Filed 8/3/23 In re Paige CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying 

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8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re DERICK PAIGE, on 

Habeas Corpus

B325982

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. GA112033

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS on petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. Rupa S. Goswami, Judge. Petition granted. 

Erika Anzoategui, Cynthia M. Janis and Patricia 

Fullinwider, Alternate Public Defenders, for Petitioner.

Collins + Collins, Tomas A. Guterres and Chandler A. 

Parker for Respondent.

George Gascon, District Attorney of Los Angeles County, 

and Elizabeth Marks, Deputy District Attorney, for Real Party in 

Interest.
2

INTRODUCTION

In January 2023, Derick Paige filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in this court challenging the trial court’s order

rescinding his bail. A different panel of this court summarily 

denied the petition a few days later. Paige then filed a petition for

review in the California Supreme Court. In April 2023, the 

Supreme Court granted Paige’s petition for review and

transferred the case to this court with directions to vacate the 

summary denial order and issue an order to show cause. We have

since complied with the Supreme Court’s directions and received 

further briefing on the issues presented in Paige’s petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. 

In his petition, Paige contends the trial court abused its 

discretion by rescinding his bail because it did not comply with 

the requirements set forth in In re Humphrey (2021) 11 Cal.5th 

135 (Humphrey) when rendering its decision. We agree. We 

therefore grant the petition, vacate the order rescinding Paige’s 

bail, and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to 

hold a new hearing where it shall consider, and make findings on,

Paige’s bail consistent with Humphrey and its progeny, as well as 

this court’s opinion. We decline Paige’s requests for other relief, 

including his request to be released from custody, and express no 

opinion on his entitlement to bail or any other relief. 

BACKGROUND

On May 11, 2022, the Los Angeles County District Attorney 

filed a felony complaint charging Paige with a single count of
3

attempted murder. (Pen. Code,1 § 664/187 subd. (a).) The 

complaint further alleged that, in committing the alleged offense, 

Paige personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and 

personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim 

(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).

At the arraignment on May 23, 2022, Paige pled not guilty 

to the charge. Bail was set at $1.2 million.

On August 15, 2022, Paige moved for a formal bail review 

hearing under Humphrey. Although unsupported by evidence, 

Paige’s motion is the sole document in the record describing the 

facts underlying the charge against him. The motion asserts

Paige and the victim have been friends since childhood. In the 

late evening of May 3 or early morning of May 4, 2022, Paige shot 

the victim “in the left side of her torso” with a Tec-9 firearm while 

they were at a “‘dope house’ or ‘hoarder house’ where transient 

individuals would [go] to drink alcohol and get high.” At the time, 

Paige was drunk, and the victim was smoking crack cocaine. A 

witness told law enforcement “there were no fights, arguments, 

or any type of confrontation[ ]” leading up to the incident.

By way of his motion, Paige asserted he cannot afford the 

set bail amount of $1.2 million. He also noted he was 45 years 

old, and that although he had several convictions for several 

“victimless offenses” related to his “long-standing drug 

problem[,]”2 he had no history of bench warrants, as well as “no 

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Penal Code. 

2 Paige sustained the following prior convictions: possession 

of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5) in 1999 

and 2006; possession of an open container containing marijuana 

while driving a motor vehicle (Veh. Code, § 23222, subd. (b)) in 
4

serious or violent history.” He further expressed “willingness . . . 

to be placed on electronic monitoring awaiting trial in this case,” 

and “welcome[d] any stay-away, no contact orders imposed by 

th[e] court as a condition of his release and is prepared to relocate 

to the Palmdale area, far from [the victim]’s residence[.]” Paige 

asked to be released on his own recognizance, or with bail not to 

exceed $200,000, along with imposition of any necessary 

nonfinancial conditions of release.

On August 16, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on 

Paige’s motion. There, Paige’s counsel acknowledged Paige was 

charged with “a serious offense[,]” but emphasized he “has no 

history of prior serious offenses.” In addition, Paige’s counsel

pointed out the house where the incident took place had been 

“taken over by the county,” and “nobody . . . still lives at that 

house[.]” Counsel also highlighted Page’s willingness to comply 

with any stay away orders, submit to electronic monitoring, 

reside with his nephew in Los Angeles, and participate in a 

residential drug treatment program while awaiting trial.

In response to the arguments by Paige’s counsel, the People 

did not present any evidence. Instead, the Deputy District 

Attorney stated: “[The] People’s opposition to reduction of bail or 

[Paige’s release on his own recognizance] is based solely on the 

high risk [to] public safety. This is a case where it is alleged that 

the defendant and several other individuals were in a home 

allegedly consuming narcotics when the defendant, unprovoked, 

2004; driving with 0.08 percent blood alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, 

subd. (b)) in 2005; and driving under the influence of an alcoholic 

beverage or a drug or under the combined influence of an 

alcoholic beverage and a drug (Veh. Code, § 21352, subd. (a)) in 

2019.
5

pulled out a Tec-9 style 9 millimeter handgun. [¶] The victim and 

another witness stated that they were in fear and just, 

potentially, tried to leave. And at that point, unprovoked, the 

defendant shot the victim in the stomach one time. She was 

taken to the hospital by one of the witnesses. [¶] Based on . . . the 

public safety issue to the victim, to the other witnesses that were

in the home, and to the general public at large, the People would 

oppose [Paige’s release on his own recognizance] and/or bail.”

Noting Paige did not have any prior convictions for serious or 

violent felonies, the Deputy District Attorney asserted “th[e] 

charge alone in this incident poses a very severe public safety 

issue.”

The trial court ordered Paige to be held without bail. In so 

doing, the trial court stated: “Under Humphrey, I only have three 

alternatives: [release Paige on his own recognizance], set 

affordable bail, or detain [with] no bail after making a clear and 

convincing evidentiary finding. [¶] I’m not concerned about Mr. 

Paige coming back to court. . . . [F]light risk is not my concern 

here. And if flight risk were my concern, I would set some form of 

affordable bail. [¶] My concern here is that this is a completely 

unprovoked attempted murder. And that causes me a great deal 

of concern because I don’t have any way of preventing something 

like that from happening again. As [Paige’s] counsel concedes, 

there were drugs and maybe other substances involved. It was an 

unprovoked attack on a woman, and it was a use of deadly force. 

[¶] Based on that . . . [and In re Brown (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 296

(Brown)], the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

there are no less restrictive means to satisfy the purpose of 

ensuring public safety. And I will, therefore, enter a no bail order 

on this matter.”
6

The minute order for the August 16, 2022 hearing states 

the trial court made the following orders and findings: “Upon 

consideration of the relevant factors of the case and of the 

defendant, including the defendant’s ability to pay, the protection 

of the public and any complaining witness, the allegations and 

seriousness of the charged offense, the defendant’s previous 

criminal record and history of compliance with court orders, and 

the likelihood that the defendant will appear at future court 

proceedings, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

no less restrictive condition or combination of conditions of 

release will reasonably assure the safety of the public or victim 

and the defendant’s appearance in court.[ ]Defendant is to be 

detained with no bail.”

On September 28, 2022, Paige filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in the superior court. The superior court construed 

the petition as a petition for writ of mandate and denied it on 

December 8, 2022.

3

On January 27, 2023, Paige filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in this court, which was summarily denied on 

February 3, 2023. Paige then filed a petition for review in the 

California Supreme Court. Subsequently, on April 12, 2023, the 

Supreme Court granted Paige’s petition for review and 

transferred the case back to this court. Further, the Supreme 

Court directed this court to vacate the prior order denying Paige’s 

3 The superior court judge presiding over Paige’s bail review 

hearing was acting as a magistrate, and therefore her actions 

were reviewable by the superior court on mandamus. (See 

Magallan v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1453 

[“The superior court is the court with jurisdiction to review the 

actions of a magistrate and issue a writ of mandate to a 

magistrate”].) 
7

petition for writ of habeas corpus, and instructed this court to

issue an order directing the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Department “to show cause why [Paige] should not be granted a 

new bail review hearing on the basis that the superior court did 

not adequately set forth the reasons for its decision on the 

record[.]”

Per the Supreme Court’s instructions, on April 20, 2023, we 

vacated the prior order denying Paige’s petition for writ of habeas 

corpus and issued an order to show cause directed to the Sheriff’s 

Department. On May 18, 2023, the People, as real party in 

interest, filed a letter brief articulating their position on Paige’s

petition. Four days later, the Sheriff’s Department filed a 

response to our April 2023 order stating it “defers to the District 

Attorney with respect to all matters pertaining to [Paige’s] 

entitlement to bail[.]”

DISCUSSION

I. Governing Legal Principles and Standard of Review

“[D]efendants charged with noncapital offenses are 

generally entitled to bail. [Citations.] But article I, section 12 [of 

the California Constitution] provides for exceptions in particular 

circumstances when a defendant is charged with at least one 

felony offense.” (In re White (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455, 462 (White).) Of 

particular relevance here is the exception set forth in article I, 

section 12(b), that applies in cases of “[f]elony offenses involving 

acts of violence on another person . . . when the facts are evident 

or the presumption great and the court finds based upon clear 

and convincing evidence that there is a substantial likelihood the 

person’s release would result in great bodily harm to others[.]” 

(Cal. Const., art I, § 12, subd. (b).) 
8

“A person who falls within the article I, section 12(b) 

exception does not have a right to bail, yet may nonetheless be 

granted bail—or release on the person’s own recognizance—in the 

trial court’s discretion.” (White, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 469.) In

deciding whether to exercise its discretion to deny bail, the trial 

court must follow “the general framework governing bail 

determinations[ ]” set forth by our Supreme Court in Humphrey, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 152.

4 Preliminarily, that framework 

provides that “[w]hen making any bail determination, a superior 

court must undertake an individualized consideration of the 

relevant factors. These factors include the protection of the public 

as well as the victim, the seriousness of the charged offense, the 

arrestee’s previous criminal record and history of compliance 

with court orders, and the likelihood that the arrestee will appear 

at future court proceedings.” (Humphrey, supra, at p. 152.) “Along 

with those primary considerations of victim and public safety, the 

court must assume the truth of the criminal charges.” (Id. at p. 

153.)

Under Humphrey, “a trial court must first determine 

whether an arrestee is a flight risk or a danger to public or victim 

safety. If the arrestee does pose one or both of these risks, then 

the court should consider whether ‘nonfinancial conditions of 

4 We agree with our colleagues in the First District that 

“[a]lthough Humphrey involved a claim of excessive bail and not 

a denial of bail under [article 12,] section 12(b) as here, the 

generality with which Humphrey laid out the . . . requirement[s]”

discussed below “reasonably indicates the Supreme Court’s 

contemplation that its holding applies to all orders for pretrial 

detention under section 12(b).” (In re Harris (2021) 71 

Cal.App.5th 1085, 1096 (Harris), review granted March 9, 2022, 

S272632.) 
9

release may reasonably protect the public and the victim or 

reasonably assure the arrestee’s presence at trial.’” (Brown, 

supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 305, quoting Humphrey, supra, 11 

Cal.5th at p. 154.) “Although ‘no condition of release can entirely 

eliminate the risk that an arrestee may harm some member of 

the public,’ the [Humphrey] court observed, ‘[t]he experiences of 

those jurisdictions that have reduced or eliminated financial 

conditions of release suggest that releasing arrestees under 

appropriate nonfinancial conditions—such as electronic 

monitoring, supervision by pretrial services, community housing 

or shelter, stay-away orders, and drug and alcohol testing and 

treatment [citations]—may often prove sufficient to protect the 

community.’” (Brown, supra, at p. 305, quoting Humphrey, supra, 

at p. 154, original italics.)

“Having considered potential nonfinancial conditions, if the 

trial court nonetheless concludes money bail is ‘reasonably 

necessary’ to protect the public and ensure the arrestee’s 

presence at trial, then bail must be set ‘at a level the arrestee can 

reasonably afford’ unless the court concludes, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that no nonfinancial condition in 

conjunction with affordable money bail can reasonably protect 

public safety or arrestee appearance.” (Brown, supra, 76 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 305-306, quoting Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th 

at p. 154.) These requirements ensure pretrial detention “doesn’t 

depend on the arrestee’s financial condition. Rather, it depends 

on the insufficiency of less restrictive conditions to vindicate 

compelling government interests: the safety of the victim and the 

public more generally or the integrity of the criminal 

proceedings.” (Humphrey, supra, at p. 143.) 
10

“A court’s procedures for entering an order resulting in 

pretrial detention must also comport with other traditional 

notions of due process to ensure that when necessary, the 

arrestee is detained ‘in a fair manner.’ [Citations.] Among those 

fair procedures is the court’s obligation to set forth the reasons 

for its decision on the record and to include them in the court’s 

minutes. [Citation.] Such findings facilitate review of the 

detention order, guard against careless or rote decisionmaking, 

and promote public confidence in the judicial process.” 

(Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 155-156.) 

“[W]e review a trial court’s ultimate decision to deny bail 

for abuse of discretion. [Citations.] Under this standard, a trial 

court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and 

its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. [Citation.] An abuse 

of discretion occurs when the trial court, for example, is unaware 

of its discretion, fails to consider a relevant factor that deserves 

significant weight, gives significant weight to an irrelevant or 

impermissible factor, or makes a decision so arbitrary or 

irrational that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (White, 

supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 469-470.) 

II. Analysis

Paige contends the trial court erred by rescinding his bail 

because it did not comply with the requirements delineated in 

Humphrey. Specifically, he argues the court failed to: (1) analyze 

whether harm was reasonably likely to occur if he were released; 

(2) analyze whether less restrictive alternatives to detention 

would be insufficient to protect the government’s interest in 

ensuring the safety of the public and the victim; and (3) state on 

the record and in the minute order the reasons underlying its

finding that pretrial detention was required. As discussed below, 
11

we agree with Paige’s contentions and conclude the trial court did 

not comply with Humphrey in deciding to detain him without 

bail. 

With respect to his first point, Paige correctly observes the

trial court did not analyze whether the public and/or the victim 

would be at risk of harm if he were released. Instead, at the 

August 2022 hearing, the court stated: “My concern here is that 

this is a completely unprovoked attempted murder. And that 

causes me a great deal of concern because I don’t have any way of 

preventing something like that from happening again.” These 

comments show that, in rescinding bail, the trial court focused

largely on its asserted inability to completely prevent a similar 

incident from occurring. As noted above, however, the Humphrey

court observed: “[N]o condition of release can entirely eliminate 

the risk that an arrestee may harm some member of the public. 

[Citation.] In choosing between pretrial release and detention, we 

recognize that absolute certainty—particularly at the pretrial 

stage, when the trial meant to adjudicate guilt or innocence is yet 

to occur—will prove all but impossible.” (Humphrey, supra, 11 

Cal.5th at p. 154, original italics.) The Supreme Court therefore 

directed trial courts to “focus instead on risks to public or victim 

safety . . . that are reasonably likely to occur.” (Ibid.) Thus, the 

record reflects the trial court may have given “significant weight 

to an irrelevant or impermissible factor,” i.e., its inability to 

ensure with certainty the safety of the victim and the public, and 

thus abused its discretion in rescinding his bail. (White, supra, 9 

Cal.5th at p. 470.) 

With respect to Paige’s second and third arguments, 

Harris, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 1085, and Brown, supra, 76 

Cal.App.5th 296, are instructive. In Harris, the petitioner was 
12

implicated as the perpetrator of a violent rape. (Harris, supra, at 

p. 1091.) After the trial court set bail at $5 million, the petitioner 

filed a bail motion, arguing under Humphrey that he should be 

released on his own recognizance because he was indigent, and 

there was no indication he posed a flight or safety risk. (Id. at p. 

1092.) At the hearing on the motion, the petitioner, through 

counsel, argued he could not afford bail as set, and asked for 

release on his own recognizance with various nonfinancial 

conditions, such as a no contact order with the victim, Global 

Position System tracking, and limitation of his use of dating 

websites to address the People’s concern that his ongoing scarf 

fetish could lead him to engage in conduct similar to the actions

giving rise to the charges against him. (Id. at p. 1094.) The trial 

court denied the motion. (Ibid.) Thereafter, the petitioner sought 

a writ of habeas corpus in the appellate court. (Id. at p. 1091.)

The appellate court conditionally vacated the denial order

and remanded the case to the trial court. (Harris, supra, 71 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1109.) It noted that although the trial court did 

not expressly find less restrictive alternatives to detention would 

be insufficient to protect the government’s interests in public or 

victim safety and/or the arrestee’s appearance in court, “such a 

finding could be implicit and inferred from the record.” (Id. at p. 

1104.) The appellate court then held, however: “[E]ven though 

the general presumptions in favor of a judgment or order might

otherwise support a finding made sub silentio, Humphrey

specifically requires, as a matter of procedural due process, that a 

court entering a pretrial detention order set forth ‘the reasons for 

its decision on the record and to include them in the court’s 

minutes.’ [Citation.] Thus, the reasons supporting a denial of bail 

cannot be implied.’” (Id. at pp. 1104-1105.)
13

Subsequently, the appellate court determined the trial 

court did not satisfy the specified requirements. (Harris, supra, 

71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105.) Specifically, it noted the trial court 

“did not actually address any less restrictive alternatives to 

pretrial detention and did not articulate its analytical process as 

to why such alternatives could not reasonably protect the 

government’s interests.” (Ibid.) The appellate court ultimately

concluded: “[T]he [trial] court’s failure to articulate its evaluative 

process requires that we speculate as to why the court believed 

that no nonfinancial conditions could reasonably protect the 

interests in public or victim safety. As such, the record here does 

not permit meaningful appellate review.” (Ibid, fn. omitted.)

In Brown, the petitioner was charged with felony offenses 

after allegedly sexually abusing two children. (Brown, supra, 76 

Cal.App.5th at p. 299.) Bail was initially set at $1.45 million, but

was increased to $3.45 million after an amended felony complaint 

was filed. (Ibid.) At a subsequent hearing, the trial court reduced 

bail to $2.45 million. (Id. at p. 300.)

Several months later, the petitioner moved for release on 

his own recognizance, or, alternatively, reduced bail not 

exceeding $1,000. (Brown, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 300.)

Acknowledging he had been accused of serious and violent 

crimes, the petitioner maintained he was entitled to the relief 

sought because he was indigent and would accept nonfinancial 

conditions of release, including electronic monitoring, community 

housing, home detention, treatment and education programs, a 

pretrial case manager, and a protective order. (Ibid.) The trial 

court denied the motion, finding “‘there are no lesser means of 

protecting the public, in that [the offenses] seemed to be done in 

the home with family members, [and] the court can’t stop family 
14

members from seeing the defendant.’” (Id. at p. 301.) The 

petitioner then challenged the trial court’s ruling by filing a 

petition for writ of mandate in the appellate court, which the 

court treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Ibid.)

The appellate court granted the petition and remanded the 

case to the trial court to conduct a new bail hearing consistent 

with Humphrey. (Brown, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 309.) In 

arriving at this conclusion, the Brown court explained: “Here, 

there was no evidence proffered in the trial court to support the 

contention that harm to the public was reasonably likely to occur 

if [the petitioner] were released. The trial court failed to address 

any of the specific nonfinancial conditions proposed by [the 

petitioner] or to indicate, even in general, why nonfinancial 

conditions of release (such as a stay away or no contact order, 

home detention, electronic monitoring[,] or surrender of [the 

petitioner’s] class A driver’s license) would be insufficient to 

protect the victims or the public or obviate the risk of flight. On 

this record we cannot conclude there was sufficient evidence to 

support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that less

restrictive alternatives to detention could not reasonably protect 

the public or victim safety.” (Id. at p. 307.)

Here, as in Harris and Brown, Paige expressed willingness 

to comply with any and all nonfinancial conditions of release, 

including stay away and no contact orders, relocation to Los 

Angeles or Palmdale, electronic monitoring, and participation in 

residential drug treatment. (See Harris, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 1094; see also Brown, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 300.)

Subsequently, in deciding pretrial detention was necessary, the 

trial court expressed concern the charge stemmed from “an 

unprovoked attack” involving “drugs and maybe other 
15

substances[,]” and “f[ound] by clear and convincing evidence that 

there are no less restrictive means to satisfy the purpose of 

ensuring public safety.” In so doing, however, the court did not

“address any of the specific nonfinancial conditions proposed by

[Paige.]” (Brown, supra, at p. 307; see also Harris, supra, at p. 

1105.) And, while the court noted its concerns with the 

“unprovoked” nature of the shooting and Paige’s involvement 

with “drugs and maybe other substances[,]” it did not “articulate 

its analytical process” connecting those concerns to its finding 

that all potential less restrictive alternatives to detention, 

including those suggested by Paige, were insufficient to protect 

the government’s interest in public safety. (Harris, supra, at p. 

1105.) Nor did the court explain its “evaluative process” in the

minute order. (Ibid.) There, the trial court represented it

considered the factors discussed in Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th 

at pp. 152-153, but did not explain how it applied the facts in this 

case to its analysis of those factors to conclude pretrial detention 

was warranted. Further, here, as in Brown, there was no 

evidence proffered or presented at the August 2022 hearing to 

support a finding that no less restrictive alternatives would 

adequately ensure public safety. (See Brown, supra, at p. 307.)

Based on this record, we cannot conclude the trial court 

“ma[d]e an individualized determination that . . . detention is 

necessary to protect victim or public safety[.]” (Humphrey, supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 156.) Nor can we conclude the court “set forth the

reasons for its decision on the record and . . . include[d] them in 

[the] minutes.” (Id. at p. 155.) Instead, the record demonstrates

that in rescinding Paige’s bail, the trial court “fail[ed] to consider 

a relevant factor that deserves significant weight,” i.e., the 

sufficiency or insufficiency of less restrictive alternatives to 
16

vindicate the government’s interests in victim and public safety

(White, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 470), and did not follow the “fair 

procedures” that ensure the entry of “an order resulting in 

pretrial detention . . . comport[s] with . . . traditional notions of 

due process[.]” (Humphrey, supra, at p. 155.) 

In sum, for the reasons discussed above, the record reflects 

the trial court did not comply with the requirements set forth in 

Humphrey when deciding to hold Paige without bail. Accordingly,

we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in rescinding 

Paige’s bail, and that Paige is entitled to a new bail review

hearing conducted in a manner consistent with Humphrey and its 

progeny. (See Harris, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1106, 1109; 

see also Brown, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 309.)5

5 In light of this conclusion, we need not address Paige’s 

argument that, pursuant to In re Alberto (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 

421, the trial court, who did not preside over the arraignment 

and did not issue the order initially setting bail at $1.2 million,

“lacked the authority to overrule the arraignment court’s bail 

order[ ]” because “[a] judge cannot . . . overturn another judge’s 

bail order based on facts already considered by the first judge[.]”
17

DISPOSITION

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. The Los 

Angeles Superior Court is directed to vacate its August 16, 2022 

order denying Paige’s motion for formal bail review hearing and 

rescinding his bail. The court is further directed to hold a new 

hearing, where it shall consider, and render findings on, Paige’s 

bail in a manner consistent with Humphrey and its progeny, as 

well as this court’s opinion. We decline Paige’s requests for other 

relief, including his request to be released from custody, and 

express no opinion on his entitlement to bail or any other relief.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, P. J.

We concur: 

COLLINS, J.

MORI, J.