U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

24–985 PDF 2006

S. HRG. 109–270

NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, USAF, TO BE PRINCIPAL

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 14, 2005

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence

(

(II)

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah

MIKE DeWINE, Ohio

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

RON WYDEN, Oregon

EVAN BAYH, Indiana

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey

BILL FRIST, Tennessee, Ex Officio

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio

BILL DUHNKE, Staff Director

ANDREW W. JOHNSON, Minority Staff Director

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk

(III)

CONTENTS

Hearing held in Washington, DC:

April 14, 2005 ................................................................................................... 1

Statements of:

Mikulski, Hon. Barbara A., a U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland .... 6

Murtha, Hon. John P., a U.S. Representative from the State of Pennsylvania .............................................................................................................. 8

Hayden, Lieutenant General Michael V. ........................................................ 9

Supplemental Materials:

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questionnaire for Completion

by Presidential Nominees ............................................................................. 33

Additional questions ......................................................................................... 65

Glynn, Marilyn L., General Counsel Office of Government Ethics, Letter

to Hon. Pat Roberts ...................................................................................... 72

(1)

NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL

MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, USAF, TO BE

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

THURSDAY, APRIL 14, 2005

U.S. SENATE,

SENATE SELECT COMMITTE ON INTELLIGENCE,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:33 a.m., in room

SH–216, of the Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Pat

Roberts, Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, presiding.

Committee Members present: Senators Roberts, Hatch, DeWine,

Snowe, Chambliss, Rockefeller, Levin, Feinstein, Wyden and Mikulski.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN

Chairman ROBERTS. The Committee will come to order. The

Committee meets today to receive testimony on the President’s

nomination for the newly created position of Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. Our distinguished witness today is

the President’s nominee, Lieutenant General Michael Hayden.

General, on behalf of the entire Committee, we welcome you and

your guests. We thank you for your service to our country.

I might just say from a personal standpoint that I have never experienced a person who has more ability than you in regards to

your responsibilities. I don’t know who’s in first place in regards to

being a straight, let-the-chips-fall-where-they-may briefer to the

Congress, but they’re not ahead of you.

Let me say that the Committee also welcomes two of our distinguished colleagues who will introduce the nominee, the distinguished Senator from Maryland, a Member of our Committee—valued Member of our Committee—and the Ranking Member of the

Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary Appropriations Subcommittee, the Honorable Barbara Mikulski.

The distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, the Honorable

Rick Santorum, had every intention to be here this morning, but

had a conflict. But Pennsylvania will be ably represented by the

Ranking Member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, a defender and champion of the military and our national security for many years, the Honorable Jack Murtha.

So we thank you all for being here today.

2

The President has made an excellent choice, I believe, in nominating General Hayden to serve as the Nation’s first Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. General Hayden is a distinguished public servant, having dedicated over 35 years of service

to our country.

Since March 1999, General Hayden has served as the Director of

the National Security Agency. Prior to that, he held a number of

intelligence positions within the Department of Defense, served on

the National Security Council, and was the air attache in the U.S.

Embassy in Bulgaria. He has worked on intelligence and national

security issues throughout his career, and in that respect brings a

great deal of experience to this position.

Most importantly, just like Ambassador Negroponte, General

Hayden has demonstrated a record as an outstanding manager and

a leader. He is well-suited for this position and I look forward to

his confirmation.

Now, much of what I spoke about in my opening statement for

Ambassador Negroponte’s confirmation hearing on Tuesday also

applies in our consideration of General Hayden’s nomination. I

know it probably doesn’t need to be repeated at length, and I beg

the indulgence of my distinguished Vice Chairman, but if you

would indulge me just for a moment.

I spoke about how critical intelligence is for our national security

and the historical importance of the creation of a Director of National Intelligence, even if he hasn’t been granted all of the explicit

authorities that I would have liked to have seen.

I also spoke about the importance of change, not only to enhance

our national security but also to give our hardworking intelligence

officers an intelligence community worthy of their efforts, an intelligence community capable of meeting both their aspirations and

our expectations. I emphasized the importance of adopting a process of sustained, fundamental change that will allow the intelligence community to continually adapt to new threats as they

emerge.

I spoke about the important precedents that Ambassador

Negroponte and General Hayden will be setting in terms of the authorities they exercise as the first DNI and the Principal Deputy.

These precedents will define the authority for all future DNIs and

set the tone for your leadership of the entire intelligence community.

The one issue that I discussed on Tuesday with Ambassador

Negroponte that I would like to re-emphasize today is the pressing

need to reject the concept of information sharing. In this particular

case, both Senator Rockefeller and I are in favor of something that

we call information access. General, if you are confirmed—and you

will be—I believe that moving from information sharing to information access will probably be your most important job.

As I have said many times before, I believe, as does the WMD

Commission, that information sharing is a limited idea that falsely

implies that the data collector is also the data owner. The concept

of information sharing relies on the collector to determine what an

analyst needs to know and then to push that information to the analyst.

3

The Vice Chairman and I think that we need new thinking on

this issue, and he has spoken to it, as I have. We need to reverse

the process, while we must continue to protect sources and methods, without any question. Cleared analysts with the need to know

should be able to pull information by searching all intelligence data

bases without waiting for any one agency to deem them worthy.

That’s a pretty challenging proposition.

Despite the intelligence failures of 9/11 and the assessment of

Iraq’s WMD program, along with the staggering and sometimes

willful inability to share information associated with those failures,

achieving a free flow of intelligence information has proven rather

elusive.

Now, General Hayden, it’s my hope that you will be able to provide the leadership to get our collection agencies to finally perfect

the concept of information access. I am encouraged by your written

responses to the Committee’s questions in regard to this topic. I

would note, however, for the last several years, that you have been

managing the National Security Agency—and the NSA will be key

when it comes to achieving information access.

That’s not to say that you have not made some strides—good

strides. But agencies like the NSA must lead and move faster in

getting properly cleared analysts from outside agencies the direct

access that they need.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will be working

with you, seeking your advice and counsel, and Ambassador

Negroponte, and we hope and expect to see clear signs of progress

toward information access sooner rather than later.

Now, the volume of the data in question is an issue that we must

watch carefully, but I believe that current technology can provide

the tools to manage that volume.

In regards to privacy issues, I think that properly trained intelligence professionals outside the NSA are no less capable of protecting civil liberties than the professionals inside the NSA. I also

understand that specialized analysis by experienced officers,

whether it be SIGINT or HUMINT or otherwise, adds substantial

value to the analytic process. Access by other intelligence analysts

will not replace that very important work.

there’s no reason that other analysts cannot have access to the

data they need to keep us safe. If those analysts find data and have

a question, they should call a specialist. But if they don’t even

know the information exists, obviously they can’t make that call.

Another important challenge to information access that you mentioned in your written response is the need to protect sources and

methods. I agree. This is a very serious matter. But I hasten to add

that the lessons of 9/11 and the Iraq WMD failures is that protecting sources and methods must be balanced against the need to

provide information access to those who actually need it.

So today, those competing concerns are not really properly balanced. And you, sir, must fix that. I have every confidence that you

can and will. Simply put, we must see progress toward information

access. So we hope to see you up here telling this Committee what

help you need from Congress to get the job done. We’re most willing to help you achieve that.

4

Despite the ambiguities in the DNI authorities, I am confident,

when confirmed, you and the Ambassador will have the strong support of the President. You, sir, should be confident that you will

have the same strong support from this Committee.

As we discussed with Ambassador Negroponte on Tuesday, exercising the authorities of the DNI will not be easy. Setting the

precedent of a strong DNI will likely mean the two of you may

have to break some china. Start with the cups and the saucers first

and then we’ll see what happens. I am confident, however, that you

and the Ambassador are the right team for this job.

With that said, I welcome you to the Committee and look forward

to your testimony.

I now recognize the distinguished Vice Chairman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,

VICE CHAIRMAN

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and

welcome, General Hayden.

One of the things that is not in my statement, but which I really

feel strongly about and have said repeatedly, is that the combination of Ambassador Negroponte and you, sir, is an absolutely magnificent combination, because he brings the diplomatic, intuitive,

political, how do you get people to agree to do things they don’t

want to do, and you bring with you all of the military, the intelligence, all of that, and the managerial skills—which he also has.

The two of you working together strikes me as quite a remarkable

and excellent team.

Now there are three other deputies, and I want to ask you about

that in the question period.

But I can say what a good choice the President made in both of

you, together. Each of you is strong on your own. Together, you’re

going to, I think, be able to make enormous changes in our intelligence community.

Interestingly, over the period that I’ve been here, this is only the

second time you’ve appeared in public, which is the way our business sort of works. But I’m very glad that we could do this the

same week as Ambassador Negroponte, because the two of you, as

I said, make an incredibly impressive tandem.

I like the fact that you’re a strong manager. You came to the

NSA at a time of real crisis. A short time after your arrival, the

problems became so severe that the agency’s computer system

crashed, and we were left without any ability to process signals intelligence for 3 days. Now, in our world, that’s called a huge crisis

and a great danger.

Just having arrived, you guided the agency through the emergency and then set about overhauling the NSA from top to bottom,

unafraid to make changes.

The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense

have had such confidence in your abilities that they have extended

your tour of duty at NSA three times.

The challenges that you have faced in reforming the NSA should

go a long way toward preparing for the job that we all have ahead

of us. You’ve had to fight an entrenched bureaucracy resistant to

input from outsiders. You’ve had to break old patterns of behavior.

5

You’ve had to create new structures, which you’ve been kind

enough—or your team—to show me. And you’ve had to create new

procedures to bring NSA into the information age. All of that, you

have done.

It’s not always been a smooth process, but you’ve continued to

push, to cajole, coerce and occasionally force those changes to take

place.

At Ambassador Negroponte’s hearing on Tuesday, I, as the

Chairman indicated, listed a number of points which I want to go

through also.

First, I think you must create the structures and procedures

needed to ensure that our intelligence is timely and objective and

independent of political considerations. This is all required by law

in the National Security Act as amended by the Intelligence Reform Act. This is your mission. You must succeed in order to restore the intelligence community’s reputation, not that it is damaged as much as some would have people think, but there’s a lot

of work to be done there.

Second, you have to take the blueprint provided by the intelligence reform bill and you have to use it to transform 15 agencies,

bring them together. That sounds like a very impossible thing to

do, but I think that you’re going to come very close to being able

to do that, the two of you and the other three deputies and the

management team at the DNI.

You have to make them into a real community, with central coordination, central direction, an ability to have access to information, as the Chairman indicated, not just sharing. But then there

will be caveats for that, because sometimes there really is a needto-know basis. You understand very well how the complexities of

all of that have to be balanced.

Third, you must instill a sense of accountability throughout the

intelligence community. I think all of us on this Committee feel

that it’s been a long time now since 9/11 and there’s been no accountability for 9/11.

This isn’t just about 9/11. It’s about the next 30 or 40 years. The

concept of accountability, I think, has to built in early. Accountability is not just punishing people or dismissing people. It’s also

about encouraging people who have done good work, letting them

know about it and making sure that others in the agencies know

about that. People—that’s the nature of people. They need to be rewarded when they’ve done well. I think that it just goes to say that

when people haven’t done well, they also need to know that.

Fourth, you will need to develop a comprehensive and consistent

legal and operational policy on the detention, interrogation and

rendition of prisoners across the intelligence community. The intelligence we gain through these interrogations is too important to

allow shortcomings in this program. I trust you share my concern

and I hope you’ll assist our Committee in undertaking a constructive inquiry into the detention, interrogation and rendition practices.

Finally, you and Ambassador Negroponte are assuming your positions in the midst of Congressional consideration of the President’s intelligence budget for fiscal 2006. You had input to the NSA

budget, obviously, but now you’re going to be responsible for spendVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:46 May 24, 2006 Jkt 024985 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\INTELL\24985.TXT CarolB PsN: CarolB
6

ing across a huge community. I urged the Ambassador to review

the priorities and submit a budget amendment if necessary. It may

not now be necessary, because of a meeting that took place yesterday.

When there are budget deficiencies, whether they be at supplemental time or otherwise, that you will be very sure that we know

about that, because this Committee wants the intelligence community to work. We now have the vehicle for it in which it can work—

through which it can work. The vehicle is not entirely proscribed

by law, and that’s good, because that means that the two of you

and your colleagues will be able to fill that out in a way which is

more intelligent than perhaps the way the Congress would do it.

The Ambassador is going to need your expertise not only to understand the intricacies of nuances of the intelligence business, but

to navigate the minefields of all of these rivalries. He understands

a lot of that intuitively already, because he’s a real pro, and there’s

not much that goes on in government that he misses.

So you’re taking on a great responsibility. I have enormous confidence in you to take up this task. I was absolutely delighted when

you were appointed, and I welcome you and look forward to your

statement.

Chairman ROBERTS. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller.

I now recognize the distinguished Senator from Maryland, Senator Mikulski, a valued Member of this Committee.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA A. MIKULSKI

Senator MIKULSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I’m

happy to be here with my colleague from Pennsylvania, Congressman Murtha, who I served with.

First of all, it’s a great honor to introduce Lieutenant General

Michael Hayden to the Committee, to be the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. I’ve come to know General Hayden

well as the Director of the National Security Agency. Maryland is

very proud to be the home of the National Security Agency.

We, in Maryland, are very proud of the fact that we have Federal

agencies that are devoted to saving lives and saving communities,

whether it’s the National Institutes of Health that come up with

new cures to help our people, whether it’s the FDA that stands sentry over our food and our drug supply, and also the National Security Agency that is the greatest eavesdropper to protect our country

against predatory attacks when the homeland and our troops and

our assets.

General Hayden has absolutely distinguished himself as both a

soldier as well as a leader at the National Security Agency. I’ve

come to know him as a soldier, as a patriot, and an intelligence

professional—and absolutely as a leader and a manager.

He grew up in a blue collar neighborhood in Pittsburgh, and

brings those all-American values to the table and puts those values

into action. His dad was a welder, and through his family he knew

that in this country hard work, merit, devotion to duty would really

take you somewhere.

Attending the Catholic high school, he was a student and an athlete. He went to Duquesne University, and came into the military

through the Air Force ROTC, and there he served in a variety of

7

military roles, each time assuming greater responsibility. It’s there

for the resume to speak for itself.

He has served in direct support of the warfighters and in sensitive, diplomatic roles. He served in lead command at military

bases. He’s had senior, sensitive national security positions in

Washington. He even led a military delegation to negotiate with

North Korean generals. If you learn to negotiate with North Korean generals, he’s learned to navigate the intel system.

Most impressively has been his accomplishment as the leader at

NSA. Long before 9/11, General Hayden was embarked not only on

reform, but on transformation. This was an agency, when he came

to his post, that was an analog agency in a digital world. It had

served the country fantastically through the cold war, protecting

our country. But a cold war orientation had to be transformed. He

led that transformation at breathtaking speed, through a series of

technological innovations, a series of technological crises, and at

the same time streamlining the organization, recognizing the duty

of the cold warriors and yet bringing in that next generation of the

cyber warriors that we’ve come to depend upon.

He looked for the best people, the best ideas, valued the employees. He also turned to academia and turned to the private sector

if necessary to get that cutting edge of the people and technology.

At the same time, he connected to the world of public information. The NSA has had an incredible mystique. Books like ‘‘The

Puzzle Palace’’ has been written about it. Even Dan Brown of ‘‘The

DaVinci Code’’ has written about NSA, called ‘‘The Digital Fortress.’’

What General Hayden did, by engaging with the press, he

demystified the agency without declassifying the agency—a pretty

spectacular feat. He provided a more public face in the national security mission, and what that did was build confidence that we

were truly standing sentry in our own country.

Members of this Committee are well aware of the historic accomplishments of NSA, as well as the future challenges the agency

must confront, including the exploding volume of global communication, the sophistication of our enemies. General Hayden has an

understanding that is a tremendous understanding of where we

are, not only on signals intelligence, but where we are.

He understands how we need to support the warfighter, but also

the great strategic thinking that needs to be done.

He’s never been willing to rest on yesterday’s achievements or remain satisfied with today’s capabilities—always thinking and planning about how we can do better today, and how we can be spectacular tomorrow.

That’s why I’m here to endorse his nomination before the Committee and we want to recognize that, for every soldier that serves

our country, that soldier, 24/7, particularly in the jobs that General

Hayden has had, has been his wonderful wife, who we mean to recognize for her service to the country here, and also to his devoted

family.

So I look forward to not only introducing him, but to voting for

him and then working with all of us to keep our country safer and

stronger.

Thank you.

8

Chairman ROBERTS. Senator Mikulski, we thank you.

It is now my privilege to recognize my former House colleague

and fellow Marine, the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murtha.

Jack, semper fi.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN P. MURTHA

Representative MURTHA. Thank you very much. Semper fi, Mr.

Chairman.

I have a plaque on my desk that says, ‘‘Victory is complete

knowledge of the enemy.’’ I was in the intelligence field in Vietnam,

and I’ve worked on this subcommittee that funds NSA for 25 years.

I’ve never seen an individual that had more integrity, more responsibility and more straightforward than Mikey Hayden. He told me

not to say Mikey Hayden. His brother calls him that.

[Laughter.]

Chairman ROBERTS. Well, rest assured I’m not going to call him

Mikey either.

[Laughter.]

General HAYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Representative MURTHA. This guy has got, I think, one of the

most difficult jobs in the government today.

We have a small agency in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, called the

National Drug Intelligence Center. We have five agencies—the

FBI, the CIA, the National Guard. We had to have the Attorney

General come in and tell them to work together. What you said,

Mr. Chairman, as you started out was they all find every excuse

in the world not to work together, stovepipe the information, not

give access to anybody else.

This guy took a cold war organization and he had an explosion

of technology which he had to get under control. We watched the

money as closely as we can. He did it within the bounds of the

amount of money that was given to him. Sometimes we had to cut

back a little bit. But as a whole, I’ve never seen a better manager.

So the team that Senator Rockefeller talked about is a marvelous

team. I hated to say—I told Vice President Cheney this the other

day—I hated to see him pull Ambassador Negroponte out of Iraq

right at such a crucial time. Well, he assured me the new guy is

going to be just as good.

The point is this job is absolutely the most important job that

you could possibly be put into, because intelligence is the key to the

way we have our resources deployed. We look at the intelligence

briefing from the very start and we say, OK, where are we going

to spend our money? How are we going to address the threat?

So I’m impressed. I highly endorse General Hayden, and I know

that the Senate is going to ratify that endorsement. I appreciate

the opportunity to be before this august body, even though it’s a

step down from the House, what the hell.

[Laughter.]

Chairman ROBERTS. I must admit that when I was a Member of

the other body I did once refer to the Senate as the cave of the

winds.

[Laughter.]

9

Chairman ROBERTS. But Senator Dole and Senator Kassebaum

set me straight real quick.

Representative Murtha, thank you very much. Thank you, too,

Senator Mikulski for being here to introduce this very fine nominee.

General Hayden, you may proceed. I would like to ask that you

begin by introducing the family members that you have with you

here today.

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL V. HAYDEN,

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE-DESIGNATE

General HAYDEN. All right, Senator.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Mr. Chairman, just before that,

I’m glad that the Chairman made that suggestion. But I think that

your testimony now gives you an opportunity to rebut the withering criticism that you’ve had to withstand so far.

[Laughter.]

General HAYDEN. Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity, Senator. Thank you.

Let me introduce the members who are here with me today. First

of all my wife, Janine, who is a counselor by training and frankly

has been a supporter for me and a partner in my work for over 37

years now. At NSA, she personally took on the responsibility of

supporting Agency families. She began the work before the attacks

in 2001, and really accelerated it after September 11th. She formed

the Agency’s Family Action Board, and continues to serve on the

board as an adviser.

I’ve got my brother Harry here, and our daughter Margaret, who

is an officer in the Air Force Reserves. She has two brothers, our

sons, but they couldn’t be with us here today. But I’m honored that

these members of the family could be present.

Chairman ROBERTS. Please proceed with your statement, sir.

General HAYDEN. Well, thank you.

Chairman ROBERTS. We welcome your family.

General HAYDEN. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,

I’ve been before you many times before, but not quite in circumstances like today.

First of all, let me say I’m honored to be introduced by Congressman Murtha. The folks back home in Pittsburgh will be elated that

I’d been introduced by such a distinguished western Pennsylvanian.

I’m also very honored to have received the very kind remarks of

a very good friend and supporter, Senator Barbara Mikulski. She’s

taken both me and the Agency, the National Security Agency,

under her wing and she’s a true supporter of intelligence and the

job it does to protect the Nation.

It’s clearly a privilege for me to be nominated by the President

to be the first Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

Frankly, it’s a little bit daunting. I know a lot of people who will

be depending on us—myself, the Ambassador and the rest of the

team—to do well in tough circumstances.

Senator Rockefeller, my brother Harry thought that this was so

important that on the day of the President’s announcement he took

10

his delivery truck into a truck stop on I–79 in Morgantown. He had

to drop a $10 tip on a cup of coffee to get the waitress to turn off

ESPN in favor of CSPAN. At the end of that, though, after the announcement, she watched it with him, and told him to wish me

good luck.

A day after the announcement, I got an e-mail from a boyhood

friend, a fellow with whom I was inseparable until he moved away

from the neighborhood when we were in the sixth grade. We lived

on the flood plain of the Allegheny River on Pittsburgh’s north side,

a district called the Ward right between Heinz Field and PNC park

today.

My friend wrote in his e-mail, and I’m quoting him now,

‘‘The Ward, the street parties, the picnics, Clark candy bars and Teaberry

gum thrown out the fifth floor windows to kids cheering on the street, and the

damp train trestle on the way to and from school are the things that you are

made of. You will never get too far from them. It’s those things that you’ll be

protecting.’’

No disrespect to the Committee, but I think it’s going to be hard

for you to put more pressure on me than Jimmy Heffley did with

his e- mail to me.

Ambassador Negroponte appeared before you earlier this week,

and he made clear the importance of U.S. intelligence. This Committee already knows full well the challenges being faced by American intelligence, and I won’t try to catalogue them all here.

So we find ourselves as a community in a very interesting

place—never more challenged by the world in which we find ourselves and never more important to the safety of the republic we’re

committed to defend.

We seem to be surrounded by dilemmas. We want more cohesion.

We want a better sense of direction throughout our community. In

fact, the WMD commission said that we were a community in name

only.

We don’t want so much centralization that it leads to group think

or a herd mentality when it comes to analysis. We need to aggressively develop more effective ways to connect the dots, even when

there may not be so many dots and those that exist may be hidden

in the noise. But we should also not base our analysis on past context alone or mere inertia or isolated data points.

We want to strengthen the center of the community, give the

DNI real power—certainly more power than we ever gave the

DCI—but we’re also to preserve the chain of command.

We all know that the enemy may be inside the gates and that

job one is to defend the homeland. But we’re also to ensure the privacy rights of our citizens and closely control any things like data

search tools that we might have. I could go on, but you get the picture. It’s going to be very hard work.

When I testified before the House Intelligence Committee last

August, I said that the American intelligence community had been

governed by the principle of consensus for almost half a century.

It wasn’t actually a bad principle for most of that time. It gave us

buy-in. It balanced competing needs and priorities. It gave us stability.

Now, as an airman, I know the value of stability when you design an aircraft. In many aircraft, stability is an absolute virtue.

11

Now, when I talk about this in larger audiences, I usually ask the

audience what they think the opposite of stability is. Their response is usually very predictable. They say, instability.

In fact, that’s not true. When it comes to designing an aircraft,

the opposite of stability is maneuverability, and maneuverability is

a virtue, just like stability. The IC needs more maneuverability.

But I think we’ve all decided as a Nation it’s hard to make sharp

turns by consensus. Consensus is rarely bold and many times it’s

just wrong.

So last summer when the 9/11 Commission reported, in August,

when the President announced his support for a DNI, and this fall

when you enacted intelligence reform legislation, it was clear to me

that we were dampening the principle of consensus in favor more

clear lines of authority and responsibility when it comes to running

the American intelligence community.

I told the House in August that if we went down this path, three

major principles would have to apply.

First, if we’re going to go ahead and dismantle the DCI and the

informal authority he exercised—because he also headed up CIA—

then we would have to be very sure that we’ve aggressively codified

the authorities we wanted the new Director of National Intelligence

to have.

Second, I told the House Committee, the new DNI would need robust authority over those big, muscular national collection agencies, like NSA and NGA and CIA’s Directorate of Operations. In

terms of collection, you want unity of effort and economies of scale.

Third, I said, this new structure would have to accommodate the

needs of America’s combat forces, needs that daily seem to redefine

standards for relevance and timeliness.

I personally believe that the legislation signed by the President

gives us a solid framework within which to build for each of those

principles. The office of the DNI has real authority to task both the

collection and analysis of intelligence. The DNI has more authority

over the budget than was ever exercised by the DCI. The DNI has

policy, security, information-sharing and personnel tools that never

before existed in one place.

I was careful to describe the legislation as providing a framework. In each of these areas, the powers of the DNI will have to

be built by what I have called case law—the concrete use of his

new authorities early and often and in actual circumstances.

I’ll do my role, should I be confirmed, to support Ambassador

Negroponte in this effort. He brings a wonderful personal history

of service to this task along with years of government and policy

experience.

I believe I was chosen by the President because he thought I

knew the neighborhood. I pledge that I’ll use that knowledge to

support the Ambassador in this effort.

For the first time in the history of our community—and I think

this is the big difference—for the first time, this legislation has

made governing our intelligence community someone’s full-time job.

That’s a fundamental difference. We’re not without tools beyond

the legislation itself. In my 6 years at NSA, I’ve learned just how

talented a workforce we have there, a workforce that represents

the kind of people we have throughout the intelligence community.

12

I’ve often said that the real power of NSA goes down in the elevators tonight.

In fact, when asked recently to summarize in one phrase whatever success we had at the Agency, I responded that I had simply

empowered our people, and our success has come from their empowerment. That can apply across the community.

The Ambassador and I are also blessed with the support of you—

with the support of Congress. During the debate on the intelligence

reform bill, I was personally impressed with the passion with

which so many Members regarded this subject. In preparing for

these hearings, I’ve met with many more Members who showed

deep interest in the specifics of the statute and in its implementation. More than one Member has publicly told us to—I’m quoting

here now—‘‘be in charge.’’ We’ve also been urged to exercise clear,

even charismatic leadership.

Finally, beyond Congress, we have the strong support of the

President. His words on the morning when he announced Ambassador Negroponte’s and my appointments were quite specific: The

DNI will set the budgets. The DNI will have access to the President.

I have no illusions about the weeks and months ahead. We have

to set up an office, build an organization, hire the right kind of people—and I should add, from inside and outside of government—and

begin to make some tough decisions.

We have to exercise the power that you and the President have

given us without creating a new layer of bureaucracy. We have to

be authoritative, and we have to be right. The DNI must ensure

that we have the information dominance to protect America, its

people, its values and its friends.

Now, I know this Committee will remain very interested in our

work. In fact, I know that several reports are due almost imminently from the original legislation.

I look forward to working with the Committee in the days ahead.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

Chairman ROBERTS. General, we thank you for your very fine

statement.

The Committee will now proceed to questions. Each Member will

be recognized by the order of their arrival. Each Member will be

granted 7 minutes and, if necessary, we will have a second round.

General, in terms of cooperation with Committee, do you agree

to appear before the Committee here or in other venues when invited?

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir.

Chairman ROBERTS. Do you agree to send intelligence community

officials to appear before the Committee and designated staff when

invited?

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir.

Chairman ROBERTS. Do you agree to provide documents or any

material requested by the Committee in order for it to carry out its

oversight and its legislative responsibilities?

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir.

13

Chairman ROBERTS. Will you ensure that all intelligence community elements provide such material to the Committee when requested?

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir.

Chairman ROBERTS. In your pre-hearing answers, you indicated

that you would recommend to the DNI that he quicken the pace

of increasing information access. Both the Vice Chairman and I

have talked to that at length, and you as well.

What do you think specifically should be done in this area?

General HAYDEN. Senator, we’ve thought a lot about this at NSA.

You mentioned we would be big a player—NSA would be a big

player in this. You were very kind by not mentioning that from

time to time NSA’s been pretty conservative about the sharing of

information.

Chairman ROBERTS. Well, actually, that’s my No. 3 question, but

you go ahead.

[Laughter.]

General HAYDEN. But we’ve done a lot of thinking about this and

a lot of acting on it in the last 2 to 3 years.

Let me give you a sense as to how I think we ought to think

about it now as a community. Frankly, I don’t think it’s a question

of sources and methods. We know how to do that, in terms of protection. Even in terms of signals intelligence, which has a lot of privacy sensitivities related to it, I actually think we can protect U.S.

person privacy. So I don’t think that’s an unsurmountable obstacle

at all.

We’ve got challenges with just raw IT—just wiring up the system. We can overcome that, as well.

I think the fundamental issue is to move out of a mindset in

which each of our collection agencies wanted to hold on to information until they had perfected it. By the way, that’s a virtue, that’s

not a vice. That’s not a sin. The folks at NSA—I’ll speak of them

because I know them best—would get an intercept and they would

want to squeeze the last ounce of value out of it, because they

knew they were the best in the world at doing that, before they attempted to share it with other parts of the community.

We’ve become very accustomed at sharing information at what

I’ll call the product level. What we’ve done at NSA in the last 2

to 3 years is to change that and to begin to share information not

when we’re done with it, but at the earliest point of consumability

by others.

Now, on one’s ever asked me for the beeps and squeaks, for unprocessed information. No one’s ever asked me for an intercept that

has not yet been decrypted. But what we’re moving to is a point

where, at the point in which that information can be consumed by

another, that other needs to have access, data access, as you described, to that information.

Let me go one step further and define consumability.

I would define consumability as the point in which that information is already of operational value to someone else or someone else

has adequate skills to add their own value to it. That adjective

‘‘adequate’’ is very important, because in most cases, again speaking of SIGINT, their skills at adding value probably won’t match

that of NSA.

14

Our new role at the agency is earliest point of consumability,

consumbability defined as the point at which no more value needs

to be added for that to be useful or the consumer is adequately

competent to add their own value. That’s the kind of approach that

I would urge.

One additional caution, Senator. You just can’t throw open the

doors and make the information created by the collection agencies

look a lot like Home Depot, where people get to roll the cart

through and take what they want, otherwise we’ll wind up looking

like 6-year-olds playing soccer—we’ll all be around the ball.

We can do a lot more in terms of data access, as you and Senator

Rockefeller have already emphasized.

Chairman ROBERTS. On independent cost estimates, General,

Agency cost estimates for procuring major systems such as satellites routinely fall far below the actual cost of procuring those

systems.

To solve this problem, Congress enacted a law requiring that

independent cost estimates be performed for all intelligence community programs costing more than $500 million. It also requires

that the President budget to these independent cost estimates. It’s

our understanding that only 12 of the 16 programs for which independent cost estimates have been completed are funded at required

levels for fiscal year 2006.

Will you commit to full compliance with the requirements of this

provision?

General HAYDEN. I will, Senator, and I will tell you we’ve had

personal experience with this with some major programs at NSA.

There indeed have been deltas between our estimate and what the

ICEs, the independent cost estimates, have come up with.

Chairman ROBERTS. According to the independent cost estimates

that have been completed, the fiscal year 2006 budget request is

substantially underfunded. This means that work that should be

done in fiscal year 2006 will have to be deferred to future years,

which in turn means that program costs will escalate, and the

budgeting shortfall for major acquisitions across the future years

defense plan grows into the multiple billions of dollars.

How would you recommend the DNI close these spending gaps?

What’s your advice to the DNI?

General HAYDEN. Well, as you have already suggested, Senator,

the first thing, even with the 2006 budget that’s already on the

Hill, is take a quick, firm look to see if any adjustments need to

be made in that.

He will have the opportunity to have a firm hand on the 2007

program build and, frankly, although we’re still getting oriented

ourselves in our discussion of the budget, it is the 2007 program

that we view as the one that we can most immediately put the

DNI’s stamp on.

The legislation gives the DNI, again, as I said earlier, authority

that’s never been in one place before. The milestone decision authority, for example, that legislation gives to the DNI, was scattered throughout the community prior to the legislation. That’s a

powerful tool and one that I think we will use.

15

Chairman ROBERTS. I have a question on that later. My time has

expired. I have two questions, so on the second round I will ask

those questions.

I now recognize the Vice Chairman.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Hayden, as I indicated, you start from a very deep basis

of knowledge about the intelligence community. That is one of the

reasons why I think the two of you are going to be very strong.

I have to assume, therefore, that you’ve given yourself—just in

thinking out loud with yourself and some of your colleagues, as

well as, I understand, you’ve have a number of conversations with

Ambassador Negroponte about how the office of the DNI should be

organized.

Now, you will have, I believe, four other deputies. So there’s a

lot of flexibility, as there should be, in the way that this DNI team

can be set up. I’d be interested in, to whatever extent you feel comfortable, getting some of your thoughts about that—a balance of

skills.

General HAYDEN. Again, as you say, this is all very preliminary.

We’ve had broad discussions about it. I’d offer the view that whatever I say to you this morning isn’t even in pencil. To the degree

that it’s down anywhere, it’s in chalk. So it’s a very, very light

hand.

Rather than talk about the specific boxes and the titles, I think

I’d be a little more comfortable talking about the broad functions

I think we need to tend to. You’re right, the law gives us four.

You’re also right, the law gives us great flexibility. It doesn’t identify what those four will be—and that’s a real blessing. So thank

you for that.

I would lay out maybe four or five broad, general areas and then

we’re going to have to figure out exactly how to fit them in the

structure.

One, in terms of operations, I would work it back from something

I’ll call, for our purposes of this morning, customer outcomes. You

want to empower someone to tend to outcomes rather than your

own inputs, rather than just the performance of this community.

What’s the impact of this community on those we are designed to

serve? So I would think we’d have to tend to something, like I said,

that I’ll call customer outcomes.

To create those outcomes, the next step I would describe is analysis. Then collection. I personally kind of wrestled with the

thought, do I want to put analysis and collection together and just

create, maybe, a J–3 as a director of operations?

Frankly, I think the management style—and again, I’m speaking

personally now—the management style you want over collection is

a bit different than the one you want over analysis. Just give me

a sentence or two to explain.

With regard to collection, you want economies of scale, and you

want unity of effort. You want efficiencies. You don’t want that

with analysis. You want competition. You want some things that

a management specialist might actually call redundancy when it

comes to analysis. You want a less firm hand as you allow the community to create alternative views.

16

So, in NSA parlance, we would have called those three functions

I just described to you as: Get it, know it and use it.

Then I would suggest a fourth broad function. It would be build

it. Those are the management functions that you’ve put into the

law. You’ve grouped together, for the DNI, H.R. training, acquisition, programs, budgets. I think that’s another broad area that has

to be tended to.

Then the fifth one I would offer—and again I realize there are

four big boxes to work with—the fifth one I would offer is the one

that is encompassed when the legislation said there should be a

CIO, a chief information officer. My sense is that’s far more than

a senior, a secretary, a desk and a phone, that you want the CIO

to be an empowered player, because so much of what it is you’ve

tasked us to do deals with information. I would broadly picture the

CIO taking care of the wiring, the IT. But beyond that as well.

My sense is I would want him to have a powerful voice in both

security and sharing so that you don’t kind of get the ‘‘He said, she

said’’ dilemma when it comes to how you want to deal with information access.

So those are the broad areas, Senator, I think. We want to make

sure whatever organization chart we finally come up with, all those

things are well handled.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER. You mentioned that competition

can be good—if not in collection, then certainly in analysis.

One of the things that I helped get into the intelligence reform

bill had to do with red-teaming, and that’s contrary views. It was

watered down when it finally arrived and was signed.

I’m interested—and I think that you’ve done this at the NSA—

in how you view the importance of formalizing that contrarian or

sort of opposing analytical views, competition.

General HAYDEN. You’re right. We’ve done some things along

these lines. Even in a collection agency like NSA, we really do empower some contrarians, not just to be contrary, but to raise questions like, well, have you ever looked at it this way, and to kind

of pull your center of gravity of analysis maybe 20 or 30 degrees

off to the side—and now things begin to look a little bit differently.

It’s something that I believe in. I believe the Ambassador believes in that and I think you’ll be pleased with the degree to which

we are creative within that analytic box that the law lays out for

us.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you.

Chairman ROBERTS. Senator Mikulski.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER. She’s not here.

Chairman ROBERTS. I beg your pardon.

Senator DeWine.

Senator DEWINE. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS. I like your style.

Senator DEWINE. Yes, sir.

Chairman ROBERTS. Senator Levin is not here.

Senator Feinstein.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, I believe it’s safe to say that you’re very widely respected and it would be hard for me to see that your confirmation

is going to be anything but unanimous. I hope that enables you to

17

see that you go in with a tremendous vote of confidence by all of

us, which I think is important.

I’d like to ask you this question. Ambassador Negroponte, by virtue of the fact of where he’s been, was necessarily somewhat vague

in the answers to some of the questions. I understand that.

You, on the other hand, have been here, have been in very high

levels for a substantial period of time and have had an opportunity

to see the overview of the intelligence community of this Nation.

What do you believe—and I said, ‘‘what’’ rather than ‘‘who’’—

what do you believe is responsible for the enormous failures of intelligence surrounding Iraq and weapons of mass destruction?

General HAYDEN. Ma’am, that’s a very difficult question and it’s

one that I’ve personally looked into. After the war and after the

evidentiary trail began to play out the way it did, I brought our

folks in, NSA folks.

As you well know, these aren’t the final analysts. They don’t put

it all together. They look at the SIGINT and deal with that—honest people, very hardworking people, incredibly conscientious people, and I think that applies across the board.

I asked them questions: How confident were you on the morning

of 19 March with the Nation going to war? I said, put everything

outside of your mind. Not that he was a bad man. It’s just WMD.

Where were you, in your heart, on a scale of 1 to 10? Without betraying their privacy, I got some pretty high numbers. They had

confidence.

We dug down deeper into that. Again, I’m kind of speaking from

NSA experience but that’s what I’ve had. It’s very clear. It was

clear to them, in fact it was clear to me before the war, that we

had a mountain of evidence about WMD from which the community drew conclusions—but that the mountain was essentially inferential.

Senator FEINSTEIN. I don’t understand what you mean by inferential.

General HAYDEN. No smoking gun. No smoking gun. It was indirect. It was oblique. It was dual-use chemicals. It was dual-use

equipment. It was suspicious equipment bought in a very suspicious way.

How does a SIGINT analyst decide whether that’s done to bust

sanctions, to keep it secret from the rest of the Iraqi government,

or to acquire precursor chemicals for weapons of mass destruction.

I think what happened, in each of our disciplines, people became

expert in the information that their discipline provided and yet we

didn’t have a view into the trail of evidence in the other disciplines.

I’ll speak personally. I’m at the NFIB. I’m at the National Foreign Intelligence Board. I raise my hand. I vote on the NIE. We

had discussions, and you well know from the Committee’s investigations, the discussions were spirited.

Frankly, I went in there carrying a brief, carrying a portfolio for

the signals intelligence. There was nothing in that NIE that signals

intelligence contradicted. Signals intelligence ranged from ambiguous to confirmatory of the conclusions in the National Intelligence

Estimate.

Now, if you take my attitude and my view of that and you spread

it around the room with every piece of the community looking at

18

their piece, you begin to get a sense of some segmentation, some

fragmentation and the difficulty of getting a holistic view.

We’ve taken some big strides to fix that. Before I go to a meeting

now of the National Foreign Intelligence Board, I have to sit and

read pages of, for example, CIA/DO information on their evaluation

of their sources that contributed to each of the conclusions of the

Estimate.

So I would put the fault at we had a process that wasn’t good

enough. We had a process that didn’t allow the right wholeness of

view, a holistic view. We ended up where we were.

Senator FEINSTEIN. I still have a minute or so. Thank you.

The DNI has been given milestone decision authority over all

programs in the NIP, to be jointly exercised with the Secretary of

Defense for programs in DOD. As someone with a long experience

with major program acquisition and as, in effect, the chief operating officer of the intelligence community, how will you work with

the Director to gain control over cost and time overruns?

General HAYDEN. As I alluded to in an earlier question, I actually think this is one of the kind of the hidden powers in the law.

It’s just a small section.

Believe me, the Senate, in its wisdom, took the milestone decision authority of NSA away from us about 2 years ago. It’s a difference. It makes a big difference. They put it in the Department

of Defense and we’ve worked with Secretary Wynne in terms of our

MDA.

We worked very productively with him, I might add, by the way.

But the absence of that authority on the desktop of the Director of

NSA, that gets noticed very quickly.

It’s something I would strongly recommend to the DNI that he—

we—hire the professional staff competent to fully make use of that

authority. I think that that’s going to be one of the key powers that

the DNI—the office of the DNI—has.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome to you, General, and congratulations on this appointment.

Many of us have been frustrated by the lack of responsiveness

on the part of some parts of the intelligence community and some

other Federal agencies to Congress when there are requests for

documents and requests for declassification.

There have been recent problems getting documents on subjects

ranging from intelligence assessments on Iraq to detainee abuse. In

one instance, the Armed Services Committee waited more than a

year to get answers for the record from the former DCI. In other

instances, the CIA promised to provide documents and then failed

to do so for up to a year. It’s simply unacceptable.

I brought these facts to the attention of the current DCI, Porter

Goss. He said he would look into it and he’d make sure that materials would be provided promptly, and he did what he promised.

In his letter to me of April 6th, this is what he wrote: ‘‘There is

no excuse for such delays. I have conveyed to my staff that this is

19

not how the agency will treat requests.’’ I commend him for that

letter and for his prompt response.

It’s a standard that I hope the entire intelligence community will

adhere to. I want to know whether or not, if you are confirmed,

whether you will commit to ensuring, to the best of your ability,

timely and responsive information to the Members of this Committee, and will you make every effort to respond to requests for

existing documents within weeks not months?

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. I fully support that. I actually think

NSA’s got a decent track record in trying to turn those kind of requests for information around.

I know there are legal procedures that have to be respected and

who on the Committee is briefed and so on, but outside of that, I

don’t see what the excuse would be for delaying the responses.

Senator LEVIN. General, I thank you for that.

A year and a half ago, the Defense Authorization Act removed

final milestone decision activity from major acquisition programs

from the Director of NSA, which is your current position, and vested that authority in the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology and Logistics. Now, in your new position, they give you

something of a different perspective on that shift.

Can you tell us how has that worked out?

General HAYDEN. Frankly, we were surprised when the Congress

made the decision. Acting like most large organizations do when a

piece of power is pulled away from them, we objected and marshalled arguments as to why we opposed that. Frankly, I think we

had some good arguments at the time.

It adds a burden of paperwork. I will tell you that, without argument, you’re staking up a lot of documents and a lot of three-ring

binders in order to get a decision. But that costs in flexibility.

That said, Secretary Wynne, who exercised MDA over us, could

not have been more wonderful in how he did it. He did it in a very,

very cooperative spirit. Frankly, we’ve learned, as an agency, from

some of the things that he’s pointed out to us.

I would like that experience to be the model for what the Office

of the DNI now must do with milestone decision authority for the

community, so that that MDA power isn’t a burden to each of the

agencies, that in fact it is an enabler.

That’s going to require talent. We’re going to have to have some

very good people on our staff.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

General, this morning’s New York Times had an article which

troubled me, about the number of times in which communications

that had been intercepted by the NSA were released to John

Bolton. I was troubled by the number of times that this happened,

frankly. But since you’re here and you’re in a position to give us

some facts on this subject, I want to ask you a number of questions

about it.

I gather that, according to the article, access to names may be

authorized by NSA only in response to special requests, and these

are not common, particularly from policymakers. That’s the quote

in there. Is that an accurate statement?

20

General HAYDEN. I think that’s a very accurate description. In

fact, I read Doug Jehl’s article. I think Doug laid it out in a very

clear way.

The way it works, Senator, is that we are required to determine

what is minimized U.S. person identity. Now, there is a whole body

of law with regard to protecting U.S. privacy. But in an agency like

ourselves, it is not uncommon for us to come across information to,

from or about what we would call a protected person—a U.S. person. Then the rules kick in as to what you can do with that information.

The rule of thumb in almost all cases is that you minimize it,

and you simply refer to ‘‘named U.S. person’’ or ‘‘named U.S. official’’ in the report that goes out.

Senator LEVIN. How often did Mr. Bolton request the names?

General HAYDEN. I don’t know.

Senator LEVIN. Do you have a record of that?

General HAYDEN. We would have a record of it. Interestingly

enough, I double-checked this this morning after reading the article

just to make sure I had this right. Because I do approve, from time

to time, the release of U.S. person identity. It’s not very often. I

have to do it when the identity is released to a U.S. law enforcement agency. If it’s just done for foreign intelligence purposes, it’s

about three layers below me in the NSA org chart.

Senator LEVIN. Was there an unusual number of accesses requested by Mr. Bolton compared to requests from other senior officials?

General HAYDEN. I don’t know that, Senator, I really don’t. The

requests from Secretary Bolton were not of such a number that

they came to my attention.

Senator LEVIN. In other words, he obviously made requests. You

say that someone other than you would have approved those.

General HAYDEN. On a normal basis; that’s right.

Senator LEVIN. But you do have records as to how often?

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir, we would.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

General HAYDEN. I should add that’s a formal process. That’s

just not a phone call.

Senator LEVIN. OK, thank you.

General HAYDEN. It’s documented.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS. Senator Levin, I wanted to let you know

that in answer to the No. 3 question that I asked and the general

replied in terms of cooperating with the Committee—do you agree

to provide documents or any material requested by the Committee

in order for it to carry out its oversight and its legislative responsibilities—we didn’t put a timeframe on it, but you have. His answer was an emphatic yes.

Senator LEVIN. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman ROBERTS. Senator Wyden.

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, welcome.

General HAYDEN. Thank you.

Senator WYDEN. General, on your watch, the National Security

Agency implemented a program called Trailblazer to modernize its

21

information technology infrastructure. My understanding is that

there were serious cost overruns with this program and that there

were significant slippages in terms of the program.

I’d like you to tell me when you became aware this was a problem and what changes you put in place to root out the inefficiencies. I also think that that may be one of the reasons for the transfer of authority that colleagues have been talking about.

So if you would, take us through what happened here, when you

found out about it, and what you did to turn the situation around.

General HAYDEN. Sure, Senator.

If you look at the things we do at the agency, Trailblazer is essentially about how we manage the vast volumes of data that our

collection systems can bring to our attention. We’ve had pretty good

success with the front-end in terms of collection. I’m going to just

leave it at that in open session.

The more success you have with regard to collection, the more

you’re swimming in an ocean of data. So what Trailblazer was essentially designed to do was to help us deal with masses of information and to turn it into usable things for American decisionmakers.

There is no other element out there in American society that is

dealing with volumes of data in this dimension. I had several leaders of industry in and described our situation to these leaders, very

well-known folks in the American IT and computing industry. I

kind of, after describing our needs, kind of got a whistle from them,

saying, whoa, that’s bigger than anything we do. So it was quite

a challenge.

We made the strategic decision, and, frankly, with the support

of both the SSCI and the HPSCI—and I think correctly—made the

strategic decision that we had to get out of the mode of building

these things ourselves. We were America’s information age organization during America’s industrial age. We’re no longer in America’s industrial age. We could go outside and engage industry in

doing this.

A personal view, now—looking back—we overachieved. We defined our relationship with industry as simply the definition of our

requirements and then expect industry to come back and deliver

something. We learned within Trailblazer that when we asked industry for something they had or something close to what they already had, they were remarkable in providing us a response, an

outcome. When we asked them for something that no one had yet

invented, they weren’t any better at inventing it than we were

doing it ourselves.

Let me give you a summary statement that I actually gave our

senior leadership yesterday. In fact, we had a conference and I

wanted to say a few things before the hearing today. I focused on

Trailblazer and related things.

I would say it’s about 60–40, that 60 percent of the difficulty in

the program was just the raw difficulty of the challenge.

Senator WYDEN. How big were the costs overrun?

General HAYDEN. I’ll take that for the record and give you exact

numbers as to how the costs——

Senator WYDEN. Give me a general sense.

22

General HAYDEN. The costs were greater than anticipated, to the

tune of, I would say, in the hundreds of millions.

Senator WYDEN. Pardon me, General. I only want you to go into

matters that can be discussed in open session.

General HAYDEN. Right, I understand.

The slippages were actually more dramatic than the costs. As we

slipped, the costs were pushed to the right. But I would say we underestimated the costs by, I would say, a couple to several hundred

million in terms of the costs. Again, it was what we actually encountered doing this. It was just far more difficult than anyone anticipated.

Senator WYDEN. So the learning experience says that when you

work with the private sector, you’ve got to change your relationship.

General HAYDEN. To a far more cooperative one, that there’s a

middle ground between doing it ourselves and just exporting the

problem.

The other thing I’d add that we learned, Senator, is that we don’t

profit by trying to do moon shots, by trying to take the great leap

forward, that we can do a lot better with incremental improvement,

spiral development. That’s where we are now with the program.

Senator WYDEN. Let me ask you about one other area, if I might,

General. I feel very strongly that it is possible to fight terrorism

ferociously without gutting the privacy and civil rights of our citizens. What would you do as a Principal Deputy at the DNI to protect the privacy rights of all Americans?

General HAYDEN. I would ensure that our collection is—all of our

activities—is absolutely in compliance with all U.S. law and the

Constitution.

I would also suggest, Senator, that you should expect of me that

I’m right up to that line, that we’re not pulling punches, that we’re

using all of the authorities that Congress has given to us in the

law.

Senator WYDEN. What measures did you take as the Director at

NSA to address privacy issues? This is as much to get a bit of your

history in terms of dealing with the issue as looking forward.

General HAYDEN. We are, I would offer, the most aggressive

agency in the intelligence community when it comes to protecting

U.S. privacy. Part of that is virtue, but part of that’s the nature

of our work. We just have to be that way.

I would suggest to you, Senator, that culturally, culturally, it’s

more difficult to get NSA-ers to go up to the full force of their authorities than it is to prevent them from going over the line.

Senator WYDEN. Let me see if I can ask one other one. Like Senator Rockefeller, I have a great interest in technology. I’m concerned that we have lagged behind technologically. What would you

do in this position to get the intelligence community out front in

terms of technology rather than lagging behind?

General HAYDEN. A couple of things seem obvious. Rationalizing,

organizing, making communal the various technology efforts that

are now being undertaken in each of the different intelligence

agencies, because of, not in spite of, but because of NSA’s experience with the private sector, aggressively engage the private sector

in the solution of these problems.

23

Senator WYDEN. I intend to support you, General. I look forward

to working with you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS. Thank you, Senator.

With the acknowledgement of Senator Snowe, who is next, Senator Hatch has requested that he make a brief statement, in that

he has a conflict. So I will, with the permission of Senator Snowe,

recognize Senator Hatch.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN G. HATCH

Senator HATCH. I will only take a minute. I just want to personally express my gratitude for your service in the past and for your

willingness to take on this daunting job and for your ability to be

able to inspire and bring other people together to do the work that

really has to be done and for the softness that you have but the

toughness that you have as well.

Anybody who has graduated with a bachelor’s and a master’s degree from Duquesne University, I’m for. I just want you to know

that. I used to play against some of their all-Americans. They were

always tough. A lot of my colleagues and partners were law graduates from Duquesne University.

I just wanted to say how much I admire you. I’m grateful for this

service. I’m not going to ask any questions.

I appreciate my dear colleague from Maine allowing me to just

make these comments, so I can go on to another meeting.

General HAYDEN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HATCH. Thank you, sir.

Chairman ROBERTS. Senator Snowe.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I too want to welcome you before the Committee, General Hayden—most importantly that we will have the benefit and the good

fortune of your talent and experience to this position as Deputy Director of the National Intelligence Agency. We really appreciate the

fact that you will be there.

Let me just ask you several questions that I think are certainly

going to be important to your mission and to that of Ambassador

Negroponte’s.

One obviously that has been identified in the aftermath of 9/11

with the 9/11 Commission and, of course, our report and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission report, as well, the failure to

share information, rightly known as information access at this

point, which are one of the things that we regrettably and tragically learned in the aftermath of 9/11. They weren’t connecting the

dots, not sharing the information.

A lesson wasn’t learned at that point. We then discovered in the

prewar assessments that there was a failure to share information

that led to very different and profoundly different assessments.

That was certainly true in the biological weapons program. Had

all the analysts known about the credibility of Curveball, for example, or the information regarding the UAVs, and the failure to

share this information, not only within an agency, but across the

intelligence community agency.

24

This is a fundamental failure that obviously is going to need to

be addressed. I would just wonder about your thoughts and perspective in terms of how you think the community has to be restructured so this failure never repeats itself again.

General HAYDEN. Yes, Senator. I actually think in many ways

we’re fairly well down the road. I think what the Ambassador and

I would need to do is to kind of reinforce whatever successes we’ve

had, to continue along the trajectory that we’re already on.

In terms of sources, for example, I mentioned earlier, to respond

to a question, when we come to look at an NIE, a National Intelligence Estimate, I’ve got far more visibility into everyone else’s

sources and their evaluation of those sources than I ever had a

year or two back.

There are some cultural things. We’ll have to deal with that—

some reluctances—not bad people, maybe just old habits.

There are some sources and methods things, but I’ve already suggested we can work through that. There are some IT things. That’s

nontrivial. It’s going to take some time.

I think, as you know, we’re pretty well wired north-south inside

of our organizations. There’s not much plumbing left and right,

east-west. We’re going to have to take care of that. That’s actually

an aspect of an office of the DNI, who’s charged with looking across

the community, would naturally look at.

I don’t naturally look at that as head of NSA. So there’s an advantage in the legislation and in the structure.

Finally—and this is more of an existential problem than it is a

cultural or an IT problem—the existential problem is this. How do

you give enough people enough access to the information without

not creating a symphony but creating a cacophony?

Again, I’ll speak from an NSA experience. People want access to

and the usual catch phrase for us is ‘‘raw traffic’’—and they’ll

pound the table about that with me until we open up the access

to raw traffic and they discover it’s all in Arabic. At that point,

you’re not in a cultural question; you’re in an existential question.

What is the ability of that consumer to consume information that

raw?

That’s where we are now. I really think so. I need to be careful.

That’s where we are intellectually. Intellectually, all those other

impediments I described for you, they’re in our rear view mirror.

There’s practically a lot of work to be done.

Intellectually, now, we’re at the question, how do you make that

much information available to people who aren’t as well schooled—

in this case, knowing Arabic—as the people who have traditionally

looked at it? That’s the hard part right now. That’s where we are.

Senator SNOWE. You think that, organizationally and procedurally, you’re in a much better position to be able to make these

cross-agency changes?

General HAYDEN. I would say that the trend line, even without

the DNI, is positive, although no one would be enthused about the

speed or the pace. With the DNI and with that both structural view

across the community and then some of the powers that you put

into the law, I would expect us to be able to accelerate.

Senator SNOWE. Turf battles, another area that has been identified, even most recently by the Weapons of Mass Destruction ComVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:46 May 24, 2006 Jkt 024985 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\INTELL\24985.TXT CarolB PsN: CarolB
25

mission’s report, the Silberman-Robb report, that underscored,

again, that the counterterrorism threats and analyses have to be

thoroughly integrated if we’re going to counter any terrorism

threat.

On the other hand, we’re seeing numerous redundancies and duplication among the agencies. As you know, we’ve created a National Counterterrorism Center to replace the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.

I was thinking about it the other day. The President first indicated it was a major goal in the State of the Union address and

that was in January, 2003. They wanted to create the Terrorist

Threat Integration Center.

It seems like—it’s been 2 years since the President issued that

mandate—that we still have considerable problems with the redundancy and duplication, and the resistance to, again, to working together across agency lines, between the National Counterterrorism

Center and the DCI Counterterrorism Office.

So I was wondering, what do you think needs to be done to clarify and define the missions of these respective offices so that we

can avoid this duplication as well?

I mean, the President of the United States can issue a mandate

and issue a directive, and 2 years later we’re still fighting the same

old turf battles. How do you think that we need to define these authorities to make sure that this doesn’t continue?

General HAYDEN. Yes, ma’am. First of all, I take the point about

the NCTC and what’s been done there, and I think you know John

Brennan has been very aggressive in establishing the center, not

without, as you suggest, some issues.

Senator SNOWE. Well, in fact, he had most recently asked—he

had some detailees assigned to the center, and not without difficulty.

General HAYDEN. Right. But John, I think, has the right sight

picture as you’ve described. I know of the President giving the

overall direction, as he should.

What perhaps may be lacking is a specificity. The President saying, ‘‘Eliminate duplication.’’ I’m sorry to even footnote my own

speech here. One needs to be careful. One wants to build a little

duplication into some areas, like analysis, so you’re not just going

to one source and so you have competition. But overall, you’re

right. We need to rationalize what the entire community is doing.

The Department of Defense has something called the Unified

Command Plan. They look at it about every 2 years. It’s signed by

the President. There’s no doubt in anyone’s mind that the U.S.-European Command has these responsibilities or that U.S. Transportation Command has these responsibilities.

We have no similar document within the intelligence community.

It’s an idea that we have discussed very informally, very briefly in

the last 2 weeks since the Ambassador’s been back.

Something like that, an approach like that, where someone who

has authority for the entire community actually says, you’re going

to do this and you’re going to do that. We’ve not done it that clearly

before. If we’re going to get the increased efficiencies you’re suggesting we need, something like that’s going to have to be done.

26

Now with the DNI—the DCI could have done that. But keep in

mind, the DCI’s sole job was not running the community. Let me

suggest to you that even if he had made a decision that was infinitely wise, the fact that he was also the head of CIA would have

presented that decision in a different light to the entire community.

The DNI doesn’t carry that burden.

Senator SNOWE. Thank you very much, General Hayden, again,

and thank you for your willingness to step forward. I think you and

Ambassador Negroponte are going to make a great team in leading

this new position and agency. Thank you.

General HAYDEN. Thank you, ma’am.

Chairman ROBERTS. Senator Chambliss.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I

am pleased that the President has seen fit to follow the recommendation by a sense of the Senate that we adopted last year

during our intelligence reform bill that one of the two top positions

in the new agency be a military officer.

I also would commend the President on his choice of General

Mike Hayden to be the Deputy to the DNI. I think, without question, General Hayden brings exactly the type of operational background and experience to the job, the right kind of leadership.

As I told him the other day when he visited with me, in my position on the House Intelligence Committee, following September 11,

General Hayden contacted me relative to the improvement of the

capabilities of his office and his agency, without having to contact

him. That showed the right kind of leadership that we need in this

very critical time in the history of our country.

So I’m excited by General Hayden’s nomination to this position.

I look forward to supporting him.

General HAYDEN. Thank you, sir.

Senator CHAMBLISS. General, as you know, Senator Ben Nelson

and I have introduced legislation to create a four-star combatant

commander which will be titled INTCOM. This legislation brings

together, for the first time, the DNI and military intelligence components from the four services, as designated by the Secretary of

Defense.

The three national agencies in DOD, the NSA, NGA and NRO,

remain directly under the Secretary of Defense, but authorizes the

Secretary to direct communications between his office and these

agencies to be transmitted through the INTCOM commander.

Also, there is no prohibition for the DNI to coordinate directly

with the national agencies as required.

Do you see a benefit in creating a unified intelligence command

to harmonize the intelligence activities being conducted by the

Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and DIA? If so, can you

please share with this Committee some of the major benefits that

you see from that?

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. I have talked to some members of

your staff on several occasions and I’ve read the draft legislation.

Let me caveat my remarks by saying we’re still kind of shaking

out what the DNI structure is going to look like, so it’s really difficult to now put this new structure into our sight and see how it

27

might relate. So anything I would say right now would be, of necessity, preliminary.

I’d offer a couple of views. One is, everyone talks about the

American intelligence community being comprised of 15 different

agencies. In fact, in my testimony to the House last August, I said

I wish people would stop saying that. It sounds like we have too

many men on the field and we should be permanently penalized or

something.

Different aspects of that community need to have different relationships to the leadership of that community. I would offer, for example, that the intelligence activities of the military departments—

Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines—should be very focused on the

Department of Defense and the needs of DOD and the DOD leadership.

At the other end of the spectrum, you’ve got what I described in

my remarks as those big, muscular collection agencies—NSA, NGA,

NRO, for example. Although they’re in the Department of Defense,

they’re the fighting force for the DNI, and his relationship to them

has to be direct in terms of what it is he can do with them, be it

budget or operations or anything in between.

My personal sense—and you and I have talked about this briefly—is that to the degree that Defense can package up the tactical

intelligence activities of the military departments and present

them in a unified, integrated, coherent way to the DNI, that would

be a real virtue and something that would be very welcome.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Well, thank you, General. We look forward

to continuing to dialog with you on that. I look forward to your confirmation and your leadership in putting this new agency together

in the way that it needs to be coordinated.

General HAYDEN. Thank you, sir.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you.

Chairman ROBERTS. Senator Rockefeller.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Hayden, during the evolution of the reform bill last year,

I proposed the creation of an intelligence community-wide ombudsman for politicization, similar to the current position at CIA. The

final legislation was watered down, in fact, so it sort of said that

it directed the DNI to assign an individual responsibility of performing the function, but it didn’t necessarily say that that would

be full-time. He might be doing five or six—or she doing five or

six—other things.

I felt very strongly about this after the Committee’s Iraq review.

I feel even more strongly about this, as Carl Levin hinted, with respect to certain nomination hearings that are going on at the

present time.

Do you think it makes sense to establish an ombudsman within

the Office of the DNI to counsel analysts and initiate inquiries into

real or perceived problems of analytical tradecraft or politicization,

biased reporting, or lack of objectivity in the intelligence analysis,

No. 1?

No. 2, how would you react if a senior policymaker—this always

gets into this question of the creation of intelligence and then the

use of intelligence—if a senior policymaker sought to take retribution? Now that could be in a variety of forms. It could be a visit,

28

which didn’t imply retribution. It could be a follow-up visit if that

analyst or particular employee had not analyzed or produced in the

way which was consistent with the policymaker’s point of view.

Again, I ask these questions because we’re looking at the next

30, 40 years. I think this war on terror is going to go on a very

long time, and the processes and the cachement areas that we put

in place now will be effective for a long time.

So if a senior policymaker sought retribution or to directly influence against an intelligence analyst whose assessment didn’t, obviously, agree with that policymaker’s point of view, how would you

handle that?

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. I know Ambassador Negroponte was

very clear. I think the phrase he used on Tuesday was to call them

as he saw them. I think you’ve already gotten, the Committee’s gotten, a personal commitment from the Ambassador that certainly, I

think the term is telling truth to power—the emphasis on truth,

and he would do that.

I have that experience in my dialog with him.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Truth to power referred more to

leveling with the President. This is, I think at a somewhat lower

level, yes.

General HAYDEN. The law does provide for an ombudsman. We

have included that in our organizational discussions. It is something that we’re aware of, we intend to do, we intend to put into

the analytical effort. It’s one of the three or four pieces that we’ve

kind of cobbled that must be part of analysis. So we would do that.

You have a personal commitment from the Ambassador. You’re

getting one from me right now. I know what my responsibility is.

It is that I know what the truth is, that I speak the truth, and

that, at an absolute minimum, anyone in the decisionmaking role—

be it a military commander or a policymaker—knows what my understanding of the truth is.

I experienced this. You made a reference in your question to

what would I do. I don’t have to make that up. I have experienced

that.

The J–2 for U.S. forces in Europe—if you recall, in the early 90s,

we had an operation called Deny Flight, where we were trying to

keep all the aircraft in Bosnia on the ground, essentially to prevent

the Serbs from flying, since they were the only ones who had an

air force.

Intelligence would look at all the sources of information for a

day, and the U.S. military forces would have AWACS and fighters

and fighter caps flying and so on. On an occasional day, we would

have a body of evidence that said, you know, we’ve got a little

SIGINT here, a little imagery here, a ground observer there. Those

dots out there suggest they could be connected in a way that somebody may have scooted one of those Maya trainers at Banj Aluka

and conducted a strafing run over at Bihach.

I quickly learned, when we began to brief that, the phenomenon

that I later identified as the phenomenon of the unpleasant fact.

When you brief, the unpleasant fact seems to have a higher standard of proof than the pleasant fact. This is entirely within a military chain of command. We kept reporting the truth as we knew

it to be, not without some stress.

29

I can recall one of my brightest junior officers who finally said

he had finally discovered what Deny Flight meant: The Serbs fly,

and we deny it. So this happens a lot. It’s part of the burden of

being an analyst.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER. It’s part of the burden of being an

analyst, but, if not unlawful, it comes perilously close to—a policymaker to walk across that Grand Canyon slender bridge, enter the

world of intelligence making to insert himself or herself into a process.

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. Right, but even the WMD Commission, who’s come back with a lot of recommendations about the intelligence community, things we could do better, talks about the

need for this dialog between those who make policy and those who

create intelligence. Although it may be susceptible to abuse, the

only way to get from here to there is to have that dialogue.

I think the responsibility of an intelligence senior, in my case the

J–2 at U.S. European Command, now as the Principal Deputy DNI,

is when that dialog gets out of bounds, if it ever were to get out

of bounds, you need to throw your body across the rails, you need

to stop that.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER. That’s good.

So you would then have, at least as of this point, the concept of

a full-time person working on that problem?

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. We have talked about the function. I

don’t want to over-promise, Senator. We have talked about the

function, the importance of that function. We understand that. I

don’t know that we’ve made any final decision.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER. OK. I’ll be watching.

Thank you very much.

Chairman ROBERTS. I was going to ask a question about the

milestone decision authority. I think that’s been covered.

One of the things that I noted in your comments, you noted the

passion by which the intelligence reform bill was considered, and

it was because, obviously, people have very strong opinions when

it comes to national security and the sense of obligation and responsibility within their own committees. You do get passionate debate.

One of the things that we kept hearing—or that I kept hearing—

was that basically it was pointed out to us—you don’t have to point

it out to the Vice Chairman and myself—that in the intelligence

community, 80 percent of the funds are used for the military and

that obviously nobody in the Congress would ever want to hinder

in any way the lash-up that we need and want and hopefully are

improving, and I think we are, between our intelligence community

and the warfighter, and that that certainly was not an issue.

The comments kept coming to me when I was talking to various

folks in the other body that while we are very much aware that the

military is the majority user of intelligence, that the principal user

of intelligence is the President of the United States and the National Security Council and, as a matter of fact, the Congress of the

United States. I wondered if you would accept that as a fait

accompli statement.

In conjunction with that, obviously, that either the President,

National Security Council or Members of Congress would do nothVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:46 May 24, 2006 Jkt 024985 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\INTELL\24985.TXT CarolB PsN: CarolB
30

ing but support in regard to intelligence to the warfighter, but that

there is a difference between the majority user and the principal

user of intelligence.

Would you care to comment?

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir, Senator.

Unless we have serious missteps—and I mean really serious

missteps—I see nothing in the legislation—and I mean missteps in

implementation—I see nothing in the legislation that condemns us

to reducing our ability or willingness to support American combat

forces.

I can’t go into detail in open session. I know this is a fairly impassioned issue. But I would lay the record of the National Security

Agency out for anyone who would care to look at it and to see what

it is we’ve done in the past 3 years for intimate, immediate, direct

support for American combat forces.

If the office of the DNI can raise the water level of the entire

American intelligence community, it just simply improves the ability of that community to provide the specific support that our forces

need.

Chairman ROBERTS. One other question in reference to the press

article that was referred to by Senator Levin. Tell me if you agree

with the following comments—that it is not unusual to request this

type of information, that it has happened before, not only this administration, but in previous administrations; such requests are

not in and of themselves inappropriate; and there are, most importantly, Attorney General-approved processes in place to deal with

such requests.

Is that true? Is that correct?

General HAYDEN. All true. Let me add one additional thought,

Senator. Again, I think Senator Wyden talked about authorities

and privacy.

On balance, we’re springloaded to minimize the U.S. person information in the report. We are allowed, for example, to actually

put it in the original report if it is our judgment that that information is essential to understanding the intelligence value of that report. I think that’s an exact quote from the intelligence directive.

On balance we’re very cautious, we’re very conservative about

that. On balance we’re probably under-shooting in terms of putting

the U.S. identity in at the beginning. That then prompts the request for the U.S. identity.

It is routine, Senator.

Chairman ROBERTS. Well, I’m a little late in doing this, but I

have here before me—and I apologize to Senator Levin for reading

this without him being here, but I’ll share it with him as soon as

possible:

‘‘The procedure for requesting a U.S. person identity when NSA publishes a

SIGINT product that references a U.S. person references a generic one, i.e.,

‘U.S. person.’ A person who receives an NSA product and who requires the specific identity for the performance of his official responsibilities may ask for the

specific identity.

An office in the Signals Intelligence Organization at NSA is responsible for

tracking and responding to such requests. If that office determines that the person making the request needs the information for the performance of his official

responsibilities and if the information is necessary to understand the foreign intelligence or assess its importance, he will authorize the release of the informaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:46 May 24, 2006 Jkt 024985 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\INTELL\24985.TXT CarolB PsN: CarolB
31

tion. The specific identities will be made available only to those individuals submitting specific requests for these identities.’’

Am I correct?

General HAYDEN. All true.

Chairman ROBERTS. That’s it. OK.

Thank you very much for coming. Thank you for the job you have

done. And thank you for the job that you will do.

General HAYDEN. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman ROBERTS. The Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

(33)

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

Æ