 

the Fourth Amendment.

C. Searches Under Warrant

[52] Nance argues that the officers obtained their first search warrant based on the 

evidence collected during their illegal warrantless search of his home. 

Accordingly, he claims “[a]ny evidence recovered as a result of the 

subsequently issued search warrant was fruit of the poisonous tree and should 

have been suppressed.” Appellant’s Br., p. 22. The State, on the other hand, 

asserts that probable cause to issue the warrant existed even if the observations 

made during the warrantless search are excluded from the search warrant 

affidavit. In essence, the State argues that the warrantless detention and search 

did not taint the search warrant or the later home search that it authorized.
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[53] “Evidence obtained as a direct result of an unconstitutional search or seizure is 

plainly subject to exclusion.” Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984).

Evidence or information obtained through illegal tactics violating constitutional 

rights also cannot be used to establish probable cause for a search warrant. State 

v. Felker, 819 N.E.2d 870, 873-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

[54] But additional inquiry is necessary when the search warrant affidavit mixes 

legally and illegally secured information and the defendant claims that evidence 

subsequently seized is tainted. See Segura, 468 U.S. at 804-5. The reviewing 

court must determine whether the challenged evidence was obtained by 

exploitation of the initial illegality or, instead, “by means sufficiently 

distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Id. (quoting Wong Sun v. 

United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963)). The language in both the search 

warrant affidavit and warrant are relevant to this determination. See, e.g.,

Esquerdo v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1023, 1030 (Ind. 1994).

[55] The search warrant affidavit here included information obtained during the 

illegal warrantless search of Nance’s home, as well as statements by Nance to 

police that ultimately were suppressed by the trial court due to other police 

misconduct. For instance, the affidavit noted that the officers observed during 

the warrantless search a vacuum sealer, drug press, a rifle, and a gun box. Exhs. 

Vol. I, pp. 9-10. The affidavit sought a warrant authorizing the officers to search 

for “[f]irearms and ammunition,” among other things. Id. at 11-12. The trial 

court issued the warrant as requested. Id. at 11-12. 
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[56] The only firearm evidence known to the officers arose from their observations 

during the illegal warrantless search of Nance’s home. A reasonable conclusion, 

which the State does not dispel, is that the trial court relied on the illegally 

obtained evidence when it issued the warrant authorizing the officers to search 

not only for marijuana but also for firearms and ammunition at Nance’s home.

Therefore, the evidence on which the officers relied in establishing probable 

cause—and on which the trial court based its finding of probable cause for the 

warrant—was obtained by exploitation of the prior illegal entry into Nance’s

home and not by means distinguishable enough to be purged of the primary 

taint.1

[57] And if the first search warrant was tainted, so too was the second search 

warrant, which was based entirely on evidence arising from the prior illegal 

searches. As the warrants were tainted by the police misconduct, the trial court 

erred in denying Nance’s motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds.

2

1 We observe that the officers may have been able to obtain a search warrant without entering the home if 

they had not resorted to illegal tactics. See Bunnell v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1231, 1237-38 (Ind. 2021) (ruling that 

officers “who affirm[] that they detect the odor of raw marijuana based on their training and experience may 

establish probable cause without providing further details on their qualifications to recognize this odor”). 

2 Notably, this result is consistent with the purpose of the exclusionary rule: to deter Fourth Amendment 

violations. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-37 (2011). Here, the officers committed serial misconduct. 

In addition to the two illegal warrantless entries into Nance’s home, they also illegally questioned Nance

after he repeatedly asserted his right to counsel, leading the trial court to suppress evidence of his statements.

“When the police exhibit ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment 

rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the results costs” of exclusion. Id. at 

238 (quotations omitted). That is the situation presented here.
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II. Article 1, Section 11 

[58] Nance also contends his detention and the later searches of his home violated 

Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution. “Although Indiana’s § 11 and the 

Federal Fourth Amendment are textually identical, they are analytically 

distinct.” Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014). The Fourth 

Amendment “focus[es] on the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.” 

Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ind. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). 

Article 1, § 11, however, “employ[s] a totality-of-the-circumstances test to 

evaluate the reasonableness of the officer’s actions.” Id.

[59] Generally, a warrantless search violates the Indiana Constitution unless the 

search is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Isley v. State, 202 

N.E.3d 1124, 1131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). We consider three non-exhaustive 

factors when determining the reasonableness of the officers’ actions under the 

Indiana Constitution: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a 

violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or 

seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law 

enforcement needs. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005).

[60] “When weighing these [Litchfield] factors as part of our totality-of-thecircumstances test, we consider the full context in which the search or seizure 

occurs.” Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 943 (Ind. 2020). Therefore, “we 

examine, at different points in our analysis, the perspectives of both the officer 
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and the person subjected to the search or seizure.” Id. The State bears the 

burden of showing the intrusions were reasonable. Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1002.

A. Degree of Suspicion

[61] The degree of suspicion that marijuana was within Nance’s home was high, but 

the degree of suspicion that Nance possessed the marijuana was somewhat less 

so. When considering this factor, “courts consider ‘the reasonableness of the 

officers’ assumptions, suspicions, or beliefs based on the information available 

to them at the time.’” Berry v. State, 121 N.E.3d 633, 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)

(quoting Duran, 930 N.E.2d at 18). We consider all the information available to 

the officers at the time of the search or seizure. Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 943. 

[62] Multiple officers smelled a strong odor of burning and raw marijuana that 

strengthened as they neared Nance’s front door. When Nance opened the door 

to the officers, those officers determined the smell was emanating from inside 

the home. Raw marijuana, which remains illegal in Indiana, has an 

unmistakable odor unique to that drug. Bunnell, 172 N.E.3d at 1236; see Ind. 

Code § 35-48-4-11. The smell of marijuana in its raw form, as detected by 

experienced and trained officers, can establish probable cause for a search 

warrant. Bunnell, 172 N.E.3d at 1235 (citing Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13). The 

officers’ belief that marijuana was within the home and that Nance might be the 

person possessing it was reasonable under these circumstances.
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B. Degree of Intrusion

[63] The degree of intrusion was also high. As “[h]ouses and premises of citizens 

receive the highest protection[,]” warrantless searches of a home are 

presumptively unreasonable. Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1002 (quoting Moran v. 

State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind. 1994)). We evaluate the degree of intrusion 

from the defendant’s point of view, considering “the intrusion into both a 

defendant’s physical movements and privacy” with a focus on how the officers 

conducted the search or seizure. Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 192 (Ind. 

2021). But in examining the search or seizure method, “we continue to consider 

the totality of the circumstances and look at ‘all of the attendant 

circumstances’—not a single aspect of the search or seizure in isolation.” 

Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 945 (quoting Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1196, 1202 (Ind. 

2016)).

[64] The knock and talk at Nance’s home was minimally intrusive at its inception.

But it became highly intrusive when police lacking probable cause and exigent 

circumstances pulled Nance from his home and expanded the encounter into a 

handcuffing, a detention, and, ultimately, an arrest. See Govan v. State, 116 

N.E.3d 1165, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“[T]here are few intrusions more 

severe than an arrest.”); Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1002 (finding officers’ 

warrantless entry into home through open door was “highly intrusive”).

[65] The alleged “protective sweep” that followed also was highly intrusive. A true 

protective sweep, standing alone, generally is minimally intrusive if it is legal, 
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limited to areas of the home where a person reasonably could hide, and lasts 

only a few minutes. See, e.g., Weddle v. State, 989 N.E.2d 371, 378-79 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2013). But the search here does not fall in that category. Instead, it 

evolved from a detention accomplished through a warrantless entry into 

Nance’s home without probable cause or exigent circumstances. And the 

evidence obtained through the two warrantless and highly intrusive entries was 

used to obtain the warrants for the later searches.

C. Law Enforcement Needs

[66] The extent of law enforcement needs was minimal. To be sure, police have a 

strong need to investigate criminal activity, including drug offenses. Corbett v. 

State, 179 N.E.3d 475, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied; Austin v. State, 997 

N.E.2d 1027, 1036 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (observing that law enforcement’s need 

to disrupt the illegal drug trade is significant). The officers reasonably suspected 

criminal activity based on the smell of raw and burning marijuana. They 

determined the smell was emanating from Nance’s home when he opened his 

front door. 

[67] That said, this strong need to investigate is tempered by the minor nature of the 

offense that the officers were investigating. Police had no evidence of any 

offense other than possible marijuana possession when they first entered 

Nance’s home to detain him. Possession of marijuana without enhancing 

circumstances is a Class B misdemeanor—one of the more minor offenses in 

the Indiana criminal code. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(a). And the officers’ 

warrantless entry was unnecessary because they likely could have obtained a 
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warrant to search the home based solely on the smell of marijuana before they 

ever knocked on Nance’s door. See Bunnell, 172 N.E.3d 1236-37.

D. Balancing Litchfield Factors

[68] Balancing these three Litchfield factors and considering the full context in which 

the search and seizure occurred, see Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 943, we conclude 

that the State failed to establish the multiple searches of Nance’s home and his 

detention were reasonable under Article 1, § 11. The officers, lacking both a 

warrant and probable cause to believe Nance had committed a crime, seized 

Nance by pulling him from the threshold of his home after he failed to follow 

Sergeant Kessie’s directive to step outside his home. The marijuana offense that 

they reasonably suspected was minor.

[69] From that unreasonable seizure of Nance flowed further unreasonable police 

conduct: the officers’ continued questioning of Nance after he invoked his right 

to counsel and a second warrantless entry into Nance’s home that we have 

already determined violated the Fourth Amendment. The searches conducted 

under the warrants were no less unreasonable, given that they were based in 

substantial part on observations made during the earlier warrantless searches. 

See Mundy v. State, 21 N.E.3d 114, 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that 

evidence derived through use of information obtained in an unlawful search or 

seizure is inadmissible).
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Conclusion

[70] As all of the challenged searches and seizures violate both the Fourth 

Amendment and Article 1, § 11, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Nance’s 

motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.